

**ARMED
CONFLICT
IN AFRICA**

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADB	African Development Bank
ADFL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo)
ANC	African National Congress
ARCI	African Rapid Crisis Initiative
AU	African Union (formerly Organization of African Unity)
BCP	Basuto Congress Party (Lesotho)
CAR	Central African Republic
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CRD	Congolese Rally for Democracy (DRC)
DOD	Department of Defense
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States (French Abbreviation CEDEAO)
EPLF	Eritrean Popular Liberation Forces
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
ex-FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises (Rwandan Armed Forces)
FAZ	Forces Armées Zairoises (Armed Forces of Zaire)
FIS	Front islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, Algeria)

FLN	Front de Libération Nationale (Algerian National Liberation Front)
FPR	Front Patriotique Rwandais (Rwandan Patriotic Front) Also RPF
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)
FROLINAT	Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (Chadian National Liberation Front)
FRUD	Front pour la Réstauration de l'unité et de la Démocratie (Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy, Djibouti)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KANU	Kenya Africa National Union (National Revolutionary Movement, Congo)
MFDC	Casamance Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques (Casamance Democratic Forces Movement)
MNR	Movement National de la Révolution (Congo)
MONIMA	Mouvement National pour l'Indépendance de Madagascar (National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar)
MONUC	United Nations Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MPR	Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (Mobutu's party in the former Zaire)
NDC	National Democratic Congress (Ghana)
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NIF	National Islamic Front (Sudan)

NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NRA	National Resistance Army (Uganda)
OAU	Organization for African Unity (now the African Union)
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front (Ethiopia)
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAICG	Partido Africano de Independencia de Guinea Bissau y Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
POLISARIO	Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia El-Hamra y Rio de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia El-Hamra and Rio de Oro)
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (National Resistance of Mozambique)
RPF	Rassablement du Peuple Français (Assembly of the French People) Also FPR
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SADC	Southern African Development Community (formerly SADCC)
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program (IMF)
SNM	Somali National Movement (Republic of Somaliland, not internationally recognized)
SPLA	Sudanese People's Liberation Army (Southern Sudan, the army governed by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, SPLM)
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSIM/A	South Sudan Independence Movement/Army
SWAPO	South-West Africa People's Organization (Namibia)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNEP	UN Environment Programme
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	UN International Children's Emergency Fund
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNLA	Uganda National Liberation Army

USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

Foreword

On February 5–6, 1999, the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) together with the University Center for International Studies (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), the electronic journal *American Diplomacy*, and the Institute for African-American Research (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) sponsored a conference on conflict in Africa at the Friday Center in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The response to this event was encouraging. Attendees came from as far off as Kenya, Senegal, Canada, and the Netherlands, bringing an extraordinary range of professional expertise to the meeting. Among the attendees were university professors, former diplomats, ministers, political activists, professionals belonging to a variety of government and nongovernment organizations, high school teachers, and college students. All were deeply engaged in the fate of Africa.

The conference was so successful and the topic itself was of such obvious importance that the executive board of TISS decided that an effort should be made to make the findings available to students and other interested members of the general public. The authors who attended the conference were then asked to revise and update their presentations for publication. This was the genesis of this book.

A few words should be said about what this book does and does not seek to do. First, the book does attempt to be comprehensive in its scope. It looks at both conflict and conflict resolution. While it focuses most closely on contemporary African conflict (since the end of the Cold War), it also pays some attention to the wars of Africa's past. At the same time, there is much that the book does not cover: many specific conflicts are not treated in depth; many explanations of the roots

of war are not explored; and many methods of conflict resolution are not addressed.

We should note, however, that the purpose of this book is not to undertake a work of synthesis. It is not to guide the reader to any particular conclusion. Its purpose is to stimulate readers to think about the contradictions they find, to face hard intellectual truths, and to decide for themselves which views are the most compelling and best supported by logic and evidence. This collection provides the reader with an excellent tool to do just that.

The contributing authors are highly respected Africanists coming from a number of different countries. Some are scholars and several have been active in public life. They have been trained in a variety of academic disciplines—including history, political science, anthropology, and law. They have radically different approaches: some of the authors examine conflict with detachment and objectivity; others do so with a passionate sense of right and wrong. Their interpretations represent a broad spectrum of thought and opinion, and each is grounded in a unique ideology. With the exception of the introductory chapter by Ali Mazrui, which is rather generalized, each individual chapter presents an individual thesis. At the same time, many of the authors provide general introductions to the broader literature, thus making it possible for the reader to use this work as a starting point for more comprehensive study. The book contains a number of tools enabling the reader to better assimilate the material, notably maps and an extensive chronology of conflict.

The purpose of this collection is to fill a gap. There is a surprising dearth of scholarship on the subject of conflict in Africa. Most recent studies of African conflict and conflict resolution focus on particular wars. Few consider broader themes or compare conflicts throughout the continent. The field of security studies, meanwhile, is dominated by Western-focused analysis of issues such as U.S. hegemony, weapons proliferation, and terrorism. This book begins to bridge the gap between African studies and security studies. Some of the most respected Africanists in the field offer thoughtful analyses of the roots of African conflict and its possible remedies. We hope that this work proves to be as stimulating as the conference that inspired it.

Carolyn Pumphrey
Rye Schwartz-Barcott

General Introduction

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WHY SHOULD WE STUDY ARMED CONFLICT IN AFRICA?

Armed and violent conflict has been part of the human scene since the beginning of written history—a statement as true of Africa as it is of other places on earth. Though it has experienced relatively few international wars, Africa has suffered more than most other continents as a result of small-scale (but often brutal) internal conflicts. Three-quarters of all countries in sub-Saharan Africa have witnessed armed conflict since 1990. Although Africa accounts for merely 10 percent of the world's population, in the year 2000, two-thirds of the one hundred thousand people killed directly in armed conflicts worldwide were African.¹ The office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that at the end of 2000, 28 percent of the world's refugees were Africans, and the UN currently maintains peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Western Sahara, and Eritrea.²

Armed conflicts have, at best, prevented Africans from developing their bountiful human and natural resources; at worst, the conflicts have given rise to conditions of near hopelessness. After the end of the Cold War, much of the world experienced periods of unprecedented growth and development thanks to the birth of the Internet and the fruits of globalization. In striking contrast, much of Africa either suffered under repressive regimes or endured conflicts that inhibited social, political, and economic progress. Forty-three percent of the 800 million Africans are under the age of fifteen. The continent has the lowest GNP per capita—\$670, compared to the global average of \$4,890.³ While armed conflict is not the sole explanation for these problems, it is obviously one of the major factors.

Clearly, conflict in Africa is an issue that needs careful analysis, yet, ironically, discussion of the subject remains relatively limited. While interest in Africa is very lively, as is interest in conflict in general, conflict in Africa remains comparatively understudied. A combination of factors appears to account for this reaction. On the one hand, the study of conflict in Africa can be little short of unbearable. Amorality, corruption, and atrocities characterize all too many of the wars, and people caught up in the conflict often seem to have no idea of what the fighting is about.⁴ On the other hand, African societies suffered for centuries from the contempt of an ethnocentric West which overlooked their very real accomplishments. As a result, many of those who care about Africa prefer to focus on the positive rather than the negative features of African life. This is an understandable, but misguided response: emotion is no substitute for rigorous thought.

Moreover, despite the very real problems that exist, it is not clear that profound pessimism is necessary. All societies experience conflict, and most conflicts are resolved before they become violent. Others are solved against all expectations. Many societies locked in seemingly intractable struggles have eventually emerged from the abyss. The European record is a case in point. European history does not reveal an inexorable march to doom. Rather, it has been marked by centuries of bitter warfare, followed by periods of relative peace and prosperity. While no nation has, as yet, succeeded in securing a lasting peace, that does not mean that such an outcome is impossible.

Africa is an immensely varied continent of great potential wealth. The second largest continent in the world and home to more than 10 percent of the world's inhabitants, it is linguistically and ethnically diverse—extremely diverse. It contains some one thousand spoken languages and at least as many ethnic groups. It has immense mineral wealth, including half the world's gold, most of the world's diamonds, and large deposits of oil, copper, and other resources. It has tremendous potential hydroelectric power and vast amounts of fertile agricultural land, much which is still untilled.⁵ If Africa's conflicts are resolved, it can surely offer a good life to most of its people.

As we all know, the first step to take when problem solving is to identify the actual problem. If we gain a clearer understanding of why Africa suffers from so much armed and violent conflict, we will be able to take more effective measures to reduce it. The goal of this book is to provide

a starting point in this learning process. It is designed to move readers to further reading, further thinking, and ultimately, we hope, constructive action.

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF ARMED CONFLICT

The first question we need ask ourselves is how we should approach the study of war and peace. What are the relative merits of different analytical methods?⁶ Does it make sense to try to identify out a single underlying cause of conflict in Africa? Or is reality too complex to be reduced in this fashion? Given the huge size and enormous diversity of Africa, can we accurately speak of “African” conflict? Or should we devote our energies to understanding one conflict at a time, paying close attention to the very specific environment—both historical and geographic—that has shaped it? Should we examine the past and attempt to find patterns of behavior across time? Or is modern conflict a unique phenomenon that should be studied on its own terms? If we want to find ways to reduce violence, how should we approach the problem of causation? Should we try to isolate the primary factors responsible for wars? Should we study those problems that we think can be solved? Or should we look at the whole picture, working on the assumption that clusters of problems provide us with our best warning of trouble to come?⁷

Finally, how should we react to advocacy positions? The boundaries between scholarship and ideology are often somewhat blurred. The study of war and peace attracts not just academics but also practitioners fighting a cause, and it is therefore especially prone to polemic. Should we reject works of this sort out of hand? To be sure, the use of evidence and logic are of paramount importance. However, strong opinion is not necessarily wrong opinion. Is it possible that in our attempt to be even-handed we may in fact be perpetrating an injustice? This is certainly a thought-provoking idea that we should not lightly dismiss. In any event, at the least, listening to advocacy positions certainly helps us better understand the kind of tensions and emotions that make conflicts so intractable.

Each chapter in this book reveals a somewhat different approach to the study of war and peace. While no one method should be judged to be ultimately authoritative, the chapters, when taken in combination,

challenge us to ask good questions and enhance our understanding of the complex problems of war and peace.

WHAT IS ARMED CONFLICT?

The title of this book is *Armed Conflict in Africa*. There might have been some logic to calling it *War in Africa*, as war may be defined as “armed and violent conflict between political entities.”⁸ However, using the term *war* creates as many difficulties as it solves. Western military theorists generally accept that war takes on many forms and that it can range from total war to low-intensity conflict. Nonetheless, it is traditional to speak of war only when belligerents are relatively equal in power and are engaging in hostilities of considerable intensity and length.⁹ Different terminology is often applied to other types of hostilities, sometimes out of hypocrisy and a desire to avoid constitutional, legal, or political problems, and sometimes to convey meaningful distinctions.¹⁰ Because the authors of this book examine a broad range of collective violence, we chose to speak of “armed conflict” rather than war.

What then is “armed conflict”? And what kinds of armed conflict are examined in this work? “Conflict” can be defined as the state of relations experienced when two or more parties have mutually exclusive goals. It is a natural and even healthy phenomenon. It occurs with the greatest frequency between those societies that interact with one another a great deal rather than between those that are most hostile. It should not surprise us, therefore, to find that the majority of conflicts are resolved short of the resort to force. Under certain circumstances, however, conflicts do become armed and violent. Once arms are used, a society moves from a state of peace to a state of war.

However, to be in a state of peace does not necessarily mean to be in a state of perfect harmony. Conversely, to be in a state of war does not necessarily mean to be in a state of uncompromising enmity. The resort to arms is a necessary ingredient of warfare, but the forms of war vary widely. The African experience has encompassed the full range of such violence.

Relatively rare in Africa, but certainly not unknown to it, are international wars—that is to say, armed and violent conflicts between sover-

eign states.¹¹ The recent war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, considered by Julius Nyang'oro, is a case in point. At one stage, it involved at least eleven African nations and was characterized by some as "Africa's First World War." Far more typical in Africa are civil wars, which are defined as being armed and violent struggles between political groups within a state. Here we may note the protracted and lethal civil war in the Sudan, as examined by Bona Malwal in chapter 8.

Other forms of armed conflict are guerrilla wars and (to a lesser extent) terrorism.¹² Guerrilla, or "small wars," involve the use of unconventional (read "illegal") means.¹³ Terrorism is the deliberate use of terror to achieve political goals.¹⁴ Both have been very much part of the African scene, as might be expected given that so many of the conflicts have occurred between groups with access to widely differing amounts of power.

Internal wars (see Pauline Baker, chapter 7) involve violent conflict, but they may fall short of the levels of violence that we typically associate with wars. Included in this category are the following: coups d'état, whereby one elite seeks to replace another elite element in the government; revolutions, which are mass movements aimed at removing the government; and insurrections. Finally, we must not overlook ethnic cleansing—defined as the use of force or intimidation to remove people of a certain ethnic or religious group from an area—and genocide, ethnic cleansing's most extreme manifestation. In chapter 5, René Lemarchand discusses some of the factors that have contributed to the history of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa.¹⁵

Classifying any given armed conflict is difficult. In the first place, no universally accepted terminology exists for the forms of war. The reader will find that most of the terms discussed in the previous paragraphs have multiple definitions. A recent book, for example, devoted an entire chapter to the different definitions of terrorism.¹⁶ In the second place, conflicts that begin as one form of war may end up as quite another, which is especially true of protracted conflicts. The war in Mozambique, for example, began in 1964 as a war of liberation against Portuguese colonialism. Once independence was achieved (1975), however, the revolution changed into a quasi civil war, with Rhodesia and South Africa supporting the anticommunist rebel movement National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO). Consider also the war in Angola,

which began as a civil war between rival nationalist groups seeking power in the newly independent government. It then gained an international dimension during the Cold War, when the United States and South Africa intervened and financed the rebel movement National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) while the Soviet Union and Cuba supported the government forces, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

The lack of universally accepted definitions and the problems of classification complicate the task of analyzing armed conflict in Africa. At the same time, the choice of terminology should always be noted, if only because it provides an interesting indication of bias. To call a conflict a “civil war” rather than a “rebellion” or to speak of a “war of liberation” rather than a “guerrilla war” is obviously to take a position in a debate.

WHAT CAUSES ARMED CONFLICT?

Who Is to Blame?

Armed conflict in Africa is seriously undermining the development of the continent. Who is to blame? The attribution of blame springs naturally from discourses begun during wartime. In the heat of the conflict opponents habitually blame one another for the problems that have led to violence and the failure to find a solution. Initially, this denial of responsibility as likely as not results from each side’s being genuinely convinced that the other is at fault. It ultimately translates into each side’s searching for legitimacy in the eyes of the wider community.

Attributing blame is clearly problematic; it is rarely objective; and it oversimplifies complex situations. That said, it continues to dominate both academic and popular discourse on instability in Africa. In general, two schools of thought exist concerning African instability. The first school sees African problems as largely “homegrown,” the result of internal forces creating conflict within the continent. The second school blames African instability on outside forces; in particular, it blames the Western, developed world. Both viewpoints are reflected in this volume.

For example, Africa’s colonial past is widely regarded as a major source of Africa’s ills. Ali Mazrui notes (chapter 2) that black violence

in Africa often has “white” roots, and Anthony Clayton (chapter 3) draws attention to some of the unfortunate consequences of colonial rule. Colonial administrators, even when acting with commendable intentions, all too often succeeded in distorting native customs and authorities as well as reawakening ethnic tensions. Their economic policies were misguided at best, exploitative at worst. They were unsuccessful in their last-minute efforts to create sound political institutions and economic infrastructures; thus, they left young African nations with daunting challenges. During the Cold War, Western powers (notably the French) exacerbated conflict by intervening in African quarrels, and the West continues to dominate the production, distribution, and marketing of the small arms with which Africans fight each other.

Bona Malwal (chapter 8) notes the role played by the British in causing and intensifying the conflict in the Sudan.¹⁷ Julius Nyang’oro (chapter 4) offers a sustained criticism of the Western role in African history, focusing in particular on the way in which economic imperialism led to the continent’s economic woes. René Lemarchand (chapter 5) shows some of the subtler ways in which Western cultural influence worked to corrode African society. He argues that Europeans played a rather crucial role in the destructive myth-making of the Great Lakes region. It was they who first propagated the belief that the light-skinned Tutsi were of Semitic origin (and therefore superior). A Hutu elite then manipulated the myths to argue the foreign nature of the Tutsi and thus help legitimize Hutu aggression.

On the other hand, African history is also susceptible to another reading. Clayton (chapter 3) suggests that patterns of violence in Africa closely resemble those of the precolonial era. He points out the marked similarities between the “frontiersmen” fighting of today and the kind of fighting that typified Africa in earlier centuries. Lemarchand (chapter 5) emphasizes the role played by Hutu and Tutsi elites in manipulating mythology and stirring up ethnic hatreds for their own political purposes. Moreover, the international community has not just been a negative factor in the African experience. After independence, European powers helped stabilize the postcolonial governments by giving them military aid to quell rebellions and economic assistance. And at this time, as Malwal (chapter 8) notes, the United States is playing a key role in motivating cease-fire and reconciliation talks between North and South Sudan.

Debates over who is to blame for armed conflict in Africa are not entirely sterile. They can help identify the forces responsible for conflict, and they can also raise important issues. The question of responsibility is rich in implications. If the international community is indeed largely to blame for the miseries of the African continent, it has a particular obligation to undo some of the damage. At the same time, the fact that it is part of the problem will make it all the harder for it to be a part of the solution. Readers will therefore find it useful to consider these arguments carefully. In the long run, their best way to understand armed conflict is to take a more objective look at causation by recognizing that multiple forces and parties share responsibility.

What Are the Causes of Armed Conflict in Africa?

From very early times, men and women have struggled to identify and analyze the causes of war. They have offered a variety of explanations, ranging from war as an expression of depraved human nature to war as god's punishment for our sins to war as the product of technological development. The analysis of historians, anthropologists, biologists, theologians, political scientists, and sociologists have gradually refined our understanding of the problem. Economic, cultural, and political explanations of war, however, continue to hold pride of place.

Economic Roots

Economics is the science of wealth and welfare. The discipline of economics focuses on the provision of the material needs of the individual and of organized groups.¹⁸ As such, it is inextricably concerned with social phenomenon, to the point that some prefer to speak of the *socioeconomic* roots of war.

Many analysts argue that economics is the driving force of history. In keeping with this perspective, some military theorists think that economic factors provide us with the most universally applicable explanation for war. It must be understood that these factors include some that may not be solely classified as economic but nonetheless have predominantly economic implications—for example, climate change, social stratification, and overpopulation.

Economic explanations provide us with some valuable insights into conflict on the African continent, as this volume makes clear. Anthony

Clayton (chapter 3) links violence in Africa to its poverty and underdevelopment. He sees the scarcity of resources and concomitant social inequality as central to understanding warfare on the continent. Pauline Baker (chapter 7) agrees that competition over resources is a major source of conflict. She also notes that demographic pressures and serious refugee problems exacerbate the problem in many regions of Africa. Julius Nyang'oro (chapter 4) attributes African instability directly to the nonmaturation of capitalism in Africa. He argues that Africa developed a capitalist economy without developing social and political institutions capable of protecting ordinary people from the injustices that tend to accompany this kind of economic system.

However, Professor Nyang'oro also notes that the presence rather than the absence of resources can cause war. The diamonds of West Africa and Angola, for example, have perpetuated conflicts in these regions. And Pauline Baker notes that in certain countries the problem is not so much lack of resources as the failure of an ethnic group (in Nigeria, for example, the Ibos) to attain a political role commensurate with their educational and economic status.

Analyzing the socioeconomic roots of conflict indicates that the presence of wealth as well as the absence of wealth can be destabilizing. This conclusion has significant implications for those who would see the infusion of aid to Africa as a basic solution to its problems. It also suggests that socioeconomic factors may provide a necessary, but not sufficient explanation for armed conflict.

Cultural Roots

Culture is the set of values and behaviors shared by a group of people with a collective identity. Culture includes religion (a personal set or institutionalized system of religious attitudes, beliefs, and practices). It also includes ideology (ideas or beliefs that characterize a particular class, group, or movement) and customs (usages or practices governing social life). Religion, ideology, and customs all have the potential to be both constructive forces and creative forces, and they all have the potential to limit violence. All have sometimes served to cause or intensify war.

Africa is no exception. Competing Marxist and capitalist ideologies imported from the West unquestionably fueled many of the conflicts during the Cold War. In North Africa, religion has been a mainspring of

violence for centuries, as even a brief glance at a chronology of conflict will show. The attempt to impose the law of Islam on the southern Sudan is recognized by Bona Malwal (chapter 8) as a significant factor in the civil war that wracks this region. Moreover, even where religion is a secondary cause of violence, it often serves to intensify its horrors. All too many atrocities have been tragically perpetrated in the name of God. South of the Sahara, as Ali Mazrui points out (chapter 2), religion plays a much more limited role.¹⁹ There are some exceptions, with Nigeria being a case in point, but in general, customs rather than religion or ideology are cited as the cultural forces driving war and conflict.

The study of tribal cultures at different times and in different places makes it clear that warlike customs in past epochs were often deliberately fostered by its perpetrators to ensure survival. It is less clear how far this evolutionary reason provides an explanation for what is happening in Africa today. Arguments can be made, however, that it does. In this volume, Anthony Clayton (chapter 3) draws attention to the *ruga ruga*. These were warrior bands of the nineteenth century whose status was derived from their prowess as warriors. He believes that their warlike mentality has been perpetuated among contemporary "frontiersmen" and must be recognized as one of the roots of contemporary violence.

Ethnicity, or a collective sense of identity and shared heritage, is a cultural phenomenon that is often invoked as a catchall explanation for bloodshed in Africa and the underdeveloped world.²⁰ That it plays some role in causing armed conflict seems clear. Ali Mazrui is not alone in thinking that conflict among black Africans is very often rooted in ethnic differences.²¹ However, Pauline Baker shows (chapter 7) that ethnicity is as likely to result from conflict as it is to cause it, and René Lemarchand shows (chapter 5) that it can be a positive force.²² Moreover, ethnic identities may be manufactured. René Lemarchand, who looks at traditional myths about ethnic differences in Rwanda, notes that political elites were responsible for distorting these myths and turning them into vehicles for genocide.

These chapters suggest that an improved understanding of African culture will provide us with significant insights into conflict. They also suggest that religion, ideology, and customs are double-edged swords that interact in complex ways with political and economic forces to cause wars.

Political Roots

The nineteenth-century thinker Carl von Clausewitz is one of the most famous of all military theorists. A product of the Enlightenment, Clausewitz saw war as a deliberate and rational process, the product of national policy. His assertion that “war is politics by other means” is still widely quoted in government and academic circles.²³ This definition (which is far from the only one Clausewitz offers) does not imply that politics alone causes war. Politics is, after all, the art of organizing a society to accomplish its goals—be they political, economic, or cultural. However, the dictum has contributed to a widespread perception that the causes of armed conflict are ultimately political in nature.²⁴

This viewpoint is well illustrated in this book in that one of its key themes is the failure of African political institutions. A central purpose of government is to provide security and see to the welfare of its people. Many African governments signally fail to do so. Ali Mazrui (chapter 2) comments at some length on the rather dismal political scene in Africa. He notes the susceptibility of African countries to military coups, the corruption of African governments, and Africa’s failure to democratize. In a similar vein, Claude Welch (chapter 6) argues that the immediate source of much of Africa’s postindependence violence has been the monopoly of political power by self-perpetuating and irresponsible cliques. Most African countries achieved independence in the 1950s and 1960s, and most of the newly independent governments became one-party states with presidents who retained power for life.

In their respective chapters, Claude Welch (chapter 6) and Anthony Clayton (chapter 3) draw attention to the artificial nature of interstate borders in Africa. These borders were colonial constructs, the product of negotiations and treaties between the colonial powers who used poor maps and largely ignored African political realities. As a result, existing state structures do not satisfy the aspirations of the various ethnic groups living within them.

Finally, Pauline Baker (chapter 7) focuses on the fact that African societies lack “sustainable security.” She defines this term as a society’s ability to solve its own problems peacefully. In her view, state collapse (the total breakdown of government) is the major explanation for ethnic violence and endemic conflict in Africa.

In short, while it would be wrong to focus entirely on political problems, it is clear that political explanations strengthen and complement cultural and economic explanations for armed conflict in Africa.

CONFLICT REDUCTION AND RESOLUTION

Analysis of the roots of conflict is not purely an academic exercise. It is a means to an end: the reduction and resolution of conflicts. The second part of this book focuses on some of the ways that these goals may be met.

Susceptibility

Before, however, we proceed any further, we need to address two questions: *Should* armed conflict be controlled, and *can* it be?

The answer to the first question is surely, yes. It is certainly arguable that armed conflict can and has served some useful purposes. European governments were able to keep social order in early modern times in good measure because they had developed standing armies for use in their international wars. Africa, as Ali Mazrui says, may suffer today from domestic disorder in part because Africans did not historically fight as many foreign wars as did Europeans. Nations have sometimes achieved desired and even worthy goals through violence, and some individuals and groups have profited from war. However, armed conflict in Africa has been almost entirely dysfunctional. The authors of this book note that the frequency and bitterness of conflict has contributed directly and indirectly to poverty, hunger, and disease on the continent. They emphatically agree that Africa's wars *should* be controlled.

But *can* it be controlled? Both the historical record and logic indicate that it can.²⁵ War is by definition organized violence, deliberately used by the state (or political entity) to achieve policy goals. Even nonstate actors are typically driven by the desire to bring about a change. As such, armed conflict is susceptible to control.

Conflicts, in short, are not necessarily (and indeed not usually) settled by the resort to force. The question remains when and how best to resolve them.

Timing

Conflict can be dealt with either before it breaks out, at the moment of crisis, or once it has broken out. Evidence suggests that the sooner action is taken, the better. Why this should be so is easy enough to fathom. The higher the stakes in a conflict, the harder it becomes to end the conflict. Even if a society takes up arms for relatively minor goals, it may come to view winning as a matter of survival. The more a society invests in an armed conflict and the greater its losses, the harder it is for that society to find a satisfactory solution to its problems. And once the dogs of war have been unleashed, they tend to run amok.

Bona Malwal's sobering chapter on the civil war in the Sudan (chapter 8) illustrates how important it is to take the opportunities we are given to make peace. His discussion of the history of negotiations in the region illustrates how mistrust has increased and how positions have hardened over time. In 1972 the Southern Sudanese were willing to settle for cultural and economic autonomy. They became much less willing to compromise after the abrogation of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1982.

Pauline Baker's model for conflict resolution (chapter 7) rests on a similar understanding that it is better not to wait too long to address a problem. All too often the international community reacts to a crisis only after matters have degenerated to the point of disaster. At this point, conflicts are much harder to deal with, and the costs to those involved in them are infinitely higher. The international community may preempt serious trouble if it provides effective, targeted assistance where it is most needed. Timing, in short, is clearly an important consideration.

Methods

Many methods for restraining and reducing conflict have been tried and tested over the centuries. Broadly speaking, the methods can be classified as follows: communication, education, justice, use of force, and arms control.²⁶ These different methods in turn reflect very different conceptions of politics. Politics may be defined as the art of influencing and controlling other people so as to achieve policy goals. If our policy goal is to bring about peace, we can influence belligerents by (metaphorically speaking) offering carrots, wielding sticks, or defanging the snake.

Those who think that enhancing cooperation among human beings offers us the best means of reducing conflict put stress on improving communication, education, and the attainment of "peace through justice." In other words, they like to offer carrots. Those who think that coercion is ultimately what dictates human behavior are the ones who are more likely to recommend the use of force, overt or subtle, to achieve their goals. They like to brandish the stick. Those who think that the best solution to war is to remove or reduce the weapons advocate arms control. They think that the snake without venom is harmless.

Communication

Diplomacy is perhaps the classic example of a method of conflict resolution and reduction that relies on communication. Diplomacy may be defined as the management of international relations, or the art of negotiating with a view to finding terms of agreement. Bona Malwal (chapter 8), who is no academic bystander, but an active player in African political life, provides us with many insights into diplomatic realities. He shows how American friendship with Egypt, the struggle for control of the Nile, and the outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia affect negotiations in the Sudan. He also shows how domestic concerns and interests alter the equation of war and peace, noting, for example, how the growth of Muslim fundamentalism and the imposition of the *shari'a* helped trigger the second round of civil war in 1983.

Education

Wars, to some extent, are the product of culture and cultural attitudes, which are learned and can thus be changed. Ali Mazrui (chapter 2), among others, speaks of the need to try to instill values that will promote peace. However, the kind of reform that is most frequently addressed within this work is political. Two themes emerge quite strongly: the need to develop healthier civil-military relations and the need to democratize or, as Professor Mazrui puts it, develop constructive pluralism.

Justice

According to many thinkers, peace can only be attained through justice. This view is based on the assumption that wars are caused by tensions and that these tensions stem from real or perceived inequities. This view is certainly well represented in this book. Claude Welch (chapter 6), whose research focuses on human rights issues, thinks that security depends on ensuring better lives for African peoples. Anthony Clayton (chapter 3) concludes his chapter by arguing that the key to a happier future for Africans lies in a more equitable distribution of wealth. And Ali Mazrui (chapter 2) makes a case that ending repression of women in Africa would be a useful step toward conflict reduction.

The search for justice, it should be noted, has another dimension. Interest in international law and international courts has been increasing in recent times. These promise to promote conflict reduction by creating universally accepted norms of behavior and developing the institutional means to enforce them. Once again, Claude Welch sheds interesting light on this subject. In particular, he draws attention to how nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International are influencing the legal structures and systems of African states and international bodies such as the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone.

Use of Force

Force is commonly seen as a way to reduce violence. Nations have long sought to try to forge relations in such a way as to prevent any one nation from imposing its will on others.²⁷ Balance of power diplomacy has been a staple of the international scene for centuries. Nations have also formed organizations capable of cooperating in a variety of ways, including through the use of force, to contain conflict. The African Security Council envisaged by Ali Mazrui offers as an example of this kind of institution as does the new African Union, which convened for the first time in 2002.

Several other authors recognize the need for military intervention. Pauline Baker (chapter 7) notes that peacekeeping operations, undertaken in timely fashion, may prevent catastrophic violence. Mazrui also countenances the use of force by Africans to contain violence in Africa.

Since most of Africa's wars are internal wars, it should surprise no one to find that a major concern is the domestic use of force. Ali Mazrui discusses the need to find some way to counter predatory governments, and he flirts with the possibility that providing the people with the right to bear arms may be one way to achieve this objective. Baker speaks of the need for African states to develop what she calls an "immutable core," capable of providing security for their people. This core must include, among other things, a competent and professional domestic police force and a professional and disciplined military accountable to a legitimate civilian authority.

Arms Control

Arms control receives limited attention in this volume. Clearly, the easy availability of weapons in Africa contributes to the instability of the continent. However, removing these weapons is likely to be a difficult task.

Challenges and Responsibilities

These methods of conflict reduction and resolution have their uses. They also have their pitfalls, as the authors make clear. The "stick" approach may be handy, but it is often difficult to use and it may even backfire.²⁸ Peacekeeping missions, as noted by Pauline Baker, are a case in point. The "carrot" approach, on the other hand, is far from infallible. Welch (chapter 6) addresses this issue at some length. He asks whether the creation of moral norms always moderates the behavior of abusive governments. He notes, moreover, that foreign aid may be siphoned off by corrupt governments and exacerbate rather than diminish social tensions.

Finally, a question remains that is of special relevance to Africa. Can the West, which has arguably done so much to cause Africa's troubles, do anything constructive to aid it now? The memory of colonialism has created an understandable sense of wariness on the part of Africans. For its part, the international community is not deeply engaged in African affairs, but wealthy and powerful as it is, the West could (and perhaps should) do much to help Africa in its struggle for stability.

CONCLUSION

Conflict resolution or reduction is clearly a daunting task. However, we do not wish to imply that the record is totally, or even predominantly, one of failure. Africans have, in fact, resolved many of their conflicts quite successfully. Several of the authors in this work speak with guarded optimism about what has been achieved and what may be achieved. Claude Welch thinks that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have made some progress toward creating a more humane environment in many African regions, and Ali Mazrui speaks with eloquence of the rather constructive ways in which individual Africans have met the challenges of their time. Utopia may not be around the corner, but with logic and creativity, there is no reason why Africans should not come to enjoy a more peaceful environment.

NOTES

1. *The Military Balance 2000–2001* (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001), 252.

2. *Regional World Surveys of the World, Africa South of the Sahara, 2002*, 31st ed. (London: Europa Publications, 2002), 16.

3. Population Reference Bureau, *2000 World Population Data Sheet* (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 2000).

4. From remarks made by Richard Joseph at the 1999 conference (see the foreword of this book).

5. William Dudley, ed., *Africa, Opposing Viewpoints* (San Diego, Calif.: Greenhaven Press, 2000), 16.

6. A useful discussion of the contributions made by different disciplines to the study of war and peace may be found in Oyvind Osterud, "Studies of War and Peace: An Introduction," in *Studies of War and Peace*, ed. Oyvind Osterud (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian University Press, 1986), 3–13.

7. Consider the position of Pauline Baker, for example (see chapter 7). Baker differentiates between the root causes of conflict and the immediate causes of conflict—that is, the proximate events that spark conflict.

8. These political entities may be nation-states, but they certainly do not have to be. Nation-states only emerged in the early modern period, yet the armed and violent conflicts that took place in previous eras between city-states, tribes, or warring feudal principalities certainly seem to qualify as wars.

9. Franz Uhle-Wettler, "War," in *Brassey's Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography*, ed. Franklin D. Margiotta (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994), 1045.

10. Uhle-Wettler, "War," 1045.

11. Samuel Kasule, *The History Atlas of Africa* (New York: Macmillan, 1998), 137. These international wars were fought in Algeria against the French; in Kenya and Rhodesia against the British; in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique against the Portuguese; and in Namibia and Zimbabwe against South Africa.

12. Countries that have fallen prey to this type of violence include Algeria, Morocco, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zaire, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, and South Africa. Kasule, *History Atlas*, 137.

13. Donald A. Wells, *An Encyclopedia of War and Ethics* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), 177–78. "Guerrilla warfare," or "small wars" (also known as "partisan warfare"), fall into the hazy area between brigandage and wars.

14. "Guerrilla warfare" involves the use of unconventional (read "illegal") means, but it has gained some legitimacy through its association with wars of national liberation. Terrorism—defined as the strategy of employing violence or the threat of violence to escalate people's fears to achieve or keep political power—is not usually regarded as war because the perpetrators are not legitimate powers. Both are types of violent conflict, however.

15. Over half of African countries have experienced coups d'état. The term "massacre" refers to those situations in which one side enjoys an overwhelming advantage and as a consequence kills an excessive number of the enemy. The term "genocide" (according to the UN definition) concerns "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such." Wells, *Encyclopedia of War*, 165–69, 285–87.

16. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), chapter 1.

17. Bona Malwal argues that the British decision to administer North and South Sudan together after forty years of separate administration was misguided. So was the British policy of investing more heavily in the North and placing government in the hands of the Arab minority.

18. Edwin R. A. Seligman, ed., *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 3 (New York: Macmillan, 1930), 344.

19. There are, of course, exceptions, Nigeria being a case in point. In addition, the Sudanese struggle has a clear religious dimension, being in good measure a war fought against Muslim fundamentalism. But on the whole, religion is not a key factor.

20. Colin Legum, *Africa since Independence* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 90.

21. Legum, *Africa since Independence*, 90. Legum argues that only six of the continent's hot wars since independence could be described as interethnic conflicts.

22. Legum, *Africa since Independence*, 36–37, 90. The tendency to regard ethnicity as harmful stems in part from the associations between ethnicity and tribalism and the way, in its turn, tribalism has come to be associated with racism. Legum notes that Westerners tend to write off conflicts in Africa as *tribal* whereas they would use the word *ethnic* in describing similar outbreaks in Europe. With the spread of colonialism in the twentieth century, the word *tribe* came to be associated with savagery, barbarism, primitivism, and even cannibalism. The word *tribe* thus offends Africans and has discredited even the notion of ethnicity.

23. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War VIII B*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605. "War is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means."

24. Geoffrey Blainey, *Causes of War* (London: Macmillan Press, 1973), 149.

25. Africans have settled some conflicts, such as the bitter struggle over apartheid in South Africa, which seemed to defy solution.

26. To this one might add "avoidance behavior" epitomized by the search for neutrality.

27. Seligman, ed., *Encyclopaedia*, vol. 1, 395.

28. This was all too vividly illustrated in Sierra Leone. In May 2000, the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched an offensive and took hostage five hundred members of the UN force.

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Conflict in Africa: An Overview

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In chapter two, Kenya-born Professor Ali A. Mazrui, Albert Schweitzer Chair of Africana Studies at State University of New York, Binghamton, provides a brief overview of conflict in Africa. While drawing attention to some of the ironies visible in large-scale political violence and war, Dr. Mazrui outlines the roots of conflict in Africa. A scholar well known for his creative insights, Dr. Mazrui concludes by offering some suggestions as to how conflict in Africa might be reduced. This chapter is broad in scope and introduces some of the themes that will be developed more fully later in the book.

As the twenty-first century begins, Africa consists of some fifty-four countries (a number that depends on how you count certain islands). Since independence, about one-third of those countries have experienced large-scale political violence or war.¹ This statistic does not include those countries that have had relatively bloodless military coups or occasional assassinations. (After all, even the United States has had presidential assassinations.) It is true that not all of Africa is afflicted to the same degree. The levels of violence differ greatly. Africa is an immense continent, richly varied in its cultures and peoples, and so large and complex an area that no one can easily predict where violence will occur. Kenya, for example, shares borders with five other countries, four of which have experienced civil wars: Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda. The fifth country it borders is Tanzania, a country that was partly born out of a revolution (the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964). In comparison with its neighbors, Kenya has so far been spared large-scale

civil conflict, yet the overall pattern of violence on the African continent is disturbing and thus worthy of analysis.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of conflict in Africa. The first part of the chapter focuses on the causes of conflict. To explain conflicts in Africa is neither simple nor easy, and the theories that have been advanced are both numerous and contradictory. Rather than attempt to catalog these many theories, this chapter instead looks at some of the rather haunting paradoxes that seem to mark conflict in Africa. The second part of the chapter suggests some possible solutions, and it also considers how much progress has, in fact, been made in recent decades.

THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT

Black Violence, White Roots

While the most lethal of all wars in Africa have been those fought between blacks, the roots of these wars lie in the white legacy. The first part of this statement is clearly borne out by the historical evidence. The fact is that, as bloody as they were, the anticolonial wars fought primarily between blacks and whites were less bloody than postcolonial wars marked by black on black violence. True, anticolonial wars did cost a lot of lives: a case in point is Algeria, where more than a million people perished at the hands of the French. Nonetheless, postcolonial wars have been significantly more ruthless.²

At the same time, it must be recognized that the seeds of the postcolonial wars themselves lie in the sociological and political mess that "white" colonialism created in Africa. Not only did colonial powers destroy old methods of conflict resolution and traditional African political institutions, but they also failed to create effective substitutes in their place. In the West, effective states are widely perceived to be one of the major tools societies have invented for the preservation of internal stability and order. In Africa, the states founded by Europeans were not effective. They were developed in newly fashioned countries and built on fragile bases. Moreover, the Africans who inherited these states from the Europeans had little experience in governing themselves. Self-government is not something easily

taught. Failing states have been one of the major sources of conflict in postcolonial Africa.

Are Borders to Blame?

While most African conflicts are partly caused by borders, those conflicts are not themselves *about* borders. Before the Western colonial powers arrived, virtually no boundaries existed in Africa. Most people lived in loose groupings; thus, their territories were unmarked. Empires came and went, absorbing new groups and being assimilated themselves, but all the while possessing few, if any, rigid frontiers. At the end of the last century, however, the colonial West arrived, and the Berlin Conference in 1884 imposed the iron grid of division upon the continent.

The political boundaries created by colonial powers in Africa enclosed groups with no traditions of shared authority or shared systems of settling disputes. These groups did not necessarily have the time to learn to become congenial.³ In West Africa, for example, the large territory that the British carved out and called Nigeria enclosed three major nations and several smaller ones. Among the larger groups, the Yoruba in the west were very different from the Muslim Hausa in the north, who in turn were quite distinct from the Ibo in the east. This artificial mixture led to one of Africa's great human tragedies, the Nigerian civil war of 1967 to 1970. Until pictures of starving Ethiopian children shocked the world in the 1980s, the most haunting images from postcolonial Africa were those of starving Biafran children, the victims of this war. If colonialism forced into the same political entity people who would otherwise have lived apart, it also separated people who would otherwise have lived together. A country like Somalia is in effect a nation trying to become an all-inclusive state. The Somali have scattered in four different countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. Their desire for reunification has resulted in deadly conflict.

Paradoxical as this scenario seems, one cannot say that African conflicts are *about* boundaries. Ironically, African governments have tended to be possessive about these artificially created colonial borders and have generally resisted any challenge to them. Relatively few disputes are about the borders themselves; they generate conflicts

within them but do not seem to generate conflicts across them. The dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea is in this regard an exception rather than a rule.⁴

Religion or Ethnicity?

While the worst conflicts in Arab Africa are religious, the worst conflicts in black Africa are ethnic. The word *ethnic* in this case is used in the sense of the older word *tribal*,⁵ and by Arab Africa, we largely mean North Africa (e.g., Algeria, Libya, and Egypt are Arab).

The worst conflict in Arab Africa is to be found in Algeria. The war that is being fought in this country between Islamists and the military secularists is among the ugliest and most intractable in the world.⁶ However politicized this conflict may be, religion is clearly at its root. The same holds true of conflict in Egypt.⁷

By contrast, the worst outbreaks of violence in black Africa in the 1990s occurred as a result of ethnic conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi in Rwanda, Burundi, and the western Democratic Republic of the Congo. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda marked the most intense slaughter in this blood-filled century. Over 800,000 Tutsi were killed in under one hundred days.⁸ The conflict in Somalia was likewise ethnic, or at any rate, subethnic (between clans rather than between tribes).⁹ The civil war between northern and southern Sudan further illustrates the point. Sudan straddles the Arab worlds and the African worlds, which leads one to ask: Is its civil war primarily ethnic or primarily religious?¹⁰ You may take your pick. Either interpretation is totally defensible.

Resources or Identity?

While blacks clash with whites in Africa over resources, blacks clash with blacks over their identities. In other words, white and black people fight each other about *who owns what*, but blacks fight blacks about *who is who*. Racial conflicts between blacks and whites in Africa are ultimately economic. Apartheid in South Africa, for example, was an economic war. By contrast, when you look at configurations of violence in those parts of Africa where blacks are fighting

blacks, it is difficult to show that the struggles are over resources. Often, there are no resources of any significance over which to fight. Sometimes it is possible to see the struggle in terms of an effort to get a share of power, but for the most part, major clashes appear to be related to cultural demarcations. The bloody struggle between the Hutu and Tutsi is one such example.

That culture rather than economics plays the determining role in the politics of black Africa can best be illustrated by looking at what happens when Africans who are left of center attempt to invoke class solidarity. When such Africans fight a party that is invoking ethnic solidarity, the cards are stacked against them. Time and again, class symbols prove inadequate in the face of ethnic sentiment. In Kenya, for example, the Luo politician Oginga Odinga used left-of-center rhetoric in his 1992 campaign, appealing to *all* Kenyans to follow him. Despite the fact that his message ought to have appealed to the exploited, those who rallied to his cause were not the disadvantaged members of all Kenyan ethnic groups. Instead, Odinga found himself followed by Luo of all social classes. Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria had a similar experience in the 1960s. He moved just a little to the left of the normal orientation of major Nigerian politicians. He warned Nigerians that they were being cheated. He too drew support, not from the disadvantaged Nigerians of all ethnic groups, but from all the Yoruba. The Yoruba, moreover, came from all social classes, the rich and the poor. In other words, the ethnic messenger, rather than the economic message, has proved to be what counts in the conflicts among blacks.

Modern Weapons and Premodern Armies

At independence, weapons in Africa were in general not very advanced, but the armies were relatively disciplined, professional, and in short, modern. Now that the weapons have become more advanced, the armies have become less disciplined and less professional. The standing army and Western weapons were both, it may be added, yet another legacy of colonialism. One of the few African countries to consider, even briefly, whether to do without a standing army was Tanzania. In 1964, Julius Nyerere had the opportunity to disband his entire army and forego building an alternative one. He did disband the old one, but he did not follow

Costa Rica's example and do without one. Instead, he reconstructed a national army. African countries, as a whole, entered independence with this dysfunctional twin inheritance of advanced weapons and unruly armies.

This combination of modern weapons and less-than-modern armies has proved to be a menacing and destabilizing one. Africa's rather fragile government institutions are all too easily destroyed by the predominant power in the country—the gun. Soldiers have proved to be the most powerful force in African politics since independence. Africa has seen over seventy coups in a quarter of a century. The susceptibility of African states to military takeovers is all the more worrisome in that militaries have not proved capable of transforming African economies. Some soldiers, it is true, have made an effort to be constructive. Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, a military pilot who seized power in Accra in the summer of 1979, sought to put his power to good use. He attempted to mobilize his people for economic development and social transformation, rather than for war. Ghana thus received a relatively large amount of support from the World Bank. But Rawling's success was limited, and Ghana to this day remains impoverished.

Dualism and Pluralism

Although plural societies cause us more alarm, dual societies may in fact be more dangerous. A plural society is one that has multiple groups defined ethnically, racially, religiously, culturally, or by other parameters. The United States is a plural society. Dual societies are less numerous and less discussed than are plural societies in Africa.¹¹ A dual society is one in which two groups (again defined ethnically, religiously, culturally, or by other parameters) account for over 80 percent of the population. Belgium, for example, is a dual society of Flemish and Francophone identity.¹²

Dual societies run a number of high risks. First, they run the risk of getting trapped in a prolonged stalemate. The standoff between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is a case in point.¹³ Second, a culture of polarized ethnic distrust may develop. The examples that come to mind here are outside Africa: Belgium, Guyana, and Trinidad. Third, dual societies may endure prolonged periods of tension and violence. Outside of Africa, the struggle in Northern Ireland provides ample warn-

ing of this scenario's potential. Within Africa, Berbers and Arabs in Algeria are on the verge of a similar struggle. Fourth, dual societies also run the risk of separatism and secessionism. Asian and European examples exist. Sri Lanka is still torn by the Tamil bid to secede from the Sinhalese polity.¹⁴ Bosnia and Herzegovina today is split between the Muslim-Croat Federation in the west and the Serbian Republic Sprska in the east.¹⁵

Lastly, dual societies run the risk of genocide and potential genocidal reprisal. The most telling example of this scenario is to be found in Rwanda, where the Hutu and Tutsi engaged in bloody confrontation that destabilized the region. The conflict eventually became a key cause of the international war that later unfolded in neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo. Meanwhile, Burundi faced acute danger of genocide until a delegation led by Nelson Mandela in 2001 helped ease ethnic tensions, at least temporarily.¹⁶

"Ethnic" dual societies can be differentiated from "regional" dual societies, where the division is between two regions rather than between two ethnic groups. Within Africa, we may point to Sudan, Nigeria, and Uganda. Northern and southern Sudan experienced civil war between 1955 and 1972 and have been engaged in civil war again since 1983.¹⁷ Northern Nigeria fought southern Nigeria in a civil war as well (1967–1970).¹⁸ While this war was not totally about divisions between north versus south, it certainly included that dimension. In Uganda, violence has periodically erupted between north and south, especially since 1980. Outside of Africa, we may point to the struggle between the northern and southern United States (the American Civil War) and, more recently, to the tensions between North and South Korea. Since their respective unifications, both Vietnam and Germany have become regional dual societies and have had to deal with the attendant problems. The evidence to date suggests that dualism may be even more dangerous than pluralism.

War: Curse or Blessing?

Africa should indeed celebrate the relative rarity of interstate conflicts today. But should it also lament the relative rarity of interstate conflicts in the past? Has the balance between external and internal conflict tilted too far toward the internal?

Africa has, in fact, had more than its share of civil wars. As human history has repeated time and again, civil wars leave deeper scars than most interstate conflicts. Civil wars are more indiscriminate and ruthless than are most interstate conflicts, with the obvious exception of world wars or nuclear wars. The United States lost more people in its civil war in the 1860s than in all its other wars combined.

That Africa has had so many civil wars is, perhaps, not unrelated to the fact that it has had relatively few interstate conflicts. The history of nation-states in Europe reveals a persistent tendency on the part of the European states to externalize conflict and thus help promote greater unity at home. A sense of nationhood within each European country was partly fostered by a sense of rivalry and occasional conflict with its neighbors. Even the consolidation of the European state as a sovereign state was forged in the fire of inter-European conflicts. The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which launched the nation-state system, was signed at the end of the Thirty Years' War.¹⁹

Africa's relative dearth of external conflicts in the past may thus partly account for the prevalence of internal conflict in the present. In the modern world, however, external aggression is no longer a viable means of forging unity and building states. International war has become too dangerous. Africa must look to other solutions to bring an end to divisiveness.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

What will the future hold for Africa? The presence of violence and conflict on the African continent is obvious, but all is not self-evidently gloomy. In the past few decades, there have been signs of the winds of change blowing through the continent. Africans can point to examples of successful conflict resolution and reduction. The late Julius Nyerere, for example, has bequeathed young Tanzanians a greater self-confidence and national pride. In November 1985, he voluntarily stepped down as president of Tanzania, and Vice President Ali Hassan Mwinyi took over. Out of the approximately 170 rulers Africa has had since independence, Nyerere was only the third to relinquish office of his own accord. By leaving the political scene, Nyerere gave

the lie to the famous dictum that all power corrupts. In Ghana, Jerry Rawlings sought to eradicate corruption; he tackled the economic miseries of his people; and he cultivated their sense of independence and initiative. The civil war in Nigeria (1967–1970), as ugly and tragic as it was, did not scar the nation as it might have done. Nigerians are not noted for their restraint and discipline, yet the victors of the Nigerian–Biafran war were magnanimous to their enemies. They did not gloat or focus on vengeance. Yakubu Gowon and his successor, Murtala Muhammed, both demonstrated a remarkable ability to bring about reconciliation and help heal the wounds of war. More recently, on December 27, 2002, Daniel arap Moi, the ruler of Kenya for twenty-four years, ceded power in a peaceful election to opposition leader Mwai Kibaki. Kibaki led one of Kenya's first multiethnic coalitions, and his victory also marked the fall of the ruling political party in Kenya, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which had clung to power since Kenya's independence in 1963.

All these examples make it clear that Africans can bring their countries to a better future. What are some of the more concrete things that can be done to achieve this goal? By cultivating toleration, developing pluralism, improving civil–military relations, and fostering innovative Pan-African solutions, African nations can make positive and constructive moves to reduce and resolve conflicts.

Toleration

One important step toward creating greater stability on the African continent is to cultivate that very elusive trait, tolerance. Tolerance is the ability to accept difference.²⁰ We need to recognize that victims of intolerance do not necessarily become paragons of toleration. History has amply illustrated this fact. Christians, who suffered dreadful tortures at the hands of the Roman government, in turn inflicted the torments of the Inquisition on their enemies in later centuries. The Jews, who suffered incalculable miseries under the Nazis, themselves became oppressors. As an occupying power in the Holy Land, they held thousands of Palestinians as political prisoners. The Muslims, whose entire calendar is a celebration of the Hegira as asylum, are today bombing each other's mosques across the sectarian divide. The Tutsi,

as victims of yesterday, became the oppressors of today, and the Hutu, as victims of today, seem destined to become the oppressors of tomorrow. Toleration can be attained only by eternal vigilance. It must be actively cultivated and institutionally enforced.

How to bring about toleration is not clear, but it does seem as if some strides have been made in the right direction. In 1991, I visited my native land, Kenya, and called on President Daniel arap Moi to step down. This event startled the world. Kenya was at the time such a closed and intolerant society that the notion that a Kenyan, in Kenya, had dared to call upon the Kenyan president to resign was seen as something remarkable. The BBC World Service even reported this action. A decade later, every second or third Kenyan was calling upon President Daniel arap Moi to step down and did so without attracting media attention. A new level of toleration had developed in Kenya that helped spur on the democratic elections that finally brought an end to Moi's rule in 2002.

Constructive Pluralization

Another avenue that needs to be explored is what some call *decentralization* and what others, myself included, call the *pluralization of power*. Power has recently tended to shift away from the center and become institutionalized in smaller groups. This trend is, in my view, a healthy one, and it should be encouraged by promoting the development of multiparty systems, capitalism, federalism, and the political representation of women.

Multiparty Systems

One of the historical problems in Africa has been the existence of one-party states that have restricted the development of multiple political organizations. Multiple parties are useful to the extent that they expand choices.²¹ Fortunately, many African countries that have previously been one-party states have become multiparty states in more recent times. They have been moving toward greater toleration of opposition parties and rival political organizations. Tanzania, under Julius Nyerere, and Kenya, under Daniel arap Moi, both illustrate this trend.

Capitalism

As long as power is concentrated in one place, constructive pluralism cannot flourish. Constructive pluralism must be nurtured. How can this be done? One answer is to develop at least minimal degrees of capitalism. Although this notion is, of course, abhorrent to many African socialists, capitalism is in fact the necessary "manure" for liberal pluralistic democracy.²² Manure may be dirty, but it does make things grow! Capitalism creates the kind of environment in which constructive pluralism can take root.²³ It helps ensure that power is not concentrated in one particular place. A concrete example of capitalism's accomplishments can be seen in the resignation of Richard Nixon from the American presidency in 1974. Without the newspapers, which are owned by private interest, he surely would not have been obliged to step down.

This case does not mean, however, that Africa should develop the same form of capitalism that exists in contemporary America. The American system demands far too little economic accountability from its citizens. Such a system would be quite destructive on this continent. What we need in Africa is a type of capitalism that permits the pluralization of power but prevents the irresponsible pursuit of profit.

Federalism

The concept of federalism also deserves to be given more attention. Federalism refers to the division of power between a central authority and its constituent political units. For the last thirty-five years or so, only Nigeria treated federalism as a legitimate concept. The trouble is that, prior to the election of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, Nigeria was almost constantly governed by military rule, and militarism does not go well with federalism. The rest of Africa has tended to regard the concept of federalism as anathema; however, it does offer some real possibilities.

Representation of Women

Another important means of creating greater stability in Africa is to give a greater voice to African women.²⁴ Women need to become

major voices in decisions not just about development—although that aspect is crucial—but on other issues as well (including security issues). This proposal means that women must be given power within the legislative process and in the executive branch of government, and they should be enlisted in the armed forces in increasing numbers.

African women today are for the most part sadly underrepresented. To change the situation, some kind of direct intervention is needed. To do so is not easy. The problem is well illustrated in India, where Indians are trying to deal with the lack of female representation in government. A women's rights movement succeeded in passing into law a resolution mandating that 33 percent of the seats in local municipal bodies should be reserved for women. Opponents claim that the real intention of its proponents is to increase the representation of the higher caste. They point out that such a law only caters to women from the upper caste, implying that by increasing the representation of women, you reduce the representation of the lower classes.

In Africa, too, the struggle for emancipation will certainly encounter entrenched opposition. While Africa is host to a great deal of cultural variation, many African societies have traditionally assigned women to a subordinate place. At the same time, we need not despair. Culture is not always the insurmountable obstacle that we think it is. One of the last barriers to be broken between men and women is that of military culture. Even liberal societies have balked at the enlistment of women in the army, yet in Somalia, women—and Muslim women at that—at times can be seen bearing arms. When the sense of urgency is great enough, traditional values are transcended.

It is clearly vital that, despite the difficulties, Africa begin to empower women. I recommend that this objective be accomplished gradually in a series of measurable steps. In the first phase, women voters should be given the opportunity to elect women candidates. A certain percentage of seats (about 10 percent) should be reserved for these female candidates. In the second phase, a certain portion of seats should still be reserved for women, but female candidates should no longer seek votes from women alone. They should attempt to reach out to men as voters and address the concerns of males as well as females. To do so will help close the gender gap. In the third and final phase, when such

artificial measures are no longer necessary, seats should no longer be reserved for women, and male and female candidates should compete for office in an open race. A parallel process in Zimbabwe suggests that this model of election could happen. Here, seats were reserved on a racial base for a designated period of time. After a point, however, such quotas ceased to be necessary.

The greater politicization and empowerment of women will have direct security consequences. When women are given a greater role to play and when they become more influential in debating, they will have an effect on the choices that are made for war or peace—and they may swing the balance in favor of peace. Once women have been empowered within their societies, then it may be possible to move one step further and tackle the task of empowering women in security institutions.

How far are we from these goals? Africa has, in fact, been slowly responding to the idea that women should be allowed to play a greater role in public life. Certain countries, to be sure, have shown great reluctance to accept the need for change. Nigeria, a nation in which democracy has not had much overall success until very recent times, is a case in point. In some countries, such as South Africa, however, the issue is at least being debated. And in other countries, such as Uganda, steps have been taken to make government more representative.

Civil–Military Relations

Clearly, something must be done to reduce the power of the gun in Africa. African leaders have tried a variety of measures to tackle the problem of predatory militaries. Jerry Rawlings, for example, armed the ordinary people of Ghana. He worked on the assumption that an armed people would be better able to protect itself from the depredations of the military. It is an idea that, ironically, many Americans are quite sympathetic to, given that their own constitution grants them the “right to bear arms.” At any rate, whether arming the people will lead to stability in Ghana or elsewhere is still very much a debatable point.

Africa, however, has a more central concern, and that concern is the power struggle between the military and civilians. Many African

countries are “coup-prone,” yet creative ways might be found to reduce this problem. Giving the military a share in power might reduce the temptation of the military to intervene violently, and it might ease the transition to civilian government.

Nigeria might benefit from such an experiment by adopting a system along the following lines. For the next thirty or forty years (or for however long is thought necessary), civilians and soldiers could share power. A two-house system could be set up to resemble that of the British Houses of Parliament. One house (the equivalent of the House of Lords) could be a “military” house; the other, an elected house. Committees, composed of elements from both houses, could then be formed. Committee members would be entrusted with the task of examining issues that have serious implications for security. They would thrash out differences until they found out a solution. In addition, a civilian and a soldier might agree to run together in a presidential campaign, with the civilian seeking election as president and the soldier seeking election as vice president. (Of course, the constitution would have to make it clear that the vice president would not succeed the president in the event of his death. Otherwise, the temptation to assassinate the president would be too great!)

Pan-African Solutions

A variety of creative Pan-African solutions need to be considered.

Intervention

An interesting option is intervention. Africans can intervene to try to minimize chaos when a neighboring state collapses. A variety of ways exists in which this objective can be met.

The first type of intervention is single-power intervention. A famous example of unilateral intervention is the 1979 invasion of Uganda by Tanzania. On that occasion, Tanzanian troops marched all the way to Kampala and put Uganda virtually under military occupation for a couple of years.²⁵ Tanzania’s intervention was very similar to Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia to overthrow Pol Pot, except that the Vietnamese stayed in Cambodia a lot longer than the Tanzanians stayed in Uganda.

Another, slightly different kind of single-power intervention took place in 1994 when Uganda invaded Rwanda. This might perhaps be dubbed a “Bay of Pigs” style intervention. Just as Eisenhower and Kennedy trained Cubans to invade Cuba in the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda trained exiled Rwandans to intervene in Rwanda in 1994. The Ugandan-based Rwandese Patriotic Front invaded Rwanda and defeated the armies of the genocidal government, the Armed Forces of Rwanda (ex-FAR). Unlike its American counterpart, the “Bay of Pigs” operation in Africa was spectacularly successful in achieving its objectives. It ended the genocide and permitted the return of Tutsi refugees to Rwanda. It did not, however, bring about democratization or long-term stability to the country.

The second type of intervention is regionally supported single-power intervention. In this case, a single power intervenes with the blessing of a wider group of states. It acts under a kind of regional umbrella. When Tanzania and Uganda intervened, neither had the backing of a regional organization. But Nigeria’s intervention in the 1990s, both in Sierra Leone and in Liberia, arguably had the blessings of The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). This type of intervention likewise has counterparts outside of Africa. Here, one might point to Syria’s intervention in the Lebanese Civil War.²⁶ On this occasion, Syria had the support of the League of Arab States.

A third type of intervention is what might be called “inter-African colonization and annexation.” Africans have on occasion “colonized” other African countries in an effort to reestablish stability. As a solution to Africa’s ills, this type of intervention is controversial, and it has not been not entirely unsuccessful.

In 1964, for example, the Tanganyikan government annexed Zanzibar. It did so with the backing of Western powers alarmed by the situation in Zanzibar. Lyndon Johnson, the U.S. president, and Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the U.K. prime minister, both encouraged the merger. They feared that Zanzibar, an island that lies off the East African coast, was subversive and unstable. They wanted to avert the danger that it would become a kind of Cuba and thus threaten the mainland.

The methods used by the Tanganyikans were very much like those used by the British in colonial days. Just as the British had “convinced”

African chiefs to accept treaties by which they ceased to be sovereign, the Tanganyikan ruler got the dictator of Zanzibar to agree to a treaty of union. Nobody held a referendum in Zanzibar to check if the people wanted to cease being an independent nation. So it is fair to see this case as a colonization of sorts. But the annexation was fairly successful, and it did impose a kind of "Pax Tanganyika." Benevolent "colonization" by Africans, for all its negative connotations, is an option worth considering.

Regional Integration

Another solution to state collapse that holds some promise is regional integration. This scenario takes place when the state as a political refugee is integrated with its host country. In other words, an unstable state is assimilated by a stable state. In my estimation, the best chance of a peaceful solution of the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi is to integrate them with such a stable society.

Rwanda and Burundi are dual societies, and as a result, they seem doomed to face an endless cycle of violence. A mere tinkering with their internal constitutions will not solve their problems. There is every reason to fear that, while limited reforms may put a temporary halt to the violence, it will only be a matter of time before Rwanda and Burundi once again face state collapse and genocide. A more radical solution is needed. Federation could solve the problem, but federation with what state? Clearly, one should not attempt to integrate Rwanda and Burundi with a "sick," conflict-ridden society such as the Congo. To do so would merely add to the problems. One should also be careful not to integrate them with a relatively unstable state, such as Uganda. Doing so would run the risk of destabilizing the plural society, rather than stabilizing the dual society. Federation with the Republic of Tanzania, in contrast, might just work.

Interestingly, German colonial powers before World War I had leaned toward treating Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi as one single area of jurisdiction. Tanzania is a stable and a plural society. Once part of a wider system, Hutu and Tutsi would compete for resources with fellow Tanzanians, but they would have other political rivals. In that context, their differences would be less apparent, and they might behave far differently than they have done in past. Hutu and Tutsi sol-

diers would be retrained as part of the federal army of the United Republic of Tanzania. Hutus and Tutsis would then stop having de facto ethnic armies of their own.

A union with Tanzania would be safer than a union with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in spite of the shared Belgian connection and French language. Tanzania is a less vulnerable society and a more stable nation than DRC. It could provide a safe haven for Hutus and Tutsis. Moreover, Hutus and Tutsis are becoming partially Swahilized and should thus be able to get on well with "fellow" Tanzanian citizens. As citizens, they would then be assimilated in due course. What was a refugee state would ultimately become an integrated part of their new country.

What leads one to some optimism here is the precedent in Uganda. The Bahima, who are traditionally pastoralists, and the Bairu, who are traditionally agriculturalists, are the Hutu and Tutsi by another name. They both belong to a Bantu group known as the Banyankore. The Bahima form a dominant caste, just as was traditionally true of the Tutsi. And though the Bahima and Bairu are in many ways mutually dependent on one another, their society reflects the traditional mistrust of pastoralists and agriculturalists. However, because they are part of Uganda, they operate as one on most issues. There are occasions, of course, when they are divided, but in the wider, plural society, they see themselves as Banyankore and therefore distinct from the various other ethnic groups of Uganda. They recognize their shared interests, and this common ground is reflected in their political behavior.

Clearly, certain difficulties need to be overcome before federation with Tanzania is possible. The chief obstacle is that the Rwandans and Burundians are possessive about their independence and their separate identity. It will take some compelling and well-reasoned arguments to persuade them to renounce their sovereignty. On the one hand, immense resources will have to be made available to all three governments. They must be offered the means to build clinics, roads, schools, and other benefits of this sort to make their sacrifices palatable. At the same time, they must also be reminded of the unbearable alternative to loss of sovereignty. Do they want their children to constantly live under the cloud of imminent genocide? Though a difficult idea to sell, federation is not one that should be lightly abandoned.

Self-Help

One concrete proposal that I supported was the creation of a High Commissioner for Refugees and Displaced Africans to serve under the erstwhile Organization of African Unity. The fact is that, although we produce a disproportionate number of refugees and displaced people, Africans play a disproportionately limited role in helping them. A continent of one-tenth of the world's population is rapidly becoming a region of one-third of the displaced people of the world. We really should organize ourselves better and tackle the refugee problem in a systematic and efficient fashion. We do not want to discourage others from helping us. But we do need to do more, and we need to be seen doing more for our own people. We need to *lead*.

African Union and NEPAD

I have often dreamed of an African Security Council composed of African military and civilian leaders who would focus on limiting, containing, and ending African conflict.

Today, in the fall of 2002, some of my dreams for African unity are approaching realization. Africa entered the twenty-first century restless for changes in the status quo. Shortly after the turn of the millennium, Libya hosted a special summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity to discuss a new agenda for Africa and new continental institutions for such an agenda. The concept of the African Union (AU) was thus born.

The union was finally consummated in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. Its scope was more ambitious than that of the Organization of African Unity, which the AU replaced. The union envisaged greater and greater economic integration, the creation of a continental banking system, the establishment of a Pan-African parliament, and eventually a monetary union with one continental currency. The concept of an African Security Council gained still greater support, but its membership remained a matter of contention. If the African Security Council is to have permanent members with the veto (in the style of the United Nations), the major powers of Africa would have to include South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt.

Would such major permanent members of the African Security Council provide troops for a Pan-African interventionist force to re-

store order in emergencies like those of Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia in the 1990s?²⁷ It may take time for such an active umbrella of Pax Africana to win adequate consensus within the African Union.

The union came into being at the same time as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). This is a partnership between African countries and its major donors and trading partners; it is designed to help Africa exploit its resources efficiently and realize its economic potential. One important innovation in NEPAD is *peer-review*. African states would review each other's performance both economically and in terms of good governance, and then pass judgment on each other. A greater effort would be made to fight state corruption and to punish its excesses. In due course, the African Union would have to accept the need for collective sanctions against members who violate too many rules of good governance.

If this agenda of the African Union and NEPAD is realized, Africans will at last become each other's keepers.

CONCLUSION

This chapter considers both the roots and remedies of armed and violent conflict in Africa. We witnessed blood and anguish; we considered solutions; and we asked questions. But one paramount question remains: Are we facing birth pangs or death pangs in the present crisis? Are we witnessing the bloody forces of decolonization as the colonial structures are decaying or collapsing? Is the colonial slate being washed clean with the blood of victims, villains, and martyrs? Are the refugees victims of a dying order, or are they traumatized witnesses to an epoch-making rebirth? Is this blood from the womb of history giving painful birth to a new order?²⁸

Moral reform is an essential prerequisite of change. And change in Africa is urgently needed. The reform mistress can be as coy, however, as an old-style mistress. If Africa is indeed to witness a new order, we must heed the warning that the seventeenth-century English poet Andrew Marvell gave his lady:

Had we but world enough, and time,
This coyness, lady, were no crime.

But at my back I always hear
 Time's wingèd chariot hurrying near,
 And yonder all before us lie
 Deserts of vast eternity.
 The Grave's a fine and private place,
 But none, I think, do there embrace.²⁹

NOTES

1. See the table in James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, *A Quick and Dirty Guide to War*, 3d ed. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1996), 651–53.

2. Recent figures include the hundreds of thousands in Rwanda and Burundi, and the tens of thousands in Algeria and the Congo; Dunnigan and Bay, *A Quick and Dirty Guide to War*, 387.

3. Not surprisingly, an article in *The Economist* 352 (January 25, 1997): 17, argues that borders have not been the primary cause of conflict.

4. For an interesting article on this conflict, see Kjetil Tronvoll, "Borders of Violence-Boundaries of Identity: Demarcating the Eritrean Nation-State," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22, no. 6 (November 1999):1037–60.

5. The governing board of UNESCO outlawed the use of the word "tribe" when it published a general *History of Africa*. The ban is somewhat regrettable. Africa has a three-million-year history, and the word "tribe" has its uses in describing some of the social institutions. Moreover, and ironically enough, objecting to the use of the word "tribe" seems to be Eurocentric. Those who do not like the word "tribe" largely are aping a European dislike of the term. But, to avoid giving offense, I have used the word "ethnic" in this chapter instead.

6. An overview of this conflict may be found in Robert A. Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algerian War," *Middle East Journal* 50 (winter 1996): 18–39.

7. The struggle between religious groups in Egypt is analyzed in Hamied A. Ansari, "Sectarian Conflict in Egypt and the Political Expediency of Religion," *Middle East Journal* 38 (summer 1984): 18–39; for a recent article on the conflict, see *The Economist* 354 (January 8, 2000): 41.

8. Descriptions of the genocide may be found in Edward Nyakanvzi, *Genocide: Rwanda and Burundi* (Rochester, Vt.: Schenkman Books, 1998).

9. The Somalian descent is chronicled in Alice B. Hashim, *The Fallen State: Dissonance, Dictatorship and Death in Somalia* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1997).

10. For one analysis of the identity conflicts that have bedeviled Sudan and brought war among the Sudanese, see Francis Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995).

11. These societies may also be termed “ethnically bipolar”; see R. S. Milne, *Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States: Guyana, Malaysia and Fiji* (Vancouver and London: University of British Columbia Press, 1981).

12. For a positive assessment of the Belgian experience, see Michael O’Neill, “Re-imagining Belgium: New Federalism and the Political Management of Cultural Diversity,” *Parliamentary Affairs* 51, no. 2 (April 1998): 241–58.

13. An overview of the Cyprus situation may be found in Robert McDonald, *The Problem of Cyprus* (London: Brassey’s, for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1989).

14. The various kinds of violence bedeviling Sri Lanka are detailed in Jagath P. Senaratne, *Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977–1990: Riots, Insurrections, Counterinsurgencies, Foreign Intervention* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1997).

15. Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998).

16. British Broadcasting Corporation, “Mandela: Burundi’s Gloomy Politics,” *BBC News*, October 12, 2001; for an overview of the situation in the Great Lakes, consult the special issue of the *African Studies Review* 41, no. 1 (April 1999): 1–97.

17. See Ann M. Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press and Oxford: James Currey, 1998) for an overview of the conflicts and peace efforts.

18. For a guide to the Biafra war, consult Zdenek Cervenka, *The Nigerian War, 1967–70: History of the War, Selected Bibliography and Documents* (Frankfurt: Bernard & Graef, 1971).

19. The Westphalian compact established the principle that national sovereignty was inviolable. It became customary for the international community to avoid intervention if it meant infringing on state sovereignty; internal excesses may, however, be testing this custom. On this issue, see Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanuto, eds., *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

20. For an overview of “tolerance,” see Susan Mendus, ed., *Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

21. Robert G. Moser provides an interesting comparative analysis of how different types of electoral systems affect the number of political parties in

regions once governed by a single-party system; see Robert G. Moser, "Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States," *World Politics* 51, no. 3 (April 1999): 359–84.

22. The debate on the linkages between economic freedom and political freedom is historic and relevant; for a recent example, see Paul A. Cammack, *Capitalism and Democracy in the Third World: A Doctrine for Political Development* (London: Leicester University Press, 1997).

23. Consult Paul Q. Hirst, *From Statism to Pluralism: Democracy, Civil Society and Global Politics* (London: UCL Press, 1998).

24. Ali Mazrui, *The African Condition: A Political Diagnosis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980): 133–38.

25. A description of the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda may be found in Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin* (Westport, Conn.: L. Hill, 1982).

26. The conditions leading to the Syrian intervention in Lebanon are described in Karen Rasler, "Internationalizing Civil War: A Dynamic Analysis of the Syrian Intervention in Lebanon," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (September 1983): 421–56.

27. The successes and failures of ECOMOG in Liberia should be studied in preparation for this new venture. See Kenneth L. Cain, "Meanwhile in Africa," *SAIS Review* 20, no. 1 (winter/spring 2000): 153–76.

28. At the start of the twenty-first century, South Africa was promoting the concept of an African renaissance. Nigeria had embarked on contradictory trends of renewed democratization at the national level and establishment of Islamic law at the local level. East Africa was moving toward a new East African community.

29. These lines are taken from Andrew Marvell's "To a Coy Mistress," in H. M. Margoliouth, *The Poems and Letters of Andrew Marvell*, 3d ed., vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971): 27–28. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of the following in revising this chapter: Albert Luthuli, professor at large, University of Jos, Jos, Nigeria; Ibn Khaldu, professor at large, School of Islamic and Social Sciences, Leesburg, Virginia, U.S.A.; Andrew D. White, professor at large emeritus and senior scholar in Africana studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, U.S.A.

Violence in Africa since 1950: Frontiersmen

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In chapter 3, Anthony Clayton—a distinguished historian who was senior lecturer at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, United Kingdom, between 1965 and 1999—advances the hypothesis that modern warfare in Africa in striking ways echoes the warfare of pre-colonial days. In so doing, he points to the African roots of conflict in Africa. In the final analysis, he sees most conflicts on this continent as struggles over inadequate economic resources (an opinion notably differing from that of Ali Mazrui). He argues that economic development and the equitable distribution of wealth are Africa's best hope for a more peaceful future.

This chapter offers some reflections on the nature and roots of conflict in Africa over the second half of the twentieth century. The argument advanced here is rather different from the arguments that appear elsewhere in this volume. The thesis rests on the assumption that our best insight into the shape of contemporary violence in Africa may come from an examination of the precolonial past. Large areas of Africa today have, in striking ways, reverted to being frontiersmen societies. The conflicts are similar to those of the African past, both in the ways in which they are fought and in their underlying motivations. After a discussion of the underdevelopment predicament that brought about this situation, this chapter will provide an overview of armed and violent conflict in Africa since 1945 by showing how it follows historical patterns. The thesis of this chapter is that, in the final analysis, the roots of much of the conflict in modern-day Africa are, just as they were in precolonial days, neither ideological nor political, but economic. The modern-day “frontierman” is engaged in a struggle

for control of desperately needed resources (often local) for the chance at a better life and sometimes even for survival itself.

AFRICA'S UNDERDEVELOPMENT PREDICAMENT

The Colonial Experience in Africa

At the root of Africa's problems lies the continent's underdevelopment predicament. An examination of this condition will help us to understand the causes and, more important, the duration and escalation in scale of African conflicts. Although the forms taken by different conflicts may vary, the tensions resulting from underdevelopment and from the competition for scarce resources form a common underlying theme. It is therefore useful at the outset to take an overview of these predicament features.

Has any part of the earth's surface been subjected to such rapid and traumatic change as Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, in the last one hundred years? Traditional, slow-moving societies had typified this region for much of its earlier history. These societies began to fall apart with the arrival of the colonial powers. Frontiers were drawn up to suit the Europeans of the late nineteenth century. These Europeans were largely interested in the international balance of power and had little knowledge of African realities. They planned these frontiers, often using atlases from elementary schools, in places as far removed from Africa as the Imperial Chancellery in Berlin or the gardens of Hatfield House in England. Some African states created by the colonial powers were large. Some were very large indeed, and they encapsulated peoples of profoundly different cultures and modes of production. Others were small and of doubtful economic viability. During the Berlin Conference negotiations (1884–1885), which determined the procedures by which nations were to acquire slices of Africa, little thought was given to needs of a region as a whole. This neglect did lasting damage, perhaps even greater damage than was done by the frontiers, some of which placed a single ethnicity under the control of two or more colonial nations.

Once in power, colonial governments demarcated administrative divisions to correspond with local ethnicities. They did so for a variety of reasons. Sometimes they were driven by economic reasons, sometimes by administrative considerations. Yet other times, they acted out of a perceived

sense of paternalistic, protective obligation. Regardless of the motives that inspired them, the policies had detrimental effects. They sharpened existing rivalries and incited ethnic consciousness where little or none had existed. Traditional African authorities were undermined, and African customs were distorted, sometimes even reinvented, by colonial administrations. This scenario, in turn, had the effect of devaluing and debasing them. Over time, individual Africans lost a part of their sense of tribal identity, becoming deracinated, as it were. Africans had to adjust to a new order, one in which the idea of the individual as a discrete individual (an "I-myself") came to replace the African understanding of the individual as an integral part of a wider society (an "I-in-society"). The individual was now subject to pressures that ranged from meeting tax and labor requirements to living in the commercial world, faced by all the temptations of worldly goods. These pressures further detached Africans from their traditional role in the wider group, while at the same time they drew men together in times of trouble and fear. Adding to the fracturing of African society were some new divisions brought in by colonial powers, notably religious (Christian versus Muslim, and in some territories Christian versus Christian) and linguistic (Anglophone versus Francophone).

Africa was often economically exploited by colonial powers. A more frequent problem, however, was uneven development. In Ghana, for example, the "golden triangle" of Accra-Kumasi-Sekondi possessed gold, cocoa, and timber resources that could be developed for export to Western markets. The north, with no comparable resources, stagnated, which ultimately led to uneven development of social services, particularly education. Urban areas generally gained at the expense of rural areas. In British Africa, and to some extent in French territories, colonial military policy favored certain ethnicities, usually from the poorer and more remote areas, perceived as "martial races." Problems, in short, abounded. Individual men, whether laborers, entrepreneurs, or officials, found themselves acting within new arenas, on the stage sets of the colonial state and suffering from sharpening anxieties over rivals. All these anomalies were, however, held together by the "colonial glue," the command culture of colonial governments, until the 1940s and 1950s.

The Postcolonial Era

When the colonial glue began to melt, the newly independent successor states found it difficult to deal with the problems, old and new, that

surfaced. They were still faced by the relatively new colonial cultural, social, and economic problems. Now, however, as fear caused people to draw together in ethnic loyalty, states also had to deal with the resurgence of historical enmities. These hostilities reemerged in particular in those regions where the colonial power had found one ethnicity dominant and another subdued. The Baganda and the Bunyoro in Uganda are a case in point.

Politics in many countries soon degenerated into zero-sum games. In this kind of struggle, the winner takes all; the loser loses all. The intensity of the struggle led to a collapse of standards and a breakdown of restraints on behavior, evident in corruption, political malpractice, and intimidation. Many African armies, or the units within them, ceased to be impartial national institutions. Rather, they became a mere collection of men with guns who supported political winners. Soldiers became players in the game, rather than referees; they became part of the problem, not its answer. Looking at the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade, which President Robert Mugabe deployed to subdue Matabeleland, and Samuel Doe's Krahn Army of Liberia, one is reminded of the words of Ciano, Mussolini's foreign minister, when he admiringly referred to Hitler's SS (*Schutzstaffel*) as "a small private *political* army" (my italics). As a result of the degeneration of politics, regimes and states lost legitimacy in the eyes of sections of their communities. Africans who had lost faith in their states soon came to acquiesce and even participate in the violence, thus contributing to the breakdown of their states and ultimately supporting those in revolt.

Africa in Recent Decades

Economic difficulties have all worsened, especially since 1974. The underdevelopment predicament is manifested by the prevalence of one crop and primary produce economies, poor balance of payments, and increasing debt. In recent years, globalization has served to aggravate many of these difficulties.

Most serious of all are the demographic problems. All African populations have continued to rise, thus adding to the pressures of frustration and envy. Four examples illustrate the dimension of the problem. The population of Kenya was 4 million in 1939; it was 28 million in 2001. That of Sudan was 5 million (1939), 27 million (1999); Nigeria, 20 million (1939), 110 million (2001); the Congo, 10 million (1939), 48 million (2000).

Foreign intervention and aid has sometimes been helpful, especially in instances where a great power thought it to be in its interest to secure stability in a particular country. However, even in such cases, it was not uncommon for this type of intervention to last only for a short time. In certain cases, the foreign powers propped up an inherently corrupt regime, making that regime's eventual fall all the worse. A case in point is what happened in Ethiopia when Soviet support was withdrawn from the Mengistu regime. In other cases—for example, in Angola—foreign intervention took the form of a surrogate extension of the Cold War.

In some African countries, these tensions were compounded by cultural clashes or external ideological teachings. The result has been psychological dissonance (made manifest in the wild, irrational lashing out at what are perceived to be enemies) and the ruthless use of brutality, mutilation, torture, and terror. The African psychology of recent decades has been afflicted by what Einstein, describing the German situation of 1917, called an “epidemic of the mind.”¹

In several countries, mass communication has infinitely worsened the problem. It has sometimes served merely to spread the epidemic of hatred; at other times, it has done much more than that. Radio Mille Collines in Kigali, Rwanda, in 1994, rivaled only Belgrade radio (Serbia) in directly inciting mass genocide. Traditional witch doctors of pre-colonial times were preoccupied with local, often domestic concerns, whereas modern-day spin doctors can inflame the masses to hatred. Drawings by Liberian school children of their civil war factions at work often picture the fighters with a nearby television showing war footage from the Gulf War or violent movies. These images reveal the subculture of men without education, work, or land, a subculture based on Rambo-style videos and films. The bizarre clothing of many fighters is another expression of the world of fantasy, with facial masks linked to former animists' beliefs and superstitions.² Drugs, alcohol, and reggae music are used and abused to increase fanaticism. Rivals are demonized. Rumors, myths, and political cartoons portray adversaries as evil and fit only for ethnic cleansing, a process vividly illustrated by René Lemarchand in his studies of genocide in Rwanda.³

In the last decade of the twentieth century, further horrors fanned the flames. The end of the Cold War led to a “new world disorder,” and other problems that appear more urgent distract the great powers. Middle

Eastern and European problems have monopolized the attention of the United States and other countries to the detriment of Africa. The withdrawal of Western support made a number of African regimes more vulnerable to attack. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Congo Brazzaville have become “failed states” (to borrow Pauline Baker’s expression).⁴ The terrorist attacks of September 11 turned the attention of the international community still further away from Africa, making it seem likely that the neglect of the continent will continue well into the twenty-first century.

Intervention from outside Africa has been superseded by intervention from within Africa. First, African regional forces attempted to intervene.⁵ These forces were not always impartial, nor always successful.⁶ Next came the African governments who intervened in other African conflicts. Regimes, which had risen to power as a result of insurgency, supported other revolutionary-based regimes out of sympathy for their views—not always disinterested ones—or out of a perception of shared threats. Some regimes have found it necessary to intervene in neighboring countries to negate threats to their own frontiers. Examples include Angola’s 1978 intervention in São Tomé and its 1997 intervention in Congo Brazzaville. The same country’s much more significant interventions in Zaire in 1997 and 1998 were as much inspired by an aim of containing National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) as by hopes of material profit.⁷ The ripple waves of war spread. Eritrea and Ethiopia’s border war has spilled over to the factions already warring in Somalia, with Ethiopia’s supporting factions opposed first to Mohamed Aideed and later his son, and with Eritrea’s supporting Aideed and the southern Oromo insurgency. Sudan’s civil war and Ethiopia’s support for southern insurgents are the factors that led Khartoum to also support the Oromo frontier fighting. Commercial companies, willingly or unwillingly, have found themselves caught up in conflicts, as targets or as providers of cash ransom, to the local faction in control. Other companies entered the conflicts as rifle/security businesses, even as surrogate armies or guard forces, for a variety of motives, ones not always wholesome. A population increase ensured a ready supply of men to the militias. When there was a shortfall, it was always possible to fill the gap with South African or Eastern European mercenaries or by large numbers of juvenile and child soldiers, as was the case in Sierra Leone. These child soldiers were initiated into violence by a number of repulsive methods, in some cases based on debased traditional rituals and animist

superstitions. Weaponry became abundant, especially simple and light weapons (i.e., the guerrillas' pocket artillery), such as the Kalashnikov AK-47 or the RPG-7 grenade launchers. Such weapons could be acquired from supplies, mostly Soviet, provided in the Cold War era or from the impoverished successor states of the former Soviet Union. Official state armies have proved unable to contain insurgency.

VIOLENCE IN AFRICA: PAST AND PRESENT

Clapham's Typology of Insurgent Violence

The brief outline just provided may serve as a general context for understanding violence in Africa. Most of the factors mentioned are present in greater or lesser measure in all its conflicts. At this point, we should proceed to an analysis of the specific causes of contemporary violence, which may be broken down into two parts: *who* is responsible for the violence and *why* there is violence.

African Guerrillas (1998), edited by Professor Christopher Clapham of Lancaster University, provides an interesting starting point for our discussion. Using the analytical tools and methodologies of political science, Clapham and his team studied a variety of insurgent movements.⁸ They excluded from consideration anticolonial guerrilla movements and those movements associated with the former South African apartheid regime in Pretoria, notably UNITA in Angola and National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO). The remaining insurgent movements were classified under three headings:

1. *Separatist insurgencies*, where insurgents aim to secede. Examples include the insurgents in Eritrea in 1993 and the original Anya Nya in southern Sudan.
2. *Reform insurgencies*, where insurgents aim simply at radical reform of the central government. Examples include the present Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front in Ethiopia.
3. *Warlord insurgencies*, where a particular figure seeks a change of leadership in his favor. Some of the warlords, like Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), may also seek a personal fiefdom for the leader and his immediate entourage.⁹

Clapham's work has many excellent qualities. The chapters are detailed, and their conclusions are based on exhaustive fieldwork carried out under very difficult conditions. A number of interesting points emerge from this book that are of direct relevance for our own concerns: the importance of the role of the petty bourgeoisie in the Eritrean and Tigray insurgency movements; the preference shown by the Sudan People's Liberation Army for the use of traditional institutions of native administration and chiefs' courts, rather than revolutionary ideology (a preference based on the essentially defensive nature of its strategy); the argument that political entrepreneurs, using traditional kinship categories, played a more important role than the kinships themselves in Somalia's disintegration; the consequences of the presence of Rwandan exiles in Museveni's Uganda; and, finally, some very interesting conclusions about the composition of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) or *lumpen*, second-generation unemployed city dwellers, living on petty theft, violence, reggae music, and marijuana.¹⁰

The Frontiersmen's Template

While much of the detail is to be respected, Clapham's framework is, arguably, incomplete. His study sheds far more light on "who" engaged in insurgency movements than "why" they did so. Historians seeking to understand the causes of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa might do better to turn to comparisons with the precolonial African past. In this regard, the work of Cambridge professor John Iliffe is particularly illuminating. He recognizes that Africa was essentially a frontiersmen's society.¹¹ He explains that Africans have historically lived in an especially hostile region of the world: "The central themes of African history are the peopling of the continent, the achievement of human coexistence with nature, the building up of enduring societies, and their defense against aggression from more favored regions."¹² The lifestyle of the frontiersman is defined by the struggle for survival.

As Professor Iliffe notes, the sheer size of the continent and its scattered population obstructed state formation. In precolonial Africa, several thousand polities existed, perhaps at least five thousand, if not more. A few of these could support a central administrative system whereas many more were what one might call "demi-states." These were organized by simple communication methods and had at their dis-

positional traditional means for mobilizing youth for conflict in time of need. What they did not have was much by way of permanent infrastructure. A large number of acephalous groupings also existed. Many of these Africans lived in small communities that were roughly oriented around a particular geographic feature, such as the Maasai of Kenya's Great Rift Valley or the Luo on the shores of Lake Victoria in Kenya. These groups had limited organization, although they did act in collusion with other communities for defensive purposes. States, demistates, and acephalous peoples all sought to control areas and resources. Although there were innumerable frontiers, there were few clearly demarcated formal boundaries.

Most African cultures were frontier cultures, and conflict between Africans may best, perhaps, be styled as frontiersmen-type warfare. This kind of warfare had several characteristics. First, groups were not permanent, but were constantly formed, broken, and reformed. The *ruga ruga* warrior bands of nineteenth-century East Africa are an excellent example of this phenomenon. These bands were composed of men of mixed culture and race. The warriors simply fought to live and lived to fight. They and societies around them allied and broke away, reformed and fragmented, in ever-changing patterns. Second, warriors in these frontiersmen societies were highly honored; warrior status was hallowed by rituals and bestowed prestige.¹³ In precise ways that differed among ethnic groups, all young men were expected to join a warrior age-set. The martial values in turn contributed to the endemic nature of conflict. Third, the economic needs of African frontier society also added to the violence. The young men of these societies engaged in almost continuous local scrapping over perceived assets: lands, cattle, and women. Fourth, the harsh environment often made behavior in conflicts cruel.¹⁴ In a world where no one had much, the little they did have came to be of profound importance. Bitter struggles ensued over resources that, to us, may seem of scant worth.

The frontiersmen's template can help us understand much recent conflict in Africa. It can shed light, not only on the three types of guerrilla insurgency chosen by Clapham, but many, perhaps most, of the warfare in Africa since 1950. This model includes explanations for the international wars, the civil wars, and the divisions within the anticolonial liberation campaigns.¹⁵ Both academic classification and the overt political rhetoric of the fighting factions have served to conceal the actual hidden agendas. These agendas are those typical of a frontier society, one struggling for

survival in a hostile environment and one seeking to acquire or defend economic assets.

Conflict in Africa since 1945

A brief examination of the conflicts in Africa since 1945 is in order here. Despite the appearance of variety, a common thread appears to unite almost all of them. Behind the rhetoric, ideology, or religion we can see the hidden agenda: the frontiersmen's fighting for perceived assets. Even a short survey, moreover, highlights the characteristics shared between the frontiersmen of the precolonial period and their modern-day descendants.

Liberation Campaigns, 1945–1970s

In sub-Saharan Africa, the first major conflict of the second half of the century was the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya. One group of ethnicities, the Kikuyu, orchestrated and executed the uprising, which was in large part motivated by an increasing lack of land resources combined with a rapid population growth. The Mau Mau insurgents initially styled themselves as the “Kenya *Land Freedom Army*” (my italics), a name that points to their underlying concern to recover land stolen, as they perceived it, by white settlers.¹⁶

The 1961 uprising in Angola saw attacks on the Portuguese estates in the north, indicating that what was at stake was again a quest for land and resources. In the liberation campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s, the formal aim of the insurgents was the ending of colonial rule both within Angola and Rhodesia. At the same time, however, rival movements—the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and UNITA in Angola and the respective armies of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe African National Union's National Liberation Army (ZANU's ZANLA), and the Zimbabwe African People's Union's Revolutionary Army (ZAPU's ZIPRA) in Rhodesia—fought to make good ethnic claims and to ensure protection from one another.¹⁷

Conflicts in Independent Africa, 1960s–1970s

During the turbulent years 1960 to 1965, several regions, notably Katanga (Shaba), sought to secure the protection of their own eco-

conomic assets in postindependence Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire).¹⁸ Nigerian politics in the first six years of independence was likewise dominated by competition of this sort. Large ethnically based political parties sought by fair means or foul to get the power that would secure them resources. When the system collapsed, one ethnicity, the Ibo, unsuccessfully tried to secure their control over the eastern region's oil resources by secession.¹⁹ This was the *démarche* that opened the Nigerian Civil War of 1967 to 1970, with the north's fearing that new frontiers would deny them access to the sea. In the mid-1960s, the Somalis conducted *shifita* operations in northeast Kenya to regain the territory lost during the nineteenth century. Another Somali attempt to regain lost territory in the Ogaden war was the cause of the Ethiopian–Somali war of 1977 to 1978. This war ended disastrously for Somalia, following the intervention of a Soviet general and staff who, together with Cuban troops, fought a brilliant air–land battle.²⁰ Finally, Tanzania's conflict with Uganda was occasioned by Uganda's brutal dictator Idi Amin, who laid claim to the Kagera River salient.²¹

Southern Africa, 1970s and 1980s

Much conflict in Africa during the 1970s and 1980s was concentrated in the southern part of the continent. Fighting centered on the efforts by whites within South Africa, most notably the Afrikaners, to secure control of the agricultural and mineral assets of the republic. The external wars were also shaped by fear that the policy of apartheid would be challenged across the African frontiers. The internal conflict was an undeclared frontier war. Its objectives were to restrict nonwhites to demarcated “homelands,” to reduce Africans to laborers without rights, and to expel them from the profitable areas of the country, which were marked out for white control.

Externally, when the Portuguese colonial regimes governing Mozambique and Angola collapsed in 1974, South Africa turned from support for the Portuguese to an open military intervention. They justified this intervention in terms borrowed from French counterrevolutionary warfare theorists of the 1950s, as part of a “total national strategy” to combat a “total onslaught” on South Africa. Because of the presence in Angola of an increasing number of Cuban troops as well as warfare

specialists from the Soviet Union and other communist countries, many South African whites were convinced that the situation was indeed urgent. As a result, they felt free to carry out their intervention with a semireligious fervor, accompanied also by a belief in the superiority of whites as the master race. The twenty-two years of the "Border War" involved sophisticated air-land military operations and tactics, with parachute and helicopter landings, the deployment of heavy armor and artillery, air-to-ground strikes, and an extensive variety of special-force operations. The incursion of large numbers of black Africans on to the farms of white South Africans can also be seen as assaults on an internal frontier. White South Africans have reacted in part by demanding a cantonal system of government, one that would provide security for whites within cantonal frontiers.

Several factors brought the Border War to an end in 1988. International pressures on South Africa and South Africa's new willingness to release its control of South-West Africa (Namibia) played a part. So, too, did the arrival of technologically advanced Soviet aircraft, which killed some South African whites and which the South Africans lacked the necessary equipment to counter. Finally, a general war weariness in South Africa, Angola, and Cuba led to a willingness to reach an agreement.²²

The ending of this technological state-of-the-art warfare on South Africa's borders did not, however, end South Africa's internal conflicts. The mounting resistance of the black population to apartheid was evidenced in rent strikes, student strikes, boycotting, and sabotage. This revolt, in its turn, was met by increasingly severe repressive measures from the government. In particular, a second conflict ensued between followers of the Zulu Inkatha movement and the African National Congress. At one level, this was a conflict that looked to the future, trying to determine who would emerge as winners and get to control the economy when apartheid collapsed. At a more mundane level, this was a bitter war fought over political allegiances and local assets in the Natal region as well as over who would be able to enjoy job opportunities in the vast and squalid hostel complexes of the Reef townships. At the outset, in Natal, the weaponry was crude, consisting of clubs, iron bars, and canisters of stones, some machetes, and a few firearms. Later, in the Reef townships, increased numbers of firearms appeared in the turf war. The fighting and killings, though reduced in scale, continued until 1995.²³ Tensions continued into the new millennium.

As a result of South African intervention, conflict has been endemic in Mozambique and Angola since 1975. In Mozambique, a South African-assisted faction, RENAMO, embarked on a military campaign against the main insurgency guerrilla movement, Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), securing control of some areas in the east.²⁴ In Angola, conflict continued with still more serious consequences until the death of UNITA guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002. The eastern-based UNITA fought on with varying degrees of international support for nearly three decades. By the end of the 1980s, UNITA was a powerful and well-organized military force, financed in good measure by the profits from diamond mines under its control, and determined to prevent Luanda from taking control of the resources of its home area. A UN-brokered cease-fire brought an uneasy agreement in Mozambique in 1990. A similar agreement in 1989 in Angola failed in practice to stop the fighting and finally broke down in 1998, with full-scale civil war resuming in 1999. In this renewed war, UNITA adopted a new tactic. In targeted areas, it deliberately attacked agricultural workers, whether they were working on estates or peasant plots. This attack drove the men and their families off the land and into towns, thereby increasing the problem of food deprivation and putting pressure on an already embattled government.²⁵ The Angolan government also had to meet further challenges of secessionist movements by seeking to create a small oil-rich state in the Cabinda enclave, again resulting in cross-border operations into former Zaire (the Democratic Republic of Congo).

Eastern Africa and the Great Lakes Region

Conflicts in eastern Africa during the 1980s and early 1990s bear frontiersmen analysis. In Zimbabwe, as a legacy of the earlier ZANU-ZAPU rivalries, Robert Mugabe's government let loose its special force, the Fifth Brigade, to make it plain to all in Matabeleland where power and control of resources would live after independence.²⁶ Between 1981 and 1988, Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army progressively asserted control over all of Uganda. In so doing, it showed that the lead in government in this country was going to be taken by southerners. Eritrea's breakaway from Ethiopia in the 1990s actually succeeded in creating a new internationally recognized frontier. In Somalia, easy access to weaponry from regional and local military

and police armories enabled warlords to arm factions and incite them to combat. These factions, led by warlord entrepreneurs, were generally, but not always, based on clan or subclan groups. International military intervention failed to stop the fighting, and in 1989, some twenty-six factions were holding different areas of the country. Indeed, one northern faction (based on the frontiers of the former British Somaliland) actually proclaimed formal secession. By the mid-1990s, conflict had reconfigured Somalia into some six local authorities, including "Somaliland" in the north and "Puntland" in the northeast. Some of the authorities are in conflict with their neighbors at the edges of their areas, and the best that can be hoped is that they eventually form building blocks for a loose confederation.²⁷ The horrifying massacres in Rwanda and Burundi showed ethnic conflict for territory and its resources at its genocidal worst. The quest for an economic if not an international frontier can also be seen in the clear wish of the local authorities and the population of Zanzibar for a looser union with mainland Tanzania, a desire the Tanzanian government seeks to suppress.

The most serious border dispute of the late 1990s is that which broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Here two regimes that had formerly been closely allied in a common struggle against Ethiopia's Marxist ruler, Mengistu, were locked in a very bloody frontier war. *The Economist* reported that in this savage contest, the "combatants use the weaponry of the Korean war, the tactics of the first world war and the medical treatments of the nineteenth century."²⁸

As already noted, this conflict spilled over into dissident frontier areas of southern Ethiopia and into Somalia, with the various factions in these countries using this conflict to embarrass their enemies. The war even spread into Sudan, whose own civil war was spilling over into Uganda. The Khartoum government deliberately supported an insurrectionary movement, the Lord's Resistance Army, as reprisal for Kampala's support for the southern Sudan People's Liberation Army. A desire to embarrass Uganda was also a major reason for Sudanese support for Laurent Kabila in the Congo Democratic Republic.

Western Africa

The warlord-led faction fighting in the Liberian Civil War of 1989 to 1996 was only slightly less brutal than that of Central Africa in the

1980s, with the different factions all targeting or trying to defend the country's few economic assets. The conflicts in Sierra Leone that followed also centered on the country's few important economic assets, diamond mines that the RUF held and defended.²⁹ In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the African peacekeeping force ECOMOG was for long a player that was serving a Nigerian agenda rather than an impartial peacekeeper. ECOMOG was replaced in Sierra Leone by a UN force that proved inadequate; peace and order were therefore eventually restored by British military action and by support for the legal government. The 1980s and 1990s saw intermittent frontier clashes, on occasion backed by Nigerian air strikes on the Nigeria–Cameroon border. The conflicts were fought over disputed territory that was thought to contain offshore mineral wealth. Minor frontier clashes took place between Mauritania and Senegal in 1990, and between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1995. Intermittent internal regional insurgency over local economic assets also flared up in the Casamance area of Senegal. The uprisings received some support from Guinea-Bissau, which in turn led to Senegal's disastrous intervention in Guinea-Bissau's civil war. In Nigeria, the Niger delta local communities are in frequent conflict over who should control oil pipelines. In 2001, a conflict broke out in the town of Ios in the Middle Belt. Although it appeared to be a conflict between Christians and Muslims, this conflict was at bottom caused by ethnic rivalries.³⁰

Central Africa

A mixture of ethnic and generational divisions lies behind the collapse of the Congo-Brazzaville state. The ongoing violence has come in several waves. Initially, ethnically based factions fought one another. They armed and recruited young people of the home regions and from the suburbs of Brazzaville. After a while, these young people, joined by the unemployed, turned in frustration to looting and random violence. Different groups emerged: "Ninjas," "Zulus," and others whose membership sometimes cut across the original ethnic divisions. Each group pegged claims to a particular area of the capital, which then became the section where it had right of pillage and roadblock extortion.³¹ A 1997 peace accord failed to end the conflict, and faction fighting reopened in early 2002, with oil profits raising the stakes.

The rich economic resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) tempted Laurent Kabila's "Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo Zaire" with its Tutsi-driven Rwandan-backed military to overthrow the corrupt and collapsing regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. In 1999, the same underlying desire for resources and the same temptingly weak regime led to worsening conflict. Ugandans, in conjunction with Rwandan Tutsis, supported forces who sought to overthrow Kabila. Meanwhile, Zimbabwe, Angola, Chad, Sudan, and Namibia together with Hutu refugees and insurgents, tried to keep Kabila in power. In June 1999, the war, in the words of *The Economist*, was "chaotic, often a localized scramble for loot, mainly gold and diamonds."³² The chaos was to worsen, with rifts in the anti-Kabila camp leading to fighting between the Ugandan and Rwandan forces. Both macroeconomic and microeconomic actors (governments who intervene with formal armies, on the one hand, and local warlords, on the other) stand to gain considerably from success in this contest, which again is being fought more for the control of resources than for political legality. In Zimbabwe, the policies of President Mugabe, which are meant to harass the white farm owners so that they will be forced out, represents an assault on Zimbabwe's "interest frontier" of land assets by one ethnicity against another. The campaign has the widest implications for the whole of southern Africa.

North Africa: A Different Sort of Struggle

If we turn briefly to Africa north of the Sahara, we can also see common themes running through the conflicts. Here the conflicts are not overt quests for resources; rather, they are quests for national identity that will result in control of resources. The Sudanese and Chad civil wars, and the internal upheavals in Mauritania, provide useful evidence. All three were countries whose colonially drawn frontiers included peoples of the widest differences of culture and ethnic origin. All three are ultimately engaged in competitive internal struggles for a national identity in which the losers can expect little share in any future wealth.

The same is true of Algeria, though there the conflict for identity assumed a different form. In the war against the French, the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgents were often referred to by the French security forces as the HLL, *Hors la Loi*, or "outlaws." In fact, the bloody

civil war, which began in 1993 and is still raging today, is being fought to determine whose law will shape the national identity. Will the state be a secular one, or will the state be based on Islamic law? Berbers (Kabyles) challenge Arab domination. The ferocity and single-mindedness of attacks levied against libraries, schools, and other institutions tainted by Western (especially French) ways suggests how strongly some in this region feel about the question of identity.³³ Morocco has attempted to solve the identity issue of Western Sahara by "Green Marches." It has resorted to a Stalinist tactic and has sent hundreds of thousands of Moroccans into the territory, securing its position by building a *berm*, a military fortified line. This structure is designed to keep out insurgents. It is based in Algeria and is composed of the territory's original inhabitants.

The Modern-Day Frontiersmen

In sub-Saharan Africa, as this chronological summary makes clear, the new warriors, factions, and militias are traditional frontiersmen. At this point, let us take a somewhat closer look at why and how these frontiersmen fight and at the nature of their leadership.

Why They Fight

Like the Africans of the past, they are not primarily fighting for a state. The territory for which they fight is defined by informal economic resource frontiers. This territory usually, but not inevitably, lies within colonial-drawn boundaries. The colonial state, however, is merely an artificial creation that encapsulates arenas in which conflicts are fought. The colonial boundaries now no longer prevent these conflicts from spreading out beyond them.³⁴ This statement is not to say that the conflicts represent struggles to change boundaries; rather, the boundaries are becoming less and less relevant. Formal secession, for example, is not high on the agenda. Secessionist movements seemingly have arisen in Sudan, Chad, the Congo, Nigeria, and Eritrea. But for all save the Eritreans, secession seems to have been a rhetorical goal, rather than a real one, and none of these movements really commanded the support necessary to succeed. Elsewhere, be it Rwanda, Burundi, Kwa-Zulu, Liberia, or Sierra Leone, there has been no sustained aim to secede from colonial frontiers.

Ideologies, particularly Chinese liberation war teachings, have contributed enormously to the organization, cohesion, and discipline of a number of the classic anticolonial insurgent movements. But the behavior of many so-called revolutionary regimes on assuming power suggest that ideology has increasingly been used as a tool for that cohesion rather than a lodestar. The tool is all too often and all too soon discarded, either out of materialism or through other pragmatic considerations.

In sum, like the frontiersmen of precolonial days, most modern-day frontiersmen are ultimately driven by economic motives, rather than political or ideological ones. They fight, in short, to control or secure local assets. Not a few of these conflicts, we may note, are fought between rural communities and the more advantaged townspeople. Much hinges on the outcome of these apparently petty wars. In a continent still afflicted by poverty, ignorance, and disease, control of what little a community has is of consuming importance. If survival itself is not at stake, the hope for a slightly more tolerable future surely is.

How They Fight

The conflicts in contemporary Africa are usually fought, as Dr. Mazrui noted in the previous chapter, with modern weapons yet with less-than-modern discipline. Weapons are usually small-scale: the AK-47 rifle, the torch necklace, the landmines, the RPG-7 grenade launcher, the mortar, the multiple-barreled cannon, or the machine guns mounted on the back of a Toyota truck. For protection, the fighters use fields of antipersonnel mines, which are the weapons of present-day frontier warfare. A few of the larger insurgent movements, such as UNITA, have sometimes captured or bought more sophisticated artillery, often with assistance from Western or former Soviet Bloc countries. When their economies are strong enough to support the expense, certain national armies that are engaged in "frontier" conflicts use helicopters and other conventional weapons drawn from the arsenals of the last decade. Although these armies can muster an alarming amount of firepower, the frontiersmen groups in some cases have actually proved more powerful.³⁵ Contemporary warriors fight with as much ferocity as did warriors of the precolonial era and for the same reason: they think that the struggles in

which they are engaged will result in the loser's losing it all. Terror and mutilation are therefore justifiable.

How do they achieve coherence? In part, as noted earlier, these groups draw on liberation ideologies to help weld themselves together. As in traditional African societies, ethnic identity plays a binding role. However, as was true in precolonial times, many of the frontiersmen of today are not necessarily ethnically homogeneous. Here we may note Brazzaville's "Cobras," "Zulus," and "Ninjas," as well as Liberia's National Patriotic Front (NPFL) and Sierra Leone's RUF. Some modern groups, notably several of the Liberian factions, bear a striking resemblance to the *ruga ruga* war bands noted earlier in this chapter. The most striking example of all, however, is perhaps to be found in the *interahamwe* Hutu, who were oppressed by Laurent Kabila until 1998 but then united with him in opposition to the Tutsi after Rwanda invaded Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1999.³⁶

Leadership: The Big Man of Frontier Society

Who are the leaders of modern-day African frontiersmen? Although it clearly varies according to local tradition and circumstance, a pattern is nonetheless discernible. Most of the rank and file seem to come from the rural areas, while the leadership seems to be largely in the hands of townsmen.

In a stimulating article, Bruce Berman adds a further dimension to our understanding of the nature of violence in modern Africa when he notes the continuity of the "big man" in African history and present-day affairs.³⁷ In the colonial era, government in rural areas depended on what Berman describes as the "decentralised despotism" of chiefs and headmen. This power structure formed what some call the "Big Men/Small Boys" politics of rural society. In postcolonial times, this dynamic has evolved into patron-client relationships. When violence erupts, such relationships are apt to take on a new form. New "Big Men" emerge as insurgent leaders or warlords. Their clients become their warrior entourage. Clapham, too, emphasizes the importance of the African leader in some insurgencies. He notes that, despite the largely rural origins of guerrilla movements, the successful leaders of frontiersmen groups almost all have elite or middle-class origins and are possessed of considerable organizational abilities. Taylor (Liberia),

Savimbi (Angola), Aideded (Somalia), and Foday Sankoh (of Sierra Leone's RUF) are obvious examples of "Big Men." Their personal significance is indicated by what happened after they died or were captured. In the case of the last three, their factions rapidly declined in power. We should beware of any suggestion that "Big Men" (or for that matter, the quest for *Lebensraum*) are a purely African phenomenon. Just ask any British or U.S. serviceman or servicewoman returning from former Yugoslavia, the land of "Big Man" Slobodan Milosevic. With no particular knowledge of Africa or history, his or her reply would be "Well, what's new?" Nonetheless, the "Big Man" as head of a rural-based faction seems likely to figure in Africa's future as well as its past.

AFRICA IN PERSPECTIVE

Westerners do not have a very clear understanding of the nature of the violence in contemporary Africa. We see African conflicts through Western-colored glasses. Appalled by massacres and mutilations, we accentuate their "otherness." We give regional-based groups the pejorative label of "tribalism," which enhances the perception that African warriors of today are "beyond the pale." Western outrage also stems in part from the fact that these warriors dare to destabilize what Westerners perceive as legitimate state boundaries. Africans' use of terror in place of more legitimate tactics also disturbs us, and it serves to distance the "other" still further. Using a frontiersmen's template at least has the merit of enabling us to understand what is going on in Africa, perhaps not as an aberration from the norm, but as part of a historical continuum. It provides us an analytical tool, which helps us see the underlying economic need that drives so much of today's violence. As such, it can help us understand what direction to take to help solve Africa's problems.

The analysis offered in this chapter is bleak. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to finish without some more constructive thoughts for the future. Two solutions for the conflict in Africa come to mind: the first a palliative, the second a cure. As a palliative, I would like to stress the importance of developing effective peace-support forces—for peace keeping and for (the more difficult) peace enforcement. The latter in particular calls for the training of well-motivated and highly disciplined

military forces who are properly equipped and under a command that is both impartial and unified. Peacekeepers must have no hidden territorial or ethnic agenda. If possible, they should be drawn from countries with a more mature (or at least more stable) political culture than that of many African countries and with a "lead Army" in overall control, as was the case of Britain in Kosovo and Sierra Leone. It is not easy for a soldier to "sit in the middle of someone else's war," to use a phrase of a recent British Bosnia peacekeeper. Only with rigorous discipline and training can your average soldier remain impartial amidst an often hostile population. Yet to do so is vital. A peace-support force inadequate in either discipline or training is likely to do more harm than good. Recent experiences around the world demonstrate the need for training only too clearly, and they suggest that peace enforcement (though not necessarily simple peacekeeping) is best carried out by soldiers of a volunteer army and not conscripts.³⁸

The only solution to Africa's problems in the long run would seem to be economic development, the fruits of which are fairly distributed. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) now under discussion may provide the basis for such progress. A new environment must be created in which opportunities are given to all and in which attention is given to the relative deprivation that some groups have suffered in earlier periods of history. A "building-block" scenario might just then emerge in areas that are content and willing to cooperate with other areas. This vision is not just a pipe dream.

Africa itself provides us with moving testimony of how political and economic reconciliation can pave the way to a better future. In 1970, General Gowon set a worthy and historic example at the end of the Nigerian Civil War. He was, of course, helped by the high oil prices of the time. However, no triumphalism was permitted at the war's end, and profits from oil were poured into the former Biafra for reconstruction. Soldiers and civilians who had supported the Biafran cause were welcomed back into the federal infrastructure, and the former Biafran currency was exchanged at a fair price. Branded at the time by Western liberals as a British army, Sandhurst-trained, genocidal warrior, Gowon's reputation should now be restored. He should be recognized for what he was: a soldier of Christian standards who allowed food to pass to the civilian population of his opponent and who offered his defeated enemies a very generous peace. Few other war leaders can claim such laurels.

Conflict can occasionally offer mankind positive as well as negative lessons.

NOTES

1. Quoted in translation in Martin Gilbert, *First World War* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994).

2. Some of these drawings appear in my own work, Anthony Clayton, *Factions, Foreigners, and Fantasies: The Civil War in Liberia* (Camberley, England: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1995). A detailed study of the linkage between faction fighters and spirit beliefs is set out in Stephen Ellis, *The March of Anarchy and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War* (London: C. Hurst, 1999).

3. See chapter 5 of this book.

4. See chapter 7 of this book.

5. For an excellent study of the largest of these regional forces, ECOMOG, see Festus B. Aboagye, *ECOMOG: A Sub-regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peace Keeping in Liberia* (Accra: Sedco, 1999).

6. In Anthony Clayton, "African Military Capabilities in Insurrection, Intervention and Peace Support Operations" in *African Interventionist States*, ed. Oliver Furley and Roy May (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), I examine the capacities of African armies for peace support operations.

7. An account of Angola's interventions appears in Morrie McQueen, "Angola," in *African Interventionist States* (see note 6).

8. Christopher Clapham, ed., *African Guerrillas* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), i.

9. Clapham, *African Guerrillas*, 6–8.

10. Clapham, *African Guerrillas*, i–vi, viii.

11. John Iliffe, *Africans: The History of a Continent* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1.

12. Iliffe, *Africans*, 1.

13. Ali A. Mazrui, ed., *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 1977), sections 1 and 2.

14. Iliffe, *Africans*, 3: "Suffering has been a central part of African experience, whether it arose from the harsh struggle with nature or the cruelty of men. . . . [Notions] of honor . . . frequently motivated Africans in the past."

15. This theory is developed in Anthony Clayton, *Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa since 1950* (London: UCL Press, 1998) and is debated further in a review article by Peter Woodward, "War or Peace in Africa," *African Affairs* 98, no. 393 (October 1999): 579–83.

16. A vast literature concerning Mau Mau has appeared since 1960. The best single account is Wunyabari O. Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). Also useful is Anthony Clayton, *Counterinsurgency in Kenya: A Study of Military Operations against Mau Mau, 1952–60* (Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower University Press, 1984).

17. Of the considerable literature concerning Zimbabwe's liberation war, of especial value are Martin and P. Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe* (London: Faber, 1981); Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger, *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (London: James Currey, 1995); and Paul L. Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965–1980* (Marshalltown, Zimbabwe: Sygna/Collins, 1982).

18. Three works covering the events of these years are particularly useful: Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo since Independence, January 1960–December 1961* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Georges Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operations in the Congo, 1960–1964* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); and David Reed, *111 Days in Stanleyville* (London: Collins, 1966); René Paul Bonnet, *Zaire: Sauver Kolwezi* (Paris: E. Baschet, 1979) covers the French intervention.

19. The best general account of these events is John de St. Jorré, *The Nigerian Civil War* (London: Hodder, 1972); also useful is Fola Oyewole, *Reluctant Rebel* (London: R. Collings, 1975).

20. Mark Urban, "Soviet Intervention and the Ogaden Counter-Offensive of 1978," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution for Defense Studies* (June 1983), describes this very sophisticated military battle.

21. No full overall account of this conflict exists, but S. M. Mmbando, *The Tanzania Uganda War in Pictures* (Dar es Salaam: Longman, 1980) and Amii Omara-Otunna, *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1980–85* (Oxford: Macmillan, 1987), provide some detail.

22. South African accounts of the war appear in Willem Steenkamp, *South Africa's Border War, 1966–1989* (Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1989); Helmored Romer-Heitman, *War in Angola: The Final South African Phase* (Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1992). A Namibian perspective is set out in Colin Keys and John Saul, *Namibia's Liberation Struggle* (London: James Currey, 1995).

23. South Africa's internal conflict is described in Matthew Krentridge, *An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1990); John Kane-Berman, *Political Violence in South Africa* (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1993); and Duncan Innes, Matthew Krentridge, and Helena Perold, *Power and Profit: Politics, Labour and Business in South Africa* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1992), iv. Similar local regional economic tensions are evident in the former Bophutswahna region of South

Africa's North West Province. Peris Sean Jones, "From 'Nationhood' to Regionalism to the North West Province: Bophutswanones and the Birth of the 'New' South Africa" in *African Affairs* 95, no. 393 (October 1999): 509–34.

24. For accounts of the fighting see Alex Vines, *Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique* (London: James Currey, 1991); Eric Berman, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes* (United Nations Disarmament Project Paper); and Paul Fauver, "Roots of Counter Revolution: The Mozambique National Resistance," *Review of African Political Economy* 29 (1984).

25. "Angola Facing War and Hunger," *The Economist* (May 29, 1999): 71.

26. For an account of these events see Peter Goodwin, *Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa* (London: Picador, 1996).

27. Patrick Gilkes, "Briefing: Somalia," *African Affairs* 98, no. 393 (October 1999): 571–77.

28. *The Economist* (May 8, 1999): 73. The openly proclaimed cause of the war is a dispute over three border areas. J. Abbink, "The Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Dispute," *African Affairs* 97, no. 389 (October 1998): 551–65, suggests other issues compounded those of the border areas, in particular ideological differences, expulsions of Eritreans from Ethiopia, and Eritrea's introduction of its own currency. Ethiopia may also have its own hidden agenda, that of access to the Red Sea at Assab.

29. William Rend, "The Business of War in Africa," *Current History* (May 1996).

30. Umar Habila Daddem Danfulani and Sati U. Fwatshak, "Briefing: The September 2001 Events in Jos, Nigeria," *African Affairs* 101, no. 403 (April 2002): 243–55.

31. Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga, "The Spread of Political Violence in Congo-Brazzaville," *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (January 1999): 37–54, sets out the original scene. The situation in mid-2002 is summarized in *The Economist* report "Ninjas, Guitars and Dodgy Democracy." *The Economist* (June 15, 2002) comments, "Why are they fighting? Because Congo has oil, so power pays."

32. *The Economist* (June 26, 1999): 85.

33. Louis Martinez in *The Algerian Civil War, 1990–1998* (London: C. Hurst, 1999) does, however, offer a different interpretation, dismissing both social deprivation and Islamic militancy as causes, and arguing that personal power and economic advancement of the faction leaders are to blame.

34. In 1999, for example, the *interahamwe*, the Hutu civilian militia responsible for the 1994 killings in Rwanda was in hiding in the eastern provinces of the Congo but still clearly posed a threat to stability in Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda.

35. The weapons and guerrilla tactics of the NPFL proved too strong for ECOMOG in Liberia. It could not impose the "Nigerian" solution it desired.

36. Philip Reyntjens, "The Second Congo War: More than a Remake," *African Affairs* 98, no. 391 (April 1999): 248.

37. Bruce J. Berman, "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State, the Politics of Uncivil Nationalism," *African Affairs* 97, no. 388 (July 1988): 305–41.

38. The point is most clearly made by a comparison of the failed performance of a conscript Netherlands unit at Srebrenica with the successful operations of a British regular professional battalion at Gorazde during the Bosnian conflicts.

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The Economic Context of Conflict in Africa

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Julius Nyang'oro is a professor of political science and African studies at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Dr. Nyang'oro offers a slightly different interpretation of Africa's problems, although he, like Anthony Clayton (chapter 2), believes that economic factors are of paramount importance. Nyang'oro theorizes that the root cause of conflict in Africa is linked to the nonmaturation of capitalism. Dr. Nyang'oro's explanation, it should be noted, tends to accentuate the negative role played by non-African powers, whereas Dr. Clayton's analysis accentuates the essentially African roots of conflict.

Conflict in Africa is multidimensional. It is not easy to make generalizations about its nature or its causes. What is obvious, however, is that conflict in Africa has gone hand in hand with the historical formation of the state. This statement is true even with regard to pre-colonial times. When early states were being formed in the various regions of the continent, the process was characterized by violence, usually perpetrated by more powerful political units seeking to subjugate weaker ones. Certainly, this scenario was true in most of West Africa.¹ At the beginning of the nineteenth century, southern Africa witnessed serious conflict as several forces coalesced to create what came to be known as the *mfecane*.² This conflict resulted in the transformation of the political economy of southern Africa. It came to reflect the triumph of colonial forces led by the British, the special role of Afrikaners who subsequently perfected the practice of racial segregation in South Africa, and the effective defeat of indigenous African political formations.³

The violence that accompanied the formation of the colonial and racial state in South Africa was reflected to various degrees in the rest of the continent as European powers sought to establish their rule. The colonizers swiftly retaliated against resistance to their rule by African societies and political units. Perhaps the most notorious were the Germans who almost totally annihilated a whole nation of the Herero in Namibia and fought a war of resistance in southern Tanzania between 1905 and 1907.⁴ In present-day Guinea, the French fought a bitter war and eventually defeated indigenous African forces, which were led by Samori Toure. In the final analysis, the fact that colonialism was established in almost every corner of the African continent is a clear indication of European military superiority in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The violent nature by which the modern state in Africa was created is a useful place to begin analysis of conflict in contemporary Africa. It sheds significant light on the central theme of this chapter, which is the economic context of conflict. In my view, the economic imperative of colonialism provides us with a key to understanding the causes and the intensification of conflict on the continent. Violence increased in Africa as the colonial state sought to stamp its authority to pursue its imperial agenda. We cannot appreciate the basis of the Maji Maji War in what is now Tanzania (1905–1907), the Shona and Ndebele Uprisings in what is now Zimbabwe (1898–1899), the *Mfecane* (1820–1840), and indeed, the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) unless we examine the underlying economic reasons for the establishment of the colonial state. In other words, the issue of global capital accumulation is absolutely critical to an understanding of why conflicts occur in Africa, even at the present moment.⁵

The economic imperatives of colonialism may also explain the intensity of African conflicts. To follow this logic, one needs to understand that the colonial economic project was radically different from the project of capital accumulation in Europe in several crucial ways. The fundamental difference lies in the nature of accumulation itself. In Europe, under the auspices of industrialization, production proceeded to create integrated national economies; it also led to wide-scale social changes, including the establishment of a bourgeois society. The existence of a bourgeois society, in turn, led to the development of a bourgeois state. In such a state, political institutions are formed and thus reflect the balance of forces in society. An active civil society develops;

representative institutions are created; and the notion of citizenship is redefined. In addition, society comes to understand the mutual obligations between citizens in a civil society and the state. The logic, however, is an economic one.⁶

In Africa, by contrast, the classic bourgeois state in society did not develop. Although the colonial project did have a strong economic logic—the global accumulation of capital—it did not, however, systematically result in the creation of conditions that would lead to the growth of a civil society, a strong sense of mutual obligation between civil society and the state, or an understanding of their relationship to the economy. Thus, from the very beginning, the modern economy of Africa has lacked the two elements that act to cushion the divisive social consequences of the capitalist system. As we will see, this aspect of the current economy in Africa plays a major role in the fueling of conflicts.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. First, I introduce what may be called “the imperative of underdevelopment in Africa.” This section contains an analysis that identifies the significant economic features that most contribute to conflicts on the continent. Second, I trace the process of decolonization. This section shows how specific instances of decolonization led to the outbreak of internal conflicts. Many of these conflicts either persist today or have only recently ended: the two conflicts on which I focus—the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan—are cases in point. Third, I highlight a new phenomenon, focusing attention on wars driven by the presence of precious minerals. Here, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo are central to our discussion, though some attention is also given to countries such as Sierra Leone, which have likewise fallen prey to this new phenomenon. Fourth, I briefly discuss the implications of my analysis for conflict of resolution. I conclude by noting that an economic logic must be the centerpiece of any efforts to bring about political order and stability in Africa.

UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

The economic context of conflict in Africa is no different from any other. From time immemorial, economic issues have shaped conflict. Tensions inevitably arise when the distribution of resources are unequal

or are perceived to be unequal. A society's success at conflict resolution to a great extent depends on how well it deals with these tensions. Societies have historically responded by creating institutions capable of convincing the aggrieved that it is in their best interest to seek redress within the system. The modern state with its governmental structures is such an institution.

The modern state, however, is peculiarly European in its origin and is heavily influenced by bourgeois notions of representative democracy. These notions are based on two key imperatives. First is the resolution of the national question through the accommodation of diverse nationalist, ethnic, religious, or regional interests. Second is the presumption that the basic elements of a bourgeois national economy are already in place and that the bourgeois economy can materially support and maintain state/political structures. It is generally accepted that Africa lacks such a bourgeois economy. Under these circumstances, the modern state cannot therefore be maintained. Because of the deficiency of African states in this regard, they have arguably not been able to contain conflict. Rather, all too often, the state perpetuates conflict by resisting those who challenge its power.⁷

The best way to explain why the consequences of conflict in Africa are so severe is to consider it as a two-factor explanation. The first factor includes the inability of global capitalism to replicate its economic logic in Africa; the second factor includes the failure of Africa to successfully adopt the global capitalist system. The point is a straightforward one: After almost five hundred years of globalization, Africa is still principally a peasant economy in society, contributing barely one percent of the global gross domestic product (GDP). Its productivity is low, and the current wave of a globalized technological revolution is passing it by. A recent World Bank report puts it succinctly:

Despite gains in the second half of the 1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa enters the 21st century with many of the world's poorest countries. Average income per capita is lower than at the end of the 1960s. Incomes, assets, and access to essential services are unequally distributed. And the region contains a growing share of the world's absolute poor, who have little power to influence the allocation of resources. . . . Making matters worse, Africa's place in the global economy has been eroded, with declining export shares in the traditional primary products, little diversification into new lines of business, and massive capital flight and loss of skills to other

regions. *Now the region stands in danger of being excluded from the information revolution.*⁸ (Emphasis added.)

All the basic economic indicators for Africa, as the aforementioned report shows, are either stagnant or in decline. Given the fact that the population on the continent is increasing at the highest rate in the world, conditions for conflict are ripe. In other words, the lack of economic development means there is less to be shared among an increasing population. As the literature on conflict has emphasized time and again, it is relatively easy to convince poor people that they are poor because somebody who is “different” from them is responsible for their misery.⁹ What makes this person “different” may be ethnic background, race, region, or religion. As many analyses of conflict have shown, the differences may also be historical inventions. But these inventions are likely to take on a life of their own, especially if they are fueled by ideologies that play on and cynically exploit hostility toward “the other.” The next step is usually an attempt to regain advantage by whatever means necessary. Violence and conflict are the inevitable result.

Conversely, it is much more difficult to persuade people who are relatively affluent to abandon their comforts and engage in civil conflict on the basis of differences in either religion or ethnicity. Consociational arrangements in politics may be viewed as pacts between elites, which reflect specific differences in societies.¹⁰ Yet, such elite pacts only come about when well-established communities, capable of articulating their interests in religiously or ethnically mixed polities, are already in existence. The capacity for articulation of political interests is fundamentally economic because for elite pacts to work, each group must bring something to the table—that is, it must have bargaining power. All involved must recognize that compromise is the only real option. They must either believe that failure to find middle ground will result in totally unacceptable consequences, or they must anticipate deriving benefit from the surrender of certain goals. Again, consociationalism is a process of bargaining on the basis of relative equality and relative well-being. An assessment of these political arrangements suggests that affluence is an important precondition for these kinds of compromises.

The argument here is that conflict in Africa will endure as long as groups on the continent have little to bring to the table and as long as they have convinced themselves that compromise is unnecessary because in

the long run their side will win. This mentality is best exemplified by the contending sides in Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] versus the Peoples' Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA] government) and in Sudan (Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement [SPLA/SPLM] versus the Khartoum government). In both conflicts, each side was (or is still) convinced that it would eventually gain the upper hand. This psychology doubtless makes belligerents less inclined to compromise than they might otherwise be. However, what seems clear in both cases is the fact that each side has felt economically threatened and unable to guarantee adequate access to economic resources. In this circumstance, politics becomes a zero-sum equation.

Such experiences suggest that most African economies are not vibrant or productive enough to create material conditions for compromise. As their resources increase, African communities (just like communities elsewhere) will presumably find ways to solve their problems short of war. It would therefore seem that economics is an important factor in conflict resolution. Earlier in this volume, Ali Mazrui suggested that black-on-black conflict in Africa could be more about identity than about resource distribution. Even if this suggestion is correct, it should be noted that the brutality of these conflicts does stem from economic concerns. The conflicts are severe because there is so little to fight for and about.

One of the obvious solutions to conflict in Africa is to create an environment that will allow for the growth of more avenues for problem solving, including the development of an effective state possessed with an effective judiciary, police power, and other characteristics of modern state institutions.

THE DECOLONIZATION PROCESS AND THE POSTCOLONIAL STATE

Decolonization in Africa was a process that began in earnest after 1945. It is generally agreed that the decisive impetus behind decolonization was World War II. The war mobilization effort of the colonial states acted as a catalyst for the resistance to injustice, thus awakening the colonial people. African nationalists learned lessons, moreover, from anti-Nazi campaigns, especially in France, England, and the United States. Many of the nationalist leaders had, in fact, been students in Eu-

rope or the United States during or immediately after war. After 1945, as Basil Davidson put it, "The colonial powers could still resist or delay 'decolonization.' . . . They could not stop it."¹¹

Unfortunately, although World War II played a crucial role in putting an end to colonialism, the leaders that emerged at the time did not prove capable of truly liberating African countries. To date, it is generally accepted that nationalist leaders were members of an elite class, which poorly represented the general interest of the masses. While most of the critical literature on development in the 1970s and 1980s indicates that African nationalists genuinely wanted to free themselves from the colonial state, they were unable to effectively do so because the type of governing structures they inherited from colonial times could not form the basis of true liberation.¹²

The kind of constitutions and constitutional process that were adopted by the postindependent states of Africa have been sharply criticized. They followed what Bereket Selassie has dubbed "The Lancaster Model."¹³ Under this model, nationalist leaders would be brought to Lancaster House in London (or the equivalent colonial office in Paris or some other colonial capital), and they would be handed over a basic constitution that had been prepared by the respective colonial office. The nationalist leaders had little say, if any, in how these constitutions were framed. After a two- to three-week visit to the colonial capital, these nationalist elites would be sent back to their countries with a timetable for independence. What this meeting ultimately meant was that, under this kind of decolonization arrangement, the critical issues that affected the colonial territories were never given the appropriate attention they deserved. The essential contradiction between the colonial state and the African realities was arguably retained in the governance structures of the postcolonial state. Existing economic inequalities and social exploitation were carried over from the colonial states to the new states. The superficial independence was thus a time bomb waiting to explode in the independence period.

Case Studies

The Sudan

Perhaps the best example of this kind of colonial inequality can be found in the Sudan. Never addressed by the new government created at

the time of independence, it has resulted in enduring and bitter conflict in the postindependence era. As the work of Francis Deng¹⁴ and others have informed us, colonial intervention in the Sudan known as the "Reconquest" led to the British-dominated Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899–1955) that ended slavery and nominally unified the country. The decision to administer the North and the South separately, however, reinforced Arabism and Islam in the North, encouraged southern development along indigenous African lines, and introduced Christian missionary education and rudiments of Western civilization as elements of modernization in the South. Interaction between the two sets of people was strongly discouraged.

While the colonial administration invested considerably in the political, economic, social, and cultural development of the North, the South remained isolated, secluded, and undeveloped. The principal objective of colonial rule in the region was the establishment and maintenance of law and order. The separate administration of the North and the South left open the option that the South might eventually be annexed to one of the East African colonies.

But just nine years before independence, the British suddenly reversed the policy of separate development. They had neither the time nor the political will to put in place constitutional arrangements that would ensure protection for the South in a united Sudan. Since independence, ruthless attempts to dominate, Islamize, and Arabize the South have characterized the policies of successive governments. Southern resistance to Arab–Muslim domination and assimilation has also persisted commensurately. The result has been an internecine war of visions.¹⁵

The war of visions between the North and South first broke out in August 1955, just four months before independence was declared on January 1, 1956. Armed conflict has been largely between the successive governments in Khartoum and the liberation movements based in the southern part of the country. The preoccupying concern among the northerners at independence was to correct the divisive effect of the separatist policies of the colonial administration. The logical response was for the government to seek the unity of the country by pursuing the forced assimilation of the South through Arabization and Islamization, which for the South was tantamount to replacing British colonialism with Arab hegemony. Southern resistance intensified first in the politi-

cal call for a federal arrangement and later in an armed struggle for secession.¹⁶

The political impasse created by the situation in the South prompted the military to take over the government in 1958, only two years after independence. They did so with the aim of pursuing the strategies of Arabization and Islamization more vigorously, unhampered by parliamentary democracy. The ruthlessness with which these assimilation policies were pursued in the South aggravated the conflict, which became a full-fledged civil war in the 1960s. The effect of that war on the political situation led to the popular uprising that overthrew the military regime in 1964. The oppressive policies toward the South were temporarily relaxed. With the return of democracy less than a year later, the traditional political parties assumed control and resumed the assimilation policies with a vengeance. The level of repression was higher than ever before. As the violence escalated, the differences between the North and the South became sharper, and the level of political instability rose. This vicious cycle was broken in 1969, when another military junta, this time under the leadership of Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri, seized power.

After displaying an ambivalent attitude toward the rebels, Nimeiri's government eventually negotiated with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and in 1972 concluded the Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted the South regional autonomy. The regime, however, remained under pressure from the conservative and radical fundamentalist elements and, in particular, the sectarian parties and the Muslim Brotherhood, with whom Nimeiri eventually entered into an uneasy alliance. Nimeiri also underwent a personal conversion, becoming a born-again Muslim, even though he still hoped that through religious reforms, he could pull the rug out from under the feet of the sectarian opposition leaders and the fundamentalists, with whom he had a restless partnership. He also hoped to remove the anomaly of liberal democracy in the South, which was incongruous with the national system of an authoritarian presidency. For these and other political reasons, Nimeiri gradually eroded the South's autonomy, moving relentlessly toward imposing Islamic law, or *shari'a*, and establishing an Islamic state. Eventually, he unilaterally abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement, triggering the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Southern People's Liberation Army

(SPLA), whose declared objective was the creation of a new secular, democratic, and pluralistic Sudan. Within only two years of the resumption of hostilities, a popular uprising known as *initiate* led to Numeiri's own political demise in April 1985.

Neither the transitional government that followed Numeiri's overthrow nor the subsequent elected government was able to reach a settlement with SPLM/SPLA. The war in the South moved northward into the non-Arab areas of the Nuba in southern Kordofan, the Ingassana in southern Blue Nile, and to a lesser degree, the Fur in the western region of Darfur. Although the imposition of *shari'a* took the limelight, because of the association of Islam with Arabism, this war became increasingly racial, remaining the greatest threat to the stability and the development of the country. Famines caused by natural disasters and by the use of food as a weapon in the conflict added a heavy toll to the war's tragedy.

It is clear that the ideological tone, which seems to guide the discourse of the conflict in the Sudan, is decidedly ethnic/racial and religious. Nonetheless, it is my contention that if the economic resources of the country had been equitably distributed at the time of independence, the conflict would not have evolved into the major war that it is now. Ethnicity and religion are in this case instruments of economic domination. In the Sudan, these two instruments serve the purposes of the Khartoum government (which is, as a matter of fact, very authoritarian and which denies many democratic rights even to the citizens of Northern Sudan). Religious and ethnic values are used by them to mobilize support for their position among the poor populations of the North.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

To fully understand the economic element that fuels conflict in Africa, we must examine more closely the modalities of transition from the colonial state to the independent state. Our most revealing example is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC; formerly the Congo and more recently, Zaire). While Belgium thoroughly exploited the Congo and never really prepared a proper mechanism for independence in the country, it was the sharp economic inequalities in the Congo that led to the initial crisis. Katanga (or Shaba) Province attempted to secede

from the rest of Congo immediately after independence. Shaba is richly endowed with mineral wealth. The people of this province and its regional leader, Moïse Tshombe, saw an opportunity to grab these riches and thereby avoid the need to share it with the rest of the country. Their rebellion was defeated, but it left a dangerous legacy. There have been two subsequent rebellions in Katanga (1977, 1978), and on each occasion, the regime in Kinshasa resorted to massive force to maintain order. In addition, every regime in Kinshasa has had to periodically deal with the threat of secession by Shaba. As a consequence, the Congo has been left in a state of perpetual crisis.

It goes without saying that the cost of maintaining order in Shaba has been high. It has resulted in the loss of human life and the loss of economic opportunity. The Shaba economy has persistently underperformed. The richest province in the DRC has failed to function as an economic powerhouse for the rest of the country, which has led to the devastating poverty that afflicts the majority of the people in Congo. In spite of tremendous mineral wealth and in spite of the fact that the DRC is capable of producing enough hydropower to provide energy for the whole of Africa, the citizens of Congo are among the poorest on the continent. Their plight is made worse by the current conflict in the Great Lakes Region (GLR). In the current conflict in the GLR, the war is primarily centered in DRC, but it has involved the countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. It is public knowledge that the desire to get access to Congo's mineral wealth—via legal and not-so-legal means—is one of the main reasons for the continuing conflict in the region.¹⁷ Again, economics looms large as an engine for conflict in Africa.

Conflicts of the Postcolonial State: Economic or Political Roots?

In short, many of the conflicts that emerged after independence can be blamed on the haphazard and incomplete manner in which the decolonization process was carried out in Africa. On the face of it, it therefore seems that the explanations for conflict are political. Decolonization, however, is merely the tip of an iceberg. Behind the political problems lie economic problems. Underdevelopment and inequality, which started with the colonization process, continued under colonialism and have been perpetuated by the postcolonial state.

While I have focused on the case of the Sudan and the Congo, a case can be made that almost every conflict on the continent in the postindependence era is in one way or another reflective of distributional economics: Siad Barre in Somalia, economically favoring his clan; President Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, arguing for the Rift Valley Province to be emptied of all non-Kalenjin peoples who are "economic migrants"; Igbo citizens of Nigeria, who saw themselves being shut out of economic opportunities in the rest of Nigeria while the federal government was busy pumping oil out of eastern Nigeria, which the Igbo community saw as belonging to them; and in a more recent case of genocidal proportions, the Hutu population of Rwanda, who saw the return of Tutsi exiles as a source of serious economic threat, especially under difficult global economic conditions and the scarcity of land. It is thus imperative that economic conditions be seen as playing an extremely important role in fueling African conflict.

In the final analysis, the combination of incomplete political transition to independence, reinforced by poor economic conditions, has resulted in some cases in the collapse of certain states on the continent.¹⁸ The notion of "collapsed" states, however, is certainly a controversial one in African politics. What disturbs some Africanists is the suggestion that state collapse entails the disintegration of society. They claim that there is not necessarily a cause-and-effect correlation between these two phenomena. This argument resonates strongly in the case of Somalia immediately before and since the fall of Siad Barre's regime in 1992. By many accounts, Somali society has been able to hold itself together in spite of the collapse of central authority by inventing and reinventing other sources of authority and legitimacy. The collapse of the state in Mogadishu has admittedly given rise to a breakaway state in northern Somalia (Somaliland), but the argument still remains that the collapse of the state in general does not necessarily lead to the collapse of a society.¹⁹

But that argument cannot be pushed too far. Modern society assumes the existence of an effective state. In spite of notions of rapid globalization and free movement of capital, production systems still take place within national boundaries, where state authority is an essential element. As a recent text argues:

States not only still matter, but it makes no sense even to try to remove them, either physically or conceptually, from an economy. There is no in-

exorable logic of competition, capital accumulation or technological imperatives driving neoliberal reforms. Rather, these policies reflect a political choice *made by state authorities*, chiefly in response to domestic and international political pressures as well as the peer pressure of global ideological conformity.²⁰

Thus, for societies and countries in Africa to continue being part of the modern system, viable state structures are essential. Yet, too many African societies lack effective states. According to Thomas Callaghy, the absence of central state authority is a major issue in contemporary Africa. The new states, with their basically artificial colonial boundaries, have survived with few exceptions and alterations. However, "the search for internal and external sovereignty, authority, and unity remains very incomplete in most African countries."²¹ The lack of a central state authority arguably plays a bigger role in preventing orderly resource distribution than any other factor, at any rate, during periods of conflict. Without state authority to provide physical security, the normal operations of markets are disrupted. Economically productive activities are not undertaken, and the result is the phenomenon that is so ubiquitous in Africa: refugees. To date, Africa is home to the greatest number of refugees in the world. Thus, the wheel comes full circle: Economic factors provide an explanation for political collapse; political collapse exacerbates the economic problems; all of which serves to perpetuate conflict on the continent.

MINERAL ECONOMICS AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA

In the last decade, a new phenomenon has seemingly emerged: the use of minerals to fuel conflict. This new phenomenon helps explain the persistence of some of Africa's conflicts, notably those in Angola, DRC, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. In some instances, the conflict may have begun for very different reasons. The war in Angola, for example, started as a national war of liberation against Portuguese colonialism. It eventually took a new turn when the control of oil and diamonds in the new and independent country provided the cause and the rationale for continuing the conflict. A more detailed example of the war in Angola will serve to illustrate the point.

As indicated, the incomplete process of decolonization is partly to blame for many of the conflicts that ravage Africa to this day, including

that in Angola. Angola, a former Portuguese colony, gained its independence in November 1975. The three principal liberation movements in Angola were the Peoples' Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). When the Portuguese army overthrew the Salazar dictatorship at home in 1974, it finally forced the colonial government to negotiate the modalities of the transfer of power for all Portuguese colonies in Africa. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) assumed power in July 1975. In the case of Angola, however, the transfer of power was not as smooth as it was in Mozambique as a result of the tremendous disunity among the three liberation movements. At the time of Angola's independence in November 1975, the country was therefore divided three ways, with the MPLA controlling the capital Luanda; the FNLA controlling a few pockets to the north, near the Congo border; and UNITA controlling most of southern Angola with assistance from the South African apartheid regime.²² It so happened that Angola was also caught in the Cold War politics of the 1970s and 1980s. The Soviet Union backed the MPLA government in Luanda, whereas South Africa and the United States backed UNITA, which by the late 1970s and early 1980s had become a full-fledged insurgency organization vis-à-vis the central government.

From the beginning of the conflict, the Angolan government financed its war effort against UNITA through revenues accrued from oil production, primarily in the Cabinda enclave in northwest Angola. Thus, by the mid-1980s, the Angolan government was spending over \$3 billion annually for the purchase of armaments, primarily from the Soviet Union. As the war continued and as South Africa saw its adventure in Angola becoming more expensive, it sought payments from UNITA to foot part of the war bill. Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, sought to pay the bill via the sale of diamonds, which UNITA got through its control of the diamond-producing region of Angola. Thus, by the late 1980s, the war in Angola was essentially Angolan financed through either the production of oil (MPLA government) or diamond mining (UNITA). As can be imagined, these two minerals, and their high value of exchange internationally, allowed Angola to become a prime territory for arms trade, both small and big. The consequences for the Angolan economy have been devastating. As one recent commentary on the situation has put it, the richer Angola got, the more its people suffered:

Indeed, while most commentators on Angola refer to the “great economic potential” of this country “blessed by the wealth of its natural resource endowment”, others cannot but question this ‘blessing’ by contrasting this wealth to the poverty and despair of most Angolans. Angola’s oil and diamonds have indeed sustained one of the longest conflicts in the world and provided little but suffering for its population.²³

It would seem, then, that there is an ironic twist to the discussion of conflict in Africa. The general argument is that economic considerations (i.e., poverty or the absence of wealth) are a primary cause of conflicts. However, we now see that in some instances it is the presence of wealth, rather than its absence, that fuels these conflicts. Does this paradox call into question the logic of our argument? To the contrary, it merely underlines our point that resource distribution provides a key to understanding these conflicts. It is important to distinguish between those factors that led to an intensification of the conflict (oil and diamonds in the case of Angola) and those factors that actually caused it. What is true of the Sudan and the DRC is equally true of Angola. At the center of the conflict in Angola is its incomplete transition to capitalism and its failure to form a coherent state after it achieved independence. When the Portuguese left the country, the MPLA only controlled the area around Luanda, the capital. Negotiations on the modalities of the transfer of power, known as the Alvor Accords, never took root. In essence, when the colonial powers left, no legitimate central authority took its place. We thus are brought back to square one: The colonial system and its transition in most of Africa was a poor preparation for many countries on the continent. Conflict almost became inevitable.

CONCLUSION

Two explanatory factors occupy center stage as the central theme to my argument on the economic context of conflict in Africa: the poor incorporation into a global capitalist system and the poor transition mechanism from colonialism to independence.

Given these assumptions, it is clear that the best way to reduce or end the conflicts is to seriously address these factors. The first step, of course, is to establish legitimate order in these societies. How countries and societies would go about accomplishing that objective is an open

question. It calls for careful analysis of specific situations. In the case of Angola, it seems to me that neither UNITA nor the MPLA government has demonstrated the capacity or willingness to arrive at a peaceful solution, although the recent death of Jonas Savimbi may open the way for serious negotiations between the MPLA government and UNITA. Recent discussions of conflict management have stressed the need to develop pluralism. Perhaps it may be possible to bypass established powers and rely on "alternative voices"—for example, nonstate actors could help pave the way for peace. The fact that a national conference of civil society groups managed to change the government in Benin is a promising possibility. However, we must remember that even though Benin was an authoritarian state, it did not have millions of guns circulating in the country. That situation is therefore not entirely analogous to that in Angola. The second logical step to take is to try to improve economic conditions. Here, the "underground" economy (i.e., "second" economy, or "informal" economy) may possibly provide a solution. This type of economy, at any rate, thrives in countries that are undergoing conflict. Still, questions remain. Could an underground economy ever become strong enough to rival that of the ruling regime and thereby force that regime to rethink its strategy? This possibility is perhaps doubtful in areas like Sierra Leone, where diamonds are fueling the war, or in the DRC, where the economic potential of the country is serving as an invitation to foreign intrigues. Would this type of underground economy actually transform into a "formal" economy? If so, how different would it be from the existing economy? These questions are hard to answer. Moreover, the task of conflict resolution is still further complicated as new factors enter into the picture. In the Sudan, for example, the North might at one time have been willing to let the South secede. Now, the discovery of oil in the South has made that option unacceptable to the regime in Khartoum. Thus, for the foreseeable future, conflicts in Africa will probably defy easy characterization and easy solutions.

NOTES

1. See for example, Philip Curtin et al., *African History* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).

2. The *Mfecane* (Zulu for "crushing"), otherwise known as the Difange, was a period of upheaval that led to mass migrations among African chiefdoms of South Africa between 1819 and 1838.

3. T. R. H. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 4th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Terence Ranger, *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia 1898–1930* (London: Heinemann, 1970).

4. John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Curtin et al., *African History*.

5. For a thoroughgoing analysis of this point, see Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972); see also D. Wadada Nabudere, *The Political Economy of Imperialism* (London: Zed Press, 1977).

6. See, for example, the classic work of Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vols. 1 and 2, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

7. For an elaboration of this point, see Julius E. Nyang'oro, "Hemmech In? The State in Africa and Global Liberalization," in *States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy*, ed. David A. Smith et al., (London: Routledge, 1999), 264–77; Kidane Mengisteab, *Globalization and Autocentricity in Africa's Development in the 21st Century* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1996).

8. World Bank, *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000), 1.

9. See, in particular, chapter 5 of Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

10. See, for example, two studies by Arend Lijphart: *Power-Sharing in South Africa* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1985); and "Conso-cial Democracy," *World Politics* 20, nos. 1, 2 (January 1969): 207–25. See also, Donald L. Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

11. Basil Davidson, *Let Freedom Come: Africa in Modern History* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 190.

12. Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (New York: Times Books, 1992).

13. Habte Selassie Bereket, "Self-Determination in Principle and Practice: The Ethiopian-Eritrean Experience," *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 29, no. 1 (fall 1997).

14. Francis M. Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995).

15. Deng, *War of Visions*, 13–14.

16. Douglas H. Johnson, "The Sudan Conflict: Historical and Political Background," in *Humanitarian Policy and Operations: Consequences Beyond Assistance*, ed. Geoff Loane and Tanja Schumer (Brussels: CPN, 1999).

17. Herbert Weiss, *War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2000).

18. I. William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegrating and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

19. Gerhard Prunier, "Somaliland: Birth of a New Country?" in *The Horn of Africa*, ed. Charles Gurdon (New York: St. Martin's, 1994).
20. Smith, *States and Sovereignty*, 7.
21. Thomas M. Calaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
22. Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, *Angola in the Front Line* (London: Zed Press, 1983).
23. Philippe Le Billon, "The Political Economy of Resource Wars," in *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds*, ed. Jackie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (Pretoria: South Africa Institute of Security Studies, 2000), 21.

Ethnicity As Myth: The View from Central Africa

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One of the most commonly cited explanations for violence in Africa is ethnicity. This explanation leads to the conclusion that African conflicts are inevitable results of ancient tribal hatreds. In chapter 5, French-born political scientist René Lemarchand, professor emeritus at the University of Florida, Gainesville, challenges this reasoning. He argues that it is not so much the ethnic differences that are to blame for the violence; rather, it is the mythmaking about ethnicity that is to blame. Using the example of Central Africa, he shows how mythmaking has contributed to the outbreak of genocide. Although the picture he paints is grim, some consolation may be drawn from the inference that ethnic differences are only as real as societies have chosen to make them.

Ethnicity is never what it seems. What some see as ancestral atavism, others see as a typically modern phenomenon, anchored in colonial rule. Where neo-Marxists detect class interests parading in traditional garb, mainstream scholars unveil imagined communities. And while many see ethnicity as the bane of the African continent, others think that it could provide the basis for a moral social contract and that it contains within itself the seeds of openness and accountability.

So overwhelming is the evidence that points to the demonic face of ethnicity that it is tempting to forget its more benign traits. Yet not everything about ethnicity translates into bloodshed and genocide, or into frenzied ethnic cleansing. Ethnic communities also generate responsible, civic-minded leaders, anxious to speak on behalf of their constituents and willing to protect them against the abuses of the state. The sense of belonging to an ethnic community need not be synonymous

with conflict and competition. John Lonsdale's argument about the significance of "moral ethnicity" readily comes to mind. He drew a valuable distinction between "political tribalism" and "moral ethnicity." He defined the former as "the use of ethnic identities in political competition with other groups" and the latter as "a positive force which creates communities from within through domestic controversy over civic virtue."¹ Moral ethnicity, he wrote, is an expression of "the common human instinct to create out of the daily habits of social intercourse and material labor a system of moral meaning and ethical reputation within a more or less imagined community."²

Ethnicity does not necessarily mean conflict, nor is conflict everywhere traceable to politicized ethnicity. Illustrating this point are the violent struggles in Somalia, one of the most conflict-ridden states anywhere in the continent, and the class-based intra-Zulu confrontations that have punctuated the recent history of Natal. Similarly, the recent war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot be reduced to ethnic polarities. Even where mass murder is clearly aimed at a specific ethnic community, as in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, it is not easy to pin the blame on ethnicity. What, indeed, does ethnicity mean when the groups in conflict share the same language, the same national territory, the same customs, and have for centuries lived more or less peacefully side by side?

Clearly then, ethnicity can be many things, both good and bad. The crucial question, therefore, for anyone attempting to understand its role in conflict is: What causes it to become a force for evil? What, in other words, accounts for the transformation of moral ethnicity into political tribalism, and tribalism into genocide? What are the mechanisms through which peaceful ethnic cohabitation gives way to death and destruction?

John Lonsdale gives us a clue: "Tribalism," he writes, "remains the reserve currency in our markets of power, ethnicity our most critical community of thought."³ In the market place of electoral competition, tribalism is the bad currency that drives out the good currency, in a kind of Gresham's law of ethnic politics. Moral ethnicity is the first casualty of the inflationary spiral of ethnic claims and counterclaims. Nonetheless, to invoke political tribalism in an attempt to explain genocide leaves out a crucial dimension of ethnicity. Ethnicity has a capacity to be manipulated for the pursuit of preeminently immoral goals, to pro-

foundly alter collective perceptions of the “other.” It can be distorted using images whose purpose it is to draw rigid boundaries between good and evil, civic virtue and moral depravity, freedom and oppression, foreigners and autochthons.

This chapter focuses on the effect of mythmaking on ethnic strife in the Great Lakes region of Africa. After an examination of the meaning of *ethnicity*, attention is given to the origin and development of myths in Central Africa, especially to the traditional Rwandan myths of origins and the so-called Hamitic hypothesis, a myth started by the Europeans. The last part of the chapter is devoted to a consideration of how and why these myths were turned to genocidal purposes. It is my contention that the history—in whose name hundreds of thousands of innocent Tutsi men, women, and children were slaughtered—is, in large part, myth. So is the view of the past that lies behind Rwanda’s claims to huge chunks of North and South Kivu. And so, also, is the reading of history implicit in the construction of new identities in eastern Congo, the so-called Banyamulenge. Mythmaking, in sum, is what transforms social conflict into irreconcilable moral standoffs.

ETHNICITY: INVENTED, IMAGINED, OR MYTHOLOGIZED?

The Meaning of Ethnicity

Ethnicity Invented

In order for ethnic entrepreneurs to make capital out of tribalism, a tribe must exist. The term “tribe,” however, as has been emphasized time and again, is hardly appropriate to describe communities whose pedigree is traceable to the accidents of colonial rule. The tribal names that have passed down into modern usage are, in most instances, misnomers. The tribes were born of European ignorance, with their existence given formal recognition in statistical records or in the writings of early European administrators, explorers, and missionaries. Prior to these European records, they had no real existence.

Should we speak then, not of tribes but of “invented” communities? Examples abound of ethnic entities whose birth certificate bears traces

of an “invented tradition,” to use Terrence Ranger’s phrase. The classic example is the case of the Bangala of northern Congo. First “discovered” by Henry Morton Stanley, who called them “unquestionably a very superior tribe,” the Bangala, as Crawford Young reminds us, “were accorded official anthropological recognition when an entire volume was devoted to them in 1907 in the first ethnographic survey of the Zaire peoples.”⁴ The Dinka of the Sudan, likewise, derive their ethnonym and thus part of their collective identity from a similar misreading of the facts by a European explorer who took the name of a local chief to designate a collection of quite separate communities.⁵ The Acholi of northern Uganda are another example. According to Atkinson, the term “Acholi” was invented by Arab traders (Kutoria) from the Sudan to refer to a variety of Luo-speaking lineages and chiefdoms.⁶ Even as late as the 1930s, “the Acholi were referred to as ‘Gangi’ or ‘Shuli’ and they had no fixed territorial boundaries.”⁷ Each of these “invented” communities, along with many others, would not have been out of place in the volume edited by Ranger and Hobsbawm on *The Invention of Tradition*.⁸

Ethnicity Imagined

Evocative though it is, the term “invention” does not do justice to the diversity of voices that contribute to the making of a community. To speak of an invented tradition does little to illuminate the ideological orientation or normative underpinnings of such a group. Nor does it bring out the different constructions placed upon it by different categories of social actors at different moments of history. Ranger himself came to recognize the limitations of the term “invention” and to prefer the notion of “imagination.” Drawing from the insights of Feierman and Lonsdale, he noted that the word “imagining” has the advantage of stressing ideas, images, and symbols, which are useful vehicles for understanding how traditions are formed.⁹ The history of any modern tradition, Ranger emphasized, is immensely complex. It is not the product of one, but of many, conflicting imaginations. Over time, the meaning of the imagined is defined and redefined. In Africa, as Ranger explained, traditions imagined by whites were reimagined by blacks; traditions imagined by particular interest groups were reimagined by others.

We should therefore, perhaps, speak of imagined communities rather than invented ones. Ranger's understanding of the exegesis of tradition certainly seems to apply to the Great Lakes region of Africa. Here, Africans appropriated the Hamitic tradition imagined by Europeans. This same tradition was again reimagined by Hutu intellectuals to forge the ideological weapons that killed hundreds of thousands of human beings. To describe Hutu and Tutsi as "invented communities" is hardly appropriate. Both existed long before the advent of colonial rule; even the term "Tutsi" is a precolonial invention. To see them as "imagined" identities does point to the changing perceptions of one group by another, as well as to the processes involved in the emergence of a new "tribe" in eastern Congo, the Banyamulenge.

Ethnicity Mythologized

Yet there is surely more than political imagination at work in the continuing carnage in the Great Lakes. What gives ethnic conflict in the region its peculiarly savage edge are the myths that have grown up around Hutu and Tutsi. Behind the twisted memories, distorted histories, and demonized ethnicities that have contributed to the bloodshed lie mythologies, which have thus been summoned up to legitimize the butchery. Ironically, in Rwanda, it is the very thing that should have welded the people together that has served to do most to tear it apart. The Rwandan myth of origins, at least in its original conception, is a normative charter-holding society together in a unified trinity of Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa. And yet, in time, this very myth of origins became the quarry for destructive ideologies.

In the context of this discussion, "myth" is used in both its conventional and metaphorical senses. A myth is in its conventional sense a "legend." Mythmaking may thus simply refer to the creation of such a legend. In such instance, the purposes of mythmaking are often benign. Myths of origins, for example, are not uncommonly designed to foster social cohesion. Mythmaking may, by contrast, carry far more negative connotations. In the metaphorical sense, mythmaking involves the deliberate denial or distortion of historical reality in a situation of crisis and conflict. The aim of mythmaking of this sort is to inspire division and to inflame ethnic passions.

THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF RWANDAN MYTHS

Origin of Rwandan Myths

Ancient Rwanda had a rich collection of myths and ideologies long before the coming of Europeans. The traditional myths of origins, which provided a virtual charter of Tutsi supremacy, continue to play a central role to this day, though their meaning has radically changed over time. They are still the main frame of reference for conservative Tutsi elites, but since the early 1950s, they have been given a quite different symbolic meaning by Western-educated Hutu elites.

These myths have been studied by Marcel d'Hertefeldt,¹⁰ who identified five essential themes: the celestial origins of the Tutsi; the fundamental and "natural" differences among Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa; the superior civilization that the Tutsi brought to Rwanda; the threat of divine sanctions against those brazen enough to revolt against the monarchy; and the notion of divine kingship.

The first of these themes finds expression in the story of Kigwe, the founding hero of the royal clan, who descended from heaven, accompanied by his brother Mututsi and his sister Nyamparu. The second is the subject of numerous folktales and dynastic poems. A typical story is that of the stratagem used by God to determine who should rule over whom. So as to test their dependability, God decided to entrust Gahutu, Gatutsi, and Gatwa each with a pot of milk to watch over during the night. When dawn came, gluttonous Gatwa had drunk the milk; Gahutu had gone to sleep and spilt his milk; only the watchful Gatutsi had stayed up through the night to keep guard over his milk. The third is the theme of Tutsi civilization as inherently superior. Nowhere is this theme more tersely summed up than in the opening statement of a folktale of central Rwanda: "Dead are the dogs and the rats, giving way to the cows and the drum." (The cows here allude to the Tutsi, who, according to legend, introduced pastoralism; the drum was a symbol of power.) Rwanda has no official history before the arrival of the Tutsi. Just as in the dark ages of pre-Islamic civilization (*jahiliya*), it is assumed that until the Tutsi arrived, there was little worth remembering, much less recording.¹¹

Why did these early myths take this shape? "The function of myth," says M. I. Finley, "is to make the past intelligible and meaningful by se-

lection, by focusing on a few bits of the past that thereby acquire permanence, relevance, and universal significance.”¹² Rwanda’s myths of origins did more than make the past intelligible. Their function was also to make the present legitimate in the eyes of both Hutu and Tutsi.

The Transformation of Rwandan Myth

In time, legends became reality. The myths gained a life of their own and came to be not so much fictitious stories but rather “a statement of a bigger reality.” Its precedents, laws, and morals were, as Bronislaw Malinowski put it, “partially alive,”¹³ and provided powerful moral justification for the all-encompassing “premise of inequality.”¹⁴ Indeed, it was this very ability of these myths to validate oppression that eventually led Hutu politicians to recast them in a radically new light.

Nineteenth-Century European Mythmaking: The Hamitic Hypothesis

By then, however, another myth had taken hold, one imported from nineteenth-century Europe that placed yet another construction on the history of Tutsi hegemony. Like its precolonial counterparts, the “Hamitic myth” underwent fundamental changes of substance and meaning; it therefore came to be seen and interpreted in very different ways by Hutu and Tutsi. It is indeed an ironic commentary on the malleability of myths that the same “Hamitic hypothesis”¹⁵ should have provided European administrators and missionaries with a powerful argument in support of Tutsi domination, and thus subsequent generations of Hutu politicians with the most devastating ideological ammunition against it.

For the early Christian missionaries, the Tutsi stood as the finest example of the Hamitic race, described by Seligman as “pastoral ‘Europeans,’ arriving wave after wave, better armed as well as quicker witted than the dark agricultural Negroes.”¹⁶ In the eyes of these Christians, the Tutsi clearly belonged to a higher order of humanity than the Hutu. For this reason, they were seen as ideally equipped to act as the privileged intermediaries between the European colonizer and the “dark agricultural” masses. Tutsi superiority was manifested in their tall, arresting physique, their extraordinary capacity for self-control, and their ability to exercise authority.

The “scientific” authority of Diedrich Westerman, among others, was also cited in support of the view that the Tutsi were an exceptionally gifted and attractive race: “The Hamites are light skinned, with a straight nose, thin lips, narrow face, soft, often wavy or even straight hair, without prognathism. . . . Owing to their racial superiority they have gained leading positions and have become the founders of many of the larger states in Africa.”¹⁷ What made the Tutsi even more attractive was the fact that they were presumed to be of Ethiopian origin. This ancestry meant that at some point in the distant past, they must have been exposed to biblical influences, which would also explain why they were disposed to embrace Christianity. As Ian Linden puts it, “It seemed to the missionaries that Hamitic history had involved the progressive dilution of some religious essence preordained to flower into the fullness of Christianity.”¹⁸ All of this history and speculation was entirely consistent with the prejudices and preconceptions of nineteenth-century European ethnology, but it was also perfectly compatible with the view that some Tutsi had of themselves. Hamitic theories showed an uncanny fit with the mythologies of traditional Rwanda; once incorporated into the work of historiographers, it became increasingly difficult to tell them apart.

Reimagining the Myth in the Early Twentieth Century

Through much of the 1920s and 1930s, Rwandan historiography was cross-fertilized by the confluence of two complementary streams of mythologies: one specific to Rwandan society, the other borrowed from nineteenth-century European race theories. Court traditions gave Christian missionaries a striking illustration of the Hamites as “born rulers, superior in every respect to the ‘dark agricultural’ masses.” The Hamitic frame of reference gave scientific respectability to the work of Tutsi historiographers. In the meantime, the coincidence of views between European and Tutsi historians gave European administrators a rationale for the most extreme and extensive application of indirect rule.

This said, it would be highly misleading to view the “invention” of Rwandan traditions as a straightforward, linear transfer of the Hamitic myth to historiographers and ultimately to African ideologues. If one can speak of “invention by tradition,” then it is important to consider the twists and turns that have accompanied the reinterpretation of tradi-

tions. The work of Alexis Kagame is a perfect example. Kagame was a Tutsi historian of considerable reputation as well as a social actor with strong political commitments. In this latter capacity, his endorsement of the Hamitic frame of reference is not nearly as significant as his attempt to put a modern, Eurocentric construction on Rwandan traditions by casting them in a juridical mold. His *Code des institutions politiques du Rwanda pre-colonial*, published in 1952, is a case in point.¹⁹ Precolonial Rwanda was not just a “royaume Hamite,” to use the title of a celebrated work by Father Pagès.²⁰ It was a traditional state system regulated by codes of laws, juridical norms, and unwritten rules. Just as the rituals of kingship were described as the “*code ésotérique de la monarchie*,”²¹ Rwanda’s precolonial institutions were carefully regulated by customary laws, much in the same way that in prerevolutionary France, the “fundamental laws of the realm” imposed specific restrictions on the king’s authority. What made traditional Rwanda eminently modern and susceptible to constitutional transformation was not the plasticity of its traditions but the fact that they were so carefully codified.

Kagame’s intellectual processes speak volumes for his political goals. Both are excellently analyzed by Claudine Vidal. “If there is only one word to describe Kagame’s philosophy of history,” she writes, “it is ‘*le juridisme*.’” Kagame systematically draws analogs between Rwandan and European institutions. Thus, for example, he assimilates personal power to administrative functions, relations of subordination to contracts, and royal decisions to fundamental laws. In so doing, Kagame identifies precolonial Rwanda with a European nation that has gone beyond the stage of feudalism. He creates an image of it as an absolute monarchy being tempered by a military code and offering some safeguards against social injustice.²² Kagame had no interest in exalting the merits of an arbitrary, omnipotent kingship. His overriding concern was to show that the institution of kingship, by virtue of its rich array of customary codes, was remarkably well equipped to evolve into a constitutional monarchy. Kagame’s history, in short, was designed to get Europeans to see that Rwandan traditions were neither arbitrary nor decadent. To the contrary, they contained within their folds the promise of a democratic renewal. Kagame’s painstaking reinterpetation of traditional Rwanda was consciously designed to influence the basic constitutional choices facing the Belgian trust authorities in the decade preceding independence.

As a politically committed intellectual, determined to save the monarchy from itself, Kagame showed unusual foresight and imagination. As an historian, however, he showed little inclination to depart from the basic tenets of the Hamitic tradition; pre-Tutsi traditions went virtually unnoticed. Not until 1962, with the publication of Jan Vansina's path-breaking work, *L'évolution du royaume rwanda dès origines à 1900*, did the flaws in Kagame's writings, and much of the historical literature on Rwanda, come to the attention of Rwandan historians.²³ The history of Rwanda as the story of exceptional men performing exceptional feats just did not stand up to the historical record. What was left out was the rich history of preconquest Hutu states, some of which survived right up until the 1920s and some of whose customs, rituals, and conceptions of authority were assimilated by Tutsi clans (and all this happened long before the term "Tutsi" gained currency in the area).²⁴ Rather than a superior civilization's imposing its rule on an inferior one, the evidence revealed a far more complex story. Ironically, much of what made the Hamites so captivating in the Europeans' eyes turned out to be the result of selective cultural borrowing from the supposedly inferior agricultural societies.

Here, then, was a view of history that came as close as any to reflecting Ranke's ideal of "how things really were." More important, it could provide a meaningful rationale for cooperation and mutual respect between Hutu and Tutsi. This possibility was not to be realized, however. As independence loomed on the horizon, confronting Hutu and Tutsi (and Europeans) with basic tactical decisions, the Hamitic view of history reasserted itself with a vengeance, but not without undergoing some extraordinary changes in meaning and substance.

THE POLITICS OF MEMORY IN THE HISTORICAL PRESENT

Commenting on the distinction between myth and ideology, Benjamin Halpern makes the argument that "the study of myth is a study of the origins of beliefs out of historic experience," whereas "the study of ideology is the study of moulding of beliefs by social situations."²⁵ Though analytically distinct, the two are intimately linked to each other.

It was in Rwanda during the social revolution of 1959 to 1962 that the efforts of both Tutsi and Hutu to remember their past entered into their political agendas with unusual bluntness and profoundly divisive consequences. For the conservative Tutsi associated with the court, history ruled out reconciliation: "Since our kings have conquered the land of the Hutu by killing their kinglets (*bahinza*) and turning them into serfs, how can they now pretend to be our brothers?"²⁶ For the Hutu, however, it was precisely this kind of outlook that made revolutionary change imperative.

Four Myths

In the remainder of this chapter, we shall turn our attention to four examples of mythmaking, where memory operates selectively and in so doing, creates not just "imagined" communities but communities of fear and hatred. The first example of divisive mythmaking can be seen in the *resurrection of the Hamitic myth* in the political discourse of Hutu elites in Rwanda and Burundi. The second example is to be found in the *denial of genocide* by both Hutu and Tutsi (the first in Rwanda, the second in Burundi). A third example of mythmaking is to be found in what might be called the *Rwanda irredenta* phenomenon. By this, we mean the efforts of postgenocide Rwanda to legitimize its claims to eastern Congo by rewriting the precolonial history of the region. A fourth concerns the *emergence of a new "tribe"* in eastern Congo, the so-called Banyamulenge.

Myth #1: The Resurrection of the Hamitic Hypothesis

Of these four myths, the first is evidently the most critical to an understanding of the other three. As is now becoming dramatically clear, it is the Hamitic myth that has spread like a cancer through much of the Congo and beyond, providing ideological justification for the wanton killings of Tutsi by Hutu, or better still of "Hamites" by "Bantus." In each case, historical memory creates its own universe of death and destruction. "Men do not find truth," wrote Paul Veyne, "they create it, as they create their history."²⁷ This maxim has devastating implications for the Great Lakes region of Africa.

The Hamitic myth initially provided a simple model for understanding perceived distinctions between lower and higher orders of humanity.

It was forged into a formidable ideological weapon during the 1959 revolution, and it reemerged with extraordinary virulence during the 1994 genocide.

Filtered through the lens of a rabidly anti-Tutsi, antimonarchical ideology, the Hamitic hypothesis underwent a striking metamorphosis. In 1959, the Hutu elites (termed "fifty-niners") took the myth and profoundly altered its meaning. They invoked the same supposed mythical themes once taken to prove Tutsi superiority, and they used them to prove, instead, Tutsi foreignness and depravity. The Hamitic race, believed by Europeans to embody all that was best in humanity, was now presented by Hutus as the embodiment of the worst. Hamites represented cruelty and cunning, conquest and oppression. Where missionaries had invoked Semitic origins to suggest racial superiority, Hutu ideologues invoked them to provide proof of foreignness. Where anthropologists had detected contractual exchange between Hutus and Tutsi, Hutus saw only exchange of a compulsory sort. What the two peoples had learned from each other to their mutual benefit was now condemned. That the native Hutus had adopted customs from the Tutsi was seen as the result of social domination, enforced by ruse and coercion. Even physical attributes once seen as marks of worthiness were denounced. For example, what most Europeans perceived as Tutsi feminine grace was now vilified as yet another ploy designed to subjugate the Hutu.

In retrospect, early references to the *feodalo-Hamites* by Hutu fifty-niners seem relatively mild compared to the murderous frenzy of anti-Tutsi propaganda and the blatantly racist iconography that was diffused by the Hutu-controlled media on the eve of the genocide (see figure 5.1).²⁸ The rabid hatred unleashed at this time was partly caused by the climate of extreme fear that was created by the invasion of the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) on October 1, 1990. In part, it was the legacy of the Burundi genocide of 1972 that resulted in the deaths of one to two hundred thousand Hutu.²⁹ The impact of the Burundi bloodbath on subsequent developments in both Burundi and Rwanda cannot be overemphasized. It is among the Hutu of Burundi that one encounters for the first time the articulation of a stridently anti-Tutsi ideology, explicitly grounded in a Hamitic frame of reference. Formalized by the founder of the *Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (Palipehutu)*, Remi Gahutu, this ideology flourished among a



L'assassinat de Ndadaye, réinterprété selon les fantasmes de la propagande extrémiste antitutsi (*La Médaille-Nyiramacibiri*, novembre 93, n° 17, p. 10)

- Un assistant: *Achievez ce stupide Hutu, les organes génitaux que vous lui enlèverez, suspendez les sur notre tambour.*
- Ndadaye: *Tuez-moi mais vous n'exterminerez pas les Ndadaye au Burundi.*
- Kagame: *Achievez-le vite. Ne savez-vous pas qu'à Byumba et à Ruhengeri nous avons fait du travail. Les femmes, nous leur avons retiré les enfants de la matrice, les hommes, nous leur avons enlevé les yeux.*
- Le tambour: *Kalinga du Burundi.*

Figure 5.1. Anti-Tutsi Propaganda: The Assassination of Ndadaye. Translation: *A bystander: Finish this stupid Hutu off and let's hang the genitals you took from our drum. Ndadaye: Kill me, but you'll not exterminate the Ndadaye in Burundi. Kagame: Kill him quickly. Don't you know that we have done some work in Byumba and Ruhengeri. We have torn children from their mothers and torn eyes from the men. The drum: Kalinga of Burundi.* [Reinterpreted through the imagination of extremist anti-Tutsi propaganda. *La Médaille-Nyiramacibiri*, no. 17 (November 1993: 10.)] (Editor's translation)

small group of Hutu exiles in Rwanda in the years immediately following the Burundi slaughter. The main themes are depressingly familiar. We learn that Tutsi domination over the Hutu can be explained only by taking into account the moral depravity of the Hamites. We hear of their consummate skill in the use of cunning and deceit, using, for example, poisoned gifts (beautiful women and cows) to reduce the Bantu into bondage. The Hutu exiles also stressed the unspeakable cruelties perpetrated during the 1972 genocide. They presented them as irrefutable proof of Hamitic perversity.³⁰

From the narratives collected by Liisa Malkki in refugee camps in Tanzania, one gets an idea of the extent to which these ideas took hold among the Hutu survivors:

In the past our proper name was Bantu. We are Bantu. "Hutu" is no tribe, no nothing! The Kihamite is the national language of the Tutsi. Muhutu is a Kihamite word which means "servant." Having been given cows as gifts by the Tutsi, the Hutu were used as a slave. It is indeed here that the Hutu were born. . . . We are not Hutu we are Bantu.³¹

From 1990 to 1994 much the same themes would emerge in the pages of *Kangura*, one of the most stridently anti-Tutsi of the forty-odd newspapers published at this time in Rwanda. The following are a few random examples:

- "The Tutsi have created out of whole cloth a tribe which does not exist: the Banyarwanda. The Banyarwanda exists nowhere in Africa; it is only mentioned to create confusion."
- "Public opinion must know that the only language of the Hutu is Kihutu, just as the Nande speak Kinande, the Hunde Kihunde."
- "Try to rediscover your *ethnie*, for the Tutsi have taught you to ignore it."³²

The Ten Commandments of the Hutu What made the ideological climate of pregenocide Rwanda pregnant with intimations of disaster was the sheer force and frequency of appeals to racism diffused through the media, the extensive use of a racist iconography, and the systematic elaboration of Hamitic mythologies into a coherent body of categorical imperatives. This is nowhere more chillingly evident than in the "Ten Commandments of the Hutu," first published by *Kangura*³³ in Decem-

ber 1990. This doctrine is a veritable catechism of racist principles. At the heart of this ideology are a series of axiomatic truths:

The Tutsi are the embodiment of malice and wickedness. “You know the trick they employed when they came to Rwanda: they pretended to have descended from heaven; in fact they came from the north of Africa. In Rwanda they found the pastures they needed for their cows. They approached the Hutu kinglets (*bahinza*), and with their customary malice they offered them women and cattle, until they overthrew the Hutu, seized power and kept it until the 1959 revolution.”³⁴

The Tutsi never change—a point put across in a *Kangura* article titled “A Cockroach (*inyenzi*) Cannot Give Birth to a Butterfly.” Thus, “history shows that the Tutsi have remained identical to themselves, they haven’t changed; their malice and wickedness is what we have experienced throughout history.” Typical of their deviousness is the fact that some “changed their identity in order to gain access to positions reserved to the Hutu,” which is why they have gained a dominant position in “the administration, commerce and the health sectors.”³⁵

Their long-term strategy is the creation of a Hima empire in the heart of the continent. The Tutsi master plan, we are told, is a diabolical scheme “to restore the dictatorship of the more extremist of the Tutsi minority through genocide and the extermination of the Hutu; to institute in the bantu region of the Great Lakes (Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania and Uganda) a vast Hima-Tutsi empire, under the guidance of an *ethnie* that considers itself superior, like the Aryan race, and whose symbol is Hitler’s swastika.”³⁶ The killing of President Melchior Ndadaye in Burundi at the hands of an all-Tutsi army is thus seen as unmistakable evidence of Hamitic imperial ambitions, along with the fact that the RPF fought its way into Rwanda with the help of “the Tutsi Museveni.”

Given the mortal threat facing the Hutu majority, it is imperative to delineate tribe from nation and for the Hutu to rediscover their true identity as Bantu. Again to quote from *Kangura*: “The nation is artificial, only ethnicity (*ethnie*) is natural.”³⁷ “You (the Hutu) are an important *ethnie* within the Bantu group,” yet numbers alone may not suffice; what you must realize is that “a conceited

(*orgueilleuse*) and bloodthirsty minority is working to create divisions among you, the better to dominate you and kill you.”³⁸

In these conditions, vigilance is the key. Watch out for spies and be particularly wary of Tutsikazi (Tutsi females). In the words of the first of the “Ten Commandments,” “Every Hutu must know that any Tutsikazi, regardless of where she works, is in the pay of her Tutsi *ethnie*. Consequently, will be treated as a traitor any Hutu who marries a Tutsikazi, or makes her his concubine or his protegee.” The second commandment stipulates that “every Hutu must know that our women (Hutukazi) are more dignified and more conscious of their roles as mothers and wives,” while the third enjoins Hutu females “to remain vigilant and bring back (their) husbands, brothers and sons to reason.”³⁹


Tutsi women, indeed, play a disproportionate part in Hutu discourse (and iconography). As the foregoing shows, the first three of the Ten Commandments are concerned exclusively with the threats arising from the presence of Tutsikazi among the Hutu communities. Tutsi women, furthermore, were a favorite target of Hutu cartoonists in search of pornographic effect (see figure 5.2). Warning against the dangers of potential Mata Haris among Tutsi females was evidently a major objective of the Hutu-controlled press. The more outrageous caricatures gleaned from the pages of *Power* and *Kangura-Magazine*⁴⁰ suggest, however, a deeper motivation. They reflect the seething anger and frustrations of many Hutu who saw in the greater attractiveness to Europeans of the typical Tutsikazi body a slur against their own “race.”

What all this adds up to is a sustained and deliberate effort to recast the Hamitic frame of reference in such a way as to throw moral discredit on an entire ethnic community. By 1994, it was almost as if every Tutsi in sight was by definition an ally of the RPF and hence an enemy of the Hutu nation.

Myth #2: The Denial of Genocide

As an ideological construction designed to justify the annihilation of the Tutsi minority, the Hamitic myth must be seen as the central element behind the 1994 genocide. In the denial of genocide by some of its perpetrators lies another extraordinary form of mythmaking.

LA FORCE DU SEXE ET LES PARAS BELGES.



Propagande préalable à l'assassinat des casques bleus belges le 7 avril 1994
(*Power*, décembre 1993, n°2, p.12)

- La "force du sexe" des filles tutsi et les paras belges de la Minuar.

Figure 5.2. Propaganda just before the Assassination of the Belgian Blue-Helmets on April 7, 1994. "The Power of Sex": Young Tutsi Girls and Belgian United Nations Troops. *Power*, no. 2 (December 1993): 112. (Editor's translation)

The term *genocide* has now become the most overused and arbitrary word in the political discourse of Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi. In both states, it is among the perpetrators that one encounters the most vigorous denial of involvement in ethnic massacres. Although many of the killers who are now in custody in Kigali or Arusha have admitted involvement in the Rwandan massacres, many more refuse to acknowledge their deeds. In flagrant contradiction with the facts, the argument one hears most often is that the killings were the result of a spontaneous outburst of collective anger, not the outcome of a planned annihilation. The real cause of the tragedy, according to this view, was the RPF invasion.

Much the same sort of role reversal can be seen in Burundi, where the perpetrators are cast as victims. To this day, the 1972 genocide of Hutu by Tutsi has been virtually obliterated from the consciousness of most Tutsi.⁴¹ Radical Tutsi ideologues officially recognize only one genocide, the killing of thousands of innocent Tutsi civilians in October 1993, in the wake of President Melchior Ndadaye's assassination. They see this carnage as planned annihilation, even though it might better be described as an explosion of collective fear and anger, set off by a murder that conjured up haunting memories of the 1972 killings. They do not mention the subsequent repression of the Hutu by the Tutsi-controlled army, which led to the death of thousands of Hutu and the exodus of some three hundred thousand of their kinsmen to Rwanda. Although, historically, the group that has suffered most from genocidal killings in Burundi are the Hutu, today it is the 1994 Rwanda genocide that impresses itself most forcefully on the mental retina of Tutsi politicians. The genocide brings into focus a simple equation: majority rule equals Hutu rule; Hutu rule equals the threat of Tutsi annihilation.

Both Hutu and Tutsi have been victims of genocide—most conspicuously and massively, the Hutu in Burundi and the Tutsi (and not a few Hutu) in Rwanda. Yet, ironically, for many Tutsi only they, as victims, have a proprietary right to genocide. A useful comparison might be made to the Serbs in former Yugoslavia, who see themselves as the perennial victims of historic massacres. “Deployed in this way,” writes Roger Cohen, “genocide was no longer a horror but a form of immunity. It was a *passe-partout* allowing the eternal Serbian victim to butcher with impunity.”⁴² That there is more than a superficial parallel here with the situation in Rwanda has been made abundantly clear by

the Kibeho massacre of Hutus in 1995 and the killings of tens of thousands of Hutu refugees in eastern Congo in 1996 and 1997.

Myth # 3: The Invention of Greater Rwanda

Besides putting historical imagination in the service of genocide, perceptions of the past have played a crucially important role in “fixing” (in both senses of the word) geographical boundaries. This kind of mythmaking has had equally destructive political consequences. An apt example of this sort of distortion may be seen in the efforts of the Rwanda government to summon the precolonial past on behalf of its territorial claims to North and South Kivu.

Shortly after the search-and-destroy operation mounted by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) against the refugee camps in eastern Congo, President Pasteur Bizimungu held a press conference. Armed with maps of precolonial Rwanda, he informed his audience of the extent of the territorial conquest of Mwami Rwabugiri (1853–1895) north and west of Rwanda’s present borders. Stretching from Lakes Rweru and Cyohoha across the Virunga volcanoes all the way to Lake Albert and beyond, precolonial Rwanda, according to Bizimungu, incorporated within its national boundaries much of eastern Congo.⁴³ The message, clearly intended to give legitimacy to the presence of RPF troops in North Kivu, could not have been clearer: much of the area included in eastern Congo was part and parcel of the precolonial kingdom.

By all accounts, however, Bizimungu’s claims simply do not stand up to the historical record. This observation, however, is not to deny that raids were conducted by Rwabugiri in North Kivu, but it is patently at odds with the facts to claim that such raids were instrumental in cementing the political control of the monarchy. Even where tributary relationships were temporarily established with local authorities, the writ of the Rwanda monarchy was precarious at best.⁴⁴ Nor did the presence of Kinyarwanda speakers in eastern Congo—“Hutu and Tutsi”—mean that they came under the effective control of the monarchy; in many instances, it meant precisely the opposite. The point is convincingly argued by David Newbury. The Kinyarwanda speakers, he argues, were “refugees, fleeing the expansion of the Nyiginya dynastic state at a time of intense competition among diverse political units in Rwanda. Thus, rather than being subjects of the royal court, these migrants were its opponents; their

presence in Itombwe (South Kivu), in fact, represented the lack of state power in that region, not its presence.”⁴⁵ Precolonial boundaries were anything but fixed. Even within Rwanda, relations between the Rwanda court and the Hutu communities in the north and the west were remarkably fluid. Many such communities remained virtually independent until brought into the fold of the monarchy by colonial troops. So far from restricting the scope of authority of the ruling dynasty, colonial rule had the opposite effect within Rwanda. As David Newbury points out, “The effect of European boundary agreements was to expand, not contract, the reach of the Rwanda state; in fact, with the help of European power, Nyiginya dynastic structures were extended to many areas that formerly had successfully resisted Rwandan expansion.”⁴⁶ The historical evidence, in short, lends little credibility to Bizimungu’s claims. They are entirely consistent, however, with the Rwanda government’s definition of its security interests in eastern Congo. Though at odds with historical facts, the president’s illusions had a clear political objective. Bizimungu was not satisfied with maintaining a military presence in eastern Congo to ward off the threats of cross-border raids. He felt that the military presence also had to be legitimized by history. Only by restoring the territorial integrity of precolonial Rwanda could the sovereignty of the new Rwanda be fully established.

Myth # 4: The Banyamulenge: Ethnogenesis As Mythmaking

The Banyamulenge are not pure invention. The term initially referred to “the people of Mulenge.” These were a small group of predominantly Tutsi pastoralists whose traditional habitat was in Mulenge, a locality situated on the high-lying Itombwe plateau, south of Uvira (South Kivu).⁴⁷ The ancestors of the people of Mulenge were renegades from Rwanda. Having fallen foul of the ruling Niginya dynasty, they moved to the Itombwe area in the late nineteenth century. Others followed in search of greener pastures, some from Rwanda, others from Burundi.

Although they formed a culturally and linguistically distinct community, their name never appears in colonial records. Their political significance became apparent in the years following the independence of the Congo, when they found themselves embroiled in the so-called Muleliste rebellion of 1964 to 1965 in eastern Congo. Unlike many Tutsi who had fled Rwanda during the revolution of 1959, the Banya-

mulenge, upon realizing that their cattle were being slaughtered to feed the rebel army, refused to cast their lot with the Mulelistes. Instead, they joined the ranks of the National Congolese Army (NCA), a fact that further contributed to mark them off as a separate community.

The “myth” of the Banyamulenge has two sides, both at odds with the historical record and both intended to serve a specific political objective. To begin with, there is what might be called the “foreigner in native clothes” version. For many “native” Congolese, the Banyamulenge are indeed Rwandan Tutsi in disguise. Their precolonial roots are vehemently denied, and so also are their claims to citizenship rights. They are seen as the Trojan horse of the Rwanda regime. Rwanda is where they belong.

The opposite version, set forth by ethnic Tutsi of non-Banyamulenge origins, aims at reinforcing the claims of “indigeneity” of all Tutsi residing in North and South Kivu. From a small, highly localized community numbering no more than thirty thousand people, the term has come to designate perhaps as many as three hundred thousand ethnic Tutsi, irrespective of their place of residence or historical roots. Lumped together under the same ethnic rubric are those Tutsi who lived in North and South Kivu long before the advent of colonial rule, those who migrated to the area during the colonial period, and the tens of thousands of refugees who crossed into eastern Congo in the early 1960s during and immediately after the Rwanda revolution. There are no parallels in the continent for such an instant and extensive ethnogenesis.

Although this chapter is hardly the place for a detailed discussion of the singularly tragic history of the Banyamulenge, their tale is a notable one of hopes betrayed, alliances undone, and vicious factional struggles. Suffice it to say that their initially very close relationship with Kagame’s Rwanda was predicated on the assumption that Rwanda would in time offer protection against the mounting threats to their security posed by self-styled “native” Congolese. Rwanda, in turn, quickly grasped the strategic advantage to be gained from this pool of potential allies. There is little question that the Banyamulenge played a significant auxiliary role during the destruction of the Hutu refugee camps in North and South Kivu in November 1996. This operation was conducted with extreme brutality by units of the RPA, assisted by hundreds if not thousands of ethnic Tutsi from eastern Congo, those very

elements who today call themselves Banyamulenge. The high point in the convergence of interests between the Rwandans and the Banyamulenge came in 1998, with the creation in Kigali of the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD). Despite or because of its subservience to Rwanda, many leading Banyamulenge joined the movement. The RCD, however, has been wracked by intramural disputes, the most serious being the dissidence of a large number of Banyamulenge troops in early 2002, led by a certain Musunzu. Only after a bloody repression by units of the Rwandan army was the rebellion finally quelled. But this has only reinforced the conviction of a growing number of Banyamulenge that they have been “instrumentalized”—their standard phrase—by Rwanda. As peace talks loom on the horizon, a growing number of Banyamulenge are trying to distance themselves from their former Rwandan patron, if only to evade the retribution that could be forthcoming if and when the Rwandan army withdraws from eastern Congo.

Partnerships dissolve, yet the myth persists. For most Banyamulenge, the label validates their claims to being authentically Congolese, and it refutes accusations that they might have acted as Rwanda’s “fifth column” in the Congo. By the same token, the term settles once and for all the nationality question: an issue that during the Mobutu years lie at the heart of Tutsi grievances against Kinshasa. No longer is citizenship conditioned by length of residence. All Tutsi are now Banyamulenge and hence, authentic Congolese citizens.

Is this a case of political tribalism, as John Lonsdale would put it, “flowing down from high-political intrigue?” Or is it an example of “moral ethnicity creating communities from within through domestic controversy over civic virtue?” It is possibly both. In North and South Kivu, as elsewhere in the region, history’s myths are in violent conflict with history’s realities. Adjusting one to the other is what much of the violence in the Great Lakes is all about.

CONCLUSION

Reflecting on the fortunes of the “Hamitic hypothesis,” Edith Sanders noted thirty years ago: “The word [Hamitic] still exists, endowed with a mystical meaning; it endures through time and history, and like a chameleon changes its color to reflect the changing light. As the word

became flesh it engendered many problems of scholarship.”⁴⁸ How one wishes the problems had remained restricted to the field of scholarship!

Amid all the bloodshed caused by the extension of civil war to the whole of the Congo, the myth has proven remarkably resilient. Bantu and Hamitic identities have now crystallized on a wider scale than ever before. The language used on all sides is clearly inspired by racist stereotypes. Hundreds, possibly thousands of ethnic Tutsi or Tutsi-looking Africans are reported to have been massacred in Kinshasa and other localities in the name of a threatened Bantu identity. The enemy can be easily identified by its physical markers, as warned by the national radio: “Watch the nose, it’s thin and narrow, and the height: Tutsi are tall!” As one observer noted, “There was nothing subliminal about Kabila’s messages. Like the infamous radio broadcasts that primed Rwanda’s Hutu for the massacre of more than five hundred thousand Tutsi in 1994, the invitation was to kill.”⁴⁹ Never before has the common imagination generated a more deadly potential for regional instability.

The final word must be left to Leszlek Kolakowski:

A myth may grow like a tumor; it may seek to replace positivistic knowledge and laws, it may attempt forcibly to take over all areas of culture, and may become encrusted in despotism, terror and mendacity. It may also threaten to relieve its participants of responsibility for their own situation, drain away the desire for freedom, and bring the value of freedom as such under suspicion.⁵⁰

Such is the bitter lesson we have learned from the endless bloodshed in the Great Lakes, where the Hamitic myth is indeed growing like a tumor, with few signs of remission.

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Nongovernmental Organizations and Their Potential for Conflict Reduction in Africa

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On a continent where the absence of effective governments is a well-noted phenomenon, considerable hope has been vested in grassroots operations known as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). While reliance on NGOs is to some degree problematic, they have become critical providers of resources and services in Africa. In chapter 6, Claude Welch, distinguished service professor at the State University of New York, Buffalo, and director of its Human Rights Center, offers a thoughtful and objective analysis of how NGOs might contribute to the reduction or resolution of conflict in Africa.

Until quite recently, students of international relations focused their attention primarily on the “power” of states. They concentrated on the tangible evidence of strength, looking, for example, at levels of military force or levels of economic development. The study of international relations was, in essence, the study of governments and the coercive and economic might they exercised. “Public opinion” was noted as a factor that potentially constrained certain state actions, as “pressure groups” sought to influence government policies. In the main, however, “realism” in global politics carried with it a tendency to minimize, even to neglect, what nonstate actors had attained and could accomplish.

This perspective, while not wrong, is assuredly incomplete. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs; once styled “citizen groups” or “grassroots organizations”) have entered from the wings to play increasingly important parts on domestic and international stages. No state, even the most authoritarian, is now immune to the actions of NGOs. Some authors go so far as to speak of a “revolution” as a result.¹

“Soft” politics is receiving greater scholarly attention, thereby reflecting its growing significance.

Several types of NGOs have, over time, affected governments’ policies. Some are rooted in commercial or industrial sectors; their influence is largely economic. Others are based largely on claims for political power and hence gravitate to centers of control to exert pressure. A few utilize their command of expertise to gain influence. And still others derive support from moral claims, made on a global, national, or regional basis, often through appeals to public opinion. It is from this latter group that I derive most of the examples for the chapter. I argue that the NGOs concerned with humanitarian assistance, development, and human rights have been involved in addressing both root causes and consequences of conflict in Africa, and they have done so on the basis of an expanding moral conception expressed as globally sanctioned human rights. In the words of the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights,

All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. . . . While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.²

This purpose of this chapter, in short, is to examine the role played by NGOs (specifically human rights NGOs) in conflict reduction. My approach is as follows. First, I discuss the nature, the objectives, and the strategies of NGOs, paying special attention to human rights NGOs. I also briefly consider the level of success they have achieved to date. Next, I focus on the African context. I look at the historical role of NGOs in Africa, focusing in particular on their shifting relations with governments. This section concludes with a case study of NGOs in Ethiopia. Finally, I assess what advantages and disadvantages NGOs possess as organizations involved in the effort to reduce conflict in Africa.

NGOS: NATURE, OBJECTIVES, AND STRATEGIES

The Nature of NGOs

As noted, NGOs have only recently emerged as an area of serious academic study in international relations. Detailed, comparative analyses

of their impact remain few in number, and no consensus as yet exists as to exactly what function they serve. To make some sense of this complex and varied group of organizations, however, some kind of classification is needed.

Classification

Two classifications in particular may prove useful. First, let us consider the list drawn up by Harry Scoble, who, with his wife, Laurie Wiseberg, founded Human Rights Internet. Scoble identified six “key functions” of human rights NGOs: information gathering, evaluation, and dissemination; advocacy; humanitarian relief or legal aid to victims and families; building solidarity among the oppressed, and internationalizing and legitimating local concerns; moral condemnation and praise; and lobbying national and intergovernmental authorities.³ Wiseberg later compressed this list, stressing two “absolutely indispensable functions,” namely, information gathering, evaluation, and dissemination; and either keeping the political process open or creating political space for democratic forces.⁴

The second list includes the clear, if not totally comprehensive, list of strategies laid out in my 1995 study of grassroots human rights groups in Africa. Mnemonically, the six strategies are the three *Es* and three *Ds*.⁵ Some NGOs concentrate on changing the overall social environment, creating what some have called a rights-protective society—in other words, they concentrate on *education*. Other NGOs focus on the legal system, arguing that constitutional provisions (say, for example, equal treatment), existing laws, and applicable international treaties be implemented—that is to say, they focus on *enforcement*. Some NGOs engage in domestic politics, seeking to help marginalized groups exercise greater influence—in other words, they focus on *empowerment*. Almost all human rights NGOs collect, confirm, and circulate information about abuses—that is to say, they concentrate on *documentation*. Many of them seek to keep open channels for political participation on an equal basis—they seek what can be called *democratization*. And, given the continent’s generally low levels of living standards and low rates of growth, some African NGOs engage (usually with foreign partners) in promoting economic change—in other words, they promote *development*.

Neither of these lists mentions another important function: the creation of moral norms. This function is central to the ability of NGOs to

reduce conflict. It is also an area in which NGOs have met with increasing success in the recent half-century. This function is one that is further discussed later in the chapter.

Relationship with Governments

The very term "NGO" begs for some kind of assessment of the relationship between NGOs and governments. In her study of the impact of NGOs in Ugandan politics, Susan Dicklitch distinguishes three major varieties of NGOs. The first includes "gap fillers," which operate in the absence or weakness of government institutions. The second comprises "people's organizations," which operate in opposition to particular regimes. Finally, the third variety includes "voluntary organizations," which seek to act as intermediaries among the state, the affected individuals, and possibly the grassroots NGOs that represent them.

The distinctions Dicklitch makes among types of NGOs is of considerable use. The evidence suggests that relations between NGOs and governments are fraught with contradictions, being sometimes cooperative, at other times confrontational. On the one hand, NGOs cooperate with governments in the effort to achieve common objectives. They are often to be found, for example, drafting new international treaties with the assistance of like-minded states. On the other hand, human rights groups frequently confront rights-abusing governments. They mount campaigns against them to mobilize public opinion, release critical reports based on their research, and work with regional or international monitoring bodies to have abuses publicized and criticized. In these instances, the NGOs oppose states (even while hoping that the states will correct their ways). Sometimes they engage in both simultaneously. NGOs' involvement in the effort to bring about conflict reduction has often led them into confrontation with states. Realists tend to think that peace is best ensured by the forging of alliances, by military or economic cooperation, and by the recognition of their sovereign powers. International human rights advocates, by contrast, tend to be of the "idealist" school. They have made inroads into the very closely guarded right of state sovereignty to achieve their goals.

Objectives of NGOs

NGOs, especially human rights NGOs, are involved both directly and indirectly in efforts to reduce conflict. The link between peace and jus-

tice is well known. Activists argue that international peace and security are best ensured through the establishment of rights-protective practices within countries. The effort to secure human rights can thus be viewed as a step on the road to conflict reduction. At the same time, the reduction of conflict is one of the conditions needed for the creation of a rights-protective society. Hence, NGOs that are concerned with human rights are by definition concerned with the reduction of conflict, both for their own functioning and for the good of their societies.

The ultimate objective of human rights NGOs is to create what has been called a "rights-protective society." In the words of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (and, for that matter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), individuals in such a society would not be subject to invidious or direct discrimination based on race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status. Instead, they would be subject to the "rule of law" infused with the basic ideas of justice applicable to all under the particular state's jurisdiction. Groups would enjoy the opportunity to express and continue their cultural heritages, and safeguards for basic needs would be secured.

Strategies of NGOs

To achieve such a rights-protective society, NGOs seek to create and expand a moral consensus in favor of such a society. Promotion of overall conditions favorable to human rights characterizes almost all human rights NGOs. They also seek to protect citizens from abuses of rights. Given the abuses that exist, some of them engage in short-term efforts at protection, especially through pressuring governments on behalf of individuals (or groups) or through participating in humanitarian assistance.

In their recent book, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink distinguish among four types of political actions employed by NGOs to achieve human rights objectives: information politics, symbolic politics, linkage politics, and accountability politics.⁶ Information politics is the lifeblood of advocacy networks. NGOs use this strategy to promote change by reporting facts. Symbolic politics utilizes culturally or politically significant icons to catalyze the formation or growth of networks. Leverage politics occurs when human rights groups join with certain

governments to pressure other governments into changing their policies. This unity allows smaller, weaker groups to multiply their influence. Human rights NGOs can use two types of leverage: material leverage, of the sort they used in the apartheid era when they persuaded major banks and international financial institutions not to extend loans to South Africa; and moral leverage, which they also used during the anti-apartheid global campaign.⁷ Finally, accountability politics rests upon combinations of information and leverage. NGOs expose discrepancies between government positions and practice. They rely on the fact that governments will sometimes reform to save face.⁸

The effort to create a moral consensus in favor of human rights has gained considerable momentum in recent times. The tactic is not a new one: citizen groups played a role in norm setting as far back as the nineteenth century. It has, however, become much more refined since World War II and especially since the Cold War settled into *détente* and ended. To understand how NGOs go about helping to create a moral consensus, it is worth turning to a 1990 article by Ethan Nadelmann. In this piece, Nadelmann examined changing attitudes toward a variety of morally suspect practices, ranging from slavery to the killing of elephants.⁹ He outlined various stages in the creation of a moral consensus:

1. The “targeted” activity is considered entirely legitimate under certain conditions and with respect to certain groups of people; states are often the principal protagonists.
2. “Moral entrepreneurs” (including international legal scholars, religious groups, and others) seek to redefine the activity as both a problem and an evil.
3. Proponents of global bans start to press for the suppression and criminalization of the particular activity, with the eventual drafting of international conventions.
4. A global prohibition regime comes into existence and steps are taken at a national level to end the activity by subjecting it to criminal laws and police action.

Successes and Failures

The effectiveness of any given strategy clearly depends upon time and circumstance. A strategy that has worked well in the past may not work

well in the future. By the same token, a strategy that works well in one environment may not work well in another. Shock tactics are a case in point. Reports of horrifying abuses have long been the stock in trade of human rights NGOs: David Rieff of the *New York Times* has argued that this strategy may have reached the limits of its effectiveness.¹⁰ Moreover, the mobilization of shame and embarrassment achieved some significant results but, not surprisingly, won its greatest successes when rights-abusing governments were sensitive to public opinion.

Success is hard to measure, especially when it comes to norm setting. Have the efforts by human rights NGOs to change public opinion achieved results? And does changing public opinion even achieve concrete benefits? At some level, NGOs have clearly shown themselves able to constrain state actions and influence developments. The proliferation of international legislation protecting human rights is a case in point. A marked increase in the number of international treaties have been ratified since the adoption of the United Nations Charter, in which promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms stand as principal objectives.¹¹ The question that arises, however, is what all this legislation means in practice. Treaty ratification does not preclude gross violations of human rights, as history clearly bears out.¹² To many governments, ratifying a treaty may be merely a symbolic act, neither reflecting nor leading to a real change in domestic policies. International conventions are sometimes adopted merely as a sop to external donors or human rights NGOs, not as a result of pressure from below or genuine commitment to the objectives of these treaties.

Does this mean that the work of NGOs in establishing international norms is of little practical worth? Not necessarily. When governments ratify treaties, they officially acknowledge their acceptance of basic obligations; they also admit that they are responsible to the international community, as well as to their own populations. At the very least, ratifying or acceding to these treaties makes it clear that unfettered domestic sovereignty is not a twenty-first-century reality. This realization in turn has made possible such things as the international monitoring of a state's human rights performance, as through the treaty bodies established by various international agreements, as well as by NGOs. The importance and universality of human rights is winning increasingly strong global acceptance; repressive policies can no longer be sheltered as falling totally in the domestic jurisdiction of the respective governments.

AFRICAN NGOS: HISTORIC CONTEXT

We now turn from general analysis of NGOs' functions and achievements to the specific context of sub-Saharan Africa. Our overall purpose, as we have said, is to evaluate whether or not NGOs have the potential to play a useful role in reducing conflict on this continent. To do so, however, we must first gain a clearer understanding of the shifting relations that have existed over time between African governments and NGOs. These are of pivotal importance to our understanding of when and why NGOs have been successful in Africa.

NGOs and Governments in Africa: Shifting Relations

European NGOs and Colonialism

For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, sub-Saharan Africa served as the epicenter of the activities of a particular genre of NGOs. Abolitionists and evangelizers from outside the continent found fertile fields for their efforts. The oldest human rights NGO in the world was established in 1839 as the (British) Anti-Slavery Society. Now known more simply as Anti-Slavery, it continues to find numerous examples of slavery or slavlike practices in states such as Mauritania or Sudan. In the nineteenth century, the Anti-Slavery Society struggled to shape global public opinion, building on an earlier mass movement in Great Britain. It organized petition campaigns against the slave trade. From 1791 to 1792, about one of every eleven adults signed the petition for a sum of approximately 400,000; in 1814, the 750,000 signatures constituted one of every eight adults; by 1833, there were twice as many signers as there were voters.¹³ The British navy was ordered by Parliament to stamp out slave trading. To do so, Great Britain established supply depots at several harbors along the West African coast, from Gambia to Nigeria. In the process, they laid the foundation for the British African Empire.

Christian missionaries showed a moral fervor similar to that of the members of the Anti-Slavery Society. They too were able to draw on government assistance. They advocated direct involvement, either by spreading the Gospel, improving social conditions (as in the effort to end "female circumcision"), or stamping out "tribal" conflict.

What these examples prove is that, ironically, humanitarian intentions, as much as commercial ones, paved the way for colonialism. From a post-World War II perspective, colonialism was a moral wrong. But a hundred years earlier, colonialism was seen as a moral obligation. Public opinion was moved by the call to bear the “white man’s burden” and bring civilization to “inferior” civilizations. Desire to fulfil this *mission civilisatrice* led to widespread support of colonization in the Northern Hemisphere.

This history has obvious implications for the reception of human rights NGOs in Africa. For Africans, moral fervor from outside the continent became associated with colonialism. The message borne by contemporary advocates of human rights seems to them to bear an uncanny resemblance to earlier justifications for imperialism.

Indigenous NGOs

Different types of NGOs were established by Africans during the colonial period to cope with social and economic issues accentuated by foreign rule. Voluntary associations—a term one sees far less frequently now than before the late 1980s—became prominent. Ethnic associations, burial societies, nascent trade unions, youth groups, and the like all sprang up. They helped bring about social change, playing an especially useful role by helping migrants from rural areas adjust to urban conditions. Many of these groups contributed to growing nationalist awareness. A preeminent scholar of the “new associations” noted a resultant “diffusion of African civic consciousness”¹⁴ by the mid-1950s, a view typical of the time. Some of these roots of civil society could be tapped in later years.

Suppression of NGOs

With the achievement of independence, however, this vibrant associational life came under increased governmental scrutiny and pressure. Leaders of the “party-states” were concerned about potential competition. Their quest for national integration entailed suspicions against ethnically based associations. Distrust of foreign influence meant restrictions on missionary groups.¹⁵ Dominant political parties created de facto, then de jure, one-party systems, thus monopolizing the political

scene. Potential contenders for power were thrust aside by the new establishment. Parties such as the Convention People's Party (Ghana), the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*, or the KANU (Kenya African National Union) created subordinate wings composed of women, youth, and/or farmers. Official licensing and registration requirements were either increased or newly imposed upon independent groups that remained outside of party control. The dominant party came to control all other types of group activity, though the degree and the form of this control varied.¹⁶

Dictatorships and Violence

Single-party control ultimately became one-man rule. African dictatorships were based increasingly on the use of force. Coups d'état became the most common way to change government personnel. Between 1965 and 1990, there were approximately seventy-five successful military seizures of power. In stark contrast, the island republic of Mauritius was the only country where an opposition party both won an election and successfully took control.

The immediate source of much of Africa's postindependence violence has been monopolization of political power. The high hopes of the late colonial period were cruelly subverted. Regimes that had seized control by force continued to rule by force. Self-perpetuating narrow cliques lorded over entire countries, treating the public purse as private revenues. Corruption spread like a cancer. Patron-client ties—with the state as the chief source of revenue—partially tied the system together. When government revenues dried up—as a result of cutbacks in foreign aid and investment, declining terms of trade on world markets, and drought (or other natural calamities)—the links of clientage could not be maintained. Coercion largely replaced consent (be it voluntary or induced by economic or ethnic ties). Persons drawn from narrow segments of society came to dominate many African states.

The popular enthusiasm typical of the early 1960s had disappeared by the early 1980s. However, the “founding fathers” who had not already been unseated by the military could not imagine stepping down voluntarily. Either they died in office (and were succeeded by their seconds-in-command), or they were deposed.¹⁷ Not until 1990, with the wave of the “second independence” sweeping across the continent,

were internationally monitored competitive national elections for the presidency held. Africa was afflicted by a quarter-century-plus of military coups, blatant enrichment of the political elite (coupled with impoverishment of the majority of the populace), narrowing bases of popular support, and inflamed ethnic and regional relations. Africa's failure to form effective governments at one and the same time explains why it suffered from relatively high levels of violence and why NGOs were to reemerge as an important force in conflict resolution in the last quarter of the century.

Reemerging Importance of NGOs

In many respects, the era of prominence for NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa started modestly in the early 1970s, as the deficiencies of the controlling states, parties, and governing juntas became more apparent. Voluntary associations continued to exist, and they remained socially important, particularly in cities. Yet human rights and humanitarian assistance NGOs, especially those linked with external donors or pressure groups, became more prominent.

Natural disasters, compounded by the political failings previously discussed, constituted the first cause of the growing NGO role. Neither African governments nor political movements (the "party-states") could resolve the economic and social problems that arose. Misdirected policies, in fact, often directly contributed to the difficulties.¹⁸ The solutions sought did not always work as anticipated, thus opening opportunities for NGOs. Conditions of drought and famine resulted in the creation (usually with funds from Western sources) of relief-oriented NGOs, including coalitions of them.¹⁹ In differing forms of partnership with private and public agencies, such gap-filling NGOs responded to lacunae in humanitarian assistance. Some worked closely with governments; others cooperated more warily; a few even became part of resistance to the political incumbents. External financial and moral support distinguished many of the NGOs from those whose focus was on disaster relief from the earlier voluntary associations to those whose roots were firmly in local societies.

The serious economic problems confronting most African states by the early 1980s provided a further, overlapping avenue for NGO involvement, once again with external input. Donors channeled increasing

amounts of aid through nongovernment and nonprofit entities. "Development NGOs" became prominent. As any survey of the relevant literature will confirm, advocates saw NGOs as appropriate alternatives to, or at least as valuable supplements to, the government ministries through which most official economic assistance had been channeled. Centralized political authority had compounded corruption, favoritism, ill-advised priorities, and similar problems. In keeping with the "small is beautiful" theme, NGOs gained greater significance (because of donor decisions) as well as more political power (or at least influence). Aid-giving countries and agencies touted NGOs as lower-cost, higher efficiency entities for development than government bureaucracies. One predictable outcome, however, was the burgeoning of what Ugandans term "briefcase NGOs," established to provide a veneer of legitimacy to the external funder and jobs for the politically connected.²⁰

Where African states collapsed into anarchy or civil war, the responsibilities of NGOs grew even more dramatically, until they became quasi administrations. Their budgets spiraled upward as better-heeled aid-giving governments or organizations looked for local partners. Thanks to disaster relief and development imperatives, local NGOs gained the opportunity in some countries to administer significant funds and (potentially) exert substantial political influence. Given the connections among multiple ills—such as economic disadvantage, natural disasters compounded by government bottlenecks or inefficiencies, civil disorder, environmental decline, population pressure, and other factors as journalistically outlined by Kaplan²¹—new approaches were needed. Many donors thought that the "gap-filler" NGOs, like Oxfam or *Médécins sans Frontières* (Doctors without Borders), might be able to do what states were manifestly incapable of doing.

The fourth and politically most significant step came with the conclusion of the Cold War. Far more political space for NGOs (as contrasted with economic opportunity for them) opened early in the 1990s, in particular for NGOs concerned with human rights and election monitoring. The overly touted "second independence" wave—now deservedly under more academic scrutiny²²—made it possible for more attention to be given to civil society. There, of course, NGOs became and remained central. Entities concerned with electoral monitoring sprang up. Human rights organizations, domestic and international, found new

opportunity for action. In short, a corner seemed to have been turned. Civil society gained new opportunities for expansion.

Ethiopia: A Case Study

The timing and nature of these phases differed, naturally, among states. Take, as one example, Ethiopia. No legal framework and little official encouragement for NGOs existed during the first half of the twentieth century, although some voluntary associations, especially if associated with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, were generally tolerated, as they seemed to ameliorate certain social issues and thus reinforce the control of the Amhara. Emperor Haile Selassie gradually allowed the formation of other associations after World War II, "provided they were in accordance with the constitution of the Empire and the relevant specific legislation."²³ The welfare associations that emerged did so largely on ethnic bases. External NGOs, and especially Christian missions, became increasingly active as Ethiopia modernized.

However, some NGOs represented implicit threats to centralized control, especially to the secular, centralizing Marxist regime of Ethiopia's Derg ("Committee") and Mengistu Haile Mariam, its dictatorial head, from the mid-1970s to 1991. NGOs were as suspicious of his authoritarian government as they had been of the modernizing autocracy of Haile Selassie in earlier decades. With global publicity for the 1984–1985 drought (most notably through music impresario Bob Geldorf and "Band Aid," and through a BBC documentary on conditions in Welo and Tigray Provinces), the government of Mengistu faced increased pressure from other states and NGOs. It refused international agencies safe passage to areas under guerrilla control. Relief activities became politicized. Some participants wanted to use relief operations as a political and military weapon, not only as humanitarian relief (i.e., "gap-fillers"). Terje Tvedt argues that one unintended consequence was the emergence of NGOs of a special type that "not only distanced themselves from the state and the government, [but] . . . also fought to bring down both." Opposition groups were often organized along ethnic lines. Most of them now came to have an NGO because, Tvedt continues, everyone knew that this course of action had proved in the past to be the most efficient way to mobilize funds.²⁴

For a few years between the conquest of power by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the consolidation of control under President Meles Zenawi, NGOs flourished throughout Ethiopia. Institutions of civil society sprang up following the ouster of the Derg, in a sort of "Addis Ababa summer." During this period (1993–1994) I was engaged in the region doing field work and had the opportunity to observe the phenomenon first hand. National entities such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Council could publicly question government actions, while international human rights groups such as Amnesty International could hold the regime responsible for fulfilling its promises of greater openness and democratization.

Given these stages of change, how have NGOs, and in particular human rights NGOs, been able to work toward conflict reduction?

CONFLICT REDUCTION IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF NGOS

NGOs have helped focus international attention on the importance of human rights. They have sought to bring about statutory and constitutional protection for human rights; they have laid emphasis on governments' obligations under international treaties to document their performance; they have organized rights-protective NGOs; and they have sought financial support for NGOs from nondomestic sources. But does all this mean better conflict resolution?

States in which human rights are disregarded or widely abused are, in all likelihood, those in which conflict has broken out or simmers just below the surface. We thus face a chicken-egg problem. On the one hand, if NGOs are going to be of any use in advancing conflict resolution, they need at a minimum to be able to function. External financial support may meet this basic requirement. On the other hand, if NGOs are dependent on external financial support, their critics are likely to claim that they are acting under foreign orders.

As a general rule, human rights activists believe that rights-based conflict will diminish where all are equally treated. They believe that nondiscrimination among individuals constitutes the sine qua non of rights-protecting government action. This protection for all results domestically from constitutional guarantees, equal enforcement of the laws, and government pledges through ratification of international hu-

man rights treaties. This proposal is great in theory. However, problems of enforcement arise in every system; no government has ever treated all its citizens equally. Human rights NGOs uphold an ideal, using fact-finding and publicity to shame particular regimes.²⁵

Limitations

But how successful have they been in effecting their goals? The task has, in fact, been complicated by a number of difficulties. First, an apparent discrepancy exists between African conceptions of human rights and those of the international community. Second, African leaders as well as those who provide funds sometimes fail to address the issues which are of critical importance to the average African. Third, human rights NGOs are sometimes weak at finding and publicizing facts as well as at persuading governments to change abusive policies.

African Conceptions of Human Rights

Human rights NGOs try to operate within a setting of globally defined and accepted standards. Part of their claim to legitimacy comes from the indivisible, interdependent, and universal basis for human rights. Despite the important 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by consensus by the more than 150 representative governments, questions continue to be raised by some governments and commentators. Particularly in Africa and Asia, critics have zeroed in on the supposed individualistic bias of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and successor documents, which are said to include disproportionate stress on rights as contrasted with duties and insensitivity to cultural context in the "international bill of human rights."²⁶ African conceptions of human rights are often said to be more collectivist than individualist.²⁷ The relevant document for OAU member states is the African Charter of Human and People's Rights, which does in fact reflect a focus on groups.²⁸ However, valid reasons exist for considering rights as the possession of collective entities as opposed to individuals. Disadvantages are often felt collectively; without question, groups can be targets of discrimination. The extensive experience of African societies with ethnically based voluntary associations, plus the ease with which "tribal" discrimination or favoritism can be alleged reinforce the group basis.

Although African countries have ratified international conventions in large numbers, their performance in meeting the resulting obligations is disappointing. An interesting illustration comes from the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). This convention was approved largely because of the pressures which African governments brought to bear against apartheid South Africa in the UN General Assembly. But these same African governments were slow to enforce the convention; a striking contrast exists between the speed of approval and the languor of implementation. By the end of 1990, 252 reports from 103 states were overdue, and some of the worst offenders were located south of the Sahara!²⁹ I suspect that in the decade-plus since, the record of African states has shown only modest improvement. They were swift to advocate and ratify ICERD, seeing it as another weapon against the lingering remnants of colonialism and apartheid. Although they were generally swift in ratifying other human rights conventions, they were lackadaisical in submitting the required reports and stingy in providing details when they did.

Failure to Focus on Key Issues

This lack of action on relatively minor human rights obligations mirrored a broader problem. The high hopes sub-Saharan leaders bore for independence were to be dashed on the grim realities of internal and international politics. African societies had endured colonialism that was both harsh and recent. Problems could be blamed on the negative impact of European imperialism and neocolonialism. Self-determination was the major goal in the early years of independence. "Seek ye first the political kingdom," Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah had opined, "and all shall be added unto it." By achieving independence, heads of state argued, the inequalities typical of foreign rule would disappear. Racism was a facet of the colonial experience. With full autonomy achieved and with imperialism and apartheid in retreat, a new era would dawn. When these expectations were not met and ethnic tensions arose, nationalist leaders did not accept the blame. The problems were explained as lingering remnants of the colonial era or as manifestations of external interference.³⁰ As a result, they often failed to do what they could themselves to promote and protect human rights for all.

African human rights NGOs have sometimes been less responsive than one would like to issues of popular concern. They are hampered by the fact that their leaders tend to be drawn from the educated and urbanized, as opposed to the rural and “traditional” sectors of African society. In consequence, these leaders tend to relate to the concept of the “rule of law” but are not necessarily closely in touch with the aspirations of ordinary Africans.³¹ Aside from the admittedly critical situations in which life itself is directly threatened by government or rebel actions, the human rights issues that concern most Africans are largely economic and social: employment, adequate nutrition, access to education, health care, and housing. About the same number of African governments have ratified the ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights) as have ratified the companion ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), as shown in table 6.1.

Despite the fact that most Africans care more about the former, it is the latter of the two treaties, however, that has been “privileged,” in the sense that the best-known Western-based human rights NGOs have concentrated on ensuring these rights.³² African human rights groups have generally found it easier to obtain external funds to analyze civil and political conditions than economic and social conditions within a rights framework.

Fact Finding and Publicity Failures

Essentially all existing African human rights NGOs are financially dependent on external sources. Their research and advocacy efforts would be severely circumscribed without the direct support of Western foundations, international NGOs, or others. They cannot readily publicize their findings unless they tap into networks in which NGOs based in New York, London, or Geneva provide funds, access to international media, and leadership. The inherent disparities in such situations have led entities such as Human Rights Watch or the International Commission of Jurists to emphasize partnership in research capacity building—an effort also supported by some Western governments and advocacy networks.³³ However, the fruits of such capacity-building efforts are only now starting to emerge, as in joint reporting.³⁴

Table 6.1 African Ratifications of Human Rights Treaties

<i>Country</i>	<i>ICERD¹</i>	<i>ICCPR²</i>	<i>Opt Prot³</i>	<i>ICESCR⁴</i>	<i>Torture⁵</i>	<i>CEDAW⁶</i>	<i>CRC⁷</i>
Algeria	x	x	x	x	x (28)	x	x
Angola		x	x	x		x	x
Benin	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Burkina Faso	x					x	x
Burundi	x	x		x	x	x	x
Cameroon	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Cape Verde	x	x		x	x	x	x
Comoros	s					x	x
Congo (DRC)		x	x	x	x	x	x
Congo (Republic)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Côte d'Ivoire	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Djibouti						x	x
Egypt	x	x		x	x	x	x
Equatorial Guinea		x	x	x	x	x	x
Eritrea	x					x	x
Ethiopia	x	x		x	x	x	x
Gabon	x	x		x	s	x	x
Gambia	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ghana	x					x	x
Guinea	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Guinea-Bissau	x			x	x	x	x
Kenya	x	x		x	x	x	x
Lesotho	x	x		x	x	x	x
Liberia	x	s		s	x	x	x
Libya	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Madagascar	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Malawi	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Mali	x	x		x	x	x	x
Mauritania	x						x
Mauritius	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Morocco		x		x	x	x	x
Mozambique	x	x				x	x
Namibia	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Niger	x	x	x	x	x		x
Nigeria	x	x		x	s	x	x
Rwanda	x	x		x	x	x	x
São Tomé	x	s		s	x	x	x
Senegal	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Seychelles	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Sierra Leone	x	x	x	x	s	x	x
Somalia	x	x	x	x	x		

Country	ICERD ¹	ICCPR ²	Opt Prot ³	ICESCR ⁴	Torture ⁵	CEDAW ⁶	CRC ⁷
South Africa	x	x		s	x	x	x
Sudan	x	x		x	x		x
Swaziland	x						x
Tanzania	x	x		x	x	x	x
Togo	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Tunisia	x	x		x	x	x	x
Uganda	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Zambia	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Zimbabwe	x	x		x	x	x	x
Total	44 + 1s	40 + 2s	23	39 + 3s	39 + 3s	46	49

Source: untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/part/chapterIV.htm (accessed June 15, 2002).

Note: s = signed but not yet ratified; x = country is a party, through ratification, accession or succession.

¹International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

²International Covenant on Civil and Political Liberties

³Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (this permits the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider nonanonymous communications alleging abridgements of rights under the Covenant)

⁴International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

⁵Convention against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

⁶Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

⁷Convention on the Rights of the Child

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude with summary points of the advantages and limitations of rights-based NGO strategies as a means of conflict resolution in contemporary Africa.

Advantages

- NGOs can provide an avenue for international support and involvement. Sometimes governments find it more acceptable to get support indirectly from NGOs as opposed to directly from other governments.
- Through their communication networks,³⁵ NGOs can tap into global advocacy networks, which may have greater credibility than governments. These advocacy networks may be able to influence not only major powers but the "target" regimes as well. Capacity building can also be pursued through these linkages.

Disadvantages

- NGOs have an urban focus³⁶ and possibly a class or political bias.³⁷ As a result, they may have a limited impact and thus affect a relatively small number of people, despite the fact that their objective is for nondiscriminatory treatment for all.
- The focus by NGOs on individuals may not satisfy groups who are seeking either collective rights or recognition of systematic deprivations.
- Where “political” solutions are necessary, NGOs can bring only influence, not power, to the bargaining table.

What, then, is the “bottom line” with respect to the roles of human rights NGOs with respect to conflict reduction in Africa?

Certain nongovernment organizations have become directly involved in alleviating the consequences of conflict. Humanitarian assistance and development aid from external donors have been channeled increasingly through African NGOs. However, the local organizations remain the junior partners, dependent on grants and contracts. What one harsh critic tagged the “famine industry” has become prominent in disaster-ridden areas such as the eastern Congo, the Horn of Africa, Sierra Leone, and Angola, perhaps even at the cost of human rights.³⁸ I do not intend to denigrate the life-saving importance of what generous givers have provided. The situations with which they are dealing are, by anyone’s calculations, human catastrophes. They represent the total failure of state policy, a culmination of human rights abuses compounded by personal ambition, ethnic or regional rivalries, environmental distress, and economic marginality.

Other African NGOs have been drawn into development activities, largely as subordinate partners with aid-giving Western NGOs and governments. Their activities can, with time, alleviate some gross imbalances in levels of economic well-being. They will contribute to improved human rights conditions, for all have the right—in the words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDRH)—to social security, work, rest and leisure, a standard of well-being, and education. The ringing affirmations of the UDHR were considerably vitiated in the subsequent years, however. By ratifying the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the countries of

Africa pledged something milder. The covenant obliges each of them to “undertake to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means.” It is hard to imagine more convoluted language! Little has been accomplished under the ICESCR in terms of improving economic and social conditions. In light of the well-justified belief of African leaders that their continent deserves reparations for centuries of exploitation, the strong African support for the “right to development” seems obvious.³⁹ Given the close association of protection of human rights with higher levels of economic development and more equitable distribution of resources, “development” seems to remain a singularly important need south of the Sahara. Despite the marginal position of Africa in terms of world trade and its generally low levels of affluence, attention to development and economic rights seems salutary.

Finally, attention was focused on racism—an area of particular concern to Africa but certainly not confined to it—through the August 2001 World Conference against Racism and its associated Forum for NGOs, both held in Durban, South Africa. While governments were represented in the conference, NGOs participated vigorously in the forum. The complex interactions between them require more historical perspective than can be provided here, however.

What we are seeing, in broad terms, is a domestication of African human rights NGOs, linked with the globalization of human rights as a factor in international relations. Advocacy networks that were once confined to developed Western states have spread across all continents. We cannot claim that a global civil society exists in full, but its rudiments can be discerned. Nonstate actors now play recognized, important roles on the world stage. Although African human rights NGOs remain small, minimally funded, and faced with often-hostile social and political environments, they must not be overlooked as instruments of conflict resolution or, better, of conflict prevention. If rights-protective societies come to exist south of the Sahara, with governments truly dedicated to equitable treatment for all, the wrenching civil wars that have wracked all too many will be matters of historical interest rather than current concern.

NOTES

1. Peter J. Spiro, "New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making Institutions," *Washington Quarterly* 18 (1995): 45–56.

2. "Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action," UN Document A/CONF.157/23, July 12 1993, paragraph 5.

3. Harry M. Scoble, "Human Rights NGOs in Black Africa: Their Problems and Prospects in the Wake of the Banjul Charter," in *Human Rights and Development in Africa*, ed. Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Ronald I. Meltzer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 177.

4. Laurie S. Wiseberg, *Protecting Human Rights Defenders: The Importance of Freedom of Association for Human Rights NGOs* (Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 1993), 4.

5. Claude E. Welch Jr., *Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Strategies and Roles of Non-governmental Organizations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 50–69.

6. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). They distinguish three types of networks: those with essential instrumental goals, often economically based; those with shared causal ideas, such as scientific groups or epistemic communities; and transnational advocacy networks, based primarily on shared values. They summarize four campaigns that started "with an idea that was almost unimaginable, even by its early proponents." These cases include international pressures for the abolition of slavery in the United States, 1833–1865; a movement that was a "notable success," in which transnational linkage politics proved valuable; the international movement for woman suffrage, which led to "surprisingly rapid results" (58); the campaign against foot binding in China, 1874–1911, which similarly showed "very rapid progress" as well as "a pattern characteristic of modern networks, where both foreign and domestic actors were crucial to the success of the campaign"; and finally, the far less successful 1923–1931 campaign against "female circumcision" in Kenya, in which this form of violence against women (to use the contemporary term) became associated with Kikuyu nationalism. This campaign "became a symbol for colonial attempts to impose outside values and rules upon the population" (70).

7. See, as one example, Claude E. Welch Jr., "Mobilizing Morality: The World Council of Churches and Its Program to Combat Racism, 1969–1994," *Human Rights Quarterly* 23 (2001), 863–910.

8. Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*, 24.

9. Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," *International Organization* 44 (1990): 479–526; quotations in this paragraph from p. 485.

10. David Rieff, "The Precious Triumph of Human Rights," *New York Times Magazine*, August 8, 1999, 36–41.

11. The process received a further boost with the 1948 adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, accepted without negative vote by the United Nations General Assembly. In 1965, it adopted the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). The following year, the General Assembly had endorsed two International Covenants, on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Other specific agreements followed, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). NGOs were influential in all these efforts. The Organization of African Unity stepped into the act as well, adopting the (relatively weak) African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981); earlier, the Council of Europe and the Organization of American States had adopted regional conventions on human rights (respectively in 1951 and 1978). All these treaty regimes, from ICERD and the two international covenants on, had elected committees of independent experts that monitored states' performance, primarily on the basis of reports from the ratifying countries.

12. See, for example, the report by Michael Banton, chair of the United Nations' Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Banton criticized the committee's inadequate analysis of the report submitted by Rwanda a few months before the 1994 genocide erupted. Michael Banton, *International Action against Racial Discrimination* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

13. Robert William Fogel, *Without Consent or Contract: The Rise of American Slavery* (New York: Norton, 1989), 212, 217, 227; cited in Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*, 44.

14. These groups were studied by anthropologists and sociologists working in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly after World War II. Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (New York: New York University Press, 1957), 85.

15. For example, national standards were established for curricula; funding was to be provided by the national governments; and final say over teachers would also come from states.

16. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg Jr., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 7.

17. Two did step aside of their own will—Leopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal and Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon. Otherwise, the first generation of African leaders died in office (as witness, Sékou Touré of Guinea, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire) by military intervention or popular uprising (as witness, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana,

Sylvanus Olympio of Togo, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and Nigeria's political elite), or were pushed out from below (much less common).

18. Two excellent examples are Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State* (London: James Currey, 1992); and Jean-François Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly* (London: Longman, 1993; originally published in French in 1989).

19. A good example is the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA) of Ethiopia, concerned with providing material resources for emergencies and supporting rehabilitation and development. See Welch, *Protecting Human Rights in Africa*, 278–79.

20. Susan Dicklitch, *The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa: Lessons from Uganda* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998), 8–9. Dicklitch finds more useful a threefold division among voluntary organizations, people's organizations ("grassroots NGOs"), and "gap fillers" (which are public service contractors and are market driven rather than value driven). This concern with filling gaps is particularly significant in sub-Saharan countries.

21. Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly*, January 1994. During my field work in Africa in 1993–1994, this article became the focus of intense discussion in many Western embassies.

22. For two of the best, see Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Richard Joseph, ed., *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

23. Terje Tvedt, *Angels of Mercy or Development Diplomats? NGOs and Foreign Aid* (Trenton N.J.: Africa World Press, 1998), 69.

24. Tvedt, *Angels of Mercy*, 70.

25. Mobilization of shame, based on information collected, vetted, and disseminated by NGOs, represents far and away the most important strategy for NGO action. Although "gap filler" NGOs act in lacunae of state action in the protection of human rights, most human rights NGOs are much more concerned with their promotion.

26. The "international bill of human rights" refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The UDHR was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 and is mentioned in the constitutions of numerous African states. The ICESCR and the ICCPR were adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and entered into force by 1976. In addition, one should note such global instruments as ICERD, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. One should also note regional treaties such as the African Charter on Hu-

man and People's Rights (ratified by all African states save Morocco, which withdrew from the Organization of African Unity as a result of the Organization's recognition of the Saharawi Democratic Arab Republic as a member). See table 6.1 for ratifications.

27. According to Keba Mbaye:

En fait, l'Afrique traditionnelle a bien un droit et connaît un système cohérent de droits de l'homme. Bien sûr, ce système baigne dans une philosophie différent de celle qui a inspiré la Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen.

In fact, traditional Africa certainly has laws and a coherent system of human rights. To be sure, this system was based upon a philosophy different from that which inspired the [French] Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. [My translation.]

Keba Mbaye, *Les droits de l'homme en Afrique* (Paris: A. Pedone, 1992), 54. For an early discussion of this topic, see Lakshman Marasinghe, "Traditional Conceptions of Human Rights in Africa," in *Human Rights and Development in Africa*, ed. Claude E. Welch Jr. and Ronald I. Meltzer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 32–45.

28. However, I must emphasize that "peoples" are not perceived in ethnic terms, but in terms of those eligible for self-determination—and in particular colonized peoples. Articles 19–24 of the African Charter list these rights. Also noteworthy are the articles dealing with the duties of individuals, far more strongly expressed in this document than in any other human rights agreement. For example, each has the duty not only "to respect and consider his fellow being without discrimination" (article 28), but also "to preserve and strengthen the national independence and the territorial integrity of his country . . . to pay taxes imposed by law in the interest of the society . . . [and] to preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with other members of the society" (article 29, 5–7).

29. Karl Joseph Partsch, "The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination," in *The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal*, ed. Philip Alston (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 347.

30. This paragraph is drawn from Claude Welch, "Ratifying and Implementing ICERD: Weaknesses in State Reporting," in *Rendering Justice to the Vulnerable: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Theo van Boven*, ed. Fons Coomans et al. (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000), 283–92.

31. In fact, "traditional" leaders represent attitudes human rights advocates often wish to change, including their stress on turning to past practice for moral guidance, even if "tradition" is marked by sexism and other forms of discrimination against individuals or groups.

32. Makau Mutua, "A Critical Evaluation of NGOs," in *NGOs and Human Rights: Promise and Performance*, ed. Claude E. Welch Jr. (Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000). Also see, by the same author, *Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002).

33. Some details can be found in Welch, *NGOs and Human Rights*. The African Commission on Human and People's Rights has received more support from external donors, including Scandinavian sources, than from the parent Organization of African Unity itself.

34. An excellent recent example comes in "The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and Torture," prepared by Human Rights Watch (New York) and CLEEN (Centre for Law Enforcement and Education, Lagos, Nigeria).

35. For a series of interesting examples, see Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*. Korey quotes Eleanor Roosevelt's reference to a "curious grapevine" of links among NGOs as one of their chief strengths. William Korey, *NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "A Curious Grapevine"* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998).

36. This weakness is more likely to characterize human rights NGOs than development or relief-oriented NGOs, whose area of operations is most likely rural.

37. Although human rights organizations bristle at the charge, the concentration of many on civil and political rights seems far removed from helping with the basic needs—food, shelter, employment—although a human rights approach does reduce threats of torture, disappearance, or extrajudicial execution.

38. Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa* (London: African Rights and the International African Institute in association with James Currey, 1997).

39. The intellectual father of the "right to development" is the eminent Senegal jurist Keba Mbaye, former chair of the International Commission of Jurists and judge on the International Court of Justice. Background on the right to development appears in Mbaye, *Droits de l'homme*, 197–209.

Conflict Resolution: A Methodology for Assessing Internal Collapse and Recovery

Pauline H. Baker, The Fund for Peace

This chapter is a logical extension of the chapter by Claude Welch in that it describes an initiative by a nongovernmental organization, The Fund for Peace, Washington D.C., which works to prevent war and alleviate the conditions that cause conflict. Pauline Baker, president of The Fund for Peace in Washington, D.C., explains a conceptual model designed by her organization to help anticipate and assess countries at risk of internal conflict and state collapse. The model, which relies on methodologies drawn from both the sciences and the humanities, highlights the importance of political legitimacy. It shows how a nongovernmental organization can blend scholarship and practice to contribute to new approaches toward the reduction of conflict.

In 1994, President Bill Clinton spoke to the victims of the genocide in Rwanda. He voiced his regret that the world, including the United States, had failed to respond in timely fashion to the horrors engulfing the people of this African nation. He called on the international community to “establish a system, hopefully through the United Nations, which gives us an early warning system, that gives us the means to go in and try to stop these things from happening before they start.”¹

The Fund for Peace is a nongovernmental organization working to prevent war and alleviate the conditions that cause conflict. As part of this effort, it is establishing the kind of system of which President Clinton spoke. To this end, it has developed an analytical model of internal conflict and state collapse.² Although there are other ways to forecast trends, this model significantly improves the ability of the international community to anticipate and respond to impending catastrophes.³

This chapter has three goals. First, it addresses the problem of internal war. It explains the need for accurate and timely warnings in addition to the importance of state building in conflict resolution and management.⁴ Second, it provides a general overview of the model developed by the fund. Third, it briefly suggests how the model may be applied to conflict in Africa.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Small Wars

The post-Cold War period has seen the eruption of a series of internal conflicts that are sometimes called “small wars” and sometimes called “internal” or “ethnic wars.”⁵ Conflicts of this sort present enormous challenges to the international community. They are unusually lethal—civilians make up approximately 90 percent of the casualties—and they are exceptionally hard to resolve. What is the source of these conflicts? And why are they a problem that should concern us?

According to the U.S. Department of State, approximately one hundred armed conflicts erupted worldwide between 1994 and 1998. Of these, some thirty-five were based on internal disputes among groups fighting for identity-based goals.⁶ Some observers maintain that such wars are diminishing in number. Others, however, argue that it is premature to be complacent about such conflicts, that many are of long duration and still pose a problem, and that their numbers are indeed increasing. By one estimate, of the twenty-seven armed conflicts in 1999, all but two were primarily internal in nature.⁷ Despite the name “small wars,” the threat they pose is far from small.⁸ Such conflicts range from Chechnya to Chiapas. They are threatening the security of nations large and small, rich and poor, north and south, old and new. While the international community has not reached a consensus on how to respond to them beyond a case-by-case review, they collectively represent one of the most significant security challenges of our time.⁹

The reasons are compelling. First, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, more people have died from internal conflict (some estimates put the total as high as four million) than from international terrorism and interstate wars combined. This figure includes the death toll since Septem-

ber 11, 2001.¹⁰ The main casualties are typically the most vulnerable members of society. The ratio of civilian-to-military casualties in these conflicts is about nine to one. Most of the civilians, furthermore, are women, children, the poor, and the weak.¹¹ Internal wars have sprung up on every continent; they have destabilized regions far beyond their borders; they have challenged the capacities of international and non-governmental institutions; and they have spawned crime, disease, and radical political movements.

Internal conflicts are also intrinsically difficult to resolve. Fractional leaders mobilize followers by stressing the narrow identities that balkanize societies. They also exploit group grievances, which means that participants in an internal war have a tendency to shift loyalties easily. Factions are quick to form new alliances; it depends on what they see as in their best self-interest at the time.¹² The complexity of internal conflicts also makes it harder for those interested in preventing them to anticipate catastrophes and to develop effective policy responses.

Another major problem is the lack of suitable mechanisms for conflict resolution. Conflicts between states are often solved using such traditional means as treaties, mediation, or foreign aid. These means, however, may not be applicable where the conflict is an internal one. The reason is that in such conflicts, the state itself often abandons or forfeits its traditional role of protecting its own citizens. When the state is disintegrating, regimes either cannot or will not serve as peacemaker and protector, and they are often not amenable to normal diplomatic appeals. Indeed, the state is typically converted into a tool of one person, group, or faction, becoming a predatory instrument of group repression. This scenario occurred in Rwanda in 1994, as René Lemarchand illustrates so effectively in chapter 5. In this tragic conflict, eight hundred thousand people fell victim to "ethnic cleansing" in less than four months. Forty percent of the population in Rwanda was either killed or displaced from this bloodletting.

When complex humanitarian emergencies develop and when the scale of human suffering reaches intolerable levels, the international community is usually called upon to intervene. This syndrome has occurred so often that there is increasing resistance to intervention, especially since it has in many cases backfired or proved to be of short-lived value. Experiences like Somalia implant permanent images of failure in

the minds of sensitive publics, undermining domestic political support for peacekeeping.

In truth, the response of the international community to internal conflicts has varied widely. It is often based on the assumption, or hope, that the intervention will be the final one. Policy makers frequently put off dealing seriously with looming crises until they no longer can ignore it. In other words, when the carnage mounts, regional stability is threatened; the media broadcasts the suffering into people's living rooms; and the elites can no longer stand aloof from the controversy. By then, intervention is costly, difficult, and risky.

NGOs offer a range of programs to prevent the outbreak of violence and heal the wounds afterward. These plans include "citizen diplomacy"; training and education to strengthen civil society; dispute resolution and reconciliation techniques; and supplying relief and rehabilitation services. Human rights groups, as discussed by Claude Welch in the previous chapter, play a leading role by exposing egregious abuses and by insisting on the apprehension and prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities. But NGOs cannot prevent the widespread outbreak of violence if such ameliorating influences fail and if they cannot stop the fighting once it breaks out. Enormous resources, of a sort available only to governments and international organizations, are needed to solve the problem at this stage.

Military intervention, if and when it takes place, is delicate and complex. In contrast to conventional military operations, protecting civilians in peace operations is not simply a secondary objective. Protecting civilians and creating "a safe and secure environment" is *the* major military mission. In addition, while there may be hostile forces, there is no "enemy" as such. The objective is not to "defeat" opponents, but to contain their capabilities and bring them to negotiations. Opposing militias may be disarmed and demobilized but not necessarily asked to "surrender." Local armed forces, including those that may have committed atrocities, are not wiped out on the battlefield or always brought to justice. To obtain a peace settlement, they are often integrated into a postconflict army, a political party structure, or a power-sharing arrangement in which they have representation and, in some cases, core control after internationally managed elections that legitimize them. This scenario occurred in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In short, internal conflicts are not only extraordinarily bloody; they also pose great political challenges.

Warning Problems

In order to deal with such conflicts in an effective manner, policy makers must be able to anticipate and assess which conflicts are most likely to become violent and which may be capable of being resolved peacefully. Armed with this knowledge, policy makers will be in a better position to take preventive action and prepare for a mission, if a military role is deemed necessary.

Some observers have argued that we already have adequate early warning from humanitarian workers, human rights organizations, diplomats, and international organizations on the ground. But do these meet the needs of a decision maker trying to decide what to do? Do the warnings come early enough to avert mass violence? And do academic studies provide relevant answers for the practitioner?

Most approaches to the study of internal conflict and state collapse fall into four general categories. First, a number of studies shed light on the historical origins of internal wars and the root causes of war. These studies consider, for example, colonialism or a country's record of discrimination against disadvantaged groups.¹³ Second, focusing on issues of critical importance, such as the treatment of minorities, are government-sponsored operational guidelines for government analysts and military commanders as well as government-sponsored studies and surveys.¹⁴ A third body of work, conducted by think tanks and research institutes, is geared to the objectives of funding agencies, such as U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or the intelligence community.¹⁵ Finally, high-profile public commissions and studies aim at influencing elites and strengthening public awareness of deadly conflict.¹⁶

Each of these approaches has enriched our understanding of the phenomenon of international conflict, but limitations remain. All too often, the warnings sound the alarm too late. They occur after or just before mass violence has broken out, when the military option is the only alternative left. Early warning should alert the international community before the dispute ignites, in sufficient time to respond to it, hopefully without the military. In addition, most existing studies are overly general; they lack policy relevance; they verify the obvious; and they are of limited practical utility. They tend to rely on quantitative techniques, disregarding key variables that are not always subject to precise statistical verification.¹⁷ Such approaches oversimplify complex situations;

they do not provide an analytical framework; and they suffer from definitional disorder.

A SOLUTION: AN EARLY WARNING MODEL

Methodology

To remedy problems before they lead to open confrontation, The Fund for Peace model provides a means for analysts to determine more accurately, and with a fair amount of lead time, what level of risk states may face, what trends can be identified, and what sectors might be targeted. The model defines its terms in a clear and unambiguous fashion, and it avoids relying solely upon quantitative evidence, which is, in any event, frequently unavailable or unreliable in collapsing states.

Qualitative and Quantitative Evidence

Why should we use both qualitative and quantitative evidence in determining which societies are at risk? Although many political scientists are wary of relying on the judgments of individual experts, area expertise is vitally important for assessing the significance of variables for unstable societies. Quantitative measures can have different meanings in different situations; area expertise is needed to provide that context and the specific cultural understanding necessary for interpreting such data. Moreover, certain signs of impending violence do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis. Mythmaking, discussed earlier in this work by René Lemarchand (chapter 5), is a case in point. It cannot be measured precisely. It nonetheless contributes to hate mongering, stereotyping, and prejudice, all of which fuel ethnic conflict.

Premises

A word is also necessary about our premises and rationale. The model utilized by The Fund for Peace is based on the premise that internal conflict is a pathology of the state. We argue that ethnicity is frequently the result, not the cause, of state collapse.¹⁸ When a state begins to fall apart and is unable or unwilling to meet the needs of its people, citizens seek protection from, and shift their loyalties to, other groups for physical,

economic, or psychological satisfaction. Traditional identities are a familiar and secure refuge in an insecure environment. The stress placed on traditional loyalties in such situations by demagogic leaders is thus a useful strategy for enhancing their chances for achieving power, and it fuels ethnic nationalism that can lead to state collapse. The focus of the analyst in early warning, therefore, should be on identifying the key pathological signs of state decay, not merely the resulting ethnic clashes.

The methodology used in our model for identifying such signs is borrowed from the field of medicine. Diagnosing the seriousness of an internal political conflict may be likened to the process of diagnosing chronic physical disease. In autoimmune diseases such as lupus, for example, there are no conclusive physical tests for a positive diagnosis. Instead, physicians look for clusters of known symptoms, some of which are verifiable through physical tests, some only observable by expert assessment.

A fixed number of indicators need not always be present for a physician to make a positive diagnosis. Nor does the presence of any one symptom conclusively mean that the disease is present. Similarly, in political analysis, a country may be in critical danger even if some typical signs of decay are not present. Conversely, the presence of one sign does not automatically mean that a country is in serious trouble.

Physicians warn of danger when their patients display an overall trend of worsening symptoms of the illness. Accordingly, one may warn of an impending political catastrophe when a trend worsens, based on clusters of known social, political, and economic indicators. Just as physicians evaluate recovery or remission from a disease by the disappearance or reduction of certain indicators, one may assess state recovery by the reduction or reversal of the social, economic, and political/military indicators of state decay.

Definitions

It is clear from this background that state building is at the heart of our strategy to resolve conflict.¹⁹ It is important to note, however, that we are not advocating an aggressive “nation-building” or a statist approach. Nor are we emphasizing wholesale democratization along the lines suggested by Ali Mazrui (chapter 2) and others earlier in this work.

Nation-building involves rehabilitating the economy and civil society. These goals are laudable ones, but they are also more ambitious than what is called for in the short term. Democracy is the political system best suited to settle differences nonviolently in the long term, and it should be a goal of policy. However, it takes time for democracy to take root. Other outcomes that fall short of democracy, but which are stepping stones toward that goal, may conceivably avert mass violence in the short term.

Instead, what we advocate is the achievement of a more modest but necessary goal: sustainable security, the ability of a society to solve its own problems peacefully without an external administrative or military presence. The standard by which one measures sustainable security is the existence of the “immutable core” of a state. Four key institutions must be functioning professionally for lasting security in a recovered state:

1. a competent and professional domestic police force and corrections system,
2. a professional civil service,
3. an independent judicial system based on the rule of law, and
4. a professional and disciplined military accountable to a legitimate civilian authority.

These institutions must be “autonomous.” By that we mean that they must not be dominated, or perceived to be dominated, by competing parties, factions, or groups in society. Once these basic core institutions are professionalized and in place, further steps toward democratization can be made beyond the initial political settlement. Without these steps, however, democratization will have weak foundations and may not last.²⁰

The Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework offered in this methodology provides a graphic portrayal of the life cycle of a conflict, allowing analysts a way to monitor a conflict as it deteriorates or as it recovers to the point of sustainable security. It comprises five stages of conflict and a major decision point. It also includes suggestions as to what the international community can do to help resolve or reduce the problem each step of

the way. A diagram of the conceptual framework that lies at the heart of this analysis is depicted in figure 7.1.

Stage 1: Root Causes

Stage 1 refers to the root causes of conflict, and these may be historical. For example, as noted by Anthony Clayton and Julius Nyang'oro in chapters 3 and 4, colonialism is obviously a root cause of conflict on the African continent. Root causes may also be structural. One might point here to Ali Mazrui's interesting discussion in chapter 2 of the significance of dual-versus-plural societies.

Stage 2: Immediate Causes

Stage 2 refers to the proximate events that spark conflict. Immediate causes are time-bound and enormously varied. For example, conflict was triggered in the Ivory Coast and many other countries in Africa by armies protesting about not being paid. Other events that may spark conflict include assassinations, military coups d'états, national strikes, and collapsed currencies.




Figure 7.1. Stages of Conflict

Critical Decision Point

If the situation continues to worsen, societies often find themselves reaching a decision point in which they stand at a crossroads. While in practice there are many decision points, there is frequently one moment of decision that is a critical one, underscoring the pivotal role of local leaders. In Nigeria, for example, the decision by former military dictator Sani Abacha to have five political parties all nominate him for an election in 1998 united the opposition and led the public to conclude that there was no constitutional way to deal with the problem of his removal. His action dealt the final blow to those seeking a legitimate electoral process. Shortly thereafter, Abacha died under mysterious circumstances with no autopsy performed. This series of events led to an interim military regime, the election of General Olusegun Obasanjo, and the installation of a far less repressive regime. Abacha's electoral decision could just as easily have led to open confrontation and political collapse, a likely scenario had he lived. For this reason, some commentators have speculated that Abacha's death was not due to natural causes alone.

Stage 3: State Transition

As this example shows, the decision point is when a society is poised to go in one of two directions: a violent or nonviolent track. For the nonviolent track (represented by the lower horizontal branch in the diagram), diplomacy, power sharing, and other solutions may avert bloodshed, and the state may reform. On the other hand, if reforms are not adopted, the society will likely lapse into violence, moving toward full-scale conflict, secession, ethnic cleansing, or state disintegration, represented by the higher horizontal branch on the model. Either way, at stage 3, transition is underway, and there is no way to reestablish the status quo ante. Subsequent events will result in an altered state.

Stage 4: Transformation of the State

In stage 4, the conflict has either moved toward disorder in the violent track or moved to a new political order in the nonviolent track. If a violent transformation happens, it may result in military victory, ethnic domination, warlordism, or ongoing conflict, as in Somalia. If a nonvi-

olent transformation happens, it may result in elections, peaceful partition, conflict resolution, or new state structures, as in South Africa.

Stage 5: Outcome

Stage 5 represents the outcome, a phase that is depicted by a continuum bounded at one end by chaos and at the other by constitutionalism. Obviously, several other possible outcomes fall between the two options, including military rule, benevolent dictatorship, or a one-party state.

In this model, a country will not necessarily remain fixed in any one place. It moves up and down the continuum in stage 5 until it reaches equilibrium, or it can go back and forth between stages, advancing or regressing to another stage. Mozambique is an example of a country that seems to have successfully reached sustainable security as a representative democracy while Angola's peace settlements for decades have been too fragile to sustain. With the death of rebel leader Jonas Savimbi, Angola's chances for sustainable security have vastly improved, but they are not inevitable. Angola is a country whose risk of violence needs to be closely monitored.

The Role of the International Community

The international community has a potential role to play at every stage. The first two stages provide it with an opportunity to have early warning. It is during these first two stages that preventive diplomacy is most likely to be effective, such as in the form of nonmilitary actions taken by official or unofficial groups in advance of an impending crisis to prevent or limit violence. In stage 3, the international community may be called upon to engage in peace enforcement or peacemaking. Peace enforcement involves the application of military force or a credible threat of force to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Peacemaking may be defined as the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement to end a dispute. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are appropriate methods during the stage of state transformation; in stage 5, the international community can assist in postconflict economic and political integration.

In sum, the model allows one to monitor a conflict as it hovers between war and peace. A crisis may be “rescued” by preventive diplomacy, or it may “backslide” from a nonviolent to a violent track. Angola has moved back and forth between war and peace initiatives, locked between the decision point and stage 3, a condition of unending instability since independence. In the post-Savimbi era, it has a reasonable chance of moving into a zone of peace.

Indicators of State Collapse

Indicators enable an analyst to assess the risk of collapse or mass violence at any stage in the life cycle of a conflict. In The Fund for Peace model, twelve key indicators were identified as critical variables based on historical comparative analysis of conflicts worldwide. These indicators collectively provide a snapshot of the state at one moment in time, just as a doctor’s examination provides a diagnosis of a patient’s physical condition at a point in time. Succeeding snapshots or examinations can be used to assess trends—that is, to determine whether conditions are getting better or worse. To establish a trend line, indicators should be applied over several stages in the life cycle. Indicators are assessed, or “rated,” on a scale of zero to ten, with zero signifying that the indicator is not present at all and with ten signifying that it is the highest or most intense. It is not possible to identify a threshold rating representing a “breaking point” for all societies. Conditions vary from country to country. However, the greater the number and intensity of these indicators and the higher their scores, the greater the risk of internal conflict and violence.

Some indicators may be measured quantitatively; for others, statistical measurement is either not available or not reliable. In those cases, observation of relevant data by experts must be used to draw an informed judgment about the presence and intensity of the indicator. The key indicators—as divided into social, economic, and political/military categories—are as follows:

Social Indicators

- Mounting demographic pressures
- Massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons, creating complex humanitarian emergencies

- Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia
- Chronic and sustained human flight

Economic Indicators

- Uneven economic development along group lines
- Sharp or severe economic decline

Political/Military Indicators

- Criminalization or delegitimization of the state
- Progressive deterioration of public services
- Suspension or arbitrary applications of the rule of law and widespread violation of human rights
- Security apparatus operates as a “state within a state”
- Rise of factionalized elites
- Intervention of other states or external political actors

APPLICATION: THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

These indicators, when they come in clusters and appear severe, provide clear early warning of a state on the road to violence and perhaps collapse. A brief look at Africa will help illustrate this point, and it will also provide the reader with a greater understanding of the nuances of the problem.

Social Indicators

Demographic pressures, as Anthony Clayton noted earlier in this book (chapter 3), clearly have played a role in conflicts past and present on the African continent. Demographic pressures, it must be remembered, do not simply refer to the growth of population relative to food supply. Other factors are conflict inducing, such as the following:

- Ethnic location—spatial distribution of ethnic groups and the relationship between settlement patterns and other forms of human and physical activity.

- Territory—groups' attachment to land.
- Environment—the relationship between ethnic groups and their physical settings.²¹

For example, high population density in Rwanda and competition over resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have both fueled conflicts in the Great Lakes region.

Refugees have also been a rather obvious source of tension and conflict in Africa. Refugees increase population density and cause environmental degradation, land competition, disease, food shortages, and lack of clean water, thus generating conflict and violence across borders. The problem is widespread, and combatants often hide among civilians on the run. One could cite examples from war-torn regions from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa. The most striking example, however, is again the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. Five countries—Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania—were affected by the two million refugees who were displaced in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Failure to resolve this crisis contributed to fears of ethnic reprisals, renewed bloodletting, and continuing turmoil throughout the region, thereby drawing in the involvement of countries as far afield as Libya and Zimbabwe. Though the roots of conflict were deep, the immediate problem stemmed from armed Hutu extremists who participated in the genocidal killings and who were determined to return to power. Using the refugee camps as their bases, they further destabilized Rwanda, their principal target. They also, in varying degrees, destabilized the surrounding countries, especially Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Massive, chronic, and sustained human flight is a slightly different problem from that mentioned earlier in our discussion of refugees. Here we are not speaking of a mass exodus of forcibly displaced persons, but rather a slower and broader pattern of people voluntarily on the move. This mass departure is a “brain drain” characterized by a middle-class exodus—that is, the flight of skilled professionals, intellectuals, artists, technicians, and other economically productive segments of the population, including entrepreneurs, businesspeople, artisans, and traders. When productive and intelligent people think they cannot live in their own country anymore, it is a clear sign of incipient conflict.

A legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia underlies many conflicts. In the Great Lakes region, Hutu–Tutsi divisions sparked the current round of violence and became entangled with other ethnic grievances in the region. These divisions were rooted in precolonial history and were clearly worsened by colonial policies. But large-scale communal violence did not erupt in Rwanda until 1959. Continuing into the 1990s, it culminated in the genocide of 1994. Hutu extremists were determined to avenge their overthrow by the Tutsi-led government, while the government was equally determined to bring the Hutu killers to justice. Mythmaking, as René Lemarchand has made clear, was at work, with both sides demonizing the other and therefore creating more paranoia.

Economic Indicators

Both Anthony Clayton and Julius Nyang'oro stressed *uneven economic development* as a fundamental root cause of violence in Africa in the contemporary world. The case of Nigeria suggests another interesting dimension of the problem. Here uneven economic development occurred in part along the same lines as ethnic divisions and thus contributed to ethnic nationalism. The advanced educational and economic status of the Ibos was not commensurate with their political power (i.e., a root cause of communal conflict).²² A 1966 coup d'état led by Ibo military officers was the precipitating event that triggered pogroms against Ibo civilians living in northern towns. These killings led to the Biafran war of secession (1967–1970). The degree to which ethnic inequalities can be the basis for ethnonationalist mobilization has not been sufficiently recognized by local elites' pursuing economic modernization or by international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which play a major role in promoting economic restructuring. In divided societies, the effects of economic policies on intergroup relations need to be taken more into account. In Nigeria, the rise of *shari'a* (Islamic law) in the northern states has deepened historical divisions, including destabilizing economic and political disparities.

Sharp and severe economic distress is a common indicator of political instability. The survival of weak states is often contingent on the ability of ruling elites to manage the economy and improve the standard

of living of the people. Progressive economic deterioration, for example, undermined political stability in Nigeria, with the collapse of the national currency, the *naira*. Any serious evaluation of economic distress in collapsing societies must also take into account the nature and scope of the hidden economy, including diverted public assets, drug money, and illegal capital flight from seemingly legitimate commercial transactions.

Political/Military Indicators

One of the most telling indicators of all is the *criminalization or delegitimization of the state*. When we speak of a criminalized or delegitimized state, we mean one that has ceased to serve its people, one that is regarded as an obstacle to people's welfare, and one that no longer claims the loyalty of its citizens. This scenario often occurs when ruling elites seek personal, political, and financial gain and no longer hold themselves accountable to the people. What are the signs of a delegitimized state? Not infrequently we see a sharp increase in crime, widespread government scandals, endemic corruption, profiteering by ruling elites, and massive evasion of taxes and military service. In Nigeria, the state lost legitimacy when the military got enormously rich from public oil revenues. Another sign of a delegitimized state is the emergence of dissidents who call for international economic sanctions against their own country, as happened in South Africa under apartheid and in Nigeria under Abacha's rule.

Progressive deterioration or elimination of public services is a symptom not merely of poor governance but, increasingly, of no governance whatsoever. We refer here not only to encrusted or inflated bureaucracies but to a disappearance of the state apparatus that serves the people. In Zaire, for example, Crawford Young noted that during the Mobutu era, "those segments of the state realm crucial to its survival and minimal reproduction—the security agencies, the presidential staff, the central bank, the diplomatic cadre—continue to operate." Public services, in contrast, were at their lowest level or nonexistent.²³ As a result, the state had lost "probity, competence, and credibility."²⁴ The case of Zaire illustrates how a collapsed state may drift into dissolution rather than experience a precipitous or explosive collapse, with the risk of violence accumulating over time rather than erupting at once. After the departure

of Mobutu, the Democratic Republic of the Congo lapsed into a prolonged civil war that gradually escalated and spread throughout the region, involving at least seven other African countries. In the short term, the slow collapse of Zaire got the international community off the hook since there was no immediate humanitarian crisis. Then, however, a crisis erupted in neighboring Rwanda. Failure to deal with the crisis in Zaire in the early stages postponed and exacerbated the problem, allowing the situation to fester and then spiral out of control.

Suspension of the rule of law is a standard indicator of dictatorial or authoritarian rule. It is also a leading indicator of failing states. Taken alone, the suspension of the rule of law does not presage state collapse. But it is particularly significant in societies in which there have been popular expectations of democratic change (Algeria) or in which democratic institutions have been undermined or suppressed (Nigeria). Moreover, adherence to the rule of law is an important measure of the viability and durability of newly constituted states in postconflict situations.

Another indicator of state collapse is the appearance of uncontrolled militias or situations in which *the security apparatus operates as a "state within a state."* This indicator has many manifestations. One sign of trouble is when we see isolated and unpopular rulers surrounding themselves by a Praetorian guard to protect them from their own people or perceived plots. Another is when "private" militias are organized by or against the state to terrorize political opponents or carry out assassinations. In military regimes, the security forces themselves often reflect the social divisions of their societies; the "state within a state" then becomes an "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military clique. Finally, two other indicators should be noted: the *rise of factionalized elites* and *foreign intervention* (economic, political, or military).²⁵

A Case Study: Nigeria in 1996

As we have already stressed, the mere presence of one or more of these indicators is not enough to indicate a state at immediate risk. We must factor into the equation the number and intensity of the indicators and whether or not there are effective mechanisms to deal with them. Before we conclude, therefore, let us turn briefly to one African state that at one moment in time illustrated this point.

Nigeria in 1996 provides an example of a country that revealed a cluster of dangerous symptoms. At that time, at least nine indicators had fairly high scores of intensity (a rating of six or more). The most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria is a country of approximately 120 million, consisting of roughly 250 language groups. Three populations predominate: the Hausa-Fulani, the Ibo, and the Yoruba, collectively constituting 60 percent of the population. The south (including the Ibo and Yoruba) is more economically advanced than the north.

In 1996, group grievances existed all around. Yorubas resented the imprisonment of a native son who had, in their view, won the 1993 election. Ibos were the principal victims of the 1967–1970 civil war. They lacked political power and lived in the most densely populated part of the country. The northern Hausa-Fulani resented the economic and educational advancement of the south. However, among the most aggrieved groups were the minority Ogoni people. These people had been agitating for their rights in the oil-rich southeast known as the Niger Delta.

An increasingly repressive and rapacious military junta lost legitimacy by stealing billions in public revenue, suspending democratic institutions, driving the economy into insolvency, executing political activists, and clamping down on political dissent. There was a steady pattern of capital and human flight, a deterioration of public services, a replacement of the rule of law by military decrees (which prohibited any military action from being challenged in a court), and a security apparatus around General Sani Abacha, which acted as a “state within a state,” or in this case, as “an army within an army.” Nigeria, in short, was a state in real danger of collapse. But its history revealed another important theme: the ability for a country to move to a less dangerous phase, then revert to a state of renewed instability. Nigeria hovered between breakdown and survival until a series of bizarre events—the deaths of Abacha and his principal rivals (Abiola and Yardaue, both of whom were in jail)—led to a rapid reshuffling at the top, a controversial election, and the installation of a new president. By 2000, Nigeria had pulled back from the brink and was now in a less ominous stage than it was four years before. But ethnic and religious nationalisms continued to erupt throughout the country with electoral democratization, exposing the accumulated legacies of state decay under Abacha and

other previous military dictators—thus creating a collective wound that will inevitably take years to heal.

CONCLUSION

While it is impossible to do more than provide the bare outlines of the model used by The Fund for Peace, it is to be hoped that this brief chapter has at least served to highlight the need for such a model and to suggest how it works. The model has been transferred to software and is being used by multinational organizations, governments, and research organizations (for more information, go to fundforpeace.org). It can be summarized as a framework for decision makers that provides early warning and assessment of societies at risk of collapse. International organizations, governments, intelligence analysts, scholars, researchers, and nongovernmental organizations may all find the model useful for their respective missions and research. It has the potential to do the following:

- Keep military involvement to a minimum by taking preventive action to stem the conflict at early stages
- Prepare for a peacemaking mission, if more direct involvement, including a military role, is ultimately required
- Assess the conditions under which sustainable security may be achieved so that military intervention can end
- Evaluate the likelihood of, and progress toward, long-term peace and security

The model should *not* be construed as a paradigm for all conflicts, a formula for predicting international humanitarian responses, or a mechanism for addressing questions of political will or national interest. Nor can it guarantee an appropriate policy response; that issue depends upon the public opinion, resources, and leadership at the time. What this analysis does offer is a conceptual framework and methodology for anticipating, monitoring, and assessing the responses to internal collapse.

We have a long way to go to bring order out of chaos, but we can now at least begin to bring some systematic thinking to the way in which we approach the problem. Whether this or any other methodology is used,

the world faces a new set of challenges that will require greater collaboration among practitioners, nongovernmental organizations, and academics, with a common framework of analysis. A model such as this one could be a way of bringing together such disparate groups to share information, interpretations, analyses, and recommendations, especially for Africa, which at the beginning of the twenty-first century has had half of the world's civil wars.

NOTES

1. Ironically, the record shows that there were many official and unofficial warnings of impending genocide, despite Clinton's statement. See Philip Gourevitch, "The Genocide Fax," *New Yorker*, May 11, 1998, 42–46.

2. Several people have contributed to this effort. The United States Institute of Peace funded the project. Col. Larry Forster, the former director of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), provided extraordinary support, both intellectually and logistically. Lieutenant Colonel Dan Miltenberger, also at PKI, provided valuable assistance in organizing the conference. PKI's work with The Fund represents the kind of creative collaboration between nongovernmental organizations and governmental agencies that can improve our capacity to understand and address problems of human survival in the post-Cold War world.

3. A preliminary report of the study is to be found in Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model," *Parameters* (spring 1996): 19–31. The study has also been published by The Fund for Peace. See Pauline H. Baker and Angeli E. Weller, *An Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse: Manual for Practitioners* (Washington, D.C.: The Fund for Peace, 1998).

4. The model was originally developed between 1994 and 1995, when I was a research associate and professional lecturer with the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. It was first published in *Parameters* (spring 1996) and applied in a graduate class taught at Georgetown University. After I joined The Fund for Peace in 1996, The Fund worked collaboratively with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) to further test and refine the model. On December 4–5, 1997, a conference was convened with a distinguished group of scholars, analysts, and policy makers who applied the model to three case studies. The model was further developed, based on extensive feedback from a variety of reviewers and subsequent comments gained in briefings with policy makers. The model should be seen as a work in progress. The Fund is developing a CD-ROM and a training

program, which would allow analysts to apply the methodology to any country at risk.

5. The term “ethnic wars” is somewhat problematic. When used in this chapter, it is broadly conceived. An ethnic conflict is a conflict between groups that are fundamentally fighting for their identity, even though other factors, such as competition for resources and leadership rivalry, may be in play. But the term is fraught with conceptual confusion. Identity, many believe, is a fixed concept, rooted in history and culture. Historical and cultural factors are clearly important in shaping identity, but that does not make identity fixed in time. It is fluid, multilayered, and contextual. Every individual claims multiple identities based on a variety of factors, such as language, origin, race, religion, sect, ethnicity, marital status, caste, class, clan, origin, age, sexual orientation, gender, territory, political allegiance, and creed. Which comes to the fore depends largely upon time, situation, and circumstance.

6. Note that between 1980 and 1998, there were only five conventional wars between states: Argentina/U.K., Iran/Iraq, China/Vietnam, U.S./Iraq, and Ethiopia/Eritrea.

7. Ted C. Fishman, “Making a Killing: The Myth of Capital’s Good Intentions,” *Harper’s Magazine* (August 2002): 33–41.

8. *Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition* (Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University), 4. Such wars were initially recognized as prevalent but of low priority.

9. Ambassador Thomas Pickering, for example, spoke of internal wars as “a new theater of operations” in his “Keynote Address” at Emerald Express 1998, a symposium jointly hosted by CINCPAC, CINCCEN, Headquarters Marine Corps, and 1 Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Pendleton, California, April 5, 1998.

10. *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Executive Summary of the Final Report* (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1998); and Roland Paris, “Peace Building and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” *International Security* 22, no. 2 (fall 1997): 54–89.

11. *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, 4.

12. Race, for example, is often regarded as an ascribed identity that cannot be changed. In reality, individuals can alter even racial identity through intermarriage, official reclassification, changes in legal terminology, or “passing” for another racial group. Class, by contrast, is often seen as a changeable identity because it is defined principally in economic terms. However, in some societies, class can be just as much of a bar to social advancement across generations as race is thought to be.

13. These range from works on nationalism to the theory and practice of conflict resolution. In addition, there have been many scholarly works on

area-specific case studies and global trends. Examples include the seminal work of Donald Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997); and the studies by William Zartman on Africa. Also notable is the path-breaking work done by Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff on minorities, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994) and *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993). Surveys and anthologies have covered a wide scope of issues dealing with political chaos, such as the excellent anthology edited by Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, *Managing Global Chaos* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996). An interesting survey of the range of scholarly research and analysis that has been undertaken in the field over the last twelve years was summarized by the United States Institute of Peace, the leading research institute devoted to issues of post-Cold War conflict, in Anne-Marie Smith's *Advances in Understanding International Peacemaking* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998). For a comprehensive discussion of the academic literature on ethnic conflict, see Pauline Baker and John A. Ausink, *Ethnic Conflict As a Pathology of the States: A New Conceptual Approach* (Washington, D.C., Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and The Fund for Peace, 1996), a Pew Case Study in International Affairs.

14. An example is the Department of Defense (DOD) Master Instability Indicators List/Matrix, which predicts the threat of low-intensity conflict through the use of 547 indicators. Intended to be a single-source tool for the evaluation of low-intensity conflict for strategic, operational, and tactical military planners, it lists 547 indicators based primarily on intelligence sources. For example, the first indicator is that "informants fail to pass accurate information," while the last is that "families of sponsor [government] officials leave the country." *LIC Instability Indicators Study*, Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley Air Force Base, Va., June 1992, X-1 to X-24. These indicators are collectively used to create a blank matrix into which real-world data are fed to obtain a snapshot assessment of any single conflict zone. It is meant to be of particular value to the combat commander in the field, but it is less useful as a predictive tool to forecast the likelihood of a future collapsed state. Another effort was the CIA's worldwide assessment of critical humanitarian emergencies likely to occur over a twelve-month period as a result of man-made and natural events. This study made no attempt to define universal indicators. Instead, it conducted a region-by-region and country-by-country survey at one point in time. While both the DOD and the CIA studies marshal useful data, neither provides a generic framework applicable for a longer time frame, which can be used by a broad array of policymakers, analysts, and military planners. Nor do many other

frameworks focus specifically on the problem of state collapse that may compel international intervention.

15. For example, Creative Associates produced a volume entitled, *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflict: A Guide for Practitioners* for the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, sponsored by the Department of State and the USAID. It discusses a variety of concepts and offers a useful checklist of the policy tools for conflict prevention and mitigation, such as the use of special envoys or professionalizing the media, but no general indicators for assessing states at risk. Another study produced by Defense Forecasts International (DFI) for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs*, examined the requisites of effective peace operations. Based on comparative case studies of fourteen peace operations, interviews and statistical methodologies, the project provided general operational recommendations, such as minimizing the role of spoilers, adopting a holistic approach, and getting political support from stakeholders to ensure the success of peacekeeping missions.

16. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, a three-year project comprising a blue ribbon international panel, was designed to be partly educational and partly motivational. It resulted in a series of studies and initiatives to raise the level of commitment and understanding of the problem of "deadly conflict" by leaders and interested publics. The final report endorsed the establishment of a UN rapid reaction force and an expansion of the membership of the Security Council, but it offered no methodologies or analytical tools for early warning or policy assessment.

17. An example of such a study would be *The State Failure Task Force*, undertaken by a number of research academics and initiated by former vice president Al Gore. Produced under contract for the CIA, this study used exclusively quantitative methods to analyze 113 cases over a forty-year period. It found two key indicators of state collapse: high infant mortality and low trade openness. A worldwide case-by-case survey by the CIA of global humanitarian emergencies in 1996 produced an assessment of countries at risk at a fixed point in time, but it provided no universal indicators.

18. There is no universally accepted definition of a state. For a fuller discussion, see Stephen J. Del Rosso Jr., "The Insecure State: Reflections on 'the State' and 'Security' in a Changing World," *Daedalus* 124 (spring 1995). As used here, a state refers to a political entity that has legal jurisdiction and physical control over a defined territory, the authority to make collective decisions for a permanent population, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and an internationally recognized government that interacts or has the capacity to interact in formal relations with other such entities. A state must perform minimum functions for the public and maintain social cohesion. For further discussion, see Gidon Gottlieb, *Nation against State: A New Approach to Ethnic*

Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); and William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

19. The prevailing view, seen in the media and in many policy discussions, is that state collapse is a consequence of ethnic conflict. The actual sequence, we argue, is often reversed. In other words, we look at the issue as one in which the state is both a cause of ethnic conflict and the basis of a potential strategy for resolving or managing it.

20. There are, of course, other state institutions that are also important in mending divided societies. These include an elected legislature, an independent press, an election commission, political parties, and local government. Elections are critical but not sufficient to ensure sustainable security. Elected leaders may fail, or they may resort to old ways without the reinforcement of core state institutions to ensure human rights, protect the public, deliver basic social services, dispense justice, maintain security, check authority, revive the economy, nurture civil society, and defend the country against outside threats. Not only are allocated leaders unable to do these task alone, they are also unable to do them for long without the appropriate institutional foundation. To focus on elections without also rebuilding key state institutions is like constructing the walls of a house without laying the foundation. There will be no long-term stability.

21. *The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990s: Geographic Perspectives*, an unclassified CIA conference report, RTT 95-100339.

22. This resulted from colonialism and postindependence economic policies and is thus linked to other historical and structural problems.

23. Crawford Young, "Zaire: The Shattered Illusion of the Integral State," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 32 (June 1994): 247-63.

24. Young, "Zaire," 263.

25. For more details on the indicators, consult "An Analytical of Internal Conflict and State Collapse." Call The Fund for Peace (202-223-7940) for information on obtaining a copy.

The Sudan: Negotiating a Settlement

Bona Malwal, St. Antony's College, Oxford

Bona Malwal is currently a senior research fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford. In contrast to the other authors of this volume, Dr. Malwal is a practitioner rather than an academic, and he writes here as a man with a cause, not merely as a detached observer of events. A founder of the Southern Front Party of Southern Sudan, Dr. Malwal became its first secretary general and later served as minister of culture and information for the Sudanese government during an interlude in the forty-year-old civil war (1972–1978). Since that time, he has been an active participant in efforts to resolve conflict in the war-ridden state of Sudan. Bona Malwal is a persuasive advocate of the cause of independence of southern Sudan. In this chapter, he offers a controversial but thought-provoking interpretation of why efforts to negotiate the peace have thus far been unsuccessful and how peace may ultimately be achieved.

The Sudan is home to one of the most intractable conflicts on the African continent. A tragic civil war has raged there almost without interruption since the formation of the state in 1956. In this chapter, I analyze the roots of the conflict, discuss the long and largely unsuccessful efforts to negotiate a settlement, and consider the possibilities for peace.

THE ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT

Many of the elements of conflict outlined by Professor Mazrui in chapter 2 are present in the conflict in Sudan—dualism, ethnic differences, religious differences, and economic disparities. What makes

the Sudanese situation somewhat unique, however, is the fact that very ancient enmity exists between the people of Northern Sudan and the people of Southern Sudan.¹ The Northern people are largely Arab by race and Muslim by faith and culture. The Southern people, by contrast, are predominantly "African" by race and Christian by faith and culture. Some of these differences date back thousands of years.² Arabs, who had settled as traders in the Northern part of Sudan thousands of years before the Christian era, gained a still stronger position in this region following the Arab Muslim invasions of the seventh to ninth centuries A.D.³ They intermarried with the Sudanese women and assimilated the native peoples to their way of life. For a variety of geographic and political reasons, the Arabs did not penetrate the South, which thus kept its "African" culture. In the nineteenth century, missionary activity in the South led to the growth of Christianity and certain Western values, all of which further added to the dualism.

On occasion, the North and South drew closer together, as when they cooperated in resistance to the Turks and Egyptians in the first half of the nineteenth century.⁴ Nonetheless, animosity remained intense, especially after the establishment of a theocratic state in Khartoum in 1881.⁵ The profound differences between the people of the North and the people of the South were clearly obvious to the colonial powers that intervened in the late nineteenth century and established an Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899–1955).⁶ The British (who dominated this condominium) administered the North and South for almost forty years as two states under one colonial administration.⁷ It is, therefore, particularly ironic that the decision was made just nine years before independence to put the two parts of the country together under one roof.⁸

The British further contributed to the problems of the country by the favoritism they showed to the Arabs. Their policy of investing more heavily in the North than the South during the years of colonial rule served to widen the educational and economic disparities between the two regions. Still more unfortunate was their decision to put the country under the control of the Arabs at the time of independence and create a government based in Khartoum (Northern Sudan).⁹ This scenario meant putting power in the hands of a minority. Africans significantly outnumbered Arabs at the time. In a survey taken by the British in 1955, only 29 percent of the people of Sudan called themselves Arabs. By contrast, 69 percent called themselves African, and the remaining 2 per-

cent identified themselves as “other.”¹⁰ To make matters worse, no attempt was made to include Africans in the negotiations over independence.

In 1952, just four years before independence, Egypt—the other, largely dormant, colonial power with control over the Sudan—put pressure on the British to open negotiations with North Sudanese political leaders. Although these were considered talks between the leaders of the Sudanese independence movement and the colonial powers over Sudan, Southern Sudan was not represented. If the representatives of the South had been well informed and alert at the time, they might have engaged in more political protest than they actually did. In hindsight, it is now clear that there was an anti-South conspiracy among the three parties involved in the pre-independence negotiations. Northern Sudanese politicians knew they did not represent the South, but pretended that they did. The Egyptians always favored the Arab North—and they still do—so they did not in actuality care about the lack of Southern opinion or representation. The British knew that Southern Sudanese trusted them to represent their interest but betrayed that trust to secure British interests in Egypt and the Middle East. Independence arrangements were agreed upon in Cairo in March 1952 without regard to the views of the South.¹¹ In addition, the British did not take any measures to put in place constitutional arrangements that would protect the bulk of the population from the new Arab power. Africans thus were marginalized by the system. This created deep-seated anger and resentment toward the Muslim minorities. Faced with this visible, collective resentment, the government at Khartoum would resist all efforts to democratize.¹²

NEGOTIATIONS IN SUDAN (1947–1994)

1947–1972

The Southern Sudanese have been fighting for the right to self-determination for the entire forty-eight years of Sudanese independence (1954–2002). Northern Sudan has retained control of the South with little regard to Southern opinion or concerns. Numerous attempts have been made during this long period to bring about a negotiated settlement, and I have been involved in a great many of

them. They have all, to date, failed, and it remains to be seen whether or not the latest agreement (signed at Machackos, Kenya, in July 2002) leads to a lasting peace.

In March 1965, following the overthrow of the first military dictatorship of General Ibrahim Abboud in a popular uprising, a roundtable was held to find a negotiated settlement to the civil war in Southern Sudan, which had already been waged for ten years. I myself was a member of the Southern delegation to that conference. At that time, the South was already calling for the right of self-determination.¹³ The conference failed to find an agreement, and the war intensified greatly, with wanton massacres of the Southern Sudanese civilian population by government forces. From 1971 to 1972, during the second military regime of General Jaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, several attempts were again made to find a negotiated settlement of the Sudanese conflict. I was again personally involved in these efforts, spending the two months of November and December 1971 in London in secret negotiations to find a basis for a political settlement. Those 1971 efforts were crowned with some success. An agreement was reached at formal talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between the government of Sudan and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement in March 1972. Sadly, that agreement—which granted regional autonomy to Southern Sudan—proved to be a temporary measure. Ten years later (1982), the same government that had signed the peace agreement with the South changed its mind and abrogated the agreement despite the fact that it was working well. A classic account of what led to the abrogation has been written by the man who represented the government of Sudan during the 1972 agreement—Abel Alier, a well-respected Southern Sudanese lawyer who became vice president of the republic and the first head of the regional government of the autonomous Southern Sudan.¹⁴

A number of reasons exist as to why no solution has been found for this conflict. One contributing factor is certainly the profound mistrust felt by the Southern Sudanese for those with whom they are negotiating. What set the wrong tone from the start was the fact that independence was initially negotiated without consulting with African leaders.

The cynicism only deepened with the collapse of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement. Negotiated by the government of Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri, this agreement had been a sensible enough compromise. It granted regional autonomy to the Southern Sudanese but conceded to

the Northern Sudanese their wish that Sudan remain an Arab state. Power, therefore, continued to be vested in the government of Khartoum. Southerners settled for this limited autonomy even though it was not the full independence that many dreamed of. They thought that the offer of self-rule was sincere, and they were glad of the chance to enjoy at least cultural and economic freedom. The settlement also gave a respite from the endless cycle of violence.

For a while, the agreement succeeded. Nimeiri, however, gradually moved toward the imposition of Islamic law (*shari'a*) on Sudan. Then, in 1982, the government at Khartoum unilaterally abrogated the Addis Ababa agreement. Not even the World Council of Churches spoke a single word of protest at the deed.¹⁵ The result of this perceived betrayal was the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and the further polarization of positions.

In May 1983, General Nimeiri decreed that Southern Sudan should be divided into three new regions. The powers granted to the South under the Addis Ababa agreement were annulled, and the three new regions of the South were equated with the provincial administrations of Northern Sudan. By June 1983, just one month after Nimeiri deprived the South of regional autonomy, the Southern Sudanese took up arms again, and the SPLA was born. In September of the same year, to make bad matters even worse, Nimeiri decreed the imposition of strict Islamic law (*shari'a*) on the entire country, including the non-Muslim South. The die was cast. A second civil war erupted in Sudan, a war that rages on to the present day.

Although the stated objective of the SPLM-SPLA was (and is) the creation of a new and democratic Sudan, the majority of Southerners lost faith in the viability of this goal. To this day, on my monthly visits to the South Sudan, I am conscious of a deep-seated disillusionment on the part of the people of this region. Despite their dreadful predicament (many are suffering from famine and desperate poverty), they are dubious of the value of compromise with the government that has sold them out. They see no reason to give unity another chance. At the same time, splitting Sudan into two separate countries is no easy option. Changing the boundaries of a state goes against a well-ingrained principle of African politics. Ironic as this may seem, as Ali Mazrui notes (chapter 2) Africans tend to regard the boundaries established by colonial powers as close to sacrosanct.¹⁶ They rarely challenge them.

For a while, activists who favored a separate Southern Sudan could point to the example of Eritrea. This country seceded from Ethiopia in 1993 and appeared to be developing into a successful and peaceful state. Sadly, however, the outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in the late 1990s has served to undermine their arguments. The fact that the Southern Sudanese have largely abandoned the quest for a united and democratic Sudan in favor of a separate Southern Sudan serves to make present-day negotiations all the harder.

Peace Initiatives, 1972–1993

As just noted, after the abrogation of the 1972 settlement, civil war broke out once again in Sudan, followed by another cycle of negotiations.¹⁷ In 1989, negotiations held in Addis Ababa in June failed as did those mediated in August and December by former president Jimmy Carter of the United States. Then Nigeria assumed the role of mediator for a couple of years, suggesting, among other things, that North and South Sudan should form a federation. Two rounds of negotiation resulted in nothing. For over two decades, neither side showed any willingness to compromise. The Northern Sudanese clung to the hope that the Southern Sudanese would tire of the endless warfare and the suffering it entailed for their people, and would simply allow themselves to become marginalized. Time has proved them wrong. The Southern Sudanese would accept nothing short of self-determination.

In 1989, the conflict took yet another turn for the worse. Led by General Omar Hassan (Ahmed) El-Bashir, a new regime composed of fundamentalist Muslims took control in Khartoum. This situation made compromise with the Southern Sudanese still more unlikely, and the specter raised under Nimeiri of having to live within an Islamic state once again emerged. Such a scenario was intolerable to large numbers of non-Muslim Sudanese. Islamic law lays down the rules governing both the public and private life of the Muslim community. Imposition of the *shari'a* on a country in effect defines the entire nature of its political, economic, social, and cultural life.¹⁸ Non-Muslims were all too aware that successful imposition of an Islamic state would doom them to life as second-class citizens.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) NEGOTIATIONS 1993–1999

Starting in May 1993, a series of negotiations were carried out under the aegis of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, formerly IGADD).¹⁹ The organization—composed initially of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda—was founded in order to coordinate efforts to foster economic development in the Horn of Africa. One of its goals was to promote the necessary peace and stability in the subregion.²⁰ The El-Bashir National Islamic Front, which took power in June of 1989, had close ties to Eritrea and Ethiopia, and it also trusted Kenya. It invited these three countries and Uganda to try to effect a settlement between Northern and Southern Sudan.²¹ Because the Northern Sudanese trusted these IGAD countries to be fair, they were somewhat more receptive to their efforts at mediation. As of 2002, IGAD efforts have borne some fruit, although it is as yet far from certain that “normalcy” will be achieved.

The 1994 Declaration of Principles (DOP)

By late 1994, IGAD negotiators had accomplished something that until that point had not been done: they successfully defined the issues at stake. Over the course of the year (May–September), they were able to settle on the principles of a settlement.²² The Declaration of Principles (DOP) established a basis for resolving the conflict in the Sudan.²³ Two of these principles were especially noteworthy.

The first important principle was that Southern Sudan should enter into an interim agreement with Northern Sudan. In keeping with this agreement, it was decided that the two regions should commit to a federal relationship for four years. During this period, every effort would be made to bring the Southern Sudanese into the political process and foster its economic development. At the end of the four years, Southern Sudan should decide whether to continue this relationship with the North or choose independence.

The second important principle was that Northern Sudan should accept the separation of church and state. This was a key point because it established that the Northern Sudanese government does not have the right to force Southern Sudan to submit to an Islamic state.

These two principles so offended the government in Khartoum that its representatives walked out of the negotiations in protest. To the credit of the IGAD countries, this objection did not deter them. As neighbors of Sudan, the IGAD countries are adversely affected by the ongoing civil war. As long as war continues and as long as these countries face the influx of refugees from their warring neighbor, they will not be able to deal satisfactorily with their own development problems. Recognizing this conundrum, the IGAD countries showed a welcome tenacity. They stayed the course for two years despite the fact that the government in Khartoum tried to deter them by abandoning the negotiations.

It is worth noting that the IGAD mediators did not impose the six-point Declaration of Principles (DOP) on their own or from somewhere else. These principles were drawn up from the position papers presented by the two Sudanese parties to the conflict at the beginning of the IGAD mediation process. In the first session of the negotiations in 1994, the IGAD mediators had asked both the National Islamic Front (NIF) government of Khartoum and the SPLA to submit their positions in writing to specify what each of them regarded as the causes of the conflict in Sudan. The IGAD mediators drew up their DOP from these two papers. Naturally, the DOP contained points that each side did not like or was not happy with. But there would not have been a conflict nor would there have been need for mediation if both sides had liked what the other said. Three out of every four IGAD mediators were friendly to the Northern position. Khartoum may, as a result, have wrongly assumed that the mediators would reject any unacceptable point in the SPLA position paper. However, the IGAD mediators wanted to be fair to both sides and accepted the points of controversy in each document. These are the items of the DOP that now constitute points for negotiations.

Negotiations 1994–1999

Momentarily, the situation in Sudan looked brighter. The government at Khartoum attempted to force the issue by renewing its military campaigns against the SPLA. However, it did not gain a military victory, and it eventually had to come back to the negotiating table. Though the government still balked at the idea of abandoning its desire for an Islamic state, it did accept, in principle, the right of Southern Sudan to

self-determination. For the first time since its inception, the government in Khartoum had come to realize that it might be time for it to cut its losses and settle for a mediated solution.

In 1995, the Sudanese government did, in fact, set up a federal structure of government for the whole country. In 1996, it negotiated two peace charters: one signed on April 10, with the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (Bahr El-Ghazal Group; SPLM-BGG); and another signed on April 26, with further groupings within the SPLA.²⁴ A peace accord in 1997 between the government and break-away rebel factions in the South established the transitional Southern Coordination Council to lead to a referendum. However, the accord did not include the SPLA, and the war continued.²⁵

Stumbling Blocks

By early 1999, three key obstacles remained to a negotiated settlement: deteriorating relations between countries of the Horn of Africa; American indecision and Egyptian hostility; and the increasing complexity of the political scene in Sudan.

Deteriorating Relations in the Horn of Africa

Just as IGAD seemed to be on the verge of a diplomatic breakthrough, deterioration in the relations between countries of the Horn tragically undercut its success. The outbreak in May 1998 of a savage war between Eritrea and Ethiopia (1998–2000) reduced the unity enjoyed by IGAD countries at the beginning of the new round of negotiations. Prospects for a negotiated settlement dimmed since three of the members of IGAD on the negotiating team were no longer on speaking terms with each other.

American Indecision and Egyptian Hostility

Another stumbling block to a negotiated settlement during this period was the failure of the United States to take decisive action. The United States lacked the courage of its convictions, although it did recognize the justice of the Southern Sudanese cause. It was also arguably in the

United States's interest to support the Southern Sudanese inasmuch as Islamic fundamentalist movements throughout the Middle East were using Khartoum as their base, and Khartoum had become "a haven for terrorism." Khartoum, after all, served as the primary base for Osama bin Laden from 1990-1996 and also harbored his associate Hassan al-Turabi, the former leader of the National Islamic Front who was finally arrested by President al-Bashir in 2001. Nevertheless, two issues prevented the United States from taking a more active role in support of the Southern Sudanese cause throughout the 1990s. First, the United States did not yet see Sudan as an area in which its vital national interests were at stake. Second, the United States was anxious to please the Egyptians, who were their chief allies in the region. They believed that the peace process in the Middle East as a whole hinged in good measure on the Egyptians, and they did not wish to do anything to antagonize them or jeopardize this precarious situation.

Unfortunately, the Egyptians have always been hostile to the idea of Southern Sudanese independence.²⁶ The White Nile flows for a thousand miles within the territory of Southern Sudan, thus making this region the backdoor of Egypt.²⁷ Egyptians, not unnaturally, are very sensitive about control of the Nile, which is the lifeblood of their country. They fear that new projects developed upstream might restrict their own use of the Nile's water, and they feel threatened by the idea that a new state might form in the region, especially one with which they have no close religious or cultural ties. In point of fact, the Southern Sudanese are more aware of the material needs of Egypt than the Egyptians think and, in any event, are not likely to quarrel with them over control of the Nile. The fact is that Southern Sudan has more than eight months of rainfall a year, and if anything, it suffers from floods rather than from a shortage of water. Northern Sudan, in contrast, competes with Egypt for its share of the Nile's waters, which it, too, needs for irrigation purposes. As population growth in both Northern Sudan and Egypt spirals out of control, the division of the Nile's waters between them is likely to produce more problems than can be managed.

The Egyptians were hoping to tap the largely wasted rain waters that annually flood the huge swampy lands of Southern Sudan (known as the "Sudd"). They planned to do so by digging the huge Jonglei Canal across these swamps to drain the excess water into the Nile. This could then be used to irrigate fields in Northern Sudan and Egypt. While the

ecological ramifications of this project remain unclear (some environmentalists believe that draining the Sudd would spell disaster for Southern Sudan), many responsible Southern Sudanese used to think it was worth the ecological risk of allowing the Jonglei Canal to be completed to help neighbors in Northern Sudan and friends in Egypt. The Egyptian attitude toward the political cause of Southern Sudan has increasingly jeopardized this project, which is vital to both Egypt and Northern Sudan. The Southern Sudanese have lived with their flooded Sudd for time immemorial and can do so forever if need be. They will do so if they think that those who would benefit from the project are as unsympathetic toward the plight of the Southern Sudanese as are many Egyptians today. Egyptian reactions to the political struggle of Southern Sudan appear to be dominated by racial prejudices rather than economic considerations. Egypt seems to want the Arab Northern Sudan to rule the non-Arab black African Southern Sudan forever, by sheer naked force if need be.²⁸

Some analysts think that Egypt might be persuaded to change its policy in regard to Southern Sudan. They argue that Egypt is hostile to the idea of an Islamic state and consequently might decide to resist the expansion of North Sudanese power. This view misunderstands the nature of Egyptian attitudes toward fundamentalist Islam. Egyptians dislike the Muslim Brotherhood, and they have been waging their own war against this group since the time of Nasser. But they want to fight it with their own model of Islam. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak does not appear to see Egypt as a secular state and would not, in my estimation, be opposed to an Islamic state in Sudan.

Political Complexity in Sudan

Deteriorating relations in the Horn of Africa, poor relations with Egypt, and a failure to win active support from the United States, all hampered the efforts of the Southern Sudanese to achieve their goals. Adding to the problem was the increasing political complexity that made the negotiating process more difficult. During the ten-year period of autonomy enjoyed by Southern Sudan, many other marginalized non-Arab groups, notably the people of the Nuba area of southern Kordofan and Darfur, took up arms against the central government in Khartoum. Some of them now fought alongside the guerrillas of the

South, which made it difficult for the SPLA to formulate their agenda at the negotiating table. They did not know whether or not they should speak for all the marginalized groups in Sudan or just act as representatives of the Southern Sudanese. If they did the former, they would run the risk of being accused of expansionism and trying to further diminish the territories of the North. They also had to choose between pushing for a new Sudan or for a separate Southern Sudan. Their stated goal was to preserve the unity of Sudan by creating a state based on equality of race, ethnicity, religion, culture, and gender.²⁹ This goal was clearly one that was more appealing to the other groups that were now involved in the struggle. In fact, because unity seemed largely unattainable at the time, the SPLA were mistrusted. They were suspected of secretly harboring separatist designs, all of which complicated the negotiations. Divisions between Muslims in the North were another wild card. Sunni Muslims inside Northern Sudan came to see the regime in Khartoum as a minority party. As far as they were concerned, the government was importing foreign fundamentalism from the Middle East. Some groups like the Mahdis and the Mirghanis³⁰ took up arms and fought the Khartoum regime alongside the SPLA. It was an alignment never before seen in Sudanese politics, and it helped to change the political equation. It did nothing, however, to facilitate the task of negotiators.

1999: The Oil Issue

In late 1999, the privately owned Canadian company Talisman Energy of Calgary, Alberta, and its Sudanese, Malaysian, and Chinese partners, began extracting oil from the Southern Sudan. Oil had been a bone of contention since the mid-1970s when the American oil company Chevron discovered oil in Southern Sudan, but Chevron stopped exploring for oil in Sudan when the war broke out again. The oil companies, supported by the Khartoum regime, built more than one thousand miles of pipeline from the Southern oilfields to the Red Sea in Northern Sudan for export, without obtaining any agreement with the South.

As the century came to an end, it was clear that this issue was likely to fuel the war, complicate negotiations, and reduce the chances of a peaceful conflict resolution. On the one hand, it seemed unlikely that Southern Sudan would agree to end the war unless it were recognized

as the principal owner of the oil. On the other hand, the North now had all the more reason to want to control the South.

THE STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM

Despite the problems outlined in this chapter, the turn of the millennium brought some hopeful signs that this long conflict might be resolved. First, the parties to the conflict—the government of Sudan and the SPLA—were exhausted and tired of war. Their fatigue was evidenced by the fact that there had been no new battlefield initiatives in the Sudan for several years.³¹ As dispassionate political analysts and peace mediators know, this kind of situation favors conflict resolution. Belligerents who are exhausted and no longer think they have a chance to win are likely to compromise.

Second, the IGAD peace mediators (the regional peacemakers for Sudan) had by this time defined the parameters of the conflict in terms of what was at dispute and what still needed to be resolved. These parameters were contained in the six-point IGAD Declaration of Principles. The DOP included the principle of self-determination for Southern Sudan, which was the very demand made by Southern Sudan since the early 1960s.

By 2000, all the political parties of both Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan agreed that the people of the South should exercise the right of self-determination in a free, internationally monitored and supervised referendum. All the parties further agreed that the South should be asked to choose between a new type of unity between South and North, based on either a confederal/federal system of government or a formal separation (i.e., an independent Southern Sudan). Some people, it is true, doubted the sincerity of the Northern politicians who claimed that they respected the right of Southern Sudanese to self-determination. However, the DOP did provide a basis for a peaceful conflict resolution.

Delicate negotiations would clearly be needed to deal with political, economic, and religious concerns even if the Northern Sudanese were to guarantee self-determination for the South. Nonetheless, by 1999, the Southern Sudanese leadership (other than the SPLA) had worked out a broad general negotiating position on most of these issues. Even though

the SPLA preferred to be less specific in its negotiating position and did not really like the clarity of the document drawn up by these leaders, they publicly agreed with more than 90 percent of its positions.

Unresolved Issues

Political and Religious Arrangements

Self-determination notwithstanding, two of the four issues yet to be resolved present a difficult test for the negotiators. If the Northern Sudanese are truly resolved to live in a unified Sudan as equals, it may be possible to agree to a system of self-government that satisfies both the South and the North. Such a system would allow the Southern Sudanese to set up a liberal secular democratic administration free from any religious impediment. At the same time, it would also allow the Northern Sudanese to be governed according to strict fundamentalist Islamic law—that is, if this is what the majority of the Northern Sudanese wish. It should even be possible, given the good intentions on both sides, to take advantage of the interim six-year period to develop a central government and constitution capable of coordinating a secular liberal democratic Southern Sudan and a fundamentalist Islamic Northern Sudan.

Security Arrangements Even if these other issues are resolved, some real stumbling blocks to peace will remain. First, the two parties will have to determine security arrangements. Given what has happened to the people of Southern Sudan during the long years of war, it will be extremely difficult for anyone to persuade the South to let the Northern Sudanese remain in charge of even a small portion of the South's own internal security. At the same time, the Northern Sudanese will be afraid (for good reason) to let the Southern Sudanese manage their own affairs during the interim period, given that their separatist instincts remain strong. This stumbling block might be overcome, but only if both parties continue to show goodwill and if both sides agree to surrender internal security in Southern Sudan to international monitors from the mediating countries.

Resource Sharing Resource sharing will be perhaps the hardest of all issues to resolve. Control of the oil resources of the Southern Sudan has indeed proved to be a serious bone of contention. The Khartoum government used the wealth it gained from oil exploitation to make its war machine more effective, and they ultimately turned these weapons

on the South. Now the parties to the conflict must decide who is to control these resources in the short and long term.

The North is likely to want this vital natural commodity to remain in the hands of the central government in Khartoum. If so, the development process during the interim period will remain in the control of the North. The North has a valid reason to want to continue to control the oil resources. They have six years before the South exercises its right to self-determination. During this period, they must create the kind of positive environment that will convince the South that they have changed their ways. To do so, they will need resources.

However, letting the North keep control of the oil will not prove acceptable to the South. For one, the Southern Sudanese do not trust the North. For another, they are not likely to understand why they should leave the development of South Sudan in the hands of the North. After all, the resources are located in their own territory: why should they not be allowed to exploit them for their own benefit? At this point, the Southern Sudanese want to run their own affairs without interference or supervision from anyone.

The Impact of September 11, 2001

Resolving these issues will not be easy, but in one regard, the situation has improved. The attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001 has created an environment that is, ironically, more conducive to the peace process.

In the first place, it led to a heightened awareness on the part of the international community of the dangers of allowing problems to fester. Directly or indirectly, armed and violent conflict encourages terrorism. Finding nonmilitary solutions to problems in the Sudan, as well as in other parts of the world, is crucial. The events of September 11 encouraged the United States to take the lead in breathing new life into peace talks. President Bush appointed U.S. senator John Danforth as U.S. special envoy to the Sudan. Along with former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, Senator Danforth has been a key force in recent negotiations.

In the second place, the terrorist attacks changed the dynamics of the peace process. The Northern Sudanese found themselves more on the defensive and thus more willing to compromise. The ruling National

Islamic Front regime, in particular, was caught wrong-footed by the events of September 11. Osama bin Laden, after all, found refuge in Northern Sudan from 1990 to 1996, working closely with the former spiritual leader of the National Islamic Front, Hassan al-Turabi. The terrorist attacks stirred up deep anger, especially in America, against all involved in international terrorism. The Northern regime responded to the new climate of opinion by cleverly getting on board with the anti-terrorism coalition being built by the United States. The president of Sudan, for example, removed al-Turabi from power and put him under house arrest in 2002. However, Khartoum was not entirely successful in establishing its bona fides and, in fact, remained on the United States's list of countries sponsoring international terrorism. The North realized that agreeing to peace with Southern Sudan might help remove it from the U.S. Department of State blacklist. This prompted the North's involvement in the Machakos Protocol of 2002.

THE MACHAKOS PROTOCOL

A Breakthrough on Self-Determination?

The summer of 2002 brought a moment of hope to the Sudan. Thanks to the renewed energy of the United States and the pressures placed upon Khartoum, a political breakthrough of a sort was made at the IGAD negotiations. On July 20, 2002, the two parties to the conflict—the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)—signed a peace protocol at the Kenyan town of Machakos, which is just outside Nairobi (the Kenyan capital).³² The protocol was the first tangible outcome of more than eight years of IGAD's mediation between the warring parties in Sudan. It settled the framework of the possible political and constitutional agreement that could end the long bloody conflict in which nearly three million Southern Sudanese have died.

In many ways, the Machakos Protocol was a remarkable achievement. Its most path-breaking provision was the one stating that the people of Southern Sudan would exercise their right of self-determination at the end of a six-year interim period. At that time, Southerners would choose between remaining in a united Sudan (on the basis of a political, economic, cultural, and social system of government yet to be negotiated and agreed upon) or forming a separate

state and gaining full independence. In agreeing to this compromise, the parties at long last overcame the most difficult obstacle on the way to peace in Sudan. At the same time, however, four major issues were still not addressed: political power sharing, resource sharing, the constitutional system of government, and security.

Before further progress could be made in these areas, fighting broke out once again. In September 2002, attacks by Northern and SPLA forces on each other led to the suspension of the Machakos Protocol and initiated what appeared to be another phase of bloodletting and wasteful suffering. A diplomatic breakthrough prompted by the involvement of former president Jimmy Carter and Senator John Danforth, in November 2002, resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the North and South and the establishment of a cease-fire (see appendix 2). It is to be hoped that this is not just a temporary reprieve from violence but a step on the way to lasting peace.

THE FUTURE OF SUDAN: UNITED OR SEPARATE?

Southern Sudan: A Nation Divided?

What future holds the most promise for the people of Sudan? Would the Southern Sudanese do better to opt for union with the North or for full independence? There are those who claim that Southern Sudan would not be able to survive on its own. They claim that this region is riddled with ethnic and political divisions. In a word, they are wrong. While divisions do exist, they are not rooted in deep-seated ethnic or political differences. What we do find are power struggles among some of the leaders in Southern Sudan. It is not unknown for opportunists who have lost their quest for power in the South to change their allegiance, join the Northern militia, and return to fight the South.³³ But these are problems linked to the current civil war. Left alone, Southern Sudan will undoubtedly have its tribal differences. They will not be destabilizing, however, because the people of Southern Sudan share a common African ancestry. The tribal differences can be accommodated through a political movement. As long as Southern Sudan is committed to the principle of democracy so that the coalitions that are built are political coalitions (rather than tribal or ethnic coalitions), Southern Sudan will be a viable state.

Moreover, despite claims to the contrary, absolutely no conflict exists between Christians and non-Christians in Southern Sudan. The majority of educated people in the South are Christian. By that very definition, they are the political leaders of the country. They therefore do not enter into conflict with the non-Christian, non-Muslim people. The people who maintain belief in African traditional religions are generally uneducated and live in the countryside. And even they are far from hostile to the Christians. The aggressive religious policies of radical Islamic militias have led many of them to turn to the Christian church for protection. They see Christians as a means of protection against Muslim fundamentalists, and they are willing to accept Christianity as the uniting factor for the South.

The Partition of India: A Warning for the Sudan?

Some observers fear that separation might lead to further conflict. They argue that what may result will be bloodshed and confusion of a sort that accompanied the division of India and Pakistan in 1947. These fears, however, are not well founded. The dividing line between the North and the South is very clear, and the two regions are very much in agreement as to exactly where it lies. All the documents produced over long years of negotiations claim that the border between the South and North is as it stood on January 1, 1956. In other words, the colonial delineation of the border is still (amazingly) accepted! The division between Southern Sudan and Northern Sudan will not follow religious lines.

This consensus is in marked contrast to what happened when Pakistan and India separated. On that occasion, the British colonial powers wanted the majority of Muslims to belong to the newly created state of Pakistan. The result was the unnatural situation whereby parts of India lay sandwiched between East and West Pakistan. The resulting war in 1971 broke the country into Pakistan and Bangladesh, with Pakistan's old enemy India supporting Bangladesh. Again, that situation is different from the one with the Sudanese, so we need not expect a bloodbath along religious lines.

Nor need we fear massive displacement of people. First of all, tribes and communities (rather than private individuals) own the bulk of the land. Perhaps this circumstance was the result of neglect by British

colonialism, but we can be grateful for it today. Second, most Sudanese of African descent live within contiguous borders. So even if new borders were to be redrawn along regional and ethnic lines, this reconfiguration would not necessarily result in the displacement of communities in the South.

This declaration is not to say, however, that the borders can remain exactly as they stand at the moment. The reason is that the 1956 borders between the South and the North have already been adjusted in favor of North Sudan. For instance, in the early 1960s, the military regime of General Ibrahim Abboud declared parts of the Southern Sudanese province of Bahr El Ghazal to be part of Darfur Province (Northern Sudan) after precious metals and minerals were discovered in the area of Kafia Kenji. Likewise, parts of the northeastern Upper Nile province were decreed to be part of the Blue Nile province of Northern Sudan. Under General Nimeiri, the government in Khartoum also attempted to cut off the oil-rich territories of Bentiu in Upper Nile and absorb them into Northern Sudan. While this attempt was contested, thanks to the vigilance of the Southern Sudanese, these oil wells of the South were named the "Unity wells." The entire district of Bentiu is now known in Khartoum as the "Unity Province" and is thus considered part of the North. A readjustment of the borders will clearly be necessary here.

Furthermore, the small Dinka district of Ngok (Abyei) will have to be returned to Southern Sudan. The British gave Abyei to Northern Sudan without asking the people for their approval. Northern Sudan comprises other marginalized territories as well. The people of the Nuba Mountains and the Ingessina Hills of Southern Blue Nile should be given a choice of whether or not to be part of Southern Sudan. If this alignment is what they want, the borders should be adjusted to accommodate that demand. These two territories are contiguous with Southern Sudan, and they have had long grievances against the North.

Southern Sudan: Economically Viable?

Others are concerned that an independent Southern Sudan would not be able to sustain itself. This perception, however, is wrong. Although it is true that food security is an issue at the moment, it must be noted that man has created the problem. Let us look at the case of Bahr El Ghazal, which is the northernmost province of Southern Sudan. Because of its

geographic proximity with the North, Khartoum often arms Arab militias and sends them into Bahr El Ghazal to loot and displace populations. Bahr El Ghazal is endowed with rich land, giving it the greatest agricultural potential in all of Southern Sudan. Were it not for the artificially stimulated violence, food security would not be a problem. A recent initiative, moreover, may be able to alleviate food shortage problems. In December 1998, four nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) went to the UN to seek a resolution that would deny parties to the conflict—the government of Sudan and the SPLA—any interference in humanitarian work and food delivery. If this referendum is effectively implemented, Bahr El Ghazal will prosper.

CONCLUSION

The road to peace will be difficult. Not even the formation of a separate state will solve all problems for the people of Southern Sudan. Nonetheless, Southerners must be given the right of self-determination. At no time in their history have they been accorded this basic right. The mistrust that currently prevails is so profound that nothing short of this objective can hope to resolve the tragic confrontation between the North and the South.

So far, the Sudanese parties to this conflict say that they accept the right of the people of Southern Sudan to self-determination. The IGAD mediators did well to develop the six-point DOP; the Machakos Protocol of July 2002 also moved the peace process forward one step further. For peace to be achieved, however, the international community, most especially the United States, must decide between right and wrong and see to it that the parties engaged in this intractable conflict agree to a peaceful and just resolution of their conflict.

NOTES

1. John O. Udal, *The Nile in Darkness, Conquest and Exploration 1504–1862* (Wilby Hall, Norwich, England: Michael Russell Publishing, 1988).
2. Udal, *The Nile*.
3. Udal, *The Nile*.
4. J. Ade C. Hamilton, ed., *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from Within* (London: Faber & Faber, 1935).

5. Hamilton, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, 15–20.
6. Hamilton, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, 61–78.
7. M. A. Mahgoub, *Democracy on Trial, Reflections on Arab and African Politics* (London: André Deutsch, 1974).
8. Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured* (Exeter, England: Ithaca Press, 1990), 11–41.
9. Alier, *Southern Sudan*, 11–41.
10. See the 1955 National Census Report.
11. Mahgoub, *Democracy on Trial*, 35–49.
12. Mahgoub, *Democracy on Trial*, 35–49.
13. Alier, *Southern Sudan*, 164–225.
14. Alier, *Southern Sudan*, 164–225.
15. The World Council of Churches chaired the 1972 Addis Ababa Talks, which resulted in an agreement granting Southern Sudan regional autonomy. When General Jaafar Mohamed Nimeiri abrogated that agreement in May 1983, the World Council of Churches did not even make a mild presentation to Khartoum about this turn of events, which raises questions about the role of mediators in such conflicts. (The Addis Ababa agreement had been negotiated under the auspices of the World Council of Churches and had received the backing of the international community. The event perhaps sheds some light on the role played by NGOs in conflict resolution, a topic discussed in chapter 6 by Claude Welch.)
16. See the Charter of the Organisation for African Unity, 1963. (This charter considers colonial borders of the newly independent African nations to be inviolable.)
17. The peace initiatives were as follows: the First Nairobi Meeting, sponsored by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter (1989); the American Initiative undertaken by the former assistant U.S. secretary of state for African affairs Herman Cohen (1990); the Kenyan Initiative undertaken by Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi (December 1990); the First Abuja Peace Talks undertaken by former Nigerian president Babangida (May–June 1992); the Frankfurt Initiative (1992); the Entebbe negotiations supervised by Ugandan president Museveni (1993); the Second Abuja Talks (April 1993); the Third Nairobi Talks (May 1993).
18. See Presidential Decree No. 13, 1991. It is the constitutional decree by which the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime has curbed all freedoms and liberties in Sudan and has proscribed all kinds of personal liberties. In spite of the hullabaloo about the liberties proclaimed by its so-called new constitution of 1998, Presidential Decree No. 13 remains the cornerstone of the iron rule of the regime over Sudan and is enshrined in the constitution. It also makes Islamic law (*shari'a*) the main source of legislation in the country.
19. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the new name of the authority superseding the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and

Development (IGADD), which was created in 1986 by six drought-stricken countries of the Horn of Africa. Eritrea became the seventh member of IGAD in September 1993 after its independence. IGAD is headquartered in Djibouti and was chartered in 1995. The first IGAD talks on the Sudan took place in Addis Ababa in May 1993, under the joint chairmanship of the Kenyan, Ugandan, Ethiopian, and Eritrean governments. Further agreement was reached regarding the shape of any future peace agreement. See Sean Gabb, "The Civil War and Peace Process in Sudan: An Occasional Paper Published by the Sudan Foundation. Peace File No. 13" at sufo.demon.co.uk/pax013.htm.

20. Article 18 of Agreement establishing IGAD states that "member states shall act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability which are essential prerequisites for economic development."

21. Uganda, the fourth state directly involved in the mediation efforts, was on much worse terms with the government in Khartoum.

22. The second, third, and fourth IGAD meetings took place in 1994 (May, July, and September). All wrestled with the task of settling on the principles of a settlement. Sean Gabb, "The Civil War and Peace Process in Sudan."

23. See appendix 1, "Sudanese Declaration of Principles."

24. Sean Gabb, "The Civil War and Peace Process in the Sudan."

25. For more information, see ploughshares.ca/content/ACR/ACR00/ACR00-Sudan.html.

26. While all the Sudanese, North and South, have recognized the right of Southern Sudan to self-determination, the Egyptians are opposed to this principle and are laboring hard to undermine the Sudanese peace process on that basis.

27. All Southern Sudanese political leaders fully recognize the legitimate rights of Egypt to the waters of the Nile, and no Southern Sudanese political leadership, now or in the future, is likely to tamper with that right.

28. It looks like a futile effort on the part of the Egyptians to stop the political and social aspirations of Southern Sudanese for freedom and independence.

29. The SPLA's idea of liberating the whole of Sudan is at best an academic exercise, and at worst, it complicates the search for a genuine peace in negotiations to end the conflict in Sudan.

30. The Umma Party, led by the El Mahdis, and the Democratic Unionist Party of the El Mirghanis, are the two principal parties of Northern Sudan. Both are based on Islamic ideological foundations: the Ansar Islamic religions sect is the basis of the Umma Party, and the Khatmiya sect is based on the DUP. Both of these two Northern political parties and the SPLA form the backbone of the Sudanese opposition to the NIF regime.

31. The last time there was serious fighting in the South was in 1998. Since then, the government of Sudan has engaged only in aerial bombardment of

civilian targets in Southern Sudan, such as hospitals, and in militia raids on the Southern population bordering Northern Sudan to capture slaves and property, especially cattle.

32. The full text of the Machakos Protocol can be found on the Internet: ncsudan.org/Machakos%20Protocol%20.htm.

33. The SPLA has suffered several internal splits in recent years. Although what is left of the mainstream has largely regrouped and reorganized, both its fighting capacity and its negotiating abilities have become impaired by these splits.

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Conclusion: A Call from Arms?

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A CALL FROM ARMS?

Since September 11, armed and violent conflicts have increased in much of the world. Would it not be a peculiar irony if the reverse were true in Africa? Welcome signs suggest that this may very well be the case.

When this project first began in 1999, Africa's prospects for peace were dire. The international war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) escalated rapidly, engulfing at least seven other African nations and prompting then-U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright to call it "Africa's First World War."² A nearly three-decade-old civil war in Angola continued to ravage the resource-abundant nation. Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front, largely an army of children, held control of the diamond-rich regions in Sierra Leone. Images of amputated civilians and abducted child-soldiers surfaced from Sierra Leone, rekindling common sentiments of hopelessness and horror in Africa. Border clashes between Eritrea and Ethiopia turned into a full-scale war marked by World War I trench-line tactics and stupefying casualty rates. In Burundi, government troops forced hundreds of thousands of civilians into internment camps, prompting some analysts to warn of incipient genocide in the small country bordering Rwanda.³

Since that time, in just over three years, fighting has subsided in DRC, Sierra Leone, Angola, Burundi, and Eritrea and Ethiopia. This turn of events is in some ways unexpected, given that human development indicators point to a deteriorating environment. Among other problems, HIV incidence is on the rise; unemployment is increasing;

and fewer people have access to clean water. Ironically, however, these widening social and economic ills may have encouraged certain African nations to assume leadership roles. This paradox arguably helps explain why some measure of peace has been attained.

If we examine the efforts to resolve the conflicts in these five areas in recent times, we may note a common theme. A new (and surely healthier) relationship has developed between African nations and international organizations and Western nations, such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States. African nations are increasingly directing the peace processes while international organizations and Western nations are playing supportive roles, principally by supplying crucial economic resources, diplomatic envoys, and small but competent peacekeeping forces. It is surely no coincidence that efforts to resolve conflicts have met with most success in precisely those areas where the international community is involved in the peace process but acts in a neutral and ancillary capacity. Let us consider these five areas more closely and see if the evidence bears out our contention.

In summer 2002, South African president Thabo Mbeki mediated a peace accord between the presidents of Rwanda and the DRC, Paul Kagame and Joseph Kabila, respectively. In support of the process, the United Nations deployed a five-thousand-member observer mission, known as United Nations Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). MONUC personnel trained a police force and monitored the cease-fire, political developments, and the withdrawal of foreign troops from eastern DRC. In September 2002, U.S. president George W. Bush met with Mbeki, Kagame, and Kabila in Washington, D.C., to further advance the peace process.

In an even more ironic twist of fate, Angola's long-standing president, José dos Santos, brokered a withdrawal of Ugandan forces from eastern DRC with Kabila and Uganda's president, Yoweri Museveni, in the war-torn capital of Angola, Luanda. "Angola wants to be the promoter of stability in the region," dos Santos announced to reporters afterward.⁴ Angola's unpredictable peace resulted after the death of UNITA rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. An agreement between the government and UNITA was signed on April 4, 2002. A multinational commission—whose members include Portugal (Angola's former colonial power) and Russia (which had supported Angolan government forces during the Cold War)—is monitoring the implementation of the peace accord.

Sierra Leone's peace process reflects a similar combination of African and international influences. It is Nigeria that has, perhaps, played the most significant role. The ECOMOG peacekeeping force that held Sankoh's RUF from taking over control of Freetown in 1998 consisted primarily of Nigerian soldiers. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), again led by Nigeria along with Togo and the Ivory Coast, negotiated the Lomé Peace Accord between the RUF and government forces in 1999. The United Nations played an important supporting role, deploying a peacekeeping force to replace ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone. The United States and Britain participated in the mediations between Sankoh and the president of Sierra Leone, Ahmed Kabbah. In April 2002, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed American David Crane as chief prosecutor for the UN Special Court to prosecute cases of war crimes in Sierra Leone, and Sierra Leone established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission modeled after South Africa's post-Apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Meanwhile, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) negotiated a peace settlement between Eritrea and Ethiopia in Algeria in December 2000. The United Nations supported the efforts by deploying four thousand peacekeepers to monitor the truce along the contested borders. In Burundi, a transitional government was established in 2002, and cease-fire negotiations were underway after two years of negotiations that were led, in part, by South Africa's deputy president Jacob Zuma. Tanzania hosted the Burundi cease-fire negotiations, which included representatives from the United Nations, African Union, and South Africa.

AFRICAN LEADERSHIP, WESTERN SUPPORT

Challenges clearly remain. In the regions we have just examined, the search to put an end to the fighting has now given way to a search to build a long-lasting peace. In certain parts of Africa, long-standing wars continue unabated. In yet others, new and potentially violent armed conflicts are appearing on the horizon. In Zimbabwe, for example, the government forces of Robert Mugabe are expelling white farmers from their land, which has led to sharply exacerbated tensions. Meanwhile, in West Africa, civil war has engulfed what was once one of the region's

most stable nations—the Ivory Coast. The conflict, which began in September 2002, threatens to escalate into the kind of full-scale war that devastated Sierra Leone and Liberia, Ivory Coast's West African neighbors.

There are no guarantees that the conflicts discussed earlier in this chapter will not flare up again. Nonetheless, the solution of these conflicts, even if temporary, should offer us some consolation. What we learn from a study of the recent peace efforts is that great things are possible when African initiative is combined with support from international organizations and nations. Regional powers, such as Nigeria and South Africa, seem to be more willing and able to promote peace efforts throughout the continent, probably because firsthand experiences have convinced them that wars rarely remain isolated.

The relationship between African nations and Western nations and international organizations will remain critical in efforts to resolve and prevent armed conflicts in Africa. One of the most frequent points of agreement among our authors is that international forces must be understood and addressed by African nations. Armed conflicts will neither be resolved nor be prevented by African nations' acting in isolation from global forces. Global events have local repercussions, and this theme is developed throughout the book. Consider how each author addresses the influence of international forces, both past and present, on armed conflicts within Africa.

Ali Mazrui shows us the deleterious impact of the 1884 Berlin Conference, where European colonial powers carved up Africa into the nation-state borders that exist today. The delineations, Mazrui writes, "enclosed groups with no traditions of shared authority or shared systems of settling disputes." Anthony Clayton and René Lemarchand remind us of how methods of colonial indirect rule imposed a century ago still foment the seeds of oppositional ethnic identity in Rwanda, Burundi, and Kenya. Julius Nyang'oro explains how international economic institutions exploit African resources and curtail development. Pauline Baker's early warning model of state collapse enables Western nations and international organizations to act before small-scale, local feuds explode into wars that threaten to destabilize entire regions. Claude Welch explains the role of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in African conflict resolution. Lastly, Bona Malwal discusses how September 11 facilitated dialogue between the West,

namely, the United States, and the Sudanese government. In part due to its desire to escape categorization as a “terrorist haven,” Khartoum has showed itself more willing to compromise. The signing in Nairobi, Kenya, of the Memorandum of Understanding between the government in Northern Sudan and the Southern Sudanese in November 2002 may mark the first real step toward a peaceful resolution of Africa’s most protracted armed conflict.

AFRICAN UNION

As daunting as Africa’s challenges are, it is important to bear in mind that most African nations are less than forty years old and that democratic institutions take time to develop. As Ali Mazrui notes in his chapter, it took the United States over two hundred years and one of the bloodiest civil wars in world history to achieve a fully representative democratic government. Some would argue that the United States is still far from having a truly inclusive political system. While it is certainly premature to speak of an “African Renaissance,” the future does hold promise.⁵ The renewed efforts of Pan-African leadership are a case in point.

On July 9, 2001, African nations renovated their premier diplomatic body, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), as the African Union (AU). African nations simultaneously resolved to establish a new Pan-African economic alliance called the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

The OAU had helped bring an end to the colonial period of white rule in Africa, but it had long been characterized as a “dictator’s club.” As its successor, the AU has a long-term focus and is touted by some as the new face of a democratic Africa. The OAU had held fast to the principle of noninterference in internal disputes of member states, responding to conflicts by orchestrating short-term political solutions and cease-fires. Modeled loosely after the European Union, the AU asserts the right to intervene in the affairs of member states in cases of genocide or war crimes.

The AU and NEPAD intend to focus on economic progress and effective government, reasoning that if these issues are secure, peace will follow.⁶ For example, on September 20, 2002, the AU convened, and

ministers signed up to twenty-six articles to be revised and adopted into law in 2003. In 2001, corruption cost the continent an estimated \$148 billion. The purpose of the so-called Anti-Corruption Convention, the draft bill read, is "to promote and strengthen the development in Africa by each State Party of mechanisms required to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in public and private sectors."⁷

Of course, success will depend on the implementation of the AU and NEPAD. In addition, member states must be willing to compromise a degree of their sovereignty in return for a broader union that will ideally promote democracy and economic development through African cooperation, collaboration, and leadership. The founding father of the OAU and Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, warned that:

The resources are there. It is for us to marshal them in active service of our people. Unless we do this by our concerted efforts, within the framework of our combined planning, we shall not progress at the tempo demanded by today's events. . . . The symptoms of our troubles will grow, and the troubles themselves become chronic. It will then be too late even for Pan African Unity to secure for us stability and tranquility in our labours for a continent of social justice and material well-being.⁸

The first decades of African independence proved Nkrumah's words to be tragically prophetic. Now, at the opening of the twenty-first century, African nations have an opportunity to learn from the past. Things that fell apart can be rejuvenated and strengthened by wisdom and experience. By working together, African nations can better their chances of reducing poverty and promoting peace.

In July 2002, at the opening summit of the AU, its first chairperson and Nelson Mandela's hand-picked successor to South Africa's presidency, Thabo Mbeki, paid tribute to the past while embracing a vision for the future: "As Africans, we have come to understand that there can be no sustainable development without peace. . . . Time has come to end the marginalisation of Africa. We call on the rest of the world to work with us as partners. This is a moment of hope for our continent and its peoples."⁹

NOTES

1. CFK is an international NGO housed at the University Center for International Studies at University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. CFK established

and leads a youth sports association, medical clinic, and Binti Pamoja (Daughters United) Center in the Kibera slum of Nairobi, Kenya (<http://cfk.unc.edu>).

2. CNN.com, "Albright Calls for End to 'Africa's First World War,'" January 24, 2000, at cnn.com/2000/world/africa/01/24/un.congo.02/.

3. The United Nations estimated that more than 800,000 people were held in internment camps in September 1999, following a major relocation exercise near the capital, Bujumbura. *BBC News*, "Burundi Urged to Close Internment Camps," December 2, 1999.

4. South African Press Association, "Uganda, DRC Sign Peace Deal," September 7, 2002.

5. The term "African Renaissance" seems to have been first articulated publicly by Nelson Mandela at the Heads of State meeting of the OAU in Tunis in 1994, and it was subsequently further popularized by U.S. president Bill Clinton in a trip to Africa in 1998. Lionel Cliff, "African Renaissance?" in *Africa in Crisis*, ed. Tunde Zack-Williams et al. (London: Pluto Press, 2002).

6. David Bamford and Joseph Winter, "Farewell to the OAU," *BBC News*, July 9, 2001.

7. United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), "Africa: Ministers Approve Anti-corruption Laws," September 20, 2002.

8. Kwame Nkrumah, *Revolutionary Path* (New York: International Publishers, 1973), 236.

9. Thabo Mbeki, "Launch of the African Union," ABSA Stadium, Durban, South Africa, July 9, 2002.

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Appendix 1: Sudanese Declaration of Principles

IGAD(D) PEACE INITIATIVE

Declaration of Principles

We, Representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (hereinafter referred to as the GOS) the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army—United (hereinafter referred to as the SPLM/A and SPLM/SPLA-United respectively):

Recalling the previous peace talks between the Government of the Sudan on the one hand, the SPLM/SPLA and SPLM/SPLA-United on the other, namely Addis Ababa in August 1989, Nairobi in December 1989, Abuja in May/July 1992, Abuja in April/May 1993, Nairobi in May 1993, and Frankfurt in January 1992;

Cognisant of the importance of the unique opportunity afforded by the IGADD Peace Initiative to reach a negotiated peaceful solution to the conflict in the Sudan;

Concerned by the continued human suffering and misery in the war affected areas: Hereby agree in the following Declaration of Principles (DOP) that would constitute the basis for resolving the conflict in the Sudan:

1. Any comprehensive resolution of the Sudan conflict requires that all parties to the conflict fully accept and commit themselves to that position that

- 1.1. The history and nature of the Sudan conflict demonstrate that a military solution can not bring lasting peace and stability the country
- 1.2. A peaceful and just political solution must be the common objective of the parties to the conflict
2. The right of self-determination of the people of south Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum must be affirmed.
3. Maintaining unity of the Sudan must be given priority by all parties provided that the following principles are established in the political, legal, economic and social framework of the country.
 - 3.1. Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society. Full recognition and accommodation of these diversities must be affirmed.
 - 3.2. Complete political and social equalities of all peoples in the Sudan must be guaranteed by law.
 - 3.3. Extensive rights of self-determination on the basis of federation, autonomy, etc., to the various peoples of the Sudan must be affirmed.
 - 3.4. A secular and democratic state must be established in the Sudan. Freedom of belief and worship and religious practice shall be guaranteed in full to all Sudanese citizens. State and religion shall be separated. The basis of personal and family laws can be religion and customs.
 - 3.5. Appropriate and fair sharing of wealth among the various people of the Sudan must be realised.
 - 3.6. Human rights as internationally recognised shall form part of this arrangement and shall be embodied in constitution.
 - 3.7. The Independence of the Judiciary shall be enshrined in the constitution and laws of the Sudan.
4. In the absence of agreement on the above principles referred to in 3.1 to 3.7, the respective people will have the option to determining their future including independence through a referendum.
5. An interim arrangement shall be agreed upon, the duration and the tasks of which should be negotiated by the parties.
6. The parties shall negotiate a cease-fire agreement to enter into force as part of the overall settlement of the conflict in the Sudan.

Nairobi, July 20, 1994

Appendix 2: Memorandum of Understanding¹

Date: 18 Nov 2002

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SUDAN (GOS) AND THE SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY (SPLM/A) ON ASPECTS OF STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

Nairobi, Kenya

18th November 2002

The Government of the Republic of The Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (the Parties) have continued their negotiations from 14th October to 18th November, 2002 in Machakos and Nairobi, Kenya, under the auspices of the IGAD Sudan Peace Process; and

The Parties reaffirm their commitment to a negotiated, peaceful, comprehensive resolution to the Sudan conflict within the context of the Machakos Protocol of 20th July 2002 which stipulates that unity shall be the priority of the Parties during the Interim Period. The Parties hereby agree:

- 1. That within the above context, they have reached agreement concerning numerous aspects of the Structures of Government, including aspects of Power Sharing, the Judiciary and Human Rights. The Parties record that they have reached a measure of understanding on the texts on Structures of Government and revenue sharing on which they have been jointly engaged. In particular, the Parties have**

agreed in principle to the following, which will be incorporated in the final Peace Agreement:

- To recognize the national sovereignty of the Sudan as vested in its people as well as the need to give expression to the aspirations of the people of Southern Sudan in all spheres of Government and to provide for linkages between the different levels of Government;
 - To promote the welfare of the people and protect their human rights and fundamental freedoms;
 - To hold free and fair general elections during the Interim Period;
 - To a bicameral National Legislature with equitable representation of the people of Southern Sudan in both legislative chambers;
 - To ensure that the National Civil Service and Cabinet Ministries be representative of the people of Sudan, and that specifically the people of Southern Sudan shall be equitably represented at the senior and middle levels;
 - To hold a census during the Interim Period;
 - To the general principles for sharing revenue and natural resources;
 - To establish a number of independent commissions;
 - To general principles of inter-governmental relations;
 - In general terms to the sequence and process governing constitutional review and implementation of the Peace Agreement;
 - To a collegial decision-making process within the Presidency;
 - The allocation of the majority of functional areas of competence of the different levels of government;
 - To establish a Government of National Unity during the Interim Period;
 - To implement an information campaign throughout Sudan to popularize the Peace Agreement in the context of the Machakos Protocol;
 - That the remaining issues still to be agreed in draft text No. 4 on Structures of Government presented by the Mediators shall form the starting point for their further negotiations.
2. To recommit themselves to continue to search for lasting peace and, without prejudice to the positions of the Parties, to resolve all outstanding issues and incorporate them into the final Peace Agreement.

3. To resume and conduct negotiations in January 2003 in good faith and goodwill in order to operationalize the above principles and achieve a just and comprehensive peace in the Sudan at the earliest possible time.

The Parties have also agreed in a separate document to extend the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the Cessation of Hostilities to the 31st of March, 2003 and to continue their regularly scheduled meetings under the terms of reference established by the Cessation of Hostilities Committee to facilitate the implementation of that MOU.

Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani

For: The Government of the Sudan

Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit

For: The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

WITNESSED BY:

Lt. Gen. Lazaro K. Sumbeiywo

Special Envoy

IGAD Sudan Peace Process and on

Behalf of the IGAD Envoys

NOTE

1. Source: Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army.

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Appendix 3: Maps




National borders, present day.

Courtesy of The Diagram Group, *African History on File*, New York: Facts on File, 2003.




Colonial borders, A.D. 1914.

Courtesy of The Diagram Group, *African History on File*, New York: Facts on File, 2003.



The Sudan, Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.


Courtesy of The Diagram Group, *African History on File*, New York: Facts on File, 2003.



Conflict, AD 1955–1972, 1983–present day.


Courtesy of The Diagram Group, *African History on File*, New York: Facts on File, 2003.

2002 CE




Hutu-Tutsi conflict, 1962–present day.

Courtesy of The Diagram Group, *African History on File*, New York: Facts on File, 2003.









Democratic Republic of Congo conflict.

Courtesy of The Diagram Group, *African History on File*, New York: Facts on File, 2003.








Angolan civil war, 1975–present day.

Courtesy of The Diagram Group, *African History on File*, New York: Facts on File, 2003.



Pan-African organizations 1: founded 1945–1964 CE.

Courtesy of The Diagram Group, *African History on File*, New York: Facts on File, 2003.



Pan-African organizations 2: founded 1969–1982 AD.

Courtesy of The Diagram Group, *African History on File*, New York: Facts on File, 2003.

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Appendix 4: A Chronology of Armed Conflict: Prehistory to Present

PREHISTORY

Archaeological and anthropological evidence seems to suggest that armed and violent though not highly organized conflict dates back to prehistory. Students of warfare generally agree that competition for food, women, or land (as well as personal vengeance) were probably the major causes for armed conflict among preliterate societies. They do not agree, however, as to the extent or violence of this fighting. It is certainly possible that fighting was frequent and lethal, except among small and isolated bands.

Prehistory in Africa ended in widely varying periods: Egypt had organized political systems and writing circa 3000 B.C., but large parts of interior Africa were still preliterate in the nineteenth century. In the absence of the written record, much of the chronology of conflict remains a blank.

B.C.

3100–2600 B.C.

Egypt Improved technological abilities, an increased capacity for organization, and the need to protect precious resources led settled civilizations to develop the first armies, which transformed the nature of warfare. Menes, who unified Egypt and established the Old Kingdom, was a warrior ruler.

2600–2000 B.C.

Old Kingdom of Egypt: Wars Egyptian power extended east and west into Palestine and Nubia, and south into what is now the Sudan. Sometimes the pharaohs engaged in foreign adventures; sometimes they focused on protecting the frontiers; and sometimes they were engaged in civil wars.

2000–1600 B.C.

Middle Kingdom of Egypt: Wars This period saw the further development of professional standing armies. Wars were primarily, though not exclusively, defensive in this era.

1800–1600 B.C.

Hyksos Period: Invasions and Rebellions The Hyksos (probably foreign invaders) invaded and dominated Egypt between 1700 and 1600 B.C. Because their rule was unpopular, there were frequent rebellions in this period.

1580–1450 B.C.

New Kingdom of Egypt: Wars of Expansion and Wars of Rebellion New Kingdom Egypt developed a formidable and highly effective military. Between 1546 and 1507 B.C., Egyptian rule was extended west into Libya, south into Nubia, and east into Palestine and Syria. At its maximum extent (1470–1450 B.C.), Egyptian power extended as far as the fringes of Asia Minor. Sometimes the people of these regions revolted against the Egyptians: the battle of Megiddo (Armageddon, 1469 B.C.), for example, was fought between an Egyptian army of perhaps twenty thousand men and rebels led by the King of Kadesh (Palestine).

1450–1294 B.C.

New Kingdom of Egypt: Egyptian–Hittite Wars During these centuries the Egyptians fought several wars against the Hittites, a major power whose center lay in Asia Minor and whose military successes have been attributed to their possession of iron weapons.

1200 B.C.

Invasions by the Sea Peoples Sea-borne raiders menaced the whole of the Mediterranean, causing extensive disruption for several centuries. Some attacked Egypt's Delta region during the reign of Ramses III (1198–1167 B.C.).

1198–331 B.C.

New Kingdom of Egypt: Egyptian Decline In 945 B.C., Egypt was wracked by a civil war between Tanis and Thebes. The Egyptians were then conquered by the Ethiopians (730 B.C.) followed by the formidable and brutal Assyrians (671 B.C.). Though they enjoyed a brief resurgence in the early sixth century (609–593 B.C.) when they reasserted control over Egypt as well as Syria and Palestine, they were driven out of Syria and Palestine by the Babylonians in 605 B.C. They were then conquered by the Persians (525 B.C.), and Egypt was to be ruled by foreign powers for the next twenty-four centuries. In 332–331 B.C., Alexander the Great defeated the Persians and became ruler of Egypt, inaugurating a period of domination by the Greeks.

900 B.C. (North Africa)

Foundation of Cush The Kingdom of Cush (Nubia) was established.

481–276 B.C.

Carthaginian–Greek Wars Carthage, an ancient city-state on the coast of North Africa (East Libya), built up a Mediterranean empire. It fought several wars over Sicily with the Greeks of Syracuse (481–306 B.C. and 311–306 B.C.) and their ally Pyrrhus of Epirus (278–276 B.C.).

281–195 B.C.

Wars of Ptolemaic Egypt The Ptolemies were the Greek successors of Alexander the Great. Under their rule, Egypt fought six wars with the Persian Seleucids for control of Palestine and Syria. In the Third Syrian War (221–217 B.C.), the Egyptians conquered Syria and

much of southern Asia Minor. They lost most of their conquests in the Fifth Syrian War (201–195 B.C.).

264–146 B.C.

Punic Wars: Rome against Carthage (Libya) The expansion of Roman power brought it into conflict with Carthage. It fought three wars against the African city-state: 264–241, 241–237, and 149–146 B.C. The conquest of Carthage gave the Romans control of its empire, including substantial territories in Africa.

112–106 B.C.

Roman Conquest of North Africa (Tunisia/Libya/Algeria) The parts of Africa today known as Tunisia and Libya were annexed and pacified by the Romans in the last century of the Republic (Numidian/Jugurthine War, 112–106 B.C.). In 46 B.C., Rome annexed the portion of Numidia that is today part of eastern Algeria. Berber states fought annexation, though they were too weak to offer effective resistance.

48–29 B.C.

Roman Conquest of Egypt and Northern Sudan The Roman dictator Julius Caesar established some control over Egypt (48–47 B.C.). When Anthony married Cleopatra (33–30 B.C.), Rome declared war on Egypt. The Romans were victorious, and Egypt came under Roman rule. When the Sudanese invaded Egypt (29 B.C.), Rome occupied northern Nubia, extending its control southward down the Nile.

A.D.

1–400

Roman–African Frontier Wars Throughout this period (and especially as of the third century), Roman armies defended the provinces against the raids of African Berber tribes who inhabited the fringes of the Saharan deserts. They also clashed now and again with other

African groups, such as the cave-dwelling inhabitants of the shore of the Red Sea, the Troglodytes.

200–400

Arabian–Ethiopian Conflicts The Kingdom of Aksum (located in the modern province of Tigré, Ethiopia) came to power as a result of its trade. It came to control most of modern Ethiopia, eastern Sudan, and northern Somalia, as well as kingdoms in Yemen. In 235, it defeated the Meroe kingdom of Cush.

238–273

Roman Civil Wars In the third century A.D., the Roman world was troubled by a series of civil wars that resulted from disputes over imperial power. Africans were at times involved: for example, in 238, African troops made Gordianus I Emperor, and in 273, the Egyptians did the same for Firmus.

400–600

Arabian–Abyssinian Wars (Ethiopia) Yemen was one of three fertile regions of the Arabian Peninsula, and it continued to be a source of conflict in this period between Arabians and the Abyssinians of Aksum (Sudan). In 522, the Ethiopians conquered Himyarite Yemen.

468

Roman War with the Vandals (North Africa) The Vandals were one of the Germanic peoples who “invaded” the Roman Empire in the fifth century. Under their capable King Genseric, they took control over Roman Africa, Sicily, and other islands in the Mediterranean. Vandal activity along the North African coast caused a lot of problems.

533–534

Vandal–Roman War in North Africa (North Africa) The Byzantine (Eastern Roman) ruler Justinian sought to reestablish control over parts of

the Roman Empire, which had been taken over by Germanic peoples during the fifth century. His general Belisarius defeated the Vandals near Carthage, restoring Byzantine control of parts of northwest Africa.

618

Visigothic Conquest of Ceuta The Visigoths (Germanic rulers of Spain) took advantage of Byzantine struggles with Persians and Avars to take the stronghold of Ceuta, a strategically located stronghold on the African side of the Straits of Gibraltar.

639–645

Arab Invasion of Egypt The Muslim Arabs began to expand out of the Arabian Peninsula in 633, eleven years after the Hegira (622). In 639, Amr ibn al-As invaded Egypt (then under Byzantine, i.e., late Roman control), and in 642, Egypt fell into Muslim hands. A revolt in 645 was suppressed.

642–643

Arab Expansion across North Africa The Muslim Arabs continued their expansion westward across North Africa. Cyrene and Tripoli were taken between 642 and 643. By 683, Arabs from Egypt had reached the Atlantic Ocean and were in conflict with Byzantines and Berbers. Carthage (and Tunisia) were in Arab control by 698. By 711, northwest Africa was pacified.

645–675

Arab Raids into East Africa (Sudan) Muslim Arabs based in Egypt raided the Christian state of Maqurrah.

711–712

Invasion of Spain The Muslims of North Africa (Morocco) launched an attack on the Visigoths of Spain. By 712, the Arabs had completed the conquest of most of the Iberian Peninsula.

740–742

Berber Revolts (Morocco); Revolt of Berbers and Kharijites Berbers and Kharijites revolted against Arab control, drove them out of Morocco, and reduced their influence in other North African provinces.

800

Rise of Ghana Ghana, later to be a major African power, emerged.

800–902

Piratical Raids and Invasions (Tunisia, Tripolitania, Eastern Algeria) Central North Africa was a base for piratical activities during this period. Islands in the Mediterranean Sea (notably Sicily) fell prey to raids and invasions from this region.

800–969

War and Revolt in Egypt The caliphs of Baghdad sometimes directly controlled Egypt. At other times, real power was in the hands of petty rulers who were vassals of the ruling caliphs. Some of these were militarily successful: in the ninth century, for example, the Tulunids conquered most of Syria.

800–1000

Wars in Morocco and Western Algeria War and revolts were endemic in this part of Africa. The Idrisids, an Arab–Berber dynasty, fought the Fatimids (who gained overlordship in 922 and again in 975), the Omayyads of Spain, and a variety of Berber factions. By the end of the period, power in northwest Africa was fragmented and largely in the hands of numerous local Berber chieftains.

914–975

Fatimid Conquest of Egypt In the tenth century (969), the Fatimid Shi'ites of Tunisia conquered Egypt. They also gained control of Syria and western Arabia. At the height of their power, the Fatimids controlled

all of North Africa, Syria, western Arabia, and much of the western Mediterranean.

1000–1500

The Karanga or Monomotapa Empire (Zimbabwe) The Karanga Empire of the Shona emerged in the eleventh century. Its center was the Great Zimbabwe. In the fourteenth century, Mutota, king of Karanga, organized a vast conquest that extended his rule over the inland plateau and later to the harbors of East Africa. The empire traded gold with Arab merchants for glass and porcelain from China.

1035–1094

Egyptian–Seljuk Wars in Palestine and Syria Egypt lost most of their possessions in Syria and Palestine to the Seljuk Turks, recent converts to Islam who were rapidly becoming an increasing threat in the region.

1056–1200

Almoravid and Almohad Expansion (North Africa) Two Muslim Berber dynasties came to power in North Africa in this period: the Almoravids (1056–1080) and the Almohads (1120–1160). The former conquered Morocco and Western Algeria (1056–1080) and went on to conquer much of Spain. The latter extended their rule into Algeria, Tunisia, and Western Tripolitania. The Almohad leader took the title of caliph.

1054–1076

Almoravid Conquest of West Africa The Almoravids (militant Muslim Berbers) overran West Africa and sacked the capital of the flourishing Empire of Ghana (a trading state that had developed in the ninth century), thus gaining power from their control of caravan routes across the Sahara. Ghana (which remained partly pagan) broke up into small states. They went on to conquer Songhay.

1075–1200

Somali Expansion Somali tribesmen migrated south through the Horn of Africa. They destroyed the Bantu Kingdom of Zanj and made war against the Christians of highland Ethiopia.

1135–1160

Norman Invasions of North Africa During the crusading era, the Italian city states of Pisa and Genoa as well as Normans raided the coast of eastern Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania. The Normans established control over the coast for some years.

1150–1200

Rise of Yoruba and Hausa States (Nigeria) The Yoruba states arose circa 1150; the Hausa states circa 1150.

1163–1169

Crusader and Zangid Struggle for Egypt Christian crusaders from Europe who had established crusading states in the Levant engaged in a complicated struggle with the Muslim leader Saladin (a Kurd of Turkish descent) for control of Egypt. Saladin became the effective ruler of Egypt in 1169.

1169–1232

Egyptian Expansion Saladin conquered Tripolitania from the Almorahds and Syria, Kurdistan, and Mesopotamia from his nominal overlords, the Turkish Zangids. Thereafter, he won back most of Palestine (including Jerusalem) from the crusaders (1169–1193). His successors invaded Anatolia from 1231 to 1232.

1200–1230

Soso Conquests (Ghana) After the Almoravid invasions, Ghana broke into smaller states. Three in particular dominated the region:

Mali, Soso, and Songhai. Mali and Songhai were Muslim. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, a warlike king Sumanguru brought the Sosi a moment of ascendancy.

1200–1300

Migrations of Nilotic Peoples (Central and Eastern Africa) A wave of pastoral Nilotic peoples (ancestors of the Tutsis) moved southward, eventually penetrating Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Zaire, and northwest Rwanda. Their success was likely made possible by their superior arms and skill at war.

1235

Defeat of the Soso (Ghana) Mandingo, led by King Sundjata defeated the Soso. The Mali Empire began to grow.

1236–1359

Wars of the North Africa States A variety of dynasties—the Marinids of Morocco, the Zenata of Algeria, and the Hafsids of Tunisia—wrestled for control of North Africa. Warfare among these Arab rulers was chronic. The Moroccan rulers also fought Christians in Spain while the Tunisian and Algerian rulers faced invasions from Europe: the French crusading King Louis IX invaded in 1270; the Angevins invaded in 1280; and in 1390, a joint Franco-English force (unsuccessfully) lay siege to Mahdia. After the collapse of Marinid power, Morocco became embroiled in internal violence.

1250

Mameluke Revolt in Egypt The Mamelukes (who were slave-soldier horsemen of Turkish extract) overthrew the Ayyubids of Egypt. They established a military government and ruled Egypt until 1517.

1250–1589

Rise of Kanem-Bornu In 1259, Dunama Dibalemi of Kanem, Sudan, died. Bedouins spread into the Maghrib. In 1300, the capital of the

Kanem Empire moved to Bornu. The Kanem-Bornu Empire reached the height of its power in 1589 under Idris Alooma.

1257–1402

Mongol-Christian-Mameluke Wars (Egypt) The Mamelukes of Egypt fought and defeated the Mongols (nomads from East Asia) in 1257 at the Battle of Ain Jalut, west of the Euphrates. Between 1260 and 1277, the Mameluke Sultan Baibars campaigned against Mongol allies of the Christian crusaders in Syria, eventually helping drive both Mongols and crusaders from the region. From 1400 to 1402, a Tartar warrior, Tamerlane, conquered Syria.

1270–1344

Revolt and Wars in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) The last Zabwe king of Abyssinia was overthrown in 1270. The Abyssinians continued to fend off attacks from Arab Muslims. They saw a brief resurgence of power in the time of Amda Tseyon (1314–1344). He defeated Muslim rebels and conquered and made tributary the Muslim state of Ifat.

1270–1450

Benin (Southwestern Nigeria) Benin emerged as a state in the thirteenth century. It developed a standing army and became an overlord of its neighbors over the course of the next century.

1275–1350

Egyptian Conquest of Sudan Arab raids and Mameluke military expeditions put an end to the Christian Kingdom of Maqurrah.

1307–1332

Expansion of Mali Mali, which emerged circa 1240, developed into a powerful Muslim state under the capable leadership of Emperor Mansa Musa (1312–1337). In his day, Mali stretched from the shores of the Atlantic to the borders of modern Nigeria. Its capital, Timbuktu, became

famous beyond Africa for its wealth and culture. Internal conflicts led to a decline in the late fourteenth century.

1340–1360

Hausaland and Yorubaland (Nigeria) Several city-states located in modern-day northern Nigeria rose to power in the middle of the fourteenth century. They were linked in a loose confederacy, consisting of inner states (Hausa) and outer states (Yoruba).

1350–1475

Rise of the Congo Kingdom (Central Africa) The Congo was one of several emergent states that bore some resemblance to nation-states. By the middle of the fifteenth century, the Kingdom of Congo had come to rule the land between the Congo and Loge rivers, and it exacted tribute from coastal districts to the south.

1400–1592

Wars of West African Empires A number of Songhay trading cities threw off Mali rule at the start of the fifteenth century. Led by their great military commander Sonni Ali and aided by their fearsome mounted lancers, the Songhay gradually established control over much of West Africa. They reached their pinnacle of power between 1493 and 1528. In the sixteenth century, two other empires fought to gain ascendancy in western Africa: that of the Hausas and that of the Kanem Bornu.

Invasions/Raids (Nigeria) Nigeria was threatened by Tuareg nomads who raided in the region and by the Portuguese who attacked the Canary Islands.

1412–1501

Wars between Mameluke Egypt and Ottoman Turks The Mameluke Sultans continued to hold power in Egypt. They kept control of Syria and attempted to expand into Asia Minor and Kurdistan. Between 1487 and 1491, they were at war with the Ottomans, who drove them out of Asia Minor.

1414–1478

Wars in East Africa Christian Ethiopia continued to fight surrounding Muslim powers. The period between 1450 and 1500 also saw the rise of Mombasa as the major coastal town and the rise of the Kingdom of Bunyoro, which lasted into the nineteenth century.

1415–1511

Portuguese and Spanish operations in North Africa The Europeans took advantage of the rather chaotic conditions in North Africa to get footholds along the coast. After Constantinople fell to the Muslim Ottoman Turks in 1453, the Christians of Spain and Portugal came to think of their conquests as crusades. The Portuguese took Ceuta (1415) and Tangier (1471). The Spanish won Algeria, then Tunis, and then Tripoli (1505–1511).

1500–1700

Lwo Conquests (Uganda) Another wave of Nilotic peoples penetrated East Africa. During the sixteenth century, they conquered and destroyed the Chzewzi Kingdom of Kitara. They became militarized, living off plunder and incorporating their captives into their society.

1505–1543

Portuguese Expansion in East Africa The Portuguese increased their influence in East Africa, engaging in some military actions—for example, sacking Kilwa (1505–1506) and Mombasa (1505–1506, 1528), becoming involved in local quarrels, and acting as a counterweight to Ottoman influence in the Horn of Africa region. In 1541, they intervened in a war on the side of the Ethiopians.

1517

Christian–Muslim Wars (Sudan) The Sultanate of Funj was established in the early years of the sixteenth century in the upper Nile (around today's Khartoum). Amars Dunkas and an Arab sheik conquered the Christian kingdoms and united them, thereby forming the Sultanate.

1517–1566

Ottoman Expansion in North Africa The sixteenth century was the heyday of Ottoman successes. The Turks advanced into Europe, Central Asia, and Africa. They won a decisive victory over the Mamelukes, bringing Egypt under Ottoman rule in 1517. Under Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, they went on to establish dominance over most of the coast of North Africa, expelling the Spanish from Tunis and Algiers.

1530–1630

Wars in Coastal West Africa (Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia) Warlike groups carved out dozens of little states. The Mane were the most famous of these groups. Originating from the Mali Empire and armed with bows and arrows, they found a ready market for their war captives and were the main suppliers of the Atlantic slave trade for a century.

1535–1541

Ottoman/Spanish–Portuguese Wars (North Africa) By the middle of the sixteenth century, the Spanish and Portuguese found themselves struggling for power with the Ottomans, who were successfully extending their power along coastal North Africa. Notably, the Emperor Charles V launched two expeditions, one of which (1535) left Tunis as a protectorate for the next forty years, the other of which failed.

1540–1587

Wars between Kingdom of Ethiopia and Somalis The Coptic Kingdom of Ethiopia continued to struggle against the Muslim tribes living along the coast of Somalia and against rebellious Muslim subjects. Ethiopians got aid from the Portuguese, while Muslims got aid from the Ottomans. From 1585 to 1589, the Ottomans encouraged the towns along the Indian Ocean to revolt against the Portuguese.

1540–1600

Tribal Movements and Conflict in East Africa Between 1540 and 1600, the Somalis displaced old Arabic Muslim states in the Horn of Africa, and the pagan Galla relocated to central Ethiopia, conquering the previous inhabitants. In 1587, a tribe from the Zambezi Valley massacred the people of Sofala and destroyed the city. Between 1550 and 1600, a new kingdom, that of Buganda rose to power, lasting to the mid-eighteenth century.

1570–1622

Congo (Central Africa) When Jaga warriors from Angola attacked the Congo kingdom, the Congolese asked the Portuguese for aid from 1570 to 1571. The Portuguese eventually gained control of the Congo following a victory at the battle of Ambuila in 1622.

1590–1620

Migrations (East Africa) The Sotho and Ngoni tribes (warlike Bantus) migrated southward (eventually settling in South Africa). En route, they caused disruption among the tribes of East Africa. In particular, they broke up the Monomotopa Empire (Zimbabwe), leaving it in chaos.

1591

Destruction of the Songhay Empire An expedition largely made up of Spanish and Portuguese mercenaries from Morocco fought and defeated the armies of the Songhay Empire, occupying Timbuktu and destroying Goa. The Europeans owed their victory in part to the use they made of firearms unknown to the Africans of this region.

1600

Rise of Oyo (Nigeria) The Yoruba of Oyo, a town that had benefited from trade, developed an army based on heavily equipped cavalry after suffering a disastrous defeat around 1550. The army (which was state supported) was virtually unbeatable, and Oyo extended their power over the next two centuries.

1600–1700

Piracy in North Africa One of the sources of violence in Africa in the seventeenth century was piracy: Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco conducted raids at sea (Mediterranean and Atlantic) and on land (the Sahara Desert). Their captives were sold as slaves or ransomed. The Ottoman deys legitimized the piratical activities in return for a cut of the profits.

Rise of Rwanda Rwanda began to develop as a centralized state in the early seventeenth century. The pastoral rulers exacted tribute from agricultural peoples in the region, increasingly through military enforcement.

Expansion of Lunda (DRC and Angola) Bands of warrior-adventurers brought numerous tribes under Lunda control. Their successes stemmed in part from their access to European firearms. However, the Lunda proved to be able rulers, politically adroit, and conciliatory. By 1700, the Kingdom of Lunda was the chief power of what is today the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and northeastern Angola.

1618–1670

Wars of Eastern West Africa (Nigeria and Benin) The collapse of the Old Songhay Empire and then the departure of the Moroccans created something of a power vacuum in this region. Violence was endemic in this period as Arab–African nomadic groups fought other African peoples. The period saw the emergence of the Bambara Kingdom on the upper Niger and the rise of Dahomey power.

1620–1654

Wars among Colonial Powers in Coastal West Africa The Dutch became a major sea power in the seventeenth century. They fought with the Portuguese, the English (1664–1665), and the French (1677) to gain bases and a share in the profitable slave trade (1620–1654).

1622–1650

Arab–Portuguese Wars (East Africa) The Arab Sultans of Oman gained rather shaky control of the coast of East Africa after throwing the Portuguese out of their bases near Mozambique.

1628

Portuguese/Madagascar War The Portuguese founded colonies on Madagascar in 1613. They defeated the Mwanamutapa Empire in 1628.

1645–1668

Civil War in Morocco The Berber tribes rebelled against the government of the Sa'adis. In 1649, the Hassani Dynasty took control of Fez. Twenty years later, the dynasty was in complete control of Morocco.

1650–1745

Wars of Western West Africa (Togo, Benin) A number of powerful and predatory states grew up in the hinterland of the Gold Coast in the late seventeenth century, notably the Akwamu and the Denykira. They captured and enslaved tens of thousands of peoples living along the coast of Togo and Benin. At the end of the seventeenth century, they were conquered by the Ashanti, a confederation made up of former migrants and refugees. Its armies, equipped with firearms, were successful enough to defeat the armored cavalry of the Muslim Sudan. The Ashanti maintained strict military control of their empire.

1652

Wars among Colonial Powers in West Africa (Gambia) The Europeans periodically fought one another for control of territories in the Gambia. In the seventeenth century, Germany, Holland, England, France, Sweden, and so forth tried to gain control of the strategically important key position of the island in the trade on the Gambia River.

1652–1727

Portuguese–Omani Wars in East Africa In 1652, the natives of Mombasa, Kenya, sought help from the Sultan of Oman against the Portuguese, the power that had been dominating the gold and slave trade in the region. In 1727, the city-state of Pate allied with the Portuguese to throw off Omani domination. From then until the final defeat of the Portuguese, the Arabs and Europeans fought for control of the region. The Portuguese were eventually driven out of the area.

1652–1800

Wars of West Africa (Gambia) In the region of the Gambia, a number of states (ruled by kings) had emerged in precolonial times. Warfare and internal power struggles were chronic. Europeans who began founding settlements in the area as of 1652 often got the support of local kings who wanted the chance to improve their trade and get guns. In time, the kings came to seek alliance with administrators of British settlements, thereby paving the way for eventual British control of the area.

1688–1700

Dutch–Bushman Conflicts (South Africa) Two Khoisan-speaking peoples (called Hottentots and Bushmen by the Europeans) had lived in southern Africa since the Stone Age. The Hottentots lived around the Cape of Good Hope. The Dutch who first arrived in South Africa in 1652 started moving inland. By the end of the century, they were settled several hundred miles in the interior. Conflicts with the Bushmen (who were the indigenous and some think relatively peaceful inhabitants of the region) started in 1688 when the Dutch reached Mossel Bay.

1700–1769

Civil Wars in Egypt Power struggles were a source of violence in eighteenth-century Egypt. In the early part of the century, two rival factions, the Kasimites and Fikarites, struggled to achieve power. The successful Mameluke governor Ali Bey himself came to power by force of arms (1750 and 1769).

1700–1800

Piracy in the Barbary States (North Africa) Piracy continued along the coast of North Africa, though it was somewhat curbed thanks to military efforts by European powers. States like Tunisia gradually normalized trade relations with European powers. There were, however, periodic clashes between the Barbary States and European powers, notably Algeria, which lost Oran to the Spanish and then won it back (1791).

Revolts against the Turks (North Africa) The period saw armed struggles against the Turks. At the start of the century, Tripoli (1714) gained effective independence from the Ottoman Turks as did Tunisia (1705). Thereafter, Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli remained nominal vassals of the Turkish sultan; they paid him tribute, but suffered from only limited interference.

1700–1890

Masai Migration (Kenya) The Masai were a pastoral people who originated from the Nile region. As they migrated south and east, they conquered or displaced their precursors. They had a military social organization and led a mobile and warlike existence.

1712–1720

Civil Wars among the Ashanti (Western West Africa) When not guided by a strong ruler, internal wars troubled the region. Between the death of Osei Tutu and the emergence of another effective warrior king (Opuke Ware), the Ashanti Kingdom suffered from a period of internal strife and unrest.

1724–1748

Dahomey Wars of Expansion (Benin) The Kingdom of Dahomey, which developed along centralized military lines, expanded its territory to the Guinea coast (1724–1727). Oyo built up its own army and inflicted two defeats on its new rival (1726–1730; 1738–1748).

1725

Holy Wars (West Africa) Islamic jihads began in Guinea.

1727–1800

Civil Wars in Morocco For much of the eighteenth century, Morocco was completely independent and ruled by a sultan. When not under the control of an effective ruler, Morocco tended to become embroiled in civil strife and lose its influence abroad. When Morocco was

strongly ruled, as by Sultan Mulay Ismail (1672–1727) and Sidi Mohammed (1757–1790), law and order soon returned.

1730–1755

Ethiopian–Sudanese War The Ethiopians fought and were defeated by the Islamic Funj sultanate of Sudan. Kanem-Bornu began to reemerge as a power in the region as of 1730.

1750–1775

Tuareg Invasion of West Africa Tuareg Nomads conquered Timbuktu and much of the central Niger valley during this period. Their conquests were probably driven by economic pressures, notably the great drought that afflicted the region between 1735 and 1756.

1755–1775

Civil Wars in West Africa West African states were not infrequently torn by internal wars during this period. Succession struggles in Segu (1755–1766) led to disorder that ended only when a strong ruler seized the throne in 1766. Similarly, another succession dispute in Benin (1775) led to civil wars that resulted in a fatal weakening of the power of this successful West African state.

1757–1763

The Seven Years' War (Senegal) A struggle for supremacy between Prussia (whose allies included Great Britain) and Austria (whose allies included France), combined with colonial rivalry, turned the Seven Years' War into a worldwide conflict. In Africa, the British and French conducted raids against one another's colonial possessions. The British succeeded in conquering part of Senegal in the course of this war.

1768–1780

Christian–Muslim Wars (Ethiopia and its neighbors) Christian Abyssinia continued to fight wars with its Muslim and pagan neighbors.

1769–1786

Egyptian Struggles for Independence Egypt was still governed by the Mamelukes, who recognized Ottoman sovereignty. In the eighteenth century, the Egyptians tried on several occasions to free themselves from Turkish control, notably under Ali Bey. Ali was defeated in 1773, and a revolt in 1786 was suppressed.

1774–1795

Khoisan Resistance (South Africa) By the latter half of the eighteenth century, the Dutch settlers were effectively waging war on any of the indigenous people who stood in their way. The Khoisan peoples put up increased resistance only to be repressed. Official records show that at least 2,480 were killed. Dispossessed bands of Khoisan, known as Oorlam groups, pressed northward over the Orange River and into southern Namibia, eventually leading to increased conflict in this region.

1778–1779

Wars in West Africa (Senegal) The Americans, with the help of the French, won their independence from British colonial powers. In Senegal, the French were able to reconquer some of their colonial possessions. The Treaty of Paris (which recognized American independence) divided Senegal posts between England and France.

1779–1878

Kaffir Wars Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Xhosa and colonists fought eight wars in South Africa: 1779; 1793; 1799–1801; 1811; 1818–1819; 1834–1835; 1850–1853; 1877–1878. In between, raiding and conflict was endemic. The Xhosa were Bantu-speaking cattle farmers who competed with the Boers for pasture along the Great Fish River. They were relatively recent arrivals in the region, having migrated from East Africa. The Xhosa became more desperate with each succeeding war. By 1818, they were also beginning to become internally divided. In 1878, all of British Kaffraria was annexed.

1790–1793

Oyo Wars (West Africa) Oyo reduced the size of its army (1770–1777) in an effort to promote economic growth. Perhaps because of this, it suffered losses in its war on the Yoruba client state of Ife (which it was attacking to get slaves). In 1790, Oyo also found itself threatened by an old enemy, Dahomey (which had fought the Oyo between 1738 and 1748.)

1792–1800

French Revolution in Africa The French and the British resumed their struggle in Africa when the French Revolution in Europe once again made them military foes in Europe. The French tried (largely in vain) to get back lost Senegal posts while the British tried to win St. Louis.

1798–1802

Napoleonic Wars in Egypt The French occupied Egypt in 1798 after Napoleon led a modern army twenty-three thousand strong into the country. The British defeated the French, and Napoleon returned to France to deal with the crisis in his own country.

1800–1850

Conflict in Southern Africa During the first part of the nineteenth century, Namibia was afflicted by a prolonged period of drought. This provoked endemic conflict over pasture between the Nama and the Hereros. The Nama were a Khoisan-speaking pastoral people who probably settled in this region by the time of Christ. The Hereros were Bantu-speaking peoples who came from the east in the sixteenth century.

1801–1829

Wars between Western Powers and the Barbary States (North Africa) The United States and Western powers paid tribute to rulers of the North African Barbary states (semi-independent satellites of the Ot-

toman Empire) so that pirates would refrain from attacking merchant vessels in the Mediterranean. The United States, the French, and the British engaged in periodic military actions (naval blockades and punitive expeditions) to try to suppress the piracy and to protest increased demand for tribute.

1801–1887

Trade Wars in West Africa (Sierra Leone) In the precolonial period, ethnic groups of the region now known as Sierra Leone were divided among smaller chiefdoms. These groups traded and fought among themselves. During the nineteenth century, they were engaged in what are now called “trade wars.” The Temne (one of the major ethnic groups) fought the Susu in 1815, Sherbo in 1825, Loko in 1841, and Sulima in 1887.

1803–1825

Colonial Conflicts in Madagascar The French and English vied for control of Madagascar, which had been annexed by the French in 1686. The French won control in 1803, the British in 1810, the French again between 1818 and 1819. During the same period, both sides periodically engaged in struggles with the local peoples who disliked both the French and the English.

1804–1818

Fulani and Tukolor Jihads (West Africa: Nigeria) The part-Berber Fulani and the Tuklors expanded during these decades between the upper Senegal River and Lake Chad. The expansion was carried out in the name of Islam. Sheikh Usman dan Fodio led the Fulani advance (1804–1810); Ahmadu ibn Hammadi led that of the Tukulors (1807–1818), establishing a Muslim empire in northern Nigeria that reached as far as Timbuktu.

1805–1811

Egyptian Revolution (North Africa: Egypt) After the end of French rule in Egypt (1798–1801), Muhammad Ali became the Ottoman sultan’s

viceroy. In a violent revolution, he changed Egypt's traditional social and political order, and he suppressed rebellions of Bedouins and peasants. He did not succeed in rebuilding Egypt along modern lines, however.

1806–1816

Ashanti Expansion in West Africa (Ghana) The Ashanti controlled an empire in the interior of present-day Ghana. They were frequently in conflict with a coastal tribe, the Fante, whom they fought in 1806, 1811, and 1816. They also fought an alliance of the Akim–Akwapim in 1814.

1807–1840

Zulu Expansion and the Mfecane At the turn of the nineteenth century, Zulu power expanded thanks to the military reforms of the famed Zulu leader, Shaka. The Zulu conquests (possibly combined with demographic and colonial pressures in East Africa) led to the *mfecane* (c. 1816) or the “crushing,” a period of violent upheavals and disruptions in southern Africa. The effect of Zulu successes was to displace tribes, who then migrated elsewhere and, in their turn, conquered and displaced other tribes. Among the migrations were those of the Matabele (Ndebele) who settled in the Marico Valley and later came into conflict with the Boers and English, and also the Ndandwe, who founded the Gaza Kingdom in Mozambique. Some two million Africans died.

1810–1840

Struggle for Control of East Coast Trade (East African Cities) War among the urban centers of East Africa was chronic in this and the previous century. After the expulsion of the Portuguese in 1699, most of this area was technically under the loose control of the Imam of Oman; however, Arab families held most of the actual power. The Mazrui family of Mombasa was chief among them. In 1806, Said bin Sultan reasserted Omani authority in East Africa. By 1824, Said had evicted the Mazrui from the area around Lamu, and Mombasa fell in 1828. In 1840, Said moved his court from Oman to Zanzibar, where he assumed the title of sultan.

1817–1835

Civil War in Oyo (Nigeria) The powerful Empire of Oyo, already broken up by the Fulani (1804–1810) was swept up in civil wars during the early decades of the nineteenth century. Ibadan, Abeokuta, Owo, and Warri fought to control the trade routes and access to fresh supplies of slaves. The capital that was earned from the sale of slaves was in turn used to buy firearms.

1818–1858

Dahomey Expansion in West Africa (Benin) The Kingdom of Dahomey (today's Benin) reached its peak of power in these decades. At this time, it was a society organized for war and rather unique in that it employed women soldiers. War permitted it to expand its boundaries and acquire slaves, who in turn provided a labor force and wealth.

1820–1839

Egyptian Conquest of Sudan The Egyptians conquered the Nilotic Sudanese (1820–1821). For many years, rebellions continued to simmer in the Sudan. Though successfully suppressed, problems continued until the appointment of the enlightened Governor General Ali Khursid Aghada in 1826. The Egyptians left in 1838.

1823–1870

Basotho Wars During his reign, King Moshoeshe of the Lesotho fought a series of wars against South Africa. The land he lost is remembered as the “Lost Territory.” He is remembered as a diplomat and military tactician.

1824–1896

Ashanti Wars Four wars were fought between the Ashanti and the British in the nineteenth century: 1824–1831; 1873–1874; 1893–1894; and 1895–1896. The Ashanti, a tribal confederation of West Africa, were a powerful and expansionist people. The first war took place when

the British intervened to protect settlers and coastal tribes (notably the Fanti) from the warriors, and it resulted in the Ashanti's losing control of part of the Gold Coast (Ghana). The fourth resulted in the final dissolution of the Ashanti federation.

1825–1854

French Wars in West Africa (Senegal and the Ivory Coast) The French were anxious to protect their gum arabic trade, and they fought several wars to this end, defeating the Amir of Trarza in 1825 and conquering the Oulo in 1842. In 1840, a French ordinance established Senegal as a permanent French possession. In 1854, the French expanded their area of control in West Africa, moving south from Senegal to take much of the Ivory Coast (1842).

1827–44

West African Blockade The British Royal Navy maintained a prevention squadron to blockade and patrol the West African coast with a view to ending the slave trade. Slavery was abolished throughout the British Empire in 1833.

Circa 1830

Wars in the Gambia In the nineteenth century, the British became involved in African wars as local rulers sought their aid. Warfare also occurred when the kings tried to preserve their sovereignty: in 1840, the British fought major wars against the kings of Barra (which they won) and Kataba (which they lost).

1830–1847

French Conquest of Algiers; The Algerian War The French invaded Algeria and captured Algiers. In 1834, they annexed the region. Until 1847, they continued to face opposition, most notably from the great religious leader Abd al Quadir. By 1839, al Quadir controlled more than two-thirds of Algeria. However, the French were eventually successful, and after brutal campaigns, they forced the Algerian freedom fighters to surrender in late 1847.

1831–1841

Turko–Egyptian Wars The Egyptians fought two wars in this period against the Ottomans. Between 1831 and 1833, they gained control of parts of Syria. The Egyptians agreed to return Syria in 1840, but their ruler Mohammed Ali was made hereditary ruler over Egypt. The Egyptians again fought the Ottomans between 1838 and 1841, but despite achieving military victory, they were thwarted by European powers. Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia forced Egypt out of Syria, and though they gave Muhammad Ali the right to rule Egypt and the Sudan, he remained subject to the sultan.

1836–1869

Boers Wars against Ndebele, Basotho, and Zulus Dutch settlers (Afrikaners or Boers/Farmers) came into conflict with indigenous peoples of South Africa when they moved out of the British-controlled Cape area into the hinterland. They fought a number of wars, in particular against the Ndebele (Trekker–Ndebele War, 1836; and again in Zimbabwe, 1852) and the Basotho (1858, 1869). They also fought against the Zulus and the Pedi.

1840–1855

Civil War in Ethiopia By 1840, the old Empire of Ethiopia had become divided into a number of states, including Bagender, Tigre, and Shoa. Civil war was endemic.

1840–1856

Zulu Civil Wars Power struggles afflicted the Zulus mid-century. In 1840, Dingane and his brother fought a war, as did the brothers Cetshwayo and Mbulazi (the two sons of King Umpanda) in 1856.

1840–1870

Yoruba Wars (Nigeria) The decline of the power of Oyo created a power vacuum. A number of newer states—Ibadan, Ijaye, Ilorin, and Abeokuta—fought wars in an effort to inherit political and economic

dominance. Ibadan was the most successful, consolidating an empire in the east between 1847 and 1870. During the same period, European explorers, missionaries, and merchants arrived in the region in increasing numbers, followed by troops and administrators.

1842–1850

Anglo–Boer Wars (South Africa) The British and the Boers came into frequent conflict during these years, engaging in military encounters in 1842 and between 1846 and 1850.

1842–1889

Wars and Colonial Intervention (Gambia) In the mid-nineteenth century, Islam expanded to the south. Wars intensified in the Gambia, culminating in the brutal Soninke–Marabout wars, which were fought between two rival Muslim sects between 1842 and 1875. In 1875, a Tukulor ruler, Musa Molloh, went to war with the Mindingo–Jola kingdoms along the south bank of the Gambia River and Fodi Kabbah. In 1889, the Jola sought for help from the British: the net result was that when Fodi Kabbah was defeated in 1892, the British extended a protectorate over the whole territory, now known as the Gambia (as agreed between the British crown and the French in 1889).

1852–1881

Anglo–Basuto Wars (South Africa) The British intervened in some of the Boer wars against native peoples, and they also inherited the conflicts of the Boers when they annexed their lands. The English were several times defeated by the Basutos: at Belea Mountain (December 20, 1852) and in 1857 at Viervoet. Between 1880 and 1881, the Basuto successfully rebelled when asked to give up their guns. British rule over Basutoland (Lesotho) was ended.

1852–1893

Tukulor–French Wars (Guinea, Senegal, Mali) The *jihād* of Umar bin Sa'id Tal brought the Tukulors into conflict with the French in coastal Senegal. The French were eventually able to take advan-

tage of the resentment and rebellions that followed Tukolor conquests to expand their own power over other parts of the Tukolor Empire.

1855–1868

Wars of Unification (Ethiopia) Chief Kassa of Qwara declared himself Emperor Theodore of Ethiopia, laid the foundations for a modern army, conquered the Galla, and started to unify Tigré and Amhara with Shoa. He killed himself in 1868, following a defeat by the British.

1859–1860

Moroccan War Morocco and Spain went to war over the boundaries of Ceuta in 1859.

1859–1905

French Pacification of Madagascar Madagascar became a French protectorate in 1859. It was troubled by periodic violence throughout the nineteenth century: riots, a war (1883–1885), and a revolt (1898–1904). It was declared a colony in 1896 and pacified by 1905.

1860–1864

Majeerteen Civil War (Somalia) The Majeerteen Sultanate, a desert kingdom on the coast of the Somali Peninsula that originated in the eighteenth century, became powerful in the nineteenth century from trade and also from the British, who paid for their shipwrecked crews to be protected. A destructive civil war broke out in 1860 between Sultan Boqor Ismaan Mahamuud and a cousin, Keenadiid, who challenged his position. Keenadiid was defeated, though in the following decade he was able to conquer a small kingdom for himself.

1861

Annexation of Lagos (Nigeria) The British annexed Lagos to help them wipe out the slave trade and develop trade in other commodities.

From there, they gradually gained control over other parts of the coastal area of Nigeria.

1862–1864

Transvaal Civil War; Boer Civil War Boers who had settled in the Transvaal and Transorangia had been given independence by the British. Those who settled in the Transvaal fought among themselves for a number of years.

1862–1896

Zanzibar–British Conflict The British gradually extended their control over Zanzibar, which became a British protectorate in 1890. A revolt was suppressed in 1896.

1867–1868

Wars in Ethiopia Theodore II of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) made himself emperor in 1858 and tightened his grip on the country. The murder of consular officials in 1867 angered the British, who sent an expeditionary force. After Theodore's defeat and suicide in 1868, civil wars broke out.

Circa 1870

Wars in Somalia With the help of some military adventurers from Arabia, Keenadiid carved out the small kingdom of Hobyo after conquering the local Hawiye clans.

1871

Kabylie Revolt (Algeria) A serious insurrection broke out in 1871 and spread through much of Algeria. The revolt was triggered by the extension of colonial authority to previously self-governing tribal reserves and the abrogation of promises. An outbreak of famine also contributed to the misery. The uprising was repressed.

1871–1879

Egyptian Expansion Although nominally still vassals of the Ottomans, the Egyptians were able to expand their power in this decade. An interest in ivory, among other things, led them to increase their control over the upper Nile between 1874 and 1879 and over the Sudan (1871–1875). They established forts and garrisons among the Dinka and Shilluk.

1875

Zimba Raids (Kenya) Zimbas raided the towns of the East Coast, and Mombasa was destroyed.

1875–1879

Abyssinian–Egyptian War The Egyptians were thwarted by the Abyssinian king Yohannes IV, who drove two of their armies out of the highlands of Eritrea (1875–1876).

1877–1893

Yoruba Wars: Colonial Expansion (Nigeria) In 1877, the Ekiti and Ijesa massacred Ibadan officials and revolted. The war that followed lasted for sixteen years and resulted in the loss of Ibadan power. It also paved the way for British control.

1878–1879

Anglo–Zulu War This war—fought between the Zulus and the British and made famous by the battles of Isandlwana, Rorke's Drift, and Ulundi—was a decisive one in eastern South Africa. The Zulus were initially successful: in one of the worst disasters endured by colonial powers, over thirteen hundred British and African allies were killed at Isandlwana mountain. However, the Zulus were beaten at the Zulu capital of Ulundi on July 4, 1879. Some fifteen hundred Zulus died on that day, and King Cetshwayo, erstwhile ally of the British, was captured and sent into exile. The British divided his country up among thirteen

pro-British chiefs, a move that led to a decade of destructive civil war. Zululand was annexed to Natal in 1887.

1880–1889

Zulu Civil War After their defeat by the British, the Zulus were deprived of their king and placed on reservations with very limited good land. The result was an immensely destructive civil war.

1880–1902

Anglo–Boer Wars (South Africa) The Boers, irked by British control, expanded from the Cape into the hinterland. The Trekkers who settled in Natal and Transvaal were granted independence after some early conflicts. However, at mid-century, in part because the economic potential of the interior was now more obvious and in part to help put an end to troubles with the “natives,” the English reannexed Boer territories, leading to two Anglo–Boer Wars. The Boers, who fought commando style and who made very effective use of horses, proved a difficult enemy. The British were unable to defeat the Boers in the first war (1880–1881), though they did eventually force the Boers to accept British sovereignty (1902).

1881

French Conquest of Tunisia In April 1881, French seaborne forces took Bizerte while army units moved across the Algerian border. In May 1881, Tunis quickly surrendered, thus becoming a French protectorate.

1881–1885

Mahdist Revolt; Sudanese War The devout Muhammad Ahmad of the Sudan declared himself the Mahdi, “expected guide,” and led a *ji-had* against the Egyptians who were controlled by the British from Cairo. In 1881, he won a victory at the Battle of Aba and successfully defeated numbers of expeditions sent against him. British general Charles Gordon was sent to evacuate Khartoum, but he later chose to

defend it. Khartoum fell. The Sudan was liberated in the time of the Mahdi's successor.

1882

British Occupation of Egypt Anti-European rioting in Egypt was followed by British military intervention. An army of twenty thousand invaded the Suez Canal Zone, and the Egyptians were defeated at Tell el-Kebir. Thereafter, the British dominated the Egyptian government.

1883–1914

British Pacification of Nigeria (West Africa: Nigeria) The British penetration of Nigeria met with various forms of resistance throughout the country. In the south, the British had to fight many wars, in particular the wars against the Ijebu (a Yoruba group) in 1892, the Aro of Eastern Igboland, and, until 1914, the Aniocha of Western Igboland. Military action was less frequent in the north, though the deposed caliph Atahiru I rebelled in 1903.

1884–1885

Berlin Conference The Berlin Conference partitioned Africa: The Germans gained South-West Africa (Namibia), Cameroons, Togoland, and Tanganyika (German East Africa), and the Belgians gained the Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire). The French were left in control of the Ivory Coast, French Guinea, Dahomey, and Gabon; the British in control of the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, and Uganda; and the Portuguese in control of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Although the event itself was not violent, the division of Africa would be a source of conflict in the future.

1885

Herero Resistance (German South-West Africa) South-West Africa was annexed by the Germans in the 1880s. The Herero resisted in 1885.

1885–1887

Anglo-German Contest (East Africa) In 1885, Britain and Germany struggled for control of the East African coast, with Germany establishing a protectorate in Tanganyika. In 1887, during the Anglo-German contest for East Africa, Britain made Kenya a protectorate.

1885–1889

Slave Wars (East Africa) British forces began an intermittent war against Arab slave traders in Africa's Nyasaland in 1885. Other colonial powers fought similar wars. From 1888 to 1890, the Germans and Arabs fought. From 1892 to 1893, Arab slave traders rose up, angered by European interference and were thus opposed by Belgian troops.

Uganda Wars of Religion Muslims fought Catholic Christians. Afterward, Protestants and Catholics engaged in a fight among themselves.

First Italo-Abyssinian War (Ethiopia) Italy secured a base on Ethiopia's Red Sea coastline in 1885 and began to penetrate the interior. They fought an unsuccessful war against Emperor John II of Abyssinia. However, in 1889, with Italian aid, a chieftain of Sewa gained the throne as Emperor Melelik II. By a treaty negotiated with him, the Italians claimed a protectorate over Ethiopia.

1885–1898

French-Mandingo Wars (West Africa) The French fought three wars (1885–1886, 1894–1895, and 1898) against Samori Touré of the Sofas, a warlike ruler of Ivory Coast tribes. In the 1880s and 1890s, he established an empire that extended over large parts of present-day Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire. His power was broken by the French by the end of the century.

1887

Zulu Rebellion The Zulus rebelled, and the British annexed Zulu territory north of the Thukela river.

1888–1890

Arab Uprising in German East Africa Bushiri bin Salim (d. 1889) incited an uprising of coastal Arab slave traders against harsh German colonizers in German East Africa (now part of Tanzania). By 1890, the rebels were suppressed.

1889

Mahdist Invasion of Abyssinia In January 1889, Mahdist forces numbering sixty thousand attacked Abyssinia, defeating Abyssinian forces numbering seventy thousand at Debra Sin. Abyssinian forces, reportedly numbering ninety thousand, decisively defeated the Mahdists at Metemma on March 12, 1889, effectively ending the war.

1889–1892

French Wars in West Africa The French fought several wars in West Africa: against the Dahomeys (1889–1890) and against the Tukulors of the upper Niger (1890–1892). Both were defeated. The French were able to link their possessions in upper Senegal and the upper Niger region.

1891–1898

Wahehe War (German East Africa) A warlike tribe, the Wahehe, who lived along the Rufiji River, rebelled against the Arabs who were not only being used as local officials in Tanzania but were also corrupt and exploitative. For two years, they fought the Arabs until German and mercenary troops arrived and helped defeat them. The Wahehe then rose against the Germans between 1891 and 1898, fighting a guerrilla war under their leader Mkwawa after their capital was destroyed.

1891–1920

Mad Mullah Wars (Somalia) The puritanical dervish, Sayyid Muhammed ben Abdullah, waged war against the Ethiopians,

the British, and the Italians in two jihads, 1899–1905 and 1907–1920. The struggle devastated the Somali Peninsula. One-third of northern Somalia's population died, and the country's economy was wrecked.

1893

Rif War (Spanish Morocco) Muslim Berbers called the Rif (Riff), who inhabited the er-Rif region in northern Morocco, menaced the Spanish possessions along the Mediterranean coast. The Spanish sent a force to Africa in 1873 when the Sultan of Morocco failed to deal with the problems.

Mahdist Invasion of Eritrea Mahdist forces numbering eleven thousand attacked Eritrea but were decisively defeated at Agordat by an Italian force of two thousand (December 21, 1893); the Mahdists then withdrew.

1893–1896

War and Rebellion (Anglo–Matabele Conflicts) The establishment of the British South Africa Company (1890) led to conflict between the Ndebele (Matabele) of Zimbabwe with colonists. The Africans were defeated. The company took over administration of the tribe. Virtually all of the Ndebele's good land was given to settlers, and many of their cows were confiscated. Worse, the Ndebele were forced to labor for the white men. In 1896, they revolted. Savage massacres ensued, but the revolt was quelled.

1895

Jameson's Raid (South Africa) On December 29, 1895, Sir Leander Star Jameson, a British colonial administrator and associate of Cecil Rhodes, led a band of volunteers on a raid into the Boer colony of Transvaal. His purpose was to support a brewing rebellion by foreign settlers (mainly British), and to further Rhodes's ambition for a united South Africa.

Batetelan Rebellion against Belgium (Congo) In 1885, King Leopold II (1835–1909) of Belgium gained international recognition as head of the newly formed Congo Free State (Zaire) in equatorial Africa.

He treated the vast area as his private domain, and his administrators were noted for their cruelty and harshness toward the native Africans. In 1895, the Batetelas, a warlike native tribe that lived in the Lomani River and Llua River areas of the Congo, rose up against their stern Belgian masters, but they were soon suppressed.

1896–1899

British Reconquest of Sudan Britain decided to reconquer the Sudan, which was controlled by the Mahdists under their caliph, Abdullah (1846?–1899), and which was of increasing interest to the Italians and French in Africa. An Anglo–Egyptian army led by General Horatio Herbert Kitchener destroyed the Mahdists and the condominium government of the Anglo–Egyptian Sudan was then established.

1897–1900

Revolt of Rabih Zobeir (Chad) Rabih Zobeir revolted against the French in French West Africa (in the part now belonging to Chad).

French Pacification of the Batetela (Congo) The French finally completed pacification of the warlike Batetela, who had earlier risen up in revolt against their Belgian “masters.”

1900

Sahara War The French finalized their conquest of the oases of the northern Sahara after years of desert warfare.

Ashanti Rebellion (Ghana) A crisis arose in the Gold Coast when the British governor tried to take possession of the Golden Stool—the symbol of Ashanti power and independence. The Ashanti rose up in rebellion but were defeated.

1900–1903

British Conquest of Nigeria The British completed their takeover of northern Nigeria. In the south of Nigeria, the British defeated the Aro, who had remained opposed to British penetration into the hinterland.

1902

Angolan Revolt The Portuguese subdued the Kwanhama who continued to resist the conquest of Angola.

1903

Border Clashes (Algeria–Morocco) French–Moroccan clashes on the Algerian–Moroccan border began substantial French penetration into Morocco.

1904

Anyang Revolt (Cameroon) The Anyang revolted against the Germans in the Cameroons.

1904–1906

First Moroccan Crisis France reached agreements in 1904 with Britain (April 8) and Spain (October 7), granting the French virtually protectorate control over Morocco. A crisis arose when the Germans—a rival colonial power—tried to block the agreement.

1904–1907

Herero and Nama War of Resistance (Namibia) In January 1904, the Herero rose in rebellion against German colonial forces. Initially successful, they were eventually defeated by German forces under the brutal general von Trotha. The battle at Waterberg (August 1904) effectively broke their resistance to the Germans. Thereafter, a number of Namas revolted and waged a guerrilla campaign for some years before finally suing for peace. The resistance and its aftermath took a terrible toll on the Herero and Nama. By 1910, the Herero people were reduced in size by about 90 percent (80–85 percent dead, 5–10 percent in exile) and two-thirds of the Nama died.

1905

French Congo Uprising French desire to exploit their colonial possessions along the Congo River led to ruthless treatment of indigenous

peoples who rose in rebellion in 1905. French forces quelled the uprising and established control in the region.

1905–1907

Maji Maji Uprising (Tanzania) Resentment by native peoples of German East Africa came to a head when the Germans started replacing food crops with cotton crops. Believing that a special water (the maji) would make them immune to gunfire, the Africans revolted against the Germans. An estimated 200,000 are thought to have died in the repression that followed.

1905–1908

Gusii revolts (Kenya) The Gusii revolted against the British in southwest Kenya.

1906

Mahdist Revolt in Nigeria In 1906, a radical (allegedly Mahdist) Muslim group rose against the British in Nigeria. The revolt was supported by many fugitive slaves (freed by colonial decree as of 1900, but in practice kept in bondage). The revolt was brutally crushed.

Zulu Revolt (South Africa) Zulus had contributed to the defeat of the Boers. After the war, however, they found themselves in a worse position than they had been before. They rebelled unsuccessfully against the British. More than two thousand died.

1908–1909

French Conquest of Mauritania The French conquered Mauritania.

1909–1911

Wadai War (Chad and Central Sudan) Wadai is a mountainous, arid region in eastern Chad and central Sudan. The French conquered this region between 1909 and 1911, putting an end to trans-Saharan trade.

1911

Second Moroccan Crisis A second crisis broke out in Morocco when French forces intervened in Fes to quell disorders. The Germans saw this episode as an attempt by France to organize a protectorate in Morocco; thus, they dispatched a gunboat to Agadir. In November, France gained its desired protectorate in Morocco, but German commercial interests in Morocco were guaranteed. France also gave Germany a piece of the French Congo with access to the sea.

1911–1912

Franco–Moroccan War The French fought Moroccan forces for control of Morocco.

1911–1917

Tutsi and Hutu Revolts in German East Africa (Tanzania) The Tutsi and Hutu revolted against the Germans and British in what was later to become Tanganyika.

1912–1931

The Sanusi War (Libya) The Italians conquered Libya during the Turko–Italian War of 1911–1912. However, it took them years to pacify the Sanusi—Bedouins who saw Turkey's surrender as a betrayal of Muslim interests and who proved to be especially adept in guerrilla wars. The struggle between 1914 and 1917 merged with the Great War.

1913

Vy Vato Sakelika (VVS) Suppression (Madagascar) The Iron and Stone Ramification (Vy Vato Sakelika—VVS) was a secret society formed in 1913 to promote Malagasy cultural identity. Though suppressed by the French, it did help give the Malagasy a representative voice in government.

Angolan Rebellions This year also saw rebellions against the Portuguese.

1914

Boer Antiwar Uprising Some ten thousand Afrikaners rose up against Botha and Smuts when they brought South Africa into World War I on the side of the British. The Boers had been helped by the Germans in the South African War and were reluctant to fight them. Botha crushed the rebels.

1914–1918

World War I Though the underlying causes of World War I are complex, the war was triggered by the assassination of the archduke of Austria-Hungary in 1914. It became an international conflict that involved most of the nations of Europe along with Russia, the United States, the Middle East, and other regions. While the major theaters of war were in Europe, the colonial connection ensured that fighting would take place in Africa: the British, French, and South Africans seized German colonies. Of special note are the campaigns in Egypt where the Arabs, organized by T. E. Lawrence, fought the Turks and the campaigns in German East Africa, where Botha and Smuts sent troops to conquer present-day Namibia. Some African soldiers also fought in Europe.

1915

Chilembwe's Rebellion (Mozambique) Chilembwe rebelled against the British and Portuguese in Nyasaland and Portuguese East Africa (what was later to become Mozambique).

Tunisian Uprising There was an uprising against the French in southern Tunisia.

1919

Nationalist Rebellion in Egypt This was a popular rebellion that was inspired by Woodrow Wilson's call for self-determination for all nations. When the British thwarted Egyptian aspirations, Egyptians of all classes participated in demonstrations. These were crushed by force: by the summer of 1919, more than eight hundred Egyptians had been killed, as well as thirty-one Europeans and twenty-nine British soldiers.

1919–1926

Riff War; War of Melilla The Moroccan Riff and Jibala nomads fought a resistance war against the Spanish and later the French in the Maghrib (northwest Africa). Some five thousand Africans died. France lost sixteen thousand soldiers and Spain, some fifteen thousand. Though an able commander, Abd el-Krim, was eventually forced to surrender because of the military and technological superiority of the colonial powers. In 1926, the Spanish Sahara was decisively retaken.

1920–24

Assassination of British Officials in Egypt A series of British officials were assassinated in Egypt, culminating with Sir Lee Stack who was the British governor general of Sudan and commander of the Egyptian army.

1921

Uprising in Egypt When Zaghlul, Egyptian nationalist leader and founder of the Wafd party, was deported, violent disturbances occurred in the towns and cities of Egypt.

1928

Coup d'état in Ethiopia The regent of Ethiopia, Ras Tafari, proclaimed himself King Haile Selassie I.

1928–1949

Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt was founded in 1928. Its goal was to purge Egypt of foreign domination, then influence, purify, and reform Egyptian society. Before the war with Israel (when the Brotherhood was dissolved), the Brotherhood was responsible for numerous attacks on British personnel and property.

1934

Border Clash between Italy and Ethiopia The Italians and Ethiopians fought an engagement in December on the Ethiopian–Italian Somaliland border.

1935–1936

Second Italo–Abyssinian War In 1936, Italy conquered Abyssinia, which was one of the last remaining independent states of Africa. Sixteen thousand Ethiopians died, as did fifteen thousand Italians. The League of Nations condemned the invasion but failed to do anything to stop the Italians.

1936

Anglo–Egyptian Treaty Protests The British fortified the Suez Canal as allowed by the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The treaty angered many Egyptians and led to a wave of anti-Wafdist and anti-British demonstrations. Support grew for more militant, paramilitary organizations, like the Muslim Brotherhood and Young Egypt.

1938–1939

Italian–French Colonial Dispute (North Africa) The Italians laid claim to a number of regions including Tunisia. The French refused to cede the territories, which led to a series of clashes.

1939–1945

World War II World War II was fought between the Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) and the Allies (France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China). Fighting took place worldwide including on African soil, where the war started with Italians invading Egypt. The British fought the Italians (1940–1941) in Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. They then fought the German Afrika Korps in North Africa. In November 1942, the first Allied offensive began with U.S. and British landings in North Africa. Africans from South Africa and elsewhere fought alongside the Allies in Africa. Considerable numbers also fought with the French in Europe and with the British in Asia.

1947–1948

Revolt of Malagasy Republic against France (Madagascar) This revolt, which was centered on the east coast of the island, was brutally

suppressed by the French. Estimates of those killed range from eleven to eighty thousand. The Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache (MDRM) was outlawed, but the revolt continued as a guerrilla war through 1948.

1947–1955

Rebellion in Morocco A nationalist movement arose in Morocco. The sultan (who supported the nationalists against the French) was deposed in 1953. Terrorism and guerrilla operations spread throughout Morocco, and Berber tribes rose in revolt. In 1955, Morocco was given its independence, and the sultan was restored to power.

May 1948–January 1949

First Arab–Israeli War; or Israel’s War for Independence The immediate cause of the Arab–Israeli War of 1948 was the decision by the UN to permit the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Egypt was among the Arab states engaged in the war. An armistice was concluded in 1949.

1949–1962

Race Riots in the Republic of South Africa A number of race riots took place during these years and were ruthlessly suppressed by government police and troops. The most significant took place at Durban in 1949, 1959, and 1960; at Kimberley, 1952; and at Sharpeville, 1960.

1951–1952

Egyptian Riots Egyptians were outraged when the British demolished Egyptian mud houses to open a road to a water supply for the British army. In 1952, the British attacked an Egyptian police barracks, and the police mutinied. People in Cairo rioted.

1952

Coup d’état in Egypt In July, the Free Officers (a clandestine group in the Egyptian Army), led by Gamal Abdul Nasser, seized power from

King Faruk and his government. They sought to free Egypt from British control and establish a more fair government.

1952–1956

Tunisian War of Independence The fall of France in World War II encouraged Tunisian nationalists to increase their struggle for independence. Led by Habib Bourguiba, they fought a successful guerrilla war. Tunisia was formally granted independence on March 20, 1956. The following year, the country was declared a republic, with Bourguiba its first president. Some fighting with the French continued into the 1960s.

Kenyan State of Emergency; Mau Mau Revolt The Mau Mau movement started among the Kikuyus of Kenya in the 1950s. Its members advocated violent resistance to British rule and resorted to sabotage and assassination to achieve their goals. In 1952, the British government declared a state of emergency in Kenya and began military operations against the rebels. By 1956, more than eleven thousand rebels had been killed in the fighting, along with about one hundred Europeans and two thousand Africans, who remained loyal to the British.

1954–1962

Algerian War of National Liberation from the French This very brutal war started as an insurrection against the French by the Algerian independence movement, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). Some 10,200 French soldiers and some seventy thousand Algerians were killed in a struggle notable for its widespread use of terror. Algeria became independent on July 3, 1962.

1955–1970

Rebellion in Cameroon In 1955, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC; composed mainly of members of the Bamileke and Bassa ethnic groups) began an armed struggle for independence within French Cameroon. They continued the fight after Cameroon became independent but were eventually suppressed in 1970. Anywhere from tens to hundreds of thousands of people may have died in this conflict.

1955–1972

Sudan Civil War (Phase I to be resumed in 1983) This was the first phase of a long and costly civil war in the Sudan. In 1955, Christian and animist Black Africans of the South rebelled against the Arab–Muslim government based in Khartoum (the North). On March 27, 1972, an agreement was reached between North and South that put a temporary end to the civil war.

1956–1963

Suez or Sinai War In 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal (owned by French and British investors). This, combined with his support for nationalist guerrilla movements and Pan-Arabism, provoked a joint Anglo–French–Israeli invasion of Egypt. The Israelis inflicted a decisive defeat on the Egyptians: some 1,650 of Egypt's ground forces were killed in the campaign.

1957

Ethnic Unrest in Ghana Ghana gained its independence from the British in March 1957. Violence broke out when the Ewe, who had kin in Benin and Togo, sought to separate from the country.

1958

Coup d'état in the Sudan On November 17, General Ibrahim Abboud seized power in the Sudan.

1959–1961

Hutu Revolution; Civil War in Rwanda Ethnic violence broke out soon after Rwanda was granted the right to self-government by the Belgians. Despite UN-supervised elections, the Hutu majority revolted against the Tutsi, who were a dominant minority. The transfer of power ignited organized political violence between Hutus and Tutsis. Thousands of Tutsis fled to Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania. On July 1, Rwanda gained its independence and became a republic under the control of the Hutu.

1960

Rebellion in Nigeria In August, the United Middle Belt Congress (UBC) sought autonomy within Nigeria.

Frontier War between Ethiopia and Somalia Border clashes between Ethiopia and Somalia started within a month of Somalia's independence.

Franco-Moroccan Dispute In July, French troops seized Bizerte in the course of a dispute with Morocco.

1960-1964

Greater Somalia Movement Guerrillas backed by the Somali government and, at times, Somali armed forces fought to extend Somali territories to incorporate into their state Somalis living in Kenya and Ethiopia. Somali ambitions were eventually thwarted when Kenya and Ethiopia signed a mutual defense agreement.

1960-1968

Congolese Civil War (Zaire) After the new republic gained its independence, central control collapsed, and ethnic conflicts erupted. In 1960, the Katanga province (rich in mineral wealth) proclaimed its independence from the government. United Nations troops intervened and tried to keep the peace until 1964. In 1964, the Katanga forces were defeated and temporarily accepted integration, only to rebel again in 1967. Relative stability was restored by 1968.

1960-1991

Ethiopian Civil War; War for Eritrean Independence from Ethiopia The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) engaged in a thirty-one-year struggle to free Eritrea from Ethiopia. By 1965, dissidence had progressed to guerrilla warfare, and the war escalated still further when Ethiopia became embroiled in the Ogaden war against Somalia. In 1991, Eritrean rebels defeated the Ethiopian government forces and gained Eritrean independence. More than 250,000 persons died in the war, both as a result of combat and of attendant drought and famine.

1961

Rebellion in Uganda Members of the Koriyo and Amba ethnic groups rebelled against the dominant Toros.

1961–1975

Liberation War in Angola Portuguese colonial rule was oppressive, and relatively few Africans were successfully assimilated. In Angola, a resistance group, the Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA), was organized, and a violent war of liberation began. Angola won its independence in 1975.

1962–1963

Internal Unrest in Algeria After Algeria gained its independence (1962), unrest continued, thanks to the ineffective and dictatorial government of Ahmed Ben Bella, the first premier.

1962–1964

Hutu-Tutsi Violence Tutsi exiles in Burundi attacked Rwanda, but they were crushed by the Hutu army. Rwandan Tutsis were then killed by the thousands by Hutu authorities, leading to another flood of refugees. At least 150,000 Tutsis fled Rwanda by the summer of 1964.

1962–1974

Guinea-Bissau War for Liberation from Portugal Guinea-Bissau (once the Kingdom of Gabu) was declared a province of Portugal in 1951, though it had been controlled by the Portuguese off and on since the fifteenth century. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) tried to negotiate its independence in the 1950s. It began an armed struggle against Portugal in the 1960s and gained independence in 1974. In the fighting between 1962 and 1974, an estimated fifteen thousand died.

1962–1975

War for the Liberation of Mozambique from Portugal The war for the independence of Mozambique was begun by the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), a rebel group formed in Tanzania in 1962 and supported by both Communist and Western European countries. The Portuguese granted independence to Mozambique in 1974, and Frelimo formed a single-party government. Estimated deaths from this war were around twenty-five thousand (Mozambique) and ten thousand (Portugal).

1963

Coup d'état in Congo President Fulbert Youlou was deposed by military coup and succeeded by Alphonse Massamba-Debat.

Coup d'état in Dahomey President Hubert Maga was deposed by military coup. He was succeeded by General Christopher Soglo.

Coup d'état in Togo President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo was assassinated.

Ethnic violence in Uganda Ethnic conflict broke out in Uganda (independent since 1962) when the Bunyoros clashed with chiefs of the Buganda.

Frontier War between Algeria and Morocco Between October and November, Algeria and Morocco fought over a disputed border area.

1963–1968

Frontier War between Kenya and Somalia Kenyans (independent since 1963) and Somalis (independent since 1960) periodically fought over disputed territory in northern Kenya. At times (as in 1963), these clashes were rather serious.

1964

Frontier War between Ethiopia and Somalia Border clashes continued between Ethiopia and Somalia.

Zanzibar Rebellion In January 1964, African nationalists (some of whom had links to Communist China) overthrew the government of Zanzibar and proclaimed a republic. On April 26, 1964, Zanzibar and Tanganyika (a former British mandated territory), merged, taking the name of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Unrest in Kenya Communist-inspired native uprisings spread from Zanzibar and Tanganyika to Kenya. The British intervened to quell the troubles.

1965

Coup d'état in Congo In November, General Mobutu Sese Seko deposed President Joseph Kasavubu.

1965–1966

Electoral Dispute in Nigeria An estimated two thousand people died in riots after an election in which democratic processes were widely thought to have been perverted. The election was followed by a bloody military coup d'état. General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi took power.

1965–2002

Civil War in Chad Chad's long civil war has been primarily (but not exclusively) a struggle between northerners (Muslim semi-nomads/nomads) and southerners (Christian/pagan farmers) who are vying to gain control of the centralized state. In 1979, the Libyan-backed Chadian National Liberation Front (FROLINAT) succeeded in wresting control from the South. Sporadic fighting has continued since then. The latest group to rebel (1998; the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad) signed a peace agreement with the government in January 2002. More than fifty thousand people have been killed since 1965.

1966

Ethnic Violence in Nigeria In the mid-1960s, economic and political instability as well as ethnic friction troubled Nigeria. In September

1966, the Hausa massacred some ten to thirty thousand Igbos who formed a minority in the area and were resented for their prosperity and higher levels of education. About one million Igbos fled to the Igbo-dominated east. In retaliation, the Igbos expelled non-Igbos from the eastern part of Nigeria.

Coup d'état in Nigeria In July, army officers carried out a counter-coup. Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu "Jack" Gowon took power. This event contributed to the civil war (Biafran War) and famine that followed.

Coup d'état in Burundi Burundi became independent from Belgium in 1962 but remained a kingdom. In 1966, the Mwami (a Tutsi king, holding sway over the Hutus) was overthrown by Tutsi army officers in a military coup.

Coup d'état in Ghana General Joseph Ankrah deposed President Kwame Nkrumah, who had been one of the leaders of the African anti-colonial movement. The years that followed were politically unsettled and marked by a series of coups.

Coup d'état in the Central African Republic (CAR) The CAR had once been ruled by the French but had been autonomous since 1958. On January 1, 1966, military officers, led by Colonel Jean Bedel Bokassa, overthrew David Dacko (who was tied to Communist China). Bokassa then built up a personal empire.

Rebellion in Uganda Bugandans fought against the government.

1966–1989, 1990

Namibian War of Independence against South Africa The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) fought a lengthy guerrilla war against the white-minority government of the former German colony of South Africa. When the Portuguese left Angola, SWAPO guerrillas were offered aid and bases there, as well as training by Cuban soldiers. The guerrilla war escalated, with South African forces raiding Angola and with SWAPO forces attacking Namibia. On December 22, 1988, South Africa agreed to withdraw from the disputed territory, provided that the Soviet Union and Cuba withdrew from Angola.

1966 to Present

Namibia Caprivi Strip Secession Separatist violence has periodically affected this region, as the Lozi (an ethnic group in this

strategically important strip of land in Namibia) have attempted to gain greater autonomy and pursue closer ties with fellow Lozi in Zambia. In August 1999, the Caprivi Liberation Army attacked Namibian military and police.

1967

Six-Day War in the Middle East In May 1967, Egypt and Israel fought a brief war, initiated by Egypt. The Israelis destroyed over four hundred Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian planes in air attacks. Israel also invaded and occupied the Sinai Peninsula, Jerusalem's Old City, Jordan's West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights. A cease-fire was signed on June 10.

1967–1970

Biafran War of Secession (Nigerian Civil War) In 1967, the eastern region of Nigeria declared its independence from Nigeria as the state of Biafra. This was a major conventional war fought with heavy weapons (contributed in good measure by foreign powers) and extremely costly in human life: it is estimated that about two million people died as a result of the war, some as direct combat casualties, many as a result of famine.

Egypt War of Attrition After the Six-Day War, Arab states resorted to a war of attrition against Israel. They employed guerrilla and terrorist tactics against Israel and launched artillery attacks along the Suez Canal. The Israelis eventually responded by using air power. Violence intensified, but in August 1970, Egypt and Israel agreed on a cease-fire.

1969

Coup d'état in Libya King Mohammed Idris al Mahdi al-Sanusi was overthrown by a group of young military officers, including Captain Muammar al-Qaddafi. Qaddafi (still in power today) installed a revolutionary and anti-Western regime in Libya.

1969–1985

Coups d'état in Sudan Colonel Mohammed Gafaar al-Nimeiry deposed Prime Minister Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub. He survived numerous coup attempts but was finally overthrown in 1985.

1970

Ethnic Violence in Benin Benin (formerly Dahomey) gained independence from the French in 1960. In March, supporters of former president Maga clashed with supporters of politicians from the south.

Bete Rebellion in Ivory Coast Ivory Coast, a colony of the French, gained independence in 1960. In November, a leader (Gnabé Opadjelé) rebelled against the government of founding president, Houphouët-Boigny. He was backed by the Bete (one of the Kru peoples, who are thought to be the oldest of the Ivory Coast's ethnic groups.) Opadjelé was captured.

1970–1993

Coup d'état and Military Rule in Lesotho Basutoland won independence from Britain in 1966 and was named the Kingdom of Lesotho. Following an electoral defeat in 1970, Chief Jonathan suspended the constitution, expelled the king, and banned the opposition. An unsuccessful coup in 1974 was crushed, and Jonathan retained power in the one-party state until 1993.

1971

Rebellion in Madagascar In April 1971, the Mouvement National pour l'Indépendance de Madagascar (MONIMA) revolted against the government in Madagascar. The revolt was harshly suppressed. As many as one thousand persons may have died in this protest against a government that levied taxes in a time of economic disaster.

1971–1979

Coup d'état and Dictatorship in Uganda Armed forces chief of staff Idi Amin deposed Milton Obote and took power. During the eight years of his rule, Idi Amin expelled all Asians, killed thousands of people, and ruined the economy of his country. The period was marked by struggles against the dictator.

1972

Hutu Revolt; Genocide of Hutus (Burundi) The Hutu constitute the majority (85 percent) of the population of Burundi. The Tutsi, however, have historically played the dominant role, causing considerable ethnic conflict. In 1972, the Hutu rose up against the Tutsi. In the course of repressing the revolt, the Tutsi wiped out some 5 percent of the Hutu community in Burundi (approximately 100,000 to 150,000 people died). About two hundred thousand Hutus fled to Rwanda. This event perpetuated the enmity between the two ethnic groups.

1972–1979

Civil War in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) The Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe fought for black majority rule against the white-controlled government in Southern Rhodesia. The guerrillas operated from bases in Zambia and from areas in Mozambique, controlled by Mozambique's resistance movement (FRELIMO). An agreement to transfer power to the black majority was reached in 1978 but failed to satisfy all factions. However, in the following year, a new settlement proved acceptable and Robert Mugabe became prime minister of the new Republic of Zimbabwe.

1973

Ethnic Violence and Coup d'état in Rwanda In 1973, Rwandan Tutsis were purged from the universities, and hundreds of Rwandan Tutsis were massacred. In an effort to put an end to violence against Tutsis, Major General Juvénal Habyarimana took power in a bloodless military coup.

October War, or Yom Kippur War, in the Middle East President Anwar Sadat of Egypt launched a war against Israel, arguably to gain the at-

tention of the UN to end the “no peace, no war” situation in the Middle East. On October 6, the Egyptians launched a massive air strike on the Sinai front and crossed the Suez Canal. The Syrians opened another front on the Golan. The Egyptian offensive was repulsed, and by October 23 and 24, the Egyptian Third Army was isolated. On October 24, a cease-fire was agreed upon, and UN peacekeeping forces were sent in to enforce it.

1973–Present

Oromo Rebellion (Ethiopia) The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) has been rebelling against the Ethiopian regime since 1973.

1974–1975

Mali–Burkina Faso Border War Between 1974 and 1975, Mali fought a border war with Burkina Faso.

1974–1991

Ethiopian Revolution In 1974, the last monarch of Ethiopia—Emperor Haile Selassie I—was overthrown by a military junta. President Mengistu Haile Mariam took control and led a Leninist regime until 1991. His regime had a reputation for cruelty. The revolution took place during Ethiopia’s long civil war (1960–1991), which escalated in 1975.

1975

Coup d’état in Chad General Félix Malloum (a Bantu) took power in a military coup.

Coup d’état in Nigeria In July, General Yakubu Gowon was deposed, and General Muritala Rufai Mohammed took power in a bloodless coup.

1975–1987

Chad–Libyan War The Chad–Libyan War was primarily fought over the Aozou Strip, a strip of land on the northern boundary of Chad,

which had been promised by the French to the Italians 1935. In 1981, Quaddafi proclaimed the Unity of Chad and Libya. Libya, which had military vehicles and planes supplied by the Soviet Union, fought Chad, periodically invaded Chad, and supported pro-northern Chad rebels. They were defeated in 1987.

1975–1977

Unrest in French Somaliland The unrest was partly internal and partly external. Somalis (and Ethiopians) engaged in cross-border violence with French troops, and separatist Afars and Issas tribesmen rose up in Ethiopia. French Somaliland (Djibouti) gained its independence in 1977.

1975–1991

Saharan War; War between Morocco and the Polisario The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) was a politico–military organization composed mainly of nomadic inhabitants of the Western Sahara who wanted independence. The POLISARIO first fought the Spanish, then Morocco and Mauritania (who partitioned Western Sahara in 1976), and then Morocco alone. After 1976, Algeria provided the movement with bases and military aid. Morocco and the POLISARIO agreed to a cease-fire in 1991. The war was fought with heavy weapons and cost Morocco some seven thousand lives, and the rebels, some four thousand.

1975–1992

Mozambique Civil War; RENAMO Insurgency On gaining independence, a one-party, Marxist-oriented FRELIMO government came to power in Mozambique and supported guerrillas fighting in Rhodesia for black majority rule. The Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), which sprang up in opposition, was trained, supplied, and supported first by the Rhodesians and later by the South African military. RENAMO's tactics included raiding villages and killing civilians. By 1977, the civil war had widened to include South Africa, Portugal, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Zaire, and by the late 1980s, it resulted in the

deaths of at least one hundred thousand people and the creation of more than one million refugees. Peace was made in 1992.

1975–2002

Civil War in Angola The MPLA and UNITA were rival movements in the fight for independence against Portugal (1961–1974). UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, rebelled against the Marxist-oriented and Soviet-backed MPLA government, which came to power when the Portuguese left Angola. The long war that ensued was fueled by the oil and diamond resources of the country and by arms sales from abroad. The 1991 Bicesse Peace Accord and the 1994 Lusaka Protocol both broke down. The fortunes of the two sides have waxed and waned. By 2000, about 92 percent of Angola was controlled by the government: UNITA continued the struggle by launching attacks on civilians. At least five hundred thousand people died in the violence, and internal displacements reached over a million in 1999. After UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's death in early 2002, negotiations led to a cease-fire.

1977

Massacre in Madagascar A number of Comorans living in Madagascar were massacred, and refugees fled to Comoros, further destabilizing the political situation in these islands located in the Mozambique Channel.

“Infitah” Rioting in Egypt In January 1977, Egyptians took to the streets in antigovernment riots. They were angered by the *infitah*, Sadat's “open door policy,” which had led him to end public subsidies on flour, rice, and cooking oil and thus cancel bonuses and pay increases. The rioters protested against the gap between rich and poor and the corruption of the ruling classes. The army was brought in to crush the riot; eight hundred persons were killed, and several thousand were wounded.

1977–1978

Libyan–Egyptian Four-Day War In the late spring of 1977, demonstrators in both countries attacked each other's consulates. Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi accused Egypt of provoking a war so that

it could seize the Libyan oil fields and hence ordered Egyptians working and living in Libya to leave the country. Gunfire was exchanged along the border in July, and a four-day war broke out on July 21. Both sides used tanks and airplanes and suffered heavy losses before they agreed to a cease-fire.

Rebellion in the Congo In 1977 and again in 1978, former Katangan secessionists invaded Shaba from Angola. Both rebellions were suppressed.

Ogaden War (Ethiopia and Somalia) In 1977, Somali insurgents, backed by Somali president Siad Barre, rose against the Ethiopians in Ethiopia's Ogaden province. The war was fought using heavy weapons, and in several of the battles, casualties were very high (Jijiga, 1977; Diredawa-Jijiga, 1978.) The Soviet Union had been giving economic support to the Somalis but gave military support to the Ethiopians in the war. The Ethiopians won.

1978

Coup d'état in Comoros In 1978, a group of largely French mercenary forces invaded and overthrew the government in the Comoros Islands.

Suppressed Rebellion in Somalia Army officers, angered by their defeat in the Ogaden war, rose up against Barre but were defeated by the government.

1978-1979

War between Uganda and Tanzania; Ugandan Civil War In November, President Idi Amin of Uganda invaded Tanzania, claiming that President Nyerere of Tanzania was supporting dissidents in Uganda. The Tanzanians and the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA; exiles seeking to end Amin's tyrannical rule) defeated Amin and his Libyan allies. Amin fled to Libya and later to Saudi Arabia.

1979

Coup d'état in the Central African Empire David Dacko, assisted by the French, deposed Emperor Jean Bedel Bokassa.

Coup d'état in Ghana Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings deposed the Akuffo government in Ghana in a military coup.

1980

Coup d'état in Liberia Liberian troubles arguably date back to 1822 when the U.S. government and private colonization societies sent freed American slaves and Africans rescued from slaving ships to Liberia. From then until 1980, the land was ruled by American-Liberian elites. The first sovereign black republic in Africa was formed in 1847. In 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe (a Liberian of Krahn ethnicity) seized power in a violent military coup. Over the next few years, the regime crushed constitutional government and arrested opponents who sought to restore democracy. The government evolved into a predatory military autocracy.

Coup d'état in Guinea Bissau In November, João Bernardo Viera deposed President Luis Cabral in a military coup.

Insurgency; Rebellion in Lesotho The Basuto Congress Party (BCP) rebelled against the central government in Lesotho.

1980–1982

Religious Riots in Nigeria Religious riots affected Nigeria in the late 1970s and early 1980s. An Islamic cult known as the Maitatsine, which appealed especially to marginal and poverty-stricken urban immigrants, clashed with the followers of traditional Islam in Kano, Kaduna, and Maiduguri. Nigerian police tried to curb the activities of the Maitatsine. The disturbance in Kano resulted in the deaths of 4,177 people between December 18 and 29, 1980.

1980–1984

West Nile Terror in Uganda Ethnic groups living in the West Nile region of Uganda had provided Idi Amin with much of his support. After his defeat, Acholi soldiers of Uganda avenged massacres that their people had endured under Idi Amin by killing inhabitants of West Nile.

1981

Violence in Egypt and Libya In 1981, Egyptian president Sadat was assassinated, and Muslim extremism spread. Two American warplanes shot down two Libyan planes over the Mediterranean on August 19.

1981–1986

The War in the Bush (Uganda) The War in the Bush was a guerrilla war fought by Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Army (NRA) against the government of Milton Obote, the corrupt successor of Idi Amin. The UNLA regime was unable to get outside support and eventually disintegrated. Museveni took power in 1986.

1981–1995

Ethnic Conflict (Ghana) In 1981, some thousand people died when long-running tribal disputes over land ownership flared into violence. These disputes erupted again in 1994, with at least one thousand killed. Warring factions agreed on a cease-fire in 1995. Tensions and ethnic fighting continue, however.

1982

Coup d'état in Central African Empire The democratic government of David Dacko was overthrown by a military coup. A one-party government led by General André-Dieudonné Kolingba took power.

Frontier War between Ethiopia and Somalia Ethiopian and Somali army units clashed in the summer of 1982.

1982–1987

Political Unrest and Violence in Burkina Faso Political unrest disrupted Burkina Faso in the 1980s: there was a military coup in 1982 and again in 1984. In 1987, Blaise Compaoré led a rebellion against the government of Sankara and became president of Burkina Faso.

1982–1988

Isaaq Insurgency in Somalia Isaaq clans of northwestern Somalia resented their exclusion from Siad Barre's government and formed the Somali National Movement (SNM). They launched guerrilla raids from Ethiopia into Somalia.

1982 to Present

The Casamance Rebellion; War for Independence against Senegal

The Diola people of Casamance, a region in the south of Senegal, called for the independence of Casamance in 1947, thirteen years before Senegal became a nation-state. The struggle was carried on between 1982 and 2001 by the Casamance Democratic Forces Movement (MFDC) and then by a hard-line splinter group that refused to accept a peace agreement. The conflict has cost over twelve hundred civilian and military battle-related deaths since 1982.

1983

Coup d'état in Nigeria Major General Muhammadu Buhari of Katsina seized power because the civilian regime in Nigeria had failed to deal with Nigeria's economic problems or its rampant corruption.

1983–1986

Political and Ethnic Violence (Zimbabwe) Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980, and supervised elections were held, bringing Robert Mugabe to power as prime minister. A rift occurred between Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU's leader) was dismissed from the government, and his supporters from Matabeleland rebelled. Suppression was brutal, with maybe thousands killed between 1982 and 1986. ZANU and ZAPU merged in 1987.

1983 to Present

Civil War in Sudan In 1983, African and Christian/animists of the South resumed their struggle to gain autonomy or independence from the Arabic and Islamic North. Several other groups have recently complicated the conflict: several groups in the North (Muslim and secular) are fighting against the National Islamic Front Government. In addition, the South Sudanese forces have been split along regional and ethnic lines since 1991. A peace protocol, leading eventually to a cease-fire was signed at Machakos, Kenya, on July 20, 2002, though it is too early to say whether the civil war is truly over. Since 1983, the war is thought

to have caused the death of over two million people and the displacement of over four million people.

1984

Failed Revolt in Cameroon In April, members of the palace guard tried, unsuccessfully, to take power. Some five hundred persons were killed and many more arrested.

Comoran Military Revolt An attempt to overthrow the Abdallah government was thwarted. Dissidents were rounded up.

Coup d'état in Sudan General Abdul Rahman Siwar el-Dahab took power in a coup in April. He imposed still harsher Muslim rule on the South, exacerbating the civil war.

Agacher Strip War between Mali and Burkina Faso Mali and Burkina Faso fought over the mineral rich Agacher strip.

Coup d'état in Uganda Milton Obote was deposed in a military coup.

1986

Armed Confrontation between Libya and the United States On April 16, 1986, U.S. warplanes attacked government and military targets in Libya in retaliation for the Libyan-sponsored terror bombing of a West Berlin disco frequented by U.S. military personnel. Libyan casualties included civilians.

1986–1995

Civil War in Uganda Rebels loyal to the previous regime continued to fight the government, especially in the North. Museveni managed to check rebel resistance.

1987

Coup in Rwanda The Second Republic was overthrown by Major Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi-Hima.

1988 to Present

Civil War in Somalia Armed opposition to the Siad Barre regime turned into outright warfare in 1988 when the Somali National Movement

(SNM) began fighting the government in northwestern Somalia. After the overthrow of Barre, Somalia fell prey to factional fighting and anarchy. Between 1992 and 1994, the United States (leading a multinational force of more than thirty-five thousand troops) and the United Nations tried to stabilize the situation but failed. Two northern republics (Somaliland and Puntland) have since made progress in developing legitimate government, and in 2001, the UN agreed to send a peacekeeping mission to Somalia. However, in the South, some six major factions are still engaged in a struggle for control of the state. It is estimated that some 350,000 Somalis have died as a result of fighting and fighting-related famine since 1988.

Civil War; Ethnic Strife; Genocide (Burundi) Burundi has been subject to ethnic violence since it won independence from Belgium in 1962. The latest phase in the conflict began in 1988 with the murder of twenty thousand or more Hutus shortly after Major Pierre Buyoya seized power in a 1987 coup. In 1993, Melchior Ndadaye (a Hutu) won Burundi's first democratic elections. Tutsi paratroopers assassinated Ndadaye less than one month after his appointment as president of Burundi, thus triggering another wave of violence that resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. In 1994, a plane carrying on board the presidents of both Rwanda and Burundi was shot down, triggering the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Pierre Buyoya resealed power in Burundi and has maintained a virtual police state ever since, ostensibly in the interests of security. The ethnic wars in Burundi have been characterized by extreme violence: civilians have been targeted; rape and torture have been employed; and thousands have been displaced from their homes.

1989

Coup d'état in Comoros President Abdallah was assassinated, and shortly thereafter, a mercenary, Denard, and the presidential guard overthrew the government in a coup. Mohammed Said Djohar became president.

1989–1991

Frontier War between Senegal and Mauritania This was a bloody border conflict with an ethnic dimension. Violence broke out in 1989 in the Senegal River valley and forced some 250,000 people into exile.

1989–1997

Liberian Civil War In 1989, a rebel force led by Charles Taylor (a Liberian of repatriate descent) invaded Liberia from Guinea. His young and drug-addicted troops slaughtered, raped, and executed civilians who had supported Doe. The rebels themselves fragmented into different factions as they advanced to Monrovia. In 1990, Doe was captured, tortured, and executed. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), led by Nigeria, intervened and joined the war in 1990. In 1996, a peace plan was brokered by African states, and in 1997, Taylor was “freely” elected as president. Conditions have been more peaceful since then, although intermittent fighting continues.

1990–1991

Coup d'état in Somalia President Barre was overthrown by a coup in December 1990.

1990–1994

ANC–Inkatha Violence Zulu Inkatha members fought Mandela’s ANC supporters after the Zulus were forced from their homes. Fighting was, at times, quite bloody. The South African police helped stifle the hostilities.

1990–1995

Tuareg Separatism in Niger The Tuaregs are a nomadic ethnic group inhabiting the northern desert regions of Niger who frequently rebelled against the central government of Niger. Violence came to a head between 1990 and 1992. In 1994, the main Tuareg coalition, the Coordination of Armed Resistance (CRA), agreed to limited regional autonomy, followed by other Tuareg rebel groups in 1997.

1990–1996

Tuareg Separatism in Mali Tuareg separatists fought the dictatorial regime of President Moussa Traoré and after he was overthrown, continued to fight with troops in the northern region of Mali. The rebels signed agreements with the government in 1993 and 1994, then agreed to disarm in 1996.

1990 to Present

The Congolese War (the Democratic Republic of the Congo) In the 1990s, rival ethnic groups (including the Hutus) fought, sometimes violently, for land and a share of economic and political power in the former Zaire. The problems were aggravated in 1994 when nearly a million Hutus fled from Rwanda into the region. In 1996, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL), a coalition of rebel groups led by Laurent Kabila, and at the time directly supported by Rwanda, successfully overthrew the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. Rwandan support for Kabila turned when Hutu elements continued to operate safely in eastern DRC, conducting raids into Rwanda to kill Tutsis and attempt to destabilize the Rwandan government. Another rebel coalition, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (CRD), formed with the support of Rwanda and Uganda. The CRD then fought to depose Kabila, and Rwandan and Ugandan troops were deployed into eastern DRC. Rwandan and Ugandan involvement encouraged many African states, including Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia, to provide support in defense of Kabila and the territorial integrity of DRC. The war became the widest interstate war in modern African history, involving some eleven African states. A cease-fire was signed on July 10, 1999, but sporadic fighting continued. Estimates of the numbers of persons killed directly and indirectly in the wars in DRC range from 350,000 to well over one million.

Rwandan Civil War Civil war between the Hutus and Tutsis broke out again in 1990 when Tutsi refugees, acting under the auspices of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded from Uganda. In 1994, a budding peace (the Arusha accord of 1993) collapsed when the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed in an airplane flying over Rwanda. Hutu extremists launched genocidal attacks on Tutsi civilians. The RPF ended the genocide with a military campaign and took control of Rwanda in 1994. Led by Paul Kagame, a government of national unity was established. The government is dominated by the RPF, which subsequently has been accused of massive human rights abuses and massacres of innocent Hutus in eastern DRC. As of 2003, the RPF continues to engage in struggles with Hutu rebels. The civil war and genocide caused between five hundred thousand and one million deaths in 1994 and resulted in the international war in the DRC in 1999.

Civil Disturbances and Violence in Nigeria Over five thousand Nigerians have died since 1990 in a variety of conflicts, including

fighting between ethnic groups and the government under President Olusegun Obasanjo, interethnic fighting, fighting between Muslims and Christians over the imposition of *shar'ia* law in the north, and fighting within the Igbo communities in the east. Border disputes have also broken out, and in the Niger–Delta, tensions are linked to the fact that decades of oil production have failed to benefit local communities.

1991

Coup d'état in Chad General Idriss Déby seized power.

Palace Massacre in Madagascar A crowd of citizens marched on the palace demanding a multiparty political system. The Palace Guard fired on them, killing hundreds. President Ratsiraka agreed to support a process of democratic transition.

1991–1992

Civil War (Togo) President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo temporarily lost control of the government but then regained control, killing opposition leaders and pro-democracy demonstrators.

1991–1994

Djibouti Civil War (East Africa) In November, the mainly Afar-supported Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) began fighting the Issa-dominated government of Djibouti. French peacekeeping forces were sent to help stop the fighting in early 1992. In 1993, the constitution was revised, and in 1995, seven FRUD leaders joined the government. The war largely ended at this time, although some dissident FRUD rebels attacked and fought government troops in the north in 1997.

1991 to 2002

Civil Disturbances and Border Clashes in Kenya In 1991, with the advent of multiparty politics, Kenya witnessed political and mob violence, police-sanctioned extrajudicial killings, and ethnic clashes. Opponents of President Daniel arap Moi, the former leader of the

Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) party, claimed that he was exploiting the violence to bolster his power. In 2001, Kenyan tribes also clashed with tribes across the border in Uganda and Ethiopia. Between 1991 and 2002, more than forty-five hundred Kenyans were killed, and in 1993 some three hundred thousand people were displaced. Daniel arap Moi and the KANU party stepped down from power in December 2002 upon the peaceful democratic election of opposition leader Mwai Kibaki. Moi had ruled Kenya for twenty-four years. KANU had been in power since the nation's independence in 1963.

1991 to Present

Civil War in Sierra Leone In 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began a guerrilla campaign against the central government. The RUF claims to be a liberation movement but is suspected of being more interested in gaining control of Sierra Leone's diamonds. Nigerian-led ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops intervened to restore peace. In 1999, the Lomé Peace Accords were signed, but they have since been violated. National disarmament began in 2001, and a UN Special Court to try war criminals was established in 2002. Some estimates suggest that over fifty thousand lives may have been lost. In addition, some thirty thousand civilians were mutilated and their limbs hacked off by rebels.

1992 to Present

Civil War in Algeria The current round of violence began in 1992 when the Algerian government canceled the first Algerian multiparty election to power to prevent a near-certain victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Since that time, the military-backed regime has fought for state control with a variety of Islamic groups. The war mainly has been characterized by government-rebel clashes, attacks on civilians by extremist rebel groups, and "disappearances" attributed to government security forces. At times, heavy weapons and air bombardment have been used. Violence has declined since President Bouteflika granted an amnesty to rebels in 2000. An estimated one million people have been killed during the past nine years.

1994–1995

Ethnic Violence in Ghana At least one thousand people were killed in clashes between the Konkomba and Nanumba ethnic groups in the north of Ghana. Ghanaian leader Jerry Rawlings declared a state of emergency.

1997

Civil War in the Republic of Congo–Brazzaville The Republic of Congo, formerly the French region of Middle Congo, became independent in 1960, and, after experimenting with marxism, it gained its first democratically elected government in 1992. A civil war broke out in 1997 when former military ruler Dennis Sassou Nguesso seized power with the help of Angolan troops. It is estimated that more than ten thousand people were killed in Brazzaville alone. The war ended in 1997, but violence continued between elements of the Congolese military and paramilitary groups.

1997–2001

Anjouan and Moheli Secession from Comoros Anjouan and Moheli attempted to secede from Comoros and restore ties to France. Troops from Comoros were routed. In December 2001, however, voters in the islands supported a new constitution that would give increased autonomy to Anjouan and Moheli but keep the three Indian Ocean islands as one country.

1998

Terrorist Attacks (Kenya and Tanzania) The U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed by the al-Qaeda terrorist organization. The attacks resulted in over 250 deaths.

Military Intervention (Lesotho) South Africa and Botswana intervened in Lesotho to preserve its government after the eruption of election-related violence.

United States Intervention (Sudan) In response to the al-Qaeda attacks, the United States launched a cruise missile strike on the al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Company in Khartoum, Sudan. The United States alleged that the company produced weapons of mass destruction and that North Sudan was a haven for terrorists.

1998–1999

Guinea-Bissau Civil War and Intervention The government of João Vieira was corrupt, a situation that when combined with economic hardship caused discontent. Civil war broke out in 1998 when Vieira sacked his army chief Ansumane Mane, who was suspected of backing rebels in Casamance. Neighboring Guinea and Senegal intervened on behalf of Vieira. Fighting continued until a peace accord brokered by Portugal was signed. Violence broke out again in 1999.

1998–2000

Border War between Eritrea and Ethiopia Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, but the border was never fixed with maps and surveying markers. The 1998 war was nominally fought over barren border territory known as the Yiagra Triangle. Currency and trade disputes, however, were probably the real cause of the conflict. This was an extremely bloody conventional war, fought using trench warfare, air bombardment, and tank combat. It cost the lives of eighty-five thousand soldiers and made some five hundred thousand Eritreans homeless. The war ended under UN auspices on December 12, 2000.

1999 to Present

Border Clashes between Liberia and Guinea Rebels apparently based in Guinea invaded northern Liberia and clashed with the Liberian government.

2000 to Present

Civil War in Guinea The Rally of the Democratic Forces of Guinea (RDFG) is fighting to end the rule of General Lansan Conte, head of the military government in Guinea. Guinea claims that Liberia and Burkina Faso are backing the rebels to exploit Guinea's rich mineral wealth. It is estimated that one thousand people have been killed to date.

Crisis in Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe and his supporters (disaffected Zimbabweans) began a violent campaign in 2000 to seize land from white farmers. A 2001 agreement brokered by Nigeria in Abuja failed to end the illegal seizures. In 2002, the European Union

imposed sanctions. Mugabe, who was reelected president in what some charge were rigged elections, remains defiant. Zimbabwe has been suspended from the Commonwealth for a year, and the United States and European Union have refused to accept Robert Mugabe as the legitimate president.

2001 to Present

Central African Republic Army Mutiny The Army of the CAR mutinied. Forces from Libya, Congo, and perhaps Chad intervened on the side of the CAR government.

2002

Chad-Central African Republic Border Conflict The armies of Chad and the CAR clashed: a few dozen casualties resulted. Mutual re-creminations followed.

Terrorist Attack in Kenya In November 2002, a terrorist strike occurred at an Israeli-owned resort hotel near Mombasa, Kenya. Thirteen civilians and three terrorists were killed in the strike. The bombing corresponded with an unsuccessful attempt to shoot down an Israeli commercial passenger airplane with shoulder-fired missiles. The airplane, an Arkia Boeing 757, was en route to Tel Aviv. The perpetrators of the attack have not been identified, although Israel has reported that the assailants were linked to the al-Qaeda terrorist organization.

2002–Present

Ivory Coast Once considered West Africa's most stable government, the Ivory Coast has experienced widespread civil strife that pits at least three rebel groups in a so-called mutiny against the government. The aims of the rebel groups are unclear. A day after the uprising began in September 2002, General Robert Guei, the Ivory Coast's former military ruler, was murdered in mysterious circumstances. The internal conflict in the Ivory Coast is rapidly escalating toward a full-blown civil war.

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Appendix 5: Colonial Occupation

COLONIAL POWER

COUNTRY	OCCUPATION *	INDEPENDENCE	Belgium	Britain	France	Germany	Italy	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain
Algeria ¹	1850	July 3, 1962			●					
Angola	1576	November 11, 1975						●		
Benin	1885	August 1, 1960			●					
Botswana	1885	September 30, 1966	●							
Burkina Faso	1897	August 5, 1960			●					
Burundi	1890	July 1, 1962	● ³							
Cameroon	1884	January 1, 1960		●	● ⁵	● ²	● ⁴			
Cape Verde	1462	July 5, 1975						●		
Central African Republic	1894	August 13, 1960			●					
Chad	1900	August 11, 1960			●					
Comoros	1843	July 6, 1975			●					
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	1876	June 30, 1960	●							
Congo, Rep. of	1885	August 15, 1960			●					
Djibouti	1884	June 26, 1977			●					
Egypt ⁶	1882	February 28, 1922	●		● ⁷					
Equatorial Guinea	1845	October 12, 1968							●	
Eritrea	1889	May 3, 1993	●				● ⁹			
Ethiopia	1936	April 6, 1941					●			
Gabon	1888	August 17, 1960			●					
The Gambia	1816	February 18, 1965		●						
Ghana	1872	March 6, 1957		●						
Guinea	1880	October 2, 1958			●					
Guinea-Bissau	1880	September 23, 1973						●		
Ivory Coast	1843	August 7, 1960			●					
Kenya	1885	December 12, 1963		●						
Lesotho	1868	October 4, 1966		●						
Liberia ¹¹										
Libya ¹²	1911	December 24, 1951					●			
Madagascar	1895	June 26, 1960			●					
Malawi	1891	July 6, 1964		●						
Mali	1890	September 22, 1960			●					
Mauritania	1904	November 28, 1960			●					
Mauritius	1715	March 12, 1968		●	● ¹³					
Morocco (French)	1912	March 2, 1956			●					
Morocco (Spanish)	1912	April 7, 1956							●	
Mozambique	1505	June 25, 1975						●		

¹ Under Ottoman rule 1519-1710

² 1890-1919

³ 1919-1962

⁴ 1884-1919

⁵ Britain and France divided and ruled Cameroon 1919-1962

⁶ Under Ottoman rule 1517-1798; 1801-1882; under French rule 1789-1801

⁷ 1798-1801

⁸ 1882-1922

⁹ 1889-1941

¹⁰ 1941-1952 (ruled by Ethiopia 1952-1993)

¹¹ Liberia has been independent since its establishment in 1822

¹² Under Ottoman rule 1521-1714


¹³ 1715-1810

¹⁴ 1810-1968

Periods of colonial occupation 1, 1462-1993 AD

Courtesy of The Diagram Group, *African History on File*, New York: Facts on File, 2003.

COLONIAL POWER



Periods of colonial occupation 2, 1462–1993

Courtesy of The Diagram Group, *African History on File*, New York: Facts on File, 2003.

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