

International Political Economy Series

The BRICS in International Development

Edited by Jing Gu, Alex Shankland
and Anuradha Chenoy



International Political Economy Series

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Jing Gu • Alex Shankland • Anuradha Chenoy
Editors

The BRICS in International Development

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Editors

Jing Gu
Institute of Development Studies
University of Sussex
United Kingdom

Anuradha Chenoy
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
India

Alex Shankland
Institute of Development Studies
University of Sussex
United Kingdom

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PRAISE FOR THIS BOOK

‘As the global discourse on development will increasingly be dominated in the years to come by Agenda 2030, this volume makes a significant contribution to a more nuanced understanding of the role that the BRICS are playing in the field of international development. With many of the contributions written by experts from those countries, the volume provide unique insights into a theme that is not only relevant but also often not sufficiently appreciated.’ —Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa.

‘This comprehensive publication by the IDS Centre for Rising Powers and Global Development comes exactly at the right moment. At a time when Western awe about the phenomenal rise of Southern heavy-weights is waning, the in-depth studies of individual BRICS members and their collective intent allow for a more nuanced perspective. Despite significant differences in domestic conditions and national interests, the consolidation of the BRICS alliance will continue and irreversibly upend the global system constructed by the West after the second World War.’ —Thomas Fues, German Development Institute, Germany.

‘The landscape of international development cooperation is changing rapidly and BRICS countries are a major driving force. This book presents a timely review of the rich evidences, the diverse experiences, and the emerging patterns of this new trend. The critical analysis by leading experts on the complex geopolitical shift and economic engagements offers rare insights on the underlying causes of this major shift. It is a must read for not only scholars and practitioners in development studies, but also people with general interest in international relations and global governance.’ —Xue Lan, Tsinghua University, China.

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay is the Director of PRIA, a global participatory research and training centre in New Delhi. He is a leading international practitioner of civil society, citizen participation and democratic governance, and has more than 20 years of professional experience with universities, government research institutions and Indian CSOs.

Marc P. Berenson is a senior lecturer at the Russia Institute at King's College, London. Just prior to this, he served, from 2007 to 2013, as a research fellow on the Governance Team at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. Previously, he worked as a research analyst for the American Bar Association, the EastWest Institute, The Carter Center and the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He has also undertaken several consultancies, for, among others, the World Bank in Russia and the OECD's Tax and Development Programme. After receiving his BA from Harvard University, Marc founded, and directed from 1996 to 1998, the Law in Action programme for Freedom House in Kyiv, Ukraine, before receiving his PhD in Political Science from Princeton University in 2006.

Richard Carey joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1980 as Deputy Director for Development Cooperation, serving as Director from 2007–10. He covered a wide range of north-south economic issues, assisted the inclusion of advanced developing countries in OECD activities from the early 1990s and then worked on aid effectiveness issues and helped conceive and launch the Millennium Development Goals. He holds an advanced economics degree (BA Hons) (1966) from Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand and an MSc Econ from the London School of Economics and Political Science (1969). He has been a Trustee of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at Sussex University. He currently chairs the International Advisory Committee of the China International Development Research Network (CIDRN), is a member of the

IDS Rising Powers in Development Advisory Council and is a Senior Advisor to the African Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET). He was awarded an Honorary Doctorate in Commerce degree from the Victoria University of Wellington in 2009.

Yunnan Chen is a PhD student at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC. She is a researcher with the SAIS China–Africa Research Initiative and has worked in the Rising Powers in International Development programme at the Institute of Development Studies. She gained her MA in Political Science from the University of British Columbia and received her BA in Politics, Philosophy and Economics from the University of Oxford.

Anuradha Chenoy is a Professor and former dean of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. She has written many articles, research papers and books, including *Maoists and Other Armed Conflicts* (co-authored, 2010) and *Human Security: Concept and Implications* (co-authored, 2003).

Jennifer Constantine is a researcher affiliated to the Institute of Development Studies (Sussex, UK). In the context of the rapid rise of countries such as BRICS in the changing politics of global development architectures and practices, her research focuses on the implications and opportunities for multidirectional policy learning. Linked to this, her other research interests include policy transfer/diffusion in the social sectors, South–South cooperation and triangular development cooperation.

Neuma Grobbelaar is the Director of Research of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), a South African-based independent foreign policy think tank. A former South African diplomat, her areas of research expertise include South Africa’s foreign policy, Africa’s business environment and the engagement of South African corporates in the rest of Africa.

Jing Gu is the Director of the Centre for Rising Powers and Global Development and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. She has an interdisciplinary background in law, economics and international development and has extensive experience in the field of governance, business and development. She has led many interdisciplinary research projects involving multi-country teams, including the groundbreaking pioneering research on China’s outward investment in Africa, which involved extensive field research in 12 African countries and 9 Chinese provinces. She has published widely on China and emerging powers, China’s international development role and South–South cooperation.

Wang Haibin is a professor at the College of Humanities and Development Studies (COHD) at China Agricultural University and the Director of the International MSc and PhD Programs on Development Studies with COHD. She obtained her Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in Agricultural Economics from China Agricultural University, and PhD in Human Resource Education from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in the USA. Her research focus is on impact assessment on development interventions and international agricultural cooperation. She is the social and economic expert for the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UNDP and UNICEF programmes in China.

Anuradha Joshi is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, at the University of Sussex, UK. The focus of her work is on state–society relations—through examination of accountability and service delivery, taxation of the informal economy and development policy processes. She has experience of consulting for bilateral and multilateral agencies, managing large multi-country research projects, and has conducted research in Ghana, India, Indonesia, Nepal and Vietnam.

Marina Larionova holds a doctorate in Political Science and a doctorate in Philology. She is author, co-author and editor of several books on global governance, the G8/G20 system, BRICS and other international institutions. Marina Larionova is Head of the International Organizations Research Institute at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in Moscow and Vice President for International Relations of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP).

Iara Costa Leite is a full-time professor at the Department of Economics and International Relations of the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC). She holds an MA in International Relations and a PhD in Political Science. Iara has been involved in teaching and research in several Brazilian institutions (including Universidade de Brasília, Observatório Político Sul-Americano, Rede de Humanização do Desenvolvimento, Fiocruz and Articulação SUL), with a focus on international development cooperation, South–South cooperation and Brazilian foreign policy. Previous international research experience includes collaboration with the Task Team on South–South Cooperation (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), with gathered evidence on South–South cooperation and aid effectiveness, and the Municipia Project, coordinated by the Observatório de la Coooperación Descentralizada Europa-América Latina and aimed at systematizing and diffusing the best practices of Latin American local governments in decentralized cooperation and aid effectiveness.

Richard Manning is a senior research fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University and Chair of the Board of the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation. He is a former UK civil servant, who worked in the Department for International Development and its predecessors from 1965 to 2003 (and as a Director-General from 1996 to 2003). He was Chair of the OECD DAC from 2003 to 2008.

Melissa Pomeroy is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. In 2011, she was one of the founder members of Articulação SUL, a research centre focused on South–South cooperation, based in Brazil, where she is the Programme Coordinator. She has over ten years of experience in research and institutional development with local and national government, civil society, international institutions and universities.

Adele Poskitt is Head of the Smaller Parties Office at the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. Previously she has managed programmes and published research on governance and human rights whilst working for CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation and Christian Aid. Adele has worked extensively as an indepen-

dent researcher on civil society issues, and some of her assignments have included working on the South Africa element of the ‘Civil Society from the BRICS: The State of the Debate’ project by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and for the Oxfam/IDS ‘Where is the real power within the BRICS and G20?’ mapping study.

Mark Rakhmangulov is Deputy Director of the Global Governance Research Centre in the International Organisations Research Institute of the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in Moscow, Russia. He focuses his research on global governance and international development cooperation, particularly on the role and contribution of G8, G20, BRICS and other multilateral institutions. He is also Director of the Center for Multilateral Cooperation of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP).

Alex Shankland is a research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. He was the founding convenor of the IDS Rising Powers in International Development research programme from 2012 to 2014 and is engaged in ongoing research on the role of Brazil and other rising powers in reshaping international development, and on civil society, representation, accountability, indigenous and minority groups and health system reform in Brazil and Mozambique. Before joining IDS, he worked extensively as a journalist, NGO project and programme manager, independent researcher and social development consultant, mainly in South America and Southern Africa.

Bianca Suyama is Executive Coordinator at the South–South Cooperation Research and Policy Centre (Articulação SUL). Before co-founding Articulação SUL, she worked as Governance Advisor at CARE International UK, first for Latin America and later for Africa; she also led CARE’s advocacy efforts on development effectiveness. Prior to that, she worked for São Paulo’s city hall in the Participatory Budget Secretariat and as a popular educator in grassroots organizations. Bianca holds an MSc in Development Management from the London School of Economics and Political Science. She has worked and published on democratic governance, poverty reduction policy processes and South–South cooperation.

Rajesh Tandon is an internationally acclaimed leader and practitioner of participatory research and development. He is the Founder President of PRIA, a global participatory research and training centre in New Delhi. He is the co-holder of the prestigious UNESCO Chair on Community Based Research and Social Responsibility in Higher Education. Dr Tandon has authored more than 100 articles and a dozen books and conducted numerous training activities.

Laura Trajber Waisbich is a researcher at the Brazilian Centre of Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP), and Foreign Policy Officer for the Brazilian rights group Conectas Human Rights. She holds a degree in International Relations from the Catholic University of São Paulo and a Master’s in Political Science from the Paris Institute of Political Science.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABONG	Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Bank
ANC	African National Congress
APEC	Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ARICF	African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (also known as ARF)
AU	African Union
BIPA	Bilateral Promotion and Protection of Investments
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party (India)
BNDES	Brazilian National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social) (Brazil)
BRICS	Brazil Russia India China and South Africa
CIA	US Central Intelligence Agency
CII	Confederation of Indian Industries (India)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CNPq	National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico) (Brazil)
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Russia)
CPLP	Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries
CRA	Contingent Reserve Arrangement
CSO	Civil society organisation
CSR	Corporate social responsibility
DA	Development assistance
DAFC	Department of Aid to Foreign Countries (China)
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa

DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)
DPA	Development Partnership Administration (India)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EBIEC	Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation (China)
EJN	Economic Justice Network
Embrapa	Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FICCI	Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (India)
FIDC	Forum for Indian Development Cooperation
Fiocruz	Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Brazil)
FOCEM	Structural Convergence Fund (Fundo para a Convergência Estrutural do MERCOSUL) (Brazil)
FSKN	Russian Federal Drug Control Service
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
G8	Group of 8
G20	Group of 20
GNI	Gross National Income
HIPC	Highly indebted poor country
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council (South Africa)
IBSA	India, Brazil and South Africa
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITEC	Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
LOC	Lines of credit
MCTI	Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (Brazil)
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEA	Ministry for External Affairs (India)
MERCOSUL	Common Market of the South
MOF	Ministry of Finance (China)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China)
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce (China)
MRE	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministério das Relações Exteriores) (Brazil)
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NDB	New Development Bank

NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NEST	Network of Southern Think Tanks
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NMMCR	New Model Major Country Relationship (USA)
NPC	National Planning Commission (China)
NPCA	NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency
OBOR	One Road One Belt initiative (China)
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONGC	Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (India)
<i>PALAMA</i>	<i>Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (South Africa)</i>
PALOP	African Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa)
PPA Africa	Food Purchase Programme for Africa (Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos) (Brazil)
PRIA	Participatory Research in Asia
READ	Russia Education Aid for Development
REBRIP	Brazilian Network for Peoples' Integration
RIS	Research and Information System for Developing Countries (India)
SAARC	South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
SABTT	South African BRICS Think Tank
SADC	South African Development Community
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Agency
SAFIS	South Africa Forum for International Solidarity
SAFPI	Open Society Foundation's South African Foreign Policy Initiative
SAFTA	South Asia Free Trade Agreement
SCAP	Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme
Senai	National Service for Industrial Training (Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial) (Brazil)
SEZ	Special economic zone
SOE	State-owned enterprise
SSDC	South-South development cooperation
TC	Technical cooperation
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFP	World Food Programme
WTO	World Trade Organization
IDS	Institute of Development Studies

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Introduction: International Development, South-South Cooperation and the Rising Powers

*Jing Gu, Richard Carey, Alex Shankland,
and Anuradha Chenoy*

INTRODUCTION

This book brings together a body of research conducted under the Rising Powers in International Development Programme led by the Centre for Rising Powers and Global Development at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) in the UK with partners across the five BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—that have come together to form the grouping since the first BRIC Summit was held at Yekaterinburg,

J. Gu (✉) • A. Shankland

Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, University of Sussex, Brighton
BN1 9RE, UK

R. Carey

4 Avenue de la Guillemotte, 78112 Fourqueux, France

A. Chenoy

Jawaharlal Nehru University, 65 Dakshinapuram, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Campus, New Delhi 110067, India

Russia, in 2009. It combines primary and secondary research from scholars and experts from the BRICS and from OECD countries. The book's aim is to contribute to the growing field of study of emerging powers, recognising the need to understand the rising powers, and particularly the BRICS, in their evolving engagement with developing countries. The volume seeks to offer a comprehensive set of insights and a comparative perspective on the growing development cooperation activities occurring across the BRICS, and the national-level drivers for engagement within each country.

We also examine current institutional developments in BRICS development cooperation, paying attention to key actors from across the BRICS—the state, business sector and civil society—and their degrees of participation in development cooperation overseas. Finally, we examine the growing mobilisation of the BRICS as a collective body in multilateral forums, the significance of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) and BRICS development finance more broadly. Although the focus of this volume is not on the impact of the BRICS on the development trajectories of other countries, we believe that this analysis provides essential insights into their likely future impacts, given their significant potential for engendering poverty reduction and growth in low-income countries (LICs).

In this opening chapter we examine the emergence of the BRICS as a geopolitical association with systems for intellectual, policy and financial interaction and cooperation, and their growing impact on international development and global governance arrangements. The chapter also discusses the historical patterns of development cooperation across the BRICS. We trace the history and rhetoric of South-South cooperation (SSC), exploring whether it presents an alternative to the OECD-DAC model of development aid and the future evolution of this SSC model as the BRICS themselves develop. We then give a breakdown of the book's structure, briefly summarising the chapters that present successively the case studies of each BRICS country, civil society and the development of collective discourse and institutions in the light of the contrasts (as well as the commonalities) that mark this heterogeneous grouping.

As 'rising powers', albeit at different points of transition from being recipients of foreign aid to becoming net donors, the BRICS have huge significance in the global development landscape and a growing role to play in generating economic development and poverty reduction in LICs and the developing world, particularly as they move towards growing collective ventures such as the NDB, established in July 2014. However,

analysis of these countries' role in development has tended either to be restricted to a single country or to generalise about what they represent as 'the BRICS'; there is little systematic understanding of how each country's individual activities and their distinct development discourses and agendas relate to those of other members of the grouping, as there has been little comparative study into what each of the BRICS has been doing in their development practices, hence little international understanding of their domestic discourses and attitudes towards development cooperation.

The studies presented in this book seek to address this information gap. The volume offers a comparative lens on the BRICS' activities in development, with a systematic framework of analysis of the political economy drivers and normative discourse for each of the five countries. Notably, the book brings together a set of perspectives from each of the BRICS through a network of authors based both in BRICS and OECD countries, who combine comparative and international perspectives with distinct insights into the internal narratives within each BRICS country. This volume therefore forms part of an emerging tradition of joint analysis by scholars from the BRICS and OECD countries (e.g. Chaturvedi et al. 2012; Li and Carey 2014; Sidiropoulos et al. 2015, Gu et al. 2016), which complements analysis carried out by experts based in the Global North or the BRICS countries themselves (e.g. Esteves et al. 2011; Mawdsley 2012; Abdenur and da Fonseca 2013; Carmody 2013; FuDan 2013; Nadkarni and Noonan 2013; Gu et al. 2014; Kragelund 2015; Larionova and Shelepov 2015; Stuenkel 2015).

Since we began the research for this volume in 2012, the topic of the BRICS has attracted even more significant interest both in and beyond Western states, particularly following the establishment of the BRICS Development Bank, with the growing visibility of collective actions from the BRICS as a bloc. There has also been a substantial growth in interest in the BRICS states themselves, as they increasingly engage in mutual learning from each other's development cooperation experiences and seek to observe and understand how each country is doing with regard to engagement in development cooperation practices. Meanwhile, audiences based in LICs, particularly in the African region, have begun to search more actively for information regarding the activities and motivations behind growing BRICS engagement in their countries, the implications of this for their domestic development, and the domestic and international political economy drivers behind this development cooperation. As we argue in this volume, understanding these drivers requires careful attention to history, both for each individual country and for the BRICS grouping as a whole.

THE BEGINNING: WHAT'S IN AN ACRONYM?

It is commonly understood that the political association now functioning under the acronym BRICS was inspired by the acronym BRICs, created in a paper written in 2001 by Jim O'Neill (now Lord O'Neill), then chief economist of Goldman Sachs. The Goldman Sachs article proposed that on the basis of their dynamic economic performance in the 1990s, Brazil, Russia, India and China would be the drivers of world economic growth in the foreseeable future and should all be invited to join the G8 (Russia had been part of the G7/8 since 1997) (Goldman Sachs 2001). The first decade of the new millennium validated this economic prognosis. And in 2008, in the midst of severe financial crisis, all of the BRICs were included along with other major players in the global economy in the G20 Heads of State Summit, an historic global governance innovation created overnight by building on the established G20 Finance Ministers process which included South Africa as well.

Yet the etymology of the BRICs can be derived another way, more closely entwined with the ongoing political association that held its first Heads of State Summit Meeting in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009. Here, the history begins with the RIC club—Russia, India and China—meeting informally in New York in the margins of UN General Assemblies from 2003, and annually on a stand-alone basis at the level of foreign ministers since 2005. The idea of establishing a BRICs grouping came as a carefully thought-through Russian initiative worked out by Foreign Minister Lavrov and President Putin. In 2006, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov invited Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim (building on a long established personal friendship) to an informal lunch of RIC foreign ministers in New York. Following from that first contact and on the initiative of President Putin, a BRIC foreign ministers meeting was convened in September 2006 in New York, and again in 2007, on the fringes of the of UN General Assembly. The first stand-alone BRICs heads of state meeting was convened by President Medvedev in Yekaterinburg in July 2009. After the second BRICs Summit meeting in 2010 in Brasilia, an invitation to South Africa to attend the 2011 Summit meeting in Sanya (Hainan, China) as a new member generated the acronym BRICS (Shubin 2013). Alphabetical serendipity thus complemented the economic and political logic, while serving to reinforce the existential ambiguity of the BRICS acronym with its dual etymology.¹

As a prelude to this volume on the development cooperation policies and programmes of the BRICS, in this introduction we map out some of the economic and geopolitical dynamics that underlie the BRICS phenomenon

and its relevance in an era of increasingly complex, interactive political and economic challenges at subnational, regional and global levels. As will become clearer later in this introduction and in the country chapters that follow, there is at this point not much concrete collaboration among the BRICS in the field of development may change as the NDB established by the BRICS begins to function and China's ambitious regional development initiatives, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and One Belt One Road Initiative, the Johannesburg Action Plan of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the cooperation agreement between China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), gather steam. Against this background, we look ahead in a final chapter, to the prospects for a more coordinated approach by the BRICS to their development cooperation endeavours. Throughout the volume we consider the extent to which the BRICS as a political association is promoting multidirectional development learning across a range of public policy fields both among its members and more widely.

THE BRICS AS AN ECONOMIC VECTOR

As a symbol of the broader emerging markets phenomenon, the BRICS acronym, applied in its broader common usage, has captured a remarkable transition in the global economy. According to the Chief Economist of the IMF, in the 1980s, emerging and developing countries accounted for 36 % of world output in purchasing power parity terms, and 43 % of world growth in that decade. In 2010–2015 those numbers leapt to 56 % of world output and 79 % of world growth. The conclusion to be drawn is that a predominantly advanced developed country lens is an ever more outmoded approach to viewing the world economy (Obstfeld 2016).

The emerging markets story, including the BRICS and beyond, has thus been a powerful catalyst for trade and investment and poverty reduction globally over this period, notably helping to boost growth in the Asian, Latin American and African regions. This 'shifting wealth' phenomenon has underpinned the basic agenda of the BRICS as a political association working to shift global governance norms and arrangements established under a US-led post-World War II, to reflect the present and future configuration of world economic and political power.

At the same time, the extraordinary role of China in generating the emerging markets phenomenon in general and the economic trajectories of the BRICS as a particular group is essential to this story. As it integrated into the global trade regime and opened up to foreign investment,

China's growth surged, generating a super-cycle in commodities which lifted growth rates in commodity-exporting countries around the world, in rich and poor regions alike. China's own investments in creating commodity supply chains further pushed this process, along with the 'going out' policy to encourage direct investment by Chinese companies, notably in the construction and Information and Computer Technology (ICT) industries (Gu 2009 and 2011). When China countered the global recession of 2009 with a major investment package for provinces and local governments in China, the macroeconomic impact via commodity markets was global, helping commodity exporters to survive the financial crisis generated in the financial markets of the USA and Europe. Among the major beneficiaries were fellow members of the BRICS—Brazil, Russia and South Africa.

From 2014 the BRICS economic vector changed. China's move to a lower 'new normal' growth path based on domestic consumption and decarbonisation of the economy rather than investment and exports has pushed the commodity cycle into reverse, exposing the weaknesses in the economic structures and testing the political systems of the commodity-exporting BRICS. Brazil, Russia and South Africa each have particular structural and political challenges of a medium-term nature and are unlikely to be in the ranks of emerging country growth stories again until they find a new way forward. Meanwhile it is India that is moving forward at a fast pace (albeit with some recent uncertainty), spurred by economic reforms that favour private sector development and mass consumption, with ICTs helping to rationalise and improve poverty reduction programmes.²

Assuming that China will be able to manage its ambitious and comprehensive reform agenda in a way that maintains the 'new normal' growth rate of 6.5 %, there is the medium-term prospect that together China and India, with a combined population approaching some 3 billion people, will be major drivers of global growth into the medium- and long-term future. This prospect is important not only for the other BRICS but also for the global economy and development prospects at large, underlining the global significance of the issues raised by the financial volatility in China that has emerged in 2015 and early 2016.³

The cogency of the BRICs as an investment category has thus changed radically. For the ten years through 2010, the MSCI Bric Index had returned 308 % compared with a 15 % return on the Standard and Poors Index in that period. But with other fast-growing developing countries emerging onto the scene, a new larger category of emerging markets has become a more compelling investment story (O'Neill et al. 2011). With

this ongoing change, Goldman Sachs' emblematic BRICs Fund declined by 21 % over 5 years and in 2015 was folded into a wider Goldman Sachs' Emerging Markets Equity Fund. The original BRIC investment story was over. But the story of China and India as major global growth engines, now forecast at between 6–8 % growth per annum for the next two years, and with the possibility of maintaining such growth through to the middle of the century, would indeed change the shape of the global economy and hence the shape of global governance and development patterns.

THE BRICS AS A POLITICAL VECTOR

What could be the cogency of the BRICS as a political vector in such a scenario, where it is surmised by some observers that, by mid-century, India would be as large as the US economy and China would be 50 % larger than the India and the US combined? (Merchant 2013) The three other BRICS, with their complementarities as resource suppliers, would be pulled along by such a China and India growth vector, as would many other developing and developed countries, albeit in a world of declining resource intensity as green growth and broader technological advances change the nature of demand for goods and services and for labour and human capital. Clearly, such scenarios need to be approached with a degree of caution. Nevertheless, the BRICS are not alone in facing uncertainty, which also continues to affect the OECD countries as well as other emerging markets and LICs; in this context the BRICS' political significance derives as much from how they respond to this uncertainty as from their economic weight per se.

As related above, the BRICS as a political vector originated as a Russian initiative, with a logic first articulated in Russian concept notes on foreign policy and on the BRICS and then reflected in the declarations of successive BRICS summit meetings, most recently in the declarations emerging from the Ufa summit of July 2015.⁴ The fundamental logic is that the international system is in a process of transformation towards multipolarity—and in that future world, US pre-eminence in the world order would give way to a sharing of voice, initiative and responsibility (Acharya 2014). The vision that continues to permeate the BRICS leaders' statements is of a world which is more just and fair, under the rule of international law and the United Nations, where regime change is not part of the agenda of the most powerful states, and where voting structures in the Bretton Woods institutions are reformed to reflect the new economic balance in the world.

It is this central logic that made the proposal from Russia, formerly the leading ‘second world’ country and now looking to exercise a major role in this global transformation, attractive to the other initial members, all three considering themselves as third world rising powers, as well as to South Africa with its aspirations to be the leading voice of a rising Africa (Kornegay and Bohler-Muller 2013).

The Russian initiative came at a time when a US-led coalition had overthrown the regime in Iraq in an initiative widely denounced as lying outside international law. Around the same time the financial crisis generated significant reputational damage to the countries and institutions at the heart of global economic management. Hence the concept of a group of major countries from outside this circle taking a collective perspective on the shape of the international system of the future did have a logic.

With history as the mother of invention, the G20 was invented on the spot in 2008 to confront a major global financial and economic catastrophe. The BRICS fully shared in the G20’s self-nomination in 2009 as the world’s premier economic forum. Indeed, this is a formula that has been repeated in BRICS statements ever since. For the BRICS, the advent of the G20 has been a validation of the position that global governance systems would need to become multipolar. It was at a G20 meeting in 2010 that the deal to reform the voting structures of the IMF (and hence the World Bank as an automatic follow-on) was reached. Opposition in the US Congress to such an overt shift in relative economic power delayed implementation of this change until the end of 2015, widely seen as damaging US longer term interests in maintaining the legitimacy of the Bretton Woods institutions. Thus, with evident relief, the US Treasury Secretary described the IMF reforms as reinforcing “the central leadership role of the United States in the global economic system and demonstrate our commitment to maintaining that position” (US Department of the Treasury 2015). In announcing the reform, the Managing Director of the IMF noted that the reforms “improve the IMF’s governance, better reflecting the role of the dynamic emerging and developing countries in the global economy” bringing four emerging market economies (Brazil, China, India and Russia) into the group of the ten largest members of the IMF, while also increasing the voice of African countries (IMF 2015). Hence one of the talismanic concerns of the Global South was advanced by the BRICS working inside and outside the G20.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN A WORLD OF NEW POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHIES

The dynamic at work as the BRICS seek to shape the global governance system of the future is a process of challenge and convergence (Li and Carey 2014), with the international development system as a key arena. As an example of such a challenge and convergence process in action, the interregnum associated with the stalled Congressional assent to the IMF reform saw the creation by the BRICS of the NDB and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. In addition, having initiated the idea of the NDB (on a proposal from Chen Yuan, the former President of the China Development Bank), China also launched the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB). Much to the consternation of US officials, the UK decided to join the Bank in early 2015, triggering applications from a large number of other developed countries.

At the Xi-Obama Summit meeting in September 2015, Chinese sources indicate that an agreement was reached on the concept of a “new model major country relationship”, acknowledging China’s status as a major power while working to ensure that the rising power process would be a peaceful one. As part of this agreement, the USA would push forward with the 2010 IMF reform package, while the Chinese side would ensure that the new multilateral institutions it was supporting, and any further such institutions in the future, would be professionally managed and adhere to accepted standards and practices of existing multilaterals. Further, China would participate meaningfully in replenishment rounds of the existing multilateral development finance institutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peoples Republic of China 2015).

Though not disclosed by the US side at the time of the Xi-Obama summit in September, this agreement, as elaborated in the Chinese outcome list, represented the challenge-convergence dynamic underlying the inclusion of the IMF reform in the end-2015 Omnibus Spending Bill passed by the US Congress. And according to the US Chief Climate negotiator, the NNMCR, first advanced by the Chinese in 2013, also underlay the China-US diplomacy that led to the joint Obama-Xi statement on climate change policy objectives that contributed decisively to the successful outcome of the Paris Climate Change conference (Brookings 2015). This rare explicit reference to the “new model major country relationship” by an US official illustrates the sensitivity but also the critical nature of the emergence of a multipolar world order. In this same time period the

Xi-Cameron summit meeting in the UK produced some major financial agreements, including for the co-ownership and construction of nuclear power plants and other major long-term infrastructure investments, and for RMB financial market development in London. The UK has also given its support to the Chinese Silk Roads initiative (One Belt One Road). US officials at that time expressed their view that the UK was leaping into the unknown, without due caution regarding the future of China and its role in a changing world order and the possible damage to longstanding western alliances. The post-BREXIT government under Prime Minister Theresa May has shown signs of revisiting the notion of a UK-China “golden era”.

The BRICS summit process has produced comprehensive and elaborate declarations which carefully track and treat the complex and evolving areas of tension and cooperation in the international political and economic arena. It is evident in these statements that there is no monolithic BRICS position on the major fault-lines such as the Ukrainian crisis or the tensions in the South China Sea or the Middle East. Nor is there any ideological or ideational content in the treatment of economic issues. This reflects the basic position that the BRICS is not a forum for confrontation with the “West” or among BRICS countries themselves. Such confrontations take place in other settings. The BRICS process is careful to stay nested within the G20 and to avoid revisiting positions that members have taken in the UN; indeed it looks to ‘strengthen’ an international system to which they look to generate and maintain world order even as they assume a growing role in that world order. Thus an implicit challenge and convergence process is almost certain to continue to be the mode in which the BRICS political association functions, even in a context of persisting power contests in the Ukraine and the South China Sea.

The reluctance at this point to expand beyond the existing membership is an indication of a calculation that the current mode of the BRICS represents an equilibrium which is providing enough of a challenge to function in the evolving world order. To expand further would be more complicated than warranted. Rather, the direction is to expand the intra-BRICS programme of knowledge exchange across the wide range of policy areas in which ministerial and expert level work is conducted, “slowly laying the foundations for a multipolar order that will allow them to shape global order according to their interests” (Stuenkel 2015). The current horizon, set out in the most recent Action Plan emerging from

the Ufa Summit in 2015, is to establish a virtual secretariat in the form of a permanent open website that would be a repository for all BRICS documents and work programmes (BRICS 2015a, 2015b). Such a virtual secretariat would leapfrog the G20, which is still discussing how to manage the establishment of a new website under every new G20 Presidency. The issues here are not insignificant in political management terms and the dynamics of the rotating presidency. But the impact in terms of efficiency, engagement and profile could also be significant. The BRICS objective is thus perhaps best understood as becoming and being recognised as a source of initiative and knowledge in a multipolar world, in a system of polycentric multilateralism or “minilateralism” that is forming to an important degree outside of formal institutional structures (Patrick 2016).⁵

There are different views in fact as to whether and how soon there might be a decisive “global transformation” in which the BRICS become clearly the leading players assuming concomitant roles and responsibilities. In this view, the USA is far from being in decline, with global impact via its policies, corporations and technologies even increasing. In the case of Europe on the other hand, relative decline and political coherence challenges may well be the outcome of adverse demographic dynamics, compounded by the impact of refugee flows from a destabilised Middle East and North Africa, itself partly a “blowback” from the 2003 invasion of Iraq and 2011 intervention in Libya. In this reading, the main challenges to world order are likely to be increasing inequality within countries throughout the developed and emerging worlds, linked inter alia to the bias of contemporary technological change, which could provoke severe social and political disruption. Climate change would be another of these global problems transcending any global governance transformation. At risk would be the progress made on reducing poverty, including the encroachment of fiscal pressures and re-emerging debt problems on the fiscal space available for initiatives such as the conditional cash transfers which have proved an effective means of tackling extreme poverty. Thus, “the rise of the South, the ‘decline’ of the US, and the ‘transformation’ of the international order should be put into this wider context” (Kiely 2015).⁶

At the same time, it is difficult to imagine that the economic dynamics at play in China and India with 3 billion people and also in an Africa approaching 2 billion people will not engender profound changes in global governance systems, with the G20 in particular, but also the BRICS, as forums helping to moderate and manage such changes.

THE BRICS AS A DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION VECTOR

The discussion above of the BRICS as an economic vector provides some indication of the impact of the BRICS on development progress and prospects at a macroeconomic level, which has been particularly important given the global growth contribution of the BRICS, and now will remain critically important through a complex cyclical and structural transition for the BRICS countries, with China's transition of particular significance. And the discussion on the international political impact of the BRICS indicates that it has provided a challenge function in the international system, while at the same time supporting and participating in the G20 system and being part of the trio of 2015 UN Agreements on universal sustainable development goals, on development financing beyond ODA, and on climate change—three agreements that already introduce significant evolutions in global governance systems (UN 2015a, b; UNFCCC 2015).

In terms of the impact of the BRICS on development cooperation, traditionally divided between North-South and South-South cooperation, the story is also mixed. As described in the following chapters of this book, all of the BRICS have agendas for making their development cooperation more effective, but so far there is no real attempt to pull together a BRICS development cooperation strategy. Indeed, it has been argued that the search for a narrative for Southern providers of development cooperation (i.e. emerging powers) is still a work in progress, “with few positive results and some worrying side effects” (Bracho 2015). This situation follows from the successive the High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness held successively in Accra in 2008 and Busan in 2011, where the special identity and relevance of SSC were embedded in the outcome texts, but with issues of buy-in and participation in follow-up processes, particularly the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, remaining unresolved.

The BRICS as a political association has not attempted to step into this arena. Indeed, the first meeting of BRICS senior officials responsible for international development cooperation took place only in December of 2015, without the engagement of the key officials in the development cooperation field of member countries (BRICS 2015b). This senior officials' meeting followed a mandate in the BRICS Ufa Declaration, where the BRICS leaders committed “to strengthen partnerships for advancing international development cooperation and to begin interaction through dialogue, cooperation and exchange of experience in advancing international development cooperation” (BRICS 2015a). This represents an opportunity to build on the growing interest in mutual learning across

the BRICS and other rising powers as their international development cooperation agencies evolve to meet the challenges of their new roles (Sidiropoulos et al. 2015), as well as a potential entry point into BRICS development cooperation policymaking for the work undertaken by the Network of Southern Think-Tanks (NeST) on establishing common frameworks for monitoring and evaluation of SSC (Besharati et al. 2015). How this promising undertaking might be developed will likely become clearer under the Indian Presidency of the BRICS in 2016, given the active role of India in efforts to generate dialogue and cooperation among SSC providers, and then under the Presidency of China in 2017.

Both China and India were present at the Bandung meeting of 1955, where the objectives and principles of SSC were first laid out. In the case of China, aid principles were codified in a speech by Zhou Enlai in Accra in 1964 which remains a basic reference today, even if Chinese development finance has evolved massively beyond the realm of concessional aid (Xu and Carey 2015a, b). Mutual benefit, knowledge-sharing and non-interference remain key parts of the framework of SSC. Yet it is now much harder to identify the domain of development cooperation as distinct from global business, as the multinationals of the BRICS countries engage and compete in the developing countries of the South and new fields and modes of development cooperation are opened up. In addition, the non-interference principle becomes more difficult to sustain when BRICS countries have large scale commercial activities at risk around the world and agendas for building effective states and regional security replace relationships based on liberation efforts and philosophies (Li and Carey 2014).

Meanwhile, the most famous BRICS initiative so far has been to establish a NDB. Located in Shanghai under an Indian President and now into its first operations, the policies and programmes of the NDB will be watched with great interest for signs of new approaches and the manner in which safeguards in the areas of environment and resettlement are handled. Preliminary conversations on policy and positioning have taken place in various international financial centres. Issues include how the NDB may push the envelope on development finance and the international financial architecture in a world where risk capital is at a premium while capital adequacy rules are being tightened and where green finance is a major international agenda, and how the NDB will engage with the concerns already being expressed by civil society groups in BRICS countries themselves, as well as in other countries of the South, that are likely to receive NDB-financed infrastructure initiatives. Reputational stakes are high for the BRICS as a political association

(Gu et al 2016). Operations are to encompass BRICS countries and sub-Saharan Africa, with an African Regional Centre established in Johannesburg and NDB strategies and operations, as well as potentially a Brazil-based operational centre for Latin America.

At the same time, Chinese initiatives have created not only the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank but also a Silk Roads Fund. A decision has also been taken to establish a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Bank (SCO), with India and Pakistan as new members of the SCO. The Ufa SCO meeting held alongside the BRICS Summit agreed to promote synergies between the SCO development bank, the One Belt One Road Silk Roads initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union. Hence the RIC association, where the BRICS association was conceived, is now at the centre of a strategic eurasian economic cooperation system based around connectivity and energy investments and political stability objectives. China has also developed ambitious strategic frameworks and financing facilities for industrialisation and development in the African continent via the FOCAC, as elaborated in the Johannesburg Declaration of December 2015 (Government of China 2015). Other BRICS countries have followed suit, through initiatives ranging from the 2010 Brazil-Africa Forum to the 2015 India-Africa Summit. In Latin America China has launched a partnership with the CELAC with triennial meetings and plans for continental connectivity investments. At the level of intellectual and political impetus, China is establishing a new International Knowledge Centre for Sustainable Development, a Silk Road Think Tank and a heads of state level forum for the Silk Road initiative. And in the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), it has established a \$US 2bn South-South Fund for implementation as well as an Institute for the Study of South-South Cooperation, alongside a Centre for New Structural Economics at Peking University concerned with economic transformation in African countries, notably as Chinese wage rates increase and manufacturing jobs migrate out of China.

Systemically, all these initiatives bring new perspectives on the economic and political geography of international development cooperation with the BRICS leadership and engagement (Xu and Carey 2015a). They also help to breathe new life into multilateral development finance as old and new institutions compete and cooperate to provide development finance at interest rates reflecting the state guaranteed funding costs of what is essentially officially supported market finance, a main policy recommendation emerging from the Financing for Development conference in Addis Ababa in July 2015 (Spratt and Barone 2015; UN 2015a).

Against this background, we now provide an overview of how the individual chapters in this volume analyse the development cooperation policies and programmes of the individual BRICS member countries and how they are being shaped by their domestic political and economic scenery.

THE FIVE BRICS COUNTRIES AS ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In their chapter on Brazil, Suyama, Waisbich and Leite discuss the historical trends and current evolution of Brazil's development cooperation activities. Their study outlines Brazil's engagement in SSC and the domestic normative debate and political discourse surrounding Brazil's role as a partner in development. The chapter details Brazil's modes of development cooperation, including its technical assistance and knowledge-sharing activities. The chapter breaks down Brazil's geographical areas of focus in Latin America and in sub-Saharan Africa, and its sectoral priorities and modes of engagement. The analysis also pays critical attention to the Brazilian state institutions working in development, looking at the evolution of Brazilian SSC and its incorporation in Brazil's foreign policy and increasingly, as part of its economic and commercial interests, looking forward to the implications of domestic political events and shifts. It discusses Brazil's attitudes to multilateral development forums, as well as Brazil's progress in aid transparency and media engagement.

Turning to China, the chapter by Gu, Chen and Wang provides a comprehensive overview of China's aid architecture, the historical context and ideological foundations underlying China's overseas aid and development cooperation, and the current discourse surrounding China's economic cooperation with developing countries. As China assumes an increasingly predominant position in the global economy, its role as a developing country that has generated huge success in high economic growth and poverty reduction, and as a player in the global development sphere, has come under increasing scrutiny. This chapter situates China's distinct approach to development aid in the context of the BRICS countries, as well as in relation to its own internal politics. It also discusses the role of state-owned enterprises in China's engagement in Africa and Asia, and domestic media and discourse surrounding China as a foreign aid actor. Finally, it turns to the need for greater mutual understanding in engagement between 'traditional' and 'rising' powers such as China, towards common global development goals.

Moving on to consider India, the chapter by Chenoy and Joshi traces the history, shifting priorities and nuances of India's development assistance (DA), which increased significantly following the spurt in Indian annual growth rates since the 1990s. The authors analyse the drivers for this increase in assistance to less developed countries (LDCs), seeking to establish whether or not a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of aid has taken place. It has been argued that the 'new donors' like India are not very different from the traditional aid givers because ultimately their assistance is driven by their interest in enhancing their own economic interest, trade and geostrategic priorities. Trade appears to be a definite goal, because India's trade with the South has increased significantly in recent decades. India's energy needs and the expansion of its energy sources to different countries in Africa do indicate some co-relation between DA and energy imports. At the same time, the chapter argues that the model of advancing concessionary credit, grants and loans to developing countries and to businesses to invest in these countries is a better and more horizontal form of DA than giving aid tied to conditions and charity. Another point made in the India chapter is that India is very upfront about its geostrategic interests and argues that its DA is based on mutual benefits and advantages to both giver and recipient. It is also based on the demands of the recipient country as opposed to what the donor feels the recipient should be doing. This chapter examines the significance and substance of SSC framework within which India bases its DA, looking at the international debate on norms in the light of the DAC principles and contrasting Indian DA to that of traditional donors, presenting India's arguments. It also looks at reasons for Indian support to the new BRICS institutional structures like the NDB and analyses the arguments made by the Indian policy elite in favour of these structures. The authors examine the discourse around DA in Indian media, business and civil society, and comment on the narratives of the policy elite. India's interest in Africa is evident from the recently concluded Third India-AFRICA Summit (2015), attended by 54 African countries' heads of state. India granted concessionary loans, made business deals and promised different kinds of assistance. Indian policy in Africa follows China and yet has its own distinctive characteristics. The chapter ends by looking at developments under the new government of Prime Minister Modi and its emerging priorities for DA.

The subsequent chapter, by Larinova, Ranghulov and Berenson, explores Russia's role and contribution as well as the contrasts and debates between the Soviet and Russian models of aid and how these models have influenced other countries. The chapter looks at how the Russian Federation is

recreating its DA programme in a way that reflects that of the Soviet period foreign aid. Russia became an aid recipient during its transition in the early 1990s. Once Russia's growth stabilised after 2004 it renewed its donorship patterns in relation to the LDCs. The continuity and changes in aid from Russia, as the successor state of the Soviet Union, are thus traced. This chapter highlights the ways in which Russia provides a contrast to the DA model that is emerging from the other BRICS, especially India and China who use business interest and Lines of Credit as a major part of their DA strategy, but also India and South Africa with their common insistence alongside China and India on the importance of SSC. Russia, by contrast, has been following the DAC principles closely and giving aid through multilateral channels. Obviously Russia is not part of SSC, but it is a country of the North that does not quite fit into the North, has a history of close cooperation with the South and has been a supporter of the SSC. Russian support to the concept of a multipolar world fits in with the vision of the Global South. Russia follows the principles of unconditional assistance and non-intervention. The chapter looks at the Russian institutions that have been developing and how they handle aid. It also shows the limitations of the discourse around aid. The authors also provide a sectoral analysis of Russian aid in health, education and food. Important issues are raised on whether Russia should continue with this DAC-inspired model of giving aid through multilateral channels, which many actors consider does not serve the purpose of soft power for Russia.

Grobelaar's chapter on South Africa focuses on the country's distinctive tradition of development cooperation, the influence of South Africa's apartheid history in the context of its current foreign policy strategy with respect to sub-Saharan Africa, and the growing institutionalisation of its development cooperation activities. The chapter emphasises in particular the role that South Africa plays in the peace-building and peace-keeping arenas in the African continent, and the importance of this under-recognised contribution to development cooperation. It also examines the strongly multilateral initiatives that South Africa has taken in the African region.

LOOKING ACROSS THE BRICS: CONTENTIONS, CONVERGENCES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

In assessing the character, role and impact of the BRICS, it is easy to be drawn simply to focus on governmental interests and action. As a counter-weight to this, the chapter on non-state actors by Pomeroy, Shankland, Poskitt, Bandyopadhyay and Tandon provides an important corrective,

highlighting the key roles played by civil society. In this chapter, the authors argue for recognition of the increased role of non-state actors, particularly Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) from the BRICS. This chapter examines the patterns and innovations deriving from CSO's roles as non-state actors working in development cooperation policy and practice. The authors also discuss the differing relationships between CSOs and respective governments from the BRICS, and opportunities within certain countries of CSO-government cooperation on development issues. The chapter highlights the growing trend of the process of civil society engagement in the sequence of official BRICS Summits held in Delhi, Durban, Fortaleza and Moscow. The chapter also discusses the differences of opinion on civil society, with some BRICS-based CSOs arguing for closer formal dialogue with the Summit process and with institutions such as the NDB while others highlight the risk of CSOs being co-opted by a 'sub-imperialist' project. In seeking to create a platform for working together within the official BRICS mechanism, these organisations are dealing with the paradox that BRICS is as 'illegitimate' as the G8 that it was established to challenge. The chapter concludes that the key focus of engagement will continue to be democratising this mechanism, not only with respect to civil society within BRICS countries but also globally, especially where missing voices of civil society need to be enabled.

The concluding chapter looks across the BRICS and asks if they are driving a new emerging international development agenda. In this chapter, Chenoy, Larionova, Manning and Constantine argue that the BRICS have moved from a concept to a substantial international reality, making an important contribution by offering a different idea and model of development. The authors argue that the BRICS have changed the pattern of giving DA to LDCs by shifting the terms of foreign aid based on their own development, aid and growth experiences. Although there are evident differences and national distinctions, it is also evident that a clear development model is emerging. Central to this is the way the model demonstrates that growth and horizontal partnerships between countries are encouraged and assisted by trade and business investments. The chapter discusses the response of the BRICS to the changing global economic and political landscape in establishing new financial institutions, most notably development and infrastructure banks, to cater to specific development needs and where the BRICS would be able to 'call the shots'. The chapter notes that the efficacy of these financial institutions and the BRICS as an economic and political grouping will play out in the coming decades.

In summary, the BRICS have generated significant impacts on the development history of recent years. Their impact in the coming decades

will depend much on how they manage their own economic and political trajectories and the associated reputational factors, just as will be the case for developed countries, in a world that is becoming more complex. In terms of their individual and collective roles and the role of the BRICS forum in development cooperation as an international mission, this volume highlights a wide range of issues, particularly those associated with the activism represented by the NDB and by Chinese initiatives in instigating new development cooperation visions and institutions around the globe. A point of particular interest will be whether the mandate contained in the Ufa Declaration of 2015 to strengthen partnerships and interact together in the field of international development cooperation becomes a substantive and significant process, looking outward to the broader international development partnerships, including South-South partnerships as well as the South-North and multidirectional partnerships embodied notably in the new set of UN development and climate change agreements.

In sum, this volume seeks to address both the geopolitical ramifications and the domestic dynamics of the BRICS' development cooperation. It applies a common analytical framework to each of the five BRICS countries, aiming to allow for a truly comparative perspective on the domestic drivers of engagement in each country. On top of this, it examines and analyses the emerging collective identity arising from the BRICS as a political grouping, most notably through the NDB, and questions the extent to which we are witnessing the emergence of a distinct BRICS development agenda and the nature of its implications for the future of development cooperation.

The research on which this volume is based was carried out in the period that followed the Delhi BRICS Summit of 2012, at which the proposal for an NDB was first formally articulated in a leaders' declaration. As the chapters show, since then there has been a rapid process of institutionalisation of the BRICS grouping, including not only the establishment of the NDB but also the consolidation of mechanisms for intergovernmental mutual learning and coordination and for consultation with business and academic actors, as well as an intensification of dialogue with civil society. Although the focus of this volume is not on the impact of the BRICS on development dynamics within other developing countries, it is clear from the chapters that since 2012 all the BRICS have intensified their individual engagements with Africa and other key developing regions—although there is as yet little evidence that their levels of interaction within partner countries are evolving to match the patterns of dialogue and coordination emerging at the global level.

Much has of course changed since 2012. The Delhi Summit came at a moment of apparent triumph for the BRICS, with their economies

rebounding much more robustly from the global financial crisis than those of the OECD member countries and with developing nations from Africa and elsewhere in the South enthusiastically seeking an ever-closer partnership with them. In the field of development cooperation, the Delhi Summit came shortly after the 2011 Busan conference declaration had formalised the recognition by the OECD DAC that South-South cooperation was a force whose importance could no longer be ignored. As we have discussed in this Introduction, however, since 2012 there has been a major shift in global economic dynamics, which has brought serious challenges to the commodity-exporting BRICS as well as to commodity-dependent African countries, and led to growing uncertainty over the future growth trajectories of China and India. This period has also witnessed the Chinese-led establishment—outside the BRICS framework—of several initiatives with major development implications, including the AIIB and the One Belt One Road initiative.

Thus, while the rise of the BRICS undoubtedly represents one of the most significant moments in the history of international development cooperation, there is increasing recognition of the uncertainties that must mark any assessment of their future impact as development actors. As the cycle of BRICS Summits returns to India in 2016 before moving to China in 2017, this is a good moment for a more sober reflection on the role of the BRICS in development that incorporates analysis of the complexity of the domestic and international political and economic processes driving their engagements, recognising their contrasts as well as their commonalities and their challenges as well as their strengths. It is our hope that with this volume we have contributed to this process of reflection and also to greater mutual understanding between the academic and policy communities engaging with development cooperation in the BRICS themselves and in the Global North, as well as in the countries of the South for whom the BRICS are now indispensable partners.

NOTES

1. The fashion for acronyms to capture new dynamic groupings in the global economy as investment themes remains in vogue. Most recent are the TICKs (Taiwan, India, China and Korea) with an IT theme and FANGs, not states but global social media/IT giants based in the USA (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google).
2. A key point to note, however, is that poverty reduction in India (which still has far to go) has occurred not only because of economic growth but also because of legislation such as the Right to Food and associated policies such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) as well as empowerment of the local

- government system (Panchayats) linked with reservations for women and other historically marginalised groups, and other social sector schemes. This is a pattern that also applies to other BRICS countries, notably Brazil, which alone among the BRICS has substantially reduced income inequality over the last decade.
3. The ratings agency Fitch, in a study framed by the Oxford Economics Global Economic Model, tests a scenario in which China's growth rate falls to 2.3 % (a scenario they judge as unlikely). In these circumstances the model suggests that global growth would fall from a base case of 3.1 % to 1.8 % in 2017 with the persistence of a world of low interest rates, low growth and low prices for oil and other commodities. Report available on www.fitch.com. The World Bank's 2016 Economic Prospects Report suggests that a 1 % decline in the growth of the five BRICS generates a 0.8 % decline in the growth of other emerging and developing countries and a 0.4 % decline in global growth.
 4. For BRICS summit documents, see BRICS Information Center, www.bricstoronto.ca.
 5. An interesting development in this context is the expanding membership and networks of the OECD with its largely soft law and peer review/learning processes. It now embraces 34 members, many more ad hoc participating countries, and Global Forum members and has four of the BRICS as « key partners » (Brazil, China, India and South Africa who are also full members of the OECD Development Centre). Russia was on the verge of OECD membership until the annexation of the Crimea brought a halt to the accession process). All of the BRICS except for Russia have also become associate members of the International Energy Agency (IEA).
 6. The theme announced for the 8th BRICS Summit in Panaji, Goa, in October 2016, "Building Responsive, Inclusive and Collective Solutions" might be seen as reflecting such a wider set of global challenges.

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Brazil as a Development Partner Under Lula and Rousseff: Shifts and Continuities

*Bianca Suyama, Laura Trajber Waisbich,
and Iara Costa Leite*

INTRODUCTION

Brazil emerged as a high-profile development cooperation partner in the 2000s, when South–South development cooperation (SSDC) gained new momentum after a downturn in the 1980s and 1990s (Lechini 2006; Lima 2005a; Morais 2009). Brazil gained the international spotlight by attaining economic growth with social inclusion, and Brazilian development cooperation, in all its different modalities, rose between 2005 and 2010 (Brasil 2010, 2013). The budget of the Brazilian Cooperation

B. Suyama (✉)

South-South Cooperation Research and Policy Center (Articulação SUL),
São Paulo, SP, Brazil

L.T. Waisbich

Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP) and Articulação SUL,
São Paulo, SP, Brazil

I.C. Leite

Federal University of Santa Catarina, Santa Catarina, Brazil

Agency (ABC) and the number of new cooperation initiatives rose almost continuously under the two administrations of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) (2003–06 and 2007–10), but this trend reversed under President Dilma Rousseff.

This chapter is in part a response to the dearth of analysis in the international literature of what has changed in Brazilian development cooperation since Lula da Silva left office. It unpacks the factors contributing to change, such as new priorities and a more challenging economic and political environment, and those contributing to continuity, such as mobilization of domestic and external actors around Brazilian development cooperation to ensure the continued financial viability of cooperation initiatives.

Drawing from Lancaster (2007), who explores decision-making in donor countries, we look at how national institutions, interests and ideas influence the sectoral and geographic allocation of public resources. In general, foreign policy priorities can vary according to ideas held by top leaders and their advisory groups, and to other domestic and global shifts. To take into account the role of both domestic and external drivers we use Foreign Policy Analysis as a theoretical framework, which aims to understand decision-making processes by analysing the interplay between shifts and continuities in domestic and external dynamics (Hermann 1990).

The focus of the chapter is on Brazilian governmental cooperation and, specifically, on technical cooperation. Growing international recognition of Brazil's inclusive development trajectory, and efforts to disseminate the country's experience to other developing countries through capacity-building, has conferred increased importance on Brazilian technical cooperation and on its distinguishing principles and characteristics vis-à-vis other emerging countries. Brazilian official technical cooperation includes a broad range of national partners, prompting coalition-building and carrying the potential to strengthen national constituencies. Technical cooperation is one of the few modalities of Brazil's SSDC that has publicly available quantitative data¹ disaggregated into sectors and beneficiary countries. This is particularly important in order to understand the extent to which Lula's administration itself represented a shift compared to previous ones. Nonetheless, the chapter also examines the intersection between technical cooperation and other modalities of Brazilian development cooperation and foreign policy, such as humanitarian assistance, export financing and participation in peace missions.

In order to analyse the trajectory of Brazilian SSDC, the next section will explore the history, principles, narratives and political dynamics surrounding Brazil's path to becoming a development partner. Section 3

discusses the boom in Brazilian development cooperation under President Lula, comparing it to previous strategies and dynamics. The fourth section discusses Brazilian cooperation under Rousseff (2011–14). We conclude by summarizing findings, examining the implications of the current economic and political turbulence in Brazil on its development cooperation and assessing the outlook for the country's development cooperation policy in the coming years.

BECOMING A DEVELOPMENT PARTNER: PRINCIPLES, NARRATIVES AND TRAJECTORY

With its growing engagement in development cooperation, Brazil's official narratives have reiterated a set of principles that define its approach to technical cooperation. According to those narratives, Brazilian cooperation is based on solidarity that is demand-driven, horizontal and free from conditionalities; it is not associated with commercial and economic interests, but it can promote mutual gains; and it adapts Brazilian experiences to the local context, but it does not interfere with partners' domestic affairs. Brazilian cooperation is thus seen as a partnership, rather than as aid or assistance.

Compared to other countries in the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)—most notably China and India—Brazilian narratives tend to give greater emphasis to solidarity. Though also seen as a foreign policy tool, political and economic gains to Brazil are not treated as conditioning cooperation (Iglesias Puente 2010; Barbosa 2011). The instrumental role of technical cooperation has rather been assessed in terms of political support for Brazil's global aspirations (such as support for its United Nations Security Council bid and to Brazilian candidates for senior positions in international bodies) as well as in terms of indirect commercial and economic gains (Valler Filho 2007; Ayllón and Leite 2009; Barbosa 2011). Technical cooperation as a means of strengthening links with other developing countries and creating a favourable setting for exporting Brazilian goods and services (Cervo 1994) can be connected with traditional diplomatic ideals concerning the diversification of Brazilian relations as a mechanism to promote the country's autonomy and its role as a global trader (Lima 2005b). Diplomat Valler Filho (2007) adds that, besides opening new markets for Brazilian industrialized products and facilitating coordination between developing countries in international forums, technical cooperation demonstrates the country's technological capacity and affirms Brazil as an emerging power.

Brazil's technical cooperation principles have multiple sources. Firstly, they translate the country's past experience as an aid recipient. Secondly, they emerge from Brazil's international identity as 'belonging to the global South', which is deeply embedded in the country's foreign policy principles of *pacifism*, *non-intervention*, *autonomy* and *pragmatism*, all enshrined in the 1988 Federal Constitution. Finally, there is Brazil's international identity as a 'middle power' or 'system-affecting state' (Lima 2005a) and an 'intermediate', serving as a mediator and aspiring to a more prominent role in international affairs (Alexandroff and Cooper 2010; Hurrell 2009; Lafer 2000; Lima 2005b; Saraiva 2007; Sennes 2012). However, both the role Brazil should play in international affairs and the meaning of development respond to shifting interests and institutions.

Brazil has for decades experienced a dual engagement in the international aid architecture as both a receiver and provider of technical cooperation (Hirst 2012; Lopes 2008; Valler Filho 2007). Nonetheless, calling Brazil a 'net donor' is still precipitate and politically challenging. Firstly, Brazil sees itself as a "partner" and not a "donor". The donor label is seen as problematic domestically because of the government's critical stance towards the aid system, led by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC); because it entails legal challenges emanating from the lack of any specific legislation on cooperation provision; and finally because of sensitivities about perceptions of public spending on international cooperation in a country that still faces important development challenges at home.

International assistance features ambiguously in accounts of national development, recognized but also resented. Historically, Brazilian dependence on foreign assistance was never high. On the one hand, specialists agree that the country was only marginally included in the global system of aid provision (Ayllón et al. 2007; Hirst 2011), with inward aid flows at their highest in the 1960s and the 1970s when the Brazilian Government, following the foreign policy principle of pragmatism, tried to link its support for Western anti-communism to receiving foreign aid to assist the country's state-led development (Valler Filho 2007). Even then, the amount received fell short of national expectations.

On the other hand, received aid is seen as having had a positive impact on the economic growth and technological autonomy of some key domestic sectors when it was coordinated by the Federal Government (Cervo 1994; Valler Filho 2007).² Government and civil society perspectives differ, with the latter being more positive about the impacts of development cooperation

on supporting social policies, democratization and strengthening civil society. A less celebrated but still very relevant legacy is that received aid contributed to strengthening ‘islands of excellence’ among certain Brazilian public institutions, such as the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) and the National Service for Industrial Training (Senai), all of which later became active in Brazil’s technical cooperation with other developing countries.

Relative independence from foreign assistance has allowed Brazil to develop a critical approach towards the traditional or Northern-based aid architecture. The Buenos Aires consensus that emerged around South-South technical cooperation³ in 1978 was aligned with traditional Brazilian foreign policy principles (from *autonomy* and *non-interference*, to the *right to development*) and was followed in the 1980s by increasing recognition and diffusion of and demands for Brazilian development experiences (Cervo 1994).

Another element influencing Brazil’s relationship with technical cooperation is its own development trajectory. The 2000s saw the renewal of Brazilian state-led developmentalism (Bresser-Pereira 2011) with a greater emphasis on social inclusion (Arbix and Martin 2010), and social development started playing a major role in Brazilian demands for development cooperation. Under Lula, the government was able to mobilize the symbolic image of a developmental state able to reconcile growth, poverty reduction and social inclusion, combining this with a bold rhetoric of *solidarity* and *non-indifference*⁴ (Abreu 2013; Ayllón 2012; Milani 2011). Mantras such as ‘there is a Brazilian solution for every African problem’ or ‘Brazilian solutions might be a better fit for developing countries’⁵ emerged from diplomatic views contesting the traditional practice of replicating cooperation previously received by Brazil in third countries.⁶

By promoting, with the support of multilateral and bilateral organizations, the image of being a ‘knowledge hub’ and packaging some of its social policies and programmes as ‘best practices’, SSDC helps Brazil to build on its soft power, reaffirming its ‘diplomacy for development’ and its identity as the champion of developing nations (Dauvergne and Farias 2012). Another correlated narrative which emerged is the concept of structuring projects, or structuring cooperation used by the ABC and implementing agencies, notably in the health and agriculture innovation sectors, but also for humanitarian cooperation. Official narratives around structuring projects present them as more sustainable because they involve establishing or strengthening governmental institutions and systems to

increase the autonomy of the partner country. Almeida (2010), discussing health cooperation, points out that structuring cooperation seeks to break with the traditional passive transfer of knowledge and technologies and instead emphasizes endogenous capacities and capabilities.

Exporting policies to other developing nations and receiving praise globally through international policy networks can be used to strengthen government legitimacy at home (Morais 2010). This is why competing domestic groupings, and their links to external actors, are to be included in the equation when it comes to understanding the characteristics and priorities of Brazilian technical cooperation. Taking into account the dynamics of policy diffusion, links between mobilized domestic groups and external actors in international policy spaces (see Leite et al. 2015) can call into question narratives such as the demand-driven nature of Brazilian cooperation, opening new venues for discussion around who is driving technical cooperation priorities.

Tracking Brazil's background as an aid recipient, its foreign policy and its own developmental trajectory gives us a glimpse of the genesis of a new player in technical cooperation. But to understand the shifting boundaries of Brazil's development cooperation engagement, we need to unpack the factors that have characterized its recent SSDC engagement. Brazilian engagement in technical cooperation is deeply influenced by the country's national institutional framework as well as by decision-making processes in foreign policy, which are permeated by a variety of domestic interests. Brazil's increasing role in technical cooperation has not been accompanied by institutional reforms, such as the design of a national legal framework establishing priorities and aims and guaranteeing the necessary flows of human and financial resources to guarantee effective engagement.

ABC, which is subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), is legally entitled to coordinate both received and provided technical cooperation. It is estimated that the MRE coordinates actions implemented by 170 national agencies, including those connected to the executive, the judiciary and the legislature, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), universities and local governments (Brasil 2013). The main source of this dispersion is the lack of specific legislation to clearly define the objectives, scope, mechanisms, competences and processes of development cooperation. This system has been built by relying on transitory arrangements in which the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) became the main agent in operationalization of technical cooperation in Brazil.

Thus, as the next section will show, Brazilian engagement in technical cooperation is the by-product not only of a single foreign policy strategy,

defined and designed by the MRE or ABC, but also of several concurring strategies from different actors in a dispersed and fragmented framework, who are not working under a single piece of legislation. Drivers for the allocation of public resources are to be found in the interplay between the technical capabilities of implementing institutions to attract and respond to external demands, the country's foreign policy agenda (which is dependent on the ruling party and president), and the politics of shifting mobilized coalitions (Leite et al. 2014).

LULA: THE GOLDEN YEARS OF BRAZILIAN TECHNICAL COOPERATION

The Lula years (2003–10) saw both continuities with and shifts from the administrations of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–98 and 1999–2002). In general, South–South relations are recognized as having emerged as a priority in Brazilian foreign policy during Lula's first mandate (Lima 2005a, 2008; Lima and Hirst 2006; Oliveira and Onuki 2013; Oliveira 2005; Pecequillo 2008; Saraiva 2007; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007), although criticisms of developing countries' unequal access to globalization and the turn to the South had already started with the negative impacts of the financial crises of the 1990s on developing countries (Iglesias Puente 2010).

Under Lula, ideas informing Brazilian foreign policy shifted from 'autonomy through participation'—in which interdependence and the downplay of military capacities were seen as opportunities for Brazilian diplomacy to influence global governance through soft power (Abdenur 1994 cited in Vigevani et al. 2003)—to 'autonomy through diversification'—that is, the promotion of 'South–South alliances [in the belief that these] reduce asymmetries in foreign relations with powerful countries and raise international bargaining capacity' (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007, 283). This ideal drew on previous visions of diplomatic autonomy (Cardoso and Miyamoto 2012; Lima 2005a; Saraiva 2010) and foreign policy ideas coming from the Workers' Party (Almeida 2004). While Cardoso's diplomacy was informed by the idea that Brazil did not possess the capacity to act unilaterally and was focused on the search for credibility, market reforms and participation in multilateral norms and institutions, Lula's diplomacy was marked by counter-hegemonic measures (Lima 2005a) and more balanced relations with developed countries (Barbosa 2011). There was an intensification of Brazil's participation in multilateral forums and a more assertive position on the reform of political and economic global governance (Barbosa 2011; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007).

The priority conferred on the theme of development cooperation as an instrument of Brazilian foreign policy, in particular, can be assessed by comparing diplomatic discourses during Lula's administrations—characterized by explicit and frequent references to development cooperation, especially in his second term (Iglesias Puente 2010)—and those of his predecessor. Though the number of technical cooperation actions increased in all geographic areas between 1997 and 2001, diplomatic discourse made few references to them, suggesting a perception of the limited instrumentality of technical cooperation to foreign policy (Iglesias Puente 2010). Barbosa (2011, 110) attributes this to the negative impact of the economic crisis on trade between Brazil and other developing countries, and on the ABC's budget.

Some of the milestones of the 'active and independent' foreign policy, as Lula's Chancellor Celso Amorim named it, and the expansion of partnerships with the global South include: the first India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum in 2003, aimed at promoting cooperation among these countries; the leadership of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti since 2004; the rejection of the US-led Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2005; a focus on the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) through the creation of the Mercosur Parliament in 2006 and the Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM) in 2007; creation of the Union of South American Nations in 2008; the first Brazil, Russia, India and China meeting in 2008 to discuss international finance; participation in the Group of 20 (G20); and the opening of nine new embassies in Africa.

Brazil's 'turn' to Africa was announced during Lula's presidential campaign (Saraiva 2002) and consolidated in his administration's first months with the celebration of the Brazil Africa Forum. Domestically, the Afro-descendent coalition in Brazil grew stronger (Patritota 2011), and the 'culturalist discourse' re-emerged,⁷ emphasizing not only the relevance of African culture to Brazilian society, but also the country's debt to Africa because of its history of slavery.

In the case of technical cooperation, presidential diplomacy was one of the main drivers of the exponential rise in demand for learning from Brazilian experiences. For instance, Lula visited 12 African countries during his two terms in office, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs conducted 67 visits to 37 African countries during the same period (IPEA and World Bank 2011). These visits were crucial starting points for various SSDC projects and the number of new initiatives (including isolated activities and projects)⁸ coordinated by the ABC rose, as did its budget (Fig. 2.1).




Fig. 2.1. Progression of ABC budget allocation, execution and number of actions initiated by year (2003–12) *Source:* Authors, based on information from ABC websites (<http://www.abc.gov.br/Gestao/EvolucaoFinanceira> and <http://www.abc.gov.br/Gestao/QuantitativoProjetos>), accessed 8 December 2015.

The collection and systematization of data on several modalities of development cooperation, resulting in the publication of the two Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (Cobradi) reports, indicated the political will to coordinate growing disbursements and mobilize several institutions and interest groups around decision-making.

Economic growth can be seen as one of the major drivers of the expansion of Brazilian technical cooperation during the Lula years,⁹ but another central driver was the growing importance of South–South cooperation for traditional donors as a means of reconstructing their legitimacy in a post-neoliberal context. As Morais (2009, 48) put it, faced with growing criticisms and transnational mobilization against neoliberal models, international agencies promoted South–South cooperation as a means for the transfer of ‘best practice’ to improve their performance and ‘clean up the mess left by structural adjustment’. Abdenur and Fonseca (2013) go further, arguing that within a context of diminishing overseas development assistance, international organizations and Northern donors are trying to harness South–South cooperation as a way to preserve and expand Northern influence within and beyond the development cooperation field.

In the case of Brazilian technical cooperation, the role played by traditional donors is not new. They played a central role in the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action in the 1980s in a context marked by the graduation of middle-income countries like Brazil. Additionally, as discussed in the previous section, due to the lack of a legal and institutional framework, Brazil relies on international organizations for the operationalization of its development cooperation. However, it is also necessary to account for domestic political dynamics to achieve a more encompassing understanding of shifts and continuities in Brazilian technical cooperation. The next sub-sections, then, focus on the evolving pattern of geographic and sectoral allocation of cooperation funds, analysing the role played by the MRE, the presidency and domestic coalitions in maintaining or shifting priorities.

GEOGRAPHIC ALLOCATION: PROMOTING BRAZILIAN SOFT POWER

In 2004, the ABC's geographic priorities ranked South America highest (Barbosa 2011), followed by Haiti; Africa, especially Portuguese-speaking countries, plus Timor Leste; other Latin American and Caribbean countries; the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP); and triangular cooperation with traditional donors (ABC 2013). According to Ambassador Elim Saturnino Ferreira Dutra, who headed ABC for most of Cardoso's rule, priorities were ranked relatively similarly: South America; Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico; African Portuguese-Speaking Countries (PALOPs); other African countries that had closer relations with Brazil (notably Nigeria, South Africa and Namibia); other African countries; Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. After its independence, Timor Leste was also included as a priority country (Iglesias Puente 2010).

The key difference in ABC's prioritization was the inclusion, in 2004, of commitments made in the course of trips by the president and the MRE as the top priority, which points to their importance as decision-making actors in Brazilian technical cooperation. According to Dutra, previously 'ABC was not driven by the diplomatic agenda, such as presidential and ministerial visits. ... Presidential or ministerial visits were used by ABC either to show what it was already doing, or to try to initiate a program that for some reason, or obstacle, still did not exist' (Iglesias Puente 2010, 328).

In practice, the priorities seem to have played out differently. ABC budgetary allocations show Africa as the main destination from 1995 to 2005, with 52 % (Iglesias Puente 2010); in the 2006–10 period, that

Table 2.1. Key recipients of Brazilian technical cooperation (2005–10)

<i>Country</i>	<i>ABC spending (US\$)</i>
Mozambique	4,007,276.80
East Timor	3,849,373.05
Guinea-Bissau	3,663,076.03
Haiti	3,328,468.68
Cape Verde	2,485,591.09
Paraguay	1,891,868.68
Guatemala	1,617,114.72
São Tomé and Príncipe	1,773,788.96
Angola	1,208,871.91
Uruguay	828,201.41
Cuba	735,181.58

Source: Authors, based on data from ABC cited in Brasil (2011a)

proportion increased to 53.58 % (Barbosa 2011). According to data for 1995–2005 analysed and disaggregated for four regions (Africa; South America; Central America and the Caribbean; and Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe) by Iglesias Puente (2010), Africa became the leading destination for ABC budget allocation in the period 1997–2001. Table 2.1 shows main recipients of Brazilian technical cooperation implemented under ABC during the second half of the 2000s.

While the allocation of ABC's budget does not appear to reflect its stated geographical prioritization of South America, it is important to note that operational costs of Brazilian technical cooperation with Africa and Asia are higher and involve more projects (instead of isolated actions, which are cheaper) (Iglesias Puente 2010). Therefore, data on budgetary allocations must be contrasted with data on the number of actions for a fuller picture. In this case, 67 % of actions between 1995 and 2005 were concentrated in Latin America (Iglesias Puente 2010).¹⁰ Looking more closely at the evolving pattern, in the 1995–96 period, the distribution of actions was 38 % in Central America and the Caribbean, 31 % in Africa and 25 % in South America; for the 1997–2001 period, 39 % were in Central America and the Caribbean, 35 % in South America and 22 % in Africa; in the 2002–05 period, 35 % were in Africa, 34 % in South America and 27 % in Central America and the Caribbean (Iglesias Puente 2010).¹¹ Therefore, the priority status conferred on South America did not correspond with allocations and actions, and other dynamics must be considered in order to understand the drivers of the allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation.

The creation of the CPLP in 1996 represented a major shift in the geographical distribution of Brazilian technical cooperation towards Portuguese-speaking countries. In the period 1997–98, complementary resources were raised through a special four-year fund totalling US\$3.1 million to support technical cooperation with CPLP countries. Following the establishment of Brazil–Africa Parliamentary Caucus in 1999, a parliamentary amendment adding R\$2.5 million to the national budget was approved in 2000 (Iglesias Puente 2010).¹² Several actions implemented from then on followed demands from PALOPs articulated through CPLP, but most of the funds were directed bilaterally and not through CPLP itself (Brasil 2010; Iglesias Puente 2010). While prioritization of Portuguese-speaking countries continued during the Lula administration, there was a shift in diplomatic ideas related to cooperation with other countries. While Luiz Felipe Lampreia, Foreign Policy Minister under Cardoso, insisted on the impossibility of meeting increasing demands from PALOPs in the face of a domestic social deficit (Iglesias Puente 2010), Lula’s Foreign Policy Minister Celso Amorim considered that, despite being ‘a country with huge social need’, as ‘Brazilians with a humble background’ show, ‘it is not necessary to be rich to show solidarity’ (Amorim 2011, 88).

In addition to this focus on Portuguese-speaking countries, another way in which technical cooperation has been used to promote Brazilian leadership is through allocating support for political and institutional stability. For instance, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Paraguay and Timor Leste received ABC missions after going through political crises (Iglesias Puente 2010). In countries with UN peacekeeping missions (Timor Leste and later Haiti), Brazil used technical cooperation as part of a broader strategy to elevate Brazil’s status in international relations through soft power,¹³ providing global public goods grounded on enlightened self-interest (Lima 2008), a narrative that is frequently found in governmental documents—such as those of ABC and Cobradi—and in publications authored by Brazilian diplomats (see Barbosa 2011; Iglesias Puente 2010; Valler Filho 2007).

During Lula’s administration, when the reform of global governance became a priority for the country, technical cooperation was reciprocated by recipients’ support for Brazilian candidates to international organizations and for Brazil’s campaign to become a permanent member at the UN Security Council, although cooperation was not conditioned on that support (Iglesias Puente 2010). According to diplomat Valler Filho (2007, 96), increased Brazilian technical cooperation accompanied the country’s

activism in international organizations, which was already visible by the end of the 1980s, when Brazil assumed rotating positions on the Security Council (January 1988 to December 1989). Brazil assumed such positions again in four periods (January 1993 to December 1994; January 1998 to December 1999; January 2004 to December 2005; January 2010 to December 2011) and began to press its claim for permanent membership.

SECTORAL ALLOCATION: PROMOTING BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT MODELS

According to data from ABC, agriculture, health and education were the leading sectors in the allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation from 2003 to 2010 (Brasil 2010, 2013), following a tendency that had emerged in previous years.¹⁴ These were the same areas prominent in the profile of Brazil's received technical cooperation,¹⁵ a correlation that may be explained, in part, by traditional donors' practice of replicating initiatives previously received by Brazil in third countries (Leite 2013).

The MRE's decision-making power in defining the sectoral priorities of technical cooperation is considered marginal by Brazilian diplomats. An analysis of the trajectory of the involvement of the three main implementing institutions in technical cooperation—Embrapa, Fiocruz and Senai—shows that different explanations help to shed light over decision-making processes, though the role of Brazilian diplomacy (MRE and the presidency) is also important. Firstly, the sectoral profile of Brazilian technical cooperation is seen as resulting from 'injunctions of supply', concentrating in 'areas at which Brazil has accumulated ... experience and bears ... levels of excellence' (Barbosa 2011, 118–9). These three institutions have been involved in technical cooperation by taking part in policy spaces and networks aimed at promoting exchanges—such as the Pan-American Health Conferences, the Inter-American Centre for Knowledge Development in Vocational Training (CINTERFOR/ILO) and the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)—and by replicating in third countries what they had experienced as recipients of North–South cooperation (Leite 2013).

In the case of Senai and Fiocruz, during Cardoso's second administration their participation in technical cooperation started to have a diplomatic component. Senai, for instance, took part in missions to Portuguese-speaking countries and countries receiving peace missions (Leite 2013). Fiocruz was one of the Brazilian institutions most in demand by Brazilian

diplomats to engage in technical cooperation in a context marked by the dispute with the USA concerning compulsory licences for HIV medicines. While the involvement of both Senai and Fiocruz continued and expanded during Lula's administrations, the novelty was that Embrapa became an important instrument of foreign policy (Barbosa 2011). Demands taken to Embrapa included the establishment of the Cotton-4 programme in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO) cotton dispute between Brazil and the USA, and the opening of offices in Ghana and Venezuela (Leite 2013).

Another factor identified by Iglesias Puente (2010, 34 and 246) is the tendency of Brazilian implementing institutions to induce demands for technical cooperation. Such induction is partly related to the formation of coalitions promoting particular views on areas of national development, for which international engagement is part of their strategy. Such coalitions can already be identified in Cardoso's administrations, as exemplified by the diffusion of the *Bolsa Escola* programme to Latin American and African countries as a means of legitimizing and strengthening the programme inside Brazil (Morais 2010).

In the Lula years, one of the main coalitions was for food and nutritional security; it spearheaded the Zero Hunger programme, which initially lost space in domestic social policies to the *Bolsa Família* coalition, supported by the World Bank (Leite et al. 2015). In that context, the agenda for the fight against hunger gained unprecedented attention in Brazilian foreign policy, as attested by several examples: the signing of technical cooperation agreements with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), when Lula made several references to the Zero Hunger programme and expressed his wish that similar initiatives should be undertaken in other countries; Lula's leadership in launching the Global Action against Hunger and Poverty in New York in 2004; and the diffusion of the Zero Hunger programme to Latin American countries when José Graziano, the programme's mentor, assumed leadership of the Extraordinary Ministry for the Fight against Hunger in 2003 and 2004, and FAO's regional office for Latin American and the Caribbean in 2006 (Leite 2013).

The legitimacy achieved by programmes designed to tackle food insecurity and poverty must also be credited to the efforts of international development agencies to disseminate them as 'best practices'. It is important to recognize, however, that the international status gained by these policies and programmes is also due to their effectiveness in fulfilling the global targets set out in the Millennium Development Goals and by the




Fig. 2.2. Historical progression of modalities (2005–10) *Source:* Authors' elaboration based on Brasil (2010) and Brasil (2013).

World Food Summit—such as reducing by half the proportion of people living in extreme poverty—as well as the fact that food security regained the spotlight in international development with the eruption of the 2007 food crisis (Santarelli and Suyama 2016).

Cobradi reports (Brasil 2010, 2013) show that the area that grew most sharply in the 2005–10 period was humanitarian cooperation (Fig. 2.2). That growth followed advances in domestic capacities with the creation of the General Coordination of Actions to Fight Hunger (CGFOME) under the MRE in 2004, ‘as the international face of the Zero Hunger programme and aimed at coordinating Brazilian foreign policy in food and nutritional security, rural development and international humanitarian assistance through actions aimed at social, economic and environmental sustainability’ (MRE 2013). Other contributory factors included the establishment of the Inter-ministerial Working Group on International Humanitarian Assistance in 2006; the inauguration of the International

Humanitarian Warehouse at Galeão Airport in 2009; and the approval of specific legislation on Brazilian food aid (Provisional measures n. 248 and n. 519 in 2010, converted into law in 2011). Drawing from the Zero Hunger strategy in a context marked by growing linkages between humanitarian assistance and strategies towards long-term development (Leite 2013) and the global food crisis, a link was made between emergency aid and structural measures, connecting humanitarian assistance with technical cooperation. The hallmark of this connection was the establishment of the Food Purchase Programme for Africa (PAA Africa), which will be further explored in the next section.

This section has identified several continuities in Brazilian technical cooperation between Lula's administrations and previous ones. Africa was the destination of the largest share of expenditure from Cardoso's second administration, while the supposed prioritization of South America was not met in practice in either administration. Diplomatic strategies connected to promoting Brazilian leadership in global affairs also continued, though ideas on Brazil's role in the world have shifted, influenced both by diplomatic visions and the agenda of the Workers' Party. In a context marked by economic growth, presidential activism, growing domestic mobilization around Brazilian technical cooperation and, externally, growing demands for Brazilian development experiences and the elevation of South–South cooperation to a priority in traditional donors' agendas, SSDC gained an unprecedented place in diplomatic discourse and practice. Data collection, systematization and publication contributed to broadening governmental and social interest in the theme. Moreover, the horizontalization of Brazilian foreign policy (Pinheiro 2007), line ministries and other governmental organizations and NGOs formed coalitions and influenced the allocation of Brazilian cooperation. Those shifts resulted in domestic disputes on national development models and development cooperation priorities, but also provided a counter-balance to the influence of traditional donors in Brazilian technical cooperation (though the latter kept a central role in its operationalization).

SHIFTING SANDS: COOPERATION UNDER ROUSSEFF'S FIRST ADMINISTRATION

After the cooperation boom of the Lula years, Rousseff's administration de-emphasized the cooperation agenda in foreign policy (Saraiva 2014; Cornetet 2014; Cervo and Lessa 2014). Closer analysis shows, however, that even though there was less ABC funding available for technical

cooperation and fewer new cooperation initiatives undertaken under the ABC umbrella, funds from other domestic and international institutions increased. Overall, the period saw a continuation of the priorities defined by the previous government, but these were restrained by both the national and international contexts, and by Rousseff's own presidential priorities.

The economic context during Rousseff's first mandate was drastically different from the one that faced her predecessor. The downward trend in commodity prices and the worsening effect of the international financial crisis had a negative impact on Brazil's economy (Oliveira 2014). The weakening of Brazilian economic growth was also due, at least in part, to a slowdown in Chinese demand. At the same time, some G7 economies (notably the USA and UK) were beginning to recover from the financial crisis, suggesting that predictions that the BRICS countries would overtake the G7 may have been premature. This context was complicated further by the president's falling approval levels, sharply reflected by the street protests of June 2013 (Mariano et al. 2015).

Rousseff demonstrated little interest in foreign policy, particularly in issues seen as having few concrete, short-term benefits (Saraiva 2014; Veigaand Rios 2011). Scholars agree that there was a slowing down of presidential diplomatic activism and an uneasy relationship with the MRE.¹⁶ However, while some point to the 'fall' of active and independent foreign policy (Cervo and Lessa 2014), others emphasize accomplishments such as the elections of Roberto Azevedo as Director-General of the WTO and José Graziano to the same position at FAO; Brazil's development of innovative proposals to international climate negotiations based on common but differentiated responsibilities; Brazil's leadership of the global initiative on internet privacy; and, most significantly for the discussion here, the strengthening of BRICS through Brazil's engagement with cooperation and mutual learning among its members, an increase in intra-bloc trade ('growth towards the inside') and the establishment of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement and the New Development Bank (Milani 2015; Saraiva 2014; Stuenkel 2015).

The foreign policy community in Brazil has greeted the deepening institutionalization of BRICS with some enthusiasm but is still looking for concrete outcomes of the partnership beyond the geopolitical gains of belonging to a cross-regional grouping that includes the world's main emerging power, China. At the same time, there is scepticism within civil society about the development models being promoted inside this heterogeneous group when it comes to social

policies (Corrêa and Khanna 2015). There are also debates about the New Development Bank, including how to meaningfully operationalize its sustainable development component (Mineiro 2015), and how to avoid reproducing the problems of Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) lending (Borges and Waisbich 2014).

Although there has been continuity in Rousseff's foreign policy priorities—in its search for autonomy through the diversification of partnerships (Cornetet 2014; Mariano et al. 2015) and its focus on strengthening political alliances such as those with the BRICS countries (Milani 2015)—relations with developed countries have been brought once more to the centre of the agenda (BRICS Policy Centre 2011). For instance, Brazil has renewed its relations with developed countries in search of advanced technologies and training for Brazilians, through initiatives such as the Science without Borders Programme.¹⁷

A more pragmatic and win-win view on South-South relations also emerged. Commercial ties rather than grants or solidarity loans became more important in Brazilian engagement with Africa. A news article (Rossi 2013) stated that the so-called 'Africa Agenda' was elaborated by the African Working Group, an inter-ministerial group coordinated by *Casa Civil* (the Brazilian Presidential Chief of Staff Ministry), aimed at aligning ministries and establishing a national strategy towards Africa. The Africa Agenda includes various activities to strengthen Brazil's ties with Africa: apart from exploring economic issues, it also proposes increasing financial and human resources to humanitarian and technical cooperation, and prioritizing activities in which Brazil has accumulated specialized knowledge, such as poverty reduction, education, health and agriculture.

Shifts in financial cooperation¹⁸ that started emerging in the last years of the Lula administration, intended to widen the participation of Brazilian companies in exports and increase the number of eligible countries,¹⁹ were deepened with measures aimed, for instance, at rendering more flexible the criteria for loans made by the Export Stimulus Programme and the BNDES.²⁰ Such measures were mainly proposed by specialized working groups created within the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC)-headed *Brasil Maior* programme, which is described on its official website as the current government's 'industrial, technological and foreign trade policy'.²¹ BNDES opened its first overseas office in Africa, in Johannesburg, in December 2013 (others are now in Montevideo and London).

Growing interest in cooperation within the MDIC, particularly the parts dedicated to the promotion of Brazilian trade with African countries, is reflected in the creation of the Africa Subgroup that integrates the

Technical Group of Strategic Studies on Foreign Trade (GTEX). GTEX was created with a mandate of ‘producing studies and elaborating proposals on foreign trade policy with specific countries or regions’ (CAMEX 2012, 1), and it invites officials from the ABC, as well as the main technical cooperation implementing agencies such as Embrapa, to take part in its meetings.²² This is not the first time the MDIC has been involved in a group focused on relations with Africa. Lula’s Productive Development Policy (2008–10) included ‘integration with Africa’ as one of its strategic programmes. Its objective was to increase trade, investment and cooperation with Africa. To manage and define the goals of this programme, a committee was created, coordinated by the Brazilian Industrial Development Agency, which is linked to MDIC (Brasil nd).

Closer ties between cooperation and trade were further emphasized during the celebrations for the African Union’s 50th anniversary in 2013, when Rousseff announced the creation of a new agency of cooperation, trade and investment for Africa and Latin America, and also highlighting debt relief as a way to ensure more effective relations with Africa. According to an official note published by *Casa Civil*, these steps, in combination with new investment treaties and financing conditions, represent measures aimed at intensifying Brazil’s relations with the African continent relying on reciprocal cooperation and mutual development (Rossi 2013). Debt relief was necessary in order to allow BNDES lending for projects in which Brazilian companies were involved in Africa as well as to start implementation of the More Food International programme.²³

After the announcement, informal interviews and news articles (see Paraguassu 2013; Barbosa 2013) revealed two contending institutional models in dispute. The first model was a new agency with a cooperation, investment and trade remit linked directly to the presidency, reflecting the strained relationship between the president and the MRE. The second model involved strengthening the ABC and keeping its institutional anchorage at the MRE. Some diplomats and government officials argued against the eventual withdrawal of ABC from the MRE on the grounds that putting investments and technical cooperation together would lead to the rhetoric of solidarity being questioned, the MRE losing influence and Brazil’s international projection threatened (Fleck 2013; Barbosa 2013).

Scholars and representatives of civil society also shared their concerns over the possibility of putting Brazil’s development cooperation under the same umbrella as trade and investment. However, there was a degree of consensus that the ABC should be strengthened, or a new agency created, in order to overcome the legal and institutional obstacles to Brazilian

development cooperation. There are differences over the best locus for the new agency, but most emphasize the need for one institution responsible for data collection and accountability for all modalities. More recently, though, this debate has lost momentum and champions amid increasing pressure from domestic agendas.

TECHNICAL COOPERATION: TRENDS WITHIN DIVERSIFYING FUNDS

As noted above, SSDC often responds to the series of parallel (and sometimes conflicting) strategies of different actors beyond the MRE: the presidency, ministries and other implementing agencies, the private sector, civil society and traditional donors. It is therefore not an instrument of a single policy but of a multiplicity of interests. During Rouseff's first administration, different interests and coalitions have managed to mobilize political and financial support to ensure their continuity or expansion during a period in which SSDC lost political momentum.

Agriculture continued to be a key sector in Brazilian SSDC. An important point to note is that most of the flagship projects where implementation began from 2011 were developed and negotiated before Rouseff took office. These include PAA Africa (see more below), ProSavana²⁴ and More Food International. All these projects combine different modalities of cooperation—technical, humanitarian and financial—and are representative of the Brazilian agricultural development model, which supports both family farming and agribusiness.

There have been changes, though, in both the sectoral focus of cooperation and its institutional arrangements. In the transition from the Lula to Rouseff administrations, the Ministry of Defence has strengthened its role in decision-making concerning the allocation of technical cooperation actions. Whereas defence cooperation projects were only 1 % of ABC's portfolio during the Lula administrations, this rose to 16 % under Rouseff (Oliveira 2014). Even though there is no publicly available information since the 2010 Cobradi report, an article published by ABC's former director shows that in 2013 expenditure on public security was at the same level as education (11 % of expenditure) (Abreu 2013). This may be explained by a number of factors: the importance of the South Atlantic²⁵ as a priority political space (Abdenur and Neto 2014); the development of a more coherent defence policy through the publication of the Defence White Paper in

2012;²⁶ and the role of former Foreign Affairs Minister Celso Amorim as the new Defence Minister (Cornetet 2014; Oliveira 2014).

At the same time, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI) and agencies linked to it have intensified efforts to engage in South–South cooperation, for instance through negotiations to use Mercosur’s FOCEM resources to finance activities related to research and development, and the organization of an international panel on Africa by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) in 2013.²⁷

In terms of the technical cooperation budget under the ABC, two important funding shifts happened: the reduction of the agency’s budget for technical cooperation (Fig. 2.3) and an increase in trilateral funding and access to funds from the Brazil–USA WTO cotton dispute. In 2011, the first year of Rousseff’s administration, the ABC’s budget was US\$9.4 million (Barbosa 2011). In that year, all the national government’s compulsory and discretionary expenditure was cut. The MRE, just like other agencies and units, had to cut its budget for expenses such as per diems and tickets by 50 % as well as suspending new contracts to rent, buy and renovate properties and to rent cars, machines and equipment (Brasil 2011b). On the other hand, funding through trilateral cooperation with international organizations increased significantly, from US\$2.7 million in 2010 to US\$16.9 million in 2014 (Fig. 2.3). The most significant partners are FAO (US\$17 million for 2011–14), the International Labour Organization (US\$9 million) and the World Food Programme (WFP) (US\$7.6 million).

There is very little information available regarding the origins and destination of multilateral funds, but they are directed from ministries to multilateral organizations and are often restricted to specific activities. Further research is needed to unpack the drivers of the growth in funding from ministries to international organizations. Trilateral cooperation with bilateral donors is different in the respect that these donors tend to fund a significant part of project costs. Another source of new funding is the Brazilian Cotton Institute, which was created to receive funds from the Brazil–USA WTO trade dispute and which, between 2012 and 2014, directed around US\$30 million to cooperation initiatives, including a partnership between ABC and FAO in Latin America (IBA 2012, 2014). It has supported, for instance, the project Cotton 4 in Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin and Chad, which provided support to the development of the cotton industry in these countries through the testing and adaptation of productive cotton varieties in order to organize a regionally profitable supply chain.




Fig. 2.3. Evolution of ABC budget execution (US\$) *Source:* Authors, based on data from the ABC website (<http://www.abc.gov.br>).

What is clear is that multilateral organizations and bilateral donors have become essential players in SSDC, taking up roles that national structures cannot currently fulfil. Such arrangements were based on opportunities that emerged from the interaction between domestic constraints, coalitions and agendas as well as a changing context in development cooperation, which led traditional donors to turn to SSDC (Leite et al. 2014).

One of the most emblematic initiatives is PAA Africa, which aims to strengthen family farming by establishing local food supply chains, public networks of food and nutrition facilities and social assistance institutions, and food stocks in five African countries. The role of Brazilian institutions is to coordinate the project, provide technical support and formulate policy guidelines. FAO contributes technical expertise in nutrition-related and agricultural production issues; provides seeds, fertilizer and agriculture tools and inputs; fosters the exchange of knowledge; and supports partnerships and inter-institutional dialogue among project stakeholders. Finally, the WFP organizes food purchase and delivery, while other actors such as the UK Department for International Development support and take part in learning and knowledge-sharing activities.

Brazil's experience with PAA is an important achievement for the country's SSDC since it involves sharing experience about a programme that is the result of one of the key lessons learned from the National Food and Nutrition

Security Policy: its capacity to bring together production of and access to food. This achievement is even more important when seen as part of the effort by CGFOME to renew Brazilian humanitarian cooperation. CGFOME aims to combine emergency and structural action, which translate into a new model called 'sustainable humanitarian cooperation'. This hybrid of technical and humanitarian cooperation can be differentiated from other humanitarian initiatives mainly by local purchasing (Santarelli and Suyama 2016).

Another rising actor in Brazilian cooperation is the Centre of Excellence Against Hunger, which was created in 2011 as an initiative of the Ministry of Education and partnered and hosted by the WFP; it focuses on creating a forum for South–South policy dialogue and learning on school feeding and food and security programmes. It is important to note that key leaders in international organizations spearheading PAA were originally involved in the Zero Hunger programme (Leite et al. 2015). FAO Director-General, José Graziano, served as Extraordinary Minister for Food Security in Lula's cabinet and was responsible for implementing the programme. Daniel Balaban, the Director of WFP's Centre of Excellence Against Hunger, was adviser to the Economic and Social Development Council, linked to the presidency, and Director of the National Fund for the Development of Education.

Despite the lack of an official, coherent and unified policy for providing SSDC, the slowdown of presidential diplomacy, budgetary cuts and a much more challenging national and international context, Brazilian SSDC implementing agencies have developed a series of constantly evolving practices. They have done so by mobilizing coalitions and new institutional solutions to ensure financing and flexibility. Antonio Patriota, the Foreign Affairs Minister from 2011 to 2013, stated in an interview that after the expansion during the Lula years it was time to consolidate Brazil's position (Bachega 2014). Whether or not this was just 'diplomatic speak', there have been signals that various agencies have taken the opportunity to consolidate learning.

In 2015, there were movements underway in Brazilian foreign policy, more generally, and in the field of development cooperation in particular, that indicated potential steps to institutionalization of the latter. In the MRE, there were internal efforts to publish a Foreign Policy White Paper and an internal working group on international cooperation was created. The ABC established a reflection group on strategic planning, which included efforts to develop a comprehensive accounting system for SSDC, to be agreed upon and adopted by other non-OECD DAC donors. Progressive institutionalization could also be seen in the Ministry's efforts

to put forward a decree to make the Cobradi report official, in order to give this systematization effort a permanent character, and a draft bill on international cooperation. If approved, this piece of legislation could contribute to generating the necessary framework to overcome some of the logistical challenges for ABC to operationalize cooperation in terms of human resources and procuring goods and services for the benefit of Brazil's cooperation partners.

CONCLUSION

In a context marked by economic growth, Lula's presidential activism and growing domestic mobilization around Brazilian technical cooperation gained an unprecedented place in diplomatic discourse and practice in the first years of the twenty-first century. Despite belonging to the same party, Lula and Rousseff, faced with distinct political and economic contexts, have pursued different agendas. Moreover, the dispersion of Brazilian technical cooperation and the horizontalization of Brazilian foreign policy (Pineiro 2007) led to growing protagonism and learning within implementing agencies, as well as the creation of new institutions.

Although development cooperation assumed an unprecedented role as an instrument of Brazilian foreign policy under Lula's administrations, this drew on older diplomatic strategies and ideas about strengthening links with Southern countries as a means to promote Brazilian autonomy in international relations (Cardozo and Miyamoto 2006, cited in Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007; Saraiva 2007) and about the use of 'soft power' to influence global governance in the post-Cold War period (Fonseca Júnior 1998). Even though this strategy continued under Rousseff, the evolving cooperation with other BRICS countries, and its growing emphasis on mutual learning and development, can be seen as an example of shifting views around partners and strategies, conferring priority to countries with significant economic power rather than other coalitions, such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum or the regional integration agenda.

The analysis shows that narratives and principles shaping Brazilian SSDC illustrate a continuous dimension of Brazilian engagement with the global South. However, official narratives around drivers for engaging in technical cooperation have changed. Lula tended to emphasize political and diplomatic gains, such as the intensification of the relations among Southern countries, over purely commercial ones. Moreover, the discourse of solidarity was much stronger in his administrations, which would also point to Brazil's historical debt to the African continent due to slavery. Rousseff's discourse has adopted a more pragmatic tone, mostly emphasizing

commercial gains. This explains the emergence of new cooperation sectors, such as science and technology, and the proposal for the creation of an enlarged ABC that would include export and trade promotion.

In practice, however, there has been an increasing trend since 2002 towards blurring the lines between cooperation, trade and investment. This is seen in the intersection between technical cooperation and other modalities of Brazilian development cooperation and foreign policy, such as humanitarian assistance, export financing, participation in peace missions and scientific and technological cooperation. This trend is driven by the incidence of traditional and emerging strategies of coalitions that influence the allocation of Brazil's development cooperation. Civil society actors have raised concerns over the closed links between cooperation, trade and defence. For instance, tensions caused by the ProSavana project in Mozambique revolve around the important question of the extent to which gains for certain economic sectors create significant losses to local communities (UNAC 2014). The challenges reflect conflicting models of agricultural development, such as support to agribusiness and family farming, suggesting the need for reflection on whether Brazilian cooperation is exporting the country's internal conflicts (Mello 2011).

Though Brazilian foreign policy priorities have shifted during Rousseff's administration, this chapter argues that some domestic coalitions and foreign actors supporting Brazil's engagement in SSDC have continued to mobilize. Different implementing agencies have found national and international supporters to ensure current and future projects, even in times of economic uncertainty. That is why a decreased ABC budget since 2010 has not prevented Brazil from sustaining growing disbursements in modalities such as contributions to UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian cooperation or to move forward with projects such as Cotton 4, More Food International and PAA Africa, notably through tri-lateral arrangements.

The crucial role of multilateral and bilateral organizations is also a continuous aspect of Brazilian cooperation. However, domestic actors have accumulated more capacity to influence the agenda, through their engagements in international policy networks and the creation of new institutions. As the PAA example demonstrates, the dynamics differ from the internationalization of the Zero Hunger programme, which was mainly driven by traditional donors, in particular the World Bank. It is also different from initiatives implemented by the historical SSDC institutions—Fiocruz, Embrapa and Senai—which tend to 'export' institutional models rather than policies.

In contrast with earlier decades of Brazilian engagement in technical cooperation, when the main foreign policy decision-making institution was

the MRE, decision-making has been rendered more complex by growing interest in foreign policy from other governmental institutions (line ministries and sub-national governments), the private sector and civil society (Lima 2000; Milani and Pinheiro 2013).²⁸ There are varying explanations of such influence in shaping SSDC priorities: the degree of a national institution's internationalization in terms of participation in international networks and forums, key spaces in terms of generating demands for cooperation; the existence of global instruments and international commitments in each particular area, and Brazil's adherence to them; the proximity of the national institution to the presidency; the ability of the institution to match its engagement in technical cooperation with each administration's priorities; the degree of cohesion inside the institution regarding the necessity and legitimacy of providing technical cooperation; and the presence of technical cooperation components involving the institution in broader sectorial and national plans.

Brazil's growing activism in development cooperation coexists with and is shaped by, on the one hand, the persistence of challenges to national development, which generates political sensitivities in the decision-making process, especially when overall public opinion has little interest in Brazilian foreign policy (De Almeida et al. 2012), and those who have an interest are split over whether Brazil should provide financial and other forms of assistance to other developing countries (Henson 2013). On the other hand, there are challenges in setting up a solid national institutional framework for development cooperation that allows for a sustainable flow of resources, as well as national planning and coordination to respond to the influx of demands. Lima (2015) points out that the favourable political and economic context during the Lula administration, and its 'active and independent' foreign policy, may have wrongly led to the belief that the conditions were set for the country's autonomous engagement in the international system. This belief may have discouraged the institutionalization, for instance, of improved mechanisms for the country's development cooperation.

In 2014, Dilma Rousseff was elected for a second mandate (2015-2018). However, a series of events have led the country to a political turmoil that culminated, in April 2016, with the opening of an impeachment process. In May, Rousseff had to step aside, leaving vice-president Michel Temer as the interim president until the process is completed. Such process has been highly contested and is seen as a coup by the Workers Party, the Brazilian left wing parties and social movements and many other sectors of society. As of this writing, whether Senators will vote for her to be removed from office in August or to be reinstalled to serve until her term

ends is unclear. Temer has, nonetheless, already carried out a ministerial reform, appointing a new cabinet, reducing the number of line ministries, and redesigning priorities.

MRE was deeply affected, and the new Chancellor José Serra (a well-known social-democrat politician) was mandated with the task of “invigorating” Brazilian foreign policy through re-aligning it with country’s foreign investment and trade priorities. Such direction deepens the trend already existent under Dilma, demonstrated, for instance, through a series of new bilateral Cooperation and Trade Facilitation Agreements with Southern partners. Serra has already vocalized his intention to review Brazilian South-South relations, moving away from relations based on “compassion” towards “effective economic and technological exchange, and investments” (Serra 2016). As part of this effort, the interim government has moved the Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX) from the MDIC to the MRE. Nevertheless, Serra also represents a significant rupture, as he disregards the trajectory built around the Workers’ Party alive and active foreign policy.

Shifts in the country’s highest political leadership is also impacting other actors of Brazilian cooperation, and the coalitions discussed in the previous sections. On the one hand, line ministries have been affected by the ministerial reforms. For instance, MDS and MDA have merged and most the key individuals involved in their cooperation initiatives have either resigned or been dismissed. On the other hand, civil society groups mobilized around the cooperation agenda (see Pomeroy et al., this volume) have been absorbed by national politics, in what they call a “resistance to the current democratic setbacks”, hindering their ability to dedicate energy to engage with development cooperation. However, other issues related to development cooperation, such as the BRICS New Development Bank, which started its operations in April 2016, can fuel remobilization.

As discussed in this chapter, Brazilian development cooperation is shaped by a variety of national interests and actors. In the present context, it remains to be seen how old and new coalitions, as well as the domestic and international context, will impact Brazilian cooperation priorities and practice. The experience of many traditional donors show that, just like in the Brazilian case, economic crisis indeed affect the agenda of development cooperation, promoting its alignment with national interests. However, if domestic constituencies do not demobilize and development cooperation’s institutional structures prove to be robust, there might be some room to mediate among pressures from different groups. Perhaps the big question for the future is if the Brazilian government will be able to undertake such mediation, or if polarization among different development models in foreign policy will endure.

NOTES

1. Responding to a proposal made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) to the Presidency, in January 2010 a partnership between ABC and the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), supported by the Presidency's Civil Office, resulted in the first official survey on Brazilian international development cooperation for 2005–09 (Brasil 2010), which was updated in 2013 with 2010 data (Brasil 2013). Data from those reports will be referred to here as the 'Cobradi report'. Praised nationally and internationally for this first gathering, systematization and publicizing effort, Cobradi is also useful for being the first official attempt to define and account for Brazilian development cooperation. The initiative nonetheless has shortcomings; for instance, it has not published annual reports since 2010, it does not follow an open data format and there are methodological inconsistencies between the two editions.
2. This was particularly felt after there was a major turn from traditional donors in the 1970s to targeting social sectors almost exclusively in a global effort for poverty alleviation, which was at odds with Brazilian focus on economic growth at the time.
3. See the introduction to this volume for more on the UN 1978 Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries.
4. The non-indifference concept inferred the easing of the principle of non-intervention. Spektor (2010, 194) notes that the idea was first mentioned by Lula in a speech in 2004: 'Growing approximation and consolidation of Brazil's relations with its region require that situations of instability in regional countries deserve a more attention follow up on the part of the Brazilian government, which is oriented by the principle of non-intervention, but also by an attitude of non-indifference.'
5. For a more detailed account of Brazilian narratives and counter-narratives around the uniqueness and better fit of its SSDC, see the policy debate section in Leite et al. (2014). See also Cabral (2012) for the myths and challenges of Brazil–Africa relations, beyond the over-statements and political rhetoric of affinities.
6. The ABC directors Elim Saturnino Ferreira Dutra (1995–2001) and Marco Cesar Naslausky (2001–03) emphasized this point to Iglesias Puente (2010, 329–32), arguing that Brazil should share its own creative and innovative experiences and practices rather than those acquired through developed countries.

7. The 'culturalist discourse' emerged in Brazilian foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s, conferring symbolic relevance to Africa for its participation in the construction of Brazil as a nation (Saraiva 1997).
8. An isolated activity 'is an instrument created with a well-defined and specific objective, which is complete in itself, a precise undertaking, which aims to meet one single demand, with a reduced budget. It is not linked to any other activity, is less complex, on a small scale and lasts a short period of time' (MRE 2007, 6, note). A project 'is an operational working unit of cooperation activities, by which means external funding is transformed into a joint fund to be used for a single objective, organised and programmed to meet previously identified requirements' (MRE 2007, 6, note).
9. Correlations between economic growth in donor countries and foreign aid were identified in several studies. For instance, Sagasti and Alcade (1999) state that the generosity of rich countries towards poorer ones emerged during the golden age of capitalism in the post-World War II setting.
10. Concentration of Brazilian technical cooperation in Latin America is not new. In general, the involvement of Brazil in technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC) was enhanced by the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, which was approved at the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (1978). According to data presented by Cervo (1994), among the 694 TCDC projects involving Brazil registered until 1989, two had started in the 1960s, 26 in the 1970s and the remaining in the 1980s. Most of the demands came from Latin American countries (475 projects), followed by Africa (37 projects), Asia (37) and Europe (11).
11. However, Mercosur countries have been the main destination of Brazilian contributions to international organizations, with the Mercosur's FOCEM leading expenditures (Brasil 2010).
12. These complementary resources did not enter into ABC's budget; they were allocated by MRE itself through a specific umbrella project with UNDP (Iglesias Puente 2010).
13. The end of the Cold War, globalization, the emergence of new themes in global agendas and prospects for a multipolar world order are seen as having opened opportunities for Brazil to influence global order design through soft capabilities (Abdenur 1994; Vigevani et al. 2003).

14. Agriculture ranked first in the number of actions since the 1995–96 period, while health started ranking second since the 1997–2001 period (Iglesias Puente 2010).
15. Ranking of cooperation received in 2005 was education and vocational training (33%), agriculture (16%), and social/education (16%) (Valler Filho 2007).
16. Saraiva (2014) explains that the relationship between the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deteriorated, and both the budget and the number of posts offered decreased. Moreover, news articles emphasized the President's lack of admiration of and patience towards diplomats. This was further demonstrated in Rousseff's speech at the Brazilian Diplomatic School in 2012 in which she said that the ministry needed more engineers, physicists and mathematicians.
17. See <http://www.cienciasemfronteiras.gov.br/web/cs-f-eng>.
18. Financial cooperation is understood as the transfer of financial resources and lending to other developing countries. It can be reimbursable or non-reimbursable and include diverse modalities such as debt relief, concessional lending and export credits. Thus, it includes flows that the OECD classifies as 'concessional lending' and 'other official flows'.
19. For data on the evolution of disbursements made to Sub-Saharan countries during the Lula administration, see World Bank and IPEA (2011) and Cabral (2012).
20. See, for instance, the measure that authorized the use of Indirect ACC by exports made by Brazilian *trading* (<http://www.comexbrasil.gov.br/conteudo/ver/chave/uso-do-acc-indireto-nas/>). For more information on the development of mechanisms aiming at boosting Brazilian trade with Sub-Saharan African countries, see Cabral (2012) and IPEA and World Bank (2011).
21. See <http://www.brasilmaior.mdic.gov.br/conteudo/128>.
22. The resolution that created the GTEX in May 2012 is available at http://www.mdic.gov.br/arquivos/dwnl_1336587768.pdf.
23. Created in 2010 by the Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development, this project aims to encourage food production and productivity in the family farming sector in Africa and to facilitate access to food production-related machinery and equipment. It combines technical and financial cooperation with an inter-sectoral (agricultural and industrial) approach, in order to increase family farming productivity in a sustainable way and to support national food security strategies.

24. ProSavana, in Mozambique's Nacala corridor, is a trilateral programme with Japan. It is focused on the agricultural development of Mozambique's tropical savannah. Technical cooperation was initially accompanied by the intention of attracting private investment to promote the development of agribusiness and food production in the Nacala region.
25. Concern over the South Atlantic is strongly linked to the protection of Brazil's offshore oil reserves (pré-sal) and the prospect of their exploration. The South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, created in 1986 but revitalized since 2007, is a multilateral space in which Brazil is a protagonist and defends the revision of the international law of seas with consequences for access of regional resources, such as oil.
26. The White Paper articulates defence policies and their relationship with other areas such as the environment and regional collective security. According to its multidimensional perspective of security (human, common/collective, citizen and food), cooperation and further integration of a collective zone of security formed by its neighbours are essential for the realization of shared goals on development.
27. During the Lula administrations, CNPq had an important role in South–South cooperation through initiatives such as the South American and African Programmes of Support to Science and Technology Cooperation Activities (PROSUL and PROÁFRICA). However, both programmes were interrupted in 2011. According to da Silva and Furtado (2013), the interruption of PROÁFRICA, as well as of other initiatives, resulted from the decision to focus CNPq's efforts on the Science without Borders programme.
28. The progressive democratization of Brazilian foreign policy and the gradual inclusion of new actors in the policy-making process date from the beginning of the 1990s and respond to a series of domestic dynamics, such as the country's re-democratization and liberalization processes since 1985, as well as imperatives from an increasingly globalized and interdependent world (Lima 2000; França and Sanchez 2009; Milani and Pinheiro 2013). The coming into power in 2003 of the Workers' Party, traditionally an opposition party, has added a new impetus to this ongoing process at the presidential level, with a steady—albeit controlled—openness to other social sectors (from trade unions and social movements, to certain businesses, such as the civil construction sector).

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Russia: A Re-emerging Donor

*Marina Larionova, Mark Rakhmangulov,
and Marc P. Berenson*

Similar to the other BRICS countries (Brazil, China, India and South Africa), since 2007 Russia has been creating, or rather ‘re-creating’, an international development assistance programme and has become an active global development cooperation partner. While the Soviet Union was one of the largest donor countries in the world, Russian official development assistance, according to official government sources, increased more than

M. Larionova (✉)

Head of the Center for International Institutions Research (CIIR),
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
(RANEPA), 11 Prechistenskaya naberezhnaya, Moscow 119034, Russia

M. Rakhmangulov

Lead Analyst, Center for International Institutions Research (CIIR),
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
(RANEPA), 11 Prechistenskaya naberezhnaya, Moscow 119034, Russia

M.P. Berenson

King’s Russia Institute, King’s College London, Strand,
London WC2R 2LS, UK

eightfold in a decade, from US\$100 million in 2004 to US\$876 million in 2014. Russia consistently promotes cooperation for international development and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in major global governance institutions. But to what extent is Russia's international development assistance compatible with its international cooperation strategy and domestic development priorities?

This chapter attempts to respond to this question by exploring the country's development assistance policy in detail. After a brief background on the history of Russian and Soviet international development assistance, the authors examine (1) the normative and institutional framework and (2) the sector and country/geographic foci of Russia's international development assistance.

At this stage, it may be hypothesized that there are three major factors that influence Russia's choice of partner countries, areas of assistance and the domestic structures of assistance delivery: the choice is driven, first, by security concerns; second, by economic interests; and third, by existing commitments in multilateral organizations.

RUSSIA'S HISTORICAL ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Among the new, emerging donors, Russia is truly unique for actually being a 're-emerging' donor, having been, as the Soviet Union, one of the largest donor countries in the world, only to become a recipient country in the 1990s, before building a foreign development assistance programme anew from the middle of the 2000s onwards. In becoming a donor again, little attention was initially paid to its Soviet-era development expertise in building a new Russian assistance programme (Korepanov and Komagaeva 2012a, 9), although this has been changing somewhat in recent years.

The volume of Soviet aid was quite significant. While the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) never published statistics, some researchers estimate that the annual development assistance offered by the Soviet Union may well have averaged 0.2–0.25 % of the country's gross national income (GNI), while the volume of international assistance from 1954 to 1991 can be estimated to amount to some US\$78 billion (Korepanov and Komagaeva 2012a, 13). Based on official criteria for what comprises overseas development assistance (ODA), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) suggested that less than half of Soviet assistance could have been classified as ODA (Korepanov and Komagaeva 2012a, 11). Meanwhile, as compensation for extinguishing debts from the extension of credits, the USSR did receive




Fig. 3.1. Russia's ODA volume, 2004–2013 (*Source:* authors' calculations)

goods valued at some 3.5 billion roubles each year, which accounted for 15 % of Soviet imports (Degterev 2013, 243). As Hynes and Trzeciak-Duval (2014, 9) indicate, until the late 1980s the OECD DAC collected statistics from various sources (USSR statistical yearbooks, newspapers, the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation, the US Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] and the British Ministry of Defence) but was not convinced of the accuracy of the figures. In the late 1980s, in spite of a better dialogue between the DAC and the USSR, the discrepancies in statistics persisted, as the Soviet Union did not share the same definition of aid as the DAC and did not differentiate between economic and military assistance, including trade subsidies into aid.

The Soviet Union's core ideological contribution to development assistance—the introduction of the concept of a non-capitalist path of development—originated in the mid-1950s, when Nikita Khrushchev came to power and the USSR began to target developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America for assistance, which continued until the late 1980s (Korepanov and Komagaeva 2012a, 10). Throughout, as Cooper and Fogarty (1985, 54) write, Moscow's basic political objectives “remained constant—to erode Western influence and substitute it by its own, to counteract the Chinese challenge to its ‘leadership’ of national liberation movements, and eventually to persuade Third World countries that Soviet Communism offers the only viable solution to their economic problems.” Hence, from the 1950s onwards, development assistance as well as military assistance became part of the Soviet–US Cold War struggle for political influence of elites across the then called ‘Third World’ (Kanet 2010, 3, 13). By the mid-1970s, when Soviet

assistance programmes were at their peak, Soviet leaders, including Leonid Brezhnev, referred to the emergence of a “Socialist International Division of Labour” that was supplanting the declining capitalist international system (Kanet 2010, 7).

The Soviet Union’s regional priorities for aid can be broken down into three main groups: (1) the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), which included most of Eastern Europe as well as Cuba, Mongolia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Vietnam; (2) countries that were socialist-oriented—both Marxist–Leninist states in Africa and non-Marxist–Leninist states in the Middle East; and (3) strategically located non-Socialist countries such as India, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey (Korepanov and Komagaeva 2012a, 12). Aid, politically driven, was used to help move these countries further along a non-capitalist path of development. “By investing considerable resources into large industrial projects of national importance, Soviet leaders aimed at creating a base for the ‘peaceful transfer’ of developing countries to socialism and assisting them to reproduce the Soviet model of industrialization” (Korepanov and Komagaeva 2012a, 11).

With respect to the countries receiving their assistance, the Soviets did not view themselves as a colonial power, nor did they view themselves as an empire exploiting the periphery (Bach 2003, 2). Rather, the Soviet Union’s unique experience in modernization was something that could be shared with the developing world. The fast/push development that the USSR introduced in the 1950s came from the crash industrialization of the Soviet Union in the 1930s Interview with Larisa Kapitsa 2013. In fact, it is a similarly unique perspective on modernization that Russia feels as if it, like other BRICS states, can uniquely offer the developing world today. “The value added [of Russia’s foreign development assistance] is exactly the [same] perspective [as] when you see both ends of the ladder ... close up,” Aleksey Kvasov, Russia’s G8 Sherpa, told an audience at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics (Kvasov 2013).

As the 1990s rolled in, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing economic crisis, Russia became an official aid recipient.¹ Since 1990, Russia, together with some other Central and Eastern Europe countries and transition economies, has been included in Part II of the DAC list of aid recipient countries.² Nevertheless, Russia, even during the 1990s, continued to take part in humanitarian operations, making regular contributions to international organizations, and agreeing to relieve the debt burden of poor countries, though its participation in development assistance was quite limited both in scope and in types of assistance.

RECENT EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENDA

From 1999, Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) showed healthy annual growth with an average of almost 7 % per year, until the dramatic drop of -7.8 % in 2009. In 2013, Russia was included in the group of high-income economies according to the World Bank classification (based on the GNI per capita threshold, but by a very small margin).

From the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russia became more actively involved in development cooperation. Russia is a member of the G20, BRICS and, until recently, the G8, and it is an emerging donor with a multilateral aid presence. It is not identified in any public documents that Russia considers itself a partner in South-South cooperation (SSC). Nevertheless, it generally supports South-South cooperation, including through donations to the World Bank SSC support mechanism. Russia also strives to enhance cooperation with the main SSC providers, especially its partners in the BRICS countries. Russia's officials characterize Russia's role in international development cooperation as a "re-emerging donor inclined toward the OECD norms and principles."³

Observers note that Russia "straddles a unique middle ground between developed and developing countries and has a re-emerging aid programme" (Hynes and Trzeciak-Duval 2014, abstract). Given that Russia inherited a vast Soviet Union experience of external aid provision, the term 're-emerging' instead of 'emerging' or 'new' donor is widespread and preferable in the community of Russian experts.

The 'soft power' concept is an important notion in the Russian discourse on development cooperation and a stumbling block in discussions among various federal authorities. Some officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and *Rossotrudnichestvo* emphasize that the majority of foreign donors use development assistance as a tool to improve their image and influence recipients' policies and attitudes towards donors. Thus, Russia should do the same by actively promoting its development assistance and channelling more aid through bilateral mechanisms, as multilateral aid is usually identified with international organizations. The Ministry of Finance strongly opposes this approach, arguing that too much attention to soft power and increasing visibility could decrease the effectiveness of aid in economic terms. This issue has recently been openly discussed by Russian officials in the media. The director of the International Financial Relations Department in the Ministry of Finance, Andrey Bokarev, said

that development assistance and soft power promotion are “close activities,” but they “should not be mixed.” According to him soft power includes “working with compatriots, culture and language promotion” (Chernenko 2014).

Nevertheless, the “Development Policy Concept 2014” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2014) recognizes development assistance as one of Russia’s foreign policy instruments and stipulates that it should be implemented in line with the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013a).

The latest version of the Foreign Policy Concept, adopted on 12 February 2013, regards development assistance within the section ‘International Cooperation in the Sphere of Economy and Environment’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013a). “Sustainable social and economic development of all countries” is recognized as an “indispensable element of the modern system of collective security,” and Russia believes that measures to facilitate international development should be aimed at finding effective ways to support efforts to eliminate imbalances in the development of various regions. To that end, Russia is using its donor potential to pursue active and targeted policies in the area of international development at both the multilateral and bilateral levels. It is notable that exactly the same wording was used in the previous version of the Foreign Policy Concept (adopted on 12 July 2008) (President of Russia 2008).

According to the Development Policy Concept 2014, Russia supports the aspiration of the international community to sustainable social and economic development of all countries. The document spells out global and regional objectives. At the global level, Russia prioritizes elimination of poverty, influence on worldwide processes for the purposes of forming a stable and fair world order, overcoming the consequences of natural disasters, as well as reinforcement of a positive perception of Russia. At the regional level, four objectives are emphasized: the formation of good neighbourly relations with adjacent countries, assistance to the removal of the existing and potential seats of tensions and conflicts, development of integration processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and facilitating the development of trade and economic cooperation.

In spite of the global economic crisis, Russia has not only been able to meet its earlier commitments but has also significantly increased its expenditures on international development aid (Kudrin 2010). Russian ODA in 2009 was 3.5 times greater than it was in 2008. Russian Foreign Ministry representatives confirm that this substantial increase is due to urgent aid

allocation to main partners, especially CIS member states, to help them cope with the economic crisis.

RUSSIA'S FOREIGN ASSISTANCE STRUCTURES

Legislative Framework

Russian legislation in the sphere of development assistance is still being developed. Analysis shows that Russian law lacks the majority of terms and notions (including concepts as important as ODA), while some terms, though they exist in Russian law, are given different definitions to the same terms in DAC documents (Dedusenko et al. 2009). Some external aid provision notions can be found in certain by-laws,⁴ regional integration treaties⁵ and strategic concept documents. Some terms ('humanitarian aid', 'technical aid') were officially recognized in the legislation on Russia's participation in the international development assistance as a recipient (Government of the Russian Federation 1999a, b).

A major step forward in re-creating Russia's development cooperation system was the Ministry of Finance's adoption of a strategic vision of the substance and priorities of Russia's policy concerning the provision of development assistance, known as the 'Concept of Russia's Participation in International Development Assistance'⁶ (or simply 'Concept') in 2007 (Ministry of Finance 2007a). The document was developed in the run up to Russia's G8 presidency in 2006 and approved by the Russian President a year later. In a way, this confirms the assumption that Russia's commitments in international organizations are a factor in defining the country's development assistance policy.

In 2014, a new attempt to shape the conceptual and governance framework of Russian development assistance was made. The 'Concept of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Assisting International Development' (Development Policy Concept 2014) was adopted by the Russian President on 20 April 2014.

According to the Development Policy Concept 2014, the mechanism for development policy implementation includes two main items:

1. State Programmes, which are implemented by the federal authorities that are engaged in international development cooperation;
2. Commission of the Russian Federation for International Development Assistance, which is "to be established in order to coordinate the

activities of federal authorities in the area of international development assistance and to prepare proposals on main directions of the Russian Federation's State policy in that area for the President of the Russian Federation" (Rossotrudnichestvo 2014). The regulations of the Commission and its membership are to be defined and adopted by the Russian President. Creation of the commission marks a major breakthrough in intergovernment coordination.

Though the new document is rather emasculated, Russia's existing conceptual framework on international development assistance does provide for a role for the academic, civil society and business communities in implementing the state policy on development assistance. It makes a contribution towards developing the system of ODA cost-effectiveness assessment in Russia, articulating the criteria for evaluating effectiveness of the funds allocated for development projects, and stipulates that evaluation shall be carried out in cooperation with relevant authorities of the recipient states and/or heads of international organizations.

National Policy Institutions

Policy-makers are the key actors in shaping the policy and actions on development assistance. The three major stakeholders are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Presidential Administration. Their decision-making is driven by their respective missions and commitments, both domestic and international. Several other agencies and institutions are responsible for development assistance: the Ministry of Economic Development; the Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Disaster Relief; the Ministry of Industry and Trade; the Ministry of Energy; the Ministry of Education and Science; the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection. Other interested agencies may also participate in the activities. Rospotrebnadzor is engaged in support on health-related programmes. The Federal Medical-Biological Agency operates in the programme of HIV vaccine development in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Biopreparaty Magazine 2007). The Russian Presidential Executive Office is one of the key stakeholders in development assistance and cooperation for development given its role in G8 and G20 forums.

In September 2008, Rossotrudnichestvo was established under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to its charter,

this federal executive body is engaged in the facilitation and development of international relations between Russia and the member states of the CIS and other states, as well as in the sphere of international humanitarian cooperation. It currently develops and implements bilateral development assistance programmes for the CIS member states (Rossotrudnichestvo 2010).

Further institutional changes concerning development-related ministries and agencies are underway. A case in point is the Presidential Decree No. 476 of 8 May 2013, on the competencies of the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation, charging Rossotrudnichestvo with the responsibilities, “in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other federal executive bodies to develop and implement mid-term and long-term bilateral development assistance programmes with the CIS member states and other countries, as well as carry out monitoring of these programmes” (President of Russia 2013). To implement these new responsibilities, the Agency will receive funds from the federal budget, execute its rights to contract third parties and will expand the presence of its 59 centres of research and culture, 8 branches and 18 representatives within Russia’s diplomatic missions, currently working in 77 countries.

Since 2014, Russian budget expenditures have mainly been allocated to state programmes, rather than ministerial or federal agency budgets, to ensure consistency, effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the actions of federal authorities.

In 2012–2013, five state programmes were adopted, which mention international development assistance in their aims, priorities or main activities: Foreign Policy Activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Management of State Finance of the Ministry of Finance; Foreign Economic Activity of the Ministry of Economic Development; Health System Development of the Ministry of Health; and Combatting Drug Trafficking of the Federal Drug Control Service.

In April 2014, new versions of all these state programmes were adopted by the government (Government of the Russian Federation 2014a, b, c, d, e). The format of the programmes was changed and now they do not contain detailed information, which makes them less transparent. Thus, the update of the state programmes contradicts the community of experts’ recommendations to make them “more detailed to avoid the overlapping of functions and responsibilities, as well as to outline specific legal and policy measures and provide for the monitoring and evaluation of results”

(Larionova et al. 2014). However, the general structure of these programmes remained mainly unchanged.

The Foreign Policy Activity State Programme (Government of the Russian Federation 2014), consisting of three subprogrammes, provides for Russian military participation in international peacekeeping operations (responsibility of the Ministry of Defence) and provision of humanitarian aid, including emergency humanitarian response (conducted jointly by the Emergency Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); for Russia's funding of a wide range of CIS and Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) institutions and support to further integration in the region, including medical and social aid to the veterans who participated in local regional conflicts; and, through Rossotrudnichestvo, a budget allocation for international humanitarian and development assistance of US\$1.6 billion for a period of eight years (2013–2020).⁷

The State Finance Management Programme (Ministry of Finance 2015) focuses on state debt management and debt settlement. Its Subprogramme on Development of International Financial and Economic Cooperation includes cooperation programmes with international financial and economic organizations, including development assistance and elaboration and implementation of development assistance measures on multilateral and bilateral bases, as well as accountability and accounting.

The State Programme on Foreign Economic Activity provides for technical assistance and strengthening integration within the Customs Union, Possotrudnichestvo 2014. EURASEC and Eurasian Economic Union. Cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is mentioned as an important factor in enhancing Russia's donor capacity to "project its national interests in different regions." The activities are linked to the goal of creating a national export support system.

The State Programme on Health System Development⁸ calls for the promotion of Russian healthcare in foreign countries, with a special focus on the CIS countries and cooperation within the G8, BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

The Combatting Drug Trafficking State Programme (Federal Drug Control Service of Russia 2014) includes technical assistance to drug control services in Afghanistan, Central Asian and other interested countries on a bilateral basis, and participation in UN Office on Drugs and Crime programmes. It is expected that the role of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) in Russia's development

assistance will be further strengthened, given that in April 2013 the Russian Government supported the idea of FSKN Director Viktor Ivanov to create a Russian Corporation of Cooperation with Central Asian Countries (Federal Drug Control Service of Russia 2013a). The Corporation's aim is to help Central Asian countries in their "alternative" development, that is, creation of favourable economic conditions through infrastructure development and jobs creation to prevent drug production and trafficking in these countries (Federal Drug Control Service of Russia 2013b).

As a whole, the current state programmes show an emphasis on security, humanitarian support, education and health. Eurasian regional interests are consistent with bilateral and multilateral assistance priorities mentioned above. Adoption of state programmes that directly include development assistance activities is an important step towards creating a coherent Russian development assistance system. The programmes are also evidence of the growing understanding that foreign assistance is an instrument of foreign policy (Denis Degterev 2013). However, ensuring policy coherence and synergies among a wide range of actions within this framework remains a challenge.

IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS

The majority of Russian foreign assistance is not distributed directly by Russia itself due to current capacity constraints. According to the data submitted by Russia to the OECD DAC, 36 % of total ODA in 2010 was multilateral. But almost 26 % of bilateral ODA was allocated through specific-purpose programme and funds managed by international organizations.⁹ Expanding multilateral development assistance, Russia uses its advantages such as the availability of well-established aid delivery mechanisms coupled with additional coordination and harmonization opportunities provided by international organizations, as well as financial monitoring systems, and technical capacity/expertise and knowledge (Kudrin 2010). Thus, 62 % of Russian ODA is managed by international organizations.

Russia has a well-established long-term relationship with the World Bank and relies on its expertise, experience and global reach in developing countries. Several new trust funds have been created in the World Bank with Russia's participation. There are five single trust funds where Russia is the only donor (US\$107 million committed). The World Bank plays an

important role in helping Russia create its national system of development assistance, maintaining “strong operational and strategic partnership between Russia and the World Bank Group (WBG), involving knowledge sharing and continued engagement from Russian counterparts at a strategic governance level” (World Bank 2011, Annex 10, 3).

The Ministry of Finance is the main Russian counterpart and proponent of international organizations in the sphere of development assistance. The Concept on Russia’s Participation in International Development Assistance adopted in 2007 states that bilateral aid cooperation requires “the availability of channels for aid delivery to beneficiaries and a regulatory legal framework enabling the transfer of funds from Russia’s federal budget to the recipient’s national budget” (Ministry of Finance 2007a, 8). Until these mechanisms are in place, Russia will mainly rely on multilateral aid, which enables it to take advantage of international organizations’ “financial controls, well-established institutional mechanisms of aid delivery, additional opportunities for aid coordination and harmonization, and technical (expert) potential and knowledge” (Ministry of Finance 2007a, 9). This is a pragmatic approach. However, to get all of the above elements in place and operational, Russia needs a more explicit and targeted action plan.

Many Russian officials criticize the fact that most of Russia’s aid is multilateral. Multilaterals are seen to pool contributions from different countries so that they lose their identity and become an integral part of its financial assets. This limits the international public awareness of Russia’s contribution to development assistance. One of the main proponents of bilateral aid is the Ministry of Economic Development, which insists that Russia’s development assistance should be aimed at creating favourable conditions for exporting Russian goods, services and investments, and should be carried out in strong cooperation with the private sector. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008) also supports the idea that the majority of Russia’s aid should be delivered on a bilateral basis. *Rossotrudnichestvo* could become the main government entity responsible for bilateral development cooperation—though, for it to become a full-scale development assistance agency, a real breakthrough would be needed.

In 2009, as a response to the international financial crisis, Russia initiated the establishment of a regional multilateral mechanism—the EURASEC Anti-crisis Fund, administered by Eurasian Development Bank “to help deal with crisis related challenges in affected EurAsEC countries.”¹⁰ Russia’s contribution is 75 % of the total US\$10 billion

that makes up the Fund. The main instruments are general budget support and concessional loans for economic development projects.¹¹ As the main shareholder of the Eurasian Development Bank and major contributor of the Anti-crisis Fund, Russia in fact controls all the Fund's operations.

According to the World Bank (2011), the Russian Government maintains "a strong focus on results achieved under the Russia-supported trust funds." The government has consistently communicated to the Bank "the importance of reporting clear results and making all possible efforts to keep within the agreed timetables and deadlines" and "documented progress under ongoing trust funds will be regarded as a precondition for financing of related new and follow-up programmes."

The Russian Accounts Chamber occasionally assesses the effectiveness and expediency of disbursement of state funds for some aspects of Russia's development assistance, including humanitarian aid (Russian Accounts Chamber 2011). However, it does not assess international organizations. In 2014, a special unit of development programmes control and assessment within the department of international development cooperation was created in Rossotrudnichestvo. However, there is no special analysis of the impact of Russian ODA in the recipient countries.

Almost nothing substantial has been achieved in establishing public-private partnerships in development assistance to date, despite the fact that such partnerships could facilitate support from the Ministry of Economic Development with regard to new aid activities.

Although Russia continues to deliver on its commitments to assist international development even in a time of crisis and austerity, the cumulative volume of political ownership of the process is insufficient to generate the desired security, economic and social outcomes in the partner countries or to create political and economic benefits for Russia.

SECTORAL PRIORITIES

The current priorities of Russia's development assistance programme were mainly formulated during Russia's G8 Presidency in 2006. Energy, health and education have been put forward. These priorities and the OECD recommendations on higher concentration on limited development areas have been taken into account in the Concept of Russia's Participation in International Development Assistance (Ministry of Finance 2007a).

The choice of the priorities can be explained by a combination of factors, including the following:

- Legacy of the Soviet Union development system, which helped many developing countries strengthen their health and education systems;
- Russia's comparative advantages in the selected areas, including huge energy resources and developed technologies, high human resource potential in health and competitive education system;
- Active position and strong capacity of certain ministries and agencies promoting relevant priorities (e.g. Rospotrebnadzor's efforts to include combatting infectious diseases as a priority);
- High importance of the selected spheres for sustainable development—for example, some government representatives emphasize energy as a priority, “because normal development of health and education without access to energy is impossible” (Ministry of Finance 2007b).

Official information on the breakdown of Russia's ODA by sectoral priorities is not available. According to recent information published by the World Bank (2013), the majority of Russia's ODA is allocated to the health sector (estimated at about 40 %), education accounts for about 25 %, while spending on energy and food accounts for the remaining 35 %. Debt relief is not included in these estimations.

Cooperation for development is also pursued by Russia in such spheres as good governance. For example, the Federal Service for Fiscal Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring) helps several countries of the CIS to develop fiscal monitoring systems (World Bank 2013).

Debt Relief

At the G8 Gleneagles summit in 2005, Russia “committed to cancel USD 11.3 billion worth of debts owed by African countries, including USD 2.2 billion of debt relief to the HIPC Initiative.”¹² In December 2006, the Russian Government decided to write off the debts of participants in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, which was completed by 31 December 2006.

This scheme of debt relief provides for use of loans for development financing. Russia and partner countries agree on the procedures for

effective use of released funds, for instance, for the implementation of the projects in Russian priority areas (Ministry of Finance 2007b). Russia also participates in debt-relief activities carried out by the Paris Club.

As of 2014, the accumulated amount of debt relief was US\$20 billion, which is higher than that of any other G8 member state. Debt2Aid and Debt2Investment models aim to ensure that the released funds are invested in development programmes. Special intergovernmental agreements have been signed recently with Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, totalling US\$263.6 million (Putin 2013).

Energy

The Russian initiative to help develop energy infrastructure in rural areas of African countries was supported by other G8 members and is now realized through the country participation in the Global Village Energy Partnership. Russia planned to contribute about US\$30 million to this programme over four years starting from 2007 (Ministry of Finance 2009), constructing mini power plants, mini hydroelectric power plants and power lines for electric energy access in remote regions of African countries.

Education

In October 2008, the Russia Education Aid for Development (READ) Trust Fund was established. It is a joint project of the Russian Government and the World Bank, aimed at enhancing Russia's role as a new donor in the sphere of education. The main aim of the programme is to increase the quality of education in the low-income countries. Seven countries (four from Africa, two from Central Asia and one from South-East Asia) were selected. The Trust Fund money (US\$32 million) allocation is planned for a period of five years (READ 2010).

In 2010, Russia was the country of destination for 3.9 % of all foreign students globally, of whom just over 45,000 come from OECD countries, and only 23,000 come from developing countries (OECD 2012). Thus, this component of support and influence has considerably diminished compared to the Soviet era. However, it should be noted that Russia has been consolidating its efforts in this regard, and the number of foreign students has been increasing steadily since 2009. By a Government Regulation adopted in October 2013, the number of foreign citizens and

compatriots studying with funding support from the federal budget in federal state educational institutions of higher and professional education was increased to 15,000 people (Government of the Russian Federation 2013), that is, by one third in comparison with the previous threshold established in 2008 (Government of the Russian Federation 2008).

Health

Russia has been contributing to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria since 2001, starting from just US\$1 million. Russian authorities value the collaboration within the Global Fund, noting that its “experience is one of the most successful” (Ministry of Finance 2007b). As of 30 November 2010, Russia’s contribution to the Global Fund amounted to US\$257 million (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013b). On 12 October 2010, the Russian Government decided to allocate US\$20 million to the Global Fund per year over the period of 2011 to 2013 (Government of the Russian Federation 2010a).

Russia provides technical assistance to the CIS countries in establishing national systems for monitoring infectious diseases. Russia’s aggregate contribution to these projects reached US\$28 million in 2004–2009. In 2010, another US\$5 million was to be provided (Government of the Russian Federation 2010b).

Russia’s 2012 Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) presidency did not include health as a presidency priority; the discussion at the Vladivostok summit was limited to “preventing non-communicable diseases, promoting ... healthy lifestyles and wellness” (APEC 2012). However, the APEC agenda includes the “promotion of transparent, fair and equitable access to vaccines” (APEC 2015). Russia’s 2013 G20 presidency did not include health issues either (Russia G20 2013). Russia planned to reiterate health as a priority in its 2014 G8 presidency, given the successful experience on several commitments from Russia’s previous G8 presidency. In that sense, Russia’s suspension from the G8 is a loss to global health security cooperation.

Humanitarian Aid

The Concept of Russia’s Participation in International Development Assistance (Ministry of Finance 2007a, 4, 6) states “liquidation of ... the consequences of humanitarian, natural, environmental, and industrial disasters and other emergencies” as one of the goals of Russia’s

development assistance policy. Until 2005, when Russia started stepping up its participation in international development assistance, it was limited to humanitarian operations, contributions to international organizations and debt relief because of the economic slowdown in the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Humanitarian assistance is the most developed part of development assistance in Russia in terms of legal regulation. Aid in emergency relief to a foreign state is allocated on the grounds of the state's request to the Russian Government (Government of the Russian Federation 2010b). All planned humanitarian operations abroad are carried out together with the World Food Programme (WFP) at the expense of Russian contributions. All other conditions being equal, preference is given to projects and programmes involving the use of goods and services originating in Russia (Ministry of Finance 2007a).

Food Aid and Agricultural Development

The main recipients of Russian food aid are CIS countries (Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the Eurasian region adjacent to Russia (Afghanistan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). Assistance also is provided to some African states (Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea and Zimbabwe) and to Latin America (Cuba) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010a).

It should be noted that humanitarian food supplies are regarded by the Russian authorities as one of the measures to support Russian grain exporters (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010b). In April 2009, the Russian Government decided to contribute US\$9.3 million and US\$10.7 million to the WFP and the International Civil Defence Organisation, respectively. It was emphasized that these targeted 'tied' contributions would be used to purchase wheat and flour in Russia and to pay Russian organizations for their delivery. Thereby, the Russian Government aimed to resolve the problem of wheat surplus in the domestic market, and support national agricultural producers, processing industry and carrier companies (PRIME-TASS 2009).¹³

The Russian authorities confirm Russia's willingness not to limit cooperation with the WFP exclusively to humanitarian food supplies but to strive towards cross-sectoral projects in the field of development assistance. In particular, this relates to joint action in the CIS countries experiencing chronic food shortages (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010c).

In March 2010, two agreements were signed by the Russian Government and the WFP to strengthen the existing partnership (Hurford 2010). Russian support for school meals programmes in CIS countries was confirmed. On the basis of the experience from the Russian city of Yaroslavl, the WFP and the Russian Government are designing school meals programmes for long-term projects in CIS countries, starting with Armenia. Initially these projects aim to distribute food supplied by the Russian Government, gradually substituting that with food produced locally. The goal is to make the programmes sustainable and nationally owned (WFP 2010). On 30 June 2010, the Russian Government decided to donate US\$8 million in 2010–2012 to WFP for school meals programme implementation in Armenia (Government of the Russian Federation 2010f).

A significant amount of food aid is allocated on a bilateral basis, especially in cases of natural and anthropogenic disasters. This work is synchronized with international food aid programmes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010d).

GEOGRAPHIC PRIORITIES

The regional priorities of Russian development assistance are defined by historical ties, security concerns and economic objectives. They are spelt out in the Development Policy Concept 2014.

1. Members of the CIS, Abkhazia and South Ossetia (the independence of which are recognized by Russia). Other states which conduct the ‘policy of good neighbourliness and alliance with Russia’ as well as countries which are members of international groupings or organizations in Eurasia together with Russia.
2. Countries which have historically developed friendly ties with Russia.
3. Countries which are engaged in the implementation of economic and social projects of mutual interest together with Russia.

However, data on geographical distribution of Russian ODA is available only for the years 2011–2012 (Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Analysis of this information shows that regional distribution of Russian ODA is quite mixed. For example, in 2012, the Kyrgyz Republic ranked first among all recipients with almost US\$28 million of total ODA, while in 2011 it was Nicaragua with almost US\$74 million (Table 3.2).

Table 3.1. Distribution of Russia's bilateral ODA by region, 2011–2013 (US\$ millions)

<i>Region</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>3-year share (%)</i>
Total	240.40	214.71	361.85	100
Europe	13.01	14.37	43.71	8.7
Africa	33.08	28.09	70.30	16.1
North of Sahara	8.72	0.87	5.96	1.9
South of Sahara	24.16	27.22	64.14	14.1
America	75.63	20.58	39.17	16.6
North & Central America	75.63	19.85	39.16	16.5
South America		0.73	0.01	0.1
Asia	73.00	127.85	199.76	49.0
Far East Asia	22.39	29.49	52.21	12.7
South & Central Asia	47.61	82.85	115.98	30.2
Middle East	3.00	15.51	31.57	6.1
Oceania	3.00	4.50	0.50	1.0
Developing countries, unspecified	42.68	19.32	8.41	8.6

Table 3.2. Top 10 recipients of Russia's bilateral ODA, 2011–2013 (US\$ millions)

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Country/Region</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>3-year share (%)</i>
	<i>Developing countries, total</i>	<i>240.40</i>	<i>214.71</i>	<i>361.85</i>	<i>100</i>
1	Kyrgyz Republic	12.65	37.92	76.73	15.6
2	Nicaragua	73.63	10.86	36.40	14.8
3	Korea, Dem. People's Rep.	22.39	15.80	33.61	8.8
4	Serbia	13.01	9.49	36.47	7.2
5	Central Asia, regional	12.50	17.68	15.45	5.6
6	Tajikistan	6.00	15.21	17.12	4.7
7	Zambia		0.63	33.05	4.1
8	Syria		11.17	12.95	3.0
9	South of Sahara, regional	8.20	13.92	1.50	2.9
10	China		1.42	13.36	1.8

Moreover, a considerable amount of ODA is defined as “unspecified” or “targeted” at whole regions with no country specification; this is explained by the prevalence of multilateral channels where Russia does not define final recipients.

In 2012, Russian ODA was allocated to 104 countries. Neither Russian officials nor OECD provide information on the amount of ODA provided to the CIS as a region, which is considered to be the main priority of Russian development aid. In 2012, about US\$66 million

(31 %) was allocated to the CIS members (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), Ukraine and Georgia (which were previously part of this organization).

Although it is not stated explicitly in any public official documents, Russia does not consider itself to be a partner in South–South Cooperation. However, it cooperates with other emerging donors. The Russian Government, together with the World Bank and the OECD, organized two international conferences on new donors and partnerships in international development in 2006 and 2010 (Kudrin 2010). The agendas were influenced by the World Bank and OECD, who perceived Russia as a mediator between traditional and emerging donors. For example, these organizations were co-organizers of the two conferences on emerging donors in the system of international development cooperation in which both traditional and new donors participated. The main outcome of the 2010 conference was participants' agreement to promote cooperation between traditional and emerging donors through experience-sharing.

Russia is the only country which was a member of the G8 and BRICS simultaneously. It is acceding to the OECD, though the process is currently suspended indefinitely for geopolitical reasons. A widespread opinion among Russian policy-makers is that an old Western donors' aid model promoted by the G8 is becoming obsolete due to limited resources in their countries and the rapid development of emerging economies. A model of cooperation for development where donors support the partners' economic growth through trade, investment in infrastructure, education and key industries—thus generating resources for development—is more relevant.

Thus, whereas geopolitical and security issues may be of prime concern when selecting target countries for Russia's foreign aid, historical area expertise, economic interests and commitment to multilateral goals would appear to be most important in defining Russia's sector priorities for development assistance.

CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION

Involvement of civil society and its influence on Russia's development assistance policy is quite limited. Open discussions are scarce and frequently driven by uninformed opinion. Many opinion leaders and commentators harshly criticized the idea of creating a Russian Agency for International Development in August 2011 as an ineffective expansion of bureaucracy and

a waste of resources. There is a small pool of journalists who specialize in economic and foreign policy issues, and cover developments in the sphere of development assistance, which might be reflective of the lack of public interest in development issues. Awareness is increasing and interest is building in conjunction with international institutions, such as the G20, APEC and BRICS, which include development cooperation as an important priority.

Civil processes within the G8 and G20 in the framework of Russian presidencies of these institutions (G8 in 2006 and G20 in 2013) substantially contributed to enhancing the participation of civil society organizations in development assistance activities in their advocacy capacity. Representatives of civil society organizations and academia are interested both in increasing their participation in Russia's actions on development assistance and in influencing the processes related to it.

Another venue of civil society engagement is the Consultative Group of Russian Civil Society Organisations on Development Issues and Interaction with the G8 and G20, which was created with the support of former Russian G8/G20 Sherpa Arkady Dvorkovich in 2010. Representatives of Russian and foreign civil society organizations working in Russia regularly met with the Sherpa and other invited officials to discuss the G8 and G20 agendas and make their recommendations on relevant issues, including development assistance. The process was instrumental in informing civil society about the Russian Government's position and priorities, and contributed to a constructive engagement with civil society during Russia's G8 and G20 presidencies (Larionova et al. 2014).

Although *Rossotrudnichestvo* regularly invites experts from academia and civil society organizations to its open events and relevant consultations, there is no public council within this agency to support its functions in the sphere of development. Many Russian ministries and agencies do, however, have public councils comprising experts and public figures with advisory functions (Larionova et al. 2014).

It is also notable that the majority of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in the implementation of Russia's development assistance programmes cannot be characterized as civil society institutions, as they mostly act as mechanisms of development policy implementation and are not engaged in advocating the interests of civil society. The Russian non-profit Social and Industrial Food Service Institute is a key NGO working in the field of development assistance. Since 2004, it has been engaged in the development and implementation of the complex systems of social feeding, and issues of food quality and safety. The Russian

authorities (Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture) have successfully used the experience of the Social and Industrial Food Service Institute in designing and implementing their development assistance programmes of school feeding in Armenia, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The Institute's specialists, in collaboration with the WFP, provide their expertise and work in the recipient countries to implement these projects (Social and Industrial Food Service Institute 2015).

Another example is the fund supporting social and information programmes of state authorities, the People's Initiative Foundation, which does what its name says it does. It has worked on development-related information campaigns supported by the Russian Government, including the Financial Literacy Programme and MDGs promotion project (People's Initiative Foundation 2015).

NGOs working in the sphere of climate change and the environment play an important role in Russian development cooperation, being primarily engaged in advocacy and monitoring of Russia's activities in this sphere. However, these are mainly the representatives of large international NGOs, including WWF and Greenpeace.

CONCLUSIONS

The Soviet period of international assistance was characterized by activities designed for building up the non-capitalist world for both security and economic reasons, as well as for humanitarian goals. Only in the post-Soviet period does Russia appear to be engaging in foreign aid as a response to its multilateral commitments. There are other differences. Whereas Soviet aid was efficiently administered centrally, included large industrial projects, was carried out on bilateral bases and supported by effective public relations, Russia's assistance is decentralized, run through relatively small-scale projects, carried out through multilaterals and is not accompanied by systemic public relations.

But there are similarities as well. Russia's assistance is focused more on sector areas within its historical expertise (health and food). Broadly speaking, the geographical target remains in the same areas of the world that the Soviet Union assisted (Africa and Soviet allies). Many of the new independent states of the former Soviet Union itself received more than 40 % of Russia's country-specified ODA in 2012 (see Table 3.2). The underlying causes for such a similar portfolio would appear to be a mix

of humanitarian, geopolitical/security and economic reasons, protecting interests and allies, as well as providing expertise, particularly in Africa, in sectors in which Russia has traditionally excelled.

Russia's priorities for the international development cooperation agenda can be summarized as follows.

1. Compliance with the commitments made in the international settings, both multilateral and bilateral.
2. A focused approach allocating funds to a select number of countries to achieve an impact, with the former Soviet aid targets and the new post-Soviet 'near abroad' countries being a priority, suggesting that security priorities are paramount.
3. Health, education (including human resources development), food and agriculture as well as energy as sector priorities, suggesting a mix of security and economic priorities combined with an interest in continuing Russia's historical expertise in these fields.
4. Ensuring efficiency of the development cooperation programmes.
5. A model of development cooperation where development is attained through support of economic growth, job creation and fostering trade, rather than through traditional aid programmes.

In short, Russia's choice of partners, areas and structures is broadly based first on security concerns, second on economic interests, and third on existing multilateral agreements, showing that Russia's international development assistance is largely compatible with its domestic priorities and international strategy. However, it would be an exaggeration to state that development assistance is one of the pillars of Russia's foreign policy and an instrument for attaining national economic priorities. If there is a political will that development assistance becomes such a pillar, Russia will need to ensure coherence of development assistance with other key policy areas and effective coordination among relevant agencies; develop an adequate legal framework; invest in capacity-building and reliable implementation mechanisms; expand the volume of assistance; make it transparent; and integrate public relations and monitoring components. Last but not least, in the recipient countries, Russia should work not only with the governments but also with the citizens, NGOs and businesses. Domestically, academia, civil society and business should be involved to secure broad-based support and amplify the government actions.

NOTES

1. Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s, Russia participated in humanitarian operations, contributed to international organizations and was a leader in providing debt relief and in providing grants to foreign students.
2. Aid to these countries was recorded separately as official aid (OA), not as official development assistance (ODA). In 2005, the DAC reverted to a single List of ODA Recipients, abolishing Part II. Russia and countries which joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007 were then excluded from the DAC list (OECD 2014).
3. A senior Russian official's remarks at the third informational and educational briefing on Russian International Development Assistance in Rosstrudnichestvo on 27 May 2014.
4. For example, Government of the Russian Federation (2000a).
5. For example, Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Community of 10 October 2000 and Treaty on the Union State of Russia and Belarus of 8 December 1999.
6. http://www1.minfin.ru/en/financial_affairs/Dev_Assis/concept_rus/.
7. It should be noted that this constitutes 8 % of all the Foreign Policy Activity State Programme funding, with the caveat that only one of the ten action lines included can be considered development assistance, given that the subprogramme also provides for such actions as public diplomacy, development of international relations of the Russian regions and cities, and preservation of Russian monuments and memorials.
8. Development of Health System State Programme. Ministry of Health.
9. In addition to their core-funded operations, international organizations set up and raise funds for specific programmes and funds with clearly identified sectoral, thematic or geographical foci. Donors' bilateral contributions to such programmes and funds are recorded here, e.g. 'UNICEF girls' education', 'Education For All Fast Track Initiative' and various trust funds, including for reconstruction (e.g. Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund).
10. The Russian Federation ODA. National Report. 2012. http://www.minfin.ru/common/img/uploaded/library/2012/05/Presentation_Eng2012.pdf.
11. See above Endnote.

12. G8 Summit document on Africa. Accessed 5 January 2016. <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2005gleneagles/africa.html>.
13. On 5 August 2010, the Russian Government established a temporary ban from 15 August 2010 to 31 December 2010 on the export of wheat, maslin, barley, rye, maize and wheat and wheat-and-rye flour from Russia, later prolonged (except for flour) until 30 June 2011, but according to Government Resolution No. 654 of 30 August 2010 the ban didn't apply to goods exported from Russia for humanitarian aid purposes and commitments of the state under Russia's international agreements (Government of the Russian Federation 2010c, d, e).

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India: From Technical Cooperation to Trade and Investment

Anuradha Chenoy and Anuradha Joshi

INTRODUCTION

India has significantly increased its development assistance (DA) to countries of the Global South since the 1990s. Although India's DA programme is not new, since the mid-1990s there has been a significant shift in terms of its nature, scope and geographic areas. In this chapter, we examine the shifts in India's recent DA trajectory and aim to unpack some of the drivers behind these changes.

In the past, Indian DA has been relatively small, focused on less-developed countries (LDCs), and has largely comprised a combination of technical assistance and grants for projects and trade. The current DA menu includes these traditional modalities and has expanded some of

A. Chenoy
65 Dakshinapuram, Jawaharlal Nehru University Campus,
New Delhi 110067, India

A. Joshi
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex,
Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK

them significantly. Lines of credit (LOCs) for trade, concessional loans and technical assistance now dominate, while grants and projects now comprise a smaller part of DA. Moreover, there has been a rise in DA to Africa, moving away from the traditional focus on neighbouring countries. Most importantly, the scale of Indian DA has increased greatly, now comprising billions of US dollars every year.

This chapter argues that the shifts in DA observed are driven by four key factors. First, the Indian government sees DA as a way of increasing and sustaining economic growth (particularly through trade), generating income and employment and thus reducing domestic poverty—the trickle-down approach. Second, for India, DA is a means to advance its strategic interests within the South Asian region, where it has a significant economic and business presence and where it occasionally intervenes politically and even militarily. Third, as a growing economy that needs resources, especially energy, India has been orienting DA towards securing domestic energy security. Finally, successive Indian governments have attempted to leverage its DA for an ‘increased role’ in the international governance system.

Woven into these four DA objectives are domestic and international political pressures and critiques—from the corporate sector, from civil society organizations (CSOs) and from bilateral and multilateral donors. Indian businesses increasingly see DA as a vehicle to expand their activities into new markets. Observers critique such business expansion with the help of government, on several grounds—questioning the rationale of giving DA abroad while ignoring social sectors at home; and the unconditional nature of Indian DA which unquestioningly supports even those with undemocratic governments/regimes with records of human rights violations. Traditional donors are wary of this new form of aid, which seems to move away from Western notions of aid as promoting good governance, democracy and development. And since the new government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came into power in 2015, DA has been further enhanced in these new directions.

In this chapter, we trace the contours of evolving Indian DA and argue that despite the potential of DA, several challenges remain.

The chapter is organized in the following fashion. In the next section, we provide a brief history of the evolution of Indian DA. The following four sections flesh out our key arguments: the drivers of DA—trade, regional strategic interests, energy and global aspirations. Given these objectives, the question is, have the expected benefits materialized? The

following three sections examine the impacts of DA on trade, on recipient countries and on South–South development cooperation. We conclude with some reflections on where Indian DA is headed in the future, given the recent international developments and the recent change of the government in power.

THE EVOLUTION OF INDIAN DA

Early Years (Until the 1980s)

Indian DA is not new. India has, since independence, historically supported countries in the South, prioritizing various forms of assistance in the form of the Colombo Plan in the 1950s through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC), which by 1972 had been extended to over 50 countries. India's approach was based on supporting governments of other newly independent countries in their development plans in a transparent and flexible manner as illustrated by the cases of Nepal and Bhutan (Chaturvedi 2012). Mawdsley (2012, 72–3) identifies three reasons for India's early aid efforts: (1) a need for energy, which took the form of investing in hydropower projects; (2) the desire to create a buffer zone between itself and China, leading to infrastructure development in Nepal; and (3) the desire to be an international player, exemplified by its leadership of the 'Third World' through the Non-Aligned Movement. However, other geostrategic considerations—like isolating Pakistan and developing a Third World network to strengthen its independent foreign policy—were additional early aspirations. Beginning modestly with technical assistance in the 1950s and capacity-building as part of its international obligations, India became an important donor.

Since the 2000s

Since the early 2000s, India has pushed its DA in new directions. The backdrop to these changes included privatization and structural adjustment reforms after 1989 that gave new openings to the private sector and encouraged foreign investments in sectors that were earlier reserved for the government. This 'opening' of the economy led to a steady growth rate, even as inequality continued to mark the Indian social scene. India simultaneously sought to emulate the model of export-led growth that had underpinned the success of the four 'Asian Tigers' (Hong Kong, Republic

of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan). Changes in economic policy and a changed international environment after the disintegration of the Soviet Union (which had been a long economic and strategic partner of India) led to shifting geostrategic interests marked by nuclear tests and strategic relations with the USA. These changes led to a rethink of aid policies.

India repositioned its stand on both accepting and giving aid in 2002–03. The reasons for this change included greater confidence and sustainability in Indian growth and development, as well as Indian aspirations for a greater say in the international political system focused on United Nations (UN) Security Council membership, and a demand for increased representation in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), ostensibly as a voice of the South in the global financial and security architecture. The Indian Reserve Bank Governor, in the IMF meeting in spring 2003, argued for reforms in the IMF (Reddy 2003). The argument was that it seemed that the developed economies shared power, and low-income countries or “innocent bystanders,” as the Indian Finance Minister called them, “should be protected” (Chidambaram 2012). In keeping with these aims, the Union Budget of 2003–04 gave debt relief to ‘highly indebted poor countries’ (HIPC) for overdue debts. Simultaneously, the India Development Initiative was announced with 2 billion rupees for the year, which was supposed to “leverage and promote our strategic economic interests abroad” (Singh 2003). In 2006–07, India made a commitment of US\$1 billion for bilateral cooperation, of which over US\$500 million was disbursed.

The strategy to expand the notion of development cooperation to include LOCs, concessional loans, debt relief, subsidized credit and technical assistance, which forms the bulk of the cooperation, evolved after 2000. Physical and financial contributions to UN peacekeeping and an increase in humanitarian assistance became part of the DA package. The official discourse on Indian DA started to coalesce around six main conceptual pillars: (1) sustainable and inclusive, (2) based on India’s own developmental experience, (3) no conditionalities, (4) demand driven, (5) contributes to soft power, and (6) development cooperation is dependent upon mutual gains being realized.¹ Clearly, India had decided to mark out a different path in DA that would distinguish it from the donor–recipient paradigm that India had historically experienced as an aid recipient.

Institutional Structures

Reflecting the increase and complexity of DA (as detailed in the following sections), the Indian Finance Minister created a dedicated agency, the

Development Partnership Administration (DPA), in 2012 as a department within the Ministry for External Affairs (MEA). The DPA was responsible for policy, planning, implementing and developing strategies. The official logic was that administrative costs would go down by 25 % when DA was handled internally (as opposed to through multilateral agencies), “so why not do it through competent divisions on our own” (Tuhin 2013). Giving aid through multilateral agencies reduces the public-relations edge that countries seek and Indian policy-makers are wary of dominance by traditional multilateral institutions where they feel they do not have an equal say. The guiding policy for DA, however, remains unclear, as no official policy paper on development cooperation has been published.

DRIVERS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: TRADE

Since the mid-1990s, Indian government policy has been proactive in supporting private Indian business abroad, and Prime Minister Modi has accelerated this with the “Make in India” theme in all his foreign policy engagements—18 in his first year in power, each trip accompanied by businesspeople. The discourse from business and the media is that the promotion and protection of business interests is “one of the primary functions of Indian diplomacy” (*Indian Express* 2012). India’s Trade Policy 2015 proposes that trade is an effective instrument of economic growth that propels employment generation, and India would like to significantly increase its share of global merchandise trade every year, so as to double it by 2020. To make this more effective, the current policy is the “Whole of government approach” (GOI, Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2015). The approach interlinks various nodal ministries for a quick and collective response for trade proposals. The policies exhibit several features (noted below).

First, the government backs Indian investment and companies in trading with less-developed countries in the South–South framework. As T.C.A. Ranganathan (2012), the former chairman of the Export-Import Bank of India (Exim Bank), stated, “India’s story is a private entrepreneurship story.” Referring to Indian companies, he noted, “If they want to go to Africa I will help them” (Ranganathan 2013). Indian companies in Africa are either privately owned or mixed private–public, vary in size and capacity, and their numbers are increasing. The Indian Government works with the chambers of commerce in India, which have a long history of connecting business with the state. The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) promotes trade meetings.

The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) has taken the lead in private-sector-led trade and investment. It organizes India–Africa Conclaves in collaboration with the Exim Bank. It had held 1700 business-to-business meetings online with African states and companies and discussed projects worth 50 billion rupees up to 2012. The CII notes that the Indian Government is always supportive of business. “We [CII] are dealing at the highest levels,” (CII Members 2013). Such business interaction has increased with the Modi Government, which is known to be business friendly. The Indian diaspora is seen as an asset for creating goodwill and business (in Eastern and Southern Africa, where the Indian diaspora is a well-established business community).

Second, concessionary LOCs are used by the government to facilitate trade and investments. Exim Bank advances LOCs at concessional rates to institutions of developing countries to support project financing. Indian LOCs qualify as ODA since they have a grant element of 25%. Government officials argue that the link between aid and commercial interests is inevitable, by and large there are no conditionalities, and buying back Indian goods (which is sometimes mandatory) is often cheaper than buying goods from other countries (Chaturvedi et al. 2014). LOCs have assisted investments in multiple fields from agriculture to electrification. India organizes the ‘Focus Africa’ programme regularly, where LOCs worth hundreds of millions of US dollars are offered (the latest was in October 2015, where most African countries were present).² As of March 2015 (17 years after the start of these LOCs), the Exim Bank had supported 149 export projects by 56 Indian companies, to 63 countries in the South, with US\$11.68 billion (Exim Bank 2015). Further, India has extended a Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme to 33 LDCs since 2008. Regional bodies in South Asia, such as the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in place since 2004, have been backed by Indian DA to increase trade between India and other South Asian countries. This form of government-supported trade with the LDCs fits into the South–South framework of ‘mutually beneficial’ and sustainable DA.

Finally, India backs up the LOCs with capacity-building through the ITEC, the Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAP), and Technical Cooperation Schemes that were initiated in the 1960s. During 2013–14, India has provided 10,000 scholarship slots at 47 institutions on diverse subjects and programmes that train officials from developing countries. Institution building of organizations such as the India Africa Institute for Technology, an institute for foreign trade and similar institutions, adds up to provide legitimacy for Indian DA.

Overall, being ‘business friendly’ seems to be one of the primary aims of Indian DA. Indian companies are told that they are an extension of Indian foreign policy and they should follow the laws of the country they invest in: “Indian companies should learn lessons from the situation created by others” (*The Hindu* 2013). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is encouraged with tax breaks. Indian Prime Minister Modi makes it a point to address the diasporas in his trips, encouraging them to “Make in India.” The sum of these policies has encouraged trade within the Global South and increased public–private partnership. The belief is that concessional trade advances with LDCs is a sustainable development and mutually advantageous assistance model, which is based on India’s own development experience.

DRIVERS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: ENERGY

India’s growing economy requires vast energy resources, since India, like the rest of South Asia, is highly dependent on imports of hydrocarbons. Thus, India’s external policies are significantly shaped by energy security concerns and drive both the nature of DA and the countries of choice in both Africa and South Asia that are prioritized as partners.

Countries that have hydrocarbon resources get priority for India’s DA. For example, of the 33 countries in Africa that come under the Tariff Preference Schemes to LDCs, 12 are located in West Africa, where the focus for oil extraction is in Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana (Exim Bank 2013). DA to Sudan is another instance where India will gain from oil imports.

The consequence of such targeted DA is that India’s trade with these select countries has increased and the LOCs and balance of trade is much more equitable than with countries with no hydrocarbon resources. Trade with the oil-rich countries is targeted to increase. Total Indian trade with Africa in 2014–15 was US\$71.65 billion, with a focus on investment in the oil and gas sectors. Nigeria has become its largest trading partner and accounts for three quarters of India’s trade with West Africa due to crude oil imports, and Sudan is slated to get credits for a power plant, sugar refineries, railways and support in agriculture, in addition to humanitarian assistance, flood relief and special concessions in capacity-building (Modi 2011). India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC) will partner in two joint oil-production companies. Despite the conflicts in the region, India is investing US\$2.3 billion in the petroleum sector.³ The consequence of such DA is that trade with these countries is growing.

The private sector is a beneficiary of DA and LOCs. Indian companies (state owned, private and multinational) have successfully bid for these contracts. A WTO–CII report argues that African countries “capture little value in the hydrocarbon value chain” (Exim Bank 2013). This is because exploration, refining, transporting and marketing is all done by others. Many Indian companies encompass the entire value chain and have ventures for resource-seeking in exchange for infrastructure investment.⁴ Indian multinationals have won oil-exploration rights in Nigeria and in exchange are constructing an oil refinery and a power plant. In Zambia, mining is being done by Indian multinationals.⁵ Energy trade is done through joint ventures as well as through wholly owned subsidiaries (e.g. Indian Oil Corporation). India has been able to diversify its energy security through trade with the oil-rich countries of West Africa. Countries in Africa remain exporters of raw materials and comparatively deficit in manufacturing and industrialization. India sees this exchange, where these partner countries get the mixed package of assistance and India has been able to diversify its access to energy, as one of mutual benefit and fair trade.

The energy security is a driver for DA in the energy-deficit region of South Asia as well. India is seeking to develop and tap hydroelectric sources from its neighbours, especially Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal, for power-sharing grids. DA for Bhutan began with budgetary support for economic planning but changed in the 1970s to assistance for power projects. Of the total grants given to Bhutan between 2006 and 2013, hydroelectric projects received 50 %—after meeting Bhutan’s needs, the surplus goes to India. In return, India has built infrastructure projects that include Paro airport, Bhutan’s Supreme Court and other small development projects. A similar model of sharing energy is on the cards between Bangladesh and India, since Indian Prime Minister Modi, accompanied by Indian big business, promoted the signing of power projects.⁶ Myanmar has been a beneficiary of the duty-free tariff presence scheme for LDCs, even while it was under international sanctions. It has received Indian credit for agriculture in 2015 and Indian private and public investments in the energy sector.⁷

DA has helped enhance India’s search for energy security. India was dependent primarily on countries in the Middle East and Asia (the Commonwealth of Independent States, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) for its energy needs. The spurt in the Indian economy, especially after the 1990s, led to a search for new energy resources. The possibility of hydrocarbon imports from Africa in exchange for Indian development projects has enhanced

Indian energy security and overall trade and cooperation interests. Besides this, India has enhanced its cooperation with neighbouring countries for hydroelectricity. India would like to be a site from where other countries in South Asia can get refined energy and DA is seen as an apt mechanism for achieving this goal.

DRIVERS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: REGIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION

South Asia is a locus for regional markets and investments. The Modi government has given priority to the South Asian region by proposing the slogan, “neighbourhood first,” which essentially means South Asia minus Pakistan. This process was initiated decades ago by (1) supporting regional associations such as the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) for regional peace and security and SAFTA to facilitate trade; (2) providing concessions and loans to South Asian LDCs;⁸ (3) promoting free trade zones and agreements;⁹ (4) removal of duties and tariff barriers as part of SAFTA;¹⁰ (5) supporting small development projects;¹¹ and (6) continuing with humanitarian assistance, capacity-building and scholarships. Thus, DA is woven into Indian policies for its neighbourhood.

Bangladesh has been the greatest beneficiary of these policies, followed by Sri Lanka and Nepal (Kumar and Singh 2009).¹² Some recent examples of trade and energy deals are: India gave US\$2 billion worth LOC to Bangladesh and has increased Indian power supply in 2015. In return, Bangladesh has promised two Special Economic Zones (SEZs), transport and road facilities for India, access to ports and renewed inland water agreements, and trade (S. Gupta 2015b). Between 2001 and 2015, nearly US\$6 billion worth of LOCs went to Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives (S. Gupta 2015b). In addition, India has promised LOCs of another US\$1 billion to Nepal as part of post-earthquake assistance (*Times of India* 2015).

The Indian government has supported investments in areas of high risk, for example, the almost US\$2 billion of DA to Afghanistan makes India the fifth largest provider of DA to Afghanistan. A large part is in the form of bilateral assistance and encompasses education, medical services, transport, telecommunications, agriculture and power generation. In 2011, a consortium of Indian companies won the bid to develop Afghanistan’s largest iron ore deposits, pacts on cooperation in coal and mineral resources, and development of small projects.

Regional organizations SAARC and SAFTA play an important role in facilitating trade in South Asia. In addition, DA, LOCs and bilateral agreements play both economic and strategic roles for India in its neighbourhood. Between 1996 and 2006, trade between member countries of the SAFTA agreement quadrupled from US\$2.214 billion to US\$9.778 billion, growing at 5 %, but stagnated thereafter (compared to 25 % increase between Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries). Reports on South Asian trade show that this is the region least integrated as compared to other regional blocks and that “regional cooperation is far short of potential” (Kumar and Singh 2009). Trade and an extended marketplace are important aspects of DA, but India’s priority interest in its neighbourhood is also strategic in nature. This is explained below.

DRIVERS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: REGIONAL STABILITY

DA has served Indian interests in stabilizing and maintaining influence in the South Asian region. To retain growth and internal cohesion, India needs regional stability. Articulated in 2014 as “neighbourhood first,” this follows from the traditional vision that Indian foreign policy’s priority “is naturally our neighbourhood, for unless we have a peaceful and prosperous periphery we will not be able to focus on our primary tasks of socio-economic development” (Menon 2007). Thus, India’s strategic intention in South Asia is (1) to ignore Pakistan and nurture smaller neighbours (Prasad 2015); (2) to ward off the influence and strategic plans of China; (3) to create a more integrated South Asian trade and security zone; and (4) to retain its influence in South Asia and beyond. In the past, India has used both DA and force in its neighbourhood to pressurize smaller states to accede to its strategic interests and to transform their internal politics towards democratic and inclusive choices.

India has also used force and military intervention and followed it with DA. The instances of the use of military intervention are well known: (1) in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, with the consequent breakup of Pakistan; (2) in Sri Lanka’s ethnic dispute and civil war and insurgency, where India sent an Indian Peace Keeping Force (1987–1990); (3) in the Maldives at the behest of its governments, in 1988 and recently on issues of democratic governance. India has been closely linked with the domestic politics of its smaller neighbours. India is known to be a friend of the Awami League Party and government of Bangladesh. (Pakistan has

been associated with the Bangladeshi opposition.) India has put pressure on Sri Lanka for the rights of Tamil ethnic minorities, supported proposals to amend the Sri Lankan Constitution and rehabilitate those affected by the deadly civil war. The domestic politics of Nepal are known to be influenced by India, which has been a factor in Nepal's democracy movements, and India made suggestions on Nepal's new constitution. India has given long-term support to Bhutan, helped in its internal economic development (11th Plan), and supported the Kingdom in its transition to a constitutional monarchy and democracy. Yet India chose strategic silence when Bhutan expelled its own citizens who were ethnically Nepalese.

Many parts of India's borders are almost notional and poorly marked (Sahni 2015). Critical parts of Indian borders and territories are disputed. The Sino-India border war (1965) remains as background to a disputed (though relatively peaceful) border with China. Two major wars (1962, 1971) and one limited war (1999) intersperse the unresolved disputes with Pakistan. Five Indian States share a border with Bangladesh and a Land Boundary Agreement has been signed with Bangladesh as recently as 2015. India shares 16,000 kilometres of border with Myanmar, south of its north-east states and a shorter border (699 km) with Bhutan. The border with Nepal is an open one and India has a trade and transit agreement with Nepal. India faces recurring problems of terrorism, insurgencies, cross-border trafficking, illegal migration and cross-border river management issues with several of these bordering countries. India has to marshal multiple resources that include DA, aid, cooperation and military means for border management.

India is both a strategic rival and a partner with China, with unresolved claims on the border. India and China are engaged in geopolitical competition in all of South Asia. China supports and gives substantial military and economic assistance to Pakistan, which has antagonistic relations with India. In 2015, China entered into an agreement to invest US\$46 billion to build a transport corridor from Pakistan to China, close to Indian borders in 'Pakistan Occupied Kashmir'. India's new active agenda in South-East Asia and collaboration with Vietnam in the South China Sea is of concern to China. India has been increasingly drawn into a strategic tie-up with Japan and the USA to balance China. At the same time, the strategic rivalries between India and China have checks and balances, such as high-level visits, opening and increasing access to each other's markets, China's offer of foreign direct investment (FDI) of US\$20 billion to India and ongoing talks on unresolved border and territorial issues. China's 'One

Belt One Road' initiative meant to counter the USA's containment has openings for Indian communication networks. India has a deep strategic partnership with Russia and the three—Russia, India, China (RICs)—collaborate in BRICS and meet in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. It is thus evident that India's DA to its neighbours in South Asia and other LDCs are intended to shore up its diplomatic and geostrategic intentions.

DRIVERS OF AID: GLOBAL ASPIRATIONS

The contours of Indian DA are also tied to its global aspirations. India has been lobbying for a seat on the UN Security Council (as have Brazil and South Africa). India is also on the forefront in arguing for reforms of the UN and other multilateral bodies. India covets its growing status as a rising power and as a member of BRICS, offering alternative 'poles' in a 'multipolar world'.

India and other BRICS countries aspire for a greater role in decision-making in the international financial institutions. India has repeatedly made a strong case for raising the shareholding of developing nations in the World Bank in a way that would reflect their growing influence in the world economy. The dissatisfaction with the response from the IMF and World Bank has been a significant reason for the coming together of BRICS and the construction of new financial regimes such as the New Development Bank (NDB), the Contingent Reserve Arrangement and the Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB). The Indian Deputy National Security Advisor reported that Prime Minister Modi, in a conversation with his foreign office staff, stated that India is poised to have a "leading role." The Advisor saw this as providing "an insight into India's approach to the engagement with the world" (A. Gupta 2015a). Similarly, Foreign Secretary Jaishankar argued in a speech that "India wants to be a leading power and not just a balancing power" (Jaishankar 2015). Statements like these repeatedly reveal India's interest in becoming a 'pole' in a multipolar world. The objective seems to be to negotiate multiple interests, retain independence in foreign policy and play a role in influencing economic and political choices.

IMPACTS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: TRADE LINKS

The Indian government believes that trade, as opposed to aid, is key to sustainable development and fosters closer partnerships. The goal of 'self-reliance' that was articulated in the 1950s remained the core of central

planning and economic development well into the 1980s. India's DA policies have integrated trade with the developing countries as an integral part of its DA. A decade after extending LOCs and concessionary loans, it has become evident that the annual trade between India and Africa has grown significantly.¹³ Observers note that in the coming years, India will "intensify aid for trade assistance" (CII and WTO 2013, 59). India has become one of the leading investors in Africa with investments in multiple sectors.¹⁴ The CII acknowledges that the core of India–Africa trade expansion is by increasing natural resource trade (CII and WTO 2013).

Questions do remain about the actual benefits to African countries because their trade continues to be based on extraction and natural resources and not manufacturing or processed goods.¹⁵ The Indian answer to this charge is that, while commodity trade dominates African exports, trade with Africa has diversified and India imports not just fuels, minerals and metals, but also commodities like cotton and food products that have undergone labour-intensive processing. Indian investments in several African countries have increased (e.g. Ethiopia, where India is the second largest investor) and India has signed Bilateral Promotion and Protection of Investments (BIPA) agreements with several African countries in the last few years. African investments in India are on the rise. Mauritius is the largest investor in India from among the African countries. This is because many non-resident Indians (NRIs) and multinational companies route their investments from Mauritius by taking advantage of exemptions in capital gains clauses. The next biggest investors in India are South Africa and Morocco (CII and WTO 2013). Another argument is that the choice for Africa to market its products has increased with the entry of India and other BRICS countries competing for African goods and resources.

However, there is no conclusive evidence that DA alone has promoted trade, since there are many variations in costs and benefits. By and large, it appears that the increase in India's growth, international trade and investment coincides with India's DA. LDCs have increased their exports to India from 14 % in 2001 to 21 % in 2011. The non-oil-producing LDCs have much lower exports to India. Trade with West Africa, which was US\$508 million (0.8 % of India's total import) in 2002–03, went up to US\$17,101 million in 2011–12 (3.5 % of India's total imports) on account of oil imports. India has gained markets and trade deals with most LDCs and energy is a major component of the DA–trade linkage as we show below. Further, Indian Foreign Trade Policy documents show that India has benefitted from the recession in the West. As a result, while the

European Union's share of exports from Africa dropped by half, India's rose by 3 %.¹⁶ Thus, as we can see, even though it is not possible to draw conclusive evidence of DA and trade benefits to India, indications are that DA does support a growing economic and strategic partnership.

IMPACTS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: PARTNER COUNTRIES

Indian DA has been critiqued for not following international standards and norms, such as human rights, while engaging with several LDCs. The fear that rogue states (e.g. Myanmar earlier, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) are able to sustain themselves because of the 'unconditional' DA given by the BRICS countries, including India, has been articulated by the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. However, while India prides itself in abiding by its commitment to democratic principles, its policies of unconditional DA are based on principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs of partners. This means that India has not participated in military missions to democratize countries or impose sanctions when Western countries have done so. In fact, India has opposed unilateral sanctions.

As far as normative principles are concerned, since the mid-1990s, India has tried to persuade partners and 'assisted' in democratic transition of some regional partners. For example, Indian DA to Nepal increased three fold in 2006–07, after King Gyanendra was overthrown and democratic processes were renewed (Cartwright 2009). Nepal alleged that India facilitated an unofficial blockade and supported ethnic groups after the Nepali Constitution was passed in 2015. India similarly attempted to influence Bhutan in democratizing the Kingdom. India has openly supported democratically elected regimes in the Maldives and cut DA when such regimes were overthrown. India has tried to influence Sri Lanka to be inclusive towards ethnic Tamils and argued for constitutional changes in Sri Lanka. The argument is that democratic transitions and rights are an aspect of internal politics, where India should give a polite nudge, rather than direct intervention. Critics, on the other hand, argue that India has intervened militarily and by other means in its neighbourhood in the past. It is evident that India prefers the use of all kinds of economic assistance as opposed to military threats for its strategic aims, but has used both force and all forms of DA for its strategic interests, especially in South Asia.

As far as recipient countries are concerned, there has been no public social impact survey of Indian DA, even though this is recommended by the Exim Bank. However, the responses to Indian DA are generally viewed positively. For example, Ethiopian government officials defend Indian investments, land acquisitions and LOCs. They have been on the forefront of questioning international debate as being partisan and ‘paternalistic’ because of the identity of current beneficiaries (i.e. Indians, Chinese and West Asians) unlike the ‘Westerners’ who are buying land in Latin America. They also reject the ‘condescending outlook’ of Western institutions that doubt African institutions’ and governments’ capacities to advocate the interests of their own citizens (Tadesse 2013; Zewide 2013). Other vocal supporters include Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Mauritius. The Bangladesh ambassador argued for his country’s need of both China and India for their DA and Russia for its aircraft, “we do not view China and India as competitors for our development” (Express News Service 2015). Significant research argues that aid can encourage development/growth only in countries with good internal policies (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007; Drèze and Sen 2013).

One sector where Indian investment has faced flak is in land acquisition. Between 2000 and 2011, Indian investors acquired millions of hectares of land for agriculture (3.2 Mha in East Africa and 2.1 Mha in South-East Asia) (*Times of India* 2012). NGOs raised concerns about the displacement of small peasants by big Indian companies, citing the example of Ethiopia, where Indian companies acquired 600,000 ha, and one company, Karaturi Global, leased 300,000 ha in Gambela, Ethiopia (Parsai 2012). NGOs linked the Indian LOCs of US\$640 million to Ethiopia as a method of support for Indian companies. Interestingly, the Exim Bank did not support land deals directly.¹⁷ Subsequently, many of these deals failed; for example, Karaturi Global exited Ethiopia after flash floods destroyed its plantations that were in the floodplains. This also revealed the necessity of tying up with local companies and gaining from local knowledge.

Thus, the Indian experience of DA appears to be a highly mixed one. On the one hand, DA has supported factors that are critical for improving development indicators such as education, health, capacity- and institution-building. DA also supports trade in the South–South framework. On the other hand, internal conditions and a range of domestic factors are responsible for a country’s development processes and DA is just one of the many factors involved. DA from India and other BRICS is based on this kind of paradigmatic understanding of development.

IMPACTS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: SOUTH–SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Although oriented to advancing South–South development cooperation and its global aspirations, Indian DA does not give immediate or direct strategic benefits and returns; and India has no such naive expectations. On the contrary, India’s increased role also fuels nationalist sentiments in the neighbourhood and rivalries in the developing world.¹⁸ Yet, India has gained from using a South–South development cooperation frame in a number of ways. It shares historical solidarity from a common colonial past and common post-colonial institutions; shared problems of development, transfer of technology, poverty alleviation, threat perception about interventionism and opposition to externally driven regime changes. India’s role as a leader in the past of the Non-Aligned Movement, and its support to de-colonization, recognition of new states and participation in UN peacekeeping are gestures that are seen to have underpinned its stand on South–South development cooperation.

India views its DA as distinct from that of the OECD DAC-led principles formulated in Busan and other meetings, since the donor–recipient relation as historically perceived by developing countries was based on asymmetric power relations. Some OECD DAC rules do not suit Indian terms. For example, India often lays down the condition when giving concessionary credit to an LDC that it buy 75 % of Indian products and services. Since India sees itself as a developing country, the focus is on mutual gains and horizontal relations. This implies that assistance is based on the needs of the partner country and on mutual cooperation where both partners benefit and feel a sense of equality.

As part of the South–South development cooperation agenda, India has participated in establishing the NDB to break the hegemony of international financial institutions, in which the rising powers did not have sufficient voice, voting rights and dignified partnership. The NDB was designed to impact multilateral lending for infrastructure in the countries of the Global South, and aims to be an alternative to the World Bank. The BRICS’ second project, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, has 49 countries that signed a shareholding agreement in June 2015. India has 7.5 % voting share and China 26 %. Of course, the nature and impact of these institutions, and whether they play the role envisaged, will only be known in the coming decades.

IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: DOMESTIC DEBATE

The dramatic increase in India's development cooperation has not received the attention it deserves in the Indian media and civil society in the early years from 2003 to 2015, because Indian public interest is focused on domestic debates, and foreign policy issues (especially those linked within the South–South framework) are covered in a shroud of nationalism. The ethic of sharing, regionalism and supporting LDCs evokes nationalist support and is not deeply questioned. Debate on foreign policy related issues linked to DA takes place in policy-making, academic and research institutions.

Debate among the business community and with the government is conducted in dedicated bodies such as the chambers of commerce. The FICCI supports public–private partnership in DA and encourages government investment in infrastructure. Both FICCI and CII have sponsored studies and conferences on various aspects of DA, LOCs and FDI (FICCI 2011). The business community on the other hand carries out a sustained dialogue with the government on DA since they are increasingly the ones who gain from the contracts through the LOCs and other policies.

Public opinion and debate on DA has to be gauged by media reports and academic input, because no systematic survey or opinion poll has been conducted on public responses to DA and grants by India. One survey reveals that the policy elite do approve of DA since it has proven to boost Indian economic and strategic interests (Henson 2013). Policy-making circles expected that the Indian public would resent India's spending on development cooperation abroad, given that almost a third of the Indian population lives below the poverty line. However, these two discourses—one of high levels of domestic poverty and the second on the increasing DA budget (especially to countries in Africa)—have not been combined in public debate (Mawdsley 2014). The reason for this disconnect is the South–South solidarity framework, and India's rivalry with China is part of the collective nationalist support to India's engagements. Witness, for example, the editorials of highly influential newspapers on the eve of the Third India–Africa Summit in October 2015. The editorials supported the largest ever meeting of all 54 African leaders with India as “an opportunity to forge a constructive and deeper alliance with the resource-rich continent” (*Indian Express* 2015). The fanfare and declarations at this Summit give a boost to the current Modi government as an international leader.

There has been no dedicated debate in the Parliament on these issues, except for some questions related to security issues. The media editorials have argued that, if foreign aid is viewed as a political and diplomatic tool, “then this makes increasing sense” (*Business Standard* 2011). In recent times, the frequent visits of Prime Minister Modi to various countries have been cynically appraised by the opposition parties. But none have actually criticized India’s DA. When India’s energy security and trade are at stake, DA is again seen as a good initiative.

Since 2012, several CSOs, including the Forum for Indian Development Cooperation (FIDC) hosted at the Research and Information Systems, have begun a conversation around issues of development cooperation and have initiated research and policy briefs. Other CSOs have proposed that they would like to engage in development activities and also raised the issue of transparency and that the right to information be made applicable to DA (VANI 2013). Some radical NGOs have developed a critique of Indian DA and have questioned whether this is a form of neocolonialism. The DPA of the Ministry of External Affairs has made an effort to engage with CSOs and with academics on issues relating to DA (GOI, Ministry of External Affairs 2013).

Overall, the domestic debate has limitations and is narrowly focused within the official framework. The cover of South–South development cooperation, the competition with China, the benefits to Indian exports, India’s own uneven development and poverty and feeling for humanitarian causes have shrouded Indian DA within a nationalist discourse that endorses DA policies. The discussion in the media, business and civil society appears to identify with the norms established within this discourse, even more so after the establishment of BRICS, which has similarities in the way partnerships in the South are viewed.

CONCLUSIONS

The Indian position on DA, as described in this chapter, has not been articulated in any policy document, and we have attempted to draw the contours of the policy through an analysis of the various DA initiatives undertaken since the mid-1990s. The existing discourse on DA in official, media and civil society circles is generally supportive. The meaning of foreign aid seems to have been reframed as DA and includes LOCs to facilitate trade, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, capacity-building, technical assistance, scholarships and other forms of assistance. The Indian

government has been instrumental in expanding Indian business with LDCs by generating goodwill through DA policies.

This new approach of advancing LOCs to institutions in the South, to LDCs and to domestic companies appears to be a successful way of increasing trade and investment in LDCs. Investments by way of LOCs in the oil-rich LDCs have added to the basket of India's hydrocarbon/energy sources. The argument is that trade assists the growth of both donor and recipient countries. Growth in turn assists employment and poverty alleviation. Thus, Indian DA seems to have focused on giving DA to countries producing hydrocarbons, minerals and raw materials. Yet, there is no conclusive evidence that DA alone has promoted trade and energy security. There are many instances where India has little or no benefit from countries that receive DA, other instances where countries have a trade surplus with India, and yet others where India has benefitted and opened new markets. However, by and large, the increases in India's growth, international trade and investments coincide with the increase in Indian DA.

Our conclusion is that, as currently framed, Indian DA is definitely different from traditional aid because India does not impose conditions of reform but lets the LDCs decide on their pattern of growth. Indian DA focuses on horizontal relationships that ensure mutual advantages where India feels it has equally benefitted from DA because it has received some advantage—economic, energy or geostrategic—in return. The donor–recipient relationship was seen as an unequal one by developing countries and they appear more comfortable with South–South partnerships. India's new regime under Prime Minister Modi will re-enforce this trend because it is an overtly pro-business government and has promised more Indian investment abroad and more manufacturing within India for exports and for the domestic market.

India's growth patterns and building a relationship with the other BRICS countries match its aspirations to become a major power. The BRICS-propelled financial institutions are intended to provide options for infrastructure and other lending to countries of the South. India has given full support to these new institutions and continues to put pressure on the IMF and World Bank to reform and give India more voting rights and a voice in keeping with its status.

The new government in India under the National Democratic Alliance (with the right-wing BJP leading) has marked a proactive approach towards DA programmes by prioritizing the South Asian neighbourhood; focusing

on trade and energy deals with the Global South and projecting partnership with African countries; giving priority to completing small development and other projects; and coordinating with other rising powers and BRICS multilateral institutions such as the development and infrastructure banks. It is likely to take steps to ensure quicker project implementation and encourage greater private sector entry into development projects and decrease obstacles to trade.

The Modi government equates growth with development and also views development as business. It is proactive in promoting Indian business abroad. The strategic competition with China will remain since the Modi government is competitively nationalistic. It will try to retain high growth rates and export-led growth. The partnership with hydrocarbon-producing countries and the search for energy alternatives such as hydro-electricity will continue to be drivers of Indian DA. The linkages with Africa are likely to grow with this government, as will the links with Indian diasporas in Africa and elsewhere. The Indian private sector, especially Indian multinationals and big business, are likely to be partners of the Modi government as Indian corporations and businesses have supported further reforms that will facilitate their growth. It is also likely that, as India continues to increase its DA package, internal debate and interest in the media will also increase.

NOTES

1. Note that these are not very different (apart from one on expatriate standards of living) from the eight principles of Chinese aid set out in 1964 (see <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/interactive/2013/apr/29/china-commits-billions-aid-africa-interactive>).
2. In 2006, LOCs totalling US\$558 million were offered, half of which went to the Bank for Investment and Development of the economic community of West African States (Broadman 2008, 109).
3. These commitments were made by former foreign minister Khurshid during his tour of Sudan, 4 February 2014.
4. These Indian multinationals are Essar Oil, ONGC Videsh, Indian Oil Corporation and Mittal Energy Ltd.
5. These are multinationals OBL, MEL and Vedanta.
6. Adani Power Limited and Reliance Power Limited signed a memorandum of understanding with the Bangladesh state-run Bangladesh Power Development Board, to develop power plants with a proposed investment of US\$4.5 billion (Thomson Reuters 2015).

7. These companies are private and public, namely Essar, GAIL and ONGC Videsh.
8. India gives the second largest development aid to Sri Lanka after China. The total commitment of loans and grants between 2008 and 2012 was US\$1448 million, for railways, housing and livelihood development (Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Finance 2013).
9. India signed a Free Trade Agreement with Sri Lanka in 1998, operationalized in 2003, and simultaneously extended humanitarian assistance to Sri Lanka during the December 2004 tsunami and for post-conflict reconstruction assistance. The value of India's exports to Sri Lanka grew from US\$640 million in 2000–01 to US\$3.3 billion in 2008, and Indian investment increased to US\$8.5 million in this period.
10. India committed to reduce its tariffs to 20 % for LDCs, and in 2007 removed all duties and concessions given in order to increase their market access.
11. Nepal is a beneficiary of India's Small Development Projects that have been stepped up since mid-2000; by 2010–11, there were 400 projects in all 75 districts of Nepal. India took in 86.8 % of Bhutan's exports between 2005 and 2011 and provides 16 entry points for this landlocked country.
12. Bangladeshi textiles have been allowed entry at zero duty.
13. India–Africa trade grew from US\$3 billion in 2000 to US\$46 billion in 2010. Since 2010, it is said to be increasing at 31.8 % annually (CII and WTO 2013).
14. Indian joint ventures and fully owned subsidiaries touched US\$33 billion in 2010. Indian investments are in the information technology, oil, gas, minerals, pharmaceuticals, infrastructure and telecoms sectors. ODA excluding LOCs in 2011–12 for Africa was US\$22.4 million–3.6 % of Indian ODA.
15. Some 89 % of total African exports to India are from Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco. The products are oil from Nigeria, Angola, Algeria and Egypt, and gold from South Africa. All these countries have a trade surplus with India, which in 2011 was US\$24.5 billion, which is increasing every year and projected to reach US\$67 billion in 2015.
16. The top exports to India from Africa are ores, ash (2–3 %); edible fruits (5 %); metals, inorganic chemicals, precious stones (13 %); metals, mineral, fuels (66 %). The African imports from India are 2–4 % machinery, 10 % vehicles, 11 % pharmaceuticals, mineral fuels and

- oils, and 20 % non-basmati rice. Indian multinationals that invest in Africa are the Tatas; Mahindra Automobiles; Ranbaxy, CIPLA. Medium investor companies from India are Kirloskars, Apollo Types and Karaturi (KPMG 2011).
17. Exim Bank of India funded only one land acquisition project by construction major Shahpurji Pallonji in Ethiopia.
 18. For example, India's assistance to the smaller states in South Asia has given impetus to internal politics that are based on 'pro' or 'anti' India sentiments (Adhikari 2014). These states have gained by getting assistance from both India and China, and even from Pakistan.

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China on the Move: The ‘New Silk Road’ to International Development Cooperation?

Jing Gu, Yunnan Chen, and Wang Haibin

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been intense debate about the nature of the contribution made by Chinese foreign aid, especially in Africa and Asia. In particular, the question of what role the Chinese state and Chinese ‘state capitalism’ play in Africa’s development has fascinated the world. China’s growing role as a provider of development assistance, and the broader impact of its economic engagement overseas, is the subject of considerable interest both within and outside of China. A rich literature ranges from

J. Gu (✉)

Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Library Road, Brighton
BN1 9RE, UK

Y. Chen

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), 1740
Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, DC 20036, USA

W. Haibin

College of Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural University,
Room 259, Minzhu Building, No. 17 Qing Hua Dong Lu, Haidian District,
Beijing 100083, China

studies on China's aid approaches and country or regional case studies, to research specifically focusing on aid data, or on single projects or sectors. Conclusions and opinions appear divided, ranging from positive analyses that echo the 'win-win' perspective, to scepticism from those who argue that China's primary interest is in accessing raw materials and exporting its labour and goods (Manji and Marks 2007). However, communication and collaboration between Chinese and international policy researchers and practitioners have been limited, creating a knowledge gap and understanding deficit among different stakeholders. As 'traditional' Western donors engage China in development cooperation aimed at forming new joint-venture programmes and facilitating mutual learning and understanding, China is also pursuing an enlarged international role for itself through new multilateral platforms, including the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and—closer to home—the much-touted One Belt, One Road initiative (OBOR).¹

In this context, this chapter will explore and interpret Chinese development cooperation. It discusses the differences between Chinese and Western approaches to aid, and whether the two are converging or diverging, and outlines the primary institutions and policies that guide China's activities in development cooperation. The chapter also examines new and emerging developments in China's development cooperation framework. Finally, it considers how to engage with China in international development cooperation. In an era where the 'traditional' aid discourses and the practices of new 'emerging powers' in development cooperation are simultaneously reacting and evolving—and given China's growing prominence as a source of development finance and institutional player and the potential that it offers for poverty reduction and growth in low-income countries—there is a real need for greater mutual understanding to engage this rising power in cooperation.

CHINA'S AID ARCHITECTURE

China's foreign aid architecture has evolved over its contemporary history, as its own foreign and economic policy goals have changed. During the 1950s, like all other economic activities, foreign aid was managed by the National Planning Commission (NPC). During this period, both the scale and number of foreign aid projects were small and within the capacity of the NPC to manage. However, after the 1955 Bandung Conference,² which brought together newly independent African and Asian governments in a show of

South–South solidarity against colonialism, China expanded its aid support to many non-socialist developing countries, especially in Africa. This significant expansion of aid recipient countries stretched the ability of the NPC, and so in 1956, Beijing set up the Administration of Foreign Economic Cooperation to oversee all foreign aid affairs. A Foreign Economic Commission, established in 1964, subsequently became the Ministry of Foreign Economy. After going through several rounds of organizational restructuring, foreign aid is now managed under the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries (DAFC) and implemented by the Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation (EBIEC), both under the Ministry of Commerce.

China's foreign aid policy and its implementation are primarily governed by four entities: the State Council, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)—together with some 23 related ministries, commissions and local offices of the Ministry of Commerce.

Theoretically, the State Council oversees all of China's aid programmes, while MOFCOM leads and coordinates China's foreign assistance and outward economic engagement. This includes reviewing requests that come from MOFA that require approval, conducting feasibility studies for aid projects, choosing aid implementers and conducting project reviews. DAFC and the EBIEC exist as subdivisions of MOFCOM (Xue 2014, Gu 2014). Beyond the three major ministries, there are also a multitude of actors involved in foreign aid and development projects, including the Ministries of Health and Education; local and provincial governments; and Chinese country embassies and economic counsellors' offices, which support large Chinese firms operating overseas. China's two major policy banks, the Export-Import Bank of China (Eximbank) and the China Development Bank, also play instrumental roles, particularly the former in the provision of concessional and interest-free loans. Many other actors, such as educational institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), hospitals and state-owned enterprises, are also involved in the implementation of development cooperation projects, such as technical training programmes, educational exchanges, and infrastructure construction and management. Each of these actors have their own bureaucratic and economic interests, and vary in the degree to which they are controlled by central government (Gu et al, 2016).

Since the China–Africa Summit in 2006, Beijing has attempted to enhance coordination mechanisms among all agencies involved in foreign aid. In 2011, these related agencies set up a cross-ministry liaison mechanism, to coordinate foreign aid affairs, comprising two components: the

management mechanism and the supporting mechanism. The former, responsible for the management of foreign aid planning and strategy, involves the three leading ministries, MOFCOM, MOFA and MOF (Gu et al, 2014). It also entails coordination between these ministries and the national and policy banks; and between the ministries and implementing institutions, such as the People's Liberation Army in humanitarian assistance operations, as well as with technical teams and local agents, including embassies and counsellors' offices.

The supporting mechanism comprises the Eximbank, which is responsible for concessional loans of foreign aid and plays an important role in promoting an open and export-oriented economy through trade financing (Gu 2011), under the guidance of MOFCOM, which is responsible for issuing policies regarding concessional loans and signing the agreement or framework for the loans. The EBIEC is responsible for the assessment of loans projects, reimbursements, management as well as the repayment of loans and accumulated interest. Each year, the scale of the loans is proposed by the People's Bank of China, EBIEC, MOFCOM and MOFA, for the approval of the State Council.

The role of China's business sector in aid and development activities has also increased in the last decade, coinciding with the 'going global' strategy set out by the government in the early 2000s, which aimed to promote the international expansion of leading Chinese firms. This has become intertwined with many of China's development cooperation projects, most visibly in infrastructure and construction, and involves an extensive number of overseas investment and expansion-promoting incentives. These include lower-cost loans, engineering contracts, diplomatic support, export tax exemptions, help with risk assessments, easier emigration approvals, insurance and interest rate rebates (Wolf et al. 2013, Gu and Carty, 2014).

In contrast to most Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) donor countries, China lacks an independent aid agency. The department for foreign aid, the closest institution with a dedicated goal, lacks the capacity and personnel to manage existing aid projects, being minimally staffed with only around 100 personnel managing all aid projects—a far cry from the international development agency of any OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) country. Though the participation of multiple agencies in aid can mobilize funds and human resources from different sectors, it also creates high coordination costs. MOFCOM has been trying in recent years to improve existing and develop new regulations and standards related to

the development and execution of projects. However, it does not have the analytical capabilities nor the incentives to develop a coherent strategy for aid (Xue 2014).

Overall, Chinese foreign aid is more political than developmental in nature.⁴ Although under the impact of the Western development discourse China has begun to use the term 'international development cooperation', the dominant mainstream opinion is that Chinese aid is primarily political.⁵ It is MOFA rather than MOFCOM that deals with China's strategic plan and foreign policies, creating tensions between the two ministries due to overlaps and conflicts in their jurisdictions. The recently established Department of International Economic Affairs, under MOFA, further blurs the current overlaps between the two ministries in terms of responsibility for international aid.

IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE WEST ON DEVELOPMENT AND AID

The most striking ideological difference between China and Western donors concerning foreign aid is the core principle of China's foreign aid programme: 'non-interference' or 'non-conditionality'. For many Western countries, international aid is an effective tool to apply pressure on developing countries to move towards goals of 'good governance' and 'democracy', and these conditions, together with environmental standards and human rights practices, are often attached to the provision of aid or other financing. China's refusal to use conditionality in its foreign aid has led to accusations of it being a 'rogue donor', with fears that it might undermine the tools used by the traditional donors (Thompson 2005; Gill et al. 2007).

However, the principles of non-interference and non-conditionality derive from broader principles in China's foreign policy, which have remained remarkably consistent over history. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence—mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence—were proposed by former Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1953. They were subsequently expanded into the so-called *Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries* in January 1964.

1. Ensure equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries.

2. Respect the sovereignty of recipient countries.
3. Provide economic aid in the form of interest-free or concessional loans.
4. Promote self-reliance and independent economic development.
5. Give priority to projects that require less investment but produce fast results.
6. Provide high-quality equipment and materials manufactured by China at international market prices.
7. Transfer skills and technology to recipient countries.
8. Provide technical and practical expertise from visiting Chinese experts.

China's adherence to non-interference and rejection of political conditionality stems in part from its particular historical experience of Western colonialism, as well as its own experience of political conditionality as a recipient of Soviet aid (Xue 2014). China followed the principles of internationalism and third world solidarity during the early era of foreign aid provision and used foreign aid to support other developing countries in their anti-colonial struggles. In 1958, after Bandung Conference, the government stated that China should support more underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa, and provide technical and economic aid to these countries. China still emphasizes that aid should be used to help recipient countries build up their self-development capacity: the goal of aid should be greater independence, not dependence.

Since 1978, the priority of the Communist Party has shifted from ideological struggles to economic development. The ideology of foreign aid has also changed significantly. Rather than being based on political considerations or objectives, Chinese foreign aid shifted to a more practical focus, based on national interests and economic goals. In the 1980s, foreign aid policy in development cooperation started to emphasize 'mutually beneficial cooperation and common development' and 'remaining realistic while striving for the best'. This is partly based on China's own experiences and lessons as the world's largest developing country, with a large population, and development outcomes across the country that remain uneven. Realizing that development is an arduous and long-standing task both at home and abroad. China redefined its foreign aid as a part of South-South cooperation (SSC) (SCIO 2011).

Based on these principles and guidelines, the practice of China's development cooperation pays attention to equal partnership and development effectiveness, emphasizing infrastructure development and maintaining an environment of non-interference so that other developing countries

can determine their own development agendas and paths. Simultaneously, China has also expanded its scholarships and training programmes to developing countries to foster knowledge exchange and help countries build capacity in their human capital (Li and Wu 2013; Lancaster 2007).

Academic discussion of China's non-interference policy frame it in the context of Chinese domestic politics: as a communist, non-democratic state, China has a limited interest in promoting Western democratic governance in its recipient countries; as such, non-interference serves to ensure China's own sovereignty and support from other developing countries (Li 2007).

THE STATE OF THE DEBATE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN CHINA

China emphasizes that aid should be used to help recipient countries build up their self-development capacity, and that it should not be used to impose political conditions on recipient countries nor intervene in their internal affairs. This is a marked difference from the historical practice of Western aid institutions, notably under the dominant Washington Consensus, and the conditionality that marks loans from Western multilateral organizations.

In practice, the Chinese approach means that zero-interest and concessional loans are usually given on a request-based system to fund a specific project in the host country.⁶ China also offers interest-free loans through economic and technical cooperation agreements, which are disbursed for projects determined through agreement with the host government. This stands in contrast to Western aid agencies, which normally stipulate how and to which sectors aid money is distributed.

In contrast to Western donors, China does not make any conditions for political reforms prior to aid disbursement (Kjøllestad and Welle-Strand 2010), upholding the principle of mutual respect of sovereignty (Gu et al. 2014). However it has been argued that this practice conflicts with the plans of OECD countries to harmonize aid, and some have argued that this undermines good governance initiatives promoted by the West in Africa (Chidaushe 2007; Schoeman 2007). Despite this criticism, several studies argue that there is no reliable evidence to prove that China has undermined governance standards (Paulo and Reisen 2010; Woods 2008), and in practice, the behaviour of Chinese actors has not differed significantly from that of Western donors (Power et al. 2012). Indeed, China's presence, alongside the other rising powers, as an alternative source of development finance may arguably be a boon for low-income countries,

whose bargaining power vis-à-vis the traditional donors has increased with the availability of choice.

Since 2005, there has been a growing interest in China's foreign aid, particularly in Africa, where Chinese economic engagement has expanded widely since the first Forum for China–Africa Cooperation in 2006. Perspectives on the impact of China's impact on Africa range widely, with critics pointing to the negative impacts of Chinese investment, such as the crowding-out of local production with cheap Chinese imports (Manji and Marks 2007; Trofimov 2007), especially in labour-intensive industries such as textiles, clothing, footwear and furniture (Cropley and Martina 2012). China's demand for raw materials and natural resources has also spurred accusations of neocolonialism and exploitation, as resource exports offer little added value or potential for job creation.

Simultaneously, others point out that new Chinese-funded roads, railways, ports and airports have filled a critical gap that Western donors have failed to address and are removing some of the core constraints in Africa's development (Zhao 2014). Other scholars point out that “not only Chinese but also Western actors are responsible for their lack of political will to solve Africa's security and governance problems,” and that Chinese and Western actors often behave no differently in areas of foreign policy (Hirono and Suzuki 2014).

Scoones et al. (2013) have called for the identification and recognition of innovative methods and practices in Chinese development assistance, trade and investments, in place of an overemphasis on rhetorical claims. Similarly, Zimmermann and Smith (2011) draw attention to the growing opportunities for mutual learning and collaboration between all providers of development cooperation. Li et al. (2014) argue in favour of reviewing China's aid practices, which are different from those of Western donors, and suggest that what is most important is to identify the common goals and concrete ways in which Western and Chinese aid can become a joint ‘developmental force’ on the ground.

This demand for greater collaboration also comes from established donors, who are interested in applying lessons from China's experience to their own development cooperation programmes through triangular or trilateral development collaborative frameworks. This trend was originally hailed as one of the ways forward for more horizontal relations between OECD DAC and non-OECD countries; such an approach would also help blur the lines between recipient and donor, in order to focus on development outcomes rather than the politics of aid. However, as we discuss below, this engagement must take place in a context that acknowledges the distinct values in China's

aid and foreign policy, and recognizes a role for mutual learning—and thus mutual respect—in development cooperation frameworks.

CHINA'S PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

China is not the only rising power to play a significant role in international development cooperation. Other large countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey have established a significant presence in international debates. The BRICS countries and other emerging economies are a prominent part of the contemporary landscape of international development and a deeper understanding of their roles and significance is necessary. Beyond the BRICS grouping, the dynamics of South–South dialogue and cooperation have supported the bilateral and multilateral initiatives involving the next wave of 'emerging economies' such as Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. And it is quite clear that the BRICS countries carry particular characteristics that mark them out for specific attention in the international development domain. Developing from a process of dialogue begun in 2006, the grouping and its members are distinguishable in a number of ways. There are a number of commonalities and convergences in their overall approaches to the 'development agenda', as well as a general consensus on the main elements of classic South–South Cooperation.

Like the other BRICS countries, China shares the traits of having a large territory, a large population and impressive rates of GDP growth (Gu et al 2008). The BRICS have a common acceptance of the idea that the state has a legitimate and important role to play in both domestic and international development, and all have at various times been providers and recipients of development assistance. China in particular is an embodiment of the East Asian developmental state model that has previously been so successful in countries like Japan and South Korea.

Despite its economic successes, China, like the other BRICS countries (perhaps with the exception of Russia, despite the fact that it still faces substantial challenges of poverty, inequality, health and deprivation) still classes itself as a developing country. As with the other BRICS countries, China brings its own history of conflict, poverty and inequality, yet presents an example of successful reform, recovery and eventual growth and political stability; it holds both regional and global importance and influence; and it has started to establish itself as a new source of international development assistance and cooperation. China is also committed to a collective process of increased BRICS institutionalization.

As with the other BRICS countries, China's role and economic impact in the post-2008 global financial crisis world has become greatly enhanced, as the weakened performance of Western donors affects not only their capacity to deliver aid and resources but also the credibility of their development paradigms. As a success story of economic development, China—as with the other BRICS countries—offers an alternative set of innovative strategies to achieve fast growth, which has boosted their credibility with other developing countries, and can serve as an aspirational model.

However, all the BRIC countries also face the common challenge of how to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth domestically, to maintain political and economic stability, and how to design and implement the foreign aid in a way that handles this challenge overseas. The volatility that has afflicted Chinese financial markets starting in 2015 has also raised concerns over the global ripple effects of a Chinese economic slowdown in the long term.

In terms of differences between the BRICS countries, each member brings to the grouping a different geography, history, cultures and set of values, as well as different political, cultural, social and economic systems. One major difference in political terms centres on 'political democracy' and the way that the term is understood and practised in the respective BRICS member states. While India is widely recognized as the world's largest political democracy, grounded in a pluralistic, multi-party representative system of government, Brazil, Russia and South Africa have laboured hard to establish stable equivalent systems in recent decades, with Brazil and South Africa both stressing the importance of democratization in their development pathways at home and internationally. China, on the other hand, interprets democracy quite distinctly, retaining the paramount and 'vanguard' role of the Community Party as central to the political and social system, both constitutionally and in practice, while promoting a market economy. This diversity gives rise to very different approaches to the role and purpose of civil society and NGOs, issues of transparency and accountability, civil and human rights, as well as freedom of expression and the role of the press and media.⁷ Such domestic issues overflow into analyses of international development practices ranging from human rights to corporate social responsibility and promotion of good governance.

While most BRICS aid financing has been concentrated in the infrastructure sector, to support economic activity, Russia is an exception that resembles more closely the OECD 'traditional' donors, focused on social

spending, mostly in the form of grants and debt relief. While Chinese loans have been accused of fuelling problems of debt sustainability in many developing countries—a large macroeconomic issue—the project-based financing model China uses does help to circumvent corruption at a micro level, while adhering to principles of non-interference (Mwase and Yang 2012).

BRICS development assistance is complementary to that of the established donors. The different sector focus of the development financing and the aid implementation approaches have provided the new opportunities and options to developing countries for their efforts to fight against poverty.

UNDERSTANDING THE LINKAGES BETWEEN CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT (COOPERATION) POLICY AND ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS

There has been a strong linkage between China's development cooperation and its internal affairs over the six decades of the PRC's existence. When the PRC was founded in 1949, many Western countries imposed diplomatic isolation. During this difficult time, China received foreign aid from the Soviet Union, and in turn built up diplomatic relationships with other socialist countries against Western containment. In 1950, China started to provide foreign aid to two neighbouring socialist countries, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Vietnam, followed by Mongolia and Lao People's Democratic Republic in the late 1950s.

In 1955, China sent a delegation to participate in the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, a demonstration of South–South solidarity against colonialism, and positioning China as a pseudo-leader of the developing world. During the Cold War period, China expanded its foreign aid beyond socialist countries to other developing countries in Africa, supporting many large-scale projects, such as the Tanzania–Zambia Railway, that still remain today. This generosity came despite China's own financial difficulties and huge population of people living in poverty. In 1973, China's foreign aid accounted for 7.2 % of its financial expenditure, a phenomenal sum compared to most developed countries (Xue 2015). Until 1976, foreign aid was driven mainly by political ideologies of anti-imperialism, third world solidarity and internationalism, and as a means to gain allies to support China's claims to a seat in the UN, against the Republic of China (Taiwan).

Since 1978, and the beginning of market-oriented reform and opening up policies, the priority of the central government shifted from 'class struggle' to 'economic development'. In 1979, China's foreign aid accounted for

only 0.7 % of its gross financial expenditure (Xue 2015). In addition, seeing the low effectiveness of foreign aid in some recipient countries led China to adjust its foreign aid strategies and approaches. The most important shift was from ‘one way aid’ to ‘mutual benefit and cooperation’, where the pursuit of economic benefit was put ahead of political purpose.

Since the 1990s, China has sped up the process of domestic transformation from a planned to a market economy. The year 1995 was a transition point for the reform of the foreign aid framework. To support China’s grand economic and trade goals, the mandate for foreign aid became the promotion of China’s economic development, through mobilizing both national and international funds, resources and markets. The implementation of foreign aid now considers the interests of both China and the recipient country. The preferable loan, rather than the grant, became the main financial tool for foreign aid. In 1993, the Chinese government set up the Cooperation Fund for Foreign Aid to support small and medium-sized enterprises in China to develop cooperation with enterprises in recipient countries. More emphasis was placed on capacity building in recipient countries, and government scholarships allowed foreign officials and students from recipient countries to study and train in China.

Since 2000, and the acceleration of economic growth, China has enhanced its national capacities and put more funds into foreign aid. According to the 2014 White Paper on Foreign Aid of China 2014 (Information Office of the State Council 2014), between 2010 and 2012, China provided CNY89.34 billion of aid to 121 countries, accounting for about 20 % of its total foreign aid expenditure since 1950. Beyond traditional bilateral channels, China also enhanced its presence in multilateral mechanisms at the international and regional levels. China announced its foreign aid programmes at the UN High Level Summit for Fund Raising for Development, the Forum of China–Africa Cooperation and the China–Association of Southeast Asian Nations leaders conferences.

Currently, China is in the process of deepening domestic reforms, taking steps to strengthen its power regionally and globally, as seen in the establishment of the AIIB and the ‘OBOR.’⁸ Though they can be seen as projections of China’s expanded international role, they are also channels that allow China to divest some of the excess capacity overseas, boosting markets for Chinese infrastructure firms.

The AIIB, launched in late 2014, produced its Articles of Agreement in June 2015, signed by all 50 founding members. Its stated mission—to support infrastructure development for the Asia–Pacific and address the

region's mounting infrastructure needs—has been positively received by the Western multilaterals such as the World Bank, and ADB, and boasts a number of key European states within its founding members. The OBOR initiative meanwhile has a greater focus on China's near-abroad and Eurasian neighbours through the Silk Road Economic Belt, as well as a New Silk Road Infrastructure fund, all with the aim of promoting greater economic integration and regional growth. These initiatives have caught the attention of Western analysts, though often framed through the lens of seeing China as a rival to existing Western institutions, without consideration of the internal factors driving these actions.

UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S INTEREST, INFLUENCE AND POTENTIAL IN DEVELOPMENT-RELATED KNOWLEDGE CREATION: KNOWLEDGE SHARING AS A WAY FORWARD

China is changing the landscape of international development architecture through both its bilateral activities and its multilateral roles. It is therefore imperative to understand the logic of Chinese policy. China's role in the BRICS NDB and the AIIB shows that it—like other BRICS countries—is increasingly influential outside its immediate geographic region. In the wake of economic globalization, and the growth of its own economy, China is increasing its participation in international affairs. In September 2015, President Xi Jinping announced that the Development Research Centre of the State Council in China will establish an International Development Knowledge Centre. He also announced that China will establish an assistance fund for SSC, with an initial pledge of US\$2 billion to support developing countries' implementation of the post-2015 development agenda.⁹

China is becoming more assertive in its pathways to development cooperation, yet it does not necessarily want or aim to circumvent cooperation with the West; in fact, the opposite might hold true. What should be recognized is that within China, policy-makers are themselves constantly appraising what the role of this increasingly empowered country in the international scene should be. While this might complicate existing relationships, it also represents an opportunity for engagement, since it suggests that China is open to exploring different options for its future development cooperation strategies.

Xiaoyun Li, Chairman of China International Development Research Network, writes that, “[A]s China moves from its previous, marginal status to being one of the central powers in the global system, it needs to have more

multilateral perspectives for its development cooperation programme, rather than sticking to bilateral channels ... China needs to incorporate the provision of global public goods into its development cooperation programme, rather than primarily focusing on its own economic interests.”¹⁰ However, in order to take advantage of this opportunity, OECD DAC donor countries and the United Nations (UN) itself need to think about the relevance of what they can offer from a Chinese perspective. This includes asking how this offer could contribute to China’s new international development thinking and its critical path, whose current roadmap centres on the Silk Road Fund¹¹ and OBOR initiative. On the part of the AIIB, the application in 2015 of several European countries to join the Bank as founding members is a positive development that not only reinforces the legitimacy and inclusivity of the new Chinese-led institution but also offers a seat at the table for these OECD DAC member countries to cooperate with and strengthen China’s multilateral engagements.

As far as China is concerned, the OECD DAC countries appear to be doing business as usual, even if the discourse has shifted from aid effectiveness to effective development cooperation (Li et al. 2013). There is clearly a need for improved communication about current OECD DAC thinking and the new approaches that OECD DAC members, rising powers and the least developed countries are working on together through the UN. However, this communication must be designed with greater awareness of the perspectives and sensitivities of rising power countries such as China, or it risks triggering renewed concerns about attempts to push China and the other BRICS countries in a particular direction.

In addition, the potential to engage in genuine mutual learning with China may be compromised by the prevalence of a ‘China threat’ narrative among policy-makers in many UN member countries. This means that openness to learning from Chinese-led development at home and abroad is compromised by disapproval of the Chinese Communist Party’s stance on political freedoms and human rights. It is imperative that the UN develops a strong alternative narrative on the value of mutual learning on development challenges even where clear political differences remain (potentially, a narrative that acknowledges the SSC principle of non-interference) if it is to engage meaningfully with China and other BRICS countries.

Despite these challenges, there are several potential entry points for an engagement strategy focused on knowledge-sharing in relation to development cooperation. One such potential entry point is to engage with the standards that China currently uses to evaluate its development interventions abroad. China will not necessarily adopt the conventional standards

used in the West to monitor and evaluate development impact. This would suggest that perhaps a more effective approach would be for Western and Chinese academics and practitioners to work together to identify the necessary criteria and specific mechanisms to be put in place to ensure more transparency, efficacy and effectiveness in this changing environment of aid provision.

A priority for the present and the future would then be to engage with Chinese policy-makers and academics to develop these new standards, specific and relevant to Chinese foreign policy priorities, beliefs and values, but also to apply them to Western donors: the best way to secure cooperation with China, is to learn with China.

The mutual understanding and trust developed through this type of initiative could in turn help to convince China of the value of triangular cooperation with bilateral and multilateral agencies. At the moment, China is careful about any form of triangular cooperation, and normally undertakes it only if recipient countries are clearly playing a leading role in the proposals it receives. The UN can help its OECD DAC member countries to engage with China by brokering contacts with third countries, especially those close to China and its SSC sphere of influence. In particular, this could include the Central Asian republics, given the focus of the new Chinese development roadmap on the 'New Silk Road'.

China's own development experiences, particularly those of the initial reform era (1978–1985), have resulted in a practical approach towards development (Zhang et al. 2015). The very nature of Chinese development policy is that it is predominantly responsive to demands from state authorities within the developing world. In its engagement for the purpose of development, China has mostly taken a bilateral (state-to-state) demand-driven approach. China provides projects and services as they are demanded by individual governments, with Chinese embassies in recipient countries playing a central role, as they hold regular consultations with national agencies for needs assessment. Development cooperation with China is definitely not simply a bilateral issue, and effective dialogues should be based on concrete issues rather than seeking a common framework or pushing the convergence of different approaches.

In conclusion, the philosophies and practices of China's development assistance have been formed and shaped by its unique experiences, history, culture, and political and economic situation. China's development aid experiences—focusing on non-interference, mutual benefit, aid mixed with trade and investment, financing productive infrastructure, self-reliance and autonomy in development—have made a significant contribution to

the global development knowledge base and provided credible examples to other developing countries. Despite the differences between China's modes of development assistance and those of Western donors, there are significant opportunities to engage China in dialogue and cooperation, to share learning outcomes and experiences and to set up common goals and identify complementary and effective approaches, towards the end goal of promoting development and poverty reduction across the world.

NOTES

1. One Belt, One Road—sometimes described as the ‘New Silk Road’—is a Chinese economic development initiative which focuses on building infrastructure and broadening trade principally among countries situated on the historic ‘Silk Road’ through Central and West Asia, the Middle East and Europe.
2. The Bandung Conference was the first ever large-scale meeting of African and Asian nations, many of which were newly independent. It aimed to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism.
3. A similar move has been undertaken by the Indian government in encouraging and supporting the expansion of Indian business, see Chenoy and Joshi (2016) in this volume.
4. In their chapter on India in this volume, Chenoy and Joshi (2016) argue that a similar political motive is increasingly underpinning Indian development assistance.
5. As the chapters by Chenoy and Joshi (2016) Suyama et al (2016) and Grobbelaar (2016) show, there exists a similarly close link between development cooperation and foreign policy in India, Brazil and South Africa. Russia, as Larionova et al (2016) in this volume shows, adopts a more nuanced approach to these partner countries, with development partnerships remaining a critical part to ensuring security.
6. Brautigam (2009) gives an example of Sierra Leone, which contrasts Chinese and Western financing. While Chinese financing did not stipulate how funds should be spent (and went towards building a stadium), promises from Western donors such as Germany and the UK were conditional on specific sectors (e.g. electrification and human security).

7. For an analysis of the debates and dynamics of civil society actors' role in development cooperation in Brazil, India, and South Africa, see Pomeroy et al (2016) in this volume.
8. According to Chinese officials, China's objective is to establish a new land-based Silk Road that would go through Central Asia to northern Iran and through Iraq, Syria and Turkey, thus connecting Asia with Europe. China explains its expansion as an attempt to further unite the nations of Asia and to establish closer economic ties. See Bhattarai (2014).
9. See China–US Focus (2015).
10. Author's interview, May 2015.
11. The Silk Road Fund is a state-owned investment fund established by the Chinese government to invest in businesses participating in the OBOR initiative. It is separate from the AIIB.

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South Africa: Security and Stability in Development Cooperation

Neuma Grobbelaar

This chapter explores South Africa's development cooperation from two vantage points: firstly, as a mechanism to secure the country's prosperity and security in one of the world's most under-developed and volatile continents; and secondly, as a contribution to South–South cooperation as the smallest member—both in terms of political and economic clout—of the BRICS grouping. Of course, representing BRICS as a South–South cooperation construct is a contradiction in terms, given the presence of Russia in the group. However, insofar as the BRICS grouping seeks to challenge the North in its traditional shaping of the global governance architecture, it offers a counterpoint to traditional Northern dominance. More importantly, the approach and content of South Africa's development cooperation fall squarely within a South–South cooperation framework.

A third vantage point, namely South Africa's influence in the economic sphere, is less explored here, despite the fact that South Africa carries significant economic weight in its own region.¹ This is largely because the South African Government has not actively sought to build on the strength of its economic dominance in its development approach towards the region.

N. Grobbelaar (✉)

PO Box 31596, Braamfontein, Johannesburg 2017, South Africa

South Africa's economic engagement in the development space is hemmed in by the ideological rupture between its public and private sector. This does not mean that South Africa is not influential in regional and global debates on economic concerns. Indeed, as the only African state that is a member of the G20, its influence extends well beyond the boundaries of its region. Rather, the full potential of its economic clout in regional and global fora is under-developed given the absence of a strong synergistic relationship between the South African private and public sectors. This is in contrast to the other BRICS countries. As shown in the chapters in this volume by Gu et al (see Chap. 5) and Chenoy and Joshi (see Chap. 4), linkages between the state and private sector remain strong in both China and India. Unlike them, South Africa has largely steered clear of facilitating the entry of its domestic private sector either into its immediate neighbourhood, or globally. Instead, the mechanisms that it utilizes to support greater integration with the regional economy are mainly indirect.²

South Africa's pursuit of regional and global trade agreements, and agreements within the BRICS grouping, has been lethargic. In fact progress has largely stalled and the ambition of most of the more recent trade negotiations with which South Africa has engaged—such as the conclusion of the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement, which links the South African Development Community (SADC), the East African Economic Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa into Africa's largest economic grouping—has been extremely low. The closest comparison that can be drawn between the regional economic engagement strategies of South Africa and the other BRICS countries is in its strong support of South African state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the region. This posture aligns closely with that of Brazil and India, given the strong market principles that South Africa employs in managing the outward-facing engagements of its SOEs. There is also no doubt that the economic dwarfism of the South African economy, in comparison with the collective weight of the other BRICS members (Smith 2013), is also a factor.³ Indeed, South Africa's lack of economic clout is further compounded by its lethargic economic performance since 2006, not only relative to the BRICS grouping but also to other African economies.

Like many other rising development partners, South Africa is hardly a newcomer to development cooperation. Dreher et al. (2013, 403) suggest what is 'new' is "the attention that these 'donors' receive in the public

debate”. Indeed the rapid growth of South Africa’s development cooperation in the post-1994 period has its antecedents in the Apartheid era, when the South African Government actively destabilized and sought cooperation and acquiescence from its neighbouring countries during years of increasing political, economic and military isolation.

However, like all of the Southern members of the BRICS grouping, South Africa is only recently emerging as a recipient of substantial donor aid from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC) and other ‘traditional’ donors.⁴ Although South Africa’s overseas development aid (ODA) receipts traditionally represented less than 1 % of its annual budget, it featured in the top quintile of African aid recipients. Moreover, the strong political reaction of the then South African Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan when, in May 2103, the UK Government announced that it would halt its aid to South Africa from 2015 onwards given that it “is now in a position to fund its own development” (DFID 2013) is indicative of how important this assistance has been for South Africa.

In fact, South Africa’s middle income status and per capita income of US\$6478 (World Bank 2015a) mask significant ongoing inequality and poverty. In part, despite 21 years of political freedom, this is the outcome of the legacy of Apartheid, but it is also the result of massive and endemic unemployment, weak health indicators and persistent poor technical skills and educational results. With reference to the latter, this has been the case despite the consistently high levels of expenditure on education over many years (World Bank 2015b).⁵ South Africa’s ‘job-less’⁶ growth, a result of its anaemic economic performance, is one of the biggest reasons for the perpetuation of severe social inequality that mirrors racial divisions. This is evident in a high Gini coefficient of 0.70 in 2008 (Barrientos et al. 2013).⁷ Endemic poverty and inequality are not unique to South Africa, and are strongly mirrored in its fellow BRICS countries.

It is therefore worth considering whether the fragility of South Africa’s internal economic consolidation (and that of Brazil and India, and arguably also that of China if not managed well) and related self-development experiences puts these countries in a strong position as ‘new’ actors in development cooperation. It also raises interesting questions about the extent to which their home-grown experiences inform their South–South cooperation strategies. Lastly, it also underscores the extent to which their development cooperation initiatives are exposed and vulnerable to the vagaries of their own economic fortunes—as is certainly the case with

South Africa. Moreover, specifically in the South African case, it underlines the country's unique dependence on external (or trilateral) partners to bolster its own limited sources of funding for development cooperation in its own region. South Africa's broad-based engagement with the other BRICS countries and its enthusiastic support of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) should also be viewed through this prism.

The chapter starts with a brief introduction of the size of South Africa's development cooperation. It looks at the modalities, mechanisms and locus of engagement, and its location in the South–South cooperation space. It focuses on South Africa's regional development institution-building role and the conceptualization of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) and discusses South Africa's track record in peace-building, as well as public support for this role. Lastly, it considers the importance of trilateral cooperation as an important enabler of South African engagement in its region alongside the multiple identities that BRICS can offer it as a development partner.

AFRICA'S LARGEST HOME-GROWN DEVELOPMENT PARTNER: BUT IS IT AID?

A study (Braude et al. 2008) by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) found that over half of South African Government departments are involved in providing development assistance to the region. By 2004, it was estimated that a total of US\$1.6 billion of South African donor assistance had been provided to the rest of the region since the mid-1990s (Chin and Quadir 2012). But these figures are under dispute given that this process has been largely demand-driven and evolved incrementally without a central coordinating mechanism in place. This is because a diverse group of public and private institutions have been involved in South African development activities in the rest of Africa. These included the obvious candidates, such as the departments of public service and administration (through exchanges and capacity-building), education (mainly through the provision of bursaries and scholarships), defence (through support to regional peacekeeping operations) and trade and industry. However, other less obvious departments—such as mineral resources, science and technology, justice and constitutional development,⁸ the police service, agriculture, energy, public works and public enterprises—are also included.

Apart from direct bilateral line department cooperation, there are numerous South African public institutions and bodies, including parastatals, that provide developmental support to countries in the region.

These include the Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA), Statistics South Africa, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, the South African Revenue Service, the Reserve Bank—all of which mainly provide technical support and capacity-building; the National Research Foundation and the University of South Africa; and SOEs including the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the Industrial Development Corporation, Eskom, Telkom, Portnet and Transnet (Besharati 2013a).

The accumulation of these individual interventions, alongside the totality of South Africa's peacekeeping, electoral and regional support, led the authors of an internal treasury review in 2006 to conclude that South Africa's 'overseas development aid' is comparable with countries such as Sweden and Norway. Alden and Le Pere (2010) calculated that in 2004 South Africa's public and private outflows to Africa amounted to ZAR1.6 billion, while another study (Braude et al. 2008) suggested that by 2006, South Africa's total development assistance was closer to ZAR3.211 billion or 0.18 % of the country's GDP. They concluded that the inclusion of the South African contribution to the South African Customs Union (SACU) development component (around ZAR2 billion in 2006) would increase South Africa's development cooperation contribution to 0.29 % of GDP. More recent assessments have revised the estimates significantly upwards to 0.7 % (Vickers 2012) and 1 % of the country's Gross National Income (GNI) (Grimm 2011), suggesting that South Africa is surpassing even the ODA target set for traditional donors.

However, these figures have to be dealt with circumspectly given the underlying data gaps, as well as some disputes about whether some of the data included here (such as South Africa's transfers to the SACU member states) constitute a real contribution to development assistance, even though South African Government officials might view it in this way.⁹ Despite these impressive figures, like the other Southern BRICS members, South Africa cannot be regarded as a 'donor country' or a 'provider of development assistance' in the mould of the OECD DAC definitions. The OECD DAC criteria of development aid sit uneasily both with the actual activities that South Africa undertakes in the region and the country's world view.

South Africa's development interventions in the region are framed within the broad interpretation of South–South cooperation as articulated in the 1978 United Nations (UN) Buenos Aires Plan of Action of 1978 and the High-level UN Conference on South–South Cooperation in Nairobi of 2009. This is in a similar vein to Brazil, see Suyama et al's (see Chap. 2) in

this volume. As noted by Simplicio et al. (2011, 23), South–South cooperation “operates on the foundational principles of solidarity, non-interference and mutual benefit which comprise the sharing of knowledge and experiences, training, technology transfer, financial and monetary cooperation and in-kind contributions, among developing nations.” This approach suggests an exchange of resources, technical expertise, peer learning and cooperation based on a *common definition of partnership*. It is thus no surprise that the South African Government is wary of describing itself as a donor country and even the name of its yet-to-be-established ‘donor agency’ reflects this unease, having changed from the initially conceptualized South African International Development Agency, to the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) (Besharati 2013b).

Uniquely, a great number of South Africa’s ‘development interventions’ fall under the broad rubric of peace-building, conflict mediation, post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization of the region, in partnership mainly with African actors and often under a UN and/or African Union (AU) mandate. These types of intervention are not regarded as aid contributions under the OECD DAC framework but have been included in the emerging description and classification of South–South cooperation initiatives by the Network of Southern Think Tanks (NEST), an initiative led by Southern-based think tanks in South Africa, China, India and Brazil, and supported by think tanks in Turkey, Mexico and Indonesia and various African countries through the African chapter of NEST.¹⁰ They are a prominent feature of South Africa’s support to the stability and development of Africa, and despite definitional differences, there is no disputing the fact that South Africa is Africa’s leading African development assistance partner.

It is also in its own region that South Africa’s credentials as a development partner have been cemented. Of all the BRICS countries, South Africa’s development partnership cooperation is possibly most narrowly focused and located in its own region, a reflection of its relative global economic weight compared to the other BRICS countries. Although a giant in regional terms, South Africa’s status as the 33rd largest economy globally (2014 estimate), with a real GDP of US\$349.82 billion, is small compared to the rank and size of the rest of the BRIC economies—China (2nd largest, US\$10.36 trillion), Brazil (7th largest, US\$2.35 trillion), India (9th largest, US\$2.07 trillion) and Russia (10th largest, US\$1.86 trillion) (World Bank 2015c). This explains the limited reach of South Africa’s South–South cooperation, despite its high ambitions. There are a few

exceptions to South Africa's mainly African targeting, namely countries, like Cuba, which either provided support to the African National Congress (ANC) during the liberation struggle, or countries, like Palestine, where a perceived anti-colonial liberation struggle is still being fought. The government also provides logistical support to humanitarian organizations, such as the Gift of the Givers, to provide emergency humanitarian assistance in countries such as Haiti, Japan and Turkey, but this is a very small part of its overall development cooperation contribution.

From a South African perspective, the area where there is most potential for 'development' cooperation within the BRICS framework is within global economic governance fora. This is the case despite the scale and intensity of African-based development initiatives supported by Brazil, India and China in South Africa's own sub-region and hinterland. Some of these engagements are pursued at a bilateral level: Brazil, for example, is heavily engaged in countries that are part of the Lusophone Africa group. For more on this see Suyama et al's (see Chap. 2) in this volume. Others are pursued regionally or continentally through initiatives such as the Chinese-driven Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. Apart from joint peacekeeping initiatives under a UN Mandate, an area where South Africa feels most at ease collaborating with external partners on regional projects, there are no known examples of joint India–South Africa, China–South Africa or Brazil–South Africa third-party collaborations in individual countries.¹¹ The only exceptions are where South African development finance institutions have provided finance for third-party development projects or African projects that are located under the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) fund.¹² This lack of collaboration is not unique to South Africa, and on the one hand points to the nascent status of the development cooperation architecture of both South Africa itself and the BRICS countries collectively, in addition to South Africa's limited resources for partnering initiatives. On the other hand, it also points to the fact that many BRICS engagements in Africa—including those of South Africa—are interest-driven.

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AS A COUNTER-WEIGHT TO REGIONAL INSTABILITY? BENEVOLENCE OR SELF-INTEREST?

Given the scale of turmoil in its region and the key focus of the South African Government on regional peace-building, it is no surprise that South Africa is amongst the biggest African contributors to multilateral

peacekeeping operations through the AU and the UN. It has been involved in peacekeeping operations in countries as diverse as Burundi, Central African Republic, Comores, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Lesotho and South Sudan. Importantly, apart from providing actual peacekeepers on the ground, South Africa has invested heavily in regional mediation and institution-building efforts in Africa. Of the former, its engagement in DRC has been the most extensive and sustained. It has chosen continental initiatives and institutions focused on the development and stabilization of Africa as the key vehicles through which it has pursued its 'development partnership agenda' and the re-emergence or 'renaissance' of Africa.

South Africa's focus on peace-building and regional stabilization should be understood against the broader backdrop of South Africa's historical destabilization role in the region pre-1994. In this respect, South Africa views its engagement as servicing a 'debt' towards the region for its support to the ANC during the liberation struggle. It is probably in this space where it most strongly diverges from the rest of the other BRICS countries, although the extent to which this remains an overriding concern 21 years into democracy is questionable. Indeed, the South African parliament has actively questioned the value to South Africans of the country's extensive peace-building agenda. However, this agenda is of course also informed by a strong sentiment of enlightened self-interest, namely the realization that South Africa cannot prosper in a region that is immersed in a 'sea of poverty'.

Over the last 21 years South Africa's approach to development partnership has shifted significantly from the initial position of broad rhetoric stated in the pre-1994 ANC election manifesto. This emphasized rejoining the international community and playing a part in a "worldwide campaign for democracy, human rights, peace and nuclear disarmament"; working for "just economic and social relations between the developed industrial nations and the developing countries"; recognizing that "our destiny is intertwined with that of Southern Africa"; and lastly, "build[ing] extensive links with countries of Africa and work[ing] with other states to ensure that the continent is not ignored by the rest of humankind" (ANC 1994, no page).

By 2004, under the heading 'Africa and the World', the 2004 ANC election manifesto (ANC 2004) identified the following key objectives for the ANC-led Government's engagement globally:

- "Speed up economic integration in Southern Africa and strengthen democracy, peace, stability as well as economic growth and

development; ... in particular ... in Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Swaziland. Realization of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), [and]... co-operation with civil society, to promote development, prevent conflicts ...

- Improve co-operation among countries of the South in terms of economic relations, socio-political programmes and efforts to ensure peace and equitable global relations ...
- Strengthen economic and other relations with industrialized countries, including inward investment and tourism, trade and transfer of skills and technology ...
- Promote a collective multilateral approach to global challenges, and work for the democratization of the UN, IMF, World Bank and other global institutions, and ensure that development and environmental goals of humanity are pursued and met.”

(ANC 2004, bullets added)

South Africa's relations with the rest of Africa and Africa's engagement with the rest of the world have emerged as a central pillar of South Africa's foreign policy. Today, this is framed as South Africa's African Agenda in the strategic plan of the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation. In many respects, despite several changes in administration and two terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, the foreign policy thrust of ANC-led Government has largely remained true to the broad parameters of the 2004 manifesto. However, particularly under the Zuma administration, there has been a shift from the strong liberal approach of the Mandela and to a lesser extent the Mbeki administrations¹³ to one that is much more ideologically tilted towards the stance of China and Russia (Qobo and Dube 2015). In addition, South Africa's prioritization of its relations with the BRICS countries (to the detriment, some would argue, of its relations with key trading partners like the European Union), its voting behaviour in international humanitarian fora and its support of the establishment of a nascent alternative development architecture such as the BRICS NDB, all point to a shift in emphasis, priority and approach.

It remains to be seen whether this shift constitutes a significant move away from South Africa's traditional role of bridge-builder between North and South and dedicated multilateralist, to one that is driven by a narrower set of ambitions. Where this becomes particularly problematic

is in the discourse of how South Africa squares its enduring ambition to be globally recognized as Africa's leading state (Alden and Schoeman 2013, 112) with lagging support from within its region and the rise of competing African gateways and regional anchors, namely Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia and Senegal. Of all the BRICS countries, South Africa's geopolitical influence and reach are most constrained by the hard paradigm of its limited military and economic might, yet it seems under the Zuma administration to be most willing to adopt definitive positions that ironically also diverge most strongly from the accepted Southern consensus, such as its single-minded pursuit of the AU chairmanship.¹⁴

SOUTH AFRICA AND AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT: THE CENTRALITY OF PEACE AND STABILITY

As noted by Besharati (2013b) and Sidiropoulos (2012), one of the first undertakings by the South African Government in 1994 was to forgive the debt of around ZAR3 billion owed by Namibia, Swaziland and Mozambique. More importantly, the pre-1994 South African Government's decision to return the port of Walvis Bay, a South African territorial enclave, to the newly independent Namibia following pressure from the ANC, underwrote the new South African government's intention to place its relationship with Africa on a completely new footing, leaving behind its hegemonic and colonialist past.¹⁵ This bold initiative has largely continued to set the tone for the way that South Africa engages the rest of Africa.

As one of Africa's biggest and most sophisticated economies, South Africa looms politically and economically large in Africa's affairs—both regionally and globally. South Africa has adopted a strategy that demonstrates decisive leadership in African initiatives, while taking care—unfortunately, sometimes unsuccessfully—not to be cast as a regional hegemon or bully pursuing its own interests. South Africa's quiet diplomacy towards its region has been supported by an elaborate regional strategy. However, South Africa's first and primary priority was, and arguably continues to be, contributing towards peace in its own region.

It was clear very early in the life of South Africa's democratic dispensation and its various forays into the region that the South African Government considered peace and stability as an absolute *sine qua non* for its own development and that of Africa more widely. This is also how South Africa's expansive efforts in regional peace-building ought to be understood.

In the early years of democracy, under the presidency of Nelson Mandela, a great deal of emphasis was placed on the reintegration of South Africa into the global community following over 30 years of isolation. South Africa became a key advocate of nuclear and weapon disarmament resulting in the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the signature and adoption of the Ottawa Treaty on demining. In many respects, South Africa established itself during this period as an important bridge-builder, acting as a responsible emerging middle power and utilizing the moral authority of its peaceful transition to garner significant support for its foreign initiatives in the interest of global peace and development.

CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS AND FRAMEWORKS TO STABILIZE THE REGION: REACHING OUT TO THE DEVELOPED NORTH

It was under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008) that the South African Government’s engagements globally and in the rest of Africa elaborated far more explicitly the vision of playing a constructive role in the development and stability of the continent. This approach straddled both bilateral and regional initiatives. The effort to put the entire continent on a more sustainable path of growth was most clearly manifested in the role that South Africa played in engineering the reform of the Organisation of African Unity, which led to the establishment of the AU in Durban in 2002. This was preceded in July 2001 by the adoption by African leaders of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as “the AU’s socio-economic development programme ... designed to operationalize the vision and the principles of the [AU] Constitutive Act” (Malcomson 2004, 11).¹⁶

The adoption of NEPAD was a clear example of enlightened and decisive leadership and effective African coalition-building focused on placing the continent’s engagement with the North on a new footing. It was the outcome of close cooperation and trade-offs under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade and Algeria’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika. NEPAD also signalled a redefinition of Africa’s historical donor–recipient engagement with its traditional donors, to a relationship founded more strongly on the principle of joint partnership. This manifested in the North–South outreach initiatives following the 2002 Kananaskis G8 Summit, which included for the first time a G8 outreach to Africa through the adoption of the African Action Plan¹⁷ and the establishment of the Africa Partnership Forum. South Africa, as a key

representative of African countries and supporter of NEPAD, has been an active participant in all subsequent G8 outreach initiatives to Africa, at first purely representing African interests.

South Africa's role subsequently expanded when it was one of a group of countries labelled the Outreach Five—also including Brazil, China, India and Mexico—invited by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to the Gleneagles Summit in 2005. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the G20 (in which South Africa is the only African country represented) became the premier international forum for engagement on global economic governance challenges.¹⁸

SOUTH AFRICA'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFRICAN INSTRUMENTS AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS

In setting new precedents on how African countries could become more stable, South Africa was instrumental in setting up the voluntary African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) under the auspices of NEPAD. The APRM enables ongoing review of the performance of member countries by peers through significant civil society participation in four core sectoral areas: political, economic, socio-economic and corporate governance. The APRM is also partly the result of a tempering of South Africa's human rights agenda towards the rest of the region following the strident criticism that the country endured when President Mandela publicly called for sanctions against the Sani Abacha regime in Nigeria following the execution of the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and his fellow Ogoni activists.¹⁹

The launch of the AU and the introduction of the APRM signified for the first time a substantial move away from the hallowed and absolute principle of sovereignty as 'non-interference' in the affairs of other nation states, towards a more nuanced interpretation of 'non-indifference'.

South Africa is the biggest contributor to NEPAD, providing ZAR35 million annually. Two-thirds of its contribution is to the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA)—which it also provides with premises, equipment and tax exemptions—while one-third goes towards supporting the APRM. South Africa has also in the past provided high-level secondments to NEPAD, including its first chief executive officer Prof. Wiseman Nkhulu, a former economic advisor to President Thabo Mbeki. South Africa also provides active support to another body of the AU, the Pan-African Parliament, in a similar manner.

Other regional commitments by South Africa towards African institution-building include its engagement within the framework of SACU, the oldest customs union in the world. Established in 1910 to compensate for South Africa's economic dominance in the region, its other members are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. SACU's revenue-sharing agreement disproportionately favours the four smaller members, with South Africa transferring the bulk of its customs duties to its neighbours. In the 2009/10 budget this represented more than 1 % of its GDP, or US\$3 billion (Vickers 2012). While South Africa's transfers are not recognized as development assistance, it is worth noting that they constitute between 50 and 70 % of the revenue of Swaziland and Lesotho, and between 15 and 30 % of the revenue of Namibia and Botswana (Besharati 2013b, 19).

South Africa is also the biggest contributor to SADC, providing 20 % of the operational budget of the 15-member regional institution. It is an active participant in SADC peace-building and regional integration efforts, and a South African is currently seconded to one of the Deputy Executive Secretary posts in Gaborone, the seat of the SADC secretariat. As a key maintainer of Africa's regional architecture, South Africa is also the biggest contributor to the AU budget, transferring ZAR150–200 million a year to the AU, 15 % of the budget of the organization.²⁰

All of these initiatives demonstrate the primacy of Africa in South Africa's external engagement, but also the South African Government's strong belief in the principle of subsidiarity. This underpins its efforts to strengthen regional institutions and initiatives to deal with regional concerns. It has also informed its efforts to improve cooperation between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council.

INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS TO SUPPORT SOUTH–SOUTH COOPERATION

The vehicles South Africa uses to provide development assistance to the rest of Africa predate the democratic transition. The Economic Cooperation Promotion Loan Fund (ECPLF), located in the Department of Foreign Affairs, was initially the primary instrument of development assistance, while the DBSA was established in 1983.²¹

However, South Africa's rejoining of the international community post-1994, and the formation of its ambitious African Agenda under the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies, prompted a hasty rethink of the

instruments available to South Africa to see this agenda through. By 2000, the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARICF, but also known as ARF) was established by an act of Parliament to replace the ECPLF. Located in the Department of Foreign Affairs, the ARF had an initial capital of US\$30 million, a residual of the funds remaining from the ECPLF (Vickers 2012, 538). The parliamentary act also made provision for the annual replenishment of the fund through parliamentary allocations and the provision of a rolling budget to enable the building up of capital and reserves through funds that were not spent in a particular budget year.

As an explicit *foreign policy tool* (Besharati 2013a; Vickers 2012), the ARF supported cooperation between South Africa and other countries by promoting democracy and good governance; preventing conflict and assisting with conflict resolution; supporting socio-economic development and integration; providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Africa; and providing technical assistance and capacity-building (DIRCO 2011a). Besharati (2013a, 19) suggests that the “fund was *not* envisioned as an instrument to provide aid but rather to establish partnerships, demonstrate solidarity and support the economic empowerment of Africa.” This positions the new development approach squarely within the South–South cooperation discourse.

Despite the ability of the ARF to mobilize funds for priorities in the region as a foreign policy tool, its operational framework had a significant impact on its efficiency and capacity, as well as its transparency and strategic focus. These lessons would be taken forward in the subsequent conceptualization of SADPA.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP AGENCY: A DIFFERENT DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM OR A BRIDGE BETWEEN TWO WORLDS?

The establishment of a development partnership agency was first mooted at the ANC’s July 2007 preparatory policy conference, and then subsequently formally adopted during the 52nd National Conference in Polokwane the same year. As noted in resolution 21 (ANC 2007, 21):

The idea of a Developmental Partnership is one of the key strategies that could assist the ANC and government in pursuit of our vision for a better Africa. The Development Partnership will enhance our agenda on

international relations which rests on three pillars namely; (i) consolidation of the African agenda, (ii) South–South and (iii) North–South cooperation.

This resolution provides a strong indication of the conceptual direction of South Africa’s development cooperation, confirming the consolidation of its current approach. In the wide-ranging consultation process that followed to build a business case for the establishment of SADPA, Besharati (2013a, 34) notes that “special attention was given to models of development assistance in post-conflict environments, as this [was] particularly relevant to the African context.” A proposal was adopted in April 2012 by the Ministers of International Relations and Cooperation, Finance, and Public Service and Administration for the establishment of the agency as a ‘Section 3a public entity’, and the creation of a new Partnership Fund for Development which would repeal the ARF and benefit from the transfer of its assets and funds (Besharati 2013, 35; Vickers 2012, 551; DIRCO 2013a, 2).

SADPA will be established as a separate agency of government but will operate under the executive authority of the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and thus will receive its policy direction from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).²² While the formal structures and decision-making processes will remain unclear until the promulgation of the SADPA Bill and the Partnership Fund for Development Bill, lines of authority and decision-making seem to be largely informed by some of the accountability gaps that characterized the operationalization of the ARF, as well as the adoption of best practices prevalent in the SOPs of several development cooperation agencies in both the North and the South. The body is expected to be governed by an Advisory Board of 11 members who would include representatives from Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Science and Technology, the Presidency and DIRCO. It is also suggested that provision would be made for representation of academia, labour and business, alongside other technical experts on the Board. The agency would initially be staffed by around 20 people—including development specialists, legal and financial management experts and diplomats—increasing to 50 in the longer term.

In addition to the inherited funding of the ARF of around ZAR1 billion, SADPA will receive a yearly allocation of ZAR500 million through parliamentary appropriation in line with the current ARF arrangement, with the understanding that unused funds may be rolled over into the

next funding period, allowing SADPA to build its funding base over time (Besharati 2013). The income of the PFD would be supported by loan repayments, accumulated interest, investments, revenue from projects, and public and private donations and contributions (Vickers 2012, 551).

Importantly, contributions from foreign donors are expected to make up the bulk of the funding at SADPA's disposal. This seems to be borne out by the 2011 South African White Paper on foreign policy²³ and the DIRCO Annual Report 2011–12, which notes under its outcome area for technical and development cooperation that trilateral cooperation arrangements have been explored with 15 [foreign] development agencies (DIRCO 2013a). Indeed, a cursory review of the country assistance programmes of some of the key donor agencies involved in South Africa, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), indicate substantial interest and commitment to support South Africa's cooperation activities in the region (JICA 2012; USAID 2013).

It is noteworthy that many of South Africa's South–South capacity-building initiatives would not have been possible without the trilateral cooperation support from other partners, mainly Northern donors.²⁴ This introduces a significant constraint, compared to the other BRICS members, on South Africa's scope for enforcing a unilateral approach to its programming, driven by narrow self-interest. It also points to a scenario where of all the BRICS countries, South Africa is most likely to adopt a hybrid model for its development cooperation, particularly in those areas where it would be closely cooperating with traditional Northern donors. This might in part also explain why the South African Government is keen to diversify its financing possibilities and the attraction of the BRICS NDB.

The establishment of SADPA will provide an opportunity for South Africa to professionalize and systematize its approach. Given its intent to work closely with civil society and other non-state actors, SADPA offers a unique opportunity to leverage the total South African offering and capacity in this area.

DOES SOUTH AFRICA OFFER IMPACTFUL DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS?

Lucey and O'Riordan's (2014) research, which reviewed the impact of South Africa's activities in three of the key theatres where it has been active—DRC (according to DIRCO (2014), the biggest recipient of South African support, at around ZAR2 billion), Burundi and South

Sudan—identified several learnings, but also raised several unanswered questions that are fundamental to South Africa’s future development approach. On the whole, Lucey and O’Riordan regarded South Africa’s engagements positively, noting the importance of its having a more similar development trajectory to its African development partners than traditional Northern donors. South Africa also enjoyed the trust and confidence of its partners, giving it high-level buy-in and access where other donors might struggle. South Africa was also able to provide services in a much more cost-effective manner than traditional donors, and with greater alignment to local and regional interests. Against this background South Africa could play a catalytic role in developing “capacities in partner countries to negotiate and defend Africa-wide interests” (Lucey and O’Riordan 2014, 6). South Africa also enjoyed particular strengths in security sector reform and gender mainstreaming.

However, South Africa’s impact was limited by the ad hoc and short-term nature of its engagements. While numerous memoranda of understanding were signed, they were not always followed through. Some information exchanges, capacity-building and training were one-off initiatives, lacking context, and with a geographic bias towards urban centres. In addition, some training followed a one-size-fits-all model that was not appropriate for individual country settings. While South Africa’s engagements were demand-driven, they lacked proper integration into national planning frameworks; they also seldom engaged either civil society or other non-state actors, or other donors (Lucey and O’Riordan 2014). For an analysis of the debates and dynamics of civil society actors’ role in development cooperation in Brazil, India, and South Africa, see Pomeroy et al (see Chap. 7) in this volume.’

Apart from suggesting that South Africa should seek closer alignment with the national planning frameworks of partnership countries, Lucey and O’Riordan also proposed the adoption of a knowledge management system that is more strategic, focused on a long-term vision and supported by properly structured M&E, learning, project management and financial transparency. The study also recommends that South Africa needs to build more expertise on post-conflict reconstruction and development, making use of experts with experience in this field and with deep knowledge of Africa. A model that mimics the UK Department of International Development’s network of UK-based research institutions, think tanks and universities was regarded as one way to strengthen internal analytic capability, but also to provide the context and analysis that often accompany governance and development challenges that are difficult, intractable and

politically sensitive. This suggestion is particularly relevant in the context of South Africa's rich, regionally focused epistemic community. Lucey and O'Riordan further recommend expanding this relationship to non-governmental organizations that have a focus on peace and security, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction to strengthen the institutional capacity of SADPA to engage in a range of contexts and through diverse methodologies.

In questioning whether South Africa, as a provider of South–South cooperation, finds itself on less fraught ground than traditional donors, Lucey and O'Riordan note that the establishment of SADPA assumes that South Africa will be expanding a diplomatic relationship to one of development partnership. However, while South Africa might view the framing of its engagement as inherently technical or benevolent, there is no doubt that for the recipient, the engagement is deeply political. Moreover, while the notion of a 'development partner' as opposed to a 'donor' seems to signal an "emphasis on implementation rather than on financial clout" (Lucey and O'Riordan 2014, 4), an unequal power relationship is implicit even under the watered-down guise of a 'development partnership'. These observations raise the prospect that in many respects South Africa, and the other BRICS countries, will face a particular challenge in convincing the recipients of donor cooperation that South–South cooperation is inherently different or 'better' than traditional aid. This is especially relevant in the African context where the relative power distribution is extreme.

HOW READY IS SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY TO SUPPORT SOUTH AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP WITH ITS REGION?

A broad-based public opinion survey conducted by the University of Stellenbosch provides useful insights into how much traction the government's peacekeeping agenda enjoys amongst ordinary South Africans (van der Westhuizen and Smith 2013). In a comparative light, Chenoy and Joshi (see Chap. 4), in this volume, note the lack of evidence of firm public opinion on India's development cooperation. From a representative sample group of 3500 South Africans surveyed during October and November 2012, some 66 % agreed (22 % strongly) that they wanted "South Africa to be known as a country that helps to resolve conflicts in Africa." The researchers noted that support for this view was regardless of age, race, religion, income, geography or level of education. However,

when probed about how important these issues were to them directly, only 5 % of respondents indicated that ‘conflict in Africa’ was of most concern to them, with a further 4 % indicating ‘global inequality’ and another 4 % ‘climate change’. By contrast, unemployment (34 %), housing (16 %), crime (16 %), education (14 %) and illegal immigrants (7 %) topped the list of key concerns for South Africans.

The survey also found, not surprisingly, that the majority of the respondents were in agreement that the promotion of economic growth should be the top priority (at 44 %) of South Africa’s foreign policy, which also aligns well with the general thrust of South–South cooperation. This should be understood against the backdrop of high levels of unemployment and poverty and slow economic growth. However, the other foreign policy options given to the respondents also received high support: 24 % of the respondents were supportive of the government’s role in promoting a world with a more equal distribution of wealth and power, 16 % believed that the promotion of human rights should be the key driver of South Africa’s foreign policy and a further 16 % believed that attracting foreign investment should be the driving force.

The researchers also probed the supportiveness of the respondents for South Africa providing aid, particularly to other African countries. The researchers noted that:

Interestingly, despite the public’s overwhelming concern with unemployment and poverty, 63 per cent of respondents contend that South Africa should give aid to other African countries (with 21 per cent strongly agreeing and 42 per cent agreeing). Support for South Africa’s role as a donor country shows no significant difference across income levels, but there were some racial divergences (with black, coloured, Indian and white South Africans agreeing or strongly agreeing at 66, 60, 65 and 50 per cent respectively). In addition, those with full-time employment are slightly less inclined to give aid to Africa (at 54 per cent), while the unemployed show stronger support (at 63 per cent).

(van der Westhuizen and Smith 2013, 7)

This last finding is particularly interesting as there is a strong assumption in the literature that societies that are themselves facing huge development challenges would be less willing to provide development assistance to others (Noel and Thérien 2002).

In assessing whether at a societal level one could begin to discuss the emergence of pro-BRICS affiliation, the survey result pointing to whose

Table 6.1. Ipsos/Markinor Foreign Policy Survey, 2012

Countries identified by respondents in the questionnaire that offer good lessons on how to address poverty and unemployment, in descending order of preference

Noteworthy countries that offer good lessons on poverty and unemployment alleviation which South Africa should emulate	Percentage of survey group in support of particular countries
China	26
Brazil	20
Botswana	20
Cuba	11
Sweden	9
India	8
South Korea	6

Source: van der Westhuizen and Smith (2013)

developmental model South Africa should follow is illuminating. It is clear that China's remarkable economic progress has not gone unnoticed by South Africans (Table 6.1).

These results are also useful to consider against the backdrop of which countries South Africa should be aligning itself with geopolitically. While China emerged across the sample group as a key ally, it is interesting to note that Xhosa speakers (41 %) were more pro-China than Zulu speakers (19 %) or white South Africans (27 %). The survey also found that the poorest and least educated group in the sample identified the USA as South Africa's most important ally. The results also point to a growing awareness of or possible constituency for emerging powers in South Africa. However, this does not necessarily translate into support for BRICS as an entity, as Russia is absent from the analysis.²⁵ Furthermore, while provision is made for an official BRICS Academic Forum and a BRICS Business Forum, there is no formal mechanism for the involvement or participation of civil society organizations in the BRICS summits apart from a limited form of outreach by DIRCO with citizens through public engagements or *imbizos*. This has the result that only a small number of voices are steering civil society engagement with BRICS, notably residing within South African think tanks, international NGOs and certain individuals. This creates an accountability gap between South African Government decision-making regarding policy choices and implications for South African civil society and society more broadly (Table 6.2).

Van der Westhuizen and Smith suggest from the findings that South Africans are *pragmatic internationalists* who are committed to improving

Table 6.2. Ipsos/Markinor Foreign Policy Survey, 2012

Ranking of countries and groups of countries with which South Africa should align itself, choices from a pre-determined list in descending order of preference

First preference, listing of countries	Ranking, %	Second preference, listing of countries	Ranking, %
China	26	Europe	19
USA	19	Brazil and India	19
Europe	15	USA	15
Our neighbours in Southern Africa	13	Our neighbours in Southern Africa	13
Brazil and India	11	China	13
Nigeria	9	The rest of Africa excluding Nigeria	12
The rest of Africa excluding Nigeria	7	Nigeria	9

Source: van der Westhuizen and Smith (2013)

the world as long as it also means that this will spill over into improving the quality of life for all at home. In this light, South Africans seem generally supportive of South Africa's 'diplomatic activism' in the mode of a typical middle power with its focus on conflict resolution in its immediate region and further afield, and the strengthening of the multilateral system and international law to further its interests. Lastly, the survey also found an "ambiguous orientation towards both China and 'the West,'" which "may also be symptomatic of a middle power orientation that appreciates the strategic value of not being explicitly aligned with any specific power bloc in international politics" (van der Westhuizen and Smith 2013, 12).

SOUTH AFRICA, BRICS AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

In tracing the trajectory of the international development discourse of South Africa over the 21 years since the democratic transformation of the country, at least three key themes emerge.

First, South Africa positions itself squarely in the South (or in the developing world). In doing so, it identifies both with its plight and global marginalization, and hence rejects the notion of describing itself as a donor, instead seeking development partnership and cooperation as the conceptual framing of its foreign policy.

Second, by positioning itself in this geographic sphere, South Africa also assumes a particular role, namely that of actively addressing the

marginalization of the developing world, in particular Africa. This is situated in a sometimes emotive discourse of ‘global Apartheid’ where Africa, like the rest of the developing world, frequently finds itself marginalized and excluded. Vieira notes that these themes have been translated in terms of Southern norms as the notion of ‘distributive justice’, where “the reorganization of international governance structures [occurs] in a way that they would promote a more equitable distribution of wealth and political participation of the developing world” (Vieira 2012, 311). South Africa has consistently worked towards a levelling of the global playing field to enable Africa to develop and prosper.

Third, South Africa’s actions and its engagement with global development frameworks, such as its active participation in the development of the post-Millennium Development Goal (MDG) framework,²⁶ also position it as a bridge-builder between North and South. Yet, herein also lies a tension. President Zuma made it clear during his remarks as co-chair of a special event on achieving the MDGs at the 68th UN General Assembly meeting on 24 September 2013 that it is important that developed countries should meet their commitment to the developing world to contribute 0.7 % of their GNI towards overseas development aid. He furthermore noted that to delegate “some of these new historical responsibilities to new emerging economies in the South is *unacceptable and unworkable as such emerging nations have their own historical challenges and backlogs to deal with*” (DIRCO 2013b, author’s italics). This sense of shifting ground is also giving rise to the impetus for South Africa to assess the value of aligning itself more strongly with the rising South.

In this latter respect, South Africa seems to have moved significantly away from its traditional stance as an emerging middle power (Schoeman 2000) to one that seeks active acceptance and value within a specific club, BRICS. Yet of all the BRICS members, South Africa is the most dependent on international cooperation and a consensus-seeking foreign policy, firstly, because of its size and power relative to the rest of the BRICS grouping, and secondly, because its global stature is directly linked to the acceptance and support that it can garner from its own region.

Of late, the framing of its foreign policy stance seems less clear, although Alexandroff argues that its “incoherence may instead be foundationally the incipient multiple identities for South Africa” and that “a multiple identity strategy is likely to enhance influence in a variety of settings and with various states” (Alexandroff 2015, 263). From this perspective, South Africa’s

membership of BRICS is only one of multiple identities from which to enhance its influence and power. BRICS sceptics such as Degaut (2015) argue that the basis of BRICS is profoundly flawed. Yet, fundamentally BRICS represents a much more complex world where an old revisionist power and emerging hegemon sit cheek by jowl with three emerging democracies, in all their messiness and incompleteness. The development cooperation model that South Africa offers in this group does not correlate exactly with the development cooperation models of the other BRICS countries and is unique to its setting, circumstance and specific offering. Yet there is scope for cooperation. That is the value for South Africa of a broader conversation about development cooperation and partnership both inside and outside BRICS.²⁷ Only time will tell whether the full promise of BRICS will be delivered.

NOTES

1. Until April 2014 South Africa was regarded as Africa's largest economy, before being overtaken by Nigeria following the rebasing of its economy. In 2016, South Africa was also overtaken by Egypt. It is now Africa's third largest economy.
2. See Grobbelaar (2014) for a brief overview of the role of South Africa's private sector in the region, and Grobbelaar and Besanda (2008) for a comprehensive review of the entry of South African business into the rest of Africa.
3. According to Smith (2013), Standard Bank estimates that the South African economy represents only a 2.5 % share of the total BRICS economies.
4. According to the National Treasury (2012), South Africa received around ZAR8 billion (US\$1 billion) a year of mainly European and US development assistance, aimed primarily at the health and education sectors.
5. According to the World Bank (2015b), South Africa has spent on average around 5 % of its GDP on education over the last 20 and preceding 7 years, reaching an all-time high of 6.07 % of GDP in 1993.
6. While new jobs have been created in certain sectors of the economy, this has not been sufficient to mop up the vast number of unemployed people. It is also important to note that there have been net job losses in the textile and leather industries and other low manufacturing sectors.

7. However, some South African development economists diverge from the World Bank estimates and argue that the impact of the South African Government's approach to redistribution and inequality has lowered the Gini coefficient for South Africa to around 0.59, indicating significant success for social welfare policies. See Bosch et al. (2010).
8. Although this seems obvious, given the significant need to provide assistance in post-conflict state building and restorative justice in the region.
9. Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, urged the revisiting of the SACU revenue-sharing agreement following a surge in South African imports resulting in the transfer of ZAR14.1 billion to the BLNS economies (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) in the financial year to March 2007. One SARS senior official commented that "this is development aid disguised as revenue sharing" (see Maphalala 2007).
10. This grouping explicitly excludes Russia, which is not recognized as a Southern actor in the South–South cooperation space. See <http://www.saiia.org.za/news/nest-dialogue-emerging-partners-in-africas-development> and Besharati et al. (2015) .
11. SAIIA is part of a group of Southern-based think tanks under the NEST initiative that has begun to define the full scope of the South–South cooperation initiatives of emerging powers. The institute is currently busy with a comparative and mapping study of South–South cooperation initiatives in DRC.
12. The India–Brazil–South Africa forum, a cooperation and dialogue initiative of key emerging democracies, was established in 2003. The three governments agreed to set up a trilateral Fund for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation in the developing world which is administered by the United Nations Development Programme. See <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/about-ibsa2>.
13. The reference here to liberalism implies both the centrality of human rights in South Africa's foreign policy but also the period of 'embedded liberalism' in the world order, as described by Ruggie (1982).
14. South Africa flouted the unwritten rule that none of the Africa's large economies would seek to field a candidate for the AU chair.
15. After Namibia's independence, facilities at Walvis Bay, the country's only deep-water port, were managed by a Joint Administrative Authority established by South Africa and Namibia. South Africa

- transferred control over the port enclave to the Namibian authorities on 1 March 1994 shortly after South Africa's first democratic elections.
16. For more details, see Malcomson (2004).
 17. G8 Africa Plan, Kananaskis Summit, Canada, 27 June 2002. See <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/afraction-e.pdf>.
 18. The first G20 Summit was hosted by President Bush on 14–15 November 2008 in Washington.
 19. The writer and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni activists were executed for treason despite efforts by President Mandela to negotiate an amnesty for them during and following their military trial.
 20. The AU is also for the first time headed by a South African and the first woman in its history, Nkosazana Zuma, the former Minister of Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs.
 21. As noted by Besharati (2013a), the DBSA Act was reviewed in 1997 to expand its mandate to development projects in Southern Africa.
 22. As noted in the DIRCO Annual Report 2012–13, “DIRCO will continue to assume its responsibilities for South Africa’s foreign relations and for policy matters, while the agency’s role will focus on the development, delivery and management of all South Africa’s outgoing development cooperation.” (DIRCO 2013a, 2).
 23. The White Paper states: “The South African Development Partnership Agency will be an important instrument to promote more effective development cooperation. It will therefore pursue bilateral cooperation with African countries as well as trilateral cooperation with international partners in support of African development” (DIRCO 2011b, 23).
 24. Many of South Africa’s flagship South–South cooperation initiatives, such as the South African police training throughout Africa or the engagement of PALAMA in regional capacity-building, would not have happened without significant foreign donor support. The South African Police capacity-building project in Sudan was, for example, made possible by Norwegian support. For more details, see Besharati (2013a, 39).
 25. This could of course also be a function of the choices that the respondents were confronted with.
 26. South Africa played an active role in global aid effectiveness meetings in Paris, Accra and Busan, and served in the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness hosted by the OECD.

27. South Africa is an active member, participant and engaged observer in a range of global initiatives and fora (such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the Africa Partnership Forum, the G20, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD, the UN and its various agencies, IBSA and BRICS), combined with its active participation and also leadership in a range of African fora and initiatives (such as the AU, SADC, the African Development Bank, NEPAD and SACU). This unique positioning enables South Africa both to seek to represent African perspectives in these fora and to attempt to develop a consensus around African interests and concerns. This is a difficult role, as South Africa has been neither nominated nor elected to fulfil it, and its interests do not only converge with other African interests. Nevertheless, South Africa's active role in global affairs and in its region provides an opportunity to leverage and elevate Africa's development concerns through multiple fora and initiatives.

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Civil Society, BRICS and International Development Cooperation: Perspectives from India, South Africa and Brazil

*Melissa Pomeroy, Alex Shankland, Adele Poskitt,
Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay, and Rajesh Tandon*

INTRODUCTION

Literature on BRICS and development tends to focus on government-to-government relations, state-led South–South development cooperation (SSDC), engagement in multilateral processes and the growing presence of the business sectors of the BRICS countries within their regions and in least developed countries. Much less attention has been paid to the roles

M. Pomeroy (✉)

Articulacao Sul, Av. Dr. Arnaldo 1566, São Paulo, SP CEP: 01255-000, Brazil

A. Shankland

Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex,
Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK

A. Poskitt

Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 11 Artillery Row, London, SW1P 1RT, UK

K.K. Bandyopadhyay • R. Tandon

PRIA, 42, Tughlakabad Institutional Area, New Delhi 110062, India

played by civil society actors from the BRICS countries and their contribution to international development.

Civil society is notoriously hard to define, and even more so in the case of the BRICS, with their extreme diversity of political cultures and histories. Here we adopt the definition developed by Cohen and Arato (2000, 8) of civil society as the sphere “of social interaction between economy and state,” where social subjects mobilize strategic and symbolic demands and resources. More specifically, we focus on civil society understood as “the world of associational life,” identified by Edwards (2009, 19) as “the most common of the understandings in use today.” Within that world we look in particular at formally structured civil society organizations (CSOs) and social movements engaging with SSDC and BRICS processes. Our analysis developed focuses on state–civil society interactions, since SSDC in BRICS is mainly a state-led process. Nevertheless, examples of civil society mobilization around the social and environmental impact of BRICS state-supported corporations and analysis of the relationship between the investments of these corporations and SSDC are highlighted throughout the chapter, to contextualize the main debates that permeate civil society engagement.

Among the BRICS countries, we include more in-depth examinations of India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA). This is partly because the IBSA countries are the three most visible ‘democratic emerging powers’ (Jenkins and Mawdsley 2013) and home to some of the best-known CSOs in the global South. They are also participants in a tripartite ‘institutionalized coalition’ of their own, the IBSA Dialogue Forum, that is based on their “established normative pull as large democracies and emerging economic powers” (Vieira 2013, 296). In addition, during the fieldwork for this chapter, they are the three countries that hosted BRICS Heads of States’ summits. Following the 2015 Heads of States Summit in Russia (where the first ‘Civil BRICS’ meeting caused controversy among CSOs), the sequence of summits has now moved back to India, making this a good moment to take stock of the picture that has emerged during the period since the 2012 Delhi Summit.

Civil society in the IBSA countries has long been mobilized to promote social rights and reduce the inequality that is a marked feature of all the BRICS countries (Krozer 2015). As these countries claim recognition for their development successes in the international arena, they often fail to acknowledge that some of the policy innovations that enabled these successes had their roots in civil society struggles and proposals. Moreover,

CSOs' South–South engagement, guided by the principle of solidarity among peoples, began long before their countries emerged as 'rising powers'. Against this background, Indian, South African and Brazilian CSOs' engagements with official SSDC often aim to contest and shape both its guiding conceptual framework of development and its implementation practices, based on their own previous domestic and international experiences (Moilwa 2015).

This chapter argues that despite the apparently more promising engagement environment in the 'democratic emerging powers', even in these countries civil society efforts to achieve effective influence over the SSDC agendas of the BRICS collectively, or individual countries, face many obstacles. Nationally, the fact that SSDC is mainly seen as a foreign policy agenda—traditionally closed to civil society engagement—and the restrictions increasingly imposed on the domestic enabling environment for civil societies are critical stumbling blocks to engagement (Poskitt et al. 2015). Internationally, even under Indian, South African or Brazilian presidencies BRICS has certainly proved less open to civil society than to other sectors, such as academia or business, that have their own channels to reach government leaders. Within the IBSA countries, civil society's lack of common diagnostics around BRICS potentialities and pitfalls contributes to a fragmented engagement agenda, which is compounded by the difficulty of building cross-BRICS links with CSOs from the very different contexts of Russia and China.

This chapter draws on evidence from a number of research projects in which our three institutions—the South–South Cooperation Research and Policy Centre (Articulação SUL), the Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS)—have worked over the last few years.¹ It also draws on formal and informal interviews and participant observation at the three summits held in 2012 (Delhi), 2013 (Durban) and 2014 (Fortaleza), and at a number of CSO events debating BRICS-related issues during this period, as well as on a literature review.

In the next three sections we provide for each of our three focus countries an overview of the dynamics of civil society engagement in SSDC and in debates over civil society's role in the BRICS grouping. The following section discusses commonalities and differences across these three countries and their fellow BRICS, Russia and China, and discusses civil society engagement with BRICS at the transnational level, analysing key characteristics and tendencies. We conclude by discussing the prospects for civil

society engagement with the international development cooperation activities of the BRICS countries through the Indian and Chinese presidencies and beyond, with a particular focus on the New Development Bank (NDB).

INDIAN CIVIL SOCIETY'S ENGAGEMENT WITH SOUTH-SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND BRICS

In the last three decades, several major shifts have influenced Indian CSOs. First, India's categorization as a lower middle-income country by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC), has led to a large number of official donors and their recipient international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) either withdrawing or reducing their commitment of aid resources to India, presenting some Indian CSOs with a declining resource scenario. Second, funding for CSOs from India's central and state governments is now primarily geared towards service provision and administered through tender-based approaches. In addition, as many accountancy and management consultancy firms are entering the social development and service provision arena, CSOs face increased competition. The resulting decline in resources to support actions for social mobilization, capacity-building and empowerment has particularly affected organizations engaged in policy advocacy. Third, over the years micro-finance has become the 'business model' for many CSOs to pursue financial sustainability, shifting their focus away from the social and political empowerment of the marginalized. Finally, with the proliferation of private sector actors and the accumulation of enormous fortunes enabled by governmental deregulation, economic liberalization and globalization, there has been an increase in private companies' corporate social responsibility and private philanthropic activities, but these have not necessarily used CSOs as their primary vehicles.

In addition to the socio-political and economic changes occurring within India, (discussed by Chenoy and Joshi, this volume) the country has also witnessed several changes in its international position and relationships. The country's emergence as a possible superpower, its expanding domestic market and its rising stature in international fora has given rise to optimism. In 2010 alone, 24 heads of state visited India, including the leaders of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. With the exception of China, all the other visiting leaders supported India's candidature for a permanent UN Security Council seat, as nuclear-armed

India has emerged as the world's largest democracy. These bilateral visits saw the signature of deals worth billions of dollars as business took centre stage. Indian business enterprises (both public and private) have been making their presence felt around the world; Indian investment abroad in 2012 was higher than foreign investment in India.

While Indian government and business establishments are going global, most Indian CSOs have remained domestically focused in their development efforts. Although they are collectively concerned about declining international support for development activities, they are not collectively focused on India's impact abroad. However, over the last few years a group of Indian CSOs have been focusing on India's positioning in the global context as well as on the role of India's policy, investments and international activities. In this context, the Fourth BRICS Summit, held in New Delhi in March 2012, served as an important catalyst for engagement. In this section we provide some background on CSO engagement with India's development cooperation, examine engagements around the Delhi Summit and finally look at more recent trends.

Civil Society Engagement with India's Role as a Development Actor

Civil society interventions in India over the last few decades have successfully shaped many social policies, in health, education and other sectors. Indian CSOs have long argued that it is important to acknowledge civil society contributions in innovating and applying development methodologies, particularly in the context of local diversities.² However, CSOs face a dilemma in engaging with foreign policies, or even in encouraging the government to spend money outside the country, because India itself is characterized by a huge list of domestic problems which need to be addressed.

In recent years, the volume and diversity of Indian development cooperation, under the broad rubric of SSSDC, has grown dramatically. The new government which came to power in May 2014 has indicated that this cooperation—which takes place through a variety of instruments including technical assistance, training and capacity-building, trade and investment, concessional lines of credit and financial assistance—will continue to expand. Although India, so far, has largely relied on government and business institutions to implement its development cooperation with other developing countries, this promise of future expansion has raised expectations of a greater role for CSOs.

For decades, many Indian CSOs have been implementing projects and programmes in other developing countries, with resources from international NGOs, foundations, donor agencies and, occasionally, the government. CSOs have utilized the practical knowledge and skills gained through implementing domestic interventions to work in other countries with similar development contexts. However, current official policy and practice do not adequately and explicitly recognize the existing and potential contributions of Indian CSOs in development cooperation. Civil society groups have therefore called for an informed and constructive policy dialogue between government, CSOs and other actors for institutionalizing CSO engagement in India's development cooperation.

One of the constraints for engagement with government over civil society's role in India's development cooperation is a lack of robust evidence about what has already been achieved. While the role and contribution of Indian CSOs in domestic development are well-documented, there is a dearth of systematic analysis of Indian CSOs as providers of SSDC. An initial mapping (Society for Participatory Research in Asia 2013) pointed out that there are indeed several CSO-led initiatives, analysis of which could provide significant lessons for framing SSDC policy and practices. This contributed to increased interest on the part of government, which coincided with the growth in civil society engagement with international issues that was catalysed by the Delhi Summit.

Civil Society Debates on BRICS and the Delhi Summit

PRIA was one of the first Indian CSOs to seek to promote civil society engagement with BRICS. With support from the Montreal-based Forum for Democratic Global Governance and other partners, PRIA undertook to facilitate an initiative which, while it was not official or full-scale, nonetheless tried to make civil society–BRICS engagement more meaningful. This initiative took its lead from the fact that the BRICS Summit held in Sanya, China, in April 2011 had identified a shared concern about growing inequality within the BRICS countries, while also promoting a wide range of people-to-people exchanges across BRICS countries to build understanding and share knowledge. PRIA and its partners argued that Indian NGOs have considerable practical knowledge on such issues as food security, youth unemployment, economic inclusion, basic education,

environmental sustainability, local development and urban poverty, which BRICS leaders had identified for attention. PRIA explicitly linked India's BRICS engagement with the wider issue of India's role as a development actor, raising questions about India's aid to other developing countries which included: who is receiving it? where is it coming from? and what purpose is it serving? PRIA articulated its expectation from the engagement with BRICS as follows:

BRICS as a multilateral entity has an ambitious agenda. It has the potential to significantly change the established norms and practices of international development and cooperation, which is largely established by the OECD/DAC. It has the potential to change the architecture of global governance institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization etc. As the Indian government intends to spend a significant amount of resources in other developing countries it is pertinent to ask questions such as how are these decisions taken? what values and norms guide such decision-making? (Society for Participatory Research in Asia 2013, 2)

Concerned with the growing inequality and exclusion in India, a meeting of development NGOs held in advance of the Delhi Summit issued a call for greater attention to those trade and economic policies in BRICS countries which perpetuate and exacerbate such exclusion. These NGOs asked the Prime Minister of India, as host of the summit, to take a lead in evolving an institutional mechanism for ongoing dialogue with development NGOs and civil society in all five BRICS countries, so that their practical knowledge could be harnessed to addressing the challenges of increasing inequality and exclusion.

Indian development NGOs also called upon the Delhi Summit to use BRICS' collective influence to ensure that firm commitments for addressing climate change were secured at the UN's Rio+20 conference, as well as stating that in order to ensure that multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank live up to their commitments, the summit should issue a call for open, transparent and merit-based recruitment for the presidency of the World Bank, and put an end to the post-colonial hegemony of America and Europe.

The CSO communiqué emphasized that as the country responsible for carrying forward the mandate from the Delhi Summit, India could become a leader in ensuring the creative institutionalization of mechanisms for dialogue and exchange of knowledge between development NGOs and

civil society, and BRICS deliberative processes. It also expressed the hope that BRICS governments would support such processes actively so that the vision of BRICS as an alliance for stability, security and growth in the world could be realized for all citizens of the world.³

One of the constraints to civil society engagement in the Delhi Summit was lack of information. During their mobilizations, Indian CSOs recognized that the creation of an information hub through which information on BRICS-related development could be accessed was very urgent. They also recognized the need for CSOs to engage with BRICS in a more constructive manner, informing local CSOs and consulting with CSOs and academics in other BRICS countries, thereby bringing these actors together to understand and form uniform positions wherever possible. They argued that while BRICS summits had talked about broadening cooperation between the BRICS countries beyond governments to include people-to-people cooperation through sports, cultural exchanges and so on, and the BRICS academic forum had been formalized through the BRICS Think Tank Council, civil society had been conspicuously absent from the whole process.

Policy Spaces and Engagement Trends Since Delhi

Since the Delhi Summit, particularly after the formation of the Development Partnership Administration (DPA)—an agency responsible for formulation of SSDC policies and programmes and coordination of SSDC projects, under the Ministry of External Affairs—PRIA and some other CSOs have endeavoured to initiate meaningful policy dialogues and engagement with DPA. Initial engagements have been encouraging, but they need to become much more robust and meaningful to progress towards generating and communicating evidence and lessons from Indian CSO-led development cooperation practices, to support policy advocacy for institutionalizing CSO engagement in India's development cooperation.

A significant development in this direction was the creation of the Forum for Indian Development Cooperation (FIDC), which was launched in January 2013 to serve as a forum for drawing on India's experience to explore various facets of development cooperation. The FIDC Secretariat is located in Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), a think tank of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The steering mechanism includes Indian CSOs, academic

institutions and DPA representatives. FIDC has played a critical role not only in systematically bringing out information on India's development cooperation, but also in creating platforms for dialogues between Indian CSOs by organizing well-attended conferences, workshops and seminars across the country. For the Third India–Africa Summit Forum in New Delhi, FIDC, with support from RIS and MEA, published *India–Africa Partnership: Towards Sustainable Development*, a compilation of case studies on India's development cooperation in Africa which included the work of CSOs. Another significant achievement was the reference to FIDC in the *India–Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation*, signed in October 2015, as a bridge to engagement with African civil society.

The Indian government is gradually opening up to the contributions of CSOs in its overseas programmes, recognizing that their professional expertise and practical innovations can be deployed overseas, but there are not yet any clear modalities for operationalizing these contributions. India's legal framework and financial procedures do not allow Indian non-profits to operate overseas, so policy changes will be critical in enabling CSOs to play an active role in development cooperation. Policy-makers' knowledge of the contributions of CSOs at home and abroad is currently very limited.

On the other hand, Indian civil society remains in general domestically focused and there is a need to build a larger public constituency to debate and monitor the government's development cooperation programmes. Despite efforts by PRIA, the anti-poverty campaign Wada Na Todo Abhiyan and FIDC, interest in the government's international development policies among Indian CSOs is still weak and sporadic. Inadequate knowledge and absence of independent analysis by CSOs, largely due to lack of capacity and funds, have further weakened sustained and long-term engagement.

Since the start of this process of engagement with BRICS, and PRIA's convening of a few consultations in 2012–13, the institutionalized engagement now taking place through FIDC has begun to have some traction. The July 2015 conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa and the Indo-African summit in October 2015 have begun to show FIDC's relevance as a multistakeholder platform, and CSOs have been encouraged to see that FIDC has begun to take a tripartite character and is being recognized as a platform for debating and contributing to India's development partnerships.

SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY'S ENGAGEMENT WITH SOUTH–SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND BRICS

South African civil society's engagement with domestic development issues is as vibrant as it is diverse, extending from partnership in local-level service delivery to fierce contestation in national policy debates. Historically, South African CSOs have benefited from significant flows of resources from Northern donors in support of their work on domestic development issues, although these flows have diminished in recent years and now tend to be focused on South Africa-based organizations that work at a regional or pan-African level. The relationship between CSOs and the African National Congress (ANC)-led government has become increasingly tense in recent years, but this tension is still tempered by recognition on both sides that, as a 2008 government-commissioned report put it, civil society's role as "a key partner in a democratic and free society ... is particularly pertinent in South Africa, where civil society played a fundamental role in the transition to democracy" (CASE 2008, 3).

Despite this recognition, civil society in South Africa does not have a strong tradition of influencing the government's foreign policy. According to Michelle Pressend of the Economic Justice Network (EJN), "when it comes to foreign policy and international relations, these discussions seem to be the domain of an elite group of think tanks, experts, international NGOs and representatives from business forums" (2013, 1). Thus far, debates within civil society about the country's geopolitical relations in general, and international development cooperation in particular, have been ad hoc and largely reactive. Nevertheless, opportunities for engagement with the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) have expanded in recent years and some civil society-led initiatives have emerged, with both trends receiving a major boost from the debates around the country's hosting of the BRICS summit in Durban in March 2013. In this section we review civil society-led initiatives to engage with development cooperation policy and practice and then discuss the evolution of civil society debates on the BRICS and development before and during the Durban summit. We conclude with an assessment of emerging trends in South African civil society's engagement with development cooperation policy and BRICS development agendas.

Civil Society-led Initiatives

Civil society in South Africa is heterogeneous, with diverging interests and strategies for engaging in issues related to BRICS, development cooperation and foreign policy. The most prominent voices in debates on these issues largely come from international NGOs, think tanks, national organizations and networks, media and the labour movement. There has been some collaboration between these groups and individuals, but divergences and fragmentation can also be identified.

An initial indication of a coordinated civil society effort to discuss foreign policy issues was the establishment of the civil society network South Africa Forum for International Solidarity (SAFIS).⁴ Since its launch in November 2011, SAFIS has organized a series of debates on issues such as migration and security, but there has not been as much progress in systematically engaging with and influencing government policy as was initially hoped.⁵ The group is facing the challenge of members not prioritizing joint initiatives but rather pursuing their own organizational goals, and it remains to be seen whether SAFIS can become the effective platform with a role in shaping South Africa's foreign policy that its founders hoped for.

In addition to SAFIS, other civil society-led initiatives to engage with foreign and development cooperation policy have included the 'BRICS from below' mobilization (discussed later in this section) and some activities linking CSOs and academic actors that were supported by the Open Society Foundation's South African Foreign Policy Initiative (SAFPI) between 2011 and 2013. There have also been more ad hoc mobilizations on specific foreign policy-related issues, such as those triggered by the failure of the South African government to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir when he attended an African Union meeting in 2015, ignoring an international warrant issued for his arrest by the International Criminal Court (Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa 2015).

South African CSOs have also engaged directly in civil society-led development cooperation activities, based on political or humanitarian solidarity principles. CSO and social movement engagement in cooperation based on political solidarity has generally focused on the Southern Africa region, via a mix of learning exchanges and joint advocacy on issues ranging from migration policy and xenophobia to the social and environmental impacts of South African investments in neighbouring countries. In some cases, however, this engagement has extended far beyond South Africa's 'near abroad', as is the case for the Cape Town-based Shack/Slum Dwellers

International alliance, which was born out of an exchange between South African and Indian housing rights activists (Poskitt and Shankland 2014). Civil society-led humanitarian cooperation has mobilized a mix of public and private (often religious) resources, operating both alongside and independently from government peace-building interventions, with the highest-profile example being the Gift of the Givers Foundation, which claims to be the largest disaster response NGO of African origin on the African continent (Poskitt et al. 2015).

Civil Society Debates on the BRICS and the Durban Summit

After the country joined the grouping in 2010, the debate on South Africa's role in BRICS came to be one of the key areas for civil society engagement with foreign policy and development cooperation issues. The emerging narrative of South Africa as the grouping's 'gateway to Africa' combined with anxieties about the impact of other BRICS countries (notably China) on domestic development to energize the debate about the linkages between domestic and international development agendas.

In 2011–12, whilst politicians negotiated South Africa's place at the table amongst the BRICS group, civil society in South Africa focused on considering the potential benefits and risks of joining the group. Some civil society conferences, research activities and debate events took place to discuss the possible impact of changing geopolitical dynamics and the new southern multilateralism. BRICS was often discussed alongside other groups such as G20 and IBSA, with measured enthusiasm for exploring South–South cooperation on economic growth and development.⁶ However, debates about whether South Africa should join the BRIC group and what membership would look like were largely taking place within academic circles and think tanks; there was no widespread debate within civil society that included grassroots organizations, movements or labour groups.

The decision to join BRICS was taken by South Africa's government, with almost no consultation with civil society. The official invitation from the Chinese government to South Africa to join BRICS highlighted the strategic and political interests of both parties. Civil society voices that were expressing concerns about joining BRICS were sidelined and left behind in a quickly changing political environment.⁷ Debates moved very quickly from whether South Africa should join BRICS, to the meaning of being a member. The coverage of South Africa's accession to BRICS in

the national media was cautious and at times noticeably uncertain about what membership of a grouping seen as part of the global political elite would mean for the country.

Human rights groups in South Africa also expressed concern about the influence of China and Russia on BRICS policies, fearing that they would oppose any progressive positions the other countries might propose. Independent researcher David Fig cites in support of this concern the evidence that “as a donor to the ruling ANC coffers, China has, for example, been able to influence Pretoria to keep the Dalai Lama out of the country, even when specifically invited to the private 80th birthday celebrations of former Archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu” (2013, 57).

Patrick Bond, a prominent activist and academic from the Universities of KwaZulu-Natal and Witwatersrand, has developed a line of analysis of civil society debates on BRICS which in its latest version (co-authored with the Brazilian academic Ana Garcia) identifies ten ideological standpoints summarized under three narratives described as ‘BRICS from above’, ‘BRICS from the middle’ and ‘BRICS from below’ (Bond and Garcia 2014). The ‘BRICS from above’ narrative welcomes the opportunity for increased trade and knowledge transfer with other BRICS economies and is mostly articulated by the business community, government and some intellectuals who tend to see BRICS as reinforcing South Africa’s economic base in Africa. The ‘BRICS from the middle’ are NGOs and scholars who take a pragmatic approach to leveraging influence on policy-making decisions and are hesitant to criticize BRICS openly. The ‘BRICS from below’ narrative is highly critical of the grouping, describing its member countries as ‘sub-imperialists’ who seek regional domination and exploitation. Strongly condemning South Africa’s positioning itself as the gateway to Africa, this narrative highlights the violations of socio-economic, political and civil rights resulting from “elite-centric, consumerist, financialized, eco-destructive, climate-insensitive, nuclear-powered strategies that advance corporate and parastatal profits” (UKZN Centre for Civil Society 2013, 1). Bond and other BRICS-from-below activists have also argued that too many South African stakeholders lack the analytical nerve to speak out on the implications of BRICS engagement for economic and environmental issues (Bond 2015).

These varying positions crystallized around the Durban Summit in 2013, which generated media attention on South Africa’s role in BRICS and ignited civil society engagement on issues of trade and sustainable development. This was the first time many CSOs had considered the

BRICS grouping either in relation to South Africa's own local and national development needs or to its implications for other countries in Africa.

In 2013, there was no formal mechanism for CSO involvement in the Durban Summit. Some CSOs did participate in the official BRICS Academic Forum which took place as part of the summit process (as did the BRICS Business Forum and the BRICS Trade Union Forum), working closely with think tanks to get information and access the sessions. In the absence of a formal civil society space, the CSOs Groundwork (Friends of the Earth South Africa), South Durban Community Environmental Alliance and the University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society organized a joint 'counter-summit' entitled *BRICS-from-below!* There were also a small number of other civil society events, mostly organized by international NGOs. For example, Oxfam hosted a public policy dialogue with the New Partnership for African Development which addressed BRICS' development cooperation and investment in Africa and discussed mechanisms for greater transparency and accountability of the development assistance BRICS provides to African states, while the Heinrich Böll Foundation and the Brazilian CSO Instituto Mais Democracia organized an event on the newly proposed BRICS bank, which aimed to create an international network of CSOs to monitor the bank.⁸ These international NGO-led events had a distinctly 'BRICS-from-the-middle' identity, though some South African CSOs did attend both these events and the *BRICS-from-below!* 'counter-summit'.

Policy Spaces and Engagement Trends Since Durban

Since 2013, the opening up of formal and informal policy spaces by DIRCO and other government agencies has enabled an increasingly broad participation for CSOs in debates on South Africa's development cooperation and foreign policy. While interviewees felt that in 2013 and 2014, DIRCO tended to consult civil society on a more individualized and ad hoc basis, there have recently been moves towards more systematic and formal mechanisms for dialogue. However, there is as yet no formalized national platform for CSOs from all sectors, regions and ideological positions to come together with government agencies to debate South Africa's international cooperation and foreign policy.

In addition to policy dialogue, CSOs have also been directly involved in government development cooperation and peace-building efforts, providing specialist advisory support or outsourced service delivery alongside

the armed forces and other government agencies, often with funding from the African Renaissance Fund, established by the government in 2000. However, delays in the establishment of the long-promised South African Development Partnerships Agency have hampered efforts to establish a more robust legal and budgetary framework for government–CSO partnerships to deliver SSDC projects.

There have been similar difficulties with establishing a formal platform for dialogue about South Africa’s role in BRICS. Between 2013 and 2015, the responsibility of coordinating liaison with academia and civil society on South Africa’s engagement with the bloc was passed between several different government departments, with DIRCO, Higher Education South Africa, the Department of Higher Education and Training and Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) all playing a role at different points. In 2015, the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences was formally designated to take a leading role in the official South African BRICS Think Tank (SABTT) structure. As has been evident since the 2013 BRICS Academic Forum, think tanks play an important role in linking civil society with policy-making processes, and there is evidence that these links have been strengthened with the establishment of the SABTT as host for civil society liaison work.

Since the Durban Summit, there has been increasing attention from civil society groups and the media to South Africa’s role in the BRICS bloc and its impact on the economy and foreign policy. Debates on South Africa’s regional and international relations are dynamic and reflect the ideological differences between the above, middle and below positions which have remained evident in the different priorities and strategies adopted by CSOs.

Civil society groups that can loosely be labelled as identifying with ‘BRICS from below’ have continued to regard government-sponsored opportunities for policy dialogue with suspicion and have favoured an ‘outsider approach’ based on civil society ‘claimed spaces’.⁹ A BRICS People’s Dialogue was coordinated by the Trust for Community Outreach and Education in 2013 and 2014 to share information and facilitate learning experiences about BRICS with grassroots organizations, as part of a wider effort to “build a bottom-up civil society network to analyze, watchdog and represent silenced voices of dissent” (Bond 2013).¹⁰

Many civil society actors in South Africa have reluctantly come to see BRICS as a successor to the IBSA group. IBSA is seen as a more natural alliance of countries than BRICS, given common histories of citizen

activism, social justice struggles and democratization. As one civil society activist put it, “IBSA has a clear identity and shared values [and] was a direct result of the WTO Doha Round trade negotiations, whereas BRICS is a construct of Western investment banks.”¹¹

Reflecting this reluctant acceptance of BRICS as a much more influential forum than IBSA, and one with which South African civil society cannot avoid engaging, organizations like Oxfam and the EJN have taken a more ‘BRICS from the middle’ insider approach to influencing government positions. This has included building relationships with key individuals within DIRCO, with the South African BRICS Sherpa¹² and with Olive Shisana, the former director of the government’s initially designated BRICS academic liaison agency, the HSRC. From late 2014, EJN and Oxfam had numerous meetings with government officials in preparation for the BRICS Summit that took place in Russia in July 2015 and discussed how to work together effectively with the South African Sherpa. This strategy of engaging with the government more than six months ahead of the summit suggests that there has been a process of learning since the Durban Summit, with some CSOs taking a more systematic and strategic approach to influencing South Africa’s BRICS agenda. In the event, the South African delegation to the Civil BRICS event in Russia in July 2015 included a fairly diverse range of national organizations including EJN, South African Network on Inequality, Human Rights Institute of South Africa and the South African Red Cross Society.

Many CSO interviewees considered that despite the absence of a consistent platform for dialogue, the South African government has been willing to engage with civil society on BRICS, with DIRCO often accepting meeting requests and attending civil society-convened events. In 2015, the HSRC hosted a series of meetings following the BRICS Summit in Russia, which included using video technology and social media to bring together all the members of the South African delegations to Civil BRICS from four different cities across the country for a *Report back on Civil BRICS, Moscow 2015* meeting that was opened to other CSOs. The stated purpose of the meeting was to reflect on the Civil BRICS event and consider how civil society participation and inclusive dialogue could be improved. While the establishment of permanent institutionalized dialogue structures still appears some way off, there is evidence that since the Durban Summit both government departments and civil society have developed more systematic consultation processes on South Africa’s engagement with BRICS.

BRAZILIAN CIVIL SOCIETY'S ENGAGEMENT WITH SOUTH-SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND BRICS

Over the past 20 years, Brazil has experienced an unprecedented period of institutional innovation with the institutionalization of large-scale participatory initiatives at different levels, and there is now a solid base of empirical evidence on their impact on policy formulation (Pogrebinski and Samuels 2014). Nevertheless, this participatory trend has not yet penetrated the realm of foreign policy, which dominates the framework for Brazilian SSDC and BRICS engagement.

However, there have been changes to decision-making processes in Brazilian foreign policy, in response to the broadening of the international agenda by economic liberalization and democratization (Lima 2000). These changes have led to the incorporation of new specialized institutional actors and to the growth of pressure to treat foreign policy as a public policy arena subject to democratic oversight (Pinheiro and Milani 2011; Sanchez et al. 2006; Silva et al. 2010). Nevertheless, despite growing awareness and expectations among domestic constituencies the patterns of state-civil society relations around foreign policy remain discretionary, characterized by arbitrary decisions on when to open participatory spaces and to whom, and by informal initiatives marked by information asymmetry and low levels of representation of social movements (Leite et al. 2014). The creation of an institutionalized multistakeholder consultative space, the National Council on Foreign Policy, has been promised for over 20 years but has yet to materialize (Lopes 2012).

Brazilian CSOs have a long history of engagement in international development cooperation, having benefitted from it since the 1970s, with aid having played a decisive role in the consolidation of civil society and its role in the democratization of Brazil's political system during the 1980s and 1990s, including the enshrining of social and human rights in the 1988 democratic constitution. Brazilian civil society has also had a long-standing engagement with transnational activism and contentious politics, with many CSOs and social movements engaging in transnational solidarity networks. The campaign against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the establishment of the World Social Forum are emblematic expressions of these transnational engagements and contributed to consolidating transnational linkages and a wide repertoire of transnational strategies and tactics.¹³

In this section, we review three different aspects of Brazilian civil society engagement in SSDC and debates on BRICS:¹⁴ (i) participation in government-led initiatives ('invited spaces'); (ii) efforts to build a constituency and influence domestic decisions through 'claimed spaces' and (iii) transnational action, through solidarity networks and horizontal cooperation initiatives.

Participation in government-led Initiatives

The fragmented decision-making process of Brazilian SSDC results in multiple entry points for civil society (Leite et al. 2014). It is possible to identify civil society participation in invited policy spaces, mainly consultative, in governmental technical cooperation initiatives that include partnerships with CSOs and in efforts to influence the formulation of government SSDC initiatives.¹⁵

An initial attempt to map invited SSDC policy spaces shows that such spaces tend to have either a very broad remit or are too focused on specific aspects of SSDC (Leite et al. 2014).¹⁶ There is little evidence on the extent to which civil society has achieved influence or impact on the cooperation agendas debated in such fora. Similarly, SSDC projects implemented by civil society are not numerous, but among those that do exist it is possible to identify different conceptions of civil society participation, with civil society's expertise serving as a point of departure (Berrón and Brant 2015) both for CSOs to implement SSDC projects on the government's behalf (Santos 2013) and for government to support CSOs in implementing their own projects (Suyama and Pomeroy 2014). These two conceptions reflect the 'perverse confluence' (Dagnino 2004) that emerged in Latin America with the end of authoritarian regimes, between a neo-liberal minimal state project involving transfer of responsibilities to civil society and a bottom-up democratizing and participatory project.

It is also worth emphasizing the role of CSOs in the formulation of narratives and recommendations to influence certain development cooperation agendas. A particularly prominent example is the Food and Nutrition Security coalition which mobilized civil society participation and the creation by the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) of its Council for Food and Nutrition Security (CPLP 2012). Brazil's National Council for Food and Nutrition Security, an official policy oversight space with a particularly strong civil society presence, has been actively involved

as a participant in the Purchase from Africans for Africa local food procurement initiative (Beghin 2014), highlighting the importance of social accountability and civil society mobilization in its delivery (Leite et al. 2015). Within the Southern Cone Common Market, CSOs helped to create a Specialized Meeting on Family Agriculture mechanism that has now secured its own fund to implement projects and sustain its activities (Maluf and Prado 2015).

One hypothesis to explain the emergence of these spaces and initiatives is that they respond to a combination of two factors: the existence of civil society mobilization on specific issues and the willingness and openness of the relevant government interlocutors.

DOMESTIC INFLUENCE AND POLICY SPACES

SSDC is an emerging policy space in Brazil. Many narratives are still being formed, and the concepts and boundaries of the debate are fluid (Leite et al. 2014). Despite important challenges, such as lack of funding, low levels of public information and difficulties identifying and accessing government interlocutors to channel demands, there is a small but committed network that has managed to advance in building a constituency, providing information and building spaces for debating and monitoring Brazil's actions abroad.¹⁷ This network brings together a broad range of actors identified with progressive politics, including academics, think tanks and individuals who had previously engaged with development debates from the perspective of Brazil as an aid recipient, as well as prominent NGOs, usually with a history of transnational activity on multilateral governance issues, especially international trade (Leite et al. 2014).

Although this is a diverse group, it shares a focus on linking its members' domestic agendas to international issues and examining the implications for the pursuit of more equitable, sustainable and democratic development. This includes paying substantial attention to the social and environmental impacts of Brazilian government and private sector initiatives in Southern societies. This translates into demands and advocacy strategies in relation to (i) public debate on SSDC policy's objectives and modalities; (ii) a more accountable, transparent and efficient institutional and legal framework; (iii) the recognition of civil society as actors in development and international development cooperation; (iv) the establishment of the National Council of Foreign Relations; (v) more transparency and enhanced public debate regarding financial cooperation, in particular

the operations of the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) abroad (Di Ciommo and Amorim 2015; Berrón and Brant 2015; Leite et al. 2014).

Transnational Solidarity Networks and Activist Cooperation

In response to the impact of neo-liberal prescriptions imposed by international financial institutions (IFIs) dominated by developed economies, Brazilian social movements have been forging, during the last two decades, political alliances with Southern civil society. These links are not always framed as South–South cooperation and many organizations prefer to define their practices in terms of solidarity, political ties or dialogues among Southern peoples. Among their main objectives, organizations cite the construction of an international agenda of resistance to the hegemonic development model, the search for Southern societies' autonomy and sovereignty, efforts to address common development challenges and strengthening Southern civil society (OBS forthcoming).

The activities developed under this framework of 'activist cooperation' (Marcolini 2014) can be summarized as a mix of cooperation and contentious activities, centred on knowledge exchange, supporting political mobilization, coordinating international agendas of resistance and proposing alternatives. The thematic agenda is diversified and includes projects related to human rights, environment, food and nutrition security, gender and democracy (OBS forthcoming). Labour unions, peasant organizations and the Landless Rural Workers' Movement are representative of the CSOs employing these activist and autonomous cooperation practices (Berrón and Brant 2015).

The cases of the Brazil–Japan–Mozambique ProSAVANA programme¹⁸ and the BRICS NDB exemplify two recent emblematic agendas for contentious politics among Southern civil society. In the case of ProSAVANA, the alliance between Brazilian and Mozambican social movements directly contests a government development cooperation initiative. Previous links, shared background and a common political agenda facilitated coordination among movements and produced a series of contentious activities such as the two People's Triangular Conferences (held in 2013 and 2014); the *Open Letter from Mozambican CSOs and Movements to the Presidents of Mozambique and Brazil and the Prime Minister of Japan*, supported by Brazilian and Japanese organizations and individuals; visits by Mozambican activists to Brazil's savannah zone and a joint advocacy agenda that has

pressured the three governments for more transparency and participation (Mello 2013). Brazilian CSO engagements with the BRICS Bank, on the other hand, rely on previous mobilization related to BNDES. Although it is emerging as a concrete opportunity for engagement (Mineiro 2013), a homogenous civil society position is still far from being agreed.

Civil Society Engagement and the Fortaleza Summit

The pattern of Brazilian civil society engagement with BRICS has been mainly oriented to the construction of transnational networks and domestic influence and constituency-building. The self-organized parallel events around the BRICS Summits in South Africa and Brazil had in common the fact that they were naturally informed by local contexts, supported by large international NGOs and northern political foundations, and established constant dialogue with government representatives during the run-up process. Ahead of the Fortaleza Summit, the Brazilian government promoted a meeting with Sherpas and attended civil society-convened events, sharing information about developments in the inter-governmental negotiations.

Brazilian civil society made a number of joint efforts during the run-up to the Fortaleza Summit, organizing events, publications and fostering research agendas nationally and internationally, working with partner CSOs from other BRICS countries. Right after Durban, the Brazilian Network for Peoples' Integration (REBRIP¹⁹), a key Brazilian civil society actor in debates on international trade agendas, and the NGO Socioeconomic Studies Institute published *The BRICS and Social Participation from the Perspective of CSOs*, co-authored by different BRICS CSOs, discussing the role of civil society in influencing BRICS agendas. In 2013, Oxfam Brazil also promoted a workshop to discuss civil society engagement in foreign policy, including mobilization strategies for the Fortaleza Summit.

In 2014, REBRIP, the Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (ABONG) and Equit institute convened an international seminar entitled *Equity and Social-Environmental Justice in BRICS*,²⁰ which included representatives from other BRICS CSOs and aimed to explore possible common agendas. The seminar included an in-depth analysis of commonalities between BRICS countries regarding their state-led development models based on economic growth and intensive exploitation of natural and human resources, and set a critical tone for the Fortaleza Summit agenda. The seminar's final report stated that all

voices were critical of the nature of BRICS, although there were different positions regarding engagement with the grouping: some considered it pointless, since BRICS was just another instrument to reproduce relations of domination, while others advocated for the importance of monitoring BRICS developments and of identifying opportunities for civil society to exercise influence (REBRIP 2014).

Against this background, strategies for the organization of parallel events were drawn up with Fortaleza's local context in mind, as the city had been highly affected by and mobilized against big infrastructure projects. Fortaleza's radicalized political context and the tight presidential race which marked the period around the summit led some CSOs to call for caution, as they were unsure whether a high-profile civil society event criticizing Brazil's engagement in BRICS would be counterproductive. This led to a parallel summit that consisted of a seminar entitled *Dialogues on Development: the BRICS from the Peoples' Perspective*, organized by REBRIP, and a number of parallel meetings attended mainly by Brazilian and South African and, to a lesser extent, Indian CSOs.

The Fortaleza Summit's side events sought to promote debate over BRICS countries' development models, the BRICS national development banks, social and environmental justice and financing of infrastructure, and the NDB, which was still being negotiated.²¹ A street mobilization was also organized to express discontent over the NDB's proposed role as an instrument to finance big infrastructure projects, in line with mobilizations against the social and environmental impacts of the infrastructure associated with the 2014 football World Cup. The events were also characterized by the presence of grassroots movements and a significant increase in women's participation, with the holding of the First BRICS Women's Forum.

During the parallel meetings organized in Fortaleza, CSOs agreed on some common agendas for future work, including the NDB, BRICS' transnational corporations, and human rights and civil society participation. These agreed focus issues provide opportunities to connect with the agendas of grassroots organizations in the BRICS countries, including social and environmental conflicts resulting from infrastructure projects and mining and other extractive industries, as well as global agendas such as tax justice and wealth and income inequality. The Fortaleza meetings also identified strategies to tackle issues of representation as well as the weakness of links between national and global agendas.

These decisions showed that in Fortaleza civil society groups had managed to reach agreement on the urgent need to construct a common

discourse to contest dominant framings of development (particularly sustainable development, the stated aim of the NDB), to raise national awareness and connect with grassroots movements to build domestic constituencies, as well as to engage with local populations affected by development projects within each country and in non-BRICS countries receiving NDB projects or other BRICS investments.

Aligned with the strategies agreed and the minimum consensus reached over the nature of the BRICS grouping, the main Brazilian civil society actors responsible for organizing the Fortaleza parallel summits declined to participate in the Civic Forum promoted by the Russian government in 2015. The main criticism, expressed by REBRIP, relates to the fact that the Civic Forum was not considered to have respected basic participatory principles (derived from Brazil's own experience and the self-organized events in Durban and Fortaleza), such as civil society's autonomy and diversity, including space for the participation of the most-affected populations. The Civic Forum was considered a "pseudo space for participation in an authoritarian manner, where the Russian government decided who would participate, what themes would be discussed and the methodology to be adopted" (Salles de Carvalho and Beghin 2015, 4) and participation in such space would have expressed "surrender to co-optation and political capture by the governments" (ibid).

CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT ACROSS THE BRICS COUNTRIES: COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES

As the previous sections have shown, civil society engagement with both SSDC and BRICS development agendas has grown significantly in recent years across the three IBSA countries. However, this growth has been from a very low initial base, and in all three countries the relatively small group of CSOs that has engaged most actively has struggled to engage the mass of development-oriented NGOs and social movements, which have tended to remain exclusively focused on domestic issues. The BRICS Summits held in India, South Africa and Brazil in 2012, 2013 and 2014, respectively, helped to energize engagement in the three countries, as they provided a powerful opportunity for bringing together debates on domestic development policies and international roles.

The difficulty has been in sustaining engagement, particularly where coordination mechanisms are weak and there is no permanent formal space for dialogue with government on SSDC and other development-related aspects of foreign policy. Although South African civil society did launch

a pioneering effort at coordination with the establishment of SAFIS in 2011, this has proved hard to sustain. Brazil's civil society coordination efforts started more slowly, but have since developed more strongly—perhaps because these efforts were able to build on the foundation established by REBRIP, as well as civil society's growing awareness of Brazil's new position in the international system. Indian civil society has been able to make strategic use of the establishment of the FIDC as a permanent structure for dialogue with government and academia.

Since 2012, the political environment for engagement in all three countries has become less favourable. In South Africa, relations between civil society and the ANC have soured further, particularly after the 2014 elections revealed growing public anger over alleged corruption and splits in the labour movement's once-solid support for the ANC-led government (Plaut 2014). In India, the Bharatiya Janata Party's victory in 2014 resulted in the accession to power of a prime minister who is regarded with suspicion by many CSOs. In Brazil, civil society's relations with the Workers' Party have remained strong, but the latter's ability to respond to CSO proposals on SSDC and other foreign policy issues has been seriously undermined both by budget cuts and by a prolonged political crisis that made its mandate more dependent on alliances with political and economic interests that are often hostile to civil society agendas.

It has also become clear over this period that even without these shifts, it was never likely that these three countries would fulfil the hopes of those who looked to the 'democratic emerging powers' as potential champions for global rights-based development agendas (Jenkins and Mawdsley 2013). This is in part because the South–South cooperation tradition of non-interference has historically made these countries reluctant to accept CSOs' criticisms of the social and environmental impacts of their 'win–win' partnerships with other developing countries—whose governments, they insist, have entered into these partnerships voluntarily, with none of the coercion or conditionalities that characterize North–South aid.

It is also because policy elites in the IBSA countries share a state-centric vision that tends to regard civil society as little more than an occasionally useful collaborator for delivering development programmes and certainly not as an equal partner in the definition of national priorities and development strategies. Particularly where foreign policy is concerned, they tend to operate in much closer alignment with 'national champion' corporations than with CSOs, and within their South–South cooperation programmes their lavish provision of state-subsidized credit for strategic

international corporate expansion contrasts strongly with their weak and ad hoc arrangements for supporting civil society engagement in technical cooperation. They combine this preference for corporate over civil society partnerships with a strongly nationalistic approach that makes them reluctant to take advice from civil society groups whose funding often comes from abroad; in some cases, suspicion of CSOs' links with Northern donors who are often seen as geopolitical adversaries has been channelled into restrictive measures or even outright harassment (Poskitt et al. 2015).

As a result of these trends, the 'enabling environment' for civil society engagement in SSDC and other foreign policy agendas across the IBSA countries has started to converge with that of their fellow BRICS, Russia²² and China, where CSOs are excluded from key policy decisions but increasingly encouraged to engage in outsourced service provision. Russian and Chinese CSOs have long faced much more severe restrictions than those that are beginning to affect their counterparts in the IBSA countries and continue to operate in an environment that is far more politically closed than is the case for democratic India, Brazil or South Africa. However, CSOs have also come to be seen by the Chinese and Russian governments as useful partners for service delivery, especially at the sub-national level, where there has been a rapid growth in innovative civil society-led development projects (Buxton and Konovalova 2012; Simon 2011).

The degree of civil society engagement with development cooperation also shows signs of convergence across the BRICS countries. Chinese and Russian civil society representatives interviewed during our research commented on the willingness of officials working on their countries' development cooperation strategies to listen to their advice and discuss practical strategies for collaboration, as long as civil society avoided any suggestion that it was questioning the government's overall policy directions. Some Russian and Chinese CSOs—especially those with strong government links, such as the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation—have been actively encouraged to operate overseas, particularly in disaster relief or response to emergencies such as the West African Ebola outbreak (Poskitt et al. 2015). A recent study of Chinese NGOs that 'go out' to other countries of the global South argues that this has the potential to attract greater state support since "from the Chinese government's perspective, it can add a useful new dimension to China's soft power, presenting a face of China that may win new admirers, resolve the negative impacts of Chinese overseas investment, and increase Chinese representation in solutions to global issues" (Bannister 2015, 1).

Civil society-state engagement on development cooperation across all of the BRICS has two other common elements. The first is the role played by international NGOs and foundations such as Oxfam, ActionAid, the Heinrich Böll Foundation or the Ford Foundation. In addition to supporting constituency-building and advocacy activities on development cooperation within different BRICS countries, these organizations have played a key role in building links among CSOs from different countries, in the absence of pre-existing cross-BRICS civil society coordination mechanisms. While this support has been greatly valued by partner CSOs, it has also raised questions about power relations and who controls the agenda, in a context that has long been marked by North–South divisions in global civil society development policy fora such as the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (Poskitt et al. 2015).

The second common element is the importance of think tanks and other academic actors in brokering dialogue. In some cases, think tanks have emerged as possible allies for CSOs seeking access to development cooperation policy processes, given their privileged position as government interlocutors (Poskitt et al. 2015). This has been the case in Brazil, and to a lesser extent in South Africa. In India and China, think tanks have helped to create spaces with which civil society can engage but have also tended to ensure that those spaces adhere to government agendas rather than allowing civil society to play an agenda-setting role. This has been even more apparent in Russia, where government has tended to use think tanks and other academic actors, rather than NGOs and social movements, as privileged representatives of civil society in formal dialogue spaces, in a model initially developed for the Civil20 gathering that took place as part of the country's G20 Presidency in 2013 (Poskitt et al. 2015).

This model characterized the first ever official Civil BRICS forum, which was established by Russia as part of the 2015 BRICS Summit process. This was billed as an inclusive process promoting open dialogue on a wide-ranging set of issues, but as noted above CSO interviewees from outside Russia complained that the agenda was largely controlled by representatives of government-linked academic institutions. Suspicion of the intentions of the Russian presidency led many of the most influential CSOs from other BRICS countries to stay away from the Civil BRICS forum and provoked a lively debate between sceptics calling for a fully autonomous 'Peoples' Forum' and advocates of engagement in the government-sponsored Civil BRICS space (Salles de Carvalho and Beghin 2015; Krishnaswamy 2015). The focus of the search for an engagement model capable of bringing

together CSOs from across the ‘BRICS-from-below’/‘BRICS-from-the-middle’/‘BRICS-from-above’ spectrum has now shifted to India and China, hosts of the 2016 and 2017 BRICS Summits.

Notwithstanding the momentum that official summits provide, other official BRICS decision-making instances (such as the ministerial meetings and the Justice Forum) or official debate forums (such as the Academic Forum, the Think Tank Council and the Business Council) may also provide entry points for civil society actors. Since intra-bloc cooperation activities and agreements are diverse and extensive (covering trade, agriculture, health, science and technology, and food and nutritional security, to name but a few), policy-oriented non-governmental organizations and social movements with sectoral knowledge and experience may be able to establish dialogue channels around specific agendas. Nevertheless, information and consultations are discretionary, depending on the willingness of each government’s official representatives to create meaningful spaces for engagement. Joint BRICS financial initiatives such as the NDB and the future Green Fund may also establish themselves as concrete opportunities for engagement, with different civil society networks already monitoring crucial aspects of the NDB’s conception and implementation plans as well as engaging domestically with executive and legislative actors to influence their governments’ positions on the bank, especially with regard to human rights standards.²³

Besides these ad hoc engagements driven by the official agenda, civil society networks have been establishing autonomous spaces for dialogue and preparing themselves to monitor BRICS initiatives and build common understandings on BRICS issues, including more in-depth knowledge of other BRICS countries’ contexts and enhanced skills for engagement around the domestic and international development impact of the grouping’s activities. In India, Brazil and South Africa there is a growing recognition that cross-BRICS engagement—and thus the strengthening of mutual understanding with Russian and Chinese civil society groups—is an unavoidable necessity, given the extent to which the BRICS grouping has eclipsed the IBSA alliance of ‘democratic emerging powers’.

In Fortaleza, participating organizations reached a minimum consensus over the nature of BRICS, the need to develop a shared alternative framing for sustainable development as seen from the perspective of BRICS civil societies and the importance of engaging with grassroots movements and building domestic constituencies. However, the momentum of cross-BRICS mobilization proved hard to sustain, given the divisions

over participation in the Civic BRICS and the limited presence in Moscow of organizations that had played a key role in civil society mobilizations around the Durban and Fortaleza Summits. In the final section of this chapter we review the prospects for future engagement, including key challenges around the choice of engagement strategies, linkages between local and global issues and the consolidation of spaces that guarantee both coordination and legitimate representation.

CONCLUSIONS

The process of civil society engagement in the official BRICS Summits in Delhi, Durban, Fortaleza and Moscow has highlighted the critical importance of national coordination to build a legitimate, inclusive and effective platform for engagement. The complex nature of foreign policy issues and the apparent distance that separates BRICS decisions from issues that concern grassroots social movements have led to a trend whereby the main actors engaged with the debate have primarily been international NGOs, think tanks, academics and a few NGOs that are well versed in international processes. This raises issues of representation and makes coordination and outreach at the national level a priority issue (Tandon and Bandyopadhyay 2013). CSOs engaging with the BRICS agenda are well aware of these challenges and have sought to forge future agendas that respond to them.

The engagement process has also consolidated the determination of CSOs from the different countries to build cross-BRICS knowledge and linkages through international networking, domestic constituency-building, and engagement with BRICS Sherpas and government officials, while consolidating initiatives such as the BRICS Trade Union Forum and parallel summits. This cumulative process of transnational engagement has seen civil society perceptions of BRICS evolve from seeing it as an unfamiliar agenda to adopting it as a focus of diversified criticism. However, while the trade unions of the BRICS countries publicly support the bloc's initiatives and present straightforward demands (UGT 2014), mobilization by BRICS NGOs and social movements presents a much more complex kaleidoscope of actors, visions and strategies, held together by a common interest in forging critical international alliances (Brasil de Fato 2014).

The main tendencies in civil society debate are those identified by Bond and Garcia (2014) as 'BRICS from the middle' and 'BRICS from below'.

These two strands of thought bring together NGOs and intellectuals who see the grouping as a potential centre of countervailing authority in a multipolar global governance system ('BRICS from the middle') with grassroots activists who take a stand against BRICS corporations and state-led projects that are seen as threatening human rights and the environment ('BRICS from below'). Thus, civil society seems to be searching for common ground among perspectives that range from, on the one hand, opposing BRICS as a sub-imperialist or neo-colonialist grouping and denouncing the social and environmental impacts of its investments to, on the other, constructive criticism that recognizes BRICS achievements in the fields of social and economic development and sees the group's emergence as an opportunity to strengthen and democratize multilateral governance.

This disjuncture leads to different positions on engagement and raises challenges for broad national and transnational alliances. On the one hand, some CSOs focus on policy-oriented advocacy engagement, where civil society, legitimated by its own expertise in social policy formulation and implementation (Poskitt et al. 2015), acts as both critic and constructive partner of governments. These CSOs aim to take advantage of opportunities to influence the BRICS project and seek to support the bloc's stances on the need for transformation of the power balance in global governance, while seeking to ensure that this transformation takes place without undermining formal and legitimate multilateral mechanisms or leading the group to become an elite club with narrow self-serving interests (as the G8 is considered to have done). On the other hand, CSOs with a more contentious orientation denounce the role of BRICS in maintaining the capitalist world system, citing the group's focus on growth and infrastructure development, with the attendant natural resource-related conflicts and the risk of a 'race to the bottom' (Guerrero 2013).

Many CSOs' engagement with BRICS focuses on efforts to internationalize their own domestic agendas, either in relation to intra-bloc agreements or to initiatives that will have an impact on countries outside the bloc, as is the case for the NDB. CSOs' concerns about the NDB reflect their previous experience of the individual national development banks of the BRICS countries, which share a set of strategies based on long-term credit provision to 'national champion' corporations and on investment in production and export-related infrastructure in sectors such as energy and transport (Neto et al. 2013) that are especially sensitive because of the frequency with which they are identified with human and environmental rights violations.

Despite being presented as an alternative to existing IFIs, especially regarding infrastructure finance, BRICS officials have insisted that the NDB aims to supplement rather than challenge existing institutions. The new bank has been welcomed by World Bank President Jim Yong Kim (The Times of India 2015), and the fact that its focus will be on providing infrastructure finance in Latin America, Africa and Asia has given rise to concerns that it will compete with existing Southern-led initiatives such as the Bank of the South.²⁴ Furthermore, CSOs have pointed out that although it will be owned and capitalized by national governments, the NDB will be funded via the private capital markets (with public and private co-financing), which reinforces the idea that it will serve to entrench the status quo.

Given that civil society has struggled to generate enough traction among domestic constituencies in engaging with the broad BRICS agenda, and that so far this agenda has not fully connected with public goods debates or other global and regional processes (John 2012), some CSOs hope that a focus on the NDB and related processes of financing BRICS transnational corporations will provide valuable common ground, a framework for mobilization and a shared set of long-term objectives and strategies. This represents a concrete engagement opportunity that brings together agendas related to the growth-based development model and its perceived consequences, such as inequality, large-scale tax avoidance, sustainability challenges and human rights violations. It also provides a platform for linking with grassroots movements focused on the social and environmental impacts of infrastructure development and extractive industries. However, focusing on the NDB requires specific technical expertise and poses the challenge of engaging with finance ministries, which are not usually very open to civil society engagement. This may have the unintended consequence of once more restricting participation in the debate to elite CSOs and think tanks.

Engagement with the broader BRICS Summit process raises similar challenges. Fulfilling the potential of BRICS as an entry point for global governance democratization and the inclusion of missing voices requires the skills to navigate foreign policy debates which are currently dominated by efforts to strengthen a complex multilateralism that serves corporate and economic interests. These skills are restricted to a small group of relatively elite organizations, whose links with grassroots constituencies are still under construction.

In seeking to create a platform for working together within the official BRICS mechanism, it will be important for these organizations to remember that BRICS is as 'illegitimate' as the G8 that it was established

to challenge. The key focus of engagement will continue to be democratizing this mechanism not only with respect to civil society within BRICS countries but also globally, especially where missing voices of civil society need to be enabled (Martin and Tandon 2014). As the sequence of summits moves from India to China, the ‘Civic BRICS’ model of government-sponsored, think tank-mediated civil society engagement is likely to become consolidated, and the challenge of organizing CSO-led ‘counter-summits’ will grow. In this context, networks linking different levels within and across countries and also different ideological positions across civil society will have an increasingly critical role to play in ensuring that engagement is both legitimate and effective.

NOTES

1. Including the IDS/PRIA/Articulação SUL *CSO-led South–South Cooperation* project (funded by the UK Department for International Development), the Articulação SUL/Brazil and the South Observatory *Brazilian Civil Society’s South–South Engagement* project (funded by Oxfam), PRIA’s studies of *The Transnational Role of Indian Civil Society* (funded by the Forum on India’s Development Cooperation) and of *Civil Society-BRICS Engagement* (funded by Forum for Democratic Global Governance), and an IDS study of BRICS and G20 actors and spaces for the Oxfam-supported BRICSAM grouping of civil society networks.
2. For further assessment of the domestic civil society dynamics on development impact in India, see Chenoy and Joshi (2016) in this volume.
3. *BRICS Must Address Growing Inequality*, a declaration by Indian CSOs, March 2012.
4. SAFIS is a grouping of CSOs and activists made up of local groups, the South African offices of international NGOs and the Congress of South African Trade Unions. It is a locally driven initiative, established by South African organizations that recognized the need for civil society to have a more coordinated and effective impact on the government’s foreign policy. Oxfam largely funded a part-time coordinator of the network during 2012 and 2013, although the initiative is not registered and remains informal.
5. G. Govender, pers. comm., 10 December 2013.
6. F. Kornegay, pers. comm., 9 December 2013.

7. *Ibid.*
8. Attendees included representatives from international NGOs based in BRICS countries, USA and Europe; multilateral agencies; South African, Brazilian, Indian and Chinese NGOs; South African, Chinese, Brazilian and British universities, and one Zimbabwean NGO. No local grassroots groups attended.
9. Invited spaces are government-sponsored participatory instances, whether institutionalized or not, that create opportunities for stakeholder involvement, whereas claimed spaces are those created by civil society or other non-state actors to bring together like-minded actors with common pursuits (cf. Gaventa 2006).
10. Grobbelaar's (2016) chapter in this volume reports on the results of a survey on foreign policy attitudes and development cooperation amongst South Africans, claiming that they are 'pragmatic inter-nationalists' and confirming the limited engagement between government and civil society.
11. M. Tiwana, pers. comm., 9 December 2013.
12. 'Sherpa' is the term used in the BRICS context (as well as in relation to other diplomatic processes) to refer to the officials who lead preparatory negotiations ahead of a Leaders' Summit.
13. Conceptual analysis based on Tarrow (2005). Empirical evidence can be found in Berrón (2007) and Campos et al. (2014).
14. So far, very little attention has been paid to the role of civil society in SSDC. This attempted classification is supported by evidence raised in Berrón and Brant (2015), Suyama and Pomeroy (2014), Leite et al. (2014), Di Ciommo and Amorim (2015), Poskitt et al. (2015), OBS (forthcoming), Marcolini (2014) and Santos (2013).
15. See the chapter by Suyama et al (2016) in this volume for insight into civil society positions around development cooperation.
16. Those spaces can be classified as sectoral national councils, forums related to regional integration, and specific subject committees, promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency's General Secretariat's International Affairs Advisory department.
17. See Poskitt et al. (2015) and Di Ciommo and Amorim (2015) for the main actors identified.
18. This triangular initiative combines technical cooperation with private sector investment initiatives through the Nacala Fund. ProSavana is focused on the agricultural development of Mozambique's tropical savannah, based on the experiences of the development of Brazil's

- cerrado*. The aim is to attract private investment to promote the development of agribusiness and food production in the Nacala region.
19. REBRIP is a network that gathers most prominent Brazilian NGOs, social movements, trade union organizations and professional associations. It was established in 1998 and formally constituted in 2001, as part of Brazilian civil society's mobilization against the FTAA. Its main focus areas are foreign policy, regional integration and international trade.
 20. Supported by Oxfam International, ActionAid and the European Commission.
 21. Side events were supported by Oxfam International, Heinrich Böll Foundation, ActionAid and the Ford Foundation.
 22. For an assessment of the dynamics of civil society in Russia, see Larionova et al (2016) in this volume.
 23. For instance, Brazilian organizations have submitted considerations regarding the NDB's socio-environmental and human rights policies to the government of Brazil (Bank on Human Rights 2014).
 24. The Bank of the South—set up in 2009 by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela—aims to finance projects that accelerate the integration of Latin America, reducing regional inequalities and dependency on external IFI finance and its conditionalities. However, the Bank—announced in 2007, with US\$20 billion committed—has not yet become operational.

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Looking Across BRICS: An Emerging International Development Agenda?

*Anuradha Chenoy, Marina Larionova, Richard Manning,
and Jennifer Constantine*

INTRODUCTION

As discussed in the introduction to this volume, the high profile of BRICS in recent years is the outcome of the increased economic performance of its member countries. Economic problems in several of the BRICS countries have led some to speculate about ‘the end of BRICS’, but this is to misunderstand the nature of the grouping, whose importance for international development goes far beyond its economic weight. Besides fast economic growth, dissatisfaction with the international monetary

A. Chenoy
65 Dakshinapuram, Jawaharlal Nehru University Campus,
New Delhi 110067, India

M. Larionova
11 Prechistenskaya naberezhnaya, Moscow 119034, Russia

R. Manning
13 Trystings Close, Claygate, Esher KT10 0TF, UK

J. Constantine
68 Fairways, Dyke Road, Brighton BN1 5AD, UK

system was an important reason for these countries clubbing together. This went hand in hand with dissatisfaction with the international aid system, which the BRICS countries (along with many other developing and transition nations) associated with a history of ‘humiliation’ in international relations (Badié 2014). The BRICS grouping claims a different model of development and critiques traditional types of foreign aid, arguing instead for a broader form of development cooperation (DC) that includes business partnerships, trade and peacekeeping. A consequence of the rise of BRICS for developing countries has therefore been the acceleration of a paradigm shift in DC.

The BRICS countries are markedly innovative partners. At the individual level, in recent years they have broadened and reframed their policies on aid and DC. At the collective level, a consequence of the increasing institutionalization of the BRICS grouping has been the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). Together with other institutions promoted by individual BRICS countries, such as the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the NDB and CRA are building capacity for international development as well as for development within BRICS.

This book has analysed ‘the role played by ideas, institutions and interests’ in the reconstruction of development assistance paradigms (Suyama et al. this volume). It has shown how and why BRICS pushed for the very term ‘aid’ to be transformed into ‘cooperation’ and for the donor–recipient relationship to be questioned and replaced with a more horizontal partnership. This transformation is far from complete, however, and the idea of DC is in a phase of transition in each of the BRICS countries. The chapters in this volume have analysed the historical narratives and factors that shape the discourse of DC, current policy debates and the perspectives of individual countries and of BRICS civil society on the new multilateral institutions and their functioning. This concluding chapter looks across BRICS as a whole to examine differences and commonalities in development discourses, and in the structures that have emerged as a consequence of international engagements, as well as the role of the BRICS grouping’s emerging collective structures and their construction of alternative financial institutions. The chapter has three sections. The first section provides a comparative analysis of the transitions taking place in the DC activities of the five BRICS countries. The second section looks at the grouping’s development agenda and the common discourse of the BRICS. The third and final section asks ‘what next?’

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BRICS COUNTRIES IN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Though the BRICS countries have been labelled ‘new’ donors, all have a lengthy history of supporting other developing countries. Post-independence, both India and China started giving technical assistance in the 1950s; Brazil supported other developing countries through capacity building; South Africa’s Industrial Development Corporation has been working since 1940 with private sector focus and has spent over a billion dollars between 2001 and 2010 on industrial collaboration with African projects in the energy, infrastructure and agricultural sectors. The BRICS—excluding Russia—were modest donors between the 1950s and the 1980s, focusing for the most part on technical assistance, capacity building and humanitarian assistance for less-developed countries. Russia was a significant donor during the Soviet period and claims a heritage of assisting anti-colonial national liberation movements, especially in developing countries that were of ‘socialist orientation’ and followed the ‘non-capitalist path to development’, including India, China, Egypt and Indonesia. Russia calls itself a ‘re-emerging donor’ with Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) norms and principles. All the BRICS countries show continuity of historical association with developing countries.

All the BRICS have been aid recipients at different periods in their history, and some continue to receive aid; this experience has shaped their understanding of aid and cooperation. China and India benefitted especially from Soviet aid for infrastructure projects, and both believe that this type of assistance for public sector projects was beneficial for their development. China received aid from OECD countries after the 1970s, while India received aid from both the West and the Soviet Union until the late 1980s, with some project aid continuing to the present. Both India and China formulated ‘self-reliance’ as a development model after the 1950s. Brazil and South Africa were beneficiaries of Western assistance from the OECD DAC countries, even though Brazil argues that this aid fell short of national expectations. Out of necessity, Russia received aid for a decade in the 1990s during its transition. South Africa receives significant aid from the countries of the North and currently receives US\$1 billion a year from USA and the European Union (EU) for its health and education sectors. South Africa however is not donor-dependent, as overseas development assistance (ODA) makes up less than 1 % of its budget.

The BRICS countries increased their development assistance as their national economies saw fast and stable growth rates after the late 1980s. Although Russia became an aid recipient in the 1990s, it continued to give humanitarian assistance to the less-developed countries with which the Soviet Union had old ties. In 1990, Brazil shifted to economic reforms and the ODA they received targeted only anti-poverty schemes and environmental protection. Meanwhile, assistance through South–South development cooperation (SSDC) grew in parallel with national economic growth. India announced enhanced development assistance in its 2003–04 Union Budget, gave debt relief to ‘highly indebted poor countries’ (HIPCs), announced the India Development Initiative with INR2 billion for the year 2006–07 and made a commitment of US\$1 billion for bilateral cooperation, of which over US\$500 million was disbursed (Chaturvedi et al. 2014). Stabilization and increase in Russian GDP after 2000 led to a sevenfold increase in Russian aid between 2004 and 2013. So DC in all the BRICS countries accelerated; even though domestic inequality increased in some cases, support to less-developed countries in the South also increased. Cooperation within and between the countries of the South has continued to increase yearly since this spurt.

COLLECTIVE DISCOURSE ON SOUTH–SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Four of the BRICS (excluding Russia) locate their DC within a framework of SSDC. The foundational principles of SSDC are: Southern identity that derives from common colonial experience; anti-colonial struggles; post-independence/colonial structures; and technological lag and uneven development with relative economic backwardness. South Africa conformed to this identity only after the 1990s and the dismantling of the Apartheid system, when it declared commitment to also eradicating Apartheid in development policies. Some explanation of SSDC was given in the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, adopted at a 1978 meeting for technical cooperation (TC) among developing countries sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme, which provided a blueprint for major changes in development assistance with an emphasis on ‘collective self-reliance’ and a new international economic order. The focus was on pooling knowledge and deepening technological cooperation to strengthen the capacity of least-developed countries. Documents

sponsored by developing countries in the 1970s called for SSDC using terms like solidarity, non-interference, mutual benefit, knowledge sharing, transfer of technology, and financial and monetary cooperation. These expressions are now articulated in most BRICS statements and documents, and in the bilateral aid documents of Southern countries. They convey the message of dignity, inclusion and equality in the international system. The South–South vision has several fragments and variations but is collectively articulated in forums like BRICS, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

SSDC is framed as different from traditional aid models. But is there a clear agreement on what South-South Co-operation (SSC) is? How much of it is rhetoric, and how difficult is it to put into practice? Among the BRICS countries, common SSDC principles for DC include the following:

- (i) Safeguarding sovereignty, opposing intervention and focusing on the autonomy of nations to choose their own development paths. The BRICS countries do not lay down ‘conditions’ on policy-making when they partner with less-developed countries (Russia shares the principles of non-intervention and no conditionality in its bilateral partnerships with the South). The BRICS countries believe that each country should be responsible for its political and economic choices and do not make norms of democracy or human rights a condition for DC. They do not lay down privatization and economic reforms as pressure points for assistance. South Africa endorses the universal values of human rights and democracy but remains in line with the non-interventionist BRICS position.
- (ii) BRICS SSDC is structured around ‘mutual benefit’. The narrative is that the traditional aid and donor–recipient relations are asymmetrical and thus top-down. The BRICS practice of cooperation encourages horizontal relations, based on ‘mutual benefits’, as opposed to charity, ensuring a sense of equality and dignity between partners.
- (iii) Helping countries with sustainable development based on the idea of ‘demand-driven’ cooperation. Demands from partner countries are evaluated and grants determined on the basis of the needs of the recipient country. BRICS opposes donor-driven agendas and supply-driven priorities, and respects demands from partners. This distinguishes the BRICS countries from lenders who decide what the receiver country needs. The sub-text is that partners determine their own needs and retain their autonomy, and no agenda is imposed.

- (iv) Based on their own development experience. The Indian and Chinese narrative of development experience is based on ‘self-reliance’. This translates to state-supported industrialization, backed by international development assistance for large infrastructure projects. Self-reliance was also a Soviet period narrative that is now regaining popularity in Russia. The Indian DC paradigm of ‘sustainable and inclusive’ principles for assistance implies public–private partnership. Brazil increasingly recognizes that civil society has a part to play in sharing internationally the innovative solutions for inclusive and sustainable development that it has helped to generate at home. Other BRICS countries emphasize the role of business (whether private sector or state owned) in DC (Gu et al. 2014).
- (v) SSDC is based on soft power, practical realities and pragmatism. All the BRICS countries associate SSDC with soft power to influence international politics. Russian analysts believe that they are losing out on soft power since the country has a relatively high focus on multi-lateral channels for aid.

The BRICS have differences in their approach within the SSC framework, just as they have similarities. China separates aid from the development discourse and argues that the two cannot be interlinked, since each country should be in charge of its own development, and aid is within the domain of foreign policy. However, in practice China admits to both paradigms by embedding its foreign aid within SSDC.

Russia does not consider itself part of the South, or the SSDC framework but definitely sees itself (just as the Soviet Union did) as a major partner of the South. Russia articulates its policy goals as: (a) compliance with commitments to multilateral agencies and bilateral partnership; (b) focused approach by giving aid to select countries and showing the impact of this aid; (c) sectoral priorities like health, education, food and energy; (d) continuities from Soviet aid; (e) efficiency in DC; and (f) developing a model of DC through supporting economic growth, job creation and fostering trade, rather than through traditional aid programmes. While Russia’s approach is distinct from SSDC, clearly several agendas overlap. Russia supports SSDC through the United Nation’s South–South mechanism.

At present, the four other BRICS members count themselves as ‘developing countries’, even while they distinguish themselves from this economic identity by labelling themselves as ‘middle powers’, ‘intermediate emerging powers’ and ‘system-affecting states’. These recent distinctions

separate them from the rest of the developing countries. Their inclusion in the G20 further demarcates their different status.

All the BRICS countries see themselves as bridges between the North and the South. This has set them apart from the least-developed countries (LDCs), and the earlier solidarity has been diluted. Their lead in creating new multilateral institutions, becoming major lenders, and the formation of new groupings like the India–Brazil–South Africa Forum and BRICS, is giving them a ‘separateness’. Furthermore, their foreign policy position of ‘pragmatism’ and support to economic policies that benefit those countries and groups that have comparative advantages has a potential to distance them from others of the global South. However, their enthusiasm for Southern causes continues in a variety of ways.

WHAT MAKES UP DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION?

The argument that policy debates on SSDC “are embryonic and often fragmented” and “made of mostly ad hoc and informal spaces” (Leite et al. 2014, 9) is true for all the BRICS countries. The Russian, Chinese and South African governments have published official policy documents on DC, while the Brazilian Government published reports on cooperation for international development in 2010 and 2013. The Indian Government has not published any one official policy document, but the Ministry of External Affairs—like that of other BRICS countries—publishes its budget for technical assistance and development assistance. The Export Import (EXIM) Bank of India, like other EXIM banks, also publishes lines of credit (LOCs) and grants given and available for bidding.

It is not easy to access complete information on the amount of SSDC from the BRICS countries, for several reasons. The first is that access to complete data is difficult. For example, Chinese aid is classified data and under strict government control. Ministries are ‘forbidden zones’ with just select academics and others engaged in aid processes (Zhang et al. 2015). The DC discourse in most BRICS countries is led by the government and mainly official in nature. Russian analysts complain that there is no long-term policy and that implementation remains a black box.

The second reason is that the SSDC package has broadened in definition and has grown to involve many different combinations of activities. Technical assistance and capacity building, skill training, food aid, debt relief and waivers to HIPC, and humanitarian assistance are modalities common across BRICS. For India and China concessionary credit (in the form of

LOCs), trade and investment, and concessionary grants to assist infrastructure projects are also major aspects of DC. The Chinese Government's White Paper on Foreign Aid (SCIO 2011) says that the country's foreign aid is a package of grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans. It includes complete projects, goods and materials, TC and human resource DC. Brazilian SSC includes TC, financial donations, concessional loans and trade; while the Brazilian Government emphasizes transferring knowledge and information about its own socially inclusive policies to other developing countries, the longstanding Brazilian insistence that SSCDC consists principally of TC with no connection with economic interests is making way for an approach in which TC is increasingly linked to trade.

For the South African Government, foreign investments in Southern Africa and other parts of Africa are integral to DC, and peacekeeping in Africa is also considered to be a major contribution to development interventions. A large proportion of South Africa's cooperation funds are dedicated to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, mediation and state reconstruction; this is also the case with China, although the other BRIC countries do not classify military or peacekeeping activities as part of DC. Russian DC is more comparable to OECD DAC DC principles. The Russian Government's sector-wise priorities focus on giving assistance for energy, health and education, and are concentrated on the LDCs and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The reason for this approach is partly to do with the Soviet legacy, which focused on these sectors not only because of the country's own comparative advantage and capacity but also with a belief that these sectors are most important for sustainable development. The Russian Government gives support and funding to train 15,000 foreign students as part of DC.

For all the BRICS countries apart from Russia, more assistance is delivered bilaterally than multilaterally. This is because multilateral channels do not give these countries the leverage they need for foreign policy, geopolitics or economic advantages. The BRICS governments also argue that their DC model increases trust between partners, and the implementation costs are lower since they do not employ expensive consultants.

BUSINESS DISCOURSE

The Chambers of Commerce in Brazil, India, China and South Africa are very active and work in partnership with their governments in DC, especially since trade has increasingly been linked with aid, and the

LOC method of delivery has become part of the development regime; the South African business community in particular supports the idea of increasing public–private partnerships in DC (Grobbelaar 2014). Chambers of Commerce organize trade fairs and partnership meetings, and get access to members of their governments, often accompanying prime ministers and presidents as part of their delegations. DC is gradually transforming to a relationship where businesses have a leading role. While the business community would like a greater say in policy-making, this is articulated very subtly. The discourse in the corporate-controlled media in all the BRICS countries is generally very positive about this development.

CIVIL SOCIETY DISCOURSE

The uneven nature of civil society in the BRICS countries is reflected in the uneven nature of civil society organization (CSO) engagement with governments on DC. In Brazil, CSOs are important partners in national development, and although they have struggled to achieve influence in DC policy, the government increasingly recognizes the need to consult them on its international development engagements. The consequence is that in Brazil, official government DC discourse is contested and critically examined. Brazilian CSOs have the ability to provide an input into policy and problematize political choices. This analysis in the public space is possible because the government has in recent years preserved space for dissent and debate. The South African Development Partnership Agency works closely with civil society, which is a particularly active partner in supplying relief to conflict zones and in grassroots peace mediation, as well as in development issues. The Development Partnership Administration in India engages with the Forum for Indian Development Cooperation, which brings together a number of CSOs, academics and others who carry out research on DC. Larinova et al. (2014) suggest that that CSOs need to coordinate much more with Russian aid and assistance programmes, and that the government needs to work more with civil society in recipient countries to support and amplify government actions. However, the Russian Government consults only some CSOs and epistemic communities when shaping aid and assistance policies, and Russian CSOs and analysts have criticized Russian DC for lacking coherence with other key policies. Chinese DC is primarily state-centric, as Chinese aid is mostly government to government. The Chinese Government does not often seek support of

the underdeveloped Chinese civil society (Zhang et al. 2015). Chinese civil society has no influence at all on aid priorities, whereas Russian civil society has some very limited influence on policy-making. Neither Russia nor India give aid to CSOs in other countries.

CSOs in the BRICS countries, particularly Brazil and South Africa, tend to be dependent on foreign grants; support for Brazil's CSOs by foreign agencies has generally been tolerated and even welcomed by the Brazilian Government. By contrast, foreign-funded CSOs in Russia, India and China are viewed with suspicion by the government and seen as opposing development, because they have critiqued projects like big dams, mining and large infrastructure projects.

In general DC receives little attention from parliamentarians in BRICS countries; in China, for example, the National People's Congress has never discussed foreign aid as a separate topic. The Indian Parliament, on the other hand, passed the increased 2003–04 budget for development assistance, and Members of Parliament have occasionally raised technical questions on assistance, but have not opposed it. The media in South Africa, India, Brazil and Russia is supportive of DC and has welcomed trade–foreign direct investment (FDI) and DC linkages. Editorials in leading dailies in the BRICS countries have welcomed the foreign and economic diplomacy and advantages gained by the SSDC framework, though in Brazil the media was initially sceptical of the emphasis placed by President Lula da Silva's Government on boosting relations with the South. Public opinion in South Africa supports the government's efforts to stabilize the region. Systematic public opinion surveys have not been organized to gauge the mood of the public about DC in most BRICS, but there is a common sense that the people are sympathetic to the framework of assistance that has evolved. However, there is little negativity about DC in the BRICS countries, especially since it is couched in the SSDC framework, which has a nationalist element that is effectively used by governments.

Government and civil society discourses about DC are in the process of growing. They remain confined to a small set of engaged scholars and CSOs that work on issues of DC and develop solidarities between Southern countries. Clearly, there is much scope for a healthier debate on SSDC as part of civil society and public discourse in most of the BRICS countries. Such a debate is likely to strengthen DC and make the process more transparent and accountable. An open debate would also serve to popularize and legitimize SSDC.

AID DELIVERY AND MANAGEMENT AGENCIES

Over the last decade, the BRICS countries have created institutions and departments with structures, financing and accountability mechanisms to manage DC funds. The Indian Government created a Department of Development Administration within the Ministry of External Affairs in 2012. The Brazilian Government has tried to restructure the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, which was originally established to manage aid inflows, for the same purpose, though much remains to be done to strengthen the country's legal and institutional framework for DC. In China, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) manages aid in collaboration with other departments, though this collaboration is not always harmonious; it gives priority to improving management systems and project implementation (Gu and Carty, 2014). Over half of South African Government departments have been involved at one time or another in providing DC to other parts of Africa, leading to an effort to create a central coordinating mechanism, the South Africa Development Partnership Agency. This agency is distinct from the other BRICS countries agencies because of its openness to receive and manage trilateral funding from Northern donor agencies, leading to a debate on whether the distinctiveness of South African funding gets diluted because of external funding for its projects, and whether trilateral cooperation leads to different agendas and donor interference. In addition to rebranding an existing agency as *Rossotrudnichestvo* (the Federal Agency for the CIS, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation) to lead on bilateral cooperation, for regional aid Russia created a specific legal mechanism, the Eurasian Economic Community, to transfer assistance to its neighbours in the CIS.

The reason for this somewhat unsystematic process of creating full-scale agencies for management of DC is because DC has grown incrementally in the last one and half decades and is 'demand driven'. As such, a wide variety of ministries and agencies in each country have been involved in grant making and implementation of TC projects. However all the BRICS countries are in the process of institutionalizing management of DC, although legislation and institutional development for governance of DC are still lagging behind.

Each of the BRICS countries is also in the process of evolving mechanisms and searching for better methodologies for project implementation, leading to an increased interest in learning both from donor countries of

the North—through initiatives such as the China–DAC Study Group—and from each other’s experience—through initiatives such as the Network of Southern Think Tanks. However, big differences remain between SSDC and OECD DAC approaches. The aid principles of the DAC member countries tend to be based on the liberal model of supporting individual rights and market development, whereas SSDC is more supportive of large projects linked to the state.

Although, as noted above, of all the BRICS countries Russia is closest to following the DAC framework, this might be changing. In the early years after 1990 Russia tried to refashion its DC and did not pay much attention to Soviet period aid, but the historic model is now being re-examined. There is a debate in Russian policy circles in which some analysts argue that Russian DC should be delivered through bilateral channels, since multilateral aid is less visible and dominated by Northern governments. Russian analysts state that their DC has not been popularized in international discourse. Up until 2015, the Russian Ministry of Finance disagreed, arguing that shifting to bilateral channels might decrease effectiveness as aid gets fragmented country-wise. Just over one-third (36 %) of Russian aid is channelled through multilateral bodies, while 26 % is for specific projects and funds managed by international organizations and relies on the World Bank. Russian DC is in a transitional phase, and it appears that support for the model adopted by the Soviet past, more similar to that of the other BRICS countries, could be growing. Since OECD DAC does not accept military assistance or peacekeeping and trade subsidies as part of aid, Russia changed the terms of its aid after accepting DAC principles.

The other BRICS countries are unlikely to change their policies to converge with OECD DAC principles in the near future, since they believe that their lower implementation costs make a more sustainable model; so their focus on bilateral DC arrangements is likely to continue. At the same time, the BRICS countries are willing to diversify their aid relationships and build strategic partnerships with the North. The Brazilian, Indian, South African and Chinese governments see themselves as the voice of the global South in the G20 and other bodies. South Africa, a key strategic partner to several Northern states which also has many Southern partners, played the role of linking Africa to the G8 countries and has, along with other BRICS countries, called for reforms in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). In future, the BRICS countries are likely to hold on to SSDC and at the same time cooperate with the G20

on DC. They could also become more willing to partner with Northern countries on trilateral or multilateral platforms for assistance partnerships.

FOREIGN POLICY AND GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS

While all the BRICS countries state that their DC is linked to geopolitics and economic interests and serves their foreign policy and economic diplomacy, Russian aid has substantial differences from other BRICS countries on the issue of direct interests of foreign policy. While Soviet aid was strategically and economically driven, post-Soviet Russian aid reflected attempts to become a ‘normal Western country’ in its emphasis on giving aid through multilateral agencies. As the amount of aid declined from that given during the Soviet period, its nature also changed. Soviet aid was centralized and consisted of large projects often linked to major infrastructure initiatives. Russian aid, on the other hand, consists of many small projects and is not accompanied by systematic public relations (Larionova et al. this volume). Russian development assistance in both theory and practice is in transition stage.

Brazil, India, China and South Africa see DC as a reflection of their foreign policies. For example, unconditional terms of aid and mutual benefit are in keeping with the stated principles of Brazil’s foreign policy: non-intervention, autonomy and pacifism. All four countries voice the principles of building coalitions with the South and opposing force and militarism. When the Indian decision to enhance development assistance was announced by the former Finance Minister in parliament, he stated that the aim was to leverage and promote India’s strategic economic interests abroad (Jaswant Singh 2003, quoted in Chaturvedi et al. 2014, 11). Although the Chinese Government sees aid primarily as a foreign policy tool and a reflection of its international image, Russian policy-makers argue that their aid is not a pillar of foreign policy, or a method of achieving national priorities. However, DC has been recognized as a principle of foreign policy in the Russian Government’s *Development Policy Concept* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2014), which advances both bilateral and multilateral channels, and views development partnerships as part of ‘collective security’, a key concept of Russian foreign policy.

All the BRICS countries are interested in playing a greater role in international affairs and in leveraging DC for political capital. India, Brazil and South Africa are all lobbying for a seat on the UN Security Council and for UN reforms. In the India–Africa meeting in October 2015, India

invited all 54 leaders of African countries, offered them a package of DC that included concessional credit and asked for their support for Security Council membership.

The BRICS countries have built coalitions with Southern countries. India was especially active in the NAM. Brazil was a leader in formulating coalitions of Southern countries at the UN, such as the G77. Soviet Russia partnered with the South, and China competed for leadership of the South; one of the reasons for the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s was leadership of the South. South Africa's close links with the North during the Apartheid regime isolated it from the South, but the end of Apartheid strengthened South Africa's resolve to integrate with Africa and the South.

Analysts debate whether the generosity or humanitarian nature of aid is diluted if it is also a principle of foreign policy. Southern analysts argue that Western aid was always linked to foreign policy and to commercial advantage. However, they argue that DC enhances self-sufficiency, has the capacity to leverage developing countries into growth and is different from traditional aid. It encourages business and trade on more equal terms, gives LDCs a choice of partnerships and is opposed to aid dependency. This is the reason that DC is welcomed by many LDCs.

The BRICS' DC flows follow geographical patterns and are based on priorities set by geopolitical advantages. The first element of geopolitical interests is regional. Brazil is interested in regional integration as an important foreign policy strategy, and so Latin America and the Caribbean have been the main beneficiaries of its DC, along with African countries, particularly those like Angola and Mozambique that are fellow members of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries. The former Soviet states of the CIS, particularly those in Central Asia, are the priority beneficiaries of support from Russia: the CIS received 40 % of ODA in 2012 because Russia sees these 'near abroad' countries as a 'special zone of interest' for political and security reasons. Russian funding for health also goes to the CIS, as well as to global funds. China has deep cooperation links with regional allies like Pakistan and Mongolia, as well as several South East and Central Asian countries. India uses DC to retain strategic influence in South Asia and has formulated a policy of 'neighbourhood first' for regional peace. India's intention is to ignore Pakistan, nurture smaller neighbours and ward off the strategic spread of China, to create a more integrated South Asian security zone.

Regional geopolitics is particularly important because (i) all these countries have to safeguard their long and often porous borders; (ii) many borders are not clearly demarcated and are areas of conflict that range from radical and secessionist movements to terrorism; (iii) they have to safeguard against trafficking, cross-border threats, terrorism and other illegal activities; (iv) some countries have concerns about threats to their security from other countries. All the BRICS countries realize the need to influence and secure their regions, since peace is necessary for development and growth.

The second element of geopolitical interests is resource-based. All the BRICS countries are focusing DC on resource-rich regions, and especially Africa, to search for energy and markets, and—as more and more African countries stabilize—for investments and trade. For South Africa, Southern Africa is priority region, followed by the rest of Africa. Regional integration is of critical interest and results in the promotion of African institutions such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). South Africa has positioned itself as the 'gateway to Africa' for the North (Grobbelaar 2014) and leverages its geostrategic position to focus on its role as an economic hub for Africa.

The third element of geopolitical interests is historic, and consists of building relationships with countries with historical links. Thus the geographic spread of Russian DC remains largely similar to that of the Soviet period: the CIS countries and various nations in Africa and West Asia. Some countries that were beneficiaries of Soviet aid—like India, China, Indonesia and Vietnam—have become much more self-reliant, but continue to have strong trade and strategic relations with Russia today. Russian technical experts focus on giving African countries similar expertise that Soviet technical experts gave to India and China in the 1950s and 1960s. (Larionova et al. this volume). China, India and Brazil have all accelerated their DC to Africa and all recall their historical links and in some cases shared colonial links.

The fourth element is using DC to support other developing countries within the framework of SSDC. There is an economic surge in DC, and demand for competitive markets and cheaper goods is attracting the BRICS countries beyond their own regions and Africa to newer and stable markets.

The fifth element is diversification. All the BRICS countries want to diversify partners, in keeping with the current investment climate of diversifying investments. Security concerns definitely determine the choice of

partners for DC in the current scenario, as do economic interests and the need to build on existing multilateral interests. This further shows that the domestic priorities of all the BRICS are in keeping with DC.

TRADE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS

The BRICS countries are convinced that trade and manufacturing are more effective instruments for sustainable development than aid. South–South trade and investment has grown exponentially and is propelling growth. Russia is relatively behind the other BRICS countries on using trade as development assistance but is catching up. The BRICS policy mantra is to make trade and business partnerships a major component of DC. Some aspects of trade as DC include the following:

1. The BRICS governments support large, medium and small business sectors for trade and investment, by making policies that facilitate this entry of the business sector into DC. The South African government works with the business community to improve the impact of investments in areas of retail, manufacturing and banking. The Indian Government works with multiple chambers of commerce and industry, organizing meetings, and information and business fairs. India has been extending its duty-free market access scheme to 34 LDCs, helping them expand their trade. Indian bilateral trade with African countries stood at US\$72 billion in 2014–15, having doubled over the preceding five years. China’s trade with Africa amounts to more than US\$220 billion a year, and there are more than 3000 Chinese companies working in Africa, ranging from large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to small and medium private enterprises (Gu et al. 2015 and 2016).

2. The BRICS governments encourage FDI, especially since developing country governments welcome it. China is the fourth biggest investor in Africa, while India is the fifth largest investor (Chaudhury 2015). Brazil has concentrated FDI by focusing on former Portuguese colonies in Africa (Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde) for trade and DC.

3. Increasing competition and multilateral business projects. For many years South Africa was the most significant investor in other African countries, but it is now facing competition, including from other BRICS countries. South Africa has used its mineral wealth to leverage relations with North and with emerging economies like India and China, focusing on good infrastructure and institutions. The South African Government grants special incentives for local FDI in the Southern African region and encourages SOEs to invest in regional infrastructure development. As

Grobelaar (this volume) shows, South African investments in Africa and in other developing countries are led by private investment.

The Brazilian Government supports business alliances. Its main private sector cooperation is through financial cooperation “an increased funding by BNDES [National Economic and Social Development Bank] for Brazilian companies carrying out infrastructure projects in Africa coincides with growing technical cooperation projects in these countries” (Leite et al. 2014, 55).

4. The BRICS countries are interested in expanding free trade areas and agreements. Brazil has played a leading role in the creation of the Common Market of the South, India is part of the South Asian Free Trade Association, Russia has a customs union with several CIS countries and is integrating its economy with Central Asia, China has economic free trade areas in several regions, and South Africa is seeking to extend free trade areas in Africa beyond the Southern Africa region. The least integrated of these regions is South Asia, because of long-running bilateral disputes between India and Pakistan.

5. While grant assistance is significant in all cases (e.g. for technical cooperation, scholarships and usually small capital projects), the BRICS have mostly put increasing emphasis on low-interest concessional loans. In 2015, India promised US\$600 million of development assistance, which includes concessionary credit. The Chinese Government has shifted its smaller development projects to its stream of grant assistance.

6. A significant shift in mechanisms for providing DC was initiated in the 1990s by several of the BRICS countries, which started giving low-interest concessional loans known as LOCs for projects in developing countries. These LOCs are subsidized by the government, and their undercut interest rates are lower than commercial loans, making them attractive to borrowers. EXIM banks from the lending countries invite local and developing country companies to apply for LOCs. Concessional loans are increasingly targeted at large projects that are profitable in the long run; they qualify as ODA because they have a grant element (in India, e.g. 25 % of the LOC is a grant). Although the BRICS countries, like many donors, frequently require equipment, goods and services to be tied to or be preferentially sourced from the donor country, it is not their practice to lay down broader conditionality of the kind often associated with Northern or multilateral aid. The argument from the BRICS governments that use LOCs is that their goods are cheaper than those from other countries, and that the costs of implementing their projects is low. The EXIM bank of these countries manage the LOCs, and the activities they

fund are implemented by companies and government enterprises. LOCs have assisted investments in multiple fields, including infrastructure, agriculture and electrification. The creation of these new instruments is linked to aid, trade and investment—very much like the mixed credits provided by many Western donors in the 1980s.

The Chinese Government uses LOCs for big projects, while small and medium projects are funded by grants. SOEs in recipient countries play a major role in implementing LOC-funded projects. SOEs are proposed by their embassies, MOFCOM evaluates their feasibility and projects are financed via the LOC administered by the EXIM bank (Zhang et al. 2015). The other BRICS countries have a somewhat similar pattern, but in South Africa it is private investors who mainly take the lead; in India, both the government and multinational companies engage in large projects. Chinese LOCs and projects dwarf those implemented by the other BRICS countries, even while the others also have significant presence. For example, at the China–Africa Summit in Johannesburg in December 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced US\$60 billion in loans and assistance to Africa including US\$5 billion in zero interest loans and US\$35 billion in preferential loans, export credit and concessional loans. African commentators calculated that this is more than the North has ever given Africa in aid (Duodu 2015). By contrast, in the last ten years, India has made available LOCs worth US\$7 billion for 140 projects in 40 African countries—two-thirds of the country’s total LOCs—and in October 2015 offered US\$10 billion-worth of concessional LOCs over the next five years. Whilst their Indian-funded projects are generally smaller than Chinese-funded ones, they are more likely to get feedback from the local recipients (people impacted by the project), use local labour and transfer technology, giving a different set of long-run benefits for recipient countries. Brazil also gives official export credits and concessional public loans, and has private-sector-led investments (Suyama et al. this volume).

The LOC appears to be a fairly successful model of trade as DC. The South–South trade figures of all the BRICS countries have increased significantly, as figures in all the country-specific chapters in this volume show. Though there is much need for improvement, and problems in project implementation and impact assessment remain, it is through LOCs that governments are able to guide investment policy on trade-linked aid. The LOC-led trade and business is the core of the BRICS DC model.

PEACEKEEPING

Peacekeeping and military assistance are not considered as aid contributions under the OECD DAC framework, though a small percentage of peacekeeping operations is accepted as ODA. However, several of the BRICS countries are engaged in peacekeeping activities in their own region and beyond, and submit that peacekeeping is part of their development activity, preventing conflicts from spilling over, and ensuring the peace and security needed for development and commerce. The South African Government maintains that its 'development interventions' fall under the rubric of peace building, conflict mediation, post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization in African countries, that often takes place under a UN or African Union mandate. The South African argument is that development is not possible without security and stabilization and development gains are not possible in conflict situations; the current South African administration views the country's pre-1994 role as a de-stabilizer of the region. To compensate for this past, it feels peacekeeping and regional integration are a debt it must pay. So South Africa is the biggest contributor to multilateral peacekeeping in Africa—in countries including Burundi, Central African Republic and Liberia—and is an experienced regional mediator. India includes its UN peacekeeping activities in the menu of its development activities; it also had a peacekeeping force in Sri Lanka in the 1980s that assisted in trying to end Sri Lankan civil conflict, ultimately unsuccessfully, and has given some military assistance to other countries, and engages in training military personnel from other developing countries. But this is an understated part of India's development activities. Russia has a strong peacekeeping force in the CIS countries but does not include it in its aid or development menu. The broader issue of collective security, safeguarding threats from terrorism, threats from radical groups, international crime, trafficking and piracy are part of the security vision of BRICS cooperation.

ENERGY

Energy security is a driver for DC in a variety of ways. China and India are net importers of energy. Russia as an energy exporter uses energy as aid and DC. India's recent focus in Africa is on the energy-exporting countries that are prioritized as DC recipient partners. For example, of the 33 countries in Africa that come under India's Duty Free Tariff Preference

Scheme, 12 are located in West Africa, where the focus for oil extraction is in Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. Similarly, India has supported projects for hydro-electric generation in neighbouring Bhutan and Nepal, and both India and China have given assistance to Myanmar in exchange for oil, even when there were sanctions against the military regime. Inter-BRICS cooperation for energy is also important, since China is a major importer of hydrocarbons from Russia, and India is also an investor in Russian oil fields. Energy is an important input into DC within the South.

The BRICS countries share the paradigm that the current international system is multipolar, on account of the relative decline of the North and the rise of emerging and re-emerging powers. They argue that multilateral institutions need to be inclusive (of BRICS) to reflect this changed reality. The BRICS countries have expressed dissatisfaction with the dominant international financial institutions (IFIs), and the creation of the NDB is a move towards offering new financial arrangements that reflect this dissatisfaction. In the next section we examine the extent to which BRICS approach development issues collectively, and whether they are beginning to act in a coordinated manner on such issues in practice. We assess whether there is a consolidated agenda for international cooperation emerging from BRICS, and the implications of this for low-income countries and the global development landscape. We also examine collective BRICS engagement in multilateral forums and relationship with Northern-dominated international organizations, and the implications of the establishment of the NDB.

BRICS APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In addressing these questions, we first note the extent to which structured discussion among the BRICS countries as a group has grown since the establishment of the original BRIC grouping in 2008, and the addition of South Africa in 2012. BRICS has become a recognized informal summit institution with a rapidly expanding agenda, established identity and distinctive positions on a wide range of issues including international institutional reform, economic and socio-economic policy, finance, foreign policy, regional and security issues, and development.

As Larionova and Shelepov observe in a recent article about BRICS, “the institution’s collaborative dynamics has been increasing steadily” (Larionova and Shelepov 2015). Alongside the summits, foreign and finance ministers meetings, they calculate that there are now no fewer than

14 other cooperation formats, including ministerial level fora on agriculture, trade, health, education, energy and the environment. At expert level, such cooperation includes competition and customs authorities, export credit insurance agencies, development banks, intellectual property offices, national statistical services, supreme courts, officials responsible for population issues and national security advisers. Non-governmental groupings, such as the Business Council and the Academic Forum, show a willingness to extend cooperation beyond the official sphere, developing new bonds and group identities (although, as Pomeroy et al. [this volume] argue, controversies remain over the nature of formal provision for civil society engagement in formal BRICS summits). However, there had been no meeting of officials responsible for development until 2015, when the first such meeting took place in Moscow, in the seventh year of BRICS history, organized by Rossotrudnichestvo on behalf of Russia's BRICS presidency.

For a relatively recent plurilateral grouping, BRICS' development of mutual collaboration is quite impressive. It does not amount to any merging of national responsibilities (unlike, say, the fully 'collectivized' trade policy of the EU, where collective competence trumps national competence), but establishes, across a growing field, a habit of lesson-learning, benchmarking and cooperation that has the potential to change national behaviours significantly over time.

Many of the fora aim first and foremost at improving cooperation, lesson-learning and exchange among the BRICS countries, but two forms of outreach are also important.

First, there is an explicit policy of improving coordination among the BRICS countries in their engagement with international institutions. The communiqué from the 2015 Ufa summit underlines the significance of this coordination by noting that:

We agreed to step up coordinated efforts in responding to emerging challenges, ensuring peace and security, promoting development in a sustainable way, addressing poverty eradication, inequality and unemployment for the benefit of our peoples and the international community. We confirmed our intention to further enhance the collective role of our countries in international affairs.

(BRICS 2015a)

In the same vein, the Strategy for Economic Partnership, agreed at the Ufa summit, states:

Development of intra-BRICS cooperation in various international and regional platforms is vital for the promotion of common interests in international trade, investment, industrial, scientific and technological cooperation. (BRICS 2015b)

It goes on to give examples of such platforms: the UN, the international economic institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the G20. Again, this cooperation does not take away national sovereignty or force identical policies across the group, but establishes a cooperative mind-set that encourages collective action and thus gives BRICS greater influence.

Since its launch, BRICS coordination has explicitly aimed at safeguarding the interests not only of BRICS countries,¹ but also of other emerging and developing economies. BRICS support for a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all states—with emerging market economies and developing countries playing an ever larger and more active role as engines of economic growth and prosperity—have been the cornerstones of the members' cooperation.²

One example is the common wish of the BRICS countries to pursue reform of global economic governance institutions. At their first summit in 2009, BRIC leaders pledged to advance the reform of the IFIs, to reflect changes in the global economy and ensure that the emerging and developing economies have greater voice and representation in these institutions.³ The BRICS countries have reiterated their commitment to IFI reform at each subsequent summit, underscoring their determination to work with the international community to promote reforms and development.⁴

The Ufa Summit communiqué makes a similar point in relation to the G20 by observing that “we will also continue working to bring greater attention to the issues on the G20 agenda that are prioritized by developing countries and emerging markets” (BRICS 2015a), giving such examples as macroeconomic policy coordination under the G20 framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth, bridging the gaps caused by cross-border impacts of global financial regulation reform and adaptation to new rules introduced by the OECD's 2013 Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.

The communiqué continues, “we will continue to appeal for broader and deepened G20 consultations with low-income countries on G20 policy recommendations that will have an impact on them” (BRICS 2015a).

There is therefore a clear BRICS positioning of supporting the legitimate interests of other emerging and developing economies in international economic fora. If carried through, this could be significant for these countries.

Secondly, development issues have been prominent on the BRICS agenda since the first summit in Ekaterinburg, where the leaders made three concrete commitments pledging to strengthen efforts for the provision of international humanitarian assistance and overcome the food crisis. Larionova and Shelepov (2015) find that although the number of commitments and share of discourse fluctuate across years, development lies in fifth position in BRICS discourse—after economy, finance, trade and health—with a total share of just under 8 %.

Within the development domain BRICS has prioritized three central issues: cooperation for progress on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), support to infrastructure development in Africa and its industrialization within the framework of NEPAD, and mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS countries and other emerging economies and developing countries.

Support for the MDGs, a priority present in declarations from all the summits since the first BRICS leaders' meeting, is three-pronged. The first pillar is TC and financial support to poor countries to achieve the MDGs through implementation of their development policies and provision of social protection.⁵ Though this pillar is carried out individually by BRICS members, the imperative for collective actions is repeatedly emphasized in the declarations of the BRICS leaders.

The second, and arguably much more significant, pillar is the economic development of the BRICS countries as a major driver of development progress. As the Fortaleza Summit of 2014 rightly noted:

During the first cycle of BRICS Summits, collectively our economies have consolidated their position as the main engines for sustaining the pace of the international economy as it recovers from the recent economic and financial global crisis. The BRICS continue to contribute significantly to global growth and to the reduction of poverty in our own and other countries. Our economic growth and social inclusion policies have helped to stabilize global economy, to foster the creation of jobs, to reduce poverty, and to combat inequality, thus contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

(BRICS 2014a)

Indeed the impact of the BRICS countries' own economic development has been highly significant for the global economy and for developing countries over the past 15 years.

The third pillar is collective support for a coordinated, inclusive and transparent inter-governmental process for the elaboration of the UN development agenda beyond 2015 which builds on the MDGs.⁶

BRICS has repeatedly emphasized its commitment to the MDGs as a fundamental milestone in the development agenda, and the centrality of the MDGs and the UN's role in ensuring inclusive, equitable and sustainable global growth is underlined in all BRICS declarations since 2011. It is symbolic that in anticipation of the 70th meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (UN GA) in September 2015, "to review the progress of the MDGs and adopt the post-2015 development agenda, which will guide international development cooperation in the next 15 years,"⁷ the BRICS leaders expressed their intention "to strengthen partnerships for advancing international development and to begin interaction through dialogue, cooperation and exchange of experience in advancing international development of mutual interest to our countries",⁸ thus for the first time explicitly stating an intent to launch a BRICS development agenda. The first meeting of the BRICS countries' senior officials in charge of international DC will be a stepping stone in that direction. At the same time, given the adherence of the BRICS members to the MDGs, any new BRICS development agenda is likely to be supportive of the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

It is a matter of some note that the SDGs were adopted in full by the UN GA in September 2015, following the earlier consensus on financing agreed at the Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa in July 2015. The BRICS countries were able to play a far larger role in these important negotiations than had been the case with the MDGs, thanks to the much more inclusive processes adopted by the UN, not least through the innovative design of the Open Working Group, which helped individual countries' perspectives be represented outside of their regional groupings. This enabled potentially troublesome issues, such as the long-standing insistence by G77 plus China on 'Common but Differentiated Responsibilities', to be addressed and settled in advance of the final UN GA session, thus ensuring the SDGs are universal in their scope but not in the distribution of the burden of development. While individual BRICS members had some different emphases (South Africa, e.g. as a member of the Common African Position, giving a somewhat stronger emphasis to peace and security dimension as fundamental to development; China on

maintaining development as separate from security issues; Brazil particularly concerned that the SDGs should influence the sustainability agenda of developed countries), they were able to find common cause on the essentials of the agenda (Constantine and Pontual 2015).

BRIC made its first collective commitment to support infrastructure development in Africa and its industrialization within the framework of NEPAD in its 2011 Sanya Declaration, before South Africa became a member.⁹ The pledge was reiterated in New Delhi in 2012 and emphasized at the summit in Durban in 2013. At the Fortaleza meeting (2014) the BRICS leaders announced the decision that concurrent with establishing a headquarters for the NDB, an Africa Regional Centre should also be established in South Africa. Conflict resolution and peace as prerequisites for socio-economic development in South Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and the Central African Republic were the focus of the leaders' attention in Ufa in 2015.

As part of its emerging development agenda, BRICS has shown increasing interest in improving the access of poorer countries to development finance. Part of this approach, consistent with traditional 'Southern' views frequently expressed in international meetings, is to stress the importance of developed countries in honouring their commitments to supplying official development assistance, while also expressing willingness to boost SSDC. As the Ufa Summit communiqué puts it:

We are committed to further strengthening and supporting South-South cooperation, while stressing that South-South cooperation is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to North-South cooperation which remains the main channel of international development cooperation.

(BRICS 2015a)

This wording reflects the fact that despite their overall economic strength, the BRICS countries remain poorer by a considerable amount in terms of income per head than Northern donor countries. Indeed, the slowdown or in some cases even decline in economic growth among a number of 'rising powers' puts in question whether the rapid expansion of assistance from these sources will be maintained over the medium term. However, the weight of international cooperation activities of some of the BRICS countries is now very significant in its own right. The BRICS countries have already (with China the most prominent because of the scale of its activities) significantly reshaped the global development landscape, in

terms of both how recipients of ODA and SSDC look at providers, and how Northern donors think about their own future DC activities, given the ‘competition’ from rising powers such as BRICS.

International cooperation is one of the small number of areas where BRICS has established a new, formal, jointly owned institution, the NDB—located in China, with an Indian President, a Brazilian Board Chair, a Russian Chair of Governors and an outpost in South Africa, and with each BRICS member contributing an equal share to its capital.

According to the Agreement on the NDB adopted on July 15, 2014, in Fortaleza:

The Bank shall mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, complementing the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development.

The Purpose and Functions article specifies that

To fulfil its purpose, the Bank shall support public or private projects through loans, guarantees, equity participation and other financial instruments. It shall also cooperate with international organizations and other financial entities, and provide technical assistance for projects to be supported by the Bank.

(BRICS 2014b)

The NDB can be seen in at least two lights: first, as a major BRICS commitment to increase, and to work more closely together in, the provision of official finance, including to developing countries outside their own group; and second, as a demonstration of the ability of the BRICS countries, most of whom are under-represented in the traditional multilateral development banks (Manning 2014), to operate collectively and at scale outside the traditional framework.

This does not seem to lessen the interest of the BRICS countries in playing a full part in existing multilateral development banks, where indeed they continue, along with other rapidly growing economies, to press for much quicker adjustments of representation and voting shares to reflect changing economic realities. Establishing new collective financial institutions is a time-consuming business. It is not at all surprising that it has taken several years from the launch of the NDB idea in 2012 to its

inaugural investment projects, likely to be approved in early 2016. The leaders reiterated in the Ufa Communiqué that they see the NDB as “a powerful instrument for financing infrastructure investment and sustainable development projects in the BRICS and other developing countries and emerging market economies and for enhancing economic cooperation between our countries” (BRICS 2015a), and welcomed the intention for the NDB to cooperate closely with existing and new financing mechanisms including the AIIB.

The long-term significance of the NDB will depend on how effectively it operates. However, the mere fact of its establishment already sends out a message about the BRICS’ intention to put its own stamp on the international cooperation process.

AN EMERGING DEVELOPMENT AGENDA?

At the political level, BRICS has paid a good deal of attention to international DC, notably at the BRICS leaders’ summits, from the Sanya summit in 2011 onwards. The deliberation and decisions are mostly related to UN development goals or more generally the need to eradicate poverty and ensure inclusive and equitable growth and access to universal health coverage and education. As noted above, Larionova and Shelepov (2015) find that the share of BRICS discourse on development is substantial and stands fifth after the BRICS agenda core policy areas: economy, finance, trade and health (see Fig. 8.1).

More than 10 % of all BRICS commitments are on development. However the leaders’ meetings in Brasilia (2010) and Durban (2013) were marked by peaks of 16 % and 21 % of all commitments being on development. Available data on BRICS compliance performance allows the conclusion that delivery on development commitments in this area is higher than the overall rate of delivery on commitments, as Table 8.1 illustrates.

Though BRICS has not established its own collective and distinct development agenda, three facts indicate that it is embarking on the long road towards this agenda. First, the BRICS countries have confirmed their explicit intention to strengthen partnerships for advancing international development through dialogue, cooperation and exchange of experience, as stated in the Ufa declaration. Second, the first ever forum of senior officials in charge of international DC was held in December 2015. What will come out of this is still uncertain at the time of writing, but it may evolve




Fig. 8.1. BRICS priorities 2008–14, percentage of the total discourse (Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of the compliance reports prepared by the BRICS Research Group: <http://www.hse.ru/en/org/hse/iori/bricsanalyt> (2015)).

Table 8.1. BRICS commitments and compliance

<i>Issue area</i>	<i>Yekaterinburg 2009</i>	<i>Brasilia 2010</i>	<i>Sanya 2011</i>	<i>Delhi 2012</i>	<i>Durban 2013</i>	<i>Fortaleza 2014</i>	<i>Total</i>
Number of commitments	15	31	38	32	47	68	231
Number of commitments on development	1	5	1	3	10	4	24
Commitments on development as % of total commitments	6.7	16.1	2.6	9.4	21.3	5.9	10.4
Compliance on all commitments (%)	NA	NA	74	64	74	70	71
Compliance on development commitments (%)	NA	NA	80	70	80	90	80

NA: data not available. *Source:* Authors' calculations on the basis of the compliance reports prepared by the BRICS Research Group (<http://www.hsc.ru/en/org/hsc/iori/bricsanalyt>).

into a systemic mechanism pushing for and shaping a BRICS development agenda. Third, with the NDB, the BRICS countries have a joint facility to finance infrastructure and development projects which reflect their shared priorities for international development. So there is the political will to direct the agenda, there is an emerging new actor to shape it and there is a vehicle to finance collectively agreed targets. In an optimistic expectation, the process of agenda-building may take a full cycle of BRICS summits, but history may prove us wrong.

The evolution of BRICS in the past decade shows that the plurilateral group has matured fast, moving from concept to reality. The regular meetings and statements of intent have been matched by the establishment of new institutions like the NDB and CRA. Despite the significant differences in economic profile, in hard and soft power, and in geostrategic interests across the BRICS countries, they have shown their ability to work together as a group within the G20, the WTO and other institutions of international governance when it has been in their collective interest to do so. The grouping has consolidated its gains and generated ideas that have been welcomed by the global South, despite the increasing power asymmetries between the BRICS countries and the LDCs of the South, and the concerns raised by some in civil society about 'sub-imperialism'.

The rapidly expanding portfolio of BRICS DC activities has demonstrated the potential for a DC approach that is different from that

of traditional aid. Its growth has been welcomed by recipient countries who are keen to increase their room for manoeuvre by diversifying their sources of support, as well as by some LDC governments who are genuinely eager to look to other countries in the South for inspiration and for promising examples of feasible development pathways that differ from the orthodoxy promoted by Northern donor countries.

However, the ultimate impact of the emergence of BRICS on the international development landscape will depend on the answers to some important questions that remain. These include: has there been a fundamental shift in economic power in the international system? How far has international finance changed because of BRICS interventions and institutions? To what extent have the BRICS countries' models of DC influenced other providers of development assistance? And, beyond the discourse, how different in practice is the BRICS paradigm of development?

Clearly, economic shifts in power balances are discernible, despite the economic troubles which several of the BRICS countries are currently experiencing. The intensification of Africa's trade with the BRICS countries, and of FDI flows from the BRICS countries into Africa, is a shift with very significant development implications. Even though trade remains largely dependent on the export of primary products, and therefore vulnerable to commodity price cycles, FDI is beginning to include higher value added activities and thereby to stimulate industrial and service-sector growth.

The new BRICS financial institutions are an important addition to the global landscape of development finance and send a clear signal to the Northern countries that their stranglehold on the existing multilateral institutions will no longer go unchallenged. Nevertheless, two factors suggest that their impact may not be as significant as initially expected. The first is that economic and financial power has not yet radically shifted; the traditional institutions are keen to co-opt these new institutions and mechanisms, and provisions such as the requirement for CRA borrowing above a certain threshold to be accompanied by an IMF programme suggest that they may be achieving some success. The second is that collective BRICS institutions like the NDB may end up being overshadowed by others that are dominated by the largest BRICS economy, China. The Chinese-dominated AIIB that came into force in October 2014, in which China has an authorized investment of US\$ 50 billion out of a total of US\$100 billion, may grow rapidly to the point where it ends up sidelining the NDB. Other initiatives such as the New Silk Road¹⁰ may enable

China to achieve a greater development impact individually than BRICS does collectively.

This takes us to the question of whether there is a post-BRICS development agenda in the making. Such an agenda is likely to emerge not only if BRICS fragments but also if it expands, which is a possibility. Other globally significant middle-income countries like Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey would in many ways be valuable additions to the grouping. However, such an expansion would increase the transaction costs of the types of intra-BRICS cooperation we have described in this chapter and thereby slow the rapid growth in capacity for promoting technical and policy exchange and mutual learning on development challenges that has proven to be one of the BRICS grouping's most significant and surprising successes.

The BRICS grouping is extremely heterogeneous and characterized by conflicting economic and geostrategic interests as much as by common characteristics and shared purpose—though this lack of coherence is not necessarily a weakness, given that the grouping seeks primarily to preserve its member countries' room for manoeuvre in the face of Northern dominance rather than to promote itself as an alternative global hegemonic bloc. As our analysis in this chapter has suggested, development is one of the few areas where the BRICS countries have identified a genuine common purpose. They are genuinely committed to supporting development in the countries of the South with which they have long identified and are inspired by solidarity as well as economic and geopolitical self-interest. They are also keenly aware of the domestic development challenges that they face and keen to use the BRICS grouping as a mechanism for mutual learning on how best to address these challenges. It appears that in this grouping the BRICS countries have found a formula that has worked for these purposes, and for the coming decade, whatever their individual difficulties and agendas, they are unlikely to want to lose out on the comparative advantage that they have created.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Anuradha Chenoy is a professor, and currently dean, at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. She has written many articles, research papers and books including *Maoists and Other Armed Conflicts* (co-authored, 2010) and *Human Security: Concept and Implications* (co-authored, 2003).

Marina Larionova holds a doctorate in political science and a doctorate in philology. She is author, co-author and editor of several books on global governance, the G8/G20 system, BRICS and other international institutions. Marina Larionova is Head of the International Organizations Research Institute at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow and Vice President for International Relations of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.

Richard Manning is a senior research fellow at the Blavatnik School of government at Oxford University and Chair of the Board of the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation. He is a former UK civil servant, who worked in the Department for International Development and its predecessors from 1965 to 2003 (and as a Director-General from 1996 to 2003). He was Chair of the OECD DAC from 2003 to 2008.

Mark Rakhmangulov is Deputy Director of the Global Governance Research Centre in the International Organisations Research Institute of the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. He focuses his research on global governance and international development cooperation, particularly on the role and contribution of G8, G20, BRICS and other multilateral institutions. He is also Director of the Center for Multilateral Cooperation of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.

NOTES

1. This history is described in depth by Gu et al (2016) in this volume.
2. See for example Section III of the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership (BRICS 2015b).
3. See paragraphs 2 and 8 of the Joint Statement of the 2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government, Brasilia, Brazil (BRIC 2010).
4. For more on this, see Gu et al (2016) in this volume.
5. See paragraph 2 of the Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries' Leaders, Yekaterinburg, Russia (BRIC 2009).
6. See paragraphs 6–8 of the Joint Statement of the 2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government, Brasilia, Brazil (BRIC 2010).
7. See paragraph 15 of the Joint Statement of the 2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government, Brasilia, Brazil (BRIC 2010).
8. See paragraph 39 of the BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation (BRICS 2013).

9. See paragraph 65 of the BRICS VII Summit Declaration, Ufa, Russia (BRICS 2015a).
10. See paragraph 66 of the BRICS VII Summit Declaration, Ufa, Russia (BRICS 2015a).
11. See paragraph 25 of the Sanya Declaration, Hainan, China (BRICS 2011).
12. The New Silk Road—also known as One Belt, One Road—is a Chinese economic development initiative which focuses on building infrastructure and broadening trade principally among countries situated on the historic ‘Silk Road’ through Central and West Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

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