Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of Crimes

William A. Schabas

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Genocide in International Law

After more than forty years of near dormancy, the 1948 Genocide Convention has suddenly become a vital legal tool in the international campaign against impunity. The succinct provisions of the Convention, including its enigmatic definition of the crime, are now being interpreted in important judgments by the International Court of Justice, the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and a growing number of domestic courts. In this definitive work William A. Schabas focuses on the judicial interpretation of the Convention, relying on the preparatory work, debates in the International Law Commission, political statements in bodies like the General Assembly of the United Nations, and the growing body of case law. Detailed attention is given to the concept of protected groups, to the quantitative dimension of genocide, to problems of criminal prosecution including defences and complicity, and to issues of international judicial cooperation such as extradition. He also explores the duty to prevent genocide, and the consequences this may have on the emerging law of humanitarian intervention.

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Professor Schabas is a frequent participant in international human rights missions with non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty International, the International Federation of Human Rights, and the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. He has also worked as consultant to the Ministry of Justice of Rwanda and the United States Agency for International Development.
Genocide in International Law

The Crimes of Crimes

William A. Schabas
National University of Ireland, Galway
To my parents, Ann and Ezra
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The legal questions involved in studying genocide draw on three areas of law: human rights law, international law and criminal law. These are all subjects that I have both taught and practised. This alone ought to be sufficient to explain my interest in the subject. But there is more. Of the three great genocides in the twentieth century, those of the Armenians, the Jews and Gypsies, and the Tutsi, my life has been touched by two of them.

My grandparents on my father’s side, and my ancestors before them for generations, came from Kosowa and Brzezany, towns in what was once called Eastern Galicia. Located in the general vicinity of the city of Lvov, they are now part of Ukraine. Essentially nothing remains, however, of the Jewish communities where my grandparents were born and raised. In the months that followed the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the Einsatzgruppen murdered as many as two million Jews who were caught behind the lines in the occupied territories. On 16–17 October 1941, in a German Aktion, 2,200 Jews, representing about half the community of Kosowa, were taken to the hill behind the Moskalowka bridge and executed. Parts of the population of both towns, Brzezany and Kosowa, were deported to the Belzec extermination camp. As the Germans were retreating, after their disastrous defeat at Stalingrad in January 1943, the executioners ensured they would leave no trace of Jewish life behind. It is reported that more Jews were killed in Brzezany on 2 June 1943, and in Kosowa on 4 June 1943, a ‘final solution’ carried out while the Soviet forces were still 500 km away. The victims were marched to nearby forests, gravel pits and even Jewish cemeteries where, according to Martin Gilbert, ‘executions were carried out with savagery and sadism, a crying child often being seized from its mother’s arms and shot in front of her, or having its head crushed by a single blow from a rifle butt. Hundreds of children were thrown alive into pits, and died in fear and agony under the weight of bodies thrown on top of them.’

Although my grandparents had immigrated to North America many years before the Holocaust, some of my more distant relatives were surely among those victims. Several of the leaders of the *Einsatzgruppen* were successfully tried after the war for their role in the atrocities in Brzezany, Kosowa and in thousands of other European Jewish communities of which barely a trace now remains. The prosecutor in the *Einsatzgruppen* case, Benjamin Ferencz, a man I have had the honour to befriend, used the neologism ‘genocide’ in the indictment and succeeded in convincing the court to do the same in its judgment.²

Exactly fifty years after the genocide in my grandparents’ towns, I participated in a human rights fact-finding mission to a small and what was then obscure country in central Africa, Rwanda. I was asked by Ed Broadbent and Iris Almeida to represent the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development as part of a coalition of international non-governmental organizations interested in the Great Lakes region of Africa. The mission visited Rwanda in January 1993, mandated to assess the credibility and the accuracy of a multitude of reports of politically and ethnically based crimes, including mass murder, that had taken place under the regime of president Juvenal Habyarimana since the outbreak of civil war in that country in October 1990. At the time, a terrifying cloud hung over Rwanda, the consequence of a speech by a Habyarimana henchman a few weeks earlier that was widely interpreted within the country as an incitement to genocide. We interviewed many eyewitnesses but our fact-finding went further. In an effort to obtain material evidence, we excavated mass graves, thus confirming reports of massacres we had learned of from friends or relatives of the victims.

At the time, none of us, including myself, had devoted much study if any to the complicated legal questions involved in the definition of genocide. Indeed, our knowledge of the law of genocide rather faithfully reflected the neglect into which the norm had fallen within the human rights community. Yet faced with convincing evidence of mass killings of Tutsis, accompanied by public incitement whose source could be traced to the highest levels of the ruling oligarchy, the word ‘genocide’ sprung inexorably to our lips. Rereading the definition in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide helped confirm our conclusion. In a press release issued the day after our departure from Rwanda, we spoke of genocide and warned of the abyss into which the country was heading. The term seemed to fit. Our choice of terminology may have been more intuitive than reasoned, but history has shown how closely we came to the truth. Three months after our

mission, Special Rapporteur Bacre Waly Ndaïye visited Rwanda and essentially endorsed our conclusions. He too noted that the attacks had been directed against an ethnic group, and that article II of the Genocide Convention ‘might therefore be considered to apply’. In his 1996 review of the history of the Rwandan genocide, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali took note of the significance of our report.

Four months after the Rwandan genocide, I returned to Rwanda as part of an assistance mission to assess the needs of the legal system, and more specifically the requirements for prompt and effective prosecution of those responsible for the crimes. Over the past five years, much of my professional activity has been focused on how to bring the genocidaires to book. I have been back to Rwanda many times since 1994, and participated, as a consultant, in the drafting of legislation intended to facilitate genocide prosecutions. The International Secretariat of Amnesty International sent me to Rwanda in early 1997 to observe the Karamira trial, the first major genocide prosecution under national law in that country, or, for that matter, in any country, with the exception of the Eichmann case. I have since attended many other trials of those charged with genocide, both within Rwanda and before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in Arusha, Tanzania, including the Akayesu trial, the first international prosecution pursuant to the Genocide Convention. I have also devoted much time to training a new generation of Rwandan jurists, lecturing regularly on criminal law and on the specific problems involved in genocide prosecutions as a visiting professor at the law faculty of the Rwandan National University. On 2 September 1998, I took a break from teaching the introductory criminal law class to 140 eager young Rwandans and we all spent the morning listening attentively on the radio to Laity Kama, president of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, as he read the first international judgment convicting an individual of the crime of genocide. But I have also spent many hours with genocide survivors, and I have visited the melancholy memorials to the killings. The smell of the mass graves cannot be forgotten and, like the imagined recollections of my grandparents’ birthplace, it has its own contribution to what sometimes may seem a rather dry and technical study of legal terms. There is more passion in this work than may initially be apparent.

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS
Washington, 27 August 1999

I wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a research grant and for the Bora Laskin Research Fellowship in Human Rights. This work was completed while on sabbatical leave from the University of Quebec at Montreal, when I held a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellowship with the United States Institute of Peace in Washington. I hereby acknowledge my great appreciation for the Institute’s support. The help and encouragement from my many colleagues there, but particularly Neil Kritz, Bill Stuebner, John Crist and Joe Klaits, is fondly recalled. A term as visiting professor at the University of Montpellier in 1998, the guest of Frédéric Sudre and Michel Levinet, gave me the opportunity for an intensive period of writing on an early draft of a portion of the manuscript. Besides providing time and travel funds, my various research grants also blessed me with several gifted assistants with whom it was always a pleasure to work: Véronique Brouillette, Sophie Dormeau, Geneviève Dufour, Niru Kumar, Véronique Robert-Blanchard and particularly Cecilie Lund. Many colleagues and friends encouraged and assisted me with various aspects of my research. Inevitably, my colleagues and I will disagree about some of the many difficult issues in this field. I have great respect for their views, and know that our debates will continue as the subject evolves. Of course, the views expressed here are my own. I wish to thank particularly Elizabeth Abi-Mershed, Howard Adelman, Catarina Albuquerque, Kai Ambos, Cecile Aptel, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Katia Boustany, Rowly Brucken, Frank Chalk, Roger Clark, Emmanuel Decaux, René Degni-Segui, Rokhaya Diarra, Bernard Hamilton, Frederick Harhoff, Kristine Hermann, Martin Imbleau, Laity Kama, Ben Kiernan, Anne-Marie La Rosa, Linda Melvern, Miltos Miltiades, Faustin Ntezilyayo, John Packer, Dorothy Shea, Brenda Sue Thornton, Otto Triffterer, Daniel Turp and Nicolai Uscoi. Diplomatic personnel in embassies and governments around the world, too numerous to mention individually, also gave generously of their time in providing me with their domestic legislation on genocide. The reliable profession-
alism, confidence and support of the personnel of Cambridge University Press, and in particular of Finola O’Sullivan, is also gratefully acknowledged.

As always, words fail in expressing my love and thanks to my wife, Penelope Soteriou, and to my daughters, Marguerite and Louisa.
Abbreviations

AC  Appeal Cases
AFDI  Annuaire français de droit international
AIDI  Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International
AJIL  American Journal of International Law
AI  Amnesty International
All ER  All England Reports
BFSP  British Foreign and State Papers
BFST  British Foreign and State Treaties
BYIL  British Yearbook of International Law
CHR  Commission on Human Rights
CHRY  Canadian Human Rights Yearbook
CLR  Commonwealth Law Reports
CERD  Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
Coll.  Collection of Decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights
Cr App R  Criminal Appeal Reports
Crim LR  Criminal Law Review
CSCE  Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CYIL  Canadian Yearbook of International Law
DR  Decisions and Reports of the European Commission of Human Rights
Doc.  Document
Dumont  Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens
EC  European Communities
EHRR  European Human Rights Reports
EJIL  European Journal of International Law
ESC  Economic and Social Council
ETS  European Treaty Series
F.  Federal Reporter
FCA  Federal Court of Australia
GA  General Assembly
HRJ  Human Rights Journal

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<td>ICC</td>
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<td>International and Comparative Law Quarterly</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
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<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</td>
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<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
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<td>RCADI</td>
<td>Recueil de cours de l’Académie du droit international de la Haye</td>
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<td>Yearbook</td>
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<td>YIHL</td>
<td>Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>YECHR</td>
<td>Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights</td>
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Introduction

‘The fact of genocide is as old as humanity’, wrote Jean-Paul Sartre.¹ The law, however, is considerably younger. This dialectic of the ancient fact yet the modern law of genocide follows from the observation that, historically, genocide has gone unpunished. Hitler’s famous comment, ‘who remembers the Armenians?’, is often cited in this regard.² Yet the Nazis were only among the most recent to rely confidently on the reasonable presumption that an international culture of impunity would effectively shelter the most heinous perpetrators of crimes against humanity.

The explanation for this is straightforward: genocide was generally, although perhaps not exclusively, committed under the direction or, at the very least, with the benign complicity of the State where it took place. Usually, the crime was executed as a quite overt facet of State policy, particularly within the context of war or colonial conquest. Obviously, therefore, domestic prosecution was virtually unthinkable, even where the perpetrators did not in a technical sense benefit from some manner of legal immunity. Only in rare cases where the genocidal regime collapsed in its criminal frenzy, as in Germany or Rwanda, could accountability be considered.

² Hitler briefed his generals at Obersalzburg in 1939 on the eve of the Polish invasion: ‘Genghis Khan had millions of women and men killed by his own will and with a gay heart. History sees him only as a great state-builder . . . I have sent my Death’s Head units to the East with the order to kill without mercy men, women and children of the Polish race or language. Only in such a way will we win the lebensraum that we need. Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?’ Quoted in Norman Davies, Europe, A History, London: Pimlico, 1997, p. 909. The account is taken from the notes of Admiral Canaris of 22 August 1939, quoted by L. P. Lochner, What About Germany?, New York: Dodd, Mead, 1942. During the Nuremberg trial of the major war criminals, there were attempts to introduce the statement in evidence, but the Tribunal did not allow it. For a review of the authorities, and a compelling case for the veracity of the statement, see Vahakn N. Dadrian, ‘The Historical and Legal Interconnections Between the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust: From Impunity to Retributive Justice’, (1998) 23 Yale Journal of International Law, 504 at pp. 538–41.
The inertia of the legal systems where the crimes actually occurred did little to inspire other jurisdictions to intervene, although they had begun to do so with respect to certain other ‘international crimes’ such as piracy and the slave trade, where the offenders were by and large individual villains rather than governments. Refusal to exercise universal jurisdiction over these offences against humanitarian principles was defended in the name of respect for State sovereignty. But it had a more sinister aspect, for this complacency was to some extent a form of quid pro quo by which States agreed, in effect, to mind their own business. What went on within the borders of a sovereign State was a matter that concerned nobody but the State itself.

This began to change at about the end of the First World War and is, indeed, very much the story of the development of human rights law, an ensemble of legal norms focused principally on protecting the individual against crimes committed by the State. It imposes obligations upon States and ensures rights to individuals. Because the obligations are contracted on an international level, they pierce the hitherto impenetrable wall of State sovereignty. There is also a second dimension to international human rights law, this one imposing obligations on the individual who, conceivably, can also violate the fundamental rights of his or her fellow citizens. Where these obligations are breached, the individual may be punished for such international crimes as a matter of international law, even if his or her own State, or the State where the crime was committed, refuses to do so. Almost inevitably, the criminal conduct of individuals blazes a trail leading to the highest levels of government, with the result that this aspect of human rights law has been difficult to promote. While increasingly willing to subscribe to human rights standards, States are terrified by the prospect of prosecution of their own leaders and military personnel, either by international courts or by the courts of other countries, for breaches of these very norms. To the extent that such prosecution is even contemplated, States insist upon the strictest of conditions and the narrowest of definitions of the subject matter of the crimes themselves.3

The law of genocide is very much a paradigm for these developments in international human rights law. As the prohibition of the ultimate

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threat to the existence of ethnic groups, it is right at the core of the values protected by human rights instruments and customary norms. The law is posited from a criminal law perspective, aimed at individuals yet focused on their role as agents of the State. The crime is defined narrowly, a consequence of the extraordinary obligations that States are expected to assume in its prevention and punishment.

The centrepiece in any discussion of the law of genocide is the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 October 1948. The Convention came into force in January 1951, three months after the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession. Fifty years after its adoption, it had slightly fewer than 130 States parties, a rather unimpressive statistic when compared with the other major human rights treaties of the United Nations system which, while considerably younger, have managed to approach a more general degree of support by the nations of the world. The reason is not the existence of doubt about the universal condemnation of genocide, but unease among some States with the onerous obligations that the treaty imposes, such as prosecution or extradition of individuals, including heads of State.

In its advisory opinion on reservations to the Genocide Convention, the International Court of Justice wrote that:

The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as ‘a crime under international law’ involving a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. The first consequence arising from this conception is that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation.

This important statement is often cited as the judicial recognition of the prohibition of genocide as a customary legal norm, although the Court

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4 (1951) 78 UNTS 277.
does not refer to it expressly in this way. The Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes two non-conventional sources of international law: international custom and general principles.\(^7\) International custom is established by ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’, while general principles are those ‘recognized by civilized nations’. Reference by the Court to such notions as ‘moral law’ as well as the quite clear allusion to ‘civilized nations’ suggest that it may be more appropriate to refer to the prohibition of genocide as a norm derived from general principles of law rather than a component of customary international law. On the other hand, the universal acceptance by the international community of the norms set out in the Convention since its adoption in 1948 mean that what originated in ‘general principles’ ought now to be considered a part of customary law.\(^8\)

Besides the Genocide Convention itself, there are other important positive sources of the law of genocide. The Convention was preceded, in 1946, by a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations recognizing genocide as an international crime, putting individuals on notice that they would be subject to prosecution and could not invoke their own domestic laws in defence to a charge.\(^9\) Since 1948, elements of the Convention, and specifically its definition of the crime of genocide, have been incorporated in the statutes of the two \textit{ad hoc} tribunals created by the Security Council to judge those accused of genocide and other crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.\(^10\) Affirming its enduring authority, the Convention definition was included without any modification in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in July 1998.\(^11\) There have been frequent references to genocide within the resolutions, declarations and statements of United Nations organs, including particularly the work of expert bodies and special rapporteurs.

A large number of States have enacted legislation concerning the

\(^7\) Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b) and (c).


\(^9\) GA Res. 96 (I).


prosecution and repression of genocide, most by amending their penal or criminal codes in order to add a distinct offence. Often they have borrowed the Convention definition, as set out in articles II and III, but occasionally they have contributed their own innovations. Sometimes these changes to the text of articles II and III have been aimed at clarifying the scope of the definition, for both internal and international purposes. For example, the United States of America’s legislation specifies that destruction ‘in whole or in part’ of a group, as stated in the Convention, must actually represent destruction ‘in whole or in substantial part’. Others have attempted to enlarge the definition, by appending new entities to the groups already protected by the Convention. Examples include political, economic and social groups. Going even further, France’s *Code pénal* defines genocide as the destruction of any group whose identification is based on arbitrary criteria. The variations in national practice contribute to an understanding of the meaning of the Convention but also, and perhaps more importantly, of the ambit of the customary legal definition of the crime of genocide. Yet, rather than imply some larger approach to genocide than that of the Convention, the vast majority of domestic texts concerning genocide repeat the Convention definition and tend to confirm its authoritative status.

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is, of course, an international treaty embraced by the realm of public international law. Within this general field, it draws on elements of international criminal law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. By defining an international crime, and spelling out obligations upon States parties in terms of prosecution and extradition, the Convention falls under the rubric of international criminal law. Its claim to status as an international humanitarian law treaty is supported by the inclusion of the crime within the subject matter jurisdiction of the two *ad hoc* tribunals charged with prosecuting violations of humanitarian law. Genocide is routinely subsumed –

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12 Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), S. 1851, § 1091(a).
14 See the comments of *ad hoc* judge Milenko Kreca in *Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium et al.)*, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, 2 June 1999, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kreca, para. 21: ‘A certain confusion is also created by the term “humanitarian law” referred to in paragraphs 19 and 48 of the Order. The reasons for the confusion are dual: on the one hand, the Court has not shown great consistency in using this term. In the Genocide case the Court qualified the Genocide Convention as a part of humanitarian law, although it is obvious that, by its nature, the Genocide Convention falls within the field of international criminal law.’
Genocide in international law

erroneously – within the broad concept of ‘war crimes’. Nevertheless, the scope of international humanitarian law is confined to international and non-international armed conflict, and the Convention clearly specifies that the crime of genocide can occur in peacetime. Consequently, it may more properly be deemed an international human rights law instrument. Indeed, René Cassin once called the Genocide Convention a specific application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Alain Pellet has described the Convention as ‘a quintessential human rights treaty’. For Benjamin Whitaker, genocide is ‘the ultimate human rights problem’.

The prohibition of genocide is closely related to the right to life, one of the fundamental human rights defined in international declarations and conventions. These instruments concern themselves with the individual’s right to life, whereas the Genocide Convention is associated with the right to life of human groups, sometimes spoken of as the right to existence. General Assembly Resolution 96(I), adopted in December 1946, declares that ‘[g]enocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings’. States ensure the protection of the right to life of individuals within their jurisdiction by such measures as the prohibition of murder in criminal law. The repression of genocide proceeds somewhat differently, the crime being directed against the entire international community rather than the individual. As noted by Mordechai Kremnitzer, ‘[i]t is a frontal attack on the value of human life as an

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16 The International Court of Justice has described international humanitarian law as a lex specialis of international human rights law, applicable during armed conflict. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, note 6 above, para. 25.

17 UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.310, p. 5; UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.311, p. 5. There is a cross-reference to the Genocide Convention in the right-to-life provision (art. 6(2) and (3)) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1976) 999 UNTS 171, the result of an amendment from Peru and Brazil who were concerned about mass death sentences being carried out after a travesty of the judicial process. Because the Covenant admits to limited use of capital punishment, Peru and Brazil considered it important to establish the complementary relationship with the Genocide Convention: UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.813, para. 2. See also Manfred Nowak, CCPR Commentary, Kehl, Germany: N. P. Engel, 1993, pp. 108–9; William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.


abstract protected value in a manner different from the crime of murder’.\textsuperscript{21}

There have been no legal monographs on the subject of the Convention, or the legal aspects of prosecution of genocide, since the 1970s.\textsuperscript{22} Most academic research on the Genocide Convention has been undertaken by historians and philosophers. They have frequently ventured onto judicial terrain, not so much to interpret the instrument and to wrestle with the legal intricacies of the definition as to express frustration with its limitations. Even legal scholars have tended to focus on what are widely perceived as the shortcomings of the Convention. The Convention definition of genocide has seemed too restrictive, too narrow. It has failed to cover, in a clear and unambiguous manner, many of the major human rights violations and mass killings perpetrated by dictators and their accomplices. Jurists have regularly looked to the Genocide Convention in the hopes it might apply, and have either proposed exaggerated and unrealistic interpretations of its terms or else called for its amendment so as to make it more readily applicable. The principal deficiency, many have argued, is that it applies only to ‘national, racial, ethnical and religious groups’.

And that was how things stood until 1992. War broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina in March. By August 1992, United Nations bodies, including the Security Council and the General Assembly, were accusing the parties to the conflict of responsibility for ‘ethnic cleansing’.\textsuperscript{23} In December 1992, the General Assembly adopted a resolution stating that ‘ethnic cleansing’ was a form of genocide.\textsuperscript{24} In March 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina invoked the Genocide Convention before the International Court of Justice in an application directed against Serbia and


\textsuperscript{24} ‘The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, GA Res. 47/121.
Montenegro. The Court issued two provisional orders on the basis of the Convention, the first time that it had applied the instrument in a contentious case.\(^{25}\) A month later, the Security Council created an *ad hoc* tribunal for the former Yugoslavia with subject matter jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, as defined by the Convention.\(^{26}\)

In April 1993, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions of the Commission on Human Rights warned of acts of genocide in Rwanda against the Tutsi minority, echoing the conclusions of an international fact-finding mission composed of non-governmental organizations that had visited the country some weeks earlier.\(^{27}\) The warnings were ignored by the international community and, in April 1994, genocidal extremists within Rwanda put into effect their evil plan physically to destroy the Tutsi. The Security Council visibly flinched at the word ‘genocide’ in its resolutions dealing with Rwanda, betraying the concerns of several members that use of the ‘g-word’ might have onerous legal consequences in terms of their obligations under the Convention. Eventually, the Security Council set up a second *ad hoc* tribunal with jurisdiction over the Rwandan genocide of 1994.\(^{28}\) On 2 September 1998, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda issued its first conviction for the crime of genocide.\(^{29}\)

Some may have legitimately questioned, in the 1970s and 1980s, whether the Genocide Convention was no more than an historical curiosity, somewhat like the early treaties against the slave trade whose significance is now largely symbolic. The emergence of large-scale ethnic conflicts in the final years of the millennium has proven such a hopeful assessment premature. The Genocide Convention remains a fundamental component of the contemporary legal protection of human rights. The issue is no longer one of stretching the Convention to apply to circumstances for which it may never have been meant, but rather one of implementing the Convention in the very cases contemplated by


\(^{26}\) UN Doc. S/RES/827.


\(^{28}\) UN Doc. S/RES/955.

its drafters in 1948. The new challenges for the jurist presented by the application of the Convention are the substance of this study.

Thus, the focus here is on interpreting the definition and addressing the problems involved in both the prosecution and defence of charges of genocide when committed by individuals. The criticisms of lacunae or weaknesses in the Convention will be considered, but I understand the definition as it stands to be adequate and appropriate. While genocide is a crime that is, fortunately, rarely committed, it remains a feature of contemporary society. It has become apparent that there are undesirable consequences to enlarging or diluting the definition of genocide. This weakens the terrible stigma associated with the crime and demeans the suffering of its victims. It is also likely to enfeeble whatever commitment States may believe they have to prevent the crime. The broader and more uncertain the definition, the less responsibility States will be prepared to assume. This can hardly be consistent with the new orientation of human rights law, and of the human rights movement, which is aimed at the eradication of impunity and the assurance of human security.

Why is genocide so stigmatized? In my view, this is precisely due to the rigours of the definition and its clear focus on crimes aimed at the eradication of ethnic minorities or, to use the Convention terminology, ‘national, racial, ethnical and religious groups’. Human rights law knows of many terrible offences: torture, disappearances, slavery, child labour, apartheid, and enforced prostitution, to name a few. For the victims, it may seem appalling to be told that, while these crimes are serious, others are still more serious. Yet, since the beginnings of criminal law society has made such distinctions, establishing degrees of crime and imposing a scale of sentences and other sanctions in proportion to the social denunciation of the offence. Even homicide knows degrees, from manslaughter to premeditated murder and, in some legal systems, patricide or regicide. The reasons society qualifies one crime as being more serious than another are not always clear and frequently obey a rationale that law alone cannot explain. Nor does the fact that a crime is considered less serious than another mean that it is in some way trivialized or overlooked. But in any hierarchy, something must sit at the top. The crime of genocide belongs at the apex of the pyramid. It is, as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has stated so appropriately in its first judgments, the ‘crime of crimes’.30

For decades, the Genocide Convention has been asked to bear a burden for which it was never intended, essentially because of the relatively underdeveloped state of international law dealing with accountability for human rights violations. In cases of mass killings and other atrocities, attention turned inexorably to the Genocide Convention because there was little else to invoke. This, too, has changed in recent years. The law applicable to atrocities that may not meet the strict definition of genocide but that cry out for punishment has been significantly strengthened. Such offences usually fit within the definition of ‘crimes against humanity’, a broader concept that might be viewed as the second tier of the pyramid. According to the most recent definition, comprised within the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, crimes against humanity include persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.\(^{31}\) This contemporary approach to crimes against humanity is really no more than the ‘expanded’ definition of genocide that many have argued for over the years.\(^{32}\)

One of the main reasons why the international community felt compelled to draft the Genocide Convention in 1948 was the inadequate scope given to the notion of ‘crimes against humanity’ at the time. When the International Military Tribunal judged the Nazis at Nuremberg for the destruction of the European Jews, it convicted them of crimes against humanity, not genocide. But the Nuremberg Charter seemed to indicate that crimes against humanity could only be committed in time of war, not a critical obstacle to the Nazi prosecutions but a troubling precedent for the future protection of human rights.\(^{33}\) The *travaux préparatoires* of the Charter leave no doubt that the connection or nexus between war and crimes against humanity was a *sine qua non*, because the great powers that drafted it were loathe to

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\(^{31}\) ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 11 above, art. 7(1)(h).  

\(^{32}\) *Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana*, note 18 above, para. 89. The Rwanda Tribunal observes that the correspondence between genocide and crimes against humanity is not perfect. Specifically, crimes against humanity must be directed against a ‘civilian population’, whereas genocide is directed against ‘members of a group’, without reference to civilian or military status (*ibid.*, para. 631). This may be splitting hairs, because the nature of genocide requires in practice that it be directed against a ‘civilian population’, even if individual victims may also be combatants. Recently, Leslie Green has argued that ‘it is time to dispense with the differentiation between genocide, grave breaches and war crimes. All of these are but examples of the more generically termed “crimes against humanity”.’ L. C. Green, ‘“Grave Breaches” or Crimes Against Humanity’, (1997–8) 8 USAF Academy Journal of Legal Studies, p. 19 at p. 29.  

\(^{33}\) Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), annex, (1951) 82 UNTS 279, art. 6(c).
admit the notion, as a general and universal principle, that the international community might legitimately interest itself in what a State did to its own minorities.\(^{34}\)

Thus, the Genocide Convention, not the Nuremberg Charter, first recognized the idea that gross human rights violations committed in the absence of an armed conflict are nevertheless of international concern, and attract international prosecution. In order to avoid any ambiguity and acutely conscious of the limitations of the Nuremberg Charter, the drafters of the Convention decided not to describe genocide as a form of crime against humanity, although only after protracted debate.\(^ {35}\) Accordingly, article I of the Convention confirms that genocide may be committed in time of peace as well as in time of war.\(^ {36}\) But it now seems generally accepted that genocide inheres within the broader concept of crimes against humanity.\(^ {37}\)

\(^{34}\) The drafting of the ‘crimes against humanity’ provision of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal is discussed in chapter 1, at pp. 30–7 below. The original draft genocide convention, proposed by Saudi Arabia in 1946, described it as ‘an international crime against humanity’ (UN Doc. A/C.6/86). But GA Res. 96(I) avoided such a qualification (UN Doc. E/623/Add.1; UN Doc. E/AC.25/3) and the distinction was reinforced in GA Res. 180(II) of December 1947. At the time, France was one of the principal advocates of genocide being viewed as a crime against humanity (e.g., UN Doc. A/401/Add.3; UN Doc. A/AC.10/29). The final versioneschewed any reference to crimes against humanity (for the debates in the Sixth Committee, see UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.67).


Since 1948, the law concerning crimes against humanity has evolved substantially. That crimes against humanity may be committed in time of peace as well as war has been recognized in the case law of the *ad hoc* international tribunals,\(^{38}\) and codified in the Rome Statute.\(^{39}\) Arguably, the obligations upon States found in the Genocide Convention now apply *mutatis mutandis*, on a customary basis, in the case of crimes against humanity. Therefore, the alleged gap between crimes against humanity and genocide has narrowed considerably. This makes the debate about the distinction between the two, in terms of the stigma the two categories involve, all the more significant. The practical consequences of the distinction are now less important. In fact, from a prosecutor's standpoint it is generally easier to prove crimes against humanity than it is to prove genocide. But the interest in defining a separate offence of genocide persists. If the result is to insist upon the supreme heinousness of 'racial hatred', for want of a better term, and to reiterate society's condemnation of the mass killings of Jews, Tutsis and Armenians, to cite the primary historical examples of the past century, the distinction retains and deserves all of its significance. Genocide stands to crimes against humanity as premeditated murder stands to intentional homicide.

This study follows, in a general sense, the structure of the Convention itself, after an initial presentation of the origins of the norm. An inaugural chapter, with an historical focus, addresses the development of international legal efforts to prosecute genocide, up to and including the Nuremberg trial. The second chapter surveys the process of drafting the Convention, as well as subsequent normative activity within United Nations bodies such as the Security Council and the International Law Commission. Chapters 3 to 6 examine the definition of genocide set out in articles II and III, reviewing the groups protected by the Convention, the *mens rea* or mental element of the offence, the *actus reus* or physical element of the offence, and the punishable acts, including acts of participation such as conspiracy, complicity and attempt. Admissible defences to the crime of genocide are considered in chapter 7. Domestic and international prosecution of genocide, matters raised by articles V, VI and VII of the Convention, comprise chapter 9. Chapter 9 deals with State responsibility for genocide, an issue addressed indirectly by several provisions of the Convention, including article IX. Chapter 10 is devoted to the prevention of

\(^{38}\) *Prosecutor v. Tadic* (Case No. IT–94–1–AR72), *ibid.*, paras. 78, 140, 141.

\(^{39}\) *Supra* note 12, art. 7.
genocide, a question of vital importance but one considered only incompletely in the Convention, principally by articles I and VIII. A variety of treaty law matters addressed in articles X to XIX of the Convention are examined in chapter 11. The law is up to date as of 31 December 1999.
1 Origins of the legal prohibition of genocide

Winston Churchill called genocide ‘the crime without a name’. A few years later, the term ‘genocide’ was coined by Raphael Lemkin in his 1944 work, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. Rarely has a neologism had such rapid success. Within little more than a year of its introduction to the English language, it was being used in the indictment of the International Military Tribunal, and within two, it was the subject of a United Nations General Assembly resolution. But the resolution spoke in the past tense, describing genocide as crimes which ‘have occurred’. By the time the General Assembly completed its standard setting, with the 1948 adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ‘genocide’ had a detailed and quite technical definition as a crime against the law of nations. Yet the preamble of that instrument recognizes ‘that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity’.

This study is principally concerned with genocide as a legal norm. The origins of criminal prosecution of genocide begin with the recognition that persecution of ethnic, national and religious minorities was not only morally outrageous, it might also incur legal liability. As a general rule, genocide involves violent crimes against the person, including murder. Because these crimes have been deemed anti-social since time immemorial, in a sense there is nothing new in prosecution of genocide to the extent that it overlaps with the crimes of homicide and assault. Yet genocide almost invariably escaped prosecution because it was virtually

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3 Lemkin later wrote that ‘[a]n important factor in the comparatively quick reception of the concept of genocide in international law was the understanding and support of this idea by the press of the United States and other countries’: Raphael Lemkin, ‘Genocide as a Crime in International Law’, (1947) 41 AJIL 145, p. 149, n. 9.  
always committed at the behest and with the complicity of those in power. Historically, its perpetrators were above the law, at least within their own countries, except in rare cases involving a change in regime. In human history, the concept of international legal norms from which no State may derogate has emerged only relatively recently. This is, of course, the story of the international protection of human rights. The prohibition of persecution of ethnic groups runs like a golden thread through the defining moments of the history of human rights.

International law’s role in the protection of national, racial, ethnic and religious groups from persecution can be traced to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which provided certain guarantees for religious minorities. Other early treaties contemplated the protection of Christian minorities within the Ottoman empire and of francophone Roman Catholics within British North America. These concerns with the rights of national, ethnic and religious groups evolved into a doctrine of humanitarian intervention which was invoked to justify military activity on some occasions during the nineteenth century.

International human rights law can also trace its origins to the law of armed conflict, or international humanitarian law. Codification of the law of armed conflict began in the nineteenth century. In its early years, this was oriented to the protection of medical personnel and the prohibition of certain types of weapons. The Hague Regulations of 1907 reflect the focus on combatants but include a section concerning the treatment of civilian populations in occupied territories. In particular, article 46 requires an occupying belligerent to respect ‘[f]amily honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice’. Moreover, the preamble to the Hague Regulations contains the promising ‘Martens clause’, which states that ‘the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages

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6 For example, Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey, signed at Adrianople, 14 September 1829, BFSP XVI, p. 647, arts. V and VII.

7 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between France and Great Britain, signed at Utrecht, 11 April 1713, Dumont VIII, Part 1, p. 339, art. 14; Definitive Treaty of Peace between France, Great Britain and Spain, signed at Paris, 10 February 1763, BFSP I, pp. 422 and 645, art. IV.


9 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War by Land, [1910] UKTS 9, annex, art. 46. See Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case No. IT–94–1–AR72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 56.
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the
dictates of the public conscience’. But aside from sparse references to
cultural and religious institutions, nothing in the Regulations suggests
any particular focus on vulnerable national or ethnic minorities.

Early developments in the prosecution of ‘genocide’

The new world order that emerged in the aftermath of the First World
War, and that to some extent was reflected in the 1919 peace treaties,
manifested a growing role for the international protection of human
rights. Two aspects of the post-war regime are of particular relevance to
the study of genocide. First, the need for special protection of national
minorities was recognized. This took the form of a web of treaties,
bilateral and multilateral, as well as unilateral declarations. The world
also saw the first attempt to establish an international criminal court,
accompanied by the suggestion that massacres of ethnic minorities
within a State’s own borders might give rise to both State and individual
responsibility.

The wartime atrocities committed against the Armenian population
in the Ottoman Empire had been met with a joint declaration from the
governments of France, Great Britain and Russia, dated 24 May 1915,
asserting that ‘[i]n the presence of these new crimes of Turkey against
humanity and civilization, the allied Governments publicly inform the
Sublime Porte that they will hold personally responsible for the said
crimes all members of the Ottoman Government as well as those of its
agents who are found to be involved in such massacres’. It has been
suggested that this constitutes the first use, at least within an inter-

10 Ibid., preamble. The Martens clause first appeared in 1899 in Convention (II) with
respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247, 91
BFST 988.
11 Ibid., art. 56.
12 In 1914, an international commission of inquiry considered atrocities committed
against national minorities during the Balkan wars to be violations of the 1907 Hague
Regulations: Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and
Conduct of the Balkan Wars, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1914, pp. 230–4. The section entitled ‘Extermination, Emigration, Assimila-
tion’, pp. 148–58, documents acts that we would now characterize as genocide or

York: St Martin’s Press, 1991; R. Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origin of the

14 English translation quoted in United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the
United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War, London:
His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1948, p. 35.
national law context, of the term ‘crimes against humanity’.

At the time, United States Secretary of State Robert Lansing admitted what he called the ‘more or less justifiable’ right of the Turkish government to deport the Armenians to the extent that they lived ‘within the zone of military operations’. But, he said, ‘[i]t was not to my mind the deporta-
tion which was objectionable but the horrible brutality which attended its execution. It is one of the blackest pages in the history of this war, and I think we were fully justified in intervening as we did on behalf of the wretched people, even though they were Turkish subjects.’

**Versailles and the Leipzig trials**

The idea of an international war crimes trial had been proposed by Lord Curzon at a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet on 20 November 1918. The British emphasized trying the Kaiser and other leading Germans, and there was little or no interest in accountability for the persecution of innocent minorities such as the Armenians in Turkey.

The objective was to punish ‘those who were responsible for the War or for atrocious offences against the laws of war’. As Lloyd George explained, ‘[t]here was also a growing feeling that war itself was a crime against humanity’. At the second plenary session of the Paris Peace Conference, on 25 January 1919, a Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties was created. Composed of fifteen representatives of the victorious powers, the Commission was mandated to inquire into and to report upon the

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violations of international law committed by Germany and its allies during the course of the war.

The Commission’s report used the expression ‘Violations of the Laws and Customs of War and of the Laws of Humanity’.\footnote{Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of America and Japanese Members of the Commission of Responsibilities, Conference of Paris, 1919, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919, p. 23.} Some of these breaches came close to the criminal behaviour now defined as genocide or crimes against humanity and involved the persecution of ethnic minorities or groups. Under the rubric of ‘attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory’, the Commission cited many offences in Serbia committed by Bulgarian, German and Austrian authorities, including prohibition of the Serb language, ‘[p]eople beaten for saying “good morning” in Serbian’, destruction of archives of churches and law courts, and the closing of schools.\footnote{Ibid., p. 39} As for ‘wanton destruction of religious, charitable, educational and historic buildings and monuments’, there were examples from Serbia and Macedonia of attacks on schools, monasteries, churches and ancient inscriptions by the Bulgarian authorities.\footnote{Ibid., p. 48.}

The legal basis for qualifying these acts as war crimes was not explained, although the Report might have referred to Chapter III of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which codified rules applicable to the occupied territory of an enemy.\footnote{Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War by Land, note 9 above.} But nothing in the Hague Regulations suggested their application to anything but the territory of an occupied belligerent. Indeed, there was no indication in the Commission’s report that the Armenian genocide fell within the scope of its mandate.\footnote{However, see Dadrian, ‘Genocide as a Problem’, p. 279, n. 210.} The Commission proposed the establishment of an international ‘High Tribunal’, and urged ‘that all enemy persons alleged to have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity’ be excluded from any amnesty and be brought before either national tribunals or the High Tribunal.\footnote{Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, note 22 above, p. 25.}

A ‘Memorandum of Reservations’ submitted by the United States challenged many of the legal premises of the Commission, including the entire notion of crimes against the ‘Laws of Humanity’. The American submission stated that ‘[t]he laws and principles of humanity vary with the individual, which, if for no other reason, should exclude them from consideration in a court of justice, especially one charged with the administration of criminal law’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 64. See also p. 73.} The United States also took issue with
the suggestion that heads of State be tried for ‘acts of state’,\(^{29}\) and that leaders be deemed liable for the acts of their subordinates.\(^{30}\) But while clearly lukewarm to the idea, the American delegation did not totally oppose the convening of war crimes trials. However, it said efforts should be confined to matters undoubtedly within the scope of the term ‘laws and customs of war’, which provided ‘a standard certain, to be found in books of authority and in the practice of nations’.

The Japanese members also submitted dissenting comments, but these were considerably more succinct, and did not focus on the issue of crimes against humanity.

At the Peace Conference itself, Nicolas Politis, Greek Foreign Minister and a member of the Commission of Fifteen, proposed creating a new category of war crimes, designated ‘crimes against the laws of humanity’, intended to cover the massacres of the Armenians.\(^{32}\) Woodrow Wilson protested a measure he considered to be \textit{ex post facto} law.\(^{33}\) Wilson eventually withdrew his opposition, but he felt that in any case such efforts would be ineffectual.\(^{34}\) At the meeting of the Council of Four on 2 April 1919, Lloyd George said it was important to judge those responsible ‘for acts against individuals, atrocities of all sorts committed under orders’.

Although article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles stipulated that Kaiser Wilhelm II was to be tried, this never took place because of the refusal of the Netherlands to extradite him. Articles 228 to 230 allowed for the creation of international war crimes tribunals, the first in history.\(^{36}\) They were to try persons accused of violating the laws and customs of war, yet in deference to the American objections the Treaty of Versailles did not

\(^{29}\) Citing \textit{Schooner Exchange} v. \textit{McFaddon et al.}, 7 Cranch 116, in support.

\(^{30}\) ‘It is one thing to punish a person who committed, or, possessing the authority, ordered others to commit an act constituting a crime; it is quite another thing to punish a person who failed to prevent, to put an end to, or to repress violations of the laws or customs of war’, said the American dissent: \textit{Violations of the Laws and Customs of War}, note 22 above, p. 72.

\(^{31}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 64.

\(^{32}\) Dadrian, ‘Genocide as a Problem’, p. 278.


Genocide in international law

refer to ‘crimes against the laws of humanity’. The new German government voted to accept the treaty, but conditionally, and it refused the war criminals clauses, noting that its penal code prevented the surrender of Germans to a foreign government for prosecution and punishment.³⁷ A compromise was effected, deemed compatible with article 228 of the Versailles Treaty, whereby the Supreme Court of the Empire in Leipzig would judge those charged by the Allies. Germany opposed arraignment of most of those chosen for prosecution by the Allies, arguing that the trial of its military and naval elite could imperil the government’s existence.³⁸ In the end, only a handful of German soldiers were tried, for atrocities in prisoner of war camps and sinking of hospital ships.³⁹ A Commission of Allied jurists set up to examine the results at Leipzig concluded ‘that in the case of those condemned the sentences were not adequate’.⁴⁰

The Treaty of Sèvres and the Armenian genocide

With regard to Turkey, the Allies considered prosecution for mistreatment of prisoners, who were mostly British, but also for ‘deportations and massacres’, in other words, the persecution of the Armenian minority.⁴¹ The British High Commissioner, Admiral Calthorpe, informed the Turkish Foreign Minister on 18 January 1919 that ‘His Majesty’s Government are resolved to have proper punishment inflicted on those responsible for Armenian massacres’.⁴² Calthorpe’s subsequent dispatch to London said he had informed the Turkish government that British statesmen ‘had promised [the] civilized world that persons connected would be held personally responsible and that it was [the] firm intention of HM Government to fulfil [that] promise’.⁴³ Subsequently, the High Commission proposed the Turks be punished for the Armenian massacres by dismemberment of their Empire and the criminal trial of high officials to serve as an example.⁴⁴

London believed that prosecution could be based on ‘the common

³⁷ Goldberg, Peace to End Peace, p. 151.
⁴² FO 371/4174/118377 (folio 253), cited in ibid. ⁴³ Ibid.
law of war’, or ‘the customs of war and rules of international law’.\textsuperscript{45} Trials would be predicated on the concept that an occupying military regime is entitled to prosecute offenders on the territory where the crime has taken place because it is, in effect, exercising \textit{de facto} authority in place of the former national regime. Jurisdiction would not, therefore, be based on broader notions rooted in the concept of universality.

Under pressure from Allied military rulers, the Turkish authorities arrested and detained scores of their leaders, later releasing many as a result of public demonstrations and other pressure.\textsuperscript{46} In late May 1919, the British seized sixty-seven of the Turkish prisoners and spirited them away to more secure detention in Malta and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{47} But the British found that political considerations, including the growth of Kemalism and competition for influence with other European powers, made insistence on prosecutions increasingly untenable.\textsuperscript{48} In mid-1920, a political-legal officer at the British High Commission in Istanbul cautioned London of practical difficulties involved in prosecuting Turks for the Armenian massacres, including obtaining evidence.\textsuperscript{49} By late 1921, the British had negotiated a prisoner exchange agreement with the Turks, and the genocide suspects held in Malta were released.\textsuperscript{50}

Attempts by Turkish jurists to press for trial before the national courts of those responsible for the atrocities were slightly more successful.\textsuperscript{51} Prosecuted on the basis of the domestic penal code, several ministers in the wartime cabinet and leaders of the Ittihad party were found guilty by a court martial, on 5 July 1919, of ‘the organization and execution of crime of massacre’ against the Armenian minority.\textsuperscript{52} The criminals were sentenced, \textit{in absentia}, to capital punishment or lengthy terms of imprisonment.\textsuperscript{53}

According to the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on 10 August 1920, Turkey recognized the right of trial ‘notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Turkey’ (art. 226), and was obliged to surrender ‘all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by name or by rank, office or employment which they held under Turkish authori-

\textsuperscript{45} FO 371/4174/129560 (folios 430–1), cited in \textit{ibid.}, p. 283.
\textsuperscript{46} Dadrian, ‘Genocide as a Problem’, p. 284. \textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 285.
\textsuperscript{48} FO 371/4174/156721 (folios 523–4), cited in \textit{ibid.}, p. 286.
\textsuperscript{49} FO 371/6500, W.2178, appendix A (folios 385–118 and 386–119), cited in \textit{ibid.}, p. 287.
\textsuperscript{50} Dadrian, ‘Genocide as a Problem’, pp. 288–9.
\textsuperscript{52} Cited in Dadrian, ‘Genocide as a Problem’, p. 307.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 310–15.
ties'. This formulation was similar to the war crimes clauses in the Treaty of Versailles. But the Treaty of Sèvres contained a major innovation, contemplating prosecution of what we now define as ‘crimes against humanity’ as well as of war crimes. Pursuant to article 230:

The Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers the persons whose surrender may be required by the latter as being responsible for the massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire on the 1st August, 1914. The Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to designate the Tribunal which shall try the persons so accused, and the Turkish Government undertakes to recognise such Tribunal. In the event of the League of Nations having created in sufficient time a Tribunal competent to deal with the said massacres, the Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to bring the accused persons mentioned above before the Tribunal, and the Turkish Government undertakes equally to recognise such Tribunal.

However, the Treaty of Sèvres was never ratified. As Kay Holloway wrote, the failure of the signatories to bring the treaty into force ‘resulted in the abandonment of thousands of defenceless peoples – Armenians and Greeks – to the fury of their persecutors, by engendering subsequent holocausts in which the few survivors of the 1915 Armenian massacres perished’. The Treaty of Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923 that included a ‘Declaration of Amnesty’ for all offences committed between 1 August 1914 and 20 November 1922.

Inter-war developments

The post-First World War efforts at international prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity were a failure. Nevertheless, the idea had been launched. Over the next two decades criminal law specialists turned their attention to a series of proposals for the repression of international crimes. The first emerged from the work of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, appointed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1920 and assigned to draw up plans for the international judicial institutions. One of the members, Baron Descamps of Belgium, proposed the establishment of a ‘high court of international justice’.

56 Ibid.
58 Treaty of Lausanne Between Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey, (1923) 28 LNTS 11.
Borrowing language from the Martens clause in the preamble to the Hague Convention, Descamps wrote that the jurisdiction of the court might include not only rules ‘recognized by the civilized nations but also by the demands of public conscience [and] the dictates of the legal conscience of civilized nations’. However, as a result of American pressure, his formulation was later changed to ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’. In any case, the Third Committee of the Assembly of the League declared Descamps’ ideas ‘premature’.59

The International Law Association and the International Association of Penal Law also studied the question of international criminal jurisdictions.60 These efforts culminated, in 1937, in the adoption of a treaty by the League of Nations contemplating establishment of an international criminal court.61 A year later, the Eighth International Conference of American States, held in Lima, considered criminalizing ‘[p]ersecution for racial or religious motives’.62 Hitler was, tragically, one step ahead. Only after his genocidal policies were ineluctably underway did the law begin to assume its pivotal role in the repression of the crime of genocide.

Also in the aftermath of the First World War, the international community constructed a system of protection for national minorities that, inter alia, guaranteed to these groups the ‘right to life’.63 It is almost as if international lawmakers sensed the coming Holocaust. Their focus was on vulnerable groups identified by nationality, ethnicity and religion, the very groups that would bear the brunt of Nazi persecution and ultimately mandate development of the law of genocide. According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the minorities treaties were intended to ‘secure for certain elements incorporated in a State, the population of which differs from them in race, language

60 Ibid., paras. 18–25.
63 Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, and Poland, [1919] TS 8, art. 2: ‘Poland undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion’. Similarly Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Roumania, (1921) 5 LNTS 336, art. 1; Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia, [1919] TS 20, art. 1; Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, [1919] TS 17, art. 1.
or religion, the possibility of living peaceably alongside that population and co-operating amicably with it, while at the same time preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the majority, and satisfying the ensuing special needs. According to Hersh Lauterpacht, ‘the system of Minorities Treaties failed to afford protection in many cases of flagrant violation and although it acquired a reputation for impotence, with the result that after a time the minorities often refrained from resorting to petitions in cases where a stronger faith in the effectiveness of the system would have prompted them to seek a remedy’. Yet to a certain and limited extent their provisions stalled the advance of Nazism. In Upper Silesia, for example, the Nazis delayed introduction of racist laws because this would have violated the applicable international norms. Jews in the region, protected by a bilateral treaty between Poland and Germany, were sheltered from the Nuremberg laws and continued to enjoy equal rights, at least until the convention’s expiry in 1937. The minorities treaties are one of the forerunners of the modern international human rights legal system. They contributed the context for the work of Raphael Lemkin, who viewed the lack of punishment for gross violations to be among their major flaws. Lemkin’s pioneering work on genocide is to a large extent the direct descendant of the minorities treaties of the inter-war years.

Raphael Lemkin

Raphael Lemkin was born in eastern Poland, near the town of Bezwodene. He worked in his own country as a lawyer, prosecutor and university teacher. By the 1930s, internationally known as a scholar in the field of international criminal law, he participated as a rapporteur in such important meetings as the Conferences on the Unification of Criminal Law. A Jew, Lemkin fled Poland in 1939, making his way to Sweden and then to the United States, finding work at Duke University and later at Yale University. He initiated the World Movement to Outlaw Genocide, working tirelessly to promote legal norms directed against the crime. Lemkin was present and actively involved, largely

64 Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 6 April 1935, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 64, p. 17.
Origins of the legal prohibition of genocide

behind the scenes but also as a consultant to the Secretary-General, throughout the drafting of the Genocide Convention. ‘Never in the history of the United Nations has one private individual conducted such a lobby’, wrote John P. Humphrey in his diaries.\textsuperscript{68}

Lemkin created the term ‘genocide’ from two words, \textit{genos}, which means race, nation or tribe in ancient Greek,\textsuperscript{69} and \textit{caedere}, meaning to kill in Latin.\textsuperscript{70} As an alternative, he considered the ancient Greek term \textit{ethnos}, which denotes essentially the same concept as \textit{genos}.\textsuperscript{71} Lemkin proposed the following definition of genocide:

\begin{quote}
[\textit{A} co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objective of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group.\textsuperscript{72}]
\end{quote}

Lemkin’s definition was narrow, in that it addressed crimes directed against ‘national groups’ rather than against ‘groups’ in general. At the same time, it was broad, to the extent that it contemplated not only physical genocide but also acts aimed at destroying the culture and livelihood of the group.

Lemkin’s interest in the subject dated to his days as a student at Lvov University, when he intently followed attempts to prosecute the perpetrators of the massacres of the Armenians.\textsuperscript{73} In 1933, he proposed the recognition of two new international crimes, ‘vandalism’ and ‘barbarity’

\textsuperscript{70} During the drafting of the Convention, some pedants complained the term was an unfortunate mixture of Latin and Greek, and that it would be better to use the term ‘generocide’, with pure Latin roots: UN Doc. A/PV.123 (Henriquez Ureña, Dominican Republic).
\textsuperscript{71} Since Lemkin, the term ‘ethnocide’ has also entered the vocabulary, mainly in the French language, and is generally used to refer to cultural genocide, particularly with respect to indigenous peoples.
\textsuperscript{72} Raphael Lemkin, \textit{Axis Rule}, p. 79.
(barbarie), in a report to the Fifth International Conference for the Unification of Penal Law.\textsuperscript{74} For Lemkin, ‘vandalism’ constituted a crime of destruction of art and culture in general, because these are the property of ‘l’humanité civilisée qui, liée par d’innombrables liens, tire toute entière les profits des efforts de ses fils, les plus géniaux, dont les œuvres entrent en possession de tous et augmentent leur culture’. In other words, the cultural objects in question belonged to humanity as a whole, and consequently humanity as a whole had an interest in their protection.\textsuperscript{75} As for the crime of barbarie, this comprised acts directed against a defenceless ‘racial, religious or social collectivity’, such as massacres, pogroms, collective cruelties directed against women and children and treatment of men that humiliates their dignity. Elements of the crime included violence associated with anti-social and cruel motives, systematic and organized acts, and measures directed not against individuals but against the population as a whole or a racial or religious group.\textsuperscript{76} Lemkin credited the Romanian jurist Vespasien V. Pella with authorship of the concept, which appears in Pella’s report to the third International Congress on Penal Law, held at Palermo in 1933.\textsuperscript{77}

\textit{Axis Rule in Occupied Europe}

A decade later, in his volume, \textit{Axis Rule in Occupied Europe}, Lemkin affirmed that the crimes he had recommended in 1933 ‘would amount to the actual conception of genocide’.\textsuperscript{78} But, as Sir Hartley Shawcross noted during the 1946 General Assembly debate, the 1933 conference rejected Lemkin’s proposal.\textsuperscript{79} During the war, Lemkin lamented the fact that, had his initiative succeeded, prosecution of Nazi atrocities would have been possible.\textsuperscript{80} But the Allies proceeded anyway, on the basis of a definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ that encompassed ‘extermination’ and ‘persecutions on political, racial or religious

\textsuperscript{74} Lemkin, \textit{Axis Rule}, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 55. See also Raphael Lemkin, ‘Genocide as a Crime in International Law’, (1947) 41 AJIL, p. 145 at p. 146.
\textsuperscript{77} Lemkin cited the provisional proceedings of the 1933 meeting, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 55, n. 11.
\textsuperscript{78} Lemkin, \textit{Axis Rule}, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{79} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.22 (Shawcross, United Kingdom). The conference proceedings do not show that the proposal was defeated; it appears to have been quietly dropped by a drafting committee preparing a text for the Second Commission of the Conference: de Asua, Pella and Arroyo, \textit{Ve\textsuperscript{c} Conférence}, p. 246.
\textsuperscript{80} Lemkin, \textit{Axis Rule}, p. 92.
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The International Military Tribunal and other post-war courts consistently dismissed arguments that this constituted *ex post facto* criminal law.82

‘New conceptions require new terms’, explained Lemkin. Noting that ‘genocide’ referred to the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group, he described it as ‘an old practice in its modern development’. Genocide did not necessarily imply the immediate destruction of a national or ethnic group, but rather different actions aiming at the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of the group, with the aim of annihilating the group as such. ‘The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.’83

The major part of *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* consisted of laws and decrees of the Axis powers and of their puppet regimes for the government of occupied areas. These were analyzed in detailed commentaries. One chapter of the book was devoted to the subject of the new crime of genocide. Lemkin defined several categories of genocide. Basing his examples on the practice of the Nazis in occupied Europe, he wrote that genocide was effected:

through a synchronized attack on different aspects of life of the captive peoples: in the political field (by destroying institutions of self-government and imposing a German pattern of administration, and through colonization by Germans); the social field (by disrupting the social cohesion of the nation involved and killing or removing elements such as the intelligentsia, which provide spiritual leaderships – according to Hitler’s statement in *Mein Kampf*, ‘the greatest of spirits can be liquidated if its bearer is beaten to death with a rubber truncheon’); in the cultural field (by prohibiting or destroying cultural institutions and cultural activities; by substituting vocational education for education in the liberal arts, in order to prevent humanistic thinking, which the occupant considers dangerous because it promotes national thinking); in the economic field (by shifting the wealth to Germans and by prohibiting the exercise of trades and occupations by people who do not promote Germanism ‘without reservations’); in the biological field (by a policy of depopulation and by promoting procreation by Germans in the occupied countries); in the field of physical

81 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), annex, (1951) 82 UNTS 279, art. 6(c).


83 Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, p. 79.
existence (by introducing a starvation rationing system for non-Germans and by mass killings, mainly of Jews, Poles, Slovenes, and Russians); in the religious field (by interfering with the activities of the Church, which in many countries provides not only spiritual but also national leadership); in the field of morality (by attempts to create an atmosphere of moral debasement through promoting pornographic publications and motion pictures, and the excessive consumption of alcohol).

Lemkin identified two phases in genocide, the first being the destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group, and the second, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. He referred to the war crimes commission established in 1919, which had used the term ‘denationalization’ to describe the phenomenon. Lemkin also cited remarks by Hitler, speaking to Rauschning:

It will be one of the chief tasks of German statesmanship for all time to prevent, by every means in our power, the further increase of the Slav races. Natural instincts bid all living beings not merely conquer their enemies, but also destroy them. In former days, it was the victor’s prerogative to destroy entire tribes, entire peoples. By doing this gradually and without bloodshed, we demonstrate our humanity. We should remember, too, that we are merely doing unto others as they would have done to us.

Yet Lemkin observed that while some groups were to be ‘Germanized’ (Dutch, Norwegians, Flemings, Luxemburgers), others did not figure in the Nazi plans (Poles, Slovenes, Serbs), and, as for the Jews, they were to be destroyed altogether.

Lemkin wrote of the existence of ‘techniques of genocide in various fields’ and then described them, including political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious and moral genocide. Political genocide – not to be confused with genocide of political groups, which Lemkin did not view as falling within the definition – entailed the destruction of a group’s political institutions, including such matters as forced name changes and other types of ‘Germanization’. On the subject of physical destruction, Lemkin said it primarily transpired through racial discrimination in feeding, endangering of health, and outright mass killings.

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84 Ibid., pp. xi–xii. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. In a subsequent article, Lemkin suggest that ‘denationalization’ had been used in the past to describe genocide-like crimes: Lemkin, ‘Le crime de génocide’, p. 372. See the discussion on genocide-like war crimes in the note accompanying United States of America v. Greifelt et al., (1948) 13 LRTWC 1 (United States Military Tribunal), p. 42. Specific cases of the war crime of ‘denationalization’ were also considered by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, History, p. 488.


88 Lemkin, Axis Rule, p. 82. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid., pp. 87–9.
The chapter on genocide concluded with ‘recommendations for the future’, calling for the ‘prohibition of genocide in war and peace’.\(^91\) Lemkin insisted upon the relationship between genocide and the growing interest in the protection of peoples and minorities by the post-First World War treaties. He noted the need to revisit international legal instruments, pointing out particularly the inadequacies of the Hague Regulations.\(^92\) For Lemkin, the Hague Regulations dealt with technical rules concerning occupation, ‘but they are silent regarding the preservation of the integrity of a people’.\(^93\) Lemkin urged their revision in order to incorporate a definition of genocide. ‘\textit{De lege ferenda}, the definition of genocide in the Hague Regulations thus amended should consist of two essential parts: in the first should be included every action infringing upon the life, liberty, health, corporal integrity, economic existence, and the honour of the inhabitants when committed because they belong to a national, religious, or racial group; and in the second, every policy aiming at the destruction or the aggrandizement of one of such groups to the prejudice or detriment of another’.\(^94\) Lemkin also said that the Hague Regulations should be modified ‘to include an international controlling agency vested with specific powers, such as visiting the occupied countries and making inquiries as to the manner in which the occupant treats natives in prison’.\(^95\) But he also signalled the great shortcoming of the Hague Regulations: their limited application to circumstances of international armed conflict.

Lemkin observed that the system of minorities protection created following the First World War ‘proved to be inadequate because not every European country had a sufficient judicial machinery for the enforcement of its constitution’.\(^96\) He proposed the development of a new international multilateral treaty requiring States to provide for the introduction, in constitutions but also in domestic criminal codes, of norms protecting national, religious or racial minority groups from oppression and genocidal practices. Lemkin also had important recommendations with respect to criminal prosecution of perpetrators of genocide. ‘In order to prevent the invocation of the plea of superior orders’, argued Lemkin, ‘the liability of persons who order genocidal practices, as well as of persons who execute such orders, should be

\(^{91}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 90.
\(^{92}\) Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War by Land, note 9 above.
\(^{93}\) Lemkin, \textit{Axis Rule}, p. 90.
\(^{94}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 93.
\(^{95}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 94. Here Lemkin may be able to claim credit for conceiving of the fact-finding commission eventually provided for under article 90 of Protocol Additional I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (1979) 1125 UNTS 3, that was created in 1991.
\(^{96}\) Lemkin, \textit{Axis Rule}, p. 93.
provided expressly by the criminal codes of the respective countries.’ Finally, Lemkin urged that the principle of universal repression or universal jurisdiction be adopted for the crime of genocide. Lemkin made the analogy with other offences that are delicta juris gentium such as ‘white slavery’, trade in children and piracy, saying genocide should be added to the list of such crimes.97

**Prosecuting the Nazis**

During the Second World War activity intensified with regard to the creation of an international criminal court and the international prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity. An unofficial body, the League of Nations Union, established what was known as the ‘London International Assembly’ to work on the problem. In October 1943, it proposed the establishment of an international criminal court whose jurisdiction was to encompass ‘crimes in respect of which no national court had jurisdiction (e.g. crimes committed against Jews) . . . [T]his category was meant to include offences subsequently described as crimes against humanity.’98 On 17 December 1942, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden declared in the House of Commons that reports had been received ‘regarding the barbarous and inhuman treatment to which Jews are being subjected in German-occupied Poland’, and that the Nazis were ‘now carrying into effect Hitler’s oft repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe’. Eden affirmed his government’s intention ‘to ensure that those responsible for these crimes shall not escape retribution’.99

**The United Nations War Crimes Commission**

The Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943 is generally viewed as the seminal statement of the Allied powers on the subject of war crimes prosecutions. While referring to ‘evidence of the atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions’ being perpetrated by the Nazis, and warning those responsible that they would be brought to book for their crimes, there was no direct reference to the racist aspect of the offences or an indication that they involved specific national, ethnic and religious groups such as the Jews of Europe.100 The United Nations Commission

97 Ibid., pp. 93–4 (italics in the original).
100 ‘Declaration on German Atrocities’, Department of State Publication 2298, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945, pp. 7–8. See also (1944) 38 AJIL, p. 5.
for the Investigation of War Crimes, established immediately prior to
the Moscow Declaration,\textsuperscript{101} was composed of representatives of most of
the Allies and chaired by Sir Cecil Hurst of the United Kingdom. It
initially agreed to use the list of offences that had been drafted by the
Responsibilities Commission of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as
the basis for its prosecutions. The enumeration was already recognized
for the purposes of international prosecution. In addition, Italy and
Japan had agreed to it, and Germany had never formally objected.\textsuperscript{102}

Although the 1919 list included the crime of ‘denationalization’ as
well as murder and ill-treatment of civilians, the Commission did not
initially consider that its mandate extended to prosecutions for the
extermination of European Jews. The Commission’s ‘Draft Convention
for the Establishment of a United Nations War Crimes Court’, prepared
in late 1944, was confined to ‘the commission of an offence against the
laws and customs of war’.\textsuperscript{103} Nevertheless, from an early stage in its
work, there were efforts to extend the jurisdiction of the Commission to
civilian atrocities committed against ethnic groups not only within
occupied territories but also those within Germany itself. In the Legal
Committee of the Commission, the United States representative
Herbert C. Pell used the term ‘crimes against humanity’ to describe
offences ‘committed against stateless persons or against any persons
because of their race or religion’.\textsuperscript{104} On 24 March 1944, President
Roosevelt referred in a speech to ‘the wholesale systematic murder of
the Jews of Europe’ and warned that ‘none who participate in these acts

\textsuperscript{101} United Nations War Crimes Commission, \textit{History}, p. 112; Arieh J. Kochavi, \textit{Prelude to
Nuremberg, Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment}, Chapel Hill, NC,
Foreign Office Versus the United Nations War Crimes Commission During the

\textsuperscript{102} ‘Transmission of Particulars of War Crimes to the Secretariat of the United Nations
War Crimes Commission, 13 December 1943’, NAC RG-25, Vol. 3033, 4060–40C,
Part Two.

\textsuperscript{103} ‘Draft Convention for the Establishment of a United Nations War Crimes Court’, UN
3033, 4060–40C, Part Four, art. 1(1).

In 1985, during debates about ratification of the Genocide Convention, United States
Senator Claiborne Pell said ‘this Convention has a very real personal meaning for me,
because it was through my father’s efforts as US Representative on the UN War
Crimes Commission that genocide was initially considered a war crime’: United States
of America, \textit{Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 5
United States of America, \textit{Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United
p. 40.
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of savagery shall go unpunished'.

Nevertheless, the State Department was decidedly lukewarm to the idea that war crimes prosecutions might innovate and hold Germans accountable for crimes committed against minority groups within their own borders.

In May 1944, the Legal Committee submitted a draft resolution to the plenary Commission urging it to adopt a broad view of its mandate, and to address ‘crimes committed against any persons without regard to nationality, stateless persons included, because of race, nationality, religious or political belief, irrespective of where they have been committed’. Studying what it called ‘crimes for reasons of race, nationality, religious or political creed’, the Commission considered that recommendations on ‘this vital and most important question’ should be sent to the Allied governments. On 31 May 1944, Hurst wrote to Foreign Secretary Eden: ‘A category of enemy atrocities which has deeply affected the public mind, but which does not fall strictly within the definition of war crimes, is undoubtedly the atrocities which have been committed on racial, political or religious grounds in enemy territory.’

The reply came from Lord Simon, the Lord Chancellor, on 23 August 1944:

This would open a very wide field. No doubt you have in mind particularly the atrocities committed against the Jews. I assume there is no doubt that the massacres which have occurred in occupied territories would come within the category of war crimes and there would be no question as to their being within the Commission’s terms of reference. No doubt they are part of a policy which the Nazi Government have adopted from the outset, and I can fully understand the Commission wishing to receive and consider and report on evidence which threw light on what one might describe as the extermination policy. I think I can probably express the view of His Majesty’s Government by saying that it would not desire the Commission to place any unnecessary restriction on the evidence which may be tendered to it on this general subject. I feel I should warn you, however, that the question of acts of this kind committed in enemy territory raises serious difficulties.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{105}}\text{Statement of the Acting Secretary of State, 1 February 1945, on War Criminals’, NAC RG-25, Vol. 3033, 4060–40C, Part Four.}\]


\[\text{\textsuperscript{107}}\text{United Nations War Crimes Commission, History, p. 176.}\]


\[\text{\textsuperscript{109}}\text{‘Correspondence Between the War Crimes Commission and HM Government in London Regarding the Punishment of Crimes Committed on Religious, Racial or Political Grounds’, UNWCC Doc. C.78, 15 February 1945, NAC RG-25, Vol. 3033, 4060–40C, Part Four.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{110}}\text{Ibid.}\]
As a compromise, Hurst thought the Commission might issue reports dealing with ‘special categories of the atrocities committed by the Axis Powers’ and that ‘[o]ne of these reports might well deal with this campaign for the extermination of the Jews as a whole’.111 Hurst also told the Commission that ‘Lord Wright was of opinion that the persecution of the Jews in Germany was, logically, a war crime, and that the Commission might have to consider extending its definition of war crimes’.112 Hurst presented his idea of preparing reports on ‘special categories’ and the Commission agreed with the approach.113 Hurst died in the midst of this work, but had already made preparations for the drafting of a report on ‘atrocities committed against the Jews’.114

The London Conference

The United States became the first to alter its position, as Washington prepared for the meeting of the Big Three in Yalta. On 22 January 1945, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Attorney-General issued a memorandum entitled ‘Trial and Punishment of War Criminals’.115 It called for prosecution of German leaders for pre-war atrocities and those committed against their own nationals:116

Many of these atrocities . . . were ‘begun by the Nazis in the days of peace and multiplied by them a hundred times in time of war.’ These pre-war atrocities are neither ‘war crimes’ in the technical sense, nor offences against international law; and the extent to which they may have been in violation of German law, as changed by the Nazis, is doubtful. Nevertheless, the declared policy of the United Nations is that these crimes, too, shall be punished; and the interests of post-war security and a necessary rehabilitation of German peoples, as well as the demands of justice, require that this be done.117

111 Ibid., p. 3.
116 Kochavi, Prelude, p. 160.
117 ‘Memorandum for the President, Subject: Trial and Punishment of Nazi War Criminals’, in Smith, American Road, pp. 117–22 at p. 119 (italics in the original).
On 1 February 1945, the United States issued a public statement indicating its intent to punish the Nazi leaders ‘for the whole broad criminal enterprise devised and executed with ruthless disregard of the very foundation of law and morality, including offences wherever committed against the rules of war and against minority elements, Jewish and other groups and individuals’.  

By April 1945, the Americans were circulating a draft ‘Implementing Instrument’ for trial of the major Nazi war criminals. A proposed ‘document of arraignment’ set out the offences with which they were to be charged, including ‘[t]he programme of persecution of minority groups in Germany and the occupied countries, conducted with a view to suppressing opposition to the Nazi regime and destroying or weakening certain racial strains’. Later, this became a more timid reference to ‘the right to charge and try defendants under this instrument for . . . atrocities and crimes committed in] violation[s] of the domestic law of any Axis Power or satellite or of any of the United Nations’. A draft dated 16 May 1945, and developed during the San Francisco conference, provided for a tribunal with jurisdiction to try ‘[a]trocities and offences committed since 1933 in violation of any applicable provision of the domestic law of any of the parties or of [sic] Axis Power or satellite, including atrocities and persecutions on racial or religious grounds’.  

At the London Conference, which began on 26 June 1945, the United States submitted a text that drew on the Martens clause of the Hague conventions. But the reference to ‘the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public conscience’ was linked to the crime of aggression. The record of the meetings leaves no doubt that the four powers insisted upon a nexus between the war itself and the atrocities committed by the Nazis against their own groups.
Jewish populations. It was on this basis, and this basis alone, that they considered themselves entitled to contemplate prosecution. The distinctions were set out by the head of the United States delegation, Robert Jackson, at a meeting on 23 July 1945:

It has been a general principle of foreign policy of our Government from time immemorial that the internal affairs of another government are not ordinarily our business; that is to say, the way Germany treats its inhabitants, or any other country treats its inhabitants is not our affair any more than it is the affair of some other government to interpose itself in our problems. The reason that this program of extermination of Jews and destruction of the rights of minorities becomes an international concern is this: it was a part of a plan for making an illegal war. Unless we have a war connection as a basis for reaching them, I would think we have no basis for dealing with atrocities. They were a part of the preparation for war or for the conduct of the war in so far as they occurred inside of Germany and that makes them our concern.123

Speaking of the proposed crime of ‘atrocities, persecutions, and deportations on political, racial or religious grounds’, Judge Jackson betrayed the lingering concerns of his government:

[O]rdinarily we do not consider that the acts of a government toward its own citizens warrant our interference. We have some regrettable circumstances at times in our own country in which minorities are unfairly treated. We think it is justifiable that we interfere or attempt to bring retribution to individuals or to states only because the concentration camps and the deportations were in pursuance of a common plan or enterprise of making an unjust or illegal war in which we became involved. We see no other basis on which we are justified in reaching the atrocities which were committed inside Germany, under German law, or even in violation of German law, by authorities of the German state.124

France was the only delegation to express concerns with Jackson’s narrow view. Professor Gros of the French delegation questioned whether it was necessary to insist upon a connection between persecutions and armed conflict. He said:

I know it was very clearly explained at the last session by Mr Justice Jackson that we are in fact prosecuting those crimes only for that reason, but for the last century there have been many interventions for humanitarian reasons. All countries have interfered in affairs of other countries to defend minorities who were being persecuted. Perhaps it is only a question of wording – perhaps if we could avoid to appear as making the principle that those interventions are only justified because of the connection with aggressive war, it would not change your intention, Mr Justice Jackson, and it would not be so exclusive of the other intervention that has taken place in the last century.125

124 Ibid., p. 333.
Gros warned of the difficulties in proving that persecutions of the Jews were carried out in pursuit of aggression. He said it would be easy for the lawyers of the war criminals ‘to submit to the court that the Nazis’ plan against the Jews is a purely internal matter without any relation whatsoever to aggression as the text stands’. The head of the British delegation, Sir David Maxwell Fife, replied that there would be no problem establishing the connection.

The delegates to the London Conference continued to exchange drafts containing the ‘atrocities and persecutions and deportations’ category of crimes. Each of the four powers was associated with one or several of the drafts. But all of the drafts reflected the insistence of Judge Jackson upon a connection with the international armed conflict. On 31 July 1945, the United States submitted a revised definition of crimes over which the Tribunal would have jurisdiction. The category of ‘atrocities’ was quite substantially redrafted and, for the first time, bore a title: ‘Crimes against humanity’.

(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in furtherance of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

In a note accompanying the submission, Jackson explained that language had been inserted in the definition to make it clear that persecution would cover that directed against Jews and others in Germany as well as outside of it, and both before and during the war. But the nexus with the war remained.

The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) was formally adopted on 8

August 1945, and signed by representatives of the four powers.\footnote{Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), (1951) 82 UNTS 279.} The Charter of the International Military Tribunal was annexed to the Agreement. This treaty was eventually adhered to by nineteen other States who, although they played no active role in the tribunal’s activities, sought to express their support.\footnote{Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.} In October 1945, twenty-four Nazi leaders were served with indictments, and their trial – known as the Trial of the Major War Criminals – commenced the following month. It concluded nearly a year later with the conviction of nineteen defendants and the imposition of death sentences in twelve cases.

In December 1945, the four Allied powers enacted a somewhat modified version of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, known as Control Council Law No. 10.\footnote{Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, 20 December 1945, \textit{Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany}, No. 3, Berlin, 31 January 1946, pp. 50–5.} It provided the legal basis for a series of trials before military tribunals of the victorious allies as well as for subsequent prosecutions by German courts that continued over several decades. Control Council Law No. 10, which was really a form of domestic legislation because it applied to prosecution of Germans by courts of the civil authorities, largely borrowed the definition of crimes against humanity found in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal but omitted the reference to other crimes within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, thereby eliminating the nexus with the war.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, art. II(1)(c): ‘(a) Crimes Against Humanity. Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.’} Several important trials were held pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10 in the period 1946–8 by the American Military Commission.

The Nuremberg trial

Referring to article 6(c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, the indictment of the International Military Tribunal charged the defendants with ‘deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order to destroy particular races
and classes of people, and national, racial or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies'. The United Nations War Crimes Commission later observed that ‘[b]y inclusion of this specific charge the Prosecution attempted to introduce and to establish a new type of international crime’. At the close of the Nuremberg trial, in August 1946, the French prosecutor, Champetier de Ribes, stated: ‘This is a crime so monstrous, so undreamt of in history through the Christian era up to the birth of Hitlerism, that the term “genocide” had to be coined to define it.’ The British prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross, also used the term in his summation: ‘Genocide was not restricted to extermination of the Jewish people or of the gypsies. It was applied in different forms to Yugoslavia, to the non-German inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, to the people of the Low Countries and of Norway.’

Although the final judgment in the Trial of the Major War Criminals, issued 30 September–1 October 1946, never used the term, it described at great length what was in fact the crime of genocide. Lemkin later wrote that ‘[t]he evidence produced at the Nuremberg trial gave full support to the concept of genocide’. More than fifty years later, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda noted that ‘the crimes prosecuted by the Nuremberg Tribunal, namely the holocaust of the Jews or the “Final Solution”, were very much constitutive of genocide, but they could not be defined as such because the crime of genocide was not defined until later’. A distinct and important section of the judgment of the Tribunal was entitled ‘Persecution of the Jews’. The Tribunal noted:

The persecution of the Jews at the hands of the Nazi Government has been proved in the greatest detail before the Tribunal. It is a record of consistent and systematic inhumanity on the greatest scale. Ohlendorf, chief of Amt III in the RSHA from 1939 to 1943, and who was in command of one of the Einsatz groups in the campaign against the Soviet Union testified as to the methods employed in the extermination of the Jews. He said that he employed firing squads to shoot the victims in order to lessen the sense of individual guilt on the part of his men; and the 90,000 men, women and children who were murdered in one year by his particular group were mostly Jews.

137 France et al. v. Goering et al., p. 431. See also ibid., p. 300.
138 Ibid., pp. 497. See also France et al. v. Goering et al., (1948) 19 IMT 509.
139 Lemkin, ‘Genocide as a Crime’, p. 147.
The tribunal noted that defendant Hans Frank has spoken ‘the final words of this chapter of Nazi history’ when he testified: ‘We have fought against Jewry, we have fought against it for years: and we have allowed ourselves to make utterances and my own diary has become a witness against me in this connection – utterances which are terrible . . . A thousand years will pass and this guilt of Germany will not be erased.’

The Tribunal documented the emergence of the Nazi Party’s genocidal policy, something that was plain to see more than fifteen years before the ovens of Auschwitz went into operation. The judgment reviewed the history of the Nazi movement, describing the role played by anti-Semitism in its thought and propaganda. It noted that the Nazi Party programme stated that Jews were to be treated as foreigners, that they should not be permitted to hold public office, that they should be expelled from the Reich if it were impossible to nourish the entire population of the State, that they should be denied any further immigration into Germany, and that they should be prohibited from publishing German newspapers.

With the seizure of power, the persecution of the Jews was intensified. A series of discriminatory laws were passed, which limited the offices and professions permitted to Jews; and restrictions were placed on their family life and their rights of citizenship. By the autumn of 1938, the Nazi policy towards the Jews had reached the stage where it was directed towards the complete exclusion of Jews from German life. Pogroms were organised which included the burning and demolishing of synagogues, the looting of Jewish businesses, and the arrest of prominent Jewish business men. A collective fine of one billion marks was imposed on the Jews, the seizure of Jewish assets was authorised, and the movement of Jews was restricted by regulations to certain specified districts and hours. The creation of ghettos was carried out on an extensive scale, and by an order of the Security Police Jews were compelled to wear a yellow star to be worn on the breast and back.

Nazi anti-Semitic doctrine was disseminated through Der Stuermer and other publications, as well as in the speeches and public declarations of the Nazi leaders. In a September 1938 diatribe in Der Stuermer, editor Julius Streicher described the Jew ‘as a germ and a pest, not a human being, but “a parasite, an enemy, an evil-doer, a disseminator of diseases who must be destroyed in the interest of mankind”’. A lead article in Der Stuermer in May 1939 proclaimed:

A punitive expedition must come against the Jews in Russia. A punitive expedition which will provide the same fate for them that every murderer and
criminal must expect. Death sentence and execution. The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be exterminated root and branch.  

Addressing implicitly the issue of the nexus between crimes against humanity and the war itself, something that appeared fundamental in order to comply with the Charter of the Tribunal, the judges noted that ‘[i]t was contended for the Prosecution that certain aspects of this anti-Semitic policy were connected with the plans for aggressive war’. Thus, the Tribunal made a distinction between pre-war persecution of German Jews, which it characterized as ‘severe and repressive’, and German policy during the war in the occupied territories. United States prosecutor Telford Taylor observed in his final report to the Secretary of the Army that ‘[n]one of the Nuremberg judgments squarely passed on the question whether mass atrocities committed by or with the approval of a government against a racial or religious group of its own inhabitants in peacetime constitute crimes under international law’. Taylor said that the practical significance of this problem could hardly be overstated, and cited the 1948 Genocide Convention, whose drafting had just been completed when he penned these words, as a manifestation of the interest in this question.

The Tribunal noted that mass murders and cruelties committed against the civilian population in Eastern Europe went beyond the purpose of stamping out opposition or resistance to the German occupying forces: ‘In Poland and the Soviet Union these crimes were part of a plan to get rid of whole native populations by expulsion and annihilation, in order that their territory could be used for colonisation by Germans.’ It noted Hitler’s comments in Mein Kampf along such lines, and that the plan had been put in writing by Himmler in July 1942, when he stated: ‘It is not our task to Germanise the East in the old sense, that is to teach the people there the German language and the German law, but to see to it that only people of purely Germanic blood live in the East.’

The judgment referred to the testimony of Hans Frank, who in December 1941 stated: ‘We must annihilate the Jews wherever we find them and wherever it is possible, in order to maintain there the structure of Reich as a whole.’ Frank testified that, at the outset of the war, there were approximately 3,500,000 Jews in this territory, and that by

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145 Ibid., p. 548.  
146 Ibid., p. 492.  
149 Ibid.  
150 Ibid., p. 543.
January 1944, only 100,000 remained. The Tribunal concluded that the Germans organized special groups that travelled through Europe, to such countries as Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, to find Jews and subject them to the ‘final solution’.

Originally the policy was similar to that which had been in force inside Germany. Jews were required to register, were forced to live in ghettos, to wear the yellow star, and were used as slave labourers. In the summer of 1941, however, plans were made for the ‘final solution’ of the Jewish question in all of Europe. This ‘final solution’ meant the extermination of the Jews, which early in 1939 Hitler had threatened would be one of the consequences of an outbreak of war, and a special section in the Gestapo under Adolf Eichmann, as head of Section B4 of the Gestapo, was formed to carry out the policy.

The judgment went on to describe the establishment of concentration camps, equipped with gas chambers for the murder of the inmates and furnaces to burn the bodies. It noted that some of the camps were used for the extermination of Jews ‘as part of the “final solution” of the Jewish problem’. With regard to the notorious concentration camp complex at Auschwitz, the Tribunal heard the testimony of Rudolph Hoess, its commandant from May 1940 until December 1943. According to Hoess, some 2,500,000 persons were exterminated, principally in gas chambers, and a further 500,000 died from disease and starvation.

Among those condemned by the Tribunal, Julius Streicher’s role stands out because he was not a member of the military establishment and had played no direct role in what were qualified as war crimes or crimes against peace. As editor of Der Stuermer, his hate propaganda of the 1930s continued during the war. The Tribunal found that twenty-six articles published between August 1941 and September 1944, of which twelve were signed by Streicher himself, ‘demanded annihilation and extermination in unequivocal terms’. On 25 December 1941, he wrote: ‘If the danger of the reproduction of that curse of God in the Jewish blood is to finally come to an end, then there is only one way – the extermination of that people whose father is the devil’. The Tribunal concluded: ‘Streicher’s incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews in the East were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in connection with war crimes as defined by the Charter, and

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151 Ibid.  
152 Ibid., p. 496.  
153 Ibid., p. 493.  
154 Ibid., p. 494.  
155 Ibid., p. 495. Hoess was convicted by a Polish national tribunal and condemned to death: Poland v. Hoess, (1948) 7 LRTWC 11 (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland).  
157 Ibid.
constitutes a crime against humanity.’

Streicher was sentenced to death and executed by hanging on 16 October 1946. Other defendants singled out for their role in genocide of Jews were Hermann Goering, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Keitel, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Walter Funk, Baldur von Schirach, Arthur Seyss-Inquart and Martin Bormann. In his dissenting judgment, I. T. Nikitchenko, the Soviet judge, found Hjalmar Schacht and Hans Fritzche, both of whom were acquitted by the majority, to be guilty of persecution of the Jews. He also believed that Rudolph Hess, who fled Germany in 1941 and spent the rest of the war in detention in England, was involved in anti-Semitic persecution, although the majority made no finding on this point.

**General Assembly Resolution 96(I) of 11 December 1946**

The Nuremberg judgment was issued on 30 September–1 October 1946 as the first session of the United Nations General Assembly, then sitting in London, was getting underway. Cuba, India and Panama asked that the question of genocide be put on the agenda. The matter was discussed briefly, and then referred to the Sixth Committee where, on 22 November 1946, the same three States proposed a draft resolution on genocide. Cuba’s Ernesto Dihigo, who presented the text, noted that the Nuremberg trials had precluded punishment of certain crimes of genocide because they had been committed before the beginning of the war. Fearing they might remain unpunished owing to the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege*, the representative of Cuba asked that genocide be declared an international crime, adding that this was the purpose of the draft resolution. Dihigo argued that, although the General Assembly was not a legislative body, ‘and that its recommendations could not be considered as laws’, any measure it took ‘was vested with incontestable authority’.

The draft resolution stated:

*Whereas* throughout history and especially in recent times many instances have occurred when national, racial, ethnical or religious groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part; and such crimes of genocide not only shook the conscience of mankind, but also resulted in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups;

*Whereas* genocide is a denial of the right to existence of entire human groups in the same way as homicide is the denial of the right to live for individual human

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159 UN Doc. A/BUR.50. For a summary of the history of the resolution, see UN Doc. E/621.  
160 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.22 (Dihigo, Cuba).  
beings and that such denial of the right to existence is contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations;

Whereas the punishment of the very serious crime of genocide when committed in time of peace lies within the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the judiciary of every State concerned, while crimes of a relatively lesser importance such as piracy, trade in women, children, drugs, obscene publications are declared as international crimes and have been made matters of international concern;

Be it resolved that the United Nations Assembly draw the attention of the Social and Economic Council to the crime of genocide; and invite the Council to study this problem and to prepare a report on the possibilities of declaring genocide an international crime and assuring international co-operation for its prevention and punishment, and also recommending, inter alia, that genocide and related offences should be dealt with by national legislations in the same way as other international crimes such as piracy, trade in women, children and slaves, and others.162

In the course of the debate, the notion that the resolution be completed with a full-blown convention soon began to circulate. Saudi Arabia took the initiative, urging preparation of a new text163 and subsequently submitting a draft convention on genocide.164 In support, the Soviet Union proposed asking the Economic and Social Council to undertake preparatory work ‘with a view to elaborating a draft international convention concerning the struggle against racial discrimination’.165 This became a formal amendment: ‘It is desirable that the Economic and Social Council should study the question of the preparatory work to be done for a convention on crimes against any particular race.’166

Several other amendments to the draft resolution were presented,167 but after some discussion on procedure it was agreed to refer the

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162 UN Doc. A/BUR/50. The General Assembly decided to include the point in its agenda (UN Doc. A/181), and the matter was referred to the Sixth Committee (UN Doc. A/C.6/64).
163 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.23 (Riad Bey, Saudi Arabia).
164 UN Doc. A/C.6/86. It consisted of a preamble and four articles. The preamble denounced genocide as ‘an international crime against humanity’. Article I defined it as ‘the destruction of an ethnic group, people or nation carried out either gradually against individuals or collectively against the whole group, people or nation’. Article I also described acts of genocide: mass killing, destruction of ‘the essential potentialities of life’, ‘planned disintegration of the political, social or economic structure’, ‘systematic moral debasement’ and ‘acts of terrorism committed for the purpose of creating a state of common danger and alarm . . . with the intent of producing [the group’s] political, social, economic or moral disintegration’. Article II required States parties to take international action. Article III excluded the defence of superior orders and required states to enact legislation penalizing genocide. Article IV provided for universal jurisdiction, and set out the non bis in idem rule.
165 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.22 (Lavrischev, Soviet Union).
166 UN Doc. A/C.6/83. 167 Ibid.
Genocide in international law

question to a sub-committee, chaired by Chile and composed of representa-
tives of Saudi Arabia, Chile, Cuba, France, India, Panama, Poland, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Within the sub-committee, the proposal to begin work on a draft convention met with no apparent opposition, although there was considerable debate about who should assume responsibility for the task. Several delegations believed the responsibility should devolve to an expert body such as the Committee on the Development of International Law and its Codification, to whom the General Assembly was also proposing to entrust the codification of the Nuremberg principles. However, the majority favoured assigning the duty to the Economic and Social Council, and agreed upon such a proposal ‘for the sake of unanimity’.

Controversy also surrounded the nature of criminal responsibility for genocide. Shawcross of the United Kingdom had proposed an amendment to replace paragraph 3 of the original draft resolution: ‘[d]eclares that genocide is an international crime for the commission of which principals and accessories, as well as States, are individually responsible’. France took exception because its law made no provision for criminal responsibility of States. It urged a small change to the United Kingdom amendment: ‘Declares that genocide is an international crime for which the principal authors and accomplices, whether responsible statesmen or private individuals, should be punished.’ The sub-committee chair later explained that ‘the question of fixing States’ responsibility, as distinguished from the responsibility of private individuals, public officials, or statesmen, was a matter more properly to be considered at such time as a convention on the subject of genocide is prepared’. Indeed, two years later, France and the United Kingdom would lock horns on the same issue in the Sixth Committee during preparation of the convention.

169 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.32, p. 173 (Liu Shih-shun, China). The International Law Commission was not created until the following year (GA Res. 177(II)).
170 GA Res. 95(I).
172 UN Doc. A/C.6/83.
173 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.22 (Chaumont, France). France later amended the text (UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.24 (Chaumont, France)): ‘Declares that genocide is an international crime, for which the principals and accomplices, whether private persons or responsible statesmen, should be punished’ (UN Doc. A/C.6/83). The text was amended a second time: ‘Declares that genocide is an international crime, entailing the responsibility of guilty individuals, whether principals or accessories, as well as States on behalf of which they may have acted’ (UN Doc. A/C.6/95).
174 UN Doc. A/C.6/120.
The draft resolution, as prepared by the sub-committee and approved without change by the Sixth Committee, was adopted on 11 December 1946 by the General Assembly, unanimously and without debate. Resolution 96(I) states:

Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such denial of the right of existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations.

Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part.

The punishment of the crime of genocide is a matter of international concern.

The General Assembly, therefore

Affirms that genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principals and accomplices – whether private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds – are punishable;

Invites the Member States to enact the necessary legislation for the prevention and punishment of the crime;

Recommends that international co-operation be organized between States with a view to facilitating the speedy prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, and, to this end,

Requests the Economic and Social Council to undertake the necessary studies, with a view to drawing up a draft convention on the crime of genocide to be submitted to the next regular session of the General Assembly.175

Because it is a resolution of the General Assembly, Resolution 96(I) is not a source of binding law. Nevertheless, as the International Court of Justice wrote in 1996:

The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris. To establish whether this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an opinio juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new rule.176

175 GA Res. 96(I).
176 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Request by the United Nations General Assembly for an Advisory Opinion), [1996] ICJ Reports 226, para. 70.
The fact that it was adopted unanimously and without debate enhances its significance. Moreover, Resolution 96(I) has been cited frequently in subsequent instruments and judicial decisions, reinforcing its claim to codify customary principles. Nonetheless, the resolution was adopted hastily and there is little recorded debate on some important questions, such as the inclusion of political groups within the definition. Because this issue and others were reconsidered and revised somewhat during the more protracted debates concerning adoption of the Convention in 1947 and 1948, much caution is advised with respect to claims that Resolution 96(I) constitutes a codification of customary law.

What are the norms that Resolution 96(I) sets out? First, the General Assembly ‘affirms’ that genocide is a crime under international law for which both private individuals and officials are to be held responsible. Resolution 96(I) eliminates any nexus between genocide and armed conflict, the unfortunate legacy of the Nuremberg jurisprudence. Its designation of genocide as a crime under international law means that perpetrators are subject to prosecution, even when there has been no breach of the domestic law in force at the time of the crime. The resolution does not, however, clarify the question of the appropriate jurisdiction for such prosecutions. The following year, in 1947, Raphael Lemkin and two other experts consulted by the Secretariat considered that the Resolution was consistent with recognition of universal jurisdiction. However, the sub-committee had replaced an explicit recognition of universal jurisdiction in the original draft of Resolution 96(I) with a much vaguer reference to ‘international co-operation’. In light of the General Assembly’s subsequent decision to exclude universal jurisdiction from the text of the Genocide Convention, the better view is that the resolution does not recognize universal jurisdiction for genocide. Rather, it authorizes prosecution by international jurisdictions similar to


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the Nuremberg Tribunal. The reference to international co-operation implies that States are obliged to prosecute in accordance with classic rules of international law concerning jurisdiction, or to facilitate extradition to States entitled to undertake such prosecutions.\(^{179}\)

Resolution 96(I) also proposes certain elements of the definition of genocide, notably with respect to the groups protected. Interestingly, the initial draft of the Resolution listed four groups, ‘national, racial, ethnical or religious groups’, an enumeration that is virtually identical to that of article II of the Convention, adopted two years later. However, the sub-committee of the Sixth Committee that reworked the draft resolution modified the list, for reasons that cannot be divined from the published documents. The final version adopted by the Assembly refers to ‘racial, religious, political and other groups’. The terminology appears to be patterned on that of the definition of crimes against humanity in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, which speaks of ‘persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds’, except that the enumeration in the Nuremberg Charter is exhaustive whereas that of Resolution 96(I) also allows for the protection of ‘other groups’.

Thus, Resolution 96(I) imposes obligations and creates international law with respect to prevention and punishment of genocide. But because of the uncertainty present at a time when international criminal law was still very underdeveloped, the General Assembly recognized that additional instruments were necessary. Resolution 96(I)’s final and most significant conclusion is its mandate to draft a convention. Only five years after its adoption, in 1951, the International Court of Justice associated Resolution 96(I) with the Convention in order to conclude ‘that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation’.\(^{180}\)

### Genocide prosecutions after the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals

The Nuremberg judgment of 30 September–1 October 1946 set the tone for a second generation of prosecutions of Nazi leaders, pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10.\(^{181}\) The United States Military Tribunal held twelve thematic trials, dealing with crimes committed by various elements of the Nazi military and civilian hierarchy, including SS

\(^{179}\) On these questions, see chapter 8 below.


\(^{181}\) See p. 37 above.
commanders, the officer corps, doctors and jurists. They provide a more detailed exploration of the atrocities committed by bodies like the Einsatzgruppen and the RuSHA, and many of the legal principles that they examined and developed are generally considered to form part of international war crimes jurisprudence. They also showed the emerging acceptance of the term ‘genocide’. In the Ohlendorf trial, the prosecutor used the word ‘genocide’ in the indictment, as did the Tribunal in its judgment, to characterize the activities of the Einsatzgruppen in Poland and the Soviet Union. Because of the definition of crimes against humanity in their enabling legislation, which did not insist upon the nexus with the war, the tribunals were more clearly entitled to address the issue of persecution of Jews within Germany prior to the outbreak of the war than had been the International Military Tribunal. Alstotter’s case, known as the ‘Justice trial’, concerned Nazi judges and prosecutors and their application of anti-Semitic legislation, even prior to September 1939. The court cited General Assembly Resolution 96(I) on four occasions:

The General Assembly is not an international legislature, but it is the most authoritative organ in existence for the interpretation of world opinion. Its recognition of genocide as an international crime [in Resolution 96(I)] is persuasive evidence of the fact. We approve and adopt its conclusions . . . [We] find no injustice to persons tried for such crimes. They are chargeable with knowledge that such acts were wrong and were punishable when committed.

For example, the Tribunal concluded that Oswald Rothaug, a Berlin prosecutor, ‘participated in the national program of racial persecution . . . He participated in the crime of genocide.’ Another Berlin prosecutor, Ernst Lautz, was convicted of enforcing the law against Poles and Jews which comprised ‘the established government plan for the extermination of those races. He was an accessory to, and took a consenting part in, the crime of genocide.’

In the RuSHA case, the defendants were charged before the United States Military Tribunal with participation in a ‘systematic program of genocide, aimed at the destruction of foreign nations and ethnic groups, in part by murderous extermination, and in part by elimination and suppression of national characteristics’. The court described geno-

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184 *United States of America v. Ohlendorf et al*, note 177 above.
186 Ibid., p. 1156 (TWC).
187 Ibid., p. 1128 (TWC).
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cide as ‘the master scheme’, noting it ‘had been devised by the top ranking Nazi leaders in pursuance of their racial policy of establishing the German nation as a master race and to this end exterminate or otherwise uproot the population of other nations’. As part of this plan, the judgment referred to such genocidal activities as treatment of ‘racially valuable children’ and those from ‘racial mixed marriages’, ‘kidnapping of alien children’, preventing birth by forced abortions, punishment for sexual intercourse with Germans, ‘impeding the reproduction of Enemy Nationals’ and forced evacuation, resettlement and ‘Germanization’ of the inhabitants of occupied territories. Ulrich Greifelt, Rudolf Creutz, Herbert Huebner, Werner Lorentz, Heintz Brueckner, Richard Hildebrandt and Fritz Schwalm were found guilty of genocide, the first such conviction in history.

Other post-war trials, held by national tribunals, also established responsibilities for the genocide of European Jews. The Polish Supreme National Tribunal tried and convicted Rudolf Franz Hoess, the commandant at Auschwitz, who had earlier testified in the trial of the major war criminals at Nuremberg. The tribunal drew attention to the so-called medical research conducted at the notorious concentration camp, measures that ‘constituted the preparatory stage of one of the forms of the crime of genocide, which was intended to be perpetrated by scientific means’. In the trial of Artur Greiser, the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland identified crimes committed against Poland including ‘genocidal attacks on Polish culture and learning’: ‘[t]he accused ordered and countenanced and facilitated, as is shown by the evidence, criminal attempts on the life, health and property of thousands of Polish inhabitants of the “occupied” part of Poland in question, and at the same time was concerned in bringing about in that territory the general totalitarian genocidal attack on the rights of the small and medium nations to exist, and to have an identity and culture of their own.’ Amon Leopold Goeth, an Austrian Nazi, was found guilty by the Polish Supreme National Tribunal for ‘[t]he wholesale extermination of Jews and also of Poles [that] had all the characteristics of genocide in the biological meaning of this term, and embraced in

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189 Ibid.
190 Ibid., pp. 3–19.
191 Poland v. Hoess, note 155 above, pp. 24–6. Hoess was sentenced to death by the Polish Supreme Court on 2 April 1947 and hanged at Auschwitz two weeks later. He penned an autobiography while in detention in Poland, which was published in an English translation: Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, Autobiography, Cleveland: World Publishing, 1959.
192 Poland v. Greiser, (1948) 13 LRTWC 70, [1946] ILR 389 (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland), pp. 112–14; also pp. 71–4 and 105 (LRTWC).
addition destruction of the cultural life of these nations’.\textsuperscript{193} Over the ensuing decades, many trials were held within Germany itself for anti-Semitic persecution in the death camps of Treblinka, Belzec, Sobibor and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{194}

Some of the prosecutions also referred to the crime of ‘denationalization’, a category of war crime recognized since 1919 that, while narrower in scope, resembles genocide in many ways. Under war crimes law of Australia and the Netherlands, it was an offence to attempt ‘to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory’.\textsuperscript{195} The manufacturer of Zyklon B gas, which was used at Auschwitz and other concentration camps for purposes of extermination during the Second World War, was condemned by a British military court for violating ‘the laws and usages of war’.\textsuperscript{196} In another concentration camp prosecution, members of the staff at Belsen and Auschwitz were found ‘in violation of the laws and usages of war [to be] together concerned as parties to the ill-treatment of certain persons’.\textsuperscript{197} The judge advocate charged them with ‘deliberate destruction of the Jewish race’.\textsuperscript{198}

\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Poland v. Goeth}, (1946) 7 LRTWC 4 (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland).
\textsuperscript{194} Dick de Mildt, \textit{In the Name of the People: Perpetrators of Genocide in the Reflection of their Post-War Prosecution in West Germany, the ‘Euthanasia’ and ‘Aktion Reinhard’ Trial Cases}, The Hague, London and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996.
\textsuperscript{195} (1948) 5 LRTWC 95; (1948) 15 LRTWC 123. One tribunal spoke of ‘forced Germanization’.
\textsuperscript{196} \textit{United Kingdom v. Tesch et al. (‘Zyklon B case’)}, (1947) 1 LRTWC 93 (British Military Court).
\textsuperscript{197} \textit{United Kingdom v. Kramer et al. (‘Belsen trial’)}, (1947) 2 LRTWC 1 (British Military Court), p. 4.
\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 106.
Early in 1947, the Secretary-General conveyed General Assembly Resolution 96(I), declaring genocide to be a crime under international law, to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The resolution requested the ECOSOC ‘to undertake the necessary studies, with a view to drawing up a draft convention on the crime of genocide to be submitted to the next regular session of the General Assembly’. The Secretary-General suggested that the ECOSOC might assign the task to the Commission on Human Rights or to a special committee of the Council. The United Kingdom warned that the Commission on Human Rights already had a heavy programme, and proposed that the matter be returned to the Secretariat which would prepare a draft convention for subsequent review by a commission of ECOSOC.

ECOSOC’s Social Committee favoured returning the matter to the Secretary-General. On 28 March 1947, ECOSOC adopted a resolution asking the Secretary-General:

(a) To undertake with the assistance of experts in the field of international and criminal law, the necessary studies with a view to drawing up a draft convention in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly; and (b) After consultation with the General Assembly Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification and, if feasible, the Commission on Human Rights and, after reference to all Member Governments for


2 UN Doc. E/330. Two draft resolutions were submitted, one by the United States proposing referral to the Commission on Human Rights (UN Doc. E/342), the other by Cuba proposing the creation of an ad hoc drafting committee.

3 UN Doc. E/PV.70 (Mayhew, United Kingdom).

4 UN Doc. E/AC.7/15; UN Doc. E/AC.7/15/Add.2; UN Doc. E/AC.7/W.14.
comments, to submit to the next session of the Economic and Social Council a draft convention on the crime of genocide.\(^5\)

**The Secretariat draft**

The Secretary-General turned to the Secretariat’s Human Rights Division for preparation of an initial draft.\(^6\) The Division consulted three experts, Raphael Lemkin, author of *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* and inventor of the word ‘genocide’, Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, professor at the University of Paris Law Faculty and a former judge of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and Vespasian V. Pella, a Romanian law professor and President of the International Association for Penal Law. The experts\(^7\) reviewed the preliminary draft with the Director of the Division of Human Rights, John P. Humphrey, and the Chief of the Research Section of the Division of Human Rights.\(^8\) The Secretary-General felt that genocide should be defined so as not to encroach ‘on other notions, which logically are and should be distinct’.\(^9\) This was an oblique reference to ‘crimes against humanity’, already defined in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in its judgment of 30 September–1 October 1946, as well as to the question of minority rights, then under consideration by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities and the Commission on Human Rights within the context of the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.\(^10\)

The Secretary-General considered that the draft should, as far as possible, embrace all points likely to be adopted, leaving it to the competent organs of the United Nations to eliminate what they did not wish to include.\(^11\) Donnedieu de Vabres later described it as ‘a

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5 ESC Res. 47(IV).
9 UN Doc. E/447, p. 15.
11 UN Doc. E/447, p. 16.
Drafting the Convention

maximum programme’ that ‘the authors of the Convention would be able to draw from . . . as they considered appropriate, in view of the fact that controversial questions had been raised’.12 The resulting twenty-four-article text was accompanied by a commentary and two draft statutes for an international criminal court.13 Nothing in General Assembly Resolution 96(I), however, indicated that the statute of an international criminal court was to be prepared in conjunction with the draft genocide convention.

The Secretariat draft began with a preamble defining genocide as ‘the intentional destruction of a group of human beings’ and a crime against the law of nations. The commentary stressed the importance of a narrow definition, so as not to confuse genocide with other crimes, and to ensure the success of the convention by facilitating ratification by a large number of States.14 Article I stated that the purpose of the convention was ‘to prevent the destruction of racial, national, linguistic, religious or political groups of human beings’. This enumeration differed from the letter of General Assembly Resolution 96(I), which had spoken of ‘racial, religious, political and other groups’, by eliminating the reference to ‘other groups’.15 Lemkin preferred to omit political groups, which he said lacked the required permanency.16 In its description of three types of acts of genocide, physical, biological and cultural, the draft followed the approach taken by Lemkin’s book. After questioning whether cultural genocide belonged, the Secretary-General decided to include it in the draft, subject to change by the ECOSOC or the General Assembly.17 Donnedieu de Vabres and Pella ‘held that cultural genocide represented an undue extension of the notion of genocide and amounted to reconstituting the former protection of minorities (which was based on other conceptions) under cover of the term genocide’, whilst Lemkin felt its inclusion was important.18

Article II asserted that genocide includes attempts, preparatory acts, wilful participation, direct public incitement and conspiracy. Under article III, all forms of public propaganda tending to promote genocide were also punishable. According to article IV, all persons committing genocide, including rulers, were subject to punishment. Article V declared that command of the law or superior orders shall not justify genocide. The draft convention required States parties to enact legisla-

12 UN Doc. A/AC.10/SR.28, p. 13. Not surprisingly, the same opinion was expressed in France’s submissions to the General Assembly on the draft convention later in 1947: UN Doc. A/401/Add.3.
13 UN Doc. A/AC.10/41; UN Doc. A/362, Appendix II.
14 UN Doc. E/447, p. 17
15 Ibid., p. 22. 16 Ibid., p. 17. 17 Ibid., p. 17. 18 Ibid., p. 27.
tion to provide for punishment of genocide (art. VI), and set out the rule of universal punishment: ‘The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to punish any offender under this Convention within any territory under their jurisdiction, irrespective of the nationality of the offender or of the place where the offence has been committed’ (art. VII). Moreover, States were obliged to grant extradition (art. VIII) and could not set up the political offence exception (art. VIII). Furthermore, States parties vowed to commit persons suspected of genocide for trial by an international court in cases where they were themselves unwilling to try the offenders or grant extradition, or where the acts were committed by individuals acting as organs of the State or with its support or tolerance (art. IX). States parties undertook to disband organizations involved in acts of genocide (art. XI). They were also required to provide reparation to victims of genocide (art. XIII). Disputes concerning interpretation or application of the convention were to be submitted to the International Court of Justice (art. XIV). Several technical or protocolar provisions addressed such matters as signature, the number of States parties required for coming into force and denunciation of the convention.

In the appendix, the first draft statute provided for an international court to have jurisdiction only in cases of genocide, while the second – the Secretariat’s preference – had a broader jurisdiction in matters of international criminal law. As a subsequent note stated: ‘If ILC [International Law Commission] not only defines offences but also organizes their punishment, there would be an advantage to punishing them as a whole according to the same principles, and even to judging them before the same tribunal; this is why it may not be helpful to establish a special genocide tribunal.’ Pella and Lemkin proposed that the resolution of the General Assembly adopting the convention should also contain two recommendations: ‘1. The High Contracting Parties should take suitable steps likely to allay such racial, national, or religious antagonisms or conflicts as may lead to genocide; 2. Special national offices should be created by each High Contracting Party in order to centralize information on antagonisms between human groups and to transmit such information to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.’

The Secretariat draft, accompanied by a summary of the comments of the three experts, was sent to the Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification, on 13 June 1947. In preparation for the debate, France circulated a memorandum ‘on the subject of genocide and crimes against humanity’ which chal-

19 Ibid., p. 38. 20 UN Doc. E/AC.25/3. 21 UN Doc. E/447, p. 64. 22 UN Doc. A/AC.10/41. 23 UN Doc. A/AC.10/42/Add.1. See also UN Doc. A/AC.10/15.
lenged the use of the term ‘genocide’, calling it a useless and even dangerous neologism. France preferred to approach the problem of extermination of racial, social, political or religious groups from the standpoint of crimes against humanity.24 The United Kingdom proposed that the Committee decline to reply to the Secretary-General’s request for comments on the draft convention.25 Poland disagreed, saying the Committee had the duty to consider at least the general principles involved.26 A proposal by the Netherlands that the Committee recommend referral to the International Law Commission,27 which had not yet been created, was defeated.28 Eventually, the Committee reached agreement upon the text of a letter to be sent to the Secretary-General declining to review the matter.29 The Chair wrote that the Committee felt unable to express any opinion on the matter, given that it did not have comments from member governments.30

The Secretariat draft was presented to the Economic and Social Council at its fifth session, in July–August 1947. The Secretary-General had fulfilled part of the mandate given at ECOSOC’s previous session, but some elements remained unaccomplished. The draft had not been considered, at least in substance, by the Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law, or by the Commission on Human Rights, which had not met in the interim. Although it had been transmitted to member States for their comments,31 there were as yet no replies.32 On 6 August 1947, the ECOSOC instructed the Secretary-General to collate the comments of member States on the draft, and to transmit these to the General Assembly together with the draft convention. It informed the General Assembly that it proposed to proceed as rapidly as possible, subject to further instructions from the General Assembly.33

24 UN Doc. A/AC.20/29.
25 UN Doc. A/AC.10/44. See also UN Doc. A/AC.10/SR.28, pp. 12–13 (United States); UN Doc. A/AC.10/SR.28, p. 14 and UN Doc. A/AC.10/SR.29, p. 7 (France); and UN Doc. A/AC.10/SR.28, pp. 18–19 (Colombia).
26 UN Doc. A/AC.10/SR.28, p. 15. See also UN Doc. A/AC.10/SR.28, pp. 15–16 (India); UN Doc. A/AC.10/SR.28, p. 16 and UN Doc. A/AC.10/SR.28, pp. 18–19 (Yugoslavia).
27 UN Doc. A/AC.10/SR.29, p. 10; see also pp. 20–1.
28 Ibid., p. 25 (ten in favour, four against, with two abstentions).
29 UN Doc. A/AC.10/SR.30, p. 10. Australia, the Netherlands and Poland had drafted the resolution, with James L. Brierly of the United Kingdom as convenor of the drafting committee: UN Doc. A/AC.10/SR.29, p. 28.
30 UN Doc. A/AC.10/55; UN Doc. E/447, p. 65
31 UN Doc. A/362.
32 UN Doc. A/476.
33 ESC Res. 77(V). See UN Doc. E/573, pp. 21–2, adopted following a draft resolution prepared by the Social Committee: UN Doc. E/522.
Comments by member States

Only seven States replied to the Secretary-General’s initial appeal for comments, and two of them (India and the Philippines) confined their remarks to procedural matters. The most detailed observations, from France and the United States of America, largely reflected, perhaps not surprisingly, the views expressed by Henri Donnedieu de Vabres and Raphael Lemkin during preparation of the Secretariat draft. Both France and the United States also prepared draft conventions as a contribution to the debate. Four non-governmental organizations, the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (representing the World Council of Churches and the International Missionary Council), the World Jewish Congress, the Consultative Council on Jewish Organizations and the World Federation of United Nations Associations, also made observations.

While the proposal to adopt a special convention on genocide was unchallenged, Denmark said that it ‘would prefer a briefer text regarding the punishable conditions, as a more elaborate summing up as the one indicated in the draft – although detailed – cannot be complete and exhaustive’. Venezuela felt that the Secretariat draft had gone beyond the terms of General Assembly Resolution 96(I), raising the bugbear of state sovereignty. Venezuela was particularly disturbed by the importance placed in the Secretariat draft upon the creation of an international criminal court, which it considered to be ‘clearly inconsistent with the principle laid down in paragraph 7 of article 2 of the United Nations Charter’. Venezuela insisted that it would ‘prefer a convention by which member States undertook to adopt national criminal legislation ensuring the punishment of genocide and to apply

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34 UN Doc. E/447 (Denmark, France, Haiti, India, the Philippines, the United States and Venezuela).
35 UN Doc. A/401. 36 UN Doc. A/401/Add.1.
41 UN Doc. E/C.2/49.
42 UN Doc. E/C.2/64. It was supported by an appended document entitled ‘A Call for International Action Against Genocide’, signed by Gabriella Mistral, Edouard Herriot, Francois Mauriac, Aldous Huxley, Pearl Buck, Count Folke Bernadotte, Quincy Wright, Robert G. Sproul and other eminent intellectuals, authors and international personalities.
43 UN Doc. A/401.
44 Art. 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations states: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.’
the appropriate penalties themselves’. Haiti’s brief comments essentially concerned the issue of United Nations intervention to prevent genocide, and encouraged an enhanced role for the Secretary-General.

France, on the other hand, regarded the draft as too preoccupied with domestic prosecution for genocide: “The utility of such provisions would appear to be relative since the crime can only take place with the complicity of the government.” According to France, the convention should affirm its relationship with the principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and explain that genocide was merely one aspect of crimes against humanity. It believed that genocide ought to relate directly to State action and punishment, on an international basis, and should be restricted to rulers who would otherwise enjoy impunity within their own States. France favoured excluding cultural genocide as a punishable act.

The United States said the convention should exclude ‘preparatory acts’ such as studies or research, or address the issue of hate propaganda, matters too far removed from the crime itself. It urged that the jurisdiction of national and international tribunals be carefully circumscribed. Moreover, the convention should cover genocide of political groups, but only if this could be confined to physical destruction. The text should carefully insist on the intentional element in the commission of the crime. Like France, the United States wanted to exclude cultural genocide from the convention. The United States proposed replacing the text of the preamble, which it found too wordy, with: ‘The High Contracting Parties declare that genocide constitutes a crime under international law, which the civilized world condemns, and which the Parties to this Convention agree to prevent and repress as hereinafter provided.

Later in 1947, the Secretary-General submitted a new appeal to member States for comments. This generated additional answers from the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Siam (Thailand). Norway focused its attention on the problem of prosecuting State officials, urging an international criminal jurisdiction in order to overcome obstacles within national legislation.

45 UN Doc. A/401/Add.1. 46 UN Doc. A/401. 47 Ibid. 48 UN Doc. A/401/Add.3. 49 UN Doc. A/401. 50 UN Doc. A/362. 51 UN Doc. E/623/Add.2. The United Kingdom presented no detailed comments. 52 Ibid. Norway repeated the comments of its representative in the Sixth Committee Assembly, in 1947, concerning prosecution of State officials. 53 UN Doc. E/623/Add.3. 54 UN Doc. E/623/Add.4. Luxembourg made no substantive observations. 55 Ibid. 56 UN Doc. E/623/Add.2.
erlands preferred the draft convention submitted by the United States, and said the entire question should be referred to the International Law Commission.57

**Second session of the General Assembly**

The convention returned to the agenda of the General Assembly at its second session, held from September to December 1947, where the matter was referred to the Sixth (Legal) Committee.58 Some delegations were impatient. France, supported by the United States,59 argued that the General Assembly could take action without waiting for observations from all member States.60 The United Kingdom, on the other hand, attempted to obstruct further progress on the matter. Sir Hartley Shawcross noted that genocide was already recognized as a crime under international law, a consequence of the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Shawcross said a convention would defeat the purpose it sought to achieve, because the failure to ratify by some States would undermine the claim that it stood for universally accepted principles.61 The United Kingdom submitted a resolution referring the draft convention to the International Law Commission so that it might ‘consider whether a convention on this matter is desirable or necessary’.62 The Soviet Union basically sided with the United Kingdom, but it proposed a compromise amendment that did not directly question the principle of a draft convention.63

A sub-committee of the Sixth Committee, established to assess which United Nations body should be entrusted with advancing the work on genocide, opted for the Economic and Social Council. Its members could not agree whether ECOSOC should be empowered to decide if a convention was desirable, because some argued that the issue had already been settled in General Assembly Resolution 96(I).64 A draft resolution prepared by the sub-committee requesting ECOSOC to continue its efforts on the draft convention was forwarded back to the Sixth Committee, which studied it together with a number of amendments. A United Kingdom proposal adding a preambular paragraph declaring ‘that genocide is an international crime entailing national and

international responsibility on the part of individuals and states’ was adopted by a strong majority. An amendment proposed by the Soviet Union noted that ‘a large majority of the members of the United Nations have not yet submitted their observations on the draft convention’. It called on the ECOSOC to proceed with more studies on measures to combat genocide, to examine ‘whether a convention on genocide is desirable and necessary’ and, if so, whether it should be considered separately or in conjunction with the drafting of a convention on the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and in its judgment. Finally, it asked the ECOSOC to report back to the General Assembly ‘after having received comments from most of the governments of the States Members of the United Nations’. In effect, the Soviet amendment put the whole question of whether or not a convention was desirable back onto the table. After a minor amendment proposed by the rapporteur, changing the reference to ‘comments from the governments’ to ‘comment from most of the governments’, the amendment was put to a roll-call vote and adopted by a very slim majority.

Several States were furious with the Sixth Committee draft resolution, an unquestioned retreat from the text adopted the previous year. The Egyptian representative qualified the Sixth Committee’s resolution as ‘retrograde’, noting that the General Assembly had answered in the affirmative the previous year and could not now pull back. Panama’s Ricardo J. Alfaro protested that ‘what was yesterday a conviction or a decision that a certain thing had to be done, appears today beclouded by doubts and is a subject of consultation’. Panama, Cuba and Egypt, who were most critical of the draft resolution, proposed an amendment.

To support the Sixth Committee’s draft, the United Kingdom argued once again that genocide was so closely related to crimes against humanity that it was preferable to refer the whole matter to the International Law Commission, for study in the context of its work on codification of the Nuremberg principles. ‘We wonder why it is neces-

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66 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.59 (twenty-one in favour, six against).
69 Ibid. (Rafaat, Egypt).
70 Ibid. (Alfaro, Panama). See also the comments of Dihigo (Cuba), Raafat (Egypt), Pérez-Pérez (Venezuela), de la Tournelle (France), Seyersted (Norway), Fahy (United States), Villa Michel (Mexico), Henriquez Ureña (Dominican Republic) and Wellington Koo Jr (China), and draft amendments from China (UN Doc. A/514) and Venezuela (UN Doc. A/413).
71 UN Doc. A/512.
sary to insist that there must be a convention without due deliberation; why there must be a convention which may not be the best method of carrying further this declaration and which is a method, as I have already stated, not altogether satisfactory to a large number of Members who would presumably be unwilling to accede to such a convention’, said Davies, the representative of the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union was the only other delegation to speak in favour of the Sixth Committee’s draft resolution.

Presenting a Chinese amendment to the proposal from Panama, Egypt and Cuba, Wellington Koo Jr said: ‘We feel that the Economic and Social Council should draw up the text of this convention bearing in mind that another body, the International Law Commission, has been charged with the responsibility of dealing with a cognate subject – namely, the formulation of the principles of the Nurnberg Tribunal – and also with the preparation of a draft code of offences against peace and security.’ The heart of the issue was whether to consider genocide as a variety of crime against humanity, or to treat it as a distinct form of criminal behaviour. The Chinese amendment, which implied the latter, was adopted on a roll-call vote, followed by adoption of the amendment from Panama, Egypt and Cuba, also on a roll-call vote. General Assembly Resolution 180(II), its wording substantially reinforced by the amendments of China and of Panama, Egypt and Cuba, was adopted on 21 November 1947. It read as follows:

The General Assembly,

Realizing the importance of the problem of combating the international crime of genocide,

Reaffirming its resolution 96(I) of 11 December 1946 on the crime of genocide;

Declaring that genocide is an international crime entailing national and international responsibility on the part of individuals and States;

Noting that a large majority of the Governments of Members of the United Nations have not yet submitted their observations on the draft convention on the crime of genocide prepared by the Secretariat and circulated to those Governments by the Secretary General on 7 July 1947;

Considering that the Economic and Social Council has stated in its resolution of 6 August 1947 that it proposes to proceed as rapidly as possible with the consideration of the question of genocide, subject to any further instructions which it may receive from the General Assembly;

72 UN Doc. A/PV.123 (Davies, United Kingdom).
73 Ibid. (Durdenevsky, Soviet Union).
74 UN Doc. A/512.
75 UN Doc. A/PV.123, p. 241.
76 Ibid. (twenty-nine in favour, fifteen against, with eight abstentions).
77 Ibid. (thirty-four in favour, fifteen against, with two abstentions).
78 Ibid. (thirty-eight in favour, with fourteen abstentions).
Requests the Economic and Social Council to continue the work it has begun concerning the suppression of genocide, including the study of the draft convention prepared by the Secretary, and to proceed with the completion of the convention, taking into account that the International Law Commission, which will be set up in due course in accordance with General Assembly resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 1947, has been charged with the formulation of the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, as well as the preparation of a draft code of offences against peace and security;

Informs the Economic and Social Council that it need not await the receipt of the observations of all Members before commencing its work; and

Requests the Economic and Social Council to submit a report and the convention on this question to the third regular session of the General Assembly.79

**The Ad Hoc Committee draft**

General Assembly Resolution 180(II) directed the Economic and Social Council to pursue work on the draft convention, and not to wait for comments from member States before taking further steps.80 At its sixth session, in early 1948, the ECOSOC created an *ad hoc* drafting committee composed of China, France, Lebanon, Poland, the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Venezuela.81 The committee was instructed:

(a) To meet at the headquarters of the United Nations in order to prepare the draft convention on the crime of genocide . . . and to submit this draft convention, together with the recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights thereon to the next session of the Economic and Social Council; and (b) To take into consideration in the preparation of the draft convention, the draft convention prepared by the Secretary-General, the comments of the Member Governments on this draft convention, and other drafts on the matter submitted by any Member Government.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee met a total of twenty-eight times over the course of April and May 1948,82 preparing a new draft convention and an accompanying commentary.83

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79 GA Res. 180(II).
80 See the ‘Terms of Reference’ prepared by the Secretary-General for the Economic and Social Council: UN Doc. A/622.
81 ESC Res. 117(VI); UN Doc. E/734. See UN Doc. E/SR.139–140; UN Doc. E/AC.7/SR.37; UN Doc. E/663 (with the United Kingdom amendment, E/AC.7/65); and UN Doc. E/662/Add.1.
82 The Secretariat had earlier estimated the process would take two weeks, and be completed by mid-April: UN Doc. E/AC.25/2.
**Preparation for the Ad Hoc Committee**

In preparation for the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the Secretariat submitted a memorandum reviewing a number of questions that might be addressed, most of which had arisen in the course of work on the Secretariat draft or in comments on it by member States. First was the issue of what groups should be protected by the convention, and whether it should cover all racial, national, linguistic, religious, political or other human groups, or only some of them. Secondly, the Secretariat raised the issue of what acts of genocide would be contemplated, and more specifically whether the convention would include cultural genocide, consisting ‘in the destruction by brutal means of the specific characteristics of a human group, that is to say, its moral and sociological characteristics’. The memorandum noted that several governments proposed the exclusion of cultural genocide, and limited the scope of the convention to physical and biological genocide. Thirdly, should the convention apply to rulers, or to rulers, officials and private persons without distinction? ‘Opinions differ on this point’, said the note. Fourthly, should an international criminal court be created to punish genocide, or should prosecution be left to national courts? Even if the international court were favoured, the Secretariat observed that questions concerning its relationship with national courts needed to be resolved eventually, although this was perhaps not necessary at such a preliminary stage. Finally, and in keeping with the mandate of the General Assembly, the *Ad Hoc* Committee would need to address the relationship between the convention and related matters being considered by the International Law Commission, namely formulation of the Nuremberg principles and the preparation of a draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind.84

The memorandum recommended using one of the existing drafts as a basis for discussion. Furthermore, ‘[s]ince relatively few Governments have presented their comments on the question of genocide, and the *ad hoc* committee consists only of seven members, the committee may, in certain cases, think it advisable to follow the suggestion made in the Economic and Social Council to submit alternative texts and leave the final choice to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly’.85 The Secretariat proposed that the *Ad Hoc* Committee also consider some other substantive questions: the defences of command of the law, superior orders, head of state immunity, *nullum crimen sine lege*, and the relationship between genocide and crimes against humanity.86

Alongside the Secretariat draft, the United States,\textsuperscript{87} France\textsuperscript{88} and China\textsuperscript{89} prepared alternative texts. Those of the United States and France essentially corresponded to their respective comments on the Secretariat draft. China’s draft articles dealt with the substantive issues of the convention but excluded the various protocolar clauses. China did not describe genocide as a crime against humanity. It advocated prosecution of cultural genocide, as well as physical and biological genocide. China also sought universal prosecution of genocide and the establishment of an international court.\textsuperscript{90}

The Soviet Union did not present its own draft, producing instead a document entitled ‘Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide’. The Soviet proposals limited the scope of genocide to extermination ‘on racial, national (religious) grounds’, omitting the category of political groups. They had a distinctly ideological bent, insisting upon the relationship between genocide and ‘Fascism-Nazism and other similar race “theories” which preach racial and national hatred, the domination of the so-called “higher” races and the extermination of the so-called “lower” race’. The Soviets felt that repression of genocide should include prohibition of incitement to racial hatred as well as various preparatory or preliminary acts, such as study and research aimed at developing techniques of genocide. They also wanted the convention to cover cultural genocide, giving as examples the prohibition or restriction of the national language in public and private life and the destruction of historical or religious monuments, museums and libraries.\textsuperscript{91}

\textit{Debates in the Ad Hoc Committee}

At its first meeting, the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee elected John Maktos of the United States as its chair, and Platon D. Morozov of the Soviet Union as vice-chair. Karim Azkoul of Lebanon was designated rapporteur. Henri Laugier, Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Social Affairs, represented the Secretariat, in the absence of John Humphrey.\textsuperscript{92} Surprisingly, the Committee never formally debated the Secretariat draft convention, although this was the chair’s original proposal\textsuperscript{93} and had been, at least informally, agreed to.\textsuperscript{94} The first series of meetings, sessions three to eleven, concerned issues raised by the Soviet ‘Basic Principles’, while the second series, from twelve to twenty-three, considered the Chinese draft convention, which the Committee

\textsuperscript{87} UN Doc. A/401. \textsuperscript{88} UN Doc. A/401/Add.3. \textsuperscript{89} UN Doc. E/AC.25/9. \textsuperscript{90} Ibid. \textsuperscript{91} UN Doc. E/AC.25/7. \textsuperscript{92} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.1. \textsuperscript{93} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.3, p. 9. \textsuperscript{94} UN Doc. E/794, p. 1.
agreed to make the basis of its work,\textsuperscript{95} although the other texts were to be taken into account. The Committee decided to assign the final or protocolar clauses to a sub-committee.\textsuperscript{96} The last five meetings were occupied with adoption of the Committee’s report and various technical matters. The Committee’s draft convention, which differed substantially from that of the Secretariat a year earlier, was adopted by five votes in favour, with the Soviet Union voting against and Poland abstaining.\textsuperscript{97}

One of the more difficult issues confronting the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee was reconciling the draft convention with the ‘Nuremberg Principles’ that the General Assembly had asked the International Law Commission to formulate. In Resolution 180(II), the General Assembly instructed the Economic and Social Council to take into account the terms of reference given to the International Law Commission. Here, the principal question was defining the relationship between genocide and crimes against humanity. In accordance with a suggestion from the Secretariat, the debate arose in the context of discussion of the preamble.\textsuperscript{98}

France was the most insistent about the linkage between genocide and crimes against humanity, while others were equally firm in their view that the concepts had to be made distinct and separate. France had, in fact, urged that the preamble describe genocide as ‘a crime against humanity’,\textsuperscript{99} but this was rejected by the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee, which chose instead to characterize it as ‘a crime against mankind’.\textsuperscript{100} Aleksandr Rudzinski of Poland said it was true that genocide was a crime against humanity, but that this did not mean it needed to be stated in the convention; this was overreaching the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 180(II).\textsuperscript{101} According to the final report of the Committee, its members ‘categorically opposed the expression “crimes against humanity” because, in their opinion, it had acquired a well-defined legal meaning in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal’.\textsuperscript{102} France also proposed that the preamble make reference to the International Military Tribunal,\textsuperscript{103} an idea that was supported by China and the United States.\textsuperscript{104} Lebanon objected, saying that the Nuremberg trial

\textsuperscript{95} As agreed by the Committee: UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.3, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{96} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.6, p. 21; UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.7, p. 1. The report of the sub-committee, UN Doc. E/AC.25/10, consisting of John Maktos of the United States, Platon D. Morozov of the Soviet Union and Aleksandr Rudzinski of Poland, was discussed at the twenty-sixth meeting: UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.26, pp. 2–3.
\textsuperscript{97} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.26, pp. 4–7.
\textsuperscript{98} UN Doc. E/AC.25/11.
\textsuperscript{99} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.20, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{100} UN Doc. E/794, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{101} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.20, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{102} UN Doc. E/794, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{103} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.23, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 4.
Dealt with crimes against humanity and not genocide. Venezuela was opposed to any reference to Nuremberg. The reasons for the opposition stemmed from the same concern, namely that the crime of genocide might be confused with the crimes against humanity that had been judged by the International Military Tribunal. Here, France’s efforts were more successful, resulting in the adoption of a preambular paragraph reading: ‘having taken note of the fact that the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in its judgment of 30 September–1 October 1946 has punished certain persons who have committed analogous acts . . .’

The Ad Hoc Committee decided that genocide directed against political groups should be prohibited by the convention, with Poland and the Soviet Union opposed. The Secretariat draft had omitted any reference whatsoever to a motive element of the crime of genocide, something that gave rise to considerable debate in the Ad Hoc Committee. Eventually, the Committee voted to include a reference to motive in the definition of the crime, requiring that those charged with genocide be driven by ‘grounds of national or racial origin, religious belief or political opinion of its members’. That genocide might involve the ‘partial’ destruction of a group was also envisaged in some of the proposals. The Committee initially agreed that a reference to ‘in whole or in part’ should be included, but the concept disappeared in the final draft.

The United States representative proposed that the definition of genocide should require the involvement or complicity of the government. John Maktos argued that genocide could not be an international crime unless a government participated in its perpetration, either by act or by omission. France agreed with the United States, saying that ‘it was necessary to retain in the definition of genocide the concept of governmental complicity, providing always that the word “complicity” be understood in its widest sense: for example, the mere act of granting impunity to the group committing genocide would constitute complicity.’ But after strenuous objections from Lebanon, Poland and China, France ‘thought it might be better to abandon this limitation, which was likely to create practical difficulties’. It was so decided by the Committee.

The Secretariat had suggested that the Committee might consider three basic types of genocide: physical, biological and cultural. Physical genocide clearly was meant to cover cases of homicide, and, on a French proposal, this was extended to ‘[a]ny act directed against the corporal integrity of members of the group’. The Committee also added to the list of punishable acts ‘inflicting on the members of the group such measures or conditions of life which would be aimed to cause their deaths’. The Committee also voted to include ‘[a]ny act or measure calculated to prevent births within the group’. The central issue with respect to acts of genocide concerned cultural genocide. The United States was vigorously opposed to this, but its views were rather isolated. France was less aggressive, but made its discomfort with the concept known. The other five States favoured including cultural genocide, and their detailed text was subsequently adopted.

The Committee decided to place what became known as ‘other acts of genocide’ within a distinct article. There was no difficulty with the notion that the convention should go beyond the principal perpetrator of the crime and cover accomplices. Inchoate or incomplete offences posed more problems, notably drawing the line between genuine attempts and the more distant concepts of ‘preparation’ and unsuccessful incitement. A proposal to omit the concept of preparation was ultimately adopted. The Committee was reluctant to go any further ‘upstream’ in the prevention of genocide, as it had been invited to do by the Soviet Union.

The Committee accepted the Secretariat’s recommendation for a specific provision declaring that ‘[h]eads of State, public officials or private individuals’ were all punishable under the convention. The Committee had more trouble with the issue of whether to exclude expressly the defences of superior orders and command of the law. The Secretariat had advised following the example of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and explicitly eliminated the defences of command of the law and superior orders. The United States, while

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117 UN Doc. E/AC.25/2.
118 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13, p. 12 (five in favour, one against, with one abstention).
119 Ibid., pp. 13–14 (four in favour, one against, with three abstentions).
121 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, p. 5.
122 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.14, p. 14 (five in favour, two against).
124 Ibid., p. 7 (four in favour, two against, with one abstention).
125 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.18, p. 4. See also UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.9, p. 7. That the rule about trying rulers did not impair the system of diplomatic immunity was common ground: UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.9, p. 7.
126 UN Doc. E/447, art. V.
not challenging the inadmissibility of the two defences as a norm of international law, favoured silence on the point, leaving the issue for the judges who would ultimately interpret the convention.\textsuperscript{128} Others, however, openly opposed exclusion of the superior orders defence.\textsuperscript{129} The rejection of a Soviet proposal excluding the defences of superior orders and command of the law\textsuperscript{130} provoked an angry outburst from Rudzinski of Poland who suggested the Nuremberg principles were being repudiated.\textsuperscript{131}

The Committee was also sharply divided on the nature of the obligations that the convention would impose, and its means of implementation. For some, it should establish an international criminal legal system, necessary because genocide was generally committed by the State or with its complicity, and that any hope of domestic prosecution was futile. Others saw in it a source of obligations that States parties were to implement within their own domestic legal systems. A particularly extreme form of this position held strictly to the territorial principle of jurisdiction: besides eschewing the idea of an international tribunal, it confined prosecution to courts with jurisdiction on the territory where the crime was committed. Some understood that repression of genocide might involve a combination of domestic and international jurisdiction, the latter to apply when the former failed to ensure prosecution. A related issue was universal jurisdiction: whether States other than those where the crime had taken place were entitled to prosecute genocide. Ultimately, a text almost identical to the eventual article VI was adopted, rejecting universal jurisdiction in favour of exclusive jurisdiction for the territorial State, accompanied by a proposal to create an international criminal court.\textsuperscript{132}

A Soviet proposal requiring the Security Council to intervene in all cases of genocide was rejected.\textsuperscript{133} Instead, the Committee favoured a Chinese text allowing parties to the convention to submit matters to ‘any competent organ of the United Nations’, something they could do anyway.\textsuperscript{134} A compromissory clause, giving the International Court of Justice jurisdiction in disputes arising amongst parties to the convention, was approved over Soviet and Polish opposition.\textsuperscript{135}

The Ad Hoc Committee’s draft was submitted to the third session of the Commission on Human Rights in June 1948. The Commission

\textsuperscript{128} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.18, p. 5.  
\textsuperscript{129} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.9, p. 8 and UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.18, p. 6 (Venezuela); UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.18, p. 6 (China); UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.18, p. 6 (Lebanon).  
\textsuperscript{130} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.18, p. 9 (two in favour, four against, with one abstention).  
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., pp. 9–10.  
\textsuperscript{132} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.24, p. 10.  
\textsuperscript{133} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.20, p. 4.  
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., p. 5.  
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., p. 6.
established a sub-committee to consider the convention, and briefly discussed it during a plenary session. It was, however, preoccupied with the draft international declaration of human rights, and gave the genocide convention only cursory attention. The Commission referred the matter back to ECOSOC, expressing the view that the draft convention represented ‘an appropriate basis for urgent consideration and action by the ECOSOC and the General Assembly during their coming sessions’.

The draft convention was also discussed at the third session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Commission expressed its discontent at the fact that the report of the Ad Hoc Committee did not condemn the suppression of a people with narcotic drugs. It said it was ‘profoundly shocked by the fact that the Japanese occupation authorities in North-eastern China utilized narcotic drugs . . . for the purpose of undermining the resistance and impairing the physical and mental well-being of the Chinese people’. The Commission warned that narcotic drugs might eventually constitute ‘a powerful instrument of the most hideous crime against mankind’ and urged ECOSOC to ‘ensure that the use of narcotics as an instrument of committing a crime of this nature be covered by the proposed Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide’.

ECOSOC discussed the draft convention only summarily at its August 1948 session before submitting it unchanged to the General Assembly. As John Humphrey’s diaries report: ‘Partly because of Lemkin’s lobbying and other efforts the public has become extremely interested in genocide and any postponement of the question now by Council would affect the latter’s prestige.’

The third session of the General Assembly

The United Nations General Assembly held its third session at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris. Two draft instruments of momentous importance for the era of human rights were on the agenda, the ‘international declaration of human rights’ and the convention on genocide. The declaration occupied the time of the General Assembly’s Third Committee for several weeks, and was finally adopted on 10

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136 UN Doc. E/800, pp. 8–9. The Soviet Union included a dissenting statement in the Commission’s report charging that the Ad Hoc Committee draft did not provide ‘a sufficiently effective instrument to combat genocide’.

137 UN Doc. E/799, para. 17.

138 Ibid.


December 1948 as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.\textsuperscript{141} The eventual Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted by the plenary Assembly one day earlier, on 9 December 1948, following detailed debate in the Sixth Committee, accompanied by two related resolutions, one calling for the establishment of an international criminal court,\textsuperscript{142} the other concerning the application of the Convention to dependent territories.\textsuperscript{143}

At the beginning of the Assembly session, the report of the Economic and Social Council on the draft genocide convention, including the instrument prepared by the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee, was referred to its Sixth Committee.\textsuperscript{144} The \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee draft was debated by the Sixth Committee from 28 September 1948 to 2 December 1948.\textsuperscript{145} After detailed article-by-article consideration, the Committee assigned its revised text of the convention to a drafting committee composed of representatives of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, Iran, Poland, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay.\textsuperscript{146} The drafting committee’s text and the accompanying report\textsuperscript{147} were then returned to the Sixth Committee for adoption.

\textit{Preliminary matters}

At the outset of the debates in the Sixth Committee at the end of September 1948, some delegations proposed that the convention be referred for further study to the nascent International Law Commission.\textsuperscript{148} They argued that the Commission was an expert body, best qualified to prepare legal documents. This was nothing more than a tactic aimed at delaying adoption.\textsuperscript{149} Similarly, New Zealand said the draft convention had not been adequately studied, and proposed that it be examined further by member States, the Economic and Social

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{141} Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A (III), UN Doc. A/810.
\textsuperscript{142} ‘Study by the International Law Commission of the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction’, GA Res. 216 B(III).
\textsuperscript{143} ‘Application with Respect to Dependent Territories, of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, GA Res. 216 C(III).
\textsuperscript{144} UN Doc. A/PV/142.
\textsuperscript{145} See Drost, \textit{Genocide}, pp. 54–136.
\textsuperscript{146} Created at the 104th meeting. Australia, Brazil, Iran and Czechoslovakia were added at the 105th meeting. At the 108th meeting, Uruguay replaced Cuba, whose representative could no longer participate.
\textsuperscript{147} UN Doc. A/C.6/288; UN Doc. A/C.6/289.
\textsuperscript{148} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.64 (Egeland, South Africa); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.65 (Arancibia Lazo, Chile).
\textsuperscript{149} See the comments of Raafat of Egypt, Chaumont of France and Spiropoulos of Greece: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.63; and Pérez-Perozo of Venezuela, Kaeckenbeeck of Belgium and Paredes of the Philippines: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.65.
\end{footnotesize}
Council, and the Commission on Human Rights. Some delegations, such as Belgium, preferred that the General Assembly adopt only a declaration on genocide, a view supported by the Dominican Republic. Sir Hartley Shawcross of the United Kingdom said he was not ‘enthusiastic’ about the draft convention, adding that member States would be deluded to think adoption of such a convention would give people a greater sense of security or would diminish dangers of persecution on racial, religious or national grounds. He noted that physical genocide was already punishable by law as murder, and that cultural genocide was a question of fundamental rights better addressed elsewhere.

Initially, then, these efforts to block the convention had to be overcome. Leading the opposition to them, the United States urged negotiation and prompt adoption of the convention. ‘Having regard to the troubled state of the world, it was essential that the convention should be adopted as soon as possible, before the memory of the barbarous crimes which had been committed faded from the minds of men’, said Ernest A. Gross. The United States launched the debate in the Sixth Committee with an oddly phrased resolution: ‘The Committee decides not to refer to the International Law Commission the preparation of the final text of the convention on genocide, and to proceed with the preparation of such said text for submission to this session of the Assembly.’ The Soviet Union, although quite critical of the Ad Hoc Committee draft, was also opposed to sending the draft to a committee or to the International Law Commission for further study, and eager to proceed with clause-by-clause study. In the end, a proposal by South Africa, supported by the United Kingdom, to refer the draft convention to the International Law Commission was convincingly defeated. Then the Committee agreed to article-by-article consideration of the Ad Hoc Committee draft.

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150 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.65 (Reid, New Zealand).
151 Ibid. (Messina, Dominican Republic).
152 Ibid. (Shawcross, United Kingdom).
153 UN Doc. A/C.6/208. See also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.63 (Dignam, Australia); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.65 (Lapointe, Canada); and UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.66 (Abdoh, Iran).
156 Ibid. (Shawcross, United Kingdom).
157 Ibid. (twenty-seven in favour, eleven against, with nine abstentions).
158 The United States proposal (UN Doc. A/C.6/208) was adopted by thirty-eight to seven, with four abstentions: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.66. A resolution, presented by the Philippines (UN Doc. A/C.6/213), calling for an article-by-article study of the draft, was adopted: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.66 (forty-eight in favour, with one abstention).
Then disagreement arose regarding the order in which the draft would be discussed. The Soviet Union insisted this begin with the preamble, so as to clarify the basic principles involved, while others preferred this be left to the end, as the preamble merely repeated the principles set out in the substantive provisions. The Committee resolved to begin debate with article I of the Ad Hoc Committee draft, and leave the preamble for later.

**Article-by-article study**

Article I of the convention, as eventually adopted is, in any case, somewhat ‘preambular’, and as a result many of the issues were debated twice. One of them is the nature of the crime, that is, whether genocide is an autonomous infraction or a form of crime against humanity. France had prepared a rival draft convention, and article I of that text began by affirming that ‘[t]he crime against humanity known as genocide is an attack on the life of a human group or of an individual as a member of such group, particularly by reason of his nationality, race, religion or opinions’. This was, of course, connected with the idea, included in the final version of article I, that genocide was a crime that could be committed in time of peace or of war. Crimes against humanity were still widely believed to be crimes that could only be committed during armed conflict, a consequence of the Nuremberg jurisprudence. Some nations thought it important to affirm that geno-

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159 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.66 (Morozov, Soviet Union). Supported by Haiti, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Venezuela.

160 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.66 (Spiropoulos, Greece). Supported by Egypt, Cuba and Australia.

161 A Soviet proposal to discuss the preamble and art. I at the same time was rejected: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.66 (thirty-two in favour, eleven against, with six abstentions). Then, Iran’s proposal to begin with art. I was adopted (thirty-six in favour, four against, with seven abstentions).

162 The Soviet Union (UN Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1) and Iran (UN Doc. A/C.6/218) felt that art. I was so ‘preambular’ that it ought to be left out altogether and incorporated in the preamble.

163 UN Doc. A/C.6/211, art. I. See also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.67 (Chaumont, France). France had been concerned that its own proposal would be forgotten if the Committee studied the Ad Hoc Committee draft. The chair assured the French representative that this was not the case: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.66 (Alfaro (chair)).

Genocide was a crime under international law,\textsuperscript{165} while others found this to be unnecessary.\textsuperscript{166}

The basis of article I was not the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee draft, but rather an amendment proposed by the Netherlands: ‘The High Contracting Parties reaffirm that genocide is a crime under international law, which they undertake to prevent and to punish, in accordance with the following articles.’\textsuperscript{167} The Soviet Union unsuccessfully urged deletion of the phrase ‘under international law’.\textsuperscript{168} An amendment by the United Kingdom to insert ‘whether committed in time of peace or of war’ after the words ‘under international law’ was easily adopted.\textsuperscript{169} The final text stated ‘[t]he High Contracting Parties confirm that genocide is a crime under international law whether committed in time of peace or of war, which they undertake to prevent and to punish’,\textsuperscript{170} although several delegations expressed reservations and indicated they wanted to come back to the point when the preamble was being reviewed.

Perhaps the most intriguing phrase in article I is the obligation upon States to prevent and punish genocide, added in the Sixth Committee upon proposals from Belgium\textsuperscript{171} and Iran.\textsuperscript{172} Belgium argued that article I, as drafted by the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee, did nothing more than reproduce the text of General Assembly Resolution 96(I). Because the purpose of a convention was to create obligations, ‘it was preferable that the undertaking to prevent and suppress the crime of genocide which appeared at the end of the preamble, should constitute the text of article I of the convention’.\textsuperscript{173} Yet, while the final Convention has much to say about punishment of genocide, there is little to suggest what prevention of genocide really means. Certainly, nothing in the debates about article I provides the slightest clue as to the scope of the obligation to prevent.

Articles II and III are the heart of the Convention.\textsuperscript{174} They define the crime, as well as the modalities of its commission. In the Sixth Committee the debate returned to issues that had been bruited since the first days of the drafting: definition of the intentional element; inclusion of political groups among the victims of genocide; and treatment of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{footnotes}{165} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.67 (Raafat, Egypt).
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\begin{footnotes}{166} \textit{Ibid.} (Bartos, Yugoslavia); \textit{ibid.} (Morozov, Soviet Union).
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\begin{footnotes}{167} UN Doc. A/C.6/220.
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\begin{footnotes}{168} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.68 (thirty-six in favour, three against, with seven abstentions).
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\begin{footnotes}{169} \textit{Ibid.} (thirty in favour, seven against, with six abstentions).
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\begin{footnotes}{170} UN Doc. A/C.6/256; UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.68 (thirty-seven in favour, three against, with two abstentions).
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\begin{footnotes}{171} UN Doc. A/C.6/217 \textsuperscript{172} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.68 (Abdoh, Iran).
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\begin{footnotes}{173} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.67 (Kaeckenenbeck, Belgium).
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\begin{footnotes}{174} The drafting of art. II is considered in detail in chapters 3, 4 and 5 at pp. 114–46, 152–97 and 215–55 below respectively. For the drafting of art. III, see chapter 6, pp. 260–99 below.
\end{footnotes}
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cultural genocide as an act of genocide. Article II consists of an enumeration of ‘acts of genocide’, but actually begins by delimiting the intentional element of the crime: ‘genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’. The Sixth Committee of the General Assembly made four changes to the Ad Hoc Committee draft: it eliminated the word ‘deliberate’ before ‘acts’; it incorporated the qualification that genocide need not involve the total destruction of a group, but can also occur where destruction is only partial; it redefined the notion of protected ‘groups’, adding ‘ethnical’ and removing ‘political’; and it replaced the suggestion that genocide was committed ‘on grounds of the national or racial origin, religious belief, or political opinion of its members’ with the enigmatic words ‘as such’. The Sixth Committee agreed without difficulty to include a list of ‘acts’ of genocide and, after considerable debate, decided that this should be exhaustive and not indicative. It also voted to limit the punishable acts to physical and biological genocide, excluding cultural genocide, which several delegates said should be addressed elsewhere in the United Nations as a human rights issue.175

Article III of the Convention lists what the Ad Hoc Committee labelled ‘punishable acts’, and raises issues relating to criminal participation as well as incomplete or inchoate offences. It begins ‘The following acts shall be punishable’ and is followed by five paragraphs setting out the various acts. The first paragraph of article III consists of the word ‘genocide’, and in effect refers the interpreter back to article II, where genocide is defined. This did not give rise to any real difficulty in the Sixth Committee. The remaining four paragraphs are what the Convention refers to as ‘other acts’. The debate in the Sixth Committee involved questions of comparative criminal law, with delegates searching for common ground as to the meaning of such terms as conspiracy, complicity and attempt. The third paragraph, dealing with direct and public incitement to commit genocide, was the most controversial of these provisions. Some delegations argued for its deletion, fearing it might encroach upon freedom of expression. The Soviet Union tried to push the incitement issue even further, with an additional act of genocide: ‘All forms of public propaganda (Press, radio, cinema, etc.) aimed at inciting racial, national or religious enmities or hatreds or at provoking the commission of acts of genocide.’176 This obviously went well beyond ‘direct incitement’. A similar proposal had been rejected by the

Ad Hoc Committee, and the Sixth Committee reacted no differently.\textsuperscript{177} It should be borne in mind that, when the debate took place, the Committee had already agreed to include genocide of political groups within the text, a decision it later reversed. This context undoubtedly influenced attitudes towards the hate propaganda amendment. The fourth paragraph of article III defines ‘attempt’ as an act of genocide. In the Sixth Committee there was no debate whatsoever about the text, and there were no amendments. It was adopted unanimously.\textsuperscript{178} But, as in the case of incitement, the Soviet delegation made a similar, unsuccessful effort to enlarge the scope of attempted genocide with an amendment concerning ‘preparatory acts’, which encompassed ‘studies and research for the purpose of developing the technique of genocide; setting up of installations, manufacturing, obtaining, possessing or supplying of articles or substances with the knowledge that they are intended for genocide; issuing instructions or orders and distributing tasks with a view to committing genocide’.\textsuperscript{179}

Article IV concerns the defence of ‘act of state’, by which rulers or heads of government or armed forces attempt to avoid criminal liability.\textsuperscript{180} The debate revealed sharply differing opinions about the Convention’s purpose. Article IV vexed the drafting committee, and the chair reported that the wording ‘had satisfied none of the members’.\textsuperscript{181} The debate spilled over onto ancillary issues, notably the creation of an international criminal court susceptible of prosecuting such officials. The United Kingdom observed that article IV was predicated on the creation of an international penal tribunal. For France, this was ‘the essential purpose of the convention on genocide’. According to Charles Chaumont, ‘[t]he convention would be a mere accumulation of entirely ineffective formulas, if such a court were not established within a reasonable period’.\textsuperscript{182}

Article V imposes upon States parties an obligation to take the necessary legislative measures to give effect to the Convention.\textsuperscript{183} As the Belgian Kaeckenbeeck explained, the article involved States in ‘an obligation to introduce the definition of genocide and the penalties envisaged for it into their own penal codes, and also to determine the competent jurisdiction and the procedure to be followed’.\textsuperscript{184} That this entailed penalties may have been obvious, but the Soviet Union insisted

\textsuperscript{177} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.87. \textsuperscript{178} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.85.
\textsuperscript{179} UN Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1.
\textsuperscript{180} The drafting of art. IV is discussed in detail in chapter 7, pp. 317–20 below.
\textsuperscript{181} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.128 (Amado, Brazil).
\textsuperscript{182} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.95 (Chaumont, France).
\textsuperscript{183} The drafting of art. V is discussed in detail in chapter 8, pp. 347–8 below.
\textsuperscript{184} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.93 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
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upon an explicit amendment to this effect.\textsuperscript{185} The Committee adopted a revised text, but then reopened the debate a few days later in order to correct the impression that the provision pertained only to penal measures. The final version of article V makes it clear that criminal law is merely one of the areas in which States are required to enact necessary legislation.

Article VI deals with jurisdiction for the prosecution of genocide, from the standpoint of both domestic and international courts.\textsuperscript{186} With respect to the former, the central issue was universal jurisdiction, already recognized in certain other treaties dealing with international crimes. The Sixth Committee rejected universal jurisdiction and opted for territorial jurisdiction. With respect to international courts, the major question was creation of an international jurisdiction. The original Secretariat draft included draft statutes for such a court. The \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee had endorsed the idea of the creation of the international criminal court as an alternative to jurisdiction of the territorial state. Reference to an international court was eliminated in an initial vote of the Sixth Committee, but was successfully reintroduced by the United States.

Article VII concerns extradition, and was rendered particularly important in light of Article VI, which declared that as a general rule genocide suspects will be tried in the territory where the crime took place.\textsuperscript{187} It was important to eliminate the possibility that offenders would invoke the political offence exception to extradition, which is widely recognized in extradition treaties as well as at customary law.\textsuperscript{188} But the debates made it clear that States whose legislation did not provide for extradition of their own nationals would be under no obligation to grant this.\textsuperscript{189}

Article VIII affirms the right of all States parties to call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.\textsuperscript{190} In fact, it declares nothing more than something to which all Member States of the United Nations are entitled in any case, although theoretically it extends this right to a handful of non-member States, such as Switzerland. The Soviets had sought a provision requiring States to address the Security

\textsuperscript{186} The drafting of art. VI is considered in detail in chapter 8, pp. 355–60 and 368–78 below.
\textsuperscript{187} The drafting of art. VII is considered in detail in chapter 8, pp. 402–3 below.
\textsuperscript{188} UN Doc. A/C.6/217.
\textsuperscript{189} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.95 (Alfaro, chair).
\textsuperscript{190} The drafting of art. VIII is considered in detail in chapter 10, pp. 448–51 below.
Council, but this met with opposition. The Sixth Committee actually voted to delete article VII, but Australia successfully revived the provision in a subsequent debate.

Article IX is a compromissory clause, conferring jurisdiction on the International Court of Justice in the case of disputes concerning the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention. The United Kingdom, which had not participated in the Ad Hoc Committee and which believed the convention really concerned State rather than individual liability, was particularly enthusiastic about this provision. Yet there appeared to be much confusion about what it really meant. France and Belgium presumed it dealt with State responsibility, while the Philippines thought it concerned State crimes.

A Soviet Union amendment pledging States parties to disband and prohibit organizations that incite racial hatred or the commission of genocidal acts was defeated. The Ad Hoc Committee had rejected a similar proposal. In the Sixth Committee, France had attempted to help the Soviet proposal with a friendly amendment, but the Soviets were not seduced and refused to accept it.

After drafting the technical or ‘protocolar’ clauses, the Sixth Committee turned to the question that logically belonged at the beginning but that it had agreed to leave for the end: the preamble. In its final version, the preamble consists of three succinct sentences. The first refers to General Assembly Resolution 96(I), observing that ‘genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world’. The second recognizes that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity. The final paragraph states that in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required.

Several States altogether opposed including a preamble. The Sixth Committee set aside the Ad Hoc Committee draft and conducted its

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193 The drafting of art. IX is considered in detail in chapter 9, pp. 418–24 below.
194 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.105 (eighteen in favour, two against, with fifteen abstentions).
195 UN Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1: ‘The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to disband and prohibit any organizations aimed at inciting racial, national or religious hatred or the commission of acts of genocide.’
197 The drafting of the protocolar clauses is discussed in detail in chapter 11, pp. 503–22 below.
198 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.109 (Manini y Ríos, Uruguay); ibid. (Dihigo, Cuba); ibid. (Abdoh, Iran); ibid. (Amado, Brazil).
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There was no real disagreement with reference to the historical basis of the crime of genocide, and recognition that it had existed long before the adoption of the Convention or of General Assembly Resolution 96(I). The Soviets, however, also believed it was important to refer to recent history or events, and to indicate that genocide was ‘organically bound up with fascism-nazism’ and similar ideologies. Venezuela refused to accept the amendment, explaining that the Convention was directed against genocide and not fascism-Nazism. ‘The statement

199 UN Doc. A/C.6/261: ‘The High Contracting Parties, Considering that the General Assembly of the United Nations has declared in its resolution 96(I) of 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and which the civilized world condemns, Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity, and Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required; Hereby agree as hereinafter provided . . . ’


201 Ibid. (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela).


204 UN Doc. A/C.6/273: ‘1. After the words “has inflicted great losses on humanity”, insert a comma and add the words “while recent events provide evidence that genocide is organically bound up with fascism-nazism and other similar race ‘theories’ which preach racial and national hatred, the domination of the so-called higher races and the extermination of the so-called lower races”. 2. After the words “from such an odious scourge”, add the words “and to prevent and punish genocide”.’

205 UN Doc. A/C.6/267. ‘3. Substitute the following for the third sub-paragraph: “Having taken note of the legal precedent established by the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg of 30 September–1 October 1946”,’ The Soviet preamble, UN Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1, included a similar paragraph: ‘Having taken note of the fact that the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg in its judgments of 30 September–1 October 1946 has punished under a different legal description certain persons who have committed acts similar to those which the present Convention aims at punishing.’


that genocide was organically bound up with fascism-nazism was not historically accurate, as acts of genocide had been committed as recently as the previous year without having any connection with such theories’, said Victor M. Pérez-Perozo. The United States agreed with Venezuela, adding that this might suggest that acts of genocide committed for other motives might not be punishable. Egypt also opposed the Soviet amendment: ‘instances of genocide were to be found in the far more distant past, instances which had no connexion at all with theories of racial superiority.’ On a roll-call vote, the Soviet proposal was decisively rejected. The Soviets also proposed that reference to ‘prevention and punishment’ as purposes of the Convention be included in the preamble. The idea was hardly controversial, because it was also found in article I, already adopted by the Sixth Committee, but the Soviet suggestion was not taken up.

A number of reasons were advanced for excluding any reference to the Nuremberg judgment. Several States feared this would confuse genocide with crimes against humanity, and consequently limit the concept, because crimes against humanity had received a relatively restrictive interpretation at Nuremberg, notably in the requirement that they be committed in relation to international armed conflict. According to the United States, genocide was a new concept that originated in General Assembly Resolution 96(I) and ‘did not need to be propped up by any precedents’. Jean Spiropoulos explained, but to no avail, that this was a misunderstanding of the Nuremberg jurisprudence. ‘That Tribunal had, in fact, dealt with crimes committed in peacetime, crimes committed in war-time and crimes against humanity whether committed in peace- or wartime, as article 6(c) of the Nurnberg Charter showed. In [his opinion], genocide belonged to the category of crimes against humanity, as defined by that article.’ The Chinese were unhappy with reference to the Nuremberg judgment because there was no corresponding mention of the Tokyo Tribunal, an objection that the

209 Ibid. (Maktos, United States).
210 Ibid. (Raafat, Egypt). See also ibid. (Abdoh, Iran).
211 Ibid. The Soviets reintroduced the proposal in the General Assembly on 9 December 1948, where the amendment (UN Doc. A/766) was rejected by thirty-four to seven, with ten abstentions.
212 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.110 (twenty-three in favour, fifteen against, with six abstentions).
213 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.109 (Correa, Ecuador); ibid. (Azkoul, Lebanon); ibid. (Manini y Ríos, Uruguay); ibid. (Dihigo, Cuba); ibid. (Abdoh, Iran); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.110 (Agha Shahi, Pakistan); ibid. (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela).
215 Ibid. (Spiropoulos, Greece).
United States considered reasonable.\textsuperscript{216} It was also argued that the General Assembly had assigned the International Law Commission the task of drafting the ‘Nuremberg Principles’ and the genocide convention should not prejudice the process.\textsuperscript{217} But the debate betrayed dissatisfaction with the Nuremberg judgment, particularly among Latin-American States. Peru said that: ‘The trials had been an improvisation, made necessary by exceptional circumstances resulting from the war, and had disregarded the rule *nullum crimen sine lege*, which meant that any penal sanction must be based on a law existing at the time of the perpetration of the crime to be punished.’\textsuperscript{218} The issue never formally came to a vote. The chair ruled that the Venezuelan amendment as a whole should be decided, and its adoption\textsuperscript{219} obviated the need to consider any other proposals.

The Sixth Committee completed its consideration of the draft convention on 2 December 1948. The draft resolution and the draft convention were adopted by thirty votes to none, with eight abstentions.\textsuperscript{220} Following the vote, Gerald Fitzmaurice explained that the United Kingdom had abstained in order to indicate its reservations. The United Kingdom considered it preferable not to go beyond the scope of General Assembly Resolution 96(I), and for this reason had not participated in the *Ad Hoc* Committee. For the United Kingdom, the Convention approached genocide from the wrong angle, the responsibility of individuals, whereas it was really governments that had to be the focus.\textsuperscript{221} Poland said that it had abstained because of the text’s failure to prohibit hate propaganda and measures aimed against a nation’s art and culture.\textsuperscript{222} Yugoslavia made a similar intervention.\textsuperscript{223} Czechoslovakia regretted the inability of the Convention to prevent genocide.\textsuperscript{224} Finally, France expressed its reservations about certain provisions, adding that ‘the principle of an international criminal court had, irreversibly,
become part of statute law. It was because that principle had been introduced that France was able to sign the convention.\textsuperscript{225}

Two resolutions were adopted at the same time as the Convention. The first noted that the discussion of the Convention had ‘raised the question of the desirability and possibility of having persons charged with genocide tried by a competent international tribunal’. The resolution stated that there would be ‘an increasing need of an international judicial organ for the trial of certain crimes under international law’ and invited the International Law Commission ‘to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by international conventions’. The General Assembly requested the Commission to consider whether establishing a criminal chamber of the International Court of Justice might do this.\textsuperscript{226} A second resolution recommended that States parties to the Convention which administer dependent territories ‘take such measures as are necessary and feasible to enable the provisions of the Convention to be extended to those territories as soon as possible.’\textsuperscript{227}

The Sixth Committee draft was submitted to the General Assembly on 9 December 1948, in the form of a resolution to which was annexed the text, as prepared by the drafting committee, and the two accompanying resolutions.\textsuperscript{228} The Soviet Union proposed a series of amendments, in effect returning to the points it had unsuccessfully advanced in the sessions of the Sixth Committee: reference to racial hatred and Nazism in the preamble, disbanding of racist organizations, prohibition of cultural genocide, rejection of an international criminal jurisdiction, and automatic application to non-self-governing territories.\textsuperscript{229} Venezuela also proposed an amendment prohibiting cultural genocide, adding a sixth paragraph to the list of punishable acts in article II.\textsuperscript{230} Venezuela withdrew its amendment after determining it could not rally sufficient support. The Soviet amendments were all rejected.\textsuperscript{231} The Convention itself was adopted on a roll-call vote, by fifty-six to none.

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid. (Chaumont, France).
\textsuperscript{226} ‘Study by the International Law Commission of the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction’, GA Res. 260 B(III) (twenty-seven in favour, five against, with six abstentions).
\textsuperscript{228} UN Doc. A/C.6/289; UN Doc. A/760 and A/760/Corr.2.
\textsuperscript{229} UN Doc. A/760. For Morozov’s speech, see UN Doc. A/PV.178.
\textsuperscript{230} UN Doc. A/770: ‘Systematic destruction of religious edifices, schools or libraries of the group’.
\textsuperscript{231} UN Doc. A/PV.178.
The resolution concerning the international criminal tribunal was adopted by forty-three to six, with three abstentions, and the resolution on non-self-governing territories was adopted by fifty votes, with one abstention.

Subsequent developments

There have been several efforts at the further development of the norms of the Convention. Four legal instruments are involved: the draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, developed by the International Law Commission; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the 1998 Diplomatic Conference; and the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The drafting of these instruments is of interest not only from the standpoint of interpretation of the texts in their own right, but also as an aid to construing the Convention itself.

The Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind

At its second session in 1947, the General Assembly asked the International Law Commission to prepare a draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind. The Commission proceeded sporadically on the project, only completing it in 1996. In the final version, genocide is defined as one of the crimes against the peace and security of mankind. In the course of the half-century during which it studied the subject, the Commission periodically addressed issues relating to the law of genocide.

The initial ‘draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind’ was prepared for the International Law Commission by Special Rapporteur Jean Spiropoulos in 1950. Crime No. VIII consisted of two components, genocide and crimes against humanity. Spiropoulos did not actually use the word genocide, but paragraph 1 of Crime No. VIII corresponded exactly to the text of article II of the Genocide Convention, while paragraph 2 of Crime No. VIII was taken from the crimes against humanity provision of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. Several members of the International Law Commission questioned whether to include genocide, as the crime could be committed in time of peace, and they believed that they were drafting a
The United States indicated that it favoured inclusion of genocide in the draft code. The debate at the 1950 session of the Commission suggests a malaise with the Genocide Convention, which had not yet come into force. Some Commission members noted that no great power had yet ratified the instrument, implying that this imperilled its future success. The absence of protection of political groups in the Convention definition was also criticized.

In a memorandum for the Secretariat on the Spiropoulos draft, Vespasian V. Pella, one of the international criminal law experts retained by the Secretariat in 1947 to work on the initial draft of the Convention, opposed the inclusion of genocide. According to Pella, genocide and crimes against humanity (whose incorporation in the code he supported) overlapped considerably. But there was a significant distinction because, unlike genocide as defined in the Convention, crimes against humanity, as set out in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, covered persecution on political grounds. Pella observed that General Assembly Resolution 96(I), which referred to political groups, was ‘tout à fait indépendante’ of the Genocide Convention. He went so far as to claim that it would go against the decisions of the General Assembly to include genocide in the draft code. The Secretariat took care to note that the document expressed Pella’s personal views and did not necessarily represent its own position. The International Law Commission subsequently rejected Pella’s somewhat extreme assessment.

For the 1951 session, Jean Spiropoulos prepared a revised draft code. His new text modified slightly the Convention definition, specifying that acts of genocide could be committed ‘by the authorities of a State or by private individuals’, language borrowed from article IV and in no way incompatible with the Convention in a substantive sense. He also added the word ‘including’ at the end of the chapeau of the definition, just prior to the enumeration of the acts of genocide. This
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was more significant, because article II of the Convention is an exhaustive list of acts of genocide, and quite intentionally so. The report adopted by the Commission claimed – inaccurately – that the new text ‘follow[ed] the definition’ in the Convention.241

The Commission’s 1951 draft was submitted to member States for their comments. When the Commission returned to the code, in 1954, Spiropoulos said that the comments on the genocide provision were conflicting and he had therefore decided not to make any changes. Consequently, the International Law Commission in 1954 adopted the draft code’s genocide provision, with its slight departure from the text of article II of the Convention.242 Acting on the instructions of the General Assembly, the International Law Commission suspended work on the draft code in 1954,243 and did not return to the question until 1982,244 when Doudou Thiam was designated the Special Rapporteur of the Commission. Thiam’s first draft stuck to Spiropoulos’ definition of genocide in the 1954 draft code.245

In 1986, Thiam produced a substantially revised set of draft articles.246 In a new and more detailed list of offences, genocide was placed in Part II of Chapter II, entitled ‘Crimes against humanity’, together with *apartheid*, other inhuman acts and crimes against the environment. The 1954 definition of genocide had been revised once again. The list of acts was the same, but the chapeau read: ‘Genocide, in other words any act committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such, including . . .’ The word ‘genocide’ had finally been introduced into the provision. As for the non-exhaustive aspect of the list of punishable acts, which had been Spiropoulos’ ‘improvement’ on article II of the Convention, this notion was further strengthened by adding the phrase ‘any act committed . . .’.


Thiam also replaced the term ‘ethnical’ with ‘ethnic’, a linguistic change of no substantive significance. Thiam’s 1986 report discussed the distinctions between genocide and ‘inhuman acts’, which are a component of crimes against humanity, noting that genocide needed to be committed with the purpose of destroying a group, something that was not required in the case of inhuman acts. Here, Thiam was insisting upon a motive requirement for the crime of genocide.

The Commission did not return to the issue of genocide and crimes against humanity until 1989. Thiam retained the wording he had proposed in 1986, but his comments focused almost exclusively on crimes against humanity and he had nothing to add on genocide. During debate in the Commission, Calero Rodrigues questioned the use of the term ‘including’, noting that article II of the Genocide Convention had been intended as an exhaustive enumeration of punishable acts. Emmanuel Roucounas, on the other hand, said the word ‘including’ corrected a shortcoming in the Convention. The report of the 1989 session noted that Thiam’s draft provision on genocide had been favourably received by the Commission, ‘first because it placed genocide first among the crimes against humanity; secondly, because it abided by the definition given in the 1948 Convention; and thirdly because, unlike that in the 1948 Convention, the enumeration of acts constituting the crime of genocide proposed by the Special Rapporteur was not exhaustive’.

At the 1991 session of the International Law Commission, a committee was established to revise the Thiam draft. The committee recommended that the Commission return to the original Convention text, rejecting the approach in the Spiropoulos and Thiam drafts by which the list of punishable acts was indicative rather than exhaustive. According to the report: ‘The Commission decided in favour of that solution because the draft Code is a criminal code and in view of the

247 Ibid., art. 12(1). Thiam’s reports were originally drafted in French, and it is likely that translators at the Secretariat introduced this minor linguistic change to the English version.


251 Ibid., 2100th meeting, p. 27, para. 2. See also the comments of Barsegov, Ibid., p. 30, para. 31; Thiam, Yearbook . . . 1989, Vol. I, 2102nd meeting, p. 41, para. 12.

nullum crimen sine lege principle and the need not to stray too far from a
text widely accepted by the international community.253 The provision
consisted of two paragraphs:

1. An individual who commits or orders the commission of an act of genocide
shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced [to . . . ].

2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as
such . . .

This was followed by the five sub-paragraphs of article II of the
Genocide Convention. Paragraph 1 was original, and reflected concerns
among some members of the Commission that distinct penalties be set
out for each crime in the code. Aside from deleting the words ‘In the
present Convention’, at the beginning of the provision, paragraph 2
replicated article II of the Convention.

Thiam prepared yet another draft code for the 1995 session of the
Commission, with an entirely new provision on genocide.254 Article 19
consisted of four paragraphs, of which the first specified that ‘[a]n
individual convicted of having committed or ordered’ the commission of
genocide would be sentenced to a period of detention, still unspecified.
Paragraph 2 resembled article II of the Convention, except that the

253 Yearbook . . . 1991, Vol. I, 2239th meeting, p. 214, paras. 7–8; ibid., 2251st meeting,
pp. 292–3, paras. 9–17; ‘Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the
(2). See Albin Eser, ‘The Need for a General Part, Commentaries on the International
Law Commission’s 1991 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind’, (1993) 11 Nouvelles études pénales 43; L. C. Green, ‘Crimes under the ILC
1991 Draft Code’, in Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory, eds., War Crimes in
International Law, The Hague, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind:


Article 19. Genocide

1. An individual convicted of having committed or ordered the commission of an act
of genocide shall be sentenced to . . .

2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such:

(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

3. An individual convicted of having engaged in direct and public incitement to
genocide shall be sentenced to . . .

4. An individual convicted of an attempt to commit genocide shall be sentenced to . . .
words ‘[I]n this Convention,’ with which article II begins, were omitted. Paragraphs 3 and 4 indicated that direct and public incitement of genocide and attempted genocide would also be punishable, leaving room for specific penalties.\textsuperscript{255} Members of the Commission expressed mixed opinions about these changes.\textsuperscript{256} The majority believed that genocide should respect the Convention definition.\textsuperscript{257}

Following the debate, the Drafting Committee reviewed the comments and prepared yet another version, submitted as an interim report. Articles II and III of the Convention were combined, consistent with the model developed by the Security Council in the statutes of the \textit{ad hoc} tribunals.\textsuperscript{258} As a result, the text comprised not only the definition of the elements of genocide, drawn from article II of the Convention, but also the forms of participation and inchoate offences taken from article III. The Drafting Committee said it would return to this point once the Commission decided how criminal participation in general, with respect to all of the crimes in the code, was to be treated.\textsuperscript{259} The entire provision

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Yearbook . . . 1995}, Vol. I, 2379th meeting, pp. 3–4, para. 10; \textit{ibid.}, 2379th meeting, p. 6, para. 26; \textit{ibid.}, 2382nd meeting, p. 24, para. 43; \textit{ibid.}, 2383rd meeting, p. 31, para. 28; \textit{ibid.}, 2384th meeting, p. 40, para. 52.
\item ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Seventh Session, 2 May–21 July 1995’, note 255 above, p. 43, para. 78, p. 65, para. 132. See also \textit{Yearbook . . . 1995}, Vol. I, 2379th meeting, p. 3, para. 3; \textit{ibid.}, 2381st meeting, p. 17, para. 26; \textit{ibid.}, 2381st meeting, pp. 20–21, para. 13; \textit{ibid.}, 2383rd meeting, p. 31, para. 28; \textit{ibid.}, 2384th meeting, p. 38, para. 40; \textit{ibid.}, 2384th meeting, p. 39, para. 51; \textit{ibid.}, 2384th meeting, p. 41, para. 63; \textit{ibid.}, 2384th meeting, p. 41, para. 69.
\item UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.506; ‘Draft Articles Proposed by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading’, \textit{Yearbook . . . 1995}, Vol. I, 2408th meeting, pp. 197–8, para. 1:
\end{enumerate}

\begin{flushleft}
Article 19. Genocide
\end{flushleft}

[1. An individual who commits an act of genocide shall be punished under the present Code.]

2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such:
\begin{enumerate}
\item Killing members of the group;
\item Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
\item Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
\item Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
\item Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
\end{enumerate}

3. The following acts shall be punishable:
\begin{enumerate}
\item Conspiracy to commit genocide;
\item Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
\item Attempt to commit genocide;
\item Complicity in genocide.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
was prefaced by a paragraph 1, in square brackets, which said: ‘[1. An individual who commits an act of genocide shall be punished under the present Code.]’ The chair of the Drafting Committee explained that paragraph 1 had been modified from the draft adopted on first reading, which had also referred to the ordering of genocide. It was really superfluous to include a reference to ‘ordering’ genocide: a commander who orders the commission of a crime is an accomplice and can be held responsible pursuant to general principles of law.

The International Law Commission, at its 1996 session, adopted the final version of the draft code. After tinkering with the Convention definition for nearly half a century, the Commission eventually returned to the exact text of article II of the Convention, with one minor and intriguing difference. ‘The definition of genocide contained in article II of the Convention, which is widely accepted and generally recognized as the authoritative definition of this crime, is reproduced in article 17 of the present Code’, reads the commentary of the Commission. This is not quite accurate. Instead of beginning the provision with ‘Genocide means . . . ’, it says ‘A crime of genocide means . . . ’, possibly implying that there are other types of crime of genocide. Was the Commission hinting at a return to its earlier position, whereby the list of acts of genocide is non-exhaustive? Indeed, the words suggest an even larger view, by which there is a customary content not only of the acts of genocide but also of the other aspects of the definition. The commentary provides no guidance on this point.

In its report, the Commission noted the very particular historical context: ‘Indeed the tragic events in Rwanda clearly demonstrated that the crime of genocide, even when committed primarily in the territory of a single State, could have serious consequences for international peace and security and, thus, confirmed the appropriateness of

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261 See the discussion of complicity in chapter 6, pp. 285–303 below.
264 Ibid., p. 85.
including this crime in the present Code.'\textsuperscript{265} One of the members of the Commission, Christian Tomuschat, described the genocide provisions as being ‘in a way the cornerstone of the draft Code’.\textsuperscript{266} The Commission also insisted upon the close relationship between the second category of crimes against humanity, namely ‘persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal’\textsuperscript{267} The commentary stated: ‘Article II of the Convention contains a definition of the crime of genocide which represents an important further development in the law relating to the persecution category of crimes against humanity recognized in the Nurnberg Charter.’\textsuperscript{268}

Where the Commission departed significantly from the Convention was in its treatment of the other acts of genocide, that is, the forms of participation listed in article III of the Convention. The Commission decided not to repeat the terms of article III within the definition of genocide, as the Security Council had done in the statutes of the \textit{ad hoc} tribunals, believing that general notions of participation belonged within an umbrella provision, applicable to the code as a whole. In so doing, it discarded some forms of participation provided for in article III of the Convention, eliminating the inchoate forms of conspiracy and direct and public incitement. Under the draft code, these acts cannot be committed if genocide itself does not take place.

In the \textit{Furundžija} judgment, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia remarked that the draft code had been prepared by ‘a body consisting of outstanding experts in international law, including government legal advisers, elected by the General Assembly’. Moreover, the General Assembly, in its Resolution 51/160, had expressed its ‘appreciation’ for the completion of the draft code. According to the Tribunal, ‘the Draft Code is an authoritative international instrument which, depending upon the specific question at issue, may (i) constitute evidence of customary law, or (ii) shed light on customary rules which are of uncertain content or are in the process of formation, or, at the very least, (iii) be indicative of the legal views of eminently qualified publicists representing the major legal systems of the world’.\textsuperscript{269}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[265] Ibid., p. 87.
\item[266] \textit{Yearbook . . . 1995}, Vol. I, 2385th meeting, p. 43, para. 5.
\item[268] Ibid., p. 87.
\end{footnotes}
The International Criminal Court

One of the two resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in conjunction with the Convention, on 9 December 1948, noted that the adoption of the Genocide Convention had ‘raised the question of the desirability and possibility of having persons charged with genocide tried by a competent international tribunal’. It stated that there would be ‘an increasing need of an international judicial organ for the trial of certain crimes under international law’ and invited the International Law Commission to pursue the question.270

This invitation and the implicit mandate attributed by article VI of the Convention were taken up the following year when the Commission assigned two special rapporteurs the task of formulating a draft statute for such a court.271 Their initial reports were submitted to the Commission in 1950. One of the rapporteurs, A. E. F. Sandström, was quite pessimistic about the possibility of creating a court given the existing political climate,272 while the other, Ricardo J. Alfaro, was somewhat more encouraging.273 The Commission recognized the difficulty of proceeding on the subject separately from the closely related work on the Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, being undertaken by another special rapporteur, Jean Spiropoulos.274 Professor Cherif Bassiouni has described this piecemeal approach to the work as ‘[contrary] to logic and rational drafting policy’.275

In 1951, parallel to the work of the International Law Commission, the General Assembly established a committee charged with drafting the statute of an international criminal court. Composed of seventeen States, it submitted its draft statute the following year.276 A new Committee, established by the General Assembly to review the comments by member States, reported to the General Assembly in 1954.277 But that year, work on the entire project ground to a halt when the General Assembly considered it could advance no further until there was an acceptable definition of aggression.278 Given the Cold War

270 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.132 (twenty-seven in favour, five against, with six abstentions).
278 GA Res. 898(IX).
context, this sounded the death knell for an international criminal court, at least in the foreseeable future. The Soviet Union remained quite vehemently opposed to the idea of such a jurisdiction. According to one Soviet author, ‘the prevention and punishment of genocide should remain within the realm of national legislation and should not be left to some sort of a vague “international criminal law” and “international criminal justice” about which American diplomats have recently prattled much in the United Nations’.279

The international criminal court project remained dormant until 1989, the year the Berlin Wall fell. Trinidad and Tobago, a Caribbean state plagued by narcotics problems, introduced a General Assembly resolution directing the International Law Commission to consider the subject within the framework of the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.280 Initially, these initiatives were not focused on genocide and other international crimes against human rights, but rather on the more mundane matter of drug trafficking, although this soon changed.

Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam made an initial presentation in 1992 that comprised a draft provision where States parties to the Statute ‘recognize the exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in respect of the following crimes: genocide . . . ’281 Thiam noted that ‘[c]ertain crimes, because of their particular gravity, heinous nature, and the considerable detriment they cause to mankind, must come within the purview of an international court’.282 In its report, the International Law Commission emphasized the importance of spelling out the crimes for which the Court would have jurisdiction, although it conceded that ‘there exist rules of general international law, for example, the prohibition of genocide, which directly bind the individual and make individual violations punishable’.283

By 1993 the Commission had prepared a draft statute. Article 22, entitled ‘List of crimes defined by treaties’, began: ‘The Court may have jurisdiction conferred on it in respect of the following crimes: (a) genocide and related crimes as defined by articles II and III of the Con-

280 GA Res. 44/89.
282 Ibid., para. 38.
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vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, of 9 December 1948 . . .'  

This was simplified in the 1994 report: ‘Article 20. Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide . . .’ No detailed text set out the elements of the crime. However, the travaux pointed to the Convention as the authoritative definition. Speaking of the crimes within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the Commission’s report stated: ‘The least problematic of these, without doubt, is genocide. It is clearly and authoritatively defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which is widely ratified, and which envisages that cases of genocide may be referred to an international criminal court.’

The Commission’s 1994 report said: ‘it cannot be doubted that genocide, as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, is a crime under general international law.’ A crime under general international law is ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as being of such a fundamental character that its violation attracts the criminal responsibility of individuals’.

The Commission also recommended that genocide constitute a crime of ‘inherent’ jurisdiction, the only crime so characterized. In effect, this confirmed genocide’s position at the apex of the pyramid of international crimes. By inherent jurisdiction, the Commission meant that the Court would have subject matter jurisdiction over the crime by virtue of ratification of the Statute by a State party. For all other crimes, States would be required to ‘opt in’ to the jurisdiction of the Court, choosing from a menu including crimes against humanity, war crimes, aggression, torture and apartheid. The Commission considered that genocide deserved this unique treatment not only because of the

287 Ibid.
289 ‘Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court’, UN Doc. A/49/10, arts. 21(1)(a) and 25(1).
significance of the crime itself, but also because the Court’s creation had been specifically envisaged by article VI of the Convention.

The case for considering such ‘inherent jurisdiction’ is powerfully reinforced by the Convention itself, which does not confer jurisdiction over genocide on other States on an aut dedere aut judicare basis. The draft statute can thus be seen as completing in this respect the scheme for the prevention and punishment of genocide begun in 1948 – and at a time when effective measures against those who commit genocide are called for.290

When some members favoured recognition of an inherent jurisdiction for a broader list of crimes291 or generally questioned the validity of the approach,292 Christian Tomuschat responded: ‘Genocide was undeniably the most horrible and atrocious of crimes under general international law and he found it incomprehensible that anyone could be reproached for placing too much emphasis on it.’293 Tomuschat saw the criticisms as an attempt to trivialize genocide, which he described during the debate as ‘the extermination of entire ethnic communities, the supreme negation of civilization and solidarity’.294 Rapporteur James Crawford observed that: ‘Among what were described as the “crime of crimes”, genocide was the worst of all. Moreover it was a crime that was still being committed.’295 The draft statute was submitted to the General Assembly at its 1994 session.296

The General Assembly decided, in 1994, to pursue work towards the establishment of an international criminal court.297 Taking the International Law Commission draft statute as a basis, it convened an Ad Hoc Committee, that met twice in 1995. The Ad Hoc Committee did not agree with the International Law Commission’s approach, which had left genocide undefined, and favoured incorporating the Convention

292 Ibid., 2358th meeting, p. 207, para. 33; ibid., 2359th meeting, p. 215, para. 28.
293 Ibid., 2359th meeting, p. 214, para. 21. 294 Ibid.
294 Ibid., 2358th meeting, p. 208, para. 41.
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definition within the statute. Some delegations suggested that the definition might be expanded to encompass social and political groups, taking the position that ‘any gap in the definition should be filled’. In reply, others argued that any change in the Convention definition might lead to a problem of conflicting decisions by international judicial bodies when dealing with the same fact situation. Delegates suggested that, where acts fell outside the scope of the definition because the victims were not an enumerated group, the offence ‘could also constitute crimes against humanity when committed against members of other groups, including social and political groups’. Although many delegations expressed concerns about the intent requirement, general solutions emerged from the discussions.

Building upon the progress made by the Ad Hoc Committee, at its 1995 session the General Assembly convened a Preparatory Committee, mandated to revise the International Law Commission draft for submission to a diplomatic conference which would formally adopt the treaty. The Preparatory Committee’s 1996 report essentially reiterated the points raised the previous year concerning the definition of genocide. That article II of the Genocide Convention should be reproduced, with or without modification, was not disputed. Several delegations were concerned with article III of the Convention, however. While some argued that forms of criminal participation or ‘ancillary crimes’ be included in the genocide article, others thought these belonged in a general provision applicable to all crimes within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

The Preparatory Committee’s Working Group on the Definition of Crimes, which met in February 1997, considered a number of proposed modifications but ultimately returned to the text of the Convention. It added that:

with respect to the interpretation and application of the provisions concerning the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court shall apply relevant international conventions and other sources of international law. In this regard,

299 Ibid., para. 61.
300 Ibid., para. 62.
302 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 18, para. 64.
the Working Group noted that for purposes of interpreting [the provision concerning genocide] it may be necessary to consider other relevant provisions contained in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, as well as other sources of international law. For example, article I would determine the question of whether the crime of genocide set forth in the present article could be committed in time of peace or in time of war.304 A footnote contributed by the Working Group at the February 1997 session of the Preparatory Committee affirmed this point: “The reference to “intent to destroy, in whole or in part . . . a group, as such” was understood to refer to the specific intention to destroy more than a small number of individuals who are members of a group.305 Although some delegations to the Preparatory Committee requested clarification of the term ‘in part’, none was ever provided.306 With respect to the enumeration of acts of genocide, the Preparatory Committee Working Group appended a footnote stating that ‘[t]he reference to “mental harm” is understood to mean more than the minor or temporary impairment of mental faculties’,307 reflecting a persistent concern of the United States.308 The final Preparatory Committee draft, submitted in April, 1998, left the text of article II of the Convention untouched, adding the text of article III in square brackets, to indicate that it was not yet a basis for consensus.309


305 ‘Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at Its Session Held 11 to 21 February 1997’, ibid., p. 3, n. 1; see also ‘Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands,’ ibid., p. 17, n. 10. Two academic commentators said the footnote was ‘misleading and should not appear in its present form. Genocide can occur with the specific intent to destroy a small number of a relevant group. Nothing in the language of the Convention’s definition, containing the phrase “or in part,” requires such a limiting interpretation. Moreover, successful counts or prosecutions of crimes against humanity, of which genocide is a species, have involved relatively small numbers of victims.’ Leila Sadat Wexler and Jordan Paust, ‘Preamble, Parts 1 & 2’, (1998) 13ter Nouvelles études pénales, p. 1 at p. 5 (emphasis in the original, references omitted).


307 ‘Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held 11 to 21 February 1997’, note 303 above, p. 3, n. 4; see also ‘Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands’ note 304 above, p. 17, n. 13. Similar wording appears in its understanding (2) formulated at the time of ratification. Nehemiah Robinson, in his seminal study of the Convention, considered that mental harm within the meaning of art. II of the Convention ‘can be caused only by the use of narcotics’. Robinson, Genocide Convention, p. ix.

309 ‘Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, The
These efforts to create a permanent court with jurisdiction over genocide culminated in a diplomatic conference, held in Rome from 15 June to 17 July 1998. The outcome – the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – establishes a court charged with inherent jurisdiction for genocide, as well as crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. Drafting of the genocide provision in the Statute proved to be one of the easiest tasks at Rome, further confirmation of the authoritative nature of the Convention definition. At the conference, the Bureau proposed, without objection, that the definition of the crime be taken literally from article II of the Convention.

Like the International Law Commission in the drafting of the Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, and the Security Council in the drafting of the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the Rome conference also had to deal with the forms of participation in the crime of genocide set out in article III of the Convention. The International Law Commission had opted for a general provision dealing with participation, applicable to all crimes covered by the draft Code of Crimes, while the Security Council took a different approach, incorporating the text of article III within the definition of the crime of genocide. At the Rome conference, the Working Group on General Principles agreed to omit article III of the Convention from the definition of genocide, but on the condition that its provisions would be accurately reflected in article 25, dealing with individual criminal responsibility. This result was only partially achieved. The Statute’s texts concerning complicity and attempt initially appear to cover the same ground as the corresponding parts of article III of the Genocide Convention. Article III(c) of the Convention creates an offence of incitement that is distinct from incitement as a form of complicity, in that ‘direct and public incitement’ within the meaning of the Convention may be committed


310 ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, art. 5; subject to an exception concerning war crimes in art. 124.


312 Paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of art. 25(3) of the Statute cover, somewhat redundantly, what art. III(e) of the Convention accomplishes with a single word, ‘complicity’. Paragraph (f) deals with attempt, spelling out the difficult issue of the threshold for an attempt that art. III(d) of the Convention leaves to the discretion of the court.
even if nobody is in fact incited. For this reason, article 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute specifies individual criminal liability for a person who ‘[i]n respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide’. The drafting is redundant, it being unnecessary to specify that direct and public incitement to commit genocide must take place ‘in respect of the crime of genocide’. The awkward text betrays the concerns of some delegations that inchoate incitement might be extended by interpretation to other crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, something that was not the drafters’ intent. With respect to conspiracy, article 25(d) of the Rome Statute envisions ‘the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose’. Under the Statute, conspiracy can occur only when the underlying crime is also committed or attempted. The Statute does not, therefore, cover the inchoate form of conspiracy, something contemplated by article III(b) of the Genocide Convention. No real debate took place on this point at Rome. The Statute follows the approach of the International Law Commission’s 1996 draft Code, and the inconsistency with the terms of the Genocide Convention was probably inadvertent.

During the drafting of the Rome Statute, isolated and unsuccessful initiatives tried to enlarge the list of groups protected by the definition. In a footnote to the genocide provision in its final draft, the Preparatory Committee ‘took note of the suggestion to examine the possibility of addressing “social and political” groups in the context of crimes against humanity’. In debate in the Committee of the Whole at Rome, Cuba argued again for inclusion of social and political groups. Ireland answered that ‘we could improve upon the definition if we were drafting a new genocide convention’, but said it was better to retain the existing formulation.

The Rome Statute requires the preparation of an additional instrument, entitled the ‘Elements of Crimes’, intended to ‘assist the Court in

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313 This interpretation of art. III(c) of the Convention has been endorsed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in *Prosecutor v. Akayesu* (Case No. ICTR–96–4–T), Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 548–61.


317 Author’s personal notes of debate, Committee of the Whole, 17 June 1998.
the interpretation and application’ of the provisions that define the infractions, including genocide. The Elements form part of the ‘applicable law’, according to article 21(1)(a) of the Statute, although in case of conflict with the Statute itself, the latter takes precedence. The Elements are to be drafted by the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court and adopted by the Assembly of States Parties once the Statute comes into force. The Preparatory Commission held its first session in February 1999 and is required to complete its drafting work by June 2000. The United States, which originated the idea, submitted a draft ‘Elements’ text at the Rome conference that reflected some of its traditional positions on the definition of genocide. At the February 1999 session of the Preparatory Commission, the United States presented a quite new and different text on the elements of the crime of genocide.

The Rome Statute will come into force when it has been acceded to or ratified by sixty States. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in the Furundzija case, explained its legal scope:

[A]t present it is still a non-binding international treaty (it has not yet entered into force). It was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the States attending the Rome Diplomatic Conference and was substantially endorsed by the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee on 26 November 1998. In many areas the

319 Ibid., art. 9(3).
322 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.10, p. 1:
   (i) That the accused intentionally committed one or more of the following acts against a person in a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, because of that person’s membership in that group:
   a. Killing;
   b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm;
   c. Inflicting conditions of life intended to bring about physical destruction of the group in whole or in part;
   d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or
   e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group;
   (ii) That when the accused committed such act, there existed a plan to destroy such group in whole or in part;
   (iii) That when the accused committed such act, the accused had intent to take part in or had knowledge of the plan to destroy such group in whole or in part.
Statute may be regarded as indicative of the legal views, i.e. *opinio juris* of a great number of States. Notwithstanding article 10 of the Statute, the purpose of which is to ensure that existing or developing law is not ‘limited’ or ‘prejudiced’ by the Statute’s provisions, resort may be had *com grano salis* to these provisions to help elucidate customary international law. Depending on the matter at issue, the Rome Statute may be taken to restate, reflect or clarify customary rules or crystallise them, whereas in some areas it creates new law or modifies existing law. At any event, the Rome Statute by and large may be taken as constituting an authoritative expression of the legal views of a great number of States.\(^3\)

**The Ad Hoc Tribunals**

While the International Law Commission was considering its draft statute of an international criminal court, events compelled the creation of a court on an *ad hoc* basis in order to address the atrocities occurring in the former Yugoslavia. In late 1992, as war raged in Bosnia, a Commission of Experts established by the Security Council identified a range of war crimes that had been committed and that were continuing. It urged the establishment of an international criminal tribunal, an idea originally recommended by Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance.\(^3\) The General Assembly supported the proposal in a December 1992 resolution.\(^3\) The rapporteurs appointed under the Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Hans Correll, Gro Hillestad Thune and Helmut Türk, prepared a draft statute.\(^3\) Several governments also submitted draft statutes or otherwise commented upon the creation of a tribunal. There was general agreement that genocide should be within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and that the definition should conform to the text in the Genocide Convention.\(^3\)

\(^3\) *Prosecutor v. Furundzija*, note 269 above, para. 227 (reference omitted). These views were endorsed by the Appeals Chamber in *Prosecutor v. Tadic* (Case No. IT–94–1–A), Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 223.


\(^3\) ‘The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, UN Doc. A/RES/47/121, para. 10.

\(^3\) *Ibid*. The CSCE rapporteurs were concerned with establishing an overlap between applicable international law and the law in force within the territory of the former Yugoslavia. They proposed that the crime of genocide be included within the statute because it had also been introduced in the domestic legislation of Yugoslavia.

On 22 February 1993, the Security Council decided to establish a tribunal to prosecute ‘persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991’. A draft statute prepared by the Secretary-General was adopted without modification by the Security Council in May 1993. According to the Secretary-General’s report, the tribunal was to apply rules of international humanitarian law which are ‘beyond any doubt part of the customary law’. The report continued: ‘The part of conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond doubt become part of international customary law is the law applicable in armed conflict as embodied in . . . the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948.’

As a creation of the Security Council, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is not exactly what the drafters of article VI of the Convention had in mind. Article VI refers to a court applicable to ‘those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction’. Yugoslavia, of course, did not accept the jurisdiction of the


332 Note 330 above, para. 34.
333 Ibid., para. 35; see also para. 45.
Tribunal. The argument that the Tribunal consequently lacks jurisdiction – an argument analogous to the one unsuccessfully submitted by Adolph Eichmann with respect to domestic prosecution\(^{334}\) – has yet to be raised by a defendant.

In November 1994, acting on a request from Rwanda\(^ {335}\), the Security Council voted to create a second \textit{ad hoc} tribunal, charged with the prosecution of genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and in neighbouring countries during the year 1994.\(^ {336}\) Its Statute closely resembles that of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, although the war crimes provisions reflect the fact that the Rwandan genocide took place within the context of a purely internal armed conflict.\(^ {337}\) The resolution creating the Tribunal expressed the Council’s ‘grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda’, referring to the reports of the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,\(^ {338}\) as well as the preliminary report of the Commission of Experts established some time earlier.\(^ {339}\)

The applicable provisions concerning genocide are the same in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.\(^ {340}\) They

\(^{334}\) \textit{A-G Israel v. Eichmann}, (1968) 36 ILR 18 (District Court, Jerusalem).

\(^{335}\) UN Doc. S/1994/1115.


\(^{338}\) UN Doc. S/1994/1157, annex I and annex II.


consist of three paragraphs, the first stating that: ‘The [International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia] [International Tribunal for Rwanda] shall have the power to prosecute persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.’ The second paragraph comprises the text of article II of the Convention, minus the introductory words ‘[i]n this Convention’. The third paragraph lists ‘other acts’ punishable, following article III of the Convention, namely, conspiracy, direct and public incitement, attempt and complicity. This approach to article III, it will be recalled, differs from that of the International Law Commission, which placed the ‘other acts’ and forms of criminal participation within a general provision applicable to all crimes. Because the ad hoc tribunals have jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity as well as genocide, their statutes also include such a general provision. As a result, each statute contains two different provisions dealing with complicity and incitement that are applicable to the crime of genocide.\footnote{For discussion of this question, see chapter 6, at pp. 302–3 below.}
The *chapeau* of article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states that the intent to destroy must be directed against one of four enumerated groups: national, racial, ethnical or religious. The Convention does not even invite application to what might be called analogous groups, a departure from General Assembly Resolution 96(I), which referred to ‘other groups’ in its definition of genocide.\(^1\) Moreover, the drafters of the Convention quite intentionally excluded ‘political’ groups from its scope,\(^2\) as they did reference to ‘ideological’,\(^3\) ‘linguistic’\(^4\) and ‘economic’\(^5\) groups. The Convention’s list of protected groups has probably provoked more debate since 1948 than any other aspect of the instrument. This is often reflected in frustration that the victims of a particular atrocity, that otherwise would respond to the terms of the Convention, do not neatly fit within the four categories. According to scholars Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, ‘the wording of the Convention is so restrictive that not one of the genocidal killings committed since its adoption is covered by it’.\(^6\) They add that ‘potential perpetrators have taken care to victimize only those groups that are not covered by the convention’s definition’.\(^7\)

The limited scope of the Convention definition has led many academics and human rights activists in two distinct directions. There have been frequent attempts to stretch the Convention definition, often going beyond all reason, in order to fit particular atrocities within the meaning of article II. Sometimes this is presented as the argument that the

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1. GA Res. 96(I). The resolution is discussed in chapter 1, pp. 42–7 above.
2. See pp. 134–45 below.  
4. UN Doc. A/AC.10/41; UN Doc. A/362, appendix II, art. I § I.  

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lacunae in the definition are filled by customary norms.8 Other commentators have proposed new definitions in order to enlarge the scope of the term, among them Stefan Glaser,9 Israel W. Charny,10 Vahakn Dadrian,11 Helen Fein,12 and Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn.13 The most extreme position applies the term ‘genocide’ to any and all groups. According to Pieter Drost, one of the advocates of this view: ‘a convention on genocide cannot effectively contribute to the protection of certain described minorities when it is limited to particular defined groups . . . It serves no purpose to restrict international legal protection to some groups; firstly, because the protected members always belong at the same time to other unprotected groups.’14

Concerns about the scope of groups protected by the Convention may represent a passing phase in the law of genocide. For several decades, the Convention was the only international legal instrument enjoying widespread ratification that imposed meaningful obligations upon States in cases of atrocities committed within their own borders

10 Israel W. Charney, ‘Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide,’ in George J. Andreopoulos, Genocide, Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, pp. 64–94 at p. 75: ‘Genocide in the generic sense is the mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the course of military action against the military forces of an avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims.’
11 Vahakn Dadrian, ‘A Typology of Genocide’, (1975) 5 International Review of Modern Sociology, p. 201: ‘Genocide is the successful attempt by a dominant group, vested with formal authority and/or with preponderant access to the overall resources of power, to reduce by coercion or lethal violence the number of a minority group whose ultimate extermination is held desirable and useful and whose respective vulnerability is a major factor contributing to the decision for genocide.’
12 Helen Fein, ‘Genocide, Terror, Life Integrity, and War Crimes,’ in Andreopoulos, Genocide, pp. 95–107 at p. 97: ‘Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or through interference of the biological and social reproduction of group members.’
and, as a general rule, by their officials. The temptation was great to subsume a variety of State-sanctioned criminal behaviour within its ambit due to the absence of other comparable legal tools.\textsuperscript{15} This problem has diminished in recent years with the progressive development of international criminal law in the field of human rights abuses. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment\textsuperscript{16} and the statutes of the \textit{ad hoc} criminal tribunals\textsuperscript{17} stand out among the newer instruments. Case law of the \textit{ad hoc} tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda has both clarified and enlarged the scope of ‘crimes against humanity’ in customary law.\textsuperscript{18} The adoption, on 17 July 1998, of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, constitutes the culmination of the process. Besides genocide, the Statute takes subject matter jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, defined as criminal acts ‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population . . .’.\textsuperscript{19} Such acts include ‘persecution’, perpetrated against ‘any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender . . . or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law’.\textsuperscript{20} Consequently, many of the so-called lacunae of the Genocide Convention have been or are in the process of being filled by international law.

Raphael Lemkin, in his 1933 proposal to the Fifth International Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, sought to criminalize actions aimed at the destruction of a ‘racial, religious or social group’.\textsuperscript{21} Lemkin’s 1944 book, which coined the term ‘genocide’, said that ‘[b]y “genocide” we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group’.\textsuperscript{22} Lemkin called for the development of ‘provisions protecting minority groups from oppression because of their nationhood, religion,
or race’. Lemkin’s writings indicate he conceived of the repression of genocide within the context of the protection of what were then called ‘national minorities’. Use of terms such as ‘ethnic’, ‘racial’ or ‘religious’ merely fleshed out the idea, without at all changing its essential content. But, among those who participated in developing the law of genocide in its early years, some saw the crime differently, and hoped to incorporate other groups within its scope.

According to the initial Saudi Arabian draft convention, submitted to the General Assembly during the 1946 debate on Resolution 96(I), ‘[g]enocide is the destruction of an ethnic group, people or nation’. The Secretariat draft, prepared in early 1947, replaced the General Assembly’s reference to ‘other groups’ with two categories, ‘national’ and ‘linguistic’ groups. It began the text with the title ‘[p]rotected groups’, furnishing an exhaustive enumeration: ‘The purpose of this Convention is to prevent the destruction of racial, national, linguistic, religious or political groups of human beings’. The three experts convened to examine the Secretariat draft disagreed on this subject. Raphael Lemkin wanted to exclude political groups; Henri Donnedieu de Vabres favoured their inclusion; and Vespasian V. Pella considered that this was a matter for the General Assembly to resolve.

A note from the Secretary-General in preparation for the sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee said that the Committee would have to decide whether or not to include all of the groups set out in the Secretariat draft, or only some of them. Among the members of the Ad Hoc Committee, coverage of national, racial and religious groups was common ground, notwithstanding a suggestion that the term ‘national’ lacked a degree of clarity. However, there were very divergent views within the Committee as to whether or not to include political groups within the ambit of the definition.

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23 Ibid., pp. 93–4. 24 UN Doc. A/C.6/86.
25 In its explanatory comments on the draft, the Secretariat said that, on the subject of groups to be included, it had decided to follow the General Assembly resolution: UN Doc. E/447, pp. 17, 22.
26 UN Doc. A/AC.10/41; UN Doc. A/362, appendix II, art. I.§I.
27 Ibid. 28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. 30 ‘Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Ad Hoc Committee’s Terms of Reference, Note by the Secretary General’, UN Doc. E/AC.25/2.
31 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.10, p. 16.
In the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, every category except ‘racial’ groups led to debate. Several delegations formulated the view that the protected groups should be immutable, and not subject to individual decisions to join or leave the group. The Committee added ‘ethnical’ to the enumeration. Many States expressed discomfort with the reference to ‘religious’ groups. Predictably, the sharpest conflict in the Sixth Committee emerged on inclusion of political groups. Initially, it decided to retain them. Later in the session, after the drafting committee had presented its report, renewed proposals to remove political groups resulted in another vote reversing the earlier ruling.

‘Groups’

Lemkin’s early work, as well as his major study, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, referred to ‘groups’ as the entity that deserved protection by the emerging law of genocide. But sometimes Lemkin mentioned ‘minority groups’, suggesting that he viewed the two concepts as somewhat synonymous. The drafting history of the Convention does not record any meaningful discussion about use of the term ‘group’. Nehemiah Robinson, in his study of the Genocide Convention, proposed an obvious and succinct formulation: ‘groups consist of individuals’.

The word ‘groups’ appears in other international instruments in the field of human rights. General Assembly Resolution 96(I) states that: ‘Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings.’ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that education ‘shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups’. Article 30 of the Universal Declaration speaks of ‘any State, group or person’, indicating the ordinary meaning of ‘group’, that is, an entity composed of more than one individual. The minorities provision in the International Covenant

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33 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Shawcross, United Kingdom).
34 Ibid. (Amado, Brazil).
40 Lemkin, ‘Terrorism’. See also Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, p. 91
44 Ibid. See also the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1976) 999
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on Civil and Political Rights refers to members of a minority ‘group’.\footnote{Ibid.} Article 13(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights speaks of ‘nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups’.\footnote{Similarly the American Convention on Human Rights, (1979) 1144 UNTS 123, OASTS 36, art. 13(5).} The International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination uses the expression ‘racial or ethnic groups’.\footnote{(1969) 660 UNTS 195, art. 1(4). See also art. 2(2), which refers to ‘racial groups’, art. 4(a), which refers to ‘any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin’ and art. 7, which speaks of ‘racial or ethnic groups’.} The Convention on the Rights of the Child lists ‘all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin’.\footnote{Convention on the Rights of the Child, note 45 above, art. 29(1)(d).}

Professor Natan Lerner, in his book \textit{Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law}, employed the term ‘groups’ in a generic sense, as if it were unnecessary to precede it with the adjectives religious, ethnic or national, much in the way ‘minorities’ is often used to refer not to any minority in a numeric sense but more specifically to ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities. Lerner regarded the term ‘groups’ as an improvement on references to ‘minorities’, an archaic usage that is to an extent stigmatized. ‘The term may or may not be preceded by qualifying notions such as “racial”, “ethnic”, “religious”, “cultural”, or “linguistic”’, he wrote. ‘In international law, the notion of group requires the presence of those already mentioned unifying, spontaneous (as opposed to artificial or planned) and permanent factors that are, as a rule, beyond the control of the members of the group.’\footnote{Natan Lerner, \textit{Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law}, Dordrecht, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990, pp. 30–1.}

Given that minorities constitute the principal beneficiaries of genocide law, it might be asked why the drafters of the Convention did not opt for this designation, already well-recognized in international jurisprudence. First, the term ‘minorities’ may have been felt to have a technical meaning that might limit the scope of the Convention. Its use, in the treaties and declarations of post-First World War Europe, implies the protection of ‘national minorities’ with ties to their ‘kin-State’, or, in exceptional cases such as European Jews, a religious minority without

\footnote{Ibid., art. 27. See also the Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA Res. 44/25, annex, art. 17(d); and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, GA Res. 47/135, annex, art. 5.}
any such kin-State.\textsuperscript{50} Secondly, the drafters may have understood that the majority of a population, for example in an occupied territory, might also become victim of genocide.\textsuperscript{51} Benjamin Whitaker observed that a victim group can constitute either a minority or a majority.\textsuperscript{52} The reference, in article II(e) of the Convention, to transferring children from one ‘group to another group’ implies that the term encompasses both majority and minority.\textsuperscript{53} Certainly the label ‘group’ is flexible, enabling the Convention to apply without question to the destruction of entities that may not qualify as ‘minorities’, or for which expressions such as ‘peoples’ may be preferable.\textsuperscript{54}

Some States, in introducing offences of genocide into their own domestic law, have deviated from the Convention terminology. In place of the term ‘group’, the Portuguese penal code of 1982 used ‘community’,\textsuperscript{55} although the word disappeared in the 1995 revision when lawmakers decided to return to the letter of the Convention definition.\textsuperscript{56} The Romanian penal code of 1976 employs the term ‘collectivity’, but this appears to have been chosen in order to reflect the meaning of ‘group’ within article II of the Convention, not to modify it.\textsuperscript{57}


\textsuperscript{53} In the same sense, International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, note 47 above, art. 4.


\textsuperscript{55} Penal Code of 1982 (Portugal), art. 189.

\textsuperscript{56} Decree-Law No. 48/95 of 15 March 1995 (Penal Code (Portugal), art. 239).

\textsuperscript{57} Penal Code (Romania), 1976, art. 357. However, it also uses the term ‘group’: ‘The commission of any of the following acts for the purpose of completely or partially destroying a collectivity or a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.’
Groups protected by the Convention

The four groups listed in the Convention resist efforts at precise definition. Professor Joe Verhoeven pointed out that over the years many have tried to provide some clarity to the terms, but that their efforts remain unconvincing. This is hardly a surprise, he continued, because the concepts of race, ethnic and national group are *a priori* imprecise.\(^{58}\)

The difficulties in the application of the four concepts can be seen in the case of Rwanda. The Rwandan Tutsis are, it is widely believed, descendants of Nilotic herders, whereas the Rwandan Hutus are considered to be of ‘Bantu’ origin from south and central Africa. Historically, their economies were different, the Tutsis raising cattle while the Hutus tilled the soil. There are genomic differences, a typical Tutsi being tall and slender, with a fine, pointed nose, a typical Hutu being shorter with a flatter nose. These differences are visible in some, but not in many others. Rwandan Tutsis and Hutus speak the same language, practise the same religions and have essentially the same culture. Mixed marriages are common. Distinguishing between them was so difficult that the Belgian colonizers established a system of identity cards, and determined what Rwandan law calls ‘ethnic origin’ based on the number of cattle owned by a family.\(^{59}\)

Yet the hatred that fired and drove the genocide in 1994 was undoubtedly directed towards a ‘national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. And if the Tutsi of Rwanda are not such a group, what are they?

Determining the meaning of the groups protected by the Convention seems to dictate a degree of subjectivity. It is the offender who defines the individual victim’s status as a member of a group protected by the Convention.\(^{60}\) The Nazis, for example, had detailed rules establishing, according to objective criteria, who was Jewish and who was not. It made no difference if the individual, perhaps a non-observant Jew of mixed parentage, denied belonging to the group. As Jean-Paul Sartre wrote in *Réflexions sur la question juive*: ‘Le juif est un homme que les autres hommes tiennent pour juif: voilà la vérité simple d’où il faut

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partir. En ce sens le démocrate a raison contre l'antisémite: c'est l'antisémite qui fait le juif.61 In Rwanda, Tutsis were betrayed by their identity cards, for in many cases, there was no other way to tell.

Problems with the four categories in article II of the Convention have led some writers to argue for a purely subjective approach.62 If the offender views the group as being national, racial, ethnic or religious, then that should suffice, they contend. In Kayishema and Ruzindana, a trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda adopted a purely subjective approach, noting that an ethnic group could be ‘a group identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the crimes’.63 Indeed, it concluded that the Tutsi were an ethnic group based on the existence of government-issued official identity cards describing them as such.64

This approach is appealing up to a point, especially because the perpetrator’s intent is a decisive element in the crime of genocide. Its flaw is allowing, at least in theory, genocide to be committed against a group that does not have any real objective existence. To make an analogy with ordinary criminal law, many penal codes stigmatize patricide, that is, the killing of one’s parents. But the murderer who kills an individual believing, erroneously, that he or she is killing a parent, is only a murderer, not a patricide. The same is true of genocide. Although helpful to an extent, the subjective approach flounders because law cannot permit the crime to be defined by the offender alone. It is necessary, therefore, to determine some objective existence of the four groups.

It is also significant that several references to ‘group’ appear within article II of the Convention. The term is used both within the chapeau, which describes the mental element or mens rea of the offence, and the five paragraphs which follow, which set out the punishable acts of genocide. Had the concept of groups appeared only in the portion of the text dealing with the mental element, the subjective argument would have more force. It would be sufficient to identify a genocidal intent where the accused believed that the group existed. However, the

63 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana (Case No. ICTR–95–1–T), Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 98. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has taken the same approach in its first judgment on a genocide indictment. However, the Trial Chamber, presided by Judge Claude Jorda, also conceded that the intent of the drafters of the Genocide Convention was to assess groups on an objective rather than a subjective basis. Prosecutor v. Jelesic (Case No. IT–95–10–T), Judgment, 14 December 1999, paras. 69–72.
64 Ibid., paras. 522–30.
Groups protected by the Convention

provision goes further and requires, in the definition of the actual acts of genocide, that they be directed against ‘members of the group’.

The High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Max van der Stoel, was once quoted saying that, although he could not define the term, ‘I know a minority when I see one’.\(^\text{65}\) Put differently, difficulty in definition does not render an expression useless, particularly from the legal point of view. The four terms necessarily involve a degree of subjectivity because their meaning is determined in a social context. For example, issue may be taken with the term ‘racial’ because the existence of races themselves no longer corresponds to usage of progressive social science.\(^\text{66}\) However, the terms ‘racial’ as well as ‘race’, ‘racism’ and ‘racial group’ remain widely used and are certainly definable. They are social constructs, not scientific expressions, and were intended as such by the drafters of the Convention. To many of the delegates attending the General Assembly session of 1948, Jews, Gypsies and Armenians might all have been qualified as ‘racial groups’, language that would be seen as quaint and perhaps even offensive a half-century later. Their real intent was to ensure that the Convention would contemplate crimes of intentional destruction of these and similar groups. The four terms were chosen in order to convey this message. International law knows of similar examples of anachronistic language. One of the earliest multilateral treaties dealing with human rights was aimed at ‘white slavery’.\(^\text{67}\) Its goal, the eradication of forced prostitution on an international scale, remains laudatory and relevant, although the terminology is obviously archaic.

The four terms in the Convention not only overlap,\(^\text{68}\) they also help to define each other, operating much as four corner posts that delimit an area within which a myriad of groups covered by the Convention find protection. This was certainly the perception of the drafters. For


\(^{66}\) According to the Commission of Experts on Rwanda, ‘to recognize that there exists discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds, it is not necessary to presume or posit the existence of race or ethnicity itself as a scientifically objective fact’: ‘Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994)’, UN Doc. S/1995/1405, annex, para. 159.


example, they agreed to add the term ‘ethnical’ so as to ensure that the term ‘national’ would not be confused with ‘political’. On the other hand, they deleted the reference to ‘linguistic’ groups, ‘since it is not believed that genocide would be practised upon them because of their linguistic, as distinguished from their racial, national or religious, characteristics’. The drafters viewed the four groups in a dynamic and synergistic relationship, each contributing to the construction of the other. The 1996 report of the International Law Commission on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind adopts this approach in considering ‘tribal groups’ to fall within the scope of the definition of genocide. It is not difficult to understand why tribal groups fit within the four corners of the domain, whereas political and gender groups do not. Yet in concluding that tribal groups meet the definition of genocide, it seems unnecessary to attempt to establish within which of the four enumerated categories they should be placed. In the same spirit, the Canadian Criminal Code’s genocide provision includes the term ‘colour’ in its list of protected groups. We readily appreciate the fact that groups defined by ‘colour’ are also protected by the Convention without it being important to determine whether they are in fact subsumed within the adjectives national, racial, ethnical or religious.

There is a danger that a search for autonomous meanings for each of the four terms will weaken the overarching sense of the enumeration as a whole, forcing the jurist into an untenable Procrustes bed. To a degree, this problem is manifested in the 2 September 1998 judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Akayesu case, as well as in the definitions accompanying the genocide legislation adopted by the United States, both of which dwell on the individual meanings of the four terms. Deconstructing the enumeration risks distorting the sense that belongs to the four terms, taken as a whole.

Raphael Lemkin conceived of genocide as a crime committed against ‘national groups’, something made apparent by frequent references in his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. In his famous study, he

70 UN Doc. A/401.
72 Criminal Code (Canada), RSC 1985, c. C–46, s. 318(4): ‘any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin.’
74 Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (Proxmire Act), S. 1851, s. 1093.
associated the prohibition of genocide with the protection of minorities. Lemkin clearly did not intend the prohibition of genocide to cover all minorities, but rather those that had been contemplated by the minorities treaties of the inter-war years. The term ‘national’ had an already well-accepted technical meaning, having been used to describe minorities in the legal regime established in the aftermath of the First World War. For Lemkin, genocide was above all meant to describe the destruction of the Jews, who cannot in a strict sense be termed a national group at all. Yet the term’s usage was clear enough in what it covered and what it was meant to protect. The historical circumstances and the context of Nazi persecution further enhanced this perspective. The etymology of the term ‘genocide’ also confirms this. In ancient Greek, genos means ‘race’ or ‘tribe’. It does not refer to any group in the abstract, or even to groups defined on the basis of political view, or economic and social status. Lemkin’s outlook was not shared by all participants in the drafting of the Convention. For example, he differed with his colleague on the Ad Hoc Committee, Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, about the inclusion of political groups.

Fundamentally, the problem with including political groups is the difficulty in providing a rational basis for such a measure. If political groups are to be included, why not the disabled, or other groups based on arbitrary criteria? Logically, the definition ought to be expanded to cover all episodes of mass killing. But, despite criticism that the enumeration of protected groups within the Convention is limited and restrictive, the final result is coherent. It aims at protecting groups that were defined, prior to the Second World War, as ‘national minorities’, ‘races’ and ‘religious groups’. A more contemporary usage seems to prefer ‘ethnic groups’. But these are really all efforts to describe a singular reality.

The Convention enumeration is also defensible from a policy perspective. Critics who see no reason to protect the four enumerated groups and omit others, defined by different criteria, might consider why the international community has adopted an important convention dealing with racial discrimination and another concerning apartheid, instead of simply condemning discrimination in general and in all of its forms. The International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination defines racial discrimination as any distinction,

76 Lemkin, Axis Rule, p. 90.
77 International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, note 47 above.
exclusion, restriction or preference ‘based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’. Interestingly, these terms closely overlap the categories recognized in article II of the Genocide Convention. Religion is excluded, but, at the time, the United Nations planned a companion instrument on religious discrimination. However, discrimination on the basis of political opinion, or belonging to a political group, was not included.

Attacks on groups defined on the basis of race, nationality, ethnicity and religion have been elevated, by the Genocide Convention, to the apex of human rights atrocities, and with good reason. The definition is a narrow one, it is true, but recent history has disproven the claim that it was too restrictive to be of any practical application. For society to define a crime so heinous that it will occur only rarely is testimony to the value of such a precise formulation. Diluting the definition, either by formal amendment of its terms or by extravagant interpretation of the existing text, risks trivializing the horror of the real crime when it is committed.

**National groups**

The original draft of General Assembly Resolution 96(I) included ‘national’ groups within the enumeration, but they were eliminated, with no evident explanation, from the final text. The Secretariat draft of the Convention reintroduced the concept of ‘national’ groups, together with ‘linguistic’ groups, replacing the reference to ‘other groups’. Within the *Ad Hoc* Committee, some suggested the term ‘national’ lacked clarity. In the Sixth Committee, the United Kingdom questioned including ‘national groups’, because people were free to join and to leave them. The Egyptian delegate replied that: ‘The well-known problem of the German minorities in Poland or of the Polish minorities

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79 Note 47, art. 1.
80 No convention was ever drafted. In 1981, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the subject: ‘Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief’, GA Res. 36/55.
81 However, it is included in other instruments, for example the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, note 43 above, art. 2; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, note 44 above, art. 26; and the ILO Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, (1960) 361 UNTS 31, art. 1(1).
82 UN Doc. A/BUR/50, proposed by Cuba, India and Pakistan. The Saudi Arabian draft convention referred to ‘the destruction of an ethnic group, people or nation’: UN Doc. A/C.6/86.
83 UN Doc. E/447, pp. 17, 22.
84 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.10, p. 16.
85 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Shawcross, United Kingdom).
in Germany, and the question of the Sudenten Germans, showed that the idea of the national group was perfectly clear.\textsuperscript{86} Out of concern that ‘national’ might be confused with ‘political’, Sweden proposed adding ‘ethnical’ to the enumeration.\textsuperscript{87}

According to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the term ‘national group’ refers to ‘a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties’.\textsuperscript{88} As authority for this statement, the Tribunal cited the \textit{Nottebohm} decision of the International Court of Justice.\textsuperscript{89} However, in \textit{Nottebohm}, the Court was interested in establishing ‘nationality’, not membership in a ‘national group’.\textsuperscript{90} The difference is significant, because the International Court of Justice focused on the correspondence between a formal grant of ‘nationality’ and the reality of the bonds linking an individual and his or her State of nationality. \textit{Nottebohm} does not address the situation of national minorities who, while sharing cultural and other bonds with a given State, may actually hold the nationality of another State, or who may even be stateless.\textsuperscript{91} Thus, the Rwanda Tribunal’s reference to \textit{Nottebohm} is incomplete.

The latest edition of \textit{Oppenheim’s International Law} says: ‘“Nationality”, in the sense of citizenship of a certain state, must not be confused with “nationality” as meaning membership in a certain nation in the sense of race.’\textsuperscript{92} In his commentary on the Genocide Convention, Stéfan Glaser observed that: ‘What characterizes a nation is not only a community of political destiny, but, above all, a community marked by distinct historical and cultural links or features. On the other hand, a “territorial” or “state” link (with the State) does not appear to me to be essential.’\textsuperscript{93} Nicodème Ruhashyankiko referred to the drafting of the

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\item \textsuperscript{86} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Raafat, Egypt). See also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
\item \textsuperscript{87} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.73 (Petren, Sweden); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Petren, Sweden).
\item \textsuperscript{88} \textit{Prosecutor v. Akayesu}, note 73 above, para. 511.
\item \textsuperscript{89} \textit{Nottebohm Case (Second Phase)}, Judgment of 6 April [1955] \textit{ICJ Reports} p. 24. For an alternative definition, see the Inter-American Court of Human Rights advisory opinion, \textit{Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica}, Advisory Opinion OC–4/84, 19 January 1984, Series A, No. 4, para. 35: ‘Nationality can be deemed to be the political and legal bond that links a person to a given state and binds him to it with ties of loyalty and fidelity, entitling him to diplomatic protection from that state.’
\item \textsuperscript{90} See J. F. Rezek, ‘Le droit international de la nationalité’, (1986) 198 RCADI, p. 335.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Glaser, \textit{Droit international}, pp. 111–12 (translated into English in Whitaker, ‘Revised Report’, note 52 above, pp. 15–16).
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International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination\textsuperscript{94} for guidance as to the meaning of ‘national group’ in the Genocide Convention. He noted distinctions between the ‘politico-legal’ sense of the term, which referred to citizenship, and the ‘ethnographical’ or ‘sociological’ sense of the term, which referred to origin.\textsuperscript{95} The United States legislation to implement the Genocide Convention expresses a similar although somewhat narrower view, defining ‘national group’ as ‘a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of nationality or national origins’.\textsuperscript{96}

The core concern of the Genocide Convention, as the drafting history and context of adoption make clear, is protection of what are known in Europe as ‘national minorities’.\textsuperscript{97} When he first conceived of the notion of genocide, Lemkin favoured the term ‘national’. Doubtless, this stemmed from the minorities system created under the aegis of the League of Nations. The Permanent Court of International Justice had already ventured a definition to assist in construing the minorities treaties. Working with the term ‘communities’, it said: ‘By tradition . . . the “community” is a group of persons living in a given country or locality, having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own and united by this identity of race, religion, language and traditions in sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and rendering mutual assistance to each another.’\textsuperscript{98} A considerably more recent attempt to define the term ‘national minority’ was made by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the ‘Venice Commission’), an institution affiliated with the Council of Europe. It entails ‘a group which is smaller in number than the rest of the population of a State, whose members, who are nationals of that State,
have ethnical, religious or linguistic features different from those of the rest of the population, and are guided by the will to safeguard their culture, traditions, religion or language.  European human rights law continues to favour the term ‘national minorities’, resisting the expression consecrated by the universal human rights instruments, which refer to ‘ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities’. The Venice Commission definition shows, however, that in European law ‘national minorities’ is meant to cover ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities. In 1992, the General Assembly of the United Nations combined the two definitions, in its resolution on ‘national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities’.

Discussing the definition of genocide, International Law Commission Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam noted that national groups often comprise several different ethnic groups, particularly in Africa, where territories were divided without taking them into account:

With rare exceptions (Somalia, for example), almost all African States have an ethnically mixed population. On other continents, migrations, trade, the vicissitudes of war and conquests have created such mixtures that the concept of the ethnic group is only relative or may no longer have any meaning at all. The

99 European Commission for Democracy Through Law, *The Protection of Minorities*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Press, 1994, p. 12. The definition uses the term ‘minority’ without the adjective ‘national’ in para. 1 of art. 2, but in para. 3 refers to ‘national minority’, suggesting the two terms are interchangeable. The Venice Commission’s definition is modelled on one developed by F. Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, but applicable to ‘ethnic, linguistic and religious’ minorities rather than ‘national minorities’: ‘A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the state – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directing towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.’ See Capotorti, note 98 above. Subsequently, another definition was prepared for the Sub-Commission by Jules Deschênes, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31, para. 181: ‘A group of citizens of a state, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that state, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law.’


nation therefore does not coincide with the ethnic group but is characterized by a common wish to live together, a common ideal, a common goal and common aspirations.103

While Thiam’s culturally sensitive approach is laudable, it has the same shortcoming as the definitions proposed by the Rwanda Tribunal and by the United States legislation. In attempting to impose contemporary usage on a term whose meaning was different in 1948, it has the curious result of narrowing the Convention’s scope. Set within the context of 1948 and the writings of Raphael Lemkin, the term ‘national group’ dictates a large scope corresponding to the concept of ‘minority’ or ‘national minority’, one that in reality is broad enough to encompass racial, ethnic and religious groups as well.

What is sometimes called ‘auto-genocide’, that is, mass killing of members of the group to which the perpetrators themselves belong, has been presented under the rubric of national groups.104 The expression appears to have been coined by a United Nations rapporteur referring to the Khmer Rouge atrocities in Cambodia.105 It is argued that, since this constitutes the intentional destruction of part of a national group, it meets the Convention definition.106 Legislation adopted in the United

105 UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1510.
States in 1994 declares: ‘The persecution of the Cambodian people under the Khmer Rouge rule, [when] the bulk of the Khmer people were subjected to life in an Asian Auschwitz, constituted one of the clearest examples of genocide in recent history.’ The point was taken with some scepticism by the Group of Experts in its 1999 report. While agreeing that the Khmer people of Cambodia constituted a national group within the meaning of the Convention, the Group said that ‘whether the Khmer Rouge committed genocide with respect to part of the Khmer national group turns on complex interpretative issues, especially concerning the Khmer Rouge’s intent with respect to its non-minority-group victims’. The Group declined taking a position on the issue, saying that the matter should be addressed by the courts if Khmer Rouge officials are charged with genocide against the Khmer national group.

Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon took a similar approach in two 1998 rulings dealing with charges that genocide had been committed in Argentina during the 1970s and 1980s, and later the same year in his ruling in the Augusto Pinochet case. When Yugoslavia charged several NATO States with genocide in May 1999, it claimed the acts were directed against a national group, namely the ‘Yugoslav nation’.

Confusing mass killing of the members of the perpetrators’ own group with genocide is inconsistent with the purpose of the Convention, which was to protect national minorities from crimes based on ethnic hatred. Obviously mass killing along the lines of the crimes com-

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107 The United States Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100–204, § 906. In 1994, the United States Congress passed the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103–236, 108 Stat. 486, 486–7 (1994), which states that: ‘Consistent with international law, it is the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979’ (§ 572(a)); it authorized the creation of the Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigation to ‘develop the United States proposal for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of those accused of genocide in Cambodia’ (§ 573(b)(4)).


110 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium et al.), Verbatim Record, 10 May 1999 (Rodoljub Etiński); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium et al.), Verbatim Record, 12 May, 1999 (Ian Brownlie).

mitted by the Khmer Rouge and by the Pinochet regime, can be easily qualified as crimes against humanity.

**Racial groups**

The reference to ‘racial’ groups posed the least problem for the drafters of the Convention, although it may well be the most troublesome a half-century later. The *travaux préparatoires* reveal no significant discussion of the term. This suggests that it is very close to the core of what the drafters intended the Convention to protect. As a term, ‘racial groups’ was present throughout the drafting process, in General Assembly Resolution 96(I), the Secretariat draft,112 and the drafts submitted by the United States,113 France114 and China.115

The penal codes of Bolivia116 and Paraguay117 omit mention of ‘racial’ groups altogether in their genocide provisions: perhaps legislators considered the term redundant and unnecessary, given the other elements of the enumeration.118

A general discomfort with the term on this basis may explain why the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has not classified the Tutsi as a racial group. The general conception of Tutsi within Rwanda is based on hereditary physical traits, even though these may be difficult to distinguish in many cases. According to the Rwanda Tribunal, ‘[t]he conventional definition of racial group is based on the hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors’.119 The genocide legislation in the United States adopts a similar view, defining ‘racial group’ as ‘a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of physical characteristics or biological descent’.120 References to the problem in the academic literature are rare. Stéfan Glaser wrote that:

112 In its explanatory comments on the issue of groups, the Secretariat said it had decided to follow the General Assembly resolution: UN Doc. E/447, pp. 17, 22.
113 UN Doc. E/623, art. I.I.
114 UN Doc. E/623/Add.1, art. 1.
116 Penal Code (Bolivia), 23 August 1972, Chapter IV, art. 138.
117 Penal Code (Paraguay), art. 308.
118 Perhaps employing the same reasoning, the Costa Rican code eliminates ethnic groups from its enumeration: it refers to race rather than to ‘racial group’: Penal Code (Costa Rica), art. 373.
119 *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, note 73 above, para. 513. See also *Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana*, note 63 above, para. 98.
120 Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, note 74 above, s. 1093.
“Race” means a category of persons who are distinguished by common and constant, and therefore hereditary, features.121

What did the drafters of the Genocide Convention mean by ‘racial group’? The Oxford English Dictionary provides an indication of usage at the time. It proposes several definitions of ‘race’, of which the most appropriate are: ‘A group of persons, animals, or plants, connected by common descent or origin’; ‘A group or class of persons, animals, or things, having some common feature or features.’122 This definition can be readily extended to cover national, ethnic, and even religious minorities, which is how the term was understood in 1948, although this no longer corresponds to modern-day usage.123 For example, the Permanent Court of International Justice, in a 1935 advisory opinion, spoke of the ‘the preservation of [the] racial peculiarities’ of national minorities.124 A United Nations Declaration of 17 December 1942 denounced ill-treatment of the ‘Jewish race’ in occupied Europe.125 The judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg noted that judges in Germany were removed from the bench for ‘racial reasons’, a reference to the harassment of Jewish jurists.126 It also condemned Julius Streicher for crimes against humanity because his incitement to murder and extermination at a time when Jews in the East were being killed under the most horrible conditions constituted ‘persecution on political and racial grounds’. Even reputable anthropologists of the time employed such terms: ‘The Jews are an ethnic unit, although one that has little regard for spatial considerations. Like other ethnic units, the Jews have their own standard racial character.’127 A British war crimes tribunal at the end of the Second World War convicted Nazis for their ‘persecution of the Jewish race’.128


123 David Levinson, ed., Ethnic Relations: A Cross-Cultural Encyclopedia, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC–CLIO, 1994, p. 195. In the early 1980s, a Netherlands court concluded Jews were covered by the word ‘race’ in the country's Penal Code, because ‘[t]he widely held opinion is that the term “race” in paragraph 429(4) cannot be construed solely in the biological sense but rather . . . must be viewed as defining “race” by reference also to ethnic and cultural minorities’: S. J. Roth, ‘The Netherlands and the “Are Jews a Race?” Issue’, (1983) 17:4 Patterns of Prejudice 52.

124 Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 6 April 1935, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 64.


127 Carleton S. Coon, Races of Europe, New York: Macmillan, 1939, p. 444.

for the Far East charged the Japanese Government with failing to take into account the ‘racial needs’ and ‘racial habits’ of prisoners of war.¹²⁹

Subsequent international instruments apply a similarly broad approach to the term. The International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination uses the term ‘racial group’ in two places,¹³⁰ defining ‘racial discrimination’ as ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’. According to Michael Banton, former chair of the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the concept of race is itself culturally sensitive, with different meanings in different continents, in some cases with no real basis in heredity whatsoever.¹³¹

The term ‘racial group’ is also used in the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted by the General Assembly in 1973. The Apartheid Convention defines apartheid as ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons’.¹³² As recently as 1993, the Vienna Declaration and Plan of Action made reference to ‘racial or religious groups’.¹³³ It was also incorporated in definitions in the 1998 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court.¹³⁴

The UNESCO Declaration on Race and Race Prejudice of 27 November 1978 does not explicitly reject the notion of race, yet it affirms, in article 1(1), that ‘[a]ll human beings belong in a single species and are descended from a common stock’. It condemns theories which label ‘racial or ethnic groups’ as inherently superior or inferior. The Declaration resists any suggestion that racial and ethnic groups exist in an objective sense, addressing the concept only within the context of denouncing theories about racial superiority.¹³⁵ From a purely scientific standpoint, the value of the term ‘race’ is now disputed by modern specialists.¹³⁶ As a way to classify humans into major

¹³⁰ Note 47 above, arts. 2(2) and 7.
¹³² Note 77 above, art. II. The meaning of the term ‘racial group’ in the Apartheid Convention is discussed in Ratner and Abrams, Accountability, pp. 114–15.
¹³⁴ ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 19 above, arts. 7(1)(h) and 7(2)(h).
¹³⁵ UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.1, annex V.
¹³⁶ See the discussion in ‘Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Study Prepared by Mr Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Special
subspecies based on certain phenotypical and genotypical traits (e.g., Negroid, Mongoloid, Caucasoid), race has become virtually obsolete. Indeed, efforts to define these so-called races have in themselves a racist connotation, in that generally they aim to demonstrate not only some common denominator of physical characteristics, such as type of hair and skin colour, but also purportedly scientific justifications for slavery and colonialism. Anthropologist Ashley Montagu described the very existence of race as a fallacy. Apart from references to the ‘human race’ as a unified group, ‘nearly all social scientists only use “race” in [the] sense of a social group defined by somatic visibility’. Nevertheless, in popular usage the concept of racial distinctions continues to have ‘tremendous social significance’ because ‘we attach meaning to them, and the consequences vary from prejudice and discrimination to slavery and genocide’.

Thus, although the term ‘racial group’ may be increasingly antiquated, the concept persists in popular usage, social science and international law. Understandably, progressive jurists search for a meaning consistent with modern values and contemporary social science. This explains the Rwanda Tribunal’s insistence upon hereditary traits as the basis of a definition. Yet the meaning of ‘racial groups’ was unquestionably much broader at the time the Convention was drafted, when it was to a large extent synonymous with national, ethnic and religious groups. Although it may seem archaic, the 1948 meaning of ‘racial group’, which encompassed national, ethnic and religious groups as well as those defined by inherited physical characteristics, ought to be favoured over some more contemporary, and more restrictive, gloss.

**Ethnical groups**

The first draft of General Assembly Resolution 96(I) mentioned ‘ethnical’ groups, but this reference was eliminated by the drafting committee of the Sixth Committee and did not appear in the final version of the resolution. The Secretariat draft convention of early 1947

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140 UN Doc. A/BUR/50.
did not reintroduce the concept.\textsuperscript{141} It was only added in the Sixth Committee, on a proposal from Sweden, which felt that use of the term ‘national’ might be confused with ‘political’.\textsuperscript{142} The Swedish delegate also noted that the constituent factor of a minority might be its language. If a linguistic group did not coincide with an existing State, it would be protected as an ethnical rather than as a national group.\textsuperscript{143} The Soviets supported the Swedish proposal, stating that ‘[a]n ethnical group was a sub-group of a national group; it was a smaller collectivity than the nation, but one whose existence could nevertheless be of benefit to humanity.’\textsuperscript{144} Several States said they saw no difference between ethnical and racial groups.\textsuperscript{145} Remarking on confusion between the terms, Haiti observed that ‘ethnic’ might well apply where ‘racial’ was problematic.\textsuperscript{146} But the motion to add ‘ethnical’ to the enumeration succeeded in the Sixth Committee by only the barest of majorities.\textsuperscript{147}

The International Law Commission, in its Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind of 1996, changed the word ‘ethnical’ in the definition of genocide to ‘ethnic’ to reflect modern English usage without in any way affecting the substance of the provision.\textsuperscript{148} But in the Rome Statute’s definition of genocide, the Diplomatic Conference returned to ‘ethnical’ out of fidelity to the Convention,\textsuperscript{149} although the word ‘ethnic’ appears elsewhere in the instrument.\textsuperscript{150} The word ‘ethnical’ was used by the International Court of Justice as recently as 1993,\textsuperscript{151} and it also appears in article 7 of the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.\textsuperscript{152}

‘Ethnic origin’ is not a prohibited ground of discrimination listed in

\textsuperscript{141} UN Doc. E/447, pp. 17, 22.
\textsuperscript{143} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Petren, Sweden).
\textsuperscript{144} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Morozov, Soviet Union).
\textsuperscript{145} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Raafat, Egypt); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Manini y Rı́ os, Uruguay); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
\textsuperscript{146} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Demesmin, Haiti).
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Ibid}. (eighteen in favour, seventeen against, with eleven abstentions).
\textsuperscript{149} ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 19 above, art. 6.
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Ibid},. arts. 7(1)(h), 7(2)(f ) and 21.
\textsuperscript{152} Note 47 above.
Groups protected by the Convention

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights\footnote{Note 43 above, art. 2.} or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,\footnote{Note 44 above, arts. 2(2) and 26.} implying it must be covered by other terms such as race, colour and nationality. However, article 27 of the International Covenant asserts that persons belonging to ethnic minorities have the right ‘to enjoy their own culture’.\footnote{Ibid. Article 27 protects ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities’. This formulation can be traced to the definition of ‘minorities’ mooted by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1950: UN Doc. E/CN.4/358. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not contain a minority rights provision: William A. Schabas, ‘Les droits des minorités: Une déclaration inachevée’, in La Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme 1948–98, Avenir d’un idéal commun, Paris: La Documentation française, 1999, pp. 223–42.} Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contains the phrase ‘racial, ethnic or religious groups’.\footnote{Note 44 above, art. 2(2).} The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination speaks of ‘race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’.\footnote{Note 47 above, art. 1(1).}

The Oxford English Dictionary provides a guide to contemporary usage of the term. In its 1933 edition, ‘ethnical’ is defined as ‘[o]f an ethnic character’. Ethnic receives two meanings: ‘[p]ertaining to nations not Christian or Jewish; Gentile, heathen, pagan’ and ‘[p]ertaining to race; peculiar to a race or nation; ethnological’.\footnote{R. W. Burchfield, ed., The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 901 (miniature version of the 1933 edition).} In the 1987 supplement, an additional usage appears: ‘pertaining to or having common racial, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics, esp. designating a racial or other group within a larger system’.\footnote{Ibid., Vol. III, p. 245.} The word is derived from the ancient Greek term \textit{ethnos}, which was used to denote ‘heathen’ or ‘pagan’. In 1935, Sir Julian Huxley and A. C. Hadon maintained that the groups in Europe then commonly called races would be better designated as ethnic groups,\footnote{Ellis Cashmore, ed., Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 295.} and this has prompted suggestions that ethnicity is a ‘sociological euphemism’ for race.\footnote{J. Milton Yinger, \textit{Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Conflict?}, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994, pp. 16–18.} Classical theorist Max Weber viewed an ethnic group as one whose members ‘entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization’.\footnote{Max Weber, ‘What Is an Ethnic Group?’, in Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex, \textit{The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration}, Malden, MA: Polity Press, 1997, p. 575.}

Stéfan Glaser wrote that ‘ethnic’, as employed in article II of the
Genocide Convention, was larger than ‘racial’ and designated a community of people bound together by the same customs, the same language and the same race. According to Malcolm Shaw: ‘It is also rather difficult to distinguish between “ethnical” and “racial” groups . . . [I]t is probably preferable to take the two concepts together to cover relevant cases rather than attempting to distinguish between these so that unfortunate gaps appear.’

In its work on the draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the International Law Commission considered whether it was necessary to retain both ‘ethnic’ and ‘racial’, given the apparent redundancy. Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam considered it ‘normal to retain these two terms, which give the text on genocide a broader scope covering both physical genocide and cultural genocide’. While agreeing that the distinction was ‘perhaps harder to grasp’, Thiam observed:

It seems that the ethnic bond is more cultural. It is based on cultural values and is characterized by a way of life, a way of thinking and the same way of looking at life and things. On a deeper level, the ethnic group is based on a cosmogony. The racial element, on the other hand, refers more typically to common physical traits.

But, as with national and racial groups, there has been a tendency to narrow the scope of the term ethnic with respect to the meaning that prevailed in 1948. This is the result of efforts to give each term in the enumeration an autonomous meaning, as well as to take into account contemporary usage in popular language and in the social sciences. Cultural and linguistic factors are the common denominator of this modern approach. In the Akayesu case, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda stated: ‘An ethnic group is generally defined as a group whose members share a common language or culture.’ Another trial chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal wrote: ‘An ethnic group is one whose members share a common language and culture; or, a group which distinguishes itself, as such (self identification); or, a group identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others).’ The legislation in the United States defines ethnic group as ‘a set of individuals whose identity as such is

166 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 73 above, para. 512.
167 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, note 63 above, para. 98.
distinctive in terms of common cultural traditions or heritage’.\(^{168}\) The better view is to take the concept as being largely synonymous with the other elements of the enumeration, encompassing elements of national, racial and religious groups within its scope.

**Religious groups**

Religious groups were part of the list of protected groups in General Assembly Resolution 96(I)\(^{169}\) and in the early drafts of the convention.\(^{170}\) However, in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the United Kingdom questioned the inclusion of religious groups, arguing that people were free to join and to leave them.\(^{171}\) The Soviets also questioned the term ‘religious’, urging it to be added in brackets after the reference to national groups.\(^{172}\) But there was an important historical argument: religious groups had come within the ambit of the post-First World War minorities treaties.\(^{173}\) The drafters of the Convention considered religious groups as closely analogous to ethnic or national groups, the result of historical conditions that, while theoretically voluntary, in reality circumscribed the group in as immutable a sense as racial or ethnic characteristics. The Soviets and Yugoslavs sought to refine the definition\(^ {174}\) but this seemed unnecessary to the majority of delegates.\(^ {175}\) Wahid Fikry Raafat of Egypt gave the example of the St Bartholomew massacre of French protestants in the late sixteenth century, noting that ‘[r]ecent events in India, Pakistan and Palestine also provided examples of destruction of religious and not racial or national groups’.\(^{176}\)

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\(^{168}\) Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, note 74 above, sec. 1093(2).

\(^{169}\) UN Doc. A/BUR/50.

\(^{170}\) UN Doc. A/AC.10/41; UN Doc. A/362, appendix II, art. I § I; UN Doc. E/623, art. I.I; UN Doc. E/623/Add.1, art. 1; UN Doc. E/AC.25/9, art. I.

\(^{171}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Shawcross, United Kingdom).

\(^{172}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/223.

\(^{173}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Spiropoulos, Greece).

\(^{174}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/223.

\(^{175}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Morozov, Soviet Union); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Bartos, Yugoslavia). In a clairvoyant comment, Bartos said ‘it was his duty to call attention to exceptions to that rule which had occurred in his country during the recent war. In view of the fact that there were both Serbs and Croats who belonged to one of three religions, there had been cases, among both the Serbian and Croatian peoples, of genocide for purely religious motives. The Chetniks who were in the service of the forces of occupation had encouraged acts of genocide and had perpetrated them against Serbs. Still more flagrant cases had been committed against Croats at the instigation of certain Catholic bishops. For those reasons, his country had had to include provisions in its legislation for the prevention and suppression of religious genocide as such.’

\(^{176}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Raafat, Egypt).
In *Kayishema and Ruzindana*, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda wrote that a ‘religious group includes denomination or mode of worship or a group sharing common beliefs’.\(^{177}\) National law in the United States defines ‘religious group’ as ‘a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of common religious creed, beliefs, doctrines, practices, or rituals’.\(^{178}\) Once again, as with the other categories of groups, these attempts at definition are more restrictive than both the drafters’ intent and the common meaning of the term in 1948.

Identifying a ‘religious group’ involves identifying a religion. The Human Rights Committee has said ‘religion’ should not be limited to ‘traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics analogous to those of traditional religions’\.\(^{179}\) But the Committee refused to consider that a group known as the ‘Assembly of the Church of the Universe’ was entitled to this protection because ‘a belief consisting primarily or exclusively in the worship and distribution of a narcotic drug cannot conceivably be brought within the scope of article 18 of the Covenant’.\(^{180}\) And a recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights indicates a concern that so-called sects may improperly benefit from freedom of religion.\(^{181}\) Professor Malcolm Shaw has urged that ‘an overly restrictive definition ought to be avoided, provided that a coherent community based upon a concept of a single, divine being is concerned and that such a community is not engaged, for example, in criminal practices’.\(^{182}\) According to Matthew Lippman, ‘[r]eligious groups encompass both theistic, non-theistic, and atheistic communities which are united by a single spiritual ideal’.\(^{183}\) Spanish judge Garzon, in an application alleging genocide in Argentina, ruled:

To destroy a group because of its atheism or its common non-acceptance of the

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177 *Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana*, note 63 above, para. 98. See also *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, note 73 above, para. 514.

178 *Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987*, note 74 above, s. 1093(7).

179 UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para. 2 (1993). For similar broad interpretations, see the report of Special Rapporteur Theo van Boven, ‘Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/32, para. 5.


Christian religious ideology is . . . the destruction of a religious group, inasmuch as, in addition, the group to be destroyed also technically behaves as the object of identification of the motivation or subjective element of the genocidal conduct. It seems, in effect, that the genocidal conduct can be defined both in a positive manner, vis à vis the identity of the group to be destroyed (Muslims, for example), as in a negative matter, and, indeed, of greater genocidal pretensions (all non-Christians, or all atheists, for example).  

In its 1999 report, the Group of Experts for Cambodia said that persecution by the Khmer Rouge of the Buddhist monkhood might qualify as genocide of a religious group. It said the intent to destroy the group was evidenced by ‘the Khmer Rouge’s intensely hostile statements towards religion, and the monkhood in particular; the Khmer Rouge’s policies to eradicate the physical and ritualistic aspects of the Buddhist religion; the disrobing of monks and abolition of the monkhood; the number of victims; and the executions of Buddhist leaders and recalcitrant monks’. This raises the intriguing issue of whether the destruction of religion can be equated with destruction of a religious group. The Group of Experts for Cambodia did not claim that the group of believers as such, that is, Buddhists, was destroyed in whole or in part. Thus, the destruction of the Buddhists took the form of ‘cultural’ rather than ‘physical’ genocide, culture being taken in a sense that would include religion. Of course, eliminating the religious leaders and institutions was necessary to eradicate religion, but the purpose was to destroy the religion, not to destroy physically its followers. An alternative view, only implicit in the report of the Group of Experts, views the clergy itself as a religious group contemplated by the Convention, or as being numerically significant enough to qualify as ‘part’ of a protected group pursuant to article II of the Convention.

The Group of Experts also identified the Muslim Cham as both an ethnic and religious group victimized by the Khmer Rouge. It said that the intent to destroy the Cham was evidenced by an ‘announced policy of homogenization, the total prohibition of these groups’ distinctive cultural traits, the dispersal among the general population and the execution of their leadership’. This is arguably cultural rather than physical genocide, and therefore beyond the scope of the Convention.

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184 ‘The Criminal Procedures against Chilean and Argentinian Repressors in Spain’, note 106 above.


186 See chapter 4, pp. 179–89 below.
Other Groups

Beyond its list of three categories, General Assembly Resolution 96(I) added that genocide could also be directed against ‘other groups’. The sparse records of the discussions provide no guidance whatsoever on what these might entail. General rules of interpretation would suggest an *ejusdem generis* approach; the ‘other groups’ must in some way be similar to or analogous with those that are enumerated.\(^{187}\) The Secretariat draft convention replaced the General Assembly’s reference to ‘other groups’ with two categories, ‘national’ and ‘linguistic’ groups,\(^{188}\) perhaps hinting at what the Assembly meant. The text began with a provision entitled ‘[p]rotected groups’, thus making the list an exhaustive one.\(^{189}\) Although debate raged about the content of the enumeration, particularly political groups, there is no question the drafters intended to list the protected groups in an exhaustive fashion. For many years, the International Law Commission flirted with modifying article II of the Convention so as to make the enumeration of protected groups non-exhaustive, before finally returning to the original 1948 version.\(^{190}\)

There are references in national legislation, case law and academic writing to groups not contemplated specifically by the Convention. The most important of these, without a doubt, are political groups. Some isolated support also exists for the recognition of economic and social groups and linguistic groups. The only judicial discussion of the issue is in the *Akayesu* case, where the novel concept of ‘stable and permanent groups’ was developed.

**Stable and permanent groups**

The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in its 2 September 1998 decision in *Akayesu*, considered the enumera-

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\(^{188}\) UN Doc. E/447, pp. 17, 22.

\(^{189}\) UN Doc. A/AC.10/41; UN Doc. A/362, appendix II, art. I § I.

tion of protected groups in article II of the Genocide Convention, as well as in article 2 of the Tribunal’s Statute, to be too restrictive. In light of the above comments on racial and ethnic groups, it can hardly be doubted that the Tutsi fall within the Convention definition. But the categorization of Rwanda’s Tutsi population clearly vexed the Tribunal. For the Tribunal, the word ‘ethnic’ came closest, yet it too was troublesome because the Tutsi could not be meaningfully distinguished, in terms of language and culture, from the majority Hutu population.191 The Tribunal searched for autonomous definitions of each of the four terms. Had it adopted the more holistic approach proposed above, it would not have faced the same problems categorizing the Tutsi. Confronted with the prospect that none of the four terms of the definition might apply, the Tribunal concluded that the Convention could still extend to certain other groups, although their precise definition was elusive. Pledging fidelity to the Convention’s drafters, the Akayesu judgment declared:

On reading through the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention (Summary Records of the meetings of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 21 September–10 December 1948, Official Records of the General Assembly), it appears that the crime of genocide was allegedly perceived as targeting only ‘stable’ groups, constituted in a permanent fashion and membership of which is determined by birth, with the exclusion of the more ‘mobile’ groups which one joins through individual voluntary commitment, such as political and economic groups. Therefore, a common criterion in the four types of groups protected by the Genocide Convention is that membership in such groups would seem to be normally not challengeable by its members, who belong to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable manner.

The Trial Chamber continued:

Moreover, the Chamber considered whether the groups protected by the Genocide Convention, echoed in Article 2 of the Statute, should be limited to only the four groups expressly mentioned and whether they should not also include any group which is stable and permanent like the said four groups. In other words, the question that arises is whether it would be impossible to punish the physical destruction of a group as such under the Genocide Convention, if the said group, although stable and membership is by birth, does not meet the definition of any one of the four groups expressly protected by the Genocide Convention. In the opinion of the Chamber, it is particularly important to respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention, which

191 Nevertheless, the Tribunal employed the ‘ethnic’ classification in applying the concept of ‘crimes against humanity’, finding Akayesu guilty of a ‘widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population on ethnic grounds’: Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 73 above, para. 652.
according to the travaux préparatoires, was patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent group.\textsuperscript{192}

With this approach, the Rwanda Tribunal encompassed the nation’s Tutsi population within the definition of genocide, even if the term ‘ethnic group’ was deemed insufficient. In the second major judgment of the Rwanda Tribunal, a second Trial Chamber adopted a significantly different approach to this issue. It determines the Tutsi constitute an ethnic group, and evidently failed to endorse the ‘stable and permanent’ analysis of the \textit{Akayesu} judgment.\textsuperscript{193}

The \textit{Akayesu} analysis is open to criticism on several fronts. In the first place, it quite brazenly goes beyond the actual terms of the Convention definition, invoking the intent of the drafters as a justification. The problem is that the drafters chose the four terms in order to express their intent. If they meant to protect all ‘stable and permanent groups’, why did they not simply say this? The role of the \textit{travaux préparatoires} is to assist in clarifying ambiguous or obscure terms, or those that are manifestly absurd or unreasonable,\textsuperscript{194} not to add elements that were left out. As was stated by Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice of the International Court of Justice: ‘The principle of interpretation directed to giving provisions their maximum effect cannot legitimately be employed in order to introduce what would amount to a revision of those provisions.’\textsuperscript{195} Reading in terms that are not already present in the text is also particularly objectionable when the treaty defines a criminal offence, which should be subject to restrictive interpretation and respect the rule \textit{nullum crimen sine lege}.\textsuperscript{196} If the ‘stable and permanent’ hypothesis is to be sustained, it must rely on a construction of the actual words that appear in article II.

On closer scrutiny, three of the four categories in the Convention enumeration, national groups, ethnic groups and religious groups, seem neither stable nor permanent. Only racial groups, when they are defined

\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Ibid.}, para. 515. But note that the same Trial Chamber, in a subsequent decision, \textit{Prosecutor v. Rutaganda} (Case No. ICTR–96–3–T), Judgment, 6 December 1999, seemed to hedge its remarks somewhat: ‘It appears from a reading of the \textit{travaux préparatoires} of the Genocide Convention that certain groups, such as political and economic groups have been excluded from the protected groups, because they are considered to be ‘mobile groups’ which one joins through individual, political commitment. That would seem to suggest \textit{a contrario} that the Convention was presumably intended to cover relatively stable and permanent groups.’ (reference omitted).

\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana}, note 63, para. 94.

\textsuperscript{194} Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1979) 1155 UNTS 331, art. 32.

\textsuperscript{195} \textit{South West Africa Case}, [1950] \textit{ICJ Reports} 128.

genetically, can lay claim to some relatively prolonged stability and permanence. But as this chapter has argued, the drafters conceived of racial groups as comprising national, ethnic and religious minorities. The day after the General Assembly adopted the Genocide Convention it approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes the fundamental right to change both nationality and religion, thereby acknowledging that they are far from permanent and stable.\textsuperscript{197} National groups are modified dramatically as borders change and as individual and collective conceptions of identity evolve. Nationality may be changed, sometimes for large groups of individuals where, for example, two countries have joined or secession has occurred. Religious groups may come into existence and disappear within a single lifetime. As for ethnic groups, individual members may also come and go, although there will often be formal legal rules associated with this, determining ethnicity as a result of marriage or in the case of children whose parents belong to different ethnic groups.

Furthermore, it is not at all clear from a reading of the travaux préparatoires of the Convention that the intent of the drafters ‘was patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent group’, as the Rwanda Tribunal claimed. In fact, reference to groups which are ‘stable and permanent’ occurred only infrequently during the drafting, and other, complex justifications for the choices of the General Assembly were also given in the course of the debates.\textsuperscript{198} What a review of the drafting history reveals is that political groups – perhaps the best example of a group that is not stable and permanent – were actually included within the enumeration until an eleventh-hour compromise eliminated the reference. The debates leave little doubt that the decision to exclude political groups was mainly an attempt to rally a minority of member States, in order to facilitate rapid ratification of the Convention, and not a principled decision based on some philosophical distinction between stable and more ephemeral groups.

Finally, there is no support for the ‘stable and permanent’ hypothesis in national legislation introducing the crime of genocide in domestic penal codes. It is true that several States have departed from the Convention definition, but none has taken the ‘stable and permanent’ approach.

\textsuperscript{197} Universal Declaration of Human Rights, note 43 above, arts. 15(1) and 18.
\textsuperscript{198} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Amado, Brazil).
Political groups

The first draft of General Assembly Resolution 96(I) did not include political groups.\textsuperscript{199} It was added by a sub-committee of the Sixth Committee. No reported debate explains this development. It has subsequently been argued that the presence of political groups within the 1946 definition suggests the existence of a broader concept of genocide than that expressed in the Convention, one that reflects customary law. But given the very meagre record of the debates, the haste with which the resolution was adopted, the novelty of the term, and the fact that the subsequent Convention excludes reference to political groups, such a conclusion seems adventuresome at best. The fact that the enumeration in Resolution 96(I) also omits ethnic and national groups is a further argument against its authority on this issue.

Taking the lead from General Assembly Resolution 96(I), the Secretariat draft convention contained a reference to political groups. This provoked sharp disagreement among the three experts consulted by the Secretariat.\textsuperscript{200} Raphael Lemkin said political groups lacked the permanency and specific characteristics of the other groups, insisting that the Convention should not risk failure by introducing ideas on which the world was deeply divided. In practice, history had shown racial, national and religious groups were the most victims of genocide, Lemkin observed.\textsuperscript{201} But Henri Donnedieu de Vabres differed, arguing that ‘genocide was an odious crime, regardless of the group which fell victim to it and that the exclusion of political groups might be regarded as justifying genocide in the case of such groups’.\textsuperscript{202} The third expert, Vespasian V. Pella, did not pronounce himself, saying this was a matter for the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{203}

Among member States involved in drafting the Convention, the inclusion of political groups initially appeared well accepted. The United States proposal of 30 September 1947 spoke of ‘criminal acts directed against a racial, national, religious, or political group of human

\textsuperscript{199} UN Doc. A/BUR/50.
\textsuperscript{200} UN Doc. A/AC.10/41; UN Doc. A/362, appendix II, art. I § I. For a review of the debates, see ‘Prevention of Discrimination and Denial of Fundamental Freedoms in Respect of Political Groups (Memorandum by the Secretary-General)’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/129, paras. 3–16.
\textsuperscript{201} UN Doc. E/447, p. 22. In Lemkin, \textit{Axis Rule}, pp. 62–83, Lemkin spoke of ‘political genocide’, but meant something entirely different than the destruction of political groups. Rather, he was concerned with genocide of ethnic groups by the destruction of their political institutions.
\textsuperscript{202} UN Doc. E/447, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{203} \textit{Ibid.}
Groups protected by the Convention

France’s draft convention of 5 February 1948 referred to an attack on the life of a human group or an individual as a member of such group, ‘particularly by reason of his nationality, race, religion or opinions’. Only one non-governmental organization, the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations, urged deleting ‘political groups’ so as not to delay acceptance of the Convention.

The Ad Hoc Committee was seriously divided on this issue. Venezuela said it could only inhibit ratification of the Convention, ‘as such a prevention might be interpreted as hampering the action of Governments with regard to subversive activities against them’. Lebanon’s Karim Azkoul called attention to the essential differences between racial, national and religious groups, all of which bore an inalienable character, and political groups, which were far less stable in character.

China likewise expressed hesitation, Moushong Lin questioning that political groups ‘had neither the stability nor the homogeneity of an ethnical group’. He said ‘there was a risk of bringing about a confusion between the idea of political crime and that of genocide’.

The Soviet Union’s ‘Basic Principles’, tabled during the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, excluded political groups. Platon D. Morozov explained that: ‘From a scientific point of view, and etymologically, “genocide” meant essentially persecution of a racial, national or religious group.’ According to the Soviets: ‘The crime of genocide is organically bound up with Fascism-Nazism and other similar race “theories” which preach racial and national hatred, the domination of the so-called “higher” races and the extermination of the so-called “lower” race.’

Poland expressed similar resistance to including political groups, observing that national, racial and religious groups ‘had a fully established historical background, while political groups had no such stable form’.

France’s Pierre Ordonneau argued that ‘it was necessary to protect freedom of opinion not only in political matters but also in all other

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204 UN Doc. E/623, art. I.I.
205 UN Doc. E/623/Add.1, art. 1.
206 UN Doc. E/C.2/49.
208 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, p. 10.
210 ‘Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide’, UN Doc. E/AC.25/7: ‘I. Genocide, which aims at the extermination of particular groups of the population on racial, national (religious) grounds is one of the gravest crimes against humanity.’
211 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13, p. 3.
212 UN Doc. E/AC.25/7, Principle I.
213 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, pp. 10–11.
France wanted to take the issue a step further, advocating reference to ‘political and other opinion’, and noting that the term had been used in the 1789 *Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen*. The United States did not like the French proposal: ‘many of the groups against which a State might proceed held certain opinions, and it was a mistake to shelter them by allowing them to appear as groups persecuted on account of their opinion.’ John Maktos said ‘a political group was more easily recognizable than a group holding a certain opinion, bearing as it does distinguishing marks which leave less room for confusion’. China’s Lin rallied to the French suggestion to include both political groups and groups based on opinion in the definition, but warned against making the definition needlessly lengthy. There was, in fact, no good reason why social, economic and other groups should not be included as well, he remarked.

Recalling that General Assembly Resolution 96(I) had mentioned political groups, the United States proposed an amendment retaining political groups in the enumeration and referring to political belief within the motives of genocide. But, according to the Soviet Union: ‘Crimes committed for political motives belonged to a special type of crime and had nothing in common with crimes of genocide, the very name of which, derived as it was from the word *genus* – race, tribe, referred to the destruction of nations or races as such for reasons of racial or national persecution, and not for political opinions of those groups.’ On first reading, the Committee voted to include political groups, by four to three; on second reading, at its twenty-fourth meeting, the vote was five to two in favour, with only Poland and the Soviet Union opposed. However, a United States proposal to add the words ‘or political’ to the preamble was defeated.

In the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, amendments by Uruguay and Iran called for removal of the terms ‘political’ and

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214 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.3, p. 11.
215 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, p. 10.
216 Ibid., p. 11.
217 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
218 Ibid., p. 12.
219 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13, p. 2. As amended it read: ‘In this convention genocide means any of the following deliberate acts directed against a national, racial, religious or political group, on grounds of national or racial origin or religious or political belief.’ China successfully proposed changing the final words to read ‘or political opinion’: UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13, p. 3.
221 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13, p. 4.
223 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.21, p. 7 (four in favour, three against).
Groups protected by the Convention

‘political opinion’. Several States argued that incorporating political groups in the enumeration rather dramatically extended the definition of genocide, and might inhibit ratification.\textsuperscript{226} Venezuela said: ‘The inclusion of political groups might endanger the future of the convention because many States would be unwilling to ratify it, fearing the possibility of being called before an international tribunal to answer charges made against them, even if those charges were without foundation. Subversive elements might make use of the convention to weaken attempts of their own Government to suppress them.’\textsuperscript{227} Sweden, too, was opposed, maintaining that ‘in principle, the question of the protection of political and other groups should come within the scope of the Commission on Human Rights’.\textsuperscript{228} The Dominican Republic also favoured excluding political groups.\textsuperscript{229} Iran saw a distinction between groups whose membership was inevitable, such as those based on race, religion or nationality, and those of which membership was voluntary: ‘it must be admitted that the destruction of the first type appeared more heinous in the light of the conscience of humanity, since it was directed against human beings whom chance alone had grouped together . . . Although it was true that people could change their nationality or their religion, such changes did not in fact happen very often.’\textsuperscript{230}

Belgium referred to the etymology of the word ‘genocide’, which made it clear that political – or for that matter economic – groups were not included.\textsuperscript{231} Uruguay added: ‘If an international tribunal were established – and the speaker was in favour of such a course – it was probable that many States would refuse to allow such a tribunal to intervene in their internal affairs on the pretext that political genocide had been committed. In order, therefore, that an international tribunal might be established, the convention must not apply to political groups.’\textsuperscript{232} Also advocating the removal of ‘political groups’, the Soviet Union said such acts would belong to the category of crimes against humanity. ‘Genocide therefore applied to racial and national groups, although that did not make crimes committed against other groups any the less odious’, said Morozov. He observed that the essence of genocide was that the criterion for belonging to a group was objective, not subjective. Answering the argument that this did not apply to religious

\textsuperscript{226} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Amado, Brazil); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Raafat, Egypt); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Maúrtua, Peru); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela).
\textsuperscript{227} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela).
\textsuperscript{228} Ibid. (Petren, Sweden).
\textsuperscript{229} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Messina, Dominican Republic).
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid. (Abdoh, Iran).
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid. (Kaeckenenbeeck, Belgium).
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid. (Manini y Ríos, Uruguay).
groups, because a person could always change religion, Morozov noted that ‘in all known cases of genocide perpetrated on grounds of religion, it had always been evident that nationality or race were concomitant reasons’. It was for this reason that the Soviet Union wanted religion listed in parentheses, after racial and national groups.  

Those who needed protection most were those who could not alter their status’, said Manfred Lachs of Poland. Political groups, on the other hand, were not only more subjective, but also often quite subversive.

Bolivia preferred retention: ‘genocide meant the physical destruction of a group which was held together by a common origin or a common ideology. There was no valid reason for restricting the concept of genocide by excluding political groups.’ The Netherlands likewise was supportive, noting the Nazis had also attacked socialist and communist parties. Ecuador said that, ‘if the convention did not extend its protection to political groups, those who committed the crime of genocide might use the pretext of the political opinions of a racial or religious group to persecute and destroy it, without becoming liable to international sanctions’. Others noted that General Assembly Resolution 96(I) had referred to political groups, saying that ‘[p]ublic opinion would not understand it if the United Nations no longer condemned in 1948 what it had condemned in 1946’. Sweden, which had changed its mind in the course of the debate, said that while it understood the arguments of those who wanted to exclude political groups, it felt it was important not to leave political groups unprotected. Sweden’s delegate argued that as the prohibition in article II was confined to physical destruction, ‘all States could guarantee that limited measure of protection to political groups’.

On a roll-call vote, the Sixth Committee decided, by twenty-nine votes to thirteen with nine abstentions, that political groups be retained within the Convention. But the debate was not over. Despite an apparently convincing majority, renewed proposals to remove political groups surfaced later in the session, after presentation of the drafting committee’s report. Iran, Uruguay and Egypt proposed amendments to this effect. Brazil said it was opposed to the inclusion of political

234 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Lachs, Poland).
235 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Medeiros, Bolivia).
236 Ibid. (de Beus, Netherlands). On the same point see ibid. (Gross, United States).
237 Ibid. (Correa, Ecuador). See also ibid. (Demesmin, Haiti); ibid. (Dihigo, Cuba); ibid. (Camey Herrera, Guatemala); and UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Guillen, Salvador).
238 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Correa, Ecuador). See also ibid., (Gross, United States).
239 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Petren, Sweden).
240 Ibid.
groups, ‘should the Committee decide to re-examine the question’.242 Egypt, which had abstained in the original vote, explained that it wished to exclude political groups ‘primarily for practical reasons’ because this could be an impediment to ratification.243 The United States, which had spearheaded efforts to include political groups, quickly retreated: ‘The United States delegation continued to think that its point of view was correct but, in a conciliatory spirit and in order to avoid the possibility that the application of the convention to political groups might prevent certain countries from acceding to it, he would support the proposal to delete from article II the provisions relating to political groups.’244 The change in the United States position was decisive, and no real debate on the issue ensued. The Sixth Committee voted, by twenty-six to four with nine abstentions,245 to review the question. Then, the proposal to delete political groups was adopted by twenty-two to six, with twelve abstentions.246

A few delegations congratulated the United States for its flexibility. The United States delegation itself, in internal reports on the debates, wrote that ‘when it appeared that some States might refrain from ratifying the convention because of the retention of these groups therein [i.e., political groups], the United States delegate stated that he would support the proposal for deletion of political groups in the hope that there would be a maximum number of ratifications, and in the further hope that at a future date the Convention might be amended to include them’.247 China was unhappy with the result, and in a statement after the vote declared that it still preferred to retain political groups, which ‘at a time of ideological strife’ were ‘in greater need of protection than national and religious groups’.248

It is clear that political groups were excluded from the definition for

242 Ibid. (Amado, Brazil). 243 Ibid. (Raafat, Egypt).
245 Ibid. 246 Ibid.
248 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.128 (Ti-tsun Li, China).
‘political’ reasons rather than reasons of principle.\footnote{In its 1996 report, the International Law Commission said political groups were excluded by the General Assembly ‘because this type of group was not considered to be sufficiently stable’: ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May–26 July 1996’, UN Doc. A/51/10, p. 89.} Rigorous examination of the \textit{travaux} fails to confirm a popular impression in the literature\footnote{Drost, \textit{The Crime of State}, pp. 60–3; Whitaker, ‘Revised Report’, note 52 above, p. 18, para. 35; Glaser, \textit{Droit international}, p. 110, n. 99; Shaw, ‘Genocide’, pp. 797–820 at p. 808; Bruun, ‘Beyond the Convention’, p. 206; Verhoeven, ‘Le crime de génocide’, p. 21; Ratner and Abrams, \textit{Accountability}, p. 32.} that the opposition to inclusion of political genocide was some Soviet machination. The Soviet views were shared by a number of other States for whom it is difficult to establish any geographic or social common denominator: Lebanon,\footnote{UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, p. 10.} Sweden,\footnote{UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Petren, Sweden).} Brazil,\footnote{UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.63 (Amado, Brazil); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.68, p. 56.} Peru,\footnote{UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Maurtua, Peru).} Venezuela,\footnote{UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.65 (Pérez-Pozo, Venezuela).} the Philippines,\footnote{Ibid. (Paredes, Philippines).} the Dominican Republic,\footnote{UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Messina, Dominican Republic).} Iran,\footnote{UN Doc. A.C.6/218; UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Abdoh, Iran).} Egypt,\footnote{UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.63 (Raafat, Egypt); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.72 (Raafat, Egypt); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74, p. 91.} Belgium\footnote{UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).} and Uruguay.\footnote{UN Doc. A/C.6/209; UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Manini y Ríos, Uruguay).} The exclusion of political groups was in fact originally promoted by a non-governmental organization, the World Jewish Congress,\footnote{UN Doc. E/623. Cited in Robinson, \textit{Genocide Convention}, p. 59, n. 9.} and it corresponded to Raphael Lemkin’s vision of the nature of the crime of genocide.\footnote{Lemkin, \textit{Axis Rule}, pp. 82–3.}

Discrimination and Protection of Minorities adopted a resolution suggesting that the Convention ‘could be improved’ and that it would ‘study the possibility of extending its application . . . to political genocide’. Benjamin Whitaker argued for a broader ‘lay’ concept of genocide, applied by sociologists and historians, which includes political groups. Some writers have introduced the term ‘politicide’. Also, certain domestic legal systems have taken the initiative of including ‘political’ genocide within their own criminal law texts. Ethiopia is one of them, the result of provisions that date from its 1957 Penal Code.

In the 1990s these texts formed the basis of prosecutions of former leaders of the Derg regime for ‘genocide’ committed against political opponents. The domestic penal codes of Bangladesh, Panama, Costa Rica, Peru, Slovenia and Lithuania also recognize genocide of political groups. But there are few such States, and it is ambitious to suggest that the practice of a few defines some customary


270 Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1957, art. 281 (Negarit Gazeta, Extraordinary Issue No. 1 of 1957). Apparently, it was added at the initiative of a zealous young intern, Cherif Bassiouni, who was eager to correct the shortcomings of the Convention definition.
272 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (Bangladesh), s. 3(2)(c).
273 Penal Code 1993 (Panama), art. 311.
274 Penal Code 1992 (Costa Rica), art. 373.
275 Penal Code of 1995 (Peru), art. 129.
276 Slovenia respects the Convention definition, but appends to its Penal Code provision dealing with genocide the following: ‘The same punishment shall be imposed on whoever commits any of the acts under the previous paragraph against a social or political group’ (Penal Code (1994) (Slovenia), Chapter 35, art. 373(2)).
norm including political groups in the definition of genocide. The vast majority of States follow the Convention to the letter in their domestic legislation.

In a 1996 report, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights considered inadmissible a claim that a Colombian political party, whose members were subject to extrajudicial executions, disappearances and other human rights violations, was a victim of genocide. The Commission noted that the Genocide Convention codifies customary international law, citing article II:

23. The petitioners have not alleged facts which would tend to show that the Patriotic Union is a ‘national, ethnical, racial or religious group.’ Instead, the petitioners have alleged that the members of the Patriotic Union have been persecuted solely because of their membership in a political group. Although political affiliation may be intertwined with national, ethnic or racial identity under certain circumstances, the petitions have not alleged that such a situation exists in relation to the membership of the Patriotic Union.

24. The definition of genocide provided in the Convention does not include the persecution of political groups, although political groups were mentioned in the original resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations leading to the preparation of the Convention on Genocide. The mass murders of political groups were explicitly excluded from the definition of genocide in the final Convention. Even in its more recent application such as the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, the definition of genocide has not expanded to include persecution of political groups.

25. The Commission concludes that the facts alleged by the petitioners set forth a situation which shares many characteristics with the occurrence of genocide and might be understood in common parlance to constitute genocide. However, the facts alleged do not tend to establish, as a matter of law, that this case falls within the current definition of genocide provided by international law.

There has also been occasional reference to political genocide in international instruments, such as the Cairo Declaration of 29 November 1995, which, speaking of the situation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, ‘forcefully condemn[ed] the ideology of ethnic and political genocide used in the rivalry for the conquest and monopoly of

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278 In accordance with art. 29(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights, (1979) 1144 UNTS 123, OASTS 36, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is competent to interpret provisions of treaties like the Genocide Convention: ‘Other Treaties’ Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC–1/82, 24 September 1982, Series A, No. 1, paras. 43–4.

power’.

The Special Rapporteur on Burundi of the Commission on Human Rights has lamented the fact that criteria based on the political affiliation of the victims of genocide are not included within the Convention definition. Interestingly, however, in recent years, when the question has been examined by bodies such as the International Law Commission, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court and the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, the question has not led to very serious debate, and the allegedly much-desired improvement to the Convention has never been made. Nor was such a position seriously advanced by any of the influential non-governmental organiza-


283 ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’, note 26 above, para. 61: ‘There was a suggestion to expand the definition of the crime of genocide contained in the Convention to encompass social and political groups. This suggestion was supported by some delegations who felt that any gap in the definition should be filled. However, other delegations expressed opposition to amending the definition contained in the Convention, which was binding on all States as a matter of customary law and which had been incorporated in the implementing legislation of the numerous States parties to the Convention. The view was expressed that the amendment of existing conventions was beyond the scope of the present exercise. Concern was also expressed that providing for different definitions of the crime of genocide in the statute could result in the International Court of Justice and the international criminal court rendering conflicting decisions with respect to the same situation under the two respective instruments. It was suggested that acts such as murder that could qualify as genocide when committed against one of the groups referred to in the Convention could also constitute crimes against humanity when committed against members of other groups, including social or political groups.’ Egypt was apparently the source of the proposal: Herman von Hebel and Darryl Robinson, ‘Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court’, in Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results, The Hague, London and Boston: Kluwer Law, 1995, pp. 79–128 at p. 89, n. 37.

284 In its final version of the ‘Text of the Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court’, adopted at the conclusion of the March–April 1998 session of the Preparatory Committee, the Convention definition of genocide was accompanied by the following footnote: ‘The Preparatory Committee took note of the suggestion to examine the possibility of addressing “social and political” groups in the context of crimes against humanity. N.B. The need for this footnote should be reviewed in the light of the discussions that have taken place in respect of crimes against humanity.’ UN Doc. A/AC.249/1998/CRP.8, p. 2.
tions in their persistent lobbying during the drafting of the Rome Statute.

The omission of political groups has inspired some critics to make comments that can only be characterized as hyperbole. According to Pieter Drost: ‘By leaving political and other groups beyond the purported protection the authors of the Convention also left a wide and dangerous loophole for any Government to escape the human duties under the Convention by putting genocide into practice under the cover of executive measures against political or other groups for security, public order or any other reason of state.’285 His words were echoed by Benjamin Whitaker in his 1985 report.286 According to Barbara Harff, because ‘the two most recent events most closely resembling the Holocaust (Uganda and Kampuchea) cannot properly be called genocide’, they ‘cannot properly be called a crime under international law’.287 Beth van Schaack has asserted that, because of shortcomings in the Convention definition, those who perpetrate ‘political genocide’ will ‘escape liability’.288 Yet would anybody credibly argue that the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination constitutes incitement to discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation and disability because of its narrow focus? Obviously, excluding political groups from the definition of genocide is in no way a licence to eliminate them, especially because for many decades the destruction of political groups has been encompassed within the customary law notion of crimes against humanity. As the International Law Commission stated, in resisting perfunctory efforts to amend the Convention definition: ‘Political groups were included in the definition of persecution contained in the Nuremberg Charter, but not in the definition of genocide contained in the Convention because this type of group was not considered to be sufficiently stable for purposes of the latter crime. None the less persecution directed against members of a political group could still constitute a crime against humanity.’289

It is entirely reasonable that the Genocide Convention confine its scope to the type of groups protected by other not unrelated legal systems and instruments, and specifically those dealing with minority rights and racial discrimination. As Malcolm Shaw has observed: ‘it is by no means clear that the gap that exists is one that could or should be

286 Whitaker, *Droit international*, p. 19, para. 36.
filled in the context of the Genocide Convention itself. In particular, one needs to bear in mind the dangers of States not acceding to this and thus threatening the viability of the Convention itself and the serious definitional problems that do exist in relation to the notion of political groups.’

**Economic and social groups**

During the drafting of the Convention, there were isolated proposals to add economic and social groups to the enumeration. Genocide of ‘economic’ groups was suggested by the United States, but later dropped. In the Sixth Committee, the Netherlands said this would be going too far: ‘It would lead to the absurd result that certain professions, when threatened by economic measures which were required in the interest of the country, might invoke the convention to protection their own interests.’ Lemkin had written about ‘economic genocide’, but by this he meant not the destruction of economic groups but instead the destruction of the foundations of the economic life of a nation or national minority. Lemkin’s philosophy was picked up in the 1946 Saudi Arabian draft: ‘Planned disintegration of the political, social or economic structure of a group, people or nation.’

Considerable academic literature tends to favour inclusion of economic and social groups within the scope of the crime of genocide. The persecution of rich peasants or kulaks during collectivization in the Soviet Union and the massacres associated with various social changes that the Khmer Rouge attempted to effect in Cambodia during the late 1970s are given as examples. In draft legislation directed at the prosecution of Khmer Rouge leaders, prepared in August 1999, the Cambodian Government enlarged the Convention definition of

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292 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (de Beus, Netherlands). See also UN Doc. A/C.6/69 (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela); and UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.72 (Raafat, Egypt).
294 Note 24 above.
genocide to include ‘wealth, level of education, sociological environment (urban/rural), allegiance to a political system or regime (old people/new people), social class or social category (merchant, civil servant etc.)’. Commenting on the Cambodian proposal, a United Nations delegation headed by legal officer Ralph Zacklin noted the discrepancy with the Convention definition and charged that any such provision would violate the prohibition of retroactive offences. It noted, however, that the categories not covered by the Convention definition would be captured under crimes against humanity. The United Nations counter-proposal confined itself to the text of article II of the Convention, as well as to the definition of crimes against humanity contained in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

There were proposals to include economic and social groups in the genocide provision of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court. Peru, Paraguay and Lithuania include ‘social groups’ within their legislation prohibiting genocide. When Spain enacted a crime of genocide in 1971, it defined it with reference to a ‘national ethnic, social or religious group’. However, the legislation was changed in 1983 and Spain returned to the enumeration in article II of the Convention. Portugal’s 1982 penal code also included ‘social groups’ within the definition of genocide. However, the code was revised in 1995 and Portugal reverted to the Convention definition.
Groups protected by the Convention

**Linguistic groups**

The Secretariat draft replaced the General Assembly’s reference to ‘other groups’ with two categories, one of which was ‘linguistic’ groups.307 The United States argued against what it considered an unnecessary reference to linguistic groups in the enumeration, ‘since it is not believed that genocide would be practised upon them because of their linguistic, as distinguished from their racial, national or religious, characteristics’.308 Later, in introducing the term ‘ethnical’ during debates in the Sixth Committee, Sweden also noted that the constituent factor of a minority might be its language, and if linguistic groups were not connected with an existing state, then they would be protected as an ethnical group rather than a national group.309

**Gender**

Some scholars have advocated adding groups defined by gender to the enumeration. Benjamin Whitaker, in his 1985 report to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, said the list of groups should be extended to cover both men and women.310 If the basis of the enumeration is groups that are ‘stable and permanent’, as proposed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Akayesu, it can certainly be applied to women.311 On closer scrutiny, however, the purpose of such initiatives is to facilitate the prosecution of crimes directed against the reproductive capacity of women, and this is more a matter of the survival of the national, ethnic, racial or religious group to which women belong. In such cases, the intent of the offender is to destroy the group to which the women victims belong, not the women as a group. The real interest in extending the Convention’s scope to gender groups is to strengthen its role in the prosecution of crimes directed against women.312 This is better accomplished by purposive interpretation of the acts of genocide than by adding to the enumeration of protected groups.

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307 In explanatory comments on the draft, the Secretariat said it had been guided by the General Assembly resolution: UN Doc. E/447, pp. 17, 22. See Drost, *The Crime of State*, pp. 22–3.

308 UN Doc. A/401.


Any group

The first draft of General Assembly Resolution 96(I) spoke of ‘national, racial, ethnical or religious groups’, echoing the terminology finally adopted, but the drafting committee of the Sixth Committee changed this to ‘racial, religious, political and other groups’. The debates in no way indicate that the term ‘other groups’ was meant to be interpreted broadly, so as to encompass any group. The *ejusdem generis* rule of interpretation indicates that ‘such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned’. In 1947, the Secretariat warned that ‘protection is not meant to cover a professional or athletic group’.

French legislation has taken genocide to imply groups, of whatever kind, identified by an ‘arbitrary’ criterion. Belgium made a proposition along these lines in its comments on the International Law Commission’s draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, arguing for what it called a ‘non-exhaustive list of groups’:

The non-exhaustive nature of the list of groups is totally justified: genocide is a concept intended to cover a variety of situations which do not necessarily coincide with the few examples documented by history. Thus, in the case of the acts of genocide perpetrated in Cambodia, the target group did not have any of the characteristics included in the definition of genocide set out in article II of the Convention of 9 December 1948 . . . Consequently, the definition of genocide should be reviewed. There are two possible solutions: either adopting a non-exhaustive list of groups, or supplementing the exhaustive list with other notions such as those of political groups and socio-economic groups.

A non-exhaustive list may certainly be large enough to cover, for example, groups of disabled persons, for whom there are definite historical examples of persecution. It also satisfies long-standing demands to include political groups. Other groups for whom it has been occasionally argued that the term genocide should offer protection

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313 UN Doc. A/BUR/50.
314 GA Res. 96(I).
316 UN Doc. E/447, p. 22.
Groups protected by the Convention include homosexuals,\textsuperscript{320} the elderly\textsuperscript{321} and the mentally disturbed.\textsuperscript{322} So-called ‘auto-genocide’ can also fall within the rubric of genocide of any group.

The Spanish National Audience adopted this view in its November 1998 ruling on charges that genocide had been committed by the dictatorships in Argentina and Chile during the 1970s and 1980s. The ruling also sustained indictments of genocide filed against Augusto Pinochet. According to the Spanish court, a dynamic or evolutive interpretation of the Convention should extend the scope of article II to all groups:

We know that in the 1948 convention the term ‘political’ or the words ‘or others’ do not appear, when it relates in article 2 the characteristics of the groups object of the destruction proper of genocide. But silence is not the equivalent of un-failing exclusion. Whatever the intentions of the writers of the text were, the Convention acquires life by virtue of the successive signatures and ratifications of the treaty by members of the United Nations who shared the idea of genocide as an odious scourge that they should commit themselves to prevent and sanction. Article 137bis of the repealed Criminal Code, fed by the worldwide concern that funded the 1948 Convention, cannot exclude from its typification acts as those alleged in this case. The sense of the force of the necessity felt by the countries party to the 1948 Convention of responding criminally to genocide, avoiding its impunity, for considering it to be a horrible crime against international law, requires that the term ‘national group’ not mean ‘group formed by people who belong to a same nation’, but simply a national human group, a distinct human group, characterized by something, integrated to a larger community. The restrictive understanding of the type of genocide that the appellants defend would stop the qualification as genocide of such odious actions as the systematic elimination by the power or by a band of AIDS patients, as a distinct group, or of the elderly, also as a distinct group, or of foreigners who reside in a country, who, even though they are of different nationalities, can be considered a national group in relationship to the country where they live, differentiated precisely for not being nationals of that state. That social conception of genocide – felt, understood by the community, in which it founds its rejection and horror for the crime – would not permit exclusions such as those pointed out. The prevention and punishment of genocide as such genocide, that is to say, as an international crime, as an evil that affects the international community directly, in the intentions of the 1948 Convention that appear from the text, cannot exclude, without reason in the logic of the system, certain distinct national groups, discriminating against them for others. Neither the 1948 Convention or our Penal Code, nor the repealed


\textsuperscript{321} Lippman, ‘Drafting’, p. 62.

\textsuperscript{322} \textit{Ibid.}
code, expressly exclude this necessary integration. Garzon’s interpretation was confirmed by the National Audience.323

It is hard to quarrel with the humanitarian sympathies of the Spanish court, although the legal analysis is hardly compelling.

In the end, such reasoning leads to an absurdity that trivializes the very nature of genocide: the human race itself constitutes a protected group, and therefore genocide covers any mass killing.324 From a legal standpoint, the principal drawback of this approach is that it can in no way be stretched to apply to the Convention. Arguably, it might be subsumed within a customary law conception of genocide. But the basis for such a claim is indeed flimsy. Aside from the wishful thinking of some commentators, there is a paucity of supporting evidence to show either *opinio juris* or State practice, the two components of customary norms. Nor is the reference to ‘other groups’ in General Assembly Resolution 96(I) particularly convincing, given what we know of the superficial and very preliminary discussions that took place on this point in the Sixth Committee. Atrocities committed against groups not covered by article II of the Genocide Convention are adequately addressed by other legal norms, in particular the prohibition of crimes against humanity.


This chapter and the one that follows concern the two basic elements of the offence called ‘genocide’. Because genocide constitutes a criminal infraction, and because this study concentrates essentially on the law of genocide, a jargon familiar to criminal lawyers has been chosen for this discussion. To the criminal lawyer, the ‘elements of the offence’ are fundamental because they set out the ground rules of the trial, determining what must be proven by the prosecution for a case to succeed. If the prosecution establishes all the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt (or the *intime conviction*) of the trier of fact, then a conviction may lie. If the defence casts reasonable doubt on even one ‘element of the offence’, then the accused is entitled to acquittal.

Criminal law analysis of an offence proceeds from a basic distinction between the material element (the *actus reus*) and the mental or moral element (the *mens rea*). The prosecution must prove specific material facts, but must also establish the accused’s criminal intent or ‘guilty mind’: *actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea*.1 The definition of genocide in the 1948 Convention invites this analysis, because it rather neatly separates the two elements.2 The initial phrase or *chapeau* of article II addresses the *mens rea* of the crime of genocide, that is, the ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’. The five subparagraphs of article II list the criminal acts or *actus reus*.

In his book, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, Raphael Lemkin conceived of several ‘techniques of genocide in various fields’: physical and biological, political, social, cultural, religious, economic and moral.3 He was not referring to political, social, cultural, religious, economic or

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1 *Reynolds v. G. H. Austin & Sons Ltd* [1951] 2 KB 135; *Sherras v. De Rutzen* [1895] 1 Q.B. 918, 921.
moral groups, but rather to acts of genocide directed at various aspects of the life of a group. Political genocide, for example, involves the destruction of a group’s political institutions and may even entail forced name changes. Economic genocide targets the group’s economic institutions and its source of livelihood. Lemkin said physical genocide is carried out mainly by racial discrimination in feeding, endangering of health, and outright mass killings. In all of this, his mind was turned to the ongoing genocide in Nazi Germany and in the Reich’s occupied territories.

Lemkin’s broad view of the nature of genocide was reflected in the original draft convention, proposed by Saudi Arabia in late 1946. Article I contemplated mass killing, destruction of ‘the essential potentialities of life’, ‘planned disintegration of the political, social or economic structure’, ‘systematic moral debasement’ and ‘acts of terrorism committed for the purpose of creating a state of common danger and alarm . . . with the intent of producing [the group’s] political, social, economic or moral disintegration’.

It became clear, from the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 96(I) in December 1946, that any international consensus on the scope of genocide would be considerably more narrow. The preamble described genocide as ‘a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings’. This association between genocide and homicide focused on the physical dimension. The Resolution noted that genocide had resulted ‘in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups’. But the reference to culture did not have the same connotation as in Lemkin’s writings. It merely lamented cultural loss occasioned by physical genocide, without necessarily suggesting that the destruction of culture, in the absence of violence against the person, might also amount to the crime of genocide.

The Secretariat draft contained three categories of genocide, corresponding roughly to the headings of physical, biological and cultural genocide. According to the Secretariat, physical genocide involved acts intended to cause the death of members of a human group; biological genocide consisted in placing restrictions upon births; cultural genocide was the destruction ‘by brutal means of the specific characteristics of a human group, that is to say, its moral and sociological characteristics’. In its explanatory report, the Secretariat noted that Lemkin had distinguished between these three types. Should all three, or only the first two, be included, asked the Secretariat? It also cautioned the General

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4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid., pp. 87–9.  
6 UN Doc. A/C.6/86.  
7 GA Res. 96(I).
Assembly about covering too much ground with the convention, insisting upon a restrictive definition: 'Otherwise there is a danger of the idea of genocide being expanded indefinitely to include the law of war, the right of peoples to self-determination, the protection of minorities, the respect of human rights, etc.' The Secretariat also signalled a tendency to include crimes that did not constitute genocide, saying this could jeopardize the success of the convention.

The Ad Hoc Committee and the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly both decided to exclude acts of cultural genocide. Besides working on the precise definitions of acts of genocide, the debates addressed whether the enumeration should be merely indicative. The list in the draft adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee was an exhaustive one. In the Sixth Committee, China proposed replacing the words ‘the following’, used in the Ad Hoc Committee draft, with ‘including the following’, to make the enumeration non-exhaustive. Similarly, Peru proposed adding the phrase ‘for example’ in order to convey the idea that the enumeration was not exhaustive. In opposition, Poland argued that the Charter of the International Military Tribunal contained an indicative enumeration of war crimes. Yugoslavia observed that the future convention was not ‘a law which judges would have to apply’ but rather an international obligation, so a similar approach was acceptable. Opponents of the Chinese amendment claimed that law required certainty, and that a failure to specify all acts of genocide might mean the convention would be applied differently in different countries. The United States warned against incorporating provisions that could encourage international tension, explaining that an open-ended list of acts of genocide might increase the chances of one State accusing another of violating the convention. The example it gave dealt with freedom of the press, a sore point where the Soviet Union and the United States had serious differences. In any case, the Chinese amend-

8 Ibid.
9 ‘Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Ad Hoc Committee’s Terms of Reference, Note by the Secretary-General’, UN Doc. E/AC.25/2.
10 See pp. 179–89 below.
12 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.78 (Ti-tsun Li, China). See also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.81 (Morozov, Soviet Union).
14 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.78 (Lachs, Poland).
15 Ibid. (Bartos, Yugoslavia).
16 Ibid. (Manini y Ríos, Uruguay). See also ibid. (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium); and ibid. (Amado, Brazil).
17 Ibid. (Maktos, United States).
ment was soundly defeated.18 Thus, any suggestion that article II invites the addition of analogous acts is unsustainable.

Despite what seems a convincing rejection of the idea of an indicative list of acts of genocide, the International Law Commission opted for a non-exhaustive enumeration during the initial drafting of the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind in 1951.19 Later, Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam proposed yet another definition which said genocide consisted of ‘any act committed with intent to destroy . . .’ and retaining the word ‘including’ to indicate that the list was not exhaustive. Even though Thiam’s initiative received considerable support,20 the drafting committee established by the Commission in 1991 preferred a return to the Convention text, ‘in view of the nullum crimen sine lege principle and the need not to stray too far from a text widely accepted by the international community’.21 No suggestion to enlarge the list of acts or to deem the enumeration non-exhaustive even arose during the drafting of the Rome Statute, although there has been some support for the idea in the academic literature.22

**Genocidal acts defined in the Convention**

After the chapeau, article II of the Convention comprises five paragraphs, an exhaustive list of acts constituting the crime of genocide:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Together, they define the material element or actus reus of the offence,

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18 *Ibid.* (thirty-five in favour, nine against, with five abstentions).
19 *Yearbook . . . 1951*, Vol. II, p. 136: ‘(9) Acts by the authorities of a State or by private individuals, committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such, including . . . [the enumeration of acts of genocide in article II of the Convention follows].’ For the debates, see *Yearbook . . . 1951*, Vol. I, 90th meeting, pp. 66–8.
although within the paragraphs there are also elements of the mental element or *mens rea*.

The term ‘acts’ is also used in article III of the Convention, but in a different context. Article III of the Convention deals essentially with criminal participation, and provides for liability of individuals other than the principal offender, such as accomplices, as well as for incomplete or inchoate offences, such as attempts and conspiracy, where there is no principal offender at all because the ultimate crime never takes place. Other provisions of the Convention distinguish between ‘acts’ of genocide – those defined in article II – and ‘other acts’ of genocide – those listed in paragraphs (b) to (e) of article III. The ‘other acts’, all of which have their own specific material element or *actus reus*, are defined in article III and are considered in chapter 6 of this study. The present chapter concerns the material element of the crime of genocide itself, taken from the standpoint of the principal offender.

The expression ‘acts of genocide’ occurs only once in the Convention, in article VIII, a provision addressing the right of States parties to submit cases to the relevant bodies of the United Nations. Article VIII contemplates ‘acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III’, indicating that the words ‘acts of genocide’ refer to the five subparagraphs of article II and not to the ‘other acts’ defined in article III. The Security Council referred to ‘acts of genocide’ in Resolution 925, adopted on 8 June 1994 with respect to Rwanda, the first time in its history that it had used the word ‘genocide’ in a resolution. The General Assembly has also spoken of ‘acts of genocide’ in certain of its resolutions.23

Criminal acts, depending upon the definition of the crime, may require proof not only of the act itself, but also of a result. Put differently, the material element includes a result. Three of the five acts defined in article II of the Convention require proof of a result: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Two of the acts do not demand such proof, but require a further specific intent: deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; or imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. In the three cases where the outcome is an element of the offence, the accused may still be subject to prosecution for attempting to commit the crime even

if no result can be proven.24 Proof of a crime of result also requires evidence that the act itself is a ‘substantial cause’ of the outcome.25

The *actus reus* of an offence may be either an act of commission or an act of omission. This principle applies to all of the acts of genocide enumerated in article II, including killing.26 The most obvious act of genocide by omission is article II(c): ‘deliberately imposing conditions of life designed to destroy the group’.27 Manfred Lachs called it ‘negative violence’, observing how the Nazi authorities reduced the amount of food in occupied countries to 400 and even 250 calories a day.28 Robert Ley, the German Minister for Labour, who was charged at Nuremberg but committed suicide before judgment, stated: ‘A lower race needs less room, less clothing, less food, and less culture, than a higher race. The Germans cannot live in the same fashion as the Poles and the Jews.’29 But omission can also apply to the other paragraphs of article II, as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda noted in the *Kambanda* judgment:

Jean Kambanda acknowledges that on 3 May 1994, he was personally asked to take steps to protect children who had survived the massacre at a hospital and he did not respond. On the same day, after the meeting, the children were killed. He acknowledges that he failed in his duty to ensure the safety of the children and the population of Rwanda.30

24 Pursuant to art. III(d) of the Convention. Attempts are discussed in chapter 6, pp. 280–5 below.
26 In *Prosecutor v. Kambanda* (Case No. ICTR 97–23–S), Judgment and Sentence, 4 September 1998, para. 40(1), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found that the accused, ‘[b]y his acts or omissions described in . . . the indictment, [was] responsible for the killing of and the causing of serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Tutsi population with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic or racial group, as such, and has thereby committed GENOCIDE’. Subparagraphs (2)–(4) make the same finding with respect to conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and complicity to commit genocide. In the indictment of Drljaca and Kovacevic, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia alleged that the accused did, ‘by their acts and omissions, commit genocide’: *Prosecutor v. Kovacevic and Drljaca* (Case No. IT–97–24), Indictment, 13 March 1997, para 9. See also *Prosecutor v. Delalic et al.*, ibid., para. 424; Oscar M. Uhler, Henri Coursier et al., *Commentary, IV, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958, p. 597.
Moreover, the possibility that a commander or superior may be found guilty of genocide for failing to intervene when subordinates are actually carrying out acts of genocide, while not specifically contemplated by the Convention, is also clearly recognized in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals as well as in the Rome Statute. Nevertheless, troubled by the possibility that crimes of omission might not be adequately covered, Benjamin Whitaker proposed an amendment to article II: ‘In any of the above conduct, a conscious act or acts of advertent omission may be as culpable as an act of commission.’ The word ‘advertent’ clarifies the intentional aspect of the omission, although the proposed amendment is totally unnecessary for judges to give such an interpretation to article II.

**Killing**

The term ‘killing’ initially appeared in the 1946 Saudi Arabian proposal. The Secretariat draft divided the *actus reus* into three categories, the first entitled ‘causing the death of members of a group or injuring their health or physical integrity’. Its four subcategories included ‘group massacres or individual executions’. In the *Ad Hoc* Committee, China significantly simplified this provision. The Committee’s chair further reworked the text to contain two paragraphs dealing with physical genocide, and a third covering cultural genocide. The first form of physical genocide was ‘killing members thereof’. The concept was relatively uncontroversial, and, with the final wording changed to ‘[k]illing of members of the group’, it was adopted. The Sixth Committee agreed to ‘killing’ as the first form of genocide, after little discussion and without a vote.

A trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in *Akayesu* identified two material elements: the victim is dead; and the

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33 UN Doc. A/C.6/86: ‘Mass killing of all members of a group, people or nation.’

34 UN Doc. E/447.

35 UN Doc. E/AC.25/9: ‘1. Destroying totally or partially the physical existence of such group; 2. Subjecting such group to such conditions or measures as will cause the destruction, in whole or in part, of the physical existence of such group.’

36 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.12.

37 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13, p. 8 (five in favour, two against).
death resulted from an unlawful act or omission of the accused or a subordinate.\textsuperscript{38}

The reference to ‘members of the group’ as victims of the genocidal act in paragraph (a) of article II, as well as in the subsequent paragraphs, may suggest that the act itself must involve the killing of at least two members of the group.\textsuperscript{39} Such an interpretation seems a bit absurd, however, and from a grammatical standpoint, the phrase can just as easily apply to a single act of killing. The co-ordinator’s discussion paper, submitted at the conclusion of the February 1999 session of the Working Group on Elements of Crimes, following informal discussions with interested States, took the reference to ‘members of the group’ to mean ‘one or more persons of that group’.\textsuperscript{40} Clearly, the quantitative dimension, that genocide involves the intentional destruction of a group ‘in whole or in part’, belongs to the mental and not the material element, as explained in chapter 5.

Paragraph (a) of article II of the Convention specifies that the victim must be a member of the national, racial, ethnic or religious group that is the target of the genocide in question.\textsuperscript{41} In \textit{Akayesu}, the Trial Chamber considered whether murder of an individual who was not a member of the group, but who was killed within the context of genocide, could be considered an act of genocide under the Convention definition. The Tribunal was convinced of Akayesu’s presence and participation when Victim V was beaten with a stick and the butt of a rifle by a communal policeman called Mugenzi and by a member of the \textit{interahamwe} militia. The Chamber said that the act would have constituted genocide had Victim V been a Tutsi, but because Victim V was


\textsuperscript{39} This must be why the United States genocide legislation specifies that ‘the term “members” means the plural’: Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), S. 1851, S. 1093(4). Yet the United States delegation to the Preparatory Commission of the International Court took the view that acts of genocide apply to one or more members of a group: ‘Draft Elements of Crimes’, UN Doc. PCNICC/1988/DP.4, pp. 5–6.

\textsuperscript{40} This view is supported by the ongoing work of the Working Group on Elements of Crimes of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court. Following informal discussions with interested States, the co-ordinator proposed the following: ‘The accused knew or should have known that the conditions inflicted would destroy, in whole or in part, such group or that the conduct was part of similar conduct directed against that group’ (‘Discussion Paper Proposed by the Co-ordinator, Article 6: The Crime of Genocide’, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/RT.1).

\textsuperscript{41} Nothing prevents the offender from being a member of the targeted group, however: Whitaker, ‘Revised Report’, note 32 above, para. 31, p. 16.
Hutu, Akayesu could not be convicted of genocide for this particular act.42

Causing serious bodily or mental harm

The Secretariat draft included ‘mutilations and biological experiments imposed for other than curative purposes’ as a punishable act.43 What is now paragraph (b) did not really emerge until the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee. It was based on a French proposal: ‘Any act directed against the corporal integrity of members of the group.’44 Delegates to the Sixth Committee advanced similar alternatives. Belgium proposed ‘impairing physical integrity’.45 The Soviets favoured ‘the infliction of physical injury or pursuit of biological experiments’.46 The United Kingdom suggested ‘causing grievous bodily harm to members of the group’.47 India recommended that the United Kingdom replace the term ‘grievous’ with ‘serious’.48 The principle that the Convention punish serious acts of physical violence falling short of actual killing was affirmed without difficulty.

The concept of ‘mental harm’ was more troublesome for some delegates. China initiated an amendment reading ‘impairing the physical or mental health of members of the group’.49 It insisted on mentioning drug use as a method of perpetrating genocide,50 explaining this related to ‘crimes committed by Japan against Chinese people by promoting consumption of narcotics’.51 According to China, ‘Japan had committed

42 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 38 above, para. 710.
43 The United States proposed that the words ‘physical violence’ should be inserted before the words ‘mutilations and biological experiments’, that ‘mutilations and biological experiments’ be changed to ‘mutilations or biological experiments’, and that the words ‘imposed for other than curative purposes’ should be deleted: UN Doc. E/623.
44 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13, p. 12 (five in favour, one against, with one abstention).
47 UN Doc. A/C.6/222. Gerald Fitzmaurice explained that ‘grievous’ had a very precise meaning in English law; but said he would not press the point, because the idea of intention was made very clear in the first part of article II: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.81.
48 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.81 (Sundaram, India).
49 UN Doc. A/C.6/211. China was really recycling an idea it had promoted, unsuccessfully, before the Ad Hoc Committee. In the debate on cultural genocide, China had requested that the systematic distribution of narcotic drugs for the purposes of bringing about the physical debilitation of a human group be included in the list of measures or acts aimed against a national culture: UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, p. 9. An additional paragraph was not adopted, although China insisted on the inclusion of a statement in the final report of the Committee referring to Japan’s wartime construction of an opium extraction plant and the intention to commit genocide using narcotics: UN Doc. E/794, p. 6.
50 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.65 (Tsien Tai, China).
numerous acts of that kind of genocide against the Chinese population. If those acts were not as spectacular as Hitlerite killings in gas chambers, their effect had been no less destructive.\textsuperscript{52}

China’s amendment was defeated.\textsuperscript{53} The United States said it had voted in favour, believing that physical integrity also included mental integrity.\textsuperscript{54} But the United Kingdom considered that ‘to introduce into the convention the notion of impairment of mental health might give rise to some misunderstanding’.\textsuperscript{55} Nevertheless, India submitted a new amendment to add ‘or mental’ after the word ‘physical’.\textsuperscript{56} The United Kingdom argued that the idea had been defeated with the Chinese amendment, but India insisted, and its proposal was adopted.\textsuperscript{57}

The notion of acts that cause bodily harm is well known in domestic legal systems.\textsuperscript{58} It differs from assault, requiring proof that actual harm has resulted. Domestic laws often recognize degrees of assault causing bodily harm, distinguishing between harm in a general sense and harm of a serious or permanent nature. The Convention text does not specify that the harm caused be permanent, but it does use the adjective ‘serious’.

The District Court of Jerusalem, in its 12 December 1961 judgment in the \textit{Eichmann} case, stated that serious bodily and mental harm of members of a group could be caused ‘by the enslavement, starvation, deportation and persecution . . . and by their detention in ghettos, transit camps and concentration camps in conditions which were designed to cause their degradation, deprivation of their rights as human beings, and to suppress them and cause them inhumane suffering and torture’.\textsuperscript{59} In \textit{Akayesu}, the Rwanda Tribunal ruled the term ‘serious bodily or mental harm, without limiting itself thereto, to mean acts of torture, be they bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution’.\textsuperscript{60} Another Trial Chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal defined this as ‘harm that seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any serious injury to the external, internal organs or senses’.\textsuperscript{61} The Trial Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal likewise considered torture and inhuman or degrading treatment to fall within the provision’s

\textsuperscript{52} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.81 (Ti-tsun Li, China).
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. (seventeen in favour, ten against, with thirteen abstentions).
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid. (Maktos, United States).  \textsuperscript{55} Ibid. (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
\textsuperscript{56} UN Doc. A/C.6/244.
\textsuperscript{57} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.81 (fourteen in favour, ten against, with fourteen abstentions).
\textsuperscript{58} In submissions to the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court, the United States used the term ‘physical harm’: ‘Draft Elements of Crimes’, UN Doc. PCNICC/1988/DP.4.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{A-G Israel v. Eichmann} (1968) 36 ILR 5 (District Court, Jerusalem), p. 340.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Prosecutor v. Akayesu}, note 38 above, para. 503.
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana}, note 38 above, para. 109.
The physical element of the offence 161

These acts overlap, of course, with some of the material acts of crimes against humanity, as well as with well-known prohibitions set out in international human rights law.63

The International Law Commission has proposed a very demanding standard, requiring that: ‘The bodily harm or the mental harm inflicted on members of a group must be of such a serious nature as to threaten its destruction in whole or in part.’64 This interpretation goes beyond the plain words of the text, and is not supported by the travaux préparatoires. Indeed, it indicates a confusion between the mental element of the chapeau and the material element of paragraph (b).

Including ‘causing mental harm’ within acts of genocide was tendentious, and the scope of this act of genocide remains problematic. In the above-cited excerpt from the Akayesu judgment, the Tribunal explained that rape and sexual violence may constitute genocide on both a physical and a mental level.65 However, Nehemiah Robinson, in his important study of the Convention, wrote that mental harm ‘can be caused only by the use of narcotics’.66 Robinson obviously relied on China’s statements during the drafting. Interestingly, however, the Chinese amendment was defeated. It was India that proposed the final wording of the provision, without any particular reference to use of drugs. Robinson also cited Canadian diplomat Lester B. Pearson, during domestic parliamentary debates, saying that ‘mental harm’ could not mean anything but ‘physical injury to the mental faculties’ of the members of the group.67 Pearson said: ‘I therefore suggest to the House that the use of the words “mental harm” would and should be interpreted, as a measure of both our domestic and our international responsibilities, as meaning “physical injury to the mental faculties”.’68 Pearson’s views are unsupported by either the Convention text or the travaux. Consequently, Robinson’s interpretation of article II(b) is excessively narrow.

According to the Rwanda Tribunal, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group does not necessarily mean that the harm

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63 For example, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (1987) 1465 UNTS 85.
65 Note that Spain’s new Penal Code, art. 607, enacts an offence of genocide that includes sexual aggression as a punishable act: (1998) 1 YIHL, p. 504.
67 Ibid., p. 65, n. 32
68 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (Canada), 21 May 1952, p. 2442.
is permanent and irremediable. It seems well accepted that physical harm need not be permanent, but there is more controversy with respect to mental harm. When ratifying the Convention, the United States formulated the following ‘understanding’: ‘(2) That the term “mental harm” in article II(b) means permanent impairment of mental faculties through drugs, torture or similar techniques.’ Its domestic legislation is to the same effect. Professor Jordan Paust has criticized the ‘permanent impairment’ notion, pointing to the possibility of alleged terrorists or Nazi war criminals defending their actions with evidence that intense fear or anxiety produced in the primary victims was not intended to be ‘permanent’ but temporary. The Preparatory Committee of the International Criminal Court took a similar although far more moderate approach to the issue, indicating, in a footnote to its draft provision on genocide, that ‘[t]he reference to “mental harm” is understood to mean more than the minor or temporary impairment of mental faculties’. This makes sense, since such impairment of mental faculties would in any event fail to meet the threshold of seriousness required by article II(b). The Preparatory Committee’s definition was endorsed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Reflecting long-standing gender stereotypes, sexual crimes of violence directed against women have often been treated in national law from the standpoint of morality rather than as assaults on the physical and mental integrity of the victim. In *Akayesu*, the Trial Chamber affirmed that rape and other crimes of sexual violence may fall within the ambit of paragraph (b):


72 Jordan Paust, ‘Congress and Genocide: They’re Not Going to Get Away with It’, (1989) 11 *Michigan Journal of International Law*, p. 90 at p. 97. This seems to confound the *actus reus* and the *mens rea*. The Convention does not require that the offender intend to cause permanent harm; rather, this must be the result of the act accomplished by the offender, who must also intend to destroy the group in whole or in part.


74 *Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana*, note 38 above, para. 94.

The Chamber wishes to underscore the fact that in its opinion, they constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. Indeed, rape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on the victims and are even, according to the Chamber, one of the worst ways of inflict [sic] harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm. In light of all the evidence before it, the Chamber is satisfied that the acts of rape and sexual violence described above, were committed solely against Tutsi women, many of whom were subjected to the worst public humiliation, mutilated, and raped several times, often in public, in the Bureau Communal premises or in other public places, and often by more than one assailant. These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole. The rape of Tutsi women was systematic and was perpetrated against all Tutsi women and solely against them. A Tutsi woman, married to a Hutu, testified before the Chamber that she was not raped because her ethnic background was unknown. As part of the propaganda campaign geared to mobilizing the Hutu against the Tutsi, the Tutsi women were presented as sexual objects. Indeed, the Chamber was told, for example, that before being raped and killed, Alexia, who was the wife of the Professor, Ntere, and her two nieces, were forced by the Interahamwe to undress and ordered to run and do exercises ‘in order to display the thighs of Tutsi women’. The Interahamwe who raped Alexia said, as he threw her on the ground and got on top of her, ‘let us now see what the vagina of a Tutsi woman tastes like’. As stated above, Akayesu himself, speaking to the Interahamwe who were committing the rapes, said to them: ‘don’t ever ask again what a Tutsi woman tastes like’. This sexualized representation of ethnic identity graphically illustrates that Tutsi women were subjected to sexual violence because they were Tutsi. Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group – destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself. On the basis of the substantial testimonies brought before it, the Chamber finds that in most cases, the rapes of Tutsi women in Taba, were accompanied with the intent to kill those women. Many rapes were perpetrated near mass graves where the women were taken to be killed. A victim testified that Tutsi women caught could be taken away by peasants and men with the promise that they would be collected later to be executed. Following an act of gang rape, a witness heard Akayesu say ‘tomorrow they will be killed’ and they were actually killed. In this respect, it appears clearly to the Chamber that the acts of rape and sexual violence, as other acts of serious bodily and mental harm committed against the Tutsi, reflected the determination to make Tutsi women suffer and to mutilate them even before killing them, the intent being to destroy the Tutsi group while inflicting acute suffering on its members in the process. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber finds firstly that the acts described supra are indeed acts as enumerated in Article 2(2) of the Statute [corresponding to article II(b) of the Genocide Convention], which constitute the factual elements of the crime of genocide, namely the killings of
Tutsi or the serious bodily and mental harm inflicted on the Tutsi. The Chamber is further satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that these various acts were committed by Akayesu with the specific intent to destroy the Tutsi group, as such.\footnote{Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 38 above, para. 731.}


The recognition that sexual violence accords with serious bodily and mental harm is perhaps not revolutionary. Nevertheless, the historic trivialization of such crimes of violence directed principally against women impacted upon the prosecution of genocide as it did upon war crimes and crimes against humanity. The prosecutor did not include gender-based crimes in the initial indictment of Akayesu. It was only midway through the trial, after pressure from non-governmental organizations, that the indictment was amended.\footnote{Akayesu himself complained about this, saying the indictment had been amended because of pressure from the women’s movement and women in Rwanda, whom he described as ‘worked up to agree that they have been raped’. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 38 above, para. 447.}

The *Akayesu* case law on this point has already found a sympathetic ear in the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, where a discussion has asserted that ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ may include, but is not limited to, ‘acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment’. The paper also ‘recognized that rape and sexual violence may constitute genocide in the same way as any act, provided that the criteria of the crime of genocide are met’.\footnote{‘Discussion Paper Proposed by the Co-ordinator, Suggested Comments Relating to the Crime of Genocide’, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/RT.3.}

Yet while sexual violence and rape may in fact have the effect of contributing in a significant manner to the destruction of a group in whole or in part, this is not what the text of paragraph (b) requires. The prosecution need not demonstrate a cause and effect relationship between the acts of violence and the destruction of the group. The result
The physical element of the offence that the prosecution must prove is that one or more victims actually suffered physical or mental harm. If this act is perpetrated with the requisite mental element, the crime has been committed.

Deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy the group

The 1946 Saudi Arabian draft contained ‘[d]estruction of the essential potentialities of life of a group, people or nation, or the intentional deprivation of elementary necessities for the preservation of health or existence’. Under its heading physical genocide, the Secretariat draft presented two provisions addressing this issue: the subjection to conditions of life which, by lack of proper housing, clothing, food, hygiene and medical care, or excessive work or physical exertion, are likely to result in the debilitation or death of the individuals; and the deprivation of all means of livelihood, by confiscation of property, looting, curtailment of work, denial of housing and of supplies otherwise available to the other inhabitants of the territory concerned. Only the second category led to a significant comment in the explanatory report: ‘If a state systematically denies to members of a certain group the elementary means of existence enjoyed by other sections of the population, it condemns such persons to a wretched existence maintained by illicit or clandestine activities and public charity, and in fact condemns them to death at the end of a medium period instead of to a quick death in concentration camps; there is only a difference of degree.’

In the Ad Hoc Committee, China’s proposal noted that the actus reus of genocide should include not only destruction of the physical existence of the group but also ‘subjecting such group to such conditions or measures as will cause the destruction, in whole or in part, of the physical existence of such group’. The Soviet ‘Basic Principles’ like-

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80 But see M. Cherif Bassiouni and Peter Manikas, *The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1996, pp. 587–8, arguing that sexual violence may cause destruction of a group through ‘deliberate emotional destruction of a vital part of that group’. Women are the caretakers of society, and if they become dysfunctional, the survival of the society is threatened, according to Bassiouni.

81 UN Doc. A/C.6/86.

82 The United States attempted to improve on the wording: ‘Subjection to conditions of life wherein, by lack of proper housing, clothing, food, hygiene and medical care, or excessive work or physical exertion the individuals are doomed to weaken or die’ (UN Doc. E/623).

83 The United States proposed deletion of the word ‘all’ which it said seemed to narrow unduly the crime: UN Doc. E/623.

84 UN Doc. E/447, p. 25.

85 UN Doc. E/AC.25/9.
wise urged that ‘[t]he concept of physical destruction must embrace not only cases of direct murder of particular groups of the population for the above-mentioned reasons, but also the premeditated infliction on such groups of conditions of life aimed at the destruction of the group in question’.

The United States and the Soviet Union submitted revisions of the Chinese text on this point. In general, the idea received support within the Ad Hoc Committee. As France explained, ‘[t]o quote an historical example, the ghetto, where the Jews were confined in conditions which, either by starvation or by illness accompanied by the absence of medical care, led to their extinction, must certainly be regarded as an instrument of genocide. If any group were placed on rations so short as to make its extinction inevitable, merely because it belonged to a certain nationality, race or religion, the fact would also come under the category of genocidal crime.’ The Soviet proposal, reworked by Venezuela, was adopted: ‘Inflicting on the members of the group such measures or conditions of life which would be aimed to cause their deaths.’ Debate on the provision in the Sixth Committee addressed the mental element of the act, and is considered in chapter 5.

The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has proposed the following interpretation of the provision:

The Chamber holds that the expression deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, should be construed as the methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction. For purposes of interpreting Article 2(2)(c) of the Statute [and article II(c) of the Convention], the Chamber is of the opinion that the means of deliberate inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, in whole or part, include, inter alia, subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical services below minimum requirement.

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86 UN Doc. E/AC.25/7, Principle II.
87 The United States proposal, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13, p. 12, said: ‘Subjecting members of a group to such conditions or measures as will cause their deaths or prevent the procreation of the group.’ The Soviet Union proposal, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13, p. 12, said: ‘The premeditated infliction on those groups of such conditions of life which will be aimed at destroying totally or partially their physical existence.’ Platon Morozov subsequently agreed to withdraw the word ‘premeditated’ and to insert the words ‘measures or’ before the words ‘conditions of life’.
88 See also UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, p. 14 (Ordonneau); ibid., pp. 15–16 (Rudzinski).
89 Ibid., p. 14 (four in favour, one against, with three abstentions).
91 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 38 above, para. 505. See also Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, note 69 above.
The physical element of the offence

The examples provided by the Tribunal appear to be drawn from Nehemiah Robinson’s commentary on the Convention:92

It is impossible to enumerate in advance the ‘conditions of life’ that would come within the prohibition of Article II; the intent and probability of the final aim alone can determine in each separate case whether an act of Genocide has been committed (or attempted) or not. Instances of Genocide that could come under subparagraph (c) are such as placing a group of people on a subsistence diet, reducing required medical services below a minimum, withholding sufficient living accommodations, etc., provided that these restrictions are imposed with intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.93

In Kayishema and Ruzindana, the Rwanda Tribunal said the conditions of life include ‘rape, the starving of a group of people, reducing required medical services below a minimum, and withholding sufficient living accommodation for a reasonable period, provided the above would lead to the destruction of the group in whole or in part’.94

Unlike the crimes defined in paragraphs (a) and (b), the offence of deliberately imposing conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s destruction does not require proof of a result.95 The conditions of life must be calculated to bring about the destruction, but whether or not they succeed, even in part, is immaterial. If a result is achieved, then the proper charge will be paragraphs (a) or (b). This important distinction was made by the District Court of Jerusalem in the Eichmann case. Eichmann was charged with imposing living conditions upon Jews calculated to bring about their physical extermination. In the view of the District Court of Jerusalem, such an accusation was only applicable to the persecution of Jews who had survived the Holocaust: ‘We do not think that conviction on the second Count [i.e., imposing living conditions calculated to bring about the destruction] should also include those Jews who were not saved, as if in their case there were two separate acts – first, subjection to living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction, and later the physical destruction itself.’96

92 Robinson, Genocide Convention, p. 64.
95 Nevertheless, in its ‘Draft Elements of Crimes’ paper submitted to the Preparatory Conference of the International Criminal Court, the United States suggested that the prosecution establish that ‘the conditions of life contributed to the physical destruction of that group’: ‘Draft Elements of Crimes’, UN Doc. PCNICC/1988/DP.4, p. 7. The United States view is surely an error, as was pointed out by delegates during the general debate on 17 February 1999, and in a paper submitted by Colombia: ‘Proposal Submitted by Colombia’, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.2, p. 2.
The treatment of the Armenians by the Turkish rulers in 1915 provides the paradigm for the provision dealing with imposition of conditions of life.\(^97\) These crimes have often been described as ‘deportations’. But they went far beyond mere expulsion or transfer, because the deportation itself involved deprivation of fundamental human needs with the result that large numbers died of disease, malnutrition and exhaustion. When the International Law Commission considered adding ‘deportation’ to the list of acts of genocide, Juri Barsegov explained that in 1948 the General Assembly was unaware ‘of many existing precedents in which whole populations had been destroyed by depriving them of their means of subsistence, such as soil and water, or forcing them to emigrate’.\(^98\) He argued that ‘deportation’ of populations should be considered an act of genocide.\(^99\) However, the Commission concluded an amendment was unnecessary, the situation being adequately covered by the text of paragraph (c) as it stands, to the extent a deportation occurred with the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.\(^100\) The Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court did not refer to deportation, but mentioned ‘systematic expulsion from homes’ as a possible element in the definition of article II(c).\(^101\)

The Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification that concluded genocide had been committed against the Mayan people by the army in 1981–3 noted practices which included the razing of villages, the destruction of property, including collectively worked fields, and the burning of harvests. These left the communities without food. In the


opinion of the Commission, this amounted to infliction of conditions of life ‘that could bring about, and in several cases did bring about, its physical destruction in whole or in part’.\textsuperscript{102} The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has declared admissible a petition alleging genocide in Guatemala in 1982.\textsuperscript{103}

Yugoslavia based its charges of genocide, which were directed against several NATO States in a May 1999 application to the International Court of Justice, upon article III(c). In its oral argument in an application for provisional measures, the Yugoslav agent said:

Continued bombing of the whole territory of the State, pollution of soil, air and water, destroying the economy of the country, contaminating the environment with depleted uranium inflicts conditions of life on the Yugoslav nation calculated to bring about its physical destruction.

The Respondents have used weapons containing depleted uranium. The Institute for Nuclear Science, based in Belgrade, confirmed this fact (Ann. 7). The Army Environmental Policy Institute tasked by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army Installations, Logistic and Environment of the USA has produced the technical report on health and environmental consequences of depleted uranium use in the US Army. Commenting on the health risk from radiation, the Report informed: ‘Internalized DU [depleted uranium] delivers radiation wherever it migrates in the body. Within the body, alfa radiation is the most important contributor to the radiation hazard posed by DU. The radiation dose to critical body organs depends on the amount of time that DU resides in the organs. When this value is known or estimated, cancer and hereditary risk estimates can be determined.’ (Health and Environmental; Consequences of Depleted Uranium Use in the US Army: Technical Report, p. 108, Ann. 8)

It is well known that the radiation hazard materialized in the case of a large number of US soldiers participating in actions against Iraq. Serious health and environmental consequences have been detected in areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina exposed to effects of weapons containing depleted uranium. Far-reaching health and environmental damage is a matter of certain pre-knowledge of the Respondents, and that implies the intent to destroy a national group as such in whole or in part.\textsuperscript{104}

Subsequently, Ian Brownlie, counsel to Yugoslavia, proposed a six-point list of evidence to support the claim that article II(c) had been breached: the large number of civilian deaths and the resulting knowledge of the risk of death; the high explosive power of the missiles and the widespread


\textsuperscript{104} Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium et al.), Verbatim Record, 10 May 1999 (Rodoljub Etinski).
effects of blast; the incendiary element in the weapons and the knowledge that some victims are quite commonly burnt to death; the general disruption of patterns of life; the extensive damage to the health care system and the deliberate creation of risks to patients by causing power cuts.\(^{105}\) The argument is fine from a theoretical basis, in that far-reaching health and environmental damage might well constitute an act calculated to destroy a group in whole or in part. It is, however, virtually impossible to distinguish acts of warfare in a general sense from these charges of genocide, and it was surely not the intent of the Convention’s drafters to include this within the scope of the definition. The most serious difficulty with the Yugoslav case on this point was establishing a genocidal intent, as several of the respondent States insisted during their oral arguments.\(^{106}\) As the agent for Canada pointed out, the Yugoslav approach to genocide amounted to the assertion that ‘any use of force and any act of war is automatically equated with genocide’.\(^{107}\) In his response, Professor Brownlie did not answer the challenges from the NATO States to provide evidence of genocidal intent.\(^{108}\)

Cherif Bassiouni has argued that rape and sexual assault may be deliberately used to create conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of the group, noting that Islamic law provides that women who have sexual relations outside of marriage are not marriageable. He has explained that ‘targeting Muslim women for rape and sexual assault in order to effectively separate Bosnian Muslim women from Bosnian Muslim men may create a condition of life calculated to bring about the group’s destruction’.\(^{109}\)

Although it is possible for all five acts of genocide to be committed by omission, the concept applies most clearly to paragraph (c). Because of the specific intent requirement in the first paragraph of article II, not to mention the requirement in the subparagraph that the conditions be ‘calculated’, the omission cannot be one of simple negligence. The examples given by the Rwanda Tribunal and by Nehemiah Robinson, namely placing a group of people on a subsistence diet, reducing

\(^{105}\) Ibid., 12 May 1999 (Ian Brownlie).

\(^{106}\) Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. the Netherlands), Verbatim Record, 11 May 1999, para. 29 (J. G. Lammers); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Portugal), Verbatim Record, 11 May 1999, para. 2.1.2.2.2 (José Maria Teixeira Leite Martins); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom), Verbatim Record, 11 May 1999, para. 20 (John Morris).

\(^{107}\) Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Canada), Verbatim Record, 10 May 1999 (Philippe Kirsch).

\(^{108}\) Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium et al.), Verbatim Record, 12 May 1999 (Ian Brownlie).

\(^{109}\) Bassiouni and Manikas, International Criminal Tribunal, p. 587. For similar comments, see Fisher, ‘Occupation’, p. 123.
required medical services below a minimum and withholding sufficient living accommodations, are all to a certain extent acts of omission. As a general rule, domestic criminal law takes the position that intentional acts of omission are criminal in nature where there is a positive duty to act.\textsuperscript{110} Such a positive duty is stronger in penal codes of the Napoleonic tradition, which usually require an individual to intervene where the life of another is in danger,\textsuperscript{111} than in the common law, where positive duties to act are considerably rarer.\textsuperscript{112} A positive duty to act to prevent genocide is imposed upon military and civilian superiors by the superior responsibility provisions of the Rome Statute.\textsuperscript{113} They may be held liable before the International Criminal Court for their failure to exercise control properly if their subordinates have committed genocide.

Nevertheless, in the case of genocide, an approach to crimes of omission that relies on the existence of a positive duty may unduly limit the scope of the Convention. It is difficult to establish the extent of the obligation of a State, or for that matter of an individual, in terms of assuring adequate nutrition, medical care and housing. International human rights law has made promising inroads in the protection of economic and social rights, and its norms may provide helpful guidance here.\textsuperscript{114} Where genocide is committed by the omission to provide necessities of life, in a manner calculated to destroy the group in whole or in part, this omission will probably be apparent not by some abstract standard of a vital minimum but because it is discriminatory \textit{vis-à-vis} other groups.\textsuperscript{115}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{110} \textit{Prosecutor v. Delalic et al.}, note 25 above, para. 334.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} \textit{R. v. Miller} [1983] 1 All ER 978, [1983] AC 161 (HL).
  \item \textsuperscript{113} ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 31 above, art. 28.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} In the \textit{Ministries case}, the court agreed the defendant’s department had issued decrees depriving Jews of special food rations allowed to other German citizens. However, the prosecution conceded that they were not ‘so severe or their effects so harsh as to cause sickness or exposure to sickness and death’. The accused were exonerated on charges of crimes against humanity for such acts: \textit{United States of America v. von Weizsaecker et al.} (‘Ministries case’), (1948) 14 TWC 314 (United States Military Tribunal), pp. 557–8.
\end{itemize}
Imposing measures intended to prevent births

In the Secretariat draft, biological genocide was addressed under the heading ‘restricting births’, a rubric which contained three subcategories: sterilization and/or compulsory abortion; segregation of the sexes; and obstacles to marriage. The explanatory report noted segregation of the sexes could ‘be induced by various causes such as compulsory residence in remote places, or the systematic allocation of work to men and women in different localities’. In comments on the draft, Siam (Thailand) proposed adding the phrase ‘including racial prohibition’ to the third subcategory, ‘obstacles to marriage’, observing that ‘at the present time, there exist certain racial groups with less female in number than male and the prohibition of their marriage with persons belonging to other racial groups may result in their gradual extinction’.

China’s draft for the Ad Hoc Committee removed all reference to forms of biological genocide, that is, to restriction of births. Proposals from the United States and the Soviet Union also omitted the concept. The Soviet Union said the Committee needed first to decide whether genocide encompassed biological and cultural destruction, as well as physical acts. But, after brief discussion, it agreed to modify the Soviet ‘principles’ to include ‘restriction of births by means including among others, sterilization and compulsory abortion’. The Ad Hoc Committee eventually adopted an additional paragraph dealing with restrictions on births, proposed by Lebanon: ‘Any act or measure calculated to prevent births within the group.’

The Sixth Committee perfunctorily adopted the phrase ‘imposing measures intended to prevent births’. A Soviet variant, ‘the prevention of births by means of sterilization and enforced abortion’, was rejected following no real debate.

The Nazi atrocities remained very fresh in the minds of the drafters of article II(d), introduced largely to deal with the revelations of the post-war trials. The Supreme National Tribunal of Poland found the director of

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116 The United States proposed that the heading be changed to ‘Compulsory restriction of births’: UN Doc. E/623.
117 Norway made the interesting observation that, in distinction to the other crimes listed in the Convention, creation of obstacles to marriage was a crime that could only be committed by organs of a State and not by individuals: UN Doc. E/623/Add.2.
119 UN Doc. E/623/Add.4.
120 UN Doc. E/AC.25/9.
121 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.12, p. 2.
122 Ibid., p. 3.
123 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, p. 5.
124 Ibid., p. 13.
125 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13, p. 14 (by four votes with three abstentions).
126 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.82.
128 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.82 (thirty votes in favour, five against, with seven abstentions).
of the Auschwitz camp responsible for sterilization and castration, qualifying these acts as a form of genocide.\textsuperscript{129} Similarly, a United States Military Tribunal condemned Ulrich Greifelt and his associates for sterilization and other measures aimed at restricting births, acts that it also described as genocide.\textsuperscript{130} But the scope of article III(d) is not confined to acts analogous to those committed by the Nazis. Nehemiah Robinson, in his commentary on the Convention, remarked that: ‘The measure imposed need not be the classic action of sterilization; separation of the sexes, prohibition of marriages and the like are measures equally restrictive and produce the same results.’\textsuperscript{131}

Article II(d) of the Convention does not make a result a material element of the offence. The \textit{actus reus} consists of the imposition of the measures; it need not be proven that they have actually succeeded. Nevertheless, in its proposed ‘Elements of Crimes’ for the Rome Statute, the United States suggested that the prosecution must establish that ‘the measures imposed had the effect of preventing births within that group’.\textsuperscript{132} The ‘Elements’ are intended to facilitate the interpretation of the text, not to change the definition of the offence. Pursuant to article 9(3) of the \textit{Statute}, the Court could disregard such a provision, if it is ever included in the final version of the ‘Elements’, as being incompatible with the \textit{Statute} itself.\textsuperscript{133}

In recent years, attention has focused on rape as a war crime or a crime against humanity. That rape and sexual assault are covered by paragraph (b)\textsuperscript{134} cannot be questioned, and there are also compelling arguments for considering these crimes in the context of paragraph (c).\textsuperscript{135} Can it moreover be argued that rape and sexual assault are forms of biological genocide akin to other techniques for ‘restricting births’ within the group? Testifying before the Yugoslavia Tribunal, Christine Cleirin, a member of the Commission of Experts established in 1992 by the Security Council, was asked if rape had been used systematically to change the ethnic character of the population by impregnating women. She answered: ‘The Commission did not have enough information to

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Poland v. Hoess}, (1948) 7 LRTWC 11 (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland), p. 25.
\textsuperscript{130} \textit{United States v. Greifelt et al.}, (1948) 13 LRTWC 1 (United States Military Tribunal), p. 17.
\textsuperscript{132} UN Doc. PCNICC/1988/DP.4, p. 8. The United States proposal also added the requirement that the imposition be accomplished ‘forcibly’, which seems to be totally redundant. The United States position was criticized on these grounds: ‘Proposal Submitted by Colombia’, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.2, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{133} ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 31 above.
\textsuperscript{134} See pp. 162–5 above. \textsuperscript{135} See p. 170 above.
verify, let us say, these testimonies, who spoke in these terms. I guess it is possible that both happened.\textsuperscript{136} Based on this and other testimony, the Trial Chamber concluded that: ‘The systematic rape of women . . . is in some cases intended to transmit a new ethnic identity to the child.’\textsuperscript{137}

The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in \textit{Akayesu}, considered that rape could be subsumed within paragraph (d) of the definition of genocide:

For purposes of interpreting Article 2(2)(d) of the Statute [and article II(d) of the Convention], the Chamber holds that the measures intended to prevent births within the group, should be construed as sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages. In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother’s group. Furthermore, the Chamber notes that measures intended to prevent births within the group may be physical, but can also be mental. For instance, rape can be a measure intended to prevent births when the person raped refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way that members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma, not to procreate.\textsuperscript{138}

Such views may seem exaggerated, because it is unrealistic and perhaps absurd to believe that a group can be destroyed in whole or in part by rape and similar crimes. But this is not what the Convention provision demands. In contrast with paragraph (c), paragraph (d) does not require that the measures to restrict births be ‘calculated’ to bring about the destruction of the group in whole or in part, only that they be intended to prevent births within the group. Such measures can be merely ancillary to a genocidal plan or programme, as it was, for example, in the case of the Nazis. Adolph Eichmann was tried on a charge of ‘devising measures intended to prevent child-bearing among the Jews’. The court said it did not regard the prevention of child-bearing as an explicit part of the ‘final solution’, concluding Eichmann’s involvement in ‘imposing measures’ had not been proven.\textsuperscript{139} Nevertheless, he was convicted for devising ‘measures the purpose of which


\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Prosecutor} \textit{v. Karadzic and Mladic}, note 62 above, para. 94.


\textsuperscript{139} \textit{A-G Israel} \textit{v. Eichmann}, note 59 above, para. 199.
was to prevent child-bearing among Jews by his instruction forbidding births and for the interruption of pregnancy of Jewish women in the Theresin Ghetto with intent to exterminate the Jewish people’.140

Forcibly transferring children

Paragraph (e), ‘[f]orcibly transferring children of the group to another group’, was added to the Convention almost as an afterthought, with little substantive debate or consideration. The provision is enigmatic, because the drafters clearly rejected the concept of cultural genocide. The International Law Commission treated paragraph (e) as ‘biological genocide’.141 But the idea for such a provision originated in the Secretariat draft, which quite logically proposed that ‘forcible transfer of children to another human group’ be considered as an act of cultural genocide. The three experts consulted by the Secretariat differed on the issue of cultural genocide but, exceptionally, agreed on including ‘forced transfer of children . . . ’ as a punishable act.142 Subsequently, it disappeared from the Ad Hoc Committee’s compromise text.143 In the Sixth Committee, after the notion of cultural genocide had been definitively rejected, Greece proposed adding ‘[f]orced transfer of children to another human group’ to the list of punishable acts.144 Greece noted that States opposed to cultural genocide did not necessarily contest ‘forced transfer’.145

Manfred Lachs of Poland was uncomfortable with the Greek text: ‘The transfers carried out by the Germans during the Second World War were certainly to be condemned, but the word “transfer” could also be applied to the evacuation of children from a theatre of war.’146 Platon Morozov maintained that ‘no one had been able to quote any historical case of the destruction of a group through the transfer of children’.147 But, despite the concerns of several delegates, and an unsuccessful attempt at postponement, the Greek amendment was adopted.148

140 Ibid., para. 244.
142 UN Doc. E/447, p. 27. The same view was taken by the United States in its comments on the draft: UN Doc. E/623. The World Jewish Congress, in submissions to the Secretary-General, urged that the Convention ‘should specifically outlaw the systematic practice of forcibly separating children from their parents and bringing them up in a culture different from that of their parents’: UN Doc. E/C.2/52.
145 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.82 (Vallindas, Greece).
146 Ibid. (Lachs, Poland). 147 Ibid. (Morozov, Soviet Union).
148 Ibid. (twenty in favour, thirteen against, with thirteen abstentions). Siam, Haiti, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia made statements.
According to the International Law Commission, ‘[t]he forcible transfer of children would have particularly serious consequences for the future viability of a group as such’. Like the acts of genocide defined in paragraphs (a) and (b), paragraph (e) requires proof of a result, namely that children be transferred from the victim group to another group. But in *Akayesu*, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda suggested that this went further, covering threats of such transfer: ‘as in the case of measures intended to prevent births, the objective is not only to sanction a direct act of forcible physical transfer, but also to sanction acts of threats or trauma which would lead to the forcible transfer of children from one group to another.’

The Convention does not specify what is meant by ‘children’, and the question was not addressed by the drafters. The authoritative international precedent is the Convention on the Rights of the Child, defining a child as anyone under eighteen. The United States genocide law declares that for the purposes of the crime of genocide, children are under eighteen. Israel’s genocide legislation offers the same definition. The Working Group on Elements of Crimes of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court also appears to favour the age of eighteen. But, although not stated in the Convention, the genocidal act of transferring children only makes sense with relatively young children, and eighteen years must be too high a threshold. Presumably, when children are transferred from one group to another, their cultural identity may be lost. They will be raised within another group, speaking its language, participating in its culture, and practising its religion. But older children are unlikely to lose their cultural identity by such transfer.

The difficulty of applying forcible transfer to older children becomes even more obvious in the case of adults. From a legal standpoint, while children may be considered to belong to their parents, the principle is

\[\text{footnotes}\]


150 *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, note 38 above, para. 505. See also *Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana*, note 38 above, para. 118.


153 Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, note 39 above, s. 1093(1). In the ‘Draft Elements of Crimes’ that the United States submitted to the first session of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, the age had dropped to fifteen: UN Doc. PCNICC/1988/DP.4, p. 8.


The physical element of the offence

completely inapplicable to adults. There is nobody from whom to be forcibly transferred. Of course, article II(e) does not apply to adults, but some States have taken the position that this is a lacuna in the Convention. For example, the genocide provision in Bolivia’s Penal Code refers to transfer of both children and adults. Paraguay made a similar submission to the International Law Commission with respect to the genocide provision of the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, although it received little serious support. Nevertheless, in its report the Commission stated: ‘Although the present article does not extend to the transfer of adults, this type of conduct in certain circumstances could constitute a crime against humanity . . . or a war crime . . . Moreover, the forcible transfer of members of a group, particularly when it involves the separation of family members, could also constitute genocide under subparagraph (c) [inflicting conditions of life, etc.].’

In its draft ‘Elements of Crimes’ paper submitted to the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court, the United States approached the issue of transfer as being ‘from that person’s or those persons’ lawful residence’. Amnesty International criticized this new gloss on the Convention, noting that: ‘Any such requirement would not only be contrary to the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, but also exclude transfers of children born in prison or in concentration camps and children whose parents were not in a location which was considered lawful, such as immigrants whose papers were not in order or persons who were evicted from housing for non-payment of rent.’

The term ‘forcible’ was also considered by the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court in the context of drafting the ‘Elements of Crimes’. The co-ordinator’s discussion paper said that the term ‘forcible’ is ‘not restricted to direct acts of physical force and may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, threats or intimidation’.

156 Penal Code (Bolivia), 23 August 1972, Chapter IV, art. 138.
162 ‘Discussion Paper Proposed by the Co-ordinator, Suggested Comments Relating to
During the drafting, the Soviet delegate challenged the Sixth Committee to provide an historical example of genocide committed by transfer of children. There was no response, but delegates might have referred to the Nuremberg judgment. There, Nazi leader Heinrich Himmler was proven to have said:

What happens to a Russian, a Czech, does not interest me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way of good blood of our type, we will take. If necessary, by kidnapping their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our Kultur, otherwise it is of no interest to me.\textsuperscript{163}

These were, apparently, only threats. But there have been recent accusations concerning aboriginal children in Australia. In 1997, the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission concluded that the Australian practice of forcible transfer of indigenous children to non-indigenous institutions and families violated article II(e) of the Genocide Convention.\textsuperscript{164} According to its report: ‘The Inquiry’s process of consultation and research has revealed that the predominant aim of Indigenous child removals was the absorption or assimilation of the children into the wider, non-Indigenous, community so that their unique cultural values and ethnic identities would disappear, giving way to models of Western culture . . . Removal of children with this objective in mind is genocidal because it aims to destroy the “cultural unit” which the Convention is concerned to preserve.’\textsuperscript{165}

\textbf{Acts of genocide not punishable under the Convention}

Raphael Lemkin described a broad range of acts that might be carried out in the course of commission of genocide, as a frenzied racist regime endeavoured to destroy a group’s political, economic, linguistic and cultural existence. The Convention’s drafters were more conservative, deliberately excluding what is known as cultural genocide, as well as forced expulsion from the group’s homeland, an act known more recently as ‘ethnic cleansing’. The destruction of political institutions, including partition, dismemberment or annexation of a sovereign State,
is also excluded from the Convention, as the International Court of Justice noted in its ruling of 13 September 1993.166

_Cultural genocide_

Axis Rule in Occupied Europe attached great attention to the cultural aspects of genocide.167 Destruction of a people often began with a vicious assault on culture, particular language, religious and cultural monuments and institutions. During the post-war trials, attention had focused on the cultural aspects of the Nazi genocide. In the RuSHA case, the defendants were charged with participation in a ‘systematic program of genocide’ that included ‘limitation and suppression of national characteristics’.168 Evidence revealed that Greifelt and his accomplices carried out ‘Germanization’ orders from Himmler.169 In another post-war decision, Artur Greiser was found guilty of ‘genocidal attacks on Polish culture and learning’.170 Amon Leopold Goeth was convicted of ‘[t]he wholesale extermination of Jews and also of Poles [which] had all the characteristics of genocide in the biological meaning of this term, and embraced in addition destruction of the cultural life of these nations’.171 The Secretariat draft divided acts of genocide into three categories, of which the third, entitled ‘destroying the specific characteristics of the group’, dealt with the crime’s cultural manifestations. There were five subcategories: the forcible transfer of children to another human group; forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group; the prohibition of the use of the national language even in private intercourse; the systematic destruction of books printed in the national language or of religious works or prohibition of new publications; systematic destruction of historical or religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses; and the destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic or religious value and of objects used in religious worship.

Two of the three experts consulted by the Secretariat opposed inclu-

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167 Lemkin, Axis Rule, pp. 84–5.
168 United States of America v. Greifelt et al., note 129 above, pp. 36–42.
169 Ibid., p. 12.
170 Poland v. Greiser, (1948) 13 LRTWC 70 (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland), pp. 112–14; see also ibid., pp. 71–4 and 105.
171 Poland v. Goeth, (1946) 7 LRTWC 4 (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland).
sion of cultural genocide, with the exception of ‘forced transfer of children’. Otherwise, Donnedieu de Vabres and Pella believed cultural genocide unduly extended genocide, reconstituting the former protection of national minorities which they said was based on other conceptions. This argument emerged as a theme in the debate on cultural genocide. In these initial exchanges, for example, it was maintained that forced assimilation did not constitute genocide, and that ‘[t]he system of protection of minorities should provide for the protection of minorities against a policy of forced assimilation employing relatively moderate methods’. Nevertheless, Lemkin felt strongly that cultural genocide should be included, and his arguments were compelling. He insisted that a racial, national or religious group cannot continue to exist unless it preserves its spiritual and moral unity.

The United States and France supported the majority of the three experts in excluding acts of cultural genocide. The United States insisted on confining the convention ‘to those barbarous acts directed against individuals which form the basic concept of public opinion on this subject. The acts provided for in these paragraphs are acts which should appropriately be dealt with in connection with the protection of minorities.’ France maintained the definition should be ‘[l]imited to physical and biological genocide, for to include cultural genocide invites the risk of political interference in the domestic affairs of States, and in respect of questions which, in fact, are connected with the protection of minorities’. Similarly, the Netherlands said this was ‘a human rights issue’.

Siam favoured retaining cultural genocide, and made suggestions aimed at improving the text. So did the Soviet Union, which insisted upon the point in its ‘Principles’. While conceding that genocide ‘essentially connotes the physical destruction of groups’, the Soviet Union argued for coverage of measures and actions aimed against the use of the national language or national culture. It called this ‘national-cultural genocide’, giving as examples the prohibition or restriction of the use of the national tongue in both public and private life, the destruction or prohibition of the printing and circulation of books and other printed matter in the national tongues, and the destruction of historical or religious monuments, museums, documents, libraries and

172 UN Doc. E/447, p. 27.  
173 Ibid.  
174 Ibid., pp. 24 and 27.  
175 Ibid., p. 27.  
176 UN Doc. E/623. The United States also wanted to eliminate wording from the preamble that addressed the issue of cultural genocide. The Secretariat draft included ‘by depriving it of the cultural and other contributions of the group so destroyed’.  
177 UN Doc. A/401/Add.3.  
178 UN Doc. E/623/Add.3.  
179 UN Doc. E/623/Add.4.
other monuments and objects of national culture or of religious worship.\textsuperscript{180}

Early in its work, the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee decided, by six votes to one, to recognize the principle of the prohibition of cultural genocide.\textsuperscript{181} The United States was the dissenting voice: ‘The decision to make genocide a new international crime was extremely serious, and the United States believed that the crime should be limited to barbarous acts committed against individuals, which, in the eyes of the public, constituted the basic concept of genocide.’\textsuperscript{182} John Maktos, head of the United States delegation and chair of the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee, reminded the Committee that the General Assembly resolution had been inspired by the systematic massacre of Jews by Nazi authorities during the Second World War. ‘Were the Committee to attempt to cover too wide a field in the preparation of a draft convention for example, in attempting to define cultural genocide – however reprehensible that crime might be – it might well run the risk to find that some States would refuse to ratify the convention.’\textsuperscript{183} France, while not so openly hostile to the notion, said initially that it ‘would adopt a waiting attitude, for, above all, it was necessary to succeed in drafting a convention condemning physical genocide’.\textsuperscript{184}

In the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee debates, Maktos suggested placing cultural genocide in a separate article, so as to ‘enable Governments to make reservations on a particular point of the Convention’.\textsuperscript{185} But the Soviet Union said ‘a Convention constituted a whole which could only be ratified or rejected in its entirety’.\textsuperscript{186} Although agreeing with the Soviet delegate, France said it would be useful to put cultural genocide in a separate article to avoid confusion, as the crimes were rather distinct.\textsuperscript{187} The Committee decided to insert the notion of cultural genocide in a separate provision.\textsuperscript{188}

France expressed concern about the possibility that the problem really fell within the scope of the protection of minorities.\textsuperscript{189} The United States also argued that the matter was one of defence of national minorities, especially in time of armed conflict, and on that account it should be included in the conventions regarding war.\textsuperscript{190} Even the Soviets seemed alive to the problem, insisting upon the term ‘national-cultural’ rather than simply ‘cultural’, ‘as the crime had to be considered

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} UN Doc. E/AC.25/7.
\item \textsuperscript{181} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, p. 8. The negative vote presumably was the United States.
\item \textsuperscript{182} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.14, p. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{183} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{184} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{185} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.10, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{186} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{187} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 8.
\item \textsuperscript{188} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 12 (three in favour, one against, with two abstentions).
\item \textsuperscript{189} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.14, pp. 8–9.
\item \textsuperscript{190} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, p. 3.
\end{itemize}
only from a national standpoint’; otherwise, this might concern individual members of a national minority and should be dealt with not by the convention but by the international bill of rights. 191 Lebanon claimed that General Assembly Resolution 96(I) ‘made it a duty for the Committee to mention cultural genocide’, although what it meant by this is unclear, because there is no particular reference to cultural genocide in the resolution. 192 The only relevant allusion in the 1946 resolution was in the first preambular paragraph, which deplored the fact that genocide ‘results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups’. 193

A committee, made up of China, Lebanon, Poland, the Soviet Union and Venezuela, all of whom had been openly favourable to the concept of cultural rights, prepared a new draft:

In this convention, genocide also means any of the following deliberate acts committed with the intention of destroying the language or culture of a national, racial or religious group on grounds of national or racial origin or religious belief:

(1) prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, or prohibiting the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group;
(2) destroying, or preventing the use of, the libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the group. 194

Lebanon suggested adding the words ‘such as’ at the end of the first paragraph so that the enumeration would be indicative and not exhaustive. Lebanon also proposed a third paragraph: ‘(3) subjecting members of a group to such conditions as would cause them to renounce their language, religion or culture.’ With these amendments, the article was adopted, by five votes to two (the United States and France). 195

The Sixth Committee reversed the Ad Hoc Committee’s decision to include cultural genocide as a punishable act of genocide. France launched the battle, proposing the matter be referred to the Third Committee, which would ensure ‘the protection of language, religion

191 Ibid., p. 2. 192 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, p. 6. 193 GA Res. 96(I). 194 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.14, p. 13. 195 Ibid., p. 14. The final Ad Hoc Committee text said: ‘In this Convention genocide also means any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a national, racial or religious group on grounds of the national or racial origin or religious belief of its members such as: 1. prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group; 2. destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the group.’
and culture within the framework of the international declaration on human rights’. Belgium had a similar amendment: ‘Omit, with a view to inclusion among provisions for the protection of human rights. Such transfer could be noted in a resolution.’ Sweden noted that the draft provision resembled texts in the post-First World War minorities treaties, agreeing that the genocide convention was not ‘the appropriate instrument for such protection’. Iran opposed inclusion of cultural genocide, advocating instead the adoption of a supplementary convention on the subject. Others favouring elimination of a reference to cultural genocide were the United Kingdom, India, the United States, Peru and the Netherlands.

Nevertheless, many States that wanted to retain cultural genocide found the Ad Hoc Committee draft too broad. Pakistan submitted an amendment that was more limited than what had been adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee. Venezuela recalled that genocide had been defined, in General Assembly Resolution 96(I), as ‘a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups’, saying this implied protection against cultural genocide. But it warned that the term cultural genocide ‘should be used with reference only to violent and brutal acts which were repugnant to the human conscience, and which caused losses of particular importance to humanity, such as the destruction of religious sanctuaries, libraries, etc.’ Along the same lines, the Philippines cautioned that the draft provision ‘could be interpreted as depriving nations of the right to integrate the different elements of which they were composed into a homogeneous whole as, for instance in the case of language’. Egypt urged that the definition be ‘reduced to the very reasonable proportions suggested by the delegation of Pakistan’.

196 UN Doc. A/C.6/216. See also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.65 (Chaumont, France).
199 Ibid. (Abdoh, Iran). See also UN Doc. A/C.6/218.
202 Ibid. (Gross, United States). 203 Ibid. (Goytisolo, Peru).
204 Ibid. (de Beus, Netherlands).
205 UN Doc. A/C.6/229: ‘In this Convention, genocide also means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy the religion or culture of a religious, racial or national group: 1. Systematic conversions from one religion to another by means of or by threats of violence. 2. Systematic destruction or desecration of places and objects of religious worship and veneration and destruction of objects of cultural value.’
208 Ibid. (Paredes, Philippines).
209 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.83 (Raafat, Egypt). See also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.63 (Raafat, Egypt). In support, see ibid. (Tarazi, Syria); ibid. (Correa, Ecuador); ibid. (Khomusko, Byelorussia); ibid. (Tsien Tai, China); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.65 (Kovalenko, Ukraine); and UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.83 (Morozov, Soviet Union).
It was clear that the issue had hit a nerve with several countries who were conscious of problems with their own policies towards minority groups, specifically indigenous peoples and immigrants. Sweden noted that the fact it had converted the Lapps to Christianity might lay it open to accusations of cultural genocide.210 Brazil, said: ‘The cultural protection of the group could be sufficiently organized within the international framework of the protection of human rights and of minorities, without there being any need to define as genocide infringements of the cultural rights of the group.’211 Brazil warned that ‘some minorities might have used it as an excuse for opposing perfectly normal assimilation in new countries’.212 New Zealand argued that even the United Nations might be liable to charges of cultural genocide, because the Trusteeship Council itself had expressed the opinion that ‘the now existing tribal structure was an obstacle to the political and social advancement of the indigenous inhabitants’.213 South Africa endorsed the remarks of New Zealand, insisting upon ‘the danger latent in the provisions of article III where primitive or backward groups were concerned’.214 Canada declared that, if the Committee were to retain the cultural genocide provision, the Canadian government would have to make certain reservations ‘as the Canadian Constitution limited the legislative powers of the Federal Government to the benefit of the provincial legislatures’.215

211 Ibid. (Amado, Brazil).  
212 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.133 (Amado, Brazil). See also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.63 (Amado, Brazil).  
213 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.83 (Reid, New Zealand). Referring to UN Doc. A/603, concerning Tanganyika.  
214 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.83 (Egeland, South Africa). See also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.64 (Egeland, South Africa).  
215 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.83 (Lapointe, Canada). The National Archives of Canada reveal that ‘cultural genocide’ was the single most important issue for the Canadian Government. ‘The Canadian delegation to the seventh session of Economic and Social Council was instructed to support or initiate any move for the deletion of Article III on “cultural” genocide (see document E/794) and, if this move were not successful, it should vote against Article III and, if necessary, against the whole convention. The delegation was instructed that the convention as a whole, less Article III, was acceptable though legislation will naturally be required in Canada to implement the convention.’: ‘Commentary for the Use of the Canadian Delegation’, NAC RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475–DG–3–40‘2’ (this text is also in NAC RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475–DG–1–40). In a report to Ottawa at the conclusion of the debate, the Canadian representative took a rather exaggerated view of his own importance in the debate: ‘According to instructions from External Affairs, the Canadian delegate had only one important task, namely to eliminate the concept of “cultural genocide” from the Convention. He took a leading part in the debate on this point and succeeded in having his viewpoints accepted by the Committee. The remaining articles are of no particular concern for Canada. Most of the contentious items have already been settled. The delegates are for the greater part wearying of their own eloquence on the subject and the final articles may well be dealt with during
On a roll-call vote, the Sixth Committee decided to exclude cultural genocide from the Convention. But the Soviet Union and Venezuela returned to the point in the General Assembly debate on 9 December 1948 with amendments aimed at incorporating cultural genocide in the Convention. Venezuela quickly withdrew its proposal after realizing there was no chance of success. The Soviet proposal was defeated on a roll-call vote.

Many of the delegates had argued against including cultural genocide in the Convention because it was a ‘human rights question’ more properly addressed under that rubric. Of course, while debate on the Convention was proceeding in the Sixth Committee, the Third Committee was drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But, despite the sentiments expressed in the Sixth Committee, the protection of the cultural survival of ethnic minorities was not included in the Declaration, which was adopted one day after the final approval of the Genocide Convention. A text on minority rights, based on an original proposal by Hersh Lauterpacht, appeared in the initial drafts of the declaration prepared in the Commission on Human Rights, but ultimately the Commission voted against the idea of a minority rights provision. The delegations in the Sixth Committee who called the issue of cultural genocide a ‘human rights issue’ to be studied by the


217 The Soviet Union (UN Doc. A/760) proposed the addition of a new article: ‘In this Convention genocide also means any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a national racial or religious group on grounds of national or racial origin, or religious beliefs, such as: (a) prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group; (b) destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the group.’ Venezuela’s amendment (UN Doc. A/770) was more modest: ‘Systematic destruction of religious edifices, schools or libraries of the group.’

218 UN Doc. A/PV.179.

219 Ibid. (fourteen in favour, thirty-one against, with ten abstentions).

220 Note 113 above.


224 UN Doc. E/800, p. 38.
Third Committee were thus well aware the latter was unlikely to give the matter serious treatment. In fact, there was sharp debate about this in the Third Committee, with the United States opposed to a provision and Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Denmark in favour. Ultimately, the General Assembly adopted a companion resolution to the Universal Declaration that noted the decision not to have such a provision, calling upon the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to study the matter.225

Some twenty years later, the General Assembly adopted a text on cultural rights of ethnic minorities, article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: ‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.’226 In its general comment on article 27, the Human Rights Committee stated:

With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under article 27, the Committee observes that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resources, specially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to life in reserves protected by law. The enjoyment of those rights may require positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them.227

According to the Committee, which is responsible for implementation of the Covenant, the protection of the rights enshrined in article 27 ‘is directed to ensure the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities concerned . . . States parties, therefore, have an obligation to ensure that the exercise of these rights is fully protected.’228 Measures of cultural genocide contemplated during the drafting of the Genocide Convention, such as destruc-

225 GA Res. 217 C (III).
227 ‘General Comment No. 23 (art. 27)’, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, para. 7 (reference omitted). See also the views of the Committee on these issues: Lubicon Lake Band (Bernard Ominayak) v. Canada (No. 167/1984), UN Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984, UN Doc. A/45/40, Vol. II, p. 1, 11 HRLJ 305; Kitok v. Sweden (No. 197/1985), UN Doc. A/43/40, p. 221.
228 ‘General Comment No. 23 (art. 27)’, note 227 above, para. 9.
tion of libraries and the suppression of the minority language, obviously fall within the ambit of article 27. In its general comment on reservations, the Committee declared that the minority rights set out in article 27 are customary norms.229

Cultural rights of minorities are also protected by instruments of international humanitarian law, applicable in armed conflict. The regulations annexed to the fourth Hague Convention of 1907 prohibit ‘[a]ll seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science’.230 Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions defines ‘extensive destruction’ of ‘clearly-recognized historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples’ as a grave breach under certain conditions.231 A specialized instrument, the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, also applies in this context.232

Nevertheless, in light of the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention, it seems impossible to consider acts of cultural genocide as punishable crimes if they are unrelated to physical or biological genocide. According to the International Law Commission:

As clearly shown by the preparatory work for the Convention, the destruction in question is the material destruction of a group either by physical or by biological means, not the destruction of the national, linguistic, religious, cultural or other identity of a particular group. The national or religious element and the racial or ethnic element are not taken into consideration in the definition of the word ‘destruction’, which must be taken only in its material sense, its physical or biological sense. It is true that the 1947 draft Convention prepared by the Secretary-General and the 1948 draft prepared by the ad hoc Committee on Genocide contained provisions on ‘cultural genocide’ covering any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a group, such as prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group or destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the group.233

229 ‘General Comment No. 24’, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para. 8.
230 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War by Land, [1910] UKTS 9, annex, art. 46. For a case where the destruction of monuments was considered a violation of art. 56 of the regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV, which protects cultural monuments, see Karl Lingenfelder, (1949) 8 LRTWC 67 (Permanent Military Tribunal, Metz).
The cultural component remains relevant as evidence of the intent to destroy a group. Proof an accused was involved in the destruction of cultural monuments or similar acts directed against the culture of the group will aid a tribunal in assessing the elements of intent and motive. In its hearing into charges of genocide in Karadzic and Mladic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia heard a UNESCO expert on cultural heritage describe the destruction of monuments in Mostar and other towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He concluded that this constituted an attempt to change ‘the physical environment’ by destroying cultural evidence of a culture or civilization. Asked by Judge Riad whether this was part of a strategy, he answered:

Well, if it was not the strategy at the beginning of the war, it certainly became part of the strategy. You cannot possibly have 1,183 damaged mosques without something fairly deliberate being done. I return back to my original position: it certainly became one, it was very useful, but destruction or damaging of a minaret is clearly a sign to a population. I know of an example in western Herzegovina where you have a village which is totally undisturbed, with a village of Muslims in 1993, and then in 1994 or 1995 you have one shot on the minaret. This is a signal. Hitting a minaret is also one way of chasing, chasing the people.

The Tribunal concluded: ‘The destruction of mosques or Catholic churches is designed to annihilate the centuries-long presence of the group or groups; the destruction of the libraries is intended to annihilate a culture which was enriched through the participation of the various national components of the populations.’

Critics of the Convention continue to lament the absence of cultural genocide, although among international lawmakers this is a dead issue. Neither the International Law Commission nor the drafters of the Rome Statute seriously entertained adding cultural genocide to the list.
of punishable acts. Recognizing that ‘cultural genocide’ does not fall within the ambit of the Convention, another term, ‘ethnocide’, appears in the academic literature,239 documents of international human rights organs240 and even in international instruments.241 According to the UNESCO ‘Declaration of San Jose’:

Ethnocide means that an ethnic group is denied the right to enjoy, develop and transmit its own culture and its own language, whether individually or collectively. This involves an extreme form of massive violation of human rights . . .

1. We declare that ethnocide, that is, cultural genocide, is a violation of international law equivalent to genocide, which was condemned by the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.242

Of course cultural genocide is not ‘a violation of international law equivalent to genocide’, because no international instrument exists making it a punishable act. Moreover, in light of the above, it would be implausible to argue that there was some customary norm to fill the void in the Convention on this issue.

‘Ethnic cleansing’

The expression ‘ethnic cleansing’ first appeared in 1981 in Yugoslav media accounts of the establishment of ‘ethnically clean territories’ in


The term entered the international vocabulary in 1992, used to describe policies being pursued by the various parties to the Yugoslav conflict aimed at creating ethnically homogeneous territories. There have been a number of attempts at definition. According to the Security Council’s Commission of Experts on violations of humanitarian law during the Yugoslav war: ‘The expression “ethnic cleansing” is relatively new. Considered in the context of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, “ethnic cleansing” means rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.’ The Commission considered techniques of ethnic cleansing to include murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, and sexual assault, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian populations, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property. During the Rule 61 hearing in Karadzic and Mladic, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was asked to define the term. He said:

Well, ethnic cleansing is a practice which means that you act in such a way that in a given territory the members of a given ethnic group are eliminated. It means a practice that aims at such and such a territory be, as they meant, ethnically pure. So, in other words, that that territory would no longer contain only members of the ethnic group that took the initiative of cleansing the territory. So, in other words, the members of the other group are eliminated by different ways, by different methods. You have massacres. Everybody is not massacred, but I mean in terms of numbers, you have massacres in order to scare these populations. Sometimes these massacres are selective, but they aim at eliminating the elite of a given population, but they are massacres. I mean, that is the point. So whenever you have massacres, naturally the other people are driven away. They are afraid. They try to run away and you find yourself with a high number of a given people that have been massacred, persecuted and, of

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246 UN Doc. S/25274 (1993), para. 56.
course, in the end these people simply want to leave. They also submitted to such pressures that they go away. They are driven away either on their own initiative or they are deported. But the basic point is for them to be out of that territory and some of them are sometimes locked up in camps. Some women are raped and, furthermore, often times what you have is the destruction of the monuments which marked the presence of a given population in a given territory, for instance, religious places, Catholic churches or mosques are destroyed.

So basically, this is how ethnic cleaning is practised in the course of this war.247

The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, said that ‘“[e]thnic cleansing” may be equated with a systematic purge of the civilian population with a view to forcing it to abandon the territories in which it lives’.248 The Commission itself, in the resolution adopted during its first special session in August 1992, said that ‘ethnic cleansing . . . at a minimum entails deportations and forcible mass removal or expulsion of persons from their homes in flagrant violation of their human rights, and which is aimed at the dislocation or destruction or national ethnic racial or religious groups’.249 Ad hoc Judge Elihu Lauterpacht of the International Court of Justice defined ethnic cleansing as ‘the forced migration of civilians’.250 In a speech to the Security Council, Sir David Hannay of the United Kingdom said it was ‘the forcible removal of civilian populations’.251 Ambassador Colin Keating of New Zealand, in the General Assembly, said the term ethnic cleansing ‘covered a multitude of gross violations of human rights such as systematic expulsion, forcible relocation, destruction of dwellings, degrading treatment of human beings, rape and killings’.252 A member of the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination described ethnic cleansing as a form of ‘enforced segregation’.253 In a 1998 resolution, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities described it as ‘forcible displacement of populations within a country or across borders’.254

253 UN Doc. A/CERD/SR.1003.
The expression ‘ethnic cleansing’ began to appear in the documents of international bodies in August 1992. That month, the term was used, always within quotation marks, in resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council. The quotation marks reflected the view that the term had been coined by the perpetrators themselves, although by 1994 the General Assembly no longer used the quotation marks.

The Commission of Experts appointed by the Security Council stated that ‘“[e]thnic cleansing” is contrary to international law’. It suggested that in some cases ‘ethnic cleansing’ could be considered a breach of the Genocide Convention:

Based on the many reports describing the policy and practices conducted in the former Yugoslavia, ‘ethnic cleansing’ has been carried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extrajudicial executions, rape and sexual assault, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property. Those practices constitute crimes against humanity and can be assimilated to specific war crimes. Furthermore, such acts could also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention.

The most affirmative assertion that ethnic cleansing is equivalent to genocide appears in a December 1992 General Assembly resolution that evokes ‘the abhorrent policy of “ethnic cleansing”, which is a form of genocide’. This reference has been reaffirmed in a number of subsequent resolutions. During the debates on the December 1992 resolu-

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256 UN Doc. A/RES/46/242, preamble, paras. 6 and 8.
258 ECOSOC Res. 1992/305.
262 Ibid., para. 56.
263 ‘The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, UN Doc. A/RES/47/121. UN Doc. A/47/PV.91, p. 99 (102 in favour, with 57 abstentions, on a recorded vote). The abstentions concerned a provision in the resolution calling for an arms embargo to be lifted, and had nothing to do with the reference to genocide.
The physical element of the offence

tion, several delegates described ethnic cleansing as ‘genocide’ or, more frequently, ‘genocidal’, as well as a ‘crime against humanity’ and a form of ‘apartheid’. The debates are, however, embarrassingly laconic with respect to the assertion that ethnic cleansing is a form of genocide, considering the months that the General Assembly devoted to defining the crime in 1948. Significantly, another resolution adopted by consensus at the same session in December 1992, entitled “Ethnic Cleansing” and Racial Hatred’, approached the question from the standpoint of racial discrimination and the protection of minorities and did not even refer to genocide or to the Convention.

In other debates in both the General Assembly and the Security Council, several delegations have equated genocide with ethnic cleansing, among them Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, Bangladesh, the Czech Republic and Senegal. But most countries use the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ in a way that suggests they understand it is distinct from genocide, although related. There has also been occasional reference to ‘religious cleansing’ in debates in the United Nations organs.

Whether ethnic cleansing corresponds to genocide was also addressed before the International Court of Justice, in Bosnia’s 1993 application against Yugoslavia. Bosnia named Professor Elihu Lauterpacht of Cambridge University as its ad hoc judge, in accordance with article 31(3) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. In the Court’s 13 September 1993 ruling on provisional measures, Judge Lauterpacht appended a separate opinion in which he asked ‘Has Genocide Been Committed?’ He noted ‘the forced migration of civilians, more commonly known as “ethnic cleansing”, is, in truth, part of a deliberate of Women in the Areas of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia’, UN Doc. A/RES/50/192; ‘Rape and Abuse of Women in the Areas of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia’, UN Doc. A/RES/51/115.

UN Doc. A/47/PV.86, p. 31 (Jaya, Brunei Darussalam); UN Doc. A/47/PV.87, pp. 14–15 (Khoshroo, Iran); UN Doc. A/47/PV.87, pp. 24–5 (Elaraby, Egypt); UN Doc. A/47/PV.87, p. 46 (Huq, Bangladesh); UN Doc. A/47/PV.88, p. 22 (Shkurti, Albania).

UN Doc. A/47/PV.86, p. 21 (Nobilio, Croatia); UN Doc. A/47/PV.86, p. 48 (Pirzada, Pakistan); UN Doc. A/47/PV.87, p. 2 (Al-Ni’mah, Qatar); UN Doc. A/47/PV.88, p. 65 (Ansay, Organization of the Islamic Conference).

UN Doc. A/47/PV.86, p. 46 (Cissé, Senegal); UN Doc. A/47/PV.88, p. 65 (Ansay, Organization of the Islamic Conference).

UN Doc. A/47/PV.88, p. 12 (Arria, Venezuela).

UN Doc. A/RES/47/80. See also ‘Third Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination’, GA Res. 48/91.


UN Doc. A/47/PV.82, p. 17. 272 Ibid, UN Doc. S/PV.3136, para. 68.


campaign by the Serbs to eliminate Muslim control of, and presence in, substantial parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina:

Such being the case, it is difficult to regard the Serbian acts as other than acts of genocide in that they clearly fall within categories (a), (b) and (c) of the definition of genocide quoted above, they are clearly directed against an ethnical or religious group as such, and they are intended to destroy that group, if not in whole certainly in part, to the extent necessary to ensure that that group no longer occupies the parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina coveted by the Serbs. The Respondent stands behind the Bosnian Serbs and it must, therefore, be seen as an accomplice to, if not an actual participant in, this genocide behaviour.

Should there be any disposition to regard ‘ethnic cleansing’ as no more than an aspect of a particularly vicious territorial conflict between Serbs and Muslims . . . it must be recalled that the respondent has itself also characterized ‘ethnic cleansing or comparable conduct’ as genocide . . . Since the evidence presently before the Court of such ‘genocide against the Serb ethnic group’ is of a limited kind, and in terms of expulsion by Bosnian Muslims of Bosnian Serbs from the areas in which they were living does not approach the same order of magnitude as the expulsion of Bosnian Muslims by the Serbs, it would appear a fortiori that the Respondent also regards the ‘ethnic cleansing’ as carried out in this conflict as a breach of Article II of the Genocide Convention.

Judge Lauterpacht declared he was prepared to order, pursuant to the Genocide Convention, ‘a prohibition of “ethnic cleansing” or conduct contributing thereto such as attacks and firing upon, sniping at and killing of non-combatants, and bombardment and blockade of areas of civilian occupation and other conduct having as its effect the terrorization of civilians in such a manner as to lead them to abandon their homes’. These individual views were not, however, echoed in the majority decision.

In the academic literature, ‘ethnic cleansing’ has sometimes been described as a euphemism for genocide. The special rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions has also said ethnic cleansing is a euphemism for genocide.282

The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was unknown at the time the Genocide Convention was drafted. But the notion of ‘rendering an area ethnically

282 ‘Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Note by the Secretary-General’, UN Doc. A/51/457, para. 69.
homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given
groups from the area’ has a long history in international relations, and
only in the late twentieth century has it come to be understood as a
serious human rights violation. For example, in post-war Europe, the
Allies forcibly removed ethnic German populations from areas in
Western Poland. As many as 15 million Germans were expelled and
resettled pursuant to Article XIII of the 1945 Potsdam Protocol.
Indeed, during the drafting of the Convention, the United States
expressed concern that the proposed definition of the crime ‘might be
extended to embrace forced transfers of minority groups such as have
already been carried out by members of the United Nations’. And
while the Convention was being drafted, Palestinians were ‘cleansed’ of
areas in the new state of Israel.

Another contemporary indication of the acceptability of ‘ethnic
cleansing’ appears in the debates of the 1952 session of the prestigious
Institut de Droit International. Rapporteur Giorgio Balladore Pallieri
listed twenty ‘population transfer’ treaties between 1913 and 1945,
admitting that ‘il n’y a jamais de transfert vraiment volontaire des

283 Jennifer Jackson Preece, ‘Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State
p. 817.
International Law Journal, p. 207; A. De Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam; The Expulsion of the
Germans from the East, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1989; Freiherr Von
285 ‘Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat,
Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations’, UN Doc. E/623. The
United States cited specifically para. 3(b): ‘Destroying the specific characteristics of
the group by . . . (b) Forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the
culture of a group . . .’ The fears of the United States were not totally misplaced. One
academic writer has said that ‘the expulsion of Germans and of persons of German
descent living in the former eastern provinces of Germany and in eastern and south-
eastern European countries frequently took place under conditions that are classifiable
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. II, Amsterdam: North-Holland Elsevier,
1995, pp. 541–4 at p. 541. During the United States Senate’s consideration of the
Genocide Convention in 1950, James Finucane of the National Council for the
Prevention of War testified about the United States’ ‘genocidal intent, or genocidal
carelessness, at Potsdam’: United States of America, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Jan. 23, 24, 25, and 9 February
286 Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, Bloomington and Indiana-
polis: Indiana University Press, 1994, pp. 291–307; Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S.
146–56; Benny Morris, 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians, Oxford: Clarendon
populations’. Pallieri concluded, with the logic of an ethnic cleanser, that there was nothing in international law to oppose the legitimacy of population transfers and that they were even, in certain circumstances, desirable. They were the consequences of the legitimate desire of all modern States to have loyal citizens, he said. Pallieri’s analysis was well received by most of the members of the Institute, including Max Huber, Jean Spiropoulos and Fernand de Visscher. Georges Scelle stood alone, deeming the whole idea repulsive and incompatible with the emerging law of human rights.

There is no doubt the drafters of the Convention quite deliberately resisted attempts to encompass the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing within the punishable acts. According to the comments accompanying the Secretariat draft, the proposed definition excluded ‘certain acts which may result in the total or partial destruction of a group of human beings . . . namely . . . mass displacements of population’. The commentary continued: ‘Mass displacement of populations from one region to another also does not constitute genocide. It would, however, become genocide if the occupation were attended by such circumstances as to lead to the death of the whole or part of the displaced population (if, for example, people were driven from their homes and forced to travel long distances in a country where they were exposed to starvation, thirst, heat, cold and epidemics).’ The unspoken reference here is to the mass displacement of Armenians within the Ottoman Empire in 1915, where the exposure to starvation, thirst, heat, cold and epidemics resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands.

In the Sixth Committee, Syria proposed an amendment to the definition of genocide corresponding closely to the contemporary notion of ‘ethnic cleansing’. The Syrian amendment read: ‘Imposing measures intended to oblige members of a group to abandon their homes in order to escape the threat of subsequent ill-treatment.’ The Syrian representative said: ‘The problem of refugees and displaced persons to which his delegation’s proposal referred had arisen at the end of the Second World War and remained extremely acute.’ Yugoslavia supported the amendment, citing the Nazis’ displacement of Slav populations from a part of Yugoslavia in order to establish a German majority. ‘That action was tantamount to the deliberate destruction of a group’, said the Yugoslav delegate. ‘Genocide could be committed by forcing members

288 Ibid., p. 149.
289 UN Doc. E/447, p. 23.
290 Ibid., p. 24.
of a group to abandon their homes’, he added. But the United States argued that the Syrian proposal ‘deviated too much from the original concept of genocide’. For the United Kingdom, ‘the problem raised by the Syrian amendment was a serious one but did not fall within the definition of genocide’. The Soviets said: ‘Measures compelling members of a group to abandon their homes, in the case of acts committed under the Hitler regime, were rather a consequence of genocide.’ The Syrian amendment was resoundingly defeated, by twenty-nine votes to five, with eight abstentions.

During discussion of the ‘Elements of Crimes’ of the Rome Statute, the ‘Arab Group’ criticized a United States draft for failing to deal with the practice of ethnic cleansing as a means of genocide within the context of article 6(b)(iii) of the Statute, which corresponds to article II(c) of the Convention. Accordingly: ‘This confirms the difficulty of enumerating all the so-called elements of crimes. It is more than likely that future events in the world will reveal other forms of genocide that have not been mentioned in this or similar proposals.’

In the confirmation of the Srebrenica indictment (second indictment) in *Karadzic and Mladic*, Judge Riad referred to ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a form of genocide:

The mass executions described in the indictment were evidently systematic, being organized by the military and political hierarchy of the Serbian administration of Pale, apparently with close support from elements of the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). These executions were committed in the context of a broader policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ which is directed against the Bosnian Muslim population and which also includes massive deportations. This policy aims at creating new borders by violently changing the national or religious composition of the population. As a result of this policy, the Muslim population of Srebrenica was totally banished from the area.

The policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ referred to above presents, in its ultimate manifestation, genocidal characteristics. Furthermore, in this case, the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, which is specific to genocide, may clearly be inferred from the gravity of the ‘ethnic cleansing’ practised in Srebrenica and its surrounding areas, i.e. principally, the mass killings of Muslims which occurred after the fall of Srebrenica in July.

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295 *Ibid.* (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).  
297 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.82.  
298 ‘Proposal by Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen, Comments on the Proposal Submitted by the United States of America Concerning Terminology and the Crime of Genocide’, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.4, p. 3.
1995, which were committed in circumstances manifesting an almost unpar-
alleled cruelty.299

A similar interpretation was adopted by Trial Chamber I (Jorda, Odio-
Benito and Riad), in its Rule 61 decision in Nikolic. The judges invited
the Prosecutor to amend the indictment, ‘if feasible and advisable’,
adding complicity in genocide or acts of genocide:

It emerged on the basis of the record that the policy of discrimination
implemented at Blasenica, of which Dragan Nikolic’s acts formed a part, was
specifically aimed at ‘cleansing’ the region of its Muslim population. In this
instance, the policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ took the form of discriminatory acts of
extreme seriousness which tend to show its genocidal character. For instance,
the Chamber notes the statements by some witnesses which point, among other
criimes, to mass murders being committed in the region . . . The Chamber
considers that the Tribunal may possibly have jurisdiction in this case under
Article 4 of the Statute.300

In the Tadic judgment, the Tribunal spoke of the horrors of ethnic
cleansing but stopped shy of using the word genocide.301 Indeed, Tadic

299 Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic (Case No. IT–95–18–I), Confirmation of Indict-
ment, p. 4.

300 Prosecutor v. Nikolic (Case No. IT–95–2–R61), Review of Indictment Pursuant to
Rule 61, 20 October 1995, para. 34. During the hearing, Judge Jorda asked expert
witness James Gow, of King’s College, London, whether ‘the concept of ethnic
cleansing is to be found somewhere, either officially or in documents or proclamations
as organized plans’. Professor Gow answered: ‘The term ethnic cleansing has been
widely used. It does have some history, but it has come to prominence and has been
used in a widespread way in connection with the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and,
particularly, with the Serbian campaign there. The term is often attributed to one of
the Serbian paramilitary leaders, Vojislav Seselj, in the current context. It has also
been used by one of the other Serbian paramilitary leaders, Zeljko Raznjatovic
(Arkan), and there is some film evidence, I believe, in which Arkan is giving
instructions to his troops to be careful in this particular cleansing operation. But to say
that there is some official document in which a plan for ethnic cleansing appears, I
think, would be to take – would be to make too strong a statement. I have seen no
evidence of an official document in which the term “ethnic cleansing” is used, but the
term has been used and it has been used by some of the people involved in the activity
that they have been carrying out.’ Prosecutor v. Nikolic (Case No. IT–95–2–R61),
Transcript, 9 October 1995.

301 Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case No. IT–94–1–T), Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997,
para. 62: ‘Many of these hard-fought and bloody conflicts took place in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and many of the outrages against civilians, especially though by no means
exclusively by Ustasa forces against ethnic Serbs, also took place there, particularly in
the border area between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Partisans
were especially active and which is the very area in which Prijedor lies. A minister of
the wartime Croatian puppet government had promised to kill a third of the Serbs in
its territory, deport a third and by force convert the remaining third to Catholicism.
Another urged the cleansing of all of the greatly enlarged Croatia of “Serbian dirt”.
Wholesale massacres of Serbs ensued; in six months of 1941 the Ustasa may have
killed well over a quarter of a million Serbs, although the exact number is a subject of
much controversy. Bulgarian and Hungarian occupying forces in other parts of
was not even indicted for genocide. Trial Chamber II, in contrast with the Nikolic case, never suggested that Tadic might also have been charged with genocide.302

In any case, the Office of the Prosecutor seemed unimpressed with the proposal to amend the Nikolic indictment. More generally, it has been extremely cautious in laying charges of genocide. The prosecutor addressed the acts of ethnic cleansing carried out by the Milosevic regime in Kosovo in early 1999 under the rubrics of ‘deportation’ and ‘persecutions’, both of which belong within the general category of crimes against humanity.303

The opinion expressed in certain resolutions of the General Assembly and by some writers that ethnic cleansing is a form of genocide is troublesome. While there is no generally recognized text defining ethnic cleansing, the various attempts at definition by jurists, diplomats and scholars concur that it is aimed at displacing a population in order to change the ethnic composition of a given territory, and generally to render the territory ethnically homogeneous or ‘pure’. Plainly, this is not the same thing as genocide, which is directed at the destruction of the Yugoslavia also engaged in massacres of Serbs and in ethnic cleansing. However, other ethnic groups also suffered in Prijedor, the Partisans killing many prominent Muslims and Croats in 1942 and again, in nearby Kozarac, in 1945’ (emphasis added). See also ibid., para. 84: ‘The objective of Serbia, the JNA [Yugoslav People’s Army] and Serb-dominated political parties, primarily the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], at this stage was to create a Serb-dominated western extension of Serbia, taking in Serb-dominated portions of Croatia and portions, too, of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This would then, together with Serbia, its two autonomous provinces and Montenegro, form a new and smaller Yugoslavia with a substantially Serb population. However, among obstacles in the way were the very large Muslim and Croat populations native to and living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To deal with that problem the practice of ethnic cleansing was adopted. This was no new concept. As mentioned earlier, it was familiar to the Croat wartime regime and to many Serb writers who had long envisaged the redistribution of populations, by force if necessary, in the course of achieving a Greater Serbia. This concept was espoused by Slobodan Milosevic, with ethnic Serbs widely adopting it throughout the former Yugoslavia, including Serb political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia. In addition to the concept of a Greater Serbia, there was also a concept on the part of Croats of the creation of a Greater Croatia that would include all Croats living in the territory of the former Yugoslavia’ (emphasis added).

302 In Germany, where he was initially arrested, Tadic had been charged with ‘aiding and abetting genocide’. In his study of the Tadic case, Michael Scharf wrote: ‘Conspicuously absent from the Tribunal’s indictment of Tadic is the charge of genocide, especially since it was on the basis of that charge that he had been arrested in Germany. “We were amazed that Germany had no specific evidence on that charge,” [deputy prosecutor] Graham Blewitt explains. “They were going to attempt to prove it solely on the basis of the testimony of an expert witness. But we thought it would be difficult to establish genocide with respect to Tadic.”’ Michael Scharf, Balkan Justice, Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1997, pp. 97, 101.

group. To use a historical example, until 1941, Nazi anti-Semitic policies were directed towards convincing Jews in Germany to leave the country. Jews were required, of course, to pay a price for their freedom. Moreover, large numbers who attempted to leave were unable to find refuge because other ‘civilized’ States refused to admit them. The Nazi policy, at the time, was one of ethnic cleansing. Jews were incited to leave by various forms of persecution, including discriminatory laws and periodic outbursts of violence such as the Kristallnacht of 9–10 November 1938. After the war against the Soviet Union was underway, the Nazi policy became destruction of the Jews of Europe, in whole or in part. No longer was emigration permitted, even if asylum was possible. At this point, the Nazi policy became genocidal. The District Court of Jerusalem, in the *Eichmann* case, noted this evolution in Nazi policy, commenting that: ‘The implementation of the “Final Solution”, in the sense of total extermination, is to a certain extent connected with the cessation of emigration of Jews from territories under German influence.’ Until mid-1941, when the ‘final solution’ emerged, the Israeli court said ‘a doubt remains in our minds whether there was here that specific intention to exterminate’, as required by the definition of genocide. The Court said it would deal with such inhuman acts as being crimes against humanity rather than genocide. Eichmann was acquitted of genocide for acts prior to August 1941.

To conclude on this point, it is incorrect to assert that ethnic cleansing is a form of genocide, or even that in some cases, ethnic cleansing amounts to genocide. Both, of course, may share the same goal, which is to eliminate the persecuted group from a given area. While the material acts performed to commit the crimes may often resemble each other, they have two quite different specific intents. One is intended to displace a population, the other to destroy it. The issue is one of intent and it is logically inconceivable that the two agendas coexist. Of course, as the *Eichmann* judgment notes, ethnic cleansing – described as ‘deportation’ – remains punishable as a crime against humanity and a war crime.

306 Ibid., para. 244(1)–(3); see also paras. 186–7.
307 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, *Crimes Against Humanity*, Dordrecht, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992, pp. 301–17; and Bassiouni and Manikas, *International Criminal Tribunal*, p. 530. The Rome Statute expands slightly upon the terminology, referring to ‘deportation or forcible transfer of population’. These terms are defined as the ‘forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law’. ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 31 above, art. 8(1)(d) and 8(2)(d).
Ethnic cleansing is also a warning sign of genocide to come. Genocide is the last resort of the frustrated ethnic cleanser.

**Ecocide**

Threats to the integrity of the environment can conceivably imperil the survival of a group or people. If associated with the intent to destroy the group, the definition of genocide may apply. The term ‘ecocide’ has been developed to describe cases of environmental destruction falling short of genocide because the evidence can only establish negligence and not the special intent of genocide.\(^{308}\) ‘Ecocide’ means ‘adverse alterations, often irreparable, to the environment – for example through nuclear explosions, chemical weapons, serious pollution and acid rain, or destruction of the rain forest – which threaten the existence of entire populations’.\(^{309}\) According to Malcolm Shaw, ‘ecocide’ is ‘generally defined as the intention to disrupt or destroy the ecosystem by assault upon the environment, usually for military purposes’.\(^{310}\) Professor Shaw has urged that concern with ecocide be focused elsewhere than on the Genocide Convention.\(^{311}\) Nicodème Ruhashyankiko noted that States had placed the question of ecocide ‘in a context other than that of genocide’, and that ‘it is becoming increasingly obvious that an exaggerated extension of the idea of genocide to cases which can only have a very distant connexion with that idea is liable to prejudice the effectiveness of the 1948 Convention Genocide [sic] very seriously’.\(^{312}\)

**Apartheid**

*Apartheid* is a crime against humanity, defined by the Apartheid Convention as ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other

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\(^{309}\) Whitaker, ‘Revised Report’ note 32 above, p. 17, para. 33.


Genocide in international law

racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The preamble to the Apartheid Convention refers to the Genocide Convention: ‘Observing that, in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, certain acts which may also be qualified as acts of apartheid constitute a crime under international law . . .’

The Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts of the Commission on Human Rights considered that certain practices of apartheid should be characterized as genocide:

(a) The institution of group areas (‘Bantustan policies’), which affected the African population by crowding them together in small areas where they could not earn an adequate livelihood, or the Indian population by banning them to areas which were totally lacking the preconditions for the exercise of their traditional professions;

(b) The regulations concerning the movement of Africans in urban areas and especially the forcible separation of Africans from their wives during long periods, thereby preventing African births;

(c) The population policies in general, which were said to include deliberate malnutrition of large population sectors and birth control for the non-white sectors in order to reduce their numbers, while it was the official policy to favour white immigration;

(d) The imprisonment and ill-treatment of non-white political (group) leaders and of non-white prisoners in general;

(e) The killing of the non-white population through a system of slave or tied labour, especially in so-called transit camps.

The Working Group believed that apartheid did not fall within the scope of the Genocide Convention definition, however, recommending it be revised to make punishable ‘inhuman acts resulting from the policies of apartheid’. It also urged that cultural genocide be recognized as a crime against humanity.

Subsequently, an Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Violations of Human Rights in Southern Africa concluded that: ‘The way in which


317 ‘Study Concerning the Question of Apartheid from the Point of View of International Penal Law’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1075, para. 163.
the South African regime implements the policy of *apartheid* should henceforth be considered as a kind of genocide.' The Working Group requested the Commission on Human Rights to call upon the General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice ‘on the extent to which *apartheid* as a policy entails criminal effects bordering on genocide’.318

In his study on genocide, Special Rapporteur Nicodème Ruhashyankiko concluded that *apartheid* should be approached as a crime against humanity rather than as genocide.319 His successor, Benjamin Whitaker, discussed the question in some detail but did not take a position.320 The Rome Statute defines *apartheid* as a crime against humanity.321 With the fall of the racist South African regime, the practical interest of the legal distinctions between genocide and *apartheid* have virtually vanished.322

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established as part of the democratic transition in South Africa, considered whether acts perpetrated by the white supremacist regime should be described as genocide. In the result, it rejected the qualification as inappropriate, and the term ‘genocide’ does not appear in its final report.

**Use of nuclear weapons**

In its 1996 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice examined whether the threat to use or the use of nuclear weapons could be considered genocide. Some States had argued that the Genocide Convention set out ‘a relevant rule of customary international law which the Court must apply’ in examining whether nuclear weapons were contrary to customary international law.323 The Court observed:

321 ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 31 above, art. 7(1)(j). *Apartheid* is defined as inhuman acts ‘committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime’: art. 7(2)(h).
323 See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Right to Life and Genocide: The Court and an International Public Policy’, in Philippe Sands and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes,
It was maintained before the Court that the number of deaths occasioned by the use of nuclear weapons would be enormous; that the victims could, in certain cases, include persons of a particular national, ethnic, racial or religious group; and that the intention to destroy such groups could be inferred from the fact that the user of the nuclear weapon would have omitted to take account of the well-known effects of the use of such weapons.

The Court would point out in that regard that the prohibition of genocide would be pertinent in this case if the recourse to nuclear weapons did indeed entail the element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision quoted above. In the view of the Court, it would only be possible to arrive at such a conclusion after having taken due account of the circumstances specific to each case.\footnote{Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Reports 226, para. 26.}

A few of the judges took the argument somewhat more seriously. Judge Weeramantry wrote: ‘If the killing of human beings, in numbers ranging from a million to a billion, does not fall within the definition of genocide, one may well ask what will.’\footnote{Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, p. 61} Judge Koroma expressed his apprehension over the Court’s dismissal of the genocide argument. He said the Court:

must be mindful of the special characteristics of the Convention, its object and purpose, to which the Court itself referred in the Reservations case as being to condemn and punish ‘a crime under international law involving a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity and which is contrary to moral law and the spirit and aims of the United Nations.

According to Judge Koroma:

The Court cannot therefore view with equanimity the killing of thousands, if not millions, of innocent civilians which the use of nuclear weapons would make inevitable, and conclude that genocide has not been committed because the State using such weapons has not manifested any intent to kill so many thousands or millions of people. Indeed, under the Convention, the quantum of the people killed is comprehended as well. It does not appear to me that judicial detachment requires the Court from expressing itself on the abhorrent shocking consequences that a whole population could be wiped out by the use of nuclear weapons during an armed conflict, and the fact that this could tantamount to genocide, if the consequences of the act could have been foreseen. Such expression of concern may even have a preventive effect on the weapons being used at all.\footnote{Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, p. 16.}

Debate about the incompatibility of the use of nuclear weapons with...
the prohibition of genocide has been around since 1948. During drafting of the Convention, the Netherlands warned that: ‘Attention will have to be paid that the definition of genocide is not made so large as to include every act of war against a large group of persons, notably an attack by atom bombs.’327 A few years later, when ratification was being considered by the United Kingdom Parliament, Emrys Hughes said that if there were another war, persons responsible for the use of nuclear weapons could be charged with genocide.328 In his commentary on the Convention, Nehemiah Robinson described Hughes’ remarks as a ‘misunderstanding of the Convention’. According to Robinson: ‘It is hard to understand how anyone could have arrived at this groundless fear, since the Convention does not treat of the outlawing of wars, nor does it deal with the destructions (even though intended) of “enemy” populations within the meaning of the laws of war.’329

Certainly the use of nuclear weapons, where the intent is to destroy a protected group in whole or in part, meets the definition of genocide. But, in the absence of the special characteristics of genocide, situations of mass killing such as those occasioned by the use of nuclear weapons are better examined from the perspective of crimes against humanity or war crimes.

327 UN Doc. E/623/Add.3. 328 Hansard, 18 May 1950. 329 Ibid.
Genocide is one of the five ‘acts’ of the subparagraphs of article II of the Convention, committed with the ‘intent’ defined in the \textit{chapeau}. Even where an act itself appears criminal, if it was purely accidental, or committed in the absence of intent to do harm or knowledge of the circumstances, then the accused is innocent. According to Lord Goddard, ‘the court should not find a man guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has a guilty mind’.\footnote{Brend \textit{v.} Wood, (1946) 62 TLR 462 at 463. See also Harding \textit{v.} Price, [1948] 1 KB 695 at. 700.} But in cases that cannot be described as purely accidental, the accused’s mental state may be far from totally innocent and yet not egregiously evil. To quote Racine, ‘[a]insi que la vertu, le crime a ses degrés’.\footnote{Jean Racine, \textit{Phèdre}, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1946, p. 158.} Criminal law systems establish levels of culpability based more or less entirely on the mental element, even when the underlying act is identical. Homicide is a classic example, because virtually all legal regimes recognize degrees of the crime based on differences in the mental element alone. For instance, involuntary homicide or manslaughter is a form of homicide that is not completely accidental and is attributable to the gross negligence of the offender. Homicide that is truly intentional, on the other hand, qualifies as murder. Even within murder, criminal law systems may make further distinctions, defining particularly reprehensible forms such as planned and premeditated murder, patricide, multiple murder, murder associated with other crimes such as sexual assault, and contract killing.

Within national legal orders, introduction of genocide \textit{per se} is rarely necessary for domestic offenders to be judged and punished. Even if genocide as such is not codified, they will be subject to prosecution for most if not all of the acts described in the subparagraphs of article II of the Convention. The core offences of article II, killing (article II(a)) and serious assault (article II(b)), are punishable under all domestic penal codes. The principal reason States enact the crime of genocide is to stigmatize it above and beyond ordinary murder or serious assault, in
much the same way as they introduce the crime of intentional murder in order to distinguish it from the less reprehensible offence of manslaughter or involuntary homicide.

These levels of culpability are often associated with, or rather expressed by, degrees of criminal sanction, so that the punishment will fit the crime. To an extent, this analysis breaks down in the case of genocide because ‘ordinary’ murder normally exposes the offender to the maximum penalty available in the domestic legal system, generally lengthy imprisonment up to and including life imprisonment or even the death penalty, leaving little room for an even more severe sanction. In the two major domestic cases of genocide prosecution since 1948, namely that of Adolph Eichmann in Israel in 1961 and of the Rwandan génocidaires in 1998, capital punishment was reintroduced after a period of de facto abolition for ordinary crimes in order to address this issue.³

The drafters of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court codified the two component elements of serious international crimes, including genocide. Article 30 of the Statute declares that the mens rea or mental element of genocide has two components, knowledge and intent.⁴

Knowledge

According to the Rome Statute, ‘“knowledge” means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events’.⁵

Thus, the accused must have knowledge of the circumstances of the crime. Because of the scope of genocide, it can hardly be committed by an individual, acting alone. Indeed, while exceptions cannot be ruled out, it is virtually impossible to imagine genocide that is not planned and organized either by the State itself or by some clique associated with it.⁶ This is another way of saying that, for genocide to take place, there must be a plan, even though there is nothing in the Convention that explicitly requires this.⁷ Raphael Lemkin spoke regularly of a plan as if

³ On sentences for genocide, see chapter 8, pp. 393–9 below.
⁵ Ibid., art. 30(3).
⁶ Note, however, that proposals to include an explicit requirement that genocide be planned by government were rejected: UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, pp. 3–6. See also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 USL.W. 3832 (18 June 1996).
⁷ See contra: Amnesty International, ‘The International Criminal Court: Fundamental Principles Concerning the Elements of Genocide’, AI Index IOR 40/01/99, February 1999: ‘There is no requirement that the accused had to have committed an act in conscious furtherance of a plan or a widespread or systematic policy or practice aimed at
this was a *sine qua non* for the crime of genocide.\(^8\) Genocide is an organized and not a spontaneous crime.\(^9\)

The cases support the requirement of a plan. In its ruling on the sufficiency of evidence in the case of Karadzic and Mladic, who were charged with genocide, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia spoke of a ‘project’ or ‘plan’.\(^10\) The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in *Akayesu*, did not insist upon proof of a plan with respect to the indictment for genocide, but this may have been because the issue was self-evident. At one point in the judgment, it referred to the ‘massive and/or systematic nature’ of the crime of genocide.\(^11\) Convicting Akayesu of crimes against humanity as well as genocide, the Tribunal said that the crimes had been widespread and systematic,\(^12\) defining ‘systematic’ as involving ‘some kind of preconceived plan or policy’.\(^13\) In *Kayishema and Ruzindana*, the Rwanda destroying, ‘in whole or in part’, a protected group. See also ‘Proposal Submitted by Colombia’, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.2, p. 2: ‘the Statute does not refer to the widespread or systematic nature of the acts [of genocide], which element is found in the description of crimes against humanity. The judicial decisions of the international tribunals did refer to that systematic or widespread nature because genocide was traditionally included among the crimes against humanity. In establishing genocide as a separate offence from other crimes against humanity, it stands out as a special type but also as one having its own or autonomous characteristics. Accordingly, there are historical, logical and juridical arguments which justify our not endorsing the United States proposal to include within the elements of the crime “a widespread or systematic policy or practice”. The proposal clearly goes beyond the definition of article 6 of the Statute and produces a lessening of the protection of the “group”’.


\(^9\) According to the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ‘a policy must exist to commit these acts [although] it need not be the policy of a State’: *Prosecutor v. Tadic* (Case No. IT–94–1–T), Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 655.

\(^10\) *Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic* (Case No. IT–95–5–R61, IT–95–18–R61), Consideration of the Indictment within the Framework of Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996, para. 94. ‘Project’ may be an overly literal translation of the French word *projet*, which means ‘plan’, and possibly reflects the role of French judge Claude Jorda in the drafting of the decision. Judge Jorda came back to this point in *Jelesic*, where he noted that, while it was theoretically possible for genocide to be committed by an individual acting in the absence of some more general plan, in practice it would be impossible to make proof of such a situation. Thus, the *Jelesic* judgment confirms the requirement of a plan as an evidentiary matter even if this is not explicitly part of the definition within the Convention: *Prosecutor v. Jelesic* (Case No. IT–95–10–T), Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 655.


\(^12\) *Ibid.*, para. 651.

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Tribunal wrote: ‘although a specific plan to destroy does not constitute an element of genocide, it would appear that it is not easy to carry out a genocide without a plan or organization.’ Furthermore, it said ‘the existence of such a plan would be strong evidence of the specific intent requirement for the crime of genocide’. The Guatemalan truth commission considered it necessary to demonstrate the existence of a plan to exterminate Mayan communities that obeyed a higher, strategically planned policy, manifested in actions which had a logical and coherent sequence.

In its draft ‘definitional elements’ on the crime of genocide for the Rome Statute, the United States proposed that the moral element of genocide require a ‘plan to destroy such group in whole or in part’. During subsequent debate in the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, the United States modified the ‘plan’ requirement, this time borrowing from crimes against humanity the concept of ‘a widespread or systematic policy or practice’. The wording was widely criticized as an unnecessary addition to a well-accepted definition, with no basis in case law or in the travaux of the Convention. Israel, however, made the quite compelling point that it was hard to conceive of a case of genocide that was not conducted as a ‘widespread and systematic policy or practice’. As the debate evolved, a consensus appeared to develop recognizing the ‘plan’ element, although in a more cautious formulation.

The plan or circumstances of genocide must be known to the offender. The Israeli court found that Eichmann knew of the ‘secret of the plan for extermination’ only since June 1941, and acquitted him of genocide prior to that date. In Tadic (which dealt with crimes against

15 Ibid., para. 276.
17 ‘Annex on Definitional Elements for Part Two Crimes’, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.10, p. 1. The elements also specify that ‘when the accused committed such act, there existed a plan to destroy such group in whole or in part’.
18 The draft proposal specified that genocide was carried out ‘in conscious furtherance of a widespread or systematic policy or practice aimed at destroying the group’: ‘Draft Elements of Crimes’, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.4, p. 7.
19 Comments by Canada, Norway, New Zealand and Italy, 17 February 1999 (author’s personal notes).
20 ‘Discussion Paper Proposed by the Co-ordinator, Article 6: The Crime of Genocide’, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/RT.1: ‘The accused knew . . . that the conduct was part of a similar conduct directed against that group.’
humanity and not genocide), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia described this as ‘knowledge by the accused of the wider context in which his act occurs’, a rather modest threshold. An individual who lacks knowledge of the circumstances cannot be found guilty of the crime of genocide, although he or she may well be liable for prosecution of some lesser and included offence, such as murder or assault. This issue was considered in the commentary of the International Law Commission on its draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind:

The extent of knowledge of the details of a plan or a policy to carry out the crime of genocide would vary depending on the position of the perpetrator in the governmental hierarchy or the military command structure. This does not mean that a subordinate who actually carries out the plan or policy cannot be held responsible for the crime of genocide simply because he did not possess the same degree of information concerning the overall plan or policy as his superiors. The definition of the crime of genocide requires a degree of knowledge of the ultimate objective of the criminal conduct rather than knowledge of every detail of a comprehensive plan or policy of genocide.

But individual offenders need not participate in devising the plan. If they commit acts of genocide with knowledge of the plan, then the requirements of the Convention are met.

Proving a leader’s knowledge of a genocidal plan may be relatively easy, although Nazi war criminal Albert Speer and some other intimates of Hitler argued successfully that even they were not privy to the ‘final solution’. To this day, debates continue about how widespread the knowledge was within the German Government, army and population as a whole about the plan to destroy the Jews of Europe. In Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia dealt with the accused’s knowledge of policies of ethnic cleansing, an element necessary for conviction of crimes against humanity. The court accepted evidence that Tadic was an ‘earnest SDS [Serb Democratic Party] member and an enthusiastic supporter of the idea of creating Republika

24 See, for example, ‘Proposal by Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen, Comments on the Proposal Submitted by the United States of America Concerning Terminology and the Crime of Genocide’, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.4, p. 4.
Srpska’, both of which embraced the notion of an ethnically pure Serbian territory. Evidence showed that he knew of and supported the goals of the SDS, including the fact that as president of an SDS branch ‘he must have had knowledge of the SDS programme, which included the vision of a Greater Serbia’.27

Knowledge of the genocidal plan or policy, or of ‘the wider context in which the act occurs’, should not be confused with knowledge that these amount to genocide as a question of law. An accused cannot answer that, while fully aware of a plan to destroy an ethnic group in whole or in part, he or she was not aware that this met the definition of the crime of genocide.28 Addressing this point, the Yugoslav Tribunal, referring to the analogous situation of crimes against humanity, said that ‘it would not be necessary to establish that the accused knew that his actions were inhumane’.29

The accused must also have knowledge of the consequences of his or her act in the ordinary course of events. If the genocidal act is killing, then the consequence will be death, and the accused must be aware that this will indeed result or at least be reckless as to the act’s occurrence. Knowledge of the consequences will vary, of course, depending on the act with which the accused is charged. In some cases, the genocidal act does not require proof of consequences. An example is direct and public incitement to genocide. In such cases, no proof of knowledge of the consequences is required.

In order to meet the standard of knowledge required for mens rea, it may also be sufficient for the prosecution to demonstrate that the accused was reckless as to the consequences.30 An isolated sentence in the Akayesu judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for

27 Prosecutor v. Tadic, note 9 above, para. 459.
28 See also ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 4 above, art. 33(2): ‘A mistake of law as to whether a particular type of conduct is a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. A mistake of law may, however, be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it negates the mental element required by such a crime, or as provided for in article 33.’
Rwanda refers to this aspect of the knowledge requirement: ‘The offender is culpable because he knew or should have known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group.’31 This is sometimes described as indirect intent. A criminal who is reckless possesses knowledge of a danger or risk, and knows that the consequence is possible. Criminal law theory takes different approaches to this question, depending on whether the offender need only contemplate a probability that the act will occur or whether it requires a virtual certainty.32 At the low end of recklessness, Romano-Germanic jurists speak of dolus eventualis, a level of knowledge that must surely be insufficient to constitute the crime of genocide.33 As the recklessness moves closer to a virtual certainty, the knowledge requirement of the mens rea becomes increasingly apparent. Although there is as yet no case law on this subject, it is relatively easy to conceive of examples of recklessness within the context of genocide. A commander accused of committing genocide by ‘inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction’, and who was responsible for imposing a restricted diet or ordering a forced march, might argue that he or she had no knowledge that destruction of the group would indeed be the consequence. An approach to the knowledge requirement that considers recklessness about the consequences of an act to be equivalent to full knowledge provides an answer to such an argument.

The threshold of knowledge of consequences that has emerged from debates in the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court is surely too low. The Co-ordinator’s discussion paper, submitted at the conclusion of the February 1999 session of the Working Group on Elements of Crimes, contained the following: ‘The accused knew or should have known that the conduct would destroy, in whole or in part, such group or that the conduct was part of similar conduct directed against that group.’34 The ‘should have known’ standard is generally used to describe crimes of negligence and is definitely inappropriate in the case of genocide.

But criminal knowledge should also be established in cases of ‘wilful blindness’, where an individual deliberately fails to inquire into the consequences of certain behaviour, and where the person knows that

31 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 11 above, para. 519.
33 On dolus eventualis, see Prosecutor v. Delalic, note 30 above, para. 435.
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such inquiry should be undertaken. Even where there is no proof that a concentration camp guard knew mass murder of genocidal proportions was being undertaken, the offender may have sufficient knowledge of the crime of genocide if it can be shown that he or she was wilfully blind to what was going on within the walls of the camp. This is what the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia meant when it spoke of the requirement of either actual or ‘constructive’ knowledge that criminal acts were occurring on a widespread or systematic basis. According to the International Law Commission:

A subordinate is presumed to know the intentions of his superiors when he receives orders to commit the prohibited acts against individuals who belong to a particular group. He cannot escape responsibility if he carries out the orders to commit the destructive acts against victims who are selected because of their membership in a particular group because he was not privy to all aspects of the comprehensive genocidal plan or policy. The law does not permit an individual to shield himself from criminal responsibility by ignoring the obvious. For example, a soldier who is ordered to go from house to house and kill only persons who are members of a particular group cannot be unaware of the irrelevance of the identity of the victims and the significance of their membership in a particular group. He cannot be unaware of the destructive effect of this criminal conduct on the group itself. Thus, the necessary degree of knowledge and intent may be inferred from the nature of the order to commit the prohibited acts of destruction against individuals who belong to a particular group and are therefore singled out as the immediate victims of the massive criminal conduct.

Intent

It is a commonplace to state that genocide is a crime requiring ‘intent’. As the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda wrote, in Akayesu: ‘The moral element is reflected in the desire of the Accused that the crime be in fact committed.’ All true crimes require proof of intent. Even without the terms ‘with intent’ in the definition of genocide, it is inconceivable that an infraction of such

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35 Glanville Williams, *Criminal Law: The General Part*, 2nd ed., London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1961, p. 159: ‘The rule that wilful blindness is equivalent to knowledge is essential, and is found throughout the criminal law.’ In a prosecution for crimes against humanity, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed that ‘wilful blindness’ would be sufficient to establish knowledge: *R. v. Finta*, note 29 above.

36 Case No. 3, (1947) 13 ILR 100 (Spruchgerichte, Stade, Germany), pp. 100–2.

37 *Prosecutor v. Tadić*, note 9 above, para. 659.


magnitude could be committed unintentionally. The requirement of intent is reaffirmed in article 30 of the Rome Statute.

The District Court of Jerusalem, in Eichmann, said that the intent requirement explained the special nature of the crime of genocide, as defined in the Convention:

What is it that endows this crime with its special character in the criminal law of a State which adopts in its domestic legislation the definition of the crime of genocide? One would say, the all-embracing total form which this crime is liable to take. This form is already indicated by the definition of the criminal intention necessary in this crime, which is general and total: the extermination of members of a group as such, i.e., a whole people or part of a people. As the Supreme Court said in the case of Pal (1952) 6 PD 489, 502 [(1951) 18 ILR 542]: ‘Under section I of the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 1950, a person may also be found guilty of an offence which in fact he committed against specific persons, if the offence against those persons was committed as a result of an intent to harm the group, and the act committed by the offender against those persons was a kind of “part performance” of his wilful intent against the whole group, be it the Jewish people or any civilian population’.40

The definition of mens rea in the Statute of the International Criminal Court states that a person has intent where, in relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; in relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.41 But the words ‘with intent’ that appear in the chapeau of article II of the Genocide Convention do more than simply reiterate that genocide is a crime of intent. Article II of the Genocide Convention introduces a precise description of the intent, namely ‘to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’. The reference to ‘intent’ in the text indicates that the prosecution must go beyond establishing that the offender meant to engage in the conduct, or meant to cause the consequence. The offender must also be proven to have a ‘specific intent’ or dolus specialis. Where the specified intent is not established, the act remains punishable, but not as genocide. It may be classified as a crime against humanity or it may be simply a crime under ordinary criminal law.42

40 A-G Israel v. Eichmann, note 21 above, para. 190.
41 ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 4 above, art. 30(2).
42 In a series of case studies, Cherif Bassiouni concluded that genocide was not committed by the United States against the aboriginal population, or in the case of the Vietnam war, because of an absence of proof of the specific intent. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Has the United States Committed Genocide Against the American Indian?’, (1979) 9 California Western International Law Journal, p. 271; M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘United States Involvement in Vietnam’, (1979) 9 California Western International Law Journal, p. 274. In 1995, a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights wrote that
Drafting history

The 1946 Saudi Arabian draft convention contained several references to intent. The list of offences included ‘planned disintegration of the political, social or economic structure’, ‘systematic moral debasement’ and ‘acts of terrorism committed for the purpose of creating a state of common danger and alarm . . . with the intent of producing [the group’s] political, social, economic or moral disintegration’. The terms ‘planned’, ‘systematic’ and ‘with the intent of’, are all markers for the intentional element of a crime.

The preamble of the Secretariat draft described genocide as ‘the intentional destruction of a group of human beings’. The word ‘intent’ did not appear in the substantive portions of the draft, although the definition proposed in article I § II labelled genocide an act committed ‘with the purpose of destroying [the group] in whole or in part, or of preventing its preservation or development’. In its commentary, the Secretariat described genocide as ‘the deliberate destruction of a human group’. By this definition, it continued, ‘certain acts which may result in the total or partial destruction of a group of human beings are in principle excluded from the notion of genocide, namely, international or civil war, isolated acts of violence not aimed at the destruction of a group of human beings, the policy of compulsory assimilation of a national element, mass displacements of population’. The Secretariat argued that war would generally fall outside the scope of genocide, because it was not normally directed at the total destruction of the enemy.

War may, however, be accompanied by the crime of genocide. This happens when one of the belligerents aims at exterminating the population of enemy territory and systematically destroys what are not genuine military objectives. Examples of this are the execution of prisoners of war, the massacre of the populations of occupied territory and their gradual extermination. These are clearly cases of genocide.

Referring to times of political or religious turmoil, in which there is loss of life, the Secretariat stated that: ‘Such acts are outside the notion of”

genocide so long as the intention physically to destroy a group of human beings is absent.\textsuperscript{48}

In comments on the Secretariat draft, the United States objected that the preamble was wordy, and that it dealt with substantive matters. It called attention to the fact that ‘the important matter of “intent” is injected into the definition contained in the Preamble by the inclusion of the phrase “intentional destruction”, which in any event might better read “deliberate destruction or attempt to destroy”’. Moreover, ‘It is obviously not intended that groups must be totally destroyed before the crime of genocide exists.’ Feeling it important that there be some reference to ‘purpose’ or ‘intent’ in the draft,\textsuperscript{49} the United States recommended the phrase ‘for the purpose of totally or partially destroying such group or of preventing its preservation or development’.\textsuperscript{50}

The \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee did not initially use the word ‘intent’,\textsuperscript{51} opting instead for ‘deliberate’. But there was no serious debate about the principle, the Committee being more concerned with the related but distinct issue of motive. The preliminary text adopted by the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee read: ‘In this convention genocide means any of the following deliberate acts directed against a national, racial, religious [or political] group, on grounds of national or racial origin or religious belief.’\textsuperscript{52} On a proposal from the United States, the Committee later added the word ‘intent’: ‘In this Convention genocide means any of the following deliberate acts committed with the intent to destroy a national, racial, religious or political group, on the grounds of the national or racial origin, religious belief, or political opinion of its members.’\textsuperscript{53} The report of the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee stated that the proposed definition encompasses ‘the notion of premeditation’.\textsuperscript{54}

In the Sixth Committee, the word ‘deliberate’ provoked a debate about whether or not genocide was a crime requiring premeditation. According to Belgium, any reference to premeditation was superfluous because article II sufficiently defined the intentional element.\textsuperscript{55} Egypt said that where genocide was not only intentional but premeditated, this would constitute an aggravating circumstance.\textsuperscript{56} Cuba agreed, opposing

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 24.  \textsuperscript{49} UN Doc. A/401.  \textsuperscript{50} UN Doc. E/623.
\textsuperscript{51} It appeared in some of the amendments: UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.11, p. 1; UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.12, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{52} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.12, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{53} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.24, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{54} UN Doc. E/794, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{55} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.72 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium). See also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.71 (Paredes, Philippines); and UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.72 (Fawcett, United Kingdom).
\textsuperscript{56} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.72 (Raafat, Egypt).
deletion of the word ‘deliberate’. In reply, Yugoslavia cited cases where charges involving lynching of blacks had been dismissed because premeditation had not been established. Haiti espoused the view that premeditation was merely an aggravating circumstance, although it believed that in practice it was always implicit in genocide because preparatory acts were necessary if a group was to be exterminated. At the close of the debate, the word ‘deliberate’ in the Ad Hoc Committee draft was deleted.

Peru argued that retaining the concept of premeditation would also have the drawback of excluding from responsibility those who, through negligence or omission, were guilty of the crime of genocide. Yet it is inconceivable that genocide as defined in the Convention extends to negligent crimes. France and the Soviet Union were likewise concerned about the danger that the definition of the intentional element might be too narrow and result in acquittals. These debates were confusing and sometimes contradictory, and it is particularly dangerous to rely on isolated remarks from certain delegations in attempting to establish the intent of the drafters. The wording represents a compromise aimed at generating consensus between States with somewhat different conceptions of the purposes of the convention.

**Specific intent or dolus specialis**

The degree of intent required by article II of the Genocide Convention can be described as a ‘specific’ intent or ‘special’ intent. This common law concept corresponds to the *dol specialis* or *dolus specialis* of Romano-Germanic systems. ‘Specific’ intent and ‘special’ intent appear to be

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57 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.73 (Dihigo, Cuba). See also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.73 (Noriega, Mexico); *ibid.* (Messina, Dominican Republic); and *ibid.* (Manini y Rios, Uruguay).

58 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.72 (Bartos, Yugoslavia). See also *ibid.* (Setelvad, India); and *ibid.* (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela).


60 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.73 (twenty-seven in favour, ten against, with six abstentions).

61 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.72 (Maúrtua, Peru).


63 In *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, note 11 above, paras. 121, 497, 498, 516 and 539, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda suggested that *dolus specialis* is a synonym for *mens rea*. In fact, the term *mens rea* comprises crimes of *dolus generalis* as well as crimes of *dolus specialis*. See also *A-G Israel v. Eichmann*, note 21 above, para. 30; and *Prosecutor v. Serushago* (Case No. ICTR–98–39–S), Sentence, 5 February 1999, para. 15.

‘Specific’ intent is used in the common law to distinguish offences of ‘general’ intent, which are crimes for which no particular level of intent is actually set out in the text of the infraction. In a general intent offence, the only issue is the performance of the criminal act, and no further ulterior intent or purpose need be proven. An example would be the minimal intent to apply force in the case of common assault. A specific intent offence requires performance of the *actus reus* but in association with an intent or purpose that goes beyond the mere performance of the act. Assault with intent to maim or wound is an example drawn from ordinary criminal law.

According to the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in the *Akayesu* case:

Special intent of a crime is the specific intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime, which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged. Thus, the special intent in the crime of genocide lies in ‘the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’. Thus, for a crime of genocide to have been committed, it is necessary that one of the acts listed under Article 2(2) of the Statute [or article II of the Convention] be committed, that the particular act be committed against a specifically targeted group, it being a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.

The Tribunal continued:

Special intent is a well-known criminal law concept in the Roman-continental legal systems. It is required as a constituent element of certain offences and demands that the perpetrator have the clear intent to cause the offence charged. According to this meaning, special intent is the key element of an intentional offence, which offence is characterized by a psychological relationship between the physical result and the mental state of the perpetrator.

In *Kambanda*, the same Trial Chamber observed: ‘The crime of genocide is unique because of its element of *dolus specialis* (special intent) which requires that the crime be committed with the intent “to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such”’. In its commentary on the 1996 Code of Crimes against the Peace and
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Security of Mankind, the International Law Commission qualifies genocide’s specific intent as ‘the distinguishing characteristic of this particular crime under international law’.  

The prohibited acts enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (c) are by their very nature conscious, intentional or volitional acts which an individual could not usually commit without knowing that certain consequences were likely to result. These are not the type of acts that would normally occur by accident or even as a result of mere negligence. However, a general intent to commit one of the enumerated acts combined with a general awareness of the probable consequences of such an act with respect to the immediate victim or victims is not sufficient for the crime of genocide. The definition of this crime requires a particular state of mind or a specific intent with respect to the overall consequences of the prohibited act.  

Echoing the District Court of Jerusalem in the *Eichmann* case, the International Law Commission noted that, where the specific intent of genocide cannot be established, the crime may still meet the conditions of the crime against humanity of ‘persecution’. Within the Commission, some suggested the genocide provision might be rephrased in order to clarify the specific intent requirement, ‘using a formulation such as “acts committed with the aim of” or “acts manifestly aimed at destroying” to avoid any ambiguity on this important element of the crime’. The specific or special intent requirement of genocide was also discussed during the negotiations surrounding the establishment of the International Criminal Court. According to the record of debates: ‘The reference to “intent to destroy, in whole or in part . . . a group, as such” was understood to refer to the specific intention to destroy more than a small number of individuals who are members of a group.’  

The United States has been particularly insistent on qualifying the genocidal intent as ‘specific’. Its ‘understandings’, formulated at the time of ratification of the Convention, include the following: ‘That the term “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, 

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71 A-G Israel v. Eichmann, note 21 above, para. 25: ‘under the Convention a special intention is requisite for its commission, an intention that is not required for the commission of a “crime against humanity”’.  


or religious group as such” appearing in article II means the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such by the acts specified in article II; and ‘That acts in the course of armed conflicts committed without the specific intent required by Article II are not sufficient to constitute genocide as defined by this convention’. The second of these understandings is puzzling, because the specific intent requirement of article II applies to acts committed in time of peace as well as in armed conflict, as article I of the Convention makes clear. The Genocide Convention Implementation Act, adopted by the United States Congress prior to ratification of the Convention, declares that the intent component requires ‘specific intent to destroy’. In its comments on the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the United States referred to its understandings, implying that the draft Code’s definition of genocide, which mirrored the Convention definition on this point, ‘fails to establish the mental state needed for the imposition of criminal liability’. Curiously, however, in its ‘definitional elements’ presented to the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, the United States did not use the term ‘specific intent’ to describe the mental element of genocide.

The first paragraph or *chapeau* of article II of the Convention defines the specific intent: ‘to destroy in whole or in part a national, racial, ethnical or religious group as such’. The components of this phrase are discussed in greater detail below. In some cases, the acts of genocide defined in the five subsequent paragraphs of article II also contain elements of specific intent. Paragraphs (a) and (b) involve a result, and the offender must have the specific intent to effect this result. The crime

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75 A fierce critic of the United States’ reservations and declarations, Professor Jordan Paust, has written that the qualification of genocide as a crime of ‘specific intent’ is appropriate under the circumstances: Jordan Paust, ‘Congress and Genocide: They’re Not Going to Get Away With It’, (1989) 11 *Michigan Journal of International Law*, p. 90 at p. 95. See also Joe Verhoeven, ‘Le crime de génocide, originalité et ambiguïté’, [1991] RBDI 5.

76 Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), S. 1851, s. 1091(a).


78 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.10, p. 1; see also ‘Draft Elements of Crimes’, UN Doc. PCNICC/1988/DP.4. But see the ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’, UN Doc. A/50/22, para. 62: ‘There was a further suggestion to clarify the intent requirement for the crime of genocide by distinguishing between a specific intent requirement for the responsible decision makers or planners and a general intent or knowledge requirement for the actual perpetrators of genocidal acts.’
of murder, set out in paragraph (a), requires the specific intent to kill the victim. Paragraph (b), ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm’, also involves a special intent. Subparagraphs (c) and (d), which do not require proof of a result, but nevertheless introduce an additional mental element. In the case of imposing conditions of life, these must be ‘calculated’ to bring about its physical destruction of the group in whole or in part. As for paragraph (d), which deals with imposing measures that prevent births, these must be specifically intended to prevent births within the group. Only paragraph (e), ‘forcibly transferring children’, does not seem to have a specific intent.

In the Akayesu decision, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda concluded that, while the principal offender must possess the special or specific intent of genocide, this is not necessary in the case of accomplices. The Tribunal reduced this to a question of whether the accomplice had knowledge of the principal offender’s intent. Thus, it concluded that, if an accused knowingly aided or abetted another in the commission of genocide while being unaware that the principal offender had the special genocidal intent, the accused could be prosecuted for complicity in murder but not for complicity in genocide. On the other hand, if the accused ‘knew or had reason to know that the principal was acting with genocidal intent, the accused would be an accomplice to genocide, even though he did not share the murderer’s intent to destroy the group’.

This assessment by the Rwanda Tribunal cannot be correct, and confuses the issue of knowledge of the principal offender’s intent with the accomplice’s intent. It also flies in the face of a consistent line of authority by which specific intent is an essential element of the offence. In reality, genocide is more likely to be committed where the principal offender – the actual murderer – lacks genocidal intent, but is incited or directed to commit the crime by a superior – technically an accomplice – who possesses the genocidal intent. The principal offender is a subordinate who may possibly be ignorant of the genocidal plan. He or she follows an order to commit an act while unaware that the intent behind the order is to destroy a group in whole or in part. The superior orders the murder, but does not in fact commit it, and is therefore an accomplice or principal in the second degree. The better view, then, is that a person prosecuted for genocide as an accomplice must have the special intent required by article II of the Convention, and is culpable even if the principal offender lacks such special intent.

79 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 11 above, para. 539.
Proof of intent

In practice, proof of intent is rarely a formal part of the prosecution’s case. The prosecution does not generally call psychiatrists as expert witnesses to establish what the accused really intended. Rather, the intent is a logical deduction that flows from evidence of the material acts. Criminal law presumes that an individual intends the consequences of his or her acts, in effect deducing the existence of the *mens rea* from proof of the physical act itself. As the United States Military Tribunal said in the *Hostages* case: ‘we shall require proof of a causative, overt act or omission from which a guilty intent can be inferred.’\(^8^0\) For ordinary crimes, of general rather than specific intent, this is a relatively straightforward exercise. An individual who assaults another will be presumed to have intended the crime, in the absence of evidence indicating the material act was purely accidental. But the material act may not provide enough information to enable a court to conclude that the intent is specific, and not merely general. For example, if a victim is killed by an automobile, in the absence of other elements the likely conclusion will be that it was an ‘accident’. Upon further proof of negligent behaviour by the perpetrator, there may be a finding of manslaughter or involuntary homicide. If the prosecution intends to prove that killing by an automobile is intentional, or even premeditated, considerably more evidence of intent will be required.

The specific intent necessary for a conviction of genocide is even more demanding than that required for murder. The crime must be committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group, as such. If the accused accompanied or preceded the act with some sort of genocidal declaration or speech, its content may assist in establishing the special intent. Otherwise, the prosecution will rely on the context of the crime, its massive scale, and elements of its perpetration that suggest hatred of the group and a desire for its destruction. The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in *Akayesu*, declared that genocidal intent could be inferred from the physical acts, and specifically ‘their massive and/or systematic nature or their atrocity’.\(^8^1\) According to the Trial Chamber:

This is the reason why, in the absence of a confession from the accused, his intent can be inferred from a certain number of presumptions of fact. The Chamber considers that it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts

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\(^{8^0}\) *United States of America v. List*, (1948) 8 LRTWC 34 (United States Military Tribunal).

\(^{8^1}\) *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, note 11 above, para. 477.
were committed by the same offender or by others. Other factors, such as the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups, can enable the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent of a particular act.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.}

Further on, the Tribunal stated:

The Chamber is of the opinion that it is possible to infer the genocidal intention that presided over the commission of a particular act, \textit{inter alia}, from all acts or utterances of the accused, or from the general context in which other culpable acts were perpetrated systematically against the same group, regardless of whether such other acts were committed by the same perpetrator or even by other perpetrators.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}. See also \textit{Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana}, note 14 above, para. 93. See also paras. 531–45.}

In addition to the speeches of the accused, which the Trial Chamber held to be convincing evidence of genocidal intent, it also cited such factors as the very high number of atrocities committed against the Tutsi, their widespread nature in the commune of Taba as well as throughout Rwanda, and the fact that the victims were systematically and deliberately selected because they belonged to the Tutsi group, persons belonging to other groups being excluded.

Although the Genocide Convention does not recognize cultural genocide as a criminal act falling within its scope,\footnote{On cultural genocide, see chapter 4, pp. 179–89 above.} proof of attacks directed against cultural institutions or monuments, committed in association with killing, may prove important in establishing the existence of a genocidal rather than merely a homicidal intent. The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in its Rule 61\footnote{‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, as amended 10 December 1998, UN Doc. IT/32, Rule 61. See M. Thieroof and E. A. Amley, ‘Proceeding to Justice and Accountability in the Balkans: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rule 61,’ (1998) 23 \textit{Yale Journal of International Law}, p. 231; and Faı¨za Patel King, and Anne-Marie La Rosa, ‘The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal: 1994–1996’, (1997) 8 \textit{European Journal of International Law}, p. 123.} hearing in the \textit{Karadzic and Mladic} case, noted that genocidal intent need not be clearly expressed, but that it may be implied by various facts, including the general political doctrine giving rise to the criminal acts, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts. The Trial Chamber also explained that this intent may also be inferred ‘from the perpetration of acts which violate, or which the perpetrators themselves consider to violate, the very foundation of the group – acts which are not in themselves covered by the list in Article 4(2) [of the
Statute of the Tribunal, corresponding to article III of the Genocide Convention] but which are committed as part of the same pattern of conduct’. The Trial Chamber continued:

In this case, the plans of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] in Bosnia and Herzegovina contain elements which would lead to the destruction of the non-Serbian groups. The project of an ethnically homogeneous State formulated against a backdrop of mixed populations necessarily envisages the exclusion of any group not identified with the Serbian one. The concrete expressions of these plans by the SDS before the conflict would confirm the existence of an intent to exclude those groups by violence. The project does not exclude the use of force against civilian populations. Furthermore, it appears that a certain group which had been targeted could not, in accordance with the SDS plans, lay claim to any other specific territory. In this case, the massive deportations may be construed as the first step in a process of elimination. These elements, taken together, would confirm that the project which inspired the offences before the Trial Chamber, contemplates the destruction of the non-Serbian groups, and specifically the Bosnian Muslim group, as the ultimate step. In addition, certain methods used for implementing the project of ‘ethnic cleansing’ appear to reveal an aggravated intent as, for example, the massive scale of the effect of the destruction. The number of the victims selected only because of their membership in a group would lead one to the conclusion that an intent to destroy the group, at least in part, was present. Furthermore, the specific nature of some of the means used to achieve the objective of ‘ethnic cleansing’ tends to underscore that the perpetration of the acts is designed to reach the very foundations of the group or what is considered as such. The systematic rape of women, to which material submitted to the Trial Chamber attests, is in some cases intended to transmit a new ethnic identity to the child. In other cases, humiliation and terror serve to dismember the group. The destruction of mosques or Catholic churches is designed to annihilate the centuries-long presence of the group or groups; the destruction of the libraries is intended to annihilate a culture which was enriched through the participation of the various national components of the population.

The Trial Chamber concluded that genocidal intent can be deduced from the combined effect of speeches or projects laying the groundwork for and justifying the acts, from the massive scale of their destructive effect and from their specific nature, which aims at undermining what is considered to be the foundation of the group. For the Tribunal, the national Bosnian, Bosnian Croat and, especially, Bosnian Muslim groups were the targets of those acts.

Cherif Bassiouni has written that the specific intent requirement of

86 Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, note 10 above, para. 84. See also Prosecutor v. Nikolic (Case No. IT–95–2–R61), Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, 20 October 1995, para. 34.
87 Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, note 10 above, para. 94.
88 Ibid., paras. 84, 94 and 95.
the Convention is too high, criticizing the International Law Commis-

sion for failing ‘to progressively define article 2 of the 1948 Convention

in light of the clearly perceived need for it considering all of the quasi-
genocidal conduct that have taken place since 1948’. According to

Professor Bassiouni:

Quite obviously in situations such as Germany’s during World War II where

there was a significant paper trail, evidence of specific intent can more readily be

established than in cases where such a paper trail does not exist. It is not difficult

to think of a number of contemporary conflicts such as those in Cambodia and

the former Yugoslavia, where there is obviously no paper trail and where the

specific intent can only be shown by the cumulative effect of the objective

conduct to which one necessarily has to add the inference of specific intent

deriving from omission.89

He has proposed adding a paragraph in order to facilitate proof of

specific intent: ‘Intent to commit Genocide, as defined above, can be

proven by objective legal standards with respect to decision makers and

commanders. With respect to executants, knowledge of the nature of

the act based on an objective reasonable standard shall constitute

intent.’90 The paragraph does not really seem essential, however, and

fears of judicial conservatism in this respect may have been exaggerated.

In practice, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda applied the

recommended approach to proof of genocidal intent in its first judg-

ments.91

Premeditation

Premeditation implies that there is a degree of planning and preparation

in the commission of a crime.92 Many national criminal law systems

consider premeditation to be an aggravating factor, particularly in the

case of homicide.93 The travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Con-

vention indicate quite clearly that the drafters did not intend to extend

the concept of premeditation to the crime of genocide.94 In removing

the term ‘deliberate’ from the Ad Hoc Committee draft, the Sixth

89 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Commentary on the International Law Commission’s 1991


études pénales, p. 233.

90 Ibid.

91 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 11 above; Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, note 14

above, paras. 531–40.

92 Pradel, Droit pénal comparé, p. 473.

93 For example, the French Penal Code, art. 132–72.

94 See pp. 216–17 above. See also Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A

Commentary, New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960, p. 60; Matthew Lippman,

‘The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:
Committee meant to eliminate any suggestion that genocide be premeditated.

The issue of premeditation should not be confused with the requirement of proof of a plan as part of the circumstances of the crime. Genocide cannot be committed without a degree of planning and preparation, and it is unlikely courts will convict in the absence of proof of a plan.\(^95\) At trial, proof of the plan, or at the very least the logical inference that a plan exists drawn from the actual conduct of the crime, will inevitably be an important element in the prosecution case, as discussed earlier in this chapter. However, there is a distinction between proof of a plan of genocide, to which an individual may be privy, and premeditation on the part of the individual with respect to perpetration of specific acts of genocide. An individual offender may participate in genocide, with full knowledge of the plan, and yet act without premeditation. Of course, such an offender would obviously be a minor player in the genocide as a whole and would probably attract less prosecutorial attention than those more intimately involved in the crime.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has in effect insisted upon premeditation, at least with respect to the specific intent component found in the *chapeau* of article II. It stated that ‘for the crime of genocide to occur, the *mens rea* must be formed prior to the commission of the genocidal acts. The individual acts themselves, however, do not require premeditation; the only consideration is that the act should be done in furtherance of the genocidal intent.’\(^96\) In *Eichmann*\(^97\) and *Akayesu*,\(^98\) premeditation was evidenced from the circumstances. In *Serushago*, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda noted that the crimes had been committed with premeditation, treating this as an aggravating factor in the determination of sentence.\(^99\)

### ‘Negligent’ genocide

Article II’s intent requirement excludes ‘negligent’ genocide. A crime of negligence is one without genuine intent, but resulting from extreme

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\(^{96}\) *Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana*, note 14 above, para. 91.

\(^{97}\) *A-G Israel v. Eichmann*, note 21 above.

\(^{98}\) *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, note 11 above.

carelessness. Negligence imposes an objective standard of criminal responsibility, holding the accused liable for failing to exercise the degree of care expected of an ordinary or prudent individual. This is obviously incompatible with the specific intent requirement of the crime of genocide.\textsuperscript{100} As the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda observed in the \textit{Akayesu} case, an individual cannot be guilty as a participant in genocide ‘where he did not act knowingly, and even where he should have had such knowledge’.\textsuperscript{101}

Negligence should not be confused with omission. An individual may intentionally omit to perform an act, thereby participating in a result. Where the result is an act of genocide, the individual may participate with the required level of intent. Omission is not an issue of intent so much as one addressing the material element of the crime. Depending on the circumstances, an omission may occur intentionally, although it may also be the result of negligence. For example, one of the acts of genocide defined in article II is ‘[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction’. An individual may inflict conditions of life on a group by failing to provide it with essentials for survival. The crime is committed by omitting to take action, rather than taking action. Obviously, such an act can be committed with the specific intent to destroy the group.\textsuperscript{102}

Recognition of a crime of ‘negligent genocide’ or ‘genocide in the second degree’ has been proposed.\textsuperscript{103} It is explained that such a crime would be particularly applicable in the case of economic development policies that displace aboriginal peoples.\textsuperscript{104} But while the desire to extend international law to cover negligent behaviour of governments and corporations is commendable, this becomes somewhat far removed from the stigmatization of genocide as the ‘crime of crimes’ for which the highest level of evil and malicious intent is presumed. Extending the scope of genocide to crimes of negligence can easily trivialize the entire concept.

Arguably, an individual may commit genocide by negligence as an accomplice rather than as a principal offender. This is, of course,

\textsuperscript{100} Lippman, ‘1948 Convention’, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Prosecutor v. Akayesu}, note 11 above, para. 478. The Tribunal was referring to liability under art. 6(1) of its Statute, making an exception in the case of superior or command responsibility.
\textsuperscript{102} For a more detailed discussion of the issue of omission, see chapter 4, pp. 156–7 above.
Command responsibility holds the superior liable for the acts of subordinates when the superior knew or ought to have known that the subordinates were committing such acts and the superior failed to intervene. Where the superior knew and failed to intervene, the crime is one of intentional omission and meets the criteria of article II of the Convention without any difficulty. Where the superior ‘ought to have known’, the standard becomes one of negligence. Liability of commanders on this basis has been recognized by international war crimes law for more than half a century, although its application in a non-military context is far less manifest. The essence of the Convention, and specifically the definition of the crime in article II, challenges the idea that it may be committed by negligence. Nevertheless, the plain words of the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and of the International Criminal Court, recognizing the application of command responsibility to genocide, make it at least theoretically possible for a superior or commander to be found guilty of genocide where the mental element was only one of negligence. The limited case law on this point indicates that the courts remain rather uncomfortable with the concept.

Components of the specific intent to commit genocide

The specific intent of the crime of genocide, subject to the additional intent requirements of the punishable acts in the five paragraphs of article II, has three basic components. The offender must intend to destroy the group, the offender must intend that the group be destroyed in whole or in part, and the offender must intend to destroy a group that is defined by nationality, race, ethnicity or religion.

‘to destroy’

Article II of the Convention specifies that the offender must intend ‘to destroy’ a protected group. Raphael Lemkin took a large view of this concept, observing that genocide involved the destruction of political

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105 Command responsibility is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6, at pp. 306–15 below.
107 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 11 above.
The mental element of the offence

Institutions, economic life, language and culture. Physical destruction was only the ultimate or final stage in genocide. Nevertheless, the drafters of the Convention clearly chose to limit its scope, in terms of the acts of genocide set out in the five subparagraphs of article II, to physical and biological genocide. Still, an important problem of interpretation arises as to whether the destruction that is part of the intent, in the first part of article II, must correspond to the physical or biological destruction defined in the second part of article II. For example, a State might intend to destroy a group by eliminating its political structures, economy and culture, but not its physical existence in the sense of mass killing or similar acts. In the course of such measures, perhaps only in an incidental way, members of the group might be killed. If destruction is viewed from this large perspective, then such killing would meet the definition of genocide, being killing of members of a group with the intent to destroy the group, even though the intent is not to destroy the group by killing.

The words of the Convention can certainly bear such an interpretation. This might facilitate extending the Convention to cases such as ethnic cleansing, where an intent at physical destruction is not obvious but where the intent to destroy the community as a political, economic, social and cultural entity is beyond question. It would also encompass without doubt the destruction of aboriginal communities by a combination of violence, eradication of economic life, and incitement to assimilation. The travaux préparatoires of the Convention do not, however, sustain this construction. While these questions were not specifically debated during the drafting of article II, the spirit of the discussions resists extending the concept of destruction beyond physical and biological acts. During consideration of the draft Code of Crimes, the International Law Commission addressed this problem:

As clearly shown by the preparatory work for the Convention, the destruction in question is the material destruction of a group either by physical or by biological means, not the destruction of the national, linguistic, religious, cultural or other identity of a particular group. The national or religious element and the racial or ethnic element are to be taken into consideration in the definition of the word ‘destruction’, which must be taken only in its material sense, its physical or biological sense. It is true that the 1947 draft Convention prepared by the

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109 This interpretation was adopted by a German court: Bundesgerichtshof, Urteil vom 30 April 1999, 3StR 215/98. It is suggested by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, note 14 above, para. 95.
Secretary-General and the 1948 draft prepared by the ad hoc Committee on Genocide contained provisions on ‘cultural genocide’ covering any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a group, such as prohibiting the use of the language of a group in daily intercourse or in schools or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group or destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the group. However, the text of the Convention, as prepared by the Sixth Committee and adopted by the General Assembly, did not include the concept of ‘cultural genocide’ contained in the two drafts and simply listed acts which come within the category of ‘physical’ or ‘biological’ genocide.\footnote{Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Forty-First Session, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1989/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 102, para. (4).}

A court seeking to adopt the broader and more liberal view could, however, rely on the text itself, the objectives of the Convention, the need for dynamic interpretation of legal instruments that protect human rights,\footnote{Soering v. United Kingdom and Germany, 7 July 1989, Series A, Vol. 161, 11 EHRR 439; Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 23 March 1995, Series A, Vol. 310, 16 HRLJ 15.} and the principle established in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which authorizes resort to a convention’s preparatory work only when the ordinary meaning of the provision, taken in its context and in the light of its object and purpose, leaves a provision ‘ambiguous or obscure’.\footnote{Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1979) 1155 UNTS 331, arts. 31–32.}

The initial sentence of article II says that acts of genocide must be committed with the intent to destroy a protected group ‘in whole or in part’. In Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Raphael Lemkin did not focus on the quantitative question, declaring simply that genocide means ‘the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group’.\footnote{Lemkin, Axis Rule, p. 79.} However, the notion that genocide might constitute destruction of groups ‘entirely or in part’ appeared in the preamble of General Assembly Resolution 96(I).\footnote{See also the first draft: UN Doc. A/BUR/50.} The Secretariat draft defined genocide as ‘a criminal act directed against any one of the aforesaid groups of human beings, with the purpose of destroying it in whole or in part, or of preventing its preservation or development’.\footnote{UN Doc. A/AC.10/41; UN Doc. A/362, appendix II, art. I § II. The Saudi Arabian draft expressed the same idea with the word ‘gradually’. Art. I defined genocide as ‘the destruction of an ethnic group, people or nation carried out either gradually against
individual executions’ in the list of acts of genocide.\textsuperscript{117} The issue does not seem to have concerned the expert committee that considered the Secretariat draft.\textsuperscript{118} The United States reformulated the concept in its 1947 draft, which spoke of destroying a group ‘totally or partially’.\textsuperscript{119} France’s draft convention did not adopt the ‘in whole or in part’ language, but obviously seemed to accept the concept, saying genocide consisted of ‘an attack on the life of a human group or of an individual as a member of such group’.\textsuperscript{120}

A Secretariat note to the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee reiterated the idea: ‘Genocide in the most restricted sense consists in the physical destruction of the members of a human group with the purpose of destroying the whole or part of that human group’,\textsuperscript{121} But the Secretariat also commented that: ‘The victim of the crime of genocide is a human group. It is not a greater or smaller number of individuals who are affected for a particular reason (execution of hostages) but a group as such.’\textsuperscript{122} China’s draft definition referred to genocide’s quantitative aspect in the enumeration of specific acts: destroying ‘totally or partially’ the physical existence of the group or subjecting it to conditions causing its destruction ‘in whole or in part’. The third category, cultural genocide, had no quantitative qualification.\textsuperscript{123} The Soviet Basic Principles stated that the convention ‘should include as instances of genocide such crimes as group massacres or individual executions on the grounds of race, nationality (or religion)’.\textsuperscript{124} When asked by Venezuela whether the definition would cover the destruction of one or more persons,\textsuperscript{125} the Soviets answered that it ‘obviously applied not only to the destruction of a group but to that of the individuals composing it whenever murder for racial, national or religious reasons was involved. Naturally, the murder of an individual could not be considered genocide unless it could be proved that it was the first of a series of acts aimed at the destruction of

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Ibid.}, art. I.1(a). The phrase ‘group massacres or individual executions’ was well accepted, and reappeared in the United States draft (UN Doc. E/623, art. 1(a)) and the Soviet Union’s ‘Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide’ (UN Doc. E/AC.25/7, Principle VII).

\textsuperscript{118} UN Doc. E/447.

\textsuperscript{119} UN Doc. E/623.

\textsuperscript{120} UN Doc. E/623/Add.1.

\textsuperscript{121} ‘Relations Between the Convention on Genocide on the One Hand and the Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles and the Preparation of a Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security on the Other, Note by the Secretariat’, Chapter I, no. 1.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{123} UN Doc. E/AC.25/9.

\textsuperscript{124} UN Doc. E/AC.25/7, Principle VII. They later proposed another formulation: ‘[d]estroying totally or partially the physical existence of such groups’ (UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.12, p. 2).

\textsuperscript{125} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.10, p. 13.
an entire group." The Ad Hoc Committee initially agreed that reference to ‘in whole or in part’ should appear in the text of the definition rather than in the reference to the specific acts of genocide. But the debate apparently startled some delegates who feared that perceived ambiguity in the term might result in an excessively low quantitative threshold. A revised text from the United States deleted ‘in part’. The final version of the Ad Hoc Committee eliminated any suggestion that genocide might be ‘partial’.

In the Sixth Committee, a Chinese proposal reactivated the concept of partial destruction: ‘genocide means any of the acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnic, racial, religious or political group as such.’ Amendments from the Soviet Union, Sweden and Venezuela had a similar import. Norway focused the debate by inserting ‘in whole or in part’ after the words ‘with the intent to destroy’ in the Ad Hoc Committee draft. Venezuela insisted ‘it should be stated that destruction of part of a group also constituted genocide’. But for Belgium, genocide had to be aimed at the destruction of a whole group, ‘even if that result was achieved only in part, by stages . . . It would be illogical to introduce into the description of the requisite intention the idea of partial destruction, genocide being characterized by the intention to destroy a group.’ New Zealand cautioned that ‘in whole or in part’ might imply genocide had been committed even where there was no intention of destroying a whole group.

A French amendment sought to address the same issue, but by another route, returning to the draft it had proposed earlier in the year. France explained that the crime of genocide occurred as soon as

\[\text{126 Ibid., p. 14.} \qquad \text{127 Ibid., p. 16.} \]
\[\text{128 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.12, p. 2.} \]
\[\text{129 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.24, p. 4.} \]
\[\text{130 UN Doc. A/C.6/223/Rev.1.} \]
\[\text{131 UN Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1: ‘The physical destruction in whole or in part of such groups’. See also UN Doc. A/C.6/223 and Corr.1.} \]
\[\text{132 UN Doc. A/C.6/230 and Corr.1: ‘In this Convention genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.’} \]
\[\text{133 UN Doc. A/C.6/231: ‘In this Convention genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, racial or religious group as such.’} \]
\[\text{134 UN Doc. A/C.6/228.} \]
\[\text{135 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela). See also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Wikborg, Norway).} \]
\[\text{136 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.73 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).} \]
\[\text{137 Ibid. (Reid, New Zealand).} \]
an individual became the victim of acts of genocide. If a motive for the crime existed, genocide existed even if only a single individual were the victim. France said its amendment ‘had the advantage of avoiding a technical difficulty . . . namely, that of deciding the minimum number of persons constituting a group’.139 Egypt suggested that the aim of the French amendment would be met if the Committee adopted the Norwegian proposal to insert the terms ‘in whole or in part’.140

The United States delegation worried about ‘broadening’ the concept of genocide to cases where ‘a single individual was attacked as a member of a group’.141 Egypt agreed that ‘the idea of genocide could hardly be reconciled with the idea of an attack on the life of a single individual’.142 Yugoslavia was more equivocal, conceding that ‘it would be difficult to establish whether or not the murder of an individual was genocide’.143 The United Kingdom said that, when a single individual was affected, it was a case of homicide, not genocide. But ‘if it was desired to ensure that cases of partial destruction should also be punished, the amend-ment proposed by the Norwegian delegation would have to be adopted’.144 This is in fact what happened, and by a decisive majority.145

The 1948 debates in the Sixth Committee and, for that matter, all of the preparatory work of the Convention, provide little guidance as to what the drafters meant by ‘in part’. The French approach, with its reference to individual victims, seems to confuse the intentional element, or *mens rea*, with the material element, or *actus reus*.146 Even a small number of actual victims is enough to establish the material element.147 The actual quantity killed or injured remains a relevant

139 UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.73 (Chaumont, France).
140 *Ibid.* (Raafat, Egypt).
142 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.73 (Raafat, Egypt).
144 *Ibid.* (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
145 *Ibid.* (forty-one in favour, eight against, with two abstentions).
material fact, but what is really germane to the debate is whether the author of the crime intended to destroy the group ‘in whole or in part’. As discussed earlier in this chapter, intent is normally proven as a deduction from the material act. Where genocide involves the destruction of a large number of members of a group, the logical deduction will be more obvious. If there are only a few victims, this deduction will be far less evident, even if the criminal is in fact animated with the intent to destroy the entire group. Hence, unable to rely on the quantity of the victims as evidence of genocidal intent, the prosecution will be required to introduce other elements of proof. The greater the number of actual victims, the more apparent the conclusion that the accused intended to destroy the group, in whole or in part.

For these reasons, the concern, expressed by the United States and others, that genocide might be expanded to cover cases where ‘a single individual was attacked as a member of a group’, was misplaced. No acceptable rationale can justify why an individual murder, if committed with the intent to destroy a group ‘in whole or in part’, should not be qualified as genocide. On the other hand, the intent to destroy an individual member of a group because that person belongs to the group would be a racially motivated murder and not genocide. But at what point do a number of racially motivated murders cross the threshold and attain the status of genocide?

A 1982 resolution of the United Nations General Assembly declared the massacre of a few hundred victims in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, located in the suburbs of Beirut, an ‘act of genocide’. The resolution was not unanimous, however, and a separate vote on the paragraph referring to genocide was approved by ninety-eight to nineteen, with twenty-three abstentions, on a recorded

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150 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.73 (Gross, United States). When the United States finally ratified the Convention, in 1988, one of its understandings indicated that ‘in part’ was to mean ‘in substantial part’: ‘“That the term intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such” appearing in article II means the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such by the acts specified in article II.’


152 GA Res. 37/123 D. See chapter 10, pp. 454–5 below.
vote. Doubtless, many States used the term ‘genocide’ to express their outrage at the atrocity in a manner calculated to torment a State whose population had itself suffered so much as a result of the same crime. A General Assembly resolution could, in theory, be of considerable assistance in construing the scope of the words ‘in whole or in part’, as a form of authentic interpretation or merely an indication of opinio juris of States. Yet the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Sabra and Shatila resolution, and the lack of unanimity, argue against drawing any meaningful conclusions.

What the terms ‘in whole or part’ do is undermine pleas from criminals who argue that they did not intend the destruction of the group as a whole. The Turkish Government targeted Armenians within its borders, not those of the Diaspora. The intentions of the Nazis may only have been to rid Europe of Jews; they were probably not ambitious enough, even in their heyday, to imagine this possibility on a world scale. Indications they were prepared to accept the departure of Jews from Europe for Palestine, even in the later stages of the war, could support such a claim. Similarly, in 1994 the Rwandan extremists do not appear to have given serious consideration to eliminating Tutsi populations beyond the country’s borders. In all three ‘classic’ cases, then, an argument can be made that the intent was not to destroy the group as a whole, but rather a part of the group. Surely, it is cases like these that are contemplated by the phrase ‘in whole or in part’ found in article II of the Convention.

According to Nehemiah Robinson, the real point of the provision is to encompass genocide where it is directed against a part of a country, or a single town. Genocide is aimed at destroying ‘a multitude of persons of the same group’, as long as the number is ‘substantial’. [T]he intention must be to destroy a group and not merely one or more individuals who are coincidentally members of a particular group. The

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155 Robinson, Genocide Convention, p. 63.
156 Ibid.
prohibited act must be committed against an individual because of his membership in a particular group and as an incremental step in the overall objective of destroying the group. It is the membership of the individual in a particular group rather than the identity of the individual that is the decisive criterion in determining the immediate victims of the crime of genocide. The group itself is the ultimate target or intended victim of this type of massive criminal conduct.157

However, ‘[i]t will be up to the courts to decide in each case whether the number was sufficiently large’.158

The International Law Commission considered that: ‘It is not necessary to intend to achieve the complete annihilation of a group from every corner of the globe. None the less the crime of genocide by its very nature requires the intention to destroy at least a substantial part of a particular group.’159 Its 1996 report on the draft Code of Crimes continues: ‘it is not necessary to achieve the final result of the destruction of a group in order for a crime of genocide to have been committed. It is enough to have committed any one of the acts listed in the article with the clear intention of bringing about the total or partial destruction of a protected group as such.’160 Moreover:

The main characteristic of Genocide is its object: the act must be directed toward the destruction of a group. Groups consist of individuals, and therefore, destructive action must, in the last analysis, be taken against individuals. However, these individuals are important not per se but only as members of the group to which they belong.161

Similarly, the final draft statute of the Preparatory Committee of the International Criminal Court noted that: ‘The reference to “intent to destroy, in whole or in part . . . a group, as such” was understood to refer to the specific intention to destroy more than a small number of individuals who are members of a group.’162

The Commission of Experts established by the Security Council in 1992 to investigate violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia took a slightly different perspective. According to one of its members, Cherif Bassiouni, the Commission considered the definition in the Genocide Convention to be ‘sufficiently pliable to

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encompass not only the targeting of an entire group, as stated in the
convention, but also the targeting of certain segments of a given group,
such as the Muslim elite or Muslim women’.

Furthermore, a given group can be defined on the basis of its regional existence,
as opposed to a broader and all-inclusive concept encompassing all the
members of that group who may be in different regions or areas. For example,
all Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be considered a protected group. One
could also define the group as all Muslims in a given area of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, such as Prijedor, if the intent of the perpetrator is the elimination
of that narrower group . . . For example, all Bosnians in Sarajevo, irrespective of
ethnicity or religion, could constitute a protected group.163

The prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia has considered the definition requires ‘a reasonably signifi-
cant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a
significant section of a group such as its leadership’.164 Furthermore: ‘In
view of the particular intent requirement, which is the essence of the
crime of genocide, the relative proportionate scale of the actual or
attempted physical destruction of a group, or a significant section
thereof, should be considered in relation to the factual opportunity of
the accused to destroy a group in a specific geographic area within the
sphere of his control, and not in relation to the entire population of the
group in a wider geographic sense.’165 In a genocide indictment, the
Prosecutor alleged the accused intended to destroy ‘a substantial or
significant part of the Bosnian Muslim people’.166 The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in Kayishema and Ruzindana, said ‘that
“in part” requires the intention to destroy a considerable number of
individuals’.167 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia said that genocide must involve the intent to destroy a
‘substantial’ part, although not necessarily a ‘very important part’.168

Difficulties on this point arose when the Truman administration
submitted the instrument for advice and consent by the Senate as a

Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law
164 Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic (Case Nos. IT–95–18–R61, IT–95–5–R61),
Transcript of hearing of 27 June 1996, p. 15. The prosecutor (Eric Ostberg) noted
165 Ibid., pp. 15–16.
17; Prosecutor v. Jelisic and Cesić (Case No. IT–95–10–I), Amended Indictment, 12
May 1998, para. 16; Prosecutor v. Jelisic and Cesić (Case No. IT–95–10–I), Second
constitutionally prerequisite for ratification. Lynching of African-Americans was not infrequent in the apartheid-like regime of the southern United States. The Senate was concerned that article II of the Convention might apply.\(^{169}\) Dean Rusk, then Deputy Under Secretary of State, testified before the Senate that the drafters of Article II meant to deal only with the intent to destroy the group as a whole, although the crime would be made out even if part of the group were actually destroyed. Rusk said: ‘United Nations negotiators felt that it should not be necessary that an entire group be destroyed to constitute the crime of genocide, but rather that genocide meant the partial destruction of a group with the intent to destroy the entire group concerned.’\(^{170}\) Even a summary review of the travaux préparatoires shows that Rusk’s assessment was a grievous misunderstanding.

Raphael Lemkin wrote to the Senate Committee in 1950 that ‘the destruction in part must be of a substantial nature so as to affect the entirety’.\(^{171}\) These views were not new to Lemkin, who had written, in 1947, that the definition of genocide was subordinated to the intent ‘to destroy or to cripple permanently a human group’.\(^{172}\) Lemkin actually proposed the text of an ‘understanding’ that he invited the United States to file at the time of ratification: ‘On the understanding that the Convention applies only to actions undertaken on a mass scale and not to individual acts even if some of these acts are committed in the course of riots or local disturbances.’\(^{173}\)

When it eventually ratified the Convention, in 1988, the United

\(^{169}\) Leblanc, ‘Intent to Destroy’, p. 377. According to a 1947 State Department internal memorandum: ‘The possibility exists that sporadic outbreaks against the Negro population in the United States may be brought to the attention of the United Nations, since the treaty, if ratified, would place this offense in the realm of international jurisdiction and remove the “safeguard” of article 2(7) of the Charter. However, since the offense will not exist unless part of an overall plan to destroy a human group, and since the Federal Government would under the treaty acquire jurisdiction over such offenses, no possibility can be foreseen of the United States being held in violation of the treaty’: ‘US Commentary on Secretariat Draft Convention on Genocide, Memorandum, 10 September 1947, Gross and Rusk to Lovett’, National Archives, United States of America, 501.BD-Genocide, 1945–49.


\(^{171}\) 2 Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Historical Series 370 (1976).


\(^{173}\) 2 Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Historical Series 370 (1976).
States attached a declaration affirming that the meaning of article II is ‘in whole or in substantial part’. In its own domestic legislation, the United States defines ‘substantial part’ as ‘a part of a group of such numerical significance that the destruction or loss of that part would cause the destruction of the group as a viable entity within the nation of which such group is a part’. Critics of the ‘substantial part’ terminology fear it might shelter individuals responsible for killing millions of blacks who will plead they did not intend to kill a ‘substantial part’ of the African-American population in the United States. Similarly, the ‘viable entity’ notion has been challenged: ‘If ninety-five percent of a group of thirty-five million men, women and children was brutally and systematically exterminated at the hands of some nationwide conspirators, would a defence be that the remaining five percent, now even more unified in its group identification and determination, was never targeted and still constitutes a viable entity?’

Leila Sadat Wexler and Jordan Paust have argued that:

Genocide can occur with the specific intent to destroy a small number of a relevant group. Nothing in the language of the Convention’s definition, containing the phrase ‘or in part,’ requires such a limiting interpretation. Moreover, successful counts or prosecutions of crimes against humanity, of which genocide is a species, have involved relatively small numbers of victims.

Malcolm Shaw, on the other hand, citing Special Rapporteur Benjamin Whitaker, warned that: ‘The offence can only retain its awesome nature if the strictness of its definitional elements is retained and not in any way trivialized.’ According to Whitaker, the term ‘in part’ denotes ‘a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group such as its leadership’.

The intent requirement that the destruction contemplate the group ‘in whole or in part’ should not be confused with the scale of the participation by an individual offender. The accused may only be involved in one or a few killings or other punishable acts. No single accused, as the principal perpetrator of the physical acts, could plausibly be responsible for destroying a group in whole or in part. As the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-

176 Ibid.
slavia said in *Tadic*: ‘Clearly, a single act by a perpetrator taken within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility and an individual perpetrator need not commit numerous offences to be held liable.’\textsuperscript{181} While these comments referred to crimes against humanity, they are certainly applicable to genocide.

Within the quantitative or numerical context, there have been suggestions that the law recognize the existence of acts falling short of full-blown genocide, that might be characterized as ‘genocidal massacre’. Leo Kuper originally proposed the concept,\textsuperscript{182} that differs from genocide in that ‘the mass murder is on a smaller scale, that is, smaller numbers of human beings are killed’\textsuperscript{183} Examples would be pogroms and mass executions. This concept is already covered, and in an adequate fashion, by the concept of crimes against humanity or, when it occurs in the course of armed conflict, by violations of the laws and customs of war. But here, too, international prosecution is wary of involvement in what are only individual or isolated acts. Thus, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court requires that crimes against humanity be ‘widespread or systematic’\textsuperscript{184} Even for war crimes there is a somewhat equivocal threshold: ‘... in particular when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.’\textsuperscript{185}

*Groups*

The groups contemplated by the Convention are examined in detail in Chapter 3, and it is unnecessary to review those comments here. Article II of the Genocide Convention specifies that the accused must intend to destroy one of the enumerated groups as such. Therefore, intent to destroy the group as well as knowledge of its existence are certainly elements of the specific intent that must be established by the prosecution.


\textsuperscript{184} ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 4 above, art. 7(1).

\textsuperscript{185} *Ibid.*, art. 8(1).
The mental element of the offence

Mens rea of the punishable acts

The five paragraphs that follow the chapeau of article II list the punishable acts of genocide. These punishable acts have their own specific mental elements.

Killing

Paragraph (a) obviously addresses homicide, but the word ‘killing’ gives it an additional mental element which may be qualified as a specific intent. During drafting of the Convention in the Sixth Committee, Gerald Fitzmaurice of the United Kingdom explained that ‘killing’ had a much wider meaning than ‘murder’. ‘If, for example, a Government destroyed a group, that might not be “murder” according to some national laws, but it would be “killing”’, he maintained. The United States said the word was used because the idea of intent was sufficiently clear in the first part of the provision, and ‘it had never been a question of defining unpremeditated killing as an act of genocide’. There was also some consideration of the French term, meurtre, which translates into English as either ‘killing’ or ‘murder’. France said that killing was an act of manslaughter; if committed without premeditation, it was an act of homicide; with premeditation, it became an act of murder. ‘In view of the very precise legal meaning of the words “homicide” and “murder”, it seemed that the French word meurtre was the term closest in meaning to the English word “killing”, explained the French delegate. But Uruguay would only accept the English version, and Australia could not agree that meurtre and ‘killing’ were synonyms.

Although the argument seems to have been entertained by some members of the Sixth Committee, it is really inconceivable that ‘killing’ be deemed broad enough to include involuntary homicide or manslaughter. The term ‘killing’ must be read together with the chapeau of article II, which speaks of intent to destroy a group as such.

According to Nehemiah Robinson: ‘The act of “killing” (subparagraph (a)) is broader than “murder”; and it was selected to correspond to the French word “meurtre”, which implies more than “assassinat”; otherwise it is hardly open to various interpretations.’ This analysis

187 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.81 (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
188 Ibid. (Maktos, United States).
189 Ibid. (Spanien, France).
190 Ibid. (Manini y Ríos, Uruguay).
191 Ibid. (Dignam, Australia).
192 Robinson, Genocide Convention, p. 63.
was endorsed by the International Law Commission.\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Assassinat} in French law is equated with premeditated murder in English law, whereas the broader term \textit{meurtre} corresponds to intentional but not necessarily premeditated murder. Yet the above review of the \textit{travaux préparatoires} shows it is hardly accurate to suggest the term was chosen to correspond to the French word \textit{meurtre}. Some delegates expressly rejected any attempt to introduce comparisons with the French language into the debate. Nor was there any discussion whatsoever in the Sixth Committee comparing the French terms \textit{meurtre} and \textit{assassinat}. Besides, ‘murder’ in English generally serves as an equivalent for either of the French terms. English-language legal instruments use a qualifying adjective such as ‘intentional’ or ‘premeditated’, or else refer to degrees of murder, in order to make the distinction that the French language effects with a single word. In \textit{Akayesu}, the Rwanda Tribunal said the English term ‘killing’ was ‘too general’, and that the ‘more precise’ French term ‘meurtre’ should be applied. This reasoning was supported with reference to the Rwandan Penal Code, as well as the canon of interpretation by which the accused should benefit from the more favourable version. But in \textit{Kayishema and Ruzindana}, a differently constituted Trial Chamber of the same tribunal said there was ‘virtually no difference between the term “killing” in the English version and “meutre” in the French version’.\textsuperscript{194}

Case law has established that the victim must in fact be a member of the persecuted group, but whether this must be known to the offender has not yet been addressed by the courts.\textsuperscript{195} It would seem perverse to acquit a killer with the specific intent to commit genocide simply because of a failure by the prosecution to establish knowledge of the victim’s racial, ethnic, national or religious identity.

\textit{Causing serious bodily or mental harm}

The mental element of paragraph (b) does not appear to pose any particular difficulties. The offender must have the specific intent to cause serious bodily or mental harm to a member of the group.


\textsuperscript{194} See \textit{Prosecutor v. Akayesu}, note 11 above, paras. 492–3; and \textit{Prosecutor v. Rutaganda}, note 68 above. See also \textit{Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana}, note 14 above, para. 104

\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Ibid.}, para. 710.
Deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy the group

Besides the general intent to inflict conditions of life, paragraph (c) includes the specific intent that these be deliberately calculated to destroy the group. This additional mental element originated in a Belgian proposal in the Sixth Committee: ‘inflicting enforced measures or conditions of life, aimed at causing death.’ It was withdrawn after the Soviets agreed to substitute ‘as are calculated to bring about . . .’ for ‘as is aimed at . . .’ in their text. Another alternative, ‘likely to cause death, disease or a weakening of such members generally’, was criticized for being too vague and was rejected. A slightly modified version of the Soviet amendment met with consensus: ‘The deliberate infliction of conditions of life for such groups as are calculated to bring about their physical destruction in whole or in part.’

In fact, the word ‘deliberately’ is a pleonasm, because the chapeau of article II already addresses the question of intent. The acts defined in paragraphs (a) and (b) of article II must also be ‘deliberate’, although the word is not used. A person who imposes such conditions of life on a group with the intent to destroy obviously does so ‘deliberately’. The French version of article II(c) confirms this interpretation, using intentionnelle in place of ‘deliberately’. According to Nehemiah Robinson, ‘“deliberately” was included there to denote a precise intention of the destruction, i.e., the premeditation related to the creation of certain conditions of life’.

The word ‘calculated’ definitely adds an important concept to the offence, implying not only intent and even premeditation but also indicating that the imposition of conditions must be the principal mechanism used to destroy the group, rather than some form of ill-treatment that accompanies or is incidental to the crime. This goes

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197 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.82 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
198 Ibid. (Sunduram, India).
199 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.81 (twenty-one in favour, six against, with nine abstentions).
201 Verhoeven, ‘Le crime de génocide’, p. 15.
202 ‘Soumission intentionnelle du groupe à des conditions d’existence devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle.’
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beyond the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b), where proof of killing or causing serious harm, even on a relatively isolated level, is sufficient to establish guilt given the intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part. Four indictments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia suggest that article II(c) of the Convention is breached by conditions in detention camps, where inmates were deprived of proper food and medical care and generally subjected to conditions ‘calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the detainees, with the intent to destroy part of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups, as such’. The indictments may be insufficient to establish liability for genocide if it cannot be proven that the camps were ‘calculated’ to destroy the group, in the sense of genuine extermination camps like those established by Nazi Germany. The fact that the indictments have been confirmed by a judge of the Tribunal, and that one of them has survived a Rule 61 examination, implies that the Tribunal may lean towards a looser construction of article II(c) of the Convention. It should be kept in mind, however, that the Tribunal has reached such conclusions on the strength of the prosecutor’s representations alone.

**Imposing measures intended to prevent births**

Examining the additional mental element of paragraph (d) leads to a tautology, because the act itself is defined with respect to the additional intent. Any measures imposed must be ‘intended’ to prevent births. Concerned by the provision, Ecuador’s comments on the International Law Commission draft Code recommended a clarification: ‘As currently drafted, it is vague and could create misunderstanding and confusion between purely social birth control programmes and crimes of genocide.’ The solution to this problem lies in assessment of the mental element. ‘Purely social birth control programmes’ are not intended to destroy a group as such.


206 Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, ibid.

The mental element of the offence does not appear to pose any particular difficulties. The offender must have the specific intent to transfer forcibly children of the group to another group. The offender must have knowledge of the fact that the children belong to one group, and that they are being transferred to another group. Thus, an individual who perpetrated the transfer of children from a victim group would have to know that the children were in fact members of the group. Similarly, he or she would have to know that what the children were being transferred to was in fact another group. Paragraph (e) is somewhat anomalous, because it contemplates what is in reality a form of cultural genocide, despite the clear decision of the drafters to exclude cultural genocide from the scope of the Convention. As a result, in prosecution of the perpetrator of the crime defined by paragraph (e), the prosecution would be required to prove the intent ‘to destroy’ the group in a cultural sense rather than in a physical or biological sense.

Motive

There is no explicit reference to motive in article II of the Genocide Convention, and the casual reader will be excused for failing to guess that the words ‘as such’ are meant to express the concept. Here, the travaux préparatoires prove indispensable. It should be noted at the outset that intent and motive are not interchangeable notions. Several individuals may intend to commit the same crime, but for different motives. Domestic criminal law systems rarely require proof of motive, in addition to proof of intent, as an element of the offence. Under ordinary circumstances, a motive requirement unnecessarily narrows the offence, and allows individuals who have intentionally committed the prohibited act to escape conviction. This is not to say that motive is irrelevant. Evidence of motive or lack of it may always be germane to the outcome of a trial. If an accused can prove lack of motive, this will colour assessment of ostensibly inculpatory factors, especially if the evidence is indirect. Finally, motive will normally be taken into account in assessing the appropriate penalty once the offender’s guilt has been determined. A crime driven by passion will not be punished as severely as one motivated by avarice or pure sadism.

The significance of motive in defining international crimes of race hatred appears in such early attempts at the development of international criminal law. In Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., note 30 above, para. 1235, the prosecution established that the accused acted out of avarice, and the trial chamber concluded that this was an aggravating factor.
international criminal norms as the Eighth International Conference of American States. The Final Act of the Conference condemned ‘[p]ersecution for racial or religious motives’. The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal’s definition of crimes against humanity also recognized the relevance of motive. Using similar language, General Assembly Resolution 96(I) also implied the significance of motive, describing genocide as a crime ‘committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds’.

The Secretariat draft of the Convention eschewed reference to motive, referring to ‘a criminal act directed against any one of the aforesaid groups of human beings, with the purpose of destroying it in whole or in part, or of preventing its preservation or development’. Conceivably, a variety of ‘purposes’ might be invoked to explain the destruction of a group, of which racist grounds would be only one. Mention of ‘purpose’ addresses the issue of intent, not motive; it explains what is being attempted without asking why. The experts who considered the Secretariat draft had no particular remarks on the subject of motive.

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210 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), (1951) 82 UNTS 279: ‘namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the court where perpetrated’ (emphasis added). See also Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Humanity, 20 December 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, No. 3, Berlin, 31 January 1946, art. II.1(c) (‘murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds’); ‘Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, UN Doc. S/RES/827, annex, art. 5 (‘persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds’) and ‘Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda’, UN Doc. S/RES/955, annex, art. 3 (‘when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds’). On the motive element for crimes against humanity, see Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law, Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 57–64; and Eric David, Principes de droit des conflits armés, 2nd ed., Brussels: Bruylant, 1999, pp. 657–62, paras. 4.137–4.141.

211 GA Res. 96(I).

212 UN Doc. E/447, art. I § II.

213 Ibid. See ‘Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat, Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations’, UN Doc. E/623: ‘Genocide means any of the following criminal acts directed against a racial, national, religious, or political group of human beings, for the purpose of totally or partially destroying such group, or of preventing its preservation or development.’
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The draft’s omission was explained to the Ad Hoc Committee by Henri Giraud of the Secretariat, who said that it should be unnecessary to prove motive: ‘the minute the intention arose to destroy a human group, genocide was committed.’ The chair, John Maktos, seemed to grasp this, observing that: ‘if the reasons were mentioned, it might be claimed that a crime was committed for motives other than those specified.’ But there was support for the idea from Lebanon, which considered ‘that the criterion was to be found in the motive provoking such destruction. Included in the crime of genocide, therefore, would be all acts tending towards the destruction of a group on the grounds of hatred of something different or alien, be it race, religion, language, or political conception, and acts inspired by fanaticism in whatever form’. Lebanon proposed the following language: ‘namely, that of the destruction of a group, as such’. The Soviet Union and Poland also insisted that motive be included. Reacting to these views, China agreed to change its draft text to read ‘particularly on grounds of national or racial origin or religious belief’. But this was not enough for the Soviet Union, as it implied that genocide might consist of criminal acts committed for reasons other than national, racial or religious persecution. A Lebanese amendment to delete ‘particularly’ from the Chinese draft was adopted by four to three, and the phrase as a whole (‘grounds of national or racial origin or religious belief’) by six votes. Reference to ‘political opinion of its members’ was added in a subsequent amendment. The Committee’s report discussed the issue of motive as follows: ‘In the opinion of some members of the Committee it was in the first place unnecessary to lay down the motives for genocide since it was indicated in the text that the intent to destroy the group must be present and in the second place, motives should not be mentioned since, in their view the destruction of a human group on any grounds should be forbidden. They accepted the mention of motives, but only by way of illustration.’

214 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.11, p. 3. Yet a Secretariat document prepared for the Ad Hoc Committee (UN Doc. E/AC.25/3) observed: ‘The destruction of the human group is that actual aim in view. In the case of foreign or civil war, one side may inflict extremely heavy losses on the other but its purpose is to impose its will on the other side and not to destroy it.’
217 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.10, p. 13. The term ‘as such’ was also picked up in a United States proposal: UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.12, p. 2.
219 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.10, p. 11.
221 Ibid., p. 12.
222 Ibid.
223 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.24, p. 4 (five in favour, two against).
224 UN Doc. E/794, p. 5.
In the Sixth Committee, the United Kingdom fought to delete reference to motive.\textsuperscript{225} According to Gerald Fitzmaurice:

the concept of intent had already been expressed at the beginning of the article. Once the intent to destroy a group existed, that was genocide, whatever reasons the perpetrators of the crime might allege. The phrase was not merely useless; it was dangerous, for its limitative nature would enable those who committed a crime of genocide to claim that they had not committed that crime ‘on grounds of’ one of the motives listed in the article.\textsuperscript{226}

Fitzmaurice maintained that: ‘Motive was not an essential factor in the penal law of all countries. Motive did not enter into the establishment of the nature of the crime; its only importance was in estimating the punishment.’\textsuperscript{227} Venezuela, too, argued that reference to motive be deleted, explaining that if ‘[t]he aim of the Convention was to prevent the destruction of those groups, the motive was of no importance’.\textsuperscript{228} Norway concurred: ‘it was the fact of destruction which was vital, whereas motives were difficult to determine’.\textsuperscript{229} Panama also argued that: ‘It was unnecessary to add the factor of motive in the convention, since no provision was made for it in any penal code.’\textsuperscript{230} Brazil said it was enough to specify the \textit{dolus specialis}, noting that motive was only relevant in the penalty phase.\textsuperscript{231} France suggested appending the word ‘particularly’ to the enumeration in order to allay British fears.\textsuperscript{232}

The Soviet Union protested that the United Kingdom proposal ‘lacked all foundation in law or history’. Platon Morozov stated that ‘a crime against a human group became a crime of genocide when that group was destroyed for national, racial, or religious motives’.\textsuperscript{233} Egypt likewise opposed efforts to remove reference to motive. It considered this an essential component of the offence, as ‘it was the motives which characterized the crime’.\textsuperscript{234} Iran said that if a national group was destroyed for motives of profit, this should not be an international crime.\textsuperscript{235} New Zealand noted that ‘modern war was total’, and that bombing which might destroy an entire group should nevertheless be

\textsuperscript{225} UN Doc. A/C.6/222.

\textsuperscript{226} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{228} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela).

\textsuperscript{229} Ibid. (Wikborg, Norway).

\textsuperscript{230} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Aleman, Panama).

\textsuperscript{231} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.76 (Amado, Brazil).

\textsuperscript{232} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Chaumont, France).

\textsuperscript{233} Ibid. (Morozov, Soviet Union). See also the comments of Kural (Turkey) and Zourek (Czechoslovakia).


\textsuperscript{235} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Abdoh, Iran).
distinguished from genocide.\textsuperscript{236} Yugoslavia said it was important to distinguish between common law crimes and crimes of genocide; for that reason, ‘[i]ntent and motive should, therefore, be stressed’.\textsuperscript{237} The Philippines urged that, if the Sixth Committee wished the concept of genocide to retain its restrictive meaning, the reference to motive should remain.\textsuperscript{238} Panama called it ‘a grave mistake to omit the statement of motives, as the nature of the crime which it was intended to prevent and to punish would thus be obscured’.\textsuperscript{239} Many delegates conceded that, under common law, motive is generally irrelevant to guilt, but they argued that genocide was a special case.

In a search for consensus, Venezuela, which favoured the United Kingdom proposal to delete the reference to motive, proposed that the words ‘as such’ should be introduced.\textsuperscript{240} Venezuela said its amendment ‘should meet the views of those who wished to retain a statement of motives; indeed, the motives were implicitly included in the words “as such”’.\textsuperscript{241} Fearing that the inclusion of a statement of motives ‘might give rise to ambiguity’, the United States supported Venezuela’s proposal.\textsuperscript{242} Morozov said that the willingness of States opposed to an enumeration of motive to compromise by accepting ‘as such’ showed the cogency of his arguments: ‘In the view of the Soviet Union, the words “as such” in the Venezuelan amendment would mean that, in cases of genocide, the members of a group would be exterminated solely because they belonged to that group.’\textsuperscript{243} Jean Spiropoulos said that: ‘The adoption of the Venezuelan or the French amendment would mean, therefore, that it was decided to include the motives in the definition but not to enumerate them.’\textsuperscript{244}

The chair began the voting with the United Kingdom’s amendment, ‘inasmuch as it proposed that the motives should be left out entirely, whereas the Venezuelan amendment retained those motives by implication’. He considered that the ‘essential question’ was whether the Committee wished to include in article II a statement of the motives for which genocide was committed.\textsuperscript{245} The United Kingdom proposal was rejected by a large majority.\textsuperscript{246} A few delegations later explained that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{236} Ibid. (Reid, New Zealand).
\item \textsuperscript{237} Ibid. (Bartos, Yugoslavia).
\item \textsuperscript{238} Ibid. (Paredes, Philippines).
\item \textsuperscript{239} Ibid. (Zourek, Czechoslovakia).
\item \textsuperscript{240} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Pérez-Peizo, Venezuela). See also UN Doc. A/C.6/231.
\item \textsuperscript{241} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.76 (Pérez-Peizo, Venezuela).
\item \textsuperscript{242} Ibid. (Gross, United States).
\item \textsuperscript{243} Ibid. (Morozov, Soviet Union).
\item \textsuperscript{244} Ibid. (Spiropoulos, Greece).
\item \textsuperscript{245} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Alfaro (chair)).
\item \textsuperscript{246} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.76 (twenty-eight in favour, nine against, with six abstentions).
\end{itemize}
they accepted the Venezuelan proposal as a compromise, and for this reason had not voted in favour of the British amendment, although they would have preferred deletion of motive.\textsuperscript{247} However, there were not enough of them to make a difference in the vote, confirming that a majority of States did not want to exclude all reference to motive.

Then the Committee turned to the Venezuelan amendment, which replaced an enumeration of motives with the phrase ‘as such’. France was initially unhappy with the compromise text, but withdrew an alternative proposal after receiving assurances from Venezuela, ‘it being understood that the Venezuelan amendment reintroduced motive into the definition of genocide’.\textsuperscript{248} Venezuela explained that its amendment:

omitted the enumeration . . . but re-introduced the motives for the crime without, however, doing so in a limitative form which admitted of no motives other than those which were listed. The aim of the amendment was to give wider powers of discretion to the judges who would be called upon to deal with cases of genocide. The General Assembly had manifested its intention to suppress genocide as fully as possible. The adoption of the Venezuelan amendment would enable the judges to take into account other motives than those listed in the \textit{ad hoc} Committee’s draft.\textsuperscript{249}

When the chair put the Venezuelan amendment to the vote, he noted that ‘its interpretation would rest with each Government when ratifying and applying the convention’.\textsuperscript{250} Because the Venezuelan amendment had the consequence of eliminating the enumeration of grounds for motive, the Soviets requested this point be put to a vote. The Soviet position favouring a more detailed motive provision was rejected.\textsuperscript{251}

The debate continued about the meaning to be given to the Venezuelan amendment. The United States warned that: ‘The judge who would have to apply the text would certainly tend to assume that the majority of the Committee had decided in favour of the interpretation given to the amendment by its author, since that interpretation had been known to the Committee before the amendment was voted upon.’ As a result, the United States said the report should say that the Committee ‘did not necessarily adopt the interpretation given by its author’.\textsuperscript{252} The chair said that this had been his intention.\textsuperscript{253} El Salvador advanced an

\textsuperscript{247} \textit{Ibid}. (Manini y Ríos, Uruguay); \textit{ibid}. (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
\textsuperscript{248} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.77 (Chaumont, France). The French proposal was to replace ‘as such’ with ‘by reason of its nature’. Pérez-Perozo told the Committee that in Spanish translation, both of these texts came out the same: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.76 (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela).
\textsuperscript{249} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.77 (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela).
\textsuperscript{250} \textit{Ibid}. The amendment was adopted by twenty-seven in favour, twenty-two against, with two abstentions.
\textsuperscript{251} \textit{Ibid}. (thirty-four in favour, eleven against, with six abstentions).
\textsuperscript{252} \textit{Ibid}. (Gross, United States).
\textsuperscript{253} \textit{Ibid}. (Alfaro (chair)).
interesting procedural explanation. For the Venezuelan amendment to
be deemed to rule out all consideration of motive, such a modification
of a decision already adopted should have been voted by a two-thirds
majority, which was not the case. But if, on the contrary, it was
construed as incorporating all motives, it should not have been voted
upon before the Soviet amendment. Therefore, the procedure bol-
stered Venezuela’s interpretation of the amendment.

The next day, Manini y Rios of Uruguay said there were three possible
interpretations of the Venezuelan amendment:

Some delegations had intended to vote for an express reference to motives in the
definition of genocide; others had intended to omit motives while retaining
intent; others again, among them the Uruguayan delegation, while recognizing
that, under the terms of the amendment, genocide meant the destruction of a
group perpetrated for any motives whatsoever, had wanted the emphasis to be
transferred to the special intent to destroy a group, without enumerating the
motives, as the concept of such motives was not sufficiently objective.

This was further complicated by the uncertainty regarding implications
of the rejection of the United Kingdom amendment, he continued. ‘It
certainly could not be maintained, as the representative of the Soviet
Union had suggested, that in rejecting that amendment the Committee
had intended to retain the motives in the definition of the crime’, said
Manini y Ríos. Uruguay proposed, and the chair agreed, that a
working group be set up to endeavour to clarify the consequences of the
vote on the Venezuelan proposal. However, the Committee rejected the
suggestion.

Did the Committee agree to disagree? In his study of the Convention,
Nehemiah Robinson considered the debate about ‘as such’ to be
indecisive, leaving the issue for interpretation. Another student of the
Convention, Matthew Lippmann, appeared prepared to admit that the
travaux préparatoires connote a motive requirement. Special Rapporteur
Nicodème Ruhashyankiko acknowledged the seriousness of the
controversy, but took no position on the subject himself. Nevertheless, the weight of academic writing rejects the relevance of motive,

254 Ibid. (Guillen, El Salvador).
255 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.78 (Manini y Ríos, Uruguay).
256 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.78 (thirty in favour, fifteen against, with three abstentions).
Spiropoulos also proposed that the Committee itself should vote on the interpretations
of the Venezuelan amendment, but no action was taken on his suggestion: UN Doc. A/
C.6/SR.78 (Spiropoulos, Greece).
257 Robinson, Genocide Convention, pp. 60–1.
259 ‘Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Study prepared by Mr Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Special Rapporteur’, note 64 above, paras. 101–6.
although the reasoning is rarely very compelling.\textsuperscript{260} Little in the way of justification is offered to support this view, the main rationale being essentially pragmatic, namely that it can only further complicate prosecutions of genocide.\textsuperscript{261} The Commission of Experts on war crimes in the former Yugoslavia inferred that motive was not an element of genocide because it is not a constituent element of crimes in most countries. According to the Commission, the term ‘as such’ appears in the Convention in order to indicate that ‘the crimes against a number of individuals must be directed at them in their collectivity or at them in their collective character or capacity’.\textsuperscript{262} On the other hand, the ‘Annex on Definitional Elements’ of the Rome Statute prepared by the United States suggested an element of motive, specifying that genocide is committed ‘against a person in a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, \textit{because} of that person’s membership in that group’.\textsuperscript{263} A 1996 judgment of the English Divisional Court revealed divided views on whether or not the words ‘as such’ denote a motive element.\textsuperscript{264} The Netherlands, in its oral argument before the International Court of Justice in the \textit{Legality of Use of Force} case, noted that the words ‘in such’ referred to the concept of ‘discriminatory purpose’, a concept analogous to motive.\textsuperscript{265}

The case law of the \textit{ad hoc} tribunals is hardly enlightening as to this vexing problem of interpretation. In \textit{Akayesu}, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda effectively avoided the question. There is only a fleeting reference in the judgment to the subject during the discussion of intent: ‘The perpetration of the act charged therefore extends beyond its actual commission, for example, the murder of a particular individual, for the realization of an ulterior motive, which is to destroy, in whole or part, the group of which the individual is just one element.’\textsuperscript{266} A second Trial Chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal, in \textit{Kayishema and Ruzindana}, also failed to address the issue directly. However, referring to the list of protected groups in article II, it said that acts of genocide ‘must be directed towards a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{260} Ratner and Abrams, \textit{Accountability}, p. 36; Drost, \textit{Genocide}, p. 84; David, \textit{Principes de droit}, para. 4.137; and Bassiouni and Manikas, \textit{International Criminal Tribunal}, p. 528.
  \item \textsuperscript{261} David, \textit{Principes de droit}.
  \item \textsuperscript{262} ‘Interim Report of the Commission of Experts’, UN Doc. S/25274.
  \item \textsuperscript{264} \textit{Hipperson et al. v. DPP}, (1998) 111 ILR 584 (England, Divisional Court, QBD), p. 587.
  \item \textsuperscript{265} \textit{Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Netherlands)}, \textit{Provisional Measures}, Oral Argument of Counsel for the Netherlands, 11 May 1999, paras. 29 and 31.
  \item \textsuperscript{266} \textit{Prosecutor v. Akayesu}, note 11 above, para. 461.
\end{itemize}
specific group on these grounds’. This confuses two concepts, because the list in article II is not at all about ‘grounds’. 267

The International Law Commission’s commentary on this point is profoundly inadequate, and completely neglects the issue of motive: ‘The intention must be to destroy the group “as such”, meaning as a separate and distinct entity, and not merely some individuals because of their membership in a particular group. In this regard, the General Assembly distinguished between the crimes of genocide and homicide in describing genocide as the “denial of the right of existence of entire human groups” and homicide as the “denial of the right to live of individual human beings” in resolution 96(I).’ 268 In fact, the debates within the International Law Commission reveal conflicting views on this issue. 269 The Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission considered the relevance of motive with respect to charges that genocide had been committed in transferring indigenous children to families of European descent, in violation of article II(e) of the Convention. It was said in defence that the transfers had been committed in order to give children an education or job training. The Commission concluded that, even if motives were mixed, a fundamental element in the programme was the elimination of indigenous cultures, and that as a result the co-existence of other motives was no defence. 270

As discussed elsewhere in this study, genocide is generally acknowledged to be a particular form of crime against humanity. 271 There is some support for the view that crimes against humanity include an element of motive, at least with respect to the ‘persecution’ component which is the one most analogous with genocide. 272 In his 1986 report to the International Law Commission, rapporteur Doudou Thiam observed it was ‘motive’ that distinguished a crime against humanity. 273 In Tadic, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia declared that, for an individual offender to participate in crimes against humanity, it must be shown that this is for more than ‘purely personal reasons unrelated to the armed conflict’, adding that ‘while personal motives may be present they should not be the sole motivation’. But this finding was overturned by the Appeal Chamber.

The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid establishes responsibility for apartheid ‘irrespective of the motive involved’ and, like genocide, apartheid is a special form of crime against humanity. In the International Law Commission, Juri G. Barsegov said: ‘Whatever the reasons for its perpetration, whatever the open or secret motives for the acts or measures directed against the life of the protected group, if the members of the group as such were destroyed, the crime of genocide was being committed.’ Barsegov claimed that, while crimes against humanity required a motive, genocide did not. Nevertheless, the crime against humanity with which genocide has the most affinity is ‘persecution’. It is defined in the Rome Statute as ‘[p]ersecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law’, unquestionably indicating a motive element. But regardless of the words in the definition, in practice motive will remain extremely relevant to prosecutions. Where the defence can raise a doubt about the existence of a motive, it will have cast a large shadow of uncertainty as to the existence of genocidal intent.

In light of all of these considerations, it seems unreasonable to dismiss entirely any role for motive in the elements of the crime of genocide. Interpreters of article II of the Convention cannot simply ignore the words ‘as such’, which were inserted as a compromise to take account of views favouring recognition of a motive component. An effort should be made to address the concerns of both positions on the question, as they were expressed during the drafting of the Convention. For the purposes

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276 (1976) 1015 UNTS 243, art. III.
277 Yearbook . . . 1989, 2100th meeting, p. 29, para. 29. 278 Ibid.
280 ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 4 above, art. 7(1)(h).
of analysis, it may be helpful here to distinguish between what might be called the collective motive and the individual or personal motive. Genocide is, by nature, a collective crime, committed with the cooperation of many participants. It is, moreover, an offence generally directed by the State. The organizers and planners must necessarily have a racist or discriminatory motive, that is, a genocidal motive, taken as a whole. Where this is lacking, the crime cannot be genocide. Evidence of hateful motive will constitute an integral part of the proof of existence of a genocidal plan, and therefore of a genocidal intent. At the same time, individual participants may be motivated by a range of factors, including financial gain, jealousy and political ambition. During the drafting of the Convention, States like the United Kingdom urged caution with respect to motive because of evidentiary difficulties arising when it was applied on an individual level, surely a wise approach. These States cited practice under domestic law for ordinary crimes, explaining the obstacles that a motive requirement put in the way of effective prosecution. Proponents of a motive requirement, however, focused on the collective dimension of motive. If those who organized and planned the crime were not driven by hatred of the group, they argued, and if it were not committed ‘on grounds of’ existence of and membership in the victim group, then this should not be stigmatized as genocide.

The drafters did not manage to articulate these two quite different angles on the problem of motive as an element of the crime of genocide. Had they succeeded, the text of the Convention might have been clearer on this point. The analysis proposed here remains faithful to the spirit of the debates, while giving the terms ‘as such’ an effet utile. Nor should it present impossible evidentiary hurdles for prosecutors. In conclusion, it should be necessary for the prosecution to establish that genocide, taken in its collective dimension, was committed ‘on the grounds of nationality, race, ethnicity, or religion’. The crime must, in other words, be motivated by hatred of the group. The purpose of criminalizing genocide was to punish crimes of this nature, not crimes of collective murder prompted by other motives. In the classic cases of genocide – Nazi Germany and Rwanda – the existence of motive cannot be gainsaid.

Thus, the reasoned arguments made by the United Kingdom and others during the drafting deserve respect. Individual offenders should not be entitled to raise personal motives as a defence to genocide, arguing for instance that they participated in an act of collective hatred but were driven by other factors. This position, it should be pointed out, joins that of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the *Tadic* judgment. While a purely personal motive such as the desire to feed one’s family might, in some cases, suggest mitigation of guilt, it is hard to understand why other personal motives would compel any particular sympathy. On the issue of individual motive, practical considerations should nevertheless not be overlooked. An individual who does not manifest genocidal motives, and who appears to have been driven by purely personal considerations, is unlikely to attract much attention from international and even domestic authorities in the course of genocide prosecutions at a time when there are plenty of the proverbial bigger fish to fry.

In addition to genocide itself, which is defined in article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,\(^1\) article III describes four forms of participation in the crime: conspiracy, direct and public incitement, attempt and complicity. These are the ‘other acts’ mentioned in articles IV, V, VI, VII, VIII and IX. With its reference to ‘genocide’ in the first paragraph of article III, the Convention establishes that the four subsequent ‘other acts’ are not, strictly speaking, ‘genocide’. Arguably, they are lesser crimes, and therefore do not bear the same stigma that is attached to the crime of genocide. Lawyers often refer to them as forms of ‘secondary’ liability, and domestic legal systems usually attach penalties to them that are significantly reduced from those for the principal offender. Yet complicity in genocide should hardly be viewed as being less serious than genocide itself. The accomplice may well be the leader who gives the order to commit genocide, while the ‘principal’ offender is the lowly subordinate who carries out the instructions. In this scenario, the guilt of the accomplice is really superior to that of the principal offender.

Most of the acts defined in article III – incitement, conspiracy and attempt – are ‘inchoate’ or incomplete crimes, and can be committed even if the principal offence itself never takes place. For example, direct and public incitement to commit genocide may be perpetrated even if nobody is actually incited to act. Attempted genocide is also an inchoate offence; if the crime is committed, the offender is prosecuted for genocide, not the attempt. Inchoate offences are particularly important in the repression of genocide because of their preventive role. The seriousness of genocide and its dire consequences for humanity compel the application of the law before the crime actually takes place. A broad and teleological conception of the inchoate acts of genocide is totally consistent with the spirit of the Convention and, moreover, gives

\(^1\) Paragraph (a) of article III is really unnecessary, and could be removed from the Convention without changing anything from a practical standpoint. The statement in article III that genocide shall be punishable is, in effect, repeated in article V.
meaning to the enigmatic word ‘prevention’ that appears in both the title and article I.

There are two approaches to incorporating the ‘other acts’ of genocide set out in article III within international criminal law instruments. The first, that of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the International Law Commission’s draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, is to merge the ‘other acts’ into a general provision dealing with criminal participation, applicable not only to genocide but to other offences as well, such as crimes against humanity and war crimes. Most national penal codes do the same thing, distinguishing between general principles or a ‘general part’, and the definition of individual offences or the ‘special part’. The second approach, that of the statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals, is to incorporate the provisions of article III within the definition of the crime of genocide. But, because the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals address other crimes in addition to genocide, they still require a general provision dealing with criminal participation. The result is a degree of overlap between the general provision, dealing with participation in all crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the statutes, and the special provision, which is applicable only to genocide.

The statutes of the ad hoc tribunals retain the Convention’s distinction between genocide and the ‘other acts’: ‘The International Tribunal for [the Former Yugoslavia] [Rwanda] shall have the power to prosecute persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.’ But the Rome Statute does not make the same differentiation. Article 5(1)(a) of the Rome Statute limits the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to the crime of genocide, making no mention of any ‘other acts’. Article 25 provides for individual criminal responsibility for genocide in cases of attempt, incitement, conspiracy and complicity. In other words, under the Rome Statute, the ‘secondary’ offender commits the crime of genocide, whilst under the Genocide Convention and the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals he or she is guilty of an ‘other act’.

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Article III of the Convention raises difficult problems of comparative criminal law. The concepts it sets out are all familiar ones in domestic systems of criminal law, although their application varies considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The great legal traditions, principally the influential common law and Romano-Germanic systems, approach these issues differently. But even within judicial systems of the same tradition, the distinctions can be considerable. The caution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia should be borne in mind, when it said that, whenever international criminal rules do not define a notion of criminal law, reference may be made to national legislation, but not to one national system only. ‘Rather, international courts must draw upon the general concepts and legal institutions common to all the major legal systems of the world’, said the Tribunal.6

The material and moral elements of the crime of genocide have been discussed in the previous two chapters. The specific intent requirement of genocide should apply not only to the basic crime of genocide, but also to the various forms of participation. Accomplice, conspirator, planner and abettor must all share the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the national, racial, ethnic or religious group, as such. Conceivably, a prosecutor might argue that the specific intent defined in article II applies only to the acts defined in that provision, and not to the ‘other acts’ listed in article III. While ingenious, this approach finds no support in the drafting history of the Convention or the debates on the subsequent instruments that provide for prosecution of genocide. It is also illogical, precisely because the accomplice or the conspirator may be as guilty or even more guilty than the principal offender who technically commits the crime. Thus, the considerations concerning the mens rea of genocide discussed in chapter 4 should also apply mutatis mutandis to the other acts listed in article III.

Conspiracy

‘Conspiracy to commit genocide’ is listed as a punishable act in article III(b) of the Convention. Conspiracy is derived from Latin and means, literally, to breathe together. It is crime committed collectively, with a minimum of two offenders. By its very nature, the crime of genocide will inevitably involve conspiracy and conspirators. Common law and the Romano-Germanic tradition take two quite different approaches to the concept of conspiracy.7 In Romano-Germanic law, conspiracy is a form

of participation in the crime itself, and is only punishable to the extent that the underlying crime is also committed. At common law, a conspiracy is committed once two or more persons agree to commit a crime, whether or not the crime itself is committed. Thus, common law conspiracy is an inchoate offence.

**Drafting history**

The Secretariat draft listed ‘conspiracy to commit acts of genocide’ as a punishable act. According to the accompanying commentary, ‘the mere fact of conspiracy to commit genocide should be punishable even if no “preparatory act” has yet taken place’. The Secretariat’s conception of conspiracy was obviously drawn from the common law. The United States’ 1947 draft had an identical provision. The Soviet ‘Principles’ reflected the continental legal view, referring to ‘[c]ompli-

8 UN Doc. E/447, pp. 5–13, art. II.II.3.
9 Ibid., p. 31.
10 UN Doc. E/623.
12 UN Doc. E/AC.25/9, art. I in fine.
13 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.16, p. 12. The Soviet proposal had earlier been rejected, by three to two, with two abstentions: ibid., p. 5.
14 Ibid., p. 12; UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.17, p. 9 (six in favour, one against).
15 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84 (Maktos, United States).
16 Ibid. (Raafat, Egypt).
terms used, for that would make it practically impossible to draft the convention’, the Danish delegate added.\(^\text{17}\)

The French version of the provision proved a problem because the concept of common law conspiracy was unfamiliar to French law. Belgium proposed replacing the initial term *entente*, which it said was too vague and unknown in Belgian law, with the word *complot*. Belgium conceded that the idea of *complot* was more limited than the English concept of ‘conspiracy’, but argued it was impossible to find an entirely appropriate expression.\(^\text{18}\) In effect, in penal codes derived from the Napoleonic code, such as the Belgian penal code, *complot* indicates an agreement to commit a crime but one that must be ‘concrétisée par un ou plusieurs actes matériels’.\(^\text{19}\) Belgium, France and the Netherlands abstained in the vote on article III(b) because the Sixth Committee failed to decide whether to use *entente* or *complot* in the French text.\(^\text{20}\) The final French version of the Convention defines ‘entente en vue de commettre le génocide’ as a punishable act.\(^\text{21}\)

*The Nuremberg legacy*

The debates on conspiracy in the Sixth Committee seem straightforward enough, but the subject has had a controversial history in international criminal law. The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal also recognized conspiracy as a distinct crime.\(^\text{22}\) The French and Soviet drafters agreed with the British and Americans that it was the common law concept,\(^\text{17}\) *Ibid.* (Federspiel, Denmark).

\(^\text{18}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/217; see also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).

\(^\text{19}\) For example, *Code pénal* (France), art. 412-2. See Pradel, *Droit pénal comparé*, p. 240.

\(^\text{20}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84 (forty-one in favour, with four abstentions).


\(^\text{22}\) Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) (1951), 82 UNTS 279, annex. Conspiracy was included in the definition of ‘crimes against peace’: ‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing’ (art. 6(a); emphasis added). The same language does not appear in the definitions of war crimes or crimes against humanity. The subject matter jurisdiction provision concludes with: ‘Leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan’ (emphasis added).
because this was appropriate to the type of crimes being prosecuted.\textsuperscript{23}
However, the intent of the drafters was not fully grasped by the judges at
Nuremberg, and they decided, based on an analysis of article 6 of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, that conspiracy could
not stand alone as an autonomous crime. Moreover, it could only, in
their opinion, apply to crimes against peace, and not war crimes and
crimes against humanity, as had been charged in the indictment.\textsuperscript{24}

The International Military Tribunal identified the ‘common plan or
conspiracy’ in the waging of aggressive war going as far back as 1919,
with the formation of the Nazi party. Among its elements, the Tribunal
said, ‘the persecution of the Jews’ was one of the steps deliberately taken
to carry out the common plan. But the Tribunal considered this concep-
tion to be too broad for the terms of its statute:

\begin{quote}
[T]he conspiracy must be clearly outlined in its criminal purpose. It must not be
too far removed from the time of decision and of action. The planning, to be
criminal, must not rest merely on the declarations of a party programme, such
as are found in the twenty-five points of the Nazi Party, announced in 1920, or
the political affirmations expressed in ‘Mein Kampf’ in later years. The Tribunal
must examine whether a concrete plan to wage war existed, and determine the
participants in that concrete plan.\textsuperscript{25}
\end{quote}

The Tribunal rejected the argument that common planning cannot exist
where there is complete dictatorship: ‘A plan in the execution of which a
number of persons participate is still a plan, even though conceived by
only one of them; and those who execute the plan do not avoid
responsibility by showing that they acted under the direction of the man
who conceived it.’\textsuperscript{26} The Tribunal noted that a criminal organization
could constitute a form of conspiracy:

A criminal organisation is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in that the essence
of both is co-operation for criminal purposes. There must be a group bound
together and organized for a common purpose. The group must be formed or
used in connection with the commission of crimes denounced by the Charter.\textsuperscript{27}

Nevertheless, the International Military Tribunal said membership in
the organization in and of itself was insufficient to prove conspiracy.
Members without knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the
organization could not be found guilty of conspiracy.\textsuperscript{28} Accordingly, the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[23] Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on
Howard S. Levie, Terrorism in War – The Law of War Crimes, Oceana Publications,
1992, pp. 405–11; Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human
Rights Atrocities in International Law, Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, Oxford: Clarendon
\item[25] Ibid., pp. 467–8.
\item[26] Ibid., p. 468.
\item[27] Ibid., p. 528.
\item[28] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
Tribunal acquitted Frick, Bormann and Doenitz of conspiracy.\textsuperscript{29} The conspiracy provision in Control Council Law No. 10\textsuperscript{30} was virtually the same as the one in the Nuremberg Charter and the military tribunals followed the narrow precedent set by the International Military Tribunal.\textsuperscript{31}

Lawmakers continue to be haunted by the narrow construction given to conspiracy at Nuremberg. The International Law Commission, in its draft Code of Crimes, provided for conspiracy to commit an offence only when it ‘in fact occurs’.\textsuperscript{32} The Commission explained the Code’s conspiracy provision ‘sets forth a principle of individual responsibility with respect to a particular form of participation in a crime rather than creating a separate and distinct offence or crime’. This was completed with a footnote: ‘This is consistent with the Nurnberg Judgment which treated conspiracy as a form of participation in a crime against peace rather than as a separate crime. Nurnberg Judgment, 56.’\textsuperscript{33}

The same approach to conspiracy obtains in the Rome Statute.\textsuperscript{34} The text makes it clear that this is not the inchoate offence of conspiracy as contemplated by the common law but rather a form of complicity,
adding considerably to the redundancy of the article. The term ‘conspiracy’ is not even used. The precise wording of the provision is derived from the recently adopted International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. Consequently, although the Genocide Convention defines the inchoate crime of conspiracy as an ‘other act’ of genocide, it cannot be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court because of the narrow definition of the concept in the Rome Statute. Ostensibly, the Rome diplomatic conference was attempting to transfer to the Rome Statute all of the offences defined in the Genocide Convention, as can be seen from its attention to the very specific provision dealing with direct and public incitement to genocide. The discrepancy between the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute was probably an oversight of exhausted drafters.

There is an essentially similar problem in the domestic legislation of the vast majority of States from the Romano-Germanic criminal law tradition. Although many have adopted specific provisions in their law setting out a crime of genocide, they have not provided for the offence of conspiracy, probably under the mistaken assumption that the existing norms in the general parts of their penal codes are adequate, which is not the case.

The outstanding exceptions are the statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals, precisely because article III of the Convention is incorporated within their genocide provisions. On 4 September 1998, Jean Kambanda was found guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The indictment charged that Kambanda, ‘by his acts or omissions . . . did conspire with others, including Ministers of his Government, such as Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Andre Ntagerura, Eliezer Niyitegeka and Edouard Karemera, to

37 UN Doc. A/RES/52/164, annex, art. 2(3).
38 See pp. 268–82 below.
kill and to cause serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Tutsi population, with intent to destroy in whole or in part, an ethnic or racial group as such, and has thereby committed conspiracy to commit genocide’. Several other trials for conspiracy to commit genocide are pending, including those of Ferdinand Nahimana, Alfred Musema, Obed Ruzindana, Charles Sikubwabo, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has no public indictments that charge the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide.

Whether the Rwanda Tribunal considers conspiracy to be an inchoate offence may never be known. In all cases, the offenders are also charged with genocide itself, and there can be no doubt that the crime of genocide did take place in Rwanda. In the Akayesu judgment, there is a fleeting reference to conspiracy: ‘Such planning is similar to the notion of complicity in Civil law, or conspiracy under Common law, as stipulated in Article 2(3) of the Statute.’ If the implication is that ‘conspiracy’, as set out in article 2(3)(b) of the Tribunal’s Statute, as well as in article III(b) of the Genocide Convention, corresponds to the ‘Civil law’ or Romano-Germanic conception of conspiracy, then the Tribunal is in error. Two days later, in Kambanda, the Tribunal used a curious formulation, finding the accused guilty of conspiracy, ‘stipulated in Articles 2(3)(b) of the Statute as a crime, and attributed to him by virtue of Article 6(1)’. Article 6(1) describes various forms of complicity, but does not include inchoate conspiracy. As a result, inchoate conspiracy cannot be charged in cases of war crimes or crimes against humanity. These still obscure signals suggest that the Rwanda Tribunal may remain faithful to the tradition of judicial conservatism established at Nuremberg.

To establish conspiracy, the prosecution must prove that two or more persons agreed upon a common plan to perpetrate genocide. Proof of the material element of the crime will obviously be facilitated by documentary evidence. But where this is lacking, circumstantial evidence of the common plan or conspiracy will be sufficient. As for the moral element, the prosecution must establish the accused intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group as such. Under the principle that an individual is deemed to intend the consequence of his or her acts, the tribunal may infer the existence of the moral element

from proof of the material facts. In practice, proving conspiracy is extremely difficult, and prosecutors generally require the co-operation of an informer. As in Kambanda, conspiracy to commit genocide may be charged in tandem with an indictment for genocide per se, precisely because it is a distinct crime.

**Direct and public incitement to commit genocide**

Article III(c) prohibits ‘direct and public incitement’ to commit genocide. Incitement is, of course, a form of complicity (‘abetting’), and to that extent it is already covered by article III(e). But as a general rule, incitement qua complicity, or abetting, is only committed when the underlying crime occurs. Under both the Romano-Germanic and common law traditions, there is no crime of incitement if nobody is incited. Nehemiah Robinson said: ‘The present wording of Article III excludes incitement “in private” because it was felt that such incitement was not serious enough to be included in the Convention.’

This is inaccurate, because incitement in private is subsumed within the act of complicity, listed in Article III(e). Incitement in private is punishable only if the underlying crime of genocide occurs, whereas incitement in public can be prosecuted even where genocide does not take place. In specifying a distinct act of ‘direct and public incitement’, the drafters of the Genocide Convention sought to create an autonomous infraction, one that, like conspiracy, is an inchoate crime, in that the prosecution need not make proof of any result. It is sufficient to establish that direct and public incitement took place, that the direct and public incitement was intentional, and that it was carried out with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group as such. The crime of incitement butts up against the right to freedom of expression, and the conflict between these two concepts has informed the debate on the subject.

**Drafting history**

The Secretariat draft stated: ‘The following shall likewise be punishable: . . . 2. direct public incitement to any act of genocide, whether the incitement be successful or not.’

This text was located in a more general section dealing with criminal participation. The Secretariat commentary indicated what was meant by ‘direct public incitement’:

This does not mean orders or instructions by officials to their subordinates, or

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43 Robinson, Genocide Convention, p. 67.
by the heads of an organization to its members, which are covered by the
‘preparatory acts’ referred to above. It refers to direct appeals to the public by
means of speeches, radio or press, inciting it to genocide. Such appeals may be
part of an agreed plan but they may simply reflect a purely personal initiative on
the part of the speaker. Even in the latter case, public incitement should be
punished. It may well happen that the lightly or imprudently spoken word of a
journalist or speaker himself incapable of doing what he advises will be taken
seriously by some of his audience who will regard it as their duty to act on his
recommendation. Judges will have to weigh the circumstances and show greater
or lesser severity according to the position of the criminal and his authority,
according to whether his incitement is premeditated or merely represents
thoughtless words.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 30–1.}

Predictably, the United States, with its strong judicial and political
commitment to freedom of expression, was opposed to such a provision:
‘Under Anglo-American rules of law the right of free speech is not to be
interfered with unless there is a clear and present danger that the
utterance might interfere with a right of others.’ The United States
proposed that the provision on ‘incitement’ be so qualified.\footnote{UN Doc. E/623.}
Subsequently, it put forward an alternative text: ‘Direct and public incitement
of any person or persons to any act of genocide, whether the incitement
be successful or not, when such incitement takes place under circum-
stances which may reasonably result in the commission of acts of geno-
cide.’\footnote{Ibid.} The Soviet Union was at the other end of the spectrum on this
issue.\footnote{‘Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide’, UN Doc. E/AC.25/7, Principle V:
‘The convention should establish the penal character, on equal terms with genocide, of
. . . 2. Direct public incitement to commit genocide, regardless of whether such
incitement had criminal consequences.’\footnote{Ibid., Principle VI: ‘The convention should make it a punishable offence to engage in
any form of propaganda for genocide (the press, radio, cinema, etc.), aimed at inciting
racial, national or religious enmity or hatred.’\footnote{UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.6, p. 2.}}
Initially, the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee adopted the Soviet principle on crim-
inalizing incitement, whether successful or not. However, it stopped
short of endorsing a broader prohibition of hate propaganda. The
unease of the United States with measures restricting freedom of expres-
sion was noted.\footnote{‘Draft Articles for the Inclusion in the Convention on Genocide Proposed by the
Delegation of China on 16 April 1948’, UN Doc. E/AC.25/9: ‘It shall be illegal to
conspire, attempt, or incite persons, to commit acts enumerated in 1, 2, and 3.’}
 provision:52 ‘Conspiring, attempting, or inciting people to commit genocide shall be punishable.’53 France suggested adding the word ‘direct’ before ‘incitement’, but the vote was an indecisive three to three, with one abstention.54 The Committee voted again on the question – this time the word was ‘directly’ – and it was so agreed, by three to two.55 Venezuela’s suggestion that ‘publicly or privately’ be added after the word ‘directly’ was also accepted.56 According to Venezuela, the addition of ‘publicly or privately’ would obviate the need for further particulars, such as ‘press, radio, etc.’57 At no point did the Committee discuss what ‘direct’ or ‘public’ might mean. Venezuela also suggested adding ‘whether the incitement be successful or not’:58 France and Lebanon considered this unnecessary and the United States agreed, but the proposal was adopted anyway.59 The final Ad Hoc Committee text read: ‘The following acts shall be punishable . . . (4) direct public or private incitement to commit the crime of genocide whether such incitement be successful or not.’60

In the Sixth Committee, the United States took a more aggressive posture, contesting entirely any reference to incitement as an inchoate offence. It argued that incitement was ‘too remote’ from the real crime of genocide. ‘Even with regard to preventive measures, it should be borne in mind that direct incitement, such as would result in the immediate commission of the crime, was in general merely one aspect of an attempt or overt act of conspiracy’, said the United States. The heart of the United States’ objection was that criminalization of incitement might endanger freedom of the press. ‘If it were admitted that incitement were an act of genocide, any newspaper article criticizing a political group, for example, or suggesting certain measures with regard to such group for the general welfare, might make it possible for certain States to claim that a Government which allowed the publication of such an article was committing an act of genocide; and yet that article

54 Ibid., p. 3. There were similar suggestions from Venezuela (‘direct private and public incitement’) and the Soviet Union (‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ before ‘incitement’).
56 Ibid. (five in favour, with two abstentions).
57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., p. 3.
59 Ibid. (four in favour, with three abstentions).
60 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.16, p. 12 (adopted by six votes to one); UN Doc. E/AC.25/ SR.17, p. 9. The United States was the dissenting vote. In an internal memorandum, Ernest Gross wrote that ‘the provision in its present form is not too objectionable from our point of view since we probably will be in a position to insist on a narrow interpretation of “direct incitement”: ‘Additional Punishable Offences Agreed upon by Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 23 April 1948, Gross to Sandifer’, National Archives, United States of America, 501.BD-Genocide, 1945–49.
might be nothing more than the mere exercise of the right of freedom of the press.’

The United Kingdom gave the United States some support. Gerald Fitzmaurice argued it was unlikely that incitement would not lead to conspiracy, attempt or complicity, which were already covered by the draft convention. Therefore, it was unnecessary to criminalize incitement, and preferable to delete the provision ‘so as to avoid giving anyone the slightest pretext to interfere with freedom of opinion’. The United States was also backed by Chile, the Dominican Republic and Brazil. Belgium, which later proposed a compromise formulation, indicated that it also preferred deletion and would vote for the United States’ amendment.

Arguing for the provision, Manfred Lachs of Poland insisted that prevention was also the goal of the convention, and that freedom of the press ‘must not be so great as to permit the Press to engage in incitement to genocide’. Venezuela, too, insisted that the purpose of the convention was to prevent and not only to punish genocide. The Philippines challenged the United States on the issue of freedom of the press with an innovative and somewhat provocative argument. Its delegate explained that Philippines law considered criminalization of incitement to be compatible with freedom of expression, a repressive legacy of United States rule. Other delegations upholding retention of the provision included France, Haiti, Australia, Yugoslavia, Sweden, Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, the Soviet Union, Uruguay (subject to clarification of the words ‘in private’) and Egypt.

However, several delegations, while supporting the incitement provision, were concerned about the scope of the Ad Hoc Committee text. Belgium urged a ‘happy compromise’, deleting the phrase ‘or in private’. Arguing in support, Iran stated that: ‘Incitement in private could have no influence on the perpetration of the crime of genocide; it

61 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84 (Maktos, United States); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.85 (Maktos, United States).
62 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84 (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
63 Ibid. (Arancibia Lazo, Chile).
64 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.85 (Messina, Dominican Republic).
65 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84 (Guerreiro, Brazil).
66 Ibid. (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
67 Ibid. (Lachs, Poland). See also ibid. (Morozov, Soviet Union); and UN Doc. A/C.6/ SR.85 (Zourek, Czechoslovakia).
68 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84 (Pérez Perozo, Venezuela).
70 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84—85.
71 UN Doc., A/C.6/217; see also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
therefore presented no danger.' But Venezuela answered that: ‘Incitement could be carried out in public, but it could also take place in private, through individual consultation, by letter or even by telephone. It was necessary to punish both forms of incitement.’ The Committee voted to delete the words ‘or in private’.

Belgium also proposed deleting ‘whether such incitement be successful or not’. Belgium said this ‘would allow the legislature of each country to decide, in accordance with its own laws on incitement, whether incitement to commit genocide had to be successful in order to be punishable’. But, as other delegations quite correctly argued, if this were the case, the provision would be superfluous; incitement, if successful, becomes a form of complicity covered by paragraph (e) of the same article. On a roll-call vote, deletion of the words ‘whether such incitement be successful or not’ was approved. After the separate votes to delete ‘in private’ and ‘whether such incitement be successful or not’, the Belgian amendment was adopted. The United States amendment, aimed at simply deleting the provision dealing with incitement, was defeated on a roll-call vote.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union sought to go even further, and urged adoption of an additional paragraph prohibiting ‘[a]ll forms of public

72 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84 (Abdoh, Iran).
73 Ibid. (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela).
74 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.85 (twenty-six in favour, six against, with ten abstentions).
75 UN Doc. A/C.6/217; see also UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
76 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.85 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
77 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84 (Abdoh, Iran); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.85 (Manini y Ríos, Uruguay).
78 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.85 (nineteen in favour, twelve against, with fourteen abstentions).
79 Ibid. (twenty-four in favour, twelve against, with eight abstentions).
80 Ibid. (twenty-seven in favour, sixteen against, with five abstentions).
81 The Canadian delegate to the Sixth Committee observed, in a dispatch to Ottawa: ‘The battle lines are the usual ones – the Soviet bloc arrayed against the rest of the world, although on occasion the United States delegate, who is leading the debate for “the West”, has failed to convince the Latin Americans, Arabs et al of the cogency of his arguments. He did succeed in having “political” added to the “national”, “racial” and “religious” groups protected against genocide. However, he failed in his insistence that freedom of the press would be threatened by describing “incitement” to genocide as a crime’: ‘Progress Reports on Work of Canadian Delegation, in Paris, 1 November 1948’, NAC RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475–DG–2–40.
82 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.85 (Maktos, United States).
83 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.91 (Maktos, United States).
propaganda (press, radio, cinema, etc.) aimed at inciting racial, national or religious enmities or hatreds or at provoking the commission of acts of genocide'. The Soviet amendment was decisively defeated, after a vote taken in two parts.

**Incitement in other instruments**

In the latter stages of its work on the draft Code of Crimes, the International Law Commission debated whether to recognize a distinct offence of inchoate incitement to genocide. Contemporary events in Rwanda and Burundi undoubtedly coloured its assessment, and underlined the importance of incitement. One of the members of the Commission, Salifou Fomba of Mali, was a member of the Commission appointed by the Security Council in 1994 to investigate the Rwandan genocide, and he regularly reminded delegates of the significance of repressing incitement. During the debates, Yamada of Japan made the rather bizarre observation that his country had not acceded to the Convention because inchoate incitement was only prosecuted ‘in the most serious cases’, as if genocide was not a serious case. In the end, the International Law Commission only provided for a general offence of direct and public incitement, applicable to all crimes in the Code including genocide, specifying that this applied to inciting a crime that ‘in fact occurs’. The report of the Commission revealed a serious misunderstanding, because the Commission cited article III(c) of the Convention as the *raison d’être* of the provision. Yet, by making incitement dependent on the occurrence of the crime, the Commission obviously departed from the spirit of article III(c). In any case, the Commission’s special provision for direct and public incitement is totally redundant, because article 2(3)(d) of the same Code creates an offence of ‘abetting’, which is incitement when the underlying crime occurs. The Commission did not seem to understand the meaning of the term ‘abetting’, describing it as ‘providing assistance’. According to *Black’s Law Dictionary*, abet means ‘[t]o encourage, incite, or set

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85 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.87 (twenty-eight in favour, eleven against, with four abstentions; thirty in favour, eight against, with six abstentions).
another on to commit a crime...'. Like much common law terminology, it is derived from old French, à beter, meaning to bait or to excite.

The Rome Statute provides for the inchoate crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, faithfully reflecting the Convention on this point. There were unsuccessful efforts to enlarge the inchoate offence of incitement so as to cover the other core crimes but the same arguments that had been made in 1948, essentially based on the sanctity of freedom of expression, resurfaced. The Working Group on General Principles at the Rome Conference rejected suggestions that incitement to commit genocide be included in the definition of the offence, and instead incorporated it in article 25, a general provision applicable to all crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the statute, but with the proviso that direct and public incitement only concerned genocide and could not be extended to war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression.

Within the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, inchoate direct and public incitement is also incorporated because of the incorporation of article III of the Convention within the definition of genocide. The complex drafting of the statutes means that ‘instigating’ and ‘abetting’, which are equivalent to incitement, are also criminalized in the general provision dealing with individual responsibility. There have been no indictments by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for direct and public incitement to commit genocide. In the case of the Rwanda Tribunal, several indictments charge direct and public incitement and there have been two convictions, of Jean-Paul Akayesu and Jean Kambanda.

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92 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGIP/L.4, p. 3. Adopted unchanged in the final version: UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.76/Add.3, p. 2. Yet misunderstanding and confusion about the nature of the provision persists. The proposed ‘Elements of Crimes’ submitted by the delegation of the United States to the first session of the Court’s Preparatory Commission present direct and public incitement to genocide as requiring a result, even though the title of the document refers to inchoate crimes. The document requires ‘[t]hat the accused committed a public act that had the direct effect of causing one or more persons to commit the crime of genocide in question’: UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.4/Add.3, p. 3.
Judicial interpretation

The Trial Chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal observed that the drafters of the Convention had emphasized the importance of addressing incitement to genocide because of its critical role in the planning of genocide. In Akayesu, the distinction between inchoate incitement, where the crime is incomplete or unsuccessful, and complicity incitement or abetting, where genocide actually takes place, often seems blurred. The Tribunal noted the omission by the Convention’s drafters of an explicit statement that incitement would be punishable whether or not it was successful, but ultimately agreed that direct and public incitement is an inchoate offence. The discussion of inchoate incitement was really obiter dictum, because Akayesu’s exhortation to the local population was shown to be successful. This consisted principally of an inflammatory speech delivered during the night of 18–19 April 1994 before a considerable crowd including members of the racist militia known as interahamwe. Because the speech was followed by killings and other acts of violence, the act can also be qualified as complicity, set out in article 2(3)(e) of the Statute (corresponding to article III(e) of the Convention), as well as abetting, which is listed in article 6(1) of the Statute. Similarly, the Tribunal convicted Jean Kambanda of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, but on the same basis he could have been charged and convicted of complicity or abetting instead.

The Canadian justice system made a finding of direct and public incitement to commit genocide in a case concerning Rwanda. Leon Mugesera, an activist with the pre-1994 regime of Juvenal Habyarimana, called upon his supporters to massacre Tutsis in a public speech on 22 November 1992. Mugesera later fled Rwanda and obtained refugee and permanent resident status in Canada. His speech fell outside the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda because it occurred well prior to 1 January 1994, the starting point of the ratione temporis jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Under Canadian law, however, he could be stripped of his right to remain in Canada if it could be established that he had committed crimes against humanity or war crimes. In a decision of 11 July 1996, adjudicator Pierre Turmel of the Immigration and Refugee Board wrote:

93 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 41 above, para. 560.
94 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, note 39 above. Other indictments alleging direct and public incitement to genocide are pending: Sunga, ‘First Indictments’.
95 Tribunal prosecutors examined whether Mugesera could be charged because his speech could be deemed to have had effects during 1994, but wisely decided this argument would be difficult to sustain.
In my analysis of the testimony and the documentary evidence, I found that in my opinion Mr Mugesera made a speech which incited people to drive out and to murder the Tutsi. It is also established that murders of Tutsis were in fact committed, and, on the basis of probabilities, resulted from the call for murder thrown out by Mr Mugesera in his speech. The Tutsi, beyond a shadow of a doubt, form an identifiable group of persons. They constituted an identified group and they were a systematic and widespread target of the crime of murder.

The counselling or invitation thus issued to his audience establishes personal participation in the offence. In addition, I find that this participation was conscious, having regard to Mr Mugesera’s social standing and privileged position. Mr Mugesera’s writings and statements clearly attest to the conscious nature of this participation. I would add that this counselling was consistent with the policy advocated by the MRND [the political party of former president Habyarimana, of which Mugesera was a member], as established by the evidence.

Having regard to the socio-political context which prevailed at the time in question, the assassination of members of this identifiable group constituted in my opinion a crime against humanity within the meaning of subsection 7(3.76) of the Criminal Code, all of the physical and mental elements of which are present. Did this crime constitute a contravention of customary international law or conventional international law in Rwanda at the time it was committed?

... In my opinion, the speech made by Mr Mugesera constitutes a contravention of these provisions of the Convention, in that it is a direct and public incitement to commit genocide.96

Here, too, there is some confusion about the ambit of article III(c) of the Convention. Because adjudicator Turmel concluded that killings had indeed resulted from the Mugesera speech, he might have found him responsible for complicity in genocide. Perhaps, however, he considered that the killings, which occurred in December and January 1992 and concerned relatively small numbers of victims, did not constitute full-blown genocide, in which case article III(c) was indeed the applicable provision. The resulting massacres were relevant, nevertheless, in proving that the speech constituted genuine incitement and that it was not, as Mugesera claimed, a harmless political diatribe. In the Akayesu judgment, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda referred to the Mugesera speech as an important indicator in the build-up to genocide.97


97 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 41 above, para. 39.
The Rwanda Tribunal drew upon comparative law sources to interpret the term ‘incitement’. Under common law, incitement involves ‘encouraging or persuading another to commit an offence’. Both Romano-Germanic and common law consider that incitement may consist of threats or other forms of pressure. The Tribunal associated the notion of ‘direct and public incitement’ with the crime of provocation in Romano-Germanic penal codes. It referred to the French Penal Code, which defines provocation as follows:

Anyone, who whether through speeches, shouting or threats uttered in public places or at public gatherings or through the sale or dissemination, offer for sale or display of written material, printed matter, drawings, sketches, paintings, emblems, images or any other written or spoken medium or image in public places or at public gatherings, or through the public display of placards or posters, or through any other means of audiovisual communication shall have directly provoked the perpetrator(s) to commit a crime or misdemeanour, shall be punished as an accomplice to such a crime or misdemeanour.

The incitement must of course be intentional. As the Rwanda Tribunal noted: ‘The mens rea required for the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide lies in the intent to directly prompt or provoke another to commit genocide. It implies a desire on the part of the perpetrator to create by his actions a particular state of mind necessary to commit such a crime in the minds of the person(s) he is so engaging.’ Here, the Tribunal confirmed that the mens rea of one of the ‘other acts’ of genocide defined in article III involves the specific intent set out in article II.

Direct and public incitement to commit genocide is recognized in many domestic legal systems that have incorporated the crime of genocide within their criminal law. Canada, for example, decided that it did not need to amend its criminal code in order to punish genocide as such, but was aware that the ‘other act’ of direct and public incitement would not fall under its ordinary criminal law provision dealing with incitement. As a result, a specific offence of inciting genocide was enacted.

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98 Ibid., p. 554. The Tribunal cited Professor Andrew Ashworth: ‘someone who instigates or encourages another person to commit an offence should be liable to conviction for those acts of incitement, both because he is culpable for trying to cause a crime and because such liability is a step towards crime prevention’: Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 462.

99 Law No. 72–546 of 1 July 1972 (France) and Law No. 85–1317 of 13 December 1985 (France).

100 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 41 above, p. 559.

101 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C–46, s. 318: ‘Every one who advocates or promotes genocide is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.’ See also Canada, Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada, Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966, p. 62.
Jamaica reached a similar conclusion, and amended its legislation accordingly.\footnote{Offences Against the Person (Amendment) Act 1968, s. 33.}

\textit{Meaning of ‘direct’ and ‘public’}

The \textit{travaux préparatoires} give little guidance as to the scope of the words ‘direct and public’, although clearly these terms were the technique by which the drafters meant to limit the scope of any offence of inchoate incitement. The word ‘public’ is the less difficult of the two terms to interpret.\footnote{The 1954 draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind deleted the words ‘and public’: \textit{Yearbook . . . 1954}, Vol. II, pp. 149–52, UN Doc. A/2693, art. 2(13)(ii). The International Law Commission decided upon the omission after a short debate in which members failed to see why private incitement should not also be punishable: \textit{Yearbook . . . 1950}, Vol. I, 60th meeting, p. 154, para. 88; \textit{Yearbook . . . 1951}, Vol. I, 91st meeting, p. 77, paras. 87–92.}

Public incitement, according to the International Law Commission, ‘requires communicating the call for criminal action to a number of individuals in a public place or to members of the general public at large’. Referring to events in Rwanda,\footnote{Prosecutor \textit{v. Akayesu}, note 41 above, p. 555. Citing the French Court of Cassation, Criminal Tribunal, 2 February 1950, Bull. crim. No. 38, p. 61.} the Commission considered that the incitement could occur in a public place or by technological means of mass communication, such as radio or television. ‘This public appeal for criminal action increases the likelihood that at least one individual will respond to the appeal and, moreover, encourages the kind of “mob violence” in which a number of individuals engage in criminal conduct.’ It added that private incitement would be considered a form of complicity; but in that case, proof would be required that the incitement had succeeded and that there was a causal link with the crime of genocide itself.\footnote{Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May–26 July 1996, note 3 above, pp. 26–7.}

According to the International Law Commission: ‘The element of direct incitement requires specifically urging another individual to take immediate criminal action rather than merely making a vague or indirect suggestion.’ United States legislators took a somewhat different approach, declaring that it means urging another ‘to engage imminently in conduct in circumstances under which there is a substantial likelihood of imminently causing such conduct’. In Akayesu, the Rwanda Tribunal said incitement must ‘assume a direct form and specifically provoke another to engage in a criminal act’. It must be more than ‘mere vague or indirect suggestion’. The Tribunal referred to the crime of provocation in civil law systems, which is regarded as being direct when the prosecution can prove a causal link with the crime committed. The requirement is puzzling. Because direct and public incitement is by its nature inchoate or incomplete, it is impossible to prove such a causal link.

The problem with requiring that incitement be ‘direct’ is that history shows that those who attempt to incite genocide speak in euphemisms. It would surely be contrary to the intent of the drafters to view such coded language as being insufficiently direct. In Akayesu, the Tribunal stated that ‘the direct element of incitement should be viewed in the light of its cultural and linguistic content. A particular speech may be perceived as “direct” in one country, and not so in another, depending on the audience.’ For example, during the Rwandan genocide, the president of the interim government exhorted a crowd to ‘get to work’. For Rwandans, this meant using machetes and axes and would be taken as an invitation to kill Tutsis, according to the Special Rapporteur, René Degni-Segui. In Kambanda, the Tribunal cited the accused’s use of an incendiary phrase, ‘you refuse to give your blood to your country and the dogs drink it for nothing’. The problem of interpreting ambiguous language also confronted the Canadian tribunal in the Mugesera case. Mugesera’s speech consisted of a series of double entendres and implied references, clearly understandable to his audience but
sufficiently ambiguous to provide Mugesera with arguments in his defence, especially in remote Canada. He said, for example: ‘Well, let me tell you, your home is in Ethiopia, we’ll send all of you by the Nyabarongo so that you get there fast.’ Only with the assistance of expert testimony was the Tribunal able to determine the real meaning of this sentence, which implied murder of Tutsis by drowning in the Nyabarongo River.113 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda expressed the same view, noting that ‘implicit’ incitement could nonetheless be direct:

The Chamber will therefore consider on a case-by-case basis whether, in light of the culture of Rwanda and the specific circumstances of the instant case, acts of incitement can be viewed as direct or not, by focusing mainly on the issue of whether the persons for whom the message was intended immediately grasped the implication thereof. In light of the foregoing, it can be noted in the final analysis that whatever the legal system, direct and public incitement must be defined for the purposes of interpreting Article 2(3)(c), as directly provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit genocide, whether through speeches, shouting or threats uttered in public places or at public gatherings, or through the sale or dissemination, offer for sale or display of written material or printed matter in public places or at public gatherings, or through the public display of placards or posters, or through any other means of audiovisual communication.114

Although not charged with with ‘direct incitement’, Hans Fritzsche was accused before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg of inciting and encouraging the commission of war crimes ‘by deliberately falsifying news to arouse in the German people those passions which led them to the commission of atrocities’. The Tribunal found definite evidence of anti-Semitism in his broadcasts, which blamed Jews for the war. But, said the Tribunal, ‘these speeches did not urge persecution or extermination of Jews’. Consequently, it refused to hold ‘that they were intended to incite the German people to commit atrocities on conquered peoples’. In effect, Fritzche’s anti-Semitic propaganda was not ‘direct’ enough.115 Julius Streicher, on the other hand, was found guilty at

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113 Mugesera v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, note 96 above.
114 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 41 above, para. 557.
115 France et al. v. Goering et al., note 24 above, pp. 584–5. But Fritzche was subsequently prosecuted by the German courts under the de-Nazification laws, found guilty, and sentenced to nine years of hard labour and loss of his civic rights. Fritzche waved the Nuremberg judgment before the German judges, but to no avail. It provides a marvellous example of national justice stepping in when international justice fails, although the approach to the non bis in idem rule is flexible, to say the least. Fritzche was pardoned in 1950 and died of cancer in 1953: Eugene Davidson, The Trial of the Germans, New York: Macmillan, 1966, pp. 549–61; Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremburg Trials, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992, p. 612.
Nuremberg for such direct incitement as the following: ‘A punitive expedition must come against the Jews in Russia. A punitive expedition which will provide the same fate for them that every murderer and criminal must expect. Death sentence and execution. The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be exterminated root and branch.’

Although a punishable act of genocide, incitement also bears on the obligation of States parties to prevent genocide. The activities of the hate-mongering Radio Mille Collines were well known to the international community prior to the April 1994 genocide in Rwanda, but the United Nations peacekeeping mission did not intervene. In the Kambanda case, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda focused on the accused’s role in Radio Mille Collines:

Jean Kambanda acknowledges the use of the media as part of the plan to mobilize and incite the population to commit massacres of the civilian Tutsi population . . . Jean Kambanda acknowledges that, on or about 21 June 1994, in his capacity as Prime Minister, he gave clear support to Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), with the knowledge that it was a radio station whose broadcasts incited killing, the commission of serious bodily or mental harm to, and persecution of Tutsi and moderate Hutu. On this occasion, speaking on this radio station, Jean Kambanda, as Prime Minister, encouraged the RTLM to continue to incite the massacres of the Tutsi civilian population, specifically stating that this radio station was ‘an indispensable weapon in the fight against the enemy’.

More recently, the Security Council has urged States and relevant organizations, with respect to the African Great Lakes region, ‘to cooperate in countering radio broadcasts and publications that incite acts of genocide, hatred and violence in the region’.

One of the more insidious forms that propaganda in favour of genocide has taken in recent years is revisionism or negationism. Some States have enacted laws prohibiting public denial of genocides such as the Holocaust or Shoah of the Jews during the Second World War. The Human Rights Committee held criminal prosecution of a Holocaust

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116 Frane et al. v. Goering et al., note 24 above, p. 548. See also the findings of the United States Military Tribunal in the case of another Nazi propagandist, Dietrich: United States of America v. von Weizsaecker et al. (‘Ministries case’), (1948) 14 TWC 314 (United States Military Tribunal), pp. 565–76.

117 The rules of engagement prepared for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) stated that it would intervene, if necessary alone, in order to prevent the occurrence of crimes against humanity: In Force Commander, Operational Directive No 2: Rules of Engagement (Interim), 19 November 1993, UN Restricted, UNAMIR, File No. 4003.1, Art. 17. However, the rules were never formally adopted.


denier did not breach the fundamental right to freedom of expression, although it stopped short of endorsing the law upon which the conviction was based.\footnote{Faurisson v. France (No. 550/1993), UN Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993.} The Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination praised Germany for adopting legislation prohibiting denial of genocide, noting only that it was ‘too restricted’ because it did not refer to all types of genocide.\footnote{‘Annual Report of the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’, UN Doc. A/52/18, paras. 217 and 226.} According to the European Court of Human Rights, denial of ‘clearly established historical facts – such as the Holocaust’ would not be covered by the right to freedom of expression.\footnote{Lehideaux and Isornia v. France (No. 55/1997/839/1045), Judgment, 23 September 1998, para. 47.} Benjamin Whitaker described negationism as a form of incitement to genocide.\footnote{Benjamin Whitaker, ‘Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, para. 49.} But according to Malcolm Shaw, it is doubtful that article III(c) of the Convention is ‘sufficiently broad to cover what may be termed public propaganda in favour of genocide’.

\section*{Attempt}

Article III(d) includes ‘[a]ttempt to commit genocide’ as an ‘other act’. The Secretariat draft defined ‘[a]ny attempt to commit genocide’ as a punishable offence.\footnote{UN Doc. E/447, pp. 5–13, art. II.I.1.} The \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee also proposed that ‘[a]ttempt to commit genocide’ be included within the convention.\footnote{UN Doc. E/794, art. IV(c). The French ‘Draft Convention on Genocide’ (UN Doc. A/C.6/211), which was never put to a vote, included the following provision: ‘Article 2. Any attempt, provocation or instigation to commit genocide is also a crime.’ The United States draft of 30 September 1947 said: ‘It shall be unlawful and punishable to commit genocide or to wilfully participate in an act of genocide, or to engage in any . . . attempt to commit an act of genocide’: UN Doc. E/623, art II.1. See also ‘Draft Articles for the Inclusion in the Convention on Genocide Proposed by the Delegation of China on 16 April 1948’, UN Doc. E/AC.25/9 (‘It shall be illegal to conspire, attempt, or incite persons, to commit acts enumerated in 1, 2, and 3’); and the Soviet Principles, ‘Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide’, UN Doc. E/AC.25/7, Principle IV (‘The following actions should also be included in the convention as crimes of genocide: 1. Attempts . . . ’).} There were no amendments in the Sixth Committee, and the paragraph was adopted unanimously without debate.\footnote{UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.85. See also Robinson, \textit{Genocide Convention}, p. 66.} A provision prohibiting
'Other acts’ of genocide

‘preparatory acts’ contained in the Secretariat draft\textsuperscript{128} was voted down in the \textit{Ad Hoc Committee}\textsuperscript{129} and again in the Sixth Committee.\textsuperscript{130}

Attempt to commit genocide is also contemplated by the statutes of the two \textit{ad hoc} tribunals, which incorporate article III of the Convention in their definitions of genocide.\textsuperscript{131} There is, however, no text on attempt applicable to all of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the \textit{ad hoc} tribunals.\textsuperscript{132} This is quite logical, as there is hardly a need to prosecute attempt when a tribunal is set up \textit{ex post facto}. The draft Code of Crimes contains a general provision applicable to all crimes in its subject matter jurisdiction, including genocide: ‘An individual shall be responsible for a crime set out in article 17 [genocide] . . . if that individual: . . . (g) attempts to commit such a crime by taking action commencing the execution of a crime which does not in fact occur because of circumstances independent of his intentions.’\textsuperscript{133} There is a similar provision in the Rome Statute, applicable to all offences within the Court’s jurisdiction, including genocide:

In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: . . . (f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person’s intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under

\textsuperscript{128} UN Doc. E/447, pp. 5–13: ‘I. The following are likewise deemed to be crimes of genocide . . . 2. The following preparatory acts: (a) studies and research for the purpose of developing the technique of genocide; (b) setting up of installations, manufacturing, obtaining, possessing or supplying of articles or substances with the knowledge that they are intended for genocide; (c) issuing instructions or orders, and distributing tasks with a view to committing genocide.’

\textsuperscript{129} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.17, p. 7. For the debate in the \textit{Ad Hoc Committee}, distinguishing between preparatory acts and attempts, see UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.6, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{130} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.86.

\textsuperscript{131} ‘Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, note 4 above, art. 2(3)(d); ‘Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, note 4 above, art. 4(3)(d).

\textsuperscript{132} ‘Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, note 4 above, art. 7(1); ‘Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, note 4 above, art. 6(1).

this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.  

Apart from their rejection of the concept of ‘mere preparatory acts’, the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention provide no useful guidance on how the concept of ‘attempt’ is to be applied. There is no case law on the subject because there have never been any prosecutions for attempted genocide. Even in the case of war crimes, only a handful of prosecutions are reported. During the post-Second World War period, Norway, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia and France all had legal provisions authorizing prosecution for attempted war crimes, although the closest that the Nuremberg Charter or Control Council Law No. 10 came to the concept was in the offence of planning certain crimes. In a French trial, a Nazi official was found guilty of attempt when he recommended that the Gestapo arrest and deport some ‘politically undesirable’ individuals, although no subsequent action was taken. The conviction was based on a provision in the French penal code stating: ‘Any attempt to commit a crime which is displayed by a commencement of execution, when it is suspended or has failed to achieve its object on account of circumstances independent of the will of


135 The author of the first version of the International Law Commission’s draft Code, Jean Spiropoulos, proposed that ‘preparatory act’ be added to art. III of the Genocide Convention. According to Spiropoulos: ‘Preparatory acts are declared punishable by the Nürnberg Charter, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and by the Control Council Law No. 10 in the case of aggressive war or war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances. The great importance of the crimes to be established by the draft code renders advisable the declaration that the preparatory acts to these crimes are punishable’: ‘Report by J. Spiropoulos, Special Rapporteur’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/25, para. 83(d).


138 In his report on the subsequent proceedings held pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10, note 30 above, Telford Taylor noted that art. II(2) did not include attempt as a form of criminal activity but suggested that there was criminal liability for attempt to commit international crimes by analogy with domestic legal systems: Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials under Control Council Law No. 10, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1949, p. 229.
the perpetrator is regarded as the crime itself.\footnote{139} The International Law Commission considered that an individual who has taken a significant step towards the commission of genocide or any of the other crimes addressed in the Code ‘entails a threat to international peace and security because of the very serious nature of these crimes’.\footnote{140} Certainly the preventive mission of the Convention mandates diligent prosecution of any attempt.

The principal interpretative problem in attempts is establishing the threshold at which innocent preparatory acts become criminal. Domestic legal texts vary considerably in this area.\footnote{141} All legal regimes require that attempt involve something going beyond mere preparation and showing a beginning of execution of the crime.\footnote{142} Four somewhat different approaches emerge from comparative criminal law: the material act must be unequivocal; the material act must have a causal link with the offence to which it leads directly; the material act must be the first step after preparation; the material act must be the final step before commission of the crime itself. The Rome Statute is the first instrument to articulate a test, declaring that attempt occurs when the offender ‘commences its execution by means of a substantial step’,\footnote{143} a hybrid formulation drawn from French and English law that sets a relatively low threshold.\footnote{144} It appears to situate the analysis somewhere between ‘the first step after preparation’ and ‘the last step before commission’. In its commentary on the draft Code of Crimes, the International Law Commission said that attempt involves ‘a significant step’ towards completion.\footnote{145}

The Rome Statute also codifies the significance of voluntary abandonment, which is a form of defence invoked if the attempt has actually

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\footnote{139} France v. Stucker, (1948) 7 LRTWC 72 (Permanent Military Tribunal at Metz).
\footnote{143} ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 2 above, art. 25(3)(f). The draft ‘Elements of Crime’ submitted by the United States to the February 1999 session of the Preparatory Commission of the Court give the ‘substantial step’ test a very low threshold, saying only that ‘[t]he “substantial step” requirement for this offence means that the act must amount to more than mere preparation’: UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.4/Add.3, p. 3.
\footnote{145} Ibid., p. 28.
\end{footnotesize}
been perpetrated but the offender has since failed to complete the crime. The possibility of voluntary abandonment was considered in sessions of the Preparatory Committee,\textsuperscript{146} and the diplomatic conference agreed, upon a proposal from Japan, to exclude liability in the case of voluntary abandonment.\textsuperscript{147} Why this should be is hard to understand, although presumably it is based on the questionable supposition that this may induce criminals to change their minds.\textsuperscript{148} The punishment for an attempt is, as a general rule, considerably less than that for the completed crime, which ought to be a sufficient incentive to desist before the deed is done.

Theoretically, at least, it is possible to be an accomplice to an attempt. But such a form of criminal behaviour is clearly excluded by article III of the Convention, which only contemplates complicity (art. III(e)) in the case of acts of genocide, and not the ‘other acts’.\textsuperscript{149} Nevertheless, the statutes of the \textit{ad hoc} criminal tribunals suggest another possibility, because they include the terms of article III but also have a distinct provision dealing with complicity. A charge could be based on the combined effect of articles 2(3)(d) and 6(1) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, or of articles 4(3)(d) and 7(1) of the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. An individual charged with complicity in an attempt might argue that this is retroactive application of the law, because complicity in an attempt is excluded by the Genocide Convention. The \textit{ad hoc} tribunals might be tempted to disregard the general provision dealing with criminal participation (arts. 6(1) and 7(1) respectively) on the assumption that the definition of genocide itself constitutes a form of \textit{lex specialis}. In the \textit{Akayesu} case, the Trial Chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal decided there could be no complicity in an attempted genocide, but on the basis of the \textit{travaux} of the Convention rather than construction of its statute.\textsuperscript{150} Yet the texts of the statutes declare

\textsuperscript{146} ‘Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at Its Session Held 11 to 21 February 1997’, note 91 above, p. 22, n. 12; UN Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13, p. 54, n. 84.
\textsuperscript{147} UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGP/L.4, p. 4. The draft ‘Elements of Crime’ submitted by the United States to the February 1999 session of the Preparatory Commission state: ‘The fact that the crime must fail to occur owing to circumstances independent of the accused’s intentions means that no offence of attempt exists if the crime failed to occur because the accused completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose and abandoned the effort to commit the crime’: UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.4/Add.3, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{149} See the discussion of this point at pp. 285–303 below. For the same reason, art. III permits prosecution for attempt to commit genocide but not for attempt to commit the other acts listed in art. III.
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Prosecutor v. Akayesu}, note 41 above, para. 526.
unambiguously that the general provision on complicity applies to genocide as well as to the other crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunals. The exercise of interpretation is frustrating because it seems doubtful that the Secretary-General, who drafted the texts, and the Security Council, which adopted them, ever considered the matter. The confusing provisions seem to stem from a drafting oversight, the unfortunate result of a hasty ‘cut and paste’ approach to the preparation of international instruments.

**Complicity**

The final ‘other act’ of genocide listed in Article III is ‘[c]omplicity in genocide’. Probably all criminal law systems punish accomplices, that is, those who aid, abet, counsel and procure or otherwise participate in criminal offences, even if they are not the principal offenders.151 As the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia declared in the ‘Celebici’ case: ‘that individuals may be held criminally responsible for their participation in the commission of offences in any of several capacities is in clear conformity with general principles of criminal law.’152 Another trial chamber has identified a customary law basis for the criminalization of accessories or participants.153 The ‘Nuremberg Principles’ formulated by the International Law Commission stated that: ‘Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law.’154

The responsibility of accomplices was recognized in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in only a limited way.155 However,
on this point, the Nuremberg Tribunal seems to have given its Charter a liberal interpretation informed by general principles of law. In fact, many of those convicted at Nuremberg were held responsible as accomplices rather than as principals.\footnote{156} A provision in Control Council Law No. 10 established criminal liability of an individual who was an accessory to the crime, took a consenting part therein, was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission, or was a member of any organisation or group connected with the commission of any such crime.\footnote{157} The concept of complicity is also recognized in the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,\footnote{158} and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.\footnote{159}

Complicity is sometimes described as secondary participation,\footnote{160} but when applied to genocide, there is nothing ‘secondary’ about it. The ‘accomplice’ is often the real villain, and the ‘principal offender’ a small cog in the machine. Hitler did not, apparently, physically murder or brutalize anybody; technically, he was ‘only’ an accomplice to the crime of genocide. As explained by the Appeal Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia:

Although only some members of the group may physically perpetrate the criminal act (murder, extermination, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, etc.), the participation and contribution of the other members of the group is often vital in facilitating the commission of the offence in question. It follows that the moral gravity of such participation is often no less – or indeed no different – from that of those actually carrying out the acts in question.\footnote{161}

Therefore, a provision authorizing prosecution for complicity seems important in order to reach those who organize, direct or otherwise encourage genocide but who never actually wield machine guns or

\footnote{156} ‘Formulation of Nurnberg Principles, Report by J. Spiropoulos, Special Rapporteur’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/22, para. 43. In Prosecutor v. Tadic, note 153 above, para. 674, the Trial Chamber noted that the post-Second World War judgments generally failed to discuss in detail the criteria upon which guilt was determined.
\footnote{157} Control Council Law No. 10, note 30 above, art. II.2.
\footnote{158} Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (1987) 1465 UNTS 85, art. 4(1).
\footnote{159} International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, (1976) 1015 UNTS 243, art. III.
machetes. Such a requirement is not as obvious as it might seem, however.

The District Court of Jerusalem considered Eichmann to be a principal offender ‘in the same way as two or more persons who collaborate in forging a document are all principal offenders’. The Court noted that the extermination of the Jews was a most elaborate operation requiring a ‘complicated establishment’. According to the Court: ‘Whoever was let into the secret of the extermination plan, above a certain rank, knew that such an establishment was required, that it existed and functioned, although not everyone knew how each part of the establishment operated, with what means, at what pace or even where.’ But this establishment was ‘a single comprehensive act, not to be split up into the acts or operations performed by sundry people at sundry times and in sundry places. One team of men carried it out in concert the whole time and everywhere.’ It follows, said the Court, that a collaborator in the extermination of the Jews, who had knowledge of the plan for the ‘final solution’, should be regarded ‘as an accomplice in the extermination of the millions who were destroyed during the years 1941–1945, irrespective of whether his actions extended over the entire extermination front or only over one or more sectors of it. His responsibility is that of a “principal offender” who has committed the entire crime in conjunction with the others.’

When the United Kingdom incorporated the Genocide Convention in its domestic law, it did not include a provision dealing with complicity. Parliamentary Secretary Elystan Morgan, in explaining the legislation to Parliament, noted that: ‘Complicity in genocide has not been included in Clause 2(1) [because] we take the view that the sub-heading in Article III is subsumed in the act of genocide itself in exactly the same way as, under our domestic criminal law, aiding and abetting is a situation in which a person so charged could be charged as a principal in relation to the offence itself.’

Drafting history

General Assembly Resolution 96(I) of 11 December 1946 affirmed that genocide was a crime under international law ‘for the commission of which principals and accomplices’ were punishable. The Secretariat

162 A-G Israel v. Eichmann, (1968) 36 ILR 18 (District Court, Jerusalem), para. 194.
163 Ibid., para. 193.
164 Ibid., para. 194.
166 GA Res. 96(I).
draft of the convention described ‘wilful participation in acts of genocide of whatever description’ as a punishable act.\textsuperscript{167} The various drafts submitted by the United States, France, the Soviet Union and China all included complicity.\textsuperscript{168} Nor was the idea of secondary liability for genocide at all contested in the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee.\textsuperscript{169} Essentially, the debate in the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee turned on whether complicity of the State was an essential element of the crime of genocide.\textsuperscript{170} The \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee draft referred to ‘[c]omplicity in any of the acts enumerated in this article’, making it evident that complicity in the ‘other acts of genocide’, that is, conspiracy, incitement and attempt, both before and after the crime, was also covered.\textsuperscript{171}

In the Sixth Committee, Belgium proposed an amendment reading ‘[c]omplicity in crimes of genocide’.\textsuperscript{172} At first blush, this was identical in substance with that of the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee. But under the Belgian proposal, complicity was only meant to apply to genocide as such, and not to the ‘other acts’. Luxembourg claimed the whole issue was rather irrelevant. It was meaningless to talk of complicity in conspiracy, said its representative; although it was theoretically possible to have complicity in incitement, this was unclear and vague; and it was also undesirable to have complicity for attempts, especially in light of the evidentiary difficulties.\textsuperscript{173} But there were compelling arguments for the distinction. Venezuela observed it could be important to prosecute an accomplice after the fact, that is, one who assisted principal offenders to escape

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{167} UN Doc. E/447, pp. 5–13, art. II.II.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{168} ‘United States draft of 30 September 1947’, UN Doc. E/623, art. II: it shall be unlawful and punishable ‘to commit genocide or to wilfully participate in an act of genocide’; ‘French draft convention of 5 February 1948’, UN Doc. E/623/Add.1, art. 1: ‘Its authors or their accomplices shall be responsible before International Justice.’ The French draft also stated: ‘Any attempt, provocation or instigation to commit genocide is also a crime’; Soviet ‘Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide’, UN Doc. E/AC.25/9, Principle V: ‘The convention should establish the penal character, on equal terms with genocide, of: 1. Deliberated participation in genocide in all its forms . . . 3. Complicity or other forms of conspiracy for the commission of genocide’; ‘Draft Articles for the Inclusion in the Convention on Genocide Proposed by the Delegation of China on 16 April 1948’, UN Doc. E/AC.25/9, art. II: ‘For the commission of genocide, principals and accomplices, whether they are public officials or private individuals, shall be punishable.’
  \item \textsuperscript{169} See UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.3, pp. 3–5 (Rudzinski).
  \item \textsuperscript{170} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, pp. 3–7; UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.7, p. 9. A judgment of the United States Military Commission also suggests that government complicity is required in the commission of crimes against humanity: \textit{United States v. Alstötter}, note 31 above, p. 80.
  \item \textsuperscript{171} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.16, p. 12; UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.17, pp. 7 and 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{172} UN Doc. A/C.6/217.
  \item \textsuperscript{173} UN Doc. A/C.6/87 (Pescatore, Luxembourg).
\end{itemize}
punishment.\textsuperscript{174} Iran, however, wanted to limit complicity to the crime of genocide \textit{tout court}.\textsuperscript{175}

The United Kingdom proposed adding the word ‘deliberate’ before ‘complicity’.\textsuperscript{176} Gerald Fitzmaurice explained that it was important to specify that complicity must be deliberate, because there existed some systems where complicity required intent, and others where it did not.\textsuperscript{177} Several delegates said that this was unnecessary, because there had never been any doubt that complicity in genocide must be intentional.\textsuperscript{178} The United Kingdom eventually withdrew its amendment, ‘since it was understood that, to be punishable, complicity in genocide must be deliberate’.\textsuperscript{179} The United Kingdom’s amendment was now essentially identical to that of Belgium. It graciously withdrew its proposal\textsuperscript{180} and the United Kingdom amendment reading ‘complicity in any act of genocide’ was adopted.\textsuperscript{181} These debates leave no doubt that the term ‘complicity’ in article III(e) of the Convention applies only to the crime of genocide itself, and not to the other acts described in article III. This was the conclusion of the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: ‘It appears from the \textit{travaux préparatoires} of the Genocide Convention that only complicity in the completed offence of genocide was intended for punishment and not complicity in an attempt to commit genocide, complicity in incitement to commit genocide nor complicity in conspiracy to commit genocide, all of which were, in the eyes of some states, too vague to be punishable under the Convention.’\textsuperscript{182}

Belgium also proposed an amendment introducing the notion of cooperation in genocide.\textsuperscript{183} This was criticized for suggesting genocide had to be committed by a number of individuals.\textsuperscript{184} Belgium said it would be prepared to replace ‘co-operate’ by ‘participate’. It ‘had put forward its amendment on the ground that it was almost inconceivable that a crime aimed particularly at the destruction of a race or group
could be the work of a single individual’.185 This provoked debate about whether the convention was aimed at the State, or required State complicity; or whether genocide could be committed by individuals. Egypt said ‘it was possible to imagine cases where physical or biological genocide was committed without co-operation or participation and where the head of State was alone responsible’.186 The United States observed that the Committee would not be acting in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 96(I) ‘if it drafted a convention which did not afford protection to human groups against the acts of individuals’.187 Belgium explained that its intention was to emphasize the ‘collective’ nature of genocide, but agreed that this might be better done in the provision on complicity, and did not push the point.188

Complicity in other instruments

The issue of complicity takes a slightly different dimension in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Both instruments repeat article III(e) of the Genocide Convention within paragraph 3 of the substantive genocide provision. In addition, the statute contains a general complicity provision, applicable to all of the offences over which the two tribunals have subject matter jurisdiction, including genocide. It establishes criminal liability for persons who have ‘planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime’ within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.189

The International Law Commission’s draft Code of Crimes defines complicity in five rather detailed provisions:

3. An individual shall be responsible for a crime set out in article 17 [genocide] . . . if that individual:

(b) orders the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;

(c) fails to prevent or repress the commission of such a crime in the circumstances set out in article 6;

(d) knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of such a crime, including providing the means for its commission;

185 Ibid. (Houard, Belgium).
186 Ibid. (Raafat, Egypt).
187 Ibid. (Gross, United States).
188 Ibid. (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
189 ‘Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, note 4 above, art. 7(1); ‘Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, note 4 above, art. 6(1).
(e) directly participates in planning or conspiring to commit such a crime which in fact occurs;
(f) directly and publicly incites another to commit such a crime which in fact occurs.\textsuperscript{190}

The provision seems at times redundant and at times contradictory. The ordinary meaning of abetting, in paragraph (d), means inciting, instigating or encouraging the commission of a crime, even in private.\textsuperscript{191} Yet paragraph (f) seems to offer a complete codification of the issue of incitement. The commentary on the Code reveals that the Commission did not understand the meaning of the term ‘abetting’.\textsuperscript{192} If nothing else, the International Law Commission text on complicity shows the pitfalls of obsessive codification, which has been the unfortunate result of the mechanistic application of the \textit{nullum crimen sine lege} principle. The much simpler formulations in the Genocide Convention and in the statutes of the \textit{ad hoc} tribunals have much to recommend themselves.

The Rome Statute provision on complicity suffers from some of the same weaknesses as the International Law Commission’s draft Code:

3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:

\ldots

(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:

(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.\textsuperscript{193}

There is a certain redundancy about these provisions, perhaps because of an unfamiliarity of the drafters with the common law term ‘abetts’

\textsuperscript{190} ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May–26 July 1996’, note 3 above, p. 18. The reference to art. 6 is to the provision dealing with command or superior responsibility. This issue is discussed at pp. 304–13 below.
\textsuperscript{191} Smith and Hogan, \textit{Criminal Law}, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{193} ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 2 above, art. 25.
which, although it appears in paragraph (c), in reality covers everything described in paragraph (b).  

*Forms of complicity*

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in the *Akayesu* case, attempted to explain the distinctions between the different terminologies used to describe secondary participation. The first term it discussed is ‘planning’. According to the Rwanda Tribunal:

Such planning is similar to the notion of complicity in Civil law, or conspiracy under Common law, as stipulated in Article 2(3) of the Statute. But the difference is that planning, unlike complicity or plotting, can be an act committed by one person. Planning can thus be defined as implying that one or several persons contemplate designing the commission of a crime at both the preparatory and execution phases.

But it is inaccurate to associate ‘planning’ with conspiracy as it is intended in the common law, because conspiracy is an inchoate crime. ‘Planning’ within the meaning of the statutes of the *ad hoc* tribunals is only criminal if the underlying crime is committed.

The second category is ‘instigation’, which the Rwanda Tribunal agreed is synonymous with ‘incitement’, at least in English law. According to the Tribunal, this involves ‘prompting another to commit an offence’. The Tribunal noted that instigation or incitement, as set out in the general provision of the Statute concerning criminal participation, is not the same as the crime of ‘direct and public incitement’ listed in the specific provision concerning genocide. ‘Direct and public incitement’ is an inchoate crime, and not a form of complicity.

The third category is ‘ordering’ the commission of an offence. Ordering implies a superior–subordinate relationship between the person giving the order and the one executing it. In other words, the person in a position of authority uses it to convince another to commit an offence. In certain legal systems, including that of Rwanda (See Article 91 of the Penal Code, in ‘Codes et Lois du Rwanda’, Université nationale du Rwanda, 31 December 1994 update, Volume I, 2nd edition: 1995, p. 395), ordering is a form of complicity through instructions given to the direct perpetrator of an offence. Regarding the position of authority, the Chamber considers that sometimes it can be just a question of fact.

The final form of criminal participation in the statutes of the *ad hoc* tribunals is ‘aiding and abetting’. This is a rather classic common law

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195 *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, note 41 above, para. 479.
formulation of complicity. According to the Rwanda Tribunal, aiding means giving assistance to someone, while abetting involves facilitating the commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto. The two terms are disjunctive, and it is sufficient to prove one or the other form of participation, the Tribunal declared. Yet the Yugoslav Tribunal has treated the terms as if they have a collective meaning, offering no distinct meanings for the two elements: ‘practical assistance, encouragement or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.’

The Rwanda Tribunal claimed there is a distinction between ‘aiding and abetting’, set out in the general provision of the Statute and applicable to all crimes covered by the Statute, and ‘complicity’, which is in the genocide provision alone. This is hard to understand because in comparative criminal law the two mean essentially the same thing. Moreover, the drafters of the Genocide Convention intended ‘complicity’, as used in article III(e), to embrace the familiar common law concept of ‘aiding and abetting’. The Rwanda Tribunal said that there are three forms of ‘complicity’ in ‘civil law systems’: complicity by instigation, complicity by aiding and abetting, and complicity by procuring. But on closer examination, instigation is synonymous with abetting, and procuring is synonymous with aiding. The Tribunal added that in Rwandan law there are two additional forms of complicity, namely incitement through speeches and harbouring or aiding a criminal. But once again, these concepts fit comfortably within the general terms of aiding and abetting. The Tribunal said that, given the absence of a definition of complicity in the Statute, it would follow the approach

198 Ibid., para. 423. According to Smith and Hogan, the words ‘aiding’ and ‘abetting’ connote different forms of activity. ‘The natural meaning of “to aid” is “to give help, support or assistance to”; and of “to abet”, “to incite, instigate or encourage”’: Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, p. 126.


200 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, note 6 above, para. 249. See also Prosecutor v. Tadic, note 153 above, para. 689: ‘aiding and abetting includes all acts of assistance by words or acts that lend encouragement or support, as long as the requisite intent is present.’

201 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, note 4 above, art. 6(1).

202 Ibid., art. 2(3)(e).

203 It proposes more detailed definitions of some of these terms: Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 41 above, para. 536. Thus, ‘complicity by procuring means, such as weapons, instruments or any other means, used to commit genocide, with the accomplice knowing that such means would be used for such a purpose; complicity by knowingly aiding or abetting a perpetrator of a genocide in the planning or enabling acts thereof; complicity by instigation, for which a person is liable who, though not directly participating in the crime of genocide crime, gave instructions to commit genocide, through gifts, promises, threats, abuse of authority or power, machinations or culpable artifice, or who directly incited to commit genocide.’
of the Rwandan Penal Code.\textsuperscript{204} All of this is quite contrived, and leads the Tribunal on some rather strange meanderings, particularly with respect to the \textit{mens rea} of complicity, as shall be seen below. Why the Security Council would have created two different and at times contradictory concepts is never explained.

In \textit{Tadic}, the Appeals Chamber developed the concept of ‘common purpose’ complicity, which is distinct from ‘aiding and abetting’. It said ‘aiding and abetting’ lacked the stigmatization of ‘common purpose’ complicity.\textsuperscript{205} The Tribunal observed that criminal liability could be extended to cover responsibility where two or more persons have a common design to pursue a course of conduct where one of the perpetrators commits an act which, while outside the common design, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that common purpose.\textsuperscript{206} The Tribunal said this form of liability derived from customary law and could be inferred from the Statute.

\textit{Problems of application}

War crimes case law provides many examples of prosecution for complicity law, including some directly related to the Nazi genocide. The manufacturer of Zyklon B gas, which was used for mass extermination at Auschwitz and other concentration camps, was condemned by a British Military Court for violating ‘the laws and usages of war’.\textsuperscript{207} His attorney argued, unsuccessfully, that he was ‘merely an accessory before the fact, and even so, an unimportant one’.\textsuperscript{208} In another concentration camp prosecution, members of the staff at Belsen and Auschwitz were found ‘in violation of the laws and usages of war [and to be] together concerned as parties to the ill-treatment of certain persons . . .’.\textsuperscript{209} The judge advocate who successfully prosecuted the case conceded that ‘mere presence on the staff was not of itself enough to justify a conviction’, but insisted that ‘if a number of people took a part, however small

\textsuperscript{204} The Rwandan Penal Code was adopted in 1977, but is modelled on the nineteenth-century codes of France and Belgium. See William A. Schabas and Martin Imbuleau, \textit{Introduction to Rwandan Law}, Cowansville, Quebec: Editions Yvon Blais, 1998.

\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Prosecutor v. Tadic}, note 161 above: ‘to hold the latter liable only as aiders and abettors might understated the degree of their criminal responsibility.’ For the distinction between ‘aiding and abetting’ complicity and ‘common purpose’ complicity, see para. 229.

\textsuperscript{206} \textit{Ibid.}, paras. 204–20.

\textsuperscript{207} \textit{United Kingdom v. Tesch et al.} (‘Zyklon B case’), (1947) 1 LRTWC 93 (British Military Court).

\textsuperscript{208} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 102.

\textsuperscript{209} \textit{United Kingdom v. Kramer et al.} (‘Belsen trial’), (1947) 2 LRTWC 1 (British Military Court), p. 4.
in an offence, they were parties to the whole’. Judges and prosecutors who applied racist laws, contributing to persecution and genocide, were convicted as parties. According to the United States Military Tribunal: ‘This is but an application of general concepts of criminal law. The person who persuades another to commit murder, the person who furnishes the lethal weapon for the purpose of its commission, and the person who pulls the trigger are all principals or accessories to the crime.’

In Tadic, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia noted that the degree of aiding or abetting has not been specified by the case law, although it offered some examples as guidance. The authorities suggest that the contribution of the accomplice must meet a qualitative and quantitative threshold. The prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia argued that ‘any assistance, even as little as being involved in the operation of one of the camps’, constitutes sufficient participation to meet the terms of complicity. ‘[T]he most marginal act of assistance’ can constitute complicity, pleaded the prosecutor. The Tribunal viewed the matter otherwise, saying that criminal participation must have a direct and substantial effect on the commission of the offence. It endorsed the views of the International Law Commission, noting that, while the latter provided no definition of ‘substantially’, the case law required ‘a contribution that in fact has an effect on the commission of the crime’. The Tribunal suggested that participation is substantial if ‘the criminal act most probably would not have occurred in the same way had not someone acted in the role that the accused in fact assumed’. But ‘assistance need not constitute an indispensable

\[\text{\textsuperscript{210}}\] Ibid., pp. 109 and 120.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{211}}\] United States v. Alstötter, note 31 above, p. 62.


\[\text{\textsuperscript{213}}\] Prosecutor v. Tadic, note 153 above, para. 671.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{214}}\] Ibid., paras. 691 and 692. See also Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., note 152 above, para. 326; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, note 6 above, paras. 223 and 234; Prosecutor v. Aleksoski (Case No. IT–95–14/1–T), Judgment, 25 June 1999, para. 61.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{215}}\] The International Law Commission required that accomplices participate ‘directly and substantially’ in the commission of the crime. In addition, the commentary to the draft Code noted that ‘the accomplice must provide the kind of assistance which contributes directly and substantially to the commission of the crime, for example by providing the means which enable the perpetrator to commit the crime. Thus, the form of participation of an accomplice must entail assistance which facilitates the commission of a crime in some significant way: ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May–26 July 1996’, note 3 above, p. 24.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{216}}\] Prosecutor v. Tadic, note 153 above, para. 688.
296 Genocide in international law

element, that is, a *conditio sine qua non* for the acts of the principal’. The Rome Statute does not provide any indication as to whether there is some quantitative degree of aiding and abetting required to constitute the *actus reus* of complicity. The absence of words like ‘substantial’ in the Rome Statute, and the failure to follow the International Law Commission draft, may imply that the diplomatic conference meant to reject the higher threshold of the recent case law of The Hague.

Even the accused who is not actually present when the crime takes place may be a participant. As the Yugoslavia Tribunal observed: ‘direct contribution does not necessarily require the participation in the physical commission of the illegal act. That participation in the commission of the crime does not require an actual physical presence or physical assistance appears to have been well accepted at the Nuremberg war crimes trials.’ Robert Mulka, a camp commander at Auschwitz, was convicted by a German court as an accessory in the murder of approximately 750 persons. Mulka was involved in procuring Zyklon B gas, constructing gas ovens, arranging for trucks to transport inmates to the gas chambers, and alerting the camp bureaucracy as to the imminent arrival of transports. Identification of a victim to those who subsequently carry out the crime, if the informer knows that this will lead to the commission of genocide and intends this consequence or is recklessly indifferent to it, may also constitute complicity.

Just as presence at the scene of the crime is not essential for complicity, it is also clear that mere presence at the scene of the crime, in the absence of a material act or omission, is not an act of complicity. On this issue, the Yugoslavia Tribunal referred to the judge advocate’s statement before a British Military Court in the *Schonfeld* case:

Those who are present at the commission of an offence, and aid and abet its commissions, are principals in the second degree . . . The presence of a person at the scene of the crime may be actual in the sense that he is there, or it may be constructive. It is not necessary that the party should be actually present, an

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217 *Prosecutor v. Furundzija*, note 6 above, para. 209.
218 *Prosecutor v. Tadic*, note 153 above, paras. 678 and 691. In *Tadic*, the Trial Chamber cited *United Kingdom v. Golkel et al.*, note 151 above, p. 53 (‘it is quite clear that [concerned in the killing does] not mean that a man actually had to be present at the site of the shooting’) and pp. 45–7 and 54–5 (defendants who only drove victims to woods to be killed there were found to have been ‘concerned in the killing’); *United Kingdom v. Wielen et al.*, (1948) 9 LRTWC 31 (British Military Court, Hamburg), pp. 43–4 and 46 (it is not necessary that a person be present to be ‘concerned in a killing’).
221 *Prosecutor v. Tadic*, note 153 above, para. 678.
eye-witness or ear witness to the transaction; he is, in construction of law, present, aiding and abetting, with the intention of giving assistance, if he is near enough to afford it should occasion arise . . . There must also be a participation in the act; for even if a man is present whilst a felony is committed, if he takes no part in it and does not act in concert with those who commit it, he will not be a principal in the second degree, merely because he did not endeavour to prevent the felony. It is not necessary, however, to prove that the party actually aided in the commission of the offence; if he . . . was in such a situation as to be able readily to come to their assistance, the knowledge of which was calculated to give additional confidence to his companions, he was, in contemplation of law, present aiding and abetting.222

Where the accused has a legal duty to intervene, mere presence may however constitute a form of complicity.223 An example would be where police do not intervene to prevent a racist mob. Indeed, failure to intervene is in reality a form of encouragement or abetting. In the Borkum Island case, civilians brutalized and killed captured American pilots who were being paraded in public, without any intervention by German guards who were present at the time. The latter were convicted, as well as the commander who ordered that the prisoners be paraded.224 In Tadic, the prosecutor also contended that the accused was criminally responsible because he had taken part in earlier acts and thereafter remained present, never withdrawing from the subsequent acts: ‘the continued presence of the accused gave both support and encouragement to the other members of his group and thereby aided them in the commission of the illegal acts.’225 The Trial Chamber concluded:

Under this theory, presence alone is not sufficient if it is an ignorant or unwilling presence. However, if the presence can be shown or inferred, by circumstantial or other evidence, to be knowing and to have a direct and substantial effect on the commission of the illegal act, then it is sufficient on which to base a finding of participation and assign the criminal culpability that accompanies it . . . Moreover, when an accused is present and participates in the beating of one person and remains with the group when it moves on to beat another person, his presence would have an encouraging effect, even if he does not physically take part in this second beating, and he should be viewed as participating in this second beating as well. This is assuming that the accused has not actively withdrawn from the group or spoken out against the conduct of the group.226

222 United Kingdom v. Schonfeld et al., note 151 above, pp. 69–72.
223 Under many legal systems, failure to assist a person whose life is in danger may constitute a distinct crime, rather than a form of complicity. The accused must have been in a position to intervene without incurring personal harm.
224 United States of America v. Goebell et al. (Case. no. 12–489), 15 September 1948, USNA RG 338, File M1217, Roll 1.
225 Prosecutor v. Tadic, note 153 above, para. 671.
226 Ibid., paras. 689–90
In *Furundzija*, the Tribunal said that ‘an approving spectator who is held in such respect by the other perpetrators that his presence encourages them in their conduct’ could be found guilty as an accomplice to crimes against humanity.  

The responsibility of a superior is not automatic on this basis, although presence at the scene will create a strong presumption of guilt.

Sometimes, complicity is established because the accused is employed in a criminal enterprise or belongs to some civilian or military unit. But complicity should never be equated with some form of collective guilt, by which members of a regime or of armed forces in the regime are deemed, by that fact alone, to share criminal liability. In the judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Kaltenbrunner was acquitted of crimes against peace due to the absence of evidence showing a material act of participation, even though his guilty intent was hardly in doubt. In the *Dachau* trial, employees of the notorious concentration camp were found guilty as accomplices once their direct involvement in the running of the camp had been established.  

In the *Mauthausen case*, the court concluded: ‘That any official, governmental, military or civil . . . or any guard or civil employee, in any way in control of or stationed at or engaged in the operation of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, or any or all of its by-camps in any manner whatsoever, is guilty of a crime against the recognized laws, customs and practices of civilised nations.’ In the *Sandrock case*, the prosecution relied on British military regulations which specified: ‘Where there is evidence that a war crime has been the result of concerted action upon the part of a unit or group of men, then evidence given upon any charge relating to that crime against any member of such unit or group, may be received as prima facie evidence of the responsibility of each member of that unit or group for that crime.’ This amounts to a very useful presumption that the prosecution ought to be entitled to rely on in appropriate

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228 *Prosecutor v. Aleksovski*, note 214 above, para. 65.  
229 ‘If war crimes are being committed in Indochina, not every member of the armed forces is an accomplice to those crimes’: *Switkes v. Laird*, 316 F. Supp. 358 at 365 (SDNY 1970). See also Paust, ‘My Lai’, p. 165.  
233 *United Kingdom v. Sandrock et al.*, (1948) 1 LRTWC 35 (British Military Court), p. 43, referring to: Royal Warrant, 14 June 1945, as amended by Royal Warrant, 4 August 1945, reg. 8(ii).
'Other acts' of genocide

Of course the prosecution must also be able to establish the mental element in cases of genocide, including knowledge by the accused of the plan to destroy the group concerned.

Probably the greatest significance of complicity in cases of genocide is that it establishes the criminal liability of leaders, organizers and planners, few of whom actually soil their hands with the mundane tasks of physical killing and assault. In its *ex parte* hearing to confirm the indictment in the *Karadzic and Mladic* case, the Trial Chamber ruled the accused were participants in genocide on this basis. ‘The uniform methods used in committing the said crimes, their pattern, their pervasiveness throughout all of the Bosnian Serb-held territory, the movements of prisoners between the various camps, and the tenor of some of the accused’s statements are strong indications tending to show that Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic planned, ordered or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of the genocide perpetrated in the detention facilities’, the Trial Chamber wrote.

Under many legal systems, complicity may take place after the crime as well as prior to or during its commission. The *travaux préparatoires* of the Convention give no indication as to whether it was the intent of the drafters that article III(e) include complicity after the fact. The general complicity provision in the statutes of the *ad hoc* tribunals speaks of ‘planning, preparation or execution of a crime’, again leaving this question without resolution. The Yugoslavia Tribunal declared that complicity involved ‘supporting the actual commission before, during,

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234 International legal instruments have not gone as far as the British military regulations, and do not contain any codified presumptions of this nature. Nevertheless, this does not exclude their application by judges as circumstances permit. Factual presumptions, whereby proof of one fact is deemed by the court to prove another fact, are widely recognized in criminal law, even where these are not set out in a positive law provision. An example would be the presumption that an individual who is in possession of recently stolen goods is deemed to be the thief, even in the absence of direct evidence showing theft. This presumption is really little more than a logical deduction based on circumstantial evidence. Presumptions of this nature have been deemed not to violate the presumption of innocence in cases determined by bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights: *Salabiaku v. France*, Series A, No. 141–A, 7 October 1988, para. 28; *Pham Hoang v. France*, Series A, No. 243, 25 September 1992. See also *Duhs v. Sweden* (App. No. 12995/87), (1990) 67 DR 204.

235 Nehemiah Robinson wrote that the *Ad Hoc* Committee intended complicity to refer to ‘accessorship before and after the fact’: Robinson, *Genocide Convention*, p. 69.
or after the incident’.238 The International Law Commission debated whether or not to supply an explicit recognition of complicity after the fact in the Code of Crimes.239 There is none. Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam described complicity as ‘a drama of great complexity and intensity’, and said it could cover acts committed before the principal offence as well as afterwards.240

Complicity requires proof that the underlying or predicate crime has been committed by another person. However, the other person need not be charged or convicted for the liability of the accomplice to be established. In some cases, prosecution may be quite impossible, because the principal offender is dead or has disappeared, or because the principal offender is unfit to stand trial, or a minor, or immune from process. As the Rwanda Tribunal noted: ‘As far as the Chamber is aware, all criminal systems provide that an accomplice may also be tried, even where the principal perpetrator of the crime has not been identified, or where, for any other reasons, guilt could not be proven.’241

The mens rea of complicity

An accomplice to genocide must have the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, racial, ethnical or religious group as such, in accordance with article II of the Convention. The Yugoslavia Tribunal said that ‘there is a requirement of intent, which involves awareness of the act of participation coupled with a conscious decision to participate by planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime’.242 In the Mauthausen Concentration Camp case, where inmates were murdered in gas chambers, the United States Military Tribunal found that every official, governmental, military and civil, and every employee thereof, whether he be a member of the Waffen SS, Allgemeine SS, a guard, or civilian, was criminally liable as an accomplice. As the Trial Chamber noted in Tadic:

This finding was based on the determination that ‘it was impossible for a

238 Prosecutor v. Tadic, note 153 above, para. 692.
240 Ibid., para. 38, p. 32.
241 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 41 above, para. 530.
242 Prosecutor v. Tadic, note 153 above, para. 674. See also United Kingdom v. Rohde et al., (1948) 15 LRTWC 51 (British Military Court, Wuppertal); United States of America v. Alstötter, note 31 above, p. 88 (LRTWC); United States of America v. List, (1948) 11 TWC 1261 (United States Military Tribunal).
governmental, military or civil official, a guard or a civilian employee, of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, combined with any or all of its by-camps, to have been in control of, been employed in, or present in, or residing in, the aforesaid Concentration Camp Mauthausen, combined with any or all of its by-camps, at any time during its existence, without having acquired a definite knowledge of the criminal practices and activities therein existing. Thus the court inferred knowledge on the part of the accused, and concluded that the staff of the concentration camp was guilty of the commission of a war crime based on this knowledge and their continued participation in the enterprise.  

The International Law Commission draft Code specifies that complicity must involve knowledge of the consequences. According to the commentary, the accomplice must ‘knowingly provide assistance to the perpetrator of the crime. Thus, an individual who provides some type of assistance to another individual without knowing that this assistance will facilitate the commission of a crime would not be held accountable.’ The Yugoslav Tribunal said that ‘it is not necessary for an aider and abettor to meet all the requirements of mens rea for a principal perpetrator’. The accomplice must have knowledge of the circumstances of the predicate crime, although ‘it is not necessary that he shares and identifies with the principal’s criminal will and purpose’. The Tribunal said that the real test is whether the accused had knowledge of the principal offender’s intent. These remarks seem to confuse the issue. Obviously, the accomplice’s intent is not identical to that of the principal offender, but it is criminal and genocidal just the same. The reason why criminal law needs to focus on knowledge rather than intent in the case of accomplices is that their behaviour is often quite ambiguous. In the case of the principal offender, the mens rea is proven generally as a logical deduction from the act itself. This is not so easy with an accomplice whose material acts may be facially neutral and, arguably, totally innocent. Therefore, the logical deduction of mens rea from actus reus is impossible and, in order to prove the mens rea of the accomplice, the prosecution must establish knowledge of the principal offender’s intent. But this is not at all the same thing as the suggestion that the mens rea of the accomplice is somehow lesser than that of the principal offender, a questionable assertion of the Yugoslav Tribunal. The person who procures a machete for a militia member or otherwise incites that person, knowing that an act of genocide will be committed, fully intends to participate in genocide. The mens rea or guilty intent is

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243 Prosecutor v. Tadic, note 158 above, para. 677.
245 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, note 6 above, para. 243
246 Ibid. See also: Prosecutor v. Tadic, note 161 above, para. 229(iv).
absolutely comparable with that of the principal offender. Indeed, that is precisely why criminal law treats the accomplice’s guilt on the same plane as the principal’s.

The Rwanda Tribunal, in Akayesu, created similar confusion when it made its perplexing distinction between the forms of complicity defined in article 6(1) of its Statute, that is, the forms of complicity applicable to all crimes within its subject matter jurisdiction, and complicity as it is meant in the specific provision dealing with genocide, which is derived from article III(e) of the Convention. In the former case, it agreed that the accomplice must have knowledge of the circumstances and must have the specific intent for genocide. In the latter, however, it claimed that specific intent is not necessary. It reasoned that an accomplice must act knowingly, but ‘need not even wish that the principal offence be committed’. The Tribunal cited Lord Devlin, in an English case, stating that ‘an indifference to the result of the crime does not of itself negate abetting. If one man deliberately sells to another a gun to be used for murdering a third, he may be indifferent about whether the third lives or dies and interested only in the cash profit to be made out of the sale, but he can still be an aider and abettor.’247 The Rwanda Tribunal stated:

Therefore, the Chamber is of the opinion that an accomplice to genocide need not necessarily possess the dolus specialis of genocide, namely the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such. Thus, if for example, an accused knowingly aided or abetted another in the commission of a murder, while being unaware that the principal was committing such a murder, with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the group to which the murdered victim belonged, the accused could be prosecuted for complicity in murder, and certainly not for complicity in genocide. However, if the accused knowingly aided and abetted in the commission of such a murder while he knew or had reason to know that the principal was acting with genocidal intent, the accused would be an accomplice to genocide, even though he did not share the murderer’s intent to destroy the group . . . In conclusion, the Chamber is of the opinion that an accused is liable as an accomplice to genocide if he knowingly aided or abetted or instigated one or more persons in the commission of genocide, while knowing that such a person or persons were committing genocide, even though the accused himself did not have the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.248

The problem with this analysis is that the accomplice who knows of the principal offender’s intent and who assists or encourages must necessarily share the genocidal intent. To say that the goal of the accomplice is

248 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 41 above, para. 544.
to earn money by selling the weapon rather than to destroy a group in whole or in part is to confuse concepts of intent and motive. In any event, the Rwanda Tribunal’s reference to English authority is incorrect, because the *National Coal Board* case, as well as subsequent judgments, actually confirm that the motive of the accomplice is irrelevant as long as knowledge and intent are present.249

The preoccupation of both the Yugoslav Tribunal, in *Furundzija*, and the Rwanda Tribunal, in *Akayesu*, with the *mens rea* of ‘aiding and abetting’ is all the more unusual because in those cases the form of participation was ‘abetting’ rather than ‘aiding’. In both cases, the accused was charged with inciting, instigating or encouraging, in other words abetting, rather than with providing material assistance, that is, aiding. It is often said that abetting relates to the *mens rea* of the principal offence whereas aiding relates to the *actus reus*.250 The aider provides material help, and in this sense the *mens rea* is often unclear or equivocal, because the act is ostensibly innocent. The abettor, on the other hand, in effect provokes the crime with words and behaviour. If the acts of the abettor can be proved satisfactorily, it must be virtually self-evident that the abettor had the *mens rea* to destroy, in whole or in part, a group protected by the Convention.

‘Common purpose’ complicity, defined by the Appeal Chamber in *Tadic*, raises particularly difficult issues with respect to *mens rea*. An individual may be held liable for all offences committed by his or her accomplices that reasonably result from a common purpose to commit a crime. Thus, the accomplice may be found guilty for a crime that was not truly intended, because he or she failed to foresee how his or her partners in crime would behave. According to the Trial Chamber,

It should be noted that more than negligence is required. What is required is a state of mind in which a person, although he did not intend to bring about a certain result, was aware that the actions of the group were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless willingly took that risk. In other words, the so-called *dolus eventualis* is required (also called ‘adventent recklessness’ in some national legal systems).251

The Tribunal notes that such complicity is commonly recognized in national legal systems, although it admits that some jurisdictions have found such an objective standard of foresight to be incompatible with fundamental principles of justice.

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250 *DPP for Northern Ireland v. Lynch*, ibid.

251 *Ibid.*, para. 220. See also *Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana*, note 199 above, para. 204
Command responsibility

Command or superior responsibility is a form of criminal participation by which a person in a hierarchically responsible position may be held liable for the acts of subordinates. It differs from ordinary complicity, which exists upon proof that the commander ordered the act or otherwise aided and abetted its performance. A commander who knows that troops under his or her command are about to commit an atrocity or are in the course of committing one, and who fails to intervene, can be prosecuted as an accomplice, as discussed above. Command responsibility takes this one step further, implicating the commander in the absence of proof of knowledge. Under command responsibility, the commander ‘ought to have known’ of the crimes. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his report on the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, described command responsibility as ‘imputed responsibility or criminal negligence’.

Command responsibility developed in a military context and was applied, at least historically, to war crimes, where there is often no specific intent requirement. It was later codified with respect to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions in Protocol Additional I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Relating to The Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. Command responsibility in the case of war crimes is closely related to issues of military discipline, and the fact that a commander had specific duties that he or she had failed to fulfil. In the leading post-Second World War case, the United States Military Commission noted that Yamashita ‘was an officer of long years of experience, broad in its scope, who had had extensive command and staff duty’. Although acknowledging it would be absurd to condemn


254 (1979) 1125 UNTS 3, art. 86(2): ‘The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.’

a commander merely because one of his or her soldiers committed a crime, the Commission held that ‘where murder and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offences, and there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops . . .’.256 Yamashita had ‘failed to provide effective control’ of his troops as was required by the circumstances.257 The judgment itself is not a model of clarity and when the matter was appealed to the United States Supreme Court the prosecution claimed it had led evidence showing ‘that the crimes were so extensive and so widespread, both as to time and area, that they must either have been wilfully permitted by the accused or secretly ordered’ by him.258 If this is true, Yamashita would have been guilty as a full accomplice, and not on the basis of command responsibility for negligent supervision. Justice Rutledge on the Supreme Court, who dissented in the final judgment, said that the ‘vagueness, if not vacuity, in the findings’ ran throughout the proceedings, and that this affected ‘the very gist of the offence’. For Justice Rutledge, it was impossible to determine whether Yamashita’s crime was ‘wilful, informed and intentional omission to restrained and control troops known by petitioner to be committing crimes or was only a negligent failure on his part to discover this and take whatever measures he then could to stop the conduct’.259

Extending command responsibility from war crimes to genocide raises particular problems with respect to the intent element. Unlike many war crimes, genocide requires the prosecution to establish the highest level of specific intent. But command responsibility is an offence of negligence, and exactly how a specific intent offence can be committed by negligence remains a paradox. Command responsibility in the case of genocide, as a form of criminal participation, is not contem-


257 Ibid.
258 In re Yamashita, note 255 above.
259 Ibid. See also the comments on the case, United States v. Yamashita, note 255 above, pp. 84, 86 and 88.
plated by article III of the Genocide Convention or elsewhere in the instrument. The only suggestion in the preparatory work is a proposal from a non-governmental organization, the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations, but nothing came of its recommendation. Subsequent instruments aimed at the prosecution of genocide, however, have incorporated forms of command responsibility. It appears for the first time in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: ‘The fact that [genocide] was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.’ There is an identical provision in the Rwanda statute.

Command responsibility in the case of genocide is also set out in article 28 of the Rome Statute:

Responsibility of commanders and other superiors

In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court:

1. A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:

   (a) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and

   (b) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

2. With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph 1, a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective

260 UN Doc. E/C.2/49: ‘Add: “Rulers and public officials shall also be liable to punishment if they fail to employ every lawful means to prevent and punish offences under this Convention”; Add to article IX: “If individuals acting as organs of the State failed to employ all lawful means to prevent any offence under this Convention”; “If an individual was brought before a municipal court for an offence under this Convention but the Court failed to convict him or to impose upon him a penalty commensurate with the crime as a result of a manifest miscarriage of justice”; Add to article XI: “Failure by the responsible officials to carry out this pledge shall be deemed to constitute an offence under this convention.”’

261 Note 4 above, art. 7(3).

262 Note 4 above, art. 6(3).
authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:

(a) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;

(b) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the superior; and

(c) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.²⁶³

A command responsibility provision was not part of the original draft statute submitted by the International Law Commission to the General Assembly in 1994.²⁶⁴ The idea only emerged during the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1995,²⁶⁵ and detailed texts on the subject, including the idea of extension of liability to civilian superiors, appeared in the 1996 report of the Preparatory Committee.²⁶⁶ A proposal from the United States submitted at the Rome diplomatic conference divided the provision into two parts, distinguishing between a ‘commander’ who has ‘forces under his or her command and effective control’ and a ‘civilian superior’ who has ‘subordinates under his or her authority’. In the former case, the commander is liable if he or she knew or ‘should have known’ of the crimes, whereas in the latter, the civilian superior must have had knowledge of the crimes.²⁶⁷ The distinction remains in the final text. Civilian superiors can only be liable if they knew or were wilfully blind to the acts of their subordinates, and did not take appropriate measures to prevent the offence. This is a crime of omission and, in the case of genocide, a civilian superior would need to have knowledge of the circumstances and the specific intent of genocide, which in this case would be manifested by a failure to act to prevent it. It is really a form of complicity, and must be accompanied by the full mens rea of genocide, that is, knowledge and specific intent. In the case of military commanders, the Statute defines the classic concept of command responsibility, holding the commander liable for negligent supervision,

²⁶³ Note 2 above.
even where the commander did not know of the acts of the subordinates but rather ‘should have known’.

While it did not include command responsibility in its draft statute for an international criminal court, the International Law Commission incorporated the concept in the 1996 draft Code. There are minor differences with the Security Council’s formulation in the ad hoc statutes. The Commission added ‘in the circumstances at the time’ and required that measures taken be ‘necessary’ rather than ‘reasonable’. Its provision stated: ‘The fact that a crime against the peace and security of mankind was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superiors of criminal responsibility, if they knew or had reason to know, in the circumstances at the time, that the subordinate was committing or was going to commit such a crime and if they did not take all necessary measures within their power to prevent or repress the crime.’

The accompanying commentary explained that the reference to ‘superiors’ was sufficiently broad to cover civilian authorities in a position of command and exercising a degree of control analogous to that of military commanders.

The prosecutor of the two ad hoc tribunals has preferred several indictments for genocide committed in the form of command responsibility. There have been three convictions for genocide committed by command responsibility, and a finding of liability pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules in a fourth case. The most detailed treatment of the scope of command responsibility by the Tribunal involved charges of war crimes, in the so-called ‘Celibici’ case. There, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was clearly troubled that its Statute might constitute ex post facto law, at least as far as command responsibility was concerned. With this in mind, it interpreted the relevant provision in light of existing customary and conventional norms, and specifically article 86(2) of Protocol Additional I. The Tribunal concluded that ‘a superior can be held criminally responsible

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269 Ibid., p. 37.
271 Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, note 235 above.
272 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., note 152 above, paras. 330–400. See also Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Case No. IT–95–14–T), Decision on the Defence Motion to Strike Portions of the Amended Indictment Alleging ‘Failure to Punish’ Liability, 4 April 1997, paras. 9–12.
273 See note 248 above.
only if some specific information was in fact available to him which
would provide notice of offences committed by his subordinates’. In
other words, although the superior need not have information of the
crimes themselves, he or she must at least have information sufficient to
warrant further inquiry. This is already a step away from pure negli-
gence, approaching a wilful blindness standard. The Rwanda Tri-

bunal endorsed this reasoning in a genocide prosecution.

The decisions on command responsibility in genocide indicate a
profound judicial malaise with the entire concept. In the Akayesu
judgment of 2 September 1998, the Rwanda Tribunal identified two
different views of the mens rea required in the case of command
responsibility: ‘According to one view it derives from a legal rule of strict
liability, that is, the superior is criminally responsible for acts committed
by his subordinate, without it being necessary to prove the criminal
intent of the superior. Another view holds that negligence which is so
serious as to be tantamount to consent or criminal intent, is a lesser
requirement.’ The second view was supported by the text and author-
itative commentary of article 86(2) of Protocol Additional I, and was
the one favoured by the Rwanda Tribunal.

The Chamber holds that it is necessary to recall that criminal intent is the moral
element required for any crime and that, where the objective is to ascertain the
individual criminal responsibility of a person accused of crimes falling within the
jurisdiction of the Chamber, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and
violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II thereto, it is certainly proper to ensure that there has been malicious
intent, or, at least, ensure that negligence was so serious as to be tantamount to
acquiescence or even malicious intent.

The Rwanda Tribunal ultimately decided to acquit Akayesu on the
portions of the indictment concerning command responsibility because it
found these to be ambiguous. Its comments, however, indicate its
very rigorous and demanding vision of the mens rea of command

277 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 41 above, para. 488.
278 Ibid., para. 689: ‘Although the evidence supports a finding that a superior/subordinate relationship existed between the Accused and the Interahamwe who were at the bureau communal, the Tribunal notes that there is no allegation in the Indictment that the Interahamwe, who are referred to as “armed local militia,” were subordinates of the Accused. This relationship is a fundamental element of the criminal offence set forth in Article 6(3).’
responsibility, even for war crimes. To the extent civilian officials rather than military commanders are involved, the Tribunal said that the law remains ‘contentious’. If this philosophy continues to inform its approach to the question of command responsibility, the standard in cases of genocide will be high indeed, a position that seems eminently fair and legally correct.

In its February 1999 decision in the Serushago case, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found the accused guilty pursuant to article 6(3) of its Statute. As the Tribunal explained, Omar Serushago was the *de facto* leader of the political militia known as the *interahamwe*. The relevant portion of the judgment reads:

28. It was submitted by the prosecutor and admitted by the Defence, that Omar Serushago, in the commission of the crimes for which he has been found guilty, played a leading role and that he therefore incurs individual criminal responsibility under the provisions of Article 6 (3) of the Statute. At the time of commission of the offences for which he is held responsible, Omar Serushago enjoyed definite authority in his region. He participated in several meetings during which the fate of the Tutsi was decided.

29. He was a *de facto* leader of the Interahamwe in Gisenyi. Within the scope of the activities of these militiamen, he gave orders which were followed. Omar Serushago admitted that several victims were executed on his orders while he was manning a roadblock erected near the border between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As stated *supra*, thirty-three persons were killed by people placed under his authority. The accused admitted that all these crimes were committed because their victims were Tutsi or because, being moderate Hutu, they were considered accomplices.279

The ruling is ambiguous, because to the extent Serushago commanded the *interahamwe* and gave orders that were carried out, he was guilty as a principal offender or accomplice pursuant to article 6(1) of the Statute, and not on the basis of command responsibility. Similarly, the Tribunal accepted the guilty plea of Jean Kambanda to an indictment for genocide containing elements of command responsibility. Kambanda was prime minister of Rwanda during the genocide, and there was uncontested evidence that he had actually participated in the orders to commit genocide.280 Thus, as in Serushago, the command responsibility indictments were redundant and unnecessary. Similarly, Clement Kayishema was found guilty of command responsibility genocide, but only after the Tribunal had determined he had also planned, instigated, ordered, committee or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, perpetration

279 *Prosecutor v. Serushago*, note 270 above.

'Other acts’ of genocide

or execution of the crimes.\textsuperscript{281} The real test of the command responsibility provisions will be a finding of guilt where, as in the case of Yamashita, it is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the commander or superior had knowledge of the predicate crimes.

The Yugoslav Tribunal considered charges of command responsibility involving genocide in its Rule 61 hearing in Karadzic and Mladic. The Trial Chamber addressed the issue by attempting to establish a form of vicarious mens rea:

In this case, the Trial Chamber considers that it must focus more specifically on the analysis of the intention ‘to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. Insofar as it is considering command responsibility, it must carry out its examination in order to discover whether the pattern of conduct of which it is seised, namely ‘ethnic cleansing’, taken in its totality, reveals such a genocidal intent.\textsuperscript{282}

Here it appears the Tribunal was attempting to determine whether those under the command of Karadzic and Mladic had a genocidal intent.\textsuperscript{283} Presumably, if no such intent could be shown, the crime of genocide would not have been committed, and as a result Karadzic and Mladic could not be liable for it as commanders or superiors. In its ruling, the Trial Chamber considered ‘that certain acts submitted for review could have been planned or ordered with a genocidal intent. This intent derives from the combined effect of speeches or projects laying the groundwork for and justifying the acts, from the massive scale of their destructive effect and from their specific nature, which aims at undermining what is considered to be the foundation of the group.’\textsuperscript{284} The decision was equivocal on this point, but there is a strong suggestion that the Trial Chamber considered Karadzic and Mladic to be responsible, as commanders, because the acts ‘could have been planned or ordered [by them] with a genocidal intent’. But if they were planned and ordered by Karadzic and Mladic, the basis of responsibility is full-blown complicity and not command responsibility. In other words, with command responsibility, the prosecution must establish the genocidal intent of the subordinate, not that of the commander. If the issue shifts

\textsuperscript{281} Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, note 199 above, para. 473.
\textsuperscript{282} Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, note 235 above, para. 94.
\textsuperscript{283} A lawyer from the prosecutor’s office has raised the intriguing hypothesis of a case where ‘subordinates may be committing acts in execution of a genocidal policy of which they are not aware’. In such a case, the commander must have ‘knowledge that his or her failure to prevent and punish subordinates relates specifically to the crime of genocide’: remarks of Payam Akhavan, in ‘The Genocide Convention after Fifty Years: Contemporary Strategies for Combating a Crime against Humanity’, (1998) 92 ASIL Proceedings, p. 1, at p. 13. But this is not a problem of command responsibility. If the commander has knowledge, the commander is an accomplice.
\textsuperscript{284} Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, note 235 above, paras. 84, 94 and 95.
to the commander’s genocidal intent, as it did in *Karadzic and Mladic*, then complicity, not command responsibility, is the proper basis of guilt.

It is entirely appropriate that a military commander, and perhaps even a civilian official, be held liable for negligent execution of duties, and punished accordingly under criminal or disciplinary laws. It is considerably more doubtful, however, whether negligent behaviour in a failure to exercise command responsibility can be reconciled with a crime requiring the highest level of intent. Logically, it is impossible to commit a crime of intent by negligence. Genocide involves intentional behaviour and, despite the wording of the command responsibility provisions in the two statutes of the *ad hoc* tribunals as well as in the Rome Statute, it must be wrong in law to consider that genocide may be committed by a commander who is merely negligent. From a policy standpoint, it is also highly questionable whether international justice, with its limited resources, should be concerning itself with what is only negligent behaviour.

In reality, command responsibility facilitates the prosecution of a commander where his or her subordinates have actually committed the crime of genocide and where it is impossible to establish that this was pursuant to orders. There is little doubt that Yamashita ordered the pillage of Manila, or that Meyer ordered the summary execution of Canadian prisoners of war at the Abbaye Ardenne, or at the very least that they had knowledge of the crimes and by their behaviour encouraged their subordinates to commit them. If this is assumed, then Yamashita and Meyer are guilty not by virtue of command responsibility but as principals or accomplices. They had the requisite level of specific intent as accomplices, and not one of mere negligence. But, because the courts found evidence of complicity insufficient, they devised the principle of command responsibility. For the prosecution, this simplifies things enormously. In practice, the accused commander must answer the charge of negligence with a defence of due diligence, demonstrating, in effect, that appropriate orders were given to the subordinates in order to prevent the crimes. The tactical consequence of the rule of command responsibility is to force the accused to reply to the evidence, generally

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286 Several cases appear, at first blush, to be based on negligence in supervising subordinates. However, on closer examination, the courts insist upon a knowledge requirement. See, in this respect, the cases cited in the commentary of the *Law Reports on the Yamashita case: United States v. Yamashita*, note 255 above, pp. 84–91; see also *Prosecutor v. Delalic*, note 152 above, para. 769.
by testifying. The command responsibility rule accelerates the moment of reckoning for the accused, assisting the prosecution to meet its burden of proof and compelling the accused to take the stand. In all likelihood, the accused’s answers may fill in the missing link and make proof of true complicity.

A more attractive solution, at least from a principled point of view, is to create an evidentiary presumption by which a commander is deemed to have participated in genocide if his or her subordinates committed the crime. From the standpoint of the case for the prosecution, the elements of proof that must be adduced are the same as those for command responsibility. The prosecution must establish that subordinates committed genocide, and that the accused was their commander. Given the nature of the crime of genocide, and given the relationship between commander and subordinate, such a presumption is little more than a logical inference from circumstantial evidence. While it is open to charges of violating the presumption of innocence, international human rights tribunals have accepted similar presumptions to the extent that there is a rational link between the proven fact and the presumed fact. It is submitted that in cases where genocide is committed, the rational connection between proof that subordinates committed the crime and the presumption that the commander wilfully and knowingly participated will be self-evident.

When the Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission explained the concept, he presented ‘command responsibility’ as a form of presumption by which the responsibility of a superior was presumed, failing proof to the contrary: Yearbook . . . 1986, Vol. I, 1957th meeting, p. 90, paras. 22–3.

Salabiaku v. France, note 234 above, para. 28. See also Pham Hoang v. France, note 234 above; and Duhs v. Sweden, note 234 above. Note, however, that the Rome Statute has a provision specifically protecting the accused against ‘any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal’: note 2 above, art. 67(1)(i).
A defence is an answer to a criminal charge. It is used to denote ‘all grounds which, for one reason or another, hinder the sanctioning of an offence – despite the fact that the offence has fulfilled all definitional elements of a crime’. The law of defences is complex and, because of the special nature of the crime of genocide, some defences that may be quite significant in another context, such as consent of the victim, are of little interest here.

Sometimes different terminology is used to describe ‘defences’. For example, the Rome Statute speaks of ‘[g]rounds for excluding criminal responsibility’. There are also classifications within the general bodies of defences. The Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly on the International Criminal Court divided ‘defences’ into three categories: ‘Negation of liability’, including error of law, error of fact and diminished mental capacity; ‘Excuses and justifications’, including self-defence, defence of others, defence of property, necessity, lesser of evils, duress/coercion(force majeure), superior orders, and ‘law enforcement/other authority to maintain order’; and ‘Defences under public international law’, including military necessity, reprisal, and self-defence pursuant to article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Ultimately, however, the drafters of the Rome Statute did not attempt to classify defences in any analytical manner.

Many legal systems distinguish between ‘justification’ and ‘excuse’,
although the utility of this is not necessarily apparent. As George Fletcher has explained:

Claims of justification concede that the definition of the offence is satisfied, but challenge whether the act is wrongful; claims of excuse concede the act is wrongful, but seek to avoid the attribution of the act to the author. A justification speaks to the rightness of the act; an excuse, to whether the actor is accountable for a concededly wrongful act.

It is often said that the defence of self-defence is a justification, in that the offender is considered to be morally right to have reacted as he or she did. On the other hand, the defence of duress is usually presented as an excuse, a recognition that, while the act was improper, the offender had no real choice in the matter. While an excuse to a charge of genocide might be conceivable, a justification seems unthinkable.

Criminal law also distinguishes between special defences and general defences. A special defence exists with respect to certain types of charges, whereas a general defence is an answer to all offences. Defences that establish a lack of specific intent are special defences to genocide. While leading to an acquittal for genocide, they cannot be set up against other crimes of violence against the person. It is no defence to a charge of homicide to claim lack of intent to destroy an ethnic group in whole or in part.

This study is not the place for a review of all general defences. It is primarily concerned with special defences available to the charge of genocide. Somewhat more incidentally, general defences are also of interest if special features render them germane to genocide prosecutions.

Defences may also be classified according to whether they are substantive or procedural. The latter address issues such as lack of jurisdiction, or the plea of double jeopardy (non bis in idem). Procedural defences are also of general application within criminal law systems, and as a result they too do not receive detailed consideration in this part of the study.

The Genocide Convention addresses defences in only one provision, article IV. Article IV declares a defence of head of State immunity to be inadmissible to a charge of genocide. After considerable debate, a draft proposal to eliminate another defence, that of superior orders, was dropped from the Convention. The statutes of the ad hoc tribunals are hardly more complete. They essentially repeat the Convention rule on

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heads of State, but add a prohibition of the defence of superior orders. The International Law Commission draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind takes the same approach, adding in a general provision that the competent court shall determine the admissibility of defences ‘in accordance with the general principles of law, in the light of the character of each crime’. Only the Rome Statute attempts a more thorough codification of defences applicable to genocide.

**Head of State immunity**

Heads of State may not invoke their status if charged with genocide, according to article IV of the Convention: ‘Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.’ Immunity for heads of State was denied at Nuremberg and in the other post-Second World War instruments. A formal provision was deemed necessary for several reasons. Traditional international law recognizes degrees of immunity from criminal prosecution for heads of State and other officials. Some domestic legal systems may provide immunity to their own heads of State or to heads of State of foreign powers under certain circumstances. There is also a customary

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8 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), (1951) 82 UNTS 279, annex, art. 7: ‘Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for any crime with which he is charged, but such circumstances may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.’ See also Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Humanity, 20 December 1945, *Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany*, No. 3, Berlin, 31 January 1946, art. II(4)(a): ‘The official position of any person, whether as Head of State or as responsible official in a Government Department does not free him from responsibility for a crime or entitle him to mitigation of punishment’; ‘Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment Formulated by the International Law Commission’, GA Res. 177(II)A, art. III: ‘The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.’


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law foundation for the idea that one State cannot exercise its jurisdiction over another’s sovereign, and this is still the case as far as ordinary crimes are concerned. However, in prosecution before international tribunals for international crimes, immunity began being laid to rest when the Treaty of Versailles contemplated the prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm II.11

Drafting history

While the principle by which heads of State had no immunity seemed clear enough since Nuremberg, the drafting of article IV of the Convention proved to be quite difficult, largely because it touched on related questions such as State responsibility. General Assembly Resolution 96(I) specified that persons responsible for genocide, ‘whether private individuals, public officials or statesmen’, were punishable.12 This inspired the Secretariat draft, whose provision closely resembles article IV in the final version of the Convention: ‘[Persons Liable] Those committing genocide shall be punished, be they rulers, public officials or private individuals.’13 Similar formulations were proposed by China,14 the United States15 and the Netherlands.16 Endorsing views expressed by expert Henri Donnedieu de Vabres,17 France considered that rulers alone should be punishable, given that genocide was the consequence of some culpable act or omission by the State. According to France, those private individuals who actually carried out the State’s instructions should be tried by international courts but on a charge of murder and as common law criminals.18 Norway also had trouble with the Secretariat’s approach, because holding rulers liable for genocide before national courts, either of their own State or in another State, was simply not practical. Rulers should be judged by an international court, Norway believed.19

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12 GA Res. 96(I).
13 UN Doc. E/447, pp. 5–13, art. IV.
14 ‘For the commission of genocide, principals and accomplices, whether they are public officials or private individuals, shall be punishable’: UN Doc. E/AC.25/9.
15 ‘Punishment under this Convention shall be meted out to the guilty be they rulers, public officials, private individuals, groups or organizations’: UN Doc. E/623.
16 The Netherlands suggested that the provision might be amplified ‘so as to include specifically those who have taken the initiative for the genocide, and especially those who can be considered as the intellectual authors’: UN Doc. E/623/Add.3.
17 UN Doc. E/447, p. 35.
18 UN Doc. A/401.
19 UN Doc. E/623/Add.2. Norway repeated the comments that its representative had made in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, in 1947, concerning prosecution of state officials.
The Ad Hoc Committee welcomed the Secretariat’s suggestion to clarify the term ‘public officials’ so as to encompass heads of State.\(^\text{20}\) It unanimously adopted the following: ‘Those committing any of the acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished be they Heads of State, public officials or private individuals.’\(^\text{21}\) But, when the provision was discussed in the Sixth Committee, sharply differing views about State responsibility for genocide emerged, as well as conflicting opinions about the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction, questions that were raised, at least indirectly, by the idea that rulers could be punished.\(^\text{22}\)

States with constitutional monarchs were unhappy with the provision, because they claimed their heads of State were really nothing more than figureheads. In some, notably Sweden, the sovereign was immune from legal process. Sweden told the Sixth Committee that it could not guarantee that its constitution would be amended if the convention were to include such a provision, and proposed an alternative: ‘Those committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article V shall be punished, whether they are public officials or private individuals.’ Sweden also questioned the role of legislative immunity, asking whether those adopting genocidal laws would not be immune from prosecution.\(^\text{23}\) Several delegations challenged the Swedish proposal for eliminating the most important category of offenders.\(^\text{24}\) The Philippines said constitutional monarchs who acquiesced in genocide shared responsibility.\(^\text{25}\) Sweden subsequently volunteered that it ‘would be satisfied if it were made clear one way or another that the constitutional heads of State would not be liable under the convention’. It would accept the word ‘rulers’, ‘with the reservation that a suitable official interpretation should be inserted into the Committee’s report’.\(^\text{26}\) Most delegations agreed to include a note in the report ‘exempting constitutional monarchs from responsibility, thus providing a complete solution of the problem’.\(^\text{27}\)

\(^{20}\) UN Doc. E/447.

\(^{21}\) UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.18, p. 4. See also UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.9, p. 7. It was agreed that the rule about trying rulers did not impair the system of diplomatic immunity: UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.9, p. 7.

\(^{22}\) For discussion of these questions, see chapter 2, p. 89–98 above and chapter 8, pp. 368–78 below, on the establishment of an international criminal jurisdiction, and chapter 9, pp. 418–34 below, on State responsibility.

\(^{23}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.92 (Petren, Sweden). His views were endorsed by Bahadur Khan of Pakistan and Fitzmaurice of the United Kingdom.

\(^{24}\) Ibid. (Chaumont, France); ibid. (Raafat, Egypt); ibid. (Pratt de Maria, Uruguay).

\(^{25}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.95 (Ingles, Philippines).

\(^{26}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.93 (Petren, Sweden). He was supported by Morozov of the Soviet Union.

\(^{27}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.95 (Spiropoulos, Greece).
Much of the debate focused on terminology. In the French language version, the term *gouvernants* had been used to translate ‘Heads of State’, provoking some dissatisfaction.\(^{28}\) Pakistan noted that *gouvernants* included ministers or members of the government as well as heads of State, whereas the English expression ‘heads of State’ was less explicit.\(^{29}\) France answered that *gouvernants* should not create a problem, because it ‘embraced only those having the actual responsibility of power’.\(^{30}\) The chair noted that the *Ad Hoc* Committee had translated *gouvernants* as ‘heads of States’ because it felt the term ‘rulers’ was not suitable for the head of State.\(^{31}\) The Netherlands proposed ‘responsible rulers’,\(^{32}\) and ‘constitutionally’ was added on a suggestion from Siam.\(^{33}\) As modified, the provision was then adopted: ‘Those committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article IV shall be punished whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or individuals.’\(^{34}\)

The United Kingdom explained it had voted in favour, adding that in its view the provision only applied to genocide by individuals and not by governments.\(^{35}\) The United States said it had abstained because the word ‘rulers’ could not be applied to heads of State, and particularly the President of the United States.\(^{36}\) India declared that it did not think ‘constitutionally responsible rulers’ necessarily excluded the heads of State of countries having a parliamentary regime.\(^{37}\) Sweden said the discussion had brought no clarification on the status of members of parliament, adding it would conclude that the article imposed no concrete obligation in that respect.\(^{38}\) Subsequently, the drafting committee reviewed the text of article IV, ‘the wording of which had satisfied none of the members’. It agreed, unanimously, to retain the terms *gouvernants* in French and ‘constitutionally responsible rulers’ in English.\(^{39}\)

A Syrian amendment proposed extending the provision to cover ‘*de facto* heads of state’.\(^{40}\) Syria explained that this was intended to clarify

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\(^{28}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.92 (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).

\(^{29}\) Ibid. (Bahadur Khan, Pakistan).

\(^{30}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.93 (Chaumont, France).

\(^{31}\) Ibid. (Alfaro, chair).

\(^{32}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/253.

\(^{33}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.93 (Wan Waithayakon, Siam).

\(^{34}\) Ibid. (thirty-one in favour, one against, with eleven abstentions).

\(^{35}\) Ibid. (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).

\(^{36}\) Ibid. (Maktos, United States).

\(^{37}\) Ibid. (Sundaram, India).

\(^{38}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.96 (Petren, Sweden). At Sweden’s request, a statement was included in the report of the Sixth Committee: UN Doc. A/760 and Corr.2, para. 13.

\(^{39}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.128 (Amado, Brazil).

\(^{40}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/246. The amended provision read: ‘Those committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article V shall be punished, whether they are heads of State, public officials, persons having usurped authority or private individuals.’
the text: ‘there was a definite distinction between heads of State, de facto heads of State and persons having usurped authority.’

Lebanon agreed, because ‘de facto rulers might not be constitutionally responsible’. But Jean Spiropoulos said the amendment was superfluous: ‘It was obvious that de facto rulers would have the same responsibility as de jure rulers and usurpers of authority could be considered as private individuals.’ Spiropoulos’ reasoning was compelling. If the de facto ruler is treated as a head of State, then the defence of head of State immunity is unavailable, pursuant to article IV. And if the de facto ruler is not treated as a head of State, then the defence is unavailable in any case. The Syrian amendment was rejected. Yet despite the travaux préparatoires, many years later Special Rapporteur Benjamin Whitaker expressed concern about the application of article IV of the Convention to de facto rulers. While stating that this must necessarily be the case, he urged an amendment to clarify the point.

Other instruments

The prohibition of the defence of official position or of immunity of head of State is reaffirmed in all of the subsequent instruments that provide for prosecution of genocide. The statutes of the ad hoc tribunals declare: ‘The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.’ The Secretary-General’s report on the Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal explained:

Virtually all of the written comments received by the Secretary-General have suggested that the statute of the International Tribunal should contain provisions with regard to the individual criminal responsibility of heads of State, government officials and persons acting in an official capacity. These suggestions draw upon the precedents following the Second World War. The Statute should, therefore, contain provisions which specify that a plea of head of State immunity or that an act was committed in the official capacity of the accused will not constitute a defence, nor will it mitigate punishment.

41 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.96 (Tarazi, Syria).
42 Ibid. (Saleh, Lebanon).
43 Ibid. (Spiropoulos, Greece).
44 Ibid. (twenty-eight in favour, five against, with fourteen abstentions).
A person in a position of superior authority should, therefore, be held responsible for failure to prevent a crime or to deter the unlawful behaviour of his subordinates . . . 47

Similarly, the Rome Statute excludes any recourse to this defence. Article 27, entitled ‘Irrelevance of official capacity’, declares:

1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.

2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. 48

There was no such provision in the original International Law Commission draft statute, submitted in 1994. 49 The suggestion the statute should exclude head of State immunity emerged during the 1996 sessions of the Preparatory Committee. 50 A consensus text was proposed 51 and the provision was adopted with no significant debate or controversy at the Rome conference. 52

The draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind also excluded the defence: ‘The official position of an individual who commits a crime against the peace and security of mankind, even if he acted as head of State or Government, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment.’ 53 The accompanying commentary noted that: ‘The official position of an individual has been consistently excluded as a possible defence to crimes under international law.’ 54 The International Law Commission had first affirmed the norm

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54 Ibid., p. 40. See also ‘Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work
in its codification of the Nuremberg Principles: ‘The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.’\(^5\) It was also recognized in the 1954 draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.\(^6\)

**Judicial interpretation**

Eichmann invoked a defence of act of State, which has similarities with the concept of head of State immunity. Eichmann argued that any guilty acts were committed by the State, and that no single individual could be held accountable for them. Dismissing his plea, the Supreme Court of Israel relied on article IV of the Genocide Convention as well as the ‘Nuremberg Principles’. These had ‘become part of the law of nations and must be regarded as having been rooted in it also in the past’.\(^5\) The trial court, citing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on reservations to the Genocide Convention, declared: ‘This article affirms a principle recognized by all civilized nations.’\(^5\) For both the District Court and the Supreme Court, it was inconceivable that an individual participant in such heinous crimes could escape justice with such a claim. According to the District Court: ‘The very contention that the systematic extermination of masses of helpless human beings by a Government or régime could constitute “an act of State”, appears to be an insult to reason and a mockery of law and justice.’\(^5\)

The Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals cited article IV of the Convention in a civil claim directed against Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. A long line of authorities reflect that unambiguously, ‘from its incorporation into international law, the proscription of genocide has applied equally to state and non-state actors’.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) *A-G Israel v. Eichmann*, (1968) 36 ILR 18 (District Court, Jerusalem), para. 28.


Defences to genocide

During the extradition proceedings of Augusto Pinochet, article IV was briefly considered by the English courts. The United Kingdom authorities invoked article IV, saying the head of State defence had been excluded by customary international law and by the conventional codification of customary norms in such instruments as the Genocide Convention. But in the Divisional Court, the Lord Chief Justice observed that when the Convention was implemented in national law, Parliament had failed to incorporate article IV, implying equivocation about the principle set out in that provision. On appeal to the House of Lords, this was noted by Lord Slynn of Hadley, in his dissenting reasons. His colleague, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, also dissenting, wrote:

Moreover when the Genocide Convention was incorporated into English law by the Genocide Act 1969, article 4 was omitted. So Parliament must clearly have intended, or at least contemplated, that a head of state accused of genocide would be able to plead sovereign immunity. If the Torture Convention and the Taking of Hostages Convention had contained a provision equivalent to article 4 of the Genocide Convention (which they did not) it is reasonable to suppose that, as with genocide, the equivalent provisions would have been omitted when Parliament incorporated those conventions into English law. I cannot for my part see any inconsistency between the purposes underlying these Conventions and the rule of international law which allows a head of state procedural immunity in respect of crimes covered by the Conventions.

The majority was unimpressed. Nor, on closer examination, can the suggestion be sustained that the UK Parliament intentionally omitted article VI from the 1969 Genocide Act. When Elystan Morgan, Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office, introduced the legislation at the second reading in the House of Lords on 5 February 1969, he called attention to the 1946 resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, which ‘affirmed that genocide is a crime under international law and that those guilty of it, whoever they are and for whatever reason they commit it, are punishable’. He continued:

We have to remember . . . the peculiar circumstances in which the crime of genocide may be committed. Past experience has amply shown that it may be committed by or with the consent of the authorities in power at the time, and that those authorities may take the necessary steps to legitimate such acts by, for instance, legalising concentration camps, experimental surgery, and so on. It would make nonsense of the Convention and of this legislation if its provisions

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could be completely negatived by the simple expedient of legitimating legislation of this kind.\textsuperscript{62}

In effect, English legislators felt it unnecessary to state the obvious, namely that there could be no immunity for heads of State charged with genocide.

In the 24 March 1999 ruling of the House of Lords, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers wrote that article IV of the Convention was hardly even necessary, because customary law deprived heads of State of immunity in the case of such crimes:

Had the Genocide Convention not contained this provision, an issue could have been raised as to whether the jurisdiction conferred by the Convention was subject to state immunity \textit{ratione materiae}. Would international law have required a court to grant immunity to a defendant upon his demonstrating that he was acting in an official capacity? In my view it plainly would not. I do not reach that conclusion on the ground that assisting in genocide can never be a function of a state official. I reach that conclusion on the simple basis that no established rule of international law requires state immunity \textit{ratione materiae} to be accorded in respect of prosecution for an international crime. International crimes and extra-territorial jurisdiction in relation to them are both new arrivals in the field of public international law. I do not believe that state immunity \textit{ratione materiae} can co-exist with them. The exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction overrides the principle that one state will not intervene in the internal affairs of another. It does so because, where international crime is concerned, that principle cannot prevail. An international crime is as offensive, if not more offensive, to the international community when committed under colour of office. Once extra-territorial jurisdiction is established, it makes no sense to exclude from it acts done in an official capacity.\textsuperscript{63}

Two States have formulated reservations to article IV of the Convention. One of the original twenty States parties, the Philippines, declared: ‘With reference to article IV of the Convention, the Philippine Government cannot sanction any situation which would subject its Head of State, who is not a ruler, to conditions less favourable than those accorded other Heads of State, whether constitutionally responsible rulers or not. The Philippine Government does not consider said article, therefore, as overriding the existing immunities from judicial processes guaranteed certain public officials by the Constitution of the Philippines.’ Australia immediately objected to the Philippines reserva-


\textsuperscript{63} R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and others intervening) (No. 3), [1999] 2 All ER 97, [1999] 2 WLR 825 (HL), pp. 189–90 (All ER).
Defences to genocide 325

tion. Brazil, the United Kingdom, Norway, Greece and Cyprus have also objected over the years.

Finland’s reservation to article IV made accession ‘[s]ubject to the provisions of Article 47, paragraph 2, of the Constitution Act, 1919, concerning the impeachment of the President of the Republic of Finland’.64 The impeachment procedure for high treason or treason by the president stated that ‘[i]n no other case shall charges be brought against the President for an official act’.65 There were no specific objections to the Finish reservation, although the blanket objection by Greece and Cyprus to all reservations presumably applied. Finland withdrew its reservation on 5 January 1998.

Superior orders

Despite precedents from the Leipzig trials,66 during the Second World War the conditions under which obedience to superior orders could be invoked as a defence to war crimes remained uncertain. Violation of the laws and customs of war as the result of an order from a superior was, from the standpoint of custom, excusable only to the extent that the offender did not know that the order was illegal, and furthermore to the extent that the order was not manifestly illegal.67 Nevertheless, in 1944, the United States and the United Kingdom modified their military manuals in order to limit abusive recourse to the defence. To dispel any ambiguity, a provision of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg excluded the defence altogether.68 Despite the absence of a comparable provision in Control Council Law No. 10, the

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64 (1959) 346 UNTS 324.
68 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), note 8 above, art. 8.
post-war military tribunals generally applied the prohibition.\textsuperscript{69} Assessing the treatment of the question by the post-war courts, Geoffrey Best wrote: ‘Justice in the event was found to require sympathetic consideration of the “superior orders” plea when made by underlings in all but the most atrocious cases but the plea was indignantly dismissed when offered by officers and officials in the higher echelons.’\textsuperscript{70}

\textit{Drafting history}

In \textit{Axis Rule in Occupied Europe}, Raphael Lemkin recommended that: ‘In order to prevent the invocation of the plea of superior orders, “the liability of persons who order genocidal practices, as well as of persons who execute such orders, should be provided expressly by the criminal codes of the respective countries.”’\textsuperscript{71} The Saudi Arabian draft stated: ‘An allegation that any act of genocide . . . has been committed under order of a superior authority shall not be available as a defence.’\textsuperscript{72} The Secretariat draft contained in article V: ‘Command of the law or superior orders shall not justify genocide.’\textsuperscript{73} The Secretariat considered an express provision to be advisable, given lingering confusion about circumstances where the defence might be invoked.\textsuperscript{74} Its proposal received general support from States and non-governmental organizations commenting on the draft.\textsuperscript{75} Only Siam questioned whether the article should ‘be more carefully considered since it affects the general principle in criminal law that a person should not be punished for any act committed in carrying out a lawful command’.\textsuperscript{76}

In the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee, the Soviet Union strongly supported the Secretariat’s provision on superior orders, noting it was consistent with the precedent not only of the Nuremberg Tribunal but of all the courts established in the occupied zones after the defeat of Germany and Japan.\textsuperscript{77} But the United States said an express text was unnecessary because the principle had been set out in article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter, accepted since 1945 as an ‘established rule’. The United States favoured leaving the matter ‘to the judgment of the court in the light of

\textsuperscript{69} United States v. von Leeb (‘German High Command trial’), (1949) 11 LRTWC 1 (United States Military Tribunal); United States of America v. Ohlendorf et al. (‘Einsatzgruppen trial’), (1948) 4 LRTWC 411 (United States Military Tribunal).
\textsuperscript{72} UN Doc. A/C.6/86. \textsuperscript{73} UN Doc. E/447, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{74} UN Doc. E/AC.25/11.
\textsuperscript{75} UN Doc. A/401, UN Doc. E/623 (United States); UN Doc. E/623/Add.3 (The Netherlands); UN Doc. E/C.2/52 (World Jewish Congress).
\textsuperscript{76} UN Doc. E/623/Add.4. \textsuperscript{77} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.9, p. 8.
the usual rules of law’.78 Some States had more substantive objections. Venezuela said its constitution provided that those who act on superior orders are not subject to punishment.79 The Venezuelan representative felt the draft ‘might be interpreted as an incitement to disobedience and insubordination, since officials might invoke its provisions to question superior orders. He feared that States might hesitate to sign the convention if this provision were retained.’80 China agreed, citing the danger of injustice, and saying that Nuremberg was a special case.81 Lebanon, too, invoked the danger of injustice.82

Secretariat official Egon Schwelb reminded the Committee that article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter excluded the defence, noting that two subsequent General Assembly resolutions had endorsed the Nuremberg Principles.83 He also pointed out that even minor officials were being prosecuted under Control Council Law No. 10, which had no such provision.84 The United States disagreed, arguing that the General Assembly resolutions did not confirm the Secretariat’s interpretation.85 Ultimately, the Soviet proposal on superior orders and command of the law was rejected.86 Poland reacted sharply, saying it took no responsibility for the present draft, as the object of such a convention was to fill in the gaps in the principles established by the Nuremberg trials. ‘The exclusion of a provision stating that superior orders and command of the law could not justify the crime of genocide is a definite regression both as concerns the Charter of Nurnberg and the accepted principles of international law’, said Rudzinski. He asked that this statement, made in the name and on behalf of his government, be recorded verbatim in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.87

In the Sixth Committee, the Soviet Union tabled an amendment based on article 8 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal88 that said: ‘Command of the law or superior orders shall not justify genocide.’89 Yugoslavia,90 France91 and Czechoslovakia92 expressed support. Manfred Lachs of Poland noted that the Soviet proposal did not eliminate other possible defences, ‘such as coercion and the impos-

78 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.18, p. 5.  
79 Ibid., p. 6.  
81 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.18, p. 6.  
82 Ibid.  
83 Ibid., p. 7.  
84 Ibid., p. 8.  
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid., p. 9 (two in favour, four against, with one abstention).  
87 Ibid., pp. 9–10.  
88 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), note 8 above. See UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.92 (Morozov, Soviet Union).  
90 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.92 (Bartos, Yugoslavia).  
91 Ibid. (Chaumont, France).  
92 Ibid. (Zourek, Czechoslovakia).
sibility of refusing to act, which could play an important part in determining the responsibility of the accused’.93

But there were again objections from States whose legal systems admitted the defence. Venezuela argued that denying the defence eliminated the notion of intent, an essential element of the crime of genocide. Venezuela gave the example of a group of soldiers who opened fire on a political group, believing that they were suppressing disturbances, whereas the officer giving the order wanted to destroy the group.94 Jean Spiropoulos agreed, noting the principle was not acknowledged in all legal systems. Although recognized at Nuremberg, it was better to let the judge decide in each individual case whether there was intent, he said.95 The United States said that such a provision would restrict the judge’s freedom of action and might result in the conviction of innocent parties. ‘There were therefore grounds for doubt as to whether it was wise to include in the Convention so inflexible a clause . . . or whether it would not be more advisable first to permit international law to develop in the matter’, said John Maktos.96 Sweden,97 the Dominican Republic98 and Belgium99 expressed similar views.

Some States declared that while agreeing in principle with the Soviet amendment, they would abstain100 or vote against101 to ensure the Convention would have broad appeal. In the end, the Soviet amendment was rejected in a recorded vote.102 Ecuador said that, while it had voted against, it did not consider the principle to be invalid.103 The Netherlands explained its negative vote, saying the matter was premature, and should be addressed by the International Law Commission in formulating the Nuremberg Principles.104

Eichmann invoked obedience to superior orders as a defence, but this was dismissed by the District Court of Jerusalem on the basis of a clause in the 1950 law on genocide prosecutions to the contrary.105 On appeal, the Israeli Supreme Court demonstrated that the statutory prohibition was consistent with evolving international law.106

93 Ibid. (Lachs, Poland). 94 Ibid. (Pérez Perozo, Venezuela).
95 Ibid. (Spiropoulos, Greece). 96 Ibid. (Maktos, United States).
97 Ibid. (Petren, Sweden). 98 Ibid. (Messini, Dominican Republic).
99 Ibid. (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium). 100 Ibid. (Inglés, Philippines).
101 Ibid. (Federspiel, Denmark); ibid. (Camey Herrera, Guatemala).
102 Ibid. (twenty-eight in favour, fifteen against, with six abstentions).
103 Ibid. (Correa, Ecuador).
104 Ibid. (de Beus, Netherlands). See also ibid. (Maktos, United States); and ibid. (Amado, Brazil).
106 A-G Israel v. Eichmann, note 57 above, para. 15.
Defences to genocide

Other instruments

The statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals excluded entirely the defence of superior orders: ‘The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the [Tribunal] determines that justice so requires.’107 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is slightly more equivocal. Rather than exclude the defence altogether, as in the other models, it codifies judicial pronouncements on the subject. Article 33 (Superior orders and prescription of law) provides:

1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless:
   (a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question;
   (b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
   (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.

2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.

It appears that the effect of paragraph 2 is to eliminate the defence of superior orders in cases of genocide.108

The International Law Commission’s draft Code of Crimes excludes the defence of superior orders: ‘The fact that an individual charged with


a crime against the peace and security of mankind acted pursuant to an order of a Government or a superior does not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if justice so requires.\textsuperscript{109} According to the commentary: ‘a governmental official who plans or formulates a genocidal policy, a military commander or officer who orders a subordinate to commit a genocidal act to implement such a policy or knowingly fails to prevent or suppress such an act and a subordinate who carries out an order to commit a genocidal act contribute to the eventual commission of the crime of genocide. Justice requires that all such individuals be held accountable.’\textsuperscript{110} This reiterates expressions of the same principle by the International Law Commission in the Nuremberg Principles\textsuperscript{111} and in its 1954 draft Code of Offences.\textsuperscript{112}

\textit{Distinction with duress}

Difficulties with the defence sometimes arise because of confusion with the defence of duress. Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter, which seemingly forbids any recourse to superior orders as a defence, disturbed many jurists because it imposed a form of ‘absolute liability’.\textsuperscript{113} It was, accordingly, interpreted by the Nuremberg Tribunal to allow a defence of superior orders under exceptional circumstances:

The provisions of this article are in conformity with the law of all nations. That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of the international law of war has never been recognized as a defence to such acts of brutality, though, as the Charter here provides, the order may be urged in mitigation of the punishment. The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible.\textsuperscript{114}

The Tribunal implied that superior orders might possibly be a defence


\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p. 31.

\textsuperscript{111} ‘Report of the International Law Commission Covering Its Second Session, 5 June to 29 July 1950’, note 55 above, paras. 95–127, Principle IV: ‘The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.’

\textsuperscript{112} Yearbook . . . 1954, Vol. II, pp. 150–2, UN Doc. A/2693, paras. 49–54, art. 4: ‘The fact that a person charged with an offence defined in this Code acted pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him of responsibility in international law if, in the circumstances at the time, it was possible for him not to comply with that order.’

\textsuperscript{113} Eser, ‘‘Defences’’ in War Crime Trials’, p. 258.

\textsuperscript{114} France et al. v. Goering et al., (1946) 22 IMT 203, p. 466.
where there was an absence of moral choice.\textsuperscript{115} The Nuremberg Principles, endorsed by the General Assembly in 1950, confirmed the International Military Tribunal’s interpretation of article 8 and its qualified prohibition of the defence of superior orders.\textsuperscript{116} In the Einsatzgruppen case, the American Military Tribunal applied the dictum of the International Military Tribunal, rejecting the defence of superior orders because of the absence of compulsion or duress.

But were any of the defendants coerced into killing Jews under the threat of being killed themselves if they failed in their homicidal mission? The test to be applied is whether the subordinate acted under coercion or whether he himself approved of the principle involved in the order. If the second proposition be true, the plea of superior orders fails. The doer may not plead innocence to a criminal act ordered by his superior if he is in accord with the principle and intent of the superior. When the will of the doer merges with the will of the superior in the execution of the illegal act, \emph{the doer may not plead duress under superior orders}.\textsuperscript{117}

A plea of superior orders in the absence of evidence of duress was inadmissible. In the alternative, evidence of superior orders could be relevant in establishing the factual basis of a plea of duress, although it would alone be insufficient. Thus, in practice, the two pleas overlap, to the extent that an individual is given an order, and then told that he or she will be killed if the order is not carried out. But where obedience to an order is argued in the absence of any suggestion of real duress, the issue of ‘moral choice’ can hardly arise. The individual offender may be subject to disciplinary measures or some other form of sanction, but nothing that could conceivably approach a threshold of moral choice in cases dealing with genocide.

In \textit{Erdemovic}, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia reflected the views of the International Military Tribunal and the International Law Commission’s Nuremberg Principles, recognizing the distinction between duress and superior orders and noting that ‘the complete defence based on moral duress and/or a state of necessity stemming from superior orders is not ruled out’.\textsuperscript{118} On appeal, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald said she would take

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115} Dinstein, \textit{Obedience to Superior Orders}, pp. 147–8; \textit{Prosecutor v. Erdemovic} (Case No. IT–96–22–A), Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, 7 October 1997, para. 30.
\item \textsuperscript{116} ‘Report of the International Law Commission Covering Its Second Session, 5 June to 29 July 1950’, note 55 above.
\item \textsuperscript{117} \textit{United States of America v. Ohlendorf et al.} (‘Einsatzgruppen trial’), note 69 above, p. 480 (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{118} \textit{Prosecutor v. Erdemovic} (Case No. IT–96–22–T), Sentencing Judgment, 29 November 1996, para. 19. These remarks seem to echo the writings of Yoram Dinstein: ‘[W]e may conclude that the fact of obedience to superior orders may be taken into account
exception if the Trial Chamber was attempting to create a ‘hybrid defence’ out of superior orders and duress. According to Judge McDonald, obedience to superior orders could be considered ‘merely as a factual element in determining whether duress is made out on the facts’. Rather than nuance the issue of superior orders, in the manner of the International Military Tribunal, Judge McDonald stated unequivocally that ‘obedience to superior orders per se has been specifically rejected as a defence in the Statute’. Judge Antonio Cassese, who dissented on the merits of the appeal, shared the majority opinion as to the distinction between superior orders and duress:

It is also important to mention that, in the case-law, duress is commonly raised in conjunction with superior orders. However there is no necessary connection between the two. Superior orders may be issued without being accompanied by any threats to life or limb. In these circumstances, if the superior order is manifestly illegal under international law, the subordinate is under a duty to refuse to obey the order. If, following such a refusal, the order is reiterated under a threat to life or limb, then the defence of duress may be raised, and superior orders lose any legal relevance. Equally, duress may be raised entirely independently of superior orders, for example, where the threat issues from a fellow serviceman. Thus, where duress is raised in conjunction with manifestly unlawful superior orders, the accused may only have a defence if he first refused to obey the unlawful order and then only carried it out after a threat to life or limb.

In conclusion, an order to commit genocide, or to participate in the crime in whatever fashion, must be deemed manifestly illegal. Whether or not there is an applicable statutory provision, as in the case of the ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal Court, superior orders alone in the absence of duress is no plea to a charge of genocide. The absence of a provision in the Convention neither confirms nor rejects the status of superior orders as a defence. Scrutiny of the travaux indicates that several of the States voting against the inclusion of a provision did not support the admissibility of such a defence but

in appropriate cases for the purpose of defence, but only within the scope of other defences, namely, those of mistakes of law and compulsion, insofar as the latter really constitute valid defences under international law: Dinstein, Defence to Superior Orders, p. 82.

119 Prosecutor v. Erdenovic (Case No. IT–96–22–A), Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 7 October 1997, para. 34.
120 Ibid.
121 Prosecutor v. Erdenovic (Case No. IT–96–22–A), Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, 7 October 1997, para. 15.
122 Benjamin Whitaker was sufficiently concerned to recommend an amendment that might be placed at the end of article III stating: ‘In judging culpability, a plea of superior orders is not an excusing defence’: Whitaker, ‘Revised Report’, note 45 above, p. 26, para. 53.
preferred silence on the subject in the interests of compromise with those who held a different view. Subsequent authorities, and specifically the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as well as the various efforts at codification including the Rome Statute, have clarified any doubt on the subject.

**Duress, compulsion and coercion**

Charged with crimes against humanity in the summary execution of scores of Bosnian civilians at Srebrenica in July 1995, Drazen Erdemovic told the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:

"Your Honour, I had to do this. If I had refused, I would have been killed together with the victims. When I refused, they told me: ‘If you are sorry for them, stand up, line up with them and we will kill you too’. I am not sorry for myself but for my family, my wife and son who then had nine months, and I could not refuse because then they would have killed me."\(^{123}\)

Erdemovic in effect entered a plea of duress, compulsion and coercion. He claimed that the imminent threat of force or use of force directed against himself or another deprived him of any moral choice. As a result, he implied that he did not possess a genuine criminal intent, he had no *mens rea*.

It is difficult to distil any general principles from comparative criminal law applicable to the defence of duress for genocide. As a rule, duress is admissible as a plea to any charge under codes of the Romano-Germanic tradition, where it is called an ‘excuse’. Authority under common law is more equivocal, and tends to the position that duress cannot be generally admissible as a defence to crimes of homicide.\(^{124}\) Moreover, a large number of States have enacted statutory provisions that limit or forbid a defence of duress to serious crimes of violence against the person.\(^{125}\) The defence of duress to charges of war crimes was considered in the *Von Leeb* case:

The defendants in this case who received obviously criminal orders were placed in a difficult position, but servile compliance with orders clearly criminal for fear of some disadvantage or punishment not immediately threatened cannot be recognized as a defence. To establish the defence of coercion or necessity in the

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\(^{124}\) *R. v. Dudley and Stephens*, (1884) 14 QBD 273 (CCR). But see the remarks of Judge Cassese with respect to *Dudley and Stephens* in *Prosecutor v. Erdemovic*, note 121 above, para. 25.

\(^{125}\) For example, Criminal Code (Canada), RSC 1985, c. C–46, s. 17; New Zealand Crimes Act, 1961, s. 24; Criminal Code Act (Australia), 1902, s. 31(4); Penal Code (India), s. 94.
face of danger there must be a showing of circumstances such that a reasonable man would apprehend that he was in such imminent physical peril as to deprive him of freedom to choose the right and refrain from the wrong.126

In the *Krupp* case, the United States Military Tribunal said that coercion should be assessed ‘from the standpoint of the honest belief of the particular accused in question’ and that ‘the effect of the alleged compulsion is to be determined not by objective but by subjective standards’.127 In the *Einsatzgruppen* case, it said that ‘there is no law which requires that an innocent man must forfeit his life or suffer serious harm in order to avoid committing a crime which he condemns . . . No court will punish a man who, with a loaded pistol at his head, is compelled to pull a lethal lever.’128 Duress was admitted by German courts as a defence in some of the prosecutions for ‘euthanasia’ committed at Grafeneck and Hadamar as part of the ‘T–4’ programme.129 Nevertheless, the plea was rejected by German courts in the 1964 trial of personnel of the Treblinka concentration camp. The court heard evidence that, while the SS imposed harsh punishment for theft and security breaches, there was no credible proof that ‘disadvantages to life and limb’ resulted from a refusal to participate in extermination activities. In practice, SS agents who balked at genocide were merely stalled in their career advancement, and sometimes transferred or demoted.130 Eichmann also pleaded duress or necessity, but the defence was dismissed on a factual basis. The Court found that he willingly volunteered, and never displayed the slightest displeasure or lack of enthusiasm.131

The Genocide Convention says nothing on the defence of duress. There was only perfunctory discussion of the question during the drafting of the Convention. At one point in the debate on superior orders, Poland said that the proposed provision ‘did not suppress certain other elements in the criminal act, such as coercion and the impossibility of refusing to act, which could play an important part in determining the responsibility of the accused’.132 These comments were unopposed.

128 United States of America v. Ohlendorf et al. (‘Einsatzgruppen trial’), note 69 above.
130 Ibid., pp. 269–74.
131 A-G Israel v. Eichmann, note 57 above, para. 18.
132 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.92 (Lachs, Poland).
The Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, Doudou Thiam, admitted duress as a defence to genocide: ‘the exception of coercion may be accepted if it constitutes an imminent and grave peril to life or physical well-being. It goes without saying that this peril must be irremediable and that there must be no possibility of escaping it by any other means.’133 His views on the subject met with general approval from the Commission.134 The Commission’s final report on the draft Code of Crimes observed that: ‘There are different views as to whether even the most extreme duress can ever constitute a valid defence or extenuating circumstance with respect to a particularly heinous crime, such as killing an innocent human being.’135

Erdemovic is the leading case on duress, decided by the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal on 7 October 1997.136 The court divided three to two, with the majority taking the position that duress could never be a defence to a charge of crimes against humanity. This reasoning must also apply to genocide. According to Judge McDonald, ‘duress does not afford a complete defence in international law to a charge of a crime against humanity or a war crime which involves the killing of innocent human beings’.137 The finding of the Appeals Chamber left great uncertainty about the question, because it settled the issue by only the barest of majorities. Judges Cassese and Stephen both wrote dissenting opinions in which they set out the reasons why the defence of duress should be admissible.138

Some nine months later, at the Rome diplomatic conference, it was agreed to allow duress as a defence to charges of genocide before the International Criminal Court. According to the Rome Statute:

1. In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute, a person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person’s conduct . . .

137 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, note 119 above, para. 89.
138 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, note 121 above; Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, note 115 above.
(d) ... The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be:

(i) Made by other persons; or
(ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person’s control.  

In effect, the Rome Statute sets aside *Erdemovic* as a precedent and codifies the conclusions of dissenting Judge Cassese. Clearly, a defence of duress will be admissible in only the rarest of circumstances, because of these very strict criteria. In the history of genocide, there has never been a shortage of willing executioners.

The standard of proportionality (‘provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided’) would at first glance seem to eliminate duress altogether as a possible defence to a charge of genocide. In *Erdemovic*, Judge Cassese explained that ‘this requirement cannot normally be met with respect to offences involving the killing of innocents, since it is impossible to balance one life against another’. Nevertheless, he explained that, where the offender participates in killing victims who would be killed in any case, the test of proportionality could be met. This opens the door to a plea of duress for subordinates who participate in genocide. The Auschwitz guard or the *interahamwe* thug will always be able to plead that the victims were doomed, and that, given the scale of the enterprise, any refusal by an isolated individual would be insignificant. Of course, even if the plea is admissible, the accused must produce evidence showing

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141 *Prosecutor v. Erdemovic*, note 121 above, para. 50.
that there was a credible threat to his or her life or some other circumstance allowing the defence of duress.

The defence of necessity is closely related to duress, in that the accused argues that the material act was committed under circumstances where there was an absence of moral choice. In the case of duress, the exterior pressure comes from an individual; in the case of necessity, it results from natural causes. 142 These concepts guided the debates preparatory to adoption of the Rome Statute143 where the defence of necessity is codified in article 31(1)(d)(ii), cited above. On necessity, Albin Eser has stated: ‘it is very difficult to imagine a factual situation in which a soldier is able to avert personal danger by simply committing a war crime.’144 These remarks are all the more relevant in the case of genocide.

Self-defence

An individual acts in legitimate self-defence when proportionate force is used to defend that person or another from imminent use of unlawful force.145 The European Convention on Human Rights recognizes self-defence as an exception to the principle of respect for the right to life.146 There is no theoretical or policy reason why an individual, accused of genocide, could not plead self-defence in appropriate circumstances.


144 Eser, ‘“Defences” in War Crime Trials’, note 1 above, p. 262.


The specific intent of a person acting in self-defence would be to protect that person’s life or the life of another, not to destroy a national, racial, ethnic or religious group as such.\footnote{Although this question was not discussed [during the drafting of the Convention], it must be assumed that an act, generally, cannot become punishable if it is committed within the narrow context of legitimate self-defence and does not exceed the limits required by such action}: \footnote{Nehemiah Robinson, \textit{The Genocide Convention: A Commentary}, New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960, p. 62.}

Self-defence as a plea to a charge of genocide is codified in the Rome Statute:

1. In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute, a person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person’s conduct . . .

\begin{itemize}
\item[(c)] . . . The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person or, in the case of war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the person or another person or property which is essential for accomplishing a military mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or property protected. The fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this subparagraph . . .\footnote{Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, note 3 above, art. 31. For the drafting history, see ‘Report of the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’, note 4 above, annex II, p. 59; ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’, Vol. I, note 50 above, paras. 206–7, pp. 46–7; \textit{ibid.}, Vol. II, p. 99; UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1, p. 20; UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.2/CRP.7; UN Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13, p. 62; and UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, p. 58.}
\end{itemize}

The specific reference to defence of property in the case of war crimes makes it clear \textit{a contrario} that defence of property cannot be invoked with respect to genocide.\footnote{According to Eric David, recognition of defence of property in the Rome Statute may violate a \textit{jus cogens} norm and is therefore null and void: David, \textit{Principes de droit}, para. 4.184c.}

Self-defence of individuals should not be confused with ‘individual or collective self-defence’, enshrined in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,\footnote{See ‘Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Thirty-Eighth Session’, note 54 above, para. 172, p. 53; ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May–26 July 1996’, note 2 above, pp. 75–6. This point is also made in two footnotes appended to the provision on self-defence adopted by the Working Group on General Principles at the diplomatic conference: ‘This provision only applies to action by individuals during an armed conflict. It is not intended to apply to the use of force by States, which is governed by applicable international law’ (UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGGP/L.4/Add.3, p. 2, n. 1); ‘This provision is not intended to apply to international rules applicable to the} covering self-defence by States, either individually or collectively. Although not expressed explicitly in the Charter, exercise
of the right to self-defence must obey the rule of proportionality, and cannot comprise retaliatory or punitive action.\textsuperscript{151} For this reason, no State or individual can ever be permitted to justify genocide in the name of self-defence.\textsuperscript{152}

Yugoslavia has hinted at a defence of self-defence in written observations filed with the International Court of Justice in reply to the claim by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yugoslavia has cited acts of direct and public incitement to commit genocide against the Serbs allegedly perpetrated by Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to its submissions, the alleged acts ‘strongly influenced the attitude of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and they are therefore ‘very relevant for deciding on whether the Serb people acted under the orders of the Yugoslav authorities . . . or spontaneously to protect itself’.\textsuperscript{153} Yugoslavia admitted, however, that a ‘breach of the Genocide Convention cannot serve as an excuse for another breach of the same Convention’.\textsuperscript{154}

\textbf{Mistake of law and mistake of fact}

Mistake of fact is recognized generally in domestic legal systems. An individual in error about an essential element of a crime lacks the knowledge requirement, and cannot therefore have the appropriate \textit{mens rea} of the offence. In terms of \textit{mens rea}, an individual who is mistaken about the law ought logically to be in the same position as the individual who is mistaken about facts. However, mistake of law is generally refused in comparative criminal law, essentially on policy grounds,\textsuperscript{155} although war crimes jurisprudence has been more flexible.\textsuperscript{156}

The Rome Statute codified the defences of mistake of law and mistake of fact:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{154} Ibid. See also \textit{ibid.}, p. 258.


1. A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility only if it negates the mental element required by the crime.

2. A mistake of law as to whether a particular type of conduct is a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. A mistake of law may, however, be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it negates the mental element required by such a crime, or as provided for in article 33.157

The text was a difficult compromise. The provision adopted by the Working Group on General Principles included a footnote saying that: ‘Some delegations were of the view that mistake of fact or mistake of law does not relieve an individual of criminal responsibility for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the court.’158

There are a number of factual elements in the *actus reus* of genocide about which an accused person might conceivably claim error. First and foremost, of course, is knowledge of the genocidal plan itself. An accused might also argue mistake of fact, and even mistake of law, with respect to such knowledge-related aspects of the crime as membership in the targeted group. The co-ordinator’s discussion paper to the Working Group on Elements of Crimes of the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court proposed the prosecution be required to establish that ‘the accused knew or should have known that the person or persons were under the age of eighteen years’, thereby limiting the defence of mistake of fact in such cases.159 The provision is of questionable legality, given recognition of the defence of mistake in the Statute.

**Reprisal and military necessity**

Reprisal and military necessity are not formally prohibited by international humanitarian law as a defence to charges of war crimes.160

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Defences to genocide

Although not specifically mentioned in the Rome Statute as an available defence, they are not excluded,161 and the travaux préparatoires imply their admissibility, to the extent they are recognized at public international law.162 Reprisal is only justified if there has been a breach of international law by the adversary. Reprisal as a defence must be proportional, and on this basis its application to genocide would seem inconceivable.163 In the Ensztgruppen-Fall, a reprisal killing of 859 Jews based on the killing of twenty-one German soldiers was deemed to fail this test.164 For the Trial Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, ‘the rule which states that reprisals against the civilian population as such, or individual civilians, are prohibited in all circumstances, even when confronted by wrongful behaviour of the other party, is an integral part of customary international law and must be respected in all armed conflicts’.165 While military necessity may justify ‘wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation’, it ‘extends neither to killing of civilians nor to their deportation to concentration camps – actions that are never justified’.166

**Tu quoque**

The defence of *tu quoque* is a plea that the adversary committed similar atrocities. It sometimes takes the form of alleging that the adversary initiated the conflict. Obviously, certain aspects of Allied behaviour during the Second World War were not explored at Nuremberg because of a perceived vulnerability to such a plea.167 A Trial Chamber of the

161 ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 3 above, art. 31(3).
167 For example, submarine warfare: Best, *War and Law*, p. 78; Philippe Masson, ‘La
Yugoslavia Tribunal held that evidence that another party to a conflict may have committed atrocities ‘is, as such irrelevant because it does not tend to prove or disprove any of the allegations made in the indictment against the accused’. According to the Trial Chamber, tu quoque is inapplicable to international humanitarian law, which creates obligations that are erga omnes.168

The argument arose, at least implicitly, and in the context of State responsibility rather than individual liability for criminal behaviour, in the application of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the International Court of Justice. After its preliminary objections had been dismissed, Yugoslavia filed a counter-claim. Its admissibility was contested by Bosnia and Herzegovina, pleading that it was no answer to a charge of genocide to say that the other side had also committed the offence, an argument endorsed by Vice-President Christopher Weeramantry in dissenting reasons. The majority of the Court ruled the counter-claim admissible on other grounds.169

**Intoxication**

Voluntary intoxication has been recognized in case law as a defence to war crimes.170 Where an individual is heavily intoxicated, even voluntarily, that person may not have the specific intent required for a crime such as genocide. Depending on the circumstances, then, the defence is certainly admissible. It was formally codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:

1. In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute, a person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person’s conduct . . .
   (b) . . . The person is in a state of intoxication that destroys that person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform to the requirements of law, unless the person has become voluntarily intoxicated under such

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170 United Kingdom v. Yamamoto Chusaburo, (1947) 3 LRTWC 76 (British Military Court).
circumstances that the person knew, or disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the intoxication, he or she was likely to engage in conduct constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court . . .

Several Arab States objected to the provision, demanding its deletion before finally accepting the following footnote in the report of the Working Group:

Some delegations have doubts about accepting voluntary intoxication as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. It was the understanding that voluntary intoxication as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility would generally not apply in cases of genocide or crimes against humanity, but might apply to isolated acts constituting war crimes. One delegation was of the view that one should not differentiate between different types of crimes.

The defence is highly unlikely to arise in international prosecutions for genocide, where prosecutorial discretion should confine accusations to leaders or repeat offenders. The protracted nature of genocidal activities will virtually exclude the defence of voluntary intoxication. In domestic trials, where large numbers of offenders may be judged, intoxication as a defence is far more likely. In Rwanda in 1994, for example, many reports described crimes committed by bands of drugged or inebriated young militia members. Depending on the applicable texts of the national law system in question, intoxication may be a special defence to a charge of genocide, because of the specific intent element. Should the plea succeed, the result cannot generally be acquittal. The accused would remain guilty of involuntary homicide or manslaughter, or some other crime of general intent.

**Insanity**

Virtually all legal regimes recognize that an individual who is insane when the crime is committed is entitled to clemency, although different solutions are proposed. Under the common law, an individual who is unable to distinguish right from wrong, or to appreciate the nature and

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173 In the case of Rwanda, for example, art. 70 of the Penal Code rules out voluntary intoxication as a full defence. See William A. Schabas and Martin Imbleau, *Introduction au droit rwandais*, Cowansville, Québec: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1999, p. 43.
quality of the impugned acts or omissions, cannot be found guilty of a crime.\textsuperscript{174} In systems of the Romano-Germanic tradition, the approach is relatively similar.\textsuperscript{175} There are isolated examples in war crimes case law of pleas of insanity,\textsuperscript{176} including the ‘Celebici’ case.\textsuperscript{177}

The defence of insanity is codified in the Rome Statute, and may be invoked where ‘[t]he person suffers from a mental disease or defect that destroys that person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform to the requirements of law’.\textsuperscript{178} An accused need only raise a reasonable doubt, and is not required to prove or establish insanity.\textsuperscript{179} The Statute provides for no consequence of the plea other than acquittal, nor should it. An individual who is insane at the time of the crime may well pose no threat either to him or herself or to others by the time of trial and in such circumstances ought simply to be released. In the alternative, the public health authorities in the Netherlands, where the Court will have its seat, can be expected to take the appropriate measures.

\textsuperscript{174} M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 E.R. 718 (HL).
\textsuperscript{175} Pradel, Droit pénal comparé, pp. 293–4.
\textsuperscript{176} United States v. Peter Back, (1947) 3 LRTWC 60 (United States Military Commis-
\textsuperscript{177} Prosecutor v. Delalic et al. (Case No. IT–96–21–T), Judgment, 16 November 1998, paras. 1156–86.
\textsuperscript{178} ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 3 above, art. 31(1)(a). For
\textsuperscript{179} ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 3 above, art. 67(1)(i).
8 Prosecution of genocide by international and domestic tribunals

Genocide may be prosecuted by international or national courts. The preference of international law for the latter can be seen in the decision of the drafters of the Convention to establish an obligation to repress genocide without at the same time creating an international jurisdiction, although such a possibility was certainly contemplated and, indeed, expected at some time in the future. It is also evident in the principle of ‘complementarity’ which defines the operations of the future International Criminal Court. Pursuant to this principle, genocide offenders are, preferably, to be tried before domestic or national courts.¹ Only when these fail should the international jurisdiction become operational.

From a policy standpoint, however, one or the other system may not always be preferable for genocide prosecution. Where a domestic judicial system operates in an effective manner, it may be quite capable of dealing appropriately with the crimes of the past. But sometimes, a domestic judicial system will be operational yet require, for its own credibility, that some international trials be held to deal with major cases. Rwanda chose this approach when, in 1994, it requested that the Security Council establish an international criminal court. Accordingly, the Security Council resolution creating the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda stressed ‘the need for international co-operation to strengthen the courts and judicial system of Rwanda, having regard in particular to the necessity for those courts to deal with large numbers of suspects’.²


² UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). See William A. Schabas, ‘Justice, Democracy and
Because genocide is committed, as a general rule, by the State or with its complicity, leaving genocide prosecution to the domestic courts may only ensure impunity. Although universal jurisdiction authorizes courts of third States to try offenders, practice shows they will rarely do so. International prosecution is, in such cases, the only viable option. Whether the complementarity regime proposed by the Rome Statute will function as intended remains to be seen. In concrete cases, it may prove extremely difficult for the Court to exercise jurisdiction when domestic courts are determined to hold sham trials, thereby shielding génocidaires from justice.

Article V of the Genocide Convention requires States to implement its obligations in domestic law, specifically by providing for trial and punishment of those responsible for the crime. Article VI says trials should be held by the courts of the territory where the crime took place, but does not explicitly address whether there are other options. These may include prosecution by the State of nationality of the offender, or of the victim, or any State prepared to see that justice be done. Article VI also recognizes the possibility of trial by an international criminal court. To facilitate prosecution, the Convention also addresses extradition. An obligation to co-operate in extraditing genocide suspects is set out in article VII.

**Obligation to enact national legislation**

According to article V: ‘The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article 3.’ The need for such a provision had been foreseen by Raphael Lemkin in *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. ‘An international multilateral treaty should provide for the introduction, not only in the constitution but also in the criminal code of each country, of provisions protecting minority groups from oppression because of their nationhood, religion, or race’, wrote Lemkin. ‘Each criminal code should have provisions inflicting penalties for genocidal practices.’³

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Drafting history

The Secretariat draft required States parties ‘to make provision in their municipal law for acts of genocide as defined [in the Convention], and for their effective punishment’. The Ad Hoc Committee agreed, but by a narrow margin of four to three, that the Convention should address this issue. There were two proposals, one from the Soviet Union, spelling out in detail an obligation to adopt criminal legislation aimed at preventing and suppressing genocide as well as racial, national and religious hatred, the other from the United States, defining an obligation to give effect to the Convention by legislation, but only in the most general terms. The United States said it required the vaguer wording because of its federal system. A reworked United States provision was adopted: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact the necessary legislation, in accordance with their constitutional procedures, to give effect to the provisions of the present convention.’

In the Sixth Committee, the United States said there was a need to enact domestic legislation, but did not want the Convention to go further. Its government ‘could enter into only a general engagement to respect the provisions of the convention’. Belgium considered that the Ad Hoc Committee draft imposed ‘an obligation to introduce the definition of genocide and the penalties envisaged for it into their own penal codes, and also to determine the competent jurisdiction and the procedure to be followed’. The Soviet Union proposed two amendments, one requiring that necessary legislative measures be ‘aimed at the prevention and suppression of genocide and also at the prevention and suppression of incitement to racial, national and religious hatred’, the other that they ‘provide criminal penalties for the authors of such crimes’. The first proposal was ruled out of order, because the

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6 Ibid. ‘The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to make provision in their criminal legislation for measures aimed at prevention and suppression of genocide and also at prevention and suppression of incitement to racial, national and religious hatred, as defined in articles I, II, III and IV of the present Convention and to provide measures of criminal penalties for the commission of those crimes, if such penalties are not provided for in the active codes of that State.’
7 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.19, p. 3: ‘The High Contracting Parties shall make such provisions in their laws in accordance with their constitutional procedures as will give effect within their borders to the purposes of the Convention.’
8 Ibid., p. 4. 9 Ibid., p. 8 (four in favour, three against).
10 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.93 (Maktos, United States).
11 Ibid. (Kaeckenbeek, Belgium).
12 UN Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1; UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.93 (Morozov, Soviet Union). The entire amendment read: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact the necessary legislative measures, in accordance with their constitutional procedures,
question of incitement to racial hatred had already been addressed by the Committee. The second met with wide approval. The United States criticized the text for suggesting that the scope of the obligation was confined to penal sanctions. Article V, as amended by the Soviet Union, was adopted: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of this Convention, and in particular, to provide effective penalties for the authors of the crimes mentioned in article [III].'

A few days later, Australia charged that the provision was ‘ambiguous’ and ‘ungrammatical’, and possibly more narrow than the Ad Hoc Committee text, although its intention was the opposite. ‘The Sixth Committee had adopted a text which might well be construed as relating to penal measures only and not to the whole of the obligations of the States under the convention’, said Australia. It proposed: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake, in order to give effect to the provisions of this Convention, to enact the necessary legislation in accordance with their constitutional procedures and to provide criminal penalties for the authors of crimes under this Convention.’ The Soviet Union agreed and the revised text was adopted.

State practice

It has been suggested that article V is superfluous, because the obligation to enact legislation is implicit in the Convention. Special Rapporteur Nicodème Ruhashyankiko believed that article V was included in the Convention ‘in accordance with a well-established practice in the field of conventions concerning international penal law’. The travaux

aimed at the prevention and suppression of genocide and also at the prevention and suppression of incitement to racial, national and religious hatred, to give effect to the provisions of this Convention, and to provide criminal penalties for the authors of such crimes.’

14 Ibid. (Maktos, United States).
15 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.93 (twenty-six in favour, three against, with eleven abstentions).
16 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.96 (Dignam, Australia).
17 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.97 (thirty-six in favour, with two abstentions).
préparatoires indicate that article V goes beyond an obligation to provide for genocide in domestic criminal law. It can be extended to such matters as extradition, imposing upon States parties an obligation to ensure that effective legislation is in place in this respect. Finally, States may also be required to enact measures to prevent the crime of genocide.

The reference to national constitutions – what has sometimes been called the ‘constitutional reservation’ – might be taken as implying that implementing provisions are subordinate to domestic constitutional law. Ruhashyankiko said ‘there is no reason to assume that the clause would have that effect firstly because it can be interpreted as providing that a national law must be enacted in accordance with the constitutional procedures, which is quite normal’. Accordingly, he continued, ‘this clause must be interpreted as relating to rules of form rather than of substance’.20

The United States made the only reservation to article V: ‘That nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.’21 Obviously, if the United States considered article V as a ‘constitutional reservation’ this statement would be unnecessary. The United States’ reservation provoked objections from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Many of the objecting States22 referred to article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which declares that States may not invoke the provisions of their domestic law for failure to

Constitution for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, (1910) 7 Martens NR (3d) 252, 211 Consol. TS 45, art. 3.


22 Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
perform treaty obligations. Thus, State practice confirms the view expressed by Ruhashyankiko.

In ‘monist’ States, ratification of or accession to an international treaty introduces the norms of the treaty into national law and makes them directly applicable before domestic courts. In some cases, the international obligations are deemed hierarchically superior to other legislation, and may even supersede the country’s constitution law. Nevertheless, a treaty can only be implemented on this basis within domestic law to the extent that it is ‘self-executing’. In other words, the treaty must be drafted in such a way as to be applicable without further addition or modification. The Genocide Convention provisions cannot easily be applied within domestic law without some additional legislation and are therefore, in a general sense, not self-executing.

This is confirmed by the text of article V itself. For example, the offence of genocide defined in articles II and III of the Convention is not accompanied by a precise sanction or penalty. Rwanda confronted this problem following the 1994 genocide. At the time of accession in 1975, Rwanda published the Convention in the official gazette, thereby making it part of the law of the land. But, because of the non-self executing character of the Convention, it could not readily be invoked in prosecutions. Rwandan legislators admitted this in the preamble to legislation enacted in 1996 to facilitate prosecutions for genocide.

Many States have enacted provisions within their domestic penal codes providing for a specific offence of genocide. In some cases, they have simply taken article II of the Convention and incorporated it within

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23 (1979) 1155 UNTS 331.
24 This view was presented by Dean Rusk of the State Department to the United States Senate in 1950: United States of America, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Jan. 23, 1950, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 13; see also ibid., pp. 31–2; and ibid., pp. 257–8.
25 Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30 August 1996 on the Organisation of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed since 1 October 1990, Journal Officiel (Rwanda), 35th year, No. 17, 1 September 1996, preamble: ‘Given that the acts committed constitute offences provided for and punished under the Penal Code as well as the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity; Given that the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity are provided for specifically in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and its additional Protocols, as well as the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity of 26 November 1968; Given that Rwanda has ratified these three Conventions and has published them in the Official Gazette, but without having provided for penalties for these crimes; Given that, as a consequence, the prosecutions must be based on the Penal Code . . .’
a special part of their codes, adding a provision setting out the applicable penalties. There are also examples where States have incorporated the Convention definition by reference, making it an offence to commit an offence defined by article II of the Convention. A few States have expanded upon article II, particularly with respect to the groups protected. In some cases, the definition has been slimmed down, for example by removing a protected group or a punishable act. For example, the Canadian committee designated to recommend legislative action said: ‘we believe that the definition of genocide should be drawn somewhat more narrowly than in the international Convention so as to include only killing and its substantial equivalents.’ In addition to the definition of the crime itself in article II, full implementation requires legislation providing for the ‘other acts’ listed in article III. Most States that have enacted genocide provisions do not appear to

26 Among them Albania (Penal Code, art. 71); Austria (Penal Code, art. 321); Bulgaria (Penal Code, art. 416); Croatia (Penal Code, art. 119); Brazil (Act, No. 2889 of 1 October 1956); Bulgaria (Penal Code, art. 416); Cuba (Law No. 62, Penal Code); Czech Republic (Penal Code, art. 259); Fiji (Genocide Act, 1969); Germany (Penal Code, art. 220a); Ghana (Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 1993, s. 1); Hungary (Penal Code, art. 137); Israel (Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law, Laws of the State of Israel, Vol. 4, 5710–1949/50 P101); Italy (Act of 9 October 1967); Liechtenstein (Penal Code, art. 321); Mexico (Penal Code for the Federal District, art. 149bis); Netherlands (Act of 2 July 1964 Implementing the Convention on Genocide); Panama (Penal Code, art. 311); Portugal (Decree-Law No. 48/95, Penal Code, art. 239); Romania (Penal Code, art. 357); Russian Federation (Penal Code, art. 357); Slovakia (Criminal Code, art. 259); Slovenia (Penal Code, 1994, Chapter 35, art. 373); Spain (Penal Code, 1996, art. 607); Sweden (Act of 20 March 1963); Tonga (Genocide Act, 1969); the United Kingdom (Genocide Act, 1969); and the United States of America (USC Title 18, § 1091).

27 For example Antigua and Barbuda (Genocide Act, Laws of Antigua and Barbuda, Vol. 4, chapter 191, s. 3); Barbados (Genocide Act, chapter 133A, s. 4); Cyprus (Law 59/ 1980); Ireland (Genocide Act 1973, s. 2(1)); Seychelles (Genocide Act 1969 (Overseas Territories) Order, 1970, s. 1(1)); and St Vincent and the Grenadines (Criminal Code, cap. 124, s. 157(2)). The Israeli law declares that it is ‘consequent upon the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’: The Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law, note 26 above, s. 10.

28 Bangladesh (International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973, s. 3(2)(c)) providing for political groups; Costa Rica (Code of 1992, art. 373), providing for political groups; Canada (Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, c. C–46, s. 318), which adds reference to groups defined by ‘colour’; Ethiopia (Penal Code, art. 281), protects political groups; France (Penal Code, 1992, art. 211–1), for ‘any other arbitrary criterion’; Panama (Penal Code of 1993, art. 311), protects political groups; Peru (Penal Code of 1995, art. 129), protects social groups; Finland repeats the Convention enumeration of groups but says it also applies to ‘a comparable group of people’ (Criminal Code, 578/95, chapter 11, s. 6).

29 Bolivia (Penal Code, 23 August 1972, Chapter IV, art. 138), which removes reference to racial groups; Canada (Criminal Code, note 28 above, s. 318), which removes reference to national groups; and Costa Rica (Code of 1992, art. 373), which removes reference to ethnic groups.

30 Canada, Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada, Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966, p. 61.
have considered the issues raised by article III. They leave the substantiative offence of genocide subject to the general provisions of their criminal law with respect to participation that, inevitably, address such issues as attempt and complicity. Nevertheless, many of these States have no provision for inchoate conspiracy, and virtually none have provisions for direct and public incitement. Thus, even where the obligation to enact the offence appears to be formally respected, by direct legislative action, the requirements of the Convention are not completely respected in the majority of cases.

Several States have concluded that no new legislation is required, because the underlying crimes of killing and causing serious physical or mental harm are already part of their criminal law. Some take the view that no legislation is necessary because the Convention has force of law. A few initially believed that no legislation was required, but later changed their minds. Others have no legislation and no accounting for its absence, or explain that the matter is being studied. Some States have taken the position that because no national, ethnic, racial or religious groups exist within their society, or because equality is ensured to all citizens irrespective of origin, no further legislative protection of groups is required. In the Sixth Committee, Belgium claimed its constitution and penal law contained all the necessary provisions for the repression of genocide. Although the crime was not mentioned by name, Belgium said it was simply an aggravated form of crimes already

31 Among them Australia (communication from Australian Government, 9 March 1999); Belgium (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416, para. 498, n. 2); Egypt (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416, para. 498, n. 3); Ecuador (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416, para. 498, n. 4); Greece (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/303/Add.5); Iceland; India (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/303/Add.8); Iraq (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416, para. 498, n. 9); New Zealand (personal communication from Professor Roger Clarke); Norway; Pakistan (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/303/Add.10); Senegal (communication from Government of Senegal, 7 June 1999); Ukraine (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416, para. 498, n. 12); and Turkey (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/303/Add.1). Bahrain takes the view that the crime of genocide is incorporated by virtue of the Islamic Sharia, which ‘prohibits those acts made punishable by Article 2 of the Genocide Convention’ (communication from State of Bahrain, 19 May 1999).

32 Finland (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416, para. 498, n. 5); Luxembourg (communication from Luxembourg Government, 8 April 1999); Philippines (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416, para. 503); Poland (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416, para. 498, n. 11).


34 Belarus, Cambodia, Gambia, Malaysia (communication from Malaysia, 27 September 1999), Maldives, Namibia, Papua New Guinea and Zimbabwe.

35 Morocco (communication from Morocco, 10 August 1999).

Prosecution of genocide

Canada considered a provision for genocide unnecessary except with respect to ‘advocating genocide’, its domestic formulation of direct and public incitement. Yet Nehemiah Robinson’s observation should be borne in mind: ‘From the viewpoint of the minority groups, which are or may be exposed to acts described in the Convention, it makes a great difference whether those who commit these acts against them are prosecuted on that basis or only the basis of “ordinary” violations of the criminal code.’ In any event, on closer examination this approach suffers from the same inconsistencies we see in States that have enacted provisions for genocide, particularly with respect to inchoate offences. While criminalization of murder and assault is covered by essentially every criminal code, few provide for imposing conditions of life calculated to destroy groups, preventing births or transferring children.

Jurisdiction

States exercise jurisdiction in the field of criminal law on five bases: territory, protection, nationality of offender (active personality), nationality of victim (passive personality) and universality. Territory is the most common, if for no other reason than that it is the only form of jurisdiction where the State can be sure of actually executing the process of its courts. In the Lotus case, Judge Moore indicated a presumption favouring the forum delicti commissi. One of the earliest criminal law treaties, the Treaty of International Penal Law, signed at Montevideo on 23 January 1889, stated that: ‘Crimes are tried by the Courts and punished by the laws of the nation on whose territory they are perpetrated, whatever may be the nationality of the actor, or of the injured.’ Sometimes territory may be given a rather broad scope, so as to encompass acts which take place outside the State’s territory but which

37 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.65 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
38 Canada (Criminal Code, note 28 above, s. 318). See Canada, note 30 above, p. 62. See also the Jamaican legislation, which also confines itself to incitement (‘whosoever shall advocate or promote genocide’), Offences Against the Person (Amendment) Act, 1968, s. 33.
41 SS Lotus (France v. Turkey), PCIJ, 1927, Series A, No. 10, p. 70.
42 (1935) 29 AJIL, p. 638.
have a direct effect upon it. Jurisdiction based on nationality of the victim or the offender, as well as on the right of a State to protect its interests, is somewhat rarer. The Permanent Court of International Justice, in the *Lotus* case, recognized the right of States to exercise jurisdiction based on personality.

Universal jurisdiction – *quasi delicta juris gentium* – applies to a limited number of crimes for which any State, even absent a personal or territorial link with the offence, is entitled to try the offender. In customary international law, these crimes are piracy, the slave trade, and traffic in children and women. Recognition of universal jurisdiction for these crimes was largely predicated on the grounds that they were often committed in *terra nullius*, where no State could exercise territorial jurisdiction. More recently, some multilateral treaties have also recognized universal jurisdiction for particular offences such as hijacking and other threats to air travel, piracy, attacks upon diplomats, nuclear safety, terrorism, *apartheid* and torture.

The fundamental difficulty with genocide prosecutions based on territorial jurisdiction is a practical one. States where the crime took place are unlikely to be willing to proceed, either because the perpetrators remain in power or influence, or perhaps because a post-genocide social and political *modus vivendi* is built upon forgetting the crimes of the past. For this reason, it is often said that universal jurisdiction must be a *sine qua non* if those responsible for genocide are to be brought to book. Raphael Lemkin urged that universal jurisdiction be recognized for the crime of genocide. But, after bitter debate, the drafters of the Convention opted for the most restrictive approach, stating, in article

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44 SS *Lotus* (*France v. Turkey*), note 41 above.


52 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, note 21 above, art. 10.

VI, that: ‘Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article 3 shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.’

Drafting history

The 1946 Saudi Arabian draft contemplated universal jurisdiction: ‘Acts of genocide shall be prosecuted and punished by any State regardless of the place of the commission of the offence or of the nationality of the offender, in conformity with the laws of the country prosecuting.’\(^{54}\) Similarly, the Secretariat draft stated: ‘[Universal Enforcement of Municipal Criminal Law] The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to punish any offender under this Convention within any territory under their jurisdiction, irrespective of the nationality of the offender or of the place where the offence has been committed.’\(^{55}\) The Secretariat’s experts agreed with universal jurisdiction, noting that this was consistent with General Assembly Resolution 96(I), and because ‘genocide is by its nature an offence under international law’.\(^{56}\)

The United States was the first dissenting voice. It proposed prosecution for crimes committed outside the territory of a State only with the consent of the States upon whose territory genocide was committed.\(^{57}\) The Soviet Union was equally negative about universal jurisdiction. According to the Soviets, cases of genocide ‘should be heard by national courts in accordance with domestic legislation’. Alternatively, the Soviet Union said there should be an obligation to report genocide to the Security Council.\(^{58}\) Views in support of confining the Convention to territorial jurisdiction were also expressed by the Netherlands.\(^{59}\) In comments on the Secretariat draft, only Siam endorsed universal jurisdiction.\(^{60}\)

A Secretariat memo noted that where genocide was committed by members of a government, they would be prosecuted if they fell into enemy hands or were arrested ‘in the course of international police

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\(^{54}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/86.

\(^{55}\) UN Doc. E/447, pp. 5–13, art. VII. See also UN Doc. E/AC.25/8. This is an exaggerated reading of GA Res. 96(I). The initial draft of the resolution provided explicitly for universal jurisdiction, but the reference was eliminated in the final version and replaced with a reference to international co-operation. See chapter 1, pp. 000–0 above.


\(^{57}\) UN Doc. E/623, art. V.

\(^{58}\) UN Doc. E/AC.25/7.

\(^{59}\) UN Doc. E/623/Add.3.

\(^{60}\) UN Doc. E/623/Add.4.
action organized by the Security Council’ or if, after having fled, they were arrested abroad.\textsuperscript{61} In other cases, the Secretariat considered the option of \textit{in absentia} trial. The court judging the accused, the memo continued, could be either international – an \textit{ad hoc} court like the Nuremberg Tribunal – or one organized under the Convention. National courts, either of the State where the offender was captured, or one ‘which the powers concerned had decided to entrust with the task of repression’, might also assume jurisdiction. The Chinese draft was in line with the Secretariat’s philosophy. It was worded permissively, and recognized universal jurisdiction: ‘Genocide \textit{may} be punished by any competent tribunal of the state, in the territory of which the crime is committed or the offender is found, or by such an international tribunal as may be established.’\textsuperscript{62}

In the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee, the Soviet Union strenuously opposed internationalization of prosecution for genocide.\textsuperscript{63} It disliked both universal jurisdiction and the idea of an international court, proposing as an alternative: ‘The Convention should provide that persons guilty of genocide shall be prosecuted as being guilty of a criminal offence; that crimes thus committed within the territory coming under the law of a state shall be referred to the national courts for trial in accordance with the internal legislation of that state.’ According to the Soviets, no exception would be made to the principle of the territorial jurisdiction, which alone was compatible with respect for national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{64} France was hardly keener about universal jurisdiction although it strongly favoured the establishment of an international tribunal.\textsuperscript{65} It warned that universal jurisdiction might invite expressions of hostility on an international scale.\textsuperscript{66} The analogy with other crimes subject to universal jurisdiction was misleading, it said, because crimes like piracy were not adequately covered by territorial jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{67} The United States was also opposed to the principle of universal punishment.\textsuperscript{68} There was equivocal support for the idea from Venezuela\textsuperscript{69} and Poland.\textsuperscript{70} China spoke in favour,\textsuperscript{71} as did Lebanon.\textsuperscript{72} But a Lebanese proposal to recognize universal jurisdiction was rejected by the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{61} UN Doc. E/AC.25/8.
\textsuperscript{63} ‘Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide’, UN Doc. E/AC.25/7, Principle IX.
\textsuperscript{64} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.7, pp. 3–4. \textsuperscript{65} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{66} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.8, p. 7. \textsuperscript{67} \textit{Ibid.}.
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{69} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.1, pp. 4–8; UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.8, pp. 3 and 6.
\textsuperscript{70} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.3, pp. 3–5. \textsuperscript{71} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 5–6.
\textsuperscript{72} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.8, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 12 (four in favour, two against, with one abstention). The Chinese member abstained, saying he lacked instructions from his government on this point. Lebanon’s
The chair suggested a rule of subsidiarity, by which courts with territorial jurisdiction would take precedence, an international court operating only when the former had failed to act.\textsuperscript{74} The principle of subsidiarity (or complementarity, as it is now known) was adopted by the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee.\textsuperscript{75} The United States revised the Chinese proposal to read: ‘Genocide shall be punished by any competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the crime is committed or by a competent international tribunal.’\textsuperscript{76} It was agreed, by five votes with two abstentions, to retain the word ‘shall’ in order to stress the obligation to punish.\textsuperscript{77} The final version, adopted by four to three, stated: ‘Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or by a competent international tribunal.’\textsuperscript{78}

In the Sixth Committee, Iran proposed incorporating the concept of universal jurisdiction within the Convention, although it was subject to failure by the territorial State to seek extradition.\textsuperscript{79} ‘The answer to the assertion that the offender could be brought before an international tribunal was that no such tribunal existed yet, and that, even if it did exist, it would be logical to submit to it only serious cases in which rulers or large organizations were involved’,\textsuperscript{80} said Iran. Brazil was supportive, noting the principle of universal punishment had been accepted since the Middle Ages, and was reflected in nineteenth-century legislation.\textsuperscript{81} But India argued that analogies with other universal jurisdiction crimes, such as piracy, were not helpful. India said that universal repression of piracy was recognized because it was committed on the high seas and not on the territory of a State.\textsuperscript{82} Similarly, the Soviet Union explained that universal punishment ‘was justified in the cases of traffic in women or piracy by the fact that it was often extremely hard, if not impossible, to determine the place where the crime had been committed’, something that was not the case with genocide.\textsuperscript{83} According to Egypt, universal jurisdiction was not yet generally accepted.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Ibid}., p. 4.  \textsuperscript{75} \textit{Ibid}., p. 15 (four in favour, with three abstentions).
\textsuperscript{76} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.18, p. 10.  \textsuperscript{77} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.20, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{78} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.24, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{79} UN Doc. A/C.6/218. Add a paragraph: ‘They may also be tried by tribunals other than those of the States in the territories of which the act was committed, if they have been arrested by the authorities of such States, and provided no request has been made for their extradition.’
\textsuperscript{80} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (Abdoh, Iran).
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{82} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.24, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Ibid}.

Contrasting genocide with piracy, Egypt said ‘[i]t would be very dangerous if statesmen could be tried by the courts of countries with a political ideology different from that of their own country’. 84 For the United States, ‘[t]he principle of universal punishment was one of the most dangerous and unacceptable of principles, and he hoped, consequently, that the Committee would reject it’. 85 Its provocative example was prosecution of an individual ‘for having uttered certain opinions in his own country where the Press was free’. 86 The United Kingdom opposed universal jurisdiction because its criminal law was based on the territorial principle. 87

Others, while not questioning the principle of universal jurisdiction, felt its incorporation was inopportune. Jean Spiropoulos of Greece said that ‘jurisprudence would have taken a great step forward if the principle of universal punishment would be applied to the crime of genocide’. But four of seven members of the Ad Hoc Committee, including France, the Soviet Union and the United States, opposed the principle, and it was therefore ‘questionable’ to include the notion if it would make it impossible for three of the great powers to ratify the Convention. The real remedy was not to adopt the principle of universal punishment but rather to create the international tribunal, said Spiropoulos. 88

Iran’s proposal was decisively defeated. 89 After this rejection of universal jurisdiction, the Sixth Committee embarked upon a protracted debate about other forms of jurisdiction, namely those based upon the nationality of the offender and the nationality of the victim. An Indian amendment sought formal recognition of the right of domestic courts to try their own nationals, even where the crime was committed elsewhere. 90 The drafting committee felt this could be achieved with an explanatory statement in the report ‘to the effect that the jurisdiction of the courts of a State over its own nationals was not excluded’. 91 It was agreed to include language to this effect in the report of the Com-

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84 Ibid. (Raafat, Egypt). See also ibid. (Manini y Rios, Uruguay).
85 Ibid. (Maktos, United States). Iran claimed the United States had changed its views on this point, and that its proposal of 30 September 1947 (UN Doc. A/401/Add.2) had advocated universal punishment: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (Abdoh, Iran).
86 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (Maktos, United States).
87 Ibid. (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
88 Ibid. (Spiropoulos, Greece).
89 Six in favour, twenty-nine against, with ten abstentions. Subsequently, India said it shared Iran’s desire for universal punishment, but could not vote for the amendment in the form in which it was presented as it could ‘have lent itself too easily to abuse’; as a result, India had abstained: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (Sundaram, India).
90 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.129 (Sundaram, India).
91 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.130 (Abdoh, Iran).
mittee. Then Sweden suggested that jurisdiction over genocide could also be asserted by the courts of the nationality of the victim, a somewhat more controversial proposition. Sweden had its own statement for the report: ‘Furthermore, article VI should not be interpreted as depriving a State of jurisdiction in the case of crimes committed against its nationals outside national territory.’ The United States and the United Kingdom were opposed, with Fitzmaurice stating it was dangerous to go beyond ‘the two universally recognized principles according to which the jurisdiction of courts was based on the territoriality or the nationality of the perpetrators of a crime’. Belgium said the Swedish position was ‘not generally accepted and was embodied only in some of the various national legal systems’.

The United States said that the whole problem had been provoked by the Indian text. It would be better to confine additional comment in the report to the phrase ‘article VI has no other implications’, said the United States. Eventually the chair proposed the following: ‘The first part of article VI contemplates the obligation of the State in whose territory acts of genocide have been committed. Thus, in particular, it does not affect the right of any State to bring to trial before its own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside the State.’ The term ‘in particular’ reflected the compromise, and in effect left the issue of passive personality jurisdiction unresolved. The chair’s proposal was adopted. John Maktos of the United States, speaking as chair of the Ad Hoc Committee, explained that the text ‘did not at all imply that States could not punish their nationals for crimes of genocide committed abroad. The only obligation imposed on them by article [VI]

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93 Ibid. (Petren, Sweden).
94 UN Doc. A/C.6/313.
95 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.131 (Maktos, United States).
96 Ibid. (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
97 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.132 (Kaeckenbeek, Belgium).
98 Ibid. (Maktos, United States).
100 Eric David has written that Article VI does not mean that other States cannot try the offence of genocide, only that the jurisdiction of the territorial state should have priority. He has also said that the words ‘in particular’ (in French, notamment) are intended to reserve other extra-territorial forms of jurisdiction than active personality jurisdiction: Eric David, Principes de droit des conflits armés, 2nd ed., Brussels: Bruylant, 1994, p. 666, para. 4.145.
101 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.134 (twenty votes in favour, eight against, with six abstentions).
was to punish crimes of genocide committed on their own territory; such a provision was not restrictive.' The General Assembly has since recognized explicitly that States are entitled to try their own nationals for crimes against humanity, no matter where they are committed.

The Eichmann case

Adolph Eichmann relied on the Sixth Committee debates and on the text of article VI of the Convention when he challenged the Jerusalem court’s jurisdiction: ‘If the United Nations has failed to support universal jurisdiction for each country to try a crime of genocide committed outside its boundaries, but has expressly provided that, in the absence of an international criminal tribunal, those accused of this crime shall be tried by “a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed”, how, it is asked, may Israel try the accused for a crime that constitutes “genocide”?’ The District Court recalled the words of the International Court of Justice, which, in its 1951 advisory opinion, declared that ‘the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on all States, even without any conventional obligation’. For the District Court, there was an important distinction between such principles, which applied even prior to adoption of Resolution 96(I) in 1946, and article VI of the Convention, ‘which comprises a special provision undertaken by the contracting parties with regard to the trial of crimes that may be committed in the future’.

Perhaps somewhat painfully aware of the weakness of this argument, the District Court attempted to demonstrate that article VI’s drafters did not intend to confine prosecution of genocide to the territorial State. The Court cited the statement in the report of the Sixth Committee, stating that article VI was not meant to limit the right of States to try their own nationals for acts committed outside the State. Referring to commentaries on the Convention, the Court said that article VI imposed a duty of punishment, but did not impinge upon jurisdictional rules in criminal matters applicable within different States. According to the Court, territorial jurisdiction was nothing more than a ‘compulsory minimum’, a conservative compromise that could be contrasted with

102 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (Maktos, United States).
105 Ibid., para. 22.
106 Robinson, Genocide Convention, p. 84; Drost, Genocide, pp. 101–2.
the more exigent provisions of the Geneva Conventions, which imposed
a rule of compulsory universal jurisdiction.107

It is the consensus of opinion [wrote the Court] that the absence from this
Convention of a provision establishing the principle of universality (together
with the failure to constitute an international criminal tribunal) is a grave
defect in the Convention, which is likely to weaken the joint effort for the
prevention of the commission of this abhorrent crime and punishment
therefor, but there is nothing in this defect to lead us to deduce any rule
against the principle of universality of jurisdiction with respect to the crime in
question. It is clear that the reference in Article VI to territorial jurisdiction,
apart from the jurisdiction of the non-existent international tribunal, is not
exhaustive.108

The Israeli Court also took the view that it was entitled to exercise
jurisdiction under the ‘protective principle’, ‘which gives the victim
nation the right to try any who assault its existence’.109 The Court cited
Hugo Grotius and other authorities:

All this applies to the crime of genocide (including the ‘crime against the
Jewish people’) which, although committed by the killing of individuals, was
intended to exterminate the national as a group . . . The State of Israel, the
sovereign State of the Jewish people, performs through its legislation the task
of carrying into effect the right of the Jewish people to punish the criminals
who killed its sons with intent to put an end to the survival of this people.
We are convinced that this power conforms to the subsisting principles of
nations.110

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Israel, while noting full agreement
with the District Court on the protective principle of jurisdiction,
insisted upon the universal jurisdiction argument, as this applied not
only to Jews, in whose name Israel claimed to exercise protective
jurisdiction, but also to Poles, Slovenes, Czechs and Gypsies.111

Subsequent developments

The final report of the Commission of Experts established by the
Security Council for the former Yugoslavia stated that: ‘The only
offences committed in internal armed conflict for which universal

108  Ibid., para. 25. 109  Ibid., para. 30. 110  Ibid., para. 38.
For a critical assessment on the jurisdictional issue, see J. E. S. Fawcett, ‘The
Eichmann Case’, (1962) 27 British Yearbook of International Law 181, pp. 202–8. The
approach of the Israeli courts in Eichmann was followed by the United States courts in
Demjanjuk, although the specific issue raised by the exclusion of universal jurisdiction
in art. VI was apparently not considered: In the Matter of the Extradition of John
jurisdiction exists are “crimes against humanity” and genocide.\(^\text{112}\) The existence of universal jurisdiction in the case of genocide has also been acknowledged in academic writing.\(^\text{113}\) Professor Christopher Joyner, citing General Assembly Resolution 96(I), has written that:

Every state thus has a customary legal right to exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute offenders for committing genocide, wherever and by whomever committed. The Genocide Convention does not derogate from that obligation. Parties to the anti-genocide instrument have merely obligated themselves to prosecute offences specifically committed within their territory.\(^\text{114}\)

According to Professor Theodor Meron: ‘it is increasingly recognized by leading commentators that the crime of genocide (despite the absence of a provision on universal jurisdiction in the Genocide Convention) may also be cause for prosecution by any state.’\(^\text{115}\) In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stated that ‘universal jurisdiction [is] nowadays acknowledged in the case of international crimes’\(^\text{116}\).

The fact remains, however, that it is difficult to contend that a customary legal norm existed, in 1948 at any rate, recognizing universal jurisdiction for genocide, given the widespread opposition to the concept in the Sixth Committee. While the situation may have evolved since then, the same equivocal debate took place fifty years later, in June 1998, at the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the International Criminal Court. Speaking to the jurisdictional basis of the international court, several States argued that, because universal jurisdiction for genocide already existed in customary law, they were entitled to transfer or delegate this universal jurisdiction to the new international court. But the idea was resisted by many delegations to the Rome conference, and the result was a compromise recognizing only territorial and active personal jurisdiction.\(^\text{117}\) In itself, this shows that universal jurisdiction


\(^{115}\) Meron, ‘International Criminalization’, p. 569.


\(^{117}\) ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, note 1 above, art. 12(2).
remains somewhat controversial. Moreover, during debates in the Committee of the Whole at the Rome conference, several States openly expressed their reservations about the existence of universal jurisdiction for genocide and crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{118}

Three States parties to the Genocide Convention formulated interpretative declarations affirming their opposition to universal jurisdiction in the case of genocide. Although these statements are rather old, none of the three have been withdrawn. Algeria, at the time of accession in 1963, declared: ‘The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria declares that no provision of article VI of the said Convention shall be interpreted . . . as conferring such jurisdiction on foreign tribunals.’\textsuperscript{119} Burma, upon accession in 1956, stated that nothing contained in article VI is to be construed ‘as giving foreign courts and tribunals jurisdiction over any cases of genocide or any other acts enumerated in article III committed within the Union territory’. Upon accession in 1958, Morocco declared: ‘With reference to article VI, the Government of His Majesty the King considers that Moroccan courts and tribunals alone have jurisdiction with respect to acts of genocide committed within the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco.’ The United Kingdom, China\textsuperscript{120} and the Netherlands\textsuperscript{121} have objected to these statements. However, the silence of many other States that often object to suspect reservations suggests that they share the views expressed by Algeria, Burma and Morocco about the scope of article VI.\textsuperscript{122}

In preparing his 1978 report for the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Nicodème Ruhashyankiko canvassed States parties on this question, broaching the idea of an additional protocol to the Convention to recognize universal jurisdiction. Canada replied that the Convention could not be interpreted as conferring universal jurisdiction, but agreed that pending creation of an international criminal court, ‘the Convention would be more effective if universal jurisdiction were to be established for the competent domestic courts of the States party’.\textsuperscript{123} Finland said that an additional protocol to

\textsuperscript{118} Author’s personal notes of debates at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 17–18 June 1998.

\textsuperscript{119} Special Rapporteur Ruhashyankiko called this ‘an unfavourable position regarding the principle of universal punishment’: ‘Study Prepared by Mr Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Special Rapporteur’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2416, para. 197.

\textsuperscript{120} The objection was formulated by Taiwan in 1956 and is no longer in effect because of the subsequent invalidity of Taiwan’s ratification of the Convention.

\textsuperscript{121} There is no record of an objection to the Burmese reservation by the Netherlands. As this is inconsistent with its general policy of objecting to reservations, it is presumably an oversight.

\textsuperscript{122} Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Ecuador, Norway and Sri Lanka.

\textsuperscript{123} ‘Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
create universal jurisdiction ‘would obviously improve the effectiveness of the Convention’.124 The Netherlands said it ‘might improve the implementation of the Convention’.125 Favourable responses were also received from Romania and Ecuador.126 Italy said that no protocol was required, as the principle was already admitted in international law, but it seems to have been the only State to say this.127 Oman said that such a position was ‘unlikely to be favoured by a majority of States’.128 Ruhashyankiko concluded that universal jurisdiction should be recognized, ideally in an additional protocol to the Convention.129

Recent judicial consideration of universal jurisdiction shows that uncertainty continues to shroud the issue. In the Bosnian application before the International Court of Justice, ad hoc Judge Kreca recalled that the Convention ‘does not contain the principle of universal repression. It has firmly opted for the territorial principle of the obligation of prevention.’130 His colleague, the ad hoc judge for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Elihu Lauterpacht, took a diametrically opposite view. According to Judge Lauterpacht, article I of the Convention, in stating that genocide ‘is a crime under international law’, authorizes universal jurisdiction. ‘The purpose of this latter provision’, he wrote, ‘is to permit parties, within the domestic legislation that they adopt, to assume universal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide – that is to say, even when the acts have been committed outside their respective territories by persons who are not their nationals’.131 Judge Lauterpacht did not refer to article VI in his discussion of the universal jurisdiction issue.

In the 1996 version of its draft Code of Crimes, the International Law Commission endorsed universal jurisdiction for the crime of genocide.

Study Prepared by Mr Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Special Rapporteur’, note 119 above, para. 201.
Article 8 of the draft Code says a State party ‘shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction’ over the crime of genocide, irrespective of where or by whom the crime was committed.\textsuperscript{132} According to the commentary, this ‘extension’ was justified because universal jurisdiction obtained on the basis of customary law ‘for those States that were not parties to the Convention and therefore not subject to the restriction contained therein’.\textsuperscript{133} Thus, the Commission has admitted that universal jurisdiction cannot be read into the Convention, contrary to what many have suggested. Moreover, it seems to have taken the position that universal jurisdiction exists for States that are not party to the Genocide Convention, but not for those that are, a bizarre conclusion. Can it be true that States may reduce their international human rights obligations that exist at customary law by means of multilateral conventions that impose less stringent norms? A more logical result would be that widely ratified multilateral treaties tend to confirm the real content of customary international law, which will inevitably be less expansive than conventional obligations.

The view that universal jurisdiction exists in the case of genocide is widely held within United Nations human rights institutions. In his recent draft statement of ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation’, Special Rapporteur Theo van Boven said that: ‘Every State shall provide for universal jurisdiction over gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law which constitute crimes under international law.’\textsuperscript{134} The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has also said that universal jurisdiction exists for the crime of genocide.\textsuperscript{135}

The case law of domestic courts is inconsistent. In \textit{Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky}, a federal court in the United States said that ‘some crimes are so universally condemned that the perpetrators are the enemies of all people. Therefore, any nation which has custody of the perpetrators may punish them according to its law.’\textsuperscript{136} However, French courts have


\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., pp. 46–7.


\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Prosecutor v. Nuyahaga} (Case No. ICTR–90–40–T), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw the Indictment, 18 March 1999.

refused to recognize universal jurisdiction in the case of genocide, referring explicitly to article VI of the Convention to support the idea that it does not form part of customary law.\textsuperscript{137} In the first ruling of the House of Lords in the \textit{Pinochet} case, Lord Slynn of Hadley, who dissented, rejected the suggestion that the 1948 debates were superseded by more recent customary law:

That international law crimes should be tried before international tribunals or in the perpetrator’s own state is one thing; that they should be impleaded without regard to a long-established customary international law rule in the Courts of other states is another. It is significant that in respect of serious breaches of ‘intransgressible principles of international customary law’ when tribunals have been set up it is with carefully defined powers and jurisdiction as accorded by the states involved; that the Genocide Convention provides only for jurisdiction before an international tribunal of the Courts of the state where the crime is committed, that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court lays down jurisdiction for crimes in very specific terms but limits its jurisdiction to future acts.\textsuperscript{138}

The German Federal Supreme Court, in an April 1999 ruling, held that universal prosecution was recognized for the crime of genocide but that for German courts to exercise jurisdiction ‘legitimate points of contact’ (\textit{legitimierende Anknüpfungspunkte}) must be established. In the instant case, these were the fact that the defendant had resided in Germany for many years, that his wife and daughter continued to reside there, and that he had voluntarily surrendered to German authorities.\textsuperscript{139}

Practice in the area of universal jurisdiction also emits contradictory signals. Some States have enacted legislation entitling them to exercise universal jurisdiction for genocide, apparently without protest.\textsuperscript{140}


\textsuperscript{138} \textit{R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte,} [1998] 4 All ER 897, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.). The ruling of the House of Lords following the rehearing of the \textit{Pinochet} case sends a troubling signal in the suggestion, by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, that the existence of universal jurisdiction is a kind of litmus test for the qualification of an ‘international crime’. This is surely an error, for there can be no doubt that genocide is an international crime since 1946, despite the uncertain state of the law about universal jurisdiction over genocide: \textit{R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and others intervening) (No. 3),} [1999] 2 All ER 97 at 114 [1999] 2 W.L.R. 825 (H.L.).


\textsuperscript{140} Canada (Criminal Code), note 28 above, s. 7(3.76).
Prosecution of genocide

During the 1990s, there were several efforts to hold trials for genocide with respect to the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in European States, including Austria, Germany, Denmark, France, Belgium and Switzerland, again without apparent opposition or challenge. The United States, whose domestic legislation does not allow for universal jurisdiction, is nevertheless quite comfortable when other States exercise it, as shown by Washington’s efforts, in 1997 and again in 1998, to convince Canada, Spain, the Netherlands and Israel, to try former Cambodian dictator Pol Pot. The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States declares that: ‘Universal jurisdiction to punish genocide is widely accepted as a principle of customary law.’

In a 1994 resolution on Rwanda and the prevention of humanitarian crises, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated:

6. The Parliamentary Assembly therefore:

   ii. appeals to the member states of the Council of Europe to use their influence within the United Nations Security Council with a view to:

       c. revising the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to make it possible for the perpetrators of genocide to be tried in countries other than those where they committed their crimes.

To conclude on the subject of universal jurisdiction, there can be no doubt that the Genocide Convention rejects the concept. The Eichmann precedent purports to revisit the issue, but its legal reasoning is indeed flimsy. State practice, opinio juris, international and domestic judicial decisions, and academic writing all suggest an increasing willingness to accept universal jurisdiction and to go beyond the terms of article VI of the Convention. Undoubtedly, the existence of more isolated contrary signals may give some pause to suggestions that an international consensus has developed on the subject. The law will only develop in the


right direction if States attempt to exercise universal jurisdiction over genocide, and here they show little inclination.

**International penal tribunals**

In addition to courts with territorial jurisdiction, article VI mandates prosecution for genocide before ‘such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction’. The Convention establishes no hierarchy or preference between the two regimes. The text of article VI represents a compromise of sharply divergent views on the role of international justice, from those of the Soviet Union, which was opposed to any initiative in this respect, to France, which considered international prosecution the only effective way to repress genocide, to the United States, which favoured a combination of the two with priority to national courts. In a sense, article VI was also a mandate to the international community, to the States parties and to the United Nations to ensure the creation of an international jurisdiction. Attempts to establish such a court in the years following adoption of the Convention succumbed to Cold War tensions. In 1954 the work was suspended. It was only really resumed in 1989. The first international tribunal giving effect to article VI, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, was established in May 1993, with a mandate that was severely restricted in both time and space. Following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, a second, similar body was created. The *ad hoc* tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda proceeded to prosecute charges of genocide that were within their temporal and territorial jurisdiction. An initial conviction for genocide was recorded on 2 September 1998, just short of fifty years after the adoption of article VI of the Convention. Meanwhile, preparations for a full-blown international court of general jurisdiction culminated in the 1998 adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Court will come into existence after the deposit of sixty accessions or ratifications.

**Drafting history**

The idea of an international criminal court can be traced to the mid-nineteenth century. In the 1870s, Gustav Moynier of the International

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145 On the creation of the *ad hoc* tribunals, see chapter 2, at pp. 98–101 above.
146 On the creation of the Court, see Chapter 2, at pp. 89–98 above.
Prosecution of genocide

Committee of the Red Cross drafted a statute for such a body.\textsuperscript{147} The post-First World War peace treaties envisaged the creation of an international war crimes tribunal, but the scheme was aborted for political considerations. In 1937, the League of Nations adopted the statute of an international court, charged with prosecuting the crime of terrorism, but it never came into force because of insufficient ratifications.\textsuperscript{148} Nuremberg, of course, was the big breakthrough, its statute adopted on 8 August 1945 by the four-power conference held at London. Months later, a second international tribunal was created by decree in order to try offences committed by Japanese war criminals in the Far East.\textsuperscript{149}

In its initial proposals on the genocide convention, the Secretariat clearly favoured establishing an international tribunal. This would be the appropriate body to try ‘the more serious cases’ of genocide, it said. Two options were considered, the first an international criminal court with general jurisdiction, the second a special court for the crime of genocide alone.\textsuperscript{150} Model statutes reflecting these alternatives, based largely on the 1937 League of Nations treaty, were appended to the Secretariat draft.\textsuperscript{151} The international court would hear cases if a State was unwilling to try or extradite offenders, or where genocide had been committed by individuals acting as organs of the State or with its support or tolerance.\textsuperscript{152} The Secretariat explained that States might be reluctant to try or extradite for various reasons:

It may consider itself incapable of seeing that justice is done; for instance, if the decision of the jury empanelled for the case is open to criticism. The State may also fear lest the trial further disturb its divided and excited public opinion, or it may be reluctant to risk the possibility of a decision by its courts attracting the animosity of other Powers, however unjustified. The State may refuse to grant extradition on request, either because public opinion in the country, rightly or wrongly, objects; because the State requesting it does not appear capable of ensuring justice; because the latter State is in fact endeavouring to let the offender whose extradition it is requesting go unpunished; or because the State requesting extradition proposes to take revenge on political opponents under cover of punishing genocide.\textsuperscript{153}

The three experts consulted by the Secretariat were not of one mind on these subjects. Donnedieu de Vabres and Pella agreed that an inter-
national jurisdiction should have a subsidiary or complementary status, to be activated failing effective prosecution by national courts. Raphael Lemkin, on the other hand, believed the international court should take jurisdiction only in the most serious cases, involving rulers and other State officials. ‘[Lemkin] said that as the cases of these other persons were of lesser importance, no action should lie in an international court, since this involved the use of complicated procedure. The danger would be that the complexities of the procedure might eventually result in the offenders going unpunished.’\textsuperscript{154} Donnedieu de Vabres envisaged a criminal chamber of the International Court of Justice.\textsuperscript{155} Vespasian Pella agreed, saying a draft adopted in 1928 by the International Association for Penal Law might form a basis of discussion.\textsuperscript{156} Lemkin was more cautious, believing the establishment of a permanent court with general jurisdiction to be premature.\textsuperscript{157}

The United States agreed with Lemkin that ‘where genocide is committed by or with the connivance of the State the accused individuals should be tried by an international court’.\textsuperscript{158} But it found the Secretariat’s draft statutes far too ambitious, and warned that linking the creation of an international tribunal with the genocide convention might compromise the latter’s success. The United States said the matter should be referred to the International Law Commission.\textsuperscript{159} It suggested that, pending creation of a permanent court, ad hoc tribunals could be established to deal with specific cases.\textsuperscript{160} Venezuela contested the Secretariat’s initiative on the issue of international jurisdiction as going beyond the mandate it had been given by General Assembly Resolution 96(I). Not only did Venezuela believe the creation of an international jurisdiction to be very premature, it claimed the whole idea was inconsistent with the principle of respect for national sovereignty laid down in article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations. ‘The establishment of international criminal jurisdiction to deal with these cases seems to be a step that should be reserved for the future’, said Venezuela, ‘when the circumstances of international life are more favourable and the spirit of international co-operation in the legal sphere has, as is to be hoped, made further progress.’\textsuperscript{161} For the Soviet Union, the Secretariat’s recommendations ‘ignored realities and were in flagrant contradiction with the principles of national sovereignty’.\textsuperscript{162} The Neth-

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., p. 41. \textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 42. \textsuperscript{156} Ibid. \textsuperscript{157} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{158} UN Doc. A/401. \textsuperscript{159} Ibid. \textsuperscript{160} ‘United States Draft of 30 September 1947’, UN Doc. E/623, art. VII. \textsuperscript{161} UN Doc. A/401/Add.1. \textsuperscript{162} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.7, p. 4. See also ‘Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide’, UN Doc. E/AC.25/7, Principle IX.
erlands\textsuperscript{163} and Siam\textsuperscript{164} favoured international prosecution, but preferred expanding the jurisdiction of the existing International Court of Justice.

France’s draft convention of 5 February 1948 contained relatively detailed provisions for the creation of an international criminal court.\textsuperscript{165} It was to sit at The Hague, and would have an independent prosecutor. In absentia trials would be allowed, and the court would be empowered to award reparation to victims. Non-compliance with its decisions would be submitted to the Security Council, and action to impede execution of its judgments could be considered an act of aggression under article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{166} France conceived of an international tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction, having no confidence in national justice systems to assume responsibility for genocide prosecutions. ‘No State would commit its governing authorities to its own courts’, said France.\textsuperscript{167}

Faced with considerable opposition in the Ad Hoc Committee to the idea of a court, France pushed for a compromise. There should be some reference to the international court, but ‘[i]t was customary for international conventions to stipulate that the machinery for implementing certain points should be determined later’.\textsuperscript{168} The Ad Hoc Committee’s chair, John Maktos of the United States, proposed a rule of subsidiarity or complementarity, by which an international court would only have jurisdiction if the State with territorial jurisdiction had failed to act. He warned that anything more might discourage ratification of the convention by States nervous about encroachments upon sovereignty.\textsuperscript{169} Maktos urged inserting a clause stating ‘the jurisdiction of the international court would be exercised in cases where it has found that the State in which the crime was committed, had not taken adequate measures for its punishment’.\textsuperscript{170} The principle of subsidiary was adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee.\textsuperscript{171}

The United States reworked a Chinese proposal to read: ‘Genocide shall be punished by any competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the crime is committed or by a competent international tribunal.’\textsuperscript{172} The Soviet Union replied with a text that excluded all reference to international jurisdiction: ‘The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to prosecute the persons guilty of genocide, as defined in the present Convention, as responsible for criminal offences,

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{163} UN Doc. E/623/Add.3.
\bibitem{164} UN Doc. E/623/Add.4.
\bibitem{165} UN Doc. E/623/Add.1.
\bibitem{166} \textit{Ibid.}
\bibitem{167} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.7, p. 9.
\bibitem{168} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 3.
\bibitem{169} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 4.
\bibitem{170} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13.
\bibitem{171} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 15 (four in favour, with three abstentions).
\bibitem{172} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.18, p. 10.
\end{thebibliography}
submitting the cases of these crimes committed within the territory under their jurisdiction for trial by national courts in accordance with the national jurisdiction of that country.\(^{173}\) The Soviet proposal resulted in a division of votes, three to three, with one abstention.\(^ {174}\) The Committee turned to the United States proposal, which had been slightly modified. It was agreed to keep the word ‘shall’ so as to stress the obligation to punish.\(^ {175}\) The words ‘or by such a competent international tribunal as may be established in the future’ were adopted by four to three.\(^ {176}\) In the Ad Hoc Committee’s final version, this was changed slightly: ‘Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or by a competent international tribunal.’\(^ {177}\)

France returned in the Sixth Committee to its ambitious proposal to have the convention itself create an international jurisdiction. It proposed replacing ‘or by a competent international tribunal’ with ‘or by the international Criminal Court constitute[d] as follows . . . ’.\(^ {178}\) And what followed were articles 4 to 10 of the French draft Convention, proposed earlier that year.\(^ {179}\) France’s position was extreme, because it eliminated national jurisdiction in favour of an exclusively international jurisdiction. The Philippines supported France, stating that ‘genocide was a crime of such proportions that it could rarely be committed except with the participation of the State; it would be paradoxical to leave to that same State the duty of punishing the guilty.’\(^ {180}\)

Many found the French view too radical, endorsing the idea of an international jurisdiction, but not to the exclusion of the national courts. Pakistan would have preferred an international tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of genocide, but said this was going too far. It suggested that rulers be subject only to the international tribunal, and that the States parties to the convention have the right to appeal to that tribunal from judgments pronounced by national courts against officials and private individuals.\(^ {181}\)

Still others realized that the creation of an international tribunal was probably unrealistic, but felt nevertheless that the final phrase of the draft should be allowed to stand. Syria said: ‘the Committee could declare itself in favour of the principle of the creation of an international tribunal’.

\(^ {173} \) UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.20, p. 2.  \(^ {174} \) Ibid.  
\(^ {175} \) Ibid. (five in favour with two abstentions).  \(^ {176} \) Ibid.  
\(^ {177} \) UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.24, p. 10 (four in favour, three against).  \(^ {178} \) UN Doc. A/C.6/255.  \(^ {179} \) UN Doc. A/C.6/211.  
\(^ {180} \) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.97 (Inglés, Philippines).  \(^ {181} \) Ibid. (Bahadur Khan, Pakistan).
criminal court and leave the elaboration of a plan for the establishment of such a court to the appropriate organs of the United Nations.’

Haiti believed that ‘reference to an international tribunal in article [VI] would not fail to have a salutary effect on authorities who wished to commit acts of genocide and who, in the absence of such reference, would be ensured impunity’.

The United States favoured an international criminal court, but subject to the proviso that its jurisdiction be complementary to that of the State with territorial jurisdiction. Only if national courts failed to prosecute effectively would the international tribunal be entitled to exercise jurisdiction. The United States urged incorporating a sentence to recognize this principle, adding that: ‘If the proposal for the deletion of the final phrase of article VII were adopted, there would not be any foundation for the establishment of an international tribunal and the convention would greatly suffer thereby.’ Uruguay tabled a similar amendment.

Several delegations called for deletion of the provision. Belgium wanted it removed on practical grounds, namely that no such tribunal existed. Cuba noted that ‘the ad hoc committee has recognized the principle of an international tribunal in article VII of its draft, but it had made no provision regarding the composition of that tribunal, its procedure and the laws it was to enforce. In those circumstances, the final words of [article VI] had no practical value and should be deleted.’ The United Kingdom proposed a new sentence referring genocide cases to the International Court of Justice. Fitzmaurice said article VI as drafted was useless:

182 Ibid. (Tarazi, Syria).
183 Ibid. (Demesmin, Haiti).
184 UN Doc. A/C.6/235: ‘Jurisdiction of the international tribunal in any case shall be subject to a finding by the tribunal that the State in which the crime was committed had failed to take appropriate measures to bring to trial persons who, in the judgment of the court, should have been brought to trial or had failed to impose suitable punishment upon those convicted of the crime.’
185 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.98 (Maktos, United States).
186 UN Doc. A/C.6/209: ‘Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article IV shall be tried by the competent tribunals of the State in the territory of which the act was committed. Should the competent organs of the State which is under a duty to punish the crime fail to proceed to such punishment effectively, any of the Parties to the present Convention may submit the case to the International Court of Justice, which shall decide whether the complaint is justified. Should it be proved that there has been such failure as aforesaid, the Court shall deal with and pronounce judgment on the crime of genocide. For this purpose the Court shall organize a Criminal Chamber.’ Uruguay withdrew its amendment after the resolution on the international criminal court was adopted: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.99 (Manini y Rios, Uruguay).
188 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.97 (Dihigo, Cuba).
374  Genocide in international law

With regard to national jurisdiction, there were already other provisions in the
convention, such as the preamble, article [IV] and article [V], which affirmed
the obligation of States Parties to the convention to punish genocide on the
national level, and as to international jurisdiction, the mention of a competent
international tribunal – which could only be an international criminal tribunal –
was useless since such a tribunal did not exist. Even if it did exist, it would be of
as little use as national courts, for it was to be anticipated that culprits would not
be handed over to it and that unless armed force were used it would be
impossible to bring the perpetrators of an act of genocide to trial by that court.

For that reason, the United Kingdom preferred recourse to the Inter-
national Court of Justice ‘to enact measures capable of putting a stop to
the criminal acts concerned and of awarding compensation for the
damage caused to victims’.\textsuperscript{190} After criticism that this question had
already been debated and decided when article V was being con-
sidered,\textsuperscript{191} Belgium and the United Kingdom withdrew their amend-
ments and developed a new proposal which was discussed in
conjunction with article IX.\textsuperscript{192}

Some States took the view that an international jurisdiction, while
ultimately desirable, was plainly unrealistic at the present time, and that
it was better to delete any such reference in the draft. Afghanistan said
international punishment could not be achieved ‘since it was impossible
to see how a sentence pronounced by an international tribunal could be
carried out’.\textsuperscript{193} Ecuador said it favoured an international tribunal but
said article VI was too vague and should be deleted.\textsuperscript{194} Manfred Lachs
of Poland said he ‘would have been among the first to urge the establish-
ment of such a court if he had thought that the idea was really

190 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.97 (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
191 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.99 (Maktos, United States). See also \textit{ibid.} (Morozov, Soviet
Union).
192 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (Kaeckenbeek, Belgium).
193 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.97 (Bammate, Afghanistan).
194 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.98 (Correa, Ecuador).
practicable. In existing circumstances, however, it seemed that the idea was not acceptable to all delegations and its inclusion in the convention might make it difficult for those delegations to sign the convention.\textsuperscript{195} Venezuela described the idea as ‘unrealistic’, observing that ‘it might be better to postpone the establishment of an international tribunal to a later stage’.\textsuperscript{196} For Brazil, ‘[t]he last words of article [VI] expressed merely a wish, an aspiration, and the delegation of Brazil thought they should be deleted in order that the convention might remain within the confines of reality’.\textsuperscript{197} Similarly, Chile said that, even if the provision was of little practical significance, it contained ‘the expression of a hope’.\textsuperscript{198}

The Sixth Committee decided, by a narrow majority, to delete the words ‘or by a competent international tribunal’.\textsuperscript{199} France asked that the following declaration be added to the record:

Just as it has taken twenty-five years for collective security to prevail, so the French delegation is convinced that an international criminal court will come into being. The French delegation considers the vote which has just taken place to be of extreme gravity. By rejecting the principle of international punishment, the Committee has rendered the draft convention on genocide purposeless. In these circumstances, France will probably find itself unable to sign such a convention.\textsuperscript{200}

Similarly, Canada said it voted against ‘because the failure to provide for an international tribunal would defeat the very basis of the convention’.\textsuperscript{201} But it was clear that the vote was not so unequivocal, because Luxembourg, Poland and Peru all stated that they did not oppose the concept of an international tribunal, only that it did not belong in the convention. Indeed, Belgium said it would be erroneous to interpret the vote as dispositive of the issue.\textsuperscript{202} Then, draft article VI as a whole, as amended by deletion of the words ‘or by a competent international tribunal’, was adopted.\textsuperscript{203}

The Committee proceeded forthwith to debate a resolution, proposed by Iran, assigning consideration of the creation of an international tribunal to the International Law Commission.\textsuperscript{204} The Netherlands

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid. (Lachs, Poland).
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid. (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela).
\textsuperscript{197} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.97 (Amado, Brazil).
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid. (Arancibia Lazo, Chile).
\textsuperscript{199} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.98 (twenty-three in favour, nineteen against, with three abstentions).
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid. (Chaumont, France).
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid. (Feaver, Canada).
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid. (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
\textsuperscript{203} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (twenty-one in favour, ten against, with fifteen abstentions).
\textsuperscript{204} The United Kingdom, Siam, Egypt, India and Australia explained that they had abstained. Uruguay, El Salvador, Canada the Philippines and Cuba said they had voted against.

UN Doc. A/C.6/218:
submitted an amendment specifying that crimes other than genocide might be submitted to the court.\textsuperscript{205} The Soviet Union opposed the resolution, saying it was out of order and that the notion of international suppression of genocide had already been rejected by the Committee.\textsuperscript{206} But Egypt insisted that in the previous meeting several delegates had voted against the words dealing with an international tribunal because one did not yet exist, and it could not be presumed that, if one existed, they would have been opposed.\textsuperscript{207} The joint resolution of the Netherlands and Iran\textsuperscript{208} as adopted by the Sixth Committee, read:

The General Assembly,

Considering that the discussion of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide had raised the question of the desirability and possibility of having persons charged with genocide tried by a competent international tribunal,

Considering that in the course of development of the international community the need for trial of crimes by an international judicial organ will be more and more felt,

Invites the International Law Commission to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of individuals, whether private persons or officials, charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by international conventions;

Requests the International Law Commission in the accomplishment of that task to pay attention to the possibility of establishing a Criminal Chamber of the International Court of Justice.\textsuperscript{209}

France said it had abstained because it did not understand how the Draft resolution concerning the establishment of an international tribunal competent to deal with the crime of genocide,

\textit{Whereas} genocide is a grave crime against mankind which the civilized world condemns,

\textit{Whereas} punishment must be meted out for the crime of genocide wherever and by whomever committed, and

\textit{Whereas} if a competent international tribunal were established, it could deal with crimes of genocide and mete out punishment to the guilty,

\textit{The General Assembly}

\textit{Recommends} the International Law Commission, after inviting the opinions of all Governments of Members on this question, to undertake the necessary studies with a view to preparing a draft convention on the establishment of an international tribunal competent to deal with the crime of genocide.

\textsuperscript{205} UN Doc. A/C.6/248: ‘Considering that the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has raised the question of the desirability and possibility of having persons charged with genocide tried by a competent international tribunal.’ See the comments in UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.98 (Spiropoulos, Greece); and \textit{ibid.} (du Beus, Netherlands).

\textsuperscript{206} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.99 (Morozov, Soviet Union).

\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Ibid.} (Raafat, Egypt). \textsuperscript{208} UN Doc. A/C.6/271.

\textsuperscript{209} GA Res. 260B(III). UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.99 (thirty-two in favour, four against, with nine abstentions).
Committee could vote on the application of a principle that it had rejected. However, it ‘took note of the admission which the Committee had thus made, namely, that an international tribunal was necessary’.\textsuperscript{210} Venezuela recalled that it had voted for deletion of the final words of article VI because it opposed ‘at that juncture’ the creation of an international court, adding that it did not object to the International Law Commission studying the question.\textsuperscript{211}

But over the next few weeks, the Sixth Commission continued to stew over the question. When the drafting committee report was finally presented, towards the close of the session, there were new proposals. The United States wanted to add, at the end of article VI, the words ‘or by a competent international penal tribunal subject to the acceptance at a later date by the contracting party concerned of its jurisdiction’.\textsuperscript{212} It explained that some representatives had voted against the international penal tribunal because political groups were to be protected by the convention; others had been opposed because they first wanted to know more about the powers and scope of the tribunal. Both of these factors had changed and justified reconsidering the issue.\textsuperscript{213}

Predictably, the Soviet Union opposed any reconsideration. The decision to refer the matter to the International Law Commission had already been taken, and adoption of the United States proposal would amount to a decision to establish a competent tribunal.\textsuperscript{214} Reopening the question required a two-thirds vote, but this succeeded.\textsuperscript{215} France submitted a modification of the United States amendment changing the end of the provision to read ‘or by an international penal tribunal which shall have competence in respect of the contracting parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction’.\textsuperscript{216}

A new drafting committee on Article VI was struck, composed of France, Belgium, India and the United States. It presented its report to the next session, taking the form of a joint text, authored by the United States, France and Belgium, that closely resembled the one debated at the previous session. Evidently there was no consensus in the drafting committee. It incorporated the idea of a non-compulsory international criminal tribunal, adding ‘or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to such Contracting Parties as shall have accepted the jurisdiction of such tribunal’.\textsuperscript{217}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{210} Ibid. (Chaumont, France).
\item \textsuperscript{211} Ibid. (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela).
\item \textsuperscript{212} UN Doc. A/C.6/295.
\item \textsuperscript{213} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.129 (Gross, United States).
\item \textsuperscript{214} Ibid. (Morozov, Soviet Union).
\item \textsuperscript{215} Ibid. (thirty-three in favour, nine against, with six abstentions).
\item \textsuperscript{216} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.129 (Chaumont, France).
\item \textsuperscript{217} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.130 (Chaumont, France).
\end{itemize}
Czechoslovakia remained opposed to any mention of an international criminal tribunal, and, thus, to the United States–France–Belgium text. Venezuela said it did not like the vague reference to an international criminal court, given that no details about it were known. ‘The Venezuelan delegation still considered that the institution of international criminal jurisdiction could only lead to unfortunate results, in view of the existing world situation’, said Pérez-Perozo. Brazil announced that it had changed its position, and would now vote in favour. The Sixth Committee adopted the joint amendment, followed by a successful vote on the article as a whole.

In the subsequent General Assembly debate, the Soviet Union unsuccessfully introduced an amendment consisting of the deletion of the words ‘or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction’. It seems clear enough from the text that article VI of the Convention does not make a State party automatically subject to the jurisdiction of a future international court. However, in order to dispel any possible ambiguity, some States made declarations to this effect at the time of ratification of accession.

Prosecution by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Of the more than seventy public indictments issued by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, only eight suspects have been accused of genocide. The indictments focus on the Serb-run

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218 Ibid. (Augenthaler, Czechoslovakia).
219 Ibid. (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela).
220 Ibid. (Amado, Brazil).
221 Ibid. (twenty-seven in favour, nine against, with five abstentions).
222 Ibid. (twenty-seven in favour, five against, with eight abstentions).
223 UN Doc. A/766. The amendment was rejected (UN Doc. A/PV.179), eight in favour, thirty-nine against, with eight abstentions.
224 United States: ‘That with regard to the reference to an international penal tribunal in article VI of the Convention, the United States declares that it reserves the right to effect its participation in any such tribunal only by a treaty entered into specifically for that purpose with the advice and consent of the Senate’; Venezuela: ‘With reference to article VI, notice is given that any proceedings to which Venezuela may be a party before an international penal tribunal would be invalid without Venezuela’s prior express acceptance of the jurisdiction of such international tribunal.’
concentration camps – Omarska, Luka, Keraterm – where Muslims and Croats were incarcerated during the war. The prosecutor has also qualified the mass executions of Muslims in the Srebrenica enclave in July 1995 as genocide. The prosecutor’s caution in preferring accusations of genocide became evident in the very first case actually to come to trial. After Dusko Tadic was arrested in Germany, national courts proceeded against him for aiding and abetting genocide, as well as torture, murder and causing grievous bodily harm.\textsuperscript{226} Although Tadic was only a minor player in Bosnian war crimes, the youthful International Tribunal was hungry for work and jumped at the chance to preempt the German courts.\textsuperscript{227} But the prosecutor confined his indictment to war crimes and crimes against humanity, dropping the charge of genocide. ‘We were amazed that Germany had no specific evidence on that charge’, said deputy prosecutor Graham Blewitt. ‘They were going to attempt to prove it solely on the basis of the testimony of an expert witness. But we thought it would be difficult to establish genocide with respect to Tadic.’\textsuperscript{228} In another early case, Nikolic, the judges themselves invited the prosecutor to add an indictment of genocide after hearing evidence of ethnic cleansing during a Rule 61 proceeding, a suggestion that was never taken up.\textsuperscript{229} Nor did the 1999 indictment of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic charge genocide, to the surprise of many

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  \textit{Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al.} (Case No. IT–95–8–I), Indictment, 21 July 1995. There have been no convictions for genocide and there has been one acquittal (\textit{Prosecutor v. Jelesic} (Case No IT–95–10–T), Judgment, 19 October 1999.


\textsuperscript{227} \textit{Prosecutor v. Tadic} (Case No. IT–94–1–1), Application for a formal request for deferral, 8 November 1994.


who had assumed, based on statements by politicians and journalists, that this was a given.230

The most important of the genocide cases to come before the Tribunal is that of Bosnian Serb leaders, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. Frustrated by the failure of NATO forces to arrest the two, who continued to lead quite public lives in both the Republica Srpska and Yugoslavia itself, the prosecutor initiated a hearing to confirm the indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The *ex parte* hearing was held over a two-week period in June and July 1996. In an opening statement, prosecutor Eric Ostberg spoke to the charge of genocide:

Genocide is the ultimate crime. It is characterized by the particular intent, or *dolus specialis*, to destroy a group ‘as such’. It is this fundamental element which distinguishes genocide from the ordinary crime of murder. In the words of the Israeli District Court in the *Eichmann* case, I quote, ‘the special character’ of genocide is the ‘general and total’ intent to physically exterminate members of a group ‘as such’. The term ‘in whole or in part’ in article 4 of our Statute clearly indicates that the intent to destroy does not have to be directed against the entire group. The term ‘in part’ is ambiguous and lends itself to differing interpretations.

However, it is the submission of the prosecution that it implies, to quote the official report of a UN expert on genocide, ‘a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group such as its leadership’. This is taken from the Whitaker report at page 16, paragraph 19.

In view of the particular intent requirement, which is the essence of the crime of genocide, the relative proportionate scale of the actual or attempted physical destruction of a group, or a significant section thereof, should be considered in relation to the factual opportunity of the accused to destroy a group in a specific geographic area within the sphere of his control, and not in relation to the entire population of the group in a wider geographic sense.

In all cases, it is the submission of the prosecution that in the interests of international justice, genocide should not be diluted or belittled by too broad an interpretation. Indeed, it should be reserved only for acts of exceptional gravity and magnitude which shock the conscience of humankind and which, therefore, justify the appellation of genocide as the ‘ultimate crime’.231

Ostberg told the Tribunal that it was ‘inconceivable to suggest that the accused Karadzic and Mladic had not given their approval to the massive criminal policy of “ethnic cleansing”, often genocidal in char-

acter, which was committed by their subordinates, and which lasted for some three and a half years’.  

In evidence led about Yugoslavia’s history, an expert witness described Croat atrocities against Serbs in 1941 as ‘genocide’. But, while the testimony indicated heinous persecution of Muslims and Croats during the war in the 1990s which clearly fell within the ambit of crimes against humanity, evidence that these acts were committed with the intent to destroy the groups, in whole or in part, was far from clear. The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Elisabeth Rehn, testified as an amicus curiae to the policies of ethnic cleansing but did not use the word ‘genocide’. John Ralston, an Investigations Commander with the Office of the prosecutor, described the conditions in the various detention camps, calling for the release of those detained. At no time did he suggest these were extermination camps, comparable to those in central and eastern Europe under the Nazi regime. The former mayor of Sarajevo, Tarik Kupusovic, described the shelling of his town, saying the goal of the Serbs was not to destroy it but rather to divide it into Serb, Muslim and possibly Croat neighbourhoods. He continued:

As they did not succeed in doing so at the beginning, then by a long siege they wanted to make life in the city impossible, so that the inhabitants of the city could feel hopelessness, to abandon their city so that the city as such would die. Afterwards, when they wanted to take the city, they could not do so without enormous human, technical and other losses on their own side.

Colin Kaiser, a UNESCO specialist on cultural heritage, described the destruction of monuments and similar objects, concluding that the Serb forces were attempting to change ‘the physical environment’ by destroying cultural evidence of a culture or civilization.

The prosecutor’s case tended to confirm that the Serb forces, led by Karadzic and Mladic, hoped to drive Muslim and Croat populations from previously mixed areas in order to create an ‘ethnically cleansed’ Serb region. The intent, therefore, was not to destroy the group, although the evidence seems clear that many murders, including mass killings, took place. The Tribunal took the view that individual criminal responsibility for genocide had been established. Turning to the detention camps, the Trial Chamber said:

The Trial Chamber is of the view that the evidence and testimony submitted suffice at this stage to demonstrate the active participation of the highest

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232 Ibid., p. 17.
233 Ibid., Transcript, 28 June 1996, pp. 9, 26–7 (testimony of Professor Paul Garde).
234 Ibid., Transcript, 3 July 1996.
235 Ibid., Transcript, 1 July 1996, p. 4.
236 Ibid., Transcript, 2 July 1996, p. 3.
237 Ibid., p. 55.
political and military leaders in the commission of the crimes by Bosnian Serb military and police forces in the detention facilities. The uniform methods used in committing the said crimes, their pattern, their pervasiveness throughout all of the Bosnian Serb-held territory, the movements of prisoners between the various camps, and the tenor of some of the accused’s statements are strong indications tending to show that Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic planned, ordered or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of the genocide perpetrated in the detention facilities.238

The Tribunal also considered that liability had been established on the basis of command responsibility. Clearly disappointed by the prosecutor’s conservatism in charging genocide only with respect to the conditions in the detention camps, the Trial Chamber noted that the evidence revealed a pattern of genocidal acts targeting ‘[t]he national Bosnian, Bosnian Croat and, especially, Bosnian Muslim national groups’, inviting the prosecutor ‘to consider broadening the scope of the characterization of genocide to include other criminal acts listed in the first indictment than those committed in the detention camps’.239

However, in its first verdict on one of the camp cases, the Tribunal summarily dismissed the charge of genocide even before the defence presented its case. Goran Jelisic was initially charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. He pleaded guilty to the first two offences, but refused to admit guilt to the charge of genocide. The prosecution evidence indicated that over a two-week period Jelisic was the principal executioner in the Luka camp. He was shown to have systematically killed Muslim inmates, as well as some Croats. The victims were essentially all of the Muslim community leaders. The Trial Chamber, presided by Judge Claude Jorda, said that the prosecutor had failed to prove the existence of any general or even regional plan to destroy in whole or in part the Bosnian Muslims. It said that Jelisic could in no way be an accomplice to genocide if in fact genocide was never committed. On this point, it said that the prosecutor had simply failed to prove the existence of genocide in Bosnia.

Prosecution by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda got off to a rocky start, plagued with administrative problems, incompetence and corruption of

239 Ibid., paras. 84, 94 and 95.
Prosecution of genocide

some of its senior officials. However, by mid-1997 many prominent suspects in the genocide had been apprehended in various parts of Africa, and transferred to the seat of the Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania. In contrast with prosecutorial policy before the Yugoslav tribunal, genocide was charged systematically in the Rwandan indictments. On 2 September 1998, the Tribunal registered its first conviction for genocide, in the Akayesu case. A month later, it condemned him to imprisonment for life. On 4 September 1998, it sentenced Rwanda’s former Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda, to a term of life imprisonment for genocide after accepting a guilty plea. A third accused, Omer Serushago, pleaded guilty to genocide, and was sentenced to a term of fifteen years in February 1999. Two more accused, Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, were convicted on 21 May 1999. Georges A. N. Rutaganda was found guilty of genocide on 6 December 1999 and sentenced to life imprisonment. Akayesu, Kayishema, Ruzindana and Rutangada have appealed their convictions, and all five have appealed their sentences.

The trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, bourgmestre (mayor) of the Rwandan commune of Taba, began in early January 1997 and concluded in April the following year. The judgment, a tome of some 300 pages, set out in great detail its general assessment of the history of the Rwandan genocide as well as its analysis of the applicable law, in particular, the definition of genocide found in articles II and III of the Convention. Relying on expert testimony, the judgment noted the Habyarimana regime’s ‘policy of systematic discrimination’ against not only the Tutsi minority but also against some regional Hutu groups. The build-up to the events of 1994 was examined closely, including such incidents as the notorious November 1992 speech of Habyarimana henchman Leon Mugesera, calling for the extermination of the Tutsi, and the hate-mongering broadcasts of Radio Mille Collines. These elements were important in the Tribunal’s conclusion that the massacres of 1994 were committed with the intent to destroy the Tutsi group.

A schoolteacher by profession, Akayesu was appointed bourgmestre by President Juvenal Habyarimana in April 1993, serving until June 1994.

During April, May and June 1994, the Tribunal concluded that at least 2,000 Tutsi were killed in Taba commune. The evidence showed that, in the early days of the genocide, Akayesu attempted to prevent violence. Witnesses described how he opposed efforts by the *interahamwe* militia to extend the scope of the genocidal massacres that had ravaged Rwanda’s capital Kigali since the assassination of Habyarimana on 6 April 1994. Then, Akayesu attended a meeting on 18 April 1994 where Prime Minister Kambanda enlisted the participation of Rwanda’s *bourgmestres* in genocide. Akayesu argued that henceforth, challenging genocide openly was impossible, although he pursued clandestine efforts to resist violence. The Tribunal rejected Akayesu’s defence, concluding that from 18 April 1994 he engaged actively and enthusiastically in the massacres, tolerating, ordering and, in some cases, directly perpetrating killings, beatings and rapes.

For example, on 19 April 1994, Akayesu participated in a public meeting attended by over 100 people. There, the Trial Chamber concluded, Akayesu urged the population to eliminate the accomplices of the rebel Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), associated with the Tutsi minority. The population construed his remarks as an appeal to kill Tutsis. The Tribunal found that Akayesu was himself fully aware of the impact of his statement on the crowd. It identified a causal link between Akayesu’s statement at the gathering and the widespread killings of local Tutsis that ensued.

The Tribunal, in one of its significant innovations, defined rape as a form of genocide, in that it constitutes serious bodily or mental harm in accordance with article II(b) of the Convention. One witness at the trial, identified only as ‘JJ’ for the purposes of her own protection, recalled:

> having been raped repeatedly by *interahamwe*, and hearing the cries of young girls around her, girls as young as twelve or thirteen years old. On the way to the cultural centre the first time she was raped there, Witness JJ said that she and the others were taken past the Accused and that he was looking at them. The second time she was taken to the cultural centre to be raped, Witness JJ recalled seeing the Accused standing at the entrance of the cultural centre and hearing him say loudly to the *interahamwe*, ‘Never ask me again what a Tutsi woman tastes like’, and ‘Tomorrow they will be killed’.

Akayesu denied that these events took place, and complained that the indictment had been amended because of pressure from women’s groups whom he described as ‘worked up to agree that they have been raped’.

Two days after the *Akayesu* verdict, the same Trial Chamber sen-

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tenced Jean Kambanda to life imprisonment for genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, as well as crimes against humanity. Kambanda was acting prime minister of Rwanda between 8 April 1994 and 18 July 1994, the period when the atrocities were taking place. Pleading guilty to genocide, Kambanda admitted ‘a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Tutsi, the purpose of which was to exterminate them’. He contributed to the massacres by making incendiary speeches, distributing arms, and presiding over cabinet and other meetings where they were planned and discussed.247

Condemning Kambanda to life imprisonment, the Tribunal described genocide as ‘the crime of crimes’.248 Both the prosecutor and Kambanda’s attorney urged the Tribunal to interpret his guilty plea as ‘as a signal of his remorse, repentance and acceptance of responsibility for his actions’.249 But the Tribunal seemed unimpressed, noting that ‘remorse is not the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from a guilty plea’.250 Moreover, the Tribunal was profoundly distressed that Kambanda ‘has offered no explanation for his voluntary participation in the genocide; nor has he expressed contrition, regret or sympathy for the victims in Rwanda, even when given the opportunity to do so by the Chamber’.251 Kambanda’s co-operation with the prosecutor – a mitigating factor, according to the Tribunal’s own rules – was also taken into account. Kambanda’s co-operation with the Tribunal went beyond a plea of guilty and a certain number of admissions; he also provided the prosecutor’s office with ninety hours of videotaped testimony, to be used in trials of his accomplices within the Rwandan government and military. Kambanda’s family had benefited from significant protective measures in exchange. In the result, the Tribunal ruled ‘that the aggravating circumstances surrounding the crimes committed by Jean Kambanda negate the mitigating circumstances, especially since Jean Kambanda occupied a high ministerial post, at the time he committed the said crimes’.252

A third accused, Omar Serushago, pleaded guilty on 14 December 1998 to genocide and three counts of crimes against humanity.253 The prosecution was authorized to withdraw a fifth count of crimes against humanity (rape). Serushago was a local leader of the *interahamwe*, the racist militia affiliated with the ruling party. In April 1994, he was assigned to supervise a roadblock at Gisenyi, in northwest Rwanda,

where Tutsi were identified and detained, then executed. Serushago admitted personally killing four individuals, and the responsibility for another thirty-three murders committed by militiamen under his authority. He also acknowledged attending a number of meetings where progress reports on the ongoing genocide were presented.

Serushago was sentenced to a term of fifteen years. The Tribunal said that ‘exceptional circumstances in mitigation’ entitled him to some clemency. A number of factors were cited: his co-operation with the prosecutor was ‘substantial and ongoing’; he had surrendered voluntarily even before being indicted; he pleaded guilty; he assisted some Tutsi victims to escape; he was the father of six children; there was a possibility of rehabilitation; he had expressed his remorse and contrition publicly, asking forgiveness from the victims of his crimes and the entire people of Rwanda and appealing for national reconciliation in Rwanda.

Kayishema and Ruzindana were tried together for charges relating to genocide in Kibuye prefecture, of which Kayishema was the prefect until July 1994. Kayishema ordered Tutsis to seek refuge in places that had historically served as safe havens, such as churches and sports stadiums, knowing that they would subsequently be massacred. The numbers for which he was personally held responsible exceed 50,000. Both directed and incited crimes of horrible atrocity. Georges Rutaganda was one of the leaders of the racist militia known as interahamwe. Among the specific crimes for which he was found guilty was directing and participating in an attack on thousands of unarmed Tutsi men, women and children at a school in Kigali where they had sought refuge. For several days at the outset of the genocide, the Tutsi were protected by Belgian soldiers who belonged to the United Nations contingent. When the Belgians left, the interahamwe moved in for the kill. Rutaganda was also implicated in subsequent house-to-house searches in Kigali for Tutsi victims.

**Prosecutions by national courts**

There have been only rare attempts to prosecute genocide under national penal codes. The *Eichmann* case, heard in 1961–2, is undoubtedly the most well known and also the most important. Eichmann was abducted from Argentina by Israeli agents and brought to Jerusalem where he was indicted under the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law for ‘crimes against the Jewish people’, ‘crimes against

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254 Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 1950 (Law 5710/1950), s. I(a). The legislation only applied to Nazi war criminals. Israel also enacted genocide legislation
humanity’ and ‘war crimes’. The acts of ‘crimes against the Jewish people’ are modelled on article II of the Genocide Convention.\textsuperscript{255} Eichmann was charged with four counts of genocide corresponding to the first four subparagraphs of article II: killing Jews, causing serious physical and mental harm, placing Jews in living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction, and imposing measures intended to prevent births among Jews. The Court disposed of a variety of arguments invoked by Eichmann, including the charge that the applicable legislation violated the \textit{nullum crimen sine lege} principle,\textsuperscript{256} the defence of act of State,\textsuperscript{257} the assertion that crimes against humanity could only be committed in time of war (a claim of little practical importance to the facts in Eichmann’s case),\textsuperscript{258} and the charge that his abduction from Argentina deprived the court of jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{259}

The trial court found Eichmann criminally responsible for the entire ‘final solution’.\textsuperscript{260} Alternatively, the court said he was responsible individually for elements of the final solution in which he personally participated: ‘Even if we view each sector of the implementation of the “Final Solution” separately, there was in fact not one sector in which the accused was not active in some way or another, with varying degrees of intensity, so that this alternative would also lead to his conviction in respect of the whole front of extermination activities.’\textsuperscript{261} Eichmann was convicted of all four counts charged, although acquitted with respect to acts prior to August 1941: ‘he, together with others, caused the killing of millions of Jews for the purpose of executing the plan known as “the final solution of the Jewish problem” with intent to exterminate the Jewish people.’\textsuperscript{262} On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the reasoning of the District Court, although it developed some of the arguments a little differently. On retroactivity, it endorsed the District Court’s conclusion concerning the customary nature of the crime of genocide, and noted that ‘the enactment of the Law was not from the point of view of international law a legislative act which conflicted with the principle \textit{nulla poena} or the operation of which was retroactive, but rather one by which the Knesset gave effect to international law and its objectives’.\textsuperscript{263} Eichmann was executed on 31 May 1962.\textsuperscript{264}

There have been many other prosecutions before national courts for

\begin{itemize}
\item with a prospective effect: Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law, note 26 above.
\item \textit{A-G Israel v. Eichmann}, note 104 above, paras. 16, 190.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, para. 27.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, para. 28.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, para. 29.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, para. 39.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, para. 196.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, para. 197.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, para. 244.
\item \textit{A-G Israel v. Eichmann}, note 111 above, para. 11.
\item According to Hannah Arendt, ‘Eichmann went to the gallows with great dignity’:
\end{itemize}
atrocities committed during the Second World War, although few of them for the crime of genocide as such, or based on provisions derived from the 1948 Convention. Poland was the first country to use the term ‘genocide’ in its criminal prosecutions. In July 1946, Artur Greiser was charged with – and convicted of – genocide.\(^{265}\) Genocide was also charged in three of the successor trials held at Nuremberg by United States military tribunals in the aftermath of the trial of the major war criminals.\(^{266}\)

In the late 1980s, Israel judged John Demjanjuk after obtaining his extradition from the United States.\(^{267}\) Demjanjuk was believed to have been ‘Ivan the Terrible’ at the Treblinka death camp, but he was acquitted of this charge after the Court of Appeal ruled ambiguous identification evidence entitled him to the benefit of the doubt.\(^{268}\) The Attorney-General of Israel refused to proceed with new charges, despite compelling evidence that Demjanjuk had in fact served as a guard in the Trawniki camp. Extradition law prevents prosecution based on charges if these were not authorized by the extraditing State which, in Demjanjuk’s case, was the United States. The High Court of Justice was petitioned to review the Attorney-General’s decision, but declined to intervene.\(^{269}\)

Rwanda’s genocide prosecutions have taken place in a country devastated by a civil war that destroyed what was at best a feeble judicial infrastructure. In 1994, tens of thousands were arrested and thrown into already overcrowded prisons. The numbers mounted steadily, reaching 120,000 early in 1998.\(^{270}\) Within months of the genocide, there were major appeals for assistance in ‘rebuilding’ the justice system. In November 1995, the Rwandan Government organized an international meeting in Kigali entitled ‘Genocide, Impunity and Accountability’. The conference recommended new mechanisms to deal with the genocide cases, including specialized chambers of existing courts, a classifica-

265 \textit{Poland v. Greiser}, (1948) 13 LRTWC 70 (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland).

266 These cases are discussed in chapter 1, at pp. 47–9 above.


tion scheme to separate the main organizers of genocide from criminals with lesser degrees of responsibility, and encouragement of offenders to confess in exchange for substantially reduced sentences. These measures were the object of legislation adopted by the National Assembly on 30 August 1996 and approved shortly afterwards by the Constitutional Court.

The preamble to the new statute noted that, although Rwanda had ratified the relevant international treaties, including the Genocide Convention, it had not set out applicable penalties for the offences. Consequently, continued the preamble, prosecutions could only be based upon the existing Penal Code. The legislation defined four categories of offender. The first category comprised organizers and planners of the genocide, persons in positions of authority within the military or civil infrastructure who committed or encouraged genocide, and persons who committed ‘odious and systematic’ murders. This category accounted for a relatively small percentage of the total detained, and overlapped somewhat with those targeted by the International Tribunal. The second category covered those not in the first category who committed murder or serious crimes against the person that led to death. Other serious crimes against the person were covered by the third category, and the fourth was those who had perpetrated crimes against property.

The heart of the new legislation was a ‘Confession and Guilty Plea Procedure’. In return for a full confession, offenders benefited from a very substantial reduction in penalties. The new Rwandan legislation declared that sentences were to be imposed in accordance with the Rwandan Penal Code, subject to certain exceptions. Thus, offenders in category I were to be sentenced to the death penalty, and category II criminals to a maximum of life imprisonment. Category I and II offenders taking advantage of the confession procedure had sentences reduced to seven to eleven years, if entering the programme prior to prosecution, and twelve to fifteen years, if entering it subsequent to prosecution.

The trials met an international chorus of condemnation, journalists and other observers denouncing what they found to be a lack of due


process. While some of the early trials were unquestionably open to criticism for failure to respect all internationally recognized rules of procedural fairness, the problems did not appear to be due so much to bad faith as to inexperience. By all accounts, there was a steady improvement in the quality of the trials. The High Commissioner for Human Rights commended ‘the increased number of witnesses testifying in court; the improvement in detainees’ access to case files; and the increase in the granting of reasonable requests for adjournments’. Rwanda’s experience recalls Georges Clemenceau’s comment at the Paris Peace Conference when the creation of the first international criminal tribunal was being debated: ‘The first tribunal must have been summary and brutal; it was nevertheless the beginning of a great thing.’

By 1999, Rwandan courts had tried more than 1,300 accused. In some jurisdictions, acquittal rates were in the range of 20 per cent, a sure sign of healthy justice. Somewhere in excess of 5,000 had offered to confess, although the judicial infrastructure seemed unable to cope with their files. Gradually, Rwandans seemed to appreciate the practical impossibility, not to mention the social cost, of trying all the detainees. New proposals began circulating, including revival of a traditional justice mechanism known as gacaca whereby offenders are tried by councils of local elders.

During the 1990s, several European States pursued genocide prosecutions with respect to events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In 1994, Austria tried a Bosnian Serb, Dusko Cvjetkovic, for genocide allegedly committed in Kucice, in central Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 13 July 1994, the Supreme Court of Austria ruled that article 321 of the Austrian Penal Code did not permit prosecutions for crimes committed outside the country. Citing Article VI of the Genocide Convention, the court concluded that a State party is obliged to extradite a war criminal to the state where the crime was committed. Novislav Djajic went on trial in Germany for being an accomplice to genocide in Bosnia after the

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277 ‘Austria to Charge Bosnian Serb with Genocide’, Reuters World Service, 3 August
Prosecution of genocide

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague decided not to proceed in his case. In 1997, Djajic was acquitted of genocide ‘because he lacked the necessary mens rea’, proof of his intent was insufficient, and ‘the court presumed in the accused’s favour that he did not see the policy of “ethnic cleansing” as the underlying reason for his action’.\(^{278}\)

Several national jurisdictions have prosecuted mass killings and atrocities under the label of genocide. In some cases, national law had changed the definition of genocide to give it a wider reach. Prosecutions pursuant to these idiosyncratic definitions of genocide have been initiated in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Romania, Ethiopia and Spain.

Bangladesh threatened to prosecute Pakistani soldiers for genocide for crimes committed during the secession of Bangladesh in the early 1970s. Legislation enacted by Bangladesh modified the Convention definition to include political groups.\(^{279}\) When India indicated it was prepared to extradite Pakistani prisoners to Bangladesh, Pakistan launched proceedings against India before the International Court of Justice.\(^{280}\) The case was settled when India agreed to repatriate the Pakistani prisoners and genocide prosecutions never took place.\(^{281}\)

Cambodia’s Decree-Law No. 1, adopted by the People’s Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea, set up a ‘People’s Revolutionary Tribunal to judge the genocide crimes committed by the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique’.\(^{282}\) The Cambodian legislation defines genocide as ‘the planned mass killing of innocent people, the forced evacuation of the inhabitants of towns and villages, the rounding up of the population and forcing them to labour in physically exhausting conditions, the banning of religious practices, the destruction of economic and cultural institutions and social relations’.\(^{283}\) In 1979, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were found

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\(^{279}\) International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (Bangladesh), s. 3(2)(c).

\(^{280}\) Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India), Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, pp. 3–7. See chapter 9, at pp. 000–0 below.


\(^{282}\) UN Doc. A/C.3/34/1.

\(^{283}\) UN Doc. A/34/491, p. 34.
guilty of genocide in what commentators have described as a ‘show trial’.  

Several Romanian leaders, including the son of Nicolae Ceausescu, were tried in 1990 for abetting genocide. The allegations concerned mass killings during the December 1989 popular uprising, as well as other victims of the Ceausescu regime. Genocide charges were also filed against former police officers for their participation in killings in Timisoara in 1989 where nearly 100 people died. Ceausescu’s son was acquitted of complicity in genocide, but the former dictator’s brother, Nicolae Andruta Ceausescu, was convicted of incitement to genocide. Four other Ceausescu aides, Emil Bobu, Manea Manescu, Ion Dinca and Tudor Postelnicu, were convicted of complicity in genocide for their role at Timisoara. Romanian prosecutors appear to have taken the view that genocide was the proper charge solely because of the large numbers of victims, believed, erroneously, to have numbered in the thousands.

In the early 1990s, Ethiopia launched trials of former members of the Dergue military regime, which ruled the country from 1974 to 1991, charging them with genocide. Ethiopia’s Penal Code of 1957, drafted by Swiss expert Jean Graven, added political groups to the Convention’s enumeration. Established in 1992 after the fall of the old government, Ethiopia’s Office of the Special Prosecutor indicted more than 5,000 suspects, many charged with genocide. The accusations are based on the fact that the victims were political opponents of the regime. The process has been interminable and there have been no verdicts. The most recent prosecution in this category is that of Augusto Pinochet by Spanish courts. Pinochet was charged with genocide

Prosecution of genocide because of the killings of political prisoners in Chile during the 1970s.\textsuperscript{293} However, Pinochet’s extradition on the basis of the genocide accusations was denied by the English authorities.\textsuperscript{294}

**Effective penalties**

Article V of the Convention imposes an obligation to ‘provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article 3’. The drafters gave the issue little attention. The Secretariat had initially recommended against specifying applicable penalties, ‘because penal systems vary and because it is preferable to leave some freedom of action to States, wherever this does not present any real disadvantage. It is enough to say that the penalties should be sufficiently rigorous to make punishment effective.’\textsuperscript{295} The Secretariat draft required States to ‘make provision in their municipal law for acts of genocide’ and to provide ‘for their effective punishment’.\textsuperscript{296} But later, the Secretariat suggested the Ad Hoc Committee might ‘wish to consider the insertion, in the draft convention, of an express provision concerning the kind of punishment to be meted out for genocide. The provision might be of a general nature, e.g. a statement that genocide will be punished by death or any lesser punishment which might be provided for by international convention or which the court may find appropriate.’\textsuperscript{297} No such action was taken. In the Sixth Committee, a Soviet amendment requiring States parties to ‘provide criminal penalties for the authors of such crimes’\textsuperscript{298} was adopted after only the most perfunctory debate.\textsuperscript{299} France said that the application of penalties could not be left to domestic tribunals. ‘There was a defect in the text of the convention prepared by the ad hoc Committee’, argued Charles Chaumont.


\textsuperscript{294} R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, note 138 above.

\textsuperscript{295} UN Doc. E/447, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{296} Ibid., pp. 5–13, art. VI.

\textsuperscript{297} ‘List of Substantive Items to be Discussed in the Remaining Stages of the Committee’s Session, Memorandum Submitted by the Secretariat’, UN Doc. E/AC.25/11.

\textsuperscript{298} UN Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1; UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.93 (Morozov, Soviet Union). The entire amendment read: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact the necessary legislative measures, in accordance with their constitutional procedures, aimed at the prevention and suppression of genocide and also at the prevention and suppression of incitement to racial, national and religious hatred, to give effect to the provisions of this Convention, and to provide criminal penalties for the authors of such crimes.’

\textsuperscript{299} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.93 (seventeen in favour, fourteen against, with eight abstentions).
'In no part of the convention were any real penalties specified; they had, however, to be provided at the international level.'

During the post-war trials of the Nazis, there was some authority for the notion that international law recognized the death penalty as a maximum sentence in the case of war crimes, and therefore that the rule prohibiting retroactive punishments was not breached. The 1940 United States Army manual, Rules of Land Warfare, declared that: ‘All war crimes are subject to the death penalty, although a lesser penalty may be imposed.’ A post-war Norwegian court answered a defendant’s plea that the death penalty did not apply to the offence as charged, because the death penalty had been abolished for such a crime in domestic law, by finding that violations of the laws and customs of war had always been punished by death at international law.

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was authorized to impose upon an individual convicted of crimes against humanity the sanction of ‘death or such other punishment as shall be determined by it to be just’. Of those accused in the Trial of the Major War Criminals, three were acquitted, seven were sentenced to prison terms, and twelve condemned to death by hanging. Within weeks of the conviction, the executions were carried out in the Nuremberg prison gymnasium by an American hangman.

Penalties for genocide have been regularly considered by the International Law Commission, in the context of its work on the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and on the draft statute of an international criminal court, as well as during the drafting of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. International law now frowns upon capital punishment, and the maximum sentence for genocide allowed by the Code of Crimes, the

300 Ibid. (Chaumont, France).
301 (1949) 15 LRTWC 200.
302 Field Manual 27–10, 1 October 1940, para. 357.
303 Public Prosecutor v. Klinge, (1946) 13 ILR 262 (Supreme Court, Norway).
304 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), annex, (1951) 82 UNTS 279, art. 27.
statutes of the *ad hoc* tribunals and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is life imprisonment.\textsuperscript{308}

When creating the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in November 1994, the Security Council intended to exclude the death penalty, as it had done with the Yugoslavia Tribunal.\textsuperscript{309} Although it had not been applied for many years,\textsuperscript{310} leading the Secretary-General of the United Nations to classify Rwanda as a *de facto* abolitionist State,\textsuperscript{311} Rwandan political leaders noted that capital punishment was provided for as a penalty for murder in the country’s Penal Code and they affirmed their intention to use it in appropriate genocide cases. During debate in the Security Council, Rwanda claimed there would be a fundamental injustice in exposing criminals tried by its domestic courts to execution if those prosecuted by the international tribunal – presumably the masterminds of the genocide – would only be subject to life imprisonment.\textsuperscript{312} ‘Since it is foreseeable that the Tribunal will be dealing with suspects who devised, planned and organized the genocide, these may escape capital punishment whereas those who simply carried out their plans would be subjected to the harshness of this sentence’, said Rwanda’s representative. ‘That situation is not conducive to national reconciliation in Rwanda’,\textsuperscript{313} he added. New Zealand reminded Rwanda that: ‘For over three decades the United Nations has been trying progressively to eliminate the death penalty. It would be entirely unacceptable – and a dreadful step backwards – to introduce it


\textsuperscript{310} Death sentences were regularly commuted: Arrêté présidentiel No. 103/105, Mesure de grâce, *Journal Officiel* (Rwanda) 1992, p. 446, art. 1.


\textsuperscript{313} UN Doc. S/PV.3453, p. 16.
In April 1997, Rwanda held public executions of twenty-two offenders, convicted in its domestic trials. Several of the trials lacked the rigorous procedural guarantees that international law requires in the case of capital offences. The executions were criticized by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, and by a resolution of the African Commission of Human and People’s Rights, as well as by non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International. In sentencing offenders to heavy sentences, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda noted the discrepancy between the international and national approaches, observing that were the offenders to be judged by the national courts, they would likely have been sentenced to capital punishment. Indeed, referring to capital punishment in Rwandan law, the Tribunal has said this ‘general practice regarding prison sentences in Rwanda represents one factor supporting this Chamber’s imposition of the maximum and very severe sentences’.

Determination of the appropriate sentence for genocide provoked a fierce debate in Israel when Adolph Eichmann was sentenced to hang. The prosecution demanded death and argued it was mandatory under the law, although Israel had abolished the death penalty for all other crimes. The defence argued that subsequent amendments to Israel’s criminal law meant the sentence was not mandatory, and that in any case the court’s approach should be informed by the law then in force in Germany, where the death penalty had been abolished. Although agreeing capital punishment was not mandatory, the court

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320 Four years later, the Penal Code Amendment (Modes of Punishment) Law appeared to leave this to the discretion of the tribunal, and the presiding judge seemed to agree that death was not mandatory.
ordered the death penalty, stating that ‘for the punishment of the accused and the deterrence of others the maximum punishment authorized by law had to be imposed’. On appeal, the Supreme Court wrote:

But our knowledge that any manner of dealing with the appellant would not be comparable and any penalty or punishment inflicted on him would be inadequate – dare not move us to mitigate the punishment. Indeed, there can be no sense in sentencing to death, under the Law for the Punishment of Nazis and Nazi Collaborators, one who had killed a hundred people, while setting free, or merely keeping under guard and in security, one who had killed millions. When, in 1950, the Israeli Legislature provided the maximum penalty laid down in the Law, it could not have envisaged a criminal greater than Adolf Eichmann, and if we are not to frustrate the will of the Legislature we must impose on Eichmann the maximum penalty prescribed by Section I of the Law, that is the penalty of death.

Martin Buber met with Israel’s president Ben Gurion to plead for a life sentence. He argued that the death penalty should not be imposed, not only because he was an abolitionist, but because he felt that it might put an end to progressive developments among German youth.

Victor Gollancz later wrote that: ‘For a court of three mortal judges to award death to such a man, on the ground of compensatory justice, is to trivialize, in a manner most grievous, the crucifixion of a whole people.’ For Hannah Arendt, the ‘supreme justification for the death penalty’ was that: ‘Eichmann had been implicated and had played a central role in an enterprise whose open purpose was to eliminate forever certain “races” from the surface of the earth.’ She criticized the judges, saying they should have directly addressed this aspect and said that: ‘Just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations – as though you and your neighbours had any right to determine who would not inhabit the world – we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must hang.’

That two abolitionist countries, Rwanda and Israel, have retreated from a commitment and, arguably, a social consensus, opposed to

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327 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem.
capital punishment when confronted with genocide, testifies to the overarching gravity of the offence. It also may represent the triumph of retributive theories of justice, at least when genocide is concerned. As Leon Sheleff has observed:

The question is whether there are not certain acts committed against humanity that are so far beyond the pale with genocide prosecutions is certainly instructive. On the one hand, it demonstrates how unacceptable capital punishment must be for ‘ordinary crimes’, but also signals the overwhelming force of retributive sentiments in the rare cases of genocide prosecutions of normal social intercourse that even considerations of mercy, justice, or forgiveness cannot serve to mitigate the ultimate penalty of death. The question arises even as to what are the obligations owed the memory of the victims. Those opposed to the death penalty are here confronted by a stern test of the sincerity and depth of their beliefs, the logic and consistency of their arguments, and the relevance and applicability of their approach in extreme cases . . . The use of the death penalty in such limited and extreme cases does not necessarily undermine the overall argument for abolition, but may, on the contrary, give it added emphasis.328

As a general rule, States that have enacted genocide legislation provide that it is to be punishable by the most serious sanctions known to their law, at least with respect to killing. This may consist of a lengthy prison term,329 life imprisonment330 and even death331 depending on the specifics of the domestic system. Many legislative systems allow reduced terms for ‘lesser’ offences of genocide, that is, those that do not involve homicide.332 In some countries, the sentence

328 Sheleff, Ultimate Penalties.
329 Bolivia (Penal Code, 1972, Chapter IV, art. 138), ten to twenty years; Mexico (Penal Code for the Federal District, art. 149bis), twenty to forty years; Romania (Penal Code, art. 357), fifteen to twenty years; Slovakia (Criminal Code, No. 140/1961, art. 259), up to twenty-five years; Slovenia (Penal Code, 1994, Chapter 35, art. 373).
330 Antigua and Barbuda (Genocide Act 1975, s. 3(2)(a)); Austria (Penal Code, art. 321(2)); Barbados (Genocide Act, s. 4(a)); France (Penal Code (1994), Book II, art. 211-1); Finland (Penal Code (1995), Chapter 11, s. 6); Hungary (Penal Code, s. 137); Ireland (Genocide Act 1983, s. 2(2)(a)); Germany (Penal Code, art. 220a(1)); Lithuania (Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, art. 71); the Netherlands (Act of 2 July 1964 Implementing the Convention on Genocide, s. 1); Seychelles (Genocide Act 1969 (Overseas Territories) Order 1970, s. 1(2)(a)).
331 Ethiopia (Penal Code (1957), art. 281, ‘in cases of extreme gravity’); Ghana (Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 1993, s. 1); Rwanda (Organic Law 8/96 of 30 August 1996); St Vincent and the Grenadines (Criminal Code (1988), s. 158(1)(a)); United States (USC Title 18, § 1091(b)(1)).
332 Antigua and Barbuda (Genocide Act 1975, s. 3(2)(b)); Barbados (Genocide Act, s. 4(b); Ireland (Genocide Act 1983, s. 2(2)(b)); Germany (Penal Code, art. 220a(2)); Seychelles (Genocide Act 1969 (Overseas Territories) Order 1970, s. 1(2)(b)); St Vincent and the Grenadines (Criminal Code (1988), s. 158(1)(a)); United States of America (USC Title 18, § 1091(b)(2)). When he signed the Act, President Ronald Reagan said that he would have preferred the death penalty be provided: Ronald Reagan, ‘Remarks on Signing the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987
is aggravated if committed by government officials.\textsuperscript{333} Most domestic legal systems treat accomplices as harshly as principal offenders, depending on the specific circumstances. Thus, an aider and abettor could be subject to the most severe sanctions. In many judicial systems, attempted crimes are subject to substantially reduced penalties, and the same principle ought to apply with respect to genocide. The offence of direct and public incitement has been treated in domestic legislation as being significantly less serious than the other forms of participation in genocide. Maximum sentences for this offence, where provided, are in the range of five years’ imprisonment.\textsuperscript{334} Lesser sentences are also allowed in the case of conspiracy to commit genocide in some legal systems.\textsuperscript{335}

**Amnesty**

The Genocide Convention requires that States with custody of the offender exercise their jurisdiction and try those suspected of genocide. This is the effect of the word ‘shall’ in article VI, coupled with the provisions of article V. A general amnesty for genocide would therefore be contrary to the Convention. But ordinary criminal law recognizes a variety of forms in which prosecutorial discretion may be exercised, for example by granting immunity from prosecution in return for incriminating testimony of accomplices.\textsuperscript{336} Priorities may also be established where there are a large number of accused and limited resources with which to try them. This is precisely the problem that confronted Rwanda following the 1994 genocide. Rwanda’s efforts at prosecution for genocide are hampered by its desperate shortage of resources and the sheer numbers of the accused. At some point it may be unable to continue and decide to accept some alternatives to criminal prosecution. But after honest efforts to hold those responsible for genocide accountable, who would dare suggest that Rwanda had breached its duties under article V of the Convention?

Transitional regimes may also consider alternative mechanisms for

\textsuperscript{333} Bolivia (Penal Code, 23 August 1972, Chapter IV, art. 138).

\textsuperscript{334} Bulgaria (Penal Code, art. 416(3)), one to eight years; Canada (Criminal Code, s. 318(1)), maximum of five years; United States (USC Title 18, § 1091(c)), maximum of five years; Jamaica (Offences Against the Person (Amendment) Act 1968, s. 33(1)), maximum of ten years, with the possibility of hard labour.

\textsuperscript{335} Austria (Penal Code, art. § 321(2)), one to ten years.

\textsuperscript{336} This is also recognized by the \textit{ad hoc} Tribunals. See ‘Regulation No. 1 of 1994 (as amended 17 May 1995)’, \textit{Basic Documents/Documents de référence}, The Hague: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1995, p. 135.
justice and reconciliation such as truth commissions. In the context of another crime against humanity, apartheid, South Africa granted amnesties to individual criminals who appeared before the Commission and who testified to their involvement in the crimes of the previous regime. Defenders of the South African approach explained that this was the only way to allow transition to majority rule without the terrible bloodshed that would accompany the otherwise inevitable civil war. All of these measures may be deemed, in effect, to be exceptions to the obligation to prosecute contained in the Convention. To the extent that they contribute to the ultimate goals of the Convention, it may be argued that they are acceptable. Each case must, of course, be examined on its own individual merits.

Reparation

It is surely significant that Raphael Lemkin’s seminal volume was subtitled ‘proposals for redress’. Yet the Convention is silent on the subject of reparation for the victims of genocide. The Secretariat draft included a provision on this subject: ‘[Reparations to Victims of Genocide] When genocide is committed in a country by the government in power or by sections of the population, and if the government fails to resist it successfully, the State shall grant to the survivors of the human group that is a victim of genocide redress of a nature and in an amount to be determined by the United Nations.’ The Secretariat explained that the provision represented ‘an application of the principle that populations are to a certain extent answerable for crimes committed by their governments which they have condoned or which they have simply allowed their governments to commit’. The Secretariat suggested that redress could consist of compensation to dependants, restitution of seized property, and special benefits such as houses or scholarships. Groups might benefit from reconstruction of monuments, libraries, universities and churches, and compensation to the group for its collective needs.


339 Lemkin, Axis Rule.

340 UN Doc. E/447, pp. 5–13, art. XIII.

341 Ibid., p. 47.

342 Ibid., p. 49.

343 Ibid.
Noting the matter would normally fall to the International Court of Justice, the United States said the issue should be considered by the International Law Commission. It viewed redress and compensation as part of the jurisdiction of an eventual genocide court. The Netherlands agreed: ‘The principle of awarding an indemnity in cases where this can be done, seems reasonable.’

The subject has been addressed by the Sub-Commission on Human Rights, which designated Theo van Boven as Special Rapporteur on the subject of ‘restitution, compensation and rehabilitation of gross violations of human rights’. In 1996, Professor van Boven submitted his ‘Revised Set of Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’. The document declared that persons who allege their rights have been violated are entitled to a remedy. These include reparation, which may be claimed individually and, where appropriate, collectively. According to van Boven, forms of reparation include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. The latter category may include such measures as verification of the facts and full disclosure of the truth, apology, commemorations and paying tribute to victims, and correct accounts of the facts in history textbooks.

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344 UN Doc. A/401: ‘Article VII. The High Contracting Parties agree to take steps, through negotiation or otherwise, looking to the establishment of a permanent international penal tribunal, having jurisdiction to deal with offences under this Convention. Pending the establishment of such tribunal, and whenever a majority of the States party to this Convention agree that the jurisdiction under Article VIII has been or should be invoked, they shall establish by agreement an ad hoc tribunal to deal with any such case or cases. Such an ad hoc tribunal shall be provided with the necessary authority to indict, to try, and to sentence persons or groups who shall be subject to its jurisdiction, and to summon witnesses and demand production of papers and documents, and shall be provided with such other authority as may be needed for the conduct of a fair trial and the punishment of the guilty. In addition, such an ad hoc tribunal shall also be authorized to assess damages on behalf of persons found to have sustained losses or injuries as a result of the violation of this Convention by any High Contracting Party. Prior to the assessment of any such damages any State alleged to have violated the Convention, shall be given an opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence on its behalf. Each High Contracting Party agrees to pay such damages, and costs, as may be assessed against it as a result of its failure to comply with the terms of the Convention. The ad hoc tribunal shall have authority to determine the method of distribution and payment of any amounts so awarded.’ (emphasis added).

345 UN Doc. E/623/Add.3.

Extradition

To the extent the Convention contemplates a regime of territorial jurisdiction, and rejects universal jurisdiction, extradition is obviously fundamental to effective prosecution. Yet the wording of article VII, at least at first reading, presents any obligation to extradite in the most equivocal terms. First, paragraph 1 of article VII eliminates the political offence exception to extradition: ‘[G]enocide and the other acts enumerated in article 3 shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition.’ Paragraph 2 states that: ‘The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.’ Arguably, paragraph 2 of article VII imposes no meaningful obligations at all, aside from a general duty to respect already existing treaties and laws. Yet it is profoundly unsatisfactory to conclude that the provision adds nothing to existing legal obligations. The travaux préparatoires, the other clauses of the Convention, as well as subsequent State practice, suggest more may be read into article VII than is at first apparent.

Pledge to grant extradition

The Secretariat draft stated: ‘[Extradition] The High Contracting Parties declare that genocide shall not be considered as a political crime and therefore shall be grounds for extradition. The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to grant extradition in cases of genocide.’ The Secretariat said that extradition requests in cases of genocide would nevertheless be subject to general principles of international law. Consequently, States would be entitled to refuse extradition if the crime had been committed in their territory or if the victims of the genocide were their nationals. The United States favoured a somewhat more modest formulation, because the Convention could not incorporate an entire extradition convention on genocide. The United States preferred a text requiring States ‘to grant extradition in these cases in accordance with [their] laws and treaties’. Some States objected that they would have constitutional problems with an absolute obligation. Two additional issues were raised: rules preventing the extradition of nationals, and rules preventing extradition where fugitives were subject to life imprisonment or the death penalty.

In the Ad Hoc Committee, the United States proposal was adopted

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347 UN Doc. E/447, pp. 5–13, art. VII.  
348 Ibid., p. 39.  
349 UN Doc. A/401; UN Doc. E/623.  
350 UN Doc. A/401.
unanimously and without significant debate.Prosecution of genocide Each State party to the convention ‘pledged[d] itself to grant extradition in such cases in accordance with its laws and treaties in force’. The Sixth Committee considered only minor and largely technical amendments. Belgium proposed that the provision refer specifically to genocide as set out in article II, implying the exclusion of the other acts listed in article III. Incitement or complicity might be carried on in such a way that some States could not, under their domestic legislation, extradite offenders, said Belgium, adding it would have great difficulty with extradition for all of the acts listed in article III, ‘particularly in view of the fact that article [VII] made extradition obligatory’. The United Kingdom supported the idea of limiting extradition to genocide itself, and not the other acts: ‘The article would be more readily acceptable if its application were confined to the main crime of genocide excluding acts such as incitement which involved technical difficulties.’ The Belgian amendment was rejected by the barest of majorities. The United Kingdom proposed that the phrase ‘for purposes of extradition’ be substituted for the phrase ‘and therefore shall be grounds for extradition’. Both the United Kingdom amendment and the entire article were adopted by large majorities.

After the vote, the United States made an interpretative statement explaining that its Government could not give effect to such an undertaking until Congress had adopted legislative measures. Belgium also reserved its position, noting that, pending legislative changes, the Belgian Government would implement the Convention only to the extent allowed by Belgian legislation and the treaties to which Belgium was a party. Considerable time might elapse before such changes could be made, it said.

352 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.94 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
353 Ibid. (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
354 Ibid. (seventeen in favour, sixteen against, with two abstentions).
356 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.94 (twenty-seven in favour, seven against, with two abstentions).
357 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.95 (twenty-six in favour, two against, with five abstentions).
358 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.133 (Gross, United States): ‘With regard to article VII, relating to extradition, the United States representative declared that, until the United States Congress had passed the legislative measures necessary to bring the convention into force, the United States Government could not hand over any person accused of a crime by virtue of which he was not already liable to extradition under the terms of the existing laws. Moreover, the provisions of the United States Constitution relating to the non-retroactivity of laws were such as to prevent the United States Government from extraditing any person accused of a crime committed before the promulgation of the law defining the new crime.’
359 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.133 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
Benjamin Whitaker referred to experts who considered article VII flawed, in that it allowed each State party to interpret its own laws. Certainly, the obligation assumed by article VII would be clearer if there was no reference to laws and treaties in force. But there is enough in the travaux to justify rejection of such a pessimistic interpretation. The Secretariat draft consisted of a pledge to grant extradition. The drafters essentially accepted this principle, although adding the language ‘in accordance with their laws and treaties in force’. As a result, then, States are required to grant extradition subject only to legally recognized exceptions, principally the non-extradition of nationals and the right to assurances that cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments, such as the death penalty, not be imposed. Suggesting the phrase ‘in accordance with their laws and treaties in force’ goes so far as to allow absolute discretion in the extraditing State is inconsistent with the travaux préparatoires and has the consequence of depriving article VII of any effet utile. Note that a more general obligation to co-operate in international prosecution of those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity has been recognized in a number of resolutions of the General Assembly and the Sub-Commission on Human Rights.

Aut dedere aut judicare

The text of the Genocide Convention stops short of imposing any general duty to try or extradite (aut dedere aut judicare), comparable to that found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions for grave breaches. Yet, the combination of articles I, IV, V, VI and VII might be read to imply such an obligation. Pursuant to article VI, States having territorial

361 At the time of ratification, Venezuela made the following statement: ‘With reference to article VII, notice is given that the laws in force in Venezuela do not permit the extradition of Venezuelan nationals.’
363 GA Res. 3(I); GA Res. 170(II); GA Res. 2583(XXIV); GA Res. 2712(XXV); GA Res. 2840(XXVI); GA Res. 3020(XXVII); GA Res. 3074(XXVIII).
366 Lee A. Steven, ‘Genocide and the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute: Why the United
jurisdiction ‘should’ bring to trial persons suspected of committing genocide. In other cases, article VII imposes an obligation to extradite.367 But, if this is the case, the scheme seems fraught with loopholes, principally because of the implicit exceptions to the duty to extradite.

During the drafting of the Convention, a Secretariat memo suggested that prosecuting genocide, even if committed outside of a State’s territory, be treated not as a right but as a duty.368 ‘The convention will not confine itself to recognizing the right of States to punish genocide; it will make it obligatory for them to do so’, said the Secretariat.369 The Secretariat noted that this was a significant difference with the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which did not impose on States a formal and general obligation to punish such crimes in the future.370 The Secretariat said that a State party would be compelled, pursuant both to the convention and to ‘general principles of law’, to punish genocidal acts committed on its territory. If it complied, its national courts would have jurisdiction irrespective of the nationality of offenders. If suspects were captured elsewhere, the capturing State would grant extradition to the State where the crime was committed. If this did not occur, then the suspects would be judged pursuant to universal jurisdiction. This principle of law – aut dedere aut judicare – was already set out in several treaties, noted the Secretariat.371

Iran pushed to include the concept during the debate on article V, explaining a distinction between what it called ‘primary universal punishment’ and ‘subsidiary universal punishment’. Iran said primary universal punishment, which applied to offences under international law such as piracy, differed from subsidiary punishment in that the offender was tried in the State which had arrested him, whether or not a request for extradition was received from the State upon whose territory the offence had been formulated. In contrast, under the principle of subsidiary punishment, which dated from the time of Grotius, the State was bound to extradite offenders unless extradition was not requested or was impossible. ‘While few legal systems recognized the principle of primary universal punishment, many admitted the principle of subsidiary punishment’, said Iran.372
In its commentary on the draft statute of the international criminal court, the International Law Commission observed that ‘the [Genocide] Convention is not based on the principle aut dedere aut judicare but on the principle of territoriality’. Nevertheless, in its draft Code of Crimes, adopted two years later, it proposed precisely such a rule in the case of genocide. Professor Eric David has argued that a modern interpretation of the Convention, flowing from the terms of article I, may imply the application of aut dedere aut judicare.

What if there is no extradition treaty in force? Some more recent treaties in the area of serious human rights abuses and international criminal law declare that, if there is no extradition treaty, the convention itself is deemed to fulfil that role. There is no practice permitting a conclusion as to whether or not the Genocide Convention might be considered to constitute an extradition treaty in and of itself and between States parties, in the absence of some more general bilateral arrangement. The question was considered by a Canadian Royal Commission of Inquiry presided by Jules Deschênes. Justice Deschênes felt that, had this been the intent of the drafters, a more explicit formulation would have been used in the Convention. Answering the same question in a slightly different way, the legal adviser to the United States Department of State told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that article VII of the Convention imposed no obligation to negotiate new extradition treaties in order to facilitate prosecution of genocide.

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375 David, Principes de droit, pp. 667–8, para. 4.146.

376 For example, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, note 21 above, art. 8.


Extradition of nationals

Another issue raised during the drafting was the extradition of nationals. Many domestic penal codes prohibit extradition of citizens and in some cases this is even elevated to a constitutional right. During debates in the Sixth Committee, Luxembourg asked whether the convention would oblige a State to extradite its own nationals.\textsuperscript{379} France answered that ‘the ad hoc committee had only envisaged extradition as applying to foreigners and not to a country’s own nationals’.\textsuperscript{380} Belgium ‘thought that the phrase “in accordance with its laws” in the second paragraph of article [VII] made it quite clear that no country would be obliged to extradite its own nationals, if its laws did not permit that’.\textsuperscript{381} Pratt de María of Uruguay told the Committee that some countries, including his own, accorded extradition of their own nationals. However, the text would enable each country to act in accordance with its own laws in that respect.\textsuperscript{382} The discussion concluded with a statement by the chair that States whose legislation did not provide for extradition of their own nationals would be under no obligation to grant it.\textsuperscript{383}

A norm tolerating impunity in cases where States refuse to extradite their own nationals is obviously incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. The rationale for such a rule is rooted in outdated concepts of national sovereignty. If States are unable or unwilling to bring their own nationals to trial for genocide, they should not be allowed to refuse extradition to States willing to assume their international duties.

Exceptions to extradition

As a crime committed, generally, by the State or with its complicity, and for what are generally political motives, genocide would seem to be the political crime \textit{par excellence}. For this reason article VII specifies that genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III of the Convention ‘shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition’. It is a highly important provision, neutralizing the political offence exception to extradition, codified in most extradition treaties.\textsuperscript{384} As

\textsuperscript{379} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.94 (Pescatore, Luxembourg).
\textsuperscript{380} Ibid. (Chaumont, France).
\textsuperscript{381} Ibid. (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
\textsuperscript{382} Ibid. (Pratt de María, Uruguay).
\textsuperscript{383} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.95 (Alfaro, chair).
Gerald Fitzmaurice explained to the Sixth Committee, the crime of genocide is ‘inherently political’: ‘It was precisely because of the political nature of the crime that it was necessary to state that, for purposes of extradition, it should be considered as non-political.’

The Secretariat draft declared that ‘genocide shall not be considered as a political crime and therefore shall be grounds for extradition’. The United States draft contained a virtually identical provision. In the Sixth Committee, Belgium proposed that: ‘The crime of genocide as defined in article II shall not be considered as a political crime exempt from extradition.’ The United States explained that the provision would ‘ensure that criminals would not escape being brought to justice on the pretext that the crime was not considered as extraditable’. The Soviet Union was disturbed, because the text of the draft convention made it quite clear that genocide was not a political crime, complaining that so many delegations had changed their opinion on the point.

In comments to the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission, Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Germany said that requests for extradition for racially motivated killings during the Nazi era had been refused on several occasions on the grounds that these constituted political crimes. Germany said: ‘It can only be assumed that the countries concerned feel entitled on the strength of Article VII(2) of the Convention to refuse such requests because the extradition obligation is, in their view, subject to national law, which may place a special interpretation on the concept of a political crime.’ Some countries have explicitly provided in their genocide legislation that it is not to be regarded as a political crime for the purposes of extradition.

Most extradition treaties also impose a ‘double criminality’ require-

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385 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.94 (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
386 UN Doc. E/447, pp. 5–13, art. VIII.
387 UN Doc. E/623.
389 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.94 (Maktos, United States).
390 Ibid. (Morozov, Soviet Union).
392 Germany (Act Concerning the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/303/Add.2, art. 4); Brazil (Act No. 2889 Defining and Punishing the Crime of Genocide of 1 October 1956, art. 6); Italy (Constitutional Act No. 1 of 21 June 1969, Extradition in the Case of Crimes of Genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
For extradition to be obtained, the requesting State must demonstrate that the same crime exists in the criminal law of the requested State. Given that the crime is defined in the Convention itself, this should be unnecessary for genocide. States pledge to grant extradition with respect to crimes defined in articles II and III of the Convention, and not with respect to some national perception of criminal behaviour. Nevertheless, at the time of ratification, the United States formulated the following understanding: ‘That the pledge to grant extradition in accordance with a state’s laws and treaties in force found in article VII extends only to acts which are criminal under the laws of both the requesting and the requested state.’ Such an ‘understanding’ is really a reservation, in that it affects the obligations assumed by the United States. Its apparent purpose is to make extradition conditional on the definition of genocide in the laws of the United States rather than the definition in the Convention. Malaysia made an identical reservation upon ratifying the Convention in 1994.

Rights of the accused

Whether or not States may refuse extradition because a suspect has already been tried and either convicted or acquitted is not resolved by the Convention. The issue does not appear to have been considered by the drafters. Many extradition treaties entitle the requested State to refuse extradition on these grounds, but the principle is far from universal. International case law supports the idea that prosecution in one State for an offence where the individual has already been tried in another State does not offend the \textit{non bis in idem} rule, set out in such instruments as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The norm is also recognized in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, although not in the \textit{ad hoc} statutes, which have no general prohibition on trial before the international tribunal subsequent to acquittal or conviction before national courts.

Many extradition treaties consider unfair procedure in the requesting State to be grounds for refusing extradition. Here, too, the Convention is silent. The right to a fair trial, recognized in such fundamental provisions as common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and article 11 of the

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  \item[303); Ireland (Genocide Act 1973, s. 3); Israel (Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law, note 25 above, art. 8); United Kingdom (Genocide Act 1969).]
  \item[393] Gilbert, \textit{Aspects}, pp. 47–54.
  \item[395] Note 21 above, art. 14(7).
  \item[396] Note 1 above, art. 20.
  \item[397] Note 374 above.
\end{itemize}
Universal Declaration of Human Rights\textsuperscript{398} is arguably a \textit{jus cogens} norm, and therefore a valid ground to refuse extradition. But it should be invoked only in the clearest of cases and not, for example, to deny underdeveloped countries the right to try genocide suspects simply because issues of resources mean that their courts lack the accoutrements of those in rich countries.

Most modern extradition treaties allow States to make extradition subject to an undertaking that the death penalty not be imposed. The legitimacy of such clauses, even in the case of genocide, was recognized by the Rome conference. A principal reason for the exclusion of capital punishment from the Rome Statute was constitutional and international legal prohibitions applicable in many States where extradition may result in capital punishment.\textsuperscript{399} Making extradition subject to such a condition is not a refusal to extradite, and should not therefore be considered to breach article VII. A requesting State that refused to make an undertaking not to impose capital punishment would be ensuring impunity for the offender and, therefore, would itself violate articles I and VI of the Convention. At the time of ratification, Portugal made the following declaration: ‘The Portuguese Republic declares that it will interpret article VII of the [Convention] as recognizing the obligation to grant extradition established therein in cases where such extradition is not prohibited by the Constitution and other domestic legislation of the Portuguese Republic.’ Article 33(3) of Portugal’s Constitution prohibits extradition if the death penalty is provided for the offence in the law of the requesting State.

The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment obliges States parties to refuse extradition where there are substantial grounds for believing that the suspect would be in danger of being subjected to torture.\textsuperscript{400} The Torture Convention adds that, in determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.\textsuperscript{401} Hypothetically, a conflict could arise between the duty

\textsuperscript{398} Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A(III), UN Doc. A/810.

\textsuperscript{399} \textit{Soering v. United Kingdom}, Series A, No. 161, 7 July 1989.

\textsuperscript{400} Note 21 above, art. 3(1). Note that in the case of refugees, the principle of \textit{non-refoulement} does not apply because the Refugee Convention is inapplicable in the case of persons with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that they have committed ‘a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes’: Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, (1954) 189 UNTS 137, art. 1(F)(a)

\textsuperscript{401} Note 21 above.
to extradite, pursuant to article VII of the Genocide Convention, and the obligation to refuse extradition when there is a suspicion that torture would be imposed upon the fugitive, pursuant to article 3 of the Torture Convention. A State that refuses extradition for this reason should be prepared to ensure that the offender is brought to trial, either before its own courts, before those of another State or before an international tribunal.

The Philippines formulated the following reservation at the time of accession: ‘With reference to article VII of the Convention, the Philippine Government does not undertake to give effect to said article until the Congress of the Philippines has enacted the necessary legislation defining and punishing the crime of genocide, which legislation, under the Constitution of the Philippines, cannot have any retroactive effect.’ Whatever the legality of the reservation, it should be noted that while national laws may differ on this point, there is no fundamental human rights issue of retroactivity involved in the case of extradition. The Convention clarifies the fact that the crime of genocide has always existed, and the prohibition on retroactive offences does not apply where crimes are recognized at international law.402

State practice

In his report to the Sub-Commission, Benjamin Whitaker said that to his knowledge, no extradition for genocide had ever occurred.403 That was probably true at the time,404 but there is now at least one precedent, that of Froduald Karamira, who was arrested in India and charged with

402 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, note 21 above, art. 15(2).
404 Arguably, the extradition of John Demjanjuk from the United States to Israel might be considered a case of extradition to stand trial for genocide. Demjanjuk’s extradition was sought for prosecution pursuant to the same Israeli statute under which Eichmann had been tried, a law whose definitions were modelled on article II of the Genocide Convention. Article III of the extradition treaty between the United States and Israel stated: ‘When the offence has been committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting Party, extradition need not be granted unless the laws of the requested Party provide for the punishment of such an offence committed in similar circumstances . . . ’ As the District Court noted, although Israel’s laws allowed for prosecution of murder, manslaughter and malicious wounding committed outside of Israel, United States law did not provide for trial and punishment of persons accused of murdering civilians in Nazi concentration camps. Consequently, the extradition treaty did not require extradition, but it did not prohibit it either. In such cases, extradition was discretionary and, the Court noted, the United States authorities had decided to exercise their discretion in favour of extradition of Demjanjuk, as they were entitled to under the extradition treaty. See In the Matter of the Extradition of John Demjanjuk, note 111 above, pp. 559–61; see also Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, note 133 above.
participation in the Rwandan genocide. Karamira was sent back to Rwanda from India in July 1996. There was no extradition treaty in force, but the two States considered extradition a requirement of article VII of the Genocide Convention. While en route, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda attempted to exercise jurisdiction. By virtue of the rule of primacy applicable to the Tribunal, its claim took precedence over that of the Rwandan justice system. Rwanda persisted in its demand, and eventually the prosecutor of the International Tribunal dropped his competing request. Karamira was tried by Rwandan courts in January 1997 and sentenced to death. His appeal was denied and, on 22 April 1998, he was executed in public by firing squad before a packed football stadium.

But Rwanda has not always been successful in obtaining extradition. In March 1996 it applied to Cameroon for the extradition of Jean-Bosco Bayaragwiza. On 21 February 1997, the Central Appeals Court of Cameroon denied the Rwandan request. It claimed that Rwanda had not filed the application through proper diplomatic channels, that the request was a copy and not an original, that the crimes listed in the request were not crimes under the law of Cameroon, and that Cameroon would not extradite to a country where the death penalty might be imposed. Cameroon is not a party to the Genocide Convention.

Israel obtained custody of Adolf Eichmann not through extradition but by a spectacular kidnap ploy. Eichmann was abducted from Argentina on 11 May 1960 where he had been living under the nom de guerre of Ricardo Klement since 1950. Argentina immediately protested his capture, demanding Eichmann be returned and that those responsible for breaching Argentine law be punished. Argentina complained to the United Nations Security Council. Israel answered: ‘If the volunteer group violated Argentine law or interfered with matters within the sovereignty of Argentina, the Government of Israel wishes to express its regret. The Government of Israel requests that the special significance of bringing to trial the man responsible for the murder of millions of persons belonging to the Jewish people to be taken into account, and

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405 Personal communication from Faustin Ntezilyayo, former Minister of Justice, Rwanda. But in testimony before the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Cameron said it had refused to extradite those charged with genocide because Rwanda had the death penalty; Cameroon said that it had sent accused to the international tribunal, however: UN Doc. CERD/C/SR.1201, para. 74.

406 Schabas, ‘Justice, Democracy and Impunity’.


408 UN Doc. S/4336 (1960).
asks that due weight be given to the fact that the volunteers, who were themselves survivors of that massacre, placed this historic mission above all other considerations.\textsuperscript{409}

On 23 June 1960 the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution in the \textit{Eichmann} case, noting that acts such as the kidnapping of Eichmann involved ‘a breach of the principles upon which international order is founded, creating an atmosphere of insecurity and distrust incompatible with the preservation of peace’. At the same time, the Council declared itself to be ‘[m]indful of the universal condemnation of the persecution of the Jews under the Nazis and of the concern of people in all countries that Eichmann should be brought to appropriate justice for the crimes of which he is accused’.\textsuperscript{410} The resolution requested Israel ‘to make appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law’. Poland and the Soviet Union abstained, fearing that ambiguity in the resolution might favour Eichmann himself or benefit other war criminals.\textsuperscript{411} The details of the Genocide Convention were not considered in the Security Council debate, although Tunisia suggested that Israel had ‘a disquieting conception of the extension of the exercise of sovereignty both in space and in time’, and expressed surprise that Eichmann could be judged in Israel.\textsuperscript{412} On 3 August 1960, Israel and Argentina signed a joint communique: ‘The Governments of Argentina and Israel, animated by a desire to give effect to the resolution of the Security Council of 23 June 1960, in so far as the hope was expressed that the traditionally friendly relations between the two countries will be advanced, resolve to regard as closed the incident which arose out of the action taken by citizens of Israel, which infringed the fundamental rights of the State of Argentina.’\textsuperscript{413}

At trial, Eichmann argued that his kidnapping rendered the jurisdiction of the court ineffective. Dismissing the charge, the District Court cited the Security Council resolution of 23 June 1960.\textsuperscript{414} It also referred to various common law precedents supporting the position that even if a fugitive is apprehended illegally, this cannot deprive the trial court of jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{415} As the Court noted, by the 3 August 1960 statement,

\textsuperscript{409} UN Doc. S/4342 (1960).
\textsuperscript{410} This paragraph did not appear in the original draft resolution, submitted by Argentina: UN Doc. S/4345; UN Doc. S/PV.865, para. 47. It was added as the result of an amendment proposed by the United States: UN Doc. S/PV.866, para. 78.
\textsuperscript{411} UN Doc. S/PV. 868, para. 56.
\textsuperscript{412} UN Doc. S/PV.867, paras. 76–7.
\textsuperscript{413} Cited in \textit{A-G Israel v. Eichmann}, note 104 above, para. 40.
\textsuperscript{414} \textit{Ibid.}, para. 39.
\textsuperscript{415} \textit{Ker v. Illinois}, 119 US 436 (1886).
Argentina ‘waived its claims’, and Argentina was the wronged party, not Eichmann. Therefore, ‘[a]ccording to the principles of international law no doubt can therefore be cast on the jurisdiction of Israel to bring the accused to trial after 3 August 1960’. The Supreme Court of Israel endorsed this reasoning, citing the Security Council resolution, and saying that ‘in bringing the appellant to trial, [Israel] has functioned as an organ of international law and has acted to enforce the provisions of that law through its own laws’. The Supreme Court distinguished the kidnapping from cases where a State was applying its laws alone.

**Statutory limitation**

The Genocide Convention contains no provision dealing with statutory limitations. The *travaux préparatoires* have only the barest of suggestions that this was an issue. In an isolated comment, Professor Castberg of the Norwegian delegation said that the right of a State not to prosecute ‘when considerable time has elapsed since the crime was committed’ should be reserved. Yet it can hardly now be contested that genocide should not be subject to statutory limitation, even if not explicitly required by the Convention. A State that retained provisions of this nature in its domestic legislation would be in breach of articles V (obligation to enact legislation), VI (duty to prosecute) and VII (obligation to extradite). A teleological interpretation of these provisions compensates for the silence of the Convention.

The Charter of the International Military Tribunal had no provision on statutory limitation, but this is hardly surprising, as in the absence of a text there could be no time bar to prosecutions. In any case, the question is really academic because the Tribunal has been *functus officio* since issuing its judgment in 1946. Control Council Law No. 10 stated that: ‘In any trial or prosecution for a crime herein referred to, the accused shall not be entitled to the benefits of any statute of limitation in respect of the period from 30 January 1933 to 1 July 1945.’ Like the Nuremberg Charter, the statutes of the *ad hoc* tribunals contain no provision dealing with statutory limitations.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court departs from

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418 UN Doc. E/623/Add.2. Norway repeated the comments that its representative had made in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, in 1947, concerning prosecution of state officials.
the model. Article 29 states: ‘The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any statute of limitations.’ The issue was viewed as one in which national and international law might find themselves in conflict, with several States expressing the progressive position opposed to statutory limitation, and others noting that it remained part of their national law. Testifying to the difficulty with the concept for some delegations, the report of the Working Group on General Principles at the Rome conference included a footnote:

Two delegations were of the view that there should be a statute of limitations for war crimes. One delegation agreed to the above text in a show of flexibility, but stressed that there should be a possibility not to proceed if, due to the time that has passed, a fair trial cannot be guaranteed. The question of statute of limitations will need to be revisited if treaty crimes are included. There must also be a special regime for crimes against the integrity of the Court. The absence of a statute of limitations for the Court raises an issue regarding the principle of complementarity given the possibility that a statute of limitations under national law may bar action by the national courts after the expiration of a certain time period, whereas the ICC would still be able to exercise jurisdiction.

Thus, the travaux of the statute seem to suggest a persistent ambiguity about the scope of the norm prohibiting statutory limitations on international crimes, including genocide. Yet a literal reading of article 29 leads to an intriguing result. To the extent that the statute does more than simply create a court, and actually imposes obligations on States, can it not be sustained that article 29 in effect constitutes a prohibition on statutory limitations of genocide, as well as of the other crimes within the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction? A State would breach the Statute if its legislation allowed genocide prosecutions to become time barred. Even if this interpretation is considered too radical, the complementarity provisions of the Statute render ineffective any attempt by national law at statutory limitation. A State party which allowed such an
obstacle to a genocide prosecution would, in effect, concede jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court in such cases.

Many domestic criminal law systems provide for statutory limitation of crimes, even the most serious. Under French law, for example, prosecutions for murder are time barred after ten years. Codes derived from the Napoleonic model generally have similar provisions. During the 1960s, as the application of statutory limitations in national penal codes to Nazi war criminals loomed on the horizon, pressure mounted to change domestic legislation. On an international level, these developments took the form of General Assembly resolutions and treaties within the United Nations and the Council of Europe. Both conventions refer specifically to the crime of genocide as an offence for which there shall be no statutory limitation. The instruments have not been a great success in terms of ratifications, leading some academics to contest the suggestion that this is a customary norm. The French Cour de Cassation determined, in the Barbie case, that the prohibition on statutory limitations for crimes against humanity is now part of customary law.

424 Penal Code (France), art. 7.
426 Note 363 above.
Some argue that retroactive prohibition of statutory limitation violates fundamental legal principles. The European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations is cited in support, because it does not apply in cases where prosecution of the offence is already time barred. But this is a questionable proposition. The issue is whether the crime was known as an offence at the time it was committed. A procedural rule barring prosecution under domestic law can hardly change the fundamental truth of this proposition, and as a result it cannot be claimed that the nullum crimen sine lege rule is breached. A recent decision of the Hungarian Constitution Court endorses this position.

Eichmann pleaded that his prosecution was time barred, invoking a fifteen-year limitation period in force in Argentina. The District Court ruled that Argentine norms could not apply. It also noted a provision in the applicable Israeli legislation declaring that ‘the rules of prescription . . . shall not apply to offences under this Law’.

433 A-G Israel v. Eichmann, note 104 above, para. 53.
State responsibility and the role of the
International Court of Justice

The Genocide Convention is principally concerned with prosecution of individuals who perpetrate genocide. In articles II and III, the Convention defines the offence. In article IV, it eliminates the defence of act of State or head of State. In article V, the Convention requires States parties to adopt appropriate legislation within their domestic criminal law. Article VI establishes the jurisdictional bases for such prosecutions and article VII addresses extradition issues. The Convention imposes a number of obligations upon States, for which they can obviously be held accountable. However, it does not explicitly declare that States themselves may be guilty of genocide. Nevertheless, States have often been accused of committing genocide. In fact, given the nature of the crime, it is difficult to conceive of genocide without some form of State complicity or involvement.

According to article IX, disputes concerning ‘the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice’. Article IX has been invoked in four applications, although the International Court of Justice has yet to render a final judgment establishing the scope of State responsibility for genocide, a matter about which great controversy persists.

**Drafting of the Convention**

During the drafting of the Convention, sharply differing views emerged about the possibility that States, in addition to individuals, could be held accountable for genocide. Three rather different conceptions of the role of the Convention were at work. Taking the middle path, the United States and the Soviet Union oriented their efforts to individual criminal responsibility. They agreed that the principal or exclusive vehicle for individual prosecutions should be national courts. While France and the United Kingdom believed national judicial systems could not be
counted upon to prosecute genocide, they drew different conclusions from this observation. France considered that the future genocide convention was directed exclusively at individual responsibility. Rejecting the prospect of national trials, France viewed an international court as a *sine qua non*. On the other hand, the United Kingdom saw the convention directed at States and not individuals. It had no real interest in the details of criminal prosecution, believing firmly in mechanisms to hold States accountable. The United Kingdom said it was impossible to blame any particular individual for actions for which whole governments or States were responsible.

**Debate on article IV**

These issues were initially aired within the Sixth Committee during the debate about article IV and the issue of head of State immunity. A United Kingdom amendment introduced the concept of State, and not just individual, responsibility for genocide: ‘Criminal responsibility for any act of genocide as specified in articles II and IV shall extend not only to all private persons or associations, but also to States, governments, or organs or authorities of the State or government. Such acts committed by or on behalf of States or governments constitute a breach of the present Convention.’

Gerald Fitzmaurice suggested the convention contain a direct reference to the type of genocide most likely to occur, namely, genocide committed by a State or government. He said it should be assumed that individuals acting on behalf of the State would not be punished by its courts. The United Kingdom conceded that, under its somewhat ambiguous text, States and governments could not be made criminally responsible. The International Court of Justice ‘would not pronounce sentence but would order cessation of those acts’, explained Fitzmaurice.

Belgium supported the United Kingdom amendment, deeming it a valuable link with the International Court of Justice. ‘The convention should provide for recourse to the International Court of Justice, which was the only international juridical body capable of rendering a mature, considered and impartial decision on the responsibility of the State’, it said. Noting that State liability obeyed different principles than crim-

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2 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.95 (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
3 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.96 (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
4 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.92 (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
5 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.95 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium). See also *ibid.* (Medeiros, Bolivia); UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.96 (Pescatore, Luxembourg); and UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.95 (Dihigo, Cuba).
nal responsibility, Syria said it was important to provide for State liability and recourse to the International Court of Justice.\textsuperscript{6} Sweden observed that, while States could not be punished as such, a clause could be included on reparations to be paid to victims.\textsuperscript{7}

France challenged applying the concept of criminal liability to States.\textsuperscript{8} Venezuela agreed that States could not be punished, in the sense of criminal law, and that they could only be condemned to material reparations. This would not serve as an example ‘because the State would not be touched as would a private individual in a similar situation, since the taxpayers would pay the required reparations’.\textsuperscript{9} For Panama, the convention was intended as an instrument of criminal law, not civil law.\textsuperscript{10} The United States said the convention’s aim was to ensure repression of genocide and punishment of culprits. It should not get involved in payment of reparations, a question that belonged to another branch of the law.\textsuperscript{11} Canada saw no point in affirming that States were breaching the convention it there was no intent to punish them.\textsuperscript{12}

The United Kingdom amendment recognizing State responsibility for genocide was rejected by a margin of only two votes.\textsuperscript{13} The numerous explanations of the vote indicate that it had failed to explain satisfactorily that the purpose was to integrate a concept of State civil liability into the convention. Several delegations may have agreed with the concept of State responsibility but found the formulation equivocal. Iran said it could not vote in favour because there was no clear distinction between criminal and civil liability.\textsuperscript{14} The Dominican Republic had voted against the amendment because under its law, ‘legal entities could not be held guilty of committing crimes’.\textsuperscript{15} Brazil said the United Kingdom text was ‘superfluous’, giving ‘the impression that a State could be held guilty of the commission of a crime’.\textsuperscript{16} Egypt explained that ‘[i]f States and Governments were to be mentioned, the list should have been extended to include other corporate bodies’.\textsuperscript{17} Peru described the provision as incomplete, because there was no international tribunal to judge such cases.\textsuperscript{18} Given the closeness of the vote, the defeat of the United Kingdom amendment should not be taken as a rejection of the idea of State responsibility. The statements and the vote indicate widespread

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid. (Tazari, Syria).\textsuperscript{7} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.92 (Petren, Sweden).
\textsuperscript{8} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.95 (Chaumont, France).
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid. (Pérez-Perozo, Venezuela).
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid. (Aleman, Panama).
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid. (Maktos, United States).
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. (Feaver, Canada).
\textsuperscript{13} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.96 (twenty-four in favour, twenty-two against).
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. (Abdoh, Iran).
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. (Messina, Dominican Republic).
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. (Amado, Brazil). Similarly UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.96 (Iksel, Turkey).
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. (Raafat, Egypt).
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. (Maúrtua, Peru).
opposition to any concept of State responsibility in a criminal law sense but an equally widespread support for State civil liability.

**Debate on article VI**

The issue arose again when the Sixth Committee turned to article VI, dealing with jurisdiction over genocide prosecutions. The United Kingdom attempted to add a new sentence to the provision:

Where the act of genocide as specified by articles II and IV is, or is alleged to be the act of the State or government itself or of any organ or authority of the State or government, the matter shall, at the request of any other party to the present Convention, be referred to the International Court of Justice, whose decision shall be final and binding. Any acts or measures found by the Court to constitute acts of genocide shall be immediately discontinued or rescinded and if already suspended shall not be resumed or reimposed.19

The United Kingdom charged that reference to a competent international tribunal in draft article VI was ‘useless’ since such a tribunal did not exist, and even if it did, it would be ineffectual because of State complicity in the crime. For that reason, the United Kingdom favoured recourse to the International Court of Justice, in order ‘to enact measures capable of putting a stop to the criminal acts concerned and of awarding compensation for the damage caused to victims’.20 Belgium proposed an amendment to the United Kingdom text:

Any dispute relating to the fulfilment of the present undertaking or to the direct responsibility of a State for the acts enumerated in article IV [article III in the final version] may be referred to the International Court of Justice by any of the Parties to the present Convention. The Court shall be competent to order appropriate measures to bring about the cessation of the imputed acts or to repair the damage caused to the injured persons or communities.21

The United States opposed debate on the United Kingdom and Belgian proposals, arguing that the substance of the issue had already been debated and decided during consideration of article IV.22 Belgium and the United Kingdom subsequently withdrew their amendments and developed a new proposal, to be discussed in conjunction with article IX.23

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19 UN Doc. A/C.6/236 and Corr.1. Indeed, the United Kingdom also wanted to delete reference to national courts, saying that this was already covered by article V.
20 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.97 (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
21 UN Doc. A/C.6/252.
23 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.100 (Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium).
Debate on article IX

The Secretariat draft contained a compromissory clause that is the ancestor of article IX: ‘[Settlement of Disputes on Interpretation or Application of the Convention] Disputes relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice.’ According to the Secretariat, the Court would be the appropriate body in cases where ‘it is to be ascertained whether one of the parties has faithfully discharged his obligations’. The Secretariat considered it essential that disputes about the interpretation and application of the convention be settled by the International Court of Justice rather than by arbitration, ‘for then its decision would lack any claim to be binding on other states’. Over the objections of Poland and the Soviet Union, the Ad Hoc Committee adopted the following: ‘Disputes between any of the High Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice.’ An additional clause, proposed by the United States, was also adopted: ‘...provided that no dispute shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice involving an issue which has been referred to, and is pending before or has been passed upon by a competent international criminal tribunal’.

A modified version of the text withdrawn by the United Kingdom and Belgium during the debate on article VI was resubmitted: ‘Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for any of the acts enumerated in articles [I] and [III], shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the High Contracting Parties.’ France supported the amendment. Although regretting that genocide should be dealt with solely on the level of disputes between States, France was not opposed to the principle of the international responsibility of States as long as it was a matter of civil, and not criminal, responsibility.

Jean Spiropoulos of Greece felt that the notion of State responsibility

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24 UN Doc. E/447, art. XIV.  
25 Ibid., p. 50.  
26 Ibid.  
27 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.20, p. 6 (five in favour, two against).  
28 Ibid. (four in favour, one against, with one abstention). It was derived from the United States draft of 30 September 1947, UN Doc. E/623: ‘Article XI. Disputes between any of the High Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, provided that no dispute shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice involving an issue which has been referred to, and is pending before or has been passed upon by a tribunal referred to in Article VII.’  
29 UN Doc. A/C.6/258.  
30 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.103 (Chaumont, France).
was not very clear. ‘What was meant was obviously not international responsibility for violation of the convention, which was already implicit in article I of the draft convention’, he said. But Spiropoulos noted that the French delegation thought the amendment related to the civil responsibility of the State, something which seemed confirmed by the original Belgian text, which referred to reparation for damage caused. Spiropoulos said that, if this were the case, the State might well be required to indemnify its own nationals. ‘But in international law the real holder of a right was the State and not private persons. The State would thus be indemnifying itself.’ Spiropoulos had put his finger on the tautology implicit in all international human rights norms. In any case, Spiropoulos said he would vote in favour of the amendment.31 Peru thought it difficult to see how victims could be compensated, but agreed that the Court might interpret the convention by means of advisory opinions.32

Indeed, there was confusion about what the article really meant. France and Belgium believed it dealt with civil liability. The Philippines thought it concerned criminal liability.33 Haiti said the provision envisaged civil and not criminal liability, but wondered how there could be civil liability until criminal liability was established.34 Canada noted that the Committee had earlier rejected the notion of criminal responsibility of a State, but wondered whether the United Kingdom was trying to reintroduce it.35 In reply, the United Kingdom said that ‘the responsibility envisaged by the joint Belgian and United Kingdom amendment was the international responsibility of States following a violation of the convention. That was civil responsibility, not criminal responsibility.’36

The original Ad Hoc Committee draft established a rule of *lis pendens* in cases where the international criminal court was seised of the question, a text originally proposed by the United States. Many delegates now felt the issue was moot, because the Committee had already dismissed the concept of an international criminal court.37 Accordingly, the Sixth Committee agreed to delete the reference to pending proceedings before the international criminal court.38

The joint amendment of Belgium and the United Kingdom, which had provoked some confusion but little controversy, was then

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38 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.105 (twenty-two in favour, eight against, with six abstentions).
adopted.\textsuperscript{39} The United States later said it felt the text of article IX was ambiguous and unsatisfactory. It could not agree that ‘responsibility’ in article IX could refer to the civil responsibility of the State for injuries sustained by its nationals. Nor, according to the United States, could it be deemed to cover the State’s criminal responsibility, a concept that the Committee had earlier rejected. Finally, if it referred to treaty violations, the United States said the word added nothing to the meaning of the article.\textsuperscript{40} The United States later made a formal interpretative statement on article IX.\textsuperscript{41}

Six months later, in presenting the Genocide Convention for advice and consent of the Senate, United States President Truman proposed an understanding ‘that article IX shall be understood in the traditional sense of responsibility to another state for injuries sustained by nationals of the complaining state in violation of principles of international law, and shall not be understood as meaning that a state can be held liable in damages for injuries inflicted by it on its own nationals’. The understanding was recommended by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations although it would be nearly forty more years before the United States ratified the Convention. By then, the United States had decided to exclude entirely the application of article IX by means of a reservation.\textsuperscript{42}

At the time of its ratification of the Convention, the Philippines said it did not consider article IX ‘to extend the concept of State responsibility beyond that recognized by the generally accepted principles of international law’.

\textsuperscript{39} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.105 (eighteen in favour, two against, with fifteen abstentions). There were proposed amendments to the drafting committee text, but the Commission voted not to reconsider art. IX, and as a result these were never discussed: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.131.

\textsuperscript{40} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.131 (Maktos, United States).

\textsuperscript{41} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.133 (Gross, United States): ‘Article IX stipulated that disputes between the contracting parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the convention “including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide of any of the other acts mentioned in article III” should be submitted to the International Court of Justice. If the words “responsibility of a State” were taken in their traditional meaning of responsibility towards another State for damages inflicted, in violation of the principles of public international law, to the subjects of the plaintiff State; and if, similarly, the words “disputes . . . relating to the . . . fulfilment” referred to disputes concerning the interests of subjects of the plaintiff State, then those words would give rise to no objection. But if, on the other hand, the expression “responsibility of a State” were not used in the traditional meaning, and if it signified that a State could be sued for damages in respect of injury inflicted by it on its own subjects, then there would be serious objections to that provision; and the United States Government would have reservations to make about that interpretation of the phrase.’

\textsuperscript{42} For a discussion, see Lawrence J. Leblanc, ‘The ICJ, the Genocide Convention, and the United States’, (1987) 6 Wisconsin International Law Journal, p. 43 at p. 52.
Litigation pursuant to article IX of the Convention

Four cases have been filed before the International Court of Justice, pursuant to article IX. The first, by Pakistan in 1973, alleged that India was breaching the Convention because it proposed to transfer Pakistani prisoners of war to Bangladesh for trial. The case was discontinued following political negotiations. The second, by Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993, charged the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with genocide. Two provisional measures orders were granted by the Court. After failing to obtain the dismissal of the case based on preliminary objections, Yugoslavia filed a cross-demand charging Bosnia with genocide. At the time of writing, the case had yet to be argued before the Court. In 1999, a third application under Article IX was filed by Yugoslavia against several members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization concerning their conduct during the Kosovo bombing campaign. Weeks later, on 2 July 1999, Croatia took a suit against Yugoslavia alleging its responsibility for genocide.

The Pakistani Prisoners Case

Article IX of the Convention was invoked for the first time before the International Court of Justice in 1973, following civil war in Pakistan leading to the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan. During the conflict, troops from West Pakistan reportedly killed one million East Pakistanis, provoking the flight of ten million more to India. Invoking the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, India took military action, and the Pakistani army subsequently surrendered. India detained approximately 92,000 Pakistani troops. India, in co-operation with Bangladesh, contemplated trial of some of the Pakistani prisoners. For this purpose, Bangladesh adopted ‘An Act to provide for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international law’.43

Pakistan instituted proceedings against India on 11 May 1973, alleging that India intended to hand 195 Pakistani prisoners over to Bangladesh for trial for genocide and crimes against humanity.44

44 Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India), Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, pp. 3–7. Accusations of State responsibility for genocide are as old as the Convention itself. Even during the drafting of the Genocide Convention, during 1948, Pakistan accused India of genocide, notably by Sikhs and Hindus directed against Moslems: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.63 (Ikramullah, Pakistan). See India’s response (UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.64 (Sundaram, India)) and Pakistan’s diplomatic refusal to reply (UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.65 (Bahadur Khan, Pakistan)).
Pakistan indicated several facts suggesting that Bangladesh intended to try the Pakistani prisoners for genocide, including the adoption of the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order 1972, whose preamble made reference to those who ‘have aided and abetted the Pakistani armed forces in occupation in committing genocide and crimes against humanity’. A number of exhibits showed Indian and Bangladeshi authorities using the term ‘genocide’ to describe conduct of Pakistani troops. Pakistan argued that this would breach the Genocide Convention, in that Pakistan alone had an exclusive right to try the prisoners. Pakistan declared that by virtue of Article VI persons charged with genocide shall be tried by the courts of the territory where the act was committed. ‘This means that Pakistan has exclusive jurisdiction to the custody of persons accused of the crimes of genocide, since at the time the acts are alleged to have been committed, the territory of East Pakistan was universally recognized as part of Pakistan.’ Pakistan cited article IX of the Convention as the basis of jurisdiction.

Pakistan also claimed that the courts of Bangladesh could not be deemed a ‘competent tribunal’: ‘A “Competent Tribunal” within the meaning of Article VI of the Genocide Convention means a Tribunal of impartial judges, applying international law, and permitting the accused to be defended by counsel of their choice . . . In view of these and other requirements of a “Competent Tribunal”, even if India could legally transfer Pakistani Prisoners of War to “Bangla Desh” for trial, which is not admitted, it would be divested of that freedom since in the atmosphere of hatred that prevails in “Bangla Desh”, such a “Competent Tribunal” cannot be created in practice nor can it be expected to perform in accordance with accepted international standards of justice.’

Pakistan’s suit was accompanied by an application for provisional measures, requesting the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees to proceed without interruption, and that they not be sent to Bangladesh pending the proceedings.

India replied, in letters dated 23 May, 28 May and 4 June 1973, that the Court was without jurisdiction. India’s strongest argument was the fact that, at the time of ratification in 1959, it had formulated a

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46 Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India), Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, p. 6.
47 Ibid., p. 7. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
reservation to article IX: ‘With reference to article IX of the Convention, the Government of India declares that, for the submission of any dispute in terms of this article to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the consent of all the parties to the dispute is required in each case.’

Public hearings were held, but India did not attend. Subsequently, Pakistan informed the Court that the issues before it would soon be discussed in negotiations with India, and asked that the request for provisional measures be postponed. On 13 July 1973, the Court held that the application by Pakistan for postponement meant that there was no longer any request for interim measures, which was, by definition, an urgent matter. Pakistan produced a memorial on the issue of jurisdiction on 2 November 1973. But on 14 December 1973, Pakistan informed the Court that in order to facilitate negotiations with India it would not be proceeding with the case. The following day, the President of the Court ordered that the case be removed from the docket.

_The Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia)_

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application to the International Court of Justice was filed on 20 March 1993. Bosnia and Herzegovina charged

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that Yugoslavia had ‘breached, and is continuing to breach, its legal obligations toward the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Articles I, II (a), II (b), II (c), II (d), III (a), III (b), III (c), III (d), III (e), IV and V of the Genocide Convention’. When the application was initiated, Bosnia also sought provisional measures, pursuant to article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, asking ‘[t]hat Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), together with its agents and surrogates in Bosnia and elsewhere, must immediately cease and desist from all acts of genocide and genocidal acts against the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Yugoslavia promptly replied with a request that the Court order provisional measures, including leaving alone Serb towns, ceasing destruction of Orthodox churches and places of worship and of other Serb cultural heritage, and that the government of Bosnia ‘put an end to all acts of discrimination based on nationality or religion and the practice of “ethnic cleansing”, including the discrimination related to the delivery of humanitarian aid, against the Serb population in the “Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”’.53

On 8 April 1993, the Court ordered provisional measures against Yugoslavia, and indicated that neither party should take action that might aggravate or extend the dispute. The Court held that article IX of the Genocide Convention appeared ‘to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded to the extent that the subject-matter of the dispute relates to “the interpretation, application or fulfilment” of the Convention, including disputes “relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III of the Convention”’.54 The Court refused to assume jurisdiction on other bases, and concluded that it had to ‘proceed therefore on the basis only that it has prima facie jurisdiction, both ratione personae and ratione materiae, under Article IX of the Genocide Convention’.55 The Court’s order said that ‘there is a grave risk of acts of genocide being committed’.56

Some months later, on 27 July 1993, Bosnia-Herzegovina applied once again to the Court, this time alleging, inter alia:


54 Ibid., p. 16. 55 Ibid., para. 45. 56 Ibid., p. 18.
4. That the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina must have the means ‘to prevent’ the commission of acts of genocide against its own People as required by Article I of the Genocide Convention;

5. That all Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention are obliged by Article I thereof ‘to prevent’ the commission of acts of genocide against the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

6. That the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina must have the means to defend the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina from acts of genocide and partition and dismemberment by means of genocide;

7. That all Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention have the obligation thereunder ‘to prevent’ acts of genocide, and partition and dismemberment by means of genocide, against the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

8. That in order to fulfil its obligations under the Genocide Convention under the current circumstances, the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina must have the ability to obtain military weapons, equipment and supplies from other Contracting Parties;

9. That in order to fulfil their obligations under the Genocide Convention under the current circumstances, all Contracting Parties thereto must have the ability to provide military weapons, equipment, supplies and armed forces (soldiers, sailors, airpeople) to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina at its request.57

Yugoslavia again answered with its own request for provisional measures: ‘The Government of the so-called Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina should immediately, in pursuance of its obligation under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, take all measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide against the Serb ethnic group.’58 At the oral hearing, held on 25–26 August 1993, Yugoslavia requested the Court to dismiss Bosnia’s request, inter alia ‘because the clarification of the provisions of the Genocide Convention cannot be the subject-matter of the provisional measures’ and ‘because they would cause irreparable prejudice to the rights of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that the so-called Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina fulfils its obligations under the Genocide Convention concerning the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.59

The Court concluded, unanimously, that Yugoslavia ‘should immediately, in pursuance of its undertaking in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948,

take all measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide’ and more specifically that it should ‘ensure that any military, paramilitary or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may be subject to its control, direction or influence, do not commit any acts of genocide, of conspiracy to commit genocide, of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, or of complicity in genocide, whether directed against the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina or against any other national, ethnical, racial or religious group’.

Shortly after the issuance of the second provisional measures order, Bosnia declared its intention to institute proceedings against the United Kingdom, based on the latter’s obligation to prevent genocide. Its statement charged the United Kingdom was ‘jointly and severally liable for all of the harm that has been inflicted upon the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina because the United Kingdom is an aider and abettor to genocide under the Genocide Convention and international criminal law’. The United Kingdom replied, on 6 December 1993, that the application was without foundation, and on 17 December 1993 Bosnia and Herzegovina informed the Security Council of its decision not to proceed.

On the merits of the case directed against Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s memorial charged:

1. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), directly, or through the use of its surrogates, has violated and is violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, by destroying in part, and attempting to destroy in whole, national, ethnical or religious groups within the, but not limited to the, territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in particular the Muslim population, by
   - killing members of the group;
   - causing deliberate bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
   - deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
   - imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

2. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has violated and is violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by conspiring to commit genocide, by complicity in genocide, by attempting to commit genocide and by incitement to commit genocide;

3. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has violated and is violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of

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60 Ibid., pp. 342–3.
the Crime of Genocide by aiding and abetting individuals and groups engaged in acts of genocide;

4. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has violated and is violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by virtue of having failed to prevent and to punish acts of genocide;

5. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) must immediately cease the above conduct and take immediate and effective steps to ensure full compliance with its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;

6. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) must wipe out the consequences of its international wrongful acts and must restore the situation existing before the violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide were committed;

7. That, as a result of the international responsibility incurred for the above violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is required to pay, and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is entitled to receive, in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens, full compensation for the damages and losses caused, in the amount to be determined by the Court in a subsequent phase of the proceedings in this case.

Yugoslavia raised a number of preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, including the construction of article IX of the Convention. These were rejected in the Court’s 11 July 1996 decision, and the case was ordered to proceed. In July 1997, Yugoslavia filed a counter-claim accusing Bosnia and Herzegovina of genocide against the Serbs. Bosnia and Herzegovina contested the counter-claim being joined to the principal demand, but the court dismissed the objection. Yugoslavia’s counter-claim sought to cast Bosnia as guilty of ‘acts of genocide against the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina’ and demanded that Sarajevo punish those responsible. Yugoslavia, in its memorial, said in defence that, if alleged acts were committed, ‘there was absolutely no intention of committing genocide’. Acts were not committed against the members of one ethnic or religious group ‘just because they belong to some ethnic or religious group’, it continued. An oral hearing on the merits of the application and the counter-claim should be held during the year 2000.


64 Ibid. 65 Ibid., p. 250. 66 Ibid.
On 25 April 1999, as bombs rained down on Belgrade and other Yugoslav cities, the Belgrade government filed an application in the International Court of Justice challenging NATO’s use of force. The armed attack was a response to persecution of the Albanian population within Kosovo, a Yugoslav province. Belgrade’s treatment of the Kosovar minority had been condemned in a number of Security Council resolutions, and variously described by politicians, human rights activists and journalists as ethnic cleansing and even genocide. Armed humanitarian intervention by NATO to protect the Kosovars was opposed by Russia, making Security Council authorization impossible.

The core of the Yugoslav application was the allegation that use of force was prohibited by the United Nations, with the two well-recognized exceptions of self-defence and Chapter VII action endorsed by decision of the Security Council. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia also invoked the Genocide Convention as a second basis for its claim. The allegations of genocide were far-fetched, but the Convention was of singular importance from the standpoint of jurisdiction. Yugoslavia’s argument based on the UN Charter was fraught with jurisdictional obstacles, including the fact that it was not a United Nations member and therefore not a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and that its declaration under article 36(2) of the Statute recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court was late and in bad faith. No such difficulties existed with article IX of the Genocide Convention, at least with respect to those respondent States that had not made reservations to article IX.67

On the merits of its claim that the Genocide Convention had been breached, Yugoslavia invoked article II(c). The application stated: ‘Furthermore, the obligation contained in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide not to impose deliberately on a national group conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group has been breached.’

Yugoslavia’s application was accompanied by a request for provisional measures. The Court was asked to order the respondent States to cease all use of force against Yugoslavia. The Court dismissed Yugoslavia’s request for provisional measures in its ruling of 2 June 1999. According to the Court, there was not even an arguable case for violation of the Genocide Convention sufficient to justify its intervention at such a stage.

67 Both Spain and the United States invoked their reservations to art. IX.
of the proceedings. The Court said that ‘in order to determine, even prima facie, whether a dispute within the meaning of Article IX of the Genocide Convention exists, the Court cannot limit itself to noting that one of the Parties maintains that the Convention applies, while the other denies it’.68

*Croatia v. Yugoslavia*

In early July 1999, Croatia invoked article IX of the Convention in an application directed against Yugoslavia. No request for provisional measures accompanied the suit. Croatia charged Yugoslavia with responsibility, through its armed forces, intelligence agents and paramilitary groups, for ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the Knin region, including the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of ‘Croatian citizens of Serb ethnicity’:

By directly controlling the activity of its armed forces, intelligence agents and various paramilitary detachments, on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, in the Knin region, eastern and western Slavonia, and Dalmatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is liable for the ‘ethnic cleaning’ of Croatian citizens from these areas – a form of genocide which resulted in large numbers of Croatian citizens being displaced, killed, tortured or illegally detained, as well as extensive property destruction – and is required to provide reparation for the resulting damages. In addition, by directing, encouraging, and urging Croatian citizens of Serb ethnicity in the Knin region to evacuate the area in 1995, as the Republic of Croatia reasserted its legitimate governmental authority (and in the face of clear reassurance emanating from the highest level of the Croatian government, including the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr Franjo Tudjman, that the local Serbs had nothing to fear and should stay), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia engaged in conduct amounting to a second round of ‘ethnic cleaning’ in violation of the Genocide Convention.69

The claim, then, was based on an equation between ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide. The Croatian application referred to the General Assembly resolution of 1992 as support for such a premise.70 Croatia sought reparations, ‘in its own right and as *parens patriae* for its citizens’, for damages to persons and property, including harm to the economy and environment.

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Can States commit genocide?

The Nuremberg Tribunal said that ‘[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities’.71 Yet according to Malcolm Shaw there can be no doubt about ‘the core proposition that the international community views such phenomena as . . . genocide as reprehensible activities for which States are to be held accountable’.72 Arguably, article IX of the Convention does nothing more than give the International Court of Justice jurisdiction for disputes arising between States parties about the ‘interpretation, application or fulfilment’ of the various obligations that arise with respect to the specific obligations set out in the Convention, that is, prosecution, extradition and enactment of domestic legislation. Article IX of the Convention makes explicit reference to State responsibility. Many remarks in the travaux préparatoires indicate that civil liability for genocide was being addressed, although the scope of article IX in this area continues to be debated. Of course, the general concept of State responsibility for genocide can hardly be doubted. The real problem is jurisdictional, because if this is not contemplated by article IX then access to the International Court of Justice will often be denied.

As for the suggestion that article IX involved a form of criminal liability, this was rather convincingly rejected by the drafters.73 According to the 1998 report of the International Law Commission: ‘It was true that the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide envisaged the international trial of individuals for the crime of genocide, but it did not envisage State crime or the criminal responsibility of States in its article IX concerning State responsibility.’74 But if the responsibility is only ‘civil’, how can the Convention definition, which so clearly contemplates criminal liability of individuals, be transposed to such a different context?

The litigation currently pending before the International Court of Justice between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia raises these problems. The preliminary rulings in that case hint at the answers, but leave many questions unresolved. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) challenged the jurisdiction of the Court, arguing for a conservative interpretation of

article IX of the Convention. This objection was dismissed by a majority of the Court, eleven to four, on 11 July 1996.\(^75\) Relying on an essentially textual interpretation, the Court dealt quite briefly with the allegation that article IX excluded State responsibility.

According to Yugoslavia, that Article would only cover the responsibility flowing from the failure of a State to fulfil its obligations of prevention and punishment as contemplated by Articles V, VI and VII; on the other hand, the responsibility of a State for an act of genocide perpetrated by the State itself would be excluded from the scope of the Convention.

The Court would observe that the reference in Article IX to ‘the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III’, does not exclude any form of State responsibility.

Nor is the responsibility of a State for acts of its organs excluded by Article IV of the Convention, which contemplates the commission of an act of genocide by ‘rulers’ or ‘public officials’.\(^76\)

The Court continued:

it is sufficiently apparent from the very terms of that objection that the Parties not only differ with respect to the facts of the case, their imputability and the applicability to them of the provisions of the Genocide Convention, but are moreover in disagreement with respect to the meaning and legal scope of several of those provisions, including Article IX. For the Court, there is accordingly no doubt that there exists a dispute between them relating to ‘the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the . . . Convention, including . . . the responsibility of a State for genocide . . . ’, according to the form of words employed by that latter provision.\(^77\)

The paucity of the reasoning and the ambiguity of this last sentence hint at a compromise among the judges, who may have stopped slightly short of affirming that a State may be held responsible for committing genocide pursuant to the Convention. The Court merely noted that the text of the Convention does not ‘exclude’ any form of State responsibility, or responsibility of a State ‘for acts of its organs’. As there exists a difference between the parties on this point, the matter properly falls within the scope of article IX of the Convention, wrote the majority.

The Court’s remarks were sufficiently equivocal on the issue of State responsibility that members of the International Law Commission could not agree on whether the Court had recognized this as falling within the ambit of the Convention.\(^78\) Some members suggested the preliminary

\(^75\) Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Preliminary Objections, note 62 above.

\(^76\) Ibid., para. 32. \(^77\) Ibid., para. 33.

decision in the Bosnia case indicated that ‘article I of the Convention did not mean that only crimes committed by State agents were involved; the contemplation of the commission of an act of genocide by “rulers” or “public officials” in article IV did not exclude the responsibility of a State for acts of its organs; and article IX did not exclude any form of State responsibility, including criminal responsibility’. Others took the view that:

the case contained no indication, either in the statements of the Court or the pleadings of the parties, that would suggest that the Genocide Convention referred to the criminal responsibility of States in the penal sense. Furthermore, the travaux préparatoires made it clear that article IX of the Convention did not refer to the criminal responsibility of States. Rather, the role of the State responsibility regime with respect to the crime of genocide was more or less analogous to that of the general responsibility regime, and in particular to establish the responsibility of States to redress the injuries suffered by victims.

The position of Special Rapporteur James Crawford was that ‘[t]he Court’s reference to “any form of State responsibility” is not to be read as referring to State criminal responsibility, but rather to the direct attribution of genocide to a State as such’.

In the 1996 inadmissibility decision, a joint declaration of dissenting Judges Shi and Vereshchetin stated their ‘disquiet’ with the premise that article IX of the Convention recognized State responsibility for genocide:

The Convention on Genocide is essentially and primarily directed towards the punishment of persons committing genocide or genocidal acts and the prevention of the commission of such crimes by individuals. The travaux préparatoires show that it was during the last stage of the elaboration of the Convention that, by a very slim majority of 19 votes to 17 with 9 abstentions, the provision relating to the responsibility of States for genocide or genocidal acts was included in the dispute settlement clause of Article IX, without the concurrent introduction of necessary modifications into other articles of the Convention. As can be seen from the authoritative commentary to the Convention, published immediately after its adoption, ‘there were many doubts as to the actual meaning’ of the reference to the responsibility of States (Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention. Its Origin and Interpretation, New York, 1949, p. 42). As to the creation of a separate civil remedy applicable as between States, the same author observes that ‘since the Convention does not specifically refer to reparation, the parties to it did not undertake to have accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in this question’ (ibid., p. 43).

In substance, the Convention remains an instrument relating to the criminal responsibility of individuals. The Parties undertake to punish persons committing genocide, ‘whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public

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79 Ibid., para. 261.  
80 Ibid., para. 264.  
81 ‘First Report on State Responsibility by Mr James Crawford, Special Rapporteur’, note 73 above, para. 63.
officials or private individuals’, and to enact the necessary legislation to this effect (Arts. IV and V). Persons charged with genocide or genocidal acts are to be tried ‘by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction . . . ’ (Art. VI). Such a tribunal was established (after the filing of the Application) specifically for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.

Judges Shi and Vereshchetin pointed to the significance of individual prosecutions, saying that ‘in our view, it might be argued that this Court is perhaps not the proper venue for the adjudication of the complaints which the Applicant has raised in the current proceedings’.82

Judge Oda, who also dissented, reviewed in more detail the travaux préparatoires of the Convention, concluding that they seemed ‘to confirm that there was some measure of confusion among the drafters, reflecting in particular the unique nature of their task in the prevailing spirit of the times’. Judge Oda considered the scope of the words ‘responsibility of a State’ in article IX:

As far as I know such a reference has never been employed in any other treaty thereafter. It seems to be quite natural to assume that that reference would not have had any meaningful sense or otherwise would not have added anything to the clause providing for the submission to the Court of disputes relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention, because, in general, any inter-State dispute covered by a treaty per se always relates to the responsibility of a State and the singling-out of a reference to the responsibility of a State does not have any sense with regard to a compromissory clause.83

According to Judge Oda, Bosnia was required to allege the existence of a dispute with Yugoslavia relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention: ‘only such a dispute – and not the commission of genocide or genocidal acts which certainly are categorized as a crime under international law – can constitute a basis of the Court’s jurisdiction under the Convention’.84 In addition to the travaux préparatoires, Judge Oda invoked the spirit of the Genocide Convention: ‘I admit that the extremely vague and uncertain provision of Article IX of the Genocide Convention may leave room for the Court to allow itself to be seised of the present case’, he wrote, ‘but consider that such a conclusion would be based on a misinterpretation of the real spirit of the Genocide Convention.’85 According to Judge Oda, the Convention was

83 Ibid., Declaration of Judge Oda, para. 5.
84 Ibid., para. 8. 85 Ibid., para. 10.
conceived of as ‘a new type of treaty to deal with the rights of individuals as a whole, but not with the rights and obligations in the inter-State relations’. He questioned whether the International Court of Justice was ‘the appropriate forum for the airing of the questions relating to genocide or genocidal acts’, adding that he was ‘inclined to doubt whether international law, the Court, or the welfare of the unfortunate individuals concerned, will actually benefit from the consideration of cases of this nature by the Court’.

The most extensive reasons on this point were drafted by Judge ad hoc Kreca, named by Yugoslavia to sit on the case. Judge Kreca cited an article by Manley Hudson, published shortly after the adoption of the Genocide Convention, commenting on the scope of article IX:

The article goes further, however, in ‘including’ among such disputes ‘those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III’. As no other provision in the Convention deals expressly with State responsibility, it is difficult to see how a dispute concerning such responsibility can be included among disputes relating to the interpretation or application or fulfilment of the Convention. In view of the undertaking of the parties in Article I to prevent genocide, it is conceivable that a dispute as to state responsibility may be a dispute as to fulfilment of the Convention. Yet read as a whole, the Convention refers to the punishment of individuals only; the punishment of a State is not adumbrated in any way, and it is excluded from Article V by which the parties undertake to enact punitive legislation. Hence the ‘responsibility of a State’ referred to in Article IX is not criminal liability.

For Judge Kreca, article IV of the Convention has a two-fold meaning; first, it affirms the principle of individual guilt, even for rulers and public officials; secondly, it has ‘a negative meaning – contained in the exclusion of criminal responsibility of States, governments or State authorities and the rejection of the application of the doctrine of the act of the State in this matter’. Accordingly, ‘[t]he resolution built into Article IV of the Genocide Convention represents an expression of a broader understanding of the inability to establish the criminal responsibility of legal persons (societas delinquere non potest)’. Judge Kreca argued that article IX was by its nature a standard compromissory clause, a procedural provision, and as such was only meant to encompass disputes concerning the individual criminal responsibility obliga-

86 Ibid., para. 9.
87 Ibid., para. 9.
88 Ibid., Dissenting Reasons of Judge ad hoc Kreca.
91 Ibid.
tions in the Convention.92 The reference to ‘responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III’ was, said Judge Kreca, ‘abstract and broad in its vagueness’.

Judge Kreca conceded that a State could be held responsible on an international level for perpetrating genocide in another State. He also examined how the general legal regime of State responsibility might apply before the Court if genocide were committed within the State’s own borders:

Leaving aside the conditions in which a State may be responsible for genocide perpetrated in the territory of another State, civil responsibility would be characterized by two stages. The first stage would comprise a claim for reparations to the competent authorities of the State responsible for genocide and adjudicated in the procedure established by its own internal law. The second stage would involve an international litigation for the reparation of losses incurred by genocide, the parties to it being the state responsible for genocide and the State on whose territory genocide was perpetrated. In other words, it would be a case of the typical international civil responsibility of a State. Given the fact that the national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as an object safeguarded from the crime of genocide, has no locus standi in the Court, the State on whose territory the crime has been perpetrated should espouse the cause of the ‘national, ethnic, racial or religious’ group after having exhausted local legal remedies.93

Thus, the concept of civil responsibility of a State for genocide committed on its own territory against a group led to the absurd result that it would be both applicant and respondent in the same case, a problem first evoked during the debates in 1948. As a result, Judge Kreca said he was convinced that the Convention contemplated no such international civil responsibility of States for the crime of genocide.

Such a standing [sic] of the Convention on the matter of international responsibility may of course be qualified in more than one way, but it is difficult to infer any conclusion on the force of the concept of international civil responsibility within the fibre of the Convention, unless one strays into the area of legal construction. It is easy to accept the view that the international civil responsibility of States for the crime of genocide would strengthen the effectiveness of prohibition of the crime of genocide. However, in the present case, the question is reduced to the qualification of positive law concerning responsibility for genocide and not to the qualification of optimal solutions in abstracto. As suggested by Special Rapporteur Whitaker ‘when the Convention is revised consideration shall be given to including provisions for a State responsibility for genocide together with reparations’.94

92 Ibid., para. 105.
93 Ibid., para. 105.
The debate about the nature of State responsibility for genocide re-emerged when the Court was asked to rule on the admissibility of the counter-claim filed by Serbia and Montenegro after its preliminary objections had been rejected. The Court’s Vice-President, Christopher Weeramantry, in dissent, argued that a counter-claim was inadmissible because its criminal nature meant that it could not be an answer to the initial application. Judge Weeramantry noted that the charge of genocide in the originating application alleged a criminal offence. ‘An act of genocide by the applicant cannot be a counter-claim to an act of genocide by the respondent’, he wrote. ‘Each act stands untouched by the other, in drawing upon itself the united condemnation of the international community.’

Assuming the majority ruling of the Court on the admissibility of the application of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its summary and somewhat ambiguous pronouncement on the existence of a form of civil liability for genocide, is followed at the stage of the merits, there remain some major unresolved issues. The preliminary ruling in the Bosnia and Herzegovina case will, presumably, be developed more thoroughly in the final judgment. As it stands, the true nature of the genocide committed by a State and contemplated by the Court remains nebulous.

The idea that a State can be liable for committing the crime of genocide finds some support in the work of the International Law Commission. The 1976 version of the draft principles on State responsibility contemplate a form of State crime, defined in article 19 as ‘an internationally wrongful act which resulted from the breach by a State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of the fundamental interests of the international community that its breach was recognized as a crime by that community as a whole’. According to article 19, ‘an international crime may result, inter alia, from . . . a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those prohibiting . . . genocide’. Special Rapporteur James Crawford called this ‘[t]he single most controversial element in the draft articles on State responsibility’. The Commission reconsidered the issue of State crimes at its 1998 session, eventually deciding that it should be ‘put to

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one side because of the many conceptual problems that arise and the lack of general consensus among its members on the subject.

Part of the difficulty in the International Law Commission codification was terminological. The 1976 draft articles distinguished between ‘crimes’ and ‘delicts’, stating in draft article 19 that all ‘internationally wrongful acts’ that are not ‘crimes’ are to be labelled ‘delicts’. These terms appear in penal codes derived from the Napoleonic model, where they describe degrees of offences: misdemeanours (contraventions), delicts (délits) and crimes (crimes). The practical significance of the distinction in the national law models relates mainly to applicable penalties and statutory limitations. Yet the terms suggest another legal classification, that between delictual responsibility (civil liability or torts, in common law jargon) and criminal responsibility.

Members of the Commission, as well as States submitting comments on the earlier draft, disagreed on whether the very concept of ‘State crimes’ belonged within a regime of State responsibility. Compelling arguments were expressed in support of the view that ‘criminal liability’ could not be extended by analogy from individuals to States. It suggests a concept of collective guilt, and there are difficulties with respect to sanctions as well as in establishing the mental element of the crime. The majority of the International Law Commission appeared to recognize the problems inherent in applying criminal law analogies to the area of State responsibility, and took the view that, even if the notion of ‘State crimes’ were retained, it more correctly defined a particularly serious form of liability within a civil sense. It was common ground that there was an absence of relevant State practice on the subject, suggesting that States saw no role for the concept of ‘State crimes’ within the framework of State responsibility.

In comments submitted to the Commission, Denmark, on behalf of the Nordic countries, took the view that States could indeed commit genocide:

If, for instance, one looks at the crime of genocide or the crime of aggression, such crimes are, of course, perpetrated by individual human beings, but at the same time they may be imputable to the State insofar as they will normally be


carried out by State organs implying a sort of ‘system criminality’. The responsibility in such situations cannot in our view be limited to the individual human being acting on behalf of the State. The conduct of an individual may give rise to responsibility of the State he or she represents. In such cases the State itself as a legal entity must be brought to bear responsibility in one forum or another, be it through punitive damages or measures affecting the dignity of the State . . . If the term ‘crime’ used in relation to a State is, however, regarded as too sensitive, consideration may be given to using other terminology such as ‘violations’ and ‘serious violations’ (of an international obligation). It must be essential though to establish particularly grave violations of international law by a State, such as aggression and genocide, as a specific category, where the consequences of the violations are more severe.100

Ireland, on the other hand, said that ‘[w]hile States bear international responsibility for a breach of [the obligation to prevent and punish genocide], there is no question of the responsibility being criminal in character’.101

The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in a 1997 ruling, held that ‘[u]nder present international law it is clear that States, by definition, cannot be the subject of criminal sanctions akin to those provided for in national criminal systems’.102 Also, it is noteworthy that the diplomatic conference that drafted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was unable to agree on applicable principles that would permit corporate bodies to be tried by the Court.103

The issue of State responsibility is well recognized in international law in the case of ‘internationally wrongful acts’.104 These require: the

100 ‘State Responsibility, Comments and Observations Received from Governments’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/488, pp. 53–4. See also ‘First Report on State Responsibility by Mr James Crawford, Special Rapporteur’, note 97 above, paras. 43 and 53–9.

101 ‘State Responsibility, Comments and Observations Received from Governments’, note 100 above, para. 52.


existence of an international legal obligation in force as between two particular states, an act or omission which violates that obligation and which is imputable to the State responsible, and loss or damage resulting from the unlawful act or omission.\textsuperscript{105} That genocide, or the material acts that underlie it, be defined as ‘internationally wrongful acts’ should not require any demonstration or justification. The consequence is an obligation to provide reparation to the injured State. A State is an injured party when its own nationals have suffered damage as a result of the internationally wrongful act. The limited nature of such an approach, from an international law standpoint, is apparent. As a general rule, it will be the citizens of the perpetrating State who will be the victims of genocide. For example, nobody but Turkey can invoke international law before the International Court of Justice in order to claim the right to compensation for the genocide of the Armenians, something it is hardly likely to do. Of course, this does not prevent States from offering some form of relief to their own nationals who have been victims of genocide.\textsuperscript{106} Germany, as a matter of national policy, continues to provide compensation to Jewish survivors of the Holocaust. Rwanda has established funds to compensate victims of the 1994 genocide, although as a developing country with a very low standard of living its resources to do this are quite limited.

However, reading down the definition of genocide to create a tort of ‘civil’ genocide dramatically changes the nature of the act. With the mental element removed, the crime of genocide becomes indistinguishable from other cognate concepts such as crimes against humanity, large-scale human rights violations and war crimes. Under general principles of State responsibility, there could certainly be a finding of liability giving rise to an obligation to make reparation for acts that might also, in a criminal law context, be defined as genocide. But this can hardly be an application of the Convention itself, because special intent is so much an integral part of the definition of the crime. This suggests the conclusion that ‘civil’ genocide is not contemplated by the Convention and, as a result, the State whose nationals are victims cannot invoke article IX in order to take the case before the International Court of Justice. A State could only file an application on this basis if the interested States had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 36 of its Statute.

Nevertheless, a majority of the International Court of Justice con-


\textsuperscript{106} ‘Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power’, art. 12, UN Doc. A/40/881.
siders that article IX of the Convention may well be applied on this basis. If genocide can be committed in such a civil liability sense, and if the Court has jurisdiction in accordance with article IX, then must the parties establish that genocide was committed as it is defined in article II of the Convention? The obvious problem is that the Convention definition of genocide requires proof of specific intent. It is hard to conceive of a State with a specific intent.\textsuperscript{107} But several States argued, in the \textit{Use of Force} case, that Yugoslavia had failed to allege or prove that the NATO States had acted with genocidal intent.\textsuperscript{108} Professor Christopher Greenwood, speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom, said: ‘There is no plausible evidence – nor could there be – that the United Kingdom has the intent required by the Convention and in their submissions yesterday, counsel for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not attempt to adduce any.’\textsuperscript{109} In dismissing the application for provisional measures, the Court said that it did ‘not appear at the present stage of the proceedings that the bombings which form the subject of the Yugoslav Application’ indicated the requisite intent.\textsuperscript{110}

A helpful analogy is with corporate liability in national legal systems, where the problem of intent or \textit{mens rea} is a familiar one. Not all domestic legal systems allow for responsibility of corporate bodies. Those that do take a variety of approaches to the issue of the \textit{mens rea} of the corporate defendant. Some apply vicarious liability, holding a corporation liable for the acts of its employees, in the same way that parents are held liable for the acts of their children. Others impute to the society the \textit{mens rea} of its \textit{alter ego} or guiding spirit.\textsuperscript{111} Yet others attempt to establish a \textit{mens rea} of the corporate body itself, based on a criminalized ‘corporate culture’. Whatever the approach taken, the conclusion that a State had committed genocide would inexorably depend on proof that its leaders had also perpetrated the crime, as defined in article II of the Convention. Thus, the mental element is not overlooked, it is simply transferred.

Related to this question is the qualification of genocide as a \textit{jus cogens} or an \textit{erga omnes} norm. \textit{Jus cogens} norms are defined as peremptory


\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom)}, Verbatim Record, 11 May 1999, para. 20 (John Morris).

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Ibid.}, para. 20 (Christopher Greenwood).


norms of international law by article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.112

The prohibition of genocide has frequently been qualified as a *jus cogens* norm.113 Judge Elihu Lauterpacht, in the September 1993 provisional measures ruling in the *Bosnia and Herzegovina* case, said that ‘the prohibition of genocide . . . has generally been accepted as having the status not of an ordinary rule of international law but of *jus cogens*. Indeed, the prohibition of genocide has long been regarded as one of the few undoubted examples of *jus cogens*.’114

*Erga omnes* norms are norms which all States have a legitimate interest in enforcing. The prohibition of genocide has been listed as an *erga omnes* norm by the International Court of Justice.115 But while this may provide an answer to the objection that ‘uninvolved’ States cannot litigate issues before the International Court of Justice, it cannot solve the requirement imposed by the legal regime of State responsibility whereby the injured State is the one whose own nationals have suffered from the internationally wrongful act. In other words, the fact that the prohibition of genocide is an *erga omnes* norm may entitle a State with no direct interest to sue for failure to prevent and punish the crime, but

it cannot act on behalf of the nationals of the perpetrating State because the latter obviously is unwilling to do so.

In conclusion, the view that States can commit genocide in the sense of ‘State crimes’ finds little support. Far more acceptable is the application of the general principles of State responsibility. But these stumble on the problem of defining genocide, which is presented in the Convention as a specific intent offence whose transposition to corporate bodies is not obvious. States may of course be liable for the ‘internationally wrongful acts’ that comprise the crime of genocide. These issues are germane to determining whether article IX of the Convention actually provides a forum for applications based on State responsibility, a matter awaiting decision by the International Court of Justice.
Although the Genocide Convention’s title speaks of both prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, the essence of its provisions is directed to the second limb of that tandem. The concept of prevention is repeated in article I: ‘The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish.’ Of course, punishment and prevention are intimately related. Criminal law’s deterrent function supports the claim that prompt and appropriate punishment prevents future offences. Moreover, some of the ‘other acts’ of genocide imply a preventive dimension. Prosecution of conspiracy, attempts and above all of direct and public incitement are all aimed at future violations. But the drafters of the Convention resisted going further upstream, rejecting efforts to criminalize ‘preparatory acts’ such as hate speech and racist organizations. Finally, in article VIII of the Convention, the States parties are authorized to ‘call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article 3’.

Prevention may entail other rights and obligations that are only implicit in the Convention. A purported obligation of humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide, up to and including military intervention, vexed the Security Council and other United Nations organs, as well as States parties to the Convention, in 1994 as genocide raged in Rwanda. In March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization launched bombing attacks on Serbia, in apparent violation of article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Representatives of some of the belligerents, including United States President William Clinton, suggested that it was permissible to employ force in such circumstances because genocide was being committed. Many of the legal difficulties raised by these crises remain unresolved.
Drafting of article VIII of the Convention

The Genocide Convention is, of course, an autonomous treaty with a life of its own. It creates no independent treaty body with responsibility for implementation. In the area of prevention, the only hint of a mandate is that accorded the ‘competent organs of the United Nations’, pursuant to article VIII. Perfunctory references to prevention in the Convention are all that remain of considerably more substantial provisions in the Secretariat draft. Article XII of that text was entitled ‘Action by the United Nations to Prevent or to Stop Genocide’. It stated that: ‘Irrespective of any provision in the foregoing articles, should the crimes as defined in this Convention be committed in any part of the world, or should there be serious reasons for suspecting that such crimes have been committed, the High Contracting Parties may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take measures for the suppression or prevention of such crimes. In such case the said Parties shall do everything in their power to give full effect to the intervention of the United Nations.’ Commenting on the provision, the Secretariat noted that all criminal law had a preventive effect. ‘The fact that there is a law tends to deter and prevent action by persons who might be tempted to commit a crime’, it said. ‘Experience shows, however, that the preventive effect of threats is limited, since these do not stop certain criminals.’ Consequently, continued the Secretariat commentary, ‘if preventive action is to have the maximum chances of success, the Members of the United Nations must not remain passive or indifferent. The Convention for the punishment of crimes of genocide should, therefore, bind the States to do everything in their power to support any action by the United Nations intended to prevent or stop these crimes.’

Experts consulted by the Secretariat, Vespasian V. Pella and Raphael Lemkin, believed the Secretary-General should have the duty to inform competent organs of the United Nations of threats of genocide because governments might hesitate to do this themselves. But could a convention attribute powers or duties to the Secretary-General that were not mandated by the Charter of the United Nations?

Member States had mixed reactions to these ambitious proposals.

1 UN Doc. E/447, p. 45. 2 Ibid., pp. 45–6. 3 Ibid., p. 46. 4 Ibid., p. 46. The powers of the Secretary-General are defined in arts. 97–101 of the Charter. 5 See the Haitian amendment, UN Doc. A/401: ‘Irrespective of any provisions in the foregoing article, should the crimes as defined in this Convention be committed in any part of the world, or should there be serious reasons for suspecting that such crimes have been committed, the High Contracting Parties or the human groups affected may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take measures for the suppression...
The United States proposed a text that was both more timid and more general: ‘The High Contracting Parties, who are also Members of the United Nations, agree to concert their actions as such Members to assure that the United Nations takes such action as may be appropriate under the Charter for the prevention and suppression of genocide.’ The Soviet Union pushed for a stronger formulation, considering that it should be an obligation upon States to report genocide to the Security Council so that measures could be taken in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter. It seems the Soviets were concerned not so much with the powers of the Security Council, where they held a veto, as with the alternative, which was litigation before the International Court of Justice. Making the Council the principal body could, conceivably, obstruct the role of the Court. China’s proposal, which sought the middle ground, came closest to the final result: ‘Any Signatory to this Convention may call upon any competent organ of the United Nations to take such action as may be appropriate under the Charter for the prevention and suppression of genocide.’

In the Ad Hoc Committee, Poland supported the Soviet proposal: ‘the convention should stipulate that the crime of genocide leads to international friction and endangers the maintenance of peace and security and that that could make the intervention of the Security Council necessary.’ France did not object to an obligation to report genocide to the Security Council, but said the Security Council alone could decide whether to take up the matter. The United States and others thought other United Nations bodies, such as the Trusteeship Council, might be more appropriate fora. The United States preferred a provision saying that cases of genocide should ‘be referred to the various organs of the United Nations competent to deal with them’. It also felt strongly about specifying that the reporting obligation only concerned acts of genocide, and not all breaches of the obligations imposed by the convention. The United States cautioned about the danger of ‘devious ways’ to refer matters to the Security Council rather than to the international court. The Ad Hoc Committee rejected a rule of mandatory

or prevention of such crimes. In such case the said Parties shall do everything in their power to give full effect to the intervention of the United Nations.’ See also UN Doc. E/623/Add.3 (the Netherlands); and UN Doc. E/623/Add.4 (Siam).

9 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.8, p. 17.
10 Ibid., p. 19.
11 Ibid., p. 20.
12 Ibid., p. 22.
13 Ibid., p. 27.
notification of the Security Council.\textsuperscript{14} Eventually, a re-amended version of the Chinese text was adopted: ‘Any Signatory to this Convention may bring to the attention of any competent organ of the United Nations any cases of violation of the Convention to take such action as may be appropriate under the Charter for the prevention and suppression of genocide.’\textsuperscript{15} A final Soviet attempt to revive the proposal requiring reference to the Security Council was rejected.\textsuperscript{16}

In the Sixth Committee, both the United Kingdom\textsuperscript{17} and Belgium\textsuperscript{18} urged deletion of article VIII, explaining its concerns were already dealt with under the Charter of the United Nations. The rationale for the provision was explained by chair of the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee, the American John Maktos, as a compromise formulation adopted as a response to the Soviet proposal requiring Security Council referral. Maktos told the Sixth Committee that the legal reason for the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee’s rejection of the Soviet amendment was the impossibility of amending the Charter of the United Nations or of enlarging the powers of the Security Council by subsequent conventions.\textsuperscript{19} The Soviet delegate answered:

Any act of genocide was always a threat to international peace and security and as such should be dealt with under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter . . . Chapters VI and VII of the Charter provided means for the prevention and punishment of genocide, means far more concrete and effective than anything possible in the sphere of international jurisdiction . . . The obligation to bring a case of genocide to the attention of the Security Council would ensure that States did not evade their obligations.\textsuperscript{20}

Poland’s Manfred Lachs gave an example of enlargement of Security Council powers by treaty.\textsuperscript{21} Jean Spiropoulos agreed that there was a precedent for conferring new powers on the Security Council, but said that in such cases, the Council would have to be asked if it accepted.\textsuperscript{22} Lachs thought the powers of the Security Council could be increased without it even being asked.\textsuperscript{23}

The United States agreed with the United Kingdom and Belgium that article VIII should be dropped, ‘but objected in advance to any effort

\textsuperscript{14} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.9, p. 5 (four in favour, three against).
\textsuperscript{15} UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.20, p. 5 (five in favour, one against, with one abstention).
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 4 (five in favour, two against).
\textsuperscript{17} UN Doc. A/C.6/236 and Corr.1: ‘Delete. Note. These matters are already provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.’
\textsuperscript{18} UN Doc. A/C.6/217: ‘Delete. Redundant. What is permitted under the Charter should not be permitted in different terms in a convention.’
\textsuperscript{19} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101 (Maktos, United States).
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. (Morozov, Soviet Union).
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. (Lachs, Poland).
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. (Spiropoulos, Greece).
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid. (Lachs, Poland).
which might be made to reintroduce a provision to the effect that cases could be brought before the Security Council only’.24 This is precisely what happened. The Sixth Committee initially voted to delete article VIII.25 Then new proposals along similar lines were tabled, one from the Soviet Union,26 another from France,27 followed by a compromise text from Iran, France and the Soviet Union. ‘The High Contracting Parties may call the attention of the Security Council or, if necessary, of the General Assembly to the cases of genocide and of violations of the present Convention likely to constitute a threat to international peace and security, in order that the Security Council may take such measures as it may deem necessary to stop that threat.’28 Put to a vote, the amendment was rejected.29

Australia revived the question with an amendment that said essentially what the Ad Hoc Committee had decided.30 The chair declared the Australian proposal out of order, as it had already been decided, but was overruled on a vote by the Committee. Given that the substance of the Australian proposal had been discussed at length, there was no real debate. Clearly, a deal had been struck. The new text of article VIII was adopted.31 The United Kingdom declared it had voted for the Australian amendment because, although unnecessary to confer powers already possessed by virtue of the Charter, there should be no doubt that the convention did not imply the only recourse was to the International Court of Justice.32

Some twenty years later, the General Assembly thought sufficiently highly of the role of article VIII to include the same text, \textit{mutatis}

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{24} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.94 (Maktos, United States).
  \item \textsuperscript{25} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101 (twenty-one in favour; eighteen against, with one abstention).
  \item \textsuperscript{26} UN Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1: ‘replace paras 1 and 2 with “The High Contracting Parties undertake to report to the Security Council all cases of genocide and all cases of a breach of the obligations imposed by the Convention so that the necessary measures may be taken in accordance with Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.”’
  \item \textsuperscript{27} UN Doc. A/C.6/259: ‘The High Contracting Parties may call the attention of the Security Council to the cases of genocide and of violations of the present Convention likely to constitute a threat to international peace and security in order that the Security Council may take such measures as it deems necessary to stop the threat.’
  \item \textsuperscript{28} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.102 (Chaumont, France).
  \item \textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid}. (twenty-seven in favour, thirteen against, with five abstentions).
  \item \textsuperscript{30} UN Doc. A/C.6/265: ‘With respect to the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide, a Party to this Convention may call upon any competent organ of the United Nations to take such action as may be appropriate under the Charter of the United Nations.’
  \item \textsuperscript{31} UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.105 (twenty-nine in favour, four against, with five abstentions). Canada, Peru and India declared that they had voted against, and Greece said that it had abstained.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid}. (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
\end{itemize}
mutandis, in the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. Yet most commentators have tended to dismiss article VIII as relatively insignificant. Nehemiah Robinson observed that the ‘low value’ the drafters gave to the provision is shown by the fact that it was originally deleted. Benjamin Whitaker wrote that article VIII adds nothing new to the Convention. But Hans-Heinrich Jescheck made the useful observation that, by allowing for recourse to the organs of the United Nations, article VIII of the Convention presents an obstacle to any State that might invoke article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations and claim that a genocide-related matter is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. According to Special Rapporteur Nicodème Ruhashyankiko:

[A]rticle VIII of the Convention, while adding nothing to the Charter, is of some importance in that it states explicitly the right of States to call upon the United Nations with a view to preventing and suppressing genocide and the responsibility of the competent organs of the United Nations in the matter. Furthermore, as has been pointed out, it is the only article in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which deals with the prevention of that crime, referring to the possibility of preventive action by the United Nations called upon by Parties to the Convention. It should be noted, further, that such action by United Nations organs is action of a particularly humanitarian nature, the need and justification for which should not be underestimated. It would be desirable for the organs of the United Nations, in pursuance of article VIII of the Convention, to exercise their powers in this field actively.

Academic writers have also considered article VIII to be important in that it allows States parties that are non-members of the United Nations to appeal to its bodies. While of interest historically, this point can only be of marginal significance at a time when virtually all States now belong to the United Nations.

33 GA Res. 3068(XXVIII), art. VIII.
38 Robinson, Genocide Convention, p. 94.
Action by United Nations organs

At the very least, article VIII of the Convention invites States parties to call upon the appropriate organs of the United Nations to take action that they deem appropriate to prevent and suppress genocide. Article 7 of the Charter of the United Nations defines the term ‘organs’, and distinguishes between the principal and subsidiary organs of the organization. The principal organs are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat. The term ‘subsidiary organs’ is not defined, although provisions in the Charter entitle the General Assembly and the Security Council to create them. The Economic and Social Council is empowered to establish commissions, including the Commission on Human Rights, but these bodies are not designated ‘subsidiary organs’.

Nehemiah Robinson said that the only competent organs contemplated by article VIII are the General Assembly and the Security Council because they are the only ones to which reference was made during the debates. Robinson said that, prima facie, the Economic and Social Council has no competence in such cases. These propositions are questionable, given that ‘organs’ is a technical term, and that the Charter clearly refers to the ECOSOC as a United Nations organ. Moreover, the ECOSOC, and its subordinate bodies, including the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, have principal responsibility in the areas of human rights and the protection of minorities. The involvement of the United Nations in the Rwandan genocide indicates the wide range of organs, both principal and subsidiary, that may be called upon. The Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat and the Economic and Social Council all took action in Rwanda, either in their own right or through their subsidiary bodies.

40 Charter of the United Nations, art. 29.
41 Ibid., art. 68.
42 Robinson, Genocide Convention, p. 98.
43 Whether the ECOSOC was a ‘competent organ’ within the meaning of art. VIII of the Convention was debated when it considered a request from the Soviet Union to include in the agenda of its thirty-ninth session the following item: ‘Policy of Genocide Which is Being Pursued by the Government of the Republic of Iraq Against the Kurdish People’ (UN Doc. E/3809).
The General Assembly appears to have addressed the issue of genocide for the first time in 1982, when it qualified the massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut as genocide. On 18 September 1982, hundreds of Palestinian refugees in those camps were massacred. Israel, which had invaded much of southern Lebanon during the summer months of 1982, was blamed for the atrocity. Its security forces had taken control of the camps, leaving Christian militias with a free hand to carry out the carnage. The Security Council promptly condemned ‘the criminal massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut’, following a report submitted by the Secretary-General. The Soviet Union, on 21 September 1982, said: ‘The word for what Israel is doing on Lebanese soil is genocide. Its purpose is to destroy the Palestinians as a nation.’ In a General Assembly debate a few days later, the German Democratic Republic claimed the events proved irrefutably that Israel had decided genocide was the answer to the Palestinian question. Cuba, on behalf of sixteen sponsors, proposed a General Assembly resolution declaring the massacres to be an ‘act of genocide’. Speaking in support, Chamorro Mora of Nicaragua declared: ‘It is difficult to believe that a people that suffered so much from the Nazi policy of extermination in the middle of the twentieth century would use the same fascist, genocidal arguments and methods against other peoples.’ Nicaragua added that its people had relevant experience, because of ‘the genocidal massacre of 50,000 of their sons under the Somoza dictatorship’ which ‘was effected with Israeli and United States weapons’.

44 However, this was not the first time that allegations of genocide had been made before the General Assembly. For example, in the 1959 debate on Tibet, there were charges that China had committed genocide: UN Doc. A/PV.812, para. 127 (El Salvador); UN Doc. A/PV.831, para. 13 (Malaya), para. 126 (Cuba); and UN Doc. A/PV.833, para. 8 (El Salvador), para. 28 (Netherlands). The accusations were sparked by a report from the International Commission of Jurists, *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law*, Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1959, pp. 68–71. In June 1963, the Mongolian People’s Republic requested the General Assembly to include in its provisional agenda the item: ‘The Policy of Genocide Carried out by the Government of the Republic of Iraq Against the Kurdish People’. See UN Doc. A/5429 (1963).

45 SC Res. 521 (1982).
46 UN Doc. S/15400 (1982).
48 UN Doc. A/37/PV.92.
49 UN Doc. A/37/L.52 and Add.1; UN Doc. A/37/PV.108, para. 58.
50 UN Doc. A/37/PV.96, para. 29. See also UN Doc. A/37/PV.96, para. 41; UN Doc. A/37/PV.92, para. 50; UN Doc. A/37/PV.92, para. 95.
51 UN Doc. A/37/PV.96, para. 37.
There was little discussion of the scope of the term genocide, which had obviously been chosen to embarrass Israel rather than out of any concern with legal precision. Of interest in terms of the scope of article VIII were suggestions that the General Assembly was not the appropriate organ to address the issue of genocide. For example, according to Singapore:

[M]y delegation regrets the use of the term ‘an act of genocide’ as we feel that the determination of an act of genocide should be made by the appropriate legal bodies, in accordance with article VIII of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In the Convention, the term ‘genocide’ is used to mean acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. My delegation regrets the tendency in the Assembly to engage in the use of loose and casual language when referring to issues with a precise legal definition.

Canada said ‘the term “genocide” cannot, in our view, be applied to this particular inhuman act’. Echoing Singapore, it said: ‘We also question whether the General Assembly has the competence to make such a determination.’ The United States said that, while the criminality of the massacre was beyond question, it was ‘a serious and reckless misuse of language to label this tragedy genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention . . . Indeed, in a very real sense, the reckless use of hyperbole tends to cheapen a tragic event.’ Finland regretted that the term had prevented the General Assembly from giving unanimous expression ‘to the universal outrage and condemnation which are shared by the whole international community with regard to the massacre at Sabra and Shatila’. Sweden said that, despite its revulsion at the massacre, the term genocide was ‘not correct’. The resolution was adopted by 123 to none, with twenty-two abstentions. Paragraph 2, which ‘[r]esolve[d] that the massacre was an act of genocide’, was adopted by ninety-eight votes to nineteen, with twenty-three abstentions, on a recorded vote.

A preambular reference to the Genocide Convention in the preamble of the General Assembly’s 1992 ‘Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic Religious and Linguistic Minorities’

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53 UN Doc. A/37/PV.108, para. 121.


60 UN Doc. A/RES/48/138.
emphasized the close relationship between the prohibition of genocide and the protection of minorities. Article 1(1) of the Declaration begins: ‘States shall protect the existence . . . of minorities . . .’. In December 1993, a General Assembly resolution dealing with the situation in the former Yugoslavia cited the Genocide Convention in its preamble.61 It also endorsed a resolution of the Commission on Human Rights adopted at its special session of August 1992, ‘in particular its call for all States to consider the extent to which the acts committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia constitute genocide, in accordance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’.62 Another important resolution described ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a form of genocide.63 But the Assembly was hardly consistent, because at the same session another resolution entitled “Ethnic cleansing” and racial hatred’ did not even employ the term genocide or mention the Convention.64 Since 1992, a number of General Assembly resolutions relating to the Bosnian crisis have referred to the Genocide Convention or cited the importance of preventing genocide.65 In 1996, the Assembly went a step further, stating that rape, under certain circumstances, could constitute an act of genocide.66

63 ‘The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, UN Doc. A/RES/47/121.
64 ‘“Ethnic Cleansing” and Racial Hatred’, UN Doc. A/RES/47/80. See also ‘Third Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination’, GA Res. 48/91.
During its 1994 session, the Assembly adopted several resolutions on the Rwandan crisis, although only one that spoke of genocide. On 23 December 1994, it condemned the acts of genocide that had taken place in Rwanda, especially following the events of 6 April 1994. The resolution also expressed ‘deep concern at the reports from the Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts that genocide had been committed in Rwanda’.

The General Assembly’s 1997 resolution on human rights in Cambodia used the term genocide in a preambular paragraph: ‘Desiring that the United Nations respond positively to assist efforts to investigate Cambodia’s tragic history including responsibility for past international crimes, such as acts of genocide and crimes against humanity.’

Periodically, the General Assembly has adopted resolutions on the status of the Convention, calling upon non-party States to ratify the instrument. On 2 December 1998, upon a proposal from Armenia, the Assembly resolved to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Convention. In the debate, many delegations emphasized the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court five months earlier as an historic development in the law of genocide. Several addressed issues of particular concern, declaring openly or suggesting implicitly that acts of genocide were involved. Thus, Cyprus described the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the northern portion of the island, occupied by Turkey since 1974. The Cypriot delegate referred to ‘massive colonization and systematic destruction of the religious and cultural heritage in the territory occupied by the Turkish army and by the inhumane conditions of life imposed on the few Greek Cypriots and Maronites still living in the occupied part of the island’. The United States discussed the situation in the Great Lakes region of Africa, the crisis in Kosovo,

A/CONF.177/20, para. 147(e). See also ‘Rape and Abuse of Women in the Areas of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc. A/51/557, para. 2.


69 GA Res. 49/206, adopted without a vote.

70 ‘Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia’, GA Res. 52/135.

71 GA Res. 795 (VIII); GA Res. 40/142; GA Res. 41/147; GA Res. 42/133; GA Res. 43/138; GA Res. 44/158; GA Res. 45/152; GA Res. 47/108.

72 UN Doc. A/53/L.47.

and the efforts to prosecute the leaders of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Ukraine addressed the 1932–3 famine, describing it as ‘a conscious and deliberate genocide undertaken by the Soviet regime’. The Ukraine delegation said it was necessary ‘to take a fresh look at the substance of the Convention’, proposing that ‘the definition of genocide should be expanded to include all groups targeted by policies which led to the destruction or any delineation of humanity’. The delegations of Armenia and Rwanda discussed the phenomenon of denial of genocide and the importance of ‘countering intellectually crafted obscurantism and revisionism, which sought to hide, diminish or belittle the past relating to genocide’. Israel warned that the Convention definition was being ‘recruited to serve controversial political and cultural aims and contexts’. Accordingly, while it might be appropriate to expand the definition of genocide to include gender and political groups, this should be accomplished ‘by using the international treaty mechanism rather than misinterpreted contemporary legal definitions’. Cuba described the blockade by the United States as ‘a genocidal policy that targeted a people with extermination through hunger and disease’.

A subsidiary body of the General Assembly, the International Law Commission, has often studied the issue of genocide in the course of its work on the draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and on the draft statute for an international criminal court. In 1954, the Commission concluded that the definition of genocide set out in the Convention should be modified, and that the list of punishable acts in the five paragraphs of Article II be expressed as an indicative enumeration, rather than as an exhaustive list. But the International Law Commission later concluded that the original Convention text should be retained, ‘having regard to the need to conform with a text widely accepted by the international community’. The 1996 version of the draft Code of Crimes repeats the definition of genocide found in the Convention, although it proposes some interesting innovations with respect to jurisdiction and criminal participation.

77 Note 73 above.
78 These matters are discussed elsewhere in this work. On jurisdiction, see pp. 364–5 above. On criminal participation, see pp. 263 and 271–2 above.
The first Security Council action to prevent and punish genocide can be dated to 1992, with its initial intervention in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Commission of Experts established by the Council did not have an explicit mandate to investigate the crime of genocide, but the members undoubtedly considered it within the ambit of their work. The preliminary report of the Commission to the Council addressed the application of the Convention to the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The work of the Commission led, in short order, to the Council’s establishment of an international tribunal having subject matter jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. Implicitly, at the very least, the Council was taking action to prevent genocide. However, it stopped short of declaring that genocide had been committed. The resolution creating the ad hoc Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, adopted on 8 May 1993, did not refer to genocide, although the Tribunal’s statute recognized genocide as part of its subject matter jurisdiction. The word ‘genocide’ had appeared in its resolutions for the first time a few weeks earlier, on 16 April 1993, when the Council took note of the order of the International Court of Justice of 8 April 1993, requiring Yugoslavia to ‘take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide’. But here too the Council avoided adopting any position of its own on the subject.

The Security Council initially employed the term ‘genocide’ to characterize a situation at the height of the Rwandan crisis, and then only after weeks of vacillation and debate. In its initial response to the genocide, the Security Council actually authorized a reduction in the forces of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, in service in the country since late the previous year. By the end of April 1994, slightly more than two weeks after the beginning of the massacres, several members of the Council took the view that genocide was being

81 Ibid.
committed. New Zealand’s Colin Keating, then the president of the Council, was convinced that the Council must recognize that genocide was ongoing because he believed this would compel the body, of which all but three members had ratified the Convention, to take action. At an informal Council meeting on 28 April 1994, Czech ambassador Karel Kovanda stated that genocide was taking place in Rwanda. But some permanent members strenuously objected to the term. The United Kingdom permanent representative, Sir David Hannay, said that if the Council used the word ‘genocide’ it would become a laughing stock. As for the United States, its representative was operating pursuant to instructions that the word ‘genocide’ was not to be used in the context of the Rwandan debacle. On 30 April 1994, the Council finally agreed upon a presidential statement that echoed the terms of articles I and II of the Genocide Convention but did not use the term ‘genocide’. The statement said: ‘the Security Council recalls that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable by international law.’ A 1999 report of the French National Assembly described this use of the definition of genocide while avoiding the term itself as ‘l’hypocrisie la plus totale’.

Now challenged to take measures to prevent genocide, and in effect


85 Ibid. The three non-parties were Djibouti, Nigeria and Oman.


87 Melvern, ‘Genocide’.


89 Statement by the President of the Security Council Condemning the Slaughter of Civilians in Kigali and Other Parts of Rwanda’, UN Doc. S/PRST/994/21 (30 April 1994).

called upon to act by the Czech Republic in accordance with article VIII of the Convention, the Security Council dawdled as hundreds of thousands were killed. On 6 May 1994, the non-permanent members presented a resolution aimed at reinforcing the Assistance Mission with 5,500 new troops. But only Ethiopia offered a unit ready for immediate service. Other offers came from Congo, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia and Zimbabwe, but all required United Nations equipment and none had any airlift capability. The United States magnanimously offered to provide fourteen armoured personnel carriers on a lease for US$14,000,000. The debates wore on. As ambassador Keating later recalled: ‘It was almost surreal. While thousands of beings were hacked to death every day, ambassadors argued fitfully for weeks about military tactics.’

On 17 May 1994, the Council adopted a resolution authorizing an expansion of the Mission, as proposed, to 5,500 troops. Again borrowing the definition of genocide but without the word itself, the preamble of the resolution ‘recalled’ that ‘the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group, in whole or in part, constitutes a crime punishable under international law’.

Finally, on 8 June 1994, the dreaded ‘g-word’ graced the lips of the Council, when a resolution noted ‘with the gravest concern the reports indicating that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda and recall[ed] in this context that genocide constitutes a crime punishable under international law’. The reports had come, inter alia, from the Secretary-General who, on 31 May 1994, informed the Security Council that ‘there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide, since there have been large-scale killings of communities and families belonging to a particular ethnic group’. The resolution extended the mandate of the Assistance Mission and decreed the deployment of two additional battalions.

On 22 June 1994, the Council authorized a form of humanitarian intervention that became known as ‘Operation Turquoise’. This followed an announcement two days earlier of France’s intent to deploy a force in the region whose aim would be to protect civilians. Suspi-


UN Doc. S/RES/925 (1994), preamble. The report of the inquiry commissioned by the Secretary-General concluded: ‘The delay in identifying the events in Rwanda as a genocide was a failure by the Security Council. The reluctance by some States to use the term genocide was motivated by a lack of will to act, which is deplorable.’ Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda’, issued 15 December 1999 by the United Nations (italics in the original).

‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda, reporting on the political mission he sent to Rwanda to move the warring parties towards a cease-fire and recommending that the expanded mandate for UNAMIR be authorized for an initial period of six months’, UN Doc. S/1994/640 (1994), para. 36.

ciously, the word ‘genocide’ had again dropped out of the Council’s vocabulary. Operation Turquoise was a French-run mission establishing a ‘safe humanitarian zone’ in the south-west corner of Rwanda. The philosophy behind the effort seemed to reject the qualification of genocide directed against an ethnic group and instead approached the crisis as an armed conflict between two warring parties in which civilians in general required protection. France’s contingent included forces that had previously been garrisoned in Rwanda to assist the former regime in fighting the Rwandese Patriotic Front. The French Assemblée nationale commission conceded in its 1999 report that use of such troops ‘without doubt created a source of ambiguity and encouraged mistrust and scepticism’.96 In her history of the Rwandan genocide, Alison Des Forges spoke of the ‘indifference to the genocide’ of French policy makers involved in Operation Turquoise, but admitted that many Tutsi lives were in fact saved by the efforts of individual soldiers.97

Three weeks later, the Security Council established a Commission of Experts, like the one created for the former Yugoslavia.98 The Commission was to study indications of grave violations of international humanitarian law, ‘including the evidence of possible acts of genocide’.99 The Council also called upon States and ‘international humanitarian organizations’ to collate substantial information relating to breaches of the Genocide Convention during the conflict in Rwanda.100 The Commission confirmed that genocide had taken place:

After careful deliberation, the Commission of Experts has concluded that there is overwhelming evidence to prove that acts of genocide against the Tutsi group were perpetrated by Hutu elements in a concerted, planned systematic and methodical way. Abundant evidence shows that these mass exterminations perpetrated by Hutu elements against the Tutsi group as such, during the period mentioned above, constitute genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted on 9 December 1948.101

Drawing on this report, on 8 November 1994 the Security Council

96 Note 90 above, p. 321.
100 Ibid., para. 2.
created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Like its Yugoslav counterpart, it had subject matter jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. In addition, however, and in contrast with the Yugoslav tribunal, the text of the resolution actually referred to genocide. The Council ‘express[ed] once again its grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda’. The first operative paragraph declared the tribunal had ‘the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law’. 102 The word ‘genocide’ also figured in the Tribunal’s full title: ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.’

Since then, the Security Council has mentioned genocide in six more resolutions, four of them dealing with the situation in Rwanda. Three of these, all adopted in 1995, did little more than repeat earlier pronouncements.103 The fourth, adopted on 9 April 1998, addressed preventive measures directed to the threat of future genocide. The resolution noted, in its preamble, ‘the need for renewed investigation of the illegal flow of arms to Rwanda, which is fuelling violence and could lead to further acts of genocide, with specific recommendations for the Security Council for action’. In an operative paragraph, the Council ‘[u]rges all States and relevant organizations to co-operate in countering radio broadcasts and publications that incite acts of genocide, hatred and violence in the region’.104 The two other resolutions referring to genocide concern neighbouring Burundi. On 25 August 1995, the Security Council took note of the fact that the parties in Burundi had agreed that ‘genocide’ accurately characterized the massacres which followed the

103 UN Doc. S/RES/978 (1995): ‘Expressing once again its grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda’; UN Doc. S/RES/1011 (1995): ‘Stressing the need for representatives of all sectors of Rwandan society, excluding those political leaders suspected of planning and directing the genocide last year, to begin talks in order to reach an agreement on a constitutional and political structure to achieve lasting stability’; UN Doc. S/RES/1029 (1995): ‘Recalling its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and its resolution 978 (1995) of 27 February 1995, concerning the necessity for the arrest of persons suspected of committing genocide in Rwanda.’

assassination of president Melchior Ndadaye on 21 October 1993. In 1996, the Council expressed its deep concern ‘at the support extended to certain groups in Burundi by some of the perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda and the threat this poses to the stability of the region’, and ‘at the continued incitement to ethnic hatred and violence by radio stations and the growth of calls for exclusion and genocide’.

Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights

Because of its important responsibilities in the field of human rights, the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies have been the focal point of much activity concerning genocide within the United Nations. It was ECOSOC that launched an important study, in the late 1960s, of what was then an essentially dormant instrument. Following a 1967 decision by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council called for the preparation of a report on genocide and the appointment of a Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission. Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, a Rwandan, was designated Special Rapporteur in 1971. He filed a series of preliminary reports before producing a final text of nearly 200 pages in 1978. Besides studying the academic writing, case law and relevant official documents, Ruhashyankiko sent a series of requests to governments for information about domestic implementation of the Convention and for their views on related matters. Ruhashyankiko was late coming to the 1978 meeting of the Sub-Commission,

108 ECOSOC Res. 1420 (XLVI).
109 SCHR Res. 7(XXIV).
prompting the chair to describe the situation as ‘a report without a rapporteur’.\textsuperscript{112} The summary records reveal considerable tension, with members of the Sub-Commission calling for his replacement and predicting that he would not attend in any case.\textsuperscript{113} But a few days later, Ruhashyankiko unexpectedly appeared in Geneva to present his report.

When the debate began, the source of the malaise in the Sub-Commission became apparent. In his preliminary study, Ruhashyankiko had written of the genocide of Armenians in Turkey during the First World War,\textsuperscript{114} only to remove the reference in the final version, prompting fierce criticism.\textsuperscript{115} Only one member of the Sub-Commission defended Ruhashyankiko on the Armenian omission.\textsuperscript{116} He was, predictably, also supported by the Turkish Government’s observer.\textsuperscript{117} Ruhashyankiko explained that ‘it had been decided to retain the massacre of the Jews under Nazism, because that case was known to all and no objections had been raised; but other cases had been omitted, because it was impossible to compile an exhaustive list, because it was important to maintain unity within the international community in regard to genocide, and because in many cases to delve into the past might re-open old wounds which were now healing’.\textsuperscript{118} He said that if the Sub-Commission wanted to put the Armenian case in the final report, it should so decide, but ‘[h]e would, however, need to have the necessary evidence’.\textsuperscript{119}

Ruhashyankiko’s unpardonable wavering on the Armenian genocide cast a shadow over what was otherwise an extremely helpful and well-researched report. He explained that ‘it would be a mistake to interpret the 1948 Convention in broader terms than those envisaged by the signatories, and . . . it would be better to adhere to the spirit and letter of the Convention and to prepare new instruments as appropriate; this would avoid raising any difficulties for the States parties’.\textsuperscript{120} Ruhashyankiko also urged the establishment of an \textit{ad hoc} committee on genocide, the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{112} UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.816, para. 68.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} \textit{Ibid.}, paras. 68–70.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} ‘Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Progress Report by Mr Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Special Rapporteur’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.583, para. 30.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} \textit{Ibid.}, paras. 33–4.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} \textit{Ibid.}, paras. 38–9.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} \textit{Ibid.}, para. 40.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} \textit{Ibid.}, para. 47.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.822, para. 5; ‘Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Study Prepared by Mr Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Special Rapporteur’, note 111 above, para. 618.
\end{itemize}
creation of an international criminal court, and the recognition of universal jurisdiction over the crime. The Sub-Commission showed little interest in the important legal issues raised by the report. In addition to the debate on the Armenian genocide, there were isolated criticisms about the treatment of other specific cases. One member said that all references to the Eichmann trial should be removed because of the circumstances of his abduction. Another complained that mention of the genocide of the Palestinian people had been omitted.

The Sub-Commission transmitted Ruhashyankiko’s report to the Commission on Human Rights, recommending it be given the widest possible distribution, and the Commission so resolved. Although a mimeographed version can usually be found in major university research libraries after considerable effort, the promised dissemination never took place. The hostile reaction to Ruhashyankiko’s report on the Armenian issue led the Sub-Commission to consider revising the report. In 1982, the Sub-Commission asked the Commission on Human Rights to request the Economic and Social Council to mandate a new Special Rapporteur, with instructions to revise and update the study. Authorization was obtained and Sub-Commission member Benjamin Whitaker of the United Kingdom appointed. His final report was accepted by the Sub-Commission in 1985. Whitaker corrected the omission of the Armenian genocide, although the controversy did not go away. Some of the experts at the 1985 session of the Sub-Commission argued that Ruhashyankiko had been right to hesitate. The Sub-Commission’s final report contained an equivocal paragraph: ‘Turning specifically to the question of the massacre of the Armenians, the view was expressed by various speakers that such massacres indeed constituted genocide, as was well documented by the Ottoman military trials of 1919, eyewitness reports and official archives. Objecting to such a view, various participants argued that the Armenian massacre was not adequately documented and that certain evidence had been forged.’

A decade later, a French court referred to the Whitaker report as an

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122 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.822, para. 15.
123 Ibid., para. 30; see also ibid., para. 32 (Sadi).
124 CHR Decision 9 (XXXV).
125 SCHR Res. 1982/2.
127 SCHR Res. 1983/2.

Whitaker’s report made a number of innovative and controversial conclusions, contrasting sharply with the conservatism of the Ruhashyankiko document. For example, Whitaker wanted to amend the Convention in order to include political groups and groups based on sexual orientation, to exclude the plea of superior orders, to extend the punishable acts to those of ‘advertent omission’ and to pursue consideration of cultural genocide, ‘ethnocide’ and ‘ecocide’. At the conclusion of the debate in the Sub-Commission, two resolutions were proposed.\footnote{‘Draft Resolution Submitted by Mr Deschênes and Mr Mubanga-Chipoya’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/L.15.} The first endorsed Whitaker’s proposals, including amendment of the Convention;\footnote{‘Draft Resolution Submitted by Mr Deschênes, Mr George and Mr Mubanga-Chipoya’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/L.16.} the second merely received and took note of the study, thanking the Special Rapporteur for his efforts.\footnote{One member, Sofinsky, said he had ‘thrown the ship’s compass overboard’ by attempting to enlarge the concept unreasonably. For the debates, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/SR.17, pp. 2–10; UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/SR.18, pp. 3–10; UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/SR.19, pp. 2–7; UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/SR.20, pp. 2–17; UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/SR.21, pp. 2–16; UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/SR.22, pp. 2–5.} Opinions about Whitaker’s conclusions so divided the Sub-Commission\footnote{UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/SR.36/Add.1, para. 21.} that even the more modest of the two resolutions could only be adopted with difficulty. A paragraph was added to note ‘that divergent opinions have been expressed about the content and proposals of the report’.\footnote{Ibid., para. 32.} An attempt to strengthen the resolution by expressing the Sub-Commission’s thanks and congratulations for ‘some’ of the proposals in the report was rather resoundingly defeated.\footnote{Ibid., para. 57.} The resolution thanking Whitaker, as amended, was eventually adopted.\footnote{UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/SR.37, paras. 2–14.} The second resolution was eventually withdrawn by its sponsors.\footnote{‘Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, SCHR Res. 1993/8.}

The Sub-Commission resumed consideration of genocide in 1993.\footnote{UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/L.15.} The next year, the Sub-Commission recommended that the statute of an international court be prepared quickly so as to facilitate prosecution of genocide. The Sub-Commission also asked that article VIII of the Convention be applied and a committee created charged with examining State party reports on their respect of undertakings pursuant to article V.
of the Convention. Furthermore, the Sub-Commission proposed that the Convention be improved by including a clause creating universal jurisdiction. In 1995, the Sub-Commission examined incitement to hatred and genocide, particularly by the media. Its resolution cited specifically the case of ‘Radio Démocratie – La Voix du Peuple’, transmitting from the Uvira region of Zaire, which was responsible for ‘stirring up genocidal hatred’ in Burundi. Referring to both the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Genocide Convention, the Sub-Commission urged the authorities of Zaire, as a party to those instruments, ‘to take steps to close down this radio station, prosecute its sponsors and “reporters”, order an investigation and, in that connection, place under seal all materials and recording which may serve as evidence, and to bring the “reporters” and their sponsors before the competent courts’. The Sub-Commission also concluded, in another resolution adopted in 1995, ‘that a veritable genocide is being committed massively and in a systematic manner against the civilian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, often in the presence of United Nations forces’.

Commission on Human Rights

The Sub-Commission’s work percolated up to the Commission on Human Rights, which began, in 1986, adopting a series of resolutions on genocide. Only three special sessions of the Commission have ever been convened. In each case, they related to allegations of genocide. The first was held in August 1992 to consider the situation in the former Yugoslavia. The Commission ‘[c]ondemn[ed] absolutely the concept and practice of “ethnic cleansing”’. It stopped short of using the term

'genocide', although the question was clearly on its mind, as can be seen from the reference to ‘destruction of national, ethnic, racial or religious groups’ in the preamble of the resolution, a phrase obviously borrowed from article II of the Genocide Convention. The Commission’s resolution was subsequently endorsed by the Economic and Social Council.\textsuperscript{147} The second special session, convened on 30 November 1992, repeated the allusion to article II of the Convention, adding an express reference to the title of the Convention in the preamble and, in the dispositive paragraphs, ‘[c]all[ing] upon all States to consider the extent to which the acts committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia constitute genocide, in accordance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’.\textsuperscript{148} The Commission was again convened on an emergency basis in May 1994, at the request of Canada,\textsuperscript{149} to deal with the ongoing genocide in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{150} The principal result was appointment of a Special Rapporteur, René Degni-Segui, dean of the law faculty at the University of Abidjan and a member of a fact-finding commission of non-governmental organizations that warned of genocide more than a year earlier.\textsuperscript{151} He visited Rwanda immediately, promptly issuing a report on the scope of the genocide:

14. From the definition of the crime of genocide given in article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, it is apparent that this crime has three constituent elements which might be summarized as follows: a criminal act, ‘committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,’ a particular group ‘as such’.

15. There does not seem to be any doubt about the first condition, in view of the massacres perpetrated and even the cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The second is not difficult to establish either, since such a clear and unambiguous intention is contained in the constant incitements to murder put out by the media (particularly [Radio-télévision libre mille collines]) and reproduced in leaflets. And even if that were not so, the intention could have been deduced from the facts themselves, on the basis of a variety of concordant indications: preparations for the massacres (distribution of firearms and training of members of the militias), number of Tutsi killed and the result of a policy of destruction of the Tutsi. The third condition, on the other hand, requiring that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{147} UN Doc. E/1992/22/Add.2/Rev.1.
\item \textsuperscript{148} ‘The Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia’, CHR Res. 1992/S–2/1, para. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{149} UN Doc. E/CN.4/S–3/2.
\end{itemize}
the ethnic group should be targeted as such, raises a problem, because the Tutsi are not the only victims of the massacres, in which Hutu moderates have not been spared. But the problem is more apparent than real, for two reasons: firstly, many witnesses confirm that the screening carried out at roadblocks to check identities was aimed essentially at the Tutsi. Secondly, and above all, the main enemy, identified with the [Rwandese Patriotic Front], is still the Tutsi, who is the inyenzi (cockroach), to be crushed at all costs. The Hutu moderate is merely a supporter of the main enemy, and is targeted only as a traitor to his ethnic group, which he dares to oppose.

16. The conditions laid down by the 1948 Convention are thus met, and Rwanda having acceded to it on 16 April 1976, is required to respect its principles, which would be binding upon it even without any treaty obligation, since they have acquired the force of customary law. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, the term ‘genocide’ should henceforth be used as regards the Tutsi. The situation is different in the case of the assassination of Hutu.152

Degni-Segui continued to study the Rwandan genocide in the course of his three-year mandate. In 1997, the Commission on Human Rights designated a ‘Special Representative’ to replace the Special Rapporteur, more a change in terminology than in substance, replacing Degni-Segui.153 The Commission, in its annual resolutions on Rwanda, has condemned ‘genocidal activities perpetrated in Rwanda by former members of the Rwandan armed forces, interahamwe and other insurgent groups’.154

The Commission’s Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, has taken the lead on genocide-related issues.155 In his first report, in 1993, Ndiaye listed the Genocide Convention as one of the instruments he considered applicable to his mandate.156 In April of that year he visited Rwanda following allegations of genocide by the NGO fact-finding commission in which


155 A list of standards underlying the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, published by the Commission in a 1992 resolution, did not mention the Genocide Convention, although it suggested enlarging the mandate by adding the word ‘extrajudicial’: ‘Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions’, CHR Res. 1992/72.

Degni-Segui had participated.\textsuperscript{157} Ndiaye confirmed its conclusions, writing: ‘The cases of intercommunal violence brought to the Special Rapporteur’s attention indicate very clearly that the victims of the attacks, Tutsis in the overwhelming majority of cases, have been targeted solely because of their membership of a certain ethnic group, and for no other objective reason. Article II, paragraphs (a) and (b) [of the Genocide Convention], might therefore be considered to apply to these cases.’\textsuperscript{158}

Since then, the Special Rapporteur has systematically addressed the issue of genocide in his annual reports.\textsuperscript{159} In 1996, he considered the crisis in Burundi, warning that ‘[t]he failure to take concrete measures with immediate effect by either the Burundian authorities or the international community in order to put an end to this violence and prevent its degeneration into genocide has also contributed to shaping the situation’.\textsuperscript{160} In 1997, the Special Rapporteur noted ‘a great reluctance in the international community to use the term “genocide”, even when reference is made to situations of grave violations of the right to life which seem to match clearly the criteria contained in article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’.\textsuperscript{161} The Special Rapporteur again focused on Burundi, saying it was characterized by a long series of massacres and acts of genocide,\textsuperscript{162} and on the situation in eastern Zaire.\textsuperscript{163} He noted that the prevention of genocide had not gained the attention it deserved from the international community, and called for the establishment of a system of rapid alert in


\textsuperscript{159} UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60, para. 26


\textsuperscript{161} UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60, para. 42. See also ‘Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Note by the Secretary-General’, UN Doc. A/51/457, para. 68.

\textsuperscript{162} UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60, para. 43.

\textsuperscript{163} ‘Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Note by the Secretary-General’, UN Doc. A/51/457, para. 73.
regions where political situations are identified as being volatile.\textsuperscript{164} In addition, the Special Rapporteur urged governments to ratify the Convention and to act pursuant to article VIII as required.\textsuperscript{165} Finally, he recommended the establishment of a monitoring mechanism to supervise the application of the Convention.\textsuperscript{166}

Ndiaye resigned in 1998 and was replaced by Pakistani human rights lawyer Asma Jahangir. Her first report to the Commission confirms an intention to pursue Ndiaye’s work on genocide. She cautioned that:

the frequent and at times casual use of the term ‘genocide’ in everyday political discourse . . . risks eroding some of its weight as a legal term. This underscores the importance of using the term ‘genocide’ with precision and in accordance with the criteria set out in article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. However, she notes with concern the reluctance on the part of the international community to use the term ‘genocide’, even when the situations referred to constitute grave and systematic violations of the right to life which seem to match these criteria.\textsuperscript{167}

Several other special rapporteurs of the Commission on Human Rights have also addressed genocide issues. In his initial reports, the Special Rapporteur on Burundi, Paolo Sergio Pinheiro, cited the perpetration of ‘deliberate genocidal acts’\textsuperscript{168} and the activities of extremists subscribing to a ‘genocidal ideology’.\textsuperscript{169} Pinheiro said it was inappropriate to ask when genocide would occur in Burundi, saying it might be more fitting to speak of ‘genocide by attrition’.\textsuperscript{170} He also described the massacres of Hutus in 1972 as a ‘selective genocide’\textsuperscript{171} and those of

\textsuperscript{164} UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60, para. 110.
\textsuperscript{166} UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60, para. 130; ‘Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Note by the Secretary-General’, UN Doc. A/51/457, para. 56.
Tutsi following the assassination of president Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993 as ‘genocide’. In later reports, Pinheiro was more cautious with the term, perhaps betraying an awareness of its potentially inflammatory consequences within the ethnic conflict of Burundi. The special rapporteur on the Congo, Roberto Garreton, made controversial remarks charging genocide in mid-1997, but he too, in later reports, steered gingerly around the word. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Radhika Coomaraswamy, has studied the impact of the Rwandan genocide on women in Rwanda, noting how systemic discrimination against women exacerbates the consequence for genocide survivors.


The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Its involvement in prevention of genocide, although theoretically contemplated by article VIII, is set out in a special provision, article IX. Four cases have been taken before the court based on alleged breaches of the Convention, the application by Pakistan against India in 1972 concerning the threatened prosecution of Pakistani prisoners of war for genocide; the application by Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993 against Yugoslavia for its role in the war (and the Yugoslav counter-claim of 1997); the application by Yugoslavia against ten members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999; and that of Croatia against Yugoslavia in 1999. On all of these occasions, the parties to the dispute relied essentially on article IX, although in the second case, Bosnia and Herzegovina also invoked article VIII. The Court said that, even assuming article VIII applied to the Court as one of the competent organs of the United Nations, it ‘appears not to confer on it any functions or competence additional to those provided for in its Statute’. The overlap between the provisions was not considered during drafting of the Convention.

The Court first considered the Genocide Convention in the advisory opinion requested by the General Assembly concerning the validity of reservations to the Convention, a question on which the text of the instrument is silent. The Court was divided on the question, with a majority concluding that reservations were permitted to the extent that they were compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. The Court also noted ‘that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation’.

The Court has also touched on the issue of genocide in other decisions. In the *Barcelona Traction* case, it made its oft-cited remark about the *erga omnes* nature of the prohibition of genocide. In the *Nuclear Weapons* case, some States had contended that the prohibition

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177 The contentious cases filed pursuant to art. IX of the Convention are discussed in detail in chapter 9, pp. 425–33 above.


180 *Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd (Belgium v. Spain)*, [1970] ICJ Reports 3, p. 32: ‘By its very nature, the outlawing of genocide, aggression, slavery and racial discrimination are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights
of genocide, set out in the Convention, was a relevant rule of customary law applicable to the question of nuclear weapons. They argued that, because of the high number of victims in the case of nuclear attack, and because they would in certain cases be members of a protected group, the intent to destroy the group could be inferred. According to the ruling of the Court, 'the prohibition of genocide would be pertinent in this case if the recourse to nuclear weapons did indeed entail the element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision quoted above. In the view of the Court, it would only be possible to arrive at such a conclusion after having taken due account of the circumstances specific to each case.'\textsuperscript{181}

\textbf{Secretariat}

To the extent that the other United Nations organs are involved in the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, the Secretariat is inevitably a part of any activity of the organization. During the Rwandan genocide, the Secretariat was the first to be informed of the threats of genocide in messages coming not from States parties but from its own representatives in the field. Four months prior to the assassination of president Habyarimana and the real beginning of the massacres, on 11 January 1994, the commander of the UNAMIR, Canadian general Roméo Dallaire, sent a coded cable to the Peacekeeping Operations department of the Secretariat warning of a plan for the extermination of the Tutsi population. Peacekeeping operations at the time were under the direction of future Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. Known as the ‘genocide fax’, it told of an informant, a former member of the security staff of President Juvenal Habyarimana, who had been ‘ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali’. Dallaire wrote: ‘He suspects it was for their extermination. Example he gave was that in twenty minutes his personnel could kill up to a thousand Tutsis.’ In a reply the same day, signed by Kofi Annan but apparently authored by Iqbal Riza, Dallaire was instructed that, if he was ‘convinced that the information provided by informant is absolutely reliable’, he should share it with Habyarimana, telling him the activities ‘represent a clear threat to the peace process’ and a ‘clear violation’ of the ‘Kigali weapons secure area’. He was also instructed to share his information with the ambassadors to involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations \textit{erga omnes}.\textsuperscript{181}

Rwanda from Belgium, France and the United States.\textsuperscript{182} Years later, Iqbal Riza, who was Assistant Secretary-General for peacekeeping at the time, said: ‘We did not give that information the importance and the correct interpretation that it deserved. We realized that only in hindsight.’\textsuperscript{183} Riza said he eventually accepted the fact that this mistake had led to loss of life. Dallaire had asked for permission to raid arms caches that had been identified by the informer, but Riza, acting on behalf of Annan, denied such authority.\textsuperscript{184}

The actual rules of engagement of Dallaire’s forces were never formally adopted, although the draft rules could well have authorized intervention. They stated:

Criminal Acts

15. The recent history of Rwanda is burdened with civil war, dislocation of large elements of the population, terrorist, ethnic and political violence, armed banditry and virtual economic collapse. The potential for a dramatic rise in armed banditry during the UNAMIR mandate, due to the rapid demobilization of approximately 35,000 military personnel, high unemployment, overpopulation and mass desertion from the army is very high.

16. For the most part, the maintenance of law and order, and therefore responding to control criminal activity is the responsibility of the local police, monitored by the UNAMIR UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) monitors. However, during the period of demobilization, the ability of the local police may be severely taxed. As a very real possibility, UNAMIR military personnel may be required to assist UNCIVPOL and local authorities in maintaining law and order. In these circumstances, these RoE [Rules of Engagement] would be used in support of local authorities and UNCIVPOL. In these circumstances, military personnel or units would be placed in support of UNCIVPOL, who would act to support local police in the maintenance of law and order.

Crimes against humanity

17. There may be ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts committed during this mandate which will morally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them. Examples are executions, attacks of displaced persons or refugees, ethnic riots, attacks on demobilized soldiers, etc. During such occasions, UNAMIR military personnel will follow the [Rules of Engagement] outlined in this directive, in support of UNCIVPOL and local authorities or in their absence, UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent any crime against humanity.\textsuperscript{185}


\textsuperscript{184} See interview with Iqbal Riza on the television documentary ‘The Triumph of Evil’, note 86 above.

\textsuperscript{185} \textit{In Force Commander, Operational Directive No. 2: Rules of Engagement (Interim)}, 19 November 1993, UN Restricted, UNAMIR, File No. 4003.1.
It is often stated that, with a proper mandate, the United Nations peacekeeping forces could have prevented genocide in Rwanda. General Dallaire claimed that with an appropriately equipped force of 5,000 soldiers he could have stopped the killings. A study by United States military experts confirms his assessment. But because of instructions from the Secretariat in New York, Dallaire’s forces did not take aggressive steps to intervene. Later, as the crisis unfolded, the Secretariat fought with the Security Council in order to maintain the strength of the Mission. Boutros Boutros-Ghali challenged the Security Council, saying it was afraid to use the word ‘genocide’ in presidential statements and resolutions because this would require it to act to prevent the crime being committed. Eventually, Boutros-Ghali acknowledged that the United Nations was slow to warn of plans for the 1994 genocide, saying major world powers should have been given an explicit warning about General Dallaire’s message.

Since 1994, the Secretariat has been deeply involved in issues relating to ethnic conflict in the Great Lakes region of Africa and thus, necessarily, in questions of genocide. Much of its work has been directed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, a position established in 1994 following the World Conference on Human Rights. Indeed, the first issue tackled by the incoming High Commissioner was the Rwandan genocide. In Burundi, a special representative of the Secretary-General has been actively involved in conflict prevention since the putsch of October 1993. In 1996, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that ‘the international community must allow for the possibility that the worst may happen and that genocide could occur in Burundi’. He said that ‘military intervention to save lives might become an inescapable imperative’. The Secretariat was an important player in eastern Congo, after the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Roberto Garreton, warned of genocide in 1997. The Congo government refused a Commission-mandated investigative team permission to proceed with its work, and Secretary-

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188 UN Doc. S/1996/660, para. 49.
189 See note 175 above.
General Annan became involved in attempts ‘to help break a dead-
lock’. According to Annan, ‘[t]he members of the Team believe that 
some of the killings may constitute genocide, depending on their intent, 
and call for further investigation of those crimes and of their motiva-
tion’. A three-person panel accompanied by technical personnel was 
eventually appointed by the Secretariat, although it was never able to 
function effectively within Congo. In the executive summary of its 
report, issued in June 1998, the investigating commission wrote:

96. When the camps in North Kivu were attacked in October and November 
1996, it is clear that one of the objectives was to force the refugee population in 
the camps to return to Rwandan territory. To some extent the return was 
voluntary, since many genuine refugees had been prevented from returning to 
the military elements in the camps. However, it also is clear that, at some times 
and in some areas, the attacks on former camp populations which fled westward 
into the interior of Zaire were not intended to force them to return, but simply 
to eliminate them. This is clearest in the massacre at Wendji and Mbandaka, 
when a large number of Rwandan Hutus at the border of a third country, the 
Republic of Congo, were systematically killed just as many of them were trying 
to flee. Some evidence suggests that the objective of physical elimination of the 
Rwandan Hutus who opted to remain in Zaire rather than return to Rwanda 
explains the way the attacks on the camps south of Kisangani were carried out, 
including the ‘mopping up’ operations carried out after the attacks on such. 
There are at least two possible interpretations of the intent to eliminate the 
Rwandan Hutus remaining in the country: either there was a decision to 
eliminate them because the breaking up of the camps in effect separated the 
‘good’ Hutus from the bad: those who had little involvement in the 1994 
genocide against Tutsis had returned, and those who fled rather than return 
were those who had participated in or supported genocide. In either case, the 
systematic massacre of those remaining in Zaire was an abhorrent crime against 
humanity, but the underlying rationale for the decisions is material to whether 
these killings constituted genocide, that is, a decision to eliminate, in part, 
the Hutu ethnic group. The underlying reason for the massacres of Zairian 
Hutus in North Kivu is also material. This question is the most momentous one 
included in the mandate given to the Team, and one which requires further 
investigation.

112. In Wendji, the [Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the 
Congo] troops announced to the local population in Lingala that they ‘were not

190 ‘Letter Dated 19 June 1998 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of 
191 Ibid., p. 2.
192 ‘Letter Dated 19 June 1998 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, Annex, Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team 
Charged with Investigating Serious Violations of Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc. S/1998/581, 
p. 25.
there for the Congolese’, but rather for the refugees. Using Lingala, the local language, they ordered the local population to place white headbands around their heads, to allow the soldiers to distinguish them from the Rwandans. Soon after this, the soldiers began to shoot the latter. The number of victims killed in Wendji is unknown.\(^{193}\)

Whether genocide took place in eastern Congo in late 1996 and early 1997 remains unanswered.\(^{194}\) The question continues to preoccupy international organizations as well as human rights activists. The investigative work is inconclusive and as time passes the trail goes colder.

**Preventive measures not included in the Convention**

The laconic references to the prevention of genocide in articles I and VIII of the Convention are all that remain of considerably more extensive proposals aimed at attacking the origins of the crime. The further ‘upstream’ that international law was prepared to go in preventing genocide, the more likely it was that it would trench upon ‘matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’, to borrow the language of article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations. The failure to adopt these more far-reaching provisions highlights the still relatively underdeveloped condition of international human rights law in 1948, when the Convention was adopted. While the drafters of the Convention were prepared to admit, albeit with great caution, international intervention when genocide had in fact been committed, they were loathe to accept such activity when it was only threatened because of hate propaganda and the activities of racist organizations. The exclusion of these provisions from the Convention was, to a large extent, corrected in subsequent human rights instruments. Ironically, these more recent obligations are not only more complete than what had been proposed in 1948, they are also presently more widely ratified than the Convention itself.

**Hate propaganda**

The Secretariat draft contained a provision addressed to hate propaganda: ‘All forms of public propaganda tending by their systematic and


\(^{194}\) In her 1999 report, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions expressed her regret that ‘because of lack of cooperation on the part of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Team was unable to complete its investigations’: ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms Asma Jahangir, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/68’, note 167 above, para. 30.
hateful character to promote genocide, or tending to make it appear as a necessary, legitimate or excusable act shall be punished.’ The Secretariat noted that this differed from direct and public incitement to commit genocide, listed elsewhere in the draft as an act of genocide. In cases contemplated by article III, ‘the author of the propaganda would not recommend the commission of genocide, but would carry on such general propaganda as would, if successful, persuade those impressed by it to contemplate the commission of genocide in a favourable light’. According to the Secretariat, ‘[s]uch propaganda is even more dangerous than direct incitement to commit genocide. Genocide cannot take place unless a certain state of mind has previously been created’.

The United States proposed deletion of article III of the Secretariat draft, the first of its many initiatives to ensure that measures dealing with hate propaganda be excluded. The United States said that ‘[u]nder Anglo-American rules of law the right of free speech is not to be interfered with unless there is a clear and present danger that the utterance might interfere with a right of others’. According to the United States, this requirement of ‘clear and present danger’ would only be met in the case of incitement, something that was already covered as an act of genocide. The Soviet Union was diametrically opposed, taking the view that the convention should make it a punishable offence to engage in any form of propaganda for genocide (‘the press, radio, cinema, etc., aimed at inciting racial, national or religious enmity or hatred’).

In the Ad Hoc Committee, the United States challenged a Soviet proposal to include reference to ‘public propaganda . . . aimed at inciting racial, national or religious enmities or hatreds’, afraid ‘that any hostile statement regarding a group of human beings might be denounced as incitement to genocide. This would hamper freedom of speech and in particular the freedom of the press, to a considerable extent.’ The United States ‘agree[d] that action should be taken against the press and other media of information when they were guilty of direct incitement to commit acts of genocide’. But it threatened to withdraw such agreement in principle if the convention conflicted with its Constitution with respect to freedom of the press. The United States was not alone in its reluctance to deal with hate propaganda.

195 UN Doc. E/447, p. 32.
196 Ibid.
197 UN Doc. A/401.
199 Ibid., p. 6.
200 Ibid., p. 7.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid., p. 10. See also UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.6, p. 3.
falling short of direct and public incitement to genocide. Lebanon noted that campaigns undertaken during wartime to arouse hatred for the enemy should not be mistaken for genocide. ‘It was clear that such campaigns which helped to raise the morale of its citizens should not be considered as propaganda for the incitement of genocide’, said Lebanon.\(^{203}\) The Soviet amendment dealing with hate speech was eventually rejected.\(^{204}\)

In the Sixth Committee, the Soviet Union again proposed a paragraph to prohibit hate propaganda: ‘All forms of public propaganda (press, radio, cinema, etc.) aimed at inciting racial, national or religious enmities or hatreds or at provoking the commission of acts of genocide.’\(^{205}\) This went much further than ‘direct incitement’, which had already been accepted.\(^{206}\) The Soviets argued that a similar proposal had been earlier rejected because the Ad Hoc Committee felt the matter was covered by the incitement provision. The Soviets wanted to deal with all hate propaganda, which they said was ‘the cause of acts of genocide’. Hitler’s infamous book *Mein Kampf* was cited as an example of the type of work that would be prohibited by the additional provision.\(^{207}\) France was supportive, offering a reworded provision: ‘All forms of public propaganda which inflame racial, national or religious enmities or hatreds, with the object of provoking the commission of crimes of genocide.’\(^{208}\) Haiti, too, supported the amendment.\(^{209}\)

Inevitably, the United States was opposed, on the grounds this would infringe upon freedom of the press.\(^{210}\) Jean Spiropoulos of Greece said the Soviet proposal was out of place in the convention. He noted that, if the purpose was to suppress propaganda ‘aimed at inciting racial, national or religious enmities or hatreds’, this was not genocide, because there was no intent to destroy a group.\(^{211}\) Gerald Fitzmaurice of the United Kingdom said that he would have supported the amendment ‘if the world situation were different’. However, given the current context, the provision ‘might become a pretext for serious abuses’ by governments which did not like ‘criticism, particularly newspaper criticism’, he

\(^{203}\) UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5, p. 10.  
\(^{204}\) UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.16, p. 11 (five in favour (of rejection), two against).  
\(^{206}\) For a discussion of the debate, see ‘Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Study Prepared by Mr Nicode`me Ruhashyan-kiko, Special Rapporteur’, note 37 above, paras. 117–19.  
\(^{207}\) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.86 (Morozov, Soviet Union).  
\(^{208}\) *Ibid.* (Chaumont, France).  
\(^{209}\) *Ibid.* (Demesmin, Haiti).  
\(^{210}\) *Ibid.* (Maktos, United States).  
\(^{211}\) *Ibid.* (Spiropoulos, Greece).
said. Cuba, Uruguay, Syria and Egypt also spoke against the amendment.

It should be borne in mind that during debate, delegates believed political groups were to be protected by the convention. The Sixth Committee had already so decided, and only later in the session would this be reversed. This undoubtedly influenced the attitudes of some delegations towards repressing hate propaganda. For example, Iran invoked the spectre of ‘punishment of propaganda aimed at stirring up political hatred. The result might be that political strife between parties could be interpreted as propaganda.’ Sweden said it was nervous about the prohibition of hate propaganda being extended to political groups and thought it best to abstain.

The Soviet amendments were rejected by convincing majorities. Subsequently, the Soviet Union unsuccessfully attempted to revive the issue, with a new modification to article V, concerning obligations to enact legislation to prevent and punish genocide.

The lacuna in the Convention on hate propaganda has been filled by other instruments of international human rights law. Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted the day after the Genocide Convention, states that: ‘All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.’ Moreover, the right to freedom of expression, enshrined in article 19 of the Declaration, is deemed subject ‘to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society’.

212 Ibid. (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
213 Ibid. (Dihigo, Cuba).
214 Ibid. (Manini y Ríos, Uruguay).
215 Ibid. (Tarazi, Syria).
216 Ibid. (Raafat, Egypt).
217 Ibid. (Abdoh, Iran).
219 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.87. The first part of the Soviet amendment, dealing with propaganda aimed at inciting enmities or hatred, was rejected by twenty-eight to eleven, with four abstentions. The second, concerning propaganda aimed at provoking genocide, was rejected by thirty to eight, with six abstentions. For academic criticism of the rejection of the Soviet proposal, see Jean Graven, ‘Sur la prévention du crime de génocide: Réflexions d’un juriste’, (1968) 14–15 Études internationales de psychosociologie criminelle, pp. 9–11; and Antonio Planzer, Le crime de génocide, St Gallen, Switzerland: F. Schwald, 1956, pp. 113–14.
221 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A (III), UN Doc. A/810, art. 29(2).
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted in 1965, contains quite extensive obligations with respect to the prevention of hate propaganda.\textsuperscript{222} Article 4 of the Convention declares:

States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, \textit{inter alia}:

(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof;

(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;

(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.

The International Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has been ratified by more than 150 States, enjoying a considerably broader reach than the Genocide Convention. Moreover, States parties to the Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination are subject to a supervisory mechanism. They must submit periodic reports to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on compliance. Individuals may also file complaints with the Committee alleging violation of the Convention, for those States that have accepted the petition mechanism. In some of these contentious cases, the Committee has found States parties in breach of their obligations. According to the Committee: ‘When threats of racial violence are made, especially when they are made in public and by a group, it is incumbent upon the State to investigate with due diligence and expedition.’\textsuperscript{223}

Essentially similar obligations, at least with respect to hate propaganda, are set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Covenant recognizes the right to freedom of expression, but subjects its exercise to special duties and responsibilities. According to article 19(3): ‘It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but

\textsuperscript{222} Note 135 above.

these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.’ Legislation prohibiting hate propaganda in its various forms, including denial of genocide, is thus sheltered from attack. But the Covenant takes this a step further, imposing an obligation upon States parties to prohibit by law ‘[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’. As in the case of the Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, there is a periodic reporting obligation to the Human Rights Committee in order to supervise compliance with these obligations as well as a widely accepted individual petition mechanism.

In 1990, France adopted the Loi Gayssot to repress denial of the Holocaust. The legislation made it an offence to contest the existence of crimes against humanity as defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945, on the basis of which Nazi leaders were tried and convicted at Nuremberg in 1945–6. The French legislation was challenged in an individual communication before the Human Rights Committee filed by Robert Faurisson, who had been convicted under the law in 1992. Faurisson based his complaint on article 19 of the Covenant, which protects freedom of expression. In unanimous views issued in December 1996, the Committee dismissed the communication, although stopping short of fully endorsing the French legislation. This leaves open the hypothesis that the Loi Gayssot might, under certain circumstances, run foul of the Covenant.

Although the European Convention on Human Rights does not include an obligation to prevent hate propaganda, many States parties have taken such initiatives. The European Commission of Human Rights has ruled that hate propaganda is not protected by article 10 of the Convention, which enshrines freedom of expression. In 1995, it dismissed an application from an Austrian who had been successfully prosecuted for denying the Holocaust, saying ‘the applicant is essentially seeking to use the freedom of information enshrined in Article 10 of the


Convention as a basis for activities which are contrary to the text and spirit of the Convention and which, if admitted, would contribute to the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention’.  

In the *Jersild* case, a Danish journalist was prosecuted under hate propaganda provisions not for his own words but because he had provided a platform for racist extremists during a television interview. The European Court of Human Rights agreed that the freedom of expression provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights should be interpreted, ‘to the extent possible, so as to be reconcilable with its obligations’ under the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Denmark argued its legislation had been enacted to give effect to these treaty commitments. The Court noted that the remarks made by the extremists during the interview were not themselves protected by the Convention. Nevertheless, it was the journalist who had been prosecuted. Concluding that there was a violation of article 10, the Court laid considerable emphasis on the fact that the purpose of the journalist was not racist.

The freedom of expression provision in the American Convention on Human Rights is broader than the other international models. The Inter-American Court has noted that: ‘A comparison of Article 13 with the relevant provisions of the European Convention (article 10) and the Covenant (article 19) indicates clearly that the guarantees contained in the American Convention regarding freedom of expression were designed to be more generous and to reduce to a bare minimum restrictions impeding the free circulation of ideas.’ However, despite its large vision of freedom of expression, the provision also contemplates the case of racist propaganda. Article 13 § 5 of the Convention is more or less identical to article 20 of the International Covenant, and requires that where propaganda for war or advocacy of racial hatred constitute

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incitements to violence, they are to be considered as offences punishable by law. This provision was added to the Convention upon the recommendation of the rapporteur of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in order to bring the text into accordance with the International Covenant.\footnote{Comparative Study of the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and of the Draft Inter-American Conventions on Human Rights’, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.19 Doc. 18, para. 67.}

\textit{Disbanding of racist organizations}

Nothing in the Secretariat draft concerned disbanding of racist organizations. During the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee sessions, the Soviet Union argued for a provision requiring States to disband racist organizations.\footnote{‘Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide’, UN Doc. E/AC.25/7, Principle VIII.} China felt this went too far. ‘The convention should be as simple as possible and should represent the smallest common denominator of all the drafts’, said Lin. He noted that each State party should be free to act as it saw fit.\footnote{UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.6, p. 8.} The United States warned of ‘cumbersome burdens which States might seek to evade’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 13.} France agreed, adding that Member States were already bound to dissolve such organizations as a result of General Assembly Resolution 96(I).\footnote{Ibid., p. 13 (four in favour, three against).} The concept, contained in the Soviet Basic Principles, was rejected.\footnote{Ibid., p. 15.} But subsequently, Venezuela’s Pérez-Perozo said he had voted against the text, not the principle, and would ‘favour a clause whereby States agreed to take legislative national measures for the prevention or suppression of genocide’.\footnote{Ibid. (Maktos, United States). See also \textit{ibid.} (Davin, New Zealand).}

In the Sixth Committee, the Soviet Union once again urged a provision pledging parties to disband and prohibit organizations that incite racial hatred or the commission of genocidal acts.\footnote{UN Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1: ‘The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to disband and prohibit any organizations aimed at inciting racial, national or religious hatred or the commission of acts of genocide.’} It gave the Nazi party as an example, noting that it had existed long before the Holocaust.\footnote{UN Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1: ‘The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to disband and prohibit any organizations aimed at inciting racial, national or religious hatred or the commission of acts of genocide.’} The United States argued this ‘could lead only to an increase in international tension, and would merely serve as pretexts to harass States parties to the convention’.\footnote{UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.105 (Morozov, Soviet Union).} The United Kingdom invoked problems with its domestic law, which recognized ‘the right of any organization, whether political or not, to hold meetings and to express
its opinions freely, unless it advocates the use of violence and unless its activities were subversive.\textsuperscript{242} Egypt called the Soviet proposal ‘dangerous’ because the disbanding of the organization did not depend on the judicially established fact of the crime.\textsuperscript{243}

France attempted to salvage the Soviet proposal, saying that the convention would be incomplete if it did not strike at organizations. It suggested that the Soviets accept a proposal similar to one in the Secretariat draft\textsuperscript{244} and proposed an amendment: ‘The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to take the necessary measures with a view to disbanding groups or organizations which have participated in acts of genocide.’\textsuperscript{245} The Netherlands also said it did not like the Soviet proposal, because the criteria were not clear enough, but expressed willingness to accept another formula, such as that proposed by France.\textsuperscript{246} The Soviets stubbornly refused to accept the French proposal, because it depended on genocide being committed. Consequently, it did not prevent, it punished.\textsuperscript{247} France withdrew its amendment,\textsuperscript{248} and the Soviet article was rejected.\textsuperscript{249} The Soviets unsuccessfully returned to the issue in the plenary General Assembly with a similar amendment.\textsuperscript{250}

Although this issue is addressed rather more summarily in human rights instruments than the obligation to prohibit hate propaganda, article 4(b) of the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination requires that States parties shall ‘declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law’.\textsuperscript{251}

\textit{Preparatory acts}

Domestic criminal law systems generally consider mere preparatory acts insufficient to incur criminal liability. At a certain point, ‘mere’ prepara-
tory acts segue into behaviour that becomes punishable as an attempt. Attempted genocide is covered by article III(d) of the Convention as an ‘other act’. A more far-reaching provision dealing with preparatory acts was included in the Secretariat draft convention on genocide. ‘As a rule preparatory acts do not fall under criminal law because the agent is unable to carry out his schemes’, explained the Secretariat. ‘But it is different in the case of certain crimes against society.’ The Secretariat said preparatory acts should be punishable because genocide was an extremely grave crime; because once committed, it is irreparable; and because it requires the support of a comparatively large number of individuals. Nevertheless, because of the exceptional nature of punishment of preparatory acts, the Secretariat believed that if they were to be criminalized, they should be clearly defined. The following was suggested:

1. studies and research for the purpose of developing the technique of genocide;
2. setting up of installations, manufacturing, or training, possessing or supplying of articles or substances with the knowledge that they are intended for genocide; and
3. issuing instructions or orders, and distributing tasks with a view to committing genocide.

The United States opposed the provision, stating ‘these acts may be too far removed from what is generally regarded as the commission of the offence’. On the other hand, the Soviets keenly desired such provisions.

A Secretariat memorandum explained that: ‘This prevention may involve making certain acts punishable which do not themselves constitute genocide, for example, certain material acts preparatory to genocide, agreements or plots with a view to committing genocide, or systematic propaganda inciting to hatred and thus likely to lead to genocide. Prevention may take other forms than penal measures.’ But the United States remained adamantly opposed to the word ‘preparing’

252 Attempts are discussed in chapter 6, pp. 280–5 above.
253 UN Doc. E/447: ‘I. The following are likewise deemed to be crimes of genocide; . . . 2. The following preparatory acts: (a) studies and research for the purpose of developing the technique of genocide; (b) setting up of installations, manufacturing, obtaining, possessing or supplying of articles or substances with the knowledge that they are intended for genocide; (c) issuing instructions or orders, and distributing tasks with a view to committing genocide.’
257 UN Doc. E/AC.25/3.
or any other reference to ‘preparatory acts’.\textsuperscript{258} In an initial vote, the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee decided that ‘preparing’ should be included.\textsuperscript{259} But returning to the issue in a subsequent session, some members explained that the issue could be adequately covered by the crime of attempt and by adding a reference to the word ‘complicity’.\textsuperscript{260} A proposal to omit preparation was ultimately adopted.\textsuperscript{261}

In the Sixth Committee, the Soviet Union submitted a further paragraph dealing with ‘acts in preparation for the commission of genocide’.\textsuperscript{262} Its text closely followed the previous Secretariat draft: ‘The preparatory acts for committing genocide in the form of studies and research for the purpose of developing the technique of genocide: setting up of installations, manufacturing, obtaining, possessing or supplying of articles or substances with the knowledge that they are intended for genocide; issuing instructions or orders and distributing tasks with a view to committing genocide.’\textsuperscript{263} The Soviet delegate explained that preparatory acts should be punished when they constituted ‘direct preparation’. The object of the text was ‘to avoid broadening unduly the concept of preparatory acts, in order that it might be acceptable to States whose internal legislation provided for the punishment of preparatory acts only in certain specified cases’.\textsuperscript{264}

The Netherlands enthusiastically supported the Soviet proposal, noting it had intended to submit a similar amendment but changed its mind after seeing the Soviet version. The Netherlands felt that a related gap in the draft convention was the failure to prohibit the promulgation of laws directed towards the perpetration of genocide, and it proposed an oral amendment to the Soviet amendment, adding ‘promulgating laws’ before the words ‘issuing instructions’.\textsuperscript{265} Yugoslavia joined the supporters, noting that there was little or nothing in the draft convention about the prevention of genocide. It felt the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee had concentrated on measures of punishment, yet the convention should focus on prevention: ‘to that end, all preparatory acts must be punished.’\textsuperscript{266} It was pointed out that there was a precedent in international
law for such a provision, in the Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeit Currency.\(^{267}\)

Opposition came from States that felt mere preparation should not constitute a crime. ‘It was, indeed, extremely difficult to establish the criminal intent of the author of a preparatory act unless he made a confession – which was unlikely, as he could always claim that his act was harmless in intention and not unlawful – or unless drastic measures were employed to make him speak’, said Venezuela. The United Kingdom argued the text would be unenforceable under UK law because of evidentiary difficulties: ‘a preparatory act could not be condemned on vague presumptions; if, however, such presumptions were substantiated, there would be conspiracy or attempt, which crimes were already provided for in the convention.’\(^{268}\) As the tone sharpened, the United States delegate said ‘he could predict that the USSR delegation would vote against the text of the convention as a whole, adding that States ‘that had no intention of ratifying the convention should not create difficulties for those which sincerely desired to do so’.\(^{269}\) The United States said that ‘by permitting some States to prevent others from possessing certain products or objects, the amendment might give them a pretext for arriving by indirect means at the solution of certain problems which had been the subject of discussion for two years and which were not in the same category as genocide’.\(^{270}\) The Committee decided against a provision dealing with preparatory acts in the convention,\(^{271}\) and defeated the Soviet amendment, as amended by the Netherlands.\(^{272}\)

The failure to include a provision dealing with preparatory acts was criticized by Jean Graven, who wrote that: ‘Covering such acts does not mean “getting away from the crime itself”; on the contrary, it means getting nearer to it, grasping it more closely, going to the heart of it . . . There must be ways to lay hold of a crime and if possible prevent it as soon as it is embarked upon, without waiting for it to be committed.’\(^{273}\) But in contrast to the hate propaganda provision, which was deleted by the drafters but then adequately covered by human rights norms, the concept of punishing acts preparatory to genocide seems to have been


\(^{268}\) Ibid. (Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).

\(^{269}\) Ibid. (Maktos, United States). In fact, the Soviet Union voted in favour of the Convention, and ratified the instrument in 1954. The United States did not ratify the Convention until 1988.

\(^{270}\) Ibid. (Maktos, United States).

\(^{271}\) Ibid. (eleven in favour, thirty-one against, with five abstentions).

\(^{272}\) Ibid. (eight in favour, thirty against, with five abstentions).

forgotten by both international and domestic lawmakers. There is nothing, either in international treaties or in national criminal codes, to authorize criminal repression of acts preparatory to genocide until they reach the threshold of attempts.

**Humanitarian intervention**

At the first session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, in 1947, René Cassin remarked that it was essential to ensure the protection of the right to life in what was to become the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He said that it ‘certainly was not as elementary a right as one might believe for in 1933, when Germany violated those principles, there were many countries in the world who asked themselves whether they had a right to intervene’.\(^274\) In 1947, referring to General Assembly Resolution 96(I), Raphael Lemkin wrote that: ‘By declaring genocide a crime under international law and by making it a problem of international concern, the right of intervention on behalf of minorities slated for destruction has been established.’\(^275\) Yet nowhere does the Genocide Convention recognize that individual States or the international community acting in concert may or must intervene in order to prevent the crime. The matter was only addressed tangentially, in the debate concerning article VIII, a provision watered down in the final version to remove specific mention of the Security Council, the logical candidate for such activity.

The concept of humanitarian intervention with respect to genocide was largely forgotten for several decades, reflecting a general malaise with the concept prevailing during the Cold War. Academic writers occasionally addressed the subject, but found no significant echo in the activity of international organizations.\(^276\) Only in the late 1980s was the suggestion that international intervention in the case of humanitarian disasters, a notion dating back centuries, beginning to win acceptance in the international community. Carefully crafted resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly in 1988 and 1990, although their scope was apparently limited to humanitarian crises of natural origin.\(^277\)

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\(^{277}\) GA Res. 43/131; GA Res. 45/100; GA Res. 46/182.
1991, the Security Council authorized military activity to prevent atrocities directed against the Kurdish minority in Iraq.\(^{278}\) If intervention could be justified in such circumstances, \textit{a fortiori} the precedent ought to apply in cases of genocide, especially given the term ‘prevention’ in the title of the Convention and the obligation ‘to prevent’ set out in article I.

With the outbreak of war in Bosnia, it was argued that there was a duty to prevent genocide, imposed by the Convention as well as by customary law. No longer was it merely a question of whether States individually or the international community as a whole could intervene – the argument submitted in the case of Iraq and, subsequently, in Somalia – but rather that they \textit{must} intervene. There were even charges that the Security Council, in imposing an arms embargo, was preventing the victims of genocide from defending themselves and that the Council was, at least indirectly, an accomplice in the crimes. Malaysia invoked article I of the Genocide Convention, saying: ‘the Contracting Parties have not upheld their Convention obligations to prevent the crime from being committed and therefore are in violation of the Convention themselves. It has been argued that the Security Council’s failure to take enforcement action and to lift the arms embargo against the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina has made some of its members, which are also Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention, accomplices to the crime of genocide.’\(^{279}\) Bosnia put the question to the International Court of Justice in March 1993, when it filed its claim against Serbia. Bosnia argued that the Belgrade government, by directly or indirectly supporting Serb nationalists within Bosnia, was breaching its obligation to prevent genocide.\(^{280}\) In late 1993, Bosnia threatened to sue the


United Kingdom on the same basis. The argument was more tenuous, because the United Kingdom was not a combatant and its role was, at best, indirect. This time Bosnia argued that the United Kingdom had violated the Convention through its activities in the Security Council. But Bosnia never filed the case, and subsequently declared that it would not proceed.

The case against Serbia has yet to be adjudicated on the merits. During preliminary skirmishing, in the context of applications for provisional measures, Judge ad hoc Elihu Lauterpacht, who was appointed by Bosnia, wrote that ‘[t]he duty to “prevent” genocide is a duty that rests upon all parties and is a duty owed by each party to every other’. This is the concept of the prohibition of genocide as an *erga omnes* obligation, something already recognized by the International Court of Justice in the *Barcelona Traction* case. Judge Lauterpacht said that three separate elements needed to be distinguished.

First, there is the duty of the Respondent both to prevent genocide and to refrain from conduct that inhibits the ability of the Applicant itself to prevent genocide or to resist it. There can be no doubt that the Court may require the Respondent in general terms not to commit genocide and to take measures to prevent the commission of genocide, whether directly by itself or indirectly by others who may be directed, controlled or supported by it. This is what the Court has done in its Orders of 8 April 1993 and of today’s date. It is the least that the Court can do. There is a case, however, for saying that, in the light of the facts of which it is aware, the Court should be more specific in directing the Respondent to refrain also from particular kinds of acts, especially further murder of civilians and the continuance of the process of ethnic cleansing and the forced displacement of the Muslim population.

Second, there is the duty of the Applicant conceived and expressed in the same terms as those just used in regard to the duty of the Respondent. In principle, the duties of the two Parties are identical. But when the evidence indicates (as it does) that the extent of the atrocities committed against the Muslim population of Bosnia is of an order which so far exceeds the extent of any wrongs done to the Serb ethnic group in Bosnia-Herzegovina as to exclude any conclusion that the latter are suffering genocide, there is no need for a more


specific indication of interim measures in favour of Yugoslavia than appeared in the Court’s Order of 8 April 1993; and that is the view that the Court has taken in its Order of today’s date.

Third, there is the question of access by the Applicant to the means to prevent the commission of acts of genocide. The Applicant obviously has here in mind some consideration by the Court of the effect and future of the embargo placed by Security Council resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 upon the provision of arms and military equipment to both sides in the conflict.284

Looking at the provisions of the instrument, Judge Lauterpacht observed that it ‘strongly suggests that the Convention does no more than establish for the Contracting States duties that are to be implemented by legislative action within their domestic legal spheres’. But he said that such a narrow view must be rejected:

The statement in Article I that the Contracting Parties undertake ‘to prevent and to punish’ genocide is comprehensive and unqualified. The undertaking establishes two distinct duties: the duty ‘to prevent’ and the duty ‘to punish’. Thus, a breach of duty can arise solely from failure to prevent or solely from failure to punish, and does not depend on there being a failure both to prevent and to punish. Thus the effect of the Convention is also to place upon States duties to prevent and to punish genocide on the inter-State level. This is the plain meaning of the words of Article I and is confirmed to some extent by Article VIII and most clearly by Article IX.285

Judge Lauterpacht took the view that Article IX of the Convention contemplates State responsibility for genocide.286 Consequently, he said, the obligations extend to the duty to prevent a State from committing genocide.287 Judge Lauterpacht said this view is based on ‘the plain meaning of the words’ in the Convention, and that ‘preliminary scrutiny of the travaux préparatoires’ does not suggest differently.288 Then he moved to the most difficult issue, reaching a hesitant and nuanced conclusion:

What is more controversial is whether this duty extends beyond the duty of each party to prevent genocide within its own territory to that of preventing genocide wherever it may occur. Obviously, an absolutely territorial view of the duty to prevent genocide would not make sense since this would mean that a party, though obliged to prevent genocide within its own territory, is not obliged to prevent it in territory which it invades and occupies. That would be nonsense. So there is an obligation, at any rate for a State involved in a conflict, to concern itself with the prevention of genocide outside its territory.289

But does this ‘also mean that every party is under an obligation

285 Ibid., p. 443. 286 Ibid. 287 Ibid., p. 444. 288 Ibid. 289 Ibid.
individually and actively to intervene to prevent genocide outside its territory when committed by or under the authority of some other party.” Judge Lauterpacht said that to answer this it was necessary to look at State practice. In this respect, he referred to the Whitaker report, which discussed the massacre of Hutu in Burundi in 1965 and 1972, of Ache´ Indians in Paraguay prior to 1974, the mass killings by the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea between 1975 and 1978, and killings of the Bahai in Iran. ‘The limited reaction of the parties to the Genocide Convention in relation to these episodes may represent a practice suggesting the permissibility of inactivity’, was Judge Lauterpacht’s discouraging assessment. ‘In contrast with the position that I have taken on other debatable aspects of this case that have not been fully argued by the Parties, I do not feel able, in the absence of a full treatment of this subject by both sides to express a view on it at this stage – sympathetic though I am in principle to the idea of an individual and collective responsibility of States for the prevention of genocide wherever it may occur.’

The matter returned to centre stage in April 1994, as genocide raged in Rwanda. The situation was clearer, in some respects. The existence of full-blown genocide was more obvious than in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, this was a case of pure internal conflict, and there was no question of laying blame at the door of a foreign belligerent. Many asked whether the obligation to prevent genocide imposed a duty upon States parties to intervene militarily in order to stop the killings. The response was elusive and to this day the question remains largely unanswered.

What is known is that several members of the Security Council, and in particular the permanent members, were extremely reluctant to use the word ‘genocide’ in a resolution directed to the Rwandan crisis. In the view of many, including the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, this was because a finding of genocide would impose an obligation to act to prevent the crime. The United States was foremost among those who were uncomfortable with the word genocide. At a press briefing on 10 June 1994, State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelley said that the United States was not prepared to declare that genocide was taking place in Rwanda because ‘there are obligations which arise in connection with the use of the term’. The position of the United States is still not entirely clear on the subject, although obviously there has been considerable soul-searching about the obliga-

290 Ibid. 291 Ibid., p. 445.
tions that flow from the Convention in terms of preventing genocide. In a speech at Kigali airport, on 25 March 1998, President William Clinton said, contritely: ‘We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide.’ It is reasonable to deduce that American hesitation at the time was in some way connected with a perception that there was indeed an obligation under the Convention. Shortly thereafter the United States’ understanding of the scope of the obligation to prevent genocide became more subtle, emerging as a vague commitment with no real legal significance. That view was best expressed in late 1998 by the United States Ambassador for War Crimes, David Scheffer:

There also needs to be a better understanding of Article II [sic] of the Genocide Convention. Under Article II [sic], States Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or war, is a crime under international law that they undertake to prevent and punish. The US Senate, in ratifying the Genocide Convention, understood this to express the general purpose and intent of the States Parties, without adding any independent or specific obligation to the Genocide Convention. A State Party may choose from among a range of measures – diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, judicial initiatives, or the use of military force – to ‘undertake’ to prevent or punish genocide. But the State Party’s choice is necessarily discretionary. No government should be intimidated into doing nothing by the requirements of Article II [sic]; rather, every government should view it as an opportunity to react responsibly if and as genocide occurs.

Immediately prior to the Kigali speech, the United States and Uganda took the initiative to convene the Entebbe Summit for Peace and Prosperity. A declaration of principles agreed to on 25 March 1998 by six African heads of State and government as well as President Clinton and the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity included:

On Condemnation of Acts of Genocide:

The Heads of State and Government recognize the accomplishment of the Government of Rwanda in halting the 1994 genocide, condemn all acts of genocide and pledge to undertake a concerted effort to prevent its resurgence. To this end:

All Heads of State and Government condemn the continued atrocities of the ex-[Rwandan Armed Forces], the Interahamwe and their allies, pledge to work

together to prohibit future atrocities in the Great Lakes region, including those aided and abetted by external arms suppliers, call for the revitalization and expansion of the UN Arms Flow Commission, and are committed to publicize and duly consider its findings;

African Heads of State and Government pledge to deny extremist networks the use of their territory, postal services, airports, financial institutions, passports, road networks, and communications systems. The Summit calls upon all states to implement tight controls over these networks abroad;

All Heads of State and Government pledge to support the efforts of the OAU Eminent Personalities Study of the Rwanda Genocide and the Surrounding Events, and to duly consider its findings and recommendations;

The United States commits itself to working with regional partners and others to begin exploring, within one month’s time, the creation of an international Coalition Against Genocide, the aims of which might include: fostering international co-ordination in support of regional efforts to enforce anti-genocide measures; providing a forum for high-level deliberations on long-term efforts to prevent genocide in the future; and ensuring international support for the findings of the OAU Study;

The Heads of State and Government commend the Government of Rwanda for its efforts to render justice for the victims of the genocide and to prevent acts of revenge. We call upon the international community to redouble its efforts to work with the Government of Rwanda to achieve these goals;

The Heads of State and Government recognize recent progress made by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, but express their concern about the slow pace with which the Tribunal’s work has proceeded, urge the ICTR to do everything within its power to accelerate the processing of its cases, and call on all nations to cooperate fully and expeditiously with the Tribunal;

The Heads of State and Government affirm that the restoration of regional peace and stability requires an end to the culture of impunity and the restoration of the rule of law, and pledge their best efforts to strengthening national systems of civilian and military justice. The United States commits itself through the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, to an expanded effort to help the public and private sectors in Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo develop justice systems that are impartial, credible, and effective, and to support efforts to promote inclusion, coexistence, co-operation and security.295

The same day, President Clinton announced the establishment of a genocide early warning centre, to be established under the direction of the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.296 The core


of the system will be an Atrocities Prevention Interagency Working Group.\(^{297}\)

In the mid-1950s, Professor Hersh Lauterpacht said that ‘[a]cts of commission or omission in respect of genocide are no longer, in any interpretation of the Charter, considered to be a matter exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the States concerned. For the Parties expressly concede to the United Nations, the right of intervention in this sphere.’\(^{298}\) Practice of States since that time suggests that this intervention may include military action, but that this is viewed as a right rather than as an obligation. The most unfortunate consequence of this is to subject the prevention of genocide to what may often be cynical policy decisions by which humanitarian initiatives are inextricably linked to questions of national interest. This was indeed the situation in 1994 when the Security Council shrank before the word genocide. The French intervention in Rwanda in late June 1994 was not only too limited and too late, it appears to have been at least partially driven by a desire to protect the retreat of France’s erstwhile allies and prevent the advance of the Rwandese Patriotic Front.\(^{299}\)

The legal basis for humanitarian intervention in its 1990s iteration has been Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. As an exception to the general prohibition of the use of force, contained in article 2(4) of the Charter, and subject to the only exception allowing unilateral action (art. 51 of the Charter), the Security Council may authorize armed intervention ‘as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.\(^{300}\) Perhaps the single most significant development in the law on Chapter VII is the notion that international peace and security may be threatened by human rights violations within the borders of a sovereign State where there is no perceptible or realistic impact even on neighbouring States. The implicit


\(^{300}\) Charter of the United Nations, art. 42.
philosophy is that gross human rights violations anywhere are a threat to peace and security everywhere. In a sense, the Council has made the same leap that international justice made when it evolved from prosecuting piracy and began to prosecute crimes against humanity. Genocide must be deemed a threat to international peace and security, within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter. As the International Law Commission noted in its comments on the Code of Crimes, ‘the tragic events in Rwanda clearly demonstrated that the crime of genocide, even when committed primarily in the territory of a single State, could have serious consequences for international peace and security’.

The Security Council is dominated by its five permanent members and is to a large extent driven by the political agendas of their national interests. In its threatened application to the International Court of Justice against the United Kingdom, Bosnia raised the question of breach of the Convention by permanent members of the Security Council and, implicitly, by the Council itself. The question of the permissibility of action outside of the Security Council and without its authorization arises. There are isolated, and controversial, examples of allegedly humanitarian interventions that did not have the imprimatur of the Security Council: India in Bangladesh in 1971, Tanzania in Uganda in 1979, Vietnam in Cambodia in 1978–9. The latter were not cloaked in Security Council resolutions and cannot be justified under the Charter, although the international community tended to look the other way much as cinema-goers cheer when an aggressive policeman tortures a brutal criminal, despite their general abhorrence of police brutality and recognition that it is fundamentally illegal. More recently, invoking the duty to prevent genocide, Rwanda’s foreign minister said that it was prepared to intervene militarily in Congo in order to protect Tutsi minorities from massacre. In March 1999, the United States and its NATO allies undertook military intervention in the Kosovo crisis in the name of protecting the Kosovar minority from persecution by the central government of Yugoslavia. Security Council approval was impossible because of the Russian veto. In the early days of the bombardments, NATO leaders, including United States President William Clinton, spoke of genocide.

Secretary-General referred to ‘the dark cloud of the crime of genocide’. As it became clearer that Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic intended to drive Kosovars out of the territory, not destroying them physically, references to genocide declined. A resolution adopted by the Commission on Human Rights in late April 1999 described the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity but did not mention genocide. When Yugoslavia’s application for provisional measures against the NATO States was heard in early May 1999, the respondent States qualified its actions in Kosovo as ethnic cleansing, not genocide. The indictment issued by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia against Slobodan Milosevic and four others confined the charges to crimes against humanity and violations of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions in the conduct of the campaign of ethnic cleansing. Milosevic was not charged with genocide.

Arguably, humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization could be legally permissible as a result of the treaty-based obligation to prevent genocide in article I of the Genocide Convention and the customary norm that it reflects, even without Security Council authorization. If the duty to prevent genocide is a peremptory or \textit{jus cogens} norm, then it trumps any incompatible obligation, even one dictated by the Charter of the United Nations.

It has often been argued that the prohibition of genocide, and the duty to prevent and punish the crime, constitute norms of \textit{jus cogens}.\footnote{Yearbook \ldots 1994, Vol. I, 2333rd meeting, p. 30, para. 7; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Preliminary Objections, note 283 above, Dissenting Reasons of Judge ad hoc Kreca, para. 101; Application of the Convention on the}
Judge Elihu Lauterpacht reasoned accordingly in his individual opinion on provisional measures in the case of Bosnia v. Yugoslavia. He noted that the Security Council embargo applicable to the conflict operated ‘unequally’ between the two sides and inhibited Bosnia’s ability to prevent the commission of genocide. He cited the Special Rapporteur, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who had noted the ‘imbalance’ in weaponry between the two sides, a comment incorporated in General Assembly Resolution 47/121, and noted it showed a ‘direct link . . . between the continuance of the arms embargo and the exposure of the Muslim population of Bosnia to genocidal activity at the hands of the Serbs’. Judge Lauterpacht asked whether the Court could review the Security Council resolution, noting the doctrine set out in the Lockerbie case. But he said that the Bosnian application was different, because genocide was involved, and genocide is a *jus cogens* norm. The result, said Judge Lauterpacht, was that, when operation of the resolution began to make members of the United Nations ‘accessories to genocide’, it ceased to be valid and binding, and members were free to disregard it. However, he added, ‘it would be difficult to say that they then became positively obliged to provide the Applicant with weapons and military equipment’.

Judge Lauterpacht’s proposition only goes half-way towards the issue of whether unilateral or even multilateral armed action to prevent genocide is legal in the absence of Security Council authorization. First, Bosnia was asking the Court to declare that the Security Council resolution was invalid because it conflicted with a *jus cogens* norm. In the absence of the resolution, Bosnia was not bound by an arms embargo. As Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey argued before the Court, ‘can the Security Council act to limit the affirmative obligation of the signatories of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of


313 *Ibid*.
315 Note 279 above, pp. 439–40.
genocide to stop the crime?" The case of armed intervention is quite different because it is in the absence of a resolution that intervention becomes illegal, by the operation of the Charter itself. Theoretically, a State could ask the International Court of Justice to declare article 2(4) of the Charter inoperative, at least to the extent that it conflicted with the duty to prevent genocide. But this would not be a case of unilateral action, because the State would be recognizing that any action was contingent on a Court ruling. Perhaps the most serious objection to the idea that humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide is permissible because it is a *jus cogens* norm is the fact that the prevention of the use of force subject to the two exceptions mentioned in the Charter, Chapter VII action and self-defence, is also a *jus cogens* norm. Tolerating individual initiatives in the absence of Security Council permission is a slippery slope that threatens chaos. The consequences for international human rights are potentially as serious as those of any genocide.


Articles X to XIX of the Genocide Convention are protocolar clauses. They address such issues as the authentic language versions of the Convention, the procedures for signature, ratification and accession, denunciation and amendment. These questions, while secondary to the Convention as a whole, were considered at all stages of the drafting. Work on this subject was largely conducted by a three-member sub-committee of the Ad Hoc Committee, whose conclusions received perfunctory approval by the plenary Committee and were subsequently endorsed by the Sixth Committee. ¹ Most of these protocolar clauses are deemed to take effect from the date of adoption of the Convention, and not from the date of entry into force of the Convention, in accordance with article 24(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: ‘The provisions of a treaty regulating the authentication of its text, the establishment of the consent of States to be bound by the treaty, the manner or date of its entry into force, reservations, the functions of the depositary and other matters arising necessarily before the entry into force of the treaty apply from the time of the adoption of its text.’²

**Languages of the Convention**

There are five authentic versions of the Convention: Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. Article XI says that all of the texts are equally authentic.

A Secretariat draft provision dealt with the subject but did not specify the languages.³ The Ad Hoc Committee decided that the Convention should be drafted in the five official languages of the United Nations.⁴

¹ UN Doc. E/AC.25/10.
³ UN Doc. E/447, art. XV: ‘[Language – Date of the Convention] The present Convention, of which the . . ., . . ., . . ., . . . and . . . texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of . . .’ See also ‘United States Draft of 30 September 1947’, UN Doc. E/623, art. XII.
⁴ UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.23, p. 11.
The Ad Hoc Committee draft provision was adopted by the Sixth Committee without discussion.\(^5\) The five authentic versions are published in the United Nations Treaty Series.\(^6\)

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets out the principles of interpretation for treaties authenticated in more than one language. As a codification of customary rules, these should apply to the Genocide Convention. Article 33 of the Vienna Convention declares:

**Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages**

1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.

2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.

3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.

4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.

When the United States Senate was considering ratification of the Convention, a number of questions were asked of administration representatives concerning discrepancies in the different language versions. The State Department and Justice Department said they detected no substantive differences in the five versions.\(^7\)

**Date of the Convention**

Pursuant to article X, the Convention bears the date 9 December 1948, that of its adoption by the United Nations General Assembly.\(^8\) This should not be confused with other dates relevant to the application of the Convention, notably the date of entry into force, which is governed by article XIII.

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\(^6\) (1951) 78 UNTS 277.


\(^8\) See UN Doc. E/447, art. XV: ‘[Language – Date of the Convention] The present Convention, of which the . . ., . . ., . . ., . . . and . . . texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of . . .’ See also ‘United States Draft of 30 September 1947’, note 3 above, art. XII.
**Signature, ratification and accession**

Article XI sets out the rules applicable to signature, ratification and accession:

The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid.

Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The terms ‘ratification’ and ‘accession’ describe the international act by which a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty.9

Although signature of a treaty may also, under certain circumstances, constitute a means of indicating its acceptance,10 article XII of the Convention specifies that it is to be only a preliminary step, necessarily followed by ratification. Signature indicates an intention to become a State party. According to the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on reservations to the Convention, ‘signature constitutes a first step to participation in the Convention’.11 The Secretariat considered the question of signature to be relatively secondary, given that Member States of the United Nations would also vote on the text in the General Assembly. It proposed two alternatives, one of which eliminated signature altogether.12 The United States urged the more traditional approach, allowing for a short period following adoption when Member States would be entitled to sign the Convention. Non-Member States could also sign if invited by the Economic and Social Council. Subsequently, signatory States would be allowed to ratify the Convention. Also, any Member State, as well as non-Member States invited by the Economic and Social Council, could accede to the Convention.13

The Sub-Committee of the *Ad Hoc* Committee adopted a text based on the United States draft, except that it left unsettled the question of

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9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, note 2 above, art. 2(1)(b).
12 UN Doc. E/447, p. 54.
13 ‘United States Draft of 30 September 1947’, note 3 above, art. XIII.
the body entitled to invite non-State parties to sign and accede. The Sub-Committee felt this could be either the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. In plenary session, the Ad Hoc Committee decided the General Assembly was the appropriate organ.14

In the Sixth Committee, the Soviet Union urged that the responsibility be given to the Economic and Social Council rather than the General Assembly.15 Platon Morozov explained this was preferable because ECOSOC met twice a year, whereas the General Assembly met only once.16 In reply, the United States insisted the same argument had been rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee, which noted that the General Assembly was a sovereign body whereas the ECOSOC had to submit its decisions to the General Assembly.17 Iran added that this was a political decision, best left to the General Assembly.18 The Soviet proposal was defeated19 and article XI adopted by the Sixth Committee without a vote.20

Because only Member States are entitled to sign, ratify and accede to the Convention, subject to invitation from the General Assembly to non-Member States, the provision has been called discriminatory.21 The German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and Vietnam formulated statements to this effect at the time of ratification. In contrast, a treaty such as the Apartheid Convention is open to all States.22

According to article XI, the Convention was open for signature until the end of 1949. Nineteen States signed the Convention on 11 December 1948,23 and twenty-four more before the end of 1949, more than two-thirds of the organization’s membership.24 General Assembly Resolution 368(IV) of 3 December 1949 requested the Secretary-

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14 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.23, p. 7 (four in favour, three against).
17 Ibid. (Maktos, United States). But apparently there was a precedent for this. The Syrian delegate, Tarazi, noted that the Sixth Committee, at its 89th meeting, had decided to transfer powers of the League of Nations under the International Convention Relating to Economic Statistics, and accorded ECOSOC the authority to invite ratifications.
18 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.107 (Abdoh, Iran).
19 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.107 (twenty-one in favour, five against, with twelve abstentions).
20 Ibid.
23 Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, France, Haiti, Liberia, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, the United States, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.
24 Belgium, Burma, Byelorussia, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
General to invite non-member States to sign the Convention, as authorized by article XI. Twenty non-Member States, were invited to sign: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Monaco, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland, Jordan, Indonesia, Liechtenstein, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and the Federal Republic of Germany. Seven responded before the deadline for signature expired: Bulgaria, Jordan, Korea, Monaco, Cambodia, Ceylon and Vietnam.

For the Convention to bind a State, signature must be perfected by filing an instrument of ratification. If a State did not sign prior to 31 December 1949, it must formulate an instrument of accession. Three States have signed the Convention but never ratified it: Bolivia, Dominican Republic and Paraguay. Customary law, as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, requires that between the time of signature and ratification a State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.26

By the time the Convention came into force, on 11 January 1951, twenty-five States had either ratified or formulated instruments of accession. Over the next five years, they were joined by another twenty-one States. Then the pace slowed considerably. From 1956 to 1961, there were fifteen ratifications or accessions. In the decade from 1961 to 1971, there were another ten, from 1971 to 1981, ten more, and from 1981 to 1991, seventeen. Since 1991, there have been twenty-seven additional States parties, some of them former republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, but also several from Asia and Africa. Periodically, the General Assembly has urged States to accede to or ratify the Convention.27

By far the most public process of ratification was that of the United States.28 Under the United States Constitution, signature of treaties is

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27 For example, GA Res. 795(VIII).
an executive act. The United States signed the Convention on 11 December 1948. Ratification, however, requires the consent of the Senate. President Harry S Truman submitted the Convention to the Senate in June 1949. It was discussed in 1950 but failed to obtain enough support.\textsuperscript{29} The administration changed in 1953, and the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, openly opposed ratification.\textsuperscript{30} Presidents periodically resubmitted the Convention to the Senate, leaving an extensive published record of the deliberations. Eventually, on 19 February 1986, the Senate consented to ratification on the condition that legislation be enacted to implement the treaty.\textsuperscript{31} The legislation is officially known as the Proxmire Act to honour Senator William Proxmire, who had doggedly urged ratification in the Senate every day for nineteen years.\textsuperscript{32} The United States became a party to the Convention on 25 November 1988, forty years less two weeks from the date of signature.

The Convention was ratified by the Republic of China on 19 July 1951. In 1971, the General Assembly decided the People’s Republic of China was the only legitimate representative of China to the organization.\textsuperscript{33} The People’s Republic of China undertook to examine the multilateral treaties to which the Republic of China was a party and to indicate its position. On 18 April 1983, the People’s Republic of China ratified the Convention, making the following declaration: ‘The ratification to the said Convention by the Taiwan local authorities on 19 July 1951 in the name of China is illegal and therefore null and void.’

**Succession to the Convention**

The Convention says nothing about the rules applicable to State succession, creating a degree of uncertainty on the subject. Some of the applicable rules of customary international law have been codified in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties.\textsuperscript{34}


*Congressional Record* S1355–01 (daily ed., 19 February 1986).\textsuperscript{31}

Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), S. 1851.\textsuperscript{32}

GA Res. 2758(XXVI).\textsuperscript{33}

Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, (1978) 17 ILM 1488. Only fifteen States have ratified the Convention, which entered into force in
The Convention defines ‘succession of States’ as ‘the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory’. International law distinguishes between the creation of newly independent States and succession with respect to a part of a State’s territory.

In the case of newly independent States, the general rule is that the new State is not bound by the treaties contracted on its behalf by the previous rulers. It has been posited that there is an exception in the case of treaties setting out fundamental human rights, a category to which the Genocide Convention surely belongs. In the litigation before the International Court of Justice, when Serbia questioned whether Bosnia and Herzegovina was a State party, the latter answered that the Genocide Convention belonged to a category of international human rights instruments to which a rule of ‘automatic succession’ applied. In such cases, no special declaration of succession was required. Although the Court seemed keen on the idea, it declined to take a formal position, considering this unnecessary for the outcome of the debate. The Secretary-General’s practice is not to consider successor States as being automatically parties to the Genocide Convention.

Newly independent States have two choices: to formulate declarations of succession; or to accede to the Convention. At the time of decolonization, some States that were entitled to succeed to the treaty obligations of the colonizer chose instead to formulate their own instruments of accession. Several States made specific declarations of succession to the Genocide Convention at the time of or shortly after independence: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Fiji, Slovakia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. Others have


35 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, note 34 above, art. 2(1)(b).


37 For example, in the years following independence in 1962, Rwanda issued a number of declarations providing for its succession to obligations contracted on its behalf by Belgium in such areas as dangerous drugs, highway traffic, humanitarian law and labour standards. It made no such declaration about the Genocide Convention, however, and instead filed new instruments of accession in 1975. Burundi might also have succeeded to the Convention, because Belgium made a declaration on its behalf in 1952. Burundi’s formal accession to the Convention was only registered by the Secretary-General in 1997.
made general declarations of succession applicable to all treaties ratified by the predecessor State.\textsuperscript{38}

The principal interest of the distinction concerns the date the Convention will apply to the new State. In the case of a declaration of succession, the Convention continues to apply without interruption, whereas in the case of accession, the Convention itself imposes a three-month waiting period before entry into force for the acceding State. A recent ruling of the International Court of Justice in the litigation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia suggests the practical significance of the distinction may not really be that great.\textsuperscript{39} On 29 December 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina transmitted a notice of succession, adding that this was to have retroactive effect to 6 March 1992.\textsuperscript{40} On 18 March 1993, the Secretary-General informed the parties to the Convention of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s notice of succession.\textsuperscript{41} Yugoslavia argued that the notice filed by Bosnia in December 1992 was one of accession, not of succession, and that as a result it did not take effect for ninety days. Bosnia-Herzegovina had become a member of the United Nations as a result of a decision adopted on 22 May 1992 by the Security Council and the General Assembly. According to the Secretary-General, as depository of the Convention, Bosnia was entitled to accede to the Convention with effect from 22 May 1992.\textsuperscript{42} The Court concluded that Bosnia was entitled to succeed to the Convention, and that therefore the notice it filed would be treated as effecting succession to the Convention, although it did not rule on whether or not this could be retroactive. According to the Court, Bosnia was certainly a party at the time of filing of the application, and this was sufficient to dispose of Yugoslavia’s objection.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{38} For example, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 8 April 1993, [1993] ICJ Reports 16, p. 15, para. 22.


\textsuperscript{40} Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures, note 38 above, para. 23; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Preliminary Objections, note 36 above, para. 18.

\textsuperscript{41} Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures, note 38 above, p. 15, para. 23.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 16, para. 25. \textsuperscript{43} Ibid., para. 23.
On 15 June 1993, Yugoslavia filed the following statement with the Secretary-General:

Considering the fact that the replacement of sovereignty on the part of the territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia previously comprising the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was carried out contrary to the rules of international law, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia herewith states that it does not consider the so-called Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina a party to the [said Convention], but does consider that the so-called Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is bound by the obligation to respect the norms on preventing and punishing the crime of genocide in accordance with general international law irrespective of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

In a separate opinion to the 1996 preliminary objections, Judge Parra-Aranguren said that Serbia had admitted Bosnia and Herzegovina was a party to the Convention when it applied, on 10 August 1993, for provisional measures against Bosnia and Herzegovina alleging breach of its obligations under the Convention.44

The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is incorporated in the Dayton Agreement, states that the Genocide Convention is ‘to be applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.45

Where only part of a State’s territory is concerned, the treaties in effect in the successor State apply to the new territory, and the treaties in effect in the former territory cease to apply.46 The Government of South Vietnam acceded to the Genocide Convention in 1950. It took effect in the south but not in the north. When the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was victorious over the Saigon regime in 1975, the southern portion of the country ceased to have any independent existence. As a result, the Genocide Convention no longer applied even to the south. On 9 June 1981, Vietnam acceded to the Convention.

On 1 January 1998, sovereignty over Hong Kong was transferred from the United Kingdom to China. The United Kingdom had extended the application of the Genocide Convention to Hong Kong in 1970 without reservation. On 6 June 1997, China submitted the following statement to the depositary:

46 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, note 34 above, art. 15.
In accordance with the Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the question of Hong Kong signed on 19 December 1984, the People’s Republic of China will resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997. Hong Kong will, with effect from that date, become a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China and will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China.

The [said Convention], which the Government of the People’s Republic of China ratified on [18] April 1983, will apply to Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with effect from 1 July 1997. [The notification also contained the following declaration]: The reservation to article IX of the said Convention made by the Government of the People’s Republic of China will also apply to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

The Government of the People’s Republic of China will assume responsibility for the international rights and obligations arising from the application of the Convention to Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

A few days later, the United Kingdom notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations as follows:

In accordance with the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong signed on 19 December 1984, the Government of the United Kingdom will restore Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China with effect from 1 July 1997. The Government of the United Kingdom will continue to have international responsibility for Hong Kong until that date. Therefore, from that date the Government of the United Kingdom will cease to be responsible for the international rights and obligations arising from the application of the [said Convention] to Hong Kong.

The United Kingdom made no comment about the Chinese reservation to article IX. The United Kingdom has been one of the most strenuous opponents of reservations to article IX of the Convention. Its objections usually declare that it has ‘consistently stated’ its opposition to reservations to article IX. This was the first episode of inconsistency.

Application to ‘sovereign territories’

Article XII allows a party to extend the application of the Convention to sovereign territories for which it is responsible. The provision resulted from a United Kingdom proposal in the Sixth Committee.47 Gerald Fitzmaurice said that the insertion of such clauses in multilateral treaties

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47 UN Doc. A/C.6/236 and Corr.1: ‘Any High Contracting Party may, at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, extend the
had been customary for the past twenty or thirty years, and that only recently had there been objections ‘based on purely political motives and designed to create difficulties for the colonial powers’. He added that without such a clause, there would be a considerable, if not indefinite, delay before adherence by the United Kingdom to the Convention. Fitzmaurice pointed out that many of its territories were self-governing and would have to be consulted first. For the United States, such a provision was unnecessary, because in any case it intended to extend the protection of the Convention to its territories. But John Maktos recognized that the United Kingdom’s arguments were ‘extremely reasonable’.

Fitzmaurice was correct in anticipating that the new article might provoke some anti-colonialist sentiment. Ukraine proposed an amendment making it mandatory to extend the Convention to dependent territories. Egypt liked the spirit of the Ukrainian amendment, and suggested that the word ‘may’ in the United Kingdom amendment be changed to ‘shall undertake’. Iran proposed that the issue be resolved by means of a resolution, to be adopted at the same time as the Convention, in which the General Assembly would recommend that States with dependent territories take ‘such measures as are necessary and feasible’ to extend the Convention to those territories as soon as possible.

The Ukrainian amendment was defeated and the United Kingdom proposal adopted. The Iranian resolution was also adopted. In the plenary General Assembly, the Soviet Union unsuccessfully proposed an amendment requiring automatic application of the Convention to non-self-governing territories. The General Assembly resolution recommended that States parties to the Convention which administer
dependent territories ‘take such measures as are necessary and feasible to enable the provisions of the Convention to be extended to those territories as soon as possible’.  

Australia, Belgium and the United Kingdom are the only States to have applied article XII of the Convention. In 1949, Australia declared the Convention in force for all territories for which Australia assumed responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations. In 1952, Belgium declared the Convention applicable to the Belgian Congo and to the Trust Territory of Rwanda-Urundi, both of which became independent within a decade. In 1970, the United Kingdom declared that the Convention applied to several of its territories, some of which have since become independent.  

In a reference to the United Kingdom’s statement concerning the Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Argentina announced that ‘[i]f any other Contracting Party extends the application of the Convention to territories under the sovereignty of the Argentine Republic, this extension shall in no way affect the rights of the Republic’. Following the 1982 war with the United Kingdom, it made a further objection: ‘[The Government of Argentina makes a] formal objection to the [declaration] of territorial extension issued by the United Kingdom with regard to the Malvinas Islands (and dependencies), which that country is illegally occupying and refers to as the “Falkland Islands”’. The Argentine Republic rejects and considers null and void the [said declaration] of territorial extension.’ The United Kingdom replied: ‘The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have no doubt as to their right, by notification to the Depositary under the relevant provisions of the above-mentioned Convention, to extend the application of the Convention in question to the Falkland Islands or to the Falkland Islands Dependencies, as the case may be. For this reason alone, the Government of the United Kingdom are unable to regard the Argentine [communication] under reference as having any legal effect.’ 

Special Rapporteur Ruhashyankiko observed ‘that article XII no longer reflects current United Nations practice with respect to multi-lateral conventions or the progress of international reality towards completion of the decolonization process’. In declarations formulated

57 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.132 (twenty-nine in favour, seven abstentions).
58 Channel Islands, Isle of Man, Dominica, Grenada, St Lucia, St Vincent, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Fiji, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Pitcairn, St Helena and Dependencies, Seychelles, Tonga, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.
at the time of ratification or accession, several States have indicated their rejection of article XII. They consider that all provisions of the Convention should also extend to non-self-governing territories, including trust territories.\(^ {60}\) The precise legal significance of these statements is unclear. Use of the word ‘should’ indicates that the States concerned do not consider the Convention to be automatically applicable to non-self-governing territories, in the absence of a declaration. Rather, these are political statements that do not affect the rights and obligations arising from the Convention. Ecuador has said it ‘is not in agreement’ with the reservations made to article XII, and that as a result ‘they do not apply to Ecuador’. Because Ecuador has no non-self-governing territories, the legal consequence of this statement is mysterious.

**Coming into force**

Article XIII of the Convention announces that on the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited, the Secretary-General is to prepare a *procès-verbal* and to transmit it to all Member States and to all non-Member States who have been invited to sign, ratify or accede to the instrument. The Convention is to come into force on the ninetieth day following deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession. Ratification or accession effected subsequent to the coming into force becomes effective on the ninetieth day following deposit of the relevant instruments.

The only significant issue in the drafting of this provision was the number of contracting States required for entry into force. The Secretariat noted that to the extent the Convention could apply even to non-States parties, this question was ‘of special importance’.\(^ {61}\) Siam (Thailand) proposed that this should not be less than half the total number of Member States of the United Nations, which had fifty-eight members at the time.\(^ {62}\) The United States proposed the number be set at twenty States,\(^ {63}\) a view shared by the Sub-Committee of the *Ad Hoc* Committee\(^ {64}\) and confirmed by the *Ad Hoc* Committee.\(^ {65}\) The issue was not subsequently debated.

Ethiopia was the first State to ratify the Convention, on 1 July 1949.

\(^ {60}\) Albania, Algeria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Vietnam. Hungary reserved its rights ‘with regard to the provisions of article XII which do not define the obligations of countries having colonies with regard to questions of colonial exploitation and to acts which might be described as genocide’.


\(^ {63}\) UN Doc. E/623. \(^ {64}\) UN Doc. E/AC.25/10.

Over the next fifteen months, eleven more States ratified the Convention (Australia, Norway, Iceland, Ecuador, Panama, Guatemala, Israel, Liberia, the Philippines, Yugoslavia and El Salvador) and seven acceded to it (Monaco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Vietnam and Sri Lanka), for a total of nineteen. On 14 October 1950, two States ratified (France and Haiti) and three acceded (Cambodia, Costa Rica and the Republic of Korea), bringing the total to twenty-four contracting States. This was a godsend for the Secretariat, because at the time of ratification or accession both the Philippines and Bulgaria had made reservations which were met with objections from Australia, Ecuador and Guatemala. At the time, the law on reservations was even more unclear than it is today. Because of the possible illegality of the reservations as well as the uncertain effect of the objections, the Secretary-General was not sure whether or not to consider the Philippines and Bulgaria as contracting States. Nevertheless, there were, as of 14 October 1950, at least twenty-two unquestionably valid ratifications or accessions, and the Secretary-General proceeded to draft the procès-verbal required by article XIII. Three months later, on 12 January 1951, the Genocide Convention entered into force.

The three-month delay for entry into force of the Convention with respect to individual States was invoked by Portugal in the Legality of Use of Force Case. Portugal deposited its instrument of accession on 9 February 1999, and consequently the Convention entered into force for Portugal on 10 May 1999. Yugoslavia’s application against Portugal was filed in late April 1999, prior to the entry into force of the Convention for Portugal. Portugal invoked the argument in oral argument on the application for provisional measures on 10 May 1999, and again two days later, at a time when the Convention had in fact entered into force for Portugal.

**Denunciation of the Convention**

The Convention may be denounced by written notification to the Secretary-General, pursuant to article XIV. No State has ever availed

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66 The issue was considered the following year by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion. See pp. 522–5 below.


68 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Portugal), Verbatim Record, 10 May 1999 (José Maria Teixeira Leite Martins); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Portugal), Verbatim Record, 12 May 1999 (José Maria Teixeira Leite Martins).
itself of this privilege. The same provision declares that the Convention remains in effect for a period of ten years from its date of coming into force, that is, 11 January 1951, and then for successive periods of five years for those States parties that have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the five-year period. The terms of article XIV indicate that denunciation takes effect only at the expiration of the five-year periods. Thus, if a State were to denounce the treaty on 12 January 2001, it would remain bound by the Convention for five more years less a day.69

During the drafting, the Secretariat noted some States considered that ‘in the interests of the progress of international law, States should not be allowed to relieve themselves of their obligations, once they have contracted them, in the case of Conventions serving a purpose of general interest and having universal application’.70 The Secretariat favoured a denunciation clause, however. It observed that if governments were to stop supporting the Convention, it would become practically nugatory.71 The Secretariat believed such an escape clause would help to promote accession.72 It proposed a text that is not very different from the final version of article XIV. The United States took a similar position,73 as did the Ad Hoc Committee.74 In the Sixth Committee, Uruguay,75 the United Kingdom76 and Belgium77 all submitted amendments aimed at deleting the denunciation provision. China said it would have preferred the Convention to be permanent, but recognized that present international practice made that impossible.78 The Soviet Union had the most conservative proposal, allowing for denunciation at any time, subject to a one-year notice period.79

The United States argued that making the Convention permanent, without reserving the right to denounce the Convention, would constitute an obstacle to ratification. Therefore, it would vote to restrict validity and would accept the Chinese proposal. If the Chinese proposal failed, the United States would accept the Soviet proposal.80 Subsequently, Belgium,81 the United Kingdom82 and Uruguay83 all withdrew

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their amendments. The Soviet amendment was rejected, and the provision, as amended by China, was adopted.

Article XV provides that if denunciations reduce the number of States parties below a certain point, the Convention shall cease to be in force. Several amendments in the Sixth Committee proposed deletion of this provision, but they were based on the assumption that the preceding article, dealing with denunciation of the Convention, would be eliminated altogether. Once the Committee agreed to allow denunciation, it became necessary to anticipate the eventuality. The amendments were withdrawn at the outset of the debate for this reason. There was no discussion, and the article was adopted.

In a published legal opinion, the Secretariat suggested that denunciation would be the technique by which a State could withdraw reservations and formulate new ones.

Revision

Article XVI allows for revision of the Convention: ‘A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.’ The General Assembly is then to decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken with respect to such a request for revision of the Convention. The question has never arisen, although there have been frequent suggestions that the Convention be amended. There was even talk, in 1998, of a review conference to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Convention.

The original Secretariat draft was quite similar to the final text, except that the Economic and Social Council, and not the General Assembly, was to rule on requests for revision. The United States draft was more rigorous, requiring written communication from one-quarter of all Contracting Parties. This proposal was submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee, although it took no formal decision on the matter. The Ad Hoc Committee draft said the General Assembly would decide upon

84 Ibid. (fourteen in favour, eight against, with eighteen abstentions).
85 Ibid. (thirty-one in favour, with ten abstentions).
86 Ibid. (thirty-eight in favour, with three abstentions).
88 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.108 (Pratt de Maria, Uruguay; Kaeckenbeeck, Belgium; Fitzmaurice, United Kingdom).
89 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.108 (thirty-four in favour, with two abstentions).
91 UN Doc. E/447, art. XXI.
92 UN Doc. E/623.
93 UN Doc. E/AC.25/10.
the steps to be taken, ‘if any’. In the Sixth Committee, Belgium urged
deletion of the proposal, but subsequently withdrew this suggestion
because the question of establishing an international tribunal was
unresolved and had been referred to the International Law Commis-
sion. The Soviet Union presented an amendment assigning responsi-
bility for consideration of requests for revision to the Economic and
Social Council. France and the United States said they preferred
such matters to be addressed by the General Assembly. France then
introduced amendments to the Soviet proposal, which the Soviets
accepted. The first paragraph of the Ad Hoc Committee draft was
replaced by the first paragraph of the Soviet text, while the second
paragraph remained unchanged. The only real difference between the
Soviet text and the Ad Hoc Committee draft was the elimination of the
words ‘if any’. Article XVI was then adopted, as amended.

The Convention provides no details on the rules applicable to amend-
ment or revision. Assuming that the principles set out in articles 39–41
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties apply, as a codification
of customary norms, an amended Convention would in reality be a new
Convention. Thus, existing States parties would be able to accept or
reject the amended version. International practice in the field of human
rights treaties has tended to approach revision or amendment by devel-
oping additional protocols, to which States are free to contract if they
are willing to accept additional obligations, although there are exam-
pies of successful amendment where all States to a human rights treaty
have agreed.

Deposit and the functions of the depository

The original of the Convention is deposited in the archives of the United
Nations, in accordance with article XVIII. The same provision states

96 UN Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1: ‘A request for the revision of the present Convention may
be made at any time by any State signatory to the Convention by means of a
notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General. The Economic and Social
Council will decide what action should be taken regarding such a request.’
97 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.108 (Chaumont, France).
98 Ibid. (Maktos, United States).
99 Ibid. (twenty-five in favour, eleven against, with four abstentions).
100 Ibid. (twenty-eight in favour, with ten abstentions).
101 Yuen-Li Liang, ‘The Question of Revision of a Multilateral Treaty Text’, (1953) 47
AJIL, p. 263.
102 For example, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
103 For example, Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention on the Protection of
that a certified copy of the Convention is to be transmitted to each Member State of the United Nations and to each of the non-Member States contemplated in article XI, presumably by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The Secretary-General, as depositary of the treaty, and pursuant to article XVII of the Convention, is required to notify Member States as well as non-Member States in accordance with article XIX of the following: signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with article XIX; notifications of application to non-self-governing territories received in accordance with article XII; the date of entry into force in accordance with article XIII; denunciations received in accordance with article XIV; abrogation of the Convention in accordance with article XV; and notifications received in accordance with article XVI.

Articles XVII and XVIII of the Convention are virtually identical to the texts in the original Secretariat draft,104 and to those proposed by the United States.105 They were adopted without incident.

Besides the notification function, other issues relating to deposit and to the responsibilities of depositaries are set out in articles 76–80 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.106 Among the functions of the depositary are impartial verification of formal requirements of signature, ratification, accession or other communication.107

It was as depositary of the Genocide Convention in 1950 that the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly that certain procedural problems had arisen concerning the practice of reservations.108 The Secretary-General noted that his practice had been adapted from that of the League of Nations. Upon receipt of a signature or instrument of ratification or accession subject to a reservation, the Secretary-General would notify all contracting States and States that might become parties to the Convention. They were informed that subsequent ratification or accession without express objection would be deemed tacit acceptance of the reservation. Once in force, States parties would also be given a reasonable time to object, failing which their acceptance

104 UN Doc. E/447, arts. XXIII and XXIV.
105 UN Doc. E/623.
106 Note 2 above.
107 For a discussion of the practice of the depositary, see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Preliminary Objections, note 36 above, Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreca, paras. 90–8.
108 The depositary had previously solicited the opinions of States as to their positions on the reservations made at time of signature. The Soviet Union contested this as going beyond the powers assigned to the Secretary-General by art. XVII of the Convention: ‘Written Statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations’, note 67 above, p. 104.
would be presumed. The Secretary-General’s practice was officially endorsed by the General Assembly, which invited him to continue with it pending the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

**Registration**

Article XIX states that the Convention is to be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force. The provision appeared in the original Secretariat draft and was never really debated. Registration of treaties is a requirement of the Charter of the United Nations.

**Reservations to the Convention**

A reservation is ‘a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State’.

**Drafting of the Convention**

No provision in the Secretariat draft addressed the permissibility of reservations, but the accompanying commentary said: ‘At the present stage of the preparatory work, it is doubtful whether reservations ought to be permitted and whether an article relating to reservations ought to be included in the Convention.’ For the Secretariat, reservations of a general scope had no place in a convention that did not deal with the private interests of a State, but rather the preservation of an element of international order. The Secretariat considered it ‘unthinkable’ that, for example, States could pick and choose among the groups to be protected under the Convention. But the Secretariat did not rule out the hypothesis of certain limited reservations. It envisaged two possibilities: ‘either reservations which would be defined by the Convention itself,'
and which all the States would have the option to express, or questions of detail which some States might wish to reserve and which the General Assembly might decide to allow. The United States draft proposed omitting the subject of reservations altogether. The Sub-Committee of the Ad Hoc Committee agreed that there should be no text on reservations. Its report said: ‘The Sub-Committee saw no need for any reservations.’ This suggests silence on the subject means prohibition of reservations. The conclusions of the Sub-Committee were endorsed by the Ad Hoc Committee. There were no proposals on reservations in the Sixth Committee. But following adoption of the draft text of the Convention by the Committee, some delegations made explanatory statements. When the Dominican Republic asked that its ‘reservations’ be included in the report, a brief exchange about their significance ensued. It appears the Sixth Committee believed that, while reservations could be made upon signature, ratification or accession, the reserving State could not become a party to the instrument until its reservations had been accepted by the other contracting parties, either expressly or tacitly.

In the advisory opinion on reservations to the Genocide Convention, the judges of the International Court of Justice divided on how to interpret the travaux préparatoires. According to the majority:

Although it was decided during the preparatory work not to insert a special article on reservations, it is none the less true that the faculty for States to make reservations was contemplated at successive stages of the drafting of the Convention. In this connection, the following passage may be quoted from the comments on the draft Convention prepared by the Secretary General: ‘(1) it would seem that reservations of a general scope have no place in a convention of this kind which does not deal with the private interests of a State, but with the preservation of an element of international order . . . ; (2) perhaps in the course of discussion in the General Assembly it will be possible to allow certain limited reservations.’ Even more decisive in this connection is the debate on reservations in the Sixth Committee at the meetings (December 1st and 2nd, 1948) which immediately preceded the adoption of the Genocide Convention by the General Assembly. Certain delegates clearly announced that their governments could only sign or ratify the Convention subject to certain reservations . . . The Court

115 Ibid.
116 UN Doc. A/401/Add.2, p. 15.
117 UN Doc. E/AC.25/10, p. 5.
119 See the discussion of the subject in ‘Written Statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations’, note 67 above, p. 88.
120 UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.133.
121 Article 2 § 1(d) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, note 2 above, defines a reservation as ‘a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.’

The majority’s reference to the \textit{travaux préparatoires} seems incomplete and inaccurate. It only cites the Secretariat commentary, hardly an indication of the views or intent of the parties. The only real signal from national delegations is the report of the Sub-Committee of the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee, the gist of which is to prohibit reservations altogether, and this document was not even mentioned by the majority of the Court. The only serious argument based on the drafting history flows from the ‘reservations’ some States made in their oral interventions at the time the entire text of the Convention was adopted. But the statements it refers to were not, on closer scrutiny, typical reservations at all. The Dominican Republic said that the vote in favour of the draft convention should not imply that the Dominican Republic repudiated its reservations expressed during discussion of the draft, particularly with regard to the articles against which it had voted.\footnote{UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.133 (de Marchena Dujarric, Dominican Republic).} Here, the Dominican Republic was protecting its comments during the drafting process, not formulating a reservation to the treaty or even suggesting that it had the right to do so. The other State to make ‘reservations’ at the time of adoption was the United States. It was concerned with State responsibility and the interpretation of article IX. The United States said:

Article IX stipulated that disputes between the contracting parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the convention ‘including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide of any of the other acts mentioned in article III’ should be submitted to the International Court of Justice. If the words ‘responsibility of a State’ were taken in their traditional meaning of responsibility towards another State for damages inflicted, in violation of the principles of public international law, to the subjects of the plaintiff State; and if, similarly, the words ‘disputes . . . relating to the . . . fulfilment’ referred to disputes concerning the interests of subjects of the plaintiff State, then those words would give rise to no objection. But if, on the
other hand, the expression ‘responsibility of a State’ were not used in the traditional meaning; and if it signified that a State could be sued for damages in respect of injury inflicted by it on its own subjects, then there would be serious objections to that provision; and the United States Government would have reservations to make about that interpretation of the phrase.\footnote{124}

The threat that the United States might have ‘reservations to make about that interpretation’ is, again, not a true reservation or even a suggestion that reservations are permissible to the Convention. The United States also made a comment concerning article VII:

With regard to article VII, relating to extradition, the United States representative declared that, until the United States Congress had passed the legislative measures necessary to bring the convention into force, the United States Government could not hand over any person accused of a crime by virtue of which he was not already liable to extradition under the terms of the existing laws. Moreover, the provisions of the United States Constitution relating to the non-retroactivity of laws were such as to prevent the United States Government from extraditing any person accused of a crime committed before the promulgation of the law defining the new crime.\footnote{125}

This is most certainly not a reservation. The majority of the International Court of Justice seems to have exaggerated the significance of these statements.

The minority – four judges out of twelve – interpreted the Secretariat commentary differently. ‘It is evident from the final paragraph that what the Secretary-General had in mind was that it was open to the delegates either to define any permissible reservations in the Convention itself or to obtain for them the express permission of the General Assembly, that is to say, in accordance with a not infrequent practice, the permitted reservations should be agreed in advance.’\footnote{126} The minority cited the conclusions of the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee, noting that no further proposal was entertained in either the Sixth Committee or the plenary sessions of the General Assembly. The minority said that the discussions were inconclusive and that it could not therefore be assumed that the drafters agreed to allow reservations.\footnote{127}

In hindsight, the minority’s assessment of the \textit{travaux préparatoires} may well be more compelling. Nevertheless, it is unquestionable that the advisory opinion settled the issue of the permissibility of reservations, as confirmed by State practice since that time. Prior to the issuance of the advisory opinion, some States had indicated in the form of objections

\footnote{124}{\textit{Ibid.} (Gross, United States).} \footnote{125}{\textit{Ibid.}} \footnote{126}{\textit{Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory Opinion)}, note 11 above, p. 40.} \footnote{127}{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 41 and 43.}
that they deemed all reservations to the Convention to be prohibited. Since the advisory opinion, the principle of the permissibility of reservations seems to be well accepted. Only Greece, in an old objection,\(^\text{128}\) and Cyprus, in a very new one,\(^\text{129}\) consider all reservations to the Convention to be unacceptable. However, some States, specifically the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, take a dim view of the advisory opinion and object more or less systematically to reservations, especially those concerning article IX, although they do not exclude the possibility that some reservations may be acceptable.\(^\text{130}\)

**Subsequent practice**

Of the approximately 130 States parties to the Convention, twenty-nine have formulated reservations. Ten of these have since been withdrawn. The broadest and the most controversial reservation to the Convention has been made by the United States.\(^\text{131}\) At the time of ratification in 1988, the United States declared: ‘That nothing in the Convention

\(^{128}\) On 8 December 1954, Greece made the following statement: ‘We further declare that we have not accepted and do not accept any reservation which has already been made or which may hereafter be made by the countries signatory to this instrument or by countries which have acceded or may hereafter accede thereto.’

\(^{129}\) On 18 May 1998, Cyprus made the following statement: ‘The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has taken note of the reservations made by a number of countries when acceding to the [said Convention] and wishes to state that in its view these are not the kind of reservations which intending parties to the Convention have the right to make. Accordingly, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not accept any reservations entered by any Government with regard to any of the Articles of the Convention.’

\(^{130}\) For a recent affirmation of the United Kingdom’s position, see its comments on the ‘genocide’ article in the ‘Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind’: UN Doc. A/CN.4/466, para. 60. The United Kingdom appears to have missed Bahrain, which ratified the Convention in 1990. At the time of its ratification, in 1966, the Netherlands made a general objection to most of the art. IX reservations (it overlooked the Philippines and Argentina, for no apparent reason). It made a second general objection in 1989, this time including the Philippines and Argentina, as well as other States that had objected since 1966. Like the United Kingdom, it seems to have missed Bahrain in 1990. A new objection was formulated in 1996 to the reservations by Singapore and Malaysia.

requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.' Most of the reservations to the Convention have concerned article IX and the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Reservations to article IX have been made by the following States: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Mongolia, Morocco, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, Rwanda, Spain, Ukraine, the United States, Venezuela and Vietnam. Besides article IX, States have formulated reservations to articles II, IV, VI, VII and VIII.

Beginning in the late 1980s, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Ukraine withdrew their reservations to article IX, reflecting a reassessment of the legitimacy of the International Court of Justice following its ruling against the United States in the Nicaragua case. Ironically, the Nicaragua case prompted the United States to enter a reservation to article IX, after initially opposing such a measure precisely because it had been so popular among the Soviet bloc countries. In the aftermath of genocide, Rwanda withdrew its reservation to article IX.


Argentina made a limited reservation to art. IX, saying that it does not apply only in so far as it concerns ‘any dispute relating directly or indirectly’ to the Falkland Islands. On the illegality of territorial exceptions to the application of human rights treaties, see *Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits and Art. 50)*, Reports 1996–IV, 16 December 1996 (European Court of Human Rights).

United States (understandings).

Philippines and Finland (since withdrawn).

Algeria, Morocco, Myanmar, Philippines, United States and Venezuela.

Malaysia, Philippines, United States and Venezuela.  


Decree-Law 014/01 of 15 February 1995 (Rwanda), s. 1.
giving effect to a commitment made by its president and prime minister in their reply to a critical report by a commission of non-government organizations\textsuperscript{142} and an undertaking in the Arusha Peace Agreement of 3 August 1993.\textsuperscript{143} Finland withdrew its reservation to article IV in 1998.

Besides reservations, States occasionally formulate what they describe as declarations or understandings. The fact that a State uses the term ‘declaration’ or ‘understanding’ does not make it so, and where the statement attempts to modify or limit the obligations of the ratifying State, it may be deemed a reservation.\textsuperscript{144} Usually such statements merely indicate the interpretation that a State considers appropriate for a provision of the Convention. The United States made three such ‘understandings’ with respect to article II,\textsuperscript{145} one with respect to article VI\textsuperscript{146} and one with respect to article VII.\textsuperscript{147} Sometimes, declarations do no more than affirm the views of the ratifying State as to some inadequacy in the Convention. Three States, the German Democratic Republic,\textsuperscript{148} Mongolia and Vietnam, have attacked article XI as being discriminatory for failing to allow all States to become parties to the Convention on an equal basis. Similarly, twelve States have expressed their disagreement with article XII, concerning the extension of the Convention to non-self-governing territories.\textsuperscript{149} The United Kingdom


\textsuperscript{143} Protocol of Agreement on Various Questions and Final Provisions (Arusha Peace Agreement), 3 August 1993, art. 15.


\textsuperscript{145} ‘(1) That the term “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such” appearing in article II means the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such by the acts specified in article II; (2) That the term “mental harm” in article II(b) means permanent impairment of mental faculties through drugs, torture or similar techniques; . . . (4) That acts in the course of armed conflicts committed without the specific intent required by article II are not sufficient to constitute genocide as defined by this Convention.’

\textsuperscript{146} ‘(3) That . . . nothing in article VI affects the right of any state to bring to trial before its own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside a state.’

\textsuperscript{147} ‘(3) That the pledge to grant extradition in accordance with a state’s laws and treaties in force found in article VII extends only to acts which are criminal under the laws of both the requesting and the requested state . . .’

\textsuperscript{148} The German Democratic Republic no longer exists.

\textsuperscript{149} Albania, Algeria, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Vietnam.
has reacted to some of these statements with its own declaration saying that it does not accept them. Ecuador stated that the ‘reservations’ to article XII ‘do not apply’ to it. The most extravagant such declaration is that of Democratic Kampuchea, formulated when Vietnam acceded to the Convention. Kampuchea said Vietnam’s accession was without legal force, because it was ‘no more than a cynical, macabre charade intended to camouflage the foul crimes of genocide committed by the 250,000 soldiers of the Vietnamese invasion army in Kampuchea’.

During discussions in the Sixth Committee following adoption of the Convention, it was suggested that reservations could be made at the time of signature, and that their effect was to protect a State’s freedom of action with respect to ratification. The significance of reservations at the time of signature was not discussed by the Court in its advisory opinion, and is not addressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Identical reservations at time of signature of the Convention, in December 1949, were made to articles IX and XII by the Soviet Union, Byelorussia, Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. The Secretary-

The full text states: ‘The Government of Democratic Kampuchea, as a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, considers that the signing of that Convention by the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam has no legal force, because it is no more than a cynical, macabre charade intended to camouflage the foul crimes of genocide committed by the 250,000 soldiers of the Vietnamese invasion army in Kampuchea. It is an odious insult to the memory of the more than 2,500,000 Kampucheans who have been massacred by these same Vietnamese armed forces using conventional weapons, chemical weapons and the weapon of famine, created deliberately by them for the purpose of eliminating all national resistance at its source. It is also a gross insult to hundreds of thousands of Laotians who have been massacred or compelled to take refuge abroad since the occupation of Laos by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, to the Hmong national minority in Laos, exterminated by Vietnamese conventional and chemical weapons and, finally, to over a million Vietnamese “boat people” who died at sea or sought refuge abroad in their flight to escape the repression carried out in Viet Nam by the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. This shameless accession by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam violates and discredits the noble principles and ideals of the United Nations and jeopardizes the prestige and moral authority of our world Organization. It represents an arrogant challenge to the international community, which is well aware of these crimes of genocide committed by the Vietnamese army in Kampuchea, has constantly denounced and condemned them since 25 December 1978, the date on which the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea began, and demands that these Vietnamese crimes of genocide be brought to an end by the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and the restoration of the inalienable right of the people of Kampuchea to decide its own destiny without any foreign interference, as provided in United Nations resolutions 34/22, 35/6 and 36/5.’

'As regards Article IX: The Soviet Union [the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR, Czechoslovakia] does not consider as binding upon itself the provisions of article IX which provides that disputes between the Contracting Parties with regard to the interpretation, application and implementation of the present Convention shall be referred for examination to the International Court at the request of any party to the
General wrote to contracting States inquiring as to their position with respect to these reservations made at signature, saying 'that it would be his understanding that all States which had ratified or acceded to the Convention had accepted these reservations unless they had notified him of objections thereto prior to the day on which the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession, necessary to bring the Convention into force, had been deposited'. The Secretary-General also took the position that, if States were to object to the reservations at the time of signature, 'the Secretary-General would not be in a position to accept for deposit instruments of ratification' by the reserving States. Australia, which had ratified the Convention on 8 July 1949, was the only State to object formally to these reservations made at the time of signature. Australia said it would not regard as valid any ratification of the Convention maintaining reservations that had been made on signature. In a letter to the Secretary-General, Ecuador stated that 'it had no objection to make regarding the submission of such reservations, but expressed its disagreement with their content'. Subsequently, Ecuador said that 'it was not in agreement with the reservations and that therefore they did not apply to Ecuador, which had accepted without any modification the complete text of the Convention'.

**Objections**

International law recognizes the right of States parties to a multilateral treaty to formulate objections to reservations. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, States parties have a period of twelve months in which to object to a reservation. If they object, then they too are not bound by the reserved provision, at least with respect to their obligations vis-à-vis the reserving State. The technique of objec-
tions was developed in the context of multilateral treaties not concerned with human rights, and is aimed at preserving the reciprocity of obligations between contracting States. Suitable as this mechanism may be in the case of some multilateral treaties, its significance is very slight when human rights provisions are concerned. As the European Court of Human Rights has observed on at least two occasions, reciprocity is a concept that does not fully apply to human rights treaties.\footnote{Ireland \textit{v.} United Kingdom, Series A, No. 25, 19 January 1978, para. 239; Belilos \textit{v.} Switzerland, note 144 above, para. 62.} By their nature, human rights stipulations in international conventions create obligations for a State party in favour of individuals.

According to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the principles dealing with reservation and objection found in the Vienna Convention:

reflect the needs of traditional multilateral international instruments which have as their object the reciprocal exchange, for the mutual benefit of the States Parties, of bargained for rights and obligations . . . It permits States to ratify many multilateral treaties and to do so with the reservations they deem necessary; it enables the other contracting States to accept or reject the reservations and to determine whether they wish to enter into treaty relations with the reserving States; and it provides that as soon as at least one other State Party has accepted the reservation, the treaty enters into force with respect to the reserving State. The Court must emphasize, however, that modern human rights treaties in general, and the American Convention in particular, are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange or rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings.\footnote{The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC–2/82, 24 September 1982, Series A, no. 2, §§ 29–30.}

These words echo similar comments in an early report from the European Commission on Human Rights:

the obligations undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the European Convention are essentially of an objective character being designed rather to protect the fundamental rights of individual human beings from infringements by any of the High Contracting Parties than to create subjective and reciprocal rights for the High Contracting Parties themselves.\footnote{Austria \textit{v.} Italy (App. No. 788/60), (1961) 4 YECHR 116, p. 140; see also Cyprus \textit{v.} Turkey (App. No. 8007/77), (1979) 21 YECHR 226.}

In its 1994 General Comment on reservations, the Human Rights Committee judged the objections mechanism of the Vienna Convention ‘inappropriate’ to human rights treaties:

[H]uman rights treaties . . . and the Covenant specifically, are not a web of
Treaty law questions and the Convention

Inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the endowment of individuals with rights. The principle of inter-State reciprocity has no place, save perhaps in the limited context of reservations to declarations on the Committee's competence under article 41. And because the operation of the classic rules on reservations is so inadequate for the Covenant, States have often not seen any legal interest in or need to object to reservations. The absence of protest by States cannot imply that a reservation is either compatible or incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. Objections have been occasional, made by some States but not others, and on grounds not always specified; when an objection is made, it often does not specify a legal consequence, or sometimes even indicates that the objecting party nonetheless does not regard the Covenant as not in effect as between the parties concerned. In short, the pattern is so unclear that it is not safe to assume that a non-objecting State thinks that a particular reservation is acceptable. In the view of the Committee, because of the special characteristics of the Covenant as a human rights treaty, it is open to question what effect objections have between States *inter se*. 162

However, the European Court of Human Rights, in its 23 March 1995 judgment in *Loizidou v. Turkey*, breathed new life into the significance of objections in the context of human rights treaties. The Court considered that objections 'lend convincing support' to arguments that a reserving State should have been well aware that a given reservation was dubious.163

Most reservations to the Convention have provoked objections. There was an initial spate of objections following the reservations made upon accession by Bulgaria and ratification by the Philippines, in addition to the objections made to the reservations formulated by several States at the time of signature. Australia, Belgium, Ecuador, Norway and Sri Lanka made general objections to some or all of these reservations. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice established that objections would not prevent the coming into force of the Convention for the reserving State, providing the reservation was otherwise legal.164 The reservation that has inspired the greatest number of objections is the general one (reservation (2)) made by the United States. Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom objected, for varying reasons, to the United States suggestion that its Constitution came before the Convention. Three arguments were submitted in the various objections: the reservation was incompatible with the object and purpose of the

162 ‘General Comment No. 24 (52)’, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para. 17.
Convention,\textsuperscript{165} it was inconsistent with the principle by which States may not invoke provisions of domestic law as a reason for non-compliance with international obligations, a norm which is codified in article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,\textsuperscript{166} and the reservation created uncertainty as to the obligations assumed by the United States.\textsuperscript{167} Spain did not formally object, but issued a statement saying it ‘interprets’ the reservation ‘to mean that legislation or other action by the United States of America will continue to be in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’. Germany also stopped short of an objection, but stated that: ‘The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany interprets paragraph (2) of the said declarations as a reference to article V of the Convention and therefore as not in any way affecting the obligations of the United States of America as a State Party to the Convention.’

Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China (Republic of),\textsuperscript{168} Cuba,\textsuperscript{169} Cyprus, Ecuador, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and the United Kingdom have objected to the reservations to article IX of the Convention, concerning the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. According to the United Kingdom, ‘in their view this is not the kind of reservation which intending parties to the Convention have the right to make’. The Netherlands is even more aggressive on the subject, stating that such reservations are incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. Furthermore, The Netherlands ‘does not deem any State which has made or which will make such reservation a party to the Convention’.\textsuperscript{170} However, the Netherlands considers States that have withdrawn their reservations to be parties to the Convention. Opposition to the article IX reservations appears to be growing. In 1996, Norway, which had been silent for decades on the subject, used the occasion of reservations by Singapore and Malaysia to express its objections.\textsuperscript{171} In representations before the International Court of

\textsuperscript{165} Netherlands and Mexico.
\textsuperscript{166} Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
\textsuperscript{167} Estonia, Italy, Mexico and the United Kingdom.
\textsuperscript{168} The Republic of China is no longer a State party: see p. 508 above.
\textsuperscript{169} In 1982, Cuba withdrew its objections to the reservations to art. IX by Belarus, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Ukraine.
\textsuperscript{170} Recognizing the Netherlands’ objection to its reservation to art. IX, the United States has said: ‘the ensuing lack of a treaty relationship between the United States and the Netherlands under the Convention is the result prescribed by international law if States do not accept a reservation’: \textit{Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States)}, Verbatim Record, 11 May 1999, para. 3.9 (Michael Matheson).
\textsuperscript{171} ‘In [the view of the Government of Norway], reservations in respect of article IX of the Convention are incompatible with the object and purpose of the said Convention.’
Justice, the United States has pointed to the large number of reservations to article IX as evidence that these are not contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, although it said nothing about the objections that have been formulated.\textsuperscript{172}

Spain and the United States invoked their reservations to article IX against Yugoslavia in the \textit{Legality of Use of Force} case.\textsuperscript{173} In its 1 June 1999 ruling on Yugoslavia's application for provisional measures, the Court ruled that the reservation of the United States to article IX could be set up against Yugoslavia. Interestingly, it did not directly answer Yugoslavia’s challenge that the reservation was contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention. The Court noted that ‘the Genocide Convention does not prohibit reservations’, that Yugoslavia had not objected to the United States reservation to article IX, and that ‘in consequence Article IX of the Genocide Convention cannot found the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a dispute between Yugoslavia and the United States alleged to fall within its provisions’.\textsuperscript{174}

Article 21(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties explains the legal effect of objections: ‘When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation.’ But while this rule may have considerable significance in the case of some multilateral treaties, its role with respect to the Genocide Convention is unclear. For example, a State that formulates a reservation to article IX has established its refusal to participate in litigation before the International Court of Justice. It can be neither applicant nor respondent. In other words, article IX simply does not apply with respect to the reserving State, irrespective of whether there are objections. The legal effect of objections is equally mysterious when the substantive provisions of the Convention are the subject of reservations, because such norms are not addressed to the reciprocal rights of the reserving and the objecting State, but rather to the rights of groups \textit{vis-à-vis} the objecting State.

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Legality of Use of Force} (Yugoslavija v. United States), Verbatim Record, 11 May 1999, para. 2.18 and 2.19 (John R. Crook).


\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Legality of Use of Force} (Yugoslavija v. United States), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, 2 June 1999, paras. 23–5.
Assessing the legality of reservations

In accordance with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, any reservations must be compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention:

The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention imply that it was the intention of the General Assembly and of the States which adopted it that as many States as possible should participate. The complete exclusion from the Convention of one or more States would not only restrict the scope of its application, but would detract from the authority of the moral and humanitarian principles which are its basis. It is inconceivable that the contracting parties readily contemplated that an objection to a minor reservation should produce such a result. But even less could the contracting parties have intended to sacrifice the very object of the Convention in favour of a vain desire to secure as many participants as possible. The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit both the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them. It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation.\textsuperscript{175}

The Court continued:

Any other view would lead either to the acceptance of reservations which frustrate the purposes which the General Assembly and the contracting parties had in mind, or to recognition that the parties to the Convention have the power of excluding from it the author of a reservation, even a minor one, which may be quite compatible with those purposes. It has nevertheless been argued that any State entitled to become a party to the Genocide Convention may do so while making any reservation it chooses by virtue of its sovereignty. The Court cannot share this view. It is obvious that so extreme an application of the idea of State sovereignty could lead to a complete disregard of the object and purpose of the Convention.\textsuperscript{176}

The Court itself did not, however, pronounce on the specific reservations that had provoked the General Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion. The real thrust of the Court’s advisory opinion was to confirm the permissibility of reservations consistent with the object and purpose, and to establish that, if the reservation was otherwise acceptable, objections could not prevent the entry into force of the Convention for the reserving State.\textsuperscript{177}

States do not have consistent positions about the determination of an illegal reservation, and there are conflicting views among scholars. One


\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., p. 24.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., pp. 24 and 26.
theory, which is favoured by the Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, Alain Pellet, approaches the question from a contractual standpoint, and adheres strictly to the text of the Vienna Convention. It holds that States parties alone are the arbiters of the legality of reservations.\(^{178}\) They authorize reservations by their failure to object, and they reject them by formulating objections. Another view, one favoured by human rights tribunals and treaty bodies,\(^{179}\) views the question of the legality of reservations as being independent of the will of the States parties. Accordingly, even where the States parties are silent, a reservation deemed incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention could be challenged as being invalid.\(^{180}\) The ad hoc judge appointed by Yugoslavia, Milenko Kreca, devised an original argument by which the United States reservation was illegal and inoperative because it was not severable from the questionable understandings formulated by the United States at the same time.\(^{181}\) Kreca’s imaginative remarks found no echo among his colleagues.

The consequences of an illegal reservation are also uncertain. The issue is one of severability or separability. If the illegal reservation cannot be ‘severed’ from the ratification or accession as a whole, then the latter ought to be invalid altogether, and the State determined not to be a party to the Convention. If, on the other hand, the reservation is considered invalid but severable, can this mean that the State is a party to the Convention with the exception of the reserved provision? This would mean that there is no real difference in effect between a legal and an illegal reservation. As Ronald St John MacDonald has written, ‘[t]o exclude the application of an obligation by reason of an invalid reservation is in effect to give full force and effect to the reservation’.\(^{182}\)

Nevertheless, this was precisely what the United States argued before the International Court of Justice in answer to the Yugoslav request for provisional measures in the *Legality of Use of Force* case. The agent for the United States pointed out that its reservation to article IX was an obstacle to the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, noting that Yugoslavia had never objected to the reservation within the twelve-month period provided by article 20 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.


\(^{179}\) *Loizidou v. Turkey*, note 133 above; ‘General Comment No. 24 (52)’, note 162 above.

\(^{180}\) *The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention (Arts. 74 and 75)*, note 160 above, paras. 29–30; *Belilos v. Switzerland*, note 144 above, para. 47; ‘General Comment No. 24 (52)’, note 162 above, para. 17.


But the agent went on to speculate about the ‘one or two’ legal consequences that could result in the hypothesis that Yugoslavia had formulated an objection. He said that an objection would have either stopped the Convention as a whole from coming into force between the United States and Yugoslavia, or it would have prevented article IX from coming into force between the two States.183

In formulating objections to reservations, States sometimes indicate the consequences they attach, although the practice is quite inconsistent. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: ‘When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation.’184 Sweden chose to make this explicit in its objection to the general reservation formulated by the United States: ‘This objection does not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the Convention between Sweden and the United States of America.’ Mexico made a similar statement. What neither Sweden nor Mexico clarified in their objections was whether they considered the reservation to be effective. In other words, in the treaty relations between Sweden (or Mexico) and the United States, is the entire Convention operative or is the Convention as amended by the United States reservation the applicable law? The Netherlands, on the other hand, expressly declared that it does not consider the United States, or for that matter other reserving States, to be parties to the Convention. China (Taiwan) made a comparable declaration in 1954, at the time of its accession to the Convention. Brazil has stated that it ‘reserves the right to draw any such legal consequences as it may deem fit’ from its objection to reservations. Ecuador has said that that certain objectionable reservations ‘do not apply to Ecuador’.

The issue of the consequences of an illegal reservation to a multilateral treaty was considered by Judge Hersh Lauterpacht of the International Court of Justice, in his separate opinion in the Norwegian Loans case.185 France had formulated a reservation at the time of its declaration recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court. After finding the reservation to be incompatible with the Statute of the Court, Judge Lauterpacht addressed the issue of severability as a ‘general principle of law’, asking whether it was possible ‘having regard to the intention of the parties and the nature of the instrument’ to sever the offending

183 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States), Verbatim Record, 11 May 1999, para. 2.1.2 (John R. Crook).
184 Note 2 above, art. 21(3).
reservation from the declaration as a whole.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 56–7.} Two years later, Judge Lauterpacht revisited the issue in his dissenting opinion in the \textit{Interhandel} case. He sought to determine the intent of the United States with respect to a reservation (known as the ‘Connelly amendment’) to its declaration concerning the jurisdiction of the Court. A review of United States practice over several decades left no doubt that it considered the issue of the reservation to be a \textit{sine qua non} of its acceptance of the treaty as a whole:

If that reservation is an essential condition of the Acceptance in the sense that without it the declaring State would have been wholly unwilling to undertake the principal obligation, then it is not open to the Court to disregard that reservation and at the same time to hold the accepting State bound by the Declaration.\footnote{Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States), [1959] \textit{ICJ Reports} 6, p. 117.}

Judge Lauterpacht made particular reference to the debates in the United States Senate when advice and consent was given to the matter.\footnote{Ibid., p. 105.}

In its 1988 judgment in \textit{Belilos v. Switzerland}, the European Court of Human Rights not only ruled that Switzerland’s ‘reservation’ (Switzerland had called it an ‘interpretative declaration’) to article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights was invalid, it went on to find that Switzerland was bound by the Convention as a whole and that the ‘reservation’ was therefore severable from the ratification. The Court summarily considered the consequences, applying the test of intention of the reserving State, and concluded that ‘it is beyond doubt that Switzerland is, and regards itself as, bound by the Convention irrespective of the validity of the declaration’.\footnote{\textit{Belilos v. Switzerland}, note 144 above, para. 60.} Counsel for Switzerland had simplified matters for the Commission when it admitted this during the hearing.\footnote{‘Verbatim Record of the Public Hearings Held on 26 October 1987’, Council of Europe Doc. Cour/Misc (87) 237, 45.}

But there was no such admission from Turkey when the European Court of Human Rights ruled illegal its ‘reservations’ to articles 25 and 46 of the European Convention of Human Rights in a judgment issued on 23 March 1995. Turkey argued before the Court that, if reservations to its declarations under articles 25 and 46 were found to be invalid, then the declarations themselves were inoperative. Turkey, said the Court, ‘must have been aware’ that there was a consistent State practice of parties to the Convention unconditionally accepting the competence of the Commission and the Court, and that its purported reservations

\footnote{Ibid., pp. 56–7.}
were of questionable validity under the Convention and might be deemed impermissible by the Convention organs. The ‘special character’ of the Convention regime, which the Court qualified as one of an ‘instrument of European public order (‘ordre public’), therefore favoured the severance of the invalid clauses from the declaration, as this would ensure the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention for all areas falling within Turkey’s jurisdiction.

Applying this reasoning to the reservations to the Genocide Convention involves an assessment of the basic intent of the reserving State. To take the most questionable of the reservations, that by the United States invoking its Constitution, the question is whether or not the United States regards itself as being bound by the Convention irrespective of the reservation. Many members of the Senate would surely say that the reservation was a sine qua non of ratification. On the other hand, the behaviour of the United States, particularly since ratification of the Convention, indicates its commitment to the norms set out in the instrument without regard to domestic constitutional considerations. This favours the conclusion that, assuming the reservation to be illegal, the United States is not only a party to the Convention, it is moreover bound by the Convention as a whole and its reservation is without any legal force.

**Interpretation of the Convention**

Several principles of interpretation, not all of them entirely compatible, may be brought to bear on problems raised by the Genocide Convention. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies rules of interpretation applicable to treaties in general. Article 31 sets out a ‘general rule of interpretation’: ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ The scope of the ‘context’ of a treaty is explained in article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention. For the purposes of interpretation, the ‘context’ of a treaty includes its preamble and annexes, ‘any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty’, and ‘any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty’.

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191 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), note 163 above, para. 95.
192 Note 2 above.
The Genocide Convention includes a short preamble, but no annexes. The preamble contains a number of important ideas that do not appear elsewhere in the Convention, including the reference to General Assembly Resolution 96(I), the idea that genocide has existed ‘at all periods of history’, and the requirement of international co-operation ‘in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge’. The preamble was cited by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in its sentencing decisions in the Kambanda\(^{193}\) and Serushago cases.\(^{194}\) Adoption of the Convention was accompanied by two related resolutions, one calling for the establishment of an international criminal court\(^{195}\) and the other concerning extension of the provisions of the Convention to dependent territories.\(^{196}\)

The Vienna Convention states that, in addition to the context, account is to be taken of any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.\(^{197}\) There have been none. Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation is also to be considered. In his individual opinion on the application for provisional measures by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Yugoslavia, Judge ad hoc Elihu Lauterpacht referred to the subsequent practice of States parties to the Genocide Convention in concluding that they did not appear to consider that the duty to prevent genocide included an obligation to intervene militarily.\(^{198}\) Finally, the Vienna Convention also says that any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties should be considered.

Article 32 of the Vienna Convention says that ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ may also be applied where the rules set out in article 31 leave the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’. The Convention cites ‘the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’ as supplementary means, although it indicates that this is not an exhaus-

\(^{193}\) Prosecutor v. Kambanda (Case No. ICTR 97–23–S), Judgment and Sentence, 4 September 1998, para. 16.


\(^{195}\) ‘Study by the International Law Commission of the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction’, GA Res. 216 B (III).


\(^{197}\) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, note 2 above, art. 31(3)(a).

tive enumeration of possible sources. In the advisory opinion on reservations to the Genocide Convention, both majority and minority examined the *travaux préparatoires* in assessing whether the drafters of the Convention had intended to allow reservations. The two opinions express different conclusions as to the meaning of the *travaux*.199 In *Akayesu*, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda relied on the debates in the Sixth Committee in ruling that the list of protected groups in article II of the Convention includes all groups that are ‘stable and permanent’.200

There is a danger that reliance on the *travaux préparatoires* will tend to freeze the interpretation of the Convention, preventing it from evolving by constantly returning to the benchmark of the 1947 and 1948 debates. Human rights tribunals have had to come to terms with this issue, adopting an ‘evolutive’ or ‘dynamic’ approach to interpretation.201 They rationalize this by explaining that the drafters themselves intended such a result. Judge Alvarez, in his lone dissenting judgment in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, warned of the dangers of excessive reference to the drafting history of the Convention. Conventions like the Genocide Convention ‘have acquired a life of their own’, he said. ‘They can be compared to ships which leave the yards in which they have been built, and sail away independently, no longer attached to the dockyard. These conventions must be interpreted without regard to the past, and only with regard to the future.’202

Because of its nature as a human rights or humanitarian law treaty, other rules of interpretation are also said to apply to the Genocide Convention. In their joint dissenting opinion in the advisory opinion, Judges Guerrero, McNair, Read and Mo of the International Court of Justice said ‘the enormity of the crime of genocide can hardly be exaggerated, and any treaty for its repression deserves the most generous interpretation’.203

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has drawn upon comparative law in the interpretation of provisions of its Statute and its Rules.204 Neither instrument is an international treaty in the strict sense, although both are legal norms derived from the Charter

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of the United Nations and arguably it is the Vienna Convention rules
and not canons of interpretation from national law that should be used.
Among the rules derived from domestic law by the Tribunal is that of
strict construction of penal statutes, a ‘rule which has stood the test of
time’. According to the Tribunal:

A strict construction requires that no case shall fall within a penal statute which
does not comprise all the elements which, whether morally material or not, are
in fact made to constitute the offence as defined by the statute. In other words, a
strict construction requires that an offence is made out in accordance with the
statute creating it only when all the essential ingredients, as prescribed by the
statute, have been established.

Similarly, in Kayishema and Ruzindana, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda found there was ambiguity in the definition of
genocide, and said ‘that if a doubt exists, for a matter of statutory
interpretation, that doubt must be interpreted in favour of the
accused’. This approach to interpretation is not fully consistent with
the Vienna Convention and, in practice, it has not been systematically
followed by the ad hoc tribunals. For example, the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda indulged in judicial ‘gap-filling’ in an effort to
satisfy itself that the Tutsi were contemplated by article II of the
Genocide Convention.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, however, has
applied a related rule, by which the version most favourable to the
accused should be adopted. The Tribunal said this rule resulted from
the principle of the presumption of innocence.

Temporal application of the Convention

According to article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, ‘unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is
otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to
any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist
before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that
party’. Article 28 of the Vienna Convention codifies customary law.
There is nothing in the Genocide Convention to suggest ‘a different

205 Ibid., para. 408.
206 Ibid., para. 411.
207 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana (Case No. ICTR–95–1–T), Judgment, 21
May 1999, para. 103.
208 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 200 above. This is discussed at length in chapter 3, pp.
130–3 above.
209 Ibid., para. 500.
210 Note 2 above.
intention’. Therefore, ‘[t]he simple fact is that the Genocide Convention is not applicable to acts committed before its effective date’. 211

This does not mean that genocide cannot have been committed prior to 12 January 1951, when the Convention came into force. The preamble of the Convention makes this quite clear when its declares that ‘at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity’. Nevertheless, the operative clauses of the Convention, including article IX, can only apply to genocide committed subsequent to its entry into force with respect to a given State party.

Conclusions

Many of the conclusions suggested in this study may soon find themselves challenged by judicial decisions. Important cases are pending before the trial and appeals chambers of the two ad hoc international tribunals, and before the International Court of Justice, and these may well clarify the lingering interpretative issues that have wallowed in obscurity over the half-century since the adoption of the Genocide Convention in 1948. The academic’s dilemma is whether to await judicial pronouncements or to anticipate them. The second course has been more compelling because of the existence of published commentaries on the Convention that set out different hypotheses than those presented here. The judges who will have the final say on these matters in the years to come should be exposed to a range of views. What today remain nebulous and arcane disputes will, probably in short order, be taught and studied as conventional wisdom, established by this or that decision of the International Court of Justice, the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Court.

The horrors of Auschwitz, Dachau and Treblinka set the context for the development of human rights law in the years following the Second World War. Prosecution of war crimes perpetrated against civilians had hitherto been confined to cases where the victims resided in occupied territories. What a country did to its own citizens had been deemed a matter that did not concern international law and the international community. Nuremberg appeared to take this bold step forward, but strings were attached. Although the Nazi persecution of Jews, even those within the borders of Germany, was deemed an international crime, the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter insisted upon a nexus between the crime against humanity and the international conflict. In effect, they were holding the Germans accountable for atrocities committed against Germans but resisting a more general principle that might hold them responsible for atrocities perpetrated within their own borders or in their colonies. This imperfect criminalization of crimes against humanity
mirrored the ambiguities of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted in June 1945, that pledged to promote and encourage respect for human rights yet at the same time promised that the United Nations would not intervene in matters which were ‘essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’.

Two streams converged in December 1948, at the General Assembly of the United Nations: the standard-setting of international human rights manifested in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the individual accountability for violations of human rights, of which the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was the modest beginning. Both instruments were adopted, within hours of each other, by the General Assembly on 9–10 December 1948, meeting in the Palais de Chaillot in Paris. The Genocide Convention established that in the case of a particular form of strictly defined atrocity there was no longer any nexus, and that the crime could be committed in time of peace as well as in wartime. The Universal Declaration laid the groundwork for steady progress in both standard-setting and a growing recognition of the right of the international community in general and United Nations bodies such as the Commission on Human Rights in particular to breach the wall of the domaine réservé by which States historically sheltered atrocities from international scrutiny.

Then the accountability component of the movement stalled, and was only revived as the Cold War came to an end. During this period, the only instrument with any real potential, at least theoretically, to compel accountability for human rights violations remained the Genocide Convention. When gross violations were committed – in Vietnam, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lebanon, to give a few examples – the international community turned inexorably towards the Genocide Convention in the hope that it might govern. In fact, its application was almost never clear because of the very strict definition of the crime of genocide. As Georg Schwarzenberger noted cynically, ‘the convention is unnecessary when applicable and inapplicable when necessary’. The obligations assumed by States in the Genocide Convention were a radical departure from the past. But in so doing, they had made it clear that the scope would be confined to a very narrow range of violations, indeed, the most extreme and rare of the catalogue of human rights breaches.

Two factors emerged to change this situation and, in a sense, to take

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the pressure off the Genocide Convention as the vital weapon in the battle to protect human rights. First, new law developed to enhance accountability for human rights violations. No longer was the Genocide Convention indispensable. The case law of international human rights bodies directed States to enforce the prosecution of human rights violations, even when committed by non-State actors. The clouds surrounding the concept of crimes against humanity, which arguably fills the gaps left by the Genocide Convention, began to dissipate, in particular with the recognition that they could be committed in the absence of armed conflict. New instruments were developed dealing with international crimes such as apartheid and torture, imposing obligations largely similar to those set out in the Genocide Convention. Thus, the first of Schwarzenberger’s objections, namely, that the Convention never seemed to apply when it was needed, became less significant, because there were other norms, both customary and conventional, to take its place. Secondly, the growth of ethnic conflict brought with it circumstances that seemed to correspond exactly to what the Convention’s drafters had in mind, of which the clearest and most horrific manifestation was the massacres in Rwanda in mid-1994. Schwarzenberger’s other objection, that when the Convention applied it was not needed, had been overtaken by events. In the last decade of the twentieth century, after more than four decades of marginalization, the Convention became an imperative legal tool for prosecution of individual offenders in situations where its applicability was unchallengeable.

The recent revival of the Convention has shown that forty years of atrophy did the instrument little good. During this time, many of the more or less intentional ambiguities left by the drafters had never been resolved or even seriously addressed. Aside from the Eichmann trial, there was essentially no case law. Academic writing had focused far more on the perceived inadequacies of the Convention than on clarifying the content of the actual provisions.

Perhaps the greatest unresolved question in the Convention is the meaning of the enigmatic word ‘prevent’. The title of the Convention indicates that its scope involves prevention of the crime, and, in article I,

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5 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (1987) 1465 UNTS 85.
States parties undertake to prevent genocide. Aside from article VIII, which entitles States parties to apply to the relevant organs of the United Nations for the prevention of genocide, the Convention has little specific to say on the question. The obligation to prevent genocide is a blank sheet awaiting the inscriptions of State practice and case law. A conservative interpretation of the provision requires States only to enact appropriate legislation and to take other measures to ensure that genocide does not occur. A more progressive view requires States to take action not just within their own borders but outside them, activity that may go as far as the use of force in order to prevent the crime being committed. The debate on this is unresolved, and is likely to remain so, at least until the next episode of genocide, if there is no insistence that the subject be clarified. The sad reality is that, five years after the Rwandan genocide, and despite professions of guilt about their inertia while the crimes were taking place, States are hardly more prepared today to intervene to prevent genocide in central Africa. Military action in Kosovo in early 1999 was sometimes defended as being founded in a desire to correct the tragic errors committed while genocide raged in Rwanda in 1994. But the Kosovo intervention fit within a context of strategic interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Moreover, the tragic ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in March, April and May 1999 fell short of the requirement in article II of the Convention that the intent be to destroy physically a protected group. In any case, NATO never claimed that it was required to intervene in Kosovo, only that it was entitled to. The missing piece here, the one that is relevant if genocide recurs, particularly in Africa, is the view that humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide is not so much a ‘right’ as a duty.

Short of an amendment to the Convention that could develop the content of the duty to prevent genocide – an unlikely prospect – a number of other less dramatic mechanisms might be considered. A commitment by States to the use of force in order to prevent genocide might take the form of a General Assembly resolution. Statements to the same effect could be adopted by regional bodies, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity. These would amount to authentic interpretation of the obligation to prevent genocide set out in the Convention, and might also be deemed to create binding law as a manifestation of subsequent State practice.

Article I of the Convention also declares genocide to be a crime under international law, specifying that it can be committed in time of peace or war. This was an important factor in 1948, when the prevailing view of crimes against humanity was that they could only take place in relation-
ship with an armed conflict. The law has now removed the distinction, and genocide can be readily admitted as a subset or category of crimes against humanity. Affirming genocide to be a crime under international law was an answer to those who pleaded that it was a retroactive offence. The point had already been made by the General Assembly two years previously, in Resolution 96(I).

The definition of the crime of genocide, set out in articles II and III of the Convention, has stood the test of time. A source of great controversy when it was adopted, debate continued to rage as to whether or not the enumeration of groups should be expanded, principally to include political groups, as well as about extension of the punishable acts of genocide. But, when given the opportunity, at the Rome conference in 1998, the international community showed no inclination to amend or revise the definition of genocide. With due respect for views to the contrary, of which there are many, this study concludes that the definition of genocide is not an unfortunate drafting compromise but rather a logical and coherent attempt to address a particular phenomenon of human rights violation, the threat to the existence of what we would now call ‘ethnic’ groups and what the drafters conceived of essentially as ‘national minorities’.

As for extending the scope of punishable acts, this would be desirable if the Convention’s full preventive mission is to be enhanced. Experience has shown that the inability to address preparatory acts such as the dissemination of hate propaganda, by radio and print media in particular, contributes mightily to the extent of the crime and the difficulty in its suppression. Some of the Convention’s shortcomings in this respect have been corrected by provisions of widely ratified human rights instruments. Similarly, the political compromise that resulted in the Convention’s exclusion of cultural genocide is to be regretted. However, the normative protection of ethnic and national minorities against cultural persecution remains an underdeveloped zone within the overall scheme of international human rights.

Several of the provisions of the Convention contemplate the obligations assumed by States in matters of criminal law legislation, jurisdiction and extradition. Scrutiny of the domestic law provisions by which States introduce the crime of genocide in their own penal codes shows that many States have enacted the crime of genocide, although there are some notable exceptions, including the tragic example of Rwanda, which acceded to the Convention and then neglected to amend its Penal Code. There are also significant and relatively widespread shortcomings in terms of the legal rules that accompany the crime itself. This indicates that the introduction of the crime of genocide in domestic penal legisla-
tion is often rather perfunctory. The inadequacies of the English laws concerning the exclusion of head of State immunity, a principle recognized since the Treaty of Versailles and codified in article IV of the Genocide Convention, came to international attention during the efforts to extradite Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.6

The Convention’s failure to recognize universal jurisdiction is one of its great defects. Article VI, which declares that offenders are to be tried by the courts of the State where the crime took place (or by an international court), was a pragmatic compromise reflecting the state of international law at the time the Convention was adopted. Although universal jurisdiction, and the related concept of aut dedere aut judicare, had been long recognized for certain crimes, committed by individual outlaws, few in 1948 wanted to extend it to crimes which would, as a general rule, involve State complicity. The Israeli courts, in the Eichmann case, attempted to manoeuvre around the obstacle of article VI, but their reasoning was unconvincing.

Extradition is another area where the provisions of the Convention seem insufficient. States undertake to ‘grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force’, but article VII might be deemed inapplicable if there is no treaty between the two States concerned. Extradition ought to be mandatory, even if there is no treaty. Arguably, when article VII is combined with the obligation to punish set out in article I, this is implicit in the Convention. Practice is so limited that it is hazardous to attempt any conclusions as to how States view the scope of article VII.

Parallel to the Genocide Convention there exists a body of customary international law, and some have argued that it is in some respects more complete than the instrument itself. This was the position of the Israeli courts in Eichmann, where the judgment found that customary law had enlarged the scope of jurisdiction under the Convention. The definition of the crime of genocide is undoubtedly part of international custom, as are the basic obligations to punish and prevent genocide. The very consistent State practice in introducing the crime of genocide, in conformity with the Convention definition, and the reaffirmation of that definition in contemporary instruments, attests to the customary status of articles II and III of the Convention. Demonstrating that some of the more specific rules set out in the Convention, such as a duty to extradite

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and a prohibition of head of State immunity, are also customary norms is a more difficult undertaking. The Convention, while relatively widely ratified, lacks the universal scope of treaties like the Geneva Conventions or the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which have laid claim to status as a codification of customary norms by virtue of their general acceptance within the international community. The norms found in articles IV, V, VI and VII cannot claim the same consistent introduction in domestic law or in bilateral practice between States.

Thus, the Convention’s balance sheet is inadequate, incomplete and uncertain. In some cases, such as jurisdiction, the Convention plainly needs to be brought up to date. In others, great doubts remain about its interpretation. A very useful mechanism to help resolve some of these problems would be to create a reporting system, similar to those developed by the International Labour Organization and the major human rights treaties. States parties to the Convention would be expected to submit periodic reports on their compliance with the Convention in which they would address the unresolved interpretative issues. In this way, a form of ‘practice’ could be established. The reports would be presented to an expert committee that would ensure some control over the sincerity and accuracy of the reports, challenging the State to explain omissions or to provide justifications. Such a committee could also monitor the early signs of genocide, alerting the State itself as well as the international community to potential dangers. In 1994, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities proposed the creation of a treaty committee along these lines, including a system of periodic reports, and a role for the High Commissioner for Human Rights:

Requests the States Parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide . . . to encourage – or even undertake – the drafting and adoption of a control mechanism in the form of a treaty committee charged in particular with monitoring compliance of States Parties with the commitments they undertook . . . through the assessment of the reports submitted by the States Parties and, on a preventive basis, to draw the attention

of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to situations which may lead to genocide.\textsuperscript{8}

A similar proposal has been made by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions of the Commission on Human Rights.\textsuperscript{9} While ideally a mechanism along these lines would be established by an additional protocol to the Convention, that option may be rather too ambitious, at least in the short term. But it could also be created by resolution of the General Assembly; a similar body was created by the Economic and Social Council, charged with monitoring respect of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, although no provision to this effect was made in the treaty itself. It is true that some States might fail to co-operate, but this is also the case with many who have ratified the treaties. In other words, the existence of a binding legal obligation to submit reports is probably not that essential, at least for those States that are in good faith. If the resolution creating such a mechanism reflects genuine consensus, and if the members of the committee are credible and prestigious, its success will be likely even in the absence of a treaty obligation.

Early warning of genocide has been suggested on several occasions as a necessary element in its prevention. It is hard to quarrel with any efforts to anticipate crimes before they are committed. The proposals have sometimes involved sophisticated models employing computer databases and modern technology. In his report to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Benjamin Whitaker said that, once warning was provided, subsequent steps could be taken to prevent genocide:

- the investigation of allegations; activating different organs of the United Nations and related organizations, both directly and through national delegations, and making representations to national Governments and to interregional organizations for active involvement; seeking support of the international press in providing information; enlisting the aid of other media to call public attention to the threat, or actuality, of genocidal massacre; asking relevant racial, communal and religious leaders, in appropriate cases, to intercede, and arranging the immediate involvement of suitable mediators and conciliators at the outset.\textsuperscript{10}

Early warning of genocide requires an ability to identify and recognize the initial symptoms. The real challenge is distinguishing between garden-variety ethnic conflict, of which there is no shortage in the modern world, and genuine signs of possible genocide. In early 1994,


\textsuperscript{9} UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60, para. 130; 'Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Note by the Secretary-General', UN Doc. A/51/457, para. 56.

\textsuperscript{10} UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, para. 84.
the United Nations peacekeeping mission learned of the planning of the Rwandan genocide from a well-placed informer. Yet even direct information of preparations was not enough to sound alarm bells at United Nations headquarters in New York. Other signs, however, confirmed the report, and ought to have been taken more seriously. The principal external indicator in Rwanda, as in Nazi Germany, was the tone of hate propaganda directed against the targeted group. Speeches by prominent political personalities, print media and radio all pointed to a campaign intended, at a minimum, to lay the groundwork for public acceptance of genocide and, possibly, provoke public participation in the crimes. While early warning of genocide involves assessment of a range of factors, the presence of such propaganda is the real common denominator.

The law of genocide, if it is to develop, is confronted with a choice between two very different options. The first is to enlarge the scope of the definition of genocide, mainly by including groups not presently covered by article II, such as political groups, gender groups and other groups that are the victim of mass killing. Many have argued in favour of this, and their arguments are compelling. The second is to extend the scope of the obligations assumed by States parties, notably in the direction of a duty to intervene in order to prevent genocide. Ultimately, this may require military intervention. The more the definition of the crime is either generous or equivocal, the less States will be prepared to make such commitments. We cannot improve the Genocide Convention in both directions at the same time. Assuring States that genocide has a precise, restrictive and unchanging definition is the price to pay for their undertaking to take effective preventive action.

Yugoslavia’s proceedings taken against NATO in April 1999 demonstrated the value of a restrictive definition of the crime of genocide. While Yugoslavia had an arguable case against the respondents for breaching the obligation not to use force contained in the Charter of the United Nations, it faced enormous obstacles on the jurisdictional front. It tried, but in vain, to engage its adversaries in a debate about the merits of the case. The respondents refused the invitation, sticking to their position that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case. But Yugoslavia also charged NATO with genocide. Its argument on the merits was weak, possibly even frivolous, but there was little trouble in establishing the jurisdiction of the Court. Here, most of the NATO countries took on the debate on the merits of the claim, because they had no quarrel on the jurisdictional issue. In other words, genocide is different. States will accept obligations, such as the jurisdiction of the Court, that they refuse in another context. And, to the extent that the
International Court of Justice continues to insist upon a precise and restrictive definition of genocide, it will be relatively easy to convince States to accede to or ratify the Convention without reservation. But, if the opposite path is taken, the prospect of enlarging the body of States parties will be a dim one.

Given that other instruments exist or are emerging to cover the crimes that lie on the margins of genocide, including mass killing taking the form of crimes against humanity, enlargement of the definition does not rate at the top of the list of priorities. Admittedly, the author remains marked and indeed haunted by the failure of the international community to intervene in order to prevent the Rwandan genocide. These views prompt a preference for strengthening the obligations that flow from prevention rather than extension of the scope of those protected by the Convention. In other words, if a choice must be made, it would be better to engage States in a commitment to intervene, with force if necessary, in order to prevent the crime of genocide, rather than to expand the definition or suggest its borders are uncertain.
Appendix: the three principal drafts of the Convention

Secretariat draft

Preamble

The High Contracting Parties proclaim that Genocide, which is the intentional destruction of a group of human beings, defies universal conscience, inflicts irreparable loss on humanity by depriving it of the cultural and other contributions of the group so destroyed, and is in violent contradiction with the spirit and aims of the United Nations.

1. They appeal to the feelings of solidarity of all members of the international community and call upon them to oppose this odious crime.
2. They proclaim that the acts of genocide defined by the present Convention are crimes against the Law of Nations, and that the fundamental exigencies of civilization, international order and peace require their prevention and punishment.
3. They pledge themselves to prevent and to repress such acts wherever they may occur.

Article I

Definitions

I. [Protected groups] The purpose of this Convention is to prevent the destruction of racial, national, linguistic, religious or political groups of human beings.

II. [Acts qualified as Genocide] In this Convention, the word ‘genocide’ means a criminal act directed against any one of the aforesaid groups of human beings, with the purpose of destroying it in whole or in part, or of preventing its preservation or development.

Such acts consist of:

1. Causing the death of members of a group or injuring their health or physical integrity by:
(a) group massacres or individual executions; or
(b) subjection to conditions of life which, by lack of proper housing, clothing, food, hygiene and medical care, or excessive work or physical exertion are likely to result in the debilitation or death of the individuals; or
(c) mutilations and biological experiments imposed for other than curative purposes; or
(d) deprivation of all means of livelihood, by confiscation of property, looting, curtailment of work, denial of housing and of supplies otherwise available to the other inhabitants of the territory concerned.

2. Restricting births by:
   (a) sterilization and/or compulsory abortion; or
   (b) segregation of the sexes; or
   (c) obstacles to marriage.

3. Destroying the specific characteristics of the group by:
   (a) forcible transfer of children to another human group; or
   (b) forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group; or
   (c) prohibition of the use of the national language even in private intercourse; or
   (d) systematic destruction of books printed in the national language or of religious works or prohibition of new publications; or
   (e) systematic destruction of historical or religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses, destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic, or religious value and of objects used in religious worship.

Article II

I. [Punishable offences] The following are likewise deemed to be crimes of genocide:
1. Any attempt to commit genocide;
2. the following preparatory acts:
   (a) studies and research for the purpose of developing the technique of genocide;
   (b) setting up of installations, manufacturing, obtaining, possessing or supplying of articles or substances with the knowledge that they are intended for genocide;
   (c) issuing instructions or orders, and distributing tasks with a view to committing genocide.

II. The following shall likewise be punishable:
1. wilful participation in acts of genocide of whatever description;
2. direct public incitement to any act of genocide whether the incitement be successful or not;
3. conspiracy to commit acts of genocide.

Article III

[Punishment of a Particular Offence] All forms of public propaganda tending by their systematic and hateful character to promote genocide, or tending to make it appear as a necessary, legitimate or excusable act shall be punished.

Article IV

[Persons Liable] Those committing genocide shall be punished, be they rulers, public officials or private individuals.

Article V


Article VI

[Provisions Concerning Genocide in Municipal Criminal Law] The High Contracting Parties shall make provision in their municipal law for acts of genocide as defined by Articles I, II, and III, above, and for their effective punishment.

Article VII

[Universal Enforcement of Municipal Criminal Law] The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to punish any offender under this Convention within any territory under their jurisdiction, irrespective of the nationality of the offender or of the place where the offence has been committed.

Article VIII

[Extradition] The High Contracting Parties declare that genocide shall not be considered as a political crime and therefore shall be grounds for extradition.
The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to grant extradition in cases of genocide.

Article IX

[Trial of Genocide by an International Court] The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to commit all persons guilty of genocide under this Convention for trial to an international court in the following cases:
1. When they are unwilling to try such offenders themselves under Article VII or to grant their extradition under Article VIII.
2. If the acts of genocide have been committed by individuals acting as organs of the State or with the support or toleration of the State.

Article X

[International Court Competent to Try Genocide] Two drafts are submitted for this section:
1st draft: The court of criminal jurisdiction under Article IC shall be the International Court having jurisdiction in all matters connected with international crimes.

2nd draft: An international court shall be set up to try crimes of genocide (vide Annexes).

Article XI

[Disbanding of Groups or Organizations Having Participated in Genocide] The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to disband any group or organization which has participated in any act of genocide mentioned in Articles I, II, and III, above.

Article XII

[Action by the United Nations to Prevent or to Stop Genocide] Irrespective of any provision in the foregoing articles, should the crimes as defined in this Convention be committed in any part of the world, or should there be serious reasons for suspecting that such crimes have been committed, the High Contracting Parties may call upon the competent organs of the United Nation to take measures for the suppression or prevention of such crimes.

In such case the said Parties shall do everything in their power to give full effect to the intervention of the United Nations.
Article XIII

[Reparations to Victims of Genocide] When genocide is committed in a country by the government in power or by sections of the population, and if the government fails to resist it successfully, the State shall grant to the survivors of the human group that is a victim of genocide redress of a nature and in an amount to be determined by the United Nations.

Article XIV

[Settlement of Disputes on Interpretation or Application of the Convention] Disputes relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice.

Article XV

[Language – Date of the Convention] The present Convention, of which the . . ., . . ., . . ., . . . and . . . texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of . . .

Article XVI

[What States May Become Parties to the Conventions. Way to Become Party to It]
(First Draft)
1. The present Convention shall be open to accession on behalf of any Member of the United Nations or any non-member State to which an invitation has been addressed by the Economic and Social Council.
2. The instruments of accession shall be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(Second Draft)
1. The present Convention shall be open until 31 . . . 1948 for signature on behalf of any member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation has been addressed by the Economic and Social Council. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. After 1 . . . 1948 the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State that has received an invitation as aforesaid. Instruments of accession shall be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article XVII

[Reservations] No proposition is put forward for the moment.

Article XVIII

[Coming into Force]
1. The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the accession (or ratifications and accession) of not less than . . . Contracting Parties.
2. Accessions received after the Convention has come into force shall become effective as from the ninetieth day following the date of receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article XIX

[Duration of the Convention]
(First Draft)
1. The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of five years dating from its entry into force.
2. It shall remain in force for further successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties that have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period.
3. Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(Second Draft)
The present Convention may be denounced by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Such notification shall take effect one year after the date of its receipt.

Article XX

[Abrogation of the Convention] Should the number of Members of the United Nations and non-member States bound by this Convention be less than . . . as a result of denunciations, the Convention shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become operative.
Article XXI

[Revision of the Convention] A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any State which is a party to this Convention by means of a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General.

The Economic and Social Council shall decide upon the measures to be taken in respect of such a request.

Article XXII

[Notifications by the Secretary-General] The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all members of the United Nations and non-member States referred to in article XVI of all accessions (or signatures, ratifications and accessions) received in accordance with articles XVI and XVIII, of denunciations received in accordance with Article XIX, of the abrogation of the Convention effected as provided by article XX and of requests for revision of the Convention made in accordance with article XXI.

Article XXIII

[Deposit of the Original of the Convention and Transmission of Copies to Governments]

1. A copy of the Convention signed by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be deposited in the Archives of the Secretariat of the United Nations.

2. A certified copy shall be transmitted to all members of the United Nations and to non-member States mentioned under article . . .

Article XXIV

[Registration of the Convention] The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.

Ad Hoc Committee draft

Preamble

The High Contracting Parties

Declaring that genocide is a grave crime against mankind which is
contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and which the civilized world condemns;

Having been profoundly shocked by many recent instances of genocide;

Having taken note of the fact that the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg in its judgment of 30 September–1 October 1946 has punished under a different legal description certain persons who have committed acts similar to those which the present Convention aims at punishing; and

Being convinced that the prevention and punishment of genocide requires international co-operation,

Hereby agree to prevent and punish the crime as hereinafter provided:

[Substantive articles]

\textit{Article I}

[Genocide a crime under international law]
Genocide is a crime under international law whether committed in time of peace or in time of war.

\textit{Article II}

[‘Physical and biological’ genocide]
In this Convention genocide means any of the following deliberate acts committed with the intent to destroy a national, racial, religious or political group, on grounds of the national or racial origin, religious belief, or political opinion of its members:
1. Killing members of the group;
2. Impairing the physical integrity of members of the group;
3. Inflicting on members of the group measures or conditions of life aimed at causing their deaths;
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.

\textit{Article III}

[‘Cultural’ genocide]
In this Convention genocide also means any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion, or culture of a national, racial or religious group on grounds of the national or racial origin or the religious belief of its members such as:
1. Prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse
or in schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group;

2. Destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the group.

**Article IV**

[Punishable acts]
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide as defined in Articles II and III;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct incitement in public or in private to commit genocide whether such incitement be successful or not;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in any of the acts enumerated in this article.

**Article V**

[Persons liable]
Those committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article IV shall be punished whether they are heads of State, public officials or private individuals.

**Article VI**

[Domestic legislation]
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact the necessary legislation in accordance with their constitutional procedures to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.

**Article VII**

[Jurisdiction]
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article IV shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or by a competent international tribunal.

**Article VIII**

[Action of the United Nations]
1. A party to this Convention may call upon any competent organ of
the United Nations to take such action as may be appropriate under the Charter for the prevention and suppression of genocide.

2. A party to this Convention may bring to the attention of any competent organ of the United Nations any case of violation of this Convention.

Article IX

[Extradition]
1. Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article IV shall not be considered as political crimes and therefore shall be grounds for extradition.
2. Each party to this Convention pledges itself to grant extradition in such cases in accordance with its laws and treaties in force.

Article X

[Settlement of disputes by the International Court of Justice]
Disputes between the High Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice provided that no dispute shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice involving an issue which has been referred to and is pending before or has been passed upon by a competent international criminal tribunal.

[Final clauses]

Article XII

[States eligible to become parties to the Convention. Means of becoming a party]
1. The present Convention shall be open until 31 ———— 194— for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been
addressed by the General Assembly. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. After 1 ———— 194—, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article XIII

[Coming into force of the Convention]

1. The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of not less than twenty instruments of ratification or accession.

2. Ratification or accession received after the Convention has come into force shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article XIV

[Duration of the Convention. Denunciation]

1. The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of five years dating from its entry into force.

2. It shall remain in force for further successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties that have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period.

3. Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article XV

[Abrogation of the Convention]

Should the number of parties to this Convention become less than sixteen as a result of denunciations, the Convention shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become operative.

Article XVI

[Revision of the Convention]

1. Upon receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of
written communications from one-fourth of the number of High Contracting Parties, requesting consideration of the revision of the present Convention and the transmission of the respective requests to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General shall transmit such communications to the General Assembly.

2. The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such requests.

*Article XVII*

[Notification by the Secretary-General]

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and non-member States referred to in Article XII of all signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with Articles XII and XIII, of the date upon which the present Convention has come into force, of denunciations received in accordance with Article XIV, of the abrogation of the Convention effected as provided by Article XV, and of requests for revision of the Convention made in accordance with Article XVI.

*Article XVIII*

[Deposit of the original of the Convention and transmission of copies to governments]

The original of this Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.

A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to all Members of the United Nations and to the non-member States referred to under Article XII.

*Article XIX*

[Registration of the Convention]

The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.

**Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Final Text)**

*Preamble*

The Contracting Parties,
Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world,

Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity, and

Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required,

Hereby agree as hereinafter provided:

Article I

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

Article II

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article III

The following acts shall be punishable:

(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.

Article IV

Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.
Article V
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

Article VI
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

Article VII
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition.

The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.

Article VIII
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

Article IX
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.

Article X
The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948.
Article XI

The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid.

Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article XII

Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is responsible.

Article XIII

On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a procès-verbal and transmit a copy thereof to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in article XI.

The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.

Any ratification or accession effected, subsequent to the latter date, shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.

Article XIV

The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of its coming into force.

It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period.
Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article XV

If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.

Article XVI

A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.

The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

Article XVII

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the non-member States contemplated in article XI of the following:

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with article XI;
(b) Notifications received in accordance with article XII;
(c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with article XIII;
(d) Denunciations received in accordance with article XIV;
(e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with article XV;
(f) Notifications received in accordance with article XVI.

Article XVIII

The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.

A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in article XI.

Article XIX

The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.
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