Higher Education Dynamics 38

Sheldon Rothblatt *Editor*

Clark Kerr's World of Higher Education Reaches the 21st Century

Chapters in a Special History

Foreword by
Vartan Gregorian

Springer

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HIGHER EDUCATION DYNAMICS

VOLUME 38

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Foreword

It is fitting that this volume of essays honoring Clark Kerr's contributions to the strength, excellence, resilience and potential of US higher education is being published as we prepare to celebrate the 150th anniversaries of the Land Grant College Act of 1862 and the establishment of the National Academy of Sciences in 1863. Endorsed by President Abraham Lincoln in the midst of the Civil War, the Land Grant College Act, also known as the first Morrill Act (named for Justin Smith Morrill, Congressional Representative of Vermont, who sponsored the bill), provided federal funding to establish at least one college in every state. A landmark piece of legislation, it laid the groundwork for public higher education as we know it today. After the Civil War, when the Industrial Revolution was in full swing, the Morrill Act helped to provide the research and the educated workforce that were desperately needed in agriculture, mining, manufacturing and the "mechanical arts." Before this legislation was passed, higher education was available to only a small proportion of America's population. The Morrill Act, in effect, put universities where the people were. It was hailed because it established colleges "for our Land and Time," or "New Education for the New World." Andrew D. White, president of Cornell, declared at the time, "In all the annals of Republics, there is no more significant utterance of confidence in national destiny out from the midst of national calamity" (Cornell University 1868, p. 6). The Act not only provided greater access to higher education, it also promoted specialized training and spurred the development of both theoretical knowledge and its practical applications. It is astonishing to note that Congress enacted this law while the country was embroiled in its bloodiest conflict, making it clear how strongly both the president and Congress believed in the role of public higher education as the cornerstone of our nation's economy, as well as our nation's democracy.

In addition to the Morrill Act and the establishment of the National Academy of Sciences, there were three other important developments in the history of US higher education: the release of a groundbreaking 1945 report by Vannevar Bush, science adviser to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the passage of the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the GI Bill of Rights) and the creation of Pell Grants. All of these developments played a role in democratizing access to knowledge and to education.

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS), which was closely related in spirit and application to the Morrill Act, was founded in 1863, just 8 months and a day after the Act was signed into law. Established to advise Congress on "any subject of science or art," NAS expanded in time to include the National Research Council, the National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine. Election to membership in the Academy is one of the highest honors that can be accorded to a scientist. NAS enlists the nation's foremost scientists, engineers, health professionals and other experts to address the scientific and technical aspects of some of society's most pressing problems. Among the critical issues NAS has addressed in recent years is the relationship between higher education and our nation's leadership in science, medicine and technology, as well as our global economic competitiveness, not to mention standards of science and math instruction in our K-12 institutions.

In addition to the National Academy of Sciences, a major report commissioned by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and enacted by President Harry S. Truman had a tremendous impact on the future of science in the United Stations. I am referring to, of course, the 1945 report by Professor Vannevar Bush, entitled *Science – The Endless Frontier,* which defined the United States' postwar policy in science. Bush noted that business and industry naturally took the lead in applied research but were deterred by marketplace considerations from conducting basic research. He argued that it was the federal government's responsibility to provide adequate funds for basic research to push the boundaries of human knowledge for the benefit of society. He also wrote that the nation's universities were, by their very nature, best suited to take the lead in conducting this work. Public funding, he said, would promote competition among researchers, and projects could be selected based on merit through a peer-review process. Bush suggested that a federal agency oversee the program, and Congress, in 1950, created the National Science Foundation to carry out this mission.

Giving universities a central role in basic research turned out to be a brilliant policy. Instead of being centralized in government laboratories – as science tended to be in other parts of the world – scientific research became decentralized in American universities, spurring a tremendous diversity of investment. It also gave graduate students significant research opportunities and helped spread scientific discoveries far and wide to the benefit of industry, medicine and society as a whole.

The GI Bill was one of the most imaginative, creative acts of Congress, in that it opened the doors of higher education institutions to millions of veterans. Drafted by Harry W. Colmery, a former Republican National Chairman and national commander of the American Legion, the bill passed by only a single vote. But with its adoption in 1944, Congress prevented a major social and economic crisis; some even believed it averted another Depression. The bill allowed returning servicemen and women to receive a college education or technical training without charge. By 1947, according to Department of Veterans Affairs statistics, 49% of those admitted to college were veterans. Ultimately, 15 million second world war veterans took advantage of the GI Bill. This was another major step toward the democratization of education and opportunity.

Another historic milestone in the history of access to higher education – and the one in which Clark Kerr played a crucial role – was the creation of what became known as the Federal Pell Grant Program (named for Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island). Today, Pell grants are an intrinsic element of higher-education funding, but it is important to remember how revolutionary they were when first proposed. Originally, the grants, which do not require repayment and are awarded based on a financial-need formula determined by Congress, were to be funneled directly to institutions. But with the passage of the Higher Education Act of 1972, which was influenced by the work of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (led by Clark Kerr), control of the largest share of financial aid dollars was shifted from institutions to individuals, very much in keeping with the American character. In that way, the grants became portable, meaning they could follow a student from one institution to another if his or her higher-education career required that kind of mobility.

The rationale for the program was laid out in one of the commission's most influential reports, *Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education*, published in 1968, which argued for direct financial aid to students rather than grants to institutions. Insisting that block funding was bound to turn political, Kerr wanted to empower students to pay their own way at the institution that best met their needs. This recommendation eventually won the day, leading to programs that became Pell grants and Perkins loans (named after Kentucky Congressman Carl D. Perkins, a proponent of student aid; Perkins loans are also federally subsidized and need-based, but must be repaid). Along with the GI Bill, these programs provided an open door to colleges and universities in ways that previous generations could never have dreamed of.[1] Without the determination of Clark Kerr to serve the needs of students over those of institutions and administrators (a stance that some might see as ironic, given his experiences at the University of California, discussed in the pages of this book), Pell grants would likely never have had the continuing, positive and far-reaching impact that must be attributed to them. Since 1973, more than $270 billion in Federal Pell grants have been awarded to fund the education of millions of low-income students.

Clark Kerr inherited the rich legacy of all these educational milestones and, in his work, attempted to incorporate their aim and logic, which was to democratize knowledge, to exploit science to the fullest and to provide full and open access to higher education.

[1] Writing about the commission and the impact of Pell grants, Ellen Lagemann, education historian and author of *The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy and Public Policy* (1983) said, "The effect on higher education was tremendous. There had been great turbulence in higher education and no one really knew what to do. People were asking, 'What's a college education really worth?' The commission was a stabilizing voice of authority providing guidance to higher educational institutions," according to Lagemann. http://carnegie.org/publications/carnegie-reporter/single/view/article/item/245/. "Pell grants came straight out of their work – a switch in the way aid is given that reflects understanding of the 'student as consumer' and recognition that institutions had to be more responsive to the market."

While Kerr's impact on American higher education extends in many directions (as is explored in this book), it also includes introducing the concept of the "multiversity," which he highlighted in his Godkin Lectures at Harvard University in 1963. By that time, Kerr had been president of the University of California system for 5 years and had served as chancellor of the Berkeley campus for 6 years before that. As James W. Wagner, president of Emory University has noted, Kerr was "an economist with an historian's sensibility, [who] very astutely analyzed the 'hinge of history' on which American universities then seemed to hang. Still connected to their past, they were swinging into an unrecognizable future, and it was Kerr's genius to see the outlines of that future clearly" (Wagner 2007). Those outlines were brought into sharper focus by the Cold War, which demanded that the nation's academic community climb down from its ivory tower and face the fact that America seemed to be competing not only for the hearts and minds of both its enemies and its allies, but also for control of the goods and services – along with the means of inventing, producing and delivering them – that would determine who won and who lost the superpower race that was heating up in the mid-twentieth century. Domination in the realm of science and technology were considered of utmost importance.

This was also the period when the kind of gentlemen's agreement that had existed among private and public institutions began to fall apart. Until world war two, by and large, private institutions depended on endowments, tuition and private funding; public entities relied on public funding. During the Cold War, however, both public and private colleges began to compete for federal funding, a situation that remains true today. However, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a topsy-turvy aspect to the demand for both state and federal dollars: the once seemingly free flow of money has been drastically curtailed by the prolonged economic downturn, as well as by the growing sentiment among some members of the public and the government that everyone, including public institutions of higher education, must find new resources in order to survive and prosper. In short, that they must pay their own way – by increasing tuition, relying on lower-paid part-time faculty or applying cost-cutting measures.

It was in the midst of Kerr's academic career that all these forces combined in a kind of educational big bang that brought forth his concept of a "multiversity," which he described as "not one community, but several – the community of the undergraduate and the community of the graduate; the community of the humanist, the community of the social scientist, and the community of the scientist; the communities of the professional schools; the community of all the nonacademic personnel; the community of the administrators" (Kerr 1963, p. 14). Be warned though, Kerr cautioned, because the interests of these communities can, and often do, conflict.

Kerr could be humorous about these conflicts and tensions – in particular, as they affected the role of the university president – once providing this description of the job:

> The American university president is expected to be a friend of the students, a colleague of the faculty, a good fellow with the alumni, a sound administrator with the trustees, a good speaker with the public, an astute bargainer with the foundations and the federal agencies; a politician with the state legislature, a friend of industry, labor and agriculture, a persuasive

> diplomat with donors, a champion of education, generally … a spokesman to the press, a scholar in his own right, a public servant at the state and national levels, a devotee of opera and football equally, [and] a decent human being…. He should be firm, yet gentle, sensitive to others, insensitive to himself; look to the past and the future, yet be firmly planted in the present; he should be both visionary and sound, affable, yet reflective … a good American but ready to criticize the status quo fearlessly; a seeker of truth, where the truth may not hurt too much; a source of public policy pronouncements when they do not reflect on his own institution (Gardner 2005, p. ix).

Of course, there is nothing even remotely lighthearted to reference when it comes to what is perhaps the defining conflict of Kerr's career – his dismissal in 1967 from the presidency of the University of California by the Board of Regents. The board first asked him to resign; he refused twice and was finally fired, though as Kerr later said, he left the position as he had come into it, "fired with enthusiasm!" (Kerr 2003, p. 309; Gardner 2005, p. 35). As discussed in this volume, many strands of discord led to Kerr's involuntary parting of the ways with the Regents, though the culmination of his problems was certainly the Free Speech Movement and the student protests, especially at the Berkeley and Santa Barbara campuses in the 1960s. As Kerr's self-described mentee,[2] and later his successor, David P. Gardner, relates, much of the pressure for Kerr's firing came from California's then newly elected governor, Ronald Reagan, who had run for office on a platform of "cleaning up the mess at Berkeley" (Gardner 2005, p. 34).

Before that, Kerr had enjoyed great success, as when he became the chief architect and shepherd of the California Master Plan for Higher Education of 1960, created during the tenure of Governor Edmund "Pat" Brown, and with his enthusiastic support. The plan developed new guidelines for the University of California system, for the normal schools and colleges which subsequently became the California State University system and the state's community colleges. Its reorganization resolved much of the competition between schools and led to expanded educational resources in a public higher-education system known for excellence, accessibility and relative affordability. "This postsecondary system – designed for both broad access and excellence in research and teaching – not only transformed educational opportunity in California for several generations, but also transformed public higher education," said David Ward, past president of the American Council on Education (quoted in Maclay 2003), forcing other states to coordinate their provision for higher education.

Though in the end – at least, the end of his presidency of the University of California – Kerr was caught between the opposing forces of faculty autonomy and independence and the power of trustees and governors to flex their collective muscles – he chose, as he always did, to look toward a bright future. Writing in *The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949–1967*, Kerr professed that, "The personal consequences of my dismissal were release from an impossible situation and the opportunity to become chair and director of the Carnegie

[2] In *Earning My Degree*, Gardner pays homage to Kerr, describing him as "one of the two or three leading lights in twentieth-century American higher education, worldwide, for that matter" (Gardner 2005, p. 357).

Commission on Higher Education. This position was one of the high points of my life" (Kerr 2003, p. 316).

The "impossible situation" must have included Kerr's realization that he had possessed the courage – and suffered the consequences – of simply stating what was true about the "multiversity," from the time of the Morrill Act to the second world war, and throughout the post-war period. I would contend that what he asserted remains true today: the modern American university, whether we like it or not, serves multiple interests. Students, certainly, to whom all educators owe nothing less than the highest possible level of excellence in their efforts to impart learning and share knowledge, should be first on the list. But the interests of research and industry, of the US government, and of corporate America are not far behind. Kerr was right when he suggested that the pluralism of America's institutions of higher education corresponded to the pluralism of American society, both for good and for ill.

Clark Kerr tried to establish an equilibrium that would reconcile democratization of access to higher education in America, preservation of excellent faculty and research and shared governance (i.e., faculty autonomy vis-à-vis the Board of Regents). He tried to establish a university system that would continue to respond to the evolving social and economic needs of our culture. Such balancing acts are and always will be under stress in our democratic society.

Professor Sheldon Rothblatt, one of our nation's leading historians of higher education, and his colleagues, are to be congratulated for giving us this important collection of essays on Kerr's legacy. It is especially timely because the course of democratization of access to higher education has reached a critical stage. Many states are financially insolvent and cannot afford to provide what had once amounted to a free education. The Federal government cannot afford the full cost of Pell Grants, relying, instead, on loans. The Pell Grant program itself is facing possible insolvency. Many students and parents are going into debt in order to finance higher education at a time when education is no longer a luxury, but a necessity. This volume gives us an important historical perspective on what was once opportunity guaranteed by public funding and is now opportunity underwritten largely by borrowing. What was once seen as an investment in the future of our nation now is seen as an expenditure – a financial burden to be borne by families.

This volume also provides us with historical perspective on Clark Kerr's Master Plan for higher education, which envisaged a role for community colleges, state colleges and public universities. Unfortunately, political pressures have now undermined the whole Master Plan. As a result, there is much unnecessary duplication as community colleges have become colleges; state colleges have become state universities; and almost all major institutions aspire to give the PhD, all of them competing for limited resources. The Master Plan is no longer efficient or effective. It is my hope that this collection of essays will allow an analysis of what went wrong and what opportunities were missed.

In this volume, Clark Kerr's peers, admirers, friends and colleagues honor his vision and accomplishments, as do I.

Vartan Gregorian

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Prefatory Remarks

Clark Kerr, the 12th president of the University of California (UC) but only the second of the multi-campus system as refashioned well after the second world war, died in 2003 at the age of 92. His death was widely reported, and his achievements generally praised. He remained in reasonably robust mental and physical health until about a year or 18 months before his death. To many of us he appeared indestructible. By any measure, his life was not only long. It was also productive and filled with achievements duly recognized. He was by any judgment one of America's greatest university leaders and arguably a seminal figure in comprehending and discussing the salient structural and value changes in higher education occurring in the second half of the twentieth century. But it was not only the salient changes that concerned him, for his grasp was breathtakingly comprehensive as he pulled almost every conceivable social, economic and political detail into the service of broad matrices of intellectual understanding. He read widely, was learned and had a wonderful capacity to ask the relevant questions and connect the possible answers. He created or significantly aided in creating original ways of meshing ideas, policies and structures. He certainly encouraged others to do so.

He wrote continually, sometimes in collaboration with his invaluable research colleague, Marian L. Gade, who was in turn aided by Sangwan Zimmerman. While his writings, addresses, letters and memoranda are plentiful, they are not exactly of a character that lends itself to a conventional detailed biography. Kerr was a private man, and it is significant that he sub-entitled his two-volume published reminiscences as "A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949–1967." It was the University even more than himself that was his subject. Furthermore, the many boxes of materials concerning his life and work are still being processed in the Bancroft Library of the Berkeley campus. Some 70 cartons exist, six boxes and six oversize folders, the whole comprising 90.13 linear feet. An account of his life that would go beyond or at least sideways from his memoirs, should it ever prove possible, must await another time.

In the meantime, this collection of essays, "chapters" in a remarkable history, is offered in tribute to him and as recognition of his eminence. Fundamentally it is an analysis of the world which he inherited and in which he operated, how he saw that

world and how he contributed to its making and understanding. It is also a statement about what happened to that world as one century ended and another commenced. He lived to see both.

Clark Kerr was one of those personalities who gave new life and meaning to policy studies and pointed the way for others. As Neil Smelser wrote in a foreword to volume I of the memoirs, Kerr "had an ability always to grasp the *big picture*, no matter what issue he was pursuing." And, adds Smelser, he turned the big picture into a *vision*. "Most scholars cannot do or do not take this step" (Kerr 2001, pp. xxiii–xxiv). A number of the chapters are directly about Kerr, others indirectly so; but whatever the format, he is always present, and he is the overriding inspiration. The authors circle around him since he was involved in every major aspect of the evolution of higher education in the United States for more than half a hundred years and made the parts into a whole. So the contributors have been asked to engage with the issues that he defined, the formulations that he made, the suggestions that he advanced, the structures that he helped create, the legacies that he left and even his musings. The problems that he identified and confronted were actually those affecting higher education systems outside California and abroad in the postwar expansion of higher education as this collection makes clear. It is no great mischief to second-guess him, for he was a supremely honest man and continually second-guessed himself. As such, he would have been pleased and we would be pleased if our chapters invite comments and reflections or started hares.

The chapters are sometimes personal, as many of us knew him, and we hope that the analyses combined with mini-portraits will capture his unique qualities. But the chapters are also interpretive. They often deal with politics, but they are not political as such. They are rather efforts to understand Kerr's achievements in time-bound contexts. Seen in those contexts, and whatever reservations he himself entertained, he emerges as a unique personality in the multiple histories of higher education. In many respects he fulfilled the poet Matthew Arnold's dictum that a civilized person has an obligation to see life clearly and to see it whole. And Kerr was a supremely civilized man.

This is a book about past and present. It is a book about where higher education stood as the horrors of the second world war subsided and new tensions, but also new successes, arose and where we might stand today with respect to the issues of a century now over. The phrase "past and present" was made famous by the cantankerous Scottish romantic historian, Thomas Carlyle. In a history of a twelfth-century hero-abbot whose name was ironically Samson, Carlyle contrasted the order and purpose of a medieval religious estate with the vapid money-grubbing of a Victorian factory economy. Kerr began his own story with a later version of the history of industrialism. Unlike Carlyle, he mostly tried to be optimistic about its possibilities, but as will be seen, the picture of industrial and even postindustrial society that he drew was often clouded. He had favorites but no outsize person corresponding to Abbot Samson. The darker tones are frequently missed by commentators who wish to prove him wrong about the world he described and its fate. They do not see him as he was, a man of many sides who continually revisited his judgments. And did he end his life somewhat closer to Carlyle? The reader will need to decide.

Gathered around him and stimulated by his presence and encouragement were many of the outstanding scholars of higher education in his generation, amongst them Burton Robert Clark of Yale and the University of California at Los Angeles, Martin Trow and Neil Smelser of Berkeley, Seymour Martin Lipset also of Berkeley before moving on and Henry Rosovsky of Harvard, another who was at Berkeley in the 1960s. And Kerr brought others of renown into the enterprise, then or later, when he accepted the offer to lead the Carnegie projects discussed in the second chapter. Notice how many academics and administrators appearing in this book had some connection to him. He was in touch with intellectuals and scholars abroad, and they made pilgrimages to see him. It is sometimes said that leaders have such strong egos that they surround themselves with lackeys. Nothing of this sort could ever have been said or imagined of Kerr.

Berkeley, CA and Amherst, MA Sheldon Rothblatt

Acknowledgements

The idea for a book honoring the achievements of Clark Kerr originated with Patrick M. Callan who worked closely with Kerr over many years. He was concerned that unless we undertook such a project, a time would come when Kerr's accomplishments would fade from fickle memories or the assessments would be misleading or perverse, born of the vanity that delights in attacking solid reputations. Fortunately that has not yet happened to any great degree. In fact, new appreciations have been appearing. As the idea evolved, especially in the aftermath of Kerr's own published memoirs, it took the form of a collection of essays from those particularly well-qualified to review his legacies. The task of assembling the volume happily fell to me. I came to know Kerr well when I was director of the Center for Studies in Higher Education (CSHE) on the Berkeley campus. The Center had been founded or re-founded in 1977 by the distinguished sociologist of higher education, Martin Trow, now deceased, at the behest of the Dean of the Graduate Division and Berkeley's Division of the Academic Senate. I followed Trow in the succession. Kerr's memoirs project was housed in the Center, and he visited his research team often.

I am consequently immensely thankful for that team, Marian Gade, Kerr's greatly capable research associate, and Maureen Kawaoka, his accomplished secretary and administrative assistant at the Institute for Industrial Relations on the campus, of which Kerr had been founding director. They have supplied me with information and sources, filled in blanks and caught errors of fact. They have done so over many years. It is difficult for me to think about Kerr without thinking of them, my colleagues and friends of long-standing.

I would also like to acknowledge the encouragement of Judson King, a former vice president of the University of California and the current director of CSHE.

From the start, or even before that, Ted Tapper has supplied me with indispensable counsel and assistance, for which I am particularly indebted. I would also like to thank the other contributors to this volume for finding the time to write. I chose colleagues who are prominent and consequently over-committed. Although pushed on all sides, they not only consented to contribute, they did so with enthusiasm, respecting the subject and realizing Kerr's unique qualities and contributions to the

understanding of higher education in relation to all the many significant variables of contemporary civilization. Others could have been asked, but publishers are cost-conscious.

Over the years I have been fortunate to be part of a group of generous-minded and thoughtful scholars in the US and abroad. In the first book that I published, a history of Cambridge University in the great Victorian period of reform when that celebrated institution's modern tutorial system evolved, I noted that scholarship, at its finest levels, is always a collaborative affair. A community of dedicated academics is required for any single publication ever to appear. Many decades have passed, and I see no reason to modify that youthful opinion. The pleasure, support and inspiration I have received from a talented network of scholars domestic and abroad have been a mainstay of my professional life.

Together, we offer this collection in the expectation that Kerr will continue to be regarded as a special figure in the history of higher education anywhere.

We are grateful to the Regents of the University of California and to the University of California Press for permission to reprint material from the following Press publications: Clark Kerr*, The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949–1967, Volume I.* (c) 2001; Clark Kerr*, The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949–1967, Volume II.* (c) 2003; David Pierpont Gardner*, Earning My Degree: Memoirs of an American University President.* (c) 2005.

Sheldon Rothblatt

Contents

Chapter 1
Clark Kerr: Two Voices

Sheldon Rothblatt

Clark Kerr's dismissal from the presidency of UC by The Board of Regents in 1967 astounded the academic and political communities. It was a shot heard round the world. His account of the affair of the dismissal is dramatically related in his memoirs, the two-volume *The Gold and the Blue* published in 2001 and 2003. He had long irritated the more conservative-minded Regents for his tolerant positions during the reign of the House Un-American Activities Committee and McCarthyism of the 1950s and into the 1960s. He also attracted the suspicions of J. Edgar Hoover's Federal Bureau of Investigation. Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, pertinent documents are included in the memoirs. Personal differences with Regents were also involved, although these are rather standard in the relationships of presidents to trustees.

He was, as he wryly but also sadly noted, denounced by the ideological Right as a communist or fellow traveler and by the New Left as a "proto-fascist." For some odd reason, *Time Magazine* in 1960, putting his picture on the cover and celebrating his work as a labor arbitrator (the basis of his early reputation), referred to him as "the Machiavellian Quaker" (Riley 2006, p. 85). (He had become a Hicksite Quaker while an undergraduate at Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania, a particularly optimistic version of the faith as he said.) Of course he fit none of the stereotypes. He was, given the era in which he came of age, and as he himself said, a Roosevelt New Deal liberal in politics and a Keynsian in economics (Kerr 2002b, p. 390). He was also a "liberal" in the older meaning of fearing the power of central government; but on this point there are inconsistencies, for he accepted New Deal regulation and significantly respected Scandinavian social democracy.

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The student disturbances at the Berkeley and Santa Barbara campuses in the 1960s provided the kindling for Kerr's dismissal. Governor Ronald Reagan was determined to find a scapegoat for the troubles (a governor being *ex officio* a member of the Regents, its president but not its chair). Reagan had run for gubernatorial office on a platform exploiting public dismay and confusion over the campus disruptions. As Kerr loved the University and had a special affection for the Berkeley campus where he was professor of economics and industrial relations, the dismissal haunted him for many years, actually throughout his entire life. No one requires reminders of such a catastrophic event, but there were many on display in his home in El Cerrito in the hills overlooking San Francisco Bay. Visitors could not avoid seeing a wall of original newspaper cartoons depicting the sacking.

In this volume both Presidents David Gardner and Arnold Levine have amply illustrated Kerr's extraordinary personal qualities. He was not a man to feel sorry for himself. It is a tribute to his fortitude and strength of mind that dismissal from office did not prevent him from wide participation in public and higher education affairs. He served on many boards and councils, among them the Rockefeller Foundation (for 16 years) and, since its inception, the Council of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He went on to head the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and to chair the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, which led to a library of books on numerous aspects of higher education viewed in the round. Levine, who worked under him as a junior staff member, recalls those years and provides an account of the pioneering Carnegie achievements. They are in danger of being forgotten in these turbulent fiscal times, but they are a significant part of the evolution of higher education policy in the second half of the twentieth century, establishing a common lexicon for generations of scholars and planners. In fact, as the interviews conducted by David Breneman and Paul Lingenfelter for this book indicate (confirmed by Levine), the work at Carnegie may well have been Kerr's most influential achievement. He traveled much abroad. Once, on a plane to Latin America, volunteers were asked to exercise a group of Emperor penguins traveling on the same aircraft and solidly iced in the hold. Kerr of course volunteered, as did his wife Kay. When the plane subsequently landed to refuel, they paraded about the tarmac accompanied by penguins. Kerr bowed and thinks the bird bowed back.

His advice and counsel were repeatedly sought. He continued to testify before the California Legislature and remained a presence in his University. He is amply remembered on his home grounds. A sub-campus in Berkeley bears his name, as does the Clark Kerr Medal, an annual award given by the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate to an eminent figure in higher education. Recipients have included Nöel Gilroy, Lord Annan, sometime Provost of King's College, Cambridge University and the first "permanent" head of the University of London, and Earl Warren, Governor of the State of California and Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The Faculty Club on the Berkeley campus has a restaurant named after Kerr where his portrait is prominently displayed, and there was once – an entry that pleased him – a hamburger on the menu called "the Clark Kerr Special." I was with him when he ordered one, sitting underneath his large portrait, the young waiter oblivious of all connections.

He gained a moral authority that rarely if ever adheres to a sitting president obliged to placate outside communities and caught in the cross-fires of academic disputes. His experience in office led him to examine the nature of university leadership in his own time. The results of a survey revealed a position with some satisfactions but also beset by continual headaches and pressures, especially (expectedly) within large university systems. In smaller private colleges, the life of a president appeared more agreeable (Kerr and Gade 1986). Looking back, he compiled a substantial list of the tribulations facing the heads of large publics. The bottom line was that their leaders were almost always hamstrung. The campus, he said, was far more complicated than any factory, and in the 1980s he spoke of administrators as "political survivors" (Kerr 1991, pp. 35, 185, 202).

By temperament a scholar – and hence his appreciation of the intellectual commitments necessary for a university to be great – removal from office furthered an heuristic detachment well in keeping with his personality. He was now free to devote himself to understanding the place of higher education in history and society from multiple viewpoints, writing about the ethics of the academic profession, the tensions between national and international trends, changing administrative styles, citizenship, liberal education and general culture. There was hardly any aspect of higher education that did not receive his attention. He filled in the blanks of his earlier work, qualified many conclusions and changed his mind. Many commentators simply do not read far enough into his extensive published corpus and instead arrive at pat and insensitive descriptions of his thought and character. The large number of references to history, sociology, ethics, economics and politics indicate how wide were his readings and how embracing was his grasp.

His manner was famously reserved. He internalized his feelings and was not given to open expressions of emotion. His self-discipline was remarkable, and his powers of concentration almost legendary. But a controlled exterior notwithstanding, he could be tormented by events, especially those emanating from the 1960s, and he said so simply but effectively in his memoirs. At one point in the campus conflicts, he "died a hundred deaths" (Kerr 2003, p. 278). Summing up his California history, he remarked that he won and lost "big" (Kerr 2003, p. 311). He was a keen fighter in academic affairs and particularly where the interests of the University of California were at stake. He did not stray from a main point under discussion, nor did he say more than appeared necessary at the time. Levine notes these characteristics; but I can also attest that Kerr became somewhat more garrulous in his later years, sensing that time was running out; and once engaged in explanation, not amenable to interruptions. Levine says that Kerr was not charismatic. That is correct. He was not charismatic in the popular meaning, but possibly in a Weberian sense where moral concerns are evident.

While his personal style was self-effacing, it would be a mistake to conclude that he was humble or in any way passive. There was no pretense in him. He had a strong sense of who he was, and there was an inherent strength in whatever he said. His observations were compelling, and he spoke with clarity and direction in sentences often pithy. Audiences sensed that his remarks were based on a particular depth of understanding and looked forward to hearing him. He avoided using platitudes; and

while he possessed a social scientist's inclination to anticipate the future, he was never trendy, succumbing to the familiar temptation of some academic leaders to praise whatever came down the pike. His voice was one of authority but doubts entered, and he took with one hand what he gave with the other. Ultimately his view of the world was exceedingly complex and never settled but always fair.

It has been observed that Kerr often spoke in the language of industry and business affairs (Soo and Carson, p. 225). This was hardly surprising as he was a labor economist by training, but this mode of understanding is more marked in his earlier than in his later years where his other side showed more effectively, the side of him that reflected his concern for moral order and for a hope – he said this obliquely – that the university could be a conscience of the nation. There were numerous impediments. He commented frequently on the politicization of the university which he had directly experienced, noticed the possible loss of public trust, deplored the weakening of a guild sense of community and wondered if the academy was capable of satisfactorily governing itself. He quoted William James: "No priesthood ever reformed itself." If, as widely stated, the university had come under managerial direction, one reason was an academic reluctance to manage itself (Kerr 1994c, pp. 11, 14). But earlier he had offered another and more overarching explanation, one that derived from his work on the characteristics of industrial civilization.

It is the case that he often gave the impression of being all business no matter the time or circumstance. I recall a dinner party at his home. The guests, leading lights from European countries, were enjoying a good meal with wine (he was himself abstemious). They were surprised, however, when at the conclusion, while merriment reigned, Kerr asked each of them to provide an account (presumably sober) of the latest higher education developments abroad. Taken initially by surprise, the guests, being seasoned veterans, swiftly gathered their wits and complied, never imagining that summaries were required in exchange for hospitality. Kerr had no such bargain in mind, of course. He was always interested in comparisons, he wished to be informed, he respected his guests, and he thought it only natural that a dinner party should be the occasion for an exchange of views.

He was simple in his personal habits. I found him unloading cardboard boxes unaided in a local recycling center when he was already very elderly. He declined my offer of help. Once I commended him on a new sports jacket, knowing that such expenditures were exceedingly rare, and he proudly answered that it was his first new jacket in eons (as if no one could ever have noticed). He was not given to chatting about private or family affairs beyond an occasional anecdote, nor did he generally laugh heartily, but he could certainly be amused and was not above quiet, even affectionate teasing, which he accepted in return from those who mattered to him. In fact, he had a sly sense of humor and could coin memorable ironic phrases. Once I even caught him out in a fib in connection with a delightful prank played on me. So I chided him: "Quakers don't do that." He wrote to me (in June 1996): "You took the surprise with good humor and forgave the deception in good spirits." I cherish the letters he sent me, written briefly and, as Levine also remembers, in micrographia– "chicken scratches" Kerr called them – even if they are barely readable by all but his devoted assistants.

He respected talent and believed that talented people ought to be given scope and freedom, and in response, talented people desired to please him. He was generous and understanding: the University of Chicago historian of anthropology, George Stocking, once at Berkeley and interviewed by Kerr regarding past communist affiliations, provides a perfect anecdote about his quiet personal style and largeness of mind (Stocking 2010, pp. 77–79). As one learned in time, he was not at all indifferent to the personal problems of others. He was a good listener and appreciated his friends even while not inclined to say too much by way of praise. If he did not have generous impulses, he presumably would not have become a Hicksite Quaker. Also, as Gardner remarks, he did not himself seek praise, although it would be silly to imagine that he did not welcome appreciation. It was the case – strangely given his immense public standing – that he was socially shy. Levine also recalls this aspect, and he said it of himself: "by nature too shy, too reserved" (Kerr 2003, p. 238). And it was also the case that those who worked very closely with him and were often enough in his presence to catch the nuances and shadings, to see the complexity and decency that lived below the shyness and reserve, loved him and were profoundly loyal out of respect, admiration and fondness. As he aged, I found myself even wanting to protect him even though there was nothing to protect him from.

It is easy to remember Clark Kerr.

The Big Picture

Kerr is possibly best remembered for his central role in the creation of the California Master Plan for Higher Education of 1960 and for his depiction of a new phase in the long history of the university. He called that phase the advent of the "multiversity," a term which some thought a semantic barbarism. It is easy to suppose that he was thinking of Berkeley. That mistake is carelessly made, but he had Harvard in mind and *in embryo* traced the phenomenon back to the appearance of medical schools at the University of Pennsylvania in 1765 (Kerr 2001a, pp. 103, 106). Authors continue to use the neologism (Krücken et al. 2007). The multiversity differed from its predecessors because it contained innumerable missions and functions, many ideas instead of a dominating animating or governing idea. "Higher education in practice," Kerr wrote, "is a strung-along enterprise without a single preferred function." The idealists "look for the one and only true faith." The pragmatists (he put himself there) "look at whatever works best….The former are exclusionist and perfectionist, the latter inclusionist and adaptive" (Kerr 1991, p. 4). By the beginning of a new millennium, however, Kerr had become tired of "multiversity" and wished that some of the "multi" could be taken out of it (Kerr 2001a, p. 184).

The conception of a multiversity was put forth in the Godkin Lectures delivered at Harvard University and published in 1963 as *The Uses of the University*, now in a fifth and final edition. Later, as Kerr's world and that of so many others was overwhelmed by the student activists of the 1960s, he wondered how he had been so

foolhardy in advancing unconventional thoughts about higher education when he was still a sitting president and thus particularly vulnerable.

Whether a university had ever coalesced around a single dominant historical idea as to its purpose is greatly problematical (as Kerr was much later to note). The multiversity idea of a university overstated many of the differences between past and present. Universities had been dividing internally almost since their origins, acquiring colleges, "nations" and "faculties" to serve different constituencies (Rothblatt 2006). Or in Neil Smelser's words, "a kind of 'blistering' principle of social change, whereby new programs and structures are added onto existing ones rather than displacing them" (Smelser 2010, p. 359). But a rhetorical or essentialist view of a university was instrumentally easier to defend than one containing innumerable and competing visions. Seen in this light, the multiversity, lacking a unified voice, was harder to defend *entire* against outside criticism. Nevertheless, parts of it could function almost unnoticed as critics concentrated on particular aspects. The multiversity simply contained too many targets to be engaged at once. Seen in yet another way, the multiversity was so integrated with modern society that it was both vulnerable and invulnerable at one and the same time.

In roundabout fashion, the essentialist view could, philosophically, be traced back to Edmund Burke and German scholars until, in the English-speaking world, it found a special home in the famous Victorian lectures of John Henry, Cardinal Newman. Whatever one's views about the nature of a university, Newman's lyrical disquisition on "the idea of a university" had enormous staying power. It was still very much alive when Kerr wrote – he referred to it often – and it continues to be referenced (as in Barnett 2012). Kerr's point was to say that the university and history had moved on. Universities contained many ideas. It was best to acknowledge that, but also the changing realities, for these defined the spheres of activity and the values associated with those activities in the newer centuries. Knowing is better than just believing.

Both the idea of a multiversity and the California Master Plan were contained within a paradigm about the structures, characteristics and values of industrial society and the changes wrought by a development so long in the making. Paddy Riley has traced the background to Kerr's labor economics to theories of "industrial pluralism" prevalent in his youth and to Paul Taylor, with whom he studied at Berkeley, writing a huge doctoral dissertation (1939) on workers' cooperatives for the unemployed in Depression-era California. By then Kerr and other labor economist were losing faith in neoclassical theories about pure markets (Riley 2006, pp. 74–75). By 1960 he had joined with John T. Dunlop of Harvard, Frederick H. Harbison of Princeton and Charles A. Myers of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in a project that produced a wealth of information about the consequences of industrialization. Several summaries appeared, the first in 1960, the second in 1975, and a number of essays. Kerr also wrote a book on *The Future of Industrial Societies, Convergence or Continuing Diversity*, published in 1983. In between came the Alfred Marshall Lectures delivered at Cambridge University in April 1968. In 1960 Marxists led one-third of the world's countries (Kerr et al. 1960, p. 22), and the Kerr and company project was aimed at constructing a different meta-view of economic transformations.

The publications are therefore a reminder of where intellectuals and scholars of what we can call a "liberal" persuasion were in the decade after 1945, liberal in the sense of seeing markets and market discipline as major aspects of industrial civilization.

In a deliberate and even mocking echo of Marx, Kerr and his collaborators wrote that the "giant of industrialization is stalking the earth, transforming almost all the features of older and traditional societies." (Kerr et al. 1960, pp. 28, 43) Industrialization was an inexorable force, and all that would remain from a process even more revolutionary than Marx projected were "a few odd backwaters" or vestiges of conventional national traits. Painful and unsettling changes led to the weakening of the bonds uniting class, religion, race or caste and family. Instead of class warfare, the authors projected a society composed of numerous class gradations and little unanimity on issues and interests. (Marx had wrestled with this, struggling to find the historical circumstances that would create a unified working class). A "new bohemianism" would emerge composed of a greater degree of personal liberty and individualism. "Men debate and protest and fight with each other almost every step of the way. This has been a large share of the history of the past century and will be a good share of the history of the next" (Kerr et al. 1960, p. 48).

Any historian might asseverate that upon the ruins of past arrangements wrought by industrial civilization, arise new enterprises, new forms of association, new arrangements and relationships. In an industrial context, these can be "affinity groups," casually put together and temporary. But they can also be firmer. And therefore Kerr and his colleagues now constructed a brave new world. It was composed of large-scale structures, characterized by rule-making and constant rounds of negotiations and tradeoffs. Followers of the sociologist Talcott Parsons – Kerr did not say this – might describe societies as altering between states of equilibrium and disequilibrium, yet in the industrial scenario developed by Kerr a new equilibrium appears impossible.

It is hard to see in this overarching picture of industrial civilization the "excessive optimism" sometimes attributed to it (Riley 2006, pp. 78, 86). The scenario is rather more confused, depending upon how Kerr's generalizations are read, for as in all of his writings he described paradoxes. In 1986, for example, he wrote about industrial relations as being a combination of workplace freedoms and heavily regulated corporations (Kerr and Staudohar 1986, p. 42). The combination is not easy to grasp. One can imagine numerous actual complications, including a fundamental anarchy, a society without cohesion.

If any class emerged from the flux of industrial society, it would be a class of managers assuming greater importance than family, tribe and village. Kerr and company took issue with what the economist and statesman John Kenneth Galbraith called a managerial technostructure. Managers were not technocrats but mediators. Kerr had arrived on the national scene by arbitrating major industrial disputes, and so it is hardly surprising that he would single out mediation as the ordinary means of conflict resolution within industrial society. This became a major theme of the Godkin Lectures. He contrasted the great university builders of the past with his own day when single-minded leadership was elusive. Mediation, by definition,

requires a necessary and flexible middle area of negotiation and compromises. It means anticipating the shared boundaries of a likely solution. It also implies the existence of a system of conventions, an unwritten manual of procedures, as it were, known in advance to all parties to the process of resolving disputes. But what Kerr was to find and indeed found, as did others, was that the student radicals were comfortable in this intermediate world, learning that when conventions were dispensed with and boundaries were fluid, the managers were at a loss as how to proceed. Given the industrial society paradigm, it makes sense to imagine that Kerr should have been more prepared emotionally than he was for the campus conflicts.

He struggled throughout his life to define leadership, "management." In the paradigm of an industrial society, he and his colleagues, as good social scientists, began to tick off the various possibilities. Management could be patrimonial, political or professional. Managers could be rule-makers or elites who both controlled and delegated (Kerr et al. 1960, pp. 142ff). At one point, regarding the trials of a university presidency, Kerr suggested dryly that maybe the university manager was a times a "gladiator" (Kerr 1963, p. 37). Faced by continual surprises, maybe the right stance was to be perpetually ready for change, to be more like a line officer, he said, than a staff type (Kerr 1991, p. 157). And in yet another revision of the Godkin Lectures, he tried to correct the impression that managers as mediators merely tried to split the differences between antagonist positions. No, the mediator leader was also someone who could move the disputing parties to completely new levels of understanding. He used different metaphors and references depending upon the decade. Sometimes he thought that the academic leader would need to become more like a mayor or a governor accustomed to working with many different groups, essentially more "political." Change was inevitable, and being inevitable, the administrator had to anticipate problems, become an active part of defining them, laying out alternatives, explaining difficulties to a great number of constituents and including them in the decision-making process.

Campus leaders – the simile came naturally to him – were like clerks in an assembly of Quakers: "the person who keeps the business moving, draws forth ideas, seeks the 'sense of the meeting.'" This was not only the university manager at work: it was also the educator. In an equally telling, indeed more pointed, remark, he added: "Power is not necessary to the task, though there must be a consciousness of power" (Kerr 2001, p. 29).

In an address delivered as the first David Henry Lecture in October 1972 at the University of Illinois, Kerr, sketched in other dimensions of the history of campus leadership. In the rural and commercial society of colonial America, campus administrators were deans of students. In the nineteenth century, as industrialism commenced, they could build and innovate. After 1917, when campus academic senates began to evolve, they lost influence to the professors. (He did not say this, but the classic European university structure was precisely governance by faculties, deans and professors, rectors having dignity but little authority. All of this was to change somewhat, depending upon country, in the run-up to the twentieth-first century.) After 1945, with postwar recovery and demographic expansion, presidential administrators became managers of growth.

The year 1970 constituted a fifth phrase, a new "climacteric." The challenges were and would be an increase in the costs of higher education rising faster than economic growth (no increase in productivity), an aging tenured professoriate conservative in outlook and insufficient new hires from which innovative ideas might spring. Students would be drawn from lower income families, many of them racial and ethnic minorities, They would attend lower quality schools and require more remedial courses. The university president-manager would now find the university more of a "regulated public utility" than an autonomous estate, which, he added, it had never actually been in the first place. Dealing with outside influences would become a greater undertaking, and there would be continuing internal conflicts over power and principle because that was the nature of a multiversity required to serve diverse interests. Thinking of what he had just been through in California, Kerr spoke about the challenges of dealing with an "adversary culture" situated on campus. "The aspirations of some intellectuals outrun the tolerance of many citizens in society" (Kerr 1972, p. 25). He would of course think that. He often pondered the role of intellectuals. It was, after all, a subject that the Marxists had explored in relation to the leadership of a revolutionary proletariat.

It is not clear how the 1972 statement of an academic leader differs from the one laid down in the Godkin Lectures, except that by then Kerr had actually experienced the difficulties and challenges that he listed and could speak less theoretically about them. The important element remained the working principle of any industrial mediator, the invisible "rules of the game" implicit in any bargaining situation. So the problem of how to manage change or growth or decline still depended upon what the student radicals had rejected. Explicitly, there would nevertheless be constant revisions in "the rules of the game." Could the leader-manager stay abreast of them? Keeping up, grasping the inherent nature of the rules, defined leadership in the industrial world.

But all of this reflection upon campus leadership, all of the revisiting of the styles necessary to move combatants to new levels of agreement, all of the metaphoric attempts to define the role of a campus head derived fundamentally from social science paradigms. These were the structures, these were the issues: how to move the whole of it along towards problem-solving. There is a stumbling about in the reflections, a desperate wish to locate the indispensable key to leadership. Anyone who has even casually observed leaders in action understands that there is a mystique that lurks in establishing connections and winning approval. Kerr's immediate predecessor as president, Robert Gordon Sproul, had that mystique. Kerr did not. Temperamentally, he was reluctant to put himself forward. The subject of leadership in relation to personality and personal traits was always missing from Kerr's analyses. He preferred to construct structures. It is true that performance is indeed constrained by institutional boundaries. Nevertheless Kerr's discussions were abstract. He spoke in the language of political science theory. Borrowing from Machiavelli (and Sir Isaiah Berlin), he spoke about leaders as hedgehogs and foxes, the first knowing one big thing, the second knowing many things, the first on a straightforward course, the second nimble with an eye towards survival. Doubtless the combination appears ideal, but perhaps the leader has also to reach the inner,

intangible core of human response? Reason not the cause, says an anguished King Lear. Sometimes intellect falters. In other words, being focused on problem-solving, Kerr could not fathom leadership as inspiration, leadership as an example for living. Consequently, in the same way, his conception of liberal education was the study of issues more than it was the shaping of character, a more ancient version. He knew these things in theory, but they were more likely to be trapped within his great paradigm of industrial society. Yet – and the argument will be made later – he was psychologically geared to escape from his own paradigm.

If the picture of the industrial world that emerges from the research is not exactly cheerful, I imagine that it was not meant to be quite as far-away and glum as it sounds. Yet at first blush it seems to be a science-fiction, impersonal world of bureaucracy, rivalries and plural self-interest, with elementary and secondary schools acting as "giant sorting machines" determining "access to positions of wealth, status and power" (Kerr et al. 1975, p. 22). One almost thinks of Aldous Huxley's catatopian world of human selection via chemical means. There are it is true hopeful references to education as a means for enriching life and creating a consensus on values; but within a plural environment, as Kerr well understood, there can be no firm consensus on values. The multiversity, he had quipped, was held together not by values but by a faculty grievance over parking, a paraphrase of Chicago's Robert Maynard Hutchins that in a cold climate, campus bonding was attributable to the heating plant (Kerr 1963, p. 20). In an industrial context, where engineering, the health sciences and administrative law were prominent, there was less room for the arts and humanities (except insofar as greater amounts of leisure might provide a place for them) (Kerr et al. p. 35).

Doubtless a scientific and technical education can enrich life. Yet it is impossible to imagine that Kerr meant only that, for at the same time that he was developing a large-scale scenario for industrial society, he was also dreaming about a new kind of liberal arts campus to insert into the research-led UC to be located at a rare site in Northern California above the Pacific Ocean. As a Hicksite Quaker he declared repeatedly (with doubts) that despite all the tensions and confusion of industrial society, he retained a belief in the goodness of mankind. There was, it appeared, a deutero-Kerr. Had he not been so focused on industrial man as a rational being, he might have recognized in himself the split personality that was so much a part of the great Romantic Movement in western civilization. Did he grasp the idea later? It was not his style to say such things, yet so much of what he thought and felt did not fall easily under his self-identified persona as a descendent of the Enlightenment.

Kerr repeatedly declared his optimism, and, as noted, commentators have eagerly jumped on his declarations, taking him at face value. But suppose we look more closely. It is assuredly difficult to equate his oft-declared optimism with the titles and quotations used for his books. From Heraclitus he took "All is in flux, nothing stays still," and the ancient philosopher so resonated with him that he cited him again. Looking into the Book of Job, he found "Man is born into trouble." One collection of essays bears the edgy title *Higher Education Cannot Escape History.* Another one is entitled *Troubled Times for American Higher Education.* A collection of writings published in 1991 is full of allusions to educational crises, the

greatest in 300 years, he concluded. During the 20 years from 1960 to 1980, the period Kerr termed the "unfolding of the Great Transformation," the mood of professors swung from "euphoria to depression," maybe unjustifiably (Kerr 1991, p. 110). There may have been a Golden Age once, but we were now in an "Age of Survival" (Kerr 1991, p. 131). In 2002 he added "Shock Wave I" and "Shock Wave II" to his list of cataclysmic metaphors (Kerr 2002a, p. 5). In the David Henry Lecture he even went so far as to suggest that the correlation between a higher education degree and a good job had become weak. Earlier, in 1967, he had observed that the correlation between the content of a degree and labor markets was difficult to measure. "There is…no precise way to relate rising job content to higher educational requirements" (Kerr 1991, p. 24). The conclusion does not appear to fit well within the industrial paradigm where progress is heavily dependent upon the research university. However, it seems to have some validity at present, as prospects for the employment of college graduates are less assured, depending of course upon field of competence (*New York Times* October 9, 2011, p. 10). So what then for Kerr was the value of a degree? He retreated to a familiar argument long advanced by proponents of liberal education that a university education was necessary to live the "good life." This is cultural and not economic capital.

His respondents to the Henry Lecture took issue with several of his arguments. Parents did indeed think that job prospects for their children improved with a university degree; and as for the good life, why go to a university at all when so many rich cultural opportunities exist off-campus? As for institutional autonomy, it still existed for the most part, intruders notwithstanding, in the survival of *Lehrfreiheit* and *Lernfreiheit*. "We don't have to give the whole game away." (Kerr 1972, p. 36) Another comment that might have been made is that Kerr's implicit depiction of a professoriate of aging Wordsworths – which he did often in print and in person – was misleading. He nearly forgot, until prompted, that science and scholarship were fundamentally daring and ever changing. As knowledge changed, the internal configuration of disciplines and disciplinary structures also changed. After all, no departments existed until the Knowledge Revolution of the nineteenth century. But what he meant to say was that professors were conservative with respect to changes that might affect their day-to-day routines and privileges. That is when they became inflexible, so he maintained. Eager to embrace every new cause for social justice, they dug in their heels when at home.

Kerr reviewed the positive achievements of capitalism: technology has been a boon, real wages have risen, education adds to human capital, economic depressions can be controlled. But at the same time he wrote that "dystopias have replaced utopias." Skepticism reigned. The multiversity was a new and historic creation but disunited. Kerr was not given to sentimental verdicts about the past (although that might just be the common wisdom), but he concluded the Marshall Lectures by saying that "We can only envy the optimism of Marx and Marshall that surrounded their views of the evolution of the working class" (Kerr 1969, pp. 17, 31, 130). We envy their optimism says a man who declares himself to be optimistic.

Revisiting their preliminary discussions of industrialism, Kerr and company revised some of the formulations. Industrialization had not advanced as fast or as

far as originally imagined, some countries being too weak or small. Even in the developed economies, income disparities and stagnant sectors remained. The effects of population growth had been underestimated (Kerr et al. 1975, p. 29). Student activism and the civil rights movement in American had created more intellectual unrest than first imagined, more racial conflict, suspicion about the efficacy of science and technology and debates over industrial growth "limits." Furthermore, intellectuals, who were supposed to be central to achieving some sort of consensus, were instead doing the opposite. (But Kerr was using an archaic view of intellectuals as eighteenth-century men and women of letters). Students were now included in the category of intellectual "vanguards" (replacing the workers in a Marxian analysis), and their attitudes varied depending upon whether they were in Japan, India, Colombia, Mexico or the US. They could be pacifists or advocates of civil disobedience and even violence, and their targets could be the university or the wider society (Kerr et al. 1975, p. 23). In the Marshall Lectures Kerr turned again to students, not surprisingly because they had been the cause of his dismissal from the presidency. Clearly he wanted to know who they were and where they fit in the overall schema of an industrial society. Essentially, he surmised, they were outside of it, and being outside, having no formal place, they were not part of the world of bargaining and exchanges that characterized industrial society. Hence they were not responsive to the usual trade-offs (Kerr 1969, p. 110). The observation was rudimentary as anyone witnessing student activism in the 1960s could attest.

Not being part of the world of work, students drifted between freedom and subjection. Concentrated on large campuses, they developed separate cultures, and a few radicals could set the tone for the others. He concurred now in thinking that the student movements were far more existential than ideological. Marx, said Kerr, had dismissed students as "unreliable" (Kerr 1969, pp. 106–108). Seymour Martin Lipset had analyzed the rather free-floating nature of the student leaders of the 1960s, who, unlike their predecessors of previous decades, lacked a disciplinary base in established political parties (Lipset 1971, 1993). The conclusion must have been alarming for someone who thought that the foundation of the Santa Cruz campus would provide an antidote to student alienation. He recalled the evening in September 1965 when he and Kay met with the first graduating class. It was "one of the most enchanting evenings of our lives." The mood almost seems lifted from recollections of how Romantics saw Victorian Trinity College Cambridge. "The moon was shining and a soft breeze was wafting in from Monterey Bay" (Kerr 2001, p. 301). The aftermath was utterly different.

In the Marshall Lectures, Kerr yet again described himself as an American "pluralist" and "pragmatist." At the same time, he continued to expatiate upon the grand thesis of an industrial process, even, as he said some years earlier, the post-industrializing process. Pluralism and pragmatism were interrelated because the first created the problem-solving conditions requiring the second. He now listed different forms of pluralism: coordinated pluralism under central leadership, managerial pluralism by the leaders of large-scale enterprises, liberal pluralism with more individualism, syndicalism but not of the coercive variety. Comparing and contrasting Marshall and Marx, Kerr concluded that both were Victorians who between

them identified the problems of modernity. He mentioned the obvious differences: Marshall favored free markets, and Marx distrusted them; Marshall saw trade unions from the perspective of markets, Marx from the perspective of social class; Marshall was a supporter of education, Marx was not; Marshall grounded morality in the family, Marx famously wished to abolish the bourgeois family. Industrial society produced many struggles – Kerr had said that any number of times, but now he also said that the new struggles were not over property as Marx supposed but over authority, and this was a confusing struggle because in a plural society there was no one authority. If relationships were defined by authority, then authority was forever suspect, adding to the difficulties of leadership.

The Modern World as a Culture of In-betweens

There is a sense in which Kerr's mind-set was to see the dominant culture of the modern world as a set of "in-betweens." There were no absolutes. Consequently he too was required to engage the modern issue of moral relativism. His paradigm forced him to do so. After all, pluralism required the toleration of differences of opinion. He reminded himself, and he reminded readers and listeners, that to describe a particular state of affairs does not mean to subscribe to it. "May I comment with great emphasis that an effort to describe and to analyze reality does not necessarily imply defense of it" (Kerr 1969, p. 80). He had said as much in the Godkin Lectures. The multiversity, he insisted, was a fact of history, like it or not, and his critics were sure that as a solid social scientist in love with prediction, he liked it. Some may still make that error. The accusation had once been made about John Stuart Mill's discussion of social science in his treatise on *Logic*. The prophet invokes the future to provide warnings. The social scientist identifies trends because he or she desires them. There is no subtlety in these generalizations.

But there was much that Kerr did not like, and he certainly did not like moral relativism. Apparently the whirligig of industrial society had not destroyed all traditional values if he could, as he did, appeal to their maintenance. We find at one point that Kerr speaks of the dangers of "moral nihilism" present in an "open society," citing Leszek Kolakowski. His view of learning and teaching was Weberian, value-free knowledge, a commitment to objective inquiry. He certainly feared that ideological partisanship had entered into the classroom (Kerr 1994c, pp. 9, 11). At his core he preferred values more established, education that was not confrontational, reasonable alternatives, curricula that respected free and open discourse, a campus where dissent was not shouted down. He understood such things, having had to make his way on an "ad hoc basis in the midst of controversy." He knew and admired Lord Ashby, who had been Master of Clare College, Cambridge and Vice-Chancellor of the University, and in 1968 Ashby had called for an academic Hippocratic Oath. Kerr was intrigued, although hoped it would be unnecessary. At any rate, who would have taken it? The institutions of higher education "have

more the status of a public utility within the nation-state " (Kerr 1990, p. 18), that is to say, the reality of a self-regulating guild barely existed.

How could Kerr's moral concerns fit within the original paradigm of industrial society? Not easily, it appears. His "two voices," one speaking to the industrial narrative, the other, increasingly louder, expressing qualms, were evident in the Godkin Lectures and especially in the Marshall Lectures onwards. He posed sharp alternatives, and then endeavored to position his thinking and his values somewhere in the middle territories that polarities represented. Was it the mediator in him, the man of practical affairs or something else, for example, a paradigm disturbing to begin with and fraying with the passage of time?

Both capitalism and socialism were in crisis, he said, both showing signs of decay (when the Marshall Lectures were given, stagflation was an economic issue). The multiversity was a hybrid, neither public nor private but in fact both, in fact, even more. (Kerr 1963, p. 2). In contrast to Marshall and Marx, he posited a world that was in-between free markets and a command economy. (The idea, with no connection to Kerr, became the slogan of a "Third Way" in Tony Blair's Labour Party government of the 1990s.) The state remained an important factor despite his fear of government intrusion into higher education (Kerr 1969, p. 104); and because he now perceived threats to personal autonomy as emanating from "group tyranny" or syndicalism, he agreed that a strong state was necessary for the preservation of individualism (Kerr 1969, p. 120). One is reminded of the intellectual debates in 1830s' Britain over what Tocqueville had called "the tyranny of the majority." The Master Plan was another in-between allowing for market play but within carefully defined legal parameters.

Achieving a balance between the tendency of governments to intervene in what Martin Trow once called the "private lives of universities" and the seductions of special interests represented by markets was a difficulty that Kerr pondered throughout the decades. The problem led to a central difficulty in the historiography of determinism, or in any kind of philosophical *telos*. What remains of human freedom when the impersonal forces of history sweep all before them? Can individuals still order their affairs, can they rise above their times to some definition of a higher moral reckoning that is not totally based on self-interest? Can the members of universities do the same, finding a means of being the conscience of a nation instead of grant-getting, self-regarding actors, *homo academicus* rather than *homo economicus*? The moralist in Kerr – his Quakerism and simple personal habits – forced its way into his understanding of social and economic forces. And the thrust was a very old one in western civilization, familiar from religion and (unlikely as it may appear) from ethical socialism: the temptations of wealth (Dennis and Halsey 1988). At one point he declared that money may not be the source of all evil, but it was the source of some (Kerr 1994b, p. 78). In 1994 he observed that "Knowledge is not only power, it is also money – and it is both power and money as never before; and the professoriate above all groups has knowledge" (Kerr 1994c, p. 9). In the Godkin Lectures, Mammon assumed the guise of the "Federal Grant University." In the last edition of the Godkin Lectures, Washington was replaced by the "Private Research University." In the *Future of Industrial Society* he called for new visions that would "satisfy the human spirit more effectively than through greater affluence alone,

which has proved so futile" (Kerr 1983, p. 126). The Master Plan had been designed to thwart the intrusions of state government where the purse was held. But state governments provided only small amounts of research money. Teaching support came from states. Behemoth - more specifically, the Office of Naval Research at one point, the Atomic Energy Commission at another and the National Institutes of Health today, along with other of the numerous agencies of federal government – sustained most of the output of all American research institutions, private as well as public. Only quite recently has corporate support of research risen against public money, if still much below it.

The price paid for this dependence varied by the decades according to the drift of government policy and volatile shifts in political ideology. Thus government laboratories like the Berkeley Lawrence Laboratory, administered however by UC, experienced a change in emphasis from theoretical physics and its galaxy of Nobel Laureates to applied science. In the aftermath of the civil rights movements, Washington bureaucrats started inquiring into the hiring policies of universities respecting minorities and women with obvious implications for the award of grants. In general, public issues eventually enter into government policy-making, health, environmental and energy concerns, for example. In his contribution to this volume, Levine points out that as higher education today is a "mature" enterprise, governments are intent on squeezing as much efficiency and productivity out of colleges and universities as they can find. The consequence is much closer outside scrutiny than in the heyday of the Carnegie Commission's books and recommendations, much closer attention to the "private life" of the university. One result is more bureaucracy, more staff to complete a vast increase in the paperwork required for accountability and reporting. Since universities are often careless in justifying expenditures (or lax in management as in the case of UC's administration of another national laboratory at Los Alamos), the consequence has been an increase in the numbers of non-academic staff required to administer grants and a general suspicion that money has been misspent. Kerr saw this happen, and it merely reinforced his feeling that money was the root of some evil, if not all. Yet is it perverse to suggest that government civil servants in the United States learned how to put higher education under the microscope from the example of the remarkably detailed and all-encompassing work of the Carnegie Commission and the Carnegie Council under the direction of Kerr?

The California Master Plan for Higher Education (1960)

Gardner observes in his contribution that as president he benefited greatly from the struggles that Kerr underwent in working out the governance of the emerging multicampus UC. Scale and complexity had grown, he adds, and the University's governance had become dysfunctional. Gardner briefly reviews the achievements of Kerr's major predecessors from the founding of the University in order to set the stage for Kerr's transforming policies, and he provides an account of the challenging administrative and policy conditions that Kerr inherited as he worked out the

transitions to the multiversity and the multi-campus system. Some of the difficulties involved the immensely popular and voluble Sproul. While Sproul certainly strengthened the prestige of UC, he also resisted any dilution of his central authority. Gardner knew both Sproul and Kerr well and noticed that Kerr was never as adept as the first in attracting the loyalty of the University's innumerable external constituencies. Cultivating outsiders was simply never his style. He sought the isolation of the scholar. He was building the campus system from within, and when the student troubles commenced, he was left without adequate support.

Sproul was not keen on embracing a system of decision-making campus chancellors. Until gaining some independence, for example, UCLA was ruled from Berkeley as the "Southern Branch." Kerr has some amusing (to us, irritating to him) anecdotes in his memoirs about how he was barely acknowledged when named chancellor of the Berkeley campus. For a time he had nothing to do and thought of resigning. He realized that UCLA could not be kept in servitude to Berkeley. He decentralized the system, but it was not mere expediency because he believed in local initiative as consistent with his matrix of industrial society. But he also had second thoughts later, wondering whether the process had gone too far (Kerr 2001b, p. 325), and the president in particular had become distant and isolated. Tensions between north and south continued for decades, however, as Gardner remarks in his own memoirs (Gardner 2005, p. 179). Kerr had many run-ins with Franklin Murphy, the chancellor at UCLA, and his successor there, Charles Young (now retired to northern California). Granting greater initiative to the campuses entailed working out the complications between center and periphery of a wholly new structure, between the president's office in Berkeley and the other regions before Gardner moved the headquarters to neighboring Oakland. Kerr denied that university presidents could build as the giants of the past. Protestations notwithstanding, he certainly built the University of California.

Besides this, Kerr is well known for his role in the formulation of the Master Plan for Higher Education of the State of California for 1960. So much has been written on the specific provisions of the Master Plan, its rationalization of three existing public systems or segments – UC, now with ten campuses, the California State University or CSU (once a set of mainly normal schools) now with several dozen, and community colleges, over 100, weighted funding formulas, mission differentiation, standards for undergraduate entry and research assignments – that a detailed account in this place is superfluous. For those less well acquainted with the Plan's provisions, much information will be found in the chapters that follow, especially in Patrick Callan's up-to-the-minute analysis. But a few additional reflections, even at the price of some repetition, may not be wholly out of place.

The Plan has just reached a half century. Historically, it deserves a place in the long and unbroken history of the university as a distinct corporate entity emerging out of the new urban fabric of twelfth-century Europe. It was the first such comprehensive plan, less piecemeal than such efforts that may have previously existed. It was the first attempt anywhere to create a "system" of higher education in the major meaning of that word: integrated institutions of specified purpose, self-governing in certain critical respects, whose missions and funding were products of public policy

and defined at statutory law. In a "system" a serious change in one part affects another, and that is what appears to be happening at present. Callan, for example, points out that as cutbacks in funding affect the first or community college segment, the student transfer function is in turn hampered, and educational mobility upwards is then severely curtailed. Thus a principal feature of the Plan is undermined, if unintentionally. Callan also makes the extremely important point that the spectacular past growth of higher education in California was primarily driven by the policies contained in the Master Plan. Neither market forces alone nor even demography were responsible for the successes. Public policy matters.

Looking backwards, Kerr said that the fabricators of the Plan were not thinking about glory so much as problem solving. "To the extent we made history, we did so as an unintended side effect" (Kerr 1994c, p. 11). The view was not from the heights of the Acropolis, he stressed, but from the Agora (Rothblatt 1992, p. 47; Rothblatt 2010).

The Plan grew out of the particular circumstances of California in the decade following recovery from the effects of the second world war, an especially dynamic period for the state. Was there a need for a master plan? The political and higher education classes thought so. The period was one in which the very idea of planning in itself was held in high esteem. Population growth, that irresistible historical force, was frighteningly rapid, affecting housing, the supply of water in semi-arid California, transportation, education, health – the usual issues. Kerr, the economist, worried repeatedly about "a tidal wave" of people. The birth rate was at the highest in modern American history, he wrote, and migration brought half a million new people into the state annually (Kerr 1994c, p. 114). Veterans who had set sail from San Francisco to fight a militaristic Japan liked what they saw, and if they survived, returned to settle down in the state. The foundations of Silicon Valley had been laid thanks to the foresight of a famous dean of engineering at Stanford University and the investments in electronics in the San Francisco Bay Area by the Office of Naval Research. Los Angeles was expanding outward, its suburbs swallowing the endless citrus orchards economically important in earlier decades. The state's abundant natural resources, its remarkable agricultural industry growing crops of almost every conceivable kind, Hollywood and, for a time, a strong aircraft industry provided the wealth needed to liberate the political will. While becoming the world's first automobile-based city culture was dizzying (building on initiatives first employed in New York City), smog and gridlock replaced the exhilaration of freedom once offered by cars.

The Plan was actually long in the making if precedents are taken into account, but the final period of negotiation was tense. "[E]verything was up in the air," wrote Kerr. "[T]he atmosphere was an impossible one for planning….We were living under terrible pressures, day by day, to get it done; and we barely did" (Kerr 1994c, pp. 114–115). The actors were numerous. They consisted of representatives of the state colleges, then largely if not exclusively normal schools wanting to be universities, private colleges and universities fearing the competition of a richly-funded public sector, the UC, state agencies such as the Department of Finance and the Department of Education, a new governor, key legislators and heads of legislative

committees and faculty unions from the state colleges. Interestingly, given the attention usually paid to the expansion of education by politicians and civil servants, the political leaders were content to watch from the sidelines, at the same time warning the educational representatives that any failure to provide a framework for rationalizing the higher education system opened the door for government action. Judging from the interviews of Breneman and Lingenfelter, this was not an attitude common in other states. But this self-denying ordinance was not necessarily true of the rank and file in California. Legislators in fact had already introduced dozens of bills creating colleges irrespective of demand. Yet if personal ambition is set aside, the state's primary interest, besides access, was in differentiating institutional missions to avoid unnecessary duplication and contain costs.

A conception of the greater good was not absent in the California of the 1950s, but in Kerr's paradigm of an industrial society numerous interests have to be reconciled. The planning mentality is never romantic, although meanderings into utopian territory are always possible. Nevertheless, the grand object is to avoid anarchy, move people about, provide for their security and health, feed and educate them. From a negotiating perspective, a master plan for higher education entailed possible losses. The ambitions of particular institutions would be circumscribed. But much could be gained, especially a certain freedom from the reach of the state. Furthermore, clarity of purpose replaced patterns of confusion and allowed for a focus on a basic mission. The 2-year junior/community colleges were often folded into the 4-year normal schools, themselves growing into colleges with liberal arts programs, and both came under the State Department of Education, which, understaffed and mostly occupied with schools, was unable to imagine alternatives. The Department of Finance was constantly interfering in the determination of curricula, workloads and other aspects of the academic mission of the colleges. Furthermore, unlike UC, which possessed a central administration at Berkeley, the state colleges were disunited. Unable to speak with one voice, they competed against one another for resources, and they were separated into two groups. Some looked ahead to new educational possibilities. Others preferred existing arrangements, including more or less open admissions. Numbers, after all, justified revenue support, and numbers were also a democratic objective.

Banana peels were many, but one of particular importance to the college faculty unions was a research mission. Throughout the life of the Plan, representatives of the CSU have sought the right to award doctorates, and some minor concessions were initially made by Kerr. But essentially he dug in his heels and fought for the University's monopoly over advanced and professional degrees, and the politicians probably understood that the price of allowing for vast expansion of research capabilities was far too high. The ensuing trade-offs produced a self-governing structure for the campuses of the CSU, and articulation agreements between what were to be three distinct public higher education segments linked together by the critical principle of student transfer. This last appealed to Kerr. It was, after all, a structural mechanism to further American conceptions of upward educational mobility and opportunity, and it legitimized the University's historical privileges. In fact, whenever the numbers of transfers into the University from the other segments declined,

he was particularly troubled. Whether the professors of the University were similarly troubled is problematical. The Master Plan defined the eligibility standards for the various segments. Fewer transfer students meant more places for entering freshman students with higher qualifications than required for transfer. From time to time quarrels have occurred over whether transfer students achieve at the same or higher levels than those who spend a full 4 years of undergraduate work at the University. As some transfer students were actually eligible to enter as freshmen but chose not to do so for reasons of income or family, statistics that might indicate parity of achievement are not perfect. The issue is hard to resolve, but why make the attempt? The data are likely to be ambiguous, and the matter is best avoided because it inevitably leads to charges about snobbery and elitism.

Elites, Non-elites and the Problem of Merit Selection

Populist attitudes were in fact expressed during the negotiations over the Plan. Status rivalries are hardly unique to the United States – they have certainly been a feature of the evolution of higher education in Britain and greatly figure into the narrative provided by Michael Shattock. But in a nation theoretically committed to egalitarianism, the label "elite" is a ticklish matter in public higher education. In 1964 Kerr had written that "[T]he great university is of necessity elitist – the elite of merit – but it operates in an environment dedicated to an egalitarian philosophy." Each cannot be easily justified to the other, and the battle between them is permanent (Kerr 1991, p. 129). As American social and business leaders, as well as many top civil servants and judges, are now educated in prestige colleges and universities, attitudes about being excluded are easily generated. Inevitably, as the state colleges were attempting to move upward academically, broadening into comprehensives and seeking higher public approval, a suspicion of privilege was inevitable. However, it must also be said that representatives of the state colleges had long chafed at the maneuvers of UC aimed at preventing their further ascent. President Sproul, in office for some 28 years, had certainly tried to inhibit state college mission creep (Gerth 2010, p. 62).

At the time of the Master Plan negotiations, a member of the governor's staff was reported to have criticized the University for being conservative, elitist and Republican – the governor himself was a Democrat. The Regents at the time were in fact largely Republican. By contrast the state colleges were praised as "the wave of the future," being suited for a mass-access, democratic society (Kerr 1994c, p. 116). Kerr himself has been called an elitist because of his role in defending the University's research mission and selective admissions during the negotiations over the Master Plan. Doubtless he was more diplomatic than Sproul and saw further into the future. But he was a meritocrat. He wanted to remove any barriers to select admission that depended upon family means, and he absolutely wanted the University of California to be included alongside the great private universities of the nation and of the world. He was proud of pointing out that already in the early twentieth

century Berkeley enjoyed great national standing, and it was his intention to assure that the newer campuses of the University achieved similar recognition.

In the postwar period the research university model, having played a major role in developing technologies used in two world wars, was poised to become the top of the higher education pecking order. The global university much discussed today is the research university writ large, and any other type of institution aspiring to recognition hopes to gain the resources necessary to compete in the league standings. That some leaders of the CSU wished and still wish to acquire a research capacity is hardly surprising, and especially because their faculty have been educated in the same graduate research programs as those in UC as the PhD became a near-universal requirement for employment. The polytechnics in Britain, often compared to the CSU institutions, had similar aspirations, and some of them gained university status with the demise of the binary plan in 1992.

But apart from research quality as determined primarily by peer review, prestige is also measured by student selection. In the United States the standard was set by the famous private colleges and universities of the nation. Once discriminatory in admissions and notoriously anti-Semitic, especially in the 1920s and into the 1930s (Axtell 2006; Karabel 2005; Keller and Keller 2001; Klingenstein 1991) – public institutions were not exactly immune from such bias – they were known for "legacy admits," the children or relatives of alumni. Harvard had the "Gentleman C" undergraduate, notorious for doing no work. Legacy admits still play a role in determining matriculation. Practices vary hugely, normally in private institutions, and a conception of "merit" that applies to athletes or a category of "special admissions" obviously means something else. "Reverse discrimination" with respect to targeted minorities is prevalent (if calculated in different ways). Nevertheless, it is reasonably accurate to say that meritocratic entry is the dominant if not sole feature of selection today.

Admittedly, the determination of "merit" is in itself a difficult issue, much debated by reformers. It rests on sorting criteria, a farrago of examinations, tests, interviews and judgments that, with the best will in the world, are far from scientifically objective. There is also confusion in selection between achievement and promise, for those who are not competitive through achievement may still show promise. But how to measure *that* without a strong element of subjectivity? Higher education in the United States has struggled with this intractable dilemma throughout the period of affirmative action and its courtroom battles, with public opinion evenly divided depending upon how affirmative action policies are defined (Rothblatt 2007, chap. 11; 2010, chap. 5).

The Master Plan gave UC a choice of freshmen from among the high schools' top achievers. Insofar as this could be seen as an impediment to the acquisition of higher status by CSU, we might expect the issue to be raised in some form at some point, which happened yet not as an initial sticking point in the negotiations. But the fact is that despite understandable denials by the heads of brand-name institutions that a conflict exists between access and quality, the problem remains. High achievers within the Asian-American university-going population, for example, are resentful of policies that advance the claims of lower-achieving minorities. In recent decades it has, however, become apparent that the fundamental barrier to access

above remains schooling below, and even more fundamental than schooling are the conditions of family life as determined by culture and economic circumstances. Writes the distinguished Oxford sociologist, A. H. Halsey, who has played an important role in conducting the research exploring how to improve life chances through education in Britain:

> The relations between education and social mobility have been much studied since World War II. Policies for establishing equality have been advocated in both liberal and Marxist circles. Yet both have failed. Research has increasingly pointed back to the nursery for successful solutions (Halsey 2011, p. 1)

That much of American public schooling is now in the doldrums and a constant topic of media attention is a commonplace conclusion. But the problem is not recent. A few months before becoming president of UC and while still president of the University of Utah, Gardner headed a national commission that issued a famous report in April 1983, *A Nation at Risk*, with its ominous opening warning: "If any unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might have viewed it as an act of war" (National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983). The causes vary according to decade: from the character of new immigrant populations in the US arriving from poorer regions, to urban poverty and broken homes, to the failures of governments to invest, to inadequate facilities, to schools bureaucracies, to the training of schoolteachers and issues of seniority, to the discipline administered in schools to disadvantaged minority pupils, to the safety of the classroom, the absence of computer technology in teaching and to fights over curricula, especially Darwinian biological science. Every commentator has a favorite variable and a favorite remedy.

Not a week goes by when some measure of performance in academic subjects reveals vast disparities in achievement amongst ethnic groups, and every minor upward tick in standardized testing outcomes creates pious hopes of a turnaround. Global comparisons produce even more despair. The Programme for International Student Assessment of the OECD reports that in 2009 the United States ranked 14th out of 18 countries in an assessment of the quality of schooling. This is but one of many such global and national comparisons (*Economist* Sept 17, 2011, pp. 23–35) Today California ranks towards the bottom of American states on many variables. It is always possible to challenge the methodology upon which rankings are based, and it is sensible, from a policy perspective, to disaggregate results to refine the difficulties. Nevertheless, the overall situation is dire.

Adding insult to injury are shocking revelations of cheating, and classroom disasters are sometimes covered up to avoid embarrassment and also to avoid the penalties specified in Congressional legislation. (A report in *The New York Times* for September 8, 2011, pp. A16 and A21 regarding cheating in 44 Atlanta, Georgia schools involving 178 educators is but another chapter.) This is in fact a worldwide phenomenon as entry into labor markets requires a higher order of skills and as a degree from a "branded" university is deemed crucial. Some universities in the US pass student essays through vast computerized data bases in order to catch plagiarism. In reaction to the troubles of schooling, movements for reform include a

burgeoning of private education, home schooling and experiments such as charter schools, bypassing the customary authority of school administration. Similar disenchantments exist in today's Britain where in mid-2011 private education contained about 7% of the school population but reaching a high of about 20% in secondary education in central London (*Economist* June 25, 2011, p. 71 Britain).

Even a Master Plan as engaged with the issues as California's has foundered on these rocks. There can be no universal meritocratic access to higher education without the formation of self-discipline and ambition that begin early in life. In the meantime, merit can flourish only amongst those who possess the requisite cultural or economic capital, first acquired in the family, and the competitive values encouraged by the best available kinds of schooling.

The Master Plan was precisely designed to identify merit and move it along an upward educational trajectory. The non-elite community colleges, as the first place of entry into the higher education system, were expected to identify latecomers with merit potential. Detractors who simply and unthinkingly charge Kerr with "elitism," a word once neutral and now pejorative, simply fail to capture the Master Plan's fundamental balance of democratic access and merit and Kerr's desire to create and maintain that balance. There were those – again we turn to the interviews in Chap. 4 – who saw discriminatory flaws in the Master Plan from the outset. Nevertheless, it was not merely the case that Kerr wanted, as he said, to preserve the UC's "crown jewels" of advanced graduate and professional education. He also believed that an industrial society was dependent upon middle-level proficiencies and other skills preparation more suited to institutions that were not primarily research-led but could still achieve excellence of mission. If upward academic drift was freely allowed, the new layers of "in between occupations would not be serviced" (Kerr 1994c, p. 121). This was the larger picture derived from the development of mass access higher education. Shattock notes that in Britain policymakers did not differentiate the configuration of higher education institutions because at the time of the Master Plan the numbers of students eligible for elite places were thought to be few. Expansion could safely take place on the select model that the Robbins Committee advocated.

In the world of "celebrity" universities so much talked about in our age of rankings, pride of place in Anglophone countries (or in Sweden) often adheres to the oldest institutions. That is true of Oxford and Cambridge, and it is certainly true of the sometime colonial universities of New England, all of whom began as state-supported institutions before a famous legal ruling in the nineteenth century allowed them to drift towards what would become private status. Later public foundations on the east coast have had to struggle for reputation against the great and little Ivies. But in California, before the rise of Stanford University in the 1890s, and long after, public higher education was dominant despite the presence of at least one older private institution, the Jesuit university of Santa Clara on the San Francisco Peninsula founded in 1851. The prestige of UC spread to the state Legislature, where, at the time of the Master Plan, 50 out of 120 members were graduates of the University, and only three came from the state colleges (Gerth 2010, p. 83). (This was the closest Californians could come to the sometime cosy relationship between Oxbridge and the Whitehall bureaucrats in London, moribund since the years of Prime Minister

Margaret Thatcher.) Consequently, it was perhaps only natural that it occurred to some political leaders that the expanding normal schools ought to be brought under the prestige umbrella of the University of California Board of Regents.

The suggestion was made by a leading legislator, but little more appears to have been said at the time (Gerth 2010, p. 75). It is doubtful that Kerr would have wanted UC to assume such responsibility, which arguably would have diluted the focus of the University and destroyed the differentiation principle. Differentiation itself, it might be said, was not exactly a new idea. Discussions about it extend back to the last year of the nineteenth century and came up again in 1933, 1948 and 1955 (Gerth 2010, p. 84). Other states, however, such as New York, have built inclusive governance structures, and the five-campus University of Massachusetts has similarly not separated its flagship campus of Amherst from the other campuses, which are largely different. Wisconsin, Florida and North Carolina can be added to the list. The heads of those systems are therefore saddled with the difficulties of apportioning resources to widely differing missions and interests. That the CSU would have desired a University umbrella is equally doubtful. Their fear of being second-class citizens was well-grounded. They had lost the liberal arts college at Santa Barbara to the University (although the University did not want it), and for years the campus on the edge of the Pacific Ocean had not flourished (Gerth 2010, p. 92).

However, the idea of a higher education system wholly under the authority of the Regents had one special recommendation. Thanks to the California constitution of 1879, UC was given a protected place at law that greatly accounted for its relative institutional independence. This was the University of Michigan model in fact. That campus, founded as a private institution in 1817, became public in 1835 and received Regental autonomy at mid-century. At constitutional law, UC is not "public." It is the property of The Board of Regents. The state colleges, eager to acquire the same stature, sought a similar constitutional outcome but lost, and it is entirely likely that Kerr favored the possibility given his preference for institutional autonomy. However, the mood of the Legislature was not to grant any more such privileges and lose whatever control over higher education that it retained. The idea of a single huge university was, however, suggested again only some 9 years after the Master Plan. A Joint Legislative Committee for Higher Education chaired by a famous Speaker of the Assembly, the colorful "Big Daddy" Jesse Unruh, a symbol of the rough and tumble of California's period of great growth, suggested a regional scheme whereby community colleges and the state colleges would be associated with a nearby campus of the University. There were two justifications. The first was the prestige of a UC award (degree, diploma) open to everyone in the public sector, and the second was cost-effectiveness.

The opportunity structure in the Master Plan assumed that income disparities were the major impediment to upward educational mobility, and that these could be addressed through free-tuition, strong secondary schools and the student transfer function. In sum, discussions of racial or ethnic distinctions that became prominent as the century advanced were more or less subsumed under the American definition of social "class," and class in turn was mainly tied to income, rather less to status as in Europe. Logically, therefore, if income as a factor in securing access to higher

education could be minimized, then presumably class identity would be unimportant. Writing some 30 years later, Martin Trow reiterated the usual explanation: "a culture is defined, in part, by what it feels guilty about….Americans [unlike Europeans]…are remarkably free of guilt towards working-class people, individually or collectively." Race, however, was different, said Trow. Americans did feel guilty about its history of race relations (Rothblatt 1992, pp. 106–107).

Interestingly enough, after the formulation of the Master Plan, Kerr was already thinking in terms of an underclass composed of racial groups, and he said so in the Marshall Lectures (Kerr 1969, p. 37). However, use of the word "underclass" increased as it became apparent that the foundations of educational opportunity were disintegrating, hence the view that the meritocratic admissions standards contained in the Master Plan were exacerbating the existence of social barriers and contributing to the making of an underclass. If the firm tripartite divisions were dispensed with, might the phenomenon of an underclass erode? Movement through the mission membranes would become easier.

The idea of a single university under one Board of Regents was revived. New authors suggested doing away with the provisions stipulating high school class standing for attendance at two of the segments. "The question of who should be admitted to the upper track of higher education – and who gets assigned to less-prestigious levels or kept out altogether – is no longer very useful." The resulting regional organization would eliminate wasteful expenditures but also remove existing barriers to the sharing of students, faculty, curricula, libraries and research options and – the authors did not use the phrase – further the spirit of the nineteenth-century outreach mission implicit in the federal legislation governing the foundation of "land grant universities" such as Berkeley (Darknell and Darknell 1989, B9).

Kerr has been criticized for failing to include an underclass of disadvantaged ethnic minorities in his deliberations regarding the Master Plan. One "issue that Kerr seems to have underestimated, if not missed…[was] diversity," writes Cristina González. He "did not anticipate that this plan would segregate the student population along the color line, which was indeed the problem of the twentieth century" (González 2011, pp. 64–65). The criticism has been made by others, but it needs to be qualified. The object of the Master Plan was inclusion not exclusion. Because California's schools system appeared to be strong at the time of the Master Plan, the assumption was that it would continue to meet the needs of pupils. That it failed to do so was in truth not anticipated, or at least in California, leading to the maldistribution of educational opportunities below the levels of tertiary education. How much of the future even the most thoughtful planning can anticipate is a nice point. Some variable is generally overlooked. Shattock observes that at the time of the Robbins inquiries, the thought of establishing a differentiated system was hardly uppermost. The potential pool of students was regarded as manageable within the existing assumptions of higher education policy. Second-guessing is easy. The task of the historian is to try to understand the prevailing circumstances.

Ultimately, the schools failed higher education (Kerr said the "suburbs," meaning the withdrawal of affluent parents from inner-city schools). But if segregation as a possible outcome at the time of the intense deliberations over the Plan was

unforeseen, ethnic diversity itself was soon on Kerr's agenda. In 1963 the Regents "adopted an outreach program to encourage minority students to take advantage of access opportunities" (Kerr 2002b, p. 390.) He returned to the problem at various later points, remarking in 1999 upon "'backward movements' since…1960, and some have increased inequality of opportunity." But the schools and social forces much larger than the Master Plan had thwarted the best of intentions.

> These include enormous discrepancies between low-income and high-income neighborhoods in the availability of advanced placement courses in high schools and transfer programs in community colleges (Kerr 2002a, pp. 7–8).

There is another and necessary perspective. Historical context is absolutely required. Kerr's generation primarily understood diversity to mean intellectual not ethnic diversity or identity politics. The debate between the two meanings of diversity continues to the present, with articles and books proliferating. Kerr, like other forward-looking intellectuals and policymakers of his generation, was intent on eliminating the restrictive admissions criteria widespread in prewar America. In public institutions their symbols were the socially exclusive "Greeks," the fraternities and sororities that would not accept into membership either Jews or ethnic minorities. It is necessary to remember how strong was the Greek presence on campuses right through the 1950s. The fraternities dominated student government and were backed by the alumni that sponsored them. "Homecoming queens," football cheerleaders and student politicians came from the Greeks. They were the embodiments of campus loyalty and exclusion and the most visibly prominent in the student populations, their campus residences the places for lively post-game parties easy to envy. The tone was one of convertibles and carefully-groomed co-eds in search of mates and some of the leftover trappings of F. Scott Fitzgerald's Princeton world of the roaring twenties. One of the consequences of the civil rights movement and student activism was the decline of the exclusive "country club" sentiment, indeed the attack on the fraternities and sororities for their exclusionary practices, and the rise of other groups. This coincided with a successful assault on the racially restrictive clauses in contracts required for the purchase and sale of homes. Kerr knew this world. It was not to his liking. He fought it. The controversies over affirmative action were as yet in the future.

Remove existing access barriers, allow for student transfer, and, it was assumed, the schools would take up the challenge. California's lower forms of education at the time of the Master Plan appeared strong in comparison to the other states. No one adequately foresaw the collapse of school standards, the arrival of large numbers of immigrants lacking English, the problems that would be created by the "Big Test" and other high stakes testing. (Berkeley adopted the national SAT examination relatively late in 1967.) In retrospect, this can appear naïve, but the Master Plan rode into the world on a wave of hope, a wave that would sweep away past forms of educational discrimination and promote democratic and meritocratic conceptions of opportunity. As for the problems of non-Anglophone pupils, well, American immigration from the nineteenth century onwards was familiar with the difficulty, and it had been overcome. But then again, the competition for educational places in higher

education had never before been so fierce since selection (and discrimination) was first actively practiced in the Ivies in the 1920s.

Currently there are no serious movements in the direction of a single university/college system, although the subject may come up again in discussion. It is nearly impossible to imagine the reality of such a revolutionary scenario. In general, more inter-segmental cooperation is being urged and may well occur. But there are many signs of an opposite movement, one intended to strengthen the elite standing of UC through privatization efforts. These entail fund-raising on a massive scale, sharp increases in fees for undergraduates and professional school candidates and the offer of many more places to out-of-state undergraduates, who pay much steeper tuition. As in Britain, a certain emphasis is being placed on attracting greater numbers of students from abroad for the same reason. These are in fact national trends, but they do coincide, it should be said, with sustained efforts to provide scholarships, loans and other forms of financial aid as a means of tuition discounting. The danger, as any UC leader must know, is that any severe diminution in undergraduate places for California residents is likely to have political consequences down the line. In 2011 the president of the University of California noted that the total numbers of non-resident undergraduates enrolled on the campuses were only 6.6%, or much less than Michigan's 35% or Virginia's 30% (Yudof 2011, p. 3). However, not all of the campuses of the University are equally positioned to move towards privatization. Berkeley or UCLA, for example, are able to attract outsiders in substantial numbers. If this should prove to be the case, the "one university conception" fought for by successive presidents would disintegrate (Pelfrey 2004), and it would be a further undermining of the Master Plan.

In September 2009 the Berkeley chancellor argued that in light of the disinvestment in higher education occurring at state levels, the nineteenth-century principle of land grant federal assistance to state universities should be revived (not all state universities were land-grant assisted, but UC was). He provided three justifications. The first was that the top ten public universities in the US educated more than 350,000 undergraduates, while the eight Ivies enrolled less than 60,000. The second was the enormous contribution made by the publics to national prosperity. And the third was the access provided to students from disadvantaged backgrounds, thus fulfilling the "American dream of an increasingly better life for the middle class." The model proposed was basic operating and student support from Washington joined to funding from the relevant state governments. Washington would also agree to match philanthropic endowments at a rate of 2-to-1 for 10 years, again with state government involvement. In effect, this plan would nationalize a certain unspecified number of public institutions by allowing them to charge the same tuition to in-state and out-of-state undergraduates, leading (inevitably in my view) to a drop in the number of places reserved for Californians (Birgeneau and Yeary 2009).

From the earliest days of the new Federal Republic, proposals to create a University of the Unites States were periodically floated. There was never one version, but in a federal system where states constitutionally control education, it would hardly be expected that Congress would ever single out particular state institutions

for special support. The locals would surely howl. The suggestion not only sounds desperate. It would essentially detach UC from California and provide the *coup de grace* for the California Master Plan.

It would appear that the current political and economic crisis is pushing the very idea of a comprehensive system of public higher education in California in two opposed directions. One inclines towards the possibility of increasing cooperation, if not in the radical form of a single Board of Regents, and the other towards a preservation of an elite function for UC by loosening the linkages envisaged in the Master Plan. In the meantime, the definition of a "public" or "state" or even "land-grant" university as a tuition-free institution serving the residents of California is changing, already, as Kerr was to say long ago in 1963, a "hybrid."

In 1990 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris (OECD) chose to study the State of California as a separate country, given its wealth and special higher education system, and meetings were held in Berkeley and Paris. Kerr of course participated. Halsey, who drafted the sections on California higher education, noted slyly that Kerr had presented himself as a "plain American come to do a job of work" in the original negotiations over the Master Plan. This was of course "preposterous," for Kerr was "no plain American," nor were the others who were party to the discussions. He also saw that despite Kerr's talk of practical problem-solving, he was,

> dreaming the California dream. True he was sleep-walking, as practical reformers habitually do. But the California dream was his inheritance from older American commitment to Jeffersonian equality of opportunity, to Benjamin Franklin's insistence on 'useful knowledge', to John Maynard Keynes' balanced economy, and to James Madison's vision of power shared between relatively autonomous institutions (Halsey 1995, pp. 289–290).

Kerr, in his own reflections, added the name of John Rawls, who provided a philosophical justification for meritocracy. (González 2011, chap. 3, provides an extended discussion of the sources of Kerr's thinking.) For Halsey, the Master Plan was "a vigorous variant of that wider and deeper philosophy of the good society" despite the fact that no such soaring statement was made. But Halsey is undoubtedly right. Kerr had a vision of a good society in major respects at war with his eagerness to adopt a reality principle. As for dreams, many years ago I heard a participant at a conference mockingly describe the California dream as a creation of land speculators.

The California Master Plan in the Year 2011

The Master Plan has invited an extraordinary amount of comment over the years, and it has been repeatedly reviewed. In the last decade of his life, Kerr proposed calling into sessions all of the many groups affected by the Plan to engage in the "process" of addressing the pressing issues of the day. These were access, the education of the labor force, equality of opportunity but also quality. Higher education, he wrote, is fighting for its soul. (Kerr 1994a, pp. 5–8).

The Master Plan of 1960, no matter its critics, is still talismanic. The Master Plan solved a problem imaginatively. It was bold, bringing together ideas that had existed for decades but had never coalesced – "The Big Idea" says one of our interviewees. The Plan, adds Shattock, was "a great leap" and displayed a "classic simplicity." It was appealing to the academic community because it was a bottom-up response, to be contrasted with a statist top-down set of policies in Britain. In California, Shattock observes, the presidents of colleges and universities worked out the compromises leading to the Master Plan. In Britain, elected officials deliberated and used national associations to arrive at higher education policies.

No one can imagine life in higher education in the state without it, and no one can design a system to replace it. "There just aren't a lot of big, interesting ideas out there," says Callan. "Even as we violate the Master Plan year after year, we salute it" (quoted in *The Berkeley Voice*). Some, rather more gloomily, maintain that the Master Plan requires no revision because its provisions are in the process of disappearing. Callan in this volume revisits some of his earlier reflections on the Plan's defects and joins those who no longer find it an effective document. Its strengths may be rigidities – this is now a prominent opinion if not universal. For the first time in the history of the Master Plan, the state's public institutions are not able to keep the promise of a place in higher education for all those willing and able to benefit from it.

Financial difficulties have brought to the fore the defects of California's Progressive Era plebiscitarian constitution which permits the use and as it appears misuse of provisions allowing for legislation by voters. Quotes the well-informed journalist Peter Schrag, early twentieth-century voters wanted to "lash the money changers out of the temple of the people" (Schrag 2011, p. F4 Insight). Private interests have now proven adept at using the initiative and the referendum to influence legislation regarding taxation, entitlements and the recall of officeholders. Instituted in 1911 as a check on monopolies, the initiative process itself has been increasingly used to pass laws, *inter alia*, affecting illegal aliens, automobile insurance, stem cell research, tort reform, timber harvesting and gambling on tribal lands owned by Native-Americans. Individual legislators have resorted to the initiative to secure legislation that a deadlocked Legislature cannot pass, and the process has deteriorated into a weapon of party politics. Initiatives require that signatures be secured in advance, and paid petition-gatherers are advised to "Look clean-cut but wear a crazy hat and an interesting button." Voters, confronted by devious wording, cannot grasp the ramifications of ballot entries. Direct democracy, writes one authority, is no longer democratic (Lee 2006, pp. 136–141, 149). Grandly, democracy depends upon an informed citizenry, but corruption of the initiative process has led to a misinformed citizenry.

A two-thirds majority requirement for passing budgets has contributed to what now amounts to a dysfunctional constitution, although this has been recently changed to a simple majority vote. Gerrymandered voting districts assure the election of representatives who are dogmatic in their outlook. A new special state commission is expected to make needed changes. In the best of times the Legislature has been handicapped, but in the era of divisive party politics, the situation has worsened. In short, events have overtaken the good intentions of an historic planning document,

and those who observe that the Master Plan was too blasé about the financing of higher education in the first place (Gerth 2010, p. xxii) are (at the moment) correct.

Financial exigencies are not restricted to California, although education in the state has fallen from trumpeted great heights to an embarrassing low-point. New proposals are consequently emerging around the nation about how to address the crisis in the publics (Lyall 2011). Kerr had once advocated year-round operation of universities, and this proposal is again floating around, the so-called "throughput model." The upgrading of some community colleges to 4-year status in the expectation that they could be run more cheaply has also been suggested, as well as the creation of a polytechnic sector to address labor market needs. Thus far on-line instruction has a shaky start, especially in the for-profit markets where financial irregularities are egregious and student loan defaulting outrageous (*New York Times* Sept 13, 2011, p. A14), but some form of computer-aided learning will no doubt become a staple of higher education. Berkeley is introducing experimental on-line courses in order to absorb more students.

This is a controversial subject requiring more extended treatment than can be provided here. Other proposals involve negotiating wholly new agreements with states on a basis of contracts, new proposals for securing endowment support from government (the investment would have to secure at least a 4% return) and even privatizing professional schools within public universities. Some interest is expressed in the California trinary model, but single-governance systems remain influential. "Income-contingent financing" or deferred tuition payments is now under discussion by the current White House. Student indebtedness has reached new levels, as the costs of obtaining a degree are rising more rapidly in public than in private colleges and universities. Income-contingent financing was proposed in the Browne Report for the United Kingdom released on October 12, 2010 and has occasioned much discussion as to details. Deferred tuition repayment schemes ordinarily involve many considerations, however, including a hotly-disputed view in the UK of the student as a "rational-choice consumer" (see Collini 2010, pp. 23–25).

Analysts are doubtful whether cost-savings will actually result from any of the other proposed innovations. The expense of dissolving existing arrangements and adopting new ones would be substantial without the assurance of a long-term gain. Would radical financial and organizational changes improve the capacity of higher education to serve markets more efficiently as some imagine? How can anyone know? Lost in all of these calculations is any passion for higher education as knowledge that transcends the ordinary, that elevates the imagination and that enhances what Cardinal Newman called "well-being." Clark Kerr told us in the Godkin Lectures that Newman's university had been superseded by the multiversity. But Kerr, as will be apparent, had several voices.

Alternatives to a "Master Plan"

Guy Neave in his contribution to this volume calls the Master Plan "world referential," whether copied or not, as a means of stressing its importance. Elsewhere the California Plan is called "a model to be followed not only across the U.S. the country

but around the world" (Young 2011, p. 1), which, admittedly, does not mean it actually is followed. A recent short article in *The Economist* categorizes the Plan as "an international model" (*Economist* Sept 10, 2011, p. 36 US), suggesting that perhaps it has been widely adopted. However nuanced is praise for the Plan, Kerr himself never suggested that it was indispensable outside California. In fact, he began to think that the word "Plan" itself was misleading, suggesting that a simple "planning" would be a better word to describe a process that could lead to many versions. A "Plan" assumed a world of greater stability than truly existed.

Did the California Master Plan actually have any influence? Yes, insofar as it was widely known and therefore, as Neave says, "referential." But Kerr was right in thinking that it could not be emulated. The contributors to this volume find both answers to be correct. The Master Plan was a topic of national and international discussion, but our test studies of countries such as Britain, Sweden and France, where Kerr was particularly known, and a sample of higher education policies in other American states, indicate what historians generally assume. In order for the California innovations to take hold elsewhere, both the mind-set and the specific contexts must be similar, and what if there is no Kerr to steer solutions in a particular direction? Thorsten Nybom, in his contribution on Sweden and Europe, particularly regrets the absence of a Kerr-like figure, but insofar as policies also depend upon history and circumstance, a Kerr in other national clothing may not have made a difference. But an interesting conclusion from the work undertaken for this volume is that comparisons not only bring out contrasts. They also reveal the underlying assumptions and values that guide decision-making, assumptions and values rooted in historical commitments that policymakers avoid at their peril.

Borrowings can be taken intact only if the existing conditions provide no barriers. A grand concourse can be built if, as in the case of mid-nineteenth-century Paris, existing structures are cleared out. A new constitution can be created, based on examples existing elsewhere, in a revolutionary setting, and a university can be established afresh on a foreign model. The Johns Hopkins, founded in 1875 can be thought of as a German-style research university because it was a departure from American practice. Nevertheless, in time Johns Hopkins introduced the features of undergraduate instruction that made it another American university. The present day formation of liberal arts colleges in the Netherlands or Israel can be regarded as "American" because they are in fact deliberate copies. But whether their evolution will follow a similar trajectory is problematical.

Generally, the German university of the nineteenth century that so captivated some 10,000 American visitors to the imperial states could not be exported into existing American colleges and universities because it was built on completely different assumptions about the purpose of the highest education and could not rest upon a superior-quality system of schooling to prepare students. Nor did state examinations exist, allowing students to wander at will from university to university in search of professorial instruction, even within single states. American undergraduates were young and in need of parenting. US colleges were in fact described by foreign visitors as only secondary schools. But what could be exported was the idea of research as original inquiry. To realize such an idea in a different context,

Americans imposed two new structures on the university. The first was the modular system, a first degree consisting of a network of discrete courses partially or imperfectly connected. Modular courses replaced the old mandatory curricula. These now provided a small opening for advanced courses for the right kind of student, but could also be legitimized as a step towards the accumulation of credits for transfer. A more important innovation for introducing a research ethic was the separately administered graduate research school where students could be admitted on the basis of their ambitions and preparation.

What could be exported from California was planning as an effective instrument for public policy, and a belief in the necessity for some kind of coordination of different public segments of higher education. Planning in itself, Ted Hollander informs us in a later chapter, usefully raises questions, stimulates data-collection and forces analysis. California provided the primary example of how this could be done with respect to higher education. What California also exported was the very idea of California itself, an American state writ larger in the imagination than any other. It possessed a mythic quality. Halsey noticed its seductions for Europeans of his generation (Rothblatt 1992, p. 29). The state was a source of inspiration, a churning example of experimental possibilities, and – perhaps equally – a world of enchantments certain to lead the unsuspecting awry. It was therefore an example to be resisted, especially by New Yorkers. (The only cultural advantage of California, the filmmaker Woody Allen, a confirmed Manhattanite, once said, was the legality of making a right turn after stopping for a red traffic light.) For many states, California was simply too much, too overwhelming, too outrageous a challenge to entrenched interests, too much at odds with their own histories, especially in the American South, too much a 1960s haven for the counter-culture.

The interviews conducted by Breneman and Lingenfelter reveal a plethora of planning options, distinct state habits and practices, semi-borrowings from California, existing fault lines incapable of modification, strongly-emplaced private sectors and political in-fighting. The higher education planning situation across the nation, taking our examples as representative, was bewildering and messy. And if this was true of the United States, where presumably shared national values existed, how much more true it was of other nations.

Yet all states and western nations confronted the problems that Kerr's generation identified; how to accept more students into higher education, how to maintain standards in mass society, how to coordinate (if at all) varying types of educational systems and define the role of central governmental authorities. Should there be a distinct pecking order of higher education institutions, and if so, how were institutional jealousies to be kept from weakening educational programs? Should higher education institutions be lumped together in one governance system or separated by mission as in California? As a contribution to comparative policy and planning studies, the chapters on three Continental countries (with references to others) and on a sample of particularly interesting American states provide rare discussions of how the problems dealt with in California, most notably a significant increase in the demand for higher education and a shift in mentality from thinking of tertiary education as just for the few, to a mass-access perspective, were dealt with in different contexts.

To the question often raised as to whether a "master plan" is necessary, the answer is clear. There were master plans in other states, but they were not like California's. In California the Master Plan was a response to particular circumstances at a particular time by particular representatives of government and the universities and by at least one person who had a vision of how to combine democratic opportunity and quality derived from a framework of "industrial man." By their very nature, the balances were unpredictable. In quoting Heraclitus, Kerr knew that. Yet his vision may well have encouraged efforts, new or existing, to rationalize the provision for higher education in other states without dictating a specific solution. In fact, given his stature, and, if it may be said, his disciples, this appears to be accurate. Overseas Kerr's reputation was high, but the academic cultures of France, Britain, Germany and Sweden were radically different from the American, the role of central government more pronounced, elite standards more widespread and protected from on top. In many countries academics were, and in some remain, civil servants, cementing relationships between government bureaucrats and professors. Higher education in Europe had always depended upon what Guy Neave calls the "Prince," and Kerr was wary of the Prince. Shattock points out that if in the California setting the Master Plan could be regarded as revolutionary, in Britain problem-solving was evolutionary.

Nybom, a passionate critic of developments in the Nordic countries and Germany – has come to conclusions somewhat at variance with what we might expect. In his reading of the evolution of northern European higher education policies, national traditions (apart from self-satisfaction) and established modes of decision-making were not always the primary barriers to innovation. No responsible authority, he argues, expressed interest in the systematic exploration of alternatives and ramifications. Sweden, widely regarded as a model progressive democracy and the most "americanized" of European countries, was at the highest levels of policy-making in fact largely indifferent to California's innovations. American higher education scholars visiting Sweden were certainly warmly received. Discussions were plentiful. Many heads nodded knowingly, but no lessons were learnt (positively or negatively) because none were desired. Policy decisions were developed on an ad hoc basis (as in Britain), very often ideologically-driven especially with respect to egalitarian approaches, but with unfortunate results from Nybom's perspective. In particular, he maintains that both intellectual community and the quality of higher education greatly suffered. Changes were made merely to be unmade, and only lip service was paid to overseas activities that could have produced informed discussion. At the very least these might have led to a recognition of possible unintended consequences or the existence of probable new pressures. Instead of serious reflection, Nybom's Europeans, in his determined view, retreated to slogans and careless if comfortable pronouncements.

Of all European nations, France has always been regarded as the most self-contained, and it has often been noted that in France the elite sector of higher education has never been the universities. France does indeed use the principle of institutional differentiation, but unlike California or other American states, the differentiated institutions are not linked through student transfer. The most privileged and select

segment is composed of more than 200 specialized "schools" or *grandes écoles*, which have close relations to the governing elites and ministries and are fed by a system of special preparatory classes. Neave goes well beyond the fact of this segmented structure to explain in detail the real and underlying differences between France and other nations. These are in his words the "commanding values" that justify, legitimate and order the structure of higher education. They are the great ideals of the French Revolution, which higher education is expected to maintain and express. They are fundamentally political and national in character and reside in the French conception of the state – nothing could be less Californian or less in the spirit of the Master Plan. The underlying political values, which are also legal, dictate merit, selection and opportunity, and they follow a Cartesian logic that spreads itself throughout the higher education system and unifies the purposes of that system, foremost to safeguard a republican heritage. The virtue of logic is that it clarifies a path for action. However, it is also a drawback. It limits alternatives and impairs flexibility, for in order to introduce reforms, whether suggested by demographic or technological causes, change must always be wholesale, consistent and never piecemeal. This is a tall order; and if reforms are tried, the fundamental aspects of the provision for higher education nevertheless revert to familiar patterns. Like Nybom, if for another reason, Neave deplores the tendency of would-be reformers to rely on useless slogans and platitudes when deeper values prevail.

Our collective efforts at comparative policy analysis have uncovered a great variety of responses, or lack of responses, to common problems. The causes are many, some of them proximate, some of them ultimate. No tidy pattern emerges, although it is clear that policies need to be based on a substantial number of variables and contingencies. Kerr recognized this. His action seems to have been to strike while the iron was hot. Is the overall planning undertaking itself hopeless? The utilitarian Mill once wrote that he would rather be a Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. Ignorance may be bliss, but it is no way to start a conversation about problem-solving.

The University of California at Santa Cruz: Swarthmore in the Redwoods

Some considered the Godkin Lectures a brave statement of present conditions and others a portrait of the university as devoid of idealism, caught in the sometime sordid realities of the give and take of plural cultures. Where were the lofty aims? Would the common denominator rule? And was it necessary to be so yielding – the criticism Kerr received when he gave the Henry Lecture? Was it truly pointless to reach back in time, to Cardinal Newman perhaps or to Wilhelm von Humboldt, and resurrect these paragons who spoke on behalf of the True, the Good and the Beautiful? That seemed to be the message. It angered those who believed that the past was alive and that tradition was a quality necessary for all stable and enduring human institutions. Kerr in fact cared about tradition. Later he wrote cryptically that

systems of higher education "do not have heritage," but he went no further (Kerr 1994c, p. 48). When he used the word "heritage" elsewhere he went off into his customary themes about economic growth and broad-scale changes in religion or politics (Kerr 1991, pp. 24–25). He used numbers. He was descriptive. He never plumbed an anthropologist's conception of culture, although it is clear he was often on the verge of wanting to do so. He circled around the possibilities.

Doubts haunted the Godkin Lectures, but they were expressed *sotto voce*. The dominant tone was that of the planner and the policymaker obligated to take into account the world as it is before embarking in other, presumably radial directions. But there was an opportunity. It was implicit in Kerr's own argument that "multiversity" described a phenomenon in which plural conceptions of a university co-existed. Why not then have Newman in one part of the university, Von Humboldt in another, professional service missions in another. One part of the university might be engaged in liberal education, another in the higher vocational instruction, another in outreach. However, nothing in the model of a multiversity suggests that the different functions are equivalent in emphasis and resources.

But insofar as the multiversity UC was also a multi-campus organization, with one campus even a highly specialized, gigantic medical school in San Francisco, why not have another campus more devoted to the welfare of undergraduates, starting with more amenities? When chancellor of the Berkeley campus Kerr was appalled by what he regarded as inferior undergraduate campus facilities. From the Godkin Lectures onwards he spoke about the "neglect" of undergraduates in the multiversity. He made vatic utterances about a student revolt, but he could never imagine what actually happened in the 1960s. In 1972, long after his encounters with the student activists, he suggested that it was time to bring back deans of students and non-academic staff to pay more attention to undergraduates. The deans had been banished from the campuses in the 1960s when *in loco parentis* fell out of favor, and parietal rules were replaced by adversarial judicial proceedings. New generations of students, thought Kerr, had emotional and psychological needs requiring more staff assistance, a function that the faculty could not or would not perform (Kerr 1972, p. 27). He might have added (which he knew) that as many students were now drawn from non-traditional backgrounds, they lacked the self-reliance and experience of conventional students. It is not clear exactly what teaching changes he expected from institutions that never possessed staffing ratios close to those of Princeton (which he especially admired) or liberal arts colleges, but his espousal of the collegiate mode for the new campus at Santa Cruz strongly suggests that he believed that tutorial or small group instruction was the best structure for nourishing undergraduates. He wondered out loud why it was that private liberal arts colleges disproportionately supplied the leading graduate schools with outstanding science candidates. What did the public institutions lack? But was it just the teaching, one might inquire? After all, the little Ivies recruited from a pool of top applicants. Students learn as much from their peers as from their teachers (he did not at the time say this). The open secret of select institutions, especially residential institutions, is that superb students educate one another.

Kerr discussed teaching and curricula with his colleagues in the Santa Cruz venture. Disagreements over the desirability of core curricula occurred. The most

available source for the type of education he supported appears much later in an introduction to a translation of Ortega y Gasset's Lectures delivered at Madrid on the eve of the fascist takeover of Spain (Ortega y Gasset 1997). Kerr wrote a draft in 1990, but the edition was not published until 7 years later. A liberal education, said Kerr, following upon Ortega, was not "Great Books" (i.e., if taught as museum pieces), not "western or world civilization," absolutely not "distribution requirements," the disconnected courses of the undergraduate curriculum in most American institutions, and so much more than the trendy "race, gender and class" that had become staples of campus discourse in the humanities and social sciences. The purpose of an undergraduate curriculum was "general culture," and while that might encompass material covered in courses on great books or courses in western and world civilization, Kerr pulled out several key elements elaborated by Gasset.

They all involved education as the pursuit of living or vital ideas or the ideas by which an age conducts its life, or the great issues of the day. Kerr then proceeded to offer a list of them: issues of war and peace, the role of religion, the failure of command economies but also the "pathologies of industrial civilization" and the processes by which decisions were made. In sum, as he read Ortega, general culture was the one thing needful. General culture was the process by which undergraduates were encouraged through mental discipline to engage the seminal problems of their day. He favored "horizontal" rather than "vertical" teaching. This, said Kerr (again repeating Ortega), stipulated two additional requirements. The first was that faculty themselves had to possess general culture – a "genius for integration, not the pulverization of research" – and to properly disseminate the fruits of cultural integration, the university would have to be student-centered. This was a heady mix. Kerr could not find it anywhere in the US. I think I found it once upon a time many years ago at a small Roman Catholic college in the Midwest (St. Joseph's).

I read the Ortega draft and wrote Kerr my appreciation, at the same time also wondering why a Great Issues curriculum was more student-centered than Great Books courses. I suggested that in the history of liberal education, a student-centered approach was character-shaping in the grand manner, but the Ortega approach was more intellectual, Continental rather than Anglo-American, knowledge-oriented rather than person-oriented. Furthermore, a student-centered approach required a high faculty-student ratio. He must have known all of this, for he once noticed that in the "oral traditions" of the "classical college" the formal measurements of tests and degrees were "anathema." The purpose of those traditions was to provide sensitivity and understanding and not high skills, deep knowledge or a sense of discovery (Kerr 1991, p. 53). Yet his answer to me, dated February 1, 1991 was characteristically circumspect: "Greatly appreciate your taking the time to read my Ortega introduction and your interesting comments."

It appears that Kerr was also attached to another aspect of the history of the college idea and the history of campus planning. Undergraduates needed to be exposed to natural beauty. It was only in the Garden of Epicurus or the Groves of Academe that a rounded liberal education could flourish. This was, whether Kerr noticed it or not, a prime romantic element in Cardinal Newman's definition of undergraduate nurturance. A university was a "place." French translators of Newman

got it exactly right by suggesting "milieux" (Rothblatt 1997, chap. 2). A farm boy from Pennsylvania, and a devoted gardener as an adult, Kerr found the sub-Berkeley campus (the Clark Kerr campus) lacking in trees, and made a gift of them. They were flowering crabapples. He loved apples. Santa Cruz was set within spectacular redwood forests in mountains overlooking the Pacific Ocean. Ironically, the student counter-culture of Santa Cruz focused on organic gardening, and vegetables were sold from a store at the campus entrance. Needless to say, Kerr never expected a hippie culture to emerge there, and one of the awful ironies of the student events of the 1960s is that his ideas and hopes were pushed to absurdity.

All of this suggests an emotional longing for what Gerald Grant and David Riesman have called "the perpetual dream" in American higher education, the periodic revival of the small college ideal, intimate, non-bureaucratic, humanistic (Grant and Riesman 1978). In fact, they listed and praised UCSC. Hannah Gray, the former president of the University of Chicago, in her Kerr Lectures at Berkeley in 2010, noticed Kerr's utopian side (Gray 2012), and he himself did once refer to a utopian strain. If Kerr possessed such a "romantic" yearning – and Ted Tapper and David Palfreyman catch it – no one could have guessed it, and in fact he never really grasped what Lipset called the "affective politics" of the student radicals. He was honest enough to admit it and remarked upon it belatedly. "I was not accustomed to a more irrational world of emotions, of spontaneity, of sole adherence to some political faith." He went on to add: "I was all agendas and concerns and not given to easy conversation, not affable enough." This, he continued, added to his difficulties with some Regents, legislators and students (Kerr 2003, p. 238). His typical honesty needs to be qualified. Few if any academic leaders of the 1960s were more successful in handling student dissent. Administrators were largely confused, and the styles of confrontation baffled many since precedents did not exist. Gardner remarks in his own autobiography that campus leaders at the UC Santa Barbara campus where he was after Kerr's dismissal from office were particularly feckless during the demonstrations over America's involvement in Vietnam (Gardner 2005, pp. 5, 35–165, 146). One tough-minded president at CSU San Francisco met the student challenges head-on, but he was also criticized for doing so. Administrators were whipsawed.

Kerr understood belatedly that students were not, as he thought of himself, inheritors of the Enlightenment, and he regarded the colleges as places where ideas could be explored and gained through rational discourse in pleasant and encouraging surroundings. The operative point is that he deeply hoped, and did his best to realize that hope, that somewhere within the interstices of a famous state research-intensive university structure, room could be found for a type of undergraduate experience hitherto associated only with expensive Ivies, large and small, or with elegant and privileged universities such as Oxbridge.

It is not clear, as Tapper and Palfreyman point out, just what kind of collegiate institution Kerr specifically had in mind. However, what appears clear from their account is that the founders of Santa Cruz were amongst the many reformers in the United States who have been dazzled by the seductions of Oxbridge without adequately noticing the different provenance and development of those incomparable establishments. Neither Oxford nor Cambridge have ever been part of greater federal

higher education systems. As they also say, Santa Cruz was a university with colleges and not a collegiate university, and they add, perceptively, that Oxbridge works because the colleges were able to establish an independent presence before their universities entered the research era. They gained immeasurably, it turns out, from the desire of Reformation monarchs to secure the new Anglican establishment of the English state through the religious indoctrination of undergraduates, the colleges being ideal loci for influential teaching.

Kerr actually sent a team to Britain to examine the new universities of York and Kent, and the Claremont colleges of Pasadena were also obviously relevant, although each of those colleges was actually an independent foundation. Unfortunately we have not been successful in locating the report written by John Galbraith, as it would have provided clues as to why the new universities of Britain were not thought to be viable examples. Tapper and Palfreyman are strongly of the opinion that those new universities of the era of the Robbins Report were in fact the right kind of models for a Santa Cruz, ironically more experimental, less attached to past examples that could not travel well. However, they also make the critical point that the only test of whether a collegiate university experiment was possible within the boundaries of a research-led university was in fact to try it.

Nevertheless, Kerr does not appear to have worked out those dilemmas of how to incorporate a liberal arts collegiate university within the multiversity structure. How, for example, would it be possible to recruit a collegiate teaching faculty within a multi-campus structure where careers were based on research contributions? Would Santa Cruz one day be accused of being a second tier institution? Many years later Kerr told me that one of his mistakes was not to secure sufficient endowment money in order to render the colleges more independent in the Oxbridge fashion, and he repeated that view in his memoirs, noting Porter College as something of an exception. But that still did not answer the question of whether Santa Cruz would become a stepchild. His hopes for the new campus at Santa Cruz, although initially confronted by the student counter-culture movement, were eventually thwarted by the desires of the faculty to develop research careers like their counterpart on the other campuses. (Once serving as chair of a tenure committee on the campus, I found predictably that the issue of teaching versus research was the exact sticking point.)

Would Kerr's hopes for a Santa Cruz have been better met by arrangements similar to those of Barnard College and Columbia College in relation to Columbia University where separate faculties exist? One can imagine satellite teaching colleges clustered around a Berkeley or a UCLA; but besides finding room to build colleges in crowded urban environments, the problems of compensation and second-class citizenship would remain.

Not long before he died Kerr asked me to write a history of the "failure" of Santa Cruz. Actually that task has been taken up by Carlos G. Nõrena. My response at the time was that while the ideal of a collegiate university as envisaged by him had not been achieved, the university was by most American measures a considerable success. I still have in my possession a copy of a long letter I wrote explaining why the project was destined to disappoint him. My argument was unexceptional. UC had built its national and global reputation on the strength of its research achievements,

its nationally-praised "balance" of disciplines and schools, its Nobel Laureates, Fields Medallists, Guggenheim Fellows and numerous other academic honors. Faculty were recruited according to the same standards prevailing throughout the University system. A different outcome was inconceivable. I am sure he responded. He always found the time; but I cannot locate his letter.

I remember raising the issue of whether an undergraduate campus could exist within the structure of a research-dominated university when the first Santa Cruz chancellor, Dean McHenry, visited me at King's College Cambridge in 1963 and stated that without graduate degree studies, a top-quality professoriate could not be recruited.

Kerr took up the relevant questions at some length in his memoirs. The pertinent sections reveal his ambivalence and second-guessing. He should have recruited a senior tenured faculty "to engage fully in the liberal learning activities of the neo-classical college." Junior faculty were understandably nervous about their career prospects in a teaching-led university. He and his colleagues should not have assigned faculty to colleges but allowed only those with the proper commitment to join them. Rewards for teaching were necessary. The provosts of colleges were too idiosyncratic in their decisions. He knew what he did not want, but accepted criticism that he was not clear enough about what he did want. On another tack, he regretted that two of his presidential successors were not eager supporters of Santa Cruz. Typically, he blamed himself "for the failure of the original Santa Cruz dream, for pursuing the dream too far" (Kerr 2001, pp. 300, 295–300).

The timing was wrong. He could not of course have expected a "counterculture tsunami" (Kerr 2001, p. 293). Of the faculty, he did not think that the beautiful location would attract "those few who chose to become lotus-eaters in the elysian fields" (Kerr 2001, p. 295). It was an age of Dionysius and Che Guevara and millions of federal dollars (Kerr 2001, p. 297). He noted that in the beginning, the students attracted to Santa Cruz were of high quality, but that as standards in high schools fell, so did the preparation of entering students. Requiring more remedial attention, they were rather a nuisance for a research-minded professoriate (Kerr 2001, p. 295).

By 1980 he was very disappointed. Few of the undergraduate liberal educational experiments of the previous decade and a half had survived, including several prominent ones at Berkeley. He did not say why, but one of the Berkeley experiments had actually collapsed more from a lack of student interest, even from the rigor of the work, than from the absence of committed members of the faculty (the Tussman Program). Possibly many undergraduates on a large campus were not thrilled with closely-supervised intellectual activity? Did the students in mass-access higher education in the United States genuinely crave Oxbridge-style teaching? Possibly they preferred the comforting anonymity of the large lecture and the impersonal examinations. Disappointing too was the decline of the celebrated honors program at Swarthmore begun by the famous President Aydelotte in the 1920s – Kerr was a member of the College governing board (Kerr 1991, p. 147). But while expressing his sorrow at certain failings at Santa Cruz, he acknowledged some triumphs. The experiment had attracted national attention and was more successful than other

undergraduate teaching initiatives. He reaffirmed his belief in the need to break large structures into "more humane components." He again insisted that the greatest disaster area of the multiversity was the first 2 years of the undergraduate curriculum in a mass monolithic campus (Kerr 2001, pp. 296–297). The "neoclassical liberal arts college" remained an antidote for him. At the 1999 reunion of the original graduating class, he found enthusiasm for the idea of Santa Cruz. "The Santa Cruz dream lives on in their lives, as Swarthmore 1932 does in mine – 'Swarthmore in the Redwoods' did exist for at least those years" (Kerr 2001, p. 300).

Something else lived on. Kerr put two colors into the title of his memoirs. The Berkeley campus colors are blue and gold. Gold, said Kerr, was the color of the California hills in summer. Blue, the color of Yale, was for its graduates and the liberal Protestants who brought eastern college traditions to California in the form of a private College of California. The fledgling College was almost immediately absorbed into the new land-grant university on the brow of the Berkeley hills. UCSC was the sentimental return of the College of California. (An early Berkeley campus plan by the renowned American landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted, the creator of Central Park in Manhattan, depicts a conventional American college design of a picturesque park.)

So UCSC was something if not everything. Kerr, the hard-headed rationalist, the pragmatist who "came to do a job of work," the man who eschewed the view from the Acropolis, the manager-mediator-gladiator-survivor, was as much entitled to his idylls as any of those others – "those few, those happy few" (and not so happy few) – who leave behind a wonderful, indeed an heroic, legacy of selfless devotion to the public good. But it was there all along, as Tapper and Palfreyman mention, in the on-going historical tradition of American colleges. It was there all along, the voice of an old-fashioned American humanist not the social scientist forecaster. How wrong were those who thought otherwise. How wrong he was to even think differently of himself (if he ever did), for in the end he was closer to Newman's conception of a university and a cultivated person than anyone in the 1960s supposed. Yes Newman, allegedly banished from the Halls of Ivy. Yes, but also greater than Newman who had a dark and dangerous side (Fallis 2007, pp. 22, 30). It was there all along, waiting to be untethered. It was there all along, kicking and screaming to get out of the massive, all-pervading, relentless, choking and disintegrating culture of industrial society.

And it did.

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Chapter 2
Clark Kerr and the Carnegie Commission and Council

Arthur Levine

This chapter is a description and assessment of the work of Clark Kerr and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education. These bodies, which operated between 1967 and 1980, were created "to study and make recommendations about higher education" in the last third of the twentieth century (The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 1968, p. vii).

I was a staff member at the Council for its final 5 years. It was my first job out of graduate school. Clark Kerr was my first employer. I was 26 and ABD (All But Dissertation) when I arrived. After the Council closed its doors, I worked at the parent and successor organization, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. I taught about the work of Clark Kerr and the Carnegie Commission and Council in courses on the history of higher education. I spent much of my career as a college professor and president in the world the Clark Kerr and the Carnegie Council/Commission sought to shape. Thirty years later, I attempted to apply some of the lessons I learned from Clark Kerr and the Carnegie Council at the Woodrow Wilson Foundation.

I long ago concluded that three factors were responsible for whatever impact these two organizations had. The first was Clark Kerr's stature. While not yet regarded as a historically important figure, he was viewed as a giant, compared frequently to Charles William Eliot at Harvard, Andrew Dickson White at Cornell and Daniel Coit Gilman at Johns Hopkins. He was generally credited with modernizing, expanding and naming the contemporary public research university. He was also the leader in creating the California Master Plan for Higher Education of 1960, which established the prototype of the modern American higher education system incorporating universal, mass and elite access sectors.

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The second factor was Clark Kerr the person. He had the temperament, mind, knowledge, self- confidence, vision, work ethic and comfort in his own skin necessary to conceive of and carry out the work of the Carnegie Commission and Council.

The third factor was the nature and design of the Carnegie Commission and Council: their purpose, sponsorship, agenda, personnel, longevity, funding, products and focus. In a very real sense, these bodies were the culmination of Clark Kerr's career, a review of the university model he had been instrumental in developing and an opportunity to formulate the policies necessary to make it stronger.

This chapter will examine each of the factors in turn and then look at the recommendations of the Commission and Council and their impact.

A Giant

As chancellor of the Berkeley campus and president of the University of California, Clark Kerr not only remade the University of California but in the process became the architect of the postwar transformation of American higher education. Kerr was the right person at the right place in the right time.

The times were the years after the second world war when the nation began an effort to expand higher education. This entailed an increase in college access and enrollment, the construction of more campuses, the recruitment and hiring of more faculty and enlarging the postsecondary capacity in teaching, research and service.

The foundation was the GI Bill, the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944, which sought not to increase college attendance but to avoid the massive veteran unemployment that followed world war one by providing returning veterans with the financial support to attend college. The result, however, was that 2.25 million former servicemen and women flooded the nation's campuses, which enrolled only 1.5 million students on the eve of the second world war (Levine 1981, p. 510; National Center for Education Statistics 2010).

Three years later, the national growth policy was made explicit by President Truman's 1947 Commission on Higher Education for Democracy which called for doubling of college enrollments by 1960. It recommended making a minimum of 2 years of tuition-free college available to all capable Americans, developing community colleges, expanding upper division and graduate education, increasing financial aid and ending the racial, religious, economic, and geographic and gender barriers to college access. (The President's Commission on Higher Education. Higher Education for American Democracy: A Report of the President's Commission of Higher Education, New York, Harper and Row, 1997.)

The growth that followed was dramatic. In 1950, 2 years before Kerr became Chancellor, there were 1851 degree-granting colleges and universities in the United States. They employed 247,000 faculty, enrolled 2,445,000 students and granted 392,000 bachelors degrees, 58,000 masters degrees and 6,420 doctoral degrees. By 1980, when Kerr completed his work with the Carnegie Council, the number of institutions had risen by 75%: faculty had increased nearly three-fold; enrollments

had multiplied five times; the number of bachelors degrees nearly doubled; and masters and doctoral degrees increased five-fold (National Center for Education Statistics 2010).

The place to be was California, a state with a booming economy, rapidly growing population and surging college enrollments. In 1946, in the aftermath of the GI Bill, the California Legislature funded a study, the first of its kind, to project future postsecondary attendance and develop a plan for higher education expansion.

The nation demanded growth in higher education, and California led the nation. This was the stage onto which Clark Kerr stepped when he became chancellor at Berkeley. In his 15 years leading a campus and the system, Kerr produced four major changes in California that formed the basis for the work of the Carnegie Commission and were widely studied across the country. Certainly the design of the research university was near universal. Kerr's "multiversity" did not have real competitors as a term and description of the transformed university. Systems did spring up across the country, coordinated or uncoordinated. The real difference is how states dealt with master planning. The common wisdom is that most engaged in some planning exercise and created something that embraced excellence and access, usually thought of as competing goals. (David Brenemann and Paul Lingenfelter discuss various state planning endeavors in another chapter.)

The first of Kerr's changes was that he "modernized" the contemporary public research university, which until about 1940, had been largely a feature of the private sector, principally Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Pennsylvania, and Yale. Graduate education was mushrooming in enrollment. Institutions offering doctoral instruction were expanding quickly. Scholarship was growing more specialized, and fields of study were multiplying. The federal government was investing in research and graduate education. In this context, Kerr championed excellence in students, faculty and scholarship. It was excellence at scale across fields, numbers of doctorates awarded, amount of research funded, awards garnered for scholarly excellence. As president of the University of California, he decentralized the system. Chancellors in the relatively new multi-campus University of California were given the authority to shape and give direction to their universities. He changed the role of the president from the nineteenth-century *paterfamilias* to a mediator among diverse constituencies. The University focused on hiring and promoting outstanding scholars for its faculty. It was during Kerr's presidency that Berkeley was first rated the number one graduate school in America with 12 Nobel Prize winners, the largest number of Guggenheim Fellows in the country and the second largest membership in the National Academy of Sciences. The undergraduates, who were not charged tuition in California's historic tuition-free policy, came from the top ranks of the state's high school graduates, which, under the Master Plan, made them more selective than many of the nation's more prestigious universities.

Kerr also wanted to curb what he saw as the weaknesses inherent in the research university. He did not want them to become education factories. Instead he sought ways to make them seem small, human-sized, and as they grew larger by limiting enrollments to 27,500 students on each campus and stressing student life. He feared what would happen at research universities across the country, which have grown

to the size of small cities, such as Arizona State University (70,000 students), Ohio State University (64,000 students), the University of Minnesota (52,000 students) and the University of Texas (51,000 students).

He sought to differentiate each of the universities, for the most part in degree rather than kind, so they would not become cookie-cutter research institutions. For example, UC Irvine would focus on a broad vision of arts, letters and sciences. UC Riverside would be a liberal arts college. UC San Diego would emphasize the sciences and engineering. Kerr also created an innovative new university at Santa Cruz, a research university composed of small interdisciplinary colleges. (Discussed by Tapper and Palfreyman in another chapter.) Looking back on his achievements decades later, comparing his hopes with the results, he believed this was the least successful of his initiatives.

A second change attributable to Kerr is that he took the research university and cloned it. At the end of world war two, the research university was still young, having been founded in the US at Johns Hopkins only 69 years earlier. It remained largely a small hothouse affair, particularly in the public sector. As president of the University of California, Kerr took over six institutions of widely varying quality and type: Berkeley, UCLA, an agriculture school, a teachers college, a medical school and an assortment of appendages, such as a marine biology station and an astronomical laboratory. Each was strengthened and expanded and when necessary remade in the model of a research university. He added three new universities to the mix. They were Irvine, San Diego and Santa Cruz. Kerr built the modern University of California. In this sense, he did for the research university what Henry Ford did for cars. He mass-produced high quality, low-cost education and research potential for a state and nation that hungered for both.

A third major change was naming and developing a *raison d'être* for his creation. In Kerr's 1963 book, *The Uses of the University* (and subsequent editions and changes), he christened the modern research university the "multiversity," a term that gained currency and acceptance in the American higher education community. Kerr characterized the "multiversity" as,

> an inconsistent institution. It is not one community, but several - the community of the undergraduate and the community of the graduate; the community of the humanist, the community of the social scientist, the community of the scientist, and the communities of the professional schools; the community of all the non-academic personnel; the community of the administrators. Its edges are fuzzy - it reaches out to alumni, legislators, farmers, businessmen - who are all related to one or more of these internal communities.

He saw it as a community of varied even conflicting interests "many parts can be added or subtracted with little effect on the whole, or even little notice taken or any blood spilled" (Kerr 2001, pp. 14–15).

Kerr's vision of the university was a profound departure from the ideal types that preceded it. The multiversity was not the pristine teaching college advanced by John Henry, Cardinal Newman or the pure research university advocated by Abraham Flexner. It was an unvarnished description of the university as it existed and a justification for why it should be that way.

Kerr's fourth major change was taking the lead in the creation of a comprehensive master plan for all of California's higher education public sectors, of which

the research university was only a part. It was a plan that at once sought to provide universal access to higher education for all Californians, establish diversity in the institutional choices available to them, assure excellence in the higher education system and create a rational plan and method for allocating higher education funding and missions. As it emerged from intense and lengthy negotiations, the Master Plan established three distinctive higher education sectors or segments. One was an elite sector, Kerr's University of California, which would focus on research, grant doctoral degrees and enroll the top 12 1/2% of high school graduates. The second was a mass access sector, the California State University System, which was charged with emphasizing undergraduate education, some professional studies and teaching, admitting the top third of secondary graduates and providing limited masters level graduate education. The third element was a universal access sector, the community colleges, offering transfer and vocational programs and providing an opportunity for all high school graduates to enter tertiary education.

The Master Plan, which Kerr negotiated, was in a very real sense a peace treaty among California's many colleges and universities which were stampeding toward a single homogenous model of higher education, epitomized by the University of California system. Instead, California produced a pioneering model of higher education built on the pillars of access, excellence and diversity. Following its example, most states would establish diversified and open access public higher education systems.

The Master Plan was Kerr's proudest achievement and earned him the cover of *Time Magazine*. He came to the Carnegie Commission and Carnegie Council as the foremost higher education educator in America. He was recognized as the architect of the modern public research university, the creator of the most advanced and most prestigious university system in the country, and the author of the Master Plan. In becoming chair of the Carnegie Commission and Council, Kerr was being asked to study his creation and identify the ways in which it could be made better.

The Person

A large portion of any success the Carnegie Commission and Council achieved was a consequence of having Clark Kerr at its helm. He came to the job already a legend.

Kerr was a man of contrasts. He was distinguished by his many friends and supporters and his enemies, such as the labor union leader James Riddle "Jimmy" Hoffa of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Ronald Reagan, governor of the state of California and subsequently US president. He was modest and appeared distant, but was in fact shy, an interesting trait for a labor negotiator. He was a pragmatist and an idealist, a realist and an optimist who rarely spoke badly of anyone. He attended a small liberal arts college that he loved, Swarthmore, an institution with a Quaker heritage. Kerr was there when Frank Aydelotte was president. He was a Rhodes scholar who remade Swarthmore, a party school, into what he believed to be the equivalent of the best of the Oxbridge Colleges. Kerr, however, built universities. He was a kid from rural Pennsylvania who came of age during the Great Depression and was an activist in the Student League for

Industrial Development, the progenitor of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The causes of the Free Speech Movement and 1960s student unrest were things he continued to grapple with throughout his post-University of California years.

I was hired by Verne Stadtman, one of the Carnegie Council's associate directors and did not report directly to Clark for 2 years. During much of that time I hid in my office for fear of meeting him in the hallway.

I was not the only one who held him in awe. The boards of the Carnegie Commission and Council were composed of major figures in government, leading academics, college and university presidents and key figures in business and philanthropy. My job was writing books and reports for the Council, which is a dream job to have right after graduate school. An outspoken board member, twice a college president, pulled me aside one day and said she did not care for the first chapter of a report I had written. I think she said something to the effect that it was needlessly provocative and lacked evidentiary support. I told her that I did not like it either. Clark had written that chapter! She thanked me for letting her know. When we reviewed the manuscript at the board meeting, she thought it a gem.

I watched Clark Kerr perform what I regarded as almost a magic trick countless times. He would preside over a meeting in which there was a heated discussion with participants saying black, white, red, blue and on through the rainbow. At some point, the conversation would wind down, and Clark would turn to the group and respond, "I think I heard you saying magenta." The usual response was nodding of the heads around the table.

This needs to be understood in terms of who Kerr was. He was not charismatic. He was not stylish. His dress was funereal. He was an ascetic, who carried his work to and from the office in a grocery box. He went abroad with little more than an overnight bag and washed his clothes in his hotel room sink. On my first trip to Europe, he saw my wife and I leaving with two big suitcases. He asked if we were moving to Europe.

He was a quiet, soft-spoken, a man of few words, not given to small talk. E. K. Fretwell, former president of the State University of New York's Buffalo campus and founding chancellor of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, said that he knew Clark was very excited by something he had seen, when E.K. received a postcard saying not only "you must see this;" but also followed by "you really must." Meetings with him lasted only minutes and concluded with "fine, fine, fine" (Levine 1987, p. 16).

This parsimony of words was actually a very good thing because his handwriting was the worst I have ever seen. Eric Ashby, then a member of Britain's House of Lords and formerly Master of Clare College, Cambridge University, said it was reminiscent of "a seismograph recording a slight volcanic eruption 10,000 miles away" (Levine 1987, p. 16) – a straight line with the occasional dip or rise. If this were not enough, his handwriting was also tiny. One suspected Kerr could write the entire Bible on an index card.

A common staff pursuit was rotating notes he sent them to get a more favorable perch on the possible message. People went from office to office seeking second,

third and fifth opinions. One could have called Kerr, but it seemed inappropriate to bother him with something so trivial. Far better for a half dozen people to devote 20 minutes to the task.

But Kerr was a leader, a man with a first-class mind, unparalleled accomplishments, a master planner with a vision of what higher education's future should be and a labor negotiator's temperament about how to achieve it. He was also a man of integrity, one of the most honest and ethical people I have ever worked with. He was a magnet for talented and accomplished people. Three US presidents offered him cabinet positions. Jimmy Carter was a frequent caller during his 1976 presidential campaign and even afterwards.

He recruited top academics to the University of California and did the same with the Carnegie Council, and he also grew talent. He gave young people he considered able increasing responsibility and nurtured their careers. Having brought me to California from the East Coast, he would not allow me to work full-time for the Council until I finished my doctoral dissertation. He never offered advice but was always there when asked. Business meetings may have been short, but counseling sessions went on as long as needed (within reason. He was not a "touchy feely" kind of guy, no *Kumbaya* for him (a popular folk song of the 1930s, revived in the 1960s, sung around the campfire and widely associated with spiritual and human unity.) However, all sessions still ended with "fine, fine, fine." He never once turned me down when I asked him to speak, whether I was at Bradford College or Harvard. He showed up for a public session when I was being interviewed for a job at Berkeley. I had not told him that I was a candidate.

Once, I told him that I had been offered a job and could not decide whether to take it. What should I do? He said that I was to draw a line down the center of a sheet of paper. At the top of one column, place a plus sign. At the top of the other, put a minus sign. In the plus column, list all the good things about the job and in the minus column put all the negatives. If something is particularly good or bad, give it two pluses or minuses. Then add up the columns. If there are more pluses than minuses, decide to take the job. If there are more minuses, don't. I was flabbergasted. This was the best advice he could give me? He then said, after you've gone through that procedure, listen to your stomach. I have been giving that advice to people for more than 30 years with attribution of course.

Clark Kerr prepared three generations of higher education leaders – his peers, their juniors and those just starting out. When Jack Oswald was president of Pennsylvania State University, his secretary asked why it was that before he took a phone call from Kerr, he always put on a jacket and pulled up his tie. We were all Clark Kerr alumni, the seniors and the youngsters.

His expectations of staff were high. He did not respond well to disappointment without a legitimate cause, though I never heard him yell or lose his temper. He wanted a quality product by an agreed upon date. He was not tolerant of poor work or tardiness. However, when something went wrong in either regard, Clark took public responsibility. When work was praised, he publicly credited the staffer who had done it.

He modeled the behavior he expected of staff. No one worked harder, more productively or did more homework in preparation for upcoming events. He went to his country home for a week or so to write the final report of the Carnegie Council and came back with what he called a "clothes line," that is to say, a full manuscript with places for staff to add the data and prepare the appendices.

He had received more than enough media coverage in his life and did not hunger for more personally. Media work at the Commission and Council was about policy.

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies on Higher Education

Alan Pifer, president of the Carnegie Corporation, called Clark Kerr immediately after he was fired by the Regents at the behest of Governor Reagan:

> The moment I heard the news and without waiting to consult the board, I called Clark and said we would like him to be full-time paid chairman, as well as staff director of the commission. I moved with great haste so that the announcement of Clark's new post could come immediately and could make the point that California's loss was the nation's gain. Clark appreciated this, accepted at once, and the announcement was out, as I recall, only one day after the firing. (Levine 1987, p. 27)

The Carnegie Commission was launched with three extraordinary strengths. The first was support by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, the organization which had sponsored Abraham Flexner's historic study of medical schools in the US and Canada and is credited with transforming American medical education. Second, the Carnegie Commission received full and healthy funding from the Carnegie Foundation. Third, Clark Kerr, the man and the legend, was leading the initiative

Kerr began the new assignment characteristically by doing extensive homework: research, discussions and interviews to learn about the experience of previous commissions and to determine how best to structure the Carnegie Commission. He drew the following conclusions:

The Commission would have to be independent. It would not be located on a campus or be affiliated with any higher education stakeholder in order to establish itself as a champion of the nation more than an advocate for higher education.

To establish credibility in the higher education community, a 19-member board of trustees would be composed largely of representatives from colleges and universities. They came from every sector of postsecondary education and every region of the country, though heavily weighted to top research universities. However, the board was leavened with members from business, law and government. It was also modestly diverse with three black and/or female members. To give the Commission particular stature, its board would include notable personages, such as the sociologist David Riesman, former Pennsylvania governor and presidential candidate William Scranton, Notre Dame president Theodore Hesburgh and the current or past leaders of Harvard University, Cambridge University, Cornell,

the University of North Carolina and the Illinois systems. The principal change as the Commission shifted to the Council in 1973 was the make-up of the board. The Council board was smaller, having only 15 members. It was a bit more diverse in race and gender but more homogeneous too since it consisted largely of higher education insiders, principally current and former college presidents. Also, intentionally, it did not have the virtuosos of the Commission. The changes were intended to make it easier to find common ground and to reach a consensus. That the Commission would operate by consensus was fundamental to Kerr's conception of its work as well as his skill set.

The Commission would serve a Paul Revere function. It would seek to identify current and emerging problems, propose solutions and alert the appropriate publics. To be effective, the Commission would need to avoid being both too early and too late in identifying the problems, which would necessitate that its time frame should not go beyond 20 years into the future. To encourage the adoption of its solutions, the Commission would need to propose recommendations that pushed the envelope but did not go outside it.

The reports of the Commission would be research-based, specific in topic, concrete in recommendations and targeted at particular audiences. This was seen as essential if the reports were to have an impact. James Bryant Conant, the former president of Harvard, who authored a series of reports on schooling in America, very much-shaped Kerr's thinking in this area. He advised being definitive and precise in recommendations. Instead of using words like "some" or "many" or "most," say "25 per cent," or "40 percent" or "85 percent" to spur debate and provide a measuring stick. Give specific dates by which actions must be taken. Identify who is responsible for making them happen. Technical advisory boards were established to assure research quality.

The Commission would focus on dissemination and adoption strategies, seeking media attention for reports, making use of a 5,000-name mailing list, speaking to key audiences and conferring before and after publication with leaders and gatekeepers, such as legislative staffers. Of the 66 board meetings of the Commission and Council, 45 were in locations other than Berkeley and New York, the homes of the Carnegie Commission/Council and Carnegie Foundation. They were held in 23 states, Washington D.C., Puerto Rico, Canada and Mexico. In each location, the Carnegie groups were briefed by state, university and other key leaders. The rationale was as much to educate those leaders about the Carnegie groups as to educate the board about the condition of higher education.

Probably the best example of this combination of strategies was a report entitled *Selective Admissions in Higher Education: A Report and Two Essays* (Carnegie Council 1977). This May 1977 report anticipated the October 1977 US Supreme Court hearing of the affirmative action case of the University of California Regents v. Bakke. Alan Bakke, who was white, was denied admission to the University of California, Davis medical school. He brought suit on the grounds that students with credentials weaker than his had been admitted through a racial quota system reserving 16 places in the class for racial minorities. The California Supreme Court had sided with Bakke, ordering his admission to Davis and finding that the admissions quotas violated the Equal Protection Clause of the US Constitution.

The Council report was based on expert commissioned research studies. It was clear in its discourse on the value of affirmative action, and specific in its recommendations, which were to maintain affirmative action, eliminate racial quotas in favor of goals and consider race as one of several factors in admission. The report was widely disseminated and received considerable media attention, but it was targeted at only nine people, the Justices of the US Supreme Court. When the Court decision was announced in June 1978 by a five to four vote, it had fundamentally adopted the Council position and even specifically footnoted the Council report in the decision (US Supreme Court 1978, p. 51n).

The Commission and Council turned out an extraordinary volume of publications – 37 policy reports from the Commission and Council boards, 79 sponsored volumes by commissioned authors and 50 technical reports. The Commission and Commission – sponsored books were published by McGraw – Hill. Jossey-Bass published the Council versions. Technical reports were published in-house.

According to Kerr, the Commission and Council reports focused largely on six issues (Carnegie Council 1980b, pp. 1–2):

- "social justice," assuring equal opportunity for talent to be discovered and advanced. This was seen as a major issue for at least the remainder of the twentieth century as the proportion of minority youngsters rose to 20–30% of their age group.
- "provision of high skills and new knowledge," focusing on the balance between labor market supply and demand for individuals with high level skills. Here the primary issues were the over-preparation of PhD's and the insufficient numbers of health care personnel educated by universities.
- "effectiveness, quality, and integrity of academic programs," examining subjects varying from basic skills, general education and educational technology to creative arts, career education and institutional and program diversity to meet the needs of changing student populations.
- "adequacy of governance," dealing with issues such as administrative leadership, student and faculty roles, collective bargaining and institutional independence.
- "resources available to higher education," emphasizing financial and human resources, principally faculty and students.
- "purposes and performance of institutions of higher education," including the roles and responsibilities of higher education with regard to students and society. Particular concerns were declining funding for basic research, the need for continuing improvement in assuring equal opportunity in higher education and excessive faculty and student activism.

The sponsored and technical reports were even broader, including the same six issues as well as historical studies and international perspectives.

Accomplishments of the Carnegie Commission and Council

The most apt assessment of the work of the Commission and Council was probably offered by Waldemar Nielsen in his book, *The Golden Donors: A New Anatomy of the Great Foundations.* "In breadth of coverage, quality, objectivity and impact on

public policy, the work of the commission constituted probably the most important body of descriptive and analytical literature about American higher education ever produced" (Nielsen 1985, p. 141).

The enormous output of the Carnegie Council and Commission documented and chronicled the condition, challenges and needs of postwar higher education, providing an education for the public, funders, media, policy makers and practitioners. They created a baseline for future research on higher education. For example, in 1993 and 2008, I replicated the Commission's 1969 and Council's 1975 surveys of undergraduate experiences, attitudes and values in order to study how college students had changed over 40 years. They developed new tools to better understand and study higher education, such as the Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education which divided America's enormously diverse higher education institutions into nine fundamental categories and public or private control, plus several small specialized categories. This tool, periodically updated by Carnegie, was used by scholars, government, media, the higher education community and others to understand, compare and contrast institutions. One of Kerr's successors chose to multiply the number of categories, rendering the classification system far less useful.

The Commission brought new terms and concepts into the higher education lexicon, such as "stop out" and "middle/early college." "Stop out" was an important refinement of the familiar term "dropout." It referred to the phenomenon of students leaving college with an intent to return. The "early or middle college" described a different type of postsecondary institution which merged all or part of high school and lower division undergraduate studies. The intent was to wring out duplication for advanced students and increase college access for at-risk populations. The idea was not new, but the name, which defined the notion, was original. The practice actually reappeared roughly every 30 years since William Rainey Harper, the first president of the University of Chicago, conceived of it in the late 1890s.

The Council and Commission created the largest and most distinguished collegium of academics ever to study colleges and universities. It made the study of higher education a legitimate area of research within and across the disciplines. Clark Kerr used his appeal as he had at Berkeley to recruit leading academics to carry out the work of the Commission and Council. He built his board and his advisory committees with the most outstanding names in their fields. He commissioned top scholars from the disciplines and professions, from sociology, history, psychology, economics, political science, medicine, business and law, from the United States and from abroad to write books and reports on higher education for the Commission and Council. Some had previously written about higher education, others had not.

The Commission and Council offered a model for how to study a field and how a think tank might effectively function. The combination of a research-base, specific topics, concrete recommendations, targeted audiences, and emphasis on adoption has become the norm with commissions, task forces and panels that followed. Kerr's staffing design has also been widely adopted. He chose to employ a small permanent staff, hire experts largely on leave from their permanent jobs for the duration of specific studies and reports, and commission the most outstanding

academics for studies, books and reports in their fields. This made the Council and Commission agile in moving from issue to issue and enabled them to employ exceptional people in their fields for the time they had available.

But most important, the Carnegie Commission and Council had a significant impact on policy. For a report to bring about systemic change, it typically goes through a four-stage process. The first might be described as generating press and debate. When a report receives significant media coverage, it generates debate, sometimes heated, among practitioners and policymakers regarding its merits and demerits. Many of the Carnegie reports accomplished this, though often in a particular sector of higher education such as black colleges, dental schools or community colleges.

The second stage is being invited to speak with key policymakers (e.g., governors, legislators, state higher education executive officers and trustees) and practitioners (e.g., college and university presidents, professors, associations and leaders of specific sectors or institutional types, such as research universities, black colleges and community colleges). Such strategies were commonly built into dissemination plans for Commission and Council reports.

The third stage is the serendipitous adoption of policy recommendations. Pieces of reports are used in different ways by different actors. The Federal government, for example, adopted the Carnegie Classifications in its reporting. As many as 40 universities adopted the Commission's recommendation to create a Doctor of Arts degree focusing on teaching rather than research. The Carnegie Corporation funded the time-variable undergraduate degrees recommended by the Commission. Many of the reports were cited as the source of decisions by campuses, government and foundations.

The fourth and final stage is systemic change, which generally necessitates creating a coalition of the key stakeholders. In at least two cases, Commission reports brought about such broad scale changes. The Carnegie Commission report, *Higher Education and the Nation's Health,* was directly responsible for the US Manpower Act of 1971 which increased the number of students admitted to medical schools annually and spawned the development of Area Health Education Centers around the country. The very first of the Commission report, *Quality and Equality,* is credited with key elements of the 1972 Higher Education Amendments: the establishment of Basic Educational Opportunity Grants, which became the Pell Grant program, and the creation of the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education. The Bakke decision would be another instance of such major change.

The bottom line in terms of impact is that the Carnegie Commission and Council reports often received significant media coverage and generated debate among higher education and its publics. Carnegie reports were also commonly used to educate and encourage action on the part of policymakers and practitioners. Elements of various reports were serendipitously adopted, used or attributed to Carnegie reports by the Commission's or Council's audiences. In several instances, Commission and Council reports were responsible for systemic policy changes.

Limitations of the Carnegie Commission and Council

The Commission and Council by any measure were very successful. Ironically, some of their most important contributions were also limitations.

While the Commission and Council produced an extraordinary volume of publications, that sheer volume was itself a hurdle. Harold Howe, former US Commissioner of Education, joked that when he was a vice-president at the Ford Foundation, he used the "five-foot" bookshelf of Carnegie publications "to prop open the stairwell door when the electric lights failed." When he became a professor at Harvard, Howe required his students to "read it both for ideas and information and to build character" (Levine 1987, p. 30).

Howe's comment gets at the problem. There were so many books that it was nearly impossible for any person to read them all. It was equally impossible to give each volume the time and attention needed to promote adoption. For this reason, Ernest Boyer, Kerr's immediate successor as president of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching which took on the functions of the Council, chose to focus on only one issue at a time. His own successors chose a path between the two approaches.

The Carnegie books advanced a large number of recommendations and proposals, some very intriguing. But a significant number of them lacked traction and were not adopted. For instance, Carnegie proposed the creation of urban-grant universities, the equivalent of the land-grant universities of the nineteenth century, as well as a national student loan bank and an education fund for all young people to be used for the first 2 years of college, postsecondary education or apprenticeships. There was also a recommendation that community colleges and regional universities establish learning pavilions, a home base for adult learners offering basic educational programs and technology for self-study. Recommendations targeted at campuses were particularly difficult to have adopted. Kerr thought he had underestimated institutional resistance and commitment to maintain the status quo. There were also ideas that proved faddish, such as the Doctor of Arts degree, which produced a burst of activity, but the degree programs quickly faded.

Other proposals yielded immediate innovations, which disappeared and are once again in vogue. Time-variable degrees, funded by the Carnegie Corporation, produced notable experiments around the country but declined when Carnegie funding ended and enrollments were not adequate to sustain them. However, they experienced a resurgence in recent years owing to the influx of older part-time students in higher education, rising tuition prices and a weak economy and America's shift from an industrial to information economy which places greater emphasis on common outcomes than common processes. The early college, after initial funding by the Carnegie Corporation, largely disappeared until resurrected and spawned in larger numbers than ever before by the Gates Foundation. Today it is not unusual to hear governors praise them.

In addition, there were recommendations that appeared to have no traction at the time they were made, but have become common practice in the years since.

A good example is the call for colleges and universities to operate year round. Such proposals and there were several, were largely ahead of their times.

There were also topics that deserved greater attention by the Council and Commission. The emphasis of the work was on the research university. As part of the Paul Revere function, it would have been useful to give greater attention to community colleges, which now enroll 44% of all first-time freshman college students and nontraditional learners-students who are older, working and attending part-time, often referred to today as the new majority in higher education (National Center for Education Statistics 1995–2009, Table 206).

The degree to which these changes were occurring went largely unnoticed by mainstream higher education. The changing student demographics and the boom in community colleges went hand in hand. The changes were easy to miss. The new majority made their appearance first in community colleges and subsequently in open door, low endowment, private colleges and less selective regional public universities in need of students. They attended more selective institutions initially through the backdoor, i.e., the divisions of continuing education. In 1990, I wrote an article in which I said that I spent so much time in the 1970s and 1980s engaged in research on undergraduate liberal arts curriculum and traditional college students that I nearly missed this revolution that was occurring simultaneously in higher education (Levine 1990).

As might be expected the Commission and Council did better in identifying issues on a five-year horizon than 20 years into the future. Kerr realized that when he first began. The final Council report, *Three Thousand Futures, published in 1980,* attempted to describe the conditions, issues and needs of higher education over the next 20 years. It was premised on a 5–15% decline in undergraduate full-time equivalent enrollment. There were several years in which enrollments actually dropped, but between 1980 and 2000 full-time student enrollment increased by 25% and part-time enrollment rose by 27% (National Center for Education Statistics 1995–2009, Table 206).

Another limitation may have been the location of the Commission and Council. In 1979, as Clark Kerr was about to retire and Ernest Boyer was preparing to succeed him, Boyer came to Berkeley to interview the Council staff. He asked me where the Carnegie Foundation should be located. I loved Berkeley and told Boyer he should keep it there. He said it had to be on the east coast because that was where government, foundations and the press were situated. The only question for him was whether the Foundation should be established in Washington D.C., New York City or Boston. Ultimately, he chose Princeton, New Jersey. In the Internet age, physical location may matter less, but I have often wondered whether the Carnegie Council and Commission would have had greater impact if they had been closer to the centers of power. Of course, each of the cities Boyer mentioned came with their own negatives in public perception.

The Gold Standard

Abraham Flexner's *On Medical Education in the United States and Canada* is the standard that is commonly applied in assessing the impact of a report or commission. It is the brass ring of education reports. The Flexner report had the effect of remaking medical education in the United States, closing the country's poorest medical schools, strengthening weak and mediocre schools and investing in excellent schools. It resulted in increased American Medical Association (AMA) goals for doctors and medical education, more rigorous state certification requirements and an outpouring of private and public funding for medicine and medical education. The report enhanced the quality of candidates entering the field of medicine and improved the standard of medical services in America.

The success of the Flexner initiative can be attributable to eight factors:

1. The timing was right. There was broad dissatisfaction with the preparation of doctors, medical education and medical services in the U.S.
2. The right organization was leading the charge. The sponsoring Carnegie Foundation had the standing and status to make the work visible, important and credible.
3. The research was comprehensive, clear and undeniable.
4. There were demonstrable models of medical school excellence to establish expectations and needed standards of practice in the performance of the German universities and The Johns Hopkins University medical school.
5. Recommendations were straightforward, grounded in research and targeted at specific stakeholders.
6. Networks of key stakeholders were created at the start of the study to build awareness, ownership and willingness to act. They included the profession via the AMA, educators from top medical schools, press, government and funders.
7. There was wide dissemination of the research. Fifteen thousand copies of the report were distributed.
8. In the aftermath of the research, the Carnegie Foundation mobilized actors to carry out the recommended changes: the AMA, state government, licensing boards and foundations, particularly the Rockefeller Foundation. In the years after the Flexner Report, foundations gave over $150 million dollars to improve medical education, the equivalent of billions today.

The Carnegie Commission and Council did not achieve such dramatic results, nor should they have. Unlike medical education at the turn of the twentieth century, American higher education was not broken. Clark Kerr had already transformed the old model and created a new one in California. The purpose of the Carnegie Commission and Council was basically to finish the job, to make it better. This is exactly what it did at a scale never before or after accomplished.

The Carnegie bodies did all of these things in varying degree. The timing was perfect for launching the Commission. Higher education had been transformed in the postwar era and was under stress owing to the student unrest of the 1960s. The sponsorship for the Flexner and Carnegie initiatives was the same. Both endeavors were grounded in research with Carnegie commissioning the most renowned scholars in the world to carry it out. For Carnegie, the models were universities like Berkeley and colleges like Swarthmore (Kerr's home institutions). The recommendations were comparable in specificity and targeting. Carnegie had a far looser network of stakeholders, which was unavoidable because there were 37 policy reports, relying upon different networks of stakeholders. The Commission and Council boards were a nod in the direction of creating a tightly-linked network of stakeholders. Both emphasized broad dissemination of their reports. There was also substantial funding for the Carnegie Commission and Council recommendations, but there were so many of them, and they were so diffuse that they could never be fully funded. The Carnegie Corporation and other foundations supported some of the recommendations. The federal government alone put billions into the Pell Grant program.

In short the methodology of the Carnegie effort and the Flexner initiative were very much alike, but the Commission and Council had a critical resource that the Flexner effort lacked. They had a giant, Clark Kerr, leading the initiative, which added extraordinary authority, visibility, experience, credibility and mystique to the enterprise. In contrast, Flexner was not known, had no experience in medical education and built a reputation as a consequence of the Report.

Prospects for a New Carnegie Commission

For many reasons a successor effort is unlikely, but two stand out. First, there is no equivalent of a Clark Kerr in higher education today to lead it. Today there is no one of his stature and accomplishment to take his place in leading a Carnegie Commission.

None of his Carnegie successors, though they have been very talented people with skills in areas that Kerr lacked, has been a person of historic importance. They may have been capable of modernizing the research university, growing the number of research universities, naming the research university and developing the Master Plan, but they did not. They were born too late.

Second, the timing is wrong. The world of higher education is in flux today. It is no longer the enterprise created by Kerr's generation. The number and kinds of higher education providers is booming. They are local, state, national and international entities. With globalization, borders are fading. For-profit and not-for-profit enterprises exist. Higher education, a subsidized, countercyclical, growth industry, is a very appealing investment area to the business community that believes higher education is high in cost and low in productivity, technology use and leadership. Knowledge producers of all kinds – publishers, museums, software companies, television

networks, symphony orchestras and a host of others have entered the postsecondary marketplace. The largest university in America is the for-profit University of Phoenix, which is regionally accredited and traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange. Today higher education comes in brick, click and brick and click forms. New technologies and the digital natives arriving on campus are challenging the ways in which universities traditionally do business

The demographics of higher education have changed. Seven out of ten high school graduates are now attending some form of postsecondary education, and the walls between grades 12 and 13 have grown more porous through Advanced Placement, dual enrollment and remedial college courses. Furthermore, opportunities are geographically maldistributed. There are not enough campuses in California to accommodate the growth and too many in New England for the population. The traditional college student is disappearing. Less than one in five students is 18–22 years of age, attends full time and lives on campus. Most American families cannot afford the sticker price for a 4-year college. The growing numbers of students of color have disproportionately graduated from the poorest high schools in this country.

Higher education has shifted from the growth industry demanded by the Truman Commission and postwar America in which the goal was to increase the number of campuses, faculty and students. In this environment financial support for higher education grew, government asked fewer hard questions. Today with the high percentage of students enrolled and declining governmental budgets, higher education has become a mature industry from which government demands accountability and efficiency. Regulation and oversight have increased dramatically. Issues such as tenure, course loads, graduation rates, cost and pricing, student outcomes, program quality and program duplication are all being scrutinized by government as support for higher education diminishes. Public universities have begun privatizing units.

The information economy changes the jobs students are preparing for and the skills those jobs require. It sharply reduces the half-life of knowledge, requiring students to return to higher education throughout their lives for updating. Increasingly they are asking for just-in-time education rather than the just-in-case education universities customarily offer. Vocationalism continues to rise as does consumerism.

The point is this: with higher education in turmoil owing to profound, swift and unceasing demographic, economic, technological and global change, this may not be the right time for another Carnegie Commission. Too much remains unsettled, unknowable and in motion for such a body to make a significant contribution.

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Chapter 3
The Perils of Success: Clark Kerr and the Master Plan for Higher Education

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Clark Kerr's California legacy incorporates two highly interrelated but nonetheless distinct threads. The first is his institutional leadership as faculty leader, chancellor of the Berkeley campus and president of the University of California, the subject of his two-volume memoir, *The Gold and the Blue.* The second strand is his role as the principal architect of the Master Plan for Higher Education in California, 1960–1975*,* a mid-twentieth century public policy blueprint for the development of California higher education. This essay focuses on the latter, particularly the Master Plan's history, influence and relevance to contemporary California.

As Kerr acknowledges in his biography, many leaders in higher education and state government made important contributions to the development, enactment and implementation of the Master Plan, and there were many compromises (Kerr 2003, pp. 172–199). However, Kerr was the intellectual as well as the political leader of this effort, and the basic elements of the plan reflected his vision of the future of California higher education. He was the instigator, framer, principal negotiator and advocate and public face of the Master Plan. The plan established the structure for the development of California higher education that has endured for more than a half century.

I will discuss California's 1960 Master Plan, the conditions that led to its development and enactment, its initial impact, its relevance to the circumstances confronting California higher education in the early twenty-first century, and conclude with observations on Clark Kerr and his legacy.

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California's 1960 Master Plan: Development, Enactment and Implementation

In almost every state, veterans benefiting from the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the GI Bill) after World War II created public pressure to expand the enrollment capacity of colleges and universities, including vocational instruction. This pressure intensified in California in the late 1950s as population growth accelerated, and the first "tidal wave" of baby boomers approached college age. In 1960, the state responded by creating a 15-year Master Plan for Higher Education. That plan, the values and policies it reflected, and the growth that it envisioned, provide context for the questions and challenges that confront California higher education more than 50 years later.

During the three decades after the World War II California did not differ from most other large states in seeking to plan and support enrollment growth of higher education. In fact, these issues became the dominant public policy themes for higher education in this era. California distinguished itself, however, by its path-breaking commitment to higher education opportunity, by the size and scale of its higher education systems, and by its development of the Master Plan, the state's comprehensive policy framework to expand capacity and manage growth.

Whether California higher education would expand was never at issue during this period. What was perceived as problematic, however, was the extent to which conflicts among local, institutional and political interests would impede realization of an overarching policy goal: universal educational opportunity through planned and coordinated growth. Efforts to address these conflicts trace back at least to the Depression era. In 1932, a legislatively commissioned study conducted by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching found that problems of policy and organization in higher education had resulted in overlapping functions. There was waste and inefficiency, a lack of unified policy and inequitable distribution of state funds. In addition, the study found:

> There is a lack of articulation among the various units of the educational system. This has resulted in vigorous controversies over admission requirements, transfer regulations, and curricula. These controversies are aggravated by regional rivalries and local ambitions. (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 1932)

The challenges identified by the Carnegie report persisted despite the State of California Legislature's creation of an advisory and ineffectual State Council for Educational Planning and Coordination. In 1945, a joint committee called the Liaison Committee was formed by the state Board of Education (which at that time had statewide jurisdiction over the junior colleges and state colleges) and by the University of California (the University). The Liaison Committee was a voluntary effort to manage campus growth and program expansion and to deter legislatively imposed coordination. The principal policy vehicles of the Liaison Committee were *ad hoc* studies commissioned by it and the Legislature, studies that addressed such issues as: the degree-granting authority of junior colleges, state colleges and the University; admissions standards; the needs and locations for new campuses; and the necessity and requisites of a state scholarship program. (Douglass 2000, pp. 170–197).

In the absence of an overarching policy framework, the Legislature could implement, ignore or even augment the smorgasbord of recommendations presented by

these studies – and it did all of these. For example, at the urging principally of the Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce and despite initial opposition of the University, the state college at Santa Barbara was transferred to the University in 1943. (In 1946, a state ballot proposition prohibiting such transfers in the future was enacted.) New state college campuses were authorized in 1946 at Los Angeles and Sacramento, in 1948 at Long Beach, and in the late 1950s at Fullerton, Hayward, Northridge and Turlock. In addition, the University added medical and engineering schools at its Los Angeles campus and colleges of letters and sciences at its Davis and Riverside campuses. In 1955, the Legislature established the first state scholarship program.

By the late 1950s, the absence of what the Carnegie report had termed "unified policy" had created a planning vacuum in which initiatives and aspirations for growth and change were scattered widely across communities and institutions and ultimately were controlled by the Legislature and the governor. The "problems of policy and organization" found in the 1932 report had not only persisted but had been exacerbated by the GI Bill, the increase in birth rates after World War II and in-migration. In the 1957 legislative session, the scramble for new campuses intensified: bills authorizing 17 new state colleges were considered and four were approved; none of the four had been on the list of priorities recommended in the Liaison Committee's 1957 planning report. Several of these campuses were placed in sparsely populated areas represented by powerful state legislators.

Academics and politicians alike recognized that reform was needed to bring order to the chaos and uncertainty. Kerr, who had assumed the presidency of the University of California in 1957, took the initiative. In 1959, Assemblywoman Dorothy Donahoe, at his encouragement, introduced a resolution calling on the Liaison Committee to prepare a master plan for higher education and to present it to the Legislature at the beginning of the 1960 session. The resolution also called for a 2-year moratorium on legislation affecting higher education, principally to prevent establishment of new campuses while the plan was being developed and considered. The resolution was adopted by both the Assembly and the Senate.

The major concerns of the educational leaders who initiated and then wrote the Master Plan were immediate ones. In his memoir of this period, Kerr reflected that:

> the plan looked to those of us who participated in its development more like a desperate attempt to prepare for a tidal wave of students, to escape state legislative domination, to contain escalating warfare among its separate segments….And the preparation, escape, and the containment in each case was barely in time and barely succeeded. The master plan was a product of stark necessity, of political calculations, and of pragmatic transactions (Kerr 2003, p. 172).

Eight months after the adoption of the resolution, a proposed Master Plan was presented to the Legislature, and its major provisions were enacted into statute. It became the state policy structure that resolved the immediate challenges to higher education. Reaffirmed many times, the Master Plan remains in place long after the emergency described by Kerr had passed. Each sector of California higher education gained immediate benefits:

- The junior colleges (subsequently designated "community colleges") gained acceptance as an integral part of higher education and were given the largest responsibility for expansion.

- The state colleges, which ultimately became the California State University (the State University), were removed from the public school system and were given degree-granting authority through the master's level as well as an independent governing board.
- The organization of the University of California (the University) was not affected, but its monopoly on state-funded, advanced graduate and professional programs and research was confirmed.
- The Legislature was relieved of the increasingly controversial political pressures for new campuses by delegating initial approval of these decisions to a new higher education coordinating council.

Rarely do all parties to a negotiated plan achieve not only their own individual goals, but, in so doing, benefit the overarching public interest – as reflected in this case in greater college opportunity and controlled institutional competition. Kerr and the Master Plan framers were able to accomplish this feat because they advanced institutional aspirations in the context of a common policy goal: the commitment that every California high school graduate who was able to benefit from college could attend a college or university. California became the first state or, indeed, governmental entity to establish this principle of universal access as public policy (Rothblatt 2007, p. 261). It was this principle that made the Master Plan a major innovation in social as well as educational policy. Its specific provisions established an organizational and policy framework for meeting the state's commitment to access and for balancing what Kerr later characterized as the egalitarian and meritocratic imperatives (Kerr 1992, pp. 55–57).

The organizational provisions of the Master Plan were straightforward. College opportunity would be provided by grouping public colleges into three statewide "systems" organized according to their missions, each with designated enrollment pools. The junior colleges would offer instruction up to the 14th grade level and would include courses for transfer to baccalaureate-granting institutions as well as vocational and technical programs. These colleges would be open to all Californians who were capable of benefiting from attendance. The state colleges, now the California State University (CSU), would offer undergraduate education and graduate programs through the master's degree and could participate in joint doctoral degree programs with the University of California. Students were to be admitted from the top third of high school graduates. The University was to draw its students from the top eighth of California high school graduates. Within public higher education, the University was to have sole authority to offer doctoral degrees (except for joint doctoral programs offered with the state colleges), as well as professional degrees in medicine, law, dentistry and veterinary medicine. The University was also designated the state's primary agency for state-supported academic research. Selective admissions at the state colleges and the University restricted the growth of 4-year institutions, and this meant that most students would enroll, at least initially, in junior colleges. Californians who enrolled in junior colleges could transfer to a state college or University campus after 2 years, and all qualified students were to be accepted. The 4-year public institutions were to reserve sufficient upper

division spaces to assure capacity to accommodate community college transfer students. These provisions for transfer, along with the promise of college access to all who could benefit from it, connected and balanced the egalitarian and meritocratic dimensions of the plan. Without the assurance of transfer opportunities, it is unlikely that the Master Plan recommendation of greater selectivity in freshman admissions policies of the state colleges and the University of California would have been palatable in the populist and egalitarian California political culture of 1960.

The Master Plan recommended, and the Legislature established, a governing board for state colleges, separating those institutions from the State Board of Education. To replace the Liaison Committee, a state board to coordinate higher education was created by statute. This new board was made up of representatives of the public systems of higher education and the private nonprofit colleges and universities. The Legislature expressed in statute its intention to establish new campuses only upon recommendation from this board. The state scholarship program for eligible undergraduates in public and private institutions was expanded. This program served the dual function of providing students with the option of attending private colleges and universities and enabling the private institutions to absorb a portion of the projected enrollment growth. Public higher education was to be low-priced, and California residents were not to be charged tuition, reflecting the state's commitment to access.

The Master Plan pioneered the concept of universal access to education and training beyond high school as state public policy. It was also unique in establishing mission differentiation as the basis of organization and governance for all of the state's public colleges and universities, including the explicit delineation of eligibility criteria for admission to each of the three public systems. The plan sought to recognize, balance and institutionalize the values of competitive excellence and equality of opportunity, selectivity and open admissions, and growth and efficiency. Costs were managed by constraints on the missions and admissions policies of each of the three public sectors and through concentration of growth in the community colleges. In short, the plan constituted the policy and organizational framework for both the expansion of college opportunity and for the University's high national and international ranking.

Since the Master Plan's adoption in 1960, formal revisions to its framework have included: the creation of a statewide Board of Governors for community colleges in 1967; the transformation of the statewide coordinating board into the California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC) in 1973; the imposition of student charges (still not called "tuition") in all three public sectors; and the legislative authorization for the State University to offer its own doctoral degree, the Ed.D., in 2005.

Growth: Students, Campuses, and Funding

After World War II California's dramatic growth and the state's response to its population increases provided the context and the impetus for higher education policy. In the early 1960s, California became the nation's most populous state with

Table 3.1 Growth of population and public higher education enrollment

Year	California population (thousands)	California population growth (%)	Total public enrollment growth (%)
1960	15,727	49	67
1970	20,038	27	300
1980	23,780	19	36
1990	29,828	25	12
2000	34,099	14	16
2005	36,154	6	14
2010	37,254	3	6

Sources: Population: U.S. Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstract*, "Bicentennial edition: Historical statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970," and *Statistical Abstract* yearly editions, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past_years.html (Accessed 10 April 2008); 1970–2008 data from California Department of Finance, Demographic Research Unit, E-3 Race/Ethnic population estimates with age and sex detail (1970–1989, 1980-1999, and 2000–2008 editions), http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/DEMOGRAP/Data/DRUdatafiles.php (Accessed 8 August 2011); 2010 data from California State Data Center, Census 2010, http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/state_census_data_center/census_2010/view.php (Accessed 8 August 2011); Enrollment: 1960 from California Higher Education Policy Center, "Financing the California master plan: A data base of public finance for higher education in California 1958/59 to 1996/97" (San Jose, CA: June 1997); 1970–2010 from California Postsecondary Education Commission, "Fiscal Profiles, 2010" (Commission Report 10–22, December 2010)
Note: Enrollment data is for Fall Full Time Equivalent students

15.7 million residents (1960 census), and by 2010 that number had more than doubled. Expansion of higher education in California was inevitable because of the pressure of its rapidly growing population compounded by public demand for college access. As in other states, public demand for higher education rose to political saliency as local communities pressed their legislators for action. California responded to this pressure by increasing college enrollment at a rate that exceeded the state's rapid population growth (see Table 3.1).

In purely quantitative terms, the transformation of higher education in California in the last half-century has been staggering, even after considering population growth. Total enrollment of undergraduate and graduate students in public and private nonprofit higher education increased from about 163,000 in 1950 to 250,000 in 1960, and to about 2 million in 2010 (see Table 3.2. The paucity of historical data precluded the inclusion of the private for-profit sector, which plays an increasingly important role in California and elsewhere.) Public higher education accounted for most of this enrollment growth:

- Community colleges absorbed the greatest share of growth, from about 56,000 students enrolled in 1948 to 98,000 in 1960, to over 1.1 million in 2010.
- Enrollment in the State University grew from just under 23,000 in 1948 to 61,000 in 1960 and to almost 360,000 in 2010.
- The University of California enrolled about 43,000 students in 1948, some 44,000 in 1960 and over 232,000 in 2010.

Table 3.2 Enrollment in California higher education, 1948–2010

Year	CCC	CSU	UC	Independent[a]	Total
1948	55,933	22,787	43,469	N/A	N/A
1950	56,624	25,369	39,492	41,036	162,521
1960	97,858	61,330	43,748	47,000	249,936
1970	526,584	186,749	98,508	N/A	N/A
1980	752,278	232,935	122,761	133,313	1,241,287
1990[b]	818,755	272,637	152,863	145,375	1,389,630
2000	999,652	279,403	165,900	173,341	1,618,296
2005	1,121,681	324,120	201,403	202,035	1,849,239
2010[b]	1,161,807	358,063	232,613	203,068	1,955,551

Sources: 1948 and 1950 figures from California State Department of Education, *A master plan for higher education in California: 1960–1975* (Sacramento, California, 1960); CCC, CSU and UC data for 1960 from California Higher Education Policy Center, "Financing the California master plan: A data base of public finance for higher education in California 1958/59 to 1996/97" (San Jose, CA: June 1997); Independent data for 1960 from The Association of Independent California Colleges and Universities, "1960 Guidebook;" UC, CSU, and CCC data for 1970–2010 and Independent data from 1980, 1991, 2000, 2005, and 2009 from California Postsecondary Education Commission, "Fiscal Profiles, 2010" (Commission Report 10–22, December 2010)
Note: Enrollment data is for Fall Full Time Equivalent students
N/A Data not available
[a] Independent enrollment numbers include all students at institutions that are members of Association of Independent Colleges and Universities
[b] Independent data are for 1991 instead of 1990 and 2009 instead of 2010

- Private colleges and universities accounted for approximately 41,000 students in 1950, 47,000 in 1960, and 203,000 in 2009. Even with this substantial growth, however, the independent institutions' share of all California college enrollments dropped from about 25% in 1950 to about 10% in 2009.

Public and private 4-year baccalaureate-granting institutions enrolled two-thirds of California's college students in 1950 and 39% in 2010 (calculated from data in Table 3.2). In terms of numbers of students served, the community colleges became the predominant sector of California higher education, enrolling substantially more students than the other sectors combined. This distribution followed from public policy decisions concerning access, institutional mission, capacity, and student eligibility in the 1960 Master Plan.

The framers of the Master Plan encouraged access by prohibiting tuition for California residents at any public campus, but this provision eroded as the institutions increasingly have levied and sharply increased "fees." The amount students pay to enroll escalated. The high costs of living in California also contribute to the erosion of college affordability (Zumeta and Frankle 2007).

The initial state scholarship program was created in the mid-1950s primarily to enable academically high-achieving students to attend in-state private colleges and universities. As the public institutions raised fees, the original program was modified and grew into a constellation of Cal Grant programs. In 2008, these grants were awarded to about 297,000 students at a cost of almost 1.2 billion dollars (see

Table 3.3 Cal Grant awards, 2008

(New and renewal recipients)

Institution	Total number of awards	Total amount of awards (millions)[a]
UC	53,090	$350
CSU	74,825	$253
CCC	124,931	$168
Independent	23,970	$224
Private career colleges/other	19,702	$202
Total	**296,518**	**$1,196**

Source: California Student Aid Commission, *Preliminary grant statistics report 2007–2008*
[a]Amounts represent awards offered and not reconciled payments

Table 3.4 Campuses by sector, 1945–2011

Year	CCC	CSU	UC	Independent[a]
1945	43	9	2	69
1950	55	12	2	74
1960	64	16	6	78
1970	92	20	9	100
1980	105	20	9	115
1990	106	21	9	120
2000	107	22	9	126
2005	108	23	10	N/A
2011	112	23	10	119

Sources: California Postsecondary Education Commission, *California colleges mailing list*, http://www.cpec.ca.gov/OnLineData/AddressOptions.asp (Accessed 10 August 2011); University of California History Digital Archives, http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/uchistory/general_history/overview/maintimeline.html (Accessed 11 March 2008)
N/A Data not available
[a]Independent includes WASC Accredited non-public institutions

Table 3.3). In addition, each of the public systems of higher education administers its own financial aid programs. In the University and the State University, set-asides from student fees are the principal source of funding for these programs.

Increases in college participation in California were made possible by massive increases in capacity as existing campuses were expanded and new campuses were built (see Table 3.4). The number of California Community College campuses, where the largest growth was concentrated, increased from 43 in 1945 to 64 in 1960, and to 112 in 2011; the State University added 14 campuses from 1945 to 2011, for a total of 23; and the University had ten campuses by 2011. Including all three systems, the number of public college and university campuses totaled 145 in 2011.

The 15 years from 1945 to 1960 reflect the uncoordinated building of new campuses that led to the enactment of the Master Plan. In the 1960s and 1970s, growth followed the Master Plan's guidelines: new community colleges brought higher education within commuting distance of students; and for the 4-year systems, new campuses recommended in the plan were built. As described in the next section, however, institutional and community pressures in the 1990s began to replace planning based on demography and projected regional needs, as decision-making about the

Table 3.5 State and local operating support for public higher education, 1960–2010 (In millions of dollars)

Year	CCC	CSU	UC	Total
1960	$58	$55	$99	$169
1970	$366	$285	$330	$741
1980	$1,276	$814	$902	$2,749
1990	$2,489	$1,632	$2,077	$5,498
2000	$3,986	$2,175	$2,716	$7,293
2005	$5,032	$2,448	$2,699	$10,179
2010	$5,764	$2,346	$2,591	$10,701

Inflation adjusted state and local operating support for public higher education, 1960–2010 (In millions of 2010 dollars)

Year	CCC	CSU	UC	Total
1960	$429	$405	$727	$1,243
1970	$2,058	$1,601	$1,852	$4,162
1980	$3,378	$2,155	$2,387	$7,274
1990	$4,152	$2,722	$3,465	$9,173
2000	$5,047	$2,755	$3,439	$9,235
2005	$5,618	$2,733	$3,013	$11,365
2010	$5,764	$2,346	$2,591	$10,701

Sources: 1960–1990 data from California Higher Education Policy Center, "Financing the California master plan: A data base of public finance for higher education in California 1958/59 to 1996/97"(San Jose, CA: June 1997). 2000, 2005 and 2010 data from California Postsecondary Education Commission, "Fiscal Profiles, 2010" (Commission Report 10–22, December 2010)
Note: CCC data is for State General Fund and Local Property Taxes. CSU and UC data is for State General Fund. Inflation adjustments based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

placement of new campuses reverted to the politicized approach that had dominated decisions on new campuses in the decades prior to the Master Plan.

The spectacular growth of California higher education cannot be explained simply by population increases or market forces. Rather, the growth of colleges and universities in the state is directly attributable to the public policies of the Master Plan and state financial support of those policies over more than half a century. The operating revenues from state and local sources for public higher education from 1960 through 2010 are summarized in Table 3.5.

Altered State Realities

The Master Plan for Higher Education was developed to meet the challenges that California faced in the mid- twentieth century. In the twenty-first century, California and its colleges and universities must now adapt to new economic, political, demographic, and educational changes that have reshaped the state and its public sector. This section identifies and explores these altered state realities.

Unstable, Constrained Public Finance Combined with Political Volatility

The 1960 Master Plan was the product of the optimism of the post-World War II era, an era characterized by massive expansion of public services to meet the needs of a growing population. In addition to its support of higher education, California made and implemented major commitments to public schools, highways, parks and extensive water and irrigation projects. This expansion took off in the mid-1940s and early 1950s under the gubernatorial administrations of Earl Warren and Goodwin Knight, peaked during the administration of Edmund G. Brown from 1958 to 1966, and was sustained under his successor, Ronald Reagan.

In 1978, however, the California electorate brought an abrupt end to the era of public sector expansiveness by overwhelmingly adopting Proposition 13, an initiative that reduced property taxes by about 60% and severely constrained future tax increases. In addition to inaugurating an era of reduced public spending, Proposition 13 ushered in an era of "government by plebiscite," in which the initiative, sparsely used prior to 1978, was increasingly commandeered to "legislate" on a broad spectrum of issues. Such issues included but were not limited to: minimum spending on public schools (1988), legislative term limits (1990), mandated prison terms (1994), affirmative action (1996) and Native American casinos (1998). One effect of the extensive use of initiatives has been directly or indirectly to mandate specific expenditures, even as Proposition 13 and other tax-cutting measures constrained revenue growth. The consequence has been a reduction of the discretionary funds available for appropriation – that is, funds that support higher education and other expenditures that are not legal mandates or entitlements (Schrag 1999, 2006).

Higher education has not escaped the harsh realities of diminished public sector financial support in the 30 years since 1978. Another effect of Proposition 13 has been the increasing dependence on income, capital gains and sales taxes – the revenue streams most sensitive to economic conditions. As a result, during periods of recession and state revenue shortfall, higher education has faced harsh fiscal restraints. On the other hand, the economic dynamism of California has also enabled several years of generous state support when the economy has flourished. It was fortuitous that Proposition 13 and the reversal of public sector fortunes did not begin until after the baby boomer college enrollments had peaked, and after most of the new campuses and campus expansions envisioned by the 1960 Master Plan were completed or well underway.

The most significant, and apparently permanent, departure from the Master Plan has been the abrogation of its foundational public policy commitment to college opportunity – that is, its commitment to make higher education available for every Californian who can benefit from college. This historic obligation undergirded the differentiated missions and admissions policies of the three public sectors. There has never been a formal retraction or revision of the commitment, and it continues to enjoy the rhetorical support of most political and higher education leaders. But it is a promise that the state honors only in the best of economic times,

and quietly sacrifices in years of budget problems. Between 1960 and 1980, the Master Plan commitment to access was California's most fundamental public policy. But since the 1980s, this commitment has eroded steadily, often without public discussion or deliberation.

Recessions bring state financial stringency. In California, they have brought severe restrictions in college access, principally at the broad-access institutions – the community colleges and the State University:

- Community college enrollments were reduced by more than 250,000 students in the recession of the early 1980s.
- In the recession of the early 1990s, enrollments decreased by over 170,000 in the community colleges and 50,000 in the State University.
- The recession of the early 2000s brought enrollment reductions of nearly 150,000 in the community colleges[1] (California Higher Education Policy Center 1997; California Department of Finance 1999–2007; California Postsecondary Education Commission 2006).
- State and institutional responses to the recession that began in 2007 and its continuing aftermath have to date followed the pattern of earlier recessions but with greater severity: deep budget cuts and limitations and reductions of enrollments[2] (California Postsecondary Education Commission 2010).

What is particularly noteworthy in the context of the Master Plan's commitment to college opportunity is that the broad-access institutions – the State University and the community colleges – have been the locus of enrollment reductions. In each recession, the community colleges have responded to state budget cuts with reductions in faculty, courses and class sections, while at the same time the costs of college attendance has increased.

The broad-access institutions of California higher education, particularly the community colleges, enroll most of the low-income, first-generation, and Latino college students. Many of these students work and support families, attend part-time and depend on evening and weekend classes. Scheduling changes and the elimination or reduction of part-time faculty, courses and class sections reduce capacity, and this reduced capacity, along with tuition increases, results in lower enrollments. This subtle form of rationing of higher education opportunity has occurred without formal changes in policy or state priorities. Despite the Master Plan's commitment to access, the suppression of enrollments at the broad-access institutions for over three decades is *de facto* state policy in difficult budgetary times.

[1] California Higher Education Policy Center, *Financing the California Master Plan: A Data Base of Public Finance for Higher Education in California 1958/59 to 1996/97* (San Jose, CA: 1997); California Department of Finance, *Governor's Proposed Budget* (Sacramento: 1999 through 2007 editions); and California Postsecondary Education Commission, *Fiscal Profiles, 2006*, Commission Report 06–13 (Sacramento: 2006).

[2] California Postsecondary Education Commission, *Fiscal Profiles, 2010*, Report 10–21. (Sacramento: December 2010).

An analysis of the impact of the 2004–2005 community college budget reductions and enrollment losses by the Institute for Higher Education Leadership and Policy observed that:

> The greatest impact has been felt by the less well-prepared students who are not as savvy to deadlines, fees, financial aid, and ways to navigate the system….Many of the colleges we studied primarily serve first-generation students who have limited understanding of the educational system. Students who are somewhat uncertain about attending in the first place or about their ability to succeed are those most likely to be discouraged by the reduced access to classes and services, according to campus officials. Some respondents were very concerned that this will shut down the pipeline to the diverse clientele that the community colleges aim to serve (Shulock 2004).

After enrollments in broad-access institutions are reduced, they do not recover immediately when economic conditions and state appropriations improve, instructional capacity is restored, or even when tuition is frozen and financial aid is increased. These experiences from the 1990s are illustrative:

- The State University experienced budget cuts and raised student charges substantially in 1991, 1992, and 1993. Student fees increased by 103% during this period. Enrollments decreased each year from 1992 to 1995 and did not recover to the 1990 level until 2001, even though state funding was fully restored (and more) by 1997 and a multi-year tuition freeze was instituted.
- At the community colleges, state and local funding was cut in 1993 and 1994 and was restored to its pre-recession level in 1996. But enrollments were depressed for the remainder of the decade; they reached and surpassed the 1991 level in 2000 (California Higher Education Policy Center 1997; California Department of Finance1997–2007; California Postsecondary Education Commission 2006).

It is reasonable to conclude that the college aspirations of students or potential students may have been dampened when they were confronted with precipitous fee increases or denied access to college courses or services such as counseling and childcare.

The state's failure to plan for predictable enrollment growth has been at least as problematic as its response to financial downturns. By the early 1990s, it was widely expected that the numbers of high school graduates in California would increase substantially during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Projections in 1995, based on the continuation of established trends, set the impact on college enrollments at an additional 450,000 students by 2005[3] (Breneman et al. 1995.) In the late 1950s, it had been these types of projections that had evoked the planning and policy response embodied in the Master Plan. In contrast to the foresight of that era's leaders, however, California did not develop a state plan to accommodate its growing numbers of high school graduates. Political pressure for such a plan was lacking, the

[3] David W. Breneman, Leobardo F. Estrada, and Gerald C. Hayward, *Tidal Wave II, An Evaluation of Enrollment Projections for California Higher Education* (San Jose, CA: California Higher Education Policy Center, 1995).

influential Legislative Analyst's Office argued for an incremental rather than a comprehensive approach, and no higher education leader stepped forward to press the case for statewide planning, as Kerr had done in 1959. In 1994, Kerr, by then in his 80s, urged that the state adopt a comprehensive approach, arguing that "the course of facing-the-future-all-at-once" in 1960 had helped California create the best system of higher education in the nation in terms of both access and quality (Kerr 1994a).

Compounding their lack of a plan, state and higher education leaders regressed, in effect, to the practices of the 1950s that the Master Plan was designed to remedy. In the 1990s, each sector, with the support of communities, local boosters, and their legislators, put forward its own aspirations for new campuses. Policy leaders gave in to local and regional political pressures and ignored demography in the placement of new institutions. New campuses were established by the University at Merced and by the State University at Monterey, both in sparsely populated locations and far from the areas where projected growth of high school graduates was concentrated. For the first time since the enactment of the Master Plan, pork-barrel politics dominated decision-making processes for campus placement. California's capacity for comprehensive statewide higher education planning was nonexistent and the vacuum created by the absence of a statewide plan helped open the door for the politicized approach to increasing higher education capacity.

It is impossible to ascertain precisely the importance of the Master Plan in the successful expansion of California higher education in the 1960s and 1970s. Assuredly, a robust economy, along with dedicated state and higher education leaders, contributed to that success. By the same token, it is impossible to pinpoint the effect of the lack of statewide planning on recent history. However, by 2006 the community colleges – the point of college access for most Californians – enrolled 120,000 fewer students than had been projected in the mid-1990s (Breneman et al. 1995). These proved to be conservative. Community college enrollment for 2006 was more than 206,000 below projections of a 2000 study by the California Postsecondary Commission. It is unclear how many students were denied college opportunity, but what is clear is that the principle of the Master Plan – universal access to college for every high school graduate who was able to benefit – no longer applied. In addition, smaller proportions of high school graduates were enrolling in college, and the likelihood that a California high school student would enroll in college by age 19 was 36%, compared to 57% in the leading states on this measure (National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 2008).

Demographic Shifts

The rate of growth and the sheer size of California's population is only half of the demographic story. The other half is the transformation of an overwhelmingly white populace – over 90% at the time of the Master Plan's adoption – to a "majority minority" state in which no population group constitutes a majority (see Table 3.6). By 2000, about 47% of Californians were white; 33% were Hispanic; 11% were Asian/

Table 3.6 California population by ethnic group, 1960–2010

Amount

Year	White	Hispanic	Asian/Pacific Islander	Black	American Indian	Total population
1960	14,465,000	N/A	N/A	884,000	N/A	15,727,000
1970	15,480,723	2,423,085	671,077	1,379,563	83,838	20,038,286
1980	15,949,865	4,615,231	1,257,019	1,793,663	164,290	23,780,068
1990	17,023,502	7,760,598	2,748,810	2,106,060	189,503	29,828,473
2000	16,086,267	11,087,712	3,871,535	2,221,347	184,286	34,095,211
2005	15,927,936	13,116,938	4,500,424	2,251,099	202,964	36,899,417
2010	14,956,253	14,013,719	4,903,647	2,163,804	162,250	37,253,956

Percent of total population

Year	White	Hispanic	Asian/Pacific Islander	Black	American Indian	Total population
1960	92%	N/A	N/A	6%	N/A	100%
1970	77%	12%	3%	7%	0.4%	100%
1980	67%	19%	5%	8%	0.7%	100%
1990	57%	26%	9%	7%	0.6%	100%
2000	47%	33%	11%	7%	0.5%	100%
2005	43%	36%	12%	6%	0.6%	100%
2010	40%	38%	13%	6%	0.4%	100%

Sources: 1960 data from U.S. Bureau of the Census Statistical Abstract, "Bicentennial edition: Historical statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970," http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past_years.html (Accessed 10 April 2008); 1970–2010 data from California Department of Finance, Demographic Research Unit, E-3 *Race / Ethnic population estimates with age and sex detail (*1970–1989, 1980–1999, and 2000–2008 editions), http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/DEMOGRAP/Data/DRUdatafiles.php (Accessed 8 August 2011); and table 3A *Total population by race (1) and Hispanic or Latino: April 1, 2010,* http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/state_census_data_center/census_2010/view.php#PL94 (Accessed 19 August 2011)

N/A: Data not available

Note: The total for 1960 includes those who selected "other" and totals for 2000 and 2004 include individuals who selected multiple races. The Hispanic category for 1970–1990 equals a sum of Hispanic White, Hispanic Asian/Pacific, Hispanic Black, and Hispanic Indian

Pacific Islander; and 7% were black. In contrast to the first 25 years after World War II when the state's growth was fueled primarily by westward in-migration of Americans from other states, the immigrants of the past four decades have been overwhelmingly Asian/Pacific Islander and Hispanic. By the turn of the century, more than one in four of the 34 million Californians were foreign born. Between 2000 and 2010, Hispanics and Asian/Pacific Islanders have continued to grow as a share of the population while the percentage of whites continues to decline.

Not surprisingly, these demographic shifts are more pronounced in the state's young population (see Table 3.7). Hispanics accounted for 43% of California's high school graduating class of 2010, followed by whites at 33%, with Asians, Filipinos, and Pacific Islanders at 14%, and African Americans accounting for 7%. Public school enrollment reflects the depth and permanence of this profound transformation.

Table 3.7 Distribution of California public school enrollment and graduates by ethnicity, 2010

Ethnicity	White (%)	Hispanic or Latino of Any Race (%)	Asian, Pacific Islander, Filipino (%)	African American (%)	American Indian or Alaska Native (%)
Kindergarten	25	54	11	6	0.6
Grade 1	25	53	11	6	0.6
Grade 2	25	52	11	6	0.7
Grade 3	25	52	11	6	0.7
Grade 4	26	51	12	7	0.7
Grade 5	27	51	11	7	0.7
Grade 6	27	51	11	7	0.7
Grade 7	27	50	12	7	0.7
Grade 8	28	50	12	7	0.8
Grade 9	27	50	11	7	0.8
Grade 10	28	49	12	8	0.8
Grade 11	30	47	12	7	0.8
Grade 12	31	45	13	8	0.8
Total	27	50	12	7	0.7
High School Graduates	33	43	14	7	0.8

Sources: K–12 data from California Department of Education, DataQuest, *Enrollment by gender, grade and ethnic designation*, http://dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/ (Accessed 19 August 2011)
Note: The rows of percentages do not add to 100 because individuals who selected multiple ethnic groups or none at all are not reflected. Students who are not associated with a specific grade are also not included

Table 3.8 Distribution of public higher education enrollment by ethnicity, 2009

	Asian (%)	Black (%)	Filipino (%)	Latino (%)	Native American (%)	White (%)	Unknown (%)	Total (%)
UC	33	4	4	16	0.6	38	5	100
CSU	14	6	4	27	0.6	38	9	100
CCC	11	7	3	30	0.7	32	18	100
Total public	13	6	3	28	0.7	33	15	100

Source: CPEC, Ethnicity Snapshots, http://www.cpec.ca.gov/StudentData/EthSnapshotMenu.asp (Accessed 19 August 2011)

In short, contemporary California's higher education pipeline bears little resemblance to the homogeneous, preponderantly white baby boomer generation of the 1960s and 1970s. Many of the "new Californians" – Chinese and Japanese Americans in particular – enroll in California's most selective colleges and universities (see Table 3.8). Many others, however, are hampered by barriers of poverty, language, weak public schools and poor high school completion rates. The adverse impacts of these barriers are reflected in Table 3.8. The low high school graduation rates and college enrollment rates of Latinos, even as they approach majority status in the public schools, exemplify that impact.

Public Schools

The effectiveness of California's public schools was not an issue for the framers of the Master Plan. The limited indicators available in 1960 offered no reason for fundamental concerns about the health of public education. For example, the state's public schools, though not without their critics, consistently ranked high among the leading ten states and above the national average in expenditures per pupil; and its school teachers ranked among the best educated in the nation. At the time, it was reasonable to assume that graduates of California high schools would be able to benefit from the college opportunities that implementation of the Master Plan would create, and its architects made that assumption.

In 1978, the burden of Proposition 13 fell particularly heavily on public schools. Combined with legislative implementation of a court-mandated equalization of district funding, the passage of Proposition 13 set school finance into a downward spiral, one that was marked with only brief spurts of recovery in peak state revenue years. In 2010, California ranked 42nd in spending per pupil. California's spending per pupil was $1,740 below the national average and well below that of major industrial states ($8,076 below New York, $5,920 below Massachusetts, $3,882 below Pennsylvania and $2,749 below Michigan). In 2009, California ranked near last among states in staff to student ratios, and last in the ratio of guidance counselors and librarians to students. These declines occurred at the same time that the schools needed more resources to address increasing ethnic and language diversity and the poverty that afflicted almost one in five of California's children (National Education Association, Rankings 2010 and Estimates of 2011; NEA Research 2010).

Beginning in the 1990s, the National Assessment of Educational Progress assessed the performance of fourth and eighth grade students in math, reading and science by state. In 2009, 23% of California's eighth graders scored at levels of proficient or above in math, compared with 44% in the best-performing states; 22% of California's eighth graders scored at levels of proficient or above in reading compared to 42% in leading states; low-income California eighth graders scored very poorly in math (12% were proficient compared to 27% in leading states); and in science, 18% were proficient compared with 41% in leading states (in 2005). In science, the percentage of eighth graders scoring at or above the proficient level had decreased over the previous 9 years at one of the steepest rates in the nation. The poor performance of eighth graders suggests that they are not well prepared for challenging high school coursework in these basic disciplines. One consequence for higher education is that only 25% of high school graduates are academically prepared for college-level work (California Department of Education, NAEP results 2008; National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 2008; Governor's Committee on Educational Excellence 2007; EdSource 2008–2009).

In 2007, the University reported that more than 28% of its entering freshmen, drawn from California's highest-achieving high school graduates, did not perform at the required level as measured by its analytic writing placement exam. In 2010,

35% of regularly admitted freshmen in the State University needed remediation in mathematics and 49% needed remediation in English; 27% of students lacked proficiency in both reading and mathematics. (CSU Proficiency Reports) Although statewide standards for college readiness or placement examinations are lacking, a survey by the community colleges indicates that approximately half of community college students require basic skills instruction (California Community Colleges, *Basic Skills* 2003–*2004*, p. 9; CSU Proficiency Reports; UC, Office of the President, *Analytical Writing*; Brown and Neimi 2007).

California Higher Education, the Master Plan and the Kerr Legacy

The Master Plan brought stability and orderly growth to California higher education at a critical time in its modern development and resolved, for several decades, the principal cause of conflict between the university and the state colleges – the politicization of campus placement. Whatever its imperfections, the plan was the framework that catapulted California to national and global leadership in the growth of college participation and in the development of eminent research universities for two decades.

By addressing the issues of institutional mission and program allocation and by encouraging each sector, as the Master Plan legislation articulated, "To strive for excellence in its sphere," California developed a diverse array of colleges and universities to meet the needs of a growing population that had a broad range of abilities, motivations and educational aspirations. By sparing the state the battles over turf that dominated the higher education landscape in other states, the Master Plan contributed to public confidence and political and state financial support of higher education. The affirmation of the University of California's exclusive franchise in doctoral education and state-supported research positioned the University to maintain and enhance its standing among leading research universities.

In 1959 and 1960, critics of the Master Plan were few. The principal opponents at that time were the advocates of doctoral-granting authority for the state colleges, mostly faculty and staff of those colleges. But no alternative vision that transcended the aspirations of individual institutions was advanced. The plan was enacted nearly unanimously by the state legislature within a few months.

Several factors account for the political and educational consensus that emerged in support of the plan. The most important was that it resonated with and reinforced civic values, both egalitarian and meritocratic, that were prevalent in California and the nation in the late 1950s and 1960s. Also embedded in the plan was the optimism of Kerr and other leaders of higher education and state government, leaders who had experienced the adversity of the depression, World War II and the ensuing years of prosperity. As Kerr said many years later, "We thought things were getting better, they were going to keep on getting better. What we were doing we could

accomplish together. It was not a zero sum game. It was a game where all of us were going to benefit" (California Higher Education Policy Center 1993).

But out of this general optimism, came a plan that was grounded in financial realism. Its specific provisions were shaped by awareness of financial and political limitations and real tradeoffs. Financial discipline was reflected in the explicit definitions of institutional mission; the restriction of authority to offer the most advanced and expensive graduate and professional programs; reliance on community colleges as the initial point of access for two-thirds of the Californians who would enroll in public colleges and universities; state scholarships to permit eligible California students and the state to utilize the capacity of private colleges; and the establishment of new 4-year campuses in locations where they could attract sufficient enrollments to operate efficiently. Without these measures to constrain costs, the commitments to growth and expansion would have been beyond the financial reach of the state. The Master Plan's framework for managing growth – including a larger than projected 300% enrollment increase in the first decade after its enactment – was ambitious, but also cost conscious.

Another factor that contributed to the plan's success and to the political consensus that emerged in support of it was that it was deeply grounded in careful analysis of California's educational needs and capacities. The 230-page plan included statewide and regional projections of student enrollments, the needs for faculty, facility requirements and costs. These were developed by an array of advisory groups drawn from public and private higher education, public schools, and state government. Data and analysis could not assure policy agreement but contributed to the sense of urgency of planning. Most important, although the projections, as is usually the case, were flawed, this analytical backdrop linked the Master Plan to the demography and educational aspirations of California in 1960.

The unprecedented commitment to universal access to higher education was the single-most important innovation of the plan as well as the provision that had the greatest impact within and beyond California. While no state replicated the organizational and governance aspects of the California Master Plan, most followed California's example of moving toward universal access, relying primarily on junior or community colleges to increase higher education capacity, and seeking to define institutional missions as they expanded. It is conceivable (Kerr would strenuously disagree) that the University of California might have achieved most of its aspirations for expansion and preeminence in the absence of the Master Plan – many state flagship universities thrived in the 1960s and 1970s, and Berkeley was already the nation's preeminent public research university. But the development of California's state universities and community colleges, California's "broad access" institutions, would have been more problematic in the absence of a statewide framework that incorporated all three components of public higher education. By systematically legitimizing and rationalizing the roles and responsibilities of the "broad access" institutions – community colleges and state colleges – the plan offered a historic road map to universal higher education opportunity (a CSU perspective is provided by Gerth, 2010, esp. pp. 609–616). It enabled California to dramatically increase higher education participation and attainment with enormous economic and civic

benefits to the state. But if the egalitarian commitments of the plan were the most innovative and the most influential, they were also to prove the most fragile.

The plan was not without flaws. For example, the assumption that equitable higher education opportunity could be achieved by placing 2-year colleges within commuting distance of most state residents, keeping college costs to students free or low, and investing modestly in student financial assistance seems naïve in retrospect – geographical access and affordability are necessary but not sufficient conditions of access. And for all that they contributed to orderly growth, the uniform definitions of mission for each system, along with the size and scale of campuses and public systems, may have inhibited innovations and mission differentiation within these systems – reflected in Kerr's great disappointment with the effort to implant a collegiate campus at Santa Cruz within a multi-campus research university and some half dozen less than successful efforts to develop a liberal arts college in the California State University. In short, while the structure and organization of the plan succeeded in establishing heterogeneous public systems, it may have encouraged homogeneity of campus missions within these systems. And while the mission delineations put a brake on "mission creep" by community colleges and state colleges, it did not constrain the unbridled expansion of the University of California, as its campuses sought and many achieved a comprehensive array of graduate and professional programs and, most egregiously, as the University established a new campus at Merced in 2005. These developments were expensive and often unwarranted in terms of statewide needs. While this expansion can be understood in the context of campus aspirations, political pressures, and local economic development, it may produce one consequence that Kerr was most determined to prevent – the expansion of the number of research institutions beyond the financial capacity to support the requisite level of the quality (Kerr 2003; Rothblatt 2004).

The core of the Master Plan was the delineation of distinctive missions and structures of governance of each sector. This division of responsibility was critical to meeting the growth challenges of the 1960s and 1970s. As these public systems expanded and matured, the organizing principle of public higher education was "each train on its own track," or each higher education sector in its own "silo." The structure that reinforces differentiated missions and governance also accounts for the relatively limited collaboration across these mega-systems on core educational issues, such as the effectiveness of the transfer function, the strengthening of public education and college readiness of high school graduates, the use of technology off and on campus to support access and strengthen quality, or efforts to assure adequate funding for community colleges, which offer most of the state's lower division instruction and are the first-line responders in higher education to changing demographics, population growth, labor market volatility, and the weaknesses of public schooling (for collaboration issues, National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 1997; Bracco and Callan 2002; Pickens 1999; Richardson et al. 1999).

It could not be expected that any plan conceived in 1959 and 1960, however well attuned to its own times, would be functioning effectively a half century later. The Master Plan cannot be fairly criticized for failing to anticipate Proposition 13

and the taxpayers' revolt, the demographic shifts, the decline of California public schools, or the economic and political changes that would transform California over the next half century. But it is fair to point out that it lacked adaptive capacity; in effect, the plan was a constitution without provisions for amendment (Richardson et al. 1999; Richardson and Martinez 2009). The absence of adaptability along with its iconic stature as a symbol of the "California dream" has contributed to the prevailing consensus that this is a plan for the ages and to its rigidity in the face of radically changed circumstances. After 50 years, its structures and governance are mostly intact, but the fundamental principles they were designed to serve are seriously jeopardized.

After the Master Plan had resolved the urgent planning issues of the early 1960s, additional measures for assuring statewide planning and coordination were perceived as unnecessary; the mechanisms for these functions were left structurally weak. In 2011 the state gave up on this function completely by abolishing the California Postsecondary Education Commission, the last ineffective vestige of policy coordination. The vacuum in statewide policy and planning has contributed to California's failure to set statewide priorities, particularly in difficult financial circumstances when public priorities are most warranted but hardest to achieve by consensus. The Commission was the victim of the state fiscal crisis, its perennial lack of influence on policy and the disinterest of current and recent governors and legislators in effective coordination of higher education or, more generally, in higher education policy.

In contrast to the two decades after the adoption of the Master Plan, college opportunity in California has declined and casts a shadow on the state's economic future. A 2007 report from the Public Policy Institute of California warned that the state's workforce would likely fall far short of the level of education and skills needed in the future. The report's authors estimated that 39% of the jobs in the state's increasingly knowledge-based economy would require college degrees by 2020, but only 33% of working-age adults were projected to have acquired them by that time. The report warned that it is unlikely that the gap would be filled by in-migration of college-educated and trained workers (Johnson and Reed 2007). Another analysis projected a decline in the educational attainment of California's adult population and in personal income by 2020, "unless the state can increase the number of Hispanics/Latinos going to college and getting degrees" (National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 2006).

Under the Master Plan, community colleges enroll the overwhelming majority of college students in California. Relatively few of their students, however, benefit from the transfer opportunities within public higher education that were central to the Master Plan – less than 60,000 transferred in 2009: 15,121 to the University and 42,539 to the State University (California Postsecondary Education Commission 2011). One consequence is that California consistently ranks in the bottom third among states in baccalaureate degree production (National Center for Higher Education Management Systems 2008). In short, the fundamental Master Plan commitments to access and transfer are in disarray, with serious potential consequences for the state economy and for educational opportunity.

As indicators of a growing educational deficit accumulate (Moore et al. 2011), the state's financial condition offers little prospect of sustained infusions of new public dollars. Sporadic increases in state appropriations when the economy is growing rapidly can be generous, as in the "dot com" boom of the late 1990s and again as the state economy recovered from the recession of the early 2000s. However, state financial support as a consequence of the "Great Recession" and its aftermath has been reduced more drastically than ever and even in eventual recovery, California faces a chronic structural deficit. In years of weak state budgets, cuts to higher education are likely to continue to be severe (Jones 2006; Martinez and Nodine 1997).

In the absence of explicit mechanisms or processes for reexamining assumptions, policies and structures, numerous *ad hoc* citizens' commissions and special legislative committees have been established to review the plan every decade or so since the 1960s. They have consistently reaffirmed its key provisions, usually without examination of either its core components or careful analysis of state educational needs. Yet for three decades, the letter and spirit of these provisions have been set aside on an *ad hoc* basis when expedient. Reducing opportunity at the community colleges, and, at times, at the State University, has become California's stock response to financial difficulty. In contrast to the first decade of the Master Plan when enrollments exceeded expectations, the community colleges now enroll considerably fewer students than projected (Breneman et al. 1995).

Kerr's lifelong concern about the potential intrusiveness of state government or central authority generally was reflected in the Master Plan and in a 1971 report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, *The Capital and the Campus*. His skepticism led him to underestimate the need for some entity that would bring a perspective beyond the priorities of each of the sectors of higher education; to reassess policy in the context of changing state circumstances; and, particularly, to address the tradeoffs in policy and funding priorities across the sectors in relation to state needs – such as the relative priority of new research and graduate programs and campuses or of maintaining and enhancing access – as Kerr and his colleagues had done in creating the plan. It is not clear what kind of mechanism or process might have performed this function, but the issue was inadequately addressed by the Master Plan.

Few would dispute Kerr's conviction that highly centralized governance or greater state operational control of higher education would have been counterproductive, particularly in a state higher education system of California's scale and complexity. But the absence of any way to address overarching issues of state needs and priorities, or to address the performance of the system in the context of state needs and goals helps explain the poor adaptation to changing conditions, with each sector pursuing its own priorities and responding to unique and often parochial political pressures. The tradeoffs that had made the Master Plan effective as both a treaty and as public policy could not be identified or acted upon within the institutional structures the plan created. Kerr later characterized the Master Plan as Madisonian, because it protected the autonomy and independence of institutions (Kerr 1992, p. 57). But the reality was an institutional and policy structure that lacked the capacity to balance institutional and broad statewide public interests – more akin to the

Articles of Confederation than to Madison's federal Constitution. In 2011, California eliminated its weak and ineffectual statewide coordinating agency, in effect, giving up completely on the federalism model.

In the mid 1990s at a time of fiscal contraction and growing needs, state and higher education leaders turned once again to Kerr for advice. His response was that the policy agenda should include: "consideration of the highest fiscal priorities for higher education….[,]the best mechanisms for implementation…" and "redistribution of resources among segments" (Kerr 1994, p. 7). But he could only suggest that this agenda be addressed by an approach similar to that used to develop the 1960 Master Plan, one that would require unanimity or very broad consensus among institutional stakeholders. Not surprisingly, no effort was ever made to implement this proposal.

The Master Plan of 1960 was a balanced and finely tuned response to California's needs over the next decade and a half, as best they could be anticipated. But its rigidities in the face of changes in the state context over 50-plus years have resulted in a growing mismatch between institutional priorities and the needs of the state. And California has come full circle. The problems and issues that brought the Master Plan into being – politicized campus expansion and mission creep – have returned with a vengeance at the time of diminishing state support. The solution of 50 years ago, the Master Plan structure is now a substantial part of the problem.

We cannot know how Kerr would have responded to these circumstances. But if his leadership in developing the Master Plan has lessons, it is probably less in the specific solutions of 1960, though he always hoped they would be sustained, than in his recognition of higher education's responsibility to connect to the needs and aspirations of society for educational opportunity, for the development of knowledge and skills and for a pragmatic and disciplined balance between opportunity and research excellence and the institutional and financial arrangements that support them. In the Master Plan and elsewhere, Kerr believed higher education could best serve society when it retained independence and flexibility, but stressed that autonomy "be constantly earned and earned by responsible conduct and effective service to society….We would advance our autonomy by developing a Master Plan that well fitted the needs of the state" (Kerr 1992, p. 57).

The best retrospective assessment of the 1960 Master Plan was offered by Kerr himself: "the decisions…met the tests of that time and that place" (Kerr 1992, p. 60). But it is not the plan for California in the twenty-first century.

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Chapter 4
The California Master Plan: Influential Beyond State Borders?

David W. Breneman and Paul E. Lingenfelter

In 1990, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published, as one of its Reviews of National Policies on Education, a report entitled Higher Education in California. Previous studies in that series had reviewed higher education in Norway, Turkey, Iceland, Spain and Italy. One's first reaction is to wonder why the United States was being reviewed solely through the lens of one state, California. It is worth quoting at some length the answer to that question, as presented in the opening chapter of the report:

> Why then was California chosen as the focus for another of the OECD's reviews of national policy? It is not because California can be proxy for the United States—none of the fifty states lies at the median point of American economic or educational statistics. California is certainly superabundantly American but not an anonymous representative average. Even less is California a typical OECD territory. It is richer, technologically more advanced, educationally more lavishly endowed, and ethnically more diverse than any other part of the First World. Moreover, it shares only with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand a close and complex communication with the developing economy of the Pacific Rim.
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> The choice of California for the review could have been justified by its special economic and geographical position on the western frontier of the First World: but it was chosen for two quite different additional reasons. First, California offers the convenience, which the United States as a whole does not, of being comparable in scale to most OECD countries. Its 25 million people give it a government and administration of a size and scope somewhere between the smaller OECD countries such as Norway or Greece and the large ones like France or Germany. It is an appropriate choice, therefore, because comparisons

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> are paradoxically only practicable between similar social entities. Second, the purpose of OECD national reviews is to draw lessons as far as possible for other Member countries (OECD 1990, p. 15).

The report goes on to suggest that California provides, with its strong and diversified public sector of higher education, together with an also strong set of private, independent colleges and universities, a model that allows examination of a central issue in the current policy debate of that time, namely the potentially conflicting roles of state planning vs. market competition in the development and support of higher education. Implicitly, if not explicitly, one of the main purposes of the OECD review was to consider whether the California Master Plan could or should provide a road map for development of higher education in other OECD countries.

The answer to that question, presented in the short concluding chapter, is a clear statement of ambiguity: "The underlying great question as to the transferability of Californian educational expansiveness was not and could not be wholly settled" (OECD 1990, p. 121). Some interpret the California model to be heavily decentralized and market driven, pushing inevitably toward privatization. The reviewers, however, state:

> But nothing could be of greater distortion or of greater disservice to current policy debate in the European OECD countries or in Japan than the idea that California is the exemplar of a free market system of higher education. The particular Californian genius is that of combining public with private enterprise, of devising constructive competition and cooperation between and among both public and private institutions. Each of the Californian segments of higher education is aware that it cannot fulfill its own distinctive mission without the existence of and support from the others. It is this complex of creativity, and emphatically not the simplistic translation of the message into insistence on education as privatized competitive industry, that can usefully be exported from California to the OECD world (OECD 1990, p. 122).

In 1992, the Center for Studies in Higher Education at the University of California, Berkeley published a slim volume, entitled *The OECD, the Master Plan and the California Dream.* This volume was based on a conference held in Berkeley in May 1990 to give a broad group of primarily California educators and policymakers an opportunity to discuss the findings of the OECD review. Among the papers included in the volume is one by the late Burton R. Clark of the University of California at Los Angeles with the explicit title: "Is California the Model for OECD Futures?" Clark was never one to waffle around a question, or leave his conclusions shrouded in uncertainty. He states emphatically that California is not a model for OECD countries to emulate (Rothblatt 1992, pp. 74, 61–77). His argument is that the US (and California) model is one of decentralized governance and competition, hardly consistent with the highly centralized Ministry of Education model found in Europe and Japan. To the extent that one agrees with Clark, one can conclude that this international foray into the scope and influence of the California approach led to a negative conclusion.

In the present chapter, we undertake a similar investigation but focus on the question of whether, and to what extent, the California Master Plan exerted a significant influence on the development of higher education within the United States. In this case, one might assume that the California plan could have exercised more influence

than it may have abroad, as the history, culture and traditions among the 50 states are far more similar with regard to higher education than they are with Europe or Japan. Upon further thought, however, one would be hard pressed to name another state that had adopted the three-tiered system of institutions, each with its own governance structure and well-defined missions, and with very weak and largely ineffective coordination among the three systems. If one used those structural features of the Master Plan as defining elements, then this could be a very short chapter, with a very clear negative conclusion. As several papers in this volume have argued, however, defining the Master Plan purely through its structural elements is to misunderstand the values embodied in the plan, which may well have influenced thought in other states. Among those values were a state commitment to universal access to some form of higher education; clear mission differentiation among research universities, comprehensive state colleges and two-year community colleges; a reliance on data and rational planning for higher education viewed as a system, not simply as a collection of independent institutions; clearly defined admissions criteria for each tier of institutions; inclusion of the community colleges as an important part of the higher education system; and, in overarching terms, a plan that provided for both equality and excellence, without necessarily pitting them against each other. As a consequence, we approach the task of this chapter with this broader definition of the Master Plan guiding our inquiry, rather than the structural elements that often first come to mind.

Our approach was to interview ten state leaders of higher education who served during the years following the adoption and implementation of the California Master Plan. Some were in leadership positions in state coordinating boards, others with particular state systems, but all were in a position to experience the intellectual currents flowing from California and to reflect now on whether actions they took or observed seemed to be responsive to values or policies found in that plan. Our interviews with these leaders were rich and rewarding, and we present summaries of their comments in the material that follows. Those interviewed were:

1. **Kenneth H. Ashworth**: Texas Commissioner of Higher Education, 1976–1997.
2. **Joseph C. Burke**: VP for Academic Affairs, State University of New York (SUNY) system, 1973–1974; President of SUNY Plattsburg, 1974–1986; Provost, SUNY system, 1986–1995.
3. **Patrick M. Callan**: Directed review of CA Master Plan, 1971–1973; Executive Director, Montana Commission on Postsecondary Education, 1973–1975; Washington State Council for Postsecondary Education, 1975–1978; California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC), 1978–1986; Vice President, Education Commission of the States (ECS), 1986–1990.
4. **Gordon K. Davies**: Associate Director and Director, State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, 1973–1997; President, Kentucky Council on Postsecondary Education, 1998–2002.
5. **John K. Folger**: Executive Director, Tennessee Higher Education Commission, 1968–1975; Education Commission of the States, 1975–1981.
6. **James M. Furman**: Executive Officer, Ohio Board of Regents, 1964–1970; Washington State Council on Higher Education, 1970–1975; Illinois Board of Higher Education (IBHE), 1975–1980.

7. **T. Edward Hollander**, CUNY system, 1964–1968; New York Board of Regents, 1969–1974; Chancellor, New Jersey Board of Higher Education, 1977–1990.
8. **Stanley O. Ikenberry**: Pennsylvania State Center for the Study of Higher Education; Pennsylvania State administration; President, University of Illinois, 1979–1995 and 2010; President, American Council on Education (ACE), 1996 to 2001.
9. **David Pierce**: community college faculty, administrator and president, California, Illinois, and Iowa, 1962–1980; Executive Director, Illinois Community College Board, 1980–1990; Chancellor, Virginia Community College System, 1990–1991; President, American Association of Community Colleges, 1991–2000.
10. **Richard D. Wagner**: Deputy Director (1969 to 1980) and then Executive Director (1980 to 1998), IBHE.

Ken Ashworth

Ashworth served as the Texas Commissioner of Higher Education for 21 years (1976–1997). He indicated that the California Master Plan did have an influence on thinking in that state, and that initially Texas tried to emulate the tiered model part of the plan, but was unsuccessful in that effort. A key reason was that the University of Texas at Austin and Texas A & M were independent of each other and were the leading research universities. It was never possible to combine them into something analogous to the UC system. In addition, there was never full political support for efforts to restrain several of the regional public campuses from striving for research status. Ashworth and his colleagues fought this "mission creep" but only with modest success as various regional campuses managed to gain doctoral-granting status in a few disciplines. He also mentioned that there was never the funding supply that would have allowed the development of three tiers a là California.

Ashworth mentioned that he spoke with Kerr sometime in the 1990s at an SREB meeting, and Kerr said that the California plan was a unique creation of the right plan at the right time, and that he could never have achieved something like it a couple of decades later.

Ashworth was also critical of the inconsistency across the nation of the six regional accrediting bodies with their different policies on accreditation, which he believes made it difficult for the nation to develop common standards for what it takes to deliver specific programs.

When turning to the issue of values embedded in the California plan, he indicated that Texas supported open access and educational opportunity for all, one key feature of the California model. He believes adoption of that policy would have happened anyway as the state was benchmarking itself against the nation, not a single state. With regard to affordability, Texas maintained low tuition into the 1980s, as during the 1960s and 1970s, the legislature set tuition rates and wanted them kept low.

Eventually, the institutions began pushing for higher tuitions because they had to have more income, and they were no longer getting it through appropriations. The legislature was constricting their ability to fund their operations by controlling both appropriations and tuition charges. In addition, building use fees, computer fees and library fees were not providing enough additional income. Tuition was the only remaining source, so the institutions needed freedom to raise that student charge. Campuses have recently achieved tuition autonomy, with tuition setting delegated to the Board of Regents.

Ashworth remarked that the years he served were the "Golden Age" for coordinating boards, with the governor making appointments to the Board, but largely staying away from doing so in a narrow political fashion. In recent times, politics has intruded sharply into the governance of Texas institutions, and mission creep continues apace. In his words: "Politics has overwhelmed rationality."

Joseph Burke

Burke was a faculty member at Ohio Wesleyan and Duquesne University in Pittsburg during the 1960s; and after holding administrative positions in Canada and SUNY Plattsburg, he was president of Plattsburg from 1974 to 1986. He was provost of the SUNY system from 1986 to 1995, and interim chancellor of the system 1994–1995 and served as system professor of higher education and management from 1995 to 2006.

Burke indicated great admiration for Kerr's book, *The Uses of the University*, and of his work with the Carnegie series, but does not see any connections between the California Master Plan and the development and expansion of higher education in New York. Burke suggests that the shape of public higher education in New York as it exists today was largely the creation of Nelson Rockefeller, who served as governor from 1959 to 1973. Burke, who became president of Plattsburg near the end of Rockefeller's term, indicated that the governor never would have appointed anybody to higher education leadership who "suggested he got ideas from California!" The Empire State does its own thing.

Rockefeller's plan responded to the same demographics experienced in California and other states, but it was shaped by the traditions and the distribution of population and political influence in the state, not ideas borrowed from elsewhere. The private sector was quite strong in New York and building the City University of New York (CUNY) and SUNY systems was something of a coup for Rockefeller. New York (and New Jersey especially) had a strong tradition of sending students out of state to college. The dispersion of campuses around the state began in 1948 when Thomas Dewey was governor.

In all his years at SUNY, Burke "Never once heard reference to the California Master Plan in relation to the plan, origin, or development of the SUNY system." While New York and California share a tradition of low tuition, New York's tradition is rooted in the CUNY system, and it persists to this day. In California, public research universities now have higher tuition and fees than in New York.

Selectivity is a campus issue in New York, not a regulatory issue as in the California Master Plan. The most selective institutions of SUNY are not necessarily the research universities. Geneseo (an honors college) is the most selective, Buffalo and Stony Brook are not especially selective, and Binghamton and Albany are the most selective research centers. New York's two-year colleges came in part from the agricultural technology campuses, which have been permitted to migrate to four-year campuses. Differentiation of mission has not been rigidly maintained in New York. Other community colleges emerged after the Second World War, and they exist in most counties.

Burke suggests that private higher education in New York has been influential in restraining the state support for increasing the stature of public research universities despite Chancellor Cliff Wharton's Graduate and Research Initiative.

Pat Callan

Callan got into higher education policy work in 1971, when he was asked to staff a review of the CA Master Plan, even though it was originally set up to run from 1960 to 1975, i.e., the legislative review came several years early. In that capacity, he came to know Clark Kerr well, as his contributions to this book and the 1992 Berkeley volume make clear. Having completed the review in 1973, he was then asked to undertake a similar venture in Montana, which lasted until 1975. He was then asked to be the head of the Washington Coordinating Board, which he served until 1978. He returned to California to head CPEC (a 1974 creation that replaced the California Coordinating Commission), in which capacity he served from 1978 to 1986. He followed that experience with four years at ECS, and then headed the California Higher Education Policy Center, which became the National Center on Public Policy and Higher Education, both independent, non-partisan, foundation-supported think tanks in San Jose, California.

Callan noted that in the early 1970s, when he first became engaged with the study of higher education, Berkeley, the city and the university, was a seedbed of ideas, with the Carnegie Commission, the Ford Foundation Program for Research on University Administration, an Education Testing Service (ETS) branch office, and a higher education center in the UC Berkeley School of Education. (The campus-wide Center for Studies in Higher Education was established later.) Probably never before or since have such a wealth of resources coexisted in one location, all focused on systematic study of higher education.

His view of the California Master Plan is that it had few original ideas, but that Kerr was a great synthesizer, who took ideas that were in the air and gave them an operational business plan, which elicited broad enthusiasm and substantial financial support from the state government.

Callan argues that there were three key ideas in the Plan: (1) universal educational opportunity; (2) the systematic inclusion of the community colleges as an essential part of higher education and of the Plan; and (3) strict mission differentiation among the three tiers, with effective controls that prevented mission creep. He argues that

in understanding the influence the Plan may have had on other states, these concepts are the right markers, rather than focusing solely or primarily on the three-tiered system, which did not happen in other places.

His view, expressed elsewhere in writing as well as in our interview, is that the Plan was grounded in the political, economic and demographic realities of California in the 1960s, and its success is that it responded effectively to those realities. As such, it has developed iconic status in the state that continues to the present. He also argues that it was too rigid, too "siloed," and thus not as adaptable to changing conditions as one might have wished. In that vein, his chapter for the current volume is entitled *The Perils of Success*.

In that spirit, he notes that the Plan tied mission, governance and strict admissions criteria into a tight linkage, too rigid in the long run, blocking adaptive capacity. However, as one who has spent most of his time in California, he notes it was clearly the big success story of the post-Second World War era in American higher education. When he served at CPEC, educators and policymakers world-wide came to California to learn about the Plan and how elements might apply to newly-emerging higher education systems.

Gordon Davies

Davies followed several earlier stints in higher education with his long service with the State Council on Higher Education in Virginia (SCHEV), which he served from 1973 to 1977 as associate director and from 1977 to 1997 as executive director. He filled a similar role as head of the Kentucky Coordinating Board from 1998 to 2002.

He said that when he arrived in Virginia, the Carnegie Commission's five-foot shelf of books was in the office and obviously had been read and used by those concerned with state policy. He clearly indicated that the California Plan and the Carnegie Commission writings of Kerr had a significant influence on the thinking in Virginia, not in terms of the three-tiered structure but in the planning and policy setting for enrollment growth, system expansion and institutional mission. Davies's comments were among the most explicit in this regard of the individuals interviewed. Most were less clear about the actual influence, perhaps largely seeing the ideas as in the air everywhere.

As executive director, Davies did prepare a master plan, focused on access and on keeping the colleges and universities true to their essential missions. In that regard, the influence of California is obvious. He said that he and his colleagues saw one of the downsides of the Master Plan, with its three tiers, to be the social stratification thereby created, and Virginia sought to avoid that trap by insisting that the selective public universities draw from all parts of the state, not just the wealthy suburbs of Washington, DC. SCHEV was created in 1956 and so predated the California Plan. In the early 1970s, there was serious consideration of moving to a governing board model such as in North Carolina, but that proposal was soundly rejected.

We agreed at the end of our conversation that the high tide of influential coordinating or governing boards had passed, and that perhaps they were a product of a particular era in US higher education where enrollment growth and institutional expansion had to be handled in other than purely political ways. But we also fear that we may be returning to some of the bad old ways as higher education today is mired in partisan political battles of various sorts.

John Folger

Folger was the first head of the Tennessee Coordinating Commission, serving in that capacity from 1968 to 1975. Prior to that, he had been at Florida State University and at Southern Regional Education Board (SREB). Following his time at the Coordinating Commission, he spent 6 years on the staff at ECS.

He remembers the era of his work at the Coordinating Commission as one in which there was a burst of interest in planning, a system-wide look at the needs of the state and the institutional capacity required to meet those needs. He noted that Dick Millard, who was head of ECS during those years, was pushing rational planning hard and heavy as well. He did note, interestingly, that the regional universities in Tennessee, as well as the national American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU) office was opposed to the feature of the California plan that capped their academic offerings at the masters degree levels, and he remembered active opposition to this aspect of the plan, both in the state and nationally. The regional campuses did not want any formal plan restricting them to a more limited set of offerings, and particularly, denying them the PhD degree.

While his charge as the first commissioner was to establish a master plan for Tennessee, the feature of mission definition prevented a truly successful plan. Everyone paid lip service to the value of limited missions, but no one really wanted to be bound by such restrictions, and all managed to defeat the effort politically.

He did note that the California Plan brought the community colleges into the total system of higher education, and defined a clear mission for them. Folger used that example to help develop and shape the community colleges in Tennessee, a direct influence from California. On the other hand, he noted that most policymakers and educators in Tennessee knew very little about the California Plan but developed a cultural aversion to anything of that sort coming out of California in the 1960s, where the hippy culture and the campus demonstrations against the Vietnam War were not broadly supported in the more conservative American South. He believes that even though these cultural issues were unrelated to the California Plan, they became associated in the mind of many with what was wrong with California higher education.

In addition to creating a Coordinating Commission in the 1960s, Tennessee also adopted formula budgeting at this time, another aspect of the rational approach to resource allocation. Together, the Commission and the new budget models did

change the nature of the discussion regarding the growth of the Tennessee systems of colleges and universities. He did stress, however, that Tennessee never sought to emulate the three-tiered system of campuses.

In Folger's view, Florida was the best southern example of the development of a community college system in the early 1950s. Texas, Georgia and Mississippi were all southern states that had extensive two-year colleges by the 1950s without defining their role in a total system. Because the SREB was an important means of spreading educational ideas, the Florida community college example was more influential on the development of community colleges in Tennessee and other southern states than the community college example of the California Master Plan.

He also noted that in Tennessee and most states the budget is the de facto short-range plan, and if the state's master plan does not relate to the budget, it is ignored. Tennessee has been a fiscally conservative state, with low taxes, and that constrained the change and development of public higher education. To the extent that Tennessee master plan concepts and ideas were included in the budget, they affected the development of higher education. For example, the master plan recommendation for giving need-based aid directly to students rather than through institutions became a part of the budget and had a positive effect in increasing access to higher education. Another example was differentiated funding of programs that reinforced differentiation of institutional missions, even though broad support for the kind of three-level structure exemplified in the California Master Plan did not exist.

Jim Furman

In 1961, Furman worked for the Ohio Legislative Research Commission and staffed an Interim Commission on Education Beyond High School, which, in his words, did not accomplish much. Later, his boss, Lauren Glosser, asked him to continue working on the topic, and he wrote a January 1963 report (Ohio Legislative Research Commission Report #53) entitled simply "Coordination of Higher Education." The California Master Plan was not mentioned in this work, but Lyman Glenny's scholarship on state planning was influential, and Furman borrowed freely in the paper from the recently passed legislation creating the IBHE (Glenny was professor of education at UCB).

While the California Master Plan was visible, Furman thought Ohio legislative leaders would not have been very receptive to using California as a model. Furman recalled, however, that Kerr was on the cover of *Time Magazine*. (The related article, dated October 17, 1960, available to subscribers only, can be found at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,895026,00.html).

Jim Rhodes, Ohio's new governor took a liking to Report #53 and asked Furman to draft legislation to implement it. Within about a year the Ohio Board of Regents was created, and John Millet became the first chancellor, leaving his position as president of Miami University of Ohio. Millet persuaded Furman to join

him as executive officer. The context of the creation of the Board of Regents included competition for expansion and resources among existing public universities, especially Ohio State and Ohio University, and Governor Rhodes was not a big fan of Ohio State.

The Ohio Board of Regents strategy for providing access was to convert municipal universities (Youngstown, Akron, Toledo, Cincinnati and Cleveland) to state universities, and to encourage local communities to float bond issues to add local branch campuses from existing state universities. Some of these later became locally controlled community colleges. There was no segmentation of admissions by high school rank on policy grounds, but eventually Ohio State become more selective. As a practical matter, every high school graduate could be admitted to some university.

About 1970, Furman left Ohio to become the first executive director of the Washington State Council on Higher Education. There, on the West Coast, California was an influential model, and the role of the coordinating board became managing the ambitions of different institutions. The Council picked up on the California role and mission model, but universities generally did not want it to be established.

In both Washington and Ohio, Furman observed that the flagship research university successfully protected its turf, but both states managed to coordinate policy better than California with its segmented system silos. Washington emulated California in pursuing low tuition (not no-tuition policy, however) and building a strong student aid program. Furman believes the California model of weak coordination had a negative impact on dynamics in Washington.

In Illinois, the last state where Furman had a leadership role, the primacy of the IBHE in dealing with issues of mission and scope was well-established by the time he arrived in 1975.

Ted Hollander

Hollander began his career in higher education policy work at CUNY in the early 1960s. As a young faculty member, he was asked to serve on the Commission on City Finances, and he prepared, among other things, a report on CUNY recommending that they introduce tuition. Al Bowker, the chancellor of City University (and later to become chancellor at UCB), then brought him onto his staff, where he served through the late 1960s, culminating in the move to open enrollment in 1968. Subsequently, Joe Nyquist hired him at the New York Board of Regents, where he worked on statewide policy for five years. He then served as chancellor of the New Jersey Board of Higher Education from 1977 to 1990, followed by several years of teaching at Rutgers University. He thus had a central seat at the events in both New York City, and the states of New York and New Jersey.

We talked at length about whether the creation of the CUNY and SUNY systems were modeled to some degree on the California Plan, as New York seems to be the one state where one might try to make that case. We recreated the chronology of the SUNY system, largely the result of Nelson Rockefeller's time as governor, and

realized that Sam Gould was Rockefeller's pick to establish and expand SUNY, beginning in 1964. (Gould had served as chancellor of the University of California, Santa Barbara from 1959 to 1962, the period when the California Plan was created.) Rockefeller's ambition initially was to incorporate CUNY into the state system, which prompted leaders at the City University to create their own system, to avoid being swept into the larger entity. (Note that Al Bowker came to the CUNY system from Stanford University and thus would have observed the creation of the California Master Plan.) It is interesting, therefore, to read Joe Burke's interview, where he staunchly denies that the California Plan played any role in the thinking in New York in the 1960s.

Hollander viewed the move at CUNY to open enrollments as critically important to preventing a social explosion in New York City in the late 1960s. Riots in Harlem, which then as now had a large African-American population, clearly had an influence on the decision to advance opportunities for minority students who had not been able to enroll in significant numbers in the restrictive CUNY four older, senior colleges (City College, Brooklyn College, Queens College and Hunter College). That decision remains controversial to this day.

In New Jersey, the Board of Higher Education was the creation of Governor Robert Meyner, who first established a Commission on Higher Education which recommended creation of the Board, a very powerful body. Ralph Dungan was the first chancellor, and Hollander was the second incumbent, serving for 13 years. By 1977, one might expect that the impact, if any, of the California Master Plan would be attenuated, although the emphasis on systemic planning endured and was part of the focus of the Board of Higher Education. Hollander's successor, Ed Goldberg, tangled with Governor Christie Whitman, who sought to fire him. Learning that she could not do that, Whitman simply shut down the Board of Higher Education in the early 1990s, ending its short life.

Although Hollander generally seemed amenable to the view that there was an influence, however indirect, from Clark Kerr and the Master Plan on both New York and New Jersey, he took issue with Pat Callan's view that California had been instrumental in establishing universal educational opportunity. His point is that the three-tiered system in California was highly inequitable, in that minorities and the poor were largely shunted into the two-year college system, while the children of wealth and privilege, largely white, were able to attend the University of California at very low cost. He argued that this form of stratification was precisely what New York sought to avoid by having large numbers of the "best" institutions be open to all students regardless of academic background. Hollander's view is an interesting reappearance of the Hansen-Weisbrod thesis of 1969 (Hansen and Weisbrod 1969). Indeed, one could fault the California Master Plan as being a form of merit-aid routed through institutions, rather than through student financial aid.

Hollander subsequently contributed the following additional thoughts:

> I would now conclude that the only possible links between California and New York are in the earlier positions of Sam Gould and Al Bowker. I doubt that Al was a catalyst. In all the years I knew him at CUNY, we never discussed the California system. I did not know Gould.

Our major preoccupation in the 1964 plan was with the problem of providing sufficient capacity for the newly identified baby-boom wave of students. Our projections were for massive enrollment increases that could not be accommodated in existing facilities even if we did not change the highly selective admissions policies. We needed additional institutions, and we needed them quickly. I recall an early trip to Harvard to consult with faculty to discuss whether there was an optimum size for an undergraduate four-year institution. We discussed how many were needed, which educational programs were required and where they could best be located. Unlike California, CUNY operated within a single city with reasonably adequate public transportation. An early decision was made to establish a single university-wide doctoral program headquartered opposite to the New York Public Library (with its massive research collection and reading room). An office building was converted with adequate classroom facilities for all programs except the sciences which would remain at campuses with adequate laboratory facilities. CUNY was given the power to confer doctoral degrees, and the programs were organized centrally (exceptions were allowed and rare).

CUNY developed a master plan within the framework that was primarily focused on the need for a rapid expansion that took into account the city's unique history and geographical needs. CUNY was not at all like the California-tiered system. CUNY financed new construction through existing tuition for part-time students and through fees and other charges. SUNY financed its construction program through adoption of a tuition policy. In both systems, public monies were appropriated to replace the revenues and they reverted to help finance operations.

The point of all this discussion is that there was no one model that makes sense everywhere. Planning is useful in raising questions. Planning is useful in collecting data and forcing analysis. As long as higher education is a state responsibility, in the end, the politics, history and tradtions of each state and its fiscal circumstance determine the outcomes.

The California model was not, in my judgment, the model for New York City, in form nor fulfillment. The California model may have been the model for New York State because of the state's similarity to California in population and its dispersal.

Did the idea of open access originate in California? It may be, but only a search of the literature would help answer that question. In New York, the transformation began with the identification of need for additional capacity to absorb the baby boom and only after realizing that expansion, by itself, would not open opportunity for minority students, did the University seek other ways of integrating the colleges. That in turn set off a series of events that lead inexorably to "open admissions." Initially, the city's no-tuition-policy established in 1847 was continued.

Stan Ikenberry

Ikenberry began his professional career in the 1960s at Pennsylvania State University. Jack Oswald was president of Penn State, and Ikenberry worked closely with him in Oswald's efforts to address planning issues in Pennsylvania. Oswald, while clearly working in the Pennsylvania environment, had been a vice president in Clark Kerr's presidency of UC and was influenced by him. Ikenberry recalls that he and Oswald were once talking in Oswald's office in their shirtsleeves when Oswald was informed that President Kerr was on the phone. Oswald donned his jacket before taking the call. (Levine reports the same anecdote in his chapter.)

Penn State was self-consciously a state-related, not a state university, and prided itself as perhaps the antithesis of the California "State University" model. Yet Oswald in 1970 saw the need for Pennsylvania to deal with statewide planning issues and recruited Ikenberry from the Center for the Study of Higher Education to help. Oswald worked to develop a quiet "master plan" in Pennsylvania, bringing together presidents from other institutions, Wes Posvar from Pittsburgh, Marvin Wachman from Temple University in Philadelphia, Richard Richardson from Harrisburg Area Community College, Keith Spaulding from Franklin and Marshall College in Lancaster, to talk about statewide needs. Oswald was influenced by Kerr's example, but did not talk about California as a model. One interesting indication of this was that the public university presidents testified on behalf of cross-sectoral access to state student aid, and the private presidents testified in favor of the public appropriations to Penn State. Eventually, of course, Pitt and Temple became more closely state related.

Penn State, under its previous president, Eric Walker, established two-year Commonwealth Campuses across the state in an obvious ploy to prevent the development of a community college system. Oswald worked more cooperatively with other sectors (as described above) and sent Ikenberry as an emissary to some of the smaller private colleges in the state. The Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education, the former teachers colleges, has, without the formal planning guidelines of California, nevertheless evolved much like the CSU system. But unlike many other states, Pennsylvania's community college system remains relatively small.

Ikenberry observed:

> With all the positive things accomplished by the California Master Plan, in the later years it became a mixed blessing for the state. The roles and responsibilities of institutions which were so carefully defined and delimited didn't allow for the natural adaptation, development and growth that would have better served the public. The University of California grew well and wisely the first couple of decades, but later the ability of the system to evolve became more tortured and complicated. Two or three of the California State Universities could have developed into strong, more complex institutions, and efforts to manage growth in the University of California system by building research universities on greenfields have been difficult. I'm not sure the Master Plan didn't thwart the development of the California State University system unnecessarily. The elegance and strength of the Master Plan cuts both ways, and saddled the state with undue rigidity.

As an afterthought Ikenberry wrote:

> It may be the most significant contribution of the California Master Plan that it defined and legitimized statewide planning and the application of the methodologies of the social sciences to the organization of higher education. I recall the formation of Michigan State's first Office of Institutional Research in 1960 which did essentially the same thing at the institutional level. The Penn State Center for the Study of Higher Education that I joined in 1969 also was intended to support planning and decision-making at the University.
>
> Kerr continued this contribution after he left the presidency of UC through his massive Carnegie Commission studies. Higher education had never seen the likes of that before; and honestly, we have seen too little of it since. But it was all founded on the belief that analysis of data, along with rational planning and decision-making, could lead to sounder, better higher education policy, especially during a period in which obvious growth was going to take place and major decisions needed to be guided and informed.

> So, I think it may have been the planning of the "Big Idea," widely adopted across the country in other states, that was the major material impact of the California Master Plan. It did not dictate that every state should reach the same solution as California; but that every state could engage in thoughtful, professional analysis grounded in social science methodology that could be useful to policymakers and institutions and ultimately to citizens.

David Pierce

David Pierce grew up in Oklahoma, but stayed in California after serving in the US Marine Corps, enjoying tuition free access to Fullerton (community) College and then CSU Long Beach where he got his BA and MA. By the late 1960s he had obtained his doctorate at Purdue in Indiana and began his administrative career in Illinois and Iowa.

In 1961, while teaching mathematics at Costa Mesa High School and Orange Coast (community) College in California, he attended a presentation on the Master Plan by the college president Basil Peterson. The topics of discussion Pierce recalls were: (a) would community colleges get a fair share of the good students; and (b) how could the universities still be competitive athletically if they only get high ranking students!?

In Pierce's view, the Master Plan had nothing to do with low-cost community colleges or geographic access to them in California; that already existed. The focus of the Master Plan was about the location and building of new campuses, and he does not remember hearing much about the Master Plan after that meeting. California was viewed as a flagship state for community colleges, but that was true before the Master Plan, not because of the Master Plan.

In the late 1960s, Pierce came to Illinois at Waubonsee community college. Lyman Glenny was a force then in Illinois and spoke of California from time to time. Illinois sought geographic access and tuition as low as possible, part of the community college ethos. But there was no discussion of distributing students among institutions by academic achievement—the natural process of student choice and institutional selectivity was allowed to function. The IBHE had authority to set admission standards, but did not exercise it in any way in the 1960s or 1970s.

In Illinois during the 1960s and early 1970s, the focus was on the expansion of the regional universities, building the community college system, and establishing upper division universities [the last two-years of a four-year BA] to provide adequate space for community college transfer students. Pierce questioned the wisdom of aggressively expanding four-year campuses in rural areas of the state, but endorsed the vision of including every part of the state in a community college district. Although it took several decades, he later (along with Dick Wagner) played a role in completing that vision.

As a community college leader, Pierce indicated he has often wondered, "Who really owned the California Master Plan?" He seems inclined to believe the Land Grant Universities were the dominant voice in California as well as many other states, including his home state of Oklahoma. [By Act of Congress in 1861, the

federal government provided states with land on which to build universities, provided they offered courses in agriculture and engineering.]

While virtually every state was affected by the baby-boom demographics, Pierce believes the national elections of 1964 (the Lyndon Johnson landslide) did more to support the expansion of higher education than any other factor. Democrats took over the state house and legislatures in most states and legislation passed (to create community colleges in Iowa for example) that never would have had a chance before.

Dick Wagner

Dick Wagner was in graduate school at the University of Pittsburg in Pennsylvania during the early 1960s and had come to Illinois to work for the IBHE in 1969. But he grew up and did undergraduate college work in Illinois. He is deeply versed in the history of Illinois higher education public policy through both his own experience and personal relationships with others who have played significant roles.

In the 1950s, Governor Stratton of Illinois created a commission to study a way to make higher education policy that would improve on the traditional log rolling between Senator Everett Peters, a patron of the University of Illinois, and Speaker of the House Paul Powell, the patron of Southern Illinois University. But public policy debates on higher education began earlier. In 1945, Peters proposed legislation to set up a statewide public junior (community) college system which would offer schooling for freshmen and sophomores near their homes (Senate Bill No. 153, 1945). Others, including then State Senator Richard J. Daley, introduced legislation calling for the creation of a new branch of the University of Illinois in Chicago (Senate Bill No. 388, 1945). While neither initiative—both advanced in response to the GI Bill—passed the General Assembly at that time, both were eventually implemented.

The Stratton Commission eventually led to the creation of the IBHE. Richard Browne, who became the first executive director, was an influential player on the Stratton Commission and in other dimensions of higher education public policy in Illinois. In his memoirs (located in the University of Illinois-Springfield oral history archives), he indicated that a priority was to avert the University of Illinois' efforts to dominate the early work of the IBHE. With the help of Ben Heineman, chairman of the IBHE and a prominent business leader, this was achieved.

Another priority was to find his successor, since Browne came out of retirement to take on the leadership of the IBHE. Ironically, David Dodds Henry (University of Illinois president) asked Clark Kerr for ideas. Kerr nominated several Californians, including Lyman Glenny, whom Browne successfully recruited to Illinois. Glenny built the "system of systems" model, an effort to strengthen the coordinating function of the IBHE by developing a "balance of power" among four university systems and a community college coordinating board in Illinois. He clearly was not a captive of the University of Illinois.

The role of the private sector in Illinois as well as the political balance of power between Southern Illinois University and University of Illinois did a lot to shape both plans and policies in Illinois. The Southern/University of Illinois competition was diminished when legislative redistricting required by a Supreme Court "one man, one vote" decision reduced the clout of rural Illinois, but it remained a factor.

Stronger was the influence of private colleges and universities in the Chicago metropolitan region as well as rural Illinois. The private sector was well organized, it employed skillful lobbyists, and it had an important influence on state student assistance programs and the Illinois master plan. For example, Glenny initially proposed four upper division universities to provide baccalaureate completion access for community college transfers, but only two were approved. The IBHE proposed universal coverage for community colleges all over the state, but this was not completed until the 1980s with the final holdouts in Evanston [Northwestern University] and Bloomington/Normal, both the homes of significant private institutions, and in the case of Bloomington/Normal also a public university. When the state decided to increase education in the health professions in the 1970s, a significant investment in private health professions education complemented public expansion.

Mission differentiation occurred in Illinois, but not as rigidly as in California. Tuition and fees were moderately higher, with financial aid to provide a degree of choice in the private sector as well as access. Statewide coordination was strong throughout the remainder of the twentieth century.

Reflections on the Interviews

We would argue that a careful reading of the above reflections would suggest that the California Master Plan *per se* exercised a limited impact on the development of other state systems of higher education in the 1960s and beyond. The issues facing California in 1960 were being felt in most states, and the broad policy goals of equal educational opportunity and mass higher education were "in the wind." Indeed, these ideas had first been advanced forcefully in the Truman Commission Report of 1947, which was roughly a decade ahead of its time (*Higher Education for Democracy* 1947). California, facing rapid population growth, may have been forced to respond earlier than other states, but the issues involved clearly confronted the nation in its entirety.

What one can say is that the California Master Plan was a unique form of response to these challenges, in that few other states adopted a fixed structure of institutions, with clearly defined admissions requirements and clearly delimited missions. In many states, coordinating boards were formed to work on these issues, but these entities, while quite influential in some states, rarely had sufficient authority to enforce their policy objectives without political compromise. California, in essence, pre-empted a strong coordinating board by incorporating the main objectives and strategies of the initial Master Plan directly into the provisions of the Plan itself,

coupled with a very weak form of coordination among the three systems. (The original California Coordinating Commission, a result of the Master Plan, was very weak and had limited authority. Its successor, CPEC, was only modestly stronger.) Kerr and the Master Plan are given credit by our interviewees with advancing the role of rational planning, based on social science research and extensive empirical data, which led in many states to the creation of the very coordinating boards to continue the planning process that California did not include in its Plan, an ironic impact.

As our interviews also indicated, it is difficult to separate the Clark Kerr of the Master Plan from the Clark Kerr of the Carnegie Commission and Carnegie Council on Policy Studies, both of which he headed after 1967. The Carnegie activities gave Kerr a national platform from which to create and promulgate systemic proposals for the development and support of higher education. It seems likely, in retrospect, that the numerous publications of the Carnegie projects had a larger impact on the states than did the original California Master Plan itself.

We would be remiss, however, if we did not note the numerous mentions in the interviews of individual leaders who at one point or another in their careers served in California colleges and universities and thus observed the Master Plan in its early years. Among those mentioned are Lyman Glenny, Al Bowker, Jack Oswald, Sam Gould, David Dodds Henry (who served on the Carnegie Commission), as well as Patrick Callan and David Pierce among our interviewees. Tracking the spread of ideas is an elusive effort, but the fact that several leaders of the early planning and coordination efforts had spent formative time in California is surely part of the story.

Reflections on Outcomes

In addition to their perceptions of how the California Master Plan influenced or did not influence other states, our interviewees offered their views about the effects of the Master Plan in California and the varied planning efforts of other states. While it is a tricky business to sort through the role of planning among the multiple causes of outcomes (and impossible to keep our own views of history entirely separate from our analysis of these interviews), it seems useful to venture a few observations based on the interviews and a view of higher education 50 years later.

Table 4.1 displays the 2009 enrollment distribution by sector for California and the states represented by our interviewees. (Florida was added as a large and significant state referenced by interviewees but not included in the interviewee group.) California stands out in several respects, the most obvious being the workload of community colleges in undergraduate education. More than 70% of California's undergraduate enrollment is in community colleges, compared to the national average of 47.6%. Several other states on this table exceed the national average community college enrollment significantly (Washington, 62.0%; Texas, 58.8%; Florida, 57.0%; and Illinois, 56.5%), but all have a relatively smaller community college sector than California. New Jersey and Virginia are near the national average

Table 4.1 Enrollment by level and institution category, 2009

	Undergraduate enrollment 2009					Graduate enrollment 2009				
	Associates institutions (%)	Four year non research (%)	Four year research (%)	Four year very high research (%)	Total (%)	Four year non research (%)	Four year research (%)	Four year very high research(%)	Total graduate enrollment (%)	Graduate percent of grand total (%)
California	70.8	19.7	1.1	8.4	100.0	62.5	3.6	33.9	100.0	8.8
Florida	57.0	18.5	11.9	12.6	100.0	45.0	19.9	34.8	100.0	12.0
Illinois	56.5	28.0	6.7	8.9	100.0	50.9	16.4	32.7	100.0	16.0
New Jersey	49.7	36.4	4.3	9.6	100.0	60.6	19.5	19.8	100.0	13.2
New York	35.6	49.8	4.1	10.5	100.0	51.8	13.5	34.6	100.0	18.0
Ohio	43.0	23.6	21.9	11.5	100.0	31.5	35.7	32.2	100.0	13.1
Pennsylvania	30.8	49.7	7.4	12.1	100.0	54.0	17.1	28.9	100.0	16.5
Tennessee	39.4	44.4	6.1	10.2	100.0	54.0	11.2	34.4	100.0	13.2
Texas	58.8	23.4	11.4	6.4	100.0	53.2	28.5	17.8	100.0	10.1
Virginia	49.2	27.1	15.0	8.8	100.0	41.9	36.9	20.3	100.0	15.1
Washington	62.0	21.8	0.0	16.1	100.0	48.7	0.0	51.3	100.0	9.2
United States	47.6	33.9	8.1	10.4	100.0	53.1	17.0	29.8	100.0	13.3

on this statistic, Ohio and Tennessee are a bit below the average, and Pennsylvania (30.8%) and New York (35.6%) are well below it.

Secondly (related to the large enrollment of community colleges), California's graduate enrollment at 8.8% of total enrollment is relatively smaller than the national average of 13.3%. All of the other states in this group had proportionately larger graduate enrollments, with New York leading the group at 18.0%. The high percentage of graduate enrollment in New York, Pennsylvania and Illinois may well reflect the size and influence of private universities in those states. Among them only Illinois has a large community college sector, which may be due to its more vigorous and active planning history.

California's concentration of graduate enrollment at "very high activity" research institutions (33.9%) is above the national average of 29.8%, but 7 of the 11 states in this group also exceeded the national average in the percentage of graduate enrollment at very high research activity universities. Yet California is quite different in the extent of graduate enrollment at less extensively active research universities.

In the United States, 17% of graduate enrollments are in institutions that fall within the Carnegie Classification of "Research University," and 53% of graduate enrollments are in comprehensive, non-doctoral institutions. It is quite striking that only California (3.6%) and Washington (0.0%) of the 11 states in Table 4.1 have fewer than 11% of graduate enrollments in research universities that do not reach the "very high activity" threshold. (Washington has no institutions in that category and California has just one, California State University at San Diego.)

Clearly, without the sharp mission differentiation of the California Master Plan, most other states have expanded doctoral programs and graduate education at a wider range of universities. This evidence could be used to argue that other states have experienced "mission creep" and the development of a number of comparatively weaker graduate programs. Others might suggest that the Master Plan has unduly constrained the useful development of graduate programs in California. We suspect both are true to some extent.

Figure 4.1 below provides a comparison of expenditures per student in public institutions by sector for the United States compared to expenditures in California and in the nation excluding California. Figure 4.2 similarly compares expenditures per degree.

While an analysis among states of the relative size of high cost programs (e.g., health, science, and engineering) and doctoral education might easily explain and justify the cost differences shown on Figs. 4.1 and 4.2, even this coarse-grained analysis can be instructive. It is evident that the excellent reputation of the University of California system has been supported by comparatively higher levels of resources among public research universities. (We note that these data do not reflect budgetary cuts since 2007, and average funding levels in high research activity private universities of similar stature to Berkeley and UCLA are higher.) The concentration of graduate education in a relatively small group of institutions, as well as the focus on quality, has surely enabled the University of California system to achieve its well-deserved reputation for excellence.



Fig. 4.1 Cost per FTE by Carnegie Grouping, 2007 (public institutions) (Source: State Higher Education Executive Officers, Degree Production and CostTrends; A National Analysis 2010)



Fig. 4.2 Cost per Degree by Carnegie Grouping, 2007 (public institutions) (Source: State Higher Education Executive Officers, Degree Production and CostTrends; A National Analysis 2010)

The community college system in California, by contrast has below average support per FTE student, combined with above average costs per degree. The CSU system shows lower than national average costs both per FTE student and per degree. These statistics are influenced by the symbiotic relationship between these two systems. The cost per degree in community colleges is driven up both by students who enroll in courses without completing a credential and those who transfer without achieving a degree. The cost per degree in the CSU system is reduced by the large number of students who graduate from this system with a substantial fraction of their credits earned in community colleges.

Reflections on State Planning

Finally, as several of our interviewees credited the California Master Plan for helping to launch the practice of state planning for higher education, it seems appropriate to conclude by reflecting on that history in California and other states. The impetus for virtually all these planning efforts was the growing demand for higher education and the need to manage competing institutional and sectoral ambitions for serving that demand in the 1960s. The California Master Plan was a grand compromise, more or less "written in stone," as a means of settling the issue permanently and avoiding a perpetual political debate. Stability and the avoidance of continuing political controversy and potential interference were certainly implicit objectives.

In California and in most states, the last 40 years of the twentieth century witnessed enormous expansion of higher education enrollments and public support. We believe the planning impetus added to that support and shaped the development of higher education, especially so in states that worked on their own "master plans." It is not accidental that states like Florida, Texas, Washington and Illinois have large community college systems; they were planned to meet this demand. In the first decade of the twenty-first century there are new and unprecedented pressures on these "planned" systems. Enrollment demand is surging for economic as well as demographic reasons, and public support for higher education has been unable to keep pace with that demand. The policy and planning mechanisms of the states, whether they are active planning agencies or an established set of policies as in California, are challenged to deal with these issues.

Finally, an important objective of state plans for higher education has been to avoid both political indifference toward higher education and political interference. Perhaps every state, including California, has had episodes of both over the past 50 years. The absence of a strong coordinating board in California has not prevented political interference from time to time, nor has it averted fairly intrusive and constraining state policies, especially with respect to community colleges. The idea of a broadly supported, bipartisan state plan for higher education served California and many other states well in the past century. We may need to reinvent such practices to meet the needs of our time.

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Chapter 5
Parallel Worlds: The California Master Plan and the Development of British Higher Education

Michael Shattock

National Differences and Processes

Clark Kerr was the most far sighted and innovative thinker about higher education as a system in America in the period 1960–1990. The California Master Plan led the way in encouraging American states to restructure their own higher education systems, although it is significant that none of them adopted the layering of their systems with quite the same degree of classical simplicity as did California. British links with the California research universities were close. The Robbins Committee on Higher Education, on its way to producing the most exhaustive plan for the development of British higher education, visited California in 1962 and published a detailed account of it (Committee on Higher Education 1963). Three of the most influential University of California (UC) scholars of higher education, Burton Clark, Sheldon Rothblatt and Martin Trow, were frequent visitors to, and commentators on, British higher education. Clark Kerr's book *The Uses of the University* (Kerr 1963) was widely read in Britain; and the OECD chose a British sociologist, A.H. Halsey, who had spent a year at Stanford in the late 1950s and had been an adviser to the British Secretary of State, Tony Crosland, as the leader of its study of the Master Plan (OECD 1990).

Why then does one look in vain for evidence that Kerr's book and the Master Plan had any tangible impact on the development of British higher education? I think the answers are four fold. The first is distance. Before the arrival of globalization, California represented a far country. Had California been on the East coast, its impact on Britain might have been much greater. The second and much more important reason lay in the deep cultural, political, economic and demographic differences between the two. In particular the processes of political decision-making

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about the size and shape of higher education were very different. The third was that the two higher education systems were in very different stages of development. In 1960 California was already entering mass higher education and the Master Plan could envisage what Trow was later to describe as the final, universal, stage of higher education, while Britain was still in the first or elite stage. Britain in 2011 stands roughly in its participation rate at nearly 50% where California stood in 1960. For Britain the recognition of the need for research concentration only emerged in the 1980s, and the importance of a junior or community college sector only in the 1990s, while in California key elements of the Master Plan in 1960 were the preservation of an exclusive basic research role for the UC campuses and a very large- scale expansion of the community college system. Finally, California had a large private higher education sector containing distinguished research universities and a range of other colleges which competed vigorously with UC and with the state college and community college sectors. In Britain this did not exist – the state was a monopoly provider.

Yet there were also some close parallels. The decision in 1959 in California to create a Master Plan was driven by the pressure of numbers, the capital implications of expansion and the need to decide the pattern or structure of the higher education system. In 1961 in Britain, the Robbins Committee was asked to forecast the rate of expansion, against a perceived pressure of numbers and the pattern of institutions in which they would be taught. The Master Plan's end point was 1975, Robbins' 1980. In both systems there was a need to reach decisions on the aspirations of an ambitious non-university sector. Significantly in Britain this polarized around the power to award the first degree, while in California it was around the PhD. In both cases the initial critical decisions were concentrated into very short periods, in California in just a few months in 1959–1960, in Britain over a 2-year period between 1963 and 1965. An important difference, however, was that while California determined a Master Plan structure in 1960 which has remained in place, in Britain the structure established in 1965–1966 has been subject to frequent change and adaptation.

But the defining difference between the two systems lies in the processes that were used to reach decisions on structure. Drawing on the detailed accounts provided by John Douglass (2000) and by Kerr (2001), the creation of the 1960 Master Plan was conceived and negotiated within the higher education community itself, albeit under the threat from the state governor that if higher education could not produce a plan, the politicians would do it for them. By contrast in Britain the initial plan was produced by a Committee established by the Prime Minister, the university dominated membership of which might be said to be comparable to the Master Plan Survey Team selected by Kerr and the Superintendent of Public Instruction, Roy Simpson, but the Robbins Committee's recommendations were largely rejected and replaced by decision of a Minister, Crosland, under the influence of a powerful civil servant, Toby (later Sir Toby) Weaver. Although it was always clear that the Master Plan proposal had to be approved by the Legislature in Sacramento, the fact is that the leading protagonists – UC, the leaders of the state colleges and the community college movement – were in agreement. In Kerr's words, a "treaty" had been "negotiated," and this alone was a powerful incentive for procuring acceptance at a

political level (Kerr 2001, pp. 182, 184). In Britain this was not the case: the national Government was present from the start, the interests of two government departments, the Treasury and the Ministry of Education, were closely involved, the Report did not produce unanimity within higher education and a change of Government from Tory to Labour enabled a radical alternative to the Robbins proposals to be imposed. Whereas in California, Kerr was both the initial architect of the Master Plan idea and could use UC's political muscle to deliver a coherent proposal, in Britain from the beginning national politics were intrinsic to the decision-making process. Once the Report was delivered, Lord Robbins had no role in guiding the process; implementation was entirely in the hands of Ministers steered by ideologically motivated officials. In Britain, the fact that higher education had agreed to a plan (which they had not) would have weighed very much less in the minds of Government than political considerations and the relationship of the proposals to the machinery of government and the ambitions of local authorities. In California the process could be described as bottom up, in Britain it was very much top down.

The Context of the Master Plan Exercise and the Robbins Committee

In each case higher education was in a state of turbulence. In California in 1959 at one of the two joint meetings between the University Board of Regents and the state Board of Education, which preceded the establishment of the Survey Team, Kerr demonstrated that while the percentage of the relevant age group entering higher education in the US was likely to attain 50% by 1970, that figure had already been reached in California, and enrollments were likely to triple in the next two decades (Douglass 2000, p. 256; Kerr 2001, p. 160). The result was enormous pressure to create new state colleges and, within the state college system, for colleges to achieve full university status. Institutional ambition had led to the state teachers' colleges diversifying into professional fields like engineering and to potential moves into medicine; the state colleges had put up a proposal to Sacramento that they should be granted their own governing board and no longer be subject to the restrictions of the state Board of Education. But an even sharper trigger for action was the decision to create a new state college campus at Turlock, a small town whose outstanding feature was turkey farming, except for the fact that it was the home of the chair of the State Senate Education Committee. At the Liaison Committee, which acted as the coordinating body between the Board of Education and UC, it was reported that unless higher education institutions could themselves come up with an orderly plan, the Legislature would draw up its own (Douglass 2000, p. 258). This led directly to the creation of the Survey Team whose constitution was made up of representation from UC (carefully briefed by Kerr), the state colleges, the community colleges and the private sector, and chaired by the president of a private college. It was a body set up to reach agreement between competing parties and sign a treaty, with Kerr, an experienced industrial negotiator, pulling the strings.

The British environment was much more structured and more institutionalized than California's. In 1961 when the Robbins Committee was established there were 45 universities, including those in the planning stage, each with full legal independence and jealous of its autonomy. They varied between Oxford and Cambridge, world class universities, founded in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, and the new foundations of the nineteenth century: the University of London, the major colleges of which were University College (UCL), King's College, Imperial College and the London School of Economics (LSE), already full universities in status, the Victorian civic universities mostly achieved full university status at around 1900 (though some had to wait until the 1950s), and the New Universities, led by Sussex, which had only been founded at the end of the 1950s.

The universities had high status, particularly Oxford and Cambridge, whose graduates dominated the civil service. Lord Morris, a former influential vice-chancellor of Leeds University, told an interviewer that at this time the civil service "regarded the universities as a power in the land, perhaps more powerful than the church and they treated them, almost addressed them as a power in the land" (Walsh Papers 1974). One reason, among many, was the extent to which the university system was closely interwoven with the machinery of government. The universities did not come under the Ministry of Education, but were funded through the University Grants Committee (UGC), which acted as a kind of "collective Minister" (Carswell 1985, p. 12). The Committee was formally part of the Treasury, the senior department of state, and its spokesman in Cabinet was the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The chair of the Committee was appointed by the Prime Minister, and its members were mostly senior academics who cast off any loyalty to their own institution when decisions about the allocation of funds had to be taken. The independence of the Committee can be judged by the fact that observers from the Treasury and the Ministry of Education were required to leave the meeting when decisions were taken to allocate funds to institutions so as to maintain the purity of the exclusion of government influence from the funding of individual universities. Like California, in the postwar period, the universities were largely state funded but unlike California there was no private sector to compete with state-supported institutions. The Committee commanded the trust of the university system because its judgments were primarily academic or, when its judgments were financial, because they were made by academics not by lay people.

The UGC worked in close partnership with the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP), the representative body of the heads of institutions, which was at pains to convey to the Robbins Committee in its evidence (and to Ministers on other occasions) the importance it placed on the UGC's role in policy making. The Treasury, the UGC and the CVCP were bound together by ties of a common elite culture based on shared Oxbridge and often private school backgrounds. The UGC staff were Treasury civil servants posted to the UGC; the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, a political appointment, could greet vice chancellors at his quinquennial meeting with the CVCP in 1956 with the words: "From the Treasury point of view, of course, it is one of the redeeming features of the lives of Treasury Ministers that we have contact with the universities… We have to be constantly

dealing with figures and saying 'No' to our colleagues in Government and yet here is something of a warm and constructive character into which we can throw ourselves." In 1962 he noted that one of the vice-chancellors present had been his tutor and another had played in the same college hockey team (CVCP 1956). Outside the universities, responsibility for higher education, as for primary and secondary schooling, was devolved by the Ministry of Education to local government. Similar links did not exist between the universities and the Ministry, and no links whatever existed with the politicians representing the local authorities at national level.

The Background to the Robbins Committee

Three issues had dominated the policy discourse in the second half of the 1950s: the question of university status and the right to award first degrees, the future of teacher training and the cost and other implications of the expansion of higher education numbers. The question of university status had been decided in the universities' favor. In the aftermath of the second world war, politicians and senior civil servants were agreed that Britain needed to continue and increase its investment in scientific and technological education but the Percy Committee (Special Committee on Higher Technological Education), which reported to the Ministry in 1945, was split over whether non-university institutions should be allowed to award a Bachelor of Technology degree through a National Council of Technology or whether degree awarding powers should remain restricted to the universities. The CVCP in its evidence to the Committee argued that "a single Faculty institution cannot be a university…. Only a multi Faculty society, housed at one place, where every day its staffs of different faculties may educate one another, and its students of different faculties may likewise educate one another can begin to come within the description' University'" (CVCP 1994). Lord Percy himself, in a Note at the conclusion of his Committee's Report, added a further point that degree awarding powers were linked to university status and that universities must in the British tradition be self-governing institutions. If colleges were to be upgraded to universities, they could not remain municipal colleges "with only such autonomy as is compatible with financial control by the representatives of ratepayers" (Ministry of Education 1945, note par. 7). These arguments were reinforced by the UGC which emphasized that: "In general… university courses [in Technology] should be more widely based in higher standards of fundamental science and contain a smaller element of training related to immediate or special work" (UGC 1950).

The difficulty with these high-minded arguments was that there were 150 local authority colleges already doing engineering, of which 27 were providing higher technological courses of 3 years' duration (the standard length of a university degree). To make matters more complicated, over 100 colleges had students working for University of London external degrees. By 1947–1948, of 8,977 students registered in the University's Faculties of Science and Engineering, 3,846 were students of local authority colleges in London. The Manchester College of Technology,

a municipal college, had Faculty of Technology status of the University of Manchester, and in Glasgow the Royal College of Science and Technology which came directly under the Scottish Office was fighting a determined battle with the University of Glasgow (whose Principal was chairman of the CVCP) to obtain degree-awarding powers. In 1946 the Barlow Committee had laid down targets for the expansion of science and technology in universities, and in 1951 a Government White Paper announced plans for further investment. The Chancellor of the Exchequer naturally turned to the UGC for advice, and the additional resources were distributed to 13 university institutions including the Manchester and Glasgow colleges which implicitly joined the escalator to full university status (as the University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology and, eventually, Strathclyde University), both owing their elevation to lobbying by senior Ministers. The universities had won the argument: their monopoly of degree awarding powers had been sustained, and their major contribution to national targets in scientific and technological manpower had been consolidated.

In 1956 a White Paper on Technical Education issued by the Ministry of Education reinforced the sectoral division (Ministry of Education 1956). It proposed an expansion of technical education in the local authority colleges: advanced programs were to be concentrated in 24 colleges with a further sub-set of colleges, ultimately nine, to be separated out as Colleges of Advanced Technology (CATs) which, however, had to be strong in the fundamental sciences, be competent to conduct research and have the degree of autonomy "appropriate to the level of their work" (Ministry of Education, February 1956). This might have seemed to be a triumph for local authority politicians, but in fact it represented a defeat. The civil servant and Minister who had forced the program through had had to contend with considerable opposition both amongst the local authority barons and within the Ministry to selecting out institutions for a concentration of resources. The local authorities essentially favored an equitable distribution of resources and status, the Ministry, wedded to decentralization, was normally highly respectful of local government views. (A later Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, described the Ministry as being "little more than a post box between the local authorities and the teachers' unions" (Donoughue 1987, p. 110). The 1956 Technical Education Act only permitted the colleges to teach to a Diploma in Technology level. Five years after the legislation, the CATs were withdrawn from local authority control and made the direct responsibility of the Ministry. The local authorities had lost them and deeply resented it.

A similar battle was fought over teacher training, where the Ministry was responsible for forecasting national manpower requirements and determining the higher education places to be funded to meet them but the colleges themselves were under the control of the local authorities. Manpower needs were, however, split between, on the one hand, the grammar (selective secondary) schools and the private sector (the anomalously called "public schools" or "independents" today), and largely met by the universities and, on the other, the (non-selective) primary and secondary schools, met by teacher training colleges controlled by local authorities. This separation illustrates an important difference from California where state colleges, originally teachers

colleges, were able to diversify, while in Britain local authority-controlled teacher training was restricted to small monotechnic colleges. In the longer term the technical colleges were to morph into a British version of the community college, while the teacher training colleges were merged into what by this time had become the polytechnics.

Once again the origin of the battle dated back to the war years when the McNair Report (Ministry of Education 1944) was unable to agree on the future structure of teacher training. Two schemes were presented, A and B, the former involving universities closely in the setting of standards in the colleges and the latter requiring the establishment of a national standards body and a much closer liaison between the colleges and their local education committees which, it was argued, would be, for the most part, the employers of the colleges' output. College principals and college staff trades unions were strongly in favor of scheme A, local authorities of scheme B. The influential London City Council (LCC) thought that the universities were too academic in their orientation and not interested in the training of primary school teachers, a view widely canvassed in local authority circles.

University reaction to the two schemes was mixed. Education as a discipline was not highly regarded within universities, and any extension of university responsibility for training for non-selective primary and secondary education was viewed by academic colleagues in other disciplines with suspicion. The CVCP took a wider view, but scheme A left the management of the colleges firmly in the hands of governing bodies which contained no college representation and were often merely committees of the local authority in which the director of education served as the clerk. If universities were to be responsible for the regulation of standards, the CVCP argued, the universities should have a powerful say in college management and decision-taking. Eventually a third option was created which left universities to make individual arrangements with their local authorities. In effect, scheme A came into being with universities establishing Institutes of Education to manage the education college relationship but not the colleges themselves. The initial university foot-dragging, however, remained lodged in the memory of the Ministry and of the local authorities.

Before long, the demands of the teaching profession and the ambitions of the colleges rendered inadequate the award of only a certificate on the basis of a 3-year program and the case for a 4-year degree, a Bachelor of Education, was advanced. Universities were again criticized for being slow to respond to these ideas. While some reacted positively, others struck attitudes which could best be described as unnecessarily academically exclusive in regard to a first degree which combined in-school training and a broad education covering the disciplines taught in primary and secondary schools. It was at this point that the issues became part of the Robbins Committee's agenda. The conflicting interests of the universities and the local authority (which came to be known as the "public") sector of higher education bear only a distant relationship to the policy issues which divided UC from the state colleges. In great part this is a reflection of the fact that the state colleges were subject not to local government but to a statewide Board which devolved considerable autonomy to the presidents of the colleges. Thus in California it was the presidents

who fought the battles, while in Britain it was the elected local politicians operating nationally through powerful organizations, the Association of County Councils, the Association of Municipal Authorities and the Association of Education Committees, all staffed professionally and with close links, as appropriate, with Tory and Labour Party national politicians.

In the issues arising from expanding student numbers, however, more direct comparisons can be made, although the processes involved were again very different. In Britain universities were funded by the UGC on a quinquennial basis against student numbers and research cost estimates. The UGC, in its turn had to secure the budget to fund universities from the Treasury. It was implicit from the end of the second world war until 1962 that funding should follow qualified student numbers, but national financial stringency and postwar quotas on construction materials initially slowed the necessary rebuilding program after 1945. The burst of expansion in university numbers at the end of the war reached a peak in 1949 when numbers fell, only to begin to rise again in 1954 from when they continued to grow. The UGC identified two causes: the "bulge," the immediate rise in the birth rate following the end of the war, and the "trend," the numbers of children staying on at school beyond 16. The chairman, Keith (later Lord) Murray took soundings from vice-chancellors as to their willingness to expand and found their responses added up to 25% less than was necessary to meet the expected demand. The annual Home Universities Conference in 1955 confirmed that there was little enthusiasm for institutional growth. The CVCP indicated that it was not resistant to expansion but that less than half of the capital required for the immediate postwar expansion had been received, and it was unwilling to contemplate increasing student numbers without adequate resourcing. With an average increase of qualified applicants of 5% a year, the UGC persuaded the Treasury and, ultimately, the Government to found a new tranche of universities which were intended to meet the expansion demands of the 1960s. Seven new universities were eventually created with the first, Sussex, taking its initial intake in 1959.

Meantime the UGC and the Treasury were in regular negotiation about the level of demand that would require funding. In 1956 the figure for the mid-1960s was fixed at 106,000, but two years later the Treasury had accepted an increase to 124,000. By 1960 the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been persuaded to authorize an additional 35,000 to 40,000 places, but the UGC had moved on to forecast the need for 170,000–175,000 by the early 1970s. It was this, although it was already thinking of a longer-term figure of 200,000, that was the eventual trigger for the establishment of the Robbins Committee in 1961 to review all the evidence and provide a long term coherent plan for the future development of higher education. Decisions on the founding of new universities could not await this larger exercise if a generation of would be applicants for university places were not to be disadvantaged but were dependent on the Government accepting student number forecasts. Persuading the Treasury to accept the forecasts, which carried substantial financial implications for a cash strapped Government, was another matter, especially as the capital programs for 1962 and 1963 had yet to be agreed. Meantime growth was taking place in public sector institutions, but, since there was no national agency collecting statistics, the extent of the growth, whether in full-time or in part-time mode or

whether concentrated in the institutions where advanced programs were planned to be encouraged, was by no means clear.

These considerations made up part of the Robbins Committee agenda but there were other issues lurking below the surface, one of which was to emerge while the Committee was actually sitting. In 1961 the Treasury adopted a new approach to decision-making over public expenditure and following a blue ribbon report the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC) was installed, which in the period of financial stringency which the country was going through, had the task of sifting and assessing budget requests from departments against a target for increased public expenditure pre-determined by the Cabinet. Always before, negotiations between the UGC and the Treasury had been carried out behind closed doors, and it had been found possible to accept the bid the UGC had presented. In 1962, however, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, a Cabinet-level political appointment, had had to report to Parliament that it had not been possible to accept the UGC's estimates and that fewer student places would be funded than had been asked for. This provoked political uproar both in Parliament and in the press, particularly as by now the Robbins Committee was taking evidence, and it was not long before the Government reversed its position. What, however, it had exposed was the difficulty in which the Treasury found itself, in making financial judgments across the public spending departments but also having to be an advocate for the UGC bid which fell within its own budget. The political question as to whether the universities should be permitted to continue their special position under the Treasury, separate from the rest of Education, was added to the Robbins agenda.

Thus, if we compare the issues facing the California Legislature and the British Government – the establishment of a future pattern for higher education, the rate of expansion and how it was to be financed and the sorting out of relationships between the different sectoral providers were common to both. However, the British had also to settle some significant political issues – the future role of the local authorities in higher education and the location of higher education within the structure of government departments – which were to overshadow the framework which was to emerge. But in California there was another issue, not emphasized in Britain, which was the consolidation of the position of the University of California as the dominant research and PhD awarding sector of the system. For Kerr, as University president, it can be argued that securing this was the main driver of his initiation of the process.

The Master Plan and the Robbins Report

The best summary of what Kerr planned to achieve through the Master Plan is provided by Kerr himself (Kerr 1991, p. 366):

> Higher education should make its own plans on academic grounds, not the state legislature on other grounds.
>
> Universal access should be provided to all high school graduates via an expansion of the community college movement, in response to developing egalitarian expectations.

> The new occupational skills needed by the economy should be provided particularly by extending the state colleges from four year to include also five year programs [i.e to add masters degrees to a predominantly first degree program] and by opening them to all programs at these levels, going far beyond teacher education.
>
> The University of California should be protected in its elite functions of research, and training for the PhD and for the highest professions.
>
> These levels of functions should not be mixed - they involved different types of students, differently oriented faculty members, and different sets of rules on admission and advancement of students, on appointment and promotion of faculty members and on levels of financial support. These differences could not be handled well within a single set of institutions.
>
> There should be a mechanism for advisory state-level coordination with strong participation by leaders of the academic institutions themselves.

If we examine the practical application of these principles, we see that the "treaty" represented a package from which each sector obtained benefit: the student market share was re-drawn so that UC's fell from 15% to 12.5% and the state colleges' from 50% to 33%, leaving 65% for the community colleges but with rapidly increasing demand and agreement over levels of migration from community colleges to state colleges and the University. At the same time there were agreed opportunities for student transfer between sectors to enable student progression. Every sector was a winner: the community college sector could expect an enormous expansion, but the state college sector was due five new campuses and UC three. In a last minute compromise, the University agreed to relinquish its exclusive right to award the PhD, but in conceding joint PhD awards with state colleges it had retained a veto over quality. Its designation as the exclusive center for basic research consolidated its position as the research-intensive sector of the system. The huge expansion of the community colleges met the demand for widening access, fully justifying Halsey's description of the Master Plan 30 years later as being designed "to reconcile populist with elitist institutions, access with success" (OECD 1990, p. 3). Finally, as Douglass shows, the Plan measured up to financial scrutiny because the expansion of the community college sector was highly economical and stabilized costs per student across the whole of higher education in California for a generation (Douglass 2000, p. 319).

The Robbins Committee, which reported in 1963, was set up on an altogether more formal basis than the Survey Team in California, as a body to advise Government on the future pattern and organizational structure of British higher education. Its members were appointed by the Prime Minister. Lord Robbins, its chairman, combined being a professor of economics at the LSE with being chairman of the board of the *Financial Times* and, with John Maynard Keynes, had been the leading negotiator over the terms of Lend Lease at the end of the second world war. His Committee was hand picked to combine representation of Scottish, schools and local authority interests with distinguished academics. It held 111 meetings and received more than 400 written submissions. Its secretariat was provided by the Treasury but its statistical advisor, Professor Claus Moser, also from the LSE, was enabled to build up a large team which provided the ground work for all subsequent British higher education statistics. It also had a category of advisers called "assessors" drawn from relevant Government Ministries and including, most influentially,

the chairman of the UGC. The final Report contained 178 recommendations and five volumes of published appendices. It is still regarded as one of the great social documents of the postwar period.

The Report recommended, as in the Master Plan, that forward planning should be based on access for all appropriately qualified applicants, though the bar in Britain was set higher at the achievement of academic qualifications in state examinations rather than the much broader graduation from high school. It forecast that student numbers would rise from 185,000 in 1962–1963 to 558,000 in 1980–1981 and that this increase should be concentrated in the universities (346,000 in the university sector, 146,000 in teacher training colleges and only 66,000 in the rest of the public sector). Structurally it recommended that the CATs should be upgraded to universities and that the teacher training colleges should be transferred to university control in order to raise their academic standards. They should be encouraged to award degrees validated by their parent university. Perhaps 10 local authority colleges should over the period, following the model of the CATs, be considered for upgrading to full university status. In addition the Report recommended that six further new universities should be founded and that one of these together with four existing institutions should be designated as Special Institutions for Scientific and Technological Education and Research (SISTER). These recommendations, taken as a group, bear not just the imprimatur of a highly committed university membership of the Committee but also the mark of its most influential Assessor, Keith Murray, who saw them as a natural continuation of the UGC's activities of the past decade.

Much of the evidence submitted to Robbins had concerned itself with the resolution of the question of Ministerial responsibility for the universities. Underlying this issue lay the protection of universities' autonomy and their monopoly status as degree awarding authorities. This had been sedulously protected both by the UGC and by the fact that the Treasury made no pretence of having views about educational policy, leaving that entirely to the UGC which, while administratively part of the Treasury, was in practice dominated by its academic membership. The Ministry of Education, it was thought, would impose policy from outside and would intervene in administrative and possibly curricula detail as it was alleged to do with schools. The Treasury, however, had made it clear that the conflict of fiduciary responsibility revealed in 1962 could not be allowed to continue. Most of the evidence, particularly that from the CVCP, argued strongly against a transfer to the Ministry of Education, and Robbins was persuaded to recommend the creation of a new Ministry of Arts and Science, effectively a higher education department, which would have responsibility for the universities and for the research councils.

This, however, prompted the one minority report of the whole exercise by the one local authority representative in the membership, Harold Shearman, the chairman of the LCC Education Committee. He argued for a transfer of the universities to the Ministry of Education on the grounds that the education system was "a coherent whole in which no section can prosper if the others are failing and in which the actions of each must inevitably affect the rest" (Committee on Higher Education September 1963, H. C. Shearman, "Note of Reservation on Administrative Arrangements," pp. 293–296). A particular justification was the position of the

teacher training colleges where he dissented from their transfer to the universities, arguing that the benefits of university influence and degree validation could be obtained without removing local authority control. The Shearman Note of Reservation provided the crucial chink in the armor of university dominance that Robbins had created.

Nevertheless, the Report was greeted with national euphoria as a liberal expression of a guarantee of widening access to higher education especially welcome after the apparent rejection of growth in 1962. "Britain appeared to be turning its back on elitism and on a narrow professionalism in higher education," wrote Noël Annan (later Lord Annan) in 1967. The Tory Government, now in its last days, immediately accepted the Report's forecasts for expansion and promised funding support. It also accepted the need to transfer the universities from Treasury responsibility, but after a brief experiment with a separate Government department opted for a compromise position whereby the universities were moved to the Ministry of Education, which was itself upgraded to be a Department of Education and Science (DES) it was given their own Minister and Permanent Secretary within an uncomfortably bifurcated departmental structure which was intended to preserve the special position of the universities. This was to last only until the General Election which brought Labour to power, when within the Department the opportunity was taken to rationalize the structure and bring higher and, what in British parlance was termed "further education," together under one powerful and unusually ideologically-minded official, Toby Weaver.

The Filleting of the Robbins Report

The two years between the publication of the Report and the Labour Government's reaction to it is described by John Carswell, who as a civil servant who moved from the Treasury to the DES with the universities, was very close to the action, as 'the Great Plastic period' (Carswell 1985, p. 52). Outside Government and Whitehall, the reaction to the Report may best be summed up by an editorial written by Lord Morris within a few days of its publication: "it seems clear that it has been overwhelmingly well received, and that both Government and the universities are pretty much committed to implementing it, at any rate its main policies" (Morris 1963, pp. 109–116). It is unsurprising that the one critical set of comments came in the same issue of the *Universities Quarterly* from someone from the California system, Martin Trow. He pointed out that Robbins' projections implied that while by 1980–1981 university and teacher training numbers were expected to grow by 165%, higher education in the further education colleges was only expected to grow by 113% even though university qualified numbers in further education had grown much faster than university numbers in the period since 1955. "What is the price," he asked, "for making the universities with their high standards and expensive practices, the numerically dominant form of British higher education?" British higher education was shaped like an inverted pyramid. Would British higher education he

suggested "not be better served by a system…that is shaped like a pyramid not an inverted pyramid?" (Trow 1963, pp. 117–132).

Such comments highlight two of the great differences from the Master Plan. Faced with an already extensive university system which Murray, the nearest analogue to Kerr as the "animateur" of the Report, had been bent on expanding, Robbins simply reinforced and expanded it further on the wholly egalitarian grounds that the increased number of qualified applicants deserved the full breadth and standing of a university education. History dictated that the option of California style concentration was not available: there was already an extensive university system and in the British context to have tried to contract it would have seemed wilfully elitist. In Robbins' defense, Britain was a long way from the mass higher education of California. In 1961–1962, the proportion of the age group achieving university entrance standards was only about 7%, and Robbins' forecast envisaged this rising only to 12.9% by 1980–1981. With the implications this had for the size of the university system, the question of research, let alone PhD, concentration was simply not on the agenda.

The delay in implementing Robbins also enabled other forces to mobilize against the structural changes proposed. Within the DES the arrival of Weaver to a position of authority presaged a change of direction. Weaver had been partly brought up in the household of Sir Stafford Cripps, a former Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer in the wartime Coalition, and was married to the daughter of a former Labour President of the Board of Education (the predecessor of the Ministry of Education). He had taught at Eton and at an East End school in Barking, and he had inherited what Campbell, the biographer of Crosland, the new Labour Secretary of State for Education, described as "an austerely high minded strain of paternal socialism" (Campbell 2000, p. 219).

Weaver was strongly in tune with the local authority view of higher education. He regarded the universities as elitist, argued that university education gave too much emphasis to academic as against vocational criteria and that their autonomy under the UGC made them insensitive to local and national needs. He deeply resented, like the local authorities, that Robbins had recommended that the CATs leave the public sector and become universities. This was one battle he was to lose as the Tory Government accepted the recommendation along with student number forecasts within hours of the Report being published. But he was immensely influential in persuading the outgoing Tory Ministers and the incoming Labour Minister to turn down the recommendation in regard to the teacher training colleges and consigned them firmly to continued local authority control (Godwin 1998, pp. 171–191). (Both ex- and current Ministers used his briefing paper in the course of the House of Commons debate). However, there was also a professional side to the argument. As Crosland was to say to T. R. McConnell of the University of California at Berkeley, "it was essential for the Ministry to keep full control of the education of teachers if enough were to be trained to meet demand." (McConnell Papers 1966). This would have made a stronger argument if a decade later the DES had not butchered the colleges and merged them with the new polytechnics because of teacher over production.

But Weaver's greatest influence was reserved for the decision to institutionalize the existing binary line between the universities and the non-universities and, instead of following Robbins in creating conditions which allowed up to 10 local authority colleges to move to university status by 1980, to establish 30 polytechnics out of local authority colleges to comprise an alternative sector of higher education intended to rival the universities. It is easy to see through American eyes why this might look like the creation of a state college sector, as in the Master Plan. Rothblatt initially suggests but later rejects the comparison of binarism in Britain with trinarism in California (Rothblatt 1992), while Trow seems to have believed that Kerr's reforms influenced Crosland and Weaver and that what they were doing "in a different way and in a different context reminded me of what Clark Kerr and his colleagues had created in California…that is a Master Plan for higher education" (Trow 2005, p. 8).

In fact the reinforcement of the binary line grew entirely out of a British political and social context. Stimulated by Weaver's concern about the elite nature of university education and by the refusal of local authorities to contemplate the loss of further colleges to the university sector, the actual key document was drafted by the General Secretary of the trades union, the Association of Teachers in Technical Institutions (ATTI). Edward (later Sir Edward) Britton (the ATTI were not entirely coincidentally unconcerned at the loss of members to the Association of University Teachers after the transfer of the CATs and the possibility of losing more under the Robbins proposals) argued that any college left over after a fresh exodus from the sector "will inevitably be looked upon as the place where students go if they fail to obtain a place at university….at best they can only achieve fourth division status in the university league" (Britton 1965) In other words higher education in colleges would be permanently relegated to a second tier below the universities.

But a further administrative reason for the decision was claimed to be to choke off the plethora of applications from colleges to be considered for university upgrading, what Crosland called in his Woolwich Speech announcing the new policy "our snobbish caste ridden obsession with university status." He criticized a unitary system as being "hierarchically arranged on the ladder principle with the universities at the top and the other institutions down below." What Weaver and Crosland actually wanted was that a substantial part of higher education "should be under social control, directly responsible to social needs" (DES 1965), that is, not autonomous like the universities but firmly under local authority control and not protected by the UGC umbrella.

Universities were in the words of John Pratt and Tyrrell Burgess, two of Crosland's informal advisers, "aloof, academic, conservative and exclusive," while the public sector represented a service tradition which was "responsive, vocational innovative and open." The "autonomous" sector emphasized academic disciplines and "the preservation, extension and dissemination of knowledge for its own sake." It was not socially useful (Pratt and Burgess 1974, p. 9). Crosland, as his wife's biography of him makes clear, did not like the universities (Crosland 1982, p. 142). Halsey, an adviser and a regular attendee at Crosland's evening discussions about education, wrote: "I sometimes thought Tony's educational policies were a complicated battle between his love/

hate for Oxford and his wish to identify with his Grimsby constituents" (Halsey 1996, p. 130). Ideology and politics played a major part in the decision.

The Robbins' guns had been comprehensively spiked. Unlike California where the governor had consciously stepped back to allow negotiations to take place and would only have intervened if they failed, in Britain the Secretary of State and his senior official determined the structure against the recommendations of the Committee established to advise the Government and in favor of local political authorities, who it was argued, would exercise "social control" over the curricula and academic development of the new institutions, an element that was alleged to be lacking in the university sector. Although Crosland assured the universities that the polytechnics would be "primarily to provide teaching," he did not rule out them doing research (CVCP Archive 1966). The new Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA), which was set up on a Robbins recommendation to provide machinery to permit non-universities to teach for degrees, agreed to support them teaching for the PhD. The designation of polytechnic status did not destroy the "continuous rat-race to reach the First or University Division" (DES 1965). In its first year of meeting, the new Committee of Polytechnic Directors (CDP) resolved that every polytechnic "should have as its legitimate and realistic aim" to obtain a university charter and be able to award its own degrees (CDP Archive 1970).

Lord Robbins was appalled by the decisions. He argued in a House of Lords debate on the Woolwich Speech and in an interview in the *Universities Quarterly* that students' first choice would remain the universities and that the system would become more hierarchical rather than less. "What we had in mind…was an evolving system in which as the demand expanded and as standards were raised in further education and the teacher training colleges, institutions could be upgraded, higher education in our conception was indeed a continuous spectrum" (Robbins 1965a, pp. 5–16). He concluded his House of Lords speech: "I do not believe that the Binary system will be a success. I do not believe that the 'public sector,' as the Secretary of State conceives it , can be built up to match the status and efficiency of the autonomous sector…. I am confident that the system, as presently conceived, is not ultimately viable" (Robbins 1965b, p. 156).

The Evolution of British Higher Education

Robbins was to be proved correct. Trow, writing a little over 20 years after the Woolwich Speech, could say: "From American perspectives, British universities and polys are more alike than either will admit" and that both sectors were observing a "gold standard" at first degree level because degree programs in the polytechnics were validated by the CNAA which was required to maintain common standards with the universities (Trow 1987, pp. 268–292). The concept of social control broke down under the administrative and, on occasion, political regimes exercised by local authorities, and polytechnics campaigned to be given independence. In 1988 the Government removed them from local authority control. In 1992 the binary line was

dissolved, and the polytechnics were made universities and brought under the same funding machinery as the established universities. In one sense the Robbins recommendations had been realized, but in another they had not because this was a mass transfer rather than the staged process, with the kind of special support given to the CATs that Robbins had envisaged. In 1987 the Advisory Board for the Research Council (ABRC) produced a report which predicted (accurately) a layering of British higher education into R (research intensive institutions, T (teaching intensive institutions) and X (somewhere in between) institutions (ABRC 1987). The polytechnics clearly fell into the T category and have remained so.

As we have seen, two striking characteristics of the Master Plan were not addressed by Robbins: the protection of the university sectors' prime role in research and the expansion of the community college system. Robbins assumed that all universities would be research active but saw no need to argue for any particular concentration, and the concept of community colleges would have seemed irrelevant when the age participation rate was so low. Neither issue was to go away, however, if only because, as the California Master Plan identifies, they are generic issues in mass and universal higher education systems. British higher education authorities and politicians were, of course, deeply aware of the research excellence of the various UC campuses, but the idea of concentration within the British university system came negatively out of the Treasury's concern for value for money expenditure rather than, at least initially, in any search for research excellence. Up until 1981 British universities had been funded through the UGC on a broadly common basis, although some were clearly more successful than others in competing for individual research grants from the research councils. The budget cuts in 1981 forced the UGC to be openly selective in its allocations for the first time, which alerted the Treasury to the obvious disparities of research performance between, for example, Salford University, an ex-CAT, and Cambridge. The Treasury let it be known that it thought there was a 'Black Hole' of £800 m in the UGC's allocation of recurrent grant to non-research performing universities.

Simultaneously, a review of research expenditure across Government departments revealed the extent and productivity of research expenditure under the control of the DES through the research councils and the UGC. This exercise led to calls for research to be funded more strategically. The California model, which might be described as an institutional designation for research concentration, was, however, rejected in favor of a disciplinary-based research concentration. Maurice Kogan and Stephen Hanney describe a dinner party in 1983 at which the chairman of the UGC, Sir Peter Swinnerton Dyer, invited the chairman of ABRC and other senior figures each to provide a list of the 12 most research active universities, but the list when counted up amounted to 20, far more than could be afforded (Kogan and Hanney 2000, p. 99). Swinnerton Dyer used this to reinforce his personal preference for concentration at the subject/department level irrespective of the research status of the particular institution, an approach that sprang more naturally from the extended university system inherited from Robbins.

This conclusion led in 1985–1986 to the first UGC Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), carried through by some 30 disciplinary panels, which gave research ratings

to departments that were translated into funding levels, thus allocating funds to the most research active departments while withdrawing them from the least research active. The exercise was repeated in 1989, 1992, 1996, 2001 and 2008. The effect was to winnow out over time a more differentiated institutional picture not dissimilar to the concentration of the California system. Thus in terms of research support (funding provided via the RAE plus external research funding), 25% goes to four institutions, Oxford, Cambridge, Imperial College and University College London (UCL), but 75% goes to 25 universities, leaving some 40 institutions with virtually none. This monetary assessment, of course, favors universities with medical schools and a heavy investment in science and technology. However, if one looks at performance as judged by peer review in the RAE over the 20 or so years in which the RAE has been conducted, a league table based on the departmental ratings would identify a top 10 of Cambridge, Oxford, LSE, Imperial College, UCL, Warwick, Manchester, York and Edinburgh (Shattock 2010, p. 11). Two of these, Warwick and York, were among the 1960s new foundations, which offers persuasive evidence of the permeability of the British system. None of the post-1992 universities appear in the top 50. Another media sensitive measure of concentration might be membership of the Russell Group, 19 self-selected institutions comprising Oxbridge, the major London institutions, the civic universities, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Warwick, which claims to speak on behalf of a research intensive sector of British higher education. Thus over time the more evolutionary approach adopted in Britain has produced a situation not unlike the selectivity implied by the pyramidal structure which Trow regretted had not been built into the Robbins structure. The fact that Britain ranks second only to America in the world publication and citation league tables represents some endorsement of the more flexible, permeable structure which has emerged in Britain as compared to the more formal layering of the Master Plan.

Trow in his 1963 article rightly criticized the Robbins Report for its lack of attention to the role of further education. He correctly prophesied that regional and area colleges would grow more rapidly than the autonomous sector (Trow 1963, pp. 117–132). He could not, at that time, have foreseen the creation of the polytechnics out of the further education sector, but in fact Treasury pressure after 1981 ensured that the public sector grew at the expense of the university sector precisely because, as his article foretold, its unit costs were so much lower than the universities. Polytechnics, at this stage, were divided in their sense of mission. Some certainly saw university status as their natural ambition, but in 1980, in one of the very few public cross references to the Master Plan in British higher education, a delegation from the Committee of Polytechnic Directors (CDP) visited California and reported in evidence to the Parliamentary Select Committee that they saw their role as vocational institutions with a role definition similar to the California community colleges:

> If you want each institution in the system to develop excellence, if you put parameters, loosely perhaps, around role definition and say to an institution "This is your role" the likelihood is that the institution will then rise to that role and perform in ways that are excellent (CDP 1980).

This was not to remain a CDP majority view: the trend of "academic drift" was upwards (Pratt 1997). Trow, in his 1987 article, identified the extent to which to American eyes the further education colleges looked "remarkably like our community colleges" (Trow 1987, pp. 268–292). In 1993 they followed the polytechnics out of local authority control and, with the development of franchising arrangements with the post-1992 universities by which they taught the first year or 2 years of university degree programs, began indeed to assume American community college characteristics. With the 2011 White Paper, which encouraged further education colleges to broaden their titles and compete with universities by offering both 2-year Foundation degrees and low cost 3-year degrees, a community college sector comparable to the junior college sector in the Master Plan may be said to have been created (Dept of Business, Innovation and Skills June 2011).

The effects of price differentiation envisaged by the White Paper may also force some of the post-1992 universities back into a more community college character, thus reversing the upward trend since Robbins, though whether the proportionate student numerical contribution of further education to higher education in Britain will ever equal that of the community college sector in California is doubtful. It will also require a revolution in attitudes to accept what Trow called for, a sector which embraced "democratizing pressures, demands and functions" willingly "in order to protect the very high academic standards" of an elite sector (Trow 1987, pp. 268–292). According to Douglass, at a critical point in the negotiations on the Master Plan, Kerr approached four state college presidents to ask if they wanted to become part of the University; they all refused (Douglass 2000, p. 292). In Britain they would have accepted immediately. The current British Governmental policy is to try to resolve the issue through financial incentives and institutional competition, whereas the Master Plan chose to do it by a "treaty" between the sectors. The differences of approach illustrate why in spite of the commonalities of issues in higher education policy, the California Master Plan could not have been replicated in Britain.

Master Planning or the Evolutionary Approach to the Development of Higher Education Systems

The most striking illustration of this difference can be seen in Clark Kerr's vision for the California system as combining Jefferson's equality of opportunity for all and the development of an "aristocracy of the intellect" with Franklin's belief in "the value of polytechnic" skills (Kerr 2000, p. 186). In 1960s Britain it was possible to refer publicly to equality of opportunity, provided that in higher education this was understood to mean opportunity subject to minimum university entrance requirements. It was possible, and Weaver's writing would confirm it, to refer to "polytechnic skills," but almost no one would refer to the desirability of an "aristocracy of the intellect." Indeed Robbins was in favor of reducing the differences between Oxbridge and London and the rest of the universities. It was possible for

Kerr, in a wealthy, expanding state already attracting very substantial immigration, to defend and protect an elite sector of higher education. In postwar Britain, with its concern for raising standards for all whether in health care, welfare or in education, the idea of an elite sector of higher education would have been indefensible. Hence Robbins' view that universities should be undifferentiated and available to everyone who was appropriately qualified. The Robbins' proposals were defeated by political considerations: the local authority interest and the DES' fear that an "autonomous" sector would give it no policy leverage over higher education, and by a primarily metropolitan view that the universities were too academic and uninterested in useful skills. The result was that the polytechnics were accorded most of the academic privileges of the universities but few of their freedoms. This left them unprepared, when the binary line's lack of utility became apparent to the Government, for translation to an RAE-led university agenda.

If we accept that the structural issues embodied in the Master Plan are broadly common to both systems (and indeed to all successful higher education systems), we need also to accept that historical, cultural and social differences determine very different approaches to dealing with them. In Britain the operation of the RAE, albeit it was designed initially to answer a specifically financial question, has reproduced an elite sector by the back door both in terms of research and, in practice, in terms of the academic quality of the student entry. The continued pressure of demand (as more narrowly defined in Britain) of nearly 45% of the age group wanting higher education, together with the need to contain costs, has over the last decade produced a further education sector which looks very like the world of the California community college. But the steps that have been taken to achieve this have been very different. California opted for a Master Plan, a giant leap to create a permanent framework. Britain's structure, on the other hand, has evolved, reacting to pressures as they came up, blown hither and thither by politics and by resourcing issues, but on the whole reflecting a need to develop pragmatically in line with what was seen at the time as the country's requirements. Most observers would see it as a strength, for example, that climate change research at East Anglia, life sciences at Dundee or agriculture and estate management at Reading can be pursued to the highest international standards in universities outside the Russell Group, or that some of the most popular universities to students like Durham, Exeter and St. Andrews are not placed in the RAE top 10, or that former CATs like Loughborough or Bath have been able to force themselves into a media league table top 20 position. There are perhaps advantages in diversity, flexibility and the benefits of intense internal competition which in some political cultures outweigh the grand vision and the fixed framework.

The Robbins vision fell short of the Master Plan both in its failure to identify the need to concentrate further at the top level and to provide a broader base to encourage access to the system; but both deficiencies have been addressed as British conditions changed, first, with the introduction of the RAE in 1986 and second, as participation rates rose slowly to something like Californian 1960 levels, if never on "the tidal wave" scale described by Kerr (2001, p. 174), the conversion of further education colleges to a community college role. The Master Plan has assured

California of the world-wide respect of the higher education community, and the existence of a powerful private sector has given it a safety valve if its structure became too rigid. But it could not have been introduced in Britain in 1963. Britain's political culture could not have accommodated a "treaty" and certainly not one of such a long-lasting time span, and its higher education policies have invariably been driven by national political and financial concerns as much, if not more, than from below by the pressures from the institutions themselves. Generalizing from these two cases, one can argue that the Master Plan will remain unique because it aligned with the state's particular political and financial culture at a particular time. The issues which it identified, however, are common to all developed higher education systems – how to combine universal access with the need to preserve an "elite" research intensive sector, how to create machinery that provides for a regulated student transfer between the two. Nevertheless, the way they are, or are not, resolved will depend on circumstance, politics, finance and culture which stand outside the systems themselves. And may there not be some advantage to the system in not freezing the structure but letting it evolve in line with the grain of society itself?

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Chapter 6
Contrary Imaginations: France, Reform and the California Master Plan

Guy Neave

Introduction

At certain moments, thankfully rare in the history of higher education, visionaries are two a penny. And in such moments each man and woman in that hallowed institution – and sometimes beyond – has his or her own views on what the university ought to be. Paris in May 1968 saw the brief and riotous multiplication of the more heady and eccentric forms of what an American president alluded to as "the Vision Thing" (Neave 2011a). Mercifully, those who set their views on paper are fewer indeed. And those whose insights become the acknowledged inspiration for, or for the weighing up of, change, whether in their own lifetimes or later, are even fewer and therefore most uncommon. Amongst them stand John Henry, Cardinal Newman in Britain, *Staatssekretär* Wilhelm von Humboldt in Germany and the Emperor Napoléon (Neave 2006, pp. 382–384).

Clark Kerr's place amongst this curious trilogy cannot be disputed. The vision of higher education he negotiated into the 1960 California Master Plan not only places him firmly in the pantheon of "shapers of higher education." The particular model his vision contained combined universal access to post-school learning at the base of a coordinate system, which included the highest level of public research universities at its summit. It remains a yardstick against which the initiatives and progress of other nations may be compared (OECD, 1990 *Higher Education in California* quoted in Kerr 2001, p. 187). Regardless of whether other nation's policymakers looked explicitly to the California Master Plan when reviewing their own, leaving aside the features they chose to look at and paying even less attention to why they chose what they did, the Master Plan itself has two very clear functions. It may be seen as a "solution." It may equally be seen as a diagnosis in respect of the issues and problems it deliberately sought to avoid.

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The Master Stroke

As Kerr himself pointed out in his Memoirs, the Master Plan was a "treaty" (Kerr 2001, p. 182) adopted by both houses of the California State Legislature and signed into statutory law. As a matter of record and also to lay out the basic features to allow us to make comparison with parallel efforts in France, it is worthwhile setting them out. The Master Plan specified the undergraduate admissions pools of three public segments of higher education, provided transfer opportunities, created a separate governing system for the former normal schools (later the state university system), provided scholarships for students in private as well as public establishments and created a state Coordinating Council. This last was intended to keep the Legislature at bay and to ensure that higher education, in Kerr's words, "Controlled its own destiny" (Kerr 2001, p. 183).

From a French perspective, these five features – as indeed the very status of the Master Plan itself – scarcely have lent themselves to be entertained either in the same organizational form or through the procedures that brought it about in California. Neither the way dominant values were interpreted in France nor the administrative procedures which expressed and upheld them were compatible with the way the Master Plan was negotiated, drawn up and enacted. True, one may quibble as to whether, from a linguistic standpoint, what Kerr described as a "treaty" is not better rendered as an *entente* – that is, an understanding which leaves a high degree of discretion to interpret how individual partners will position themselves within the overall framework they all agree upon. But that is only the tip of an immense cultural and political, administrative and historic sea-mountain that sets off higher education in France from the United States, and *a fortiori*, from California.

The California Master Plan was worked out between the presidents of the three public "networks" – community colleges, state colleges and universities – and whilst not independent of the state Legislature, all most certainly shared an interest in keeping the Legislature at arms length. Indeed, as Kerr's Memoirs make abundantly clear, the threat of admitting the wolf of the state Education Board into the fold played a powerful part in winning over the hesitant. And not least because failure would open the way for the Legislature "taking over the planning function. And higher education would have lost much of its essential autonomy" (Kerr 2001, p. 186). Thus, the Master Plan agenda was set, negotiated, worked out in detail through consultations with campus heads and faculty leaders across the three public sector networks, prior to being laid before the Legislature for approval. In short, consensus was reached between the interested parties beforehand, a procedure not greatly different from the then contemporary "policy style" of Social Democratic Sweden (Neave 1973, pp. 304–315).

Certainly, there are, at least on paper and in recent legislation, dating from August 2007, signs that such a "bottom up approach" to major national policy formation in France might possibly seem less bizarre than it would most assuredly have appeared more than half a century earlier. This is not to say that France has lacked the energy to tackle the selfsame issues as the Master Plan – spiraling application rates, access

to and modernization of, mass higher education. Commissions of Enquiry, Higher Education Guideline Laws, Ministerial decrees and circulars dealing with institutional restructuring and curriculum change, setting the qualifications necessary for and the conditions of recruitment to, academic posts are France's monuments to – and the debris of – that selfsame purpose. Like the Irishman's reply to a foot sore, lost and weary tourist seeking the way to Galway, so with France's higher education: "By God, but you don't start from here!"

Republican Virtues and Values

French higher education has been shaped by three fundamental values: Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, the interpretation and implementation of which place France at the polar opposite to the way similar political, cultural and thus administrative, values and norms have been interpreted in what recent scholarship has called the cross-Atlantic English-speaking democracies (Rothblatt 2007). The Revolution of 1789 closed down the universities, together with guilds and corporations under the Le Chapelier Law of June 1791 on the grounds they served inherited privilege and as such, hostile, if not to liberty, then certainly to equality. The Corsican Ogre revived higher education in the shape of the "Imperial University," promulgated by imperial decree in 1811 (Charle 2004, pp. 34–35). Despite its title, *l'Université Impériale* in the strict meaning of the term was not a university at all. It was a *national* education system from primary schooling through to higher education (Durand Prinborgne 1992, p. 217). Its functions, role, curriculum and appointments were subject to that other Napoléonic innovation: systematic and detailed legal codification. Legal codification was one of the enduring and much emulated features in the modernization of Europe and later in the nineteenth century was taken over by Spain and Italy. The Ley Morano of 1857 and the Casati law of 1859 were direct imports of the French legally-based model into Spain and Italy (Garcia Garrido 1992, p. 664; Martinelli 1992, p. 356).

Arguably, reviving higher education sought to place the imperial regime on a firmer base by extending to civilian society the Revolutionary slogan *La carrière ouverte aux talents* that in its earlier form had created an imperial and military meritocracy. As George Weisz's study of university reform in France of the Third Republic has pointed out, the Napoleonic Faculties dispensed a truncated and largely utilitarian training for the liberal professions as well as supplying a qualified inflow to the *corps enseignant* and the *corps universitaire* (Weisz 1983, p. 370). Often translated into English, if erroneously, as the "teaching" or "academic" professions, a *corps* has civil service status. As "servants of the Republic" corps members can be assigned nationally according to qualifications. However, a corps does not possess the guild privileges associated with the English word "profession." *De facto*, the Ministry of Education exercises these responsibilities.

The Third Republic

The Third Republic (1876–1940) from 1876 onwards, chastened by the disaster of the Franco Prussian War of 1870–1871 and in an effort to catch up with Germany in the key areas of scientific research and technological training, broadened the "Faculties," making them multi-purpose bodies and later, though in a limited number of instances, even succeeded in attenuating the administrative rigidities of France's regional and central centralization by creating universities at Grenoble, Toulouse, Lyon, Nancy and Lille (Weisz 1983, pp. 370–371, 375). But, success in laying down France's science base was offset by a development that was to mark French higher education up to the present day.

The 1876 Law on the Freedoms of Higher Education (*Loi sur les libertés de l'enseignement supérieur*) defined three identifying features. It drew a line between the university and another segment of higher education institutions called *grandes écoles*. It made a second distinction between public sector universities on the one hand and both private sector universities and *grandes écoles* on the other. Furthermore, the public sector was legally defined as "the public service of higher education" and thus came under the ambit of the state (Durand Prinborgne 1992, p. 217). By defining public sector higher education in this manner, the Third Republic also defined a "non-state" or private sector if only by omission (Neave 2007, pp. 27–54). Deliberate marginalization of this sector by the refusal to fund Catholic universities from public resources set an indelible stamp on Church-run establishments that was to receive a final *coup de grâce* with the separation of Church and State in 1905. Thus, the ability of private higher education in France to hold its own against the supremacy of the state sector as a source for innovation and change was not an issue until the last decade of the twentieth century.

The Law of 1876: An Anachronistic Perspective

Precisely because it set the boundaries to a segmented higher education system that were *grosso modo* to hold good over the century that ensued, the Law of 1876 merits closer attention and very especially with respect to the context in which it took place. No less significant are the political values and assumptions that underpinned it. Both are important. They have direct bearing on explaining why the way in which the California Master Plan was conceived and negotiated was not compatible either with French political values or the administrative procedures that upheld them.

Anachronism is sometimes a useful device in history and very certainly so in this instance. The Law on the Freedoms of Higher Education may be seen as an early, though by no means unique, example of what seven decades later was to be termed "postwar reconstruction" (Neave 1992, 94–128). In this instance, however, "reconstruction" followed the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war. The capture of Napoleon III at the Battle of Sedan on September 1, 1870 and the collapse of the Second Empire three days later opened the way to what today's feline phraseology

would call a "régime change." The 6 years that followed the Treaty of Frankfurt (1871) and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by the newly created German Empire were a period of bitter recrimination and equally bitter struggle over whether France should revert to a monarchy or should drive forward to becoming a fully-fledged Republic.

The elections of 1876 saw the return of a Republican majority. They also ushered in a period of *political* reconstruction of the institutions that were to form the basis of the Third Republic. Was it, for instance, to center around a powerful president? Or was it to be a parliamentary democracy, an issue finally decided in favor of the latter in 1877. Even before the 1876 elections and very certainly during them, higher education stood as a key issue in the process of political debate. Léon Gambetta (1838–1882) the most prominent and active amongst Republican Radicals, raised the issue of the responsibility – or rather its manifest absence – that private higher education had for the nation's drubbing. For Gambetta, private higher education was a very real example of social division, privilege and civic irresponsibility, all of which to a very great degree could – and should – be held to account for France's defeat (Histoire de la Faculté libre de Médicine et Pharmacie de Lille 2011).

Fundamental Values

French Republicans during the 10 years from 1876 regarded their policies as completing the legacy left by the Revolution of 1789. Their task they saw as giving effective expression to the revolutionary doctrine of the "Republic One and Indivisible" and, by natural extension, to embed the fundamental values of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity in key institutions to form the basis of a democratic and Republican order. Recruitment by formal competitive examination (*concours*) to the higher echelons of state service was one priority (Kessler 1978, pp. 16–24; Kessler 1983, pp. 64–65). Higher Education was another. Leaving aside the nuances between Freedom and Liberty, for the Republicans of the day *Liberté* as it applied to higher education was less a matter of "freedom for" so much as "freedom from." For the Republicans, "freedom from" entailed freeing the nation from the trappings, symbols, institutional and social control through which a resuscitated ghost of the *ancien régime* and inherited privilege perpetuated themselves. In this, the Catholic Church and its educational network at all levels were the most obvious historic expression.

The Law on the Freedom of Higher Education, from the standpoint of the Republicans of the day, opened a breach in one of the key institutional bastions of the old order, a breach rapidly widened in 1880 by the state assuming sole responsibility for awarding public certificates and degrees. (Article 1 of the Law of March 18, 1880 stated: "*Les examens et épreuves pratiques qui déterminent la collation des grades ne peuvent être subis que devant les facultés de l'État*.") In addition, the legal authorization for "free sector" or private establishments to call themselves universities was rescinded.

The second round of legislation enacted in 1880 effectively sealed off free sector higher education in two ways. It cut off any possibility of transfer to the public sector by denying recognition to the certificates and diplomas the free sector awarded. By the same token, it removed any prospect of the holders of free sector awards to apply for public service employment, a key function wholly vested in the public education system and an important source of the latter's standing, not to mention attractiveness.

With free sector, private higher education relegated to the status of an ecclesiastical and educational ghetto, the way was opened for the Republicans to address the final item on the agenda – the creation of a nationwide system of primary education, free – that is without cost – compulsory and secular (Loi du 16 juin 1881). It covered the age range 6–13. Legislation was passed in 1882, under the aegis of Jules Ferry, today regarded as the father of French primary education. "Les Lois scolaires de Jules Ferry" (1882) on http://www.senat.fr/eventment/archives/D42/index.html

From this excursion across the formative years in the Republic's drive to create a national system of higher education more in keeping with its own system of values, a number of points may be retained. First amongst them was the key status of higher education as an initial point of attack, subsequently used to leverage further reform. Second, both stages of reform, higher education as well as compulsory primary schooling, were nationwide in their application. Third, both were top-down. And finally, both showed clearly that educational reform was explicitly and avowedly seen by its initiators in overtly political terms. Social progress was equated with ousting the authority, together with the traditional irrational beliefs and practices mustered around organized religion and its replacement by a culture and by a legislative framework expressly dedicated to upholding the values of Liberty and Equality, if not Fraternity. Indeed, this was a radical – even revolutionary – vision of educating the future citizen in the Republic and appeared so to many. Nor was it easily accepted. But the central part of education in the struggle for hearts, minds – and votes – was lost to neither side. The conflict in the villages of France between the primary school teacher as "hussar of the Republic" (the prayerful added the adjective "black" to the descriptor) and Monsieur le Curé as guardian of the faith and teachings of an older order, a classic theme in French literature both serious (Thabault 1944) and light (Chevalier 1974), was no less real for all that.

That educational reform in general and higher education reform no less so were conceived in terms of outright partisan politics can surprise none save perhaps the naïve. What differs today is largely the way reform is argued and justified, which is often disingenuous. It is not presented as a shift in the political socialization of society so much as a supposedly nonpartisan "solution" to a "challenge" or an "issue" variously couched and underpinned in terms of measurable, detectable and evident failure or, alternatively as the sudden discovery that other nations – or systems – have outstripped one's own measured performance. This is then accompanied by the implicit assumption that one must "catch up" or suffer what are presented as the inevitable consequences of such apparent laxity, sloth or inefficiency.

Whilst this is today part of the world we live in, employing such a discourse is no less a bid to re-mold both opinion and perceptions than earlier and less covert agendas which drew upon social and political rationales. In the case of the

Republicans during the early days of the Third Republic, the rationale they invoked was both political and historic, namely to bring to final fruition the inheritance of the first French Revolution. What has to be remembered, however – and it stands as a major dividing line between higher education policy in France before the 1950s and its subsequent development – is that such policies prior to that crucial decade were national in the sense that they rarely took systematic account of what was happening elsewhere, though, as we have seen, defeat on the field of battle gave a solid jolt to national narcissism. Nevertheless, the driving force behind reform lay within the nation itself, which comparative educationists have termed "the ameliorative tradition" (Mallinson 1966), operated within a context of values that were cultural in the main. They were also historical, either to reassert values lost or to correct those currently in place. The French Republicans played both ends of this ideological diptych against the Parties of Order (Goguel 1946) and the institutions they regarded as perpetuating it.

Yet, the crucial element in shaping the practices, mores and identity of a nation's universities, polytechnics (in the English not the French vocational sense) and colleges lies less in the ostensible and public values or in the mission such values lay upon them, so much as the way these ideas are translated into reality, organized and inserted into the institutional fabric of higher education (Clark and Neave 1992). The way Equality, for instance, is given operational expression and assumes institutional form is very different indeed from one nation to another. So, for that matter, is Liberty, which is not quite the same thing as Freedom, though often the translation in language involves a shift more subtle and less obvious than the differences in structures and provision to which they give rise across systems.

Liberty, Equality and Fraternity as Public Values

The definition of Equality that the founding fathers of the Third Republic made their own derived both from Montesquieu in respect of the sovereignty of the people and from Rousseau in its basic principle. It was also legal in both definition and execution. Thus, the philosophic principle that all men (sic) are born equal was interpreted as being equal before the law. The second guiding principle, first expressed by the Convention on September 25, 1792, defined the Republic in respect of its spatial extent and in terms of the salient legal fundamentals of the nation thus delineated. The Republic is one and indivisible. The third guiding principle holds the state alone as expressing the General Interest. This latter stipulation stands in marked contrast to the Anglo-American view and very particularly so in the spheres of education and culture where nineteenth-century British and American liberalism took the view that the presence of the state was best held at a distance.

This is different indeed in the Republic. Rather, the state is held to be a guarantee of the freedom of its citizens who are free only when in and part of the national community – "*un citoyen … n'est libre que dans et par la cité.*" Just how far French jurisprudence places the state as a fundamental bulwark for Equality emerges clearly

and without ambiguity: "the French Republic is committed to [*est attachée*] to the equality of the rights of citizens, which can only be upheld [*assurée*] by the very present activity of the State in the domains of politics as well as the economy and society" ("L'Etat expression de l'Intérêt général." La République 2011).

There remains one final principle that derives directly from the Republic construed as One and Indivisible. Though it too stands as a generic principle, its application to the sphere of education and to higher education in particular is exceedingly important when we come to deal with the focus of this Chapter: namely, why the issues addressed by the California Master Plan could not be dealt with in the same manner in France. Since it is so important, it merits being quoted in-extenso:

> The Republic does not recognize any affiliations (whether groups ethnic, religious, cultural or interest groups) which may tend to break up that community of citizens which makes up the Nation. This concerns less brotherhoods of blood, ties of ethnicity or between members of the same locality so much as formally constituted groupings. Thus it follows that the Law applies to all throughout the breadth and depth of the land. Such conditions place the Republic as a specific form of Democracy. The unity of the Nation cannot be imperiled by recognizing allegiance to a community that divides it, regardless of whether such allegiances are cultural, religious or social….It is the citizen's civic obligation to put aside his multiple affiliations when exercising his political rights in the General Interest. The Nation is a Republic only in the fullest meaning of that term when it acts as a "community of citizens" exercising civic responsibility ("La République Une et Indivisible", La République 2011).[1]

Their Administrative Consequences

Translating these values into administrative process and procedure rested on a number of assumptions. First amongst them is that cohesion and order in the nation-state are best ensured by uniform and rational process, which take the form of legal codification and enactment. Second, the application of what in today's jargon is called "system steering" takes place through legal enactment by the passing of Law, by decrees of application or, in finer detail, by Ministerial circular. Steering by legal instrument, the predominant mode of "system coordination" in France. remained until the last decade of the twentieth century. Third, the purpose of such instrumentality was to ensure a homogeneity within the particular sphere – school level or university – to which it applied. Homogeneity in application was seen as operationalizing and upholding the principle of equality in the provision by the state of services to the

[1] *La République ne reconnaît pas tout ce qui tend à morceler (groupes ethniques, religieux, culturels, d'intérêt) la communauté civique qu'est la nation. Cela implique une fraternité qui ne soit pas une fraternité de sang, d'ethnie, de terroir mais une fraternité construite. En conséquence, la loi est la même pour tous et sur tout le territoire. Ces caractéristiques font de la République une forme particulière de la Démocratie. L'unité de la nation peut être mise en péril par la reconnaissance d'appartenance communautaire qui la fractionne, que ces appartenances soient culturelles religieuses ou sociales. … Le civisme du citoyen consiste à mettre à distance ses appartenances multiples pour exercer ses choix politiques en vue de l'intérêt général. La nation n'est pleinement républicaine que comme «communauté des citoyens» animés de vertu civique* ("La République Une et Indivisible", La République 2011).

nation and its citizens. Thus, for instance, the legal fiction that all universities were equal in status and treatment persisted well on into the last century, despite evidence to the contrary (Bourdieu and Passeron 1964). In effect, Equality as a public value lies at the heart of that other major characteristic of higher education policy in France, namely, its reliance on "legal homogeneity" (Neave and van Vught 1991; Neave 2012a).

Legal homogeneity, by the same token, itself rested on a number of assumptions. Prime amongst them, legal homogeneity stood as the main channel through which Equality was translated from basic value into an operational policy. The most important of these assumptions held that formal Equality meant uniformity in the process of applying it. Hence, change aimed at one segment of higher education or intended for a particular type of institution, applied across the breadth and depth of France from Valenciennes in the North to Pau on the border with Spain in the South on the grounds that to do otherwise would be to undermine both the concept of Equality as uniformity of process and procedure, quite apart from doing violence to the principle of unity and indivisibility which stood as the basic political identity of the Republic itself. Certainly, there were procedures for dealing with exceptional cases. These were handled by an exceptional procedure (*derogations*) that authorized individual higher education establishments to depart from the letter of the law or to retain certain provisions and practices, which otherwise were to be modified. As with most exceptions, they served merely to underline the prevalent legal norm.

Legal homogeneity was then a most powerful tool in the administrative armory of the central state. It governed access to higher education in the shape of France's equivalent to the high school graduation certificate, the *Baccalauréat*, which was – and remains still today – a nationwide and nationally standardized examination, nationally set and, within the option tracks available, based on standardized national syllabi. The same operational principle applied to the public awards, degrees and diplomas that attested to the successful completion of university study. Significantly, such qualifications were not awarded by the individual university, though the reforms of 1896, put in hand by Louis Liard, gave universities the right to award their own degrees, as opposed to degrees awarded by the state – *diplômes nationaux* (Weisz 1983).

Contrary Imaginations, Complementary Perspectives

Viewed from outside France, the very pervasiveness of legal homogeneity as an operational principle may appear redolent of the over-mighty state penetrating deeply into what Martin Trow termed the "private lives" of higher education (Trow 1975, pp. 113–115). Seen within a British or American value set, to conclude that the power of the state in France like that of Britain's mad monarch, George III "has grown, is going and ought to be diminished" is but a short step. It is, however, a step in the wrong direction, for as we have seen, the role of the state in France is very different and its constant presence justified in the name of upholding formal equality and thus social cohesion precisely through the very detailed nature of its presence – in this case in higher education.

Though the view of higher education as an "axial institution," (Perkin 1984, p. 42) – the hub between teaching, research and the innovation – underlines its key role in the modern economy, its importance, whilst no less in France, conferred upon it a

very different function and place in the polity. In the French polity, higher education is inseparable from the General Interest and, since defining and translating the General Interest is the monopoly of the state, so higher education as a public service comes under its purlieu since it performs those equally crucial functions that underline "Republican rigor" by defining and identifying both merit and worth (Rothblatt 2007). From this a number of consequences flowed. In the first place and in contradistinction to both Britain and the United States, higher education was not regarded as servicing its immediate locality, though this does not mean the individual institution did not contribute to local life. But such impact as it might have had was a second order consequence. Rather the community that higher education was held specifically to serve was national, not local, a view that takes on very real substance when one considers, for example, the procedures for staffing universities prior to the Higher Education Guideline Law of August 2007.

Higher Education as a National Community

University teaching staff, as has been noted earlier, formed the *corps universitaire*. Selection was based on a series of national competitive examinations. Those successful were placed on a list of qualified and nationally recognized lecturers (*Liste d'aptitude*). A second procedure saw the chosen – but patiently waiting – nominated into post by a national body as places fell vacant. Academic staff were not recruited by the university. On the contrary, the university notified a central agency, which then nominated the individual whose qualifications corresponded to the vacancy. Thus, the individual university had the vacancies. The central, national agency had the posts, a subtle yet vital distinction. As public servants, academic staff were, in the official phrase, "at the disposal of the Republic" and in consequence were assigned to wherever the vacancy occurred from Strasbourg to Nantes. To put no finer point on the matter, and staff "recruitment" practices merely illustrate it, higher education provides a very clear demonstration of the national character of higher education. The state extends *into* the local community, an action justified as upholding the principle of national unity, of the Republic One and Indivisible. Higher education is most explicitly not the emanation *of* the local community. To cast higher education as a community concern would re-define it as a "particular" interest rather than being part of the General Interest, thereby removing it from the sphere of the *Res publica*.

In dissecting the way the lead values of French Republicanism were operationalized through legal homogeneity and woven into the institutional fabric and practices of higher education, we are simply engaged in a more detailed examination of the relationship between higher education and government that more commonly parades under the typological shorthand of "state control" (Neave and van Vught 1991) or, alternatively, exploring the finer dimensions in one specific example of the "Continental European" model of central control over higher education (Clark, 1978, 1983). By focusing on values, once the product of partisan politics, that serve to shape French higher education and which, by dint of their enduring, evolved into "system norms" or "administrative style" (Premfors 1981), we have sought to go a

little further beyond that perspective of higher education largely internal, which portrays it mainly in terms of organization and structure. There are good reasons for concentrating on the historical origins of these commanding values rather than taking them for granted. First, because they are an indissoluble part of the forces that shape – and to a considerable extent even today still shape – the dynamic of reform. Second, failure to do so would make understanding why France took a different path from the California Master Plan in the drive to mass higher education at best a partial account and at worst, down right obscure.

Critique of Legal Homogeneity

Legal homogeneity may be criticized on a number of grounds. Amongst the more telling in purely operational terms is the difficulty it imposes on reform or to adaptation itself. For instance, introducing a new subject discipline at the institutional level is certainly demanding. But to do so across all the universities of France and Navarre and at the same time turns a relatively minor adjustment into a major undertaking. In the absence of institutional discretion and latitude, the prospect of reform is formidable indeed.

Why France remained wedded for so long to legal homogeneity as an administrative procedure brooks no easy answer. At one level, one may take refuge in the argument that policies – whether in higher education or further a-field – always involve some form of trade off (Premfors 1982, pp. 365–378). The issue of trades-off – for instance; between cost and access, access and maintaining excellence, excellence and useful knowledge – takes on new weight when the purpose of higher education itself is re-defined. These, after all, were the heart of the issues the Master Plan addressed.

The need for trade-offs is one thing. Admitting that need, anticipating it and putting a pre-emptive strategy in place – again an outstanding feature of the Master Plan – is a very different matter indeed. Arguably, France's reluctance to compromise with legal homogeneity as the procedural expression in higher education of the Republic's three fundamental values plus the scale of implementation change called for, accounts less for the inability to contemplate reform so much as the inability to translate intention into capacity and capacity into action in the early 1960s. Legal homogeneity, as has been pointed out, served in the early days of the Third Republic as a key instrument for the root and branch overhaul of both higher education and its mission. It was used to separate the definition of merit and worth from authoritative learning, from religious belief, the better to place both on a rational base. Yet, legal homogeneity was very far from casting higher education as an institution for on-going social change. On the contrary, higher learning, the accompanying socialization for public office and for the liberal professions, were essentially tasks of ensuring social and administrative stability to a Republican order (Soulier 1939).

Legal homogeneity, when first translated into a policy procedure, served on the one hand to modernize national bureaucracies and, on the other, to ensure that the "value allocating bodies" in society – medicine, law, taxation – in some cases, the military

but most decidedly not the Church in the case of the Republic – had the means to fulfill their role and responsibilities to society by dint of having access to up-dated, scientific and verifiable knowledge they both required and themselves generated. Forged in the days when higher education was elite education, legal homogeneity was singularly ill-suited to reforming higher education when that institution's task moved on to become both an agent for economic and social change whilst at the same time becoming itself the object of that change. Brutally stated, the major challenge mass higher education set foursquare before legal homogeneity was the challenge of scalability compounded. And when, as it did in last two decades of the twentieth century, the notion that change itself ought to be an organic and on-going feature of mass higher education took hold elsewhere in western Europe – notably in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands – (Neave 2012b) some of the major assumptions that had grown up around this long-abiding procedure turned to dust and ashes. Legal homogeneity was perfectly adequate to handle reform on a stop/go basis and to do so once every 20 years, a presumption it shared with most systems of higher education in post-war Western Europe. By the same token, it was very far from adequate when the pace, scope and intensity of external change, whether driven by "social demand" or by shifts in the economy and thus the qualifications needed, required a more rapid response. Hence the issue was joined as to whether legal homogeneity could continue to act as an operational procedure in maintaining formal system coherence – higher education's echo of the Republic One and Indivisible – or whether it was not better preserved as a symbol of continuity amidst change – in short, as a legal fiction.

A New Vision – Frustrated

As Kerr himself pointed out, the California Master Plan *anticipated* change. Some of the propellants behind change in California were also present in France of the 1950s; the postwar baby boom, not least. However, where France – and for that matter, the rest of Western Europe – differed from California was the point at which the baby boom would have first impact in the education system. To Kerr and his colleagues, this was higher education (Kerr 2001, p. 173). In Britain as for France (Crowther 1959; Cros 1961), the major point of impact would be felt in the high school. Agreed, massification was key. But, for France, just for other countries in Western Europe during the 1950s – Sweden (Marklund and Söderberg 1968) or Belgium (Mallinson 1980), for example – massification *à l'européenne* saw the attention of governments and Ministries of Education focused primarily on "the democratization of secondary schooling," a structural lag already evident and very clearly so in the closing stages of the war. In concrete terms, it emerged in a particularly dramatic form in 1944. English initiative opened general access to *secondary* schooling through the Education Act of that year. The corresponding reform took place in 1945 in Scotland, which even then had its own legal system and primary and secondary schools very different in age range and curriculum from England (Scotland 1969). In the United States, the Serviceman's Readjustment Act was also promulgated in 1944. It opened access to *higher education* for returning GIs.

Yet, it would be a gross error to suggest that higher education was the victim of a terrible silence in the years during France's post war physical reconstruction. France too had its visionary in the person of Pierre Mendès France, briefly *Président du Conseil* (Prime Minister) between June 1954 and February 1955 and subsequently vice president of the Radical Party (Rizzo 2002). In many respects, Mendes France, like Kerr in California, anticipated the shape of things to come. Both were mobilizers and movers, Mendes from outside but with support inside the university, Kerr from inside the university, but with support outside. One major difference separated the two men. It was crucial: the efforts of Mendès France were not directly crowned with success. Still, this in no way detracts from his role as "precursor." The diagnoses he made of the issues higher education ought to tackle were later to prove not merely prophetic but also correct. Whilst Kerr's was a holistic vision which sought to combine the goals of universal access in the same general framework as research universities, Mendès France's strategy worked back from the research function. It was a form of a 'backward mapping' (Elmore 1982) though obviously this term was never used at the time. Mendès' concern lay primarily with the dearth of research staff, technicians, research funding and France's general backwardness in the research domain, pure and applied (Rizzo 2002).

To lobby for a national research and science policy, a series of national conferences was launched at Caen in 1955, at Grenoble 2 years later, at Sèvres in 1961-returning to Caen in 1966. An agenda that sought to persuade the state to take active steps in developing a national science policy moved steadily deeper into higher and secondary education. For the historians of higher education, the first Caen conference in which Mendès was naturally prominent, marked the first postwar attempt to modernize French higher education (Ruegg 2011, p. 13). It brought together leading figures from academia, business and politics. The 12-point program that emerged from the debates, though interesting on its own account, is no less interesting as a pointer to what then appeared to be evident weaknesses in the French higher education system. It called for a doubling of students in technology and science, a fourfold increase in the output of engineering students and for the ranks of teaching and research staff in science to multiply tenfold (Rizzo 2002). Raising the level of qualified output was not, however, the only aspect to come under scrutiny. If higher education was to meet these aims, attention had also to be paid to secondary schooling and very particularly to developing a technical track.

Alongside strengthening specific curricular and knowledge pathways between school and higher education went other proposals, no less radical for their day. They were to resurface as constant themes in French higher education policy, though subject to varying enthusiasm in their pursuit. The Caen Conference called for an overhaul of the Ministry of National Education, for more autonomy for universities, improvement in the drawing power and attractiveness of the "research career" and last, but far from being the least significant, setting up cross sector research linkages between universities and grandes ecoles (Rizzo 2002).

Here was a clarion call for educational reform at all levels: for Faculties to be reorganized, for the administrative burden of academic staff to be reduced the better to concentrate on research and, finally, from a purely French standpoint, a proposal of the most heretical kind: namely, to open permanent academic appointments to

non-French citizens. To outsiders, this last will not appear greatly radical. It was, on the contrary, the way of the world in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in Britain. In France, however, as I noted earlier, academia figured as one of the "services of the Republic;" and as such was restricted not only to those holding appropriate *French* qualifications, but as members of *la fonction publique* had compulsorily to be French citizens, a condition required since the earliest days of the Imperial University. As subsequent events were to show, overhauling the legal status of the academic Estate generated the most vehement of reactions.

Despite the momentum the Caen colloquium built up and despite Mendès France's efforts to build upon his own initiative in setting up the Higher Council for Science Research (*Conseil Supérieur de la Recherche Scientifique*) in September 1954 (Rizzo 2002), the first postwar attempt to overhaul French higher education was still-born. It was in large part sacrificed to the confusion, bitter personal animosity, political polarization and, in consequence, the ministerial instability the Algerian conflict generated during the twilight years of the Fourth Republic. It was the fate of Pierre Mendès France to see others take up the tasks he had been instrumental in identifying.

If taking over others' ideas is the most sincere form of flattery that the world of politics can pay, then the Gaullist Fifth Republic paid Mendès France a handsome compliment. Shortly after the Fourth Republic collapsed and passed from a parliamentary regime to become France's Fifth Republic – a presidential democracy incarnated in the person of General Charles de Gaulle – it set up in 1958 a General Directorate for Scientific and Technical Research inside the Ministry of National Education (Rizzo 2002). Thus, the Caen program was not wholly cast aside. Indeed, the Gaullist régime heeded the call for a national science policy, whilst making it its own. Major investments were made in the university and particular priority laid on biology, medical and agricultural research, areas not previously to the fore.

Contrary Imaginations

Important though the initiatives of Mendès France were, viewed comparatively and very particularly when set against the California Master Plan, they become more important still. They give us a very significant purchase over the contrasting policy "styles" and basic assumptions that respectively accompanied them. Kerr's account of the Master Plan contained elements of innovation and consolidation. In his own words, the Master Plan set out:

> to develop an outstanding statewide system of higher education and to keep the university's place as the great center for graduate instruction and research within that system, while considering both the public welfare and the private interests of the several segments (Kerr 2001, p. 172).

The Master Plan combined universal access with the basic principle that higher education was to preserve its autonomy through planning its own future (Kerr 2001, p. 172). Whilst the Master Plan built forward, it did so by setting future needs and requirements against its own then-current provision and performance. To this extent,

the Master Plan may be seen as both internal to California and self-referring. How far external considerations – for example, the so-called "Sputnik scare" and the National Defense (Education) Act of 1958 created a climate conducive to such initiatives – remains unclear. They cannot have been without influence.

A Significant Change in Policy Perspective

By contrast, the Caen conference and, over the 10 years that ensued, the meetings that followed saw a profound change to the context in which French higher education policy was weighed up as a national concern. Justifying reform was no longer wholly internal to France. For just as Caen marked the first step in rethinking the priorities for French higher education policy, so the decade that followed saw a fundamental change in the referential base, that is to say, the examples invoked to justify the proposals the Caen "process" drew upon. By 1966 at the second Caen Conference, France's research expenditure and performance were explicitly and directly compared with the performance of other systems – principally the United States (Rizzo 2002). It must remain a matter for future research to determine whether the second Caen meeting marks the first and earliest glimmerings in France of what was to emerge fully fledged 30 years later under such desolatingly inadequate gather-all labels as "internationalization" or the "globalization" of higher education.

A slow but steady advance that added other external points of reference and comparison to the general framework of policy debate in France as against the largely internal considerations that propelled the California Master Plan forward, was not the only difference between the two contrasting visions of reform. For whilst Kerr and his fellow reformers were all too well aware of the consequences of failure – not least the intervention of the State Education Board – for Mendès France and the members of the *Association d'Etude pour l'Expansion d la Recherche Scientifique*, set up to spearhead reform – national planning was not an option that could be avoided. It existed already since 1946 in the *Commissariat Général du Plan,* a national agency with oversight for general economic planning based on Five Year Plans, set up in 1946 by General de Gaulle. Indeed, one of the key aspects which Mendès France and his colleagues held accountable for the lamentable state of French research was precisely its absence from the Five Year planning mechanism (Rizzo 2002).

Back to Basics

Differences in the way basic values had been interpreted into administrative and political procedures saw the Master Plan and its French counterpart starting from assumptions that drove each very precisely in the opposite direction one from the other. For Mendès France, failure to develop a research policy, to underpin it by the

overhaul of both higher and secondary education and to set up clear lines of responsibility between research and industry, were all clear evidence of the failure of the state. They were evident failures of the state's basic function: to attend to issues clearly in the "General Interest" of the nation. With the state absent, without the formal order and codification it brought about, necessarily stagnation, inertia and confusion reigned. From this it followed that the only way to jolt the state into action lay in obliging it to recognize officially that indeed the reform agenda did fall into the General Interest. And this, as Mendès France made abundantly clear from the first, depended on making reform, in his own words, *d'abord une affaire politique* (Rizzo 2002). Or, to revert to the habitual framing of French political discourse, to bring the issues identified by a particular interest into the arena of public debate by laying it before the National Assembly, the prime instance where an agenda drawn up by particular interests may through due democratic process be recognized as, and translated into, the General Interest.

There is no better illustration of the French proverb *Autres pays, autres moeurs* than to compare higher education policy across France and California. For the former, and for reasons rooted as much in cultural constructs as they are in the political values and administrative procedures that flow from them, higher education as the quintessence and expression of the nation's identity, its standing and its future fortunes was indivisible from the official means of giving them operational shape. Higher education was – and is – inseparable from the political process. By the same token, in a Jeffersonian democracy it is precisely this separation that upholds and maintains that same institution as an expression of the freedom that comes from individual choice. For the universities of France to be able to draw up, negotiate between themselves what in French legal parlance would be termed a Higher Education Framework Law (*Loi d'Orientation*) that left higher education with the discretion to plan its own future, and subsequently to have that agreement granted the full weight of Law, would in truth be the French version of "The World set Upside Down."

Planning Progress, Meeting Change

Reduced to its simplest, planning deliberately moves what one has to become what one reckons one ought to have. How this takes place, at what speed and to meet whatever the purpose might be, depend upon the resources available – human and financial, readiness, will and, not least, the persuasion or instrumentality the planners can bring to bear (Neave 2012b). Whilst the California Master Plan entailed re-profiling three very different and segmented systems of higher education into one overall system with provision for transfer between three now complementary levels, this model has never formally been contemplated in France. Certainly, attempts were made to attenuate segmentation. Some have even succeeded. Whilst segmentation has some apparent advantages in the clarity of purpose or in delineating clearly the type of training different sectors may provide, it also strengthens one besetting sin.

Clarity often carries with it the natural determination to maintain where not improve upon those conditions that allow individual institutions to build up their self-perceived identity and standing. Accommodating this was key to the success of the Master Plan (Kerr 2001, pp. 173–174).

In France, higher education has been heavily segmented since the days of the Third Republic. Reform did not challenge the basic characteristic of institutional segmentation at the undergraduate level, though the situation shows signs of "loosening up" over the course of the past quarter century at the level of the "research training system" (Clark 1994). At first degree level, quite on the contrary, segmentation between institutional types has, if anything, been reinforced. So has "internal" segmentation or "tracking" within the university sector *stricto sensu* and considerably so in the course of the 1990s.

The *Grandes Écoles*

Differentiation by mission was one of the critical aspects of the California Master Plan, which Kerr continually defended despite attacks that he was elitist in a pejorative sense. In this volume Thorsten Nybom argues that despite lip service, differentiation often gave way to egalitarian beliefs in northern Europe with harsh consequences for quality. France, however, had its own and unique form of differentiation with a long history, a division between universities and the virtually untranslatable *grandes écoles*. Although historians and political scientists quibble as to their exact origins, antecedents can be found in the *ancien régime*, the work of economists known as physiocrats (Dakin, 1965; Poirier, 1999). Taken up by the Revolution itself, and developed in the centuries following, there are now some 226 *grandes écoles*, two-thirds in the public sector and the rest private but state recognized (Conférence des Grandes Ecoles, 2011). The *grandes écoles* are highly specialized. More than half feature some form of engineering, but subjects like agronomics and high level management are also represented. Unlike universities, which come under the ambit of the Ministry of Higher Education and Research, public sector *grandes écoles* are scattered across some seven different government Ministries. The *grandes écoles* are the true élite sector in French higher education. Selection is ferocious. It starts with access to Classes preparatory to the *grandes écoles* (*Classes préparatoires aux Grandes Écoles, CPGE)* which prepare students for various national competitive examinations. Naturally, these examinations too are highly selective. In effect, the entry conditions of the *grandes écoles* penetrate directly down into the CPGE. From both an organizational and pedagogic point of view, their curriculum splits the CPGE off from mainstream high schools.

The preparatory classes have no counterpart in the US or the UK. Together with the *grandes écoles*, they form a closed sub-system (MEN, 2011). Selection for the grandes écoles then formally commences after the *Baccalauréat,* which is sat at the end of the French equivalent of 12th grade in the American high school. Furthermore, the numbers of students admitted to the elite public sector schools depends upon vacancies or opportunities in the civil service. The *grandes écoles* are the forcing

house from which the state recruits its top drawer permanent civil servants and account for approximately 11% of all enrollments in higher education. In effect, it would not be misplaced to see the ties between public sector *grandes écoles* and the state as being akin to higher education in a command economy. Their privileged status means that they, but not the universities, were shielded from the direct impact of rising student numbers.

The University

In 2008, there are 86 universities in France, attended by 1,450,000 students (MESR 2010, Table 2, p. 2). Formally speaking, with the exception of restricted place programs – medicine, pharmacy and veterinary medicine – which begin at undergraduate level in France, the university is open to all holding the *Baccalauréat,* They have the legally recognized right to a place at university, though not necessarily in the Faculty of first choice. The universities were in effect, powerless to screen students until the end of the first year. Or, an alternative possibility, they relied on students to "cool themselves out" (Clark 1960, pp. 569–576), which many did. Thus, in France, the cooling out function, which in California was located primarily in the community college, in France migrated upwards and took up residence in the university. As more entered so the numbers of those "cooled out" also rose, just as at the same time conditions for learning, under sheer press of numbers and grotesque levels of overcrowding, sank towards the 'intolerable' (Ruegg and Sadlak 2011, p. 105).

University Institutes of Technology (IUTs)

In addition to the *grandes écoles* and the universities, France has a third higher education segment, fundamentally different and separate from the other two and designed in part to serve business and industry more directly. The University Institutes of Technology (*Instituts universitaires de Technologie*) were legislated into being by the Ministerial decree of January 7th 1966. The IUTs were a considered act of policy. They were a coherent bid to shape not merely an alternative to the university, but also to galvanize technician education in the high school. They provide an appropriate vehicle to contrast French higher education reform with the California Master Plan and its specified segments. The IUTs share certain similarities with the California community colleges, particularly in the type of diplomas they deliver. Indeed, at the launching of the IUT initiative, the Minister of Education, Christian Fouchet, explicitly acknowledged both junior colleges and community colleges as sources of his inspiration (La creation des IUTs 1966). Like the community colleges, the IUTs were heavily biased towards the practical and the applied sciences. Stress was laid on biology, chemistry, civil, chemical

and electronic Engineering, mechanical and thermal Engineering (Neave 1976, p. 50). Their vocational emphasis emerged around "information careers" – later to flourish under the title "communication studies": social work training, business studies, computing and statistics.

However, inspiration demands interpretation, and interpretation is often a far cry from the original. The IUTs differed from the community colleges in three significant respects. They rested on vertical segmentation, intended to place them in parallel to the university. Transfer between IUTs and universities was rigorously excluded, at least in the minds of planners. Access to them was selective.. And finally, the 2-year diploma they awarded – the *Diplôme Universitaire de Technologie* (DUT) – was a "terminal diploma." It led directly to the labor market. Government projections looked forward to the IUTs attracting 10% of all students in higher education by 1972. This, they were fated never to reach. In 2008, IUTs accounted for 5% of total enrollments in higher education (MESR 2010, Tableau 1, p. 2).

After the uproar of the student unrest of May 1968, plans to have the IUTs as a parallel sector separate from the university were scrapped. Instead, they were brought under the overall umbrella of the university, though subject to a greater degree of direct Ministry control, in part to preserve their specific vocational identity, in part to prevent their assimilation into the university (Neave 1975, p. 51).

The Anatomy of Unrest

1968 posed two very substantial challenges to the Republic's assumptions about the character of the higher education system. They shook to the roots the university's social ecology. And student calls for "direct democracy" profoundly rattled the political assumptions about the role of the state as well as its basic legitimacy as the operational expression of the General Interest.

Before 1968, university students were closely tied to city culture. Precisely because the French university was neither residential nor surrounded by a campus – precisely because the French university was not a campus separated physically and architecturally from the urban fabric – it was symbiotically bound into, benefited from and contributed to, that prime Roman virtue to which the Republic saw itself the natural heir: civility. And civic virtue implies precisely that. It is nurtured in the city, not on the farm. The larger the city, the higher the level of "civilization" – in the strict etymological sense of that term. The older the university, the closer it was to the city center. After 1968, with the administrative splitting off of individual Faculties to form separate universities and the construction of new ones, a new social ecology emerged in higher education. The campus began to take on some substance. This, however, was intended less to foster a *genius loci* (Rothblatt 1997, pp. 58–64), a new wellspring for a renewed civility, so much as the pragmatic lessons learnt from May 1968 itself, considerations of cost and availability of suitable sites, for land is always cheaper on the edge of a city than at the center.

But changes in the social ecology of the student experience took on a very different dimension as the French Student Estate sought to re-define its civic and thus its political ecology. The Student Estate set out to proclaim an alternative basis for its status as citizens. It laid claim to be the heirs of another long tradition of "direct action" that harked back to the early days of the French labor movement. Only then did authorities view the Student Estate in much the same light as their predecessors looked upon the French laboring classes after 1830. They were *classes laborieuses, et classes dangereuses* (Chevalier 1958). Within this *Weltanschauung* of French political and university history, the student uprising, leaving aside its causes, stood as a fundamental challenge to the Republican order itself. Howls against a "pedagogic gerontocracy" were wounding. They were meant to be. Far more significant was the explicit line that student radicals drew between the state and democracy and very particularly between the monopoly over higher education that the state wielded in the name of the General Interest. State monopoly and democracy were no longer held by the Student Estate as complementary so much as adversarial – in default of the latter driving the former.

By drawing a line between the state on the one side and democracy on the other, the Student Estate reinterpreted the state as adversarial to democracy. 1968 was then far more than a student uprising. It struck at the heart of the Republican Concordat that had shaped higher education policy in France since 1876. To this, the state responded urgently and pragmatically with the Higher Education Guideline Law of November 1968. It jettisoned the Napoléonic University. It modified the relationship between state and university by including two principles: participation and autonomy (Loi No 68-978 du 12 novembre 1968). No longer were universities subject to direct control by a state-appointed official, *the Recteur d'Académie*. Since 1808, the "Faculties" as France's equivalent of the universities were officially called, had come under the administrative authority and direct oversight of this high-ranking civil servant, in whose person resided the full weight of the Council of Ministers and who was nominated into post by the President of the Republic. The Napoleonic "Faculties" were henceforth designated "universities." Each university was headed by a president, elected by secret ballot for 5 years by the representatives of academic staff and students at the university where the vacancy occurred.

Minimal though such autonomy might appear to American eyes, it was sufficient to move students off the streets and back to the lecture theaters and laboratories (Ruegg and Sadlak 2011, pp. 106–107). In a French setting, the concessions were in truth far-reaching. The fathers of the Third Republic radical, though they were, had not seen fit to abolish the institutional forms of state oversight. Certainly, Republican rigor formalized the conditions of entry to the institutions of state (Kessler 1983). Education was a central and abiding element in the General Interest and for that reason came under the indivisible oversight of the state as the formal guarantor of the rights, duties of the citizen and the defender of Equality.

From a comparative perspective, the Guideline Law is an interesting legal instrument inasmuch as its provisions, when compared to the 1960 Master Plan, reveal a contrary dynamic. Whilst the legislation that passed the Master Plan onto the statute book left the way open for individual universities to develop their own priorities, the

Guideline Law set down a framework with reserve powers that could, if the circumstances so warranted, be used *by government* to write in further details. In the former, latitude lay with the individual university. In the latter, lit lay with national administration.

In effect, the Guideline Law diluted the pure milk of state *dirigisme* with a carefully calculated dose of university participation in key aspects of higher education policy. At the institutional level, it gave both the Academic Estate and the Student Estate voting rights on all save academic appointments and budgetary allocation. Making one's views known is not the same thing as determining policy, however. The universities did not determine policy. That, the state retained. Two significant issues were, however, omitted from the Guideline Law. It did not apply to the *grandes écoles.* Nowhere did it make the slightest mention of democracy. Participation was far from the student vision of "participant democracy." Whilst individual universities might deceive themselves into believing it was, the government steadfastly ignored it. Participation left intact the basic decision-taking capacity of the state. It most certainly did not dent the fundamental role of the state to operationalize the General Interest. Participation merely extended the range of those consulted. It did not alter those who determined how soundings and consultations were to be given operational expression in Law, decree of application or ministerial circular.

The Aftermath

The Guideline Law re-contoured the landscape around the "mass sector" of French higher education. It split up the Republic's universities. During an intense sorting out between 1970 and 1974, two-thirds of the universities existing today were created, a splendid example of *ex uno plures* rather than *e pluribus unum* (Neave 2011b, pp. 48). It profoundly altered their profile. Prior to 1968, French universities were largely "comprehensive" in the sense that all Faculties, Medicine included, were covered in the individual university. After 1968, some two-thirds of the 67 universities thus created became specialist establishments with a limited range of programs, though these programs extended across all levels up to the Third Cycle Doctorate – then the French counterpart to the Ph.D. "Comprehensive" universities did not altogether vanish, however.

The Guideline Law, if nothing else, revealed without any possibility of denial that if the university was to be the sole vehicle for massification, further reform would concentrate on it. Thus, mismatch between student expectations and university teaching – inevitable when increasing numbers of students and a wider ability range drive into higher education – in France concentrated on the university, not, as in California, on the Community College: This source of tension was not ignored by the Ministry of Education. But its concern was taken up in planning the cursus for the IUTs, which were largely developed with 'first generation' students in mind. For the IUTs, officials opted for a 2-year diploma, not as in university, a 3-year *Licence*.

A Legislative Saga of Prudence and Redefinition

From a statistical point of view, French universities attained mass status in 1972 or thereabouts. Shortly after, higher education policy embarked on what was to be a prolonged legislative saga. It was to last over the next two decades. Ostensibly, it set out to adjust both the structure of studies and their content to bring them into line with the diversity of ambition and in the ability of the rapidly swelling Student Estate. It also addressed the key issue of where the boundary should be placed between what in American terms would be called "the undergraduate experience" and the research training system (Neave 1993, pp. 159–220). Beneath this "manifest" function lay a "latent" strategy of considerable delicacy, which, given student sensitivities, could not be overtly announced. It entailed shifting the purpose of higher education away from public service in the hitherto accepted definition of this function, to become a broader ranging "service to the public" including business and industry. To American eyes, there is nothing unusual or for that matter, controversial in this. On the contrary, what does appear puzzling is that it was not done before. At the time, with memories of student volatility painfully fresh in the French administrative mind, to have admitted this long-term aim would have been imprudent in the extreme.

The delicate process of redefining the purposiveness of the French university started in 1973. The university *cursus* was modified and, like the IUTs, based on an initial cycle of 2 years, leading to the award of the *Diplôme d'Etudes Universitaires Générales* (DEUG). The purpose of this measure, was to allow students more time to firm up their subsequent study choice, a crucial step because guidance counselling services remained far less developed, if not outrightly vestigial, compared to their American counterparts. As mature adults, students were held to be masters of their fate.

A Modernization That Dared Not Say Its Purpose

The modernization of the curricular pathways inside the university, delicately realigned its mission around industry and enterprise. The functional boundaries between what would be known in the United States as undergraduate study, and in France the "first two cycles," made the masters degree level at year 4 into a buffer zone, separated off from the "research training system" which began at year 5 after the *Baccalauréat* (Neave 1993, pp. 159–220).

Reform rolled majestuously onward and upward. In 1974, the Diploma of Advanced Study (*Diplôme d'Etudes Approfondies* – DEA), passed 5 years after entry to university, was put in place as a boundary qualification marking the research training system. Two years later, the policy of "vocationalizing" first cycle studies was extended to the second cycle – years 3 and 4 (Lamour and Rontopolou Lamour 1992, pp. 45ff). It called for degree courses at *Licence* and *Maîtrise* level to show clearly the type of employment each subject diploma might lead to. That vocationalization was

controversial, none could doubt. It was controversial on at least two counts: first, because it implied – though certainly no one was so suicidal as to say it – that the historic role of the university in supplying the cadres for public service, a task it had fulfilled since the days of the Great Napoléon, was drawing to a close and that a new purpose defined in terms of the economy stood in the wings.

Certainly the Student Estate had rejoiced heartily at the demise of the Napoléonic University in 1968. It was less smitten, however, with the prospect of the *soi-disant* "autonomous" university harnessed to the chariot wheels of capitalism. Indeed, much had been said, often with great vehemence, about the unreformed university's "betrayal" of what the Student Estate regarded as the university's public service mission, namely the "liberation" of citizens – and themselves in prime instance – from the shackles of a capitalist state. With exquisite timing, the decree activating vocationalization was promulgated during the month of August, at a moment when the student mind dwelt on everything save study!

Well-Hidden Parallels

Yet, disregarding the colorful details the better to focus on the underlying strategy, reveals a more interesting perspective. In effect, although the central issue successive French government sought to address was not greatly dissimilar from certain key elements in Kerr's 1960 Master Plan, nowhere was the Master Plan mentioned as a source of influence by French policy-makers. The overhaul of curricular pathways and setting out the boundaries between initial training – (the first cycle), undergraduate qualification (the second cycle), taught post graduate degrees (*maîtrise*) and the entry port to the research training system (DEA) were tackled and solved by Kerr and his fellow reformers by setting these functions within each of the three institutional levels of higher education. In France, they were compressed into the university. The IUTs had seen their mission set in 1968. The *grandes écoles*, and their *Ministères de tutelle,* adamant, had no need for reform.

The saga of reform continued with the return of the Left with the election in 1981 of François Mitterand to the presidency of the Republic. Easing the once indissolvable ties between the state and its institutions that the law of 1968 put in train was pushed further. The explicit role the regions played in stimulating economic growth was recognized, though within the overall framework of national planning. Economic progress was accorded priority as a means to reduce social and cultural inequalities, thus to uphold equality amongst citizens (Loi No. 84-52 du 26 janvier 1984 Article 2), one of the bedrock values of the Republic.

The 1984 Guideline Law reordered the general priorities for higher education as the development of research, resourcing for the training undertaken and raising the levels of knowledge, culture and skills in the nation and of the individuals within it (Loi No. 84-52 du 26 janvier 1984 Articles 27, 28), but it also combined change with continuity. Continuity could be seen, for those who had the memory, in the priority assigned to research, an echo at some three decades distance of the

agenda outlined by Pierre Mendès France. Continuity too and with the same figure, emerged in the proposal to begin the process of *rapprochement* with the *grandes écoles,* though this step departed from the usual line hewed by the Socialist Party, which was to abolish them. The vocationalization of first cycle studies was further reinforced, and the government redesignated the French counterpart of Faculties and Schools as Units of Training and Research (*Unités de Formation et de Recherche*).

Ecoles Doctorales

The Master Plan placed the University of California at the crowning apex of a universal system of education and training. As a research university, the University of California stood as a beacon of excellence. In France, much is changing. The growth of Doctoral Schools is an example of change as has been the modification to the status of the National Scientific Research Center (*Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique* CNRS). In its earlier form, the CNRS both funded and undertook research. Founded in 1939, it stood above and apart from higher education and was, in effect, the state's main research arm.

The French research system in its classic form had two notable features: it was organizationally separate from the university, though many of its research units are located on their premises. The *grandes écoles* did not form part of the research training system. This was a university monopoly, as was the recommendation for the award of state-validated research degrees (Neave 1993, pp. 159–220).

A Segmented Research Training System

Many *grandes écoles*, and not least the most prominent amongst them, undertook research. They did not, however, have the formal right to qualify their students as researchers. Nor were their diplomas recognized as research degrees. Such separation was the source of not inconsiderable envy on both sides. The universities envied the *grandes écoles* for their ability to select their students. The *grandes écoles* looked with no less covetousness upon the university's research training status. Viewed through the lenses of the Master Plan, such differentiation was not without anomaly: research training – the key to the nation's fortunes in a modern economy – lay in precisely that sector most subject to the pressures and vagaries of having to struggle with mass higher education.

Attempts to reconcile the apparent contradiction of a research training system locked cheek by jowl into an institution prone to the tensions and stresses of massification, taxed the ingenuity of France's reformers from the 1970s onwards. By contrast, the California Master Plan from the start set down the broad institutional boundaries and located both the research and research training functions at

the top of the system – a masterly example of proactive policy. This was not so in France, which was rather forced back onto a series of piecemeal measures, handled for the most part reactively.

Absence of the Graduate School

The issues were plain to see. At what point in the university *cursus* should the research training system begin? Furthermore, French higher education was devoid of any arrangement similar to the American graduate school. This was less an omission. It was rather the consequence of studies, which in the American university formed part of the graduate school – medicine, business management for example. In France these began at the undergraduate level.

The drive towards *Écoles doctorales* was the French response to a broader, European- wide issue: how to secure sufficient highly trained research staff to meet the demands of both public and private sectors and to sustain the transition to an innovation-based economy? If awareness of this situation varied – Britain and the Netherlands were amongst the first to address the issue in the 1980s – so did the diagnosis and also the margin for maneuver. In France, the reforms of the 1970s put a dual mechanism in place in the universities; on the one hand a diploma marking the boundary between the research training system in the form of the DEA, and on the other a bifurcation which split off advanced professional training which had its own track through the *Diplôme d'Etudes Spécialisées Supérieures* (DESS) as a channel of deflection. Clearly, the *Écoles doctorales* were inspired by the research lead of American universities and by the ardent wish that in key technologies France should have a place in the sun if not in Silicon Valley, an ambition that drew president François Mitterand to the Bay Area in the March of 1984, just 3 months after the Higher Education Guideline Law had been fought into the statute book.

Why the Graduate School Model Was Not Retained

The model of the American graduate school, if contemplated, was not retained. To have done so would have required setting a selective barrier at the level of the *Licence* – in French terminology, Bacc + 3 – a delicate decision which in all likelihood would have been savaged by the Student Estate as a return to élitism or even as the "de-massification" of the university. Selection remained a sensitive issue. Attempts by the Right wing government of M. Chirac in November 1986 to impose selective entry on the university once again saw the Student Estate in the streets of Paris and the abrupt departure of the Minister in charge of Higher Education and Research, Alain Devacquet.

Nor would the graduate school model have been a remedy either, for the difficulties involved in sustaining the country's research capacity were as much

political as quantitative. The difficulties the research training system faced and to which the *École doctorale* addressed were two. Both were interlinked. Since all universities had research as an official public responsibility, and exercised the monopoly over research training, a policy of *triage* – of assigning the latter to some universities and not others – would in all likelihood have united both Academic and Student Estates on the grounds of its being a flagrant violation of the principle of Equality through legal homogeneity. Yet, with evident exceptions in the Paris region, the problem underlying research training was largely a dissipation of resources, human, financial or equipment.

Raison d'être of the *École Doctorales*

A close inspection of the *Écoles doctorales* shows their rationale as one of concentration to ensure that specialized doctoral programs have sufficient students – and for that matter, sufficient teaching and research staff. By combining across institutions what would otherwise be unsustainable, a viable, indeed a "critical" mass in both meanings of the term is possible. This prime objective makes them both less and more than a graduate school: less because, as the name implies, they are wholly focused on 3-year research training programs at doctoral level; more, because they combine both across and between not individual universities alone but also *grandes écoles.*

This is innovation indeed. The pattern of horizontal and vertical segmentation that set universities and grandes écoles apart, a segmentation first defined over a century ago, through the *Écoles doctorales* is replaced by a research training system based on cross-sector institutional collaboration. Furthermore, whilst the graduate school obviously does not exclude the possibility of inter-institutional links, this is not its prime purpose. It is, however, the basic rationale for the *Écoles Doctorales*.

Concentration has two dimensions: institutional and spatial. The latter, termed Poles of Research and Higher Education, are networks between higher education institutions operating within a region. Initially set up in 2006, there are currently some 21 Poles, bringing together 64 universities together with engineering schools, hospital centers and business schools (*écoles de commerce*) (*Poles de Recherche et d'Enseignement Supérieur PRES;* MESR 2011, PRES). The inter-institutional level counts 83 universities – that is to say, virtually all – and some 24 *grandes coles*. By 2009, France had some 290 *Écoles doctorales* active which bring together 3,000 research units. Student enrollment in the same year was around 66,500 with an annual output of 11,400 (Campus France 2009; MESR 2011: Recherche publique).

The *Écoles doctorales* are an excellent example of reconstructing the research training system around the principles of complementarity and consolidation. In an individual university, what is a modest source of strength can be made more viable still by collaborating with colleagues elsewhere whose specialization is complementary. There are, naturally, controls and evaluation. Only those research units

that have been nationally and publicly evaluated may seek a partner unit, which has also been subject to similar rigor. The decision to merge lies solidly in the hands of academia and the individual establishment. The *Écoles doctorales* have a significance that is goes beyond their official purpose. They appear to enjoy a margin of latitude that is otherwise unusual in French higher education. Such latitude is clear from the procedures for their establishment, accreditation and the credentialing of their awards. *Écoles doctorales* are established individually by Ministerial decree. Whilst not surprising since not all units are at the same stage of readiness, this is nevertheless a significant dent in the once sacrosanct notion of legal homogeneity. They are accredited by the Ministry of Higher Education and Research. The doctoral degree is awarded in the name of the participating universities. Thus, the *École doctorale* in social and cognitive formed by the four universities of Paris VI, VII, VIII and Paris XI sees the doctorate awarded in the name of all four (Observatoire de Paris UPMC 2010).

Clearly, evidence from the research training system suggests that many of the old sibboleths no longer retain their force. They are seen as a brake to progress, not a positive aid. The *Écoles doctorales* do not challenge the monopoly the university had over research training. It opens the university and the research training system to new partnerships, to a variety of institutional types in addition to the *grandes écoles*. The *Écoles doctorales* rest on a model very different from the Master Plan's sequential flow upward into the research universities. The French research training system as it now appears to be shaping up around the *Écoles doctorales* is akin to a series of parallel pathways, which draw in students from a very different series of establishments as well as those coming direct from the university.

Envoi

This chapter set out to explore the way France tackled some generic issues such as universal access and efficiency expressed by the opportunity for social mobility – what the Victorians would have called "self betterment." Another important generic issue was defining excellence in the form of the provision for research training, research and its creative dynamic, all of which in our respective societies make higher education an "axial institution." I have taken these key issues the better to see precisely how they were addressed in France, what differed from the Californian condition and why. In doing so, several truths are best remembered. The attention that the Master Plan attracted, not merely in the United States, but farther afield, shows clearly that the Master Plan was "the right thing at the right time." Ultimately, it changed what is best described as the "policy status" of California, moving it from being self-referring – what has been achieved before and how it may be improved upon – to become one of the major world referential systems of higher education.

In the history of French higher education over the past two centuries or so, a reverse dynamic is visible, though less strong than once it was. The influence that the "French model" exerts is today, not surprisingly, at its most evident in the

Francophone countries of the world. The ties of language and sometimes institutional profile and practice, however, are not always an advantage, even if they engage a substantial traffic in individuals, ideas and sometimes capital. For this relationship may well have served to maintain French higher education policy for longer in the self-referring mode than was prudent.

Higher education as Kerr pointed out, cannot escape history (Kerr et al. 1994). It is most certainly shaped by it. In the case of the French Republic, that shaping was done in a most deliberate and considered way expressly to create a new and specific national identity. French higher education policy remained – though over the past two decades to a lesser degree, given the demands of the "European venture" and the lure of the Dead Sea fruit of "internationalization" – predominantly settled in the logic of self-referral. There are many explanations for this, not least the belief that still beats strongly in the national psyche that just as the French Revolutions were instrumental in shaping European institutions, so in turn France's institutions, and higher education not least, still serve that broader humanitarian purpose. The mission *civilisatrice* is now directed towards her European and Southern Mediterranean neighbors.

Pragmatism vs. Monsieur Descartes

The way France has gone about addressing the generic issues of mass higher education, which the California Master Plan pioneered, are very different from the way Kerr and his colleagues set about it. At the risk of banality, one explanation for the different policy styles is not far distant from the stereotype of Anglo-Saxon pragmatism versus an equally banal characteristic but often evoked by the French to explain themselves, to wit their Cartesian bent for the logical and the orderly. The differences can of course, be summed up by two demotic phrases that illustrate them. The pragmatist takes the view, "If it works, don't fix it. But if you have to fix it, make sure it works."

At the risk of gross injustice to Kerr and his partners, let me suggest that the California Master Plan and the negotiations it demanded were fully in keeping with the adage. It brought together men and women of "good will" from within higher education, those whose loyalty and reference points lay precisely in higher education to find acceptable ways "of fixing it so that it worked." I have no doubt whatsoever about the equally unimpeachable motives of their French counterparts. But, from an American standpoint, the French did heed the Irishman's advice mentioned at the start of this essay and "By God, they did not start from there." Or, to revert to the wisdom of Demos, they took the view that "If it's going to work, it's got to be fixed – in law."

The reasons for this difference have been developed in detail. Suffice it to say that this point also highlights a further difference between the Master Plan and French higher education policymaking. For the Master Plan, the law and state planning were literally the last resort. If state planning could be avoided, the law

could not. Better by far to have agreements between interested parties set in place beforehand so the only item remaining was formal ratification by the state Legislature. In France, there is no possibility of avoiding planning within the Ministry. The slightest progress, adjustment, change without the intervention of the Ministry which effectively writes the appropriate legal instrument – decree, circular or *arête* – or a Parliamentary Commission which draws up the proposals – are indispensable for setting the stamp on whatever the proposal envisages henceforth figures as being in the General Interest.

Why the 'California Option' Was Not Considered

The Master Plan combined successive segments in a system of open access at the bottom with the highest levels of achievement and excellence at the top. It assigned to each segment a given percentage of the measured ability range. France too had, by its own lights, an "open system" inasmuch as being open was coterminous with possessing the *Baccalauréat* and the segment to which it gave access, the university. This definition was never challenged. It remained a fixed and constant feature reiterated wherever relevant to do so across the decades. The possibility of a Californian option of placing the open sector – the university – "end on" to the closed sector, the *grandes écoles* – was never envisaged, though "a work round" has recently been found at the level of the *Écoles doctorales*.

Why was a Californian option never contemplated? From time to time, the French Socialist Party, in its more radical moments rather than its tamer managerialist phases, occasionally called for the abolition of the *grandes écoles.* This was more in the nature of political saber-rattling than serious policy, however. To this question, there is a technical explanation. There is an historic and sociological one as well. Both have political overtones.

The first would simply point out that the *grandes écoles* do not come under the authority of one Ministry, whereas the university does. The *grandes écoles* have powerful defenders, many of them, and at the highest levels of the French civil service. The historic reason is that the *grandes écoles* are considered the quintessence of Republican merit. And whilst their function is evolving from servicing the state to a broader one of forming a technocracy, evident as much in the public as in the private sectors of the French economy, the *grandes écoles* are not lacking in influential supporters who occupy portal positions across both public and private sectors. Similarly, with the drive towards massification, the university is increasingly associated less as a forcing house for the liberal professions so much as an institution where merit has yielded place to worth, that is to say, to a less examination-specific assessment of personal value (Rothblatt 2007).

For reasons that have been explored in this essay, higher education policy in France remains, in the words of Pierre Mendès France, "*d'abord une affaire politique.*" There are, however, some pointers to this situation changing in part because higher education's mission and purpose are increasingly seen in a technocratic light,

its performance subject to regular examination, assessment and measurement by performance indicators; in part due to the increasing influence of that technocracy alluded to previously for which "technical" solutions are often seen as acceptable because they blunt – or disguise – the political cut and thrust (Fuller 2006, pp. 345–360). The rise of the French version of the "Evaluative State" as a powerful and sensitive instrumentality that bids not to replace the principle of legal homogeneity so much as act as its powerful handmaiden in "steering" higher education dynamically may also drive in the same direction (Neave 2012a).

The most telling lesson to be learned from the "French experience" of higher education is one that goes contrary to the common wisdom preached in the temples of international technocracy, be they the World Bank or the OECD. *Soi-disant* "solutions" to higher education issues are too often presented in the abstract. What I have offered (and others in this volume have made similar suggestions) is an account of policymaking that rests on cultural, political and historical norms that underlie and permeate both systems and decision-making.

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Chapter 7
The Disintegration of Higher Education in Europe, 1970–2010: A Post-Humboldtian Essay

Thorsten Nybom

Après le pain, l´éducation est le premier besoin d´un peuple.[1]

Georges Jacques Danton (1759–1794)

The chapter that follows is an interpretation of what may be termed "gross" trends in European higher education since the early 1960s. Obviously many national variations existed, but I have tried to pinpoint what were common directions. However, Swedish/Scandinavian, and partly also German, cases and examples admittedly form the backbone of my account.

The main reason for what may be identified as a "northern European" emphasis is my own academic specialty within modern European history. But there are nevertheless several special reasons why a relatively small European nation like Sweden is of unusual interest from the perspective of comparative higher education policy studies in the period of Clark Kerr.

First, between 1955 and 1975 Sweden was often referred to as "the most progressive and modern nation in the Western world," and certainly within the field of education policy. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) regarded Sweden as something of a model pupil.

Secondly, Clark Kerr himself – in his long professional and intellectual life – showed a remarkable, constant interest and knowledge in Swedish/Scandinavian

[1] This genuinely *revolutionary* motto was heard, and cherished in the Western/European World. And of course it was also adhered to by – among others – poor, yet ambitious Pennsylvania Quaker schoolboys in the 1920s and 1930s. One of those, Clark Kerr, made Georges Jacques Danton's motto to his own lifelong commitment.

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policy-making and reform policies. Listening or talking to him over the years, in Berkeley, Hamburg, London or Stockholm sometimes I had the distinct feeling of not talking so much with a Californian Democrat but with a covert Swedish mainstream social democrat.

Prologue

The State of California Master Plan for Higher Education of 1960, in which Clark Kerr played a leading and decisive role, has been discussed by all of the contributors to this volume. A dominant conclusion is that while individual American states and European nations faced the same problems of student demand, access, mission differentiation and funding challenges, the Plan was never slavishly followed outside California. Discrete influences can be noticed, especially where higher education leaders had a personal connection to Kerr, but local conditions, higher education traditions and the play of political interests were obviously too dissimilar to produce copies of California's historic achievement. There was also a factor of neglect and arrogance, upon which I will subsequently comment.

It was not as if Kerr and other prominent US scholars and university leaders were unknown to Swedes or Europeans generally. The 1990 OECD report on California certainly made California policies widely known. Kerr and others came to Sweden on an almost regular basis, invited often by the National Board of Universities and Colleges (NBUC). He was admired, and, and as Sheldon Rothblatt remarks in his contribution, he certainly respected Nordic social democracy. His ideas and related issues were repeatedly aired by other members of the "California School," such as Rothblatt himself, Burton Clark, Martin Trow, Roger Geiger, and Neil Smelser. Everyone on the Continent appears to have read Clark's (1983) book, *The Higher Education System*, yet I have found almost no Continental references to the treatment of university issues appearing in that book, let alone extended discussions of California's solutions to common higher education problems.

According to my own fairly extensive survey of the official documents (inter alia, government decisions, white-papers, commission reports), as well as the central contributions to the public nation-wide debates on these issues in a number of Northern European states, there are almost *no* indications that Clark Kerr – or for that matter any other prominent US-discussant – played even a minor role in the sometimes major changes in higher education policy that took place in many European countries during this period.

The Swedish prime minister, Tage Erlander, by far the most "academic" PM Sweden ever had (or *will have*, if you look at the present holder or the possible contenders) and also the prime mover behind the successful reorganisation of Swedish elite research funding after the second world war, visited Berkeley in 1961 and met Kerr, yet there is no mention of any California or Berkeley impact on him in his recollections – except for the intense California sunshine:

> (San Francisco 7/4 1961) There is probably nothing in the world that compares with SF! We had an incredible day here....Then Berkeley, where I baked in the sun and hence almost had a black-out during lunch, which was all the more unfortunate since our host Kerr, was full of exciting and interesting topics. I was told he had been offered the job as Minister of Labor, but had declined. […] I didn't get as much out of the Berkeley visit as I had hoped, which certainly was my own fault (excessive sunbathing) (Erlander 2011, p. 64).

In fact, I will go so far as to maintain that any Nordic or German reading of the Master Plan or California's policies respecting higher education in the 1960s and 1970s, especially with regard to massification issues, were either negative or based on a very superficial understanding.

As is well-known, Clark Kerr's work on the negotiations leading to the Master Plan was meant to resolve a dilemma generally regarded as "insoluble." The crucial component, even masterstroke, was the creation of a differentiated yet still coherent higher education system combining the legitimate and necessary democratic demands on widened access with the equally seminal pursuit of academic excellence and world-class research. This insoluble dilemma was almost nowhere dealt with or even recognized in the different reform-schemes which were realized in Continental Europe during the 1960s and 1970s.

Even if Kerr sometimes maintained that American universities, like their European counterparts, changed mainly due to external pressures (Kerr 1991, 1994), I would argue that the North American research universities and central university actors have shown a comparatively remarkable ability to act and reform. Both the Master Plan and Kerr himself must be considered to be almost ideal-typical examples of this capacity (Trow 1991, pp. 156–172; Keller and Keller 2001). The undisputed success of the North American research universities in the last century and particularly in the last 30 years (the same period in which their European sisters declined) could, at least to a certain extent, be explained by their readiness and superior ability to *react* to social, economic, scientific and political changes (see Douglass 2000; Geiger 1993; Kerr 1991, 2001).

The European university, on the other hand, has not changed in the last 50 years as a consequence of its own initiative, nor has it changed as the result of bold intervention on the part of informed and deeply concerned politicians. Few if any detectable signs of higher political wisdom or of institutional prudence and professional insights have occurred during the last 40 years and certainly not in comparison to the California other higher education system. Changes have come about however through systematic negligence or through half-hearted and un-systematic ad hoc policies on the part of government, ministries, and bureaucracies. The rapid expansion of the existing institutional and organizational forms did not result in *structural renewal* necessary to accommodate the swift and massive growth of the higher education systems. One outstanding exception that must be named, however, is the establishment of the Open University in Britain in 1969, an undisputed innovation that became a model almost everywhere, as, for example, in the instance of the Fern-Universität, Hagen, founded in 1974.

Europe and the Fifth University Revolution, 1965–1975

In an article published in 2007, I listed five revolutionary transformations in the long history of the Western university from 1460 to 1970 that profoundly changed its organization, mission and self-understanding (Nybom 2007, pp. 55–79). These revolutions were all – in *different* ways – equally seminal, revolutionary and system wide:

The "Gutenberg Revolution" (1460–1560),
The "Scientific Revolution" (1600–1770),
The "Humboldt Revolution" (1810–1850),
The "Research University Revolution" (1850–1914).

The fifth of those revolutions was what the late, brilliant Berkeley sociologist Martin Trow in his classic and seminal article from 1974 defined as the ultimate shift from elite to mass higher education (Trow 1974). It had started in the USA already after world war two (Geiger 1993) with the introduction of the GI Bill and gained momentum on the European Continent in the 1960s and early 1970s. This shift was primarily caused and driven by external political, economic and demographic forces and had, at least initially, very little to do with internal cognitive or educational factors. It was both a consequence of growing popular demands (equality of life-chances) and of the immediate intellectual and professional needs of the emerging welfare state.

When the Continental European institutions of higher learning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as a consequence of legitimate demographic, democratic and economic pressures, were transformed from elite to mass institutions, the transformation occurred without the kind of necessary and simultaneous restructuring that took place in the US, where in fact a totally new and different type of higher education system emerged. This blatant sin of omission on the part of both responsible politicians and academics eventually had a number of more or less fatal and long-lasting consequences (Geiger 1976):

First, the universities in some parts of Europe (not least in their "cradle-countries") gradually ceased to function as proper institutions of higher learning (especially, southern Europe).

Second, in some parts of Europe the institutions of higher education were "reconstructed" through heavy-handed bureaucratic means, which lead to even greater uniformity instead of a necessary differentiation (Sweden is a prime example).

Third, the more or less half-hearted attempts to partly differentiate at least some of the European higher education systems (UK, Germany, Scandinavia) nowhere succeeded – or even tried – to bring about the *systemic flexibility and dynamic* that the California Master Plan had been able to achieve to a very high degree.

Instead, these crude formal or bureaucratic initiatives led to increased rigidity and stubbornness, which 20–30 years later finally started to crumble. Starting in the early 1980s – or in some countries even as early as the late 1970s – the publicly

funded non-reformed European universities became too expensive and – with a few exceptions – subjected to systematic under-funding and political marginalization (France, Germany).

A 200-year-old contract between the state and the university system, symbolized by the founding of the Berlin University in 1810 where the state accepted the role of "guardian-angel" and "lender of last resort" of its universities, was no longer honored by the politicians. A culture of mistrust replaced a long-standing mutually-beneficial relationship. Wherever possible, the more expansive and successful fields of research has tried to decouple itself from the comprehensive university, either through different forms of "inner emigration" where at least the more successful researchers tried, and often succeeded, to buy themselves out from their ordinary university obligations by obtaining external funding (Sweden), or by simply leaving the university altogether to find homes elsewhere, as in the independent extramural research institutes of France and Germany.

Mass Higher Education: The Binary Solution – UK and West Germany

In the German and UK cases the solution to handling the imminent and future expansion was the creation of a more or less rigid binary system. Non degree-granting institutions were formed; *Fachhochschulen* and polytechnics (*vide* Michael Shattock) which, *in practice*, prevented – contrary to the California Master plan – any real possibilities of developing a diversified, functional and cooperating higher education *system* because these strata were separate and not, as in the Californian case *integrated on the system-level* (Ryan 2011). The middle-range consequences of the reforms for the universities in the two countries were however almost contrary; the British universities continued to function as part of a fairly restricted elite system, while the "open" German universities already in the 1970s became overcrowded and underfunded, the long range consequences at least from the mid-1980s tended to be equally system wide and perhaps equally detrimental. In the UK the consequences and real impact of massification did not become clear until the "Thatcher-revolution," which introduced sweeping system wide changes such as the abolition of polytechnics and tenure.

Thus, in the UK the exclusive elite university system during the 1960s and 1970s was to very high degree retained and protected, with the result that England's universities until the Thatcher revolution of the 1980s had the lowest share of eligible students admitted into the university system in Europe. In the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, the existing "elite Humboldtian" university system bore the brunt of the massive increase in student numbers. The paradoxical situation arose that while the "lower" level of the higher education system – the *Fachhochschulen* – were allowed to limit their intake, and choose their students, every prospective student who passed the school-leaving examination or *Abitur* had a constitutional right to the (West) German university of choice. Or as the German

sociologist Thomas Ellwein summarizes German developments in the 1960s and 1970s: "*Ausbau statt Umbau*" (expansion instead of reconstruction) (Ellwein 1985, p. 238)!

Consequently, expansion produced a combination of overload and increasing under-funding, a situation that became critical already in the 1980s when the German university system gradually threatened to implode and disintegrate under its own overweight. This did not only show itself as a sharply deteriorating student-faculty ratio, in some cases from 1–15 to 1–30. It gradually also became obvious regarding the infrastructural facilities. Libraries, course-books, even chairs in the lecture halls and seminar rooms became almost rare commodities – and not only for students!

In addition to the establishment of a second tier of more or less regionally and vocationally significant tertiary education institutions, there were in both countries nevertheless some rather impressive attempts to expand the system, but these initiatives did not aim at bringing about deep-going *structural* changes of the existing higher education systems. Thus, in the UK in the wake of the Robbins Report, eight institutions of higher learning received their royal university charters between 1961 (Sussex) and 1966 (Bath and Loughborough). At least in some cases these institutions initially not only represented an ambitious policy to expand the existing university system, they were in fact also supposed to introduce new forms of institutional orders and campus cultures in the English university landscape. And there were also, at least some, expectations that they would introduce and develop new and innovative fields of studies and research, e.g., research that was strongly interdisciplinary. At least in hindsight it remains nevertheless highly debatable if this institutional expansion and "rejuvenation" brought about any substantial diversification or differentiation in English higher education. Instead, the perpetual and almost irresistible force of "academic drift" fairly soon turned them into mainstream, traditional – if certainly in a handful of cases excellent – English universities.

Also in West Germany there were some initiatives taken, both on the federal and on regional level, to reform the existing university system. Thus, between 1962 (Bochum) and 1969 (Bielefeld) a handful of "*Reform-Universitäten*" were founded; and even if, as in the English case, there initially were some expectations this would lead to at least a marginal renewal of the university system, that outcome did not really occur. In effect, the results were almost negligible, and the process of "readjustment to normalcy" was even quicker and more definite than in England (Schelsky 1969).

An even more ambitious reform initiative was launched in the 1970s, primarily in the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen but also in Hessen (Kassel) with the introduction of the *Gesamthochschul*-concept. This initiative was an attempt to combine the aims and directions of both the university and the *Fachhochschule* and thus to promote the restructuring of a more "socially relevant" and open higher education system. By the early 1980s *all Gesamthochschulen* had turned into more or less ordinary universities – certainly not in name only – but also in regard to their curricula, programmes, recruitment, and stated missions.

On both the German state and the federal level the rapid expansion during the 1960s with a doubling of the number of students also brought the necessity to reorganize or, perhaps better, to install some kind of national higher education

policy. It became obvious that the division of power and responsibility between the center and the periphery, between the *Bund und Länder* regarding higher education, needed to be shaped and coordinated. What has been called the era of "co-operative federalism" ended up with the enactment of the Framework Act for Higher Education (*Hochschulramengesetz*) in 1976. General guidelines for higher education, including matters concerning access, participation, organization, funding, organization and administration could now, at least in principle, be decided (Kehm 1999, p. 16).

The extraordinary power of existing traditions and structures in German higher education could be illustrated by the resigned comments from one of the most prominent "reformers," the renowned and controversial sociologist Helmut Schelsky, when he, already in 1969, in his *Festrede* at the bi-centennial anniversary of Wilhelm von Humboldt's birth, warned against the unreflective tradition in German academic circles of making Humboldt the eternal litmus test for higher education policy:

> In our considerations on education [*Bildung*] we have elevated Humboldt to the rank of Church Father, and subsequently, every attempt or suggestion to change anything in what is held to be the founding elements in his University structure, is condemned as blasphemy (Schelsky 1969, p. 152; Bartz 2005, pp. 105–110).

This remained an almost eternal truth almost until the beginning of the new millennium when a number of consecutive *Shanghai Jaiotong* and *Times Higher Education* rankings "suddenly revealed" that Heidelberg was not even on the same page as, for instance, Ohio State. It is would not be unfair to state that these rankings – regardless of their actual worth and credibility – have been an important driving force behind, for example, the ongoing comprehensive and expensive "Excellence-Initiatives" in both Germany and France. It is, by the way, quite interesting and even astounding to notice the tremendous and sudden general impact of the international rankings on the present European *political* reform initiatives, from Helsinki to Bologna!

The Bureaucratic Unitary Solution: Sweden

Even in countries where the higher education system was quite substantially transformed, as in the Swedish case, its comprehensive and monolithic character was nevertheless retained and even strengthened, partly as an effect of the deliberate ambitions to "vocationalize" almost all types of higher education, re-placing disciplines with "lines," classroom courses designed for markets (Lindensjö 1981; Svensson 1987; Premfors 1980, p. 61). This meant that even if the traditional disciplines/departments and faculties continued to exist, higher education was at the same time reorganized according to a new labor market oriented "line system" with a separate board including external (often trade-union people) representatives, who formally decided which programmes should be offered.

There was, however, one important compromise between academia and *polito-byråkrater*, the convinced political and civil servant "torch-bearers"; Departments could still offer the traditional, often discipline-based courses, but these *enstaka kurser* were supposed to be "exceptions." Ironically the "exceptions" gradually

turned out to be very popular, so when the "line-system" entered 1987, a majority of students were actually taking these more or less traditional courses.

One major consequence of the curricular and vocational streamlining was the elimination of what had been separate types of academic and vocational missions. Course work leading to qualifications in fields such as nursing, social work, teacher training or law enforcement – subjects that hitherto had been taught in separate, autonomous and often highly successful institutions – were merged with existing academic institutions into one single unitary higher education system. Differentiation of mission as in the California Master Plan was wholly ignored.

The formal unitary system was already from the start informally stratified, which led to continuing "border" conflicts, a policy of disruption, and an abiding ambition for new colleges to become "real" universities – at least as commonly understood. Nevertheless, even the institutional label "university" was *formally* abolished in all official documents and formal regulations of the Swedish higher education system even if Uppsala, Lund or the others continued to be referred to as "Uppsala or Lund University." These nominal changes were expressly made to emphasize the uniformity and equality of the higher education system.

In the late 1960s, as the provision for higher education expanded, the existing universities such as Gothenburg, Stockholm, Uppsala, Umeå and Lund were (respectively) assigned the task of establishing undergraduate branches in Karlstad, Linköping, Örebro, Sundsvall and Växjö. The actual locations of the new institutions were either decided with reference to existing industrial clusters or they were to be regarded as central elements in a coordinated regional policy. At the same time Swedish higher education was reorganized into a number of non-academic "Regional Boards" mainly geographically assigned with tasks and responsibilities that remained very unclear. However, and possibly as a consequence of their vague assignments, these boards were abolished in 1987 together with the vocational "line-system" (Engwall and Nybom 2008).

In 1975 the regional branch at Linköping was upgraded to university status, and the other four branches became independent "university colleges" – *Högskolor*. The continuing drive towards regionalization between 1970 and 1990 resulted in 14 additional regional university colleges throughout Sweden, located in Borås, Mälardalen, Dalarna, Gävle, Halmstad, Jönköping, Kalmar, Blekinge, Kristianstad, Malmö, Skövde, Södertörn, Trollhättan and Visby. Chalmers Institute of Technology located in Gothenburg was re-created as a private institution with initial funding from the central government, and this model was used for the university college situated at Jönköping, which has four affiliated wholly-owned limited companies for the support of research and teaching. In addition, ten colleges specializing in artistic performance (dance, sports, crafts and design, art, music, opera, drama and the training of nurses) were all located in Stockholm. In the 1990s and early 2000s the remaining branch institutions together with Luleå Technical University College (1995) became universities (Örebro, Karlstad and Växjö in 1999, Mittuniversitetet in 2005), all intent on going down the dubious but easily predictable road of "academic drift" that Clark Kerr so strenuously and successfully argued against in 1959!

The comprehensive reforms between 1968 and 1980 were perceived and labelled by many as a form of "americanisation" of the Swedish higher education system. The identifiable American elements were the introduction of transferable credit-units and modules. The German practice of a lengthy "second doctorate" or *Habilitation* was ended and replaced by variants of the US PhD. Nevertheless, these seemingly significant formal changes did not constitute the kernel of the reform policy. Instead, what more or less fundamentally changed the higher education system between 1963 and 1977 was a series of white paper proposals and political decisions (U 55, U 63, U 68, H 75). These more or less *dirigiste* and manpower planning under-takings led to substantial new organizational forms, constitutional proceedings and rules, and even terminological changes which were finally codified in the 1977 decision usually referred to as H 77 (Engwall and Nybom 2008).

As a matter of fact, and as previously stated, I would be prepared to argue that in the 1960–1970 reform era, whatever the rhetoric, American higher education models seen in system terms were rarely followed in Continental Europe, and certainly not in Sweden, long considered to be favorable to American influences. The reason was not because American models and practices were carefully studied and reflected upon and *subsequently* regarded as politically and practically inappropriate (see Chap. 5), but rather because of both ignorance and a lack of interest on behalf of the responsible politicians and administrators. I would also go so far as to suggest that the academic community itself displayed a high degree of unfounded intellectual arrogance. The academics could not accept even the thought that there existed any alternative to their own historically "superior" national higher education systems.

The technocratic and instrumental Swedish higher education reforms of the 1970s, which were supposed to "streamline" the system to make it more efficient but also more "equal" and less hierarchical both in terms of the relations of professors and lecturers, and in terms of the institutional pecking order, in reality created a system that internally became highly stratified and even heterogeneous, not only with regard to the different types of institutions but also – and more ominous – within the old university-type of institutions, which were to have long-range, detrimental effects both socially and constitutionally. Thus, the failure to adequately consider the meaning of a system of higher education institutions differentiated by mission actually created institutions that were, whatever appearances, differentiated internally. There was now not only a *formal* division between research/research training and undergraduate teaching. There was also an *informal* but very distinct division between what was considered as "proper" – or legitimate – academic programs and disciplines, on the one hand, and allegedly "pseudo-academic" disciplines and semi-professional, vocationally oriented programs, on the other.

There was also the introduction of a distinct political-bureaucratic element both within the university on the system level, which became influential in areas that traditionally had been considered to be exclusive academic prerogatives, such as curricula and research funding (Svensson 1987; Lindensjö 1981). There was a general tendency – or at least a general opinion among the academic staff – that the administrative rules and

bureaucratic structures gradually had turned from being primarily supportive to becoming a separate domain and even ends in themselves. Hence, the animosity between faculty and the administrative staff within the institutions grew and became much sharper and more counterproductive than the "normal" tensions between the "shop-floor" and "management" (Strömholm 1994).

But even more ominous was that this heterogeneity and these changes in the balance of power and influence eventually led to a more or less permanent disintegration of collegial solidarity, internal disruption and the subversion of a common norm system. It gradually also led to dissension and splits within the higher education sector as a whole, which hampered its ability to function as a powerful united and collective political actor. Instead, more or less politicized infighting between institutions and the so called "stakeholders" – not least national and regional politicians – became the order of the day.

It must be admitted that the prime motives behind a doubtless ambitious, reform policy were a sincere wish among responsible and sometimes even idealistic politicians to create a more democratic and "modern" higher education system, not least by opening it up to new social groups and social strata. With the massive expansion of the entire system of higher education, the total number of students grew substantially in 1960 there were 37,400, in 1970 a huge jump to 124,400, and in 1980 another leap to 187,000 (Ekstedt 1976).

But the ambitious goals were only partially achieved. The established universities did not radically change in their social composition. The lion's share of the socially-targeted students went primarily to the new regional undergraduate colleges, not least because the expansionist reforms were at the same time combined with a form of *numerus clausus* limiting the total number of students, where each university was given a certain number of "slots", which meant the established institutions usually got more applicants than slots. The traditional open access to the old "philosophical" faculties (the "autonomous" disciplines plus law) at the older universities was abolished. Admission to the historic professional schools of medicine, agriculture and engineering had been restricted even prior to the reforms, primarily due to the costs but also to, in some cases, a highly state-regulated labor market. Furthermore, the increasing totals of students did not lead to a decreasing social stratification. The *relative* share of students coming from lower social strata was actually higher in the late 1960s under the former system than after the massive reforms in the 1970s and remained so until the next – and this time underfinanced – boost in the number of students starting in the early 1990s.

Considering the growth-rate of the total student body between 1960 and 1980 (above) one major reason for this relative failure of social mobility would be that the first wave of massive expansion had already happened before the reforms of the 1970s were implemented. Hence, the first generations of incoming students after the reforms probably came from the same social strata as before. In addition, the eventual quantitative and qualitative effects of the equally deep-going changes in the secondary school system on the higher education system were still to come (Eriksson and Jonsson 1993; Eriksson and Jonsson 2002, pp. 210–217).

Facing the Consequences: Developments Since 1980

The most immediate and deep impacts of these primarily quantitative and probably also qualitative changes in the 1970s and early 1980s soon became visible, as indicated above, on all levels of university life: the professional, intellectual and political levels. The Swedish – and I would maintain that similar changes occurred elsewhere on the Continent – academic profession which hitherto had been extremely homogenous gradually split up into different levels and tasks. This, in turn, gradually led to the declining social and economic status of the academic work-force. I would go so far as to maintain that this eventually also included a slow but irreversible process of "de-professionalization/de-academization" in what had been regarded as "the highest profession" – what Harold Perkin once called "the key profession" because it trained all the others (Perkin 1969).

This subsequently either led to a gradual shift from collegiate and academic to bureaucratic governance or in some European cases to neither but to political neglect (Nybom 1997, pp. 121–127; Nybom 2000, pp. 14–45; for Norway, Olsen 2000, pp. 231–249). This could also be stated as the transformation of university governance from a meritocratic collegiate via a quasi-democratic representative system to the present management-driven and near-market oriented "entrepreneurial" system (De Boer and Stensaker 2007, pp. 91–117). The latter was also manifested by the massive introduction of new and different types of semi-academic vocational programs as well as by the, at least sometimes, reformed admission requirements and examination forms. For instance, to attract students over the age of 25, an admissions rule was introduced where "work-experiences" weighed fairly heavily, and the old formal exams – *Fil kandidat* and *Fil. Magister* – were abolished.

As long as the European states such as Sweden, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom were prepared to fully finance a rapid and massive expansion, the institutional disintegrating consequences remained limited. However, when after 1980 this was no longer the case, an institutional dissolution process became inevitable. From the 1980s onwards – and in the Nordic countries from the middle of the 1990s (Nybom 2000, pp. 14–45; Kim 1999) – perhaps the most fundamental changes took place on the political or policy level. Due to its steadily rising costs and size, and its growing social and economic relevance, higher education no longer was perceived as primarily a national cultural investment but rather regarded as an integrated part of the ordinary education system where manpower planning and not academic excellence became the highest priority in higher education policy and planning. In a period covering about 15 years, this transformation or even revolution altered or in certain cases even severely damaged some of the European higher education systems.

What is perhaps even more significant, at least in northwestern Europe, is that the rapid growth of the student body and the introduction of a plethora of additional societal tasks and responsibilities – social, economic, gender or ethnic – have been accompanied by unchanged or, in many cases, even reduced levels of state funding. This could be seen as an indisputable indication of the

European states' and central governments' massive retreat from their traditional "Humboldtian" obligation of being the ultimate guardian of their national higher education institutions. And additionally, starting in the UK, the resources which eventually were allocated to the universities and research gradually turned from a system that had included a substantial share of bloc grant funding into a system where so-called "competitive funding" became the standard operating procedure for the financing of higher education. This meant that the possibilities of long-range research planning at the university level became more or less illusory – *pace* Clark Kerr – and, eventually, it also led to a reduced capacity for universities or other types of higher education bodies to function as independent and autonomous institutions.

During the last 25 years, many European central governments have become just another "stakeholder" in the university, primarily treating the universities not as a public good *as such* but rather as just another political means for achieving all sorts of diverse political ends. It is, for instance, quite clear that at least some European governments – and most certainly the Swedish – expanded their higher education systems in the 1990s *primarily* because they wanted to reduce the unemployment level among young people. The universities are now supposed to function like any other public service institution, something they traditionally were not expected to be (Kerr said universities had become a regulated "public utility"). From the late 1990s onwards they are primarily seen as instrumental means; to function as "development or innovation centers" in national or even regional economic policy. The most frequent European catchwords in higher education are "innovation/system" and "employability." In addition, this process has been accompanied by an almost explosive growth of numerous evaluations and accountability schemes which have turned the traditional European system of exclusive and strict "input control" (*Abitur, Habilitation*) into different types of "output control" where practically "everything that moves is measured" (Sir Peter Scott's characterization at a Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation seminar at Krusenberg on May 25, 2003; Scott 2007).

At least since the mid-nineteenth century universities were established and supported precisely because they were supposed to represent what Sir Karl Popper in 1946 defined as "the third world." In this autonomous *non serviam* role they constituted a central and relevant societal institution. Education as the backbone and strength of a modern society, contributing to its culture, setting standards for that culture even, and providing for its well-being at more than routine levels, seems to have vanished with both Newman and von Humboldt, as Kerr once remarked. Perhaps these attributes are partly over-blown. University history is more complicated than idealists suppose, but one may well ask whether it is necessary to banish all ideals whatsoever. If they are alive, at least they are present and can be counted.

Seen in this light, and in a European etatist university context and tradition, it remains an undisputable fact that, as of today, very few among the present European central governments can be said to articulate, or much less pursue, any form of conscious, systematic and long-range national science and higher education policy

even in the most rudimentary form, with the possible exception of the Netherlands and Switzerland. Instead, when the new millennium dawned European politicians were standing on the ruins of their crumbling university systems delivering one joint and one might add pious statement after the other on the strategic importance of knowledge, research, innovation or education without noticing what seemed to be happening.

Dreaming of "The American Model": European Higher Education Policy Today

With the withdrawal of the state as a guardian of universities and the emergence of the state as just a "stakeholder," there was an equally sudden if drowsy realization of the immediate need to engage other stakeholders, such as industry, rich donors, alumni and students. And to achieve this it became necessary to convince all of them that it was possible at the same time to become both "entrepreneurial" and certainly more academically "excellent" through another radical reform or comprehensive reform in higher education and research policy. Something more or less nebulously called "the US-model" became the catchword and least common denominator. In practically every official statement from politicians, administrators and even from many academic representatives, "the American way" almost seemed to be the *passpartout* which eventually would lead to a rejuvenated and competitive higher education and research system in Sweden or Europe generally.

These constantly repeated references to the United States were – and are – nowhere preceded by or combined with careful studies and qualified discussions of the historical back-ground or the present tendencies, problems or possible mistakes in US higher education. The American dream has nevertheless been a powerful rhetorical justification for the present almost breathless waves of reform sweeping through almost all of Europe's higher education systems. With different definitions and emphases, this has been the case in the German and French *Excellence-Initiatives*, in the sweeping and continuing UK reforms and in the different Scandinavian "autonomy, concentration, competition and quality initiatives."

In this connection it is important to remember that if there were some interconnections between innovation/business and the traditional European universities, it was perhaps primarily a negative one – with the obvious exception of medicine and some of the technical universities. One possible explanation to this development could perhaps be the historically close connection between the European universities and the state/civil service rather than industry. Another might be that the Humboldtian university – contrary to the US university – was historically conceived as an "Ivory Tower" with no obligations towards a specific "community" (Nybom 2007, p. 62). In the 1960s and 1970s, the sophisticated branches and producers of the emerging information communication technology, and other high tech branches, did not intensify their collaboration and interactions with the

ordinary European university. The establishment of the Fraunhof-Institut Organization in Germany and similar initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s elsewhere are instructive cases of the relatively wide gap between traditional university research and qualified development work.

A process of estrangement, together, of course, with other interrelated political and economic factors, is certainly not unimportant when trying to explain the constantly widening scientific/technological gap between the USA and Europe after 1945 and particularly since the1980s. To deny, like many European academics still do, the fact that the quality and performance of the respective higher education systems has played a crucial role in bringing about this rapid and massive shift in the distribution of intellectual capital during the last 30 years is not only a sign of historical ignorance but also an example of institutionalized Continental, mainly academic self-importance.

Excursus I: Bologna: A Step Forward or Yet Another "EURO-Crisis"

Against this background, one could very well start wondering if the euphoria among national and European politicians and higher education bureaucrats over the alleged unlimited possibilities opened up primarily by the jointly agreed upon implementation of the Bologna Agreement and process in European higher education, has anything to do with a serious will on the part of its academic and political protagonists to promote the pursuit of quality in knowledge generation.

Officially, the Bologna Agreement aims to create a *common* European area *and* market of higher education with interchangeable degrees and degree programs, a system of transferable credit-units or comparable examinations. One should be aware of the fact that Bologna – like the EURO – is primarily a top-down political-bureaucratic project and not a set of spontaneous initiatives emanating from academia.

That is why more cynical observers would perhaps tend to detect not an academic but a mainly hidden political agenda behind the sudden and massive Bologna enthusiasm among national and European politicians, bureaucrats and lobbyists. This might indicate that the main advantage of the Bologna scheme is that it gives the politicians an opportunity to avoid the risk of having to take the immediate responsibility for a number of necessary but probably very controversial reforms on a national level concerning funding and fees, differentiation, access, masters degrees and marketization. Instead, unpopular undertakings can and have been presented as "unavoidable and logical consequences" of Bologna. This type of argument is commonly referred to as the TINA syndrome – There Is No Alternative (Neave 2003, pp. 141–166; Neave 2006a, b; Neave and Veiga 2011).

This implies that the Bologna process is not only presented as the magic tool for creating an open European Higher Education Area, it is also considered to be the

ultimate means for implementing long overdue, fundamental structural reforms in European higher education. In the worst of all possible cases the politicians – together with their allies in academia – will succumb to the illusion that Bologna will, in itself, both raise the quality of higher education and research and at the same time take care of the constantly growing needs for qualified vocational training and lifelong learning structures.

Excursus II: European Research Policy Since 1970

Simultaneous with the changes in the European higher education landscapes, there were, as indicated above, also in many European countries fundamental shifts in research funding, which underwent a period of massive bureaucratization and instrumentalization – contrary to what took place in the US (Cole 2009). This is primarily but certainly not solely manifested by the constantly growing importance – direct and indirect – of the so-called European Union "Framework Programmes". But it has also, to a very high degree, become a dominant trend in science policy and research funding on the national level.

"Policy *for* Science" or the Vannevar Bush formula that characterized the first three decades after the Second World War was in practice abandoned in many European countries for something that rightfully could be labelled "politicized science." This gradually led to a growing tendency in research funding to replace the traditional criterion of academic excellence by more nebulous criteria, sometimes labelled "strategic," sometime "social- economic relevance," sometimes "mode 2," sometimes "the production of socially robust knowledge." One could go on almost forever with this almost Orwellian type of science policy "Newspeak." The ultimate result has been a system of research funding where government earmarking, pork-barrelling and the "strategic" allocation of resources have become the rule rather than the exception.

These policies or practices have had salient consequences for discipline formation and other dimensions of the internal life of science and the universities, including the self-understanding and professional ethos of scientists and scholars – gradually turned from trusted, tenured free intellectuals into contract-based employees. Thus it is not only relevant to talk about a transformation of the university idea but, at least in relative terms, also a decline of the disciplines, particularly in research policy planning. Even if the traditional disciplinary structure is still well-anchored in academic life and its prestige structure, it has nevertheless gradually lost its sometime favorable position in the research policy hierarchy.

From the mid-1970s many of the research funding agencies that had been controlled by active researchers were either closed down or reorganized in such a way that external "stake-holders" in bureaucracy, politics, and organisations played a decisive role. But also in funding bodies (research councils), where researchers retained *formal* dominance different forms of external intervention – not only from

politics – has gradually become quite substantial. Usually this development is explained as a more or less natural consequence of the alleged widening gap between academic basic research and the acute real problems the world is facing and will be facing in the near future.

The first phase of the changes in research policy planning and funding, which could be labelled "the technocratic phase," or Science *for* Policy, started in the mid-1960s and lasted roughly until the late 1970s. This development constituted no immediate threat to the primacy of basic research and to traditional academic values. Instead it was seen as a complementary but supposedly more socially relevant form of knowledge production which was funded and administered outside the traditional research sector, but, nevertheless, often under the qualitative supervision of academic research. It could, perhaps, a little simplistically, be regarded as an attempt to fulfil the old social democratic dream of the good society governed by a scientifically based and enlightened form of social engineering.

The second phase, "Policy *in* Science," through the 1980s and into the early 1990s could be characterized as a massive effort of political interventionism under the above mentioned labels of deregulation and marketization. This did not just include a fundamental shift in the funding of research and higher education. It also entailed the introduction of full-scale political steering and earmarking of research funding, where some ministers and government bureaucrats started to invade what had hitherto been considered to be an exclusive academic function and prerogative, previously usually carried out by different types of research council bodies with academics in charge.

Accordingly, during this phase, the attacks on peer-reviewing and disciplinary-based research became open and sometimes even aggressive. These classic modes of quality-control were increasingly excoriated as anti-innovative, conservative and ill-adjusted to the real social and economic problems facing today's world, to quote a German minister of education. This anti-academic and I would say anti-intellectual offensive was soon also eagerly supported by an array of post-modern representatives from within the traditional academic community, who had an equally immediate and equally vested interest in subverting traditional academic norms and values.

The present phase, over the last 10 years, could be described as an almost deadly combination of the bureaucratic rule of the first and the ideological interventionism of the second and has been even more disastrous. The new system was introduced on a super-national level in the form of the EU Framework Programmes, which among other things, also constituted blatant breaches with traditional forms and principles of science policy planning. What resulted was something almost similar to the old Soviet bureaucratic five-year plans in science policy. A possible counter-trend, however, and most promising development is the establishment of the European Research Council in 2007. The prime movers behind this initiative are a number of academies of science and private research foundations but *not* the universities, it is important to notice, *nor* national or EU research administrators and responsible European politicians.

Concluding Remarks and Some Very Modest Proposals

In my view, the European higher education systems have been going through a process of major historical disorientation, and this has been brought about by the confluence of several simultaneous cultural and intellectual, as well as economic and political forces. The development in science policy, research organization and higher education has also had a lack of focus and has actually led to a crumbling of the value system of the traditional European University.

I believe this situation is lamentable, and I believe that it calls for rethinking on a systematic scale similar to what occurred in California in the Clark Kerr era, even if, as the Californians appear to feel, no fundamental change can ever be permanent. I would go so far as to compare the current period to the era of turbulence and decline that preceded the foundation of a university that ultimately transformed virtually all universities, the creation in 1810 of the generally-called Humboldtian University (the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin). At present we do not need more declarations by European Union prime ministers or ministers of education. Instead, we have to devote all our efforts, and a substantial part of our economic and human resources, to rebuild our education systems in general, and our damaged higher education systems in particular.

We can at least take one message away from the California Master Plan and that would be an effort to seriously imagine how quality universities, supported from the public purse and with rigorous critical standards, educating and training talented young persons at the highest level, can be combined with a system of mass higher education access. Unless this happens, I fear that a research system, which is totally independent from that particular and peculiar *Lebenswelt* that the European research university has constituted for 200 years, will sooner or later suffer from a deep loss of creativity, competence and eventually also from a drop in economic efficiency.

I would like to see a discussion of how the European university of the past may be reconstituted to serve the present through regaining its historical strengths. The California model, it is clear from this volume, is floundering, but that does not mean that the issues it confronted are not issues that Europeans should be confronting today. The issues are still system differentiation and a definition of a research-led university and its particular qualities, some attempt to define the numbers of institutions actually needed in each different category or segment and the funding of a diversified system reaching different types of students.

The European governments and responsible ministers initiating such a discussion, long overdue, would not only be worthy of our unreserved respect and praise. They would also have started the long and cumbersome road back "to business." The days of quick fixes and flashing one-liners in European higher education and research policy should definitely be over. So this time it would perhaps be not only proper but even wise if concerned European actors in practically all sectors of academia and research policy planning remind themselves of the academic sincerity, administrative ingenuity, political wisdom and, not least, the intellectual and moral

integrity that characterized the way and works of Clark Kerr. It would of course be both improper and even pointless to compare Professor Clark Kerr with Wilhelm *Freiherr* von Humboldt, but still and nevertheless he is probably the closest we have come in the last century!

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Chapter 8
Pragmatic Reformer as Romantic Radical? Clark Kerr and the University of California at Santa Cruz

Ted Tapper and David Palfreyman

Introduction

It would be foolish to deny the range and depth of Clark Kerr's analysis of the development of contemporary higher education along with his achievements in shaping how institutions actually functioned under his leadership. On the one hand, we have his portrayal of the rise of the multiversity (Kerr 1963, with four subsequent editions). On the other hand, we have his leadership, firstly as chancellor at Berkeley (1952–1958), and then as president of UC (1958–1967). Underwriting his policy legacy is California's rightly-famed 1960 Master Plan for Higher Education, which set a model not only for the expansion of higher education in California, but also provided a possible way forward for other higher education systems. Arguably, he was a less elegant and persuasive exponent of the idea of the university than John Henry Newman, but undoubtedly an infinitively more effective institutional leader.

Mary Soo and Cathryn Carson claim that,

> Before he became an administrator, Kerr was an expert in business administration, labour relations, and economics. At UC, he implemented a management approach towards the new research university, based upon a reformed liberal individualism he believed suitable for an industrial age. Not by accident he invoked contemporary business understandings of organizational structure and function. The result in many ways reflected contemporary business practice. (Soo and Carson 2004, pp. 215–216)

While there is no inevitable contradiction between the advocacy of a business organizational model and the desire to establish a collegiate university within the

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framework of the research-led University of California, it is nonetheless reasonable to suggest that his immersion in "contemporary business practice" should have led him to explore more deeply whether the proposed collegiate model was really viable given the framework into which it had to be embedded. And, with the wisdom of hindsight, it is evident that the calculations if pursued were, if not flawed, then lacking in sufficient scepticism. It is as if the desire to succeed overwhelmed more cautious counsel. Indeed, in his memoirs he refers to the fact than he and Dean McHenry (UCSC's first chancellor) had a shared vision of the campus, which many of the early alumni have retained as a "dream" (Kerr 2001, p. 252).

It is difficult not to draw the conclusion that for Kerr the foundation of UCSC was an expression of his deep-seated values, and by its creation the University of California would come closer to realizing his idea of the university. The first purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to examine what these values were. Secondly, we want to consider precisely what is meant by the idea of the collegiate university and the degree to which the initial UCSC model approximated it. We will address the question of why in a comparatively short period of time UCSC evolved into a different university, to become broadly akin to the other campuses of the University of California. However, we have no wish to present another history of the University as Carlos Noreña (2004) has already accomplished this in depth and with some style. Hence this section will be analytical rather than descriptive in its approach.

Thirdly, we will dissect the differing interpretations of this process of rapid change and address the question of whether the original UCSC model was indeed unsuccessful as some have claimed (and as Kerr sometimes thought). Fourthly, we want to use our analysis of developments at UCSC to raise some broader, more comparative questions. We will examine the current trajectory of American higher education with particular reference to the legacy of a liberal education and its relationship to the research university, and draw together some comparative thoughts on the interpretation and development of the collegiate model of the university. We will also suggest that, if the Santa Cruz campus is analyzed in the light of a more realistic reference point (that of the new universities of 1960s Britain rather than the ancient collegiate universities of Oxford and Cambridge), then a different perspective emerges on both Santa Cruz itself, as well as developments in Anglo-American higher education. Finally, there will be a brief conclusion that draws the chapter together and addresses explicitly one of its implicit themes: Could the Santa Cruz campus have been founded in such a way that enhanced the experience of undergraduate education but avoided the conflict between the colleges and the departments that soon enveloped the University?

Contextual Values

With the inclusion of a chapter on UCSC ("The University of California, Santa Cruz: The City on the Hill") in his *Importing Oxbridge*, Alex Duke is asserting unequivocally that the Oxbridge model of the university was the inspiration for

its foundation. It is indeed a fact that Kerr was an admirer of the British commitment to undergraduate education: in this respect, "any university could aim no higher than to be as British as possible" (quoted in Duke 1996, pp. 144–170, 152). Duke also provides citations by members of Kerr's entourage to demonstrate their admiration for Oxbridge:

> Likewise, Dean McHenry, who in 1961 became Santa Cruz's first chancellor, had long-standing admiration for the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge. McHenry looked to Newman and the English universities as "beacons of light for undergraduate liberal arts programs". (Duke 1996, p. 152)

At face value it appears that McHenry was responding to an image of Oxbridge, and it is all too easy to make the point that Newman has long since departed (as Kerr suggested in *The Uses of the University*), and to note that by 1961 both Oxford and Cambridge were established international research universities that, although still dedicated to quality undergraduate education, were committed to single or joint honors degrees. Even if the pedagogy could be structured to encourage a liberal education, disciplinary boundaries remained strong. More importantly, it is one thing to note McHenry's admiration but quite another to claim that such admiration was a guide to action. One can admire, but at the same time recognize the problems of, replication.

The critical point, therefore, is not the unreflective image of Oxbridge's admirers but trying to ascertain exactly how important this image was in shaping the foundation of UCSC. In a moving statement about Kerr, Sheldon Rothblatt has presented an alternative source of Kerr's inspiration:

> The Swarthmore ideal of liberal education with a stress on ethical conduct remained with him forever, best illustrated by his dream of making the new University of California at Santa Cruz, which he founded, into a west coast version of collegiate Cambridge University. What he had in mind was a publicly-financed "Swarthmore in the redwoods". (personal communication)

There is general acceptance of the fact that Kerr was influenced deeply by his undergraduate years at Swarthmore. It was an experience that remained with him for the rest of his life, implanting in him a profound respect for quality teaching and the collegial spirit of the residential college. It would be dangerous, however, to equate "Swarthmore in the redwoods" with "a west coast collegiate Cambridge." While in terms of undergraduate education there may be affinities between Swarthmore and Cambridge, they most definitely represent different models of the university – Swarthmore dedicated to providing a liberal arts program and Cambridge marrying the roles of world-class research university with the provision of quality undergraduate education (Rose and Ziman 1964). Thus, is Santa Cruz to be the reincarnation of Swarthmore or of Cambridge, or possibly an amalgam of the two?

Rather than looking to the past (his Swarthmore years) or across the Atlantic (his admiration for British undergraduate education), it is perhaps more meaningful to see Kerr's UCSC initiative as reflective of the wider value pattern that shaped his long-term relationship to the University of California. On January 20, 1967 Kerr held a news conference to make a statement on his impending departure from the

presidency of the University of California. The statement makes both an enlightening and moving postscript to the second volume of his *The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California* (Kerr 2003, pp. 318–324). He listed ten policies (in effect guiding principles) that he had supported and hoped would be continued by the University of California after his departure. Amongst these there are four that it can reasonably be claimed were furthered by the foundation of Santa Cruz. Firstly, he wanted the University to be diverse in character with each campus having its own distinctive identity. Secondly, he had worked for a decentralized University and, moreover, referred positively to the decentralization brought about by the college systems of Santa Cruz, San Diego and Irvine. Thirdly, he had favored balance within the University between the functions of research, teaching and service but went on to say that "a great deal can be done in serving undergraduates better". And to reinforce the latter point, he claimed that more was required to improve undergraduate education along with the overall quality of student life.

It would be naïve to argue that there was a direct correlation between these core principles and the foundation of UCSC. However, it can be reasonably claimed that Santa Cruz is at least in part a reflection of the sentiments expressed in these guiding principles. There are, as you would expect in the presentation of such a broad sweep, few explicit guidelines, but UCSC represented a drive for institutional diversity, decentralization of administrative control, and a better deal for undergraduates both socially and academically. It is evident that Kerr's relationship to the University of California was underwritten by much more than a desire to secure organizational efficiency. Moreover, his liberalism was expressed in terms that transcended "contemporary business practice" with respect to both institutional goals and means. Kerr recognized that institutions needed to be more than efficient; they also required souls.

In his "Calling on the Past: The Quest for the Collegiate Ideal", Gary Rhoades has argued that a concern with the idea of collegiality reflects an elitist preoccupation with the past that has little meaning for contemporary higher education in the US (Rhoades 1990). Although these charges (of elitism and irrelevance) may be accurate, it is nonetheless important to note that the collegiate ideal must be seen as integral to the American heritage of higher education. An import it may be, but one that was refashioned to become part of the identity of American higher education. It is not simply a nostalgic manifestation for the colonial past.

Thus the foundation of Santa Cruz needs also to be located within the context of American higher education – both the historical legacy and its contemporary concerns. As such, it should not be seen as a peculiar aberration foisted upon an unsuspecting university and an uninformed state. There is a powerful collegial heritage in the US built around a variety of inputs: a liberal education, quality undergraduate education as a key mission of the university, the residential college, institutional autonomy in the sense of being shielded from direct state intervention and academic control over academic affairs – teaching, examining and research (Tapper and Palfreyman 2010, pp. 113–133). The issue is whether the University of California, Santa Cruz could be established in a manner that

harmonized with this tradition. If it were to prosper, it had to be seen, if not as part of the mainstream of American higher education (and, of course, of the University of California), then at least as a manifestation of core values and practices that had a powerful body of local support.

Moreover, it is not as if these were principles that had disappeared entirely from the higher education landscape in the United States. In New England there was the long-established co-operation between the Quaker colleges of Bryn Mawr, Haverford and Swarthmore, functioning alongside the more ambitious Five Colleges Consortium (Amherst College, Mount Holyoake College, Smith College, Hampshire College and the flagship state University of Massachusetts at Amherst). And within California itself were to be found the Claremont Colleges (a consortium of five undergraduate colleges and two graduate institutions working in conjunction with a central support body, the Claremont University Consortium). Nor should we forget the quintessential liberal arts college of St John's with campuses in Annapolis, Maryland and Santa Fe, New Mexico, combining a prescribed curriculum with small-group teaching. Obviously, this array of colleges does not define the institutional boundaries of the collegial tradition in the US, but arguably it represents its most powerful expression. If the intention, therefore, was to establish UCSC as a university which embodied characteristics of the collegial tradition, then there was no need for Kerr to look back to Swarthmore or across to Oxbridge because the tradition was alive, if confined in its presence and interpretation, within the United States.

As Kerr explicitly stated in his "farewell news conference", he was concerned that higher education in the US was paying decreasing attention to the provision of quality undergraduate teaching (one of the themes in his 1963 Godkin Lectures at Harvard). The commitment may still exist, but it was in decline in both the major state and private universities. However, it can be justly noted that ever since the steady emergence of the American research university in the latter half of the nineteenth century, this very concern has intermittently raised its head. For example, in the 1930s Edward Harkness bequeathed Yale and Harvard the resources to establish decidedly upmarket residential colleges. And, in his highly regarded *The American College and University: A History*, Frederick Rudolph was moved to write,

> The great monuments to the return of Aristotle, that symbolized the revolt against the university idea, were the benefactions of Edward S. Harkness, which provided Harvard in 1928 with its house system and Yale in 1930 with its system of colleges. The Harvard houses and Yale colleges recognized the responsibility of the two great old colonial institutions to inculcate patterns of social conduct and moral behavior… to provide encouragement for those collegial values that Harvard and Yale had once so nobly sustained. (Rudolph 1990, p. 461)

Like its Ivy League counterparts, by the early 1960s the University of California had evolved into one of the world's leading research universities. Thus Kerr was reflecting a periodic concern within American higher education circles at the wider impact of this development. Contemporarily, besides the emergence of Santa Cruz there were parallel developments at Irvine and San Diego, while the college movement gathered pace in Michigan – with experiments at the University of Michigan, Michigan State and Wayne State (Duke 1996, pp. 155–156). And, as an ironic

manifestation of that re-occurring interest, one should note that as recently as 2007 the University of California Commission on General Education issued a report on *General Education in the 21st Century* which addressed the question of how to provide undergraduates with a quality experience of higher education (University of California Commission on General Education 2007)!

UCSC as a Collegiate University?

It is possible, therefore, to argue that the origins of UCSC can be explained with reference to differing interpretations of the collegial tradition: Swarthmore College, Oxbridge, the liberal arts consortia to be found in New England and at the Claremont colleges in southern California (Oxford in the Orange Groves rather than Swarthmore in the Redwoods). We also have Kerr's broadly progressive liberal values that reinforce the growing concern over the apparently unstoppable rise of the research university. Was the desire to rediscover part of the American past or to implant an alien tradition? Or, to put the issue concretely, what model of collegiality would Santa Cruz seek to embody? While Kerr was strong in his critique of contemporary American undergraduate education, he had a broad-brush approach to change (Kerr 2001, pp. 263–265), and inevitably much of the responsibility for the implementation of the Santa Cruz model would fall to others, especially its first chancellor, McHenry.

A University of California campus had been mooted for Santa Cruz since the late 1950s. California's demographic trend, accompanied by an increasing higher education participation rate, required either the growth of existing institutions at the three levels within the system (the University of California, the state universities and the community colleges) and/or the creation of new institutions. The denizens of the town of Santa Cruz desired the new campus, no doubt influenced by interests that combined financial motives with the desire for community-enhancement. It is impossible not to draw the conclusion that the campus was meant to have an aesthetic appeal, which would reinforce its educational purpose (Kerr 2001, pp. 244–245).

From the outset, it is evident that there would be a serious attempt to structure the new university along collegiate lines. But if it were indeed to be a *collegiate* university, to state the issue again, what particular variant of the model would its founding fathers attempt to create? Frequently the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge are seen as the best exemplars of the collegiate university, but it should be noted that there are important differences between them. It is also very dangerous to construct an idealized image of the collegiate university because the model has to evolve over time if it is to survive. A rose-tinted view could well reflect an image drawn from yesteryear rather than describe contemporary realities as the histories of both Oxford and Cambridge would illustrate only too well. Indeed, Rothblatt went so far as to describe the nineteenth-century reform of Cambridge as *The Revolution of the Dons*

(Rothblatt 1968, 1982). Without that revolution, Cambridge would have been cut adrift from critical developments (most notably the rise of the professional class) in British society (Perkin 1989) and almost certainly would have declined steadily.

That said, there are core features to the collegiate university that provide it with a stable identity and, should these disappear, perhaps a different descriptive label needs to be found. Institutional reform may be critical to preserving the collegiate university, but we have to consider the possibility that if change is sufficiently pronounced it may also undermine the integrity of the label. We have identified the following core characteristics that together make up a pure form of the collegiate university (Tapper and Palfreyman 2010, pp. 18–37):

1. Collegiate universities have federal structures of governance and administration (although the converse is not necessarily true, that is to say, federal universities are not automatically collegiate universities).
2. Within the federal model both colleges and university are independent corporate bodies, and their status is legally recognized. Thus, at least in theory, the colleges could persist as legal bodies without the university and vice versa. Both colleges and universities possess resources (status, income and power) in their own right, which enable them to play powerful roles in the policy-making process.
3. Within the collegiate university, although the sharing of responsibility for core functions will fluctuate over time, a binding interactive co-operation is integral to how the model operates. Thus, by way of illustration, within Oxford undergraduate admissions is primarily the responsibility of the colleges, while the University controls the admission of postgraduates; undergraduate teaching is a duty shared by the colleges and University; and many faculty appointments are made on the basis of a mixture of both college and university inputs. The point is that there needs to be a sharing of key functions by the colleges and the university if the collegiate model is to prevail. In particular, the colleges need to sustain a central academic role and must not abdicate total responsibility for academic matters to university departments and faculties.
4. Authority in collegiate universities is diffused with sovereignty resting ultimately in a collective of the university membership (the Regent House at Cambridge and Congregation at Oxford). In the colleges the fellows constitute the governing body and possess the ultimate formal decision-making authority.
5. The dominant decision-making interest within the collegiate university resides within the academic community who have special responsibility for managing and developing the academic mission of the university. The academic community exercises this authority both within the walls of the colleges as well as in the corridors of the university.
6. Although the central purpose of the university is to achieve academic goals, with a continuing importance attached to undergraduate teaching (in which the colleges have a particularly significant part to play through the organization of tutorial teaching), a university education is seen as something more than the formal acquisition of a degree. The socio-cultural ambience of the colleges is critical to sustaining a community with close relationships amongst fellows, amongst

students, and between students and fellows. Indeed, the idea of intellectual collegiality suggests a symbiotic relationship between the academic and socio-cultural dimensions of the collegiate university in which one feeds off the other.

This is a Weberian ideal-type, and like those constructed by Weber himself, nowhere to be found. However, it does provide a framework with which to analyze the model of the university that was created at UCSC, and indeed a framework for evaluating Oxbridge's own commitment to the sustenance of the collegiate university.

There are some clear affinities between the model of the university that emerged under the auspices of Chancellor McHenry and the features of the collegiate university that we have listed above. Firstly, and most obviously, residential colleges were established:

Cowell, 1965
Adlai E. Stevenson, 1966
Crown, 1967
Merrill, 1968
Benjamin F. Porter, 1969
Kresge, 1971
Oakes, 1972

But thereafter inspiration in the naming of colleges appears to have evaporated, which perhaps reflects a declining interest in them because we have College Eight (1972), College Nine (2000) and College Ten (2002) (UCSC June 27, 2010). But the important issue is how the colleges interacted with the University to determine the character of UCSC.

As a residential university with colleges at its core, UCSC could be expected to create a sense of community for its undergraduates. The colleges would provide a vibrant socio-cultural environment. Whatever else changed over time, Noreña confirms that this expectation has been fulfilled (Noreña 2004, pp. 331–336), although it is also true that, while students retain a college affiliation, not all reside in college. The socio-cultural role has also been reinforced by a positive college input into academic advising and counselling (Noreña 2004, pp. 337–341), although not surprisingly this been more of a bone of contention between the colleges and departments (regarding academic advising), and the colleges and central university services (regarding counselling). But bone of contention or not, the colleges retain responsibilities in these matters.

However, the success of the experiment – whether or not UCSC could be labelled a collegiate university – would depend upon the academic functions of the colleges and whether these would carry equal weight to those of the university departments. The evidence is that in the early years this was indeed the case, and the colleges had a powerful stake in academic appointments as well as decisions about promotion and tenure (Duke 1996, p. 162). Moreover, a substantial proportion of the curriculum was to be provided by the colleges, which would establish a strong focus on interdisciplinary themes, with the colleges constructing as well as

teaching their own programs (Noreña 2004, pp. 29–43). In particular, the first 2 years of undergraduate study would be dominated by the college courses. This represents a powerful genuflection to the American tradition of a liberal education, which – given that it is the colleges that embrace this commitment – creates a model in which colleges and university contribute different, but complementary, inputs into the student experience.

It could be expected that initially the University would attract faculty who were at least sympathetic to the values that it was attempting to fulfill. Each college had a provost (very Oxbridge), and British academics – notably Jasper Rose of King's College, Cambridge – gravitated to Santa Cruz to eventually become provost of Cowell College. It was the provost who had the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the college functioned smoothly. There was also provision for some faculty to live in college residences and an expectation that they would enhance the idea of the college as a community. And, most definitely, it was an established norm that they would want to teach the colleges' inter-disciplinary courses, which in the early years made up a significant proportion of the degree programs.

But, unsurprisingly, the loyalties of the faculty would be driven ultimately by pragmatic professional considerations. Attachment to UCSC's values had to be reinforced by the belief that a commitment to the colleges would not hinder career advancement. Gradually, however, the departments increased their influence through boards of study (another parallel to Cambridge), which had been created as early as 1965. No one could fail to recognize the likelihood of an impending struggle for control over both academic careers and the shape of the curriculum. In view of this, it is pertinent to ask why the defenders of the colleges lost out, especially given the eminence of some of them. And perplexity is increased by the fact that McHenry, who came from UCLA, was fully aware of the potential for departments to control how academic organizations functioned (McHenry 1977, pp. 85–116).

The explanation is to be found more in the wider developments steadily embracing American higher education than in the political ineptitude of the defenders of the collegial interests. It was a very bold venture indeed to set up a publicly-funded university centered on residential colleges, which represented a commitment to the importance of undergraduate teaching that embraced degree programs with a core element of a liberal education. But, while it may seem visionary to have placed such an institution within the University of California, it was also a precarious venture. The University of California was at the time (and still is) one of the world's leading research universities, and it is difficult to believe that UCSC would not be seen as a fish out of water. From the very beginning it was almost inevitable that the values of the wider research university would eat away at the ethos that UCSC was trying to foster. The battle between departmental and college academic interests was, therefore, highly likely to be resolved in favor of the former. Being a "good college man" may have given you status within your college and stood you in good stead with undergraduate students, but whether it cut much ice with your disciplinary peers is an entirely different matter. Who was more likely to achieve tenure, promotion and job offers from other prestigious universities?

Furthermore, although UCSC may have been launched at a time of considerable optimism for the future of American higher education, this mood changed quite swiftly. Santa Cruz was one of the campuses strongly affected by the political and cultural disturbances of the 1960s. In the words of Kerr:

> My greatest surprise has been the vulnerability of the campus to changing circumstances. We had thought we had a tried and true enterprise – the neo-classical college for undergraduates. Yet our version of it was particularly hard hit by political and cultural radicalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This unexpected, but natural, vulnerability reflected the context. (Kerr 2001, p. 265)

The initially high positive image of the campus declined. Santa Cruz represented an appeal to a particular tradition, which would find difficulty in flourishing within both a more conservative socio-political environment and a more demanding labor market. For a period of time demand for places declined at Santa Cruz along with applicants' SAT (standardized) scores. Moreover, the attraction of non-college residence increased, the core liberal arts courses lost ground, and more students wanted their academic performance to be evaluated by letter grades rather than the pass/fail grade that some courses permitted. Inevitably, letter grades would pose fewer problems for undergraduates wishing to transfer to other campuses or those seeking postgraduate positions. The pressures could be accommodated: expansion would slow down; students could be assigned a college allegiance without necessarily being a college resident; the scope of the core courses that represented genuflection to a liberal education could be curtailed with the degree programs incorporating more departmentally-based electives. It had always been the case that students could opt for a letter grade if they so wished – what changed is that more students chose this option. Consequently, the innovative spirit associated with UCSC withered, to be replaced by the more conventional model of the American university. Noreña argues that the years of 1977–1987 (during which Robert Sinsheimer was chancellor) witnessed the effective re-founding of the institution (Noreña 2004, pp. 249–272) and in which Santa Cruz was transformed steadily into a conventional campus of the University of California. If Santa Cruz was ever a collegiate university, then it was so for only a comparatively short period of time. With reference to the Oxbridge model, it was never a collegiate university.

Interpreting the Outcomes

Our evaluation of the history of the UCSC is, like Kerr's own (Kerr 2001, p. 293), equivocal. There are several plausible alternative judgements, which suggest a more rounded evaluation than is conjured up by the term "failure." The contention is that the evidence can be evaluated in different ways, and it is hazardous to assume there is a clear-cut interpretation of the University's history. How the experiment is to be judged depends upon what you believe was the purpose of UCSC, and against what standard the outcomes are to be measured.

A Failure?

If the key purpose of the Santa Cruz experiment was to recreate "Oxbridge in the Redwoods," then undoubtedly it was not a successful experiment. In the early years there were affinities between UCSC and Oxbridge, but they were no more than that. In the context of the University of California the long-term viability of Santa Cruz's colleges as effective players in determining the academic shape of UCSC was doomed. The Oxbridge model of the collegiate university evolved in a particular historical context. It is the product of English society with its embedded socio-cultural, economic and political character, and it is, therefore, incapable of being exported. The problem is compounded by the fact that the would-be-importers appear more often than not to have formed an idealized image of Oxbridge with the desire not so much to import Oxbridge but rather their often rose-tinted perception of it.

However, as we have argued, although Oxbridge may have constituted a romanticized goal for the UCSC founders, the idea of the residential college and a liberal education were very much part of the American tradition of higher education. Therefore, rather than importing Oxbridge, it could be argued that the intention was to revitalize a part of the American heritage within the mainstream of a major state, and publicly-funded university. If this was the primary intention, then the evaluation of Santa Cruz has to be more equivocal. But for Noreña there is no equivocation – the UCSC colleges have been dismantled as an academic force. Whilst the evidence overwhelmingly supports this judgment, it should not be forgotten that some vestiges of the supposedly "idyllic past" still persist, albeit in a considerably truncated form:

> Although students take classes in any number of colleges and academic units [note the lack of a specific reference to departments] throughout the campus, core courses within each college provide a common academic base for first-year and transfer students. (UCSC July 8, 2010)

The pedagogy is far from an Oxford tutorial (seminars of 20–25 students rather than tutorials of two students (Palfreyman 2008)), but this is also a long way from sole dependence upon lecture-based courses with mass attendance. Moreover, as we have noted, the colleges continue to exist as convenient places of residence for many students, as well as providing an obvious context for socio-cultural activities. Although the colleges have failed to live up to their full potential, the question that also needs to be asked is whether they have enhanced the quality of higher education for their students over the years. In this respect they may well have been a success. But the fact that the campus lost much of its radical pedagogical edge to become akin to the other University of California's campuses is why it is regarded as a failure.

Lost Opportunities?

The first lost opportunity was a slip in defining carefully what kind of collegiate model Santa Cruz would be: the purposes of its colleges, how these would be embedded fully within the University's mission and the construction of a model of governance

that would ensure their survival. It is not as if there were no precedents or warnings from the interested parties. McHenry's head of academic planning, Byron Stookey, "believed strongly that the college system itself would be undermined if departments controlled major academic functions" (Duke 1996, p. 161; see also, Noreña 2004, pp. 52–54). However, perhaps this was no more than a theoretical lost opportunity: a major research university, the University of California, provided the wider institutional context. College allegiances and the attractions of undergraduate teaching run up against more powerful values and interests embedded in that university, and – inevitably – as new foundations the colleges lacked the resources and status to compete. Put simply, the colleges were no long-term match for the counter-interests that were present at both Santa Cruz and within the wider University.

What we have to ask ourselves is whether an alternative scenario could have been constructed that would have enhanced the possibility of creating a collegiate university, or at least one in which the colleges could continue to play a dominant academic role. Could there have been an alternative base for the collegiate university? Could one conceive of a publicly-funded institution run as a collegiate university placed outside the framework of the University of California? How would this have fitted into the Master Plan for Higher Education? One possibility is that the Santa Cruz colleges could have been provided directly with publicly-funded resources, which over time could be augmented by their own fundraising (Kerr later regretted not emphasizing endowments). But public funding demands public accountability, and it is not hard to imagine the reaction to these variables: student cultural and political protest, declining demand for places, the lower SAT scores of applicants, a waning in the appeal of college residence, and internal pressure to shrink the input of the core college courses. What we are suggesting is that either scenario – a publicly-funded collegiate university independent of the University of California or the direct public funding of UCSC's colleges – were highly improbable scenarios rather than lost opportunities. From the beginning, it would have been more realistic to have opted for a structure that created something akin to the traditional American commitment to residential colleges and a liberal education for undergraduates, and that the desire to create something more adventurous, certainly anything approaching a collegiate university, was a step too far.

Abandoning a Niche Market?

In part the pressure for change at UCSC was intensified by its dwindling attraction to students, as measured by a decline in applications and the SAT scores of its applicants. It appeared as if it occupied a niche market with reduced appeal as students responded to changing economic and political circumstances. To this must be added the growing antipathy to the colleges by at least a segment of the UCSC faculty. How else is intensifying departmental pressure and the steady withdrawal of the core faculty from teaching the college interdisciplinary courses to be explained? Given these circumstances, the obvious question is whether Santa Cruz needed to change its market appeal or tunnel through the bad years in the expectation (or hope?) that circumstances would change.

Gerald Grant and David Riesman's evaluation of the Santa Cruz experiment in their influential *The Perpetual Dream* was so strikingly positive (Grant and Riesman 1978, pp. 287–290) that it suggests the latter option was a real possibility. In a fascinating overview of the choices that universities face in responding to pressure for change, Rhoades has written: "In short, for all the so-called toughness of the choices, most universities seem to be making similar ones, and pursuing similar paths." (Rhoades 2007, p. 121). Rhoades was arguing for the need to construct a different discourse, one promoting "distinctive choices:"

> Although it seems to be relatively easy (and common) to make tough choices, which involve running with, or after, the herd, it appears to be more difficult (and unusual) to make distinctive ones, which involve seeking out new niches. (Rhoades 2007, p. 121)

He noted that as the tide turned, UCSC appeared to be intent on joining the herd, which led him, like Grant and Riesman, to question whether this was a desirable course of action:

> Or would the system, the state and prospective students, be better served by Santa Cruz pursuing its historically distinctive culture and the interdisciplinary programmatic emphases in the social sciences and humanities? (Rhoades 2007, p. 122)

Indeed, it may have been the case that the policy course implied by Rhoades should have been followed, but it is a difficult, if not impossible, conundrum to resolve. It was not a question of finding an acceptable niche market because UCSC already had one, but one that appeared to be failing. Without the decline in its market position, it is possible that the pressures exerted by the departments, coupled with the ingrained ethos of the UC as a major research university, could have been resisted. However, this did not take place. While the tide may have turned in the long-run, this could not be predicted with any certainty, and it would have been impossible to sustain a pristine UCSC as a publicly-funded institution on the basis of an optimistic prediction (or, to express it more harshly, "a hope and a prayer"). Could a viable case, one that would garner public and political support, be made for sustaining Santa Cruz as a collegial university whose central purpose was to provide a quality undergraduate education based on a core liberal curriculum? Of course this path was not followed, and thus we will never know the answer to the question. Abandoning the niche market may represent the most critical "lost opportunity," but it would be churlish to criticize those who had to make the key decisions on the grounds that they should have been more sensitive to what might have been. In the circumstances change was inevitable and the issue was what form it would take.

An Inappropriate Measuring Rod?

In a provocative reflection on the so-called failure of Santa Cruz (similar to Rhoades), Duke has written:

> Perhaps putting to rest a century-old fixation with re-creating Oxford in America would allow educators the freedom to explore more original – and potentially more successful – ways to broaden the experience of undergraduates beyond the classroom. (Duke 1996, p. 175)

In view of the fact that we have argued for the uniqueness of the Oxbridge model of the collegiate university as a product of peculiarly English historical circumstances, this would seem to be a common sense conclusion. However, if it is accepted that the undergraduate experience needs to be enhanced both within and beyond the classroom, and that the fixation with Oxbridge is not a desire for replication but rather represents the appeal of its core values, then the judgment has to be more equivocal. This is particularly so if those core Oxbridge values can be married to the American heritage of higher education.

The issue, therefore, is what kind of measuring rod Oxbridge should be and when it should be applied. It is clear from the ten principles that Kerr believed had guided his tenure at UC there was some pessimism on his part about the prevailing commitment to undergraduate education. It is perfectly reasonable to look for guidance to institutions with which you would wish to be identified that seemingly do it better. Do they in fact have a stronger record of quality undergraduate teaching? How is this to be explained? And what practices, if any, can be replicated? This presupposes a fixation not so much with Oxbridge but rather with the idea of quality undergraduate education, which to gather from the constant re-appearance of reports on this very topic appears to be an embedded concern in American higher education.

It may well be that, even if the focus is directed at the undergraduate experience, then Oxbridge as a comparative reference point is inappropriate: residential colleges with an independent power base within the university cannot be exported, tutorial teaching is costly, and the highly selective student intake is not easily replicated. The danger, as so often appears to be the case, is that the defining contextual constraints are ignored. However, if employed constructively, Oxbridge is not an inappropriate measuring rod, although it can be a dangerous reference point because its apparent charms can rather too easily seduce the unwary.

Wider Issues

The Trajectory of American Higher Education

Noreña's book charts the deterioration of the Santa Cruz colleges as an effective academic force within the wider University and reaches the conclusion that in his judgment UCSC has become a "conventional campus of the University of California system." He writes that,

> The original dream of Dean McHenry and Clark Kerr practically vanished from the hill overlooking Monterey Bay. Today UCSC is an excellent and thriving school but something totally different from what the founders envisioned in 1961. (Noreña 2004, p. 329)

This is an evaluation, in spite of a few quibbles, with which we would concur. Undoubtedly, the curriculum is structured along more conventional lines with the departments in control of its overall shape. However, the colleges continue to

exist, and the UCSC website still extols their virtues as an important feature of an undergraduate education at Santa Cruz.

We have examined different ways of interpreting Kerr's "leap in the dark," but regardless of how you explain what he was trying to do and what evaluation you reach in terms of its effectiveness, it has to be admired for its boldness. You may consider it rather foolhardy to create a university dedicated to quality undergraduate teaching within the bowels of one of America's leading research universities. However, an alternative interpretation of the initiative is that its focus was pertinent because the challenge to the research university had to be made on its own terrain in order to determine whether it could harmonize with an embedded parallel tradition of higher education – that of a liberal undergraduate education entrenched within a collegiate setting.

Whether the battle could have been won, or perhaps could have been won if it had been fought differently, are important questions, but the ground on which it was fought was very relevant. It is important to know whether American higher education can incorporate a strong commitment to high quality undergraduate education within the research university. The struggles that took place at Santa Cruz are inconclusive but do suggest that there is an incompatibility between the research university and a commitment to quality undergraduate education, or at least that the latter has to be accommodated on the terms of the former – that it has to be departmental in its focus rather than embrace a liberal education. But it is foolish to generalize on the basis of one case study, and different conclusions might be reached if the focus was directed at Harvard or Yale (or even more so, Princeton). But Kerr asked the question of UC and Santa Cruz provided the answer – and the institution was found wanting.

Running throughout our analysis is an implicitly harsh critique of the founders of Santa Cruz: an inability to grasp how the Oxbridge model of the collegiate university functioned and naivety as to how the Santa Cruz experiment could be sustained in the context of one of the world's leading research universities. There was also the little matter of resources as funding became more stretched over time, and Santa Cruz faced stiff competition for public monies from Irvine and San Diego (which were also experimenting with residential colleges). Moreover, the contemporary historical circumstances were hardly conducive to the smooth foundation of a new campus. In a wonderful discussion of draft chapters of Kerr's *The Gold and the Blue* (offered at Kerr's request), Rothblatt saw this as one of the main lessons to be learnt:

> One of the strongest ones must be "history" itself, that is to say, the unknown variables that disrupt a smooth understanding of how planning can be carried out. Santa Cruz was created at a time when the counterculture raged. You [that is Kerr] note this over and over again. Of course it was to become a magnet for every outlandish feeling that arose. The new institution provided no barriers. It had no history of its own (unlike Irvine and San Diego). All the hermit crabs rushed to it, all the discontented. (Letter to Kerr from Rothblatt, March 8, 1997)

Besides the counterculture there was also the prolonged political radicalization, embracing both students and faculty, generated by the Vietnam War. Nonetheless,

we are inclined to the view, that even if the historical circumstances had been more propitious, the fundamental internal tensions embracing values and structures would have steadily impacted upon the character of Santa Cruz. However, it is likely that its evolution would have been less traumatic, and it may have been possible to preserve in a more complete form its original ideals.

Is American higher education, therefore, essentially fractured rather than composed of contrasting parts that blend to form a coherent whole? At one end of the continuum are the great research universities, fuelled by public and private funding; and at the other the small private liberal arts colleges dedicated to providing a collegially-driven undergraduate education that is second to none. But the issue is whether a collegiate university dedicated to the synthesis can be created in America. The logic of our argument is that collegiate universities are not created but rather emerge over time. It is, therefore, more realistic to pin one's hopes on the consortia of private (liberal arts) colleges if this is your desired goal. Yet it will take a vivid leap of imagination to see them moving beyond their essentially pragmatic ties to developing strong centers with independent policy interests that may run counter to those of the individual colleges – in other words, to become a living collegiate university. Perhaps it is better that we should learn to live with the contradictions rather than dream of the unattainable.

UCSC and Oxbridge: Changing Collegial Traditions

The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge have each evolved over time to create contrasting models of the collegiate university. There is no one immutable definition of the collegiate university. Moreover, there were affinities between UCSC's initial values and practices and the Oxbridge model of the collegiate university. Key functions were shared between colleges and departments, authority was diffused, academic affairs were under academic control, undergraduate education was at the core of the venture, and the experience of higher education incorporated an important socio-cultural message embracing more than the acquisition of a degree. From the beginning the major flaw in the model was the absence of an effective federal structure of governance. At Oxbridge the two Universities developed over time with the aid of considerably enlarged incomes (very much a consequence of state intervention) and steadily accrued greater responsibilities. Nonetheless, the colleges continued to remain potent bodies that expressed, and still continue to express, a powerful voice in the deliberations of the two Universities. Furthermore, the central collegial values were formed long before the two Universities became powerful entities in their own right, and certainly long before they emerged as major research universities. The colleges have retained core academic functions; they are not merely student residences confined to providing board and lodging and a stimulating socio-cultural ambience. They exist, as charitable corporations, to provide undergraduate teaching an a residential model.

At UCSC the colleges were created as a result of the foundation of the University. They were not legally constituted corporate bodies that had an existence independent

of the University. While representing a theme within the American tradition of higher education, they did not express a set of values that already had a powerful base within UC itself but rather represented something of a challenge to the dominant ideology of the University as a leading research institution. Thus, while an idealized image of the collegiate university may have had support in certain quarters, it could not be described as representing either a widely or deeply entrenched value system at the heart of UC. In fact after the founding of Oakes College (1972) even the naming of colleges was delayed as the University waited for well-endowed donors to appear. At the very least this suggests the shallowness of the commitment, for what kind of college is it that has a number rather than a name? (Although it should be noted that this was also a difficulty initially besetting new post-war Parisian universities.)

So, if the Santa Cruz colleges were to take root and flourish, they needed to establish at the very minimum an effective resource base – economic as well as political. In the very early years the desire to create a distinctive image for UCSC, coupled with the fact that the colleges initially had important responsibilities for both the curriculum and faculty appointments, was sufficient to sustain their position. But as the tide, externally and internally, turned, their role was rather easily dissipated. The contrast with Oxbridge could not be more striking in terms of collegial status, income and power. The key measure of the erosion of the academic role of the Santa Cruz colleges was their declining control of the curriculum. The college-controlled interdisciplinary courses, representing the commitment to a liberal education, were slowly marginalized. Over time such courses made up a declining percentage of the degree programs and were less likely to be taught by the core faculty. In comparison, the academic authority of colleges within Oxbridge remains very broad-based: formal control of undergraduate admissions, a major input into undergraduate teaching, involvement (at Oxford) in the appointment and support of academic faculty with joint college-university contracts, the resources to offer college research fellowships (often for young post-doctoral academics on short-term contracts), and financial support for the research of college fellows, (including funding a leave of absence to pursue a project). Moreover, particularly if you are a fellow of one of the better-known colleges, your fellowship will bring with it a considerable amount of prestige. The Oxbridge colleges are far from marginalized institutions.

However, it should be said that certain of the forces that undermined the endeavor to establish a collegiate university at Santa Cruz have been experienced in recent years at both Oxford and Cambridge (Tapper and Palfreyman 2011). The Research Assessment Exercise (which since 1986 has determined the distribution of core public funding for research in the UK), and the need for academics to establish strong research profiles to secure jobs and promotion, militates against establishing a good local reputation for undergraduate teaching. Moreover, this is coupled with important social pressures (college fellows with partners and children rather than bachelors resident in college) that make it more difficult to engage in the governance and administration of college and university, let alone share in the commensality of the former. While donnish dominion may prevail in the colleges (although

some Cambridge colleges have established governing councils that are the effective decision-making, if not sovereign, bodies), there is no doubt that today both Oxford and Cambridge are more managed institutions with a stronger leadership cadre at their centers. Thus, over time the presence of the University has become more prevalent in the functioning of both Oxford and Cambridge. Furthermore, the influence of colleges within the circles of the two Universities will vary widely. All are equal, but some are more equal than others. As at Santa Cruz, the model of the university is as shaped as much (if not more so) by the intrinsic resources that buttress power as it is by high ideals.

A Different Comparative Reference Point?

It is easy to understand why so often the Oxbridge collegiate model has been used as a comparative reference point for those parties intent on founding a university that places a high commitment on a quality undergraduate experience – the broader socialization milieu as well as teaching – at its core. Within the ancient collegiate universities the colleges still retain a strong presence that centers upon their teaching and socializing functions (in which the two inevitably intermingle), as well as their input into key university policy decisions. But one of the messages of this chapter is that, while it is understandable to take inspiration from Oxbridge, it is unwise to imagine that its values, practices and structures can be easily replicated on foreign soil.

At one level of analysis, certainly that favored by Duke in his *Importing Oxbridge*, the foundation of the Santa Cruz campus of the UC represented yet another thwarted attempt to import Oxbridge. Undoubtedly the two founding fathers of Santa Cruz, Kerr and McHenry, were impressed with the attention that the British universities, and more particularly Oxbridge, devoted to undergraduate education. But we have argued that the residential college and a liberal education are also part of the American tradition of higher education; and, if Kerr and McHenry were keen to buttress those dimensions of the tradition, then they had no need to look so far afield for inspiration. What the foundation of UCSC signalled was an attempt to hold the line against the steamroller represented by the American research university; to redress somewhat the balance within the greater University between the pressures of teaching and research. What we have shown is that in those terms Santa Cruz could not be described as a great success, although the campus retains something of a distinctive identity.

In certain respects a more relevant and interesting comparative reference point for UCSC is the new universities (nine in all: East Anglia, Essex, Kent, Lancaster, the New University of Ulster, Stirling, Sussex, Warwick, and York) that emerged in 1960s Britain. The first, if obvious, point is that their foundation occurred at roughly the same time as that of the Santa Cruz campus. Second, their development was definitely being followed by Kerr: “When we were beginning to plan for the new campuses, I had asked him [John Galbraith, subsequently nominated by Kerr to be

the first chancellor at San Diego] to head a committee to see what Britain was doing with its new campuses. He wrote a very good report." (Kerr 2001, p. 259). [We have been unable to locate this possibly telling report.] Furthermore, McHenry notes that on a trip to Europe in 1963 he made a point of visiting the new universities (McHenry 1977, pp. 97–98).

Indeed, these new universities were founded in part for very much the same reasons as the new campuses of the UC. In Britain, as in California, there was an increasing demand for higher education stimulated by a growing pool of qualified applicants. There was also the parallel issue of how to accommodate the expanding demand – in the established universities or in new foundations? But the most significant parallel was the common interest in creating universities that would offer their students a different academic experience. There may have been a widespread belief in the US that British universities provided an undergraduate education that was second to none, but in the UK itself enchantment was on the wane. There was a strong feeling in certain quarters that the experience of undergraduate education had become too formalized, that it was unduly dominated by traditional disciplinary programs under the control of the departments. Remember, moreover, that at this time the overwhelming majority of university entrants were 18-year olds who had secured their university place on the basis of a narrowly-defined range of academic qualifications. The drive was on to create new maps of learning, which hopefully would transcend the disciplinary straitjackets.

In view of the fact that the individual campuses of the nine new universities did not follow a common blueprint, the comparisons with UCSC cannot be made systematically, but there are sufficient similarities to suggest a shared drive for change. Three of the new universities (Kent, Lancaster and York) established residential colleges, which performed essentially cultural, pastoral and social functions (Tapper and Palfreyman 2010, pp. 59–74). Although the content and structure of the degree programs and the pattern of examinations at all nine foundations were the responsibility of the university (which, as we have noted, was not the case at UCSC in its early years), the most common academic administrative model was a sharing of the obligations that these generated between a department and a school of studies, with the departments having an established disciplinary focus and the schools of studies embracing either a broad academic approach or a field of studies. Thus, at Sussex, for example, there was the School of European Studies and the School of Social Sciences, and students from different departments (initially called "subject groups") could pursue their degree programs within different schools. The traditionally structured single honors degree was the exception rather than the norm. Furthermore, following the University of Keele (founded in 1949 as the University College of North Staffordshire and often seen as the precursor of the new universities), students could spend most of their first academic year studying very broad liberal arts and/or general science courses which, although examined, did not impact upon the student's final class of degree.

Although certain of the critics of the new universities have spied an Oxbridge input into their making (Robinson 1987, pp. 94–97), structurally they were most definitely unitary institutions – even more so than the early Santa Cruz. Even at the

three universities with residential colleges, the key academic functions were under university control. The attempts at curriculum innovation were essentially a consequence of the restructured degree programs, which combined inputs from the departments with those of a school of studies, both functioning under university authority. In terms of pedagogy, the widespread emphasis on the need for a small-group teaching mode points to an affinity with Oxbridge, but in the new universities the norm was the seminar of six-eight two students rather than the Oxford tutorial of two students which is again closer to the experience of UCSC.

Another important link between the Santa Cruz campus and the new universities were the embracing parallel themes about the relationship between the physical character of the university – the rural/small town locations, the generous layout of the campuses and the architectural qualities of the buildings – and how this would reinforce the identity of the university as a thriving academic community (Muthesius 2000). The extent to which these qualities were in fact delivered is open to debate, but nonetheless there was a real desire in Britain to break the mold established by the Victorian civic universities and at Santa Cruz to make the colleges, rather than the departments, the key foci of a university.

Comparing the foundation of UCSC with the new universities of 1960s Britain is to offer support for the claim that within the Anglo-American tradition of higher education there is, at least within certain quarters, a common concern with the teaching of undergraduates. What the respective initiatives represent are somewhat different ways of achieving the goal of a quality university experience for such students. In pursuing this goal it is only to be expected that other models, old and new, would be analyzed to see what possible lessons could be learnt. The focus was not on recreating Oxbridge but rather upon what had to be done to construct a quality undergraduate degree program. For both UCSC and the new universities in Britain the answer would be provided by the creation of a different pedagogy (what to teach, how to teach it, and what would be the pattern of examinations). The contrast would be where pedagogical responsibility was to reside, with UCSC initially giving an enhanced role to its colleges and the new universities to schools of studies, but both showing their suspicion of the departments. We are examining the actions of practical reformers bent not so much on recreating an idealized past but rather in constructing a working model that would achieve certain ideals.

Conclusion

We commenced the chapter by claiming that the foundation of UCSC represented Clark Kerr's attempt to diversify the mission of the UC by transforming it into a university that, at least on one of its campuses, would develop a strong commitment to undergraduate education. Whatever were the foundations of his motivation, it is evident that the Santa Cruz campus was meant to be an expression of those values that he believed a system of higher education should represent. To achieve this goal Santa Cruz was to have colleges, which would determine a substantial part of the

undergraduate curriculum and would provide an intellectual home for its academics as well as act as a residential base for the students.

In fact UCSC was a university with colleges rather than a collegiate university, and the collegiate ethos subsided reasonably swiftly as the pressure of the departments, driven by the wider values of the University of California, intensified. We put forward a number of interpretations of this supposed failure, arguing that because Santa Cruz lacked a collegiate structure of governance the colleges were in a weak position to defend their interests and rather quickly succumbed to departmental power. But we have been keen to stress that this represents not so much a failure to "import Oxbridge" but rather a failure to make Santa Cruz a significantly different experience for undergraduates than that offered on the other campuses of the University of California.

Besides providing an opportunity for us to examine a bold experiment in higher education, Kerr's creation of the Santa Cruz campus has also enabled us to draw wider lessons about the analysis of higher education, and – in particular – the Anglo-American experience. First, it appears that there is an inherent tension between the demands of the high-status research university and the provision of quality undergraduate education, that the two are not easily reconciled within the same institutional base. (Consider the organizational complexity of Oxford as Berkeley with 39 liberal arts colleges such as Dartmouth or Swarthmore embedded within it!). Perhaps the lesson to be drawn from the UCSC experiment is that it is better to accept this apparent incompatibility rather than try to construct a false consensus. The implication, therefore, is that the US system of higher education is the sum of very distinctive parts with each part having a different mission. Thus, structurally it is composed of a number of contrasting sectors that complement one another to form a reasonably coherent whole at state and national levels.

Second, it has enabled us to reflect on the nature of the collegiate university. It is an ever-changing idea, which raises the question of what are its core values and practices and how resistant these are to the pressures for change. Is collegiality always contextually bound and, therefore, subject to continuous re-interpretation? Or are there boundaries that mark out its integral meaning and if these are stretched too far then the collegiate idea of the university evaporates? Third, we have raised the issue of comparative analysis in higher education. By what standard was Kerr's creation to be measured? For the analysis of UCSC we have offered what we consider to be a more appropriate reference point than Oxbridge – the new universities of 1960s Britain. It is a less demanding comparative benchmark but more appropriate because the goals were parallel: to rejuvenate undergraduate education.

The new universities, especially those that chose to establish residential colleges, could have provided Kerr with a more viable model through which to achieve his intention to create an enhanced experience of undergraduate education. Perhaps the prospect was contained in the Galbraith Report, but that information is presently elusive. At the same time, academic authority, as at Kent, Lancaster and York, could have resided solely in the University. Indeed, at Oxford and Cambridge, although the colleges may admit undergraduates and provide teaching support, the degree programs are the formal responsibility of the two Universities, and the colleges have no control over the content of the curriculum. The undergraduate teaching within the colleges prepares students for the University's "public" examinations on the

basis of which the Oxford or Cambridge BA is awarded; this college teaching, of course, is reinforced by department teaching in the sciences (laboratory practicals) and increasingly in the social sciences (problem solving in, say, Economics).

Furthermore, the interpretation of a liberal education should have been couched in terms of a learning experience that embraced the idea of developing critical minds rather than the broadening of the curriculum to incorporate college-based multi-disciplinary courses built around a particular theme. The emphasis should have been upon an undergraduate teaching experience based in the departments that was offered by the core faculty members and incorporated the commitment to a serious element of the teaching taking place in small groups, with a stress upon the academic interaction between students and tutors (Palfreyman 2008). Moreover, this should have been pursued as a model of how undergraduate education needed to be undertaken in UC at large rather than establishing Santa Cruz as a somewhat separate model of higher education on the periphery of the University. What was needed more than a new campus was a strategy for rebalancing the purposes of the established campuses.

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Chapter 9
Clark Kerr: Triumphs and Turmoil*

David Pierpont Gardner

The University of California, while chartered in 1868 by the state Legislature, was mostly formed and fashioned as to its mission, structure and governance by the vision, fortitude and personality of four of its presidents – Daniel Coit Gilman (1872–1875); Benjamin Ide Wheeler (1899–1919); Robert Gordon Sproul (1930–1958); and Clark Kerr (1958–1967).

These four presidents, each very different one from the other in background, personality, and temperament, at different times and in varying ways, managed to protect the University's independence and to modify its mission, form and structure as circumstances required while persuading governors, legislators, donors, agricultural and business interests, and the people of California to support the University and sustain it over time.

They did so, it should be noted, during times of war, civil and social unrest, natural disasters, financial panics, recessions, and depressions, faculty discontent, student-driven political activism, contending political interests and the vagaries of California's many cultures and lifestyles.

To better understand Clark Kerr's service as president and the challenges he confronted upon taking office in 1958, a summary remembrance of the contributions made by his three most influential predecessors will better inform the reader about the trail of history that led to and helped shape Kerr's presidency. It will also accord them the recognition they so richly deserve but, which in today's preoccupation with what is only immediate, they so rarely receive.

My fellow authors, it should be noted, write more completely and in more detail about Kerr's presidency, the substance of his accomplishments and the effect of his presidency and achievements on universities elsewhere than do I. This is so because

*Drawn from Kerr's subheadings of his memoirs, as fitting for this chapter as for his two-volume work

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I was asked to write a more personal account of Clark Kerr and his work as UC's president, relying on our 43 years of friendship, not from a distance, but as a student, colleague and successor president of the University of California (1983–1992).

I have sought to do so as objectively and as honestly as did Clark when preparing his own memoirs.

Gilman (1872–1875)

Daniel Coit Gilman became the University's second president when appointed in 1872 at 41 years of age. He was a Yale man and a contemporary of Charles William Eliot of Harvard, Andrew Dickson White of Cornell and James Burrell Angell of Michigan, all of whom were transforming their respective institutions from the colleges they had been into the universities they were to become with the then modern German universities as their model.

The character and course of American higher education would be changed forever by these initiatives, their influence extending even to the far reaches of the nation's most distant frontier: the California coastline, site of the State's then fledgling University and destined for greatness. Gilman brought this vision of the university to his adopted state and its even newer University. He chose his inaugural address as the venue not only to introduce but also to declare his plan for developing the University of California, a vision as fresh, far- reaching, vibrant and bold as those planning for Harvard's, Cornell's and Michigan's futures. His vision, however, was at odds with the then raging debate in California about how its new University should plan for its future: agricultural interests battling those favoring industrialization and mining and each of these opposing those favoring a more classical curriculum.

Gilman used his inauguration to place his stake firmly in support of a vision more comprehensive than the more narrowly articulated educational purposes of those seeking to influence and/or control the University; more strategic in its thinking than the latest debate in the state capitol; more public as to the University's character and purpose than those arguing for a more private, limited and tightly focused mission; and more in tune with the probable direction of American universities as they were then being envisioned. In other words, Gilman did not seek to negotiate or mediate the then contending views over the University's mission, structure, governance and/or purpose. He merely asserted his own view and laid claim to his intentions as being those of the University's as well, as excerpts make clear:

> First, it is a "University" and not a high school, nor a college, nor an academy of science, nor an industrial school which we are charged to build. Some of these features may indeed be included in or developed with the University, but the University means more than any or all of them. The University is the most comprehensive term which can be employed to indicate a foundation for the promotion and diffusion of knowledge – a group of agencies organized to advance the arts and sciences of every sort, and to train young men as scholars for all the intellectual callings of life….It is not the University of Berlin nor of New Haven [Yale} which we are to copy; it is not the University of Oakland nor of San Francisco which we are to create; but it is the University of this State. It must be adapted to this people, to their public and private schools, to their peculiar geographical position, to the requirements of their new society and their underdeveloped resources….

> Science is the mother of California. Give us more and not less science; encourage the most thorough and prolonged search for the truth which is to be found in the rocks, the sea, the sand and air, the sun and the stars; in light and heat and magnetic forces; but let us also learn the lessons which are embodied in languages and literature, in laws and institutions, in doctrines and opinions, in historical progress (Adams and Newhall 1967, p. 12).

Gilman's tenure at UC was to be brief, but telling. His vision, it might be said, laid the foundation for the University's development and set the course for its public character and educational underpinnings. While his inaugural failed to dampen the political maneuverings for the course and control of the University, his vision came to outweigh and outlast these adverse forces.

In 1875, Gilman resigned to accept the presidency of The John Hopkins University in Baltimore, for both personal and professional reasons (Stadtman 1967, p. 12).

Owing in no small part to Gilman's untimely resignation and the enduring political wranglings within the state about UC's future, a Constitutional Convention was convened to write a new constitution. One was drafted and in 1879 submitted to a vote of the people. It was approved, including Article IX, Section 9, thus enshrining in the state's highest law for the University of California the autonomy it so desperately needed.

This provision provided for a Board of Regents to govern the University with nearly unqualified authority, excepting that the Board keep the University free of political and sectarian influence in its administrative affairs and in the appointment of its Regents; the admission of women to the University was to be on the same basis as for men, a requirement previously approved by the Regents in 1870 but now embodied in the state's constitution; and members of the governing board were to be appointed by the governor for 16 years. *Ex-officio* members served during their term of eligible office. Constitutional amendments were made in 1918 and 1974 as well. These changed the composition of the Board, in the first instance by increasing the number of *ex-officio* members by two, and in the latter, by increasing the number of gubernatorial appointments by two, reducing the number of *ex-officio* members by one, and the lengths of terms for appointed members from 16 to 12 years.

The University's autonomy has proven to be, time and again, both an indispensable protection for the University against external political pressures and internally against actions of the Regents or administration that might otherwise have been considered. (As president from 1983 to 1992, numerous occasions arose of both kinds, mostly legislative in origin, that were deflected or mooted by the provisions of Article IX, Section 9, when firmly and confidently invoked.)

The University of California owes much to its second president, Daniel Coit Gilman.

Wheeler (1899–1919)

Between the years 1875 and 1899, the University of California mostly evolved rather than developed. It was opportunistic, both in action and outlook. Five presidents came and went, earning the University a reputation for using up as many presidents as were willing to take the job.

Significant academic progress had, nevertheless, been made during those years: enrollments grew from 231 when Gilman resigned to 2,553 as the century turned (Stadtman 1967, pp. 212, 216). Private donations grew; state resources flowed with a modest measure of predictability; several professional schools and research centers were added mostly through gift, affiliation or merger, such as the medical sciences in San Francisco (later to become UC San Francisco) and the Hastings College of Law, also in San Francisco. The range and character of educational offerings obviously responded to local demands. Most importantly, distinguished scholars and scientists were recruited, including several from the former Southern Confederacy, all gambling their professional careers and personal hopes on what California and its university might well become. Powerful external forces, however, tended to drive UC's internal decision making at this time, owing to an insufficiency of countervailing pressures from within.

The election in 1899 of Benjamin Ide Wheeler, as the University's next and eighth president, changed all that. He was 45 years of age and came to California from a professorship at Cornell where he taught philology and Greek. Brown was his undergraduate college, and the University of Heidelberg in Germany had granted him his Ph.D.

Wheeler wrote to the Board of Regents, prior to his being offered the presidency, in which he set down four conditions for the Board's review, and if they wanted to consider him further, for the Regents' approval as well:

1. That the President should be in fact, as in theory, the sole organ of communication between the faculty and staff;
2. That the President should have sole initiative in appointments and removals of professors and other teachers and in matters affecting salaries;
3. That the Board, however divided in opinion during discussion, should in all things the President is called upon to do regarding the Faculty, support him as a unit;
4. That the President should be charged with the direction, subject to the Board, of all officers and employees of the University (Stadtman 1967, p. 181).

By agreeing to Wheeler's conditions without amendment or restraint, and then with his acceptance, the Board of Regents for the first time in UC's history delegated to the president the executive discretion needed to administer the increasingly complex and growing university. Clearly, Wheeler had no intention of being just another president whose tenure was brief and influence marginal. He served as president for 20 years – a golden era for the University, and especially for undergraduates whose respect and affection he earned as well as reciprocated.

The University also grew in enrollments – 2,553 at the start of Wheeler's presidency and some 12,227 at the close (Stadtman 1967, pp. 216, 218) – in its physical plant, in the size and diversity of the faculty, in the flow of funds and the richness and variety of its academic program and research. The University's geographic reach and influence was by then spreading well beyond the boundaries of Berkeley and San Francisco: agriculture at Davis (later UC Davis); the Citrus Experiment

Station at Riverside (later UC Riverside); astronomy at Mt. Hamilton (the Lick Observatory, later part of UC Santa Cruz); the absorption of the regional Normal School in Los Angeles (becoming UCLA during Wheeler's tenure); and the Marine Biological Research facility at La Jolla (later the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, and afterwards, a part of UC San Diego), among others. One could sense even then the prospects and potential for one state University having several parts, not just on its mother campus but throughout the state. These early initiatives, however, were as much an effort by the University to prevent the absorption of university-level research and teaching by institutions independent of UC as it was to attract such endeavors to the University itself.

Wheeler also had an eye for talent and proved to be a remarkable recruiter of distinguished scholars and scientists from throughout the country, and even beyond, just as faculty members from the last half of the nineteenth century were retiring.

While Wheeler's relations with UC's myriad constituencies remained strong throughout, not so for important segments of the faculty who regarded him with respect but not in his dealings with them which they saw as unduly autocratic. So strained were these relations that near and following the close of his presidency a "faculty revolt" occurred. The consequences were a timely retirement by the president at age 65 (who in any event was in ill health), and a Regental delegation of authority to the Academic Senate (the professoriate), not via the president but directly, for the full but not necessarily final involvement of the Senate in the processes of faculty recruitment, appointment and promotion, academic planning and the formulation of educational policy. The Senate was also delegated authority to organize itself as it wished, to elect its officers and appoint its committees and otherwise to perform its duties free of administrative or Regental oversight, involvement, reproach and/or concurrence.

By 1920, therefore, some but not all of the University's governing and management principles familiar to us today were in place. Gilman's earlier vision remained the referent. The Berkeley campus was named as one of the six major universities in the nation (Kerr 2001, p. 50). Three years following Wheeler's retirement, the University with an enrollment of 17,347 students was the largest of any university in the country; and Wheeler's successor, President Barrows, and the Senate were beginning, by virtue of Regental actions, to develop a shared governing arrangement, a unique and challenging expectation, but, as it matured, as much responsible as any other single consideration, except for the University's autonomy, when seeking to understand the University's ascendency to a pre-eminent position among public universities worldwide.

The complexities and prospects for one University with multiple campuses and a worldwide range of relationships and obligations was just forming within the University's leadership during the later years of Wheeler's presidency, but the expansive growth in enrollments then looming was not well forecast nor especially well planned. These and other matters of consequence were to fall not so much on the shoulders of Wheeler's two immediate successors but on those of Robert Gordon Sproul, UC's first native Californian and UC graduate to be so chosen (Ferrier 1930).

Sproul (1930–1958)

Robert Gordon Sproul was elected as the eleventh president of the University of California in 1930 at the age of 39. His affiliation with UC spanned one-half a century, from his admission as a freshman in 1909 (excepting one year working in Oakland as an engineer) until his retirement as president in 1958 at age 67.

His first appointment at UC was as its Cashier. In 1920, he was chosen by the Board of Regents to serve as Comptroller, Secretary of The Regents and UC's land agent, all at the age of 29. In 1925, he was appointed vice-president for business and finance; and then president in 1930. These were not just titles. They reflected as wide a range of administrative duties held in the University by any person (except for the president). His direct report was to The Regents but, as expected, he worked closely with his two sequentially serving presidents as well.

This nearly 10-year assignment immersed him in all things administrative; placed him in regular contact with members of the governing board; introduced him to the vagaries and uncertainties of political life in California when representing the University in the state capitol; and broadened his reach and appreciation for the complexities in working simultaneously with the Regents, the president, the Academic Senate, his administrative staff, the students and the political, agricultural and business leadership of California.

Sproul, however, was not an academic. This gave pause on the part of some Regents as to whether or not Sproul, if considered for the presidency when it opened in 1929, would be acceptable to the University's faculty. By then, however, the recently won rights of the Academic Senate (1920) were an established reality. That fact along with Sproul's more than decade-long service within the University's administration had earned him the Faculty's respect and, therefore, their support. Thus, he was elected president with the widespread and confident regard of the faculty, the larger University community and those external to UC whose opinions also counted. Sproul had a full plate of problems awaiting him:

- The nation's "Great Depression" was then one-year old and destined to persist throughout the decade, accompanied by shrinking funds for UC; and the needs of the University were growing both in complexity and scale, necessitating fresh sources of funding and/or reduced expenditures to balance spending with revenues;
- The Berkeley campus was casting an uneasy eye toward UCLA, given the latter's expressed ambitions and assertions of a Berkeley bias among Sproul's staff, which, if correct, would pit a growing UCLA in the south against a more mature and settled Berkeley in the north, allegedly protected to UCLA's detriment by a presidency charged with having favored Berkeley rather than UCLA and the northern interests over the southern;
- The growth of the state's community colleges and the implications this carried for UC's academic standards for admission to its lower-division programs;
- The growing restlessness of California's state colleges, then under the aegis of the State Board of Education, and tied, therefore, more to K-12 than to California's other public institutions of higher education;

- The growing concern among the private colleges and universities that UC seemed to be looking increasingly to the private sector's donor base – foundations, corporations and individuals of means – to augment insufficient public funding, thus, impinging on a sphere of funding believed to be the province of the state's private colleges and universities;
- The cultivation and servicing of an ever-widening number of alumni, now from both Berkeley and UCLA, as they and other friends both in the public and private sectors played an increasing role in building support and good will for the University;
- The increasing diversity of UC's operations, now widely distributed throughout the state, and the ensuing changes this would have on the University's practiced and established ways of working;
- The need for long-range planning of the then quite large and complex University grew steadily more urgent as enrollment increases appeared on the horizon (to Sproul's credit addressed by him in the early years of his presidency but less so subsequently as prospects for the doubling of enrollments in the 1960s later became apparent); and,
- To sustain Sproul's commitment to one, unified University with its several parts, including new campuses, rather than to succumb to the omnipresent centrifugal forces increasingly in evidence within the larger University of California.

As the years passed, Sproul found his list of strategic challenges lessened or enlarged by changing times and conditions.

For Sproul, the "Great Depression" yielded in 1941 to the second world war. Hostilities ended in 1945, and veterans returned to their colleges and universities, helped and encouraged by the GI Bill (Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944), filling UC's campuses then operating with a much augmented teaching staff and year-round classes with weekend and night classes being the norm; and this post-war era yielded in 1950 to the Korean War (1950–1953) with its disruptions and federal and state governments' initiatives to uncover "disloyal" members on the faculty and staff of American universities, including California's.

In addition, the University in 1949 self-imposed a loyalty oath to be signed by all members of UC's faculty and staff as a condition of employment and/or continuing service. The oath controversy (1949–1952) proved to be the singlemost disruptive event within the University's internal affairs and in the negative, opinions of the public in Sproul's otherwise remarkable record of accomplishment (Gardner 1967).

During his final years as president (1952–1958), four seemingly intractable but also strategic issues remained, managed by Sproul but not resolved:

- The concept of a single University with multiple campuses, to which Sproul was unwaveringly committed, became even more of an issue within UC when Sproul agreed in the very early 1950s, under Regental and regional pressures, to appoint chancellors at UC Berkeley and UCLA, while refusing to accompany the appointments with delegations of executive authority from the president sufficient to enable the chancellors to perform their assigned duties. This resolved in the mind of Clark Kerr, who was the first Berkeley chancellor, any residual reservations

about the need for dramatic changes in the University's administrative structure. He would have to await his presidency, however, to do anything about it as Sproul was immovable on this subject (Lee 1995);

- California's public institutions of higher education were not functioning as a system, not only loosely, divided as they were on issues of mission, governance, structure, funding and admission standards. This impasse, long-standing and as yet unresolved, became a matter of real concern to the state at the end of the second world war and thereafter as enrollments for these institutions were expected to double in the 1960s. Given the lead time needed for such expansion by these institutions, the matter moved from a mere concern to an immediate crisis;
- It was also being made clear by the Legislature that they were quite willing, in the absence of agreement between the various segments of California's higher education community, to act on their own, approving as they were in the late 1950s new colleges and universities throughout the state at each legislative session and according to no plan whatsoever, just political and financial pressure from the home districts of the most powerful members of the Legislature. It was not that this matter had not been studied. It had been studied, indeed studied nearly to death (Douglass 2000). Decisions, on the other hand, had not been made. The luxury of indecision was no longer an option but the differences, deeply held, resisted resolution, yielding up instead answers that were unworkable: lots of unworkable answers, no viable solutions; and,
- The delayed but now compelling need for the University of California to develop its own long-range planning, i.e., an academic plan, a physical facilities plan and a fiscal plan, the first including enrollments, academic programs and personnel, the second, the grounds, buildings and equipment needed to support the first, and the third, the fiscal resources needed to fund it all.

The University's long-range planning had been well done over the decades, for the most part, but with a doubling of enrollment expected for the 1960s, UC was back of the curve in the latter years of the 1950s when Sproul announced his intention to retire in 1958.

Thus, these three unresolved and major strategic issues were mostly bequeathed by Sproul to Kerr, although Sproul as president and Kerr as Berkeley's chancellor had worked on these issues, sometimes together and other times separately, Kerr mostly for Berkeley's planning and Sproul's for UC as a whole.

As the 25th anniversary of Sproul's presidency (1955) arrived, celebrations were arranged. Professor Joel Hildebrand, Dean of Berkeley's famed College of Chemistry and a leader among the faculty, was asked to author the Senate's tribute to Sproul and add thoughts of his own as well:

> Professors are hard to please, as they should be because timid, uncritical men cannot train youth for courage and adventure. The President who retains his intellectual and moral stature under their cold scrutiny is indeed a good one. Many a president has had to take refuge in aloofness and the authority of his position. Not so President Sproul. He is the kind of president who can be called by his first name without loss of dignity. His government by cooperation rather than ukase has fostered a fine sense of loyalty and responsibility. We respect his wisdom and we like his friendly humility….

> You have abundantly earned our confidence. You have demonstrated over the years your appreciation of the high standards of both discovery and teaching upon which the greatness of the University must be built. You have devoted yourself with zeal and success to maintaining the unity, the dignity, the distinction of the University of California. We deeply appreciate the fact that your leadership has been affected by patient, persuasive wisdom, rather than recourse to the formal authority of your office. You have been receptive to constructive criticism. You have treated us as colleagues, and have shared the sense of obligation to our common task which has become the genius of this institution.
>
> Such a combination of virtues, essential to the distinction of a university, is too rarely found in a university president (Pettitt 1966, p. 86).

In short, Sproul's presidency was a triumph and a second golden era in UC's history, complementing Wheeler's (Gardner 1986, pp. 462–490). Clark Kerr agreed with this judgment of Sproul's presidency, as he made abundantly clear throughout his own memoirs, whatever differences they may have had when serving together for 6 years (1952–1958), Kerr as Berkeley's chancellor and Sproul as president.

The shoes Kerr was asked to fill as Sproul's successor in 1958 were large indeed, both a challenge in the ordinary sense of the term, but also in the very real sense as well, that the succession of a successful and revered predecessor is a good deal more difficult than succeeding one less well regarded or, even better, one poorly considered.

Sproul was Sproul, of course, and Kerr was Kerr. I knew them both personally and also understood their role as I later served as UC's 15th president (1983–1992). Here are some general impressions I have of them before I move into Kerr's work as UC's 12th president:

- They were not in personality, style or background very much alike other than they each learned how to work at an early age, Sproul in urban San Francisco and Kerr in rural Pennsylvania. Whatever the differences their life experiences may have been as children, they shared in their respective homes a solid and loving environment, where education was valued and individual responsibility nurtured;
- Their working relationship when Sproul was president and Kerr was Berkeley's chancellor was not altogether smooth or seamless, if I may understate it, the perceptions of their respective roles differing fundamentally one from the other;
- Each was committed to the concept of a single, unified University, with a single Board of Regents, one president and with multiple campuses. Beyond that, they disagreed over how best to sustain this concept. Sproul had run a highly centralized administration, a role he regarded as essential to preserving the one University idea. Kerr, on the other hand, believed the times, growth and complexity of the University could no longer be managed, not to mention governed, with Sproul's system. It had worked for Sproul but as far as Kerr was concerned, decentralization of the University was long overdue, indeed desperately needed. Neither conceded to the other on this point, but as Sproul was leaving and Kerr was coming, the outcome was predictable;
- Kerr was deliberative and intensely analytical, as was Sproul. Sproul, however, tempered his conclusions with what he perceived as being also relevant considerations independent of the analysis itself. Kerr's conclusions, however, reached after his always studied and thorough analysis, were arrived at with less regard for other variables he regarded as extraneous to his analysis, but to which

Sproul attached significance and Kerr did not. In short, for Kerr the answer was the solution, but for Sproul, the only solution was an answer that worked, not answers that were suspect or might prove to be unworkable when factoring in other considerations that appeared to others to be extraneous but often were not;

- Sproul cultivated constituencies outside the University as deliberately as he did internally. For Kerr, this use of time did not rise to a level of priority that would deflect or otherwise diminish his efforts to deal with Sproul's bequest of major, indeed strategic, issues referred to above. Sproul, however, had also bequeathed Kerr a "reservoir" full of good will toward the University by its key external constituencies. In the course of dealing with the incredibly challenging tasks at hand, each on a tight time line for resolution, Kerr drew down this reservoir of good will without replacing it. Thus when the Free Speech Movement hit (1964) and Kerr looked to the outside for help, there was not sufficient water left in the reservoir to make much difference;
- Kerr was prompt in dealing with the business on his desk and implementing his decisions. Sproul was not, not because of neglect but on purpose. (His assistant of over 30 years, Ms. Agnes Robb, one of the University's real characters, told me while I was waiting to see him on a matter, that Sproul had discovered early on in his administration that a not small percentage of the problems piled on his desk would, if not answered, resolve themselves within 4–6 months and without his involvement.);
- Kerr's contacts were more international than Sproul's and Sproul's were more domestic than Kerr's;
- Kerr was more reluctant socially than Sproul who was an extrovert; Kerr did not feel as comfortable in large crowds as did Sproul who thrived on it.

The above is not an exhaustive list, merely illustrative.

In other respects, the two men were less different and more alike. For example:

- Each was devoted to the University and made personal and professional sacrifices by putting the University first;
- Each was young when elected president, Sproul at 39 and Kerr at 47 (so, too, had been Gilman at 41 and Wheeler at 43);
- Each was well prepared for the task, full of knowledge and relevant facts and figures, with a vocabulary to match, and persuasive styles, Kerr being more understated and Sproul more expressive;
- Each had an uncanny way of seeing the larger issues within context. Kerr was more historical and theoretical about the links between the context, the problem and his favored solution, and Sproul more practical and instinctual about both his perception of the context and the reasoning that ran to his solution. These were especially important considerations when Sproul was dealing with the antecedents of the loyalty oath and then proposed that it be enacted by The Regents, as it also bore directly upon Kerr's perceptions of student unrest in the 1960s and his actions to cope with it;
- Each was quite capable of saying "no" when others or most were pressing them to say "yes," and the reverse;

- Each earned the faculty's confidence, Sproul having chosen to work closely with the Academic Senate during his presidency when his predecessors had not. Kerr's reputation stemmed from his long service as a faculty member at Berkeley and as the first director of The Institute for Industrial Relations (Kerr was already a famous negotiator and arbitrator of some of the major union-management disputes in the United States.); and his involvement in the loyalty oath controversy also earned him the respect of the faculty generally and a high opinion among some Regents, but not all;
- Each was healthy throughout his respective tenure, full of energy and verve expended in behalf of the University, all made possible, of course, by a supporting family, and the intelligent, capable and accomplished spouse each had married;
- Each had Regental support on the major issues throughout their service, except for Sproul during the loyalty oath controversy when, had it not been for the intervention of his former classmate at Berkeley and then governor of the State of California, Earl Warren, the tide might well have turned against him. It was close.

As for Kerr, all went well except during the Free Speech Movement (FSM) at Berkeley in 1964, and the Filthy Speech incident a year later. There were also some Regents, a distinct minority, however, who had not welcomed Kerr's role in the loyalty oath years and liked even less his handling of the Free Speech Movement. These feelings came to be more tellingly expressed once Ronald Reagan became governor of California, promising during his campaign to "clean up the mess at Berkeley" and "get rid of its President, Clark Kerr." (See Kerr 2003, Chaps. 15 and 16 and pp. 332–365 for the role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the matter of Kerr's dismissal.)

Kerr (1958–1967)

While there are other differences and similarities that could be drawn, I go now to Kerr's service, first as Berkeley's chancellor (1952–1958) and second to his labors as UC's twelfth president, elected in 1957 and in possession in 1958, at the age of 47.

"I was the first Chancellor at Berkeley, a title in search of a job," he was fond of saying. What he meant was that the title, august as it was, possessed none of the academic and administrative executive authority implied, no office of consequence, no staff and mostly makework. Kerr was really an assistant to the president in a highly centralized administrative apparatus, and Sproul was president. Kerr, who found idleness to be out of character for one ordinarily working 12- to 14-h days, determined to make his years as chancellor productive, even if in doing so he incurred the displeasure of Sproul's staff, which he did.

In typical fashion, and in the absence of direction from above, he chose to pursue seven objectives:

- Make something of the chancellorship;
- Maintain Berkeley in the Big Six;

- Develop an academic plan for the future;
- Improve the quality of undergraduate life;
- Provide the physical facilities needed for the support of this institution;
- Plan for the improvement of Berkeley's cultural life; and,
- Restore lost confidence in Berkeley's academic freedom, damaged by the loyalty oath controversy just concluded (Kerr, 2001, p. 29).

Kerr succeeded, and in every respect, not because he possessed delegated authority sufficient for his title, but because he acted as though he did.

Berkeley would soon bustle with evidence of his efforts: residence halls for undergraduates, student cafeterias and a student union building, playing fields, facilities for the performing and visual arts, all intended to move Berkeley away from the German model with its neglect of student life and more towards the British model that took more explicit account of it.

Kerr also set very high academic standards and expectations for the Berkeley campus, and, along with the Academic Senate and faculty, worked tirelessly to improve even further the quality and standing of Berkeley's academic departments, schools and colleges.

The basic Berkeley strategy was "one of select attention, not equal across the board distribution of efforts and resources, and aimed at the…intellectual resources for advancing academic performance" (Kerr 2001, pp. 56–57).

This effort, pushed hard by Kerr when appointed Berkeley's chancellor, continued throughout his tenure and beyond by Glenn Seaborg, who succeeded him in 1958. Seaborg, a Nobelist in chemistry, and later to serve several U.S. presidents as Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, was Kerr's first appointment of a chancellor as UC's new president (Seaborg 1994).

In Spring of 1964, the American Council on Education named Berkeley at the top of the "Big Six" universities in the United States; and Berkeley was also judged to be the "best balanced, distinguished university in the country" (Kerr 2001, pp. 57–58). Credit for this accomplishment, of course, radiated across the University, as indeed it should have, but the role Sproul played for so many years and Kerr's leadership at Berkeley and then as President should not be overlooked.

Kerr was a self-starter, always reaching for a challenge. He did not seek people's approval. He did not need "position" to get things done. He did not seek favors from others. He did not require adulation in any way or form whatsoever. He tended to be direct in his speech but not overbearing. He was a child of The Enlightenment and, thus, reasoned in his thought, but too often assumed others were the same. He was always Clark Kerr doing his job. To his credit, this style worked at Berkeley and to its immense advantage when he served as chancellor. It was somewhat more problematic when he became president, as we will see.

Kerr moved into the presidency in July 1, 1958, but not into University House on the Berkeley campus, occupied by his predecessors beginning with Wheeler. He preferred to live in his own home in El Cerrito, just north of the City of Berkeley's northern boundary with a 180° view of San Francisco Bay from high in the Berkeley Hills. He also chose to work at home rather than in his office just a block or two

from the west entrance to the Berkeley campus. With couriers moving back and forth between his office near campus and his home, he only needed his real office for meetings, entertainment or special guests.

While this arrangement worked for him, others thought differently, preferring to work with him on a more frequent and personal basis. This was Kerr's preference throughout his tenure as president, and while some found this pattern to be reflective of someone who valued his privacy more than his colleagues, or one who wanted to put distance between those who worked for him and himself, I tend to believe that for Kerr time was precious and, thus, better to work at home on the priorities he favored than to work at the office and thus be more susceptible to the priorities of others. It was a mixed blessing in any event.

Here is the agenda Kerr confronted from the first day of his presidency:

- The need to break the lock in the then stalled negotiations between California's public colleges and the University of California on issues of governance, mission, admissions and funding, and the effect these negotiations were most likely to have on the state's private colleges and universities. The need to move on this matter was as great as the resistance to do so. Kerr would have to play, and did play, the major role in this initiative. He was a skilled and seasoned arbitrator of major union-management disputes on the West Coast and elsewhere as well. This task played to his strength. That Sproul had also retired, changed the personal and institutional dynamics among and between the key people on all sides;
- In October of 1957, when Kerr was president-elect but not yet president, the Regents directed Sproul to plan for three new campuses without, however, having settled on the futures of the six existing ones: Davis, Berkeley, San Francisco, Santa Barbara, UCLA and Riverside; and all but Berkeley and UCLA were in a state of uncertainty, knowing where they had been but not where they were going, being mostly hybrids or half-formed as to mission in any event, all of this in anticipation of doubling UC's enrollment during the 1960s;
- Decentralizing the University's governing and management system, no surprise to Kerr who had been living with it as chancellor at Berkeley, as had his counterpart at UCLA, was a job not to be taken lightly: many moving parts and many implicated persons; and,
- Pressures were building on UC campuses, especially at Berkeley, to loosen or at least lighten, the restrictions on the time, manner and place regulations governing the use of UC's grounds and buildings by on- and off-campus persons and organizations for political purposes. UC's rules and regulations in these matters were out of step with the trends elsewhere as universities were liberalizing their pertinent regulations. The courts were also looking with increasing favor on these trends, and were also broadening the definitions of free speech to include political advocacy. This subtlety had not been picked up by Kerr or by UC's legal counsel when in the early 1960s Kerr moved to liberalize UC's rules on time, manner and place, and not just because of student pressure to do so but because he thought it was the right thing to do even

when he was chancellor. All of this was antecedent to the Free Speech Movement of 1964, as misnamed as it was unforeseen by the University and its leadership.

Kerr was also faced with the task of managing the transition of his administration taking office and Sproul's administration leaving. Sproul had been president for 28 years, functioning according to his pleasure and staffed by persons vested in the outgoing administration and not the one coming in. The self-evident problems attending such a transfer of authority require no explanation or elaboration; and this was just one more example of what Kerr faced in July of 1958.

In retrospect, this portfolio of problems would most surely have given pause not only to the Regents, but also to Kerr as to the feasibility of tackling them all at once, not just a daunting task, but perhaps even an unattainable one within the given timetable. However, he saw this portfolio not as a whole but, rather, as the sum of its parts, each amenable to modification and redefinition and potentially complementary rather than conflicting:

> Three new campuses, all at once! This tremendous opportunity came along at the same time as reorganization [decentralization] of the University which included transferring three quarters of the University-wide staff to the campuses; and both came on top of the day-to-day operations of our already very large and very complex enterprise (Kerr 2001, p. 235).

Courageous optimism is the only way one could describe Kerr's attitude about his new job and the challenges entailed. Thus he chose not to work sequentially on his problems, but on them all at once.

It was the tidal wave of students expected to enroll in California's colleges and universities, a doubling in the 1960s, that was the impetus for his decision to take immediate action on three new campuses and to designate five more as general campuses within the University of California system, and its corollary of administrative decentralization, an already overdue reaction to a centralized administration that for reasons of scale and complexity had become increasingly dysfunctional.

This "tidal wave" was driven by very large in-migration to California after the second world war, the growing percentage of high school graduates seeking higher education and the high birthrate in the immediate years following 1945. Just as UC had an urgency to prepare for this massive influx of students, so too did the public colleges of the state and the private sector colleges and universities as well. Prior efforts by the leaders of California's public institutions of higher education had failed to find a consensus among the contending parties. The state had lost patience with these efforts and, with a new UC president, delayed its involvement for a year in order to afford the higher education community one last chance to work through its differences.

Enter Kerr who knew how to arrange the variables such as to make a negotiated settlement possible among those previously unable to do so. Thus, it was Kerr who fashioned a new approach to the old and stale arguments that had divided the segments rather than having brought them together. But at this point, neither the students were going to go away nor were the governor and the Legislature. It was decision time. Kerr described it best:

> We had to do everything all at once: set up new campuses and renovate some of the older ones, reorganize as well as administer the University – and each was a full-time task in

> itself. Our basic task in preparing for the future, however, was to determine the role of the University of California within the totality of higher education in the State. As of 1958, this was much in dispute.
>
> Working to develop an outstanding statewide system of higher education and to keep the University's place as the great center for graduate instruction and research within that system, while considering both the public welfare and the primary interests of the several segments, we created the Master Plan for Higher Education in California….*Ex post*, the Plan looks like a grand design to achieve great purposes: equality of opportunity through universal access to higher education; provisions for supplying the highest level skills and the most advanced knowledge to serve both health and welfare; concern for the full labor market needs of a technologically advancing society; and preservation of the self-governing ability within institutions of higher education….
>
> *Ex ante*, however, the plan looked to those of us who participated in its development more like a desperate attempt to prepare for a tidal wave of students, to escape state legislative domination, to contain escalating warfare among its separate segments. This it also was. And the preparation, the escape and the containment in that case was barely in time and barely succeeded. This master plan was a product of stark necessity, of political calculations, and of pragmatic transitions (Kerr 2001, p. 172).

The daily work of pushing this through fell on the shoulders of Dean McHenry, Kerr's vice president for academic planning and his assistant Charles Young. McHenry was a personal friend of Kerr's for quarter of a century and had been previously serving as Dean of Social Science at UCLA. He was later to be named as the founding chancellor at Santa Cruz and Young was to be named chancellor of UCLA where he served with distinction for over a quarter of a century.

While these two men carried the heavy water, it was Kerr in the end who had arranged the variables in the most optimal way possible and at the very end offered the deal-clinching concession, namely, a joint doctoral degree possibility with the state colleges.

For those who perceived Kerr as "merely an academic" and "one over his head in his position," they had no idea how shrewd, substantive, resolute and nimble he could be as circumstances required. I saw this first hand when I was working for the California Alumni Association at Berkeley and driving Kerr around the state in early 1960, working the editorial boards, alumni and service clubs, donors and others to secure passage of the Master Plan then pending before the California Legislature. It passed with only one dissenting vote. Kerr shortly thereafter was featured on the cover of *Time* magazine and his triumph acknowledged.

At this time, he was concurrently pursuing the siting and construction of the three new campuses and settling on the future of the other six campuses. As with the Master Plan effort, Dean McHenry was carrying the heavy water on this assignment, and to a brilliant conclusion.

It was not long before the University was to have its three new campuses: one at Santa Cruz, in the redwoods just north of and looking over Monterey Bay, a short distance south of San Francisco; one at Irvine, in Orange County just south of Los Angeles and immediately east of the Pacific Ocean; and one very near La Jolla, just north of San Diego. Each of these sites had been gifted to the University and each was large enough to plan for a major university campus. The sites were magnificent in appearance and environment, all three within a short distance of the Pacific Ocean,

and serving parts of the state welcoming of a University of California campus. All three were open for students as early as 1959 in San Diego, with the presence of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography at La Jolla, and in 1965 at Irvine and Santa Cruz. Of the remaining campuses, Berkeley's and UCLA's role as "general campuses" was confirmed. Davis, Santa Barbara and Riverside were also designated as "general campuses." San Francisco was designated as a health sciences campus. Each of the University's now nine-campus system was to have a chancellor, appointed by the Regents on recommendation of the president, and accountable to him as the president was in turn accountable to the Regents.

The University's work was proceeding apace within the strictures of the State of California Master Plan for Higher Education and in accord with a new confidence in its internal planning concerned at that point with massive new construction, recruiting and appointment of new members of the faculty for a growing institution, setting enrollment goals and caps for the nine campuses, both short and long term, adjusting admission standards consistent with the Master Plan's requirements, and establishing new schools, colleges, centers, institutes and bureaus for research and related matters (Gardner 2006).

The decentralization of the University's administrative structure was also moving forward under the guidance of Professor Eugene Lee of Berkeley, Kerr's vice-president- executive assistant who was assigned this task. (Lee had been my major advisor during a portion of my graduate years at Berkeley.)

> In 1966, Clark Kerr, President of the University, could report that the number of general campuses had risen from two to eight, enrollment from 43,000 to 88,000, faculty from 4,000 to 7,000, Nobel Laureates from five to twelve, nineteen new colleges and professional schools had been created, and sixty-one new institutes, bureaus, centers, and laboratories for organized research. In eight years, the University of California had doubled both in size and distinction (Adams and Newhall 1967, p. 16).

This was another golden era complementing those of Wheeler and Sproul.

Kerr bore the burden of making the strategic decisions, in consultation with the faculty and the concurring approval of the Regents, that led to this spectacular outcome. He too was responsible for implementation once the Regents had acted; and Kerr was well served by the chancellors and the vice-presidents and key staff in his immediate office. He also had to live with the ambiguities of decentralization as it evolved and the consequences of his other decisions as they played out over time, as we will see.

During the years 1958–1963, he accomplished what few people could have; but he was engaged in work to which he was devoted. His reach and influence went well beyond the University to encompass the course and direction of California's system of public higher education, to the national associations concerned with higher education's fortunes within the country, and, in a way, was the resident intellectual who also happened to be president of the University of California, witness his still famous Godkin Lectures at Harvard University in 1963, *The Uses of the University* (Kerr 1963). He was also known throughout Europe, Latin America and Asia for his work and in frequent demand as a lecturer, consultant and advisor to colleagues and governments worldwide.

Putting it all together, Kerr had a full-time job! But his schedule so insistent, the demands on his energy so unforgiving, the daily burdens of overseeing the University of California and its remarkable growth so encompassing, that whatever time he did have, or could carve out, went to the cause of higher education elsewhere. Something had to suffer under the exigencies of this insistent schedule. What suffered was everything else a UC president would have done in ordinary times, but what Kerr was then mostly constrained from doing. Cultivating the plethora of UC's external constituencies was slighted by Kerr in preference to those internal, owing to the immediacy of the latter and the distance of the former. Kerr's natural inclinations, as to serving the needs of one over the other, very likely played a role as well.

Kerr gestured toward the University's external constituents early in his presidency to help assure enactment of the Master Plan. Subsequently, in the early years of his presidency, it was a less predictable part of his calendar, except for an annual visit to alumni clubs in California (for which I was then responsible as a staffer at the California Alumni Association), on what was called the President's Tour. I accompanied Kerr (1960–1964) not in any way to help with the substance of his visits, but merely to arrange them. Nevertheless, I came to know him as I drove from one event to another, he to speak, socialize and otherwise "show the flag," and me to make everything else work.

Kerr's speeches were well prepared, well delivered and substantive. He was always open to arriving early and staying late. He was easily approachable and responsive to the questions that followed his remarks.

He had other obligations of this kind to fulfill, of course, and did so in the state capitol of Sacramento, in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere, both in and out of California, but not in quite as inclusive or public way as his predecessor. Sproul, of course, had done this for 28 years; Kerr just recently. But the disparate commitment of time and energy was only part of the point I am making.

Sproul mostly lived and worked in different times than did Kerr: with different issues, with a much smaller state population, with fewer alumni and donors, with a much smaller University, with less complicated media coverage, and with richer acquaintances and relations built over three decades, whereas Kerr had just assumed office. Thus Kerr's audiences had known Sproul. Many thought they knew him, even if they didn't, but liked to tell Kerr that they did. They compared Kerr with Sproul more than they did the reverse. And, finally, Kerr was not Sproul: not in personality, in style, in demeanor or in appearance.

This was no one's fault, just the way it so often is when a revered, successful and long-serving president is compared to a successor who is just getting started. This same phenomenon was evident during Kerr's first years in office at the annual Charter Day ceremonies in the Greek Theatre on the Berkeley campus. When Kerr was introduced, it was to warm and cordial applause, but for Sproul, it was to a standing and prolonged ovation, the audience composed mostly of townspeople, alumni, faculty, staff and students. It couldn't have been easy for Kerr, and probably not for Sproul either.

I mention all this because as Kerr's presidency moved into its sixth year in 1964, the "reservoir" of public good will towards the University, full when bequeathed by

Sproul to Kerr in 1958, had been much depleted: time taking its inexorable toll on those in positions of authority and/or leadership, and time having generally not accorded Kerr the luxury of meeting his external obligations as he strove to meet the internal ones. Even so, this would not have been a necessarily consequential problem if times were otherwise congenial. The fall of 1964 at Berkeley, however, would prove to be anything but congenial.

It was also true, and should be noted, that by 1964, all things considered, Kerr still looked to his internal agenda for his personal and professional satisfactions, more to the private, inner life of the University than to the expectations of the University's many publics.

Unlike Sproul, Kerr was a true academic and felt most comfortable in an environment defined as such and less comfortable in the more social and transitory. On more than one occasion, at least when I was present, and when he was crowded around by well-wishers, critics, complainers or what not, I thought he would have much preferred to be at home gardening, reading and writing, or with his friends and colleagues in conversation at the Faculty Club, in the heart of the Berkeley campus.

The consequence of all of the above was that when the fall of 1964 came with the misnamed Free Speech Movement and its accompanying turmoil, Kerr as president faced a campus whose chancellor had only recently received from the president (under UC's decentralization process) the executive authority to administer the campus (including the use of University facilities), on the one hand, and on the other a dearth of public good will on which Kerr might otherwise have drawn as a counter-weight to Berkeley's ensuing troubles. The ambiguities inherent in the systematic but prolonged transfer of authority from the President's Office to the campuses, during this interim but changing time, didn't help.

Sandwiched in the middle, Kerr was in an unenviable position, emboldening his detractors internally, while delimiting his discretion externally as he struggled to cope with a problem that escalated within a mere day to an unprecedented level of international scrutiny and judgment. Thus, Kerr, qua president, was ripe for exploitation from within and for scapegoating from without. Not good!

I will not recount the history of the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in the Fall of 1964, as it has been written about *ad nauseam*, but most completely and honestly by Kerr himself in ways reflective of his remarkable ability to analyze and objectify events, finding fault with his own actions as he also does in referring to the errors and offenses of others, all within the larger context of student protests then occurring elsewhere, domestically and internationally (Kerr 2003, Parts IV & V). I will instead try to identify and to interpret Kerr's decisions during these now well-memorialized events.

One of Sproul's legacies to Kerr was University Rule 17, established in 1936, and according to Kerr, both as chancellor and as president, "the most restrictive set of rules covering free speech and political activities on any campus, to my knowledge, of any American university, with the possible exception of City College of New York" (Kerr 2003, p. 122). This rule controlled the use of the University's name and facilities by students and off-campus groups, including the granting of permission for outside speakers to appear on campus.

As chancellor, Kerr had been required by virtue of Rule 17 to deny Adlai Stevenson permission to speak on campus, once in 1952 and again in 1956, as Stevenson was running for public office, in this instance for the presidency of the United States. (Kerr regarded this as an embarrassment.) While this Rule was a well-established one in the University, no such prohibitions pertained at the state colleges. Kerr regarded these limitations and restrictions to be dated, if I may understate it, but was resolved to revise not abandon them. Becoming president in 1958 facilitated this purpose, assuming the Board of Regents could be persuaded accordingly.

Kerr's views on these matters were rooted in his own history:

- I knew at firsthand of the rising level of student concerns about the shape of the world we were inheriting, going back to my experiences as a student peace activist in the 1930s.
- I had learned of the horrible deprivations of black people as a Swarthmore student working in the ghetto of North Philadelphia…[and] had long expected a civil rights revolt.
- I had witnessed German student and faculty support of the Nazis in Germany in the 1930s and had been antagonized by what they did.
- I had seen student riots in Latin America in the early 1960s as I visited most Latin American countries as a member of the Conference on Higher Education in the American Republics and heard many rectors recount student abuse of their academic privileges.
- As a member of the Board of Trustees of the Chinese University of Hong Kong during the 1960s, I had also observed the rise of the Red Guards in China and the Zengakuren in Japan as a several-time visitor with friends in Japanese universities.
- As Chancellor at Berkeley, I had listened to countless students complaining about their neglect in the developing "multiversity" that concentrated on research… [and] students were being alienated.
- I had seen the rise of the modern American trade union movement in response to exploitations and grievances. I knew a lot about student unrest.

Rule 17 provided in summary:

- All off-campus speakers must continue to have the advance approval of the president of the university or his representative, except when invited by faculty members for their own classes.
- Only student groups "recognized" by the university, or under the jurisdiction of the associated students (the ASUC), could submit applications for outside speakers.
- University facilities could not be used for partisan political or sectarian religious events. Specifically, "Facilities may not be used for the purpose of raising money," and meetings or events which by their nature, method of promoting, or general handling, tend to involve the university in political or sectarian religious activities in a partisan way that will not be permitted. Discussion of

> highly controversial issues normally will be approved only when two or more aspects of the problem are to be presented by a panel of qualified speakers (Kerr 2003, p. 106).

Beginning with his first year as President (1958) Kerr, with Regental approval, withdrew his support for Sproul's earlier directives written to implement Rule 17 as to its practical aspects, by preparing amendments to Sproul's directives and thus liberalizing them both in spirit and in language. This effort extended over the period 1958–1963 (and even beyond), including in 1963 lifting the ban on Communist speakers on campus. This initiative by Kerr, coincided with some of the most active years of the Civil Rights movement, mostly in the American South, and engaging the participation of young people from throughout the country. Some in the late 1950s and early 1960s had made their way to Berkeley either as students or otherwise. Berkeley was becoming the place to be as, among other things, Kerr's Godkin Lectures in 1963 at Harvard University had captured the attention of students, professors and those interested in higher education nationwide.

The "multiversity," which was so thoroughly and brilliantly explained in Kerr's Lectures, was a prototype of what he saw American research universities becoming but not what Kerr was necessarily advocating. Indeed, he pointed out its shortcomings as well as its strengths, paying special attention to his own view that the students were the chief victims. Students took note.

Several things were beginning to happen and all at once, but not well perceived by Kerr as potentially interactive or even prospectively troublesome:

1. What had been referred to as the Sproul Directives on the use of University facilities and off-campus speakers, now, with Kerr's efforts to liberalize them, became the Kerr Directives. Kerr owned them, not Sproul, and they were being perceived by the more activist students at Berkeley as just another set of regulations intended to limit freedom of speech on the campus, at least as they defined it.

   On the other hand, these very same Directives were being increasingly viewed by some Regents, politicians, alumni, donors and members of the general public as prospectively, if not already in reality, violating the social compact between the state and the University: "to keep external politics out of the University and the University out of external politics." Indeed, UC's constitutional autonomy was predicated on this principle.
2. Student resentments against racial discrimination, mostly in the Southern States, were being challenged, and effectively, with non-violent tactics. These tactics became the means most favored by the Civil Rights Movement, and for persons involved in the Movement, and then later as students at Berkeley, the transfer of such tactics to grievances against UC seemed suited.
3. The decentralization of authority from the president to the chancellors continued, and over a period of years as with the Kerr Directives (the extended period of time needed to effectuate these delegations of authority and revisions to the Sproul Directives did not help matters); and,

4. As to these delegations of authority within UC's administrative structure, it should not be surprising that persons in the Office of the President did not necessarily interpret the delegations as would those in the chancellor's office on campus, given the former's reluctance to relinquish authority and the latter's disposition to welcome it. This ambiguity became operative at the outset of the Free Speech Movement in the fall of 1964.

The trigger for the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley was an action taken by the chancellor's office on the Berkeley campus to prohibit student political advocacy, as defined by Rule 17 above, as subsequently implemented by Sproul, as later revised by Kerr and, through decentralization within UC's administration, recently delegated by the president to the Berkeley chancellor for its administration. The locus of authority to act on such violations of these regulations now rested squarely on the chancellor, whatever residual uncertainty there might have been with the language of delegation itself.

On September 14, 1964, the chancellor's office deemed that prohibited political advocacy was occurring at the south edge of Sproul Plaza, the southern corridor of egress and ingress to the Berkeley campus from the City of Berkeley, the larger plaza itself being just west of Sproul Hall, the main administration building for the campus. This small strip of land on the south edge of the Plaza was believed by the chancellor's office to be UC property and, therefore, within the purview of his jurisdiction and, therefore, his responsibility. The staff was not of one mind as to the interpretation of the pertinent Kerr Directive in this instance, but was of one mind that if there were a problem, it was the chancellor's to handle. Clarification was not easily obtained as Kerr was in Asia, on his way home.

There was a prior ambiguity, however, that did not include the language of the Kerr Directives or the language of delegation to the chancellor from the president, namely, that months earlier the Regents, on Kerr's recommendation, had authorized the University's land agent to negotiate a transfer of a small strip of land at the south end of Sproul Plaza to the City of Berkeley so that the tradition of having a "Hyde Park" near but not on the campus could be preserved.

The transfer of this strip of land, however, had not taken place on September 14, 1964 when the chancellor judged its use for student political advocacy to be prohibited. Kerr, on the other hand, thought that the transfer had taken place, given the Regents' earlier action in the matter. Each would have had a different view of the chancellor's action if each had known the real status of this small piece of property (Kerr 2003, pp. 182–186).

It is not clear to me who really knew what and when they knew it! But it was a monumental and avoidable breakdown in communication anyway one looks at it; and on an issue that was to mark the Berkeley campus of the University of California for years to come as a campus given over to liberal policies and practices and confirming in some people's minds already holding that view, given the loyalty oath controversy of 15 years earlier (1949–1952), which was also recalled, both on and off campus.

Kerr returned to Berkeley from his extended trip to Asia the day following the chancellor's action, amidst the dramatic and immediate reaction of the campus to this decision. Meetings were promptly held between Kerr and persons from the Office of the Chancellor Instead of reversing the chancellor's decision, Kerr allowed it to stand, much, he said later, to his enduring regret. But in Kerr's mind, he, as the architect of decentralization within UC, did not want the first time something went awry to be seen as the first to recentralize; and, in this instance, the Berkeley chancellor had no intention of changing his own mind. Also, if Kerr were to have reversed the chancellor, Kerr would have owned the problem. As it turned out, he owned it anyway.

The history of what then followed, as noted above, has been well documented. The following months, in summary, were a nightmare for everyone, including the governor, Legislature, the Regents, the president, the chancellor, the faculty, the staff, most students and, of course, law enforcement. The public was not happy, and neither were most alumni. Neither was the governor nor the Legislature. Neither was Kerr.

Fall Term 1964 was defined by daily protests, marches, sit-ins, building occupations, police actions, trespasses, confrontations and civil disobedience of all kinds, which of all institutions in our society, the university is the least able to deal with.

The meaning accorded the key words in this event such as free speech, freedom to speak, political advocacy, direct political action, and so forth, both changed and confused the campus. Most of the ambiguities, semantical and otherwise, as one might expect, were used as weapons among and between contending parties. Kerr's views on these matters were not in the least ambiguous:

> In any event, the Free Speech Movement was not about freedom of speech …..Freedom of speech in our sense existed in full within the University of California, as events in the fall of 1964 demonstrated….If there ever was full freedom of speech in our sense of it actively exercised anywhere at any time in U.S. history, one such place and one such time was that fall at Berkeley (Kerr 2003, p. 143).

Kerr was walking across campus one day on the 30th anniversary of the Free Speech movement. He was approached by an alumnae who had been active in support of the Free Speech Movement and said to Kerr, "I had hoped to run into you to tell you that if you had not brought free speech to Berkeley and kept the campus open for free speech in the fall of 1964, we could never have had our free speech movement" (Kerr 2003, pp. 143–144).

In Kerr's view, the Free Speech Movement had entirely to do with UC permitting "direct political action" or "free advocacy," or whatever term accorded with the activist students' desire to use the University's facilities to advocate for on-and-off campus political action, to sign up members for the same, to raise money for the cause and to organize for the purpose, for both on- and off-campus political action. This is what the Free Speech Movement was all about and, with the help of the courts who were then broadening the definition of free expression and free speech to include most of the Free Speech Movement advocacy agenda, along with changes in the pertinent University regulations in the use of University facilities, most of the real objectives of the Free Speech Movement had been realized.

Kerr was to pay a dear price for this controversy. His memoirs call out his self-admitted mistakes, too hard on himself in my view; he also criticizes others, too gently in my view; but his account of the Free Speech Movement in his memoirs, in every other respect, was vintage Kerr: thoroughly analyzed within a conceptual framework more universal than merely domestic or local; attention to detail and its place in the broader course of events and explained with remarkable insight and clarity; reflective but not morose; forward-looking but with an eye to the events and variables that determined the course of events; too modest as to his own accomplishments and too condemnatory of his perceived failings, as the following quote suggests:

> I had no understanding of romantic radicals or sympathy for them, of experience of how to work with them. I had experience with the ideologies of the Old Left who were more rational, more disciplined, more oriented toward achieving results and less to enjoying expressive experiences. The world of the romantic radical – no cost-benefit analysis, and immediate passion instead of long-term analysis – was unknown to me.
>
> The key to understanding my actions is an appreciation of how opposed I was to authoritarian outcomes like the September 14 edict and how devoted I was to persuasion and to consensus, or failing that, consent; and how concerned I was with means as well as with ends; and how protective I was of the reputation of the University.
>
> To those observers among the regents, the alumni, the politicians, and the campus administrators who most criticized my conduct in fall of 1964, I offer a quotation from President John F. Kennedy, 'There will always be dissident voices heard in the land… that vituperation is as good as victory, and that peace is a sign of weakness" (Kerr 2003, p. 244).

And, I would add one of my own from Eric Fromm: "There is perhaps no phenomenon which contains so much destructive feeling as 'moral indignation,' which permits envy and hate to be acted out under the guise of virtue."

Kerr also paid a heavy personal price, as well as the professional ones already noted, as his own words make clear, with special attention to the last sentence that so starkly confirms why so few persons of influence rallied to his side when times were hard and even when facing his own ouster as president. The incidents below occurred within days of his being dismissed as UC's president:

> That weekend I had a phone call from Walter Haas, Sr. of the Levi Strauss family, asking me to have lunch with him and his friend and colleague, Dan Koshland. Walter had taken a central table in the dining room as a way of declaring his support for me – a warmhearted and courageous thing to do. When I arrived, I glanced around and knew almost everyone there. But except for Walter and Dan, no one said hello or smiled – I got a frozen response. This was a signal to me that the Establishment was following Governor Reagan.
>
> Shortly thereafter, I was considering attending an affair at another San Francisco Club. So I asked my good friend former Regent Dan McLaughlin what to do. He said that I should not go, that my presence "would anger" my enemies and embarrass my friends. I have followed this advice ever after, even to this day, and have found it good advice….I was being shunned by the Establishment. Their leader [Reagan] and hero had spoken. I accepted that, and the Establishment did not mean that much to me in any event (Kerr 2003, p. 314).

Kerr survived the Free Speech Movement (but it was much in evidence when he was dismissed some 2 years hence), others did not, such as Ed Strong, Berkeley's chancellor, and several members of his staff. Public attitudes towards the University were mixed but mostly negative and spreading, especially among the alumni. Some donors withdrew.

Governor "Pat" Brown remained very supportive even though not always sympathetic to Kerr's decisions on handling the protests. The attitudes in the Legislature varied, as one might expect, as with the media. As to Kerr's last 2-plus years in office, besides contending with the short-lived but widely noticed "filthy speech" incident, his fortunes tended to wane. In 1966, Governor Brown was running for another term but this time against Ronald Reagan, vowing to clean up "the mess at Berkeley" and to rid UC of its sitting president.

The tide was turning in California. Governor Brown's record was the focus of his campaign: building much of the state's infrastructure, the school system, the state's colleges and universities, along with other accomplishments tied to the state's prosperity and economic well-being. The focus in 1966, however, was on social more than on economic issues, and when personalizing the sense of frustration felt by the public on issues mostly social and political, Kerr was the convenient bulls eye for what was ailing California. Kerr, in 1964, had been exploited from within and in 1966 scapegoated from without, as noted earlier in this chapter.

The long trail of the loyalty oath controversy still led to Kerr's coattails, as well, quite unfairly it should be said, for he performed admirably during that dispute as far as most members of the faculty were concerned as well as most Regents, but what does fair have to do with it under the circumstances Kerr faced in 1966? A coupling of the legacy of the loyalty oath controversy and the turmoil of the Free Speech Movement utterly overwhelmed people's then fleeting recollections of Kerr's earlier triumphs. Real accomplishment, as with fame, is yesterday's news!

With the election of Ronald Reagan as governor in 1966, having run on a campaign in significant part criticizing UC and its leadership, the dye was cast. Kerr's memoirs provide a remarkably honest and accurate account of the events that led up to his being dismissed as the University's president in 1967, which I will not cover here, except to say that he comported himself with dignity and grace throughout, twice refusing to resign the day he was to be fired, believing, and rightly so, that he had done nothing to warrant such a resignation.

Consequently, in spite of offers of implied benefits were he to resign, which he spurned, he was dismissed by a split vote of the Board of Regents on January 19, 1967, with immediate effect, leaving the position as he had come into it 8 1/2 years earlier, "Fired with enthusiasm," as he wryly commented on his way out the door (Kerr 2003, pp. 303–330).

Here was a President who had performed a miracle for the University and for the people of California, opening wide the doors to educational opportunity in ways unprecedented, and positioning the University for a doubling of enrollment in the 1960s.

Here was an educational leader, tested, accomplished, valued and recognized worldwide, carrying UC's banner and message to an admiring world.

Here was an educator with the highest of standards, forging one University with several campuses whose ratings and rankings today, as one university and as to its several parts, is without peer or precedent.

Here was a decent, honest person, devoted to his work, committed to his University, serving it without stint or other ambition (he refused President Kennedy's

offer to serve as Secretary of Labor in his administration and President Johnson's offer to serve as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in his administration). His dismissal was a great blunder in my view, depriving UC of his leadership at such a critical time and losing for California a voice of calm, good will and patience coupled with a rare combination of practical competence all encompassed by an intellect informing his decisions and, thus, enabling him to explain them to persons from all walks of life.

In other ways, however, he was spared the trauma of the anti-Vietnam War protests of the late 1960s and early 1970s that so shook the University of California as they also did the leading American universities. If he were troubled by the behavior of students in the 1964 Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, which lasted only one quarter, he would have been appalled by what happened during the later protests that persisted for nearly 4 years.

The dismissal of Kerr by the Board of Regents and the tasteless way it was done, wounded him deeply and, I believe, stayed with him for the rest of his life. Whenever he raised this matter, or when raised by others, I would say to him that he had no choice under the circumstances other than to have done what he did. "No," he would say, "I should have anticipated this action and taken steps to deal with it before the only remaining possibilities were to resign or be fired."

In preparing an article about Kerr for the *California Monthly* (Berkeley's Alumni magazine), following his death at age 92 on December 1, 2003, I closed by saying, as I do this chapter, as follows:

> When I was serving as President of the University of Utah and then of UC, Clark Kerr was my most valued counselor. No person could have had a better mentor, a closer colleague, a steadier friend, or a more honest critic. And I am sure I am not alone; many others have also benefitted from Kerr's friendship, generosity of spirit and intelligent, candid, honest advice. It is very unlikely that we will see his kind again. How fortunate we were that Clark Kerr devoted to the University of California so much of his talent, energy, and remarkable life (Gardner 2004, p. 27).

Post Script

Kerr's dismissal as president of the University of California spared him having to confront and deal with the anti-Vietnam War protests that engulfed the nation's colleges and universities, 1968–1971, and UC as well. He would have been appalled, irrespective of the issues, by the behavior of many of the protesting students, their abusive uses of the University and its grounds and buildings, and their arrogance. Reason was the last thing the protestors had in mind, but for Kerr, it would have been the first.

I was in the middle of this maelstrom as a young (mid-30s) vice-chancellor at the University's Santa Barbara campus shortly after having completed my PhD at Berkeley, much younger, that is, than my administrative colleagues, and thus able to translate the language of one contending party into the language of the other.

In a way, the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in 1964 was a "dry run" for the larger protests that shortly followed. The Free Speech Movement leadership at Berkeley, as with the Vietnam War protestors, was composed mostly of a student generation impatient for change and lacking sympathy for the norms, customs and educational underpinnings of American academic life. The Movement at Berkeley targeted University regulations intended to limit political advocacy on campus. It was a limited-purpose protest, even though it had wider repercussions than even the activists may have supposed; and students, faculty, staff and administrators were walking on unplowed ground as each sought to cope with the tactics and demands of the others.

Not so with the Vietnam War protestors: seemingly targeted, but with numerous sub-agendas; more violence against the University itself and the surrounding communities, and less respect for those in disagreement; personalized, as the draft was on and the students were deferred so long as they were enrolled in good standing; financially secure, as the economy was strong and jobs plentiful; indifferent as to the effect of their disruptions on non-protesting students who were far and away in the majority; contemptuous of authority and less restrained in their own behavior than they expected of the administrators with whom they dealt; and using the protections of the University's policies and regulations and use of facilities and grounds on campus to shield them from civil sanctions that would otherwise have befallen them if the direct political action had been off campus.

In this matter, however, and mostly in contrast to the Free Speech Movement, the anti-Vietnam War protests were not perceived by the state and local governments as a matter for the University to deal with alone. Government's involvement was prompted by protests that were unlawful as often as they were permitted and as much off-campus as on. The government's role, therefore, escalated using law enforcement more aggressively and politicizing the entire matter given the higher level of public interest and anger towards the University that was daily becoming more evident. Besides, the Free Speech Movement was really only at Berkeley and lasted for only 4 months; whereas the anti-Vietnam War protests were nationwide and university-wide and went on for nearly 4 years.

Although not entirely parallel, the University administration soon found itself, as did Kerr in the Free Speech Movement, sandwiched in the middle, between protesting students on the one side and the government on the other. As with Kerr, and under similar circumstances, the situation was ripe for exploitation from within and scapegoating from without. Not good, but as with Kerr, that is what happened.

My thoughts on all of this were summed up after the worst of the Vietnam War protests at the University of California had ended:

> In a strange way, the coercive character of the new student activism and the familiar coercive nature of government are much alike: each relies on direct political action to achieve its respective objectives; each is as ready as the other to distort truth and misrepresent facts to secure its purposes; each finds it convenient to make simplistic assertions about highly complex, nuanced, and subtle events and ideas; each is by and large uncaring about the effects its actions have on the university; and each in approach, behavior, means, and tactics is at fundamental odds with the norms, customs, beliefs, and principles of free universities everywhere, relying as the latter do on evidence, reason, reflection, respectful tolerance, civility, and the commonly accepted ways of knowing (Gardner 2005, p. 42).

I also commented on the overlooked consequence of these protests on the lives of others, and not just on those of the protestors, the former usually ignored by the public and the latter highlighted if not glorified by the press.

> During the protests the lives of thousands of students were stimulated and invigorated. But the lives of thousands more were bruised, battered, harmed and bewildered and often enduringly. The professional careers of capable, long-serving, and often distinguished academic administrators and some senior faculty members were also prematurely concluded, often under sad and unforgiving circumstances. Because of these protests, the politics of the state changed, the attitudes of the California public hardened against the University, and the norms of academic life were fundamentally and permanently altered. Whatever the gains, the costs were dreadful and yet rarely mentioned, it should be added, as the recollections of these times have come to be memorialized in mostly self-congratulatory assertions as unbalanced as they are unaccountable (Gardner 2005, p. 64).

These protests, and the others that followed, such as the "divestment" controversy throughout the University of California in the mid-1980s (demands that the University divest its holdings in companies doing business in apartheid South Africa), also employed political advocacy and direct political action, on and off campus to advance their agenda: marches, sit-ins, demonstrations and so forth.

Advocacy of this kind has clearly brought the University more into the larger political arena, and the larger political arena into the University, precisely what UC's constitutional autonomy was intended to prevent. There is nothing immutable in this world, including constitutional provisions, in force today, but changeable tomorrow.

Whatever successes various advocacy groups or direct political action organizations may have enjoyed in recent decades, working from their base in the universities, it is the university that has paid the price: political advocacy subsuming freedom to speak by those who think otherwise; prospective speakers not invited for fear of disruptions; speakers invited who are safe or otherwise insulated against disruptions because their views accord with those who would otherwise disrupt; political considerations in the appointment and promotion of faculty, however subtle or vigorously denied; political correctness subordinating the freedom to speak without subtle but potentially hurtful consequences, by way of example.

During the controversy over divestment at the University of California (1985–1986), I confronted as president many of the same issues and tactics that Kerr did when dealing with student-driven, direct political action, although it did not generally but only occasionally rise to the level of violence and ill-will characteristic of the anti-Vietnam War protests, nor were the University's internal policies in dealing with such political action as ambiguous or fluid as they were during the Free Speech Movement. Moreover, the respective roles of the chancellors and the president were understood by both parties; and most of us were already quite seasoned in dealing with such protests, whereas Kerr and his colleagues were not.

As with the protests of earlier years, the students were not of one mind on the merits of divestment, the faculty was divided, the staff held mixed views as did the Regents and the public was confused. The Legislative leaders favored divestment and, at least during the first year of protests, the governor was opposed. I was opposed throughout. In short, the Regents opposed divestment the first year and voted for it the second, divided votes both years.

My remarks to the Board of Regents in opposing divestment made just prior to the Board's vote against divestment in 1985 are as applicable to the issues of political advocacy that drove the Free Speech Movement as they are to the direct political action that characterized the anti-Vietnam War protests:

> The issues before the Board this morning encompass more than the injustices of apartheid, divestment of the University's interest in companies doing business in South Africa, fiduciary duty, investment options, and legalisms; they also reflect a dispute about the nature of the university itself and how it is to respond to injustices in the larger society.
>
> The University of California, like all universities in America, is committed to the established values of academic life: patient inquiry; the sequential development of ideas; the emphasis on reasoned discussion and criticism; and the continual reference to evidence. These values affirm the University's faith in intelligence and knowledge and its obligation to ensure the conditions for their free exercise. Ideas are to be welcomed, exchanged, critically examined, freely debated, and respected.
>
> These values are the means by which the cause of truth is carried forward. They are the values that distinguish the university from governments, churches, businesses and other institutions, parties, groups, and associations in our society. They form the core of the enterprise and the basis for whatever respect and freedom the university can hope to command from the larger society. They should be nurtured and protected, not contravened; and these values stand in contrast to economic sanctions, boycotts, institutional pressuring and similar means of effecting change, which are more coercive than they are reasoned expressions of the human will (Gardner 2005, p. 287).

On this occasion, The Regents voted not to divest, to mixed reactions within the University. The action was reported across the country, and internationally as well. The action encouraged some universities and complicated the lives of others. And, it should be mentioned, it was an action taken in the midst of major protests occurring outside, barely contained by the San Francisco police, typical of the direct political action we had been dealing with for nearly a year on this issue and precisely to the point made in my remarks.

The next year, The Regents voted to divest, but by then the issue was of less consequence.

I had attempted throughout the divestment controversy, as I did in my remarks to the Regents, to remember the purposes of the University and the means by which truth is sought, and the academic freedoms essential to these purposes on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the antithesis of using the University for predetermined political ends and not employing just the means of persuasion and discussion just noted, but the means of coercion, threats, boycotts, sit-ins, disruption of classes, and other forms of pressure not to persuade but to force others into conformance. In this effort, I failed as The Regents eventually acquiesced to political pressure and voted to divest.

Kerr quotes from Alexander Meikeljohn, one of the nations foremost civil libertarians, and this puts the matter squarely:

> The primary purpose for the University is that all the individuals who carry on the active life of the community shall be both encouraged and unhindered to pursue the truth wherever, to each of them severally, it shall seem, at the moment to lead. And the danger which must, therefore, be avoided is that the university, by committing itself officially to any political or sectarian belief will consciously or unconsciously, abridge the freedom of its individual members….[S]o far as student organizations are regarded as representative of the university,

> it has full authority to apply to them the same ban upon partisanship and sectarianism which it applies to all its other like organizations. And the censorship and control thus imposed are not violations of the First Amendment (Kerr 2003, p. 150).

Kerr was president during the Free Speech Movement of 1964; Charles Hitch, Kerr's successor, was president during the Vietnam War protests of 1968–1971(and I served under him as a vice-president of the University from 1971 to 1973); and I was president during the Divestment Movement of 1985–1986. We were driven by a common commitment to the fundamental values and norms of American academic life referred to in my 1985 remarks to the Regents, as noted above. All three of us were willing to speak out in defense of these values and at no little risk to our position, and even occasionally to our personal safety. Each of us was subjected to the most vicious of attacks by both ends of the political spectrum as we were seeking to hold the center while also protecting the basic values held dear by free universities everywhere.

My work as an academic administrator spanned 20 years with the University of California and 10 years with the University of Utah, while also holding a professorship and even having time periodically to teach a course and occasionally serve as an invited lecturer.

The challenges of academic administration are not those that warrant complaining about; they are instead opportunities to serve a noble cause, one's tenure in the position tied in part to the times and in part to one's understanding of how it all works, especially in the most distinguished and observable ones. The University of California surely qualified.

Here is what I learned both at UC Santa Barbara as a vice chancellor during the anti-Vietnam War protests, and at UC as its president during the divestment controversy:

> I learned how very much alone the person is who carries decision-making authority under conditions such as those we confronted; how confident and unforgiving the views and judgments of noncombatants and 'Monday morning quarterbacks' can be when they know nothing of the facts and the real world with which we were dealing; how reluctant most faculty members are to get mixed up in matters of this kind; how readily students believe the worst of authority and the best of those challenging it; how easily misled the public and how willingly misled the media. I came to recognize how important it was to have advisors who would speak their minds; how crucial it was to explain decisions to all interested parties in a timely and open manner; and how an administrator working under these circumstances and looking for any acknowledgement of a job well done would be well advised "to go buy a dog" or so my friend Derek Bok, President of Harvard, later told me at the time I was retiring from the University of California in 1992.
>
> [I learned] that the political center of gravity fit between the opposite ends of the political spectrum and how crucial it was, therefore, that the center hold during times of stress. Otherwise, the pressures from the opposite extremes will weaken the center and thus destabilize the consensus of views and opinions upon which rest the means of settling disputes and managing or resolving conflict; that most student, faculty, staff, alumni and the public were well-intentioned even when misled and that you simply had to work harder to gain their confidence; that persons of good will could be very much as odds, one with another; that to reconcile differences without compromising either of the contending parties or those whose counsel and advice you had sought and whose judgment you respected was crucial; that there is a difference between finding an answer that satisfied and discovering a solution

> that worked; that after most controversies had ended, there is a rush to penalize the innocent and reward the guilty; and that the world at large is not nearly as rational as those within the academy prefer to believe and, of course, neither are they (Gardner 2005, pp. 64–65).

Thus, the academic imperatives that drove Kerr, Hitch and myself are by definition in conflict with the more narrowly construed and targeted purposes of those using political advocacy and direct political action to accomplish their goals, the tactics and strategies of which clash fundamentally with the values and norms of university life as earlier described.

The faculty of the University of California was very much divided during the loyalty oath controversy of 1949–1952, divided during the Free Speech Movement of 1964, divided during the Vietnam War protests of 1968–1971, and divided by the Divestment protest of 1985–1986. While it is very understandable that they should have been divided on the issues, they should not be divided but united when it comes to defending the historic purposes of the university and the accompanying norms, values and customs of academic life honored by free universities everywhere and upon which their own work depends, as does the university's authority in the broadest sense of the term. The next great protest will bring this conflict over the uses of the university into stark relief. This time, however, it will not be enough for academic administrators to bear the burden mostly alone. The Academic Senate must be a timely and confident partner in defending the University's academic freedom and the freedom to teach and the freedom to learn, fundamental values of the academy, but routinely ignored by political advocates whose objectives are to advance their cause whatever the means. On the issues of the university itself and the cause it represents, and the freedom both the institutions and its faculty enjoy, the need to be of one mind on these issues is not just critical, it is indispensable. And if we are not willing to fight for our freedoms, we will surely forfeit them, irretrievably.

Kerr's life was a testament to his belief in reason, persuasion, consensus-building and the respectful interplay of ideas and evidence – the embodiment of the academic freedoms to which he was so personally and professionally committed. These were the "uses of the university" to which he was devoted, and, therefore, just as opposed to its misuses which rely on the more authoritarian and coercive means of "persuasion" than on the reasoned expressions of the human will for which Clark Kerr will be so long remembered. Fiat Lux.

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Index

S. Rothblatt (ed.), *Clark Kerr's World of Higher Education Reaches the 21st Century: Chapters in a Special History*, Higher Education Dynamics 38,
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