

Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century

EDITED BY LOUIS DE SAUSSURE AND PETER SCHULZ

DISCOURSE APPROACHES TO
POLITICS, SOCIETY AND CULTURE



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Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century

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Volume 17

Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century: Discourse, language, mind

Edited by Louis de Saussure and Peter Schulz

Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century

Discourse, language, mind

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Foreword

Preview by review

Frans van Eemeren
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Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century: Discourse, Language, Mind is an impressive title. I think that this is due to the daring combination of vast fields of scholarship (Discourse, Language, Mind) and a complicated research subject that is so obviously socially significant (Manipulation and Ideology). Or am I just taken in by a rhetorically effective choice of book title? Let me try to find out by taking a closer look at the contents of this volume.

During the past decades, ‘critical discourse analysts’, such as Teun A. van Dijk, Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, have made a substantial contribution to the study of the forms and functions of ideological discourse. As Eddo Rigotti recalls in this volume, van Dijk, for one, singled out a series of ‘ideological discourse structures’ and described them in *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach* (1998). In this endeavour, van Dijk connected the notion of ‘manipulation’ with the fact that dominant groups can to a certain extent succeed in persuading other people to adopt an ideology that does not sustain their own interests but those of the dominant ones. Rigotti rightly observes that the concept of manipulation is thus placed at the centre of the process of reproduction and inculcation of ideologies. He immediately adds that van Dijk does not formally define this concept.

For an argumentation theorist as I am, manipulation is even more a subject of primary interest than the broader concept of ideology. I remember that a long time ago my late colleague Rob Grootendorst and I even volunteered a cautious remark about manipulation, when we were making an effort to characterize argumentation as a complex speech act (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984). We associated manipulation with one of the ‘sincerity conditions’ of

argumentation. The sincerity condition we had in mind is violated if a proposition is presented as an acceptable justification or refutation of a standpoint while the speaker or writer does not really believe that it constitutes an acceptable defence. In such cases, we observed, the speaker or writer who performs the (complex) speech act of argumentation is guilty of a form of misleading that amounts to an attempt at manipulation. Whether or not the listener or reader is aware of the ‘infelicity’ of the justification or refutation, he or she is always entitled to hold the speaker or writer responsible for having pretended to offer a justification or refutation, as the case may be (1984: 46). This is why we renamed Searle’s sincerity conditions as *responsibility conditions*.

I realize, of course, that our observation concerning manipulative argumentation is, at best, a tiny contribution to the study of manipulation, if only because it dates back from 1984, so that it must be part of some Old Perspective on manipulative discourse. It is at any rate clear that we did not provide the definition of manipulation that Rigotti misses. And in this, Rigotti is not alone. Although most contributors to this volume point to the fact that manipulation is, in the words of Daniel Weiss, an “omnipresent phenomenon”, which has, according to the Introduction by Louis de Saussure and Peter Schulz, “fuzzy borders” and involves “very heterogeneous aspects”, these authors conclude at the same time more or less univocally that a satisfactory definition of manipulation is still lacking.

When thinking about the meaning of the related words ‘manipulation’ and ‘to manipulate’, my first association was, in fact, with the manual tricks of a juggler. At the same time, of course, I realised there is more to this concept. My *Advanced Learner’s Dictionary* – always ready to lend a helping hand – teaches me that, basically, the verb ‘manipulate’ has two distinct meanings: (1) operate, handle with skill, and (2) manage or control somebody or something skilfully or craftily, especially by using one’s influence or unfair methods. The first, more harmless, meaning seems to prevail in observations such as Paul Danler’s that manipulation is, at least to a certain degree, inherent in language in use. In the same vein, Rigotti regards all communication as in itself manipulative because it aims at changing, and thus somehow at manipulating, the behaviour of others. The only way for communication not to be manipulative, he says, “would be for it not to be effective”. Like Louis de Saussure, I am inclined to call skilful communication of a proposition that is believed to be correct by the speakers or writers themselves *manipulation in a weaker sense*.

The contributors to *Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century: Discourse, Language, Mind* would not only like to have a clear-cut definition of manipulation but are also in particular interested in the second, and

stronger, meaning of managing or controlling somebody or something skilfully or craftily *but unfairly*. They call for a more precise stipulating extension of a lexical definition as provided in the second part of the description in my dictionary. Regina Blass, for one, misses a ‘technical term’ that defines exactly what we want to include in manipulation, and Paul Chilton warns that defining manipulation ‘in the abstract’ will probably not get us very far because the ordinary understanding of this term may not be theoretically coherent. This requires a more detailed examination of the characteristics that are to be included in a definition of manipulation that is theoretically adequate. Let me give a few pertinent examples of the distinctive features the contributors to this volume attribute to manipulation *in the stronger sense* in characterising the subject matter of their studies.

However obvious it may seem, it is important to note that the phenomenon of manipulation is always situated in a context of *communication*. In this volume the manipulative communication that is examined is, as a rule, conducted verbally, whether orally or in writing, but this does not seem a principal and necessary constraint. In their Introduction, de Saussure and Schulz point to a more important feature of manipulative communication, i.e., the fact that such discourse implies an *asymmetrical relation* between the two parties involved. I am not entirely sure whether I agree with their claim that this asymmetrical relation always means that the speaker or writer has at least some power over the addressee but I certainly agree with the need for including another important feature in the characterisation of manipulative discourse, i.e., that the manipulation is *intentional* on the part of the speaker or writer. As Blass correctly observes, manipulation cannot happen by accident.

Another crucial characteristic of manipulative discourse is that the speaker’s or writer’s intention is always *covert*. Rigotti phrases this very subtly by pronouncing that a manipulative strategy “must largely escape the awareness of the manipulated subject”. The need for this hidden intention is immediately connected with another feature generally ascribed to manipulative discourse, i.e., that it is aimed at *deceiving the addressee* in some way or another. In order to be successful, this “deliberate deception”, as Jürgen Wilke chooses to call it, must remain hidden. Some authors conclude, perhaps a little too hastily, that this means that the manipulator is necessarily always *insincere*.

As to the question of what the manipulative deception exactly aims to achieve, various answers are given in this volume. Rigotti phrases his answer most succinctly: “to induce into error”. Saussure is much more specific: “to have the hearer [or reader] adopt a behaviour consistent with the manipulator’s interest”. It is my impression that most other authors tend to agree with the

inclusion of an *interest dimension* in the characterisation of manipulation. By itself, however, this inclusion is not enough. In valuing communicative practice, there is a vital difference between cases of convincing the addressee of a standpoint that serves the arguer's interest by means of sound argumentation and cases of getting the addressee to adopt one's position by means of manipulation. The difference becomes clearer when we take account of other features of manipulation mentioned earlier, such as covert intention and deception. To complete the characterisation of manipulation in a satisfactory way, however, one more characteristic should certainly be added: the means that are used in the manipulative discourse to achieve the desired effect are not 'rationally acceptable' or, as I prefer to phrase it, *not in agreement with generally acknowledged critical standards of reasonableness*. These general standards are reflected in remarks made by several contributors to this volume that being subjected to manipulation means that, rather than receiving all necessary and relevant information, the addressee receives unnecessary and irrelevant information. Saussure summarizes this essential characteristic nicely by saying that manipulation is about "blocking one's rational device".

In sum, manipulation in discourse boils down to intentionally deceiving one's addressees by persuading them of something that is foremost in one's own interest through the covert use of communicative devices that are not in agreement with generally acknowledged critical standards of reasonableness. It goes without saying that these devices can be more or less sophisticated and can be part of a more comprehensive strategy. Along these lines, most contributors to this volume set out to examine, like Weiss, the range of linguistic manipulative devices characteristic of political discourse or to construct, like Rigotti, a typology of manipulative devices. In the process, Saussure suggests that there is a "central mechanism" of manipulation through discursive strategies, the "trouble-and-resolution device", which consists in "causing trouble in the hearer's understanding procedure and offering resolutions of that trouble".

Blass lists a number of linguistic techniques used in manipulation, such as omission, minimization, exaggeration, repetition, distortion, figurative speech, connotative or substandard language and emotional appeal. Danler concentrates on how it is possible to manipulate in political speech by omitting "complements", on what the pragmatic functions of such omissions are and on whether the omissions can be discursive strategies. Saussure, sensibly, adds that manipulation is not about using metaphors, particular syntactic structures or specific semantic features of quantifiers, but about making them play a particular role at the pragmatic level. According to Blass, two "basic ways" can be distinguished of influencing people and making them believe and do what one

wants them to do: *testimony* and *argumentation*. If testimony is given with a deceptive goal that is not made overt, it is manipulative. Argumentation is often used to gain the trust of the addressee that is needed for the acceptance of testimony. Argumentation serves to determine “whether the claims are warranted, or grounded in evidence and inferences that are themselves acceptable and hence constitute good reasons for the claim”. In turn, argumentation itself can, of course, also be a tool to deceive and manipulate.

Now argumentation has been brought in so emphatically, I cannot resist adding a few extra remarks of my own. They connect well with several observations made in this volume, in particular by Saussure, Kienpointner and Rigotti. To my great satisfaction, Saussure points to the manipulative use of fallacious argumentative devices. Manfred Kienpointner discusses instances of well-known argument schemes, such as the “pragmatic argument” and “illustrative examples”, and the formulation of these arguments with the help of metaphors and hyperbolic exaggerations. In his fine essay, Rigotti proposes to use the notion of ‘strategic manoeuvring’, as developed by Peter Houtlosser and me, for tackling the vital question of how in manipulative discourse “what is negative” can be “somehow disguised as something positive” and go unnoticed (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002). We understand strategic manoeuvring as the management of argumentative discourse to maintain the balance between pursuing one’s ‘rhetorical objective’ of having one’s own position accepted and complying at the same time with one’s professed ‘dialectical objective’ of resolving a difference of opinion in a reasonable way. Precisely because the same modes of strategic manoeuvring can often be used in a perfectly legitimate way but can also derail into fallaciousness by overstepping the boundaries of critical reasonableness, in argumentative practice their fallacious variants may easily appear convincing and pass unnoticed. As the tricky demarcation problems involved in distinguishing between legitimate uses of argumentation from authority and perpetrating the fallacy of *argumentum ad verecundiam* may illustrate, the Jekyll and Hyde portrayal of the relationship between sound and fallacious as complete opposites is often too simple. There is a close link, by the way, between this observation and Saussure’s observation that in manipulative discourse “normal cognitive abilities (with respect to the presumption of relevance and other cooperative principles) are simply exploited by the manipulator”.

This volume makes clear that besides argumentation theory there are a great many other theoretical angles from which manipulation can be approached. In their Introduction, de Saussure and Schulz mention the epistemological problem ensuing from this precarious luxury of how “apparently

incompatible theories can be put to some sort of interplay". Apart from the old linguistic and semantic traditions, text linguistics, (critical) discourse analysis and speech act theory have come into play. Weiss, for one, makes use of the lexicographic framework of the Moscow Semantic School. Linguists like Andrea Rocci tackle the problems of coherence or consistency in manipulative discourse in a pragmatic way. In recent times, Gricean pragmatics has developed into a powerful cognitive linguistic approach, which can be put to good use in analysing manipulative strategies, as Paul Chilton's excellent contribution demonstrates. The important cognitive approach inspired by Sperber and Wilson's prominent 'relevance theory' has had a major impact on many of the contributions to this volume, such as those by Blass and Saussure. They typically deal with the interpretive process in relation with extra-linguistic contextual features.

Nicholas Allott explains that in manipulative discourse "key information about the misused term is not arrived at by the hearer", but this information "can be accessed if some re-analysis is undertaken". Saussure claims that according to relevance theory a specific device in the mind is dedicated to the detection of intentions: the "mindreading device". He adds that the role of such a device is the same in any variant of the theory of mind (which he views as a form of 'popular psychology'). According to Rigotti, we also have to expect a significant contribution in terms of empirical evidence and enriching insight from socio-psychological research on persuasion such as Daniel O'Keefe's. As regards the variety of possible theoretical approaches to manipulation in discourse this volume has a lot to offer!

The proposed approaches in *Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century: Discourse, Language, Mind* are in many cases illustrated by examples taken from public discourse within totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. Blass considers the manipulation by the Nazis. The press instructions of the Nazi government (and the German Democratic Republic) are central in Wilke's essay. Carlos Inchaurrealde concentrates on the former Chilean dictator Pinochet and Cornelia Ilie on Ceaușescu's speeches at Romanian Communist Party meetings. Weiss presents a comparative description of the propagandistic discourse in the Stalinist Soviet Union and the Third Reich. Allott examines contemporary political discourse in the western world and Kienpointner contemporary populism in Europe, focussing on potentially racist propaganda. Blass opines that manipulation plays an increasing role in many areas of our life, such as advertising, religion and politics. Weiss adds the useful reminder that it may well turn out that "the essence of totalitarianism does not lie in its subtle persuasive tricks but in its power to overwhelm the audience".

The editors of this volume, de Saussure and Schulz, express their concern about the rise and power of extreme and fanatic ideologies. This leads to the important question of what can be done against it. De Saussure thinks that religion, when it is not itself used as a totalitarian ideology, is to count among the efficient counter-powers to manipulation, since the psychological “throne” of an exclusive God is then already occupied. Another kind of protection is to identify the manipulative intention that resides in the “god-like” image or a related “super-competent” image of the speaker or writer. People are less prone to manipulative discourse “when they are aware of some of the central mechanisms involved”. A critical evaluation can prevent someone from being a victim of manipulative discourse. As Saussure and Schulz emphasize, analysis helps to provide “a higher degree of awareness”. Just like Blass, most contemporary discourse analysts tend to agree with this vision and consider analysing manipulative discourse as producing a “control filter”. Our task, Rigotti claims, is not “a moral evaluation, but a critical analysis aiming at discovering manipulative processes [...] to prevent our contemporary society from repeating the errors of the past.”

Kienpointner, when studying Le Pen, Haider, Bossi and the likes, does not want to deal so much with their worldview, but with the way in which they argue to persuade others to accept this worldview. He stresses that his critical analysis is not directed at the content of various ideological traditions but rather at the way in which people argue in favour of their positions. Kienpointner emphasizes that there are standards of argumentation that are generally accepted across differing ideological positions, like the principle of non-contradiction and the need of avoiding overly aggressive personal attacks, the need to a correct application of plausible argument schemes, and the need to ensure clarity of formulation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, 2004). It goes without saying that I could not agree more. In their Introduction, our editors, however, have put in a useful cautionary note. Behind any ‘critical control device’, any ‘mindreading device’, they warn us, there are profound affective aspects of interpersonal relationship: “Quite unfortunately, love is also blind regarding the problem of influencing the other’s thoughts and beliefs.”

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Introduction

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The sciences of language and pragmatics in particular are crucially concerned with the fact that the cognitive representations of the individuals involved in a discursive interaction evolve through time. They change, are replaced by others, new ones are created, others are erased, etc. These changes that take place in the mind, particularly in the addressee's mind when he processes any given discourse, are changes in the individual's *cognitive environment*, to use a convenient expression (taken from Sperber and Wilson): his set of manifest assumptions.

Mental changes produced by discourse interpretation are a consequence of intentional and unintentional uses of language by the speaker. In standard cases of conversation, these mental changes are achieved through benevolent respect of unconscious principles of discourse or conversation. Such principles are identified in linguistics and pragmatics through various concepts: the Gricean principle of cooperation, the presumption of relevance, and other principles within speech act approaches, within trends of sociolinguistics, from Labovian approaches to discourse analysis and cognitive linguistics, and within many frameworks in social psychology and theory of communication.

Whenever the speaker is not benevolent in one way or another, one may be tempted to say that he *manipulates* the addressee. If he is not benevolent, he intends to operate changes in the hearer's mind without respecting the tacit contract in which participants of a dialogue are presumably engaged, thus without providing the hearer with all the necessary and relevant information: it is therefore a case of covert intentionality.

But such a statement, despite its intuitive soundness, requires much nuancing. It is firstly unclear which properties of the speaker are concerned with the notion of benevolence. If being benevolent is making cooperative use of

gricean maxims, then the parent telling his child about Santa Claus could be seen as not benevolent in some way. But he is not manipulative, at least not intuitively. Even the parent is probably not really *lying* to the child, although he makes the addressee believe in a proposition which is false and known to be so by the speaker. We might mention also the old dispute about truth-conditions of sentences with violation of existential presupposition: “Santa Claus travels on a flying sledge” is certainly not a lie, because it is true in the considered fictitious world. What can be considered wrong is to be found on another level: the fact that the existential presupposition can be assumed to be true in the reality by the child instead of in the fictitious world may be considered as problematic. However, again, it would be counter-intuitive that the parent telling the child about Santa Claus is performing manipulation.

Arguably, the parent telling the child about Santa Claus does not seek any benefit nor expect any advantage for himself from the child’s belief in Santa Claus. This aspect is also central as far as manipulation is concerned.

If a parent, however, tells the child to go out for a walk in search for Santa Claus, the parent’s intention being that the child does some walking instead of staying in front of the TV set, because walking is good for the health or whatever other reason, the question of manipulation is raised again. Is the parent manipulating the child? One would be reluctant to say so, although it seems at first glance that the intuitive main conditions for manipulation are fulfilled: a lie, and an intention to make the addressee adopt some specific behaviour according to the speaker’s desire.

Now, if the parent says: “Go and have a look in the attic: Santa Claus may be there” in order to watch the news quietly while the child goes up in the hope of meeting Santa, our intuition is that the parent has actually manipulated the child. There seems then to be another condition for manipulation, one of *benefit*. However, as all the papers gathered in this volume show, the questions surrounding the problem of manipulation in discourse are very complex. For example, what about the father saying to the child: “Go and have a look in the attic, there’s a present there for you”, when the utterance is true (there is actually a present), but the intention of the father remains to watch TV without disturbance for a while? And what if the present was precisely put in the attic in anticipation of this situation?

The question of manipulative discourse requires much attention to:

- the kind of communicated material;
- the ways in which communication is achieved (including the ‘packaging’: formal aspects of sentence semantics and syntax);

- the intentions of the speaker and the recovery of these intentions by the addressee;
- the sincerity of the addressee's consent to the propositions conveyed.

Of course, other crucial problems must be considered when studying manipulation. Among the theoretical questions addressed in this volume are the following:

- Precisely which phenomena should be tackled under the label 'manipulation'?
- What tools allow for the identification of manipulative discourse?
- What links can be assumed between morphology, syntax, semantics and pragmatics when they all converge in building up a manipulative discourse?
- Are there several types of linguistic / discursive manipulative behaviours?
- Do specific problems of coherence and of logic appear exclusively in manipulative discourses?
- How can apparently incompatible theories (for example cognitive theories *vs.* psychosocial theories, objectivist approaches *vs.* anti-objectivist approaches, formal models *vs.* informal trends, etc.) be made to interact on this topic?
- What kind of speech act is performed when manipulating?

The problem of manipulation in discourse, or of *manipulative discourse*, obviously has very fuzzy borders, as shown in the former example of Santa Claus, and involve extremely heterogeneous aspects.

Over the years following the fall of the great totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century, in particular Nazism, the question of manipulative discourse was of fundamental concern. Observing that critical numbers of individuals followed totalitarian discourse and seemed to be convinced by it, human rationality seemed to be put in serious danger, as if irrational consent was stronger than rational analysis of the speeches heard, the press read, the images seen (which is not surprising, considering that Nazi discourse traditionally favoured 'instinctive' feelings against misleading rationality, although this was not a wholly consistent attitude, as Weiss recalls in this volume).

A whole tradition of studies on manipulation concentrated on emotion-sharing, and thus in *mass* phenomena of emotional behaviour, using the tools of the Freudian tradition; psychosocial analysts are still providing the field with a great deal of fundamental insights into the phenomenon of manipulation. The spreading of emotions and the success of mass influence was, in the twen-

tieth century, marked by the arrival of a whole set of novel technologies in communication and persuasion. As noticed and commented upon by scholars in the group of Ludwig Jäger in Köln, these tools were first used within Nazi propaganda. There is no doubt about the important role played by these aspects. These are widely documented. However, approaches of the more rationalist side, we notice, have much to say about manipulation through language. We have the impression that the contribution of these frameworks is likely to shed new light (and potentially converge with more psychosocial trends) on a field of study which is undergoing a renewal of interest among linguists and scholars of social science.

For the philological tradition, the phenomenon of propaganda and manipulation was soon linked to the problem of language being used *in a certain way* by the producer of manipulative discourse, and of the idiom being intentionally altered and modified (as with Orwell's 'Newspeak' in 1984). Probably the most well-known scholar who focused his attention on language change in totalitarian regimes was the German philologist Viktor Klemperer, who typologised day by day in his secret diary the ways in which the Nazi regime adapted the German lexicon with new words and new formulations, in order to create new concepts spreading over the society by being endlessly repeated (see Klemperer, *Lingua Tertii Imperii*) and by other means of belief-enforcement such as group pressure. This book also became popular in Eastern Germany, but there are good grounds to think that it was famous there in particular because it revealed a number of practices that were also dear to Communist regimes.

The work of Klemperer not only pointed out that some discourses are suspect, and that therefore some *organisations of thought* are suspect. The main consequence of his book may well be that *there is a way to show* that such discourses and thoughts are problematic; this way is *rigorous analysis* of the discourse, its contents and its packaging, and therefore of the communicated material, allowing for the detection of deceptive intentions. The fundamental questions of the type of analysis to be pursued, and of the appropriate tools, remained nonetheless open.

The hypothesis lying behind the necessity of identifying the indices of a manipulative discourse is that analysis helps to provide a higher degree of *awareness*, which can in turn prevent the hearer from being the victim of such a discourse. The goals of most trends in contemporary discourse analysis relate to this vision where analysis is producing a 'control filter' between the interpretation of discourse and its evaluation, particularly – but not exclusively – of *well-formedness*.

The theoretical trend known as *Critical Discourse Analysis* adopts this very position, and suggests various devices and practical tools dedicated to the identification of manipulative practices, within a framework linking to French Marxists structuralists like Louis Althusser. Since the works of Fairclough on discourse, politics and ideology, Critical Discourse Analysis is a main reference for scholars interested in manipulation. Several authors in this volume pursue their work in relation to this framework. Works in *Cognitive Linguistics*, following in particular recent advances from Chilton and Lakoff, consider the possibility of some cognitive module dedicated to critical analysis of discourse, which would be disrupted by manipulative discourse (see Paul Chilton's paper in this book). Within *Cognitive Pragmatics* (Relevance theory), a related suggestion is made: the general 'mindreading' module (in Baron Cohen's sense in contemporary research in cognitive psychopathology) does not work properly when processing manipulative discourse, since the detection of intentions is not adequately achieved. These lines of thought are typically pragmatic: they concern the interpretive process itself with regard to extra-linguistic (contextual) features, as suggested by Blass, Allott and Saussure in their papers.

We have just stated that a critical reading can prevent someone from being a victim of manipulative discourse. But what does it mean exactly to be a victim of a manipulative discourse? Is it enough to say that the hearer consents sincerely to false propositions, for example? Surely not: see the former discussion on Santa Claus. And even: to what extent does it make sense to speak about someone being the *victim* of some *discourse* which itself has the property of being manipulative? And if that makes sense in a way or another, one has to answer the fundamental issue of the formal aspects of manipulative discourse, if there are any.

A long history of linguistic and semantic descriptive traditions attempted to approach the problems of the formal aspects of manipulative discourse. The classical studies on this topic in the post-war decades (see Saussure in this volume for a summary) have focused on quantitative aspects – consciously or unconsciously. They provide wide documentation showing that some formal aspects in sentence-construction such as lexical combinations on mutually strengthening items (in particular in the Russian school of semantics, where the notion of lexical function is of great use), and others, are *particularly often* found in totalitarian propaganda. None of these manipulative tricks has been shown to be strictly exclusive to manipulative discourse, whatever definition may be assumed (or not assumed, for theories that refrain from adopting any working definition). The question of manipulation is not solved by such trends, but a critical point was reached when a sufficient number of elements

were developed to allow for detection of suspicious discourses. Then, together with the development of text linguistics and discourse analysis, where the notion of *coherence* gained success among pragmaticists, the question of the formal parameters leading to the identification of manipulative discourse at the macrostructural level opened the way for new insights in the domain. Trends in formal logic (in particular theories dealing with logical fallacies in discourse, in particular Argumentation Theory) play a major role in tackling problems of coherence, or, one should say, consistency in discourses, identifying problems of the well-formedness of the reasoning presented in a specific discourse.

Adding to these approaches the developments of inferential studies of discourse and of pragmatic frameworks, there seems now to be a wide array of tools on offer, which can be used to tackle the issue of manipulative discourse. However, the question of manipulative discourse, in particular ideological, still remains very open: the state of the art in this domain of study shows how poor interaction between trends in this field has hitherto been, and how much is left to be done in order to coordinate scholars' efforts towards a better understanding of a phenomenon that plunged whole peoples into totalitarianism, a phenomenon which is perhaps undergoing a resurgence in some Western countries, and which is widely used in order to lead the individual towards the consumption of a product or towards the passive acceptance of some abnormal situation.

We noticed however that approaches with very different (and sometimes incompatible) epistemological backgrounds could provide comparable conclusions. In order to understand more precisely what the common lines of thoughts could possibly be among different theories, and what conclusions seem to be shared cross-theoretically, we organised a conference on the topic of manipulation where scholars representing a great variety of approaches were to gather and identify the places where they meet and the places where they do not (*International Symposium on Manipulation in the Totalitarian Ideologies of the Twentieth Century*, Ascona, Switzerland, Sept.–Oct. 2002). This book presents a selection of talks delivered on this occasion. It needs to be clear, though, that mainstream research on the topic of manipulation is psychosocial. Most scholars in this volume present contributions with other starting points in the idea of cross-fertilisation of approaches.

Among the conclusions that finally seem to some extent consensual are the following:

- Manipulative discourse implies an asymmetrical relation between the speaker and the hearer, where the manipulator has in particular the prop-

erties of (i) having at least some *power* over the addressee, (ii) is to some extent *insincere*, and (iii) leads the manipulated to believe *false* propositions (keeping in mind that *falsity* is a very complex problem). Conversely, the manipulated is (i) *confident*, (ii) has a presumption of the *sincerity* (or cooperation), of the *relevance* (more or less in the sense of the theory of that name) and of the *truthfulness* of the speaker (who is assumed to know the truth better than the addressee).

- Manipulative discourse implies problems of discourse organisation at the micro- and macrostructural levels, which concern both the individual psychological level of interpretation (this is, the role played by some rhetorical devices and which deals directly with pragmatic understanding and rationality) and the social level of discourse construction, by means of semiotic devices, cultural key-words, metaphors, networks of interrelated conventionalised significations and so on.

Of course, lines of convergence must not hide dialogue difficulties. These remain significant between approaches that assume the need for a working definition of manipulation, following the hypothetic-deductive method prevailing in popperian or post-popperian approaches to science (who see the study of language as a domain of the natural sciences), and the ones that focus first on data, rejecting any type of *a priori* definition or of any neutral, objective, standpoint (approaches which generally view language as primarily social, in the tradition of phenomenology). Our belief is however that these obstacles can be and should be considered in a perspective of serene collaboration and cross-fertilization.

Most papers in this book have a strong focus on theoretical aspects; when illustrating the proposed approaches by examples, these are generally taken from public discourse within Nazism and other totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. However, Kienpointner's paper opens the discussion to contemporary populism in Europe (right-wing extremists), and Allott's paper discusses contemporary political discourse in the Western world (in particular in the U.S. administration).

It is likely that for some time individuals in the Western world were more permeable to manipulation, since it may seem to less informed people that propaganda was dead and buried, left in the graves of history after the world was freed from Hitler and, much later, from the Soviet regime. Of course, these regimes were the champions of manipulative propaganda, but we all know how much propaganda is achieved everyday in order to promote all kinds of ideas.

Before the fall of the Iron Curtain, we can say, assuming of course a rather strong simplification, that the world had two main poles – with the third world being ideologically ambiguous. In both promoted ideologies, values of *better living* were put ahead in discourses and in other sorts of communication: each side was to communicate that the correct social model was its own. Of course, the free world was legitimately fighting Communist totalitarianism, promoting in particular free speech and opinion over censorship and political repression, and the ‘American dream’ over the material mediocrity of living in the East. But still, on the Soviet side, the official discourse was intended to convince the audience that Communism is a better system, in particular a fairer one, avoiding the heavy trade-offs of American capitalism for the lower classes. These trade-offs were easy to show, and are still a powerful instrument of Cuban diplomacy in the rooms of the United Nations, for example (particularly during the sessions of the Commission on Human Rights). It is of course interesting to notice that, in this respect, propaganda relied on a number of true matters, leading to half-truths (as Blass’ paper in this volume about Nazi propaganda recalls).

Now that the Iron Curtain has fallen down, it is possible to imagine that manipulation is a souvenir of previous bad times: without ideological bipolarity, it could be thought that political discourse throughout the world had become one of normal, fair, rational and serene argumentation and conviction, lowering the obsession of *Realpolitik* in the measure of the lowering of ideological and economic threats. But it is trivial to underline how different the facts are. Dividing the world between, again, a manicheist vision – the democratic nations and ‘rogue states’ forming an ‘axis of Evil’ – it is quite obvious that manipulative argumentation is again reaching a quite high level of activity in Western political discourse (and Europe is certainly not that different from the U.S. in several respects). But most of all, one can notice the impressive and frightening growth and power of extreme and fanatic ideologies cultivating values of death, where killing is an acceptable action that can be committed against the ‘other’: the unfaithful to Allah, the Westerner, the ‘Great Satan’ or whatever other denomination showing that the old division, where the ‘other’ is no more a human being deserving respect, is more and more active again: life seems a secondary value with respect to ideology, in particular religious fanatic ideology (but blind faith in the Western model of government and its associated system of values is also the source of ideological and condemnable behaviours, as seen in the news every day). Whole sets of individuals, particularly the young and uneducated, are seduced by such fanatical discourses, which are of course highly manipulative, deserving close examination and analysis. In fact, it may seem that these discourses are odd and stupid, but then, how do they achieve

such successes? Of course, social aspects are very important – poverty, corrupted power, instability. But this is far from an adequate explanation, since not all poor and instable countries automatically give rise to such high degrees of fanatic manipulation – not to mention fanaticism in stable countries.

If manipulation is about gaining *sincere consent* on the part of the hearer to propositions that are manifestly false to the speaker, and that lead to some intended behaviour and support from the hearer, quite often it does not only imply a pragmatic discrepancy between the speaker and the hearer. Crucially, it also involves *emotions*, in particular affectivity, which in turns triggers confidence. Many devices are dedicated to the achievement of confidence on the part of the addressee, among them the personality cult, where the speaker's image is one of over-competence, benevolence and caring. Behind any critical control device, any mindreading device, there are profound affective aspects of interpersonal relationships. Quite unfortunately, love is also blind regarding the problem of *being under the influence* of the other's thoughts and beliefs.

The articles in this book do not generally address these last types of worries directly, which remain for further interdisciplinary works, but aim at capturing the most critical properties of manipulative discourse and suggest ways towards an explanation. Most of them have particularly strong theoretical consequences and propose epistemological and methodological discussions, and a number of them attempt to use the tools provided by theories of 'normal' discourse on the biased form of communication that takes place in manipulative discourse. Their contributions help open the research on the topics towards new and, we think, promising perspectives in pragmatics and discourse analysis.

Analytical summary

Paul Chilton (*University of East Anglia*) addresses the case of *Mein Kampf* from the hypothesis that a manipulative discourse is deceptive and luring, driving the hearer to have his thought 'controlled' by the manipulator. One of the main problems the article addresses is the question of the spreading of ideas, detailing both Dawkins' hypothesis of *memes* and Sperber's hypothesis of cultural *epidemiology* relating to Relevance theory. Addressing the question of the search for truth, Chilton recalls that the type of expressions chosen to refer to some object lead the hearer to draw specific inferences according to connotative aspects of the lexical item used. In particular, Chilton shows what a fundamental role is played by metaphor in allowing for transfer or projection from a source domain to a target domain, where these domains are respectively

the one of *vision* and the one of *understanding*. Exploiting Lakoff's framework of *cognitive linguistics* together with the concept of understanding as *blending*, Chilton dismantles Hitler's book in showing the role of metaphors in convincing the audience, providing close examination of numerous examples. In conclusion, Chilton addresses the issue of the cognitive *critical module* dedicated to controlling consent to a discourse, and suggests that memes, if they exist, are active in making the critical module inactive or dysfunctional.

Paul Danler (*University of Innsbruck*) starts from the fact that the aim of any political speech is to persuade the audience of selected political goals and that the justification of decisions taken or to be taken is an indisputable underlying function. Considering that a speech is fundamentally a 'textual whole', Danler emphasizes that the speaker, as initiator in this particular communicative situation, resorts to various morpho-syntactic and textual means to convey syntactic and textual meanings which go far beyond the meanings of individual words. He recalls that the speaker aims at more or less concrete pragmatic goals, which he tries to get across to his audience often implicitly, so that the hearers, without being aware of the speaker's skilful use of certain linguistic means, are deliberately and unwittingly guided into drawing their own conclusions and eventually share the speaker's point-of-view. Danler's paper investigates two aspects: the means the speaker has at his disposal to leave some arguments unexpressed and to focus on others; and how gifted orators manage, through a skilful selection of complements in corresponding syntactic constructions, to claim general or even universal validity of their ideas. The article further aims at showing how the speaker polarizes by means of including and excluding discursive strategies. Examples chosen are speeches by Franco, Mussolini and Pétain.

Eddo Rigotti (*University of Lugano*) understands manipulation in a cross-theoretical perspective, where theories of argumentation and ideology embed into a model of dialogue within communication science. Doing so, he attempts to list a number of manipulative processes, starting from a definition of manipulation which views it as a vice in communication. He considers manipulation with regard to the normal features of the communicative *event*, a notion that links to an approach of communication as action, or *joint action* following Clark. Rigotti posits a number of manipulative cases where the communicative event is not achieved to the hearer's satisfaction but to fulfil the speaker's covert aims. Among them, he details what he calls the "cake temptation", which is the human instinct to totality. The paper also explores the "polarity temptation", which plays with inferences based on opposite terms. Finally, Rigotti wonders about the notion of *interest*, saying that a way of manipulating an individual

with language is to trigger the hearer's interest towards elements of knowledge that would not deserve interest (or presumption of relevance) under normal circumstances, that is, benevolent communication.

Andrea Rocci (*University of Lugano*) wonders whether manipulative discourses are coherent or not, and to what extent. Within the framework of *Congruity theory*, he explains that the question arises from the results of two rather independent strands of research. On the one hand, research in Congruity theory has shown how the elusive notion of *text coherence* can be brought back to an instance of the notion of *semantic congruity*, that is to say the respect of presuppositions imposed by predicates to their arguments at various levels. He identifies coherence with congruity at the level of the 'connective predicates' that form the pragmatic and rhetorical structures of the text. He recalls on the other hand that the prominent role of the exploitation of presuppositional structures in manipulation and ideological discourse has been pointed out by various authors since Frege, and proposes a provisional answer to the question of coherence of manipulative discourse that springs out from this double background. He claims that, though all forms of manipulation cannot be reduced to incongruity (straightforward lies and contradictions in the asserted content, for instance, cannot), many forms of manipulation rest more or less directly on incongruities (violations of presuppositions) at various levels. The relationship between (in-)congruity, common ground and ideology is investigated and the notion of 'logical incongruity' is introduced. The paper then raises another question concerning what he calls the *perceived coherence* of (successful) manipulative texts. Rocci exploits the notion of *accommodation* (creating a perception of coherence at the global level) and tackles problems of implicit meaning and of vagueness with tools of well-formedness of 'connective predicates'. A corpus of Mussolini is analysed in this perspective.

Louis de Saussure (*University of Neuchâtel*) applies to manipulative discourse the theoretical framework of Relevance theory, a mechanist and naturalistic theory often referred to as *cognitive pragmatics* and primarily devoted to human understanding and communication. After positing a working definition for manipulation in discourse, where he assumes that manipulative discourses aim at persuading the hearer of defective propositions with covert cognitive strategies, he emphasizes that manipulative discourse is not a discourse *type* which can be identified through strictly formal linguistic parameters: it is, on the contrary, a type of pragmatic usage of language. Louis de Saussure then addresses in detail the question of truth-conditional and truth-functional aspects of manipulative discourse and focuses on how the hearer is misled in evaluating the conveyed propositions. He typologises the linguistic

and non-linguistic 'global' and 'local' manipulative strategies, in the idea that the condition for successful manipulation is the dysfunction of the cognitive module dedicated to the management of the theory of mind (identification of intentions) or 'mindreading module'. The paper insists that the most efficient mechanism of manipulation is a twofold device that he calls the *trouble-and-resolution* device, consisting in (1) altering the hearer's self-confidence in his ability to understand the discourse completely (mostly because of excessive use of fuzzy communication and defective argumentation together with a great confidence in the speaker's competence), and (2) proposing seemingly convincing conclusions that save the hearer from the mental trouble created. This way, the manipulated consents sincerely to conclusions without examining the argumentation that led to them, and is asked to refer to his own intuition (which in turn already contains an emotional attraction towards the speaker).

Nicholas Allott (*University College London*), who refers to the cognitive tradition from Chomsky to Relevance theory, focuses on 'misuse of concepts', viz. lexical items which are inappropriately used, and takes contemporary Western political discourse as his main target. His contribution is achieved within Sperber and Wilson's approach to human understanding. Recent work within Relevance theory has focused on pragmatic illusions like the 'Moses' illusion. Nicholas Allott claims that misuse of concepts is a type of pragmatic illusion, where known information is not accessed because of *shallow processing* due to contextually lowered expectations of relevance. In particular, lexical items may appear where they should not (according to the kind of concept they semantically encode), if the context lowers the attention that the hearer dedicates to the use of this lexical item (as in some famous word jokes, where the hearer does not notice that a word was inappropriately used, since he expected very strongly another concept, like in the classical "where are the survivors buried?"). A main contribution of the paper is that the mental representations derived then by the hearer *do not contain the contradictions they should contain*, and that, therefore, the misuse of concepts goes unnoticed by the hearer, which makes it a powerful tool in covert intentions of specific changes in the hearer's cognitive environment.

Regina Blass (*Summer Institute of Linguistics, Africa branch*) makes use of recent work within Relevance theory, notably on the study of advertising and covert communication, in order to capture and track some fundamental aspects of manipulation in the speeches and writings of Hitler and the NSDAP. She compares manipulation to persuasion and suggests that both are products of a covert manipulative intention which must not be identified. She refers to recent work from Sperber and emphasizes that the addressee does have

the theoretical means to reject being manipulated since he checks for apparent coherence. She assumes that manipulation is deceptive and focuses on the question of truth. She identifies strategies like *testimony*, *argumentation*, *omission / commission*, with a particular focus on lies and half-truths, and comes then to propaganda proper (which she assumes is directly linked to emotions), to implicatures weakly and unreliably communicated, and to deontic mood. She proposes an elaborated treatment of manipulation within Relevance theory, referring in particular to an internal and external consistency-checking module, Sperber's *logico-rhetorical module*, which allows for a "persuasion-counter-persuasion arms race". Considering Nazi rhetoric, she raises the hypothesis that manipulation succeeded mostly because of conscious elaboration by the speakers of an appearance of credibility and truthfulness that prevented thorough coherence checking.

Cornelia Ilie's (*University of Örebro*) study is focused on the manipulative (re)interpretation of certain speech act verbs that involve a (re)distribution of their respective participant roles with particular reference to the totalitarian discourse illustrated by Ceaușescu's speeches. Her theoretical approach is situated at the semantics-pragmatics interface and draws on insights from semantic role theory and speech act theory. Participant roles are conceived of in terms of language-internal syntactico-semantic structures and in terms of language-external, pragmatically definable, mechanisms of control and coercion. Ilie pays particular attention to specific instantiations of the pragma-semantic relations of Agency, Co-Agency and Causation.

Manfred Kienpointner (*University of Innsbruck*) deals with racist manipulation in the political propaganda of right-wing populist parties in France, Italy, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands. To begin with, Kienpointner discusses some basic methodological problems, notably the problem of finding a neutral and unbiased perspective for the analysis of populist discourse and the problem of avoiding the straw man fallacy. After suggesting some tentative solutions to these problems, he tries to define basic concepts such as 'ideology', 'propaganda' and 'racist manipulation'. In the empirical part of the paper, some racist aspects of the political discourse of Jean-Marie Le Pen, Umberto Bossi, Ronald Schill, Joerg Haider and Pim Fortuyn are analysed critically. Kienpointner focuses on their use of argument schemes such as the pragmatic argument and illustrative examples as well as their use of figures of speech such as metaphor and hyperbole. Finally, a comparison of the five right-wing populists shows both similarities and differences as far as their discourse strategies are concerned.

Carlos Inchaurrealde (*University of Zaragoza*) applies two related important frameworks of pragmatics, Fauconnier's theory of mental spaces, and Werth's 'text-world' theory to pro- and contra- Pinochet propaganda. Instead of focusing on the analysis of some discourse of the Chilean leader, Inchaurrealde addresses the way the image of Pinochet is built up by people holding opposite opinions. He shows that these approaches have much to say, in their granularity of analysis, about the fact that the image of the dictator is a product of a construction that takes place within a certain time period, within certain spaces and under certain circumstances. In particular, he shows what kind of process is used to manage 'space shifts' in order to ensure that Pinochet will be viewed either as a hero, a victim, or a villain, according to Hawkins' 'warrior iconography'.

Daniel Weiss (*University of Zurich*) compares various aspects of semantic features taking place in manipulative discourses in Nazism and in Stalinism, using tools from the Russian school of Semantics. After detailing how manipulative discourse makes specific use of universal and existential quantifiers, Weiss refrains from drawing strong conclusions from evident similarities between the two types of ideological discourse. Comparing the global consistency of propositions held in both discourses, he observes major differences. He shows that the Marxist-Leninist discourse always puts forward a collective entity of power, which was unfavourable to the construction of Stalin as the only leader, the personality cult towards him always being backed up by alleged collective opinion within 'the party'. He suggests that the Stalinist discourse was continually and consistently developing arguments that were taken as rational whereas Nazi discourse was inconsistently arguing in favour and in disfavour of rationality. As an example, he shows that the Soviet 'intelligencija' had a positive image whereas often, but not always, the Nazis were opposed to everything 'intellectual'.

Jürgen Wilke (*University Johannes Gutenberg, Mainz*) presents a paper with less linguistic and pragmatic concern but with a great import, as far as contextual constraints are concerned, regarding manipulation in media discourse. He analyses a number of instructions that were given by the Nazi propaganda officials to the newspapers. Interestingly, his analysis shows much similarity between these instructions and the ones that were later given by the concerned ministry of the German Peoples' Republic. He explains the different levels on which these press instructions were active and what their particular role was in shaping a global discourse designed for the people to believe what the power in place wanted them to.

Manipulation, memes and metaphors

The case of *Mein Kampf*

Paul Chilton

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1. Manipulation

Trying to define *manipulation* in the abstract does not get us very far. There are considerable doubts that in the ordinary understanding of the term it is theoretically coherent as a category characterising a particular form of human communication. My reasons for thinking this are the following:

- a. I am manipulating you right now, dear reader, into associating mental representations with the black marks that you are reading, without your being aware of the process you are going through. Is this what you understand by the ordinary language term *manipulation*? But you have now realised that you are being manipulated, and can close the book if you think I am wasting your time.
- b. Would you be happy to say that a teacher is manipulative in using interesting stories to teach a child to read? Was Martin Luther King manipulative with his undoubtedly effective rhetoric? Is the BBC news reader manipulative in using well ordered, clearly phrased (let us assume) linguistic formulations? Is the Sermon on the Mount manipulative?
- c. From the point of view of the addressee, theory of manipulation might be something like the following. An addresser manages to get an addressee to form mental representations, and to perform actions as a consequence, without the addressee being aware (or perhaps fully aware) of what is being done to her. But why is the addressee not aware? Anyone is capable of suspecting duplicity, and most of the time most people check for the veracity or cohesion of what other people say or write to them. True, an

addresser might have a very naïve or uninformed addressee, but this is not a linguistic or communicative fact in itself. Again, an addresser might give only partial information when more is required in the circumstances, but here too we are dealing with non-linguistic matters, and addressees are still capable in principle of checking. A third possibility is that the linguistic channel is in some way affected by, for example, seductive music, torture or bribes – again non-linguistic devices.

What about rhetorical devices, which *are* purely linguistic? And speech acts such as flattery and (false) promises? This objection seems to be vulnerable to the point already made – that people are, in principle, able to check and control their response to verbal stimulation.

- d. Suppose that in a given community of people the idea ‘gets about’ or ‘spreads’ that aliens from another planet have landed and are surreptitiously claiming social benefits. Has that community been manipulated? Well, possibly. Maybe somebody had secretly plotted to ensure enough people believed the idea simultaneously, say, by mass media, or by secret agents gossiping in hairdressers’ salons. Even so, the objections raised under (c) seem to apply: why are silly or sinister ideas believed in the first place when people can easily check them or reject them?

Despite all this – despite the fact that I want to preserve the principle that people have the freedom to reject manipulative attempts – ideas propagate themselves or are propagated or get propagated.

2. Propagation

I am therefore going to give up the attempt to formulate manipulation in terms of an addresser’s intention to deceive, lure or inspire, or in terms of an addressee being unconsciously thought-controlled. In other words, we shall look at propagation rather than propaganda. The question in this paper is: how do ideas spread? This is a question that some thinkers have endeavoured to answer. Dawkins says ideas spread by ‘memes’ (1976, 1982, 1993; cf. Dennett 1991; Blackmore 1999). Sperber says, by epidemiology (1996).

While Dawkins’s approach sometimes suggests memes are blind self-replicators, transmuting by random mutations as they go from mind to mind, he also sometimes emphasises the idea of memetic ‘contagion’. The latter suggests some memes in some circumstances, given certain kinds of actors, are likely to ‘spread’ more than others: his favourite example is probably religious

memes spread to by priests, mullahs, swamis, and the like. The epidemiological analogy runs as follows. An idea or set of ideas may not be found in all members or groups of a given population. So ideational epidemiology will study the distribution of ideas in the population. Over time the distribution may change – may shrink or spread, so ideational epidemiology will be interested in patterns of spread or retreat. Further, some diseases are contagious, some are not: the epidemiology of ideas should then be concerned with which are contagious or not, and why, linking micro-processes to macro-processes. The overriding question, the one we shall focus on in this chapter is: Why do some ideas or idea-clusters propagate more than others? Elsewhere (Chilton 2003) I have pointed out that forceful spreading of ideas, ‘manipulation’, depends largely on the ability of the propagator to control or dominate an intended receiver’s mind by controlling the channel of communication or depriving the receiver of the potential to verify.

We therefore have to ask how an ‘idea’ affects the ‘organism’ (i.e., the mind or the cognitive system) where it finds itself. How do ideas get transferred from mind to mind? Only by being expressed and moved about in the form of sound waves, electromagnetic waves or contrastive lines on flat physical surfaces which the eyes and ears of individual humans convert into cognitive representations in their skull-encased neurological networks. That is by speech or writing in its various mediations. Of course, the received representation is not just stamped on the surface of the receiving mind: rather, the receiver goes through a fast, largely unconscious, process of interpretation of the perceived signal.¹ It is this rapid unconscious processing (you can’t stop yourself understanding speech in a language you understand, can you?) that we need to focus on, since it is here if it is anywhere that language-borne ideas might just be ‘contagious’. The rest of this chapter is given to exploring some ways in which this notion might be made to some degree more explicit. More specifically, I will focus on the cognitive aspects of the process. I will take it as read that social, economic, individual-psychological factors will always be crucial to the success or non-success of idea (or, meme if you will) transfer, and that, moreover, any ideas or memes can in principle be rejected. But even in suitable circumstances, not all ideas will ‘catch on’ and be passed round.

A starting point is Sperber’s (1996: 140) observation, though I shall not use it in the way Sperber himself does:

The most general psychological factor affecting the distribution of information is its compatibility with the human cognitive organization.

For Sperber compatibility is guaranteed by relevance. What he means in this context is “independence of the immediate context”, which means “relevance in a wider context of stable beliefs and expectations”, which in turn means “the modular organisation of and processing of knowledge” (Sperber 1996: 140).

In this connection, a little more needs to be said about the term ‘modular’. In psychology, archaeology and linguistics it is currently common to adopt as a hypothesis the view that the human mind involves specialised ‘modules’ that have or once had an adaptive origin. Here I shall not attempt to qualify this hypothesis further. What are modules? Sperber’s crucial notion is that modules have long since lost their natural domain of application (say, to warn us of approaching predators), and that “cultural transmission. . . causes a proliferation of parasitic information that mimics the module’s proper domain” (1996: 141). Now Sperber himself sees cultural forms (e.g., music) as taking hold – artificially, as it were – of natural, genetically inherited modules that were once adaptive in evolution. In this chapter I am taking a somewhat different, though related route. I am concentrating on the following propositions:

Some of the cognitive components that make up political ideologies are ‘parasitic’ on basic modular knowledge, though I am going to be not more than merely suggestive as to which modules are actually involved.

The cognitive components in question are both representational in nature and procedural. The representational part belongs to different modules – e.g., intuitive physics, intuitive biology, intuitive physiology modules.² The procedural part has to do with the special way the human mind appears to generate imaginative representations by integrating representations from different domains processed by different modules.

Since we are concerned with the language-cognition interface we shall have to work with units of linguistic and cognitive analysis.

3. Texts

To explore the above ideas, let us take a text that many will agree is sinister and thus a candidate for being characterised as manipulative. We also know that it was effective in spreading ideas and disastrously affecting behaviour. Then let’s consider carefully how we think it may work, or might have worked in a particular concrete situation. This will involve us in considering what we mean by ‘text’ and how we think a ‘text’ works.

Hitler's *Mein Kampf* appeared in 1925 (first volume) and 1926 (second volume).³ Alongside other texts and utterances issuing from Hitler and his entourage it contributed to the spread of ideas that led many people to perform or accept the most inhumane acts. Conceivably, given appropriate conditions it could perform the same feat again for some smaller or greater number of individuals. However, for me and many other readers, the perlocutionary effects of *Mein Kampf* can probably be described as nausea, outrage, contempt or sheer boredom. This is evidence enough that for such ideas as it expresses to *catch on* and *spread* in one mind and in many minds very specific conditions must obtain, as they did in 1930s Germany. Given such conditions, how might the text be said to stimulate mental representations that proliferate among a population of minds?

Mein Kampf is an instance of a general and singularly human behaviour – the production and consumption of *text*. 'Text' as a form of communication is any stretch of talk or writing that displays coherence (largely conceptual) and cohesion (largely linguistic) in the technical sense of those terms. 'A text', an instantiation of text, may display many forms of coherence and cohesion. One way of thinking of texts is in terms of *tiers* – a concept that crops up in the analysis of other areas of language structure, for instance phonological structure. For the sake of argument, we can think of a text as made up of a *sectional tier* (also sometimes called 'macrostructure' and roughly what classical rhetoric calls *dispositio*). At this tier a linear sequence of 'sections' can be discerned. One tier lower, each section consists of a sequence of sentences. Zooming in on sentences, each sentence expresses or implies propositions. We can call this the *propositional tier*.

More microscopically, each proposition has its own two micro-tiers – a semantic tier and a referential tier (cf. Jackendoff 2002: 394–429). Important conceptual phenomena occur at the referential tier, and they are not (necessarily) perceptible in linear text structure. They are 'text worlds' (Werth 1999), also known as 'mental spaces' (Fauconnier 1994). For instance, if in reading a text you came across 'John believed the invaders would eat them alive', you build a mental space for John's reality or belief-world where cannibalistic invaders exist, though they might not exist in (say) the narrator's reality. Propositions come in a sequence of clauses and sentences, though often clauses are embedded inside one another to one or more degrees, and often propositions are not totally explicit but are presupposed or implicated. In general terms propositions are syntactic encodings.

But there is another tier that does not work in this way. It is the tier at which global conceptual structure is found. What are the 'ideas', or 'myths', or (in one

of the many senses of the term) ‘discourses’ that govern the proposition-by-proposition linear structure of a text? Such a tier may sound nebulous; it is in fact a construct in the mind/brain of particular readers guided or prompted by the linguistic input we call text. For example, the idea that men are superior to women might in some sense be said to be emergent via the argument structure of propositions and the narrative structure of sentence sequences. Recurrent particular distributions of thematic roles over arguments (and their referents) is produced by (or prompts the mental construction of) an overarching stipulation of roles and relations among actors, locations, etc. Let us call this provisionally the *role-and-relation conceptual tier*. We shall look closely at this particular tier of *Mein Kampf*.

Most important for present purposes is the conceptual tier at which textual metaphors are processed. Let us call this provisionally the *metaphor conceptual tier*, and this tier is also one that we shall focus on. Much has been written about metaphor and the processing of metaphorical expressions (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Ortony 1993; Lakoff & Johnson 1999). This body of work concerns metaphor and metaphorical expressions at the lexical or phrasal level. Yet anyone who has read many texts will know that certain kinds of texts achieve coherence in part through the weaving of metaphorical threads. Werth calls these ‘megametaphors’ (Werth 1999:323). What is meant is that certain discontinuous linguistic expressions within texts are or can be conceptually related to one (or to a small set of possibly interrelated) metaphors. A ‘megametaphor’ can give rise to (or in interpretation of it can unify one’s understanding of) recurrent expressions in the text. It may be part of the grand ‘idea’ or ‘myth’ or ‘discourse’ of the text, alluded to earlier. It may be a *meme* and I want to suggest that this is one important site where memes may lurk. It is therefore important to say more about the properties of metaphor and metaphorical expressions (these are distinct technical terms).

4. Methods of analysis

4.1 More on propositions

To logicians propositions are abstract forms that can be true or false and on the basis of which inferences can be drawn. As far as truth and falsity is concerned, what counts for discourse analysis, is not absolute truth or falsity, but truth or falsity with respect to some discourse-user. If Jane says: ‘Martians are green and small’, the proposition ‘Martians are green and small’ is asserted to be true in

her belief space. Hearers may or may not wish to pass empirical judgement on the matter. If John says: 'Jane believes that Martians are green and little', John is making a truth-claim about what Jane believes, not about Martians. And so on. Syntax provides, amongst other things, ways of prompting people to construct proposition-like representations within belief-spaces, or indeed other kinds of spaces, such as counterfactuality or possibility or rumour. . . . Texts consist of a kaleidoscope of changing linked spaces and their propositions.

Propositions themselves consist of a predicate and one or more arguments. In natural human languages, predicates make assertions about arguments, or specify relations between them. Language prompts language-users to assign to arguments a semantic (also known as 'thematic') role, such as *agent, patient, instrument, location, beneficiary*. . . . Arguments are prototypically nominal expressions (though they can be, for example, nested propositions) that refer to entities in some belief space. We can look at the recurrent entities and their doings, who does what to whom where and when, in the ontological spaces that human processors of discourse entertain, whether as producers or consumers of text.

In fact, texts can be thought of as prompting their users to set up mental ontologies, little interrelated virtual worlds in which are specified two main kinds of phenomena – entities and relations among them. Entities can also have properties asserted of them, and they can be individual things, pluralities, or categories. It is important to note that entities can be linked to a referent 'really' existing in the belief space of speaker and/or hearer, or potentially existing, or simply left 'in the air' because the speaker is asking a question. The same is true of predicates, where, for instance, a speaker is asking if a certain event or action occurred or relationship holds. It is also important that the same entity (say, the king of France in 1609) can be indicated by different referring expressions (e.g., Henri IV, Henri de Bourbon, the enemy of the faith, that apostate, his majesty, the man who saved France. . .). Different referring expression can lead to different inferences by evoking different frames. Thus some were moved to support Henri, others to plot his assassination. Groups of people are not so easy to circumscribe referentially as individual people. None the less, some groups remain the same group, however you refer to them. But the semantics of the referring expression makes a whole lot of difference, in terms of the inferences that they can warrant.

New referring expressions for old referents can be found in various ways. Categorisation and metaphorisation are such ways. If entities in a belief space, text world or sub-world, are picked out by metaphor, and this is somehow consistent through the text, then an inferential pattern can be set up that hov-

ers above, so to speak, the overt referents. This may happen linguistically by substituting one nominal expression for the usual one, or it may be done more overtly by predication. Thus it is not simply the fact that the Jews are picked out referentially in Hitler's text, again and again, in order to have certain properties and relations predicated of them. It is the categorisation and metaphorisation of the Jews that potentiates inferences at a supra-sentential level that is significant. At this level the memes may reside (though also at the overt level).

Of course, no-one *has* to accept as true any of the virtual worlds set up in discourse. But in so far as propositions come as social transactions claiming *prima facie* to be true, people are inclined to accept them as true, initially, and certainly have to initially represent them as such before any metarepresentational faculty can kick in and start criticising. Still, because human language users are also good at detecting deception, speakers may want to take preemptive measures. This means that speakers often seek to build in guarantees, authorisations and assurances as to their veracity, seeking to appeal to whatever they believe their interlocutors believe to be veracious (cf. Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Sperber 2000). In texts, therefore, there is often a self-referential, meta-textual stratum, sectioned or continuous, whose job is self-legitimation. This may range from demanding belief in the unbelievable precisely because it is unbelievable (as Dawkins has pointed out), to claiming the opposite – that proposition *p* is blindingly obvious to any reasonable man (usually, a man) on the Clapham omnibus.

4.2 More on metaphor

The sense in which I am using the term 'metaphor' is that developed in cognitive linguistics. Metaphor is primarily seen as a cognitive operation, in which different domains of knowledge and experience are brought together. We can see the underlying conceptual operation when we look at metaphorical expressions, such as *I see what you mean*, *she shed light on the problem*, *I cannot see my way through his dense argument*, *it suddenly dawned upon him what was meant by the term metaphor*. . . In this example, we find a semantically cohering proliferation of expressions, because it makes intuitive sense to human minds to think of 'understanding' in terms of physical vision. We can say that vision is a *source domain*, and understanding a *target domain*.

The relationship between source domain and target domain is often described (borrowing from mathematics) as a 'mapping' or as a 'projection'. This simply means that elements of knowledge from the source domain are transferred into the target domain. It turns out from the linguistic evidence that

source domains and target domains are not any old domain. Source domains have a clear tendency to be based in human physiological experience of the physical and the social world. Some of this knowledge is either innate or developed very early in life by interaction with the external environment – for example, seeing things, being aware of light and dark, orienting one’s body forwards or backwards, orienting one’s body vertically with respect to the surface of the planet, feeling and exerting physical pressure, moving from place to place, being enclosed, entering enclosures of various kinds, experiencing temperature differences, having a proprioceptive system that gives awareness of one’s body, its shape and motions, knowing about the distinction between animate and inanimate, knowing about the animal-human distinction, finding it natural to categorise plants and animals. . . One can go on; but this list is meant to indicate some of the areas that have been noted by researchers, and which also strongly suggest a basis in human evolution, in cultural evolution, perhaps in genetic inheritance, and most likely in the neural structure of human brains. These kinds of source domains, when linked with a target domain, yield what can be termed primary, or basic, metaphors.

Target domains, on the other hand, tend to be more abstract, under-structured or problematic conceptual areas or subjective experiences – such as understanding, affection, life, time, society, causality. Important ideological or quasi-ideological beliefs are often understood in terms of one or more primary source domains. For example, if a society strongly believes people should structure their lives over time to achieve specific actions, this can be conceptualised by mapping the concrete schemas *PATH OF JOURNEY* onto *LIFE*. So, one has a *direction* in life, and one may *go far in life*, and so on. Or again, if a society has an ideology of historical progress, it will map certain kinds of *JOURNEY* onto particular forms of social organisation, or onto ‘history’ – a large and vague conceptual domain, if ever there was one. So one may find oneself part of *the long march of socialism, advancing towards the defeat of capitalism, holding back the forces of history, moving towards a better future, or taking the route to democracy* . . .

It is possible, perhaps only possible, for humans to conceptualise, reason about and communicate about intrinsically under-defined target domains by mapping on to them the source domains that they understand intuitively. The list of source domains given in the preceding paragraph does not mean that specific cultural characteristics are not involved. For instance, while *PATH* and *VERTICAL ORIENTATION* depend on universal and intuitive spatial intuition, *JOURNEY* may have, in addition to *PATH*, elements of cultural information (e.g., type of vehicle, form of dress, etc.).

Metaphors are dynamic and productive. The reason for this is that the source domains have rich structure: one intuitively knows a lot about them and they have their own inherent ‘logic’. If I think ‘contained space’, then I think a topology: there are internal central regions, internal peripheral regions, a boundary, and an external region. To get in or out, I have to cross a boundary. So, if I metaphor-map this schema, CONTAINER, onto, say, ‘society’, the entire set of implications triggered by CONTAINER become available for thinking about, drawing inferences about, ‘society’. Similarly, for the schema BODY. The vast amount of intuitive and cultural knowledge potentially triggered by BODY in the source domain can be metaphor-mapped to ‘society’. This potential is usually referred to as ‘metaphorical entailment’. The interesting thing is that humans find this operation on basic source domains very natural, to the point of its being largely unconscious, until some linguist or discourse analyst comes along.

Metaphors explain a large part of the evolution and structure of a language’s lexicon – they may have become dead or half-dead. We need not go into the extent to which metaphorical expressions are active or conventionalised. What is important is that metaphorical expressions, whether ‘dead’ or not, can be used selectively, perhaps only semi-consciously or not consciously at all in the building of textual coherence. In fact, the particular source domain schemas mentioned above – container, path, body – are of special interest in looking at what we called earlier the *metaphor conceptual* tier of the text of *Mein Kampf*. They also have a lot to say to say to us, if we choose to think of this text as a potent meme-carrier.

4.3 And some notes on blending

Metaphorical thought may be a special case of ‘blending’. Blending is a cognitive theory of the way humans understand discourse – that is, understand language on-line, in working memory as it is read or heard. It is also a powerful theory for other forms of human cultural activity (Fauconnier & Turner 2002). And it may also be the way in which new lexical concepts are formed (Evans 2002). In principle, while metaphor theory may tell us about stable cross-domain mappings in long-term memory that are activated in metaphorical and polysemous expressions, blending theory offers an account of what the mind is doing when it processes metaphor-mappings, or when it constructs new concepts that are not metaphorical.

In the theory blending works as follows. There are two or more input *spaces*; they share some rather abstract features in common, which reside in

a *generic space*; some but not necessarily all elements from the input spaces are transferred to a third space, the *blend*. When the blend is ‘run’, inferences are made, and new meanings may emerge that are not present in either of the input spaces. Here is Fauconnier’s (1997: 18–25) example: *virus*.

What do you think of?

Suppose you think of computers. What *virus* has done in that context is merge two conceptual domains: health and biology on the one hand and electronic machines of a certain type on the other. What are the fine details of this, in itself, rather odd human conflation of realms? Clearly, there is absolutely no physical resemblance between a microbe and a computer program. Similarity is found in the generic space, and is essentially structural and functional. The similar properties in the present case seem to be: *x* is present but unwanted, comes in from outside, does not belong, is able to replicate to produce similar unwanted *x*’s, is harmful to the system it is in, the system should be protected from *x* and can be protected against if it is kept out, ejected, counteracted or destroyed. Interestingly, this cluster of properties is partially covered by metaphor theory. The generic properties can be related to basic image schemas such as CONTAINER, PATH, FORCE. As Fauconnier points out, it is not just computers that can be (partially) conceptualised in these terms, but also social life – e.g., ‘keeping harmful intruders out of established groups’ (Fauconnier 1997: 19). Such a cluster exists before its specific instantiation in *virus* is ever brought into contact with *computer*, or anything, or anyone, else.

The next stage in the stabilisation of a new conceptualisation involves the mapping of structure into the target domain, as in metaphor theory. Thus, *virus* can be mapped to certain kinds of program contrasted with normal programs. The input space (source domain) from which *virus* comes also has *health, disease, spread, contaminate, infect, doctor, cleanse, purge, disinfect, vaccine*, etc. These can be mapped to separate elements in the target domain, *computer* – e.g., to programs that damage normal programs. There is an extremely important point here, also made in metaphor theory. Before we applied the virus-health space to computers, there may be no existing counterpart to, say, ‘vaccine’. But the metaphor-mapping makes it possible to *envisage* such a program (though of course, you’ll need formal non-metaphorical programming skills to actually produce the program). This entailment is automatic, and leads to action.

Fauconnier thinks that in the cultural emergence of a concept like ‘computer virus’, the cross-domain mapping we have just described is, in the initial stages of the stabilisation of the concept, ‘felt to be a metaphor’ – people talk about harmful computer programs only ‘as if’ they were viruses. None the

less, the mapping persists and increasingly yields entailed transfers to the target domain. This it does more or less automatically, diachronically, as people communicate about computer programs in natural language – computers can now ‘infect’ one another, be ‘disinfected’, etc. Actually, this is the stage where quotation marks disappear – we simply say and think computers infect one another. The term for this in cognitive linguistics is *entrenchment*. We cannot say these are ‘dead’ metaphors. They are just less noticeable because entrenched in the lexical and grammatical system. They can still spawn new entailments – it is entirely possible to use the cross-domain metaphor-mapping in (relatively) new ways – to say that my computer is in the surgery, that my technician is its doctor, for example. More importantly, it is possible that entrenchment makes *unconscious* use of the mapping and the drawing of conclusions, including conclusions *unconsciously* leading to plans and actions. In blending theory this is made possible because the target domain in fact remains linked to both the source biological domain and to the generic space that motivates it. At this stage the word *virus* has extended its meaning, being associated in the target domain with properties not found in the source domain.

The blending story continues. We are still thinking about the development, over time, in a communication community, of new or altered word-meanings and new dynamic conceptualisations. Here blending theory goes further than metaphor theory and argues that the two input spaces – in our example the biological source domain and the computer target domain – become blended or conceptually integrated in a further ‘space’, the blend. In this space, further meaning emerges that is in neither of the two input spaces. For a start, the integration means that *virus-programs* are now felt as a category or ‘kind of thing’, *biological-viruses* as another kind of thing, and both are felt as part of a super-category *virus*. Conceptually, in the blend, it is worth noting, in support of blending theory, that categorisation into kinds is itself probably an intuitive human mental operation. The blend is, moreover, dynamic. Fauconnier proposes that

The blend opens up a possible search for members in other domains – for instance, social viruses or mental viruses (destructive ideas that propagate, mutate, and replicate).
(Fauconnier 1994: 23)

Such a mental space is dynamic because it can be ‘run’ in various actual social contexts, with various kinds of input details coming from that context. An important idea is also that there are degrees of conceptual integration, ranging from full entrenchment to conscious ‘engineering’ of blended elements. Texts, we may surmise, are one means by which blending operations can be steered in

various directions along the natural channels formed by the intricate interconnections that human thought lays down among different areas of knowledge and experience.⁴

We have here an interesting conundrum. What do we say about Dawkins who thinks that computer viruses are real viruses, and that memes are real viruses (1993:192, 322–323)? Is he infected with his own meme? Dawkins is clearly aware of the disanalogies between the biological source domain and the target domains – in fact, his description of the intersecting commonalities is tantamount to a detailing of the generic space, while his explorations of the influencing of minds and the disruption of computers is tantamount to a ‘running’ of the blend with various input spaces. It will be apparent why all this is significant to the question in hand.

5. Dismantling *Mein Kampf*

In probing the propositions of *Mein Kampf* we shall focus on (i) the sectional tier and its functions, (ii) on the propositional tier and its distribution of roles and relations, and (iii) on the metaphorical tier.

5.1 Sectional tier

Hitler’s book is long and is broken into two volumes, each of which is split into chapters, and some of which have further typographically marked subdivisions. Of course, we are concerned not just with the latter, but with linguistically indexed sections and sub-sections, of which readers may be more or less consciously aware. For the purposes of discussion, let us consider one of these chapters – the notorious *Volk und Rasse*, which is Chapter 11 of the second volume.

Rather than presenting arguments for these divisions, I shall simply present them as one possible way of subdividing the chapter, though I think the divisions would be broadly agreed on by many readers (see Figure 1). This is a very coarse-grained sectioning; each section could certainly be analysed further. The point here, however, is to identify the *function* of the sections that we can establish with a first cut, asking what job one thinks each is doing within the whole text.

The theme of section one of *Volk und Rasse* is marked by universally quantified truth claims in the generic present tense. The arguments of the propositions predominantly refer to abstractions (e.g., ‘truth’, ‘Nature’), ani-

1	<i>Epistemological claim:</i>	<i>author knows the truth</i> (p. 258: “There are some truths which are so obvious that for this very reason they are not seen or at least not recognised by ordinary people”)
2	<i>Main premise:</i>	<p><i>claim empirical evidence Nature</i> (p. 258: “Even the most superficial observation shows that Nature’s restricted form of propagation and increase is an almost rigid basic law...”; p. 260: “Historical experience offers countless proofs...”)</p> <p><i>give examples</i> (p. 258: “Every animal mates only with a member of the same species. The titmouse seeks the titmouse, the finch the finch...”)</p> <p><i>generalise</i> (p. 259: “The consequence of this racial purity, universally valid in Nature, is not only the sharp outward delineation of the races, but their uniform character in themselves”)</p> <p><i>counter possible objections</i> (p. 260: “Here, of course, we encounter the objection of the modern pacifist, as truly Jewish in its effrontery as it is stupid”)</p>
3	<i>The Aryans:</i>	<p><i>attribution</i> (pp. 263ff.: Aryans are “the bearers of culture”, “self-sacrificing”, “idealistic”, etc.)</p> <p><i>narration</i> (pp. 265: “Aryan races...subject foreign peoples, and then... develop the intellectual and organisational capacities dormant within them... In the end, however, the conquerors transgress against the principle of blood purity...”, etc.)</p>
4	<i>The Jews:</i>	<p><i>attribution</i> (p. 272ff.: “In hardly any people in the world is the instinct of self-preservation developed more strongly than in the so-called ‘chosen’”; p. 273: “... today the Jew passes as ‘smart’”, “the Jew... was never in possession of a culture of his own...”; p. 274: “his sense of sacrifice is only apparent”, etc.)</p> <p><i>narration</i> (p. 275: “the Jew takes over foreign culture, imitating or rather ruining it”; p. 275ff.: “the Jew is no nomad”, “the Jew of all times has lived in the states of other peoples... a parasite in the body of other nations and states”, p. 280: “He comes first as a merchant... he becomes active exclusively as a middleman... settles special sections of the cities and villages... approaches the governments, puts his money to work... begs for ‘patents’ and ‘privileges’. Finally he needs only to have himself baptised”, etc.)</p>
5	<i>Conclusion:</i>	<p><i>causes of German decline</i></p> <p><i>racial impurity</i> (p. 296: “If we pass all the causes of the German collapse in review, the ultimate and most decisive remains the failure to recognise the racial problem and especially the Jewish menace”)</p> <p><i>weakness</i> (p. 298: “our general disease”, “the bourgeois world was inwardly infected with the deadly poison of Marxist ideas”)</p>

Figure 1. Functional sections in *Volk und Rasse*

mate beings ('animals') and humans ('man', 'people'). We shall have more to say about Hitler's referential world but what is at issue here is what Hitler is doing in making these references. Consider, for example:

- (1) There are some truths which are so obvious they are not seen or at least not recognised by ordinary people.
- (2) Even the most superficial observation shows that Nature's restricted form of propagation and increase is an almost rigid basic law of all the innumerable forms of expression of her vital urge. (p. 258)

Such assertions indicate, directly and indirectly, a claim to epistemological validity. Most interesting are the indirectly expressed claims. Truth is objectified – it is something that can be 'seen'. There is a distinction between 'ordinary people' and exceptional people – and the author is pragmatically presupposed as one of them. Only such people can 'see' these truths. At the same time, however, it is implied that all one needs is 'superficial observation'. The implication is, and it is made explicit elsewhere, that anyone can in principle 'see' the truth if they are not 'blind' or blinded. In addition, it is indicated that these truths are 'scientific', because based on empirical observation of nature, though simultaneously 'nature' is mystified by its capital initial,⁵ and more importantly by various kinds of personification, more specifically matrifaction. Let us digress for a moment to see how the metaphorical tier is operating within a section whose main job is to establish epistemological credentials.

The supposed 'truths' are based on metaphor and emergent blending of cognitive frames. Hitler uses a 'mother nature' metaphor, which entails that 'nature' has 'vital urges' (*Lebenswille*) and produces offspring (*Fortpflanzung* 'planting forth'), which is semantically more transparent than English 'propagation'). But only in accordance with a 'basic law', which requires that a creature must only mate with one of its own species. He is going to apply this frame to humans of course. But here is another detail he has to establish – by simple asseveration. Sometimes an animal from species does mate with an animal from another species, but only under unusual conditions – for instance, under 'the compulsion of captivity'. He is already giving us a blend: animals and the captivity of animals are merged with a domain of knowledge about humans. That is, the animal category is mapped onto the human category, along with entailments. Thus, if animals are compartmentalised into species, so is the category 'human'. It just remains to fill out the detail. This requires another metaphorical step.

A basic cognitive and perceptual (specifically, proprioceptive) source domain for human metaphors is UP-DOWN, or high-low, orientation. It is encoded in many cultural forms. In western culture it precipitates in the 'great chain of being' schema, propagated explicitly in the medieval and Renaissance period but taken for granted for much longer.⁶ The fundamental conceptual transfer involves 'higher is better, physically, morally and spiritually'. Combined with compartmentalised animal category frame, we now have the notion that compartmentalised species are arranged in a hierarchy. The same for humans. And there is another quasi-logical entailment imposed on this conclusion. It is based on the schema, 'a higher value combined with a lower value generates a mean', which of course does not have to be stated explicitly – it seems natural. So, if one higher being mates with a lower being, it produces a being between the two on the hierarchy. Moreover, the two beings are already conceptualised as belonging to sharply delimited compartments (*scharfe Abgrenzung*), which draws on the fundamental cognitive CONTAINER schema. The image-logic of the container schema tells you that the contents are protected by the boundary; this is how the abstract concept of 'purity' and 'contamination' is in large part conceptualised. So the combining of a higher-compartment species with a lower has not just produced a middling being, but an *impure mixture*. Thus is the concept of *Rassenheit* grounded in metaphorical reasoning. The reasoning itself is embedded in a general epistemological claim to objective observation.

The remaining sections of this overarching tier do not need to be analysed in detail. The chapter falls thematically into the grand binary divide of Hitlerian cognition: Aryans and Jews. Once this dichotomy is established as 'natural' – this is what the function of the two sections seems to be – conclusions can be drawn. Unsurprisingly, this section of *Mein Kampf*, then, has a 'conclusion'. Its propositions are derived via a form of inference grounded in the propositional and metaphoric tiers of text that precede it.

5.2 *Mein Kampf*: Propositional tier

As an illustration of this analytic approach, let us take a passage from Section 4 of *Volk und Rasse* that we identified earlier (*Mein Kampf*, pp. 276–277):

No, the Jew is no nomad; for the nomad had also a definite attitude towards the concept of work which could serve as a basis for his later development in so far as the necessary intellectual premises were present. In him the basic idealistic view is present, even if in infinite dilution, hence in his whole being he may seem strange to the Aryan peoples, but not unattractive. In the Jew, however, this attitude is not at all present; for that reason he was never a nomad,

but only and always a *parasite* in the body of other peoples. That he sometimes left his previous living space has nothing to do with his own purpose, but results from the fact that from time to time he was thrown out by the host nations he had misused. His spreading is a typical phenomenon for all parasites; he always seeks a new feeding ground (*Nährboden*) for his race.

This, however, has nothing to do with nomadism, for the reason that a Jew never thinks of leaving a territory that he has occupied, but remains where he is, and he sits so fast that even by force it is very hard to drive him out. His extension to ever new countries occurs only in the moment in which certain conditions for his existence are there present, without which – unlike the nomad – he would not change his residence. He is and remains the typical parasite, a sponger who like a noxious bacillus keeps spreading as soon as a favourable medium (*Nährboden*) invites him. And the effect of his existence is also like that of spongers: wherever he appears, the host people dies out after a shorter or longer period.

Thus the Jew has at all times lived in the states of other peoples, and there formed his own state, which, to be sure, habitually sailed under the disguise of ‘religious community’ as long as outward circumstances made a complete revelation of his nature seem inadvisable. But as soon as he felt strong enough to do without the protective cloak, he always dropped the veil and suddenly became what so many others previously did not want to believe and see: the Jew.

The first question is: Who or what are the referents? In other words, in the text world that Hitler’s text is requiring us to imagine, which are the actors and entities of which qualities are predicated and among which relations of one kind or another are specified? We do not simply list all the noun phrases: some of these are predicates, some semantically belong under the same category.⁷ Scrutinising the arguments at the propositional tier yields the universe of actors and entities; these are filtered out of the text given above and presented in Figure 2.

This is of course a small subset of Hitler’s text world as projected in the entire text. The non-human realm is represented in this extract only by parasites; elsewhere, for instance in the opening paragraphs of *Volk und Rasse*, Hitler lists the finch, titmouse, stork, field mouse, dormouse, wolf. . . It is important to note here the *essentialism* implicit in the categorisation and the attribution of characteristics. In using this term, I want to indicate more than is usually indicated by its use in post-modernist literary-philosophical writing. Cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists have postulated, on empirical and on theoretical grounds, that the human mind-brain includes a module for zoological categorisation which entails essential categorial attributes: a wolf is a wolf is a wolf. It has been argued that such a module may have something to do with the persistence of racial categorisation in human thought (Gelman et al.

Human attributes

body
phenomenon (= attribute of a being)
view, attitude
purpose (of a people)

Concepts for types of human groups

peoples
the Aryan peoples
Jews
nomads, nomadism (*Nomadentum*)
race
nations
host nations/peoples
state

Social groups

religious communities (counterfactual in Hitler's world)
spongers (*Schmarotzer*)

Non-human categories

bacillus
parasites

Abstract categories

existence of a person or race (*Dasein*)
intellectual premises
development (of a people)
whole being (*ganzes Wesen*), nature (of a person or race)
effect (of a cause)
conditions for existence (*Bedingungen für sein Dasein*)

Locations

countries (*Länder*)
territory
living space
residence (*Wohnsitz*)
feeding ground

Event types

spreading (*sein Sich-Weitverbreiten*), extension
force

Figure 2. Actors and entities in Hitler's universe

1994:341–365; Hirschfeld 1994:206f.; Mithen 1996:224–225). It makes racial categories appear natural. It also means that the module is available as a source domain for metaphorical projection and blending processes. It is fundamental

in *Mein Kampf* that the biosphere is compartmentalised and each compartment has its 'essence'. In the present extract, the phrase 'whole being' (*ganzes Wesen*) appears to express this notion; it postulates 'whole being' as an object referent.

The referential status of the expressions listed in Figure 2 is not always straightforward. Some have to be read as having objective referents (Jews, nations, etc.); others have to be read as referring to objective processes and qualities ('development'). Yet others have a special cognitive status: 'body', while activating concepts of the human body, has no specific referent, but enters in a metaphoric mapping, to which we shall return.

It is probably significant that a relatively high proportion of nominals refer to kinds of location. The spatialisation of the other categories in Hitler's world (human and non-human kinds, social kinds, reified attributes, etc.), together with spatial predicates such as movement and confinement, seems to be fundamental. And this is significant in our analytic perspective because the perception and representation of space and movement probably provide the cognitive grounding for a wide range of conceptualisations constructed and communicated through language.

Having established the entities in the text's ontology, we can now consider the relations between them: who is where? Who does what to whom? Figure 3 illustrates a procedure for examining the recurrent argument-predicate structure in texts.

The two Argument columns are expressions referring to the entities we noted in Figure 2; the Adjunct and Conjunction columns are included for completeness, but are not discussed here. What interests us for the moment is the Predicate column. In this short extract two particular kinds of relation stand out. The first is the essentialist assertion or negation of properties and category membership. We can generalise thus:

- Jews are not members of category C_1 (e.g., are not in the category *nomads*)
- Jews are members of category C_2 (e.g., are members of category *parasites*)
- Jews have or do not have property P (e.g., *never thinks of moving from place to place, does not have idealistic view*)
- Nomads have property P (e.g., *have basic idealistic view, move from place to place*).

The second salient relation is spatial, expressed in the following predicates: *present in*,⁸ *throw out*, *leave*, *spread*, *seek*, *occupy*. Attributes are conceptualised as possessions, possessions as locations in the semantic systems of many languages (Lakoff & Johnson 1999:195), and the notion of essential proper lo-

ARG	PRED	ARG	ADJ/CONJ
the Jew	is not	nomad	
the basic idealistic view	is present in	nomad	however
the basic idealistic view	is not at all present in	the Jew	for that reason
the Jew	was never	a nomad	but
the Jew	was	a parasite in the body of other peoples	only and always
That he sometimes left his previous living space	has nothing to do with	his own purpose	but
p = the Jew	left	his own living space	sometimes
p	results from	q	
q = the host nations	threw out	the Jew	from time to time
the Jew	had misused	the host nations	
r = his spreading	is typical for	all parasites	
the Jew	is	a parasite	
r = the Jew / parasite	spreads		
the Jew / parasite	seeks	a new feeding ground	always ... for his race
This	has nothing to do with	nomadism	however ... for the reason that
a Jew	never thinks of leaving	a territory that he has occupied	but
a Jew	has occupied	a territory	

Figure 3. Argument-predicate structure

cation seems functionally fundamental in the cognitive structures associated with Hitler's text. In terms of image schemata, CONTAINER is important, both for the location of properties and for the represented geographical location of the category 'Jew'. Generalising again, this time from the relations made explicit in Figure 3, we can see that the category Jew appears predominantly in Agent role (though also as Theme, the term used to label the semantic role of an entity that moves or is moved), together with predicates of motion and location (Figure 4).

In sum, at the propositional tier, the syntax repeatedly encodes for a 'world' in which Jews are an *essential kind* with inherent properties. The salient properties are expressed in terms of a Container schema (the Jews are 'inside' some entity) and in terms of the Path schema (the Jews have an essential tendency to remain in a location until displaced, when they move outwards to occupy new

<i>Theme</i>		<i>Location</i>
Properties (moral)	located in	human (e.g., Jew)
Jew	located in	people (Völker)
<i>Agent</i>		<i>Location</i>
Jew	spreads	
Jew	occupies	territory
Jew	not (spontaneously) leave	territory
Jew	seeks	territory
<i>Agent</i>		<i>Patient</i>
Peoples (Völker)	throw out	Jew

Figure 4. Semantic roles of 'Jews' in *Mein Kampf* extract

containing spaces). We are now touching on a level of conceptualisation that is also dispersed through the text at the metaphor and blend tier.

5.3 *Mein Kampf*: Metaphorical tier

Metaphor is not necessarily expressed in propositional format, and thus is not coincident with clausal structure. This does not mean that it is not relevant to inference; indeed, metaphor generally provides a potential space for the drawing of new inferences. But such inferencing potential remains, precisely, suprasentential, in a sense extra-textual and certainly potential. It is this that gives it memetic power.

In this text metaphor is in fact expressed quite often in clause form:

[the Jew] was only and always a parasite.

[the Jew spreads] is a typical phenomenon of parasites.

Sometimes it is expressed as a comparison:

[the Jew] keeps spreading like a noxious bacillus.

Maybe these cases are not best described as metaphor at all. What is clear is that one category is being in some sense mapped onto another. Even mapping might not be the most helpful term here. But let us continue with the terms *source domain* and *target domain* for the moment. The source domain here is microbial parasite (bacillus), the target a human category, Jews. The propositional form makes very clear what is going on: the merging of two categories by an essentialising predicate (*x be always y*; *x be typical of y*). The Jews are categorised as non-human, and specifically as a form of being that penetrates the human body and causes disease.

But this particular metaphor is not confined in the text to relatively explicit syntactic expression. Consider:

[the Jew] always seeks a new feeding ground
[the Jew] never thinks of leaving a territory he has occupied
[the Jew] remains a sponger (Schmarotzer)
the host people dies out
the body of other peoples.

None of these overtly mentions the equation of Jews and parasitic microbes, yet each one, even without the activating context that we have here, makes its sense within the cognitive frame that stores knowledge about human bodies, microbes and disease. The term *sponger* is interesting because it translates German *Schmarotzer*. Like English *parasite*, this word and the verb *schmarotzen* (be parasitic on) can be and are used in a purely biological context with reference to parasitic organisms, doubling the word *Parasit*. In German we have a polysemy for *Schmarotzer* that we don't have for *sponger*, and thus a sort of disguised tautology (i.e., a logically necessary truth), namely, 'if X is a parasite, then X is a parasite'.

It is also highly pertinent that such a particular frame is linked to one handling information about disease, doctors and treatments. Such knowledge frames strike one as partly involving fundamental, possibly innate, representations of the body, and partly fundamental cultural frames concerning disease and medicine. There are two general points to be made here. One is that the meanings prompted by the text are generated by linking one human category with largely intuitive knowledge about a particular *non*-human domain. The other is that the relevant meanings are generated by an interaction between sentential and non-sentential structure and are dispersed along the text, as indicated in Figure 5.

The sequence in Figure 5 (from top to bottom) is that of the original text. It is remarkable that this sub-section of the text does in fact proceed from explicit premises – the mapping of two domains – to metaphorical entailments.

So far we have seen two basic cognitive mechanisms in operation: the metaphorical mapping itself, and the calling up of source domains that have some kind of basic experiential and possibly innate naturalness to give the mapping its power. Such mechanisms are stable and exist in long-term memory structures. But they are activated in real-time discourse processing. Blending theory helps us to see how the processing creates even more powerful effects with even more complex, but natural associative connections with cognitive and affective processes.




Figure 5. Conceptual dispersion in extract from *Mein Kampf*

Let us consider the conceptual operations that a single sentence of the extract might involve:

And the effect of his existence is also like that of spongers [*Schmarotzer*]: wherever he appears, the host people dies out after a shorter or longer period.

We have already noticed that *Schmarotzer* is a polysemous lexical item that lends itself to the blending of its two meanings (biological parasite, social ‘sponger’). The linguistic and cultural systems have thus already enacted a merger of social domain and natural kind domain that can be exploited in a text that explicitly activates that association. Syntactic formulations in discourse, and specifically the operations of anaphora (i.e., the linking one referring expression to another in discourse), can prompt similar blending, as the following shows:

[the Jew] was never a nomad, but only and always a *parasite* in the body of other peoples. That *he* sometimes left *his* previous living space has nothing to do with *his* own purpose, but results from the fact that from time to time *he* was thrown out by the host nations *he* had misused. *His* spreading is a typical phenomenon for all parasites; *he* always seeks a new feeding ground (*Nährboden*) for *his* race.

It is of course abnormal to refer to a biological parasite as 'he'. However, it seems to me that in reading this section, the first occurrence of *he* is associated not just with 'the Jew', but with a blended concept: Jew-parasite, or some such. This is particularly plausible because the successive clauses predicate actions and properties that are metaphorically isomorphic with the actions and properties of biological parasites. The notion of blending, as distinct from metaphor theory, helps to pinpoint the phenomenon whereby a conceptual space is consistently constructed through discourse promptings, and can result in varying degrees of conceptual compression.

What, in more detail, might the cognitive operations look like, when one is processing a particular sentence of this text? Consider again:

the effect of [the Jew's] existence is also like that of spongers [*Schmarotzer*]: wherever he appears, the host people [*Wirtsvolk*] dies out after a shorter or longer period.

As suggested in Figure 6, we have here a cross-space mapping – the metaphorical projection from biological knowledge to social knowledge, in which elements correspond: parasites → Jews, hosts → peoples. The generic space that the source and target domains share is the image schema CONTAINER.

The blend is where more cognitive processing can occur. By compression we have Jew-parasites and host-nations (or peoples). The source domain, in a process of cognitive completion, brings associated knowledge frames into the blend: the human body as host to parasites, the movements of parasites, diseases, aetiology and cures; the target domain also brings the human body frame, and other basic frames concerning human behaviour, such as nourishment, housing, homing and journeys. The natural kind domain brings the essentialist theory with it; and the in the blend we can get new conceptual structures popping up, licensing inferences about Jews. Essentialism yields necessary and inevitable behaviour of Jew/parasites. The microbe frame brings aetiology – “the effect [caused by] the Jew's existence” evoked in the example. The parasite frame brings the migration of microbes from outside the body, across its boundary into its interior. The blend may be elaborated or 'run'. The body frame, together with the generic-space CONTAINER schema, creates the possibility of evoking a mapping onto *Volk* or nation or state, all of which come with a cultural frame, 'the body politic'. In the subsequent text, this projection is made explicit, and the body/host/people is particularised to *das deutsche Volk*.

Running the blend further produces disastrous conceptualisations. Given the Jew/parasite compression and the host/people compression, and given the disease and medicine frame, it follows in the blend that 'the host people




Figure 6. The anti-Semite blend

(*Wirtsvolk*) dies out after a shorter or longer period', and this inevitably ('wherever he appears'), because of the essential aetiology defined in the parasite and disease frames. It further follows from the disease and medicine frame, that the fatal disease caused in the host can be cured by removing it or destroying the parasite. The parasite actual *is* the Jew in the blend, not 'mere metaphor'.

It scarcely needs mentioning that this blend was made explicit in words and action. However, it should be mentioned also that the blending nexus just described is a coherent cognitive system, supported by text, that can be made explicit to varying degrees. The danger is that it can be communicated in text and talk with unpredictable results: it can be elaborated under certain social conditions up to the point of enactment.

6. Conclusion: Can texts be cognitively contagious?

Texts are complex structures that prompt readers to construct conceptualisations. They draw on existing cognitive capacities and manipulate them. The

effects on readers are not of course totally predictable – and readers, as we have said, are not absolutely manipulable. The cognitive ingredients that readers assemble are a kind of *bricolage* guided by the linguistic input. The cognitive structures are not *in* the texts, they are in people's heads. They can be transferred by texts, but once in people's heads they can be elaborated in variable ways, depending on social and psychological factors.

This is not to say that any conceptual construct whatsoever can act in a meme-like way. Possibly, the conceptual constructs themselves need to be already dormant in the social and psychological environment. No one really knows how to solve the chicken and egg problem here. We might, however, hypothesise that conceptual constructs can become meme-like and 'infect' the mind (under the right social conditions) when they have complex blending potential that recruits fundamental knowledge domains along with the core mechanisms of metaphor. There is a further ingredient that seems to go along with textualised memes of this kind – the delivery of some kind of credibility assurance and epistemic warrant.

We have seen that the propositional tier combines with a dispersed metaphorical tier to produce a powerful inferencing potential. Why 'powerful'? We can go some way towards answering this question by following the speculations of Mithen (1996), Gelman et al. (1994), Hirschfeld (1994), Sperber (1996), Atran (1990), Boyer (1990) and others, according to whom, racial categorisation emerges as a product of blending across mental modules. Specifically, the idea is that the social intelligence domain is blended with the intuitive essentialist theory found in humans (Gelman et al. 1994; Hirschfeld 1994), with the zoological module which orients the human mind to the classification of natural kinds (each with its own essence), and, particularly in Mithen's account, with the technical (tool-making) module. Thus human groups come to be 'naturally' classified as non-human beings that can be manipulated. Language as discourse prompts for conceptual blending, and the domains just mentioned are natural and possibly innate. They almost form themselves spontaneously under the right textual stimulus.

Moreover, the blending processes provide a mental space in which inferences can be drawn that were not present in the input domains, and where new concepts and plans can emerge. This is not quite Dawkins's sense of memetic replication – but it matches his intuition that memes somehow proliferate in the mind. However, as I have been at pains to point out, they do not *necessarily* do so. There must be other conditions that constrain individual minds to run the blend in certain directions and to communicate the results. And there must be reasons why their critical module is inactive. None the less, if memes exist

in some meaningful cognitive and socio-psychological sense, this is where they hide and do their dirty work.

Put in other terms, no one *had* to read *Mein Kampf*, form racist concepts or perform racist actions. The reasons people did so must be various. Apart from publicity, promotion and propaganda, two possibilities spring to mind. The first is that people read it because it carried a warrant of truth and relevance – people who already respected Hitler, his ideas and his policies would want to read and believe his book. We have seen that the structure of *Mein Kampf* incorporates careful credibility claims. The second is, put simplistically, that the first reader distilled the ideas that interested him or her and told his or her neighbour, who either then bought the book or passed on the ideas verbally to his or her friend, or both. In both these scenarios, we still have to explain why the ideas (or memes) were so influential, and this brings us back to the main suggestion being made in this chapter: that if there is such a thing as meme propagation one of its main modes of operation lies in the properties of metaphorical expressions and the process of blending.

Notes

1. Nor are ideas passed on from one receiver to another just as they are, automatically. Sometimes, they just 'fall on deaf ears'. Sometimes they are mullied over, worked on and transformed before being passed on. Sometimes they are put in the mental or physical waste bin. The point is implied by Sperber (1996) and by Pinker (1999:210).
2. Such modules, if they exist, also may have their own procedural components.
3. Quotations in the present paper are from the Mannheim translation (1969), and all analyses are based on the German edition of 1939.
4. The notion of degrees of entrenchment has, to my knowledge, no back up from empirical work, either psychological or neurological; but it is attractive as a hypothesis.
5. At least in the English translation; all nouns are written in German with capital letters, of course.
6. See Lakoff and Turner (1989); Lovejoy (1960). On this metaphor in Hitler see Hawkins (2001).
7. To be sure, the categorisation here is an analyst's interpretation, but one that we can assume the text itself assumes. The grouping reflects lexical relations and grammatical constraints.
8. The German preposition is *bei*: 'bei dem Juden...?'

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Morpho-syntactic and textual realizations as deliberate pragmatic argumentative linguistic tools?

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1. Introduction

Discourse is not only the *locus* where the struggle for power is won or lost. Discourse itself is a form of power. In Lévy's words:

Le discours n'est peut-être pas, comme le voulait Aristote, ce lieu neutre et pacifié où se disent les affrontements; pas davantage, comme le veulent les marxistes, un instrument de la politique qu'opresseurs et opprimés mettent, tour à tour, à leur service; pas non plus pour autant, comme le disent les foucauldians, un enjeu, même décisif, dans la lutte pour le pouvoir. Il est bel et bien du pouvoir, la forme même du pouvoir, tout pétri de pouvoir jusque dans les formes les plus discrètes des tours de sa rhétorique.

(Lévy cit. in Bandhauer 1989:15)

The political speech is a prototypical example of discourse as power. In critical discourse analysis it is argued that a number of scientific disciplines such as history, sociology, political science and philosophy, to name some of the most important ones, have to be drawn upon in order to fully grasp and comprehend the complex dimensions of discourse (Fairclough 1999; Wodak 2002; van Dijk 2001; Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000). Discourse analysis has become an interdisciplinary subject. The danger inherent in this multidimensional approach to discourse analysis is that language itself, as the primary material of discourse no longer receives the analytical attention it deserves. Fairclough reminds analysts that "textual analysis should mean analysis of the texture of texts, their

form and organization, and not just commentaries on the ‘content’ of texts which ignore texture” (Fairclough 1999:4).

In agreement with this critique, we argue that the first stage in discourse analysis must necessarily consist of a minute linguistic analysis of the corpora. With regard to political speeches we proceed from the conviction that in a first stage discursive strategies are to be analysed purely linguistically, regardless of historical, political or philosophical messages expressed by the respective linguistic structures. The detailed content analysis, undoubtedly as important as the linguistic analysis, should, however, be discussed only in a second step following the strictly linguistic investigation.

What do we understand by discursive strategies? Language provides the speaker with a variety of possibilities to express the messages he or she aims to convey to his or her audience. In many cases it is up to him or her to specify complements or to leave them unspecified, to choose between active and passive diathesis, to resort to deverbal nouns rather than to finite verbs, to use impersonal constructions instead of personal ones, to foreground or background information by marked serialization, to speak through metaphors rather than through literal meanings, – to name but a few. These possibilities are classified in the categories of discursive strategies such as those of vagueness, polarization, manipulated communicative relevance, mystification, or genericity. In our analysis we decompose the linguistic structures of political speeches in order to afterwards lay bare the discursive strategies, used consciously or unconsciously by the speaker to convey messages to the audience from a certain perspective.

Language use is subjective. Everything linguistically expressed is perspectivated. For this reason manipulation is, at least to a certain degree, inherent in ‘language in use’.

This paper will focus on two aspects to illustrate the approach: (a) the omission of complements as an element of the strategy of vagueness, and (b) semantic-lexical bipolarity as part of the strategy of polarization.

2. Definite and indefinite omissions: The strategy of vagueness

In this section three questions will be investigated: (a) how it is possible to manipulate in the political speech by omitting complements, (b) which are the different pragmatic functions of omissions and (c) whether omissions can be considered discursive strategies. However, before tackling these questions the theoretical basis of our investigation ought to be briefly clarified.

Valence theory provides us with an adequate theoretical framework within which omissions can be plausibly explained on both the syntactic and the semantic level (Ágel 2000).

Valence is a lexical phenomenon. A lexeme creates openings for its participants, which means, as far as the verb is concerned, that it requires a certain number of complements to lay the foundation for a well-formed syntactic structure. Obligatory complements or actants are to be distinguished from optional ones on the one hand and both obligatory and optional complements from free adjuncts on the other hand. Many of the so-called free adjuncts are not really free, though, which means that they cannot occur in any context, either.

According to Grice's cooperation principle (1975:45ff.) the speaker has to be as informative as required by the communicative situation without being redundant or ambiguous. Consequently, structurally obligatory actants of a verb, which can be derived from the context, may often be left out in the concrete utterance. Structural necessity, a quality of the system, refers to *langue*, whereas communicative necessity refers to *parole*. The structural vacancies opened by the verb exist on a semantic-logical level and don't cease to exist if the respective argument is not realized morphologically or lexically. An argument being or not being realized morphologically or lexically as complement only means that a structurally existing vacancy is explicitly or implicitly occupied. It never means though – in the case of not being realized – that it has disappeared (Nikula 1986:264).

Elliptic constructions lacking complements can be classified into definite omissions and indefinite ones. Complements completing definite omissions are to be found in the context or even in the same sentence whereas those of indefinite omissions are to be recovered by the reader or listener in the context, in his or her general or situational knowledge, in his or her *Weltwissen* or *knowledge of the world*. Definite omissions, functioning as implicit anaphoras, are to be understood as instructions to look for the extensional reference (Sæbø 1996:87) in the contextual surroundings. The contextually given definite complement doesn't pass the relevance filter (Storrer 1992:257) and is therefore removed. Indefinite omissions are only bound by existential quantification (Nikula 1985:174; Sæbø1996:187).

As there is no single objectively correct or appropriate completion of indefinite omissions, it is those that can thus be used for various goals in manipulative discourse.

The very meaning of the verb accompanied by its required complements is different from the one of the verb without complements. This is particularly

true of verbs with poor intensional features. As previously mentioned, arguments often remain unrealised in order to avoid redundancies. In other cases, however, it may be communicative-illocutionary reasons that account for the omission. It may be a certain intention on the part of the speaker or author to translate some arguments while hiding others.

The following statements by Franco, Mussolini and Pétain will provide an insight into the wide range of possible reasons for concealing arguments or, linguistically speaking, for leaving them unspecified. In some cases the reasons for omissions seem quite obvious, in others the clear assignment of reasons to omissions appears rather daring and can therefore only be tentative.

In the following statements the complements of the verbs neither appear in the verbs' immediate surroundings, nor in the context:

a. Genericity

The first two samples seem to express generally accepted principles:

- (1) I popoli diventano grandi osando, rischiando, soffrendo, non mettendosi ai margini della strada in una attesa parassitaria e vile. (Mussolini 1941:57)
Peoples become great by venturing, risking, suffering, not by putting themselves on the roadside in parasitical and cowardly expectation.
- (2) Nuestra obra podría no ser perfecta, y nuestros hombres, discutidos; quizá no sean ni los más sabios ni los mejores, pero de lo que no hay duda es de que son los que tienen mejor voluntad de hacer. (Franco 1945b:619)
Our work might not be perfect and our men disputed; maybe they are neither the wisest nor the best. However, there is no doubt that they are the most willing to act.

Not being specified the complements of the verbs *osare*, *rischiare*, *soffrire*; *hacer* as variables refer to classes of situations. For this reason statements like these appear as general truths.

b. Habituality

In the next two utterances, whose first actants are clearly identified, the speakers are referring to recurring situations and events:

- (3) La Germania è in grado di resistere e di determinare il fallimento dei piani nemici. (Mussolini 1944:135)
Germany is able to resist and to determine the failure of the enemy plans.
- (4) J'ai maintes fois demandé, et avec quelle insistance, d'établir entre vous l'accord des pensées. (Pétain 1943b:319)

I have asked several times, and with great insistence, that an agreement of thought be reached among you.

The message of the first sentence is that Germany is able to resist whatever and whenever need be. In the second sentence Pétain doesn't say explicitly to whom he had talked. What is more important is that he has asked several times. Neither of the two utterances refers to a single event. The first refers to a range of unspecified potential dangers to which Germany would be able to resist whereas the second is about a series of concrete events.

c. Contrast

Complements are also left out to make contrasts obvious. The same verb, whose complements remain unidentified, is used twice. It is the implicit unspecified complements whose difference is a logical consequence of the difference between the respective first actants of the verbs, which account for the effect of contrast in the first statement:

- (5) L'Asse lotta nella certezza della vittoria, la Gran Bretagna lotta perché, come ha detto Halifax, non ha altra scelta. (Mussolini 1941:56)
The Axis fights in the certainty of victory, Great Britain fights because, as Halifax said, it has no other choice.

The situation is different in the second case:

- (6) Nosotros no venimos a dejar hacer; hemos venido a hacer. (Franco 1945b:619)
We have not come to let act; we have come to act.

The first person plural is the first actant of the verbs *venimos* and *hemos venido*. It is the potential agent of *hacer* in the two infinitive constructions *dejar hacer* and *venir a hacer* that is different. The agent of *hacer* in *dejar hacer* cannot be recovered whereas the one of *hacer* in *hemos venido a hacer* is Franco himself with the other politicians.

d. Relevance to the present situation

Omitting complements also serves to insist on the relevance of the verbal meaning to the present situation. This is particularly true of intensionally rich verbs which is illustrated by our first example:

- (7) D'ora innanzi può accadere che, specie nei rapporti privati, ogni italiano sia sospettato. (Mussolini 1943:3)

From now on it may happen that, especially in private relationships, every Italian will be suspected.

Suspicion causes distrust. The very fact of being suspected is enough for people to become sceptical. The motives behind the suspicion seem irrelevant. The deictic temporal adverbial reinforces the relevance to the presence.

In the second example it is a deictic local adverbial used for this purpose:

- (8) Je me permets ici de donner quelques conseils. (Pétain 1941c: 125)
I allow myself to give some advice.

The indirect object or third actant is not mentioned which again helps underline the verbal meaning of *donner* and makes Pétain appear as the generous, prudent and benevolent benefactor in the given situation.

e. Emphasis of modifiers

The emphasis of modifiers at the cost of complements is a further reason for omitting the latter which is shown in the sentences (9) and (10):

- (9) Dove possibile, si è resistito con accanimento e talvolta con furore.
(Mussolini 1941: 53)
Wherever possible one resisted with determination and sometimes with fury.

Clearly, in this case the motive of habituality also plays a certain role. It seems obvious, though, that the relatively long modal circonstant in the final position gains communicative relevance because the listener's attention is not drawn to a complement of *resistere* which is structurally but in this case not communicatively obligatory.

The same is true of the following statement by Pétain:

- (10) Renoncez à la haine, car elle ne crée rien; on ne construit que dans l'amour et dans la joie. (Pétain 1941a: 113)
Give up hatred because it does not create anything. One can only build in love and joy.

In this sentence the final circonstant *dans l'amour et dans la joie* is emphasized again, first because of its final position and second due to the omission of the complement of the verb *construire*. Apart from the motive of emphasis of modifiers it is the one of genericity rather than the one of habituality which is also to be regarded as partly responsible for the omission of the complement in this statement.

f. Avoidance of direct confrontation

Direct confrontation between speaker and listener, provoked by too much directness or explicitness is also avoided by the omission of complements referring to delicate issues or to people involved in those. The omission of complements is consequently also a diplomatic strategy of getting messages across implicitly. Moreover, by leaving out complements the speaker is not required to put forward any arguments to back up what he is saying. Furthermore, he may vaguely allude to situations or political constellations which might not even be objectively correct without having to assume responsibility for it. Two more examples will illustrate this complex strategy:

Mussolini declared in Milan in 1944:

- (11) È Milano che deve dare e darà gli uomini, le armi, la volontà e il segnale della riscossa! (Mussolini 1944: 138)
It is Milan which has to give and will give the men, the weapons, the will and the signal for the counter-attack.

Mussolini refrains from saying to whom or to what Milan has to 'give men'. If he completed the sentence or filled the vacancy for the third actant, he would have to say that Milan was to 'give' or sacrifice men to the war, that – in terms of semantic cases – 'war' was to be the receiver or even beneficiary of the patient 'men'.

Pétain speaks about suffering without specifying the reason for it. He says:

- (12) Vous avez souffert, vous souffrirez encore. (Pétain 1940: 66)
You have been suffering and you will suffer more.

If Pétain added the complement he might either strengthen the French resistance to the German occupation or he might as well have to justify his own policy. As neither of the two scenarios would be convenient for him, it is safer for him to leave out the complements.

In answer to the questions posed initially, we conclude that it can be argued that (a) the omission of complements does serve manipulation in the political speech; (b) that the omission of complements is used to express genericity, habituality and contrast as well as the relevance to the present situation of an action represented by the verb all by itself; moreover, leaving out complements allows for the emphasis of modifiers as well as for avoidance of direct confrontation between speaker and listener, and (c) it is justified to regard omissions of complements as a discursive strategy, namely as a strategy of vagueness. Unspecified arguments often contain essential but unpleasant infor-

mation which is withheld from the listener for strategic reasons. The speaker simply doesn't want to lose the listener's support.

3. Semantic-lexical bipolarity: The strategy of polarization

Polarization between good and evil, between friend and foe, or to put it less linguistically, black-and-white painting is an important strategy in political discourse. There is no room for grey areas or obvious ambiguities of any kind, for those might allow for critical and independent reflection on the listener's part. After listening to a political speech the audience should have a clear, unequivocal picture of which ideas are worth fighting and suffering for and which must be categorically rejected and fought against.

However, a political speech is rarely about philosophical, religious, socio-economic or socio-political convictions only. It is rather about the concrete people representing them or representing policies through which the respective convictions should materialize. Consequently, the political speech must make it easy for the listener to identify with one group and to ostracize the other.

However, in many cases the 'good' and the 'bad' one are not directly compared with each other. The 'good' are highlighted and the bad are put down, though very often not in the same context.

In attempting to describe the quality of the speaker's black-and-white painting, there are three degrees of obviousness or transparency in the linguistic discussion of polarization in the political speech:

a. The first degree refers to obvious, unequivocal and blunt utterances on the 'good' or on the 'bad'. It suffices for the listener to hear a few key-words in order to qualify the individual or group named by the speaker as good or bad. In a lexicological analysis those key-words can be grouped together to make the picture, drawn by the speaker, appear perfectly clear. Neither complex context knowledge nor subtle linguistic analyses are necessary to get the message, which is illustrated by the following examples.

Mussolini is telling the Italians what the good Italian is like:

- (13) *Attraverso voi ho voluto parlare al popolo italiano, all'autentico, vero, grande popolo italiano, quello che combatte leoninamente sui fronti di terra, di mare, di cielo, quello che di buon mattino è in piedi per andare a lavorare nei campi, nelle officine, negli uffici, quello che non si permette lussi, nemmeno innocenti.* (Mussolini 1941:58)

Through you I have wanted to speak to the Italian people, to the authentic, real, great Italian people which has been fighting lion-like at the land, sea, and 'sky' fronts, which gets up early in the morning to go to work in the fields, in workshops, in offices, which doesn't allow itself any luxury, not even the most modest.

The good Italian fights bravely for Italy, works hard, is modest and can therefore do without luxury. This statement is, however, also to be understood as a warning for those who are not like that.

Pétain explicitly states who his enemies are within France:

- (14) Je vous le dis avec toute la conviction dont je suis pénétré: si la paix qu'attendent ces mauvais Français consiste à revenir aux mœurs politiques, économiques et sociales d'avant-guerre, la France ne se relèvera pas. (Pétain 1943a:300)

I am telling you with all the conviction I am filled with: if the peace expected by those bad Frenchmen consists in getting back to the political, economic and social customs of the pre-war period, France will not rise again.

The bad Frenchmen, *ces mauvais Français*, still adhering to the pre-war political and socio-economic order, are reluctant to accept the changes Pétain has brought about. They are the first to endanger his position and that's why he logically considers them his arch-enemies.

Franco tells his people point-blank that for one thing foreigners are not in a position to judge the situation in Spain and for another that it was the social-republicans who were responsible for the disastrous political disintegration of Spain:

- (15) [...] el problema español es exclusivamente español, y no puede juzgarse a través de la mentalidad ni de la situación de los otros pueblos, que, gracias a Dios, no han llegado todavía al estado de descomposición política que la nación española había alcanzado bajo el signo republicanosocialista.

(Franco 1945a:10)

[...] the Spanish problem is exclusively Spanish, and it cannot be judged by either the mentality or the situation of other peoples, which, thank God, have not yet got to the state of political decomposition which the Spanish nation reached under the republican-socialist 'sign'.

b. The second degree of obviousness or transparency is inferior to the first and means that the obviousness of the speaker's judgment is dependent of the listener's knowledge of the context.

In one of his discourses Mussolini takes up the issue of Bolshevism:

- (16) Un giorno un ambasciatore sovietico a Roma, Potemkin, mi disse: ‘La prima Guerra mondiale bolscevizzò la Russia, la seconda bolscevizzerà l’Europa’. Questa profezia non si avvererà, ma se ciò accadesse, anche questa responsabilità ricadrebbe in primo luogo sulla Gran Bretagna.

(Mussolini 1944: 135)

One day a Soviet ambassador to Rome, Potemkin, said to me: “The First World War bolshevized Russia, the Second will bolshevize Europe”. This prophecy will not come true but, if it did, Great Britain would again have to be blamed in the first place.

In case Bolshevism gained a foothold in Europe, Great Britain would be held responsible for it by Mussolini. The listener, however, has to know two things in order to be able to identify Bolshevism, Russia and Great Britain as Mussolini’s enemies: first, he or she has to know what Bolshevism is, and second, that both Democrats and Communists are fighting fascism. Often the information necessary to understand what is being said, is to be gathered from the context. Sometimes, however, this information is not given in the speech, as is the case here with Bolshevism.

Pétain refers to one particularly evil group of people without explicitly stating who they are:

- (17) Les responsables de vos maux, les fauteurs de la guerre et de la défaite, vous les connaissez.

(Pétain 1943a: 299)

Those who are responsible for your misfortunes, the warmongers guilty of the defeat, you know them.

The listeners themselves have to know the recent history of France in order to find out who Pétain is talking about. A concept of the inner enemy has been conveyed to the audience. However, it is left to each individual listener to identify this unnamed enemy.

Franco also refers to the Communist enemy, however, without really explaining what is so bad about him and what he actually did. At any rate, for Franco, Communism counts among the most horrible nightmares:

- (18) Que el orden económico necesita de grandes mejoras y perfeccionamientos es evidente, y nosotros así lo practicamos; pero a lo que conduce su destrucción lo demuestran de una manera elocuente los veintiocho años de ensayos y miserias comunistas.

(Franco 1945a: 11)

That the economic order needs extensive improvement and perfection is obvious and that is what we are practicing, but what its destruction leads to is shown clearly by the twenty-eight years of communist attempts and misery.

Franco neither explains what kind of “misery” he is referring to, nor does he specify the “attempts” he is talking about.

The discursive strategy of polarization in the sense of this second group can be accounted for in terms of semasiology and onomasiology. Either, terms which are positively or negatively connoted in the respective culture are used without being defined or specified, or concepts are given without being denoted, which means that the extensional reference is not explicitly identified by the speaker.

c. In the third group of linguistic phenomena to be interpreted from the perspective of polarization, the degree of transparency or obviousness is the lowest. By means of minute analyses of verbal lexemes, it should be detected what the ‘good ones’ and the ‘bad ones’ supposedly really do and say in the speaker’s opinion.

Verbs play a crucial role in the sentence and in the text. Due to their argument structures verbs are responsible for syntactic structures. On the semantic level they determine the case-frame of the sentence. The perspective from which a scene is represented depends on the choice of the verb. Every linguistic representation is the result of perspectivation. Perspectivation is a condition of cognition (Welke 1994: 13). There is no neutral reflection of perception since denotation and designation necessarily depend on the subjective choice of lexemes (Welke 1988: 138). In other words, as soon as perceptions or thoughts are expressed linguistically, those are perspectivated by the respective speaker. To put it differently, in the process of being expressed linguistically, perceptions and thoughts are subject to *significative refraction* (Wotjak 1991, 1994). It is the verb that determines which participants of a cognitive scene are perspectivated. However, the verb doesn’t only indicate its arguments but also induces at least some of its modifiers. Others, however, are merely compatible with the specific verbal sememe, without being either indicated or induced.

For our analysis of polarization in political speech it is important to find out in what way verbs implicitly or explicitly attribute certain qualities to the ‘good ones’ and to the ‘bad ones’. For this purpose verbs have to be decomposed into their functors and modifiers (Wotjak 1996: 101).

Functors, as opposed to modifiers, are features which are relevant for valence (Helbig 1992: 154). According to Bondzio (2001), functors identify mean-

ing whereas modifiers differentiate meaning. However, Bondzio (2001:166) also sees modifiers in some cases as relevant for valence.

Functors, containing the slots for arguments, and modifiers, modifying functors, have equally important functions in the constitution of meaning (Wotjak 1994:172). Functors, defined by Bondzio as *generalized predicates* which cannot be further paraphrased (Bondzio 1993:23), linked to other functors, form functor structures as *socialized and usualized representations of situational knowledge* (Wotjak 1994:171). Functor structures organize the lexicon in syntactic-semantic fields because the elements of a field have the same vacancies for arguments and share one or more semes. It is the modifiers which identify the distinctive differences between the elements within a field.

Functor structures allow for the classification of verbs as well as for the recognition of the decisive modifiers or *differentia semes* (Wotjak 1991:113), which distinguish them from each other. As functors are semantic primitives, we will have to concentrate on their modifiers for they reveal the qualities, decisive for our analysis.

An example illustrating the importance of modifiers is based on the following functor structure:

$\lambda x \lambda y$ (CAUSE (x, RELATION R TO (y))) (actor, patient), which means:
(actor) x causes: (patient) y HAS RELATION R TO x (Bondzio 1993:44)

R represents the amount of relations established between y and x through the respective actions. Whether or not y is affected is irrelevant for the meaning (Bondzio 1993:44). The following verbs from speeches by Franco, Mussolini and Pétain are all based on this very same functor structure: /*engañar, desfigurar, elevar, calumniar, falsear; ingannare; injurier*/.

- (19) El mundo está totalmente *engañado* con respecto a ustedes. Evidentemente se ha *engañado* a la opinión pública universal, queriendo hacer aparecer al régimen español con características y afinidades que no le van.
(Franco 1945a:10)

The world is totally deceived concerning you. Obviously universal public opinion has been deceived, as the Spanish regime appears with characteristics and tendencies which don't suit it.

- (20) El fariseísmo político se encarga de *desfigurar* nuestra realidad.
(Franco 1945a:10)

Political pharisaical self-righteousness sees to it that our reality is disfigured.

- (21) Así también, considerando puro y plausible el ideal de *elevar* y dignificar al hombre, redimiéndole por la justicia social de sus miserias y necesidades,

condenamos de la manera más absoluta la explotación de estos anhelos de las masas para incurrir en la aberración de destruir un orden económico que, desaparecido, sumiría a las naciones en la catástrofe, y que forzosamente, con el tiempo, habría que volver a levantar. (Franco 1945a: 11)
Therefore, considering the ideal of elevating and dignifying man pure and plausible, thus saving him through social justice from his misery and needs, we absolutely condemn the exploitation of the longings of the masses only to make the mistake of destroying an economic order, which – once it has disappeared – would plunge the nations into a catastrophe and which, in the course of time, would have to be re-established anyway.

- (22) Y si alguien con malicia y con *calumnias* intenta *falsearlo* (España como uno de los más fuertes eslabones), al final de cada jornada encontraréis en esta Radio Nacional la realidad española, la verdad de España.

(Franco 1945a: 12)

And if anyone with malice and slander tries to falsify it (Spain as one of the strongest chain-links), at the end of every day you will find Spanish reality, the truth of Spain, on this National Radio.

- (23) È stato il re che ha consigliato i suoi complici di *ingannare* nel modo più miserabile la Germania, smentendo anche dopo la firma che trattative fossero in corso.

(Mussolini 1943: 3)

It was the king who advised his accomplices to deceive Germany in the most miserable way, denying, even after signing, that negotiations were taking place.

- (24) Pendant des années, ils ont *injurié* et affaibli la patrie, exaspéré les haines, mais ils n'ont rien fait d'efficace pour améliorer la condition des travailleurs, parce vivant de leur révolte, ils avaient intérêt à encourager ses causes.

(Pétain 1941a: 113)

For years they insulted and weakened our nation, increased hostility but they didn't do anything efficient to improve the working conditions because living by their revolt, they were only interested in encouraging its causes.

In this case it is indeed the modifiers referring to the actions establishing the relations through which the differences of the verbs become obvious. This means that differences between the sememes of these verbs only depend on their respective modifiers. These verbs are assigned to one or to the other group – to the 'good' one or to the 'bad' one – only because of their modifiers referring to actions causing certain RELATIONS. The extended functor structure could be the following:

calumniar:

‘x causes: y HAS RELATION R TO x by x saying *untrue* things about y to z’;

engañar; ingannare:

‘x causes: y HAS RELATION R TO x by x saying *untrue* things to y’;

desfigurar:

‘x causes: y HAS RELATION R TO x by x making y look *ugly*’;

elegar:

‘x causes: y HAS RELATION R TO x by x making y *greater* in degree’;

falsear:

‘x causes: y HAS RELATION R TO x by x making y *false*’;

injurier:

‘x causes: y HAS RELATION R TO x by x saying things to y that cause *pain* to y’s feelings’;

After the analysis of the verbs, the sememes of the modifiers must be classified in categories relevant for our purpose, which is again the uncovering of positive or negative connotations. Again it can be seen that the terms and phrases defining the modifiers are in general either positively or negatively connoted in the respective culture and correspondingly they are associated with either good or evil in the world. /*great*/, despite being extremely context-dependent, is likely to be intuitively associated with ‘good’ whereas /*untrue, ugly, false; pain*/ will rather belong to the ‘realm of evil’.

In this section we have dealt with explicit and implicit polarization in the political speech. In our first group of utterances ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are outspokenly declared as such. The second group of polarizing utterances, whose lack of clarity can be accounted for semasiologically or onomasiologically respectively, already requires more ‘creativity’ on the part of the listener. Either a positively or negatively connoted linguistic item is given without being explicated, or the other way round, a positive or negative concept is presented without being assigned to a lexeme, i.e., without being specified lexically.

As to the third group, verbs denoting supposedly good or bad actions and qualities have to be decomposed in order to find out what is really ‘good’ or ‘bad’ about the actions and qualities of presumed friends and foes referred to in the speech.

4. Conclusion

Two facets out of the wide range of language-immanent investigations have given an insight into the first step of our analytic approach to the political speech which we consider the indispensable first stage in discourse analysis.

In the first part we have dealt with morpho-syntactic explicitness. What is not said sometimes turns out to be more important than what is said.

In the second part we looked at lexical-semantic explicitness. Through the graded model of transparency it becomes obvious that even very few positively or negatively connoted semes allow for the assignment of the respective sememes to 'good' or 'evil', which is the basis of what we call the strategy of polarization.

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Towards a typology of manipulative processes*

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1. The interdisciplinary study of manipulation in totalitarian ideologies

The theme of the manipulative processes that were instrumental in installing, consolidating and preserving the totalitarian governments of the 20th century is currently attracting particular scientific and cultural interest for various reasons.

Firstly the totalitarian regimes in their classical form are generally considered – at least in Western societies – a concluded experience we should absolutely not repeat. The distance which separates us from those situations and those events makes it possible for us to look at them in a more detached way, but, at the same time, such distance is still limited: the continuity of memory is not lost, nor does our examination require an excessive amount of mediation, and, most importantly, the feeling of the dramatic character of this experience is still kept alive.

Now, it is of primary importance that this memory is kept alive for the survival itself of our democratic societies. Undoubtedly, it is essential to this purpose to continue and to extend the practice of critical scrutiny by historians and political scientists. Yet an important contribution to this work could come at the present stage of the evolution of scientific research from the enormous development and progressive integration of the disciplinary area of ‘communication sciences’.¹ This scientific development provides us with powerful new methodological tools for the analysis and evaluation of communicative interaction. It is quite apparent that totalitarian regimes founded their power not only and not mainly on military and economic constraints: particularly after their installing phase a whole communicative system was devoted to consolidating

and perpetuating the ideological control over the whole cultural network of the subject societies. A systematic application of communication sciences to the study of these systems will provide us with a significantly deeper understanding of totalitarian organizations in their entirety.

The relevance and usefulness of an application of communication sciences to specific moments of such investigations can be illustrated easily with a few examples:

- Semiotic and linguistic disciplines such as semantics and text analysis (particularly after their pragmatic turn), semiotics of visual and audiovisual texts, rhetoric, theory of argumentation and logic of ordinary language can support the analysis and evaluation of messages in their inner organization and functioning.
- Communication psychology helps to explain the cognitive and relational circumstances facilitating (or preventing) the consent of individuals and groups to the manipulative treatment applied by totalitarian ideologies.
- Studies in organizational, institutional and even corporate communication, with their analytical tools and certain theoretical notions such as communicative flow, specific public, ‘we-ness’, belonging, invisible values (intangible assets), and so on, can strongly contribute, at this stage of the research, to a deepened and innovative understanding of the communicative systems of totalitarian states in their holistic aspects.
- Sociology of communication, media studies, pedagogy of media and educational communication help us to verify the impact of totalitarian communicative system on society (invasion and exploitation of the media, influence on culture, shared attitudes and lifestyles, conflicts between traditional and ideological cultures, resistances and emergence of communities with democratic or antidemocratic visions, etc.).

We can envisage the empirical study of historical totalitarian ideologies with the abovementioned methodologies as based on three broad types of documents, respectively connected to three phases of the dynamics of a totalitarian ideology:

1. *Definition of the ideology*: the analysis of foundational texts;
2. *Propagation*: the analysis of the media;
3. *Cultural reproduction*: analysis of schoolbooks and dictionaries.

As for our specific topic, it is quite clear to me that we will be able to construct an authentic typology of manipulative devices only when we are able to apply this new systematic approach derived from the integration of the

heuristic and methodological power of the various communication sciences mentioned above. Our purpose here is to propose a first hypothesis of typology to be later verified and evaluated by such a systematic research in its manifold implications.

In sketching such a typology, our first task is, as far as I can see, to construct a plausible definition of the term *manipulative*. This is the first step, because if we do not share some notion of manipulation, we have no chance of constructing any reasonable typology of manipulative devices. And here we should not ignore the fact that some people believe that all communication is in itself manipulative because it aims at changing, and thus somehow at *manipulating*, the behaviour of others. The only way for the communication not to be manipulative would be for it not to be effective.

We could simply argue that they refuse to take into account an evident difference shown by a large experience of our everyday life and that we are confronted here by a cultural attitude of mistrust rather than by a truly scientific standpoint, an attitude belonging to a sort of *culture of suspicion*, where parents are considered to be manipulating their children by educating them and a baby should fear being poisoned while sucking her mother's breast. This blunt rebuttal, however, could be perceived as manipulative itself, and we have to take another way of falsifying this position, methodologically more sound.

I must confess that I have not found any fully satisfactory definition of manipulation. After all, not many people have tried to define this concept. We can mention Teun van Dijk's recent opus *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach* (1998). In this book the concept of *manipulation* is placed at the very centre of the process of reproduction and inculcation of ideologies, in the manufacture of consent and management of opinions in the interest of those in power. The effect of manipulation is described as the situation where "people will act as desired out of their own free will" (van Dijk 1998:274).

While a number of "ideological discourse structures" – structures that typically exhibit ideological beliefs or typically may have ideological effects – are singled out and described, manipulation itself is not formally defined by van Dijk. He notices in fact the paucity of the scientific literature on manipulation, as opposed to political commentary or other types of unsystematic remarks ("although frequently used, the notion of manipulation has, to my knowledge, never been made explicit in a theory" (p. 340, n. 10)). He tentatively characterizes manipulation as a form of mental control "of which recipients are not barely aware, or of which they cannot easily control the consequences" (ibid.:275).

Despite the fact that it is presented by its own author as a rough approximation, this concept of manipulation already succeeds in focusing on an essential aspect: a manipulative strategy must largely escape the awareness of the manipulated subject. But this aspect does not exhaust the conditions that define a manipulative event: if, e.g., a benevolent agent secretly leaves a genuine clue for me to find, which then leads me unwittingly to the truth, few people would characterize this behaviour as manipulative.

It could be objected that the malevolent nature of manipulation depends in this context on its aiming at *reproduction and inculcation of ideology*.

Yet it must be observed firstly that the manipulative practices go far beyond the ideological contexts. Secondly, the definition of the term *ideology* is in itself problematic. Van Dijk, for instance, refuses the definition of ideologies as sets of false beliefs and uses it as a more neutral term to refer to any interest-related evaluative socially shared set of beliefs.² In fact, van Dijk (1995: 245 and 258) considers the issue of the objective truth or falsity of ideological beliefs as largely irrelevant for the study of their relationship with discourse (“ideologies are not true or false”)³ as opposed, for instance, to their efficiency in furthering the interests of a group. However, it remains to be shown if, in this framework, the effects of manipulation can really be defined without reference to the truth or falsity of the beliefs entertained by the manipulated.

In van Dijk’s framework the notion of manipulation is strictly connected with the fact that dominant groups can to a certain extent succeed in persuading other people – the ‘dominated groups’ – to adopt an ideology that does not sustain their own interests but those of the dominant ones. But what do we mean when we say that someone does not pursue his/her own *interests* but those of someone else?

We need a more comprehensive approach to the basic dynamics of manipulation that allows us to focus more precisely on the interplay of notions such as *belief* and *deception* with notions such as *interest*, *goal* or *desire*. It is this kind of basic framework we want to lay out here.

2. Action, interaction and manipulation

As, roughly speaking, manipulation is in every case a vice of *communication*, our starting point will be that we can define it only within a conceptual framework describing a communicative event in its fundamental aspects. Our basic claim is that communication can be understood only as a particular type of




Figure 1. Action

human *joint action* (cf. Clark 1996). And joint action is based on actions. So, we shall start from *action*.

We speak of *action* (thus not simply of *event*) when an agent, attracted by the hypothesis of a state of affairs corresponding to some of her/his goals (desires, dreams, ideals, needs, etc., in other words: something positive attracting the agent)⁴ activates a causal chain that is expected to realize this state of affairs (Figure 1).

Generally speaking, a joint action can take place when an agent is not able or does not want to pursue his/her own goal him/herself and negotiates with other people their engagement in the causal chain. Two different scenarios of joint action can be envisaged:

1. Both agents share the same goal. In this case we can speak of cooperation: one single action with two co-agents (when, for example, two agents cooperate in helping an injured person)
2. Each agent pursues his/her goal by realising the goal of the other. We properly speak in this case of interaction. Two inter-agents having different goals leave the realisation of their respective goals to the action of the other, relying on each other for the satisfaction of their desires.

Cooperation could be represented as follows in Figure 2. Interaction proper can be represented as follows in Figure 3.

In order to realize a cooperation as well as an interaction, humans need to communicate. And communication involves, in its turn, forms of coopera-




Figure 2. Cooperation




Figure 3. Interaction




Figure 4. An electoral promise

tion⁵ as well as forms of interaction. Here, different mutual commitments are exchanged in relation to the different speech acts that are accomplished each time. Communicative interaction allows each inter-agent to construct an action scheme coinciding to some extent with the action scheme of the other inter-agent.

Roughly speaking, X shows to Y that Y obtains a certain benefit or avoids some evil by cooperating in the required way.

Consider e.g., the following instance of the act of conditioned promise:

- (1) If you give your vote to me, I'll double your pay.

It can be analysed as in Figure 4.

And now let us consider in (2) another possible speech act of the same candidate: an allegation of misappropriation.

- (2) My rival is a thief

Here another action scheme is presented to the elector, where the intended positive state of affairs proposed to Y is

- (3) By voting candidate X you avoid being governed by a thief.

Should we consider the above mentioned messages as manipulative? Not at all, if the promise made in the former is sincere and both the statement made in

the latter and the involved presumption – that only the rival is a thief while the speaker is not – are true. At most, we could say that our candidate appears in the former message demagogical,⁶ and in the latter impolite. On the contrary, these messages become manipulative if the promise made in the former is *insincere* and the statement and/or the presumption of the latter are *false*.

We conclude by proposing the following definition of manipulation:

A message is manipulative if it twists the vision of the world (physical as well as social – or human⁷ – actual as well as virtual) in the mind of the addressee, so that he/she is prevented from having a healthy attitude towards decision (i.e., an attitude responding to his/her very interest), and pursues the manipulator's goal in the illusion of pursuing her/his own goal.

If we now look at the manipulative versions of the two speech acts from the viewpoint of the above definition of manipulation, we find that they differ significantly. In the first example the manipulator induces the victim to comply by presenting a positive virtual state of affairs depending on an insincere promise conditioned by the compliance itself. Here it is the vision of the social world – a promise is indeed a social fact – and of the connected future state of affairs which is distorted. In the second example, it is the vision of the present human world (dishonesty is a human fact) which is twisted.

It would be easy to imagine some fictitious examples or to find real ones for each variant foreseen by the alternatives considered in our definition of manipulation.

It needs to be clear that the definition given above is not intended as an explanation of the whole complex strategy developed by a manipulative ideological apparatus. It simply focuses on elementary manipulative mechanisms. The fundamental aspect that our definition fails to consider is precisely *how* manipulation can succeed in twisting the addressee's world without being discovered. In fact, in order to succeed a lie has to seem true, an insincere promise must seem authentic, a fallacy must look like a sound argument, a secondary aspect has to appear essential and a deviant or reductive reading of a keyword⁸ must look straightforward and appropriate. In short: what is negative has to be somehow disguised as something positive. At this point, the relevant notion of *strategic manoeuvring* – understood as the comprehensive management of an argumentative enterprise – a notion introduced by the School of Amsterdam, becomes particularly useful (cf. van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2000, 2002).⁹ But, outside argumentation theory, the effectiveness of manipulative strategies can be successfully faced and explained from the viewpoint of cognitive science, in particular in a mind-theoretical perspective (Saussure, this volume); moreover

we have to expect a significant contribution in terms of empirical evidences and enriching insights into the individual and social dynamics of consent building from the psycho-social research on persuasion (O'Keefe 2002).

A first thrust into the complexities of the masking strategies adopted by manipulators can be obtained by examining another manipulative version of the former example. Let us imagine that our candidate *sincerely* promises to double the pay of the electors even though he/she is thoroughly aware of the fact that such a measure will lead to the bankruptcy of the entire economic system, therefore compromising the benefit that the electors expected to receive in exchange for their vote. It would be a typical case of manipulation where the perspective of a particular, uncertain, but attractive, benefit blinds the addressee, concealing a danger that will compromise the benefit itself.

It becomes now clear enough that the dynamics of manipulation are very close to the dynamics of human error. More precisely, manipulation involves an error on the part of the manipulated person. In several languages the reflexive form of the verb that means 'to deceive' is used as meaning 'to make a mistake' according to a rather common decausative wordformation pattern: see Latin *fallor*, French *se tromper*, Italian *ingannarsi*. We can now interpret the verb *to manipulate* as 'to induce into error', in other words to foster somebody's errors while blinding her/him by concentrating his/her attention only on some positive, but very partial, aspects of the situation under judgement in the decision making process.

Furthermore, 'to induce into error' has, like many other causative verbs, two possible interpretations:

1. 'to act intentionally in order to foster somebody's error';
2. 'to behave unwillingly in such a way that somebody is induced in error'.

The situation described in (2) occurs if our candidate makes his promise sincerely and *is not aware* at all that the promised measure shall at the end damage the electors or, in the second version, if he sincerely believes that his rival is a thief, even though it is not true.

In our opinion, the most interesting case of manipulation – and at the same time the most likely to succeed – occurs when an already manipulated person aims at convincing another. In fact, in this case the manipulated person does not pursue the goal of the manipulated manipulator but the goal of the original manipulator. Anecdotal evidence and the personal testimony of people who survived totalitarian regimes suggest that the effect of a manipulative device is heavily strengthened if it is applied by somebody who has himself been manipulated.

The manipulation perpetrated by such individuals may be of a mixed type: partially unintentional – because they have been manipulated – and partially intentional (as they might think that a little bit of manipulation can help the ‘Good Cause’). In principle, between these two extremes, various intermediate degrees of *fausse conscience* can be envisaged. I dare say this is a reasonable hypothesis to submit to empirical validation in psychology of communication. Such a picture of the manipulator’s mind would lead to hypothesize also the possibility of *self-manipulation*,¹⁰ where there is no manipulator whose goals are pursued.

The short discussion we have just developed enables us to draw a significant conclusion:

Our task is not, essentially, a moral evaluation, but a critical analysis aiming at discovering manipulative processes (understood as processes that in themselves are the cause of errors in judging and deciding, regardless of the intentional or unintentional nature of their origin) in order to prevent society from repeating errors of the past.

After these rather long but necessary premises, we can now present a first attempt at analysing and classifying manipulative processes. The order of presentation we follow goes from the simpler and most basic processes to the most strategic and complex ones.

3. A classification of manipulative processes

3.1 Falsity and insincerity

Falsity refers to statements and directly twists the vision of reality in the manipulated, while *insincerity* is related in particular to commissive speech acts such as promises.

Falsity takes the form of *disinformation* when the manipulator controls the whole (or, at least, a large part of the) communication system and can therefore avoid the risk of being contradicted by possible competitors.

In every case this manipulative form can succeed if it gets legitimated by a wide consistency with the whole communicative behaviour of the manipulator.¹¹ So the existence of a unique system of mass media reduces the space of citizens’ critical control on the reliability of the broadcasted information. This procedure is particularly effective because people start from their understanding of ‘how things are’ in establishing ‘how things should be’. This is true in

a general perspective: a false vision prevents a healthy attitude to decision because of the ontology-to-ethics connection. For example, the notion we have of 'human being' defines what we have the right to do with a human being and if the concept of human being is distorted, human rights too are misunderstood. The vision I have of reality determines moreover the design of my action, as far as it shapes the manner by which I intervene through my causal chain on reality. In particular, a false picture of what is possible or impossible distorts our decision processes.

Hiding the truth is an aspect of falsity and disinformation. E.g., we could assume that the attitude of the German people towards Hitler's policy would have been quite different if they had sufficiently known the real truth about Hitler's anti-Semitic persecution.

3.2 Fallacies (undue inferences)

We have considered that falsity and insincerity corrupt the vision of the world to which human communication refers. But manipulation can intervene also in the inferential processes of elaborating knowledge and making decisions on the basis of reliable information. Within the rhetorical tradition this type of manipulation is called a *fallacy*. This is undoubtedly the first form of manipulation that gets subjected to scientific analysis (cf. Aristotle's *De sophisticis elenchis*). As the ancient Sophists were believed to systematically apply manipulative distortions to inferential processes, *sophism* is used as a synonym of *fallacy*. Aristotle listed thirteen types of fallacies. Six of them are connected to different linguistic phenomena – like ambiguity and other types of semantic vagueness – that can occur in any historical language and can cause logical inconsistencies within inferential processes (equivocation, amphiboly, combination of words, division of words, accent, and word forms).¹² The language-independent fallacies – that is to say those that do not depend on the *semiotic* function of language – are in their turn seven (accident, *secundum quid*, *ignoratio elenchi*, to state the consequent, *petitio principii*, non-cause as cause and many questions).¹³

Many of these fallacies are particular applications to inferential processes of more general manipulative devices.¹⁴

In the tradition of studies in argumentation and fallacies the medieval logicians deserve a particular mention while, among the modern philosophers, the name of John Locke is bound to the so-called *ad* fallacies.¹⁵

3.3 Violating presuppositions

This type of manipulation was identified by Gottlob Frege (1892), who remarked the manipulative nature of the noun phrase *Der Wille des Volkes* depending on an undue usage of denotative expressions. A fallacy we have already mentioned under the name of ‘many questions’ is based on the same manipulative device, which has a much wider application. This device is grounded in the introduction of false information into discourse structures requiring true and shared information.¹⁶ The manipulative effects of this device are manifold:

- a. The critical control by the addressee over presupposed information is weaker than the one that is exerted over asserted information;
- b. The addressee is led to believe that he is ignorant of something he should already know and hurries ashamed to adhere;
- c. As the common ground on which every human group (nation, race, political party, social class etc.) finds itself consists of presuppositions (in terms of knowledge, beliefs, values etc.), the refusal of any presupposition is felt – and can easily be cast up to – as a betrayal of one’s own group. So all presuppositions work like tests of fidelity towards the group.

3.4 Manipulation exploiting the human instinct of referring to totality

The vices of communication are very often misuses of basically positive human exigencies and tendencies. This is very clearly the case when we have to do with manipulation exploiting the human need of referring to totality: in the cognitive dimension as well as in the ethical one, human beings feel an irresistible tendency to look for principles having general validity, and each particular datum is assumed as a sign of the total truth. And, under certain conditions, this is not only perfectly correct, but represents an authentic accelerator of scientific progress. The defect arises from undue simplifications. An aspect of this undue application of our universalising instinct is referred to by the fallacy of *hasty generalization*.¹⁷ We can directly ascribe to this fallacy the rather common practice of constructing those seemingly harmless ethnical stereotypes which go a long way in creating the type of ideologically polluted terrain where many ethnic conflicts arise.

The risk of manipulative generalisation surfaces in interpersonal relationships as well, when a certain property is transferred from a particular behaviour to the characterization of the entire person:¹⁸

- (4) You are now behaving in an unreasonable way → You are (always) unreasonable → You are an unreasonable person.
- (5) You are now confusing A with B → You always muddle everything up → You are a muddler.

There is another danger of manipulation related to the universalising instinct, which consists in the manipulative exploitation of the *agenda setting* power of the media, the control of which is an important component of political and economic power. No television, radio or print journal would start with the words *What we are broadcasting IS A VERY SMALL SELECTION of the events that took place today*; rather they will conclude saying: *This is THE news for today*. The generally implied claim of newsmakers is that *all* the significant / important / relevant facts are covered. The information given is expected to convey a reliable image of the whole day.

We conclude our short overview of this type of manipulation by briefly considering a particular instance of the ‘totality temptation’ that constitutes an enormous source of manipulative power, which I would call ‘the cake temptation’. This is not, by the way, a sin of gluttony but the tendency to think that the resources we have in front of us make up the totality of possibly available resources. When we reason like that, if someone has taken a piece of cake, he has, in fact, *stolen* my own piece of cake, or, at the very least, he has reduced the piece of cake available for me to enjoy. This very questionable principle is exploited in many demagogic regimes by the irresistible call exemplified in (6).

- (6) Give me the power, I’ll remove the differences.

As all manipulative devices, the cake principle has a certain degree of truth: for example in the political competition (if they win, we lose)¹⁹ and in many games. In many other cases, however, the cake principle is completely incorrect as one can easily bake *another cake*.

3.5 The polarity temptation

This manipulative (and self-manipulative) process is based on an improper interpretation of the logical properties of *semantic paradigms* and so could be listed among the logical fallacies. A semantic paradigm is a set of mutually exclusive predicates. The colours constitute a paradigm because the inherence of a particular colour to a certain substance excludes the inherence of the other colours to the same substance at the same time and under the same respect. If a predicate of a paradigm is affirmed, all other predicates are excluded (im-

plicitly negated); if, instead, a predicate is negated, the disjunction of all other predicates is implicitly affirmed.²⁰ So, if I affirm that John's shirt is red, I exclude that it is white, or yellow, or any other colour, while by saying that John's shirt is not red, I implicitly affirm that it is either yellow, or white, or black, and so on.

Now, if a semantic paradigm consists of two predicates only, the negation of the former becomes the affirmation of the latter: it is the case of the *contradictory* relation. Instead, if a paradigm consists of more than two predicates, the negation of one of them is not necessarily the affirmation of any other predicate in particular: we only affirm that one of the others is the case.

Our manipulative process arises in relation to those paradigms that present a scalar structure, where there is a graduation between one extreme and the other, with the presence of intermediate states:

[*high*... .. *low*];
[*white*... .. *black*];
[*strong*... .. *weak*];
[*good*... .. *bad*];
[*friend*... .. *enemy*].

Here the negation of one extreme does not coincide with the affirmation of the other: they cannot both be true, but they can both be false. So, if we affirm that one extreme is the case, we do negate the other extreme (and all other alternatives in between); on the contrary, if we negate one extreme, we do not affirm that the other extreme is the case. This other extreme becomes just one of the possible alternatives. E.g., if somebody is no friend of mine, he/she is not necessarily my enemy; similarly, *not to hate* does not necessarily mean *to love*.

This important logical difference singled out within the Aristotelian tradition between twofold and manifold²¹ oppositions has been often neglected by linguists, in particular in lexicology and lexicography, where couples of different types like *dead* – *alive* and *friend* – *enemy* are often considered indistinctly *antonymic*. But this distinction is, more importantly, often overlooked by the speakers, who are tempted to consider in any case the negation of one extreme as entailing the affirmation of the other. And so one is prone to accept that:

- (7) What is not white is black.
Who is not good is bad.
If you are not with me you are against me.
The enemy of my enemy is my friend.

A particularly poisonous application of this tendency is related to the psychosocial process of group constitution and identification, where our principles assume the form:

- (8) What is not white is black, and we are white (or the opposite).
Who is not good is bad, and we are good.
If you are not with me you are against me, and so you are against me.
The enemy of my enemy is my friend, and all others are enemies.

3.6 Distorting relevance and interest

The last type of manipulative devices we want to consider here is based on a meta-communicative dimension: every communicative act presupposes that what is said can be interesting, i.e., has something to do with the subjects involved in communication.²² Interest is indeed a keyword of our definition of manipulative messages. Manipulation intervenes when a message seems interesting, but is not. An artificial interest is constructed replacing the 'natural' one. The first question arising here is how the notion of 'natural' interest could be defined. Undoubtedly, a 'natural' interest has to do with the existential relevance of considered topics but here we could also ask whether this existential relevance is something bound to the speaker's aware perception and freedom of choice or a quasi-naturalistic correspondence to the condition of a particular person. Moreover, interest is a dimension clearly related to other mysterious dimensions of the human being such as desires and needs. But here we clearly feel that we are dealing with hugely complex questions we could hope to adequately tackle only with the help of several human sciences (philosophy, psychology, sociology, cognitive sciences, and so on). Once again, a multidisciplinary research is required.

But what we can already and, indeed, must observe, is that the role of this complex human dimension is fundamental at many levels of communication. It is thanks to interest that some information becomes a piece of news and a question becomes an issue within a critical discussion. And arousing interest has been a fundamental purpose of all practitioners of communication from ancient rhetoric to modern media. A relevant field of application of possible manipulations applying to interest is, again, agenda setting, which is a specific function/effect of modern media. As already noticed, the function of agenda setting is indeed subject to manipulative interventions, since a selection of facts is in all cases imposed on the construction of the news; and the selection of facts

is (or should be) determined by their interest, and then conveys a presumption of interest.

4. Conclusion

We are, of course, far from claiming that the list of manipulative processes we have begun to analyse can be considered as achieved. Other relevant manipulative processes, like misuse of concepts and trouble-and-resolution device are tackled in other papers of the present volume, and I limit myself to making reference to them.²³ My purpose was to illustrate and explain in as much detail as possible the variety and the complexity of these processes, which, in order to be studied effectively, require a multidisciplinary approach going far beyond the purely logical analysis characteristic of the traditional research on fallacies.

What we have presented here, far from being a fully fledged theory of manipulation can be regarded as a rich, partially ordered, conceptual toolbox, whose user manual is still to be written.

Notes

* I wish to thank Louis de Saussure and Andrea Rocci for the many stimulating discussions we had on the theme of this paper. I also want to thank the anonymous reviewers whose questions and remarks helped to focus more precisely some of the more problematic issues addressed here.

1. Communication sciences are a multidisciplinary domain whose epistemological organization is far from being defined. An attempt at representing this domain in terms of a unitary scientific framework is made in a forthcoming paper (to appear in: *Studies in Communication Sciences*), on the basis of a concept of communication related to a theory of action and interaction. The same framework is presented, in a more student-friendly fashion, in our lessons in the *Fundamentals of Verbal Semiotics* module in the SWISSLING online courseware (www.swissling.ch).

2. It might be easier, in our opinion, to try to characterise a non-ideological system of beliefs by defining it as made up of *reasonable* beliefs, i.e., beliefs that show the arguments on which they are grounded. It is true that there are systems of beliefs (among these, many religious systems) that are not concerned with an explicit argumentative foundation. And, in our opinion, they should in no way be confused with ideologies, by which they have been and are regularly fought. The latter are moreover characterized by a strong claim of realism and are presented as having an explanatory and predictive power about all actual aspects of individual and social life and hence a sort of right to rule these aspects, often exhibiting an explicit reference to some sort of (para-)scientific foundation.

3. “In sum, what is knowledge for us may be discounted as ‘mere beliefs’ by others, and vice-versa. In what follows, therefore, ideologically controlled truth and falsity of discourse will not play a prominent role” (van Dijk 1995:258).
4. P. Bange (1992) founds his theory of conversational interaction on a concept of action defined as follows “un comportement d’un individu dans une situation donnée est une action lorsqu’il peut être interprété selon une intention en vue de la réalisation d’un but qui lui donne un sens” (*An individual’s behaviour in a given situation is an action when it can be interpreted accordingly to an intention to realize a goal that provides the motivation for it*, Bange 1992:207).
5. Since Grice, the dimension of *cooperation* plays an important role in pragmatic theories of verbal communication and of dialogue in particular. In the Gricean view of verbal communication the assumption of *cooperativeness* in the interlocutor drives the interpretation process and is thus fundamental for the functioning of verbal communication at the cognitive level (Grice 1975). It is interesting to observe that the assumption that the interlocutor’s contribution corresponds to what is required by the *goal* of the conversation at its present stage, presupposes that a conversation is characterized by a *goal* (or *goals*) shared by the interlocutors – “a common purpose” in Grice’s own words – or at least that the interlocutors assume that there is such a goal when they interpret verbal communication. Grice (1975) does not say much about the nature of such shared conversational goals, or about the level at which the cooperation that drives the understanding of verbal communication takes place. Clark (1996: 140–146) observes that instead of developing a notion of “accepted purpose or direction of the conversation” Grice provides a set of maxims which are, in fact, just “rules of thumb”. According to him, in order to reach a proper understanding of conversational cooperation *and* speakers’ meaning it is necessary to develop the notion of ‘accepted purpose’ into a fuller theory of joint action rather than discussing what set of maxims is the most apt to explain conversational inferences. In a different vein, Airenti, Bara and Colombetti (1993) distinguish sharply between a basic level of *conversational goals*, that need to be shared for the advancement of communication, and a further level of *interactional goals* that may or may not be shared. This separation allows the authors to accommodate also deceitful communication (and hence manipulation) within a Gricean cooperation-based model of dialogue.
6. The word *demagogical* is not a technical term and can lead to confusion. In fact it is often used to characterize politicians that make impossible, and thus insincere, electoral promises. In this case we have, in fact, a clear case of manipulation. But let us consider a politician that actually fulfills a promise such as *I will double the salary of civil servants*. We can qualify it as demagogical and morally questionable. Deciding if the candidate was *manipulative* in making this promise is however a different problem. As we will see below, he/she *may* turn out as manipulative, but we have to look at the precise social and economical context in which such a promise is made and his/her knowledge of it.
7. Even though communication is in itself a social event, not all human aspects involved in communication can be immediately conceived of as social. It is perhaps simpler to adopt in general the word *human* as covering the whole domain.
8. On the use and the abuse of cultural keywords in argumentation see Rigotti and Rocci (2003).

9. According to the Amsterdam scholars *strategic manoeuvring* is always the attempt of coping with a tension that may arise between dialectical commitments and rhetorical goals in argumentative discourse: “The need of balancing a resolution-minded dialectical objective with the rhetorical objective of having one’s own position accepted can be occasion for strategic manoeuvring in which the parties seek to meet their dialectical obligations without sacrificing their rhetorical aims. In so doing, they attempt to exploit the opportunities afforded by the dialectical situation for steering the discourse rhetorically in the direction that best serves their interests” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2000:295). Strategic manoeuvring does not automatically imply that the critical principles for resolving conflicts are abandoned, it rather implies the *rhetorical exploitation* of the dialectical situation at hand.

10. In the context of a *dialogical* view of mind where communication between *me* and *myself* – as different moments of an evolving consciousness – the notion of self-manipulation can be taken quite literally, as well as argumentative self-persuasion in general (cf. Rocci 2005; and M. da Penha Villela Petit 1985). More generally, self-manipulation can be seen as a sort of systematic, strategic error involving the exclusive focusing on a limited, particular, perceived advantage which is sought after at the expense of other broader considerations.

11. Quintilian (M. Fabi Quintiliani *Institutionis oratoriae libri duodecim*, l. IV, 2, 91–92) mentions in this connection a subtle proverb: “Uerumque est illud quod uulgo dicitur, mendacem memorem esse oportere” (*The people are right in saying that the liar better have a good memory*).

12. These fallacies concern ambiguity phenomena at different levels. Equivocation refers to a single lexical item, while amphiboly concerns phrases. Different combinations or different divisions of words within a phrase produce different meanings. Word forms are also possible sources of fallacies insofar as certain grammatical markers such as gender or time may not correspond to the real features of the intended aspect of reality, and phenomena of syncretism can cause mistakes. Finally, a different word accent (in the wide sense of suprasegmental features characterizing syllables) can be used in many languages (from ancient Greek to English) as unique signal for distinguishing different meanings of that word. See Aristotle’s *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, Book I, Chapter IV.

13. These fallacies present, undoubtedly, a greater degree of complexity.

1. The fallacy of accident refers to the incorrect inference ‘deducing’ the identity of two terms that receive the same attribute: *Socrates is an animal; the donkey is an animal, so Socrates is a donkey*.
2. The fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter* takes place when a property inhering to one part or aspect is generalised to the whole entity: *John is good at swimming, so John is good*.
3. *Ignoratio elenchi* could be translated into ‘incorrect demonstration of contradiction’: *You said that John was a bachelor and that John got married, so you said that John was married and unmarried*.
4. The fallacy *secundum consequens* infers the premise from the consequent. *If a man in a fever is hot, a man who is hot must be in a fever; Since after rain the ground is wet in consequence, we suppose that if the ground is wet, it has been raining*.
5. The *not-cause-as-cause* fallacy (*non causa ut causa*) takes place when a hypothesis is refused as implying a false consequence, but the very cause of this falsity is another and so the hypothesis could be true. By the way, even if this hypothesis is deleted, nothing

changes in the argumentation: *Let us suppose that logic is a part of mathematics. Now, mathematics on its own is recognised as one of the foundations of computer science and therefore it's a relevant part of it. But computer science wholly replaces human computing, which is simply mathematics. And so mathematics, being made irrelevant by computer science, cannot be a part of it.* What this fallacy focuses on is rather a lack of textual coherence than a logical *non sequitur*: we have to do with a text where the purported dominant theme (namely the hypothesis that logic is a part of mathematics) is neither directly nor indirectly retrieved along the text.

6. *Petitio principii* (begging the question) intervenes when the consequent occurs covertly among the premises: *The party we vote for defends our interests because it is the people's party.*
 7. Finally the 'many questions' fallacy refers to questions (see also below) where apparently the questioned statement is one, but other statements deserving to be questioned too are implicitly conveyed: *Why did you betray the party?*
14. *Many questions* (or *complex question*) are a particular application of the more general manipulative device of undue exploiting of presuppositions, as Walton (1999) shows. A complex question is not fallacious if the information it contains as presupposed is truly presupposed, i.e., shared by the hearers.
 15. "The most important addition to the fallacies of Aristotle's list consists of the fallacies known as the *ad* fallacies [...] distinguished by [...] John Locke" (cf. van Eemeren 2001: 142). Locke distinguished in general for main argument, three of which are misleading while one is correct and relevant: *ad verecundiam*, *ad hominem*, *ad ignorantiam*, *ad iudicium*: the first dissuades from refusing an opinion not to be arrogant towards an authoritative source; the second opposes an argument by focusing not on the argumentative force of discourse but on the quality or the behaviour of the arguer; the third induces to adhere by simply showing that the other is not able to propose an acceptable opinion; finally, the fourth is based on the force of the argument itself. In the Western tradition before and after Locke other fallacies were singled out. The following are, in our opinion, particularly noteworthy: *ad consequentiam* ("this is false, because if it was true, terrible consequences would follow"), *ad populum* – also called the 'bandwagon fallacy' – ("This newspaper is read by 100,000 readers every day, therefore it's a good newspaper") and *ad baculum* ("I am your main advertiser, but you keep your freedom of the press"), *post hoc ergo propter hoc* ("After the conversation with you he died. Therefore you caused his death"). See van Eemeren (2001).
 16. For more detailed treatment of the noun phrases in their manipulative exploitation see Cigada (1999).
 17. This fallacy is closely related to the fallacy *secundum quid*.
 18. An important psychotherapeutic approach, starting from a constructivist conception, exploits this mechanism in the opposite direction, working to remove a conception of the person based on a generalising 'labelling' and circumscribing the source of trouble to specific instances of behaviour. See Rezzonico and Meier (1999).

19. We should specify, by the way, that in the present day political context of many countries the small number of citizens taking part in the elections significantly modified this condition.
20. It has to be noted, however, that the actual *relevant paradigm* with respect to which negation operates is *pragmatically* restricted by the actual contextual condition in which the speech act is performed and does not coincide with the virtual lexical paradigm that can be reconstructed from the organisation of long term memory. For example when I say *This animal cannot be a mink*, I can be understood as implying that it can be a ferret, or some other sort of small furry carnivore, but certainly not as implying that it can be an elephant, a whale or a seagull. Note also that the actual, pragmatically restricted paradigm of negation coincides with the *rhetic paradigm* made of the set of alternatives to the focus of the utterance. On the interaction between paradigm, focus and negation see Gatti (2000).
21. Peter of Spain (1947:53–54) speaks of *contraria immediata* and *contraria mediata* respectively.
22. Relevant and surprisingly up to date intuitions about the fundamental role of *interest* within verbal communication can be found in Wegener (1885). Of course a technical concept of *relevance* is at the heart of one very influential approach to verbal communication (Sperber & Wilson 1995 [1986]). Here *relevance* is defined in purely *cognitive* terms as a balance between processing effort and the effects of interpretation in terms of derived inferences. We are here concerned firstly with a broader, pre-theoretical notion of relevance, which includes experiential and affective dimensions whose reduction to propositional cognitive processing is not trivial. Moreover the notion of relevance we are hinting at here is tightly connected to consciousness and the self, while *relevance* in Sperber and Wilson's sense deliberately describes the functioning of cognitive systems at a sub-personal level. However, this remark is not to be understood as implying that the technical notion of *relevance* cannot be used to explain certain aspects of manipulative processes – for instance those processes which are directly connected to effort in cognitive processing – nor that various aspects of our intuitions about relevance cannot be explained in terms of *relevance*. An assessment of the usefulness of the theoretical notion of relevance in this respect is beyond the scope of this article.
23. Cf. Allott's and Saussure's chapters in this volume.

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Are manipulative texts ‘coherent’?*

Manipulation, presuppositions and (in-)congruity

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1. Introduction

Like other contributions to this volume, the present paper reflects an early stage of a research project, and, as a consequence, is largely programmatic.

The question I address here and the hypotheses I put forth do not directly concern the *definition* of manipulation. Assuming the working definition of manipulation proposed by Rigotti (this volume)¹ I consider the application to the study of manipulation of an existing set of theoretical tools, provided by an approach to the semantics and the pragmatics of texts called Congruity Theory,² developed in Rigotti (1993), Rigotti (1994), Rigotti and Rocci (2001), Rocci (2005), Rigotti and Rocci (in press), which offers, among other things, an explanation of text coherence. In particular, the paper extends the analysis of nonsense and incongruity done in Rigotti and Rocci (2001) to manipulation.

Extending a theoretical framework to a new domain of application implies the risk of shaping the domain of study according to the tools. As A. Maslow (1966: 15–16) remarked, “it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail”. I have tried hard, however, not to reduce manipulation to something that I could hammer down with my discourse theoretical tool. In fact, the question about the coherence of manipulative texts I ask in the title is a genuine one. And, as it is often the case with this type of question, the answer I envisage in this paper is articulated and gives rise to an array of new questions.

The main idea behind the present paper is the following: manipulative texts represent an interesting testbed for theories of coherence. On the one

hand these textual productions, or at least the more successful ones, are indeed understood by their interpreters as unitary acts of communication and produce ‘perlocutionary’ effects as such, and on the other hand many texts that are considered manipulative show a number of semantic defects, in particular concerning presuppositional phenomena that would, in other contexts, lead to a perception of incoherence.

Should a theory of text coherence explain precisely in what sense certain manipulative texts are defective *and* at the same time why they are nevertheless interpreted and produce effects in their hearers? Perhaps this expectation places an excessively heavy burden of explanation on theories of text coherence, but it is nevertheless interesting to see what insights on the functioning of manipulation can be gained from a semantic-pragmatic theory of coherence like Congruity theory.

I adopt here the working hypothesis that a ‘good’ theory of coherence can be used to *detect* a number of semantic defects in manipulative texts as a basis for their critical evaluation and to *abstractly characterize* the type of process needed for the ‘cover up’ of these defects, with which manipulators manage to sin against coherence and get away with it. *Abstractly characterize* means that the theory of coherence needs to collaborate with other types of cognitive and social investigation, which are in any case needed to flesh out the concrete conditions and the dynamics of this ‘cover up’.

2. What is coherence?

Coherence, as a technical term of discourse analysis, refers first of all to a certain set of *intuitions* people have about sequences of uttered sentences, or, better, language utterances containing multiple sentences. Some sequences seem to ‘make sense together’, to belong to a functional whole, while others seem to lack this quality.³ Let us consider the following examples:

- (1) a. No, my son does not drive. He’s five!
b. No, my son does not drive. He is married.
- (2) a. John took a train from Paris to Istanbul. He has family there.
b. John took a train from Paris to Istanbul. He likes spinach.

People are willing to consider the sequences in (1a) and in (2a) (coherent) texts – or at least as possible parts of coherent texts – while the sequences in (1b) and (2b) will be considered just as successions of unrelated utterances.⁴

Nearly all researchers agree that intuitions of this type exist and that accounting for them is one of the goals of discourse analysis.

This being said, accounts of coherence diverge not only in the particular theoretical construct called forth to explain coherence but also in their basic understanding of the nature of the *explanandum*. Perhaps the two most important points of disagreement are the following:

1. Coherence can be seen as *an objective property of texts* (that was the hypothesis of various early text grammars in the 1970s), as *a principle guiding interpretation* (see for instance Giora 1997), or just as *a (possible) effect of the interpretation of utterances* as argued, for instance, by relevance theorists (Blass 1993; Reboul & Moeschler 1998).
2. The source of coherence can be located (at least in part) at a *syntactic level*, at a (truth-conditional) *semantic level* or at a *pragmatic (intentional, or illocutionary) level*, or identified with a mix of properties at the three levels. Classic text grammatical approaches treat coherence in terms of well-formedness with respect to some set of text grammatical rules, which are seen as part of linguistic competence proper. For other theories (Hobbs 1979; Kehler 2002) coherence has to do mainly with the referential world: a text is coherent because it describes a coherent state of affairs or a coherent sequence of events, while other theories, such as RST (Mann & Thompson 1987; Mann, Mathiessen, & Thompson 1992), relate coherence to communicative intentions (and intended effects) and generally to the structure of communicative action.⁵ Other theories, such as SDRT (Asher 1993; Asher & Lascarides 2003) adopt a rather sophisticated approach where truth-conditional considerations are coupled with a limited recourse to the speaker's intentions.

We cannot discuss here the merits of the various theories of coherence and the problems they face.⁶ We will therefore press on to present the approach based on congruity and to say why we think that it has something to say about manipulation.

3. Congruity Theory: Coherence as an aspect of semantic-pragmatic congruity

According to Congruity Theory, a text is coherent when it corresponds to an overall communicative intention and to the performing of a whole meaningful communicative action.⁷ Thus, ultimately the coherence of a text concerns what




Figure 1. Predicate-argument structure

one may call the speech act or illocutionary level. Coherence is, in a sense, an objective property, *not* of the text as a linguistic object, but of the communicative action.⁸ At the same time, Congruity Theory sees *coherence* as an instance of the more general principle of *semantic congruity*, which consists in the respect of presuppositions imposed by predicates and operates at different levels in the semantic structure of utterances (Rigotti & Rocci 2001).

Before we come to the link between communicative action and congruity, let us detail the notion of *presuppositions imposed by predicates*. Rigotti (1993 and 1994a) suggested that the semantics of a text can be viewed as a network of arguments and predicates: a hierarchy of predicates governing arguments at various levels. One of the functions of syntax is to manifest directly a part (let us say the lower part) of that semantic hierarchy. So, a simple sentence like *Louis reads a book* considered as a fragment of a possible text, shows a predicate-argument structure that can be represented approximately by the diagram in Figure 1.

In this diagram, arrows represent the relation between the lexical binary predicate *to read* (x,y) and its arguments *Louis* and *a book*. This relatively simple logical-semantic structure is characterised by the requirement of *congruity* between predicate and arguments. The predicate imposes conditions (represented in the rectangular boxes placed over the arrows) that the argument must satisfy, or, in other words, it *predefines* the class of possible arguments. The conditions that appear in the boxes placed on the arrows are hyperonyms of the traits that appear in the boxes under the real arguments *Louis* and *a book*. It has to be emphasized that the content of the latter boxes, representing part

of the developing *common ground* of the utterance (cf. Stalnaker 1973, 2002; and Clark 1996), is not limited to the traits entailed by the lexical meaning of the arguments (a *book* is a written text, printed, consists of several pages) but includes all the information associated to the real referents in the communicative situation, and, if it is the case, in the course of an ongoing discourse (as, for instance, the existence of a certain Louis, known by the speaker and the hearer. . .). If there is an incompatibility between the conditions imposed by the predicate and the characteristics of the real arguments, the utterance becomes semantically incongruous, a nonsense, as in *The books read the newspaper* or *John reads the squirrel*.

In Congruity Theory, the conditions imposed by the predicates are treated as *presuppositions*. The presuppositional nature of the conditions that the predicates impose on arguments can be highlighted by the application of a variant of the usual test: the conditions remain if the utterance is negated, and examples which violate the condition remain unacceptable in the negative form.

For Congruity Theory, the idea that predicates impose presuppositions on argument places plays a major role. In fact, we make two hypotheses of quite general import. On the one hand, it is hypothesized that all nonsense, all *incongruity*, derives from the violation or contradiction of presuppositions at different levels. On the other hand, *all presuppositions* are treated in terms of congruity, as though imposed by a predicate on one of its argument places. The latter hypothesis, which has been defended extensively in Rigotti & Rocci (2001), had already been made independently by Seuren (1988, 2000).

Seuren, who speaks of the “structural source of presuppositions”, sketches a semantics where two types of conditions are associated with predicates: ‘satisfaction conditions’, which play a role analogous to truth conditions, and ‘preconditions’: when a satisfaction condition is not fulfilled the result is falsity, whereas the failure of a precondition results in nonsense, or, as Seuren would put it, in “radical falsity”. A Seuren-style semantics for the unary predicate *bald*, for example, can be given as follows (without pretensions of real lexicographical adequacy):

bald (x) = [preconditions: x exists, x belongs to a category whose members are normally covered with hair in prototypical places| satisfaction condition: the normal hair is absent from x]

If we now turn to the classic example of presupposition in the philosophical literature, that of the king of France:

- (3) The present king of France is bald.

We see that we can treat the failure of the existential presupposition associated with the denoting noun phrase *The present king of France* as the failure to respect the precondition *x exists* that the predicate *bald* imposes to its argument.

In fact, if we situate denoting noun phrases in different predicate-argument structures, we discover that the existential presupposition is not something that the denotative phrases have independently of the predicates of which they form the argument: *John repaints his house* presupposes that the house existed before the moment of utterance, whereas *John projects his house* does not have that presupposition. With the change of predicate, the presupposition of existence disappears. Clearly, that makes it plausible, or even necessary, to treat existential presuppositions in the framework of argument presuppositions.⁹

Seuren (2000) suggests that an account of presupposition based on the notion of satisfaction of preconditions imposed by predicates – based on *congruity* as we would say – may perhaps be extended to cover not only the existential presuppositions (*The king of France is bald*) and the category mismatches (*John reads the squirrel*; *That liquid crumbled to dust*) we examined above, but also “presuppositions induced by contrastive accent, and/or clefting, and presuppositions induced by focussing words like *only*, *even*, or *too*” (Seuren 2000: 279). In order to carry out such an extension all these presupposition inducing devices would need to be analysed as predicates at some “abstract level of analysis”. While Seuren (2000) does not go into any detail of such an extension, Rigotti and Rocci (2001) move along a similar path to a – perhaps even wider – generalization of the mechanism of congruity.

Let us move directly to the type of mechanisms hypothesised to account for the coherence of texts. Consider again the following two pairs of utterances (a) and (b):

- (4) a. U1: *My son doesn't drive the car.*
 U2: *He's five!*
 b. U1: *My son doesn't drive the car.*
 U2: *He's married.*

While (4a) is clearly comprehensible without any specified context, (4b) remains opaque unless we include into the context of utterance some very specific assumptions.¹⁰ The sequence *He is five!* in (a) is understood, very roughly in fact, as having the task of giving the reason of the first statement (U1). This task can be defined by a relational predicate *R* (U1, U2) taking the two utterances as arguments and imposing certain presuppositional constraints on them. This relational predicate is called *Connective Predicate*. The constraints imposed by




Figure 2. Connective predicates

the connective predicate have to be respected in order to ensure the congruity at the textual level, that is the coherence of the text.

In this respect, this approach belongs to a whole family of approaches to coherence that are based on relational predicates (which have gone under various names such as *discourse relations*, *coherence relations*, *rhetorical relations*, *rhetorical predicates*, etc.), which take text units as arguments imposing constraints on them.¹¹

One important feature of this approach, however, resides in the fact that the relations that ensure discourse coherence are ultimately defined at the level of communicative acts, analogous to the level of illocutionary acts of Speech acts theory. To put it bluntly, *the connective predicate says what the speaker does to the addressee with the utterance*.¹² In a multi-utterance text, each utterance represents a relatively autonomous stage in the accomplishment of the intended effect of the whole text, i.e., the change in the context in which the text is attempting to operate. The function therefore of Connective Predicates is to link directly or indirectly the utterance to the whole of the text, and thus to the change that it is supposed to produce.

Consequently, the Connective Predicate must have amongst its arguments also the speaker and the hearer, on whom it imposes *presuppositions* comparable to the felicity conditions imposed by Searlian illocutions (Searle 1969)¹³ which typically involve the speaker and hearer.¹⁴ Diagrammatically we can represent the general form of a Connective Predicate as shown in Figure 2.

The arguments of the connective predicate of a certain text utterance are the *Speaker*, the *Hearer*, the text utterance at issue (U_0), and if it is the case one or more other utterances of the co-text that are brought to bear on the function of U_0 anaphorically (U_{-1}) or – in some cases – cataphorically (U_{+1}). The formulae in the boxes on the arrows represent – again – the presuppositions that the connective predicate imposes on the arguments. It is worth noting that the

argument places occupied by the *co-textual utterances* (U_{-1} or U_{+1}) can be as well occupied by an implied *contextual proposition* X that is part of the common ground.¹⁵

4. Congruity in argumentative texts

Let us consider how the type of approach we have outlined so far can deal with argumentation. Consider the following example:

- (5) U_{-1} : I can't see Louis' car in the parking lot.
 U_0 : He must have already left the University.

In U_0 we find an argumentative connective predicate which is very partially signalled by non-univocal linguistic cues. In this case the epistemic use of the modal *must* marks the first of the two utterances as the *Conclusion* of a non-demonstrative inference by the speaker. With respect of U_0 the preceding utterance U_{-1} is naturally understood as providing a premise for this conclusion. However U_{-1} is not sufficient to account for the inferential process involved. According to the classical view on the reconstruction of enthymematic arguments, we need to supply a second unstated premise in order to have the conclusion follow. For example *Louis always drives to the University and parks his car in the University parking lot*. As a consequence, our argumentative connective predicate will have three argument places occupied by the two premises – one at the level of explicature, the other at the level of implicature – and the conclusion, in addition to the argument places for the speaker and the hearer:

$Conclude_{U_0}$ (*Speaker, Hearer, Major Premise $_X$, Minor Premise $_{U_{-1}}$, Conclusion $_{U_0}$*)

The argumentative connective predicate $Conclude_{U_0}$ imposes a number of presuppositions to its arguments. From the viewpoint of the interpreter, this means that if we chose a certain interpretation for our text sequence, a number of restrictions apply to the common ground of the interlocutors. From the viewpoint of the arguer, it means that performing a certain act of argumentation is subject to a certain number of felicity conditions.

Let us examine some of the presuppositions that the connective predicate imposes on its arguments: the *Conclusion* U_0 is presupposed not to be known, or yet accepted by the *Hearer*, while on the *Minor premise* the connective imposes a presupposition of factuality, and of acceptability for the *Hearer* (and for the *Speaker*). Finally, the *Major premise* – apart from being accept-

able for both the *Speaker* and *Hearer* – should indicate some link between the truth of the (propositional content of the) *Minor premise* and the truth of the (propositional content of the) *Conclusion*.

The *link* between the propositional content of U_{-1} and the propositional content of U_0 can be represented by an inference scheme, either deductive, such as *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* in propositional logic and the valid figures of the syllogism in property predicate logic, or non-deductive, such as the argument schemes for presumptive reasoning discussed by Walton (1996), for example. The requirements of the particular inference scheme employed are part of the presuppositions of the specific connective predicates at issue. According to the inference scheme employed, these presuppositions may include various referential, *content-level* relations, holding in the world between the propositional contents of the utterances.

In this case, the argumentation is *an argument from sign*, according to Walton's terminology:

Event B is generally true, when its sign A is true in the situation
A is true in this situation,
B is true in the situation.

Here the link is provided by a factual relation of concomitance. If the hearer supplies a premise such as *Louis always drives to the University and parks his car in the University parking lot* she will have satisfied, together with a series of standard assumptions, the requirement of concomitance, and by doing so the general presupposition of a link between the truth of U_{-1} and that of U_0 .¹⁶

Two distinctive features of the approach to discourse relations proposed by Congruity Theory are apparent here. The first concerns the level of granularity adopted in the description of connective predicates: Congruity theory is not chiefly concerned with delimiting a small inventory of speech act types or discourse relations defined by some very general conditions, but rather strives to describe the communicative actions performed by people communicating through texts in the richest possible detail.¹⁷

The second feature concerns the distinction made by several authors between *content level* relations and *pragmatic/rhetorical* relations. Rather than seeing coherence as a *mix* of content-level relations and pragmatic relations holding between text spans, Congruity Theory situates the coherence of the text at the pragmatic level – connective predicates are always pragmatic relations – and subsumes content level relations as *presupposed* by the specific connective predicate involved.¹⁸

5. Manipulation, presuppositions and (in-)congruity

After having presented the notion of congruity in general and in particular at the textual level we can now rephrase our initial question (*are manipulative texts coherent?*) as *are manipulative texts congruous?*

The answer, as we anticipated, is not a straightforward *yes* or *no*. There is no doubt that there are texts that are incontestably manipulative and at the same time can be perfectly congruous: simple lies or insincere promises are a case in point.¹⁹ There are however various forms of manipulation that imply the violation of presuppositions at some level in the semantic structure of the text. Sometimes, this happens at a lower level, and sometimes directly at the level of connective predicates, as in many fallacious arguments that imply a violation of the presuppositions of the purported argumentative connective predicate.²⁰ Whether a given type of manipulation entails an incongruity is something that has to be decided on a case by case basis. A full investigation of the issue can be done in the framework of a comprehensive typology of manipulative behaviour – and such a typology has still to be compiled (see Rigotti, this volume, for a first attempt).

My claim, however, is that we already know enough about the relationship between manipulation and (in-)congruity to conclude that a theory of text congruity is a very useful means for the analysis and the critical evaluation of texts with respect to ideological manipulation. In order to show this, I will refine here the notion of incongruity and its relation to ideology.

The introduction of falsity in the presuppositions of the utterance in order to escape the critical awareness of the addressee and limit his/her possibilities of criticism in a dialogue, had been already noticed by Gottlob Frege (1892) who commented on the dubious denotation of the noun phrase *Der Wille des Volkes*. Since then, many authors have commented on the ideological load- edness and manipulative potential of various presuppositional structures.²¹ Presuppositions can be manipulative when the ‘presupposed’ material is not actually agreed with or even known by the hearer ahead of time. It is a way of sneaking in ‘extra’ propositions, or of imposing the speaker’s viewpoint on the hearer.

It is however necessary to distinguish between the ideological nature of presuppositions and their manipulateness. For example Sbisà (1999), observing the ideological nature of many linguistically marked presuppositions in Italian political discourse, examines the following interesting passage from a speech of Umberto Bossi, the leader of the Italian Northern League:

- (6) These are times when there is a reorganization going on, a contraposition between those who want to keep Rome as the centre of gravity for the exploitation of Padania and Padania's patriots.²²

(Il Corriere della Sera 4/9/1997, p. 11)

which is analysed as having the following presuppositions:

1. *Some people want to keep Rome as the centre of gravity for the exploitation of Padania.*
2. *Rome is the centre of gravity for the exploitation of Padania.*
3. *Padania is being exploited.*
4. *Padania exists.*
5. *Padania's patriots exist.*
6. *Padania is a fatherland.*

Sbisà says these presuppositions correspond to *ideological* propositions. By this, she means – I assume – that these propositions are, in fact, part of the political standpoint and agenda of the Northern League and are not uncontroversial for the general Italian public. But, is this a clear case of manipulation?

Irrespectively of our antipathy or sympathy for the political agenda of the Italian Northern League, we cannot evaluate this move without considering the addressee and the actual common ground of the text: if Bossi was addressing militants of his party, all these propositions were probably well established in the common ground.

Common grounds often contain a great deal of ideological information. And a text can be perceived as congruous relatively to a certain common ground because this common ground contains certain ideological propositions. These propositions may well be false or morally dubious, but this does not concern directly the critical evaluation of the text but the factual evaluation of the ideology. This happens also with the presuppositions of discourse relations.

Van Dijk (1998) observes that the *perception of coherence* is ideologically influenced:

Thus sequences of sentences (or rather, of propositions) constitute discourses if they satisfy a number of *coherence* conditions, such as (a) *conditional* relations between the facts denoted by these sentences, or (b) *functional* relations (such as generalization, specification, contrast) among propositions.

Such coherence is based on the interpretation of events as represented in the mental models of the language users, and may therefore also be ideologically influenced. Whether language users see a social event as a cause or not of an-

other social event may thus have an effect on the coherence of their discourse. In other words coherence is both contextually and socially relative, and depends on our ideologically controlled interpretation of the world.

(van Dijk 1998: 206)

Let us consider a simple example that illustrates the phenomenon pointed out by van Dijk:

- (7) A: A burglar broke into Aunt Julie's house.
B: That's hardly surprising. Haven't you seen all those coloured people hanging around lately?

Certainly, prejudice and ideology can influence the degree of perceived congruity of the argumentative connective predicate in B's utterance. Let us suppose that the ideologically influenced common ground contains the proposition *Most dark skinned people are thieves*: B will be understood as making a very strong case! At first glance, this seems to seriously limit the interest and usefulness of a congruity theoretic analysis of manipulation, while it is not the case.

In principle, we can maintain that even if a text is perceived as congruous because its presuppositions are satisfied in the common ground, it can be judged incongruous in some absolute sense because its presuppositions are false.

But there is more. While the idea that perceived coherence is ideologically influenced is certainly very sensible, there are three aspects that I think important for a theory of manipulation, which do not emerge from van Dijk's discussion of this point.

Firstly, if we do not place some sort of *constraint* on the ideological variation of mental models, any discourse, no matter how strange, ends up being coherent with respect to some ideology providing the model for it. I make the realistic hypothesis that these constraints exist and are to identify with the basic experience of the world and basic needs of a human being.

Secondly, we might suggest that certain ideologies, in order to be maintained, need precisely to circumvent or somehow overcome these constraints, and that manipulation has to do exactly with this type of process.

Finally, ideological discourses do not always preach to the choir: we have to explain how they succeed in convincing people.

When an ideology is at variance with the basic experience of the world, or with the basic needs, desires and moral values of people, the need for manipulation arises. Ancient rhetoric teaches us that, in order to persuade, one has

to start from what is accepted and bring to the belief what is not yet accepted. And, in order to persuade, an ideology has to start from what is accepted, to show that the tenets of the ideology follow from the values and experience of the world of the manipulated or, at least, are not in full contradiction of it, while promoting ideas that, in fact, are. Then the manipulator makes the manipulated entertain ultimately inconsistent beliefs.²³

We come then to an interesting conclusion. Even if it is true that (perceived) coherence is ideology-dependent in the sense that a text can be judged congruous or incongruous according to different ideological common grounds, there are texts that are incongruous in a stronger sense:

In fact, *a text (or an utterance) that presupposes contradictory propositions is incongruous with respect to any consistent common ground.*

With the introduction of the notion of incongruity with respect of any consistent common ground – let us call it *logical incongruity* – we have introduced an important refinement in the tools for the evaluation of the argumentative texts and the detection of manipulation. I take the intentional and systematic presence of logical incongruity as a crucial stigma of manipulative texts.

Of course, texts that perpetrate this kind of obfuscation may as well contain logical contradictions, viz. straightforward inconsistencies in the asserted content, maybe as blatant as those of the well known Orwellian slogans from 1984: *War is Peace, Freedom is slavery.*²⁴

Certainly, such contradictions can have, under certain conditions, a wicked manipulative power of their own.²⁵ I believe, however, that incongruities at the level of deep-seated presuppositions, and in particular at the level of connective predicates play a more strategic role in overcoming, undetected, the resistance of the manipulated. This kind of move, involving absolute incongruity, has been hyperbolically satirised again by Orwell in his *Animal Farm*:

(8) All animals are equal but some animals are *more* equal than others.

Here Napoleon and the pigs go beyond simple contradiction (which would have looked like *All animals are equal but some animals are better than others*) and plunge their victims into the incongruity generated by the application of *more* – which requires a gradable predicate as argument – to the predicate *equal*.

In conclusion, an analysis of congruity can be useful at two different levels. First, it can be used to make explicit the common ground that a text needs in order to be perceived as congruous. In this case, the evaluation of the truthfulness of the text – while greatly helped by the explicitation – remains external to the analysis. Second, it can fully evaluate cases of logical incongruity.

It is now time to move to the analysis of a concrete example: an excerpt of one of Mussolini's speeches, where I believe one can make a strong case for incongruity at the level of argumentative connective predicates. The analysis of the passage will allow us to introduce further refinements in our tools and to address briefly an issue mentioned at the beginning of the paper, namely how successful manipulative texts manage to appear coherent despite their incongruity.

6. Analysis of an excerpt of Mussolini (Trieste, September 18, 1938)

Let us consider the following passage taken from a speech made in Trieste on 18 September 1938, a speech which coincides with the introduction of racial laws in Italy (Mussolini 1938:66–67):

With respect to internal politics, the problem of burning current concern is the racial one. Also in this field we will adopt the necessary solutions. Those who pretend we have obeyed to imitations, or worse to suggestions, are poor cretins, to whom we don't know whether we should address our contempt or our compassion.

The racial problem did not explode suddenly, as thought by those who are accustomed to sudden awakenings because they are accustomed to long lazy sleep. It is in relation to the conquest of the Empire, because history teaches us that empires are conquered by arms but are maintained by prestige. And for prestige a clear, austere, racial consciousness is needed, which should establish not only differences, but also very clear-cut superiorities. The Jewish problem is but one aspect of this phenomenon. Our position has been determined by these incontestable factual data.

World Jewry has been for sixteen years, in spite of our policy, an irreconcilable enemy of Fascism. In Italy our policy has determined, in the Semitic elements, what can be now called, what we could then call, a true rush to board the ship (it. *una corsa vera e propria all' arrembaggio* = lit. a true rush to boarding). However, the Jews with Italian citizenship, who have incontestable merits towards Italy and towards the Regime will find understanding and justice. With respect to the others, a policy of separation will be followed.

In the end, the world will perhaps have to wonder at our generosity rather than at our rigour, unless the Semites from abroad and those inside, and above all their improvised and unexpected friends, who defend them from too many chairs, oblige us to change our path radically.

The central move in Mussolini's argumentation is the following general justification of racism:

- (9) It [= the racial problem] is in relation to the conquest of the Empire, because history teaches us that empires are conquered by arms but are maintained by prestige. And for prestige a clear, austere, racial consciousness is needed, which should establish not only differences, but also very clear-cut superiorities.

from which the legitimacy of anti-Semitism is derived:

- (10) The Jewish problem is but one aspect of this phenomenon.

If we move now to a finer-grained analysis trying to make explicit the presupposition complexes of the argumentative connective predicates involved we find something interesting. We have already seen how specific *argument schemes* are evoked as presuppositions by the speaker's act of arguing and that these inferential patterns presuppose, in turn, specific content level relations between the truth values of the propositional contents. Two premises of Mussolini's argument can be safely reconstructed as follows:

- (11) a. In order to maintain empires prestige is needed.
 b. In order to enjoy prestige clear-cut racial superiorities need to be established.

But what is the conclusion? The conclusion of the argument is not explicitly stated, it has to be inferred by the hearer. That the conclusion of an argument remains implicit is not uncommon and it is not necessarily a sign of manipulation. The problem is the nature of the intended conclusion that the hearer is led to infer. I propose that the conclusion that the hearer is brought to infer in this passage is something like the following:

- (12) So, necessarily there are clear-cut racial superiorities.

If this is in fact the conclusion, the problem with Mussolini's argument is an illegitimate passage from the deontic-practical necessity 'what is necessary in order to maintain an empire' to the epistemic modality 'what is necessarily a fact, in view of the evidence' (cf. Kratzer 1981). His argumentation can be compared to the following one:

- (13) We want to maintain our Empire.
 In order to maintain empires, a strong army is needed.
 In order to have a strong army, it is necessary to maintain a big military budget.
 So, necessarily, there is a big military budget.

If my reconstruction is correct Mussolini here evokes the deductively valid inference scheme of *practical reasoning* but misuses it committing the fallacy known as *argumentum ad consequentiam*. The practical reasoning scheme requires that the conclusion be a proposition indicating a special kind of deontic necessity, and not a fact or an epistemic necessity (= known fact).

But how do we know that Mussolini was not merely arguing for the *expediency* of racism and apartheid in order to maintain an empire? That would have been a perfectly congruous use of the *practical reasoning* inferential scheme. In this case my reconstruction would have been just a pragmatically unwarranted misrepresentation.

What we have here is an instance of what Hamblin (1970) called “the problem of nailing a fallacy”. This problem derives from the striking fact that connectives predicates are usually not manifested linguistically (or are very partially manifested by various types of discourse markers) and some of their arguments (either premises or conclusions) can be implicit as well. We are here attempting to show that a certain implicit argument is incongruous with respect to some equally implicit relational predicate. The fact that connective predicates are, so to say, “invisible presupposition triggers” that are normally inferred by abduction²⁶ from the presence of utterances that would be congruous with respect to them, makes accusations of incongruity particularly difficult.

Hamblin (1970:224) observes that in many cases perpetrators of fallacies have an easy – if extreme – retreat: “In many cases of supposed fallacy it is possible for the alleged perpetrator to protest, with an innocent face, that he cannot be convinced because he was not been arguing at all”. Hamblin considers the following example:

(14) A says: “S”

B says: “It was C who told you that S and I happen to know that his mother-in-law is living in sin with a Russian”

A: “The falsity of S does not follow from any facts about the morals of C’s mother-in-law: that is an *argumentum ad hominem*”

B: “I did not claim that it followed. I simply made a remark about incidentals of the statement’s history. Draw what conclusions you like. If the cap fits. . .”

However, in order to be successful, manipulators need to be perceived as arguing. They have to make the addressee infer connective predicates *even if* their utterances do not make congruous arguments for them. In order to achieve that they have to resort to strategies that induce some coarse perception of co-

herence at the global level. The systematic study of these strategies makes an important chapter in the analysis of manipulation, and one which is largely still to be written. Certainly one important strategy involves an increased overt linguistic marking of the function of utterances and the connections between them, which is achieved through the use of discourse markers (see Moeschler 1994 on a related issue), and other more complex means such as metatextual statements and predications over various anaphorically derived second order entities.²⁷

Well, like in good detective stories there is no perfect murder. Mussolini did in fact adopt one of these strategies, and in doing so he left traces of his fallacy in the immediately following passage:

- (15) The Jewish problem is but one aspect of this *phenomenon*. Our position has been determined by these *incontestable factual data*.

The fact that the (unstated) conclusion of the above argument is anaphorically referred to as a *phenomenon* and as *factual data* is evidence that Mussolini *did* in fact intend to argue for the factual existence of racial differences and not only for the political expedience of drawing them.

Probably an important role in guiding the hearer towards the intended interpretation of the implicit conclusion without revealing the fallacy is also played, in the immediately preceding context, by the verb *stabilire* ('to establish'), which like its English cognate is ambiguous between two alternative readings, which impose very different presuppositions to the second argument of the verb.²⁸ Under the first reading *stabilire* means roughly 'to institute' and refers to the establishment of a social convention or institution by an authorized social agent, while under the second reading it means 'to find out', 'to ascertain', to establish that something is the case. The second reading of *stabilire* imposes a presupposition of factuality on the second argument – like predicates such as *to know*. The first reading, on the contrary, presupposes the non-factuality of the social reality prior to the act of establishing it.

In our passage, the first reading of *stabilire* is consistent with the non-fallacious interpretation of the argument (sound practical reasoning), but is incompatible with the anaphors *this phenomenon* and *these incontestable factual data*. Here the second reading of the verb comes in handy as a *phenomenon* can be a legitimate argument of *stabilire* in the second sense. It is reasonable to hypothesise that here the use of *equivocation* is instrumental to inducing a perception of coherence and making the *ad consequentiam* fallacy pass undetected.²⁹

7. Perceived coherence

In our analysis of the incongruity of the passage of the excerpt, we have touched the problem of the perceived coherence of incongruous manipulative texts. How is it achieved? What we can give here is only a partial answer.

We mentioned above the importance of linguistic strategies of increased explicit connection marking. In order to achieve their effect these strategies need, however, to be complemented by another resource: the exploitation of the *accommodation* of (linguistically triggered) presuppositions. Accommodation is still a poorly understood phenomenon. As it is well known, the phenomenon of *presupposition accommodation* has been defined by Lewis (1979/1991: 421) as follows:

If at time *t* something is said that requires presupposition *P* to be acceptable, and if *P* is not presupposed just before *t*, then – *ceteris paribus* and within certain limits – presupposition *P* comes into existence at *t*.

According to this basic account, when Mussolini says

- (16) World Jewry has been for sixteen years, in spite of our policy, an irreconcilable enemy of Fascism.

The hearer derives the following presuppositions, inferring them, directly or indirectly, from various linguistic sources:

- (17) Mussolini's policy has been 'favourable' to Jews,³⁰
"World Jewry" exists as a subject capable of a unitary political standpoint;
World Jewry has always been hostile to Fascism;
Mussolini has tried to appease World Jewry in the past.

If these presupposed propositions are not yet part of the common ground, they are added to it on the spot. However, this account is more an abstract characterisation rather than an explanation of the inner workings of accommodation.

There are various aspects of accommodation that need to be elucidated. Consider, first of all, that *to accommodate* does not mean automatically *to believe* or *to accept*. A sceptical addressee can always accommodate presuppositions for the sake of text understanding, without actually believing them. Additional factors must be at work in securing the success of manipulation.

One of them could be the *vagueness* of the presuppositions imposed by the predicates and the relative *coarseness of the accommodated material*.³¹ Striking coarseness in the accommodated material can arise from a phenomenon described by Herbert Clark in his more psychologically oriented account of

common ground. Clark (1996: 101) distinguishes between *inside information*, that is *particular information* that members of a community mutually assume as mutually shared, and *outside information*, that is *types of information* that outsiders assume is inside information for that community. For example, in a conversation between a layman and a medical doctor (or a nuclear physicist, etc.) the common ground is characterised by a number of *types of information* (anatomy, physiology, etc.) that the layman believes the doctor has access to without knowing the propositions that make up the information in question. Under certain conditions, these *types of information* can operate as black boxes in the common ground so that presuppositions that can be ascribed to any such type of information can be 'quasi-satisfied' – rather than accommodated – but in a very coarse and generic way.³²

One should also consider the role played by the *relevance* of the information being accommodated for the addressee.

(18) Tomorrow I'll fly home with my wife and my daughter.

Consider two situations where the addressee of (18) does not know that the speaker is married and has a daughter, but in the first situation the addressee is a new acquaintance (a colleague met at a conference) and in the second the addressee is the mother or father of the speaker, who doesn't see her-his son since he left for that visiting scholar position in the USA.³³

Psychological considerations on the *processing effort* of the hearer, in Sperber and Wilson's (1995[1986]) sense, are also likely to play a role in explaining the success of manipulation. In order to maintain a common ground 'for the sake of understanding' the sceptical addressee needs to keep in middle-term memory a representation of the ways in which this common ground differs from his/her real beliefs. Note that this extra mnemonic effort is similar in nature to the one which is necessary to the liar in order to lie consistently.

Coming back to Mussolini's speech, we can finally consider a number of other *external factors* that favour a trusting and rather coarse accommodation of presuppositions which guarantees the perception of coherence. In the concrete situation of the speech, we can tentatively hypothesise that the following factors have contributed to the acceptance (cf. Dogliani 1999: 271–283):

1. The re-use of discourse concerning the apartheid policy Fascism was trying to impose in the Italian colonies (where *austere racial consciousness* and separation from the African population were associated with the need to maintain the *prestige* and the *moral profile* of the colonisers) contributed to the impression that nothing really new was being done.

2. The recent publication of *Fascism and the problems of the race* a.k.a. “The Manifesto of the Racist Scientists” (July, 14 1938), the first of a series of official documents and ‘scientific’ publications, probably contributed to the *black box* effect discussed above.
3. The fact that Jews in Italy were considered a numerically small minority may have contributed in lowering the perceived relevance of the information.

8. Conclusion

Let us summarise, in closing, some results of our discussion and some interesting problems that remain open:

- The defectiveness (and potential deceptiveness) of a given utterance depends on the particular type of communicative action which is being performed, that is to say, on the exact function – in the sense of argument role – assigned to this utterance by a connective predicate, which is often implicit. This is neatly exemplified by Hamblin’s problem of *nailing fallacies*.
- In order to evaluate manipulative moves in argumentative texts, one has to richly characterise the presuppositions of argumentative connective predicates at different levels: both at the level of referential world connections between propositional contents, and at the illocutionary-intentional level. *Argument schemes* from argumentation theory seem at least in part to do this job.
- In manipulative discourse, the mechanisms for inferring the global coherence of discourse and the appropriate Connective Predicates at various levels seem to be, at least in part, disconnected from the fine-grained congruity checking of the presuppositions of the connective predicates. Hearers seem to infer coherence at a global level and to accommodate in the common ground coarse and opaque chunks of material in order to satisfy only the most strategic connective predicates. In this case, at least, interpretation models such as Hobbs et al. (1990), where interpreters reason abductively to *prove* coherence, do not seem to apply fully.

Congruity Theory does not make direct claims concerning the actual cognitive modelling of discourse understanding: it couples an approach to the ontology of communicative action with a method for laying out the semantic-pragmatic results of interpretation, in a way which is systematic enough to support evalu-

ation of the adequacy of the text to the communicative goal, and in the specific case, the evaluation of its *argumentative quality*. The notion of sense that it tries to tackle is necessarily open ended, as is the evaluation it supports.³⁴

Notes

* Many thanks to Eddo Rigotti for his great support and helpful advice. I also want to thank the anonymous reviewers whose remarks helped to improve both the content and the style of the paper. Remaining errors are mine.

1. Rigotti offers the following general definition of manipulation: "A message is manipulative if it twists the vision of the world (physical as well as social – or human – actual as well as virtual) in the mind of the addressee so that he/she is prevented from an healthy attitude toward decision (i.e., An attitude responding to his/her very interests), and pursues the manipulator's goal in the illusion of pursuing her/his own goal".

2. Our Congruity Theory bears no direct relation to the psychological hypothesis of the same name that was proposed in the 1950s. Cf. Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955). That Congruity Theory is one of several models of attitude formation and change based on the idea that persons seek to maximize the internal consistency of their cognitions and strive to avoid cognitive inconsistency.

3. Mann, Matthiessen and Thompson (1992:40–41) characterize coherence as follows: "Certain kinds of presentation, texts, have a kind of wholeness or integrity that others lack. We recognize that they 'hang together' and are understandable as single objects. They are coherent. Every element has some role in the whole text; otherwise the text contains a non-sequitur. This is in the sense in which we see magazine articles as texts, but magazines, news broadcasts, and some dialogues as structured collections of texts."

4. The fact that one can easily imagine a context that renders the sequences in (b) intelligible as coherent wholes does not represent an argument against coherence intuitions; rather it is evidence for the human need/tendency of establishing coherence among sequences of utterances. For a discussion of this point see Kehler (2002:3).

5. For Mann, Matthiessen and Thompson (1992:43), all the parts of a coherent text "are seen as contributing to a single purpose of the writer, i.e., as created to achieve a single effect".

6. A discussion of these problems can be found in Rocci (2003).

7. Obviously, this 'functional' definition of coherence in terms of "meaningful communicative action" raises the question of *what* exactly qualifies as a meaningful communicative action. We need, in other words, some sort of 'structural' specification of communicative action. Otherwise we have little more than two different names for the same intuition. The mechanisms of Congruity theory discussed below are part of this specification. On the distinction between 'functional' and 'structural' definitions of *text* see Rocci (2003).

8. Coherence requirements for communicative action are ‘objective’ – constitutive – much in the same sense as the door being closed is an objective requirement for the action of opening a door.

9. For a complete discussion of the classic example of the king of France see Seuren (1988 and 2000). Note that the presupposition of existence imposed by *bald* to its argument is relative to a reference world w_r , which is identified by default with the actual world. There are, however, contexts – such as fictional discourse – where w_r is not the actual world. Predicates such as *imaginary* (x) or *build* (x,y), which do not presuppose the existence of certain arguments in w_r . They presuppose, however, their existence in special sub-worlds or ‘discourse domains’ (see Seuren 2000 for the notion of discourse domain).

10. For instance, something like “The son of the speaker belongs to a sect in which married people are barred from driving vehicles” will do. Here we see that coherence is relative to the set of assumptions we are willing to include in the common ground of the interaction. This basic fact has important consequences for the relationships between coherence and ideology, which will be discussed below.

11. See Bateman and Rondhuis (1997) for a survey and comparison of various approaches to discourse relations.

12. This approach has some important similarities with another theory of text coherence, the Rhetorical Structure Theory developed by Mann and Thompson from the late ’80s. In RST *rhetorical relations* are defined both in terms of the constraints they pose on their textual argument and in terms of the effect the speaker intends to achieve in the addressee by establishing a particular relation.

13. A partial identification of speech acts and discourse relations is suggested also in the current version of the SDRT developed by Asher and Lascarides (2003): “Searle and more recent AI work [...] typically take speech acts to be a property of an individual utterance. In contrast, SDRT shows that many types of speech acts must be understood relationally, because successfully performing the speech act is logically dependent on the content of an antecedent utterance. So technically speaking, the type must be (at least) a two place relation [...]. For example if one uses an utterance to conclude something, then that conclusion must be antecedent to hypothesis or argument. And this is relational because successfully performing this speech act is dependent on the content of the antecedent” (p. 305).

14. Consider, for instance, the preparatory conditions of the assertion as formulated by Searle (1969). One of them states that ‘It is not obvious to the *Speaker* that the *Hearer* knows (does not need to be reminded of) p ’. This type of condition is treated as a (relational) presupposition imposed by any ‘assertive’ connective predicate on the argument places characterized by the roles of the *Speaker*, the *Hearer* and the asserted proposition.

15. The diagram offers a synthetic representation of the predicate-argument structure of the connective predicate which is only partially satisfactory. For instance the fact that utterances rather than propositional contents appear as the arguments of the connective predicate needs further specifications. Firstly, it should be noted that the symbol U does not refer to the utterance considered as an illocutionary act, but more generically as a speech event. The connective predicate, taking a U as argument can impose constraints on various aspects of it, for example on its truth-conditional content. Utterances are thus somewhat similar

to the 'speech act discourse referents' π_n that make-up the arguments of discourse relations in SDRT, which are not defined at the illocutionary level (cf. Asher, Busquets, & Le Draoulec 2001:221–222). A difference should be made, however, between the argument U_0 and the other anaphoric (or cataphoric) arguments. The connective predicates defines the (relational) illocution of U_0 , stating, for example, that U_0 is a conclusion drawn from such and such premises according to a certain inference schema. The fact that U_0 also fulfills the condition of an assertion is included in the content of the connective predicate – it is entailed by it, because the conditions for assertion are a subset of the conditions imposed by the connective predicate on U_0 . In this perspective the notion of assertion can be viewed as a supercategory of connective predicates, consisting of the predicates that impose the conditions of assertion on their U_0 . As regards the other arguments, partially different considerations are necessary: a connective predicate can define the function of a U_0 with respect to *any aspect* of previous utterances (or planned ones): be it their propositional content, their pragmatic function, their linguistic or phonetic form. So the constraints that the connective predicate impose on the other U s can be quite varied and concern also the function played by these utterances as the U_0 of other connective predicates (cf., for instance, *Are you hungry?* _{U_1} *Because there is some chicken in the fridge* _{U_0}).

16. For a fuller analysis of argumentative connective predicates, employing a more explicit notation, see Rigotti and Rocci (in press b).

17. According to a view held by many scholars, in order to have predictive power, a theory of discourse structure should be based on a well-constrained, smallest possible, set of coherence relations. See, for instance, Kehler (2002: 11–34), who takes a rather extreme position in this respect. In this perspective a largely open-ended approach like Congruity theory is likely to be considered devoid of theoretical significance. A discussion of this objection must be left for another occasion. However, I want to hint at two types of consideration that motivate the liberal approach followed here. The first is that the conditions associated with broad coherence relations such as the ones proposed in Kehler (2002) do not fully support the kind of semantic analysis that is needed in order to characterize properly the 'logical form' as well as the pragmatic aspects of argumentative discourse, in order to evaluate them. The understanding of argumentation requires the establishment of richer relations, such as the ones outlined above. Secondly, recent work on discourse connectives, such as Jayez and Rossari (1998) and Rossari (2000), showed that these lexical items can be seen as predicates which impose a wide variety of finely grained constraints on their arguments, and their role cannot be limited to that of linguistic cues of certain broad types of relations. It is then legitimate to ask why our intuitions of coherence should depend only on the establishing of very broad relation types, which do not constitute a full interpretation of the discourse and are even less specific than the relations needed in order to interpret discourse connectives. See Redeker (2000) for complementary considerations in the same direction.

18. This view is in accordance with the approach to argumentative discourse relations adopted by Snoek Henkemans (2001) in the framework of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation: while at the *pragmatic level* an argument is a relational speech act (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984) where an utterance 1 is presented as a means of rendering another utterance 2 acceptable, at the *propositional level* the contents are related by some referential relation (*causality, concomitance or resemblance*). Snoek Henkemans (2001:235–

238) rightly criticizes various theories of discourse relations that consider content level relations and pragmatic relations on the same level and as potentially alternative. In this way the issue of the “illocutionary purpose, or interactional goal” of content level relations is not addressed, and – we would add – the content level presuppositions of pragmatic relations are not accounted for.

19. While this conclusion is rather intuitive it is, on the technical level, less trivial than it seems, since it requires a fine-grained distinction in the felicity conditions of speech acts between *preparatory* and *propositional content* conditions on the one hand and *sincerity* and *essential* conditions on the other. The former are presuppositional in nature, while the latter are concomitant or brought about by the speech act. The distinction mirrors Seuren’s distinction between *preconditions* and *update conditions* in the semantics of (lower level) predicates.

20. Note that the incongruities at the lower levels are – except under special conditions – projected at the higher levels and entail the incongruity of the text also at a pragmatic level: I cannot, for instance, felicitously promise *to draw the square circle* because this is an impossible action, and this is an impossible action because *the square circle* is an impossible entity. The incongruity in the argument noun phrase is projected, so to say, two levels above.

21. See, for instance, Walton (1999) on presupposition and the fallacy of ‘many questions’.

22. All translations are mine.

23. It is necessary to distinguish here between what is in fact contradictory with the basic human experience of the world, what is just unexpected – a lot of good ideas might seem strange at a first glance – or even seem contradictory but can be reconciled with experience through reasonable inference. For the purposes of this paper, I maintain that a similar distinction can be made in the sphere of desires, interests and values without entering in the discussion of the kind of conception of ethics that is needed to support such a distinction.

24. In these cases, the human tendency to search for relevance may come to the assistance of the manipulator. If the expectation of relevance is sufficiently high, the interpreter will not stop her/his search at the apparent contradiction looking for deeper, hidden meanings to be discovered behind the oximoronic wording. On this search for relevance, its eventual frustration, and the consequences thereof see Saussure (this volume).

25. Technically, the difference between *logical incongruity* and *contradiction* can be formulated as follows: a logically incongruous text or utterance presupposes an inconsistent common ground, a contradictory text or utterance cannot update the common ground without making it inconsistent.

26. On the abduction of discourse relations cf. Hobbs, Stickel, Appelt and Martin (1990: 35–41).

27. On the anaphora of second order entities (or abstract objects) see Asher (1993) and Conte (1999).

28. This analysis of the verb *stabilire* was, in part, suggested by the comments of an anonymous reviewer, whom I wish to thank here.

29. Traditionally, *equivocation* is listed among fallacies. Some modern theorists, such as Hamblin (1970), objected to this classification. In fact, saying that in the passage Mussolini

committed the two fallacies of *equivocation* and *ad consequentiam* is not particularly illuminating. One would rather say that *equivocation* was instrumental in perpetrating the *ad consequentiam*. The analysis of Mussolini's speech suggests that *equivocation* and *ad consequentiam* belong to different levels of analysis, both relevant for the understanding of manipulative discourse.

30. Here "favourable" is likely to be interpreted by the hearer as "not harsh to the extent it should have, with regard to the Jews's inferiority" when the information derived from the linguistic presupposition trigger in the utterance is combined with the statement of the racial inferiority of the Jews from the preceding context.

31. Omitted indefinite complements, for instance, are presuppositions of the lexical predicates that are accommodated, giving rise to extremely vague representations in the common ground, a situation that favours manipulation. Consider, for instance: *In Italia la nostra politica ha determinato, negli elementi semiti, quella che si può oggi chiamare, si poteva chiamare, una corsa vera e propria all'arrembaggio*. The use of the event noun *arrembaggio* (Engl. 'boarding', but only in the hostile sense of a naval combat or piracy) presupposes that there is something like a ship which is boarded. But in this metaphorical context, it is extremely difficult to say what exactly has been the object of an hostile occupation by the 'Semite elements' according to Mussolini: the State? the economy? the Fascist Party? Italy altogether? On the role of implicit indefinite complements see also Danler (this volume).

32. Mann (2002:5), discussing the sources of dialogue coherence, makes the following interesting remark: "For example, a medical interview, from the patient's point of view can be incoherent. The physician may be considering two or three diseases as potentially being the diagnosis of the patient's condition. At the same time, the patient may not know what diseases are being considered, why certain questions are asked, and what context of judgment of the meaning of the questions is relevant. Another physician, seeing the dialogue or the transcript, may understand the physician's intentions completely and regard the interview as coherent. But the patient does not know those intentions and can ascribe only apparent medical relevance to them, based on the situation. Such ascriptions are 100% assumption, not derived from the specific text".

33. On this aspect of accommodation see also Greco (2003).

34. Congruity theory, equating the establishment of coherence with the open ended process of recognizing the congruity of a text, does not make the hypothesis of a shallower notion of coherence, as Asher and Lascarides (2003) do, but may well admit that a shallower processing can influence the way people makes sense of a text.

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Manipulation and cognitive pragmatics

Preliminary hypotheses

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1. Introduction¹

The paper presents a set of pragmatic hypotheses on the topic of manipulative and ideological discourse; these hypotheses, which are to be further explored and empirically validated, aim at grounding a research project. The general framework of this research is a mechanistic and naturalistic cognitive theory of human communication, Sperber and Wilson's Relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson 1995).²

In this introduction, after briefly defending the legitimacy of a cognitive pragmatic approach of manipulation, I consider the main contributions to the problem in that framework.

In Section 2, I propose a working definition for *manipulative discourse*, where manipulative discourse is *truth-conditionally / truth-functionally defective, doubtful* (when the propositions conveyed are about a state of affairs), or *unacceptable within a given culture* (when the propositions conveyed are about moral issues). Section 3 discusses the typology of strategies involved in discursive manipulation, and notes a commonality between all the strategies; they lead the hearer to problems of understanding, i.e., problems in the process of retrieving a clear informative intention on the part of the speaker. In Section 4, I suggest that a central mechanism of manipulation through discursive strategies is organised in a twofold process, managed by the speaker: causing trouble in the hearer's understanding procedure and offering ready-made resolutions of that trouble. I call that mechanism the *trouble-and-resolution* device. This device disturbs the normal processing of intention recovery, permitting to ob-

tain sincere consent to a proposition regardless of defective arguments, given a particular context. In Section 5, I discuss manipulative discourse with regard to the theory of mind.

Considering a problem like manipulative discourse through the question of *understanding natural language* is quite different from what is generally proposed on the topic within discourse analysis and the social sciences. Many trends defend the view that anything manipulative is best understood with informal tools such as those provided by text-linguistics (see the important works of K. Ehlich in Germany and of J.-M. Adam on French for example, and trends in the Critical Discourse Analysis approach). However, if assuming that manipulation in discourse is primarily achieved during the very construction of meaning in context (which is a first and necessary step for adding beliefs in one's knowledge base), it becomes clearer that theories providing descriptions of that cognitive process, which goes on when exposed to speech or text, are likely to enlighten significantly – and with less intuitive notions – research on manipulation. I suggest, moreover, that such an approach is likely to contribute to the transdisciplinary task of better grounding the fine-grained descriptions done in informal approaches.

A related point is that scholars who favour a social approach to discourse and manipulation often tend to avoid an objectivist standpoint, for various reasons. The most obvious of these reasons is the fear that the analyst can be misled, taking his own subjectivity for objectivity (see Kienpointner in this volume for a discussion). The typical distortion is that the manipulative nature of a discourse would be identified 'at first sight' and intuitively by the analyst (notably because of stereotypes and prejudices), so that he inevitably finds back the manipulative nature of the considered text by means of his own tools of description. This would be, of course, circular and methodologically unacceptable.

But when rejecting any possibility of objectivist, truth-conditional and realist assumptions, the risk of 'reading into' the text one's own expectations may be even greater with more intuitive tools: virtually any text or speech could be considered 'manipulative'.

Scholars in such trends are, of course, conscious of this kind of problem and they generally prefer not to talk of manipulation at all, or they begin by saying that all texts are manipulative but some are *more* manipulative than others.

Now, the same range of objections can be raised against contextual semantic analysis in general. Given an utterance and a context, the analyst knows, because of his 'linguistic intuition', what the basic meaning of that utterance is.

So whatever kind of analysis he would do, he would find out that very meaning he came to intuitively.

When considering semantic and pragmatic analysis of this kind, it becomes clearer that the objection of circularity either applies to any language-related analysis or is false for some reason. I argue for the latter.

The fact is that the analyst who has access to a text can differentiate between what is conveyed by the linguistic strings and what information is needed in the context to build up a consistent and relevant meaning. He does so when analysing ordinary utterances. He does so when noticing, thanks to that very differentiation, that a discourse should be understood under normal circumstances in a way in which it is common knowledge that it was not. Then, the question of intention comes up and, in particular, that of non-benevolent hidden intention.

Therefore I assume that, when comes the time for the analysis of a given manipulative discourse, the ordinary method of the pragmaticist remains unchanged, but addresses deceptive and non-benevolent communication instead of ordinary and benevolent communication; he needs then not to talk only about *understanding* but about the complex way that leads from comprehension to believing.

1.1 Relevant contributions to the issue within the cognitive framework

Cognitive pragmatics has addressed manipulative discourse only recently and to a limited extent; however the few hypotheses that have been explored within this paradigm present a rich ground for further developments.

Choi, Nisbett and Smith (1997) argue that socio-cultural factors concerning information and category salience directly affect human stereotypic reasoning. This study opens a link between changes in salience of information and inferential results which could possibly be exploited manipulatively when building up generalizations and other inductive conclusions.

In Johnson, Grazioli, Jamal and Berryman (2001), an experimental study addresses the problem of deception-detecting in groups of individuals. Although not directly connected with political manipulation, this work is in fact a continuation of Dennett's hypotheses on what he calls the *intentional stance strategy*, where detected inconsistencies in discourse are interpreted in the light of the deceiver's goals and possible actions (Dennett 1989). This aspect of research is of great interest since, as we recall later, manipulation in discourse is often discovered on the basis of inconsistencies and (formal and non-formal) fallacies.

Regarding political manipulation proper, a few references are available within Relevance theory: Sperber and Wilson (1995), Allott (2002), Allott (this volume), Allott and Rubio Fernandez (2002), Blass (2002) and Carston (2002) all address the problem of terminological misuse with regard to interpretative processes (misuse of concepts and *shallow processing*). They show that often, lexical items are not properly decoded; they just fill a position until some concept can be substituted. A manipulation can take place when some inappropriate word is used to refer to the awaited concept, leading to problematic inferences. For reasons of processing economy, the hearer either provides the proper concept (as in the joke “where did they bury the survivors?” where *survivors* is misread as *dead*), or accepts the item’s connotation in situations where the item should be rejected (connotations are part of the *encyclopaedic entry* of concepts, according to Relevance theory), because of some conceptual variation of the item in context. For example the word *democracy*, which is normally understood as *political system where the people take a crucial part in decisions*, is sometimes understood as a *political system with freedom of investment* or some other related meaning, as Allott (this volume) recalls. He argues that a word like *democracy* may be used with little meaning, sometimes only to trigger positive judgements, and can be completed by ‘whatever the speaker means by that’. I agree that this kind of strategy is among the core ones at work in manipulative discourse, since it triggers consent and adhesion not on the basis of proper arguments, but because of some fuzzy connotation. However, it is likely that the notion of *misuse of concept* needs further elaborations.

With the notion of ‘utility of interpretation’ Chomsky (notably Chomsky 1989) actually addresses misuse of concepts, which is claimed to favour the consent of the audience to thoughts or actions that are, in fact, incompatible with the concept actually encoded by the lexical expression, as with the word ‘democracy’. In *Manufacturing Consent*, Herman and Chomsky (1988) detail their view on political manipulation; however, they do not cover the theoretical aspects in much depth.

Crucial imports are given by Manktelow and Over (1990), who correlate manipulation with problems of inferential processes, and Sperber (1982, 1985 and 1997), who addresses the problems of irrationality and covert communication from an informational viewpoint. Taillard (2000) and Blass (2002) develop in detail pragmatic aspects of manipulative communication and tackle the complex relationship between *informative* and *manipulative* intentions. In particular, these authors argue that cognitive information processing is perturbed when dealing with words with vague, not understandable, vacuous meaning or

which content is inappropriate with regard to the context – a hypothesis that lies at the core of my analysis.

1.2 Manipulation as a type of language use

Every researcher approaching the field of manipulation, be it in linguistics, discourse analysis, psychology or political science, is aware of the vagueness, the semantic complexity and the lack of clear-cut definition for the concept *manipulation*. This is especially true when it applies to a specific behaviour towards other individuals, and to a type of linguistic and communicative behaviour in particular. Literally, to manipulate is to use one's hands to instrumentalize an object (*to operate or control by skilled use of the hands* according to the American Heritage Dictionary), and sometimes to change the object's original shape. Thus to manipulate a human being may be about *using* a person, i.e. have that person adopt specific behaviours to fulfill the needs and interests of the manipulator, regardless of the ones of the manipulated. But an individual, contrarily to an object, has a cognition that enables him to pursue his own interests; therefore, our first step is to admit that a manipulator first of all manipulates some aspects of human cognition, notably reasoning, checking for likeliness, emotions, etc.

The word *manipulation*, when applied to *manipulative discourse*, seems to be a kind of lexicalised metaphorical derivation. It is about using a device or strategy without which the speaker would not be able to change the addressee's beliefs and behaviour. Manipulation of an individual is directly related to *applying constraints*, in particular constraints that the individual is not aware of. These constraints act on the process of information treatment and are built-up with more or less efficient and sophisticated strategies – which remain of course *hidden* – and which aim is at misleading the hearer in a way or another. In effect, the commitment of the addressee to the propositions conveyed by the discourse must be sincere (or taken for sincere). The commitment of the addressee must be sincere while the propositions expressed are in fact problematic at several levels. Furthermore, hidden strategies are necessary because obvious and brutal force cannot gain *sincere* commitment.³ Freedom of thought, or at least the illusion of it, is a necessary condition for manipulation.

The fact that manipulation lacks a clear-cut definition does not entail that the concept itself is completely unclear. To take an analogy from Wittgenstein, a country remains real and identifiable even though it can have fuzzy or controversial borders. Therefore, I will provide below an axiomatic working definition of *prototypical* manipulation, rather than explore the complexity of the intu-

itive notion attached to the word (we are talking about a phenomenon, not about the semantic content of the lexical item 'manipulation').

Even more complex is the notion of manipulative *discourse*. Concerning its definition, two options are available. First, *manipulative discourse* can be a *type of discourse*, therefore identifiable through formal features. Second, manipulative discourse can be a *type of language use*. These two lines of thought are not theoretically equivalent – but they may lead to close conclusions in the end.

If manipulative discourse is a discourse type, like *narration*, *theatre play* or *fairy tale* may be, then *either* some linguistic forms can be found *only* in manipulative discourses, or manipulative discourses are sustained by a unique type of structure, for example specific *argumentative* structures. In both cases, these particularities would provide a formal ground for manipulative discourse identification.

Yet it seems far more reasonable to assume that manipulative discourse is *not* a discourse type according to purely linguistic criteria. Manipulative discourses exist not because of formal features; they are produced in order for the speaker to achieve specific goals. Although some formal features may be more present in manipulative discourses than in non-manipulative discourses, none are exclusive to manipulative discourses. The main criterion I will use is the one of *intention* on the part of the speaker, an intention which is not cooperative in the Gricean sense (in particular regarding the respect of the maxim of quality). The speaker aims at giving manifestness to a certain number of assumptions to the hearer and have him consent to them, provided that they would be rejected under normal conditions. Manipulative discourse is therefore a pragmatic problem in my view. It is a type of *usage* of natural language, and can be identified only through notions like goals, intentions, and broader aspects of pragmatic processing, which, in turn, explain the quantitatively high presence of some formal features (some types of argument schemes and fallacies, some semantically loaded expressions, some connotative words etc.) because they are of some help in achieving the speaker's goal. Therefore one of the core problems of manipulation in language resides in the identification by the hearer of the manipulative intention through formal and non-formal features; when this detection fails, manipulation is effective.

This type of usage of natural language requires an extensive use of some types of argumentative devices, including formal and non-formal fallacies (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992 for example). In short, I suggest that linguistic structures and formal phenomena taking place in manipulative discourse are provided by the speaker in order to trigger specific pragmatic processing. In other words, even if some linguistic elements are statistically

frequent in manipulative discourse, these linguistic elements/structures aim at weighing on the pragmatic level, in order to affect the mental state of the hearer. Thus manipulation is not about using metaphors, or some particular syntactic structure, or some specific semantic feature of quantifiers, but about making them play a particular role at the pragmatic level.

Turning now to the problem of the propositional content of manipulative utterances, one notices that manipulation is often regarded as a sort of *lie* (for example, a recent account of lies in the public discourse of the USSR is to be found in Jaccard et al. 2003). The notion of *lie* is a complex notion, but seems to have a clearer definition, intuitively, than manipulative discourse. Although, there are cases showing that there is more in lying than simply uttering a proposition known as false or believed such. Saying '2 plus 2 equals 5' when knowing that it is false is a lie only when it is uttered in order to obtain some relevant advantage. If a kid says so simply to make a fool of another kid, and not for other purposes, he probably did not actually lie in the full meaning of the term. Regarding manipulation, as many scholars, I suppose that to manipulate implies to deceive in one way or another; although deceiving is slightly different from lying.

It may be argued that the manipulator sometimes actually believes in the proposition expressed. This question is very complex, and I address it briefly further down. In principle, I suggest that a manipulation in fact always entails a kind of content which is not fully adhered to by the speaker: not necessarily a lie proper, but something wrong on one level or another of the communication going on. For example, we know that beliefs can be entertained with various strengths; a weakly entertained belief stated with great authority can be manipulative since this situation implies a discrepancy between the (weak) strength with which the speaker actually believes in P and the (strong) strength in which he communicates believing in P. This is not a lie proper but is similar in nature. On the contrary, it can also be argued that a lie is not always manipulative. I will not address this question directly in this paper, but I notice that the notion of manipulation is not only associated with concepts like *lie* and *intention* but also the one of *interest* on the part of the hearer: a lie – or any defective statement – will be manipulative if the hearer utters it in order to have the hearer adopt a behaviour consistent with the manipulator's interest and possibly inconsistent with the hearer's own interests.

Now, one may also argue that a true statement, sincerely entertained by the speaker, can be communicated 'manipulatively' to the hearer. That might be true according to some weaker notion of manipulation, but I emphasize that a communication is manipulative when the speaker retains some relevant

information, or provides the correct information in order for the hearer to conclude that he should behave in a way which favours the speaker's interests, without being aware of it. Therefore, I consider that to manipulate is, firstly, to communicate the relevance of things that are not relevant by themselves, and/or retain actually relevant information.

A first way to study the propositional content of manipulative discourse is to adopt a moderate objectivist view. The main reason for this is the following: if A says to B the proposition P where P is true in reality but P is believed false by the speaker, it is hard to qualify A's attitude as simply *lying* (B certainly would not say, under any circumstances, that A was lying, although he was not communicating accordingly to his beliefs). Again, I refrain from drawing any strong conclusion about this.

2. Manipulation and truth-conditions

2.1 A definition

Within a hypothetical-deductive framework, I will now suggest a working definition for *manipulative discourse*. The advantage of this definition is that it overcomes the fuzziness of the intuitive notion through a light, and I think legitimate, reductionism. This basic definition of manipulative discourse has further implications that will be discussed below.

A working definition: *A manipulative discourse is a discourse produced in order to persuade the addressee of a set of propositions $P_1 \dots P_n$ of type T with appropriate strategies S.*

I shall address later the characteristics of the propositions conveyed by manipulative discourse (the 'type T'), positing that they are truth-conditionally or, better, truth-functionally defective (roughly, they are *wrong* in some way: false, unlikely, doubtful, inaccurate, inconsistent with the common ground; and therefore should be rejected by the hearer under normal circumstances). The definition takes the following form, where G is the *goal* of the speaker s, λP stands for the *set of propositions conveyed*, $CE(h)$ stands for the *cognitive environment of the hearer h* (the set of his beliefs)⁴ and λS for the *set of strategies* aiming at achieving the belonging of λP to $CE(h)$:

$\exists Gs: \lambda P$ (where $P = \textit{truth-functionally defective}$) $\in CE(h)$;
 $Gs \rightarrow \lambda S$ such as $\lambda S(\lambda P) \rightarrow \lambda P \in CE(h)$.

There exists a goal G_s on the part of the speaker s , which is fulfilled when a set λP of truth-conditionally / truth-functionally defective propositions belong to the cognitive environment CE of the hearer h . G_s implies a set λS of strategies such as λS applied to λP entails λP 's belonging to the cognitive environment CE of the hearer h .⁵ Actually, the effect of the strategies are not granted: they are simply assumed by the speaker to work.⁶

Without the specification of the *properties* of the propositions conveyed and of the identification of the *strategies* used to convey them,⁷ this definition would not be informative enough. Therefore, the properties attached to the propositions, as well as the communicative strategies involved, are wholly part of the definition I assume here. Let me begin with the properties of the propositions conveyed by a manipulative discourse, which are mostly about their truth-conditional or truth-functional value (I use *truth-functional* in a wide sense: implicatures are truth-functional since their truth-value is a function of the truth-values of the explicit content and of the contextual premises needed to deduce it).

I rely here on studies that have pointed out that totalitarian ideologies, and in particular ideological discourses within totalitarianisms, imply the commitment of the addressee to ideas that do not correspond with factual reality (Jaccard et al. 2003; but of course also Klemperer 1946/1975; Chomsky 1989 and many others). Since I stand upon a (moderately) objectivist framework, this question of *reference* and *truth-value* of the propositions is a very natural starting point for my study. This concerns first *propositions about states of affairs*, but also propositions about moral issues, which we may call *propositions about desirable states of affairs* (following Sperber & Wilson's Relevance theory).

2.2 Propositions about states of affairs

I assume that the main characteristics of a proposition P conveyed by a manipulative discourse, when P is about a state of affairs, is the discrepancy of P with its objective truth value or with the truth of intended truth-functional inferences normally drawn by the addressee when interpreting the current utterance (in particular *implicatures*, but also possibly *explicatures*).⁸ More precisely, when a proposition P is conveyed by a manipulative discourse, either P is false (or half-true, which is equivalent to *false*),⁹ or a relevant implicature I inferred from P and the context is false.

In Gricean terms, one might say that the speaker does not respect the maxim of quality, either on the side of what is said, or on the side of what is implicated. Within the framework of Relevance theory, I suggest that either

P is presumed to be relevant, and therefore true, or at least assumed true by the speaker, or acceptable in principle, while it is not (which makes P a lie if the speaker is aware of that), or P is indeed true but contextual features lead the addressee to enrich the meaning of the utterance in deriving implicatures I – or in retrieving presuppositions – that are presumed to be true but which are in fact false (and known or suspected so by the speaker).¹⁰

This case, where P or I is false, is a prototypical case of manipulation. But the retrieval of some types of implicated information, presuppositions in particular, are less or not at all subject to cautious verification by the hearer. They are nonetheless derived truth-functionally since they are grounded on a truth-conditional sentence / utterance, even though they are not, or not always, part of the truth-conditional meaning of the utterance.

Again, it might be argued that the manipulators¹¹ are not always aware that the propositions they convey do not comply with reality or with the relevant scale of values. In other words, they may not be necessarily *lying*. For example when they had been persuaded with manipulative means, or when they are not aware of reality. But this would not fall into the scope of my definition: I suggest, in this case, that the speaker may be performing an action of persuasion but not a manipulation proper: he says what he actually believes in good faith, which implies that as far as he knows, there is no possible discrepancy between his own interests and the – freely evaluated – interests of the audience.

But the problem is that sincere beliefs may combine with insincere, fallacious reasoning. The ill-grounded conclusions thus constructed are then manipulative according to the above definition. More importantly, I speculate that the manipulator, in the strongest sense of the word, is *always aware*, at least to some extent, of the falsehood of what he says or implies (or suggest: for example that P is relevant while it is not, regardless of its truth). This does not imply that the manipulator is fully or intrinsically insincere, since his awareness may be unconscious, if we see these terms as non-contradictory.¹²

Not even thinking of the cases where P is *known as false* but anyway *believed* by the speaker – a case of psychological trouble –, the view according to which a manipulative discourse is based on the violation of the Gricean maxim of quality is not satisfactory: it is far too rough to consider that *to manipulate* is simply *to say what you don't believe* or *to say something you don't have good reasons to believe*. There is a complexity that lies behind the production of a manipulative discourse that cannot be captured through Gricean maxims. For instance, as said before, communicating that P is relevant while it is not is not a proper violation of the maxim of quality.

There is a difference between what the speaker actually believes and what he may *wish* to believe: manipulators are certainly involved in self-persuasion as much as they are involved in persuasion of the hearer. A manipulator may find it more desirable to be entertaining beliefs that promote his ego or positive self-image, or power, rather than having thoughts and behaviours in accordance with facts. No doubt in some (many?) cases of manipulation, the manipulator is more concerned with being admired and empowered rather than with the need for correspondence of his beliefs with reality.

This question is far too complex for me to address here; it is about the details of the production of a manipulative discourse, and about the psychology of the manipulator, while I focus on the mechanisms of detection of deception and how they are defeated by means of manipulative strategies. However I suggest that contrarily to psychotics, manipulators (in my restraint sense) are always aware, to some degree, of the falsity or doubtfulness of the propositions they communicate, as I said before. This is why manipulators often omit some necessary parameters or premises in their arguments and promote censorship and repression against intellectuals.

What is crucial is the fact that the *goal* of manipulators, whatever they themselves believe and regardless of their particular psychological condition, is to convince the addressee of a proposition or set of propositions that should be ruled out by normal information processing and reality checking. The manipulator short-circuits the process of reality checking and disturbs normal information processing. Manipulators are *more* than liars, since they aim, among other things, at producing dogmas that will in turn provide an axiomatic set of beliefs in the reasoning material of the manipulated.

2.3 Non-factual propositions in manipulative discourses

Quite often we find manipulative utterances that are not about states of affairs but about moral issues and principles. Such utterances are not confronted with the addressees' factual representations but with the addressees' moral values and culturally-sensitive representations. In other words, these propositions deal with representations of *desirable states of affairs* and not with *actual states of affairs*. The consensual way of discussing this kind of statement is to talk about *social* or *cultural values*, which are themselves grounded on deeper moral values.

In fact, with such propositions the mechanisms of manipulation are the same as with truth-conditional propositions except that a moral proposition P is not evaluated regarding its *truth* but its *acceptability* to the ethical val-

ues and cultural background of the target audience. Moral statements and propositions about desirable states of affairs are the easiest type of propositions conveyed within a manipulative discourse, since reality can be ultimately checked, whereas moral values are not stable in any comparable way.

These points lead to another hypothesis: totalitarian ideological manipulative discourse is most efficient in societies where some conditions are met, especially a state of crisis. For example, economic recession, war, and post-war situations are factors that favour less stable moral judgement for individuals and open the way for a change in moral values. The fact is that when a society or system has not been able to provide appropriate quality of life and the possibility of human relations, individuals are likely to conclude that the values that ground that particular society or system are not appropriate. This plants the seed of doubt and the will to change societal conditions. Needless to say, such change is not trivial.

If socio-cultural values, like the commitment to democracy, equality, and rights, are weak, other contradictory propositions will bring about a change in the addressees' cognitive environment that will allow the development of new beliefs. Remember that assumptions always have a certain degree of certainty, a certain *strength*. This applies to moral statements as well as to factual statements. For example, a belief like *killing is bad* is generally stronger, at least within occidental cultures, than a belief like *stealing an apple is bad*. This is a simple way of talking about scales of values.

When the proposition has a moral meaning or implications, it is evaluated with regard to the prevailing ethical beliefs. Within a public discourse, the speaker takes this into account as the confrontation of the statement with the prevailing values in the culture where the ideology intends to promote itself and develop. We can define the moral culture as follows:

The moral culture C is a set of assumptions about desirable states of affairs prevailing in a given population.

We note that *C sanctions the acceptability of moral propositions* conveyed within a public discourse.

As I said, if *C* is weakened, for example in the case of a social crisis, new moral statements can be entertained more easily. In other words, *the weaker C, the stronger P (where P is manipulative and where P is not in accordance with C), the more successfully P is accepted.*

However, manipulators can also exploit some moral assumptions in the same way as they can exploit some aspects of obvious reality. Just as they can extract and present half-truths, they can extract and exploit half-moral 'truths',

or only part of a moral statement, and distort it. For example, by exchanging different moral assumptions within the prevalent scale of value, they may receive guidance for otherwise immoral actions, as when assuming that a superior good justifies prevailing over a supposed less important good. This was the case when the killing of disabled persons by the Nazis was intended to achieve the alleged superior good of a pure and healthy society or when the killing of innocents by the Tsheka was done in order to build a society without certain social classes. All these aspects of manipulation are well documented by other scholars (in particular in the philological study of Klemperer 1946/1975, as far as Germany is concerned) and I will not comment them here.

2.4 Three kinds of proposition-evaluation

A *contextual evaluation of the propositions* is rendered by the hearer in order to guarantee that he can reasonably consent to the propositions provided. *Either* we evaluate whether it is reasonable to assume the correspondence of the supposedly intended meaning with what we assume about reality, *or* we evaluate whether the moral consequences of the intended meaning are compatible with non truth-conditional beliefs.

The first type of evaluation concerns the consistency of the proposition with background assumptions about reality. The second type of evaluation concerns the consistency of the proposition with assumptions about desirable states of affairs – moral assumptions. The two types of evaluation can both occur through the process of interpreting an utterance, when the interpretation results in a combination of truth-conditional propositions (about actual states of affairs) and implicatures that carry moral significance (about desirable states of affairs).

The same applies to sets of propositions together forming fallacious arguments. When fallacies (formal and non-formal) are provided in good faith, one cannot talk about manipulation. But when arguments are deceptive (fallacious) and are used to promote other defective propositions, there are good grounds to *suspect* a manipulation. The *bandwagon* fallacy and arguments of authority, for instance, are particularly present in ideological manipulation.¹³

My cognitive hypothesis is that the manipulator acts *on the very process of this evaluation*, leading the hearer to block his own natural process. There are therefore specific strategies that the manipulator exploits to obtain such consent (which I address below).

One final issue concerns the fact that manipulative utterances and propositions¹⁴ are often *vague, excessively metaphorical, pseudo-mystical and confusing*.

It is a well-documented fact that manipulative discourses often use these kinds of linguistic devices in order to call for irrational consent (see for instance slogans in the Stalinist era, odes to charismatic leaders or, more simply, the fight against ‘rationalism’ under the Nazi regime). However, these aspects are not part of the *necessary* characteristics of the propositions conveyed by a manipulative discourse, since, on one hand, the linguistic form is relatively incidental and, on the other hand, many vague statements are not at all manipulative. It is worth repeating that, in my view, manipulative discourse is not a discourse type that could be identified through observation of linguistic features alone. Instead I suggest an hypothesis regarding the *pragmatic effects* of fuzziness and metaphorical excess, among them the generation of a trouble that – paradoxically – may favour the confidence towards the speaker in certain conditions.

3. On manipulative strategies

The strategies used by the manipulator in order to block *truth*, *likeliness* and *acceptability* checking, as well as *consistency* checking, are first linked to the necessity of blocking the identification of the *manipulative intention* of the speaker. Manipulation is a case of covertly transmitted information – it would be self-defeating if the addressee recognises the speaker’s intention and came to a certain conclusion. But manipulation is even more: it is about blocking one’s rational device so that certain operations about beliefs are accomplished by the manipulator himself, I suggest.

We consider that the strategies used by the manipulator are of two general kinds: *local strategies* and *global strategies*. Local strategies are those used to constrain the interpretation at the level of utterance processing. Global strategies are those used to create adequate social and psychological conditions to obtain irrational consent. Global and local strategies can be both linguistic and non-linguistic.

3.1 Local strategies

Linguistic local strategies are already well-known, in particular because of the work of German philologists during or shortly after WWII.¹⁵ Most of the linguistic local strategies used to defeat the natural rules of utterance processing are oriented towards the production of *fuzziness* in general: a fuzzy thing or thought, presented with great arrogance and authority, creates a problematic double-bind. I come later to this problem of double-bind and pseudo-

resolution of the double-binding, which, I suggest, lie at the core of the manipulative process. Other strategies involve presuppositional assertion, misuse of concepts, and pseudo-mystical discourse.¹⁶

Rhetorical devices such as rhetorical questions are quite efficient, since such questions carry strong presuppositions. A question like (1) carries the presupposition that anyone disagreeing with the speaker is a traitor:

- (1) Which traitor would give our homeland to the imperialists?

Some questions such as ‘what else can we think?’ presupposes that the answer is obvious: ‘Nothing’. The implicature that this ‘nothing’ means ‘nothing at all’ and not ‘nothing that I know about’ is automatic and is due to general principles of communication (Gricean maxims or principle of relevance, Sperber & Wilson 1995).

‘Misuse of concepts’ is a problem already mentioned, and is addressed in more detail by Nicholas Allott in this volume. An interesting example can be found in Le Pen’s speech when he won the first round of the French elections in spring 2002. He talks about miners and workers of the steel industry (“*métallos*”, a word which connotes hard work and precarious living) in a sentence that could translate as ‘Don’t be afraid, you the humble, the excluded, the miners, the *métallos*.’ Talking about *miners* raises a referential problem since most coal mines in France have been closed for years, and nearly all the miners are now unemployed or have converted to other activities. Therefore, the miners form a very little part of Le Pen’s audience when he speaks to the Nation. But he addresses the audience itself with these words “you the humble, the excluded, the miners”. Le Pen is talking about virtually non-existing referents and asserts their existence by presuppositional means. The word *métallos* triggers a related problem: steel in France is no longer a leading industry and only a few of the former *métallos* are still working as such nowadays. In the interpretation of such utterances, the hearer gets something like ‘you, the *miners*, whatever this means, you the *métallos*, whatever this means’, while only connotative presuppositions or implicatures are kept and, one should say, *driven* by the words immediately preceding: “you the *humble*, the *excluded*”. Many other features of this utterance deserve interest, among which the fact that Le Pen, so to say, presents himself as the one who talks to the “excluded”, which triggers positive and empathic feelings also in the mind of the non-excluded people.

Another well-known misuse of concept was made by the use of the words *hero* and *heroism* in both the Third Reich and the Communist countries. There, the hero is the person who will follow the rule of the dictator or the party and act as requested by the power in place. Killing of innocent and unarmed people

has been many times called *heroic*. The same applies to the German *Kampf*: the ‘noble fight’. Every activity of everyday life was a *Kampf*, a noble fight for a noble cause. These facts are neatly addressed by Klemperer (1946/1975).

In the USSR, it was common to use *bandit* (approximately the same as the English and the French *bandit*) to designate not only a robber, a criminal or a gangster, but also a soldier of any anti-communist guerrilla movement (this use of *bandit* was first applied to Chang-Kai-Sheck’s movement in China). The word *bandit* has even extended to describe any anti-communist activist (as Shmelev 2002 points out). The word *comrade* (“*tovaricht’ch*”) is also a good example of the misuse of concepts.

In addition, religious-like discourse plays a very important part in ideological totalitarian manipulation. It implies that the speaker is a God-like being, a Saviour-like being. The very beginning of Le Pen’s address to the nation is a good example: “Enter in hope, be confident.” The speaker asks for faith instead of rational agreement (it must be added that Le Pen uses the French word *espérance* (‘hope’), which is used in religious contexts, instead of the usual word *espoir*).

Unmotivated analogies, metaphors, and vague terms, together with the effects of global fuzziness, make it complicated to decode the real information that lies behind the discourse and the articulation between these pieces of information. Thus the hearer is made less able, or even unable, to identify logical fallacies, half-truths, and other defects of the discourse. Fuzziness also plays a role on the feelings of incompetence in the hearer’s mind, something very important in the logic of manipulation. In all cases, the addressee is put in a state of confusion, because he can’t trust his own intuition that the discourse is meaningless. What he believes instead is that he is not competent enough to understand it.

Non-linguistic local strategies *accompany* the production of the discourse. They are elements that contribute to produce a situation where the hearer is under the lead of the manipulator. Such strategies are numerous, from the general attitude of the speaker to prosodic features and intonations,¹⁷ and to the triggering of emotional reactions. When the discourse is written, it is accompanied by pragmatic effects coming from the typeface, the organisation of text on the page, images, etc. Wilke (1998) makes it clear that these constraints apply to journals and newspaper layouts.

3.2 Global strategies

Well-known linguistic global strategies (manipulative strategies that rely on language use but which are not directly provided in some particular manipulative discourse) include:

- Spreading and repetition of specific connotative words (words that trigger under normal circumstances implicatures or presuppositions with symbolic weight);
- Generalisation of a new terminology;
- Elimination of some lexical items from public discourse;
- Unmotivated or misleading analogies;
- Acronyms, abbreviations, numbers;
- Naming of elements of the everyday environment

Specific connotative words include military terminology, which presupposes (or triggers the implicature) that the social individual is, metaphorically, a soldier who does not question orders and finds happiness in a state of instrumental submission. New words or partially new constructions, such as the well-known generalisation of the distance prefix *ent-* in German, used in order to build new verbs and substantives, are linguistic global strategies of manipulation.¹⁸ When stabilized in the public lexicon, these expressions contribute to legitimate as ‘normal’ and ‘conventional’ a range of concepts – in particular (but not exclusively) regarding actions that the target audience is expected to achieve – which would be seen as strange or exceptional under other circumstances. When this point is reached, one can hypothesize that the individuals do not really perceive any longer that these namings were at first imposed by the power, since a lexicalized item falls in the cultural common ground shared by the community as if *sui generis* (the perception we have of words and meaning are not diachronic but synchronic: the history of their implementation in the idiom is not salient at all when we use language automatically).

Unmotivated analogies which are constructed with discourse but materialised by institutions may also appear as linguistic global strategies of manipulation. For instance, one may question the classical links established between health, sport, youth and the army, when there is an obvious lack of natural motivation in the reference to the military activity. This is especially true in twentieth-century armies, where no swords, spears and halberds are used. There was, under the Nazi rule, a hybrid ministry dealing with sport and the army; in the same vein, students were forced to practice something called *Wehrsport* (‘military sport’) on Tuesdays afternoons, and there was even

a brand of cigarettes called *Wehrsport* (again a fact reported by Klemperer 1946/1975). These kind of things create a context where assumptions of the type *the army is a good and healthy sport* are present in the hearer's cognitive environment, even if they are often unconscious, unreflective beliefs.¹⁹

The creation of acronyms and abbreviations of all kinds, the loss of personal and institutional identities through the use of identification numbers, as in the names of schools and other institutions in communist countries (like 'school 22' or 'hospital 17') all contribute to create a global atmosphere where depersonalisation is progressively integrated and accepted as conventional and normal. The Soviet naming of streets, towns and villages like 'progress', 'steel plant', 'electrical power' and others, affects the everyday environment of the manipulated and creates indirectly a positive image of the human being as a worker. In addition, it implies that human existence is not only dedicated to a function in the system, in particular a working function, but also *defined* by it. This form of global alienation results from the depersonalisation of the individual through naming.

There are, I suggest, two main devices of global non-linguistic strategies.

The first one is a purely social device: group pressure (the individual tends to comply with the most salient opinion within the group he belongs to) – a very well-known topic within social psychology that I will not address here.

The other device seems to me more crucial as far as consent to defective propositions and arguments is concerned. It is the achievement, in the hearer's mind (and in public opinion), of a particular *image* by the manipulators, who want to make themselves appear super-competent, either because they manifest in some way that they have some information that the hearer does not have, or because they are viewed as uncommonly skilled. In prototypical cases, for example in a typical twentieth century dictatorship, the cult of personality focused on dictators is extreme. The over-competent image of the manipulator has a non-trivial consequence: the dictator appears as a superior mind, a universal genius, a being who knows more than any ordinary human about the world, destiny and society, which entitles him to establish transcendent-like dogmas. The manipulator in totalitarian societies can be compared with a God-like figure (to whom an alienated form of worship is dedicated). The same arises when religious preachers want to be taken for prophets, which can link to suicide bombings or whatever abnormal behaviour.

This image is built up in order to achieve a specific goal: the hearer must be *confident* in the leader, this confidence being a condition of obtaining sincere consent, because it creates the belief that the manipulator acts in favour of the individual's own interests.

In democratic societies, where manipulation is likely to happen as well, other schemes may trigger confidence for the leader. The reason is the one which lies behind any persuasion process, and we take it axiomatically: if hearers are confident in speakers, they tend to believe them. The simple reason for this is that confidence lowers critical thinking and is thus energy-sparing (I assume, following Relevance theory and others, that the human mind is geared at following paths of least-effort). Defeating a strong assumption about the speaker deserving confidence implies a cost.

Since confidence is a matter of scale, I will assume the following:

The more confident the hearer is, the less critically he thinks, and the more efficiently the manipulator is likely to achieve his persuasive goal.

Very likely, the human mind has a 'source-tagging device' evaluating the reliability of the source of the linguistic communication (reflected in various modal and evidential expressions grammaticised or lexicalised in natural languages); a prominent source is 'credible authority'. It follows that manipulators have to establish credibility, and it is common sense that the building of an over-competent image is a key to this process of gaining confidence (see on this Sperber 2000).

The important fact, making manipulation fundamentally different from rational persuasive effects, is that *the grounds for which the hearer is confident are not rational*. It is a matter of fact that, generally speaking, children tend to believe their parents, non-specialists *tend* to believe specialists, patients tend to believe doctors, and so on. In these cases, the grounds for confidence are rational.²⁰ There are good grounds to think that the speaker knows more about the topic of speech than the hearer, and this leads naturally to confidence 'by default'.

But there is another condition in which confidence arises. The hearer must have no reason to think that the speaker is deceptive or that the speaker doesn't wish the hearer's good. In the examples mentioned (the doctor, the parent), it is generally the case that the speaker is benevolent towards the hearer.

The condition of benevolence can be exploited by the speaker. When benevolence is perceived as *extreme*, which means that the speaker is perceived as pursuing the interests of the audience *more* than he's own interests, affective reflexes arise in the audience. Again, the most extreme case reveals how the speaker gains the confidence and even a form of (sometimes very strong) affection from the individuals in the audience.

We normally trust more easily people we love and who claim to love us, unless we have good reasons to think that they are not competent. If A believes

that B loves him, A assumes that B wishes A's good, and that B's actions will be oriented towards promoting A's interests. If A is a group and B a dictator exhibiting his love and concern towards his people, then it is more likely that A will believe B. As an example, Perón, in a famous speech, said he was renouncing the rank of general and personal glory for the sake of the people, an argument certainly very efficient in obtaining confidence.²¹ This happened also when Pétain asked the people to have faith in him (French capitulation speech), when Stalin was called 'Father of the peoples', when Ho Chi Minh was called 'Uncle Ho', and so on. Thus, appeals to emotion and pseudo-mystical discourse gain confidence through emotion-sharing, in turn communicating destiny-sharing, from which the hearer expects that the speaker will fulfil his existential needs.

If we also consider that A believes that B is super-competent, then all the ingredients for successful manipulation are in place, provided that B favours his own interests and not those of the audience, and that he is ready to mislead the audience for this. This approach can be applied to manipulation within sectarian cults as well.

It may be tempting to count among global non-linguistic strategies physical force and use of power, inasmuch as they strengthen group pressure and sustain an ideology where enemies are identified and subsequently punished or destroyed. This matter is complex, but I would rather suggest that force gains sincere consent only under very specific conditions and, therefore, is manipulative only when generalized repression is active. In effect, generalized repression may lead to a psychological economy of consent where an individual finds it less costly to adopt, step-by-step, the thoughts expressed by the authority, rather than trying to resist (Stockholm syndrome is an extreme case of this mechanism, although all but rare, where the dominated comes to love the dominator regardless of the harm caused by the dominator).

But when force and power become the most important or only tool of power preservation in a community, another dynamics is put in place (see Ilie in this volume). Relying on force and repression, the power in place does not need that much to convince the audience. Among leaders and members of their staff, fewer people sincerely believe in the ideology while becoming more and more aware that repression and force are the main guarantees of their privileges. These situations, where only a small minority of people believe in the public discourse (maybe in some cases almost no one) or at least fake to do so, while the rest remain in submission because of force (as was the case in the last decades of Ceausescu's reign in Rumania), generally signal the close collapse

of totalitarian regimes. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization was perhaps intended to avoid this danger in post-Stalin Russia.

4. The central mechanisms of manipulation: Trouble and resolution

Among all these strategies, linguistic ones are crucial for the manipulator to obtain sincere consent. And of all linguistic strategies, I suggest now that *fuzziness*, in a wide sense, plays an important role in the process of manipulating. Let me elaborate on this point.

First of all, fuzziness is not only about vague terms, complicated sentences and overuse of metaphors. One of the most important strategies used within manipulative discourses is the creation of a *global fuzziness*, where even parts of the discourse that seem clear and simple lead to interpretative problems for the addressee. Simplistic, and usually inductive arguments violating logical rules, and which create unmotivated generalisations, can be considered as contributing to the global fuzziness or confusion of the discourse,²² despite the fact that they are intended to imply a particularly 'clear' and wise thinking.

Simplification creates another problem. When facing this kind of discourse, the addressee is troubled, since his cognitive ability to clearly understand the speaker is disabled in some way. In such cases, the hearer may well be aware of an argumentative problem, and I think this is generally the case. However one must explain why the manipulated comes to adopt a simplistic view on complex problems.²³

The manipulative discourse, at least within totalitarian regimes, is *impressive*. First, it creates non-propositional effects on the addressee, such as emotions that give rise to the assumption, on the addressee's side, that the speaker is *sincere* and that he shares the worries of the addressee. Second, the discourse is impressive because the speaker makes use of concepts and arguments that the target addressee would not use easily, or because it draws upon reasoning that complies with some personal intuition or opinion on the part of the hearer, thus providing an appearance of justification for these intuitions or opinions.

In many other cases, the trouble does not arise from simplification (and fallacies) but from obscure, vague, metaphorical, mystical expressions. The addressee faces a conundrum: on the one hand, his natural ability to understand clearly is defeated (he has an assumption about his self-incompetence), and, on the other hand, he is keen to believe in the speaker's word, because of these non-propositional (emotional) effects, combined with the constant request, on the speaker's side, to have faith in him. In addition, there are social devices im-

plied in the communication, such as group pressure, which can lead the hearer to overcome a first impression about the problematic properties of the utterances. This phenomenon is likely to be related to the kind of situations many of us have once faced, be it during childhood or not, when we happened to laugh at a joke we didn't understand just because it would be face-threatening not to or because we wouldn't like to risk a self-exclusion.

Moreover, the addressee is led to believe the speaker's word, since it is communicated to *solve* the double-bind, which is thought to be due to the hearer's incompetence but which is in fact created by the manipulator himself. The hearer abandons some of his cognitive abilities for the sake of higher values presented by a discourse originating from a seemingly higher intellect. This way, the addressee is in a position of moral, intellectual and psychological dependence towards the speaker, who in turn appears as a saviour, a genius, a 'God-like' being.

One more word should be said about emotions. Quite often, the discourse is accompanied by other emotional devices than prosody and intonation. Emotions are also triggered by devices at the level of the general attitude of the speaker, and relative to the propositional contents of the utterances, as when the manipulator speaks about concepts that call for fear and hope. The addressee perceives the speaker's emotion, fake or real, which seems fair and motivated, since the addressee belongs to a group assumed to be integrated in a common fate with the speaker, and the emotion either comes to be shared by the addressee (for example fear) or a related emotion is triggered (for example when *enthusiasm* triggers *hope*).

5. Conclusive remarks: The manipulative intention and the theory of mind

One of the crucial problems of manipulation is the identification by the manipulated of the manipulative intention of the manipulator. How is it possible that normal humans, equipped with rational devices, stop using them correctly when confronted by an efficient manipulative discourse? Each of the aspects that we have discussed, plus a number of others that have been described by researchers, play an important role. A few points need to be explained in order to address the question of *intentions*. Relevance theory admits two levels of intention on the part of the speaker, which must be acknowledged by the hearer in order for the interpretive process to take place.

First, the relevance-theoretic idea of *ostensive-inferential communication* involves the need for the identification by the hearer of the speaker's *communicative intention*; the speaker makes it clear to the hearer that the stimulus is *intended* to communicate something to him. The recognition by the hearer of the speaker's communicative intention triggers *expectations of relevance* (the expectation that the utterance is adequately formatted to communicate relevant assumptions at a lower interpretative cost), and therefore allows for inferential processing to begin.

Second, the communicated material is not simply decoded but is pragmatically enriched (following a deductive non-demonstrative scheme of information processing). The full interpretation is a set of assumptions corresponding to what the speaker 'means' by the utterance. This set of assumptions represent the *informative intention* of the speaker, and includes all relevant propositions derived during the interpretative process. In order to deal with other types of intentions, not specifically communication-oriented, we would need a rather complex psychological apparatus. A few tools derived from Relevance theory and cognitive science regarding covert communication and detection of deception may well help (see Dennett 1989; and Sperber 1997 in particular).

We notice that there is no reason for which the deductive inferential process should stop when an interpretation is found for an utterance; that is, when the informative intention of the speaker is retrieved. We suggest on the contrary that the inferential process goes further, in order to find out about other types of information, notably the goals of the speaker and related intentions of the speaker, plus their consequences in interaction. This happens, we think, when the hearer has reasons to suspect that the communication which is going on may lead to relevant consequences. Relevant consequences may be ones that will help to improve the hearer's knowledge of reality (this happens when the interpretation of an utterance leads to further conclusions when confronted with other elements of the hearer's cognitive environment), or that will help escape from a risky situation in the interaction itself. This happens when the hearer suspects the speaker is playing a role, fakes, or is being non-cooperative in some way, which allows for a hypothesis about the speaker's having hidden and potentially harmful intentions. This, and any weird utterance in context, or any utterance having weird consequences, or a proposition that seems to undermine assumptions we hold, all need to be evaluated in terms of *risk* for the hearer *or* improvement of the hearer's view of the world before the information comes to be held as a belief or on the contrary rejected.

Dennett's 'intentional stance' is based on a similar view, although with other concepts, and, seemingly, under the assumption that the process is fundamentally reflective:

Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose behaviour is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought to do; that is what you predict the agent *will* do. (Dennett 1989:17)

The core idea is that the individual acts in accordance with his goals and intentions. Therefore, actions are the key to finding out about intentions. Relevance theory has an even more radical view on this, assuming that a specific device in the mind is dedicated to the detection of intentions: the *mindreading module* (after the well-known works of Baron Cohen). The role of such a device is the same as the role of rationality in Dennett's view, and is also the same as any variant of the *theory of mind*, itself a variant of what used to be called *popular psychology*. All these trends admit in some way that the human mind has a 'reflexive knowledge' or capacity to elaborate about itself, positing similar mechanisms to other individuals.

The question we need to address is *why is the manipulative intention not detected* by a critical amount of hearers although there are obvious or good reasons to suspect manipulation? This can only be answered through a more fundamental question: does human cognition work normally or not when interpreting a manipulative discourse? These are problems that lead beyond linguistic issues, but are directly related to the question of the interpretive processing of utterances (they are pragmatic questions). We know that these aspects of things need further elaboration and research from other disciplines, notably psychology. But there are some things that can be said about that from a cognitive viewpoint already.

First, one may hold that normal cognitive abilities are simply *exploited* by the manipulator. It is in effect certain that presumption of relevance (presumption that the utterance is relevant and thus deserves interpretation), or any cooperative principle, is in a way exploited by the speaker – the communicative act presents itself as a *normal* one. This is certainly true to the extent that the manipulator communicates the presumption of relevance of his utterances (or the presumption that he is cooperative). However, it is far more crucial to re-

mark, first, that the hearer evaluates the possible relevance of the utterance, and can well decide not to interpret it fully (that happens all the time when someone talks to you and you think that his discourse is irrelevant, a phenomenon quite common when a scientist listens to a conference paper by a scholar belonging to an opposing framework, or when a French deputy drowns while listening to the Prime Minister during debates at the *Assemblée Nationale*). Second, and more importantly, the hearer can actually presume that the utterance is indeed relevant— assuming then that the speaker is both sincere and rational when communicating the presumption of relevance carried by any utterance – but nevertheless finds out that the utterance is in fact irrelevant. In typical cases of manipulation by discourse, the fact is that these checkings that normally take place during utterance interpretation do not take place the way they should.

The first deception is at the level of what Relevance theory calls the *communicative intention* and not at the level of the information communicated itself. In fact, what is exploited is not simply the cooperative principle or the presumption of relevance, it's the *false belief*, entertained by the hearer, that the speaker is benevolent, cooperative or relevant.

But the interesting point is that when the addressee encounters a discourse with falsities and fuzziness, he does not (always) consider the discourse irrelevant. A mix of badly articulated fuzzy propositions, to take an extreme case, should not create consent, precisely because the presumption of relevance is not satisfied. How come the addressee questions his own ability to find proper and rational relevance to the utterances he processes?

Many devices that we need to discuss, such as the god-like image of the manipulator, merely open the way to a more global hypothesis on the topic of manipulation and cognition. In short, we suggest that the way to avoid identification of the manipulative intention resides in the god-like or super-competent image of the speaker. And this has a direct link with intention-recovery.

But there may be a more direct way of explaining the success, when it happens, of manipulation in discourse. Given the fact that the hearer accepts the presumption of relevance, it becomes more costly to reject the propositions expressed after that first 'agreement' to process the information. There comes the problem of cognitive dissonance, exactly as exploited by telephone marketing trainers when they tell employees to ask first a question the potential customer is likely to answer by *yes* (for example "Do you read newspapers?" or "Do you have windows in your home?"). The intuitive awareness of this phenomenon may also explain the fact that sometimes, an individual will prefer *not to be exposed to some speech* as a self-protection reflex, in order *not to be persuaded*,

just because it's complicated in the end to resist continuous persuasive speech, in particular when lacking the intellectual tools of critical evaluation (notably because of poor or inadequate education).

Whether this mindreading ability is grounded on the automatic and non-reflective discovery of intentions or on a (partly) reflective theory of mind is not important here. The interesting point is that any theory of mind or intuitive heuristics for the discovery of intentions applies first to *ordinary humans*. But attributing intentions, and in particular very complex sets of intentions, to a God, or non-ordinary, super-competent, human being, whatever this may exactly involve, becomes problematic under the assumption that the ability of intention recovery is simply not applicable to the domain. Of course, recovery of intentions is an anthropomorphic ability that applies to other species and even to objects. But regarding a being that is felt 'higher' than an ordinary human, a god, or a genius, the question is not that simple. If the hearer takes for granted that the manipulator is benevolent and more competent than him, he may simply not consider himself able to attribute precise intentions that would not fit this scheme. In particular, a negative intention such as a manipulative one may not be detectable if the hearer believes strongly in both benevolence and super-competence. Moreover, intentions attributed to a super-competent being are likely to be weakly attributed, precisely because the hearer assumes a difference of status: while the speaker is super-competent, the hearer, by contrast, is under-competent. The statement that God's intentions are not understandable, as folk wisdom claims, reflects this aspect of things, and applies to any dictator believed to be benevolent and super-competent. In a crucial way, the manipulator achieves his goals when he makes the audience believe this. The result is a form of faith on the part of the addressee.

There is however an even more fundamental question: how come a given individual accepts the idea that he should stop evaluating critically the propositions made by the speaker? There is a rational factor: if the speaker shows super-competence then it is reasonable to accept his views. But under normal circumstances, we know that super-competence – or simply competence in a domain where the speaker is not competent – needs to be constantly demonstrated by the speaker, otherwise confidence is lost (think of the doctor who suddenly starts saying weird things). We can add a number of psychological and sociological factors such as group pressure, again. But the clue to all this is that the speaker builds an environment for the hearer which makes it *more efficient* for the hearer to adopt the views of the manipulator. Resisting group pressure, evaluating complex propositions when plunged into interpre-

tive trouble, etc., is costly. Therefore, the fundamental assumption that I would hold on the success of manipulative discourse is the following:

The more costly it is for the hearer to retrieve correctly the information communicated, and to evaluate the truth, the likeliness or the ethical acceptability of it, the less likely the hearer is to resist manipulation.

It is pretty economical to rely on the other's opinion provided that he's assumed to have the right opinion, whatever this opinion may be.

Of course, not everybody is manipulation-prone. It *needs* to be accepted, *sincerely accepted*, that the manipulator is super-competent, and that, therefore, an ordinary human has no authority to engage in normal cognitive processing of the manipulator's discourse. Many people are not totally manipulation-prone. However, when the group pressure is extreme, notably because of fear, a human is oriented towards developing a worldview that complies with the manipulator's discourse. When this lasts, many people tend to adopt, by necessity of survival, the basics of the official dogmas for reasons of economical and safer ordinary life.

Religion itself, when not used as a fundamentalist and exclusive ideology, can be counter-powers to manipulation, since the psychological 'throne' of an exclusive God is already occupied.²⁴ This is one of the reasons why religion often vigorously opposes totalitarian regimes and, in general, is a central concern for dictators (an obvious fact in communist countries and in Nazi Germany, where the Churches were a target, in particular the Roman Catholic Church, despite the ambivalent attitude of the Vatican at that time). Sometimes, however, dictators try to get the support of religion for strategic goals, since generally speaking a religion can give moral caution to his actions, and therefore makes them easily acceptable to people. For example, Pétain was anxious to get the backing of the Vatican, and the contemporary right-wing extremist Le Pen has its annual party meeting on Joan-of-Arc day, which is intended to promote an alliance of right-wing extremism and Catholicism. Juan Perón, in Argentina, got the support of the Catholic Church, which was crucial for him, but once in power, his connivance with the Church was no longer important and he started to promulgate reforms which were against Catholic views (notably on divorce and prostitution).

And of course, people are much less prone to manipulative discourse when they are aware of some of the central mechanisms involved.

It still needs to be said that what the French call *langue de bois* ('Wooden language': a string of ready-made sentences, generally ideological, without any substantial meaning, typical of communist regimes in the last decades of their

lives) is not efficient as a manipulative device, since emotional support is not present. When wooden language appears as it really is, a discourse without significant content, the addressee is no longer manipulated. This is why wooden language generally appears only: (i) when police and brutal pressure enforces a behaviour of submission; or (ii) when no other political force is present to challenge the power in place. In both cases, the discourses no longer need to be convincing, they fulfil other needs.

For a totalitarian regime to emerge, it is unavoidable that a significant part of the audience actually believes and supports its promoters. Active manipulation may decrease in intensity when the regime is actually supported by repression against opponents. Some claim that when this happens, the totalitarian regime is entering into a self-destructive phase. Although apparently clear cases of this phenomenon can be identified, for instance the fall of the Apartheid regime, it would probably be too strong to posit a generalisation regarding this point.

As a conclusion, I suggest that manipulation in discourse is clearly a *pragmatic* and *contextual* problem, where the notion of context is understood as the subset of the hearer's cognitive environment which allows for the interpretation to be constructed. As such, manipulation involves cognitive processes; my main hypothesis is that normal interpretive processes are troubled at the level of *intention recognition*, which involves a specific cognitive device (mindreading module). I suggest that this trouble is achieved with a set of converging strategies leading the hearer to problems of understanding, – notably, but not only, because of unclear propositions and arguments. I also note that many aspects that were evoked in this paper require much further elaboration and research.

Notes

1. Many thanks to Peter Schulz, John Messerly and to the anonymous reviewers for their very useful comments on a previous version of this paper. I am also grateful to my assistants Steve Oswald and Patrick Morency for proof-reading and comments.

2. First published in 1986.

3. One could suggest that in cases of brainwashing or 're-education', sincere consent is gained through brutal force. I hold that it is far from clear that such consent is really *sincere* in the full sense of this term. But even if it were, this kind of manipulation is not the standard one, which is about someone coming to some conclusions believing he does so freely. Manipulation seems much more efficient when the constraints are not heavy and brutal but smaller and milder, as when the Chinese gained consent of American prisoners

step by step, first asking them without heavy pressure to explain about some bad things in America, then having them criticize more and more heavily their county, the process leading the prisoner to finally sincerely think that Communism is indeed better than Capitalism. They used a cognitive feature known as *cognitive dissonance* (cf. Lifton 1961/1989).

4. Actually the *set of facts manifest to the hearer*, which presents slight – and irrelevant at this point – differences with the ‘set of beliefs’ of the hearer. See Sperber and Wilson (1995:Section 1.8) for details.

5. This is not a definition for ‘communication of truth-functionally defective propositions’ but for manipulation, since communication does not imply that the communicated material becomes part of the beliefs entertained by the hearer, an implication *manipulation* has (as well as persuasion, but then the nature of the propositions need not be defective and the set of strategies would be different; I see manipulation as a sub-type of persuasion).

6. Ideally, I should then have replaced the symbol of implication by a symbol for ‘assumed by the speaker to imply...’, but for the readability of this definition, I chose to simply add this precision in words.

7. I use *communicative strategy* in the simplest meaning, without reference to psycho-social strategies.

8. Explicatures are context-dependant inferences which are part of what the utterance explicitly communicates (roughly, the Gricean ‘what is said’, although this notion is not operative, according to Relevance theory). See Sperber and Wilson (1995:Section 4) and Carston (2002) for details on the explicature / implicature distinction.

9. For obvious reasons: any set of truth-functionally interdependent assumptions is globally false if one of them is false (*P and Q* is true only when both *P* and *Q* are true).

10. I follow Carston (1998) and my own previous work on presupposition in negative utterances (Saussure 2000) in assuming that presuppositions are types of implicatures. The equivalence between presuppositions and implicatures is also assumed in other paradigms, for example in *congruity theory*, where implicatures are dealt with in terms of specific presuppositions. See Rigotti and Rocci (in press).

11. I call *manipulator* any manipulative instance, be it a single speaker or a collective entity (the *Party* for example).

12. A fact may be manifest to an individual although he may not be aware of it. For example, one may have shortly noticed elements of the situation of speech that are irrelevant to him, and that have not been processed as information but are stored anyway in the mind. Moreover, it is likely that not only facts can be unconsciously manifest to an individual, but also meta-propositions such as *P may be false*. Being unconsciously aware of a proposition or of a fact does not imply plain insincerity: the division between *sincere* – *insincere* is obviously too rough for a fine-grained analysis (as the distinction *lie* – *not-lie* may also be). In a relevance-theoretic terminology, we would say in this very case that *the fact that the speaker’s belief is false or doubtful is manifest to himself*: a fact is manifest to an individual if this fact is known or *could be known without any further information* (a fact is manifest if known or inferable).

13. The bandwagon fallacy is a non-formal fallacy that can be expressed as follows:

P: Everybody / most people / a great deal of people believe Q
Therefore, Q is true.

Arguments of authority are of a similar form (and is the same in essence):

P: This great man believes Q
Therefore, Q is true.

14. Utterances and propositions are distinct things: we reason with many un-uttered propositions, and the interpretation of a single utterance can lead to several propositions as meaning.

15. Since the emergence of the National-Socialist party, intellectuals pointed out a few commonsensical characteristics of manipulative discourse in the public speeches of the party, for instance the “political smoke-screen of phrases” pointing out fuzziness (Kraus 1933/1952) and many recurrent elements such as slogans and proverbial manipulation. The major work, although mostly descriptive and not theoretically detailed, is Klemperer’s (1946/1975/1998). He addresses a wide range of issues and labelled the way the party was using language *Third Reich language* recalling Orwell’s *Newspeak*. A heavy bibliography on philological issues is available, from which some must be quoted: Berning (1964), Betz (1955), Bork (1970), Glunk (1966), Paechter (1944), Sauer (1978), Seidel and Seidel-Slotty (1961).

16. I assume a distinction between ‘pseudo-mystical’ discourse and religious discourse in general. Religious discourse is not manipulative in essence, since it may well be provided in good faith (it can be persuasive, which is another matter); it may become manipulative when produced by preachers in order to promote some political ideology and some individuals’ power. In this case, we suggest an internal contradiction between the belief in a ‘true’ God, symbolising the ultimate ‘absolute’, and the authority of a human leader claiming to hold himself the absolute truth about God. Since God is normally *out of the natural ontology*, he always remains ‘unknowable’ in some way. Claiming to hold the full and only truth about what God thinks and wants is therefore manipulative because it is contradictory to the notion of God itself, at least within monotheist traditions. It’s easy to notice that the preachers presenting themselves as holding such a full and only truth make an extensive use of manipulative strategies like appeal to emotion and arguments of authority.

17. I do not put prosodic features and intonations into linguistic aspects of communication but into pragmatic and contextual ones; I am aware that this is a controversial issue.

18. The German *ent-* corresponds, roughly, to the English *un-*, *de-* or *dis-* in newly created words like *Entdunkeln* (‘undarkening’, the operation, taking place in the morning, consisting in taking off the screens put on windows to darken the city when an allied bombing was likely to happen), *Entrümpeln* (‘disobstructing’ the attics for easy access in case of fire) etc. Klemperer (1946/1975), who reports these expressions, notes and regrets a similar word-formation in *Entnazifizierung* (denazification) after the fall of the Third Reich. One notices also the word *destalinizatsja* in Russian, built up under the same scheme (‘destalinisation’).

19. The assimilation of sport and military activity probably had other motivations in the antique world, when there were no guns, bombs and planes, and where the physical ability of the soldier was the key to victory. The remotivation of this parallel between health and war had a great importance in the Third Reich, probably because it was intended to rein-

force the idea of the superiority of the pure Arian race over inferior (and therefore weaker) peoples. But it also links to the Nazi mythology of antique, legendary and heroic germanity, where nature (and therefore the body) plays a particular, quasi-mystical role. In some democratic countries, there are still remains of these analogies – see for instance the strange Swiss Federal Department (ministry) of *Defence, Protection of the Population and Sports*.

20. This is not a law. To take an example, if a doctor starts saying weird things, a patient may suspect incompetence, and, as a result, confidence is lost. However, *a priori*, it is legitimate and rational to suppose that doctors deserves confidence – otherwise, it would be of no use consulting them. Another comment on this further down.

21. Speech in Buenos Aires on October 17th, 1943. My thanks to Steve Oswald for this information.

22. One might talk about the lack of global *coherence* of the manipulative discourse, but this notion is too intuitive and problematic to be used within our framework; see Rocci (in this volume) for developments on manipulation and coherence.

23. Simplification has other interesting consequences. In general, a public discourse relying on simplification has more power of convincing than nuanced and more elaborated discourses. This is a side-effect of the global economy of human cognition: a high level of political expectation raised by simplistic discourse for a minimal reasoning, a minimal cost. In order to adhere to a more complex discourse (which represents a more complex and inter-related set of propositions), one has first to foresee a *more adequate* political result (in terms of justice, efficiency, etc.) that justifies a wider set of elements to deal with – and therefore to accept a longer and more complex information processing and reasoning.

24. I am aware of the complex relations of religious faith with non-religious, ideological, dogmatic beliefs. I hold that there is a kind of religious discourse that is indeed totalitarian, ideological and manipulative, and another kind which is not, and that these two kinds of religious discourse have occurred in most religions (see Note 15).

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The role of misused concepts in manufacturing consent

A cognitive account

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Propaganda is to a democracy what violence is to a dictatorship.
(Blum 2000: 11)

1. Introduction¹

This paper aims at a pragmatic account of a way in which concepts are misused in political discourse in the developed West, in statements by politicians and in the print and broadcast media. Three different explanations will be examined: a code-word model; the use of reflective beliefs and attributive concepts; and shallow processing due to lowered contextual expectations of relevance. A deflationary explanation which claims that pragmatics need not say anything about these cases is also briefly considered. The third model is tentatively supported and empirical predictions made that could be used to take the investigation further.

In stating the main aim of the paper I am making two assumptions which I will attempt to motivate in the remainder of the introduction but cannot fully explore here due to lack of space. First, that Western elites provide key support for totalitarian regimes and anti-democratic measures.² Secondly, that misuse of concepts is a widespread feature of political discourse in the Western media which facilitates public acquiescence in this support.

Chomsky presents many examples of what I am calling misuse of concepts in political discourse and discusses its apparent role in mobilising the sup-

port or consent of people in democratic societies for anti-democratic action by their governments. (See Herman & Chomsky 1988, for the manufacture of consent. Chomsky frequently refers to the misuse of concepts in the manufacture of consent. Sometimes he calls this the “utility of interpretations” e.g., Chomsky 1989a: 105–136.) Anti-democratic action may be carried out in the democratic society itself³ and directed against the people who consent to it or it may be implemented abroad. This paper focuses on the second case, looking at the way misuse of concepts in discourse about foreign affairs within democratic countries makes it possible for the public to consent to governmental support for dictatorships and totalitarian regimes and intervention against democracy abroad.

A central case is the misuse of the concept of democracy itself. Take as an example:

- (1) The yearning to see American democracy duplicated throughout the world has been a constant theme of American foreign policy. (Neil Lewis, diplomatic correspondent of the New York Times. NYT, Dec. 6th, 1986)

There are strong grounds for taking this statement to be false. Examination of the record of the U.S. government during the 20th century reveals its support for dictatorships and other regimes with poor human rights records and its intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, ranging from funding terrorist organisations and promoting coups against democratic governments to direct aggression including invasion (see Chomsky 1991; Blum 2000). Nonetheless, closely similar statements are often made by people who are well aware of the relevant facts. One possibility is that in these cases some of the words used do not have their usual meaning. Lewis’ statement, for example, would be true if instead of having its usual meaning, ‘democracy’ here means something like ‘a climate which provides freedom to invest without excessive regulation or popular control’. Support for this thesis comes from the use of the word ‘democracy’ in the Western media.⁴ Thus in the U.S. media during the 1980s the Central American terror states of El Salvador and Guatemala were standardly referred to as ‘fledgling democracies’. During this period the word ‘democracy’ was very rarely applied to Nicaragua, despite its relatively free elections in 1984 (Chomsky 1989a: 222–261 and references in the index; see also Herman & Chomsky 1988: Ch. 3 for comparison of the 1984 elections in Nicaragua with demonstration elections in El Salvador in 1982 and 1984 and the 1984–1985 election in Guatemala). A set of good candidates for causes is not difficult to discern: the U.S. government supported the military regimes in the former states but was behind the *Contra* opposition forces aiming to

overthrow the Nicaraguan regime. U.S. business elites saw the military states as providing them with important freedoms: the freedom to invest as they wished and to export profits, in particular, whereas these freedoms were under some threat from the possibility of social programs and land reform in Nicaragua.⁵

One might ask why politicians and commentators do not say what they mean more directly. According to the ‘propaganda model’ (Herman & Chomsky 1988: 1ff.) the answer is that the public in democracies generally does not share elite goals. Given that the public theoretically has power over the elites in formal democracies it is necessary for the elites to find ways to mould public opinion so that they can pursue their goals undisturbed by popular opposition. One important tool that is used to accomplish this is the misuse of concepts.⁶ Sometimes a state of affairs desirable to elites is labelled with a word that has positive connotations for the public as in the case of ‘democracy’. The converse also happens, so, for example, ‘terrorism’ is used to refer to popular resistance to oppression as well as violence carried out by official enemies of the West. It is not applied – in mainstream media in the West – to violence by U.S. client states or allies such as Israel and Indonesia or by the U.S. itself. Here the negative connotations of the word are selectively applied while the original meaning is ignored, although as Chomsky has pointed out, it is “not seriously in dispute. It is defined with sufficient clarity in the official U.S. Code and numerous government publications. A U.S. army manual. . . defines terrorism as ‘the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion or instilling fear’” (Chomsky 1989a: 270).

Examples of misused concepts can be readily multiplied, but since the concern of this paper is to consider the pragmatics of their use it is only necessary to list key concepts here. Words that are often misused for their positive connotations include ‘globalisation’, ‘stability’, ‘democracy’, ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘moderate’. Words whose negative connotations have been selectively applied include ‘extremist’, ‘terrorism’, ‘rogue state’ and ‘Communist’. (For ‘globalisation’ see Chomsky 2002 and Monbiot 2002; for ‘stability’ see Chomsky 2000; see above for ‘democracy’; for ‘humanitarian intervention’ see Chomsky 1991; for ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ see Chomsky 1991; for ‘terrorism’ see above and also Herman 1982, Herman & O’Sullivan 1989 and George 1991; for ‘rogue states’ see Chomsky 2000; for ‘Communist’ see Chomsky 1989: Appendix II. See also Smith 1999: 206–208 for a brief summary.)

Questions may be raised about the historical origins of the misuse of concepts in political discourse. Two answers are possible. Chomsky has discussed the phenomenon squarely within the framework of the issues covered in the

current volume, claiming that the sophisticated manufacture of consent in Western societies started in the early decades of the 20th century, particularly during the First World War in the British Ministry of Information and its American counterpart, the Committee on Public Information. A member of the committee, U.S. liberal Walter Lippmann, coined the phrase “manufacture of consent” and:

(...) welcomed the ‘revolution’ in ‘the practice of democracy’ in the early years of the [20th] century, as the ‘manufacture of consent’ became a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government. According to Lippmann, ‘the common interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality. The public should remain merely ‘interested spectators of action. (Rai 1993:22–23; Lippmann quotations from Lippmann 1932, *Public Opinion*, p. 248)

These insights were pursued further afterwards by the new industry of ‘public relations’, particularly in the U.S. In the opinion of Edward Bernays, another member of the Committee on Public Information, later to become a leading figure in the PR industry, “The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organised habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in a democratic society . . . It is the intelligent minorities which need to make use of propaganda intelligently and systematically” (1928 *PR Handbook*, quoted in Chomsky 1991:366). There are clear parallels with Leninist (Chomsky 1991:370f.) and fascist techniques of manipulation: no coincidence in the latter case at least since “Hitler was very impressed by the successes of Anglo-American propaganda during WWI, and felt, not without reason, that it explained why Germany lost the war. Germany couldn’t compete with the extensive propaganda efforts of the democracies” (Chomsky & Barsamian 2001:150).

A second answer to questions about the history of the misuse of concepts, compatible with the historical account but differently focused, is that it is a pragmatic possibility that relies (as I shall try to show) on certain human linguistic and cognitive abilities and we should expect to find it a constantly possible element in political discourse and elsewhere, much as other pragmatic phenomena such as irony and metaphor are not the monopoly of any culture or historical period. These two answers are not in conflict with each other. What I am claiming is that this kind of misuse of concepts is a pragmatic possibility that has been taken up and widely used in Western political discourse since the early 20th century (and perhaps elsewhere and in other eras).

Having given a sketch of the assumptions about politics that underlie the main point of the paper, I pass on to an attempt at a pragmatic account of the misuse of concepts.⁷

2. Pragmatics

What is a pragmatic account? Pragmatics is a much contested term: here I mean by a pragmatic account one that attempts an explanation – within the framework of a theory – of how we understand meaning, given an utterance. Thus a central task of pragmatics conceived this way is to take an utterance and show how it is interpreted. For linguistic utterances⁸ the syntax and semantics of the linguistic items uttered will provide a starting point for the pragmatic interpretation of the utterance. The theory of pragmatics that I make use of here is a part of relevance theory, which is a general theory of human cognition (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995; Wilson & Sperber 2004). My account will therefore be a cognitive account seeking to explain the phenomenon by asking what conceptual representation(s) a hearer makes for a given linguistic item, that is, for a word or a sentence, in a certain context.

2.1 Relevance theory

Relevance theory defines relevance as a property of inputs to cognitive processes. The relevance of an input is a positive function of the cognitive effects achieved by processing it and a negative function of the effort required to process it.

Relevance theory claims that human cognition is geared to maximising relevance (this is the cognitive principle of relevance). In the (special) case of ostensive-inferential communication, since an offer of information has been made, an utterance creates a presumption of optimal relevance: the speaker is justified in assuming that an utterance is at least relevant enough to be worth processing, and is moreover the most relevant one compatible with the speaker's goals and preferences. (This is the communicative principle of relevance.) This means that the hearer is justified in following a path of least effort in deriving the explicit meaning and implications of an utterance, stopping when an interpretation has been reached that satisfies his expectations of relevance.

It is also necessary to consider the result of processing an utterance, the interpretation. What form is the interpretation in? Relevance theory assumes




Figure 1. The concept DEMOCRACY

that both the explicit and implicit elements of an interpretation are mental representations: statements in a mental language (Fodor 1975) which are propositional (i.e., have truth conditions) and contain concepts. To take a simple example, the proposition expressed by an utterance of

(2) ‘Guatemala is a democracy’

might be

(3) GUATEMALA IS A DEMOCRACY
(Capital letters are used by convention for concepts.)

In relevance theory, it is assumed that concepts are mental addresses that give access to (at least) three types of information: linguistic, logical and encyclopaedic (see Figure 1).⁹

In this paper I am concerned with the information stored in the logical entry and the encyclopaedic entry of concepts. The logical entry contains a deductive inference rule or rules (also called a meaning postulate) which are necessary conditions on the concept in that they “apply to logical forms of which that concept is a constituent” (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 86). Thus in the example it is part of the logical meaning of the concept DEMOCRACY that if an entity X is a DEMOCRACY that X possesses the property of POLITICAL SYSTEM WITH POPULAR INFLUENCE OVER DECISIONS, or equivalently, the inference from DEMOCRACY(X) to POLITICAL SYSTEM WITH POPULAR INFLUENCE OVER DECISIONS(X) is valid. If someone does not have at least this information stored in their concept we can say that they do not in fact fully possess the (same) concept DEMOCRACY.¹⁰ The encyclopaedic entry of the concept also contains information about democracy and democ-

racies, but this information will vary greatly from person to person, depending on their knowledge of the world. A reason for postulating separate logical and encyclopaedic entries for concepts is to make possible a distinction between “the content of an assumption, which is determined by the logical entries of the concepts it contains” and “the context in which it is processed [which] is, at least in part, determined by their encyclopaedic entries” (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995:89). Below I suggest that in cases of ‘shallow processing’ of an utterance the logical entry of a concept is sometimes not retrieved, so that the content of the representation formed by a hearer may lack some of the implications of the logical entries of the lexicalised concepts in the utterance. Before going into this, I examine two other models of the cognitive representations involved in misuse of concepts.

2.2 The code-word model

With the framework very briefly outlined in the previous section it is possible to attempt to give an account of misused concepts. The first account that I want to suggest might be called the code-word model. This model proposes that there are (at least) two different meanings for each of the words in question, in other words that there is slippage between the normal use and the ‘expert’ use of the word in question: we have one definition, they have another. So when Neil Lewis claims in example (1) above that the U.S. yearns to spread American democracy he has in mind the expert concept DEMOCRACY’ which has the same linguistic entry as the basic public concept DEMOCRACY but has a different logical entry, perhaps along the lines of DEMOCRACY’(X) → POLITICAL SYSTEM WITH FREEDOM OF INVESTMENT (X) or DEMOCRACY’(X) → POLITICAL SYSTEM WITH INFLUENCE OVER DECISIONS FROM PEOPLE A, B, C (X), where A, B and C are the people or types of people in whose hands Lewis believes power should reside (perhaps not including the majority of adult citizens). If something like this were correct then experts like Lewis could use such words to make statements that are true in their terms and simultaneously useful for propaganda purposes when read by non-experts. There are objections to this from two angles. First it is not at all clear that ‘experts’ – commentators and politicians, for example – do not deceive themselves at least some of the time. There may well be an Orwellian process of self-deception involved so that the slippage in meaning is between that implied by the expert’s use of a concept and the meaning that that expert would define the concept as having if asked. As an illustration, consider example (1) again. An expert might consistently make statements of this sort which could only

seem true to her if she operated at some level with the concept DEMOCRACY, yet in introspection on the word 'democracy' she might access the more common concept DEMOCRACY.¹¹ I do not mean to exclude the possibility that some of the more intelligent and cynical members of elites consciously misuse concepts in full knowledge that the meaning they attach to a word is different from the meaning their audience will understand it to have, but I think that a theory that proposes that this is the general case would lack an explanation for the apparent sincerity and confusion of thought of many public figures.

A related, but more profound objection to this model is methodological. What a speaker had in mind when she spoke is not as accessible to us in our current state of scientific knowledge as what she can rationally have wanted to convey by her utterance. This is because the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure works on a guarantee that the speaker's utterance will be optimally relevant to the hearer (or be intended to be or to seem to be optimally relevant, taking into account the possibilities of incompetence and deceit respectively (see Sperber 1994, for discussion of this point)). Thus the hearer is rationally justified in accepting the first interpretation that is relevant enough and attributing to the speaker the intention of conveying it. That is, constraints seem to exist on what a speaker can rationally intend to mean by an utterance. Knowing this means that we, as pragmatists, are able to infer intended meanings by making modest assumptions about the accessibility and cognitive effects of various interpretations to the hearer. No such procedure is known for discovering what the speaker had in mind but did not intend to convey. Returning to example (1), we can see that Neil Lewis can only have intended to mean by 'democracy' whatever concept (he believes) is brought to mind for his audience by this word in the context. This, however, does not tell us what he takes the word to mean for himself. Thus there are serious problems for any explanation of misuse of concepts which relies on speakers having a private meaning for a word which they do not intend to communicate and a public meaning which they do wish to convey.

A second and perhaps more important angle of criticism of the code-word model is that it does not adequately explain the misuse of concepts. In particular it does not explain why hearers do not notice the contradictions inherent in what is being said. It explains why the *speaker* does not find what she is saying contradictory: according to the model, she has in mind a concept like DEMOCRACY' which is compatible with the rest of what she is saying. This model cannot be used to explain why the *hearer* does not become aware of any contradiction there may be between the public meaning of the concept and what else is being said, since this hypothesis proposes that hearers under-

stand the utterance using the basic public concept. Whether this is a problem for the model depends on how clearly the utterances containing misused concepts are contradictory or false. In cases like example (1) the contradiction is between what the speaker says and the background knowledge of the hearer. Facts are available to the average reader of the New York Times that make it highly implausible that the U.S. yearns to spread democracy around the world, at least on a full normal understanding of the word ‘democracy’. These facts may not be immediately accessible or brought to mind, however. In certain cases, though, there is something like a contradiction in the sentence itself, such as in example (4):

- (4) Americans are targets of terrorism, in part, because we act to advance peace and democracy. . . (U.S. President Clinton, Washington Post, August 9th 1998)

Here seeing that the sentence is false on the ordinary understanding of “peace and democracy” arguably requires less background knowledge to be brought into play. Still it might be objected that spotting the falsehood does require the use of some background knowledge: the sentence is not contradictory in itself. If it were to turn out that all cases of misused concepts only involve contradictions between statements and background knowledge that is not necessary for immediate understanding of these statements, it might be argued that what is needed is not a pragmatic explanation but rather an explanation in terms of the ways in which cognition in general deviates from perfect rationality.¹² I do not think that this is the case and later I will discuss examples such as (5) and (6) which are contradictory in themselves. I predict that even in such cases, in certain contexts hearers would not notice the anomaly.

- (5) We chose the government because we want to make Afghanistan into a good democracy.
- (6) Humanitarian intervention can only succeed if you don’t worry about civilian casualties.

If this is true – and it is a testable prediction – then the misuse of concepts must be a pragmatic phenomenon. Moreover the code-word model would be shown to be inadequate since it lacks an explanation for non-detection of these anomalies by hearers.

3. Reflective beliefs and attributive concepts

The second model of the misuse of concepts that I want to consider makes use of a distinction available in relevance theory between *intuitive* and *reflective* beliefs. This distinction was developed by Dan Sperber (Sperber 1982/1985; Sperber 1997) partly as a result of considering the use of the concept of belief in anthropology. Anthropologists face the task of describing beliefs that people profess but which seem to clash with truths about the world. For example, as a field anthropologist Sperber was asked to kill a dragon. Assuming dragons don't exist, what can we say about people who have beliefs about them? One possibility is that they are simply misinformed. A second possibility is that they may have a different sort of belief about dragons. Someone may believe:

(7) It is common knowledge that there are dragons.

This is a reflective belief, since it involves a belief: 'there are dragons', embedded under an attitude description: 'It is common knowledge that. . .'. (Reflective beliefs contrast with intuitive beliefs, beliefs that can be formed by direct perception or spontaneous inference from direct perception).¹³ Sperber notes that the possibility of reflective beliefs follows from two basic assumptions about human cognition:

- The human mind has an ability to hold representations as beliefs
- The human mind has a metarepresentational ability [that is, it can represent representations] (Sperber 1997:73)

A reflective belief, then, is one that contains a belief embedded under a credal attitude. Such attitudes may be of different types, for example, 'It is absurd that. . .', 'It is a scientific fact that. . .' or 'The tribal elders believe that. ..'. Some of these formulations attribute the embedded belief to other people, e.g., tribal elders, or to a system, such as science or religion. We may call beliefs that involve these kinds of attitude *attributive*.

A related possibility is that *concepts* may be attributive. Thus someone might believe certain facts about dragons without themselves knowing the full meaning of the concept DRAGON, or even being committed to there being any dragons.

We can see this in concept learning: Lisa hears her science teacher say "There are millions of suns in the universe". Lisa forms the beliefs: (a) The teacher (who is to be trusted on such matters) believes there are millions of 'suns' in the universe. (b) There are millions of Sun-like things in the universe.

(c) There are millions of ‘suns’, whatever the teacher means by ‘sun’, in the universe (example from Sperber 1997:76).

A model of the misuse of concepts in political discourse based on these insights seems possible; indeed Sperber gives (8) as an example of a belief that might be held reflectively:

(8) Where the judiciary is not independent, there can be no true democracy.

since “the states of affairs that make [propositions of this kind] true cannot be perceived, but only inferred, and, moreover, inferring them requires some conscious and deliberate thinking. Often, such beliefs are acquired not via ratiocination, but via communication” (Sperber 1997:80). I think that this is convincing and that most people may hold many of their political beliefs reflectively. However it seems to me that this does not account for the way that words like ‘democracy’ and ‘terrorism’ may be misused in rather straightforward assertions such as examples (1) and (4). Here the problem seems to lie more at the level of the understanding of the individual concepts. Perhaps then it is possible to model this using the notion of attributive concepts. The thesis would be that most people hold many or at least some key political concepts attributively, that is they take them to mean whatever an appropriate authority or authorities would take them to mean. This certainly seems plausible in the case of technical political terms such as ‘subsidiarity’, ‘hypothecation’ and perhaps ‘judiciary’. It seems correct that when someone hears an utterance like:

(9) The European Union must be built on subsidiarity.

a mental representation like (10) will be formed, where the inverted commas around ‘SUBSIDIARITY’ indicate that the hearer possesses it as an attributive concept.

(10) THE EUROPEAN UNION MUST BE BUILT ON ‘SUBSIDIARITY’

This might be glossed as ‘The European Union must be built on ‘subsidiarity’, whatever the speaker or other appropriate experts mean by that.’

I want to argue, however, that this can only be part of the story. I think that people generally have a sound intuitive understanding of many basic political terms, including ones that are frequently misused in the ways I have described. Good examples include the terms ‘stable’, ‘democracy’, ‘moderate’, ‘extremist’, and even such apparently technical words as ‘humanitarian’. This would explain why there seems to be a contrast between examples like (9) where the meaning of one of the words is very unclear for most people and previous examples like (5) and (6), repeated below, where the meaning of all of the words

is clear enough when they are considered individually but the contradictions are not immediately apparent to most people:

- (5) We chose the government because we want to make Afghanistan into a good democracy.
- (6) Humanitarian intervention can only succeed if you don't worry about civilian casualties.

I take it that a successful account of the misuse of concepts should shed light on scenarios like the following: a person, K, is against the invasion of Iraq¹⁴ because he is opposed to causing Iraqis to suffer the human cost of such an invasion. However K does not experience as anomalous statements in the media about Iraq which describe the attack as 'humanitarian intervention'. The attributive concept model would claim that this is because K takes 'humanitarian intervention' to mean whatever suitable experts think it means. In particular, he does not necessarily think that it must be 'humanitarian'. I think that this is the wrong explanation but that it points to some extent in the right direction. It fails to account for the fact that we *can* see the contradictions in utterances involving misuse of concepts, but that that is not what usually happens. In fact I believe that it is typically not difficult to see the contradictions when we look for them, but that normally we overlook them. This suggests that two types of processing may be involved.

4. The Moses illusion and burying survivors

In the psycholinguistics literature there are a number of papers exploring phenomena which are sometimes called semantic illusions, but are better described as pragmatic illusions. (See Allott & Rubio Fernandez 2002, for references and discussion of the pragmatic nature of the phenomena; for the Moses illusion, see Erickson & Mattson 1981, van Oostendorp & de Mul 1990 and van Oostendorp & Kok 1990; for shallow discourse processing, see Carpenter & Just 1983. Barton & Sanford 1993, suggest that the "global goodness of fit" of a term in a given mental scenario may influence the level of semantic analysis of this term. See also Sanford & Garrod 1994, 1998 for discussion.)

Experimental subjects are asked questions like:

- (11) How many animals of each kind did Moses take into the ark?
- (12) If a plane flying from Vienna to Barcelona crashes on the French-Spanish border, where do you bury the survivors?

Typically subjects reply to the questions without noticing the anomalies – that Noah, not Moses, is associated with the ark and that one does not bury survivors. The phenomena are genuine, not dependent on deficient reading of the anomalous word or lack of background knowledge. This is established by control experiments in which participants have to read the questions aloud before answering and others in which their knowledge is checked and it is established that they know, for example, that Noah built the ark.

In this paper I want to argue that there are key similarities between these pragmatic illusions and what happens when a hearer processes a misused concept and fails to detect that it has been misused. In the case of pragmatic illusions, subjects fail to make use of important information but rapidly reinterpret when cued to do so. In manipulative discourse it seems that key information about the misused term is not arrived at by the hearer, but that this information can be accessed if some re-analysis is undertaken. In the following sections I will argue that broadly the same cognitive processes underlie both phenomena. In order to do so I will have to introduce the theoretical notion of *ad hoc* concepts, but before doing this, I want to examine briefly what it means to talk about pragmatic illusions and comment on cognitive encapsulation.

4.1 Pragmatic illusions

In Allott and Rubio Fernandez (2002), we argue that the so-called semantic illusions, correctly seen by psycholinguists as examples of shallow processing, are also pragmatic illusions, a form of cognitive illusion. In an illusion, certain background information is apparently not accessed. In the classic case of the Muller-Lyer illusion two lines appear to be different lengths, even when the information that they are the same length is available to the subject, for example because he/she has measured them. In other words, there is a high degree of encapsulation.

In the case of illusions involving central processing, different paradigms show a variety of different degrees of cognitive encapsulation. Thus in the selection task (Wason 1968), a test of conditional reasoning, subjects typically




Figure 2. The Muller-Lyer illusion

resist revising their responses even when confronted with contrary evidence (Manktelow & Over 1990: 118–119). In contrast, in pragmatic illusions, subjects fail to make use of important information but rapidly reinterpret when cued to do so. Recent work (e.g., Sperber et al. 1995) has explained cognitive illusions and deviations from ideal rationality in terms of relevance theory and Allott and Rubio Fernandez (op. cit.) attempt to explain pragmatic illusions similarly (see Allott 2002 for more on connections between pragmatics and rationality).

4.2 Ad hoc concepts

The relevance-theoretic explanation of pragmatic illusions makes crucial use of a key notion of relevance theory, *ad hoc* concepts. *Ad hoc* concepts are used in relevance-theoretic accounts of metaphor, hyperbole, loose use and other pragmatic phenomena (for details of the role of *ad hoc* concepts in relevance theory see e.g., Wilson & Sperber 2004). *Ad hoc* concepts are concepts constructed by retrieving from an existing concept in long-term memory some but not all of its encyclopaedic and logical information. The new concept may be narrower or looser than the concept it is derived from, in the sense that its extension may be a subset or a superset of the original concept's extension or a set which intersects with it.

Take as an example a reformulation of (12):

- (13) The authorities should bury the survivors in France. Agree/disagree.

In processing this utterance, the ad hoc concept SURVIVOR* is built taking information from the long-term concept SURVIVOR until the proposition expressed by the utterance, together with its implications, satisfies the subject's expectations of relevance.




Figure 3. The extension of SURVIVOR* as a superset of the extension of SURVIVOR

Due to the expectation that relevance can be attained – as it were – cheaply by the subject’s providing an answer to the question asked, then the property *is alive*, part of the logical entry of SURVIVOR, but not the most accessible attribute of SURVIVOR in the context, need not be accessed at all. The result is that part of the ‘core meaning’ of the word is not accessed, although it certainly is known by the hearer, but some elements of the meaning *are* accessed – for ‘survivors’ perhaps ‘people’ or ‘people who were on the aeroplane’, since subjects give answers that are appropriate if they are entertaining the concept PEOPLE but not if they are entertaining the concept SURVIVOR.

This account of pragmatic illusions claims, then, that what might be called the face-value proposition, for example, ‘The survivors should be buried in France’ is not formed. Rather, a weaker mental representation is formed by the hearer: THE PEOPLE (INVOLVED IN THE AIR-CRASH) SHOULD BE BURIED IN FRANCE.

Pragmatic illusion experiments have been carried out with many different manipulations of the sentences and context (see the references given above). The target term has been varied, for example to *wounded* or *surviving dead*. The scenario has been changed, for example to a bicycle accident. The amount and type of background information given has been varied, for example by giving information about passengers’ nationalities. The task involved has been manipulated, for example, from answering a question to saying whether a statement is true or false.

The most important results can be summarized as follows: pragmatic illusions occur more easily when:

1. The word fits the general context well: e.g., ‘survivors’ fits into a general context of discussions of air crashes. The term *survivors* would be more easily detected in a bicycle accident than in an air crash scenario because survivors is not a word that is expected in the context of a bicycle accident (although survivors would be more likely, of course).
2. Shallow processing is encouraged by lowered expectations of relevance – in the case of the experiments, by the fact that the hearer thinks his task is mainly to show that he can produce an answer.

There are parallels with the case of the misuse of concepts in political discourse. It seems reasonable to suppose (and it is testable) that misuse of concepts is most likely not to be noticed when the word fits well into the general context. Shallow processing is encouraged by the low expectations of relevance that we have about political discourse in the media – we rarely expect anything pro-

found from politicians, and we do not expect the media to go into the depths of an issue.

The result is that in the case of misused concepts, as in pragmatic illusions, the 'core meaning' of the word may not be accessed, although it is known by the hearer, but some elements of the meaning are accessed. For 'democracy' perhaps only the positive connotations of the word are retrieved from the long-term concept, perhaps also a minimal definition is accessed: 'some kind of political system'.

Thus I am suggesting that when a hearer processes an utterance of (14):

(14) The U.S. is attacked by terrorists because it is devoted to democracy

the face-value proposition of the sentence uttered: "The U.S. is attacked by terrorists because it is devoted to democracy" is *not* arrived at. Instead the mental representation formed will be

(15) THE U.S. IS ATTACKED BY TERRORISTS BECAUSE IT IS DEVOTED TO DEMOCRACY*

Here DEMOCRACY* may mean 'some political system' or it may only serve as the carrier of positive sentiments, meaning roughly 'something good'. In either case, part of the logical entry of the concept DEMOCRACY is not accessed.¹⁵

I have argued that the parallels discussed suggest that political speech in the media is typically incompletely processed by hearers. The objection might be raised that the examples discussed do not establish that the misuse of concepts goes undetected because of shallow or incomplete processing, because they do not show such sharp contradictions within a sentence as the pragmatic illusion cases where the hearer may even be faced with contradictions within one verb phrase such as 'bury the survivors'.

I have two responses to this. First, I think that I have shown that it is *plausible* that shallow processing is responsible for the non-detection of at least some misuse of concepts, given the parallels between the cases and the apparent inadequacy of alternative theories. Secondly, I predict that even in cases where there is sharp contradiction within a sentence, as in examples (5) and (6), the anomalies will typically go undetected, just as they do in examples like (11) and (12). This would be strong corroboration of the shallow processing / pragmatic illusion explanation of the non-detection of the misuse of concepts.

5. Conclusions

In this paper I have claimed, first, that concepts are misused in political discourse in the 'free' West, particularly in talking about foreign affairs in ways that make it possible for the public to consent to support of dictatorships, totalitarian regimes and intervention against democracy.

I have examined three models of this misuse of concepts. The first, which I have called the code-word model, is inadequate because it cannot explain why hearers do not notice the strangeness of what is being said. Secondly, I looked at the possibility of giving an explanation in terms of reflective beliefs and attributive concepts. I argued that attributive concepts may be part of the explanation, but not much of it, for many words, since people have intuitive understandings of words like 'stable' and 'freedom' and – in my opinion – also of words that might be called technical terms like 'democracy' and 'humanitarian intervention'. This second attempt at explaining the phenomenon shares a number of features with the third model that I have presented. They both claim that the hearer's mental representation is in some sense weaker than the face-value proposition – that it is either not fully propositional or propositional but more general – and while the face-value proposition might contain contradictions, so believing it would be irrational, the weaker mental representation does not. Despite these similarities the pragmatic illusion / shallow processing model has the advantage that it predicts non-detection of misuse of concepts even in cases where the hearer has a full and normal concept for the word that is being misused. I have explained the cognitive mechanics of pragmatic illusions, claiming that the way the information is presented lowers expectations of relevance, encouraging shallow processing, and that relevance is easily attained by slotting the word into the 'politics' frame – so that the full meaning of a concept associated with a word is not accessed but some positive or negative connotations of the concept may well be.

Notes

1. The author acknowledges his intellectual debts to Noam Chomsky and to Deirdre Wilson and wishes also to thank Nick Doody and members of the Stop the War Group and of the Pragmatics Reading Group at University College London for help with references and inspirational conversations on subjects related to the current paper, as well as participants in the conference 'Manipulation in the Ideologies of the 20th Century', three anonymous reviewers and Louis de Saussure for highly relevant comments on earlier versions of this paper. Remaining mistakes are my own.

2. Some readers may think that it is hardly controversial that the West supports anti-democratic measures in its foreign policy, to the point of setting up and supporting dictatorships and other totalitarian regimes. Certainly there is a great deal of evidence in favour of this thesis. Examining only the record of the U.S., the list of types of intervention includes: outright invasion (e.g., Vietnam, Cuba, Grenada); military aid either to prop up a favoured military regime (e.g., Colombia, South Korea) or to destabilise an enemy (e.g., Nicaragua); assistance with coups against democratic governments (e.g., Chile, the Congo, Indonesia) and strong financial pressure on redistributive governments (e.g., Egypt, Cuba). There is substantial support for the null hypothesis – that this intervention has been designed to serve the interests of Western elites (see Chomsky & Herman 1979; Chomsky 1991 and 1997). However one might raise the question: Am I claiming that the West prefers dictatorships? There are two related answers to this: (1) Not in areas where democratic forms can co-exist with substantial investor rights, as in the industrial democracies. Note that this *could* be due to limitations on U.S. power rather than a matter of preference – since U.S. elites cannot easily change some governments – but indications are that the U.S. does not always impose dictatorship even where it has the power to do so, as in the case of Nicaragua which is now allowed formal democracy in the absence of popular participation. In areas where public opinion is not tractable, dictatorships are preferred, but otherwise business ‘democracy’ may be regarded as the best option. (2) The U.S. opposes democracy under certain conditions – whenever it might lead to real popular participation in decision-making – i.e., when there’s a danger of substantial, not merely formal democracy.

There is support for this from apparently difficult cases for the thesis, such as West Germany and Japan immediately after WWII which were partly or wholly under U.S. control and developed into democracies (unlike Greece, or Taiwan, for example, where in the same period U.S. allies set up military dictatorships). These cases might be taken to show that the U.S. does not always try to set up totalitarian regimes.

However, there is considerable documentation that shows the U.S. moved to stamp out popular participation in decision-making – i.e., substantive democracy – trade union freedoms were removed, labour violently suppressed, worker-run companies dissolved and pre-war/wartime corporations (the zaibatsu in Japan; Volkswagen and others in Germany) restored to power.

The results were as hoped: in Japan, ‘totalitarian state capitalism,’ according to Sherwood Fine, director of economics and planning in the economics and science section of the U.S. occupation, and in Germany, “Four years after the war, those responsible for the day-to-day management of post-war Germany were remarkably similar to the management in the days of Hitler,” according to the historian Tom Bower (see Chomsky 1989b).

3. This is the case, for example, with ‘anti-terror’ legislation introduced in 2001 and 2002 in many countries (e.g., the U.S., the U.K., India) in the window of opportunity provided to the right by the September 11th attacks.

4. Also note George W. Bush’s recent remarks about withholding aid from countries that fail to live up to democratic standards in South America, widely understood to be aimed at Venezuela under Hugo Chavez – a functioning democracy, but one whose government has angered U.S. elites by trying to keep some control of its oil reserves and showing signs of wanting to implement land reform, in response to substantial grassroots pressure from Venezuela’s poor, the constituency largely responsible for Chavez’s election.

5. That the U.S. government applies a double standard was admitted: “a senior U.S. official told members of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) observing the Nicaraguan elections: The United States is not obliged to apply the same standard of judgement to a country whose government is avowedly hostile to the U.S. as for a country like El Salvador, where it is not. These people [the Sandinistas] could bring about a situation in Central America which could pose a threat to U.S. security. That allows us to change our yardstick.” (“The Electoral Process in Nicaragua: Domestic and International Influences’ Report of the LASA Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan General Election of 1984, Latin American Studies Association, Nov. 19th 1984:32, quoted in Herman & Chomsky 1988:91.) As predicted by the propaganda model, the U.S. media took the same line.

6. ‘Misuse’ is, of course, an evaluative term; speaking scientifically, all uses of concepts are on a level. I have labeled the cases I am interested in ‘misuses’ because I want to draw attention to the way these uses draw the hearer’s attention away from information centrally associated with a concept in a way that may bring about manipulation of the hearer.

7. While the political viewpoint of this paper is broadly Chomskyan, an attempt to provide a pragmatic account of the misuse of concepts moves beyond what Chomsky has attempted, indeed into questions that he believes to be wholly outside of linguistics, as he has often indicated, for example in the following quotation:

Barsamian: Talk about the power of language to shape and control political discussion. . . .

Chomsky: Let me just make clear, this has absolutely nothing to do with linguistics. There’s no insight into this topic that comes from having studied language. . . .

If you have a war between two countries, they’re both fighting in self-defense. Nobody is ever the aggressor. . . . The U.S. has a deterrence strategy. Other countries, enemies, don’t have a deterrence strategy. (Chomsky & Barsamian 2000:210)

This fits with Chomsky’s view that theories of the interpreter are impossible: “The interpreter, presented with an utterance and a situation, assigns some interpretation to what is being said by a person in this situation. . . [this] is far too complex and obscure to merit attention in empirical enquiry.” (Chomsky 1992:61–70. See also Smith 1999:177–186 for discussion of the relations between Chomsky’s scientific and political views.)

8. Not all utterances are even partly linguistic. One can communicate by making gestures or by drawing attention to non-linguistic features of the environment, for example by pointing or by sniffing conspicuously (see Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995:48ff.).

9. An anonymous referee asks me to comment on the role played here by this particular view of concepts, given that there are other possibilities. As I now indicate in the text, the distinction between logical and encyclopaedic information is important for my preferred explanation in terms of shallow processing. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the reasons why relevance theory assumes atomic concepts with meaning postulates, except to say that Sperber and Wilson find compelling Fodor’s arguments against decompositionalist (feature-based) and prototype theories of the linguistic role of concepts (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995:91–93; Fodor, J. D., Fodor, J. A., & Garrett, M. 1975; Fodor, J. A., Garrett, M., Walker, E., & Parkes, C. 1980; Fodor, J. A. 1981:283–292 for decompositionalism, 292–298 for prototype theory). Note, however, that this framework does not rule out decompositional accounts of the meaning of some concepts: such concepts would have logical entries

containing, as normal, necessary conditions, but which taken together would amount to sufficient conditions. Note also that much encyclopaedic information might be prototypical in form.

10. I am not claiming to have definitely identified the logical entry of the concept DEMOCRACY, or that the logical entry must be exactly the same from person to person. I do think that the logical entry must (for most people) be close to the one given in order to explain perceived contradictions: between 'democracy' and 'dictatorship', for example. An anonymous reviewer claims that 'democracy' "is a notoriously polysemic word and not really a 'concept' at all." In my opinion one can dispute this while agreeing with the reviewer that "Most governments want to pass themselves off as democratic" from the GDR to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I do not see why the word would be worth appropriating if there were no concept associated with it.

11. The code-word theory suggests that the elites use certain words to refer to different, expert concepts, but there are examples that seem to show that members of the elite are capable of understanding a word differently depending on the context.

President Clinton, on a visit to Greece in 1999 said to a private audience: "When the junta took over in 1967 here, the United States allowed its interests in prosecuting the cold war to prevail over its interest – I should say its obligation – to support democracy, which was, after all, the cause for which we fought the Cold War. It is important that we acknowledge that" (Associated Press, quoted in Blum 2000:234).

(There is a similar quotation without the word 'democracy' from Clinton in Uganda, March 1998: "During the Cold War when we were so concerned about being in competition with the Soviet Union, very often we dealt with countries in Africa and in other parts of the world based more on how they stood in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union than how they stood in the struggle for their own people's aspirations to live up to the fullest of their God-given activities", Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents).

Here Clinton seems to be using the word in its normal sense, but at this time he was continuing to use the word 'democracy' to justify U.S. intervention in Iraq, Colombia, Mexico, Yugoslavia and elsewhere.

12. Note that I do not think that classical models of perfect or ideal rationality are good yardsticks for cognition in general or for the aspects of cognition which underlie pragmatic ability. See Allott (2002), for discussion.

13. Some beliefs may be intuitive for some people, non-intuitive (reflective to some degree) for others: e.g., in chess 'A king and two knights are not enough to force a checkmate.' A grandmaster 'sees' all the possibilities and intuits the truth; a beginner may be able to convince himself by trying different kinds of moves (example from Sperber 1997).

14. This paper was written in autumn 2002 before the U.S./U.K. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

15. An interesting possibility is raised by an anonymous reviewer, that "the *ad hoc* concept DEMOCRACY* [could] be represented by a very generic definition. . . : THE POLITICAL SYSTEM THE SPEAKER AND THE ADDRESSEE LIVE IN". The information that the hearer lives in a 'democracy' would certainly be part of his encyclopaedic knowledge. Whether it would be accessible enough to come to mind on any particular occasion would depend on the context.

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Manipulation in the speeches and writings of Hitler and the NSDAP from a relevance theoretic point of view

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1. Introduction¹

The subject of manipulation is gaining more and more attention, as it seems to play an increasing role in many areas of our life, such as advertising, religion and politics. What exactly is manipulation, how is it manifested and what are its cognitive mechanisms? I would like to make an attempt to answer those questions by considering the manipulation of the Nazis.

For decades people have asked themselves why highly educated people in Germany could fall for a deceptive system like the Nazis'. One explanation has been the economic and political situation of the time as an influencing factor. No doubt that is true, but that can hardly be it alone. An important factor is that manipulation of the population of Germany had been at the bottom of the success of the Nazis. That too has been a speculation all along. However, how was it manifested concretely and what mechanisms were involved has not been dealt with sufficiently.

In section two I would like to consider manifestations of manipulation. In section three I will try to explain the mechanisms involved in manipulation by using relevance theory, drawing on the work of Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995), Sperber (2000), Taillard (2000). In section four I will investigate the manifestations of manipulation and its mechanisms in the Speeches and Writings of Hitler and the NSDAP. In section five I will try to answer the following question: Given that addressees have the opportunity of consistency

checking, why are they nevertheless manipulated and why were the Germans manipulated to follow a destructive regime?

2. The manifestations of manipulation

2.1 Definitions

As a definition I propose the one given by Puzyrnina (1992) paraphrased in Galasinski (2000): “Manipulation is an attempt to affect the target in such a way that his behaviour/action is an instrument of attaining the goals of the manipulator, who acts without using force but in such a way that the target does not know the goal of the manipulator’s actions”. Manipulation is definitely a form of deception. Galasinski sees this deception as “a communicative act that is intended to induce in the addressee a particular belief, by manipulating the truth and falsity of information”. According to him “the last element of the definition is aimed specifically at distinguishing between, say, deception and persuasion, two forms of manipulation that refer to two realities – the world of truth and fact and the world of value, or cultural evaluation, respectively” (cf., Watzlawick 1976).

Persuasion according to Taillard (2000) can be overt and covert and it seems to me that the more it is covert the more persuasion becomes manipulative. The covert nature of manipulation makes it an act of deception. In language use it is quite acceptable to say: “Can I persuade you to come with me to the cinema?” But it is very odd to say “Can I manipulate you to come with me to the cinema?”. That makes the hidden nature of manipulation obvious.

Why does manipulation have to be covert? As Galasinski (2000) says, “if the target had access to all information relevant in a given communicative information, deception (and manipulation) would be impossible”. So “withholding information, controlling it, is the essence of deception in general”.

Manipulation is intentional, it cannot happen by accident. As Buller and Burgoon (1994) point out, “messages that are unintentionally misleading are usually described as mistakes, gaffes and the like”, but they are not manipulation.

One could argue against this by saying that some people are manipulative in their behaviour and that might be unintentional on their part. This might be true. But if we define all unintentional speech and action that makes others think or do something as manipulation that includes a lot more than what our intuitions would want to include in that. I would have a problem for in-

stance calling something *manipulation* that was created out of innocence. Let us imagine a child eats lustfully some ice cream and makes me want to eat some too because of what I see. I would not see that as manipulation on the part of the child. What is lacking yet is a technical term that defines exactly what we want to include in manipulation. In the absence of that I would like to restrict myself to intentional manipulation because we do have clear intuitions about that.

The basic way of influencing people and making them believe and do what one wants them to do is via testimony and argumentation. Let us consider that in more detail.

2.2 Testimony and argumentation

Testimony is the ‘transmission of observed information’ (Goldmann 1999: 103). Communication and testimony have as beneficial outcome to both communicator and audience that they have desirable effects on the receiver’s attitudes and behaviour. Often these behaviours or attitudes are best brought about by messages that are truthful. In other cases, however, they are best brought about by messages that are not. It occurs quite often that communicators achieve their goals by misleading or deceiving their addressees to some degree (Sperber 2000b: 3). So communicators do not think in the first place about being truthful or not truthful, but they “choose between expressing and withholding a message, whether truthful or not, that, if believed by the addressee, should have desired effects”. These effects should be desirable for the addressee, but they are also desirable for the speaker and they are the very motivation for his communication. So if the speaker of testimony has a deceptive goal that he is not making overt then his testimony will be manipulative. Addressees on the other hand are aware of the fact that the speaker is not always truthful and therefore they are not always trusting (Sperber 2000b: 4).

Sperber (2000b: 3) argues further that “Humans, thanks to their cognitive abilities and in particular to their metarepresentational capacity to represent mental states of others, are unique in their ability to engage in creative and elaborate distortion and deception, and also in their ability to question in a reasoned manner the honesty of communicators”.

Testimony is not the only way to communicate facts. Both communicator and addressee know that the acceptance of testimony depends on trust. In order to gain the trust of the addressee the communicator often engages in argumentation. Argumentation is defined by Sloane (Ed.) (2001: 33) as follows: “Argumentation is a study of reason giving used by people to justify their

beliefs and values and to influence the thought and action of others. Its central concern is with the rationality or reasonableness of claims put forward in discourse. This, in turn, depends on whether the claims are warranted, or grounded in evidence and inferences that are themselves acceptable and hence constitute good reasons for the claim”.

In argumentation, different from testimony, the speaker can give reasons as to why it is worthwhile for the addressee to accept her assertion. Even if the addressee has no confidence in the communicator, he can inspect the reasons by logical means and will accept them if he recognizes their consistency (Sperber 2000b:5). Sperber (2000b) argues that “a recognized liar whose testimony would never be accepted on anything could nevertheless convince his audience of a logical or mathematical truth by providing a clear proof of it” (2000b:5). We can see that the very mechanism that is meant to provide means for checking truthfulness, can be a powerful tool to manipulate and deceive.

Argumentation is manifested in the structure of language. As Sperber (2000:7) shows, logical terms such as ‘if’, ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘unless’ and words that indicate inferential relationships such as ‘therefore’, ‘since’, ‘but’, and ‘nevertheless’ help to display coherence in the argumentation.

While the audience on the other hand develops skills to examine the arguments of the communicator, the communicator works at improving her argumentative skills. Because of this an “argumentation mechanism of rhetorical construction and epistemic evaluation of messages emerges” (Sperber 2000b:7).

According to Aristotle (Garver 2000) argumentation is identical to persuasion. However, to him argumentation also has to do with ethics (Garver 2000:148). Thus Garver provides the example of someone arguing against smoking by pointing out the health problems involved and therefore urges her addressees to give up smoking. The communicator may have success in persuading the audience on the grounds of her logical and persuasive arguments. However, if she herself then smokes, her arguments will be weakened and may not convince the addressee anymore that giving up smoking is necessary. Thus consistency needs to be not only internally but also externally recognizable for the addressee to accept it. So internal and external consistency play an enormous role in the willingness of an addressee to be persuaded or manipulated.

2.3 Manipulation by omission and commission

Within the testimony or argumentation the communicator has a further means of moulding her utterances by withholding information or expressing it in a way that suits intended effects. So let's examine some possible linguistic routes that communicators may choose to deceive and manipulate. It has to be made clear though, that none of those linguistic means in themselves explain the mechanism of manipulation. For that we need to turn to section three. According to Galasinski (2000:22) deception can be manifested by omission and commission:

2.3.1 *Omission*

Under 'omission' falls information that is withheld in spite of the fact that it could have been relevant to an addressee in a particular situation. Omission can be passive, in which case the speaker is simply withholding information. By doing so she is preventing the addressee from acquiring beliefs he would have otherwise been able to establish. She is not trying to distort or present a false reality (cf., e.g., Bok 1982; Bradac 1983; Metts 1989). As Galasinski indicates, German and Polish have words in their language that refer to a speaker who decides to be silent about something: German: *verschweigen*, Polish: *przemilczec*. Omission occurs also in lies, where the speaker tells the addressee something that he knows to be false and he withholds relevant information.

2.3.2 *Commission*

Manipulation by commission happens if a deceiver is active. Her goal is to make the addressee acquiring or continuing a belief that she intends the addressee to accept. This can be done either explicitly or implicitly. Under explicit commission fall lies, half-truths (distortions), evasions and equivocations. Under implicit commission fall misleading underspecified explicatures and false implicatures.

Explicit information: lies. A lie is a message intended and meant to mislead the addressee. It is not so much the case that lies are objectively false, but that the communicator has metarepresented a particular set of beliefs under a higher level representation of disbelief in the truth or relevance of the lower level representations that she wants the addressee to accept as relevant. The lower level representation that she knows is not relevant information for the addressee is communicated ostensibly, with the intention to make the addressee believe and act upon his overt informative intention. The higher-level representation

of disbelief is kept hidden and so are the real facts that might have been relevant for the addressee. All of this is fully intentional which rules out communicative acts that are false, but not intended to mislead.

Explicit information: half-truths and distortions. Half-truths or distortions also have a part in active manipulation (cf., e.g., Buller & Burgoon 1994; Ekamnn 1985; Garfinkel 1977; Metts 1989; Turner et al. 1975). Others have categorized such phenomena under exaggeration, minimization, or equivocation (e.g., Metts 1989). According to Turner (1975) “exaggerations are overstatements giving more information than required; half-truths, on the other hand, deceive by providing less information”. Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero et al. (1996) propose equivocation as characterized by ambiguity, indirectness or irrelevance and depersonalisation. That includes also evasion. The latter definition of equivocation is misleading, since it includes indirect speech acts in general. Of course not all indirect speech acts like “can you pass me the salt” are intended to deceive, nor are all exaggerations meant to do so. As Wilson and Sperber (2000) point out, to be not completely truthful often saves the speaker processing effort and might therefore be more relevant than strict truth. So we need to distinguish between phenomena that are used for achieving relevance more easily and those that are meant for deception. The equivocation that plays a role in manipulation is like lies, exaggeration and half-truths.

Metts (1989) calls exaggeration, minimization and equivocation *distortions* and he defines them as ‘manipulation with truth’. As Wilson and Sperber (2000) show, truth is not always what people are out for. They are out for relevance. So what manipulation is about, is not so much about making the addressee believe untruth but to control the believes that the addressees may accept and may act upon. They may withhold relevant information from the addressee that he could accept as relevant.

Implicit information. Manipulation can also occur through implied information. This implied information can be on the propositional level (explicature) or it can be on the implicature level (misleading intended assumptions and/or conclusions).

2.4 Manipulation through propaganda strategies

2.4.1 Repetition

It is well known that the exposure to the same information again and again invites the addressee, whether directly addressed or by information via me-

dia, posters etc., to think about this information and have it therefore easily accessible. The thoughts might then lead to belief and action.

2.4.2 *Emotional appeal*

By appealing to the feelings of the audience, the addressees are often more easily ready to accept, believe and act upon the propagated information without thorough coherence checking.

2.5 Manipulation through weak implicatures and deontic mood

Connotative lexemes and figurative speech carry weak implicatures that are very powerful in influencing someone to believe in a certain way (Blass forthcoming).

Deontic mood is often used when the issue is not true or false but rather a cultural held belief or a moral issue. By using the deontic mood the addressee can be manipulated into believing that if something is a 'must' then there is a moral or custom behind it that has to be respected (Blass & Unger forthcoming).

2.6 Conclusion

I will show that in the speeches and writings of Hitler and the NSDAP all of the above manipulative manifestations are to be found.

But, of course, we do not only want to know how manipulations are manifested but we want to understand on the one hand why these manifestations have been chosen by communicators and what makes them manipulative, on the other hand we would like to know what makes an audience be willing to be manipulated. At this point I would like to mention a few insights of Sperber and Wilson (1995), Sperber (2000) and Taillard (2000). After that I would like to make an attempt at showing the manipulative mechanisms of the Nazis.

3. Manipulation and relevance theory

According to Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) within relevance theory the idea of gaining cognitive effects with a minimum of processing effort plays a big role. On the speaker's side her motivation to involve cognitive effort is based on the assumption that she will be able to achieve cognitive effects in the hearer. On the side of the hearer, he is motivated to involve processing effort because

he anticipates obtaining positive cognitive effects. The speaker may have tried to be optimally relevant but failed, or he may have intentionally tried to seem optimally relevant (for instance when he is lying). In manipulation pretending to be optimally relevant usually plays a role.

As mentioned before, the speaker's intention is important in communication as a whole and also in manipulation. Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) distinguish two levels of speaker intention – an informative intention and a communicative intention. The informative intention makes certain assumptions manifest to the audience. The speaker's communicative intention involves only the recognition of her informative intention. The informative intention on the other hand is fulfilled whenever the intended assumptions are part of the addressee's cognitive environment. According to relevance theory understanding the speaker's meaning and accepting her beliefs or attitudes are not the same, they are two different processes.

According to Taillard (2000: 169) there is most likely a third intention involved which she calls 'persuasive intention'. According to her "there seems to be evidence that the persuasive intention is recognized as a separate intention with specific effects on the hearer when he processes the persuasive attempt". In a later publication (Taillard 2002) she deals with intentions in a more elaborate way. According to her, (following Malle, Moses, & Baldwin 2001) in order to fulfil our desires and beliefs we develop plans and intentions as mental states that we develop rationally. These plans are higher-level intentions. Once we are committed to a plan, we embed lower-level intentions which make the realization of our plans possible. We then also perform the actions that the fulfilment of each intention makes necessary.

Taillard's claim is that an integrated approach to intention

pulls together previously disparate aspects of intentionality and places intentions at the centre of a more general theory of intentions in social interaction, and particularly in communication. The meeting of two intentional structures (each of the two interlocutors') in communication creates an interface. Because it enables the beneficial coordination of actions, this interface is marked by a certain susceptibility of each of the two intentional structures to intention-shaping by the other. This susceptibility can, under certain circumstances, allow a speaker to shape the addressee's existing intentions, sometimes intentionally, as in the case of persuasion. (Taillard 2002: 205)

I would say this applies also to manipulation.

This means that if Hitler's aim was to win the trust of the German people, in order to fulfil his own plans, he had to know the plans and intentions

of his addressees and try to change some of their intentions which they would be willing to accept as being coherent with their own plans and higher level intentions. For instance, in the case of invading the eastern countries, he gave as reason that a big country like Germany needs a lot of space. Whoever of his addressees had the own personal desire and plan of having more land could be won over by Hitler easily, since his plan to invade the east would be coherent with this higher level plan and intention and would fulfil certain desires that many had.

Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) argue that making an audience to believe something maybe accomplished either in an overt (ostensive) way or in a covert manner. In the latter case the informative intention is not made mutually manifest and leaves it to the audience to discover the information, or not. As mentioned before, in manipulation the manipulative intention is covert and not part of the communicative intention, in order to hide the deception.

It seems that if manipulation is involved which is usually meant to be more hidden and deceptive than persuasion, the informative intention is often a kind of 'cover up' of the manipulative intention. It is not in the communicator's interest that the manipulative intention is recognized. The wish of the communicator is to fulfil the manipulative intention in the hearer without him noticing it. However, if the addressee manages to search for the higher level deceptive intention, he may succeed in detecting the manipulative intention (Taillard 2002). In this case manipulation will most certainly fail, since no one likes to be manipulated. This is why the manipulative intention has to be covert. To give an example of how the manipulative intention can differ from an overt informative intention: Let's imagine that particular packages of juice are advertised as especially reasonable in price. Then the informative intention is that the packages of juice are reasonable. The communicative intention will be to make the informative intention manifest. If not only the communicative intention is fulfilled in that the addressee has merely understood the message, but also the informative intention then the addressee believes that the juice is reasonable and may buy it. According to Taillard's claims the addressee would buy the juice if that falls in with some higher order plans and intentions such as to live economically. However, if the addressee then recognizes the higher level intention of the salesman to get rid of the juice in spite of the passed expiry date, the addressee will recognize this intention as a manipulative intention. It is possible that the customers will not recognize the manipulative intention and buy the juice, in which case all the customer recognized was the informative intention. If the intention was really to make the customer buy just this juice because the expiry date had passed and he did indeed buy the juice then the higher order

manipulative intention, under which the informative intention was embedded, was fulfilled, recognized by the addressee or not.

So, while it is possible in persuasion to have the persuasive intention be overt, and have the content of the informative intention covertly embedded under the intention of persuasion, the manipulative intention is *always* covert, and will have the informative intention embedded under the manipulative intention. But the embedded part of the manipulative intention is very different from the deceptive manipulative higher order intention.

How easily can addressees be manipulated? Sperber (1994) and Wilson (2000) describe three strategies of understanding. A *naively optimistic* hearer accepts the first level of understanding that provides sufficient relevance as the one intended by the speaker. A *cautiously optimistic* hearer is able to cope with cases where the speaker accidentally fails to provide sufficient relevance: the hearer recovers the speaker's intended meaning by thinking about what she might have intended to convey. A hearer using the *sophisticated understanding* strategy detects more than accidental mishaps, he is able to detect deception and to infer cognitive effects both from the deceptive utterance and from the act of deception itself. Whereas the ability to use these strategies clearly increases developmentally, each strategy also requires an incremental layer of processing effort as the number of representation levels required increases.

Sperber (2000a and b) shows how the possibilities of deception and manipulation are part of communication. He assumes that there is a 'logico-rhetorical module' that allows the addressee of a persuasion or manipulation to check the message for internal and external consistency. This module, according to Sperber, has evolved as an adaptation to the deceptive possibilities inherent in communication, along the lines of Machiavellian intelligence (Byrne & Whiten 1988). Such an adaptive system is leading to a 'persuasion-counter-persuasion arms race'.

An important factor for the addressee to comprehend, believe and to be persuaded or manipulated is trust. Trust effects the amount of processing invested by a hearer and the actual meaning change. However trust has to be gained. The communicator knows that and therefore tries to be trustworthy in speech and action in order to gain trust from the addressee. I will elaborate on that in Section 5.

4. The manipulative mechanisms of the Nazis

4.1 The aims of the Nazis

The basic aims of the Nazis were stated overtly many times. Sometimes in a nutshell as in the speech of Hitler in the Münchner Löwenbräu 1928:

- (1) Das Ziel der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung heißt: Volk und Vaterland, unsere Parole heißt: Ehre, Freiheit und Brot, und der Weg heißt: Kampf
 (Hitler, A., in Boepple (Ed.) 1933: 122)
The goal of the National Socialist movement is called: People and fatherland, our slogan is called: Honor, Freedom and Bread, and the way it is done is called: Fight
 (Translation my own)

In the same speech Hitler says that the whole work of the Nazis has to be, “to enlighten the people, to change the mentality of the German thinking, to create a new movement which will reform the people through and through (*an Haut und Gliedern*) up to the soul of the individual small German human being”.

He mentions three prerequisites without which apparently exterior politics are not to be achieved: First, the people need to be educated against international thinking and for fanatic nationalism; second, the people need to be educated for the fight against democracy and parliamentarism and for the necessity of authority, leadership (*Führertum*) and personality; third, the people needs to be pulled away from the pitiful belief in possibilities which are outside of own strength, the belief in reconciliation and understanding, world peace, League of Nations, solidarity. According to Hitler there is only one right in this world and that in *Eigene Kraft* (own strength).

Other dominating subjects in the speeches and writing are: the superiority of Germany and the Germans amongst the European peoples, expansion of space for Germany towards the east, anti-Semitism, Historical Darwinism, the anti-liberal and anti-Marxist movement.

It is clear that the Nazis wanted to achieve the above-mentioned goals in the German people in the quickest and most efficient possible way. So they engaged in argumentation to achieve these goals, but they also withheld information that would make the audience weigh facts against the promised goals and recognize deception. They deceived with lots of lies to achieve cognitive effects in the people that they should hold for positive effects. The manipulation lies in the fact that the lower level informative intention was recognized by the people as intended, but the higher level intention to deceive, to communicate false or distorted information was covert.

4.2 Manipulation in testimony and argumentation

It is not easy to find neutral testimony in the Hitler and NSDAP writings. The only good example I found was not really a pro-Nazi discourse.

An example of testimony is displayed in the “Methodology of the election propaganda for the national vote of Aug. 1934 in Bavaria” (Berg-Selbmann 1988: 137). The discourse here is a description of what happened on Friday evening and especially on Saturday. The overall relevance of the discourse is to show how intensive and penetrating the propaganda was.

What is far more often to be seen in Nazi speeches and writing is argumentation. Here are only a few examples: In the final speech of the Münchner Volksgericht, 27th March 1924 (Munich 1933: 122ff.) Hitler justifies his attempted coup through skilful argumentation: Amongst other arguments he claims that there had not been a legal government anymore anyway, since Kahr, Lasser and Seisser had already formed a leadership. The reason why he and Ludendorff apparently attempted the coup had to do with the fact that they were afraid that a change of the planned leadership might still happen in a last decision. He also argued for why he was attempting to create something new: “Germany’s destiny does not lie in the republic nor in the monarchy. What I am fighting against is not the form of government, but its poor content”. He then goes on to mention particular examples of how he would propose a different content and then asks the question: “Is this high treason?”.

What was Hitler’s logical reasoning conveyed with these utterances? With the first argument he was most definitely reasoning the following way: If there is no more legal government anymore anyway, then it must be all right for him and Ludendorff to attempt this coup. If it was all right for him to attempt this coup then his offence was minimal. With the second he tried to argue that if the existing governmental systems did not have any good government content to offer, then he had a good reason for his coup.

He then turned away from justification and proposed what he would “fight for”. His reasoning here is that if someone has such good intentions to change the content of government to the better, then conducting a coup cannot be high treason. This is indeed what he asked for in a rhetorical question: Is this then treason?

Sometimes in the course of argumentation possible questions that the speaker or writer may have are made explicit and answers given – as in *Mein Kampf* (1942: 728, 736 and 742). Which deals with space expansion Hitler declares: “I want to shortly reply to the question, in which way the demand for territory and land seems ethical and moral. . .” He then answers and confirms

his first deontic discourse: “The right to territory and land can be a duty, if without extension of land a big nation seems to be doomed to perish”.

4.3 Omission and commission

4.3.1 *Commission: Explicit information*

Lies. The communication of the Nazis included omission and commission. Within commission there were a lot of the statements in the speeches or writings of the Nazis that were either downright false or misused (lies) or half-truths. It is not clear though in how far the speakers and writers had been brainwashed and deceived and were therefore blind to the falsehood of those statements themselves. However, in the light of the available evidence it must be the case that some of the obviously false or misused and half-false statements were intentional and therefore they were meant to distort facts and manipulate.

For instance in *Mein Kampf* (1942:350–352), Hitler claims that Marxism was a Jewish movement and with this claim he ascribes all sorts of intentions to the Jews that they never had because the movement was not a Jewish one. Although Marx was a Jew, Jewish beliefs are not at all in line with Marxism. So here we have a complete falsehood which Hitler must have known was a lie. So Hitler had formed representations that were based on his creation rather than on facts and it was embedded under a higher level representation to the effect that these representations were not believed by him. However his informative intention was that all of these utterances should be accepted as relevant information. The manipulative intention was meant to be hidden, unless Hitler was a psychopath to such degree that his hatred of Jews made him be convinced himself of the truth of a number of states of affairs that were obviously not true. However, although the latter is a possibility it is clear that some facts were deliberately distorted. This had ulterior motives:

Besides having as a goal to make people believe these utterances as relevant it had as a further goal to influence the society to see the Jew as the black sheep. His own personal goal was to create a scapegoat that he could use for everything that went wrong in the *Reich*.

Half-Truths and distortions. Under half-truths and distortions fall exaggeration, minimization and equivocation.

Exaggeration. In *Mein Kampf* (1942:702–704), he mentions the single financial superiority of the Jews in the stock markets of the world and their intentions to destroy Germany and other countries. It is true that the Jews were

strong on the stock market, but so were others. That they were the single financial superiority is an exaggeration. So we are dealing with a half-truth and surely most of the intentions ascribed to the Jews were wrong. Here Hitler had some factual representations about the Jews – some were financially strong and some were involved with the stock market. However that the Jews were the single financial superiority is based on self-created representations which were most likely metarepresented under a representation of disbelief of these representations. The manipulative intention is similar to the example of the Marxists.

Minimization. In the press conference of the propaganda ministry on Sept. 1938 it is made clear that the Londoner Communiqué should only be repeated *klein* ('minimal') and it should not be commented on. While the subject of the Sudeten should be covered in full. So the press was meant to give a distorted impression of what was really meant to be communicated by the British and so the people of Germany were meant to be manipulated into reading only what the state wanted them to read and draw the contextual implications about what was happening at the time that the NSDAP allowed them to draw. Here information that had relevant effects were withheld.

Another example of minimization has to do with the way the existence of concentration camps was made public. They were mentioned in newspapers, however, the extermination of the Jews and massive killings of those who did not believe in the Nazi ideas was not made known for instance in the article of the newspaper *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* (Catalogue of the museum, p. 44, Berg-Selbmann 1988: 149) with the article about "The concentration camp for political prisoners near Dachau". Here we have a case of minimization and therefore distortion of what really happened.

Let us now turn to equivocation and in particular evasion.

Equivocation, Evasion. In the final speech of the Münchner Volksgericht, 27th March 1924 (Munich 1933: 122ff.), Hitler justifies his attempted coup through skilful argumentation as outlined above. He then evades into propaganda and attacks the existing system. Part of his justification was that he was against the content that other governmental forms have to offer. He takes that as a starting point to mention a series of subjects that have been handled poorly and that he intends to change, such as: "fight against the enemies", "fight against the slavery at the international stock market", "fight against the political nature of the unions" etc. By evading he can manipulate the audience towards his goals.

Equivocation by confusing identity. Another form of equivocation is his confusing use of religious terms and quotations from the Bible for often quite unreligious uses, as in the same speech on March 27, 1924. Towards the end of his speech he mentions that the last tribunal of God would bring the reconciliation and that the judgement would be made by the *ewigen Gericht der Geschichte* (the eternal Court of History). Then he finishes by saying that *die Göttin des ewigen Gerichts* (the goddess of the eternal Court) of History will be destroying the accusation of the public prosecutor and the verdict of the court. His religious identity is as nebulous as his imagination as to how history will occur.

In the speech *im Münchner Löwenbräu* (1928) (*Völkischer Beobachter* 1928:2; Berg & Selbmann 1988:104) he mentions: “We know only two Gods: one God in heaven and one on earth which is *unser Vaterland* (our fatherland).

The religious jargon is surprising since religious activities were often attacked (Piepke 1960:223) and in some more insider publication by Alfred Rosenberg (Raem Ed. 1980:23) intentions are mentioned “to do away” in the future with the Roman Catholic Church and parts of the protestant church. So the religious jargon is not based on conviction but was used for manipulative purposes in so far, as during that time many people saw as trustworthy someone who was religious. So, religious jargon helped with coherence establishment. Although, because of his confusing religious identities he also alienated some of the existing churches and the effect did not lead to develop trust in some circles.

4.3.2 *Commission: Implicit information*

As Sperber indicated, one could in principle argue for a false cause with brilliant logic and convince the addressee. It is quite clear that Hitler’s argumentation includes the recovery of assumptions which were built on lies, but since they were implicit, they were not so obvious and had a very manipulative effect. For instance some of the signs of the shops belonging to Jews read: “Germans, defend yourself! Do not buy from Jews!”. Even if people did not have any assumption available that they had to defend themselves, if they were trusting, they established an assumption that there was indeed something they had to defend themselves against and that justified not buying from Jews, even though there were no grounds for that. The reader will think in these terms because he will try to establish relevance between the first and second conjunct.

In the speech *im Münchner Löwenbräu* (1928) (*Völkischer Beobachter* 1928:2), Hitler says under his point two that the population of Germany has to be “freed out of the atmosphere of irresponsibility and they have to be lead to

responsibility, to a sense of duty of the individual person". Since the immediate context was democracy and parliament, the assumption that the hearer will establish is that in the democracy and in a parliamentary system people do not take responsibility and do not have a sense of duty, which does not match with reality and is therefore manipulative and deceptive.

When Hitler and Ludendorff attempted a coup in 1923 they publicized a proclamation to the German people that a provisional German national government had been formed and that the leaders are: General Ludendorff, Adolf Hitler, General von Lussow and Oberst von Seisser. This gives the impression and makes assumptions available that all of these mentioned persons supported this new system. However, according to Berg-Selbmann (1988:53) at least Lussow was forced at gun-point to be part of the new government. So the proclamation, although explicitly not untrue, gives rise to wrong assumptions and interpretations because one normally holds that if someone is mentioned as being one of the leaders of the new government, then one is in agreement with that government.

4.3.3 Omission

In 1943, Himmler demanded that the Jews were exterminated. His speech was addressed to the regional leaders in Posen, but he emphasised that this was strictly secret and not to be communicated to the German people at large. Here we have manipulation of the people by omission (Smith & Peterson Eds. 1974: 169ff.). This omission of course gave rise to wrong interpretations of what the functions of the concentration camps were and what the disappearing of the Jews from their homes was all about. It therefore had a manipulative deceptive function. So the possibility of receiving relevant information and gaining positive contextual effects was withheld from the population of Germany.

4.4 Propaganda

A further tactic of the Nazis was to apply known propaganda strategies as used in marketing. In *Mein Kampf* (München 1942: 197f.), Hitler explains that the message has to be extremely simple and understandable to the lowest of understanding. It has to have only a few clear points that have to be repeated and are *schlagwortartig* (as slogans or catch-words) to be used and made very clear. Slogans and pictures were posted in many places and had a penetrating, repetitive purpose.

It is well-known that messages that are processed repeatedly are more highly accessible than those only processed occasionally. By using this strategy

the Nazis hoped and in fact did persuade those who were not that motivated from the start. As Taillard (2000) argues, in peripheral processing the target may recognize a persuasion attempt, but lacks the motivation to process it fully. However, he may be affected by something in an ad. Even if he is not processing the whole message, he may buy the product. In the case of political speeches similar mechanisms might be at work. The hearer might be persuaded through one or the other argument and then become eventually ‘converted’ to the new system.

4.5 Deontic mood

Some of the statements in the speeches and writings did not have so much to do with lies and half-truths as with the establishment of a new moral system and a new culture. Those statements were often introduced in a deontic way, as in Hitler (1942:728, 736 and 742), on the subject of the extension of the German territory to the east: “The exterior politics of the people state ‘has to’ secure the livelihood of the race which is established through the state on this planet by creating a natural relationship between the number and the growth of the population on the one hand and the size and quality of the land on the other hand”.

The deontic linguistic form alone may have a manipulative effect. If something is ‘a must’ that presupposes a moral or belief system that supports it and therefore suggests strongly that ‘the must’ has to be accepted. Because of that presupposed moral system deontic mood can be manipulative.

4.6 Weak implicatures

As mentioned before, sometimes a possible question that the speaker or writer may have is made explicit and an answer given – as in the text on space expansion by Hitler (1942:728, 736 and 742; Berg & Selbmann 1988:95). However, before Hitler answers his own rhetorical question he takes the opportunity to discredit and ridicule the potential questioners by saying that it is unfortunately necessary (to answer this question) since “... all sorts of *salbungsvolle Schwätzer* (“emotional gossip”) occur. . .”.

In *Mein Kampf* (Hitler 1942:371/372) where he discusses what should happen with political opponents he calls some of those opponents *internationale Vergifter* “international poisoners”. By using the figure *Vergifter* he makes the addressee access assumptions in his encyclopaedic entries about poison not in a concrete way but what ‘mental poison’ can possibly do.

Discrediting or ridiculing people by using substandard, figurative or connotative language is another way of influencing and manipulating people. Although this seems to be part of overt communication the weak implicatures involved may have a penetrating effect on the addressee which he may not be able to counter as easily as more literal language. It is therefore manipulative.

5. Why the addressees were manipulated

We mentioned above that humans are possibly equipped with a logico-rhetorical module that allows the target of the persuasion attempt to check the message for internal and external consistency. So if the German people had the possibility of consistency checking, why were they nevertheless deceived to such an extent?

First, it seems that the Nazis knew that a lot of people in Germany were already biased towards some of their ideas and goals (especially anti-Semitism). These people had plans and intentions that went in the same directions as the Nazis' plans and intentions that they held for desirable. So some of the claims of the Nazis were accepted because they were coherent with the plans and desires of the addressees.

Second, good argumentation can persuade and manipulate and as we have seen argumentation can logically confirm a lie or distortion. It can also make the addressee accept new intentions that were somehow in line with higher order plans and intentions.

Third, the addressees were largely prevented from checking the truth. Preventing truth checking was definitely one of the goals of the Nazis. As Hitler mentions in *Mein Kampf* (1942:371/372) "It is only possible to win the soul of a nation if next to the leading of the positive fight for one's own goals one destroys the opponents of these goals". So all opposition parties and others opposing the system of the Nazis were soon after their coming into power forbidden and even put into prison or concentration-camps and the press was censored and either only Nazi views were published or foreign news presented selectively. A lot of literature was forbidden and books burned.

Fourth, it is nevertheless surprising that the daring amount of lies and deception involved in Nazi communication was accepted. So why was it possible? In fact the 'daring' might have been one reason for the credibility. According to Bolinger (1980) "The Hitlerian 'big lie' traded on credibility-through-outrageousness. No one would dare to say such a thing if it were not true!"

Fifth, emotional appeal made the addressees accept what was said without objectively checking the truth or possibility of what was said. An example of such an emotional appeal is Goebbels' proclamation of the *totalen Krieg* (total war) in 1943 in the Berlin sports arena (Hofer 1982: 250).

Sixth, according to Sperber (2000), trust plays a big role in the addressee to accept and believe a proposition and its cognitive effects. So it was one of the major tasks of the Nazis to establish trust. They gained it by demonstrating 'credibility' by achieving some of their short-term goals that they had promised, like creating work for the people who had been in recession for a long time. Moreover, Hitler gave himself as the good Führer who looks after mothers and children and who creates recreation programmes like *Kraft durch Freude*. On the personal level Hitler tried to portray himself as a hardworking, moral and modest individual.

As mentioned before, Aristotle (see Garver 1994) always combined argumentation – practical logical argumentation – with ethics. According to him argumentation will not persuade if ethics is not connected to it. Hitler tried to appear ethical by using often religious terminology and by giving himself moral according to the understanding of what most held to be moral at the time, thus trying to fall in with the plans and intentions that his addressees had. This is also one reason why he did not make the darker sides of the Nazi intentions and actions, such as extermination of the Jews, generally known and let his relationship to Eva Brown be secret until almost the end of his leadership. The reason for this was to give external consistency to his speeches and writings and to win the trust of the German people by adapting to the addressee's plans and intentions – with which he succeeded in a remarkable and devastating way.

So many Germans became perhaps the naively trusting that Sperber and Wilson (1995) and Sperber (2000a and b) are talking about. They were easily ready to accept the lies and half truths as positive beliefs because they seemed either internally consistent because of clever argumentation and selected information or they seemed externally consistent because of the beliefs that the addressees already held themselves, because of lack of available facts to check and the in some way positive image that the Nazis projected. Finally, naive trust then also created a lack of interest in consistency checking and fostered more or less blind acceptance and following.

6. Conclusion

In this paper I first discussed the literature on manipulation as connected to persuasion and deception. I introduced some of the manifestations of linguistic phenomena used in manipulation, such as testimony, argumentation, omission, commission (minimization, exaggeration, distortion explicit information and implicit information), as well as deontic mood, figurative speech, connotative or substandard language. I also pointed out the power of repetitive language or exposure to slogans and emotional appeal in propaganda. As much as possible I tried to explain these phenomena within relevance theory applied to the Nazi speeches and texts.

Introducing the relevant points of relevance theory I argued following Taillard (2000 and 2002) that manipulation makes not only the recognition of a communicative intention and the acceptance of the informative intention necessary, but also the acting upon a higher order manipulative intention, whether recognized nor not. I pointed out that different from persuasion, manipulation is always covert and the content of the manipulative intention can be quite different from the content of the informative intention. Also, an addressee might be quite happy to accept being persuaded, but manipulation usually does not work anymore if the manipulative intention is recognized, since manipulation is deception and no one wants to be deceived.

Following Sperber that humans have a logico-rhetorical module at their disposal for coherence checking, I raised the question why the German people were so easily manipulated. I mentioned that clever argumentation and selected information to fall in with the addressees desires, plans and intentions, provided coherence with these higher order plans and intentions that the German people had. Consistency checking with already existing beliefs and the Nazis' attempt to appear credible and trustworthy provided external consistency. Further emotional involvement and the seeming consistency led to naïve trust which in turn prevented thorough consistency checking.

I am convinced that the mechanisms of manipulation found in the speeches and writings of the Nazis which were supported by their actions, maybe found in other totalitarian systems of the world. I also assume that the explanations of relevance theory as demonstrated in Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995), Taillard (2000) and Sperber (2000) and further explained especially for manipulation in this paper will provide powerful explanatory tools.

Note

1. I am grateful to Deirdre Wilson for her comments. Needless to say, all shortcomings are mine. I am indebted to Helga Schroeder for providing the Nazi texts.

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An integrated approach to the analysis of participant roles in totalitarian discourse

The case of Ceausescu's agent roles

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1. Introduction

Any deep-going linguistic investigation of political discourse is bound to focus on the reasoning and emotional processes that underlie the correlation between the participants' syntactico-semantic role-mapping and pragmatic role attribution. This paper is intended to give an account of the semantic and pragmatic underpinnings of role assumption/attribution mechanisms that are used to control the outcome of rhetorical constraints on politically conveyed meaning. The focus of the analysis is on interpersonal and mental manipulation in the official totalitarian discursive practice, with specific reference to Ceaușescu's speeches delivered at the Romanian Communist Party meetings.

Public language users, and particularly politicians who belong to the establishment, have both overt and covert motivations, as well as the required institutional means, for generating specific discursive (re)contextualisation, role (re)distribution, specific topic (re)perspectivisation, and audience feedback (re)modelling. Applying the basic principles that underlie the theory of semantic roles and speech act theory to a discourse-analytical approach has made it possible to better capture the interplay between core participant roles, such as Agent and Patient, on the one hand, and between the contextually changing scopes of their corresponding pragmatic acts, on the other.

One of the major questions addressed in this paper concerns the effects of language-based and ideology-based constraints on possible mappings and re-mappings of participant roles in relation to speech act verbs. The distorted

use of participant roles is explored in terms of their correlations with pragmatically redefined illocutionary act verbs. It is argued that particular types of participant role shifts and overlaps are associated not only with semantic feature change, but also with reconceptualisation patterns and power imbalance between speaker and audience, including speaker credibility and control, audience motivation, compliance and vulnerability.

2. Towards an integrated approach to participant roles

The approach proposed in this study is an integrated pragma-semantic approach which is concerned with the exploration of the correlations between the syntactico-semantic and pragmatic functions of participant roles in terms of scope, focus and range. Participant roles are conceived of both in terms of language-internal syntactico-semantic structures and in terms of language-external, pragmatically definable, interpersonal relationships. Particular attention has been paid to the discrepancies that occur in the way in which three core participant roles, namely Agent, Co-Agent and Patient, are instantiated in the discourse of political speeches, and the way in which real instantiators of Agent, Co-Agent and Patient roles in the actual world, including members of the targeted audience, are (mis)construed.

The notion of role is central to the present analysis. There is, however, no single unified approach to role theory. There are, instead, a number of theories that focus on the notion of *role* and that represent a wide range of perspectives derived from social anthropology, sociology, psychology, semiotics and linguistics, each of which focus on specific aspects of human interaction and are sometimes complementary, and sometimes only indirectly related (Tesnière 1959; Greimas 1970; Goffman 1971; Biddle 1979; Blake 1985; Jackendoff 1987, 1990; Langacker 1991; Palmer 1994; van Leeuwen 1995).

In verbal interaction, a role can be conceived of as a communicator's hypothetical attribute, functional or behavioural. For example, the participants' contributions to a speech event are often perceived as the impersonation of roles in an ongoing dialogue. This may be the actual or the constructed role that a participant assumes and it may become linguistically articulated in various ways. Various approaches to this notion of role instantiation focus on the interface between the private and the public personae of speakers and hearers, between individual and collective commitments, between entrusted and assumed responsibilities, between rational and emotional input-output transfers. These roles are shifting and sometimes overlapping, which explains why

they need to be continuously re-evaluated and redefined in the process of the interaction.

3. Participant roles in a syntactico-semantic analytical framework

In linguistics, semantic roles, also labelled *case roles*, *thematic roles*, *thematic relations* or *theta-roles* in generative syntax (Fillmore 1968; Carlson 1984; Jackendoff 1987; Dowty 1989, 1991; Parsons 1995), represent large classes of participants in a communicative event. They are primarily classified in conceptual, that is semantic, terms, while their actual identification is mainly syntactic. Basically, these roles specify who did what to whom. At the semantic level of linguistic interpretation, a role is associated with a particular participant in an event and it designates his/her relationship with other participants in the same event. This relationship is articulated through the intermediary of the predicate of the sentence reporting the event. Semantic roles are also called *participant roles*, because they can be viewed as the linguistic encoding of the parts that participants play in an event. The term *participant role* is more comprehensive, since it includes not only compulsory semantic roles, but also optional ones, i.e., circumstantial roles. This is why the term *participant role* has been adopted in this study to refer to the pragma-semantic interface of the notion of role.

Participant roles are reflected directly in the structure of discourse through a set of linking rules, which make it possible to associate a semantic role with a syntactic function. These roles acquire shifting and complex meanings at sentence level, which are highlighted by underlying correlations with their corresponding syntactic functions. In syntactic theory, role labelling is used to explain verb patterns according to the number of arguments they take. According to a typological study of roles, Agent and Patient are generally considered to be the two most basic and prototypical semantic roles. They indicate the distinction between transitive and intransitive sentences, since in their active form transitive sentences must always contain both an Agent and a Patient, while for intransitive sentences there is only one obligatory role, i.e., the Agent. In several languages there are verbs which are both intransitive and transitive, but which display a difference in meaning. However, the core roles exhibit varying clusters of adjacent semantic roles depending on the type of discourse in which they occur and on the particular types of participants that are involved in the event.

As has been pointed out by van Valin (1996), the terms Agent and Patient are often used in two distinct senses. First, they are used to refer to narrowly

defined participants, namely the wilful instigator of an event or action (Agent) and to the involuntary affected participant (Patient). In this sense they are distinguished from other narrowly defined roles, such as Experiencer, Instrument or Locative. Second, they are often used in a very general sense to refer to the two primary arguments in a transitive predication. In this use, Agent and Patient represent each a range of relations. Depending on the context, the role of Agent may subsume roles like Experiencer or Force, while Patient subsumes Theme and Goal. It is precisely such instances that have provided the starting point for the present investigation in the sense that they make it possible to carry out a multi-level analysis by finding correlations between a syntactico-semantic and a pragmatic framework.

While there are prototypical correspondences between semantic and syntactic categories, there is, however, not always a one-to-one correlation between them. A significant distinction needs to be made between verb arguments and semantic roles. The latter, unlike the former, include sentential elements that are not obligatory in the sentence and that can therefore be omitted. Optional semantic roles often provide decisive clues for the appropriate interpretation of speaker motivation, intentionality and relationship to the audience.

The entry for verbs such as *push*, *greet* and *interview*, will state that these three verbs take an Agent and a Patient, and also that, syntactically, they take a subject and a direct object, both of which may be marked as obligatory. Syntactically, these three verbs behave similarly, but semantically they display a number of significant differences. One important distinction, signalled by Croft (1991), needs to be made between physical interaction, as illustrated in (1) below, and mental interaction, including causation, as illustrated in (2) and (3) below:

- (1) The girl pushed the boy.
- (2) The girl greeted the boy.
- (3) The reporter interviewed the President.

The Agent (*the girl*) of the verb *push* in (1) acts physically on the corresponding Patient (*the boy*), who in this case happens to be a potential Agent. The result of the act of pushing consists in the Patient being affected in various ways (e.g., temporarily losing balance, changing position, etc.). The situation is different in (2), where the verb *greet* is a speech act verb, by means of which the Patient role (*the boy*), also a potential Agent, is affected mentally, rather than physically (although physical movements and gestures usually accompany such a speech act, as well as the addressee's response to it). Whereas *greet* implies a

one-directional speech act (with the exception of *greet one another*, for example), the verb *interview* in (3) implies a two-directional speech act exchange between an interviewer/reporter and an interviewee. Between the two of them, they instantiate at least three roles. An interview involves a (longer or shorter) sequence of speech acts jointly performed by an initiating Agent, *the reporter*, and a Co-Agent, *the President*, who, at the same time, instantiates the (affected) Patient role who undergoes the interview. The relation between the two Co-Agent roles is asymmetrical because the interviewer controls the interaction by virtue of his/her institutional assignment, while the President, in spite of his socially and politically more powerful position, has to comply in this particular interaction with the agenda set by the institutionally empowered reporter. Semantically, *the President* instantiates a double participant role, namely Patient (confronted with and affected by a reporter's question) and Agent (initiating an answer to the reporter's question). The reporter, as interviewing Agent, affects the co-participant role of President both as a Patient and as an Agent. In his Patient role, the President receives/is submitted to the reporter's questions, while in his Agent role, he is performing the speech acts of responding to or commenting on the interviewer's questions.

Unlike the verbs *push* in (1') and *greet* in (2'), the verb *interview* in (3') below involves not only one, but two or several actions or activities being performed, namely 'to ask questions, to prompt comments' (for which the main, or causing, Agent is responsible) and 'to answer questions, to make comments' (for which the Patient-cum-Agent role of the verb *interview* is responsible).

(1') [DO PUSH(gb)]

(2') [DO GREET(gb)]

(3') [DO INTERVIEW(r)] CAUSE [RESPOND(p)]

Whereas one participant is a causing Agent, the other participant can be regarded as an activated, or empowered, Patient, i.e., a co-participating Agent in (3'), since the performance of the activity conveyed by the verb presupposes *Co-Agency*. Each of the two Agent roles involved in a *Co-Agency* may act more or less independently or in a more or less synchronised manner, according to the specific circumstances, as well as their real-life positions of authority and power. Pragmatically, interviewing involves questioning (performed by the reporter) and responding (performed by the interviewee), namely two activities that require Co-Agent roles engaged in an ongoing negotiation of the control over the joint activity being co-performed. The semantic representation of (3) in (3') indicates that semantic roles are not semantic primitives, that

is the information they contribute to the meaning of a sentence can be further analysed in more detail. Thus the verb *interview* can be broken down into the components DO, CAUSE, and RESPOND arranged in a framework with two participants, the reporter and the President. If Agents are tested with respect not only to volition and control, but also to authority and power (socio-political, economic, etc.), it is apparent that there are higher and lower ranking Agents. In (3) above, standard role distribution ascribes the role of *Causing Agent* to the interviewing Agent (i.e., the reporter), and the role of affected Co-Agent to the interviewed Agent (i.e., the President). At the same time, role ranking may vary with the context, so that the interviewer can exert a leading role in the TV-studio within the context of the interview, but not, for example, in the context of a press conference with several journalists and reporters. In principle, a *President* is socially and politically a higher ranking Agent than a *reporter*, which obviously has a significant impact on the nature, aim and scope of the interviewing process. It is easy to see that the interaction between the two Agent roles will be different if the interviewee were a lower ranking Agent, such as a bricklayer, for example.

4. Participant roles in a pragma-semantic and speech act analytical framework

In the case of speech act-based events, the semantic framework of analysis does not in itself provide an adequate analytical model when the interaction concerns mental, rather than physical acts. An integrated pragma-semantic approach is necessary, because it can offer contextualised perspectivisations of the participant role relations in terms of correspondences or discrepancies with real-life role impersonations. Particularly significant are the communicative situations in which the various uses of complex speech acts can reveal information about interacting and/or shifting participant roles, reinforced institutional authority, power display, shared or clashing end-goals.

A pragmatic contextualisation of the interviewing event (3) above would imply a specification of the two real-life Agents, which in its turn would enable an understanding of their actual ideological and political backgrounds, as well as relations to each other. The President of a democratic country will be expected to accept the authority of the interviewer and to comply with the constraints of an official interview, namely answer all the questions, even embarrassing ones. In a totalitarian society, the President is a priori positioning himself above all other institutional Agents and can therefore refuse to give in-

interviews or accept to do so providing he control the interview situation (e.g., selecting the questions to be asked and answered, etc.), as Saddam Hussein did when he was interviewed by the CBS reporter Dan Rather. Whereas in the former case the co-performance of the two Agents is monitored by the interviewer according to generally accepted rules, in the latter case the co-performance of the two Agents is indirectly monitored by the interviewee, who thus interferes with and limits the interviewer's professional authority and decision power. In this respect, it is well known that Ceaușescu never gave interviews to the domestic press. On the few occasions when he accepted to be interviewed by foreign press reporters, one of his requirements was to select the questions that he was prepared to answer.

The various proposals made in previous studies with respect to a systematic conceptualisation of semantic roles in relation to their corresponding verbs have been based on a number of recurrent verb types, such as verbs of motion (go, run, chase, etc.), verbs of perception (feel, see, hear, etc.) and verbs of cognition (think, believe, know, etc.). There are, however, a number of verbs that belong to the category of illocutionary acts (declare, promise, threaten, command, authorise, etc.) whose Agents fulfil essentially discursive and rhetorical functions, but which have not been explored in more detail within the framework of semantic roles. Illocutionary act verbs like *promise* and *warn* have been analysed by Searle (1989/1969), but the analysis is carried out strictly within the framework of speech act theory. An important contribution of this theory is that it highlights the pragmatic roles of Speaker and Hearer in a speech event, one performing an illocutionary act, i.e., the Speaker, the other receiving, evaluating and/or responding to it, i.e., the Hearer. These two context-related pragmatic roles are normally not included in the analysis of semantic roles. On the other hand, speech act theory does not account for further participant roles, whether central or marginal in the discourse.

Whereas a semantic framework of analysis treats participant roles as more or less static entities that are usually identified in isolated sentences, a pragmatic framework is meant to contextualise participant roles by investigating their features at inter-sentential level and by analysing their dynamic status in interconnected utterances. At the utterance level, the roles of Speaker and Hearer can be construed as interactive macro-roles acting as pragmatic counterparts of the semantic role of Agent or Co-Agent. This is particularly relevant in the case of political speeches, where a speaker's speech acts are intended to reach a multitude of hearers.

In Ceaușescu's speeches, the speaker's ultimate goal is not necessarily to rationally or emotionally persuade the audience, but to get their compliance in

words and deeds, as well as to deter them from civil or political disobedience. The targeted audience is expected to do certain things and abstain from doing other things, as was pointed out by Walton:

Whether or not an audience really believes a particular viewpoint, or accepts it as true, the aim of propaganda is to get them to go along with it in a more practical sense. The aim is to get them to go along with a policy or program by taking part in it, and by allowing it to be implemented as a plan of social action. (Walton 1997:394)

The textual message of dogma-ridden propaganda is usually redundant and devoid of real informative value, whereas its subtext can be summed up as a hyper-directive: ‘Do as you are told, or else!’ meaning ‘Do as I tell you to, not as I do’. The tasks imposed on the hearers, i.e., the masses, are obviously compulsory, meant to be performed individually, collectively, and/or both. The role of hearers as freely consenting Agents is considerably reduced to merely complying Agents.

The famous, or rather infamous, formula “the government of the people, by the people, for the people” represents a deeply rooted confusion between legitimate (*de jure*) and actual (*de facto*) power holders. The same applies to Ceaușescu’s favourite slogan: “the working people are the owners, the producers and the beneficiaries”, which was sending a vague and confusing message, without back-up in reality. It implies an undifferentiated merging of the semantic roles Patient, Agent and Beneficiary in one and the same group of people.

5. Totalitarian distortion of the relation between participant roles

5.1 *A discuta* (= to discuss) and *a dezbate* (= to debate)

Since a semantic frame of analysis cannot accommodate distinctions like the ones mentioned above, it is necessary to integrate it with a pragmatic approach. Such an approach is better equipped to correlate the concept of semantic Co-Agency with the pragmatic Speaker-Hearer relation in order to capture the actual (a)symmetry of the relation, as well as the direction, scope and end-goal of the causation. It is symptomatic for Ceaușescu’s speeches that Co-Agency is conveyed at the syntactico-semantic level, but is not reinforced at the pragmatic level. A closer investigation of the dictator’s use of speech acts will reveal the limits of his actual intentionality, credibility and consistency. The case of

the verbs *to discuss* and *to debate* is particularly revealing, as illustrated in example (4) below (Nicolae Ceaușescu's speech at the meeting of the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, 20 February, 1987:4–19):¹

- (4) Scopul consfătuirii din aceste zile este de a *discuta* unele stări de lucruri în legătură cu indicatorii de producție care nu s-au realizat în mod corespunzător, astfel încât să *lichidăm* aceste rezultate negative. . . (p. 4)

Problemele pe care le *dezbaterem* astăzi în Comitetul Executiv sînt foarte importante. . . . Acum *discutăm* rapoartele amănunțite cu privire la diferențele indicatori . . . (p. 5)

Este necesar să *analizăm* activitatea tuturor acestor unități și să *luăm măsuri ferme* . . . (p. 8)

Propun să revedem Legea contractelor, să *luăm o măsură generală* ca toate contractele să fie înregistrate la Ministerul Justiției. Deci organele de justiție, inclusiv miliția economică, să aibă obligația de a urmări cum se realizează contractele. . . . *Cred că o asemenea măsură va fi eficientă* . . . (p. 19)

The purpose of the current meeting is to discuss certain situations in connection with the production indicators that have not been fulfilled adequately, so that we can do away with these negative results.

The problems that we are debating today in the Executive Committee are very important. . . . We discuss now detailed reports concerning several indicators . . .

It is necessary that we analyse the activity of all these production units and that we take firm measures.

I propose that we revise the contract Law, that we take a general measure for all contracts to be registered with the Ministry of Justice. Therefore, law-enforcement bodies, including the economic militia, will have the obligation to follow up the implementation of contracts . . . I think that this is going to be an efficient measure. . . .

Semantically, the verb *to discuss* can be used (in several languages, including Romanian and English) with two major meanings depending on whether it involves Agency or Co-Agency. It is significant that several dictionaries list the Co-Agency meaning first and the Agency meaning second. This indicates indirectly that the Co-Agency use is considered to be the primary one. As a Co-Agency-based verb, *discuss* means to talk about a subject with someone, to jointly explore solutions by reasoning and arguing. As an Agency-based

verb, *discuss* means to talk or write about (treat) a subject in detail, especially considering different ideas and opinions related to it.

The semantic distinction between the two meanings is crucial in the political context above, where the meeting presided by Ceaușescu is only formally said to consist of discussions among participants. According to the official agenda, the goal of the party meeting is to discuss and debate “certain situations” and other important problems. It is, however, difficult to envisage the possibility of a really open and unconditional discussion when the dictator indicates from the very beginning what the outcome of the discussion is expected to be: “so that *we can do away with* these negative results”, “that *we take firm measures*”. The two action verbs, i.e., “to do away with” and “to take measures”, can accommodate both Agency and Co-Agency participant roles. The issue of Co-Agency also arises in connection with the issue of the inclusive or exclusive use of the personal pronoun ‘we’. If ‘we’ is used inclusively, it is possible to interpret the verbs ‘do away with’ and ‘take firm measures’ as Co-Agency verbs. But if ‘we’ is used exclusively, it is fully justified to interpret the two verbs as causation verbs (controlled by causing Agents). In the former case, a further issue arises: how many Agents and what particular Agents are included in the Co-Agency involved by the use of the inclusive ‘we’?

A closer examination of the paradigmatic chain of recurrent speech acts in Ceaușescu’s public addresses in (4) reveals a consistent use of Agency-based verbs. A verb that recurs throughout the whole speech is ‘to discuss’: “The purpose of the current meeting is *to discuss* certain situations”, “*We discuss* now detailed reports”. The Speaker, i.e., the dictator, indicates and reiterates the issues being discussed, but no co-discussants are mentioned, nor are their voices heard, for that matter. There is an obvious absence of co-discussant roles. First-hand knowledge of the routines followed by such communist party meetings can only confirm that no discussion was ever intended or allowed to take place. Instead, a number of high-ranking communist party officials would take the floor in a pre-established order to deliver well-prepared speeches reinforcing the ideas, propositions and measures initially spelt out by the dictator in his opening speech.

Instead of displaying, as was programmatically declared, an interplay between Agency and Co-Agency, Ceaușescu’s speeches were meant to reinforce his own Hyper-Agent role, as has been argued in Ilie (1998):

It is further suggested that Ceaușescu’s speeches reinforce his politically promoted image as “Conducător”, an image that is frequently associated with action-oriented verbs and can be regarded as a kind of superimposed Hyper-

Agent, while the real Agents are cancelled or demoted to the role of Patients or Non-volitional Agents. (Ilie 1998:76–77)

Two major strategies are being consistently used to reinforce the authority and legitimacy of the Hyper-Agent of totalitarian discourse in terms of participant role configuration. One strategy is the use of political propaganda, meant to silence possible resistance or opposition by imposing institutional chains of multi-layered and one-directional causation, that individual and collective Agents were expected to comply with. A second strategy is the personality cult, meant to boost the ubiquitous image of the dictator and to rule out alternative standpoints or solutions by excluding the involvement of individual Agents or Co-Agents with a free will and motivation. Real events are consistently misrepresented by the dictator's Hyper-Agent at the expense of collective Agents.

5.2 *A propune* (= to propose)

As far as the dictator's use of speech act verbs is concerned, Co-Agency is being systematically cancelled, whereas causation is being systematically annihilated. For example, the verb *propose* in (4) above is normally expected to trigger a reaction from the interacting addressee(s), usually in the form of a response:

[DO PROPOSE(p)] CAUSE [RESPOND(a)]

Responses to proposals usually involve agreement and/or disagreement, as well as counter-proposals. In Ceaușescu's speeches at official political meetings, however, the only reaction to all his proposals during his twenty-five years as a president was unanimous agreement. This obviously implies that the meaning of the verb *propose* has undergone a drastic semantic distortion:

[DO PROPOSE(p)] CAUSE [AGREE(a)]

No counter-proposal, criticism or reservation was ever allowed to be expressed during party meetings against any of the dictator's proposals. The dictator's proposal in (4) above is treated as an already endorsed decision, meant to be immediately implemented, if we judge by the chain of causation it triggers: the first step is to 'revise' the contract Law, followed by a second step, i.e., to 'take a general measure . . .'. The third step empowers and entrusts "law-enforcement bodies" (including the economic militia) with "the obligation to follow up the implementation of contracts". Judging by the similar outcomes of several other speeches, it seems reasonable to conclude that this very strong 'proposal', like all the dictator's proposals, is gaining legal force the very moment it is made

public in one of the official political fora. The various steps of the chain of Causation give an indication about the way in which the proposal is to be legally enforced by means of coercion. Further indication that Ceaușescu's proposal is already operative is provided, for example, by his positive evaluation of the future measure deriving from the expected endorsement of the proposal "I *think* that this is going to be an efficient measure" (actually meaning "I *am persuaded* that . . .").

The apparently spontaneous fact that a number of delegates and members of the audience were seen to make proposals that were always in line with the official policy directives, was meant to give legitimacy to a totalitarian rule that claimed to be democratic. It was, however, crucial that the delegates who took the floor made the 'right' proposals, which had been agreed upon by members of the inner circle of high Communist Party officials. One of Ceaușescu's recurring strategies was to officially prompt and encourage such proposals, as illustrated in (5) below:

- (5) De aceea consider că *trebuie*, în circa două săptămâni, să se propună o redistribuire a cadrelor de specialitate, încadrarea și trimiterea lor în întreprinderi să lucreze
Therefore I consider that, in about two weeks, a redistribution of specialised cadres, i.e., to be hired and assigned to work in factories, must be proposed.
(Nicolae Ceaușescu's speech at the meeting of the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, 20 February, 1987:15)

The excerpt above contains a deontically conveyed proposal ("a redistribution *must* be proposed"). In order to show that there is wide popular support for his political line, the dictator uses his authority to cause the 'right' sort of proposals to be made 'spontaneously' by carefully selected conference participants. Communist rule, although theoretically pleading for equality among all citizens, was based on a very hierarchical system. The citizens' loyalty was ensured by a very sophisticated system of rewards and punishments. Those party members who were called upon to participate in the Communist Party conferences belonged to various layers of the nomenklatura. In example (5) it is possible to distinguish an implicit hierarchy of higher to lower categories of party-political Agents, whose respective roles are well defined. It goes without saying that it is Ceaușescu, the supreme 'leader', who takes the major decisions. This is why his use of 'consider', a verb of mental activity has the implicit force of a directive, which is reinforced by the use of the deontic modal 'must'. The dictator's role is the highest in the hierarchy, namely that of Hyper-Agent or *decision-*

making Agent. In this particular case, his decision consists in urging a number of high party officials ‘to propose’ a redistribution of specialised cadres, which is meant to formally create the impression of a bottom-up process. This category of high party officials enact the role of what I call *decision-endorsing Agents*, who come closest to the decision-making Agent. The next step in decision processing was to be taken by party officials further down in the hierarchy, who had to ensure that the specialised cadres got hired and assigned to work in factories. This role category is represented by what I call *decision-implementing Agents*. The lowest ranking Agents in this political hierarchy are the ‘specialised cadres’, whose only alternative is to comply with the directives initiated by the dictator and forwarded by their superiors, namely decision-endorsing Agents and decision-implementing Agents. The ‘specialised cadres’ may be regarded as mere *complying Agents*. In a totalitarian society, all these role expectations are known by its members and are being reinforced by socio-political mechanisms of power and control, such as rewards and sanctions. However, as far as compliance is concerned, all the categories of Agents belonging to the upper party hierarchy must also fulfil the role of complying Agents in order to be entrusted with a higher Agent role in the political hierarchy.

A recurrent feature of the speaker-audience interaction at party conferences consists in the fact that the delegates always convey, without exception, unanimous approval for all the proposals and plans of action presented by the dictator himself, as well as by any of his close collaborators. A prototypical example is provided in (6):

- (6) În timpul dezbaterilor, comuniștii, oamenii muncii, fără deosebire de naționalitate, și-au exprimat aprobarea unanimă față de obiectivele și orientările stabilite de partid, și-au luat angajamentul de a munci cu întregul elan pentru înfăptuirea neabătută a hotărîrilor ce vor fi adoptate de marele nostru forum revoluționar. (p. 119)

During the debates, the communists, the working people, regardless of their nationality, have expressed their unanimous approval for the objectives and orientations established by the party, have pledged to work whole-heartedly to implement the decisions that will be adopted by our great revolutionary forum. (Nicolae Ceaușescu, Report to the 12th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, 19 November, 1979)

It is highly symptomatic for totalitarian discourse that the commissive speech act verb “to pledge”, which is attributed collectively to the congress participants as instantiated Agents, can also apply to decisions not yet taken. This practice is similar to signing a blank check. In example (6) above, the communists and

the working people “have pledged to work whole-heartedly to implement the decisions that *will* be adopted by our great revolutionary forum”. This indicates that there was never any doubt whatsoever that the dictator’s decisions would be unanimously adopted for implementation. In Ceaușescu’s discourse world it is the undifferentiated mass of collectively addressed Agents who are urged and/or forced to make unconditional pledges and assume all kinds of responsibilities. As for the conference participants, they belong to the privileged upper hierarchy of party officials. This explains why the party conference reports offer an idealised and false image of the communists’ boundless devotion to and trust in the ‘wise’ decisions of the party and of its leader. At the same time, the real historical situation in Ceaușescu’s Romania shows all the signs of a ruthless totalitarian leadership with a dictatorial leader (Shafir 1985; Fischer 1989; Tismăneanu 1989a and 1989b; Verdery 1991; Verdery & Kligman 1992). A brief overview is provided by Tismăneanu:

Power under Ceaușescu was exerted by a tiny coterie using the mechanisms of populist authoritarianism, symbolic manipulation, and, especially after 1980, psychological mass terror. . . . As the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev wrote: ‘A state of terror is not only physical action, with arrests, torture, punishment – it is above all mental action.’ . . . Because the leader imagined himself as the guarantor of the country’s independence, all forms of opposition and dissent were treated as criminal offences. (Tismăneanu 1993: 317)

According to Richard Pipes (1990), many ideas promoted by Communism originated in the philosophy of the Enlightenment, whereas the basic ideas of Fascism originate in Romanticism. In theory, the former is described as rational and constructive, since it highlights the principle of controlling social mechanisms and the evolution of human society. On this view, the role of a rational, volitional and controlling Agent seems to be all-important. This may explain why mental causation processes are most revealing for communist manipulative strategies. There are often competing or incompatible participant roles that do not coincide with the actual mechanisms of the socio-political reality. These strategies can be detected when there is no compatibility between the distribution of syntactico-semantic roles and real-life role distributions and instantiations of speakers and hearers.

5.3 *A promite* (= to promise), *a-și lua angajamentul* (= to pledge), *a asigura* (= to assure)

Four criteria were used by Searle (1975) for his classification of speech acts: illocutionary point, direction of fit, the speaker S's psychological state, and propositional content. As far as the second criterion is concerned, two types of speech acts, namely *directives* and *commissives*, display the same direction of fit, i.e., world-to-words fit. *Directives* are attempts to get a hearer H to do something, while expressing S's wish that H do something. They are typically used to convey requests, orders, suggestions, warnings, etc. *Commissives*, such as to promise, to pledge, to commit oneself, etc., commit S to some future course of action, as illustrated below.

[DO PROMISE(p)] CAUSE [HAPPEN(a)]

The Agent that makes a promise indicates that s/he is committed to doing or not doing something in future. One of the caveats mentioned by Searle is the following: "I cannot promise to have done something, and I cannot promise that someone else will do something (although I can promise to see that he will do it)" (Searle 1989/1969:57). It could be further specified that promising on someone else's behalf may occur in instances of either symmetrical or asymmetrical Co-Agency. In the latter case, the speaker has a superordinate role and can exert pressure on his/her subordinates. Two violations of the conditions for a felicitous act of promising are frequently committed in speeches made by the delegates to communist party conferences. One of these violations consists in promising to carry out something unconditionally, before it has even been decided. In other words, the speaker promises to do something although s/he does not yet know the specific object of the promise. Hence, one of the preparatory conditions of the act of promising is violated, which makes the promise technically infelicitous. As a result, the apparent act of promising reveals an act of mere compliance. A second serious violation, also mentioned by Searle, consists in making promises meant to be fulfilled by somebody else. Such an infelicitous act of promising reveals an act of implicit coercion exerted by the speaker on the complying Agents targeted by the promise.

- (7) *Va asigur, mult stimat și iubite tovarășe Nicolae Ceaușescu, că organizația județeană de partid, toți oamenii muncii din județul nostru vor munci cu dăruire și pasiune revoluționară pentru înfăptuirea măsurilor ce le va adopta plenara.*

I assure you, much esteemed comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, that the party county organisation, all the working people in our county, will work with devotion and revolutionary passion to implement the measures that will be adopted by the plenary meeting. (Comrade Ion Stoian's speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, 1–2 June, 1982)

- (8) *Doresc să asigur plenara, pe dumneavoastră, tovarășe secretar general, că sindicatele sînt ferm hotărîte să acționeze cu înaltă responsabilitate revoluționară pentru a traduce în viață hotărîrile ce vor fi adoptate de plenară, pentru a-și aduce contribuția la ridicarea României pe noi trepte de civilizație și progress.*

I want to assure the plenary meeting, and you, comrade general secretary, that the trade-unions are firmly determined to act with great revolutionary responsibility in order to implement the decisions that will be adopted by the plenary, in order to contribute to Romania's development towards new stages of civilisation and progress. (Comrade Cornel Onescu's speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, 1–2 June, 1982)

The speakers in the examples above had leading positions in the party county organisation and in the trade-union leadership, respectively. Their institutional roles confer upon them enough power to allow them to take decisions and make promises on behalf of hundreds and/or thousands of people. At the same time, they can only hold such high positions by enacting the roles of Complying Agents in relation to the dictatorial Hyper-Agent. These two examples are representative for all the other delegates' speeches, in which propaganda strategies are closely correlated with personality cult mechanisms. It is no accident that in (7) the speaker makes a commitment to implement measures not yet adopted, whereas the speaker in (8) commits himself to implement decisions not yet adopted. Moreover, Stoian's act of promising in (7) is brought specifically to the attention of one particular hearer, namely Ceaușescu's Hyper-Agent role, while in (8) the act of promising is directed both to the whole audience and to Ceaușescu's Hyper-Agent in particular.

The verb *a asigura* (= to assure) functions normally as a token of the speech act of promising, since it commits the speaker to a future course of action. However, the resulting speech acts in (7) and (8) above are not prototypical commissives. According to Searle's definition, commissives commit the speaker to some future course of action, whereas in these examples the speaker makes a double commitment, both on his or her own behalf and on behalf of oth-

ers. Typically, the people on behalf of whom the commitment is made are not consulted or informed in advance. This is why this use of commissives shares an essential feature with the use of directives (attempts to get the hearer to do something), namely they exhibit the same direction of fit, i.e., the world-to-words fit. There is, however, an important distinction between the two aspects of this complex speech act: the commissive component is primarily targeted at the Hyper-Agent and the conference participants, whereas the directive component is primarily targeted at the masses of working people, i.e., Complying Agents.

6. Co-Agency and causation in relation to control and coercion

Whereas the chain of causation in (4) above involves several participant roles, including individual and institutional Agents, the Causation phenomenon in (9) and (10) below exhibits a different structure:

- (9) Consider că *trebuie angajate* mult mai serios *centralele* producătoare de utilaje, ca și *ele să acționeze* cu toată hotărârea . . .

I consider that the equipment manufacturing units must be mobilised more seriously, so that they should act with full determination . . . (Nicolae Ceaușescu's speech at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, 20 February, 1987)

- (10) *Comitetul Politic Executiv trebuie să stabilească măsurile necesare și să ceară guvernului* ca în cel mai scurt timp – în cursul lunii martie – *să se asigure ca toate sectoarele să intre în normal* cu respectarea normelor de consum.

The Executive Political Committee must establish the necessary measures and ask the government to ensure as soon as possible – during the month of March – that all industrial sectors resume the normal production flow by respecting consumption norms. (Nicolae Ceaușescu's speech at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, 20 February, 1987)

The speaker's emphasis in (9) and (10) is not only on controlling the decision process by appointing the responsible institutional Agents at all successive levels, but also on reinforcing the awareness of coercive mechanisms that are available in order to ensure the expected results. The former emphasis on control is indirectly correlated with Co-Agency as a process-oriented strategy,

whereas the latter emphasis on coercion is indirectly correlated with causation, as a result-oriented strategy.

A closer look at the role interplay in (9) reveals a prototypical case of double participant role distribution. Thus, the participant role instantiated by “the equipment manufacturing units” is first construed as Patient, only to be afterwards upgraded as Agent. As Patients, these manufacturing units are ‘mobilised’, i.e., they (must) undergo the action of external Agents. However, the same units are subsequently upgraded to the role of Agents that are expected to ‘act’. A certain (Patient-cum-Agent) overlap can be envisaged between the two instantiations of this double participant role.

In (10) it is the causation, rather than the Co-Agency strategy, that is foregrounded. On the recommendation of the dictator’s Hyper-Agent role, it is an institutional participant role, i.e., “the Executive Political Committee”, that has been assigned the task of asking another institutional participant role, i.e., “the government”, to act. Both institutional roles in (10) are hierarchically ranked as decision-making factors, unlike the institutional participant role in (9). Both institutional roles are double (Patient-cum-Agent) roles, in the sense that each of them is envisaged as Patient by a higher ranking role, while acting at the same time as an Agent. It is easy to anticipate that the lowest institutional role in (10), i.e., “all industrial sectors”, which is the Patient of the preceding Agent role (the government), is expected to act as a fully empowered Agent in relation to the corresponding industrial units and employees.

Whereas a chain of causation is systematically outlined in (10), the main Agent role is formally unspecified in (9): Who is to mobilise the equipment manufacturing units? In spite of the Agent specification in (10) and Agent under-specification in (9), what is important is for the audience to be able to identify the dictator’s Hyper-Agent as the initiator of all role distribution and re-distribution and as a central power holder. A Hyper-Agent is primarily interested in controlling everything and in being repeatedly acknowledged as supreme authority. Instances like the ones illustrated in (9) and (10) are meant to highlight complementary aspects of power control and coercion: in (9) the Hyper-Agent is mainly interested in getting something done, i.e., reaching a goal, whereas in (10) the Hyper-Agent is equally interested in getting somebody to do something, i.e., the participant roles that are specifically assigned the task must reach particular goals.

7. Conclusions

An integrated pragma-semantic approach offers better prerequisites for a systematic mapping of speech act patterns contextually, co-textually and situationally. Integrating the basic principles that underlie the theory of semantic roles and speech act theory into a pragmatic approach makes it possible to better capture the interplay between core participant roles, such as Agent, Co-Agent and Patient, on the one hand, and the mental processes and final outcomes of their corresponding speech acts. A number of discrepancies have been found between the semantic description of speech act related participant roles and their actual pragmatic use and interpretation in totalitarian discourse.

An examination of the paradigmatic patterns of a number of recurrent speech acts (*discuss, debate, propose, promise*) in Ceaușescu's political speeches has made it possible to identify and account for control- and coercion-based distortions of the notions of Causation and Co-Agency. The violations of the felicity conditions of the speech acts used by the dictator and by his loyal party officials consist in systematically depriving Co-Agents of the use of free will and power of veto. The recurrent distortions of the illocutionary force of speech acts also reveal an unofficial political hierarchy of roles from highest to lowest ranking party officials: decision-endorsing Agents, decision-implementing Agents and complying Agents. The supreme role of Hyper-Agent is enacted by the dictator himself.

Two major strategies are being consistently used to reinforce the power and legitimacy of the Hyper-Agent of totalitarian discourse in terms of participant role configurations. One strategy is political repression, which is meant to silence possible opposition by imposing institutional chains of one-directional causation that individual and collective Agents are forced to comply with. The other strategy is the personality cult, which is meant to rule out alternative voices or standpoints by ignoring or cancelling the involvement of individual Agents or Co-Agents with a free will and motivation. The (mis)representation of real-life events is rooted in ideology-based manipulative constraints concerning types of Agent- or Co-Agent-controlled relations.

Note

1. All translations are mine.

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Racist manipulation within Austrian, German, Dutch, French and Italian right-wing populism

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1. Introduction: Basic concepts

In this paper I would like to describe and criticize potentially racist propaganda within right-wing populism. My analysis will focus on instances of argumentative schemes such as the so-called ‘pragmatic argument’ and ‘illustrative examples’, and the formulation of these arguments with the help of metaphors and hyperbolic exaggerations. But first I would like to outline a few methodological problems connected with the analysis of the highly controversial language usage of right-wing populist discourse. Among these methodological problems are the following:

The difficulty of finding a neutral stance in this highly sensitive issue: if we take into account the linguistic turn of philosophy in the 20th Century (cf. Wittgenstein 1975), relativistic developments within the theory of science (cf. Kuhn 1978; Feyerabend 1979) and similar developments in ideology research (cf. Mannheim 1929; Harris 1970; van Dijk 1998) or argumentation theory (cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1983; Toulmin 1986, 1992; Kienpointner 1992; Kienpointner & Kindt 1997; Shi Xu & Kienpointner 2001), it has become highly problematic to assume that there is a neutral, objective standpoint and a corresponding neutral language from which to judge the points of view expressed in a particular argumentative text as biased, dogmatic and irrational instead of objective, democratic and rational. In my view, such a neutral standpoint and such neutral language simply do not exist. The traditions mentioned above rather suggest that the language game and the form of life (that is, the

complex activities in a society within which verbal activities are embedded; cf. Wittgenstein 1975:28) create questions of what counts as a fact or plausible assumption or a positive or negative value relative to groups or speakers and audiences. This does not preclude the possibility that the ideal of an impartial judgment of political points of view could be realized at least to a certain degree (cf. below).

There is also the danger of begging the question. If we take texts from traditions such as right-wing populism and follow the wide-spread consensus that they are dubious and potentially dangerous, and then indeed describe them as dubious, dangerous and irrational traditions, the outcome of this critical analysis could be seen as a trivial or almost tautological repetition of such presupposed negative judgments. As far as the critical analysis of populist arguments are concerned, a parallel danger arises: this danger consists in finding fallacies such as the *ad populum* argument ('mob appeal') or the *ad baculum* argument ('threat appeal'; cf. Walton 1999, 2000) more often in populist propaganda than in more respectable types of political discourse. This methodological problem is pointed out explicitly by distinguished argumentation theorists such as Plantin (1998:36f.) and Walton (1999:197):

Si l'on se propose de construire une théorie critique de l'argumentation, ayant pour objectif de traquer sophismes et paralogismes, on sera tenté de prendre plutôt pour objet des textes que la communauté réproouve; il est en effet plus facile d'invalider le discours d'un fasciste, d'un sexiste, d'un raciste, d'un xénophobe, d'un ségrégateur, d'un pétrolier pollueur ou d'un fumeur, que les déclarations d'un démocrate, d'un partisan de l'égalité des sexes, d'un antiraciste, d'un anti-ségrégationniste, d'un écologiste ou d'un non-fumeur.

If one wishes to elaborate a critical theory of argumentation, aiming at discovering fallacies, he will be tempted to examine texts that the community rejects; in effect, it's easier to invalidate the discourse of a fascist, a sexist, a racist, a xenophobe, a segregationist, a polluting oil company, or a smoker, than the declarations of a democrat, an anti-segregationist, an ecologist or a non-smoker. (translation by the Editors)

Using the example of Nazi mass meetings, it is easy to condemn the mob-appeal type of *ad populum* argument as inherently fallacious. But until the type of argument is identified, the device of declaring it fallacious because it was used by evil people, with dangerous and destructive consequences, is too easy a method of dismissal. What if the example of the use of mob appeal was a

case of a union leader appealing to the emotions of an assembled crowd of coal miners to get them to fight for workplace safety rules that are badly needed in the mine? Or, what if the orator is a feminist leader who uses an emotional appeal to a mass audience of women to try to get them to fight for the noble cause of equal rights? Would we be so quick to immediately condemn such cases of the use of powerful and emotional crowd rhetoric as ‘mob appeal’ *ad populum* fallacies?

There is also the problem that the populist opinions could be portrayed unfairly, that is, the danger of producing a straw man fallacy. For example, to say that populist discourse commits the fallacy ‘*ad populum*’ or ‘*ad baculum*’ neglects the fact that not all appeals to popular opinion can be judged as fallacious and/or illegitimate (cf. Walton 1999, 2000). In this context, it has to be stressed that each analyst of argumentative discourse inevitably has his or her own ideological standpoint and must take care not simply to presuppose this standpoint as implicit pseudo-objective point of reference (cf. Blommaert & Verschueren 1998:36).

Moreover, leaders representing all ideological positions within democratic systems use propaganda techniques to persuade their audience to accept their point of view and to vote for them. Especially as far as important subjects like nation, crime and immigration are concerned, similar techniques are used from the far right to the moderate left parties. As far as these subjects are concerned, it is far from easy to distinguish racist propaganda of right wing populism from similar techniques of the center-left parties (cf. the criticism of Fairclough 2000 concerning the political discourse of Tony Blair). Blommaert and Verschueren (1998: 141) remark that their critique of the Belgian ‘rhetoric of tolerance’ received favourable reactions only from marginal politic movements on the left. In relation to many other subjects, populist techniques of persuasion have even been used within the whole political spectrum, from the far right to the far left.

Also the question whether or not populists use their arguments sincerely or rather in an ironic or cynical way to manipulate their audience cannot be answered in a straightforward way. One should grant that populists no less than other politicians are (subjectively) sincere. At least, it is not totally evident that they would not believe most of what they say or that they would lie more or more blatantly than politicians from more respectable pluralistic traditions. Furthermore, propaganda strategies, even if clearly detectable within political discourse, need not be applied consciously, because discourse strate-

gies in general are plans of social practices which are not fully consciously used and applied (cf. Wodak & Reisigl 2001: 386).

As far as statistics on politically relevant facts are concerned, we have to deal with the following problem: There are many different statistics on controversial social and economic issues and some of them provide conflicting figures; quite often, one is not in a position to decide easily which of the differing statistics portray the political situation in the most objective way.

What, then, could be a solution to these problems of avoiding a simplistic, biased perspective and of avoiding creating the straw man fallacy? And how can we still critically deal with the lines of argumentation of right-wing populism? Right wing populism has become one of the most successful movements in elections all over Europe during the last few years, and, at least as far as I am concerned, is also one of the potentially dangerous political movements. Therefore, critical analyses are very much needed, but should not contain weaknesses like those mentioned above.

Here are a few tentative answers to these questions. The problems connected with objectivism could be partially avoided if the critical analysis is not so much directed at the content of various ideological traditions, including right-wing populism, but rather *at the way how people argue in favour of their respective positions*. There are standards of argumentation which are accepted across differing ideological positions, at least within democratic systems, like the principle of non-contradiction, the avoidance of overly aggressive personal attacks, the correct application of plausible argument schemes, clarity of formulation etc. (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992). In this way one can partially avoid the problem that a neutral stance from which to judge competing political ideologies does not seem to exist. Hence, in the following I will deal not so much with the world view of Le Pen, Haider, Bossi etc., but with the way they argue in order to persuade others to accept this world view.

Moreover, one's own ideological standpoint should be made explicit (in my case, this is approximately the political standpoint of the Green parties, which, of course, can be challenged and criticized as any other political point of view). In this way, a critical standpoint does not pretend to start from a pretension of being 'objective' while one can, and should, still try to produce a criticism which is not unfair (cf. also the methodological considerations concerning the problem of objectivity within the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis, e.g., in van Dijk 1998; Wodak et al. 1998; Wodak 2003).

Finally, central concepts like 'ideology' or 'propaganda' should be defined in a neutral way which does not presuppose the negative connotations often

connected with these terms. In this way, the objectivist classification of a political point of view or its expression in political discourse as 'mere ideology' or 'mere propaganda' can be avoided. I therefore follow recent approaches in the study of ideology and propaganda which define these concepts in a more or less neutral way:

Definition of 'Ideology':

Ideologies are the foundation of the social beliefs shared by a social group. In other words, a bit like the axioms of a formal system, ideologies consist of those general and abstract social beliefs, shared by a group, that control or organize the more specific knowledge and opinions (attitudes) of a group. (van Dijk 1998:49; cf. similarly Blommaert & Verschueren 1998:25)

Definition of 'Propaganda':

Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist. (Jowett & O'Donnell 1992:4; note that Jowett & O'Donnell do not assume that 'manipulation of cognition' necessarily involves deception and distortion of facts, cf. Jowett & O'Donnell 1992:8ff.)

As far as the problem of creating a straw man and or misrepresenting the standpoint of right-wing populists is concerned, a critical analysis should be based on plentiful authentic material, that is, data from political speeches, party programs, web-sites etc., which should be quoted amply enough to preclude selective or biased presentation. My primary sources quoted below in part one of the references, are of course only a first attempt at providing an empirically sufficient basis and would have to be enlarged considerably for more far-reaching conclusions (cf. Wodak 2003:5).

Moreover, the problem of statistics could be partially solved, if statistical data quoted by right wing populists are confronted with sources they also use themselves, for example, national institutes of statistics (e.g., Le Pen uses data from the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE); cf. Connelly 1998:290). These institutes, at least to a certain degree, could be called 'neutral' ground for the use of statistics in political debates.

Finally, populists should be granted sincerity as much as other, more 'respectable' politicians. Only if their own spoken or written texts clearly reveal omissions of facts, or, alternatively, a highly selective presentation of facts or if they clearly misapply a certain argumentative technique, are we entitled to speak of manipulation or fallacious argumentation.

Starting from these assumptions, I would like to suggest the following definition of racist populist propaganda. Note that the definition does not imply that populists are *always* using false data or are lying all the time or are denigrating immigrants intentionally all the time, an impression one could get from some of the literature on right-wing populism (cf. Souchard et al. 1997 on Le Pen and Ötsch 2000 on Haider for criticism which sometimes comes close to the straw man fallacy; compare Connelly 1999 on Le Pen and Sully 1997; Kienpointner 2002 on Haider for a more balanced criticism):

Definition of 'Racist populist manipulation':

Racist populist manipulation can be defined as the highly selective use of facts, the biased or fallacious use of argument schemes and the hyperbolic or metaphoric exaggeration of facts concerning immigration or immigrants and/or ethnic minorities with the effect of arousing negative emotions (fear, anger etc.) in mass audiences against these groups.

Finally, and most important in the context of the comparative approach of the international conference on 'Manipulation in totalitarian ideologies of the 20th Century' (held in Ascona, Switzerland, September 29 to October 3, 2002), the comparison of the political discourse of several right wing populist leaders will show that there is no unique discourse of right-wing populism. I would like to show that, in spite of the undeniable parallels, clear differences of diction but also of thought can be recognized if we look at the political discourse of Jean-Marie Le Pen, Joerg Haider, Ronald Schill, Umberto Bossi and Pim Fortuyn.

2. Analysis of right-wing populist argumentation

2.1 Pragmatic arguments and illustrative examples

In the following analysis of two argumentative techniques, namely, pragmatic arguments and illustrative examples, the general underlying structure of simple arguments is assumed to consist of an argument for or against a certain controversial claim, where the relevance of the argument is guaranteed by a warrant. This is an abridged version of the well-known Toulmin scheme (Figure 1; cf. Toulmin 1958; Toulmin et al. 1984).

More specific instances of this general scheme include argument schemes based on causal relations. Causal argument schemes, in turn, include the so-called 'pragmatic argument', which evaluates a certain action either by recommending this action or by giving advice against doing it with the help of




Figure 1. General structure of arguments: An abridged version of the Toulmin-scheme

pointing out its positive or negative effects and consequences. At a general level, positive and negative versions of the pragmatic argument can be summarized as shown in Table 1 (on the pragmatic argument in general cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1983:357ff.; Schellens 1985:157; Kienpointner 1992:340; Walton 1996:75ff.; Garssen 1997:21ff.).

Pragmatic arguments, like many other arguments, can be reinforced with the help of illustrative examples (on illustrative examples as a means of argumentation cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1983; Kienpointner 1992:373ff.). In everyday argumentation, these examples can be single (or several) events and anecdotes used to illustrate the plausibility of a certain argument. But illustrative examples can also be taken from statistical data, a strategy which can be frequently found in political discourse. The general structure of arguments involving illustrative examples can be reconstructed in Figure 2.

In the following, I will take a closer look at the use of these two particular argument schemes, namely, the pragmatic argument and the use of statistically-founded illustrative examples in political argumentation. At least sometimes, and even if we try to take into account the methodological caveats mentioned in Section 1, right-wing populists can be accused of arguing with

Table 1. Pragmatic argument schemes: Positive – Negative

Premise	Positive Version	Negative Version
1	If action A leads to the desirable effects B, A should be done.	If action A leads to the desirable effects B, A should not be done.
2	There are no other actions C with even more desirable effects D.	There are no other actions C with even more negative effects D.
3	A has manily positive effects B.	A has mainly negative effects B.
4	<u>A has no or few negative effects E</u> Therefore: A should be done.	<u>A has no or few positive effects E</u> Therefore: A should not be done.




Figure 2. Illustrative examples

the help of these argumentative techniques in a biased and irrationally exaggerated way.

More specifically, as far as the pragmatic argument is concerned, they mention only the negative effects of immigration, leaving out possible positive effects totally or almost totally. The most extreme position in this respect is held by Le Pen (followed closely by Haider), who differ from Schill, Bossi and Fortuyn because they do not acknowledge any potentially positive contributions made by legally working immigrants to the national economy. Moreover, Le Pen has asked for the total repatriation of all immigrants living in France.

In the following passages, Le Pen formulates instances of the pragmatic argument, claiming that immigration is a catastrophe for France (cf. Souchard et al. 1997:61ff.; Connelly 1998:289ff.; Loacker 2001:40ff.) and also implies huge costs for the French economy: To confirm this, Le Pen sometimes also adds illustrative statistical material (cf. examples (1) to (4) below; many further examples could be taken from Le Pen 2002):¹

- (1) Or le phénomène [= l'immigration, M.K.] par son ampleur et par son développement menace l'équilibre et la paix du monde, mais il menace surtout et d'abord l'intérêt national de notre peuple, et même sa survie.
Now the phenomenon, by its very size and development, is threatening the balance and the peace of the world, but it is especially and above all threatening the national interest of our people, and even its very existence.
- (2) L'immigration du peuplement... , l'attribution d'avantages sociaux attractifs lui ont donné un caractère torrentiel, demain cataclysmique.

The immigration of foreign people... , the attractive social advantages offered have turned immigration into a flood, tomorrow (maybe even) into a cataclysm.

- (3) Il nous menace de submersion et à terme de soumission, voire de disparition. Mais déjà, il génère dans la société des phénomènes pathologiques graves: insécurité, chômage, fiscalisme.

It threatens us with submersion and later on with submission, even extinction. But it is already now generating serious pathological phenomena within our society: insecurity, strikes, heavy taxation.

- (4) D'un point de vue économique, les prestations sociales que les ressortissants immigrés reçoivent automatiquement en arrivant en France constituent autant de pompes aspirantes des populations du Tiers Monde. Tout cela a un coût que supporte l'économie française. Maurice Allais, prix Nobel d'économie, estime que chaque ressortissant immigré coûte en infrastructures collectives quatre années de salaire et vingt années s'il vient avec femme et enfants. La différence entre ce qu'ils perçoivent et ce qu'ils paient en impôts et cotisations s'élève à près de 300 milliards de francs.

From an economic perspective, every type of income support incoming immigrants are automatically entitled to when they arrive in France serves like a suction pump for the populations of the Third World. All this produces costs which the French economy has to provide. Maurice Allais, Nobel prize (winner) in economics, estimates that, concerning collective infrastructures, each new immigrant costs the equivalent of four years of income, and twenty years if he comes with wife and children. The difference between what they receive and what they pay in taxes and contributions amounts to almost 300 billion French francs.

A more balanced and plausible use of the pragmatic argument scheme would also have to mention potentially positive effects of immigration. Moreover, Le Pen does not provide the precise source of his illustrative statistical examples, which are based on the authority of the French economist and Nobel prize winner Maurice Allais. This makes it questionable whether Allais would actually support Le Pen's view in the way formulated in example (4). Furthermore, Le Pen's overly pessimistic view is not supported by recent research on the costs and benefits of immigration (cf. Sinn & Werding 2001: 43ff.).² On the one hand, Sinn/Werding confirm that the expected increase in immigration to Germany after the planned EU Eastern enlargement would initially lead to more

costs than benefits, on the other hand, they estimate that in future the positive economic effects will prevail and, for that reason, recommend EU enlargement.

Haider develops a similar and almost exclusively negative picture of the effects of immigration and stresses the negative social, political and economic effects of immigration in Austria:

- (5) Das Experiment der multikulturellen Gesellschaft hat noch nirgends funktioniert. Immense soziale Probleme, Ghetto- und Slumbildung, hohe Kriminalitätsraten und soziale Unruhen waren überall die Folge, wo man es versuchte.

The experiment of the multicultural society has so far not been successful anywhere. Enormous social problems, the development of ghettos and slums, high crime rates and social unrest have been the consequences wherever it has been tried.

- (6) So wurden etwa von 1989 bis 1992 in der Ostregion Österreichs 10,400 neue Arbeitsplätze geschaffen. Davon sind aber alle, also 100 Prozent, mit billigen ausländischen Arbeitskräften besetzt worden. Zugleich hat sich die Beschäftigung der Österreicher um 1,300 Arbeitsplätze verringert.

For example, from 1989 to 1992 10,400 new jobs were created in the eastern part of Austria. But all of them, that is, a 100 percent, have been filled with cheap foreign labour. At the same time, the employment of Austrians has been reduced by 1,300 workplaces.

- (7) In unserem Land leben Hunderttausende Illegale. Vorzeitige Einbürgerungen haben Zuwanderer gegenüber den Österreichern – etwa bei Wohnungen – begünstigt. Die vorschnelle Vergabe von zusätzlichen 60,000 Arbeitsbewilligungen an bosnische Kriegsflüchtlinge führt zur Verschärfung der Arbeitslosigkeit in Österreich.

In our country, there are hundreds of thousands of illegal (immigrants). Premature naturalizations have favoured immigrants in comparison to Austrians, for example, in housing. The premature assignment of an additional 60,000 work permits to Bosnian refugees is leading to an increase in unemployment in Austria.

As in the case of Le Pen, the following criticism can be applied: a more balanced and plausible use of the pragmatic argument scheme would also have to mention potentially positive effects and try to create a balance between the positive and negative effects. Different from Le Pen and Haider, Bossi, Schill and Fortuyn at least acknowledge some positive effects of legal immigration (and even Haider does not ask for the repatriation of legal immigrants). For exam-

ple, Bossi states that a restricted number of immigrants is needed to replace the native Italian workers who are no longer willing to do certain jobs:

- (8) L'arrivo di un certo numero di immigrati è considerato, negli ambienti industriali, come l'unica possibilità di reperire manodopera per le mansioni più umili, quelle che gli italiani non vogliono più svolgere. Ma il ragionamento può essere valido solo per numeri limitati, per un'immigrazione rigorosamente regolamentata. Oggi, invece, l'Italia è in preda al caos, il numero di nuovi ospiti è assolutamente fuori da ogni controllo.

The arrival of a certain number of immigrants is considered, within industrial contexts, as the only possibility of finding a work force for the most menial jobs, which the Italians do not want to do any more. But this argument can only apply for limited numbers; for immigration which is controlled rigorously. Today, however, Italy is a victim of chaos, the number of new guest workers is totally out of control.

Schill even calls the majority of the legal immigrants in Germany an enrichment (*Bereicherung*) for German society:

- (9) Die Partei Rechtsstaatliche Offensive setzt sich mit Nachdruck für die Interessen der ausländischen Mitbürger ein, die legal nach Deutschland eingereist sind und hier ein Leben ohne Straftaten führen. Es handelt sich hierbei selbstverständlich um die Mehrheit der hier lebenden ausländischen Mitbürger, die alle als Bereicherung für unsere Gesellschaft empfunden werden. Die erste und zweite Gastarbeitergeneration war sogar rechtstreuer als die deutsche Bevölkerung.

The "Partei Rechtsstaatliche Offensive" ("The Party Promoting the Rule-of-Law") vigorously supports the interests of those foreign fellow citizens who immigrated legally into Germany and are leading law-abiding lives here. Of course these are the majority of the foreign fellow citizens living here, who are all considered an enrichment for our society. The first and second generations of immigrant workers were even more law-abiding than the German population.

Fortuyn acknowledges that at least a minority of the asylum-seekers can make a positive contribution to the economy of The Netherlands:

- (10) In de nieuwe aanwas [of asylum-seekers] zitten zeker mensen die een bijdrage gaan leveren aan economie en samenleving, onmiddellijk dan wel op enige termijn. Maar veruit de meesten slagen daar niet in en doen er generaties over om hier hun draai te vinden en iets bij te dragen aan het geheel.

Among the recent increase [of asylum-seekers] there are surely people who can contribute to the economy and to social life, if not immediately, then after a while. But the vast majority does not succeed in this and it needs several generations to get the hang of it and to contribute something to the community.

The populists use statistical examples to portray a menacing picture of the negative effects of immigration, which exaggerates the 'real' problems (for the data quoted below, see the websites of the national institutes of statistics of France (INSEE), Austria (Statistik Austria), Italy (ISTAT), Germany (Bundesamt für Statistik) and The Netherlands (CBS), given in the references section).

Nevertheless, if we look at these statistics closely, we have to grant right-wing populists that they are pointing out serious social and political problems. For example, the national statistics institutes all agree that the percentage of convicted immigrants and of immigrants detained in prisons has risen considerably in the past few decades. This can be illustrated with the following data: France: 1971: immigrants in French prisons: 14.4%; 1993: immigrants in French prisons: 31.2%; Italy: 2000: percentage of immigrants among convicted persons: 19%; percentage of adult immigrants among adult prison inmates: 35%; percentage of immigrants among young prison inmates: 59%; Germany: percentage of immigrants among convicted persons: 1987: 27.9%; 1992: 25.2%; 1997: 29.3%; 1998: 30.3%; Austria: percentage of immigrants among convicted persons: 1975: 10.9%; 1985: 8.8%; 1995: 20.7%; 2000: 23.2%.

But the national statistics institutes also show that these figures have to be interpreted carefully, for example, by taking into account the fact that there are certain crimes only immigrants can commit (e.g., faking immigration documents). Moreover, the percentage of male persons is higher in the immigrant population than in the native population (and male persons commit many more crimes than female persons). Furthermore, immigrants usually belong to the lower class and often lack higher education (and crimes are committed more frequently by people who lack higher education and come from the lower classes). As far as unemployment is concerned, in Germany in the year 1999 immigrants were 8.9% of the total population, but 19.2% of the unemployed population; similarly, in France immigrants were 7.4% of the total population, but 15% of the unemployed population. In Austria, in the year 2000 the percentage of unemployed persons among the total population was 5.8%, but 8% among the immigrants. In the Netherlands, in the year 2000 3% of the native population was unemployed, 5% of the non-native western population, but 11% of the non-native-non-western population. All these factors contribute to

a higher crime rate, but would also do so (or actually do so) in the native population, if they were/are present there (cf. Connelly 1998: 323 on the respective INSEE explications concerning France; similar explications are to be found on the website of the German Bundesamt für Statistik).

These mitigating facts are usually neglected by right-wing populists, for example by Schill, who makes blunt statements such as the following one:

- (11) Maßnahmen sind dringend erforderlich. 39.4% aller Straftäter in Hamburg sind Ausländer. Dabei ist auffällig: Der Anteil der Asylbewerber unter der ausländischen Bevölkerung betrug nur 2.3%, ihr Anteil an den von Ausländern begangenen Straftaten aber 30.5% – also das 15fache im Vergleich zum Ausländeranteil.

Urgent measures have to be taken. 39.4% of all criminals in Hamburg are foreigners. The following is conspicuous: the proportion of asylum seekers among the foreign population is only 2.3%, the proportion of criminal offences committed by foreigners, however, is 30.5% – that is, 15 times more compared to the proportion of foreigners (sic!).

Moreover, statistics are sometimes intentionally used in a selective and even inconsistent way. For example, Le Pen illustrates the alleged dangerous increase of immigration by giving the impressive number of eight million immigrants in France (which would be 13–14 % of the total French population of approximately 58 millions, cf. INSEE: 1999: Total population 58.623000; immigrants: 4.31000 = 7.4%). However, only a little later in the same speech (cf. Le Pen 2002), he states that the immigrants are “officially” (*officiellement*) 7% of the population, but make up 31% of the inmates in French prisons.

But obviously, Le Pen cannot have it both ways. On the one hand, he claims that there are twice as many immigrants in France than appear in official statistics like those given by INSEE (1999: 7.4%), on the other hand, he uses the official numbers of the INSEE to highlight the relatively high proportion of immigrants among the prison inmates. This, if anything, is a manipulative use of illustrative statistical examples, used by Le Pen to support his pragmatic arguments about the bad effects of immigration:

- (12) On peut estimer que la population d’origine étrangère récente est en l’an 2000 de l’ordre de 8 millions, dont 4 millions d’Africains et de Turcs, presque tous musulmans, pour une population française globale de 58,5 millions. L’assimilation n’est dès lors plus possible, car c’est la culture d’accueil qui risque d’être assimilée. . . . Au travers de ces rapports démographiques, il est bien évident que le déferlement incontrôlé de vagues mondiales d’immigrations hypothèque gravement l’avenir de France.

We can estimate that foreigners who have come to France recently amount to 8 million in the year 2000, 4 million of which are Africans and Turks, almost all of them Moslems, whereas the overall French population is 58,5 million. Therefore, assimilation is no longer possible, for it is the host culture which risks being assimilated. ... Going through these demographic reports, we can see that the uncontrolled current of global floods of immigrants seriously jeopardizes the future of France.

- (13) Les étrangers, qui ne représentent officiellement que 7% de la population, représentent 31% de la population des prisons.
Foreigners, who officially do not represent more than 7% of the population, represent 31% of the prison population.

But in this context also Bossi has to be mentioned because of his menacing picture of 'absolutely uncontrolled' immigration into Italy (*Oggi, invece, l'Italia è in preda al caos, il numero di nuovi ospiti è assolutamente fuori da ogni controllo / Today, however, Italy is prey to chaos, the number of new guests is absolutely out of any control*). Bossi hides the fact that the number of legal immigrants in Italy is much smaller than in the other compared nations (cf. the Appendix, more specifically, the following figures on the percentage of immigrants in the total population: Italy 2001: 2.5%; France 1999: 7.4%; Austria 2001: 9.4%; Germany 2000: 8.8%; The Netherlands 2000: 18%). Bossi could react with the counter argument that there are many more illegal immigrants in Italy than just 2.5% (cf. his remark: *Ospitiamo quasi un milione di immigrati "regolari", più altrettanti clandestini / We host about one million 'regular' immigrants, plus another million clandestine immigrants*). But the same statement could be made about potentially high numbers of illegal immigrants in France, Austria etc. which would result in approximately the same quantitative proportions between the five states.

2.2 Hyperbolic and metaphorical statements on immigrants

In addition to their highly problematic use of pragmatic arguments and illustrative examples, populists often use emotionally exciting language, for example, hyperbolic exaggerations or metaphors to arouse the emotions of their audience and to raise prejudices against immigrants, especially those from Africa, or other minorities such as Jews (cf. Walton 1999: 221ff. on the 'mob appeal' variant of the '*argumentum ad populum*').

Several of the passages quoted below to illustrate these techniques deserve to be criticized as highly problematic or even fallacious arguments, but there

are also clear differences between the respective populist leaders. Different from both Le Pen and Haider, other right-wing populists such as Bossi, Schill and Fortuyn are careful not to use language which is ambivalent or ambiguous with respect to the Nazi regime or anti-Semitism. Fortuyn even calls Haider's remarks on the Nazi past of Austria (*het bruine verleden van Oostenrijk / the brown past of Austria*) 'outrageous' (*stuitend*; cf. Fortuyn 2001: 131).

Of course, in line with my methodological remarks I have to admit that the 'real' meaning of ambiguous utterances is hard to pin down and I could be accused of committing the straw man fallacy if I criticize Le Pen and Haider because of their alleged anti-Semitism, relying on the interpretation of racist implications suggested by their remarks. But there are several clear examples (cf. below). Furthermore, leading politicians with a great deal of experience in public speaking such as Le Pen and Haider can justifiably be made responsible not only for what they state explicitly, but also for the implications and connotations of what they say (cf. Wassermann 1996: 122ff.; Souchard et al. 1997: 25ff.; Connelly 1998: 280; Blommaert & Verschueren 1998: 142f.; Loacker 2001: 46ff., 86ff.; Wodak & Reisigl 2002: 150; Wodak 2003: 15).

Here are some clear examples, which contain infamous derogatory remarks and jokes made by Le Pen and Haider concerning Jews and/or immigrants or the Nazi period. In (14), Le Pen ridicules the name of Kofi Yamgnane, at that time the French minister of state for immigration; in (15), Le Pen alludes to an international anti-nationalist conspiracy of the Jews:

- (14) Ce sont des Français du type de Yaka Miam-Miam, qui est devenu le secrétaire d'État à l'Intégration.

(June 1991, quoted after Souchard et al. 1998: 27)

These are the French of the type of a Yaka Miam-Miam, who has become the Secretary of State for Integration.

- (15) Les grandes internationales comme l'Internationale juive jouent un rôle non négligeable dans la création de cet esprit antinational.

(11.8.1989, quoted after Souchard et al. 1998: 71)

Big international organizations like the Jewish International play a role in the creation of this anti-national spirit which cannot be neglected.

Le Pen calls the gas chambers "a detail of the history of the Second World War":

- (16) Je ne dis pas que les chambres à gaz n'ont pas existé. ... Mais je crois que c'est un point de détail de l'histoire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

(13.9.1987, quoted after Souchard et al. 1998: 31)

I do not say that the gas chambers did not exist. ... But I believe that they are a detail of the history of the Second World War.

Haider praises the ‘good’ employment policy (“*ordentliche Beschäftigungspolitik*”) of the Nazi regime, in reply to a critical remark by a socialist member of Carinthia’s provincial parliament, G. Hausenblas, who claimed that Haider’s suggestions for more severe restrictions for employed people remind him of employment policies of the Third Reich:

- (17) Na, das hat’s im Dritten Reich nicht gegeben, weil im Dritten Reich haben sie ordentliche Beschäftigungspolitik gemacht was nicht einmal Ihre Regierung in Wien zusammenbringt. Das muß man auch einmal sagen. (13.6.1991; quoted after Czernin 2000:35)
Well, this was not possible within the Third Reich, because within the Third Reich they created an efficient employment policy, something which not even your government in Vienna [= a federal government led by the Social Democrats] succeeds in realizing.

In a recent public speech, Jörg Haider asked ironically:

- (18) *Ich verstehe nicht, wie einer, der Ariel heißt, so viel Dreck am Stecken haben kann!* (28.2. 2001, quoted according to the Austrian daily newspaper DER STANDARD, 1.2. 2002; cf. Ehlich 2002; Pelinka 2002; Wodak/Reisigl 2002)
I don’t understand how somebody called ‘Ariel’ [= Ariel Muzicant, President of the Jewish Religious Community in Austria, at the same time the well-known brand name of a detergent called “Ariel”] can have ‘so much dirt on his stick’ (that is, ‘be so corrupt’).

Fortuyn normally uses much more moderate formulations when he talks about minority groups. But he also produces the following devastating remark on ‘the’ Islam, a religious tradition which according to Fortuyn uses “terror and manslaughter” as its normal methods for converting people with differing world views. This is as provocative as Le Pen’s and Haider’s racist and ethnocentric statements:

- (19) Van de niet-geseculariseerde wereldstromingen hebben we tot op de dag van vandaag de grootste last, en vooral van de islam. *Terreur en doodslag zijn daar de normale methoden* om andersdenkenden tot inkeer te brengen.

Up to now, we have been most bothered by non-secular global traditions, first of all by Islam. In this tradition, terror and manslaughter are the normal methods to convert dissidents.

Recent research on metaphors has made it crystal clear that they have an important cognitive impact on our perception of the world (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987) and, more specifically, on our perception of social groups, political parties and questions of morality (cf. Lakoff 1996; Kienpointner 1999). Therefore, metaphors are not just purely aesthetic ornaments of political speeches or other propaganda texts. Consequently, a responsible use of metaphors in political discourse can be expected from experienced politicians. However, politicians in general, and especially right-wing populists, can often be accused of using metaphors to arouse dangerous emotions such as fear and hate in the population. For example, Le Pen's and Bossi's use of 'invasion' as a metaphor for the immigration process (*les grandes invasions, un'invasione di pretendenti stranieri*), is clearly misplaced and truly manipulative. It is true that the immigration process causes serious social problems in various European countries, but this does not mean that it could be compared with an invasion of armed soldiers. Metaphorically construing immigrants as soldiers invading a country portrays them as enemies who deserve to be hated and have to be stopped by any means.

The 'flood'-metaphor, which portrays immigration as a potentially dangerous natural phenomenon, can also be frequently found in the political discourse of Le Pen, but is also used by Schill and Fortuyn (cf. *un caractère torrentiel, demain cataclysmique, submersion, les flux migratoires, eine europaweite Begrenzung von Zuwanderungsströmen, de onverminderd hoge toestroom van asielzoekers*). The use of this metaphor can be criticized at least in its more hyperbolic versions. If exaggerated, the 'flood'-metaphor leads to a concept of immigration as a devastating natural process, that is, an enormous flood, a catastrophic process which has to be stopped immediately and totally. This metaphor is suitable for creating fear among the majority of the population. See the following examples, taken from the texts of Le Pen and Fortuyn:

- (20) (= ex. 2 above) Le Pen: L'immigration du peuplement. . . , l'attribution d'avantages sociaux attractifs lui ont donné *un caractère torrentiel, demain cataclysmique*.
The immigration of foreign people . . . , the attractive social advantages offered have turned immigration into a flood, tomorrow (maybe even) into a cataclysm.

- (21) Fortuyn: Als het met Afrika zo slecht blijft gaan als nu, *stroomt* dat continent als vanzelf *leeg* richting Europese Unie.
If things continue to go on as badly with Africa as they are now, this continent will automatically run out of people, all of whom will come to the European Union.

In this respect, one of Bossi's metaphorical remarks, which talks about "damming, surely not blocking" (*arginare, non certo di bloccare*) mass immigration, is less radical:

- (22) La Cee auspica da tempo una regolamentazione coordinata nei Paesi occidentale. Si tratta di *arginare, non certo di bloccare*, le migrazioni di massa.
The EU has already wished for some time a coordinated regulation within the western nations. We are talking about controlling, not blocking mass immigration.

On the other hand, Bossi is surely metaphorically overstating the social problems connected with immigration and thus creating fear (and potential hate) against immigrants when he claims that immigration is like an 'activated social bomb' (*una bomba sociale innescata*), and that the Arab immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East have no intention whatsoever to integrate:

- (23) Io sono convinto che gli extraeuropei che provengono da certe aree del mondo – in particolare arabi mediorientali e maghrebini – non abbiano alcuna intenzione di integrarsi e di accettare i nostri costumi. Sono quindi *una bomba sociale innescata*, creano tensioni e ostilità. Pretendono mille diritti ma non mostrano alcuna tolleranza, non accettano il nostro modo di vivere.
I am convinced that non-Europeans coming from certain areas of the world – especially Arabs from the Middle East and Maghreb – do not intend to integrate themselves and to accept our customs. They are, therefore, an activated social bomb, they create tension and hostility. They demand a thousand rights but do not show any tolerance, they do not accept our way of life.

3. Conclusion

An overall comparison of the five populist leaders which I have chosen for analysis can be roughly ordered as to their degree of political radicalism and their use of inflammatory language. Based on nine criteria, this scale of radicalism

Table 2. Overall comparison of the political discourse of five European right-wing populists concerning immigrants, immigration, history and nation

STANDPOINTS	Le Pen	Haider	Schill	Bossi	Fortuyn
Call for capital punishment	+	-	-	-	-
Call for repatriation of legal immigrants	+	-	-	-	-
Immigration has only negative effects	+	?	-	-	-
Ambiguous statements about the Nazi era	+	+	-	-	-
Potentially anti-Semitic statements	+	+	-	-	-
Positive view of nation-state	+	+	+	-	+
Strict 'Law and Order' thinking	+	+	++	+	-
Call for strong restrictions on immigration	+	+	+	+	+
Use of menacing metaphors and hyperbolic exaggerations	+	+	+	+	+

runs from Le Pen over Haider, Schill and Bossi to Fortuyn, but, of course, this does not mean that a very precise and clear-cut classification is possible (as the use of 'plus' and 'minus' in Table 2 could suggest).

These differences clearly have to do with their personal character, their age, and their national and linguistic background (cf. Wassermann 1996; Sully 1997; Connelly 1998; Scharsach 2000; Zöchling 2000; Loacker 2001; Buyse 2002; Kienpointner 2002; Wodak & Pelinka 2002; Wolf 2002). Especially the call for the re-establishment of capital punishment (abolished in France 1981) and the repatriation of legal immigrants mark Le Pen as the most radical right-wing populist leader (cf. Wassermann 1996:72ff.; Connelly 1998:297, 325). Haider and Schill, for example, in this respect only insist on the non-reduction of imprisonment for life, but do not argue for the reintroduction of the death penalty. Haider comes close to Le Pen in seeing (almost) no positive effects in immigration. However, my texts do not allow a clear decision in this respect, hence the question mark (?). Bossi, as a federalist, clearly differs from all other right-wing populists in that he is strictly against rather than for a strong position of the centralist government in the nation-state.

Schill seems to be even more convinced (cf. the double plus: '++') than the other right-wing populists that a more rigid application of the law could solve all problems connected with immigration, but this is a difference of degree. All five right-wing populists agree to impose strict regulations on immigration and all of them use figurative language – but in differing degrees – to arouse negative emotions in the majority of the population, such as anger, hate and fear concerning immigrants. All in all, Fortuyn has a less rigid and more liberal standpoint than the other populists, a fact which can partially be explained

with the pluralistic and democratic tradition typical for the Netherlands, where social pressure makes it difficult to act and speak in the same way as Le Pen or Haider in their respective countries (cf. Buyse 2002: 141ff.).

To sum up, I would like to conclude that the widespread criticism against right-wing populists and their manipulative techniques of argumentation and stylistic strategies is justified especially in the case of Le Pen and Haider. This holds true for many of their statements, even if we are careful to take into account the methodological caveats discussed in Section 1 of this paper. However, the other three right-wing populists clearly show different degrees of the use of racist manipulative propaganda techniques. Bossi and Schill seem to oscillate between more rigid – and sometimes also dubious and manipulative – formulations, and more moderate statements. Especially Fortuyn's remarks on immigration do not differ much from the political discourse of traditional conservative parties. Of course, these preliminary conclusions will have to be tested and eventually revised on the basis of a much richer and more diversified corpus of empirical data.

Notes

1. All translations are mine.
2. For information about this research I would like to thank Wilhelm Kohler, University of Linz, Austria.

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Intertextuality, mental spaces and the fall of a hero

Pinochet as a developing topic

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1. Introduction

In the pages that follow I would like to illustrate how it is possible to use approaches originally developed for textual analysis as tools for the unravelling of intertextual connections. More concretely, my purpose here will be to apply Fauconnier's theory of *mental spaces* and Paul Werth's proposal of *text world theory* to the analysis of how the image of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet is construed in texts available in the press or in the Internet and show how this image is the product of a construction that takes place within a certain time period, within certain spaces, and under certain circumstances.

2. Tools. Mental spaces and text worlds

2.1 Mental spaces

The first step in our methodological journey is Fauconnier's (1994, 1997) approach to discourse construction, based on *mental spaces*. For this author, "a language expression E does not have a meaning in itself; rather, it has a meaning potential, and it is only within a complete discourse and in context that meaning will actually be produced" (Fauconnier 1997:37). Discourse is developed as a succession of cognitive configurations, and each gives rise to the next, pressed by context and grammar. These configurations undergo prag-




Figure 1. Space connections

matic elaboration, and the information they contain is relativised with respect to different domains or *spaces*, which are connected in a subordination relation. As a result, the spaces set up by a discourse are organized into a partially ordered lattice, similar to the branching paths that we obtain when we consider the different possibilities on the time-line. However, this space lattice does not necessarily follow a temporal path. At any given time, one of the spaces is the *base* for the system, and another space is *in focus*. Any of these two can be the reference space for constructing a new space (Fauconnier 1997: 38). If we take this example:

- (1) If I were a rich man I would buy a yacht.

There exists a base space in which I exist and I am not a rich man. Another space is then built in which I am a rich man. The first space is the base space (a), and the second space is in focus (a'). Lastly, a third space is created that is related temporally to the second one (in its future), in which I buy a yacht (a''). This sentence can be represented as in Figure 1.

In the example just mentioned, we used 'If' in order to create a new space. This is a special grammatical device used for cognitive construction, an instance of a *space builder*. *Space builders* (Fauconnier 1997: 40–41) are grammatical expressions that open a new space or shift focus to another space; they comprise prepositional phrases (*in London, in 1989*), adverbials (*certainly, hopefully*), conjunctions (*if, when, while, since*), subject-verb constructions (*I think... Mary hopes...*), etc. Other devices used for cognitive construction are *names* (*Peter, Plato, Bill Clinton*), *descriptions* (*the postman, the man who was sitting nearby, a black cat*), *presuppositional constructions* (definite descriptions, aspectuals, clefts, pseudo-clefts, etc.) that assign cognitive structure in the form of a presupposition, *trans-spatial operators* (copulative verbs such as *be, become, remain may work as connectors between spaces*), and *identification of elements* (carried out by means of the *Access Principle*, which states that the

expression designating an entity can be used for accessing a counterpart of that same entity in another space).¹ Another grammatical device for cognitive construction which Fauconnier mentions is the use of *tenses* and *moods*, which “play an important role in determining what kind of space is in focus, its connection to the base space, its accessibility, and the location of counterparts used for identification” (Fauconnier 1997:41).

Once new spaces are created and linked, discourse starts to unfold and build up meaning. The construction and linkage of mental spaces is based on the following assumptions (Fauconnier 1997: Chapters 2 and 3, Summary on pp. 111–112):

- There exists some background knowledge that is available to both speaker and hearer in any communicative exchange. This background knowledge may have the form of frames, idealized cognitive models, cultural models, folk theories, etc.
- There is information available that allows us to frame locally and pragmatically the content of the linguistic message. This information has to do with the genre of the exchange, as well as with the setting (where and when it takes place) and the participants of the exchange (who talks and to whom).
- Discourse construction starts from an ‘origin’ or ‘current discourse’ (Langacker 1991:97), in the form of a *base space*, from which different spaces related to each other are created.
- The new spaces that are created are used to set up information and cognitive structure pertaining to many different kinds of things: time periods (Dinsmore 1991; Cutrer 1994; Lansing 1992), beliefs, points of view (Cutrer 1994; Sanders & Redeker 1996), geographical locations (van Hoek 1996), cultural constructions (Rubba 1996), as well as quantifications and hypothetical or counterfactual situations.
- The currently activated space is said to be ‘in focus’. Only one space is allowed to be in focus at a given time. Focus is switched by means of several grammatical and pragmatic devices.
- There are two main ways of connecting spaces: (1) by means of an ordering relation, in which each space is introduced relative to another, and (2) by means of connectors linking elements across spaces. When two spaces are connected by means of the procedure mentioned in (1), the space that is in focus introduces a new space, the old space then becomes a ‘father’ space and the new one a ‘child’ space. On the other hand, the usage of connectors in (2) should be made in accordance with the Access or Identification Principle (see below).

- Structure is transferred across spaces in many ways, such as *optimisation*, *access*, *projection* of frames, *matching conditions* for certain spaces, or *upward floating* of presuppositions (Fauconnier 1997: 112).

This approach can be applied to any stretch of language. It is very well suited for the study of sentence subordination (e.g., conditionals, concessives, adversatives, etc.). However, it can also be used for the analysis of broader textual relations. Our proposal here is to go a step further and apply it to the analysis of intertextual relations, in order to see how different assumptions about the status of facts are taken in different texts. This will be approached in Section 3 concerning texts for or against Augusto Pinochet.

2.2 Text world theory

The other approach is text world theory, which is also based on the notion of conceptual space. Other theories that draw upon similar notions are Johnson-Laird's (1983) mental models or the above-mentioned Fauconnier's (1985, 1994, 1997) mental spaces.² In these models, a mental or conceptual space is "a functional conceptual gestalt, defined by a set of deictic parameters" (Werth 1997: 252).

According to text world theory (Werth 1995), there are several spaces that can be identified in any discourse. First of all, there is an interaction space, or *discourse world*, in which the *participants* are the producer and the recipient of the discourse itself. On the next level there is what Werth calls the *text world*. This is the world that is depicted in the text, and it is based on viewpoint and referentiality as its deictic framework, time and place being therefore important elements. The equivalents of the participants at discourse world level are the *characters* at text world level. Characters are sentient thinking entities, like the participants at discourse world level, and sometimes they are also their counterparts in the text world. *Objects* are the other kind of entities in this world. All the elements mentioned are *world-building* elements, and they are supplemented with *frame-knowledge*, which is additional information details about them (such as concrete properties of the characters and objects, as well as their exact location in time and space).

Apart from world building there is also another process at text world level, which is *function advancing*. This process moves the world on towards new states in which the initial world-building elements are revised constantly by means of an *incrementation* of the deictic parameters (time, place and entities




Figure 2. Levels in text world theory (adapted from Werth 1997:258)

involved). The movement is carried out in accordance with the purposes that motivate the function of the text (narration, description, instruction, etc.).

Werth's model has a third level, that of the *sub-world*. Sub-worlds are created by thoughts, intentions, utterances, etc. of characters and are characterized by world building structure and function advancing structure, as was the case in the matrix text world. All this is summarized in Figure 2.

An important consideration in text world theory is which patterns of accessibility across world boundaries are possible. Characters in the text world (as well as some characters in their sub-worlds) are accessible to participants, but participants in the discourse world are not accessible by any character in

the text world or any of the sub-worlds. Characters in the sub-world may or may not be accessible by other characters.

This approach can also be applied to intertextual relations and we will use it for the analysis of how Pinochet's story develops in the collective mind.

3. Pinochet's story

Augusto Pinochet came into power after the *coup d'état* that took place in Chile on September 11, 1973. That day, the presidential building was attacked and the president who had been democratically elected, Salvador Allende, was killed. Pinochet ruled the country as a dictator until 1990, the year in which democracy returned to Chile. He remained untouched as a senator for life in the following years. However, this situation changed in 1998, when he was arrested in Britain, as the result of a request issued by the Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon to activate an extradition procedure for crimes against humanity. Needless to say, the supporters of Pinochet, as well as the dictator's official propaganda, had given support to him in many texts available during the seventeen-year period of his regime and beyond. There had also been texts issued by opposition members and other persons critical of Pinochet's ruling, normally outside Chile. The last developments also generated many other texts. All of them are part of a large intertextual discourse that had been evolving since 1973. Pinochet's arrest in Britain in 1998 was a turning point.

3.1 The creation of an intertextual subworld

If we use Werth's framework, we may raise the question of what kind of text world we are dealing with here. There is a global discourse situation that results from the intersection of the individual discourse situations created by all texts dealing with Pinochet's story. It seems that the model put forward by Hawkins (1997, 1998) under the name of a 'Warrior Iconography' can help us in our analysis. In this kind of iconography, it is possible to pinpoint certain essential roles in the scripts or 'stories' underlying communication sequences (whether one text, several texts, or a whole sequence of news in the media during a long time span). These main roles are the roles of 'victim', 'villain', and 'hero', which are assigned by careful use of linguistic, textual and conceptual resources. The story of Pinochet is the story of many dictators. The character is constructed in domestic texts as a hero. However, at a given point, some texts³ reflecting the views of those opposed to him, who normally are not within his




Figure 3. Texts synchronically considered




Figure 4. Texts diachronically considered

close environment, refer to Pinochet as the villain. This in turn produces a new role, in domestic texts and in texts written by his followers, for Pinochet as a victim. This sequence has a characteristic distribution both synchronically and diachronically. In Figure 3 we can see how different texts written within a fixed period of time are grouped into different discourse worlds, according to the different roles played by Pinochet within Hawkins' 'warrior iconography' (Pinochet as a hero, Pinochet as a villain, Pinochet as a victim). In Figure 4 we

represent how these groupings also have a diachronic development in which there is a natural sequence for the creation of the three types of story according to these roles (first Pinochet is a hero, then a villain, and later a victim).

A good starting point for the sequence is the text that follows below (which I also analyse in Inchaurrealde 2000, 2003). It has been available on the Internet, with the title quoted here (*The True History of 11 Sept. 1973*). However, this text is a declaration that followed the coup, and its function in the intertextual story of Pinochet is the development of his image as that of a hero [English text as shown in the URL mentioned below]:

The True History of 11 Sept. 1973

Abuse and a gradual but sustained loss of moral principles has been present in the political institutions. This had severely jeopardized the practice of democracy during the last fifty years.

The culmination of this decay was the election of a communist minority into power in 1970.

Violence, anarchy, demagogy, lies and scandals of every sort were the predominant values of the communist morality tutored from Moscow though the hard hand of Salvador Allende. He emphatically declared after his elections: "I am not the president of all Chileans".

Oddly, on that occasion, he did not lie...

Communists were determined to establish a proletariat dictatorship following the Cuban example to develop a soviet stronghold in Chile.

The Community, gathering an immense majority, organized itself giving a quota of personal sacrifice, affronting even death, to resist the communist invasion which menaced to destroy the fundamental structures of the Chilean society.

The heroic resistance of our women, youth and men expressed through popular clamour, moved the only moral reserve of the country – its armed forces – to put an end to chaos and remove the cancer that was destroying our nation.

Yesterday, under the leadership of these austere men, who have no compromise but with Chile, the country has initiated its reconstruction and is returning to normality through reconciliation, peace and national unity.

(In: <http://www.aclaris.cl/~fapilan/pinochet/ingles.html>, March 2000)

This text supports the military actions that took place and, what is more important, justifies them. The 'transmitter' of the text, that is, the encoder, is *marked*⁴ through the text. There are signals that unambiguously show that he supports

abuse	vs.	normality
loss of moral principles (= communist morality)		reconciliation
violence		peace
anarchy		natural unity
demagoguery		
lies		
scandals (= chaos)		
i.e., <i>chaos and anarchy</i>		i.e., <i>normality and peace</i>
communist minority	vs.	the community gathered an immense majority
i.e., <i>the enemy as a minority, without legitimacy</i>		i.e., <i>we as a majority</i>
communist invasion	vs.	Chilean society
		our nation
		the community organized itself
		no compromise but with Chile
i.e., <i>an external invasion</i>		i.e., <i>the defense from inside</i>

Figure 5. Examples of conceptual oppositions

or is in favour of what the military have done, and these signals are linguistic, especially concerning the use of vocabulary. This text is structured around a problem-solving structure. The first half shows the problem (the practice of democracy had been “jeopardized”) and the second half shows what appears to be a solution (“put an end to chaos and remove the cancer”). There are several conceptual oppositions that label what they had before as ‘bad’, and what has come afterwards as ‘good’. For instance, see the examples of conceptual oppositions (Figure 5).

The text is full of references to a concrete situation which the reader may know well, and it also has an extensive use of a lexical item (‘communist’) that shows a strong connotative ideological load, especially when we see the values and situations that are constructed around the term. It is interesting to mention here how the name of the main character in the story, Pinochet, does not appear in the text at all. In spite of that, his role in what happened in September, 1973, is construed as that of a hero, since he was the main leader, as later on has been stated by his followers, of this ‘popular clamour’ and ‘heroic resistance’.

Hawkins’ *Warrior Iconography* begins with an initial arrangement of roles in which the Chilean people are the victim, Pinochet is the hero (more concretely, in this text the hero is ‘the people’, but also, of course, their leader), and the villain is a collective entity, the ‘communist’ government, personified

by President Salvador Allende. Pinochet would later become the villain in most texts available in the media, and Judge Baltasar Garzon would become the new hero when he asked for Pinochet's extradition to Spain. The third stage would take place when Pinochet followers put forward texts where Pinochet was the victim and the villains were Garzon and the Spanish and British governments. But all this came later. Before that, the construction of a hero needed further material and the creation of some handy myths.

3.2 Spaces. 'Myth' and 'fact'

Pinochet and the military needed to be characterized from the start as saviours of the Chilean people. Several 'myths' supported this image: Allende was a bad president, he brought chaos to Chile, and this chaos brought about popular uprising. This was just the starting point of a sequence of myth creation, which was denounced on the Internet in a web page (<http://www.lakota.clara.net>) where we could see what the author calls 'Pinofiction' on the political left and the response to these alleged 'merits' of Pinochet as 'Pinofacts' from the political right, characterizations that refer to evidence available that refutes those myths. Unfortunately, this website has closed in 2005 and it is no longer available.

More concretely, these myths include – in addition to the reasons mentioned that justified the coup – posterior achievements, like the Chilean 'economic miracle' (apparently there was good economic growth) and the fact that there is no evidence of tortures (which is used as part of the beginning of a new characterization of Pinochet not as hero, but rather as victim). There are also other reasons that criticize his arrest: it could endanger democratic transition and had no legitimacy whatsoever. All these claims are refuted with extensive evidence accessible from links on the web page.

In this context, Fauconnier's mental spaces can be used as a convenient model for intertextual explanation. We may well assume that there is a base space in which there are several entities, like Chile, Allende, the Chilean people, Pinochet, etc. Linked to that space is a space in focus in which Pinochet appears as a hero, the Chilean people as a victim and Allende as a villain. Let us call this one *the myths' space*. It is characterized by certain knowledge configurations that are representative of the 'Pinofiction' referred to in the Internet page. In addition, however, there is still a third space that is put in focus, with links to the base space and to the myths space. This is the 'Pinofacts' space. Its ontology and knowledge structures are a counterpart of the myths space.

If we take into account Fauconnier's assumptions about construction and linkage of mental spaces (which we listed in Section 2.1), the following can be said about the spaces that are created in intertextual communication:

There exists some background knowledge that is shared by all parties involved in the exchange of information concerning Pinochet's story. This knowledge can be complex and sophisticated, or very simple, but it involves at least some notions about who Augusto Pinochet is, who Salvador Allende and Baltasar Garzon are, the background of notions like 'communism', 'socialism', 'capitalism', 'democracy', etc., where Chile is and what kind of people it has, etc.

It is possible to frame locally and pragmatically the content of the different messages, according to who issues them, in which media, and on which occasions.

There is a starting space, a 'base space', which holds the information provided by the background knowledge just mentioned. There are several entities in this base space: Augusto Pinochet, Salvador Allende, the Chilean people, among others. Judge Baltasar Garzón is incorporated at a later stage.

New spaces are created. We refer here to the information provided by the example in Text 2 as a summary of the spaces that are created intertextually, since this page is a reaction to a certain state of opinion, referred to pejoratively as 'myths'. These spaces are detailed below in Figure 6.

These implied spaces are 'in focus' whenever they are activated. Focus shifts from one space to the other chronologically, as part of a chronological sequence that assigns the roles of victim, villain and hero to the different characters in the story.

The main connecting relation is chronological. This applies to the texts that are not shown here, but which help create the 'myths'. Within the web page itself there is a graphical opposition and labelling of the two opposing spaces ('Pinofiction' vs. 'Pinofacts'). Legitimacy is claimed for the facts by referring to 'truth'. It is on the basis of this 'truth' that 'correction of myths' shall take place. There is an opposition truth-false involved which is claimed by the author of the web page. Chronologically, three main periods in time are involved: the period around the coup itself, the period during which Augusto Pinochet ruled the country, and the period surrounding the arrest of Augusto Pinochet. However, all of them are incorporated into the spaces handled in the page that we are analysing (Figure 6).




Figure 6. Evolving spaces in Pinochet's story

4. Final remarks and conclusion

As a result of this analysis, a dynamic configuration of the story is accounted for. The pattern evolves, but it does so in a clearly predictable way, which no doubt is based on how the possible configurations mark the transmitter of the message (cf. Inchaurrealde 2000). It is not difficult to identify whether the writer or speaker involved is for or against Pinochet. It is just a question of identifying who are the victim, villain and hero in the corresponding texts. This creates a dialectical opposition that can never get resolved.

In conclusion, I have pointed out here a possible approach to the analysis of intertextual relations. The object of study has been the construction of Augusto Pinochet's image in the media. The tools have been Fauconnier's (1985, 1994, 1997) *mental spaces* model, Werth's (1995, 1997) *text world theory*, and Hawkins' (1997, 1998) *warrior iconography*. Clearly, it is possible to use these approaches for the analysis of Pinochet's story, but others could have

been used too. The relevant finding here is that there is a fundamental opposition, which relates to two opposed views of the same story, one which sees the former Chilean dictator as a hero (or victim) and another which sees him as a villain.

Notes

1. "If two elements a and b are linked by a connector $F(b = F(a))$, then element b can be identified by naming, describing, or pointing to its counterpart a" (Fauconnier 1997:41).
2. These models, as Werth (1997:252) reminds us, also have conceptual links with some theories from logical approaches, like Possible Worlds Theory (Kripke 1972; Lewis 1968, 1972; Bradley & Norman 1979) and model-theoretic semantics (Montague 1974; Partee 1975, 1976; Dowty, Wall, & Peters 1981).
3. Some examples are Rojas Sandford (1975), Silvia, Leander and Axelsson (1974), Rojas (1988), Amnesty International's 1983 report on torture in Chile, etc.
4. By "marked" it is meant here that the author shows his or her ideology by means of the linguistic expressions used for encoding the message (as explained in Inchaurrealde 2000).

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Stalinist vs. fascist propaganda

How much do they have in common?

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1. Introduction

The following observations are not primarily devoted to an analysis of manipulative techniques in totalitarian discourse. The reason for this is twofold. First, manipulation in itself is rather an omnipresent phenomenon, since we all try to “control artfully or deceitfully”, as the dictionary puts it,¹ our partners, bosses, colleagues etc. in everyday situations. Even little babies learn how to manipulate their parents, dogs know how to manipulate their masters, not to speak of pupils manipulating their teachers, etc. Why then should politicians not try to do the same? What remains to be examined, though, is the range of linguistic manipulative devices which may be characteristic of political discourse (in distinction to, let us say, modern advertising). From here, one may go one step further by asking whether there are any fundamental differences between, for example, totalitarian and democratic discourse.² Only if such differences can be found (which is by no means obvious directly from the beginning),³ does the question arise if we can distinguish divergent manipulative techniques within the domain of totalitarian discourse which uniquely serve the purposes of Nazi or Soviet propaganda, for example. Again, that such a divergence is likely to be detected is not at all evident – after all, it may well turn out that the essence of totalitarianism does not lie in its subtle persuasive tricks but in its power to overwhelm the audience. However this may be, what is needed first at this stage is a thorough descriptive confrontation of the two types of totalitarian discourse in question.

The present paper is based on a more detailed study dedicated totally to such a comparative description of the propagandistic discourse in the Stalinist Soviet Union and the Third Reich (Weiss 2003)⁴ and aims to summarize the obtained results and highlight the principal phenomenological contrasts by relating them to the fundamental ideological differences between these two political systems. Its main linguistic tools are *lexical* and *sentence semantics* rather than, for instance, speech act theory, Gricean pragmatics etc. The lexicographic framework which underlies our approach is that of the Moscow Semantic School represented by (the now emigrated) I. Mel'čuk, Yu. Apresjan and their younger followers. Some terms which constitute part of its meta-language and which are defined differently than in Western lexicography will require a short explanation, e.g., *connotation* and *modal frame*, whereas others, such as *presupposition*, *polysemy* or *epistemic modality*, will remain undefined, since their use does not differ from 'Western' linguistics. My approach is basically not a quantitative one, although statistics does play an essential role in the distribution of some key concepts (above all lexical expressions of the universal and existential quantifier).

One word should be said about the exact boundaries of the two domains of comparison. Because the Third Reich lasted only twelve years, while the Soviet Union existed over seventy years, one might object that we are in fact comparing incomparable objects: Soviet discourse had much more time to develop than Nazi propaganda. This objection is, however, only partially justified because besides many historical variables we also detect quite a few constants in the history of Soviet 'newspeak' (Vajss 2000). Nonetheless, it seems advisable to restrict the Soviet part of the comparison to the period of 'mature' Stalinism (i.e., roughly the period from 1930 to Stalin's death in 1953). On the other hand, I cannot see any argument against including quotations of Nazi speeches and writings prior to their seizure of power in 1933. This choice does not only offer the advantage of comparing simultaneous periods, but covers the peak of Soviet totalitarianism and thus allows for a detailed comparison of two crucial aspects of Fascism and Stalinism, namely the linguistic manifestation of the mechanisms of *terror* and of the *cult of personality*.

All this does by no means imply that the two compared propagandistic codes constitute linguistically homogeneous systems. On the contrary, they manifest several axiological inconsistencies, which are, as will be shown below, partly due to the ideological contradictions of both Nazism and Stalinism. Moreover, the exact linguistic status of Stalinist language remains unclear: should it really be regarded as a personal style of its own or at least as a separate, historically limited style? Most researchers seem to favour the former solution,

although the linguistic evidence is rather poor. Most of the devices so dear to Stalin were in fact inherited from the twenties, if not from the revolutionary leftist tradition of the late 19th century.⁵ Therefore, I have voted against the existence of a personal style in a previous paper (Weiss 2002). The question whether one should consider it the style of a whole epoch depends on how many and what kind of criteria one deems to be necessary for the distinction of a separate style.

My paper is divided into five sections. In the first, I will summarize the parallels and convergences found in both propagandistic languages, whereas in Sections 3–5, I will dwell on the principal divergences between them by discussing such divergent topics as the oppositions <old:new>, <nature:technology> and <rationalism:irrationalism>, the different images of the enemy, and the Führer vs. Stalin cult. Section 2 constitutes a kind of transition between these two main approaches. The overall picture may be stated as follows: on the surface we observe a host of obvious resemblances, but the more we delve beneath the surface, the more striking the contrasts between the two compared codes become. This may be explained partly by the more salient (or less carefully hidden) contradictions within Nazi ideology.

Let us start with a striking *syntactic* similarity shared by Nazi and Stalinist language: both are guided by the avoidance of bare nouns and verbs, i.e., NPs and VPs always contain some appropriate modifier besides their head constituents. What we observe here is a kind of *horror vacui* which prevents the text producers from letting simple nouns and verbs stand alone.⁶ Moreover, the *meaning* of these complements is highly *predictable*: most often, they serve as *intensifiers* of some semantic component of the head noun or verb, taking the shape of ready-made blocks such as ‘historically unique successes’, ‘unchangeable decisions’, ‘total dedication’, ‘titanic activity’, ‘ruthless fight’. Besides these ‘extremist’ examples, which manifest the highest possible degree of the graded feature and thus express values of the lexical function Magn,⁷ a second group exists which is characterized by a preference for grammatical or lexical comparatives, e.g., ‘even more impressive results’, ‘still higher goals’, ‘increasing figures’ or ‘steadily weakening forces (of the enemy)’, etc. As can be seen, such expressions do not mark the extreme end of the scale as already reached, but describe the temporal evolution of the scalar value in question. These principles may be summarized as the principle of PHRASEOLOGICAL BOUNDNESS and the principle of SEMANTIC INTENSIFYING. They often produce examples which can be literally translated from German into Russian and vice versa, although some minor differences may be noted (in Nazi propaganda, the persistent fortissimo leads to an abundance of lexical ‘extremist’ expressions, which requires the cre-

ation of seemingly redundant grammatical superlatives such as *lebenswichtigste Fragen* ‘most vital questions’ or *ungeheuerster Kräfteinsatz* ‘most immense use of strength’. In the Soviet Union on the other hand, we observe a preference for such double superlative devices as *mudrejšij iz mudrejšix* ‘the wisest of the wisest’ and for developing new qualitative and hence gradable meanings from relational adjectives, cf. *vpolne sovetskij (čelovek)* ‘thoroughly Soviet (man)’ or *sovsem leninskij* ‘totally Leninist’.

It goes without saying that from a propagandistic point of view, both principles make sense: one’s own achievements (successes, victories) must always be praised in the brightest colours, while the enemy’s performance should present itself as the exact opposite. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that both principles also occur in other political systems, including parliamentary democracies, even if these principles may find a less consistent application there. Moreover, they can hardly be called manipulative: the semantics of such NPs and VPs has nothing hidden about it – on the contrary, it is *totally predictable*. They are, however, revealing in another respect, since we are always dealing with either the positive or the negative extreme of a scale. Therefore, a third principle may be stated: the principle of *axiological polarization*. As is evident from the examples quoted above, the distribution of these two values also becomes predictable and simply depends on the involved referents. What is at stake here is thus a twofold dualism, since the axiological polarization is built on the *referential opposition* ‘we : not we (the others)’.

This approach is in a trivial sense manipulative, since a dualistic view of the world excludes the existence of a third (forth, fifth, ... n-th) referential world which belongs neither to the we-group nor to the ‘others’⁸ and which has its own corresponding system of values, be it on an intermediate stage of the scale or on an independent level. Again, it should be emphasized that this is no peculiarity of totalitarian systems. On the contrary, we have come across the leading principle which is superimposed on every kind of political propaganda: any real propagandist simply cannot do without such a binary, Manichean approach. Not surprisingly, both propagandistic languages reveal a whole bundle of heterogeneous devices which serve this purpose. Among them, the following two should be mentioned here: the tendency to split the relevant vocabulary into pairs of axiologically polarized co-hyponyms (cf. ‘people’s democracy’ vs. ‘bourgeois democracy’ in the case of Soviet ideology and ‘Germanic democracy’ vs. ‘parliamentary democracy’ in the Third Reich)⁹ and the opposite tendency to monopolize certain key terms for one’s own system as in the case of the *Führer* (any and every other German leader was forced to renounce this title). The latter tendency may even affect whole groups of

metaphors, to name but a few: health (own) vs. illness (other) [see next section], militarisms (own), dynamic actions (own), railway metaphors (own, Soviet Union) or highway metaphors (own, Third Reich).

When looking at Stalinist and Nazi propaganda in more detail, one certainly detects many minor differences in the realization of these polarizing techniques.¹⁰ But even then, the overall tendencies remain the same on both sides. There is, however, one exception which can be traced back to the racist roots of Nazism: the Nazis coined or propagated overtly slanderous expressions in which the component ‘inferior’ is part of the meaning proper, cf. *minderwertig* ‘of lesser value’, *Untermensch* ‘inferior human being’ or *lebensunwert* ‘not worth living’. Soviet propaganda carefully avoided such straightforwardness by restricting itself to an implicit technique in which the derogatory component is part of the modal frame¹¹ of the lexeme in question. In other words, Soviet political language still revealed its Marxist egalitarian tradition, whereas Nazi language simply reflected the explicitly antiegalitarian ideology of the German ruling class.

2. Dividing the world into two parts: The consistent solution (Soviet style)

The obvious aforementioned parallels notwithstanding, I would claim that the degree of consistency in their realization varies among different political systems. In this respect, Soviet propaganda (not only during the Stalinist period, but during the entire period of its existence) constituted a well-organized, semantic whole which affected the very heart of sentence semantics. The reigns of the ‘good guys’ and the ‘bad guys’¹² were opposed to each other in terms of *quantifiers* (universal vs. existential) on the referential and temporal axis and even in terms of *modality* (necessity vs. possibility). Their distribution can be illustrated as in Figure 1 (for details, see Weiss 2000b).

As for universal and existential quantifiers, their assignment to the own and the other group, respectively, is well justified in a collectivist ideology. The we-group is characterized by total harmony and consensus, i.e., the idea of total unity. It dedicates itself totally to the building of socialism, it unites in the total hatred against the Fascist enemy, it mourns over the loss of its beloved leaders (e.g., Stalin) with total sadness, it never loses total control over undesirable events (e.g., the Chernobyl disaster), etc. The same holds true for the time axis: temporal totality reads as continuity, the own political system is conceived as ever-lasting, the line of the party is unchanging, the faith of the people in the

<p>‘we’ = ‘good guys’</p> <p>TOTALITY / UNITY <i>all, every, whoever, total, none, nobody; only, unique, unity; $\emptyset_{you 2}$</i> syntax: <i>not only... but...</i>, exhaustive enumeration (coordinative structures)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">⇓</p> <p>CONTINUITY, STABILITY <i>always, never, forever, unchanging, unshakeable, immortal, faithful, eternal; continue</i> syntax: ‘<i>X p-s, p-ed and will p</i>’</p> <p style="text-align: center;">⇓</p> <p>NECESSITY <i>must, need, obliged</i></p>	<p>reference</p> <p>temporality</p> <p>modality</p>	<p>‘they’ = ‘bad guys’</p> <p>ISOLATION, SEPARATION <i>some, certain, there is/are, not all, different; \emptyset_{people}</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">⇓</p> <p>UNSTABLENESS, TRANSITORINESS <i>sometimes, not always, rarely, often, temporary, passing</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">⇓</p> <p>EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY <i>may, can</i></p>
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Figure 1. Distribution of ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’

bright future is unshakeable, Lenin lives, lived and will live, etc. On the other hand, the enemy’s realm is marked off by all expressions pointing to the opposite idea of partiality (non-totality): if a sentence contains indefinite pronouns or pronouns referring to subsets such as ‘not all’, we may conclude by scalar implicature that not the whole set of referents is involved. This is an infallible indication that we are dealing with the others, our enemies. Not surprisingly, we find the same pattern on the time axis: whenever some state of affairs is described as temporary, passing, or occurring only sometimes (not always), it is ascribed to the ‘non-we-group’. That system is unstable, affected with decay and eventually bound to fall.

The overall picture just described can now be corroborated by statistical data, which is provided by an analysis of a corpus of Khrushchev’s main writings (I have to admit that I do not presently dispose of a similarly representative analysis of Stalin’s writings, which span 12 volumes). Since commenting on the entire volume of lexical items would require too much individual explanation, I will not present the detailed tables but will rather concentrate on the crucial expressions (‘+’, ‘-’ and ‘o’ denote positive, negative and neutral axiological load, respectively) (Table 1).

Table 1. Analysis of Khrushchev's corpus

		+	-	0
<i>Vse</i>	'all'	1046	367	173
<i>každyj</i>	'every'	261	22	21
<i>polnyj</i>	'full'	295	16	1
<i>nikakoj</i>	'no(ne)'	124	66	13
<i>edinyj</i>	'united'	129	1	1
<i>edinstvo</i>	'unity'	213	0	0
<i>ne tol'ko,</i>	'not only, ...			
<i>no i ...</i>	but...'	222	80	30
<i>vsegda</i>	'always'	193	30	8
<i>navsegda</i>	'forever'	44	3	1
<i>nikogda</i>	'never'	119	23	21
<i>neuklonnyj</i>	'unchanging'	87	1	0
<i>vernyj</i>	'faithful'	107	0	0
<i>nekotorye</i>	'some' (pl.)	30	224	133
<i>ne vse</i>	'not all'	5	39	6
<i>inogda</i>	'sometimes'	2	16	13
<i>inoj raz</i>	'sometimes'	3	29	23

Table 2. Analysis of an fragment of Stalin's writings

		+	-	0
<i>každyj</i>	'every'	181	48	70
<i>edinstvo</i>	'unity'	72	13	17
<i>neuklonnyj</i>	'unchanging'	50	0	0
<i>nekotorye</i>	'some' (pl.)	6	227	53
<i>vremennyj</i>	'temporary'	9	105	27

As shown clearly in this table, the scope of negation is not only semantically, but also axiologically distinctive. For example, combined with the universal quantifier, negation marks the good guy when used with narrow scope ('all not', i.e., total absence) and the bad guy when used with wide scope ('not all', i.e., partiality).

It goes without saying that this distribution of figures by no means reflects what can be observed in everyday Russian. There, most of the expressions cited are axiologically neutral, which seems expectable in the case of lexical units with such broad meanings as 'all', 'every' or 'some'.¹³ The pattern obtained from an excerpt of Stalin's writings is fairly similar (only part of the lexemes quoted above were analysed in this count) (Table 2).

What we have come across here is a real constant, found throughout the entire history of Soviet ‘newspeak’. For example, an examination of Bukharin’s and Preobrazhensky’s *Azbučnik kommunizma* (*A textbook of communism*, 1919) yields a very similar distribution of both quantifiers. The same holds for five speeches held by Kirov in 1925–1933. Not surprisingly, the same picture appears once more in Gorbachev’s *Perestrojka i novoe myšlenie* (*Perestroika and the new way of thinking*).

It goes without saying that a host of semantic comments need to be made in order to make these data watertight. For instance, polysemy needs to be accounted for in cases such as *vsjakij*₁ (all kinds of – axiologically neutral) and *vsjakij*₂ (any kind of – negative), the rules of negation calculus should be taken into account (e.g., minus times minus equals plus), embedded perspectives (quoting the other’s point of view) need to be filtered out. Furthermore, anaphoric ‘all’ must be exempted, since it behaves as an axiological neuter, etc. Moreover, a considerable part of the seeming exceptions to the expected pattern can be explained away by giving the context a closer look. For reasons of space, these details cannot be discussed here (see Weiss 2000a).

At this point, one further remark may not be out of place: one might be tempted to call this whole reorganization of vocabulary *manipulative* since reference to persons, institutions, organizations, etc. regularly intermingle with their implicit evaluation. But as a matter of fact, the polarizing procedures remain constant during the whole history of Soviet Union and occur so often that they become utterly void of any persuasive power. If a linguistic device is one hundred percent predictable at the given stage of discourse, one cannot consider it an attempt to exercise ‘artful or deceptive control’ over the recipient.

As for *modality*, the distribution given above in our scheme (1) may seem unexpected. After all, necessity is closely related to such concepts as constraint, compulsion, pressure and obligation, all of which do not sound very comfortable – why then should all these values be ascribed to the own system, i.e., the good guys? Again, to elaborate on the answer would require by far more space than the limits of this paper allow. One very preliminary explanation could be the following: the we-group is subject to *deontic* necessity in the case of actions still to be performed (hence Soviet texts simply abound in sentences such as “we ought to...”, “we should do...”), whereas in the case of *epistemic* and *alethic* necessity, the laws of history are at work which will bring about the positive solution (e.g., the victory of socialism) anyway. As for epistemic possibility, the majority of cases co-occur with indefinite pronouns of the type “some may object...”, “somebody will not be happy with our decision” etc. The overall suggestion conveyed by this device seems to be that the behaviour

HEALTH, STRENGTH <i>health, force</i>	ILLNESS, WEAKNESS, INFIRMITY <i>disease, infection, poisoning, ulcer; vermin, pest, parasite, (maggot, leech: only German)</i>
⇓	⇓
YOUTH <i>freshness, boldness</i>	OLD AGE <i>decay</i>
⇓	⇓
ACTIVITY, DYNAMISM, SPEED <i>sports metaphors</i>	SLOWNESS, PARALYSIS
⇓	⇓
LIFE <i>vitality</i>	DEATH <i>corpse, rottenness, decomposition; litter, garbage</i>

Figure 2. Derived metaphors

of the opposite system is uncertain, whereas the own policy is always certain and predictable.

As can be seen, all this constitutes not only an accidental cluster of heterogeneous features but a thoroughly consistent system that affects the very heart of semantics, embracing such key domains as reference, quantification, negation, temporality and modality. In what follows, I will argue that we cannot expect to find an exact counterpart of this on the Nazi side of our comparison. The reasons for this will become clear in the next section. But let us first have a look at some additional affiliations of the polarizing principle. Totality may be reinterpreted as corporal integrity, giving the idea of health *vs.* illness. This leads to a whole host of derived metaphors (Figure 2).

The table shows that not only denotations of the corresponding states and processes, but also their symptoms, causes (cf. “parasite”), and consequences (“decay”) may be metaphorised. All these oppositions are closely linked with the *social body metaphor*, which, as shown in Guldin (2000), goes back to a European philosophical (and propagandistic) tradition that developed over many centuries. In these domains, both propagandistic languages cover almost the same range with minor divergences in the domain of parasites, where German activists surpassed their Soviet adversaries in exploiting the whole range of repellent animal metaphors (maggot, leech, etc.).¹⁴ However, one exception seems noteworthy: unlike its Soviet counterpart, Nazi language often takes the opposition ‘health:illness’ literally when alluding to the alleged genetic difference of races, thus justifying the planned (and indeed realized) eugenic pro-

gram aimed at the elimination of “*lebensunwertes Leben*”. Again, it is its racist base that distinguishes National Socialist vocabulary from Marxism-Leninism.

3. Beneath the surface: The major divergences

In what follows, we will only briefly examine three major oppositions, the behaviour of which seems, to say the least, more consistent in Stalinist propaganda than in the propaganda of the Third Reich. The first is directly connected to one of the derived metaphors presented above: if ‘old age’ marks the adversary, due to the polysemy of ‘old’, it may serve as the base of the derived axiological opposition ‘new (+) vs. old (-)’. This opposition dominated the whole Soviet propaganda during the twenties in which the capitalist system was conceived as ‘the old world’, socialist Soviet Union as the ‘new world’.¹⁵ In Stalinist times, this dichotomy continued to function to a somewhat lesser extent but experienced a sudden second career during Khrushchev’s rule.¹⁶ The polysemy of ‘old’ was often exploited in verbal and pictorial propaganda, where some representatives of the ‘old world’ appeared as old men (e.g., uncle Sam on posters) or old women (e.g., West Germany in Khrushchev’s speeches). Note also the ‘new human being’, one of the leading myths of the thirties referring to the creation of a new, socialist fashioned type of man with a heroic and at the same time collectivist spirit.

The Nazi movement knew a similar axiological use of these antonyms: ‘the old system’ designated the Weimar republic, ‘new Germany’ and ‘new Europe’ (cf. *europäische Neuordnung*) referred to the positive, Nazi-dominated pole of the axis. Even the ‘new human being’ appeared in Hitler’s writings, this time denoting a merger of white collar and blue collar workers. On the other hand, we observe a threefold *archaizing turn* in Nazi propaganda. This becomes apparent (a) in vocabulary, (b) in semiotics (typography, posters, symbols) and (c) in mythology. The lexical regress was manifested in the creation or (more often) in the reanimation of terms related to the Germanic and medieval past, cf. *Stamm* (lit.: ‘tribe’, *Stammesgemeinschaft*, *Gefolgschaft*, *Gau*, *Gauleiter*, *Ostmark*, *Sippe*, *Orden(sburg)*, *Thing*, *Rotte*, *Schar*, *Trupp*, *Sturmabteilung*).¹⁷ The same archaizing tendency led to the spread of Germanic proper names. As for typography and symbols, the use of gothic letters and SS runes as well as the swastika come to mind. The increased role of medieval mythology may be illustrated by the (mis)use of the *Nibelungen* tale, especially the *Dolchstoßlegende*, which alludes to Hagen’s treacherous murder, i.e., the stab in Siegfried’s back. Through this metaphor, German generals, journalists and eventually the Nazis

tried to explain the defeat of the German empire in World War I (cf. Münkler & Storch 1988).

We have thus come across a striking contradiction within Nazi vocabulary: on the one hand, it displayed a decidedly modernist outfit when abounding in technology and sports metaphors, while on the other hand, it revealed a peculiar fascination with the distant past when using old-fashioned or simply artificial historic expressions. Within Stalinist 'canonical' propaganda, we do not find any similar clash between modernism and archaism. It remained faithful to its Leninist roots in metaphorical vocabulary as well as in its neologisms (not to mention new proper names of the type 'Electricity', 'Revolution' or '*Oktjabrina*'!) and new types of word formation, mainly abbreviations (stump compounds, acronyms, mixed types).

Yet it cannot be denied that Stalinist culture underwent a more than archaic wave in the mid-thirties when the rise of the so called *Soviet folklore* began. This produced new laments, epic and fairy tales, all written in the traditional interdialect of Russian folklore, but dedicated to the achievements of Soviet life (e.g., kolkhoz farms, tractors, the new social role of Soviet women, etc.) and its heroes and champions (Stalin, Lenin, Kirov, the pilots who broke the distance record, etc.). This led to a most curious blending of a non-standard variety of Russian based on the authentic oral tradition of the past, the last surviving bearers of which were now reactivated and led to the creation of new tales directed by folklore scientists, and modern Soviet terminology.¹⁸ The resulting clash between modernist and archaist elements was even more shocking than in the case of Nazi German, but at the same time it occupied a completely different position within the propagandistic concert: while in the case of the Nazis the linguistic conflict affected the hard core of propaganda, the Stalinist case was limited both functionally and historically to the utmost *periphery* of propagandistic genres. After Stalin's death, this type of pseudo-folklore was publicly denounced by the scientist Leont'ev as a falsification. Though not explicitly stated, his article clearly led to the conclusion that the whole mystification mainly served the purpose of Stalin's personality cult. Consequently, this archaizing type of Soviet folklore ceased to exist soon afterwards.¹⁹

Our next dichotomy is closely related to the previous one in that it once more reveals a conflict between progressive and retrograde tendencies. In Nazi ideology, we observe an obvious contradiction between the fascination of *technological progress* on the one hand, and the call for a *return to nature* on the other hand. Modern industrial technology was needed for many purposes, above all in the military domain due to Germany's effort to conquer Europe. However, its inevitable companion, i.e., urbanization, was considered an evil

due to the so called Blubo (blood-and-soil) ideology, which deemed urbanization as the cause of mankind's estrangement from its roots and understood urban society to be by far less fertile and more degenerate than its rural counterpart, which best preserves the healthy genes of the German race. No wonder that this axiological contrast manifested itself in Nazi vocabulary, where we find, on the one hand, *wurzellos* (rootless) marking off the bad guy, and, on the other hand, *bodenständig* (indigeneous, native, authentic) or *schollenverbunden* (lit. with adhesion to the clod of earth; devoted to one's (rural) roots). Note also that Goebbels created such compounds as *Asphaltmensch* (asphalt man) or *Asphaltungeheuer* (asphalt monster) where the first component metonymically indicates the artificial, degenerated way of life characteristic of the adversary.²⁰

All this was completely alien to Stalinist propaganda whose distribution of values worked in just the opposite way: while urbanization stands for progress, traditional farming has the connotation of 'backwardness'. No wonder then that neither the denigration of urban life nor the praise of traditional country life can be found here (recall that the installation of the kolkhoz system was part of the new society and was meant to destroy the whole of traditional Russian village culture). If worker and peasant always constitute a natural couple in both verbal and pictorial propaganda (e.g., in Soviet constitutions or in the famous statue by Mukhina), they do so as equal members of the new working society, and they equally profit of the benefits of modernization. After all, the central symbol of new agriculture was the tractor!²¹ Even the fertility cult, the symbols of which can be found in Stalinist architecture or film production, does not provide any counterevidence because it simply serves as decorum.²² Thus, it is only Nazi propaganda that manifests a contradictory evaluation of modernism.

One linguistically interesting by-product of the official esteem of the countryside was the tolerance of Low German *dialects*, cf. Wirrer (1995). In this respect, local authorities acted contrary to the general centralist policy of the Nazi regime but could argue that regional idioms had an integrating power superior to that of Standard German among the rural population. Moreover, they helped to support the German defence against Danish and Polish on the national borders. Again, such a high evaluation of local dialects was utterly unthinkable in Soviet Russia. On the contrary, dialects had been the only non-standard linguistic variety not to be exploited by Bolshevist propaganda, and they continued to be taboo during Stalin's reign.

Next comes the dichotomy of '*rationalism vs. irrationalism*'. One of the features that struck early observers most in Hitler's writings was the high regard for such notions as '*instinct*', '*fanatic*', or '*blind*' (faithfulness). They all indi-

cated a positive evaluation of antirational behaviour and went hand in hand with the overall anti-intellectualism of Nazi ideology. Furthermore, their link with the previous dichotomy is obvious since instinct is related to nature, not culture. On the other hand, science still figured among the positive values, at least in those domains where it served as a source of legitimacy for Nazi ideology, such as biology, medicine, history or linguistics,²³ hence the numerous borrowings of technical terms from these disciplines. However, this inconsistent treatment of rationalism remained a privilege of German propaganda. In the Soviet Union, such terms as ‘instinct’ or ‘fanatic’ never ranked high on the official hierarchy of values. As for the Marxist-Leninist treatment of the notion ‘intellectual’, this aspect is far too complex to be elaborated here. Therefore, I will limit myself and merely point out that the social term *intelligencija*, which included not only intellectuals, but all kinds of workers who earned their living through non-physical work, used to be divided into the ‘old’ (= pre-revolutionary) and the ‘new’ (= socialist, Soviet style), thus following the already known pattern of axiological polarization of co-hyponyms (see Section 1, end).

In summary, we may conclude that in all three respects Nazi propagandistic discourse turns out to be more contradictory than its Stalinist counterpart: the old is treated as despicable in some contexts, but as prestigious in others; modern industrial civilization is deemed helpful in some respects, but condemned as the origin of deracination in others; reason sometimes serves to legitimate one’s own goals, while on other occasions it turns out to be harmful and must be replaced by mere instinct. One final comment should be added here: none of the dichotomies discussed reveals any manipulative tendency, everything relevant to these dichotomies is stated overtly or even bluntly and is moreover repeated hundreds of times.

4. Different images of the enemy

Whereas the previous section revealed a rather homogeneous picture on the Soviet side and a heterogeneous one on the German side, in what follows we will discover the opposite pattern. The Nazi’s enemy consisted of a closed set of neatly defined classes of out-casts, namely Jews, Gypsies, adherents of leftist parties, homosexuals, the mentally and physically impaired, and certain militant parts of the clergy. To these, World War II added most of the Eastern European peoples (especially Slavs). Thus, it was entirely predictable who belonged to the other and who to the own. Furthermore, there was a marked tendency

to reduce all these enemy groups to a single one: the Jews, who were omnipresent due to their international dissemination and who seemed to merge with every other group of bad guys. Linguistically, this became apparent in such formations as *Alljuda*, *alljüdisch*, *Weltjudentum*, *internationales Judentum*, *verjudet* and numerous compounds of the type *jüdisch-liberal* / *-marxistisch* / *-bolschewistisch* / *-intellektuell* etc. Note that in view of what has been outlined in Section 2, formations such as *alljüdisch* contradict the overall picture according to which the universal quantifier should occupy the positive pole of the axiological axis.

In the same vein, the Jewish star served as a general segregation marker, so that we find a poster from 1938 against 'entartete Kunst' showing a Negro jazz musician with exaggeratedly thick lips and earrings, wearing a top hat and tailcoat (both attributes of the typical capitalist), but also the star of David! Another poster from 1939 presents the American president F. D. Roosevelt named "our modern Moses" and surrounded by the Jewish star. As for cartoons, German propaganda could always resort to the traditional racist stereotype of the Jew, which was widespread all over Europe.

The Stalinist pandemonium, on the other hand, was simply overcrowded by all different sorts of enemies. These included, to name but a few, spies, traitors, pests, parasites, spongers, loafers, shirkers, not to speak of the old enemies inherited from the revolution, who were later eliminated in the homeland of socialism, such as capitalists, imperialists, landowners, the clergy, etc. Some of these labels were simply empty semantically. This holds in particular for the most popular ones, e.g., *kulak* (allegedly a wealthy peasant) and *vrag naroda* (people's enemy). To these one may add *formalist*, which specialized in denigrating representatives of art, music and literature. From this, it becomes clear that the Soviet enemy was more often than not faceless; he could not be visualized.²⁴ What is more, the enemy very often prevented any portrayal because he was conceived of as hidden and masked. Consequently, "to unmask the enemy" and "to tear the mask off the enemy's face" belonged to the favourites of Stalinist phraseology.²⁵

All this fits well into the overall picture of Stalinism, one of the most salient features of which was a kind of general *paranoia* which was directed against virtually any individual with the exception of the General Secretary himself. This made any marks of social distinction useless because everybody was a potential traitor or hidden agent, or to put it differently: everybody was a potential victim of the Stalinist terror. On the other hand, we do observe tendencies to merge all internal and external enemies into one single menace. This becomes evident in the campaign against the so called 'Bukharin-Trotsky gang' during the

public trials in 1937–1938, which claimed that all adherents of leftist and rightist declinations from the only correct Party line constituted one single political block that was paid by foreign powers (Japan, Germany, Poland) to which it intended to cede considerable parts of the Soviet territory. Moreover, the alleged conspirators were accused of about every crime committed in the history of Soviet Union, including the attempt to assassinate Lenin, the murder of Kirov and Gorky, the boycott of the kolkhoz system, etc. This campaign was, however, limited to a very short period due to the final annihilation of all accused conspirators.

As a consequence, Nazi terror appeared more rational in a certain sense, since its victims were predictable. Stalinist terror, on the contrary, seemed irrational in that it could target just about anyone. The psychological impact on the representatives of the ‘own’ system are evident: in the Soviet Union everybody lived in an atmosphere of permanent fear, whereas in the Third Reich an average ‘*Volksgenosse*’ could feel sure that the authorities would leave him in peace as long as he did not show obvious oppositional inclinations.

Once more, very few of the linguistic mechanisms at work merit the label ‘manipulation’ if not in the very general (and rather trivial) sense that every attempt to cause irrational fear is manipulative, be it the simplifying reductionist approach which says that behind every evil lurks the same enemy (the Jew) or the opposite, but not less paranoiac conviction, that the enemy is multifarious, but always masked and hiding everywhere. More specifically, this means that the label ‘manipulative’ seems justified in the case of such formations as the German *Weltjudentum*, which carry the existential presupposition that ‘there is an international organisation uniting all Jews’, or such compounds as *jüdisch-marxistisch* and *buxarinsko-trockistskij*, which suggest a close link between the entities denoted by their constituents. Moreover, the diversity of compounds with *jüdisch-* indicates the omnipresence of the enemy in every political, non-Nazi movement. But let it be emphasized once more that all this is not characteristic of totalitarian speech alone. In particular, it may also be found during election campaigns in parliamentary democracies.

5. Führer vs. personality cult: The inconsistent Nazi style solution

Due to reasons of space, in this section we will not dwell on convergent or divergent linguistic manifestations of adoration for the leader in the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. The reader will find a large amount of illustrations of this in Weiss (2003). A few words should, however, be said about the differ-

ent premises on which the two cults were based. It may suffice to recall that Hitler was not the founder, but the legitimate and charismatic leader of the National Socialist movement who had led it from victory to victory during several elections. Moreover, he was doubtlessly a gifted orator who had come to know how to influence the masses. Unlike him, Stalin could not claim to have played a major role in the evolution of the Bolshevik movement up to Lenin's death, particularly during the October revolution. Nor was he a genial Party theoretician like Lenin, an audacious military leader like Trotsky, or a charismatic orator who could inspire the masses. What is worse, Lenin had warned the Party against Stalin in his famous secret letter because of the latter's rudeness and other weaknesses of character. Indeed, Stalin owed his career to very different talents: according to Bullock (1998, 378), he was "a master of both dissimulation and of acting a part" and had an ability to arrange perfect timing by playing off his rivals against each other before eventually getting rid of them, most often through physical elimination. These skills notwithstanding, one of the main tasks of his later personality cult was to overcome the mentioned deficiencies by overcompensating them: the General Secretary had to appear as a genius in all those fields where his score was actually poor. Hence the host of absolutely fictitious episodes with him in the role of the revolutionary leader and the overwhelming flood of quotations from his writings and speeches in the History of the All-Union Communist Party (the 'Short Course'), first edited in 1938, and in the biography of Lenin as well as in his own short biography, which he personally falsified.²⁶

But how did Stalin manage to reach such an ambitious goal in spite of all the obstacles mentioned above? Obviously, he was forced to proceed very carefully, step by step, and conceal his real intentions. First of all, he had to cope with the deeply rooted *collectivist spirit* of the Party, which was hostile to any kind of cult of personality. However, there was already one exception: after Lenin's death, the Party had declared him "alive forever" and initiated a genuine cult around its former leader and his heritage. Stalin now made a virtue of necessity by combining the already existing *Lenin cult* with his own new cult. In this way, the myth of Lenin's unquestioned successor and the legitimate interpreter of his heritage was born, its most salient symbol being the oath of faithfulness sworn by Stalin at Lenin's deathbed. From now on, the two leaders appeared side by side in countless speeches, written texts, songs, pictures, posters and films. Even on the peak of Stalin's own cult of personality we still find portraits where he is standing before a bookshelf filled with the complete Marx (upper shelf) and the complete Lenin edition, holding an open volume of Lenin in his hands. His own writings occupy the lower shelf, on the right side

of which stands his book *Voprosy Leninizma* ('Questions of Leninism'). Thus, A. Bullock's statement that "In the case of Hitler, ideology was what the Führer said it was; in the case of Stalin it was what the General Secretary said Marx and Lenin had said it was" (Bullock 1998: 458) remains justified until the very end of Stalinism.²⁷ To the Leninist cover of the own cult one may add that emphasis was still laid on the leading role of the Party as a whole.

All this contributed to the overall impression of continuity and stability which was so dear to Soviet propagandists. This is where linguistics comes in. Far from creating a new personal style of his own,²⁸ Stalin carefully avoided any indications of discontinuity. The linguistic task he had to solve was not an easy one: if the existential quantifier marked the bad guys and the universal quantifier the good guys (see Section 2), which was in perfect agreement with the Party's collectivist attitude, there could be no single person who destroyed the whole system by being singled out as superior. On the contrary, propaganda had to emphasize his close link, if not his total merger, with the masses. The simplest way to obtain this was to reanimate the ancient *family metaphor* which had earlier served the purposes of the tsardom: in more 'intimate' texts such as songs, congratulations or expressions of thanks, Stalin was addressed as *rodnoj* (the utmost degree of closeness) *otec* 'dearest father',²⁹ much as the tsar (as well as many European kings) had been called *bat'ka* by his subjects in ancient times.³⁰ At the same time, he continued to be addressed and referred to as *tovarišč*, i.e., as comrade Stalin in other, more formal texts including the Party history and his own biography. Since this form of address was the most democratic and could be directed to every citizen as long as he/she was not unmasked as an enemy of the people, it had to show the General Secretary's egalitarian attitude. Of course, such traces of modesty contrasted sharply with the simply preposterous praise of the General Secretary's gifts, merits, and deeds found in exactly the same texts.

But linguistic continuity meant much more than the mere use of titles. The entire axiological opposition outlined in Section 2 remained valid, hence the figures representing the axiological splitting of quantifiers, temporality and modality (see Section 2) show the same pattern in Stalin's works as in the writings of, say, his most hated rival Bukharin or as in Kirov's speeches. In the same way, we almost never find statements of the type 'Stalin *alone* formulated the answer / found the solution / lead the army to its victory' etc.,³¹ which would signal that at a certain moment Stalin ceased to be just a part of the collective whole. In other words, the linguistic maintenance of the essential distribution of values, i.e., of the hardcore semantics of Soviet 'newspeak', should indicate that the Party line had not changed at all and that the General Secretary did

not intend any fundamental innovations within the existing power balance. The collectivist spirit still seemed alive, even if there was one particular leader who deserved the citizens' respect and love more than others.

The last step of this procedure was no longer related to symbolic interaction. It consisted in eliminating all former rivals of Stalin and thus destroying the Party's collective memory. From now on, nobody would be able to correct his view of history; no survivor of the October revolution who had played an essential part in it was left. Consequently, the construction of his new mythology could take place, and the cult of personality reached its apogee.

Hitler's Führer cult contrasts sharply with all this. If it is true that Nazi terms such as *Volksgemeinschaft* 'the people's community' and slogans such as "*Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz*" ("the community's benefit takes precedence over the individual benefit"), "*Du bist nichts, dein Volk ist alles!*" ("You are nothing, your people is everything"), "*Dein Körper gehört Deiner Nation!*" ("Your body belongs to your nation") revealed the same collectivist spirit as in the Soviet Union, the next slogan, "*Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer*", contains a hidden case of polysemy and therefore introduces a different overtone: while accentuated *ein* entails 'united' when combined with 'people' or 'Reich',³² in the case of the Führer it denotes one single individual.³³ Again, one would not find similar slogans singling out the unique leader in the Soviet Union. There we may have *Partija u nas odna* (we have one single Party), but not *U nas vožd' odin* (we have one single leader).

The contrast deepens when we examine the distribution of quantifying expressions such as *einzel* 'single, individual' and especially the 'masses'. According to the scheme presented in Section 2, the single, individual (*einzelner*) Führer should not be opposed to the masses. Yet this is exactly what happens in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. There we find numerous examples where the individual genius is mentally superior to the masses conceived of as narrow-minded, dull, primitive and lazy, if not as a "flock of empty-headed mutttons" or "small miserable worms". Hitler is much more straightforward in his wording than Stalin ever dared to be, cf. the following quotation: "*Die Aufnahmefähigkeit der großen Masse ist nur sehr beschränkt, das Verständnis klein, dafür die Vergesslichkeit groß*" ("The receptiveness of the masses is only very limited, their comprehension small, but their forgetfulness big") [*Mein Kampf*, 198]. In Soviet propaganda such a sentence would have been utterly unthinkable.

In view of this contempt for the masses, it comes as no surprise that the relationship between the Nazi leader and his subjects is conceived in different terms than in the case of Stalin. If the latter was *samyj ljubimyj, samyj blizkij* (the most beloved, the closest one) to his people, Hitler probably was not so keen

on being on such intimate terms with his flock of mutttons and his miserable worms. On the contrary, panegyric poets used to emphasise his remoteness. For instance, he searched his inspirations in the loneliness of the Bavarian mountains, where he could commune with the Creator. In this way, the Nazi leader was singled out from his nation, while Stalin was still portrayed as an element included in the corresponding set (the Party or the nation).

All this boils down to the statement that we are dealing with a *twofold paradox*. On the one hand, the Stalinist cult of personality was contrary to the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, it had to be established carefully, gradually and needed to be linked with the cult of Lenin. As a result, the hard core of Soviet public discourse remained constant and maintained its inner consistency, even when embroidered and embellished by a flood of panegyric elements. On the other hand, not only did Hitler's Führer cult not contradict any principles of the German National Socialist movement, but it was in full agreement with its elitist base. However, this led to a linguistic conflict between the collectivism propagated by German authorities and the elitist aspirations of their leader. All things considered, the German totalitarian discourse presents a less homogeneous appearance than its Soviet counterpart. From this, one might conclude that Stalinist discourse was more manipulative, since it concealed more than Nazi propaganda did. This is, however, only of marginal importance, since in other medias, especially the new medium film, Stalin's cult of personality took at least a similarly explicit (and, as we may add, grotesque) shape as the German Führer cult. However this may be, on the whole I would maintain the thesis sketched out at the beginning: the essence of totalitarian speech does not lie in its manipulative force; its main goal is rather to overwhelm the audience by a permanent flow of emotionally loaded and often violent, but highly repetitious speech.

Notes

1. For a much more elaborate definition within the framework of speech act theory, see Bogusławski (1994:332).
2. It goes without saying that this study will not include lies and withheld information, both of which are crucial for totalitarian systems but lie beyond the scope of linguistics.
3. It should be pointed out that in the existing research on 'totalitarian' manipulative language, such a comparative approach lacks more often than not. This holds in particularly true for much of the work done on the Polish 'nowomowa' since the rise of the Solidarność movement in the eighties (e.g., Rokoszowa 1985 or Nowak 2002), which reveals a large

amount of manipulative devices without, however, asking to what extent these devices are truly unique, i.e., cannot be found in, say, Western election campaigns.

4. In turn, this study profits from about a dozen previous publications on the history of Soviet political discourse which were completed by the author and his collaborators during a research grant from the Swiss National Foundation (for a comprehensive bibliography, see Weiss 2003). As for Nazi propaganda, on the other hand, my study draws heavily on existing research.

5. This interpretation is supported by rich quotations offered by Vajskopf (2001), despite the somewhat puzzling title of his monograph (“Stalin as a writer”).

6. As for the description of Nazi speech, this is stated explicitly in Volmer (1995: 142f.); the Soviet counterpart may be found in Weiss (1987: 273f.).

7. As is suggested by this term, the LF Magn simply denotes a partly irregular (idiosyncratic, idiomatic) expression that serves to intensify the key word in question, cf. *high* (temperature), *heavy* (rain) / *shower*, *considerable* experience, (examine) *attentively*, etc. For those who are not familiar with the lexicographic framework of the Moscow Semantic School, the foreword of the TKS will provide a useful guide to such key notions as ‘lexical function’.

8. This is at least the ideal state of affairs. In reality, Soviet propaganda was forced to cope with e.g., the rise of a new group of states (the former European colonies) which in the sixties declared themselves non-aligned and which in turn created a linguistic challenge to the rigidly bipartite treatment of the international community.

9. This may be done by rearranging existing synonyms, cf. Russian *miroljubie* (+) vs. *pacifizm* (-), or by creating new terms to make up the pair, cf. *socsorevnovanie* (“socialist competition”, the socialist counterpart of *konkurencija*, which was restricted exclusively to capitalist societies).

10. For example, in certain cases one comes across opposite evaluations for the same term, cf. ‘international’, which carries a positive load in Soviet propaganda, but a negative load in the case of Nazi propaganda, where it is often associated with Jews.

11. Unlike Western lexicography, where implicit evaluative components are usually treated as a kind of connotation, Moscow lexicography posits a separative component called the *modal frame* of the given lexeme, which can roughly be made explicit by the formula: “the speaker considers that this is [good / bad, big / small, etc.]”.

12. To be precise, the empire of evil comprises not only bad guys, but also undesirable states or evolutions within one’s own country. Such exceptions from the ideal picture must then be singled out as ‘isolated’, ‘temporary’, ‘relics of the past’ and so on, see below.

13. As is well known, in many languages some indefinites tend to develop appreciative or depreciative meanings (see Haspelmath 1997: 186–192). Among Russian indefinites, in which much more finegrained distinctions are available, the latter holds particularly for *kakoj-to* which is not represented in the table above. However, *nekotorye*, which does occur in our list, shows no similar tendency in non-Soviet Russian.

14. For an in-depth examination of the metaphors related to death, decay, vermin and garbage in Soviet propaganda see Weiss (2000a).

15. Note that these labels could not evoke ideologically undesirable misunderstandings because 'the new world' in the sense of 'America' would be realized by a different word, namely *novyj svet* (cf. *novyj mir* which renders the political meaning).
16. For details, see Weiss (1999a).
17. These terms themselves often went back to fresh coinings in the 19th century, some of which arose in the gymnastics club movement founded by the 'Turnvater' Jahn, whereas others, e.g., *Gefolgschaft*, are simple scientific terms.
18. For the historical background, the evolution, and the literary genres of this most exotic and amusing aspect of Stalinist propaganda, see Miller (1990). For a linguistic analysis, see Weiss (1999b).
19. The blow against Soviet tales and laments which took place in 1953 can be regarded as the first step towards destalinization, which reached the centre of political discourse at the time of the XXth Party Congress in early 1956, when Khrushchev delivered his famous speech (cf. Weiss 1998).
20. In view of this bad reputation of asphalt, the question of how to account for the high esteem for highways arises. Interestingly enough, it turns out that their construction was motivated rather in ecological than economic terms: they were built with as much consideration for the existing landscape as possible and should allow the German 'Volksgenossen' to enjoy their countryside by slowly riding over hills, plains and through forests; never is there made mention of making traffic itself quicker and more comfortable (Weiss 2003:321).
21. As for the urban outfit of the new kolkhoznica, see Bonnell (1997: 105ff.)
22. This is of course reminiscent of what was said above about the function of archaizing epic tales in Soviet folklore.
23. As for the latter, the history of the term 'Aryan' is most revealing: the controversy about its appropriateness ended by abolishing it in legislation and textbooks, cf. Schmitz-Berning (2000:57).
24. If visualization occurred, it took the shape of traditional animal metaphors (wolf, serpent, spider, shark, octopus, dragon etc.). However, these devices were rather restricted to the external enemy.
25. Only very prominent individual enemies were exempted from this anonymization in pictorial representations, and they usually belonged to the world outside Soviet Union. For example, the political émigré Trotsky was always represented with individual traits, undoubtedly inspired by the traditional Jewish stereotype, and called a Judas. Similarly, Hitler always bore cartoon-like, but recognizable traits.
26. These three texts constitute what has been called the holy trilogy of Stalinism and were extremely widespread (the 'Short Course' alone reached the gigantic print of 42 million copies in sixty-seven languages!). As for Stalin's falsification of his own biography, Khrushchev publicly denounced it later in his so-called secret speech at the XXth Party Congress in early 1956.
27. As for the term 'Stalinism', it should be pointed out that Stalin never officially aspired for such a label, which would have suggested that he was creating his own, new period. The official doctrine in particular still had to be called Marxism-Leninism.

28. See Note 3. The question whether he would have been able to create his own style if he had wanted to is, in my opinion, still left open.
29. Note that the father metaphor is particularly convenient since it is closely related to other roles dear to Stalin, viz. the Great Teacher and the Great Protector. As for the latter, one of Stalinist propaganda's favourites was the representation of Stalin still working in the Kremlin while the whole rest of the country was asleep. This motive was even employed in cradle songs.
30. Of course, there were other metaphors available that rendered the same general idea of equality: in one song, for example, Stalin was called the "eagle among young eagles" and at the same time "the very first deputy" ("Kak *orel* sredi *orljat*, / Samyj pervyj deputat"). Not surprisingly, even the title *vožd'* ('leader') was not Stalin's exclusive privilege, but could be applied to other leading figures inside and outside of the Soviet Union as well as to the Party as a whole (cf. Hitler's exclusive right to the title *Führer*).
31. Even when such exclusive praise is indeed formulated, Lenin is never far away. For example, at the end of Stalin's 'Short Biography' the reader finds the following passage: "After Lenin, *not a single* leader in the whole world had to rule over such gigantic masses of workers and peasants as Josef Stalin. *More than anybody else*, Josef Stalin knows how to generalize the revolutionary, creative experience of the masses...".
32. This meaning can be reinforced by *einig*, cf. *Ein enig Volk*.
33. The distinction becomes obvious in the predicative use: cf. *Das Volk ist eins*, but not: **Der Führer ist eins*. Note that in Russian, these two meanings correspond to different expressions, cf. *edinyj* "united" as in *Narod i partija ediny* "The people and the Party are united" vs. *odin* "one".

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Press instructions as a tool to manipulate the public under the German Nazi government

With an eye towards the German Democratic Republic

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1. Introduction

The power with which totalitarian ideologies used to subjugate entire nations in the 20th century was founded not only on the force and authority of the state but also with the media as a means of social communication. In both fields, reprisals and abuse were common practice. Manipulating the thoughts of the masses and making their ideas conform were considered essential to achieving a regime's political goals. Creating the administrative body for this purpose and the efforts involved in its creation constituted a substantial part of the energies of the new ruling cluster. To them, ideological propaganda was an essential phenomenon, which means that all information and social communication had to be in line with what seemed politically and ideologically opportune. Consequently, manipulation was at the heart of the new dictatorships.

The following article deals with a segment of this manipulation: the Press Instructions imposed on the German press by the Nazi government since 1933. These instructions were a central feature of the Nazis' official news control system. I will start by describing the organization of these instructions and will then focus on the different forms and types of instructions without going too much into detail as this would require more space than is allowed here. Additionally, I will present a short overview of the press control system in the German Democratic Republic after 1945. The dictatorship established in East

Germany after World War II also used press instructions to manipulate the public and to consolidate the Communist rule.

For the purpose of this article, manipulation is defined as only presenting the public with a one-sided view of the world and influencing the formation of a public opinion which conforms to the regime's own objectives and interests. Obviously, this deliberate deception involves and indeed welcomes a great deal of falsification and misrepresentation.

2. The organization of the Nazi press instructions after 1933 and the documenting sources

When the Nazis came to power on January 30, 1933, they immediately implemented measures to overthrow the existing democratic order. At the same time, they took steps to control the means of information, opinion formation, and entertainment.

These measures worked on four levels: new laws had to be created. The control of the press needed to be organized. Favourable economic conditions had to be established. And finally, the content of the media had to be brought into line with the Nazi doctrine.

On the legal level, the *Schriftleitergesetz*, which came into effect on January 1, 1934, constituted an important element of the new media policy. The law allowed the government to monitor access to the journalistic profession. Journalists now had to fulfil certain requirements, and failure to do so could result in their exclusion from practicing their profession.

On the second level, the organization of press control was modelled after structures that the NSDAP had implemented on the party level before 1933 (Paul 1992). The new administrative body was headed by the *Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda* (Reich Ministry for People's Enlightenment and Propaganda). A mandatory membership in the *Reichspressekammer* (Reich Press Chamber) was introduced for all those working for the press. Together with other chambers for the media (radio and film) and culture (literature, theatre, music, art) the Reich Press Chamber formed the *Reichskulturkammer* (Reich Cultural Chamber). Like the Propaganda Ministry, this chamber was headed by Joseph Goebbels.

On the third level, the attempts to reorganize the economic structures of the German press and to add newspaper publishers to the holdings of the Nazis were directed by Max Amann, the president of the Reich Press Chamber and Director of the NSDAP's publishing house *Franz Eher Nachf.*

The fourth level involved manipulating the content of communication. One way the Nazis did this was by merging the two existing news agencies, the *Wolff'sches Telegraphisches Büro* (WTB) and the *Telegraphen Union* (TU), on January 1st, 1934. The new company, the *Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro* (DNB – German News Agency) was then nationalized (Reitz 1991; Uzulis 1995). Furthermore, the regime tried to regulate the content of the press by instructing it directly. The most important of these instructions were issued during a daily news conference at the Reich Propaganda Ministry in Berlin.

The Nazis were not the first in Germany to arrange news conferences where journalists were given information and had the opportunity to make inquiries about the work of the government (Toepser-Ziegert 1984:30f.). Indeed, the first news conference had taken place on August 3, 1914, shortly after the outbreak of World War I. This conference had been instigated by the military, who also intended to monitor the news coverage. News conferences were maintained during the Weimar Republic. They were initiated and presided over by journalists, or else organized as a 'press reception' by the director of the national press office (Bauer 1962:53sq). Participation was voluntary and the independence of the press was respected.

This respect changed decisively after the Nazis seized power. On July 1, 1933, a new law came into effect which reorganized the Berlin news conferences. The conference as an independent institution was abolished and transformed into an instrument of indoctrination. From then on, only selected journalists were admitted to the conference, primarily the correspondents in the capital. They had to apply for admission and consent to certain obligations. Failure to comply resulted in exclusion from the conference. Basically, the 'Führer-principle' was applied to the new institution: everyone had to accept the idea that the state derived its authority from the Führer as the sole executor of the national will. The change from the previous practice aimed to turn the journalists into supporters and confidants of the Reich Propaganda Ministry (Toepser-Ziegert 1984:28). According to official documents, "the new form of the official news conference was to forge an ever closer bond between the press and the government, subjecting the press to the directives of the government" (*Zeitungswissenschaft* 1933/1934:264).

The new press conference met at the Reich Propaganda Ministry on every workday at 12 noon. The deputy Reich Press Chief, the respective director of the ministry's press department (Dr. Hans Jahncke in the beginning) or the heads of other departments informed the journalists about affairs that other ministries or the *Reichskanzlei* (Reich Chancellery) – the ministry directly subordinate to Adolf Hitler – had informed them about. The Foreign Ministry,

which wished to direct its own public relations work, was represented by its own spokesman. The information was followed by additional statements, and the journalists were then given the opportunity to ask questions. Since the authorities considered the number of the accredited journalists too high – it amounted to 150 – an inner circle was established, to which representatives of important national newspapers were appointed. We owe this information to Fritz Sanger, a correspondent of the renowned *Frankfurter Zeitung* in Berlin. He took part in these gatherings (Sanger 1975:30), which the journalists called *Nachborse* ('Post Exchange'). According to Sanger, the government representatives were "generally friendly" towards the journalists (ibid.:29). However, this did not reduce the pressure exercised on the journalists. Incidentally, foreign correspondents were not admitted. A press conference specifically for the international press was not introduced until 1938. This does not mean though that correspondents from abroad could not obtain the information that was withheld from them (Lochner 1955). Sometimes by simply reading the newspapers thoroughly they could learn a lot.

Any information or instruction given out during the news conferences at the Reich Propaganda Ministry was confidential and only for the personal use of the journalists. Passing the instructions on was forbidden. There were no written instructions with consistent wording, only oral presentations. The authorities explicitly wanted the journalists to take notes and render the instructions in their own words. Thus, officials could avoid the impression that the German press was too uniform, an impression which would have undermined their credibility. Yet, journalists' compliance with the instructions was regularly checked and the conferences dealt repeatedly with violations.

Among the obligations that the journalists were forced to consent to was the duty to destroy any notes concerning the Press Instructions. We would not know any details about the instructions today, if some journalists had not defied this obligation and kept their notes or ensured their being passed on. Fortunately, four collections of the Press Instructions still exist today (Toepser-Ziegert 1984: 44f.). They can be found at the Federal Archive of the Federal Republic of Germany. One of these collections survived the Third Reich because its author, Fritz Sanger, buried it in the mooreland near Bremen. Another one, called *Sammlung Brammer*, was gathered by the journalists Georg Dertinger, Hans-Joachim Kausch, and Hans Falk, who produced records for the regional newspapers affiliated with a news service called *Dienatag*. Additionally, there are two collections of instructions in the archives under the names of Traub and Oberheitmann.

The first studies in regard to mass communication as a means of consolidating the power of the Nazis were published in Germany as early as the late 1940s (W. Hagemann 1948; Presse in Fesseln 1948). Although this topic has been one of the main focuses of historical research for decades (Bramsted 1965/1971; Hale 1965; Abel 1968; J. Hagemann 1970; Frei 1980; Gillissen 1986), the scope of these respective studies is limited to some main points. Their focus is on the administrative body and its managing staff. The impact on media content was only treated incidentally or, if at all, through the use of examples. Researchers certainly knew about the news conferences and the Press Instructions and analysed them in connection to specific incidents (W. Hagemann 1948:316f.; Bramsted 1971:148f.; J. Hagemann 1970:32f.). Yet, in regards to the methods of manipulating public opinion, their deductions are quite unsystematic (J. Hagemann 1970:175f.). Because of the lack of sources, an in-depth study of this topic had been impossible for a long time. This changed, however, when Fritz Sanger, who for some years after 1945 had been the editor-in-chief of the news agency *Deutsche Presseagentur*, published a description of the Press Instructions based on his own collection of notes (Sanger 1975). Now there was the contribution of an eye-witness, a document of invaluable historic importance. Yet the description remained selective and shaped by the view of the former journalist.

In the field of communication studies, a systematic analysis of the Nazi Press Instructions required editing and ordering the entirety of the existing sources, a project that has been executed by the *Institut fur Zeitungsforschung* in Dortmund (Institute for Newspaper Research) beginning in the 1980s (Bohrmann 1984ff.). In 1984, the first volume of the of the Nazi Press Instructions was published – the volume encompassed the instructions issued in 1933. A further six volumes with several sub-volumes followed. The seventh volume appeared in 2001 and includes the instructions issued between January 1939 and the outbreak of the war. Consequently, this set, the result of 20 years of work, is limited to the pre-war era. Nevertheless it already consists of 17 volumes – including reference volumes.

In 1938, the Reich Propaganda Ministry reorganized its tools of instructing the press. In October 1937, conferences concerning commentaries were instituted, from March 1938 on these conferences met regularly at 11:30 AM, 30 minutes before the start of the general news conference. Moreover, journalists were summoned to special conferences dealing with precise topics (Bohrmann 1999, 6/I, 17*). In 1938, Otto Dietrich, director of the NSDAP's press office, became Reich Press Chief and the undersecretary of Joseph Goebbels, which increased the friction and conflict between the two men. Finally, the competi-

tion for the domestic and the international press was divided and required to two different divisions within the ministry. In December 1938, Hans Fritzsche replaced Alfred-Ingemar Berndt, who had been in charge of the organization of the daily news conferences since 1936.

After the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, the Press Instructions became even stricter. In November 1940, Otto Dietrich began to issue the so-called *Tagesparolen* (daily watchwords), which were transmitted by telephone, written down and read out loud during the news conferences. Again, only a selection of these instructions have been published until today, based on the collections I have mentioned and other sources such as the estate of the late Helmut Sündermann. Since 1937, Sündermann was Dietrich's division head at the NSDAP's Reich Press Office. He claimed that it was he who had suggested the introduction of the *Tagesparolen*, which he found more direct than the procedure in use at the time, and that Dietrich had then appointed him to the office of this new tool (Sündermann 1973:15). When giving instructions regarding all areas of propaganda, Goebbels, himself, preferred his secret *Ministerkonferenzen* (Ministry Conferences), which he had started in the early days of the war (Boelcke 1967).

The volumes of the Nazi Press Instructions presents an extensive body of sources for the period from 1933 to August 1939. Altogether, it contains more than 15,000 Press Instructions, each of them with separate documentation and commentary. The mere number gives an idea of the intensity, with which the Nazis controlled the information of the German people through daily newspapers, influenced the masses, and tried to frame the minds of the people according to their goals. To analyse these sources in their totality would require a project of considerable dimensions, which is not possible here. Therefore, I will have to concentrate on selected points and examples. I will outline the main aspects and categories, which can serve as a blueprint for the systematic analysis of the Nazi Press Instructions as a means of manipulation.

3. Quantity and intensity of the press instructions

As the set of the Nazi Press Instructions has been recently completed, we can determine the precise quantity and intensity of the instructions contained in the edition. There are 15,311 Press Instructions listed for the period dating from May 1933 until the end of August 1939, just before the beginning of World War II. This number relies on, of course, the principles used by the editors and the primary sources from which they drew on. To define the exact amount

of all Press Instructions ever issued is hardly possible. Furthermore, one must consider that in 1933 several different instructions were summed up in one 'large' instruction. Only gradually did this procedure become standardized in the form of so-called *Bestellungen* ('making on order'), which gave a formal and thematic unity to the instructions.


If the total number of Press Instructions is considerable and impressive, their quantitative development might strike one as even more revealing. From just 290 in 1933 (May–December), the number of instructions rose to 1,036 in 1934 and 1,490 in 1935. The following year shows even higher figures with 2,505 instructions issued. In 1937, this number increased to 3,160 and, in 1938, to 3,753. In 1939 from January to August alone, it rose to 3,077. Consequently, the number and the intensity of the Nazi Press Instructions grew steadily year after year. This suggests that the system for controlling the press in the Third Reich became ever more comprehensive. An increasing number of incidents, events, and topics became subjected to official regulations, which means that the proportion of the newspaper reporting not influenced by party propaganda was constantly shrinking. Yet, the large number of regulations flooding Germany's newspapers may suggest that journalists still had some room to manoeuvre and used this space in a way that displeased the Nazis, who therefore tried to limit freedom more and more.


Graphically calculating the number of Press Instructions issued on a monthly basis provides an even more instructive view of their quantitative dimension (Figure 1).

The graph shows monthly fluctuations but also sustained growth. The number reaches its first peak in February 1934 (with 96), and then the figures sink considerably. Not until November 1935 do the figures exceed those of the previous year (with 169). In the following months, the amount of newly issued Press Instructions continues to fluctuate, but grows on the average. It peaks again in June 1937 (with 341) and in March 1938 (388). The number of Press Instructions once more slumps (199 in July 1938), only to soar during the last three months before the outbreak of the war, climbing to a record high of 513 in August 1939.

Figure 2 illustrates how rapidly the number of Press Instructions issued each month grew on average between 1933 and 1939.

The graph rises continuously. In comparison to 1933, the amount of Press Instructions issued in 1939 augmented by 700 percent. Of course, it is also possible to calculate the amount of instructions issued per day. In 1933 – only a few – albeit lengthy instructions were issued daily, whereas on average 10 instructions per day were given in 1935, then 15 in 1938, and approximately 20





Source: Hans Bohrmann (Hrsg.): NS-Pressanweisungen der Vorkriegszeit. Edition und Dokumentation. 1–7. München, New York, London, Paris 1984–2001.

Figure 2. Average number of NS-Press Instructions per month (from May 1933 to August 1939)

between May and July 1939. In August 1939, the average number reached 25 instructions per day. These figures, too, prove that the Nazis gradually intensified their control over the press by expanding the system of Press Instructions.

Exactly to what degree the growth of this system was caused by specific incidents and current events requires a thorough examination that would exceed the scope of this article. To be sure, incidents that were the focus of political interest occurred everyday; yet a review of the sources indicates that authorities did not so much concentrate on a restricted number of occasions to issue new Press Instructions. They rather multiplied and diversified the instructions increasingly to encompass every aspect of life.

4. Topics and contents of the press instructions

In light of the great number of Nazi Press Instructions, it is evident that the subjects they dealt with and their content can hardly be summed up in a few words. Instead, I will only make some general remarks about their content. A systematic classification – which an analysis of their content could provide – has not existed until now. The need for and subjects of the Press Instructions were, as aforementioned, diverse, and as their number grew so did their content, until they covered almost all areas of life. Yet, it would be wrong to assume that the Nazis dealt with all possible subjects or even sensitive issues during their news conferences. This was not the case. The regime preferred to conceal certain subjects from the public or else simply evaded them. These subjects were not seen fit for public discussion, and were kept secret as long as possible, and were only reacted to when it could no longer be avoided.

The Nazi Press Instructions referred to content of every section of the newspaper. Politics were, of course, in the foreground with a special focus on domestic political affairs. News coverage should support the new political order and government and cast a positive light on them. Similar methods – aimed at increasing the power of the nation – defined the Press Instructions which dealt with foreign policy. Their content depended largely on what seemed to be politically opportune at the moment. This is also true in cases concerning persons or subjects that had no connection to Germany. The press was expected to create a favourable international climate for German interests as defined by the Nazis. In this respect, questions that concerned the military, armament or (in the field of domestic politics) the relationship with churches were considered particularly delicate by the regime.

The main emphasis of the Press Instructions issued in 1933/1934 was the consolidation of political power at home, including new legislation, and the conflict with the League of Nations. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935/1936 and the Spanish Civil War in the following years appeared frequently among international topics. In 1938, the instructions focused on the *Anschluss* of Austria and the crisis in German-Czechoslovak relations. Press Instructions dealing with the Jews peaked in the same year.

Apart from political affairs, a lot of the new Press Instructions was focused on the state of the economy. Particularly questions regarding labour, supplying the population with food and food problems had to be handled with great care. Economic successes such as the reduction in unemployment were to be stressed, problems in the economy were to be ignored. The same principle applied to other aspects of life, for example, criminality and the coverage of court hearings by legal correspondents. The ideology of the Nazis was totalitarian and aimed at revolutionizing culture in its entirety. Therefore, it is not surprising that a great deal of Press Instructions were also concerned with this field. The importance attached to art and culture in the new society led to the establishment of a special news conference for cultural politics (Fröhlich 1974). Books were often recommended to be reviewed. Even sports reporting was regulated. In 1936, for example, journalists were thoroughly instructed how to cover the Olympic Summer Games in Berlin.

5. Types and forms of press instructions

The Nazi Press Instructions issued between 1933 and 1939 can be classified according to the subjects they deal with. Among them, we also find different forms and types. From the point of view of communication studies, this analysis might be more interesting, because it does not consider the instructions merely as statements – which reduces them to their semantic content – but also – in regard to their pragmatic component – as speech acts. Referring to Speech acts theory provides the structures needed for this analysis (Searle 1969, 1979).

What I wish to do is to suggest a typology for the Nazi Press Instructions. It is designed to include the functions and actions each instruction was to fulfil or make journalists do. The typology is open to further differentiation. Each of the types and forms of instructions is given with one or more examples, all from the source in the Press Instructions (including its number and date as quoted in Bohrmann 1984f.). Although a quick glance at the sources will immediately

result in an impression of which types and forms occur more frequently than others, one cannot determine their exact empirical distribution without systematically counting them. Therefore only examples will be given here.

My analysis starts with certain basic types, followed by the types concerned with the different speech acts. The attempt is made to translate the German typology (given in parentheses) and the style of formulation into English.

Reflexive Instructions (Reflexive Anweisung)

Reflexive instructions are defined as instructions that are self-referring, which means they concern the very system that produced them. These instructions aim to stabilize the system and maintain its ability to function. For example, an instruction issued on September 10, 1938, says:

Repeated instruction that no instructions concerning the release, the banning, or layout of announcements shall be accepted, except those of the Press Office of the Propaganda Ministry. Stress this prohibition under any circumstance. (2491/1938)

This type of instruction also includes announcements of a practical nature, such as the distribution of tickets (1198/1937), the invitation to a certain event (576/1936), or the presentation of a new official staff member during the news conference (2454/1938).

Announcements (Pressemeldung)

Interestingly, it was rather extraordinary for the information to consist of nothing but pure facts – something one expects of today's news conferences. Only rarely did this type appear among the Press Instructions issued in Berlin, for example on February 7, 1935:

The Führer will receive the Japanese ambassador at 12 AM today. The ambassador will give him his letter of accreditation. Official speeches will be transmitted by the DNB. (1094/1935)

Authorization (Autorisierung)

The Propaganda Ministry used the news conferences to distribute news that had official authorization – the instruction mentioned above which refers to the news agency DNB serves as an example here. Journalists were often obliged to use this central (and secretly nationalized) news agency as their only authentic source.

Note that information dealing with receptions of the Reich Chancellor may only be published on the basis of announcements issued by the DNB.
(298/1934)

The news agency DNB served as a distribution channel for important speeches by Hitler, Goebbels, and other high-ranking Nazi officials. Journalists were forbidden to change the wording. Yet, these were not the only cases for which authorization was required:

Future news and travel reports about Iran must be approved of by the Reich Propaganda Ministry, in order to avoid any further trouble.
(109/1939)

Datelines and 'postponing' (Sperrfristen, 'Vertröstung')

Datelines for use with certain information were common practice. Additionally, there was a type I will call 'Postponing'. These instructions actually served to put off journalists with the promise to provide more information in the future or to authorize the publishing of a news item at a later date:

The *New York Times* has published an alleged interview with Dr Goebbels. It is forbidden to report about this until further notice by the DNB.
(333/1934)

Instructions of this kind were given frequently. Obviously, the political rulers needed time to decide how to deal with and react to certain information. Of course, this caused considerable delays and reduced the relevance of the information retained.

Denial, corrections (Dementi, Richtigstellung)

The news conferences also provided officials with an opportunity to issue corrections and official denials. These were intended to contradict reports and rumours that were supposedly false. Especially information contained in foreign newspapers was often reacted to in the following way:

A rumour has appeared in the foreign press stating that Neurath [the German foreign minister] wants to establish a contact with the Vatican, particularly with Pacelli [who was the secretary of the Vatican City at the time and later became Pope Pius XII]. This is not true. He [Neurath] is only conferring with members of the Italian government. (585/1937)

Prescribed wording (Sprachregelung)

It is common knowledge that the Nazis pursued a specific language policy (Schmitz-Berning 2000). Ideological terminology was introduced and its use was encouraged. Undesirable words were to be replaced or deleted. Language was seen as a tool for manipulating the thoughts of the masses according to the regime's ideology. Apart from the fact that the press instructions reflected the Nazi vocabulary in the first place, they tried to explicitly regulate the language the press was to use. The thought of 'blood and soil' was to be avoided where colonial propaganda was concerned (444/1934) and May 1 was to be called 'National Holiday', not 'Labour Day' (446/1934). A further example dates from May 19, 1937:

The Reich Propaganda Board of the NSDAP has used the catchword 'World Enemy No. 1' for Bolshevism. Religious communities and other organizations have adopted this expression, in order to describe their respective enemies as 'World Enemy No. 2' and so on. The press shall not imitate this use of the catchword. (1163/1937)

The objective of the Press Instructions was to influence the content of newspapers through use of official regulations. The central strategy was to interfere with the journalists' news selection. Indeed, this can be observed with varying degrees of intensity, particularly through the use of different modal expressions.

Ban on publication (Publikationsverbot)

Even without counting the exact number of instructions preventing the publishing of information, I assume that bans on or suppression of information were the most frequent type of press instructions. This means that the predominant strategy was to simply forbid publication, although an explicit prohibition was quite rare. It seems that this was only done in emergency cases such as that of the fight against former 'dissenters' within the NSDAP:

Please note that it is forbidden to mention the name of Otto Strasser in the German press, no matter in which context. (1037/1937)

This strategy was also applied with facts that were inconvenient for the Reich:

The German press has again published information about the foreign debts of German shipping companies. It is strictly forbidden to publish any article on this subject. (167/1934)

Yet, the authorities usually resorted to less explicit, but no less binding speech acts, in order to ban information from being published. They preferred to use negations containing the auxiliaries 'should' and 'may':

News about American special tariffs on German exports should not be reported. (509/1936)

Reports about the armament of the Czechoslovak air force should not be published. (1230/1937)

News about the dissolution of the Hitler Youth in Kiel and its new formation may not be published. (8175/1934)

It is stressed again that problems related to the reform of the law of divorce may not be covered in the newspapers. (1149/1937)

Request to refrain from publication (Wunsch auf Publikationsverzicht)

Sometimes the Nazis used instructions which sounded even more 'polite'. They merely requested or asked the journalists not to publish certain news:

Journalists are requested not to cover an aircraft accident which took place at Hetzdorf this morning. (430/1934)

The Foreign Ministry asks reporters to treat the situation in Southern Slavia with more caution and restraint. (1099/1935)

Aside from suppressing information as part of a 'negative' strategy, the authorities also issued press instructions that were intended to place desirable information in the German press. This can be called the juxtaposed 'positive' strategy. It entailed three moods of varying intensity:

Permission to publish (Publikationserlaubnis)

There were some cases in which explicit permission was given to publish certain information:

The diplomatic conflict with Sweden (concerning the expulsion of a press representative) and German reprisals may be objectively covered by the press. . . (238/1934)

Request for publication (Publikationswunsch)

Government officials could also advise, recommend, or express the wish that some information be featured in the newspapers:

The Reich Defense Ministry requests that the rank of members of the Wehrmacht (armed forces) be mentioned in reports about their successes at sports competitions. Recently, this rule has frequently been broken out of ignorance. (295/1934)

Order to publish (Publikationsgebot)

The strongest form of a 'positive' instruction was the order to publish, which means using pressure or even threatening, in order to have the newspapers cover a certain information. The following example refers to a prominent member of the NSDAP's elite:

Saboteurs claim that the Reich Youth Leader Baldur von Schirach is of non-Aryan descent and that his real name is Baruch Meier. These rumours have to be countered under all circumstances. Baldur von Schirach is obviously of purely Aryan descent. (189/1934)

This example shows that there apparently existed a kind of opposition in the Third Reich that dispersed rumours unfavourable for the political leaders. To suppress them and to counteract its sources were goals of the Press Instructions.

Not only did the administrative body responsible for the Nazi propaganda use press instructions in order to influence what information was published in the newspapers, it tried also to control the way in which this news was commented on. Commentaries, when they appeared at all, were to conform to the tendencies pursued in the news. Corresponding instructions were given. Comparable with the news selection, the Nazis issued 'positive' and 'negative' instructions with varying intensity.

Ban on commentaries (Kommentierungsverbot)

Frequently, it was simply forbidden to comment on certain incidents and subjects. Above all, this was true for 'inconvenient' subjects that were not to receive any further attention. In this respect, the ban on commentaries was part of the overall strategy of 'downplaying' the negative event. Yet, it was also meant to prevent the newspapers from making any inconvenient and independent statements. In some cases, the authorities even expected the readers to draw their own conclusions about what happened. I will quote two examples for this type of instruction:

The so-called recordings of the French general military staff published by the *Berliner Börsen-Zeitung* may neither be used nor commented.

(1075/1935)

The fact that the Polish *Winterhilfswerk* [a charity organization] could only collect donations of money and goods worth Zloty 31 million may no longer be commented. Particularly comparisons with the results of the German *Winterhilfswerk* may not be made.

(591/1937)

Request for commentaries (Kommentierungswunsch)

At other times – this was the ‘positive’ version – journalists were explicitly requested to comment on certain news. An example for such a request dates from March 17, 1934:

On the occasion of the death of the president of Venezuela, the government asks for friendly commentaries that underline that he was a particularly brilliant statesman. . .

(374/1934)

There were also instructions that expressed the opposite request:

The situation of the Protestant Church may not be reported. Commentaries on the Good Friday declaration of the Reich Bishop, in which he addressed the parish priests, are not requested.

(401/1934)

Order to comment (Kommentierungsgebot)

In some cases, a simple request was thought to be insufficient and therefore direct orders were given to provide a commentary. This was intended to ensure the support of the press at a given moment.

News about the flag incident at San Francisco should be accompanied by a short commentary which expresses the expectation that the United States make amends for the insult that the German flag has suffered. (1288/1937)

The jamming of German radio stations by the Soviet transmitter must be commented sharply.

(2595/1938)

Layout instructions (Aufmachungsanweisungen)

Many Nazi Press Instructions forced newspapers to use a specific layout for certain topics and articles. The Nazis thought that the coverage and layout of a newspaper were indicators of the significance of specific topics and articles. It played a decisive role in drawing the reader’s attention to certain articles

and therefore influenced his selection and evaluation of information. Basically, there were two methods to achieve this: one strategy was to emphasize information by placing it in a prominent position in the newspaper; the second was to downplay inconvenient information with an unobtrusive layout. Both strategies were used. First, I will provide two examples of emphasizing information:

The opening ceremony of the Leipzig Fair should receive a prominent place in the political part of Monday's newspapers. The government requests that the articles be very appreciative. (319/1934)

The brilliant success of Germany at the Biennale in Venice should make a big splash in the newspapers. The award-winning movies must be appreciated and their history described, particularly the history of the Olympia movie. (2396/1938)

In September 1938, the Nazis tried to intensify the crisis they had instigated regarding Czechoslovakia:

The Propaganda Ministry has issued the directive that for the time being no edition may be published that does not feature a prominent lead article with four columns (covering the page) about the incidents in Czechoslovakia, beginning with the respective military measures. Sharp commentaries. . . (2549/1938)

I will now quote three examples for the 'downplaying' of news, a strategy that was used particularly when bad news was concerned – such as damage, failure or subjects that should not be given too much attention:

The DNB-news about the regrettable plane accident at Stettin which killed 11 people may not be published on the first page but only on the inner pages of the newspaper. (1073/1935)

Reports about the growing urban population should not be too extensive because these figures are closely observed by governments abroad. (1092/1935)

Daladier's [the French Prime Minister] voyage to Tunis should be treated according to its significance but not too sensational. (7/1939)

Another popular instrument used to avoid an unnecessary sensation or scandal was to allow the publication of a specific news item only in those geographic areas where the population was directly concerned and forbid all other newspapers from publishing:

The magazine of the Catholic parish at Essen and 219 other parish magazines have been suppressed because of an article about the ideological indoctrination of the BDM [Bund deutscher Mädchen – German Girls Association]. The respective DNB-news may *only* be published in the district of Essen. (671/1937)

The Propaganda Ministry also used the daily news conferences in Berlin as a means to comment on the news coverage of the German press. If necessary, they reproached the attending journalists for failing to comply with their instructions. To serve this purpose, the Nazis created a type of instruction that reflected their criticism.

Reprimand, warning (Rüge, Mißbilligung)

Failure to adhere to the Press Instructions and other misconduct of the journalists led to the newspapers being reprimanded. If the articles they featured were disapproved of, they were given advice to follow the instructions. Even warnings were issued, which shows that the news conferences had a great potential to threaten journalists:

The *Berliner Börsen-Zeitung* features a commentary on Eden's speech in the House of Commons today, which the Führer disapproves of. A conflict with Eden is to be avoided under all circumstances. The words with which the *Börsen Zeitung* attacked Eden were totally inappropriate. (358/1936)

The achievements of the late Maxim Gorky were given too much appreciation. Several newspapers have been reprimanded because of this.

(604/1936)

The *Germania* [Catholic Newspaper] was reprimanded because it covered the sex crime process . . . only with a single sentence. The *Germania* can hardly expect that news coverage of this kind will be tolerated.

(1247/1937)

Appreciation, approval (Bestätigung, Anerkennung)

Journalists were not only given the 'stick' at the Berlin news conferences but also the occasional 'carrot'. Yet the instructions only rarely contain approval, appreciation, or even praise. The Propaganda Ministry was quite pleased with the news coverage on the crisis in the Sudetenland in September 1938 because it demonstrated the effectiveness of the Ministry's strategy:

The German press has done a brilliant job, although the depiction [of the conflict] varied. The Führer was extraordinarily pleased with the press.

(2599/1938)

Visual instructions (Optische Anweisungen)

While most of the Press Instructions concern the wording of news items, one can also find instructions concerning photographic news coverage. These instructions were meant to prevent photos from being published that the regime considered detrimental to its policy. A typical example for this type of instruction is the following:

Photos showing members of the Reich government or other high-ranking politicians at social events, banquets, etc. may not be published under any circumstances. Newspapers that fail to comply with this ruling will be severely punished.

(173/1934)

6. Interim conclusions

Since 1933, the Nazi Government in Germany used the Press Instructions to create an increasingly comprehensive control system for both the news coverage and commentaries in newspapers. These instructions were especially designed to influence those organs of the press that were not part of the NSDAP and to make them fulfil the interests of the administration. This task was not deemed necessary or easily completed where the party's own newspapers were concerned. It was more difficult to accomplish this in regard to the 'outside' newspapers. Even though the communist and social democratic press had been liquidated since 1933, there still remained the so-called 'bourgeois' press. The goal of the Press Instructions was to force them into line with the Nazi doctrine. Yet, the Nazis went even further. During their reign, the bourgeois press was diminished in several waves that entailed the deliberate closing or banning of newspapers. Meanwhile the number and circulation of NSDAP newspapers grew continuously larger.

The result of this development was that the group the Press Instructions targeted was steadily shrinking. Of course, this did not alter the need for the instructions. Instead, its totalitarian features became even stronger, which can be seen in the growth and thematic diversification of the instructions. From today's perspective, it is astonishing how much the instructions reflect inferior and (seemingly) unimportant events. An example of such an instruction

that for the modern reader cannot be anything but ridiculous dates from February 5, 1935:

Urgent request not to discuss the subject of soy beans. A big article in Tuesday's edition of the newspaper DAZ [Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung] is based on absolutely wrong assumptions. The DAZ has been warned: legal proceedings have been initiated against the responsible editor.

(1084/1935)

Yet, the system of Press Instructions itself, produced problems. Such problems arose, for example, when a change in the Nazis' policy occurred and something different was considered more opportune. Changes of this kind resulted in press instructions with content opposite to that of the previous instructions, necessitating an official explanation.

Our analysis of the Nazi Press Instructions draws on sources dating from the years before World War II. As mentioned, only sources for this period have been edited extensively. The *Tagesparolen* issued during the war, however, still need further study.

So far, only a selection of the *Tagesparolen* has been published (Sündermann 1973). A first examination shows that the basic types of press instructions issued before 1939 were still used during the war, but now their content was determined by the needs of warfare. The Nazi propaganda machine faced the tremendous challenge of 'selling' the war to the public, a task that became increasingly harder as the initial successes were followed by defeat.

Of course, this analysis of the Press Instructions does not answer the question of how journalists used them and to what degree they influenced the news coverage and commentaries. This would require a comparison between the content of the newspaper articles and the instructions themselves. Fritz Sanger documented the way journalists at the *Frankfurter Zeitung* dealt with the instructions. Sanger describes the journalists' dilemma, but also points out that there were ways to distance oneself from the propaganda (Sanger 1975). As late as October 1936 – when the press conferences in Berlin were already in their third year – the regime used sharp criticism to express its dissatisfaction with the conduct of the German press:

We have noticed repeatedly that the German press publishes news items and reports full of suicidal objectivity; this will not be tolerated. We do not want news coverage in the old liberal sense of the word; we want to bring every newspaper into line with the principles of the National Socialist political order.

(Wulf 1964:80; compare with 259/1936)

7. The organization of the press instructions in the German Democratic Republic

The defeat of Germany in World War II and the collapse of the Nazi administration brought an end to their system of media control. The four allies divided up and occupied the devastated country. While steps were undertaken to rebuild independent, democratic media in the occupied zones of West Germany, and later on to revive press conferences organized by journalists in the capital, the German media in the Soviet zone were once again forced to serve a totalitarian ideology: Communism. Journalists were to serve as 'functionaries of the workers' class' and contribute to the establishment of a socialist society. Lenin's press theory provided the basic principles for this system (Herrmann 1963).

Of course, the goals of the Communist regime could not be accomplished without complete media control (Holzweißig 1997, 2002). For this purpose, the occupying Soviet authorities implemented a system that was continued by the leaders of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) after it was founded in October 1949. The Office of Information founded in this year turned into the Press Office of the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic in 1952, and became the Press Office of the President of the Council of Ministers of the GDR in 1963. Its aim was to influence media content (for example, by distributing licenses to publish), yet, it was not the only institution used to regulate the media as a whole. The ideological centre of the responsible administrative body was the Committee for Agitation of the *Politbüro*. It was headed for several decades by Joachim Herrmann. Instructions were issued daily by the Agitation Department (also known as: Agitation and Propaganda) of the Central Committee of the ruling *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED). Heinz Geggel was the department's director from 1973 to 1989.

Considering the number of offices, it could be said that the regime of the GDR utilized various offices to instruct the media. The Press Office of the President of the Council of Ministers published press information on several days each week. On an irregular basis, Joachim Herrmann, Secretary of the Central Committee, issued instructions after the Tuesday sessions of the *Politbüro* (Holtermann 1999). These so-called 'Argus' ('Argu' is an abbreviation of the word 'Argumentation') took place regularly on the premises of the SED Central Committee on each Thursday at 10 AM. They are comparable with the news conferences which were held at the Nazi Propaganda Ministry from 1933 on. Incidentally, both conferences took place at locations not far away from each other in Berlin. Between 60 and 80 journalists met at the 'Thursday-Argus'. Among them were the editors-in-chief of the most important public

or party companies in the press, radio, and TV business (Bürger 1990). The editors then had to tell their colleagues what they heard. To miss an 'Argu' was dangerous. The magazines of other parties in the GDR – after 1949, they had been forced into an association with the SED called *Nationale Front* – were not represented at the conferences. The 'Thursday-Argus' were directed by Heinz Geggel, mentioned above, and other party members employed by the Central Committee and the administration. Often, there were two to four subjects to be discussed with additional instructions concerning commentaries and news about current affairs.

Currently, a close examination of the GDR press instructions is even more difficult than an analysis of the Nazi Press Instructions, because sources are still quite insufficient. Only a few sample documents have been selected for publication from the files of the Press Office of the President of the Council of Ministers (Holzweißig 1991: 16f.). Among them, one can find a 'taboo list' dating from November 12, 1968. This list contains 12 economic topics about which nothing was to be published. We know more about the 'Thursday-Argus' thanks to a book published under the name Ulrich Bürger in 1990, shortly after the Berlin wall fell. Nevertheless this name is a pseudonym: Bürger's real name is Ulrich Ginolas, and he was a former deputy Press Official of the National Council of the *Nationale Front*. He occasionally participated in the 'Thursday-Argus', took notes – which was unusual – and copied them for others. Therefore these documents have been preserved for later research, even though they were once as secret as the Nazi Press Instructions. Of course, Bürger's book does not fulfil academic standards but simply renders his notes; moreover, he omitted some instructions arguing that "many sounded too stupid" (Bürger 1990: 19).

8. Contents and forms of the press instructions in the GDR

In spite of its limitations, Bürger's book allows some conclusions to be drawn concerning the press instructions in the GDR. Although their content differs from that of the Nazi Press Instructions, there is some similarity in regard to their forms and types. In general, the system of the SED press instructions seems to be less differentiated and standardized than that of the Nazis, if the reader takes into account the records that were disposed of. The SED instructions are much more imperative, and sound more 'primitive' – an impression that can be attributed through to the use of various obscenities.

Ulrich Ginolas' (alias Ulrich Bürger) written records of the 'Thursday-Argus' cover the period between February 25, 1982, and October 19, 1989.

Notes from the years before that time – Bürger attended the *Argus* beginning in 1978 – have not been preserved. Therefore, examples of the press instructions exist only for the last years of the GDR. These instructions dealt with a variety of subjects; primarily domestic and international politics and the economy, but they also touch on social topics, cultural events and sports. Domestically, the actions of the government and the leaders of the SED were the most important themes. Internationally, the NATO agreements on the deployment of new arms and the policy of the Reagan administration were in the foreground starting in the early 1980s. A frequent topic was the relationship with West Germany. Since 1982, the Federal Republic of Germany was governed by Helmut Kohl and his Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Therefore the communist regime stressed its successes in relations, particularly state visits and visits of GDR-officials in West Germany, including the visit of Erich Honecker, SED General Secretary. However a subject that could not be completely avoided was the rising tension between the GDR and the USSR after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Neither could the communists conceal the wave of emigration leading to growing domestic problems in 1988/1989. In regards to the economy, political leaders dealt with successes like the Leipzig Trade Fair and problems like supplying the population with basic necessities. Youth and Workers' Festivals offered opportunities for social news. And finally, even the treatment of artists and writers required official instructions.

Although basic facts about upcoming or planned events were provided at the 'Thursday-Argus', their main point was essentially to give directives for argumentation and opinion-formation. Some of these directives were quite abstract and similar to official party doctrines. The following quotations from Ulrich Bürger (with page number and date) provide examples of these directives:

Use all possible aspects of the subject 'peace', examine it from all perspectives, try new ideas, new and alternating views. (January 13, 1983:54)

No reports that could cause resignation. (November 10, 1983:89)

Provide only good information to the public at large. Good information is peace and socialism. (June 16, 1985: 129)

The media must serve all measures for the consolidation of the GDR. This is the overall standard, the top priority. (August 20, 1986: 156)

Apart from strategic instructions, there were also tactical ones. These encompassed both orders to publish and bans on publication. It was often forbidden to publish certain news, such as with government problems and economic bottlenecks. For example, journalists were not allowed to report that homes

were being turned into kindergartens and used for purposes other than living in them (March 18, 1982: 30). Journalists were instructed as follows: "Do not make any predictions concerning the crop! Do not arouse any expectation of consumer goods!" (June 9, 1983: 73). Problems in the production process had to be concealed:

The following must not be discussed in public: the railroad company has discovered that all concrete ties must be replaced: international! This is not a subject, but we must know it! (June 9, 1983: 178)

The suppression of publication was repeatedly justified out of consideration for foreign partners. On the occasion of an Austrian wine scandal, the following paradoxical instruction was issued:

We will publish nothing about the wine adulteration! We have not received any deliveries of 'such stuff'. We won't let ourselves be included in a 'war' against Austria. Those customers who have bought Austrian wine may return it to the shops. (July 18, 1985: 134)

I will now present two additional examples of the sparing between 'capitalist' countries and obvious dictatorships:

Nothing about the militarisation of Japan! Not our subject. (August 1, 1985: 136)

Pakistan is not a subject. We depend far too much on the airfield in Karachi! (ibid.)

Orders to publish instructed the journalists to positively cover certain events:

Give examples how one can succeed in spite of great difficulties! (March 25, 1982: 33)

Fight against stationing: continue with determination! (November 3, 1983: 87)

Include all news coming from Cuba, Cubans are on the ball. (ibid.)

Emphasizing and downplaying, two strategies known from the Nazi Press Instructions, were also common practice at the 'Thursday-Argus'. The visit of PLO leader Arafat to the Pope in 1982 was to receive "great attention" (September 16, 1982); the youth exchange with Poland was to be "strongly underlined" (June 23, 1983: 76); certain aspects of a youth festival in 1984 were to be "especially emphasized" whereas other aspects were not to be emphasized (May 10, 1984: 100). Some information was reserved for district newspapers (Jan-

uary 1st, 1985: 120). Commentaries were also prohibited, for example on the anniversary of the Berlin Wall in 1984: “No commentary regarding August 13!” (August 9, 1984: 104).

When the National Olympic Committee of the GDR decided the same year that the GDR would not participate in the Olympic Games at Los Angeles, the administration requested that journalists write no commentary or statement:

Until further notice, nothing may be published that we have not authorized. No individual initiative! (May 10, 1984: 101)

Yet there were also orders to publish commentaries that were in line with the *Neues Deutschland*, the party newspaper of the SED. On the occasion of the meeting between the foreign ministers Gromyko and Shultz in January 1985, the authorities issued the following instruction:

Commentaries in line with the ND are to be published by all newspapers today. (January 10, 1985: 118)

Journalists were to quote critical remarks from Western sources rather than make their own statements.

Reprimands can also be found among Heinz Geggel’s press instructions. Newspaper articles were criticized as ‘wrong and bad’ (for example, February 25: 1982). Yet, Geggel sometimes lavished praise on newspapers, too. “Reports on the crisis in the USA have had a good quality”, he said on December 4, 1986 (p. 167). When Erich Honecker visited West Germany in the autumn of 1987, Geggel sang the praises of the East German media he was so satisfied with their news coverage:

Our media provided the citizens with total information. We got a positive echo; even the other side had to acknowledge this. (September 17, 1987: 188)

This was, however, in opposition to the predominant content of the press instructions. Or as the director of the ‘Thursday-Argus’ once put it:

We don’t say that – we’ll imply it. (February 25, 1982: 27)

Incidentally, Ginolas, alias Bürger, applied this philosophy to the title of his book.

9. Final conclusions

Despite their different ideological backgrounds, both the Nazi Press Instructions and the ‘Thursday-Argus’ in the GDR share some unmistakable similarities. Yet, one must also consider the differences between them.

During the Third Reich, the Propaganda Ministry implemented a system of press instructions in order to make the press obey the Nazis’ political interests. After the banning or liquidation of many newspapers, the Nazis sought to bring the remaining ‘bourgeois’ press organs – often liberal or conservative democratic publishing houses – into line with the Nazi ideology. Yet, the Nazis did not want to make the press ‘too’ uniform. In contrast to this, a largely homogeneous press emerged in the Soviet zone immediately after the war. Although the ‘block parties’ were given publishing licenses similar to the SED and its preferred organizations, the licenses themselves were used as a tool to influence the press. Additional means of control was a limitation of paper and journalists trained by government institutions. Therefore, the political rulers of the GDR encountered a smaller opposition in the press than the Nazis and it was easier for the communists to make journalists accept their point of view.

However, this assumption still needs to be proved through a comparison of the instructions and the content of the newspapers. As Ulrich Ginolas, alias Ulrich Bürger, writes: it “didn’t matter at all, whether you bought this or that newspaper; one was the spitting image of the other” (Bürger 1990:16). If this is true, it is probably a result of the impressive efficiency of press instructions in the GDR.

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