Hadrami Arabs in Present-day Indonesia

An Indonesia-oriented group with an Arab signature

Frode F. Jacobsen

Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series

Hadrami Arabs in Present-day Indonesia

This book focuses on social and cultural trends in present-day Hadrami Arab societies in Eastern and Central Indonesia, and the history of the Hadrami Arab people, which demonstrates an early form of globalization. For centuries, migration has played a vital part in Hadrami adaptation. External forces, such as the expanding powers of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and the Turkish conquering Yemen, and internal forces, such as poverty, droughts and political unrest as well as trading opportunities and missionary work, have instigated migration movements. While some Hadrami Arabs sought work in North America and Europe, other waves of Hadrami migration have followed the monsoon winds of the Indian Ocean to the Zanzibar coast, India, Malaysia and Indonesia. The story of Hadramis in Indonesia has largely been a story of success, in terms of trade, politics, education and religious activities. Despite continual debate regarding what constitutes Indonesian Hadrami identity, the author argues that they are still 'an Indonesia-oriented group with an Arab signature'.

This book will be of interest to Southeast Asian and Middle East specialists and scholars in anthropology and migration studies.

Frode F. Jacobsen is currently an Associate Professor at the Department of Public Health and Primary Health Care at the University of Bergen, Norway. He has a special interest in health issues, local forms of knowledge, and culture and migration.

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1 Introduction

> To this day they have not discovered at the Indies any mediterrannian sea as in Europe, Asia and Affrike.
>
> (Sixteenth-century geographer Joseph Acosta, cited in Feener 2004: 355)

While some anthropologists researching the fascinating story of Hadrami Arab migration started off studying the Hadrami homeland of Hadramawt in Yemen, my own interest was first sparked during fieldwork in the Red Sea Hills in the Sudan, in 1993–5. At the end of my fieldwork, which happened to be close to Suakin and just across the Red Sea from Yemen, I started to realize that some of the people I had come to view as part of the Beja ethnic group bore typical Hadrami last names. At that time some of my colleagues at the University of Bergen had just began studies of Hadramawt and Hadrami societies, the first being an anthropologist, but most of them historians. I came to realize that the history of Hadramawt during the last one and a half century bears one striking similarity to my own country, Norway, namely massive waves of emigration, which in the case of Norway relocated more than a third of our population to North America in a few decades. The Norwegian exodus was partly for the same reason as the Hadrami migration; in both cases the population faced hunger and possible starvation in a homeland which provided meagre sources of livelihood.

Later on, during a stay in Bali in Indonesia in the end of 1998, I came across a small Hadrami community while visiting the old Dutch harbour area of Singaraja, north on the island. Having already read some academic studies on Hadrami migration, I took up my courage and approached an old man, 'Hussain', in a furniture shop which had a sign with a Hadrami name, and told him about my growing interest

in Hadrami societies. He invited me for a cup of coffee, telling me that both the coffee beans and the ginger he added to it were directly imported from Hadramawt. 'It is several times more expensive than the local coffee you normally get here', he explained, 'but you can for sure tell the difference, the coffee from Hadramawt has a great taste!'. That was not to be the last cup of coffee, and we kept in contact for several years. Through his network of relatives and friends, doors were opened to Hadrami societies on Bali and neighbouring islands.

Although some important academic works have been published (mainly since 1990) on the history of Arab migration to Indonesia and integration into Indonesian societies, less is known about the present-day Arab communities in Indonesia, most of them identifying themselves as so-called *Hadrami* Arabs. Hadrami Arabs, being mostly Sunni Muslims and reckoning the Hadramawt province in southern Yemen as their original homeland, have settled in Indonesia for several centuries. The bulk of the migrants, however, arrived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The Hadrami communities of today are the result of predominantly male migrants marrying into the local populations. A few but very interesting recent anthropological studies of Hadrami communities around the Indian Ocean reveal that the fate of these migrant communities differ significantly from country to country, and even between different towns within the same country (as is the case for India), suggesting the need for in-depth ethnographic studies of each of the ways that Hadrami migrant cultures and societies have developed. Based on fieldwork in Eastern and Central Indonesia from 1999 to 2001, the present work aims both at contributing to a small but steadily increasing comparative pool of ethnographic studies and at providing insight into some specific Indonesian Hadrami communities.

The history of Hadramawt and Hadrami societies is a history of early forms of globalization, based on seafaring and trade. For centuries, migration has played a vital part in Hadrami adaptation, with push factors from outside such as the expanding powers of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and the Turkish conquering Yemen, inside factors such as poverty, droughts and political unrest at home, and pull factors such as trading opportunities and missionary work. While other Yemenis went on labour migration to North America and Europe, waves of Hadrami migration have, possibly since before the coming of Islam, followed the monsoon winds of the Indian Ocean to places like the Zanzibar coast, India and Malaysia.

Later on, following the introduction of steamships, both the sheer number of migrants and the intensity of contact between the homeland

of Hadramawt and the diaspora communities increased to the extent that from the nineteenth to mid-twentieth century Hadramawt could be described as 'arguably more closely connected with East Africa, India and present-day Indonesia than with most other parts of present-day Yemen' (Freitag 2003: 2). Largely spoken, the history of Hadrami migration is a success story of cultural and economic co-operation over a vast ocean span and a vast span of societies. Several interdisciplinary studies, not the least since the unification of Yemen in 1990, have pointed out the relevance of not limiting the Indian Ocean area only to a fixed entity as described by physical geographers, but of increasingly focussing on it as a vast area to be explored by following the flow of people, material objects and ideas. For this reason, Indian Ocean studies naturally include investigations of the regions that border it, even including secondary waves of migration, which makes Indonesia relevant for Indian Ocean studies.

The position of Hadrami diaspora groups seems to have been ambivalent both in relation to how they have been viewed from the homeland of Hadramawt (frequently with suspicion), and how they have been perceived by their various host societies. Regarding the latter point, in some host societies at specific historical points of time they may have fared relatively well and enjoyed prestige, such as in post-colonial Indonesia, while in other situations they have experienced a very vulnerable existence and several problems, such as in post-Nizam Hyderabad. As already mentioned, their adaptation to their host societies might differ even within the same country: this is the case in Indonesia, although less dramatically so than in India.

The story of Hadramis in Indonesia has mainly been a story of success, both in terms of trade, politics, education and religion. With the exception of periods of Dutch oppression and interference in Hadrami trading relations, Hadramis in Indonesia have fared well, several of them engaging in successful business enterprises. Although enmeshed in wider international business networks, most of their business enterprises seem to centre on the household and close circle of relatives. Even their international trade relationships frequently involve more or less close relatives. A typical local shop arrangement is a furniture or clothes shop at street level, and living rooms for the owning family upstairs. The people employed tend to be close family or relatives. Sometimes both the wife and the husband of a family run a separate business from the same location, as in one instance in the town of Klungkung, on the island of Bali, when a shop underneath a couple's house had two entrances, one toward each of two parallel streets. At one end of the shop, the wife made clothes for sale, using the adjacent

entrance for her predominantly female customers, and at the other end, the husband made and sold furniture, using the other entrance for his largely male customers.

While the Hadrami diaspora groups clearly have been influenced by their host societies both socially and culturally, the Hadrami societies are not to be viewed as passive receivers of outside influences or as representing a passive adaptation to their new living conditions. Quite to the contrary, they have frequently strongly influenced their host societies, for instance by introducing Islam, or by exerting a strong influence on the development of an existing local Muslim culture. This is clearly the case in Indonesia, where Hadrami society has fostered many prominent scholars working in the field of Islamic education. Moreover, Hadrami diaspora societies have demonstrated many examples of social and cultural creativity, as for instance illustrated by their ability to create forms of social stratification and differentiation which neither exactly mirror Hadramawt societies nor forms of social organization in their host societies. This is a topic which will be dealt with in some detail in this book, supported by field work data from Indonesia.

In general, while Hadrami Arabs in Indonesia still maintain some unique Hadrami customs and identify themselves as Hadrami (albeit not exclusively so), the degree to which they have become assimilated into the general Muslim population is a question open for debate. Although the findings presented in this book do not provide clear evidence for the strength of the present processes of assimilation (or indigenization) or the extent to which Hadramis actively influence their host societies, it presents some clear recent trends, not the least in marriage patterns, of relevance to this debate, evidenced among Hadramis in some central and eastern Indonesian towns.

The present book will moreover deal with diverse experiences of Hadrami Arabs in various towns in Central and Eastern Indonesia. The first three chapters will provide more general information about their societies, while chapters four to six will provide more details on aspects of local adaptations and local forms of cultural creativity. In particular Hadramis in a mainly non-Muslim environment, on the island of Bali, will be discussed in some depth. Hadramis in Indonesia have over time developed intimate relations with majority populations. Whereas their Islamic faith often has been a strong connective across diverse ethnic backgrounds, this is not the case on the island of Bali where Bali Hinduism is the dominant culture. However, among the Balinese Muslim minority their Arabic language skills and close affiliation with the homeland of the Prophet Muhammad have proved

a valuable cultural asset. Indonesian Hadramis are often associated with quite orthodox forms of Islam.

On Bali, their religious traditions are clearly opposed to the polytheism of their Balinese neighbours, and the strictness of their religiosity may be more pronounced on Bali than in many other Indonesian societies. Nevertheless, it will be demonstrated in this book that the Bali Hindu context partly provides a special cultural avenue and an economic niche that some Hadramis know how to utilize. As an example, employing both Hindu and 'Javanese'[1] cultural resources in a meaning-making process, local Hadrami professional 'healers' fashion, amongst other things, healing practices that largely cater for Balinese Hindus, cooperating with Hindu healers and employing Hindu theories and concepts. Within a larger historical frame, since the arrival of Islam on the island of Bali, mutual influences between Islamic and Hindu societies have not been at all uncommon (Vickers 1987).

Even in largely Muslim host societies exemplified in this book, societies which represent the more usual situation for Hadramis in Indonesia, Hadramis continue to distinguish themselves from other ethnic groups in some regard, while still venturing on the trail of cooperation and integration. There clearly are some geographically widespread core concerns among Hadramis which are relevant to this issue of cultural continuity, regarding the traditions of name-giving, marriage customs, child upbringing and education, and material culture, all topics which will be dealt with below.

My fieldwork took place after a long period of relative political stability in Indonesia, with more than 30 years of New Order Government of President Suharto, which came to a sudden end in May 1998. His government, which violently replaced the Sukarno government, in a transition where at least half a million people were killed as suspected 'communists', still brought a long period of peace and prosperity from which the Hadrami minority also benefited. A post-independence improvement of the position of Hadramis and an increased integration into the nation of Indonesia continued through the New Order Government, where several Hadramis held leading political positions, some even serving as ministers. My fieldwork in other words took place in a climate where people knew with reasonable accuracy what was gone, but faced uncertainty regarding what was to come. Moreover, this was also the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis which erupted in East Asian markets in August 1997, with devastating consequences, especially for Indonesia.

After being regarded as an economic giant in Asia, following nearly 30 years of economic growth at a rate of 67 per cent annually,

Indonesia's gross domestic product shrank by an horrifying 14 per cent in 1998 (Hefner 2000). Hence, for my Hadrami informants in Indonesia at the turn of the millennium, they faced the double challenge of finding their place in a changing socio-politico-environment and surviving economically the aftermath of the crisis, an acute concern for the Hadramis in Indonesia, who still can be regarded as mainly a society of traders. When popular sayings like 'the world is shrinking' and 'it's a small world' can be heard around the world, for many of the Indonesian Hadramis the world is becoming larger in the sense that recently they have become less able to travel, both inside Indonesia and abroad, than before the crisis. This provides a most important larger context for what is to be presented in the rest of this book.

In my fieldwork I have mainly followed the so-called 'snow-ball method', where one informant, through networks of relatives and friends, led me to the next. Mainly, with some exceptions, my fieldwork can be characterized as a journey along genealogical routes and routes of affinal relationships, which kept me travelling between locations in Java (Surabaya only), Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa. Thus even the limited statistical material established is a far cry from random sampling. However, interviewing informants socially related to each other and, since I was not the only one travelling, observing particular informants in situations of social interaction in various geographical locations and various types of interaction, provided several opportunities for cross-checking on information.

A clear limitation of the snow-ball sampling approach is related to the fact that nearly all of my informants, with only a few exceptions, defined themselves as having the same family origin in terms of an old system of social stratification in Hadramawt still partly of some relevance in the Indonesian setting. Moreover, they roughly seemed to share some general outlook on religious and political matters, as most of them can be said to be of some modernist religious leaning, which is probably not as true for the whole Hadrami society in Indonesia. Needless to say, my interaction with Hadrami informants meant interaction with male informants, with the exceptions when I was invited to some of their homes, where in some very few cases female family members were present. Hence this book represents only one of the several possible stories that could be told about Hadrami societies in Central and Eastern Indonesia.

2 Historical and wider ethnographic background

The homeland of Hadramawt

> While globalization denies absence by rushing around to cover it up, diasporas do the opposite. They acknowledge absence and chronically explore its meaning and markings, such as the grave. Is the absence of the dead forever? Will they come back, or will we join them? […] Absence may make the heart grow fonder, but it also licenses new vices away from knowing eyes; teaches new skills; generates letters and poems; sends money, ideas, spouses, children and novelties home; and plots triumphant returns.
>
> (Ho 2006: 4)

Hadramawt, the homeland of the Hadrami, consists of the stretch of land situated between Oman and the Yemen proper. From 1937 to 1967 it was controlled by the British through the so-called 'Ingrams' peace', as the latest British colonial adoption, and from 1968 to 1990 it was part of the People's Republic of South Yemen. Hadramawt is now the name of the largest province of present-day united Yemen. It can be divided roughly into three parts. First is the coastal region, with important port towns including al-Mukallā, al-Shihr, Sayhut, al-Qishn and Mirbat, forming the gateway to the Indian Ocean. The coastal line shares with the interior a challenging climate with sparse and irregular rainfall, and days of extreme heat.

Second are the inland *wadis*,[1] the most important and most densely populated being the Wadi Hadramawt, running roughly parallel to the coastal line, and harbouring well-known towns like pre-Islamic Shibām and Tarīm (a well-known old centre of learning), and the less ancient town of Sey'ūn, founded in the sixteenth century. Several other *wadis* are running into this 200 km long *wadi*, for example the *wadis* of Daw'an, Al 'Ayn, and 'Amd, water from all of them flowing into the main *wadi* during rainfall. The cultivation of the *wadis* depends on infrequent and unreliable floods, and cultivation is made possible by an intricate and ancient system of canals for irrigation, connected to

underground aquifers feeding wells for agricultural use. In this area not only lack of rain, but also severe shortage of land pose a real challenge for farmers. Dates, millet, beans, simsim and honey are among the more important products.

The third part consists of a sparsely populated stretch of rocky mountains, which can be divided into two plateaus, making up close to 90 per cent of the area of Hadramawt. The southern plateau consists of a mixture of desert and semi-desert areas, the latter type providing some meagre resources for human habitation. This part of the mountain area, besides being home to a substantial number of tribesmen, has through history provided the inland *wadis* with strenuous and frequently insecure travel routes to the major lifeline of their economy, the coastal ports. Travel on the high plateau between the coast and the interconnected *wadis* took up to seven days on camel before the arrival of motorized transport.

The northern plateau is more dry and barren, and merges to the north into the sandy desert of the Empty Quarter. The desert areas of the Empty Quarter effectively bar relations between Hadramawt and Northern Yemen, a reason why historically more people have been travelling by the monsoon winds of the Indian Ocean than across that desert area.

For many centuries, Hadramawt functioned without any central government. Political instability continued through a series of successful and unsuccessful attempts at conquering the inland area, from small dynasties in the thirteenth century to the Kathiri sultanate in the sixteenth century, who up to the British colonial intervention was the major, but not the only, power in the area of the *wadis*. From the nineteenth century on and until the establishment of People's Republic of South Yemen in 1968, the political scene was characterized by a continuous political and military struggle between the Kathiri sultanate, dominating most of the inland, and the Qu'aytī sultanate, dominating the coast. The presence of the British colonialists from 1937 to 1967 brought, for most of the time, little change in this situation.

Social stratification in Hadramawt

The Hadramawt society is a stratified society (Bujra 1971; Manger 1997), as described for societies in Northern Yemen (Gerholm 1977; Nielsen (in Knutsson *et al.* 1994)). Although several systems of stratification probably co-exist in Hadramawt (Camelin 1997; Freitag 2003), a system frequently described consists of the following delineable and hierarchically ordered social groups with two (or three) leading strata at



Figure 2.1 Map of Hadramawt.

Source: Mobini-Kesheh 1999: 11.

the top: The descendants of the Prophet Mohammed, the *sāda* (or *haba'īb*,[2] *sayyids*[3] or *syeds*), are the highest ranking, lacking military power, but traditionally highly respected as arbitrators in conflicts between tribes and in charge of religious education. In addition, they are the guardians of so-called *hawta*, sacred small territories protected by specific saints, where carrying arms is prohibited and where various peaceful activities can be performed, for example arbitration or exchange of goods (Arai 2004). *Sāda* people were in many instances known to possess substantial economic assets and to be engaged in commercial activities, besides receiving gifts given to religious leaders and pious people and controlling endowed land to religious institutions (Bujra 1971).

The *sāda* are followed by the *mashāyikh*,[4] descendants of respected religious scholars. Some *mashāyikh* families used to have important positions in arbitration between tribes (ibid.). The *qabā'īl*, frequently named *gabā'īl* (or *gabail*, *gabali*) by my Hadrami informants in Indonesia, were according to Bujra (ibid.) below the *mashāyikh* in social position, but still to be viewed as part of the second strata, since they are recognized as having a common descent with the *mashāyikh*. The lowest strata consists of the unarmed rural and urban population, the so-called *masākīn*, consisting of various groups of artisans, servants and peasants that are internally ranked, with each ranked group practising, to some extent, group endogamy, and finally, at the very bottom of the social ladder, the *'abīd*, the slaves (see e.g. Bujra 1971; Freitag 2003; Manger 1997).

Indian Ocean trade and migration

To what extent Hadramis brought the system of social stratification with them to Indonesia, will be a matter for later discussion. At this stage we will pause to make a more general assessment of the Hadrami overseas migration. Contrary to the sixteenth century geographer Joseph Acosta, ancient and widespread networks of commerce and cultural interaction have been identified in other parts of the world than the Mediterranean area: for example the Indian Ocean area, already defined in a broad sense, where travel from ancient times was enhanced by the monsoon winds. Since the early centuries of Islamic history, Arab and Persian migrants have been present in the whole region of Southeast Asia, and Muslim merchants were, by the early tenth century, controlling travel routes between China and the Malay Srivijaya empire. This development contributed to the spread of Islam and Islamic culture, as part of international trade activities, missionary travels and work migration (Feener 2004; Freitag

2003; Riddel 1997). A large-scale Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago, though, began in the fourteenth century, a process 'carried out by Indians as well as by Indians of Arab origin and Arabs who came to the region via India' (Alatas 1997b: 8). The role of Hadramis in this process has probably been substantial, as Syed Farid Alatas remarks: 'What has been conspicuously absent in the literature on the history of Islam in Southeast Asia […] is recognition of the role of the Hadrami *tariqat al-'alawiyya*[5] in the process of conversion' (ibid.).

For centuries, pressure on natural resources in Hadramawt has made people seek their fortune abroad, as have frequent wars and unrest (Ho 1997a; Riddel 1997). In more recent times, increased opportunities for international trading, following the colonization efforts of Ottomans, Dutch and British, made it attractive for many Hadramis to travel in the colonialized areas as traders, missionaries or both (Chaudhuri 1990; Freitag 1997b; Manger 1997). Not the least significant was the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 1258 which triggered the involvement of Hadramis in long distance trade across the Indian Ocean, taking advantage of beneficial consequences of Aden as a trade port (Ho 2006). Up to that point long-distance trade by sea between East, South and Southeast Asia, on the one hand, and Europe, on the other hand, took the route though the Persian Gulf, Bagdad and the Levant, after the fall of Baghdad the maritime route shifted to the Red Sea, connecting Red Sea ports with ports of Europe and the East (ibid.).

Increasingly, routes across the Indian Ocean became attractive routes for labour migration for Hadramis, and by 1820, huge waves of migrants started to lead to strong growth in number and size of Hadrami migrant communities across the Indian Ocean. This does not mean that the Hadramis necessarily planned to settle where they came. As Huub de Jonge states for migrants to the Indies, '[i]nitially, most immigrants did not intend to settle in the Indies. They wanted to earn money to support their poverty-stricken relatives and save for a better future. Large sums of money were remitted to Hadhramaut each year' (de Jonge 2004: 375). Actually many migrants, not the least *sāda* migrants, moved back and forth, staying some years in the Indies, moving back for some more years to Hadramawt, and so on (Bujra 1971; Arai 2004). Still, by 1934, around a quarter of the Hadramis were said to live outside Hadramawt (de Jonge 2004).

Travel routes went in the other direction, from Diaspora communities to Hadramawt and the Arabian Peninsula, for other reasons as well. As religious centres modelled on institutions in Hadramawt were



Figure 2.2 Trade routes across the Indian Ocean.

Source: Ho 2006: xvii.

established all around the Indian Ocean (see e.g. Bang 2003; Freitag 2003; Mobini-Kesheh 1999), still both Arab and non-Arab Muslims travelled as 'pilgrims of learning' to centres of learning such as Tarīm (see e.g. Feener 2004; Freitag 2003, Riddel 1997). As a result of this many non-Arab scholars came to settle in various centres of learning in the Arab world, as for example in Mecca, where the Malay community counted around 5,600 in 1915 (Riddel 1997: 2).

As regards the Hadrami migration, it clearly left its mark on the homeland of Hadramawt as well. Impressive buildings, some in the Dutch or English 'oriental' colonial style, with or without verandas, were financed by oversees remittances. Imported cars arrived in the inland *wadis* even before these were connected to the coast by road, transported in parts on camels. There was electricity and running water, at least for the few, and food habits and clothing styles introduced from Indonesia, Malaysia, Zanzibar etc. for the many. Material aspects have been influenced by the Hadrami migrant communities. Educational reforms have been a primary goal of many Hadrami organizations abroad, as amply described for Indonesian Hadrami organizations by Mobini-Kesheh, sparking changes in the curriculum, for example the introduction of non-religious subjects in the curriculum and establishing schools for girls.

Social and political reforms in Hadramawt have been an important object of so-called reformist organizations like Al-Irshād in Indonesia, working, among other things, for the removal of the old caste-like system of social stratification, in the homeland and abroad as well. While the economic significance of the Hadrami network across the Indian Ocean can be questioned, at least if compared to a significantly higher volume of flow of cash and commercial items for other trading networks, its significance in terms of the flow of ideas cannot be overstated (Freitag 2003; Freitag *et al.* 1997; Mobini-Kesheh 1999). Reforming the homeland moreover was a most important part of the religious and ethnic revitalization among Indonesian Hadramis between 1900 and 1942 described as 'The Hadrami awakening' by Mobini-Kesheh (1999), founded in 'voluntary organizations, modern schools, and newspapers' (ibid.: 34). The role of the Hadramis in spreading Islam should not be underestimated either, as Ho (2006) so eloquently expresses it:

> Unlike the Europeans, whose activities combined conquest and trade and who maintained monopolies by navies, Hadramies entered into wide-ranging exchanges with peoples in the Indian Ocean, especially in modes that come under the broad banner of

religion. Their travels traced out pathways across the ocean marked by mosques, graves, and schools (p. 28).

Who travelled?

Based on a survey carried out in 1962–63, Bujra (1967, 1971) generally concluded that people from the upper strata, the Al-'Attas (*sāda*) and the Basahl (*mashāyikh*), had the highest proportion of migrants, and the *gabā'īl* and the *masākīn* the least, with the exception of the *subyan,* the lowest ranked among the *masākīn*, who were following the Al-'Attas as their servants. In other words, the trend was that the wealthiest people, who could afford the long and expensive journey to destinations like India and the Far East and money for their families left behind, were the ones to migrate. When the very important remittances arrived, this trend contributed to reinforcing the already existing economic differences among different strata. Even though this trend was most marked in pre-war migration, it has been continued in post-war migration, despite more *masākīn* men being able to afford the migration due to the options of cheaper and more rapid, motorized forms of travel. One should keep in mind, though, that the situation in Hureida can be viewed as a special case not applicable to the rest of Hadramawt, due to the high proportion and political and economic dominance of the Al-'Attas family in the town (Arai 2004).

Boxberger (in Arai 2004) modifies this view by stating that poorer migrants tended to travel to the closest destinations, like the Red Sea and Eastern African coastal areas, while other migrants with a better financial situation were able to travel to destinations further east. The fortunes made by migrants to the east were bigger, hence, in another way, strengthening the socio-economic differences already present in Hadramawt.

In a most interesting dissertation on the history of the al-'Attas family, Kazuhiro Arai (2004) makes it clear that for some Hadramis, at least for members of the al-'Attas family, migration did not begin with long-distance migration, but with migration within the homeland of Hadramawt. Stating that 'researchers rarely pay attention to the migration of Hadramis within Hadramawt' (p.111) and that Hadramawt has been 'treated as if it were a black box from which people suddenly came out and migrated to their foreign destinations' (p.112), he demonstrates by statistical analyses of historical data that members of the family who could not establish formal power within Hureida but were able to establish themselves in other parts of the *wadis*, tended to

move. This early short-term form of migration was hence not necessarily propelled by unrest or famine. At least for the al-'Attas family, he proposes that 'the natural growth of number of its members was a principal factor of internal migration' (p.125).

For Arai, migration abroad naturally follows as an expansion of the previous internal migration, where long-distance migration took over when the opportunity for establishing formal leadership positions within Hadramawt gradually disappeared. While warfare and economic hardship probably played a vital role in the, at times, huge waves of migration abroad from Hadramawt, the research by Arai represents a necessary corrective nuance of this prevailing perception, pointing to social and economic success leading to natural growth as a stimulus for migration as well as poverty, insecurity and need.

Travels to the Indies

A regular trading route from Hadramawt to Southeast Asia predates the Hadrami wave of migration from the mid-eighteenth century by several hundred years and may have existed as early as in the seventh century AD (Mobini Kesheh 1999). While the earliest possible migrants must have been individuals, Hadramis travelled by thousands in the latter part of the eighteenth century, arriving first in Aceh, from where they either went to Palembang in South Sumatra or to Pontiak on Borneo (ibid.). Gradually Hadramis settled further east in what is today Indonesia. Arab traders have been identified as far east as Neira in the Banda group already in 1599 (Ellen 1996), but we do not know for sure whether they were Hadramis. A few of them might have been settled, but first with the second English occupation of 1810–17 we can speak of a bigger Arab settlement in the Banda, mostly Hadramis arriving, amongst other, from Surabaya and Batavia (ibid.). The real boom of migration to the Netherlands East Indies, as well as Singapore and Penang, came after the opening of the Suez channel in 1869. Before that time, the major part of the Hadrami migration was to India, East Africa and to countries around the Red Sea (de Jonge 2004).

The proportion of Hadramis migrating and heading towards Indonesia must have, at times, been large, given the size of the Hadrami migrant society in Indonesia, in 1930 estimated to be around 70,000 inhabitants (de Jonge 2004: 373). Even though different towns and places within Hadramawt differ somewhat regarding patterns of migration, the analysis provided by Arai (2004) for 67 migrants of the Al-'Attas family may provide an indication of the importance of

Indonesia as a migratory goal. While 10 went for India, 25 for the Hejaz and 7 to other Middle Eastern countries, 50 went to Southeast Asia, of which 45 ended up in Indonesia.

A typical route between Hadramawt and Indonesia could be through the important ports of Bombay and Singapore, where the stops could last for months before the event of steamships (Freitag 2003). These ports, together with other ports like Batavia, Aden, Jeddah and the Hadrami ports like al-Mukalla and al-Shihr, served as exchange points of information, news, letters, articles of trade and more (ibid.).

The story of a first generation Hadrami in Indonesia

'Saleh' is one of the few *wulāyatī*[6] or first generation Hadrami that I met in Indonesia, in the small town of Alas in the western part of the island of Sumbawa. He was born in 1920 in the small town of 'Ināt (sometimes spelled 'Aynāt), east of and pretty close to Tarīm, in the main *wadi* of Hadramawt, where also his father was born, in 1900. In 1924, when Saleh was four years old, he left for Ethiopia with his father due to economic difficulties. 'In Africa we survived by selling cigarettes', he tells. After a short while they continued to Nairobi and then to Mombasa, where they stayed for three years. From Mombasa they left for Singapore, where an uncle of his, a brother of his father, was living. They stayed in Singapore just for one week, then went on to Surabaya, spending just a couple of days there, and finally settled in Alas. Ahmad was by then close to eight years old, and went to school in nearby Sumbawa Besar. His father had a small textile factory in Alas. Saleh himself established a small textile shop in Sumbawa Besar. He tells:

> For a while I used to sell to Dutch people. It was difficult to run a business at that time, Dutch officials were creating a lot of problems. Besides, the Indonesians robbed the country and exported enormous amounts of valuables out of the country, causing the prices in the internal market of Indonesia to fall. Many businessmen went bankrupt at that time because of this. Also during the Japanese occupation we struggled.

At the time I met Saleh, he was 80 years old and working as a full-time teacher of religion. He is leading three different mosques belonging to the Al-Irshād movement. 'I established all three mosques myself', he states, 'one here in Alas in 1992, one in Hulu [Sumbawa] in 1994, and another one in Sumbawa Besar in 1996'. He continues: 'I wanted to build a hospital in Sumbawa Besar, but at that time, just after the

fall of Suharto, the [US] dollar rose from 3,000 to 15,000 rupiah, and the construction came to a halt'.

His eight years younger brother 'Hakim' was born in Alas in 1928, but left for Kampala in Uganda together with an uncle, both of them escaping persecution by the Dutch colonialist. Before he left Sumbawa, he used to work for a Dutch company constructing houses. He tells: 'His boss appreciated him a lot, because he was very skilled and able.' He ended up settling and marrying in Kampala, where he became father of two children, one boy and one girl. Saleh ponders about what finally happened to Hakim. 'He was probably killed by Idi Amin around 1975. The last letter we got from him was from 1975. Since then I have heard nothing at all. Around five hundred Hadramis were killed in Uganda at that time.' The father of Saleh died in 1943, after a prolonged time of sickness.

Hadrami mobility and migration in perspective

> Like religions, diasporas act more slowly than globalization. But that may be because they expand the time and space of social life, rather than compress them. This is particularly true of diasporas of long standing.
>
> (Ho 2006: 4)

One may for some analytic purposes contrast old diaporas with present-day globalization, where globalization increasingly has come to mean for many academics a 'technological mobility of modernism […] obsessed with speed' and with 'a bias away from absence toward presence', in its extreme form represented by 'guerrilla transnationalist overseas capitalist' (Ho 2006: 10). Another equally fruitful option is to view globalization as a very old phenomenon, not necessarily characterized primarily by a compression of time and space. Following this latter perspective, one may perceive ancient Hadrami routes of migration as old forms of globalization, a peaceful and mostly slow process, providing a strong contrast with the ancient, violent, speedy and dramatic globalizing forces represented by Djengis Khan.

In popular conceptions, globalization is characterized by the 'fact' that 'the world is shrinking' and 'the world becomes smaller'. Quite seldom it is made explicit in which ways the world is shrinking, and for whom.[7] After some years involving research in a couple of Andean communities, I frequently had the experience of meeting people who, for economic reasons, travel less and less. As for example on the

Peninsula Santa Elena, on the coast of Ecuador (Jacobsen 2006), the forefathers of much of the present population were involved in long-distance trade with communities along the coast of America all the way up to Southern California, and during the time of the Incas, with mountain communities far away from their own. Currently [or Today], most of the population seldom make it even to Quito, the capital of their own country, and infrequently travel to the nearby town of Guayaquil. In the highlands of Bolivia I frequently heard words like 'my forefathers travelled a lot, my grandfather used to trade in llama carpets and travelled all over the country, while I cannot even afford a bus ticket to La Paz'. There have of course been periods of large-scale migration for example to the United States for the people 'who made it', but still they are too frequently locked in the geographical and socio-economic space where they end up.

Globalization, whatever it is, obviously does not mean the same for all people regardless of social and geographical situation. Globalization moreover seems to imply a good measure of paradoxical developments, including the increasing significance of local places, communities, traditions, and also conflicts, in many places in today's world. An interesting thing in this regard is the increased significance of part of the old hierarchical structure from Hadramawt regained from the beginning of the twentieth century among Indonesian Hadramis.

There does not seem to be a straightforward 'evolutionary' development where societies tend to be more and more globalized, at least not in every regard. As has been extensively discussed lately in academic works on Hadrami migration, periods of much travel and contact between Hadramawt and the Diaspora has been followed, several times, by periods of less interaction. The Second World War, and the development of nationalism that followed it across a range of Asian nations, made flow of people, messages and money much more difficult than before. As will be discussed in the present book, after a post-war period where travelling became easier and, mostly, cheaper, many present-day Hadramis have experienced severe restrictions on their ability to travel, both inside and outside Indonesia, due to economic difficulties following the Asian economic crisis in 1997.

3 Hadramis in Indonesia

Introduction to Hadrami communities on the islands of Java, Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa

Introduction

> Diaspora discourse articulates, or bends together, both roots and routes.
> (Clifford 1997, in Feener 2004: 354)

Originating from predominantly male migrants marrying into the local populations, Hadramis have over time developed intimate relations with majority populations in Indonesia. The Hadramis, in Indonesia as elsewhere, are mainly Sunni Muslims and mainly belong to the Shafi'ī school of law (Freitag 1997a; Manger 1997), with a small, but increasing, minority of Shia followers, in accord with the established trend of Shia growth in Malaysia and Indonesia in the latter decades (Alatas 1997b). According to Alatas (1997a: 26), Hadramis abroad fit into 'a broader definition of Diaspora, comprising dispersal from an original centre, collective memory or myth of the original homeland, a feeling of marginality and alienation in the host country, and continual relating to the homeland, physically or emotionally'. How strongly such a collective memory may function, may differ from locality to locality within Indonesia and from individual to individual (Jacobsen 2007).

An 'Indonesia-oriented group with an Arab signature'

Unlike the story of Hadrami Arabs in Hyderabad, India, who started off as a successful minority group both in terms of wealth and political power and since 1947 have suffered heavy losses both economically and politically (Manger 2007), the story of Hadramis in Indonesia has mainly been a story of success, in terms of trade, politics, education and religion. With the exception of periods of Dutch, and for a lesser while, Japanese, oppression and interference in Hadrami trading relations (Mobini-Kesheh 1997, 1999), Hadramis in Indonesia have fared relatively well. Hadrami Arab informants that I got to know through four months of fieldwork, from 1999 to 2001, mainly subscribed to

this story of success, admitting that they presently were surpassed by the Chinese trading communities in economic terms. They tended to point out, however, that in terms of social integration into various Indonesian communities, their communities were better integrated than Chinese communities.

Most Hadramis in present day Indonesia are descendants of forefathers who made it to the country through the Dutch colonial period. The term 'forefather' is not haphazardly chosen. First, the bulk of the Hadrami Arabs who migrated were either bachelor males or men who left their families in Hadramawt and married into the local populations in their host country. Second, in common with most Middle Eastern societies, genealogies are mainly traced through men. Hence, the offspring of a Hadrami man and a local Indonesian woman may justly be considered Hadrami.

Although Hadramis, as pointed to earlier, share several typical traits of Diasporas, such as a collective memory of their original homeland and, at least to some extent, a feeling of alienation in the host country, their Diaspora experiences clearly differ in time and space (see e.g. Bajunid 1996; Freitag and Clarence-Smith 1997; Hassan 2004). In Indonesia, with sizeable Arab communities and highly developed Hadrami Arab organizations (Bajunid 1996), close identification with the host society has in fact been usual among Hadramis during the last century (Mobini-Kesheh 1999), in contrast with Hadrami societies in, for example, Hyderabad, India and Sudan (Manger 1997, 2007). Such positive identification with the Indonesian society and cultures is also valid for Indonesian Hadrami societies from the final years before the Second World War (see e.g. Freitag 2003; de Jonge 2004; Mobini-Kesheh 1999). To quote de Jonge, the Indonesian Hadramis are 'a predominantly Indonesia-oriented group with an Arab signature' (de Jonge, in Ellen 1996: 250).

The fact that their Hadrami forefathers mostly came alone and married the local population, was a fact often stressed by my informants as one important reason for their successful integration into the various Indonesian local communities. In comparison, it was frequently noted that the Chinese immigrants are in general more segregated from their Indonesian neighbours, both in matters of marriage, where they tend to marry among themselves; and in religious matters, where a common Muslim identity has assisted the Hadrami integration into the Indonesian society at large. An indication of the success of the religious integration of the Hadrami Arabs in Indonesia is the tendency among Indonesian Muslims to view them as 'more religious and more fit for religious office' (Ellen 1996: 248), especially when they belong to the *sāda* stratum.

Although several of my informants stressed that the present trend among Hadramis in Indonesia is one of cultural and social assimilation, some of their customs to some extent continue to set them apart from the general Muslim population of Indonesia. The description provided by Hassan (2004) for the Hadramis in Kedah, Malayasia, also fits the Hadrami environments in Indonesia, where they 'on occasion, still emphasise their separateness from the Malays through the continued usage of clan names and the Arabic language; their preference for communal living; active involvement in the Arab association; and the ties that they still maintain with kinsmen in the Middle East' (pp. 401–2).

There are clearly some common core concerns among Hadramis, in Indonesia and beyond, which are relevant to the issue of separateness, none of which is represented in recent trends. I wish to mention some of those concerns which were discussed in a conference in Bergen, Norway, on Hadrami diaspora, and which are as well supported by my own data from Indonesia.[1] First, the tradition of name-giving differs between the Hadrami people and people from Northern Yemen, where people may adopt Somali or names from other ethnic groups. The Hadramis in general are said to be careful and selective in choosing names for their offspring, an observation also supported by my own data from Indonesia. Another of my informants, himself a fourth generation Hadrami on Bali, tells:

> There is a special Hadrami tradition with regard to naming. Names like for example Ahmad, Ibrahim and Mohammad are very frequent. Almost no new names are introduced. That is very different from name customs in Northern Yemen. However, things recently started to change a little bit, with people introducing names like Jamal, you know, from Jamal Abdul Nasser, and Khadafi, from the Libyan leader. Myself I named my youngest son Nidal, because I wanted him to be strong, like Abu Nidal.

Second, the Hadramis show a clear tendency toward ethnic endogamy[2] (from second generation onwards) and to stress genealogy more than most people in their host societies. For example, they do not normally marry their daughters to other Yemenis. Although in Diaspora communities the first generation of Hadrami men inter-married with the local population and good relationships with the host society has always been stressed, from the second generation onwards, ethnic endogamy has been dominant.

Third, more than other Muslims in their host societies, the Hadrami people tend to send their children to madrasahs, and teach and use

Arabic. As an example, several of my Hadrami informants in Bali employed teachers who come to their homes to teach their children Arabic. There is also a tendency among them to speak Bahasa Indonesia instead of the local Balinese language. This observation is somewhat in tune with observation of the Hadrami people on the Swahili coast, who tend to use Swahili instead of the local languages spoken in their home area.[3] Fourth, a Hadrami home is frequently easily recognizable from the organizing of furniture, carpets and decorations.

How strongly the links to Hadramawt are stressed varies greatly among the Indonesian Hadrami people whom I met. On one hand, some informants have visited Hadramawt several times,[4] while others continue to stay in contact with relatives in Hadramawt, although they do not necessarily express a strong desire to visit the place. Of the latter, some of them have visited or worked in the Gulf countries, excluding Yemen. For all of them their Hadrami identity seems important. On the other hand, some people are said to have Hadrami names but are not conscious of having any links to Hadramawt. I have not met such people, but I have heard about one family in Singaraja, north Bali, whom other Hadramis think is in the process of becoming totally assimilated.[5] Most Hadramis I met describe themselves as being somewhere in the middle between the two extremes.

Foodstuff from Hadramawt is highly valued among the people I got to know. Several lunches and dinners to which I have been invited included rice, spices, preserved vegetables or coffee from Hadramawt. Such food items are usually imported at multiples of their local price. When asked for reasons why they would pay, people usually tell me that they find such food healthier and better tasting.

Muwallads and *wulāyatīs*[6]

Very few Hadramis in Indonesia are first generation, so-called *wulāyatī (totok* in Bahasa Indonesia).[7] In Bali, as in Lombok and Sumbawa, there is only one *wulāyatī*, a very prosperous old man trading in clothing and jewellery, living in Denpasar, the regional capital of Bali. His fortune was rumoured to be around US$100 million before the recent economic crisis. Nowadays his health is said to be deteriorating. Saleh, introduced above, is a *wulāyatī* in western Sumbawa, an old and rather poor religious teacher affiliated with the Jam'iyyat al-Irshād association (the Association of Followers of the Right Way). This Association is a so-called modernist society founded by the Sudanese religious scholar Ahmad Sūrkatī in Indonesia in 1915, which represents one of the oldest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, running kindergartens, primary and secondary schools and hospitals throughout the country

(see e.g. Mobini-Kesheh 1997, 1999). Another *wulāyatī* is living near the harbour in Ampenan, on the island of Lombok, engaging on a diminishing scale in various business enterprises due to increasing health problems. Some of my informants exclusively reserved the term Hadrami to refer to first generation Hadramis like themselves, speaking about the others as *muwallad* (*peranakan* in Bahasa Indonesia), a common term designating Arabs of mixed parentage (Ho 1997a, 2006). Most informants, from second to fifth generation Hadramis, readily spoke about themselves as Hadramis, sometimes stressing the fact that very few *wulāyatīs* are still alive in Indonesia.

As mentioned, all migrants from Hadramawt travelled without wives or female relatives. When they arrived in Indonesia, they married the women of various local ethnic groups. This means that nearly all Hadrami Arabs in present day Indonesia are to be reckoned as *muwallad*. There is also, like already described, a strong tendency that *muwallad* Hadramis marry other *muwallad*. For this reason, from second generation of Hadrami onwards, there is a clear trend towards ethnic endogamy, as reported by Fredrik Barth from Singaraja (Barth 1993), Roy Ellen from the central Moluccas (Ellen 1996) and from a survey in Surabaya in the early 1980s (Freitag 2003: 51).

At an earlier time, when *wulāyatīs* were more numerous, the social differentiation between first-generation Hadramis and *muwallads* was pronounced, leading the Dutch scholar van den Berg ([1886] 1887) to write a full chapter on what he labelled 'half-cast Arabs' (Mobini-Kesheh 1999: 129). For several *muwallads,* the loyalty of the *wulāyatīs* to 'their region of origin was boundless, and they stubbornly held on to Hadrami norms and values that were seen to be more superior to Indonesian ones' (de Jonge 2004: 379). Among such norms and values were those related to the old system of social stratification in Hadramawt, which included such habits as the kissing of the hands of the *sayyids* in order to pay them special respect, but also a range of other values and norms related to saving, being industrious and possessing a business acumen. *Wulāyatīs* had higher salaries, more political influence, were more attractive as business partners and were regarded as more cultured than Indies-born Hadramis (Mobini-Kesheh 1999). This topic will be dealt with in some more detail later in the book. For now it suffices to say that the growing tension between *muwallads* and *wulāyatīs* since the publication of the book in 1886 by van den Berg, involving competing visions of what it means to be a Hadrami and reaching a climax in the 1930s, lead to a process of 'indigenization' which has been of uttermost importance for the present adaptation of Hadramis to the Indonesian societies. Although the number of *wulāyatīs* presently is insignificant and the old conflict

is past history, the results of political and organizational solutions to the social split provide an important background for understanding present-day Hadrami societies in Indonesia.

Some general trends

In Bali, most Hadrami people live in concentrated clearly defined living-areas (Kampung Arab)[8] in the towns of Singaraja, an old port and colonial stronghold of the Dutch in Northern Bali, and Denpasar, the provincial capital of Bali. In each of the two towns, the Hadrami population is estimated to have 300–400 individuals.[9] In Singaraja most of them live fairly close to the old harbour, which is not much in use any more, a few of them in old Dutch colonial houses. In Denpasar, some streets lined by jewellery, clothes and furniture shops delineate the core of the area where most Hadrami people work and live.

The bulk of the Hadrami people on the neighbouring island Lombok seem to live in the old port of Ampenan, although several Hadrami families also live in the towns of Mataram and Cakra Negara, both of them inland and in close vicinity to Ampenan. There may be close to one thousand Hadrami individuals living in Ampenan, and possibly as many outside Ampenan. In Ampenan most Hadramis live in and around the old harbour area.

Two bigger Hadrami societies are found on the island of Sumbawa, east of Lombok. In the provincial capital Sumbawa Besar on western Sumbawa most Hadramis lived in or close to Kampung Arab, some of them in old colonial style or Arab-style houses. Some informants estimated that as many as 5,000 Hadrami individuals live in Sumbawa Besar. In the old Dutch colonial stronghold on eastern Sumbawa, the port of Bima, possibly 3,000[10] Hadrami live in or near an area called Kampung Melaya.

Most Hadrami people who are not studying run business enterprises of various scales. Trades in clothes, furniture, wood or charcoal seem most common at the time of my fieldwork.[11] Several informants, who had earlier pursued other kinds of businesses, have recently turned to trading in one or several of these goods. As one informant in Singaraja said:

> Some years ago, when the economic situation of Indonesia was better, I bought beautiful carpets from Afghanistan and Iran and sold them in Indonesia, making good money. Nowadays such carpets are too expensive; people here cannot afford to buy them. The exchange rate is not in our favour [...] Nowadays I am

> planning to sell charcoal to countries in the Middle East. You know, in the desert of Saudi, the nights can be very cold.

He showed me various samples of charcoal from Kalimantan, and added that both labour and raw materials are relatively cheap in Indonesia compared with countries in the Middle East. This difference has grown since the fall of the rupiah, making the potential profit higher than before. For the same reason, exporting textiles from Indonesia to the Middle East is nowadays more profitable than a couple of years ago.

Frequently, a network of close relatives managed a business enterprise across a huge distance. One man could, as an example, live in Banjarmasid, Kalimantan, where he buys timber. His brother in Ampenan, Lombok, makes furniture or pieces of firewood, which he sends to a brother in Jakarta, who sells the finished product to markets in the Middle East through relatives living in Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi.

Regional variation and international context

While it may be the case that the same Hadrami family had their representatives in a wide range of places and that 'many [Hadrami] men [migrating] had wives in each port' (Ho 2006: 189), and for these reasons a Hadrami on travel could stay nearly everywhere with relatives, there also seem to be a trend toward people from a particular place in Hadramawt to favour settling in a specific location abroad. As a general picture,

> people from the Wadi between Shibām and Tarīm went to South East Asia, while inhabitants of Wadi Daw'an tended to head towards Aden, the Red Sea Ports and Cairo. India was preferred by people inhabiting the Hadhrami coast, as well as by members of the Yāfi'ī tribe, and coastal dwellers could also be found in considerable numbers in East Africa.
>
> (Freitag 2003: 50)

The above citation describes the general trends, to which there are of course numerous individual exceptions, as I myself encountered among my informants. Table 3.1 sums up information I got from various informants about the home town or village of their father, grandfather or great grandfather and so on who first came to Indonesia, as part of more general interviews. In some cases informants did not know from which place, or even the part of Hadramawt, from where



Figure 3.1 The Malay Archipelago.

Source: Ho 2006: 156.

Table 3.1 Family origin in Hadramawt, collected in Indonesia 1999–2001

In Denpasar, Bali	*Origin in Hadramawt*
Bal-Beid family I	Wadi Daw'an
Bal-Beid family II	Al-Mukallā
Bin-Sanad family	Say'ūn (Dahga, village outside S.)
Bal-Beid family III	Say'ūn
Bal-Beid family IV	Shibām
Al-Huraibi family	Jabal Yafi
Shammakh family	Shibām
Bin-Talib family	Say'ūn
Al-Hajri family	From Hazīm, near Shibām
Sueib family	Shibām
In Singaraja, Bali	
Zakiah family	Shibām
Shammakh family	Shibām
Bin-Talib	Say'ūn
In Klungkung, Bali	
Bal-Beid family	Wadi Leisar
In Negara, Bali	
Baras family	Wadi Daw'an
In Ampenan, Lombok	
Bin-Smit family	Shibām
Balfaqih family	Shibām
Bahweres family	Tarīm
Shammakh family	Shibām
Sumbawa Berat	
Bahweres family	Tarīm
Sumbawa Besar	
Rajab Al-Ubude family	From Tarīm (Gazzam, provincial town outside T.)
Alas, Sumbawa	
Bahanan family	Kinda*
Surabaya, Jawa	
Shammakh family	Shibām
Bayasut family	Shibām

Note:
* Appears to be the name of a well-known tribe rather than a particular place.

their forefathers originated. In many cases, there are several individual families with the same family name, sometimes acknowledging the same forefathers, living in the same place, as for example the Shammakh family in Singaraja (three families) and Surabaya (five families). In other instances, the same family name occurring in the same town does not imply close relationship, as for the Bal-Beid family name, where each of four families living in Denpasar acknowledges a different forefather, with a different geographical origin. More exhaustive information, with data more systematically collected from Sumbawa Besar only, is presented in Table 3.2.

This table illustrates the general trend of people from Wadi Hadramawt, especially from the towns of Shibām, Tarīm and Say'ūn and surrounding villages, settling in the central and eastern parts of Indonesia. It also demonstrates that there are exceptions, like the Wadi Daw'an.

Table 3.2 results from a more systematic collection of information both of strata identification and on place of origin in Hadramawt. The information was first collected from interviews with two persons having an 'expert' status among Hadramis in Sumabawa Besar, and later cross-checked with other informants as in Table 3.1.

As regards strata identification, 23 out of 38 families were considered 23 *mashāyikh,* the term here as employed by informants including one Yemeni family from outside Hadramawt and one family of Jewish origin. Ten, or more than a quarter of the families, were identified as *sayyids*. Although I have not established systematic data like this for my other places of fieldwork, from many statements in individual interviews I hold it likely to be substantially higher than any other place I visited, including Surabaya. Five families were identified as tribal, as *gabā'īl*. It should be added that several informants would identify these families within a more inclusive broadened concept of *mashāyikh*.

With this more extensive mapping of the Hadrami community in one particular town, where the size of the community is larger (estimated as comprising around 5,000 individuals by most informants), we may be in a better position to say something about the assumption that the main trend of immigration is that people from Hadramawt settle in communities where they find people from their original communities.

The findings in Table 3.2 seem to lend some support to this assumption. Eight (possibly nine) families originate from Tarīm, seven families from Gazzam, a small provincial town of Tarīm, nine families are affiliated with the important religious centre 'Ināt, east of and pretty close to Tarīm. Hence 24 family names (and maybe more) out of 38 are affiliated with Tarīm and its near surroundings. Regarding the

Table 3.2 Overview over families and origins, in Sumbawa Besar, Sumbawa, collected in 2000

Family	*Stratum*	*Place(s) in Hadramawt*
1 Rajab al-Ubude	M	Gazzam
2 Bahanan	M	Gazzam, ʻInāt
3 Joban	M	Tarīm
4 Basumbol	M	From Mekkah to Hadramawt
5 Suelah	M	Gazzam
6 Baharmi	M	Tarīm
7 Al-Kathiri	G	?
8 Ba Muʻmin	M	?
9 As-Satri	S	Tarīm
10 As-Segaf	S	Gazzam
11 Al-Jufri	S	Gazzam
12 Bin Sehan	S	Gazzam
13 Ba Ma'bad	M	?
14 Al Jaruk	G	?
15 Ba Rajak	M	Tarīm
16 Badif	M	?
17 Bin Usman	M	Tāriba
18 Ba Fadal	M	ʻInāt
19 Al Zubaidi	M/Yemeni	Zabīd
20 Al Kaf	S	Tarīm
21 Abu Nasib	M	From Mekkah to Hadramawt
22 Al-Amudi	G	Wadi al-ʻAyn*
23 As-Salmin	M**	Gazzam
24 As-Salman	M	Tarīm?
25 Hamada	M	ʻInāt
26 As-Sabban	M	ʻInāt
27 As-Sekil	M	ʻInāt
28 As-Saraf	M	?
29 Al-Habshi	S	Tarīm
30 As-Seh Abu Bakar	S	ʻInāt
31 Bin Agil	S	ʻInāt
32 Samlan	G	Near Wadi al-ʻAyn
33 Balfas	G	?
34 Halfan	M	?
35 Badawi	M	ʻInāt
36 Baharun	S	Tarīm
37 Al-Attas	S	Tarīm
38 Badubbah	M	ʻInāt and Shibām

Notes:
* Southeast of the more well-known Wadi Dawʻan and closer to the coast.
** When asked more closely, he added the information that both the As-Salmin, As-Sarur and the Nasar family used to be reckoned as among the lowest ranking in Hadramawt.

origin of eight of the rest of the families, I have not been able to establish reliable information.

While grand scale family enterprises are fairly common in some regions of Indonesia, in other regions the scale of Hadrami business enterprises is usually more humble. There are some marked economic, social and religious differences among Hadrami settlements on Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa. My current impression is that along a south-east, north-west axis from Bali to Sumbawa the economic situation among Hadrami people is generally declining. Some economic differences are clearly visible. On Bali, the bulk of Hadrami houses is kept well and is of a reasonably or very good standard. On Sumbawa, most Hadrami houses seem to be in need of repair, and many of them are less than modest in size and appearance. On Lombok the situation appears somewhat in-between, with several visibly well-to-do households but also many smaller and badly kept houses, some of them rented.

Another marked sign of economic differences along this axis is the extent and type of labour migration to countries in the Middle East. On Bali, I never once met a Hadrami who knew of any young Hadrami woman locally who was or had been working as a maid or baby-sitter in the Middle East. On Sumbawa, however, I got the impression that such labour migration was the rule rather than the exception. As an example, an old man in Sumbawa Besar, 'Obeid', has 17 grandchildren. Thirteen of them are presently attending various schools, from primary school to college and university. Of the remaining four, who all have completed their education, there is one male and three females. All the three females are presently working as baby-sitters in the Middle East, two in Abu Dhabi and one in Kuwait. Obeid has four younger siblings, who together have in total nine daughters. Three of them are married, three unmarried and unemployed, two are baby-sitters, one in Abu Dhabi and one in Kuwait, and the remaining woman, presently a local business women, has been working as a baby-sitter in Saudi Arabia until recently.

Asking a Hadrami in Bima about whether some of them still provided economic support to relatives in Hadramawt, he told me, 'No, that was long time ago. Now we have to rely on their hospitality'. More specifically people on Sumbawa seek the hospitality of countries in the Middle East for their young, unmarried women. I have so far not met a Hadrami man on Sumbawa who has worked recently in the Middle East or who knows a local Hadrami man who is currently employed in the Middle East or has recently worked there. On Bali, however, labour migration of men of various skills to the Middle East was not uncommon a few years ago, and it still occurs, although on a rather small scale, due to recent changes in the economic situation.

In other words, no female but some male labour migration occurs in Hadrami societies that are better off, and almost no male but a significant amount of female migration occurs in Hadrami societies which appear to be at the lower end of the socio-economic scale. Moreover, there seems to be almost no intermarriage between Hadrami societies on Bali and Lombok, on the one hand, and Sumbawa on the other hand. Hadrami people on Bali usually intermarry among themselves or into well-to-do Hadrami families in Surabaya or Jakarta, on Java, or on Lombok.[12] Hadrami people on Sumbawa probably most frequently intermarry with Hadrami on Sumbawa or on the neighbouring island of Sumba,[13] where the standard of living in general is, according to my informants, equally low for Hadrami and others.

The proportion of people reckoning themselves as Sayyid varies from place to place on the three islands of Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa. In Singaraja there are a few Sayyid families (around four families),[14] in Denpasar perhaps one family,[15] in Ampenan, Mataram and Cakra Negara around one-third of the recorded families,[16] in Sumbawa Besar around one quarter, while in Bima perhaps as much as two-thirds of the Hadrami population reckon themselves as *sayyid*.[17] On the whole of Bali, there are probably no more than a small minority of six *sayyid* families, while perhaps one-third of the Hadrami population on Lombok consider themselves *sayyid*. On Sumbawa, the situation differs between east and west. In western Sumbawa, including Sumbawa Besar, probably less than a quarter of the population is considered *sayyid*, while in eastern Sumbawa, the *sayyid* may be in a majority.

To some extent this situation is reflected in regional differences in religious affiliation. Al-Irshād has a stronghold in western Sumbawa. Muhammadiyya, the biggest modernist Islamic movement in Indonesia, dominates among Hadrami people on Bali. In eastern Sumbawa the bulk of Hadrami people are affiliated with Nadhatul Ulama (NU), in some aspects a more 'traditionalistic' Islamic movement and the largest religious movement in Indonesia. On Lombok both the NU, Muhammadiyya and Al-Irshād have many followers.[18]

I expected, in some measure, to find Hadrami close relatives living together in the same neighbourhood. What I found was that while many Hadrami continue to live in old Arab quarters, close relatives frequently live some distance away, sometimes even crossing national borders. Like already pointed out, there are definite Arab quarters, with a mainly Hadrami population, in most of the towns that I visited. There seems to be a trend, though, that increasingly non-Arabs are moving into those quarters and Hadramis are moving out, settling in other parts of the towns or in suburbs, minor towns and villages where there previously was no Hadrami presence.

Table 3.3 Occupations of Hadramis in Central and Eastern Indonesia (N = 157)

	Within the textile industry	*Public servants*	*Professionals and teachers**	*Store keepers and traders*
In number	47	13	12	102
In %	30	8.3	7.6	65

Note:
* The teachers comprised a total of four, three of them engaged in religious education: one affiliated with the Al-Irshād, one with Muhammadiyya, and the last one with DDII. Eight of them I grouped together as professionals, three of them being physicians, three pharmacologists, one notary and the last one an electroengineer.

Historically, as previously pointed out, Hadrami migrant societies have been, for the large part, trading communities, frequently having a middle-man function in trade (see e.g. Ellen 1996). As part of my general interviews with Hadrami informants in a range of different location, I collected some information on occupations. Table 3.3 provides information on a total of 157 informants, all of them males.

Several of the 'store keepers and traders' deal in textiles, which is the reason why the total number adds up to more than the 157 men recorded. Historically, trading in textiles, or working in the textile businesses of Hadrami relatives, used to be the most common adaptation among Indonesian Hadramis. This statistic, although quite limited, may indicate that the engagement with the textile industry and trading is not as common as before. Still, the number of informants affiliated with trade in textiles and who run clothes stores is relatively high, which does not necessarily hold true for other parts of Indonesia. Further east, in the central Moluccas, dealing in clothes is mainly a Buginese specialty (Ellen 1996). The standard of living among my Hadrami informants trading in clothes and textiles varies considerably, from one listed among the richest persons in Indonesia to, on the other end, a couple of informants striving to survive.

The high percentage of store keepers and traders in my material match the picture provided by Ellen for the central Moluccas, where Hadramis are described as 'general store-keepers […] economically less powerful than the Chinese [tending] to focus on smaller enterprises' (ibid.: 247).

4 'We are modern Indonesians'

Continuity and change among present-day Hadrami communities in Indonesia

Introduction

> Please don't talk more about Hadramis, there are no Hadramis left, no one who is born in Hadramawt. They are all dead by now. We are all *muwallad*.[1]

This chapter will deal, among other things, with different conceptions of modernity among my Hadrami informants, ambivalent conceptions about (and sometimes encounters with) their original homeland, and equally ambivalent conceptions about what it means for them to be an Indonesian citizen. Social identity and individual self-presentation among Indonesian Hadramis is a complex matter which poses both methodological and theoretical challenges. By venturing into recent theories on relativity of ethnic boundaries (Galaty 1982; Herzfeld 1997; Malkki 1995), I aim to explore how these people simultaneously work at making the best out of their business enterprises and managing their distinct Hadrami identity in an Indonesian context, pursuing long-term moral concerns.

The story of Hussain

Hussain, the first Hadrami I met in Singaraja, is a second generation Hadrami in his late sixties, and a businessman running, among other things, a furniture shop. His father, born in 1890, came to Singaraja in 1911. Hussain himself is a businessman, dealing in goods such as textiles, wood and charcoal. His business is apparently going well, although he states that times used to be better. In 1967, just after the military coup, he travelled to Shibām, where he stayed for nine months. After his time in Hadramawt he went on to Saudi Arabia, worked there for 27 years. During these years he visited Singaraja several times, one time, after 10 years abroad, returning with a new wife,

from Shibām. Once we spoke about his experiences in Hadramawt and Saudi Arabia, he went on to tell me a story about the big turning point in his life:

> Now I want to tell you a story. I was to travel to Jakarta to buy some goods to sell on Bali, in 1967. I went on a boat, and then took the train from Surabaya. All the money I had earned I carried in a bag. The bag I placed on top of a shelf above me. After a while, I had to go to the bathroom, which took a little while, since the train was full of people. Probably it took me 5 minutes to reach the bathroom. While I was in the bathroom, the train slowed down, having reached a village. The bag I had left on the shelf. Finally the train stopped, and when I reached my seat, I glanced on the shelf, and the bag was all gone! I rushed out of the train and contacted the local police. They ordered the train to wait for 10 minutes, while the police accompanied me from wagon to wagon. However, we found nothing. I left the train, with just the equal of 25 US dollars in my pocket. Five of those I used hiring a bicycle taxi, which carried me around for several hours. I was rather naïve, thinking that I eventually would spot a person walking with my bag over his shoulder. In that case I could have stopped him and maybe fight him in order to get my money back. Of course I found nothing. I went back to the station and waited for the morning train from Jakarta. I went back again, and took the boat to Singaraja. At that point of time I decided that I would never ever do business within Indonesia. My brother helped me with some money so I could travel to Saudi Arabia, and then I just left. I was for nine months in Shibām. Not that Shibām was the aim of my travel, but there I could learn the Arabic language.

As a result of his frequent travels back to Bali, he had the opportunity to bring back valuable items for sale. His years of work in Saudi paid off well. The items he brought with him to Singaraja covered the cost of his journeys and more. He continues his story:

> Each time I brought plenty of goods for sale, woollen carpets in particular. I was allowed to bring up to 30 kg, but I used to pay the people in the customs, making it possibly for me to bring with me up to 70 kg. Each time I bought land around and in Singaraja. Now I have around 1,000 hectares. In addition I have been able to pay for the education of my children. One of them has become an

> engineer and another medical doctor, of great help to me when I happened to be ill. Many Hadramis around here, the first generation born here, have wasted what they inherited from their fathers, who saved carefully. Their children have started to use their heads (points to his head), and again they have started to save. Look at myself. I have saved for a long while, and invested in a lot of land. I have sent my two daughters to a religious boarding school near Solo. The public schools are in a very bad state, sometimes girls in those schools get pregnant when they are 15–16 years old, and this is no good. Many boys have long hair, even down on their shoulders, while in their heads (points to his head while shaking it) it is empty. There is nothing left there, totally empty. They wear long braided hair. This could of course be tolerated, if they had had something in their brains.

Hussain, one of the very first Hadramis I ever met in Indonesia, was to introduce me to some complexities regarding Indonesian Hadrami perceptions both of Indonesia and Indonesian society and on Hadramawt, also of Saudi Arabia.

While the story of Hussain had a happy ending, some other stories I was told by Indonesian Hadramis did not. 'Muhsin', a young man from Ampenan in Lombok once told the following story:

> All my relatives are rich; I am the only poor one. Why I don't know, only God knows. I used to own a house which I sold to a cousin of my half-sister. The money I wanted to invest in a very attractive piece of land close to the airport, around a quarter of an acre. I went to a lawyer who presented some papers to me to prove that the seller was the real owner of that land, and we both signed the contract. Later on it appeared that the seller was not the real owner of the piece of land. I was tricked and lost all my money. I did all I could to get my money back. Eventually I found the man and dragged him along to the police station. At the police station we made the agreement to meet within two days for the repayment. I showed up as agreed on, but he did not. I searched for him in all kinds of places but without any luck. It appeared that he was continually moving from place to place and had tricked more than 70 persons in a similar manner. Well, once I met him again, but without any results. I frequently go to the place where he is supposed to live, but he is never at home. This last time I met him I brought a knife, I grabbed him by his arm and threatened him, but fortunately I came to my senses and let it go.

> Hurting the man could have destroyed my future, and not least, the future of my kids. However, I never manage to stop thinking that this man took everything I had away from me.

For Muhsin and Hussain, their experiences both confirmed the vulnerability of their own economic adaptation in Indonesia and what they perceive as general lack of moral standards related to honesty, trustworthiness and work ethics in an Indonesian context of religious laxness, ignorance and lack of knowledge. Such a lack of standards among Indonesians, as they see it, also makes foreign investment a risky venture, as once exemplified by Hussain:

> An Australian whom I know once came here to Bali, I met him at Air Sanih [place in Northern Bali famous for health-bringing springs]. He came to invest money in a restaurant project, 150,000 Australian Dollars. He went into a joint project with a Balinese guy. I asked him if he had made a written contract, but he said 'no, I trust the guy'. But, I tell you, with so much money you cannot trust anyone around here. Everyone will become an Al-Capone for so much money. I urged him to make a contract, but he maintained that it wasn't necessary. Later that night he came to my house, telling that he started to think more about the matter and felt uneasy. He asked me to join him to the Balinese guy and speak together about the matter. Then the Balinese answered: 'No, this is not a joint project at all. It is my project, and he gave me the money as a loan.' The Australian raised his hand to his head and felt sick, repeating all the time 'oh no, oh no, oh no […].' He told me that he is an ordinary worker, working very hard to get this money. Nowadays he has a problem with his back and severe rheumatism. He is not able to work hard anymore, at the age of 45. He came back several times and asked the Balinese for money. The deal he finally had got with the guy was that the 'loan' was to be paid back from the surplus of the restaurant business. Each time he got the same answer, however, 'the restaurant is not running well, there are no guests and no surplus'.

Social identity is a complex matter involving dimensions of positive identification and contrast with others perceived as different from oneself, both at a group level and an individual level (Jenkins 2004). It pertains to a human need for belonging and for a sense of continuity, biographically, in the sense of self-sameness (Erikson 1959), and historically. In the following section, matters of social

identity will be discussed in relation to an Arab minority group in parts of Indonesia, drawing on recent experiences from some Arab societies in Central and Eastern Indonesia, on the islands of Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa. It will be argued that being an Arab in Indonesia, or more precisely, a 'Hadrami' Arab, as most of them name themselves, does not merely entail a fixed identity stable through history and throughout different Indonesian contexts. Rather, specific socio-economic and political aspects of the present situation and special characteristics of the integration into the various host societies have to be considered.

I will argue that rather than looking at an ethnic group like Hadramis merely as a fixed and clearly defined entity, one may gain analytically from focusing on the shifting levels of contrast of social identity entailed in the daily identity management of Indonesian Hadrami people. While ethnic identity sometimes may be stressed, frequently other social identities such as political party affiliation and religious belonging are foregrounded. And when ethnic identity is at stake, Indonesian identity may sometimes be stressed more than Hadrami identity. This close identification with the host society has in fact been usual among Hadramis in Indonesia during the last century (Mobini-Kesheh 1999), as already commented on, in contrast with Hadrami societies in Hyderabad, India and Sudan (Manger 1997, 2007).

Indo-Hadramis, Hadramawt and Yemen

How strongly the links to Hadramawt are stressed by my informants varies considerably, as already mentioned, as do their opinions about what Hadramawt is like. As will be discussed shortly, for most of my informants in Hadramawt feelings about the place are mixed and sometimes paradoxical. 'Yazid' and 'Abdullah' are an example. Both successful businessmen from Denpasar on Bali, they questioned negative conceptions about Hadramawt received from their pro-*muwallad* grandfathers who at one time worked for Indonesian Hadramis to regard Indonesia as their homeland rather than Hadramawt (see later discussion). Yazid, who manages a textile shop, explains:

> None of us have ever been in Hadramawt, neither me nor my wife, or any of my brothers and sisters or her brothers and sisters. I wished I had visited the place and met my relatives. I once met one in Saudi Arabia, where I used to work for four years. We haven't kept up the contact, however.

Abdullah, who is running another textile shop, states that:

> I want to go to Yemen [speaking about Yemen as including Hadramawt, which some of my informants did]. We laugh at our grandfathers' stupidity. This has been a bad habit of the *muwallad*, telling us things like: 'We were told by our fathers that Yemen is a nice place. Then we went to school, and now we know they told us lies. Yemen is a very poor and backward place.' […] For us it is a problem that neither ourselves nor or children master the Arabic language.

Even if some informants used the terms Yemen and Hadramawt interchangeably, my Hadrami informants tend to distinguish themselves from Yemenis, of whom fewer families are said to reside in Indonesia. In the words of Hussain, 'maybe one Yemeni for each 10 Hadrami migrated to Indonesia, perhaps only one in 20'. Like several other Hadramis I spoke to, he viewed Northern Yemen as a more backward place than Hadramawt. 'Zyad', an informant in Ampenan, Lombok, answered this when I asked him whether a unified Yemen is a good thing:

> There are cultural differences between north and south in Yemen. The standard of education is lower in the north, and many people there don't care at all about education. They are very much attached to their villages. To establish social relationships with them is difficult, and they have very different conceptions from us regarding what is the good life. They simply don't understand. People there are egoistic, they only care for themselves. South Yemen is already modern.

Trade, wealth and ethnic identity

Several Hadrami people I got to know stressed some specific virtues as central to being a good Hadrami. Two prominent virtues are industriousness and thriftiness, as emphasized by Hussain at the beginning of this chapter. Being able to save money was linked to the ability to postpone consumption. If one, for example, had to sell valuable land in order to get a car or other expensive goods, it was better to wait until one could sell the land with maximum profit. Moreover, in such a situation one ought to sell as little as possible, since investing in land is considered to be the most safe and lasting kind of investment possible. 'Hassan', a *wulāyatī* in Denpasar who is rumoured to have become extraordinary rich by trading in textiles, is portrayed with a humorous twitch by 'Ali', a Hadrami informant from the same city

and a nephew of Hussain, after highlighting the positive Hadrami virtue of being able to save for a rainy day:

> Hassan is very old, maybe between 87 and 90 years, and extremely rich. And very clever! He buys cheap and sells them expensive. As an example, it might be that he will buy a factory making one kind of textile for sarongs. After he bought it a customer approaches him in his new factory and wants 10,000 m of the particular textile. Hassan may then say, 'I just have 2,000m, and it will cost you 8,000 rupiah for each metre'. The customer accepts, and Hassan promises to provide him with more in two days. When he returns after two days, Hassan will tell him: 'I am just able to give you 2,000 m more, and at the price of 10,000 rupiah per metre. After two more days I can give you more.' The customer again returns, and Ali tells him: 'I can only give you 2,000m more, and this time it will cost you 12,000 rupiah per. metre'. And it goes on in the same way. Hassan is indeed very clever. If you go to him in order to obtain some information for your research, you have to pay him well! Maybe he will charge you with one million rupiah. He is very fond of money.

In contrast to the thriftiness so highly valued by my Hadrami informants, other Indonesians are frequently portrayed as more susceptible to their immediate desires. As an example, Hussain once mentioned to me that several local Balinese people have recently sold much land in order to get cars and other consumer goods, even though prices for land have been rather low. 'Had they only waited for a couple of years, they might have obtained ten times the price they got. Instead they are prone to buy a car that lasts for a couple of years, and when it is gone, they are left both without a car and without land.' Ali, a generation younger, states in a similar vein, underlining his perceived lack of industriousness on Bali: 'In Europe you have five days working week, don't you? Here on Bali people work one day, then take the next off, and so on.'

Wealth without generosity is not considered honourable, though. Showing generosity and compassion is closely tied to Hadrami identity by several informants. In Singaraja one man proudly told me stories about several local Hadrami men who had contributed economically to development of schools and health facilities on Bali.[2]

Some people reckoned their origin in the Hadramawt town of Shibām. Interestingly, people still living in Shibām were portrayed as thriftier than themselves. Moreover, Hadrami from Dowan, a neighbouring valley, were said to be even more industrious and economical,

and hence more rich than people in Shibām. People from Saudi Arabia, however, are frequently portrayed as less willing to work and less productive than Hadrami people. 'This is the reason why close to all business enterprises in Saudi Arabia are run by Hadrami', one informant, Ahmed, told me, and continued:

> We work hard, and we also know how to save. That is to say, we used to work hard, but we have become too lazy. Many Hadramis are just wasting money and are not working as hard as before. Third generation Hadramis have become less clever than their fathers. We used to be able to make our fortunes from nothing. Just like the Jews […]. People from Dowan[3] are still good at saving, better than us [from *wadi* Hadramawt]. You know about Osama bin-Laden [from Dowan]? [he laughs] He made a fortune of several hundred millions of [US] dollars.

Chinese people are portrayed by Hadrami people I encountered as industrious and thrifty. Nevertheless, as Ahmed once expressed,

> they don't enjoy life. They live in small flats on the top of their stores and work from early morning to late evening. They just go upstairs to get a little nap and then they go on working again. They only work and sleep, while gaining a lot of money. They are not able to earn that much in London or in Australia. I have myself been to London a couple of weeks. In London a family usually doesn't possess more than one business or restaurant. Here [in Indonesia] they [the Chinese] gain from corruption and bribe leaders up to the very top.

Even though Hadrami people now and then told me that they consider themselves more economical and industrious than most Indonesians, they indicated that there are some limits to how productive and thrifty they are willing to be. The Hadrami people I got to know use considerable amounts of time socializing, sometimes involving long-distance travelling. When I came to visit people without any announcement, I frequently found that they were in another town, in order for example to join a marriage ceremony, a funeral, or just to visit a friend. Industriousness at the expense of sociability is not an option. Hence, when they state that they both want to be industrious and to enjoy life, enjoying life means enjoying life together with friends and relatives. Usually this means friends and relatives within Indonesia.

Going abroad has become increasingly difficult since the economic crisis, and several informants expressed the loss they feel from not being able to keep long-distance relationships. Moreover, they explained that travelling inside Indonesia is also more difficult than before. Visiting other Indonesian cities by airplane was quite common before the economic crisis. Nowadays travelling longer distances within Indonesia has become both more strenuous and time consuming for most Hadrami, since this usually means going by cars, buses and ferries. For the same reasons, labour migration abroad has become less of an option for several of my informants than before. As an example, 'Taufik', from Lombok, has worked both in Germany and Holland, in both countries for around two years. 'I worked for two years with tourists diving on the Gili Islands, serving in restaurants and bungalows. The whole time I put aside money until I had the exact amount needed for a one way ticket to Germany.' One of his brothers used to work for a German shipping company for many years. He is in his late twenties, trying to save for another change to work abroad. 'Now it has become way too expensive', he states, 'it is no longer possible.' Some people running successful businesses, like Hussain from Singaraja, used to go abroad to Australia and other countries for medical treatment, where they considered medical treatment to be both safer and more advanced. For Hussain and many others this has become too costly. Hussain, presently suffering from a medical problem in need of surgery, has finally given up the prospect of an advanced laser operation in an Australian hospital, and option that he would not have hesitated about a few years earlier.

Even going on Hajj seems out of reach for many Hadramis for economic reasons. 'Abdul Rahman', an old, learned man living in Surabaya and a brother-in-law to a close relative of Hussain, introduced above, tells me that:

> I went to Mekka in 1984 together with 'Hamid' [a *wulāyatī*] and my wife for a month, a thing you are only expected to do once in life. At that time it cost me six million rupiah. Now I couldn't have afforded it. It would have cost me more than twenty thousand rupiah, maybe even twenty-five thousand.

Generally the new economic situation means that most Hadrami people experience difficulties in upholding relationships with friends and relatives in other places. In such a situation several of them choose to sell off more land, even in periods when the market value of land is not in their favour. In other words they sometimes feel obliged to

perform unwise economic transactions and hence demonstrate lack of thriftiness in order to pursue an even more important cultural goal: to take care of a broad network of social relationships.

Even though it is the case that most of my Hadrami informants presently experience more and more difficulties in travelling, for economic reasons, this does not mean that they are in the process of being totally assimilated to the majority populations where they live, and there are few reasons why this should happen within the foreseeable future. First of all, historically the opportunities for overseas travelling of Hadrami people has waxed and waned several times. In other words, the present difficulties following the Asian economic crisis in 1997 is in principle nothing new. Second, other opportunities for keeping in contact have become important during the latest years. Several of my informants frequently receive sms-messages and emails updating them on Hadramawt and Hadrami societies elsewhere. Religious scholars from Hadramawt continue to visit Indonesia. Books by those and other Hadrami scholars are very cheap and widely available in Indonesia. Besides these, one type of contact through travelling seems to be on the rise, especially in the eastern parts of where I did my fieldwork: young females in economic hardship are travelling to the Middle East where they earn money as house-keepers and in other relatively low-paid jobs. Third, as will become clear in the following chapters, some special Hadrami cultural and organizational traits continue to be of great importance, although sometimes these have been locally transformed to some extent, as for example the case of Hadrami marriage customs.

The maintainance of Hadrami networks, including transnational networks, is not only an economic virtue. It could be argued that the social and cultural virtue of being connected may be of greater importance for my Hadrami informants than managing business network and owning and investing in land. Investing in social networks and in cultural values seems very important for most of them. While reforming the homeland of Hadramawt in earlier times was a primary goal of many Hadrami organizations and individuals prior to the Second World War (Mobini-Kesheh 1999), both regarding education, healthcare, religious life and political organization, reforming the homeland is still an important priority of many of my informants, the homeland presently being Indonesia for most of them. As an example, several of them are presently actively engaged in fundraising for hospitals, schools and mosques in various parts of Indonesia. As will be further dealt with later in this chapter, many Indonesian Hadramis started already in the 1920s to stress their loyalty to the homeland of Indonesia and to emphasize the value of joining Indonesian political parties and organizations.

The value of formal education is frequently stressed by some Hadrami informants, who gave me examples of Hadrami who had made a successful career within the sciences of engineering, economy and medicine. By contrast, one of the candidates for the presidential election last autumn, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was often portrayed, together with Suharto, as an uneducated person who for this reason was not prepared for political leadership of the large state of Indonesia.

Even more important among several informants is the possession and pursuit of religious knowledge, and they often held the view that most Muslims in Indonesia lack in such knowledge and follow religious tradition of which they do not know the background. As one man said: 'They know their religion only 20 per cent. Their religion is merely on the surface.' I asked him whether Hadrami youths in Indonesia know their religion, and he answered: 'Yes, nowadays we might say that. But for the future generation? We don't know.' Most Hadrami fathers I got to know were conscious of giving their children proper knowledge of the Quran, and many engaged a house teacher in Arabic language and religious studies for their children, while some sent their children to religious centres of teaching on Java, and some others sent their children to the Middle East, and even to Hadramawt, for language, religious and cultural education, a practice which used to be more common before (Freitag 2003; Mobini-Kesheh 1999). In fact the early Hadrami organization in Indonesia, Jam'iyyat al-Khayr (the Association for the Good), was founded in 1901 for precisely such purposes, to 'strengthen the mastery of the Arabic language and culture in the community by opening their own schools and by sending youths to the Middle East for further education' (de Jonge 2004: 377).

Visions of the homeland

In Yemen itself, people with higher education are said to frequently express ambivalent feelings towards the 'traditional' Yemeni societies and to lament the lack of education among people in general and look at traditional places like Shibām as backwards. Hans Christian Nielsen (in Knutsson *et al.*, 1994: 36–7) points out that the old city of San'ā is evaluated in two manners by educated Yemeni people: first, as a backward place where the social control is tight, where everyone knows each other, and where people are illiterates and magic and superstition reign. Second, this city is also regarded as the place where central Arabic and Islamic virtues are most pronounced. In the old city, people can trust each other, old and sick people are not living in isolation and people care for each other and help each other when sickness and misfortune occur. In the old city people live honourably.

Several Indonesian Hadramis whom I met expressed similar ambivalence towards Hadramawt in general. Even though they praised inhabitants of Hadramawt as being closer to central Islamic and Arabic virtues than Hadramis in Indonesia, they did not want to become too similar to them. Once in Denpasar, when I was chatting with an old man, brother of Ahmed, from Singaraja, and one of his sons, we were looking through a teaching book in modern literary Arabic used in some Western universities. The old man stopped after a while and pointed towards the sentence, 'the wife never eats lunch before her husband returns home'. 'Such is the tradition of Hadramawt', he told me. I asked him whether this tradition also pertains to Hadrami people on Bali. 'Oh no, not at all, we are not like that!', he exclaimed, and both the old man and his son burst into laughter. Although such behaviour is considered more honourable, they seemed to hold the opinion that there is more than enough honourableness in Hadramawt.

Although a place where people are clever at socializing, Hadramawt is also considered a somewhat dirty and backward place by several of the informants, both people who had visited the place themselves and people who had not. The custom of eating from the same plate, as practiced in Hadramawt, is an expression of sociability that is not present among any of my informants. One old man, who has been living in Hadramawt for half a year, spoke highly of this practice. At the same time, he voiced concerns about the hygiene. 'It was very difficult for me to eat together with the local people and I never fully got used to eating from the same plate. You know, they all had such incredible yellow fingers and teeth, and I could never avoid being aware of this.' He burst into laughter, and told me about his experiences with local bathing practices:

> 'I am used to taking a bath twice a day. In Hadramawt the water can be very cold, and people looked in astonishment at me when I took a bath that frequently. They themselves at most took a bath once a week. After a while I got sick, and people recommended me to take less frequent baths. So I tried once a day, then every second day, then twice a week, and at last, once a week. Then I became well again, after becoming more like them!,' he added, laughing again.

Abdul Rahman, the old man from Surabaya, once showed me an American article about *khat*-chewing and kidnapping in Yemen, and tells:

> This article I got from an old *waleītī* who got it from his son in Jakarta, and gave it to me in order to translate it to Bahasa

> Indonesia. He died two years ago, nearly hundred years old. Friends also tell me the same story, that people there plant *khat* and nothing else, no food. Most people I know who travel outside Indonesia go to places like Australia, America and Holland and got a permit to stay. I know about no one who settled in Hadramawt, that very dry and barren place. Well, some visited the place for about a month. But the political system there is very unstable. Not even the flight schedules are reliable; no one knows when the planes arrive and when they depart. Some time ago I heard some rumours that they have found oil there, but I don't know if this is true or not. Most people there are still primitive. Some of them have studied abroad, though, like their ministers. And some have studied religion, in Al Azhar.

This complex attitude towards their perceived original homeland is somehow matched by equally paradoxical attitudes in Hadramawt towards Hadramis born abroad. While migration abroad has always provided the most efficient means of improving one's socio-economic position, the most natural fruit of such migration, the *muwallad*, are frequently met by suspicion in Hadramawt (Manger 1997). This attitude is well portrayed in a poem by the judge Muhsin b.'Alawī as-Saqqāf (cited in Ho 2006: 82):

> Oh people of Say'ūn, what's this silliness and stupidity?
> How odd! How strange! This harshness and severity.
> To one in the flower of youth they say, 'To Java with thee!
> Hand over the dough, we'll marry you and throw a party!'
> Forget Java. By the wells you stay, for here is ease;
> Contentment is wealth, in it well-being and peace.
> The satisfied stay with their folk, to Java they don't.
> Ah the clean life, with neither meddling nor discord.
> Oh people of now, what's this dimness of sight?
> You care over money, the cause of enmity.
> Oh shabby smelly spit, throw a cover over it!

This devaluation of people and things foreign contrasted with the positive value given to people, things and traditions local in a society with a strong migrant tradition like Hadramawt, is somewhat surprising and puzzling. In Hadramawt *muwallads* living there are frequently conceived of as lacking purity, both in a moral and hygienic sense (Ho 2006).

There are, however, other aspects of the way *muwallads* have been conceived of and treated in Hadramawt, not the least concerning Indonesian Hadramis. As what Mobini-Kesheh has described as the awakening of Indonesian Hadrami grew, already by 1915 the need to strive for reforms (not the least educational) in Hadramawt began to be expressed, on both sides of the al-Irshād–'Alawī divide (Mobini-Kesheh 1999). Although slow to materialize in practical terms for a number of reasons, this Indonesian Hadrami initiative resulted, in the aftermath of a Qu'aytī–Kathīrī agreement in 1927 on peaceful cooperation, in 'both the Qu'aytī and the Kathīrī […] practically inviting the emigrant Hadramis to undertake reforms in Hadramawt' (ibid.: 111).

Following this invitation, Indonesian Hadramis both contributed to educational reform, not the least through introducing girl's education, more secular subjects and new teaching methods, and to constructing the homeland of Hadramawt in a very literal sense, through establishing roads for motorized traffic, running water, electricity, and modern public buildings, all initiatives which were mostly positively evaluated by the population of Hadramawt at large. Adding to this the increased number of modern and comfortable homes built by overseas businessmen, the local views of the 'foreign' Hadrami societies were not only negative. In other words, just as my Indonesian Hadrami informants tended to express mixed feelings towards Hadramawt, attitudes among people in Hadramawt towards foreign born Hadramis may be better described as complex rather than purely negative.

Some informants explicitly distanced themselves from most Indonesian '*ulamā*',[4] whom they portrayed as working for economic gain. 'They talk what the people in power want to hear. They do not follow a straight path', one of them said. Islam should be taught without any consideration for money. Moreover, benevolent acts like establishing health facilities ought to follow the teaching. 'Not like among the Chinese', one of them adds, and continues:

> They have no mercy and are only loyal to their own small family. They have no religion; they only respect their own closest forefather. He now and then comes to visit them in their houses and they treat him well. For other people they feel no responsibility. They sometimes may act charitably towards others, but only their own kind. Hadramis used to be as rich as the Chinese, before corruption became a problem. Hadrami people are religious and they don't like to bribe. Hence they loose money. But not the Chinese, because they have no religion.

To work hard, to earn money and save for a rainy day are virtues that many Hadrami praise, but not unconditionally. Industriousness and thriftiness without sociability and compassion are of limited value. Moreover, honesty is important in handling money matters. Also in this regard one informant contrasted Hadrami people with Chinese people. 'The Chinese do better than us nowadays, since they bribe their connections without hesitation.' He added that this is a general problem among Indonesians, although on a lesser scale than among the Chinese, and continued:

> The Indonesians are used to bribing people from top to bottom and from bottom to top. You know, like an Al Capone. You know what I mean? One gets nowhere without bribing people. We cannot do that, since we are religious people.

There is clearly a paradox involved when Hadrami informants contrast themselves in such a manner to Chinese, whom they resemble in many respects. They are rather similar with regard to such dimensions as economic adaptation, choices of work careers, a tendency towards endogamy with regard to other ethnic groups (although more pronounced among Chinese), a preference for living close to members of the same ethnic group and the importance of patrilines. One possible explanation for this paradox may be the very real economic competition between Hadrami and Chinese people, which is historically not at all a recent thing. A few years after the founding of Jam'iyyat al-Khayr in 1901, a commercial organization, the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Company) was set up, an enterprise which was 'clearly directed against the Chinese […]. Unsurprisingly, *Sarekat Islam* was said to be implicated in the Sino-Arab and Sino-Indonesian clashes between May and November 1912' (Freitag 2003: 235). This competition has become even more evident since the recent economic crisis. For this reason this ethnic stereotyping may be more evident nowadays than it used to be.

Not all of my informants presented a negative stereotype of the Chinese, though. Some people, such as Abdullah, introduced above, presented them more favourably as worthy, though frequently, more successful trading competitors, in periods due to colonial racist attitudes. Abdullah states that:

> During the Dutch colonial times, the Chinese were distributors for Dutch business companies. You know, the Chinese are very able business people. The Dutch looked at themselves as white

> people and as first class inhabitants in Indonesia, the Chinese as second class, and us, Indians and local Indonesian people as third class.

Abdullah adds that there is contact between Chinese and Arab communities merely in terms of business, 'outside matters of business we have nothing to do with each other. You know, there are religious differences between us'. Abdullah deals in Rastafari clothes, which are locally produced and sold worldwide. He goes on, demonstrating how Chinese sometimes may be partners in business and not just competitors:

> There is a Chinese cargo company here, to which I deliver, that has contact with a lot of foreign companies. They distribute clothes to Rastafari-groups for me around the world. Even in Jamaica young people buy from me, since the clothes they make themselves are of a lesser quality and don't last for a long time.

As an expression of the present increased competition between Hadramis and Chinese, now and then it happens that Hadrami businessmen sell their enterprises to Chinese people. One clear example of this fact connects to a booming business of birds nests for Chinese soups. One kind of swiftlet (Lat. *Micropodidae collocalia)* makes nests containing saliva from the birds, which is used as raw material for producing a popular and very expensive kind of soup. The customers are usually Chinese, most of them living outside Indonesia. A non-Arab Javanese started the soup production 1975, but several enterprising Hadrami businessmen quickly adopted the idea, rebuilding their houses in order to make space for the swiftlets.[5] For some Hadrami families on Bali this turned out to be a very profitable business, and one of my informants estimated his average monthly income from the birds at 50,000 US dollars. According to some Hadrami informants such houses, with birds and all, are increasingly sold off to Chinese businessmen, who sometimes are willing to pay triple the local price. Several Hadrami people, experiencing a growing need for cash, cannot afford to refuse such bids. Hussain, himself having invested in the bird's nest business, states that 'Bali is very stable and safe, and the Chinese now invest a lot in those swiftlets. As always, we begin, and the Chinese grab our enterprises'.

A similar situation of competition between Chinese and Hadrami businessmen, frequently turning out in favour of the Chinese, has also

been reported by Ellen from the central Moluccas (Ellen 1996). As he phrases it:

> The Chinese have historically been dominant in inter-island trade, in terms of the volume of goods shifted, the capital they have at their command and, often, demographically as well. But – to put it crudely – whereas Chinese must at all times rely on economic position for their advancement, Arabs are additionally able to fall back on cultural strategies.
>
> (ibid.: 247)

These cultural strategies, previously referred to, relate to the special standing of Arabs among many Muslims. This is linked to their homeland being on the Arabian Peninsula; speaking the language of the Quran; stemming from (or close to) well-known centres of religious learning (like Tarīm); and, in some cases, claiming descent from the Prophet. One of my informants, 'Fikri', once commented on the Hadrami communities of Sulawesi:

> On Sulawesi there are many people with a Hadrami family history. Hadrami persons, you know, have enjoyed a unique position in Indonesia, because people hold the opinion that any Hadrami had a lot of religious knowledge, whether this was the case or not. For this reason it also used to be simple for Hadramis to marry into lines of royal descent, as many did on Sulawesi. Currently, however, the situation is not like that, and people can freely marry whomever they want.

The theme of the latter topic in his statement will soon be returned to. In regard to the former theme, concerning the high religious prestige of Hadramis among many Indonesian Muslims, which he speaks about both in the past and present tense, he clearly lends support to Ellen's point. While such strategies were made difficult by the Dutch colonialists insisting on ethnic, rather than religious, categorization of the Hadramis, in post-Independence this is no longer the case.

Ethnic relativity

The discussion so far regarding Hadrami identity clearly demonstrates the importance of focusing boundaries in ethnic processes, as the anthropologist Fredrik Barth did in his seminal book *Ethnic groups*

and boundaries (Barth 1969). As demonstrated, Hadrami identity is often pronounced in opposition to Chinese people or to Indonesian people in general. Nevertheless, there are some challenges related to the various ways in which Hadrami identity is expressed that needs further theoretical elaboration. Two challenges in particular are difficult to handle within the early framework provided by Barth. First, my Hadrami informants frequently expressed ambivalent views on culture and society in Hadramawt. As demonstrated, even highly praised virtues like honourableness and sociability are not only talked about in positive terms when these virtues are realized to the extent they are in Hadramawt. This is a kind of ambivalence that may be expressed in such terms as: 'It is important to cultivate Hadrami virtues, but not excessively.' There may be too much of good things.

Second, the kind of identity pronounced by my informants varies with changing contexts. Sometimes they talk primarily about themselves as local inhabitants. As an example, one of my informants frequently voiced the opinion that 'we Balinese are more peaceful than Javanese people and less deceitful and prone to stealing than people from Lombok'. At other times they describe themselves as Indonesians, in contrast to people living in the Middle East. Their stress on being Indonesian is also supported by the fact that they mostly speak the Indonesian language at home, in contrast with non-Hadrami neighbours, who speak Javanese, Balinese and other local languages at home. They moreover contrast themselves with Chinese people, who 'live in closed communities and marry only among themselves', as one informant put it. Most informants stressed that Hadrami people interact with Indonesian neighbours and the wider Indonesian society.

At other times they speak about themselves as Arabs. In one such context, when one of my informants was together with a friend and business partner from Saudi Arabia, he voiced the opinion that immigration ought to be eased for Arabs from the Middle East, 'since we are similar [to Indonesians] in culture and religion'.

In yet other contexts their Muslim identity is foregrounded. Some informants on Bali and Lombok, when discussing Balinese Hindu people, stressed that the Hindus are tolerant and peaceful. My Hadrami informants view their tolerance with some ambivalence, though. 'The Hindu people don't have rules like us. Anything goes. We Muslims are strict, we have rules', Muhsin, the already introduced young Hadrami from Ampenan once said. He went on to stress that Islam is a religion of peace and that Muslim communities tend as a rule to be peaceful:

> There are a lot of problems in several places in Indonesia, in Ambon, Irian Jaya and East-Timor. Where the Muslims are in

> majority, however, we experience no problems at all. Just look at the situation in Lombok. Muslims are peaceful by nature. Where we are in majority we live in peaceful coexistence with Christians, Hindus and others.

Furthermore, as demonstrated throughout this chapter, different facets of their Hadrami identity are highlighted relative to level of contrast. In some contexts they look upon themselves as Hadrami traders in contrast with Balinese people, who do not know how to save money and invest wisely. In yet other contexts they are Hadrami in contrast with Indonesian Muslims, who mostly do not know their religion properly and are more prone to corruption. At other times they contrast themselves with Chinese people in being compassionate and generous towards the greater society. Moreover they contrast themselves with the Chinese in that Chinese put too much energy into their business enterprises. The Chinese, in other words, exaggerate the positive values of thriftiness and industriousness.

Another kind of complexity has so far only been briefly dealt with, relating to the internal stratification of Hadrami society in Hadramawt. The historian Huub de Jonge, stating that the original rather rigid hierarchical system of descent in Hadramawt 'left its traces' in Indonesia, proposes that 'there are still great social and cultural distances among the descendants of the various groups that belonged to different strata of society: the *sayyid*, the *syekh*, the *gabili*, and the *masakin*' (de Jonge 2004: 376). Since I in my own research have dealt mainly with informants defining themselves as *mashāyikh* (*syehk*), I am not in position to either support or refute this assumption. However, as maybe an extreme instance, one of my informants who has a famous *sayyid* last name, define himself as *sheikh*. The term *masakin* implied nothing for any of my informants, and just in one instance an informant told, in more general terms, about a family in Singaraja who used to be reckoned as servants. Even though all informants knew the meaning of the term *gabili*, most of them were not able to identify specific families as having a *gabili* origin. This may indicate, at least in the locations where I did my research, that something close to a reproduction of the old hierarchical structure has not been taking place, or at least, has not survived until present time.

Although knowledge of the traditional stratification in Hadramawt varies significantly between individual informants, Hadrami people in all locations are aware of which families are *sayyid* and which are not. Most informants told me, however, that nowadays there are no real practical differences between *sayyid* and non-*sayyid* people and that

most people do not think about the matter. Several non-*sayyid* informants went further and told me that the whole matter of being *sayyid* is just a fiction, since the Prophet Mohammed had no descendants. This view was frequently voiced especially in Bali and western Sumbawa. A few informants even specified that people calling themselves *sayyid* are not originally from Hadramawt, but from a place within what is today the country of Iraq. Hence they are less Hadrami than other Hadrami people.

In spite of most of my informants downplaying the difference between *sayyid* and non-*sayyid* groups, the fact remains that there is practically no intermarriage between the two groups, and I myself recorded just two such cases of actual intermarriage, a finding to be discussed in more detail later. Moreover, there seems to be a general trend towards non-Sayyid people affiliating with 'modernistic' movements while *sayyid* people more frequently go for Nadhatul Ulama [NU]. Clearly, this internal ethnic divide is of some importance to most Hadrami people I encountered. The marriage pattern observed is in line with what has been described as the principle of *kafa'a*, described by Bujra (1971) in the following way:

> a man ought to marry one of equal descent status to himself, but that if no such suitable spouse exists he may marry a woman of lower descent. Such a marriage is allowed because the children will take the descent status of their father and not their mother. (p. 93)

As will be discussed later, in Hadramawt there are actually examples of *sayyid* men strategically seeking to marry, included in the legal maximum of four wives, women from families with a lower social position. In this way they could increase their political sphere of influence, by creating marriage ties within groups they wanted to control.

Looking at actual marriages reveals further complexities. Both in Surabaya, Singaraja and in Ampenan I came across instances of internal ranking among people calling themselves *mashāyikh,* where some families within this category did not intermarry in any case. Most frequently, when I asked about how specific non-*sayyid* families were identified, my informants usually labelled them *mashāyikh*. *Mashāyikh* functioned in many contexts as a kind of lump category where all non-Sayyids were lumped together. However, Abdul Rahman, the old man from Surabaya who identifies his family as *mashāyikh*, told me

about a specific *mashāyikh* family: 'they never marry us, since they consider themselves to be higher ranking than us'. An informant in Ampenan, a young newly wed man, told me that most people think of his family as a high ranking family among *mashāyikh*. He moreover informed me about one big *mashāyikh* family in Ampenan, with whom I had some contact, that 'although they recently have become very, very rich, really they are very low'. When I asked him to specify, he told me that 'all people here know that', and that they are considered to originate from a servant group. I met two of the brothers of that particular family several times. One of them, 'Zyad', once told me about a cousin who made a very good public career, having a prominent position in an Indonesian embassy:

> A cousin of mine, 'Yazid', is working in the embassy in 'Bombay' (not the real city). He studied at the Lombok University, and then worked for four years in the Economy Department in Mataram. After that he received a government grant for studying in Japan, where he stayed for two years. After returning to his office in Mataram for a short while, he went on to Jakarta to teach economy at a private university. After that he went on to 'India'. My brother 'Fuad' is married to 'Leila', his sister.

Another instance of complexities inherent in the present use of the *mashāyikh* category concerned a family group in Sumbawa Besar described by informants as 'Israelites'. When inquiring about the origin of the family, I was told that they converted to Islam around ten generations ago. Still they are described as Jews, and people added that several of them recently moved to Israel.

The term *gabā'īl* (*gabili*) was not often used. In some instances both younger and older informants, who labelled themselves *mashāyikh*, seemed able to identify specific families as *gabail*, and mostly talked about them as equals. From his study of the town of Hureida, Bujra (1971) reports intermarriages between the *mashāyikh* and the *gabail* to be frequent. He writes of the Basahl (*mashāyikh*) and Ja'da (*gabā'īl*) that they are both 'ultimate descendants of Qahtan [a mythical forefather of the Arabs], and their descent status therefore equal. This allows for 'engogamous' intermarriages between the two groups without resort to hypergami' (ibid.: 34). Only in one instance, in Ampenan on Lombok, some informants voiced the opinion that people of *gabā'īl* origin are 'never good thinkers, but only doing well as soldiers. Just see it for yourself, most [Hadrami] intellectuals

are *mashāyikh*'. Among my informants on Sumbawa, the label *gabail* meant nothing.

Hadrami ethnic identity in the East Indies in a historical perspective

Among sources of ethnic identity commonly adhered to from the late nineteenth century – religious nationalism, territorial patriotism, and ethnic or linguistic nationalism – Hadramis in the Netherlands East Indies chose the second one (Mobini-Kesheh 1999), involving what Albert Hourani phrased as 'a sense of community with all who shared the same defined piece of land, rooted in love for that land itself' (ibid.: 50). Being defined by the Dutch colonialists as 'foreign orientals' (*Vremde Oosterlingen*), together with the Chinese, several restrictions were imposed on Hadramis. Among other things these included: blocking them from most institutions of higher education; forcing them to settle in specific quarters (*kampong* Arab); and restricting travel within Indonesia by rigid travel pass laws functioning until 1919, making leaving one's town, or even the defined Arab quarter of one's town, a strenuous venture (de Jonge 2004; Mobini-Kesheh 1999).

With the rise of Indonesian nationalism, Indonesian nationalist organizations were also rejecting them as foreigners. Learning from Chinese organizations that increasingly focused on their Chinese homeland, they centred on their Hadrami homeland, the original territory to which they came to see themselves as ultimately belonging. As has been discussed, for a long while they had enjoyed some privileges in the local Muslim communities where they settled, and among Muslim scholars because of their religion, their ancestral closeness to the territory of the origin of Islam, and their Arabic language skills, speaking the language of the Quran. However increasingly they came to experience hostile attitudes from both the Dutch and the growing nationalist movements, also negatively influencing their ties with the local communities.

The choice of the homeland as the centre of gravity for their ethnic identity clearly makes sense. Several Hadrami and Hadrami-led organizations were established from the early twentieth century, and investment in Arabic language for the young generation and in sending youngsters for education in Hadramawt for some years, as part of their upbringing, became an important issue for those organizations, mirroring similar developments in Chinese organizations (Mobini-Kesheh 1999).

The establishment of *muwallad* organizations, the first one in 1913, slowly began to change this picture. After the social tension between *wulāyatīs* and *muwallads* in Indonesia and a period with some not so successful organizational attempts at creating a sense of *muwallad* identity, the foundation of the organization Persatoean Arab Indonesia (PAI) in 1934 marked the beginning of a real change of mind among many Indies born Hadramis. Founded by Abdurrahman Baswedan, a young intellectual *muwallad* from a non-*sāda* family in Surabaya active in the Surabaya branch of Al-Irshād, the organization continued the homeland-centred tradition of loyalty, but changing its object from Hadramawt to Indonesia (de Jonge 2004; Mobini-Kesheh 1999.). Following this change of object of 'love for the homeland' a cultural reorientation took place as well, as described by Baswedan (in de Jonge 2004: 385), describing the Indies born as follows:

> they tasted more often the sweetness of honey than the bitterness of *tjadam* [a medicine], more often experienced soft rather than hard things […]. Since childhood their mothers have always given them plenty of possibilities to sigh, when they felt down they were cheered up, they were offered food before they were hungry, and the availability of all kinds of food and drinks, right and left, inside and outside the house […] ensured that they were not daunted by the though of making a living in this world.

In the Indies, where life was more plentiful, easy and comfortable than in Hadramawt, *muwallads* increasingly began to question the Hadrami male ideals of toughness, masculinity and fearlessness. Moreover, as already pointed out, they came to query the privileges, social positions and prestige enjoyed by the 'pure-blooded', which they – to the dismay of their fathers – began to describe as *totok*, an Indonesian term used for all foreign-born regardless of origin, including the Chinese. This general sentiment among *muwallads* is well captured by one of them, Sayyid Hoesin Bafagieh (in Mobini-Kesheh 1999: 130), describing the establishment in 1924 of one of the smaller *muwallad* organizations pre-dating PAI:

> At that time there arose among the youth of al-Irshad and al-Rabitah a spirit of opposition towards the older generation, who continuously formed an obstacle to them achieving their aims of progress […] so several youth from al-Irshad and several youth from Al-Rabitah made a kind of 'union' which gave birth to

an organization named 'Bibliotheek Attahdibijah' in Surabaya, just as a place where they could associate and make their relationship closer.

With the establishment of PAI, again a new Hadrami organization to some extent modelled their way of working on Chinese organizations, in pronouncing Indonesia their homeland and in employing Malay terminology in describing the Indies born as different from foreign born, having a different upbringing and a different political outlook and priorities. PAI became increasingly involved in Indonesian nationalistic movements, where, after a period of cautious hesitation by the nationalists, they became increasingly accepted on equal terms. When Indonesia, in 1948, achieved its independence and Hadramis, together with all inhabitants of Indonesia, got the option of defining themselves as Indonesian nationals, most of them grasped this opportunity, becoming Indonesian nationals 'by default' (ibid.: 153). At that time PAI had proved its success both in terms of number of members and by the many branches of this organization spread out over large parts of Indonesia.

Present complexities

Whether those keeping their original object of identification with the homeland, or the PAI members had gained the upper hand in terms of political mobilization at the time of independence, is difficult to know. What is certain, however, is that the mobilization to define Indonesia as the homeland of Indies-born Hadramis brought lasting changes in the Hadrami societies. The nature of the situation among contemporary Hadrami communities in Indonesia with respect to management of ethnic identity has so far been given little attention by scholars. The present study has so far demonstrated four kinds of complexities related to management of Hadrami ethnic identity:

1 First, Hadramawt society, past and present, is partly a source of pride and positive ethnic identification and partly viewed as primitive, uneducated and backward.
2 Second, in some situations, Hadrami identity is foregrounded, in others, Arab identity, Muslim identity, Indonesian identity or local identity like Balinese or Javanese is prevalent.
3 Third, different facets of Hadrami identity come to the fore relative to whether contrasted, for example, with the Chinese, the Indonesians or the non-Muslims.

4 Fourth, some measure of internal ranking of Hadrami people is of relevance in the present Indonesian Diaspora context, although not as elaborated as in Hadramawt itself.

Such complexities may be discussed in terms of 'ethnic relativism'. Several kinds of ethnic relativism have recently been described by some anthropologists working in Southern Europe (Herzfeld 1997) and Eastern Africa (Galaty 1982; Malkki 1995). In particular Michael Herzfeld and John Galaty are heavily indebted to the anthropologist and sociolinguist Michael Silverstein (see for example Silverstein 1976), who employed the concept of 'linguistic shifters' in order to discuss how people use words and labels that point towards specific meanings in specific situations. Using, for example, common academic words in a mixed party of people with and without academic background may function to highlight 'we academics' in contrast with the rest. Herzfeld and Galaty, building on Silverstein, developed the concept 'ethnic shifters' in order to analyze complex experience of how people may use ethnic labels at different levels in different situations. As an example, Hutu refugees living in a town in Tanzania may variably speak about themselves as East Africans, as Tanzanians, as Rwandans or as Hutu.

Unfortunately, however, both the early perspective of Barth and the later perspective of ethnic relativism share a problem made clear by anthropologists with a more 'primordial' orientation (see for example, Geertz 1963 and Isaacs 1975, both in Bentley 1987). Both find problematic the fact that the core content of ethnic identity is not sufficiently focused when ethnic boundaries are at the forefront. The same view is expressed by the anthropologist Rudie (1994: 69), who has been doing fieldwork among business women in Malaysia:

> There seems to be a general agreement – sometimes implicit – that the concept of identity is appropriate for capturing the continuity of contrast (e.g. Barth 1969). This does not, however, explain the continuity of a cultural content. The perception of the contrast may hinge on a few select markers, but there can still be a vast repertoire of cultural material that is not called upon.

Most probably a broader 'repertoire of cultural material' is highlighted in a perspective involving ethnic relativity, as explored in this chapter, since more boundaries are explored and each boundary relates to a different kind of ethnic content. The approach of ethnic relativity may for this reason be somewhat less problematic than focusing ethnic

groups as more or less static entities. Nevertheless, when focusing contrasts and differences, the danger of paying insufficient attention to continuity and positive identification remains. As has been discussed earlier, there are some cultural core concerns among Hadramis which pertain to this issue of cultural continuity.

Hadrami ethnic identity in Indonesia: some concluding remarks

By way of concluding, not all aspects of the identity of my Hadrami informants are fluid and their expression dependent on contextual requirements. The previously discussed concerns of hospitality, industriousness and being economical add to this list of widespread and traditional elements of identity and point towards ethnic continuity and integration. Such concerns seem to play a crucial part in Hadrami pursuits of moral 'long term cycles'.

Recent economic changes expose the vulnerability of the economic adaptation of Hadrami communities in Indonesia. The economic decline makes it more difficult for Hadrami people to visit relatives living far away, some of whom are also their business partners. The economic crisis has moreover intensified the competition with people sharing several traits of Hadrami society, culture and economic adaptation, namely Chinese societies. This fact may be a reason why several Hadrami informants, while expressing concerns about business and morality, frequently contrast themselves with Chinese people.

The marking of an ethnic boundary with the Chinese, as has been demonstrated, is only one of the several ways in which Hadrami people manage their identity. Ethnicity among Hadrami people in this part of Indonesia is a complex matter, with several cross-cutting lines of internal differentiation. A recent anthropological perspective of ethnic relativism (Galaty 1982; Herzfeld 1997; Malkki 1995) has proved a helpful tool in order to explore such intricacies. In spite of such complexity, some important moral themes seem central to Hadrami identity regardless of socio-economic background, religious affiliation and place of living. Central to the adaptation of most Hadrami people, business and trade, are the values of thriftiness and industriousness. There are, however, many ways of working hard and saving money. Being a good Hadrami is evaluated on the basis of how a person both, through daily business, perpetuates social relationships with other Hadrami, promotes integration into the wider Indonesian society and contributes to the still relatively high social esteem of Hadrami people in Indonesia. It depends on how a person,

through engaging in 'short time cycles', contributes to continuation of 'long time cycles'.

Although in this chapter I mainly venture into specific local forms of identity management, it is important to bear in mind that Hadrami Arabs in Indonesia may also be considered as part of a global network of Hadrami people who live partly in Hadramawt and partly dispersed over large parts of the world. Moreover, these people are influenced by global strands of Islam. There are several reasons for this. First, relatives living abroad influence the world view of Hadrami people in Indonesia. Second, until recently travelling Hadrami missionaries and business people from the Middle East and other parts of the world have had an immense impact on Hadrami (as well as on other) societies in Indonesia. Third, Islamic books and articles from leaders of various international movements are continually a source of spiritual inspiration for several of my informants. Fourth, local mosques and religious schools are affiliated with various global Islamic schools of law and various Islamic movements. One such movement is the already introduced Al-Irshād. As mentioned earlier, this movement is a so-called modernistic movement downplaying social inequalities, stressing the importance of careful and accurate readings of the Quran and judging local Islamic traditions as un-Islamic.

All these influences, to a varying degree, are woven into the daily moral concerns of Indonesian Hadrami people, and into the daily evaluation of both fellow Hadrami and non-Hadrami people. Additionally, the content of these cultural streams is re-negotiated and re-interpreted in the local contexts. As an example, the Al-Irshād movement among Indonesians (both Hadrami and others) is a movement attacking corruption and social inequalities in present-day Indonesia, and is concerned to find alternatives to traditional local Islamic life-crisis rituals. Another example pertains to Sufi movements, so-called mystical Islamic movements: at the present time some Hadramis on Bali are organizing their own Sufi rituals which blend elements of Indonesian Sufi movements and movements that originated in the Middle East. In these, the meticulous and accurate interpretation of Quran and other classical texts is not a primary concern. Their movement is concerned both with relieving health problems and problems which they conceive to be s related to a more stressful life in modern Indonesia.

It is not only such religious movements that have appeared to be part of global flows. Consumer goods and technology also flow through networks of Hadrami business people. Before the economic crisis many goods were imported as well as exported through these

networks. Nowadays goods like hand-woven carpets from Iran have become too expensive for most people, due to the fall of the Indonesian currency, the rupiah. Recently, export of timber, timber products and woven textiles has become more important, due to the relatively low cost of production in Indonesia, which has recently become comparatively even lower than before. Some of my informants have adapted to this situation fairly well, while others have experienced economic problems. As I have now discussed, being a Hadrami is closely interlinked with being industrious, thrifty, and being able to save money by hard work under most conditions.

5 Between ideologies of equality and social stratification

Diaspora experience is defined not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of 'identity' which lives with and through, not despite, difference (Hall 1990, in Feener 2004: 354).

The degree to which Hadramis have become assimilated into the general Muslim population of Indonesia is a question open for debate. Although the findings presented in this chapter do not provide any evidence for the strength of the present processes of assimilation (or indigenization), it presents some clear recent trends in marriage patterns of relevance to the debate, among Hadramis in some Central and Eastern Indonesian towns.

In the following, some matters of social stratification will be discussed in relation to an Arab minority group in parts of Indonesia, drawing on fieldwork experiences from some Arab societies in Central and Eastern Indonesia, in the town of Surabaya on eastern Java and in various cities on the islands of Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa from 1999 to 2001. The issue of social stratification and actual marriage patterns will be stressed in particular.

Social stratification in Hadramawt

As already discussed, Hadramawt society is a stratified society (see e.g. Bujra 1971; Freitag 2003; Freitag and Clarence-Smith 1997; Manger 1997). This model of social stratification might be better viewed as an ideological model, where 'a complex mixture of lineage, profession, learning and wealth' (Freitag 2003: 45), together with various contextual characteristics of particular places, intermingle in the realization of social inequalities in real life. There are at least two things to be stressed here, both of them pertaining to social stratification within Hadhramawt. First, economic activities and internal migration have,

since before the wave of Hadrami migration to Indonesia, to some extent counteracted the effects of stratification (Freitag 2003). Differences in the pattern of social stratification between various places in Hadramawt have not been sufficiently acknowledged by most researchers. This situation may partly be due to a trend of repetitive use by various researchers of Bujra's generalizations of his findings from a small town in Wādī 'Amd and partly to the fact that the costal areas have been less studied than the interior parts (Camelin 1997).

> Hadhramaut contains a variety of different types of social organizations or societies, which together form a very complex overall Hadhrami society. Each of these societies seems to have its own, hierarchical system of stratification adapted to local and historical circumstances. They all have their own rules, and each group is linked to the others in ways which serve religious, economic, military and political needs.
>
> (Ibid.: 156)

The Marxist philosopher Sālim al-Khudar (1989, cited in Ho 2006: 33–4) lends support to the view of Camelin, by pointing out the socio-economic differences between the dry and more egalitarian western part of Wadi Hadramawt, and the more central parts, where there are bigger farms and also a more rigid system of social stratification. He is a Hadrami from the western part. Other factors adding to this complexity of different social systems within the homeland of Hadramawt are the unequal wealth acquired by various families in migrant Hadrami communities such as those in Indonesia, and their distance to the Hadramawt homeland. How social inequalities are expressed in those communities abroad certainly must differ from a fixed and standardized vision of social stratification in the Hadramawt. Before returning to the issue of social stratification, in relation to present-day Hadrami societies in Indonesia, it may be constructive to have a look at the political and religious forces at work among Hadramis in the first half of the twentieth century.

Hadrami stratification in the Netherlands East Indies

The social composition of the Hadrami migrants to the Indies is difficult to assess. However, it appears that people from all strata of Hadrami society were represented (Mobini-Kesheh 1999), although probably proportionally more from the highest strata (Arai 2004; Bujra 1971). Albeit some researchers have argued that the system of social stratification (whatever it may imply) was transferred as a whole to the Indies, the system was probably in the process of breaking down

already by the end of the nineteenth century, with the help of initiatives from the colonial government. Dutch colonial officers tended to appoint, to a large degree, prominent non-*sāda* as Arab 'officers', heads of local Arab communities. In the wake of this policy that effectively undermined traditional ideas of social position, a new Hadrami elite was born (ibid.). This elite tended to be based more on 'achieved status' of education and wealth and less on traditional 'ascribed status' by manner of birth (ibid.).

Intra-ethnic stratification disputed

Although knowledge of the traditional stratification in Hadramawt varies significantly between individual informants, Hadrami people in all locations are aware of which families are *sayyids* or *sāda* and which are not. Most informants told me, however, that nowadays there are no real practical differences between *sayyid* and non-*sayyid* people and that most people do not think about the matter. Several non-*sayyid* informants went further and told me that the whole matter of being *sayyid* is just a fiction, since the Prophet Mohammed had no descendants. Especially in Bali and western Sumbawa this view was frequently voiced. Like stated earlier, some informants stressed that the *sayyid* are originally immigrants to Hadramawt from Iraq, and hence they are less Hadrami than other Hadrami people. 'Muksin' made this point very clear:

> How many sons did the Prophet beget? You know the answer: not one single son, only daughters. And we Arabs reckon relatives through males exclusively. Hence there are no descendants of the Prophet Mohammad. However, there are people who claim to be [descendants]. However, they do it on their own account. They assert it, but we don't believe them'. Later he added: 'The *sāda* people are not really Hadrami, but they arrived [to Hadramawt] from abroad. Only *mashāyikh* and *gaba'īl* people are really Hadrami.

One of the three *wulāyatīs* I met, Saleh (already introduced) from a small town outside Sumbawa Besar, stated that: 'There is nothing left of the old caste systems, which used to be in former times. Nowadays we are all equal, there is nothing left of such old customs'. He then went on to tell an old story about how *haba'īb* people came into existence:

> Three men were once killed in Hejaz, all of them emirs. They were from three different families, and were killed by people from Iran.

> Their three wives were captured by the Iranians, who planned to kill them. A new emir, Usman, then said: 'Yesterday three emirs were killed. Today I am emir. I will have to kill those three women.' Then a man from Iran named Ali said: 'Please do not kill my people, look, they are young women. What if I paid a high price for the three women?' Usman replied: 'No, this is not necessary. Just pay the women themselves to compensate for their losses.' He then added: 'The best solution right now would be if one of them would marry my son.' Ali also had a son, and said: 'My son may marry one of the other women.' Another emir, Abu Bakr, asked for his son to marry the last one. Hence all the women saved their lives thanks to Ali. Then people in Iran started to think: 'Ali had success, and managed to pay a high price for the women and saved their lives.' The Iranians started to think about themselves: 'We Iranians are better than other people.' To this very day, they have continued thinking about themselves that 'we are *sāda*, we are *haba'īb*'. Ali's full name is Sayyadina Ali, so people who say they are *haba'īb*, descend from Iranians. However, most of them used to live in Hadramawt prior to this incident, and hence they came back to Hadramawt. In other words, everyone is in reality on equal standing. To this day, though, Mulahela, al-Kaf, al-Idrus and others have considered themselves to be *haba'īb* and stated in front of others: 'We are higher than you. You are beneath us, and others are at the bottom.' However, both in Hadramawt, Arabia and here things have changed last ten years. 'We are all alike', people have started to say.

Interestingly enough, the story of this man bears some slight resemblance to what *sāda* people in Hadramawt are reported to state about their own origin, beginning with Ahmad bin 'Isā al-Muhājir as their common ancestor (Mobini-Kesheh 1999).[1] He is said to have left Basra in Iraq in back in 929 AD and entered Hadramawt in 951 AD to become the first *sayyid* to settle there. Most importantly, he is reckoned to be related to the Prophet through his grandson Hussayn (through the Prophet's daughter Fātimah), himself representing the eight generation in this noble line of descent (ibid.). His grandson 'Alawi was the first one to be born in Hadramawt and the only one to beget children. Hence all the *sāda* are descendants of 'Alawi, a reason why his descendents are known as Ba 'Alawi, the name which also came to designate the Sufi order introduced into Hadramawt by the *sayyid* Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Faqih al Muqaddam (d.1255/653 A.H.), al-Tariqa al-'Alawiyya (Arai 2004; Freitag 2003). This foreign identification

of their origin became to be used, in the heated 'Alawī-Irshādī conflict in the early twentieth century of what was then the Netherlands East Indies, as a 'proof' by non-*sāda* adherents of al-Irshād that *sāda* people are not to be counted among Hadramis proper (Freitag 2003). On the other hand, the conception of many Yāfi'ī (an old tribe of South Arabia) tracing their origin to an area outside Hadramawt towards Aden, did not enter this debate to question their Hadrami-ness (ibid.).

In some instances, there might even exist, at least in some specific local communities, a measure of internal differentiation between people labelled *mashāyikh*. As already mentioned, both in Surabaya and in Ampenan I came across instances of internal ranking among people calling themselves *mashāyikh*, where some families within this category do not intermarry. Most frequently, when I asked about how specific non-*sayyid* families were identified, my informants usually labelled them *mashāyikh*. The category *mashāyikh* seemed to function in many contexts as a kind of lump category where all non-*sayyids* were lumped together. Besides the already mentioned examples of internal ranking within the *mashāyikh* category in Surabaya and Ampenan, I was once told by one prominent *mashāyikh* man about one family in Singaraja that they used to be considered servants, but 'nowadays we don't think in this way any longer'. Interestingly enough, his family never intermarried with this family. The term *gaba'īl* (*gabili*) was infrequently used, though. Among many informants, the label *gaba'īl* meant nothing. One of them added that people of *gaba'īl* origin are only to be found in Yemen.

Although it seems likely, as already discussed, that the migration pattern to Indonesia favoured people reckoning themselves as *mashāyikh* or *sāda* more than people associated with other social categories, my findings (although sparse) concerning some local internal differentiation among people regarded as *mashāyikh* may indicate that the original social complexity among the first Hadrami immigrants was greater than the two terms of categorization imply. Whatever the explanation for the present domination of the categories of *mashāyikh* and *sāda* as working categories among my informants, they never spoke about other categories if I did not press them on the issue and ask specifically about other categories. I also presented various informants with maps of family relations that I made based on the interviews, starting from the first forefather who migrated from Hadramawt, and asked them to categorize the family belonging of each person marrying into their family. In all cases they employed only the two categories. In addition, I asked about Hadrami neighbours not related to them, again getting support for the same trend.

The distinction between the categories of *mashāyikh* and *sāda* should be a matter of history, according to most of my informants. As 'Yusuf' said: 'The important issue is not whether people are Hadrami, but whether they are Muslim or not.' Another informant, 'Farid', once voiced the opinion that 'really, this issue [regarding ranking of Hadrami groups] does not interest me. Some *haba'īb* people say they are high ranking, and they rank everyone else below their own rank. But this is not in accordance with Islam. This attitude is splitting instead of uniting us'. Abdul Rahman, who happens to live in the neighbourhood of an Alawiyya mosque in Surabaya, states that:

> The *sayyid* use to lift their hands and pray with a loud voice. This is what the Alawiyya people are doing, but it is not permitted. Is God not going to listen to us when we pray quietly? If you move in at the hotel near my house, you will hear people pray loudly, using a microphone. They are not respecting people who are ill, or people who are not Muslims.

Another informant, 'Ali', seemed to think that such a splitting might serve the national authorities and hence have been consciously maintained. In his view, both the present government of Indonesia, like the Dutch colonialists before them and the British in Hadramawt, have wanted to encourage the recognition of *sayyids*, in order for the authorities to govern the rest of the population through them, as followers of the *sayyids*.

Marriage patterns and issues of social stratification

From the second generation onwards, Hadrami people tend to be endogamous, as stated earlier. Several of my informants, however, hold the opinion that such a situation is now changing. One of them, Farid, stated that more and more Hadrami people are marrying out of their Hadrami communities and marry other Indonesians. Interestingly, however, when mapping his own closest relatives, including his own children and the children of his siblings, it turns out that only one of them married a non-Hadrami. Another informant, 'Sadiq', maintained that the onset of such changes depends on the presence of what he labelled 'old people', probably (inferred from the wider context of our talks) both referring to people of old age and *wulāyatī* men:

> 'As long as old people are still alive, Hadrami people will only marry Hadrami. Fifty years ago it never happened that people

> married other Indonesians. Now it frequently happens, especially when there are few old people left [in the local community].' He added with a smile: 'You know, this is the era of globalisation. The most important thing is of course that people are Muslims.' Earlier he told about himself: 'I have myself married very traditionally. God gave me Hikma. Our mothers are sisters.[2] This is a good, old custom. Men used to establish closer friendship through daughters marrying into each other's families. Frequently it was like this, that if one of them had several daughters, he could say "Choose which daughter you would like [to marry]". It was always important not to marry them off too late, when the daughters were too old.'

While some of my informants seem to regret such changes, they all unanimously welcome other perceived new trends related to changes in the system of social stratification and related marriage customs. Besides being untenable from a religious point of view, the old stratification system, and especially the place of the *sāda* within it, is illogical and harmful, creating splits in Hadrami communities and among fellow Muslims. In the view of Abdul Rahman, even the historian L.W.C. van den Berg seems to have been taken in by the rhetoric of the *sāda* leaders. He once showed me the Bahasa Indonesia translation of his book 'Hadtramaut and the Arab Colonies in the Indian Archipelago' (1887),[3] and stated that he disagreed with him on the matter of the origin of the *haba'īb*. By his interpretation of the author, van den Berg supported the view that *haba'īb* people originally descended from the Prophet Mohammad. Hassan added his opinion that:

> I doubt his explanation. Maybe he didn't learn enough about Islam, since he was Dutch. I myself doubt that they descend from the grandchildren of the Prophet. God created all humans equal and on the same level […]. Arab people ask [for spiritual guidance] by the graves [of famous *sāda* people] regarding marriages. You Christians[4] consult people, not graves! […]. As you saw for yourself earlier today by the Ampel Melati mosque [where we saw people were praying for help near holy graves], people are stupid. They don't think by themselves, they just follow their leaders. Even Muslims today do not know what Islam is about. The Prophet Mohammad himself made it clear, when he still was alive, that the religion was already established, and stressed that from that time on there should be no additions.

He continued pointing out the fact that several of his *mashāyikh* neighbours, running small businesses along the main street, were followers of the Alawiyya, and went on: 'If I want my son to marry a daughter of a *haba'īb*, they will refuse. However, if I had a daughter, they would accept to marry her.' Later he added: 'They do not want to marry of their daughters [to us]. If they do, they loose in the competition. When we marry off our daughters to them, they win.'

Abdul Rahman went on to talk about the differences between *sāda* marriages and other Hadrami marriages: 'The wedding ceremonies of the *haba'īb* are more complex than ours.' He continued to describe how the local Hadrami marriage ceremonies are mostly held in Arabic language. There are two separate ceremonies, one in the morning for men and another one in the evening for women. In the female ceremony, some close male relatives may be present. In the main ceremony, the male one, the bridegroom shakes hands with the father of the bride, or his representative, and asks for acceptance for marrying the bride. This ceremony usually last for two hours, including speeches and entertainment. If the parents of the bride are wealthy, they may hire musicians who play music from Hadramaut. In the *haba'īb* ceremonies, however, another element is also added, the *mawlūd*. He explained:

> *Ulamas* read one and a half to two hours from specific books, telling stories about the Prophet. They then think that the Prophet himself will be present, and they remain standing in order to honour him. I always arrive late in order to arrive when the *mawlūd* part is finished. I have been present in several *syed* marriages, and *mawlūd* always bothers me.

In spite of most of my informants downplaying the difference between *sayyid* and non-*sayyid* groups, the fact remains that there is practically no inter-marriage between the two groups, and I myself recording just two such cases of actual inter-marriage. This finding contrasts with the findings of Françoise Le Guennec-Coppens from her study of Hadramis in East Africa, where her analysis of several generations of Hadrami marriages demonstrated that strict rules of marrying according to social strata was not respected, probably because of the small size of the local Hadrami populations, resulting in what she describes as an idea of 'social proximity' which 'came to include just about any marriage with another Hadrami' (Guennec-Coppens 1997: 162). Similar observances have also been made from East Africa by Anne Bang, who provides evidence for *sāda* families in

East Africa marrying their daughters to other families who are seen as religiously acceptable, mainly *sheikh* families (Bang 2003). In Zanzibar she demonstrates that *sāda* families, during Ottoman times, even married their daughters to the BuSa'idi (the Sultan family). Whether this was for political strategic reasons or a recognition of BuSa'idi as equals, we do not know (ibid.).

In Indonesia, there seems to be a general trend towards non-*sayyid* people affiliating with 'modernistic' movements while *sayyid* people more frequently go for the Nadhatul Ulama (NU). Obviously this internal ethnic divide is of some real practical importance to most Hadrami people I encountered, as Table 5.1 seems to support, where 120 actual marriages through four generations, including newly wed, are recorded.

As none of the confidence intervals are overlapping, the recorded differences in marriage customs are most probably significant. A total of 77 per cent of the marriages are endogamous with regard to Hadrami identity.

Table 5.1 Patterns of marriage for Hadrami Arabs, recorded in 1999–2000 from the towns of Surabaya, Singaraja, Denpasar, Klungkung, Ampenan and Sumbawa Besar*

	No.	*%*	*95% confidence interval*
Total number of marriages	120	100	
Hadrami–Hadrami marriages, within the same social stratum	89	74	65–82%
Hadrami–Hadrami marriages, across social strata	3	3	1–7%
Hadrami–non-Hadrami marriages	28	23	16–32%
Marriages with local non-Hadrami Muslims	24	20	13–28%
Marriages with Muslims from other immigrant groups	4	3	1–8%
Men marrying out of their social category (ethnic group and social stratum)	23	19	13–27%
Women marrying out of their social category (ethnic group and social stratum)	9	8	4–13%

Note:
* Exact confidence intervals for binominal proportions were calculated with StatXact for Windows version 6.0. The data has been established through so-called 'snowball-sampling', where contact with one informant in one place leads to contact with relatives and in-laws in other places.

Only 3 per cent of those marriages (which amounts to three cases) are marriages across the *sāda*–non-*sāda* divide. In two of those three cases, the man was *sāda*. In comparison, 28 per cent married non-Hadrami Muslims, mostly non-immigrant Indonesians. Hence the social incentive to stick to your own 'caste' group seems stronger than the incentive to marry other Hadramis. Another interesting finding is that most people marrying out of their social category are men. Although not evident from the table above, there seems to be no real increase in the number of cross-category marriages with the youngest generation, whether across social strata or across ethnic boundaries. Hence even though most of my informants think that their Hadrami communities are rapidly changing, they are probably not changing that much in matters of marriage. It seems that the Hadramis in the Indonesian communities focused on in this chapter do not only demonstrate a tendency towards ethnic endogamy, but also an inclination towards endogamy at a sub-ethnic level following the division of *sāda* versus non-*sāda*.

Kafa'a debates in twentieth-century Southeast Asia

A pronounced trait of what Mobini-Kesheh labelled 'The Hadrami awakening' (ar. nahdah) in the Netherlands East Indies, starting from the beginning of the twentieth century, was the general conception that one homeland is the origin of Hadramis and that their first loyalty has to be towards that homeland (Mobini-Kesheh 1999). Hadramis clearly agreed on the prime object of identity, being the homeland rather than 'race' or religion (ibid.). The content of Hadrami identity, however, was open for debate, and has remained so in present-day Indonesia, as discussed earlier. Are the *sāda* tradition and the Hadrami system of social of social stratification at the core of what it means to be a Hadrami? Disagreement on the answer to this question has focused particularly on the status of the *sāda*, where the most contested customs were the kissing of the hands of *sāda*, the custom of *kafa'a* (and hence the ban on marriages between daughters of *sāda* and non-*sāda* men) and the legitimacy of the *sayyid* title. While many *sāda* themselves wanted an end to the traditional custom of kissing of the hands, most of them protested vehemently at the mobilization to end the custom of *kafa'a*. The famous Sudanese scholar of religion Ahmad Sūrkatī sparked a fire when he, in a pamphlet published in Surabaya in 1915, summed up the requirements for a valid Muslim marriage, excluding the principle of *kafa'a* and stressing the equality of all Muslims (ibid.). Sūrkatī, who had studied in Medina and Mecca, had been 'espoused to the ideas of the Egyptian modernists, who

wanted to bring Islam more into balance with the demands of the time, and preached equality of all believers' (de Jonge 2004: 377). Protesting against the privileged position of the *sayyids* in Indonesia, a position which caused the society of Jam'iyyat al-Khayr to distance itself from him, he founded the new organization Jam'iyyat al-Irshād in 1915, which was to become a leading modernist organization opposing the conservative ideology which supported the *sayyids*. His move provoked strong reactions among many *sayyids*, who themselves in a countermove established the pro-*sayyid* al Rabitah al-Alawiyyah (the union of the descendants of the Prophet) in 1927 (de Jonge 2004; Freitag 2003; Mobini-Kesheh 1999).

Ten years before, in Singapore, the marriage between a *sāda* woman and an Indian Muslim created a heated debate both among Hadrami migrants and in Hadramawt itself (Bujra 1971). The pronouncement by the editor of the Cairo journal *Al Manar* that the marriage was religiously legal, raised a storm of protests. The Mufti of Singapore, himself a Hadrami *sāda* from the Al-'Attas family, made a public pronouncement stating that the marriage was religiously forbidden. To this the editor of *Al Manar* made a response not very dissimilar to the one made ten years later by Sūrkatī that as long as both parties are Muslim and compatible, a slave is not marrying a free-born woman, the man is able to support his wife economically, and the girl's parents or guardian agree, then the marriage is legal according to Islamic law (ibid.).

Abdul Rahman tells the following about Sūrkatī:

> He came both to Jakarta and Surabaya, maybe around 1890. He was a very learned man, and he was invited by *haba'īb* people who wanted him to come and teach. He accepted the invitation, but later on, when he was asked about whether marriages between *haba'īb* and other people could be permitted, he answered 'Of course, according to our relgion this is permitted'. From that moment on *haba'īb* people started to dislike him. He established Al-Irshād several places in Indonesia. Still even today *haba'īb* people continue their dislike for him.

This debate concerning *sāda*–non-*sāda* marriages in particular, and the position of the *sāda* in general, also continued in full force in the Netherlands East Indies until a new challenge arose: the establishment of *muwallad* organizations, not the least PAI in 1934, the strongest, most widespread and lasting *muwallad* organization in the country. As discussed, inspired by developments within the Chinese minority, they remained focused on the homeland as the prime focus of their

identity, but changed the content of that object from Hadramawt to Indonesia (Mobini-Kesheh 1999). The new controversy following from the development did overshadow, but not end, the debate on the *kafa'a* principle and, more generally, the 'Alawi-Irshādi conflict. Since studies on post-war Hadrami societies in Indonesia are sparse and this topic has not, to my knowledge, been dealt with in studies of contemporary Indonesian Hadrami societies, a look into present marriage customs may be of some interest.

Kafa'a and cultural continuity

Although my informants stress the decreased importance of the *sāda*–non-*sāda* divide, this divide seems to be continuously celebrated by ways that marriages are conducted in real life. Those findings are very interesting to view in the light of the following analysis by Ulrike Freitag, which differs in focus from the explanation previously cited from Bujra:

> Women formed part of the varying strata but in many contexts constituted a separate group because of the relatively strict gender segregation […]. While they did not, for the most part, openly participate in the documented public life […], their presence can be felt in a variety of ways. Thus, they were crucial to the maintenance of social boundaries which was achieved by way of dress codes, through specific customs and even customary law […]. Mainly, however, these boundaries were perpetuated through marriage rules, according to which women from one stratum were preferably married to members of the same stratum. While women could marry men of higher strata, men could only marry within or below their own stratum.
>
> (Freitag 2003: 41)

According to Freitag, women are crucial in maintaining the social stratification system, and particularly in the way that they engage in marriage. Her conclusion is supported by the Hadrami scholar al-Shilli,[5] who

> states that a Hashimi – that is, a descendant of the Prophet's great-grandfather who is not also a descendant of the Prophet himself (sayyid, sharif, ahl al-bayt) – is not eligible to marry a sharifa (female descendant of the Prophet). The term he uses is kafa'a ('sufficiency'): a Hashimi does not possess sufficiency in hierarchical rank to match her. Marriage eligibility indexes an underlying

> rank that subsists in closeness to patrilineal Prophetic descent (of which unity is the maximum). Stated as a legal injunction, the maintenance of kafa'a sufficiency amounted to a rule of hypergamy, which mandated assymetrical marriage exchanges: *sayyids* could be wife takers but not wife givers.
>
> (Ho 2006: 150)

Possibly the relevance of the observation from Freitag for some of the Hadrami societies in Indonesia may indicate some measure of social and cultural continuity which persist despite other possible trends of assimilation or indigenization. Through repeated patterns of marriage, a prominent ethnic marker, part of the social stratification system, is maintained. Clearly, as has been amply demonstrated, this system is by no means a blueprint copy for any local variety of the social stratification system to be found in Hadramawt. Even though the stratification system represents cultural and social continuity, the way that social inequalities are maintained in the communities of my fieldwork is very much a local phenomenon which is, as has been pointed out, different from realizations of social differences in Eastern Africa and possibly elsewhere in the Indian Ocean region.

Marriages across the *sāda*–non-*sāda* divide can of course occur if the man is *sāda* and the woman non-*sāda*, without breaking with this particular interpretation of the *kafa'a* rule mentioned by Freitag. In the words of Arai (2004: 91), 'male members of *sāda* can marry women from any social strata'. In my material, in two of the three instances of cross-strata marriages the men were the *sāda*. This seems to imply that even *sāda* men marrying non-*sāda* women is not very frequent among my informants. In Hadramawt, strategic marriages between *sāda* men and non-s*ā*da women were probably quite usual. At least this has been documented in Arai's (2004) study of the Al-'Attas branch. As an example, the acknowledged founder of the Al-'Attas branch, 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Rahman (d.1661/1072 A.H.) and reported to have been married to more than 13 wives, besides marrying *sāda* and *masha'ikh*, also married women from within the tribes and even from the lower strata (ibid.: 48). In Hadramawt such marriages made sense, not the least regarding *sāda* establishing marriage relations with the tribes, which were of great importance to the s*ā*da as providing military protection. Such alliances naturally do not make similar sense in Indonesia, and at least among my informants, cases of *sāda* men marrying non-*sāda* women appear to be rare.

A note of caution has to be added to this presentation and discussion of data. In my fieldwork I travelled along networks of social

relations, where establishing contact with for example, a Hadrami person in Singaraja would lead me into contact with a brother in Denpasar, a son in Ampenan and a brother-in-law in Surabaya. After a while it became evident to me that all my informants turned out to be people reckoning themselves as *mashāyikh*. To some extent this realization underscores the findings that people very seldom establish marriage ties that cross the social boundary between *sāda* and non-*sāda*. However, dealing only with non-*sāda* informants is also the weakness of this research, so it is important to be careful with the generalization.

6 Hadramis in diversity

A focus on some unique adaptations on Bali and beyond

A. HADRAMI HEALERS ON BALI

Introduction: Hadramis on Bali

As previously discussed, Hadrami Arabs in Indonesia in general have maintained a close identification with their host society during the last century (Mobini-Kesheh 1997, 1999). Their history on the island of Bali, however, provides a more complex picture. The anthropologist Fredrik Barth, in a short passage about the Hadramis in Bali in his book 'Balinese worlds' (1993: 187), portrays them as devoted and rather strict Muslims, their religious traditions being clearly opposed to the polytheism of their Balinese neighbours. Several of my own informants supported such a view, pointing to their own minority situation on Bali as making them paying more close attention to the Quran. The Hadramis on Bali are a very small population and may not consist of more than 1,500 individuals.[1] In general, Muslims in general on Bali make up no more than 4 per cent of the population, where the great majority of the population are Hindus, subscribing to a particular form of Hinduism labelled Bali Hinduism (Barth 1993). When my Hadrami informants portray themselves as a tiny minority on Bali, they do not only speak about this in terms of being Hadrami Arabs, but also, and more frequently, in terms of being a small Muslim minority in a predominantly Hindu environment.

The general success of Hadramis in Indonesia is a theme that my Bali informants frequently dealt with, both historically and presently. Even on the island of Bali this is reflected, among other things, in Hadrami Arabs holding many of the important religious offices within the Bali Muslim society, among other, being leaders of many of the local Mosques, a situation which seems to have been common in Indonesia in general (de Jonge 2004). A strategy of marrying the

local population, either local Muslims or Balinese who converted into Islam, has served them well in integrating into the local Muslim community.

As in Indonesia in general, the success of Balinese Hadrami Arabs is not limited to religious matters alone. Several of my informants pointed to the, in general, good economic standing of Hadramis on Bali. They added that Hadramis have more important political offices, both in government and in voluntary organizations, than their percentage share of the population should predict. Their level of education is above that of the general Balinese population, and their contribution to establishing schools and centres of learning has been important, according to the same informants. Factors of importance for the success of Hadramis on Bali are not only found related to their integration into the Balinese society, but also related to their integration into Indonesia as a whole, and moreover, connected to the more widespread Hadrami communities outside Yemen, providing them with a wide potential of trading links. Still, this account demonstrates that the Bali Hindu context partly provides a special cultural avenue and an economic niche that some Hadramis know how to utilize. Employing both Hindu and 'Javanese' cultural resources in a meaning-making process, local Hadramis fashion healing practices that largely cater for Balinese Hindus, cooperating with Hindu healers and employing Hindu theories and concepts. While many concepts and theories earlier thought to be non-Muslim may justly be conceived as Sufi (Woodward 1989), others, like concepts of magical power employed by this healing group, are more clearly Hindu.

The Hadrami healing group

Also regarding health careers, Hadramis have made a significant contribution both within the sphere of biomedicine (mainly as medical doctors) and within other health traditions. This present account will focus on a healing group on Bali, led by a strong charismatic religious leader. The group did not employ a specific logo, but the members generally referred to the group as 'the Salaam group'. I became aware of his group through a method of travelling along lines of genealogical connections, where 'Hussain', a trader in timber, textiles and birds nests[2] in one town led me to a brother, the already introduced Fikri, in another town, who again had a close relative in a third town who was involved in the healing group. This man, 'Ahmed', visited frequently a village outside his city, where the Hadrami leader of the healing group lived permanently, together with one Muslim and another Hindu

'helper'. As will be discussed, this group, being led by a self-declared 'fundamentalist Muslim' still owes much to Hindu philosophy and Hindu concepts. In some important ways, the group can be considered a cultural 'cross-road' where seemingly conflicting religious and cultural streams meet.

Hussain himself does not support at all the activities of this healing group, since he considered it to be practicing so-called *bid´as*, heretic 'additions'[3] to the Quran and Sunnah. Moreover, he belongs to the rather strict and purist Al-irshād movement. For him, the leader of the group, 'Mustafa', in practice claims a position between God and Muslims in general, whereas such a position is not tenable in his view, since there should be no such intermediaries.

Fikri and Ahmad, however, support the healing group, even though they themselves are affiliated with Al-Irshād and, like many of my Hadrami informants, lament the general lack of religious knowledge and observance among non-Arab Muslims on Bali, echoing the view expressed by Hussain that 'most Muslims on Bali only know their religion 20 per cent'. Mustafa and other Muslim members of the group also more broadly lament what they see as a general decline of the Muslim worldwide society, as exemplified by Mustafa by one occasion:

> Historically Muslims brought science to the West. When the Islamic caliphate ended in Spain, a period of decay followed. From the sixteenth century onwards the Muslims have been sleeping. They have been backward and lacking in inspiration. Their imams have not been pure in front of God, but on the contrary, impure. From that time on people have not really understood the Quran, but have read it as a song. When Muslims begin to understand the Quran and become pure, then they will become leaders.

Abdul Gadir, another group member, a distant relative of Fikri and a close friend of the 'Yusuf', father of Yazid from Denpasar (already introduced) and a war hero from the war of independence against the Dutch colonialist,[4] support the views of Mustafa, adding that:

> At the time of Ibn Sina [Avicenna], while Richard the Lionheart was still struggling to spell his name, Muslims in Baghdad studied astronomy. Now Muslims tend to be underdeveloped and stupid. They don't put the Quran first. CIA and America is afraid that we will rise and be strong again. CIA is playing their game in Irian Jaya, Ambon, Kalimantan and Jakarta. If Muslims could lead the

> development of Indonesia, then Indonesia would have become a leader of the Muslim world. That prospect is what scares the USA. Southeast Asia is green. We have everything. This is most important in this era globalisasi [global era]. If we become strong, America will loose. Look at what happened in Algeria: CIA used France to make the Muslims, the real winners of the elections, losers. Besides, IMF, as soldiers of CIA, is staging an economic war against us. It looks like Benny Moerdani[5] represents the hand of CIA or Mossad. He met with Pentagon representatives in 1992, planning how to remove Suharto and make Moerdani himself president. He and Abdurrahman Wahid have several times been spotted together, travelling to Israel. The reason for the downfall of Suharto, was that he began working to get closer to the Muslims. Earlier he used CIA and Mossad to keep Muslims down. Wahid had most of his education from Baghdad, where he was taught a blend between communism and Islam. His practice could maybe be Muslim, but his way of thinking is Communist. Even Amien Rais[6] thinking changed after he stayed in the United States. Maybe they offered him money. Fikri, I and all Arabic people on Bali are in the Muhammadiyah. We are intellectuals, we have brains. Wahid, however, is just like Moshe Dayan, you know, the one-eyed.

The group members do not consider any of the practices of the group as religiously illegitimate, and do not think of Mustafa as occupying a position as a 'middle man' between God and humans. To the contrary, all of them maintain that 'God is democratic' and each human being can find his or her way directly to God. Fikri frequently expressed that he and the other group members have developed a 'special technology' that connects its users directly to communication with God.

Like Hussain, Fikri and Ahmad strongly object to the claims of the *sāda* of belonging to a favoured stratum of their Hadrami society descending from the prophet Mohammed, intermarrying mainly among themselves (Jacobsen 2004, 2007). No member of their group would ever do as many Indonesian Muslims and seek the advices or help of *syeds*. They tend to think that genealogical relations with the Prophet are impossible, stressing that the Prophet never had any son. In their view, the *syeds* act as illegitimate middle men between God and the largely ignorant masses among the Muslim population.

Fikri and Ahmad moreover favour the organization Dewan Dakwah Islamiyya Indonesia[7] (DDII), which has strong ties with Muslim

organizations within the Middle East and which some scholars consider to be the least liberal among the present bigger Muslim organizations. The organization is held accountable for several violent attacks on ethnic and religious minorities in Indonesia (Hefner 2000). Ahmad is a close relative of an important previous leader of the DDII, Hussain Umar al-Hajri. According to Ahmad, al-Hajris position internationally is strengthened by his membership in The Islamic International Conference, having their head office in Mecca (Jacobsen 2004).

Fikri previously was in the hotel business, on a large scale. As he was growing rich, he started to question his own success, his motives and the side-effects of committing one's life to big business. His career came at a great price for himself, his wife and children, and for his friends. After being cheated in business matters by a companion, he came to review his life and decided that God had another plan for him which would decrease his material wealth, but increase his spiritual wealth and strengthen his family ties.

Mustafa himself, a tall, thin and white-haired man, is a man of impressive learning, being fluent in several languages like Arabic, English, German and Italian. Arabic he studied for six years, and he writes beautiful calligraphy. He is well read in scientific literature. Among other things, he knows the writings of anthropologists like Clifford Geertz, of which he once commented jokingly: 'I just know that I am a Muslim, but not what type of Muslim. They [anthropologists like Geertz] can inform me about that'.

Mustafa is not only reading scholarly books and articles with a sceptical mind, he is also critical of much of the writing about Islam and Muslims among Western journalists, once stating his views on a British publication:

> A British journalist recently wrote a book named 'Militant Islam'. However, Islam can never be militant. Only Muslims may sometimes be militant. And yes, some Muslims are angry. And hungry. Like in Iran, or in Iraq or Afghanistan. Or for that sake, in Lebanon or Palestine. Hunger frequently creates anger. Just look around for yourself here in Indonesia. But Islam itself is a religion of peace.

Mustafa, who is around 60 years old, objects to calling himself a leader. Instead he stresses how the group members serve each other in both religious and worldly matters. His appearance is meek and humble, and in dealing with people he is soft-spoken and patient. I have been told that he teaches an impressive amount of students

matters of religion, 'around one thousand students, maybe the biggest group in eastern Bali', one of the members once stated.

Like Fikri, Mustafa also had his turning point in life, in 1968, when he got a big swelling on his right body side, causing a paralysis of his right arm and foot. He consulted several medical doctors, but to no avail, and he decided to consult one of the elder brothers of his father. He tells the following story:

> In 1968 I was studying in a modern pesantren[8] in Gondor. In the school we learned to use our heads and to think rationally and not only to go by religious ideas. We also learned about the great significance of 'tenaga batin' ['inner power'].[9] At that time I got a big swelling on my right body side which looked like cancer, and the whole right side of my body was paralysed. […] I decided to consult my father's older brother who was a healer. Some of it he smeared on the swelling, and the other he gave me to drink. Immediately I got as well as I was before, and started to consult older knowledgeable people in my village about health and healing.

From this time, he went through, for a couple of years, a personal development where his 'inner power' steadily increased. A special test for his spiritual abilities took place in 1970, when he practiced healing for the first time in his life, successfully fighting 'black magic' (Jacobsen 2004). He told me about this success after we have had a longer conversation about God, health and healing, where he several times stressed that healing can only derive from God and that no cure can take place without the direct intervention of God.

Mustafa still seems to think that his special growth of inner power started even before 1968, being trained in techniques of increasing inner power by his father and other relatives early in life. Already in 1965 this training proved valuable for him, in his joint fight, together with American troops, against the 'communistic' president of Sukarno. 'I myself killed several of the communists with my bare hands', he explained. At that point I realized for the first time that the concept of inner power used by him and other group members (including the Hindu members) did not only relate to areas of religious practices and healing, but also to physical fight and to so-called combat sport. This new insight was strengthened several times since then, by stories told me by Mustafa and some other group members, and also by getting acquainted with their military-like training of potentially paramilitary personnel in a nearby training site.

Mustafa and two of the Bali Hindu group members are making their living primarily from the activities of the group, and their activities

took place in Mustafa's home. Fikri and Ahmad, though, first and foremost gain their income from 'traditional' Hadrami activities such as trading in furniture and textiles, as well as, for one of them, running a hotel. According to Mustafa, their patients pay according to their economic situation. Some very poor people were even treated for free, while, on the other end, a few rich clients provided generous donations. Not all the treatment need to be that expensive, as, Mustafa states:

> Many of the health problems people suffer from are caused by blockages [of circulation], and fresh fruit, like pineapple boiled in water against kidney stones will help. We need to find the resources which are already widely available to meet the needs of people, like pure herbs and other things which are not polluted. All over the place we can collect herbs for free. This is very important for us here in our community when we frequently don't have enough money.

Mustafa goes on to tell how lack of money, and even food, sometimes can be used in a constructive way by him and his students:

> When my students and I are hungry and don't have enough food I recommend fasting, for example for three days. We don't eat and don't drink water or smoke during that time from five o'clock in the morning till eleven o'clock in the night. During nighttimes we only allow ourselves one meal. Still we keep in strong health.

Fasting several times proved a forceful means of obtaining power by Mustafa and his disciples, even enabling Mustafa to influence weather conditions sometimes, as he once told:

> I have found a way to stop the rain. Once I fasted for seven full days, during a period with too heavy rainfall. After fasting I pronounced '*as-salāmu aleikum*, rain', and I moved the rainfall to a different region. Another time a hotel manager was asking me to move the rain, affecting his tourist customers. I did it the same way, pronouncing, '*ya mattar, as-salāmu aleikum*'.[10] In between ten and thirty minutes the rain moved to another place. […] Once a patient called me from Holland and told me, 'I feel so terribly cold in my room'. I then pronounced, '*Hawa barid, as-salāmu aleikum, idhhab!*',[11] and the coldness was all gone.

The bulk of his patients appeared to be Balinese, and several of them live in or close to the village. Quite a few came from outside Bali,

even including two Europeans, and also an American tourist, whom I happened to meet. The group is not organized as a formal enterprise to be officially recognized by Indonesian authorities, but rather as an informal network, with some core members, and other more or less strongly affiliated. The network steadily increases, sometimes by patients successfully treated joining Mustafa for a while to learn, about which he tells the following story:

> One medical doctor from Denpasar once came to me to receive treatment for his eyelids. He had read about me in the newspapers. His problem was that he could not open his eyelids completely; they were always half-shut. He is a university teacher, just like you. He had travelled several times for treatment in Singapore and Australia, but to no avail. Finally he came to see me. I just needed ten minutes, and then he was well. Later he came and stayed with me for a while in order to learn.

Muslim healing in a Hindu context

The relation between the concept of inner power with combat sport is important in Hindu, Muslim and other societies all over Southeast Asia. Although not being part at all of 'original' Islamic thought, in the Indonesian versions of localized Islam this connection seems to be important. However, as Woodward has made us amply aware of, even Classical Middle Eastern Islam does not deny the existence of magical power in itself (Woodward 1989). Even though Mustafa and his group are not explicitly subscribing to any Sufi tradition, the importance of Sufi traditions in Indonesia and the general openness among Sufis to include non-Muslim beliefs and rites are part of the Muslim environment quite possibly influencing their healing enterprise.

What Benedict Andersen describes as a Javanese concept of power (Anderson 1990), the Javanese concept is very different from a modern European conception, where power is seen as abstract, having heterogeneous sources (like wealth, social status, organization, weapons etc.), without limits as to possible accumulation, and being morally ambiguous (as to questions about what forms are legitimate). By contrast, in Javanese tradition power is perceived as concrete, existing 'independent of its users' being 'that intangible, mysterious, and divine energy which animates the universe' (p. 22). It is homogenous in the sense that '[p]ower in the hands of one individual or group is identical with power in the hands of any other group' (pp. 22–3). Its quantity is constant and questions regarding its legitimacy are irrelevant, since

deriving 'from a single homogenous source, power antecedes questions of good and evil' (p. 23). In this Javanese approach, which as soon will be discussed, is part of a Javanist cultural resource exceeding the boundaries of Java itself, people are concerned more with concentration of power than of its legitimate use. Anderson goes on to describe how yoga practices and ascesis have been employed, in what he names the orthodox tradition, for accessing and concentrating power. Moreover, as Anderson further makes explicit (p. 25):

> While personal ascesis was generally regarded as the fundamental way to accumulate and absorb Power, traditional Javanese thinking also recognized that this process of absorption or accumulation could be furthered both by certain rituals, often containing a core of asceticicm, such as fasting, meditation, and the like, and by possession of certain objects or persons regarded as being 'filled' with Power.

The value of persons 'filled with power' will be part of the main theme for the next subchapter, where healers among Beja people in the Northern Sudan, where I did an earlier fieldwork, and Mustafa and his group of healers will, for some restricted purposes, be compared.

In several localities of Indonesia, the concept of inner strength is also interlinked with military and paramilitary training.[12] Interestingly enough, Mustafa describes the power as originating from the sacral bone, where there will be a sensation of heat, spreading throughout the whole body. This way of framing it is definitely Hindu, where Mustafa also employs the concept of *sakti* from the Hindu tradition, translating it as 'superpower', once adding, 'like the power possessed by Samson'. Still, the perception of concentration of power leading to heat is described by Anderson as typically Javanese (1990). Another Hadrami member of the group, 'Khalid', tells a story of how useful this power might be in matters of daily life. A woman that he knows once was working in the agricultural field. A man approached and wanted to sexually assault her. She mobilized her inner power that Khalid had taught her to train, and her power gave him a violent blow and he fell to the ground.

A vivid illustration of what is meant by inner power was once supplied to me in a meeting with Mustafa and his Hindu helper 'Wily', a newcomer to the group in August 2000:

> Mustafa tells me that he wants to demonstrate for me the power of his inner strength. He concentrates, and then grasps the arm of Wily softly. Wily twitched violently, looks very pale and tells

> Mustafa that he felt like he got a strong blow below his right ear. Mustafa immediately 'removes' the power by repeatedly moving his fingers from the right shoulder to the fingertips of Wily. Wily still complains about feeling strong pain. Suddenly he starts to vomit. Mustafa repeats the treatment, but to little avail. Wily still feels pain, and his right arm is paralyzed. Wayan, a Hindu student of Mustafa, provides Mustafa with a glass of water. Mustafa moves his right hand over the water and prays. Wily drinks the water, and feels slightly better. Mustafa continues the treatment, moving his fingers from the right shoulder of Wily and to his fingertips. As Wily is getting increasingly better, and colour is returning to his face, Mustafa comments: 'We Muslims always say that we first have to help ourselves and fix our own problems before we can help other people. Hindu people, however, say that 'if we get a piece of dust in our eye, we cannot see, and other people will have to help us.' It is like that. We think differently.

Mustafa frequently contrasts Hindu thinking and behaviour to Muslim. Before demonstrating his inner power on Wily, we engaged in a conversation on various sources of inner strength available to Muslims and others. While he freely admitted that sources of inner strength are available to people of other religions like Hindus, he still stressed the special sources of power available for devoted Muslims. By means like reciting the 99 names of God, employing special Muslim formulas in meditation, by Muslim spirit helpers, but not the least by the power of God present in people seeking a religiously pure life as Muslims, Muslims have greater sources of inner power at their disposal than others. For this reason they are able to both help them themselves in cases of own sickness and problems, and to be of assistance to others. Mustafa's stories about how he, by the help of God, has treated himself for sicknesses and solved personal problems are numerous. By contrast, Hindus, in his view, will always need the help of others when they experience sickness or other problems. As regards the 99 names, Mustafa once specified that reciting 'one name may be enough to fight in self-defence, but this has to be done in combination with moral strength, otherwise the effect will be minimal'.

Although Mustafa employs Hindu concepts and also Hindu helpers in his practice, he still views Hindu and Muslim thinking as very different from each other. Moreover, he thinks that the peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Hindus on Bali may soon come to an end. He tries to act carefully, though, regarding his Hindu friends and neighbours and with his Hindu helper and students and never tries in

any way to insult their religious feelings or to try to convert them. He acknowledges that the peaceful and mutually beneficial coexistence between Hindu and Muslim societies has a long history on the island. Once he stated that, 'We [the Balinese Muslims] are very tolerant. We are fundamentalist, but very kind fundamentalists. We have been on Bali for 500 years and lived in peace and tolerance with Hindu neighbours'. At another occasion he also commented on the similarities of many habits of Muslims and Hindus in his local community, stating for example that 'We and Hindu people here make food in the same manner, the only difference being that we do not use pork in our meals'. He even maintains that old Hindu books foretold the birth of the Prophet Mohammad as early as one thousand years before his birth. 'In fact', he states, 'the word 'mohammada' means 'to carry through' in Sanskrit'. He also finds useful elements from within the Jewish tradition, he tells:

> A woman from Jerusalem once visited me, and she asked: What do you think about the fact that I am Jewish? I told her that I respect both Nabi Musa [the Prophet Moses] and Nabi Isa [Jesus] and that we have a common platform. I use formulas from Nabi Musa against black magic. As an anthropologist you will know that Pharao used to be the king of black magic. I also employ [formulas from] old Jewish language of Babylon. For black magic I use something from Nabi Musa, and for healing I sometimes employ things from Nabi Isa [...] Nabi Isa is the greatest healer who has ever lived, nobody surpasses him. If I don't believe in Nabi Musa and Nabi Isa, I am not a Muslim. As Muslims we have to believe in them.

Mustafa and his disciples did not in general deny the value of other religions. Once Mustafa even stated that 'following different religions is like having different preferences for music, some people like jazz, others enjoy blues or rock'n roll. All religions are basically about the same'. What was not seen as an option by him or his group members, was not professing any religion, a choice Mustafa openly spoke about as connected to communism, which he himself vehemently had fought in Indonesia in the past. Mustafa acknowledges that many people in Syria and Iraq combine a Marxist and a Muslim orientation, but in his own views this is corrupting the religion of Islam. Abdulrahman Wahid, with his background from religious studies in Iraq, is in the view of Mustafa a clear example of how Marxist influence makes ones religion impure.

In various occasions Mustafa speaks highly of Hindus and Hindu religious texts. More and more, though, he voiced the opinion that the present harmonic situation between Muslims and Hindus on Bali will inevitably change. The last time I was in contact with him, in late autumn 2001, he was even less optimistic. His group had intensified their paramilitary training, stressing the need to be prepared to defend oneself and one's community. In the context of what Mustafa and his Hadrami group members saw as a state of decay in the Muslim society of Indonesia and an uncertain future where even a Bali Hindu president seemed a possible outcome, even such a worst scenario could be for the good. Mustafa emphasized that the population of Indonesia is large, with more that 200 million inhabitants, and that the Indonesian nation may afford to lose many people in war. 'Let us say that we lose more than 2 per cent of our population, around four million people. Indonesia will still manage well and survive'. According to him, the decisive point is the awakening of the Muslim population of Indonesia, and that its majority of 'nominal Muslims' could achieve deep knowledge of the Quran and the Sunnah. He adds that 'neither I, nor my group or Hadramis on Bali which I know want war and killings. But if there will be unrest, we need to be prepared and to show responsibility'.

Also at that time of our last contact his Hindu helper and his Hindu students were present in his compound. Mustafa continued to employ Hindu concepts in his healing practices, among other things, stressing the importance of analyzing the eyes and the skin surrounding the eyes of the patient:

> In order to illustrate the importance of mapping the aura of the patient, he asks me, in a class he holds for his students, to try to make such a map, comparing the aura of his students. 'You know, when there is a black radiance from the skin around the eyes, the patient lacks aura.' He asked me to look closely at his students present in the room and tell who has the most aura. I make a guess, and he supports my choice, adding a comment about his students: 'If anyone around here has a problem, he will first consult my students. If they are unable to help, the patient will come to me.' Later on he asks me to meditate, for 20 minutes, using formulas that he and his group consider to be 'technology' that will enhance the contact with God, using some of the 99 Quranic names for God, naming the repetition of the names 'a mantra', hence again employing a Hindu concept. After my meditation, he exclaims: 'Now you look much younger, your aura has increased.'

On an earlier occasion, before I myself met the group, Fikri gave me the following introduction to the group, which he named the *salām-group*[13] (Jacobsen 2004):

> Our group consists of seven members. We meditate together, and repeat the word Allah, Allah, Allah […]. We do not try to control our thoughts. If we try very hard to concentrate on something, we gain nothing. Instead of trying to avoid thinking on *nasi goreng* (spicy Indonesian rice dish), for example, we continue to think on *nasi goreng*, and try to explore where our thoughts will lead us. Then we experience a renewed strength. Old people in front of us slept without a pillow, they were stronger than us. Their channels were open, towards God, and they did not get tired. […] People in the West are tired of materialism. Maybe they have, up to now, experienced 90 per cent materialism and only 10 per cent spirituality. After learning our new form of meditation, they may experience as much spirituality as materialism. When people meditate the common way, they just close their eyes and meditate. When they open their eyes again, their problems are still there. We ourselves establish a direct channel to God. And we learn a lot. Some people say that they learn more in 15 minutes than previously during 15 years of their lives.

The mentioning of materialism by Fikri as antithetic to the spirituality achieved through meditation, does not necessarily imply that materialism and the pleasures of the world is seen as essentially evil. On the contrary, none of the group members ever spoke about materialism linked to concepts of sin and evil. This seems somehow in line with how Anderson (1990) describes a this-worldliness in Javanese orthodox thinking, not as immoral and evil, 'but rather as distracting and diffusing, and thus leading to loss of Power' (p. 24).

For Mustafa and his other group members, meditation for at least an hour a day was necessary. Mustafa told me to repeat my 20 minutes of meditation exercise for two to three weeks, and tells me:

> Your mind will then be totally clear. You will be able to read old memories as on a screen before your eyes, memories dating back as much as 10 years. After 15–21 days your brain will be awake and clear, and you might read old memories as on a screen in front of you, maybe even 10 years back. After 41 days you will be able to read the clock without opening your eyes, because your inner strength has increased. You need your inner strength when you

> travel around. Maybe you will visit the pyramids in Egypt, and you meet a person that may think you possess much money and want to steal from you. In that case you may make the person disappear by your sheer inner power.

Fikri made it clear to me that the time of the day for meditation does matter, and that staying awake at night may be rewarding:

> The best time for contact with God is from midnight to dawn, then we achieve contact [with God] at once, as quickly as this [snaps with his fingers]. We sit in total silence, and we get in direct contact with the universe and its creator. We get new strength, and we don't feel tiredness. [He repeats an earlier point.] We call it a new technology, the technology of God. We establish an open channel.

Fikri here echoes similar views voiced by Mustafa on an earlier occasion, where Mustafa explained that:

> If you employ mantras from the Holy Quran, everything will be easy. If you do it early in the morning, let us say between five and nine o'clock in the morning, you can manage a lot. You will barely notice if anyone slaps you in the face […]. The Quran is original, not like the Christian Bible, I am sorry to say, which was written by authors.

He continued to tell me about his teacher and master Mustafa, answering my question as to whether Ali himself had a teacher in meditation:

> I don't remember his [the teachers] name. I know he was from eastern Bali. Mustafa also got a good religious education, on eastern Java. But you know, in the schools of religion on Java you don't learn meditation. Only when a teacher finds a student who is particularly receptive, the student will be instructed in meditation. [I asked whether this was the case for Ali:] Yes, Ali was taught meditation. He wasn't simply picked and chosen by his teacher, it is not as simple as that. First he had to be tried, to be subjected to moral tests. But now we live in modern times and it isn't like this any longer. Now everyone can learn to meditate.

This last statement of Fikri, that learning meditation is accessible for everyone, implying also that no one really needs a teacher for

acquiring the skills, was echoed also in statements by other member of Mustafa's group. As will be discussed in the next subchapter, such 'democratic' statements are somewhat in contrast with the clear charismatic leadership function performed by Mustafa, whose perceived supernatural abilities and closeness to God make him popular both as a healer and as a teacher in meditaion, and more generally, in religion.

Later, Mustafa came to comment upon his previous education in Java, where he studied together with the well-known scholar Dr Nurholis Madjid for two years in Gondor. While he went on to Jakarta and later on to California to study philosophy, Mustafa continued to specialize in Sharia. Mustafa also added that he acquired some knowledge of healing in 'this modern pesantren in Gondor'. About his teachers he told that 'they were rational people who taught us to use our heads and not only to think in terms of spiritual matters'. Mustafa is fluent in Arabic and reads classical and modern Arabic without difficulties. He tells about his early education: 'In school I had the choice between learning Arabic and English. I went for Arabic.' Mustafa never achieved formal higher schooling, he is very much a self-learned man, unlike his fellow student Dr Madjid, as he once made clear:

> I have no university or college education. I studied at a pesantren, and after that studied for a while at a university, but not long enough to achieve a diploma. […] My greatest spare time activity is reading. For example, for a while I enjoyed very much reading about the French revolution. Not long time ago I was offered the opportunity to study for a master degree, but I declined. What am I to do with a Master degree? Now I am 60 years old, and my contract is soon finished', he adds with a smile. After that I was asked to lecture on marketing at the same university, for undergraduate students, but again I declined. My father works breeding ducks. He was very poor, and for this reason he could not afford to sponsor higher education. But I am lucky, my hobby is to read (he points at numerous books in bookshelves on every wall in the room where we are sitting).

Old philosophers and scholars of religion like al-Ghazzali are still relevant for Fikri and for the rest of the group of Mustafa. Al-Ghazzali is portrayed as a thinker who is very much in line with their thinking, which they conceive of as new and modern:

> He [Al-Ghazzali] used to teach people to isolate themselves from others and retreat to the wilderness. Later in life, however, he

> changed his mind and told people that we need to live among the general populace and to be in this world. He was already modern. You know, meditation is something we already knew a long time ago. You know the concept of *istikāf*, don't you? And when we perform our five daily prayers, after each prayer, we are in total silence and concentrated in our thoughts. This is already meditation. We read his [Al-Ghazzali's] books, but as philosophy and not in order to achieve skills in meditation techniques. We possess modern technology [of meditation]. At least now it is like this.

Like Fikri, Mustafa also used to read Al-Ghazzali, once stating that 'Al-Ghazzali is my favourite. He is an intellectual, and he is always new and fresh. Moreover, he has a realistic attitude'. Fikri states that he has not yet reached a very advanced level of spirituality, 'but I value people who have achieved it'. He explains that some people among the relatives of his wife, also a Hadrami, are famous healers. Among his own relatives, there is only one, 'Umar', a very old man. He recounts:

> At one point of time he was imprisoned by the Dutch, but he remained in jail only for three days. One day his prison guards were told that he was spotted on the main market place in Surabaya, but when they arrived there, they were told that he has been encountered in the prison. Like this it continued for a long time, and finally his prison guards said: 'We may as well release him.' Umar did not make much publicity about his work as a healer. In fact, he never spoke about this to anyone. He didn't want people to think that he himself was a source of healing. You know, we Muslims learn that everything originates from God.

Mustafa frequently employs the Hindu concept of 'the third eye' (see e.g. Organ 1987) when describing the training of a supernatural vision which enables one to see present, past and future things and events with eyes closed and to provide the right diagnoses for sicknesses. He even included Hindu formulas, in addition to the 99 names of God, in his meditation. Employing herbal medicines in his practices, he also included herbs and herbal mixtures advised by local Hindu healers.

My talks with Mustafa were frequently interrupted, by patients seeking help and by students needing advice, but also by representatives of drug companies, a couple of them Chinese people living in other Indonesian cities, marketing Chinese 'traditional' drugs, many

of them produced by a Californian company named 'Sun Hope', in addition to nutrients like capsules of fish oil. The prices of the drugs always seem open to negotiation, which usually takes some time. 'I sell the medicines to my patients, and normally I scarcely make any profit. To get a bonus [from people selling him drugs] is most important. I also make a deal with them in order that they pay back within five to six months.' However, he admits sometimes making good money, when dealing with rich people, using it for the benefit of poor patients. Once he stated, 'I buy medicines for 10,000 Rp[14] and sell to rich people for 30,000 Rp. The rich people pay for the poor ones. The poor people may get medicine for free. In this way we seek to create balance, and diminish the gap between rich and poor'. According to Mustafa, the medicines are helpful against a broad range of sicknesses like rheumatism, heart diseases, hypertension and cancer. At other times, friends or business contacts approach him with new ideas of marketing. Mustafa frequently stresses the necessity of business networking and marketing, and states that several of his patients come from abroad.

Sometimes people call him in order to get rid of a disease, even from as far as Holland. Mustafa keeps a comprehensive personal telephone directory, containing telephone numbers and addresses of people in Australia, Canada, USA and various European countries. I once asked Mustafa how he manages to treat people from a distance, and he tells me that 'A *jinni* [Ar. 'spirit'; in this case denoting a spirit helper] enters the body [of the patient] and performs investigations for me, and returns to me, providing me with the diagnosis'. Sometimes uttering the right formula by telephone, for example when relieving the already presented Dutch patient of her feeling of coldness, instantly cures the sickness. In other occasions, the interaction between Mustafa, the *jinni* and the patient is more complicated, as in the following story that he tells:

> In 1990, in the town of Semarang, a woman was treated by dialysis, and her blood was purified through pipes running in different directions. A doctor was about to do a surgical operation on her, and a relative asked me for help. I called for a *jinni*. When the doctor was about to begin, he couldn't find his needle for sewing. The *jinni* had removed it. Then he finally encountered the needle, but the thread had disappeared. It continued like that for a while, and he had to cancel the operation. [After hearing about that] I sent the *jinni* into her body, and it purified her blood system. After three days she was totally well.

When asked about how he knows the presence of his helping spirits, he states that 'I cannot see or hear the spirits; I only can give them orders'. He adds jokingly: 'I am just like the president Abdulrahman Wahid.' By his joke, he implies that just as the old and nearly blind and half deaf president[15] gives orders to people he cannot see or hear, he himself deals with spirits he still knows are there, without seeing or hearing them. Joking about president Wahid is a favourite pastime both of Mustafa and the other group members. The president is frequently likened to the former Israeli defence minister Moshe Dayan, who was blind in one eye. This type of joking indirectly targets the two main enemies of Indonesia and Islam, as Mustafa and his group see it, namely Israel and (Mustafa's former ally) the United States. Being the leader of the strongest Islamic society in Indonesia with more than 50 million members, the more 'moderate' Nadhatul Ulama (NU), the president Wahid made himself very unpopular among followers of al-Irshād and the Muhammadiyah, the biggest 'modernist' Muslim organization in Indonesia, second only to the NU, by proposing that Indonesia should pursue economic cooperation with Israel and all other Middle Eastern countries, and for the future seek full diplomatic ties with Israel. NU is, according to Balinese Hadrami informants, the society supported by the *syeds* and their followers, adding, in the view of those informants, to their illegitimacy of NU's leaders.

Mustafa is part of a Hadrami network where the commitment to the Quran and Sunnah is strongly pronounced, and where dealing personally with spirits, and other 'superstitious' practices are openly condemned. Still, practicing in a Hindu environment where Hindu (and Sufi) healers also consult spirits, Mustafa follows a practice that communicates well with Hindu as well as Muslim Balinese people. Hindu elements included in his thoughts and practice are mostly elements widely accepted by Indonesian Sufis, with one notable exception, the question of rebirth, which Indonesian Muslims of most traditions tend to view as *shirk* (*syirik* in Bahasa Indonesia), a word strictly meaning 'polytheism' in Arabic (Woodward 1989).[16] 'Martha', presented as a convert to Islam from Christianity and a long-term patient who was being trained by Mustafa to become a healer, had, according to Mustafa, become able 'to see three thousand years back through her earlier reincarnations'. He added that 'probably she has been a Muslim in an earlier life'. However that may be, as he himself views his life and practice, he performs the kind of treatment that is effective and cures people, and he continuously stays in direct contact with God, which increases his inner strength and purifies his soul.

Mustafa moreover employs a medium, a common practice among Hindus as well as Sufis, of whom he says:

> I cooperate with a medium, Mahir. You can ask him about absolutely everything, about yourself, family and friends. He is just like a lap-top, distance means nothing to him. Martha [whom I met, coming to stay for three weeks with Mustafa in May 2001] can tell you more about him. We use shells from the sea shore. Maria gets one, Mahir another and I the last one. We sit in different places and it all works just like when you watch the TV, we are in total contact with each other.

Even though Mustafa and his group members perform healing which in some measure is influenced by Hindu thought, he does not adopt practices that are deviating too much from orthodox Islam. When he employs practices and concepts that are clearly Hindu, he tends to stress elements linking Hindus and Hinduism to Islam, such as pointing out allegedly Muslim elements in early Hindu scriptures. From his point of view, early Hinduism was less 'corrupted' than present day Hinduism in forms such as Bali Hinduism.

Concluding thoughts

How can this influence from Hinduism on rather strict, and to some extent even militant Muslims, be understood? The anthropologist Clifford Geertz already in 1960 pointed out that religious understanding among Indonesian Muslims has been strongly influenced by older Buddhist and Hindu traditions (Geertz 1960), although his point probably has been exaggerated, given that several of the concepts and practices he mentioned may as well be viewed as Sufi (Woodward 1989). A somewhat similar process seems to have taken place among Muslims in Kerala, India, and in particular Hadrami Muslims, said to be particularly strongly influenced by their local Hindu wives, who as a rule converted to Islam (Engineer 1995; Ilias 2007). Even so, Hadrami Arabs like Mustafa and the Arab members of his group, strongly denounce the predominantly 'liberal' Islamic tradition in Indonesia, and voice the need for 'purifying' the Muslims of the country, a concern historically shared by most Hadramis in Hyderabad as well (Ilias 2007). How could they themselves still share so many thoughts, ideas and practices associated with Hinduism?

The anthropologist Andrew Beatty (1999) proposes, based on his fieldwork among Muslims of a strict and modernist bent in Banyuwangi

on eastern Java, that the tradition pointed out by Geertz, which he labels 'Javanism' (as a term covering dominant Islam in the whole of Indonesia), acts as a mystical and strongly relativising form of Islam transforming even self-pronounced 'orthodox' Islamic movements. In this meta-context, what is experienced as the right thing for one person might not be the right thing for another. In Mustafas group, this kind of relativism is strongly stressed, where each individual must find his or her own path to obtain a direct contact with God, a topic to which we will return. Betty describes what he labels 'Javanism' in the following way:

> The virtues [...] of self-correction, *politesse*, hierarchy, obedience, restraint and adjustment to superior force – are typically Javanese. The emphasis on ego-centred relativism, which in a sense undermines, or at least *relativises*, the other values in both Javanese and, especially, Osing, as does the faintly ironic adaptation of a Muslim concept, kiblat (Mecca as the sacred point of orientation). Strong winds blow from that direction, but one turns with them and one is clever in discriminating!'
>
> (Ibid.: 90)

There is yet another side to this. The anthropologist Lisbet Ørtenblad (1992) stresses the area of health and sickness in any given society as an area implying a certain acuteness leading people to more cultural innovation than in other areas of life. Matters of life and death naturally promote cultural creativity. I might add another important dimension regarding practices of health and healing, namely the practitioners. Being able to survive as healers in any given locality one cannot escape the cultural models that imbue the lives of their patients with meaning. The healing venture is dependent upon meaningful communication with the patients, most of whom are Hindus, and many others are Muslims of a Javanese bent. For Mustafa and his group, 'Javanism' seemingly both constitutes a cultural resource and, at the same time, is verbally opposed.

This account shows that the Hindu context partly provides a special cultural avenue and an economic niche that some Hadramis know how to utilize. This cultural avenue both provides certain resources for cultural creativity in meeting the needs of both Hindu and Muslim patients, and at the same time constitutes a necessary road for success locally for the healing enterprise. The Hindu context of their trade and practice is both indirect through the Indonesian Javanism shared by the bulk of the Indonesian population, and also very direct, through influence from the dominant Bali Hinduism and the predominantly

Hindu population on Bali. The intersection of concepts and thoughts from different cultural traditions adds tremendously to the cultural richness of this environment. Finally, it can be argued that Javanism is more of an important resource for Mustafa and his group than it is for most Muslim healers, who in most cases are working in one of the many predominantly Muslim societies of Indonesia.

B. RELIGIOUS HEALING AMONG HADRAMIS ON BALI: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

> […] the Muslim tradition as a whole has resisted both purification and unification. Indeed, it could be argued that the vitality and wide appeal of Islam are rooted in this very diversity and the fact that Islamic doctrine may be used to generate or legitimize a vast number of social formations as dissimilar as those of Bedouin Arabs, Syrian Islamic Marxists, the Black Muslims in the United States, and the Sufi theocracy of Yogyakarta.
>
> (Woodward 1989: 241–2)

Introduction

The diversity of local realizations of the religious tradition of Islam, its disputes, schools of thought and broad range of possible interpretations, defy easy generalizations both along historical lines and across geographical space. Still, sometimes it may be rewarding to look at some reoccurring themes of dispute cross-culturally, such as the question about the existence of saintly genealogies, or more generally, the position of religious leaders in Muslim communities. In this chapter, the focus will be on charismatic leadership and healing in two very different Muslim settings across large geographical space. No attempt is made or intended at broadly comparing the two settings. The aim is more narrowly to focus on a specific dilemma inherent in charismatic leadership and healing by charismatic leaders in Muslim settings.

Both among the Beja nomads in the Red Sea Hills in Northern Sudan and the Hadrami Arabs on Bali the presence of God or Allah in their daily lives is taken for granted. An atheistic or agnostic point of view is simply not an option. In both communities people of religious learning stress that God made all men equal. Still people in both kinds of society tend to perceive it as a fact of life that some people are in closer contact with God than other people, and, moreover, that such persons constitute a special resource for other people. On the one hand, the ideal

prevails that the contact between God and humans is direct and should not be mediated by any human being. On the other hand, there seems to be a widespread conception in these societies that some people may convey the presence of God and the power of God in a special way and that people in general, by affiliating with such fortunate individuals, can achieve both spiritual growth and religious miracles.

The main theme in this comparative part of the chapter concerns how particular practices are actualized in these two Muslim societies in the interface between the two seemingly opposite views, that people are made equal and appear on an equal footing before God, and that some persons are closer to God than others. The focus will be on men that enjoy special prestige by combining religious and political leadership through health-related practices, all men with whom I came into contact in my anthropological fieldworks in Indonesia from 1999 to 2001 and in Northern Sudan from 1993 to1995. Their view on how they, as particularly blessed individuals, think that people in general may come closer to God and how they themselves can contribute to this, will be stressed in particular in this discussion.

The cultural, social and material conditions in these two societies are quite different from each other. Hence how religious conceptions are related to religious (and political) leadership, differ between them. Indeed, both religiously and otherwise the situation is very different in the two Muslim societies.

God's power in Northern Sudan

People living in the Red Sea Hills have traditionally been nomads in an area that can be conceived of as very marginal from a natural resource point of view. Climatic variations have in periods made people's livelihood quite insecure and precarious in this semi-desert area where the precipitation is meagre and vegetation sparse. The drought catastrophe in 1984 provides a dramatic example, an incident where people lost between 75 and 90 per cent of their animals. People still capable of surviving in the mountains mostly had to combine animal husbandry with, from their own point of view, less attractive activities like charcoal burning, and labour migration predominantly to Port Sudan (Dahl *et al.* 1991). Health and sickness is naturally an acute concern for people in such a vulnerable adaptation, and religious leaders in the area tend to connect quite much of their practices to matters of sickness and suffering (Jacobsen 1997, 1998).

In the Red Sea Hills, people may choose from several traditions related to curing of sicknesses. Some healers mainly employ herbs

and animal products, others practice so-called 'Quranic medicine', while yet others practice in a 'borderland' where treatment involving herbs and animal substances and religiously inspired treatment are combined. The two last alternatives are frequently chosen by people who enjoy a special position of religious leadership, so-called *fugara* (pl. of *fagir)*.[17] Their religious leadership provides their health-related activities with legitimacy, while the opposite also seems to hold true, as successful healing is regarded by people in general as a sign of closeness to God. In voicing such a view, several of my informants added the point that 'in reality, all healing ultimately originates from God'.

The spread of Islam among the Beja took place relatively late. Even though some individuals were influenced by Islam as early as the tenth century, Islam did not gain real foothold in the Red Sea Hills before the seventeenth century (Paul 1954). Sufi movements played a key role among the Beja as everywhere on the Horn of Africa, and early proponents of Islam represented a range of different Sufi movements from North Africa and the Hejaz (Karrar 1992; Trimingham 1949, 1976; Voll 1969). Sufism is frequently translated 'Mystical Islam', even though Sufi practice varies considerably with regard to the degree of mystical approaches related, for example with meditation, recitation and ecstasy. In any case, holy men and their graveyards have an importance in Sufi Islam in Sudan that demonstrates clear similarities to ancestor cults among non-Muslim ethnic groups in Eastern and Northern Africa. This also seems to be the case in the Red Sea Hills, where the Khatmiyya Sufi movement is particularly strong (Voll 1969).

Most Beja people are not fluent in reading and writing. Hence it is no surprise that no strictly 'scriptures only' form of Islamic movement has gained a stronghold among them. Strong charismatic leaders function both as spiritual guides and counsellors both with regard to health and other problems. Several of them are well-known for being able to cure sickness through *baraka*, a term both describing a person and an ability possessed by that person. A bit imprecisely the Arabic term *baraka* can be translated as 'blessing' or 'blessed', where the blessing results from the particular blessed person living closely to God and hence is in the position to bring increased wealth, fortune, fertility and health to people in their surroundings. The manner in which people describe a person as *baraka* [18] is partly based on *post hoc* observations. If for example it is rumoured that good things happened to people after they met Ahmed, people will tend to say that Ahmad is (or has) *baraka*. The concept of *baraka* appears with similar use and connotations in a broad range of Muslim societies, and this concept bears

strong similarities to the concept of 'charisma', as spelled out by the sociologist Max Weber (Weber 1971).

Charisma and 'positive contamination'

In charismatic leadership the spiritual gifts (*charisma*) of the leader are what will create bonds between him or her[19] and the followers. These gifts which are bestowed on the fortunate individual may be lost, and in contrast to other forms of leadership, in charismatic leadership there is automatically no vacant position to be taken up by others after a charismatic leader has lost the position. This particular form of leadership is in other words connected to particular individuals more than an institutionalized order. The charismatic leader represents continuous renewal, transcending ordinary expectations of everyday life, creating unique and emotionally strong bonds to the followers (Weber 1971). This Weberian conception of a charismatic leader is, as far as I can see, a fairly useful description of the position of the *fagirs* among Beja people.

The concept of *baraka* has another aspect that may be not as well covered by Weber's concept of charisma, which is also important in order to understand the position of *fugara* among the Beja and religious healers among Hadrami Arabs in Indonesia. This aspect concerns the importance of particular places and happenings in conveying charisma to a person. This latter theme will be central in the following discussion.

Since relatively few Beja people can read or write fluently, their religious leaders are of great importance for their knowledge of Islam. A *fagir* that is reckoned as *baraka* is a natural choice for people who want religious education or a solution for health or other problems. *Fugara*, who I came to know, frequently said that the solution for all kinds of problems comes from God and that healing and recovery from sickness always resides with God. This idea seemingly contradicts the perceptions of Beja people in general regarding the necessary traits and abilities of a good *fagir*. Merely to be in the vicinity of a 'blessed' *fagir*, to come into contact with items that he or she has blessed, or even to let this person spit on you as part of a treatment process, is thought of as bringing blessing, healing and good luck. The idea that blessing is achieved through contact with the *fagir* is also a well-known theme from other Muslim societies (Eickelman 1976).

Both Beja *fugara* and people at large acknowledge the all-compassing might of God in the area of health and sickness. How may the

strong position of the *fagir* in relation to questions of health and sickness thus be understood? A possible solution for this seeming contradiction can be to regard both the efficiency of the means of healing and the *baraka* of the healer as a result of a triple process of 'positive contamination' (for a discussion on positive and negative contamination linked to the topics of 'contact magic' and 'magic of similarity', see Jacobsen 1997). As a first example, a health-bringing amulet containing a piece of text from the Quran may be considered. Since the Quran is derived from God, it can be conceived of as being transcended by a 'godly substance'. Since the amulet is carried close to the human body, God's blessing and protection will 'contaminate' its possessor. In the same manner, a *fagir* living in close contact with God will be positively contaminated by his holiness. An amulet or another means of healing and protection made by the *fagir* will in turn be positively contaminated, and hence transmit some of the traits of the *fagir*. Such traits will further be transmitted to the client carrying the amulet or using one type of medicine or another prepared by the *fagir*. Following such a line of thought, one may conclude that the idea of particular persons possessing *baraka* is not necessarily in contradiction to the general idea that healing ultimately resides with God. The craftsmanship of the *fagir* hence unites with the healing power of God through a process of 'transubstantiation'.

Some of the elements being part of the process of healing, be it objects or people, may of course be polluted in one way or another. What happens if for example the healer is not pure in a religious sense, while the amulet is prepared according to all the correct prescriptions? None of my informants ever touched this particular theme. Still it cannot be precluded that none of them ever asked themselves or others such a question. If a particular treatment of sickness is not successful, however, people publicly question whether the *fagir* in case has or is *baraka*. According to both *fugara* and lay people that I asked about why treatment by a *fagir* is not always successful, there may be several reasons for this failure, ranging from lack of close contact with God, the healer not living a righteous life, to the issues of not having arrived at the right diagnosis or having reached the right diagnosis, but not being strong enough to counteract the possible evil powers in question. Yet another hypothesis I heard from *fugara* in particular, is that the contact between the fagir and the patient has not been intense enough or of sufficiently long duration. In this latter case one might say that a process of positive contamination was not strong enough.

A *fagir*, who I came to know well, once told me that he tries to protect himself against failures in difficult cases by letting the patient

live in his house throughout a long period of time. Sometimes the *fagir* will prepare medicines which the patient or the relatives of the patient may administer. Not infrequently, however, the patient may wish a stronger and prolonged physical closeness to the *fagir*, and sometimes the *fagir* will suggest such a solution. In such a case both the sick person and the relatives will conceive of the physical nearness of the *fagir* as health-bringing in itself.

Besides the aspect of time being of importance in this process of holy contamination, the contamination may also be said to be dependent on dosage and intensity. Quite commonly the *fagir* will spit in the face of the patient during a healing consultation or will spit in a glass of water containing the ashes of a burned piece of paper with Quranic inscriptions given the patient to drink.

The closeness of the *fagir* to his clients will of course bring meagre results if he or she is not positively contaminated by God. Hence the daily contact with God is of uttermost importance for the work of the *fagir*. All of my *fugara* informants stressed that this implies missing important things in life that most people take for granted and which make their lives comfortable. The *fagir* is prepared for a rather demanding life in two manners:

1 Through a personal calling, frequently connected with a dramatic experience where the *fagir* has experience of being a special tool of God. All my *fugara* informants told me about such a kind of experience. 'Mohammad', for example, told how he used to work as a leader of a work group in an irrigation scheme during the British colonial period. One of his workers got bitten by a scorpion and was in great pain and had problems with breathing. He then suddenly experienced an urgent feeling that he should read from the Quran for the worker and lay his hands on him. The worker immediately got well. This happening convinced Mohammad that God had chosen him to work as a *fagir*.
2 The other manner in which the *fagir* may be prepared for his work is through going through a period of special initiation. 'Ahmad' told me how he had to fight both natural inclinations and against spirits and demons in one year and nine months. He had to abstain from all kinds of food with a 'soul' *(ruh*, in Arabic), that is to say, he could not eat meat from animals and birds. Ahmad told me that to eat meat from things having soul will weaken the *fagir* in the fight against demons. He was not able to explain why, but added that he mostly ate beans boiled in water with salt. He could never leave his house, never joke and never talk about persons not

present. Ahmad frequently told me about an immense fright that he felt during his period of initiation. Mighty demons came to fight him, and not only him, but also his children, in order to harm them. Even a minor mistake from the *fagir* may cause great danger. He himself had once experienced the loss of one of his children due to a mistake he committed during this period of initiation, he once explained.

Another important element in the selection of a *fagir* appeared to be related to genealogy. All the Beja *fugara* I got to know either had fathers who themselves were *fugara*, or were particularly known to lead a holy life. This hereditary element is included also by Max Weber in his discussion of the charisma concept as a possible, but not necessary, trait of a charismatic leader (Weber 1971). In Europe a conception of charismatic abilities as 'in the blood' has been prominent during the Middle Ages, where people tended to look for special signs of charisma in a particular person if this person is known to be part of a line of charismatic ancestors (ibid.: 103). Among the Beja, ancestral charisma may also strengthen the possibility for success of a *fagir*, even though this was never specifically touched upon by any of my informants. It merely turned out as a matter of fact that all the *fugara* that I came to know, were sons of fathers with a positive religious reputation.

One may assume that if there is a strong, even though not explicitly pronounced, hereditary element in people's conception of charisma, this will have a stabilizing effect on the society. Since charismatic leadership actually relates to rare personal traits and uncommon (possibly magical) acts, one may conclude that hereditary charisma may stabilize the religious leadership in a way which makes the charisma more predictable and hence, in a way, less charismatic. The anthropologists Yoram Bilu and Eyal Ben-Ari, however, doubt that this is a necessary consequence of connecting charisma to hereditary lines (Bilu and Ben-Ari 1992). Based on their own studies of religious charismatic leadership in Israel and Morocco they characterize charismatic leadership as a vulnerable adaptation where the abilities and bestowed gifts of the leaders will continuously be open for debate among people in general, even though the leaders may make explicit long chains of holy and charismatic ancestors. The charismatic leaders must always demonstrate their abilities to surprise and amaze their followers. Furthermore, the practices and teachings of those leaders must continuously be actualized in relation to people's daily life and common problems and anxieties (ibid.).

The blessing of being in the right spot at the right time

As in large parts of the Muslim world, and especially in Northern Africa, *baraka* may also be achieved by visiting the graves of one's forefathers at particular points of time (Eickelman 1976; Geertz 1983). This practice illustrates an important aspect of charisma, namely how charisma may be transferred to humans through their relations with culturally important happenings and places. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz holds this to be an important but frequently overlooked element in studies of charisma and charismatic leadership within the humanistic and social science disciplines. According to Geertz one may encounter some hints of such thoughts in the writings of Weber, but he does not explore or develop the idea. Instead of following up on this loose thread, most researchers have focused on the psychological dimension of charisma at the expense of other important dimensions. In its most simplified form the concept of charisma has thus been reduced to a kind of usage where it is understood as the appeal of anyone from pop stars to religious and political leaders who enchant and spellbind their audience (Geertz 1983). An important exception to this trend is a work by the sociologist Edward Shils (1975), on which Geertz based much of his new understanding of the charisma concept.

That people may obtain charisma by being in the right spot at the right time, with the necessary people gathered around the most important cultural symbols, complicates the argument of positive contamination through chosen individuals dealt with thus far. It may, however, still be possible that such a holy contamination process, which in a way dissolves the seeming contradiction between the concept of the almighty God and human charisma and charismatic acts, may contain more links in this chain, or rather, more instances of holy contamination. A holy grave may be seen as positively contaminated by a holy deceased person, who in his or her turn is made *baraka* by living close to God. Through such a grave, charisma is transmitted to people in general, and to religious leaders in particular. When religious leaders arrange large celebrations for the day of the death of a saint or religiously-merited ancestor, what may primarily happen is that those leaders confirm their ties with the person celebrated. Hence, from a social science point of view, the current religious leaders are primarily the ones strengthening their charisma by culturally correct performance in the right place at the correct time. The apt time may, as an example, be a coincidence between a particular situation of emergency, like drought or political instability, and the day of death of a particularly

important ancestor. The religious leader may then arrange and lead elaborated rituals close to the grave of the ancestor.

Through expansion and complementation of the perspectives of Weber, Geertz has contributed to a more fruitful understanding of the concept of charisma that is more useful in analyses of real politics, or politics of religion. Charisma then no longer can be reduced to a kind of indefinable mystical radiation arising from the personality of particular humans, but rather opens up for a new usage of the concept where religious and political leaders' clever handling of central happenings, persons and symbols can be included.

Such celebrations connected with important graves of ancestors appear to be a key element in the establishment of religious legitimacy among *fugara* in the Red Sea Hills, in a geographical area where ancestor cults predates the event of Islam (Ausenda 1987). In present-day Beja society, ritual celebrations in connection with holy graves are strongly interconnected with the general practice of Islam.

Charisma and 'pseudo-naturalness'

A relevant question to be raised in connection with charisma and charismatic religious leadership in the Red Sea Hills and beyond is, can one identify a common trait for such very different things as charismatic leaders, holy graves, blessed amulets, drinks and other healing substances? According to the psychological anthropologist Pascal Boyer (1993) one may. Both with regard to humans, animals, plants, non-living natural objects and man-made artefacts, people in all societies described by anthropologists have particular expectations of psychological, biological and/or physical qualities. For all living and non-living things it seems to be the fact that they will not achieve any central place in the religious conceptions of people if none of the common expectations of them are violated in one way or another. If some basic assumptions are defied, as when particular stones possess spiritual force or when plants are attributed with intentions or humans may make themselves invisible or become particular channels for supernatural power, these entities will obtain an increased potential for gaining the interest and attention of people, since the potential for inferring something regarding those things is dramatically increased.

Both healing amulets and healers can be viewed as mediators between distinct categories in a way that contradicts the natural intuitive conceptions concerning how the world is. In this manner those phenomena are lifted out and above the stream of ordinary daily life to become a unique border phenomena between disparate categories.

When such an expansion takes place, conceiving of, for example, a *fagir* being able to foresee the future, heal sicknesses, fight spirits and win, to move in an invisible state or to see and detect things at a far distance, will not be that difficult. While metaphoric processes require complex cultural explanations, such violations of the intuitively given may provide a broad 'fan of connotations' and new cultural inferences. Following such a line of thought, it might be suggested that a central element of charisma is the violation of intuitively given expectations. This is a proposition which does not contradict, but rather complements, the Weberian view of charisma as connected to the dynamic, eternally new, enthralling and surprising. A process of holy contamination transmitting *baraka*, and hence transforming natural entities, also clearly exemplifies the theoretical point made by Boyer. Violation of natural expectations contributes to opportunities for religious charismatic leadership in the context of an almighty God.

In the Red Sea Hills a predominant tradition of Sufi Islam provides ample room for charismatic leadership, with the concept of *baraka* of central importance. The concept of *baraka*, as it is employed by Beja people, implies both religious and magical aspects, but also in a broader sense relates to a broad range of characteristics as discussed by Weber and Geertz for the concept of charisma.

Could this also be true of the understanding of charisma and practices of charismatic leadership in a more 'purist' Muslim environment among Hadramis on Bali in Indonesia? Sufism is, as has been pointed to, very important in the Red Sea Hills as in Northern and North-Eastern Africa in general. In those areas Islam and Muslim traditions cannot be understood separately from Sufi traditions and organizations. The same also appears to be the case among most Muslims in Indonesia (see e.g. Mulder 1996; Woodward 1989). Among Hadrami Arabs on Bali, though, the situation is, as has already been discussed, very different. Most of my Hadrami informants on Bali openly expressed antipathy with regard to Sufi traditions, with some exceptions, one of them being a member of the particular healing group in a small town in Eastern Bali. The members of this healing group tend to pinpoint, however, that they do not follow a particular Sufi path, but pick the best from all Sufi movements. At the same time, as discussed before, they stress that they adhere strictly to the Quran and the Sunnah and do not accept 'additions' *(bid´as)* to Islam. According to them, this is the case with most Indonesian Muslims, many of whom they consider to be 'Muslims just in name'. Most of the group members have been living for two or more years in Saudi Arabia, and they are clearly much influenced by a rather 'purist' understanding of

Muslim religion. The content of the term *bid´a* is, as can be expected, open for debate. As already mentioned, Hussain, who originally introduced me to the healing group, considers several of the practices of this group to be *bid´as*.

As discussed before, the bulk of my Hadrami informants on Bali recognized themselves as *sheikh*. As also pointed out earlier, there are very few *sāda* families on Bali, while in other parts of Indonesia the percentage of *sāda* families may be even as large as the percentage of *sheikh* families. All my Bali informants demonstrate a strong antipathy against religious leaders legitimizing their position by stressing their ancestral links with the Prophet. Some of them add that such *sāda* leaders are not religiously pure, but are contaminated by popular traditions which are not Islamic. Hence they rather become part of religious movements where leadership is not based on genealogy, like the organization of Muhammadiya, a more 'purist' organization.

On Bali most people read and write, in contrast to the Red Sea Hills in Sudan. Moreover, the level of education among Hadramis on Bali is higher than that for Balinese people in general, and several Hadramis enjoy high positions within private enterprises and professions. Several of my informants voiced the opinion that supporters of *sāda* and their religious movements frequently have a low level of education and are not very enlightening in matters of religion. As an explanation for the popularity of such movements and their leaders, some added a comment such as 'people without education are easy to trick'. The general opinion was that if people are progressive and well educated, they will know that it is not legitimate for anyone to claim a position between God and people in general. Enlightened people will be able to reveal that the teaching of *sāda* is not pure.

As covered earlier, Arab people in Indonesia have for the most been highly respected among the Muslim majority of the Indonesian population, who frequently regard them as being especially competent in religious questions and in the Arab language, the holy language of the Quran (Barth 1993: 178). Maybe this partly explains why several Muslim organizations in Indonesia have a high proportion of Hadrami people among their leaders, a view which gained some support from my own findings as I mapped the family relationships of my informants. This is the case with, for example, the DDII (see above).

Like Fikri, Mustafa also cultivates strong ties with DDII and expresses a vocal support and sympathy for them. Their loyalty to the political and religious aims of the DDII is shared by the other members of the healing group as well, with 'Ketut' as a possible exception. Ketut is Hindu and a relative newcomer to the group. He rarely makes

explicit any clear political views, except the more general point of view that the political situation in Indonesia is unstable and that a stronger political leadership is needed.

Both DDII, Muhammadiyah and other Muslim organizations supported by my Hadrami informants on Bali are all strongly and vocally anti-*sāda*. For them God is democratic, in the sense that God is equally available for all human beings, regardless of position and social class. Several of my informants will, as has already been made clear, even deny that *sāda* exists and make clear that genealogical ties with the Prophet are an impossibility. The members of the healing group of Mustafa fully share this view. None of them would ever seek advice, neither in religious nor profane matters, from people claiming to be *sāda*.

Within the healing group of Mustafa, as among most of my Hadrami informants on Bali, people told me a *sāda* identity in present-day Indonesia has few social implications and that Hadrami people nowadays marry across this divide. As discussed in Chapter five, though, most Hadrami people still do not cross the *sāda*–non-*sāda* line in actual marriages. This may be one explanation why, among people belonging to *sheikh* families, which is the case for nearly all of my informants on Bali, a strong anti-*sāda* ideology continues to dominate.

Does this all imply that among Hadrami people on Bali there are no strong charismatic leaders who in their leadership function as a link between God and people at large? Based on my own research I would state that such leaders exist. Mustafa is one of the several examples of strong charismatic leaders who are sought out by many people in need of a deeper (and mystical) experience of the presence of God, of healing and of a solution for social conflicts that they experience with relation to family and relatives.

Mustafa: a charismatic religious leader

As described earlier, sick people continuously consulted Mustafa during the periods in which I was in contact with him. On some occasions he prescribed kinds of herbal medicine which people might have obtained themselves from stores of herbal medicine, without consulting any healer. The fact that Mustafa himself had prepared the medicines and had been in physical contact with their ingredients was clearly very important to his clients. The medicines may be considered positively contaminated by a man who possesses Godly gifts and who is known to have a strong inner power. Mustafa himself employs the

Indonesian concept *tenaga batin* and the English term 'inner power' interchangeably when talking about this inner strength. His inner strength has, as he described it, increased through tough periods of moral trials, dealing with spirits opposing each other, long period of fasting and continuous exercises in meditation. In the words of Anderson (1990: 28), Mustafa possessed the 'most obvious sign of the man of Power [which is] his ability to concentrate: to focus on his own inner Power, to absorb Power from outside, and to concentrate within himself apparently antagonistic opposites'.

As described earlier, Mustafa had his own specific experience of a religious calling. After that experience, he increasingly practiced as a healer. Mustafa tells the following about this first occasion when he felt that God chose him as his tool for healing: 'In 1970 I practiced healing for the first time in my life. I was asked to help a person suffering from black magic. I fought, and I won.' Mustafa told this story after we have had a lengthy conversation about God as the ultimate source of all kinds of healing. He then stressed that no healing can take place without the direct intervention of God. Mustafa from that point of time had acquired an inner power which he did not possess before, and he has demonstrated his ability both then and many times after to fight tough fights against strong agents of sickness and misfortune.

Mustafa describes inner power in a way which shares several connotations with the concept of *baraka*, as that concept is interpreted and employed in the Middle East. His concept of inner power implies much of the aspects as the concept of *baraka*, including the conception that the power may, to some extent, be inherited, even though the hereditary dimension is not stressed as much by Mustafa and his group as by my informants in the Red Sea Hills.

The concept of inner power, as used by Mustafa and his group, also implies other dimensions not relevant for the *baraka* concept employed by Muslims in the Red Sea Hills. First of all, in the group of Mustafa they frequently utilize a Javanese (and partly Hindu) jargon when talking about inner power. Second, their exercises for acquiring inner power are very similar to and inspired by Indonesian fighting sport. A peculiar historical development of Indonesian religious traditions may perhaps explain these features. On Bali, as everywhere in Indonesia, religious thinking among Muslims in general is strongly influenced by historically important Buddhist and Hindu traditions in the areas (Barth 1993; Beatty 1999; Geertz 1960). Mustafa is himself highly conscious of the various facets of the development of Islam in Indonesia.

Javanism, as portrayed by Geertz and further commented and elaborated on by Beatty, may function, as already discussed, as a meta-context which even transforms strongly modernist Islamic movements (Beatty 1999). Its strong relativizing force makes it a kind of cultural platform for people of different religious traditions and sub-traditions to partake in the same cultural rituals and events and at the same time have widely different experiences of what happens. The relativistic attitude of 'what is experienced as good and true for me does not need to hold sway for you'. This attitude seems paradoxically also to be an important element of how the members of the group of Mustafa view ways to achieve contact with God.

Already in my first meeting with a member of the healing-group, with Fikri, this relativistic aspect of their approach to meditation and to contact with God was made clear to me. Fikri introduced me to his understanding of contact with God with the following words:

> God means something particular for each and everyone of us. Each of us encounters God in our own way, depending on our specific background. Some get in contact with God their creator, others experience contact with Allah. Everyone will experience things their own way. You know, each person knows God and himself, and no one knows a person as well as that person himself, except God. My purity is different from your purity, and my impurity is different from your impurity. Hence each of us experience different things when we are meditating. I myself meditate as part of my daily prayers, perhaps like an hour a day. I am a little bit lazy. We use to waste our time on so many things, we just kill time.

Fikri further told me about his group, which he labelled 'the *salām* group', responding to questions from me regarding his view on Sufi movements:

> Our form of meditation is not linked to any specific Sufi movement. You know, Islam was introduced to Indonesia by way of Sufi movements, like Najbandiyya, Gadiriyya, Alawiyya and others. We have many Sufi movements here, maybe because Indonesia used to be Hindu. [He repeats:] But our meditation is not linked to any particular Sufi tradition. We learn from all Sufi movements. We possess a totally new technology which anyone can learn how to use. We are modern, and everything is going more smoothly for us now. We can all come into contact with the universe and with God. Maybe you are thinking about Sufi people as people whose only concern is the afterlife, but no, for us both

> parts are important: both this world and the life hereafter. We have to involve ourselves in social relationships. How else could we be tried? […] Myself I practice meditation as part of my daily prayers. This is for me a natural thing. In some periods I practice meditation for a full hour each day.

Meditation is, as discussed earlier, an important key for acquiring inner power for Mustafa, Fikri and others in the healing group. Through meditation the members achieve supernatural abilities, such as seeing the problems of others even when they are in a geographically distant location. Sometimes they link this ability to the previously mentioned concept of 'the third eye', by which they may be able to arrive at both a correct diagnosis and healing even for clients living in Europe. An elderly European woman, whom I myself met, confirmed this to me. As already dealt with, meditation is also a way to obtain supernatural physical strength, as Mustafa himself has experienced, not the least when practicing Indonesian fighting sport. This sport, being part of a Javanist tradition, shares, in the view of the group members, the advantage of enhancing both physical strength and speed, as they willingly demonstrated for me several times. As discussed already, the meditation was linked to reciting the 99 names of God as well as Hindu formulas. In general, the formulas, practices, techniques, theories and concepts employed by the healing group had both Hindu and Islamic origin and inspiration.

Mustafa and the other healers in his group may be said to represent, in the terminology of Pascal Boyer, a pseudo-naturalness where their human nature is transcended by violations of intuitive expectations to this very humanness (Boyer 1993). When the clients of Mustafa and his colleagues are convinced that the healers possess inner power which may heal sicknesses and fight demons, it is probably not difficult for these clients to imagine that the same leaders can acquire supernatural physical strength and may see and analyze other humans across vast geographical distances. Neither their naturalness nor supernaturalness contributes to their charisma, but rather their pseudo-naturalness as humans possessing power deriving from God. This condition hence increases enormously the breadth of possible inferences that people may make regarding the abilities and godly gifts of the healers.

Not all the group members are equally active at any point of time. Fikri frequently says that he has too little time for meeting the whole group, and sometimes is practicing meditation mostly on his own. Abdul Gadir (already introduced), a distant relative of Fikri and a real estate agent who lives a few blocks from Mustafa and his centre, is among the most regular participants, but admits that some days he is

not able to make it. He joined the group of Mustafa in 1987, after returning from five years in Saudi Arabia. For him, as for Fikri, the most important thing is that Mustafa always carries on with meditation, exercises and religious studies, at any time representing the continuity of the group.

Mustafa and others in his group, as already pointed out, frequently depicted themselves as modern and their meditation techniques as 'modern technology'. They were stressing that they belong to the *era globalisasi*, an Indonesian concept which can be translated as 'The global era'. For them engaging themselves in national and international politics is important, and Mustafa mentioned once that he was involved fighting against Soviet Union soldiers in Afghanistan. 'Earlier we helped our brothers in Afghanistan, now they are coming here to Indonesia to help us'. He added jokingly: 'Now they are paying us back! You know, solidarity, just like Lech Walesa in Poland.' Both he and the other members of the group were continuously engaged in issues related to Palestinian people. In general, international relations are important for him both for cooperation and for spiritual inspiration. As an example of this, Mustafa frequently stressed his cooperation with healers in the USA and Europe.

Political changes and new ways of channelling charisma

In my last contact with Mustafa and his group, in May 2001, the political situation was rather tense in many places in Indonesia, and the political support for the president Abdurrahman Wahid was dwindling. Wahid, who had been the leader of the biggest Muslim organization in Indonesia, the NU, for many years, openly spoke in favour of increased rights for religious and ethnic minorities and for democratization of Indonesia (Hefner 2000). The members of the healing group were vocal in their expression of mistrust in Wahid, a mistrust which also was nurtured by the fact that the President, in his work for strengthening regional commercial ties at the expense of commercial ties with the USA and Europe, included Israel in his Asian regional vision. Hence it was not only the physical problems with Wahid's eyes that inspired them to liken him to Moshe Dayan, sometimes adding the accusation that Wahid is working as a 'Zionist agent'.

At that point of time, in May 2001, the healing group intensified their training in fighting sport. The group, and Mustafa in particular, had earlier been training groups of young men in the neighbourhood of their local compound. Mustafa, according to his own estimate, was training around 3,000 persons. Some of the training took place during

the night and involved simulation of nightly attacks on villages besides traditional exercises in fighting sport. For me it became more difficult to meet people in the group for conversations, since they spent much time training and organizing. When I met them we were never alone any more, but different visitors from outside the town were always present. After a while Mustafa said that the peaceful and tolerant relationship between Hindus and Muslims in Bali 'unfortunately may come to an end'. For the first time in my contact with them Indonesian Christians were portrayed as aggressive proponents of Christian Missionary activities and as 'Western agents'. While earlier they had stressed that Muslims never may fight each other since they are brothers, the atmosphere now was less optimistic and more tense. Mustafa and the others began to make explicit the possibility that Muslim brothers may begin to fight each other in the near future.

Despite the tenseness and anxiety expressed by the healing group and many people in Indonesia at that time (see Bubandt 2004), the transformation from the government of Wahid to the first female president of Indonesia, Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of the previous president Sukarno, proved to be relatively peaceful. Small-scale riots were met swiftly and forcefully by the military. Megawati soon demonstrated a willingness to control groups that she conceived as 'radical Muslim groups', something she made clear by, among other things, arresting for a short period of time a Hadrami leader of the militant Indonesian group Laskar Jihad.

Tenseness, preparing for a civil war, social unrest and even outright violence, was not uncommon in Indonesia elsewhere throughout the period of my fieldwork, from 1999 to 2001, following the abrupt ending in May 1998 of the New Order Government of Suharto, which had stayed in power for more than 30 years, since 1966. After stating that the 'role that violence and narratives of violence play in millenarianism and cargo cults has generally been underexposed in the anthropological literature' and that '[n]arratives of millenarian word transformations are [...] more often than not violent narrative' (Bubandt 2004: 93), the anthropologist Nils Bubandt goes on, in his article 'Violence and millenarian modernity in Eastern Indonesia', to analyze perceptions and narratives among Christians on the island of Halmahera in Ambon.

A millenarian reading among Christians and Muslims of social and political changes taking place in Indonesia post-Suharto at the turn of the millennium, 'seemed to threaten the national stability not only of Maluku but also of Indonesia as a whole' (ibid.). In employing the contested concept of 'cargo cult', he seeks to explore how 'cargoist aspects of Indonesian millenarianism are tuned less to the acquisition

of consumer goods than towards the expected arrival of an imagined, fetishized "modernity"'(ibid.: 105). For example, in the village of Buli Asal which had a religiously mixed population, growing expectations of a Second Coming of Christ took place amidst rumours of Muslim violence of catastrophic proportions against Christians and reported supernatural happenings: people spotted God on a particular beach and Christ, with visible stigmata in his hands, in a neighbouring village. Such developments at the village level became part of the backdrop for an increasing level of real physical violence in Ambon, including the killings of hundreds of people in December 1999, with willing outside support from jihadist groups and, possibly, from within the old guard around Suharto (ibid.: 112). According to Mustafa, some of the people he trained were engaged 'helping our brothers' in Ambon.

A pronounced trait of the post-Suharto period is what Connor and Vickers (2003: 177) label 'democratization of murder', where a previous show of violent force by the Suharto government 'in the form of the corpses of criminals' in various local communities, in a vacuum of political legitimacy, has become a show of force by local communities taking their law into their own hands. A loss of people's trust in public government institutions also seems to have encouraged private organizations and para-military groups to 'bring things straight' without resort to the government. The paramilitary training by Mustafa's group is hence no exceptional thing in post-Suharto Indonesia, including Bali.

One interesting question to ask is, how can it be that the group of Mustafa, who call themselves 'fundamentalists', and who support the least liberal and least democratic organizations in Indonesia, is still so much influenced by Javanist and even Hindu thinking, even tolerating a Hindu member? As hinted at earlier, the specific historical (including religious historical) context in Indonesia may to some extent explain this. One could suggest that Javanism functions as a meta-context partly transforming scripture-based and 'purist' Islamic movements, which hence in time will loose much of their distinctiveness and also their importance. My preliminary view is that the opposite is happening. A Javanist influence paves the way for success in an Indonesian context. Even if a majority of the Indonesian population feels antipathy against such movements, it looks as if their significance and base of support in the population is increasing (Hefner 2000). A popular transformation of such movements may have secured their survival and possible growth.

The type of charismatic leadership performed by Mustafa vis-à-vis his group, and by all the group members with regard to their local societies, represents a rich tradition in Indonesia. The belief in an

almighty God has traditionally been spread by charismatic Muslim leaders in Indonesia basing their leadership, among other things, on continuous new revelations and on conveying supernatural power. In some groups, like the one led by Mustafa, downplaying (but not excluding) the notion of inherited charisma and refuting the monopolization of charisma by privileged families (for example by the *sāda*) may perhaps limit a further institutionalization of such a type of leadership. In line with Weber, however, one might propose that such a lack of formalization in groups like that of Mustafa may counteract routinization of charisma and of the leadership and secure its vitality.

The blessings of technology and charisma for sale

A main point in the analysis of modern saints[20] by Bilu and Ben-Ari is that their influence cannot be understood separately from modern technology. Mass media, souvenirs and communication technology frequently contribute to increasing the radius of the charismatic influence and to the efficient marketing of charisma on an expanding market (Bilu and Ben-Ari 1992). Both the marketing of pictures in mass media and holy objects, also through the internet, may increase the charisma of a religious leader. Geertz, Bilu and Ben-Ari also base their analysis of charisma on the works by Edward Shils.

Mustafa is clearly an example of such a modern holy man who knows more than how to employ traditional symbols and arenas in his charismatic career. During our meeting, Mustafa frequently got calls on his mobile phone from clients. Several of his clients are themselves healers, and like him, they have their own internet pages for which he gave me the addresses. Through the healing group's use of the internet, Mustafa and his practice are also marketed, even attracting European and Northern American clients.

Conclusion

Fugara in the Red Sea Hills are, by comparison, far less technologically advanced and 'modern', and they also tend to have a more geographically restricted sphere of influence than Mustafa and other Hadrami religious leaders that I came to know in Bali. Hence the context in which the dilemma concerning the almighty God and human charisma is played out is very different in the two areas. This fact illustrates an important and necessary insight regarding Islam: even though it is a universalistic tradition as the other world religions, Islam is always local Islam. In most Muslim societies it is continuously debated

which practices are genuinely Islamic and supported by the Quran and other holy scriptures (Manger 1999). A steadily increasing consciousness regarding this complexity has led a growing number of researchers to focus on Muslims rather than Islam (Bråten 1999). Studying written texts and traditions is, of course, not enough for inferring how Islam, or any other religious tradition, is acted out as lived experience in present-day societies.

As we have seen, studying different Muslim practices in different places and under differing conditions does not preclude focusing on how people relate to one and the same religious dilemma. In between the omnipotence of God and human charisma, human dramas, where people seek solutions for acute problems in their daily lives, continuously take place both among Beja people in Northern Sudan and in Muslim societies on Bali. The dramas may be perceived as ritual occasions where several elements unite at a higher level, and God's omnipresence is realized through chosen human 'tools'; through actualization of myths concerning good and evil powers (including diagnoses connected with sicknesses and misfortunes); and through healing practices where people's very real problems are taken seriously and attempted to be solved. As also has been discussed, a political actualization concerning messages from the healers related to day-to-day problem-solving practices may also be very important, when supplying political diagnoses and possible solutions for large-scale political problems also arguably was part and parcel of the religious leadership. The seeming contradiction between the conception of a democratic God in the sense of a God equally accessible for anyone, and the view that one may experience the presence of God more forcefully by being close to specific religious leaders, is solved through ritual practices where a human need for a very real and concrete intervention by God is the main focus. Exactly how this dilemma is solved in practice, however, obviously varies between different localities. As we have seen, both local, national and international cultural and political streams play a part in this variation.

7 Conclusions

I was staying in a rented room in a private home near Nusa Dua, one of the tourist magnets of southern Bali abounding with luxury hotels, when on the 20th October 1999, people kindly asked me to stay inside my room and not go anywhere, due to a sudden outbreak of rioting. By the end of the following day I was able to leave my room, and went on one of the many public mini-buses heading for Denpasar. As I was looking out the bus window I quickly sensed that something had changed dramatically: all the trees in a long, beautiful avenue, running from the tourist area and several kilometres towards Denpasar were gone. As part of what was to become known as the 'Mass Amuk', business interests of the Suharto family (one of his sons owned at least two of the biggest hotels around Nusa Dua) were attacked in a burst of public outrage. This was sparked by Megawati Sukarnoputra, who had family relations in Bali and was the daughter of the former president Sukarno, and who had failed (that time) to be elected president.

Arriving in Denpasar, I saw shopping malls damaged and burned, and heard that several hundred cabs and many buses from companies with Suharto family ownership had been set on fire, as were offices linked to Suharto's Golkar Party. Incidents of local community violence, mainly targeting suspected criminals, had been on the rise since the fall of Suharto, in Bali as elsewhere in Indonesia. The scale of the October 20th event and the fact that it hit the vital tourist industry, however, was a new development. The episode marked a peak of social unrest in Bali, where issues like government corruption, possibilities for more regional self-government, high inflation and, for many, decreased sources of livelihood were at stake. Megawati, or 'Mega' as her nickname goes, was seen as Balinese as well as Indonesian by Balinese voters and as a person who could bring much needed social, political and economic change to post-Suharto Indonesia.

This incident, which took most Indonesians and foreigners by surprise, was one of the several instance following the fall of Suharto

which demonstrated that no one really knew in what direction Indonesia was heading. Following years of growing popular resistance towards the New Order government and one year of public attempts at critically dealing with its heritage, few political leaders voiced a real new alternative political vision for Indonesia as a whole. At the same time, no relief was in sight for most people experiencing growing economic hardships that had started with the Asian financial crisis two years earlier, a crisis that contributed strongly to the fall of Suharto.

In the introduction to this book, some political and economic frames regarding the Suharto and post-Suharto period were pointed out. The effects of the Asian economic crisis on the Hadrami societies in the communities where I did my research, which still to a large extent can be said to be trading societies, can hardly be exaggerated. For several of my informants, commercial ties have been severed, the opportunities for travelling within Indonesia and abroad are severely limited, with adverse consequences for contact with networks of relatives and of business partners, and many of their business enterprises have ended up being bought up by others, not the least by Chinese business people. To the extent that Hadrami society in Indonesia can be said to have had a Golden Age, the present situation is far from such a state.

Several of my informants had been used to be able to visit Hadramawt, frequently combined with Hajj. After a severing of the ties between Hadramawt and Hadrami societies in Indonesia during the Second World War and for several years after (Arai 2004; Freitag 2003; Mobini-Kesheh 1999), both with regard to flow of people and of funds, cheaper travel and a growing economy of the Hadrami communities increasingly facilitated both travel to and sending of remittances to Hadramawt. Not everyone did, though, for various reasons. For some people the *muwallad* movements in Indonesia starting from the second decade of the twentieth century did their job and changed people's minds and heart from a focus on Hadramawt to perceiving Indonesia as their real homeland. For others, Hadramawt is still a place to support, both economically and politically, but not necessarily the first priority in terms of places to visit, as it still is seen by many as a backward place where people are derived of most forms of modern luxury, and sometimes peace, and where old customs die hard and economic and social life is less than sweet. More generally, Mobini-Kesheh might be right in her statement that 'the number of Indonesian Hadramis who retain a connection with Hadramawt is extremely small' (Mobini-Kesheh 1999: 153). However that may be, even people who still strongly want to travel to Hadramawt, or at least send their children there for a period of education, are frequently unable to do that due to economically dire conditions. One informant, in the small

Balinese town of Negara once expressed it like this: 'I strongly wish to travel to Hadramawt to get to know the place from where my forefathers came, and to meet some of my relatives there. If I ever manage to raise enough money, I will for sure go. God willing.'

Short term travel could also be suspended by several of my informants due to the dire economic situation. During the period 1999–2001, several of them experienced increased economic hardship. One of the group members in the healing group of Mustafa, from Denpasar, stated in a rather typical story when I met him at the end of 2001:

> A lot of things have changed for the worse since we first met two years ago. But thanks to God, I have gone through it all strengthened. My old workplace [he used to work as a hotel manager] owes me money for six months. I now work for a new company, but I don't know whether it is long-term employment or not. Well, there are good things too. Two months ago we had a new baby, and my wife recently got a better job. But, as I told you, due to my economic problems I haven't been able to visit Mustafa for five months [a rather short journey between the province capital of Denpasar and the town of the healing centre on Eastern Bali]. But I still keep in regular contact with the rest of the group, by telephone. We frequently call each other.

Not being able to count on a secure work position, he already had started to work for a better future for himself and his family. Based on many years of experience in trade and hotel management, he has started planning the development of a holiday resort on Northern Bali on a piece of coastal land that he inherited.

For most of my informants, their most active family ties are not towards Hadramawt, but to other sites in Indonesia, and to countries like Malaysia, Australia, Germany and Saudi Arabia. Besides wanting to travel to those places for keeping in contact with relatives, and sometimes for education or for medical treatment, many of my younger male informants were looking for options of labour migration in those countries. Some of them already have previous experience, but since the economic crisis few of them have been able to pay for their flight ticket to go abroad for work. There seems to be another trend in Hadrami labour migration, though, where Hadrami girls are sent from the relatively poorest families to work as servants in private homes in the Middle East, not the least in Saudi Arabia.

The direction of the political changes in Indonesia after Suharto remained uncertain for my informants at the time of the fieldwork. Contrary to Hadrami experiences in places like Hyderabad and

Zanzibar, the Hadramis of Indonesia fared mostly well following the rise of nationalism and Indonesian independence. After a pre-independence period where, at least in the first decades of the twentieth century, the Hadrami communities had been in 'a constant state of dissention and confusion [...] and divided by tensions that can be reduced to differences between Hadhrami culture and the Indonesian cultures, and between loyalty to Hadhramaut [...] and the country in which they were looking for a livelihood' (de Jonge 2004: 373). With the rise of the *muwallad* movements, and first and foremost with the groundbreaking work by the journalist and politician Abdul Rahman Baswedan, this situation changed (de Jonge 2004; Mobini-Kesheh 1999). During the Suharto period, several Hadramis earned high political positions, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas being the most prominent of them, another being Prof. Dr Said Agil Al Munawar, at a time serving as Minister of Religion. This does not mean that they soon were to be granted an equal status with other Indonesians as was the case for example for the Javanese, Ambonese and Balinese. As late as 1980, the Minister of Manpower proclaimed that:

> the group of non-indigenous people who have already assimilated and integrated themselves and are considered indigenous people by the local community, such as those of Arab descent who have made a complete integration with the local Indonesians, [...] have to be treated as a pribumi (indigenous) group.
>
> (from Algadri 1994, cited in de Jonge 2004: 396)

This somewhat self-contradictory statement makes it still crystal clear that full integration into the Indonesian population was still not an option. A gradual removal of several discriminating measures cruelly affecting the Hadramis during the Dutch and later Japanese colonial periods has certainly taken place during the periods of both Sukarno and Suharto. At the same time more seats in parliament became available to Hadramis and some rose into very prominent state positions. However, the period of social unrest following the fall of Suharto brought Hadrami Arab ethnicity again to the forefront of public Indonesian awareness. In this way we were reminded as late as the turn of the millennium that public negative attention on Hadramis is still possible and that a full social acceptance, even if it has come very close to it, is yet to come.

The overall impact of the Suharto period on religious life in Indonesia is part of the near history influencing the Indonesian Hadrami society.

The New Order Indonesia has implied a 'deepening influence of Islam, especially modernist or reformist Islam' (Brenner 1998: 229). As a means of discouraging communism and achieving social and political stability, Suharto launched campaigns to stimulate organized religion. His regime recognized only five faiths, Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism as legitimate options for the citizens. Besides having disastrous effects on the broad range of so-called indigenous religions all over Indonesia, and of course on all secularist movements, socialist or not, this policy of the Suharto proved no good for Javanese Islam. In the words of Hefner (2000: 18), '[o]ver the past thirty years the institutions through which Javanist Islam once operated as a public alternative to orthodox Islam have declined, whereas institutions for Islamic education and devotion have grown'.

In the 1980s, inspired by the Iranian revolution in 1979, reformist Islam continued to grow. This development was further strengthened in the 12 latter years of Suharto's government, when he changed tactics from state interference in the Muslim organizations in an attempt, among other things, to curb political Islam, to actually encourage organised Islam (Hefner 2000). On a broad scale, mass conversion to Christianity and Islam, and to a lesser extent to Hinduism, took place during the Suharto period, prompting a move from heterodoxy to orthodoxy and from passive religious affiliation to active religious participation regardless of religion. At the end of the Suharto period and towards the change of millennium, Indonesia witnessed a religious polarization unprecedented in the country, sometimes with violent consequences vividly portrayed by Bubandt (2004) from Ambon.

It is probably part of the picture that even reformist movements are themselves transformed by the pervasive mystical and relativizing force of Javanism, a tradition working far beyond Java (Beatty 1999). Several of the elements pointed out as Hindu in the context of the Hadrami healing group, may not result from Hindu influences, either historically or present, but from strong undercurrents of Javanism. Some facets of Mustafa and his groups thinking about inner power may even not be that much removed from Sufi thinking documented from all over the Muslim world, which should not be a surprise, given strong international Sufi influences on the Javanist tradition up to this day (see Woodward 1989 on Indonesian Islam).

Notes

1 Introduction

1 'Javanese' culture here denotes a dominating culture not strictly limited to the island of Java, but still being linked historically to the unique historical development of Islam in Java, as a set of cultural virtues making it possible that people of different religious traditions may partake in the same rituals, and experience them as meaningful, but in very different ways (see Beatty 1999, and later discussions in this book).

2 Historical and wider ethnographic background: the homeland of Hadramawt

1 The word 'wadi' stems from *wādin*, meaning river or river bed in Arabic.
2 *Habīb* in singular, meaning 'beloved' in Arabic.
3 *Sayyid* strictly meaning 'lord' in Arabic.
4 Pl. of *sheikh*, spelled *syekh* in Bahasa Indonesia.
5 A Hadrami Sufi path (*tariqa*) of the 'Alawi *sāda*, reckoning.
6 Translated from Arabic as 'pure-blooded' in Mobini-Kesheh 1999: 128.
7 This reminds me of a visit to Disneyland in 1997, when our children, after we stayed in California for a while, staged a 'family coup' and we all went to Disneyland in Anaheim. Joining one of the attractions, sailing in a small boat on an artificial river making its way through various parts of the world, exemplified by 'exotic' villages and folklore, we were accompanied with the continuously repeated song 'It's a small world after all'. Knowing the brilliant works of the anthropologist Claudia Strauss on American social classes and cultural heterogeneity (see e.g. Strauss 1997), I was aware that most Americans would not be able to make it to Disneyland for economic reasons, and that quite many so-called 'blue collar' citizens, even when they can afford it, will not want to 'waste' money on 'useless' expenditures like the ones epitomized by Disneyland. For many low-paid 'blue collar' American citizens, the world is not merely shrinking, but becoming increasingly larger and more complex in terms of what they tend to perceive as national and international forces beyond their grasp and beyond their influence. Perhaps fortunately for them, their chance of listening to the song 'It's a small world after all' while visiting the whole world in just a few minutes is not big.

3 Hadramis in Indonesia: introduction to Hadrami communities on the islands of Java, Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa

1 The conference 'Hadrami diaspora: migration of people, commodities and ideas' took place in Bergen, Norway, on 4–5 December 2000. Scholars from around the world, some of them Hadramis themselves, participated and presented papers and lectured. My discussion of the selected Hadrami concerns is based on a general discussion following a presentation by the Ethiopian anthropologist Dr Getachew Kassa.
2 See later discussion on marriage, social stratification and marriage among Indonesian Hadramis, where there is a tendency toward endogamy based on sub-ethnic categories.
3 Dr Anne Bang, University of Bergen, Norway, personal communication.
4 One of them is planning to send his youngest son to Hadramawt in order to look for a suitable wife.
5 In this book, the word 'family' is used to cover a broader category than usual in most Western societies, meaning a category of people sharing the same family name and hence originating from the same forefather.
6 Also labelled *aqhāh* in Arabic, with approximately the same meaning of being 'pure-blooded'.
7 Bahasa Indonesia is the official Indonesian language.
8 The Indonesian word *kampung* means both village, district and town-quarter.
9 Estimates by various Hadrami informants varied between 300 and 400 individuals. Although my own registration of the populations is still not complete, so far their estimate seems rather conservative.
10 One informant even thought that the real number may approach 4,000.
11 Based on registration of occupations of some informants and their relatives in Singaraja, Denpasar, Klunkung (all Bali), Ampenan, Mataram, Labuhan Lombok (all Lombok), Sumbawa Besar and Bima (both Sumbawa).
12 This is a major trend, where in some cases Hadrami families on Bali have intermarried with Hadrami families on Sumatra or Kilimantan, or non-Hadrami families.
13 This is my general impression from following up a few networks of relatives in Bima and Sumbawa Besar. A very few families intermarried with Hadrami in Surabaya.
14 According to an old second-generation Hadrami informant. Note again the usage of the word 'family' as covering a broader range of people than is usual in the West.
15 Some informants say one Sayyid family still lives in Denpasar, others say they have moved to Surabaya.
16 Ten families out of a total of 31. My recording is probably not complete.
17 According to some local Hadrami informants.
18 My estimation of religious affiliation is not based on registration proper, but on estimates made by several Hadrami informants.

4 'We are modern Indonesians': continuity and change among present-day Hadrami communities in Indonesia

1 'Ali', an old second-generation Hadrami on northern Bali.

2 In accordance with Islamic law (sharia) one may only freely dispose of one-third of what one inherits. A considerable part of the remaining means is meant for charity, where individual interpretation leaves some room for favoring needy close relatives (see for example, Freitag 1997b).
3 Sometimes spelled Do'an.
4 Plural form of the Arabic word '*alīm*', meaning learned or informed. The word frequently denotes, as here, a religiously learned person.
5 The swiftlet is not a local bird. If one happens to have a nest from a local swallow in ones house, however, eggs from the swiftlets may be placed in the nest, and the swiftlets will probably settle.

5 Between ideologies of equality and social stratification

1 Mobini-Kesheh here cites (on p. 25) a reproduction of the R. B. Serjeant's book *The Saiyids of Hadramawt*, from Studies in Arabian History and Civilization (London: Valiorum Reprints, 1981).
2 Real sisters, not sisters in a classificatory sense.
3 Van den Berg, A.W.C. 1989, *Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di Nusantara*, Jakarta: Indonesian Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies. First published in French in 1886, with the title *Le Hadramaut et les Colonies Arabes dans l'Archipel Indien* (Batavia: Imprimerie du Gouvernement). Translated into Bahasa Indonesia by Rahayu Hidayat.
4 Assuming Europeans to be Christians, as is a quite common presumption in Indonesia.
5 A famous Hadrami scholar of Hadith (Ho 2006: 148).

6 Hadramis in diversity: a focus on some unique adaptations on Bali and beyond

1 According to my own mapping.
2 Used as an expensive delicacy in Chinese soups, see earlier footnote.
3 The term *bid´a* strictly means 'innovation' (see Freitag 2003: 94).
4 Five years earlier Abdel Gadir was together with Yusuf in a party where he died, 70 years old. He tells:

> I used to spend much time together with him. We were very close to each other. We last met in Singaraja in a family celebration where he died. He just collapsed during a traditional Hadrami dance. He complained about headache, but didn't want to talk about it. Sometimes he used to get headache, but never made it a topic. He was a strong man. When he got headache, he just kept silent. If I asked him whether he had any problem, he just said 'no, I'm fine'. At the event he danced a little bit, then sat down with headache, then danced some more, and suddenly fell to the ground. We asked for a doctor, but he proved already to be dead. When I contacted Jazid, his son, he just cried and asked, 'why my father?'

5 A Catholic military general, once a minister of security and defence during Suharto, later actively supporting Abdurrahman Wahid as a presidential candidate.
6 The leader of the Muhammadiyah for many years, a versatile critic of communists, blaming 'communist conspiracy' to be behind outbreaks of

violence at the end of Suharto's government and voicing the view that Christians in Indonesia should be provided a Dhimmi status (Hefner 2000).

7 Somewhat imprecisely, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyya Indonesia may be translated as 'The Indonesian council for the preaching of Islam'.
8 Islamic theological school.
9 The Indonesian concept of *tenaga batin* may be translated to 'inner power' from Bahasa Indonesia. The concept is closely connected with Javanese mysticism, so-called *kebatinan* (see Mulder 1996). *Kebatinan* may be translated both as 'mystical', 'mysticism' and 'inner' (Wojowasito and Poerwadarminta 1987).
10 'You rain, goodbye!'
11 'Cold weather, goodbye, leave!'
12 Eldar Bråten, University of Bergen, oral communication, 2004.
13 *Salām* meaning both peace, safety and health in Arabic language.
14 Rp stands for Indonesian Rupiah, the local currency in the country.
15 Abdulrahman Wahid served as president in Indonesia from 20th October 1999 to 23rd July 2001.
16 Maybe the theory of rebirth is too obviously linked to the world of multiple gods and deities in Hindu cosmology for most Indonesian Muslims. The word *syirik* can also be translated 'associating other beings and powers with Allah' (Woodward 1989: 300).
17 *Fugara* is a plural form of *fagir*, a Sudanese version of the Arabic word *faqir*, which also entails the meaning 'poor', but in the present case mostly signify 'a religious and holy man' or a healer employing Quranic medicine.
18 *Héequal* in Tu Bedawie, the mother tongue of the Beja people, a so-called Cushitic language spoken besides Arabic in the Red Sea Hills.
19 In the Red Sea Hills not only male, but also female saints and *fugara* exist.
20 The concept of 'saint' is used here in a broad sense, where canonization, like in the Catholic tradition, is not to be presupposed.

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