Y.H. Teddy Sim *Editor*

Piracy and surreptitious activities in the Malay Archipelago and adjacent seas, 1600-1840

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Foreword

I have been invited to write a foreword for Teddy Sim's edited volume, *Piracy and surreptitious activities in the Malay Archipelago and adjacent seas, 1600–1840*, and I am happy to do that here. This volume is a small collection of essays triangulating around an important theme – the rise and pursuit of piratical and other non-state activities in Southeast Asia in the Early Modern age. Though there have been some important treatments of this subject in the past, it is always a good thing to have more work appear on this complicated topic, which has interested scholars for a long time now. Following the oeuvre of Nicholas Tarling, James Francis Warren, Heather Sutherland and others, this book explores these phenomena on a region-wide scale, and across two and a half centuries. The essays take in the Straits of Melaka, the lower reaches of the South China Sea, the Sulu basin, and parts of the western approaches of the Java Sea, all in one embrace. The sea connects, and that is readily apparent in this volume. Working through sources that cover Dutch, English, and Portuguese colonial archives, as well as through Malay and Chinese-language materials, the book will help scholars see the arc of clandestine activities that were pursued in this arena in a new-found *chiaroscuro*, or in high relief. By examining these activities as a whole and under one cover, one hopes that some of the overarching patterns of movement and economic decision-making become clear. Piracy and smuggling happened in all of these physical spaces and across this entire temporal band-width, and this volume shows us how that happened in both cases, geographically and over the course of time.

The definition of "clandestine activity" deserves a quick note here. While it is clear that a number of regional and trans-regional peoples smuggled against the wishes of emerging colonial states in Southeast Asia, and pursued maritime programs of piracy as well, it is less clear why this happened in individual situations. There is a temptation to read resistance into all of these projects: resistance against state-making and the foreign, as well as against the encroachment of the global economy, which had always been present in this part of the world, but which became more and more apparent as we move toward the temporal end-point of

this study. One of the virtues of this compendium is that it shows us how local these reasons for "deviance" could be – piracy and smuggling often took place under very specific circumstances. Local concerns often trumped larger, more super-structural circumstances, in other words. When we see the Portuguese, Malay, or local Chinese angle on politics or economics in these papers, they often show us this in clear detail. While it is the job of the historian to place events in context, therefore, it is also the task of interpreters of events to make sure that local mind-sets and reasoning factor into explanations as well. This is one of the real virtues of this volume. Taken as a collective, the essays presented here give us a strong sense of everyday logics in the bucking of authority in maritime Southeast Asia, whether this took place through piracy, contrabanding, or some combination of the two in the Early Modern age.

I hope this interesting collection of essays will be read by those who find the political and economic history of these seas to be complex and provocative from a historiographical point of view. The editor has done an admirable job in gathering these article-length studies and introducing them for a wider reading public. One hopes that interpreters of the past of this part of the world will read these contributions, and then make use of them in writing their own histories of the region. They tell us a story of deception, avoidance, and confrontation on the high seas, one that is still to some degree with us, even today.

Cornell University, Ithaca, USA Eric Tagliacozzo
December 2013

Preface

This edited book project is a result of three impulses. First, it is an extension of the interest (and research) I have of Macau and the sea space stretching southwards from the Portuguese port enclave. Second, it is an attempt to position the research of the South China Sea as part of the research of greater Southeast Asia. To this initiative, I am greatly indebted to the encouragement by A/P P. Borschberg, an accomplished scholar who has always had time for younger compatriots in the profession. Third, it is part of the effort to seriously study the issues (of piracy and surreptitious activities) of which I am required to discuss in a Southeast Asian course I am teaching.

The process of the involvement in the project has increased my appreciation of the region of Southeast Asia. Located between two culturally advanced regions (India and China), it is sometimes still easy to overlook developments in Southeast Asia despite the fact that the region is receiving more attention from scholars and research institutions. In relation to the phenomena of piracy and surreptitious activities investigated in this book, the difference between mainland and island Southeast Asia or between the western and eastern archipelagic island regions Southeast Asia seems to confer a probable reason for distinguishing variant cultural zones, impacting on the activities occurring in the region. Similarities and differences existed in the piratical and raiding activities occurring in the sub-regions in Southeast Asia. Beyond the comparison, these activities from the different sub-regions were also intimately linked to one another.

This edited book project would not have been accomplished without the commitment and perseverance of all the chapter contributors. Dr. R. Fernando provided feedback and advice on the entire manuscript; to this, I am deeply grateful. A/P T. C. Wong introduced me to Springer and provided advice on aspects of the book editing process. A/P J. L. Huang has always been a concerned mentor about the outcome of any project I undertake and provided advice along the way. Here, I like to take the chance to thank A/P Borschberg again for suggesting me to probe into the area of Southeast Asian history. A/P C. G. Ang and A/P M. Baildon, the ex and current head

of academic group (AG), respectively, have been supportive of the research work I do at the Humanities and Social Studies Education AG in the National Institute of Education (Nanyang Technological University). The fruition of this project has been fortunate to receive the endorsement and support of Springer. The anonymous reviewers provided comments which helped improve the chapters. Miss Jayanthie Krishnan, Mr. Vishal Daryanomel, Mr S. Abilasha and staff at Springer have been most supportive and patient in the editorial and typesetting process. An external copy editor and cartographer, Miss Sunandini Lal and Mr. J. Chandrasekar, have also provided help in the crafting of a map and the editing of chapters in the book. Finally, my wife has been a main pillar of support throughout the assembling and editorial process of the book.

Singapore, Singapore Y.H. Teddy Sim
February 2014

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Contributors

Timothy Barnard is an Associate Professor at the Department of History in the National University of Singapore, where he specializes in the cultural and environmental history of the Malay world. He has four monographs to his name and has published many chapters in books and articles in journals on an eclectic range of subjects on the Malay Archipelago from the history of warfare to that of film. Dr. Barnard is the author of *Multiple centers of authority*, a study of Malay political culture in eastern Sumatra during the early modern period, and is currently conducting research on Malay film and Komodo dragons.

Peter Borschberg is an Associate Professor at the Department of History in the National University of Singapore, where he has investigated widely on questions of the origins of international law, security and trade in the Straits region, as well as on the cartographical history of Singapore in the early modern period. Dr. Borschberg is the author of *Grotius, the Portuguese, and Free Trade in the East Indies* and *The Singapore and Melaka Straits: Violence, Security and Trade in the Seventeenth Century* and has recently released his edited book*, Security, Trade and Society in Seventeenth-Century Southeast Asia. The Memoirs and Memorials of Jacques de Coutre*. He is currently finalizing an edition of Admiral Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge's memoranda and letters touching on early Dutch expansion in Southeast Asia in the first two decades of the seventeenth century. Dr. Borschberg has been the recipient of several awards, fellowships and visiting professorships in Asia and Europe.

Chung Ming Chin his doctoral research, done during his candidacy at the National University of Singapore, is focused on the contemporary political economy of a certain locality in Laguna, Philippines. He worked as a researcher in the Department of Southeast Asian Studies of the University between 2001 and 2005, where he has presented a number of papers on various aspects of the subject. Other than political economy and food security, he is also interested in the history of the various regions of the Philippines islands. Dr. Chin is currently teaching History in a school.

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Y.H. Teddy Sim is currently lecturing at the Institute of Education in Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He has published on specific involvements of the Portuguese in the East/Far East in the eighteenth century and nineteenth centuries. He is the author of *Portuguese Enterprise in the East: Survival in the Years 1707–57*. On the trade activities and network in the East, Dr. Sim is also interested in the other groups operating in the region, most notably the diaspora Chinese, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Chapter 1
Studying Piracy and Surreptitious Activities in Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Period

Y.H. Teddy Sim

Abstract The introductory chapter fulfils a few coordinative functions for the edited volume. The objectives of the book are set at exploring the phenomenon of piracy and forms of surreptitious activities (for instance, smuggling) as well as the possible linkages between these terms/activities and war and economy and at exploring the phenomena of piracy and forms of surreptitious activities in different subregions of the Malay Archipelago and adjacent seas during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well as the period transitioning into the nineteenth century. The rationale for the geographical and time scope selected for the book is provided. What is currently known about the ebbs and flows of piracy and smuggling, focusing largely on the western archipelagic region, is also discussed chronologically and surveyed.

Contemporary Southeast Asia is still a hotbed of smuggling and piracy. Incidents of piracy in the Indonesian islands rose by more than 200 % in 2012 compared to the tally in 2011 (despite a drop in numbers in the first quarter of 2012).[1] While piracy in the Straits of Melaka may have seen a dip as a result of cooperation and pre-emptive monitoring between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, the menace remains real beyond the first decade of the twenty-first century.[2] Among the surreptitious activities encountered in history and in the contemporary period, this edited volume has chosen to highlight smuggling and contraband. The informal economy, which occupies a sizeable fraction of the world economy from São Paulo to the districts in Guangzhou, is part of the black and underground economy whose goods supply is usually provided through smuggling. In Southeast Asia, as probably elsewhere in the world, the persistence of vice is closely tied to the prevalence

[1]News featured on 15 April 2011 in *Today*, as well as on 24 April 2012 in *Today*.

[2]"Piracy in Melaka Straits reduced dramatically due to close cooperation" in the Maritime news update, 17 October 2013, from http://maritime.bernama.com/news.php?id=282527&lang=en&cat=ex, accessed 30 September 2013.

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of corruption. A BBC programme on corruption, which this writer chanced upon, urges a redefinition of the term "corruption" because it is increasingly inadequate to describe the global phenomenon across many different countries.

Although this book describes the contemporary situation of piracy and smuggling to draw the attention of readers, it does not make any suggestion that there is a causal link between past and present phenomena. Piracy and surreptitious activities, such as smuggling and contraband, are also different creatures, although they might be linked to each other and share certain features. A. Karras has tried to distinguish between pirates and smugglers, with the former being depicted as having "grander" and "more hostile" agendas and the latter being portrayed as "discreet".[3] Smugglers wish to avoid the limelight because their primary objective is to transport clandestine goods past boundaries and points of surveillance, although they do not refrain from using force if cornered. A. Roberts has tried to differentiate between pirates and members of secret societies and related rebels.[4] The former might share certain operating characteristics (in, for instance, network forming) with the latter but are not as "lofty" in terms of their goals (rectifying a social injustice or plotting a revolution). There is a need to understand the phenomena of piracy and smuggling in a historical context because "[these] cases may not be encapsulated by analysis of contemporary developments".[5] For a start, the contemporary definition of "piracy", according to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, is problematic because it defines piracy as consisting of the following acts:

> 1. any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft, and directed on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; 2. any acts of voluntary participation of a ship or aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate craft; 3. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in (1) and (2).[6]

In an age when the sea space was not fully carved up or politicized, such a definition would have posed a problem in analysing similar phenomena in history. Moreover, as will be revealed in the chapters in this book as well as experiences elsewhere, pirates were also amenable to committing banditry inland. "Raiding", used in the context of formal and informal clashes between political entities in the Malay Archipelago, refers usually to sudden attacks on a land-based target (for instance, a settlement) resulting in the appropriating of its labour resources. On the ground, as will be discussed in the chapters in this volume, transgressions could also be

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[3] See A. Karras, *Smuggling: Contraband and corruption in world history* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009).

[4] R. Antony, "Brotherhoods, secret societies and the law in Qing-dynasty China", in D. Ownby and M. Somers eds., *Secret societies reconsidered: Perspectives on social history of modern South China and Southeast Asia* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 190–211.

[5] A. Young, *Contemporary maritime piracy in Southeast Asia: History, causes and remedies* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007).

[6] The Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, "Ocean and law of the sea", 10 December 1982, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm, accessed 28 February 2014.

committed against sea-based targets. That said, this introduction is not about to deny all linkages and continuities that existed between the past and present. In P. Chouvy's *Atlas of Trafficking in Southeast Asia* (2013), which focuses on the mainland states, some recognition is made of the historical context of modern trafficking. Perpetrators travelled along historical routes even though the contraband items and the regimes of enforcement were no longer the same entities.[7]

This introductory chapter hopes to fulfil a few coordinative functions for this edited volume. The objectives of the book are twofold: to explore the phenomenon of piracy and forms of surreptitious activities (for instance, smuggling) as well as the possible linkages between these terms/activities and war and economy and to explore the phenomena of piracy and forms of surreptitious activities in different subregions of the Malay Archipelago and adjacent seas during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well as the period transitioning into the nineteenth century. This introductory chapter will attempt to provide a rationale for the geographical and time scope selected for the book. Next, the contexts and linkages of piracy and smuggling, theoretical or otherwise, to studies in war, political economy or even social sciences will be discussed and surveyed in terms of the key works that can be found on the subject. What is currently known about the ebbs and flows of piracy and smuggling will also be discussed chronologically and surveyed. Before closing, the gist of the essays in this edited volume in relation to the gaps in literature survey and subdivisions in geography (in the Malay Archipelago) and periodization delineated for the phenomenon in the book will be introduced.

The geographical and time scope selected for this book presents, hand in hand with the literature survey, a gap and need for the essays collected in this volume. The choice to begin the chronological coverage of the book from a midway point in the early modern era (1450–1750), the periodization of which is beset by its own bias, is intended to (1) avoid the earlier exploration period associated with the Europeans' venturing abroad and (2) examine the early modern period as it came to the end of its boom and into a much-touted crisis in the mid-seventeenth century. The subsequent depression (to 1680) and recovery, if one may allude to long-wave cycles to help make sense of these trends, spanned 200 years in which the subphases transpired in two roughly equal parts.[8] At the other end of the timescale, the coverage of the rest of the long (eighteenth) century as well as the transition into the nineteenth (1780–1840) hopes to look into a periodization that is usually overlooked in colonial history. The tapering off of the periodization of this book roughly in 1840 is premised on the occurrence of the Opium War in Asia, which heralded the beginning of a new era of trade and economic activities in the region

[7]Sharing by Assistant Professor Sallie Yea who has done work on human trafficking on Island Southeast Asia. Key research agencies sponsored by the United Nations or France (CNWS) are mostly located on mainland Southeast Asia. See B. Lintner, "Trade in counterfeit goods and contraband in mainland Southeast Asia", in P-Arnaud Chouvy ed., *An atlas of trafficking in Southeast Asia* (London: Tauris, 2013), pp. 156–57.

[8]See J. Goldstein, *Long cycles: Prosperity and war in the modern age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

with impacts on Southeast Asia. Referring to the Table 1.1 in the Appendix, three subphases of periodization are delineated for the case studies collected in this book, of which a brief analysis and comment may be dispensed in the final part of this introduction.

This book intends to explore the archipelagic and littoral maritime sector of Southeast Asia. Although the title of the book has "Malay Archipelago" as a focal point, the adjacent seas—the South China Sea and the Burma Sea—embrace the coasts of Annam, Cochin China, the eastern Malay Peninsula, Borneo, Burma and the western Malay Peninsula. This writer does not wish to overemphasize the mainland-insular distinction in the writing of the histories of Southeast Asia. D.G. Hall's *A History of Southeast Asia* (1968) makes the usual distinction between mainland and insular Southeast Asia in chronologizing the evolution of states in both parts of the region. J. Pluvier's *Historical Atlas of Southeast Asia* (1995) divides the region into "two clearly distinct parts" as well—an extended portion of the Asian continent (which is sometimes referred to as "Further India" or "continuing chains of mountains run[ning from China] south/south-eastwards") and a "huge archipelago".[9] If we look at A. Wallace's *The Malay Archipelago*, the physical differences between the land mass jutting from the mainland of Asia (mainland Southeast Asia) and Australia are the surrounding water mass and the prominent belt of volcanoes. Within the archipelago, Wallace makes the distinction that the islands eastwards from Celebes and Lombok exhibit a "close resemblance to Australia, as the western islands to Asia"[10]—corresponding with what J. Diamond observes for Papua New Guinea (as part of the Lesser Sunda Islands).[11] If one considers the political and economic dynamics that governed mainland and insular states, no clear-cut distinction can be found, as certain island entities such as Java have more similarities with the mainland than with neighbouring island entities. This edited book treats the Philippine islands as part of the Malay Archipelago, taking into account the debate and reservations about this inclusion. This writer feels that the issue poses more of a "problem" for the period before the sixteenth century than after (the coming of the Europeans).[12] While the degree of Indianization that reached the Philippine islands might have been debated, cross-cultural linkups

[9] J. Pluvier, *Historical atlas of Southeast Asia* (New York: Brill, 1995), map 1 and accompanying notes.

[10] A.R. Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago* (London: Macmillan & Company, 1890), p. 11.

[11] See J. Diamond, *Guns, germs, and steel: Fate of human societies* (New York: Norton, 1997).

[12] In either version of the Austronesian migratory model (going out from Taiwan or Sundaland), the first wave of the Austronesian people arrived in the Philippines before spreading to the rest of Island Southeast Asia. It was in the period culminating up to the classical period of Southeast Asia that Indianized culture and influence did not have a chance to "travel back" to these first migratory areas (specifically, the Philippines). Some scholars have tried to highlight similarities and parallelism between Philippines and the rest of Island Southeast Asia though not without controversy. Islam was able to spread to the Philippines in the late sixteenth century (after arriving in Southeast Asia roughly in the twelve century) but did not have a chance to influence the central and northern parts of the island group before the incursion of the Spanish.

and trade connections between the islands and the rest of Southeast Asia after the sixteenth century (the coming of the Europeans) became more obvious. The possibilities of how maritime Southeast Asia may be split up certainly engender comparisons (particularly on piracy and smuggling) between different subregions. Although the chapters in this book are not explicitly split up according to any subregional divisions, the collection of essays touching on a variety of these regions allows some analysis and comparison to be made later in this introduction.

The study of piracy and surreptitious activities has evolved over time. The field can be classified in terms of the approaches and agencies applied and/or in terms of the piratical groups that existed in different time periods over a fairly extensive geographical region in Southeast Asia. General studies in the field are either lacking in treatment or biased in some ways.[13] While it may not be far-fetched to claim that many works discussing human phenomena of one kind or another are about political and economic tussles between states and non-state groups or a mixture of them, these studies may not focus on issues of piracy or smuggling.[14]

The scale and intensity of piratical activities have fluctuated over the course of history in Southeast Asia, especially during the late phase of the early modern period transitioning into the nineteenth century, the periodization focused on in this book. The general crisis of the seventeenth century has been asserted by A. Reid as having been "less peaceful" in Southeast Asia.[15] The degree of intrigue and conflict is demonstrated, other than during the period of the Dutch-Iberian truce (1609–21), by P. Borschberg's "violence, security and diplomacy [in the Singapore

[13]General studies, old and new, on Southeast Asia, for example, D.G. Hall's *History of Southeast Asia* and M.C. Ricklefs' *New History of Southeast Asia*, afforded little comments on the state of smuggling and surreptitious activities although the former does touch on the fact of piracy as a way of life in the indigenous Malay population. Works on piracy, especially those for the layman, often feature a lopsided presentation of pirates around the world. Take, for instance, in A. Konstam's *History of Pirates*, only 2 out of the 11 chapters in the book discuss piracy in the East. The lopsided treatment favouring the West is obvious. The approach taken in this book is also one of "great men" approach where only the most famous sea robbers were singled out for treatment. The popular and well-illustrated Osprey series features pirates of the East (especially, the Far East) hand in hand with well-known Western bands. In terms of academic work done on the subject in the East, an early title can be seen in H. Miller's *Pirates of the Far East*.

[14]D. Tracy's *Political Economy of Merchant Empires*, for instance, reveals only 1 of its 11 chapters looks specifically at piratical activities and how Europeans used this instrument as it suited them in the contention for empire. In E. van Veen and L. Blusse's edited book, *Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, although no chapter is, surprisingly, devoted specifically to piratical activities, analysing Portuguese commerce vis-à-vis the Asians during the period of Portugal's primacy and vis-à-vis the Dutch during the period of relative decline naturally engenders the discussion of whose commercial activities were legitimate and whose illegal. As a nadir to the Portuguese struggle in the Indian Ocean and further east, Portuguese and indigenous smuggling during the Dutch siege of Goa, if involving the use of force, could be classified (according to Karras) as an extreme case of smugglers who were willing to expose themselves and become hostile.

[15]A. Reid, "The crisis of the 17th century in Southeast Asia", in G. Parker ed., *The general crisis of the 17th century* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 229.

and Melaka Straits] in the 17th century".[16] The supposed period of crisis (1600–80) saw intensified struggles between the European and indigenous polities in Southeast Asia, most notably between the Portuguese, Dutch, Johorese and Acehnese. These struggles opened up opportunities for piracy and smuggling when one or more in alliance against the other laid siege to a settlement or attempted to control or interfere in the trading routes passing a nodal point. The struggles were set off in the sixteenth century when the Portuguese captured Melaka and toppled the latter's empire after a more than 200-year existence. Sieges were, for instance, laid on Johor and especially on Portuguese Melaka; the latter case culminated in the fall of the city in 1640. The Orang Laut, whom the empires of Melaka (1400–1511) and Srivijaya (650–1377) had relied on for their naval prowess, continued to serve political entities succeeding them (most notably, Johor in the aftermath of the city's conquest by the Portuguese). The Orang Laut could be relied on to provide manpower in battle (even though clashes of this sort usually did not result in heavy casualties), periodically extend the dominions, as well as conduct raids (in an effort to appropriate labour).[17] O. Wolters' early studies established the importance of these "pirates" in the creation of the premodern state in Southeast Asia.[18]

Overlapping with the crisis of the seventeenth century, other scholars such as P. Calanca, in surveying piracy in the South China Sea, have argued for 1600–80 as a period of heightened piracy, known also as the age of merchant-pirate upsurge (referring to Chinese pirates off the coast of China under Coxinga whose trading and banditry activities were felt across the South China Sea and maritime Southeast Asia).[19] Although this book focuses on archipelagic Southeast Asia, the links between East and Southeast Asia, in terms of the flow of goods and monies between the two regions, are not overlooked. For the period 1400–1680, it is not surprising to

[16]P. Borschberg, *Singapore and Melaka Straits: Violence, security and diplomacy in the 17th century* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2010). See also A. Tonio, "The Company's Chinese pirates: How the Dutch East India Company tried to lead a coalition of pirates to war against China, 1621–62", *Journal of World History,* vol. 15, no. 4 (2004), pp. 415–44.

[17]K. Hall, *Maritime trade and state development in early Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), p. 94. H.G. Quaritch Wales, *Ancient Southeast Asian warfare* (London: B. Quaritch, 1952), p. 218. The military power harnessed by Sri Vijaya relied on an array of contribution from land and sea vassals and allies. See also L. Andaya's *Kingdom of Johor, 1641–1728* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), and *Leaves of the same tree: Trade and ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), pp. 175–201, as well as T. Barnard's "Celates, Rayat-Laut, pirates: The Orang Laut and their decline in history" (*Journal of Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. 80, part 2, 2007, pp. 33–49) for specific treatments of the Orang Lauts.

[18]See O. Wolters, *A study of the origins of Srivijaya* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967) and *Fall of Srivijaya in Malay history* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1970). Over the course of the end of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, L. Andaya's *Kingdom of Johor* and C. Trocki's *Prince of pirates* trace the rise of another nomadic and diaspora group in the Bugis.

[19]P. Calanca, "Piracy and coastal security in Southeastern China, 1600–1780", in R. Anthony ed., *Elusive pirates, pervasive smugglers: violence and clandestine trade in the Greater China Seas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), pp. 85–98.

find pirates operating from the southeastern coast of China maintaining some form of physical presence in Southeast Asia. In 1547, a particular Chinese merchant-pirate who operated a base in Pahang even led a fleet of junks from there (and possibly a host of indigenous pirates) to attack the coast of Zhejiang.[20]

In the long haul of the eighteenth century (to 1780), scholars such as J. Kathirithamby-Wells have maintained that internal political struggles in the Johor Empire, coinciding with the formation of new Malay states (supported by T. Barnard's rise of "multiple centres of authority" in Siak and eastern Sumatra), kept up a constant state of piracy and raiding in the Straits of Melaka. Specifically, the period from the rise of Raja Kecil's claim and campaign against the Johor Sultanate to the later schism between his two sons (Rajas Alam and Mahmud) spiked raiding and marauding activities in the Straits of Melaka.[21] The Chinese in Southeast Asia, the associated topic of their migratory movements, and the productive or disruptive effects they had on the Malay Peninsula (Singapore included) have been written about from as early as the 1960s.[22] The disruptive effects were usually associated with triad rivalries and conflicts in the region. In addition to D. Murray's work dealing with Chinese-local piracy along the Vietnamese coast, a work that relates the experience of Chinese migrants as a piratical problem in the Straits of Melaka is R. Fernando's *Panorama of Social Life in Melaka from the 1780s to the 1820s*.[23] One should also not forget that the Iranun piratical menace, which F. Warren has credited with the rise of the Sulu Sultanate, also threatened a number of places in the eastern and western Malay Archipelago from the end of eighteenth century.[24] The eastern Malay Archipelago harboured its own share of piratical and raiding activities. Beyond the Bajau- or Bugis-related groups, L. Andaya and

[20] J. Chin, "Merchants, smugglers and pirates: Multinational clandestine trade on the South China coast, 1520–50", in R. Antony ed., *Elusive pirates, pervasive smugglers* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), p. 50.

[21] J. Kithirithamby-Wells, "The long 18th century and the new age of commerce in the Melaka Straits", in L. Blusse and F. Gaastra eds., *On the 18th century as a category of Asian history* (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1998), p. 66.

[22] A very early work can be found in J. Vaughan, *Manners and customs of the Chinese in the Straits Settlements* (Singapore: Mission Press, 1879). In the 1950s and 1960s, we can find, for instance, W.L. Blythe's *Impact of Chinese secret societies in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969), L.F. Comber's *Chinese secret societies in Malaya* (New York: J.J. Augustine, 1959) and V. Purcell's *The Chinese in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967). In the 1980s and 1990s, we have L.F. Mak, *Sociology of secret societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); D. Ownby and M. Heidhues edited, *Secret societies reconsidered* (London: ME Sharpe, 1993); C.H. Yen, *A social history of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986); and C. Trocki, *Opium and empire: Chinese society in Colonial Singapore* (London: Cornell University Press, 1990).

[23] See D. Murray, *Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790–1810* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987) and R. Fernando, *Murder most foul: Panorama of social life in Melaka from the 1780s to the 1820s* (Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 2006).

[24] R. Laarhoven's work (*Triumph of Moro diplomacy: The Maguindanao sultanate in the 17th century*, Quezon: New Day Publishers, 1989) traces the rise and struggles of the Maguindanao Sultanate in the seventeenth century.

H. Hagerdal's work on Maluku and Timor, for instance, shed light on a variety of ethnic groups and their cultural practices in relation to the forceful acquisition of resources, labour or trophies.[25]

While Europeans continued to tussle with one another over sea space in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the beginning to the middle of the nineteenth century saw the gradual politicization of the sea space by Europeans, which slowly circumscribed the pirates' areas of operation.[26] N. Tarling's perennial work titled *Piracy and politics in the Malay world* continues to be an authoritative source on the subject matter of the period. There are scholars, such as Fernando, who think that the final break-up of the Johor Sultanate, the increased Chinese migration into the region, and the ascendency of the town settlement of Singapore gave rise to a new wave of piracy in the transitional period, 1780–1820.[27] The extent to which indigenous piracy heightened because of the unleashing of disruptive forces in groups not reined in by any authority, or because these groups were more ably led under the succeeding leadership, should be reconciled with the apparent observation in scholarship that the Temenggong (Ibrahim, r. 1855–62) was assisting in quelling piracy.[28] The rise of Singapore (with its free port status) in the Malay Archipelago opened up new opportunities for a myriad of traders in the region. New networks were gradually formed around this rising settlement overlapping with existing ports and routes in the region. Timeless and recent works on the subject include L.K. Wong's *Trade of Singapore* and E. Tagliacozzo's *Secret trades, porous borders*. Tagliacozzo's work is not focused on Singapore per se, but it is not difficult to realize that the town settlement became intimately anchored as an exchange centre in the Malay Archipelago in the second half of the nineteenth century. It is not surprising that Singapore, with its lucrative location, linked by trade routes from various parts of the Malay Archipelago, attracted its share of robbers and bandits, whether in times of peace or war. Piracy, to be sure, was not extinguished for the rest of the nineteenth century; but pirates and raiders never regained the scale or intensity of activities that characterized the earlier epochs, nor would they ever serve as a political instrument of power. The progressive Weberian framework, premised upon a conventional governing authority, has never been a satisfactory lens through

[25]L. Andaya, *The world of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the early modern period* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993). H. Hagerdal, *Lords of land, lords of sea: Conflict and adaptation in early colonial Timor* (Leiden: KITLV, 2012).

[26]E. Mancke, "Early modern expansion and politicization of oceanic space", *Geographical Review*, vol. 89, no. 2 (1999), pp. 225–36.

[27]M.R. Fernando, "Chinese traders in the Malay Archipelago in the 17th and 18th centuries", in C.K. Ng and G.W. Wang eds., *Maritime China in transition* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004), pp. 227–44. See also J. Kithirithamby-Wells, "The age of transition: The mid-18th century to early 19th century" in N. Tarling ed., *Cambridge history of Southeast Asia*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 572–614. See also C. Trocki, *Prince of pirates* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979), R. Winstedt, *History of Johor* (Kuala Lumpur: Art Printing Works, 1979), and L.K. Wong, *Trade of Singapore, 1819–1869* (Puchong Jaya: JMBRAS, 2003).

[28]See specifically Trocki, *Prince of pirates*, p. 69.

which a nonmainstream or peripheral society is viewed. There are scholars who have advocated for readers to see piracy as a norm, culture and way of life in communities in insular Southeast Asia. Writing on the nineteenth century, Tarling has highlighted the British as having been keenly aware of the phenomenon and having issued prescriptions for patrolling vessels to suppress piratical activities, which were occurring on a larger scale and were disrupting British trade, while taking care not to interfere in the domestic quarrels of local rulers or communities who might deploy these devices.[29]

Works of a more theoretical nature and relating to piracy and surreptitious activities have also seen progress over the last 20 years. Opportunities exist for the study of the phenomena to borrow ideas from social sciences. J. Thomson, author of *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns*, attempted a framework to categorize armed groups according to whether they were owned/"allocated" and whether authorizing decisions pertaining to them were undertaken by state or non-state entities. "Pirates" in this scheme of classification come under non-state decision-making structure and ownership. Privateers, whether or not they were operating as state-commissioned "pirates" on the seas, come under non-state ownership and state decision-making structure. In a publication in 2011, A. Colás and B. Mabee attempted to locate non-state or private violence in the field of study of international relations. Thomson's work is considered as being too "Weberian" in delineating "ownerships of violence in private and public spheres where these could not be separated". Further in this direction, their own work (Colás and Mabee, in the edited volume) and that of Tagliacozzo have been touted as, at most, making the "contingent ... [and] often arbitrary distinction between legal and illegal uses of collective violence, according to the interest of the most powerful party at any given time".[30] Piracy and surreptitious networks may also be explained by models of patron-client relations or *guanxi* (kinship relations) used in contemporary Southeast Asian and China studies of corruption. Eastern studies, undertaken along the approach of M. Rediker's *Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–50*, have revealed *guanxi* to be an important factor in the formation of the pirates' power base.[31] On the topic of smuggling, "gifts of goodwill" (an extension of

[29] Although relying on Western sources, Tarling's survey reflected the sophisticated governance of the British, distinguishing the "pirates" encountered into those who were making a daily living and those who possessed political pretensions. Andaya's book on the kingdom of Johore and the rise of the Bugis is still timeless. C. Peiras' *The Bugis* (Cambridge Mass: Blackwell, 1996) is focused on the Bugis from a contemporary perspective of social-political paradigm and deferred to Andaya on developments in history. Further east, James Warren's *Sulu Zone* continues to make an influential academic imprint for two decades now. In *Raiding, Trading, and Feasting: Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms*, L. Junker's work on the raiding and trading aspects of the Philippines chiefdom extends Warren's work in the area of looking at certain case studies across different time periods.

[30] A. Colás and B. Mabee, *Mercenaries, pirates, bandits, and empires* (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), p. 4.

[31] M. Rediker, *Merchant seamen, pirates and the Anglo-American maritime world, 1700–50* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

patron-client relations) may explain the existence of the phenomenon in a historical context. The frontier concept, applied to the Europeans' arrival in the East, not least in Southeast Asia, can also be extended to study the phenomenon of piracy in the region and the period covered by this book, because the open nature of sea space and cities in Southeast Asia approximate to a no man's land and the Wild West of the US frontier.[32] Finally, although much has been accomplished in the field of piracy, the same cannot be said of the array of surreptitious activities ranging from smuggling to corruption in the indigenous or collaborative colonial-indigenous political-administrative structures. A. Karras' *Smuggling: Contraband and Corruption in World History* (2009), for instance, discusses the phenomenon of smuggling from a very broad time perspective (from the early modern period to the twenty-first century) and perhaps, owing in part to the sources used, features only limited case studies from the non-Western world.[33] Tagliacozzo's article-length exhortation on the innovative use of evidence in writing Southeast Asian history, backed up by his own work on smuggling along the British-Dutch frontier in the period 1865–1915 utilizing a variety of sources—from currency counterfeit experts and lowly woodcutters to early anthropologists and missionaries, as well as surviving cultural artefacts—provides inspiration for what can be done to reveal more about those who were involved in surreptitious activities.[34]

This edited volume contains nine essays, including this introductory chapter, that explore subregions in the Malay Archipelago (including the Philippines) over three fairly identifiable time periods. Borschberg's essay looks at the development of war and piracy involving the Dutch along the Straits of Melaka in the seventeenth century. Three essays by Barnard, A. Lopez and M. Lobato look at the developments in political economy, war and raiding (and piracy) in Siak, Maguindanao and the Timor-Maluku Islands during the eighteenth century. C.M. Chin's essay relooks at the political economy of raiding in Sulu during the long haul of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to 1840. J.C. Liu's essay examines the surreptitious and piratical activities involving the Chinese along the Straits of Melaka during the transitional period from 1780 to 1840. The two essays probe into the political economy of raiding in Sulu as well as triad and piratical activities involving the Chinese along the Straits of Melaka, respectively. Y.H. Sim's essays (Chaps. 8 and 9) look at specific episodes during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to survey Iberian

[32]C.A. Lockard, "The sea common to all: Maritime frontiers, port cities, and Chinese traders in the Southeast Asian age of commerce, 1400–1750", *Journal of World History*, vol. 21, no. 2 (2010), pp. 219–46.

[33]See Karras, *Smuggling: Contraband and corruption in world history*.

[34]Editorial reviews of "Secret trades, porous borders" from http://www.amazon.com/Secret-Trades-Porous-Borders-Publications/dp/0300143303/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1355051600&sr=1-1&keywords=tagliacozzo+porous+border, accessed 30 October 2012. See the book itself, E. Tagliacozzo, *Secret trades, porous borders: smuggling and states along a Southeast Asian frontier, 1865–1915* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). See also E. Tagliacozzo, "Amphora, whisper, text: Ways of writing Southeast Asian history", *Crossroads*, vol. 16 (2001), pp. 128–58.

predatory and surreptitious activities in the sea regions between the coasts of Cochin China and Borneo as well as along the coast of Burma just north of the Straits of Melaka.

Although much has been accomplished in the field of piracy, gaps remain in the literature survey performed in the preceding paragraphs. Aspects of the Iberian and Dutch presence in Southeast Asia—especially in relation to piracy and surreptitious activities before the Dutch were able to gain the upper hand in the eighteenth century—as well as how the Iberians (particularly the Portuguese) survived during the period of Dutch hegemony and the coming of the British certainly have room for further research. Chapters 3, 8 and 9, through exploring the Dutch use of privateering, the adaptability of the Portuguese in the midst of their decline, and the Spanish withdrawal and countermeasures in the Philippines, hope to consolidate and expand the understanding of the subject matter. From the point of view of geographical coverage, Chap. 9 also aspires to add to the research of a region (littoral Burma) that is not commonly studied by historians. The multipolar "kacu" and increasingly complex environment in the western Malay Archipelago, as well as how war, piracy and raiding were usually enmeshed in the same campaign, is an idea that has not been impressed upon enough in the study of piracy in the region, and Chap. 2 aims to fulfil this agenda. It is clear from the survey that piratical activities, often overlapping with raiding campaigns, in the eastern Malay Archipelago (including the southern Philippines)—sometimes dubbed as being akin to a different cultural region—have received, apart from J. Warren's works, relatively little attention from scholars. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 hope to contribute to advancements in the field through looking at semantics and war in Timor and Maluku and the dynamics of raiding and state formation in Mindanao, as well as urging for a relook at issues relating to the Iranun and the Sulu Zone. Finally, the unlikely topic of the Chinese diaspora, often linked with economic endeavours in Southeast Asia, is included in a more Machiavellian line of inquiry in Chap. 4 that links the heterogeneous group to piracy and other forms of surreptitious activities.

The essays in this edited volume distinguish to some extent the terms "piracy" and "raiding". Barnard uses mostly "raiding" in his analysis of the 1761 invasion of Siak; the term applies also to the harassing of ships on the sea. Although the Dutch were involved in this war, their actions appear to have taken a back seat to those of the major indigenous antagonists in conflict (i.e. Raja Alam and Raja Ismail). For Lobato and Lopez, the practice of raiding (a term at times used together with "piracy") is explained as an instrument of war, state relations and power. Lobato's paper refers to raiding activities predominantly as the capturing of human resources but can also refer to material resources (such as sago). Lopez's essay includes smuggling as part of the repertoire of the "instruments of state" utilized by the indigenous power. Chin's essay, which distinguishes between piracy and raiding (the former is harassment on sea vessels and the latter on coastal communities and specifically for labour resources), pushes the limits to highlight how the tool of piracy and raiding propelled a peripheral island region of Southeast Asia to become a regional menace. Probing the linkages between the phenomena of piracy and forms of surreptitious activities (for instance, smuggling) and war

and economy, all three essays position raiding (and piracy) undertaken by the indigenous powers as an integral part of life and politics (heightened at times by intense feuds) in the island entities of Southeast Asia. In the case studies of Siak and the Maluku, Barnard and Lobato emphasize the cultural factor in the interpretation and analysis of people and events; which either perceives piracy and raiding as closely related (even indistinguishable) to each other, or from an indigenous angle, perceives these activities as being secondary to kinship ties. In terms of the diaspora groups in the region, Liu's paper shows the Chinese as having been divided into endogenous and exogenous groups. The former operated a quasi-political economic and triad-related organization. The exogenous and endogenous groups conducted long-distance piracy across the South China Sea (aggravated on occasions by instability on the Chinese coasts) as well as petty banditry in the southern Straits of Melaka (the latter committed by recalcitrant members outside the triads but linked in some way to influential figures in the Straits community). The activities of these groups contributed to the instability in the western Malay Archipelagic region. Finally, with regard to the European colonial powers in the Malay Archipelago, the Dutch used a multipronged strategy: from engaging in aggressive diplomatic manoeuvres to deploying formal and informal (privateering) instruments of war as well as extracting resources in areas under direct and indirect control. Lobato thinks that the Dutch conducted raids into coastal indigenous communities, although this was done usually with native allies. Borschberg's essay shows how privateering could be adopted by the Dutch as a key instrument of war against their adversaries, with the denial of supply lines and resources being one of the quickest ways to defeat the enemy, buttressed and justified by arguments espoused in Hugo Grotius' "Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty". Not all the European powers were equally receptive to the use of privateering. The Habsburgs, during the period of the Union (1580–1640), appeared to utilize more formal instruments of war, were more preoccupied with defensive measures and were more attracted to grand ideas and schemes. It should be noted that at a later period in the Philippines, the Spanish were "more ready to grant patents to corsairs against enemy vessels". In the eighteenth century, when a colonial power (Portugal) was in decline, members of the group obfuscated their identities (underwent a social transformation) and appeared, in theory, to be more susceptible to smuggling as a means of survival whenever a chance presented itself.

Was there noticeable variance in the phenomena of piracy and smuggling in the geographical subregions of the Greater Sunda Islands, Lesser Sunda Islands and Philippine islands and along the mainland Southeast Asian coasts linked to the adjacent seas? Although raiding and slave capture were undertaken in the western and eastern archipelago, they seem to be weaved more intimately as part of livelihood of society and the state in the latter region. Linking with the international trade network, slaves captured through raiding were traded at Batavia and transported through the Straits of Melaka and the Sunda Straits to be sold in other ports on the Indian Ocean. The Philippine islands, if they could be personified, were at one time a distant figure in the history of the Malay Archipelago and Southeast Asia. As mentioned early in this introductory chapter, the islands did

not appear to embrace the full effects of Indianization in the classical period of the region. The beginning of the early modern period and the coming of the Europeans bound this group of islands more closely to the rest of the region via the flow of precious metals through the Philippines to China and Southeast Asia as well as via the menacing effects of the rise of Sulu and the Iranun as slave-raiding "enterprises". Even if the effort was not a coherently coordinated one, this was one occasion on which a polity or people from this area rose to threaten the rest of Southeast Asia on an extensive scale. Some observations may also be made from Sim's essays on the adjacent seas or littoral mainland Southeast Asia, in conjunction with specialized works that have been done on the subject, to afford a few points of comparison of the phenomena in insular and mainland Southeast Asia. First, the proximity to China and the history of Chinese renegades operating in littoral mainland Southeast Asia (Annam and Cochin China) gave rise to a greater Chinese piratical menace there compared to petty Chinese activities in the archipelago. However, Chinese piratical activities in the archipelago, as indicated in Fernando's work and reiterated in Liu's essay (Chap. 4), were likely to be connected to the sophisticated Chinese distribution and surreptitious network in the region. Second, in terms of smuggling (of genuine or counterfeit goods), the demand for Chinese goods meant that mainland Southeast Asia was an important source of these goods. This is affirmed in, for instance, L.C. Sun's work highlighting the smuggling of precious stones as well as arms across the China-Burma border. Imitation Chinese ceramics from Vietnam displayed in the Asian Civilizations Museum (in Singapore) also point to mainland Southeast Asia as an important source of contraband.[35] The more contiguous mainland network offered as many opportunities for surreptitious activities as the diverse island region of Southeast Asia. Smuggling, if hampered on one littoral coast, could easily shift to the other via overland routes that linked the mainland states.

The ways in which diaspora Chinese and Europeans operated in various parts of Southeast Asia allow for some comparisons. G. Skinner (1996), in comparing the diaspora Chinese communities in Melaka, Batavia and Manila, acknowledges that the Chinese communities in Batavia and Manila used "secret societies" as a mode of organization and operation (or more broadly, the "kongsi" arrangement described by C. Trocki). Chinese pirates had been threatening the Philippines, and especially Manila, in the earlier period of the Spanish arrival (alarms were raised in the sixteenth century when Chinese pirate fleets amassed off Luzon at a time when wokous were rampant along the Chinese coasts). Although the "sanglay" (Spanish for "Chinese") problem is usually urgent and persistent in the Filipinas documents (from Seville), this writer has more often come across the Chinese being mentioned as smugglers rather than pirates. This edited volume does not have a second essay dealing with the Chinese in order to make further comparisons. Overall, Skinner's typification of the (Baba/mestizo) Chinese communities across the three places

[35]L.C. Sun, "From baoshi to feicui: Qing-Burmese gem trade, 1644–1800" in E. Tagliacozzo and Chang W.C. eds., *Chinese circulations* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), pp. 203–20. See also *Asian Civilizations A-Z guide* (Singapore: National Heritage Board, 2003), pp. 344–49.

seems to imply, from the size of the communities and their interactions with the colonial authorities, that Batavia and Manila were more alike. It is clear from Chin's and Lopez's essays that the Chinese networks were relied on to help the indigenous protagonists acquire goods and arms that facilitated the prowess and survival of the latter. In the Straits of Melaka, the value of the Chinese network, whether to those who were sanctioned or unsanctioned, was never in doubt. Finally, in terms of the European intrusion into Southeast Asia, C.R. Boxer has mentioned that the Dutch engaged in a more ruthless form of colonialism in the East (in terms of imposition of control and extraction of resources, including plundering to achieve the latter) compared to the Portuguese or even the British.[36] The readiness of the Dutch and Iberian powers to use piracy (in the form of privateering) as an instrument of war has been discussed. Transitioning into the nineteenth century, commensurate with the gradual expansion of Britain on the Malay Peninsula and Borneo, the Netherlands in the Indonesian islands and Spain in the Philippines, the Western powers began to give up the use of privateering as they systematically carved up and politicized the oceanic space in line with a legal system being gradually applied to this space. The consolidation of colonial power, together with the formation of a new paradigm of "international expectations", as affirmed by Lobato's paper, also slowly curtailed the raiding and/or piratical activities of the indigenous and diaspora peoples.

Can something be said from the essays in relation to the subperiodization between 1600 and 1840? The absence of concrete and coherent data on piracy and surreptitious activities prevents any conclusive remarks being made about these phenomena in the subphases. Referring to the Appendix, hegemonic competition and cycles occurred in all three subphases where international competitors clashed with regional and local contestants. The period of supposed crisis and breakdown of states appears to have favoured the growth of piracy (and probably smuggling). This was especially so when contenders also sanctioned the use of piracy as an instrument of war. Piracy beyond the era of merchant-pirates continued to thrive when indigenous states competed and warred (at times with Dutch support) against one another and against the Dutch attempt to impose a monopoly on trade and production in the region. Raiding was a favoured instrument of war. The transition into the British hegemonic period might not have seen an intense face-off between the British and Dutch in the region (due to Holland's weakness in Europe), but there were isolated campaigns by the British in the East Indies and the gradual assumption by the British of pirate-quelling activities in the region.

This book's Malay Archipelagic and mainland littoral foci are a justifiable scope of coverage because a wider definition of Southeast Asia easily encompasses most of the seas of Southeast Asia as well as its island and coastal areas. In terms of periodization, this book has chosen to focus on the later part of the early modern epoch, as more tumultuous upheavals were experienced in the seventeenth and the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, sandwiching a supposedly "long and more peaceful" eighteenth century. A survey of the development of

[36]C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch seaborne empire* (New York, Knopf, 1965).

piracy and surreptitious activities shows that the period from the seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, including the more peaceful eighteenth, was riddled with state and non-state conflicts; F. Braudel labels the latter as "a substitute for the declared war".[37] The survey of trends in piracy has also coupled up with the literature survey to reveal gaps in the field. The essays in this edited volume on the Iberian and Dutch use of piracy or privateering; Siak's deployment of raiding; the use of piracy and raiding by Timor, Maluku, Mindanao as well as Sulu; and the linkage of piracy and surreptitious activities to the diaspora Chinese seek to fill specific gaps in the literature. Overall, the use of various terms such as "piracy", "raiding" and "smuggling" by the contributors of the essays shows the usual and not-so-usual usage of the terms associated with the different groups. While piracy and raiding appear to have been common across the Malay Archipelago, state or quasi-state entities in the western and eastern archipelago took the enterprise to different scales, fuelled by different intensities of European involvement. Finally, the literature survey shows that future works can do well to involve greater use of findings by other social science disciplines or the innovative use of different sources (as suggested by Tagliacozzo), which in turn can help to uncover further niches in the study of piracy and surreptitious activities.

Appendix

Table 1.1 War, hegemonic cycles and economic environment

	General economic environment	War and hegemonic cycles in Asia (4) (5)
1600–80	Downturn in trade and economic activities (1)	Spain/Portugal vs. Holland vs. China
		Holland's war against renegade power of China (on Taiwan)
		Age of merchant-pirates (6)
		In Southeast Asia:
		Attempted expansion by Mataram (Java)
		Dutch conquest of Melaka (Portugal) and attempt to control tin-mining states on Malay Peninsula
1680–1780	Recovery and upturn in trade and economic activities (2)	Britain/other European powers vs. Holland vs. China
	"Chinese century"	Britain's contestation of power with France in India

(continued)

[37] F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 865.

Table 1.1 (continued)

	General economic environment	War and hegemonic cycles in Asia (4) (5)
		In Southeast Asia:
		Burma's wars against China and Siam
		Dutch quelling of Chinese uprising on Java
		Multiple centres of power in the western Malay Archipelago (7) and Dutch alliances
Transition 1780–1840	Upturn in trade and economic activities (3)	Britain vs. Holland/other European powers vs. China
	"Chinese century"	Britain's war against China
		In Southeast Asia:
		Britain's first war against Burma
		Britain's attempted intervention in Java
		Kedah's war against Siam
		Tay Son Rebellion

Compiled from (1) A. Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); (2) G. Knaap and H. Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders* (London: KITLV Press, 2004); (3) J. Kathirithamby-Wells, "The age of transition: The mid-18th century to early 19th century", in *Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, vol. 1, ed. N. Tarling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 572–614; (4) G. Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987); (5) J. Goldstein, *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); (6) P. Calanca, "Piracy and coastal security in Southeastern China 1600–1780", in R. Anthony ed., *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers: Violence and Clandestine Trade in the Greater China Seas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010, pp. 85–98); and (7) T. Barnard, *Multiple Centres of Authority: Society and Siak and Eastern Sumatra, 1674–1827* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003)

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Chapter 2
Siak, Piracy and Early Modern Malay Warfare

Timothy P. Barnard

Abstract Warfare in the Malay world during the early modern period often depended on entangled relationships between families and trade partners, during which overt displays of power, feints and retreats, or raiding were as valuable as weapons such as cannons or blunderbusses. By focusing on an invasion of the Siak River by a combined force of VOC ships and local rulers in 1761, this chapter examines in detail the various tactics and weapons at the disposal of warriors during the period, while also placing it in a cultural context in which both Dutch and Malay priorities were often at odds with each other. Ultimately, for rulers in the Malay world, maintaining family and patron-client ties superseded the desire for vengeance or complete defeat.

In January 1761, a fleet of ships representing the VOC ([Dutch] United East India Company) and various Malay nobles entered the Siak River in eastern Sumatra with the goal of capturing the Siak capital of Mempura. Sailing alongside the few VOC-commanded warships were numerous small craft containing the followers of a disgruntled Siak prince who was trying to regain the throne he had lost in a coup 3 years earlier. The fleet was entering a world of entangled alliances, cultural misunderstandings, trade and power. By June 1761, this force captured Mempura, which in many respects was the beginning of a colonial presence in this region. The fall of Siak to a flotilla of VOC ships and the followers of the Siak Prince Raja Alam thus reflected the various notions of warfare and interaction in the mid-eighteenth-century Malay world.

The Malay world, an area encompassing the Strait of Melaka and the southern regions of the South China Sea, in the eighteenth century was one of many small states. Malay states were mainly based along rivers, and their rulers acted as conduits for trade in products between outsiders and locals. The products traded – ranging from silk and porcelain from China and textiles from India to local natural products such as resins, gold and elephant tusks gathered from the surrounding

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environment – allowed Malay rulers to parlay their location and control over these products into positions of power. Malay rulers, therefore, were ensconced along vital trade routes and had the ability to attract followers and maintain their loyalty, which was accomplished through the development of social and cultural institutions that promoted alliances through marriage, economic benefits and even spiritual charisma. The maintenance of these 'patron-client' ties meant that great emphasis was placed upon appealing to followers as their presence reflected the prosperity of the state as well as the ability to smoothly oversee the trade that flowed through it. While this pattern of rule had existed for well over a millennium, the height of this model was the fifteenth-century trade port of Malay Melaka. Although, by the eighteenth century, the dominating presence – literally and spiritually – of Melaka had ended two and a half centuries earlier, the template of creating alliances with trade partners, attacking those who did not comply and creating an environment that was friendly to traders remained.[1]

This model of Malay rule, however, did not continue in Melaka. While the Portuguese ruled Melaka from 1511 until 1641, with the VOC subsequently replacing the Iberians, the city was shell of its former self. It was now a small trading port, albeit one where well-connected traders could obtain gunpowder and allies. The power of any polity to create an overarching state in the Malay world that could control numerous other states had passed. The plethora of communities ranging from Aceh to Kedah and Deli to Johor also supported small populations. As Carl Trocki has argued, the Malay world was 'population poor', making it an 'empty centre' of Southeast Asia.[2] At its height, Melaka – easily the largest pre-modern state – may have had some 100,000 residents, although this number is uncertain. Most Malay states only had several thousand residents and far fewer living in the royal capitals. These limited population numbers for Malay states were mainly due to the environment as the soils in the region reduced agricultural potential. Such ecological limits meant the population was primarily engaged in trade or gathering the valuable natural products of the forests and seas for subsequent trade.[3]

Gaining access to that trade as well as followers, at times through raiding, was common as the reduced numbers meant that small communities could be in a

[1]There are numerous writings about these concepts, but two of the most important are: Bennet Bronson, "Exchange at the upstream and downstream ends: Notes toward a functional model of the coastal state in Southeast Asia" in Karl L. Hutterer ed., *Economic exchange and social interaction in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from prehistory, history, and ethnography* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1977), pp. 39–52; O.W. Wolters, *History, culture and region in Southeast Asian perspectives* (Ithaca: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, 1999).

[2]Carl A. Trocki, "Chinese pioneering in eighteenth-century Southeast Asia" in Anthony Reid ed., *The last stand of Asian autonomies: Responses to modernity in the diverse states of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900*, (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), p. 86.

[3]Roderich Ptak, "Reconsidering Melaka and central Guangdong: Portugal's and Fujian's impact on Southeast Asian trade (early sixteenth century)", in Peter Borschberg ed., *Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka area and adjacent regions, 16th to 18th century* (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, 2004), pp. 4–7.

position of great significance. While the ability of Malay Melaka to control such a large area in previous centuries was most likely exaggerated – based on fragile alliances as well as myths and legends of power told over the subsequent centuries – its model of rule and its goals had not changed. Much of it focused around control of trade goods and appealing to followers, which were usually more important than maintaining a specific locality. A Malay state depended on a competent and charismatic ruler, not a place.[4]

When it came to warfare, all of these factors – low population, the need for trade goods and alliances as well as the presence of a European trade company and local desires – came into play, and this will be the focus of this chapter. To better understand these patterns, this chapter will provide a summary of the invasion of Siak in 1761 and the background on which it occurred, which will then be followed by an analysis of how it reflects patterns of warfare throughout Southeast Asia as well as what makes certain factors unique in this region during a period of rapid change. Finally, an understanding of how such larger social, cultural and environmental issues were reflected in how warfare was conducted will be discussed in a final section.

Relationships and Raids in Siak and the Malay World

The Malay world following the fall of Melaka to the Portuguese in 1511 was an area of small competing states. While the Portuguese and Dutch attempted to monopolize the trade in valuable spices, the various states in the region – particularly Johor and Aceh – vied for dominance based on the Melakan model. Johor, which the exiled Melakan rulers founded, was an unstable state throughout the Portuguese era, but developed into a regional powerhouse following the VOC capture of Melaka in 1641. The Johorese also parlayed their alliance with the VOC into a trade in weapons and resources that could be used to bring other states into their orbit. Beyond a growing power linked to alliances with the VOC, the Johorese actively promoted tales glorifying Melaka as a model in their histories of the state. Much of this meant the creation of greater ties through marriage alliances and trade that were to re-establish a great state that would be a worthy successor to a glorified Melaka. If such avenues did not work, the states were attacked and forced to join Johorese trade networks. Such tactics were common in late seventeenth-century eastern Sumatra and followed a Melakan-based model.[5]

While Melaka/Johor had been a model for Malay states and continued to play an important role in the structure and functioning of Malay states well into the early

[4]A. C. Milner, *Kerajaan: Malay political culture on the eve of colonial rule* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982).

[5]Leonard Andaya, *The kingdom of Johor, 1641–1728* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975); Timothy P. Barnard, *Multiple centres of authority: Society and environment in eastern Sumatra, 1674–1827* (Leiden: KITLV, 2003).

eighteenth century, the influx of new migrants and the founding of new states in the early eighteenth century led to changes in how they interacted and conducted warfare. This change began in eastern Sumatra, where Johor had sent expeditions for decades to ensure compliance with its trade policies among Minangkabau migrant communities. In 1717, an ambitious leader appeared in the region to challenge Johorese rule. This individual was Raja Kecik, who, while making claims to a genealogical link with the rulers of Johor-Melaka as well as Minangkabau, could appeal to the various ethnic groups situated in the Strait of Melaka which were unhappy with Johor's control over the area.[6] Within a year, Raja Kecik defeated Johor, created a new state and by the early 1720s moved it to eastern Sumatra, where it came to be known as Siak. The remnants of the Johor state, in an attempt to regain power, enlisted the help of Bugis warriors in the area to revive Johor (subsequently known as Riau), which led to almost a century of conflict and warfare in the southern Melaka Strait, during which alliances constantly shifted. While Siak and Johor/Riau were the two main players, others states – particularly the VOC in Melaka – became involved in the conflict as suppliers of goods or in the hope of gaining access to trade lanes and products. The competition and conflict played into the diverse social and ecological make-up of the region, which reflected larger issues with regard to warfare.[7]

From the 1720s until the 1740s, a sustained period of warfare occurred between Johor/Riau and Siak. Ultimately, they each carved out a sphere of influence, with Siak dominating eastern Sumatra and Johor/Riau dominating the region where the Melaka Strait enters the South China Sea. Much of the conflict during the period involved displays of power, with the goal of gaining the allegiance of participants. The number of deaths and actual confrontations was limited, often due to the low population and the diverse eco-niches into which the loser could retreat. As the original participants in hostilities grew older and passed away, their descendants inherited the tensions and conflicts, continuing the pattern of low-level confrontations. For the offspring of Raja Kecik, this initially was manifested through his two sons, Raja Alam and Raja Mahmud. While these two scions of Siak competed for the throne, a pattern soon developed. One prince would rule from the Siak capital, while the other sought fortune in the Strait of Melaka, where he could gather followers and funds to support an attempt to return to the capital. This pattern – of rotating rulers and search for supporters – continued over several generations for the remainder of the eighteenth century in Siak.[8]

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[6]Raja Kecik is also referred to as "Raja Kecil" in some accounts. I use "Raja Kecik" as it is the spelling and pronunciation used in texts from the time.

[7]Andaya, *The kingdom of Johor*; Barnard, *Multiple centres of authority*; Raja Ali Haji ibn Raja Ahmad, Virginia Matheson and Barbara Watson Andaya eds., *Tuhfat al-nafis (The precious gift)* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982).

[8]This pattern is further explored in Timothy P. Barnard, "Texts, Raja Ismail, and violence: Siak and the transformation of Malay identity in the eighteenth century", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 32, no. 3 (2001), pp. 331–42.

Raiding was an important component of the search for power and position in the Strait of Melaka and the South China Sea. Such raids had been an active form of 'warfare' for centuries. These brief outbursts of violence allowed for ships to be forced into allied ports and often became a convenient method of obtaining new clients or slaves as well as valuable cargo that could be parlayed into rewards for clients who were loyal to patrons. Such raiding of passing ships had been common since the Srivijaya Empire, the first great Malay trading polity, and they became quite common in the upheaval of the eighteenth-century Malay world. Many Siak princes roamed the region searching for material goods and supporters using such an approach to gaining supporters and wealth. The first of the prominent Siak raiders was Raja Alam, who raided ships in the South China Sea beginning in the late 1730s, during which he developed a large following among the Orang Laut (sea peoples) as well as the consternation of European merchants.[9] For Siak princes, such raids were necessary due to the frequent changes of leadership and fortune throughout the century.

An example of the frequent and sometimes confusing changes of leadership in Siak occurred in the mid-1750s. Raja Mahmud had ruled Siak since his father's incapacitation due to senility in the early 1740s. After ensconcing himself on the island of Siantan in the South China Sea, from where he raided ships and gathered followers for over a decade, Raja Alam returned to Siak and replaced Raja Mahmud on the throne in May 1753. After contacting the VOC in Melaka and the Malay leadership of Johor/Riau, both of whom disliked Raja Alam due to his piracy and ability to draw from their own supporters, Raja Mahmud returned in early 1754, regaining the throne following a series of feints and confrontations along the Siak River. Raja Alam then returned to Siantan, quickly gathered more followers and returned to Siak only a few months after he had been overthrown and – once again – retook the Siak throne. A few months later, in early 1755, a fleet of Johor Malays and the VOC helped Raja Mahmud return to the throne. Thus, in a 2-year period, the leadership of Siak had rotated between two brothers four times.[10]

The continual rotation of leadership among Siak princes reflected the ability of a charismatic leader to gather resources from a variety of regions within the Melaka Strait as well as the numerous communities who could support such a leader, all of which played a role in warfare during this period. Once Raja Mahmud had returned to the throne of Siak in 1755, he followed a policy of obtaining goods from the VOC in Melaka as well as the Malay leadership in Johor. This policy provided immediate gains and the support of followers although such support was fleeting. Eventually, Raja Mahmud was able to secure the throne for 6 more years, a relative eternity in

[9]One of the most famous raids Raja Alam conducted was against the *Nancy*, an English 'country trade' ship, which was richly laden with specie. Raja Ali Haji, *Tuhfat al-nafis*, p. 97; Joseph N. F. M. à Campo, "Discourse with discussion: Representations of piracy in colonial Indonesia, 1816–25", *Journal of Southeast Asia Studies*, vol. 34, no. 2 (2003), pp. 199–214; Timothy P. Barnard, "Celates, Rayat-Laut, pirates: The Orang Laut and their decline in history", *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. 80, no. 2 (2007), p. 44.

[10]Barnard, *Multiple centres of authority*, pp. 92–98.

mid-eighteenth-century Siak before his various alliances and supporters imploded. To secure this period of stability, Raja Mahmud entered into a series of treaties with the VOC, which supplied gunpowder to support his efforts to control Raja Alam's followers as well as gain access to the trade in the natural forest products of eastern Sumatra. In return, the VOC was allowed to construct a fort (and trade post) at the mouth of the Siak River on the island of Pulau Gontong. The VOC presence, which would monitor tin shipments to ensure they were flowing to Melaka, which combined with Raja Mahmud's efforts to oppress groups trading in forest products, greatly restricted trade and resulted in a rapid loss of influence for the Siak leader. In 1759, in an attempt to break away from this VOC support, Raja Mahmud led an attack on the VOC post on Pulau Gontong, which led to the massacre of 65 of the 72 people at the post.[11]

The destruction of the VOC post on Pulau Gontong resulted in a shift in alliances and support among communities in the mid-eighteenth-century Melaka Strait. Raja Mahmud was now a pariah to the VOC. Raja Alam, who had previously raided VOC ships and other small vessels that were going to Melaka, was now a potential ally. With regard to Raja Mahmud's Malay allies in Johor/Riau, Raja Alam married his son to the daughter of a member of the Bugis elite, thus creating tensions with his brother's Malay supporters in the same polity. In these circumstances, allies of Raja Alam began approaching the VOC in late 1759 with the proposal that these two former enemies now join together to attack Raja Mahmud. In June 1760, Raja Alam arrived in Melaka to secure this new alliance, and the following September, Raja Alam's fleet of 10 vessels sailed into the Melaka harbour, from where an invasion force gathered over the next several months. The desire of both the VOC and Raja Alam to gain control over Siak continued even after news arrived in Melaka that Raja Mahmud had died.[12]

On 16 January 1761, the relationship between Raja Alam and the VOC was formalized through the signing of a treaty. From a Western perspective, the treaty formalized their relationship with Raja Alam and addressed the issues that the VOC had with Raja Mahmud. Among the articles were agreements that Raja Alam would surrender the 'leaders of the murderous spree' at Pulau Gontong to the company and return any artillery and supplies 'stolen' from the Dutch lodge. From a Western perspective, the document symbolized an alliance in which the Dutch included language and provisions promoting vengeance and force.[13]

While the Dutch may have perceived their role as one of enacting revenge upon the Siak leadership for the massacre at Pulau Gontong, the treaty also

[11] Barnard, *Multiple centres of authority*, pp. 98–103.

[12] Raja Mahmud died on 23 November 1760. Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, p. 111; Barnard, *Multiple centres of authority*, p. 105; VOC 2993: Malacca Resolutions, 5 February 1760, f. 75–76; Letters to Outer Areas: Letter to Raja Alam at Batubahara (written 28 June 1760); E. Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak: 1602–1865* (Batavia: Bruining & Wijt, 1870), pp. 110–11.

[13] VOC 3024: Malacca to Batavia, 6 March 1761, f. 27–32; F.W. Stapel ed., *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando Indicum*, vol. VI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 215–18.

contains examples of Raja Alam's ability to create alliances through kinship and trade, a key element of leadership in the region during the early modern period. The treaty includes several articles that specifically single out members of Raja Alam's immediate family who participated in the Pulau Gontong massacre – including a son and son-in-law – and pardons them. These provisions are present to address concerns that Raja Alam guaranteed the protection of his eldest son, Raja Muhammad Ali, who was supposedly an important figure in the forces opposing him, while also allowing Raja Alam to secure support from other branches of the family and power. From the perspective of Raja Alam and his followers, warfare and conflict was something more intimate involving families and personal connections. The treaty between the VOC and Raja Alam therefore represents how both main parties attacking Siak perceived their role in the coming conflict.

In late January 1761, Jan Visboom, who was also the commander of the Melaka garrison, and Arij Verbrugge led a small European fleet out of the Melaka harbour with Raja Alam commanding an additional 25 vessels. The VOC ships were manned with 89 Europeans and 91 Bugis soldiers, and possessed a total of 82 cannon, most being three-pounders. They arrived at Pulau Gontong on 25 January, and found it abandoned. The only remains of the Dutch fort were some burnt timbers and human bones. Workers constructed a new lodge within a month, and 39 Europeans would be left behind to man it. In addition, 23 Bugis soldiers were assigned to the lodge, but were required to stay outside the palisades, further emphasizing the Dutch fear of attacks. The invasion force remained at Pulau Gontong for over 2 months, making no attempts to advance upstream, using this time to resupply the ships and prepare for the coming battle. At this time, the Governor-General in Batavia ordered a Dutch warship to Pulau Gontong.[14] The invasion of the Siak River was about to begin.

While the invasion of the Siak River is a minor event in the larger history of the region, the numerous accounts of it – from both a Dutch and a local perspective – allow for greater insight into the motivations for, and understandings of, warfare in the Malay World during the early modern period. Among these accounts are the voluminous VOC records from their presence in Melaka, their main trade port in the region. From the Siak perspective, there are two texts: the *Hikayat Siak* (the Siak Chronicle) and the *Syair Perang Siak* (An epic Poem of the Siak War). The *Hikayat Siak* is a traditional historical text that describes the founding of the Siak state under Raja Kecik, and places it within the context of other Malay states, mainly fifteenth-century Melaka, and portrays events in the state well into the nineteenth century. The *Syair Perang Siak* is an epic poem that focuses solely on the 1761 conflict. Although supportive of Raja Mahmud and his descendants like the *Hikayat Siak*, the *Syair*

[14]Many of the subsequent sections of this text, and many of the details, are taken from Barnard, *Multiple Centres of Authority*, pp. 107–15; For specific accounts of the Dutch return to Pulau Gontong, see VOC 3024 (first part): Malacca to Batavia, 6 March 1761, f. 13–14 and 33–35; Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, pp. 115–18.

Perang Siak presents a picture of a society driven by conflict as various princes vied for leadership, each able to garner support from different communities.[15]

While VOC records leave no doubt that the Dutch were intent on vengeance, the *Hikayat Siak* – much like sections of the treaty allying Raja Alam to the VOC – sets these events in a framework of kinship politics and describes them in terms of attempts at family reconciliation. Raja Ismail, who succeeded to the Siak throne with the ruling name Sultan Ismail Abdul Jalil Rahmat Syah, was still young and did not share the animosity that his father felt for the VOC and Raja Alam. According to the *Hikayat Siak*, Raja Ismail had heard of the coming alliance of Raja Alam and the Dutch and proposed to his council that his uncle be allowed back into Siak and accepted as ruler. The ruling council rejected this idea because it meant a return of the VOC to Pulau Gontong. The leading opponent of this idea in the text was Raja Muhammad Ali, Raja Alam's eldest son, who soon thereafter was appointed as leader of the Siak defensive forces.[16]

The concerns voiced in the *Hikayat Siak* over family and alliances are also reflected in Dutch accounts. While both sides prepared for the seemingly inevitable battle in early 1761, Raja Alam was actively trying to regain control of Siak without an open confrontation with his nephew, son and other family members. When Raja Alam contacted Raja Ismail in upstream Siak and requested permission to meet his wife and children, who were in the capital of Mempura, he was told that this was not possible unless he retreated to the coast. At this same time, Raja Alam learned that female members of the Siak elite and their children had fled to Pelalawan, a neighbouring polity on the Kampar River beholden to Johor, fearing the arrival of a vengeful Dutch force. Raja Alam sent a fleet of 18 vessels under the command of a son-in-law to the Kampar River to secure these family members. Dutch accounts report that Raja Alam was initially reluctant to participate in the fighting along the Siak River, probably because his forces were on the Kampar trying to secure access to family members and gain the assistance of Siak communities outside the capital.[17]

In February and March 1761, military leaders in Mempura sent raiding ships downstream to pester the Dutch vessels, which were still loading supplies and being made ready for a confrontation. In addition to harassing the invasion fleet, the Mempura ships also raided villages along the Siak River, where they burnt houses and forced the residents to move upstream.[18] Finally, since the VOC and Raja Alam were not venturing upstream, the forces loyal to Raja Ismail sailed downstream in early April 1761 in ships that the *Syair Perang Siak* poetically compared to

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[15] Tengku Said, *Hikayat Siak* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992); Donald J. Goudie ed., *Syair perang Siak: A court poem presenting the state policy of a Minangkabau/Malay family in exile* (Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 1989); Barnard, *Multiple centres of authority*.

[16] *Hikayat Siak*, pp. 153–54.

[17] Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, p. 117; VOC 3024 (first part): Malacca to Batavia, 6 March 1761, f. 14–15.

[18] According to the *Hikayat Siak* and *Syair perang Siak*, the populace of Bukit Batu and other ports near the Siak River mouth knew of the coming force, and voluntarily moved upstream to Mempura once the Alam-VOC fleet was sighted. *Hikayat Siak*, p. 154; *Syair perang Siak*, p. 155.

'tigers released from traps' (*bagai harimau lepas tangkapan*).[19] On 13 April, 15 Siak vessels under the direct command of Raja Ismail and Raja Muhammad Ali encountered two VOC brigantines. A fierce confrontation continued until sunset, with one of the brigantines virtually scuttled after it received five cannon shots to its hull. In contrast, none of the Siak ships was badly damaged, and only one Siak warrior was killed. Over the next week, both forces exchanged intermittent shots.[20] On 21 April, another major battle took place; both sides lost several warships. Following these losses, the Siak forces retreated to Mempura, while the VOC fleet slowly floated upstream with the tide until they reached Buantan – the capital during the reign of Raja Kecik.[21]

Upon his arrival in Buantan, Raja Alam descended from the ship and visited the grave of his father. The VOC commanders used this lull in the fighting to send a 'native' scout upstream to examine the defences at Mempura. The infiltrator reported that at the confluence of the Mempura and Siak Rivers, the Siak ships were aligned across the river while palisades and forts lined the shore.[22]

The environment was to play an important role in the 1761 VOC-Raja Alam invasion of Siak. Reports began to arrive in the VOC encampment in Buantan that the Siak leadership had placed bars of trees to block the river and had constructed four well-armed fortresses with at least 50–60 cannons, many of them taken from Pulau Gontong. To make matters worse, snipers in the surrounding forest and fields continually harassed the VOC troops at Buantan. When a mixed force of Europeans, Bugis and Malays attempted to use footpaths to advance towards Mempura, they quickly lost the path and entered a swamp where they sank to their knees in mud. Unable to counter the force of arms as well as nature, arrayed against them upstream, the invasion force remained at Buantan through the month of May.[23] They could not work their way through an environment that defied the kind of control that could be exercised in Western Europe or even other regions of Southeast Asia such as Java.

With men dying and morale low, the VOC appealed to Raja Alam for direct assistance. On 15 June, Raja Alam led the VOC expeditionary force towards Mempura, and on the next night the final assault on Mempura occurred. The VOC-Raja Alam forces advanced upriver with the tide, and at 9 o'clock at night began a concerted attack on the main fort. There was serious fighting and casualties, but by morning the forces of Raja Ismail had retreated farther upstream to other fortifications. The warriors who remained only fired muskets and rifles and were no longer using any of the large artillery at their disposal. A small Dutch vessel then advanced to a rattan cable stretched across the river and cut it. The assault force moved upstream to the next series of forts, where they encountered a large boom

[19] *Syair perang Siak*, p. 158. My translation.

[20] Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, p. 119; *Syair perang Siak*, pp. 165–77.

[21] *Syair perang Siak*, pp. 189, 177–91; Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, p. 120; *Hikayat Siak*, p. 154.

[22] Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, pp. 121–23; *Syair perang Siak*, pp. 191–94.

[23] Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, pp. 122–24; *Syair perang Siak*, pp. 194–97.

made of 'mastwood' stretching across the river that was considered impossible to break. The VOC-Raja Alam ships moved towards this boom, pressing up against it and opening fire with their cannon. There was very heavy fighting, and according to the *Syair Perang Siak*, 'the Siak river became a massive coffin.'[24]

By 11 o'clock on the morning of 17 June, the fighting had come to a halt. Raja Alam and his followers entered the fortresses only to discover they were now empty. Raja Ismail had fled upstream, as had the populace of Mempura. The VOC, Raja Alam and his supporters began pursuing the fleeing forces. Among the attacking forces, 25 soldiers were dead and 30 were wounded, while several of the VOC ships were severely damaged. The casualties among the supporters of Raja Ismail were unknown, but "several" corpses were floating in the river.[25] The VOC and Raja Alam had successfully invaded the Siak River and gained control over the capital.

Tactics and Weapons of Early Modern Malay Warfare

Dutch and local accounts are quite similar in that they describe an invasion of a medium-sized Sumatran state in the mid-eighteenth century. In a region of low population with high mobility, warfare was different from larger and relatively more densely populated Southeast Asian polities in the eighteenth century such as in Java, Burma and Siam.[26] Since fighting was a matter of gaining access to manpower, warfare was often a process of negotiation, strategic retreat and the invocation of supernatural powers. Raja Alam used all these skills to recruit a range of supporters for his invasion of the Siak River. Despite his approaches to the VOC, Raja Alam and Raja Ismail were both anxious to avoid open confrontation and made real efforts to reach a solution prior to the VOC-Raja Alam advance up the Siak River. Raja Alam appealed to his relatives to unite around his rule and even sent ships to the Kampar River to gather more family members. Only when these attempts were unsuccessful did Raja Alam resort to the use of force. When fighting did occur, however, the presence of a particularly brave warrior and protective talismans could rally troops who were reluctant to fight. Tales, which pepper traditional texts and describe bullets bouncing off Raja Mahmud or Raja Kecik turning salty water fresh, allowed troops to believe in the invulnerability of their leader.[27]

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[24] *Syair perang Siak*, p. 200; Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, pp. 125–26.

[25] Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, pp. 126–27.

[26] For more information on warfare in Southeast Asia in the early modern era, see Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the age of commerce*, *1450–1680*, vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 121–29; Leonard Y. Andaya, "Interactions with the outside world and adaptation in Southeast Asian society 1500–1800" in Nicholas Tarling ed., *Cambridge history of Southeast Asia*, vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 387–91; Michael W. Charney, *Southeast Asian warfare, 1300–1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2004).

[27] *Hikayat Siak*, pp. 125 and 145.

If defensive tactics did not work, the soldiers would simply fade into a maze of footpaths and make their escape to a neighbouring community. Since there were no large-scale land battles, the possibility of heavy casualties was rare or the result of European involvement as in the 1759 raid on Pulau Gontong. Even at that time, Dutchmen who survived the initial attack were brought into the circle of manpower to become valued slaves in the Siak court.[28] The object of warfare was rarely to devastate an enemy but to gain control over the available manpower and thus reinforce patron-client ties.

Adept leaders also actively exploited the forests and rivers of the Malay world to hold off attackers. Small forts, *kubus*, were built, from which sniping could occur, while the loss of position was not considered devastating since most combatants lived to fight another day. There was a variety of defensive methods that were used to exploit the environment during warfare. Among those techniques were the use of rattan cables and trees to block the movement of the enemy on streams and rivers, which was also used to hamper the movement of Raja Kecik in the invasion of Johor in 1717 and to counter Siak troops in northern Sumatra in the early nineteenth century.[29]

Other techniques that the defenders of Mempura attempted to destroy some of the Dutch vessels included the use of 'floating fires' (*brandvlotten*), which the *Syair Perang Siak* refers to as 'mountains of fire' (*gunung api*). These fire rafts were pieces of wood covered with oil and dammar resin to fuel the flames and were common weapons in river warfare throughout Southeast Asia in the early modern period, having been used against the Dutch in Palembang in 1662 and against the Spanish in the lower Mekong River in the late sixteenth century.[30] Once lit, these fire rafts were sent downstream with the hope that they would set alight to the attacking ships and their sails and thus foil any carefully laid enemy plans. Although Siak troops sent fire rafts downstream intermittently during the invasion, in the middle of the night of 2 June 1761, the forces in Mempura released their most concerted attempts at burning the Dutch ships. Floating downstream towards the VOC fleet were a number of *brandvlotten* connected by a beam so that they stretched across the river. Initially, they caused considerable turmoil among the VOC ships, but the Dutch were able to turn several of their cannons towards the advancing wall of fire and extinguish it. As described in the *Syair Perang Siak*, 'the *gunung api* were burnt out, blown away by the wind as if fanned, there was no chance to burn cotton [sails].'[31]

[28] Hendrik Poethoeven, a Dutch sergeant at Pulau Gontong in 1759, was taken to Mempura where he became a slave and converted to Islam. During the 1761 invasion he was found in Mempura. Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, p. 128.

[29] *Hikayat Siak*, p. 125; John Anderson, *Mission to the east coast of Sumatra in 1823* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 25.

[30] Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*, p. 124.

[31] *Syair Perang Siak*, pp. 197–99; Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, p. 123.

In addition to defensive methods suited to river warfare like fire rafts, the Siak troops had more conventional weapons. While most fighting in Southeast Asia usually involved hand-to-hand combat with knives, machetes and pikes, the Siak *kubu* were stocked with cannons and swivel guns, while most warriors had muskets.[32] Bullets and shot were made from metal ingots that, like gunpowder, were obtained from trade. The presence of so much ammunition and weaponry and their use by Siak defensive forces reflects the extent of trade between Melaka and Siak prior to 1759 and was one of the greatest influences of the Dutch presence in the Melaka Strait. While many of the cannons were taken from Pulau Gontong in the 1759 raid, Siak was a valuable trading partner of the VOC and had obtained other weapons and supplies through trade for years. Not all the weaponry, however, was to be used in actual shooting at the enemy. Many guns had a spiritual significance. They were often given names like *Harimau Buas* (wild tiger), and their presence brought a talismanic sense of invulnerability to the users.[33]

The most impressive weapon in the Siak arsenal was a large ship, the floating fortress. Known as the *kota berjalan* (or 'movable fortress'), it was three stories tall, and when the VOC forces eventually saw it, the Dutch commander wrote, 'that Leviathan showed itself in such a manner as if we saw the ark of Noah in a Bible picture book.'[34] The best warriors were assigned to this massive floating ship, and the *kota berjalan* participated in the early battles at the mouth of the Siak River. Eventually, three Dutch ships opened a large breech in this ship, through which 'horses and wagons' could have entered, seriously damaging the vessel and killing four Siak nobles and all but one of the crew.[35] While the deaths of those on the *kota berjalan* may seem contrary to the general methods of warfare in the Malay world, the presence of the ship was a talisman for other Siak vessels and warriors, and it went up against an enemy unfamiliar with local rules of engagement. This confrontation resulted in heavy casualties and led to a feeling that disaster was befalling the polity. Such feelings were often found in the local narratives about the invasion of Siak in 1761. It is in such narratives that we can better understand the motivations for such warfare.

To celebrate their invasion of the Siak River in 1761, VOC representatives in Melaka arranged for the painting of a magnificent map to describe the expedition

[32]Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*, pp. 23–41; *Syair Perang Siak*, p. 141–51.

[33]Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*, pp. 42–72; *Syair perang Siak*, p. 143. The use of weapons for spiritual purposes is also described in L. Andaya, "Interaction with the outside world", pp. 392–94.

[34]Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, p. 119. Raja Alam built a similar ship in his 1737 attack on Riau, while Alaung-hpaya used one in Burma during his 1754 attack on the Mons. See Ali Haji, *Tuhfat-al nafis*, p. 86; Michael W. Charney, "Shallow-draft boats, guns, and the Aye-ra-wa-ti: Continuity and change in ship structure and river warfare in precolonial Myanma", *Oriens Extremus*, vol. 40, no. 1 (1997), p. 28.

[35]Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, p. 120; *Syair perang Siak*, pp. 189 and 177–91; *Hikayat Siak*, p. 154.

and victory.[36] In the upper right-hand corner of the map are two Biblical quotations that reflect VOC relief following the successful capture of Mempura, and what they believed would be a return of Dutch prominence in the Strait and a decline in the destructive raiding of Siak ships.[37] Reactions like this were common among Dutch officials in Southeast Asia. Their presence far from home often tested their convictions, and a long battle would have been perceived as a particular test of faith. By placing the quotes prominently under the heading of the map, they represent the belief that their presence in eastern Sumatra was divinely willed.

The factions loyal to Raja Alam and Raja Ismail of course did not share the attitude of the VOC towards the expedition. For those in eastern Sumatra, the invasion involved the very basis of authority. The importance of the return of Raja Alam to the Siak throne was preserved in the collective consciousness of the region through several works, notably the *Syair Perang Siak*. In contrast to the European analysis provided through Dutch archival records, these traditional Malay narratives point towards the importance of alliances and kinship in the creation and continuation of the Siak state. The victory of Raja Alam was not due to the support of a European trading company but rather to his ability to call upon a variety of supporters and particularly close family members.

Conclusion and Perspectives

The Malay texts from Siak continually emphasize the importance of loyalty between allies and kin, particularly during the period of the invasion, and this reflects an importance such relationships would have in larger society and in warfare. Most of these literary works were composed from the collected stories maintained by the followers of Raja Ismail following their flight from Mempura. They portray Raja Alam as having lost his mind (*akal*) since he was cooperating with external groups.[38] His creative use of marriages had brought the Bugis, Arabs and other communities into his circle of power, overshadowing the influence of his brothers, nephews and nieces. In these texts, Raja Alam is presented not as a unifier of the family but as a divisive force. To symbolize the importance of unity in the family as well as the larger Siak society, both the *Syair Perang Siak* and *Hikayat Siak* focus their account

[36] Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA, The Netherlands Royal Archives): Colonial Maps and Drawings, VEL 362.

[37] The two quotes are Chronicles I, 13, 14, and Psalms 102, 16. The various Dutch commanders also specifically thanked God for allowing for the final victory in their reports sent back to Melaka. See VOC 3062 (third part): Incoming Letters from Siak: Report of Visboom to Gov. David Boelen (16 August 1761), 12 July. They are also reproduced in Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, p. 127.

[38] *Hikayat Siak*, p. 154.

on Raja Muhammad Ali, who did not join Raja Ismail when he fled Mempura, and was the one person who was welcomed by both factions in the family.

Raja Muhammad Ali's support of Raja Ismail during the invasion had been suspect since in the kinship networks of the Malay world, the bond between father and son was so important that it should ideally 'supersede all others'.[39] Despite these concerns, Raja Muhammad Ali was named the leader of the Siak defensive forces. According to the *Hikayat Siak*, when the invasion force became bogged down between April and June, the VOC was so incensed at the lack of progress that it called Raja Alam to a face-to-face meeting and berated him for promising that Mempura could be taken after a 3-hour battle. The Dutch then told Raja Alam that if Raja Ismail's supporters were still undefeated the next day, he would be sent in exile to Ceylon. This threat forced Raja Alam to write a letter explaining his predicament to Raja Muhammad Ali. After reading the letter, Raja Muhammad Ali, with the help of his wife Tengku Embung Besar, sabotaged his own vessel and saturated all the gunpowder with water. He then approached Raja Ismail and told him the situation was hopeless and the only solution was to flee. Raja Ismail took this advice and left for Pelalawan.[40] The loyalty of a son to his father had ultimately led to the return of Raja Alam to the throne of Siak, and this is flagged as correct behaviour in the Malay text.

The role of Raja Muhammad Ali in the final moments of the 1761 invasion is not clear in the Dutch sources, which state that he joined his father on 20 June.[41] Dutch accounts imply that he had actively supported Raja Alam after hearing of the pardon secured for him in the January 1761 treaty. Within the social and cultural understandings of the Melaka Strait, however, Raja Muhammad Ali had played a much more important role. Although as commander-in-chief of the defensive forces he had lost the battle, in Malay terms his apparent lack of resolve was considered proof of his paternal loyalty. The triumphant return of Raja Alam to the Siak throne thus was interpreted through different cultural lenses. The Europeans, interested in preserving their reputation in the larger Strait area, attributed their triumph as a sign of religious blessing and the superior power of their technology and tactics. In indigenous eyes, the importance of family and dependable allies were the key to power among the communities of eastern Sumatra. Raja Muhammad Ali was the ultimate symbol of this victorious return. His actions not only exemplified the flexibility in alignments so important to Malay warfare but also made evident the value placed on the honouring of kinship ties, especially father-son relations, even when this meant a denial of other friendships and alliances.

Such relationships reflected a larger understanding of conflict during the period. The Malay world was limited by small, scattered populations, which also meant that

[39] Barbara Watson Andaya, *To live as brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), p. 25; *Syair perang Siak*, pp. 137–39.

[40] *Hikayat Siak*, pp. 154–55.

[41] Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, p. 128.

military forces were limited in size, as well as the presence of numerous eco-niches, which meant that defence was of limited use and flight was highly appealing. During the same period, mainland Southeast Asia – particularly the polities of Ayuthaya and Burma – could boast armies in the hundreds of thousands if not millions, and huge conflicts and deaths were common. In the Malay world, a large military force was made up of several thousand people. On such a reduced scale, the control and influence over these smaller forces was vital for a military leader, and this was mainly achieved through a charismatic leader who understood the importance of maintaining patron-client relationships through a range of benefits. While raiding played an important role in gaining material and supporters and often received a majority of attention, it is the maintenance of relationships and particularly family ties that was as great an influence on warfare in the early modern period as the availability of Western technology or local tactics.

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Chapter 3
From Self-Defence to an Instrument of War: Dutch Privateering Around the Malay Peninsula in the Early Seventeenth Century

Peter Borschberg

Abstract This essay examines the transition of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) from a policy of self-defence into its full espousal of large-scale privateering and plundering. The argument advanced is that this shift was driven by both economic and political factors and can be traced to the very formation of the company as a unified trading venture. The taking of prizes became a cornerstone not only of the economic fortunes of the company but the establishment of the Dutch colonial empire in Asia. Of particular interest is not only the instructions emanating from the company directors and the Dutch government in the metropolis but especially the implementation and adaptation of these directives on the ground. It is this local context that adds a crucial dimension to interpretations of the eager espousal of maritime violence by the VOC and its agents in Asian waters.

Introduction

Piracy, privateering and freebooting are essentially European terms, concepts or definitions that describe distinct activities from the vantage point of law. Piracy is committed by private persons who have banded together and removed themselves from society at large and thus also from the protection of the law. Privateering, by contrast, is a concept closely associated with the idea of the just war. Of course privateering has been the subject of several landmark studies on both sides of the Atlantic as well as in Asia. With reference to Dutch privateering in both the East and West Indies, I refer for further consultation to the work of Virginia Lunsford and for the English context at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to the now

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classic study by Kenneth Andrews.[1] In this chapter, I will develop a set of questions and issues to assist me in retracing the early origins of Dutch privateering policy in Southeast Asia, focusing on the area around the Malay Peninsula and especially the Singapore and Melaka (Malacca) Straits. I am particularly concerned to identify specific decisions, resolutions or sets of instructions that (in the early 1600s) evolved into a policy to aggressively despoil the Iberian enemy under the laws of war.[2] In addition to this geographic limitation to the waters around the Malay Peninsula, I further temporally limit my study to the period c. 1595–1610. These dates mark the beginning of the Dutch voyages to the East Indies until the Twelve Years' Truce (1609–1621). It was scheduled to take effect in Asia after a 12-month delay (i.e. April 1610). Though it would be academically interesting to compare European (specifically the Dutch, English, Spanish and Portuguese) or even of European with Asian forms of piracy, a comprehensive study along these lines would certainly deserve a meaningful investigation than is possible in the context of this chapter.

The reasons and factors underlying the formation in 1601–1602 of the United Netherlands East India Company (better known by its Dutch initials VOC) have been identified and explained at length in a series of important studies in Dutch and English, including especially Femme S. Gaastra, Jonathan Israel, Martine van Ittersum, Niels Steensgaard and Jan den Tex.[3] The seasoned Dutch statesman, the Land's Advocate Johan van Oldenbarnevelt drove a hard—and some might say uncompromisingly tough—bargain, insisting that the merger of six smaller regional trading firms into the VOC must take place "for damaging the enemy [Spain and Portugal], and for security of the fatherland".[4] It would exceed the scope of the

[1] Virginia W. Lunsford, *Piracy and privateering in the golden age Netherlands* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); K.R. Andrews, *Elizabethan privateering, 1583–1603* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964). Lunsford's book contains a comprehensive and generally up-to-date bibliography which serves as a useful repertorium on the subject of privateering during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

[2] According to the estimates published by the Dutch naval historian Victor Enthoven, the Dutch company was responsible for attacking and plundering in the region of 200 trading vessels of varying sizes, capacities and flags in Asian waters during the first two decades of the seventeenth century. See Victor Enthoven, *Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek. Handel en strijd in de Scheldedelta, 1550–1621* (Leiden: Proefschrift, 1996), pp. 210–11.

[3] Femme S. Gaastra, *De Geschiedenis van de VOC*, 4th ed. (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2002) and its English translation *The Dutch East India Company: Expansion and decline* (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2003); Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic. Its rise, greatness and fall, 1477–1806* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), esp. pp. 318–27; Martine J. van Ittersum, *Profit and principle: Hugo Grotius, natural rights theories and the rise of Dutch power in the East Indies, 1595–1615* (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Niels Steensgaard, *The Asian trade revolution of the seventeenth century: The East India Companies and the decline of the caravan trade* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); Jan den Tex, *Oldenbarnevelt*, 5 vols. (Haarlem-Groningen: Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1960–72); an abridged English edition of this work is available as Jan den Tex, *Oldenbarnevelt,* 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

[4] C.R. Boxer, *Jan Compagnie in war and peace, 1602–1799* (Hong Kong and Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1979), p. 1; Ernst van Veen, *Decay or defeat: An inquiry into the Portuguese decline in Asia, 1580–1645* (Leiden: CNWS, 2000), pp. 152–54.

present chapter to delve into the more intricate reasons for the amalgamation. Suffice it to observe in this context that the formation of the VOC marked a significant turning point in Dutch policy insofar as it created in conjunction with the provisions laid down in the *octrooi* (charter) a commercial enterprise as well as an instrument of war to operate in the East Indies. The *octrooi* provided the legal foundations for a policy of aggression that was significantly directed at the commercial and colonial/ strategic interests of Spain and Portugal across Asia. It must be remembered that during the period under review, the Dutch are waging a protracted war of independence against their former overlord Spain (the so-called Dutch Revolt). The war effort was further extended to also cover Portugal and her colonies after 1581, when King Philip II of Spain ruled as Philip I of Portugal. For the next six decades, the crowns of Spain and Portugal would be ruled by the same monarch, but the two kingdoms and their respective empires continued to act as fierce rivals on the international commercial stage. Strategically and militarily, however, some cooperation and coordination of the two colonial empires took place, and this is especially true with regard to the Iberian possessions in Asia.

The late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Dutch maritime and naval historian Johan Elias observed that the Republic began to despatch fleets after 1599 under instructions to despoil the enemy in waters of the Americas, around Africa and naturally also Asia. He explained the reorientation from a policy of self-defence towards despoliation of the enemy with reference to the poor financial health of the Dutch Admiralty Boards. The taking of prize and booty emerged at the dawn of the seventeenth century as a noteworthy source of income for the Dutch navy and the state. How much the Boards actually reaped overall from the earliest privateering activities is difficult to reconstruct as the revenues generated for the company from such activities are deeply embedded within the tenuous accounting category "balance of payments".[5]

The principles laid down in the first VOC *octrooi* at the dawn of the seventeenth century represented not so much a blueprint for future action, but rather mirrored actual practices on the ground. If the early companies (the so-called voorcompagniën or pioneer companies) engaged in commerce with the East Indies, they were issued with express instructions to focus on trade and engage in violence only in self-defence. By 1600, the multitude of Dutch vessels setting sail for the East Indies enhanced the competition between the early trading firms. This competition quickly depleted available quantities of spices (especially cloves, nutmeg, mace and pepper) in the East Indies, drove up prices in Asia and eroded profits in Europe. Captains who had found little cargo for their return journey could then hardly resist the temptation to raid and plunder Iberian vessels or their Asian allies as a way of making up for lost time and poor cargo loadings.

The need to rationalize and theoretically justify acts of plundering, specifically the seizing of trading vessels sailing under an enemy flag, was heightened in the

[5]J.E. Elias, *Schetsen uit de Geschiedenis van ons Zeewezen*, *eerste gedeelte, 1568–1652* (The Hague: 's-Gravenhage, 1916), p. 76.

Dutch Republic with the arrival in 1604 of Jacob van Heemskerk and his rich booty in the form of the *Santa Catarina*. Much has been written in recent years about the incident and the legal considerations that followed in the Netherlands, and especially the justification of applied aggression in Hugo Grotius' *De Jure Praedae Commentarius* (Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty).[6] As is now well established, this work was penned after September 1604 in close historical connection with raging debates surrounding the legality, utility and moral permissibility of the so-called *Santa Catarina* incident at the time.[7]

Stepping-Up Violence: The Resolution of 1 November 1603

Among the working papers of Grotius now owned by the Municipal Archives *(Gemeentearchief)* in Rotterdam, and separately also in the National Archives of the Netherlands in the Hague, is this French-language excerpt of a resolution by the Dutch States General dated 1 November 1603:

> The present deputies of the East India Company are seriously admonished to look into and give orders to the effect that the ships, which are already equipped or afterwards shall be equipped to sail to the East Indies, can have charge and instruction to damage the enemies and inflict harm on their persons, ships and goods by all means possible, so that they may with reputation not only continue their trade, but also expand it and make it grow, otherwise by neglecting this they will certainly lose it. For this was the principal reason why the Gentlemen States General have undertaken the union of the Companies and awarded them a charter and authorisation to inflict damage on the enemies.[8]

As will be seen below, this resolution and the broader contextual canvass against which it was formulated proved crucial for the future course of the newly formed VOC. What clearly transpire from this excerpt are at least two facets of an early, evolving Dutch policy for the East Indies. First, commanders sailing to Asia are

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[6]Hugo Grotius, Martine J. van Ittersum eds., *De Jure Praedae Commentarius: Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty*, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006).

[7]P. Borschberg, *The Singapore and Melaka straits: Violence, security and diplomacy in the 17th century* (Singapore and Leiden: NUS Press and KITLV Press, 2010), esp. pp. 68–78; "The seizure of the *Santa Catarina* revisited: The Portuguese empire in Asia, VOC politics and the origins of the Dutch-Johor alliance 1602–1616", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* vol. 33, no. 1 (2002), pp. 31–62; "The seizure of the *Santa Catarina* off Singapore: Dutch freebooting, the Portuguese empire and intra-Asian trade at the dawn of the seventeenth century", *Revista de Cultura* (International edition), vol. 11 (2004), pp. 11–25; "Hugo Grotius in context: Van Heemskerk's capture of the *Santa Catarina* and its justification in *De Jure Praedae, 1604–1606*", *Asian Journal of Social Sciences,* vol. 31, no. 3 (2003), pp. 511–48; and Van Ittersum, *Profit and principle*, pp. 30–42.

[8]Rotterdam, Gemeentearchief, Handschriftenverzameling Rotterdam, 33.01, no. 3366, Pièces diverses concernantes le commerce et la navigation aux Indes, 1603–13, fol. 23 (translated from French); for the Dutch text, see N. Japikse ed., *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal van 1576 tot 1609* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1921), pp. 630–31.

to be issued with *express* and *detailed* instructions as to the goals of their voyage, including in particular the strategic and military targets over and beyond simple trade. And, second, it is evident that the Dutch States General saw the function of the VOC as a curious hybrid of Mercury and Mars, an instrument of both commerce and war. Its purpose was to safeguard the long-term survival of Dutch commerce and trading presence in the East Indies—and it was to do so as an agent in the Dutch Republic's protracted war against the Iberian powers.

The critical date, 1 November 1603, has been noted in several historical studies, including significantly van Ittersum's *Profit and Principle* and Steensgaard's now classic *The Asian Trade Revolution.*[9] The VOC had been formed for the ostensible objective of acting as a private arm in the war effort against the Spanish and Portuguese empires united in the person of Philip III/II and was to launch a campaign against both hard and soft targets of the Iberian powers in Asia. The objective of this policy was to keep Philip and his colonial officials in Asia on their toes, as well as to divert precious financial resources to shoring up strategic positions around the *Estado da India* and in the Spanish Philippines. Correspondingly, the campaign against Portugal and Spain in Asia also aimed to diminish available financial resources for the war effort in Europe—that is, along the frontline in the Spanish Netherlands.[10] In hindsight, one can say that this shift in strategy paid off, perhaps faster than had been anticipated by van Oldenbarnevelt and the Gentlemen States General.[11] By 1606, Spain was forced to the negotiating table to sue for peace. A deal was struck with the Treaty of Antwerp in April 1609 and marks the beginning of the Twelve Years' Truce (1609–1621).

The resolution of November 1603 not only marked a major shift in policy for the VOC but also set the cornerstone for the establishment of the Dutch colonial empire in Asia. It did so by not only uniting the pioneer companies into a formidable commercial monopoly, but also by transforming them into an instrument of war and colonial expansion that was directed against the Iberian powers in Asia and later, of course, also against local Asian rulers and polities. What van Oldenbarnevelt and the Gentlemen States General perhaps could not foresee—or did not wish to acknowledge—was that the Dutch company would inevitably become bogged down in defence and military infrastructure spending. These financial commitments not only seriously compromised the VOC's capacity to generate profits but importantly failed to ensure an adequate return on investments, much to the chagrin of its *participanten* (shareholders, stakeholders). Charged with projecting the war against

[9] van Ittersum, *Profit and principle,* pp. 96–97 and 109. See also Steensgaard, *The Asian trade revolution,* p. 132.

[10] van Ittersum, *Profit and principle,* p. lii.

[11] See also I.J. van Loo, "Kaapvaart, handel en staatsbelang. Het gebruik van kaapvaart als maritiem machtsmiddel en vorm van ondernemerschap tijdens de Nederlandse Opstand 1568–164", in Clé Lesger and Leo Noordegraaf eds., *Ondernemers en Bestuurders: Economie en Politiek in de Noordelijke Nederlanden in de Late Middeleeuwen en Vroegmoderne Tijd Ondernemers en Bestuurders: Economie en Politiek in de Noordelijke Nederlanden in de Late Middeleeuwen en Vroegmoderne Tijd* (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 349–68.

Spain and Portugal east of the Cape of Good Hope, the VOC acquired after 1602/3 the habit of petitioning the Dutch States General and the Admiralty Boards for defence subsidies. The squeeze on profits and available capital arising from the seemingly bottomless pit of defence and infrastructure spending in Asia could only serve to enhance the pressures on fleet commanders to compensate with yet more prize taking raids on the Iberian enemies and especially also their Asian allies. The escalation of violence in Asian waters—in the region around the Singapore and Melaka Straits—was thus almost preprogrammed. Concluding the first part of this chapter, it can be said that the VOC was created with a twin objective in mind: engaging in legitimate trade in the East Indies but also waging war on behalf of the Dutch Republic east of Cape of Good Hope. This marked a significant departure from the formal commissions and patents issued to captains sailing under the flags of the predecessor companies. In practice, however, instructions to resort to force in self-defence had already been broadly ignored or at least very generously interpreted.

Stepping-Up Violence in Southeast Asia

I now shift focus from the overarching decision-making process by the Gentlemen States General and the VOC directors in Europe to the implementation of a more coordinated, focused and far more aggressive policy in Asia. Before turning to the waters around the Malay Peninsula and especially the Singapore and Melaka Straits during the first decade of the seventeenth century, it is useful to first consider how this region came to be understood by the Dutch company and its servants stationed in Southeast Asia. There are two broader points of interest well worth underscoring at this juncture.

The first concerns what I call frontline regions in Southeast Asia. As I have previously argued in a paper on the developments leading up to implementation of the Twelve Years' Truce in Asia in the period between 1608 and 1610, the Dutch came to cast a wary eye on certain strategically and commercially important regions around insular and peninsular Southeast Asia. They came to understand that these regions were ruled by petty rajas who possessed and exercised full rights of sovereignty over structurally weak and sometimes geographically far-flung polities.[12] The Dutch regarded these weak polities and their minor rulers as inherently vulnerable to Iberian political and commercial advances and thus as likely candidates to be attracted to the Iberian world order in Southeast Asia. By the time the truce talks in Europe had reached an advanced stage, the regions and polities most in danger of being forcefully—or even peacefully—drawn into the orbit of

[12]P. Borschberg, "The Johor-VOC alliance and the twelve years truce. Factionalism, intrigue and diplomacy 1603–1613", *Institute for International Law and Justice (IILJ) Working Paper,* History and Theory of International Law Series, New York University (2009), p. 8.

Iberian interests had crystallized, and instructions from Europe pointed to the Malay Peninsula (specifically Johor) and Sumatra, the Bandas, the Moluccas, Timor as well as southern India.[13] These commercially and strategically important areas are what I have called frontline regions. Between 1608 and 1609, the VOC rushed to conclude as many contracts with rulers and polities situated in these frontline regions as possible.[14] By contrast, the large land-based and agriculturally strong polities, especially on mainland Southeast Asia such as Burma and Siam and then also the kingdom of Mataram on Java, were not seen to be under threat from Iberian advances.

The second point concerns how the Dutch began to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of the Portuguese *Estado da India.* Although in the opening years of the seventeenth century the Dutch only imperfectly grasped the complexity of the *Estado's* legal foundations and administrative structures, they did acknowledge that the political, commercial and military node established in Goa offered substantial advantages in comparison to the VOC's operations which, at that time, still functioned without a base in Asia.[15] The company was thus compelled to maintain excessively long, unbearably costly and highly unreliable lines of communication between Europe and Southeast Asia. By the early 1600s, Dutch admirals came to recognize that the Singapore and Melaka Straits represented the metaphorical Achilles heel of the *Estado da India*. They incisively concluded that, if one could gain control over the Straits, strategic communication and trade between the far-flung ports of the *Estado* could be severed. This would have impeded trade and ultimately deprived the Portuguese of the taxation revenues required to sustain their politico-military engagements across Asia. The Straits and the area surrounding it on the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, and specifically the Portuguese-held emporium of Melaka, emerged as one of the preferred hunting grounds of the Dutch privateers.

Commanders operating under the flags of the pioneer companies had already indulged in acts of anti-Portuguese violence around the Peninsula. Within a period of five years between 1600 and 1605, the Dutch (with the cooperation of the English on this occasion) attacked and plundered Portuguese merchantmen in the Melaka

[13] Borschberg, "The Johor-VOC alliance and the twelve years truce", p. 8.

[14] See Jan Ernst Heeres, "Corpus Diplomaticum Neërlando-Indicum", *BKI* 57 (1907), pp. 56–85, which includes treaties with the King of Banten in February 1609, various *negrijen* (the corrupted Malay term *negeri*, or "polity") on the island of Ambon in March, April and August 1609; Ternate in July and December 1609; Banda in August 1609; and the King of Sambas (on Borneo) in October 1609. Treaties with large, stable Asian kingdoms or empires include a treaty with Tokugawa Japan in August 1609, the Great Ayya of the Tonda-Mandalam (situated on southeastern coast of the Indian subcontinent) in March 1610 as well as the Emperor of Kandy (Ceylon) in April 1610.

[15] Concerning the role of Portuguese Goa as a model for the Dutch, see also Cornelis G. Roelofsen, "Hugo de Groot en de VOC", *De Hollandse jaren van Hugo de Groot (1582–1621). Lezingen van het colloquium ter gelegenheid van de 350-ste sterfdag van Hugo de Groot ('s-Gravenhage: 31 augustus – 1 September 1995)* (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 1996), p. 57.

Strait. Heemskerk took the *Santa Catarina* in the Singapore Strait, and Wijbrandt van Warwijk seized the Portuguese carrack *Santo António* while the ship was riding at anchor in Patani Roads. Additionally, smaller commercial craft inbound from Borneo, Java, Solor and Timor were seized near Pedra Branca at the eastern entrance of the Singapore Strait as well as in the waters off Tioman in the South China Sea.

Admirals Van der Hagen and Matelieff

This brings me back to the aforementioned resolution of the Dutch States General from November 1603. The next voyage of the VOC to set sail for the East Indies was in the process of being equipped and provisioned when the Gentlemen States General passed this resolution. The company fleet was placed under the supreme command of Steven van der Hagen and set sail from the Dutch Republic in December 1603. In the preamble of the VOC's instructions issued to van der Hagen, the necessity to employ force is visibly and carefully couched in the language of (self-)defence and to a lesser extent retaliation or revenge. In the opening lines, it speaks of the "King of Spain and the Portuguese" as "enemies of our common wellbeing" who consistently undertake efforts to impede others from accessing the Indies by "inappropriate and violent means" as well as by "evil and false practices".[16] The preamble further mentions the atrocities committed by the Spaniards and the Portuguese against the local populations in the Malukus, in Banten and in Aceh, culminating in murders and captivity of some of the said locals. The instructions then invoke the authority of the Dutch States General, but rather than speaking of an outright mandate to attack and despoil the enemy, the term "authorization" is employed, effectively blurring the divide between mission and permission. The key sentence in question is this:

> For this reason, therefore, we are required for the protection of our men and of the natives of this islands and of our friends [and allies], as well as for the promotion and assurance of the Indies trade to take offensive action against the Spanish, Portuguese and their allies, to which we (according to the *authorisation* given to us by their Honourable High Mighty Gentlemen, the States General) have framed and issued the following instructions....[17]

There is one additional aspect of Admiral van der Hagen's instructions that merits special mentioning here. When the ordinary sailors and mates learnt that the company directors had issued instructions to attack Portuguese interests and targets, they protested to the point of mutiny, arguing that they had been hired as sailors and traders and not as warriors to engage the enemy in battle or, indeed, hand-to-hand combat. This posed some serious problems not only to van der Hagen but

[16]For the source of these quotations, see notes 17 and 20 below.

[17]Jan Karel Jakob de Jonge, *Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië: Verzameling van onuitgegeven stukken uit het oud-coloniaal archief*, eerste *reeks,* vol. 3 (The Hague, 1866-1925), p. 147.

significantly also to the commander of the next fleet, Admiral Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge, who set sail from the Netherlands in 1605. The protests by the members of the crew are of special interests to the topic of privateering, as any successful plundering raised questions about the size and portion of the booty to be conceded to the crew. Customarily, the mates of merchant vessels that had successfully engaged in privateering exercises received a share amounting to 6.3 % of the registered value.[18] This was then divided into shares or portions and distributed among the officers and ships' mates according to their status aboard the vessel(s).

The instructions issued by the Gentlemen Seventeen to Admiral van der Hagen contained specific commercial as well as military objectives. After passing the Cape of Good Hope, he was to ply the same waters frequented by the Portuguese carracks between Europe and India. He attacked enemy positions in Mozambique and sought to impose a blockade on Goa, albeit with little tangible success. He harassed Portuguese shipping along the Malabar Coast, treated with the Zamorin of Calicut, founded the Dutch factories at Masulipatnam and Nizampatnam and proceeded to the Spice Islands where he rather effortlessly snatched the island of Ambon from the Portuguese in 1605.[19]

Matelieff was also issued comprehensive instructions of both a military and commercial nature.[20] His case is of particular interest, for on his return to the Netherlands in 1608, he penned several epistolary memorials which he circulated among the Gentlemen Seventeen, to his friend Hugo Grotius, Land's Advocate Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, as well as to the Stadholder, Prince Maurice of Nassau.[21] He candidly remarked: "When preparing for an exploit, one should never at all hear again: 'We weren't hired for this'".[22] This was a reference to the objections raised by the crew and ships' mates to attack the Portuguese at Melaka in a land-based offensive or in hand-to-hand combat. He also had a very negative view of them, lamenting:

> The soldiers and seamen are more interested in drinking and bad ways than in giving an edifying example, and they are always fighting. One should not give the inhabitants [of the East Indies] cause to complain about us, that we treat them more harshly than the Portuguese used to do.[23]

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[18] Enthoven, *Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek,* p. 208.

[19] The Hague, Nationaal Archief van Nederland, Inventaris van het archief van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) 1602–1795/1811 (1.04.02, no. 455). Instructions of the directors of the VOC (Gentlemen Seventeen) for Admiral Steven van der Hagen, the vice admiral and the officers' council of the fleet for the voyage to India. A partial transcript of this document is found in Jonge, *Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag,* vol. 3, pp. 146–47.

[20] The Hague, Nationaal Archief van Nederland, VOC 461.

[21] Most of these are contained in the bundle at the Nationaal Archief van Nederland, *Collectie Hugo de Groot, Supplement I* (ms. 1.10.35.02, no. 40).

[22] This manuscript has been transcribed in J.G. Frederiks, "Cornelis Cornelisz Matelieff de Jonge en zijn geslagt," *Rotterdamsche Historiebladen,* 3 afd., 1.1 (1871), pp. 204–357.

[23] Epistolary memorial by Matelieff to Grotius dated 31 August 1610, published in *Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius*, zeventiende deel, Supplement 1583–1645, ed. Henk J.M. Nellen, with the

But manning the ships with soldiers who would later be stationed in the East Indies was also not an option, as the compiled sections testify:

> In order to populate the place [that is the proposed new settlement at Jayakarta, later renamed Batavia], one would have to send as many people as possible from these regions [the Republic], people who would always be at the fatherland's service and take the place of soldiers. It is not feasible for the Company because of the high cost of the monthly wages it has to pay them [i.e. the soldiers]; instead, one should provide the people who would go and live there with means to make some money.[24]

> For the Directors' plan to man all the fortresses with soldiers will be too expensive, and will not earn us the friendship of the inhabitants.[25]

> For if you bring only soldiers there [i.e. to the East Indies], the following inconveniences will result: they scandalize the inhabitants by treating them with hostility, and without trade they will lack the most important victuals.[26]

In Asia the company found itself in a dilemma: on the one hand, the sailors were regarded as little more than restless, recalcitrant drunkards; on the other hand, soldiers scandalized the local inhabitants and also placed an unnecessary drag on the company's bottom line via their fixed monthly wages. They would get in the way of trade—and importantly of making money—rather than protecting it, because the presence of soldiers from the Netherlands would, at least in the view of Admiral Matelieff, inevitably pose problems for securing sufficient food supplies. That reduced profits, increased costs and was ultimately unacceptable.

If Matelieff continued to agonize over the appropriate and most cost-effective agents to attack and contain the Portuguese around insular and peninsular Southeast Asia, his views and recommendations on the prospects of privateering in regional waters had crystallized, as this passage testifies:

> In good time one could also go near Ceylon in February, to see what one could get from the goods which are brought to Cochin and Goa from Bengal and Nagapattinam. If this is done with good discipline, I do not doubt that it would yield good spoils, for which the armourers will be grateful. And since this could not happen without the Portuguese instantly arming themselves in defence, we should keep these yachts and ships clean and ready to sail.... For the rest, one should act according to circumstances, and if we have a good fleet at our disposal, visit Melaka Roads and destroy the ships at anchor there. Most of all, we should see to it that we are ready by the time that the ships from China come to Melaka, to attack them—for that is what damages the Portuguese the most . . . .[27]

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addenda compiled by C.M. Ridderikhoff (The Hague, 2001), no. 198A, pp. 71–75. This and other documents translated from Dutch.

[24]Epistolary memorial by Matelieff to Grotius, dated 12 November 1608, in Frederiks, "Cornelis Cornelisz Matelieff de Jonge en zijn geslagt", *Rotterdamsche Historiebladen,* 3 afd., 1.1 (1871), p. 243.

[25]Epistolary memorial by Matelieff to Grotius dated 31 August 1610, published in *Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius*, ed. Nellen, no. 198A, pp. 71–75.

[26]Epistolary memorial by Matelieff to Grotius, dated 14 December 1613, in Philip Christiaan Molhuysen ed., *Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius*, eerste deel, 1597 – Augustus 1618 (The Hague, 1928), no. 309, 285–87, p. 286.

[27]Frederiks, "Cornelis Cornelisz Matelieff de Jonge en zijn geslagt," *Rotterdamsche Historiebladen,* 3 afd., 1.1 (1871), pp. 204–357. The quoted passage is found on p. 259.

This excerpt from Matelieff reveals a number of crucial aspects relating to his thinking about privateering in the region around the Malay Peninsula. First, he recognized that the annual Portuguese trade with China was overall as lucrative—if not more lucrative—than the trade in spices. However, he was probably not aware at the time of just how much profit the Portuguese reaped from the trade between China and Japan. Still, if the objective was to inflict damage on the Portuguese, both private citizens and the *Estado da India,* then attacking and plundering the ships from China around the Singapore or Melaka Straits was by far the most cost-effective solution. For the revenue from the trade with China simply dwarfed the taxes and excises reaped from the spice trade. But inflicting damage on Portuguese interests and key settlements such as Melaka had its clear drawbacks. To scour the waters of the Straits diverted precious equipment and personnel from the VOC's mandate of generating profits from trade. It is against the backdrop of these considerations that Matelieff floated the idea of "outsourcing" privateering activities to private individuals. Who these private, non-company individuals might be is insufficiently clear in this context. What is certain, however, is that their VOC-mandated task would be to restrict as far as possible food imports into the Portuguese colony of Melaka, certainly by sea and possibly also overland. In exchange for their services, they would evidently be granted licence to seize booty from the Portuguese enemy and presumably also their allies attempting to supply the colony with victuals and other necessities. Matelieff's scheme is echoed in the following excerpt taken from his epistolary memorial of 12 November 1608:

> I do not doubt that we could find private individuals who, if we instruct them well, for the sake of prize and booty would let themselves be used for this. They should guard Melaka both to the north and to the south, which would hinder the city greatly. Because it has no food other than that which is imported, Melaka would find this hard to deal with, especially if we were a little rough with those who bring food to the city. Those importing food from the south are mostly Javanese, but the Portuguese bring it from the north, both from Bengal and from Coromandel. These privateers should take care at which times [of the year] they would have to guard Melaka in the south and at which times in the north.[28]

As VOC policy evolved in the opening decades of the seventeenth century, the task of patrolling the waters of the Singapore and Melaka Straits was not in fact outsourced to private individuals, but, because of the lucrative revenues from privateering, remained a responsibility of the company. The objective, however, remained the same, namely, to gain and maintain control of the Singapore Strait; appease the neighbouring King of Johor and coopt him into various military schemes against the Portuguese; and, like a python killing its prey, gradually tighten the inflow of supplies, especially foodstuffs, on which the Portuguese colony so heavily depended. In the words of Admiral van der Hagen, who wrote to the

[28]Frederiks, "Cornelis Cornelisz Matelieff de Jonge en zijn geslagt", pp. 258–59. Due to the monsoon winds, ships arriving from the north arrived with the southwest monsoon between May and August, while those from the south arrived with the northeast monsoon between October and March.

Gentlemen Seventeen on 20 August 1618, the objective of the VOC for the region around the Malay Peninsula should be:

> [T]o make us masters of the Singapore Strait and ensure that no junks call at Melaka to trade. [We can also leave the latter] to the subjects of the king of Johor so that we do not have to bear the wrath of these East Indian nations.[29]

The privateering campaign around the Peninsula and the Straits proved to be a very successful strategy. In penning his memorial titled *Information about Building Some Castles and Fortresses in the Straits of Singapore and Other Regions of the South, etc.,* which was probably written in the 1620s, the Flemish merchant Jacques de Coutre, who had resided in Melaka in the late 1590s, recommended the following urgent measures to counter the activities of the Dutch privateers in the Straits region:

> All this commerce described above has been disturbed by the [Dutch] rebels. They are the ones who today benefit from the said trade. To remedy this state of affairs and redirect trade to Melaka, Your Majesty must order that a very strong fortress or citadel be built in the Strait of Singapore, with a good dungeon and good artillery, munitions and supplies as is advisable. The residents of the citadel could also acquire supplies from the vessels that pass through the said Straits, both from those that sail towards Melaka as well as those that are going to Aceh, from the ships that go and return.[30]

In what appears to be a later memorial titled *Information for Your Majesty to Remedy the Estado da India,* de Coutre conceded with evident disappointment and consternation:

> Your Majesty has lost all this trade; which is now in the hands of the [Dutch] rebels. They have grown rich with this commerce and by means of their privateering, the Portuguese in India have become impoverished and have lost a lot. This is why Your Majesty should help and remedy that state in the manner that I have described, so as not to lose those lands [also] and the many Christian communities that there are in them.[31]

With the benefit of hindsight, de Coutre's assessment of the situation at the time was correct. The Iberian battle against the Dutch privateers around the Malay Peninsula was lost.

The Twelve Years' Truce in Asia

The Dutch historian M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz advanced the claim that the VOC was, as a general rule, engaged in honest trading and commercial activities. This chapter has not questioned this broader verdict but certainly has problematized its

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[29] Paul Anton Tiele and Jan Ernst Heeres eds., *Bouwstoffen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanders in den Maleischen Archipel* 3 vols. (The Hague, 1886–95), I, p. 233.

[30] Coutre, J. de, Benjamin N. Teesma eds., *Como Remediar o Estado da India? Being the Appendices of the Vida de Jaques de Coutre* (Leiden: Centre for the History of European Expansion, 1989), ms. 2780, fols. 270–76.

[31] Coutre, *Como Remediar o Estado da India?,* ms. 2780, "Emformación para Su Magestad remediar el estado en la India Oriental," fols. 277–87. The text excerpt is found in fol. 287.

validity for the first decade of its corporate lifespan with implications for the period *ca*. 1602–1621, that is, from the company's formation until the end of the Twelve Years' Truce. It is certainly not my intention here to estimate the proportion of revenue and profits reaped from early privateering activities. But seeing as prize taking could generate profits in multiples of the company's paid-in capital base—as famously demonstrated by the *Santa Catarina* incident of 1603 and to a lesser extent also by the *Santo António* incident in 1605—then one can surmise that booty obtained under the laws of war contributed to a not insubstantial portion of overall company profit, if profit is indeed even a term that can be appropriately employed in this context.

The first part of this chapter has retraced a series of decisions and resolutions that shaped early Dutch policy in the East Indies. It shows a significant transformation in attitudes towards handling the Iberian powers in Asia, which came as a result of shifting visions and policy decisions both at the level of the VOC and its pioneer companies as well as the States General of the Dutch Republic. Beginning with a policy of engaging the enemy in self-defence only, the competition between the predecessor companies, the forging of the VOC in 1602 and the acquisition of its first territorial dependencies (such as Ambon) after 1605 clearly reflect an evolving policy of the company and of the Dutch Republic for Asia at large.

Some historians, including recently van Ittersum, have argued that the resolution of the Dutch States General dated 1 November 1603 represented a clear landmark in the transition from engaging the enemy only in instances of self-defence to actively hunting down the enemy in Asian waters for despoliation under the laws of war. With reference to the latter, the region around the Malay Peninsula and specifically also the Singapore and Melaka Straits moved to the forefront of attention. While doubtlessly very important as a policy decision within a European context, it must always be remembered that the resolution of 1 November 1603 itself was the product of enhanced aggression directed against the Iberian enemy outside the European theatre. The resolution did not represent an entirely novel, sudden or even visionary blueprint for future VOC action, but rather formalized a shift towards aggression that was already taking shape since the late 1590s. In this sense, one should understand the landmark resolution of November 1603 as the formal endorsement for a new policy for Asia, rather than as the actual *cause* or origin of it. With this observation I have reached the very heart of my chapter.

If attention in the first part of this argument was dedicated to exploring the new policy at the level of government and the company directors, its second part examined how policies were implemented in Asia, with a particular focus on the geographic region of the Malay Peninsula and the adjacent Singapore and Melaka Straits. It would appear that during the first decade of the seventeenth century, the big shift did not occur so much with the resolution of the Dutch States General of 1 November 1603, but rather a few years later between 1608 and 1610 with instructions preparing the VOC's Asian-based servants for the imminent truce with the two Iberian empires. Historians in Europe have assumed—and wrongly assumed I should immediately adjoin here—that the Twelve Years' Truce was designed from the onset to be valid in the European theatre only. The surviving evidence at hand

does not support such a view. In fact, the biggest changes to VOC policy took shape in preparing Asian servants for the implementation of the truce, starting with the instructions of 11 April 1608.[32] As resolved by the Treaty of Antwerp in April 1609, the truce would become effective in regions east of the Cape of Good Hope one calendar year later—that is, 10 April 1610—a lag that would give ample time to issue fresh instructions to company servants stationed around the Indian Ocean Rim. But in hindsight the truce was not to last east of the Cape, and by 1613 at the very latest, it had broken down completely in Asia.[33]

The short-lived Twelve Years' Truce in Asia—or rather, the prospect of a truce announced to Asian-based company servants via the instructions of 11 April 1608—certainly had a far greater impact on actual developments in Asia than the resolution of the Dutch States General from November 1603. This was almost certainly not the intention of the superiors in Europe, but rather the result of how instructions were received and implemented by the men on the spot. As is evidenced by the *Santa Catarina* and *Santo António* incidents with reference to the waters around the Malay Peninsula, stepped-up aggression directed at hard and soft targets of the Iberian powers was the order of the day well before the resolution came into effect. By contrast, however, as prospects of a truce grew clearer after April 1608, the officers of the Dutch company sought to grab as much of the trading pie as possible before the truce would take effect. A string of treaties were signed within a relatively short period between early 1609 and early 1610 to cement the economic and political frontlines across Asia as well as to preempt the Iberian powers from doing the same.

Conclusion

More than any other event in the first decade of the seventeenth century, the prospect of implementing the Twelve Years' Truce in Asia heavily impacted the way the company understood its mission and also the way it operated on the ground across the region covered by its charter. This is a major departure from the story as told from the vantage point of resolutions passed in Europe. Irrespective of whether the Dutch company had been transformed into an instrument of plunder and war by Van Oldenbarnevelt and the Dutch States General, the modus operandi in Asia did not favour a silence of arms. Prize taking did indeed contribute meaningfully towards offsetting the heavy financial commitments incurred by lending armed support to Asian allies, as well as the building of commercial and military infrastructure around insular Southeast Asia. The Dutch company had come to behave like a drug addict: it became dependent on revenues from prize taking to stem a heavy drain on financial resources arising from its engagement in the war effort against the Iberian powers in Asia. Admittedly this balance between building up costly (military)

[32] Borschberg, "The Johor-VOC alliance and the twelve years truce", p. 6.

[33] Borschberg, "The Johor-VOC alliance and the twelve years truce", p. 8.

infrastructure in Asia and generating profits for the stakeholders was not entirely of its own doing. Still, it is evident from surviving materials that company officers in Asia deeply disliked the truce, saw it as a threat to the company's sprawling and expanding interests across the region and thus rejected it from the onset. The truce also caused considerable friction with Asian allies who felt increasingly that they had been abandoned by the Dutch in the conflict with the Iberian powers across the frontline regions. The contracts they had forged in the period 1606–1610 were progressively questioned by the Asian signatories who were increasingly reluctant to fulfil the exclusive delivery clauses contained in their contracts with the Dutch. Once the truce had the prospect of taking hold in the Asian theatre, rulers, including the king of Johor, almost immediately sued for peace and signed new agreements and alliances with the Portuguese.[34] Perhaps this widening rift or disconnect between the policymakers in Europe and the decisions made by the men on the spot in Asia needs closer attention by historians. The temptation to seize prizes from the Iberian enemy in the favoured spots across Southeast Asia, around the Malay Peninsula and particularly in the Straits appears to hold the key.

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Chapter 4
Violence and Piratical/Surreptitious Activities Associated with the Chinese Communities in the Melaka–Singapore Region (1780–1840)

Sandy J.C. Liu

Abstract The chapter hopes to examine the Chinese as an exogenous and endogenous group who had either settled or intermittently infiltrated the Melaka–Singapore region in the Malay Archipelago. The Chinese in the archipelago had often been associated in Western sources with "rather positive" traits such as hardworkingness, astute business acumen, etc., characteristics which could help European colonizers sustain newly founded settlements. The chapter probes the shady world in which disparate subgroups of this ethnicity or creole ethnicity, whether these were related to one another, were engaged in surreptitious activities, or in banditry acts on the seas, which contributed indirectly and sometimes directly to general violence in the region. Overall, whether the Chinese were a more "peaceful" group interested in pecuniary relative to other interests and whether they contributed indirectly to militarization and tensions in the Malay Archipelago are re-examined.

The Chinese in Southeast Asia in the period before 1840 have seldom been studied for their political ambitions—and for good reason, because they were hardly unified as an explicit political entity. One can talk about a gradation of scale in the way in which Chinese gathered and survived in Southeast Asia. There were some who were relatively well off and were indigenized, in a sense, forming a political-economic elite in the society they settled in. On the other side of the scale, there were Chinese who were not indigenized and had asserted themselves as a political state entity (as in the case of the Lanfang Republic). It is interesting to note that as the imperialist powers in Southeast Asia stepped up their control with the advent of the second wave of industrialization and the associated wave of imperialistic

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expansion in the latter half of the nineteenth century, none of the more autonomous entities that the Chinese had formed survived.[1]

The discussion of the diaspora Chinese communities in the region until the first half of the nineteenth century dwells mostly upon their commerce making as well as the nature of their exodus (from sojourning to settlement). Although commercial activities could be competitive and hostile in themselves, the discussion of the Chinese community has usually not been couched in the terminology of violence or in militaristic terms. This is not to discount that brilliant studies have been conducted on the activities of secret societies (which may be equated to quasi-political organizations) in Southeast Asia.[2] This chapter will survey and locate the works that have been done on piratical and surreptitious activities in the larger context of informal violence and sectors of economy or society. These may be understood as an evolving and overlapping space (not necessarily constrained by the physical space) where agents of state as well as quasi and non-state actors interacted to perform their dealings, "legitimate" or illegal.

In terms of the discussion from the official point of view, the Chinese court did not appear to inhibit trade (or even emigration) after the country's opening up during the Han Dynasty. G. W. Wang thought that the "nearest thing in China to an awareness of overseas Chinese only appeared in the early seventeenth century; [in the form of] Zhang Xie's *Dongxiyang Kao*".[3] The restrictions seem to have increased from the time of the Ming and Qing Dynasties—specifically during the reigns of Longqing (*Wokou* period, at its height in the 1550s) and Kangxi (against the Zheng organization in Taiwan from 1661 to 1683).[4] Regarding the Ming period, R. Ptak's detailed survey charting the fluctuations in China's trade with Southeast Asia divides the period from the mid-fourteenth century to just after the mid-sixteenth century into five phases. Up until the mid-Qing period, L. Blusse, among

[1]See M.E. Chamberlain, *The Longman companion to the formation of the European empires* (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000).

[2]See, for instance, L.F. Mak, *Sociology of secret societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). An attempt to update the field is seen in contributions of a gathering of impressive scholars in D. Ownby and M. Heidhues edited, *Secret societies reconsidered* (London: ME Sharpe, 1993). Broader works, prior and in the last 20 years, such as J. Vaughan, *Manners and customs of the Chinese in the Straits Settlements* (Singapore: Mission Press, 1879); V. Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967); C.H. Yen, *A social history of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986); C. Trocki, *Opium and empire: Chinese society in Colonial Singapore* (London: Cornell University Press, 1990); W. L. Blythe's *Impact of Chinese secret societies in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969); and L. F. Comber's *Chinese secret societies in Malaya* (New York: J.J. Augustine, 1959).

[3]G. W. Wang, "Status of Overseas Chinese studies", in Wang L. C. and Wang G. W. eds., *The Chinese diaspora: Selected essays* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998), p. 3.

[4]See essays surveying a broad chronological period collected in R. Antony edited, *Elusive pirates, pervasive smugglers: Violence and clandestine trade in the Greater China Seas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010).

others, has also investigated the impact of China's external trade policies, especially after 1757, on trade abroad.[5]

The diaspora from China is usually seen in the context of the policy orientation of the court and centre in trade and sanctions for overseas travel. The traditional paradigm (most notably of J. K. Fairbank) of Chinese–foreign relationships in the premodern period saw interactions predominantly in terms of the tribute- and gift-exchange missions between the imperial court and vassals along a hierarchy of scale. Studies of the Tang and Song periods reveal that China was not always an overawing power and utilized "permission to trade" (or tribute exchange, usually bestowed at a loss to China) as an instrument of foreign policy. Increasingly, with rising interest in the military culture linked to China, the notion of a pacifist Middle Kingdom is increasingly being questioned. G. Wade published a working paper reassessing (and highlighting the aggressive nature of) the voyages of Zheng He as early as 2004. Wade and L. C. Sun jointly edited and published *Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century: The China Factor* in 2010. Although this chapter focuses on informal violence, it is worth noting that works on Chinese military ventures overseas (initiated by the court) are comparatively limited. Other than Wade and Sun's treatment of Chinese military involvement overseas, other recently published works devote little attention to Chinese military exploits overseas before the modern period. Sun's work, for instance, acknowledges the impact of Chinese gunpowder technology on the mainland Southeast Asian states before the coming of the Europeans.[6] This is not to discount that the Chinese during the Qing period were "officially" more preoccupied with inland expansion.[7]

The field of studies of diaspora Chinese in the Malay Archipelago between Zheng He's arrival in Melaka (fifteenth century) and the founding of Singapore (nineteenth century) has always been in need of more attention relative to other periods. Researchers such as John Miksic have maintained the existence of sizeable Chinese communities in Southeast Asia on the grounds of discovery of archaeological and material evidence dating from the Song Period (960–1279). Other researchers, such as Kenneth Hall, Derek Heng, and G. W. Wang, have tried to prove the thesis via the existence of a trade and distribution network involving the exchange of

[5]L. Blusse, *Strange company: Chinese settlers, mestizo women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia* (Leiden: KITLV, 1986), see especially chapters IV and VI. See also P. van Dyke, *Port Guangzhou and Pearl River Delta* (University of S. California, 2002).

[6]Li Tana's work [*Nguyen Cochinchina* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1998)] on Vietnam can also be said to contribute on the subject of Chinese military influence on mainland Southeast Asian states in the early modern period. See G. Wade and L. C. Sun, *Southeast Asia in the 15th century* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2010). See also working and conference papers by G. Wade, "Zheng He voyages: A reassessment". ARI working paper series, no. 31 (October 2004), pp. 1–29.

[7]The numerous works done on the subject can be seen in, for instance, P. Perdue's *China marches West*, R. Dunnell et al.-edited *New Qing Imperial History: Making of Inner Asian empire at Qing Chengde*, and Y. C. Dai's *The Sichuan frontier and Tibet: Imperial strategy in the early Qing*.

Chinese goods.[8] This chapter provides a survey of the literature on the nature of the Chinese arrival and settlement (whether hostile or peaceful) in a particular region of archipelagic Southeast Asia. A version of the chronology of the Chinese coming to Southeast Asia is discussed. Groups of Chinese involved in violent and surreptitious activities in the Straits of Melaka during the period 1780–1840 are surveyed. In the process, the relationship between the two realms of activity (violent and surreptitious) is explored.

Why is the transitional period worth probing into? Writing in a contributory chapter in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, J. Kathirithamby-Wells affirms the transition occurring from the mid-eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries. The in-between period was one in which the trends appeared to be more "uniform" for the mainland states compared to the insular states. In insular Southeast Asia, the coming of the Dutch and British, apart from the Spanish who had established themselves in the Philippines, led to the creation of a diversity of smaller states and economies. The potential and resources of the Chinese, whether their communities were developing autonomously or in the societies of their residence, were harnessed in the forging of the new states or economies. Tagging on to C. Trocki's investigation of the political economy and organization of opium production and distribution, the beginning of a more sophisticated evolution of the kongsi in Southeast Asia also signifies the stepping up of violence and surreptitious activities, with implications on the theme of the investigation of this chapter and book.

In terms of the Chinese who settled in the region, this piece of writing has also chosen to focus on the Peranakan Chinese communities in the early period of the establishment of British settlements in the Malay Archipelago. Affirming the larger findings of W. Skinner, Peranakans—if they were distinctively conscious enough about themselves or recognized by the other communities (Straits Settlements laws did not appear to make any distinction between Baba and non-Baba Chinese)[9] and linking with other players on the scene (non-Peranakan Chinese and Europeans/non-Europeans)—held a certain clout in economic (and political) affairs in the Straits Settlements. The main message of this chapter is that while diaspora Chinese were often linked to more benign economic activities, they were also very astute power players. The tensions, and the resulting violence, if it came to that, saw input by various Chinese groups from within and outside the Singapore–Melaka region; whether they collaborated with one another. The process of the more benign

[8]K. Hall, "Economic history of early Southeast Asia", in *Cambridge history of Southeast Asia* vol. 1, eds., N. Tarling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 183–275; D. Heng, *Sino-Malay trade and diplomacy* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009); G. W. Wang, *The Nanhai trade: The early history of Chinese trade in the South China Sea* (Singapore: Times Academic Press); M. R. Fernando, "Chinese traders in the Malay Archipelago in the 17th and 18th centuries", in C. K. Ng and G. W. Wang eds., *Maritime China in transition* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004), pp. 227–44; and L. Suryadinata, *Chinese diaspora since Admiral Zhenghe* (Singapore: Chinese Heritage Centre, 2007).

[9]G. W. Skinner, "Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia", in A. Reid ed., *Sojourners and settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese* (St. Leonard: Allen and Unwin, 1996), p. 71.

struggle at the beginning of the nineteenth century between prominent Peranakan Chinese and other Chinese (sub-linguistic) groups generated a certain tension and conflict. Exogenous and endogenous groups, motivated by a combination of power and pecuniary interests, contributed to the violence in the Melaka–Singapore region.

While aspects of organization and settlement of the diaspora Chinese have been written about in the past, the discussion has been little linked to the deeper polemics of violence (formal and informal) and surreptitious activities, partly because evidence supporting analysis in this direction is limited and partly because military history and violence-related studies were not the most fashionable things to investigate about the Chinese.[10] Trocki's research on the political economy of the Singapore–Malaya region and the diaspora Chinese role there forms an important landmark in the literature on the subject. Trocki's work on opium and Chinese society begins serious survey after the 1840s. By that time (in fact, beginning from 1830), the decline of the Chinese junk trade and the process of absorption of Chinese settlements (into European administration in the colonies) had begun, and it would evolve over the next 50 years.[11] For the period before 1840, Trocki's limited treatment on the diaspora Chinese, however, is optimistic that the state of knowledge allows for a comprehensive picture on the subject. The "fairly distinct type of community" was "characterized by some form of kongsi organization". Trocki cites examples to show that the Chinese were largely peaceful in nature—the Chinese settlements in the region were usually superior in numbers (including the armed force) but seldom "took the law into their own hands and set themselves at odds with the Malay chiefs [and native population]". The period from the 1780s to 1820s (specifically 1787) also saw the shattering of native Malay power by the Dutch; this development did not lead the Chinese to develop a more politically assertive force beyond stepping up the defence in their sailing vessels. Referring to the timeline (Table 4.1) in the Appendix, Trocki's five-stage periodization framework of the Chinese can be adjusted to cater to part of the argument of this chapter.

In terms of Chinese engaging in piratical or surreptitious activities, N. Tarling points out that Chinese in junks, following the seasonal winds, sometimes acted as pirates in the waters of the Malay Archipelago.[12] Other than petty robbery, the Chinese were seldom presented as pirates even though D. Murray's treatment on disruption from internal war and resulting piracy on the Vietnam coast involving Chinese participants is located between the Malay Archipelago and China. Looking at the "corrupt" arrangements between Chinese merchants, Canton officials and Europeans back in China, the Chinese—usually described as being adept in

[10] See survey by Wang in "Status of overseas Chinese studies", pp. 1–17, in conjunction with G. Wade's works accounted for in the earlier endnote.

[11] At 1843, Kiong Kong Tuan held the licence to the opium and spirit farms of Singapore and, past the mid-decade, the farms in Johor as well (Cheang Sam Teo had joined the partnership by then). By the end of the decade, the "Lau-Cheang Syndicate" had materialized. The Cheang family would continue to dominate the industry to 1879.

[12] N. Tarling, *Piracy and politics in the Malay world* (Singapore: D. Moore, 1963), p. 214.

money matters compared to the other ethnic groups—were naturally susceptible to surreptitious and smuggling activities in the Malay Archipelago, facilitated by the "frontier society" in the region during the transitional period between 1780 and 1840. Studies touching on the surreptitious activities are usually linked to the activities of secret societies and kongsis and coincide with the peak of the coolie influx in the 1860s and 1870s. On the ground, as certain studies have shown and which this study will illuminate further, Chinese businessmen who were aligned with hegemonic power(s) in a geographical locale or who were labelled "clean" were not dissociated from surreptitious or illicit activities, linked with secret societies which were usually the collaborative partners of these powers.[13] This was because, as Trocki has reiterated, during the period before the 1860s–1870s, the Straits Settlements government had neither the will nor the resources to break the political power of the Chinese community, which was rested in the amalgamation of elites, clan associations and secret societies based around prominent temples located in Chinatown in the settlement in question.[14]

We may take a look at the larger picture of violence (especially formal) during 1780–1820 to better locate the subject matter of piracy and surreptitious activities in the Singapore–Melaka region. A. Reid argues that the adoption of European military technologies facilitated the formation of larger Southeast Asian states. J. Black has encouraged more attention on the non-Eurocentric approach to the study of wars.[15] Evidence has also been presented of the larger armies that contributed to this process, possibly leading to larger and more intensive conflicts and engagements.[16] Other than the incursions by the Qing Dynasty in Burma

[13]For anyone reading the history of Singapore in relation to its founder, Stamford Raffles, vice and surreptitious industries, such as gambling, prostitution, opium farming and distribution, as well as slave or coolie trafficking, trades that were most liable to be exploited by the triads, were "ideally" supposed to be banned in this "enlightened island experiment". "Raffles considered it was the government's duty to prevent crime and to reform rather than punish criminals . . . He set out to discourage violence by banning the carrying of weapons and to curb what he considered the worst vice, notably gambling . . . Heavy taxation was used to discourage other supposedly lesser vices, such as drunkenness and opium smoking. [Finally], while it would be unrealistic to attempt to ban prostitution, [Raffle's] laws forbade men living off the earnings of prostitutes . . . Raffles shared the aversion of humanitarian and radical men of his generation to the practice of slavery . . . slave-debtors among the Malay population were to work off their debts within [a limited period] . . . [even] the semi-slavery of penniless Chinese immigrants, who pledged their labour to employers in return for payment of their passage money, [were not overlooked] . . . Harsh measures [were] designed to root out corrupting vices". Raffles had been angry at Farquhar's initiative to license gambling and was at loggerheads with the latter for condoning slave trading. The third resident (J. Crawfurd) "succeeded in extracting more revenue from the opium and arrack farms and sold licenses for pawnbrokers as well as for the manufacture and sale of gunpowder. His major innovation was to revive the gambling farm, which became the most profitable source of income". M. Turnbull, *History of Singapore* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, xx), pp. x.

[14]Trocki, *Opium and empire*, pp. 220–39. See also P. L. Tan, "Chinese secret societies and labor control in nineteenth century Straits Settlements", *Kajian Malaysia*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1983), pp. 14–48.

[15]See, for instance, J. Black, *Warfare in the eighteenth century* (London: Cassell, 1995), pp. 16–19.

[16]See M. Charney, *Southeast Asian warfare* (Leiden: Brill, 2004).

(1760s) and the Tayson revolt (1771–1802, which Murray wrote about and which caused serious piratical disruptions in the Nanyang seas), the British were engaged in the First Anglo-Burman War from 1824 to 1826 while the Dutch were fighting the Java War from 1825 to 1830. It may be of interest to note that the war in Java in 1825 was sparked by an attack by a local prince against the British as well as the Chinese on the island. Involvement by diaspora Chinese (then not recognized by the authorities in China) in conflicts of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in the region has not been given its due consideration. Activities in the formal and informal realms were not easy to differentiate. A survey of the activities of Chinese secret societies from Mak L. F.'s seminal work shows that before 1840, other than Chinese–Malay clashes in Melaka (notably in 1833), Chinese secret societies were most involved in Penang in the war between Siam and Kedah in 1825 (participation on the Siamese side in 1836 is pegged at one-fourth of the whole force).[17] While data from a few statistical compendiums of warfare and armed conflicts does not appear to register a steady increase in the numbers of injured and dead in the colonial wars from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries (before the period of high imperialism), the contribution of the Chinese, which could come in the form of arms trade and subsidiary (secret society) armed participation, is certain but may not be easily quantified.

Still at the level of general violence, a sampling of civil strife or violent crimes, committed at the individual or collective level and especially if they were linked to organized crime, will be briefly discussed here. At the broader level of society, a sampling of the civil strife experienced between individuals and crimes undertaken at the individual level, especially if linked with the residual outcome of secret society dealings or activities, can be gleaned from the "lost archives of Melaka" and the Batavia kongan. Although the latter documents incidents in Batavia, certain similarities between the two settlements, in addition to the existence of secret societies in Batavia, allow for a measured inference to be made in relation to Melaka or Singapore.[18] R. Fernando's sampling from the "lost archives" gives some idea of the domestic crimes committed in Melaka.[19] These cases involved the murders of people embroiled in love affairs as well as bad master–slave relations. One story involves the activities of a band of Chinese pirates who had committed murder in the region; this will be discussed in the later paragraphs on Chinese pirates.[20] In Batavia, civil cases can be found from the kongan sampling involving robbery, scuffling and fighting, homicide (not always involving a secret society) as well as incidents associated with secret societies. Cases settled in court from the same

[17] Mak, *Sociology of secret societies*, pp. 130–32. See also M. Wynne, *Triad and tabut* (Singapore: W.T. Cherry, 1941), p. 211.

[18] Skinner, "Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia", p. 64.

[19] See R. Fernando, "The lost archives of Melaka: Are they really lost?", *Journal of Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. LXXVIII (2005), pp. 1–36.

[20] R. Fernando, *Murder most foul: Panorama of social life in Melaka from 1780s to 1820s* (Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 2006), survey of book.

source reveal instances of owing of money and goods, siphoning of funds as well as problems arising from the resale of opium and other products. The systems of criminal and civil law in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies each went through their own evolution. Surveying the Kyshe case compilation and comparing the records of Batavia (kongan), it appears that cases involving Chinese were seldom lodged in Western courts[21]; as in the case of Batavia, they were adjudicated via the Chinese kapitan. The adjudication procedure under the kapitan probably followed the clannish (or, at most, mimicking the yamen, the local district level magistrate court in China) judiciary process as it was carried out in China.[22] From a sociological perspective, crimes and deviations in colonial society could at times spiral out of the control of the Chinese organizations charged with caretaking the community. Although massacres in Batavia (1740) and Manila (1603) were motivated by the insecurities of the colonial masters, the potential to usurp power—prompted in the first case by the fragile relations between the elite and the lower-class Chinese masses (with speculations that the kapitan did lead the latter in the initial part of the social disruption) and in the second case by Chinese officials (mandarins) arriving from China (with suspicion that a revolt was being instigated)—was not lost.[23] In Melaka, outbreaks of fighting between the Ghee Hin and Hai San can be traced to 1834, although earlier conflicts between Chinese and Malays (possibly in the form of a Chinese versus a Malay secret society) should also be taken into account. In Singapore, riots can be pinpointed to as early as 1824, although there were doubts that the early disruptions had anything to do with secret societies.[24]

The banditry and surreptitious activities that the Chinese were involved in at the individual and group levels during the period 1780–1840 were not committed only by settlers or sojourners residing in the Melaka–Singapore region. They were perpetuated by secret societies—secret societies before the mid-nineteenth and certainly before the third quarter of the nineteenth century (when the Chinese Protectorate was formed) are generally believed to have been more benign, Macanese

[21] J. W. Kyshe, *Cases heard and determined in Her Majesty's Supreme Court of Straits Settlements, 1808–84*, vols. 1–3 (Somerset: Legal Library Publishing, 1885).

[22] A joint paper by A. Greif (Stanford University) and G. Tabellini (Bocconi University) comparing developments in China and Europe with their associative effects on the legal structure of the land and locality is interesting for the possible inference it can provide on how groups might evolve in overseas ("The clan and the city: Sustaining cooperation in China and Europe", version July 2012, retrieved from http://www.google.com.sg/#hl=en&tbo=d&sclient=psy-ab&q=chinese+clans+skinner+studies&oq=chinese+clans+skinner+studies&gs_l=hp.3...963.13298.1.13867.27.18.7.1.2.1.1887.12071.1j3j3j1j3j2j1j0j4.18.0.les%3B..0.0...1c.1.eYS7S55mQCg&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.&fp=a56f24f736a0489a&bpcl=38897761&biw=1024&bih=454, 21 Nov 2012). See also Q. Lin, *Qingdai yanmen tushuo* (Beijing: Zhonghua bookstore, 2006).

[23] See J. Borao, "Massacre of 1603: Chinese perception of Spaniards in the Philippines", *Itinerario*, vol. 23, no. 1 (1998), pp. 28–33; A. Kemasang, "Overseas Chinese in Java and their liquidation in 1740", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 19 (1981), pp. 123–46; and L. Blusse, "Batavia: The rise and fall of a Chinese colonial town", in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 12 (1981), pp. 159–78.

[24] Mak, *Sociology of secret societies*, pp. 130–32 (calendar of activities).

smugglers sailing southwards, Chinese pirates sailing southwards as a result of instability in mainland China and localized groups (pirates or smugglers) who were outside the system. Of the activities associated with the Chinese, some were embedded across time in the society they settled in, as part of structure, as Braudel calls it; others were episodic and fitted with tumultuous events and chronology of the people in and outside the archipelagic region.

The Chinese dominance in trade has been researched to some extent and is indeed not to be discounted. L. K. Wong, writing on the trade of Singapore in 1819–1869, affirms the important role that Chinese played as middlemen in distributing goods from the Malay Archipelago and China. Wong writes, "it was not the demand for British manufactures which brought the Chinese junks to Singapore".[25] Opium, a good that Trocki deems to have oiled the commerce of the region, was imported in quantity from India but did not necessarily cater for the China market. Even after the Opium War (1841–1842), in the face of increasing competition from square-rigged vessels favoured by Westerners, Chinese operators and investors began deploying similar vessels in their trading voyages. Hence, Western traders, particularly the British, were not able to replace the Chinese in the middleman role in bringing archipelagic produce to China.

J. Cushman's *Fields from the Sea* (1993) lists a variety of exports from Siam to China that were handled by Chinese traders. Cross-referencing N. Hussin's map (in map section) on the trading network and places of origin of commodities, goods that overlapped in both sources—such as pepper, wood, betel nut, etc., supplied from Batavia (Java), Sumatra and Borneo—must have been handled by Chinese middlemen.[26] The arms market, which saw Chinese involvement, also experienced a boom period during the transition from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth. Cushman's study, supported by C. M. Turnbull's observations in *The Straits Settlements*, is useful also because it offers a scenario whereby a combination of people—the junk captain, brokers, consignors and carriers—had more than the usual vested interest in the seasonal junk trip that they were contracted to or employed in, because of the investments they made in the trip.[27] Not all traders participated in longer voyages. Chinese traders based in Melaka were alleged to be

[25]L. K. Wong, *The trade of Singapore, 1819–69* (Bandar Puchong Jaya: MBRAS, 2003), p. 107.

[26]A recent compilation of essays on "Chinese capital, commodities, and networks in Southeast Asia" explores how overseas Chinese were involved in certain selected commodities and able to "dominate [even precariously] certain regional and colonial markets". In the essays collected covering case studies from the classical period to the twentieth century, the lack of in-depth studies of an array of commodities monopolized by the Chinese, as well as of a comprehensive and coherent quantitative analysis, is highlighted. See Tagliacozzo and Chang eds., *Chinese circulations*, 2011, p. xi; see also chapter entries in the book: H. K. Kwei, "Javanese cotton trade industry from the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries", and X. A. Wu "Rice trade and Chinese rice millers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: Case of Malaya", in *Chinese circulations*, pp. 283–304 and 336–59 respectively.

[27]Cushman 1993, pp. 68–75. M. Turnbull, *The Straits Settlements, 1826–67* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 184.

mostly small traders (and operated *prahus*). The stress on the role of the Chinese in the Melaka Straits needs to be seen in the context of other ethnic groups operating in the region.[28]

It is thought that feuds between secret societies, founded at various times during the transitional period, were more benign because the competition during this period was not as intense.[29] This line of thought does not, however, take into account that the Peranakans, the important group of Chinese involved in the process, were gradually being pressured. While it is true that the interests and relations of the Peranakan Chinese were often merged with those of the non-Peranakan Hokkienese, the formation of Kheng Teck (see elaboration in the upcoming paragraphs) points to the reaction of a group that appears to have held more consciousness about itself than otherwise suggested. The Peranakans reacted to the challenges faced in the eighteenth and the transition to the nineteenth centuries via various strategies. These included leveraging their supposedly better relations with the British and following the British impulse in expansion in the Straits of Melaka (from Melaka to Penang to Singapore) and merging with newly evolved groups or modes of operation (in the form of kongsi) and, when competition became intense, organizing a counterforce to try and hold on to their influence. The need to acknowledge the pressures faced by Peranakans lies in the link that members of the highest echelons of this group were often alleged to be undisclosed sponsors of the secret societies.

The British were "entrusted" with the jurisdiction of Melaka (1795–1816, 1824–67) and other settlements and territories across the straits in the transitional period between the 1780s and 1820s. In 1786, the British founding of Penang had started to draw investors and opportunists alike to the island. Although the British had relegated self-administration of the Chinese to members of their own communities, it appears that a new system of tingzus was favoured over the "traditional" arrangement of the kapitan system.[30] The strong connections between (Peranakan) Chinese in the Straits Settlements may be demonstrated through the network of members of the Kheng Teck Association. Tan P. L. and Trocki's works have affirmed the ambiguous links between the various groupings of the Chinese diaspora in the Singapore–Malaya region. What is clear is that the heads of clans, secret societies and biggest opium farms could be different personages although

[28]The major groups of traders acting between India and China were the British country traders, the Chinese junk traders and the Portuguese/Macanese traders picking up what was left over from the first two. Cognizance can also be taken of the other operators in the overlapping circuits such as the Bugis, who despite the setback dealt at Riau by the Dutch in the 1780s, bouncing back and sailing in sizeable fleets between various places in the archipelago (including Makasar) and stopping by at Singapore, must have helped supply some of the goods listed in Cushman's list.

[29]Trocki, *Opium and empire*, pp. 94–99.

[30]A tingzu refers to a leader of a temple council in the Chinese community in a locality; given that the temple was embedded in various social functions in a community and if this temple was of some size in that community, the lead person in this council would also be a leader of the Chinese community. In certain Chinese communities governed by colonial powers, the tingzu might also be appointed in the capacity of the kapitan (captain) Chinese.

some of these sometimes overlapped.[31] This brings back the question of the degree to which trade was "free" in the Straits Settlements, most notably in Singapore. It is noticed that aside from Kheng Teck members who contributed to the major temples of Hokkien worship in all three Straits Settlements, ships from mainland China, especially if they were coming from Amoy or related Hokkien-speaking areas, were required to make contributions to the temples, presumably in exchange for reciprocal services (e.g. at the dock or during their period of stay). It is unclear whether business could still be carried out if the shipowner resisted contributing.

The Kheng Teck Association (慶德會), established in 1831, was one of the early Chinese clan associations. According to Kua Bak Lim,[32] the Kheng Teck Association was a Melakan Hokkien Baba group whose members were traders or wholesalers. Although the Kheng Teck Association was formed in Singapore, its members were almost wholly from Melaka. With participation in temples (for instance, through appointments to important positions in Tien Fugong Temple) and partnership in the forming of new business entities, Kheng Teck Peranakan members played an important role in the early development of Singapore's economy after the colony was founded.[33] The association also made its presence felt in the council of the Singapore International Chamber of Commerce through the membership of So Guan Chuan (苏源泉) and Chee Kim Guan (徐钦元) in 1837.[34] From another angle, the Kheng Teck Association (Singapore) can be seen as an extension of the influence and power of Qingyun Ting (Melaka). A branch of the Kheng Teck Association was also established and maintained in Melaka.

All three presidents of the Kheng Teck Association had strong linkages with the association through their family networks.[35] First, Tan Tock Seng (陈笃生)[36] and Si Hoo Kee (薛佛记)[37] were Hokkien Babas from Melaka. Their family members participated as founders of the Kheng Teck Association.[38] Two other Kheng Teck Association pioneers, So (苏) and Tan (陈), also contributed as members of the council of Tien Fugong Temple. Cross-referencing of the donators' lists at Tien Fugong Temple, the Hokkien Clan Association and the Jinlan Temple (Golden Lotus Temple) shows that 22 members of the Kheng Teck Association (with their associated Baba family affiliations) were found in these organizations

[31] See Trocki, *Opium and empire*, pp. 228–31, and Tan, "Chinese secret societies and labour control in the nineteenth century Straits Settlements", pp. 17–26.

[32] M. L. Ke, *Xinhua lishi renwu liezuan* (新華歷史人物傳/ XHLSRWLZ) (Singapore: EPB Publishers, 1995), p. 163.

[33] Thian Hock Keng http://www.thianhockkeng.com.sg/home.html

[34] XHLSRWLZ, p. 163.

[35] Jinhe Chen and Yusong Chen, *Xin jiapo huawen beiming jilu* (新加坡華文碑銘集錄/ XJPHRBMJL) on Tan Tock Seng, Si Hoo Kee and Kiong Kong Tuan, p. 58.

[36] XHLSRWLZ, p. 86.

[37] XHLSRWLZ, p. 213.

[38] XHLSRWLZ, on Seet Boon Tiong, p. 211; on Ong Chai Hong, p. 29; on Tan You Long, p. 76; and on Tan Kim Seng, p. 81.

(see the Diagram 4.1 of Kheng Teck members and their network in the Appendix). It should be noted that the group associated with Jinlan Temple was thought to be a secret society because its members addressed one another in a way secret society members did.

Peranakans were ready to intermarry with non-Peranakan Hokkienese to preserve or enhance their existence. As shown in the network diagram in the Appendix, Kheng Teck member Tan You Long (second eldest), brother of Tan Tock Seng, went into partnership or marriage with (non-Kheng Teck) Peranakans and non-Peranakan Hokkienese, respectively, for the sake of survival; he entered a business partnership with Kiong Kong Tuan (dissolved in 1831) and was the father-in-law of Si Hoo Kee's son.[39] Connecting and following up further with Cushman's work, it is known that Kheng Teck members such as Ang Choon Seng and Seet Boon Tiong provided linkages with traders who were operating as middlemen in the more southerly region of the Straits of Melaka (Cushman's work explores the network of the Chinese in northern Malaya and Thailand). The former owned two ocean-going junks (running between Saigon and Bangkok), set up a shop and agency in Singapore and was himself a nutmeg planter. The latter, whose network connected to Pahang, Trengganu, Patani and Songkhla, was involved with Si Hoo Kee in a dock business.[40]

It is clear that the Peranakans, whether linked or not to Kheng Teck Association, were affiliated to some of the prominent positions in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Melaka. If it is not apparent yet, it should be highlighted that in Melaka the tingzu of Qingyun Ting from 1824, in the first six tenures of office, were members of the extended family in the following order—Neo Bee Kiat, Si Hoo Kee, Tan Kim Seng, Tan Beng Swee, Chen Mingruo and Chen Ruohuai. Neo was the brother-in-law of Si Hoo Kee (Peranakan but not a Kheng Teck member), and Tan Kim Seng was the father-in-law of Si's daughter. The fifth and sixth tingzus were related to Tan Beng Swee (son of Tan Kim Seng) as brother and son. A subtle rivalry in the earlier period between Neo and Si was because they were from Quanzhou and Zhangzhou, respectively, with whoever sat in the tingzu position indicating the ascendancy of that group (from either Quanzhou or Zhangzhou).[41]

Competition and collaboration between (Hokkien) Peranakans and an external linguistic group (the Teochews) can be seen in the relation between Seah Eu Chin and his mentor, Yeo Kim Swee, a Kheng Teck member who was heavily involved in the dock and property businesses. In 1830 he purchased large tracts of property from Morgan; he developed these lands and later sold them to Seah, demonstrating a cordial and mutually beneficial relationship. Seah himself was married to the

[39]Chen donated ($200 each) to both Hengsan Ting and Tianfu Gong but later curiously borrowed money from Tianfu Gong.

[40]Both donated to Tianfu Gong and later to Chongwen Ge (school).

[41]Linking up with C. H. Yen and C. Trocki's studies, Tan Tock Seng and his son would later lead the Quanzhou subgroup, known as the Hai Chang faction. See Trocki, *Opium and empire*, pp. 115–16.

sister of Tan Seng Poh (a member of Ngee Heng, whose father was the Kapitan of Perak).[42] The rise of Seah (the founder of Ngee Ann), which appeared to be nonthreatening to Peranakans at first sight, coupled with the earlier rise of the Teochew Ngee Heng pressured the Hokkien group over the long run. What is interesting is that within the Peranakan group, the secret society power affiliated with Si Hoo Kee (backed by Tan Che Sang) was diluted not by an external group but by a force within its own ranks (Tan Tock Seng appropriating part of Si's influence). While the esteemed positions of Peranakans in the Chinese communities did not appear to be relinquished, the rise in tensions between the Hokkien Peranakans and other groups such as the Teochews could not be discounted. This would eventually translate into serious secret society clashes between the Teochews and Hokkiens in the 1850s.

What can be said is that moves made by an individual and family in reconciliation or against other individuals were motivated by business considerations and the securing of the influence and relationship network (through marriages). It also appears that marriage links were made with Chinese diaspora immigrants of the same sub-linguistic group (for instance, Hokkien). Tan Seng Poh and Cheang Sam Teo were linked to Kheng Teck members. This further links to the network and factions depicted in P. L. Tan's and C. Trocki's work. P. L. Tan, drawing upon Song Ong Siang's *Hundred Years of Chinese in Singapore*, "[attempts to] offer glimpses into the more shadowy side of the consortium": Tan Kim Cheng's (son of Tan Tock Seng) brother-in-law had [control of] the Perak Chandu Farm in 1874. Tan Seng Poh (brother-in-law of Seah Eu Chin) was head of his syndicate in opium and spirits farming. P. L. Tan's essay (specifically, diagram in the essay) links Tan Tock Seng to Hoo Ah Kay and Seah Eu Chin although the actual relation between the first and third mentioned is not made clear. What is well known is Seah, in his professional capacity, had helped in the running of Tan Tock Seng Hospital as member and, in some years, as treasurer of its management committee. Tan Kim Seng had consistently denied any connections with the secret societies although a modern researcher like P. L. Tan points to some evidence linking him to the Ghin Hins, especially in Singapore. In C. Trocki's work, Cheang Sam Teo's name has been featured as a major player in the opium-farming syndicates from 1847 to 1863. The names of his son and grandson began to appear from 1863 to the end of 1870s; Tan Seng Poh's name (mentioned above) is also featured as a major syndicate player in the same period. J. Clammer asserts (in Sandhu's edited volume on Melaka) that the Peranakan Chinese had little solidarity as a group compared to other diaspora Chinese (who did not cross-breed and maintained strong kin and familial ties with mainland China).[43] While it might not have been beneficial for Babas to return to China, substantiated by the evidence that returnees were usually

[42] XHLSRWLZ, on Tan Seng Poh, p. 75.

[43] J. Clammer, "Straits Chinese in Melaka", in K. Sandhu and P. Wheatley eds., *Melaka: Transformation of a Malay capital, 1400–1980* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 167.

ostracized and penalized,[44] they actively formed relations with Chinese who had links with mainland China. Returning to the overall thesis of this chapter, much of the tensions and violence that was associated with groups external to or existing within the (Melaka–Singapore) region erupted because these groups were trying to appropriate a share of the benefits from a major hegemonic Chinese group, in this case the Peranakan Hokkienese.

One of the best-researched aspects of violence involving Chinese in Southeast Asia relates to the activities of secret societies. In a chapter contribution in a book on violence in China, H. Lamley describes the nature of the violence in China as *xiedou* (armed affrays), which occurred in cases of inter-lineage or communal (or ethnic) feuds. The terminology (*xiedou*) has evolved and become associated with a certain degree of severity, scale or planning.[45] What was the nature of the aggression manifested by secret societies as experienced in the Malay Archipelago, specifically the Singapore–Melaka region? Mak as well as a few other scholars have done advanced work on the subject. In the Straits Settlements, the situation appears to have been more complex. "Corporate lineage" (*zongzu*) conflict was a struggle between opposing groups of different family names and sub-linguistic divisions from the beginning—this was obvious in businessmen groupings rather than in the secret societies they were linked to. It is also noted that more secret societies were formed in Singapore towards or after 1840.[46] Secret societies were not usually thought to be entangled with clan groups in China.[47] In the Singapore–Melaka region, secret societies and related Chinese diaspora groups also, as highlighted by Trocki, adopted the economic front and organization of the kongsi in the consolidation and projection of their power.[48]

Regarding the causes of violence associated with Chinese (secret societies) in the Singapore–Melaka region, various theories have been put forth by prominent writers, past and present. The evolution of any secret society, according to Mak, could cause its own conflictual process. The "voluntary coexistence" between the societies in the first stage was followed by (intersociety) feuds, "involuntary existence" and

[44]Cases from the Qianlong period (1735–99) can be found to substantiate this. See E. K. Feng, "Wanqing nanyang huaqiao yu zhongguo jindai hua", retrieved from http://jds.cass.cn/item/6755.aspx on 1 June 2012.

[45]H. Lamley, "Lineage Feuding in Southern Fujian", in J. Lipman and S. Harrell eds., *Violence in China* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 31–32.

[46]Lim Irene, *Secret societies in Singapore* (Singapore: Singapore History Museum, 1999), pp. 21–22.

[47]For studies on clans and their development in China, one may refer to classic works on the subject such as W. Skinner, *Marketing and social structure of China* (Ann Arbor: MI, 2001), and W. T. Rowe, *Commerce and society in a Chinese city 1796–1889* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984).

[48]Political-economic organization of the diaspora Chinese in Southeast Asia, conceived according to certain discussions, in the eighteenth century when the Chinese started to arrive in the region in greater numbers.

renewed conflict in later phases.[49] These stages were different for the three Straits Settlements; the period before 1842 in Singapore (1834 and 1827, respectively, in Melaka and Penang) was described as one of "voluntary coexistence", followed by a phase of rivalries and feuds between (secret) societies that lasted until the start of the Second World War in Asia in 1941. Dialect divisions, advocated by J. Vaughan as a reason for hostility between the groups, have been disputed by Mak, among others, as "one Singapore secret society [in the 1850s], probably the Ghee Hin, had members with Cantonese and Hakka origins".[50] Still, dialect or speech affiliation appears to describe the triads to some extent, and Mak also links the types of occupation (or organization of labour in the industries managed by secret societies) with the kongsi.[51] She explains that the "monopolization and de-monopolization [of the occupations] reflected the process of competition" between the secret societies.[52] A conflict was generated when new entrants into an industry bypassed the monopoly guarded by the secret society. A lucrative area that was fiercely contested by the societies was excise farms; these dealt in opium, spirits and gambling.[53] The adapted chronological table in the Appendix shows that the coolie exodus to Southeast Asia began in the eighteenth century (perhaps even before), although prominent secret societies such as the Ghee Hin were founded in the Straits Settlements towards the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries.[54] The arrival of coolies before the nineteenth century, along with other mutually supporting trades (such as prostitution and opium), was probably managed by some form of armed and proto-kongsi type of organization (conforming to stage 2 of the chronological table in the Appendix). The competition became more intense and sophisticated in the early part of the nineteenth century. Tan Che Sang's arrest by the colonial government in 1827 led to disturbances, which implied his links with armed elements of the Chinese community, although these might not necessarily have been related to the Ghee Hin.[55]

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[49] Mak, *Sociology of secret societies*, p. 35.

[50] Mak, *Sociology of secret societies*, p. 37. Mak adds that a secret society group in Penang even recruited Malay members! One of the first writers on the field, Wynne, believes the tensions between the secret societies were ideological and against the Qing dynasty in China.

[51] Mak, *Sociology of secret societies*, p. 42. Compiling from a variety of sources, Mak has devised a table (table 4.3) listing the occupations being monopolized by the different dialect groups.

[52] Mak, *Sociology of secret societies*, p. 47.

[53] Mak, *Sociology of secret societies*, p. 49. These were bids from the British colonial government in a public tender.

[54] According to D. Murray, the origins of Tiandi Hui in China was traced to after the mid-eighteenth century; see work by Murray and B.Q. Qin, *The origins of Tiandihui* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). See also D. Murray, "Migration, Protection, and Racketeering: Spread of Tiandihui within China", in D. Ownby and M. Heidhues eds., *Secret societies reconsidered* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 178–79.

[55] Mak, *Sociology of Secret Societies*, pp. 130–32 (calendar of activities). Lim points out that secret societies like the Ghee Hin might be "reluctant to accept Straits-born Chinese members for fear of their allegiance to the colonial government"; this did not preclude the possibility that mutually benefiting links might be formed between Straits Chinese merchants and the secret societies, a point that C. H. Yen also concurs.

Written 4 years before Trocki's study on opium and Chinese society in colonial Singapore, C. H. Yen's book *A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911* was noted to be not focusing enough attention on the competition and control for specific economic resources, most notably opium, as well as on linkages outside the "boundaries of the colonies (Straits Settlements)".[56] Yen's interpretation of the cause of "chronic instability in nineteenth-century Singapore and Malaya" is

> the division of the Chinese community, and the ways in which the divisions interacted with various economic factors, including clashes of economic interest between bangs (see explanation in the rest of the quote), and clashes between the [British] colonial government and Chinese community as a whole. The responses of different bangs to various economic opportunities created by British free trade policy intensified social conflicts. The bang, as conceived by Yen, refers to the gathering of the merchants and the towkays, which were divided along linguistic lines. They were further aggravated by activities of secret societies and some external factors such as clan feuds in China, [secret societies] were used as agents of bang's economic interests; these activities were the means, effects, [and] as much as the causes of bang conflict.[57]

Yen extends the discussion of the list of businesses that secret societies contended for to include the prostitution industry. The link between smugglers from Macau and secret societies lies in the trafficking of prostitutes (and coolies), sanctioned by the Portuguese colonial government at Macau. Yen does not, in contrast with Trocki, prescribe any phased development for social conflicts in the region, although he cites the 1867 Penang riot as the "best example of a large scale social conflict".[58] The importance of Trocki's works on a diverse range of topics related to the agenda of this chapter has been briefly broached at the beginning of the chapter. Trocki's version of the conflict model (applied to, for instance, the 1854 Hokkien–Teochew riots) is that it contains "ethnic conflict, economic competition, triad fight, … class conflict, [and competition over] revenue farming (even though there was no change in the monopoly)".[59] Trocki's work informs us that in the northern parts of Singapore stretching to Johore, farmers linked with the Ghee Hin were collaborating with an increasingly influential and autonomous Temenggong and beginning to open up new farms. The implication Trocki makes is that outside the prescribed boundaries of the colonial settlements under direct British control, the tensions and struggle between competing groups could be temporarily elevated—at least until the saturation or equilibrium point was attained for the region in question. What is also clear is that the "defending champions" (the Baba group) were actively participating

[56] Trocki, *Opium and empire*, pp. 115–16.

[57] C. H. Yen, *A social history of Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 194–95. Yen and others have counterargued against the earlier position taken by P. P. Lee that "conflict arose between the free trade society and the [Chinese] pepper and gambier society [that had developed]".

[58] Yen, *A social history of Chinese in Singapore and Malaya*, p. 198. Mak, discussed in the paragraph immediately before, prescribes a four-stage development model for the evolution of secret societies in Singapore and Malaya which lasted into the post Second World War period.

[59] Trocki, *Opium and empire*, p. 229.

in the new inland ventures by sponsoring them, which illustrates (again) the complex and mercenary ways in which they operated.[60]

So far, the variety of terms used by different scholars evoked in the discussion can potentially clash with one another and require some conciliation. This essay has chosen to probe into a number of Chinese groups endogenous and exogenous to the Singapore–Melaka region and how they were linked to violence in the area. External menace, most notably in the form of piracy that was affecting Southeast Asia and depending on their origins (nearer the southern coast of China or along the coast of Vietnam), may or may not be modelled or linked to the clan organizations found in China. The "kongsi" was an arrangement used by Trocki, and Wang Tai Peng before him, to describe diaspora Chinese activities in Southeast Asia. The kongsi can refer to each of the subgroups as the triad or secret society (the other subgroups being the towkays, tax farmers, etc.) or as a collective agglomeration of these subgroups. Trocki thinks, at some point in his argument, that "[whatever the term], triad, kongsi or secret society, they all represent minor variations of the same fundamental social institution".[61] The kongsi as an institution can refer to the peculiar Chinese mode of organization in the wider sense. The use of the "bang", notwithstanding the debate about its linguistic delineation, can also refer to a "kongsi" arrangement. The crucial link is to explain, within the context of this essay, how the focus on the Peranakan group, akin to a mixed linguistic group, fit the larger discussion of the "kongsi" social, political and economic institution. The Peranakans, often represented as "towkays" and far from being a homogenous group, were able to bring together capital, linked the key figures and bang interests (especially Hokkienese, usually associated with arrivals from China) in the Chinese community and directed these towards the ends of business enterprises.

Another aspect of the manifestation of violence has been attributed to the advent of British colonial and capitalistic interference. Chinese and their protocapitalism may also be viewed as a catalyst for the escalation of violence in Southeast Asia. As "imperium in imperio",[62] secret societies were important participants in the British-indigenous struggles even before the former's "active intervention" in 1874. Emrys Chew has tried to show that the sporadic British attempts to assert their influence were gradual and apparent before the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Other studies, for instance, J. Kathirithamby-Wells' chapter entry in a volume commemorating J. C. Van Leur, depict the Chinese as having been involved in the vibrant arms trade before 1840.[63] In surveying the state and development of warfare in early modern Southeast Asia, M. Charney presents data from J. Crawfurd that the British were one of the biggest exporters in the region and exported "large numbers of muskets and gunpowder out of Singapore to [the rest of] Southeast

[60] Trocki, *Opium and empire*, pp. 72 and 100.

[61] Trocki, *Opium and empire*, p. 222.

[62] Trocki, *Opium and empire*, p. 235.

[63] J. Kathirithamby-Wells, "The long eighteenth century and the new age of commerce in the Melaka Straits", in L. Blusse and F. Gaastra eds., *On the eighteenth century as a category of Asian history* (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 57–82.

Asia" from the 1820s.[64] Charney also joined the debate among historians over whether the use of gunpowder had had a significant impact on the mode of warfare in Southeast Asia. This did not inhibit the "reasonably" widespread adoption of the new weaponry across the armies of Southeast Asian polities. In facilitating the spread of gunpowder technology, the Chinese—whom Chew identifies as Babas—should be recognized as a secondary catalyst for military change in Southeast Asia. At the level of regional commerce, Chew's analysis of the arms trade and trafficking in the eastern Indian Ocean locates the trade as an indispensable component in the triangular exchange in the region:

> drugs, guns, and slavery went hand-in-hand, the opium and munitions brought by Western traders encouraged Southeast Asian states to supply traders with exotic products accepted in the China trade, and secure simultaneously the slaves who became the means of procuring those exotic products.[65]

The analysis of the later period (towards the last quarter of the nineteenth century) by E. Tagliacozzo and J. Grant shows that the Chinese, among others (local Southeast Asians and Westerners), had been involved in the arms trade, legal or illicit.[66] The line between what and who was involved legally or illegally in the trade was often blurred and not clearly delineated. Chettiar finance, before and after the mid-nineteenth century, underwrote many of the trade voyages, knowingly or unknowingly paying for legitimate or illegitimate commerce in arms.[67] Buyers of arms included datus and rajas who bought muskets and gunpowder, for instance, from Chinese merchants in Singapore. *The Straits Times* in 1853 reported the investigation into the case of "heavy" cannons found in a Chinese junk, which were intended for attacking defenceless vessels off Singapore.[68] After the middle of the nineteenth century, despite regulations banning arms trade, pirates landing off the Rochor River could traverse freely about town and buy arms from Beach

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[64] Charney, *Southeast Asian warfare*, pp. 246–47. "The British exported 12,000 muskets in 1823, 14,411 in 1824, 6,432 in 1825, and 2,402 in 1826; as well as 2,271 kg of gunpowder in 1823, 17,509 in 1824, 33,392 kg in 1825, and 19,685 kg in 1826". See further in J. Crawfurd, *Journal of an embassy from the Governor-General of India to the courts of Siam and Cochin China* (London: H. Colburn, 1828).

[65] Emrys Chew, *Arming the periphery: The arms trade in the Indian Ocean during the age of global empire* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 189.

[66] E. Tagliacozzo, *Secret trades, porous borders* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). J.A. Grant, *Rulers, guns and money: Global arms trade in the age of imperialism* (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007).

[67] X.A. Wu, *Chinese business in the making of a Malay state, 1882–1941* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2010), pp. 86, 174 and 176.

[68] *The Straits Times*, 14 June 1853, can be read at database hosted by National Library Board (NLB).

Road before "strolling" back to their vessels.[69] Some scholars believe that secret societies dealt in firearms only to enforce their protective activities.[70]

Other than some of the prominent groups mentioned, Straits Settlements records reveal instances in Melaka and Singapore where licensed opium growers lodged complaints of transactions occurring outside the "allowed" channels and cutting into their profits.[71] J. Rush's study in Java and Tagliacozzo's research in the larger sea region of the Melaka Straits make the point that alternative sources of goods were always available in the period after 1860. These alternate sources and channels of goods, according to Rush's study, were far from being hastily organized or operated on a small-time basis. They were part of an elaborate network involving professional merchant smugglers (including rival influential Chinese families in Java), small-time smugglers, amateurs hoping for a windfall, Europeans and Eurasians, Javanese elite, connections in Singapore and even licensed opium farmers themselves (when they needed to dispose of unsold stock at the end of a time period).[72] By 1840, Seah Eu Chin's network and shipping business involved operations on both sides of the Straits (of Melaka). His rivals, Peranakans and non-Peranakans, were likely to have mounted a competing trading and smuggling system, although the scale and intricateness of the network were unlikely to approximate that of the later period. A. Karras has asserted that smugglers were not inclined to use violence or be hostile. This chapter has no evidence to support the fact that smugglers were hostile or initiated skirmishes. It cannot be said whether the smugglers were also pirates, although, as will be shown later, local (Chinese) pirates who disposed of their goods in the smugglers' network were also hostile.[73] Specific data does not appear to be available showing the involvement of Chinese in the arms trade before the mid-nineteenth century. If the figures available just prior to the 1780s are anything to go by, opium smuggling by Portuguese and Chinese can be traced from the coast of China to the port in Melaka.[74]

Finally, we turn to look at piracy, two types of which can be distinguished. One was related to instability along the coast of China and even along the coast of Annam. Tarling and other authors have identified one wave in the 1850s associated with the beginning of the Taiping Rebellion in China. An earlier wave researched by

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[69] Yunlong Shen, *Zhongguo jindai shiliao yekan: Xinzhou Shinian*, vol. 2 (Taipei: Wenhai, 1977), p. 9.

[70] See Mak's *Sociology of secret societies* and Yen's *Social history of Chinese in Singapore and Malaya*.

[71] National Archives of Singapore (NAS), NAB 1670, 14 Jun 1834. Straits Settlements Records (held in microfilm form at the National University of Singapore Library), A28 (1826), pp. 599–601.

[72] J. Rush, *Opium to Java* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 65–82.

[73] A. Karras, *Smuggling: Contraband and corruption in world history* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), p. 25.

[74] Teddy Sim, "A probe into Macao's political economy and trade relations during the mid-Qianlong period" in *Revista de Cultura*, vol. 24 (2007), p. 91. See also Zhongguo Diyi Lishi Dangan Guan, *Ming Qing shiqi Aomen wenti dangan wenxian huibian* (Macau: Diyi Lishi Guan, nd); see entries 672 and 719 in contents.

Murray was linked to Chinese militias that involved themselves in Annam in civil war. The rough period under treatment (1780–1820) does not appear to approximate the period of the great merchant pirates (1600–1680), although pirate fleets linked with these two upheavals were able to gather in strength and, over a period of time, improve on the sophistication of their vessels and weaponry. This is affirmed by Murray and Cushman in their studies on the period.[75] R. Antony, in investigating the phenomenon of piracy along the southern coast of China, has developed an understanding of the diverse groups there. He and P. Calanca have highlighted the direct relationship between instability on the coast of China and insecurity in the South Seas.[76]

Antony paints a diverse picture of piracy occurring along the coast, which transcended even unstable periods. Pirate society consisted of part-time or occasional pirates, "professional" pirates and captives of pirates (who could turn out to be reluctant or willing accomplices). Analogous to the situation in the Malay Archipelago, where groups undertook part-time piratical activities hand in hand with routine or seasonal occupations, groups along the southern China coast also manifested this mode of operation. The "part-timers" could be fishermen, sailors or labourers when not engaged in robbing on the seas. "[It] (piracy) was like any other job", and mobility of full-timers or part-timers between different hirers in the "industry" was high.[77]

Furthermore, a model and picture of the pirate network of operations and bases is understood to have been mingled with a web of "authorized" ports. These pirate bases provided convenient points whereby robbed goods could be channelled to black or smugglers' markets. In this way, the spheres of activity of pirates and smugglers overlapped. Antony's study on the coast of China fields evidences that pirates and secret society members collaborated closely—the latter, for instance, providing support in terms of supplies for their combined military operations.[78] Within the piratical groups, notably those who were more "professional", kinship relations (*guanxi*) were important in creating the base of power and influence—just as they were important to those cultivating their cliques in the officialdom. Antony reveals local cases in the coastal provinces where clan groups were linked to pirates as well as local officials in the region.[79]

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[75] See D. Murray, *Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790–1810* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 91–98, treatment on confederation's ships and weapons, and J. Cushman, *Fields from the sea: Chinese junk trade with Siam during the late 18th and early 19th centuries* (Ithaca: SEAP, Cornell University, 1993), chapter 3.

[76] R. Antony ed., *Elusive pirates, pervasive smugglers: Violence and clandestine trade in the Greater China Seas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010). See especially P. Calcanda, "Piracy and coastal security in southeastern China 1600–1780", in Antony ed., *Elusive pirates, pervasive smugglers*, pp. 85–98.

[77] R. Anthony, *Like froth floating on the sea* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, California, 2003), p. 97.

[78] Antony, *Like froth floating on the sea*, pp. 122–29 and 135–37.

[79] Antony, *Like froth floating on the sea*, p. 134.

The piratical Chinese vessels that sailed from coastal China to Nanyang were ocean-going vessels, as distinguished from coastal sailing ships. Cushman reveals that Chinese junks from Guangdong were larger than those from Fujian—up to 1,000 t in the case of the former and up to 800 t in the case of the latter (average length of 150 ft). Although Murray does not provide size specifications for the vessels, she writes that ocean-going ships were capable of "carrying 3–400 men and mounting 20–30 cannons".[80] The flagship of the piratical fleet carried up to 38 cannon, two of which were 24-pounders. There are fewer findings pertaining to the instability along the Chinese coast in the 1850s and its impact on Nanyang. Tarling, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, was one of the first to describe the phenomenon in the Malay Archipelago.[81] Turnbull also highlights the disturbance in her work on the Straits Settlements: "the crumbling of the Taiping rebellion [led to] a new peak in piracy ... this had brought trade between Cochin China and Singapore to a standstill ... In 1853, pirates were using Singapore port openly, stocking their boats, collecting information and selling their plunder".[82] Although Tarling refers to errant junks during periods of crisis and instability sailing southwards with the seasonal winds, it is possible that there were random marauding vessels sailing down during more stable times.[83]

R. Fernando's work on the social life in Melaka between 1780 and 1820 reveals the smaller and more diverse Chinese piratical groups that based themselves in the Straits of Melaka. Fernando traces the rise of large-scale piracy in the Straits to the "resurgence in commerce between China and Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century". The "emergence of Chinese as pirates" can be traced to the "exodus of Chinese from Amoy arising from harsh economic realities in South China" written about by C. K. Ng.[84] Apparently, among the emigrants who made their way to Nanyang in the eighteenth century, those who could not find jobs or escaped from their contracts or hoped to become rich quickly formed bands of bandits or pirates and began their nefarious activities. Fernando relates a murder case involving several Chinese pirates who, according to a Malay informer, came from a group as large as 60. Fernando expresses surprise at the sizeable number, if the figure is to be trusted, because it indicates a "well organized operation following the Chinese institution such as a kongsi". The observation alludes to the point that an effective organizing mode of survival and livelihood, possibly a quasi-kongsi organization, was in existence at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Citing the case of Chinese in Siak, Fernando notes that "it [could be] difficult to distinguish the small traders from the pirates"; this meant that, as in China, small-time Chinese in the Straits of Melaka perhaps also undertook seasonal piratical

[80]Murray, *Pirates of the South China coast*, pp. 91–94.

[81]Tarling, *Piracy and politics in the Malay world*, pp. 206–31.

[82]C. Turnbull, *The Straits Settlements, 1826–67* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 250–51.

[83]See Tarling, *Piracy and politics*, p. 226. Specifically, Tarling refers to Macau junks in his work.

[84]Fernando, *Murder most foul*, pp. 75–87. See further in C. K. Ng, *Trade and Society: The Amoy network on the China coast, 1683–1735* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983).

activities. Chinese pirates in the Straits moved around in prahus. Natives sailing in prahus in the area were usually plundered; the murder case mentioned earlier involved a native vessel being robbed and its crew killed in the process. Furthermore, the way the pirates followed up on the robbery reveals that goods and monies were siphoned back to Melaka (with the pirates actually going into town after the incident, indicating the laxity of the legal environment), partly because the pirate leaders were able to operate without being harassed in the settlement. Just as in China, the pirates in this case operated a base near a more prominent settlement—Pulau Besar was 5 km from Melaka—which allowed them to dispose of their loot in the black market.[85] The various groups of pirates described thus far did not hold any common interest with Straits Chinese merchants, Peranakan or non-Peranakan. The Tayson Uprising (1770–1802) unleashed disruptive and piratical activities along the coast of Vietnam. The piratical groups were composed of Vietnamese and Chinese, and their activities had direct and indirect impacts on Southeast Asia. In the 1850s, as in the earlier period, Chinese merchants in Singapore asked the colonial government for assistance against Chinese pirates, especially against indigenous pirates.[86]

Conclusion

While the economic achievements of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Singapore-Melaka region, were undeniable; they were also intimately involved, if involuntarily, in the violence and vice in the area. The Chinese who were implicated consisted of groups both within the region and outside although these might not collaborate with one another. Some of the violent and surreptitious activities were embedded across time in the society the Chinese sojourned and settled; others were episodic and fitted with the phases and chronology of larger developments. Peranakan Chinese, through their manoeuvring and adaptability, continued to maintain a certain dominance beyond the mid-nineteenth century. Their attempt to appropriate a share of the benefits from the major hegemonic group generated predictable conflict. There were ample opportunities for smuggling although the extent of the activity may not be ascertained. The activities of secret societies directly gave rise to large-scale manifestations of violence through inter-organizational rivalries and indirectly to deviance through the involvement of individuals in vice-related activities. Piratical activities reflected the intricacies of the phenomena exhibited in China but at the same time differed in minute aspects in Southeast Asia. Overall, while the Chinese propensity to engage in violence was not particularly highlighted, Chinese involvement (direct and indirect), which could potentially increase militarization and tensions in the region, should not be overlooked.

[85] Fernando, *Murder most foul*, pp. 75–87.

[86] Turnbull, *The Straits Settlements*, pp. 245 and 251.

Appendix

Table 4.1 Adaptation of Trocki's periodization

	Trocki's periodization	Periodization relating to the Peranakan group
1	Growth of Xiamen trading network linking to settlements in Nanyang (Batavia, Manila, etc.), 1630–1700	Creolized/Peranakan group in Melaka experiences the Dutch phase of colonial rule (from 1640). Chinese from China arrive in increasing numbers
2	Establishment of kongsi settlements in Southeast Asia and expansion of junk trade, 1700–1800	Chinese become more organized. Peranakans merge with newly evolved groups and their modes of organization
3	Growth of junk trade and increased Chinese migration in conjunction with the expansion of European commerce in Asia, 1800–1830	Arrival of greater numbers of Chinese and expansion of European commerce bring about increased competition amidst opportunities. Peranakans move to Penang and Singapore in greater numbers to cope with changes and increasingly huddle together as a group (rise of Kheng Teck)
4	Decline of junk trade and absorption of Chinese settlements into European colonies, 1830–1880	Decrease in opportunities intensifies competition and struggle. Creolized qualities enable the Peranakans to survive as the process of absorption is gradually implemented. Kheng Teck Association officially formed as a response
5	Disempowerment of Chinese social and economic structures and integration into the global capitalist system, 1880–1910	Peranakan communities survive in a diminished form albeit retaining a certain economic clout. In Singapore, attempt to reassert identity results in the formation of Peranakan Association

C. Trocki, *Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 30


KEY LEGEND
= Married to
= In business relation
= Kheng Teck Members
Tan Kim Seng [1]
Tan Beng Swee
Daughter
Soh Guan Chuan [2]
Ong Chai Hong
Sister
Si Hoo Kee
Son
Daughter
Neo Bee Kiat [3]
Sister
Neo Thiam Eak
Tan You Long [4]
Tan Kim Cheng [5]
Son
Daughter
Kiong Seok Wee
Chua Shi Zhang
Chua Chong Long [8]
Daughter
Kiong Kong Tuan
Daughter
Wee Bin
Chua Yan Leng
Lim Guang Yin
Daughter
Son
Ang Choon Seng [9]
Chia Poh Eng [10]
Chia Ann Siang
Chan Koo Chan [13]
Sister
Tan Tock Seng
Daughter
Lee Cheng Tee [6]
Tan Seng Poh
Sister
Seah Eu Chin
Yeo Kin Swee [12]
Cheang Hong Lim [7]
Seet Boon Tiong
Chee Kim Guan [11]
Chee Yan Chuan

Diagram 4.1 Kheng Teck network

Notes to diagram:

1. Tan Kim Seng's son, Tan Beng Swee was married to Si Hoo Kee's daughter
2. Ong Chai Hong was married to Si Hoo Kee's sister
3. Neo Bee Kiat married to Si Hoo Kee's sister. Neo was the leader of Qingyun Ting (Cheng Hoon Teng)
4. He was Tan Tock Seng's brother; Tan You Long's daughter was married to Si Hoo Kee's son
5. Tan Kim Cheng's son (Tan Tock Seng's grandson) was married to Kiong Seok Wee's daughter, Kiong Kong Tuan's granddaughter
6. Lee Cheng Tee, Tan Tock Seng's son-in-law, operated a gunpowder factory with Tan Seng Poh, Seah Eu Chin's brother-in-law
7. Seet Boon Tiong operated an opium business with Cheang Hong Lim in the 1860s. Cheang's father, Cheang Sam Teo, Tan Seng Poh and Tan Hiok Nee monopolized the opium industry in Singapore and Johor in the early period
8. Kiong Kong Tuan was married to Chua Chong Long's daughter, Chua Shi Zhang's granddaughter. Chua Shi Zhang was Kapitan of Melaka. Chua Yan Leng was Chua Chong Long's son
9. Ang Choon Seng's son married Lim Guang Yin's daughter
10. Chia Poh Eng was Chia Ann Siang's father
11. Chee Yan Chuan was Chee Kim Guan's son. The younger Chee was leader of the Hokkien-speaking community at Melaka and sponsored the renovation of Qingyun Ting in 1862
12. Yeo Kin Swee was the employer of Seah Eu Chin before the 1830s. Seah Eu Chin bought properties from Yeo in the 1830s. Yeo and Seah had a close business relationship
13. Chan Koo Chan was Tan Tock Seng's brother-in-law

Compiled from Ke M. L., *Sijie Fujian Mingren Lu* (世界福建名人录, Singapore: Singapore Hokkien Association, 2002), pp 318–27; XHLSRWLZ (新华历史人物传), pp. 50, 55, 76, 145, 186, 195 and 211; Ceng C.Y., *Malai xiya zui gulao miaoyu - Qingyun ting gean yanjiu* (马来西亚最古老庙宇 - 青云亭个案研究, Melaka: Loh Printing Press, 2011), p. 27; Lin S. G. and Luo J. S. eds., *Malai xiya huaren Shi* (马来西亚华人史, Kuala Lumpur: Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities, 1984), p. 425; XJPHRBMJL (新加坡华文碑铭集录), p. 6; Lim H.S., *Sile guji* (石叻古迹, Singapore: South Sea Society, 1975), p. 11

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Chapter 5
War-Making, Raiding, Slave Hunting and Piracy in the Malukan Archipelago

Manuel Lobato

Abstract The chapter probes into the Asian resistance against and cooperative efforts with the VOC. Political-cultural ties among rulers and headmen, which provided an immediate return, were more important than economic reasons in the struggle. In a situation of increasing warfare in the Malay Archipelago since the mid-sixteenth century, the ethnic differences in the region were concealed under the appearance of a much sharper Muslim-Christian conflict. Local disputes tended to be solved by appealing to the major regional powers, which provided Ternate or Makassar the opportunity to increasingly interfere and claim tribute as paramount leaders. Undertaking punitive long distance expeditions, seizing Asian vessels, and plundering riverine areas from Sangihe and Syau to the Sea of Timor, the major maritime Asian powers undertook enslaving for a variety of purposes beyond the economic motive. This way, they converted themselves into slave-hunters and contributed to the slave traffic leading to West Java and Batavia.

Introduction

The Maluku Archipelago made its entrance in "global history" primarily as an area for spice production and trade. Though it is a history of violence and brutal aggression against and among Asian population, spices seem having not been a motive for warlike activities prior to the arrival of the Europeans. The first encounter in Maluku occurred in 1512, when Francisco Serrão and a few other Portuguese companions were attacked at Pulau Penyu, off western Buru, by Wadjo ("bajaus") pirates from eastern Sulawesi, who used raiding port-villages in the Hoamoal Peninsula.[1] The reputation of the Buginese as pirates, whether it could be

[1] António Galvão, *A Treatise on the Moluccas (c. 1544) Probably the Preliminary Version of António Galvao's Lost Historia das Molucas*, annotated and translated into English from the Portuguese manuscript in the Archivo General de Indias, Seville, by Hubert Th. M. Jacobs, S. J.

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a stereotyped view or not,[2] was noticed by the Portuguese throughout the sixteenth century, when piracy was a rather common practice across the east and north-western parts of the Malay Archipelago. Jacques de Coutre, the Flemish merchant who traded in precious stones, considered Sultan Shah Brunei, as "more a pirate than a king" and most of his subjects as "Borneo Bajaus",[3] probably another branch of those Orang Tidung, reputed pirates that Thomas Forrest found in the north-eastern coast of Borneo two centuries later.[4] However, piracy was only an aspect of the extensive violent and plundering practices that had in slave hunting raids a major purpose. It experienced a great impulse in the late 1660s, after the Dutch-Makassarese War, when some Bajaus move into Pasir, Bima, Sumbawa and other overseas destinations in the Lesser Sunda Islands.[5]

Slave capture activity in Eastern Indonesia is often said to have been stimulated by the Dutch need for slaves in Batavia, though slave trade amounted to only 0.5 % of the total VOCs trade volume, which included trade of the South African Cape colony.[6] Several motives are actually used to explain the slave hunting and raiding boom: the European need for labour in the plantations, in ateliers, in urban and suburban orchards, and also labour for harbour works, shipyards and ship crews; the abundance of imported goods; and the Dutch spice harvesting and trading restrictions. However, with the exception of the compensation for the Dutch extirpation policy, any of the former motives seems to have produced enough impact in the Maluku area. Though after 1660s, the Dutch increasingly looked for labour for the pepper plantations in Borneo, Java, and Sumatra, and Malay, Chinese and Dutch slave owners preferred Papuan manpower,[7] the figures for Papuan and Malukan slaves flowing into Batavia, the only available so far, are too uncertain. They were probably fewer than those coming from the Lesser Sunda Islands. On the other hand, by 1700, one out of three inhabitants of Batavia was a slave and most slaves were from east Malay origin.[8] Whether they came from Makassar, the

(Rome and St. Louis: Jesuit Historical Institute, Sources and studies for the history of the Jesuits III, 1971), ch. 39, pp. 196–97 and note 1 in ch. 33, p. 343.

[2]Stephen C. Druce, *The lands west of the lakes. A history of the Ajattappareng kingdoms of South Sulawesi, 1200 to 1600 CE* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009), p. 21.

[3]Jacques de Coutre, *Andanzas asiáticas*, Eddy Stols, B. Teensma and J. Werberckmoes eds. (Madrid: Historia 16, 1991), pp. 108 and 145.

[4]Christian Pelras, "Notes sur quelques populations aquatiques de l'Archipel nusantarien", *Archipel*, vol. 3 (1972), p. 164.

[5]H. Hägerdal, "From Batuparang to Ayudhya. Bali and the outside world, 1636–1656", *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, vol. 154, no. 1 (1998), p. 75.

[6]Marcus Vink, "The world's oldest trade: Dutch slavery and slave trade in the Indian Ocean in the seventeenth century", *Journal of World History*, vol. 14, no. 2 (2003), p. 135.

[7]John Villiers, "Makassar: The rise and fall of an Indonesian maritime trading state, 1512–1669", in J. Kathirithamby-Wells and J. Villiers eds., *The Southeast Asian port and polity: Rise and demise* (Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1990), pp. 150–51.

[8]Remco Raben, "Facing the crowd. The urban ethnic policy of the Dutch East India Company, 1600–1800" (Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley, University of California, 1995), Appendix III *apud.*

Lesser Sunda Islands or the Raja Ampat areas, some of these slaves certainly had a Malukan origin.

Not surprisingly, the superabundance of imported goods hardly impulse slave capture among low-tech economies with a little diversity of items to be exchanged along the intercontinental channels, as it can be extrapolated from similar scenarios across the Indian Ocean peripheral zones, namely in eastern Africa, where the increasing supply in Indian textiles diminished the return in gold, ivory and slaves during the seventeenth century.[9] Conversely, according to Roxo de Brito, gold was a major incentive to Papuan from Misool and other islands in the Raja Ampat to raid and capture slaves to be exchanged for in East Seram. He adds that almost all Misoolese commoners wore earrings and other golden ornaments.[10] This seems to be a practice that developed quite earlier and independently from available imported items brought in by the Asian and European merchants.

Slavery had a long tradition across Island Southeast Asia. In southern Sulawesi, during pre-Muslim times, even rulers such as Tumapaqrisiq Kallonna, an early sixteenth-century king of Gowa, were sons of slave concubines, though miscegenation gave rise to descendants of a rather ambiguous and socially complex ranking. Maritime raiding seems to have been an extension of the internal devastation and massive enslaving that occurred in Gowa's dependencies during the sixteenth century, resulting in large deserted areas. Reluctantly accepting to be enslaved, many Bugis moved to the coastal shores, abandoning farming in search of seafaring activities,[11] including raiding and piracy.

With spices being a secondary motive of conflict, the cloves trade provided the Malukan rulers the means to access a flow of wealthy and prestigious goods, mainly imported Indian textiles, Javanese firearms and rice. Except for the swampy and fairly large island of Bacan, the cloves producing areas were too small and tilting to feed the native population. The endemic conflict largely derived from competition for political influence between the two major regional policies—Ternate and Tidore—as much as for control over the food supplying areas on the Northern Halmahera island.

Most significantly, early modern age historians linked the incentive for violence to the traditional political culture as well as to the emergence of cash-cropping

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Anthony Reid, "Cosmopolis and nation in central Southeast Asia", *Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series*, 22 (Apr. 2004), p. 8 (www.ari.nus.edu.sg/publication_details.asp?pubtypeid=WP&pubid=274).

[9]Manuel Lobato, "Maritime trade from India to Mozambique. A study on Indo-Portuguese enterprise, 16th to 17th centuries", in K. S. Mathew ed., *Ship-building and navigation in the Indian Ocean region, AD 1400–1800* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1997), pp. 113–31.

[10]J. H. F. Sollewijn Gelpke, "The report of Miguel Roxo de Brito of his voyage in 1581–1582 to the Raja Ampat, the MacCluer Gulf, and Seram", *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 150 (1994), p. 130.

[11]Druce, *The lands west of the lakes*, pp. 56, 163, 178 and 242–43.

production and the state formation process.[12] However, European writings from later periods, especially from the late eighteenth century onwards, would provide a rather contrasting assessment. In view of the feebleness of the eastern Indonesian policies, most historians dealing with the later colonial period assumed that the dynamics of state formation faded away due to the VOC's interference. They also assumed that the Europeans did not contribute in any significant way to reinforce the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore, the most powerful among these polities. This stems partly from the fact that Ternate proved to be, except in a few occasions, increasingly manoeuvrable during the period of the Dutch control over the region. However, Ternate was also building its own hegemony since a very remote past, a process that certainly started long before the fifteenth century and was about to enter a final stage when it was first described by the Portuguese and the Spaniards in the early sixteenth century. Iberian accounts repeatedly reported strategies used by the Ternatan and Tidoran rulers to consistently avoid losing long-acquired prerogatives, as well as the reactions by other less prestigious rulers, such as Raja Katarabumi of Jailolo (r. 1534–51), who proclaimed himself sultan in the 1540s, but failed to consolidate long lasting regional coalitions.[13]

By favouring Ternate, the European interference in Maluku definitively disturbed the rather balanced native powers based on culturally positive dualistic values. By the mid-sixteenth century, the Sultan of Ternate extended his influence over Motir and the whole Makian at the expense of Tidore.[14] The regional influence of the sultanate of Ternate and its capacity to engage military resources grew up to the point of defeating the Portuguese in 1575 and, after 1581, successfully resisting the union of arms between the Portuguese and the Spaniards fortified at Tidore. The Ternatese rulers had the ability to build strong partnership with the most powerful European party in Maluku. They first gained the friendship of the Portuguese against Tidore and the losing Spanish expeditions coming from Mexico. In the last quarter of the sixteenth century, Ternate and its dependencies intensified trading ties and received military support from several Javanese city-ports that became increasingly insecure for the Portuguese vessels linking Melaka and Maluku. Tuban, Gresik, Sidayu, Brondong and Jaratan were involved in 1580 in the seizure off Surabaya of a Portuguese galleon under the command of Agostinho Nunes, the newly appointed governor of Ambon. Twenty-five survivors were enslaved and sold at Gresik and

[12]John Villiers, 'The cash-crop economy and state formation in the Spice Islands in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries', in J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers eds., *The Southeast Asian port and polity. Rise and demise* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), pp. 83–105.

[13]Manuel Lobato, "A Influência europeia na tradição arquitectónica das Ilhas Molucas. Alguns exemplos de Ternate, Tidore e Halmahera" [European influence in the architectural tradition of Maluku. A few cases in Ternate, Tidore and Halmahera], *Review of Culture*, vol. 35 (2010), p. 100.

[14]Chandra R. de Silva, "The Portuguese and the trade in cloves in Asia during the sixteenth century", *Stvdia*, vol. 46 (1987), p. 147.

Japara.[15] In the early seventeenth century Ternate joined the Dutch successful effort to overthrow the Iberians from the cloves trade. The pathway of the sultanate was a well succeeded model of political centralization on a regional scale, as the state authority and the local officers namely the *kapitan laut* and the *Rubuhonghi*, the Ternatan 'governor' or Sultan representative in the Buru, Seram and Ambon areas, increased their subordination to the sultan. Besides these hubs of delegated power, Islam also played a major role, as the Sultan of Ternate was acknowledged to be the paramount leader throughout Maluku and by multiple polities within a wide area from Mindanao to Timor. Apparently, only in the Papuan Raja Ampat region the prestige and pre-eminence of the Sultans of Tidore exceeded Ternate. Argensola mentions Ternate to rule over 72 kingdoms[16] and Francis Pretty, in his account of Francis Drake voyage around the world, also refers to it,[17] both reproducing uncritically how the Ternatese saw their own political influence throughout the Eastern Archipelago.

Warfare: Semantics and Practices

Power relations in the Maluku area seems to have been quite similar to the other regions in the Malay Archipelago, namely in the neighbouring Philippines and western Papuan areas. Since the Filipinos were not "a friendly and peaceful people", Felice N. Rodriguez considered violence to be "a window to understanding native life" and warfare as a means to define "early native society". Such a cultural approach concerning the ultimate motives for violence supposedly explains the deep reasons why people kill and what they die for. In fact, concerning the political and economic motives for violence, it should be recognized that they often embodied mere pretexts. This appears quite obvious in territorial disputes involving important resources, such as political dominance over labour. Other motives, however, such as paying-back raids and personal disputes, implying strong warring investment to save face and reputation, all seems to be a corollary of the major and deep rooted economic and cultural needs associated to warfare. Working with the Spanish chronicles on the Philippines, F. N. Rodriguez paid special attention to the emerging of "a method, a ritual, a tool and a language of warfare". In her research on three Tagalog dictionaries compiled by the Spanish missionaries, she came to the conclusion that according to these Spanish language tools, the Filipinos had two

[15] S. J. Hubert Jacobs, "Un règlement de comptes entre portugais et javanais dans les mers de l'Indonésie en 1580", *Archipel*, vol. 18 (1979), pp. 159–73.

[16] Bartolomé L. de Argensola, *Conquista de las Islas Malucas* (Madrid: Miraguano-Polifemo, 1992), bk. II, p. 82.

[17] Charles W. Eliot ed., *Voyages and travels ancient and modern*, (reprint, New York: Cosimo, 2005, 1910), p. 230.

distinct notions for warfare - the war by land and the war by sea: *pangahat* (or *pangabat*) and *pagayao* (or *pangangayao*), respectively. However, in those Spanish dictionaries, both expressions were translated as *conquistar*, "to conquer", which contains a slightly diverse meaning, given the idea that submission implies land occupation, notions closely related in the literature concerning Spanish political practices during the early modern age. In fact, *pagayao* or *pangangayao* literally means "going to cut heads".[18]

Raiding villages for subjugation and for slave capture, on one hand, and cutting the head of the enemies, on the other hand, are clearly distinctive notions of different warlike activities hardly discernible to the European observers. Occasionally, raiders became pirates whenever an opportunity offered. This way, war, raiding and piracy merged into a single warring activity, whose specialized use in the Malay language did not occur before the latter half of the eighteenth century.[19] Therefore, it is not surprising to find, among nineteenth-century European authors and colonial agents, the uncritical use of the term "piracy" and "pirate" applied to the seizure of ships and raids on riverine villages. Such assimilation was probably due to the fact that both activities were based upon aquatic forces and assets. This is not merely another much recent example of biased European use and misinterpretation of Malay cultural key elements: to restrain such violent practices was also an important tool for the European powers to dictate the rules of the sea to independent rajas and polities. Having said that, it is essential to refer that both organized piracy and the occasional pirates were strong realities in the Malay Archipelago. Since 1780s, ships under the Dutch flag prove to be vulnerable to pirate attacks, as in the case when two ships, a *pacalang* and a brig, were seized by Mindanao pirates off Gorontalo (Northern Sulawesi) and Obi.[20]

In the Maluku area such distinction between two different ways of making war also became apparent to the European observers. Raids perpetrated with a limited purpose and contention were called *garu* (Port. and Sp. *garo*), to mean "to scrawl" and "to scratch", hence "ambush" or surprise attack, a term also used in the Sulu Archipelago, probably derived from the Malay *garuq*, "to scream aloud", and a common practice in every type of warring enterprise whether by land or by sea across the Eastern Archipelago. Sometimes these raids had the mere purpose of capturing people to obtain political and military information. In February 1614,

[18]Felice N. Rodríguez, 'Words of war: Philippine warfare in the 17th century', in Ma. Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, J. M. Fradera Barcelo and L. A. Alvarez eds., *Imperios y naciones en el Pacífico*, vol. 1: *La formación de una colonia: Filipinas* (Madrid: CSIC, 2001), pp. 278–81.

[19]James F. Warren, "A tale of two centuries: The globalisation of maritime raiding and piracy in Southeast Asia at the end of the eighteenth and twentieth centuries", *Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series*, vol. 2 (Jun. 2003), p. 3 (www.ari.nus.edu.sg/publication_details.asp?pubtypeid=WP&pubid=167).

[20]Muridan Satrio Widjojo, "Cross-cultural alliance making and local resistance in Maluku during the revolt of Prince Nuku, c. 1780–1810" (Ph.D. dissertation, Leiden, Leiden University, 2007), pp. 44–45. This essential study on power relations was later published as a book under the title *The revolt of Prince Nuku. Cross-cultural alliance-making in Maluku, c. 1780–1810* (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

the Regent of Bacan, Cacil Malitu, was killed as a result of a *garu* over Makian accomplished by two Tidorese *kora-kora*. In the same year, during a raid over Morotai, the Tidorese Prince Cacil Naro, the only son and heir of Sultan Mole, killed two Christian rulers, one of them Don Juan de Silva, *sangaji* of Tollo, where the Spaniards held a fortification until 1613. He also enslaved a number of Christian people, including women and children. Confronted by the Italian Jesuit Lorenzo Masonio, the Tidorese Prince justified himself as to prevent the Moro people from moving to Ternatan rule, denying alleged accusations of having acted deliberately to capture slaves.[21] Slaves were by no means an important and valuable property to the rulers of Tidore. A century and a half later, Prince Nuku refused to hand over 20 Papuan slaves to the Dutch as well as to demolish several forts in Tidore, while he hastily complained of other Dutch impositions.[22]

Power Relations: A Warlike Focus

According to Apolonius Schott, the inhabitants of Ternate and Tidore usually neglected to work in the fields being especially inclined to warlike activities in which they were almost permanently involved. As a consequence, these islands were not self-sufficient in foodstuffs that should be obtained abroad through impositions or by force:

> These two nations are courageous and proud, living more by warfare than by agriculture, marauding and pillaging each other, since they are constant and sworn enemies; … they have ever aimed at great dominion, endeavouring to lord it over all the other islands.[23]

He remarks that the Ternatans were especially "very open to the adoption of European methods" of making war and that they acquired social and political position by deeds in war.[24]

By 1616, the friendship between Ternate and the Dutch was provoking some criticism among the Ternatan elites due to trading and political agreements that clearly favoured the VOC.[25] A similar situation was then occurring on the Tidoran side regarding the Spaniards. Engaged with their European allies, Ternate and Tidore

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[21] Gerónimo de Silva to Juan de Silva, Governor of the Philippines, Ternate, 1 Mar. 1614; same to Sultan Mole of Tidore, Ternate, 14 Oct. 1614; and Lorenzo Maconio to Jerónimo de Silva, Tidore, 15 Oct. 1614, in Marquis of Miraflores and Miguel Salva eds., *Correspondencia de Don Gerónimo de Silva con Felipe III, Don Juan de Silva, el rey de Tidore y otros personajes, desde abril de 1612 hasta febrero de 1617, sobre el estado de las islas Molucas*, (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1868), pp. 194, 264–65 and 26, respectively.

[22] Widjojo, *The revolt of Prince Nuku*, p. 102.

[23] "A discourse by the very renowned Apoloni Schot, a native of Middelburgh in Zeeland", in J. A. J. de Villiers ed., *Joris van Speilbergen's voyage round the world (1614–1617), and the Australian navigations of Jacob Le Maire* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1906), p. 136.

[24] "A discourse by the very renowned Apoloni Schot", p. 139.

[25] "A discourse by the very renowned Apoloni Schot", pp. 137–38.

were free to making war against each other but not allowed to restore peace. As a consequence, the harmony that would be based upon a dualistic concept of alternating wartime and peaceful periods was broken. Accordingly, the Regent of Ternate and Naro, the Prince of Tidore, adjusted the terms for informal peace, feigning their commitment to their respective European allies. This situation would never be satisfactorily resolved. By 1639 the Spaniards came to be puzzled by the kings of Tidore and Ternate having formally celebrated peace, "a thing which we had never expected", they said.[26] Apparently, Gorontalo, Sultan of Tidore (r. 1633–1653), justified his act with the fact that during the previous 4 years the governors of the Philippines failed to send him the usual gifts. The Spaniards, however, did not believe that he was moved by such a rather futile reason.[27]

According to Schott, for a long time, the Ternatans were "accustomed to rule over others with great authority and power, so that they cannot but take it amiss for anyone to exercise full dominion over them".[28] He considered this dominion to be the result of good government by the three former sultans: Baab Ullah (r. 1570–1583), Said Udin Berkat (r. 1583–1606) and Hidayat (r. 1606–1610).[29] Actually, Baab Ullah was the only one to rule with full authority, free from any European support, to finally defeat the Portuguese, due to the policy fulfilled by his father, Sultan Hairun (r. 1535–1570). Hairun started ruling in a rather feeble position, successfully avoiding becoming a trifling ruler under the Portuguese, as his brothers and several other regents previously had been, patiently consolidating his personal position and building a strong regional Ternatan hegemony in the long term.[30]

The flip side of this political reality was the occasional and sometime widespread resistance by those communities which suffered from abuse and excessive pressure from the sultans of Ternate and Tidore. Apparently, the forms of resistance were generally peaceful. However, the problem was more acute in the sago and rice supplying areas in northern Halmahera and Bacan, where a number of Christian conversions took place since the 1530s. These communities tried to escape the Ternatan impositions by obtaining political support and military protection from the Portuguese, who, unlike the Dutch a century later, were easily involved in conflicts linking to local Christian communities. While the Raja of Bacan who had long been

[26] Juan Lopez S. J., "Report on Philippine events between August 1639 and August 1640, Manila, Aug. 1640", in Hubert Jacobs S. J. ed., *Documenta Malucensia*, III (Rome: IHSI, 1984), doc. 156, pp. 515–16.

[27] E. H. Blair, J. A. Robertson and E. G. Bourne eds., *The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898*, vol. 29 (Cleveland, Ohio: Arthur H. Clark, 1905), p. 195.

[28] "A discourse by the very renowned Apoloni Schot", p. 137.

[29] "A discourse by the very renowned Apoloni Schot", pp. 140–41.

[30] Manuel Lobato, "The Moluccan Archipelago and Eastern Indonesia in the second half of the 16th Century in the light of Portuguese and Spanish accounts", in Francis A. Dutra and J. C. dos Santos eds., *The Portuguese and the Pacific. International colloquium at Santa Barbara* (Santa Barbara: University of California, 1995), p. 39.

a Muslim, did not oppose the Ternatan hegemony, the *sangaji* of Labuha asked to be baptised in 1579, adopting the name Rui Pereira.[31]

Dating from a very remote past, however, this conflict, focused on the control by the sultans of Tidore and Ternate over rice- and sago-producing areas in northern Halmahera and Bacan, was embedded in the local culture and language to the point that the very same expression was used to designate "harvesting sago" and "raiding". In the late eighteenth century, for instance, people from Galela and Tobaru, in north and northwest Halmahera, are said to arm a single *kora-kora* to raid for sago provisions in the Sula Islands, off the east coast of Sulawesi.[32] Being compelled to deliver sago to the Sultan of Ternate and to avoid being victims of the Ternatans, these north Halmaheran groups developed their own raiding strategies sponsored by Ternate.

John Saris, in 1612, reported that, due to the on-going "civil war" and the lasting Dutch-Spanish conflict, cloves were no longer gathered at Bacan, formerly the most productive among the Spice Islands, the inhabitants preferring not to collect cloves.[33] A few years later the gathering of cloves in Bacan continued to be partially abandoned due to the war and the pressure on the inhabitants, some of them, previously devoted to the Portuguese, had converted to the Christian faith to avoid falling under the Ternatan rule. Schott informs that, in 1609, settlers were brought to Tobelo from Kayoa, where harsh resistance to Ternatan influence was spreading, allegedly to protect them and increase the gathering of cloves in Bacan. He described how "tiranny" (tyranny) and heavy impositions by the sultans made the islands under Ternatan rule to be sparsely inhabited and how the Dutch found difficult to honour their agreements of bilateral assistance to communities that repeatedly suffered losses inflicted by the Ternatans. The island of Motir, formerly uninhabited due to the continuous warring between Ternate and Tidore, was being repopulated by 2,000 people, among them Ternatans who had previously fled to Jailolo, and Ternatese subjects coming from Gane, on the southern tip of Halmahera.[34]

The Dutch were not able to prevent Sultan Hamzah (r. 1627–1648) and Sultan Mandar Syah (r. 1648–1675) from enlarging the hegemony of Ternate over peripheral areas. Despite these Ternatan rulers assigned some of the rebellious regions, such as Hitu, in north Ambon, and Hoamal, in West Seram, to be placed under the Dutch control, the VOC influence over the core of the sultanate remained limited.[35]

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[31] Hubert Jacobs S. J., "Introduction", in Hubert Jacobs S. J. ed., *Documenta Malucensia*, II (Rome: IHSI, 1980) p. 19*.

[32] Widjojo, *The revolt of Prince Nuku*, p. 146.

[33] "The voyage of Captaine Saris in the Cloave, to the Ile of Japan, what befell in the way: Observations of the Dutch and Spaniards in the Molucca's", in Samuel Purchas ed., *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes*, III (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1905), p. 416.

[34] "A discourse by the very renowned Apoloni Schot", pp. 135–39.

[35] Leonard Y. Andaya, *The world of Maluku. Eastern Indonesia in the early modern period* (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1993), pp. 164–68.

Maluku and the Makassar Connection

During the early decades of fair VOC control over the spice trade in Maluku, Makassarese traders are said to have visited regularly the Ambon Archipelago and occasionally some ports farther north into the core of the Sultanate of Ternate, benefitting occasionally from the favour of the local authorities and the sultan himself. Significant volumes of cloves and minor quantities of mace and nutmeg coming from areas beyond Dutch control flooded into Makassar, as reported by the English agents there,[36] who received limited trading privileges in return for providing the sultan with big sized artillery and other European firearms.[37] Portuguese from Melaka and Tidore and Spaniards from Tidore and Manila also frequented Makassar, stimulating smuggling trade though they were only admitted individually as other Malay traders usually were. Despite almost all Spanish military efforts were accomplished under defensive needs against the Dutch, on certain occasions, however, the Spanish biased background led them to attack even their own allies, as happened in 1617, off Buru island, when captain Don Fernando Becerra captured a vessel belonging to Alaudin, Sultan of Makassar (r. 1593–1639), killing all people on board, including the chief *ulama* (Sp. *casis*) and seizing a valuable cargo that, in theory, would be considered a Crown prize, but Becerra preferred to distribute the loot amongst the soldiers under his command, a common practice among Southeast Asian pirates.[38] The Dutch "free burghers" settled in the Banda Islands also used their European firearms to rob Asian traders, a fact that led the VOC to impose stricter restrictions to their freedom to purchase victuals and other non-valuable commodities.[39]

By the late 1620s intense smuggling had undermined the Dutch trade in cloves to a point that the VOC adopted restrictive measures to enforce its monopoly. In 1629, Ternate, apparently complying with Dutch pressure, positioned 100 *kora-kora* in the Ambon Archipelago to prevent Southeast Asian junks from purchasing cloves under the protection of the Sultan of Makassar. However, the representative *kimelaha* of the Sultan of Ternate in southern Seram kept on smuggling cloves to Makassar. The embargo remained ineffective and all the operation produced poor results as in 1630 some 300 bahares of cloves came into the hands of the English agents at Makassar, compelling the Dutch to blockade Ambon, also with meagre results. According to

[36] D. K. Bassett, "English Trade in Celebes, 1613–1667', *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. 21, no. 1 (1958), pp. 5–6.

[37] John Villiers, "'One of the Especiallest Flowers in our Garden': The English Factory at Makassar, 1613–1667", *Archipel*, vol. 39 (1990), p. 164.

[38] Gerónimo de Silva to Andrés de Alcaraz, president of the Royal Audiencia, Ternate, 18 Feb. 1617, *Correspondencia*, p. 418.

[39] Tom Goodman, "The *sosolot* exchange network in eastern Indonesia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries", *Perspectives on the Birds Head of Irian Jaya, Indonesia. Proceedings of the Conference Leiden, 13–17 October 1997*, ed. J. Miedema, C. Odé and R. A. C. Dam (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), p. 429.

English estimates, the rise of the "Ambonese wars" in 1636 increased quantities of cloves smuggled outside the Dutch control to some 400 bahares in return for Asian and European firearms. After 1642, when the VOC obtained permission to found a factory at Makassar, many Malay traders renounced to sail from there to Ambon for fear of being tracked by Dutch agents. Then the sultanate established closer friendly ties with Manila to obtain cloves shipped from the Spanish strongholds in Tidore in exchange for local rice as well as firearms and gunpowder of English origin.[40]

In the half century preceding the Bunggaya Treaty of 1667, however, the chronicles of the "Gowa and Talloq Princes" refers, in the year 1652, only to two military and raiding Makassarese expeditions against Ternate and the Dutch in Ambon out from a list of 55 of such expeditions.[41] They provided trading and military support from Makassar to the *kimelaha* Majira of Luhu, in the Hoamoal Peninsula of Seram, who rejected the supremacy of the Sultan of Ternate, Mandar Syah (r. 1648–1675), offering an opportunity to elude Dutch control and boosting "illegal" activities conducted by Malay country traders.[42] One hundred and sixty Dutch, including some women and children, lost their lives at the hands of the "rebel" leaders, the *kimelaha* Majira and the *kapitan laut* Said.[43] According to Charles Boxer, the Dutch authorities in Batavia believed that the leading Portuguese merchant in Makassar, Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, had been behind the rebellious events of 1651.[44]

In fact, in 1651 the Ambonese rebels strengthened themselves in Loki, the highest point on the eastern coast of Hoamoal. They received support from Makassar, in which an unspecified number of Portuguese regimented by Figueiredo participated.[45] On the 27th June of 1652, 400 Dutch soldiers and 50 Ternatans finally seized the fort on the hill of Loki.[46] In March of the following year, Sultan Hasanudin of Makassar (r. 1653–1669) sailed in support of the Ambonese rebellion against the Dutch stronghold in the Butung island:

> The king sailed in person, accompanied by other chiefs subject to him, with an army of 60,000 men[47] .... Reached an island they call Butung that lays in the way [to Ambon], which he aimed to subject because it had rebelled and joined the Dutch, which had a bulwark with 30 European and 29 Ternatans. The Makassarese assaulted the bastion that was bravely defended. The defenders, cannot no longer resist, set fire to the gunpowder

[40] Villiers, "One of the Especiallest Flowers", pp. 164–65 and 170.

[41] La Side Daéng Tapala, "L'expansion du royaume de Goa et sa politique maritime aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles", *Archipel*, vol. 10 (1975), pp. 168–70. For a recent edition of these chronicles see William Cummings (ed.), *A Chain of Kings: The Makassarese chronicles of Gowa and Talloq* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007).

[42] Bassett, "English Trade in Celebes", p. 23.

[43] Gerrit Knaap, "Headhunting, carnage and armed peace in Amboina, 1500-1700", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. 46, no. 2 (2003), p. 179.

[44] Charles Boxer, *Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo: A Portuguese merchant-adventurer in South East Asia, 1624–1667* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 8–11.

[45] Boxer, *Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo*, p. 12.

[46] Knaap, "Headhunting, carnage and armed peace in Amboina", p. 180.

[47] Three thousand according to Figueiredo. See Boxer, *Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo*, p. 12.

> and exploded along with 45 Makassarese. The bulwark was demolished and the whole island surrendered, paying 14,000 *pardaos* to the king of Makassar. Once finished with this enterprise he returned back home because the monsoon to sail to Ambon was gone.[48]

From the late sixteenth century, some Makassarese traders probably settled in Ternate's court, where they established a *kampung* Makassar about which we do have regular information from the 1680s onwards.[49]

The *extirpatie* (extirpation) policy enforced by the VOC's administration in North Maluku brought about the improvement of the revenues of the Sultan of Ternate and the impoverishment of the commoners and dependent classes,[50] who traditionally were excluded from the earnings of the non-productive enterprises, such as piratical and slave raiding. The royal family and the courtly elite shared the 12,000 *Rixdollars* annual pension that the Dutch started to pay in 1652 to the sultan as a compensation for renouncing the spice exportation and the control of the cloves gathering throughout his estates. The village headmen and the cultivators however, suffering the damages of this policy, engaged in self-initiated warring, slave raiding and other piratical activities as alternatives to the cloves production.

Raiding and Ethnical Conflict: Memory or Amnesia?

Though raiding and slave hunting existed in Maluku long before the Europeans started to give full evidence of them, it cannot be asserted that they were activities exclusively "rooted" in a characteristic Papuan warlike practice. In Galela and Tobelo, in Northeast Halmahera, the contemporary inhabitants proudly recall their ancestors as having been warriors or sea-pirates, activities which are culturally associated to virility and to representations of guiltiness and murdering performed during marriage rituals. The anthropologists believe that these communities have developed these purifying practices through a strong involvement in piracy from the seventeenth century onwards. In other villages across this region, such as Kao or Loloda, "professional" pirates could be found until the late nineteenth century. The Ngidiho of Galela, for instance, still perform the sacred *Cakalele* dance as a victorious celebration in honour of their "pirate" ancestors and speak proudly about it, as actually do most people in North Halmahera, Ternate and Tidore. Attacks on trading ships as far as Seram and Timor were also preserved in Galela's oral

[48] Fr. Metello Saccano S. J. to the Jesuit assistant of Portugal in Rome, Makassar, June 30, 1655, in Hubert Jacobs S. J. ed., *The Jesuit Makasar Documents (1615–1682)* (Rome: Jesuit Historical Institute, 1988), doc. 39, p. 124.

[49] R. Z. Leirissa, "Bugis-Makassarese in port-towns Ambon and Ternate through the nineteenth century", *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 156, 3 (2000), p. 621.

[50] Andaya, *The world of Maluku*, p. 57.

tradition.[51] Confronted with these living traditions and some historical accounts, anthropologists did not fail to link the pirate vocation among northeast Halmaheran Ndigiho villages to the process of state formation in northern Maluku. Politically and culturally it is quite obvious that the occasional piracy embodied the resistance from peripheral areas against hegemonic centres in Ternate and Tidore. But the reverse is also true. A number of examples reveal that the adherence from minor peripheral polities to a political centre was often signified through involvement in raiding activities sponsored by a major centre such as Ternate or Tidore.

Strong economic motives for piracy and raiding are also invoked in the collective memory. However, side by side with the most apparent recollections, other social and economic motives should be found, especially in the way in which the rajas of Ternate and Tidore enforced their control as paramount rulers over the Morotia Peninsula of northern Halmahera. In this region, the introduction of rice planting and harvesting, a soft form of work undertaken by women, intensified sexual labour division, releasing men from cutting and flouring sago and allowing them to dedicate more time to warring and "professional" sea-piratical activities.[52] Morotia became the barn of Maluku, since most other volcanic islands have no soil conditions for rice planting, as were the wealthy but too small islands of Ternate and Tidore, whose rulers were constrained to exchange cloves for Javanese rice to feed up their increasingly and fairly agricultural-reliant inhabitants. Though these changes were taking place from a very distant past, prior to the advent of Islam in the late half of the fifteenth century, the conflict they originated would gain a religious contour after the arrival of the Iberians in the region. From 1534 onwards, after having rejected Islam for some half a century, the *sangaji* of Mamuya, Tollo, Sugala and Cawa villages in Northern Halmahera, accepted to be baptized in return for military aid. The Portuguese, unable to refuse militarily help to the Christian communities, repeatedly interfered in this region, whether favouring the Halmaheran people against the Sultan of Ternate, or supporting Ternatan pretensions against the Tobaru people, who used to attack the coastal villages from inland. In 1629, Sultan Hamzah (r. 1627–1648), in view to consolidate himself politically and to reverse the accusation of being an apostate of Islam after having temporarily converted to Christianity during a long and forced exile in Manila,[53] enslaved and deported to Ternate 700 warriors from the six main Christian villages in Morotia Peninsula, including Galela, forcing them to accept Islam. According to L. Andaya, the spice trade and the spread of Islam both contributed to reinforce Ternate as the leading polity in the Malukan world.[54]

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[51] Farsijana R. Adeney-Risakotta, "Politics, ritual and identity in Indonesia: A Moluccan history of religion and social conflict" (Ph.D. dissertation, Nijmegen, Radboud University Nijmegen, 2005), pp. 99 and 149–50.

[52] Adeney-Risakotta, "Politics, ritual and identity in Indonesia", pp. 124–25.

[53] Andrea Simi S. J. to Muzio Vitelleschi, General of the Jesuits, Ternate, 28 Mar. 1629, in Hubert Jacobs S. J. ed., *Documenta Malucensia*, III (Rome, IHSI, 1984), doc. 140, p. 470.

[54] Andaya, *The world of Maluku*, p. 57.

Recent riots and massacres occurred throughout the Maluku area, especially in Ambon, and in some neighbouring islands, such as northern Sulawesi, have drawn worldwide attention for the role that intergroup violence continues to play in that part of the Malay Archipelago. Considered to be an ethnic conflict by the standards of the international media and humanitarian organizations, violent events were reported as another separatist "ethno-nationalist" and Muslim-Christian conflict in Indonesia, in line with those in Aceh, East Timor or West Papua.[55] How these recent events may be considered, it is not difficult to find their roots in a distant past long before Islam became a state religion in the fifteenth century.

In fact, such a conflict is not really different in nature from the wars that were already going on by 1512, when the Portuguese first settled in the region. During the third quarter of the sixteenth century, the conflict at Bacan and Ambon became a major reason for the gradual divorce between the Portuguese and the Ternatans. In 1570, the conflict finally led to the murder of Sultan Hairun, who was said to be promoting Muslim resistance to the fast increasing Christian communities in Central Maluku. By supporting both Muslim and Christian Ambonese, the Dutch later brought a temporary appeasement to this conflict. It was resumed after 1622 over discontentment regarding restrictions on clove planting and harvesting imposed by the Dutch. Turmoil across the Ambonese Archipelago and especially in the major islands of Buru and Ceram reach a peak in the 1630s, and coming to an end by 1656 as the Dutch succeeded in enforcing a lasting *pax neerlandica*.

Claims by the sultans of Ternate over Hitu and other western Seramese villages in the Hoamoal Peninsula[56] are consistent with the Ridjali's chronicle of c. 1646, the *Hikayat Tanah Hitu*.[57] This polity on the northern coast of Ambon, and other ports as Veranula, Lesidi or Kambelu, proved crucial for Ternate in restraining Christian communities across the Ambonese Archipelago, that were especially numerous in the islands to the east of Ambon, such as Haruku, Saparua and Nusalaut. This way, due to the Portuguese interference and self-determination in building a new fortified stronghold in Ambon, this region witnessed during the last quarter of the sixteenth century a rise in endemic violence which an anonymous chronicler named "the wars of Ambon".[58] The situation deteriorated during the 1560s due to attacks and killings perpetrated against low class Portuguese privateers, who were known as the *casados* or "married men", involved in the cloves and foodstuffs trade. It strained the relations between Ternate and the Portuguese authorities which finally led, by

[55] Kathleen T. Turner, *Competing myths of nationalist identities: Ideological perceptions of conflict in Ambon, Indonesia* (Ph.D. dissertation, Perth, Murdoch University, 2006), pp. 9 and 38.

[56] 'Relação dos feitos . . . que Sancho de Vasconcelos', in A. Basílio de Sá ed., *Documentação para a história das missões do padroado português do oriente. Insulíndia*, IV (Lisbon: AGU, 1956), pp. 181–82.

[57] H. Stravers, Ch. Fraassen and J. Putten eds., *Ridjali: Historie van Hitu. Een Ambonse geschiedenis uit de zeventiende eeuw* (Utrecht: Landelijk Steunpunt Educatie Molukkers, 2004). For a detailed description see G. L. Koster, "*Hikayat Tanah Hitu*. A rare local source of 16th and 17th century Moluccan history", *Review of Culture*, vol. 28 (2008), pp. 132–42.

[58] "Relação dos feitos . . . que Sancho de Vasconcelos", p. 184.

1570, to the murder of Sultan Hairun and the capture of the Portuguese fortress at Ternate by Hairun's son and successor, Sultan Baab Ullah. Hairun was believed to have ordered such actions and to have put them in practice through agents of his own royal blood, namely their own sons, while, at the same time, he justified himself blaming on unspecified 'ant typed thieves' for the resistance actions. Some wealthy *casados* were also found implicated in uncovering the acts of the ruler, with whom they developed close familial and trading ties.[59]

As to the "smuggling" practices involving the *mardika* Portuguese-Asian creole in Tidore under the Spanish rule and the Makassarese country traders during the Dutch period, there was but little room for surreptitious activities not involving the local Asian powers and the rulers themselves. In the seas of Maluku raiding was not accomplished as an independent activity. Instead, most raids, or raiding campaigns, were ordered or approved by the sultan himself.

Richard Leirissa pointed out that the political and religious distribution of the Christian and Muslim villages in the Ambon, Haruku, Saparua and Nusalaut islands, despite 300 years of Dutch rule and half a century of post-colonial regime, still stands as it was described in late sixteenth century Jesuit letters. However, he also admitted that raids and attacks in Ambon were effectively very intense from a previous period,[60] when the villages in the southern Peninsula of Leitimore, having not yet accepted the Christian faith and implicitly the Portuguese military support, suffered the pressure from the villages in the northern Peninsula of Hitu, the first federation (*uli*) of villages to embrace Islam around 1500. By the late sixteenth century, Hitu was no longer the main polity in Ambon, superseded by other ports sheltered from Portuguese raids, such as Luhu, Kambelo and Lisidi, in the Hoamal westernmost Seram Peninsula.

According to Leirissa, the raids, wars and Christianization in Ambon in the sixteenth century were part of the effort to keep social "dichotomic-symbiosis" based on *-siwa* (nine) and *-lima* (five), a classificatory group pattern widely present in Maluku and, especially, in the Ambon-Lease Islands. Georg Rumphius' manuscript *Ambonsch Landbeschrijving* on the village organization in Ambon area, not published so far, reports on seven *uli* or village federations according to their capacity of preparing *kora-kora* units to serve in the Dutch patrolling fleets. Dating back to the Portuguese period, the whole *uli* organization was maintained under the Dutch rule with the single exception of the Nusaniwe federation, extinguished as a result of having been too strongly attached to the Portuguese. Several *uli* villages were required to build and maintain operational a single *kora-kora*.[61]

Violent activities were an important part of the local cultural and social dualism in shaping a large and extremely complex human landscape. European colonists hardly accepted that the Malukan political entities, such as Ternate or Tidore, were

[59] "Relação dos feitos . . . que Sancho de Vasconcelos", p. 186.

[60] Richard Z. Leirissa, "St. Francis Xavier and the Jesuits in Ambon, 1546–1580", *Review of Culture*, vol. 19 (2006), p. 53.

[61] Leirissa, "St. Francis Xavier and the Jesuits in Ambon", pp. 60–61.

engaged in warlike activities with a different focus, omitting to annihilate their enemies or seizing their estates, which the European believed to be the purpose of war. However, the printed images circulating among European cultivated elites tended to represent the native communities in the image of their homeland societies as idealistic peaceful agriculturalists and fishermen. Conversely, they will also come to agree later on that the raids were illegal piratical acts that should be treated accordingly and not overlooked in any sense. Along with the Bugis, the Ambonese came to be reputed as among the best soldiers at the service of the Dutch during the early nineteenth-century Javanese wars.[62]

The *Sosolot* Network: (Un)economic Interaction Between Raiders and Traders?

Due to the fact that predatory activities conducted by Ternate were Dutch-aligned, those who were labelled as "pirates" were associated with areas in Tidore's realm, especially in the Gamrange area of southern Halmahera and in the Raja Ampat Islands. To pay tribute, raiding and plundering were part of rendering services to the Sultan of Tidore by the groups inhabiting in the eastern coast of Halmahera. Such practices were at the core of power relations in North Maluku. Sea villages located in sago producing areas, such as Weba, Patani and Wada, provided the Sultan of Tidore with important tributes in tortoise-shell, ambergris, birds of paradise and slaves, which were mostly flowing into trading networks beyond the European control. According to L. Andaya, the ability of the sultans of Tidore to be acknowledged as rulers in these peripheral areas was instrumental in preserving Tidore's independence during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. The coastline of Patani was considered a forbidden area to all vessels sailing without permission from the Sultan of Tidore. In the early eighteenth century a Dutch inspection in the area concluded that the Patanese were among "the greatest pirates and rogues known in these eastern parts".[63]

The relation between the Sultan of Tidore and the Papuan realm, though regulated by traditional and very strict tributary ties, seems to have been predominantly political and spiritual rather than economic or commercial: The Papuan rulers sent embassies to Tidore (previously to Bacan) with the product of their *rak* or hunting raids in return for titles, insignias and selected goods, such as clothes, supposedly embedded with the supernatural powers of the Tidorese rulers. Some authors argued that the granting of Malukan titles to the Papuan leaders and raiding headmen dated

[62] Joël Eymeret, "Les archives françaises au service des études indonésiennes: Java sous Daendels (1808–1811)", *Archipel*, vol. 4 (1972), p. 164.

[63] Andaya, *The world of Maluku*, pp. 99–100.

back from the early seventeenth century.[64] Rights of exclusivity were also observed in certain Malukan areas. Only in the name of the Sultan of Tidore could vessels visit ports in the west coast of Halmahera, such as Toseho and Payahe, rich in sago forest resources. They changed their allegiance from Tidore to Ternate by the mid-seventeenth century. The swampy island of Bacan, the Gamrange region of southeast Halmahera through the ports of Maba, Patani and Weda, and the Raja Ampat region became the main sago suppliers of Tidore. Due to the winds and streams, these areas offered difficult conditions for navigation which naturally protected them from the Dutch-Ambonese and Ternatan plundering expeditions.[65]

Long before Nuku's rebellion arose, the Dutch had already formed an accurate image of the Raja Ampat and the islands to the east of Seram. In this region, coastal communities and polities deeply interacted to acquire imported goods. Raiding and trading were the most visible effects to the European observers. Actually, it signifies a huge coordinated and ritualised effort to acquire supernatural powers that the exotic goods were supposedly embedded with. The process of "acquisition" acted to tie different ethnic communities and social identities. Long-distance maritime enterprises, such as raiding and trading, shaped regional networks of multiple ethnical hubs articulated around distinctive and mutually accepted codes, in which specialised traders and middlemen seems to have an important role.[66]

The foundational myths of the Papuans from Waigeo refer to their Biak origin and to plundering expeditions sent westwards—Seram is mentioned and the east coast of Halmahera is probably referred too. The seizing of people and raiding over far distant lands are said to have played a particular role in "feeding" the Waigeoese and providing them with rowers to perpetuate such expeditions. Among the Papuan societies, only commoners are said to have a genealogy. The rulers did not need one and it was denied to the slaves. This concept facilitated slave capture and trading. According to the myths, the first fleet from Waigeo successfully engaged at the service of the Sultan of Tidore overthrew a fleet from Jailolo. Acting as middlemen of the natives of the Raja Ampat Islands, the Waigeoese leaders adopted the Malukan title of *sangaji*. Though no precise date can be asserted for the development of relations between the Papuan rulers and Tidore, such relations were fully developed by the early seventeenth century.[67] The Portuguese trader Miguel Roxo de Brito collected information about the Misoolese raiders:

> Those of Misool raid no place other than the island of Seram Laut ... going there with a fleet of thirty to forty warships, none of which comes back without booty ... [The fleet] first takes hostages, [then] releases them for a ransom, [and] returns to its base [in Misool]. And they capture seventy to eighty inhabitants of Seram Laut every year, and these have to purchase their freedom as often as they are captured, for the same ransom they once paid

[64] Holger Warnk, "The coming of Islam and Moluccan-Malay culture to New Guinea, c.1500–1920", *Indonesia and the Malay world*, vol. 38, 110 (2010), p. 113.

[65] Andaya, *The world of Maluku*, pp. 66, 99 and 170.

[66] Goodman, "The *sosolot* exchange network", pp. 421 and 430.

[67] Widjojo, *The revolt of Prince Nuku*, pp. 118–22.

> to redeem themselves, without any discount. And if they do not have enough to purchase their freedom, they are killed … if they cannot redeem themselves, they beg other wealthy Seramese to buy them, and so they remain their slaves. The Seram Laut people themselves told this.

He adds that "there was no Seramese who had not been caught five times".[68] Actually, a number of people enslaved throughout Maluku as a result of raids were to be ransomed by their families. In most cases, they were sold to intermediaries before gaining their freedom. During such a long and exhausting process, captives were compelled to work until being rescued. Standing evidence show that slave trade in the Maluku area was more a question of kidnapping people to obtain a ransom than a labour traffic as in other parts of the Indian Ocean zone. Each year, no more than a few hundred people were captured in the Maluku Islands. Captives who could not be ransomed were sold or eventually killed if they could not be sold due to disease or age, but occasionally members of the raiding party also retained some women as wives and sold their children at very low rates. Prices could vary enormously depending on quantity, age, gender and ethnic origin: a captive sold within a group of slaves could cost 10 *Rixdollars*; women and children valued one third or less than a man, as well as eastern Malukan and Papuan slaves could be much cheaper than Ambonese, Makassarese or Chinese, who rated up to 100 *Rixdollars*. However, because information about these activities in the sixteenth century is too scarce, it is difficult to gauge whether the pattern changed and whether slaves started to be also captured as male slave labour and female domestics or wives only in the following century, in addition to ransom and selling purposes featured in earlier accounts.[69]

Actually, slave trading is poorly documented prior to the seventeenth century. Slaves were mostly war prisoners, but capture was not the only source of slavery. Describing the people of Labuha, in the island of Bacan, the Jesuit Francisco de Sousa says they were adamant in collecting debts that doubled every year.[70] In fact, insolvency was a major source of slavery, the doubled debt being linked to the idea of a renewal of all things with the annual cycle.

In the Maluku area, vessels were primarily used in sea battle, raiding and plundering.[71] In fishing activities and transportation between islands and along the coastlines over short distances, much smaller vessels or prahu were used. The pattern of the warring vessels in Maluku and on the north Coast of New Guinea was similar. The prow and the stern of some *kora-kora*, or locally made outrigger *prahus*, were said to be as higher as the stern castle of a Spanish oceanic vessel.[72] A fleet of such *kora-kora* or locally made *prahus* usually had an operational autonomy limited

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[68] Gelpke, "The report of Miguel Roxo de Brito", pp. 130–31.

[69] Widjojo, *The revolt of Prince Nuku*, pp. 134 and 151–52.

[70] Francisco de Sousa S. J., *Oriente Conquistado a Jesus Christo pelos padres da Companhia de Jesus da Provincia de Goa*, M. Lopes de Almeida ed. (Porto: Lello & Irmão, 1978), p. 1112.

[71] Leirissa, "St. Francis Xavier and the Jesuits in Ambon", p. 63.

[72] J. G. Sotil, "Ortiz de Retes, por aguas australes", in A. Landin Carrasco ed., *Descubrimientos españoles en el mar del sur*, II (Madrid: Banco Español de Credito, 1991), p. 390.

to some 2 weeks, lacking capacity to carry supplies for the numerous rowers.[73] These *kora-kora* were advantageous in warlike activities. They could easily manage against the wind and the maritime streams and tides. Neither had they a need for deep waters or safe anchors and wind protection, being usually dragged onto dry sandy beaches by their own crews. Raiding required, however, complex logistics. Long distances implied the expeditionary forces to be abroad for months or during the entire monsoon period. Water, supplies and refreshment were a constant priority for the raiding leaders. The Papuan long-distance traders and raiders seems to have developed sophisticated forms of carrying water.[74] A long tradition of technical ports of call resulted in permanent settlements, as the villages found in northern Seram by Halmaheran raiders from Weda and by the Papuan from Salawati and Misool who supplied them with sago and refreshment. Harbours, such as the islets off Seram Laut regularly visited by the Papuans from Onin, also served as meeting points during the proper monsoon for raiders from different origins who joined their forces there. These points attracted some east Seramese slave traders from Keffing who also used to buy birds of paradise in exchange for cloth they obtained through Ambonese middlemen or directly in the few Dutch *pasar kompeni* posts scattered eastwards of Ambon. Over the time, small hamlets of mixed blood settlers engaged in raiding and trading were founded.[75]

The environment also played a part in the construction of network hubs in the Seram Laut Islands. Coralline islands, reefs and shoals forming channels cautioned the European and other foreigner vessels from safely accessing these huge populous trading centres as Kilwaru, that the naturalist Alfred Wallace described as a large village floating upon the water, where a single "particle of land or vegetation" could not be seen.[76] Especially in Southern Seram, Seram Laut and Gorom, the social system was in place to prevent leaders from ruling autocratically. Miguel Roxo de Brito described an interchangeable system that compelled each local leader to sail away in the quest for valuable trading goods, prowess and royal titles granted by either the sultan of Tidore or Ternate.[77] Communitarian savings were used to fund mercenary forces against raiders and to ransom those members of the community captured by the raiders. Every year, the Onin *sosolot* hub organised expeditions or *rak* to raid Maluku and other parts in eastern Indonesia. Cooperating with Tidore and Patani, another raiding centre under the Tidore allegiance, the Onin sailed into the coastal areas of Halmahera, to Salayar, in the Flores Sea, and to the Aru Islands.[78]

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[73] Gerónimo de Silva to the Sultan Mole of Tidore, Ternate, 1 Jul. 1613, *Correspondencia*, p. 136.

[74] Goodman, "The *sosolot* exchange network", p. 430.

[75] Widjojo, *The revolt of Prince Nuku*, p. 149.

[76] Alfred Russel Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago. The land of the* orang-utan*, and the bird of paradise. A narrative of travel, with studies of man and nature* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1869), p. 368.

[77] Gelpke, "The report of Miguel Roxo de Brito", p. 132.

[78] Goodman, "The *sosolot* exchange network", pp. 433 and 438.

Evidence from later periods reveals that raiding forces were mostly multi-ethnic, the participants speaking different languages, each ethnic group under their own headmen. Despite being a male and adult activity, raiding mobilized the entire community, especially the political and religious elites. Economic and political reasons justified the rulers to take a personal part in the raiding expeditions. The *sangaji* of Patani and the Raja of Salawati are mentioned among the rulers who usually guided their subjects. According to the Malukan warring tradition, different leaders and other pre-eminent people often embarked in the *kora-kora* of an overall commander, who could be either the sultan or another ruler or some other high ranking person assigned to the task. Because warring prowess brought prestige and wealth, some imams are said to have been found in raiding expeditions.[79] Big sized *kora-kora* was distinctive of the rajas and the *sangaji*. In 1613, the Prince of Tidore sank a *kora-kora* from Ternate in which 40 royal blood individuals perished, among them were two brothers of the Sultan of Ternate, Modafar (r. 1610–1627), the Raja of Jailolo, five *sangaji*, several *casis* and princes of different royal families of Ternate, Toluku and Sabugu, as well as the Ternate's *kapitan laut*.[80]

From Raiding Repression to Political Fracture

Since the early 1650s, the Dutch made efforts against Misool, Salawati, Hatuwe, Weda and Patani. However, the activities of raiding and plundering the Malukan waters continued until 1680s as a part of the conflict opposing Tidore to Ternate and the Dutch. Acting in support of Tidore, the Papuan raiders under the Raja of Salawati and the Southern Halmaheran groups were used as a military power in the Ambon and Seram areas at the convenience of the Tidoran sultan. Villages in north Seram were major victims, having been plundered several times during the 1670s by raiders under the Raja of Misool and his *kapitan laut*, who took Ambonese captives to be sold in East Seram at the rate of 38 to 40 *Rixdollars*. The Dutch managed to refrain from raiding activities in the Ambon area. They temporarily succeeded against the south eastern Halmaheran groups, while the Papuan leaders from the Raja Ampat (Misool and Salawati) and Onin continued to sporadically raid villages under the Dutch allegiance. By the end of the seventeenth century, raiding activities boosted in intensity and extended in range from Ambon, Buru and the Seram Sea into the Aru-Kei and Tanimbar Islands, and westwards to Sula, Banggai and north-western Sulawesi. The sultan had also developed a cooperative network with the Gamrange and Raja Ampat raiders, by assigning leading Tidoran princes to the Misoolese raiding expeditions and providing them with gunpowder acquired through Ambonese merchants.

[79] Widjojo, *The revolt of Prince Nuku*, pp. 150–51.

[80] See the list of the royal blood individuals in Gerónimo de Silva to King Philip III, Ternate (Jun. 1613), *Correspondencia*, pp. 127–28.

Impotent to refrain robbery and raiding, but increasingly influential at the court of Tidore, the Dutch pressured Sultan Hamzah Fahrudin (r. 1689–1707) to condemn such activities and to surrender some raiding leaders too. By complying with the Dutch, the sultan apparently disturbed in an unprecedented way the cultural and economic ties linking Tidore to the Gamrange and the Raja Ampat rulers. The southern Halmaheran polities, after isolated demonstrations of "rebellion", reacted by shifting their allegiance from Tidore to Ternate in 1725. Conciliatory arrangements with Patani were made by Tidoran Sultan Malikilmanan (r. 1728–1756), but Papuan leaders did not cease raiding over Seram and other places. During the 1730s and 1740s, Dutch efforts to restrain raiding failed. By the mid-eighteenth century the southern Halmaheran raiders had expanded up to Sulawesi. In 1761, 500 raiders in two different expeditions under the rajas of Patani and Sulawati captured 200 slaves in Makassar and Buru.[81]

Tidore had played a double dealing game by participating in Dutch punitive and spice-controlling expeditions against the rulers of Waigeo, Waigama and Misool in the late 1720s, having previously alerted them to the VOC plans. Avoiding resisting openly against European pressure, the sultans of Tidore implemented the strategy they once adopted under the Spanish rule. As Widjojo consistently maintained, some signs of internal dissent in Tidore in the early 1760s were most probably orchestrated subterfuges to appease the Dutch with regards to the loyalty of Sultan Jamaluddin (r. 1756–1779), and did not represent a real internal rupture. The insurgents were the usual raiders from the Gamrange villages of Patani and Gebe, who presented a threat on Galela and other villages under Ternatan allegiance in the northern Halmaheran rice producing area of Gamkonora. Tidore tried this way to preserve the *sosolot* trading network beyond Dutch control, which probably operated from pre-European times on the basis of exchanging the booty of raiding, mainly slaves, but also other Papuan commodities, such as birds of the paradise and sago, for imported goods.[82]

Not every islands visited and described by Miguel Roxo de Brito in the famous account of his 1581–82 voyage into the Raja Ampat are positively identified so far. However, from the description of Serdanha as the centre of vast trading network—connecting Magusia, in the MacCluer Golf of New Guinea, Tombuku, Butung, Timor, Bima, Bali and several other ports in Java—Gelpke identified it with the Seram Laut group of islets to the east and south-east of Seram proper. Iron from Tombuku was exchanged for Papuan massoy bark (*Massoia aromatica*) to be sold to Javanese traders for medical use, and other forest products, including wild nutmeg. Such network survived to the Dutch spice control and other impositions through *hongi* fleets and punitive expeditions. While Tidoran trading dynamics is not to be excluded, traders from east Seram and Gorom islands expanded during the period of Prince Nuku rebellion and after the Anglo-Dutch conflict as result of the

[81] Widjojo, *The revolt of Prince Nuku*, pp. 133–37.

[82] Widjojo, *The revolt of Prince Nuku*, pp. 133–37.

British and Chinese demand for exotic products.[83] Such a network survived until the late nineteenth century, when the value of trade was estimated by the British at 80,000 sterling pounds, not including slave trade, which had in the meantime been abolished.[84] A line of continuity in the massoy bark trade can be easily tracked from the Brito's account to the Rumphius' description of the area one century later,[85] comprising the 1632–33 and 1637 expeditions of Artus Gysels, governor of Banda, who accepted a bribe from the traders of Onin, consisting on three kilos of gold and 200 slaves.[86]

When the time came, however, Widjojo argues, Sultan Nuku was the leader who challenged the Dutch rule over Maluku by exploring and expanding the traditional ties linking the Tidoran elites to the east Seramese, and to the Gamrange and the Papuan raiding leaders. In the early days under the Prince Nuku's insurgency, the joint fleet of raiders became a sort of state armada. However, the relations between the ruler and the participants did not suffer any significant change. The rebel sultan's strategy to gain himself followers and supporters only differed in scale, and the methods of the raiding leaders for acquiring wealth and prestige increased only in the number of forces involved, in the huge area they covered in a single raiding monsoon as well as differing in the degree of destruction and the number of their victims.[87]

During the days of Prince Nuku's rebellion, the number of raiding occurrences multiplied in the Dutch records. Part of them originated from the testimonies of the victims. In 1792, a 20-vessel raiding Tobelorese-Papuan joint-venture was reported. The Tobelorese Alifuru people seem to have developed close links with the Papuans from the Raja Ampat. Together they plundered Buton and Gane, capturing 68 slaves, including members of the Gane sangaji's family. The following year their fleet, increased to 25 vessels, raided the area, as well as Obi and the Kelling and Manipa Islands. In 1794, 26 vessels were reported to have attacked Buton and Amblau. Besides people from Tobelo, there were other north Halmaheran raiders from Galela. Fugitive slaves mentioned powerful mixed forces from the Raja Ampat, Seram, Galela, Tobelo, Maba, Weda, and Patani, all raiders under the allegiance of Prince Nuku. They also reported to be sold by a few pieces of blue and white cloth to east Seramese traders who resold them again in Banda.[88]

In some cases the raiders alternatively offer the potential victims the choice of joining their raiding force. According to Widjojo, as long as the recruitment of new supporters was based on raiding, the political alliance headed by Prince Nuku was a successful formula. Since the sixteenth century, raiding was a means for political

[83] Goodman, "The *sosolot* exchange network", pp. 429–30 and 438.

[84] E. Marin la Meslée, *Past explorations in New Guinea and a project for the scientific exploration of the Great Island* (Sydney: J. L. Holmes, 1883).

[85] Goodman, "The *sosolot* exchange network", p. 436.

[86] Gelpke, "The report of Miguel Roxo de Brito", p. 127.

[87] Widjojo, *The revolt of Prince Nuku*, pp. 139–41.

[88] Widjojo, *The revolt of Prince Nuku*, pp. 146–47.

resistance against the European rule in Maluku, as it was also a path for different groups to follow a unifying and charismatic ruler or, instead, a sign of political fracture among the Malukan polities. Even the punitive expeditions and some of the regular *hongi* fleets sponsored by the VOC remained as a sort of raiding activity as long as the booty was distributed among the usual Ambonese and Ternatese participants. This continued until 1857, when the use of steamboats made them unnecessary. As the Dutch punitive expeditions succeeded and many leading raiders surrendered to the Dutch, Nuku abandoned open confrontation adopting instead "*guerrilla* warfare at sea".[89]

Giving Pirates a New Home: A Raider's Diaspora

From the inception, European presence in Maluku was instrumental to the local rulers in reinforcing their personal power. Invoking a sort of legitimacy that they never owned, the rulers obtained support from the Iberians and the Dutch to persecute alleged rebellions from communities that previously hardly tolerated close control by any authority. According to L. Andaya, in the last quarter of the sixteenth century the authority of the ruler was finally shaped by the resemblance of the European kingship: the main rulers became really kings and the people were either subdued or rebelled against them.[90] This way, practices which were quite common across the Island Southeast Asia were labelled as legal or illegal, creating one sided views to develop into the final imperialist stereotypes in the early nineteenth century.

Actually, from 1780s, the seascape of the Malay Archipelago witnessed strong changes through the rise of piracy on an unprecedented scale. Pirates known as Ilanun or Iranun and Balangingi or Bajau Sama were based along the river in Mindanao and the Samales Islands, both areas under the control of the Sulu Sultanate, and on the north-eastern shore of Borneo. Other bases could be found in north-eastern Borneo, west Sulawesi, Bali, where some eighty Ilanun prahus were reported in 1824, and as far as Seram.[91] In the nineteenth century, a few thousand of pirates sailed every year to raid and plunder a wide area covering the entire Southeast Asia, from Sumatra to Timor and the Raja Ampat. A large number of slaves were reported to be brought to Sulu and other major slave markets in Makassar and elsewhere. Their *kora-kora* outriggers were similar to the light traditional ones in Maluku with which they were often mistaken. In this period the typical Ilanun vessel had grown to a double deck 30 m long, with 100 rower slaves and a multi-ethnic crew, only to be superseded by the mid-century European steamboats.

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[89] Widjojo, *The revolt of Prince Nuku*, pp. 143 and 148.

[90] Andaya, *The world of Maluku*, p. 58.

[91] Denys Lombard, "Regard nouveau sur les pirates malais (1ère moitié du XIXème siècle)", *Archipel*, vol. 18 (1979), p. 237.

European records emphasize violence involving colonial powers. References to violent events outside the frame of the European interference are fragmentary and usually give poor account of the context in which they occurred. Though not truly eradicated, piracy was substantially reduced and finally controlled by the colonial powers.[92] However, authors as Velthoen link the northern Malukan diaspora to the piratical raiding. The conditions that produced both processes ceased in the late nineteenth century when resettlement and repatriation started over allowing a better understanding of the nature of previous conflict as based on the foundation of sub centres orbiting the main centre. These hubs were specifically dealing with tributary practices and raiding recalcitrant peripheral communities and groups that managed to escape increasing impositions.

According to Velthoen, raiders and pirates could have originated in the appointed officials of the Sultan of Ternate in peripheral areas bordering Ternate and Bone. He points out that a manifold diasporic migration was taking place in "fluid regional spheres of influence".[93] Tobelorese communities dispersed across Maluku and east Sulawesi, whose members became reputed pirates in the nineteenth century, renounced their marauder way of life and returned to their homeland in northern Halmahera. Usually acknowledging the Sultan of Ternate, especially after the Bunggaya treaty of 1667, the ruler of Banggai, off the southeast coast of Sulawesi, was closely associated with Pulau Peling where he used to capture slaves.[94] Bugis chiefdoms in Banggai, Tombuku and Buton, which developed dependent ties with the sultans of Ternate in the late seventeenth century, continued to resist until the mid-nineteenth century against the sultan's claims of suzerainty backed by the Dutch.[95]

Among the numerous romantic accounts on pirate slaving raids and captivity testimonies, there is a Malay manuscript written in 1847 by C. Z. Pietersz, a native of Ternate, commander of a little vessel seized in May 1838 by 'a Balangingi pirates prahu' while sailing towards Gorontalo. Taken with his companions to the island of Bangka, at the tip of the Minahasa Peninsula, he was sold with 100 other prisoners from Ternate, Tidore, Butung, Sangihe, Makasar and Gorontalo, to a Balangingese who took him to Sulu, where he managed to survive fairly under the disguise of a doctor. During his confinement in Sulu he especially feared people from Borneo who occasionally came there 'to buy slaves for their human sacrifices'. Finally he was sold to the commander of an American ship that released him in Manila in May 1839, after an entire year of captivity.[96]

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[92] Esther Velthoen, "Pirates in the periphery: Eastern Sulawesi, 1820–1905", in John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer eds., *Pirates, ports and coasts in Asia: Historical and contemporary perspectives* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), p. 201.

[93] Velthoen, "Pirates in the periphery", p. 201.

[94] Andaya, *The world of Maluku*, p. 86.

[95] Velthoen, "Pirates in the periphery", p. 203.

[96] Dutch translation under the title "Lotgevallen van C. Z. Pietersz onder de zeerovers van Mangindanao" (Adventures of C. Z. Pietersz among the pirates of Mangindanao), preserved in

Conclusion

J. Warren's statement that "the dynamic interplay between raiding ... and investment in the maritime luxury goods trade ... was a major feature of the political economies of coastal Malay states"[97] can be easily telescoped to a very early period in the history of Maluku. Ternate and Tidore would hardly accumulate such huge regional prestige and power by other means than the spice trade. Raiding, however, was an essential part in political construction and management. The result of the political influence long acquired by Ternate through the control of imported goods should match European efforts to impose cloves monopoly in Northern Maluku since the days of the Portuguese. Power relations that were too fluid and the lack of a single powerful interlocutor in nutmeg producing areas in the Banda Islands would quickly led to tragedy. The period under examination illustrates a complex play in which the sultan's authority was reinforced by his association with the European and simultaneously hampered by his subordinate position to the Dutch. Accordingly, his authority was challenged internally by his courtly opponents and by rebellion on account of the resistance against the Dutch demands. The development described is also valid to Tidore after the Spanish departure. Tidore only controlled a minor part in the cloves trade. To compensate it, the sultanate developed close and complex ties with the western Papuan islands, especially by a crucial articulation of the *sosolot* trading network, unnoticeable to the Europeans until the end of sixteenth century and continuing to escape to the Dutch control afterwards. In the east Seramese Papuan frontier, raiding, plundering and slave hunting became more visible and their effects most remarkable.

In the Malukan context, raiding was not merely a sort of piracy but a more deep-rooted pattern of local conflict management among distinct ethnic groups with different political alignments. Despite it was a part of the ancestral struggle between confederated blocks supporting either Ternate or Tidore, raiding was especially a form of resistance against the Dutch constraints imposed on the native spice economy. Considering the side effects, costs and losses involved or derived from the raiding enterprises, we should ask whether they have really generated, or not, economic incomes to be distributed among a multitude of people involved in its preparing and logistics. Dutch punitive expeditions repeatedly brought destruction upon the most exposed raiding polities in Halmahera, Seram and the Raja Ampat. Whatever would have been the profits of individual raiders and their associated east Seramese traders, raiding was socially important by providing warriors with prowess and imported commodities that in turn granted wealth, prestige and supernatural powers to their owners. Chinese faience, Indian cloth, metal ware as gongs and bells and other items were supposedly embedded with such powers.

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the Library of the University of Leiden and summarized by Denys Lombard, "Regard nouveau sur les pirates malaise", p. 243.

[97] Warren, "A tale of two centuries", p. 3.

They had a ceremonial function, being used to acquire wives, power and authority, the cement of society. This way, raiding was crucial to tie power relations among communities and within each community.

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Chapter 6
An Exploration into the Political Background of the Maguindanao 'Piracy' in the Early Eighteenth Century

Ariel Cusi Lopez

Abstract The first decades of the eighteenth century witnessed the rise of two competing political factions in the sultanate of Maguindanao. The ambitious raja muda (heir apparent) Manamir led the opposition against the rule of his half-brother Sultan Bayan. Although Manamir and Bayan both relied on outside political connections to strengthen their influence, the former's extensive commercial ties in the Indonesian archipelago and the political support from the Spaniards eventually turned the contest towards his favour. Maguindanao 'piracy' or what was interpreted as such in the Dutch East India Company (VOC) sources points primarily to the trading and raiding activities associated with Manamir. These activities were labelled 'piratical' not only because they were against the Dutch commercial system but also because they challenged the ruling Maguindanao sultan. This chapter explores the relationship between internal political conflict, regional politics and overseas commerce.

Introduction

In 1720, a letter was handed by Sultan Bayan of Maguindanao to the functionaries of the Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie,* or VOC). The contents, if proved to be real, would incriminate the highest ranking officials of both the Maguindanao and Ternate sultanates in the 'illicit' trade of cloves (*nagelsluikerij*).[1] The letter was addressed to the Maguindanao Prince Tubu-tubu (Sultan Bayan's half-brother) and signed by some of the most powerful figures in

[1]Nationaal Archief (NA), The Hague VOC 8088 Ternate, pp. 243–44.

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Ternate.[2] The Ternate nobles wrote that they were sending 500 *gantang*[3] of cloves and were expecting payment in the form of gold or wax.[4] They also reminded Tubutubu that such payment should be disguised as a payment for textiles. Meanwhile, Sultan Rajalaut of Ternate also revealed to the Company that he had found another letter, most likely a copy of the first one, in the house of one of the accused Ternate nobles.[5]

Rulers implicating important personalities of their respective domains in engaging in the Company-monopolized spice trade seem counterintuitive at first sight. These leaders were well aware that trespassing Company rules could have disastrous consequences not only to individuals but also to entire communities.[6] If one aims to understand such a seeming anomaly, then it is crucial that the internal affairs of these sultanates be the focus of the discussion.

Internal political dynamics, as this chapter will illustrate, is key in understanding not only the ruler's underlying motivations in exposing peers of 'piracy' but also the very phenomenon of piracy itself. The sultanate of Maguindanao during the tumultuous early years of Sultan Bayan's rule (c. 1702–1718) and the challenge to his rule by his half-brother Manamir[7] is presented as a case to explore the phenomenon of 'piracy' and the internal political impetus for such undertaking.

While such 'piratical' activities ascribed to the people in and around Maguindanao have been linked to both economic and religious motivations, the role of internal politics has been largely overlooked. The landmark *Muslims in the Philippines* by Cesar Adib Majul, for instance, frames the phenomenon of 'Moro'[8] piracy and slave raiding within the narrative of 'religious wars': Catholic Philippines *versus* Muslim Maguindanao and Sulu.[9] Meanwhile, James Francis Warren's influential

[2]The letter implicated the royal governor (*jogugu*) Marsaoli Suara Pandjalla, his own son, the Kimalaha Marsaoli and the *sadaha* of the royal court. 'Sadaha' is a title of the person who has authority over all that occurs in the buildings of the Sultan and over all those who work in them. It is also referred to in VOC documents as *schatbewaarder/thresorier* F. S. A. de Clerq, Paul Michael Taylor and Marie N. Richards trans., "Ternate, The Residency and its Sultanate" (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Libraries Digital Edition, 1999), p. 225. W. Ph. Coolhaas ed., *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, 1713–1725, vol. 7 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), pp. 356 and 520.

[3]A measure of weight used in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago varying from place to place (e.g. in West and Middle Java a *gantang* is ten kati, while in East Java only five kati). In this case, it most likely means five.

[4]*Generale Missiven*, vol. 7, p. 416.

[5]*Generale Missiven*, vol. 7, p. 416.

[6]One is reminded of the brutal *hongi* expeditions in the Maluku region to extirpate spice-bearing plants outside Company-approved areas.

[7]While Jafar Sadiq Manamir was referred to as 'Maulana' by his contemporaries, Bayan ul-Anwar was called 'Dipatuan'. Cesar Adib Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973), p. 29.

[8]A derogatory term used by the Spanish colonizers to refer to the Muslims in the Philippines, now appropriated by the latter as its own ethnonym.

[9]Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines*.

The Sulu Zone primarily highlights the economic impetus for piracy. For Warren, the piracy and slave raiding by the Iranuns from the 1760s onwards were primarily a consequence of market demands for marine and forest products (primarily *trepang* and edible bird's nest).[10] According to Warren, the Iranuns provided Sulu, the main *entrêpot* of the said products, with raided slaves whose main task was to collect these resources.[11]

The following narrative does not intend to negate the economic dimension of piracy nor the probable though hardly verifiable religious motivations of individuals who engaged in piracy and slave raiding especially in the Spanish-controlled areas. Rather it suggests an alternative lens to view such a phenomenon by exploring the political motivations of individuals in Maguindanao which might have complemented, diluted or even subverted any religious and economic intentions.

Despite the limited number of primary sources on early eighteenth-century Maguindanao, most of them remain largely unexplored.[12] The sources utilized in this chapter are mostly archives of the VOC at the *Nationaal Archief* (NA) in The Hague and at the *Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia* (ANRI) in Jakarta. These archives contain important, if not the most crucial source for the study of Maguindanao during this period.[13]

[10]The Iranuns occupy the coast of western Mindanao from the delta of the Pulangi up to Sibugay. They are closely related to Maguindanao and Maranao through language. They maintained close political contact with the Maguindanao sultanate.

[11]James Francis Warren, *The Sulu Zone: The dynamics of external trade, slavery and ethnicity in the transformation of a Southeast Asian maritime state, 1768–1898* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981). See also, J.F. Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, maritime raiding and the birth of ethnicity* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002).

[12]Only Ruurdje Laarhoven's *The triumph of Moro diplomacy* extensively utilizes the exceptionally rich archives of the VOC, though the sources she consulted were mostly from the seventeenth century. The other 'classic' work on Mindanao, Cesar Adib Majul's *Muslims in the Philippines* had recognized the importance of Dutch sources on the history of Mindanao. But as Laarhoven rightly asserts, '[a]lthough Majul claims to have consulted Dutch sources in his research on the Islamic groups in the Southern Philippines, he only scratched the surface.' Laarhoven, *The triumph of Moro diplomacy* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1989), p. xv.

[13]Because the Spaniards abandoned their base in the Zamboanga peninsula in 1663, there was less direct contact between the Spaniards and Maguindanao. Documents relating to Maguindanao are mostly contained in the Ternate bundles of the archival collection: *Ingekomen Stukken van Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden bij de Heren XVII en de Kamer Zeeland* at the Nationaal Archief (NA) in The Hague. The VOC archives however provide excellent materials only for the study of the years before 1718. Thereafter, trade and diplomatic exchanges between the Company and Maguindanao gradually decreased as the focus of Maguindanao interactions shifted to its close Spanish neighbour. It is important to note that the VOC frequently sent missions to Maguindanao between 1688 and 1705 primarily to protect the Company monopoly in spices against English 'interlopers'. Each of these missions kept detailed reports of their journey to Maguindanao.

Alliances Fall Apart: Maguindanao in the Early Eighteenth Century

In early eighteenth-century Maguindanao, the primacy of the sultan within the polity was seriously tested by various internal and external factors. Most notable among them was the political threat arising among the ambitious rajas who had access to maritime trade. During the respective reigns of Sultan Kuda and Sultan Bayan, there had been attempts to control the movement of trading vessels from Maguindanao and the accumulation of wealth by aristocratic rajas. The sultan's preponderant role in trade, as well as the status and power that came from such role, served as controls to the expanding economic opportunities which become increasingly open to many. It has been argued that the increasing trade of 'luxury goods and other commodities' tend to 'destabilize the political economy of chiefdoms based on personalistic bonds of clientage and alliance cemented through exchanges'.[14] The case of early eighteenth-century Maguindanao is no exception.

Before proceeding to the events of the early eighteenth century, a few words on the nature of Maguindanao politics must be in order. Political power in Maguindanao as with many polities in Island Southeast Asia is 'flat topped rather than pyramidal'.[15] This means that power is shared by other chiefs and that the 'sultan' is more likely a primus inter pares than a ruler wielding absolute power.[16] Alliances within the ruling elite are thus very important to maintain group cohesion. These alliances come in many forms but most notably through marriage. It is not uncommon for members of the political elite to intermarry with each other in order to facilitate harmony within the group as well as to improve one's status (especially if one marries one of the sultan's daughters). The case of early-eighteenth-century Maguindanao however shows that this traditional alliance formation failed to prevent political discord which eventually came in the form of open warfare.

From the beginning of the eighteenth century, the political influence of Maguindanao sultans had apparently weakened—a marked contrast to the rule of the previous leaders Sultan Kudarat (r. 1619–1671) and Sultan Barahaman (r. 1678–1699). Sultan Kuda (r. 1699–1702), who inherited the throne upon Barahaman's death, lacked not only support of the upland Buayan chiefdom upon which lowland Maguindanao relied heavily for rice supply but also the support of his nephews who were powerful rajas themselves. Sultan Kuda's short reign began with the revolt of the Buayan peoples who descended the Pulangi River and attacked the main Maguindanao settlement in Silangan, forcing Sultan Kuda to transfer the royal seat

[14]Rita Smith Kipp and Edward M. Schortmann, 'The political impact of trade in chiefdoms', *American Anthropologist,* vol. 91, no. 2 (June 1989), pp. 370 and 378.

[15]David Henley, *Fertility, food and fever: Population, economy and environment in north and central Sulawesi, 1600–1930* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), p. 20.

[16]Henley, *Fertility, food and fever*, p. 20.

to the Iranun-stronghold at Simuay.[17] At the same time, Maguindanao rajas were apparently discontented that Kuda had become sultan instead of one of the previous sultan's sons. These circumstances would have made Kuda insecure of his position vis-à-vis his nephews, his supposed allies.

Political ambition coupled with ready access to luxury goods as well as firearms was a potent combination to challenge the sultan's authority that Sultan Kuda reputedly ordered the rajas to be stripped of their important material possessions (most likely prestige-bestowing luxury goods such as textiles) and even threatened to have all his political enemies in the sultanate eliminated.[18] One of his nephews, the future Sultan Bayan, who had the support of the Iranuns from Tubok to Sibugay along the coast of western Mindanao, refused to acknowledge Kuda's authority by refusing to pay tribute.[19] Despite the fact that Sultan Kuda had arranged the marriage of his daughter Kalani Kuning to one of his nephews, the politically ambitious Manamir, the intra-familial discord, remained preponderant. As a desperate solution to this conflict, Sultan Kuda called upon the help of the Sulu Sultan Shahab ud-Din[20] who arrived in Maguindanao with 75 vessels in 1702. Lack of commensurate maritime power prevented the restive Maguindanao princes to counter the incoming Sulu contingent.[21] Kuda's own distrust of the Sulu sultan's real intention proved to be fatal however.[22] The supposed alliance between Sulu and Maguindanao turned into a bloody encounter between Kuda and Shahab-ud Din, with the latter mortally wounding the former with a *kris*.[23] As a booty, the Sulu party carried with them the sultan's canons, goods, women and children, among whom the daughter of Kuda who was also the wife of Manamir.[24] With the death of Kuda, Bayan was proclaimed as the Maguindanao Sultan. The tumultuous reign of Sultan Kuda was however only a prelude to the fateful events that would mark Sultan Bayan's rule.

It is instructive that from the beginning of his reign, Sultan Bayan had already "complained that too many traders were leaving without his knowledge". He therefore 'asked the cooperation of the VOC governor [in Ternate] in arresting any Maguindanaos who were found to be trading in the Ternatan region without

[17]The already dire situation was exacerbated by the lack of rice supply, reportedly due to rat infestation. NA VOC 1637 Ternate, 111. Simuay is a river immediately north of the great Pulangi (Maguindanao) river.

[18]NA VOC 8074 Ternate, pp. 2–3.

[19]Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro diplomacy*, p. 100.

[20]Son of Sulu Sultan Salah ud-Din Bakhtiar (r. 1650–80); Shahab ud-Din ruled from around 1685 till 1710. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines,* p. 20.

[21]NA VOC 8074 Ternate, p. 3.

[22]Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines,* p. 185.

[23]Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines,* p. 185.

[24]NA VOC 8074 Ternate, p. 3.

a *pascedule* from him'.[25] Sources do not reveal if the request was heeded by the Company, but given the fact that it lies beyond the Company interests, it is highly possible that the request was simply ignored.

While the 'problem' of commodity influx through ways other than the sultan would have been present long before Bayan came into power, the extent of its impact to Maguindanao politics in the early eighteenth century was unprecedented. Sultan Bayan relied increasingly on the occasional trade with the VOC, while other Maguindanao princes, such as the ambitious Manamir, were pursuing 'overseas trade' in the various settlements across north Sulawesi and beyond. This period of political flux in Maguindanao not surprisingly coincides with the increase of trade activities in many maritime polities across Southeast Asia (1690–1717).[26] The following sections provide further details as to how this wealth/power accumulation was ably carried out by Manamir to the detriment of the sultan's position.

Manamir's Preponderance in the Maritime Realm

Since trade was an important channel through which wealth and personal prestige could be acquired by princes aspiring for the title of the sultan, Manamir took advantage of his position as the *kapitan laut* whose primary task was to oversee the overseas affairs of the sultan.[27] He cultivated relations with areas such as Sangir, north Sulawesi and Makassar. In Sangir, his family connections served his ambitions well. Meanwhile, Sultan Bayan became increasingly suspicious of Manamir's movements overseas, a sign that he most likely felt insecure of his political standing within Maguindanao.

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[25] See Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro diplomacy. Pascedule* is a contraction of the Spanish *pase* and *cedula*, meaning a sort pass. Ruurdje Laarhoven, "The Chinese at Maguindanao in the seventeenth century", *Philippines Studies,* vol. 35 (1987), p. 32.

[26] Heather Sutherland, "Trade in VOC Indonesia: The case of Makassar," in Bernhard Dahm ed., *Regions and regional developments in the Malay-Indonesian world* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992), p. 48. This phenomenon was propelled by the increase trade with China. The Sulu sultan Sahab ud-Din's involvement in Maguindanao in 1702 was hardly surprising given its regained political and economic brio. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Sulu had taken took control of much of North Borneo and southern Palawan. Michael Leifer, *The Philippine claim to Sabah.* Hull Monographs on Southeast Asia, no. 1 (Hull: University of Hull, 1968), p. 4; Nicholas Tarling, *Sulu and Sabah: A study of British policy towards the Philippines and north Borneo from the late eighteenth century* (Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 4. At the same time, the dynamic rise of polities along the eastern coast of Kalimantan (e.g. Kutai and Pasir) where migrant Bugis merchants actively took engaged may be seen as complementary to Sulu's rise. See Kathryn Gay Anderson, 'The open door: Early modern Wajorese statecraft and diaspora', Ph.D. dissertation (Hawaii: University of Hawaii, 2003), pp. 141–70.

[27] His designation as *kapitan laut* seemed to have been one of the conditions for his support of Bayan in becoming sultan. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines,* p. 187.

From the beginning of Sultan Bayan's rule, Manamir's political ambition was already evident. He had foreseen the utility of his family connections with the Sangir Islands. Manamir and Tubu-tubu (mentioned in the Introduction) were sons of the Maguindanao sultan Barahaman with Mafira Bassing, a princess from the Sangir polity of Tabukan.[28] In 1703, Manamir sent a diplomatic mission to Tabukan to 'inform' the king of Tabukan and its indigenous school master of Manamir's visit in the next monsoon season. The mission itself was an unmistakable sign of power that Manamir would have wanted to project in the world inside and outside Maguindanao. In this similar vein, one can understand his earlier marriage to Kalani Kuning, Sultan Kuda's daughter, which would have contributed to his higher standing among the ranks of Maguindanao princes.

That Manamir exerted effort to further expand his influence can be gleaned through his correspondences with some important figures in Sulawesi. He appeared to have a good connection with Sergeant Cornelis van Werken, the Company functionary stationed in Manado as well as with the King of Bolaang, Jacobus Manoppo.[29] Manamir also initiated ties with the bourgeoning trading network in south Sulawesi. He sent an emissary to the powerful Chinese Captain at Makassar, Ong Watko in 1704.[30] Manamir ably utilized the Chinese family networks that connect Maguindanao with Makassar.[31] The Maguindanao envoy arrived with *nakhoda* (ship captain) Samsaka who is referred to as the grandson (*kints kind*) of nakhoda Djieko, a resident of Maguindanao. Samsaka who was also referred to as 'a brother' of Ong Watko was therefore crucial for the introduction of the Maguindanao envoy to the influential Chinese Captain. The letter does not specify the envoy's message, but given the context, it would have been related to trade with Maguindanao which was in turn under the patronage of Manamir.

While Manamir was strengthening his ties in north Sulawesi and elsewhere by using a variety of channels (VOC, Chinese and indigenous rulers), Sultan Bayan was struggling to guard his brother's ambitions by counting mainly on the help of the Company. Sultan Bayan thought that in order to win the political game against his brother, he needed to circumvent the Company outpost in Ternate where Manamir maintained close ties and to proceed directly to the Company's central authorities in Batavia. Sultan Bayan sent repeated diplomatic missions to Batavia.[32] In 1707, for

[28]Mafira Bassing was a sister of an important *gugugu* of Tabukan named David Pandjallang. NA VOC 8072 Ternate, p. 233.

[29]NA VOC 8076 Ternate, pp. 73–76.

[30]Ong Watko was Chinese Captain from 1669 to 1701, during which time he controlled the lucrative trade in tortoiseshell and birds' nest. Heather Sutherland, "A Sino-Indonesian commodity chain: The trade in tortoiseshell in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries", in Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-Chin Chang eds., *Chinese circulations: Capital, commodities, and networks in Southeast Asia* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011), pp. 177 and 182; Heather Sutherland, "The Makassar Malays: Adaptation and identity, 1660–1790", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,* vol. 32, no. 3 (October 2001), p. 410.

[31]NA VOC 8497 Makassar, pp. 25–26.

[32]NA VOC 8076 Ternate, p. 299.

instance, he sent nakhoda Jatim[33] who gifted the Company with generous quantities of wax, tobacco and other small gifts.[34] Jatim writes to the Company in Batavia that his mission "has no other end than to purchase desired textiles".[35] But his other perhaps equally important objective was revealed later in the letter. Jatim inquired as to the whereabouts of the *jongen Magindanaôse coning* (i.e. Raja muda Manamir).[36] Mapping the movements of Manamir would have helped Sultan Bayan gauge the extent of Manamir's influence.

The threat of Manamir's rise was increasing steadily and was felt even within Maguindanao. Sultan Bayan, again writing to the Company, lamented that 'since I have no other person to entrust with my affairs, I request that my letters to Batavia, Maluku and other places under the Dutch, be written in the Portuguese (i.e., Spanish) language, because my writers do not understand Malay . . . '.[37] Sultan Bayan's circle of followers had seemingly contracted and none of those who were fluent in Malay professed loyalty to the Sultan. Bayan distrusted the traders who were probably seen as allies of Manamir. This perhaps explains why Sultan Bayan "held court in Silangan [i.e., Maguindanao] but was often in Sibugay"[38] which was a day-long sailing from Maguindanao.[39]

The Division of Maguindanao and the Rise of 'Piracy'

The political situation in Maguindanao had deteriorated so much that Sultan Bayan would appear desperate in acquiring artillery pieces and ammunitions from the Company. He was presumably gathering arms in anticipation of any open hostility.[40] He sent a trusted envoy named Maleyo[41] all the way to Batavia and tried to

[33]Jatim introduced himself as a resident of Sibugay. This is important because Sultan Bayan was reported to have stayed in Sibugay most of the time, away from Maguindanao. One possibility is that Bayan and Jatim shared the same network of allies (the Iranuns).

[34]NA VOC 8076 Ternate, pp. 295–98.

[35]NA VOC 8076 Ternate, p. 299.

[36]NA VOC 8076 Ternate, p. 299.

[37]NA VOC 8074 Ternate, p. 1; Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI) VOC Hoge Regering, no. 2527, p. 810. Bayan was most likely referring to the Spanish language since, in several occasions, he referred to the Spanish as the 'Portugesen'. See, for instance, NA VOC 8109 Ternate, p. 935.

[38]Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines,* p. 29.

[39]NA 8076 Ternate, p. 298.

[40]Sultan Bayan had previously also requested the Dutch to provide arms. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines,* p. 187.

[41]Maleyo had carried out the same mission for Sultan Bayan a few years before, but he did not succeed in obtaining military support. NA VOC 8074 Ternate, p. 3. That mission most likely occurred in 1705. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines,* p. 187.

convince the Dutch by invoking old ties between the Company and Maguindanao.[42] Meanwhile, Manamir himself also requested permission to buy two humble pieces of *vuurroers* (a sort firearm) through his envoy Tulintok who would later figure as one of the 'pirate-princes' allied with Manamir.[43] The Company officials meanwhile could only express disinterest on the brewing hostility.[44]

In January 1710, the long-held animosity between the two factions turned into an open warfare. As Sultan Bayan later relates,

> ... in the month of January, my brother the Raja Muda revolted against me; we were firing canons day and night, but my brother could not restrain the power of the cannonballs ... I have also burned down his house and those of his neighbours. He [Manamir] has fled to Tamontaka where he gathered his people, including men, women and children, numbering around 2,000, now we are at war ...[45]

From his new base in Tamontaka,[46] Manamir and his allies would engage more actively in what would be referred to by European sources as 'piracy'. On the eve of Manamir's revolt, he had hinted to the Company that Sultan Bayan was hindering his movements and thus he could not easily travel outside Maguindanao.[47] With the creation of Tamontaka, Manamir could now engage in overseas trade freely, unbridled by the restrictions imposed by Sultan Bayan. Indeed, acquiring wealth and power overseas had become more necessary as he now openly competed with the old Maguindanao centre. Maintaining the flow of goods and people to the newly created centre at Tamontaka required a more aggressive attitude towards trade.

Thus, between the period around 1710 and 1718, there was a conspicuous Maguindanao presence in the areas where the VOC had a settlement or maintained regular contact. While Company servants had previously complained of Maguindanao vessels 'illegally' trading in areas claimed by the Company (i.e. outside the

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[42]NA VOC 8077 Ternate, p. 368. Bayan reminds of the *vorige tijden* when Batavia sent cannons to *Sultan Walij Oelah* (i.e. Sultan Kudarat) almost 80 years before. He ably recalls the circumstances of the time. Shortly after his *grootvader* Sultan Kudarat transferred his capital to Lamitan (present Lanao del Sur), the Spaniards attacked and captured the entire settlement. When the Spaniards left, they brought with them all the weapons of Kudarat. Later, Sultan Kudarat sent *orang kaya* Oekboe to Batavia to request for arms which the envoy succeeded to acquire. Bayan had in mind the attack of Sultan Kudarat's settlement by the Spanish forces led by Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera in 1637. The overwhelming power of the combined Spanish and local (i.e. Tagalog and Kapampangan) led Kudarat and his followers to retreat in their *ilihan* (fortified hill). Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines,* p. 134. As Laarhoven observes, the support given by the Dutch 'must have been a difference, because the incident was still recalled in 1708 by a great-grandson of Kudarat (i.e. Sultan Bayan)'. Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro diplomacy,* p. 33.

[43]NA VOC 8078 Ternate, p. 4.

[44]Only when other competing European actors, namely, the English and Spanish, were involved that the Company would consider engaging in the domestic affairs of Maguindanao.

[45]NA VOC 8080 Ternate, pp. 183–84.

[46]Tamontaka is a riverside settlement only around 6 km away from royal capital at Silangan.

[47]NA VOC 8078 Ternate, p. 4.

Dutch harbour in Ternate),[48] the Maguindanao exploits in the second decade of the eighteenth century were of a rather unprecedented scale. That these 'piratical activities' were directly related to the political fragmentation in Maguindanao is the fact that these activities were less conspicuous, if not absent in the few years prior to 1710. Official and regular contact between the sultanate of Maguindanao and the VOC between 1686 and 1706 seemed to have effectively discouraged Maguindanao 'piracy' in the Company-claimed areas.[49] These Company visits emphasized the primacy of the Sultan in matters of trade and diplomacy and would have contributed to the prestige and power of the Maguindanao sultan.[50]

By 1711, the Company ordered to have military officers with accompanying five to six (indigenous) soldiers stationed in Sangir, located along the path where Maguindanaos would venture farther into Sulawesi and Maluku. This order came at a period when the Company noticed the increasing voyages of the Maguindanaos (*toenemende vaart*)[51] and was directed towards preventing the Maguindanaos in dealing with local kings under Company 'protection'.[52]

The VOC servants in Ternate recorded that there were fewer Maguindanao vessels visiting Maluku to trade with the Company not realizing that such absence was most likely a sign that Maguindanao trade was 'illegally' occurring outside the sole 'authorized' harbour in Ternate and therefore outside the Company's sight. The decrease in the number of Maguindanao vessels in Maluku was particularly welcome because of the founded suspicion that the Maguindanaos were conniving with the rulers of Ternate and Tidore in bringing spices outside Maluku.[53] Elsewhere, Maguindanao vessels were seen sailing usually in groups of four. Their presence was recorded in such areas as Manado, Gorontalo, Limboto, Kema and Kaidipan, among others.[54] Acknowledging this surge of Maguindanao activity, the VOC sternly

[48] ANRI, Arsip Ternate, 1667–1908, no. 62, 'Positive Ordres: Ternate, 20 November 1637–27 Februarij 1739', 'Vaart', p. 629.

[49] The VOC initially planned to send one or two ships annually to Maguindanao, ostensibly to carry out trade, though in reality, this costly and risky venture primarily aimed to spy upon the enterprising English 'interlopers' and to discourage the Maguindanao rulers to deal with foreign traders other than the Dutch. See the summary of these Company dispatches to Maguindanao in Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro diplomacy,* pp. 87 and 213–21.

[50] The often ritualistic and tedious act of trade would not commence without securing an audience with the Sultan and could only begin after the Sultan has finished his business with the Company. Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro diplomacy*, p. 167. Thus, the Sultan obtains the most favourable concessions and acquires the best products and gifts that the Company agents have. Trade goods and gifts often consist of luxury textiles, ammunitions and iron implements. These very products represent the kind of power that the Sultan (the lead trader of the Sultanate) intended to possess: prestige (textiles) and hard power (ammunitions and firepower).

[51] ANRI Ternate, no. 62, 'Magindanauw', p. 405.

[52] ANRI Ternate, no. 62, 'Sangir', p. 555.

[53] ANRI Ternate, no. 62, 'Magindanauw', p. 409; 'Correspondentie', p. 230.

[54] *Generale Missiven*, vol. 6, p. 849; vol. 7, pp. 169, 216 and 294.

warned its servants to guard against such Maguindanao vessels.[55] While available sources of this period do not contain details as to the nature of these Maguindanao activities, it is highly likely that they involved what the Company saw as 'illicit' trade in spices as well as slave raiding. At least one particular case provides evidence that activities indeed involved slave raiding. In 1718, the Company recorded that the '*Maguindanauwers* attacked Kutai with a large number of vessels, taking with them numerous women and children'.[56] Realizing the importance of tracking the movements of Maguindanao vessels and of containing the Maguindanaos, the Company reiterated to its servants in Maluku that they lure the Maguindanaos to proceed to Ternate where they would be under the Company guard.[57]

That the sources of these depredations against the Company and the territories which it claimed were associated with Tamontaka (Manamir's chosen capital) and not with the old capital of Silangan becomes clear as one considers the larger political context. As shown above, Sultan Bayan was more expectant of the Company's military support than Manamir. Wreaking havoc on Company-held territories would bear little advantages for Bayan who was still optimistic of the Company support. Indeed in the 1720s, when faced by the combined threat from Manamir and his Spanish allies, Bayan again requested the Company to supply arms.[58] On the other hand, Manamir was well aware of his precarious political position and doubtful political legitimacy that he was ready to gamble his reputation if only to achieve greater political capital. He was less hopeful of any support from the Company which he knew would prefer to deal with the 'legitimate' court of Bayan. When the Spanish returned to Zamboanga in 1718, he was more ready to accept political concessions. Indeed it was from the Spanish that he later received his title as 'sultan'.[59]

Spanish Return and the 'End' of Maguindanao Piracy

From the 1720s onwards, Company reports on Maguindanao 'piratical' activities seemed to have been replaced by reports on the Spanish return to Mindanao. The entry of the Spaniards in the scene drastically changed the terms of relations between the warring factions of Sultan Bayan and Manamir with the latter cultivating close political relations with the Spaniards.[60] It may be assumed that the

[55] ANRI, Arsip Ternate, no. 62, 'Positive Ordres', 'Correspondentie', p. 229.

[56] *Generale Missiven*, vol. 7, pp. 337–38.

[57] ANRI Ternate, no. 62, 'Magindanauw', p. 409.

[58] NA VOC 8092 Ternate, p. 120.

[59] Manamir was formally enthroned as the 'Sultan of Maguindanao' in 1726 under Spanish patronage. NA VOC 8087 Ternate, p. 353; ANRI VOC Hoge Regering, no. 2560, p. 866.

[60] The year 1718 marks the return of the Spanish in their old fortress settlement in Zamboanga. Zamboanga is at the western tip of the Mindanao Island and is thus positioned strategically. It lies between Sulu and Maguindanao, along a strait frequented by Maguindanao and Iranun slave raiders

increasing influence of the Spaniards in the court of Manamir effectively ended the propensity to engage in 'piratical' activities since military support and political patronage had become more accessible for Manamir and his faction.

However, this did not prevent Manamir from using the Spanish presence in Zamboanga as a reason to also cultivate relations with the Dutch and to attempt to acquire war funds from the VOC.[61] Manamir was playing a political game in order to gain advantage from both the Dutch and Spanish who had long viewed each other with distrust. While Manamir had been supportive of the Spaniards, he projected neutrality when communicating with the Company.[62]

That the survival strategy of Manamir at this period involved more diplomacy than 'piracy' becomes clear in his denunciation of the 'crime' committed by a Maguindanao raja named Tulintok who formerly served as Manamir's messenger to the Company. In 1718, Tulintok and his men arrived in Ternate where they were accused of 'piracy' for their possession of a fake *pascedule*[63] and various iron weapons. Right before being captured, Tulintok and his men 'ran amok' against the entire group of Company guards which resulted in the wounding and killing of five

on their way to Spanish-occupied coastal settlements in Luzon and the Visayas. In 1718, Manila sent three major missions, most likely with interrelated motivations: an unprecedented diplomatic mission to the Kingdom of Ayudhya (Siam) to import rice, a mission to Batavia 'to buy provisions for war, especially guns, cannons etc. because it has not been possible to receive these items from Spain during the desired length of time' and the expedition led by Gregorio de Padilla y Escalante to re-establish Spanish presence in Mindanao after decades of absence. Fernando Blumentritt, Enrique Ruppert trans., *Filipinas, Ataque de los Holandeses en los Siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII* (Madrid: Imprenta de Fortanet, 1882), p. 62. See also Ferdinand C. Llanes, 'Dropping artillery, loading rice and elephants: A Spanish ambassador in the court of Ayudhya in 1718', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies,* vol. 11, no. 1 (June 2009), p. 61, and Alexander Spoehr, *Zamboanga and Sulu: An Archaeological Approach to Ethnic Diversity.* Ethnology Monographs no. 1 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1973), p. 38.

[61] NA VOC 7804 Java Noordoost kust, p. 605.

[62] In December 1720, Iranun warriors numbering around a thousand came to Zamboanga aboard a hundred vessels. Their siege was unsuccessful because the Spaniards had prepared for the siege as they had been warned by Manamir of the impending attack. The following year, the combined force of Sulu and Sultan Bayan of Maguindanao (estimates vary from 3,000 to 6,000), again sieged the Zamboanga fort. Majul writes that the siege started in 'January 1721, and it was only by the middle of April that the siege was broken by the coming of Spanish reinforcements. The Sulus and Maguindanaos were then forced to retire'. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines,* pp. 193–94. It is likely that the 'Spanish reinforcements' that helped repel the combined Maguindanao-Sulu siege of 1721 came from Manamir himself. In 1722, Manamir wrote to the Company that the siege which brought great embarrassment to the Spanish, only ended with his arrival in Zamboanga (alongside his forces). He explained that his coming was only 'to know why the Spaniards wanted to occupy Zamboanga'. He wanted to display his 'innocence' by omitting the details of his dealings with Spain and by emphasizing that his main interest was to 'knowing the Spanish plot'. NA VOC 7804 Java Noordoost kust, p. 603.

[63] The Company found two other fake pascedules in Tulintok's possession and learned from other Maguindanaos in Ternate that Tulintok had been away from Maguindanao for 7 years, supposedly using these fake passes to 'trade'. As punishment, Tulintok's and his companions' right hands were chopped off before being hanged or tortured to death. *Generale Missiven,* vol. 7, p. 356.

guards and in the subsequent torture and execution of Tulintok and his men.[64] Later Manamir expressed his agreement with the Company's action towards Tulintok in saying that Tulintok "only deserved death" and that "the Maguindanao people agree and consider the Company action as justified".[65] Manamir's words, as with the phenomenon of piracy between 1710 and 1718, should be seen in the context of the politics in Maguindanao. Manamir wanted to appear friendly to the Company while maintaining close political alliance with the Spanish.

While the period until 1718 as the narrative above has shown witnessed a bustling activity of the Maguindanaons in the Indonesian Archipelago, the succeeding decades was marked by their absence in the maritime sphere. This could only be attributed to the political conflict originating within the Maguindanao polity and exacerbated by Spanish presence.[66] By 1725, the Company noted that there was poor acquisition of wax and tortoiseshell, products traditionally exchanged by Maguindanao traders with the Company.[67] In 1726, when no Maguindanao vessels visited the areas of the Company, there was an observed lack of supply of wax in Company warehouses.[68] It was noted that large amounts of wax came only from Maguindanao.[69] In 1733, the servants of the Company complained that there was no available commercial wax in Ternate because there were no traders from Maguindanao.[70] The same was true for 1734.[71]

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[64] *Generale Missiven,* vol. 7, p. 356.

[65] NA VOC 7804 Java Noordoost kust, p. 605.

[66] Not long after Manamir's assumption to the throne as 'Sultan of Maguindanao' in 1726, the Sulu Sultan and his men, united with Sultan Bayan of Maguindanao and the Raja of Buayan, stormed Tamontaka. Their forces totaled approximately 9,000 men. NA VOC 8087 Ternate, p. 354. But this number was most likely an exaggeration on the part of Manamir to highlight his later victory. Nevertheless, Sultan Bayan and the Sulu Sultan also counted upon the support of the Iranuns which would have increased the number of the sieging forces. Meanwhile, Manamir approached his enemies via land and water: river defence using warriors aboard boats and land defence using fortresses. NA VOC 8094 Ternate, pp. 550–51. After completing the defence works (*borstweringen*), most likely made of timber and earth, Manamir, alongside his trusted brother Tubu-tubu and the Raja Laut, led the attack of the surrounding enemies with 4,000 warriors. These pitched battles between the combined forces of Sulu, Iranun, Maguindanao (Bayan faction), Buayan and Tamontaka occurred in 5–6 rounds (4–5 in another account) in the period of 4 months of siege. NA VOC 8087 Ternate, p. 354; NA VOC 8094 Ternate, pp. 550–51. Manamir reported that the Sulu suffered numerous losses of lives (200 dead in one account). Those who survived fled to Sulu or to the forest around Tamontaka, and the latter were later captured by Manamir's men. According to Manamir, Sulu had at their disposal the following arms: 19 iron cannons, 9 small copper cannons, 12 picols of Chinese gunpowder and 200 firing arms. NA VOC 8087 Ternate, pp. 354–55.

[67] ANRI Ternate, no. 62, 'Positive Ordres', 'Caret of Schildpadshoorn', p. 117.

[68] *Generale Missiven,* vol. 8, p. 75.

[69] *Aleen door de handelaren uit Mindanao wordt was [wax] in grote hoeveelheden aangebracht'. Generale Missiven,* vol. 9, p. 138.

[70] *Generale Missiven,* no. 9, p. 530.

[71] *Generale Missiven,* vol. 9, p. 599. In 1735, wax was purchased by the Company for 22 *rijksdaalders* per picol. *Generale Missiven,* no. 9, p. 347.

Epilogue

The phenomenon of Maguindanao 'piracy' or activities labelled as such by the VOC in the early eighteenth century is closely intertwined with the political developments within the sultanate. Prior to the division of Maguindanao political centres under Sultan Bayan (Silangan) and Manamir (Tamontaka), such activities by the Maguindanao peoples figured less in the archival records. The creation of Tamontaka as a separate centre encouraged the Maguindanao 'trade voyages' (or piracy in Company perspective), unbridled by the restrictions imposed by the Sultan.

Trade functioned to weaken the sultan's authority since it opened opportunities to other princes such as Manamir to acquire wealth and prestige. This was realized early on by the Maguindanao Sultan Kuda who stripped his nephews of their possessions, an act which contributed to his downfall in 1702. The eventual rule of Sultan Bayan witnessed the same 'problem' of controlling princes from venturing outside. Sultan Bayan knew that it was impossible to control princes like Manamir and Tubu-tubu from expanding their trade and political networks by virtue of their social positions in Maguindanao (Manamir served as *kapitan laut* in the beginning of Bayan's rule most likely as a concession for his political support for Bayan) and their familial connections with the world outside Maguindanao (Sangir). Sultan Bayan therefore strengthened his ties with the neighbouring Sulu polity.

Manamir was an able and ambitious ruler who initiated trading relations with polities as far as Makassar. But he was also discontented with his position as a mere *raja muda* (heir apparent) of Maguindanao. His exodus to Tamontaka to build his own capital made him a ruler himself but also made him preoccupied to maintain his rather precarious position. The arrival of the Spaniards in 1718 and their increasing involvement in Tamontaka only illustrate the readiness of Manamir to accept political concessions in the face of his political insecurity.

The 'decline' of Maguindanao trade activity in the 1720s and 1730s prove that internal political situation was crucial in the presence or absence of Maguindanao traders in the Indonesian archipelago, be they 'pirates' or 'legal' traders. During this period, Maguindanao experienced further internal discord fuelled by the rivalry between two Maguindanao centres and by the advancing Spaniards.[72] As a result of the political conflict and the triumph of deltaic Tamontaka through Spanish help, Sultan Bayan's faction retreated to the uplands of Buayan Writing to the Company in 1737 to request for military assistance; Sultan Bayan indicated in his letter that he

[72]For instance, in March 1733, Sultan Bayan and his son, the *raja muda* Malinog, came to Tamontaka with 700 warriors and killed Sultan Manamir. Majul supposes that Sultan Bayan's party received assistance from the Iranuns and Sulu. The murder of Manamir was seen as a revenge for the Spanish expedition against Silangan towards the end of 1731 where 'the Spaniards attacked a few fortified places, burned a couple of settlements, and destroyed some granaries and plantations'. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines,* p. 196.

was already residing in the upland Buayan.[73] As Majul points out, this period also marked the decline of Maguindanao influence among the Iranuns.[74]

The narrative above may be considered as a prelude to the events described by James Warren.[75] From the mid-eighteenth century, the story of Maguindanao seemed to have been overshadowed by the rise of the archipelagic polity of Sulu. And as Warren has shown, the development of a 'Sulu Zone' from the 1760s onwards was crucially linked with the 'outmigration' of the Iranuns from Mindanao and their widespread piracy and slave raiding throughout Southeast Asia. Given the strong internal political impetus to Maguindanao 'piracy' as argued above, it would be worthwhile to re-examine the famed Iranun presence in Southeast Asia from the similar perspective of local politics.

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Chapter 7
Revisiting the Political Economy and Ethnicity of the Sulu Sultanate and Its Entanglement with the Seafaring World

Chung Ming Chin

Abstract The chapter examines how being a coalescence of localized power centres, characterized by political structures that were weakly centralized, the Sulu ruler was able to assume and maintain power against rivals in the Malay archipelago and colonial Spain through a complex interweaving of links engendered by trade, in particular, slave raiding and trade, obligatory and elite gift exchanges as well as warfare—links core to Southeast Asian political economies and the very foundations of political power. Building on James Warren's work, the essay re-questions some of the premises of that power. It hopes to explain how the political dynamics and other sources of power such as ethnicity and slave raiding of the Sulu sultanate came together to forge a coherence or lack of organization and identity.

Introduction

F. Warren's first monograph on the Sulu Zone appeared more than 30 years ago. It remains an important work despite the appearance of newer works over time. A key reason it continues to be a very worthy piece of work is that it has attempted a spatial and ethnohistorical approach to the study of a region and, in the process, utilized "an extremely varied, [even] eclectic, body of documentation".[1] Since this essay intends to follow up on some of the issues raised by Warren's work, it has an obligation to present (although it may not necessarily succeed) a reasonably decent sum-up of the ideas from it.

[1]F. Warren, *The Sulu Zone: Dynamics of external trade, slavery and ethnicity in the transformation of a Southeast Asian maritime state* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), p. xxxi.

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Warren's 1981 work covers the historical developments of the "Sulu Zone" in two parts.[2] Warren's "zone" is an evolving body of "economic, cultural, ecological, Western and non-Western interconnections embedded in the world capitalist economy".[3] "Culture" in a dynamic area that was "unstable" or "in flux" (migrating, incorporated slaves, possibly having more than one identity) meant defining the term in a way that was non-Eurocentric, nonlinear and nonstatic (more processual).[4] In the first part, the work traces the internal and external aspects of trade in four periods: the period of traditional trade (before 1760 to 1768), the formative period (1772–1775), the end of the eighteenth century until 1848 and 1856–1878/1898 (depending on the region discussed). Sulu had relations and had been trading with China and the Bugis before the state's rise in the late eighteenth century. The formative period of Sulu's rise was characterized by trial and error and a failed experiment of expanded trade in Balambangan (via Maguindanao) with the British East India Company and other trading partners. Some features of the domestic economy (until the mid-nineteenth century) could be seen in (1) the sea cucumbers (bêche-de-mer) and pearls harvested by an ethnic group (Samal Bajau Laut) for the sultanate, (2) the variety of goods procured by Sulu from districts in northeastern Borneo (considered as part of internal trade) and (3) the rice that Sulu obtained from Cotabato and Zamboanga (to make up for what they were not able to obtain from other channels). Until the mid-nineteenth century, Sulu's external trade with the East India Company and the Chinese from Manila could be seen in (1) the export of some of the valuable goods traded internally and (2) the increase in volume of certain imports such as arms, opium, Indian cloth and metals. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Spanish colonial conquest of the southern Philippines diverted the focal point of the entrepôt trade to Labuan (linking to Singapore). The second part of the book traces Iranun and Balangingi slave raiding (each tagged to their periods, 1768–1830 and 1830–1898, respectively) as well as the nature of slavery and its "marketing" in the region. The years towards 1830 saw the stepping up of defences and patrolling in the Philippines islands, which impacted on Iranun raiding. The Balangingis and their raiding, covered in Warren's book from 1830, were first mentioned in Western sources in the 1830s.

Warren's subsequent work *Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity* (2002) takes into account later publications that appeared in the field and adds details of slave raiding undertaken by the two groups as well as their relationship with the Tausug in the Malay Archipelago from the late 1700s to the mid-1800s.[5] Beyond Warren's works, new studies on the Philippines

[2]F. Warren, *The Sulu Zone: Dynamics of external trade, slavery and ethnicity in the transformation of a Southeast Asian maritime state* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981). This essay referred to the 2007 version published by NUS Press.

[3]Warren, *The Sulu Zone*, p. xxvii.

[4]Warren, *The Sulu Zone*, pp. xxix–xxx.

[5]F. Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, maritime raiding and birth of ethnicity* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002). See also H. Sutherland, Review essay of *Iranun*

in the early modern period (roughly speaking, archaeologists term this the "contact period") and on the political economy and structures of Philippine chiefdoms are relatively limited. A recently published work, *A Mountain of Difference: The Lumad in Early Colonial Mindanao* by Paredes (2013), may be briefly reviewed here as some of the ideas it raises are relevant to the discussion of this chapter. Paredes' book casts doubts on the nature of a datu's relations with leadership in the higher tiers as well as with his subjects—a subject relevant to an inquiry of the political economy and ethnicity of the Sulu Sultanate. Paredes shows that warfare and aggression were undertaken by the Lumad people to secure subservient labour in their communities; this is verified in the fact that "raiding (or *pangayaw*), for revenge or for slaves, was a recurring fact of Lumad life [and] ... a vital economic activity throughout central Philippines".[6]

This paper reinforces the call by a prominent scholar on Southeast Asian history and reviewer of Warren's 2002 work who urged for new questions to be asked about the latter's overall work on the Sulu Zone, especially since "the message and interpretation of the subject has remained unchanged after more than twenty [now 30] years".[7] This essay does not intend to undermine the importance of Warren's work but merely raise some questions on the subject matter. The essay does not, in fact, have answers to many of the questions it raises but hopes to spur further work on the subject, whether in the field or in the archives. If a coherent thesis can be formed around the issues discussed in this essay, it is to probe or reprobe how being a coalescence of localized power centres, characterized by political structures that were weakly centralized, the Sulu ruler was able to assume and maintain power against rivals in the Malay Archipelago and colonial Spain through a complex interweaving of links engendered by trade, piracy, slave raiding, slave trading, slavery, obligation, elite gift exchanges and warfare—links core to Southeast Asian political economies and the very foundations of political power. More importantly, the paper examines how the distinct style of political and economic leadership of the Sulu Sultanate was linked to its autonomy and identity but at the same time did not permit it to build a more centralized and homogenous entity. The paper will examine the subject by looking at several factors affecting Sulu society and how these facilitated or inhibited the shaping of autonomy and identity and whether these constituted reasons for why one of the greatest threats (in the form of piracy and raiding) from this part of Southeast Asia did not culminate in something grander, as seen in the classical kingdoms of the earlier period.

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and Balangingi by F. Warren, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 35, issue 1 (2004), pp. 133–57.

[6]O. Paredes, *Mountain of difference: The Lumad in early colonial Mindanao* (Ithaca: SEAP, 2013), p. 30.

[7]Sutherland, Review essay of *Iranun and Balangingi*, p. 134.

Ethnicity and Diaspora

Traditional works, whether on historical or contemporary issues, are usually couched in the dichotomy of the Islamic (Moro)-Christian divide and struggle.[8] Islam appears to have taken root in the farther reaches of the Malay Archipelago, in Mindanao, in the sixteenth century nearing the end of—or after—the period of the Melakan Empire. "Being Muslim", if one goes by the instrumentalist approach in studying ethnicity, contributes to the definition of the identity of the group under study. The challenge is to probe the extent to which migratory or sedentary groups in Mindanao were converted. Paredes has highlighted that Moro piratical attacks on Christianized areas in the early modern period might not have been religiously motivated (compared to the agenda of the Spanish). There were village and tribal groups in Mindanao that did not convert to Christianity or Islam or shift in their faith.[9]

Modern studies of the Moros in the southern Philippines have revealed cursory linkages between the groups in existence in the pre-contemporary/contemporary periods and the locations of their dwellings. These groups include, for instance, the Tausug and Bajau occupying the islands of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi (as depicted on the modern map), the Samal (Samal-speaking groups) from Tawi-Tawi,[10] the Iranun from Lanao and Cotabato and the Maguindanao from Cotabato. The Lumad, tribal peoples more often known by their individual tribal names, form the subject of Paredes' monograph; modern studies have trouble identifying the Lumad (especially the "genuine" ones), located in Misamis as well as part of modern-day Davao. Despite his reservations, Warren appears to have utilized rather fully J. Hunt's report to Stamford Raffles, in which the heterogeneity of the "Iranun communities" in the home islands in the southern Philippines is amply demonstrated. The classic work on sea nomads by D. Sopher traces from the mid-nineteenth century two branches (nomadic and sedentary) of Bajau, the Samal—a mestizo minority group—as well as the Sea Dayaks.[11] One can forget that the peoples of northern Borneo and the southern Philippines were closely linked in the days of the thalassocracy of Brunei in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and that until the escalation of tensions between East Malaysia and the Philippines in 2013, common folks on the ground moved between the two places with ease.[12] In the early modern period, Sulu appears,

[8] See, for instance, V. Hurley, *Swish of the kris: Story of the Moros* (Bangkok: Orchid Press, 2009).

[9] Paredes, *Mountain of difference*, pp. 26–27 and 118. It appears that the Lumad people have hardly been "categorized as Moros" despite a shared oral tradition with the Moros.

[10] According to Warren (*The Sulu Zone*, p. 195), the European records referred to the dispersed Balangingi or Tawi-Tawi group towards the mid-nineteenth century which originally settled "along the southern Mindanao coast, the southern shore of Basilan and on the islands of the Samalese cluster".

[11] D. Sopher, *The sea nomads* (Singapore: National Museum Singapore, 1977), pp. 129–43.

[12] F. Whaley, "Conflict in northern Borneo seems poised to escalate", in *The New York Times*, 12 March 2013. For the Bruneian empire in the pre-modern period, see B. Bala, *Thalassocracy:*

according to Hunt's report, to have possessed a number of dominions in Borneo.[13] This chapter uses the term "Iranun" to refer to a host of subgroups; "Sulu people" refers to the same array of subgroups.

Warren's in-depth studies of Iranun and Balangingi raiding may be brought up for discussion in terms of their analysis on ethnicity. Warren points out that many crewmen, Iranun and Balangingi, who were involved in the crew and expeditions were not "Iranun". In fact, the Balangingi were usually not distinguished from the Iranun. For a start, the Iranun had migrated from Lake Lanao in central Mindanao.[14] Corroborating related studies on the subject, the Iranuns "did not call themselves [as such] but went by the name of their village or island".[15] Elsewhere, Warren has drawn attention to ethnolinguistic differentiation in the Iranun raiding hordes.[16] Various peoples (sometimes in the form of captives) beyond Sulu and Mindanao joined the Iranuns in the raids: for instance, "Tagalogs, Visayans, Bugis, Tobello and even the odd Chinese". Tribal groups such as the Sea Dayaks (for instance, the Iban) also joined the raids for the "heads [to be] taken from dead or wounded [which] served as trophies".[17] At other times, slaves were readily incorporated "into their own social order as a crew on shipboard".[18]

In one of his works, Warren mentions the "formation and maintenance of ethnicity [which was] continually in flux [to] competing forms of social organization ... [as well as] integration into global economy etc".[19] Any political entity expanding to a certain critical mass of space to be labelled "empire" often needed to co-opt a variety of collaborators and local allies. This applied to the maritime Southeast Asian empires regardless of whether they were located in the classical age or the early modern period.[20] The Iranun spread in maritime Southeast Asia

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A history of medieval sultanate of Brunei Darussalam (Kota Kinabalu: Universiti Malaysia Sabah, 2005).

[13] J. Hunt, "Some particulars relating to Sulo in the Archipelago of Felicia", in J.H. Moor ed., *Notices of the Indian Archipelago and adjacent countries* (London: Cass, 1967), p. 53–60.

[14] F. Warren, "Who were the Balangingi Samal? Salve raiding and ethnogenesis in 19th century Sulu", in *Pirates, prostitutes and pullers: Explorations in ethno and social history of Southeast Asia.* Quezon: New Day, 2008, p. 52.

[15] Warren, *The Sulu Zone*, p. 153.

[16] Warren, "Who were the Balangingi Samal?", p. 51.

[17] Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi*, p. 209–10.

[18] Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi*, p. 209.

[19] J. Warren, "Savagism and civilization: The Iranun, globalization and literature of Joseph Conrad" in *Pirates, prostitutes and pullers: Explorations in ethno and social history of Southeast Asia* (Quezon: New Day, 2008), p. 145.

[20] K. Hall has shown that maritime classical like Srivijaya, embracing a Mandala-like system of direct and indirect control, displayed a certain degree of heterogeneity in its political and social make-up. A survey of the areas under Srivijaya's influence from the lands on both sides of the Straits of Melaka at its widest point eastwards to parts of Java easily reveals a dozen ethnic groups residing in them. See K. Hall, *Maritime trade and state development in early Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985).

from the transition of the late eighteenth century to the nineteenth may be compared to the age of the Bugis diaspora, facets of which H. Sutherland has examined in her review essay.[21] Both the Iranun and Bugis were driven by the global economy and demand to expand their acquisition and trade in slaves. The raiding and piratical activities, as depicted by C. Pelras, appear to have been undertaken by more or less homogenous groups of Bugis, although other sources seem to indicate the Bugis were not averse to allying with local potentates and intervening in regional politics. The heterogeneity and diversity in the ethnic groups undertaking activities in the Sulu Sultanate are illuminated to some extent in Warren's works. Warren has highlighted conflicts between certain groups (contrary to what Sutherland observes or reviews about Warren's work), specifically between the Samal and Tausug (the former challenging the influence of the latter) and between the Iranun and Iban (especially in the initial period of cooperation).[22] Warren also highlights the diversity of certain groups dominating various economic activities, for instance, the Tausug (to be discussed in the subsequent section) who "controlled the [regional] trade".[23] Sutherland casts doubt on this in her review article.[24] The heterogeneity in the Iranun make-up clearly engendered its own competitive dynamics as different groups attempted to appropriate parts of activities and control for themselves. The question of whether it was diversity in ethnic groups (and the resulting competition) or the unique arrangement in the Sulu/Iranun political organization or any other factor that contributed to a more decentralized arrangement will be discussed as the different factors are dealt with in the upcoming sections.

Slave Raiding

Some differentiation needs to be made between the terms "piracy" and "raiding", considering that this essay is in a book on the theme of these subjects. Piracy is defined as an act of robbery on the seas involving the robbing of goods, monies and valuables, although it is not unknown for pirates to harass ports and coastal areas. In the case of the Sulu Sultanate, slave raiding, involving the act of taking people from ships on the seas and along coastal villages and turning them into slaves with the purpose of selling them and making money or using them as labour in the fields and plantations, seems to be depicted in the most authoritative secondary sources as its main activity.

[21] The Bugis, whose diaspora and political clout had been prevalent in maritime Southeast Asia for a large part of the eighteenth century, still had domestic influence over some of the polities in the region towards the end of the century.

[22] See Warren, *The Sulu Zone*, p. 189 and Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi*, p. 215.

[23] Warren, *The Sulu Zone*, p. 153.

[24] Sutherland, Review essay of *Iranun and Balangingi*, p. 144.

Raiding has been treated in Warren's works in great detail. The breakdown of the composition of the raiding party in the previous section gives an idea of the collaborations as well as tensions existing between the ethnic groups. Beyond the home islands, the diversity in Iranun ethnicity was found also in the offshore settlements founded by the raiders. Warren has tried to show that these settlements served as bases for the extended raiding operations the Iranun conducted in much of maritime Southeast Asia (refer to the map of Iranun raiding in Southeast Asia in the Appendix), and although they were not the typical settlements of male and female populations, several thousand Iranun could be found living in these for "up to several years at a time". As observed earlier, such a large congregation of men in a locality constituted a political force in itself. This mixed "Iranun" horde was often "drawn into the local-regional arena of interethnic politics and conflict".[25] The common image of Iranuns was that they were fierce, savage and even ruthless (possibly based on the writings of contemporary novelists such as J. Conrad), while Pelras is of the opinion that the Bugis were "known by their neighbours [only?] for their fierce character".[26] This essay will not go into the details of raiding; suffice it to say that Iranun raiding vessels used Western arms, one can pursue the extent to which this contributed to the ferocity of Iranun raids. The Iranun raiders could undertake piratical attacks on ports and coastal areas but were definitely "far more than mere pirates and brigands".[27] With the potential to amass hundreds of ships and thousands of warriors, these raiders were "capable of major defeats on the [Europeans] and toppling local kingdoms"—in effect meddling in local politics. In fact, the Iranun fielded a fleet under the command of Raja Ismail, a contender for the throne of Siak whose grandfather had earlier meddled with the politics of Johor, who "joined forces with Bugis and Malay warriors [formerly] under the command of Mahmud".[28] If raiding was an instrument of war and "state" of the Iranun, why the use of a more potent means of conflict did not result in the consolidation of a more centralized state is worth probing further. The economic activities linking to the Iranuns and not involving raiding should be given their due consideration. Furthermore, why this facet of the Iranuns did not factor in presenting a more benign image may also be worth probing.

[25] Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi*, pp. 155 and 157.

[26] Warren, "Savagism and civilization", p. 130–42 and C. Pelras, *The Bugis* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 4. Warren in *Iranun and Balangingi* (p. 416) is of the opinion that the "Iranun" and "Balangingi" identities were "not fixed" before the "imposition of colonial control and [towards] the end of nineteenth century".

[27] Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi*, p. 53.

[28] Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi*, p. 59.

Sociopolitical Organization

The geography of the southern Philippine islands and insular Southeast Asia (compared to mainland Southeast Asia) is generally understood to preclude a highly stratified society being formed in the Sulu Sultanate or zone. L. Junker pins the social stratification of Philippine chiefdoms in the "contact period societies" to roughly four levels. The first two involved the chiefs and their elites, and beneath them was located a wide base of common people followed by slaves. The institution of the slaves, as noted by Junker and other prominent Southeast Asian specialists, has to be seen in the context of developments in the region. Slaves could be absorbed into the retainer group of the chief; they could work in a trade (such as goldsmithing) and accrue independent wealth.[29] Warren's *Sulu Zone* touches a little on the social organization of the groups directly under or indirectly linked to the Sulu Sultanate. If Warren's calculation of Jolo's population size is correct (that it increased from 40,000 in 1770 to 200,000 in 1814),[30] the capital of Sulu was approximately the size of Melaka in 1511, on the eve of the latter's fall to the Portuguese. This means that Sulu was likely to have attained the social complexity and cultural diversity of Melaka. The increase in size of the expeditions corresponding with the growth of villages and settlements in the region around Jolo over time gives an indication of the increased complexity in organization and arrangement of the expeditions.[31] This is where questions might also be asked as to whether the social, economic and political sophistication of a society needed to develop in tandem (a debatable issue in Junker's 1999 work and the cultural evolutionary model).[32]

The nebulous nature of the Sulu polity will be discussed next. The Sulu political system was segmentary in that it lacked a territorially fixed group under the tutelage of a political leader with coercive power over his subjects. Instead, it was characterized by fluctuating alliances in which chiefly (datu) authority was vested only in the datu's ability to forge and maintain strong ties of loyalty and in which alliance membership was the only effective means of political action. There were no functional differences between alliance segments, with each representing a temporary means for advancing political aims or economic objectives held in common at a particular time. Thus, an alliance group might be united at one level for specific purposes and then opposed at another level of the political hierarchy and at another time. To the sultan, therefore, the state was weakly centralized in that its leadership did not constitute an institutionalized chain of command from centre to

[29] L. Junker, *Raiding, trading and feasting: The political economy of Philippine chiefdoms* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), p. 136.

[30] Warren, *The Sulu Zone,* pp. 95–102; quoted and discussed in Sutherland, Review essay of *Iranun and Balangingi*, p. 154.

[31] Warren, "Who were the Balangingi Samal?", p. 54.

[32] J. Miksic, Review of *Raiding, trading and feasting: The political economy of Philippine chiefdoms* by L. Junker, *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. 47, no. 3 (2004), pp. 480–87.

periphery. Political allegiance within the Sulu polity was given only to the leader immediately above an individual with whom he had personal ties of reciprocity and loyalty. The minimal degree of centralization and political integration necessary for the existence of a state structure was achieved only in the symbolic political unity afforded by state-sponsored ritual and ideology: The sultan, by virtue of his position as the earthly representative of Islamic divinity, provided the symbolic sanctions of authority necessary for the ideological perpetuation of the state.[33]

In the Sulu polity, individual datus and their alliance factions could carry out piracy and slave raiding, launch trade voyages, control trade along a strategic river or sea corridor, mobilize trade or conscript labour and engage in myriad wealth-producing activities without the permission of the sultan or higher-order datus. Thus, local datus functioned quasi-independently in economic activities associated with financing their political activities and increasing their political power.[34] This independence of the datus resulted in a relatively unstable political system, and yet the Sulu sultan was able to create an indigenous-cum-autonomous state despite Spanish interference, which makes the study of the Sulu Sultanate and its entanglement with the seafaring world intriguing. Foreign trade permitted the sultan and datus to possess foreign prestige goods. These goods were exchanged as gifts as a ubiquitous way of cementing political alliances in the region. The datu's influence on the ground is an area that merits additional research on its own. Paredes adds to the discussion through her work on the Lumads: Beyond (symbolic) status, the legitimacy of the datu was backed up by the ability of the candidate. Raiding and other aggressive behaviours were linked to the acquisition of status and prowess through the slaves acquired; this could bolster the datu's own group or be used as a trading good.[35] Paredes notes that the indigenous confederations that "typified the sacup [were horizontally structured]".[36] My own work on the field in a contemporary municipal locality up north, which lay in historically Spanish-controlled areas, paints a datu system that was highly indirect.[37]

Linking the nature of the polity to the thorny problem of piracy produces the sub-hypothesis of a decentralized sultanate wielding a potent instrument of war that was at the same time not under its full control. The *Seaflower* was a trading vessel belonging to James Scott and Company of Bengal, which, under the command of an ex-naval officer named Spiers, undertook a commercial voyage in the Sulu Archipelago in the middle of 1821. Spiers commented that the political structure of Sulu was an aristocracy rather than a monarchy, and he believed that "even though there is a sultan, he has little power, every measure being carried by the will of the datus who sometimes attack each other without consulting the sultan upon the subject".[38]

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[33] Junker, *Raiding, trading, and feasting*, pp. 68–69.

[34] Junker, *Raiding, trading, and feasting*, p. 73.

[35] Paredes, *Mountain of difference*, pp. 28–29.

[36] Paredes, *Mountain of difference*, p. 131.

[37] Field notes collected during period of PhD research.

[38] N. Tarling, *Piracy and politics in the Malay world* (Melbourne: F.W. Chesire, 1963), pp. 146–47.

Captain Blake of H.M.S. *Larne*, under orders from his British commander, Sir Frederick Maitland, visited Manila to secure information from the Spanish about the problems of piracy and slave raiding in the Sulu Archipelago. He consulted two Spanish naval officers who had been employed for some years in watching and suppressing piracy and slave raiding in the southern group of Philippine islands and in the Sulu Sea:

> The thing from which the Ilanun derive their principal booty in their cruises is the captives they make and sell in all parts of the Eastern and Southern coasts of Borneo and the Makassar Straits. It has been supposed that these Ilanun are subject to and act under the directions of the raja of Sulu, but I was most positively assured by the Spanish officers mentioned above, as also by H.E. Don Andreas Garcia Camba, Governor of Manila, that such is not the case. Captain Don Jose Arcon has had some communication with the sultan of Sulu, and is acquainted with his situation, his means and his habits. He assured me that the sultan has no means of power and influence, over these Ilanun. That they are a race purely piratical, of a distinct community of wild predatory habits, dependent on no one, and acknowledging no external authority. It is true they frequent the Island of Sulu as they please and without hindrance, as well as other innumerable islands and mangrove banks. I was informed by Captain Don that he had witnessed at one time nearly two hundred Ilanun ships, great and small, off this island, and on attempting to chase them with his "Faluas" they outstripped all pursuit, and so disappeared in the most extraordinary manner, dousing masts and sails and taking refuge among the mangroves. He compared these haunts to extensive nests or haunts of rats, where they can fly from one refuge to another, and which no means we Europeans here possess can ever succeed in annihilating.[39]

A further example of the sultan's weakness can be seen when Captain Belcher of the British navy paid several friendly visits in the course of his surveying voyage of 1844–1845. On his first visit in April 1844, he complained of the reliance of the sultan's ports on Samal Balangingi pirates and that the ports provided facilities for the sale of slaves:

> The Spaniards, and, I believe, the British government also, still labour under the impression that the sultan of Sulu has power over and acts in concert with, all these pirates. I have taken very great pains to arrive at the proof of any such act, and my conviction is that he has not the power. He is weak to oppose the interest of some of his datus, who exhibit much greater interest in the success of the pirates.[40]

The idea was mooted at the beginning of this section as to whether the social, economic and political sophistication of a society needed to develop hand in hand. The development of the political organization in insular Southeast Asia could not be compared to developments on the mainland or states based on Western political models. "States" in the early modern period in Southeast Asia were moulded by the coming of the Europeans as well as the globalized economic network. States of various sizes could be found across the eastern Malay Archipelago, where the land masses were smaller and more scattered. Scholars have written about political entities adopting Western-style regalia in their courts along with Western weapons.

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[39]Tarling, *Piracy and politics in the Malay world*, pp. 153–54.

[40]E. Belcher, *Narrative of the voyage of HMS Samarang during the years, 1843–1846* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 270.

In Polynesia, political entities are sometimes misleadingly labelled as "empire"—for instance, in the case of Tonga. According to Hunt's report, Sulu supposedly possessed and operated a number of colonies in Borneo. The chiefs in the region and the sultan of Sulu operated a mutually consensual relation that conferred a large degree of autonomy to the former, and this could be unstable at times. If one moved outside Southeast Asia farther east, one could even find a prince (like Kamehameha I in Hawaii) attempting to carve out a Western-style empire. The Iranun raiding enterprise and menace did not culminate in a more concrete "empire" because the conglomeration of participant groups in the Sulu-Mindanao region and outside this region where bases were set up involved a complex but flexible sharing of loot that kept them bonded over a short/long period of time as long as demand for slaves continued to exist and the expenses of cooperation were not high. The next section deals with the economic dimension of activities undertaken by the Iranun, particularly the trading of slaves.

Role of Trade

Warren has argued that the increased commerce in slaves, increased profits and resources accrued from slave acquisition and trade were important pillars of Sulu society. This section will briefly outline the role of slaves in the Sulu economy as well as Sulu's internal and external trade. The development of Sulu as a political economic entity located in the debate of externalist and autonomous historiography will also be discussed. As a form of wealth, slaves were a tangible asset in easily transferable form. They played a major role in the economy both as a unit of production and as a medium of exchange. Most accounts of the Sulu Sultanate written before 1780 indicate that the internal demand for slaves at Jolo was on a much smaller scale than it was destined to become in the late eighteenth century. Early writers reported that it was more profitable for the Sulu operators to deliver slaves to Maguindanao and Bugis merchants from Cotabato and Pasir for transshipment to Makassar and Batavia than employing them in their own settlements. However, with the advent of external trade in the Sulu Archipelago in the late eighteenth century, the accumulation of wealth and the transmission of power and privilege in the Sulu polity were facilitated by the ownership of slaves.[41]

Slaves who were valuable for the variety of their labours essential to the growth of the state came to play a more important role in Sulu at this time of increased European maritime activities in the China trade. Slaves were retained by datus so that the latter's political and economic influence could increase—but far more than anything else, they contributed in fishery and forestry[42] to maintain an expansive

[41] Warren, *The Sulu Zone,* pp. 198 and 201.

[42] If the labour-intensive economy of the Sulu Sultanate relied on the sea as an abundant source of produce for external trade, the wilderness was its second mainstay. It was principally from

redistributional economy and the flow of global-regional trade. Slaves were used also in trading ventures, in diplomatic negotiations, as slave raiders, as concubines and wet nurses, as tutors to their masters, as craft workers and as peasants and fishermen.[43] In the eighteenth century, an average of 2,000–3,000 slaves were imported annually and more than 50% of the productive labour within the polity was derived from captured slaves. Foreign slaves were incorporated into the local workforce as rice farmers, fishermen, craftsmen and even traders and warriors. The use of slave labour in agricultural production and other basic economic tasks increased the surpluses and revenues of datus and freed up a larger portion of the non-slave population to serve the datu in trading and raiding activities that contributed to his wealth and political power. In Sulu, as in many Southeast Asian chiefdoms and states, captured slaves also could be directly invested in bride wealth to expand a chief's alliance network. Women captured in raids, if of sufficiently high status, were sometimes added to a ruler's polygamous harem of wives to enhance his regional notoriety or given to another datu or exchanged between datus to expand their political network.[44]

Sulu's lowland polities and adjacent upland tribal peoples generally formed extensive interactive networks that were loosely integrated through political, social as well as economic ties. Localized exchange partnerships existed between individual lowland farmers and interior upland swidden farmers or forest collectors. These internal domestic goods trade networks became directly linked to the lowland datus' political strategies for controlling the wealth-generating foreign trade, because of the nature of Chinese import demands. In return for their primarily luxury goods (porcelain, silk and weaponry), Chinese traders desired interior forest products (spices, tropical hardwoods, abaca cloth, metal ores and pet animals). These were commodities that the coastal datus did not control directly but had to amass through symbiotic exchange relations with interior upland peoples who were not under the direct political hegemony of the lowland datus. In exchange for forest products such as spices, hardwood, wax and bird's nest, internal riverine tribal people received salt, tobacco, salted fish, coconut oil, cotton cloth and slaves from the coastal datus. Sixteenth-century Spanish chroniclers record that forest products (such as wax, honey and hardwoods), gold ore, cotton and dry rice from upland populations were counterbalanced by maritime products, livestock, salt and manufactured goods (such as cotton textiles, earthenware pottery and iron implements) from the coastal

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this environment that the sultanate was supplied with specialities for the China trade. Bird's nest, procured primarily from limestone caves, and wax were obtained in abundance by thousands of slaves who expanded settlements and mined the riches of the forests for their Sulu overlords. Source comes from F. Warren, "Slavery and the impact of external trade: The Sulu sultanate in the nineteenth century", in A.W. McCoy and D.de Jesus eds., *Philippine social history* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1982), p. 425.

[43] Warren, *The Sulu Zone,* p. 46.

[44] L. Junker, "Political economy in the historic period chiefdoms and states of Southeast Asia", in Gary M. Feinman and Linda M. Nicholas eds., *Archaeological perspectives on political economies* (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2004), p. 247.

groups.[45] Forest produce arrived by river from the interior and was for the most part transported to coastal Sulu in time to meet vessels from Manila and China. Riverine tribal people, including those from Gunung Tabor, exported commodities such as wax, bird's nest and rattan. The upriver settlements of Camburcan, Labuk, Songsohi and Ano supplied the same forest produce as Gunung Tabor for Sulu's external trade. In 1814, Ano, which had an estimated population of 500 Muslims and 100 Ida'an, exported to Sulu 15 piculs of cotton wool, 10 piculs of beeswax, 1,000 bundles of rattan and 20 katis of lime.[46] Archaeological and historical evidence suggests that lowland-upland trade increased and transformed with the growing participation of lowland datus in the foreign prestige goods trade. Sulu datus competing to attract foreign trade to their coastal ports intensified exchange relations with interior foragers and tribal peoples who provided forest hardwoods, spices, metal ores, resins and other products desired by the Chinese.[47] In a way, the people living in the interior of the Sulu polity benefited due to the external trade the datus and sultan had with the Chinese and Europeans. To put it succinctly, internal trade grew due to external trade, and the interior tribal people benefited from the forces at play: trade, slave raiding, slave trading and slavery.

In terms of the external demand, one must question the extent to which demand and supply of slaves were matched. Despite substantial trade with China, it appears that slaves were never a major item of trade. In G. Bryan Souza's survey of the cargoes of ships from 1684 to 1742,[48] slaves were recorded only in the years 1689–1690. Although the Tausug seem to have acquired some of the slaves themselves, it can also be questioned, as Sutherland has done, to what extent labour was deployed by producers in the Sulu Zone to harvest trepang, one of the major and most lucrative items of trade and which required a relatively specialized workforce. While the impact of external trade, in terms of the internal demand for luxury and military items of trade, on Sulu appears to be undeniable, the extent to which the Sulu economy was connected and located in the periphery of the world economy, as mooted by Sutherland, is less easy to determine. In the context of the externalist-autonomous historiographical camps, the peak of expansive commercial activities in Southeast Asia occurred in the period 1570–1630, after which trade declined and the death throes set in in the 1680s. A. Reid notes that Southeast Asia at the peak of the age of commerce had gone farther than most parts of the world down the path of reliance on maritime trade but less towards the accumulation and mobilization of capital in private and corporate hands. As a consequence, Southeast Asian maritime states and traders were badly hit by the decline in trade (Asia's and Southeast Asia's role in the long-distance intercontinental trade dropped in

[45] Junker, *Raiding, trading, and feasting*, pp. 221–22 and 241.

[46] Warren, *The Sulu Zone,* pp. 80–89.

[47] Junker, *Raiding, trading, and feasting*, p. 240.

[48] G. Bryan Souza, *The survival of empire: Portuguese and society in China and South China Sea, 1630–1754* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 166–67. Table of data recorded by VOC of departures of Portuguese vessels from Melaka to Macau.

the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).[49] V. Lieberman, in an attempt to find commonalities in developments between Southeast Asia and various regions in Asia and Europe, is of the opinion that Southeast Asian states were not as vulnerable and indigenous mainland (more than island) entities were able to evolve an autonomy and civilization based on their increasingly sophisticated polities, economies and cultures. He specifically states that for statehood in Southeast Asia in the sixteenth to early nineteenth centuries, consolidation drew strength from several variables, including rising foreign trade, imported guns, population growth and agricultural extension, wider literacy, new religious currents and the demands of intensifying interstate competition.[50] Trade with the Chinese, which had been going on before the arrival of the Europeans and as an alternative to the European-imposed system, is amply recognized in Warren's *Sulu Zone* (as it is by Reid).[51] The "more abled" Chinese traders who were in regular transit were distinguished from those who settled permanently in Jolo. The Chinese diasporic community in Jolo is described as having been administered by Kapitan China, of a relatively limited size, by and large not well-off and having intermarried with the local population (and even embraced Islam). Reid's argument on the superiority of European maritime powers needs to be seen in perspective, because not all Southeast Asian states were reliant on the Europeans' sphere of influence and network and even those that had been subjugated to some extent were able to maintain an autonomy of their culture and indigenous economy. Lieberman has recounted from a number of secondary sources of the cultural-political process of centralization in the Spanish colonization of the Philippines. There is room to build a more compelling case for the autonomy of the southern Philippines states. Returning to an important question of this chapter, the trade and economy of Sulu appear to have developed to an extent where they could sustain a larger political entity. If Sulu had not developed a larger or more complex political organization, there would probably have been no need for such a political arrangement—the participating groups in the Iranun raids and trade could come together, reap a benefit and disperse without the need for a more permanent political arrangement.

Spanish Domination or Symbiosis?

An analysis of the symbiotic relationship between the Spanish and Sulu overlords is essential because it provides an understanding of why the Spanish, having systematically advanced their frontier in the southern Philippines especially after

[49] A. Reid, *Southeast Asia in the age of commerce: Expansion and crisis, 1450–1680,* vol. 2 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 327–28.

[50] V. Lieberman, *Strange parallels: Southeast Asia in global context: Mainland mirrors, Europe, Japan, China, South Asia and the islands, 800–1830,* vol. 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 64–65.

[51] Reid, *Southeast Asia in the age of commerce*, p. 311. The Chinese overseas trade declined in the first half of the seventeenth century and was supposed to have rebound after the 1680s.

the mid-nineteenth century, were unable to fully pacify southern Sulu. Was it due to the (fragmentary nature of the) political structure and economy (relating to trading and slave raiding) of the Sulu Sultanate or the weakness of the Spanish?

An increased French and British presence in the southern waters worried the Spanish, who had occupied and Christianized only the coasts of Mindanao and Sulu. Seeking to curb piracy and slave raiding and to prevent the Sulu Sultanate from allying with the Dutch, French or English forces, Spanish fleets from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries repeatedly tried to reduce the autonomy and independence of Sulu.[52] However, the initiative was rather the other way around, with incessant slave raids haunting the colony. But what was probably more serious was the constant lack of suitable sea power to counter the incursions by Sulu pirates. Spain's large (and slow-moving) gunboats could not catch up with the fast-moving raiding vessels, and the efficacy of Spanish forts in protecting strategic coastal towns was uneven. This unstable situation continued well into the nineteenth century.[53]

In analysing the reasons why the Spanish were unable to defeat the Sulu Sultanate completely and curb piratical activities (piracy and slave raiding, particularly the latter), it is widely agreed that the Spanish were unprepared for the difficulties of securing widely scattered islands controlled by a dizzying array of continually battling datus who seemed to have no permanent political hierarchies and spoke many different languages. This diffusion of political power among multiple competing datus with power bases that were not clearly defined is emphasized in a number of early Spanish accounts.[54] In highlighting the losing battle fought by the Spanish against the Sulu raiders, the *Ching Annals* record the following:

> During the eighteenth century, when Spain conquered Luzon, she tried her best to make Sulu one of her protectorates, but Sulu refused. Though the Spaniards despatched troops to conquer her, they were defeated.[55]

The Spanish "Forward Movement" in the South against piracy and slave raiding but with the intended purpose of conquering the South was met with local resistance not only from Sulu but also from other Muslim entities in the region. In the

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[52]Lieberman, *Strange parallels*, p. 883.

[53]P.N. Abinales and D.J. Amoroso, *State and society in the Philippines* (United States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005), p. 95; Keith Lightfoot, *The Philippines* (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1973), p. 81.

[54]Francisco Ignacio Alcina, "Historia de las islas e indio de las Bisayas", Book 3, Part 3 in Paul Lietz ed./trans., *The Munoz text of Alcina's history of the Bisayan Islands* (Chicago: Philippine Studies Programme, University of Chicago, 1960), p. 61; Francisco Colin, "Labour evangelica, ministerios apostólicos de los obreros de la compañía de Jesus, fundación y progressos de su provincial en las Islas Filipinas", in E. Blair and J. Robertson eds./trans., *The Philippines, 1493–1898* (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1906), p. 82; Miguel de. Loarca, "Relacion de las Islas Filipinas", in E. Blair and J. Robertson eds./trans., *The Philippines, 1493–1898* (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1903), pp. 175–77; Antonio Morga, "Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas", in M. Garcia ed./trans., *Readings in Philippine prehistory* (Manila: Filipina Book Guild, 1609), p. 296.

[55]Majul, "Chinese relationship with the sultanate of Sulu", p. 153.

mid-nineteenth century, dispersed Samal Balangingi pirates were still able to assemble between 60 and 100 ships by joining forces with kindred groups in Jolo and the Iranun of Tunku in attacks on the Philippine Archipelago and Maluku. Indeed, slave raiding in the Sulu Zone continued even until the end of the Spanish era. It is argued that Muslims from the unhispanicized, uncolonized areas of the southern Philippine Archipelago, most notably the Samal Balangingi, held slaves and raided Christianized settlements under Spanish rule not because they were Muslims but because they had yet to be subordinated to colonial authority.[56] This is affirmed by Paredes' (2013) investigation of the Lumads. It was only with the advent of fast-moving gunships and steam technology in the middle of the nineteenth century that large-scale slave raiding was eventually controlled by the Spanish, although sporadic slave raiding on nearby islands, especially Basilan and northern Borneo, continued into the US period.[57]

A picture of the weak Sulu Sultanate coexisting with semi-autonomous datus maintaining their own armed hordes and fending for their own possessions has been built up so far. It is not far-fetched to contemplate—though this author does not have the evidence to support this—that the Spanish might at some point in their long-drawn campaigns in the southern Philippines not have desired a fuller control of the region. If the Sulu Sultanate were to surrender to the Spanish, the many other datus would not necessarily surrender, because they pledged no allegiance to the sultan. Some other datu would just take the place of the sultan and proclaim himself as the next hegemon of the region, and the Spanish would have to face a new foe. Rather than facing such a possibility, the Spanish preferred to monitor and maintain a somewhat cordial coexistence with the Sulu Sultanate, knowing well that they could not eradicate piracy and slave raiding and being fearful of pushing the Sulu people towards the British, French or Dutch. In this aspect, Spain appears to have aligned closely with the pattern of "interactive emergence of European domination" advocated by J. E. Wills.[58]

Finally, it is crucial to locate the hostilities between the Spanish and the Moros in the context of the commerce taking place between these two supposed foes. Warren affirms the trade between Manila and Jolo:

> Manila was visited annually by a Tausag vinta but before 1787 no Spanish or Chinese coasting vessels regularly went to Jolo. By 1791, Chinese coasters and armed Spanish vessels visited the sultanate. Sulu prahus and schooners continue[d] to make occasional voyages to Manila. An average of four to five Spanish vessels was engaged in trade to Jolo at the end of 1810.[59]

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[56]Hedman Eva-Lotta and Sidel J. *Philippine politics and society in the 20th century: Colonial legacies, post-colonial trajectories* (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 169.

[57]T. Kiefer, *The Tausug: Violence and law in a Philippine Moslem society* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), p. 84.

[58]J. E. Wills, "Interactive emergence of European domination: Maritime Asia, 1500–1800", *American Historical Review*, vol. 98 (1993), pp. 83–105.

[59]Warren, *The Sulu Zone,* p. 55.

Conclusion

The rise of the Iranun helmed by the Sulu Sultanate in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a predictable and at the same time unique development in Southeast Asian history. It was predictable because the decline (and passing) of the Bugis naturally engendered the filling of the power vacuum by another group. It was unique because the Iranun menace appears to have been particularly "serious" compared to past trends in piracy or raiding in this subregion. More than that, the menace of the Iranun was unique because of the multiplicity of the phenomenon. The Sulu Sultanate appears to have attained a critical mass in the population of its capital city (Jolo) as well as sophistication in the scale of its raiding enterprise, but these developments might not have been reconciled with what seems to have been a decentralized and ad hoc arrangement in the political economy. Linking with a discussion on ethnicity and identity, the same input can be seen as divisive or as a source of strength in raiding or the functioning of the economies of the Sulu Zone. This is also perhaps where the unique cultural realm described by specialists of the eastern archipelagic region of Southeast Asia, such as L. Andaya and M. Lobato, can be differentiated from that of the western archipelago.

Appendix

Table 7.1 Jolo's annual exports of marine and jungle produce

	Sultan Bantilan, 1761	Datu Emir Bahar, 1835
Produce	(piculs)	(piculs)
Sea cucumber	1,000–10,000	10,000
Pearl shell	2,000	12,000
Tortoiseshell	100	600
Shark's fin	100	600
Bird's nest	70	100
Wax	300	1,000
Camphor	2	100
Varnish resin	1,000	6,000
Cinnamon	150–200	10,000
Cocoa	100	500

Source: Warren (2007, p. 65)

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Chapter 8
Iberians in the Adjacent Seas: A Survey of Their Piratical and Smuggling Activities in Relation to War and the Political Economy of the South China Sea

Y.H. Teddy Sim

Abstract The chapter surveys the Iberians in the South China Sea when they were under one crown and in a certain position of strength in the early part of seventeenth century and when they operated separately in the first half of eighteenth century and supposedly past their prime as imperialist powers. In the process, whether European imperialist powers were more susceptible to undertake piracy (or contract it out in the form of privateering) and/or surreptitious activities (such as smuggling) in relation to their position of power and influence is examined in the chapter. Overall, the chapter hopes to explore aspects of continuity of how the Portuguese and Spanish operated in the context of long-term structures embedded in the sea region.

Introduction

The South China Sea, notwithstanding the explicit association of its name with China, located between the long east Malaya-Indochina and Borneo-Philippine islands coastlines, is deeply embedded as a part of Southeast Asia. This chapter looks at the degree to which certain external groups, namely, the Portuguese and Spanish, located themselves during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the structures and activities of the South China Sea. The discussion will deal with the Iberians' trade and violence making in the South China Sea in two parts: (1) analyse the concerted effort they made during the Union[1] and (2) probe specifically into

[1]The Spanish and Portuguese came under a united government of the Philippines-Habsburg dynasty of the former during the period 1580–1640.

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their involvement in various subregions of the sea after their breakup. Attention will be drawn, in the process, to Iberians' involvement in piracy and smuggling as well as possible correlations of these activities with macro trends in stability or disruption.

Specific questions that may be asked in the above directions are as follows: (1) To what extent was the Habsburg hegemony achieved during the period of the Union in Southeast Asia/South China Sea? (2) Did the apparent 'hegemony', and subsequent diminution of this, in the Portuguese and/or Spanish, boost 'illicit' commerce and piracy? (3) Overall, whether in the period of attempted hegemony or out of it, what can be said about the 'illicit' trade or piracy carried by the Portuguese and/or Spanish in various parts of the South China Sea?

Specialized studies on piracy and smuggling tend to distinguish between the two activities. Piracy can be simply defined as banditry on the sea, usually involving some level of violence on the subjects of coercion. Privateers can be defined as pirates who operated with licences from sovereign states.[2] Raiding usually refers to sudden small-scale attacks on a land-based (for instance, a settlement) target that could result in the appropriating of its labour resources. Smuggling, in the context of the early modern world, is defined as the clandestine transportation of goods or persons against a rival established order in a geographical area. Some writers (for instance, A. Karras) have tried to distinguish between pirates and smugglers. The former were depicted to have 'grander' and 'more hostile' goals, while the latter were portrayed as being 'discreet'.[3]

In terms of the periodization of this chapter, the focus on episodes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries offers an opportunity for highlighting how macro-level disruption might have influenced long-term everyday structures. After the end of the long sixteenth century, the oft-touted upheaval and crisis in the mid-seventeenth century is eclipsed by another long century, the eighteenth.

The Portuguese and Spanish in Southeast Asia have been the subject of various works over time. The usual definition of Southeast Asia encompasses part of the sea region of the South China Sea. Depending on how Southeast Asia is defined,

[2] J. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Corsairs refer to privateers operating specifically in the Caribbean.

[3] A. Karras, *Smuggling: Contraband and Corruption in World History* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009).

a 'Greater Southeast Asia' might incorporate the southern provinces and coasts of China (including Macau).[4, 5, 6] Why bring the Iberians together in a discussion in a chapter when they seem not to have been preoccupied with each other except for the brief period of the Union (1580–1640)? This article refers to developments among

[4]The South China Sea, although far from being an ocean, may be seen in terms of subregions. An earlier probe into the South China Sea, in the spirit of what F. Braudel did for the Mediterranean, was offered by Denys Lombard. F. Warren's Sulu Zone, encompassing a smaller region of the Sulu and Celebes Seas and couched in the approach of zonal histories (also partly inspired by the studies of Braudel, among other scholars), is presented as an ethnocultural zone made up of economic and politicking activities. R. Ptak highlighted the tediousness that would be involved in defining a system for the South China Sea and made his own 'limited' study attempt (as he claimed) over the sea region focusing on Chinese consciousness in maps and map-making of the region over time. This limited chapter hopes to make a preliminary identification of the subregional systems. From there, this chapter will try to locate the Portuguese and Spanish groupings and activities in these identified areas as well as in the context of long-term and macro trends or disruptions of these. If one considers the 'greater notion' of Southeast Asia, several subregional systems might be broadly detected from a map of the South China Sea: (1) Lingnan-Gulf of Tonkin; (2) the Gulf of Thailand, comprising the Siam and Cambodian cultures; (3) the Melayu region, comprising lands on both sides of the Strait of Melaka, as well as Java and parts of Borneo; and (4) the Philippine islands (Warren's Sulu Zone is included here). The characteristics associated with these subregions merit some clarifications: (1) the subzones, although cultural affiliated, were by no means limited to the operations of particular groups, and (2) while each subregion might have operated as a hub in itself, interlinkages and exchanges were effected between the regions.

[5]The Lingnan-Gulf of Tonkin, although Vietnam was subjugated by China as early as the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), it achieved its first true independence in the first millennium CE. From the sixteenth century, Vietnam appears to have slipped back into partition and civil war, although Li Tana contends that the southern political entity (Nguyen Dynasty) evolved into a more indigenous identity as it absorbed the remnant Cambodian (Khmer and Cham) cultures. The Trinh lord-controlled north operated a 'more traditional' administration that drew upon the accumulated experience of the long-standing Chinese-influenced Le Dynasty. Economically, both the Trinh and Nguyen rulers were open to trade. The Gulf of Tonkin and the coast farther south acted as alternative outlets for securing goods that might be obtained in ports in China (and Japan). The eventual triumph of the Nguyens towards the end of the eighteenth century and their alliance with Cantonese-Hokkien merchants could be seen as a restoration of certain lost linkages with the Sino cultural-economic zone. In the Melayu region (used in the manner that L. Andaya has used in his works), indigenous political contenders, who at one time or another during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had vied for hegemony over parts of the Melayu region and/or resisted European (especially Dutch) encroachment, were located at Aceh, Minangkabau-Siak, Melaka/Johor and Mataram (Java) in a competitive multistate system. The first three might be said to be successors of the Srivijaya legacy. Mataram, on Java, merits a slightly different consideration—besides drawing from a different hegemonic tradition, Java has been argued by a few scholars to have been 'aligning more closely with mainland kingdoms than insular ones'. Each of these subregions either possessed port outlets or had production bases for internationally demanded goods, for instance, pepper at Aceh, pepper and gold at Minangkabau-Siak, wood and foodstuffs at Mataram, and Melaka/Johor playing the role of the entrepôt despite upheavals threatening its existence. Dutch influence and control in the region, though increasing, was not prevalent as hegemony was not achieved in all areas or sectors before the end of the nineteenth century.

[6]In the Gulf of Thailand, the rise of the Tai kingdoms (Sukhothai, and especially Ayutthaya 1351–1767 CE) after the first millennium at the expense of the Khmer empire (802–1431 CE) led to

the Portuguese or the Spanish in Southeast Asia in their own right but at times uses the term 'Iberians' collectively. The impulse for a combined history, as also highlighted by S. Subrahmanyam in an article on the 'connected histories' of Spain's and Portugal's overseas empires, more often than not charged with nationalistic sentiments, has the potential for 'much to be gained from reading Spanish and Portuguese materials … jointly rather than separately'.[7]

Individually, G. Bryan Souza's *Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea 1630–1754*, though focusing on the Portuguese, explores the subject of this chapter most directly. While the work received mixed reviews among some specialists, many heavyweight specialists who worked on trade and Iberians in the Far East, not least C. Boxer, thought that 'no serious student [working on the area] can afford to ignore it'.[8] An edited volume by P. Borschberg titled *Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka Area and Adjacent Regions*, which hosts a diverse collection of articles—a few of which are relevant to the discussion of this chapter—adds to the subject discussion.[9]

Luis F. R. Thomaz' multivolume edited work on the Far East contains chapters organized thematically along various facets of the Portuguese enterprise in the East,

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the ascendency of the Chao Phraya basin vis-à-vis the Mekong basin. Discussions have been moot about the open or closed nature of Ayutthaya, and although the state/succession disputes valued 'control of manpower more than foreign trade', the outcome was settled in favour of the former—commerce was participated in by a host of foreign communities (most notably, the Japanese diaspora) apart from the Chinese. To be sure, Cambodia continued to be 'a serious commercial competitor' in the late seventeenth century. The Teochews becoming the dominant Chinese group in Siam may also convey the sense of a differentiated subcultural zone here; in many parts of Southeast Asia, the Hokkiens were the dominant group. Finally, touching on the Philippine islands and Sulu Zone, there has been perennial dispute over the degree to which the islands may be considered part of the Malay Archipelago. The insular region, due to its size and geographical nature when compared to Indonesia, came under sustained and systematic colonization by Europeans before the nineteenth century—the north and centre of the island group (Luzon and Visayas) were gradually subjugated in the course of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries (marked by the regular recurrence of revolts). In the north, the economic rhythm of life was heavily dictated by the galleon trade as well as trade sustaining the livelihood of the city of Manila. The 'inner sea' of the Philippines or F. Warren's Sulu Zone, comprising the Sulu and Celebes Seas, held by the Mindanao and Sulu Sultanates, was depicted in the late eighteenth century as trading heavily with the Bugis (Makassar) for opium and Bengal cloth in exchange for slaves, coffee, spices and other commodities (which the latter brought to ports in the western Melayu region).

[7]S. Subrahmanyam, "Holding the world in balance: Connected histories of the Iberian overseas empires", *American Historical Review*, vol. 112, no. 5 (2007), p. 26.

[8]C. Boxer, review of *Survival of empire: Portuguese trade and society in China and South China Sea*, *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, vol. 1 (1987), pp. 164–66. M. Pearson, review of *Survival of empire*, *Journal of Economic History*, vol. 48, no. 1 (1988), pp. 201–202. W. Cheong, review of *Survival of empire*, *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 3 (1988), pp. 510–11. R. Ptak, review of *Survival of empire*, *Journal of American Oriental Society*, vol. 108, no. 2 (1988), pp. 355–57.

[9]P. Borschberg, *Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka area and adjacent regions* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004).

such as political and administrative organization as well as economic networks. The former deals with, not surprisingly, places that involved some degree of Portuguese control (such as Melaka and Macau). The latter deals with places where Portuguese exerted some influence in order to carry out commerce (such as Makassar after the fall of Melaka). In both cases, Timor is given a separate chapter treatment that combines both areas of discussion. In another edited book, J. Villiers has written a chapter on the Portuguese in Southeast Asia focusing on political economy and mode of governance. There are also an array of studies, though uneven in the depth of treatment, on the Portuguese in various parts of Southeast Asia—for instance, J. M. dos Santos Alves' study on Portuguese relations with Sumatra and Aceh, P. J. de Sousa Pinto's work on the Portuguese and Malaya, and S. Halikowski-Smith's writing on Portuguese in Ayutthaya and the Indies.[10]

On the Spanish in Southeast Asia, the wider context of their coming and the global (galleon) silver trade linking to the Philippines have been the subject of investigation by a number of specialists such as P. Chaunu, P. O. Flynn, R. d'Avila Lourido, R. Manuel Loureiro and even M. Pearson.[11] In this direction, and pertaining to the geographical coverage of this chapter, the northern stretches of the South China Sea are well covered. Other literature is focused on the conquest of the Philippine islands, although even here, a bibliographical survey in a 2011 book acknowledges that most historical narratives are still devoted to the Spanish Americas.[12] Overall, studies couched under titles exploring 'formal' activities generally receive mainstream attention by scholars, while piracy and smugglers' activities make only intermittent appearances.[13]

[10]See Jorge M. dos Santos Alves' *História dos Sultanatos de Samudera e de Achém e das suas relações com os Portugueses* (Lisbon: Sociedade da Independencia de Portugal, 1999), P. J. da Sousa Pinto's *Portugueses e Malaios* (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1997) and J. Newsome's *Hernando de los Raos Coronel and Spanish Philippines in the Golden Age* (London: Ashgate, 2011).

[11]See P. Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Iberiques* (Paris: SEVPEN, 1960).

[12]This is supported further in A. T. de Matos and L. F. Thomaz' *Vinte Anos de Historiografia Ultramarina Portuguesa* (Lisbon: CNCDP, 1993), entry on Extremo Oriente.

[13]M. Pearson, "Privateering and piracy: Corruption and corsairs in Western India", in P. Emmer and F. Gaastra eds., *The organization of interoceanic trade in European expansion* (Leiden: Ashgate Variorum, 1996), pp. 365–92. See also S. Subrahmanyam, "Of pirates and potentes: Aspects of maritime jurisdiction in Portuguese India and construction of piracy", in D. Ghosh and S. Muecke eds., *Cultures of trade Indian Ocean exchanges* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), pp. 19–30; as well as A. Disney, "Smugglers and smuggling in western half of the Estado da Índia in late sixteenth century" in A. Disney, *Portuguese in India and other studies* (Ashgate: Variorum, 2009), IV, pp. 57–75. Examples of recent studies appearing on the subject, not necessary related to the Iberians or the sea region, are E. Tagliacozzo, *Secret trades, porous borders: Smuggling and states along a Southeast Asian frontier* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) and A. Karras, *Smuggling contraband and corruption in world history* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).

Iberians' 'Big Movement' in the East in the Seventeenth Century[14]

There was no lack of individual proposals, depicted by Boxer, for instance, of Iberians' grandiose plans to conquer parts of Southeast Asia or China. There were suggestions for the Portuguese and Spanish to 'combine their forces in the East against their enemies', most notably in the Malukus, before the period of the Union.[15] Between 1580 and 1640, there was a certain Bishop of Melaka who had been canvassing for an invasion of Aceh since 1584.[16] Grandiose ventures were not always centrally directed, although they might have been officially sanctioned afterwards, as in the case of Filipe de Brito e Nicote, a Portuguese adventurer and mercenary in Arakan.[17] Elsewhere, plans for the conquest of Siam, Champa and even China were proposed by leading intellectuals, cartographers and, not least, religious personnel.[18]

If the Habsburgs were operating in a number of realms, did an imperial bureaucratic apparatus exist to support the coordination of this or the grand strategy (as G. Parker attempts to prove for Philip II)?[19] The central administrations of Philip IV's grandfather as well as Philip IV have been revealed as elaborate structures

[14]The general crisis from the 1620s to the 1640s, whose reverberations were felt past the mid-century, was man-made in that it drew its sources from the centralizing tendencies of existing regimes and regime changes that occurred during the period. The disruption of the flow of silver from Japan to China, via the intermediaries of the Macanese, could be attributed, from one perspective, to the Japanese authorities trying to curb the spread of Catholicism (which the Portuguese and the Spanish were deeply engaged in) on the islands. For the Portuguese and Spanish during the period of the Union (1580–1640), G. Parker sees the 'union of arms', as do historians of the longue durée such as Paul Kennedy, as part of the cause of the crisis and rebellion of Portugal. The original document on the 'union (of arms)' by Gaspar de Guzmán Oliveires stipulated the number and proportion of troops to be raised and maintained by individual parties for the defence of an empire pertaining largely to the home or European front. Dissatisfactions experienced by the Portuguese and Spanish, especially where they extended to overseas commitments, were because each felt that the other was either not bearing enough of the burden or dragging itself down owing to its extensive dominions.

[15]C. R. Boxer, "Portuguese and Spanish projects for the conquest of Southeast Asia", in C.R. Boxer ed., *Portuguese conquest and commerce in southern Asia, 1500–1750* (London: Variorum, 1985), p. 126.

[16]Boxer, "Portuguese and Spanish projects for the conquest of Southeast Asia", p. 127.

[17]Filipe de Brito e Nicote was conferred the Governor of Syriam by the King of Arakan. He was officially recognized by Goa as the 'Commander of Syriam'.

[18]Boxer, "Portuguese and Spanish Projects for Conquest of Southeast Asia, 1580–1600", III, pp. 118–36.

[19]G. Parker, *The grand strategy of Philip II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 13–46.

led by hard-working monarchs.[20] Boxer, however, has tried to demonstrate that there were plenty of instances when rivalry was evoked between the partners in the Union—they went to the extent of sabotaging each other on occasion. Within either side, the picture is made more complicated by factions in the settlements, affiliated in varying degrees to the centre, as 'manipulating politics' and maximizing their chances for survival.[21]

J. E. Borao Mateo surveyed the beginning of the conflict between the Habsburgs and the Dutch in Asia and pointed out that the latter were not able to match up to the Spanish strength, let alone the combined strength of the Portuguese and Spanish. As the struggle wore on, the Habsburgs (the Spanish and Portuguese colonial settlements under threat in the region or in a certain theatre) sometimes found themselves outnumbered (judging, for instance, by the series of blockades and engagements the Portuguese headquarters at Goa had to undergo). Borao Mateo, quoting from Videira Pires and citing from the materials he gathered in *Spaniards in Taiwan*, felt that Philip IV had advocated for cooperation in a number of instances—1622, 1624, 1630, 1634 and 1639. In discussing specifically the years 1628–1633, Borao Mateo highlighted in an article the fervent urgings of the king to the Count of Linhares and at least two governors of the Philippines to cooperate with each other. He also raised attention to an instance in a brief update of a junta government convened by Governor Hurtado where the term 'Union of Arms' was used in his address and discussion.[22] In the letters, it is clear that the Crown was ambitious (or overestimated its own strength) because it did not only advocate for defence but nudged for an attack on Jakarta. It needs to be borne in mind that the Dutch had begun encroaching (and erected forts at certain points) on Taiwan by the 1630s.

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[20]This decision-making apparatus of Philip IV's grandfather gives the impression of a structure facilitated by communication and records via paperwork (partly accrued from Philip II's obsession with putting down things in writing). The compartmentalized conciliar system was also only made possible by Philip's attempted personal attention to the many matters, big and small, that transacted through it. In the reign of Philip IV, the king did not appear to have begun 'making his own decisions' in the 1620s. Meanwhile, decision-making, in 'consultation with the king', was undertaken by the first minister in the form of Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares. The count, according to J. H. Elliot and Parker, appears to work 'as hard as Philip II'. The cumbersomeness of the councils was supposed to be obviated to some extent partly by the onerous (and debilitating) efforts of his own person in addition to the creation of *juntas* (ad hoc subcommittees to expedite on matters). The count did not appear to be particularly focused on the colonies in the Far East, naturally because the multiple theatres closer to home, in addition to the various colonial fronts across the globe, competed for attention. Nevertheless, all, if not most, of the deliberations taken (till his forced leaving from the court in 1643) would have been made in consultation with the count, even after the king began to assert his own judgements.

[21]Macau had to often fend off attempted regulation or imposition from Goa (where the viceroy was based). Crown's attempt to influence politics seems to have the effect of intensifying the competition of rivalling factions at Macau, leading them to employing 'whatever means (including murder) in pursuit of their own [. . .] advantage'.

[22]J. Borao Mateo, "Intelligence gathering episodes in the Manila-Macau-Taiwan triangle during the Dutch wars", in A. Baxter et al. eds., *Conference of Macau-Philippines historic relations* (Macau: University of Macau, 2005), pp. 238–42.

Borao Mateo is of the opinion that the Spanish and Portuguese, even if they joined together, were not strong enough to be able to achieve their dual objectives. From my reading of other documents collected in Borao Mateo's volume, it appears that the term 'Union of Arms' was used in more than one instance. This suggests that the idea was evolving and discussed at the highest echelons of colonial administration in the Far East, although the reasons for its non-materialization should be looked into on their own.

Prominent scholars such as Rafael Valladares also think that the Habsburg crown was 'serious' about helping its Iberian cousins and 'reforming the entire system'.[23] The issue perhaps lies in the context of the region in which this aid was applied. Making a cross-reference to Philip R. Cahns, and briefly elaborating the issue further, it appears that the Spanish prioritized the Portuguese (as well as their) colonies in the Americas as the place to commit more of their resources. Valladares recounts the formation of the Portuguese East India Company as part of the counteroffensive, even though, aligning with Anthony Disney's timeless analysis, the institution ended up being 'sabotaged' by the system. Valladares also includes the Spanish-Portuguese fight against the Dutch in the Malukus and even the manipulation of other European players (i.e. striking a peace with the English) as part of the interrelated offensive.[24] Peter Rooney, in his unpublished thesis, reveals more about the developments at home in relation to overseas priorities. Despite the Dutch invasion of Brazil in early 1630, Rooney assures that 'India remained a priority [because] difficult negotiations had procured the promise of [over] 600, 000 cruzados over six years', a sizeable sum when one considers comparable sums raised for the relief of Brazil.[25] The difficulty, as Rooney relates, was in collecting the sums that had been pledged. This included diverting about a tenth of the amount raised for Brazil. Rooney partly blames the 'world class' administrative structure for the failure—one that created 'competing bodies with overlapping responsibilities'.[26]

The supposed joint action (written about by Borschberg) involving Juan da Silva that did not come to fruition occurred earlier, in the second decade of the seventeenth century. The period 1633–1641, treated in Borschberg's book, was a period of blockades for ships of the Portuguese and their allies in the Straits of Melaka (leading eventually to the fall of the Portuguese settlement in 1640). Farther east, Manila was also besieged between 1641 and 1948. Borschberg highlights that the emphasis should not be centred on the 'black-and-white' military triumph of the Dutch and supposed transference of trade to the victors. The blockade was 'very

[23] R. Valladares, *Castilla y Portugal en Asia: Declive imperial y adaptación, 1580–1640* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001), p. 63.

[24] Valladares, *Castilla y Portugal en Asia: Declive imperial y adaptación*, pp. 53 and 56.

[25] New Christians to provide a loan of slightly over 200, 000 cruzados, the city of Oporto to contribute 30, 000 cruzados as well as a new taxation and an 'immediate levying' of a new loan of 500, 000 cruzados. See P. Rooney, "Habsburg government of Portugal in the reign of Philip IV, 1621–40" (Ph.D Thesis, University of Keele, 1998), pp. 214–35.

[26] Rooney, "Habsburg government of Portugal in the reign of Philip IV", p. 201.

costly [for the Portuguese as well as for the Dutch and ...] did not entirely quash commercial activity'.[27] The opportunities for clandestine exchange and piracy were accentuated in the prolonged siege and struggle in the Straits of Melaka. From the perspective of the blockaders, any vessel trying to get into Melaka or sail the Straits without permission from the Dutch and their allies was deemed to be illicit. Documents on matters of the Council of State in Goa show that ships from the Portuguese eastern capital and Portugal's allies in the Far East had to 'run the gauntlet' in the period up to the fall of Melaka in order to supply the settlement under siege.[28]

Although Boxer thought that 'no offensive [or cooperation was undertaken] on any scale after de Silva's miscarriage in 1615', there is some ground for Borao Mateo and Videira Pires' assertion. Just because the conquests and clashes with native powers did not materialize does not mean the phenomenon should not be studied; it might be better to explore the explanations for the lack of follow-up. The offensive in the South China Sea was maintained at the fringes—in Taiwan and in the Malukus. Support continued to be lent to the Portuguese East India Company. At the same time, diplomatic manoeuvrings persisted with and against European and local power entities—all these during a period when the Portuguese Estado da Índia was described to be facing its greatest challenge. At home, the first signs of trouble related to Catalonia and Portugal had started to brew in the 1620s and 1630s. Neither the Dutch nor the Portuguese or Spaniards, as affirmed by Borschberg, were in any position to fully blockade the seas. Skirmishes on the seas could be authorized against enemy privateers (European or indigenous). Isolated actions by locally adapted European vessels (galleys), a challenge to maintain in terms of cost and manpower, revealed the Spanish and the Dutch to be engaging in lower-intensity warfare against piratical concerns. There is evidence from the Archivo General Indias that from 1630 to 1650 there were occasional alerts to the sea regions on the 'western half' of the South China Seas, showing that Spanish interest spanned that side of the sea. This is seen in reference to the Straits of Melaka, Camboja, Cochinchina, Achen, Saem, etc., when discussing trade routes.[29] Concrete action was seldom advised. More proactive counsel was sometimes given to provide aid (for instance, munitions) to Spanish vessels sailing the coasts or allies bordering the South China Sea and to take action on the ground, military if necessary (to, for instance, clear the seas of pirates).

Did the Habsburg-Dutch struggle in the South China Sea (manifested as part of the seventeenth-century crisis in Southeast Asia) accentuate banditry and

[27] Borschberg, *Singapore and Melaka Straits*, pp. 157–88.

[28] P. S. Pissurlencar, *Assentos do Conselho do Estado*, II (Bastora: Tipografia Rangel, 1953), survey of documents (11–111) in the period 1636–41, pp. 30–329. The Dutch colonial government only made the decision to conquer Melaka in May 1640 even though intermittent sieges were laid to the settlement before this. See P. G. Leupe, "The siege and capture of Melaka from the Portuguese in 1640–41", *Journal of Malayan Branch of Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. 14, no. 1 (1936), pp. 11–69.

[29] Archivo General de Indias (AGI), Filipinos 8 (R.2), No. 26.

surreptitious activities on the sea in the first half of the seventeenth century? As claimants to the 'closed sea' (*mare clausum*) and as noncapitalist operators in colonialism, the Portuguese never quite evolved privateering against the Dutch or the English in Southeast Asia. We know, as will be reiterated and elaborated later, that the Spanish granted patents to privateers to operate against the Dutch in the eighteenth century. The Habsburgs were also liable to solicit the help of mercenary brigades (or, as J. Thomson terms it, international brigades) in grandiose ventures. Whether the Portuguese were less willing to outsource, to use a modern term, because they operated a 'feudalistic plundering' as opposed to a 'capitalistic profit-maximizing' model (in a classification asserted by M. Newitt) is open to debate. Evidence on an array of Portuguese personages (for instance, a study on the Count of Linhares by Disney), from those in the higher to lower echelons, reveals that they possessed a keen business acumen and abilities. Elsewhere in the Estado da Índia, the Portuguese were seen to be more ready to subcontract war and pacification in certain theatres to mercenary and indigenous armies.[30] In the theatre in Southeast Asia/the South China Sea, specific engagements (such as at Melaka in 1640) were likely to heighten banditry and smuggling activities in a desperate bid to survive, although evidence for this is not substantial.

Braudel correlates the rise in piracy to the general economic health of the Mediterranean. Both A. Reid and V. Lieberman have advocated for a decline in trade in the seventeenth century, although they differ on the degree to which mainland and insular Southeast Asia were affected. Looking from the perspective of China, P. Calanca has distinguished the first half of the seventeenth century as a period during which big merchant-pirates operated in the South China Sea. The Chinese pirate bands under Coxinga competed with the Dutch and operated as both merchants and pirates. Ironically, but perhaps not surprisingly, Coxinga, whose activities stretched into insular Southeast Asia, strove to ensure, at least for those who aligned with him or bought his protection, secured lanes and spaces on the sea. While the Dutch strove at times to disrupt Coxinga's trade activities linking to the Malay Archipelago, a truce was also intermittently struck. While the Spanish may have come into conflict with Coxinga on the island of Taiwan, the Portuguese from Macau reputedly had close dealings with the Zheng organization (since the days of Coxinga's father). The thesis that the Habsburg-Dutch struggle contributed to increased piratical and smuggling activities needs to be seen in the larger context of alignments and alliances in the South China Sea. The depressed trade, and hence smaller economic share of activities, as well as regime transitions on the coast of China, in Cochinchina, and most notably in the Straits of Melaka made this region one of the most vulnerable and risky for travel during the first half of the seventeenth century.

[30]The interior of East Africa was secured by mercenary typed armies led by Portuguese adventurer-licensees.

Iberians in Subregions of the South China Sea in the Eighteenth Century

Although the Iberians cannot be said to have achieved hegemony, they acted as though they had such power. On the ground, as discussed in the previous section, there appears to have been a mismatch between what Iberians hoped to achieve and the degree of control they could assert on the sea. Big movements and offensives by people and states do not always typify events in human history. The development of the Iberians in the South China Sea evolved, beyond the mid-seventeenth century, along two different trajectories—the Portuguese used a number of strategies on the ground in the bid to survive in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea (although these might be uncoordinated), while the Spanish retreated and consolidated in the Philippines.

The Portuguese occupation of Macau appears to have been the lynchpin of the Portuguese presence in the Far East after the 1640s, even as new studies reveal the hitherto little-known Portuguese and mestizo communities in Southeast Asia. The Portuguese operating model has been dealt with by Bryan Souza, Ptak and K. C. Fok. Although not advocating for a 'Chinese lake', Ptak, for instance, has argued for a strong influence of the China market on Southeast Asian trade as well as a modus operandi (*fanfang*) that he believes to be a 'superior' mode of subjugation compared to the Western terms of 'colonialism' or 'imperialism'. This may approximate to what Disney typifies as the 'East Asian' mode of Portuguese intrusion in the East. Thanks to the cordial relations the Portuguese had with the reigning power on the Chinese mainland, the latter co-opted the former as co-protectors of the coastal sea region in question.[31] This surely had an impact on operators from Macau who toyed with ideas of smuggling or robbing from other operators in the area. In any case, for Macanese Portuguese who undertook smuggling, this was usually done in cahoots with local officials and emperor-appointed merchants. This was especially so when the ports and southern coast of China were closed or severely disrupted during intermittent periods such as 1644–1683 and 1717–1727. Whatever quota was granted to Macau by the reigning Chinese dynasties was obviously not enough to satisfy the pecuniary needs of the Macanese profiteers.[32] Cross-reference may be made to R. Fernando's or Bryan Souza's work to confirm that Portuguese or mixed Portuguese (country) traders constituted a sizeable group among the many interlopers trading in the Straits of Melaka in the eighteenth century.[33]

English-language works on the Trinh interlude in the long history of the Le Dynasty are scarce. What is certain is that the Nguyen-Trinh civil war from the

[31] Arquivo Historico Ultramarino (AHU), Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 59r–v.

[32] See A. Martins do Vales, *Os Portugueses em Macau* (Macau: Instituto Português do Oriente, 1997).

[33] Souza, *Survival of empire*, pp. 213–25. Instances of Macanese smugglers being associated directly or indirectly with the elite Portuguese inhabitants of Macau can be found from documents transcribed and published in the bulletin 'Arquivos de Macau' for period of the eighteenth century.

1620s to the 1670s did not see turmoil unleashed on the coast. Although neither Macau nor Manila sought to monopolize the routes over the area—nor would they have been able to do so even if they had wished to—this did not prevent them from looting vessels that did not carry their licence. Dutch attempts to expand their control and deny other foreign ships from trading at Cochinchina seem to have provided a more compelling reason for the Nguyens to be hostile. Although trade on the Vietnamese coast had the potential to bypass the limited middleman role the Macanese were playing in the exchange of goods and monies between China and elsewhere,[34] Macanese participated extensively in commerce with the Trinhs and Nguyens, trading in military items (especially cannon) and other goods for the Chinese market.[35]

The end of the period of the Union witnessed a low point of the Portuguese empire in Southeast Asia. The loss of Melaka did not engender a wholesale collapse or expulsion of the Portuguese in the Malay Archipelago. In the Maluku Islands the Portuguese were ousted at the end of the sixteenth century, with the Spanish intervening against the Dutch until the 1660s. The fact that finance and coercive force interacted to contribute to an increase in power still holds true in this discussion so far. 'Imperialism' (before the modern era) without its bases or territories was probably an untenable outcome. The fall of Melaka resulted in one group staying behind and another taking up exodus abroad. The latter group came to gather at Makassar at a time when one of the two sultanates (Gowa) had instituted 'expansionist and trade oriented' measures.[36] This chapter will not delve into developments in the Lesser Sunda Islands. Suffice it to say that interregional trade, even before the eighteenth century, involving the Portuguese and other traders was an integral part of the islands.[37] Back in Melaka, Fernando's research has revealed that the mixed Portuguese community 'living around the fort complex … and dispersed across the entire city' increased in size during the period of Dutch rule.[38] It was, however, not easy to identify these persons of Portuguese or mixed Portuguese heritage as they could be labelled 'Portuguese', 'black' or 'burgher' on

[34]Li, Tana. *Nguyen Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the 17th and 18th centuries* (Ithaca, NY: SEA Program Publications, 1998), pp. 63 and 66. An important item of trade that the Japanese acquired in Indochina was silk, among other commodities.

[35]Bryan Souza, *Survival of empire*, p. 118. The Macanese routinely procuring staple goods in Cochinchina whenever there were shortages and famines in Guangdong.

[36]Bryan Souza, *Survival of empire*, pp. 88–89.

[37]Makassar's early economic importance derived from its geographical position as well as from an important staple (rice) commodity it supplied. During the monsoon season, cloth, gold, silver and jewellery, on top of rice, were exchanged for cloves, nutmeg, mace (from Maluku) and sandalwood (from Solor and Timor). Portuguese and Indian merchants who obtained rice and cloves from Makassar traded these for Indian goods (cloth) further west. At its height, Makassar's influence stretched over Celebes, Maluku, Lesser Sunda Islands and parts of Borneo. See Bryan Souza, *Survival of empire*, pp. 88–89.

[38]R. Fernando, "Metamorphosis of Luso-Asian diaspora in Malay Archipelago, 1640–1795", in P. Borschberg ed., *Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka area and adjacent regions* (Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden, 2004), p. 166.

different occasions; the identification became even more diffused as assimilation and miscegenation became more complete by the middle of the eighteenth century. In terms of trading undertaken by this community, the understanding is that they focused on short-distance trade involving foodstuffs (to Melaka) during the initial period of the Dutch takeover and later 'recovered' and expanded to trade in regionally demanded items such as gold and other precious commodities (along, for instance, the Melaka-Bengkalis route).[39]

Portuguese attempts to engage the various indigenous power centres in the region will now be briefly outlined. The ties and potential for alliance between indigenous traditional major and minor power centres of the Malay World must not be underrated. For instance, ancestral and marriage links ensured that the elites in Manila were of Bruneian royal blood. At the height of the Bruneian thalassocracy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Brunei's influence stretched to Luzon island (although this was not coercive). Thus, it was no surprise that armed expeditions were sent to aid Manila and the Sulu Sultanate against Spanish invaders. The Bruneian connection also needs to be perceived in terms of the larger context in the Malay Archipelago. The Bruneian kingdom was known to have supported Aceh in the latter's rivalry with the kingdom of Johore (the attempted reconstituted political entity of the fleeing Melakan court after the city's fall to the Portuguese)—linked to the post-1511 fluid quadrilateral power alignment (Portuguese-Dutch-Johore-Aceh) in the Straits of Melaka. Mataram's relations with the Portuguese were described by Borschberg to be 'sound', and the Portuguese could rely on the former to send relief if they were pressed.[40]

The Portuguese in Thailand sent their first envoy to the court of Ayutthaya shortly after the conquest of Melaka in 1511. After a series of envoy dispatches, a small settlement of Portuguese was set up. The period of the Union (1580–1640), ironically, saw a deterioration of relations between the Habsburgs and Ayutthaya. A Spanish attack on a Dutch vessel in 1624 led to the involvement of Siamese troops and a subsequent souring of relations. According to Jesuit records, in the few years after the incident, Spanish galleons '[returning] from Macau (allowed?) pursued semi-piratical paths, [attacking and capturing] Siamese vessels with valuable cargoes'.[41] Portuguese relations with Ayutthaya were naturally implicated, leading to the imprisonment of Portuguese already settled in Ayutthaya as well as those in ships stopping over from Macau.

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[39]Fernando, "Metamorphosis of Luso-Asian diaspora in Malay Archipelago", p. 166 and 172. Cross-referencing R. Fernando's other work "Shipping on Melaka and Singapore as index of growth", *South Asia*, vol. XIX (1996), p. 66, table 1, as well as Bryan Souza, *Survival of empire*, p. 136–39, tables 6.4 and 6.5, we get a picture that a sizeable proportion of the Portuguese operators in the western Malay Archipelago region comprised of those who came from Macau.

[40]P. Borschberg, *Singapore and Melaka straits: Violence, security and diplomacy in the 17th century* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2010), p. 169.

[41]T. Vandenberg, "The Portuguese in Ayutthaya", http://ayuthaya-history.com/Settlements_Portuguese.html, accessed in May 2012. See further in Pietro Cerutti, *The Jesuits in Thailand*.

The effect of not having a base or settlement with one's own arms 'calling the shots' cannot be underestimated. Portuguese refugees from Melaka first gathered in Makassar before the showdown there (and in neighbouring Banjarmasin in Borneo) led to evacuation to Ayutthaya. Halikowski-Smith notes that the arrival of this wave of Portuguese and the 'request for permission' to the King of Ayutthaya for their stay was made from a position of weakness. It is acknowledged that two shiploads of Portuguese did sail for Cambodia and the assessment of the community there appears to have been more favourable.[42] No Spanish quarters were found along the Chao Phraya River. Halikowski-Smith goes further to describe those who lived in the 'o campo Português' along the Chao Phraya: The Portuguese after 1767 were assessed as 'not do[ing] well'.[43] The debate as to whether the Portuguese' plight was due to 'pride, insolence, and vice' was revisited.[44] 'Only one or two individuals in the entire Portuguese community in Siam possessed [. . .] ships for trade on the high seas'. Most 'entrepreneurs' had 'little access to credit' and engaged in petty trade, 'probably in low-value commodities such as hides, sappanwood and foodstuffs'. Halikowski-Smith conjectures that the Portuguese could also have traded with Siam's neighbouring kingdoms in goods such as sugar cane syrup, beeswax and honey. By then, Portuguese *levantados* (renegades, or Portuguese living outside Portuguese India) could no longer sell their mercenary services attractively, their reputation having eroded by the end of the seventeenth century.[45] It appears that 'some [. . .] members of the Portuguese [group] in Southeast Asia, not the least in Siam might have been relegated to slave status (although caution was made against judging this class of people too harshly in the context of Southeast Asian societies)'.[46] The settlement was not extinguished, but the population appears to have miscegenated to some extent.[47] There must have been ample opportunities for this degraded group to engage in petty trade of the surreptitious kind. It would also not be surprising if out-of-demand and out-of-job mercenaries participated in petty or organized robbery and other crimes in the region.

Finally, we look at the Iberians' activities in the Philippines. The Spanish enterprise in the Philippines provided a duality and constancy in the economy of insular Southeast Asia. Duality, as J. Kathirithamby-Wells affirms, comprising an autonomous economic zone in the Philippines vis-à-vis the Dutch system centred in Batavia, formed the constancy that prevailed over the second half of the seventeenth

[42] S. Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and Diaspora in Portuguese Indies: Social world of Ayutthaya, 1640–1720* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 213–20.

[43] Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in Portuguese Indies*, p. 173 and 180–81.

[44] Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in Portuguese Indies*, pp. 175–77.

[45] Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in Portuguese Indies*, p. 195.

[46] Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in Portuguese Indies*, p. 198.

[47] Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in Portuguese Indies*, pp. 199–211.

to the first half of the eighteenth century.[48] The Spanish dollar, despite the British challenge from the end of the eighteenth century until the middle of the nineteenth, remained an important currency in use and accounting. The Portuguese and Spanish, although no longer officially in union, continued to be connected via the resumption of trade between Manila and Macau as well as the disparate and dispossessed Portuguese and mestizo groups latching on to the legal and surreptitious commerce linking the Macau-Manila, Melaka-Batavia-Manila and Indochina-Manila axes.

The Spanish approach to colonization in the Philippines involved revamping the indigenous economy and culture through the setting up of plantations and heavy proselytizing by the Church. One of the most important tasks of the trading structure was the regulation and distribution of freight space and privileges in Manila between the various power and mercantile interests in the Philippines and the centre (in Acapulco and in Seville). This system had evolved through a few phases, namely, the pancada and boleta systems.[49] Evasions by merchants—by smuggling, transshipments at sea, purchasing before the fixing of official prices, or after the conclusion of the pancada—led to hoarding, often in cahoots with external traders (the Macanese), and compromised the effectiveness of the first system. Deviations to the boleta system, which included the transferring of boletas, officials being open to 'corruption', overcarrying of cargo (2,000 t in 1762 compared with 300 t stipulated in 1593) as well as the raising of monies and involvement of 'pious institutions', compromised the workings of this system. Reforms and refinements were undertaken in 1620, 1638 and 1734.

R. Lourido, drawing from the archives of Seville and referring to Chaunu, has done a splendid job in describing aspects of the Manila-Macau trade. For a start, the Macau-Manila trade is not conceived as part of the 'greater' China-Philippines trade: 'The peak of trade on the Macau-Manila route does not coincide with the period of peak trade on the China-Manila route'.[50] Moreover, not all Macanese vessels going to Manila were registered, because during periods when the Crown (during the Union) decided to bar Manila-Macau voyages, the former attempted to reach Manila from intermediate ports such as Makassar and in Cochinchina. Beyond what might have been monitored by the authorities, Lourido has advised caution for the data he computed from the Archivo General de Indias in Seville for it does not

[48] J. Kathirithamby-Wells, "The age of transition: Mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries", in N. Tarling ed., *Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) pp. 606–608.

[49] The pancada system was a wholesale bargaining system (adopted at Manila). The governor and municipal government appointed two or three persons who negotiated with representatives of Chinese importers the prices to be paid for the cargo of each incoming junk. The boleta system involved an appointed committee for the (i) measuring and dividing of the space of the ship's hold, (ii) issuing of a ticket representing the right to ship on the Manila galleon, and (iii) setting of a maximum number of tickets (at 4000 at 125 pesos each) so that 'all citizens of the islands [could be provided], in proportion to their wealth, [a space on the ship], in order that everyone might strive in advantage of the traffic (decree of 1593)'.

[50] R. d'Avila Lourido, "The impact of the Macau-Manila silk trade from beginnings to 1640", in V. Elisseeff ed., *The Silk Road: Highways of culture and commerce* (New York: Berghahn, 2000), p. 229.

reflect continuity (via smuggling) in trade during periods of embargo. Illicit trade did not need to follow the cycle of the monsoon anyway. For the early period that this chapter is focused on (1630–1650), Lourido has categorized the interlude from 1622 to 1642 as 'homogenous' and 'expansive'. The period after 1642 is described, perhaps unsurprisingly, as 'interrupted'.[51] The homogeneity between 1622 and 1642 is premised on 'the arrival of an average of three boats per year' over the period, and the 'expansion' is grounded on the fact that the total number of vessels arriving during this period was '50 per cent more' than the number in 1601–1621.

After the first half of the eighteenth century (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2), drawing further on Chaunu's data and allowing for gaps in them, the depression in shipping arrivals in Manila at mid-century appears to have picked up with the conclusion of the civil wars in China (the fall of Taiwan in 1683, by which time the Three Feudatories were also defeated) but never regained the volumes attained in the seventeenth century. For some reason, trips from the island of Taiwan were terminated. Ships arriving from Macau, reflecting the intermittent embargo from Manila, hardly achieved the higher numbers attained during the Union. In part reflecting the realities in the eighteenth century, the loss in the contest for the Lesser Sunda Islands seems to have eliminated shipping figures arriving in Manila from these islands. Dutch attempts to channel shipping to Batavia appear to have had an effect, as there was a constant stream of shipping to Manila from Java. Despite the prohibition of trade with the Portuguese, the latter's vessels could be found—for instance, in 1716—in the Marianas.[52] Earlier, a series of measures had been put in place to restrict the movement of personnel of Portuguese ships arriving in Manila.[53] Conversely, Spanish ships were found in various parts of the Melayu region, most notably in Java (Batavia), where items needed for naval maintenance and repair and even ammunitions were purchased.[54]

Farther from the Archivo General Indias, the Spanish colonial government in Manila dealt with an array of matters from illicit commerce to religious agendas involving proselytization or appointment of religious representatives. It appears that routes on the Pacific Ocean or the South China Sea side were equally susceptible to corsair attacks by the French and the Dutch.[55] Vessels making illicit trips posed threats to ships travelling along the coasts (of islands) to Manila. On the Pacific Ocean side, the Marianas Islands were seeing the appearance of so many enemy vessels that they were asking for *socorros*.[56] The situation became so grave that a number of measures were devised to meet the challenges: (1) forming a Junta de Guerra,[57] (2) clearing the natives off the island to secure it as a base and

[51] Lourido. "The impact of the Macau-Manila silk trade from beginnings to 1640", p. 235.

[52] AGI, Filipinas 131, No. 9.

[53] AGI, Filipinas 129, No. 70.

[54] AGI, Filipinas 141, No. 3; Filipinas 150, No. 37.

[55] AGI, Filipinas 129, No. 40.

[56] Refers to aid.

[57] Refers to a temporary committee of war.

(3) making plans for the production as well as the distribution and equipping of ships with cannon.[58] In response to threats in coastal and inland waters, the Spanish managed to build up a fleet of big and smaller galley-type ships to meet conventional and piratical threats, a point that is also noted by Loureiro. The Spanish in the Philippines were also more ready to grant patents to corsairs against enemy vessels, especially on the Pacific Ocean.[59] According to another Philippines document in the Archives of Servile, the plan to bring in a replacement bishop (for the deceased archbishop of Manila) across the South China Sea had to be suspended because of the danger of running into the enemy, namely, the Dutch.[60]

The Spanish in the Philippines experienced the winds of economic change in the eighteenth century. While monopolized trade linking to the Philippines was still a fiercely protected ground, an increasingly globalized economy was shifting economic activities elsewhere, as well as making evasion impossible to prohibit (marginalizing the Philippines-linked trade over time). Over a period of about 40 years (between 1734 and 1770), prices of commodities from China and India registered inflationary trends that made goods re-exported from the Philippines uncompetitive. While commerce in traditional items such as silk, porcelain and lacquered goods continued, tea became a predominant item of trade towards the end of the eighteenth century. New trade flows between Europe and China also reduced the 'need for specie movement' from the Pacific and the Philippines. This, in addition to the independence of a number of nations in South America during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, altered the structure of demand on the side of the eastern Pacific and contributed to a slow decline of the Philippines trade.[61] Despite changes being slowly incorporated in the system (the formation of the Royal Philippine Company, direct trading between Spain and the Philippines by the guilds at home as well as a reduction of Chinese and an increase in the indigenous share in the Manila trade), the export and import share of the Philippines trade showed that the 'American trade [still] accounted for three-fourths of the gross profit on less than half of the investment' in 1789.[62] In the meantime, the 'abuses' associated with this protected trade persisted while existing surreptitious and new competing groups plied the commerce.

The new realities of the more globalized economic environment were imposed on the Portuguese in the East too. While mestizos in the remaining colonies in Timor evolved to become a feudal local elite (Topasses), those in Macau were hard-pressed to maintain their economic viability in the face of similar challenges posed to the Spanish (i.e. inflationary trends in goods being handled or transshipped and increased competition from new and existing groups trading in

[58] AGI, Filipinas 129, No. 5.

[59] AGI, Filipinas 131, No. 8.

[60] AGI, Filipinas 150, No. 41.

[61] B. Legarda, *After the galleons: Foreign trade, economic change, and entrepreneurship in nineteenth century Philippines* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), pp. 48 and 95.

[62] Legarda, *After the galleons*, p. 80.

the South China Sea). These challenges must have presented those in 'informal' settlements and miscegenated a similar stress unless their new identity afforded them protection or advantage as new subjects in their new homeland. Back home and in certain parts of the empire, the Portuguese also evolved a number of companies after the interregnum of Pombal in an attempt to privatize and cope with a more liberalized or open international trading environment. G. Clarence-Smith notes that 'corruption and contraband had always been structural elements of Portuguese colonialism … liberal reforms [might even] give more local power to colonial elites, enabling them to defraud … with greater impunity'.[63] In the period when tea and opium became increasingly predominant items of trade, with ports at the far eastern end in China as the final destination, Portuguese or affiliated mestizos were circumventing the attempted monopoly by the English East India Company. They were smuggling tea to Britain and importing great quantities of Malwa opium (competing with opium from Bengal) into China.[64] Marshalling the capital to finance the Asian market was an 'extremely shadowy [business]' as well. Large-scale investor-traders in Lisbon and Macau constantly referred to the same 'half dozen' names.[65] As Emrys Chew (2012) has revealed, the profitable slave trade in the eastern Indian Ocean was linked in a triangular commerce connected with the South China Sea. In the South China Sea, 'drugs, guns, and slavery went hand-in-hand, the opium and munitions brought by Western traders encouraged Southeast Asian states to supply traders with exotic products accepted in the China trade, and secure simultaneously the slaves who became the means of procuring those exotic products'.[66] Macanese involvement in the coercion and trafficking of coolie labour from China in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries may be located in a similar complex commerce.[67]

Conclusion

The Portuguese and Spanish, who were allies fighting a global war in the seventeenth century and appeared to be unrelated in the eighteenth (the Spanish with their protective economic system in the Philippines, the Portuguese operating largely as disparate mixed groups in the region), were intimately involved in piracy and smuggling activities in the region. During the period of the Union, war with external foes (Dutch and English) increased smuggling in goods difficult to supply to both

[63] G. Clarence-Smith, *The third Portuguese empire, 1825–1975* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p. 22.

[64] Clarence-Smith, *The third Portuguese empire*, pp. 25–28.

[65] Clarence-Smith, *The third Portuguese empire*, p. 46.

[66] Emrys Chew, *Arms trade in the Indian Ocean during the age of global empire* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 189.

[67] Chew, *Arms trade in the Indian Ocean during the age of global empire*, p. 29. See also P. van Dyke, *Americans and Macao: Trade, smuggling and diplomacy on the South China coast* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012).

sides in times of conflict. The Macau-Manila trade was itself plagued with Iberian perpetrators trying to skirt the system. As allies of the Spanish, the Portuguese in Melaka and Macau were able to reap the benefits of both legitimate and illegitimate commercial activities. In the first half of the eighteenth century, the Portuguese, having declined considerably in raw strength and lost key bases, continued to operate in what Craig Lockard calls the open seas and had more opportunity for smuggling and surreptitious activities because they were a disparate collection of weaker groups. The Iberians acted simultaneously as protectors of a system and at times, bandits on the seas during the period of the Union. The Spanish in the later period, perhaps subscribing to the capitalist mode of operation, were more willing to subcontract the pirating job to privateers. Overall, while it is difficult to say whether periods of war saw more incidents of piracy or smuggling than times of relative peace, both manifestations were part of the routine in the South China Seas, much as Braudel has described in the Mediterranean.

Appendix

Table 8.1 Foreign shipping in Manila 1630–1650

Year	Macau	China		Gulf of Tonkin	Gulf of Thailand	Melayu		Celebes/Maluku
		M	T			P&S	J	
1630	6	16	5	–	3	–	–	–
1631	3	33	3	1	–	–	–	–
1632	4	16	2	1	–	–	–	–
1633	3	30	1	–	1	–	–	–
1634	–	26	3	2	3	–	–	1
1635	4	40	3	1	–	–	–	–
1636	1	30	1	–	2	–	–	1
1637	3	50	1	–	1	–	–	1
1638	3	16	1	–	–	–	–	–
1639	3	30	4	–	–	–	–	1
1640	3	7	1	–	–	–	–	–
1641	2	8	1	–	2	–	–	3
1642	1	34	1	1	4	–	–	–
1643	–	30	–	–	1	–	–	1
1644	–	8	1	–	–	–	–	2
1645	–	11	–	–	–	–	–	1
1646	–	17	–	–	3	–	–	1
1647	–	17	–	–	2	–	–	1
1648	–	7	–	–	–	–	–	–
1649	–	14	–	–	–	–	–	2
1650	–	10	–	1	–	–	–	5

Table 8.2 Foreign shipping in Manila 1730–1750

Year	Macau	China		Gulf of Tonkin	Gulf of Thailand	Melayu		Celebes/Maluku
		M	T			P&S	J	
1730	1	12	–	–	–	–	1	–
1731	–	7	–	–	–	–	1	–
1732	–	15	–	–	–	–	1	–
1733	1	16	–	–	–	–	1	–
1734	–	10	–	–	–	–	1	–
1735	–	8	–	–	–	–	3	–
1736	–	14	–	–	–	–	2	–
1737	–	—	–	–	–	–	–	–
1738	1	20	–	–	–	–	4	–
1739	–	25	–	–	–	–	3	–
1740	3	16	–	–	–	–	1	–
1741	1	15	–	–	–	–	1	–
1742	–	17	–	–	–	–	2	–
1743	–	19	–	–	–	–	2	–
1744	–	—	–	–	–	–	–	–
1745	2	13	–	–	–	–	–	–
1746	–	—	–	–	–	–	–	–
1747	1	19	–	–	–	–	1	–
1748	1	13	–	–	–	–	4	–
1749	–	19	–	–	–	–	–	–
1750	1	11	–	–	–	–	2	–

Source: Adapted from Chaunu's *Les Philippines*, pp. 156–88
M Mainland (China), *T* Taiwan, *P&S* Peninsula and Sumatra, *J* Java

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Chapter 9
The Portuguese in the Adjacent Seas: A Survey of Their Identities and Activities in the Eastern Indian Ocean/Burman Sea

Y.H. Teddy Sim

Abstract The topic of the Portuguese, and, on the larger front, the Iberians, in the eastern Indian Ocean has been receiving increasing attention over the last two decades, championed by eminent historians such as S. Subrahmanyam and O. Prakash. This chapter intends to focus the survey on the Burman coast of which the Portuguese/Iberian presence has seen its peak and trough. At its height, the Portuguese empire (if informal) in the region was actualized by a mercenary-type adventurer who, after achieving a measure of glory, sought to obtain recognition from the centre (at Goa). The Portuguese in the late seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth centuries was less written on. Questions probed into in this chapter include the following: How did the Portuguese presence evolved after the closure of their feitoria at Syriam? Were the Portuguese and mestizo groups in the region more susceptible to surreptitious activities beyond their heydays?

Introduction

Developments during the second decade of the twenty-first century in Burma, one of the two remaining isolated countries—which resulted in its sensational opening up to the world at large—created ripples across a few related sectors. The increased interest in Southeast Asian history was one positive outcome. This chapter will first survey Portuguese activities in the wider context of the eastern Indian Ocean, which will also serve to locate Burma in the context of the network and activities of the wider region. The overarching goal of this chapter is to probe the various identities of the Portuguese or mixed Portuguese groups in Burma in relation to the activities they undertook or no longer undertook in the second half of the seventeenth and the whole of the eighteenth centuries. This chapter will examine Portuguese trade and violent activities, both formal and especially informal, since the realm of the east coast of India and farther east has usually been deemed an "informal or East

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Asian type" of empire.[1] The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially after 1640, are an apt period to study because the historical investigation conducted so far centres mostly on the period of Filipe de Brito e Nicote and the revisionist view of him.[2] The focus on the post-1640 period is pertinent also because the passing of the period of grandiose projects in Southeast Asia, as C.R. Boxer termed it,[3] and the loss of Melaka ushered in a new period that witnessed the miscegenation and growing nomadic tendencies of segments of the dispersed Portuguese population. S. Timothy Coates and S. Halikowski-Smith's work on creolization, convicts and diasporas stands out notably in its effort to describe the pattern and shift in the Portuguese population in Southeast Asia.[4] Detailed and admirable work has been done on the economic and network linkages of the eastern Indian Ocean by S. Arasaratnam, J. Stephen and O. Prakash.[5] J. Barendse's study on a part of the Indian Ocean (Arabian Sea) as an "autonomous unit" stands in the line of works that lead to the regionalization of research done on the Indian Ocean.[6] In terms of the mainland-archipelagic division of Southeast Asia, the historical study of Burma has thus far been more preoccupied with the country's land mass than its (surprisingly) long maritime frontier. However, J. Gommans and J. Leider's edited work titled *Maritime Frontier of Burma* (2002) has contributed to the discussion of the dynamics of inland-coastal Burma and its interaction with the adjoining sea.[7] Despite this, the rare specialist from Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) who researches the contemporary Andaman Sea as well as the nomads and gypsies who dwell in the area would attest to the difficulty of commenting in depth on the historical aspect of the subject on account of the dearth of evidence on it.[8]

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[1] A. Disney, "Contrasting models of empire: The Estado da Índia in South and East Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries", in F.A. Dutra and J.C. dos Santos eds., *The Portuguese and the Pacific* (Santa Barbara: University of California, ≈), pp. 26–37.

[2] J. de Castro, "Os Portugueses da Birmania", *Revista Macau*, no. 75 (1988). See also M.A. Marques Guedes, *Interferência e Integração na Birmania* (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1994).

[3] C.R. Boxer, "Portuguese and Spanish projects for the conquest of Southeast Asia, 1580–1600", *Journal of Asian History*, vol. 3 (1969), pp. 118–36.

[4] S. Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in the Portuguese Indies* (Leiden: Brill, 2011). T. Coates, *Convicts and orphans: Forced and state-sponsored colonizers in the Portuguese empire, 1550–1755* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

[5] S. Arasaratnam, *Merchants, companies and commerce on the Coromandel coast, 1650–1740* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); J. Stephen, *The Coromandel coast and its hinterland: Economy, society and political system* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1997); and O. Prakash, *The Dutch East India Company and the economy of Bengal* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

[6] R. Barendse, "Trade and state in the Arabian Seas: Survey from the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries", *Journal of World History*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2000), pp. 173–225. See also book by the same author, *The Arabian Seas, 1640–1700* (Leiden: CNWS, 1998); *The Arabian Seas, 1700–1763* (Leiden, Brill, 2009).

[7] J. Gommans and J. Leider eds., *Maritime frontier of Burma: Exploring political, cultural and commercial interaction in the Indian Ocean world* (Leiden: Kononklijke Nederlands Akademie van Wetenschappen, 2002).

[8] I have the privilege of contacting and corresponding with Dr J. Ivanoff from Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in the process in April 2012.

Portuguese Activities over the Wider Region of the Eastern Indian Ocean

Studies clustering on the Bay of Bengal and the Coromandel Coast have been appearing since the last quarter of the twentieth century. The connections between these two regions and Southeast Asia have also been explored in some depth. Along the Coromandel Coast, the Portuguese appear to have operated from a number of ports: Masulipatnam, Nagapattinam and San Thome. When the Portuguese controlled Melaka (till 1640), part of the region's trade went eastwards to it, carried by ships issued with Portuguese licences. The attempt to force ships to adhere to a particular destination or route achieved at best a fluctuating outcome, far from the hoped-for certainty. With the fall of Melaka and the increased presence of the Dutch and English along the Indian coast, indigenous merchants began to sail from other Indian ports such as Pulicat, Sadrapatnam and Cuddalore. In Southeast Asia, history repeated itself when attempts to avoid Dutch control led to the diversion of commerce to surrounding regions such as Aceh, Perak (a vassal of Aceh at some point), Kedah and Johor. At the major ports of call at Mergui, Syriam and Mataban, on the coast of Burma, specifically in Tenasserim and Pegu, products from Golconda such as textiles, indigo, steel and diamonds were exchanged for elephants and other goods such as tin, copper, lead, a variety of drugs, aromatics, gold and precious stones.[9] In the first decades of the eighteenth century, the Mughal-appointed governor of the Deccan, residing in Hyderabad, declared his autonomy from the empire. Although no internal strife occurred in the Hyderabad region (except for a brief period after mid-century upon the death of the first Nizam), the political economy, in part perhaps driven by external forces, still dictated the shifts of the ports along the Coromandel Coast,[10] eclipsing Masulipatnam and leaving San Thome (no longer a Portuguese enclave) and Madras (under British control from 1639) "to [be] doing [just decently] well".[11] In the second half of the eighteenth century, after the Battle of Plassey (1757), the weight of British commercial activities slowly shifted to Bengal in the north.

In the Bay of Bengal, specifically in Hooghly and Chittagong, the Portuguese appeared to be still present in some strength in the first decades of the seventeenth century. However, the Mughal consolidation of power in the Bengal area ousted them from both regions and ended their presence there. The "[divestment] of the overseas trade of Bengal", as in the Coromandel case, appears to have taken place largely towards Southeast Asia, specifically to the Indonesian Archipelago,

[9] S. Arasaratnam, "India and the Indian Ocean in the 17th century", in A. das Gupta and M.N. Pearson eds., *India and the Indian Ocean* (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 117.

[10] The Shia rulers of the Golconda state which arose in the sixteenth century had succumbed in 1687 to Mughal conquest.

[11] Das Gupta, "India and the Indian Ocean in the eighteenth century", p. 146.

the Malay Peninsula and the Burmese and Thai coasts, after 1640.[12] Bengal's commodities trade with Aceh and Melaka (or Kedah and Johor) included the exchange of muslin, cotton goods as well as a variety of foods (rice, butter, vegetable oils and saltpetre) for pepper, spices, tin, elephants and gold. The attempts by the Dutch to impose their licence system in and around Melaka shifted the trade of Bengal ships to the surrounding regions of Kedah and Johor. Along the Burman coast, Bengal's trade with Arakan, Pegu and Tenasserim included exchanges for the same commodities as those traded with Coromandel.[13] The participation of Burma in the "grand scheme" of the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie's (VOC) trade and network, whether in terms of its demand (Dutch imports into Burma) or supply (goods peculiar to Burma and sold in the Dutch trading outlets), generated profits for the Dutch. The Dutch abandonment of Burma in the 1670s drew from a series of reverses at home and in the European and Asian theatres.[14] In the eighteenth century, Mughal control over the rivers of Bengal and elsewhere in the hinterland was gradually declining. In the early decades of the eighteenth century, Dutch trade from Bengal to the Malay Archipelago, according to Prakash, was still growing, with the export of textiles and opium, although the propensity of the activities of competitors, which included the Armenians, the Chinese, the English as well as the Portuguese, to "cut deeply into the [VOC's] market" was also noted.[15] As it transpired, the English were able to establish predominance over trade in the region through the rest of the century, as was evidenced by the growing size of the Calcutta fleet even before 1757. The same authoritative source of the foregoing data pinned the time frame for the English surpassing the Dutch to be after 1760.[16]

Whether from Coromandel or Bengal, not all the goods traded in coastal Burma were produced domestically. A number of these, such as pepper, spices and silver, were procured from archipelagic Southeast Asia or from overland routes on mainland Southeast Asia and made available at ports in Pegu and Tenasserim

[12] Arasaratnam, "India and the Indian Ocean in the 17th century", pp. 121–22.

[13] Arasaratnam, "India and the Indian Ocean in the 17th century", p. 122. The goods exchanged were "textiles, silk, sugar, salt, petre, opium and foodstuffs [for] tin, elephants, precious stones and gold".

[14] W. Dijk, Seventeenth-century Burma and the Dutch East India Company (Singapore: NUS Press, 2006), pp. 195, 197 and 200. See also G. Harvey, *History of Burma* (London: Frank Cass, 1967), p. 205. The ports of Burma were not always "attractive"; Dutch ships were seized indiscriminately by the authorities. Dutch attempt to renew the Burma trade in the 1740s came to nothing.

[15] O. Prakash, *The new Cambridge history of India* (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), p. 217.

[16] Prakash is able to provide detailed figures of VOC's exports (value for Coromandel and Bengal) over the period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One can turn to K. Chaudhuri's classic work on the English East India Company in Asia covering the hundred years from 1660 to 1760 for detailed data of its trading activities. Quantitative data for the Portuguese trade is however not found in M. Pearson's treatment on the Portuguese in India nor Prakash's treatment on European commercial enterprises before the nineteenth century in the "New Cambridge History of India" series.

by merchants operating on the "common sea".[17] The value of the ports in Pegu and Tenasserim was further raised when they manifested the potential to serve as competing points against their archipelagic counterparts, especially when goods from the China coast were directly made available in the former, transported across the overland mainland Southeast Asian routes. The concept of the "common sea" used by C. Lockard (or "open sea", reminiscent of the debate between Hugo Grotius and Serafim de Freitas) versus the "closed sea" had implications for groups operating with weakened or no state (or chartered company) support. It is widely known that the Dutch aspired to impose an even tighter licence system than the Portuguese had enforced when they were in hegemony. Lockard argues that the "common sea" was a more likely scenario at the time given the manner in which dispersed Chinese merchant groups were able to operate and locate themselves in Melaka, Hoi An and Ayutthaya. This chapter purports to look at a more nebulous and varied assortment of Portuguese/mixed Portuguese groups as they operated in the region and specifically along the coast of Burma.

The watershed of 1640 and the period revolving around this no doubt caused extensive dislocation in the Portuguese communities across the East. S. Subrahmanyam has combined figures from A. Bocarro and V.M. Godinho's work to arrive at the figures of 4,900+ and 7,600+ for "white" and "black" casados, respectively, for the year 1635. While the permanent married settler status of the former (white casados) may be readily understood, "black" casados refer to "natives of the land" who resided in the Portuguese enclaves (and who, in some usages, were labelled "converts").[18] Subrahmanyam adds that the figure of 4,900 is likely to be lower given the spate of losses of outposts after 1635.[19] If we adhere to the conventional mode of classification of the populace—casado, soldier, official, ecclesiastic, renegade, levantado or lancado and solteiro—this chapter might, at first sight, appear to be concerned only with those who feature in the last three categories. However, as Subrahmanyam notes also in *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700*, classification at the eastern end of the empire is sometimes confounded by those who crossed over, operated in between or wore a number of hats at the same time. He gives the example of a certain solteiro (Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo) who, having traded at Melaka and Manila during the years of the Union, followed the Portuguese diaspora to Makassar.

The rise of Makassar, which G. Bryan Souza believes compensated partly for the loss the Portuguese suffered at Melaka, was made possible with the support of not only country traders from Macau (who committed to the common cause by

[17] See C. Lockard, "The sea common to all: Maritime frontiers, port cities and Chinese traders in Southeast Asian age of commerce", *Journal of World History*, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 219–47.

[18] S. Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese empire in Asia* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), p. 232. The inconsistency can be seen in that Bocarro did "not generally include Christian convert residents in rural settlements [in Goa]" and when describing convert residents of an island settlement off Ceylon, he also "refrained from giving them, [who were of low status], the appellation of casado".

[19] Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese empire in Asia*, pp. 228–35.

sending "approximately one-fourth to one-third of their entire fleet" there from 1644 to 1660)[20] but also traders from the eastern Indian Ocean, as seen in the case of Vieira de Figueiredo. Indian (Coromandel and Bengal) and Chinese cloth was brought for exchange at Makassar, which met the demand of Spanish traders coming from Manila. In return, traders from Macau and the eastern Indian Ocean were able to obtain precious metals (silver and gold) from Makassar, which were used to pay for the purchase of Indian textiles or transported farther to Goa to "pay its expenditure and mint specie".[21] Clearly, the focus on the country traders, who could be casados or solteiros, should encompass consideration of personages who came from either side of the Straits of Melaka. After the "successful" Dutch attack on Makassar in 1660, the country traders attempted to develop the markets at Bantam and other places.[22] Eventually, and at times simultaneously with their other ventures, the Portuguese country traders were forced to trade at Batavia—acquiring, for instance, tea, pepper and silver—and tussle with the regulatory control imposed by the Dutch. In these circumstances, the country traders were likely to be either penalized or considered smugglers. In this context, Vieira de Figueiredo returns to the topic under discussion because the "multiple hats" he was wearing led to his appointment "as Manila's envoy to Cambodia"; hence, passes and licences were conceded by the VOC for his ships to trade with Solor and Timor.[23]

When we consider the analysis from the Western perspective, Celsa Pinto's study, one of the few that shed light on commerce in Asia that links to Portuguese India transitioning from the last decades of the eighteenth century into the first decades of the nineteenth, is of interest to this chapter. Pinto lists three broad groups of merchants operating from the Estado da Índia: private Portuguese, indigenous and nonindigenous. Here, the solteiro Portuguese or Macanese Chinese who came as far as the eastern or western coast of India might not have found an easy slot in which to categorize themselves. The business linkage of an indigenous merchant family belonging to the Saraswat Brahmin subgroup the Mhamais—the focus in Pinto's study—to Macau is obvious, although there is no mention of them maintaining a stopover or base in Southeast Asia in Pinto's sectional treatment on the "overseas network".[24] The items of export analyzed by Pinto were traded from the west coast of India and reflected the commodities in demand at the time (for instance, "big

[20] Bryan Souza, *The survival of empire*, p. 101.

[21] Bryan Souza, *The survival of empire*, p. 105. Since the denial of the Japanese markets to the Portuguese traders, another alternative channel by which they were able to obtain precious metals was via Tonkin. Cloves, a "most procured commodity" in Makassar, were supplied by the Dutch who attempted to manipulate its supply and price, much to the frustrations of the Portuguese country traders.

[22] Bryan Souza, *The survival of empire*, pp. 120–28. At Batam, the Portuguese country traders were able to export a variety of Chinese goods to the Indian markets. At Banjarmasin, the country traders attempted to secure the supply of pepper for the Chinese markets.

[23] Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese empire in Asia*, p. 255.

[24] C. Pinto, *Trade and finance in Portuguese India: A study of Portuguese country trade, 1770–1840* (New Delhi: Concept, 1994), pp. 78–80.

trade" items consisted of opium, ivory and gold). Contraband goods (such as Malwa opium) were usually loaded in the eastern seaboard at Calcutta, a bastion of British strength.[25] Evidence is present in the series titled *Arquivo de Macau* to prove how elite casado or solteiro traders from Macau were involved in the smuggling of opium and apprehended in the Straits of Melaka.[26] Eventually, however, the manner in which a particular group may be classified is a matter of polemics; whether the traders and the goods traded link up to provide a lead or a story may be of greater relative importance.

Portuguese in Coastal Burma and the Burman Sea

Before we press further with the task of exploring identities, some words may be said about the basic geographical, demographic and climatic features of the Burman coast. Burma, as we know it today, was far from being a homogenous society or unitary state.[27] The coast and the adjacent islands of the Andaman experience the southwest monsoon (rainy season) from April to October. The last third of October sees "variable winds and heavy gales (often cyclones), [which] ushers in the Northeast Monsoon in November". This lasts until about January, when "the rain almost ceases and the force of the [wind] declines".[28] After that, "light winds and a fairly calm sea" prevail until the cycle is repeated from the following April. From a militaristic-cum-geographic point of view, the British already possessed some form of a fortified settlement on the Andamans when Archibald Blair was despatched to survey the feasibility of establishing a penal settlement (which Blair named Fort Cornwallis) on it. A. Hamilton, an English ship captain, described the islands as "surrounded by many dangerous rocks and banks"; and although he highlighted the case of the seaman who had been stopped by inhabitants of the islands and was "ever heard of [again]", probably "devoured by [the] savage cannibals [from the island]",[29] outside groups and forces operating in the area appear to have been more menacing to the islanders than vice versa. The Andamanese had been subjected to raids by pirates from the Malay Peninsula. A certain Admiral Cornwallis (brother of the more famous Governor General Earl Cornwallis) was of the opinion that

[25] Pinto, *Trade and finance in Portuguese India*, p. 157.

[26] Arquivo de Macau (A.M.), vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 291, 302 and 313.

[27] Harvey, *History of Burma*, pp. 208, 236 and 267. The land was inhabited by Talaing (Mons), Shan, Kachin, Chin and Kudu peoples. It might not suffice to examine coastal Burma for signs of Portuguese/mixed Portuguese presence; Harvey wrote that Filipe de Brito's "Indian" descendants were found up north (Myedu in Shwebo). The province of Arakan, for instance, had been independent for a long time (conquest in 1784–1785).

[28] Portman M.V., *A history of our relations with the Andamanese*, vol. 1 (Calcutta: Government of India Printing, 1914), p. 14.

[29] A. Hamilton, *A new account of the East Indies, 1688–1723* (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, reprinted 1995), p. 66.

occupying the Andaman would "procure a harbour [for the British] on the east side of the Bay [of Bengal]" where ships of war could ride out the monsoon.[30] He felt that other than providing a place for convicts, the occupation of the islands would also deter piracy in the region and bring about a more secure environment for the islands' indigenous inhabitants.[31] Despite this proclamation by the admiral, a look at the wider network and shipping routes of the eastern Indian Ocean region shows that ships did not necessarily need to stop by at ports along coastal Burma; Aceh, Melaka and even Tenasserim were more "attractive".[32] Commerce in slaves, secured from raiding activities, was a brisk trade in the eighteenth century in the Indian Ocean, and an occasional study/source reveals the participation of Europeans in the raiding (in the manner that such activities were taking place in insular Southeast Asia). While coolies and slaves could have been part of the cargo on Macanese ships, this writer does not have any evidence that points to people of Portuguese or mixed Portuguese descent being involved in the capturing of slaves in the area, then or in earlier times, although the *Calcutta Monthly Register* in 1790 curiously declared the inhabitants of the islands to be "descendants of slaves wrecked on the coast of the Andaman, from Portuguese ships, [during the days when they] had a settlement at Pegu".[33]

We now revert to uncovering the identities of Portuguese and mixed Portuguese who travelled to or dwelled in Burma (especially coastal Burma) after the "glorious period" of Filipe de Brito e Nicote. Halikowski-Smith's rather innovative work of examining the murals in Thai and Burmese temples to construct a picture of Europeans (especially Iberians) in mainland Southeast Asia may be presented for discussion here. The attempt to elicit useful information from the murals, itself presented in an allegorical form fused with the Jataka tales, can present a challenge. Properly contextualized, Portuguese characters in different shades and garbs from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries can be discerned in the murals. A few issues pertaining to the use of murals and artefacts adorned with imagery, which can potentially lend a hand in the investigation of the social identities of Portuguese and mixed Portuguese groups operating along coastal Burma, will be discussed first. There are two schools of thought on the use of the murals and related artefacts to arrive at a historical conclusion. First, religious (Buddhist) scholars believe that "it is fallacious to interpret the murals as historical documents ... interpretation must be based on Buddhist scripture". Others, including an "increasing number of Thai art historians", believe that the "fascinating details of contemporary reality" depicted

[30] Portman, *A history of our relations with the Andamanese*, vol. 1, p. 105.

[31] Although increased British presence on the Andaman Islands meant a step up in the security, the placing of convicts there—men of brutal violence, highwaymen, robbers, swindlers and cheats, people "who have for some reason escaped the death penalty"—in itself constituted hazardous thing to do to a community and its neighbourhood. See Mathur L.P., *A history of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands* (Delhi: Sterling, 1968), p. 193.

[32] Harvey, *History of Burma*, p. 205.

[33] Portman, *A history of our relations with the Andamanese*, vol. 1, p. 103. Harvey writes that these descendents centred themselves around a Catholic church on the islands; see Harvey, *History of Burma*, p. 202.

in the murals may reflect the situation and people of the time. For those who believe that murals can be used as a source of information and commentary, there is still the "deep problem" of whether specific events can be matched with the way they are depicted, enmeshed as they are with the Jataka tales.[34] Two sample cases highlighted in Halikowski-Smith's work may be mentioned here: a wall scene on Luso-Asian shipping and a late eighteenth-century mural titled "Eurasian Mercenary Guards Local Courtly Women"—both from the Ananda ok-Kyaung monastery in Bagan (Burma).

The Luso-Asian sailors on vessels in the Bay of Bengal, as depicted in the wall scene mural, are "of a darker complexion" than the "white Indians", which usually referred to the Portuguese. The Indo-Portuguese shippers, "beyond their ubiquitous hats and beards", tended to "contract local shipping for their commercial needs, and make periodic visits from Macau, Melaka or Malabar. The active shippers in São Tomé de Meliapur, Porto Novo and Nagapattinam operated a variety of crafts". The Portuguese still "maintained a presence" at Martaban in Pegu and were "famed for [using] junks".[35] The information shed on the Indo-Portuguese by this imagery appears to portray the earlier period when the Portuguese still had some influence in Melaka and Mataban, since, according to Bryan Souza, shipping traffic coming from Melaka or stopping at Pegu diminished in the second half of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth. Until new data or discoveries reveal otherwise about commerce between the archipelagic and South China seas and the eastern Indian Ocean during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the line of reasoning taken in the interpretation pertaining to time and place should suffice. The darker or mixed complexion of the shippers conforms to the mixed character of the Portuguese private traders operating in the Straits of Melaka described by Radin Fernando. Fernando's research reveals that it was not easy to identify a person of Portuguese or mixed Portuguese heritage as he could be labelled "Portuguese", "black" or "burgher" on different occasions; this was especially so when assimilation and miscegenation became "more complete" by the middle of the eighteenth century. The interbred Portuguese initially focused on short-distance trade involving food items and later expanded to trade in regionally demanded items such as gold and other precious commodities.[36] The portrayal of the private traders who were adept with junks probably fitted in well with Bryan Souza's depiction of Portuguese or mixed Portuguese who ventured out from Macau. Halikowski-Smith describes the remnant Portuguese community in Burma, which G. Harvey calls the half-caste,

[34] Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in the Portuguese Indies*, pp. 238 and 246.

[35] Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in the Portuguese Indies*, p. 251.

[36] R. Fernando, "Metamorphosis of Luso-Asian Diaspora in Malay Archipelago 1640–1795", in P. Borschberg ed., *Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka area and adjacent regions* (Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden, 2004), pp. 166 and 172. Cross-referencing R. Fernando's other work "Shipping on Melaka and Singapore as index of growth", *South Asia*, vol. XIX (1996), p. 66, table 1, as well as Bryan Souza, *Survival of empire*, pp. 136–39, tables 6.4 and 6.5; we get a picture that a sizeable proportion of the Portuguese operators in the western Malay Archipelago region comprised of those who came from Macau.

as providing support to traders (for instance, as translators) passing by the ports of Burma. This community continued to be "oppressed" by the state.[37] We will return to discuss the mural of the Eurasian mercenary when we explore Portuguese men-at-arms/mercenaries operating in the area in the forthcoming paragraphs.

In the mid-seventeenth century, Syriam was an important maritime outlet as well as communication point between Arakan and Toungoo. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, Filipe de Brito e Nicote had "grudging recognition of his independence from the principal powers in the region". De Brito represented "a type of Portuguese adventurer [who was] by no means uncommon in this period". De Brito's army consisted of Portuguese and Eurasian followers as well as Burmese and Mon auxiliaries. His navy was even able to "force merchant vessels from the other ports to Syriam, denying Arakan and Toungoo of the custom revenues and possibly exercising a stranglehold of firearms in the interior".[38] These mercenaries were noted by Lieberman and reiterated by M. Charney to be "politically fickle . . . and available on a short term basis", sometimes seeking more than the court stipend.[39]

Hamilton's "New Account of the East Indies" reveals that after Filipe de Brito, the Peguan king continued to employ Western soldiers and trainers in his army, especially in his war against Siam. In the mid-seventeenth century, a certain Portuguese man was able to gain such credibility that the Peguan king made him "Commander of all his Forces".[40] He, and other thus exalted Portuguese, became "proud" and incurred the wrath of the king to the extent that the latter ordered the massacre of "all the Portuguese wherever they could be found in the city or country".[41] Although Hamilton does not mention it explicitly, his writing seems to imply that the ousting of the Portuguese signified the decline of the Peguans to such an extent that they needed to seek help from the Burmans up north against Siamese incursions. From the perspective of trade, the Portuguese were peddling their war-making skills. The mercenary market in the seventeenth century has been described as a booming one.[42] The next mention of the few Portuguese who survived the massacre appears in Hamilton's journal: "some chieftains in Syriam of Portuguese and possibly Armenian descent".[43]

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[37]Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in the Portuguese Indies*, pp. 221 and 227. See also Harvey, *History of Burma*, p. 203.

[38]V. Lieberman, *Burmese administrative cycles: Anarchy and conquest, 1580–1760* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 44–45.

[39]Lieberman, *Burmese administrative cycles*, pp. 44–45. M. Charney, *Southeast Asian warfare, 1300–1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 224–25.

[40]*A new account of the East Indies*, p. 37.

[41]*A new account of the East Indies*, p. 39.

[42]G.V. Scammell, "European exiles, renegades and outlaws and the maritime economy of Asia 1500–1750", *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 26, no. 4 (1992), pp. 641–61.

[43]*A new account of the East Indies*, p. 63. "They were observed (by Hamilton) to have a church but led such scandalous lives that make them contemptible to all people in general".

Pegu and Syriam had slid into decline since 1755 and had been destroyed for several decades by the dawn of the nineteenth century, eclipsed by Rangoon.[44] J. Crawfurd, in a journal of an embassy led by him to the court of Ava, affirmed that the economic centre of gravity had shifted north to the new capital and upper provinces (this could be a reason for the decrease in the paramount status accorded by the Burmese government to the coastal provinces). The kinds of goods exported from Burma maintained their comparative advantage from before the nineteenth century—teak, stick lac, elephants' tusks, raw cotton, precious metals such as gold and silver and stones (rubies and sapphires) as well as horses. The principal imports included cotton goods, British woollens, iron, steel, gunpowder, saltpetre, firearms, English glassware, opium and tobacco. British dominance in the Burma trade was obvious in two ways: first, Burmese exports were channelled to Calcutta as "the principal mart" and, second, British imports dominated the major categories of goods bought by Burma.[45]

There is no mention of any descendants related to the Portuguese or mixed Portuguese who remained in Pegu or Burma from the earlier centuries, although among the "strangers sojourning or naturalized in the Burman dominions [were] natives of Cassay, Siamese, Cochin-Chinese, Chinese, Hindus of Western India, Mohammedans and some Christians".[46] It is under this last category that descendants of Portuguese or any other Europeans were likely to have been classified. If the diminution of the descendant group linking to the Europeans was more real than apparent, a correlated tendency could perhaps also be detected in the declining trend of the hiring of Western mercenaries. A survey of the composition of the Burman army presented in Crawfurd's journal does not reveal any evidence that Western mercenary services were procured. In another part of the journal, Crawfurd comments that the number of Chinese found in Burma was "extremely trifling", compared to the crowd of settlers found in Siam. The Chinese found in Ava were "not only fewer in number, but inferior in enterprise, intelligence, and industry, to the class known in Siam or the Malay countries".[47] If these developments are linked with the political and cultural integration in Burma mooted by V. Lieberman, the unification process seems to have produced a less embracing, although perhaps not more precarious, course of power centralization in the early modern state-building process of Burma.

Halikowski-Smith's mural of the Eurasian mercenary guard can provide alternative evidence by which the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese as a mercenary community

[44] Although Rangoon was only acquired by the British during the First Anglo-Burma War (1824–26), the latter's economic influence on the settlement was already deep seated, as affirmed from the observations in Crawfurd's journal.

[45] J. Crawfurd, *Journal of an embassy from Governor General of India to the court of Ava in the year 1827* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Crawfurd provided data for the commerce in his journal.

[46] *Journal of an embassy to the court of Ava*, p. 471.

[47] *Journal of an embassy to the court of Ava*, p. 471.

may be reassessed. Halikowski-Smith applies N. Gervaise's findings to comment thus "short trousers of fine stuff which reach below the knees" worn by the mercenary guard might be part indigenous and part European.[48] He (the mercenary) was mestizo because he differed from the "true Portuguese [style of dressing]" as well as from "indigenous traditions".[49] He differed from the former because he was "barefooted", and he differed from the latter because he carried a rifle instead of, for instance, a kris. In other ways, his sartorial style appears to have been adapted from elsewhere: for instance, wearing a top in the form of a "striped cotton jacket brought in over the waist", as well as wearing a bandana.[50] If the image painted in the mural, dated 1785, did indeed reflect a certain contemporary situation or event, the information provided points to the continuing involvement of the Portuguese in security-related roles in the late eighteenth century even though Crawfurd's journal bears little trace of this.[51] Conversely, if the image in the mural depicts a scenario from an unspecified earlier period, then the verdict would probably coincide with Halikowski-Smith's assessment of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese in Ayutthaya—that is, Ayutthaya had possibly lost its efficiency in military and mercenary skills compared to the heyday of the sixteenth or seventeenth century. Of course, the tradition of employing foreign mercenaries might not have been practised by the Burmans who conquered the Peguans, or this aspect of detail, however unlikely, might have been omitted by Crawfurd.[52] From another angle, divergent views can also be discerned on the issue of the acquisition of Western arms in the Burmese army. W. Dijk, refuting L. Andaya's writing, felt that the Burmese did not procure, or were not interested in the procurement of, weapons from the Dutch for any "special" purpose in the seventeenth century, although Harvey, writing on the eighteenth century, thought that they were well incorporated in the Burmese army.[53] The whole issue of Portuguese mercenaries in the Burmese army should perhaps be viewed in context, because it is also noted that the Burmese army at some point hired Muslim mercenaries as well.[54]

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[48]Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in the Portuguese Indies*, p. 241. Gervaise suggested that "men of quality [in Siam] wore [these trousers] beneath their pa-nonc".

[49]Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in the Portuguese Indies*, p. 241.

[50]Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in the Portuguese Indies*, p. 245. The top was different from the "light, open-necked calico shirt of the Peguans"; the headdress was different from the "red cloth headdresses that typify the Burmese style".

[51]Harvey, *History of Burma*, p. 271. Harvey's work contains mixed evidence for the thesis of Portuguese participating actively in the Burmese military—"half-caste Portuguese serving as seamen" ferrying the fourth Burmese army in the invasion of Siam.

[52]The keeping up with Western military developments can be judged partly by the extent of the hiring of mercenaries. Crawfurd's journal probably served as a source of intelligence for the British in the subsequent wars they fought against the Burmans. See also Harvey, *History of Burma*, p. 237.

[53]Dijk, *Seventeenth-century Burma and the Dutch East India Company*, pp. 39–41. See also Harvey, *History of Burma*, p. 237.

[54]Dijk, *Seventeenth-century Burma and the Dutch East India Company*, p. 35.

Identities and the Formal/Informal World

Markets operated in various sizes across the Indian Ocean and in Southeast Asia.[55] Beyond the classifications couched in ethnicity or religious affiliation, individuals in the form of private or country traders, who relied on their network and relations and whom H. Furber hailed as initiators of the commercial revolution,[56] were remarkably resilient: for instance, private traders in the Straits of Melaka who started out small after the fall of Melaka by dealing in foodstuffs and later moved to trading in bigger items and the Mhamais, who made business deals with the Macanese. This is, however, not to suggest that the various groups in the East identified with one another as a community (although Subrahmanyam thinks that a form of "Creole nationalism" had developed in the 1820s). Individuals operated between the "formal/legal" world and "informal/illegitimate" world. These individuals, especially if they were traders, "shifted identities" or "took on multiple identities" to help them negotiate their way around and thereby survive. It might not be useful to perceive the world as "being legitimate" or in "corruptedness", a main drawback of G. Winius' *The Black Legend of Portuguese India*.[57] Whether these Portuguese/mixed Portuguese individuals were solteiro or levantado, there was never a total severance of relations with the centre. "Being malleable" was perhaps "easier" for traders motivated by pecuniary objectives or for those individuals who wished to acquire recognition after obtaining wealth. For these individuals operating in the region, surreptitious activities—in the form of smuggling, for instance—were almost the norm. This writer would be interested in knowing of individuals or groups who were so driven to desperation that they resorted to robbery on the sea (i.e. piracy). Halikowski-Smith has observed that the mixed Portuguese were "dangerous elements", responsible for piracy committed in the Bay of Bengal.[58] Finally, to return to the main agenda of this chapter on Burma (in particular, coastal Burma), the Portuguese and mixed Portuguese probably consisted of small unspecified communities of mixed European or other heritage and short-stay country traders of mixed Portuguese and Asian descent who came from both sides of the Straits of Melaka. If the dwindling of the Portuguese/mestizo community in coastal Burma was more real than apparent, there were a couple of reasons for it. First, the effects of the massacre in the mid- to late seventeenth century were reasonably severe, and the subsequent unification and suppression under the second Toungoo and the Konbaung Empires neglected trade and the coastal provinces such that certain

[55] K. Chaudhuri, *Trade and civilization in the Indian Ocean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[56] H. Furber, *Rival empires of trade in the orient* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1976).

[57] A. Disney, Review of *Black Legend of Portuguese India* by G. Winius, *South Asia* (1987), pp. 91–93.

[58] Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in the Portuguese Indies*, pp. 228 and 233.

weakened groups were unable to revive.[59] Although we speak about the mestizos in Melaka striving to make a comeback, their subsequent fortunes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries relegated them to being a poverty-stricken group in a slum area.[60] Second, this chapter is preliminary in its survey and has not focused on the ecclesiastics or religiosos. Subrahmanyam mentions a certain D. Martinho who was a nephew of the ruler of Arakan serving as a mariner and soldier; he was recognized as a fidalgo and given a Habit of Christ. Here, the acculturation effect that religious orders had on certain indigenous populations cannot be overlooked. Further information in this vein may be found in the collection "Jesuitas na Asia", housed partly in the Biblioteca Ajuda.

Summing Up

The Portuguese, or, more likely, the mixed or mestizo Portuguese, appear to have retained a certain presence in coastal Burma in the second half of the seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth centuries. This presence was bolstered by the strategic but not indispensable location of Burma in the eastern Indian Ocean. Shifts in the internal political economy in early modern state building in Burma, and the northward transfer of the centre of influence, impacted the foreign and diasporic communities operating and residing in coastal Burma. The mixed Portuguese came from both sides of the Straits of Melaka in the form of private traders of varying status, depending on whether they were players in big or small markets. These included mixed Portuguese, Indians and Chinese of Macanese heritage. Did these personages fit in with the usual hierarchical classification in a Portuguese society, for example, casado and soldado? And to what degree were they linked to the centre or Estado da Índia in Asia? The exercise of finding answers to such questions can be frustrating, because many of these individuals operated in both the "legitimate" and "illegitimate" realms; and it might indeed be more realistic or accurate to accept the situation for what it was. Here again, one must remember that renegades and levantados hoped to one day receive "approval" and possibly a business favour or deal to link them with the authorities even though, beyond the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Portuguese India might have been past its prime. In such an environment, enormous opportunities existed for individuals to be involved in surreptitious activities; it was a normal part of life in early modern maritime Southeast Asia.

[59] Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in the Portuguese Indies*, p. 226. Halikowski-Smith noted that trade did not take off in Burma in the eighteenth century.

[60] See Halikowski-Smith, *Creolization and diaspora in the Portuguese Indies*.

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Maps



Map 1 Map of Southeast Asia with often-mentioned locations in the chapters marked

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

Map 2 Goods network in Southeast Asia Nordin (Reproduced with permission from Nordin Hussin, *Trade and Society in the Straits of Melaka: Dutch Melaka and English Penang, 1780–1830*, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007, p. 120, map 10)



Map 3 Slave raiding in Southeast Asia (Reproduced with permission from James Francis Warren, *The Sulu Zone*, Singapore, NUS Press, 2007, p. 146)

Glossary

B

Baba A collective term used to refer to descendants of the Peranakan Chinese in Malaysia and Singapore; also used as an honorific for a Peranakan man.[1]

Bajau The term Bajau (also Badjaw, Bajo, and other variants) is applied to a diverse collection of Sama/Bajau-speaking peoples. They are spread over a vast area of islands and littoral, extending from central Philippines through Sulu Archipelago to eastern coast of Borneo and from coastal Sulawesi Southwest through Maluku to western Timor. The Bugis (known as Bajo) can also be seen as a branch of the Sama-speaking people.[2]

Boleta The boleta system involved the appointing of a committee to distribute space and rights on ships amongst various groups of people in order of their relations to the Spanish colonial government.

Brandvlotten Floating fires.

C

Cakalele Celebrative ceremonial dance in honor of tribal ancestors (North Maluku).

Casado Married man in Portuguese colony.

D

Datus Title of distinction for any major non-royal leader, and also a general epithet of respect for any man of age and standing.[3]

E

Estado da India State of India; loosely applied to all Portuguese settlements between Cape of Good Hope to Japan.

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[1] I. Tahir ed., *Peranakan Museum Guide* (Singapore: Asian Civilizations Museum, 2008), p. 246.

[2] K.G. Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A historical encyclopedia* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), p. 200.

[3] T. Barnard, *Multiple centers of authority* (Leiden: KITLV, 2003), pp. ix–xii.

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G

Garu Raid perpetrated with limited purpose.

Ghee Hin Secret society located in Singapore and parts of Malaya. It is believed that its men were drawn largely from the same dialect group or place of origin.

Guanxi Relation or network of patronage in Chinese usage.

H

Hai San Secret society originating from Penang. It is believed that its men were drawn largely from the same dialect group or place of origin.

J

Junta da Guerra Ad hoc council of war; an administrative body formed in Iberian states.

K

Kapitan Leader of an ethnic community in settlement.

Kongan Refers to judicial cases in Chinese.

Kongsi Refers to a company or a syndicate in Chinese. Also often used for secret societies or triads.

Kora-kora A Malukan double-outrigger vessel. Two and sometimes three rows of floats were attached to the beams where additional paddlers sat. An ordinary kora-kora was manned by 50–70.[4]

Kota berajalan Movable fortress.

L

Lançado Fugitive.

Levantado Someone who has taken off to operate and live outside the Estado da India.

M

Mardika Free Asian under Dutch jurisdiction (Dutch-Malay).[5]

Mestizo (or mestiço) Mixed blood person.

N

Nakhoda Master of a sailing craft.

Nanyang Refers to the south sea (or Southeast Asia) in Chinese.

O

Octrooi Charter.

Orang Laut Proto-Malayan sea peoples, made up of different groups with a distinctive maritime culture.[6]

P

Pagayao (or pangayaw) War by sea.

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[4]L. Andaya, *The World of Maluku* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1993), p. 283.

[5]H. Hagerdal, *Lords of the land, lords of the sea* (Leiden: KITLV, 2012), p. 430.

[6]Barnard, *Multiple center of authority*, pp. ix–xii.

Pancada The pancada system was a wholesale bargaining system (adopted at Manila). The governor and municipal government appointed two or three persons who negotiated with representatives of Chinese importers the prices to be paid for the cargo of each incoming junk.

Pangahat War by land.

Pascedule Trading pass issued by VOC.

Peranakan A Malay term meaning "locally born", describes certain early diasporic communities in Southeast Asia that assimilated aspects of indigenous Malay culture into their cultures of origin. Peranakan communities comprise of ethnic Chinese groups but these can be ethnic Indian as well as ethnic Eurasian groups.

Prahu (or perahu) General term for undecked boat.[7]

R

Rak Hunting.

Religioso Member of religious fraternity.

Rixdollars Rijksdaalder (rijksdollar) = 60 "heavy" stuiver = 3 Dutch guilder.[8]

S

Sacup Alliance group.

Sangaji A Malukan title derived from the Javanese sang, an honorific, and aji, meaning "king." It was awarded by the sultan. It was also used for heads of important settlements.[9]

Sanglay Refers to Chinese under Spanish colonial rule.

Solteiro Unmarried man in Portuguese colony.

Sosolot A large web of trade network between the Malukan people and their clients in the small settlements in Papua.

Stadholder Stadholder was the highest ranking officer and dignitary in each province in the states of Holland. He was charged with overseeing the administration of justice in the provinces.

States General A representative and executive body with "proportional" representation from each province. Each province had one vote. The Generality had under it a host of advisory and administrative sub-bodies to assist in the governance of the businesses of the state.

T

Tingzu System whereby the head of lodge or temple was also an important leader of Chinese community in Settlement.

Towkay Refers to, in dialect Chinese, an "owner of business", usually of some size.

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[7] Barnard, *Multiple centers of authority*, pp. ix–xii.

[8] P. Borschberg, *Violence, security and diplomacy in the 17th century* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), pp. 340–41.

[9] Andaya, *The World of Maluku*, p. 284.

U

Ulema Muslim religious scholars.

Uli Village federation.

V

Vinta Traditional boat found in southern Philippines used for intra- and inter-island transportation.

W

Wokou Japanese pirates (included Chinese participants) menacing the central-southern coasts of China during the mid-sixteenth century.

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