

**COLONIALISM AND
REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

PRINCETON STUDIES ON THE NEAR EAST

**COLONIALISM AND
REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ORIGINS OF
EGYPT'S 'URABI MOVEMENT

Juan R. I. Cole

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For My Parents

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Acknowledgments

IN DECEMBER 1975 I abruptly found myself with time on my hands: the Lebanese civil war had interrupted my studies at the American University of Beirut. And so I visited Egypt, as a tourist, for the first time. The throbbing vitality of Cairo as a city, the rich texture of the country's history, the warmth and humor of the people, all intrigued me. Besides, Egypt was not having a civil war. So in 1976–78, I pursued, instead, an M.A. at the American University in Cairo, receiving a marvelous introduction to the history of the most populous, and culturally most central, country in the Arab world. I will always be grateful to Marsden Jones, Arnold Green, Bernard Weiss, the late Mohammad al-Nowaihi, and, in a different capacity, Husain Bikar, Muhammad al-ʿAzzawi, and the Ruhi brothers, for the initiation they gave me into a new world. In January 1977, I lived (and sometimes walked) through the bread riots that shook the country from one end of the Nile to the other. Young men rode each other's shoulders, chanting apostrophically at President Sadat, "You're wearing the latest fashions, while we sit, seven in a room!" (*Anta labis akhar moda; ihna ʿaʿidin sabʿah fiʿl-odah!*) I watched how they reversed, at least for a while, the economic policies planned out by technocrats in Cairo and Washington. Coming on the heels of my experience of the popular militias in Lebanon, this first-hand introduction to crowd collective action piqued my curiosity, and it became clear to me as I read more about the country that the elite-centered standard histories of Egypt had left out something important. In 1978 I returned to Beirut, foolishly thinking the situation had settled down there, and worked with a newspaper as the Iranian Revolution and the mobilization of the Shiʿites in Lebanon unfolded. I went on to write on Shiʿism, but retained my interest in nineteenth-century Egypt. When I gained the opportunity again to conduct research on the latter subject, I decided I had to try to make better sense of popular politics and popular culture. I gradually began to see, in part through the work of ʿAli Barakat and Latifah Salim, that many popular developments contributed to the outbreak of the ʿUrabi revolt of 1882, and I started to see ways in which the "revolt" had actually been a revolution. In a sense, the general experience of living in and studying the Middle East and especially Egypt provoked me to write this book.

To look more closely at why and how this might have been the case, I needed documents on the lives of these ordinary persons. And there I was in luck. Since 1968 the Egyptian government has opened to researchers, and been involved in organizing, the Egyptian National Archives, housed during the 1980s at the picturesque Citadel of Muhammad ʿAli overlooking the city. This magnificent repository of evidence for the history of so complex a civilization as modern Egypt is a historian's dream come true. Among the many exciting

documents I read there were petitions to the government from ordinary folk in the 1860s and 1870s, precisely the sort of nonelite record of thought and concerns I was looking for. There were also the reports on the peasants and artisans accused of acting in support of the rebels in 1882. Some series had been newly catalogued when I conducted my research in 1985–86; others were being transferred over from the Ministry of Finance Archives, and I saw them when I returned in the summer of 1988. For access to these records I am grateful to archivists like Madam Sawsan ‘Abdu’l-Ghani and the then director, Ustadh Fathu’llah.

Let me add that I do not want to play down the problems I encountered in making sense of these materials. During the period of my research the archives were open only three hours a day, in the morning. Because many records remain only preliminarily catalogued, the discovery of important new documents involves a great deal of stumbling around in the dark and depends on the great kindness and patience of the staff. I also have the sense that many relevant document series have not yet been catalogued and made available. No definitive statement can be made about the full significance of some papers, since it is impossible to cross-reference them with other relevant series. One of the referees for the manuscript complained that my findings may have been distorted by reliance on what was in the archives, since recording officials may have paid too much attention to Euro-Egyptian riots and too little to rural disturbances. I have no way of positively correcting for such a bias, however, save to warn readers of its possible existence. I have preferred, instead, to dwell on what can be accomplished, and to make a strong argument rather than a timid one, since I feel that progress in historical understanding is better served in this manner.

In the course of writing and revising this book, I have been exceedingly fortunate in friends and critics. Although I have no doubt often failed to incorporate them successfully into this book, I am grateful for the comments and insights, in regard either to chapters or to the entire book, of Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, Zachary Lockman, Ken Cuno, A. G. Hopkins, Ron Suny, Müge Göçek, Bill Sewell, Geoff Eley, Ray Grew, Jacob Lassner, and Tom Trautmann. Nikki Keddie was kind enough to tip me off to the importance of the manuscript papers of Sayyid Jamalū’d-Din “Al-Afghani” on microfilm at the University of California, Los Angeles. James Stewart Robinson heroically tutored me in nineteenth-century Ottoman texts. In Egypt, Hassanein Rabie, then a fellow at the American Research Center in Egypt, Dick Verdery, then ARCE director, and Fulbright director Ann Ridwan, were all extremely helpful. I would like to express my special thanks to Umm Anwar, who tirelessly brought me dusty registers and boxes from the bowels of the Citadel, often balanced on her head. I received a different sort of help, equally essential, from Jonathan Rodgers and other bibliographers at the Hatcher Graduate Library at the University of Michigan, especially the interlibrary loan staff.

This project received subvention from the Council for the International Exchange of Scholars, which granted me a Fulbright postdoctoral fellowship for a stay in Egypt in 1985–86; from the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, which funded a research trip to the United Kingdom in the summer of 1986; and from the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies at the University of Michigan, which awarded me a grant for further research in Egypt in the summer of 1988. I am thankful to the staffs and referees of all these institutions for this support. Portions of Chapters 7 and 9 appeared in a different form in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, and I am grateful to Cambridge University Press and to Ray Grew, the editor, for permission to rework and include that material here.

All citations are given in full in the bibliography, and for that reason a simplified system of footnote citation has been employed. Books are cited with the author's last name and a short title, along with date of publication at the first citation. Journal articles are cited by author's last name and year of publication. For the convenience of nonspecialists, I have omitted diacriticals, except for *ʿayn* and *hamzah*. I have transliterated Arabic according to the system of the Library of Congress, with a few exceptions: I have shown sun letters in the definite article, and shown the construct state in proper names. Thus, I write *ʿAbduʿr-Rahman*, not *ʿAbd al-Rahman*, since this more accurately catches the pronunciation and avoids the impression that “*ʿAbd*” could stand alone. Ottoman Turkish is given according to the system used by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*; in ambiguous cases, I have preferred an orthography that retains the visual connection to Arabic words, and so have not shown the hardened final dental (*Abdülhamid*, not *Abdülhamit*).

As always, I owe an incalculable debt to my wife, Shahin, who gamely accompanied me to Egypt on both of the trips I made in researching this work, and who soldiered through many inconveniences. Without her support, this book would not exist. Our son, Arman, also came on the second trip, and he, too, drank the water of the Nile.

**COLONIALISM AND
REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

Introduction

IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN PARTICULAR, colonies often existed before colonialism. The political and economic dominance of one country by another during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the absence of any conventional colonial state, has come to be called “informal empire.” This rather messy and improvised arrangement has much in common, it seems to me, with twentieth-century neocolonialism, where the former colonial or dominant power continues to wield exaggerated influence even after decolonization and the establishment of an indigenous regime. Informal empire is typified by a dual elite, a regional landed or capitalist class, and a foreign stratum of investors, merchants, workers, and diplomats, who, typically, have some sort of extraordinary leverage over the indigenous state. Some neocolonial states, likewise, include foreign cabinet officers and officials. Informal empire develops where a more powerful state (usually with a significant industrial base) makes an alliance with a collaborating group to attain informal hegemony over a weaker state (usually that of a primary commodity-producing country from the periphery or semiperiphery of the capitalist world-system). Their leverage gives the foreigners influence over decisions affecting imperial strategy, along with access to the local economy and privileges that allow them to exploit it.¹ This system ensures that the imperial state will not have to bear the costs of administering the informally colonized country, costs driven high by the need for an extensive apparatus of repression given both the unpopularity among most peoples of being directly ruled by foreigners and the relatively high rates of social and political mobilization achievable in the modern era.

When powerful, organized groups in a society characterized by informal empire or neocolonialism come to perceive the system as deleterious to their interests, a revolution can occur. Revolutions typically involve movements of resistance by social groups and the masses, an ideological program or set of programs that enunciates positive objectives, and the violent overthrow of established institutions.² I am in this book especially interested in historical situations where such conflicts eventuate in a social revolution, that is, one wherein major changes occur in relations of property. Egypt in 1882, China in 1899–1900, and Iran in 1979, all stand as instances of informal empire or neocolonialism gone sour. Of course, most informal empires end less violently, raising the question of why revolutions occur in some such states and not in others. In my view, four explanatory elements should be combined in attempting to explain a revolution: social structure and its socioeconomic context, organization, ideology, and conjuncture. These four approaches are not generally met with in one book, but I maintain that all four complement one

another and are required for a “total history” of a revolution. Social structure, especially the constitution of socioeconomic classes and conflict among them, has been the focus of Marxists and of scholars who emphasize the importance of the class arrangements in agrarian societies; organizational capacity has been stressed by resource mobilization theorists; ideology has been highlighted by Weberians and by social historians of ideas; and conjuncture—the way in which events in one social sphere have an unexpected impact on other groups—has been adopted as a central explanatory idea by sociologist Theda Skocpol in her *States and Social Revolutions* (1979). In appealing to all four of these dimensions of social action, I seek not to becloud the focus that might be achieved through single-mindedly appealing to any one of them, but to achieve a rounded picture of a revolution against informal empire. Those who participated in it, after all, belonged to large social classes as well as to smaller organizations, and articulated a culture and ideology that underlay their actions. Finally, the conjunctures of various types of collective and political action with one another helped shape the outcome of the revolution.

Concentrating on developments in Egypt that led to the upheaval of 1882, I want to show that revolutions in informally colonized states involve a peculiar set of conjunctures that distinguish them from the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions surveyed by Skocpol.³ Skocpol’s method is to concentrate on three basic elements: (1) the nature of the Old Regime state; (2) the class structures and contradictions existing in the state’s territory; and (3) the set of political conjunctures that typically set off a social revolution and carry it through to its conclusion. Her approach combines techniques drawn from history and sociology. She suggests that only a handful of social revolutions have occurred in modern history, and therefore, unlike most sociologists, is willing to content herself with a relatively limited range of generalization.

She also employs diachrony, a consciousness of change over time, in her theory of conjunctures, which emphasizes the manner in which one political event in one social sector leads to unexpected consequences in another. She defines conjuncture as “the coming together of separately determined and not consciously coordinated (or deliberately revolutionary) processes and group efforts.”⁴ The most important example she provides of this phenomenon is the way that a crisis of the state can allow uncoordinated peasant revolts against large landowners, which in turn heighten the polarization between reformist and conservative factions within the ruling elite. Once the peasants revolt and conduct land invasions, even if they do not think of themselves as making a revolution, the elite reformers must choose between supporting land reform or allowing the conservatives to crush the villagers. If they back the peasants, they commit themselves to a social revolution that the conservative nobles or high state functionaries are likely to resist with violence, thus risking a decisive split in the ruling elite. Skocpol maintains that conjunctures take place over short periods of time, differing from a more static conception such as

social structure, even though she thinks they recur wherever similar structures and processes exist. She makes the difference between political revolutions and social revolutions central to her argument, holding that in a political revolution, such as the English civil war of the seventeenth century, one section of the ruling elite replaces the other but no real change occurs in the social structure. In a social revolution a new elite emerges from below and property relations (especially agrarian ones) are permanently altered.

Skocpol's innovative book has been praised by sociologists and historians alike, though the latter sometimes quibble about details. Others have reservations about some of her premises. For instance, she plays down voluntaristic approaches to explaining revolution, asserting that social structures, rather than the ideas of major political actors, determine its progress and outcome. Revolutions are not made by bands of revolutionaries who succeed in spreading their message to the masses, she insists; rather, revolutions simply come. Less controversially, she stresses the importance of international economic and military competition in the creation of internal crises that weaken the state and allow a revolution to begin and to proceed. She insists on the autonomy of the state as a coercive organization, refusing to accept its demotion to a mere front for some social and economic class or even simply an arena wherein classes carry out their conflicts. She argues that urban revolts have had relatively little social consequence, and that all the major social revolutions have come about because of peasant revolts that successfully challenged a class of large landowners. Finally, she makes the case that social revolutions typically provide an opportunity for ambitious state-making politicians and bureaucrats from the margins of elite families to create a new, mass-incorporating bureaucracy whose interests are ultimately put before those of the various groups that made the revolution.⁵

Skocpol's vision resembles a Rube Goldberg machine. A country falls behind its competitors economically and politically, causing a section of its ruling elite to rebel against the center. Such divisions in the elite in turn detract from the resolve of the military. While the reformist group is attempting to force changes they find they have unexpectedly weakened the state in a way that allows the outbreak of urban and rural revolts. As explained above, the peasant revolts then pressure the reformist group into enacting major changes in land tenure that cause a stark disparity between conservatives and reformists within the elite. The urban revolts, on the other hand, have deprived the old nobility of control over administrative apparatuses that might be employed to advance their cause, leading to their downfall. The displacement of the landed nobility or gentry, in turn, allows a group of ambitious bureaucrats to come to the fore, and they go on to create a new bureaucracy that reincorporates the urban and peasant masses.

If Skocpol's treatment of conjuncture is highly original, her emphasis on social structure has a parentage in Marxism and in what might be called agrar-

ian structuralism. Marxist theorists tended to see revolutions in the modern period as struggles of a growing bourgeoisie against an entrenched feudal nobility, a dialectic of binary opposites. Marx himself discounted peasants as significant political actors in this struggle. Although Marxist conceptions of economic exploitation, the constitution of classes, and class struggle remain useful, reality is clearly too complex to be contained within such simplistic methods as a dialectical materialism based on binary opposition. In the case of the French Revolution, even Marxists began seeing a multiclass revolution, and research has demonstrated that feudalism had withered well before the Revolution, that the nobility itself had taken on bourgeois attributes, and that the peasants and marginal officials probably played more pivotal political roles than did the bourgeoisie. The Revolution constituted a multiclass alliance against anachronistic privileges—and was bourgeois only in the sense that it led to changes in law and administration that recognized social and economic transformations that had occurred earlier in the century.

Having despaired, perhaps, of the bourgeoisie, the agrarian structuralists employ the ideas of exploitation and class struggle, but make the peasants their primary protagonist. Barrington Moore, Eric Wolf, Jeffery Paige, and more recently Haim Gerber emphasize the nature of agrarian social structures and the peasants' alliances with other classes as the key to understanding the evolution of modern societies.⁶ Dealing directly with the Middle East, Gerber argues that countries with a class of large private landowners witness peasant rebellions more frequently than those characterized primarily by medium and small holdings. China, he says, had a rural gentry class that helps account for its history of peasant uprisings and its revolution. He attempts to show on the other hand that the Ottoman lands (Anatolia and Arab West Asia), because they lacked a class of permanent large landlords before the twentieth century, suffered relatively little peasant unrest. By the mid-twentieth century, when such a landlord class had emerged in some of these areas, social tensions began to rise but were defused by radical military coups that led to land reform from above. Gerber largely excludes Egypt from his analysis, but points out that it did develop a class of large landlords in the nineteenth century, well before Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. Strangely enough, he never suggests the relevance of this development for the Egyptian revolution of 1882, which included an element of peasant revolt against largeholders.

The theorists so far discussed on the whole have a conflict model of society. Some have a Marxist view of social classes as generated by different relationships to the means of production (whether one works in a factory for a wage or whether one owns the factory). Others seem influenced by the sociological idea of wealth stratification (where categorization depends on how much one earns every year, regardless of whether one is a wage-worker or self-employed). In either case, they see classes as having differing interests that either do or can create conflict among them. For Marxists the conflict is endemic; for

other sociologists it might be the exception, and develop out of a specific conjuncture. For the latter, the question arises as to what factors produce heightened class conflict. Jack A. Goldstone has put forth a wide-ranging theory of the demographic origins of increased social conflict leading to state breakdown (a term he prefers to revolution) in the early modern world.⁷ He argues that population growth, being cyclical, also contributes to cycles of political breakdown and instability. High rates of population increase typically cause exaggerated price inflation, and aggravate competition within social classes for resources.

Goldstone notes that from 1500 to 1660 northern Eurasia experienced a period of population expansion because of lower mortality. He argues that in England, where the population more than doubled during this century and a half, the political instability, civil war, and revolution that broke out in the seventeenth century were in large part caused by the impact of the population increase on social groups and the agrarian-bureaucratic state. Goldstone likewise sees rebellions in Ottoman Anatolia (the Celali revolts) and in China as related to the Eurasian population increases of the sixteenth century. He explains the subsequent relative political calm in these regions by a period of demographic stability or decline from 1660 to 1760. From 1760 to 1850 he sees another cycle of population growth, leading to a wave of state breakdowns, including the French Revolution, the Tai Ping revolt in China, and the revolutions of 1848 on the Continent. Goldstone does not believe that population growth in and of itself causes political instability, but rather that certain state and class arrangements are particularly unsuited to deal with its effects. States that depended primarily on agricultural taxes were especially vulnerable to demographic destabilization, because price inflation ate away at the value of their often fixed taxes, and because estate fragmentation and greater competition for land among a growing peasantry and gentry made them feel immiserated and made levying higher taxes on them politically risky. He believes that England escaped revolution in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, despite rapid population growth, because its state had successfully shifted the tax burden to the burgeoning industrial and urban areas, whereas Old Regime France still derived most of its taxes from the agrarian sector.

Goldstone's thesis is in the end more suggestive than decisive as far as the present study goes. Cairo's population seems to have grown, perhaps as much as 50 to 60 percent from 1517 to 1800, but most of that increase probably occurred from 1517 to 1700, given that the eighteenth century was marked by frequent plagues and other disasters. One may not be able to extrapolate confidently to the rest of the country from this estimate, but it does seem likely that Ottoman Egypt as a whole experienced a similar increase in population. After a demographic lull or reduction in the eighteenth century, the population began growing steadily again from about 1805, when it was a little over 4.5 million, and the rate of growth probably increased from 1850, from five per 1,000 to

twelve per 1,000 every year. By 1882 the population had doubled to almost 8 million.⁸ The three decades prior to the revolution of 1882 presented problems for Egyptian state and society similar to the ones Goldstone discusses for seventeenth-century England or eighteenth-century France. On the other hand, William McNeill has correctly pointed out that Egypt, despite its growth in population from 4.5 million in 1800 to 55 million in 1990, has experienced relatively little political instability in modern times, especially if we exclude the 1952 coup d'état, in which there was little popular participation. He cites Java as another example of a society that handled demographic expansion with little violence.⁹ The only sure conclusion one may draw is that periods of rapid population growth in agrarian societies pose problems for social groups and for the state that, if not addressed skillfully, can contribute to social unrest. How these problems are mediated by state actors, by social classes, by smaller social organizations, and by culture and ideology, all remain decisive in explaining any particular revolution.

A central problem is one of organization. The basic units of analysis for most students of revolution consist of large social classes such as the peasantry, the big landlords, and the urban bourgeoisie that interact with an agrarian bureaucratic state. These categories are often shorn of context and culture, and the basic conclusions of the Moore school may be expressed in abstract arithmetical terms: peasant alliance with bourgeoisie versus aristocracy equals bourgeois democracy. A close reading of such texts, however, shows that the authors most often suggest the importance of intervening variables that they do not discuss at length. Paige, for example, asserts that in addition to social structure, peasant revolutions also depend on extraneous factors, such as (1) a weakening of the aristocracy (especially the loss of control over the military), (2) the introduction of an organizational capacity among the peasants from the outside, such as from urban workers' unions, and (3) the capture of the government by reformist parties. Skocpol, as well, contrasts the well-organized medium peasantry of western Germany, who revolted during the revolution of 1848, with the more passive peasantry east of the Elbe, where Junkers acted as estate lords and agents of the Prussian state, and peasant landholdings were small and few.¹⁰ The discourse of these analysts, in putting large structures such as social classes in the forefront, only partially hides from view their continuing dependence on explanatory elements such as organization and ideology.

In order to elicit the full meaning of human action, as William Sewell has argued, the analyst must simultaneously take account of power, culture, and material factors.¹¹ Most agrarian structuralists concentrate solely on the last, the material factors, in explaining revolts and revolutions. Skocpol, with her emphasis on the state as an actor, takes account of both hegemonic power and the material. These analysts, for all their insights, have slighted the ideational and organizational aspects of revolutionary action. The importance of the

study of organizations has been stressed by sociologists working on resource mobilization. Mayer Zald, Charles Tilly, and others insist that organizational capacity explains the success of social movements. They take account of such characteristics of organized social movements as their recruitment networks, social and demographic bases, societal infrastructures, fund-raising, organizational development, integration and control, tactics, ability to adapt, and (less often) ideologies.¹² By societal infrastructures they mean such larger institutions as a church, which might be enlisted by smaller organizations with specific goals. The manner in which the anti-abortion forces in the United States have depended on the Roman Catholic and other churches is a case in point. Tilly in particular stresses the importance of the state's ability or inability to repress challenges, of the collective interests of challengers, and of their organization and mobilization. Misagh Parsa has demonstrated the value of this approach for understanding the Iranian revolution of 1978–79.¹³

In short, large structures such as are implied in peasant share-cropping on hacienda estates cannot in and of themselves explain peasant participation in revolts. Rather, the repressiveness of the powers that be, and the peasants' degree of organization and control over resources, must also be taken into account. Agrarian and other social structures form a precondition for, but do not provide the entire explanation of, any particular instance of collective violence. As the asides of the agrarian structuralists prove, employing resource mobilization theory does not necessarily rule out analysis that takes account of social and material structures. I wish to make resource mobilization central to my account of the Egyptian revolution of 1882. An emphasis on resource mobilization at first glance seems to contradict Skocpol's assertion that revolutions are not planned, but simply come. The contradiction is resolved by emphasizing that a revolution consists of several distinct revolts by different social groups. Here I am only insisting that the ways in which peasants, urban groups, and the intelligentsia are organized helps explain why and how their revolts take place and succeed. This position hardly requires a denial that they often neglect to coordinate very well among one another, or that the actions of one organized group may produce unexpected results for the others in the course of the larger revolution. Skocpol thinks that the potential for peasant and urban-popular revolts is "endemic" in agrarian states.¹⁴ Such a belief makes a close inquiry into peasant and urban organization unnecessary, but it is not a belief that bears serious scrutiny, and seems to be questioned by Skocpol's own description of the difference between the eastern and western German peasants during 1848.

Skocpol and other agrarian structuralists, then, pay too much attention to large structures such as class, and too little to organization and ideology in explaining revolutions. Implicitly modeling human societies on the machine or on Newtonian physics, this brand of social theory argues the unimportance of the individual, or even of most organizations, in the face of large social and

material structures, which it holds determinative of what paths social change could take and under what circumstances collective action might erupt. Resource mobilization theorists believe that units smaller than social classes, such as the organization, can nevertheless have a broad impact. This point of view is given some support by the science of chaos or nonlinearity, which attempts to study the behavior of millions of small units in dynamical systems. Meteorologists working within the chaos paradigm have found that relatively small events can cause very great changes in systems such as the weather. They call this phenomenon the “butterfly effect,” referring only a little hyperbolically to the idea that the flapping of a butterfly’s wings somewhere can snowball into a major change in the weather patterns. James Gleick explains: “In science as in life, it is well known that a chain of events can have a point of crisis that could magnify small changes. But chaos meant such points were everywhere. They were pervasive.”¹⁵ In dynamical systems, unlike mechanical ones, very small influences cannot be ignored as inconsequential. If human history is more like the weather than like the solar system, then individual human actions could reproduce the “butterfly effect.” Individuals and small organizations could be much more important than the theorists of class structure give them credit for, and small-scale actions could affect the large-scale at every point along the line. The idea of conjuncture may turn out to be Skocpol’s really crucial contribution to the study of collective action, insofar as it permits unexpected small-scale events to mushroom into major influences on the course of revolutions. The conjunctures, however, may be infinitely more numerous and varied than she suggests.

Last, but by no means least, we come to culture. The agrarian structuralists tend either to ignore culture altogether, or actually attempt to explain ideologies as reflective of material conditions. Raymond Williams, a Marxist humanist who spent a lifetime studying culture in social context, firmly came to the conclusion that “reflection theory,” the reduction of culture to a mere mirror of material life, stood in the way of any nuanced understanding of it.¹⁶ I maintain that structures of thought have their own semiotic logic, which interacts with social and material conditions. Ideology is not the imprint of the material on the mind, but a set of complex and dynamic mediations between the ideal and the material. Sewell in particular has called attention to the manner in which Skocpol’s account of the French Revolution ignores key issues in cultural and ideological transformation.¹⁷ To write the social history of revolutions requires us simultaneously to write a social history of ideas, of discursive practice in its variety of social and organizational settings.

Skocpol argues for structural explanation rather than the appeal to voluntarism, saying that revolutions take unexpected courses and social classes and groups end up acting in unforeseen ways. Her deemphasis on revolutionary organizations in favor of large structures, however, cannot be supported by this argument. Those who think ideology and volition important do not therefore

suggest that certain social or political groups plan out revolutions beforehand in their entirety. The conjuncture of different political movements and goals, with various social bases, simply does not rule out an autonomous role for ideologies or for volition. The new sciences of nonlinearity suggest that we should associate the volition or free will of individuals with unexpected actions and outcomes (the butterfly effect), rather than with planned outcomes. Skocpol later maintained that she had not meant to dismiss intentional action as a focus of explanation, only to situate it theoretically. She went on to say that “Substantively speaking, the analysis of cultural idioms and ideologies in social revolutions deserves treatment analogous to the analysis of class relations and class conflicts: both phenomena must be studied in relation to the central drama of the breakdown and rebuilding of state organizations.”¹⁸

A study of the generation and transmission of ideologies requires a concern with communications technology and networks of diffusion. Strikingly, Skocpol seldom remarks on the timing of her social revolutions, which all took place after 1700. One of her variables, international economic and political competition, was intensified by the rise of mercantile and then industrial capitalism. Nevertheless, the sorts of explanatory variables upon which she focuses—international competition, state crisis, and peasant revolt—could all have occurred in premodern times. Skocpol thinks the peasant rebellions in 1789 owed more to the national political dynamics of that year than to local traditions of revolt.¹⁹ Yet, truly national political dynamics existed in 1789 rather than in 1300 primarily because of the printing press and the rise of newspapers. The nation-wide revolutions she discusses depended not only on modern communications technology, but also (in the case of Russia and China) on advances in transportation technology. Although most participants in the revolutions were illiterate, intellectuals and literate brokers of information to the masses played a crucial role. Such technology is as important to the rise of the mass-incorporating bureaucratic state in the revolution’s last stages as it is to the outbreak and progress of the revolution itself. The absence of any mention of the printing press, journalism, or other innovations in communications technology strikes me as an important lacuna in most treatments of modern revolutions.

The social history of ideas has begun to come of age in the past decade. One hurdle that had to be overcome in this area of inquiry was the notion that the ruling ideas of any age are the ideas of the ruling class (Marx in the *German Ideology*). A reappropriation of Antonio Gramsci, along with a new sensitivity to culture born of the impact of symbolic and cultural anthropology, has brought home to historians the degree to which the popular strata of peasants and urban workers have in history often succeeded in creating alternative ideologies supporting their causes that contrasted with the official, hegemonic ideology of the state and the ruling strata.²⁰ George Rudé concludes that popular ideology is not the possession of a single class, and often arises even where

self-conscious social classes have not yet come into being. It comes about through three elements, he suggests. In the first, “inherent ideology,” workers and peasants elaborate a set of beliefs in their daily lives, evident in their folk tales and proverbs as well as in their general social attitudes. The second component of popular ideology, shared with other groups in society, is “derived ideas” from literate social thinkers filtering into popular culture, such as the Rights of Man, nationalism, or socialism. Although Rudé does not say so, such a process of assimilation clearly depends upon factors such as the rise of a stratum of intellectuals, the spread of literacy, and the advent of the printing press. The third ingredient is the jostle of experience, in which the popular strata come into practical conflict with the state and the propertied classes, and apply their ideologies to that dispute. The jostle of experience (a phrase borrowed from English labor historian E. P. Thompson) helps explain why the actual stance of peasants or artisans on a particular issue might differ from region to region or period to period, despite their sharing a common set of inherent and derived ideas.

As noted above, taking intellectual currents, whether popular or elite, seriously raises questions about changing communications technology, the impact of print culture, the telegraph, and the popular press. How literate were Egyptians, what sort of access did they have to newspapers, how did the popular classes derive their insurrectionary ideas in the late 1870s and 1880s? Such an approach further raises the issue of the role of intellectuals and their relationship with other social strata. The rise of a new stratum of intellectuals and the impact of print culture in the nineteenth century have implications, not only for social and political mobilization, but also for the growth of regional patriotism.²¹

Skocpol does not attempt to claim universality for her theory, and she thinks a different set of dynamics might drive anticolonial or postcolonial revolutions.²² As indicated earlier, I would like to suggest that the category of anticolonial revolutions might profitably be disaggregated into two distinct types: the revolution against an informally colonized state, a dual elite, and an indigenous bureaucracy, and the colonial revolution proper, where the state is in imperial hands. That is, I think Algeria in 1962 differed substantially from Egypt in 1882. In making this distinction I am insisting that it does matter whether an indigenous state exists or not, despite the dependence of both systems on a collaborating local elite.²³ Logically speaking, of course, revolutions against informally colonized states could be social or merely political. It is the social revolutions that interest me here. To be concrete, I would like to argue that both the Egyptian revolution of 1882 and the Islamic revolution in Iran of 1978–79 constituted social revolutions against states characterized by informal imperial hegemony. Both possessed an indigenous state that lacked complete sovereignty. For instance, the British, French, and other Great Powers

deposed Khedive Isma'il and placed his son, Tawfiq, on the throne in 1879, and when a local revolution seemed likely to topple Tawfiq, the British invaded to put him back on the throne. In Iran, an Anglo-American occupying force deposed Riza Shah in 1941, placing his son Muhammad Riza on the throne, and when a populist prime minister sent the shah into exile in 1953, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency intervened to coordinate a coup that restored Muhammad Riza to power. Imperial intervention in indigenous succession not only detracts from sovereignty but undermines the popular legitimacy of the state. In both instances, the imperial power attempted to influence indigenous economic, political, and cultural policies, provoking opposition from local groups adversely affected. Typically, elements of the indigenous elite ally themselves with the dominant external power. The state in such situations finds itself caught between the demands of this collaborating elite and its imperial allies on the one hand, and the protests of local social groups making countervailing demands on the other.

In a very important piece of self-revision, Skocpol observes that the Islamic revolution in Iran was indeed a social revolution, and that it differed from the French, Russian, and Chinese in lacking major peasant revolts. This revolution also, she admits, caused her to reconsider the importance of idea systems in shaping political action.²⁴ One cannot dismiss peasant action altogether in Iran, and about 5 percent of Iran's land was redistributed to peasants (similar to the percentage redistributed to the rural population after the French Revolution); peasant land invasions also occurred nearly a century earlier in Egypt. That said, we still have to ask why the cities should have been so prominent and pivotal as sites of revolutionary action in the revolutions of Egypt in 1882 and Iran in 1979. First, the agrarian structuralists have simply underemphasized the density of rural-urban links and the centrality of urban political action in Third World countries, as John Walton has shown.²⁵ Second, however, we must consider the peculiar position of countries suffering from informal imperial hegemony. Foreign investment, immigration, and diplomatic maneuvers are concentrated in, or conducted from, urban areas, so that any revolution that takes aim at both the indigenous and the foreign elites will see a good deal of important action in cities. Popular action in neocolonial societies that succeeds in expelling European entrepreneurs, companies, and banks may be seen as "social," insofar as these foreign elements constituted one important element of class relations. Of course, for a revolution to be social, a new elite must also come to power, from a different social class than the old. In a revolution against informal empire, not only are the foreigners expelled, but an indigenous landlord or capitalist class is displaced by persons from previously marginal professions or ethnicities. Typically, the antforeign element in the revolution leads to the use of nativist symbols and discourse, whether religious or regional. In both Egypt and Iran, Islam proved important as a cultural

idiom of rebellion. Let us at least admit the possibility of such a paradigm for revolutions against informally colonized states, and come back to it in the conclusion.

This book culminates in an analysis of the events in Egypt from September 1881 to September 1882, which Western historiography has called the ‘Urabi revolt, but most of it concerns the Revolution’s prologue in the previous two decades. Egypt in the nineteenth century constituted a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, paying tribute to the sultan-caliph in Istanbul, but enjoying a measure of administrative autonomy. It remained an integral part of the empire despite its vassal status, however, a fact played down by both modern European and nationalist Egyptian historians. From 1867 the Ottoman governor of Egypt, a post already hereditary in one family, became known as the “khe-dive,” and the succession was arranged on the basis of primogeniture. Egypt in the 1860s and 1870s had a cotton boom, and the ruler borrowed a great deal of money from Europe, mostly for infrastructural development. From 1876 the khedive declared his government’s inability to pay the debt-servicing, and a Franco-British Dual Control was set up, with cabinet-level appointments for two Europeans to supervise the Egyptian budget. The cotton boom also brought tens of thousands of Europeans into the country. From 1876 the establishment of Mixed Courts on a European model allowed these immigrants to begin acquiring significant amounts of land, and to securely pursue commerce and money-lending on a large scale. In 1881 a combined military and civilian reform movement attempted to prevent further penetration of the country by the Europeans, and these reformers, mainly native Egyptians, made claims on power and resources previously reserved to the Ottoman aristocracy in the country. European and khedivial resistance to these reforms eventuated in a revolutionary situation in the summer of 1882. A leading but not dominant role was played by the Egyptian military officer Ahmad ‘Urabi.

Needless to say, not all writers have seen the events in Egypt during 1881 and 1882 as a revolution at all, much less a social one. The “‘Urabi revolt” or the “Suez crisis,” to which British historians reduced these events, has had a career in several realms of historical imagination: British Empire history, Egyptian nationalist historiography, and analyses of the Egyptian Left. British Empire history, a field poorly integrated with the new social history of the Middle East as it has emerged in the past twenty years, has been dominated in regard to the Egyptian events by Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher’s account, first published in 1961. They put forward some extremely influential ideas. First, they see British policy in the Near East from the time of Palmerston in the 1840s until 1882 as the pursuit of “the imperialism of free trade” or informal empire. The mid-Victorians, they say, set up a security system in the Near East based upon their naval superiority and their use of the Ottomans as a bulwark against Russian penetration of the Mediterranean. Palmerston expected the forced end of the Egyptian monopoly system in 1841 to open up

markets to free trade, to increase peasant productivity, and to enhance the ability of local merchants to accumulate capital. Free trade and prosperity would bring liberal ideas of liberty and justice, and the enriched, subtly reformed Ottomans would gratefully accept the tutelage of the British.²⁶

Robinson and Gallagher know that this Palmerstonian vision failed, and they think they know why. "Moslem conservatism and Russian intrigue," they write, "blocked every attempt at liberal reform; and as a result the technique of the collaborating class did not work" (p. 78). Not only did the Ottoman ruling classes irrationally prefer their version of Islamic society to the imperialism of free trade, but indigenous state structures were being undermined by European influence. During and after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78, "Turkish power seemed to be crumbling away" (p. 80). Their account is heavy with talk of an Ottoman "collapse," of the power of the sultan and the khedive being undermined by developments such as the debt crises of the mid-1870s: "More than any other cause, the danger of a general Ottoman collapse set off the partition of Africa" (p. 82). In Egypt specifically, the Anglo-French Dual Control over the budget made Khedive Tawfiq (who was placed on the throne by the Europeans in 1879) into a revenue collector on behalf of the foreigners, undermining his legitimacy and alienating the large landowners from him. Robinson and Gallagher also maintain that the Powers not only transformed Tawfiq into their tax collector, they also made him a "constitutional monarch." Whereas the former idea is certainly correct, it is difficult to understand what they could possibly mean by the latter, since Tawfiq and the president of his council of ministers, Riyad Pasha, ruled autocratically, with an iron fist, and refused to call the chamber of deputies into session. In any case, they maintain that by 1881, the khedivate had been "eroded" by the penetration of European influences. The country verged on "anarchy," which led to a military putsch (p. 87). In short, the brittle and stagnant essence of "Moslem conservatism" and of "Turkish institutions" rendered them too fragile a vessel to hold the heady brew of Palmerstonian informal empire, so that European penetration, instead of producing a collaborating class, led to a breakdown in governance.

Robinson and Gallagher attribute this political ferment to four elements. First, the liberal reformers, led by the Ottoman-Egyptian noble and sometime prime minister, Sharif Pasha, resented "Turkish" domination and believed in a Western-style constitution. Second, "Moslem conservatives" (presumably the Muslim clerics [*ulama*]?) resented the extension of Christian influence. Third, the great landowners fought to preserve their tax privileges. Fourth, 'Urabi Pasha and the colonels took on the Europeans in order to build back up the officer corps and enlarge the army. They end with an aside about the peasantry being on the verge of revolt, but apparently do not include this lowly group in the four elements constituting the movement. Now, these authors insist that they only mean to portray the manner in which British officials of that day saw things, rather than some empirical reality. Their discussion of the

issues just reviewed is not couched in that sort of language, but appears to derive from the authors' own reasoning. But whether these ideas come from British consuls or academic historians, they are clearly incorrect, not only in terms of factual detail but in the very conception of the nature of social change in Egypt. Their diction and vagueness, their easy assumption of European superiority and Middle Eastern inability to deal with the modern world recall the discourse of Orientalism as described by Edward Said.²⁷

One hardly knows where to begin. First, I cannot find any evidence of either anarchy or impending collapse in the Ottoman Empire as a whole or in the vassal state of Egypt. Although the Ottomans did lose a war to Russia in 1878 (not a new thing), along with some Eastern European territory, their empire seems to have been entirely stable in the areas that continued under their sovereignty (with the partial exception of the Sudan, not an area relevant to this argument). Indeed, the Ottoman economy and population grew throughout the late nineteenth century despite the losses in the Balkans. The attempts to establish a parliamentary constitutionalism in Istanbul in 1876–78 failed when Sultan Abdülhamid II turned against it, but even the restoration of autocracy seems to have produced no serious internal instability in the late 1870s or for the rest of the century.

In Egypt, as well, it is hard to see what exactly occurred before the British invasion that might be considered anarchic. True, a reform movement arose that attempted to make Khedive Tawfiq into a constitutional monarch (something the French and British had not, contrary to what Robinson and Gallagher aver, already achieved). True, a chamber of deputies was elected, and the khedive had to accept cabinet government. None of this constitutes anarchy in most normal political parlance. A "restless" peasantry can hardly account for the unfolding crisis, since it had been much more restless in 1878–79, with no obvious consequences for high politics. No military putsch ever occurred. ʿUrabi became a major-general and the minister of war in two cabinets formed under the khedive, and later served the largely civilian revolutionary government. The military did become a pivotal ally of civilian revolutionaries, intervening at crucial points, but the evidence does not support the charge that it set up a martial-law dictatorship at any time in 1881–82. In late July 1882, after the British assault on Egypt, Egyptian notables deposed Viceroy Tawfiq and created what they called a "common-law" (*ʿurfi*) government, primarily out of the deputy ministers of the various ministries, along with some military officers. They meant by "common-law" that their state was provisional and not yet sanctioned by Islamic authorities like the sultan-caliph in Istanbul. We will see that this revolutionary government overruled ʿUrabi on several occasions. Robinson and Gallagher appear to consider ʿUrabi's rise to the position of minister of war as a military coup, but such a view, though widely held by imperialists of the time, cannot be maintained against the archival evidence, as Alexander Schölch has shown (see below).

Since no good evidence for “erosion” or “anarchy” exists, it seems unnecessary to explain why such a situation might have arisen. If one wishes to explain why a multiclass reform movement arose in Egypt in 1881–82, surely a vague appeal to the “corrosive” effects of European free trade on “Turkish power” will not suffice. It is the task of this book to develop an explanation for the rise of this movement, appealing to variables such as shifting class interests under the impact of economic and demographic change, the organizations of major political actors, their resources, tactics, and recruitment, their repertoires of collective action, their ideologies, the varying repressive capacity of the state, and specific conjunctures of social and political action.

The Robinson and Gallagher description of the forces that made up the reform movement is full of inaccuracies and incomplete. Since Sharif Pasha was himself a Turcophone Ottoman, it is hard to see how he could have been inspired by Egyptian nationalist resentment against “Turkish” overlordship. Many of the Muslim high clergy or ulama ended up siding with the khedive, though ulama did form one branch of the revolutionary intelligentsia. The great landowners were the Ottoman and Circassian nobility, who, again, largely sided with the khedive, and whose tax privileges were not seriously in doubt. It was the village notables who resented the khedive’s revocation of tax reductions for them. The junior officers played an important role, but so too did civilian bureaucrats, urban merchants, guildsmen, women, and other groups. Since Egypt did not slide into anarchy, moreover, the theory that the British were “drawn into” Egypt by turbulence in the periphery must be entirely rejected. The British invaded in order to ensure that a process of state formation did not succeed in creating a new sort of stable order that would end European privileges and threaten the security of European property and investments. Needless to say, British access to the Suez Canal was never in any danger, as the admiralty itself concluded, though some politicians later excused their belligerency by reference to this supposed threat to British interests.²⁸

Despite an early call to action by Robert Tignor, only one modern Western historian has published an extended account of the crisis of 1878–82 out of the Egyptian archives, the late Alexander Schölch.²⁹ Schölch’s book, a revised dissertation, has masterfully refigured our image of the political history of these times. He completely disproves the idea that then-General Ahmad ‘Urabi instituted anything like a military dictatorship in the spring–summer of 1882, for instance. He could not use all the hundreds of files on the Revolution in the archives, however, and its social dimension escapes him. He writes of August 1882: “The political revolution, the fall of the monarchy or at least of the Khedive, failed to materialize; social revolution was never even on the cards. Mobilization of the population was the result, in the first instance, of exploitation of traditional values.”³⁰ The terms of Schölch’s discourse reveal what he thinks constitutes a revolution, and why the Egyptians failed to create one.

First, he argues that the Ottoman-appointed dynastic ruler, the khedive, did not “fall”; he clearly was looking for a beheaded monarch of the French sort. That he found no evidence of social revolution probably indicates that he was not looking for such a phenomenon, having already concluded that no dethronement equals no revolution. Finally, Schölch found no secular nationalism of the French type in Egypt of 1882, but rather Islamic nativism, calls for holy war, and a vague Egyptian regional patriotism within the framework of Ottoman identity. This absence of secular nationalism appears further to have led him to see the movement as one of conservative Ottoman irredentism.

I think Schölch, though a fine historian, was misled by looking for a revolution on the French model. A revolution, it seems to me, certainly occurred, but of a different sort. His insistence on the need for the khedive to “fall” is a case in point. In the summer of 1882, as Schölch himself discovered, a situation of multiple sovereignty existed, with both the khedive and a common-law government competing for power. Multiple sovereignty, as Charles Tilly has argued, is itself a clear sign that a revolutionary situation has developed. The evidence is, moreover, that the common-law government’s authority extended over much more of the country than did that of the khedive. Indeed, the khedive was probably alive in Alexandria only because of the protection of the British admiralty, a foreign intervention. Schölch discovered no social revolution because he did not see the files, subsequently uncovered by ‘Ali Barakat and Latifah M. Salim, on peasant land invasions and other actions in the summer of 1882. He also mightily played down the importance of urban riots against European concerns, apparently primarily because he was concerned to deny the European attribution of anti-Christian “massacres” to the rebels. I have used lists of nearly 1,000 persons, out of an estimated 1,200, arrested after the failure of the movement, which, along with other lists and evidence, allow me to explore the “social” character of the Revolution in a manner Schölch did not. Finally, as the Islamic revolution in Iran underscored, revolutions against informal empire do typically appeal to nativist symbols such as local religion and regional patriotism. That they do so derives in part from the revolutionaries’ concern to escape the domination of both foreign and indigenous elites, and I fail to see why this ideological nativism should in itself disqualify a movement from being a revolution. Miroslav Hroch has seen the history of several small European countries in the nineteenth century as centered on the development of a merely regional patriotism, which only much later became a full-blown nationalism. Said Amir Arjomand has shown that most modern revolutions have had a strong religious element, and that the French and Russian models are misleading in this regard; even they, of course, had strong ideological components.³¹ Schölch’s analysis of the micropolitics of the movement is highly valuable and will probably stand for decades, but the social history of the Revolution and its ideas has only begun to be written.

For the Europeans, the Egyptian revolution of 1882 and British intervention

formed a starting-point for the controversy about economic imperialism that led to the theories of Hobson, and later, Lenin.³² For Egyptians, however, the Revolution has been a matter of continuing debate in the conception of their national evolution. The changing depictions of the Revolution in twentieth-century Egyptian historiography have been usefully summarized by Thomas Mayer.³³ He shows that an early nationalist school concentrated on political history and saw 'Urabi in a generally negative light (as having dictatorial tendencies), but praised the Revolution as having had some constitutionalist ideas. The main proponent of this view was 'Abdu'r-Rahman ar-Rafi'i. Thereafter, the most important schools have been the socialist, in the 1960s and 1970s especially, and the liberal democrats, who reemerged in the 1970s and 1980s. The socialist interpretation, in turn, can broadly be divided into a theoretical or ideal-typical approach, associated with Muhammad Anis at Cairo University, and a more empirical socioeconomic approach, associated with 'Ayn Shams University.

The major archivally based study of the 'Urabi revolt to come out of the Cairo University school of socialist historiography, Latifah Salim's *Social Forces in the 'Urabi Revolution* (1981), presents the Revolution as a nationwide, mass revolt on the part of the intellectuals, the urban guilds, and both large and small landowners.³⁴ As some Egyptian reviewers noted, despite her theoretical Marxism, the author does not show how the various forces interacted with one another to create a revolution, and limits herself to describing archival documents relating to the participant classes. Another socialist interpretation from the Cairo University school, that of 'Abdu'l-'Azim Ramadan, makes a distinction between the "petty bourgeois" military leadership and the "agricultural bourgeoisie," of Sharif Pasha, Sultan Pasha, and other magnates. Ramadan sees the agricultural bourgeoisie as the dominant force in the reform movement and early stages of the Revolution. It, however, fell from power in February 1882. Thereafter, Ramadan argues, the movement was dominated by the petty bourgeois officers, often in alliance with the peasantry. The agricultural bourgeoisie now allied itself with the khedive and the Europeans, and since the laws of historical evolution dictated the victory of this class over the petty bourgeoisie and the peasants, the Revolution failed.³⁵

I am in sympathy with the task Salim and Ramadan set themselves, of understanding the manner in which class conflict and socioeconomic factors influenced political affairs. I do not understand, however, what is to be gained by opposing large landlords as an "agricultural bourgeoisie" to the khedive and his nobles, since the latter would also have to be characterized as an "agricultural bourgeoisie." The khedive, with his sugar factories and cotton estates, was more bourgeois than his opponents. Although I agree that the loss of landlords like Sharif Pasha to the coalition of challengers in February 1882 hurt the movement, the Revolution unfolded very nicely without them that spring and summer. The common-law state set up late in July was defeated,

not by Sharif and his fellow magnates, but by a British invasion, which overwhelmed the largely pro-^cUrabi Egyptian army with superior tactics and technology.

Here a crucial difficulty with the arguments put forth by both Salim and Ramadan emerges, which is the degree to which they leave the Europeans out of the picture. I, on the other hand, see Egypt as characterized by a dual elite in this period, consisting of the local landed magnates and the expatriate European bourgeoisie. I see the Revolution as a multitude of revolutions taking place simultaneously, by great landlords, rich peasants, the intelligentsia, and the urban merchant and artisan guilds. In some instances, fractions of one class fought among themselves, as with the alliance of some great landlords such as Sharif Pasha with the reformists in 1881. These intraclass divisions were sometimes healed by threats thrown up by the course the Revolution took. Many, but by no means all of the great landlords later dropped out of the reformist coalition, and one reason for their doing so was that the reformists threatened their coexistence with the European wing of the dual elite. The hard-line opposition of the Europeans, moreover, caused most of the crises that led the other social forces to create a state and to gain the allegiance of the army, and it seems unlikely that either the khedive or the great landlords around him could have themselves defeated the revolutionaries.

I hope to build on Salim's work, not only by my own further archival discoveries, but by addressing issues in social explanation. I will appeal to the conjunctures created by conflicts among large social structures, intermediate organizations, and ideologies, and to the conception of a multiclass rebellion against a dual ruling elite. I aim to accomplish this in part by extending the time frame and examining the evolution of interests, organizations, and ideologies over the twenty-five years before the Revolution. Salim later gave an interview in which she stressed the political aims of the Revolution, especially the establishment of some form of consultative government.³⁶ I agree that an ideology of greater egalitarianism pervaded the Revolution, and that if we miss the desire to end the extraordinary privileges of the dual elite (coded as foreign) and to ensure more consultative involvement of the middling sort (coded as indigenous) in governance, we will have missed a key aspect of the Revolution. Such aspirations, I believe, existed alongside peasant grievances toward nobles, guild merchants' and artisans' grievances toward European competitors, Egyptian junior officers' grievances toward Circassian staff officers, and other structural conflicts growing out of these groups' self-construction and articulation of their material interests. The abolition of political privilege coincided with the evening of material scores in the Revolution. If power, culture, and material factors always overlap in social action, as Sewell suggests, it is not self-contradictory to see ideological demands for the abolition of political privileges as congruent with material demands for changes in relations of property.

This book will generally follow the theoretical concerns discussed above, beginning with a depiction of the material and cultural foundations of the Old Regime of khedivial Egypt under the Ottoman Empire. Let me here set out my aims and some basic definitions. I will examine the manner in which economic and demographic change and the growth of state power created new interests among the three strata that most participated later in the Revolution: the rural population, the urban guilds, and the intelligentsia. I call these three formations “strata” rather than classes because I do not believe they formed self-conscious modern classes with clear shared relationships to the means of production. The rural population was divided into wealthy village notables, smaller holders, and share-croppers and landless day-laborers. Many of them had in common semifeudal obligations (“rent”) in labor and kind toward the Ottoman-Egyptian nobles (*dhawat*). The rural middle class of village notables, who often served as headmen, generally possessed substantial holdings on which they employed hired labor, and they also imposed labor obligations on peasants, for which the latter were not remunerated. On the other hand, many village notable families found their holdings much reduced by estate fragmentation during the demographically expansive nineteenth century, whereas the cotton boom gave other peasants the opportunity to build up new, large estates, so that the rural population experienced a good deal of cyclical mobility in the viceregal period.³⁷ I will in this study concentrate on the village notables and the medium- and smallholders, that is, on the rural middle class and the propertied peasants.

The urban artisans, service and transportation workers, and the great merchants and brokers, all had a similar origin in the *suq* or old-style petty-commodity market of the Muslim world. In Iran these groups are collectively known as the “bazaaris.” Links of setting, culture, and even intermarriage tie them together, especially in the face of competition from industrialized foreigners. Even though the European world economy during the 1860s and 1870s had a hugely varying impact on this group, making some merchants fabulously wealthy and reducing some artisans to penury, most resented growing European hegemony in trade, manufactures, and finance. The intelligentsia consisted of many literate groups, some so high up in the administration and so wealthy that they must be seen as part of the ruling elite. The medium- and lower-level intelligentsia, however, largely subsisted on salaries from the state, and often suffered from low wages, blocked upward mobility, high inflation, and increasing competition from Europeans. These included the clerks and the middle management in the state and provincial bureaucracies, the graduates of the modern civil schools, the officer corps and cadets, journalists, and the Muslim and Coptic clergy. Again, the various branches of the intelligentsia did not always perceive themselves to have similar interests, but their employment (usually) by the state and their opposition to European penetration did provide the basis for an occasional alliance. The members of such a stratum can be

grouped together because of their dependence for their livelihood on the skills of literacy and their preponderant employment by the state, but I would like to avoid employing the huge, residual category of “petty bourgeoisie.” Most of the intelligentsia would not have thought they had much in common socially with skilled, tool-owning, independent artisans, for example. These three strata were sometimes united by reference to a common enemy, though before the Revolution the enemy often differed from stratum to stratum. I can anticipate my final chapter by declaring that the propertied peasants, the urban guilds, and the intelligentsia played the leading role in the Revolution, opposing the dual elite of Ottoman-Egyptian nobles and the European bourgeoisie and labor aristocracy in Egypt. Since it is boring always to use the same word, I may occasionally refer to these strata as “classes,” but I mean this term only in the sense that I have just described, of social groups with, objectively speaking, a broadly similar legal and cultural position, and, often, a spatial contiguity, but with substantial internal variation in regard to wealth. I think such a mixture of status group and class common during the transition from an estates-type society to a society characterized by modern social classes.

I will then proceed to investigate the corporate life of Egyptians in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. What changes in communications and transportation technology occurred then that might account for better chances of national mobilization in 1882 than had existed in 1850? How did the modern intellectuals employ political clubs and the new, private press to create dissident ideologies? Among the guilds and the peasants, what organizational infrastructures help explain their ideals and tactics in this period? Then I will look at changing repertoires of collective action among the urban “crowd” in confronting the immigrant Europeans and the state. I will examine the repressive mechanisms of the state, including limits on discourse, and explain the manner in which these broke down in the years leading up to the Revolution. Finally, I will detail the social origins of the revolutionaries, their ideologies, and the sorts of collective action in which they engaged in 1881–82. I will come back in the conclusion to discuss the conjunctures that characterize revolutions against informal colonialism. In contrast to Robinson and Gallagher’s vision of descent into chaos, I will present the thesis that a group of challengers attempted to build a new order, leading to changes in the state-system. Only by understanding the social origins, the interests, the organizations, the tactics, and the ideologies of these challengers can we hope to grasp the significance of the Egyptian Revolution of 1882. Only by apprehending conjuncturally the manner in which their actions affected one another and impinged on the dual elite can we see why things happened as they did.

Material and Cultural Foundations of the Old Regime

IN SEEKING TO UNDERSTAND the dissident and subaltern political currents that emerged in the late 1870s and during the Egyptian revolution of 1881–82, we must begin by considering what they were dissenting from. What were the sources of power and the ideologies of the elite strata constituting the Old Regime of viceregal rule from 1805 to 1881? I will discuss not only the social and economic position of the various elites, but also their views of the nature of governmental authority, the ordering of the economy, and the construction of ethnic identity. This cultural archeology will require a digging through social layers, beginning with the viceroy and the Ottoman nobles, proceeding to the Egyptian notables, including high clergy or ulama (“ulema”), officials, and bureaucrat-intellectuals, then considering recent implants such as the Levantine mercantile class and the Europeans. My contention that a dual elite existed in late Ottoman Egypt, composed of the Ottoman-Egyptian nobles and the Europeans, underlies this approach. These primary elites had their hangers-on and compradors, of course, so that some autochthonous Egyptians rose high enough to identify with the Ottoman ruling class, and Levantine merchants often cooperated with the Europeans. One question I want to begin with is whether we can discern a unified, hegemonic ideology among the ruling strata of Egypt. A second issue has to do with change. Are we here dealing with the breakdown of a “traditional” system of power and values, as John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson suggest, or is there anything radically new about the viceregal power system and its ideologies?

Later in this book, I will take up questions concerning the organizations and ideologies associated with peasants, artisans, and medium- and lower-ranking intellectuals. Here I wish to present a series of snapshots of the ways in which members of Egypt’s elite, in the course of working, living, thinking, and feeling within a particular social and economic context, constructed their world. My approach, as indicated in the introduction, seeks to avoid a crass reflection theory that attempts to read off social ideas from class position, while recognizing that all social thinkers actively live within broader economic and societal structures with which the abstract logic of their arguments inevitably interacts. Ideologies serve to mediate between ideal structures and logics, and material processes and constraints.

When not independent, Egypt has oscillated through history between two poles, experiencing periods of greater economic and political integration into

West Asia, and eras of incorporation into European empires. In the seventh century, Egypt passed from the Christian Byzantine Empire to the Islamic Empire of the Arabs. Turning their faces from Constantinople to Medina, Damascus, and Baghdad, Egyptians gradually forsook Coptic for Arabic as their primary language and all but 6 percent ultimately deserted Christianity for Islam as their religion. In the medieval period, Muslim rulers created for the support of their regimes a military caste of slave-soldiers, mostly Circasians brought from the marches of the northern Caucasus and converted to Islam. Over time the slave-soldiers, or Mamluks, themselves came to power, ruling Egypt from the thirteenth through the early sixteenth centuries.

In 1517 the Ottoman Empire, dominated by a Sunni Muslim Turkish-speaking elite based in Anatolia, conquered Egypt, defeating the Mamluks and absorbing them as a junior partner in Egyptian governance. Integrated into the Ottoman world economy, the fertile Nile Valley served as a breadbasket for the empire, its grains helping to feed Hijazis in Arabia and Anatolians in Asia Minor.¹ The Ottomans provided order, kept up the irrigation infrastructure, and collected taxes, leaving many administrative tasks to local institutions such as guilds and religious endowments. About a fifth of all land came to be held as religious prebends by the end of the eighteenth century, and much of the rest was put in the hands of military tax-farmers. The sultan's governor and troops provided public security, a key ingredient in prosperity and population growth. It now appears that Egypt's overall population grew during the Ottoman years, or at least that the capital of Cairo steadily expanded. This finding by André Raymond overturns an older, unfounded European image of Ottoman Egypt as having suffered an economic and demographic decline. As suggested in the introduction, Egypt's population (by analogy to that of Cairo) seems to have grown by about 50 percent in the period 1517–1800, from around 3 million to around 4.5 million, but this includes a stagnant or possibly reduced population during most of the eighteenth century. The eighteenth-century Ottoman preoccupation with the growing Russian challenge in eastern Europe allowed Egypt and Iraq gradually to achieve greater autonomy from Istanbul. During the economic golden age of 1700–1760, in which lessening demographic pressures raised wages and reduced intraclass competition, the substratum of Mamluk slave-soldiers and freedmen reemerged as the martial elite in Cairo (as in Baghdad), which ceased sending tribute to the Ottomans. Egypt under the Mamluk emir 'Ali Bey al-Kabir (r. 1760–72) appears to have continued its prosperity, and it has been argued that European capitalism began having a greater impact from that point. In the late eighteenth century, however, only 15 percent of shipping out of Alexandria was destined for European ports, and Egypt remained tied primarily to the Ottoman world economy. The Mamluk houses conducted a nasty internecine struggle in the 1780s and 1790s, provoking wars that raised urban taxes to crushingly high rates. Repeated outbreaks of plague, high Niles and floods, overtaxation, and Mamluk feuding all damaged Egypt's formerly prosperous economy. When Bonaparte

convinced the Directory to allow him to lead an attack on Egypt in 1798, the French found a country badly hurt by two decades of economic depression and frequent plague outbreaks. The grain- and territory-hungry French conquered the Nile Valley, defeating and weakening the ruling Mamluk caste. They attempted to cultivate the indigenous elite, the ulama, and other Egyptian notables. But their three years of rule had little lasting effect, except insofar as they displaced the Mamluks. A joint British and Ottoman force handily dislodged the French from Egypt in 1801, with the British providing naval support to an invading Ottoman army.²

The Ottoman army also attacked the remnants of the Mamluks, but proved increasingly divided internally. A young Albanian officer from a mercantile family, Muhammad 'Ali, emerged as a popular leader with a faction of the troops and even with the overtaxed Cairo populace. He managed to defeat other Ottoman leaders in Egypt, and to impose himself as viceroy (r. 1805–48). Muhammad 'Ali's government gradually consolidated power over Egypt, building on Mamluk traditions of governance and pursuing a mercantilistic economic policy of state monopolies. It also innovated. It introduced the organized cultivation of the indigenous long-staple cotton, expanded the trade in already established cash crops, began conscripting ordinary Egyptian peasants into the army, and sought to establish European-style factories. It also accumulated vast state lands, expropriating not only the fiefs of the Mamluks but also the pious endowments of the Muslim clergy or ulama. When in the 1830s Muhammad 'Ali rebelled against the sultan and sent armies to invade Syria and Anatolia, he provoked an international crisis. The Ottoman civil war threatened to upset the status quo, and the British thought it threw into doubt their access to India. The European Powers thus intervened to roll Egyptian armies back, containing Muhammad 'Ali. Having lost control over markets in Syria and over the right to set import tariffs for Egypt, the government of Muhammad 'Ali faced a severe setback in its political economy. The huge army was largely demobilized. Factories, plagued by machine failures, lack of know-how and spare parts, and Egypt's paucity of coal and wood, as well as by a loss of protected markets, shut down. Egypt's economy continued to grow, however, not through manufactured goods but through primary commodities such as the cash crops, especially cotton. Great Britain emerged as Egypt's primary trading partner, and Egypt became willy-nilly a part of the modern European world economy.³

After 1841, Egypt was partially reintegrated into the Ottoman Empire, albeit as a vassal state with its own local administration and privileges.⁴ The office of viceroy became hereditary in Muhammad 'Ali's extended family, but the Ottomans blocked Muhammad 'Ali's successors from commemorating him with statues. The Friday prayers were said in the name of the Ottoman sultan, and foreign consuls arriving in Egypt had to present their credentials to Istanbul before being accepted in Alexandria. Egypt paid a hefty tribute in the late 1860s of £700,000 per year, and was constrained to supply troops for

Ottoman wars. As we will see below, Egyptian conquests in Africa were explicitly made in the name of the Ottoman sultan, and announced in this way to the African villagers. These diplomatic conventions argue against viceregal Egypt having been all but autonomous of Istanbul, as some nationalist historians have depicted it. On the other hand, in many social spheres, the viceroys pursued highly independent policies. Saʿid (r. 1854–62) in particular abolished monopolies, parceled land out to a new Ottoman-Egyptian nobility, and recognized private property in land, at least on paper, establishing the basis for a new political economy.

The Sultan

Let us now turn to our archeology of class and culture. At the top of the Egyptian political system stood the Ottoman sultan or emperor, the ruler to whom the Egyptian vassal state owed allegiance, to whom it paid tribute, and for whom it raised levies of troops when necessary. Mosque preachers pronounced the Friday-prayer sermon in his name. The sultan's authority in Egypt underwent significant changes in the period 1517–1882. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, Istanbul directly ruled Egypt through frequently rotated governors, supporting them with large garrisons of Ottoman troops. The sultan cut a secular figure of steppe authority, balanced on the two supports of battlefield victories and his legislating role rooted in Turkic and Mongolian tribal custom. This sort of authority contrasted with that attributed to the Islamic ruler by classical Islamic theorists, who saw the early caliphs as having combined in their persons both spiritual and temporal power. The caliphs thereafter lost temporal power to emirs and sultans, and a dual authority structure emerged. In the last representative of this sort of state, the Mamluk sultans ruled over the temporal sphere, and maintained a successor to the Abbasid caliphs as a spiritual figure. From the time of the Mongol incursions of the thirteenth century and their Turkish successors, such as the Timurids and the Ottomans, the authority structure of the Islamic lands shifted away from earlier theocratic or duocephalous models to the Central Asian system of a secular, legislating khanate whose authority derived from the norms of pastoral nomadic, tribal society. This authority structure remained even as the steppe dynasties became sedentarized and further Islamized.

Eighteenth-century clerical theorists of Islamic and temporal authority in Egypt discussed these developments quite self-consciously. One wrote that authority derives from God through the prophets. The Prophet Muhammad, in turn, gave over authority to his lieutenants or caliphs after him. Authority remained in Arab hands until the Arabs fell to fighting among themselves, provoking God to transfer it to other groups such as the Turks.⁵ Shaykh Ahmad ad-Damanhuri (circa 1684–1778), who rose to become rector of al-Azhar seminary, put things even more baldly. He said that the Mongols exe-

cuted the last caliph in Baghdad in the thirteenth century. The Mamluks brought a nominal (*suri*) caliphate to Egypt, but it died out soon after the Ottoman conquest of 1517. Now, ad-Damanhuri said, only the sultanate and the vizierate continued as living institutions. The Ottoman sultanate, he wrote, was nevertheless the best Islamic state since the Orthodox Caliphate of the seventh century, because of its adherence to Islamic law and bestowal of honor on Muslim learned men.⁶ Ad-Damanhuri's frank dismissal of the Mamluk-sponsored caliphate as a mere formality, and his acceptance of a secular sultanate as better than medieval caliphates such as that of the Abbasids, attest the degree to which even Egyptian ulama acquiesced in the triumph of the steppe within the realm of Islam.

In the nineteenth century the Ottoman sultans began occasionally to lay claim to the office of the caliphate, a claim that some literate Egyptians accepted by the 1860s. Although their actual power over Egypt diminished to that of a liege-lord, the sultans' moral and spiritual authority actually increased as the religious establishment acquiesced in their desire to combine the vicarship of the Prophet with the steppe sultanate. The spiritual authority of the sultan-caliph affected the Egyptian viceroy as well, since some ulama insisted by 1870 that the viceroy as the agent of the caliph had the prerogative to dismiss the chief Islamic jurist, who normally served for life.⁷ An Iranian diplomat reported in 1880 that "fanatics" around Sultan Abdülhamid II felt that the only way to prevent the Europeans from pushing the Ottomans out of Europe altogether was for the sultan to gather to himself the kind of support from the Islamic world as a whole that only recognition as caliph could generate. The sultan decided to send out a proclamation of his station as caliph to Egypt, India, Iran, and Central Asia. Many but not all Egyptians accepted this call, with all its implications for authority, during the Revolution.⁸

The Ottoman sultanate continued to have great influence in Egypt during the viceregal period, and the province, despite its local administration, remained an integral part of the empire, paying tribute, providing troops, and giving Istanbul the right to review high state appointments and accept ambassadorial credentials. The manuscript and periodical literature I consulted convinces me that literate Egyptians for the most part saw themselves as loyal subjects of the sultan. With Abdülhamid (r. 1876–1909) insistently laying claim to the caliphate, his moral authority may have actually increased in the late 1870s and early 1880s, especially among the ulama and the literate classes.

The Khedive

The form of government in pre-British Egypt, eclectic and difficult to categorize both with regard to its political typology and its economic bases, has perhaps best been characterized as reform bureaucracy. Egypt constituted a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, ruled in theory by a governor appointed

by the sultan. In fact, from 1805 the sultans simply acquiesced in the power of the Muhammad ʿAli dynasty. As argued above, the viceroy (*wali*, but from 1867 termed khedive) in practice could act as a sovereign in his own sphere, deriving his authority not from the people, but from his success in arms and the appointment of the sultan (or of the sultan-caliph). Despite the cachet of the caliph that some Ottomans sought to attach to imperial institutions, the viceroys most often pursued policies that kept the religious authorities weak and dependent. Viceroy Saʿid (r. 1854–62) conscripted the sons of village headmen into the military, but detested those who insisted on saying their five daily prayers while in uniform. Religiosity could serve as grounds for dismissal, a problem for conscripted notables who had already begun careers as seminarians before being drafted.⁹ Saʿid saw his military as necessarily secular in outlook.

This embryonic secularism points to some key features of reform bureaucracy. The attempts of Ottoman sultans and Egyptian viceroys to reform their military and administrative organization in response to the European challenge led to extensive changes in Ottoman institutions. Conscripted armies of peasants trained in European-style drills replaced a caste of foreign slave-soldiers; new civil schools began competing with Qurʿan schools and Muslim seminaries; factory styles of production, especially in industries related to the military, made attempts to compete with artisanal ones; more rational taxation regimes made inroads on prebendal privileges and on lands alienated to religious use. A bureaucracy slowly emerged with a vested interest in the reform program. The viceroy ruled absolutely, but with the help of nobles and technocrats he called into being. This bureaucracy had its ups and downs in Egypt, nearly being abolished in the late 1850s for budgetary reasons, but it burgeoned once more after 1862. The reform bureaucracy could not fairly be categorized as either feudal or traditional. The Muhammadi viceroys had swept away the prebendal Mamluks, and created a class of loyal, private large landowners, in the context of cash-crop production. The Ottoman nobles of the viceregal period retained feudal privileges such as special, low taxation regimes and claims on the labor of peasants on and off their estates, but they also resembled in many ways agrarian capitalists.

The first years of the reign of Viceroy Ismaʿil (1863–79) overlapped with the cotton boom, which generated tax monies that allowed the state to undertake numerous improvements in infrastructure. Ismaʿil, the son of Muhammad ʿAli's ambitious eldest son Ibrahim Pasha, studied humanities at the Egyptian school in Paris in the 1840s. He waited out the reign of ʿAbbas (1848–54) in Istanbul, serving on Ottoman councils. He returned to Egypt under his uncle Saʿid, becoming heir apparent. In Lorne Kenny's phrase, Ismaʿil had a vision of civilization and progress, though the vision owed much to the ideas of his father and grandfather.¹⁰ He envisioned both a cultural and a material efflorescence. He wrote to the governor of the Sudan soon after his accession, urging

the spread of literacy and learning: "The prerequisite for this [civilization and prosperity] is the acquisition by the subjects of the sciences, that they may excel in them and be always disposed to love of the homeland, and eager to obtain the wealth of excellence and progress in knowledge and the arts."¹¹ The second component of civilization (*at-tamaddun, al-ʿimariyyah*) for Ismaʿil lay in material infrastructure and production. As soon as he came to power he ordered an inspection engineer "to carry out a careful study of the provinces under his jurisdiction, so that the requisite canals, bridges and other works may be put in working order or established, and he may inform the governors of the need to complete them."¹² Ismaʿil foresaw a vast increase in literacy, education, and knowledge, as well as a growing economy serviced by infrastructural improvements in irrigation canals, roads and bridges, the railroad, the telegraph, dams and other public works, all financed by the extension of cotton cultivation all the way down the Nile Valley into the Sudan.¹³ He linked increased education with a love of the homeland or regional patriotism that would serve the people as a motivation for achieving progress.

An Armenian author who wanted to flatter Ismaʿil in the 1870s listed the viceroy's achievements as the following: the establishment of lighthouses for easier shipping along the Egyptian coast; improved roads and canals; the beautification of towers and fortresses; the provision of piped water in Cairo; the extension of the telegraph even to the Sudan; the revival of the Bulaq press; the promotion of culture; the establishment of councils; the building of schools; the abolition of the *corvée* or forced labor for peasants; the founding of paper factories; the extension of the railroad all the way to the Sudan; the founding of the new city of Ismaʿiliyyah; and the opening of the Suez Canal.¹⁴ That this is what an author thought Ismaʿil wanted to hear in the way of panegyric gives a good clue to the values the khedive projected as his own at that point. Ismaʿil's Egypt had a civilizing mission of its own. The rhetoric of a civilizing mission served Ismaʿil, as it served his mentor Napoleon III of France, as a justification for his absolutism. An archival document describes how Egyptian military forces in Somalia and other African areas proceeded. First, they asked what goods the place produced. Then they promised to protect the local inhabitants from Christian oppression. When the natives affirmed their desire for protection, the Egyptians asked for a written pledge of allegiance to the Ottoman sultan, signed with the seal of local notables. The Egyptian forces then disarmed the population, prohibited the sale of slaves, and introduced fines for dirt found in a house or hut.¹⁵ The Egyptian civilizing mission thus consisted of a rhetoric of pan-Islam versus Christian imperialism, a healthy interest in local commodities, a desire for a monopoly on the use of force, and a civilized enmity to slave-trading and filth. The European version, of course, was similarly compulsive in nature. Believing that the spread of cotton cultivation in and of itself equaled greater prosperity for peasants, Ismaʿil could argue for extending it both within Egypt and down the Nile into Africa. Yet cotton had

become a cash crop, subject to the workings of the world market, and the market is always better at distributing goods than surplus wealth, which it rather tends to concentrate.

Viceregal Egypt under Ismaʿil was developing a modern form of autocracy comparable to that of eighteenth-century France or nineteenth-century Russia. The viceroy increasingly depended on a council of ministers, but before 1878 yielded no privileges to it that would detract from his absolute power. From 1866 the viceroy instituted a chamber of deputies (*majlis an-nuwwab*) or, literally, “council of delegates.” In his throne address to the first session of the chamber of deputies in 1866, the viceroy recalled Egypt before Muhammad ʿAli as a wasteland beset with brigandage and poverty. His grandfather had begun the process of restoring security and of civilizing the country. Ismaʿil announced his own civilizing mission, which included “establishing a consultative chamber of deputies . . . so that ruler and subject may consult with one another, as is done in many places.”¹⁶ Quoting Qurʾan verses concerning the virtues of consultation, Ismaʿil pledged that the chamber of deputies would be selected by the people and would meet in Cairo for two months of every year. Yet this body, made up of village headmen and a few guild officials appointed by the khedive (and thus only indirectly “selected by the people”), could only forward requests to the viceroy for his approval, lacking any actual authority. One might compare Ismaʿil’s new chamber of deputies to the “parliaments” of fourteenth-century Britain, which had a largely ceremonial purpose within a society dominated by the nobles.¹⁷

The ceremonial context of public power and authority in viceregal Egypt comes across nicely in a newspaper article of 1874. The article discusses the role of the khedive and his Ottoman nobles in publicly celebrating the ʿId al-Fitr, the Islamic holy day upon which the month-long daytime fast of Ramadan is broken. The author, probably Muhammad Unsi, son of pioneering journalist Abuʿs-Suʿud Effendi, said the festivities in Cairo’s crowded streets attested both to the continued vitality of Islam after thirteen centuries and “the degree to which the political relationships existing between ruler and ruled have been strengthened.” Unsi perceived an open adoration on the part of the masses of his subjects for the khedive on such occasions, which, he argued, served as a barometer of public opinion and demonstrated the firm bonds of affection between ruler and ruled. From the point of view of many of the regime’s literate supporters, public ceremonial confirmed the popularity of the ruler and restated his legitimacy. The holding of the chamber of deputies was designed originally for the same purpose, as an affirmation of the khedive’s authority rather than as a challenge to it.

The hopeful concentration on public ceremonial by proregime notables helped blind them to the vast discontents among the public building behind the scenes. They ignored the incredible land grab of Ismaʿil and his family, such that they came to own a fifth of the country’s arable land, and Ismaʿil’s be-

stowal of further vast tracts on his favorites. Members of the elite discounted the impact of the crushing taxes he heartlessly imposed on the country in response to the debt crisis from about 1870. The standard criticisms of Isma'îl focus on his spendthrift habits and his disposition to get helplessly into debt, which miss the point. Most of his debts were incurred for infrastructural improvements he hoped would increase his revenues, and he did actually spend the greater part of such monies on development, as Roger Owen has shown, while debt-servicing itself ate up much of the remainder.¹⁸ That part of his ideology of civilization formed no smokescreen. Rather, Isma'îl's fault lay in making himself into a combination of ruthless despot and self-aggrandizing agrarian capitalist who put his own economic and political interests above those of the province he ruled. If we look at gross statistics, Egypt made progress economically under Isma'îl, but this so-called progress hugely benefited a small group of nobles and foreign merchants and financiers, whereas it had a much more ambiguous and uneven impact on most ordinary Egyptians. The overtaxation of the late 1870s, as we shall see, resulted in the immiseration of many peasants and workers, or at least exacerbated the problems peasants already faced from high population growth and the consequent fragmentation of family plots through inheritance. Isma'îl's nods in the direction of popular consultation were little more than empty formalities at first, not designed in his own mind to detract from his absolute power. From the point of view of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite the chamber of deputies constituted a largish advisory council within the executive. In appealing to ideas of popular consultation, however, the viceroy created more substance than he had intended, and the deputies began exhibiting a desire to take on a Montesquieuesque role.

Ottoman-Egyptians

Despite Isma'îl's autocratic approach to rule, he did not run the country by himself. At the highest levels, he was served by Ottoman and Circassian bureaucrats and officers, as well as by some Armenian and local Egyptian technocrats. Ehud R. Toledano has argued that the members of the elite, despite their ethnic rivalries, shared a common "Ottoman-Egyptian" culture based upon the language and fashions of Istanbul and a commitment to serving in the Ottoman province of Egypt.¹⁹ Afaf Marsot contends, however, that Ottoman-Egyptians remained in many ways distinctive from their Anatolian counterparts, developing their own dialect of Ottoman Turkish and their local interests and traditions.²⁰ This issue deserves more research, but the difference between these two views in any case strikes me as a matter of emphasis. The importance of an Ottoman-Egyptian elite in this period, which had perhaps varying and diverse but strong ties to Istanbul, is not in question. These officers increasingly divided into a pro-European group, who sought Egypt's economic and

diplomatic integration into the European system, and a pro-Ottoman group, who resisted European encroachments in favor of closer relations with Anatolia. Ironically, the pro-European group advocated strong autocratic or cabinet rule within Egypt as a means of ensuring that the country could be a reliable trading and diplomatic party for the Europeans, whereas the pro-Ottoman group, especially after the Ottoman constitutional movement of the mid-1870s, increasingly favored more consultative government as a means of slowing European penetration. An example of the pro-European faction is Nubar Nubarian, an Armenian who rose under Isma'il to become one of the more powerful and wealthy men in the country. He consistently advocated autocratic government by the cabinet.²¹ His antagonist, Sharif Pasha, championed the cause of both Ottomanism and consultative government (though he favored a Burkean rule by representatives over grassroots democracy).

As a combination of ethnic group and social class, the Ottoman-Egyptians had great political and economic weight. Despite the centuries-long Ottoman presence in the Nile Valley, in many ways the landed Ottoman nobility in viceregal Egypt was of recent vintage. By the 1870s, they controlled about one-fourth of the land, and their peasants owed them not only labor but ceremonial gifts. This role, however, they had newly adopted. A major component of this group, the Circassians, had been imported from the marches of the Caucasus as slaves, concubines, and slave-soldiers from the medieval period, and only in the eighteenth century, with the Russian conquests in the Caucasus, did this trade begin to dry up. Manumitted Circassians and their descendants, partially because of the group's predominance in the military, often controlled substantial estates and bureaucratic posts. With the Ottoman conquest of 1517, many wealthy Circassian families assimilated to the ruling Ottoman culture. In the nineteenth century, Circassians tended to become divided in their loyalties, some supporting the Ottoman ruling class, others identifying with the indigenous Egyptian new middle strata. Ottomans began immigrating into Egypt in the sixteenth century, mostly as soldiers who served in garrisons. 'Iraqi Yusuf Muhammad's study of eighteenth-century Islamic court records has shown that these Ottoman troops tended to marry Circassian or other slave-girls, and to enter trade or artisanal work. A few acquired fiefs (*iltizams*), though rarely, since the Circassian Mamluks or slave-soldiers already had a near-monopoly in that avenue to wealth and power.²² One suspects that most of the Ottoman troops eventually merged into the urban popular classes. Of course, from 1517 Ottomans also staffed the officer corps and the higher echelons of the bureaucracy, and in this sector they retained an ethnic predominance up until 1882, their ranks strengthened by a stream of new immigrants. Gabriel Baer estimates the number of "Turks" in nineteenth-century Egypt at around 20,000, making it clear he includes in this number Ottomans in general, including Albanians and Greek converts. But if one includes in the reckoning Circassians who had intermarried with or identified themselves

with the Ottoman bureaucrats and nobility, the number of this elite probably approached 100,000.²³ In the 1850s Sa'īd (r. 1854–62) began promoting indigenous Egyptians in the bureaucracy and military, and fell out with some of his Turcophone civil bureaucrats. His dismissal of tens of Ottoman nobles late in his reign, however, may have had as much to do with his lack of revenues as with a desire to remain independent of the Ottomans and the sultan. Isma'īl, however, reversed his predecessor's pro-Egyptian policies, reaffirming Ottoman-Egyptian dominance of the officer corps and the upper reaches of the civil bureaucracy.

Because of the disruptions in land tenure brought about by the rise of Muhammad 'Alī's reform bureaucracy, the Ottoman-Egyptian nobility that took over the large, supposedly vacant *ib'adiyyah* estates in the 1850s did not enjoy the legitimacy bestowed by ancient tenure. Egyptian villagers still alive in the 1850s and 1860s could have remembered when some of this land had been under their own cultivation or had supported mosques. The nobles (*dhawāt*) also paid fewer and lower taxes on their lands than did the Egyptian yeomen and peasants. The Ottomans and Circassians continued in the period 1858–82 to exercise a near-monopoly on high government posts and on the officer corps in the military. Egyptians did penetrate the lower provincial bureaucracy. Because of their entree to government service and the wealth their accumulating land holdings gave them, the Ottoman nobles most often lived in the larger cities, rather than in the countryside.

Describing the structural position of the Ottoman elite is easier than discovering its values and ideology. A testimony to values by an Ottoman gentleman from our period does survive, however. The author, Kaşifzade Mehmet 'Aqıl Buharalı, also signed himself with the Arabized form Muhammad 'Aqıl b. Muhammad Kashif al-Bukhari, and he wrote in Arabic. Of Central Asian ancestry, he resided in the port of Alexandria and wrote a book of paternal advice for his son in 1862 entitled "Irshad al-walad" or "Guidance for my child."²⁴ The literature of advice holds an ancient and honored position in Muslim lands, yet little of this sort of writing is known from the nineteenth century, and less still has been studied. Our Ottoman rentier's manuscript survives in only one autograph in the Egyptian National Library. I would argue that the manuscript, despite its obscurity, illustrates candidly the manners and ideas about society common among Ottoman gentlemen in nineteenth-century Egypt. Here my main interest lies in the advice on matters pertaining to the construction of Ottoman social and economic status, such as education, social hierarchy, and economics (mainly microeconomics).

The author naturally begins, in a book of counsel for a minor, with education, which is after all a sort of human capital formation. He urges a very broad education in letters, religion, and the sciences. Along with exhortations to study history and geography he adds doctrinal advice, telling his son to choose the Naqshbandi Sufi order (a mystical brotherhood), the Hanafi legal rite, and

Maturidi theology. Note that these choices also differentiate al-Bukhari as an Ottoman from local Egyptians, who would more likely belong to the Wafa'iyyah or Bakriyyah Sufi orders, be Malikis or Shafi'is in rite, and Ash'arites in theology. He shows a rationalism that leads him to forbid the wasting of time on occult sciences such as magic squares and divination, and on close association with Sufi dervishes (who are either frauds after money or oversensitive souls a normal person might inadvertently hurt). Despite the broad-minded rhetoric he uses in advising wide-ranging studies, he demonstrates a marked conservatism in matters related to Europe. He attacks European approaches to sciences such as medicine, which he says are based on a different climate than that prevailing in Egypt. The censure of things European extends to manners, religious ideas, and clothing. His son should study European languages, but only after learning Islamic ones. "Do not render the language of one who opposes your religion a means of becoming mixed up with his nature and customs such that your own identity loses its reality and essence, and you forfeit your religion to worldly passions" (p. 16). He should even avoid the slightly modernized dress of government employees, sticking to the style of clothes worn by the old Ottoman elite. The only exception he allows is if his son should enter government service, where he must dress as an *effendi* in order to be accepted.

Al-Bukhari is concerned that his son differentiate himself not only from the Europeans and their imitators among the *effendis*, but also from other groups in Egypt. He has harsh words for Egyptians themselves, saying they are "eaten up with envy, have base souls, lust after women too much, show great cunning, give insufficient care to their affairs, and have mastered hardly any science" (pp. 35–36). He castigates the people of Alexandria as timid and effeminate, and as given over to too much dancing. Clearly, al-Bukhari wants his son to avoid being like the Egyptians surrounding him, rather choosing to be courageous, manly, dignified, and restrained in his passions. He exhibits a concern for the maintenance of his ethnicity when he urges his son not to mix his noble blood with that of low Circassian and Sudanese slave-women. Al-Bukhari's concern to avoid absorption either by the European bourgeoisie or by the Egyptian masses is nicely illustrated by his advice on attending the theater in Alexandria. His son should neither buy a cheap ticket, which would seat him with the Egyptian *hoi polloi*, nor the most expensive ticket, which he should leave to famous nobles and great European merchants (pp. 39, 78).

Learning a trade or set of business skills, al-Bukhari says, is praiseworthy. But he wants his son to approach commercial dealings warily, since craftsmen and merchants have developed a great deal of craftiness as a result of wide experience with customers. The people in the market are hypocrites and cooperate in relieving the wealthy of their money. One needs to know how to buy and sell. Chinese goods are superior to Indian ones, and the Indian better than Syrian ones. A gentleman, however, should avoid entering the markets, and

should send his servant instead. No stranger to commerce, he has some sharp advice for his son in business dealings. Although business partnerships can be beneficial, one should always remember that the partners are in it for themselves. If one needs to do business in another country, where one cannot keep a close eye on the account books, it is better to give someone a commission rather than taking on a partner. Those who work on commission must compete with one another and are more likely to attempt to please. Other sorts of occupation come under close scrutiny. It is not suitable for a gentleman to become a supervisor of pious endowments. Renting property is more appropriate. But never let someone on the premises without a contract in writing, and never rent for more than a lunar year (he advises the avoidance of the European solar calendar as un-Islamic). It is better not to rent to the same person for an extended period, since renters, like water, go bad if they stay in one place too long. Impress renters, he suggests, with contacts with the government, the police, and the foreign courts (pp. 43–46, 58–59).

Al-Bukhari presents a strange mixture of the old and the new. He advocates a liberal education, including the study of European languages, but retains a profound distrust of all things European, especially medicine. He admires mystics but encourages his son to remain independent of them, as well as of narrow-minded Muslim jurists. He prefers an occupation such as that of the solitary merchant or landlord, eschewing partnerships or posts like endowment supervisor where one must deal with crooked partners or importunate beneficiaries. At a time when the joint stock company was becoming a highly important institution in the Middle East, he still advises his son against entering partnerships. As late as 1862, he speaks of importing merchandise from South and East Asia, ignoring the burgeoning European market. He nevertheless recognizes the social superiority to Ottomans of his class of the great European merchants operating in Egypt. He is so Egyptianized that he writes in Arabic, and constructs a table showing Egyptian rulers from Pharaonic times to the Ottomans and their viceroys, suggesting an Egyptian regional patriotism.²⁵ Yet he clearly thinks Ottomans far superior to native Egyptians in a whole range of virtues, and feels the distrust of the proprietary class for urban shopkeepers and craftsmen.

Egyptian Notables

The Ottoman nobles and merchants constituted the top of the social hierarchy, but among the indigenous, Arabophone Egyptians, elites existed as well. These consisted of rural large landholders, some of whom rose to high administrative office under Ismaʿil, the high ulama, and the more successful of the civil school graduates who rose to head bureaus or even attained cabinet rank (only two accomplished the latter feat). Let us examine the social outlook of

some thinkers drawn from these groups, whose importance grew throughout our period. Although many of them supported the drive for parliamentary government in the fall of 1881, most of these members of the native elite dropped out of the revolutionary coalition when politics became polarized in the spring of 1882. In the end, then, most opted for an identification with their Ottoman employers, and they can be seen most fruitfully as a section of the ruling elite.

The ulama had in the eighteenth century played an important role as intermediaries between the state and the people, and they supervised philanthropic and imperial pious endowments in the form of vast tracts of the country's agricultural land. Muhammad 'Ali, in confiscating those endowments, reduced most ulama to poorly paid state officials, though he did also bestow new lands on some of them. For ambitious ulama, the only hope for gaining wealth and status lay in drawing close to the viceregal court. The establishment of such connections in turn required that they write in support of the reform bureaucracy, and against the clerical conservatives who opposed European-style innovations. Not only the celebrated Hasan al-'Attar, rector of al-Azhar seminary from 1831 to 1835, but several other religious thinkers showed an interest in modernism.²⁶ Muhammad al-'Inabi (d. 1267/1850–51), who rose to become mufti of Alexandria under Muhammad 'Ali, began his clerical career by penning a defense in Islamic terms of the viceroy's military modernization program (*nizam-ı cedid*).²⁷ He argues that it accords with Islamic law to adopt any means rationally available to defend oneself from one's enemies, since only thus can unbelief be defeated. He appeals to early Islamic collections of oral reports from the Prophet and his companions to justify tight uniforms with short chemises, the military division of labor, and the use of drilling, strategy, and flags and banners. If the oral reports from the Prophet allow the learning of Hebrew and Syriac for religious studies, he remarks, how strange it would be if one could not learn European technology for military self-defense. He even suggests that a modern military officer in Muhammad 'Ali's new army has the status of a learned man in the religious sciences, since defending Islam and waging holy war are among the duties of such a man. Al-'Inabi rejects, however, any need for Muslims to study European rationalist theories of politics, since Islamic law suffices for social and political organization. He leaves unanswered the unaskable question: What if Western political organization should also become necessary to self-defense? The question was unaskable in 1827; by 1881 it was being asked very widely indeed.

Just as a new class of Ottoman nobles began to snap up the best land in Egypt, inserting themselves above the Egyptian village notable families, so a new class of Hanafi ulama began to gain power in the official religious institution and at al-Azhar. Most Egyptians adhered to the Shafi'i and Maliki rites of Sunni Islam, the Hanafi rite being popular mainly among Ottomans and among notables in directly ruled Ottoman provinces such as Syria. Another proregime cleric, the Hanafi Ahmad at-Tamimi (circa 1801–52) of Hebron, rose to be-

come mufti of Egypt despite his Palestinian origins. He studied at al-Azhar seminary in Cairo, and attained a reputation for learning. In 1835 Muhammad ʿAli made him mufti, and in so doing he promoted the Hanafi rite of the ruling elite at the same time as he appealed for the loyalty of Syrian notables during his attempt to annex Syria from the Ottoman Empire. From the late 1830s, Muhammad ʿAli ordered that only the official mufti could give legal opinions in matters related to the government. This order not only aimed at securing stronger state control of the religious institution, but also had the effect of making the Hanafi mufti's rulings preeminent. At-Tamimi did not prove flexible enough for Ibrahim Pasha, who replaced him with another Hanafi, Shaykh Muhammad al-ʿAbbasi al-Mahdi, in 1848. Later on, Viceroy ʿAbbas, concerned at at-Tamimi's report of the tiny number of Hanafis at al-Azhar, set up an endowment for a Hanafi dormitory, which encouraged adoption of this rite by local Egyptian students in search of subvention.²⁸

Although modernists and Hanafis had great influence on the institution of mufti or jurisconsult, the al-Azhar seminary tended to be headed by the most learned among the Shafiʿis. Shaykh Mustafa al-ʿArusi, a Shafiʿi, led a council of ulama presiding over al-Azhar late in Saʿid's reign, and Ismaʿil formally made him rector in 1864. His projects of reform, and his attempts to have some ulama exiled to the distant, Upper Egyptian town of Esna, alienated many Azharite professors from him, and they petitioned Ismaʿil for his dismissal. Ismaʿil replaced him with the Hanafi mufti, Shaykh al-ʿAbbasi al-Mahdi, an unprecedented move. First, the rector had usually been a Shafiʿi. Second, the appointment as rector had always been for life. Although the ulama themselves forced the change, many Shafiʿis must have been disturbed at so stark a loss of privilege.²⁹

The Hanafis slowly built up not only a control of high religious office, but also of disproportionate resources within Egypt's preeminent seminary. By the early 1870s al-Azhar seminary employed 314 teachers. These adhered to the following legal rites: Shafiʿi, 143; Maliki, 95; Hanafi, 70; and Hanbali, 4 (see Table 1.1). Note that 22 percent taught the Hanafi rite, representing the Ottoman ruling elite, diverting resources away from the Shafiʿi and Maliki teachers and students, who accounted for nearly all Arabophone Egyptian Muslims. As noted above, most Hanafis were either foreign students, mainly from Turkey and Syria, or sons of the local Ottoman nobility. In 1872 the Hanafis constituted only 12 percent of the student body at al-Azhar, suggesting that this elite rite had twice the representation on the faculty that student numbers would have warranted. Moreover, 7 percent of the Hanafi professors were of the first rank, whereas only 2 percent of the Shafiʿi professors had that kind of rank and salary. Only the Malikis rivaled the Hanafis in this regard.³⁰

The power and control over resources bestowed on the Hanafis within the religious establishment by the Ottoman ruling elite served to demarcate the privileges attached to their culture. As we saw in al-Bukhari's book of advice,

TABLE 1.1
Legal Rites of Faculty and Students at al-Azhar, 1871–72

<i>Rite</i>	<i>Teachers</i>		<i>Students</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Hanafis	70	22	1,113	12
Shafi'is	143	46	4,570	48
Malikis	95	30	3,710	39
Hanbalis	4	1	30	—
Total	312	99 ^a	9,423	99 ^a

Source: Rawdat al-madaris, vol. 3, no. 2 (30 Muharram 1289/9 April 1872):11–13.

^a Figures do not add up to 100 percent because of rounding.

Ottomans perceived Egyptian religion, like Egyptian ways of life generally, to be second-rate. Any growth of Egyptian nativism would imply an opposition on the part of Shafi'is and Malikis to the Hanafis. The ulama as a status group lost heavily in nineteenth-century Egypt. Their economic position by all accounts declined dramatically, and from a sort of gentry they found themselves reduced to badly paid employees of the state. On the whole, they did not rush to make use of new media such as the printing press, thus restricting their audience to mosque congregations and seminary classes. Although hard-line conservatives steadfastly opposed most modern innovations, some ambitious or open ulama wrote in favor of the reforms carried on by the viceroys. The ulama, despite their losses, did not become irrelevant, however. They still could stir up multitudes in Friday afternoon sermons, still could project their views to large numbers of people, and serve as intermediaries between people and state on occasion.

The formation of a new stratum of intellectuals is discussed at length later in the book. Here it is important to stress that the state trained two cohorts of such intellectuals: one in the 1830s and 1840s, and the other in the 1860s and 1870s. In the earlier period, most of the students derived from the Ottoman and Circassian nobility, though a minority of Egyptians gained entrance to some schools, especially the School of Languages. Some of the Egyptian students, themselves often sons of village headmen or ulama, also went on educational missions to Europe. A few of these, such as Rifa'ah at-Tahtawi, 'Ali Mubarak, and 'Abdu'llah Fikri, gained high positions in the Egyptian government in the 1860s and 1870s as bureaucrats, at the rank of bureau head or even cabinet member. The state attracted the loyalties of these men by bestowing large amounts of land on them and by training them, in their youth, with military discipline.

The authoritarian conception of political power held in the 1860s by the older Egyptian technocrats is exemplified in the thought of educator and bureaucrat Rifa'ah at-Tahtawi (1801–73).³¹ Although his poetry and prose in praise of Egypt have made him a favorite of modern Arab nationalists, at-Tahtawi was a convinced Ottomanist in the 1860s. Albert Hourani once suggested that he blamed the Ottomans as well as the Mamluks for Egypt's decline, but such a view simply cannot be maintained.³² He did blame the misrule of the Mamluks of the late eighteenth century for a decline in Egypt, but he had nothing but reverence for the Ottoman sultans. When he mentioned the name of Sulayman the Magnificent, he appended a pious prayer for him.³³ Elsewhere, he wrote:

Then [God] bestowed on Egypt government by the Ottoman dynasty, which preserved the country's inherent virtues, as well as safeguarding the legal *qanuns* (*al-qawanin ash-shar'iyah*). And more especially, among the consequences of their rule was the advent of . . . Muhammad 'Ali . . . whose exalted grandson has come to rule the kingdom.³⁴

At-Tahtawi, then, saw Egypt's position as a vassal state of the Ottomans as a blessing from God, because of their virtuous, Islamic rule. Even the renewal of Egyptian civilization carried out by the Muhammadi dynasty of viceroys, he felt, was a consequence of Egypt's status as an Ottoman province.

In the late 1860s at-Tahtawi strove to justify strong viceregal rule, partially in response to the establishment of the chamber of deputies in 1866. In an appendix on politics in one of his major works, he demonstrates two basic concerns. First, he argues for the ultimate derivation of all the powers of the government from the Islamic ruler. Other governmental institutions depend on the ruler's delegation of authority. Second, at-Tahtawi wishes to avoid a completely unrestrained absolutism, arguing for a specifically Ottoman sort of rule of law. At-Tahtawi begins his discussion of politics by referring to Montesquieu's three powers of government. He proceeds, however, to turn the French thinker on his head, saying that the government or monarchy is a central ruling power "from which three branches ramify"—the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive.³⁵ "These three powers are based on one power, which is the monarchical power stipulated by the laws." He adds, "Judging is in fact one of the prerogatives of rulers, and the judges are their lieutenants in fulfilling this function." Likewise, the ruler has the prerogative of "ordering and organizing laws," as well as implementing them. "The three powers which are the pillars of the ruling faculty are thus reduced to him." At-Tahtawi thus cleverly reverses Montesquieu, who said, "among the Turks, where these three powers are united in the person of the sultan, there reigns a frightful despotism."³⁶ At-Tahtawi goes on to reject republican forms of government on the grounds that the idea of subjects without a monarch is logically absurd, and he


dismisses democracy as a more primitive method for choosing a ruler than primogeniture.³⁷

The case of at-Tahtawi as absolutist made by Leon Zolondek in the 1960s came in response to previous vague generalizations about his alleged support of constitutionalism, the representative system, and political freedom for the masses. Zolondek maintained that in at-Tahtawi's view, the king was responsible only to God and the only restrictions on his behavior were the law of the land, his own sense of responsibility, and public opinion. The chamber of deputies in his view should confine itself to preparing reports and discussing issues. He urged the people to bear the ruler's injustice with patience.³⁸ Zolondek may have exaggerated at-Tahtawi's conservatism a bit, since his description of the chamber of deputies' powers only accords with that institution's own charter. Moreover, he protested against injustices such as the low wages and status of peasants and workers.

At-Tahtawi, in any case, does insist on a rule of law in Ottoman terms, something the literature on him has overlooked. In theory Islamic canon law (*ash-shari'ah*) as interpreted by Muslim judges or qadis prevailed in Muslim lands. The Ottoman sultan retained, however, wide discretion in determining the content of positive law in his realm. He could choose whatever rite or jurist's opinion he favored in any one instance, and could restrict the competence of the qadis by such devices as statutes of limitation decrees. Finally, the Ottoman sultans in particular developed the power to make administrative law, legislating extensively in areas where the canon law remained silent or vague, and sometimes in fact implementing rulings in apparent contradiction of the scriptural code.³⁹ Such a piece of administrative legislation was known as a *kânûn-nâme* ("writ of law") in Turkish. Ottoman reformist thinkers from the sixteenth century on often saw implementation of the *kânûn-nâmes*, whose administrative genealogy lay in the Mongol *yâsâ* or tribal code, as the key to a revival of Ottoman glory. They typically combined this Central Asian steppe theory of the ruler's legislative authority with a cyclical view of the rise and decline of empires based on pastoral nomadic tribal conquest, derived from North African sociologist Ibn Khaldun. As Cornell Fleischer has observed, sixteenth-century Ottoman intellectuals "elevated *kânûn* from the level of mere temporal, 'secular' legislation to high symbolic status. *Kânûn* embodied the dynasty's commitment to justice, on which its legitimacy rested."⁴⁰

Rather than being the first Arab nationalist, at-Tahtawi might be more fairly characterized as the last of the Ottoman theorists of the *kânûn-nâme*. He wrote:

The king takes control of the government to rule his subjects in accordance with laws (*qawanin*, sing. *qanun*). For this reason, it is not permissible for a king to violate the laws that his predecessor decreed, and the requirements of which he executed and implemented, nor can he annul the ordinances which his predecessor made obligatory. This rule is current in all kingdoms.⁴¹



The Nile Valley of Egypt in the Nineteenth Century

Once the sultan issues a *kânûn-nâme*, in other words, none of his successors may nullify its provisions. For at-Tahtawi, the corpus of such Ottoman administrative decrees affecting Egypt represented a body of customary legislation, perhaps analogous to British constitutional law. He argues for the codification of the *kânûn-nâmes* and for their use as a kind of indigenous constitution, limiting the powers of the viceroy. Soon after his accession, Viceroy Isma'îl did in fact order a collection and codification of *kânûns* and other administrative orders all the way from the Muhammad 'Ali period to his own, to serve as a basis of bureaucratic and legal practice (*dastur al-'amal*).⁴²

The argument for at-Tahtawi as a supporter of absolute viceregal power, therefore, although closer to the truth than the previous depiction of him as a French liberal, still misses an important "constitutionalist" aspect of his thought. He did not see the viceroy as constrained only in a moral sense by scriptural law, but rather argued for a sort of Ottoman constitutionalism wherein both Islamic law and the corpus of *kânûn-nâmes* circumscribed the absolute power of the ruler. In rejecting the effective, modern constraints on absolutism developed in Europe, at-Tahtawi reveals a thoroughly late-Ottoman mindset. One of Egypt's great landlords, he demonstrated a strong loyalty to Isma'îl, and he wished to socialize the public to the values of the viceregal elite, of which he formed a part. In all his political writings, perhaps only his nativist historiography, emphasizing the glories of Egyptian civilization, offered much to the younger generation of dissident intellectuals.⁴³

Having discussed the kind of conception of authority we are likely to find among the older Egyptian bureaucrats, let us turn now to the economic side of the political economy equation. A key conception for at-Tahtawi is industry, which he transliterates in French, *industrie*. He gives a narrow definition first, of processing raw materials into useful form, for instance, making raw cotton into textiles. But he argues that the word bears a more general meaning, of any activity that multiplies wealth. These activities encompass agriculture, commerce, and industry. This definition may derive from Saint-Simon, who defines industry as including all sorts of useful work. For an Egyptian living in an agrarian society, the broader definition had more utility. Rather idiosyncratically, he substitutes for the word "industry" the phrase "social benefits." He does so because the term "benefit" bears a positive meaning in several Islamic sciences. In classical Arabic, it means simply benefit. In Islamic law, it includes charitable acts such as donations, endowments, and interest-free loans. In the science of household economy, it means municipal improvements. In public law it refers to a lawful means of earning wealth. I would suggest that at-Tahtawi feared that a word for industry such as *as-sina'ah* may have invoked unpleasant connotations of grimy artisans among the propertied classes he was attempting to persuade. The word *manfa'ah*, or benefit, had the advantage of evoking an image of a pious and philanthropic activity, almost equivalent to endowing a mosque.

Industry requires first of all strong ethics and moral qualities such as courage. I have shown elsewhere that, as an Aristotelian in the mold of the medieval moral philosopher Miskawayh, at-Tahtawi sees economic activity as an element of practical philosophy, along with virtue.⁴⁴ Other prerequisites of industry or benefits include a love of manufacturing goods and colonialism. At-Tahtawi lauds the expeditions sent by Viceroy Isma'îl to conquer the Sudan and farther up the Nile, and he clearly shares his government's vision of an African Empire where cotton could be grown for export, with Egypt reaping the profits. He praises the model of the British Empire as one Egypt would do well to emulate.⁴⁵ Despite his European education, he is no collaborator; he sees the European empires not as patrons, but as models. He acclaims Algerians who fought the French as heroes.⁴⁶ But he shares a common Egyptian vision of the Sudanese as barbarians whom the Egyptians have a duty to civilize.

Although at-Tahtawi defends Egypt's highly stratified social order and expatiates on the goodness of wealth in Islam, he is also concerned to improve the status and condition of workers. As noted, he espouses a paternalistic form of Saint-Simonianism.⁴⁷ He sharply criticizes those ethical and philosophical traditions of Islamic elite writers who ascribed low status to crafts and industries. On the contrary, at-Tahtawi espouses a labor theory of value, arguing that capital such as land serves only as an instrument, not as an independent generator of wealth. He thus advocates that both craftsmen and peasants be better remunerated for their labor than was generally the case in the Egypt of his time. He criticizes landowners who think their ownership entitles them to expropriate nearly all the profits generated by the laborers on their land. Such owners ignore not only the way in which labor itself creates value, he says, but the many advances in working technique and technology introduced by peasants that allow much greater yields. "What reaches the workers in return for their labor on farms, or makers of instruments in return for their fashioning them, is a small thing in relation to the huge amounts yielded to the owners."⁴⁸ Such inequities are exacerbated, he thinks, by an oversupply of labor that causes peasants to bid each other's wages down.

A key element in Saint-Simonian thought is the opposition between the unproductive, feudal classes of the aristocracy and the clergy on the one hand, and the productive classes of industrialists and workers on the other. Just as at-Tahtawi turns Montesquieu's separation of powers on its head in favor of unitary authority, so he avoids this idea of class warfare. He extracts himself from the dilemma involved in holding a theory that exalts the value of peasants' labor over that of viceregal high officials, by seeing state officials as providers of the security necessary for the undertaking of truly productive labor. Even the unproductive nobles, then, contribute to adding value by organizing society for production.⁴⁹

At-Tahtawi's vision of an Egypt with universal literacy, where manual la-

borers were well regarded and properly paid as the creators of the nation's wealth, foundered against rapid population growth and landlordism. An apologist for the viceregal state despite his reformist, Saint-Simonian program for the future, at-Tahtawi overestimated Egypt's potential as a colonial power in Africa, as well as its strength vis-à-vis Europe. He gave viceregal officials credit for their maintenance of order and lamented the poor pay of the peasants, but he never took the bull by the horns and recognized a basic conflict of class interests between the peasants and the nobles. His faith in cotton as a source of the capital for "civilizing" Egypt reckoned without the instability of primary commodity prices.

Europeans

Having examined the Ottoman-Egyptian elite and the highest-ranking Arabophone Egyptians, we now have a basic understanding of one wing of the dual elite that presided over Egypt in the nineteenth century. The other wing consisted of the Europeans and their compradors (especially the Syro-Lebanese). The foreign consular corps in Alexandria began, particularly from the accession of Isma'îl, to constitute a sort of senate capable of overruling the viceroy and his ministers on major policy decisions. These consuls had the backing of warships in the Mediterranean and of a large European expatriate population. Their position was also bolstered by a corporate body of some 1,300 European civil servants working for the viceregal government in the early 1880s, whose salaries consumed nearly 5 percent of the budget. The manner in which the expatriate Europeans came to view Egypt proved crucial in the summer of 1882. The Syro-Lebanese, as merchants of great property, money-lenders, bureaucrats, and intellectuals, likewise played a role far beyond their numbers.

In 1881 there may have been 90,000 or 100,000 Europeans in Egypt, among them large numbers of Greek and Italian workers and shopkeepers attracted by the opportunities opened up by the cotton boom. The much smaller French and British communities were more likely to be middle or upper class, and these constituted a sort of expatriate aristocracy. Ann Stoler has stressed the need for a nuanced understanding of the diversity of European communities in colonial societies, of the differences between policy-makers in the metropole and the expatriates, as well as of the conflicts among the colonial Europeans themselves.⁵⁰ Here we are concerned with the elite among the expatriates; a later chapter, on urban conflict, will deal at greater length with European laborers in Egypt.

For wealthy Europeans, Egypt in the 1860s and 1870s constituted a realm of the exotic, waiting to be rationally exploited, yet resisting because of its Oriental nature any easy rationalization.⁵¹ For travelers in search of the anarchic, the

infrastructural improvements in Egypt threatened their vision of a chaotic East. Arthur Rhoné, a French visitor, commented on the train station in Alexandria: "A railroad in the Orient, that makes one quiver! What, find again here the insipid uniformity of the public services in the West?"⁵² He adds, "Never fear." The Orient will always do things in its own way. What prompted his relief? The way in which peasants rode in open freight cars rather than coaches, and rushed on and off in a disorganized manner. A line of Egyptians waiting patiently for their morning commute would have irretrievably ruined the Orient for Rhoné.

The conviction among Europeans that the Orient, whatever the impact on it of Western inventions, could never achieve a rational organization on its own, proved one of the essential underpinnings of imperialist rhetoric. Auckland Colvin served as the British comptroller on the Dual Control in the early 1880s, an oversight agency concerned to ensure that Egypt serviced its debts to European creditors. Having, like some relatives, come up through the Indian civil service, he once boasted that the English exceeded the Orientals in duplicity: "An Englishman who knew the game, he said, could always beat them at their own weapons, and they were mere children in deceit when it came to a contest with us."⁵³ Colvin wrote that under Isma'il "there was no justice; no order, or system, in the collection of the land revenue and taxes."⁵⁴ The evidence in fact indicates that tax collection became much more systematic in the 1870s, under the pressure of servicing the debt to Europeans, but Colvin saw only chaos in one of the more organized sectors of Egyptian governance. As for the state officials, in Colvin's view "the governing body, few in number, were, with rare exceptions, devoid of character, probity and intelligence."⁵⁵ In January 1882, according to the anti-imperialist British gadfly Wilfred Blunt, Colvin began seriously considering the need for a British invasion and occupation of Egypt, once it became clear to him that the constitutionalist movement had produced a chamber of deputies determined to gain some control over the budget. Colvin, as comptroller, felt budgetary matters to be his, and Europe's, exclusive concern. He said, "The same thing had been seen over and over again in India. England would never give up the footing she had got in Egypt, and it was useless to talk about the abstract rights and wrongs of the Egyptians. These would not be considered. . . . He should work for intervention, and if it must be so, for annexation."⁵⁶ The Indian precedent thus weighed heavily with the jingoist party among British officials in Egypt. They already knew of an Oriental land where they thought the Europeans had made chaos into order, proving themselves masters of even specifically Oriental power games such as deceit. The superhuman quality of the master race sufficed to turn even a vice into a virtue if they exercised it against the child-like Oriental. There is something almost Nietzschean about Colvin's views as reported by Blunt.

The upper-class expatriates and visitors from Europe went beyond simply saying that Egypt suffered from stupid, dishonest rulers and disorganized ad-

ministration and styles of life. F. B. Zincke (“vicar of Wherstead and chaplain in ordinary to the Queen”) reported after a long visit to the country in the late 1860s that a European friend of his “who has much resided among the Orientals” thought that every Oriental had a “loose screw. Every mother’s son of them, he thinks, is, to some degree, and in some way or other, mad.”⁵⁷ Zincke contents himself with calling Egyptians (and Africans, and African-Americans) child-like, perpetual eleven-year-olds. He thinks their customs to have remained unchanged virtually since Pharaonic times, though with some “retrogression,” for which, he says, “our good friends, the Turks, are in no small degree responsible.” Perpetual change in customs and social practices is peculiar, then, to Europe.⁵⁸ Zincke also delivers himself of the remarkable tautology that Orientals lack, and have always lacked, republicanism, because they have never possessed a legislature. He thinks the East might be improved through three measures: the introduction of security of life and property, more extensive use of the printing press and circulation of newspapers, and increased literacy (pp. 370–73, 389–95). In short, Egypt should be made over in the image of the literate European middle class. Many European Christians had visceral feelings against Islam and Muslims. Zincke thought Muslims had “no liberty of any kind,” being bound by the “ideas of the Arab barbarians of twelve centuries ago” (p. 342). Lady Duff Gordon reported, “I have been really amazed at several instances of English fanaticism this year. Why do people come to a Mussulman country with such a bitter hatred ‘in their stomachs.’”⁵⁹ The British colonial elite had blamed the Muslims for the Indian rebellion of 1857, and thereafter many developed a phobia of Islam and Sufism.

The opinions of the European expatriates grew increasingly important as they took a more active role in administering the country. Samuel de Kusel, who rose to become head of the Customs Administration, had as a young man helped manage a cotton-ginning factory in the provincial town of Zaqaq. He described the methods for instilling work-time discipline in the Egyptian workers, of whom he said that “most of them were naturally of indolent dispositions.” The overseer “carried with him a sort of kourbash or long whip, with which he encouraged industry among the men and boys.”⁶⁰ Kusel, as manager, often had men whipped, either on the premises, or, for infractions such as theft, at the police station, and remarked at how stoically those whipped limped back to work. British consular officials described the Egyptian peasant as so long-suffering and submissive that no “amount of misery or oppression would provoke him to resistance.”⁶¹ Of Kusel and his like, a left-leaning visitor, Lady Duff Gordon, spoke with disgust: “What chokes me is to hear English people talk of the stick being ‘the only way to manage Arabs’ as if anyone could doubt that it is the easiest way to manage any people where it can be used with impunity.”⁶²

Kusel saw ‘Urabi as a mere demagogue, and although he admitted never hearing him speak, he said, “I surmise that he mouthed out fine-sounding,

sonorous sentences, unintelligible to himself as well as to his hearers, and, naturally enough, as the latter did not understand him, they applauded.”⁶³ Kusel’s dismissive views of the Egyptians might not have mattered so much had he not come to have charge of the Customs Administration. In 1882 he was able to hide from ‘Urabi the whereabouts of a torpedo that Stone Pasha had ordered from America, thus illustrating ‘Urabi’s point about the undesirability of having foreigners in charge of key agencies such as Customs.⁶⁴ As Timothy Mitchell has pointed out, Kusel wrote of the savage bombardment of Alexandria by the British admiralty on 11 July 1882, saying, “to a civilian who had never seen warfare the spectacle was magnificent.”⁶⁵

Egypt was a place, for many Europeans, where a career could be made. Their increasing ability to penetrate it and stake a claim to its resources excited their ambition, but also many jealousies and fears. They saw the local vice-regal government as corrupt and dim-witted, and ordinary Egyptians as capable of cheerfully putting up with any degree of mistreatment. Egypt lacked organization; its essence was to remain disorganized. Even the icon of nineteenth-century rationality, the railroad, was subverted by the anarchy of the Egyptian passengers. Local society was incapable of throwing up any opposition to the absolutist viceroy except self-serving demagogues whose eloquent nonsense could sway the minds of the impressionable, child-like public. Beneath much of this characterization lay a conviction that only rule by Europeans could hope to raise Egypt out of its primordial chaos. The forward party among the British hoped to replicate in Egypt the colonial enterprise accomplished in India. Not all Europeans shared these views, as the testimonies of Lady Duff Gordon and Wilfrid Blunt demonstrate. Yet neither sought to make a career in Egypt, whereas Kusel and Colvin certainly did. The European civil servants on the khedivial payroll had special reasons for dreaming of a Calcutta on the Nile.

Syrians

Syrian Christians from what is now Lebanon had played important cultural and economic roles in Egypt since the eighteenth century, and the cotton boom brought thousands more of them into the country as merchants and interpreters. The Egyptian bureaucracy hired Arabic-speaking Syrian Christians in preference to Copts from the mid-1860s because of their mastery of European languages and knowledge of European-style accounting. The Syro-Lebanese clans also carried on a brisk import-export trade and engaged in money-lending in rural areas. Politically, they divided into compradors who supported European penetration and local autocracy, and progressives who adhered to the ideals of the Ottoman constitutionalist movement of the 1870s. Khalil Ghanim, a Christian Beirut who was elected to the short-lived Ottoman parlia-

ment and later played a role in the Young Turk movement, wrote a revealing book on economics in Arabic entitled *Political Economy or the Art of Household Management* and published it in Alexandria in 1879 after serializing it in the newspaper *Misr*.⁶⁶ The work's publication in Egypt by Syrian Christians makes it worth considering as part of this group's intellectual ambience.

Ghanim espouses, on the whole, the values of the Syrian Christian bourgeoisie, and criticizes the Ottoman nobility. He pays great attention to the role of the state, denouncing the sort of absolutism that allows the ruler to dip into the treasury at will. Although he does not discuss political thought in this book, we know that he supported parliamentary government and detested absolutism. Unlike at-Tahtawi, he criticizes rising military budgets, urging that tax monies be spent instead on science and knowledge. Here we find evidence for a Syrian Christian lack of sympathy with the nobles' and notables' concern to build a large, powerful army for imperial purposes. He treats the problem of taxes at great length, citing Ibn Khaldun for the point that taxes should be levied on all, and says that noblemen and the clergy should enjoy no exemptions, since such inequities helped prompt the French Revolution. Moreover, he says, taxes should be kept low, should be levied progressively according to the individual's wealth, and should be fixed and not subject to frequent change (pp. 51, 53–56).

This Lebanese notable identifies fixed taxes with progress and an end to despotism. Taxes, he says, should be paid directly to the government, since middlemen only increase their onerousness, and he advocates the introduction of a European system of tax collection throughout the Ottoman Empire. He laments that some taxes are raised for the purpose of servicing debts. He stipulates that no new debts should be contracted by Middle Eastern governments until there is absolutely no hope of increased revenue from better administration or until belt-tightening has been taken to the limit. He makes a strong plea for free-trade policies, dismissing critics who feared they would result in consistently high balance of trade problems for poor nations. He also argues for a lifting of government controls on interest rates, asserting that such state interference only creates a black market, and he blames high rates in the Ottoman Empire of 20 percent (versus 3 to 5 percent in Europe) on political insecurity. He argues that the exigencies of a monetized economy have rendered religious scruples about taking interest on loans obsolete (pp. 39–40, 57–64).

Ghanim decries the lack of joint-stock partnerships in the Middle East, pointing to the importance of finance capital as the nurturer of industry and agriculture. He rejects slavery and corvée, but says wage labor involves no exploitation. This sort of labor simply demonstrates a divine order in which the rich and poor depend on one another, and managers and workers all cooperate in the production process. He prefers wage labor, with fixed working hours, to piece work, which he says leads the workers to labor night and day so that they fall ill and do shoddy work. He gives the example of construction workers in

Mount Lebanon, who if paid by the project tend to produce a rickety structure. He says the best system is to combine a daily wage with a share of the profits, a practice he says is followed by some Syrian merchants (pp. 11–13, 20–23).

Ghanim emphasizes the primacy of industry, unlike the Ottoman nobles and the technocrats in Cairo who saw agriculture as Egypt's most important activity. He understands the great increases in productivity that assembly-line division of labor could bring about, but laments that Middle Easterners are poor consumers, remaining content with what they have, and that artisans resist innovation. He denies that industrial workers are reduced to machines performing boring, repetitive jobs, and rejects the idea that factories impede national education and damage family life because they employ many women and children. He argues that industrial work is itself a kind of education, which supplies many poor families with some much-needed extra income. Not everyone, he observes, is anyway fated to be a professor. He agrees that women should be segregated from men at factories, but says that in Mount Lebanon and Nablus women have proven that they can work harder than men (pp. 13–16).

Unlike at-Tahtawi, Ghanim sees population increase as potentially a cause of immiseration, rather than as a pressure for higher productivity. He knows Malthus, but rejects the solution of artificial birth control as unnatural. For reasons of his own religious convictions, he prefers to let natural limitations on population like famine and war operate. Other brakes on development, he says, include backwardness in industry, lack of law and order, and general ignorance. He also decries what he sees as a widespread attitude of asceticism in the Middle East, such that people do not struggle to become affluent. He seldom evinces much sympathy with or understanding of the poor. He urges that government not spend a great deal on welfare stipends, lest the undeserving begin sharing in them. He celebrates the divine ordaining of disparate social classes, wherein individuals can distinguish themselves, and denounces socialist ideas of equality and the abolition of inheritance. In his view, everyone should know his own place. One cause of poverty, he affirms, is that people spend beyond their means, attempting to emulate the rich (pp. 33–38, 41–44, 52).

Aside from Ibn Khaldun, the chief influence on Ghanim's thought about political economy appears to have been Frédéric Bastiat (1801–50), a right-wing French journalist and politician from a wealthy family of merchants. Bastiat's economic philosophy, *Optimism*, argues that the capitalism and liberal state structures of France in the 1840s produced a perfect harmony of societal interests.⁶⁷ Yet Bastiat appeals to Ghanim for many of the same reasons that he adopts his other stances on political economy. His fear of socialism, his commitment to a strongly hierarchical class society, his concern about security and freedom for owners of capital, his championing of industrialization even at the expense of retarding national literacy and weakening family life, and his distrust of welfare cheaters, mark him as a self-satisfied man of

property and position. The Optimist shape of his political economy appears to be a matter of elective affinity. Ghanim's championing of progressive income taxes and profit-sharing for workers demonstrates that he leavens his laissez-faire theories with a liberal paternalism, and, like Bastiat, sees a role for the state in protecting consumers from sharp practices. Ghanim's advocacy of the development of indigenous Middle Eastern financial institutions and factories very probably derived from the successes of Beirut's silk manufactories. But he ignores the more ambivalent results of such efforts in Egypt and Turkey. In putting the entire blame for the lack of factories on the conservatism of artisans and the lack of consumerism, he slights the Ottoman nobility's preference for investment in land, the European determination to prevent protection of infant industries in the Middle East, and the difficulties of a late development of industry in the world economy. Most seriously, he never says where the capital for industrialization will come from, given that he wants low, progressive taxes.

Ghanim's mixture of antifeudalism, belief in bourgeois parliamentarism, ardent embrace of capitalism, and combined paternalism and hostility toward the poor and working classes may not, of course, be taken as emblematic of all Syrian Christian merchants and intellectuals in Egypt. But his exposition probably does shed light on the view of the world held by many of them. The Syro-Lebanese within Egypt divided into an anti-European but proconstitutional wing and a pro-European faction more comfortable with absolutism, but such a polarity overstates the differences among them. Few of the constitutionalists envisaged a suffrage that extended lower than the middle propertied strata, and even the absolutists wanted cabinet government and responsible finances. The anti-European among them welcomed European science and techniques, but felt that the European embrace had begun to stifle their own opportunities. The pro-European among them still saw cooperation with the foreigners as the best entrée into the Age of Capital. The difference between the two lay in strategy and emphasis, not in profound conflicts over social philosophy.

This archeology of social knowledge and the networks of power and wealth with which it interacted helps set the stage for our investigation of dissenting ideologies in the 1860s and 1870s. The keyword for the ideologies of the Old Regime is, as suggested above, "reform bureaucracy." Aside from a few irredentist ulama and Ottoman nobles, few members of the elite in late viceregal Egypt mourned the passing of the prebendal order of the old Ottoman Empire. Even before the boom of the 1860s, Egypt's bureaucracy increasingly depended on taxes of export crops such as cotton, and capitalist ways had begun to transform even the lives of the viceroys and Ottoman nobles. The nobles gradually became private landowners under the Muhammadi viceroys. With the coming of the cotton boom, these nobles became agrarian capitalists in a

big way, something perhaps foreshadowed in al-Bukhari's mercantile mindset as a member of the Ottoman elite. At-Tahtawi's program for cotton production, industrialization, and Egyptian imperialism in Africa sums up the economic hopes of the viceregal high bureaucrats. Colvin and Kusel, with their conviction of a unique European ability to order everything from discourse to land tenure, well represent the expatriate Europeans on the make in Egypt. Ghanim's Optimism epitomizes the self-satisfied ambition of the newly emerging local professional and commercial elites, many of them European compradors.

Despite the framework for elite social action provided by the reform bureaucracy, the various strata at the top of Egyptian society clearly engaged in much contention about the definition of social ideals. Not only were the ideas of the ruling class not the ruling ideas throughout Egypt, but the ruling classes themselves could agree on little but the sanctity of their own property and the justness of their access to state office.⁶⁸ The sultans made themselves out to be caliphs with increasing stridency, at the same time that they attempted to re-establish direct control over outlying provinces such as al-Hasa and Yemen, offering a subtle threat to Egypt's semiautonomy as a vassal state. For Isma'il, Sultan Abdülaziz was more a superstitious buffoon than the vicar of Muhammad. Although at-Tahtawi was seduced by Isma'il's vision of civilization and an African cotton empire, he retained the village notable's paternalism toward peasants, mixing it with a Saint-Simonian respect for productive labor. He cared about the peasants and their wages in a way Isma'il clearly did not, though we have no evidence that his concern manifested itself in any practical way. At-Tahtawi was also more wary of European colonialism than was his khedive. For Europeans such as Colvin, the viceregal state represented an annoying anachronism, a site of untidy disorder, rather than being the manifestation of stirrings toward civilization in Africa. They, of course, wanted to "order" it, to gain control over it and reduce its chaos so as to exploit it. The Europeans' compradors, such as Syro-Lebanese notables and merchants, developed an incisive critique of viceregal absolutism, blaming it for economic stagnation and the debt crisis, and dreamed of a liberal political economy made up of one part laissez-faire and one part parliamentary governance. These Levantine collaborators, precisely of the sort envisaged in Palmerston's imperialism of free trade, had the disadvantages of being foreign to Egypt and of lacking an indigenous power base.

The diversity of social ideas among the groups that constituted the elite is self-evident, and the differing conceptions of Egypt's future among the Ottoman-Egyptian nobles and the European expatriates in the 1870s might have struck a contemporary observer as especially ominous. The image that emerges of the dual elite suggests rapid and dynamic change rather than a static and stagnant "traditional" and "Turkish" social system. The sultan transforms himself into a caliph, the viceroy becomes a khedive and snaps up a fifth

of the country's land for himself and close relatives. The Ottoman nobles go from being a state service elite to being a class of large private landowners, and are joined by the higher-ranking native Egyptian members of the service elite. The Ottoman landowners and their courtiers benefit hugely from the cotton boom, which also raises the value of their lightly taxed estates. The Europeans, beginning as a small number of long-distance merchants, become a large community that is internally stratified into laborers, skilled workers, shopkeepers, great merchants, and financiers and diplomats. The financiers and merchants among them ride the tiger, by lending to the viceroy huge sums of money or speculating in Egyptian cotton. From 1876 the institution of the Mixed Courts encourages them to invest in land and allows them to foreclose on peasant mortgages. In 1879 the European consuls act as a group to depose Khedive Isma'il and install his son, demonstrating conclusively that they have become the province's king-makers. The Syro-Lebanese community also swells, benefiting from its European education and contacts, and makes inroads into the bureaucracy, rural money-lending, and the import-export trade.

The economic and political changes of the middle third of the nineteenth century created not only winners and losers, but new sorts of interests. Both the capitalist world-system, centered in western Europe and an expansion of the local state bureaucracy had a profound impact on the major social strata in Egypt during these years. The nobles' land-grab shoved aside Egyptian peasants who were also eager to raise cotton. The influx of European manufactured goods, merchants, and even workers displaced Egyptians from some key sectors of the economy. The bureaucracy's hiring of European and Syro-Lebanese officials excluded members of the Egyptian intelligentsia from those posts. The increasing tendency of Ottoman-Egyptians and Europeans to block native Egyptians from some forms of upward mobility coincided with the advent of a range of new interests among these Egyptians during the cotton boom and its aftermath. The elites still engaged in a great deal of face-to-face interaction. Their world was still that of the manuscript and the occasional printed book with a press run of 500. They stood unprepared for truly political journalism expressing dissident views, for constitutionalist and even republican intellectuals, for ambitious and reformist young officers, for urban crowds lashing out at what they saw as exploitative Europeans, for guildsmen ready to strike for their rights, for peasants driven by impossible taxes to form guerrilla bands in the deserts of Upper Egypt. Let us now examine what interests many of the intelligentsia, the urban guilds, and the peasants developed in these decades that put them at odds with the dual elite.

Two

Economic Change and Social Interests

THE THREE GREAT FORCES that hammered Egypt in the third quarter of the nineteenth century—capitalism, population growth, and the state—collaborated in greatly increasing the gross national product and in radically changing the way it was distributed and controlled. The saga of the cotton boom in particular, followed by a bust and the world's first modern debt crisis, has preoccupied historians of Egypt, the British Empire, and nineteenth-century economic developments for some time, but few social historians have investigated how all these things affected the middle and working strata. Here, I want to examine the impact of economic change on peasants, guilds, and intellectuals in the 1860s and 1870s. Since most historians, from 'Abdu'r-Rahman ar-Rafi'i to Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher to Alexander Schölch, have denied a substantial social dimension to the revolution of 1881–82, seeing it either as a military putsch or as an isolated development in high politics, few have raised the question of what relevance economic and social change may have had to its outbreak. Younger historians such as Latifah M. Salim, who have argued for the importance of social classes in the Revolution, have tended to treat only the early 1880s. I want, on the contrary, to see the period 1858–82 as a unity, to trace the developments in the economy and in civil society all the way through to the Revolution. Several theoretical perspectives might help make sense of this complex period of change, but two contending interpretations compete most obviously for our attention. On the one hand, the boom and bust of the cotton sales will suggest to some the possible salience here of the "J-curve," the theory that revolutions occur after a period of increased prosperity followed by an economic contraction. Its adherents argue that most revolutions are made, not by a populace mired for ages in desperate poverty, but by one whose hopes have been raised by a spurt of significant economic growth, then dashed by a recession or depression.¹ This explanation represents an advance on the conservative idea of revolution as the politics of the perennially poor, but it has its own problems. For one thing, boom-and-bust cycles occur all the time without producing revolutions or large-scale collective violence. The major rival theory, focusing on resource mobilization, would argue the need, not only for disappointment, but for a coordinated group or class with well-defined interests and possessing sufficient resources to mount an effective challenge to the ruling elite.² For those holding this latter perspective, a downturn after an expansion in the economy explains little in and of itself, forming

at most a vague precondition for a collective action more dependent on a group's consciousness of its interests and its marshaling of resources than on any specific grievance. Indeed, Charles Tilly and others hold that in estate and class societies the grievances of the poor and the weak constitute a constant. Let us examine the impact of economic change on Egyptian social classes in this period, and along the way perhaps we can determine whether either of these theories helps us better understand how it ended in upheaval.

How, then, did the economy change the lives of Egyptians belonging to the major nonelite actors in the subsequent revolution—the rural population, the urban guilds, and the intelligentsia? When I discuss economic change, I have in mind not only the increased influence of capitalism and the greater incorporation of Egypt into the world market, but also indigenous developments only tangentially related to the international ones. For instance, the growth of a new great-landowning class occurred largely in the context of local administrative and political developments. ²Ali Barakat and Robert F. Hunter have detailed this process for us from the Egyptian National Archives.³ Internal class and cultural developments, then, can often possess as much explanatory weight as external influences.

Although scholars have probably overemphasized the economic disjuncture of the 1860s with the past, the cotton boom, the extension of the railway, and the Suez Canal all did help effect extensive economic and social change. Kenneth Cuno has demonstrated that eighteenth-century Egypt also had a fairly active money economy, and that market forces operated quite directly in the provincial cities and their village hinterlands. Maxime Rodinson had already, much earlier, proposed that we see a large sector for circulating merchant capital within medieval and early modern Middle Eastern economies.⁴ The 1860s witnessed not something entirely new, but a vast expansion of monetization, cash-cropping, commodity-trading, and other practices once chiefly characteristic of the large urban regions and their neighboring villages. The changes were qualitative as well as quantitative, however, for this era saw Egypt incorporated into the European industrial world economy more completely than ever before, with clear relations of unequal exchange, much different from its limited trade with Europe in the eighteenth century.

Other sorts of economic change accompanied the widespread cash-cropping of cotton. Some landlords with greater disposable money income began finding it cheaper to pay their peasants a wage than to continue with the prebendal mutual obligations of the past, allowing the *de jure* abolition of forced labor on noble estates by the Egyptian government. Steam engines began being widely used for irrigation and ginning, giving an advantage to landholders wealthy enough to afford them. The rapid growth of Egypt's foreign debt also impelled the state to begin raising taxes to extremely high levels, a development discussed in the next chapter.

Although many Egyptians grew wealthy from the new prominence of cotton, some were hurt by other developments in this period. The opening of the

Suez Canal led to a slump among merchants in Cairo and Upper Egypt still oriented to the Indian Ocean trade, since it allowed merchandise to bypass the Egyptian land and river routes altogether. The influx of cheap manufactured goods from Europe reduced the income of many local artisans, though it by no means wiped them out in this period. The artisans also faced competition from immigrant Greek, Italian, and other skilled workers. The number of Europeans attracted to Egypt by the cotton boom grew to nearly 100,000, about 1.5 percent of the total population, in the 1870s.

The state used its increased tax receipts to train thousands of intellectuals between 1863 and 1881, but they had to compete for jobs with children of the nobles and with the incoming Europeans. One reason for considering some sections of the intelligentsia along with nonelite actors such as peasants and craftsmen lies in the role “frustrated intellectuals,” and unemployed ones, have played in revolutionary movements from the English Revolution of the seventeenth century to the upheavals of 1848 on the Continent.⁵ I ask what expectations the intelligentsia, including especially the intellectuals and middle- and lower-level bureaucrats, may have had of benefiting economically from their skills, either in the market or in the government. Insofar as they functioned within the same regional economy and dealt with the same state, did the intelligentsia share any frustrations with the merchants, artisans, and peasants?

The crushing taxation of the 1870s, a result of the debt crisis, immiserated many who had once drawn such hope from the cotton boom. Did the bust and the negative economic developments of the 1870s produce a J-curve? Or did the economy change in ways that led some groups to articulate a new set of interests, as well as empowering them for greater social and political mobilization?

Land and Cotton

For an agrarian country such as Egypt, land-holding patterns were crucial to social organization. Contrary to the Orientalist vision of a static “Turkish” feudal system, which Robinson and Gallagher present to us, land-holding in Egypt underwent seismic upheavals in the nineteenth century. Three major forces shaped the nature of land tenure. The first, the administrative, emanated from the viceregal court. The viceroys sought to extirpate the old semifeudal Mamluk system and create strata loyal to themselves by expropriating some types of landholders while nurturing new landowning classes. They also sought to expand cultivation by bestowing newly irrigated lands on courtiers; since such land needed a great deal of work and investment to become profitable, gifts like these could even prove unwelcome at first. The second major force, the integration of Egypt more thoroughly into the world economy as a producer of cotton for Britain’s industries, raised the value of certain sorts of land and encouraged nobles with tax privileges to attempt to build up large

estates. These two forces could work quite independently of one another, and it would be too single-minded to insist that all major changes occurred because of outside economic influences. The third factor, accelerated population growth after 1850, contributed to price inflation, low-wage agricultural labor, and estate fragmentation.

The viceroy Muhammad ʿAli (r. 1805–48) destroyed the old Mamluk aristocracy, which had depended upon tax-farming for its revenues. He expropriated the lands of the defeated Mamluks, as well as most of the pious endowments that then constituted a fifth of Egypt’s lands and the primary source of income for its Muslim clergy or ulama. Neither the Mamluks nor the ulama ever recovered from this transfer of their landed property to the state. Muhammad ʿAli and his successors over time gave this state land as freeholds to court favorites of various Ottoman ethnicities, gradually creating a new aristocracy. The state also in theory owned the *kharaj* lands, consisting of medium and small holdings worked by indigenous Egyptian families. In practice, the Egyptian village notables tended to acquire certain de facto rights over the disposal of this property, though the land could legally be taken from them by the state at will.⁶

Muhammad ʿAli at first attempted to deter the Ottoman bureaucrats and military officers in his immediate entourage from acquiring local landed interests, and he redistributed confiscated endowments and tax-farms (*iltizams*) to peasants in small plots as leases from the state, according to Barakat. From about 1826, however, he changed this policy and increasingly made grants of land to court favorites. The lands were considered to have become fallow and thus one step removed (*al-ibʿadiyyah*) from any original owner, though Barakat alleges that this category sometimes functioned as a legal fiction allowing usurpation of peasant-occupied land. Under Muhammad ʿAli’s successors from 1848 the Ottoman-Egyptian service class acquired further estates, transforming itself into a new nobility. These courtiers paid no taxes on the land given them as private freeholds (*milk*). From the early 1850s, however, Saʿid imposed on the new nobility a tithes (*ʿushr*), an Islamic tax of one-tenth of income paid to the state, and his successor Ismaʿil raised it, though it remained far less than what the peasants paid on the *kharaj* lands.⁷ Earlier, peasants had owned land after a fashion, and Cuno has documented eighteenth-century land sales by peasants, but they were most often considered a sort of co-owner along with the tax-farmer and the sultan. Saʿid, in 1858, relinquished theoretical state ownership, and recognized peasant sole ownership of the *kharaj* holdings in law, though the movement toward genuine private property in land for most peasants probably trailed a good bit after this legislation.

Another factor that affected land holdings, population growth, underwent a transformation in the decades before the 1882 revolution. French demographer Daniel Panzac notes that “The generation that lived in Egypt between 1840 and 1870 witnessed an extremely important change: the passage from a long period of numerical quasi-stagnation in a small population, to the establish-

ment of a regular and assured increase (despite a mortality that remained high). This is an essential, if inconspicuous, aspect of the renewal that animated the Egyptian people in the nineteenth century."⁸ Panzac estimates that the population rose from around 4.5 million in 1800 to 5.4 million in 1846, and then to 7.8 million in 1882, and such growth suggests that increased security and prosperity allowed a shift in the annual rate of increase, from five per 1,000 in the 1840s to twelve per 1,000 later in this period.

As Jack A. Goldstone has argued at some length, rapid demographic increases have wide-ranging effects.⁹ High population growth can hurt peasants and medium landholders in particular because of estate fragmentation, and it acts as a brake on workers' wages. A medium estate of fifty acres, divided among five sons as the Qur'an mandates, left only ten acres apiece. Since a peasant needed at least three acres to produce enough to live on, in two generations, during times of high population growth, a family could decline from being part of a rural middle class to having too little land to support themselves. Moreover, increasing population contributes to high price inflation. Rising prices are seen as an opportunity for some among the propertied classes, but harm others. As Goldstone argues, demographic enlargement has a disproportionate impact on marginal populations, such as younger sons of landed families or peasants seeking to expand their holdings. A simple doubling of the overall population can increase such a marginal population eleven times, thus greatly heightening competition for scarce resources. Egypt's population nearly doubled from 1800 to 1882, so that its marginal groups faced this sort of nonlinear expansion. Their difficulties were only somewhat alleviated by a 20 percent increase of arable land during this period brought about by the extension of irrigation.

Greatly increased numbers of workers, unless the economy expands very rapidly, also imply greater competition for jobs. The reformer and great landlord Rifa'ah at-Tahtawi complained of lower than reasonable wages for workers in the late 1860s:

Everyone who wants to make his living from service, which is labor, is compelled to work for whatever wages it is possible to get from the owners, depending upon their pleasure, even though this amount be extremely small and incommensurate with the labor. This is particularly so in areas where there are a great many workers, who then accept diminished wages and compete with one another in this, to the benefit of the landowners.¹⁰

In Egypt during 1850–80, the negative effects of increased rates of population growth may have been alleviated somewhat by the extension of cultivation through irrigation works, and by the great rise in cotton prices after 1860. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that the demographic enlargement was so great as to create difficulties for many peasants and for the state.

High price inflation in nineteenth-century Egypt had many causes, but the addition of millions of inhabitants was among them. Charles Issawi has

pointed out that cheaper means of transportation permitted an increase in food exportation, and therefore in its price. The large inflow of foreign capital, both because of the cotton boom and because of loans taken out by the state, also put upward pressure on prices. Under Isma'îl, the expansion of the army from perhaps 20,000 to over 100,000, along with a growth of the state bureaucracy, contributed to inflation. Urban housing and services grew more and more expensive as the population increased. As we will see below, currency debasement under Isma'îl contributed to the problem. The Egyptian bureaucrat Yacoub Artin Pasha listed a basket of goods and services, including food, animals, manufactured goods, house rents, construction materials, agricultural produce, and wages, and found a 320 percent increase between 1800 and 1880.¹¹ Although a larger labor force should have depressed wages, they rose at about the same rate as prices generally, possibly owing to an increased velocity of monetary interchange. More people buying things more often would cause prices and wages to go up if the amount of goods and services did not grow accordingly.¹² Even so, wages were at best stagnant in viceregal Egypt, if Artin's figures can be trusted, and at worse the real purchasing power of workers actually declined. It should be remembered that increasingly less expensive manufactured imported goods were a major factor in depressing prices. Workers and peasants who bought few imported goods would not benefit from their being cheaper than before. Artin's figures point to difficulties for the working classes. The price of food for a peasant increased 400 percent in this period, and urban housing increased 1200 percent, both at rates far above the increases in wages.

Let us turn to the impact of capitalism, another major shaper of land-holding patterns. The cotton boom of the 1860s in Egypt constituted one of the region's first large-scale experiences with the boom-and-bust cycles that typify primary commodity trading in the periphery of the industrial world market. Brazilian coffee, Sri Lankan tea, Malaysian rubber, and more recently Middle Eastern petroleum are all subject to wild price swings that alternately enrich and impoverish producers. High prices encourage marginal producers to come on line, which drives prices back down; but those producers with high overheads cannot survive the new, lower prices they help create, and must go out of production. Their departure leads to rising prices once more, and the cycle repeats itself. Demand in the industrial importing states also oscillates. The lack of a strong industrial sector and a marked tendency to monoculture make the peripheral and semiperipheral economies highly vulnerable to dislocations deriving from these undulating price movements. Industrialized nations at the core also export primary commodities, of course, but their diversified economies suffer less from the price swings in any one commodity.

Egypt's cotton boom occurred because the North blockaded the South during the American Civil War, creating a cotton famine in Britain, which had depended on the United States for 80 percent of its cotton imports.¹³ The Brit-

ish sought feverishly for other sources to feed their textile manufacturing plants, expanding cultivation in India, for instance. Egyptians, blessed with an indigenous strain of long-staple cotton, responded to the high prices by planting greatly increased amounts of it. Although prices fell considerably after 1866, when the American South could again compete in the open market, they remained above the preboom average, and national earnings from the commodity constituted 70 to 80 percent of Egypt's export earnings in the late 1860s and early 1870s (see Table 2.1). Since more cotton began to be grown and yields per acre improved by about 33 percent, the crop earned as much for Egypt in 1872 as it had in 1863, in absolute terms. Because of a 40 percent fall in price between these years and rapid population increase, however, the per capita profitability of the crop clearly declined from the peak of 1864–66. Moreover, the cotton boom benefited the Ottoman-Egyptian nobility and some village notables much more than it did most small peasant farmers. The boom also made land much more valuable, especially the lightly taxed land of the nobles. The nobles responded by building up large estates. Whereas Gabriel Baer estimates that in the early 1850s only one-seventh of Egypt's land was held as private property by the nobles, a British report of 1871 put their *ib'adiyyah* estates at 1.1 million acres out of Egypt's 5.1 million acres of arable land.¹⁴ With some other sorts of minor holdings, the nobles had around a quarter of Egypt's arable land by the early 1870s, and although they gained some portion of it through the extension of irrigation, large amounts were acquired from peasants under some sort of duress.

Peasants typically sold their crop to a usurer, who had advanced them money for seed and equipment at as much as 2 or 3 percent per month. The higher expectations created by the new prosperity led the state to raise land taxes in the late 1860s and the debt crisis began driving them up even further after 1871. Many small peasants could not afford to pay, and had to sell out to large landowners. Roger Owen estimates that largeholders in this manner transferred to themselves some 300,000 feddans from medium- and smallholders in the Isma'îl period.¹⁵ From 1876 a new system of Mixed Tribunals applied essentially European law in disputes between European creditors and peasant smallholders, allowing the creditors to foreclose on loans even slightly in arrears by attaching the peasant's land. Previous Egyptian-Islamic practice had not allowed a peasant's land to be taken from him for bad loans. One Egyptian official estimated that between 1878 and 1883 the Mixed Courts put some 50,000 feddans into the hands of money-lenders in the rich agricultural province of Minufiyyah alone.¹⁶

Owen suggests that the increase in the number of large private estates in the hands of the khedivial family and its courtiers may have had certain advantages for facilitating cultivation. These, he thinks, included less state harassment, inexpensive labor, assured access to water, and sufficient capital to purchase steam-driven water pumps.¹⁷ Against the putative benefits that the rise of

TABLE 2.1
Average Value of Egyptian Cotton Exports, 1840–82.^a

<i>Years</i>	<i>£E</i>	<i>Cotton Prices</i> <i>(PT/Cantar)</i>	<i>Yields</i> <i>(Cantar/Feddan)</i>
1840–44	393,450		
1845–49	427,347		
1850–54	917,763		
1855–59	1,133,307		
1861 ^b	1,430,880	240	
1862	4,920,660	600	
1863	9,356,490	727	
1864	14,842,700	853	
1865	15,443,120	616	
1866	11,424,000	640	2
1867	6,642,060	465	
1868	5,831,250	410	
1869	6,005,700	433	2
1870	5,075,291	413	
1871	6,242,689	338	2.75
1872	9,236,598	426	
1873	10,070,631	420	
1874	10,751,424	380	3
1875	9,837,371	390	
1876	9,736,345	310	
1877	7,954,045	263	
1878	5,559,455	260	
1879	9,020,947	328	
1880	10,330,000	323	
1881	8,539,000	308	
1882	9,141,000	314	

Source: A. E. Crouchley, *The Economic Development of Modern Egypt* (London: Longmans, Green, 1938), p. 263, for prices 1874–78; other prices and figures from Owen, *Cotton*, pp. 90, 124, 126, 130, 166, 191, 197.

^a From 1873 Owen augments the original import-export figures by one-ninth because of undervaluation by Customs. Owen's cotton prices differ somewhat at points with those given by Crouchley, but overall price movements are similar.

^b The production figures are given for the twelve months ending in the summer of the year listed. We should interpret 1861 as August 1860–July 1861. £E means "Egyptian pounds." PT means "piasters."

large estates may have generated, however, must be laid the problems they engendered. First of all, as Jeffery Paige has argued, such large units of agricultural production suffered from great inefficiencies before the mechanization of the twentieth century, owing to the difficulties of supervising large numbers of badly paid and uncommitted manual workers spread out over a large area.¹⁸

Smaller family farms could demonstrate much greater efficiency, and the only salvation for the owners of the huge estates lay in the exercise of brutal repression. Only by political and paramilitary means could they keep their ramshackle, inefficient enterprises, with their typically low profit margins, from succumbing to the competition of leaner, smaller units. Second, the owners of the great estates, including the viceroy himself, dallied longest in implementing the abolition of forced labor and competitive wages for peasants. These practices may have helped offset losses from low productivity for the nobles, but a badly paid peasantry further hurt both productivity and the wider economy insofar as its members could purchase relatively little locally grown food and few locally made artisanal goods.

British MP Villiers Stuart, who visited Egypt in the fall of 1882 on a fact-finding mission, calculated that productivity on Isma'il's private estates, the Da'irah Saniyyah, was only one-fourth what it would have been in the hands of peasant smallholders. Isma'il thus tied up some 450,000 acres of Egypt's best agricultural land in a huge hacienda that cost the economy, in its inefficiency, nearly £2 million per year. Stuart also observed peasants forming partnerships to buy steam engines, so that the wealthiest proprietors were by no means the only Egyptians who could afford such technology.¹⁹ Even without the advantage of steam pumps, however, peasants outproduced the great estates by a wide margin. Only the artificial tax break of from a third to a half enjoyed by the nobles, and their use of forced labor and political intimidation, kept their estates in existence in the face of competition from the much more efficient peasants. Breaking the largest estates up into numerous family farms would have improved their agricultural efficiency by 400 percent and stimulated greater general demand in the economy. I am therefore inclined to attribute the increased production of commodities like cotton in the 1870s to the other factors discussed by Owen, such as infrastructural improvements (like the extension of canals and railroads), and population growth. I think the rise of the large estates may actually have been a brake on potentially greater growth. Again, the need of peasants to pool their resources in order to buy steam pumps speaks to the ways in which economic and technological change in this period may have encouraged more cooperative enterprises, and enhanced the peasants' ability to mobilize resources.

One problem with approaching the revolution of 1881–82 as a product of a J-curve lies in the ambiguity of economic developments during the 1860s and 1870s. One could look at the economy globally, and conclude that in absolute terms the per capita share of cotton export income dropped from 243 piasters in 1865 to only 117 piasters in 1881. Two sorts of counter-argument, however, could be made. First, such global indices do not account for the vast maldistribution of wealth in Egyptian society, nor for peasant problems such as overtaxation, high indebtedness, and increased threat of foreclosure on their mortgages. Second, even in economic terms, the thesis is insufficiently nuanced, in both the long and short terms. If one instead took the late 1850s as the

starting-point, when the per capita share of cotton export income per annum would have been only around 22 piasters, then even the 1881 figures (117 piasters per capita) look like a vast improvement. In the short term, moreover, significant fluctuations occurred in the economy between 1876 and 1881.

In 1877, 1878, and early 1879, the economy underwent a profound contraction. Low cotton prices, irregular Niles, drought, and crushingly high taxes all combined to reduce crops in 1878 to only 60 percent of their normal volume. With the 1879–80 growing year, the economy bounced back. The absolute value of exports was higher in 1881 than it had been in the good year of 1876, though high inflation and population growth might have led to a slight decrease in the real per capita share of export earnings. Although the price of cotton declined about 25 percent from the early 1870s to the early 1880s, the same picture of 1879–81 as a time of recovery emerges from a close scrutiny of export price trends. Cotton prices steadily declined from 420 piasters per cantar in 1873 to only 260 piasters per cantar in 1878. But in 1879 the prices rebounded, to 328 piasters per cantar, and though the next two years saw slightly lower prices the average was well above the slump of 1877–78 (see Table 2.1). Some of the decline in prices through the 1870s, moreover, was offset by a rise in the yields of cantars per feddan from 3 in 1874 to 3.43 in 1883 (the obverse of what was happening on the inefficient domains estates; see Table 2.2). Other indexes of a significant recovery in 1879–82 include export earnings and the level of imports. Although the value of cotton exports (by this time typically making up 60 to 70 percent of all exports) fell slightly in 1881, overall export earnings were actually up that year from the previous one, so that other products must have made up the difference. In the period 1879–81, the value of imports rose 31 percent, which British observers took as a sign of increased prosperity (see Table 2.3).

That an economic recovery was underway in 1879–81 seems likely, though, as noted above, it should be remembered that even a rising tide seldom lifts all boats. Very large numbers of peasants benefited only slightly from this upturn

TABLE 2.2
Net Cotton Yield, Cantars per Feddan
on Domains Land

<i>Year</i>	<i>Cantars</i>
1879	3.51
1880	3.01
1881	2.60
1882	2.10

Source: E. Vincent, "Memorandum," 27 June 1884, Confidential Print 4987, in Bourne and Watt, eds., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, 1984, 9:340.

TABLE 2.3
Value of Egyptian Exports and Imports, 1876–81^a

<i>Year</i>	<i>Exports</i> £	<i>Imports</i> £
1876	15,340,496	4,846,941
1877	14,530,178	5,120,731
1878	9,227,666	5,520,626
1879	15,315,166	5,700,584
1880	14,795,673	7,464,311
1881	15,722,222	8,333,333

Source: War Office, Intelligence Branch, "Report," 13 July 1882, Confidential Print 4661, in Bourne and Watt, eds., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, 1984, 9:152.

^a Following Owen, the import-export numbers have been augmented by one-ninth. These augmented figures arrived at from this British document sometimes differ by a factor of 2 percent or so from those given by Owen.

(though the grim threat of starvation did recede for those in the south), and, as will be discussed below, peasant indebtedness and foreclosures on their land appear to have increased a great deal during the same period. The available evidence points to high price inflation in the 1870s and 1880s, and this factor could have eroded the value of any increased income they did experience. My point is only that, even by the rather economic lights of the J-curve theorists, the Revolution appears to have occurred during an economic recovery from a deep recession, not during a downturn. The darkest period appears to have been 1878 to early 1879, the low point of exports and high point of taxes, and although Egyptians in the spring of 1879 mounted a political movement against European influence, and some peasants revolted in Upper Egypt, they did not make a full-fledged revolution until two or three years later.

Class formation and conflict, organization, and ideas about social justice among ordinary folk seem, then, more likely to account for the participation of propertied peasants in the revolution than global economic upturns and downturns. Can we discern the formation of new interests and organizations that the resource mobilization theorists would have us look for? First, we should note the state's legal recognition of private property in land. The nobles' right to private estates (*milk*) was recognized early in the century, but from 1858 Sa'îd Pasha redefined the *kharajyyah* or peasant holdings as private property as well. I wish to avoid romanticizing the extent of this change, since Cuno has discovered extensive sales of rights in land even in the eighteenth century, when theoretically the ruler owned all land and only leased it to various sorts of tenant. Yet the legal claims of peasants to their land, their ability to sell it as they pleased, and their right to the profits from cash-cropping, were all strengthened by changes in Egyptian law decreed by Viceroys Sa'îd and

Isma'îl. A stronger sense of private property in land gave the peasants, I would argue, a greater political interest in its disposition. The creation of very large estates by the viceregal family and the nobles in the 1860s and 1870s involved encroachments on medium and smaller peasant holdings, and left the peasants seeking ways to regain their lost lands.²⁰ They especially wished to do so because these lands were so much more productive in the hands of medium and small peasants than they were under the management of the great estate holders. Moreover, the encroachments of the great landlords were taking place at a time of increased pressure on the land because of high population growth. Barakat gives a real-life example of estate fragmentation among the rural middle class. In the early 1850s the Zaghlul family of village notables had 330 feddans. By the mid-1860s, this land had been distributed among twenty-one heirs, male and female, so that only one member of the family any longer owned more than fifty feddans. It was from this family that the famous nationalist figure Sa'd Zaghlul derived, and we can see here, perhaps, the impetus for him to go to law school and enter government service rather than staying in the village.²¹ One can also understand the frustration of many village notables and peasants at the growth of noble and foreign-owned holdings during a period that their own holdings were often shrinking.

Isma'îl abolished forced labor by peasants for nobles in law, recognizing that extensive cash-cropping was turning them into a rural proletariat subsisting on wage labor, and leading inexorably to an end to their status as near-serfs. The law was implemented at a rather glacial pace, but there is evidence for its full application on the large viceregal domains by 1878, when a European noted, "I believe that within the past few months this [corvée] system has been abolished, and the managers of the Daira Estates have received instructions to engage labourers to work their lands."²² On the other hand, in some areas forced labor continued on private estates into the 1880s.²³ The *de jure* abolition of corvée constituted the abrogation of noble privilege, and (where it was actually implemented) an increased income for peasants. The first of these developments implied a profound change in Egypt's languages of class, and the second had implications for the ability of peasants to mobilize resources.

The economic changes of this period had an impact on rural social organization. The cash-cropping of cotton on a large scale led many holders of private estates to reorganize their production through the employment of peasants as service tenants, setting up adobe agricultural settlements (*'izbahs*) with tenants' dwellings situated near central stores and the mansion of the owner and house of the overseer. Some peasants on such estates share-cropped as well as worked on the central estate of the landlord; they were supplemented by wage laborers and seasonal labor. Some 5,000 of these *'izbahs* had grown up by 1882.²⁴ These estates probably had a conservative effect, insofar as they allowed supervision of the peasants by the landlord or his foremen, in contrast to the looser relationship of absentee landlords to the more traditional

village. The evidence, presented in Chapter 9 below, suggests that peasants from surrounding villages sometimes mounted land invasions of these large estates, often led by their headmen, but revolts on the estates themselves are not attested.

Political and administrative changes also had some impact in rural areas. Village leadership had, even in the eighteenth century, been based upon a combination of hereditary claims and the acclamation of fellow peasants. From 1865, however, corporate institutions such as villages and guilds began formally electing village headmen and guildmasters, presumably to give an elective base to the chamber of deputies, the members of which the khedive appointed from among prominent village headmen and merchant guildmasters. One observer reported that the voters assembled in an open space near the village in the presence of the subgovernor and divided themselves into groups, each supporting a particular candidate. The typical village had several recognized leaders.²⁵ A British observer noted that "from the decisions of the Sheikh, the fellah has the right of appeal to the village tribunal; this right is, however, seldom exercised."²⁶ On the other hand, throughout the nineteenth century peasants certainly did sometimes petition the central government about the tyranny of their village headmen.²⁷

At a higher administrative level communal councils were elected by the villagers, one for each district (*qism*) in the province. "Their duties are to check abuses by the Sheikhs el-beled, and to carry out the measures of the agricultural councils."²⁸ While one does not wish to overemphasize the importance of these elective village and district institutions in the period 1865–82, their existence points to a higher level of organization among the rural middle strata and even peasants than had existed before. The precise roles and functions of these communal councils, which have not heretofore been mentioned in the historical literature on this period, need further investigation in the Egyptian archives, but sociological theory would lead us to expect that the erection of a new organization could make the mobilization of resources easier. Village headmen had for long depended on some sort of consensus of local notables for their office, along with hereditary claims, but the formal, government-sponsored nature of the new elections probably forced them to court constituents with a new assiduousness, reinforcing vertical links in the village. These elected village headmen played an important role in mobilizing resources during the 1882 revolution.

Further, Egyptian peasants developed an interest in expelling the Europeans from the Nile Valley, both because of the debt they began owing European and Levantine money-lenders and because of European foreclosures on peasant lands. Between 1876 and 1882, village private mortgages rose from a few hundred thousand pounds to 5 million pounds, and in addition peasants owed money-lenders 3 or 4 million pounds; they owed much of this money to Europeans and Levantines.²⁹ The implementation in 1876 of Mixed Tribunals,

wherein legal conflicts between Egyptians and Europeans resident in Egypt were adjudicated, brought important changes in the legal position of the peasants. An Egyptian Ministry of Justice memorandum of 1882 concluded that the proceedings in the Mixed Tribunals were grossly unfair to peasant debtors sued by European creditors, since they took place in a foreign language, were presided over by mainly European judges, and were based on a conception of law foreign to the Muslim peasants; the peasant thereby “becomes a foreigner in his own country.”³⁰ One farmer told a British observer in 1882, “Formerly, before the Consular Tribunals were established, it had been the custom from time immemorial that no man’s land could be sold or taken from him without his consent; now a man may be evicted in a summary manner after a short process.”³¹ European money-lenders gained through the Mixed Tribunals the ability to attach peasant lands should the peasants not repay their debts promptly, a change that offended the moral economy of the peasants, whose tenancy had once been guaranteed for life.

The much increased per capita earnings from the cash-cropping of cotton in the 1860s and 1870s gave propertied peasants and village notables a greater stake in the system than they had had as subsistence farmers, and their greater profits gave them more financial resources for political mobilization. The gradual legal recognition of their holdings as private property also gave them a burning interest in the disposition of property nationally. Some peasants saw parcels of their best land taken over on various pretexts by the viceroy, his family, and other nobles, as these built up huge, inefficient estates in the 1860s and 1870s. Most peasant holders competed well with these inefficient haciendas, but found themselves at a disadvantage because of noble tax privileges and command of force. Peasants also faced increasing European land purchases and foreclosures, and their debt to European and Levantine money-lenders, contracted at usurious rates, soared. These circumstances gave the medium and small peasants an interest in abolishing noble privileges, regaining usurped land, and somehow rolling back European penetration of the Nile Valley, an interest sharpened by high rates of population growth that increased competition for land. The impact on the rural populace of the institution of communal councils and of formal elections for village headmen is still difficult to gauge, but it would be no surprise if these changes, too, enhanced propertied peasants’ ability to mobilize resources.

Guilds and Economic Change

Let us turn now to another significant actor in the later Revolution. Urban workers in Egypt had organized themselves into formal craft, transportation, service, and merchant guilds from about the fifteenth century. We will discuss the history, organization, and ideologies of the guilds in a later chapter. Here we are concerned with how the guilds responded to the greater impact of capi-

talism in this period. I have discovered large numbers of petitions from the guilds to the state, which shed at least a little light on such questions, though these petitioners only occasionally dealt with purely economic issues, where they could not have expected the state to be of much help. One gets a glimpse from these guild petitions to the Interior Ministry of the kinds of dislocations being caused by economic and technological change in the period, such as the introduction of new transportation technologies, the breakdown of communal solidarity in the face of high incentives to private wage-labor, the struggle against forced labor for the state, and increased competition with European merchants and European imports. One gets a picture of the sort of interests the guildsmen began articulating in the 1860s and 1870s, and a glimpse of the sorts of collective action to which they began to resort in order to deal with these problems.

It seems to me here necessary to make a distinction between corporate privilege and corporatism, since these words are employed differently by historians and political scientists and there is some danger of confusion. Historians of the French Revolution see the society before 1789 as dominated by privileged corporations, which were granted economic rights or patents by the monarch. Eighteenth-century France was characterized by a social hierarchy of recognized estates, each of which had its privileges. In the aftermath of the Revolution most corporate privileges (many of which were being undermined by capitalism in the eighteenth century anyway) lost their legal backing. The labor market began to dictate prices and employment for artisans, and guilds lost their legal monopoly. The corporations did not disappear (a point I will discuss below), but their eighteenth-century privileges, often called "feudal," were withdrawn. Corporatism in modern societies constitutes an altogether different phenomenon. In capitalist societies not all social arrangements are dictated by interactions of the individual with the market, and corporatism exists, in the sense that classes such as the bourgeoisie often make successful corporate appeals for special taxation regimes. But this *corporatism* has entirely different legal, social, and economic bases than the privileged *corporations* in estates-type societies. It seems to me that some institutions in nineteenth-century Egypt had much in common with prerevolutionary France, and that Egypt possessed corporations in the premodern sense. In the period 1858–82, however, I think many of these corporations, especially the guilds, were forced to accommodate themselves to the greatly expanded capitalist market.

The idea that the Industrial and French revolutions ended the social importance of artisanal guilds in Europe has come under increasing attack. William H. Sewell has shown that the Industrial Revolution did not necessarily cause an immiseration of French artisans or a destruction of all their forms of corporate organization. Only in the textile industries, with the introduction of the power loom, did artisans find themselves thrown out of work. In some other trades, the Industrial Revolution actually created new work opportunities for the artisans. Because of France's relatively slow population growth in the

nineteenth century, a comparatively low rate of industrialization sufficed to keep its economy growing healthily, which in turn led to the survival of artisanal corporations on a wide scale.³² Barrington Moore has also argued for the continued importance of guilds in nineteenth-century Germany, where they played a role in the revolution of 1848.³³ Unlike France, Egypt combined extremely low rates of industrialization with increasingly high rates of population growth, leading to long-term economic stagnation and dependence on the wildly fluctuating prices of its dominant commodity, cotton. In Egypt, as well, the Industrial Revolution probably had its greatest deleterious impact on artisans involved in the textile trade, who found it increasingly difficult to compete with inexpensive manufactured cloth imported from Europe. In most other trade sectors, however, artisans and artisanal corporations continued to dominate Egyptian city life well into the twentieth century, given the relatively small numbers of factories established before the Egyptian revolution of 1952. Guilds also survived among transportation and service workers.

The new literature on the labor history of Egypt has not generally known what to make of the survival of the artisanal corporations, since it tends to argue from a British paradigm (wherein rapid and extensive industrialization disrupted older artisanal corporate structures) rather than the more suggestive French experience. These authors focus on the rise of industrial labor unions in twentieth-century Egypt, treating the guilds as an unhelpful heritage of vertical loyalties and deference that may have impeded the development of class consciousness, and playing down their importance in late nineteenth-century national affairs.³⁴ Such writing on labor and class history is very welcome and long overdue, but in regard to the heritage of the guilds its practitioners tend to make arguments that are insufficiently nuanced, when what is needed is a recognition of both disjunctures and continuities.

Nineteenth-century Egyptian guilds resembled those in early modern France, where they tended to have the form of a *maîtrise*, a workshop dominated by a guildmaster. Egyptian guildsmen do not appear, unlike the prerevolutionary French, to have set up secret organizations, though the archives reveal the frequent formation of cliques of disgruntled journeymen intriguing to remove their guildmaster. Egypt's expanding market economy and a state that began to whittle away at privileges effected changes in the masters' guilds in the nineteenth century, but they escaped the fate of their analogues in France, where guilds and guild privileges were proscribed during the French Revolution.

The accelerated population growth of the decades 1850–80 helped keep real wages for urban workers stagnant. Competition for work posed especial problems for guilds, which attempted to push wages up by limiting the number of workers in any particular trade. The guildmaster of the tilers and pavers in Cairo, along with senior members, complained in 1873 that some journeymen dared to take contracts from the government and the public at extremely low

wages. He even accused the Ministry of Public Works of complicity in the illicit contracting. The guildmaster further charged Ministry of Public Works with involvement in independent contracting at very low wages, which contravened both the guild monopoly and the prerogative of the guildmaster to set wages with government approval. It also obviously threatened the wage level of the other tilers and pavers.³⁵

Although they probably reflected actual norms, the guildmaster's complaints were not solidly grounded in law if we are to believe Raphael Borg, who wrote that "although they are permitted to accept a rate of wages lower than that named in their diploma, should they receive higher wages, they are liable, on a complaint being preferred against them, to refund the excess and pay a fine."³⁶ Demographic realities may have impelled guild members to compete more vigorously for contracts by lowering their wage demands. As we have noted, Egypt's population grew from around 5.4 million in 1846 to around 7.7 million by 1881, which, if we assume that the economy did not grow fast enough every year to absorb the increase, could account for a labor surplus that kept down real wages. Such downward pressure on wages would naturally have been resisted by the guilds, whatever the actual writ of the law.

In addition to the new demographic climate, technological innovation and economic change had an impact on many guilds. This effect, though often adverse, was seldom completely devastating. For instance, the millers' guild petitioned the Alexandria governorate in 1864 to have their tax assessment lowered because their earnings had decreased. The cause, they said, was that government steamboats now carried flour to its destination rather than allowing the millers to transport and market it themselves.³⁷ The radical decline in their income left them unable to afford the guild's previous tax bill of 41,420 piasters; indeed, in only two years they ran up arrears of taxes worth 35,740 piasters. The governor of Alexandria finally agreed to ask the central government for permission to reduce the guild's taxes, and it complied with the request. Since many guilds not only produced commodities but also transported and marketed them, the advent of the state-owned railway and steamboat cut deeply into their profits. Yet such changes rarely posed a threat to the survival of the guilds as a whole. After all, the new means of transportation opened up new markets and reduced transportation costs. Still, such long-term (and perhaps sectorial) considerations would have been little consolation to the millers in 1864.

New technology provoked opposition from other corporate groups as well. Several petitions to the government reveal a widespread hostility toward the steam-driven cotton-ginning factories being set up in cities. The city of Mansurah complained of fires caused by such steam engines, and wanted them banished to the riverfront. How far such sentiments were driven by the economic jealousies of merchant and artisan guilds is impossible as yet to say. Maghribi ulama objected to the operation of a foreign-owned steam-driven

ginny near their endowment property, insisting that it posed a threat to the public health as a source of disease. They were stymied, however, by the intervention of the Greek consul, who ensured that the Egyptian government permitted his national to run his factory. Egyptians working in such European-owned factories were routinely whipped to instill in them a European work-time discipline, as noted in the last chapter.³⁸

Other key changes derived from the transformation of law and of social relations brought about by the impact of capitalism. The viceregal government moved in patch-work rather than revolutionary fashion toward the abolition of landlord privileges and the creation of a labor market. The urban guild members themselves often had to protest and litigate in order to have legislation ameliorating the position of peasants also apply to themselves. An urban analogue to *corvée* existed for the transportation guilds, as Borg noted: "Owners of cars, carriages, horses, camels, mules and donkeys whenever a requisition is sent out by Government for a certain number of these animals or conveyances, cannot refuse to comply with it although it is well understood by both parties that no payment or compensation attaches to the transaction."³⁹ Members of these guilds would therefore take keen interest in Khedive Isma'îl's moves away from levying obligations on labor.

The guildmaster of a group of wagon drivers complained in 1873 of government coercion in commanding their services and fixing the wages to be paid. Referring to Isma'îl's deemphasis on forced labor, he wrote that "an order was issued that all procedures should be governed by the provision of incentives rather than by coercion."⁴⁰ In accordance with the central government directive, the Cairo police chief had instructed the police headquarters in the quarter of al-Azbakiyyah that wagons would not be requisitioned from their drivers against their will. Thereafter, the guildmaster wrote, the department of transportation and railways asked him for wagons to haul away broken pieces of wood left behind on the streets in the aftermath of Isma'îl's vast construction drive in that quarter. The department employed forty-five wagons per day. The guildmaster attempted to collect payment, but the head accountant of the department declined to authorize more than half-pay. When the guildmaster refused to accept these terms, the deputy minister took away his receipt and threw him out without a piaster. The guildmaster protested that the official had no right to behave in this manner. He complained that the government had set the price per day of a wagon at 18 piasters in 1867, when lower overhead costs for such items as fodder prevailed. In other words, officials had not allowed for five years of rather high inflation. Moreover, the department requisitioned the wagons at a time when they had been committed to other, private projects, yet refused to pay competitively for them. At one point the department went so far as to have the guildmaster jailed for refusing to supply further wagons at the government price.

The guildmaster was arguing for the guild's ability to set prices according to demand, rather than having the government receive services gratis or at unilaterally fixed fees, as it had formerly done. This reasoning implies only a partial acceptance of the market, since the guild still claimed a corporate monopoly (at least within its territory and ethnic group) on the provision of wagon transport services. The guildmaster advocated a free market in contracting, but not a free labor market. The Ottoman-Egyptian government officials involved clearly did not interpret Isma'il's abolition of forced labor as preventing such practices as the summary demand for services and the payment of whatever officials decided was fair. That some guild members did see the new regulations in that light shows their great sensitivity to the impact of law and of social and economic change on their own situation. The guild may, for all we know, have lost this particular fight; the documents do not reveal the winner. Whatever the outcome, it displayed an independence and initiative, a feistiness, that the published government-decrees and the works based on them do not reflect.

The individual profit motive always posed the greatest threat to the corporate sharing and solidarity that lay at the heart of guild organization. By regulating entry into the guild and fixing prices, masters avoided the fall in incomes that could result from an increased labor supply or from an influx of workers into a particular sector of the economy. This strategy may not have been dysfunctional in Ottoman Egypt, with its low over-all rates of population increase, economic growth, and inflation. Rapid economic changes of the sort associated with the modern capitalist world system, however, brought into question the rationale for many guild practices.

The way in which capitalism promotes an odd combination of individualism and corporatism may be seen in the struggle that developed among guild members over the custom of sharing guild income among members communally, called in Egypt *ar-rukah* or *ar-rukiyyah*. The word's, and the custom's, antiquity may be indicated by its Coptic etymology.⁴¹ The practice, rather than being purely Egyptian, was widespread in Ottoman cities among service guilds, such as dyers, bleachers of cloth, and weighers; Bruce Masters finds it in seventeenth-century Aleppo.⁴² *Ar-rukiyyah* distributed income among guild members with little regard for who worked hardest, ensuring all members of a comparable rank a similar level of income. Of course, guild officers still received more than journeymen. This system of sharing wages formed a rough urban analog to the practice in some premodern Middle Eastern villages of communally sharing crop income, called *al-musha'iyah*. This custom epitomized the preindustrial sense of community (*Gemeinschaft*) felt by many subaltern groups in prebendal societies, where labor often generated a relatively small surplus above subsistence and where much of that surplus was appropriated by the nobility, the rural gentry, and other elites. In such a society the

reciprocity of sharing served the individual worker as a hedge against periods of forced idleness, as with illness or a stagnant economy. Communal sharing also had the latent purpose for public service guilds such as the weighers of reassuring clients that the individual would have little incentive to cheat. Again, I want to emphasize that such extreme forms of community occurred only in some sectors of the premodern Egyptian economy, and that other sectors had been for centuries influenced by the regional export of cash crops or made goods.

In the early 1870s, Egyptian textile and cotton merchants in Alexandria were dismayed to see the guild of weighers and measurers, which had formerly practiced *ar-rukiyyah*, transformed into a loose association of private individuals selling their labor to the highest bidder in the marketplace. The merchants maintained that this new breed of weighers and measurers was dishonestly evaluating their goods.⁴³ They did so, the petition said, because they had become the private employees of European commercial houses, in contravention of all ancient custom and usage. Weighers and measurers had previously served the public, eschewing employment with any particular merchant but rather taking care of all the merchants' business, each in turn, under the supervision of their guildmasters and senior masters. Previously, the Egyptian merchants wrote, these guild officers expelled a dishonest weigher or measurer, and even the European merchants and their compradors made no complaints. No one suffered under this arrangement, they averred. But when every European merchant hired his own weighers and measurers, others started suffering losses. If Egyptian merchants caught any weigher acting dishonestly, he would be defended by a comprador of the Europeans, and trouble would ensue. The Egyptian merchants finally appointed observers to ensure honest measuring. But this step necessitated their paying two fees: one to weighers and measurers already in European employ and another to observers. Even such procedures failed to ensure honesty. The Egyptian merchants remarked that in the provinces, where the old guild system still operated among weighers and measurers, no such problems occurred. Indeed, there the measurers had often become state employees, with government supervisors appointed over them. The textile and cotton merchants wanted a similar arrangement for their market in Alexandria.

The governor of Alexandria explained to the Interior Ministry how this situation had arisen.⁴⁴ He said a police report showed that a combined meeting of European and Egyptian merchants decided in 1867 or 1868 (1284 A.H.) to allow measurers to earn private wages, though no record existed of any similar decision concerning the weighers. On the contrary, in 1870 (1287) the governor's council decided that the weighers should retain their communal apportionment of fees, to which the weighers assented. The weighers at Alexandria's Mina' al-Basal (Onion Port), however, started working soon thereafter for the Europeans and the rest of the guild did not then wish to retain its

rukiyyah. From that time on, every weigher worked as a private, salaried individual, and no further official decisions or directives that these activities be governmentally supervised or controlled could be found.

The Egyptian merchants protested the privatization of an activity they felt should have remained independent, corporate, and under state supervision. The greater wealth of European merchants allowed them to hire the weighers and measurers as private employees, impairing their ability to perform their services impartially for other parties. The Egyptian textile and cotton merchants argued that the old guild structure, wherein the government set fixed rates for these services to be paid to the guildmaster and then divided among members, helped reduce incentives for dishonesty. Here the modern observer must note that if such a system did not ensure impartiality, it did at least favor the Egyptians over Europeans, since the local merchants had more access to and influence with key figures such as the guildmaster and government supervisors. In the view of these Egyptian textile traders, the advantage had shifted decisively toward their European competitors through the destruction of the old, communal guild system. Weighers and measurers now served the highest bidder rather than the public.

The breakdown of community among the weighers and measurers paralleled a similar transformation among other groups in society that practiced this form of reciprocity, including the peasants in *musha'i* villages. Even on the periphery of the world market, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century capitalism, industry, and technology increased the earnings potential of workers enough to encourage greater individual claims on resources. Even peasants involved in growing and selling cotton for the world market in the 1860s could earn cash far beyond the dreams of their grandparents. Again, not the phenomena of cash crops or monetization were new, only the volume and breadth of such commerce beginning with the cotton boom. Such surpluses encouraged the widespread emergence of a preference for an association of individuals over a pre-industrial form of leveling communality. The masters' guilds, however, retained their form as monopolies and could still adopt a corporate idiom, as most often happened among workers.

The struggle over whether a communal or an associational ethos would prevail at the Onion Port continued into the late 1870s. A decision of the Ministry of the Interior required the measurers to return to the communal *ar-rukah* system. This ruling provoked an impassioned protest from the guildmaster of the measurers and several of his deputies (*muqaddams*), who insisted that Alexandria differed radically from Cairo and could not be treated analogously. In addition, they noted strong grassroots pressure for the abolition of communal sharing of income, saying that even when journeymen promised their supervisors they would accept the old system, they soon changed their minds and threatened to strike if they would be forced to share their wages with goldbricks.

The account of the internal struggles and reasoning reported by the Ministry of the Interior is worth quoting at length:

Inquiries were made from the guildmaster concerning the supervisors (*muqaddams*) working in the guild, whether employed by Europeans or by others, as well as concerning the journeymen assigned to them. He gave the names of twelve supervisors, and the journeymen under each, totalling 238 persons. The supervisors were asked how the undertaking to accept the distribution of journeymen and the division of earnings was arrived at. Did they secure the agreement of the journeymen to it, or what? They responded that after they had received a reply [from the journeymen] agreeing to it, they began the [communal] division. Then, [however], all the workers began protecting their own interests, and convinced themselves to stop working. Since they [the supervisors] knew that this would result in loss and damage, out of fear of further problems they began giving each worker his own share, as earned from his work, as they had been doing before. For these reasons, the idea of communal sharing (*ma'qul ar-rukah*) was not realized.

In addition, each supervisor has his own journeymen, and their earnings are their own after meeting their obligation of contributing a part of it [to taxes], commensurate with their subsistence and that of their families . . . and it is no easy matter for them to secure their agreement. For the work each performs in measuring is not according to a single pattern. Rather, some work a great deal, whereas others work very little, and these are the wages of labor. It is obvious that the one who merits them is the one who earns them. It is not right that some persons arrive late to work, and that a worker who is already present give them part of his earnings. Rather, it is more appropriate that every laborer earn his wages himself. For this reason, and so as to resolve the existing problems, to avoid coercion, and to prevent work stoppages, the director of the Onion Port was instructed to decide the wages, and to give into the hands of every laborer his own earnings after deducting government taxes levied on the guild, in accordance with previous practice.⁴⁵

The Ottoman and Circassian nobles attempted to keep the communal system functioning among Alexandria's measurers, as desired by the Egyptian merchants. As late as 1879 they were instructing the port's directors to revert to sharing out wages on the basis of ascription (guild membership) rather than achievement. This attempt at anachronism foundered on the resistance of the journeymen, who went on strike to secure individual wages based on hours worked. These individualistic journeymen nevertheless remained attached to a corporate idiom in some ways, as they demonstrated by going on strike together. They rejected not corporatism in its entirety, but a premodern *Gemeinschaft*. The demand that a connection be established between individual effort and reward is common among workers in modern societies, but the change in idiom here reinforces Moore's point that "the implicit social contract is usually subject to continual testing and renegotiation."⁴⁶

Most journeymen wanted to strike a balance between individual reward and a corporate ethos, unlike Optimist Beirut industrialists such as Khalil Ghanim, who advocated an almost atomized society that would have left the workers at the mercy of the wealthy. But it is clear that only a minority of workers any longer desired a system that obscured individual achievement altogether.⁴⁷ Since some measurers worked for Europeans and others worked for Egyptian merchants, it may be that those in the Europeans' employ were more eager to abolish communal sharing than those in the purely Egyptian sector. The foreigners may have generated more work and paid substantially better wages, which those sections of the guild may not have wished to share. Public weighers in Alexandria were also able to extort "bribes from the captains of foreign ships under threat of returning their cargoes short of weight."⁴⁸ They may have wished to ensure that these bribes did not also go into the communal pot for equal distribution to 200 or 300 fellow workers. In short, one effect of the impact of Europeans and of capitalism was an increased stratification not only between but also within classes and estates.

The demand for individual wages involved a key alteration in the very discourse of labor. With the 1858 legal recognition of private property in land, and the legal abolition of forced labor in the 1860s, the whole Egyptian economy was moving in the direction of capitalism and away from corporate privilege and premodern communality. Under these circumstances, the weighers responded with great rationality. In the end, they won over even Ottoman-Egyptians such as the minister of the interior to their way of thinking. Here we come back to the issue of interests and strategy. Most journeymen weighers and measurers felt they had an interest in the abolition of communal sharing, as Egypt moved into a potentially more dynamic economy. Although the viceroy and his privy council enacted legislation that recognized the end of many premodern corporate privileges and the advent of a monetized economy, vested interests among the nobility, bureaucracy, or even merchant community could block implementation of these laws.

The state proved inconsistent in its commitment to a new order with fewer privileges, delaying years in the actual abrogation of corvée levies for vice-regal and noble estates, and flip-flopping on the issue of whether weighers would receive individual or communal compensation. The state failed to act quickly and decisively because it was pulled at by many interests, including groups still attached to noble and corporate privilege. Some nobles, themselves having undergone a degree of embourgeoisement, perceived an advantage for themselves of a market in labor over inefficient coercion and monopolies. Others, such as the deputy minister of public works, still wanted the perquisite of being able to commandeer groups like the transportation guilds at low dictated prices. Even Egyptian merchants, who might otherwise have welcomed a privatization of the economy and the abolition of corporate privileges enjoyed by the nobility, perceived themselves to suffer from the privati-

zation of public services such as weighing because they saw their European competitors taking advantage of it. Egypt's dual bourgeoisie, a local and a cosmopolitan one, created situations of corporate competition that sometimes drove the Egyptian merchants to remain conservative when change seemed to benefit their rivals disproportionately. The merchant guilds in particular gained a powerful interest in this period in finding some way to displace their increasingly powerful European competitors. Ironically, although some of their activities encouraged privatization and individualism, the European expatriates themselves constituted a privileged group, like the nobles, since the Capitulations allowed them to escape paying most taxes in Egypt (and to flaunt other laws), a difference that gave them an advantage over local Egyptian merchants and brokers.

The guilds had to fight where they wished to see laws favorable to themselves actually implemented. The ways in which the guildsmen showed sharp awareness of the implications of legal reform for themselves suggests new objectives and ways of arriving at them. The guildmaster of the wagoners, rather than submit to what he saw as an illegal conscription of his men for government service, practiced civil disobedience and went to jail. He then pursued his interests through appeals to other ministries and to the law. The journeyman weighers of Alexandria resorted to a work stoppage in order to force the abolition of a premodern communality. None of these sorts of action seems likely to have been taken for similar reasons by working men and women a century earlier, and both economic and administrative changes help explain these new interests and new uses for their repertoires of collective action.

The Intelligentsia and Economic Interests

Since disgruntled intellectuals have been prime suspects in the mounting of most modern revolutions, we need to attempt to gauge their degree of integration into the state and society in viceregal Egypt. I employ the word "intelligentsia" to encompass a large number of literate groups in modern societies, including those "intellectuals" who think critically about society, examining its presuppositions in an attempt at analytical interpretation.⁴⁹ Following Miroslav Hroch, we may see three distinct strata in the intelligentsia of the "small nations" of the nineteenth century.⁵⁰ The first encompassed elite sections, made so wealthy by their direct association with the ruling classes that they cannot be seen as exploited. The second stratum included independent professionals such as lawyers, physicians, and journalists, as well as popular religious leaders. The third and biggest stratum consisted of literate groups employed on a wage-labor basis, comprising lower and middle government officials and clerks, junior and noncommissioned officers, teachers, nurses,

middle- and lower-level ulama and seminarians, and state-employed professionals. I will here discuss the modern intellectuals trained in the new civil (*ahli*) schools, and the degree to which they could find niches for themselves in the Egyptian economy during and after the cotton boom. I will look at sections of the intelligentsia most directly tied to the state, such as graduates of the military academies, in the next chapter, on the impact of state policies. The intellectuals stood more at the intersection of the market economy and state hiring practices. What interests did they build up in the 1860s and 1870s, and what resources did they have at their disposal for achieving those interests? What threats to their interests did they perceive? Did they have anything in common with the other prime actors in the Revolution, the guilds and the middle peasantry?

Education in Egypt before the nineteenth century had largely been in the hands of the Muslim clergy, who ran Qur'an schools and seminaries. Modern, state-sponsored, secular education was introduced by Muhammad 'Ali. At first, he sent the sons of Ottoman gentlemen to Europe for higher training, but at length decided to set up specialized schools in Egypt, including the equivalent of high schools and of higher institutes. He also began allowing some indigenous Egyptians to attend the schools, though they remained a minority. After Muhammad 'Ali's defeat in 1841 at the hands of the European Powers, he began to reduce his state's investment in the educational system. His successors 'Abbas and Sa'id further retrenched in the area of spending on civilian educational institutions. From 1863 Isma'il began reviving the state school system, employing the cotton boom income to pay for the construction of schools, the hiring of teachers, and the distribution of textbooks. New high schools fed institutions of higher education, including military academies, that taught mathematics, engineering, history, foreign languages, and other secular subjects. Between 1863 and 1881 these new schools graduated about 10,000 students.

Although the civil school graduates tended to be drawn primarily from Ottoman and Circassian families, some of the schools proved open to admitting indigenous Egyptians. Only a small proportion overall of the civil school students came from Egyptian notable families, but these schools constituted their main avenue into the ranks of the modern intelligentsia. The indigenous gentry, of course, dominated the Islamic seminaries, but the ulama no longer had the kind of resources and power they had possessed in the eighteenth century. The military academies remained closed to all but the Ottoman-Egyptian elite. Many of the civilian students derived, not from high Ottoman families, but from Circassian gentry that had become Arabized, and the Circassian intellectuals often identified with an Egyptian nativism. The most aggrieved intellectuals were likely to have been indigenous Egyptians and Circassians from a petty landholding background who found themselves blocked from advancement by Ottomans. Other Circassians disliked indigenous Egyptians and iden-

tified with the Ottomans. Although some information on the position of the civil school graduates survives in the Egyptian National Archives, the documents I have seen shed no light on ethnic differences. Therefore, the following remarks apply to intellectuals as a group rather than only to indigenous Egyptians (a small minority, in any case). The niches filled in society by the new generation of intellectuals formed in the civil schools in the 1860s and 1870s may be seen in Table 2.4.

The figures in Table 2.4 make it clear that the civil school graduates had relatively little success in penetrating the prestigious central government ministries in Cairo, the centers of power and patronage. Aside from the Ministry of War, the only full-fledged ministry (categorized as a bureau in this 1880 report) that took on as many as fifty of them—Public Works—largely employed them as engineers at project sites rather than as bureaucrats in Cairo. Indeed, some bore titles such as “master turner at the foundry,” which sounds more like the description of a skilled artisan than that of a modern engineer.⁵¹ More found employment in specialized bureaus such as the Bulaq Press, the Translation Bureau, and the Health Service. But most of the health service employees were stationed far away from Cairo in the provinces, and were involved in dangerous work such as examining potentially infected individuals. Altogether the central government administration employed only about 5 percent of the graduates. The provincial and municipal administrations, and the school system (with its many provincial elementary schools), took on only a little over 2 percent. Among these government employees not a few women made their mark. The Midwives’ School had 323 students in 1872, and the enrollment of government girls’ elementary schools stood at around 400 in the late 1870s. A few Egyptian girls also attended European schools.⁵² Women found employment as teachers, nurses, and physicians; some served the Egyptian army in medical capacities even during the war in Ethiopia (1876).

As noted above, around a fifth of the graduates were transferred to military schools or given posts in the military, where they found the pay poor, the discipline harsh, and their postings often in remote garrisons or even on battlefields in Africa. To what other schools so many of these students were transferred remains unclear, though I suspect they went to vocational schools training mechanics. That over a fourth of the graduates of the civil schools could not find, or chose not to take on, government employment, could be interpreted in a number of fashions. At least some of those who could not find government posts seem to have sunk into poverty, including even medical personnel, suggesting that private practice was not always lucrative at this point. Others may have been independently wealthy and simply taken up the administration of their family estates. Remember, however, that this was a time of high population growth and estate fragmentation, a time when, as noted above, the Zaghlul family estate could be reduced from the patriarch’s 330 feddans to an average of 15 feddans per person among the heirs in the space of a decade and

TABLE 2.4

Placement of Graduates of Civil Schools, 1864–78

<i>Placement</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Central Government Ministries		
Ministry of Finance	5	
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1	
Ministry of Interior	1	
Ministry of Justice	3	
Ministry of Pious Endowments	10	
Ministry of Public Instruction	4	
Subtotal	24	0.3
Central Government Bureaus and Services		
Bulaq Press	37	
Health Service	58	
Observatory	7	
Public Works*	53	
Railways	181	
Telegraphs	74	
Translation Bureau	19	
Subtotal	429	4.6
Military Services		
Ministry of War and Military Schools	1,860	
Navy	83	
Subtotal	1,943	20.9
Provincial or Municipal Service		
Alexandria Customs	8	
Employed by Urban Governorates	25	
Employed by Provincial Governments	57	
Mint	2	
Provincial Inspection (engineers)	9	
Service on Viceregal Estates (<i>da'irahs</i>)	61	
Subtotal	162	1.7
Education		
Schoolteachers (both sexes)	57	0.6
Private Employment		
Returned to families after graduation	2,671	28.7
Other		
Transfers between schools	3,616	38.9
Died	282	3.0
Sent to Europe	119	1.3
Total	9,303	100.0

Source: Egypt, Dar al-Watha'iq al-Qawmiyyah [Egyptian National Archives], Mah-fuzat Majlis al-Wuzara', Nizarat al-Ma'arif, 4 Alif, Mawdu'at Mukhtalifah, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique, "Rapport au Conseil des Ministres," 4 May 1880.

* Categorized thusly in the original document.

a half. For many such families, government employment was a highly desirable alternative, and not finding a government post would have been frustrating for them.

This survey of the occupational niches filled by the civil school graduates suggests that a substantial number of them suffered from several of the classic complaints animating intellectuals in the modern world to develop a culture of critical discourse. Virtually excluded from desirable jobs high in the central government ministries, these graduates most often found themselves exiled to the provinces or transferred in some capacity to the military, when they found government employment at all. Their pay could be low, and in the late 1870s even these small sums fell much in arrears because of the debt crisis. I can only present anecdotal evidence for the dissatisfaction of a number of these intellectuals, such as the story told by Swiss observer John Ninet, of how the French-educated Muhammad Effendi, son of a village headman in Buhayra, was at first employed by his Ottoman and Circassian masters as a mere clerk at a low salary, only rising higher because of Ninet's intervention. Ninet saw many such cases, even in the Muhammad 'Ali period, of highly educated young Egyptians, saying that "exiled from the capital they settled down in the provinces as clerks and interpreters, discontented men."⁵³

Ninet's observations are given weight by the many petitions the white-collar workers filed with the Ministry of the Interior in the Isma'ili period, complaining of low pay and bad working conditions. Abu'n-Na'as Musa, a male nurse at a hospital in Isma'iliyyah, said in 1873 that he and his family could not live on his salary of a little less than one Egyptian pound per month, and he was even willing to go to a hardship post such as Suakin if only he could have a raise. Not only nurses, but even physicians had complaints. 'Ali Rasikh, chief physician of the fashionable al-Azbakiyyah quarter of Cairo, wrote in 1875 that he had been stuck in the civil rank of *mulazim* (equivalent to a lieutenant in the military) for twenty years, on a salary insufficient to meet his needs, and wanted a transfer. Muhammad Tawfiq, a physician and veteran of the Russo-Ottoman War, was posted on his return to the Upper Egyptian town of Asyut, from which he wished to be transferred because of the oppressive heat. Women physicians frequently asked for transfers, either because of low pay or a desire to be nearer their extended families; they also complained of a dearth of posts and of harassment by their bosses. Husband-wife teams of physicians were sometimes forced to split up when one was transferred and no slot for the other existed at the new posting. Government perquisites such as the pension plan, designed for the Ottoman-Egyptian elite, had to be fought for by lowlier employees such as teachers.⁵⁴

The petitions paint a picture of underpaid civil school graduates, posted in what they thought were torrid backwaters, frustrated by working conditions and dead-end jobs. The physician Hakimah Fattumah Effendi's complaint that she had been left without a job in Mansurah gives no hint that she thought she

could find a position in private practice. Petitions cannot be taken at face value, of course, since the employees may have overstated their problems for effect. On the other hand, official comments on the petitions most often admit the employees' presentation of the facts, even though higher officials seldom felt they had the resources to ameliorate the problems described.

We know from other sources that state employees did face economic hardships. For instance, all employees of the government bureaucracy suffered in the 1870s from the effects of high inflation. Egypt's government neglected to mint enough money to meet demand, leading to the circulation within the country of large numbers of European coins. The government overproduced, however, a small-denomination coin minted in copper, for which demand remained rather lower than supply. The copper coinage therefore depreciated considerably. Part of the reason for the low esteem in which Egyptians held it lay in the government policy of refusing to accept it in payment of taxes, customs dues, or for any other purpose. The state nevertheless paid 10 percent of all salaries in this coin, according to its face value. The copper coin had originally been minted as a piaster, but by 1872 had a street value of only a quarter of a piaster, so that real earnings of state employees declined 7.5 percent from this cause alone in only a few years.⁵⁵ In the late 1870s, of course, pay for government employees fell as much as a year and a half in arrears, which caused resentments toward both the khedive and his creditors, the Europeans.

If intellectuals become radicalized by unemployment, malintegration into elite structures, and repression, then some intellectuals in Egypt had much impetus to radicalism.⁵⁶ Even where civil school graduates did find a government post, it often promised little more than bad pay, poor working conditions, substantial arrears in pay, and career blockage by the Ottomans and Europeans. It will become clear in the next chapter that some Circassian and indigenous Egyptian intellectuals shared important interests with the junior officers and with guilds that contracted with the state. The dissident intellectuals' role in general culture, as publicists, journalists, and brokers of information, made them key players in the revolution of 1881–82.

The population boom, the cotton rollercoaster, and the debt crisis dominated Egypt's economic life in the years just before the Revolution. Yet to see the period as one of rising expectations suddenly dashed, leading to an explosive frustration and revolution, would be grossly to oversimplify. First of all, the good times of the 1860s were not good for everyone, for the cotton boom coincided with a cattle murrain, devastating livestock; the sudden switch to cash-cropping left many peasants malnourished when they did not grow enough food; and long-distance merchants and some other guilds were hurt by new transportation routes and technology. Some village headmen found themselves able to join the Ottoman-Egyptians in building up large estates in the

1870s, and to achieve taxation privileges through payment of a large one-time sum (*al-muqabalah*) in return for subsequent lower taxes. At the bottom of rural society, however, even the good years might witness peasant flight or foreclosure on peasant land on a fairly large scale, owing to high taxes or deep debt. Relatively high rates of population growth also contributed to the fragmentation of estates. Owen calculates the proportion of peasants who were landless at around one-third in the 1870s, and this is surely an unprecedentedly large proportion, driven to this condition by both landlord encroachment and demographic pressure. Some economic developments affected various sectors of the population differently. For instance, lower prices for food crops in the early 1880s would have hurt peasants but helped city dwellers. Since the Revolution appears to have occurred during an economic upturn after a profound contraction, my evidence does not support the J-curve theory. More important, the highly unequal impact of economic change in this period, just discussed, brings into question any theory based on global measures such as increases and decreases in per capita wealth, since these fail to address how that wealth is distributed. Noneconomic sources of dissatisfaction, such as desire for a different sort of government or resentment at foreign encroachments, are likewise not explained by economic theories.

Some Egyptians in the first two years of the 1880s had, not so much greater economic frustrations than earlier, but rather new economic interests. The continued profitability of cotton and cotton seed as cash crops made family peasant holdings potentially more lucrative than ever before, yet small and medium peasants found themselves paying taxes at the levels set during the boom, since the government did not take into account the subsequent fall in cotton prices. Arabophone village headmen and peasants bitterly resented paying higher taxes than the privileged nobles, despite the much greater productivity of their smaller enterprises, and having to compete for land against the nobles, who were using force and state patronage to expand their estates enormously.⁵⁷ The influx of European speculators into the countryside after the establishment of the Mixed Tribunals in 1876 created another competitor for the peasants: the foreign money-lender with his new ability to foreclose on their holdings. The concrete interests of the village notables and propertied peasants at this point consisted in lower land taxes, the breaking up the noble estates, and the exclusion of foreign money-lenders and foreclosure artists. The advent of king cotton either created the conditions for, or greatly intensified, these concerns. Yet I want to stress that these interests were by no means givens, that they were gradually constructed and articulated. Some rural notables appear to have initially welcomed greater European involvement in Egyptian fiscal affairs, naively believing it would lead to less corruption; by 1879, most of these sentiments had evaporated in the face of higher taxes and the deleterious effects of the Mixed Courts. The urban guilds likewise wanted lower taxes, as well as the diminution of certain sorts of European economic dominance. The

state, however, appeared to them to abet European penetration, and it created an impression of fickleness in its labor policies. It abolished forced labor in law, but continued to practice it in fact, and officials went back and forth on the issue of privatizing the weighers' and measurers' guilds. The guilds therefore developed a concern with gaining more influence over policy-makers in the Ministry of the Interior.

Finally, the intellectuals also acquired a new status and new interests in this period. From 1863 the cotton wealth allowed Isma'îl to set up a network of new civil schools for the training of future lower-level bureaucrats, teachers, and translators. Yet a significant proportion of the 10,000 or so young men and women educated in this system between 1863 and 1881 never attained their dream-jobs and found themselves shunted off to the provinces at pitifully low wages. As a salaried class, the government employees among them suffered inordinately from high inflation in the 1860s and 1870s, which the government exacerbated by paying a tenth of their salaries in virtually worthless copper coins. In the late 1870s, their salaries came as much as eighteen months late. The malintegration of intellectuals into society and specifically into state structures has often made revolutionaries of them in modern history. These intellectuals developed interests in gaining access to better government posts and higher salaries, and in having more influence on state policies. As noted above, their connections with the junior officers and their role as brokers of information to the literate public readied them for an important role in the Revolution.

The economic discontents of the 1870s affected peasants, journeymen, and the intelligentsia much more drastically than they did the Ottoman-Egyptian ruling elite. Increased social stratification promoted by cash-cropping cotton for the world market, and the differential impact of population growth, inflation, high taxes, and periodic recessions, all encouraged conflict among and within social strata. These economic and demographic problems posed an inordinately difficult challenge for the state. Let us turn, then, to the impact of the state on these civil strata, for it was, along with the economy, the social force with the greatest potential for affecting the lives of the people.

Three

Body and Bureaucracy

DURING THE 1840s AND 1850s, the great bureaucratic and military machine built by Muhammad ʿAli, partially on the basis of income from cash crops, had gradually wound down. Late in Saʿid's reign, not only was the army and civil bureaucracy reduced to a shadow of itself, but even the police force suffered large reductions in force. The expansion in trade during the 1860s and 1870s, however, allowed the state greatly to recoup, and to augment the size of its bureaucracy because of the vast increase in its tax revenues over what could be collected from the small cash-crop sector mixed with subsistence agriculture that had characterized the 1850s. The new monies permitted the government to again undertake substantial expansion of the infrastructure and to promote economic growth, after a period in which it had been reduced simply to maintaining order and redistributing wealth to the ruling class.¹ The state found itself much strengthened in regard to society. How did the peasants, the guilds, and the intelligentsia react to the emergence of the strongest state Egypt had seen since the 1830s? My argument here will be that the more intrusive system of governance that Ismaʿil built made it much more imperative that those affected by state policy gain some sort of influence over the state, so that consultative government became a desideratum of many social groups. Because of the debt crisis, the regime began intervening quite drastically in most of its subjects' lives in the highly visible form of direct taxation. The identification of the state with Ottoman-Egyptian big landlords and with European financiers and consuls, along with its visible distortion of the economy for the benefit of those groups, made the government a target of resentment for many other groups.

The boom and bust of the cotton price fluctuations and the debt crisis formed two major dynamics driving conflict between state elites and their subjects. The newly increased rates of population growth were another. Jack A. Goldstone has shown how an acceleration of population growth poses great, if not insuperable, difficulties for an agrarian state. It contributes to price inflation, which eats away at the value of the taxes levied by the state. A larger population permits a larger army and bureaucracy, though at an increased cost to any government that allows them to grow. The state finds it difficult to index taxes to inflation in such a situation, so that although taxes may go up, the regime's real purchasing power tends to decline or to prove inadequate to the new expenses forced on it by a larger population.²

Although the expansion of the government may have had some generalized benefits, the extension of its authority into new spheres, along with a huge increase in taxes, provoked unusual discontent among the middle and laboring strata. Timothy Mitchell has suggested that Muhammad 'Ali's reform bureaucracy brought to Egypt the panopticon, a Benthamite idea elaborated by Michel Foucault, wherein the state seeks to influence behavior by making individuals behave as if they were under constant surveillance.³ Isma'il's government achieved a much less wide-ranging presence than such a suggestion would imply, but it remains true that as in official medicine and police enforcement, so in taxation, the bureaucracy attained new levels of efficiency and intervention in society in the 1870s. Indeed, the panklepticon, the mulcting of an entire country, might be a more apt neologism for describing Isma'il's ruthless exactions on behalf of European financiers. Here we must descend from the abstractions of philosophy down to the realities of peasant society; we must smell the black silt of the Nile and see the red welts on the backs of emaciated taxpayers. Foucault poses the relationship of the modern state to the body as a metaphor for its intrusiveness, and it is certainly the case that Khedive Isma'il put the hands of the state on Egyptians' bodies in a manner not even achieved by his ambitious grandfather. The growth of taxation, the use of public whipping to extract taxes, the expansion of police forces, large-scale jailings, expulsion of the indigent from urban areas, domestic spying, and other state control practices served to remind everyone constantly of the viceroy's presence.⁴

The Peasants and the Whip

The various ways in which the state bureaucracy increasingly intruded into daily life in our period will be explored below. Such a discussion should begin, however, with the basics. No aspect of state intervention compared for forcefulness with taxation, and no sector of the population suffered from taxation more than the medium and small peasants. The rural context of the national debate on taxation in the period between the onset of the debt crisis and the deposition of Isma'il must be emphasized, for even though politics occurred largely in the urban areas, town and country were still intimately linked in nineteenth-century Egypt. Let us briefly discuss, then, Isma'il's taxation policies in the countryside in the late 1870s, before considering their impact on the guilds. Most of the country's revenues derived from primary agricultural commodities such as cotton, and so this sector of the economy also generated most of the tax monies. The relationship of the state to the body, as suggested above, becomes most vivid in the countryside, where the buffalo-hide or rhinocerus-hide whip stood as symbol of the tax collector and his employer, the khedive.

The debt crisis came to a head in 1876, when Egypt declared itself bankrupt. A joint British-French scheme for consolidating the Egyptian debts at a relatively high rate of interest was proposed to Ismaʿil as a way of rationalizing the debt and resuming its servicing. Egyptian budgetary affairs are too murky to allow for an exact estimate of how much taxes went up because of the consolidated debt-servicing. According to budgets floated by the government, tax receipts from all sources in 1873 appear to have been £9,265,503, with £4,253,959 of that going to interest on loans. The proposed budget for 1876 showed increased tax revenues, which rose to £10,772,611 with interest on some loans coming to £5,228,979 and the interest on the floating debt eating up the £1,790,759 budget “surplus.” In 1877, because of the contraction of the economy, revenues fell to £9,543,000, but by then £7,473,909 was claimed by the bondholders.⁵ The accuracy of these budget figures remains in doubt, and although the revenues in 1877 were not up much from those for 1873, taxes in the former year were far more onerous because the economy had turned down and incomes were falling. Moreover, the taxation numbers, accurate or not, only purport to reflect what local officials actually passed on to the central government, and have little to say about how much was actually taken from peasants by often-corrupt officials and village headmen. The question of legitimacy also arises, since assessments for local, visible purposes are often resented less than levies earmarked for distant, obscure objectives. Egypt’s per capita public debt in 1875—most of it owed to foreign concerns—had grown to something on the order of £10 per capita, and both this figure and the debt service owed by each Egyptian were among the largest in the world.⁶ Becoming the interest milk cow for European investors increasingly rankled the Egyptian public.

Reportedly even Ismaʿil Sadiq Pasha, the rapacious minister of finance, found Ismaʿil’s 1876 scheme too much to stomach, warning that the peasants simply did not have the money to service the debt at the proposed rate of interest. The European financiers attempting to reform Egypt’s finances saw Ismaʿil Sadiq as an obstacle that would have to be removed. The minister, for his part, may have worked behind the scenes to encourage provincial uprisings against the tax regime that had made him rich. Khedive Ismaʿil’s elaborate spy system reported to him the rural “excitement,” which he blamed on Sadiq Pasha, whom he had jailed. The pasha soon thereafter died under mysterious circumstances.⁷

From 1876 Egyptian informants begin painting a desperate picture of peasant immiseration at the hands of Ismaʿil’s tax agents. During the 1870s, in many areas valuable farmland became worthless overnight because peasant cultivators felt they could not make a living if they had to pay such high taxes on it and on their income. A judge on the Egyptian High Court of Appeal told the British consul early in 1877 that the peasantry were in a most terrible state of misery and destitution, tax collectors having taken nearly all their posses-

sions. He averred that the last coupon had been paid only by taxes being collected six months in advance. In the spring of 1877 we first begin hearing that “troubles have quite lately recurred in upper Egypt arising from excessive taxation which He [Isma‘il] has had to put down by military force.”⁸ British consular agents in the provinces started regularly reporting on the condition of the peasantry from 1878, and subsequent reports contain for the most part variations on the themes just mentioned. The government harshly overtaxed its peasants to meet its debt obligations, and some peasants responded by starving, revolting, or turning to banditry. The agricultural ecology of Upper Egypt in particular allowed only one crop a year and so put the peasants on the margin of existence. Overtaxation could easily push them to banditry in this area.

The vicious efficiency Isma‘il demonstrated as Europe’s extortionist received a mixed review in Consul Vivian’s dispatches back to London. He wrote glowingly of how Egypt had for eight months punctually paid its bills, and had fully paid up the half-yearly coupon of public debt (only one category of debt), amounting to £2,094,975, falling due 15 July 1877. Vivian tempered his praise of the viceroy, however, by expressing his fear that Isma‘il had achieved these results only by collecting taxes in advance, forcing early sales of crops, and running up arrears in the pay of employees in the civil bureaucracy.⁹

The mechanisms of the peasantry’s “prevailing distress” were delineated by British consular official Borg. ‘Umar Pasha Lutfi, inspector general of Upper Egypt, came to Cairo for a religious holiday and reported the dire condition of the peasantry, but was ordered by the viceroy to return immediately to his post to assist with tax collection. He went through the countryside, seizing the property of those whose taxes were in arrears. When ‘Umar Pasha returned with a substantial sum of money and more horror stories about the peasantry’s straits, Isma‘il dispatched him back to the field for a further £60,000. Borg explained that the inspector general toured villages accompanied by a number of persons who would purchase from tax-delinquent peasants their livestock, produce, poultry, and other items of value such as ornaments, turning them into cash. Should the peasant object, or attempt to hide his cattle, he was flogged and forced to sell anyway.¹⁰ Numerous eyewitness accounts make it clear that provincial authorities had village headmen whipped as a means of motivating them to extract the requisite cash amounts from their villages. The headmen, of course, in turn had peasants flogged. The buffalo-hide whip, or *kurbaj*, expressed in its rasping whisper the state’s extractive determination.

In late 1877 British sources in Aswan and Luxor underlined the hazards of traveling in Upper Egypt owing to peasant banditry, especially between Sohag and Girga. Some peasants were going two and three days at a time without food, and the government continued in places such as Esna and Aswan to force the sale of cattle at very low prices, and to bastinado peasants for nonpayment

of taxes. The 2,000 mounted troops dispatched from Cairo had through their patrols of the Nile river banks, however, slightly reduced the number of robberies and attacks on Egyptian boats. On the other hand, the northern side of Qena remained “infested by native robbers.”¹¹

The villages of Lower Egypt suffered similar overtaxation, provoking the anger of classes other than simply the peasantry in 1878. Only the European and Levantine money-lenders, who took advantage of the peasants’ need for advances to pay their taxes, rejoiced in a situation that allowed them frequently to foreclose on the peasants’ land for a pittance. From the Delta town of Tanta, British Consular Agent Carr wrote in 1878 that “it is a common occurrence to hear the Khedive and the Government Officials cursed in round numbers” by village notables, Muslim jurists and judges, and peasants, who objected to both the manner in which taxes were being collected and the large number of irregular demands made on them in addition to legislated taxes.¹² An English commercial agent doing business in the Delta reported to Vivian that “he has found throughout the Provinces he visits a widespread and most serious dissatisfaction at the harsh measures adopted by the Govt to enforce the payment of the last coupon by the collection in advance of the whole year’s taxes. . . . He has never heard the action of the Khedive and his Govt so openly and severely criticized by all classes of the population including even the gov’t officials.”¹³ One can only speculate as to why Vivian crossed out the phrase “and most serious” in the draft of his letter, but in view of the events that unfolded in the subsequent half-decade, his informant’s original wording was more reliable. Without this phrase, his letter read as a mere criticism of Isma‘il’s tactics, rather than as a warning of possible revolution.

The government continued to demand high taxes from the peasantry of Upper Egypt even when famine broke out there in the summer of 1878 owing to a series of irregular Niles. By early 1879 a special commissioner of the Egyptian government found starvation among old men, women, and children in the Upper Egyptian towns of Sohag and Girga. Another commissioner “reported that the number who had died of starvation and as a result of the want of sufficient food was not less than ten thousand. . . . He added that all this was the direct result of poverty arising from over-taxation.”¹⁴ A band of fifty to sixty peasants operating in the region between the two towns went into revolt because of overtaxation, and sought to attract to their insurgency others discontented with the government’s imposts. Government troops had difficulty putting them down because of their guerrilla tactics.¹⁵ In retrospect, it would appear that the problem derived at least in part from the doubling of the population from 1800 to 1882, which made the peasants more vulnerable to the effects of drought and overtaxation.

Although they did not actually revolt in Lower Egypt, drought and the payment of taxes up to a year in advance in provinces such as Qalyubiyah hurt peasants badly. They often sold futures in their cash crops at discounts of 50

percent, in order to meet tax demands. They then had to go deeply into debt simply to keep on farming, borrowing money at up to 5 percent per month. Not surprisingly, Qalyubiyyah suffered an unwonted outbreak of crime in the summer of 1879. Smallholders abandoned their land to hire on as day-laborers with Europeans and nobles, simply in order to escape the taxes demanded by their village headmen on behalf of the state. The advent of a new, more nationalist cabinet in the spring of 1879, and of an entirely new regime that summer, appears to have provided the rural taxpayers with no significant relief.¹⁶

It is hard to know how to think of the peasant brigandage of 1879 except as social banditry of the sort described by Eric Hobsbawm.¹⁷ The bandit gang operating between Sohag and Girga employed a rhetoric of social justice, vowing to unite those peasants oppressed by the state's overtaxation and brutal treatment of its subjects. The tax collection measures employed by Isma'îl in the provinces enraged everyone but the nobles, who were exempted from irregular levies and from being whipped and humiliated. Isma'îl did send grain to Upper Egypt in response to the famine there, but it was apparently inefficiently distributed, and he in any case went on demanding taxes and advances on taxes from landholders. His revenue-gathering tactics inevitably added to the severity of the famine, depleting livestock reserves and driving small and medium farmers into deep debt. In Upper Egypt, where the grip of the central government was weak, some peasants actually managed to mount a tax revolt, using armed force against the state. In Lower Egypt, where troops could operate more easily, immiserated peasants turned to burglary. Provincial towns such as Damietta, Tanta, Girga, and Sohag also suffered because of overtaxation, along with their hinterlands. All these events exacerbated the conflicts between the large landowners on the one hand, and the small holders on the other. For one, the new tax regime was painful but bearable, and they often actively collaborated in raising the revenues Isma'îl sought. For the other, the imposts spelled ruin and immiseration. This polarization was increased by the 1880 plan to abolish the tax breaks bestowed in the early 1870s on village notables who paid six years' worth of taxes in one lump sum. In absorbing this one-time cost, the rural notables and wealthier peasants were granted the kind of low taxation rates already enjoyed by the Ottoman-Circassian nobles on their private estates. Now Tawfiq took this privilege away from the agrarian middle class, underlining the long-term hold of ethnic and class privilege, and pushed them away from any budding alliance with the nobles and toward the medium and smaller peasants in their fiscal interests. Since payment of the *muqabalah* had also given propertied peasants firmer title to their land, the government's cavalier revocation of its benefits may also have brought into question for them their long-term ability to retain their property. The village notables and the peasants acted less visibly during the revolution of 1881–82 than did the urban workers, however. Let us, then, examine conditions in the urban areas.

Death and Taxes

In the urban context, the two issues of taxes and payment for work undertaken for the government contained the greatest potential for provoking conflict between the guilds and the state. Both seriously affected the well-being of the laboring classes in this period. Urban dwellers in the 1870s suffered under a plethora of taxes. First, the male population of all large towns had to pay a capitation tax, the *miri*. Some workers and most Egyptian peasants were liable to the Islamic tax of *ʿushr*, a tithe of a tenth of one's income collected in Egypt by the state. The state could also levy an arbitrary tax on individuals, the *firdah*. Guild members had to pay a fee for the license to pursue their trade. The guilds were also responsible for a tax on guild income, the *wirku*, that the guildmaster deducted from the pay of journeymen. Indeed, all males who did not own land had to pay the *wirku*, including peasant day-laborers, at around 200 to 300 piasters a year per head in the late 1870s. Shopkeepers and owners of their own homes or of other buildings were liable to pay an annual property tax. The state also levied an oppressive salt tax, compelling individuals to buy salt at 22 piasters per kaylah (about 17 lbs.).¹⁸ An Egyptian shopkeeper who belonged to a guild could thus be liable to pay several of these taxes. Even worse, tax rates from all accounts skyrocketed from about 1871, with local governors sometimes arbitrarily doubling and trebling them in a single year. The inexorable pressure of biannual debt service payments to Europe mounted steadily over these two decades, bankrupting the country in 1876 and producing a huge budget deficit in 1878. Although peasants in the countryside bore the worst excesses of the tax crunch, guild members also suffered.

The guilds involved in building and construction suffered most from arrears in the government payment of their fees. The Ministry of Public Works had a special relationship to these groups, often hiring them on government projects. The important point here is that those guilds doing a great deal of contracting with the state were structurally put in the same position as the civil bureaucrats and the soldiers, of being owed substantial arrears by their own government. This common grievance also functioned as a common interest, helping create a political bond between disgruntled army officers and urban guilds such as those of the butchers and horse dealers, as will be seen below.

In the 1850s and early 1860s the government set the guild and property taxes every three years. The economic volatility introduced by the cotton boom and bust, however, made such a long period between the setting of rates unsatisfactory to the state treasury, and the privy council under Ismaʿil ordered that new tax rates be set for guilds every year, in accordance with the previous year's actual profits. Steps were also taken to ensure that workers who moved seasonally between their provincial centers and the larger cities not fall through the cracks in the tax administration procedures, or end up paying only

the lower provincial taxes.¹⁹ Officials could be ingenious about ways of applying new assessments. In the late 1860s the government built a string of lighthouses to help ships navigate off Egypt's shores. A tax was levied upon all vessels transporting goods and passengers in order to help defray the construction and maintenance costs. But the minister of the navy went so far as to impose the tax on small sailboats on the Nile used by fishermen. In June 1871 some fishermen bitterly complained that to the *ʿushr* Islamic tithe and the guild (*wirku*) tax the additional payment of a napoleon a year had been laid on them, despite their poverty and the fact that their small fishing vessels were not used for commercial transport. The minister of the navy defended his imposition of the new tax on them as within the letter of the law.²⁰

Guilds felt that in former times, by custom and by law, the tax rate had borne a relationship to profits, but that Viceroy Ismaʿil's regime was disregarding that ratio in favor of ever higher, arbitrary levies. The moral economy of taxation was thus becoming corrupt. The guild that made vegetable crates asserted that tax rates were normally set according to profits as estimated by government departments: "The assessment of the guild tax should be according to income levels (inna rabt al-wirku huwa ʿan darajat al-iktisab)."²¹ They believed, however, that the authorities were singling their guild out for mistreatment. Although, they said, the guild was on the verge of disappearing and its members were living in abject poverty, its tax rates had been set very high and without reference to its estimated profits. Originally the leaders of the guild had affixed their signatures to the tax register with the understanding that the assessment would be in accordance with the profits as ascertained from the head architect (*ser miʿmar*). But, they lamented, this was not what happened at all.

The guild appealed to the viceregal cabinet, which ordered the governorate to report on the dispute. In the meantime, the guild members were detained at the ministry for payment. They were being assessed at 125 piasters each, annually, even though their daily earnings were about 1.20 piasters (that is to say, a rate of about 29 percent on gross income, for this category of tax alone). The guild asserted that it simply could not pay what was being demanded, even if all members sold their capital goods. They demanded to be assessed in accordance with the regulations, which set the rate according to guild profits. In its reply, the governorate of Cairo refused to relent, insisting that the guildmaster and seventeen senior masters had been called to the police station, where the roster of their members was called out, and that they had agreed to the tax levy as decided. Moreover, in the presence of the great merchants, all eighteen of them had signed the tax assessment papers.²²

If the state could not expand its tax base sufficiently by finding new guilds to tax or imposing new taxes, it could resort to strategies such as raising existing taxes and finding ways of collecting more than once. Date merchants protested in 1868 that they had to pay octroi dues when they brought dates from

the oases into Cairo. But if they reexported the same dates to Alexandria, they were liable to pay yet another octroi. They proposed that the police issue them a statement of payment that would allow them to avoid being doubly taxed.²³ The government also became glacially slow in paying guilds for work performed, leaving many of them disgruntled creditors of the government for years, and this problem affected a wide spectrum of the labor force. Even the tailors who made the ceremonial covering for the kaaba, the holy shrine of Mecca, had trouble getting the state to remunerate them in a timely fashion in 1879.²⁴

In 1876, Egypt declared bankruptcy, admitting its inability to continue paying the debt service on its mushrooming foreign debt. In response, and because the crisis especially affected their bondholders, the French and British set up a Caisse de la Dette or Debt Commission to oversee the Egyptian budget. These concerns also led to the appointment of two European cabinet officers to the Nubar Nubarian cabinet of 1878 and 1879, with primary responsibility for overseeing the budget. The reorganized budget often allowed Egypt to continue meeting its obligations, but only by overtaxing ordinary Egyptians ruthlessly. The urban areas suffered only a little less painfully from overtaxation in the 1870s than the countryside, but the response to the high tax rates in the larger cities differed greatly in some respects from that in provincial towns and villages. Isma'îl had a sophisticated police force in all the major cities, and the disgruntled urban dwellers had substantially fewer opportunities to raise an insurrection against the taxation regime than did peasants in the desert hills of Upper Egypt. The guilds, more disciplined as corporate entities than peasants, resorted to petition-writing and strident protest rather than to insurrection. Of course, it is possible that the imposts did not rise as much for the urban population as for the rural. The increased taxes did, however, clearly alienate the Egyptian merchants and artisans from the state in new ways. If nothing else, the floggings, beatings, and jailings of merchants unable to remit their taxes injured the pride of the traditional bourgeoisie. The new high taxes stripped away the few privileges these wealthy commoners enjoyed.

In 1878, fifty-five Moroccan merchants sent a long complaint to their king, Hasan, about the treatment of the mercantile classes in Egypt. Speaking of themselves sometimes in the third person, they wrote:

They subsisted in the land of Egypt in the utmost degradation and decline at the hands of its rulers and their scribes, suffering curses, imprecations, beatings and imprisonment because of the exigencies of the customs practiced among them in Egypt. These include giving every year heavy taxes to some of them, especially the *frdah*, and to others, particularly the licensing fees [*waraqat at-tashbih*], as well as to those in charge of affairs, the rulers. For this reason, they require a huge sum of money. Large numbers cannot pay it, or even part of it. For Your Highness must know that most of the North Africans living in Egypt are poor, whereas its prices are high, its markets yield no profit on the whole, economic stagnation dominates it, and

earning a livelihood here is an enterprise shadowed by negation. The wise and prudent can just barely earn enough for the necessities. One can hardly clothe oneself and one's children, and when we confess this to the local rulers, they curse, beat, and sometimes even imprison us.²⁵

Muslim foreign merchants, unlike the European Christians, obtained no tax relief through extraterritoriality, and so suffered alongside local Egyptian traders. Their plaint serves incidentally to state in clear fashion the concerns many merchants had, without the screens of ambiguity a local petitioner would have employed. We cannot answer quantitative questions on the basis of such petitions, such as what proportion of his income the typical merchant or artisan paid in taxes in the 1870s (Ibrahim al-Muwaylihi estimated it at a staggering three-fourths for some trades), or what proportion of guildsmen actually were flogged or went to jail for falling into poverty and proving unable to meet tax obligations. But the petitions wonderfully illustrate the conventions by which the guilds described their world, and by which they depicted their grievances.

The demand for taxes invaded even the halls of opulent privilege. The chief merchant (*ser-tuccar*) of Cairo, Mahmud Bey al-^cAttar, lamented that the government had revoked the tax exemption that for long had been associated with his office. On his being appointed to the post, he had asked to be exempted from taxes just as were his predecessors, but the Interior Ministry recommended that in view of Egypt's financial circumstances he be made to pay the guild tax at least for the time being. He complied, but complained that the former exemption had been intended to emphasize the great honor attending the office of head merchant, and he requested that the government revert to its former practice in this regard.²⁶ The financial hardships occasioned by the debt crisis had the side-effect of bringing into question the privileges of the nobility and the indigenous bourgeoisie, rather as happened in France just before the Revolution.

Goldsmiths and silversmiths also felt themselves to be subject, not only to new taxes, but to multiple taxation. A group of 121 smiths of precious metals wrote a petition to Viceroy Isma'il early in 1876.²⁷ They said that they had practiced their craft since childhood and knew no other. When the privy council decided to impose a 2.5 percent municipal tax on all goods sold through brokers, whether in Khan al-Khalili market or in an-Nahhasin, or the jeweler's market, or that of the goldsmiths, the smiths submitted to it. In addition to the tax imposed in that decision, the official in charge of municipal taxes independently ordered a further increase, as well as deducting a 1 percent commission for the broker who concluded the deal. The smiths said they duly obeyed these imposts as well.

Now, however, the same tax official had created special taxes on their guild alone, which he did not impose on any other guild—even the jewelers. This tax of 3 percent was assessed on new pieces of work sold to the buyer without the

mediation of a broker. Yet the raw material out of which they made such pieces was often older gold and silver jewelry bought from brokers, on which the 2.5 percent tax on brokered merchandise had already been paid. Once they refashioned it into new pieces, they had to pay a hallmark tax of 3 percent. Once all the previously decreed taxes had been paid, the gross earnings on such a piece of jewelry were no more than 3 percent, part of which had to pay overhead, and the other part to provide the smiths and their families a living. Moreover, their livelihood under these circumstances depended on a quick turnover of their new merchandise. If the market was sluggish, their profit could be eaten up and the merchandise could be damaged. If, in addition to all this, the government insisted on taxing independently sold merchandise, it would be taking away the smiths' profit altogether. They would be deprived of their livelihood and forced to turn to some other occupation. But, they wrote, they knew the viceroy's sense of justice would not allow him to see their guild singled out for this fate.

The goldsmiths of Alexandria entered a similar plea. In a new twist, the goldsmiths sent a copy of their petition to the radical expatriate journalist, Ya'qub Sannu', in Paris, for publication in his newspaper, *Abu nazzarah zarqa*'.²⁸ Such a step indicates a serious move toward the breakdown of polite conventions, in which petitions were couched in the language of flowery obsequy, and remained private matters between the aggrieved and the state. The publication of the goldsmiths' petition in Paris was meant to embarrass the government by giving wide circulation among the public to a complaint about injustice.

A spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior provided in 1877 a frank explanation for the new taxes and the double taxation on the goldsmiths. The ministry reaffirmed the legality and propriety of the steps that municipal authorities had taken, saying they had every right to tax the goldsmiths and jewelers in this manner. Moreover, the ministry said, if the Cairo municipality did not continue to tax both gold and silver goods sold through brokers and those sold independently, "the above-mentioned municipality would prove unable to make the requisite contribution to the Caisse de la Dette as has been ordained in the viceregal decree."²⁹ The ministry asserted that the goldsmiths and jewelers were just attempting to evade taxes that had been properly levied, and urged continuance of the exactions. The language employed, however, makes it clear that the taxes met no local exigency in Cairo or Alexandria, but were rather designed to help the central government avoid shortfalls in debt service payments to European creditors.

The political crisis in 1879 that led to Tawfiq's accession and Riyad's emergence as a hard-fisted, autocratic first minister resulted in a virtual avalanche of guild complaints about overtaxation directed at the Cairo city council. The druggists, butchers, merchants, undertakers, dyers, oil dealers, tobacconists, donkey drivers, and many others asserted in the autumn of that year that unfair

taxes were being levied upon them.³⁰ Of course, guilds perennially complained about taxation, but previous registers in this series contain no such volume of correspondence on this issue. It seems likely that the political and economic hopes raised by the accession of a new khedive had been dashed by Tawfiq and Riyad, who continued to squeeze the workers and peasants on behalf of the foreign creditors. Even Isma'îl, on his accession, had declared a one-year tax holiday for the guilds. Tawfiq at first disappointed any such expectations the workers may have harbored, and they deluged his government with bitter grievances.

In early 1880, the new Khedive Tawfiq and the government of Riyad Pasha yielded to the guilds by reducing or abolishing several of the more minor taxes on the books, especially those affecting the urban areas. The populace no doubt welcomed this move, but its benefits should not be exaggerated. The finance minister originally gave as his reason for recommending this step that the government spent more on collecting these taxes than they were worth, and many of the poor owed impossible back-taxes.³¹ Yet if it is true that many or most Egyptians were not paying the taxes that Tawfiq abolished, then his abolition of them can have had little positive effect on their household economies; it only recognized the reality, and gave the police slightly less pretext to bother these ordinary folk. The guild tax or *wirku* was abolished for landless peasants, and the general head tax (*miri*), the khedive said, would no longer be collected. Yet the urban guilds remained liable to pay the *wirku*, and the government decree issued by Tawfiq makes no mention of reducing it. European observers thought the typical urban guildsman's taxes would be reduced in absolute terms, but it is hard to know how all this worked out in practice.³² Certainly provincial officials in Middle and Upper Egypt continued to collect the salt tax, despite its supposed abolition.³³ Since the government announced this step at the same time that it proposed to increase taxes on the Egyptian rich peasants through abolishing the *muqabalah* concessions, it seems that the state was attempting to secure the allegiance of the urban populace even while it risked alienating the countryside. This reduction in urban taxes two-and-a-half years before the urban crowd burst into recurring violence underscores the degree to which only a hopeful, and seldom a hopeless, population undertakes widespread revolt. The improvement in the tax picture demonstrated that the situation could change, and since guilds had put enormous pressure on Tawfiq for tax reductions through their petitions in the fall of 1879, they could fairly conclude that their lobbying had an effect. Such a conclusion might encourage them to greater activism in combatting their other major concern, the increasing competition offered by tax-exempt Europeans.

The Ministry of the Interior's spokesman summed up the philosophy of Egyptian tax collection in the late 1870s: The taxpayers can afford high taxes (indeed, they have been growing unwontedly wealthy), and the debt service of European loans requires them. Admittedly, it is difficult to sympathize with

the plight of an affluent group like the goldsmiths (whose taxes, incidentally, the government refused to reduce in January 1880). But similar protests came from the humble builders of vegetable crates and from fishermen on the Nile. The guilds employed a language that demonstrated their view of the moral economy of taxation. They believed taxation should be indexed to profits. Since taxes often rose faster than profits in the 1870s, the state's economy increasingly became an immoral one. The viceregal Ottoman government was no longer using taxes simply to raise the money for necessary services and expansion of public welfare through irrigation and other projects. Rather, it funneled nearly half of the tax monies to the bankers and investors in Europe, largely in the form of exorbitant interest on loans taken out primarily for infrastructural development. Only by satisfying the foreign bankers and their consuls could Egypt's ruling class—the viceregal family and the high officials of the bureaucracy—hope to stay in power. Once the debts had mushroomed, what alternatives did the government have? Declaring a moratorium on payment would probably have invited European troops into the country. As an alternative to high taxes Isma'îl could have followed the path of his uncle Sa'îd, disbanding the bureaucracy and greatly reducing his military. But that path also wound toward the twin dangers of popular unrest and increased vulnerability to European attack, in addition to bypassing the African Empire on which Isma'îl still pinned hopes. The viceroy remembered the glory days of the cotton boom too vividly to despair of a reinvigorated Egyptian economy and polity. The peasants and artisans had to sacrifice much of their income on the altar of the khedive's memory of good times, which had already faded for them.

The government took so much from the peasants in the late 1870s that it provoked some of them to revolt, and drove others to burglary and banditry in order to avoid starvation. Its taxes on the urban guilds were not quite so harsh, but apparently the guild tax alone could amount to nearly a third of a guildsman's gross income, not to mention the *miri* or urban capitation tax, the fees he paid for his license to pursue his trade, the *firdah*, as well as other, irregular levies. Some urban workers went to jail in the 1870s for proving unable to pay their taxes. Others blamed their guildmasters for unbearable taxes, and intrigued to remove them. Guilds sometimes responded to the new pressures on them by attempting to hide income from the state, by taking on workers without recording them in their registers. Internal guild politics, however, were so acrimonious that rivals could inform on guildmasters to the state for tax evasion, so that such schemes were often exposed. Aside from attempting to hide income, some guilds attempted to pressure the state through petitions to the Ministry of the Interior, and they even printed these in the private press. The goldsmiths' petition printed in *Abu nazzarah zarqa'* and Ibrahim al-Muwaylihi's trenchant depiction of the guilds' plight printed in *al-Watan* signal a new alliance between the intelligentsia and the urban middle and

lower-middle classes. The success of the guild campaign in the fall of 1879 for lower taxes could only have convinced urban artisans and merchants of the efficacy of such collective action.

In the period before 1880, one finds no evidence of significant urban unrest directly owing to the high taxes, in contrast to the countryside. Yet one aspect of violent resentment may have been the brawls and riots with Europeans discussed in a later chapter. Remember that the Europeans did not pay urban taxes to the Egyptian government, because of the Capitulations. Although European landholders were liable for regular land taxes, they often avoided paying the irregular imposts demanded from Egyptian peasants. At a time when a brutally rationalized tax administration was immiserating artisans and peasants and stripping even honored Egyptians of their privileges, the Capitulations bestowed a wildly favorable exemption upon Europeans. The repertoire of crowd punishment and redistributive justice may have evolved in the face of this inequality. The Europeans had escaped taxes, but not death, for in the summer of 1882 scores of them were killed by angry urban crowds in vengeance for the arrogance of the loan sharks and imperialist men on the spot.

The Urban Populace and State Control

The strengthened state apparatus intervened in urban, especially guild, affairs on an unprecedented scale, as well as relentlessly milking workers for tax revenues. The khedive's officials imposed state control in the sensitive urban areas either directly, with police, domestic spies, and the army, or attempted to co-opt local leaders such as guildmasters. Since guildmasters served as proxies of the state in collecting taxes, it had an increasing stake in seeing that capable and honest guildmasters were installed. Ironically, the rationalization of guild organization derived not only from the impact of the growing market economy, but perhaps primarily from the imperatives of the debt crisis. State authorities demanded of guild officials first of all that guild taxes (*wirku*) be paid promptly and in full, in accordance with the actual number of guild members. When the guildmaster fell short in this regard, he left himself open to searches of his property and possible dismissal from his post.

Further, the government wanted the guild to perform its duties without undue turmoil, either internal or between guild members and their clients. Finally, the guild had a responsibility to allocate work fairly to journeymen and to charge the fees fixed for their services. Private contracting at higher rates, or throwing work the way of favorites, could invite complaints from journeymen and ultimately lead to police intervention. Of course, corruption frequently occurred, sometimes with the collusion of government officials. But the quest of the state for monies to improve infrastructure and, later, the vise-like grip of the debt service payments impelled other branches of the govern-

ment to keep watch, to ensure that a maximum of wealth was generated by the guild for the treasury. This goal demanded correct bookkeeping in regard to the number of guild members, above-board hiring so that income could not be hidden, and the prompt remission of tax monies. The common practice on the part of guild officials, of paying reduced taxes by claiming fewer guild members than actually enrolled, increasingly drew the ire of government accountants. The Interior Ministry record books are crowded with corruption cases brought against guild leaders on this charge, and the relentless prosecutions further soured guild leaders on khedivial policies.

State regulation had an impact on a wide variety of labor issues. Even in the 1850s, not times of significant expansion in the bureaucracy, the state began attempting to bring within its purview areas of life previously not very constrained. The bureaucracy grew under Ismaʿil and he increased the powers given to officials, including, for instance, building and health inspectors. Modern medicine provided officials with an unwonted tool whereby to exercise control over guild leadership. The state also began depriving guildmasters of certain prerogatives, taking these functions over itself. The imagery of the panopticon probably overestimates the resources of an Old Regime state of the viceregal sort, but the state's "eyes," as contemporaries called them, certainly multiplied greatly under Ismaʿil.

Some sorts of state intervention in guild affairs began even under the weak Viceroy Saʿid (r. 1854–62). Under this ruler, the right of the guildmaster to levy fines on journeymen for infractions against laws or regulations was abolished in favor of state functionaries. Saʿid showed a concern with state regulation of other areas of life as well. In 1857, the viceroy, on visiting the annual fair at Tanta, observed how a man's three children were killed by a confection he bought for them from a traditional druggist (*ʿattar*), and ordered that henceforth no one was to be allowed to practice medicine without a degree. Under Saʿid, even a high religious official like the Shaykh as-Sadat, a preeminent Sufi leader, could be punished for neglecting to rectify building code violations on his property. Inspectors warned him repeatedly that he should tear down a condemned building under his supervision, and when it finally fell down on a man, killing him, authorities ordered the shaykh to pay the victim's family an indemnity. In 1865 Ismaʿil decided to appoint architectural engineers to investigate rickety buildings, a move that directly affected the building guilds. Public health was a concern even earlier. In the Ismaʿil period official medicine reached even into religious spheres like the pilgrimage to Mecca, with pilgrims put in quarantine on their return. The growing supervisory role of government officials over such previously less regulated areas of society naturally made an impact also on the guilds.³⁴

The merchant and artisanal guilds could be adversely affected by new regulations and inspection procedures. North African merchants in Alexandria complained that their shipment of cooking butter was impounded at the port

because the Health Department suspected it of being adulterated with other sorts of oil. They said a physician with training in chemistry came on behalf of the department, checked their product, and found it pure. But two months later, they still had not been able to secure the release of their shipment, so that their capital and that of their backers remained tied up.³⁵

A group of fifteen merchants in the al-Jamaliyyah quarter of Cairo, who mainly dealt in the import and export of merchandise from the Hijaz across the Red Sea in Arabia, found themselves entangled in the new red tape. The practice had been, they explained, that if goods were accompanied by a certificate of transit duty showing that Ottoman customs had been paid in the port of origin, the goods were allowed to enter Egypt without further customs duties being levied on them. In 1876, however, the government began insisting that the certificate also show the value of the goods, the customs paid, and the basis on which the customs were calculated. The merchants of al-Jamaliyyah attempted to import goods with the old, vague certificate merely saying customs had been paid in the port of origin, and the Egyptian customs authorities therefore refused the shipment entry. The merchants maintained, however, that "the accompanying certificate had the customary lay-out with which we and our workers over there are familiar, since the order now issued is new, not of old standing, and had not been generally published before, so that merchants might become aware of its contents and act accordingly."³⁶ The new regulations no doubt aimed at ensuring that Egyptian customs authorities be able to reevaluate whether enough customs had already been paid on the goods, or whether it might be possible to extract a bit more from the merchant for the Egyptian treasury. Clearly, such inefficiencies and red tape attendant upon a greater regulatory role for the state had the potential for generating much resentment among the newly regulated guilds.

The consequences of regulation for workers could be even harsher, extending to imprisonment for failure to perform their work satisfactorily. For instance, a tiler named Husayn Harb took on a project at Hawd al-Marsud and did not finish it faithfully, for which he was imprisoned at the police station for a while before being pardoned.³⁷ The logic of bureaucracy required that simple market sanctions such as not receiving pay for work not finished be supplemented with police measures such as jailings. Such state intervention in economic matters may have directed the economic grievances of workers, not at the impersonal market, but at government functionaries.

In addition to an expanded role for food inspectors and for police in this period, the greater power of official medicine is demonstrated by the removal of a number of guildmasters for reasons of ill health in the 1870s. Nor were medical concerns the only issue. The inexorably increasing fiscal pressures on the Egyptian government in the late 1870s combined with its interest in public health to provoke an increased surveillance of the guildmasters. The guildmaster of the vessel-makers complained of having been unjustly dismissed. In

justification, the governor of Alexandria explained that the revenue supervisor of the governorate had indicated that a number of guildmasters were blind, deaf, or advanced in years and unable to perform their duties. For this reason the guild tax arrived late. He recommended that arrangements be made to elect suitable replacements. The medical commission attested that this guildmaster's weak eyesight rendered him unable to perform his duties. In a similar case, the governor of Cairo responded to an appeal by the deputy guildmaster of the dyers in the Cairo quarter of Bab ash-Sha'riyyah against his dismissal by asking the head of the government hospital and medical school to review the case. The physician reported that the guild officer had complete loss of sight in one eye and impaired vision in the other. Since his post supervising dyers depended on the ability to see, and because his condition was incurable, he could not fulfill his duties. This report not only demonstrates the mechanisms of increasing power for official medicine, but it suggests that Egyptian guild officers were at least partially responsible for quality control, something Gabriel Baer doubted.³⁸

Such health-related grounds for dismissal were apparently common in this period within the bureaucracy as well. Shaykh Husayn Muhammad, head clerk of the government treasury department in Alexandria, was pensioned off in 1874 after being diagnosed with glaucoma. In a similar case Shaykh 'Ali al-Hilwani, head clerk of the pious endowment for Mecca and Medinah, was ordered to undergo an eye test by the head of the medical school and hospital to determine his continued ability to keep accounts, and forced into retirement when he failed it. The wording of the sources suggests that these tests introduced a new element of precision and indicated a heightened expectation on the part of the government.³⁹

As the governor of Alexandria noted, many guildmasters suffered not only from poor eyesight, but also from old age and infirmity. But dislodging well-connected older guild officials could often prove time-consuming and difficult. The city council and the Court of First Instance in Alexandria ordered the dismissal of the guildmaster of the water carriers in Alexandria on grounds of infirmity. His appeal of the verdict dragged on. Meanwhile the police received a complaint from the senior masters of the guild that the water authority was demanding security deposits from them. Since their guildmaster was in no position to come up with such a large sum, they wanted an agent appointed. The governor of Alexandria finally complied with their request, acknowledging the guildmaster's incapacity and also his great age.⁴⁰ Here higher government authorities acted only after the guild insistently lobbied them.

The more intense interest of the Egyptian government in the health of guild officials in the 1870s attests not only to the growth of bureaucracy, but also to increased need for funds. Government officials could no longer tolerate guild structures in which the guildmaster barely functioned because of poor health or old age. In an odd way, the impact of European finance capital on Egypt

did encourage Weberian rationality, but from the top down and in the guise of the rapacious tax gatherer rather than that of the frugal merchant. Calvinism had its impact on the Nile Valley only at one remove, through the ledgers of bankers and financiers holding Egyptian paper and pledges. This change in the relationship of the state to the guilds raised many questions. Under the loose Ottoman system, the state had farmed out much administrative work to entities such as guilds. But if the state bureaucracy was going to closely regulate and supervise the guilds, as began to happen under Isma'îl, then were they really needed any longer? Could not these smaller bodies be absorbed by a grosser one?

The Intelligentsia

Unlike peasants and urban artisans and merchants, many members of the intelligentsia—our third potentially revolutionary group—did not pay taxes. This exemption obtained for the graduates of the military academies who became officers, and for the members of the bureaucracy. The state had an adverse economic impact upon the intelligentsia, as noted in the last chapter, primarily through its reductions in force of the late 1870s. The bureaucracy appears to have suffered from these cuts, along with the army and the seminaries. The regulatory role of the government also adversely affected many literate Egyptians, though in a different way from the customs inspections at Alexandria. The primary state means of controlling the intelligentsia, the censorship apparatus, will be discussed in a later chapter. Here it is enough to note that officials scrutinized all printed material closely for signs of political rebelliousness, and that this practice grated on journalists and playwrights and on their audiences.

The reductions in force affecting government jobs during the debt crisis from the mid-1870s came after an orgy of state expansion during the cotton boom. Under Isma'îl, the number of government workers rose to between 20,000 and 50,000, and the armed forces grew from less than 25,000 to around 100,000 troops in only a decade.⁴¹ The connection between the students in the civil schools, and lower- and medium-level bureaucrats, and their common opposition to state hiring of foreigners, was noted by British MP Villiers Stuart, who made inquiries in the fall of 1882 among Cairenes and Alexandrians as to why they had supported 'Urabi:

While in Cairo I took great pains to ascertain from native sources the secret of the sympathy Arabi met with there and in Alexandria amongst the very numerous class of small employes.

Educated native Egyptians informed me that it was due to resentment at the ousting of natives from the subordinate official posts which had been going on at an increasing rate ever since the commencement of the European Control, and the sub-

stitution of Syrians and others. The native student class were closely connected with them by ties of relationship and still more by community of interest, because they were being educated to fill precisely the class of posts which they now saw passing away to foreigners.⁴²

Frustrated Circassian and Egyptian intellectuals, then, chafed not only at the general constriction of economic opportunities noted in the last chapter, but also at the deliberate policy of the state in hiring Europeans and Syrians for jobs they had been trained to do. The pressure to hire what we would now call Lebanese came from high European officials, who appreciated their French education and their use of European-style accounting and bookkeeping methods, in contrast to the Copts and other local Egyptian employees.

Along with his civil schools for the training of the civilian intelligentsia, Ismaʿil set up many new military academies. These recruited exclusively from the Ottoman nobility and Circassian nobles and gentry. Since the peasants, whether wealthy or poor, generally detested military service as privates and corporals, and the Ottomans probably had a place reserved for them even in a small officer corps, the main beneficiaries of the expansion of the military academies and of the officer corps appear to have been the Circassians. Much has been made of the antagonism between the Circassian nobles and gentry, and Egyptians of peasant background, but these glib ethnic generalizations need serious questioning. Although some Circassians identified with the Ottoman ruling elite, large numbers made alliances instead with the indigenous Egyptian notables. Many Circassians by this time were Arabophone, and they had developed an origin-myth that asserted their descent from the Prophet Muhammad, so that one Circassian intellectual of this period wrote in his autobiography that he was of “Circassian descent and Arab origin” (*Jirkasi an-nasl wa ʿArabi al-asl*).⁴³ One is used to hearing that in this period “Arab” meant only the tribal Arabs of the desert, and a gentleman would not so refer to himself; but finding such a self-description by a Circassian should make us reexamine this proposition a bit.

Early in 1879 the cabinet adopted the recommendations of an investigatory commission on military affairs that, in view of the debt crisis, the army be reduced from the 90,000 characteristic of the mid-1870s to 36,000. This diminution involved a shrinkage of the officer corps from 2,609 to 993.⁴⁴ The group that had the most to lose from the reductions in force in the military was the Circassian junior officers, trained in Ismaʿil’s new military schools, along with a small number of Egyptian junior officers of peasant background who had worked themselves up through the ranks. It is hard to imagine Egypt’s peasant conscripts having many complaints about their release to their families and villages. The mainly Ottoman and wealthy Circassian staff officers, moreover, were also cushioned from any untoward effects of the demilitarization.

An incident at the British consulate in Cairo demonstrates the despair sweeping this section of the intelligentsia in the late 1870s. Borg reported that ten students at the Citadel's military college called at the consulate

and said that they and their comrades about 300 or 350 in number, had been at that college for a number of years and were lately told that they must look out for some work as they could not be kept there any longer and they came to me . . . being more fit for military service they begged in preference to be allowed to enlist, promising to serve wherever their presence might be required.⁴⁵

The offer of these young sons of pashas, beys, and other magnates to become mercenaries for the British army suggests a wild desperation that can only have gotten worse during the next two years.

In February 1879, the British consul reported serious discontent among the army officers because the Nubar cabinet, with its European members, had put 2,500 of them on half-pay as an economy measure and because the treasury still owed them substantial arrears in pay. They feared the reductions in military strength by a European-dominated cabinet constituted nothing less than a preparation for a British occupation of the country, and they particularly disliked the British cabinet officer, Rivers Wilson, and his ally, the Armenian prime minister Nubar Pasha. Many Egyptians also resented the great increase in the number of Europeans employed in the Egyptian government, brought specially from Europe or India, and the high salaries they received despite their abysmal ignorance of the country. The special privileges of the Europeans grated as well; one Captain Muhammad Fahmi found himself imprisoned for twelve years for arresting an Austrian coffeehouse owner in 1869 with insufficient evidence, and his case was probably not an isolated one.⁴⁶

Viceroy Isma'îl at this point encouraged the discontent to find expression, as a means of ridding himself of Nubar and Wilson and regaining powers the cabinet had wrested from him. After contacting some of the dissatisfied officers, Isma'îl helped instigate a riot on 18 February in which 400 armed officers took Nubar and Wilson hostage briefly, demanding arrears in pay and uttering loud cries against the Europeans.⁴⁷ Isma'îl arrived on the scene to quell the protest, and had some protesting officers fired upon and arrested in order to make himself look good, despite his prior complicity in the riot. The duplicity of the khedive in this regard turned many officers against him. Officers came streaming into Cairo from the provinces to demand arrears of pay and the release of their comrades, and "strong threats were used against the Europeans to whom the blame for the treatment of the Army was chiefly attributed."⁴⁸ Although the viceroy engineered the protests as a means of outmaneuvering the Europeans on the cabinet, the officers had genuine grievances against the Europeans, and were hardly in Isma'îl's pocket.

The officers had allies among civilians. Borg suggested that among the more

prominent of these opponents of Nubar Pasha were creditors of the government. These included about fifteen major owners of Cairo butcheries, owed thousands of pounds for supplying meat to the military; forty Syrian and Kurdish horse dealers, likewise creditors of the government; and 1,500 bedouins of Hawara who had been employed in 1876 in the Ethiopian war but never remunerated. Borg noted that "These three classes of creditors, each of which by itself might at any time create uneasiness, tired of receiving promises for their money have banded together with the disaffected officers."⁴⁹ Remember, moreover, that one is not here dealing with disparate individual creditors, but rather with corporate bodies, the *ta'ifas* or guilds. The butchers formed part of a guild, as did the horse dealers, and Egyptian tribal organization, although more egalitarian because based on kinship, had a similarly vertical authority structure. The government, then, not only increasingly regulated and overtaxed the guilds, but also welched on its debts to them. These grievances might have mattered less had the creditors actually been powerless, unconnected individuals; but the organizational capacity of the guilds made them potentially vigorous allies of the junior officers. Although the alliance came to little in the spring of 1879, partially because of Isma'il's deposition, links were forged between the military and civilian society during the 1879 nativist movement that would reemerge two years later.

The holy and learned men of Islam constituted another ally of the army officers and of the khedive and the anti-European nobles and notables in the spring of 1879. The ulama or Muslim clergy had accumulated a set of grievances against the European-dominated Nubar cabinet as well. It seems clear that, unlike Sa'id, Isma'il had no strong anticlerical leanings, and through state subvention he had greatly increased enrollment of seminary students at al-Azhar. Its enrollment figures, however, show a drastic cutback in government support from the time of the declaration of bankruptcy. After rising from around 10,000 in the early 1870s to 11,000 in 1875, enrollments at al-Azhar were cut back to 7,695 in 1876 and the three subsequent years. Since no similar declines in enrollments occurred in government schools, one must conclude that a government desperately searching for budget cuts decided to favor the new educational system over the old. Such a policy seems likely to have generated grievances on the part of excluded students and of seminary graduates with fewer job prospects. Thousands of Azharite seminarians appear to have had their stipends cut off in the late 1870s, and reduced enrollments hurt the sons of village notables, who often employed al-Azhar as a means of upward mobility.

The tax crunch also affected the ulama with property, and some were handled roughly. The Interior Ministry summoned Shaykh Hasan al-'Idwi in 1879 and threatened him over the £E1204.45 he owed in back taxes on his lands in El Minya and Bani Suef. The state demanded either that he pay up immediately or that he put up collateral for the tax debt. He replied that he

had promised to either pay or put up collateral within thirty days, which had not yet elapsed.⁵⁰

A variety of grievances helped push the clerical wing of the intelligentsia into political action during the turbulent spring of 1879. The head of Egypt's Sufi brotherhoods, Shaykh 'Ali al-Bakri (d. 1880), held meetings of notables and clergy in his home for the purpose of stirring up religious feeling against the Nubar cabinet.⁵¹ Mosque preachers, worried that the foreign-influenced cabinet might turn Egypt over to European control, began denouncing cabinet minister Riyad Pasha as a friend of the Christians and an apostate. Prominent among these preachers was our friend Shaykh Hasan al-'Idwi, whose taxes were in arrears, at least as of the following fall.⁵² Petitions began circulating for the adoption of a constitution on the model of the short-lived Ottoman constitution of 1876–77, which agitators said had been promulgated in Egypt but never instituted, and which would lead to a removal of the European ministers or at least to their subordination to the chamber of deputies.⁵³

In the end, the Nubar cabinet fell and, after an abortive attempt to set up another "European cabinet" under the heir apparent Tawfiq, Isma'il appointed a cabinet of Ottoman-Circassians with no European members. It was led by the anti-European constitutionalist, Sharif Pasha, though it should be noted that his constitutionalism was of an elitist variety aimed at shifting some power away from the khedive and the Europeans to the nobles. However cozy he was with the khedive, Sharif was not a pure viceregal absolutist, and he thus gained the trust of the Egyptian notables in the chamber of deputies, as well as many reformists among the intelligentsia. Shaykh al-Bakri went to see the British consul, and argued for the justness of the reform movement. Vivian expressed his doubt that any cabinet consisting solely of "natives" could hope to subject the khedive to cabinet rule. The shaykh in reply "declared that they had obliged the Khedive to swear on the Koran to keep his pledges to govern constitutionally and that they had also sworn to depose him, which they were determined to do, if he did not keep his promises."⁵⁴

The association of European hegemony with authoritarian government from the top by Isma'il or the Nubar–Wilson cabinet was helping push even conservative Sufi leaders into the constitutionalist camp. For all the grains of salt with which one must take Shaykh al-Bakri's statements, a genuine discontent with the Nubar cabinet undeniably affected large segments of the intelligentsia, religious or otherwise in this period. Moreover, they widely adopted a belief, or at least rhetoric, that some sort of infusion of the popular will into government through a reformist cabinet, a revived chamber of deputies, and an adoption in the vassal state of Egypt of the 1877 Ottoman constitution, could reduce European domination of the country and reverse its decline into weakness.

The movement in the spring of 1879 against the European-dominated cabinets constituted a diverse and fractious coalition of social forces. These can be

seen in the signatories of the National Manifesto (*al-la'ihah al-wataniyyah*), which demanded a new electoral law and increased prerogatives for the chamber of deputies. The cabinet was to be responsible to the chamber in matters of domestic and financial policy. The manifesto also put forward an alternative to the financial plan of Rivers Wilson, the English cabinet member who wanted to raise land taxes. Alexander Schölch, while emphasizing the way in which Isma'îl orchestrated the movement for his own purposes, admits that the manifesto gave genuine expression to the interests of the signatories. He breaks down the signatures in the manner shown in Table 3.1.

The leading role of the intelligentsia in the movement is clear. Some 28 percent of the signatures belonged to army officers, most of them graduates of the military academies, though a few, such as Ahmad 'Urabi, had only some seminary education and rose through the ranks. Another 19 percent of the signatures came from the clerical intelligentsia. Among the high government functionaries, the distinction between nobles and the upper ranks of the intelligentsia would be difficult to draw, and this difficulty pertains to categorizing some of the urban notables as well. Yet it seems clear that the intelligentsia supplied at least half of the signatures on the manifesto. Ironically, the intellectuals produced by the new civil schools seldom attained the kind of status that would lead to their inclusion among important signatories of such documents, though through their newspapers and salons they expressed their dissatisfaction with the Nubar cabinet as well.

Soon after this broad coalition of social forces managed to oust the European cabinet members, the European Powers retaliated by deposing Isma'îl in favor of his son Tawfiq. The new khedive flirted for a bit with the populist constitutionalism only half-earnestly unleashed by his desperate father, but soon reverted to absolutism with European support. Tawfiq moved to slash the army further, down to only 12,000, with, presumably, a mere 600 or so officers. He also adopted a policy of restricting the years an indigenous Egyptian could serve, thus making it impossible for sons of village headmen to rise through the ranks into the officer corps. The officers, therefore, had continued

TABLE 3.1
Social Origins of Signatories of National Manifesto, 7 April 1879

<i>Social Background</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>
High government officials and nobles	73	22
Senior military officers	93	28
Members of the chamber of deputies	60	18
Ulama from Cairo, Alexandria, and Damietta	60	18
Other religious leaders (Coptic and Jewish)	2	1
Merchants and notables from Cairo and Damietta	41	13
Total:	329	100

Source: Schölch, *Ägypten den Ägyptern*, p. 90.

grievances. So, too, did many among the ulama, as they watched European Christian hegemony over their country deepen, and as the state slashed seminary enrollments and kept their salaries and stipends much lower than those paid to translators and other members of the secular intelligentsia.

The fiftyfold expansion in Egypt's foreign trade over the nineteenth century created sufficient tax revenues for a rapid, if highly uneven, growth in the state bureaucracy. Egyptians were more dramatically than ever before hedged about with rules and regulations, with police, official medicine, customs, and other bureaucracies now regulating their bodies and behavior much more closely. The burdens of high population growth on the agrarian state, of increased price inflation and growing expenditures, were exacerbated by excessive borrowing from European banks at high interest rates with punitive service charges. The burgeoning taxation structure drove much of the increased state interference in the lives of ordinary persons, and it injured their sense of the moral economy of taxation. These developments helped undermine the state's legitimacy.

The peasant reaction to economic change and government policy gives eloquent testimony to rural discontents in this period. The tax squeeze coincided in the late 1870s with adverse weather and Nile conditions and population increases to produce widespread starvation in Upper Egypt. Peasant bands formed to resist further taxation, and to cling to life through banditry. Even in less destitute Lower Egypt, many hungry peasants turned to burglary. Worse, large numbers of peasants who managed to stay on their lands survived in the short term only by taking on massive debts, often from European or Levantine money-lenders at high rates of interest. Conditions appear to have improved in subsequent years, but the growing debt burden led to widespread peasant bankruptcies and foreclosures, often at the hands of foreigners. More ambiguous sorts of change challenged the urban guilds, but they too found taxes skyrocketing and their moral economy profoundly insulted.

Although the guilds increasingly lost administrative functions, even as economic developments began to undermine them, they nevertheless continued to have political uses for their members and leaders. During the fiscal crisis of 1871–79, and especially during its later phases, guilds added to their repertoires of collective action. Petitions, the use of the press, civil disobedience, provoking arrest, strikes, and riots all constituted arrows in the quiver of disgruntled guild members by the late 1870s. These repertoires of collective action developed under the influence of economic and bureaucratic expansion, and became increasingly less conservative in tone and goals. The leader of the wagoners who went to jail for refusing to allow his men to be pressed involuntarily into low-paid government service desired officials to conform to new legal statutes outlawing forced labor. The striking weighers in Alexandria in 1878, discussed in the last chapter, wanted changes introduced that would bring them from feudal community to a more associative form of organization

with room in it both for individual compensation and corporate solidarity. The butchers and horse dealers who allied themselves with dissidents in the spring of 1879 may have wanted more than mere arrears in pay. Guild members firmly believed in the elective principle, and in accountability of office-holders, so that the butchers may have joined the notables, intellectuals, and officers in wanting a more law-based and less despotic regime. The guilds demonstrated their ability to lobby effectively by convincing Tawfiq to lower their taxes a bit as of 1880. The guilds had continuing grievances; they were well organized; they had a set of potentially very effective tactics; and some were building alliances with dissidents among the notables, army officers, and intellectuals. They were set to play a crucial role in the mobilization of resources during the revolution of 1881–82. Finally, riots against Greeks in Tanta in 1872 and against Maltese and other Europeans in Port Sa'ïd in the later 1870s (discussed in a later chapter), may have expressed latently a dissatisfaction with the way in which Europeans generally escaped high exactions, and even profited from the situation through money-lending and the buying of land cheaply from immiserated peasant proprietors.

The intelligentsia, including the graduates of military academies among the junior officers, also built up a stock of grievances in the 1870s and early 1880s. High rates of population growth encouraged the graduation of more cadets and civil school students than could be employed, and the budget crunch of the late 1870s worsened their situation. They, like the guilds, resorted to crowd action, as in their mobbing of the European cabinet members in February 1879. The religious and military branches of the intelligentsia supplied nearly half the signatures on the National Manifesto of April 1879, and its aims were widely supported by the modern intellectuals as well. They considered the Nubar cabinet to have capitulated to European hegemony, and to be making policy inimical to their interests but congenial to the Europeans. They wanted more local control of policy, through a reformed chamber of deputies. Indeed, some form of popular influence on the state struck many Egyptians as imperative, given the increasing scope of state intervention in civil society, as well as the state's increasing subservience to European goals. Viceregal despotism became a luxury the Egyptians felt they could ill afford. The question was whether they could organize to agitate for a different sort of government. In the next few chapters I will explore the impact of increased literacy, urbanization, the rise of political journalism and of political clubs, increased democracy among guilds, and crowd collective action on viceregal Egypt's political life.

In the meantime, the actions of the state kept it in the minds of all subjects, as it invaded their lives as never before. The tax collector with his buffalo-hide whip stood as wicked caricature of the viceroy and his scepter. The hierarchical and almost ritual spectacle of the floggings, and the bodily pain and scars they produced, served to remind everyone of Khedive Isma'ïl's unrestrained presence as ruler. Urban guildsmen also suffered from such viceregal souve-

nirs but also endured dark and unsanitary jails for failure to pay the taxes demanded of them. Tawfiq's regime may have slightly benefited these guilds through abolition of some urban taxes, but that he appeared to do so under their pressure may have encouraged them to take further collective action against him and his European backers in the future. The Capitulations that protected the guilds' European competitors from local taxation remained in effect. Tawfiq's policy of raising taxes in the countryside to offset urban tax relief, on the other hand, angered the rural elite of village headmen. Moreover, issues of legitimacy hung over taxation policy. Half of Egypt's tax revenues in the early 1880s went to pay for debt-servicing on European loans. The torture of the entire Nile Valley on behalf of foreign financiers decisively undermined the viceroy's authority. It is not that the ruler is remembered that matters, but how.

Four

The Long Revolution in Egypt

IN THE EARLY 1850s, Egypt possessed only an elementary communications and transportation infrastructure, and the state had ceased promoting literacy. It is hard to imagine in such a situation how the people could have waged a truly national revolt or revolution, as opposed to tribal or urban factions engaging in scattered and uncoordinated clashes with the small army and police force. When asking what changed between 1852 and the revolution of 1881–82, we must take account of what social scientists refer to as “social mobilization”—the movement of the population into cities, the building of connective links such as railroads and telegraph lines, increases in literacy, and the rise of privately printed newspapers. Such changes do not cause movements of collective action, but they facilitate coordinated politics.

Raymond Williams refers to the transformation of communications associated with printing and literacy in Europe as the “Long Revolution,” but in Egypt (as in much of Afro-Asia) this transformation took place in a highly compressed manner.¹ The founding of private newspapers, for instance, occurred simultaneously with the extensive spread of telegraph lines. The communications revolution had at least indirect implications for the political one, insofar as a new sort of politics and political journalism grew up together. By the 1860s, not only had the cotton boom transformed the domestic economy, but telegraph connections allowed reception of international news through the wire services, and Ottoman and European newspapers could easily be shipped to Alexandria and taken by rail and steamship to Cairo and the interior. At first, immigrant European entrepreneurs and workers created a market for locally published newspapers in European languages; in the late 1860s and throughout the 1870s private Arabic newspapers began publication. The cotton boom engendered among Egyptian brokers, merchants, distributors, noble agrarian capitalists, and peasants an interest in international events that might affect cotton prices. Closer to home, the economic and diplomatic penetration of Egypt by Europeans encouraged local elites to assert their interests, and brought about a further demand for political information. The similar processes occurring in Istanbul itself, along with the Young Ottoman movement for constitutional monarchy in the Ottoman Empire, piqued the curiosity of the public inside the Ottoman vassal state of Egypt. A series of political crises in the Nile Valley, dating from Egypt’s declaration of bankruptcy in 1876, all further promoted public interest in politics and therefore newspaper sales.

The growth of the press and of a modern public opinion was also aided by an extension of public literacy and a great increase in the number of intellectuals, bureaucrats, and seminarians from the mid-1860s, which created an unprecedented market for printed materials, especially for inexpensive ones such as newspapers. This demand had not existed on anywhere near such a scale in previous decades, as is indicated by the relatively small and predominantly state-owned printing industry of the 1840s and 1850s. Printed works had been potentially available to literate Egyptian Ottomans at least since early in the eighteenth century, when successful private Turkish printing houses were set up in Istanbul. The social and economic conditions that might create a significant demand for this technology and its products simply did not exist in the Nile Valley at that time, however. The question of how an extensive private press grew up, with an audience in the tens of thousands, is a crucial one for this study. After all, the nonexistence or limited use of printing would clearly have retarded the political mobilization of the population.

Literacy and Social Mobilization

Improved communications and transportation technology, greater population density and urbanization, along with increased literacy, do not cause revolutions, or even “modernization.” Such processes do, however, make populations more available for mobilization, enabling revolutions, even though they do not provoke them. The Revolution of 1881–82 certainly constituted a new and different sort of popular movement than ever had appeared in Egypt before. Nation-wide in scope, the movement’s various components shared broadly the common goals of diminishing European economic and political influence, establishing consultative government domestically, and securing a fairer deal from the ruling Ottoman-Egyptians for the various groups and classes that supported it. Without modern communications, no such degree of national cohesion could have been achieved; as recently as the 1840s it would have been impossible.

Anthony Giddens has described the city in precapitalist societies as “a special form of ‘storage container,’ a crucible for the generation of power . . . via its relations with the countryside.”² In Egypt’s transition to capitalism, the city emerged not only as a “power-container” for the state, but also a potential dynamo of antistate activity. Although the rate of urbanization did not change greatly between 1850 and 1880, cities grew enormously because of overall population growth. This accelerated rate of growth in these decades, of twelve per 1000 every year, led to a lowering of the society’s mean age and a relatively larger stratum of young persons less fettered by property and family responsibilities.

A 30 percent expansion in population also increased the density of villagers

on the land, which in turn made communications between villages easier. The urban areas kept pace with this overall growth rate, and some cities expanded even faster because of the cotton boom and the railroad. Interior urban places in the fertile cotton-growing regions of Lower Egypt, newly linked by rail to the Mediterranean, such as Tanta, Mansura, and Damanhur, experienced anywhere from 80 to 170 percent growth in these decades. Cairo and Alexandria, already large, grew by over 40 percent, outstripping the general rate of growth.³ The cities concentrated increasingly large populations in areas where they could more easily be mobilized for collective action than in the scattered villages of the rural areas. The settlement of immigrants together in particular quarters of the city, or in bidonvilles, and the tradition of self-government within quarters allowed social bonds to remain or be built up that further enhanced the urban population's ability to mobilize. The railroad, Nile steamship, telegraph, and press, in turn, connected the cities with one another in an unprecedentedly tight network of travel and communication.

Time-space convergences owing to new technology led to an implosion of Egypt's social geography, and, indeed, that of the world as a whole.⁴ The figures on the extension of the railroad and telegraph lines under Isma'îl were often quoted by his admirers to prove he was not a total good-for-nothing, but the social meaning of these figures is seldom considered. Isma'îl had 112 canals dug, amounting to 8,400 miles, greatly expanding irrigation but also boat transportation. He had 5,000 miles of telegraph line laid, and extended railway mileage from 500 to 1,100 miles. He also established a nation-wide postal service, employing the khedivial steamers.⁵ By 1871 a British consul reported that "every town and village of importance in Lower Egypt has a telegraph station," and in 1872 Egyptian government telegraph lines carried 389,225 European messages and 238,521 Egyptian ones (figures that exclude telegrams sent through the independent lines, British India Telegraph Company and the Suez Canal Company).⁶ The infrastructural improvements not only stimulated the economy, but also wove new threads of interconnectedness through his realm. The completion of the railway under Sa'id in 1858 reduced travel time from Alexandria to Cairo from four days to eight hours. Isma'îl's further extension of railway mileage cast the rest of Egypt, and even northern Sudan, into the same sort of time warp.

The level and types of literacy, and the sorts of publishing activities being undertaken, set a crucial context for the study of social mobilization. Egypt in the nineteenth century witnessed a shift from a situation in which literacy was the monopoly of a small group of bureaucrats, clergy, and merchants to one in which shopkeepers' apprentices and sons of village headmen read out newspaper headlines to assembled crowds.⁷ Literacy is not a strictly specifiable technology, but a set of socially constructed practices that often reflects social relations of authority. Here we are mainly concerned with a level of literacy sufficient for the comprehension of a front-page newspaper article. The basic

vehicle of education for most Egyptians remained in the nineteenth century what it had been in the eighteenth century—the Qurʾan school—and in many cases it probably did bestow sufficient literacy to allow graduates some access to the press. The strict discipline of the schoolmaster, along with an emphasis on rote learning and memorization of a sacred text, not only instilled the skill of literacy, but also habits of obedience. Even the modernized elementary schools set up by ʿAli Mubarak, which taught mathematics, geography, and history, emphasized Benthamite political socialization.⁸ On the other hand, the Qurʾan school pedagogy also instilled respect for Islamic orthodoxy and norms. Those schooled in this way might most easily be turned toward rebellion where local governmental authorities, by allying themselves closely with non-Muslims, seemed themselves to be threatening Islamic norms and Muslim autonomy.

A radical press, in turn, could initiate a new sort of discourse authorizing rebellion under the banner of Islamic nativism, putting into words what many already felt. We should avoid, however, the pitfalls of looking at the impact of intellectuals' writings on nonliterate or semiliterate sectors of society as a one-way sort of communication. We should remember that nonliterate culture can be dynamic, and that literate and nonliterate culture interacted in Egypt over long periods of time. A simple dichotomy fails to account for the totality of culture in modern societies, "when, typically, different media and multiple practices almost always mingled in complex ways."⁹

The development of literacy in the nineteenth century awaits systematic study based on such criteria as ability to sign documents. In the meantime, we must examine other indicators. For instance, a correlation has been argued between literacy and factors such as education, book production, and book ownership.¹⁰ Book ownership is an ambiguous indicator of literacy in the ordinary folk, of course, who in Europe read pamphlets and picaresque tales more often than they delved into the literary canon. In Egypt newspaper readership is probably more significant in our period than book ownership; even a key nationalist text like at-Tahtawi's history of Egypt had a first printing of only 500 copies.¹¹ For nineteenth-century Egypt, the expansion of education and newspaper circulation points strongly to a significant increase in literacy. Table 4.1 indicates a remarkable doubling of the number of Qurʾan schools in Egypt between 1869 and 1878, probably as a result of the cotton boom, which put the sort of wealth into public hands that allowed a vast expansion in private and state subvention for primary education. Viceroy Ismaʿil and many notables, in founding or subventing schools, set an example followed by ordinary folk.¹² We are given help in interpreting such figures in terms of literacy rates by calculations made for the Turkish-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the same period. A decade of educational work after the Crimean War produced a literacy rate of about 2 percent of the population in 1868. By 1876 a frenetic bout of school foundings and expansion in the numbers of students

TABLE 4.1
Qur'an School Enrollment, 1838–78^a

<i>Year</i>	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Teachers</i>	<i>Pupils</i>	<i>% School-Age Boys</i>	<i>Authority</i>
1838			20,000		Bowring
1869			60,000		Regny
1872	2,696		82,256		Amici
			80,713		<i>Rawdat al-Madaris</i>
1875	4,725	4,881	119,903		Dor (Official)
1878	5,370		137,545	41	Amici; "Rapport"

Sources: Heyworth-Dunne, *History of Education*, p. 360; *Rawdat al-Madaris*, vol. 3, no. 22 (1289): 17; DWQ, Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara', Nizarat al-Ma'arif, 5 Alif, "Rapport de la commission pour les reformes dans l'organisation de l'instruction publique," p. 8.

^a Several estimates taken by Heyworth-Dunne from Dor, wildly at variance with government and other figures, have been omitted.

in existing facilities had raised the Ottoman literacy rate to about 5 percent.¹³ It seems likely to me that the Egyptian figures were comparable (even some rough calculations for the number of living Qur'an-school graduates in 1878 would suggest something on this order). Certainly, it is reasonable to posit a doubling of the literacy rate in the 1870s, given that primary-school enrollments more than doubled. In addition to the schools, the armed forces, which grew to over 100,000 men under Isma'il, proved a major avenue to literacy. Some occupations, in addition, bestowed literacy in the course of their apprenticeship. A government report complained in 1880:

At the moment, how are employees of various government departments recruited? Their offices are encumbered with a cloud of children whom their parents, themselves functionaries, bring with them from the time they can walk. These children never set foot in a school; they grow and are formed little by little, for better or worse, by sheer routine, without having any serious and methodical instruction. With time they become bureaucrats themselves, and have gotten their foot in the door of administrative work for good.¹⁴

The dour tone of this report hides the guild-like structures of tutelage in the bureaucratic workplace, whereby child employees grew from being apprentices to the equivalent of journeymen and masters.¹⁵ Such on-the-job training among employees of government offices and local trading houses may have had its drawbacks, but it probably reproduced sectors of the literate strata with minimal adequacy, and in such a way as to exclude them, often, from government statistics on education.

Egypt's literacy rate in 1800 probably did not exceed 1 percent, whereas in 1880 it may well have stood around 4 or 5 percent. With this figure, Egypt gained a critical mass of literate persons in vital employment sectors, allowing

them to establish not only urban networks, but truly national linkages with the literate in other regions and occupations, all of which could be mobilized for political purposes. In these years we see the advent throughout the city quarters and villages of individuals who could read the newly founded private newspapers aloud to family, friends, neighbors, and coffeehouse patrons. The way in which the 1870s are remembered for cultural efflorescence reflects a major shift in the literacy profile of the country, all the more remarkable for having been carried out not only through government schools, but also in some large part by private subvention, at a time of rapidly increasing population.

Printing, Journalism, and Public Opinion

From all accounts, a palpable change occurred during the 1860s and 1870s in cultural activity, as a result of the increased numbers of civil school graduates, and of the impact of the printing press and other new media such as the telegraph in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire as a whole. Political journalism came into being, supported by and modeled on the European wire services, and it interacted with its growing audience to create a new public consciousness. The newspapers also changed the position and roles of the intellectuals, making them better informed, allowing the formation of broad political consensus among them, and amplifying their own writings to the reading and hearing public. The ability of publishers for the first time successfully to launch periodicals that depended on newsstand and subscription sales constitutes yet another piece of evidence for an increased literacy rate.

The typical juxtaposition of printing and capitalism arose in western Europe from 1450 or so, in Russia during the eighteenth century, and in most of Asia and Africa from the middle of the eighteenth or sometime in the nineteenth century. Especially in the early stages of the introduction of the printing press in Afro-Asia, much publishing remained in state control. In every instance, however, government near-monopolies on publishing gave way to the rise of privately owned printing presses, as occurred in Egypt during the 1870s. The transition to private publishing usually presupposed an expansion in the rate of literacy and at least a slight movement of the society away from preindustrial and toward some sort of capitalist relations of production. Under these circumstances two contradictory forces shape publishing: the leveling and individualizing impact of the market laws of supply and demand on the one hand, and on the other the corporatist influence of the growing bourgeoisie, which attempts to establish its cultural hegemony by claiming to represent the whole society through such ideal constructs as "the public."¹⁶ Once printing becomes a relatively widespread technology in society, it makes written material available much more inexpensively and much more broadly, and allows the exact reproduction of diagrams so essential to the advancement of science and technol-

ogy. Elizabeth Eisenstein has documented the manner in which the advent of printing wrought a transformation in the world of ideas.¹⁷

The Ottoman writers seemed especially self-conscious about the changes in consciousness produced by the dramatic increase in circulation that accompanied the founding of privately published newspapers in the 1860s and 1870s. The Istanbul-based Lebanese journalist Ahmad Faris ash-Shidyaq wrote in 1871 that formerly the ulama, Muslim jurists, and poets would take no interest in politics, devoting themselves to the minutiae of their arts or disciplines. He continued:

After the spread of newspapers in Islamic lands, the learned therein acquired a desire to know about politics. Hardly any event occurs in Europe of which they remain unaware. Rather, one sees them delving into its consequences and looking into its effects. This is a fruit of the newspapers, insofar as they have rendered the learned qualified to be counted among policy makers (*arbab as-siyasah*). Those from among [the intellectuals] who took up official positions before the spread of these newspapers and who fulfilled their duties properly, such as Mehmet Rüşdü Pasha and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, are rarities of the age.¹⁸

One could hardly hope for a clearer argument for the popular press as the catalyst of an important change in the political position of intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire. That it derives from the pen of an Ottoman intellectual who lived through the period, moreover, lends it some authenticity, though as a journalist ash-Shidyaq may have wished to take too much credit for a phenomenon with rather more complicated causes.

Ash-Shidyaq's view finds support in the writings of the Young Ottoman author Namık Kemal. In the late 1870s he discussed the advent of printing and newspapers in the context of changes in style and genre in Ottoman Turkish literature. He notes, first of all, a major transformation in style and taste during the previous fifteen or twenty years. He recalls a time when composing a well-constructed letter, with correct grammar and agreement, and embellished with a prayer and some verse, was seen as a demonstration of great skill. Namık Kemal had himself received a promotion to the second civil rank because the sultan thought well of the rhetorical excellence he displayed in an article on preventing fires in Istanbul. Such a flowery article would now be scorned by the litterateurs.¹⁹

Readership has also changed, and as Ottoman prose literature became liberated from the chains of captivity to the old style, he says, it rendered many services to the nation. He marvels that

Fifteen years ago the contents of a published newspaper, no matter how important, were not read by five hundred persons. Today, every issue of those papers printed concerning [current] events passes before at least five thousand persons, in households, reading rooms, towns and villages. Citizens in their tenth or thirteenth year are reading the newly written books with great pleasure. It is amusing and profitable.

In the past fifteen years among both women and men the number of readers has grown a hundredfold. In Istanbul shopkeepers and apprentices are reading. If all cannot do so, they listen. They acquire information about the rights of the state, the independence of the nation, love of the homeland, public spirit, military glory, and the range of the benefits of knowledge, even if concisely. Has not this expansion of the horizon of reading occurred under the shadow of the new style?²⁰

Here Kemal firmly links the spread of literacy and the popularity of the daily press not simply with printing technology, but with the rise of a new, leaner prose writing style. In mentioning artisans, women, and teenagers, he underlines the democratizing effects of printing.

Kemal's argument had more force than even he probably imagined. The rhymed prose of medieval manuscript literature served in part as a mnemonic device, at a time when readers tended to commit a good deal to memory. Rhymed prose also helped work against the corruption of the text by copyists over time, since the requirement that it rhyme narrowed the possible readings of a word. The parallelisms engendered by this technique likewise led to many statements being made twice, in different ways, which also helped preserve the text from corruption. The unfortunate side effect of rhymed prose, for all its technical value in preserving manuscripts from scribal mistakes, lay in the extensive vocabulary it required. The need for rhymes, parallelism, and synonyms sent authors to the dictionaries frequently, and caused them to resort to obscure terms inaccessible to ordinary folk. Medieval Arab lexicographers even organized their dictionaries according to the last letter of the word, facilitating the work of rhyming in both poetry and prose. The introduction of printing on a wide scale eliminated the problem of copyists' errors. Thousands of copies of a book could be printed inexpensively from the same plates, eliminating the need for rhetorical redundancy. At the same time, the sheer ability to reach an audience of thousands encouraged authors to simplify their styles and to make them more accessible. The press felt these twin impetuses to a new, cleaner style most urgently and before any other genre of writing.

The Islamic reformer Muhammad 'Abduh, while a young seminarian in his twenties, wrote on the rise of the daily press.²¹ He, like the Ottoman thinkers cited above, sees newspapers as an outgrowth of writing, but gives little attention to the technology of the printing press. 'Abduh depicts newspapers as a means to civilizational advancement and to international order. They inform a people of the causes of progress, and keep international neighbors apprised of each others' news. They also serve a didactic function, he asserts, criticizing vice and encouraging virtue. In their political reporting, newspapers can guide rulers by distinguishing the just path from the wicked one and can usefully speculate on the consequences of particular courses of action. Ironically, given the Syrian Christian ownership of many newspapers, 'Abduh likens the publisher to a mosque preacher who mounts his pulpit and blows the trump of the angel Israfil, which can either cause the living to perish or bring the dead back

to life. The perception that newspapers helped expand and perhaps even displace earlier oral information networks centered on the mosque and market is valuable. So too is the idea that Egyptians used their newspapers as an extension of Islamic customs such as sermon-preaching and ethical advice-giving. ‘Abduh paints newspapers as a sort of serial “mirror for princes,” a long-term tutor of ethics and geopolitical strategy for the ruler, and even for his subjects. This conception bridges the distance between at-Tahtawi’s generation, who began to use modern tools such as nineteenth-century historiography to replace the mirrors for princes, and the generation of the late 1870s, who witnessed the inception of an Egyptian political journalism that could play that role more effectively.

Given the still small readership and listenership of the newspapers, we cannot call them a mass medium as yet. But they certainly constituted a new means of communication linking tens of thousands of individuals. Increased newspaper circulation and the rise of a private press not only spread information more efficiently, but changed the social position of intellectuals and bestowed on readers or listeners from most social strata a new consciousness of politics. In some important sense, the new press helped create a new sort of politics in Anatolia and the Nile Valley. Private journalism became an arena wherein opposing factions among the nobles and notables could fight out their battles for public support. It also became a vehicle for unprecedented power among journalists, editors, and publishers. Truly political journalism did not arise in Egypt until after 1875, but many literate Egyptians got a preview of this fabled creature by means of the Turkish-language press during the controversy in the empire over constitutionalism during the late 1860s and the 1870s.

Ottoman Constitutionalism and Political Journalism

Despite the appearance of the government gazette from 1863 and the private, progovernment *Wadi an-nil* from 1867, Arabophone political journalism hardly existed in Egypt before the late 1870s. The first experience elite Egyptians had with newspapers that addressed Ottoman concerns in terms of indigenous politics came with the appearance of Istanbul-based weeklies in Arabic and Turkish during the 1860s. These periodicals, moreover, had a context in the increasing politicization of the public in Istanbul and other Turcophone Ottoman centers. In this period, Ottoman politicians and intellectuals carried on a great debate in the press over reform and constitutionalism, in which younger cliques of intellectuals began challenging the sufficiency of the old Tanzimat philosophy of reform from the top down as autocratic, inefficient, subject to European pressures, and dangerous to the vitality of Islam. In short, a dissident philosophy of populist, nativist democracy found its way into the press through the efforts of a new generation of committed journalists.

These politically engaged writers on the whole belonged to the diffuse and often fractious movement that has become known as the Young Ottomans. Discussions of this political current have tended to focus on a handful of bureaucrats and intellectuals resident in the Ottoman capital (when, of course, they were not in exile). But in important senses, this movement had a wide influence throughout the Middle East, extending even to Iran. If the Young Ottomans had an influence in foreign lands, how much more likely is it that their debate on political reforms had an impact on the Arabophone regions of the empire itself? These areas differed in their relationship to the center. The provinces of geographic Syria, directly ruled by the sultan through rotating governors, came to participate quite centrally in the representative government of the mid-1870s, sending delegates to the first Ottoman parliament of 1877. The experiment thus had an immediate if short-lived effect on Damascus. The movement also had some significance for vassal states such as Egypt, which before 1876 was viewed as more progressive than the center because of Isma'îl's creation of the chamber of deputies.

Young Ottoman ideas came into Egypt through four channels. First, one of the Young Ottomans, Khedive Isma'îl's brother Mustafa Fadil Pasha (d. 1875), came from Egypt, even though he made his career mainly in Istanbul. He maintained a network of supporters in Cairo, despite his virtual exile as a rival for the governorship of Egypt, and Egyptian writers surely knew of his reformist ideas.²² Second, Egyptian intellectuals read Turkish-language periodicals published in Istanbul and Europe, as well as European newspapers reporting on Ottoman affairs. Third, even the Isma'îl-supported *al-Jawâ'ib*, published in Arabic from Istanbul by Ahmad Faris ash-Shidyaq, demonstrated slightly progressive leanings and certainly reported fully on the constitutionalist period in the mid-1870s. It maintained a full network of regular distributors in Egypt. Finally, Syrian immigrants to Egypt who had come more directly under reformist influences during the prime ministership of Midhat Pasha brought constitutionalist ideas with them.

Mustafa Fadil's writings, and subsequent patronage for progressive Ottoman journalism in Europe and Istanbul, brought him into close touch with a group of dissident intellectuals who had formed a secret organization they called the Patriotic Alliance. The Young Ottomans, including figures such as Namık Kemal and Ebüzziya Tevfik, made an alliance with progressive nobles such as Midhat Pasha, and finally succeeded in achieving an Ottoman constitution and parliament in the years 1876–78.²³ They deposed Sultan Abdülaziz, and attempted to impose the new institutions on the young Abdülhamid II, but the latter managed to set them aside and to revert to imperial absolutism from 1878.

The struggle over constitutionalist ideas in the Ottoman press hardly went unnoticed in Cairo. Despite Egypt's seeming step toward parliamentary government with Isma'îl's convening of a chamber of deputies in 1866, absolut-

ism remained the Egyptian political reality. The chamber of delegates, far from representing an independent branch of government, merely constituted a largish advisory council within the executive. Isma'îl, like a child tired of a new toy, even stopped convening it for a while in the 1870s. The establishment of this body satisfied few in Egypt with constitutionalist leanings, and, excitingly enough, the Young Ottomans clearly wanted to go much further than Egypt had. Turkish-language periodicals found their own distribution network in Egypt, and Egyptian intellectuals read them avidly.²⁴

Even more accessible, of course, was *al-Jawâ'ib*, an Arabophone newspaper based in the Ottoman capital and published by the Lebanese convert to Islam Ahmad Faris ash-Shidyâq with subvention from Khedive Isma'îl.²⁵ Although originally similar to at-Tahtawi and his generation in Egypt in regard to political views, ash-Shidyâq in the 1870s clearly felt the impact of Young Ottoman and constitutionalist ideas. One must remain aware here of the gradations of political sentiment in the Ottoman Empire. Conservatives favored the status quo ante of before the Tanzimat reforms, particularly those of 1856, which granted Christians civil equality with Muslims and began the secularization of law. The Tanzimat reformers themselves may thus be seen as slightly left of center, as must those who supported a cabinet form of government rather than direct monarchical rule. Such men as Fuad Pasha and Âli Pasha, however, pushed the reforms from the top down, presiding over an increasingly powerful corporation of government administrators, and they opposed decentralization of authority. The autocracy of the sultan therefore at times found an ally in the elite reformism of the Tanzimat men. The Young Ottomans challenged both. A few Tanzimat supporters among high officials, such as Midhat Pasha and Rüşdü Pasha, came likewise in the 1870s to support constitutionalism, allying themselves, however uneasily, with the Young Ottoman intellectuals.

Ash-Shidyâq belonged during the 1860s to the camp of the Tanzimat reformers, and his newspaper constituted the major Arabic-language voice for their concerns. But he appears to have moved toward the Tanzimat left wing in the 1870s, and during the short-lived constitution and constituent assembly he forthrightly defended consultative, parliamentary government. He began by setting forth his views on forms of government somewhat obliquely in the early 1870s, especially with regard to the fall of the French Empire and the rise of the Third Republic. Drawing on the views of an American journalist, he reserved special praise for English, Belgian, and American forms of polity and political economy, but suggested that a constitutional monarchy was as good as a republic. Here one feels that the use of the American journalist as his authority and the discourse about distant events in France form little more than a screen, that the real subject is the need for a constitutional monarchy in the Ottoman Empire to forestall the sort of turmoil that racked France.²⁶

During the constitutional period of 1876–78, ash-Shidyâq supported the

new restrictions on the sultan wholeheartedly. He argued that Islam mandated consultative government, that absolutist rule was inevitably unjust, that to attempt to void the principle of consultation was tantamount in Islam to the commission of forbidden sins.²⁷ Nor did he feel that the simple institution of cabinet government entirely fulfilled the mandate to consult. He insisted that

The intent of the phrase "assemblies of consultation" is those assemblies that the delegates of the community attend, having been legally elected. The phrase does not refer to cabinets attended by the ministers and agents of the country's ruler, for this regime cannot dispense with a parliament, insofar as the members of the aforementioned cabinet will compete with one another to please the ruler so as to avoid losing their posts.²⁸

He saw the parliament as a force balancing the power of the sultan, and encouraged the members of parliament not only to discuss the welfare of the subjects, but to criticize government actions when they felt them to be wrong.²⁹

With the dramatic achievement of a constitution and an elected parliament in 1876–78 the Ottoman center leapt far beyond Egypt in adopting liberal democratic reforms. Khedive Isma'îl either chose to support this movement in Istanbul in hopes it would give the vassal states more autonomy, or simply could not rein in journalistic clients such as ash-Shidyāq, whose encomiums on democratic government circulated widely back in Egypt, as well. The liberal ideals did not shine long, and the looming shadow of Russian victory in the war of 1877–78 finally eclipsed them. Already in February 1877 the sultan dismissed the reformist first minister Midhat Pasha, both for his intransigence in dealing with European demands, and from dislike of his constitutionalist convictions. A year later, in February 1878, with the Ottoman defeat, the young Sultan Abdülhamid used the state's weakness as a pretext to dissolve a reprobating parliament and to interpret the constitution thereafter in an absolutist manner—in effect putting both in limbo until the Young Turk revolution of 1908.³⁰ As the Ottoman state turned to reaction, partially under Prussian and Russian tutelage, the sultan lightly discarded a generation of liberal political work by Ottoman intellectuals and notables.

The dismissal of Midhat Pasha and the subsequent dissolution of parliament disquieted not only constitutionalists in Egypt, but even its Ottoman-Egyptian elite. Egypt and the other vassal states had not sent members of parliament to Istanbul, but apparently Cairo hoped for greater autonomy or greater influence over affairs at the center should the experiment in democracy succeed. The British consul in the Egyptian capital reported that

The news of the fall of Midhat Pasha has caused much surprise and disappointment here.

The Viceroy and the Turkish Pashas at the head of affairs, who are in constant commn. with Constantinople, believed or professed to believe that the reforms inau-

gured by Midhat Pasha were really serious, that they were the commencement of a new era which would give a fresh lease of life to the Ottoman Empire.³¹

If even the autocratic Ismaʿil and his Ottoman-Egyptian nobles, who had serious differences with the notables in Egypt's own chamber of deputies, grew alarmed at Midhat's fall, then supporters of constitutionalism within Egypt suffered even greater chagrin. Ismaʿil probably feared that Abdülhamid's turn toward absolutism might take the form of attempts to regain central control over the vassal states. Advocates of constitutionalism within Egypt, on the other hand, clearly took the two-year liberal experiment in the imperial center as a potential role model. Abdülhamid therefore disappointed both the major political forces in Egypt, and may have thus fostered a willingness to seek other imperial lieges among its nobles and a greater protonationalism among its notables.

The importance for Egyptian thought and political developments of the Young Ottoman movement and the brief constitutional monarchy in the center seems self-evident, and I will present further evidence for it later on. The way in which the standard accounts of Egypt in this period make little or no mention of the Ottoman precedent points to the pitfalls of "country history," and of projecting back into the nineteenth century the nationalism and isolation from Istanbul characteristic of Egypt in the twentieth. Aside from the publications of the Young Ottomans and of the constitutionalists of 1876–78 in Istanbul, writers within Egypt took up the ideals of this movement, prominent among them some Syrian Christian journalists.

Quite aside from its political goals, the Ottoman constitutional movement pointed in several ways to the new importance of printing and journalism. The Young Ottomans demonstrated the importance of the private press as an agent of political change, using it to promote a parliamentary form of government. The combination of patronage from liberal nobles such as Mustafa Fadil and the healthy subscriptions generated by political controversy proved a winning one. We have already seen Namık Kemal's testimony to the impressive increase in circulation and readership figures in this period, suggesting a much expanded public role for the press. Whether Syrian Christian publishers operating in Egypt such as Adib Ishaq imitated this formula or reinvented it, it certainly reoccurs in Egypt during the late 1870s.

The Expansion of Political Journalism

If Namık Kemal can be believed, from the beginnings of private newspapers in the 1860s through their multiplication in the late 1870s, the typical readership of an Ottoman news sheet increased ten times, from 500 to 5,000 copies. Remember, however, that readership differs from circulation. Modern mass-

market magazines tell their advertisers that every issue sold is read by an average of three persons. Since household size would have been much larger in the nineteenth-century Middle East, the average family of merchants, bureaucrats, or others of the middling sort should have provided four or five literate readers for any newspaper bought or subscribed to. If families read important news aloud, the multiplier would have been even higher.

From about 1876, a private press that concerned itself more directly with politics began to appear in Egypt, relieving the politically conscious of a dependence on the publications of Istanbul and Europe. The circulation of these Egyptian periodicals appears to have risen throughout the late 1870s and early 1880s. Reliable circulation estimates for individual newspapers, however, are hard to find. Yaʿqub Sannuʿ, editor of the expatriate *Abu nazzarah zarqaʿ* (Inspector Blue-Spectacles), claimed to have achieved a circulation of 10,000 copies for his newspaper in Egypt among a small elite of literate nobles, notables, and the middle strata.³² It is tempting to dismiss Sannuʿ’s circulation estimate as a wild exaggeration, given what can be discovered about other newspapers. Certainly, it was not typical. In Namik Kemal’s reckoning 10,000 would have been a huge circulation, twice the Istanbul norm for readership alone in the late 1870s. Most periodicals reported substantially lower estimates. Salim an-Naqqash published two politically middle-of-the-road newspapers in 1880–82: the daily *al-Mahrusah* and the weekly *al-ʿAsr al-jadid*. The Egyptian government put the circulation of the daily at around 2,000, and that of the weekly at 800.³³ The number of readers could, however, fluctuate. A biographer of Adib Ishaq, an-Naqqash’s sometime partner, wrote that when he published a controversial article in *al-Mahrusah* in 1882, attacking a man who had calumniated him to the khedive, the circulation of the newspaper shot up to 2,000 in Cairo alone.³⁴ More provocative and stylistically exciting periodicals apparently did somewhat better. ʿAbduʿllah an-Nadim printed 3,000 copies of the first issue of his humorous political magazine, *at-Tankit wa at-tabkit* (It is to Laugh, it is to Cry), and said he only had five returned to him by dealers. Subsequent runs sold out the minute they were printed, finding a wide distribution in both town and country.³⁵ One suspects that circulation climbed farther from the initial range of 3,000, for Nadim transformed the paper into the unofficial mouthpiece of the ʿUrabists in the autumn of 1881, changing the name to *at-Taʿif*.

Even using the contemporary multiplier of three readers per copy would suggest a readership of some 6,000 for the moderate *al-Mahrusah*. This result is in the same range as Namik Kemal’s estimate for Turkish newspapers in the late 1870s. But given the extended-family households of the nineteenth century, one could expect an even larger readership, of perhaps 8,000, on a circulation of 2,000. Of course, *al-Mahrusah* was only one of several newspapers being published in this period. In the fall of 1881, *al-Ahram*, *al-ʿAsr al-jadid*, *al-Burhan*, *al-Hijaz*, *al-Iskandariyyah*, *al-Jawaʿib*, *al-Kawkab al-misri*, *al-*

Mufid, *at-Taʿif*, *al-Watan*, and *al-Waqaʿiʿ al-misriyyah* also competed with one another in the market, not to mention the expatriate newspapers smuggled into the country on a large scale. At an average circulation of 2,000, the legally published newspapers in the fall of 1881 would have had a combined circulation of 24,000; even at a low three readers per copy, they would have had some 72,000 readers at the very least. Of course, some readers subscribed to or bought more than one of these, reducing the total number of readers, but the multiplier here used is already so small that if anything I have erred on the side of caution. Remember, too, that the smuggled expatriate newspapers have been excluded from the reckoning, simply because their circulation is impossible to estimate.

No matter how tentative, this result is quite extraordinary. In 1860 Egypt had no Arabic-language newspaper, the official gazette having ceased publication for budgetary reasons. Even when it started up again in 1863, the government broadsheet probably had a small circulation. For the regular consumers of newspapers to have risen from zero to tens of thousands in the course of twenty years indicates a virtual revolution in the consciousness of the literate strata. Around 1 percent of Egyptians (and a much higher percentage of adults) probably read the newspaper, and those readers belonged to the most powerful social classes. Again, I want to stress that I do not think the expansion of press readership caused any political events. On the other hand, the way in which the literate strata became more closely linked to political trends in the capital, and exposed to the ideologies promulgated by particular editors and political clubs, made the practice of national politics possible. As a practical matter, as well, the press supplied activists nation-wide with timely and crucial information once they decided to oppose viceregal absolutism and European hegemony.

The newspapers made available new ways of thinking and political information even to the ordinary folk, through a network of functionally literate primary-school and seminary graduates. The folk culture of Egypt, in turn, had an important effect on some newspapers. Intellectuals such as Yaʿqub Sannuʿ and ʿAbduʿllah an-Nadim spent enough time with workers and peasants to borrow their colloquial forms of discourse for satiric periodicals such as *Abu nazzarah zarqaʿ* and *at-Tankit wa at-tabkit*. The use of colloquial Egyptian Arabic rather than standard literary Arabic in turn made such newspapers especially accessible to ordinary folk. The contemporary Swiss observer, John Ninet, wrote that Sannuʿʿs publications “gained an immense circulation.” He added of the same publisher’s newsheets that in the late 1870s “there was hardly a donkey boy of Cairo, or of any of the provincial towns, who had not heard them read, if he could not read them himself; and in the villages I can testify to their influence.”³⁶

Mikhaʿil Sharubim, a contemporary historian, describes the mood in Egypt in the fall of 1881, after the departure of an Ottoman investigative team sent to

discover the causes of unrest in the army and among the populace, amid speculation that the sultan might depose the viceroy of Egypt, Tawfiq:

The people of Egypt had a desire to know, in those days, what would happen after the arrival of the delegation back in the capital of the empire. They increasingly wondered what was in the newspapers, and began buying more of them. Those among the common people with no knowledge of reading were forced to seek the company of someone who had a smattering of it. I used to see them in the streets of Cairo and the old city, crowds of them, gathered about a man, or a boy from among the Qur'an-school pupils, while he read to them the translation of a piece by the publisher of the London *Times* or . . . another foreign newspaper. All the time, they clamored and shouted, "There is no power save through God!" This practice became common among the people of the market and among followers of low trades, such as the dyers, oil dealers and barbers. One day I saw a boy in a green-grocer's shop, with one of the Arabic newspapers in his hand. In front of the shop a large gathering of rabble crowded around the boy while he read the text to them.³⁷

Here we find a common theme among contemporary writers on the rise of political journalism. The political crises of the late 1870s through 1882 created an ever larger market for newspapers by piquing the curiosity of the public as to political outcomes. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78 led to increased circulations for newspapers in Egypt, and circulations jumped once more during the crisis of 1879, which culminated in the removal of the European cabinet members and the deposition of Khedive Isma'îl.³⁸ The restlessness of the military and the move toward a constitutional regime in 1881, according to Sharubim, had a similar impact. One might conclude that a feedback loop existed whereby the political dramas provoked by the integration of Egypt into the North Atlantic-centered world-system helped create a newspaper-reading public in the Nile Valley. The thirst of this audience enticed newspapers to respond to the market by covering politics more straightforwardly. But the resultant creation of an informed public opinion among Egyptians threw up barriers to growing European influence that helped bring about further crises.

The very form taken by the press in Egypt changed greatly over the period 1876–80, as Ramzi M. Jayyid has carefully documented.³⁹ Compared with the official gazette of the 1860s and early 1870s, the late 1870s saw an increase in the proportion of editorials and cultural essays in relation to hard news. News of foreign affairs occupied some 50 to 60 percent of the space, compared with 40 percent earlier on; much of the foreign news consisted of translations from the wire services. News of the provinces was reported more frequently, and *al-Ahram* innovated in sending out roving reporters from the capital to cover news in more remote regions. Jayyid found in the late 1870s that the rambling essay full of rhyming prose and parallelisms yielded some ground to a moder-

ately pyramidal style of journalistic writing, wherein the writer sparely proceeds through the facts by order of importance. The wire service reports, which Egyptian journalists translated into Arabic, often provided them with models for the pyramid style. Jayyid found a decline in rhetorical flourishes, and less exaggerated praise of a noble or notable when his name was mentioned. Reportage of international news moved most decisively in this direction, becoming almost telegraphic in style under the influence of the wire services. Correspondents' reports kept the literary flourishes the longest.

From the mid-1870s several developments in material culture interacted with changes in mentality. The rise of a privately owned press, especially one that published newspapers accessible even to many ordinary persons, took key decisions about the shape of print culture out of government hands. The technology of the printing press and of telegraphy led writing away from medieval concerns with rhymed prose and parallelisms for the sake of preserving the text from copyists' errors. The new concerns for concision and intelligibility, partially deriving from market forces, helped introduce a new prose style and, perhaps, a new sort of readers' consciousness. These changes in turn increased the accessibility of printed literature, as did the occasional experiments with the use of colloquial Egyptian Arabic in some journals. The readership of Arabic-language newspapers rose from nothing in 1860 to a few hundred in the early 1870s, and to tens of thousands in 1881. In these two short decades, Egypt went from having nothing that could be called a public opinion to being the sort of country where crowds of ordinary persons crowded around Qur'an-school boys in the market to hear news of the latest political maneuverings of Gladstone and Sultan Abdülhamid. The "Long Revolution" of Raymond Williams occurred in the blink of an eye in Egypt and much of Afro-Asia. Of course, this extension in the network of communications had an economic as well as a technological context, and it is time to consider it.

The Business of the Arab Renaissance

A private press could not have grown up without a sufficient readership, implying a growth in literacy since 1860. Nor could it have made such progress unless potential readers could afford to buy daily newspapers, requiring a certain level of income among the reading public. But aside from these basic prerequisites, what did setting up in business as a newspaper publisher in Egypt require in the way of material and political resources? How did the market affect the content of newspapers, and what strategies did publishers adopt to increase circulation? How, in turn, did the business side of publishing affect political journalism, and hence public opinion? These questions cannot yet be answered fully, but some available documents and editorials point toward some basic conclusions.

The major private publishing houses of late viceregal Egypt tended to put out both books and newspapers, but for most of them we still have relatively little information about their finances. One of the publishing houses, al-Mahru-sah Press, however, submitted a brief on assets and expenses to the Egyptian government, seeking restitution for damage done during the revolution in 1882. The owner-editor estimated the value of its warehouse copies of ʿAli Mubarak’s four-volume ʿ*Alam ad-Din* in 1883 at Fr 60,000 (around 2,400 Egyptian pounds at the official rate), and its other book stock at Fr 10,000 (£E 400 tariff).⁴⁰ A large four-volume work typically sold for £E 2.50, suggesting that two years after its publication an-Naqqash still had about 1,000 unsold sets of ʿ*Alam ad-Din*, an imaginary travelogue to Europe. On the other hand, ordinary books ran 10 to 20 piasters, so that an-Naqqash may have had 2,000 or 3,000 other book copies in his warehouse. That a private press could possess this sort of print capital at the end of our period points to a serious change in the book-publishing environment during the 1870s, with private bourgeois publishers taking on projects that formerly would have been handled by the government press. Their willingness to step in suggests increased book-buying, and, in turn, a large pool of literate Egyptians able to afford this luxury. This change, of course, occurred among the middle strata, and did not affect the vast majority of the population. The rise of a private political press probably had more implications for the consciousness of the ordinary folk.

The first private newspaper, Abu’s-Suʿud Effendi’s weekly *Wadi an-nil*, founded in 1867, depended in large part for income on donations from the viceroy, causing many to dismiss it as a propaganda organ. In 1872 Ismaʿil gave it a hefty £E 280 subsidy.⁴¹ It seems unlikely that *Wadi an-nil* or its successor, *Rawdat al-akhbar*, could have run as they did from 1866 to 1879 solely through government donations. But such help did keep subscription and newsstand prices down. The cost of a subscription in 1870, of only one Egyptian pound per year, was small for the middle strata. Advertising, too, was low, at 4 piasters per line inside and 2 piasters on the back page. Abu’s-Suʿud worried about his publications remaining inexpensive enough to fulfill their mission as an “open school.” In 1870 he began running an advertisement for his own *Wadi an-nil* press, promising that book prices would come down by as much as one-third. A new, smaller typeface allowed him to print thirty-six lines per page rather than thirty-three, saving 10 percent in costs. He also acquired new, more efficient printing machinery. He estimated higher print runs would save another 15 percent, for he planned to double the number of book copies he printed from 1,000 to 2,000. He also in 1870 began taking up subscriptions for planned books, such as the *Travels of Ibn Battutah* and a collection of holy sayings from the Prophet, promising a discount for prepublication subscribers.⁴²

The debt crisis gradually dried up government support, opening the way to more genuinely private presses. Starting up a newspaper could be a risky busi-

ness in the 1870s, and print entrepreneurs often moved cautiously. Even though Syrian Christian immigrants Salim and Bisharah Taqla received permission to begin a new private newspaper, *al-Ahram*, late in 1875, they spent seven months attempting to find subscribers, and even printed up a facsimile copy for promotional purposes, before actually going to press in August 1876.⁴³ On the other hand, the inexpensiveness of hiring a printer in the 1870s allowed less cautious journalists of small means to put out a newspaper if only they could secure a license. Adib Ishaq was able to prepare and print the first issue of *Misr* (Egypt) in 1877 for 20 francs (all he had in his pocket), but it sold well enough to allow him to continue with it. Journalists under these conditions obviously enjoyed more independence of opinion than was common later in the nineteenth century, when the costs of publishing a newspaper increased substantially. As will be discussed later, this relative independence of some journalists had implications for their ability and willingness to espouse radical causes.⁴⁴

Although a modest newspaper could be started up on a shoe-string, especially if the editor farmed out the printing to someone else, the actual establishment of a publishing house could be costly. Only such a move, on the other hand, could ensure healthy profits for the editor. Salim an-Naqqash, Adib Ishaq's partner, said he spent Fr 13,000 (£E 520 tariff) in fixing up his printing press, used for the various newspapers he edited from 1877 to 1882. He asserted that his earnings from newspaper subscriptions, advertising revenues, and book sales amounted to Fr 2,000 (£E 80 tariff per month). He also admitted that he had been able to afford a Fr 16,000 home in Alexandria.⁴⁵ A year's subscription to the daily *al-Mahrusah* cost an average of Fr 30 per copy, so a circulation of 2,000 would have given him a gross income of Fr 60,000 per year or Fr 5,000 per month. Since, as he noted, he had advertising revenues from private and state announcements, and published a weekly newspaper and individual book volumes in addition to the daily, an-Naqqash's stated net profits of Fr 2,000 per month seem entirely reasonable—even taking into account overhead costs and subscription payment defaults.⁴⁶ Advertising revenues may have been especially important, given the decline of government subvention in the late 1870s. *Al-Mahrusah* charged one franc per line for advertisements (fifty times greater than the rate of *Wadi an-nil* a decade earlier), and often ran a display for Midland Co. Engineers. An-Naqqash and his partner Ishaq had also managed to have their newspapers appointed to publish judicial announcements, for which the government remunerated them.

Still, much revenue came from subscriptions, creating an impetus to respond to market demands. The development of networks of agents and correspondents in the provinces, and the practice of printing letters from readers, could help circulation by allowing the inclusion of news of local as well as national interest. A paragraph from *al-Mahrusah* demonstrates how such market pressures could work:

Some merchants in the Sudan requested that we publish from time to time an overview of the condition of Sudanese commerce that would contain a description of imports into that region and of exports from it to Europe, as well as current prices and other useful information. We have responded to their request and appointed someone to provide us with such details. We have begun in this issue to mention the situation regarding some Sudanese imports.⁴⁷

The importance of newspapers for indigenous trade and commerce in this period, then, encouraged merchants to lobby for wider coverage. Editors' gradual acquiescence in these requests had the effect of extending the readership of their newspapers outside Cairo and Alexandria. Newspaper editors sought not only to provide subscribers with valuable political and commercial information, but also to build a reputation for producing a better product for news consumers. Editors in consequence became increasingly aware of issues in the reliability of news-gathering techniques. Adib Ishaq and Salim an-Naqqash asserted that their newspapers differed from others in reporting only news gathered from eyewitnesses, whereas some of their competitors depended on hearsay.⁴⁸

In the search to vindicate their claims of serving their readers, editors also began playing public advocacy roles. These actions had the advantage of creating a sympathetic view of the newspapers among the public, as well as providing spicy copy that could help sales. Ishaq and an-Naqqash sometimes singled out lower-ranking officials for special opprobrium. When they accused one 'Abd'u'llah Ma'mun, a police chief at the village of Faris Kur, of a serious offense, his superiors suspended him only a few days after his appointment. When he found another position the journalists warned him that they would be watching him for signs of illegal activity. In the liberalized atmosphere of the summer of 1879, they began launching accusations against even high-ranking provincial officers. Their correspondent in Tanta provoked an official government investigation of 'Ali Bey Wahbi, deputy governor of Gharbiyyah province, by printing accusations against him of wronging local subjects. They also accused the governor of El Fayum of complicity with plunderers.⁴⁹ The public learned how to use modern media such as newspapers and the telegraph to protest overtaxation and oppression. At first, perhaps, villagers believed that the khedive and his ministers would stop the overtaxation if only they knew. The headmen of the village of Korosko, believing that their letters of protest to Cairo were being intercepted by the corrupt local official who had laid excessive imposts on them, resorted to telegraph to get their message through to the capital.⁵⁰ By the late 1870s, however, many may have felt public embarrassment though the newspapers were a more effective way to deal with oppressive functionaries. In both instances, new media allowed new forms of protest.

Newspapers that openly criticized officials by name, however, played an

extremely dangerous game. For all the heightened public good will and increased circulation they might thereby gain, they ran the risk of fines and closure under the khedive's tight censorship policies. The system of censorship and its implications for political culture will be discussed later. Here it will suffice to note that such criticism of public officials often drew down punishments on editors' heads. When the iron-gloved prime minister, Riyad Pasha, in 1879 exiled Adib Ishaq and closed down the newspapers associated with his name, his partner, Salim an-Naqqash, began a new periodical, *al-Mahrusah*. Therein he explicitly refused to carry praise or condemnation for specific officials, a policy that greatly contrasted with that of his previous newspaper.⁵¹

The bourgeois radicalism of some newspaper editors becomes easier to understand. First, a successful newspaper would gain the publisher admission into the ranks of the wealthy, even if he started out with a relatively small investment. It would attract patronage as well as subscriptions, tying the publisher to some personality or grouping in the aristocracy or notable class. Once the government decided to allow a private press to grow up, however, the publishers always had the option of opposing the state. Market forces encouraged editors to play public advocacy roles against tyrannical or corrupt officials, and a newly aroused public opinion forced high officials to pay attention when the press exposed official wrongdoing. At the same time, market forces also encouraged the extension of press coverage to the provinces, where propertied families wanted to stay informed about major local as well as national developments. Provincial officials had less power than those resident in the capital, and the press therefore singled them out for criticism. Where the central state acted to suppress such criticism, editors often decided that the extra circulation, income, and influence did not offset the risk of imprisonment or exile, and they scaled back their criticism of officialdom accordingly. In view of such dangers, many of the new intellectuals wrote for the press anonymously, such as Ibrahim al-Laqqani and Muhammad 'Abduh, or quietly influenced the editorial stance of Syrian Christian publishers. Some journalists returned, however, to exposés of government corruption whenever the state seemed weak or divided.

The conjuncture of rising public literacy, the coming to consciousness of a cohort of modern intellectuals, an expanding impact of the printing press, and a privatization of journalism and of publishing occurred in Egypt at a time of great political tensions. This compressed revolution in culture and communication coincided with a greatly increased integration of the Nile Valley into the western European capitalist world economy through the cotton boom, the Suez Canal, and the debt crisis. The expansion of external trade and heightened prosperity among some sectors of the population help explain increases in population growth rates, the growth of cities, the expanding educational sys-

tem, and the growing market for private journalism in the 1870s. The growth of newspaper readership also hinged on public interest in the crisis of the state engendered by European economic and political penetration of the country, and by a growing conflict between dominant ethnicities and classes on the one hand, and middling or subaltern ones on the other. The incipient conflict ranged large elements of the Egyptian intelligentsia, urban guilds, and peasantry against the more conservative Ottoman-Egyptian nobles, the Arab notables with huge estates, and European and Levantine money-lenders and speculators. In this conflict the new media, especially newspapers and the telegraph, became very useful tools for the antagonists.

Neither journalism nor the intellectuals were alone in becoming more politicized as European diplomatic and financial hegemony loomed, a hegemony made concrete and oppressive by soaring domestic taxes for external debt-servicing. The ordinary Egyptians began to size up politics for the succor it might offer them from khedivial absolutism and overtaxation. Political crises such as the Russo-Ottoman War, the rise of the nativist faction, the deposition of Isma'îl, and the upheavals of 1881–82, provoked the Egyptian artisans and workers to listen to, if not read, what the newspapers had to say. The conservative Qur'an schools that instilled literacy in some Egyptians had delivered to them a dual message—of obedience to duly constituted Islamic authority and defense of Muslim norms and autonomy. Once the khedives were reduced to lackeys of the Europeans, the conservative message of obedience to sultans was replaced by the other edge of the sword: a radical Islamic nativism that encouraged believers to challenge their state if it kowtowed to infidel imperialists.

The vast expansion of the elementary school system in Egypt in the 1860s and 1870s created a critical mass of functionally literate ordinary folk up and down the Nile Valley with sudden access to the world of politics through the new private press. Mikha'il Sharubim thought the practice of Qur'an-school graduates reading aloud to barbers, dyers, and the crowds at greengrocers' shops became quasi-institutionalized during 1881 and 1882. The popular classes interacted with the intellectuals in this manner, as evidenced by the preference among some journalists for colloquial Arabic. Even the majority of newspapers that chose to employ a modern standard Arabic created a new, simpler prose style that reflected the influence of novel technologies such as the printing press and telegraphy, as well as of an expanding readership and market forces demanding clarity and concision. The press and Arabic printed literature helped create in their audience a new and widespread sense of collective participation in the great events of the day, which in turn laid the basis for the emergence of a new sort of national consciousness.⁵² The bourgeois private publishers increasingly moved the tone of their newspapers away from the obsequy of the government press and toward frequent demonstrations of sympathy with the plight of workers, artisans, and the middling sort being crushed

by autocracy and taxes. They thus sent an implicit message that the Arabophone intelligentsia and the Egyptian middle strata were more worthy of the people's trust and confidence than the Ottoman nobles that dominated the highest government posts. Such a message accorded with the critical discourse that the intellectuals increasingly inscribed in print culture, and, for the publishers, it just constituted good business. The specific ways in which social groups within Egypt took advantage of the new interconnectedness of their province, the forms of organization and of collective action they created in the new imploded social geography, must be our next object of investigation.

Five

Political Clubs and the Ideology of Dissent

WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN how a new and growing stratum of intelligentsia was formed in the 1860s and 1870s, and how increased literacy and the greater impact of print media bolstered their social importance. Those intellectuals involved in political clubs and organizations who also attempted through their writings and speeches to reformulate the bases of Egyptian society and culture fell into two broad groups. These included the cosmopolitan minority thinkers, mainly from a Syrian Christian or Jewish background, and the younger Muslim liberals and radicals. The Syrian Christians tended to be involved in import-export commerce, whereas the Muslims most often derived from a medium landed background and entered government service, forming part of a service gentry. Some of the dissident politicians derived from the Ottoman and Circassian elite, who sometimes made common cause with the intellectuals from the late 1870s. Although it may be useful to clarify the social groups to which the major intellectuals of the period belonged and to specify their class origins and positions, such a broad level of analysis fails to account for many specificities in which historians are generally interested. I want to achieve a tighter focus, on the salons and organizations whereby members of social classes and religious communities that came to oppose European hegemony and/or viceregal absolutism established mutual networks. Such a focus will allow us to answer crucial questions concerning the mobilization of resources by oppositionist thinkers. These include the questions of how the reformers and radicals organized to attain their goals, how these organizational settings influenced their ideologies, and how their ideas may have contributed to the political mobilization of the notables and even of the urban guilds. Such questions emerge most urgently from the involvement of almost all the intellectuals here discussed with journalism or with the publishing of manifestoes, giving them a potentially wide audience. Students of the French Revolution have suggested that the discontinuous violence and occasional demonstrations of the crowd can best be seen in the context of more continuous, consistent political discourse in clubs and in the pages of the radical press.¹ In Egypt, thousands of notables read the press directly, and the urban artisans and shopkeepers often heard it read aloud in impromptu gatherings and in coffeehouses.

The importance of the press in this period of popular revolt has, of course, been long recognized. But only one work, the unpublished dissertation of Charles Phelps, has discussed the press and the 'Urabi revolt at length.² I be-

lieve a social historian can contribute something original to our understanding of the journalists' ideas and their impact. The contribution of the historian to the study of texts most often lies in establishing precise context and showing the significance of change over time. For a social and cultural historian, however, this historicist task seems most meaningful when combined with two other concerns. The first, the sociological, involves an appreciation of the organizational milieu and the social diffusion of the text, issues often ignored in a straight historicist discussion. The second, textual analysis, deals with the role of image, metaphor, and rhetoric in political discourse.³

I may be able to avoid several misunderstandings of my argument by making two things clear at this point. First, I do not wish to depict the intellectuals of the new middle strata as a dynamic force that somehow imbued more static, traditional peasants or urban artisanal and mercantile classes with a revolutionary fervor by awakening them. I do not believe the intellectuals were more awake than anyone else, and most artisans and peasants needed no newspaper to tell them that their taxes were high, that their government was autocratic, and that foreigners were penetrating their country's economy and administration at dizzying speed. The workers, artisans, and merchants had their own, far from static, history of economic struggle with local conditions, the bureaucracy, and the world market. In the period under discussion, a potent intermingling occurred between the discourses elaborated by liberal and radical intellectuals and the ideas of the popular classes, which the latter had formed in their own social context. The dissident intellectuals could assist their allies in other strata, in addition, by cuing their audiences to crucial conjunctures in high politics and imperial diplomacy. Their contribution lay in both their access to and dissemination of information and their ability, as specialists in the written word, to cast that information in the form of an effective political argument. Their political essays constituted an open text with which the audience could interact, teasing out their full semiotic implications.⁴ In this conception, audiences formed no helpless target of a fully elaborated, crystalline discourse, but rather constituted partners in the enterprise of sign generation and interpretation. Dissident journalism, especially given the circumlocutions and ambiguity forced on it by censorship, was a game it took two to play.

Second, I recognize that the discontented writers discussed below performed only one role in the rather large cast of characters that acted out the crisis of the state. Moreover, larger social structures and economic conditions helped determine the impact of their critical discourse. Still, I believe the ideology elaborated by liberals and radicals, and widely disseminated through the press and through political speechmaking, did have an effect. Its most potent component, a critique of growing European informal empire in Egypt combined with an argument that viceregal absolutism facilitated such foreign penetration, appears to have touched a popular nerve nearly everywhere. My questions, then, turn upon the nature of the ideology promulgated by the main status groups and organizations that together formed the nascent intelligentsia.

The sociological approach to ideology has most often emphasized the social origins and positions of authors, as discussed earlier. A more neglected, but still crucial question for setting the writings of the intellectuals in context has to do with their organizational setting. Just as clubs played an extremely important part in shaping opinion among members of the middle strata in revolutionary France, so salons, clubs, and associations formed a pivotal matrix for the generation of dissident texts in the late 1870s and early 1880s in Egypt. I was fortunate in being able to use a dossier in the Egyptian National Archives, of private papers confiscated from the Iranian activist Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din, that gives great insight into the world of secret organizations in the Egypt of the 1870s. This cache of fascinating documents has never before been analyzed extensively. The primary organizational vehicles for the dissidence of intellectuals developed from about the mid-1870s, usually growing out of more informal salons. Indeed, the distinction between salon and organization in some cases seems difficult to discern. Moreover, the state's ability to penetrate and disable these clubs and societies led sometimes to their subsequent demotion once again to mere salons, or even to less routinized forms of association and common sentiment. Let us, then, examine this question of the organizational milieu of dissident thought first.

One hesitates to bestow the lofty term "organization" on the shadowy and fleeting salons, clubs, and associations that flourished in the dissident underworld under Khedive Isma'il. Still, in this period before the emergence of full-fledged political parties, they carried more social and ideological weight than one might suppose. They succeeded in drawing adherents from the upper echelons of the old regime nobles and notables. Their members frequently launched newspapers, which gave them even greater political significance. The primary such political clubs about which we have enough information to draw some conclusions include the two societies founded by Ya'qub Sannu' in 1874–75; the masonic orders, from the late 1860s; the Young Egypt Society of Alexandria, active in 1879; 'Abdu'llah an-Nadim's Islamic Philanthropical Society, 1879–81; the young officers' clique apparently formed in 1876 by 'Ali ar-Rubi; and the Helwan Society, founded by nobles in 1879. These groups have, of course, received the attention of historians, but their organizational capacity and their ideologies have not been systematically explored.⁵

Organizational Capacity

Resource mobilization theory stresses the importance to organizational capacity of the members' social location. Clearly, organizations drawn from the wealthy have many more resources at their disposal than poor or middle-class organizations with a similar membership size. Only by vastly increasing its membership can an organization of ordinary persons generate the resources to compete with a smaller association of the rich. One issue in the study of an

organization's social location has to do with how recruitment takes place. Peter Smith has put the issue very succinctly:

According to the resource mobilization perspective, the most salient characteristic in the recruitment of the membership of most social movements is prior social interaction. Contact with a movement is normally assumed to follow from significant interaction with its existing members. Recruitment thus tends to follow preexisting and positively valued social relationships, whether these be based on ties of kinship, patronage, or vicinal proximity.⁶

This view of recruitment would not predict a very high level of ideological conformity within organizations, in contrast to a theory of organizations as expressions of growing class consciousness. This view would also suggest that many persons whose structural position in society and personal inclinations led them to be sympathetic to a particular organization's aims might nevertheless not join it if they did not encounter other persons involved in the relevant activities.

The following analysis suggests that an important factor influencing the shape of ideology is religious and ethnic affiliation. That is, membership in an organization most often indicates a broad orientation, whereas social and demographic characteristics of club members sometimes more precisely predict their views on specific controversial issues. The basic division I propose has most salience here would group younger Egyptian Muslims on one side and Syrian Christians on the other. These communities produced most of the dissident journalism in this period, though Coptic Christian newspapers such as *al-Watan* could also be critical of government policy. Ya'qub Sannu', as an Italo-Egyptian Jew in exile, also does not quite fit into this typology, and in many of his stances he came closer to the Egyptian Muslims than to the Syrian Christians.

Organizations face persistent problems of group integration and control. The political clubs met frequently, most often at coffeehouses or private homes. Although membership floated a good deal, one primary source of integration and control derived from face-to-face interaction and feelings of friendship. The development of the postal service under Isma'il, the expansion of the telegraph lines, and the extension of railways, all allowed dissident organizations to keep in better touch with members in other cities. Even in the early 1850s, such communications would have been extremely slow or even impracticable.

The print media often hold great importance for political societies, as an arena for negotiation concerning the social significance of the issues they promote.⁷ The development of newspapers associated with particular clubs formed the most significant means of communication with like-minded persons only infrequently or even never able to attend coffeehouse meetings and salons. Old institutions such as coffeehouses were also turned to new organiz-

ing purposes, as were innovations such as a more timely postal service that employed the steamship to deliver mail. The private press and its expanding audience may have allowed a relatively small number of disgruntled intellectuals and notables to launch a social movement that could not have been mounted with more primitive communication networks.

Cultural Salons

Ya'qub Sannu's societies, referred to in Chapter 3 above, developed out of the cultural salon he founded after censorship called an end to his career as a playwright. In 1874 he began the Circle of Progress (*Mahfil at-Taqaddum*). At meetings held as often as four times a week, he expounded literature and history, especially that of modern France and Italy, to his followers. The khedive's spies, however, breached the circle's security, and he was forced at some point to disband it. In 1875 he founded the Society of the Lovers of Knowledge (*Jam'iyyat Muhibbi al-'Ilm*), which included among its visitors Ahmad 'Urabi, the young Egyptian officer who later led the revolt of 1881–82. The khedive also closed down this second society.⁸ The membership of these salons remains shadowy, but attendees appear to have been drawn from the graduates of Isma'il's civil and military schools. Sannu would have met many of these individuals when he taught in the military schools himself. Even junior officers such as 'Urabi, who lacked a modern education, occasionally attended. The gatherings were small, limited to the number of persons who could comfortably attend lectures in Sannu's home. When these salons were broken up by the state, Sannu became a freemason, and his further activities must be discussed under that heading.

Masonry

Egyptian nobles began entering freemasonry chapters in Egypt as early as the 1840s, as Jacob M. Landau has shown. Many Egyptian Muslims with political aspirations recognized the growing significance of European masonic orders in Egypt, which began admitting significant numbers of local nobles and notables from about 1869. Although, since they were secret societies, the history of the orders is difficult to tease out, the social and political significance of these organizations is easier to depict. As European Powers penetrated Egypt and large numbers of Europeans immigrated there, it was natural that important institutions of European civil society such as masonry should begin taking a more active interest in that country. Within Egypt, the expatriate and the local bourgeoisie and intellectuals increasingly felt the need for a private, neutral ground upon which to meet, since they were separated by culture and religion.

The masonic lodges, with their vague deism and their secrecy, seem to have been accepted by many for this purpose. The political implications of the influx of Egyptians into masonic lodges, where they mixed with Europeans, quickly became clear to some observers. Khedive Isma'îl's rival for the khedivate, his uncle 'Abdu'l-Halim Pasha, was elected Grand Master of the freemasonic Order of the Grand Orient in 1867, before his political exile to Istanbul in 1868, and appears to have used the order to promote his campaign for Isma'îl's deposition in favor of himself throughout the 1870s. The Italian and French chapters possessed the most influence, though in the late 1870s the British Star of the East lodge attracted important local thinkers.⁹ Sannu', on his return to Egypt around 1876, became an active freemason. It was common to belong to more than one order, but it seems certain that at the very least he joined the British Star of the East organized by British consular official Raphael Borg. Borg put Sannu' forward, along with Star of the East leader Niqula Sakruj, as a potential dragoman for the British embassy.¹⁰ Sannu's political satire was often cast in the form of dialogues taking place at secret meetings of a "society." Late in the period under discussion he reported that the society had decided to be less secretive about its stances, and he gave its meeting times in Cairo and Alexandria.¹¹ This "society" may very well have been the Star of the East.

An important confluence occurred when the Iranian activist Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din Asadabadi "al-Afghani" began joining chapters of European masonry in Cairo, bringing his network of young intellectuals along with him. Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din was born in an Azeri Turkish-speaking village near Hamadan, Iran, in 1838. He was educated at the Shi'i theological seminaries of Najaf in Iraq, and he developed an interest in the innovative movements of Shi'ism at that time, particularly the esoteric Shaykhi school, but also in the messianic Babi movement.¹² After travels in India and an attempt to make a political career in Afghanistan, he settled in Cairo in 1871, having been expelled from Istanbul for a heretical comparison of prophets with philosophers. While in Egypt he represented himself as a Sunni Afghan. He received the patronage of Riyad Pasha and was offered a teaching post at al-Azhar, but declined for fear of being bored by the routine there. He instead began teaching and discussing more informally, attracting to his salons and coffeehouse exchanges groups of dissatisfied young Egyptian intellectuals.¹³ Some sought him out because of an interest in Islamic philosophy, as carriers of which Egyptians had long recognized Afghans and Indian Muslims.¹⁴ In the mid-1870s Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din had already begun attempting to penetrate masonic networks in Egypt.

Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din, as an Iranian, moreover, had a precedent. The intellectual and activist Malkum Khan, an Armenian convert to Shi'ism, had brought back to Tehran Saint-Simonian and masonic ideas from Europe in the 1850s. He founded a sort of Iranian masonry, the *faramushkhanih* (house of

forgetfulness), which the shah outlawed in 1861.¹⁵ Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din may thus have had Iranian events as well as Egyptian realities in mind when he turned to masonry. As Nikki R. Keddie has shown, Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din began applying for membership in masonic orders as early as 1875, and succeeded in entering at least one lodge by early 1876. He kept dual memberships in the British and Italian orders throughout the late 1870s.¹⁶

In December 1877 the Britain-based Star of the East Lodge 1355 in Cairo elected Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din its president by a majority of votes.¹⁷ He retained this office for a year and a half. This lodge, apparently only one of several the order maintained in the capital, remained under the ultimate authority of Star of the East leaders such as Syrian Christian Niqula Sakruj. The membership of Lodge 1355 seems to have been around fifty, since when Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din and this order broke with one another he asserted that some forty members followed him out of the lodge, while a few remained.¹⁸ The major claim to fame of Lodge 1355 may be that it succeeded in enrolling young Muslim Egyptian notables who had employment in the lower levels of the government bureaucracy and who typically lived in the older sections of Cairo. Until then, most local masons had been Europeans, Syrian Christians, or Ottoman-Egyptian nobles. Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din may be seen, then, as a precinct leader. His associates in Alexandria were also involved in a masonic lodge. Salim an-Naqqash wrote Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din that "Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh came to see me and I charged him with writing you to inform you concerning the Alexandria lodge, which has achieved marvellous advances."¹⁹ The leaders of the Star of the East closed down Cairo lodge 1355 on 1 July 1879 and forbade its leader from engaging in any further masonic activity until the order's highest leadership (in Europe?) could be consulted, citing Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's political agitation in Egypt.²⁰ According to Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's answers during police interrogation after his arrest, however, the main issue over which he and the Star of the East leadership quarreled had rather to do with which successor to Isma'il each supported. Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din and his followers wanted Isma'il's son Tawfiq, whereas Raphael Borg and other leaders of the Star of the East favored Isma'il's uncle, 'Abdu'l-Halim. The latter's supporters included especially the Syrian Christians.²¹

The masonic lodges showed themselves quite diverse. Europeans, local consular employees and Syrian Christian merchants, and Egyptian lower-level bureaucrats and intellectuals, all mingled together in the lodges. Star of the East leaders included a Maltese British consular official, a Syrian Christian described as "brother of the consular translator," one Rusu Bey, a physician, and another Syrian Christian, "a merchant at as-Sikkah al-Jadidah."²² One report noted that Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's speeches in Alexandria were attended by Muslim seminary students and effendi-class employees of government departments.²³ The common denominator probably lay in a general membership in the intermediate strata, so that class and education counted for more than

religion or ethnicity. The masons appear to have made a conscious effort to reach out to Egyptian Muslim notables in the 1870s, and appear to have succeeded in enrolling several hundred.

Two major funding sources subvented the dissident associations we have been discussing. The first derived from individual dues and contributions of members. The second came from the patronage of the Ottoman and Circassian nobles and the Egyptian notables. Both sources had their problems. Niqula Sakruj complained to Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din concerning his own lodge that some masons were lazy about paying their dues.²⁴ Another letter to Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din from a disciple contains very suggestive references to funding problems, again centering on late payment of dues or late forwarding of dues collected. Salim an-Naqqash wrote to Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din urgently in August 1879, on *Misr* stationery:

Remind the Bey [ʿAbdu's-Salam al-Muwaylihi] of the matter of Raghīb Pasha, especially since we are in dire need of cash and we have many outstanding obligations. Can he kindly make over to us what he has collected? In any case, I am grateful to him. Likewise, remind our brother Muhammad Effendi as-Sadr of the matter of the aid, since we are waiting for it. Some have accused us of siphoning off monies—can anyone hear of such a thing?²⁵

Sayyid Jama'u'd-Din's group, as the reference to Raghīb Pasha shows, often depended on the patronage of the nobles. In 1878 Adīb Ishaq suggested to the Iranian that they attempt to get the printing business of the Customs Department, and that he use his contacts with Riyad Pasha to secure such a contract.²⁶

If the organization, funding, and precise membership of the masonic orders can only be perceived through a glass, darkly, the ideas of some prominent members became very much part of the record. I think it is worthwhile to differentiate the Syrian Christian from the Muslim masons, and to discuss them separately. Let us begin with the Levantine Christians, who constituted themselves, or were constituted by Egyptian society, into castes of intermediaries among Egypt, the Levant, Anatolia, and Europe in commerce, finance, diplomacy, and the press. The concept of the comprador, the local agent of European imperialism, however, seems too simplistic a characterization for this group. Given the large number of Mediterranean Europeans in Egypt, many of whom sought to perform the function of intermediaries, the Levantines often ended up competing with local Europeans. Moreover, many Syrian Christians opposed further European commercial and imperial penetration of Egypt because they feared their own economic displacement.

The journalist Adīb Ishaq stands as an excellent example of an anti-imperialist Syrian Christian. Born in Damascus in 1856, he attended the school of the Lazarus fathers, and studied French and Arabic literature.²⁷ He had to give up his schooling at age 11 to begin work as a customs clerk when his father lost his job; in the Damascus bureaucracy he had an opportunity to learn Turkish. Around 1871, at age 15, he accompanied his father to Beirut, where both

worked for the postal service. He later found employment as a clerk in the Beirut customs house. Ishaq, demonstrating a flair for Arabic literature, began attending literary salons, and at age 17 managed to hire on as a writer for the newspaper *at-Taqaddum* (Progress). In the early 1870s he anonymously published two translations from the French, one on ethics and the other on health, following these with a book of his own. He became the president of a local literary society, and in 1875 at age 19 he translated Racine's *Andromaque*. With his friend Salim an-Naqqash, he became active in authoring and translating stage plays for a troupe in Syria.

In 1876 an-Naqqash proposed that the two move to Alexandria, since (presumably) he had heard of Khedive Isma'il's interest in the theater and generosity to playwright Ya'qub Sannu'. There they put on a revised edition of *Andromaque*, as well as an Arabic version of *Charlemagne*, and wrote an original play, *Coincidences* (*Ghara'ib al-ittifaq*). Apparently because of the khedive's turning away from playwrighting as a genre and his closing of the Alexandria theater, Adib Ishaq suddenly found himself out of work. A friend, Hunayn Khuri, however, suggested to him that Sayyid Jamalud-Din, then in Cairo, could arrange a newspaper license for him. Since Ishaq had previous experience as a journalist, and since he was unemployed, it seems likely that the idea of starting a newspaper was his own rather than that of the Iranian firebrand. The two met, and Sayyid Jamalud-Din did succeed in getting his patron to have Ishaq granted a license. Set up in an office in Bab ash-Sha'riyyah, Ishaq was able to prepare and print the first issue of *Misr* (Egypt) in 1877 for 20 francs (less than one Egyptian pound—all he had in his pocket), but it sold well enough to allow him to continue with it. I have noted above that the relative inexpensiveness of printing at this point allowed rather small-time journalists to have an impact, and helped them maintain a somewhat independent stance in regard to the government and nobles. Probably because news gathering was easier in Alexandria, Ishaq and his partner Salim an-Naqqash subsequently moved their editorial offices there.

Adib Ishaq deserves much greater credit than he has generally received as an advocate of liberal ideals and democratic government. He has been overshadowed by Sayyid Jamalud-Din, a Muslim anticolonial activist with whom later generations of Egyptians felt more in common. Yet nothing in Sayyid Jamalud-Din's background or political activities leads us to see him as a democrat. His native Iran lacked even basic representative institutions and his theological training in Najaf would have hardly exposed him to liberal thought. His public advocacy of parliamentary and constitutionalist ideas from May 1879 grew out of the influence on him of Ottoman and Egyptian political developments and of local thinkers such as Adib Ishaq, rather than the other way around.

Ishaq no doubt benefited from the intellectual influence of Sayyid Jamalud-Din's anti-imperialism, and he joined an Alexandrian branch of the latter's masonic circle with enthusiasm. But Ishaq, after all, had a far more intimate

knowledge of modern European history and political institutions. The advocacy of democracy in his newspapers, therefore, makes more sense as deriving from his Syrian awareness of the Young Ottoman movement and his own reading in French progressive literature. Several political watersheds helped shape Ishaq's political philosophy. As a journalist in Beirut in 1873–75, he surely knew of the debate on constitutionalism in Istanbul, and we know he became a partisan of the Ottoman parliamentary and constitutional system that flourished briefly in 1876–78. Second, through Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din he gained the patronage of Egyptian notables, some of whom came to favor quasi-constitutional controls on the khedive. He joined the masons, an enlightened group of liberal activists from the new middle class. His technical interests as a journalist led him to support freedom of speech and free criticism of government policy. His masonic ideals of service to mankind, his vaguely Young Ottoman political culture, and the patronage links he established in Egypt reinforced these interests.²⁸ It is important for the organizational context of his political ideas to note that he perforce spent more time in meetings of an Alexandrian masonic lodge than he did in Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's Lodge 1355 of the Star of the East order in Cairo. The Alexandrian lodge (presumably also of the Star of the East order) may have had a different sort of membership and intellectual ambience than did that of Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din in Cairo.

Finally, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78 (which Egypt supported by sending troops to the front) stirred Ishaq's patriotism and support of the Ottoman parliament. He explains in a *Misr* article during the war that political authority takes either absolutist (*istibdadi*) or consultative (*shuri*) forms.²⁹ Consultative government, in turn, consists either in a republic or in a constitutional monarchy. He thinks in terms of civilizational stages, such that China had not yet reached a level of culture that would support a consultative government, whereas absolutism was impossible for England. Where the form of government is inappropriate to the stage of civilization attained, the country experiences a revolution, as France did in 1789. He counts the Ottoman Empire and its Egyptian vassal state as among the parliamentary regimes, ranking them with France and Britain against the absolutist states such as Russia. Russia, he writes, lags behind other European states in refusing to adopt consultative government, and even acts to stop other states from fully attaining parliamentary rule. "It has prevented the Ottoman empire from implementing the internal reforms and consultative organization already legislated, through this vicious war."³⁰ He praises the embattled young sultan, now a constitutional monarch, for the way in which he had given life to the hearts of all his subjects and inspired them with a love of the homeland. The Ottoman constitutional context for Ishaq's liberalism within Egypt seems clearly apparent here. In *Misr al-Qahirah* two years after Abdülhamid dissolved the Ottoman parliament and reverted to absolutism, Ishaq is still lamenting the fall of Midhat Pasha and calling for the return of elected delegates in Syria.³¹

Ishaq, a romantic liberal, sees liberty as an almost mystical force shaping modern history. The flame of reform, he writes, was lit first in the French Revolution of 1789, devouring despotism and the tyranny of tradition (*taqalid*), while lighting the way for liberty.³² The enemies of liberty waited, and when they sensed weakness, seized the opportunity to defeat it; their victory proved shortlived, however, and the flame was soon rekindled. This conflagration then spread north to Germany and Russia. In Prussia it took the form of socialism, in Russia of nihilism. "A young Nihilist woman in the land of absolutism dared to fire a bullet quite deliberately at the police chief. She found many supporters. And a socialist youth in the land of hegemony dared to fire thrice at the great conquering king."³³

The flame then remembered its old home, the East, where movements of politics and ethical religion began, spreading to Iran, the ancient home of the prophet Zoroaster. There some thirty years before, Ishaq writes, the Babi religion grew up around the Bab, a Mahdi or messianic figure. The Babis mounted an insurrection against the government, showing an unparalleled boldness and daring. After their leader was killed, a group of Babis fired on the shah in an attempt to assassinate him, in which endeavor they failed. But as recently as 7 April 1878 Babis posing as disgruntled soldiers had penetrated the shah's security and managed to attack his carriage with stones, wounding some retainers.³⁴ The other manifestation of the fire of liberty in the East, Ishaq avers, occurred in Istanbul, where its traces were apparent in the 1876 deposition of Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Aziz. The Ottoman state had fought the advocates of liberty, arresting and exiling them.

Ishaq therefore views the Young Ottomans and Ottoman constitutionalism as a link in the great chain of intellectual movements for liberty. The metaphor of a chain is his, but the more consistent metaphor in this piece is that of a fire. Aside from the metaphor of flames, this piece has a subliminal fixation on assassination or regicide as a manifestation of liberty. That the French monarch was beheaded went without saying. Ishaq mentions that a Socialist attempted to kill the kaiser, and a young Nihilist woman fired at a representative of the tsar's authority. Babis tried to assassinate Nasiru'd-Din Shah, and the Young Ottomans finally succeeded in deposing 'Abdu'l-'Aziz. We know that Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din at one point plotted the assassination of Khedive Isma'il, and the hothouse atmosphere of the Egyptian secret societies of 1878 comes clearly across in this little article. It seems full of implied threats and predictions, and must have only escaped the censor's blue pencil because it presented itself as a mere historical excursus. The foreign settings effectively served as a screen, behind which hatred of Isma'il and his absolutism could half hide.

Ishaq, despite the radical tone of this article, demonstrated more the character of a liberal reformer than that of a revolutionary. He wanted a parliamentary, constitutional monarchy to operate throughout the Ottoman Empire—even in the Ottoman vassal states such as Egypt. This dedication to democracy

characterized many of the Syrian Christian immigrant intellectuals and merchants of Alexandria and Cairo. In the volatile spring of 1879, when some Ottoman nobles and Egyptian notables and intellectuals offered Isma'îl their help in an anti-European alliance on condition that he temper his absolutism and recall the chamber of deputies, Ishaq and an-Naqqash ran an article in their *at-Tijarah* by fellow Syrian Christian Amin Shumayyil advocating "consultative government" (*an-nizam ash-shuri*).³⁵

The dedication to Ottomanism and parliamentary government on the part of many Syrian Christians in Egypt made sense to them in view of their political and economic position. They were insiders if Egypt was Ottoman, outsiders if it was autonomous. Ishaq, for instance, advocates that all Ottoman subjects be allowed to vote in Egyptian municipal elections, and that the rolls should not be restricted to native Egyptians.³⁶ He writes that there are three signs of nationality: language, ethnicity, and political jurisdiction (*as-sultah as-siyasiyyah*). He insists that Ottomans resident in Egypt belong to the Egyptian homeland with all attendant rights and duties. Both in language and in political citizenship, the Syrians in Egypt demonstrated no difference with the Egyptians. Ethnicity among the settled peoples of Eastern nations, he admits, is impossible to specify, because of mixture in previous generations. But the combination of an identical language with an identical political loyalty makes this last criterion irrelevant, he argues. He goes on to point out that some theorists of nationalism even dismissed the importance of language, pointing to the cohesion of such multilingual states as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with its Austrian, Hungarian, Italian, and Jewish groups. These made up a single nation (*ummah*) despite their different origins and languages. In this view, political loyalty alone suffices for national identity. All Ottoman subjects in Egypt, therefore, certainly have the rights and obligations of Egyptians, either on grounds of political jurisdiction or on those of language and ethnicity. The immigrants also demonstrate both an ability to benefit Egypt and share with other inhabitants of the Nile Valley a unity of interests.

Ishaq's discussion of nationalism shows his preference for a definition that would support Ottomanism (specifying the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a model). In this model, Egypt could be mapped as Hungary; surely if a German-speaking Austrian moved to Hungary, he would still have all the rights he enjoyed in his native province, despite differences of ethnicity and language. The other criteria Ishaq mentions, however, and which he never quite relinquished, owed more perhaps to French thinking on nationalism, and though France was hardly homogeneous, it was nearly so in comparison with the polyglot Ottoman Empire. Three omissions seem significant in this discussion. The emphasis on language, while it served the Arabic-speaking Syrian Christians well, would have excluded immigrant Turks and other Ottomans from Egyptian nationality. The backing away from ethnic questions seems surprising today, but one must remember that most Egyptians and Syrian urban

dwellers in the nineteenth century did not usually consider themselves Arabs, a term they most often reserved for pastoral nomads. Finally, the exclusion of religion from even theoretical discussion as a basis for national identity seems an odd omission, though its inclusion would have weakened Ishaq's case. Ironically, it is precisely on the basis of these omitted factors that most Syrian Christians fell out with the nativist faction during the revolution of 1881–82. But that is a subject for a later chapter.

In any case, Ishaq's political thought seeks a place for Syrian Christians in Egypt and in the Ottoman Empire as citizens of a constitutional monarchy. By discussing issues in an abstract and internalist manner, he avoids mentioning their role as middlemen between Europe and Egypt and the empire, in trade and culture. That some Egyptians might see Syrian Christian dragomans, importers, and money-lenders and French teachers as traitors because of their structural position in society does not seem to occur to him. His denial of the importance of religion and ethnicity is consistent, however, and leads him to show little sympathy for the struggle of eastern European Christians to detach themselves from the Ottoman Empire. It also leads him to deride occasional Coptic attempts to depict the Syrian Christians as outsiders. Copts, after all, often sought to fulfill the same functions as the Syrian Christians in Egyptian society, but had less extensive European contacts or knowledge of European languages than the Catholic Maronites or the Eastern Orthodox. For this reason, the Egyptian government began preferring to hire Syrian Christians rather than Copts in its bureaucracy. Ishaq taunts the Copts with their Nilotic orientation, saying they supported Ethiopia against their own country during the war in 1876.³⁷ Syrians, on the other hand, as devoted Ottomans, had Egypt's best interests at heart.

Ishaq and other Syrian Christians in his circle offered a sustained critique of European domination. They complained about the replacement of local administrators and bureaucrats with very highly paid European employees, a policy pushed during the tenure of the two European ministers in the Nubar cabinet. Since Europeans presumably replaced Syrian Christians as well as Egyptians, such discontent probably manifested something other than sheer altruism. Indeed, Ishaq and an-Naqqash gained an ironic reputation as antiforeign, from which they sought to defend themselves. Ishaq says he recognizes the accomplishments of Europeans in many spheres, and the corresponding shortcomings of Easterners in many matters.³⁸ But he maintains that local prominent men know much more about Egyptian conditions than any foreigner could, and so should not be replaced by administrators imported from abroad. He criticizes Europeans in Egypt on three major grounds. First, although they support liberty and equality in their own countries, in Egypt they seek special entitlements for themselves and work against the establishment of consultative government. Although he thinks Egyptians should be grateful for what the Europeans have taught them, he insists that they are only doing their Christian

duty and ought not be rewarded with Capitulations. The Capitulations, a system of special legal privileges granted to some foreigners in the Ottoman Empire, ensured that Europeans would not have to litigate or be tried in Muslim courts before qadis, but would rather receive justice from their own consuls. Ishaq argues that the introduction of Mixed Courts had made the old Capitulations unnecessary.

Second, privileges for Europeans upset class order. Rowdy European workers receive better treatment from authorities than upper-class Egyptians:

Being pardoned for obvious misdeeds has encouraged them to rebel, so that they have acted violently and caused as much mischief as they wished, to the extent that not a day goes by but we hear that such-and-such Italian or Maltese stabbed an Egyptian national with a dagger. The wounded victim is carried to the hospital, whereas the assailant is delivered to the consulate, and put in a luxurious room where he eats gourmet meals. He is released almost as soon as he arrives.³⁹

The kind of Euro-Egyptian violence discussed in the next section, then, helped to sour Egyptian notables and intellectuals on the Capitulations. Finally, he concludes, the Capitulations hurt Egyptians' morale by making others seem superior to them. Ishaq also objects to the Mixed Courts, established primarily for European benefit, because he thinks Egyptian parties to cases in them, especially the peasants, are unlikely to know their rights or even understand the French proceedings. On the other hand, he thinks the courts unduly sensitive to pressures from consuls and government officials, and prefers a unified court system.⁴⁰

Although Ishaq includes the Nihilists and Socialists in his litany of progressive movements, he appears to have had little idea of what they stood for in the late 1870s. He does not even translate their names into Arabic, but simply transliterates them. Later, during and after his Paris exile, he writes in a more informed vein about them. As a newspaper proprietor and spokesman for liberal Egyptian notables, Ishaq had an interest in promoting the security of property. Law thus functions in civilized society, he says, to protect the rights of every individual and "impose punishment on whoever attempts to usurp more than his own allotted portion."⁴¹ On the other hand, he and Salim an-Naqqash have genuine sympathy for artisans and peasants they feel are being grossly overtaxed. They hear the cries of artisans who were bearing a *wirku* tax higher than they can stand, and of peasants physically weakened by the burdens of impossible levies intended to cover the ineptitude of the Ministry of Finance. They also attack the village headmen, depicting them as a rural elite that skim off proceeds that would otherwise go to the central government.⁴² They criticize military spending, supporting Tawfiq's plan to reduce the army to 12,000 men and suggesting that such a move would take pressure off the treasury and release agricultural and artisanal workers into the labor market.⁴³

Ishaq's economic ideas never receive a systematic exposition, but seem generally in line with the paternalistic liberalism of many Egyptian notables at this time. The sanctity of private property and its protection by law serve as bases for condemning the greed of foreign financiers and the rapaciousness of the government officials, and for lamenting the haplessness of overtaxed artisans and peasants. Some Egyptian notables, however, would not condemn the rural middle strata as Ishaq did, for they belonged to it. Many, moreover, would adduce a villain about whom he remains silent—the usurious Levantine money-lender. Egyptian notables on the whole saw the reduction in army strength as a threat to their position and a source of potential unemployment for their relatives and clients. Syrian Christians, after all, neither served in nor benefited from the Egyptian armed forces. Here, as in Ishaq's discussion of Egyptian nationality, fissures are apparent between the liberal Syrian Christian viewpoint and that of the Egyptian notables with whom he was allied. The fissures would, in 1882, erupt into an earthquake.

The freemasons of Syrian Christian background appear to have widely supported a constitutional, parliamentary regime patterned on the Ottoman experiment of 1876–78. They had been strongly socialized to these values, and not only by reading in French progressive literature. They after all had strong links to Ottoman Syria, which sent elected delegates to the first Ottoman parliament, and they regularly voted for their own lodge officers within masonry. I can think of no one in Egypt who wrote publicly in support of democracy more strongly, or earlier, than Adib Ishaq. Syrian Christians appear also to have felt that an Ottoman Empire under a constitutional monarchy would be stronger versus Russia, and would be more likely successful in reintegrating vassal states such as Egypt into the empire. Within Egypt, Syrian Christian masons wanted voting rights as resident Ottomans, and constructed a view of Egyptian political community that would include Arabophone immigrants from other Ottoman lands. They protested European domination of the economy, the courts, and, increasingly, the bureaucracy. Unlike the Levantine compradors, who tied their own fortunes to the European advance, these Syrian Christian masons saw themselves as native Ottomans in an Ottoman province faced with foreign domination. They also worried about increasing overtaxation, and approved plans to cut the size of the armed forces. Their potential for conflict with the Muslim notables and intellectuals, already visible in some of their stances, was submerged in the late 1870s in a struggle against the common enemies of viceregal absolutism and European penetration.

Ya'qub Sannu', on being exiled to France in 1878, continued to publish the satirical journal he had begun in Cairo, *Abu nazzarah zarqa'* (The Man with Blue Spectacles). *Abu nazzarah zarqa'* was widely available in Egypt despite its having been banned. A British consular report reveals that "with regard to Prince Halim it is a notorious fact that an Arabic newspaper printed at Paris in

his interests entitled *Abou Naddara* is distributed gratis among the Troops here.”⁴⁴ He cast his journal as a series of conversations at secret meetings, between symbolic characters, as short plays, and as oblique, satirical essays by fictional authors. His political cartoons most boldly proclaim his precise message, but aspects of it come across clearly in the dialogues. Sannu⁵ supports the rival claims to the khedivate launched by Isma‘il’s uncle, ‘Abdu’l-Halim Pasha, who had been exiled to Istanbul in the late 1860s. He complains that Isma‘il in spendthrift fashion builds palaces and holds banquets served by hordes of servants, while his overtaxed peasants die of hunger. The Ottoman elite, along with the petty bureaucrats and oppressive tax collectors, are ridiculed as speaking a kind of pidgin Arabic, comprised of ungrammatical Turkish and the colloquial Egyptian dialect. Sannu⁵ employs this code-switching, from one language to another, in order to accentuate the illegitimacy and foreignness of the government and its burdensome taxes.⁴⁵ Europeans, infidels, loot this Muslim country through guile and bullying, expatriating its capital to the banks of America. As a Jew and a mason, Sannu⁵ promotes religious tolerance among indigenous Egyptians, but is quite willing to employ inflammatory Islamic rhetoric against European exploiters of the country. The complaints against the Ottoman-Egyptian ruling class and against the rapacious Europeans are often put in the mouths of ordinary Egyptians, such as a “mother” in Cairo.⁴⁶

The younger Muslim thinkers who became masons did not differ a great deal in the period before 1881 from their Jewish and Syrian Christian colleagues. The few differences that did exist, however, proved to be crucial ones. The young Muslim liberals and radicals, unlike the Syrian Christians, most often sprang from an indigenous rural notable background, though at least one, ‘Abdu’llah an-Nadim, came from an artisanal family. They tended to be educated in Isma‘il’s new school system, and often found posts with the government, either as teachers or as minor bureaucrats or middle managers. They also often had links with the military, since they studied with or taught cadets, and came from the sort of families whose sons rose through the ranks to the junior officer corps. These autochthonous networks of kinship, education, and employment made them distinctive from the Syrian Christians, who often set up in private business, had fewer ties to the countryside, and, as we have seen, had little sympathy with military spending. Most of these Muslim masons were based in Cairo, and in 1879 they often contributed to the newspaper, *Mir²at ash-sharq*, though its owners tended to be Syrian Christian followers of Sayyid Jamalu²d-Din. A Muslim, Ibrahim al-Laqqani, rose to become editor-in-chief. The intimate link between masonry and dissident journalism is symbolized by the masonic rites recorded long-hand on *Mir²at ash-sharq* stationery, preserved in Sayyid Jamalu²d-Din’s papers.⁴⁷

Although Sayyid Jamalu²d-Din was not nearly as influential during his stay in Egypt as his later fame would suggest, he did nevertheless articulate some

important ideas in dialogue with his fellow masons, which they then broadcast through their political journalism. His thought during his Egypt sojourn has been analyzed by A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, Elie Kedourie, and most conclusively by Keddie, and there is no need for a long excursus on it here.⁴⁸ In bare outline, we may say that Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din most clearly and consistently articulated a fear of British imperialism, and urged Egyptian unity as a means to forestall European encroachments.

Since the voices clamoring for parliamentary democracy were quite numerous in Egypt during and after the first Ottoman parliament, and Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din only publicly began advocating constitutionalism as late as May 1879, he hardly stood out among advocates of this position. His more forceful and original contribution lay in his unalterable opposition to British imperialism, and his alerting of his Egyptian audience to the genuine danger of a British takeover. The British war with Afghanistan provoked him to write for *Misr* a brief history of that country and an attack on British expansionism in South Asia. Here his experiences in Iran, Afghanistan, and British India proved invaluable, since he had witnessed the realities of full-blown British colonialism, a sight most Ottomans could hardly imagine.

He blames many of the Muslim world's problems on European rapaciousness, but by no means all. In direct contrast to at-Tahtawi, who saw Ottoman *kânûn* law deriving from the sultans as a highly valuable indigenous constitution, Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din in an unpublished essay lambasts the Ottomans from Sulayman the Magnificent on for imposing their own royal interpretations on Islam. This cultural despotism has not only led to a departure from the strict tenets of Islamic canon law (the shari'ah), but also to a decline of learning in general, so that the Europeans have gotten ahead of the Muslims. He also criticizes the drawbacks for literacy of the writing system used in Muslim languages, with its unmarked vowels. He sees several hopeful signs, including the steadfast refusal of Muslims to give up their religion or culture in the face of European expansion. Like others in Egypt, he takes heart from the deposition of Sultan Abdülaziz and the uprising of the intellectuals (*qiyam ahl al-ilm*) in Istanbul. Finally, he discerns a movement toward a wider unity of Muslims, from India to Egypt, to ameliorate their conditions. He has no quarrel with the state giving guarantees for the well-being of resident Christians, as long as it simultaneously works to spread sciences among the Muslims. He thinks 1877 a propitious time for Muslims to gain all they can from European sciences, since the mamluks and janissaries who had prevented earlier Ottoman reform are now gone. He has high praise for Khedive Isma'il's opening of civil schools, including girls' schools, and thinks education a far more effective weapon in the anticolonial struggle than warfare.⁴⁹

His defense of Islam from Christian European encroachments was symbolically acted out when he attempted to prevent the conversion of a Muslim Egyptian to Christianity. G. Lansing and A. Watson of an American mission

in Cairo complained that one of their converts to Islam, Ahmad Fahmi, had been abducted by his own family late in 1877. The father imprisoned the young man in his house, and attempted to force him to recant. "The next day Djemal Ed-Deen, a renowned controversialist was brought with several of the ulema, & they entered into a controversy with him that lasted eight hours."⁵⁰ The ulama ultimately threatened Fahmi with death if he did not relent and perform the witness to faith. They took him to a police station, where he signed a document affirming his belief in Islam. Sayyid Jamalud-Din's liberal ideas on religious tolerance did not extend to freedom of conscience for Muslims who wished to leave Islam for Western Christianity. His blind spot here, and his willingness to play deprogrammer, probably derived from seeing such a conversion as a symbolic defection to the West, an acquiescence in imperial dominance. His demands for individual liberty and his conviction in the political utility of corporate solidarity, always at odds in his thought, here clashed vividly. The claims of the corporate clearly won out.

In February 1879, just before the military riot against the Nubar ministry, Sayyid Jamalud-Din published an article in *Misr* surveying the forms of despotism (*al-istibdad*). After giving reasons for which republican and constitutional forms of government cannot be discussed in the East, he lists three sorts of government. The first, cruel despotism, was practiced by such Central Asia marauders as the Mongols and Tamerlane. The second, oppressive despotism, overtaxes its subjects for the luxuries of the rulers. One suspects he thinks the Qajars in Iran fall into this second category, and he openly includes under this heading colonial governments such as British India. The third, enlightened or "kind" despotism, in turn, has several forms. It can be well-intentioned but impractical, exhorting subjects to progress without implementing it. It can be informed but inexperienced, setting up schools and factories but neglecting to institutionalize their upkeep, so that they fall into dissuetude over time. My own feeling is that he places the viceregal state in Egypt in this category, as had 'Ali Mubarak in a book published in 1873.

The third sort of enlightened despotism is the skilled sort. Such a state will not only build schools and factories and adopt innovations in agricultural technology, but will also consistently review these activities for further improvement. It will set taxes at a bearable level, restrain transgressors and swindlers, and implement justice. It will take account of and attempt to overcome the moral failings, the avariciousness and laziness, of human beings. It will also carefully measure its economic and political standing in the world of nations through statistics. Sayyid Jamalud-Din, then, advocates that all Egyptians work for the achievement of such a proficient enlightened despotism.⁵¹ Since we have seen that he supported, in an essay he never published, the Ottoman constitutionalist movement of 1876–78, his cautious approach to consultative government in this essay comes as a surprise. Sayyid Jamalud-Din's published position is far more conservative than that of Adib Ishaq or

Ya'qub Sannu'. One wonders if the "enlightened despot" Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din had in mind was his patron, Riyad Pasha.

We are afforded an interesting insight into how Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's article on despotic government was actually read by a letter, written in response to it, by Yahya Qadri, a resident of Suez. Qadri begins by expressing his fervent wish to see Afghani and hear his "philosophical discourse." He continues: "My eyes were gladdened, my ears soothed, and my soul delighted, as were those of my brethren here, when we read aloud the Sayyid's article published in *Misr* under the title 'Despotic Government.' We then accepted the truth of the saying, 'There is magic in eloquence.' Some of its passages caused an aversion in our souls to the [present] situation."⁵² Qadri concludes by hoping that the influence of Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's articles and speeches will bring into being a "good thing." Interestingly, then, some of Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's followers read this piece as a far more radical statement than it appears on the surface, suggesting that they saw the prologue denying any intention of discussing such radical ideas as constitutionalism and republicanism as a screen, a ploy of functional ambiguity.

In late May 1879, Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din finally came out openly for consultative government, long after the notables, nobles, and the khedive agreed on such a regime as a quid pro quo for a national anti-European alliance, and after the installation of Sharif's cabinet on 7 April 1879. Note that Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's stance at this point resembled that enunciated much earlier by Adib Ishaq, from whom he no doubt learned a great deal about modern political science and European history. Nor were his constitutionalist aspirations particularly exceptional in the spring of 1879, when even the conservative Sufi leader Shaykh al-Bakri had adopted a similar stance. Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's forsaking of enlightened despotism for consultative government probably had something to do with his changing political alliances. Riyad, his former patron, had lost his cabinet position and was forced into exile in Europe. Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din then broke off his long association with Riyad Pasha and switched loyalties to the incoming Sharif Pasha. It seems highly unlikely that, as Salim 'Anhuri wrote, Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din in August 1879 envisaged establishing a parliamentary republic in Egypt with himself as prime minister. In supporting the Sharif cabinet, Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din bet on a losing horse. In the face of the new Khedive Tawfiq's opposition, the Sharif cabinet fell in August 1879. Tawfiq slated Riyad Pasha for reinstatement. Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's identification with Sharif and with consultative government from May, and his desertion of his former patron Riyad help explain his unceremonious deportation from Egypt late in the summer of 1879.⁵³

Politics was not the only issue that absorbed the Muslim masons. The young Muslim liberals and radicals, with their close ties to local urban and rural society, worried a great deal about taxes and the plight of the poor. For instance, Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din suggested that the young men who attended

his lectures in Alexandria make a voluntary contribution for their admission to the hall, to be donated to the indigent in the city.⁵⁴ Another thinker in Sayyid Jamalud-Din's circle, Ibrahim al-Muwaylihi, wrote a tax-protest article for the Coptic-owned *al-Watan* early in 1879, during Egypt's ominous spring of discontent. "Urban dwellers other than the nobles (*umara'*)," he writes, "fall into three categories: merchants, workers and beggars. The *wirku* [capitation tax] is levied upon both the merchant and the worker."⁵⁵ The merchants had been impoverished by a stagnant market, forcing them to seek credit from Europeans, who thus had power to ruin them if they wished. The workers found themselves in an even worse plight. Al-Muwaylihi uses the imagery of a wild animal tearing into its prey to describe the effect of high taxes on this social stratum.

"Let us take the example," he suggests, "of a hauler of stones." He struggles all day long, cutting stones and hauling them in his wagon. In the summer he boils, in the winter his extremities freeze, since he is barefoot and poorly clothed. He hauls the stones for the building of finely decorated mansions for foreigners and Egyptians. He receives only 3.5 *miriyyah* piasters per day, and can usually work only five days a week, since Friday is a holiday and he must spend at least one day a week looking for work, given the economic recession. Even living the most ascetic style of life would not allow him as an individual to live on the resulting 2.5 piasters per day, and if he had a family it would go even less far. He would in addition have to pay the *firdah* tax and the guild tax. A builder pays, in addition, a permit fee. Workers owning animals must pay the *firdah* even on their donkeys and camels!

"Let us," he continues, "contemplate the confectioner. If he sells a basket, the guildmaster of the basketweavers comes to him with a contingent of his men and enrolls him in their guild so as to lessen their taxes." If he then sells a flax bath sponge, the flax guild will attempt to claim him. Some such small shopkeepers end up having to pay five different *firdah* taxes, and have little hope of justice from the layers of guild officials and petty bureaucrats above them. Indeed, they can expect to be jailed for inability to pay the fees and taxes imposed on them. In a guild such as the weighers, the government might take as much as three-fourths of their earnings in the form of taxes and fees, leaving one-fourth out of which to pay the guildmaster and on which to live. This intolerable tax burden explains the large number of beggars, he avers, most of whom had themselves earlier been workers or merchants. He tells the story of a friend who attempted to impress on a European friend the burden of Egyptian taxes by having him buy a donkey and then asking for the tax on it that an Egyptian would have to pay. Europeans, who seldom paid taxes, could not normally even conceive of the meaning of these taxes for ordinary folk.

That the censors allowed an article such as this to appear in the press, insofar as it implicitly blasted the tax collection policies of the khedive, can perhaps

best be explained by Isma'îl's increasing desire to escape the vise of European financial control. He after all had imposed such high taxes to pay the European debt-servicing. The article shows the sympathy educated Egyptians had with the urban workers and small merchants, and the gross injustice they perceived in the prevailing taxation policies. Since articles such as this one often were read aloud in shops to large crowds of working folk, they also had the potential of articulating grievances and raising the sense of injustice.

The Muslim masons, on the whole, showed a greater concern with efficient government than with constitutionalism. They wanted better upkeep of modern institutions already founded, lower taxes, and a more savvy awareness of Egypt's vulnerability to the imperial ambitions of the European Powers. They were willing to wait a while for the freedoms implied by the Rights of Man, but felt great urgency in securing a guarantee of their corporate interests against European encroachment. Europeans should not be allowed to convince Muslim young men to become Protestants, they should not be allowed to insert themselves into the cabinet and budget-making process of a Muslim state, and they should not be allowed to dictate high taxes with their arbitrary interest policies on international loans. Although Muslim and Syrian Christian masons shared an anti-imperialist rhetoric, their positive program of domestic reform differed somewhat. The Muslim masons would accept a competent enlightened despotism. The Syrian Christian masons wanted constitutionalism. Interestingly, even the old-line notables of the nativist faction who allied themselves with Isma'îl and the chamber of deputies against the Nubar-Wilson government, had by March 1879 adopted a program of consultative government more progressive than the stance of Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's followers among the Muslim masons.

The further activity of Egyptian masons, especially after Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's expulsion from Egypt in August 1879, becomes difficult to trace, since it attracted less notice from the Egyptian authorities. Masonry lodges clearly functioned in the late 1870s as political clubs, and as networks for the mobilization of support for specific political leaders among the literate intermediate strata. They provided a venue for the interfacing of Syrian Christian immigrants, Muslim Egyptian notables, and Ottoman-Egyptian nobles. The newspapers founded by members of the lodges formed one of the primary vehicles for the spread of progressive ideas in the 1870s.

Young Egypt

Another political organization of note, Young Egypt (*Misr al-Fatah*), arose in Alexandria in 1879. Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's disciple Ibrahim al-Laqqani, an Egyptian bureaucrat, describes how a group of prominent Syrian Christians

from the Sursuq, Qittah, Zughayb and Mukhalla' clans, influenced by al-Afghani's speeches, determined to arise for reform. In a private letter that survives in Sayyid Jamalud-Din's papers, al-Laqqani writes of this group that

They attached to themselves a band of Muslims, and they cooperated in issuing a newspaper half in Arabic and half in French [entitled *Misr al-Fatah/Jeune Égypte*]. Therein they published those views in which the Sayyid had united them through his speech. From the first day it appeared, this newspaper attained a fame denied the most renowned of [local] European journals after several years of existence. . . . The work of this society was not restricted to the newspaper; rather, they produced a manifesto of reform. A delegation of them brought it to Cairo, where they presented it to the khedive.⁵⁶

On most of the sentiments expressed in the Young Egypt manifesto, intellectuals of any religious background could agree. The manifesto, printed in the summer or fall of 1879, explicitly called for parliamentary government at a time when the khedive and his chief minister, Riyad, opted instead for autocracy. The members, in the section on the "Redistribution of Authority," said power should be distributed among the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of government. They wanted cabinet members to have clearly defined rights and to be responsible to both the khedive and the legislature. This dual responsibility clearly suggested an equality and a sharing between khedivial authority and the sovereignty of the people expressed through their elected representatives. Young Egypt demanded equal treatment for all Egyptians, the abolition of privileges in regard to law and taxes, and the end of imprisonment without a writ of habeas corpus. They wanted property protected except where government interference with it aimed at achieving higher public benefit that could be legally demonstrated, and they wanted freedom of religion protected. They insisted on freedom of the press and of association.⁵⁷

Though Young Egypt had a mixed membership of Muslims, Syrian Christians, and Jews, the Muslims were drafted into leadership positions. One of its Muslim leaders served as a judge in the Mixed Courts, the other as a minor bureaucrat; its Christian and Jewish members came from prominent merchant clans. As its newspaper's bilinguality suggests, its members tended to know French as well as Arabic. As with the freemasons, the Egyptian bureaucrats and the Syrian Christian and Jewish import-export merchants had in common a membership in the new middle class, sharing a European-style education and common grievances against the big European merchants and bureaucrats and their supporters among the Ottoman-Egyptian nobility. Here again, it is impossible to guess the number of members of Young Egypt. In remaining underground, clearly, the organization limited its membership to friends of the founders.

The society issued other manifestoes, but eventually attracted the baleful notice of Riyad Pasha, the first minister, who had decided that Egyptians were

not ready for this sort of liberty. Riyad Pasha's threat of administrative sanctions succeeded in cowing the Muslim Egyptian members. Because the Syrian Christians within the organization wanted to continue to publish the newspaper despite the government's displeasure with it, a serious schism occurred between the local Egyptian Muslims and the Syrian Christians, in the wake of which the Syrians gave up the activities of the society. They, after all, already had extraterritoriality through their foreign passports, and felt they had been doing the Egyptians a favor in helping them win liberty.⁵⁸ Al-Laqqani's report, which favors the Syrian Christian faction, neglects to note that the Egyptian members of the organization faced increasingly serious retaliation from Riyad, whereas the Syrians were immune from Egyptian law. This vulnerability may help explain why the Egyptian Muslims broke with their audacious Syrian colleagues over plans to revive the banned newspaper.

The Young Officers

Conventional historiography has it that young Egyptian officers organized a secret society within the armed forces sometime in the 1870s, and that it gained members especially in the wake of the disastrous Egyptian showing in its war with Ethiopia in 1876. The founder of this society is alleged to have been 'Ali ar-Rubi, a young Egyptian officer unhappy with Ottoman and Circassian dominance of the officer corps. At some point Ahmad 'Urabi is said to have joined this society. German historian Alexander Schölch casts doubt on the society's existence, arguing that the story originated with Muhammad Sabry's twentieth-century accounts for which that author offered no documentation, and that 'Urabi never mentioned it in his memoirs. I think this position overly skeptical. First, 'Urabi could scarcely be expected to discuss a secret conspiratorial society in a book intended to clear his name of charges of mutiny. Second, Schölch seems to have been unaware that the story appears in informed European accounts from the early 1880s. A recent biographer of 'Urabi, Samir Muhammad Taha, has pointed out that a nineteenth-century Arabic biographical dictionary mentions the society's formation, as does the British press in the summer of 1882.⁵⁹ I therefore accept the existence of such a young officers' society, while admitting that it may well have been little more than a clique. The society worked against the discrimination against native Egyptians by the Ottoman-Egyptian officer elite.⁶⁰

Some sense of the young officers' ideas may possibly be gained from sympathetic outsiders such as Sannu', who clearly retained a special relationship with the Egyptian junior officers. In the wake of the staged military riot against the European ministry headed by Nubar Pasha in February 1879, Sannu' presents a dialogue between two fictitious characters, the civilian Abu'l-Khayr and the military hero Abu'l-Lutf al-Jihadi. Abu'l-Khayr praises the leader of

the army as the promulgator of justice and liberty (*al-hurriyyah*) and the establisher of the principles of republican nationalism (*al-jumhuriyyah al-wataniyyah*) in Egypt. One suspects, given his strong support of ‘Abdu’l-Halim for the khedivate, that he intends by this phrase something more like a constitutional monarchy than a true republic. Al-Jihadi replies, full of bitterness about the dismissal of soldiers, the abolition of military schools, low military pay, and long arrears in its disbursement. He tells how their desperation led the officers to present their petition to the ministers, how Nubar Pasha (ridiculed as Ghubar, or Dusty) called them “rude” (*adabsız*, again in Turkish) and ordered them whipped. He describes their humiliation of Nubar, the English cabinet member Rivers Wilson, and ‘Ali Mubarak. He tells how Isma‘il, the Great Pharaoh-Despot, arrived with a special unit that fired on the demonstrators, who nevertheless dispersed only after the intervention of Egypt’s notables. A demonstration in Upper Egypt then followed, patterned on the one in Cairo.⁶¹

Sannu‘’s identification of the Egyptian officers with the cause of liberty, democracy, and nationalism, and his sympathetic portrayal of their humiliation of the Europeans who wished to weaken Egypt militarily, foreshadowed many themes of the ‘Urabi revolt three years later. His sympathy for the Egyptian military, and the hopes he placed in it as a progressive force, may have been influenced by his earlier teaching experience in a military academy, and by his extensive network of friends among the junior officers. In such articles, one can as easily see him as much a spokesman for the young officers’ society as for a branch of masonry.

The young officers’ society primarily drew its membership from among the ethnically Egyptian, Muslim Arabophone junior officers in the army. We know that young dissidents within the officer corps gained support from a few civilian intellectuals such as Ya‘qub Sannu‘ and Muhammad Fanni. Many of these junior officers had been admitted to armed forces by Viceroy Sa‘id, who began the process of Arabizing the officer corps and bureaucracy. ‘Urabi was probably typical of this group in owning a hundred acres or so of his own farmland in the countryside (before his major purchases during the Revolution), giving him links to the countryside and sympathies with the small freeholders. Given that one or two of the Egyptian officers possessed as much as 1,000 feddans, to see them as “petty bourgeois” seems an anachronistic error. Their landownership and rural kinship and patronage networks, even with the peasants who became their enlisted men, continued to count for something even when they attained the status of salaried urban employees of the state. This group felt grievances over the Ottoman-Egyptian mismanagement of the war between Egypt and Ethiopia in 1876, as well as over the arrogance of their superiors. As with all secret organizations, it is extremely difficult to guess the number of officers involved, but one suspects that eventually most Egyptian junior officers became supporters of this group’s leaders, ‘Ali ar-Rubi and

Ahmad ʿUrabi. The young officers would have made contact with one another in the military academies or in the barracks. They may have known many rank and file soldiers as peasants in their villages while still civilians.

The Islamic Philanthropical Society

In the summer of 1879 ʿAbduʿllah an-Nadim was involved in political organization in Alexandria when he discovered that several of the persons he attempted to recruit already belonged to a secret organization, Young Egypt. In a switch, they then induced him to join their group, with its Muslim leadership and Christian and Jewish rank and file. The devotion of Young Egypt to representative government greatly influenced Nadim, but he gradually felt constrained by the secrecy and anonymity the organization sought. He urged the leadership to go public, but they refused. In protest, Nadim left, taking many members with him, and founded the Islamic Philanthropical Society (*al-Jamʿiyyah al-Khayriyyah al-Islamiyyah*).⁶² This society's major activity was the founding of a school, of which Nadim himself became principal.

The Islamic Philanthropical Society attracted to its organizational meeting a broad spectrum of the Alexandrian Muslim elite. As reported by *at-Tijarah*, those attending the first meeting included military officers, high government officials, ulama, and Egyptian notables.⁶³ It depended on both donations and the patronage of nobles and the state. Its leader, Husayn Fahmi, at one point requested a large sum of money from the government to help out with teachers' salaries at the private school the organization ran in Alexandria. A statement of the society's income shows that it took in about half the amount in donations that it did from school tuition.⁶⁴ The organizational and administrative experience that Nadim gained through this society was crucial to his later, prominent role in the Revolution.

The Helwan Society

Riyad Pasha's crackdown in the late summer and fall of 1879 proved devastating to the dissident freemasons and to Young Egypt. It helped provoke, however, the founding of the Helwan Society. This group of elite politicians formed in the fall of 1879 in response to Tawfiq's acquiescence to a return of the British and French Dual Control over the portion of the budget mortgaged to foreign debt. They objected to the installation of pro-European Riyad Pasha as first minister. The society included Sharif Pasha, whom Tawfiq turned out of office because of his alliance with Egyptian notables pressing for a reinstatement of the chamber of deputies, and consisted of a continued coalition of Ottoman nobles such as Ismaʿil Pasha Yusri and ʿUthman Pasha Lutfi against

the European Control. The group issued a manifesto on 9 November, 1879, distributing some 6,000 copies.⁶⁵

The manifesto rejected European interference in Egyptian affairs, and regretted the imposition of Tawfiq on Egypt without the consultation of the people. "It repudiates such a *regime*." The society advocated the repayment of the foreign debt through Egyptian self-administration, but wanted a unified debt at 4 percent interest. The Helwan Society also insisted that Egypt's debts not continue to be put up for auction to special creditors, and would agree only to a temporary international control to be set up to oversee debt repayment. The society appears to have leaned toward Prussia diplomatically. Although the manifesto mentioned it only obliquely, the Helwan Society also evoked memories of the Ottoman constitution of 1877 to justify more consultative government in Egypt. In the wake of this document's distribution, the suspected authors had to retire for a time from Cairo to Helwan, where Riyad kept them under strict surveillance.⁶⁶ This conclave gave them their name. The group nevertheless continued to meet and to plan acts of political opposition.

The Clubs and Resource Mobilization

Let us draw some threads together with a more integrated discussion of the funding, tactics, membership, and ideology of these political clubs. One receives the impression that of the two most typical sources of support, membership dues and donations from wealthy patrons, patronage was by far the more important. This necessity for patronage from the nobility imposed political limits on the dissident organizations' scope of operation. Being tied to the political fortunes of the great nobles could also be uncomfortable at times. Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din was exiled by Tawfiq and 'Uthman Rifqi Pasha at a time when his then-patron, Sharif Pasha, had just been dismissed from the prime ministership. Patronage as a funding source clearly set limits on the independence of dissident organizations of the middle strata. The more the organization depended on the contributions of members, the more independent it would be. The officers' society and the Helwan Society probably represented the most successful such self-funded political organizations, though both were small, elitist, and conspiratorial. Masonry, on the other hand, had little success politically except where its members made a successful alliance with and gained the patronage of the nobles and officers.

The new middle strata—teachers, government employees, educated merchants, and officers—provided the rank and file for most of these organizations. The landed wealthy class also provided some members and patronage, especially the Egyptian notables, and even Ottoman and Circassian nobles played some role. 'Abdu'l-Halim supported, and gained the support of, most freemasons. Riyad Pasha, a Muslim convert from an Ottoman Jewish family,

supported Star of the East Lodge 1355 until the spring of 1879, and thereafter the Ottoman noble Sharif Pasha gave it his patronage. The Helwan Society, despite its Young Turk rhetoric, grouped elite nobles. But despite the importance of nobles in providing patronage and other support, dissident organizations such as freemasonry and Young Egypt primarily represented elements of the educated middle strata. The religious heterodoxy of many of the dissidents is explained precisely by their membership, by and large, in the new intermediate strata. Far from being seedy outsiders, as Kedourie paints them, these activists tended to be prominent intellectuals who often achieved a certain measure of success even though they were blocked from the highest offices.⁶⁷ Like most intellectuals at most times, their value structures differed from those unschooled in the culture of critical discourse. But most prominent intellectuals came from quite respectable backgrounds, as children of village headmen, of import-export merchants, or of literate lower- or middle-level bureaucrats working for the viceroys or Ottomans.

The first dissident tactics consisted in simply gathering acquaintances for private lectures in which a speaker subjected the status quo to critical inquiry. As we have seen in an earlier chapter, such activities were banned by the viceroys, and critical discourse was in and of itself considered subversive. The issuing of newspapers not only served an integrative function for the dissident organizations, but also served tactically to further their goals by spreading the message. In the very late 1870s and early 1880s one begins to see the public lecture, to mosque congregations or even street crowds, employed by intellectuals such as Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din and 'Abdu'llah Nadim.

The nativist faction (*al-Hizb al-Watani*), the coalition of notables and the intelligentsia discussed in Chapter 3 above, issued a manifesto calling for a reinvigoration of the chamber of deputies in the spring of 1879. Young Egypt and the Helwan Society in the fall of 1879 also issued manifestoes, a new and bold public step. Though a tradition of petition-writing existed in Ottoman Egypt, the tone of a manifesto differs considerably from that of a supplicating petition. A new form of petition addressed to persons in power on specific political issues seem to have appeared rather late as a political tactic. The directness of petitions to named individuals, signed by the petitioners, violated the polite conventions that earlier governed such discourse. Only when crises erupted that dissidents felt warranted the taking of extreme risks did they resort to political petitions, and those of 1879 tended to be anonymous. The state meted out exile and imprisonment to former chamber of deputies member and large landowner and Sudan merchant Hasan al-'Aqqad for his petition criticizing government policies in the spring of 1880. A similar fate met a group of young officers and the translator Muhammad Fanni in May 1880. The young officers' organization most effectively employed petitions and demonstrations in new and effective ways, but not until 1881, and these tactics will be discussed in a later chapter.

The ideologies of these political societies demonstrate a few consistent themes. First, all of these groups opposed European diplomatic hegemony over Egyptian affairs. Several of them saw European loans to Egypt as having been usurious and illegitimate, and wanted concessions in the terms of their repayment. They objected to the hiring of Europeans in the Egyptian bureaucracy. They differed in this regard from pro-European groups such as the men around Nubar Pasha and the Levantine compradors. Second, they opposed viceregal absolutism, and advocated the implementation in Egypt of the 1877 Ottoman constitution. The only exception here is the group of Muslim masons around Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din, who were content for most of this period with an enlightened despotism. Here it may be argued that these anti-European and anti-absolutist movements may well have had a majority of the politically aware sector of the public behind them. In contrast, only a section of the Ottoman and Circassian nobles, a small minority among the Egyptian country notables, some bedouin chiefs, and the European Powers favored viceregal absolutism. Even among the nobles, as the Helwan Society demonstrates, support for constitutionalism did exist. Third, they championed the cause of the grossly overtaxed workers and peasants, advocating more reasonable levies even if that left the Europeans waiting a while for their debt repayments. Here again, only the wealthier landlords and European proprietors could fail to see how devastating the overtaxation really was, and these constituted a small proportion of the population.

Most of the organizations here discussed did not demonstrate much success at adaptation and survival. Sannu's salons were broken up by the viceroy's police, and he was exiled. The Star of the East and other masonic orders by and large depleted their political capital by supporting 'Abdu'l-Halim as successor to Isma'il, rather than the successful candidate, Tawfiq. The one lodge of the order that supported Tawfiq, led by Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din, was closed down by the parent organization and its leader was exiled by the new government. Young Egypt fell apart, partially because of native Egyptian members' fear of Riyadh's repression, and partially owing to a split between the Syrian Christian and the Egyptian Muslim members. The only important dissident organizations that survived Riyadh's reaction of 1879–81 were Nadim's Islamic Philanthropical Society, the Helwan Society, and (probably) the young officers' society. The latter two were both the most elitist in their membership and also the closest to the levers of power. Nevertheless, the socializing impact of the whole range of these organizations and their activities on the strata of intellectuals and their notable patrons remained important.

Resource mobilization theory posits that grievances alone cannot explain why groups rebel, or why they sometimes do so successfully. Rather, groups weigh the risks and advantages of dissident action.⁶⁸ The high profile in the political clubs here considered of Syrian Christians and of Jews suggests the impor-

tance of foreign privilege in emboldening these groups to rebel. Ya'qub Sannu' held an Italian passport, and Star of the East leader Niqula Sakruj traveled on a French passport. The Muslim Egyptians who joined forces with these privileged foreigners risked a great deal more, since they enjoyed no similar immunity from harsh local punishment. The Egyptians most willing to take this sort of risk appear to have come mainly from the ranks of the intellectuals on the one hand, and of the notables on the other. In the instance of the junior officers and of the Egyptian graduates of the civil schools, the blockage of their advancement drove many to join organizations aimed at changing the system, even at considerable personal risk. The nobles and notables who engaged in intrigue had even more to lose, but they controlled large estates and peasant populations in the countryside, so that the state would tend to avoid a confrontation with them.

The idea of resource cumulation suggests that where a struggle is waged by an oppressed group, much support can often be obtained outside that group, as with the abolition movement in the nineteenth-century United States. One is struck by the frequency with which the dissident organizations express their concern for the plight of the peasants and of the urban working strata. The Syrian Christian merchants, the Egyptian civil and military government employees, and the Egyptian notables and village headmen, all had their own grievances against the khedive's government. But they tended to see themselves as rebelling in part on behalf of the overtaxed working people.

Newspapers associated with particular clubs not only helped unite those organizations nation-wide, but also provided a forum for bargaining over the legitimacy of the evolving Egyptian state. Under the Dual Control and the Mixed Courts, European penetration of Egypt had accelerated dramatically. The dissident press singled out Europeans of several stripes for special opprobrium: employees of the Egyptian government, the two cabinet members, financiers involved in the debt crisis, and even rowdy workers. Indeed, the first area wherein the press became political, wherein it began to develop a culture of critical discourse, was in criticism of the Europeans. The government of Khedive Isma'il allowed this criticism, precisely because its relationship with Europe under the Dual Control sometimes turned stormy. By allowing the nativist faction to undermine European credibility among the reading (and hearing) public, Isma'il gained a bargaining chip in his constant negotiations with the British and French over how the country would be run.

A second breakthrough in the evolution of political discourse occurred in the criticism of economic affairs. This subject, too, often involved a campaign against the Europeans. Dissident writers, with some justice, attacked the debt crisis as the result of a European confidence racket masquerading as respectable international finance. But their complaints about the overtaxation of workers and peasants in the late 1870s also inevitably painted a black picture of the khedive's own government. Once a culture of critical discourse devel-

oped, once the dissident organizations sniffed the khedive's own weakness, they began turning their newly sharpened weapons upon the indigenous elite. "Despotism" (*al-istibdad*) became a code-word for dissatisfaction with the Ottoman-Egyptian nobility's autocratic rule and acquiescence in the overtaxation necessary to meet debt-servicing. Modern history was ransacked for precedents for popular uprisings against royalist despotism, from the French Revolution to the Babi movement. Disappointed by the failures of the Ottoman experiment, some Ottoman nobles, Egyptian notables, and dissidents sought to try out the 1877 constitution in a vassal province. In the spring of 1879, the notables struck a compromise with the Ottoman nobles and with the khedive himself, allowing the formation of a broad anti-European front. The pro-European, pro-absolutist ministers such as Riyad Pasha and Nubar Pasha found themselves temporarily left out in the cold.

An overall social movement against European control, against viceregal despotism, and against overtaxation and oppression of the ordinary folk, arose in Egypt in the late 1870s. All of these issues, especially the prospect of higher taxes instigated by the Dual Control, adversely affected many Ottoman nobles, as well, so that they sometimes joined in. They did not share, obviously, the further grievance held by Egyptian notables and intellectuals against Ottoman-Egyptian monopolies on control of state resources. This difference points to a basic problem for those who wanted change. The movement consisted of many smaller clubs, which often competed with one another. The Star of the East masonic order generally supported 'Abdu'l-Halim for khedive. Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's lodge, on the other hand, supported Tawfiq for khedive. The young officers wanted more promotions for native Egyptians within the officer corps. The Egyptian notables wanted a regularly convened chamber of deputies with influence on taxes and the budget. The dissidents from a Syrian Christian background were sympathetic to the idea of reducing the size of the army, whereas the Egyptian Muslim dissidents for the most part opposed it. Nevertheless, a temporary alliance of these groups, aimed at ridding the country of the European cabinet ministers in the spring of 1879, succeeded in mobilizing rather impressive political resources.

Several aspects of the movement's outcome, however, helped dissipate its momentum. First, Khedive Isma'il allied himself with the junior officers, as well as with other dissatisfied groups, in seeking the ouster of the European cabinet ministers in the winter and spring of 1879. A major goal of the movement was achieved with the fall of the Nubar cabinet and the diminution of European representation and control within the Egyptian government. A few of the smaller societies associated with the movement, however, also wanted a change in Egyptian political leadership. These were somewhat mollified by the ouster of Isma'il and the accession of Tawfiq in June 1879. A third goal of some in the movement had been the achievement of a constitutional, parliamentary regime on the model of the 1877 Ottoman constitution. Unlike Isma'il

in his last months, however, Tawfiq decided he was strong enough not to need the support of the constitutionalist movement. He brought back Riyad, who, through the imposition of sanctions such as fines, newspaper closings, imprisonment, and exile, cowed the clubs and notables favoring a consultative regime. In short, the government made it very costly to continue to press for consultative government. Since movement participants had achieved two of the three major goals they sought, they largely showed themselves unwilling to assume the new risks continued activism would incur. One would conclude here that the split between figures such as Riyad Pasha and Khedive Isma'îl within the ruling elite in the spring of 1879, such that even the khedive worked for the expulsion of the European cabinet members, had proved crucial for the movement's ability to mobilize the population and to achieve its goals. On the other hand, a united regime under Tawfiq was able to suppress dissent by early 1880.

Still, movement participants had learned much about how to create a coalition of clubs and societies for the achievement of political goals upsetting to the regime. They had also learned much about the importance of the press in communicating their ideas to a wide audience in the elite and literate middle strata. The organizational umbrellas changed a great deal, but many of the same political and cultural figures reemerged to work alongside of and contribute to the mobilization of aggrieved sectors of the public during the revolution of 1882.

Guild Organization and Popular Ideology

TWO DECISIVE POLITICAL CRISES that evoked widespread popular participation helped shape politics in nineteenth-century Egypt: the struggle for control among Ottoman officers and Mamluk remnants in the wake of the Ottoman reconquest of Egypt from the French in 1801–05, and the ‘Urabi revolt of 1881–82, wherein a coalition of Egyptians in the military, Egyptian notables, and some guilds attempted to impose constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy on the Ottoman viceroy and the Ottoman and Circassian aristocracy. The first crisis ushered in the era of Viceroy Muhammad ‘Ali, the second provoked British occupation. The participation in both of ordinary people, of city dwellers who rioted and guild members who fought, makes these two periods of turmoil stand out as turning points in the slow evolution of mass politics in modern Egypt. In 1805 a popular militia of 40,000 artisans in Cairo helped notable supporters of the Albanian junior officer, Muhammad ‘Ali, defeat the titular Ottoman governor. Men such as Hajjaj al-Khudari, the guildmaster of greengrocers, and Ibn Shamah, the guildmaster of the butchers, led the militia at the barricades.¹ Although later disarmed and subdued by the victorious military of Muhammad ‘Ali, the guildsmen played a prominent and perhaps pivotal role in the change of government.

Much later in the nineteenth century some guilds supported Colonel ‘Urabi’s movement for the advancement of Egyptians versus other Ottoman ethnicities and greater parliamentary power versus the viceroy in 1882. On his dismissal as war minister in May of that year guilds lobbied for his reinstatement; cobblers, coffee sellers, and tailors marched in the streets asking God for victory over the infidel Europeans; and authorities arrested many guild leaders and members (such as the tailors and a branch of the porters) for complicity in the ‘Urabi revolt after the British put it down.² An older, conservative tradition of historiography might have dismissed such popular participation in political revolt as the result of crafty elites manipulating an unlettered rabble. But in the past thirty years the Anglo-Marxists in particular have done much to establish the study of the urban crowd and its protests as a phenomenon in its own right. More recently, an explicit concern has emerged, not only with the motives of urban working people in political protests, but with their ideology. Working people even in preindustrial settings carried with them a set of ideas, sometimes contradictory, about the proper workings of government and the nature of social justice, which they articulated most openly at times of political crisis.

This ideology had three sources: the ideas elaborated by working people as a community; the ideas they found attractive that filtered through to them from other groups, such as bourgeois thinkers; and the concrete historical circumstances under which they mixed the two.³ Understanding such mass phenomena in Egypt as the 'Urabi revolt demands that historians seek to discover popular ideology. Given the importance of the guilds in the events of 1881–82, the question arises as to whether the guilds came to carry a political culture that particularly inclined them to favor 'Urabi's program of parliamentary democracy and constitutionalism. The question is significant. The military, the notables, and the ulama may have all played more important and decisive roles in these crises than the guilds, but none represented so large a proportion of the population.

In both the pivotal transitions referred to above, the guilds stood for local choice of political leader rather than acquiescence in the selection of Istanbul or of London and Paris. Two major factors affected guild positions on politics in such situations. On the one hand, unwontedly high taxation clearly provoked a great deal of dissatisfaction in both eras. But on the other, a more subtle reason for willingness to take action may have lain in the political model generated by guild organization. The positions the guilds took raise questions about their political norms and expectations, which in turn the dynamics of their own organization may at least partially explain. In short, did guild members expect the government and larger society to behave in some respects like a guild?

Guilds in nineteenth-century Egypt, and in the Ottoman lands of Anatolia and the Arab world generally, served as professional organizations that grouped four sorts of occupation: commerce, the trades, services, and transportation. Thus, tilers and pavers in Cairo's Azbakiyyah quarter, brokers in Alexandria's textile markets, and camel drivers carrying watermelons to El Arish, all belonged to guilds, and they organized themselves according to similar principles. Guilds as professional institutions seem to have arisen in Egypt in the fifteenth century, though their origins as yet remain obscure. Precisely because guild organization encompassed so much of urban civil life, and because even city quarters were organized on a basis similar to that of the guilds, the norms and expectations of guild administration must have had a huge impact on popular conceptions of just government. Any modern historian would find it difficult to estimate the exact number of persons involved in such organizations, though most urban residents either resided in city quarters or belonged to guilds. In the late 1870s the inhabitants of Egypt's twenty-three largest towns and cities came to around a million persons, some 12 to 13 percent of the total population. Although female craft guild members appear to have been uncommon, women played an active role within feminine society in city quarters. The traditional sector of Egyptian industry alone in the 1870s employed about 100,000 men, equal to 6 percent of the adult male labor

force, and produced dyes, food, textiles, leather, metal, wood, stone, and other products. The majority of these were organized in the larger craft guilds. The craft guilds divided themselves into building guilds, who had a special relationship to the Ministry of Public Works, and nonbuilding guilds (tanners, coppersmiths, butchers, shoe-makers, etc.) But as noted above, merchants and transportation workers also formed themselves into guilds.⁴

An investigation of the norms and expectations growing out of guild administration requires access to information about the internal dynamics of guild organization in nineteenth-century Egypt, about which historians have written very little. Many other aspects of the guilds have also remained obscure. Gabriel Baer began in the 1960s the work of writing the social history of the Egyptian guilds, largely basing his conclusions on British consular reports and khedivial government-printed documents.⁵ André Raymond in the early 1970s for the first time used Islamic court documents as well as French reports to settle important questions about eighteenth-century Egyptian guilds—though historians have done less work on the pivotal nineteenth century.⁶ Much remains to be discovered about the functioning and importance of the guilds for the Egyptian economy and society.

Two reasons can be given for the relative neglect of this subject. First, the most accessible sources for its study, such as published government regulations, overemphasize state control of the guilds and suggest that few internal dynamics existed. The view of guilds as basically instruments of the state is apparent in Baer's early work, for instance: "in the course of the nineteenth century the government used the guild shaykhs for its own ends."⁷ Second, only documents originating with the artisans and merchants themselves could provide strong evidence for guild members' active roles in governing themselves and dealing with the state. Yet in a society like nineteenth-century Egypt, wherein low literacy rates circumscribed guild members' ability to express themselves in written form, few such testimonies had, until recently, come to light. Baer noted in the 1960s the absence of detailed histories of Egyptian guilds, adding that because British consular officials said no guild documents existed, "there is little hope that such histories will become known."⁸

The material becoming available in the Ottoman and Egyptian archives, luckily, demonstrates few grounds for such pessimism. Significantly, in a review article written in the late 1970s, Baer speaks instead of the guilds *servicing* the government. The shift in his depiction of them from passive instruments to active allies reflects the deeper understanding of Ottoman guild functioning we have gained from the archival work of Raymond, Halil Inalcik, and Baer's student, Haim Gerber.⁹ In the same review article Baer defines the chief functions of the guilds in the nineteenth century as providing an administrative link between government and people, collecting taxes, and supplying labor and services to the government. No doubt, the government saw the guilds in this way, in that it depended on them for the provision of certain societal services.

Baer's earlier emphasis on almost total state control of the guilds is no longer tenable, and even this later definition does not answer the question of why Egyptian artisans and merchants actively continued to support the guild structures. More recently, Ehud R. Toledano has depicted guildmasters as "social intermediaries" who offered a measure of protection to guild members but in turn helped the state maintain social control over their activities.¹⁰ I like Toledano's emphasis on the way in which the guildmasters had loyalties to both the state and their members, which seems to me an improvement over the early Baer depiction of them as straightforward servants of the government. I will argue below, however, that in the 1860s and 1870s a new ethos developed among Egypt's guilds.

What, then, did the guilds do for their members, as opposed to what they did for the state? A typical definition of the rules of early nineteenth-century European trade societies centers on four issues: the control of the craft's organization and entry into it, the administration of charity for stricken members, the regulation of behavior among members, and a tramping system of providing work to itinerant craftsmen.¹¹ Egyptian guilds had no tramping system, and only a few, such as the cobblers, provided sick relief to members. But control of the craft's organization and entry into it, and the regulation of behavior among members certainly constituted central concerns of the ordinary members. The importance of guild relations to the state must be recognized, but here we will attempt to see the guilds from the perspective of members and officers, rather than from that of Cairo's bureaucrats.

The state's relative weakness in preindustrial Egypt in any case justifies less attention to the viceroy's bureaucracy and more to the guilds' internal affairs. Only an overestimation of the state's power in the medieval and early modern Middle East, probably deriving from Weberian stereotypes of the Oriental despot, could impel one to talk of close government control over the guilds. Rather, as Raymond has argued, the Ottomans pursued a policy of decentralized urban administration, leaving the provision of many services to guilds, communal groups, city quarters, and endowed institutions. These various elements acted in a dynamic and creative manner to accommodate the urban growth and change that characterized the Ottoman period.¹² Even the somewhat more interventionist viceroys in nineteenth-century Egypt operated within the terms of an Old Regime state, except perhaps in the military.

These subtle shifts in our perspective on guilds underline the need to investigate their internal dynamics. A view of guild functioning from the bottom up, rather than only from the perspective of high state officials, can be gained from guild petitions to various government departments, especially the Ministry of the Interior, the Tax Bureau, and the Cairo and Alexandria city councils, preserved in the Egyptian National Archives.¹³ The petitions most often display the concerns of the wealthier or more highly placed guild members, of master artisans, merchants, shopkeepers, and brokers. A few petitions, often written in rather colloquial Arabic, came from groups about which we know

even less—journeyman artisans or even common laborers—expressing their dissatisfaction with the guildmaster or desiring to form their own guild in order to escape maltreatment by officers with different economic or ethnic concerns than their own. They give these groups, neglected by all but a few historians of modern Egypt, a voice.¹⁴ This material tells us much more than we heretofore knew about how guild officers were actually selected, about the nature and settlement of disputes within the guild, about conflicts between guilds, and about ethnic tensions. These documents present a lively picture of members as active in making their guild work, in negotiating disputes at its boundaries and within.

Egyptian guilds felt acutely in the 1860s and 1870s the impact of the world market, capitalist practices among European rivals, technological change, increased government bureaucracy, and the direct competition of immigrant southern European skilled workers, as well as merchants from all over Europe. They dealt with such problems within the guilds' administrative framework, which changed little during these sixteen years. In this chapter I will examine in what ways the guild organizations mediated social conflict arising out of competition for power, wealth, and prestige among guild members and between guilds and other groups. A larger, somewhat heuristic question, articulated at the beginning of this chapter, lies behind this concern, as to whether guild members saw their own organization as a normative model for wider society. Did guild-making have a bearing on state-making? Both processes depended on the mediation of conflicts and the delimiting of spatial boundaries over which leaders asserted authority. Within the guilds, members came into conflict over who would lead the guild, a conflict normally settled through elections of guildmasters. Disputes arose between guild officers and journeymen, which take on particular importance since the manner in which the parties expected them to be resolved probably reflected similar expectations about their conflicts with government officials. Guilds also fought one another for jurisdiction over specific occupations, presenting a microcosm of conflicting claims on resources by various groups within society. Finally, ethnicity and other primordial identities made their impact on the essentially professional and economic institution of the guilds, and this impact can tell us much about the nature of ethnic and religious politics in nineteenth-century Egypt.

The Election of the Guildmaster

The first set of issues into which the petitions and government documents lend us insight concern the offices of the guildmaster and his deputies. Guild members attached the greatest importance to these posts, since, among other things, until 1881 the guildmaster collected taxes for the government from them.¹⁵ How did guild members seek to influence the choice of the person who would lead and administer them? Did a powerful and ever-watchful state impose

him on them, and did the military governor choose him arbitrarily, reducing guild elections simply to a pro forma ratification?

During the first two centuries of Ottoman rule, the state apparently appointed guildmasters arbitrarily, a procedure that literate guild members complained about as a cause of guild decadence. It seems probable that guild members began to wrest from the government greater say over the choice of guildmaster during the late eighteenth century, a period of relative decentralization. Regarding those decades Raymond finds contradictory evidence about the degree of influence guild members had over the selection of their guildmaster. Most often candidates came from a few prominent families within the guild. He concludes, however, that on the whole guildmasters were elected by their peers with the state reserving the right to review the choice. Some guilds, he thinks, proved better able to assert themselves against the power of the state than others. Subsequent work by Layla 'Abdu'l-Latif Ahmad confirms Raymond's conclusions about the somewhat hereditary nature of guild leadership and the role of senior masters in choosing from among candidates from a limited number of leading families.¹⁶

Published government regulations and diplomatic documents from the Isma'îl period give the impression that the government chose the guildmaster, usually after taking suggestions from the senior masters, and they influenced historians such as Baer.¹⁷ The guild petitions and police commentaries on them in the archives, however, give an entirely different impression. The documents do not support the notion that a handful of senior masters humbly made an informal suggestion to the police chief or governor, who then appointed whomever he pleased. Rather, it is clear that a very large number of members (as many as 200 or 300) often formally voted and were taken seriously, suggesting a grassroots flavor in guild election procedures that comes as a shock to one familiar with standard historiography on the subject. Once elected, of course, the guildmaster had wide powers, which he could exercise in quite an authoritarian manner. But his constituents elected him on a somewhat democratic basis. Most petitions concerning these offices dealt either with the election of guild officers or the expression of discontent with them. The election procedures here considered hold true for the 1860s and 1870s, and certainly differ from those in earlier decades.

As in many other areas of society, the reformist government of Viceroy Isma'îl enacted legislation concerning the election of guild officers. My own guess is that when the viceroy and his privy council decided to institute a chamber of deputies or quasi-parliament, which met for the first time in 1866, they proceeded to order more consultative procedures in other social institutions as well. A government document preserves the original decision in this regard:

In the decision of the Privy Council, ratified by the viceroy, no. 3, Sha'ban 1282 [December 1865–January 1866], no. 29, upon which was based the communication

of the Governorate no. 12, Sha^hban 1282, no. 34, it is indicated as follows: Whenever it becomes necessary to install a master or deputy master of a guild, or the head of a city quarter of neighborhood, this shall be carried out through communications between the police and the governorate. These officials must first gather for an election a group composed of those who have the right to express their good pleasure and to certify the results. With the knowledge of the governorate the election shall be carried out in accordance with the above-mentioned decision. If any criminal act seems involved, the court must look into it and carry out an investigation and its decision must be executed.¹⁸

In 1870 the privy council made the oversight of most guild elections the joint responsibility of the police and the governorate, except in the case of the building guilds, where the police and the Ministry of Public Works shared responsibility; the privy council reaffirmed the principle of guild elections to determine officers.¹⁹ Guilds and the government often, but not always, followed these steps in practice, as I shall show below. Only by considering actual cases of elections and election disputes can we measure the distance between law and practice.

A typical case showing the actual procedure of elections comes from the printers' guild. The guildmaster's petition said that he wanted to resign because he felt overextended. He wished qualified guild members to elect another in his stead. Once gathered, they elected a new guildmaster, who gave as security the required sum (usually £E 20), and one senior guild member, along with the guildmaster of the paper makers, cosigned the documents. A police official attended the election, and later searched the files at headquarters to ensure that the new guildmaster had no criminal past.

The formality with which elections often were carried out can be seen in a typical police account. The guild of "helpers" (*musa'idun*) in Bulaq, probably grain brokers, had to have an election for a deputy guildmaster (*wakil*) because the former incumbent ran afoul of the law.²⁰ The precinct police chief convened the voting members of the guild at the police station. Two main preferences emerged from the vote tallies: Tha'lab ("the Fox") Salih and Ahmad Hazim, with Hazim the winner by a slight margin. The reporting officer actually talked of counting ballots (*qawa'im al-intikhab*), and gave the voting breakdown as shown in Table 6.1. Some guild members averred that Tha'lab Salih had prior convictions, or at least was under investigation by the Tax Office (Qalam al-Wirku), and the police wanted further information before proceeding. In the end, authorities decided the results were ambiguous enough to warrant holding a new election.²¹

Another instance demonstrates some occasional cobwebs in both guild organization and government records. In 1878 the knife sharpeners complained that they had no guild leadership. The police investigated and found this group to be a subguild of the blacksmiths. Police records showed that a deputy

TABLE 6.1
Voting Patterns among Helpers in Bulaq, 1879

	<i>Tha'lab Salih</i>	<i>Ahmad Hazim</i>
Masters (<i>'umad</i>)	17	18
Supervisors (<i>maqadim</i>)	25	16
Journeyman (<i>anfar</i>)	124	147
Total	166	181

Source: Egyptian National Archives, Cairo city council registers.

guildmaster had been appointed, but when they summoned him they discovered a man very advanced in years who had for long shown no interest in the guild. He said that his appointment had in any case been unofficial. The concerned police officer then called together the knife sharpeners with the officials of the blacksmiths' guild for an election, in which the guildmaster of the blacksmiths approved the winner.²²

It may have been in the guildmaster's interest to hold the election at the police station since that step helped protect him from subsequent challenges. When twelve members of a guild in Bulaq complained that the signatures in the election of the deputy guildmaster were forged or belonged to nonmembers, the police investigated and found that members had duly held the election at the station. They dryly observed that twelve persons could not overturn a decision made by 200.²³

The guild members seem to have had a fairly free hand in electing their leaders, but factionalism within the guild could occasionally invite strong government intervention. A case involving brokers best illustrates this point. The government investigated the Sha't brothers, guildmasters of the brokers or middlemen in Alexandria, on several counts of criminal activity. In consequence, the Alexandria city council ruled that they should be dismissed from their guild posts. But somewhat later the guild members petitioned the Interior Ministry complaining that the Sha'ts still held office. The governor of Alexandria's office made inquiries and decided to remove the brothers until the police issued their final report. In the meantime, the guild had to choose a temporary replacement. The brokers split into two factions: one desired Ahmad 'Ali; the other rejected him as unfit, saying his candidacy formed part of a plot to commit misdeeds. They wanted the authorities to ask about Ahmad 'Ali's reputation from the merchants of the port. This opposition faction supported a man named an-Naqah.

Officials called together the port's merchants, who denied knowing any Ahmad 'Ali, saying that the signatures supporting him appeared to be from outsiders such as the goldsmiths. These port merchants supported a third candidate, from the Sha't family and thus a relative of the dismissed guildmasters, on condition that he had no police record. But they were willing to accept

an-Naqah as a second choice. Ahmad ʿAli and his faction at this point protested that the port merchants, importers, had no right of selection, since the Alexandria council had stipulated that only exporters should help choose the successor to the Shaʿts. The authorities sent for a copy of the decision, which did indeed say that the new guildmaster should be chosen at the governorate offices by the export merchants, the port subgovernor, and the senior members of the brokers' guild.

Upon the convening of this gathering, those assembled expressed a preference for yet a fourth candidate. An investigation, however, showed him to be a defendant in a criminal proceeding, which disqualified him. Now a group of European exporters based in Alexandria submitted a statement saying that, since they had heard that the guild intended to select a guildmaster, they would like to register their confidence in an-Naqah. By this time the dealers were becoming desperate to settle the issue, since their business had been interrupted owing to the lack of a guildmaster. The governor reported that insofar as the first person put forward, Ahmad ʿAli, had proved to be unfit, and the second was legally barred from taking office, and since both senior guild members and the merchants spoke well of an-Naqah, he was to be recognized as guildmaster.²⁴

This case demonstrates that outside groups like the import merchants and even the Europeans could have a direct or indirect voice in choosing the middleman's guildmaster. Moreover, when guild members showed indecision, the government could act in a high-handed fashion. After all, authorities appear never to have offered any real proof of Ahmad ʿAli's alleged unfitness, and his strongest denunciation came from the importers, who had no right to vote in the first place. Often only the guild members' litigiousness kept Alexandria's authorities under the rule of law. The officials delayed in dismissing the Shaʿts, and they attempted to include the importers in the subsequent voting, both times disregarding the city council decision. But whenever guild members cited the decision, they were able to force the governorate and police to comply with it. In the end the disruption of business forced a settlement. Politics proved too expensive a game for brokers to play very long.

The state appears only infrequently to have interfered in election choice except in cases where guild members split fairly evenly on the choice and needed an outsider to act as tie-breaker. In extraordinary circumstances, however, government officials might intervene against the will of members in elections for the guildmaster, particularly if they suspected corruption or lawbreaking. The combined guild of Arab merchants and Sudanese brokers dealing in tamerinds, natron (a salt extract), and other Sudanese products numbered 287 members. This group found it easy to profit from the slave trade, which the Egyptian government formally outlawed in 1854. Ismaʿil's regime made efforts to suppress the trade despite many notables' conviction that Islamic law permitted it. Indeed, in the late 1870s police arrested the guildmaster of this

combined guild and imprisoned him for slave-trading, then called a new election. At the Cairo police station 171 guild members attended, of whom 117 voted for one Muhammad Abu Dhahab, and 54 for another candidate, Agha Salih. The governor of Cairo analyzed the voting patterns and discovered that, of the guild's two groups, the Sudanese had overwhelmingly chosen Muhammad Abu Dhahab. On the other hand, almost as many Arab merchants voted for Agha Salih as for his rival. The police chief reasoned that the Sudanese brokers, prone to slave-trading, might return to the practice if he allowed their man to become guildmaster. He therefore appointed Agha Salih, the favorite of a little less than half the Arab merchants, as master of the combined guild.²⁵

This document, like the one concerning Bulaq discussed above, reveals that the selection procedure at the police station involved actual voting and not merely vague consensus, since the governor had a detailed breakdown of voting patterns. Moreover, the large proportion of guild members who voted—nearly two-thirds—indicates greater democracy than historians had previously assumed. The conclusion appears inescapable that journeymen voted in these elections, though what weight their votes carried appears to have varied somewhat with the circumstances.

Not only guilds, but other similar institutions practiced these electoral procedures in the 1870s and early 1880s. The al-Azbakiyyah chamber of commerce, organized in late 1870, announced the opening of a club for merchants. The chamber pledged to post the telegraphic news and government announcements of the day, especially those affecting commerce, and to maintain a reading room with newspapers as well as a room for coffee and conversations. Moreover, it promised, merchants would elect a consultative council (*majlis shura*) from among their prominent members.²⁶ Cairo also had a committee (*majlis al-hisbah*) of prominent merchants who helped decide fair prices in the city. The Ministry of the Interior reported that

In regard to the election of two members to the majlis al-hisbah: A gathering of those required from among the merchants and city notables was convened at the police station, and they decided to elect Mahmud Bey al-^cAttar, the ser-tuccar of the capital, and al-Hajj Muhammad at-Tuwayr, because of their capabilities. They are elected for six month terms from 6 Muharram 1297, in accordance with the constitution of the majlis.²⁷

The quasi-democratic ethos of electing officials to office thus widely obtained in Egyptian society, even at times when the council of deputies was prorogued by high-handed khedives and premiers. That the indigenous bourgeoisie practiced these elections perhaps occasions less surprise than that they seem equally widespread among the humblest artisans.

Guilds in the 1860s and 1870s, then, held formal elections with the police station as a common venue. Such procedures suggest a great degree of formality and rationality. In most cases, the government simply ratified the choice of

the guild members eligible to vote, which suggests more autonomy for the guilds than has usually been assumed. The state did, of course, play an important role. The authorities kept detailed lists of guildmasters and the number of men under them, requiring registration and payment of a security for taxes. Government intervention became most dramatic when the guild split so badly as to prevent a clear winner from emerging. Officials had wide powers to decide the result of ambiguous elections, to consult groups outside the guild that might be affected, and even to overturn a clear result if they thought it might result in future lawbreaking. In such actions, however, the state acted as an occasional referee rather than as an omnipresent despot. Indeed, in the case of the knife sharpeners only an initiative of the guild members themselves brought to light an inactive guildmaster and the need for fresh elections. Within the guild structure itself, a hierarchy may be discerned. The choice of the knife sharpeners had to be ratified not only by the government, but also by the masters of the larger guild, the blacksmiths, of which they formed a sub-unit. A hierarchy of authority and of ratification constrained the grassroots spirit of the elections themselves. The detailed election returns preserved for us in the cases of the Bulaq brokers and the Arab-Sudanese merchant guilds, however, provide evidence of relatively egalitarian selection procedures. The practice of actual voting by nearly the entire membership of a guild indicates a more democratic procedure and ethos than had heretofore been envisaged among the guilds. That some guild members had been socialized to such norms surely has implications for their likely views on national politics and procedures as well.

Conflicts between Guild Officers and Journeymen

Although the guilds elected their own officers, usually with little outside interference, the relationship between guildmaster and members sometimes went sour. As the Arabic-speaking, Maltese British consular official Borg saw it, once elected the guildmaster could act as an autocrat:

A Sheikh is the supreme ruler of his Guild, he admits members, directs in which manner the works should be performed, fixes the wages of craftsmen in the several degrees, selects workmen to carry out the Government works, accepts work from private individuals and distributes it among his people, collects capitation and other taxes from the members of his craft, and in a word, deals with the men under his rule as best may seem to him, as he is the autocrat thereof, although nominally responsible to the Government for his administration and subject to the advice of the Omads [*ʿumad*, the senior masters] upon all matters. Upon sending workmen to private individuals he is entitled to a fee of from 5 to 10 current piastres (from 6 to 12 pence) per diem from the employer, until the work is finished, but that rate is invariable, whatever the number of workmen he may provide.²⁸

The guildmaster's attempt to assert such wide prerogatives provoked conflict at times with his journeymen, and he occasionally complained to the government about his men breaking guild rules. More often, guild members regretted their choice and found that their officers overtaxed them, pocketing the difference, or engaged in other corrupt activities that threatened the smooth functioning of the guild. How did the two parties handle such conflicts? Borg's report implies that none could challenge the authority of the guildmaster, but the guild petitions suggest otherwise.

More often, petitions reaching the government derived from journeymen disputing the fitness of their officers. Disgruntled journeymen wishing to remove their guildmaster could often succeed in doing so at least temporarily by accusing him of embezzlement or tax fraud. The mere appearance of impropriety could provoke a crippling investigation that would cause the guild official's dismissal. Sometimes even a verdict of innocence would not be enough to restore the official to his post, particularly if fresh elections were held while he was being investigated.²⁹ Journeymen often had access to incriminating information about their guildmaster, which they seldom hesitated to use if they decided for their own reasons to attempt to rid themselves of him. For instance, in 1879 some disgruntled members of the butchers' guild complained that an embezzlement scandal that involved dropping 9,000 head of sheep from the ledgers led to the sacking of government officials in charge of the slaughterhouse, but that the guildmaster of the butchers had not been punished despite his complicity. Here guild members attempted to use the leverage of an already notorious crime to implicate their own guildmaster, lending their charge some weight.³⁰

But this maneuver could prove tricky and dangerous unless the journeymen had good proof at hand, since the guildmaster controlled more resources than they did. Most often such accusations formed part of a power struggle between factions in a guild. Some porters accused their guildmaster of extracting an extra half guinea from each of them over and above government taxes. But the accusers proved unable to substantiate their charges in the subsequent investigation, and many other workers vigorously defended their guildmaster. That one of the accusers himself had a criminal record helped undermine his credibility with the military investigator.³¹

One problem facing journeymen who denounced officers for overtaxing members probably lay in the guildmasters' payment of kickbacks to local authorities. More sophisticated guild members, such as merchants, therefore attempted to build complex cases against disliked officers in hopes of bringing in the high bureaucrats of the Interior Ministry. For instance, fifty North African merchants in Alexandria charged that although their guild tax, set by the viceroy's privy council, came to £E880, their guildmaster had assessed them at £E2500. Moreover, they had discovered that he had a police record, something they had not known when they elected him, and which legally barred him from serving as master of this or any other guild.³²

The governor of Alexandria had to reply to the minister of the interior concerning the petition, explaining the facts of the case. He admitted that authorities had once found 'Ali Muntasir, now master of the North African merchants' guild, guilty of misallocating funds when a clerk for the grain-transporters' guild. Sentenced to prison, he received a pardon in a general amnesty and never served any time behind bars. As for the £E2500 guild tax, this trebling of the guild's assessment derived from a decision of Hasan Pasha Rasim when governor of Alexandria rather than from the guildmaster. Other guilds had also protested this increase, but it was something known and recorded at the Finance Ministry and other government departments.

The North African merchants' charge of overtaxation could thus stand up only if it was allowed to implicate higher officials as well; the accusation that Muntasir had a conviction on his record possessed more force, though this series of documents does not reveal the final decisions to which the Interior Ministry came. The petition only proves that the merchants felt themselves illegally overtaxed and that they succeeded in obtaining and citing an obscure police report against a leader they wished to depose. The desperate atmosphere of Viceroy Isma'il's last years, and the structural tensions generated by high taxes and debt crisis, pervade this petition, and must have underlain much of the friction between the guildmasters and their rank and file in the 1870s.

The failures of the porters and the North African merchants demonstrate that members needed both a strong legal case and unity in order to effect a desired change in their guild leadership. Members of the guild of garment brokers in Bulaq seem to have been on firmer ground when they complained about the deputy guildmaster, Hasanayn Salim. They alleged that he, having grown too old and ill to perform the duties of his office, had delegated his authority in 1875 to another man. They argued at that time that the old man had in effect resigned and was attempting to install his own choice as successor by the legal fiction that the new man was his agent. They had wanted a fresh election that would reflect the will of the guild members themselves, insisting that appointment of his successor was not the guild officer's prerogative. When Salim saw trouble brewing, he had resumed the functions of deputy guildmaster, despite his health problems, rather than relinquishing power and holding elections. But two years later, in 1877, he attempted the same ploy, delegating authority to one Zayid, the son of his first agent. The other guild members, outraged, charged Zayid with being a crooked street ruffian and petitioned the Interior Ministry for new elections. The ministry replied that the guild should elect a reliable person. The qualified guild members met and chose a man they considered solid and knowledgeable. The guildmaster of the Bulaq market merchants and head of the brokers testified to the new man's suitability and sent the election forms to the governorate requesting that he be recognized. In the meantime, the guild found that Zayid had spread a rumor that the governor would appoint him to the office to spite the guild, which had angered him.

The petitioners pleaded that the appointment be made in accordance with the desires of the guild members, none of whom wanted undependable Zayid. Moreover, they pointed out, the Interior Ministry had already directed that he not be retained but a reliable person chosen. They ended their petition, saying, "The kindness of your honor rules out tyranny and treachery, and coercion is forbidden."³³

The guild members thus felt that they had the right to express their will in the election of their officers, and resisted both the encroachments of guild officers reluctant to give up power despite age or illness, and the arbitrariness of the government officials who ratified the results of elections and could sometimes overturn them. Their description of Zayid as a street tough implies that Salim chose him as agent in order to intimidate them, an effort that obviously failed. The brokers saw the election procedures as bulwarks against tyranny, and they cleverly employed functional ambiguity to say so. Their final sentence suggests that the only possible motive for overturning their duly held election was tyranny, which they slyly refused to attribute to the governor in view of his character; and that the only means of carrying out such a reversal was coercion, which they openly disputed the right of the governor to use.

Other guild officers resorted to similar tactics for retaining power, provoking journeymen to challenge them. Guild members often stood up for what they conceived to be their rights in helping choose their own leadership. In 1876 over 130 measurers at Bulaq shore challenged their deputy guildmasters, who had selected temporary agents.³⁴ The authorities had arrested these guild officers for corruption, and had tried and sentenced them to varying prison terms. The arrests required that the guild choose agents to run affairs while the officers languished in jail, and the police gathered guild members for an election, the results of which authorities approved. Earlier the dismissed guildmaster, Hasan Abu 'Abdu'llah, had filed an appeal against his removal from office, a process that went on for a year and a half. During this time his journeymen continued to oppose him. The petitioning rank and file guild members complained that Abu 'Abdu'llah had secretly handpicked the agents elected to stand in for the jailed officers, and they made trouble for the guild in hopes of getting the government to intervene. The measurers appear to have been charging that the agents deliberately acted in such a way as to convince the government that the guild desperately needed the dismissed guildmaster's strong hand. Ultimately, the Cairo governor refused Abu 'Abdu'llah's appeal, so at least the measurers escaped the domination of a guildmaster they despised.

Both the brokers and the measurers, in initiating complaints against their guild authorities, demonstrated a determination to have a say in who led them. Both succeeded in ousting guild leaders whom they did not want. The brokers' refusal to accept the fiction of an "agent" of the decrepit deputy guildmaster, and the measurers' petition to the interior minister against the agents of their jailed guild officers show that when the rank and file members felt their right

to help select guild leadership had been circumvented they were willing to take determined action, and even to go outside the guild to the authorities.

A guildmaster who found his own authority and sanctions against members who over- or undercharged for their services insufficient finally had recourse to the state. As we saw in Chapter 2, the guildmaster of the tilers and pavers in Cairo, along with senior members, complained to the authorities in 1873 that some journeymen contravened the principles earlier agreed upon by both master artisans and the rank and file. They refused to obey or respect the masters, they held up the payment of the capitation tax, and they took contracts at low wages, but they then often left the work contracted for incomplete.³⁵ Such complaints to the state suggest, in themselves, that the guildmaster sometimes had difficulty making his writ run among the journeymen.

The guildmaster's relationship with guild members may have often been paternalistic and autocratic, as Borg reported. But clear limits existed to his authority, which members hardly accepted as absolute. Guild officers sometimes grew exasperated with their journeymen, who in the face of the competition introduced by rapid population growth and European immigration, constantly faced the temptation to sell their labor at cheaper rates than those preferred by the guild. Such forces threatened the discipline of the guild and even its reason for being. On the other hand, rank and file guild members sometimes felt frustrated with their guild officers when these attempted to circumvent normal election procedures that gave a wider cross-section of the guild some say in who should fill guild posts. The struggle of a handful of officers, sometimes corrupt, to retain their power in the face of dissatisfaction from the rank and file, appears to have been a constant dynamic of guild organization in these decades. Such a dynamic required an active determination on the part of guild members to assert their will, something they appear to have done fairly frequently.

Dissatisfied journeymen seeking the ouster of their officers could in the last instance appeal to the state. The government's authority to ratify guild elections, and the lack of a fixed term of service for guild officials, made this method of challenging incumbents a potentially effective one. Where they could substantiate such accusations, which practically speaking required the cooperation of most journeymen, the authorities tried the guild officer, convicted and sentenced him, and declared him ineligible to hold further office. This dismissal then opened the way to new elections, though involved judicial appeals of the dismissal could long delay the installation of a genuinely new leadership. Many such attempts to unseat incumbents failed, of course, whether because most originated with a small number of aggrieved members and rested on slim or no grounds, or because these endeavors required taking on entrenched interests. The frequent challenges journeymen threw up to their leadership in the 1860s and 1870s, however, at least demonstrate a conviction that they ought to be able to express their political will within the guild admin-

istration. They even instructed the governor of Cairo that he was forbidden by law to use coercion in imposing a guildmaster on them. This unexpected tradition of feistiness may help explain the support of many guildsmen for the ʿUrabi revolt, wherein Egyptians challenged the viceregal leadership as tyrannical and corrupt at home and weak in dealing with the foreigners. Let us now turn to the question of intergroup relations, which may, again, help us understand popular models of social conflict and the role of mediating authority.

Disputes over Jurisdiction

Just as state-making requires both the mediation of internal conflict and the delineation of boundaries with outside groups, so the ongoing process of making the guild necessitated the resolution of recurring conflicts over jurisdiction. Journeymen sometimes found themselves gerrymandered into a guild structure in which they felt out of place or exploited. Occasionally two similar guilds would arise in the same place, and rival guildmasters claimed complete authority. Larger guilds often had sub-branches, some of which made bids to be recognized as independent guilds. Borg wrote that the guildmaster was assisted by an agent and deputy guildmasters, varying in number from two to four, depending on the size of the guild.³⁶ The deputy guildmaster often presided over a branch of the guild, the members of which pursued a slightly different occupation than that of the main guild, and this branch could under certain circumstances become autonomous. In all these conflicts among guilds the ambitions of guild officers played an important part, but so did the desires of masters and journeymen.

Jurisdiction was worked out by the guilds in various ways. Some guilds existed only in a particular city quarter, whereas others functioned on a city-wide scale. The dynamics of the process of fission and unification piques Baer's curiosity, though he is unable to provide answers: "If we had detailed histories of the various guilds, it would be interesting to try to find out what determined whether a trade split up into separate guilds or remained unified under a common shaykh, when the members dispersed over different parts of the city."³⁷

We still, of course, lack detailed histories, but at least some answers will be attempted below. Here it is enough to note that some guilds, such as the wagoners (*al-ʿarabajiyyah*) and the bakers, did have a unified guild structure throughout Cairo as evidenced in Table 6.2. In such instances, members elected a deputy guildmaster in each city quarter.³⁸ Such a unified structure throughout a large urban area, of course, also speaks to the guilds' organizational capacity and ability to mobilize political resources in times of crisis.

Conflict among guild officers over matters of jurisdiction arose when the authorities themselves had left such matters vague and unformalized, a by no

TABLE 6.2
City Quarter Residence of Wagoners'
Guild Petition Signers

<i>Quarter</i>	<i>Number</i>
Bulaq	31
al-Azbakiyyah	27
al-Jamaliyyah	17
Manshiyyah	6
Darb as-Sa'adah	5
Suq Miskah	4
Misr al-Qadimah	1

Source: DWQ, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 14, 'Ardhal ta'ifat 'Arabajiyyah [petition of the wagoners' guild], rec'd. 29 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1291/8 January 1875.

means uncommon situation. It then fell to the guilds themselves to work out the conflicting claims; only if they failed did they bring the state back in as arbiter. This sort of conflict among guild officers occurred in the case of the guards at the Delta city of Tanta. In 1875 the governor of Gharbiyyah province, owing to an increase in the number of thefts in Tanta, wrote the Cairo police chief requesting that he send Nubians headed by a reliable guildmaster to restore order and protect the city. 'Ali 'Uthman, the guildmaster of the guards that were dispatched, related how he and his men arrived and prevented further thefts. The guildmaster was troubled, however, to find some Nubians already present and employed as guards in the markets and workshops, and at the homes of wealthy private citizens and Europeans. Shaykh 'Ali said he did not know if these men paid a guild tax or not, and he felt it wise to take security deposits from them, lest he should later be held accountable for them as guildmaster of the Nubians. But it transpired that the hired guards in Tanta already had a guild, guildmaster, and fixed taxes. Their leader, Shaykh Yusuf, worked as a government employee in the office of pious endowments in the city. When the newcomer Shaykh 'Ali attempted to find out the tax rate for Tanta's guards, the police informed him that they could only give out this information to the guildmaster, Shaykh Yusuf.³⁹

A power struggle developed between the two men, each of whom declared himself guildmaster. Both they and the authorities recognized that Tanta was not big enough for two guildmasters, a situation that might cause troubles among their armed men. Local authorities had recognized Shaykh Yusuf as guildmaster for ten years, preserving his security deposit at the public record office, and he charged that Shaykh 'Ali, a troublemaker, was employing his guards to deprive Shaykh Yusuf of his livelihood. Shaykh 'Ali's authority

rested on his having been made head of the forty men sent from Cairo, where he had paid his security deposit and had been certified by the Cairo guildmaster. All concerned recognized that the Cairo guildmaster should settle the affair. When the Gharbiyyah governor wrote to him, he replied that as long as the incumbent Shaykh Yusuf performed his duties then he was guildmaster of Tanta's hired guards. The governor recommended placing all the guards under Shaykh Yusuf. Shaykh ʿAli in his petition contested this decision, insisting that if his rival intended to head all the guards he must increase his security deposit to cover them all. Moreover, he pointed out that if Shaykh Yusuf had been doing his job it would not have been necessary to call in outsiders from Cairo to restore order. Finally, he said, a guildmaster acted improperly in attempting also to hold down a desk job at the pious endowments office. If a theft occurred, would he leave his office to investigate it?

The conflict between the two guildmasters derived from several ambiguities. The Cairo authorities, in dispatching the new guards, gave them their own guildmaster rather than integrating them into the local structures from the beginning, which shows little understanding of provincial conditions. The trouble shooters from the big city clearly looked down on their colleagues in Tanta, and their leader saw the Tanta guildmaster as a milquetoast office worker. This sentiment indicates the potential for wider disputes between full-time guild officers and those who combined their post with other, often more white-collar, occupations.

Not all disputes between guilds originated in the rivalries of guild officers. The rank and file members themselves sometimes sought to alter organizational affiliations. Where a general guildmaster asserted a claim to authority over a subguild, and could convince the state of the legitimacy of his claim, he could often have workers assigned to him. How actively did ordinary guild members respond to such assignment? One petition shows that they did not always simply acquiesce in the guild structure designed by the bureaucrats and guildmasters. Ninety-one wagon drivers protested early in 1875 that they did not wish to remain under the authority of the guildmaster of the camel drivers. This man, they said, had despotically forced the camel drivers to sell their livestock, so that they had been obliged to take up carting for a profession. The wagon drivers feared a similar fate awaited them at his hands, and wanted their own man, Ahmad Muhammad, as guildmaster. They warned that the camel driver still intended to enter them under his leadership and reduce them to a condition of slavery. Ahmad Muhammad made similar charges against the camel drivers' leader, of having forced his men to sell their animals. But the authorities rejected Muhammad's own candidacy because he had a police record.⁴⁰ The wagon drivers' petition demonstrates the near terror working men could feel at the prospect of having a guildmaster inimical to their perceived economic interests. Under such conditions they went so far as to liken themselves to slaves—no empty metaphor in a society that still practiced on a small

scale the buying and selling of human beings. In short, under some circumstances the ordinary guild members themselves made a bid to influence the drawing of guild lines by agitating and appealing in the strongest possible terms to the state.

As noted, a guild often grouped several subguilds, each with its own deputy guildmaster, subsumed under the authority of a supreme guildmaster.⁴¹ When a subguild grew in number of members or became more specialized, it frequently wished to break off and form an independent guild with its own autonomous guildmaster. This move was occasionally resisted by the larger guild, since it could detract from their wealth and power. The guildmaster of the fancy weavers (*‘aqqadun*) involved in making silk cords, braids, and tassels, who had general authority over similar workers using coarser materials as well as cloth weavers (*habbakun*) of various sorts, attempted to stop the secession of a subguild of *‘aqqads* who used reed materials rather than silk to make ribbons, buttons, and tassels. He, deputy guildmasters, and other guild members totaling forty-nine persons submitted a petition to stop the new guild's recognition.⁴² Officials often proved unsympathetic to such opposition, however. During Mahmud Sami al-Barudi's tenure as Cairo police chief, in the late 1870s, officials had no objection to subguilds breaking off unilaterally. At age 80 the head of a subguild of importers wished to retire. Al-Barudi checked the guild register, but found no listing for the name of this guild or its master. He summoned the guildmaster of the silk merchants, who affirmed that these importers, a subguild under his leadership, had always shown a measure of independence. A check with the Cairo municipal council showed the old head as a deputy guildmaster responsible for the subguild's taxes. Police decided to call an election, but guild members replied that their guild was independent and they wanted as-Sayyid ‘Abdu’l-Qadir Badawi appointed as autonomous guildmaster. An upright man, he did not drink and had no police record; he proved willing and able to pay the required security deposit. With this choice the guild became independent.⁴³ Officials even cited this decision later as a precedent, when a subguild wished to break off from the china-ware dealers because their numbers had grown to sixty-five, and they allowed them to do so unilaterally. On the other hand, authorities resisted the recognition of guilds when they consisted of only a handful of members. Also, in some instances the previously dominant guildmaster and his supporters strenuously resisted the secession, feeling it would diminish his power and authority.⁴⁴

Conflicts over jurisdiction often broke out when a subguild feared that a guildmaster might, from personal or structural motives, adopt policies inimical to their own economic standing and activities. Raymond finds evidence that eighteenth-century guilds experienced little internal stratification by wealth, that guildmasters on the whole left about the same size estates as other members.⁴⁵ But perhaps the cotton boom and other economic changes in the 1860s and 1870s began to change all that. Just as the Muslim Egyptian wealthy

tended to go into landowning or government office in this period, so we find the guildmaster of the hired guards in Tanta working in an endowment office while simultaneously pursuing his guild duties. The guildmaster of the camel drivers also seems to have had an economic position more favorable than his immiserated guild members. Such stratification within the guild, although quite different from the European phenomenon of the embourgeoisement of the upper guild leadership, appears as one source of tension that provoked secession attempts. In many cases subguilds could freely pull away to form their own independent guilds, but on occasion the interests of high officials made it more difficult for them to do so. At other times conflict broke out where the precise lines of authority were fuzzily drawn. The initiative for such restructuring of guild relationships, in any case, came from either guild officers or members themselves, rather than primarily from the government.

If one considers these guild procedures as a model that members might also have had in the back of their minds when thinking of society and the state, the whole question of the ability of a subguild to secede and stress its independence takes on particular importance. The fear the wagoners felt at being put under the rapacious guildmaster of the camel drivers, who had overtaxed his men into penury, must have paralleled their trembling at Viceroy Isma'il's extremely harsh taxes. Many subguilds could become independent simply by insisting they be so recognized. To what extent did guild participation in the 'Urabi revolt on the side of the revolutionaries represent a similar bid for autonomy from a state system that had overtaxed them for two decades? Were they, in siding with 'Urabi over Viceroy Tawfiq, expressing a preference for being subsumed under the authority of one "master" rather than another?

Ethnicity

The 'Urabi revolt posed in the most vivid manner questions of ethnic identities and their impact on state-making. The junior officers and troops in the Egyptian army who supported the revolt often complained about being blocked and bullied by the Ottomans and Circassians who monopolized the higher military ranks. Once the European Powers openly took the side of the Ottoman- and Circassian-dominated status quo, Egyptian relations with Europeans deteriorated rapidly, reaching a low point in the Alexandria riot of 11 June 1882, wherein Egyptian laborers and artisans clashed violently with the thousands of Europeans in the port city. 'Urabi appears to have conjured up an Egyptian nativism that, politically, had an element of protonationalism, despite Egyptians' reluctance to forsake the Ottoman sultan-caliph. The apparent suddenness with which ethnic politics arrived on the scene during the 'Urabi revolt, an illusion, derives from our ignorance of social history in this period. I will show in Chapter 7 below that Euro-Egyptian working-class conflicts com-

monly took place in the 1860s and 1870s, as tens of thousands of Greeks and Italians immigrated. Social closure on ethnic and religious grounds exists in any complex society, and can often achieve greater importance than economic differences among classes. Can we see further evidence for the prior importance of ethnic divisions in the politics of the guilds?

The issue of ethnicity and the guilds has been controversial. Baer originally maintained that different religious categories universally generated several different guilds even within the same occupation. He concluded that the main reason for such divisions “was the administrative and fiscal considerations of the government.”⁴⁶ Raymond, on the other hand, found that eighteenth-century guilds most often had members of more than one religious group, and that even mostly Christian and Jewish guilds had a Muslim guildmaster appointed over them. Baer later approached Raymond’s findings cautiously, however, pointing to the lack of statistical evidence and suggesting that whether one wanted to see guilds as mostly segregated by religion with some mixture, or mostly mixed with some segregation, was simply a matter of emphasis. He also continued to believe that separate guilds for Christians and Muslims grew increasingly common in the nineteenth century, as the economic position of Christians improved.⁴⁷ The guild petitions to the Interior Ministry cannot, of course, in and of themselves settle the issue of how mixed guilds were by religion or ethnicity. But they can help tell us whether ethnic divisions within an occupation really derived from the government’s administrative priorities, and they can suggest what importance guild members attached to ethnic divisions.

Ethnic differences led seventy-nine Nubian and Sudanese wagon drivers in 1871 to protest against their continued inclusion in the general guild. They wrote:

We wish to say that we are given no rest by the present guildmaster of the wagoners. Given this, we have been so bold as to approach your excellency, hoping for the issuance of an order to the requisite quarters that we be separated off and given our own guildmaster. For there is no rest for persons of our race [*jins*], and no concord with the abovementioned guildmaster. In addition, a previous instance of such disharmony occurred in Alexandria. Then the sons of the Arabs were given their own guildmaster, whereas the Nubians were given an independent guildmaster, as a way of avoiding tiresome difficulties. The most beloved things for your excellency are the comfort of men and the prevention of tyranny, which are among the affairs of justice.⁴⁸

Note that the workers themselves proposed a separate guild organization for persons pursuing the same occupation, previously in the same guild, on grounds of their guildmaster’s racial prejudice. The Nubian wagoners responded to perceived mistreatment by a form of voluntary social closure whereby they sought to transform themselves from subordinates of Lower

Egyptian co-workers into their competitors in a separate guild. The government, far from initiating such an arrangement for administrative reasons, had to be pressured into acknowledging it with the citation of grievances and precedents.

A similar struggle that pitted private guards against a group from another region occurred in Alexandria. One Shaykh ʿAbduʿl-ʿAziz, guildmaster for all the Upper Egyptians in Alexandria, gained authority over the guards as well. The guards protested that he mistreated and then plundered them, and that his appointment “bore no fruit for the guild of guards.” Moreover, they had never wanted him over them, since he served as guildmaster for the Upper Egyptians, a group that included household servants, doormen, bribe takers, and waiters.⁴⁹ The guards, almost certainly Nubians, prided themselves on providing security to the city, and felt themselves demeaned by being grouped with base guilds under a man who, they felt, was irresponsible.

Writers on Egyptian guilds from the Ottoman period onwards commonly classified guilds by social status, based on income and the griminess of the work.⁵⁰ But here we have clear evidence that considerations of social status and ethnicity sometimes overlapped. The Nubian guards objected to being classed with persons from Asyut and Jirja whose trade they considered either servile or dishonest. Moreover, they feared that a guildmaster primarily concerned with such groups would be unjust to them and would neglect to look after their interests.

Religion could also form a basis of guild specialization, and could provoke conflict between guilds. Because Coptic Christians in Egypt practiced endogamy, there are grounds for looking at them as an ethnic group as well as a religious community. The one petition growing out of Coptic concerns in this period sought redress for a situation that arose from specifically religious considerations. The guild of Coptic merchants in El Minya complained that the general market day at the city fell on Sunday. Because of their other duties and religious observances on that day, they could not sell their goods. The Coptic merchants wanted the day changed. The governor of the district easily resolved this conflict by complying with the request, ordering that the day be changed to Monday.⁵¹

Religion clearly played a part in some guild secessions, even where the documents do not openly refer to the issue. For instance, until 1879 the 218 cobblers in Cairo’s posh al-Azbakiyyah quarter operated within a single guild structure (see Table 6.3). They consisted, however, of two distinct groups: the recently arrived foreign (*ifranji*) cobblers and the more established local (*baladi*) ones. Al-Azbakiyyah, a fashionable neighborhood rebuilt by Ismaʿil, would have generated a fair amount of work for those who made European-style shoes and boots. The foreign cobblers seem to have been primarily Christians, probably Syrian and Armenian immigrants, whereas the local cobblers appear to have been mostly Muslim. The foreign cobblers began protesting

TABLE 6.3
Numbers and *Wirku* Tax of Cobblers of al-Azbakiyyah

<i>Type of Cobbler</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Tax Assessment, 1879</i>
Foreign	137	13,500 <i>qurush</i>
Local	81	6,555 <i>qurush</i>
Total	218	20,055 <i>qurush</i>

Source: Ministry of Interior, Arabic correspondence, box 34.

that the guildmaster, ‘Abdu’r-Rahim (a Muslim name), was mistreating them and they wanted him removed from office. The Ministry of the Interior, however, found no grounds for dismissing him. The foreign cobblers next decided to withdraw and form their own guild. Since they formed 63 percent of the guild’s 218 members, and payed 67 percent of the tax assessment, government officials had no substantive reason to resist their formation of a separate guild. They held a formal election, choosing Sulayman Jirjis as their guildmaster. The latter paid the security fee, and had the pledge witnessed by Mu‘allim Hanna Sabbagh. It was further attested by Jirjis Ilyas Kafasi, deputy guildmaster of the Armenian jewelers’ guild.⁵² The Christian names and the informal relationship to the Armenian guild suggest that religion formed one of the reasons for their secession from a guild headed by a local Muslim.

Of course, economic reasons may have entered into the dispute. The immigrants appear to have been Ottomans, and thus subject to Egyptian taxes; but they clearly generated a disproportionate amount of the guild’s wealth, even considering their greater numbers. They probably were admitted to an already existing guild as they arrived in the quarter, and so were stuck with the guildmaster elected before the influx of foreigners. They became a wealthy majority institutionally dominated by a less wealthy minority, simply because of what Jean-Paul Sartre calls “serial inequality”; they arrived too late to make a difference. Religious ethnicity overlapped with differences in working materials and wealth to provoke a split. On the other hand, these Christian Ottomans might well have been successfully integrated into the existing Muslim Egyptian guild structure had the authorities allowed new elections to reflect the vastly changed shape of the electorate.

Society ascribes ethnic status, in the language of sociologists, rather than judging the member of an ethnic group by that person’s individual achievements. But guild members themselves worked out how ethnicity would affect their professional organization. Where Nubians felt persecuted by Lower Egyptian guildmasters and colleagues, or where they felt demeaned by association with Upper Egyptian servants, they sought to pull away and form their own guilds on an ethnic basis. Neither society nor the government imposed such ethnically differentiated guilds as a given, as the existence of many mixed guilds demonstrates. By locating the reasons for such divisions in bureaucratic

considerations, Baer underestimates the ongoing and socially dynamic forces of identity formation among workers and their own initiatives in shaping a work environment they found comfortable. The published administrative documents, precisely on these points, exaggerate the role of the government and give insufficient weight to the guild members' own role, something these petitions can help correct. Guild members themselves, then, sometimes fashioned ethnically similar guilds in response to their own prejudices or to perceptions of discrimination by others, as in the instance of the al-Azbakiyyah cobblers. Such social closure could take place on the basis of feelings of group pride versus another ethnic or occupational category, or from practical cultural conflicts as with the Coptic recognition of Sunday, rather than Friday, as the day of worship.

The idea that ethnic groups based on skin color, language, or religion, should when they find it necessary pull away from mixed guilds and establish a separate organization, cannot be devoid of political consequences. When ʿUrabi complained about Ottoman-Egyptian superciliousness, calling for an increased say for Egyptians, he was employing a cultural code of ethnic dispute that was already implicit in Egyptian public discourse. The anti-European sentiments and actions of the Egyptian crowd likewise depended on the ability to lump Italian, Greek, and Maltese workers with the French and British merchants and consuls, all as Christian Europeans, and to form an alliance of indigenous Muslims, redefining the essential ethnic divide for a political moment. The Nubians who seceded from a guild dominated by Lower Egyptians, or from one in which Upper Egyptians formed the majority, were not acting in a peculiar or unaccustomed manner; nor were Christian merchants who strove to remove disabilities caused by their religious minority status, or immigrant Christian cobblers attempting to find a way to express themselves politically in a guild structure already erected before their arrival. Such conceptions of ethnic relations within and among guilds more than likely helped structure popular attitudes toward and actions during the ʿUrabi revolt.

In 1866 Viceroy Ismaʿil inaugurated the first council of deputies, a gathering of village headmen and other notables (including some guild officers) from up and down the Nile Valley, to advise him on government policy. The move, hailed in Europe as a step toward parliamentary constitutionalism, probably intended to give away less than it did. The deputies grew feistier over time, and in 1879 and 1881 effectively challenged the viceroy's autocracy. Ironically, Ismaʿil's government also instituted formal guild elections in the mid-1860s. One wonders if the viceroy intended that all major innovations in his central government should radiate out to be reflected in the series of vertical, cone-shaped institutions that made up Egyptian society, such as tribes, villages, city quarters, and guilds. The evidence, that hundreds of journeymen and tens of masters began gathering for guild elections at local police stations, and that

government officials routinely tallied and analyzed their votes, startles by its contrast with the almost dynastic selection process known from the eighteenth century. Although still marked by some government interference and by corruption and paternalism on the part of the guildmasters, from the mid-1860s the guilds may have become some of the more democratic institutions in Egyptian society, rivaling the masonic orders in this regard. Indeed, an organizational matrix for popular ideology such as the guilds, carrying a more or less democratic message, had much wider implications for tens of thousands of ordinary Egyptians than masonry, which affected a small elite.

I believe that the masters' and journeymen's conviction that they had a right to choose their guild leadership by formal balloting may have disposed them to support the calls for parliamentary constitutionalism raised by the Egyptian notables, officers, and intellectuals in 1879 and 1881–82. Ironically, Isma'il's own government ordained a voting procedure that suggested to guildsmen a new basis for legitimate authority, deriving from the public will. Remember that one guild petition explicitly denied the right of a guildmaster to choose his successor. When the viceroy sought to prorogue the council of deputies and to rule in an autocratic fashion, he contradicted the new norms he himself had sown among the urban populace. The contrast for ordinary persons of being able to trek to the local police station to vote for their guild officials, but of having no opportunity to vote for government representatives, must have been stark and unsettling. As the viceroys increasingly overtaxed the ordinary folk in order to satisfy the *Caisse de la Dette*, they made themselves extremely unpopular. Isma'il and Tawfiq became increasingly like the wicked guildmaster of the camel drivers who made his men sell their animals for his profit and forced them to take up common carting. I think the documents discussed above contain ample indication that guildsmen knew exactly what to do with an overbearing leader who overtaxed them; they agitated for his removal.

The addition of European cabinet members to Isma'il's government in the late 1870s also raised issues of jurisdiction. The Egyptian guilds practiced a closed shop. The middle-class nationalists, in effect, wanted a national closed shop that would exclude or control European capital, political influence, and even labor. Just as guild members were used to fighting over guild jurisdiction, they could understand the conflict posed by European claims over local resources. This sort of issue also elides into the question of ethnicity. Members of the guilds in Egypt sometimes formed guilds along religious and ethnic lines, even if that meant duplication of effort and an inefficient division of labor. Some guilds had a mixed membership, but religious and ethnic cleavages often provided a rationale for guild fission. As noted above, the discourse of social closure on the basis of religion and ethnicity suffused the politics of the 'Urabi movement. The indigenous faction wanted a polity for Egyptians that would exclude, or weaken the position of, the dominant Turks, Circasians, and Europeans. They wanted a polity that would favor indigenous

Shafi'i and Maliki Muslims and Copts over foreign Hanafi Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, and Greek Orthodox. In the words of one petition from ordinary people, cited above, there was no rest for people of the indigenous *jins* (ethnicity) under the elites then in power.

I have already admitted that the influence of guild administrative practices on popular conceptions of just national government can be posed only in a heuristic manner. Some of the guild support for 'Urabi's movement may have derived from their desire to see the Europeans—their chief competitors—weakened or driven out. Still, it seems to me that we can strengthen our understanding of the form this nativism took by looking at the everyday political rhetoric of the guildsmen. Only thus can we better explain the appearance of radical democrats among the tailors and porters of late Ottoman Egypt. Nativism, after all, need not have taken a constitutionalist form. Taking account of the models provided for national politics by evolving institutions within society, it seems to me, will provide for a sturdier conceptual vehicle. The question of ethnic and economic conflict between Egyptians and Europeans remains an important one, of course, and we should now turn to its manifestations in crowd action during the viceregal period.

Seven

Of Crowds and Empires: Euro-Egyptian Conflict

HAVING DISCUSSED THE ROLE of the guilds during the 1870s, let us now turn to some of the more informal vehicles for collective action in urban areas. The 12 percent of Egyptians who lived in large towns and cities structured their society in many ways. Informally, they gathered as a crowd on certain occasions. More formally, they grouped themselves by city quarter and by occupation. As we have seen, guilds dominated urban life, organizing skilled artisans, service workers, and those involved in transportation. The ways in which guild life interacted with the government bureaucracy and national politics have already been discussed. I want to pursue our exploration of the roles of workers and merchants in politics by focusing on a less structured form of association, the crowd.

An urban crowd forms on many occasions—during religious festivals and at coronations and other ceremonial events, at times of mourning and celebration, during strikes and demonstrations, and sometimes for violence during a riot.¹ Despite the suggestive work of André Raymond and Gabriel Baer on the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, historians have virtually ignored the history of the Egyptian crowd during the second half of the nineteenth century.² Yet crowd behavior has implications for a whole range of political phenomena, including Euro-Egyptian relations. Although scholars have much investigated the political and intellectual context of Egyptian resistance against European encroachments in the quarter-century before the British occupation, little has been written about the urban social context of the conflict between Egyptians and Europeans. The Alexandria riot of June 1882 has drawn much attention, but it hardly constituted the first violent encounter between Egyptian and European crowds in Egypt's rapidly growing cities. The Euro-Egyptian urban clashes during the revolution of 1882 cannot fully be understood without reference to both economic and demographic changes in the preceding period and to the history of crowd action and conflict.

We know that the nativist faction, largely drawn from the elite and the middle sort, sought links with the Egyptians who commonly made up the urban crowd. We may not assume, however, that the ordinary folk acted in this period simply as the elite directed. The problem of how to understand the crowd's own motivations remains unresolved. Albert Hourani, writing of the Ottoman lands, suggests that a number of anti-European or anti-Christian riots, including Jiddah (1858) and Damascus (1860), manifested the opposition of

local notables to both Ottoman centralization and the increasing political and economic penetration of the European consuls and their clients.³ This interpretation, a breakthrough at the time Hourani offered it, contains a strong element of truth. But its force is somewhat vitiated by the concentration solely on an elite. Hourani, appealing to both the Weberian notion of the patriciate and the Middle Eastern conception of the *a'yan* or prominent leaders, limits the notables to three groups: the Muslim clergy or ulama, the heads of local garrisons, and the landed secular notables. The argument seems to assume that such riots were the work of mobs directed by notables. The question we must address is whether the anti-European urban riots to which Hourani refers, as well as those occurring in Egypt during this era, were really directed by persons deriving from these three groups. Or did the urban crowd act in a more complex and autonomous fashion than such an interpretation would suggest?

A further question has to do with ways in which the context, aims, and tactics of crowd action changed over time. We know that in Ottoman Egypt crowds rioted to protest high food prices. Violence did occasionally break out between ordinary Egyptians and the Ottoman troops garrisoned in the major cities. These forms of crowd action tended to have the conservative aims of restoring ancient rights or securing a just economic situation in accordance with the crowd's moral economy.⁴ In the period 1801–05, following the French defeat at the hands of an Ottoman army supported by the British navy, crowds played an important proactive political role. The crowd action, in favor of the notable 'Umar Makram, set in motion a chain of events that led to the accession of a young Albanian officer named Muhammad 'Ali as Ottoman viceroy in preference to the sultan's original appointee. These events marked the beginnings of crowd intervention in modern politics, for all the Ottoman and Mamluk urban traditions that lay behind these popular actions. A new sort of Ottoman army had begun to come into being, with implications for the nature of its relationship to political power. One faction of the Ottoman army in Egypt managed to gain allies among the crowd in an apparently unprecedented manner. The subsequent further integration of Egypt into the world market led to a greatly increased European impact on the country. In our much later period, from a little after mid-century to the early 1880s, the issues that animated the Egyptian crowd had increasingly to do with growing European economic and diplomatic influence.

The European Impact on Egypt, 1858–76

The Bowring Report of 1839 foresaw that Egypt as the highroad to India would also come into increasing contact with the British. Although there might be some initial opposition, the report concluded, it would die down when Egyptians realized that the British were spreading wealth and civiliza-

tion.⁵ The first part of the prediction, about increasing British influence, proved accurate, especially from the late 1850s. The completion of the Cairo–Alexandria railway in 1858 helped open Egypt up to European penetration in a dramatic fashion. The trains shortened the length of a journey from the cosmopolitan port city of Alexandria to the previously more isolated capital of Cairo in the interior from four days to eight hours. The treasury receipts from higher tax income generated by the cotton boom allowed the Egyptian government to hire European mechanics, engineers, teachers, and even former Confederate officers. And, of course, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 created large expatriate communities at Suez and Port Said.

The Europeans immigrated into a dynamic urban environment. We have seen that the rate of population growth probably went from five per 1,000 per annum to twelve in this period, and cities grew substantially in absolute terms, even though rural population growth kept pace. Such growth in and of itself, of course, need not have led to crowd violence or collective action. Charles Tilly has numbered among his Eight Pernicious Postulates the idea that rapid social change such as that involved in urbanization causes strain and disorder, arguing that the premise is a fallacy that social science has inherited from nineteenth-century middle-class publicists. He cites Joan Nelson to the effect that most Third World rural immigrants into cities employ continued networks of family, ethnic, and village solidarity to carve out a stable place for themselves in the city. Some even transport sections of their villages into outlying city enclaves. In any case, their lives very quickly become shaped by specifically urban concerns, and on the whole they show great adaptive abilities and manifest relatively little immigration-related disorder. Ehud R. Toledano finds similar immigrant networks at work in Cairo at mid-century.⁶ In pointing to urban growth in the decades under consideration, I do not wish to suggest that growth in and of itself produced strains that led to crowd action. In nineteenth-century Egypt, as well, the evidence suggests that most rural immigrants to the cities were smoothly absorbed and that they employed kinship, guild, and quarter networks to make the transition.

Rather, it is precisely the relatively high degree of organization manifested by Egyptian urban dwellers, recent immigrants or not, that gave them the ability to mobilize for collective action in seeking the attainment of their social and economic goals. The same tight networks, including those based on nationality, characterized immigrant Greek, Italian, Austrian, French, and British immigrants into Egypt's urban centers. The legacy of the weak state apparatus left by Viceroy Sa'id in the 1850s did allow crowd action to proceed further than it might have with a stronger bureaucracy and police force in place. But rapid change did not in itself invite disorder. Collective action and collective violence on the part of workers and crowds manifested a competition for resources and for relative status in the new and dynamic urban setting of the cotton decades.

From about 10,000 in 1848, the number of Europeans in Egypt grew to around 100,000 at the beginning of the 1880s. Although most still lived in Alexandria, large numbers moved to Cairo and even, as landlords and money-lenders, into the provinces. Viceroy ʿAbbas had not permitted Europeans to own land, but Saʿid and Ismaʿil gradually allowed them to acquire land and urban property in fact, though they often had to resort to legal fictions.⁷ Since workers tend to conceive of foreign labor as illegitimate competition, the large numbers of European immigrants who commanded higher wages and paid fewer taxes than locals naturally generated a certain amount of resentment. There was nothing particularly Middle Eastern about antiforeign sentiment; one has only to think of the anti-Irish agitations in eighteenth-century London. But competition for work formed only one dimension of Egyptian relations with Europeans. Along with large numbers of southern European workers and shopkeepers came a smaller but highly influential group of northern European merchants and investors. The Europeans were therefore present everywhere the Egyptian worker, artisan, or merchant looked, whether as competitors for work, or as owners acquiring workshops, or as creditors. Europeans demanded cash crops like cotton, transforming the economy. But they also insisted on immunity from Egyptian law and taxation, seeking an advantage over Egyptians in their own country that led to seething frustrations.

To the insult of their general success in escaping high Egyptian taxes and flaunting Egyptian justice, the immigrant European workers added the injury of drawing higher wages than local artisans for the same work. Moreover, European workshops tended to shun Egyptian skilled labor out of a conviction that it produced an inferior product, thus shutting the indigenous population out of the more highly paid European sector of the economy.⁸ New insight into other, more complex frustrations can be gained from documents in the Egyptian archives. Textile and cotton merchants in Alexandria complained bitterly in 1873 that weighers and measurers, who used to constitute a public guild, had all now gone to work as individuals for private European concerns, so that Egyptians could no longer expect fair weighing. Here it is enough to note the potentially annoying impact that the privatization of some parts of the economy might have on certain groups; I presented a more detailed analysis of this issue in Chapter 3. Egyptian authorities regularly consulted European merchant communities when appointing guildmasters for guilds such as the brokers in Alexandria, allowing European concerns to weigh in their decision against the powerful Shaʿt family in 1878. Again, the losers in such guild elections may have harbored grievances against the Europeans for the way their vote went. Ibrahim al-Muwaylihi said, in an article discussed earlier, that “as for the merchant, he has been impoverished by a stagnant market and forced to cling for shelter to the hem of the foreigner, who can, if he pleases, ruin him or allow him to remain as he is.”⁹ And as for the laborer and artisan, he wrote, they were crushed beneath the weight of taxes. Everyone knew the

taxes were so high because of the need to service the debts to Europe. From the point of view of many ordinary Egyptians, then, Europeans brought with them, not progress, but a highly unequal social system that included caste privileges for themselves, high taxes to satisfy their greedy financiers, and hellish machines that threatened the quality of life.

Urban Conflicts: Egyptians and the European Impact

The classic accounts of anti-European agitation in the 1860s and 1870s focused on the role of notables, military officers, and intellectuals.¹⁰ But the now largely forgotten workings of the crowd formed an important social context for the anti-imperialist and pan-Islamic agitations of intellectuals and the holy and learned men. These groups interacted, of course. Muslim sermonizers had direct access to the public every Friday afternoon at congregational prayers, and some artisans were literate enough to read the anti-European press that sprang up in the late 1870s. Even the illiterate often heard press reports read aloud, as shown in Chapter 4. As we have seen, one leading nationalist journalist, ‘Abdu’llah an-Nadim, even sprang from an artisan background. When they did take notice of the crowd in Egypt, most historians depicted it as a gathering of Egyptian rabble or a paid-for mob directed by some sinister elite. But was it really no more than an occasional rowdy assemblage of day-workers or a facade for elite conspiracies? And was it invariably Egyptian? The answer to both questions is no, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, and the second query may be dismissed out of hand. The urban crowd in this period clearly became increasingly polarized, between Egyptian workers and artisans on the one hand, and European immigrants on the other. The Europeans were on the whole much more boisterous than the locals, and the rivalries between these groups generated their own history of feuding.

Although the urban disturbances discussed below had many proximate causes, some themes reemerge time and again. Religious identity contributed an important element of the crowd’s mentality. European workers sought to participate in imperial glory by asserting their superiority over the locals—even their immunity from prosecution for crimes. Not only Egyptian nationalists, but apparently even European toughs themselves saw a parallel between the imperialist’s usurpation of territory in Africa and Asia with impunity, and the European worker’s unpunished acts of burglary or vandalism. The Egyptian crowd, on the other hand, often adopted a rhetoric of defending Muslim honor against Christian encroachments. Events elsewhere in the Muslim world could set off or influence disturbances in Suez or Alexandria.

For this reason, not only the Jiddah (1858) and Damascus (1860) massacres of Christians, but also the war for independence of 1857–58 in North India formed important background events for the culture of Euro-Muslim conflict

in Middle Eastern cities. Anti-European disturbances sometimes reflected the activities of international networks of Muslim activists who opposed European expansion in India, North Africa, and eastern Europe. These activists, drawn from many social strata, had often been displaced by the European advance, gone on pilgrimage to Mecca, and then settled in the Hijaz, Egypt, or Syria.¹¹

The British consul in Cairo in 1858 not only reported local Christian and European fears aroused by the Jiddah massacre that same year, but added that “there can be little doubt that from the breaking out of the revolt in India, in which Moslems have taken such a prominent part, there has been here a certain sympathy of Mussulman feeling with that movement, and there is reason to suppose that Indian and Persian partisans have done their best to increase, if not excite, that sympathy.”¹² The increasingly light government of Sa’id Pasha, whose treasury ran lower and lower, held out little prospect that the Egyptian government could control any outbreak of anti-European or anti-Christian feeling in Cairo. Ensuring security for minorities became difficult with the increasing spread of these communities outside their traditional neighborhoods and the breakdown of the old system of local defense measures within city quarters. The vice consul in Suez also reported that some Muslims in that city showed satisfaction on hearing of the Jiddah massacre, especially the boatmen from Jiddah and other Red Sea coasts, and those in direct contact with Hadramautis. He reported that earlier in Suez “native Christians and even [sic] Europeans were openly insulted by a number of natives assembled for the purpose.”¹³

Sa’id’s death, and the change of government early in 1863, created expectations of change. For several days after Viceroy Isma’il’s accession, crowds assembled at the spot where executioners usually dispatched criminals “to see the European who it was currently reported was to be hung by the order of the Government as a mark of the change that had taken place as regards Christians.”¹⁴ Of course, this expectation proved a chimera. In February 1863, arsonists set a fire at the Christian-owned inn Hamzawi Khan in al-Mousky, and attempted to start blazes at several French and Italian establishments. The British consul, again, laid suspicion on cosmopolitan Muslim anti-imperialists, writing that Druze, Afghans, and people from Mecca living in Cairo “it is said are inciting the Musulman mob to commit outrages against Christians.”¹⁵ These incidents coincided not only with the accession of a new viceroy, but also with the beginnings of the impact of the cotton boom, which brought increased numbers of Europeans into a country undergoing more rapid economic and social change.

Although our focus here is on urban disturbances, these must have been influenced by general feelings of government strength or weakness, and thus by collective action taken in the countryside and in provincial small towns. Upper Egypt remained more difficult for the government to control than the Delta. In the late 1850s and early 1860s notorious bandits such as the Sufi

leader ʿUmar al-Misri attracted to their gangs Arab tribesmen for the purpose of plundering caravans and slaves en route to and from the Sudan.¹⁶

More important, the city of Asyut and the towns and villages around it were shaken in 1865 by an uprising centered on the Egyptian disciple of an Indian holy man.¹⁷ Shaykh Ibrahim, a Sufi from the subcontinent, had played an active role in the 1857 revolt against the British, and had fled in the wake of its failure to Egypt. Based near Asyut, he spread his version of militant Sufism for several years, before returning to India and leaving an Egyptian deputy in charge. This deputy, Sayyid Ahmad at-Tib, lived in the town of Qaw in the district of Girga. Sayyid Ahmad laid claim to deputyship (*al-wilayah*), to special knowledge, and to miracles, and gathered many followers in Girga. His descent from the Prophet and his Sufi charisma gave him a basis for laying claim to secular authority as well, and he began cursing the Egyptian government and all its works, accusing Viceroy Ismaʿil of having turned away from Islam. Violence occurred when a local Coptic Christian bought a slave-girl and attempted to convert her to Christianity. She refused. When at-Tib heard of the matter, he gathered followers from the districts of Girga and Asyut, and raided the Copt's house, rescuing the slave-girl. He did not stop there, however, but announced that he was the Mahdi, the messianic promised one of Islam. His followers also perpetrated violence against Greeks. When government security forces dispersed the militant Sufis, they formed themselves into small bands and took to pillaging. Shaykh Ahmad's moral suasion was such that he proved able to convince at least one of Ismaʿil's own Ottoman officers to defect to him.

The viceroy himself had to accompany four or five steamers loaded with a few companies of regular soldiers and some light artillery pieces up the Nile to Asyut. There the government reinforcements engaged about a thousand of the insurgent Sufis, routing them and killing thirty of their number, including Shaykh Ahmad and the military officer who had thrown in with him. Ismaʿil claimed to have lost only five or six men in the operation. The British speculated that one source of discontent for workers in the area may have been their forced employment on Ismaʿil's estates at only 2.5 piasters per day, wages suitable to 1863, rather than at the 10 to 12 piasters per day they could have gotten on the open labor market of 1865. But the longer-term ideological structures of Sufi militancy, with strong influences from charismatic anti-imperialists such as the mystic Ahmadu'llah Shah, prominent as a Sufi leader during the Indian revolt in Lucknow, cannot be discounted as forces in their own right. Viceroy Ismaʿil, with his modernizing ways and ambitions to join Europe, looked like a cultural traitor to these militant Sufis still fighting 1857. The movement, moreover, appears not to have been an exclusively rural affair, but to have had a base in the small towns of Upper Egypt.

At least a light fallout from 1839 (the First Anglo-Afghan War) and 1857 in South Asia, from 1858 in the Hijaz, and from 1860 in the Levant therefore

continued to rain down upon Egypt in the 1860s through networks of resident Muslim travelers, merchants, pilgrims, and exiles whose bitterness from experiences in defending themselves from Europeans or fighting local Christians had led them to agitate against them among their contacts in the leadership of Egyptian urban crowds. The government of Ismaʿil, however, took firm steps to protect Christians and Europeans in the capital, and the new cotton wealth allowed an expansion of both the army and the police force, as well as a restoration of the Interior Ministry.

Ironically, the Sufi-phobia of the British consuls in the aftermath of 1857 led them to look in the wrong places for urban disturbances in the 1860s. They should have been worried about the European immigrants. Despite the rumors of impending Muslim agitation, the cases of arson in Cairo, and the Sufi insurrection near Asyut, for most of the 1860s the major urban riots originated with the foreigners rather than with the Egyptians. The large number of southern European workers who congregated in Egypt's urban centers from 1862 onward came into ethnic conflict several times with local Egyptians. These Greeks, Italians, and Maltese could ignite fights with slurs on Islam or simply by starting drunken brawls (working-class Egyptians and Nubians also drank). Like the American Gold Rush two decades earlier, the Egyptian Cotton Rush created large and rowdy immigrant communities of the greedy or ambitious whose antecedents, as the British consuls superciliously put it, would not have borne much inquiry. The French consul reported in 1865 that

Ismaʿil pleads that measures be taken to prevent the invasion of the country by vagrants who either will not or cannot in any way create honorable means of subsistence for themselves. His Highness complains above all against Italy and Austria, who go to few pains to hide the assistance they give to the emigration to Egypt of all bad subjects and ex-convicts. It is certain that these convoys of 4 to 5,000 individuals arriving at the same time could not be organized without receiving encouragement. Alexandria is inundated above all by Calabrians and the police are impotent to prevent the murders and thefts that are committed with a rare audacity.¹⁸

Early in 1863 Egyptian authorities arrested and sentenced to deportation a group of armed Greek toughs, who stood accused of various crimes, foremost among them the murder of an Egyptian in an altercation at a Cairo coffee-house. The European consuls even in such situations reacted in a knee-jerk fashion, intervening for their subjects on grounds of the Capitulations that generally put Europeans outside the reach of ordinary Egyptian law. The Greek consul demanded that the deportation order be rescinded, but the new government of Viceroy Ismaʿil stood its ground, insisting that its admission of inability to intervene in such cases would endanger public order for Egyptian and European alike.¹⁹

In the 1860s, however, the vast majority of Europeans settling in Egypt made the Mediterranean port of Alexandria their home. Muhammad ʿAli had

revived Alexandria as an arsenal and naval shipyard and built the crucial Mahmudiyyah Canal that provided it with water and connected it to the rest of the country (see Table 7.1). Beginning in the 1840s, it began to shed its military aspect, and became instead a civilian center of commerce. With the cotton boom Alexandria emerged as one of the four great ports of the Mediterranean, along with Istanbul, Marseilles, and Genoa, in terms of tonnage shipped.²⁰ Robert Ilbert suggests that it may be analyzed into four basic zones in this period. The first is the cotton market at Mina' al-Basal, a huge arena for bargaining over prices and quality, for mixing and warehousing Egypt's white gold. Adjacent to this commercial zone, extending south toward the Mahmudiyyah Canal, there grew up a popular quarter for Egyptian laborers, many of them recent immigrants from the rural provinces of Lower and Upper Egypt. The heart of the old city, on the other hand, was gradually taken over by immigrant southern European workers (see Table 7.2). Finally, the wealthy of all nationalities congregated above the Square of the Consuls.²¹ These four zones were relatively accessible to one another, however, and their various populations penetrated each other's territory for work or business.

In May 1865 a drunken brawl threatened the tranquility of Alexandria.²² Three tipsy Italian marines off a corvette in the harbor quarreled with some Egyptian donkey boys in a suburb. They started beating the boys up when a large party of Arabs came to the rescue and attacked the Europeans. The marines fled to town, where they gathered comrades and assailed the Arabs, who had followed them. Some police guards (largely Turks or Albanians) then came up and took the side of the Arabs, seizing the marines, engaging in sword-play, and wounding several Italians. The Italian consul general demanded, in the wake of the incident, the dismissal of the prefect of police and

TABLE 7.1

Total Population of Alexandria,
1798–1882

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>
1798	8,000
1821	12,000
1835	52,000
1848	110,000
1863	170,000
1868	200,000
1872	212,043
1882	222,636

Source: Awad, 1987:94. These figures are only approximate; more work in the Egyptian archives may well modify them.

TABLE 7.2

Passengers Arriving in Alexan-
dria from All Ports

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number</i>
1837	10,176
1842	18,709
1847	16,690
1852	18,303
1857	33,429
1862	32,722
1867	40,950
1871	51,482

Source: *Al-Waqa'i' al-misriyyah*, no. 501 (4 Safar 1290/1 April 1873).

punishment of the police guards. Even after the Egyptian government dismissed several policemen and punished the donkey boys, many in the 16,000-strong Italian community felt dissatisfied.²³ A body of 400 armed working-class men proceeded from the old city, surrounding and breaking into the Italian consul's house, then demanding that he exact heavier satisfaction from the Egyptians. The Italian official had for a while to be guarded by a special force of 300 Egyptian guards until a detachment of marines from the corvette could be called to mount guard. These managed to identify and arrest several ring-leaders of the demonstration at the consul's residence, putting them on the corvette. The British consul was probably correct in worrying that the affair held explosive potential, but it had no immediate issue. The long-term impact of the Italians' turbulence and high-handedness, and of Egypt's forced capitulation to their demands, is harder to gauge. Security became an ever more explosive political issue with the influx of tens of thousands of Europeans, some propertied, others laborers or confidence men. European newspapers complained *ad nauseam* of burglaries and lack of public security. Egyptian authors riposted, however, that most of the criminals were themselves Europeans.²⁴

It is sometimes difficult to separate out criminality and social protest, as when Egyptian guards in Alexandria decided to burglarize the European company for which they worked.²⁵ These guards, often Nubians from the poor villages beyond Aswan, saw every day and firsthand the opulence of the Europeans, while working for them at a pittance. The explosiveness of such a situation was demonstrated a century later, in 1986, when poorly paid security police who often guarded tourist hotels and sites rioted throughout Cairo, attacking the hotels of the European multinationals and symbols of Gulf Arab wealth such as nightclubs. In Alexandria of the 1860s and 1870s, however, European crowds continued to cause most of the trouble.

Internal factionalism within European colonies could erupt into urban violence with ease. From 1857 to 1870 the Hellenic communities were frequently divided over issues of patriarchal authority and the secular autonomy of the Alexandrian community. Under the Ottoman system, the Greek Orthodox patriarch would normally have been considered the head of the community, in both religious and secular matters. The Alexandrian community, however, insisted that it should enjoy autonomy from the church, and at the same time demanded the right of community members to vote for the patriarch when the office became empty. Underlying these conflicts, one senses, was the growth of a bourgeois leadership among Alexandrian Greeks that chafed under traditional ecclesiastical authority. Early in 1870 this ongoing internal Greek dispute menaced Alexandria with further European lawlessness. A popular Greek patriarch died in 1869, strengthening the hand of the widely disliked Archimandrite of the local monastery. A mob broke into the monastery and removed the body of the patriarch, who had died there, to the Greek cathedral

in Alexandria, in order to prevent the Archimandrite from presiding over the funeral ceremony. Several riots broke out among the Greeks in the European section of the old city, in defiance of their own consulate and of the Egyptian government, and the British consul grew so concerned about security that he applied for permission to keep firearms.²⁶

A year later in Alexandria some French subjects publishing an unauthorized journal clashed with local police who tried to close it down, provoking an angry correspondence between the French agent and the Egyptian government. The French consular agent issued a decree authorizing his subjects to repel force by force, which created a sensation. Attempts to arbitrate the dispute bogged down, and more numbers of the unauthorized publication appeared. The French consul general even threatened to have French marines disembark to provide security for French subjects, but the rest of the European consular corps, who feared provoking a riot, dissuaded him. The Europeans' sense of being a state within a state, wherein they even denied the Weberian monopoly on the use of legitimate force to the Egyptian government, shows clearly through in such incidents.²⁷

Another Egyptian city, the newly founded Port Said, witnessed extremely rapid growth, especially with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, yet lacked developed urban institutions to mediate the conflicts that arose among the well-organized immigrants (see Table 7.3). Some Greek and other European workers proved rowdy, engaging in theft and rape. Local prison facilities were inadequate, foreign consuls uncooperative, and efforts to impose an 11:00 P.M. curfew fruitless.²⁸ On 16 February 1870 a serious disturbance took place in the port. At 4:00 P.M. four government guards began walking through the streets, singing and firing pistols. At 10:00 P.M. a drunken guard entered a Greek shop, demanding some cheese and saying he would pay later. The shopkeeper declined to extend him credit. The guard came back with a gold piece, but as he was leaving whirled about and shot the shopkeeper in the face.

TABLE 7.3
Passengers Arriving at Port Said
from All Ports

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number</i>
1861	651
1863	497
1865	7,080
1867	8,316
1869	24,815
1871	58,560

Source: Al-Waqa'i' al-misriyyah,
no. 501 (4 Safar 1290/1 April 1873).

The alarm went up, with Greeks gathering to arrest the guard, and other guards coming to his assistance. A gunfight began between the two groups, which the governor's men could not break up until around midnight. The governor and the Greek consul spent part of those two hours arguing about how to stop the melee. The incident left four Greeks and an Austrian severely wounded on the European side, and the vice governor took a bullet while attempting to disperse the crowd.²⁹

Two years later another fracas involving Greeks erupted at Tanta, the large Delta city with the shrine of the medieval mystic Sayyid Ahmad al-Badawi. After the dust had settled the general opinion prevailed that drunken Greeks began it by insulting the principal official of the Sayyid al-Badawi Mosque. The conflict remained confined to the local population and the Greeks, however, and did not affect other Europeans.³⁰ Tanta was among the Lower Egyptian cities that experienced dramatic growth from the 1860s, as a cotton entrepot and a major railway stop. It hosted an annual fair for Sayyid Ahmad al-Badawi, which grew from 150,000 attenders earlier in the century to some 500,000 in the 1870s, and served as a major marketing center in addition to its religious purposes. The inhabitants of a shrine city may have been especially touchy about Greek blasphemy; on the other hand, Greeks and Greek Orthodox Syrians were especially active as money-lenders and owners of steam-powered cotton gins in the interior, and this role may have increased the hatred for them of ordinary Egyptians, as infidels, wealthy industrialists, and creditors.³¹

European workers' willingness to offer outrageous insults to revered Muslim leaders caused minor brawls to escalate into either riots or diplomatic incidents. In the same year two Maltese British subjects, Cesare Sacchet and Giovanni Azzopardi, employees of the Water Company, were laying pipes in Cairo when they had a dispute with one of the servants of Muhammad al-'Abbasi, the Shaykhu'l-Islam, a high Muslim religious authority and rector of al-Azhar seminary. The three fell to fighting, and the Maltese "are said to have made use of disrespectful and improper language toward the Sheikh himself."³² The imprecations they pronounced on the Shaykhu'l-Islam required the British consulate to conduct tiresome and protracted investigations, and to negotiate the tricky terrain involved in taking a deposition from the Shaykhu'l-Islam himself for a secular, Western consular trial of the two.

In 1875 a riot occurred at Port Said, this time between some Maltese Christians and Nubian Muslim guards posted at the customs house.³³ The feud between the Maltese and the Nubians created an even more dangerous incident in the summer of 1878, recorded by a British captain whose ship was then in the port. A fight began between two members of these groups, which drew a mainly European crowd. The police became alarmed at the sight of this large mob, and the Italian police chief called the deputy governor, 'Uthman Effendi. The latter sent for help from an Arab village about a half-mile away. A soldier,

a bugler by his side, called out that Muslims must hurry to rescue their co-religionists, whom the Christians were killing. Hundreds of excited villagers hurried into the European quarter of Port Said, crying “Death to the Christians.” In the meantime authorities separated and arrested the two brawlers, and dispersed the 300 European spectators. The 2,000 Muslims that came running into town found no one to fight with, and no one to defend, and so returned to their village. Captain Beamish thought the deputy governor to blame for panicking, and the central government in fact punished him for his role in the affair.³⁴

Such ethnic violence pitting indigenous groups against Europeans in cities such as Port Said should not obscure the continued tensions among European groups themselves, which frequently led to small-scale violence. The difficulty Egyptian authorities had in dealing with habitual European offenders must also be recognized. European thieves in the port cities, or those guilty of engaging in armed violence, received sentences of deportation. These habitual criminals could, however, fairly easily sneak back into Egypt on the return ship, despite increasingly sophisticated Egyptian attempts to establish passport control. In the late 1870s the Ministry of the Interior issued strict orders that Europeans found guilty of theft or armed violence be deported (at government expense) and photographs of them placed at passport control offices in Port Said, Suez, Cairo, and Alexandria to prevent their return. Authorities also took steps to clear from city streets indigent Egyptians, often recent immigrants from the countryside.³⁵ Although officials were attempting to be even-handed in maintaining public order in urban areas, they were unwittingly sending the signal that most Europeans were more welcome in Cairo and Alexandria than most Egyptians, and that poor Egyptian villagers attempting to make a better life for themselves by moving to the city were as deserving of exile as European rogues and burglars. Like Tilly’s nineteenth-century burghers, Egyptian officials believed the pernicious postulate that mere rural-urban migration posed a threat to public order.

Of the contentious encounters discussed above, only five occurred in Egypt’s interior. Two of the relatively minor Cairo affairs—the arson against Christian shops and the Greek brawl at a coffeehouse—took place in 1863, at a time of transition from Sa’id to Isma’il. The same political factor—the inexperience of an untested new ruler—may have influenced the timing of Sayyid Ahmad at-Tib’s mahdist revolt near Asyut in 1865. The 1872 Maltese-Egyptian fight in Cairo involved only three persons, and despite its international ramifications, cannot really count as a contentious encounter since it was so small. I found evidence of one major riot in Tanta, set off by Greeks in 1872. The other seven incidents all occurred in port cities, with their large numbers of Europeans. Alexandria saw three disturbances: the 1865 Italian riot, the 1870 Greek rampage, and the 1871 conflict between Egyptian police and French printers. Suez witnessed just one contentious gathering, the 1858 as-

sembly that abused Christians. In Port Said the Nubian guards and Greeks fought in 1870, and in the mid- to late 1870s two conflicts erupted between Nubians and Maltese.

Egyptians in the eastern ports of Suez and Port Said seemed more aggressive toward Europeans, in contrast to Alexandria, where Italians and Greeks appear to have caused most of the trouble. One suspects a difference in mentality in the Red Sea cities, and a British report of the mood in Port Suez also suggests such a distinctive attitude. Consul West wrote in 1873 that most local inhabitants of that town preferred to think of themselves as more closely linked to the Hijaz, with its Muslim holy cities, than to Egypt, with its rustic peasant image.³⁶ They submitted to the power of Egyptian officials, but reserved their respect for notables from the Hijaz or upper-class pilgrims passing through. Like many other Red Sea ports, Suez, hostile to Europeans, only sullenly acquiesced to Viceroy Isma'îl's rule. West recognized that the Egyptian government had done little for the city's inhabitants. Although the authorities spent much money in the vicinity, they allocated most of it to sectors where mainly Europeans benefited. Locals faced increasingly onerous taxes, and had been displaced by the competition of steamships from their traditional means of earning a living through conveying pilgrims to Jiddah. Many formerly wealthy boat owners and agents now found themselves in reduced circumstances.

Naturally, then, the people of Suez not only deplored the current state of affairs, but tended to blame their troubles on the arrival of the Europeans and their innovations. West thought manifestations of xenophobia and religious demonstrations more frequent in 1873 than they had been ten years earlier. Pious Muslims had harsh words for Khedive Isma'îl's exorbitant taxes, interference with their trade, and lavish expenditure "on a horde of abhorred and impious Foreigners."³⁷ Rogers in Cairo, on the other hand, said he had not observed any manifestation of Muslim anti-Europeanism in his district. But he did admit that his informants thought local Muslims attributed the ballooning Egyptian budget and consequent high taxes to the khedive's too great intimacy with Europeans.³⁸

Leaving aside differences in mentality among the inhabitants of various cities, the urban disturbances of which I could find a record in the 1860s and early 1870s have many elements in common. First, a rivalry or some sort of friction existed between two relatively small groups. Coptic merchants and Muslim Sayyids, Italian sailors and Egyptian donkey drivers, Greek shopkeepers and Nubian guards, Greek Orthodox believers and Muslim shrine officials, Maltese port workers and Egyptian customs house employees—all came into conflict on a small scale fairly frequently. But when that conflict assumed an aspect of public violence, larger networks and loyalties came into play. Maltese and Italians came to the aid of Greeks, Egyptians to the aid of Nubians. Guilds that might otherwise have their own differences with one another would stand together against the foreigner. This unthinking allegiance—and

suspension of disbelief about the enormities of which the Other was capable—could cause a minor fracas to escalate into a full-blown riot very quickly. The economic relations of Europeans and Egyptians were frequently unequal and exploitative, and often frustrating for all concerned. These daily frustrations formed a background of continuous prose for the occasional punctuation afforded by the riots. The Euro-Egyptian conflicts of the 1860s and early 1870s had little overtly political content, though local pride and imperial glory lurked in many a humble bout of fisticuffs. The establishment of European fiscal control over Egypt in 1876, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78, and the ‘Urabi revolt, all helped to politicize such conflicts in succeeding years.

Debt Crisis, the Russo-Ottoman War, and Student Protests, 1876–78

In 1876 Egypt officially defaulted on its loans and the Europeans set up a debt commission to exercise control over Egyptian finances, with an eye to ensuring that Egypt made its debt service payments to European creditors on time. This direct foreign role in the administration of Egypt altered the country’s relationship with Europe and set the stage for greater anti-European feeling. It coincided with the establishment of Mixed Courts, which gave foreigners the ability often to manipulate law even in disputes with local Egyptians, and made them more confident about speculating in Egyptian real estate. The author of one contemporary Egyptian government report on the effect of the Mixed Courts discussed the disadvantages to peasants of the newly introduced court system vis-à-vis Europeans and invoked Algerian and Indian (1857) revolts as arguments against such a radical alteration of local law and custom.³⁹

British officials in Cairo on the whole played down rumors of increased Muslim militancy. Late in 1876 Vivian, the consul in Cairo, reported back to London that local Christians feared an outbreak of violence against them at the next Muslim holy day. “These reports,” he wrote, “were based upon an alleged change of demeanor of the Mussulman towards the Christians; upon insults to the servants of Christians; upon an assault stated to have been committed upon an Italian for venturing to smoke in the streets during Ramadan & upon the alleged concealment of arms in the mosques.”⁴⁰ Vivian dismissed all these grounds after a careful investigation. The alleged assaults on Christians, he suggested, could usually be traced to some provocative act on the part of the Greeks or Italians and there was no evidence of arms stockpiling in the mosques. But he did find great dissatisfaction among Muslim Egyptians about the overtaxation and arrears of pay to which their government subjected them. Although most simply had a feeling of hate for Viceroy Isma‘il and his officials, “clever attempts seem to have been made to direct it against the Europe-

ans and to attribute to them all the distress from which the country is unfortunately suffering.”⁴¹ Since much of the distress derived from European demands that debt service payments on loans contracted at high interest from European banks and speculators be made promptly and in full every six months, such an enterprise actually required little cleverness.

In 1876 Egypt’s debt crisis intertwined with the political crisis of the Egyptian-Ethiopian War, and then in 1877–78 with that of the Russo-Ottoman War, to which Viceroy Isma‘il was expected to contribute troops as a vassal of the sultan. Vivian reported that the viceroy confided in him worries about where the money would come from to pay for the levy of troops for the Ottomans. Peasants in Upper Egypt were already revolting against high taxes, and had to be put down by military force. Vivian added, “I should inform your Ldshp. that there is a strong and growing feeling among *both* foreigners and many Natives that the best & indeed the only issue out of the difficulties with which Egypt is beset would be it’s occupation by England.”⁴² Needless to say, consular reports such as this tell us more about the ambitions of the men on the spot than about public mood in Egypt.

Quite apart from increasingly apparent Great Power designs on the Nile Valley, rumors of impending war in Europe between a Muslim and a Christian power raised the communal tension in the Ottoman Empire, including Egypt. In Western historiography, the Ottoman actions against Christian populations in the Balkans, and the campaign led by Gladstone on the issue of the “Balkan massacres,” have been emphasized. But Muslim populations in eastern Europe suffered greatly during the subsequent Russo-Ottoman War, and, of course, this sort of news roused the fiercest emotions in Egypt. In April 1877 a Meccan Sufi and his father, who had fought with the Ottoman army and been decorated at Bosnia, landed in Alexandria. The Sufi paraded the streets of Alexandria with a green standard (the Prophet’s colors), calling upon the people to rise up and kill the infidels. The Sufi managed to attract a following of street boys, but the police swiftly arrested him and his father and put them on the first boat to Mecca.⁴³ In June pious Muslims received a telegram from a Shaykh Ahmad, styled servant of the Prophet’s tomb in Medina, and posted it in “the Arab quarters” of the capital. The message related a dream of the Prophet in which he castigated believers for neglecting their devotions, turning to drink and lewdness, and despising the poor and oppressed, refusing them alms. It instructed the believers to ostracize those who did not say their five daily prayers, and promised that the last day, when the sun would rise from the west, was fast approaching.⁴⁴ The chiliastic poster created a sensation in the older sections of Cairo, and Vivian took this incident to be one more attempt to arouse the religious feelings of Muslims during the war.

A few weeks later, as Egyptian troops prepared to embark for Istanbul, heretofore unnoted but, I think, important anti-European demonstrations took place in Kafr az-Zayyat and Zaqaziq, towns in the Delta. Carr, the vice consul

in Kafr Zayyat, reported that Europeans in his vicinity were alarmed by a daily procession formed mostly by students of the local Egyptian schools, who paraded the European quarter of the town asking for God's help against enemies of the Muslim faith and loudly crying out, "Death to all Christians."⁴⁵ Carr reported the general opinion that the boys had been carefully trained in the phrases they shouted, since these were in formal Arabic, and worried that the chief of police had done nothing to interfere with the processions.

As noted, similar incidents occurred in Zaqaqiyah, and then spread in July to Mansura. An Italian newspaper reported that on 20 July a number of Egyptian boys marched through the streets of Mansura uttering cries that instilled fear in European residents. The following morning, when the foreign consuls complained, police arrested some boys, who then confessed they had been led to act this way by two men, Hasan and Khalifah.⁴⁶ In September, schoolboys demonstrated against the Europeans in the port city of Damietta, and the area's deputy governor acted in such a way as to receive a reprimand for his conduct from the viceroy.⁴⁷

Despite the complaisance of local officials toward these student protests against the Europeans, the central government worked to stop them. The viceroy told the British consul general that he had telegraphed strict instructions to all governors to "repress promptly and energetically any acts of insult or hostility on the part of natives towards Europeans."⁴⁸ Isma'îl said that he had deliberately ignored orders from Istanbul to hold large Qur'an recitals to inflame the religious enthusiasm of the people for the war effort, lest more serious incidents ensue.

The students' anti-imperialist fervor undoubtedly reflected the sentiments of at least some of their teachers, and very possibly their parents as well. This literate new middle class often felt most strongly against the hiring of large numbers of foreigners as engineers or bureaucrats, since they felt themselves undervalued in contrast. We have seen above that the cities mentioned had large and growing educational systems, both traditional and modern, creating networks and access through literacy to newspapers that would allow teachers and students to respond to international events like the Russo-Ottoman War through local anti-European demonstrations.

The venue for these protests also suggests that European penetration of the Egyptian interior generated some resentment. The four towns mentioned were all in Lower Egypt and were provincial centers where Europeans had become increasingly visible and powerful in the 1870s. One report noted that before the opening of mixed tribunals in 1876, which ensured that European property-owners would not have to take their disputes to an Islamic court, Europeans had owned only 3,000 or 4,000 feddans in Minufiyyah and Gharbiyyah provinces, but that "since then the amount has greatly increased."⁴⁹ A petition from twenty-seven British subjects asking for a consular agent to be appointed in Zaqaqiyah (a growing new town founded in the Muhammad 'Ali period as a

result of irrigation extension) said that “Zagazig is a place in which the numbers and the property of British subjects are increasing by reason of the number of Cotton Ginning factories and the cultivation of cotton in the district of which it is the chief town, and on account of the Tribunal of the Reform established in its neighborhood’s market.”⁵⁰ In 1878 some seventy to eighty Europeans owned lands around Zaqaqiz, and their total property came to around 10,000 feddans (a feddan is about an acre). These Europeans acted as money-lenders for hard-pressed peasants in the area, and could often buy land cheaply if a small proprietor decided to sell out because he could no longer make his tax payments.⁵¹

Despite the large foreign presence in Alexandria, it proved quieter in the 1870s. There, the old and established European community had developed enough local contacts, power, and institutional arrangements to defuse tension after some mainly European-led riots and incidents in the 1860s. The Sufis who attempted to stir up anti-European feelings in Alexandria in 1877 seem to have met with no great success, and they were not themselves Egyptians. In the 1870s urban conflicts between locals and foreigners came in the new or rapidly growing towns of Zaqaqiz, Suez, and Port Said, or in interior provincial centers formerly unused to Europeans such as Tanta, Mansura, and Kafr Zayyat. The student protests of 1877–78 marked the entry of a new element into these conflicts, that of the intelligentsia. Especially from its base in the army and police, this literate intermediate stratum would increasingly ally with the urban crowd in anti-European action during the next three years, in what became known as the ‘Urabi revolt.

Military Riots of 1879

The three and a half years beginning with January 1879 saw increased military discontent and involvement with politics. The most rebellious officers derived from rural Egyptian notable families, and the troops who supported them came from a peasant background, which raises the question of whether they might have had other sorts of loyalties toward them than merely the military. Discontent with the European-backed status quo engendered antagonism toward Europeans as well, not only in the army but also among the Egyptians who supported the junior officers’ protest. One manner in which the troops’ discontent manifested itself, crowd action, may have owed something to the incipient urban traditions of rioting developed by the civilians, as well as older peasant protesting techniques (given the troops’ largely rural origins).

Although it is too small to be called a contentious encounter, a brawl between the guard (“janissary”) of the British consulate in Alexandria and a lieutenant in the Egyptian army in the summer of 1878 has left behind some pertinent dialogue. The two individuals were haggling over a bundle of hay

sold by a woman pedlar. The janissary, Muhammad Agha, offered her 6 or 7 piasters, saying, “Whore, and daughter of a dog, it is not worth more.” The lieutenant, Ibrahim ‘Umar, offered 10.5 piasters, and thus got into a shouting match with the janissary. Slighting him as a servant of the English, the lieutenant shouted at the janissary, “Go, pimp, I am the servant of Effendina [the khedive]—you are the servant of the Christian pimp.”⁵² As one might imagine, a brawl ensued between the two. The arrogance of the high and mighty Circasian guard of the British consul toward a daughter of the streets has almost metaphoric force if one transposes it to the level of high politics. And the way in which the lieutenant degraded his opponent as the hanger-on of a foreign procurer, in contrast to his own service to Egyptian/Islamic authority, gives insight at a small level into how junior officers ordered their world in the late 1870s, and offers a premonition of a struggle to come.

Aside from the military riot instigated by Khedive Isma‘il in February, the politically volatile spring of 1879 witnessed few instances of popular collective violence. One exception to the relative quiet in the streets during the alliance of nobles, notables, the intelligentsia, and the khedive against European influence came in late May. A French couple and two other persons went for a ride on the train connecting Cairo and al-‘Abbasiyyah. This trip took them to the European hospital just west of the army garrison that contained the Sudanese regiments. On seeing the Europeans, a group of soldiers from the al-‘Abbasiyyah garrison accosted them, insulting them and beating them with sticks, then throwing stones at them as they fled. The incident drew an impassioned French protest, and went to the Mixed Courts, a procedure that could only exacerbate the anti-European feeling in the garrison.⁵³ The troops at al-‘Abbasiyyah, of course, played an important role in supporting ‘Urabi’s junior officers just two years later. One does not normally think of the military as part of the crowd, but it is clear that officers in February and ordinary soldiers in May 1879 engaged in crowd behavior, coming together in contentious gatherings to express their grievances.

Crowd action need not be violent. Gathering together to shame an individual has formed an important item in the repertoire of most crowds in history. An example of an impromptu shaming occurred within Borg’s earshot at one of Cairo’s many *mawlid*s or celebrations of a revered holy figure’s birth. Borg, a Maltese fluent in Arabic, reported that

The current of opinion is thus fixed against the Khedive of whom positive hatred is entertained while no attempt is made to conceal it. About 11:30 P.M. last evening the Khedive drove to the Mouled just as I was leaving it and owing to the press of people to make way for the carriage I came to a stand-still for a few minutes. I was surrounded by natives of the well-to-do trading and merchant class and as the carriage passed us at a slow pace I distinctively heard “El kelb geh” (The dog has come)

“Yinaal el . . . illi fakkarna” (Accursed be the . . . (foul expression) who has made beggars of us)! These expressions were uttered loud enough to reach the carriage which drove at no more than about 4 feet from the speakers.⁵⁴

Once a crowd has gathered for one purpose, it can easily turn to another. Here, a religious festival, which in Egypt always implies trade and hawking, provided crowd members of the merchant class with the anonymity and security that allowed them to shame the khedive openly. What intellectuals could not print in the newspapers because of the conventions of censorship could in this setting be openly proclaimed to the ruler with impunity.

Of course, in the event the European Powers deposed Isma‘il themselves in June 1879, installing his son Tawfiq as viceroy with Ottoman acquiescence. The agitation of the first half of 1879, encouraged behind the scenes by the viceroy and the Ottoman aristocracy, eventuated in relatively little crowd violence since the elite mainly directed it. The desire of many Egyptian notables and clerics, both for a compromise with Isma‘il that would give them more power, and for the removal of the Nubar government, should not be underestimated. Ironically, the whole ploy backfired in that it clearly played a part in convincing the Europeans that Isma‘il could no longer control the country and certainly that they could not hope to control him. Ironically, Isma‘il’s connivance at crowd action on the part of his officers not only sent the message he desired, of the unpopularity of the Nubar ministry with its European cabinet members; it also signaled to the British that a populist spirit had infected Egypt, bringing into doubt the viceroy’s own strength and ability to rule. Soldiers openly attacking European civilians, as in al-‘Abbasiyyah in May, could not be countenanced by the imperial powers.⁵⁵

The growing signs of indiscipline in the armed forces, of which Isma‘il at times took advantage, signaled the soldiers’ capacity for adopting the repertoires and rhetoric of crowd action. Like the European sailors in the port towns, they too could brawl with foreigners. Like the Italian workers who surrounded their embassy in 1865 and accused the ambassador of treason, the Egyptians too could accost the symbols of authority, here the cabinet ministers who included foreigners and their lackeys. Many young officers had been through the civil schools for a time, and could articulate as well as the intellectuals a rhetoric of dissidence. When the military demonstrated its discontent, it found numerous allies in civil society, from Muslim holy and learned men to butchers, horse dealers, and bedouin. The urban crowd at a *mawlid* spoke for many Egyptians in cursing the viceroy to his face for beggaring them. Merchants may have found courage to act in this manner more easily once they perceived that even the state’s security apparatus was wavering in its loyalty.

Not all the riots between Europeans and Egyptians discussed in this chapter possessed any great political significance, of course. But it is important to note

that a tradition of urban interaction existed in which some sorts of conflict between ethnic and religious groups were handled autonomously without reference to the national or even provincial authorities. An imagined slur on the honor of Italy caused working-class Italians to run amuck and even to take their own ambassador hostage until they considered that face had been saved. An affray between French printers and Egyptian police could provoke the French ambassador into acknowledging what the French crowd already took to be the case: Frenchmen could repel force by force without recourse to the authorities. On the other hand, the Muslim crowd at the shrine at Tanta thought they knew how to handle blaspheming Greeks, and it was not by submitting complaints to the local police. Nubians in Port Said were involved in major instances of violence with Greeks or Maltese three times in the decade of the 1870s, suggesting recurring frustrations and enmities—in short, an incipient urban tradition. Throughout, crowd behavior suggested a lack of respect for the supposed Weberian monopoly on force the Egyptian government thought it should have enjoyed. The officers' attack on cabinet members in February 1879 exemplified the vigilante tactics of the crowd.

What we begin to see happening in 1877–78, against the backdrop of a major military confrontation between the Ottomans and a European power, is the congruity of riots such as that in Port Said with urban anti-European demonstrations, and the participation, not only of workers and tradesmen, but of students from the middle strata. With the appointment of the Debt Commission and the increasing European penetration of the court system and the bureaucracy, Britain and France had decisively entered the arena of domestic Egyptian politics. Policies that might once have simply elicited popular hatred of the viceroy now conjured up anti-European protesters. As the Egyptian intermediate strata began to seek means of political self-expression, they not only ran up against the Ottoman and Circassian hammerlock on power, but also found the Europeans blocking them at every turn. That school boys mounted anti-European protests in several cities in 1878, developing a new repertoire of contention that complemented the urban conflicts between Egyptian and European workers, served as a harbinger for the future. In 1882 a section of the Ottoman nobles, most of the country notables, the intelligentsia, and the crowd joined forces against the Europeans and the khedive who had allied himself with them.

The verdict on Hourani's theory about the notables provoking the riots appears to be that it works best for smaller cities and for towns, where the notables still had a great deal of face-to-face contact with the populace. Here the events in Jidda in 1858 are suggestive.⁵⁶ Recent research has shown that high ulama, religious judges, the leader of the Prophet's descendants, an Ottoman official, and the chief of the Hadramauti merchants all helped plan an attack on European consulates and business establishments in response to a conflict between the British and the Ottomans over the nationality of a ship

anchored in the harbor. Artisans and sailors took part in the rioting in this small Red Sea port of 15,000, and must in part have been reacting against increasing European economic penetration of the area. But here, as Hourani argued, the notables played the leading role. Notables in Hourani's sense also led several of the Egyptian riots or other conflicts discussed in this chapter. A millenarian Sufi mystic provoked the riots in the small towns of Upper Egypt in 1865. Muslim holy and learned men of Tanta may have helped fan the anti-Greek riot of 1872. The deputy governor's panic partially caused the near-riot at Port Said in 1878.

In many other instances, however, the urban crowd appears to have acted spontaneously or at the direction of popular leaders from among the ordinary folk. The Nubian *melées* with Maltese or Greeks in Port Said seem unlikely to have been planned or to have had much connection to notables. In other large cities such as Alexandria and Damascus, crowd action in this period probably had its own origin in the city streets, rather than deriving from the machinations of elites. Philip Khoury has argued, for instance, that the anti-Christian riots in Damascus in 1860 can in part be explained not only by Muslim resentment toward increasingly favorable economic and legislative conditions for the Christian minority, but also by the decreased authority of Muslim notables over the urban crowd.⁵⁷ In this interpretation, anti-European riots can often be seen as the result of crowds acting on their own initiative, perhaps even in opposition to the wishes of patricians, rather than always being manifestations of notables' political opposition to centralization or European competition. Autonomous crowd action formed an important repertoire of contention during the revolution of 1882, by which time the ordinary city folk were well practiced in ethnic contention with Europeans.

Although the ethnic brawls occurring in Egypt during the 1860s and 1870s did often have the effect of dividing the population into Europeans and Egyptians, the polarization remained sporadic before the Russo-Ottoman War. There is some evidence for a general anti-European feeling in Cairo's al-Husayn quarter, fanned by Indian Muslims and Afghans who had already suffered from British colonialism. The riot in Tanta in 1872, on the other hand, remained confined to Muslim Egyptians and Greeks, and other Europeans did not feel any hostility directed toward themselves. The conflation of all Europeans with one another, however, was increasingly used as a tactic by demonstration leaders during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78. The picketing of British, French, Italian, and Greek nationals for the sins of the Russian Empire makes sense only if the schoolboys and their mentors saw all Christian Europeans as having some essential identity. Further, the Egyptian viceregal government itself became tainted by close association with the Europeans, with its French and British cabinet officers and its Italian police sergeants. A generalized hostility to Europeans could easily become a hatred for the Egyptian state itself.

Narrow conceptions of ethnicity, and strong attachments to smaller ethnic groups, impede the growth of nationalism, which typically seeks to subsume a large number of ethnicities into an overall framework based on a common territory, a national language, and a unified market. In Benedict Anderson's pregnant phrase, nations are imagined communities.⁵⁸ The imagination involved, however, requires an ability to see as similar what previous generations took to be different. Many European nations, such as the Italians, did not think of themselves as a natural unit, or even as speaking the same language, before the nineteenth century. Egyptians give evidence of beginning to develop this sort of imagination, for better or worse, in our period. It also, of course, requires the imagination of similarities to cease at a particular border. Those outside that border constitute a profoundly disturbing and threatening Other for the in-group. The unifying efforts of nationalists may even need such an Other; the Europeans, in any case, provided it for nineteenth-century Egyptians. The brawls in Egypt's streets formed one element in the development of this new idiom.

Eight

Repression and Censorship

THE MODERN AUTOCRATIC STATE'S ABILITY to repress dissent and control forms of public discourse constitutes an important deterrent to successful political mobilization. Despotic regimes with little or no legitimacy can survive for decades, providing the public fears their control over armed force or their ability to call on a patron state to provide that force. This way of stating the issue, however, incorrectly suggests that Mao Zedong was right when he said that power grows out of the barrel of a gun, and ignores the manner in which security forces can be sabotaged by desertions and draft-dodging, so that a minimum of public support for them remains a constant necessity. The argument for hegemony by sheer force also neglects to take into account the necessity for the troops, officers, and civilian ruling stratum themselves to accept the authority of the state and to obey its orders if they are to provide a credible deterrent to unrest in society. The invocation of the apparatuses of repression does not banish the shadow of the social contract from the analysis; it only points to the especial importance of some segments of society (the civilian elite, the army, police, and intelligence forces) in maintaining the contract when others wish to renegotiate it. If the members of these repressive institutions can themselves be swayed by the discourse of dissenters, they can be subverted. A strong repressive apparatus, then, does not relieve the autocratic state of the need to police thought as well as actions, lest dissidents spin off a discourse that could corrode the loyalty of state officers themselves, or persuade the public to a quiet sort of noncooperation.

The issue of censorship, of state control over discourse, raises crucial questions about the conditions of reading, listening, and writing in Egypt. The Ottoman sultan, his viceroys, and his administrators understood only too clearly the potential printing and journalism contained for uniting and politicizing the public. They knew such a technology of the word could create consensus, could bring into being a public opinion up and down the Nile where before subjects had established only limited networks based on face-to-face encounters. The authorities found printing too useful as a tool of government and as a means of politically socializing the populace simply to ban it. They chose to allow the increasing circulation of printed works, including newspapers, but to restrict print discourse through various mechanisms. The attempt of the state to set the perimeters of discourse profoundly affected what could be published and how it could be expressed, as well as the way in which

the audience came to interpret political texts. Authors and audience (including official censors) developed a number of conventions that governed how far the writer could go in making statements with political relevance. Not only radical or antistate authors were caught up in these conventions, but also “the moderate, loyal, but occasionally dismayed.”¹ This very notion of a subtle contest between censors and authors disputes the pervasiveness of a hegemonic discourse, bringing into question whether the state and the religious establishment ever really succeed in establishing the ideas of the ruling class as the ruling ideas among most segments of society.

The system of regime suppression of dissent should be seen as an archipelago, stretching throughout society from the censor’s office to the jailhouse and the barracks. Here we will examine the functioning and breakdown of state repression. The manner in which the regime employed, then lost the use of, these three levers of state control illuminates an essential precondition for the Revolution. Weakness in the police, army, and censorship bureau would not in itself provoke a revolt, but by now I think we have discovered sufficient interests and organizational ability among such groups as the intelligentsia, the urban guilds, and the village notables, to recognize that state repression played a central role in keeping them in their places before 1881.

Policing

The state employed the police not only to protect property and ensure public order, but to control the laboring strata. One problem the viceregal regime consistently faced derived from the privileged position of Europeans in Egypt. The consuls and great merchants had secured an extremely liberal interpretation of the Capitulations for their own purposes, and working-class Italians and Greeks cannily employed extraterritoriality as a means of putting themselves outside the grasp of the Egyptian police and army, making themselves free of state interference in their lives. The influx of indigent poor from the Egyptian countryside, and the inability of the urban workers to pay greatly increased taxes, also worried the urban administrators. Officials under Isma‘il clearly felt the bureaucracy and military bequeathed by Sa‘id inadequate to deal with the European working-class influx provoked by the cotton boom, with Egyptian rural-urban migration, and with the task of imposing ever more rigorous tax discipline on urban workers. How did Isma‘il’s state approach these perceived challenges?

Fiscal problems had made the state and its major institutions weak in the last years of Sa‘id’s reign. Before the cotton boom began filling the treasury again, Sa‘id actually disbanded the Ministry of the Interior and greatly reduced the police force. Disgruntled unemployed police then turned to looting.² The cotton boom gave the state the wherewithal to build back up its institutions of

coercion. It is emblematic of his reign that Isma'îl, sensitive to the old problems of security bequeathed him by Sa'îd's weak bureaucracy and the new ones provoked by the social changes inherent in the incipient cotton boom, reinstated the punishment of physical beating, which Sa'îd had abolished. In the early years of his reign Isma'îl ordered the organization of police forces, or their restoration, in several provincial cities.³

Problems with European guest workers formed the impetus for much of the emphasis on policing urban areas. In 1867 Egyptian police, stung by criticism in the press concerning the lack of law and order, rounded up 150 Europeans they said were criminals. Cairo police chief Ahmad Pasha Daramalli also began sending out spies to watch for trouble in the capital.⁴ Eventually Isma'îl required all provincial capitals by law to have an organized police force. In 1870 the urban police forces included 6,000 patrolmen, 2,000 mounted police, and in Alexandria and Cairo 1,500 members of a special constabulary called "guardians," (*mustahfizan*), for a total of 9,500.⁵ The Egyptian government here responded primarily to the insistence of wealthy Europeans that something be done about the European laborers and confidence men at the bottom of expatriate society, an insistence echoed by the Egyptian middle strata as well.

The Europeans so badly wanted something done that they contemplated actually setting up their own private police in Egypt, but a more satisfactory compromise eventually was reached. Partially in response to the 1870 riot between Greeks and Nubian guards, Europeans in Port Said floated the idea of hiring their own police force. British Vice Consul Zarb reported in late winter of 1870 that in the previous few months the number of "bad characters, vagabonds and thieves has greatly increased."⁶ The consuls and vice consuls had therefore met to decide what should be done. The local Egyptian governor admitted that such a small number of guards could not protect the town. The European authorities suggested that they should introduce a system of private guards, such as they perceived to exist in Alexandria and Cairo. They decided to see if the city's inhabitants would each make a small monthly contribution to hire fifty night guards, which would require a total of about 4,000 francs per month; they expected some contribution from the Suez Canal Company as well.

G. E. Stanley, the British consul at Alexandria, objected strenuously to these proceedings. First, he instructed Zarb to contact the governor and "protest against his statement that he cannot guard the town."⁷ The British official insisted that the government could not put off on private persons its duty to ensure public order. He also disputed the idea that the European communities in Alexandria and Cairo maintained any large-scale system of private guards, designed to supersede the government's own police. Rather, a few banks and large merchant houses had hired Nubian guards, whose guildmaster guaranteed their character, on a strictly private basis with no public subscriptions.

Indeed, Stanley worried, the Egyptian government would hardly see such a system of private security erected by the Europeans as compatible with its dignity, and already wanted to abolish the practice of private firms hiring special guards.

In response to the need for an Egyptian police force that could deal effectively with the European workers as well as its own, from the early 1870s the government hired European officers, anticipating administrative arrangements for the accommodation of Egypt's dual elite. The Egyptian cabinet, too, would eventually contain European members. Partially under European pressure, the Egyptian government began a reorganization of its urban police forces in 1872, hiring a certain number of Europeans to serve as police sergeants and in other capacities. The following year the privy council approved the employment of forty-seven Italians on the Cairo police force at high salaries.⁸ By 1877 the police force in Cairo was so large and well organized that the Interior Ministry granted it administrative independence from the Cairo governorate.⁹ The European element in the state's chief instrument of coercion could only begin to give a foreign coloring to the state itself in the minds of ordinary Egyptians. These European employees in the police departments also provoked the resentment of their Egyptian peers, who thought some of them incompetent.¹⁰

The police routinely applied the whip to Egyptian employees at European-owned cotton-ginning factories when the Europeans accused them of any theft or other infractions. The police not only punished workers accused of committing crimes, including the serious one of inability to pay the taxes demanded, but even went after artisans who did not complete their work for their patrons, as we saw in Chapter 3. They also periodically swept the indigent from the streets of Cairo, sending them to police stations in Bulaq and Misr al-Qadimah for boarding on Nile riverboats and passage back to their villages. Born and bred Cairenes who could not support themselves and had no relatives were sent to the Ministry of Pious Endowments, though in the late 1870s that ministry began refusing to accept them, either because of their large numbers or its strained resources.¹¹ The police and the Ministry of Interior sent a clear message that they served the propertied and the foreigner, and existed to instill work-place discipline as well as law and order in the dangerous and laboring classes.

In the late 1870s, however, the police, like the military, increasingly felt badly treated by the state. The arrears in pay suffered by police officers provoked them into writing repeated petitions. The officers and troops of the *mustahfiz* constabulary in Alexandria protested in September 1879 about their pay being late. In Cairo, six officers complained to the police chief late in 1880 that they, unlike the military officers, had not yet had their arrears in pay made up to them. The state's effort to achieve economies in the budget appears to have adversely affected the police forces just as it affected the military.¹²

The expansion of the police and the military served as visible reminders of Isma'îl's determination to exert greater control over society. This need to control grew more urgent as he embarked upon unpopular measures such as overtaxing the populace to meet the debt-servicing on European loans. The presence within Egypt of a large and often rowdy European expatriate population also impelled him to put Europeans on the force, so as to be able better to deal with the powerful foreigners. Even European petty criminals could expect their consulates to back them to the hilt, and all Europeans enjoyed something close to diplomatic immunity. As we have seen above, violent conflict between Egyptian workers and European ones began to occur regularly in the 1860s, as Europeans began increasingly establishing their hegemony over the country, and Isma'îl no doubt saw these developments as a further impetus to increase the police force. The European sergeants can only have undermined the authority of the police with Egyptians, however. Ironically, when the Revolution came, the police tended to join the Egyptians' side in the fights against Europeans, and to greet with some complacency the looting of European shops.

The expanded police force, along with a much bigger army, allowed Isma'îl not simply to keep order, but to intervene in the lives of ordinary citizens to an unprecedented extent. He could now tell Egyptians where to live and how to behave. He had access to many more bodies than had his immediate predecessor. Yet the increased police force, with its embryonic suggestion of colonial agency in the form of the Italian officers, only formed one element in the state's wide-ranging penetration into civil society, among which also must be counted the military and the censorship bureau. Like the other sources of coercion, the police were weakened in the late 1870s and early 1880s by poor morale resulting from arrears in pay, by the imposition over them of highly paid Europeans often ignorant of local conditions, and by reductions in force necessitated by the difficulties in servicing the debt to the Europeans.

The Army

The rise and decline of the viceregal army remained center stage throughout the drama of 1862–82. The military under Isma'îl became an important tool for the repression of peasant and other protest. The army handily and brutally crushed the chiliastic peasant uprising near Asyut of Sayyid Ahmad at-Tib in 1865, and again intervened in Upper Egypt in 1878–79 to put down peasant rebellions that protested overtaxation during the drought. Several distinct questions must preoccupy any inquiry into the schism in the armed forces of the late 1870s and early 1880s. What structural causes might have exacerbated ethnic factionalism in the officer corps? What events or policies caused the factionalism to lead to a full-scale split? What resources allowed the dissident

officers to gain the upper hand over their superiors? How did the dissident officers build coalitions with groups in civilian society?

As soon as he acceded to the throne in 1863, Isma'îl expanded the regular armed forces to 26,359, rather more than the 18,000 allowed Egypt by the Ottoman firman of 1841.¹³ Two years later, in 1865, the number had risen to almost 35,000, and by 1870 almost doubled to 65,000 (not counting reserves and the *mustahfiz* constabulary). In 1874 the Ottoman sultan acquiesced to political reality by formally bestowing on Isma'îl the right to increase his army to whatever level he wished. That year, the Egyptian armed forces consisted of nearly 94,000 regular troops and officers within Egypt, with another 30,000 garrisoned in the Sudan. The strength of the armed forces declined late in 1876, as the Ethiopian war wound down and the fiscal crisis hit, to around 83,000. The debt crisis, as it unfolded, induced further budget cuts, bringing the armed forces down to 57,000 in early 1878, a smaller number than at any time during the decade. The newly appointed European cabinet members persistently demanded from the middle of 1878 that the military budget be cut as one way of meeting the European debt obligation.

The year 1879 witnessed a massive demobilization of Egyptian troops, the number being slashed to 32,000 early in the year, with a view toward further reductions to a total of 18,000 as the year progressed. Despite a brief reversal of these policies in April and May 1879, during the national unity Sharif cabinet, the reductions continued after Isma'îl's deposition that June. In the summer of 1879, the newly installed Khedive Tawfiq announced a plan to shrink the army to only 12,000 men.¹⁴

These reductions in force in the military had a well-known effect, insofar as they helped provoke the discontent of the junior officers. Yet a smaller military also carried the implication that the state could less easily control the populace. The battlefield successes of the Sudanese Mahdi in 1881 and 1882 probably said as much about viceregal weakness as about the strength of the dervishes. The state could deal much less handily with bedouin tribes and urban crowds within Egypt proper with a military of 12,000 than it could with 90,000.¹⁵ Finally, any one section of the army could more successfully challenge the state under such conditions of weakness, since it formed a much larger proportion of the whole. Although the February 1879 military riot was orchestrated by Isma'îl, it expressed genuine discontent about the reduction in force and its European advocates in the cabinet. The attack of soldiers on French civilians at al-^ḥAbbasiyyah in May 1879 points more surely to the mood of the soldiery. Late in 1879 one begins finding reports in the Ministry of Interior files of courts-martial of officers for verbal insubordination toward commanders of fortresses.¹⁶

The 1880 decision of Khedive Tawfiq and his minister of war, 'Uthman Rifqi, effectively to exclude Egyptians from rising through the ranks into the officer corps, derived largely from the reduced number of officer slots, which

the dominant Ottoman-Egyptians decided to monopolize. It had been the larger army and officer corps of Isma'îl that had allowed the increase in native Egyptian officers to occur without much friction. The European wing of the dual elite, and the debt crisis, thus bore direct responsibility for both the vast reduction in the military and for the subsequent disaffection of the Egyptian junior officers.

The manner in which the junior officers' discontents became intertwined with the dissatisfactions of the new intellectuals can be discerned in the case of Muhammad Fanni, whose autobiography I discovered in manuscript in the Egyptian National Library.¹⁷ Fanni, a Circassian who claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad, came from the household of a high functionary in Muhammad 'Ali's government. He himself attended both al-Azhar seminary and Isma'îl's civil schools, and acquired a post in the Translation Bureau at the Ministry of Finance. Sharubim reported that in 1880 when Rifqi dismissed a group of junior Egyptian army officers, they experienced financial difficulties "and used to meet every night at the house of Muhammad Effendi Fanni, one of the translators at the Ministry of Finance, seeking succor from their predicament."¹⁸ That spring, they asked that he edit the Arabic text of their petition to Rifqi, in which they complained of certain government policies. Fanni said he at first refused their request. But they had been encouraged by his own superior, Sa'îd Bey Nasr, the overall head of the Translation Bureau. Nasr had previously taught at the military school, and these junior officers were his former students. He therefore pressured Fanni to help them, and the latter says he finally agreed to do so.¹⁹

The officers in their petition complained of the criticisms offered the Ottoman sultan by newspapers published in Egypt, and demanded their closure for six months to teach them a lesson. They insisted that neither Egyptian notables nor the country's less fortunate classes had benefited from the loans contracted from Europeans, despite the precedence repaying them took in the budget. They criticized the employment of Europeans and Syrian Christians in the bureaucracy at exorbitant salaries. Finally, they complained about the dismissal of half the army's officers and stipend reductions for those remaining. Fanni must have known how explosive and seditious a document this was, but he agreed to work it up in good Arabic.²⁰

Although, as we have seen, ordinary Egyptians often petitioned their government for redress of grievances, the officers' manifesto broke the conventions of deference and avoidance of politics required in such petitions. The state replied aggressively by finding, arresting, and interrogating the disgruntled ex-officers, some of whom implicated Fanni and Nasr. A military council sentenced Fanni to three months in prison, but the president of the council of ministers, Riyad Pasha, insisted that he be executed. The military council temporarily blocked him, however, by failing to achieve unanimity on the need for the death penalty. Only the intervention of the Prussians and of Sultan

Abdülhamid ultimately prevented Riyad from having Fanni put to death; he was jailed for two years and barred from government employment. Nasr got only thirty days in prison, and Tawfiq later attempted to co-opt him with a judgeship on the Mixed Courts.²¹ Fanni does not dwell on the fate of the dismissed officers.

The attitude of Riyad Pasha toward this case typified his policy of the iron fist. The manner in which he found himself unable to strike once he had lifted his hand, however, points to the international and local constraints on his power that weakened him. Nothing encourages revolution more than a dictator with an iron fist but no follow-through. Riyad manifested his unwillingness to compromise again in January 1881, when the three Egyptian colonels, including Ahmad ‘Urabi, petitioned him to dismiss Rifqi as minister of war and cease discriminating against native Egyptians. This petition, like many such appeals that caused such a stir among ruling class circles, was fairly unexceptionable by the standards of Egyptian and Ottoman practice. But Riyad wrote the American general Stone Pasha, who served in the Egyptian army, that these colonels’ petition demonstrated that they would have a bad effect on their subordinates, “and will push them to insubordination and resistance.”²² He, in essence, decided to court-martial the three for their petition, and only the determination of their colleagues to come to their rescue saved them from imprisonment or worse.

The discontents within the officer corps combined professional grievances with larger issues of national and international politics. The French occupation of Tunisia in 1881, and British complacency toward it, raised fears among intellectuals and among the junior officers that the French and British had struck a deal whereby the latter could have Egypt in return for allowing the French into Tunis. A petition circulated among the officers, addressed to Colonel Ahmad ‘Urabi, saying that the Tunisian occupation required the augmentation of the army from 12,000 back up to 18,000 men, the construction of new fortifications around Cairo and on the Mediterranean coast, and the creation of a chamber of deputies before which the cabinet would be responsible and which would vote the budget. The French consul in Cairo thought these ideas were becoming more and more popular among civilians. Tawfiq’s response, he said, had been to attempt to divide and rule. He had divided the military into two distinct factions, one highly loyal to himself; but the loyalists were still the weaker.²³

The manner in which Tawfiq deliberately abetted the split developing in the officer corps in the end worked against him. He divided and failed to rule. The close connections between the Egyptian junior officers who had risen from the ranks and the noncommissioned officers and peasant conscripts ensured their ability to gain actual authority over the fighting forces. The likelihood that the troops would obey an order issued by the Ottoman and Circassian command staff where it contradicted the will of the junior officers became ever fainter.

Although the split in the army involved an ethnic component of rivalry between the native Egyptians and the Circassians, many Circassian officers must have supported their Egyptian colleagues. One may conclude that fear of foreign domination and of a further weakening of the military helped pushed many young Circassian officers to support the rebellious colonels.

The debt crisis and the implementation of the Dual Control, whereby a French and a British member gained seats on the cabinet and exercised duties of budget oversight, weakened the state and the military. The European comptrollers demanded a vast reduction in the armed forces from 1878, and the implementation of this policy angered the Egyptian and Circassian officers whose careers it ended. The reduction in officer slots also made the Ottoman-Egyptians suddenly unwilling to allow Egyptians to rise through the ranks. Most of the ethnic factionalism in the officer corps derived from the reduction in force and the exclusion of Egyptian noncommissioned officers from opportunities for promotion as of 1880. The Egyptian officers who protested this exclusion met harsh treatment from the absolutist Riyad government, which pushed them from petition-writing to greater acts of insubordination. The Egyptian officers' ability to attract the loyalty of peasant troops and to build coalitions with sections of the intelligentsia and the urban merchant and popular classes gave them powerful weapons against the Ottoman-Egyptian command staff. The Egyptians, because none had risen above colonel in 1881, served as regimental officers in close contact with troops, whereas many of the Ottoman-Egyptian staff officers in Cairo were isolated from their men. The officers were clever enough to insist on Egyptian strength and independence, and to demand the resuscitation of the chamber of deputies and its acquisition of budget oversight powers, a demand already popular among the intelligentsia, the urban guilds, and the village notables. They thus created a platform that could unite the disparate middle strata in the Nile Valley against the dual elite represented by Riyad Pasha and Auckland Colvin. Such coalition-building in turn required use of the press and of printed petitions circulated in the countryside, tools the state sought to subvert through the use of censorship. We must, then, skip to the last island in the archipelago.

Policing Thought

The outbreak of revolution signaled the breakdown of the state's censorship apparatus as well. By censorship I mean primarily state surveillance and shaping of print discourse, but regime intervention in oral speech also comes under this heading. Annabel M. Patterson finds, in early Stuart England, several basic principles for a hermeneutics or interpretation of censorship, especially as the authorities understood it, which she terms "functional ambiguity." They examined the timing of the work in relation to political events and looked for signals

of provocation in the preface or introduction. The author's denial of any political relevance to his book is often itself a clue to topicality. Many authors resorted to translations in order to make a statement while retaining the alibi that someone else had authored the work. Ottoman censorship worked in a similar fashion, though censors and authors developed their own, local conventions.²⁴ Tsarist Russia, too, had its conventions of censorship, called "Aesopian" language, wherein writers avoided the blue pencil by a "systematic alteration of the text occasioned by the introduction of hints and circumlocutions."²⁵ Authors seeking to avoid the censors employed devices such as screens (setting the story outside Russia, even in a mythical land or, often, in neighboring Iran). Markers included asides that drew attention to hidden meanings. Lev Loseff thinks such a system inherently unstable, subject to breaking down over a generation, primarily out of the boredom it provokes.²⁶

A similar system of functional ambiguity or Aesopian language operated in viceregal Egypt's print culture in the years before the Revolution. I want to stress that my acceptance of the word "functional" does not imply a functionalist view of the system. For, in Egypt, it was hardly stable. The subtle protests of the intellectuals interacted with popular protest, ultimately breaking down the understood codes of restraint. The very nature of intellectual discourse challenged viceregal absolutism by bringing into question authority statements, subjecting them to the search scrutiny of modernist reason.²⁷ In a ratcheting motion, the state's authoritarian crushing of even mild printed dissent pushed some writers and journalists into opposition, along with their literate audiences.

The viceregal state was much too weak to administer a panopticon of universal surveillance, but it did worry about unfettered speech and its consequences. This worry focused especially on the working class and on the intellectuals. In 1867 the viceregal government issued a set of sentencing guidelines for civil infractions such as assault and battery and theft, but added to it punishments prescribed for cursing. In recent years, the government complained, both young and old had grown accustomed to cursing and blaspheming, so that a son even cursed his father and some had even begun cursing religion itself. The law set fines for cursing religion, and prescribed military service as part of the punishment for the third offense. That such care should be taken over so minor an issue (*yal'an dinak*, or "may your religion be cursed" is heard even today in colloquial Arabic) indicates a ruling-class anxiety over the potential consequences of increasing impiety. Perhaps the reasoning ran that what began in disrespect for religion would end in disrespect for the state. This concern to control working-class discourse shows up again in a formal complaint sworn to the police by the town notables in Port Said in 1880 against a greengrocer, Hasan Muhammad Abu Kalam al-Fahham, who had the habit of publicly insulting and cursing the prophets and ulama. It was not necessary to be impious to attract the ire of Isma'il's thought-police; even

simple heterodoxy would serve, as is demonstrated by the viceregal state's persecution of the newly established Baha'i religion that had begun spreading among Iranian expatriates. The idea that it was none of the state's business what private individuals thought or said about metaphysics or politics had little purchase in viceregal Egypt. In a regime wherein even high-ranking officials could suddenly disappear overnight should they incur the khedive's displeasure, freedom of conscience for the ordinary folk had no meaning.²⁸

The ways in which the state attempted to punish the weak and the popular strata for defying official ideologies are difficult for the historian to recover. The efforts of the state to impose its hegemony on print culture, however, have left a longer paper trail. Censorship of print discourse implies the existence of a private press, since in-house government oversight of state publications constitutes a different sort of phenomenon. Private presses were few in Egypt before the 1860s, but existed in sufficient numbers in Istanbul to provoke the Ottoman government into drawing up a set of press laws in 1857. This law required the licensing of all publishers and prepublication censorship of page proofs by Ottoman officials. Politically or morally "dangerous" books would be seized. Viceroy Sa'id (r. 1854–62) showed himself reluctant to implement the law in full, probably as part of his assertion of provincial rights over administration in a vassal state.²⁹ Sa'id's own approach to the issue was just as severe, however. When, in 1860, Cairo's police chief inquired of him whether to permit the operation of a certain publishing house, Sa'id responded with a qualified "yes." The press was begun by an agent for 'Abdu'l-Qadir al-Jaza'iri, the Algerian resistance leader then residing in exile in Syria. "The founding of printing presses and printing books is freely allowed to all," Sa'id wrote, "as long as they do not touch the policies and affairs of the government."³⁰ The state sought to maintain the area of political and economic policy as a privileged realm of discourse unapproachable by the journalist.

The explosion in printing and in the founding of foreign newspapers that accompanied the cotton boom from 1862 required a movement away from personal supervision of printing by the viceroy or his officials, and toward a routinized bureaucracy governed by a press law. In October 1863 the Egyptian foreign minister made it known that Ottoman censorship laws would henceforth be more strictly applied in Egypt, through a special government department overseeing newspapers.³¹ Newspapers were to abstain absolutely from any criticism of governmental actions and avoid any discussion of matters, the mention of which might affect relations with foreign powers. Reporters had to report news from the provinces in a manner that kept to the facts, avoiding any criticism of officials. Editors were responsible for orally reporting the content of articles to the Press Bureau before going to press. Newspapers contravening these articles of the law would receive three warnings, after which they would be closed down and large fines would be imposed. In order to oversee implementation of the law, the viceroy created a Press Bureau within the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs.³² In the late 1860s, however, the Egyptian government adopted a new press law promulgated in Istanbul in 1865, which was in many ways less Draconian than the 1857 statute.

The first publications to feel the effect of these restrictions, which required the official registration of presses and periodicals, were newspapers in European languages. In dealing with acid-tongued foreign journalists, the viceregal authorities had to act with circumspection. On the one hand, they felt they could not allow incisive criticism of policy to be widely circulated in any language. On the other, the European proconsuls believed that the Capitulations protected their subjects from legal action by the Egyptian authorities.³³ Nor was the European-language press in Egypt necessarily irrelevant to indigenous intellectual developments. What impact the foreign press, with its norms of independence from the state and critical perspective on Isma'îl's government had on local intellectuals is difficult to gauge. But many of the modernist thinkers read French or Italian. The privately owned Arabic-language press would only begin to expand in the late 1860s, when it too would come up against censorship regulations.

In addition to censorship laws, the state employed other means to limit or influence public discourse on politics. Even the editor of the official gazette, reestablished in 1863, had difficulty gathering news about officials. At times the state also attempted to limit the number of licenses for printers, saying in 1869 that "the Government has adopted a rule that it will stop with the authorizations already granted, which appear on the whole to satisfy all the need for publicity that could exist in the country."³⁴ The state both spied on and secretly bribed editors as well. In 1873, the national budget allocated over £E9,000 to something called "Newspaper Intelligence Offices," more than was given for the antiquities museum and nearly a fifth of the entire budget for schools and colleges. Besides outright gifts, newspapers could be favored with lucrative contracts for printing government announcements. The autocratic European governments of the nineteenth century also commonly gave publishers bribes; the Russians called these the "reptile fund" because they encouraged servility.³⁵

Government censors carefully scrutinized all new publications for signs of subversive intent. They invariably took anonymity as such a clue. The Alexandrian newspaper *al-Kawkab ash-sharqi* was investigated because the editor, Salim Hamawi, had neglected to affix his name to it. He turned out to have the proper licenses, but was admonished for this oversight, a potential signal of seditious intent. The satirical French newspaper, *Le Crocodile*, quite deliberately appeared with no indication of authorship or editorship, since it savaged the khedivial regime. In such instances the police could usually move against the press that printed such news sheets. In these ways the authorities constantly let publishers know they were under surveillance, were in effect continuously on trial for treason before the fact.³⁶

The first semiprivate Arabic newspaper in Egypt, *Wadi an-nil*, received heavy subvention from Ismaʿil, and clearly the editor, ʿAbduʿllah Abuʿs-Suʿud Effendi (ca. 1821–78) worried a great deal about censorship. He disclaimed any special expertise in politics and administration, saying “we make no pretense of being able to bring about something like Plato’s Republic or the philosophy of Zeno, since God is refuge from such assertions.”³⁷ The new Arab intellectuals, he seems to have been assuring the khedive, did not seek to replace the viceroy with a republic. In a later article he criticized European dailies for flying too high and opposing every government order, which had led to their suspension for one month. He replied to European criticisms of the lack of hard news in *Wadi an-nil* by saying that he had to observe the “conditions of the era.”³⁸ Even the language Abuʿs-Suʿud used to describe the system of censorship under which he labored is vague and ambiguous, laden with metaphor. “Conditions” (*ahwal*) constantly appears as a code for the blue pencil of the press censor. Ironically, in 1872 the viceroy did indeed close down *Wadi an-nil* out of annoyance at its manner of reporting politics. Abuʿs-Suʿud’s son, Muhammad Unsi, was, however, allowed to begin a new newspaper, *Rawdat al-akhbar*, which received the generous support of the viceroy.³⁹

The Arabic-language press declined in the mid-1870s, probably because the debt crisis forced the government to cut back subventions. It may well be that Ismaʿil’s censorship policies so discouraged the reporting of hard news that Arabic-language weeklies simply could not attract sufficient readership to remain solvent in the absence of government support. As long as only two or three Arabophone publishers, themselves government employees in the main, put out newspapers in Egypt, they could do little about the censorship system except resort to ambiguity. But Ismaʿil’s civil school system had begun graduating a new generation of young intellectuals impatient with government supervision, and a stream of Syro-Lebanese writers had already begun flowing into the country. Moreover, from 1876, as Ismaʿil began to use the press to fight off the increasing influence of Britain and France over Egyptian internal affairs, the khedive allowed a livelier Arabic political press to grow up that had some hope of surviving financially.

The career of Yaʿqub Sannuʿ well illustrates the way in which professionals closely associated with the court could be radicalized by the system of censorship. Sannuʿ’s Jewish family had immigrated to Egypt from Italy and his father served one of Viceroy Muhammad ʿAli’s nephews. The young man went on an educational mission to Leghorn, and so belonged to the European-trained intellectual elite. Yaʿqub Sannuʿ rose to become tutor in the viceregal household during the era of Viceroy Saʿid. Under Ismaʿil he gained a post at the Cairo Polytechnic Institute, where he taught from 1863 to 1869, and where his “eclectic liberalism” impressed the military cadets and civil school students he taught. The formation of Italy as a nation seems to have inspired him

with nationalist ideas that he passed on to students.⁴⁰ Sannu^ʿ saw Molière performed on stage in the late 1860s, and began writing satires in colloquial Arabic. Some of these were said to have ridiculed the extravagances of the viceregal family, though they must have done so with Aesopian language, for in 1870 Khedive Isma^ʿil commissioned Sannu^ʿ to write plays. Despite several successes in the period 1870–72, Sannu^ʿ ran into censorship over his criticism of polygamy and his barbs against the English. The former infuriated the khedive, the latter the British diplomatic corps, and in 1872 Sannu^ʿ's tenure as court playwright abruptly came to an end.⁴¹ We have already seen that the khedive's spies infiltrated and broke up the secret societies Sannu^ʿ then founded. He next wrote a travelogue of Italy for Isma^ʿil, who hated it so much he had it destroyed. The reform-minded young man, however, having had plays closed down, societies disbanded, and at least one manuscript destroyed, had developed an abiding dislike of Isma^ʿil. His foray into dissident journalism with the Arabic-language *Abu nazzarah zarqa* (The Man with Blue Spectacles) led to his exile in 1878. He continued to publish his journal from Paris, and in 1879–82 it favored the oppositional secret societies such as that of the Egyptian junior officers and Young Egypt (*Misr al-fatah*).⁴² The evidence points to frustration with khedivial censorship as a major impetus to Sannu^ʿ's eventual disaffection, a frustration other intellectuals often shared.

As of about 1877, with the debt crisis and increased European interference in the administration, Khedive Isma^ʿil began giving newspapers greater license to attack foreign imperialism. By the spring of 1879, Isma^ʿil had allied himself with the nativist faction, which desired an end to the European cabinet and the Dual Control's oversight of the Egyptian budget. The fall of the European-dominated cabinet headed by Nubar Nubarian, and the appointment of an anti-European, proconstitution ministry in its stead, led the Germans, British, and French to insist on Isma^ʿil's deposition and the appointment of his son Tawfiq in his place. These highly visible political intrigues made the public more interested in news, and presented both opportunities and challenges to newspaper owners.

The economic pressure to create interesting copy also led many newspapers to develop a more politicized approach. The new freedom to speak of European politics critically, however, encouraged criticism of domestic policy as well. Finally, early in 1879 Isma^ʿil's near-bankrupt government abolished the subventions it had been giving most newspapers in Egypt. The communication from the cabinet read,

The Council decided to cease the subventions given heretofore to newspapers by the state, with the exception of *Jinan* in Beirut and of *al-Jawa'ib* [in Istanbul], the subvention of which is reduced to 300£.s.

As for the *Phare d'Alexandrie*, which received F. 50,000 per year, its subvention is also to cease in principle. But insofar as a contract was signed on this subject

between the government and the proprietor of the newspaper, his excellency the minister of finance will have to investigate the best means for arriving at a cancellation of the contract.⁴³

The abolition of financial incentives to take the government line appears to have had a direct but subtle effect on the system of functional ambiguity. In the spring of 1879, during the fierce political struggle between Isma'îl and his European-dominated cabinet, one finds comments and statements in the Arabic-language press far bolder than anything that appeared during the first eleven years of the private press. Of course, the government still held the stick, and severe limits on expression remained. Even so, the tenor of discourse definitely changed with the abolition of subventions. Unremunerated servility would give pleasure to few, and a stick without a carrot would as likely inspire defiance as abject obedience.

The Publications Department made it clear early in 1879 that it disliked the new boldness. In an official warning, it regretted the flurry of articles in the press containing protests against the policy of the government in regard to taxation and state revenues. Newspapers, the warning gravely intoned, are not to repeat such criticism. Whether because of the gravity of the crisis or owing to the abolition of the subventions, journalists virtually ignored such tough language, taking their fifteen-day suspensions one after another. The left, represented by the *Star of the East* freemasons, hoped for Isma'îl's replacement with 'Abdu'l-Halim Pasha or Tawfiq and the emergence of a constitutional monarchy able to withstand European interference. The right, represented by the Taqla brothers, criticized Isma'îl's alliance with the nativist faction against the Europeans, fearful that by undermining the Mixed Courts Isma'îl would worsen the position of compradors. By May 1879, the frantic and frustrated government of the khedive got even tougher. The Taqla brothers, pro-French Syro-Lebanese, had their *Sada al-ahram* (Echo of the Pyramids) suspended and fined for finding fault with Isma'îl, and on its second serious offense the Publications Department simply ordered it out of existence.⁴⁴ For their part, journalists began openly defending freedom of the press and attacking the system of press censorship in Egypt. The Coptic editor of *al-Watan*, forced to print a notice in his own newspaper of its two-week suspension and fine for ignoring the "times and conditions," went so far as to include a protest against the order along with the notice. He complained that he had no idea what particular story had caused the state to act against him, and appealed to the European idea of the free press. Egyptians, he said, were suffering from ignorance, and closing newspapers was rather like denying a sick man his medicine. One searches in vain for so forthright an argument for freedom of the press prior to this article, and its appearance in 1879 points toward a breakdown in the system of functional ambiguity.⁴⁵

Another attack on censorship late in Isma'îl's reign came from Adib Ishaq

and Salim an-Naqqash. In their newspaper *at-Tijarah* (Commerce), they replied to criticisms of them in the European and pro-European press in the wake of the fall of the Nubar ministry in the spring of 1879. They asserted that the division of the press censorship bureau into a European department and a department dealing with the Arabic press created invidious policies. The European department gave the foreign newspapers full rein to publish anything, and to slander Egypt and its rulers, they averred, whereas the Arabic-language department arbitrarily silenced those journalists attempting to serve the homeland.⁴⁶ Later that summer, when the Taqla brothers' newspapers were closed by the new government of Tawfiq for criticizing his then-allies, the nativist faction, Ishaq and an-Naqqash went so far as to criticize this action against their enemies for lacking any basis in law.⁴⁷ The defense of freedom of speech even for the Taqlas by Ishaq and an-Naqqash surely ranks as a watershed of some sort for Ottoman journalism.

High politics, however, now moved in an entirely different direction. Khedive Tawfiq decided to break with Sharif Pasha and the nativist faction, to prorogue the chamber of deputies, and to renounce the framing of a constitution. He turned away from the nobles, rich peasants, and urban middle strata with whom his father had attempted to strike a bargain over consultative government in return for help in excluding the Europeans. Tawfiq turned instead to a narrower social base for his regime, that of the Ottoman and Circassian nobles, combining this policy with a more conciliatory posture toward the European Powers such that he now agreed to the reinstatement of European comptrollers over the Egyptian budget. Among Tawfiq's Ottoman-Egyptian cabinet members, Minister of War 'Uthman Rifqi Pasha took the hardest line against the various political activities of the nativist faction, and he appears to have zeroed in on Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din Asadabadi as an important agitator in the shadowy and amorphous world of Arabophone secret societies. On 21 August 1879 Khedive Tawfiq announced that he had had Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din arrested as the head of a secret society of youth that formed a menace both to religion and to the state. Few of Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's admirers showed themselves willing to stand up for him. 'Abduh at the government gazette, and Ishaq and an-Naqqash in *Misr* and *at-Tijarah*, acquiesced in the printing of the official statement concerning Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's corruption of religion and of Egypt's youth. Only Ibrahim al-Laqqani, at *Mir'at ash-sharq*, refused to print the statement. In response, the government ordered his newspaper closed for six months, and threatened to go through the back issues in search of articles allegedly defaming the Ottoman Empire. Al-Laqqani, knowing a threat when he saw one, quietly agreed to cease publishing *Mir'at ash-sharq* altogether.⁴⁸

As the Tawfiqian reaction unfolded, *at-Tijarah* became so coy that it appeared to engage in doublespeak. After Riyad's installation as premier, Ishaq wrote that it was wrong to think Riyad Europe's man; he simply employed

Europe's support to improve Egypt's administration. He added, "According to those who are more eager for independence than for good administration, this dependence simply served as a means to acquiring for himself a special position."⁴⁹ Ishaq began by giving a safe, sycophantic statement of support for the new premier, with whom everyone knew he had broken. But by including a description of oppositionist views, he managed to undermine his opening remarks and to include a jab at Riyad. A clever end run around the censors here masquerades as balanced journalism.

Riyad instituted a hardline policy of press repression, which required that he find ways to block journalists' access to news within the bureaucracy, as well as that he intimidate publishers into avoiding criticism of the regime. Toward the first goal he formulated a rule that government employees could no longer serve as agents or correspondents for the press.⁵⁰ The new regulation had an immediate impact, as *at-Tijarah*, for instance, lost its special Cairo correspondent, Hasan ash-Shamsi, and had to attempt to replace him with a French lawyer in private practice. This law may have had an unforeseen impact, insofar as it helped draw the lines more sharply between private journalists and government employees. The new, more independent press might take risks and venture criticisms, when the regime weakened, of which the bureaucrat-journalists would never have dreamed.

The situation of the press depended largely on state policy, and Riyad made a deliberate effort to cow journalists. Riyad closed down the newspapers owned by Ishaq and an-Naqqash late in 1879, and then exiled Adib Ishaq. He allowed an-Naqqash to start up two new newspapers early in 1880, but only on condition that they avoid lively politics. As noted earlier, Riyad also targeted *Misr al-fatah* (Young Egypt), published jointly by Syrian Christian merchants and Egyptian Muslim bureaucrats in Alexandria. Riyad instructed the head of the publication bureau, then an Italian, to close the paper, but the foreign official sought to avoid doing so. Riyad then laid this charge on the minister of the interior himself, who carried it out. The society, however, sued for illegal violation of its rights in the Mixed Courts, and won the judgment. The Muslim Egyptian members of the society, lacking the foreign passports of the Syro-Lebanese, showed themselves disinclined to defy Riyad, despite the favorable court judgment. Their fear suggests they believed the prime minister was not above using foul play to remove noisome opponents.⁵¹

Nor did Riyad scruple to act even against the better-protected European press in Egypt. In the spring of 1880 he presented a plan to raise taxes on lands whose owners had earlier paid six years' worth of taxes in advance in return for a 50 percent reduction in imposts thereafter. The owners, mostly wealthy peasants, considered this plan a betrayal of the deal earlier struck with them. The Egyptian large landowner, Sudan merchant, and former member of the chamber of deputies, Hasan Musa al-^ʿAqqad, presented a petition against the raising of taxes on these *muqabalah* lands, which he is said to have written in red ink

to indicate his willingness to shed his blood over the issue.⁵² Jules Barbier, a French editor and supporter of the nativist faction, published a copy of the petition in his *La Reforme*. The government promptly arrested and imprisoned al-‘Aqqad, and closed down *La Reforme*, confiscating Barbier’s printing equipment with slight compensation. The message to the journalistic establishment in Egypt was clear: open criticism of the Riyad cabinet invited closure and bankruptcy. Riyad acted much more harshly against the press than Isma‘il ever had, taking absolutism to new heights in Egypt.⁵³

The British consul general in Cairo, Sir Edward Malet, wholeheartedly approved of Riyad’s hard line against the press. Increasingly, as the British gained an interest in the administration of Egypt, they came to share the values of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite toward issues such as political repression. After noting al-‘Aqqad’s imprisonment for merely expressing his conscience, Malet wrote to Lord Granville that in judging events in Egypt “it is necessary to bring a different view to bear upon them than that which similar events would merit in Europe.”⁵⁴ To allow the printing of petitions would signal the government’s weakness, would serve as a “precursor of fall.” The situation could not be addressed by a rule of law, since native law is “shadowy.” Malet wrote that if the khedive and his ministers neglected to take action against such “agitators,” then their position would become untenable. He concluded, “I make these reflections in order to justify the imprisonment of a person for presenting a petition couched in seditious language and other arrests which may follow.” As we have seen, Muhammad Fanni was arrested around the same time, on similar charges. Just as the dual elite cooperated in so many other areas, so they colluded in taking Draconian action against Egyptians for the mere expression of a political opinion. In the fall of 1881, after Riyad had fallen and been replaced with Sharif, Malet lobbied hard to have *al-Hijaz*, an anti-imperialist, pro-‘Urabi newspaper, curbed, and Sharif in the end obliged by closing the paper.⁵⁵

The Egyptian public believed that the European press in Egypt had enjoyed special dispensation to slander the Ottoman Empire and to criticize their government, whereas indigenous newspapers faced stiff penalties for speaking out. With the rise of a nativist populism in the fall of 1881, many Egyptians felt the time had come to even the score. When, in October 1881, M. Safon, editor of *L’Égypte*, referred to the Prophet Muhammad as a “false prophet,” all pandemonium broke loose. In the face of mounting death threats, Safon was forced to flee the country, a nineteenth-century Salman Rushdie. The Egyptian government then framed a new censorship law, giving the premier wide powers to prohibit, without giving any reason, the publication of any European newspaper on his territory. Although some Egyptian dissidents worried the law might be used against them, its target clearly was the European expatriate press, who protested loudly.⁵⁶

As officials in the Publications Department such as Muhammad ‘Abduh came to support the ‘Urabists in the winter of 1881–82, they surreptitiously

lifted censorship of pro-ʿUrabi newspapers. ʿAbduh appears to have told Blunt as much, for he writes, “the Press, under Sheykh Mohammed Abdu’s enlightened censorship, freed more than ever from its old trammels, spread the news rapidly.”⁵⁷ The same divisions within the ruling elite that weakened the police and army now enervated the censorship office. Riyad had brought ʿAbduh and others associated with Sayyid Jamaluʿd-Din into the Publications Office as a means of co-opting them. Since he had long been the Iranian firebrand’s patron, he possessed an intimate knowledge of the group around him, and succeeded in gaining their loyalty. Riyad had been in many ways an enlightened despot, precisely the sort of ruler the need for which Sayyid Jamaluʿd-Din preached; some of the opposition to him by the wealthy peasants derived from his drive entirely to abolish forced labor. Once the chamber of deputies had been elected and had hammered out an Organic Law, however, ʿAbduh and other Muslim intellectuals largely went over to the populist reformists.⁵⁸ Since Riyad had put them in control of the press, they could now employ censorship laws to privilege ʿUrabist discourse while harassing conservatives and compradors. The Ottoman-Egyptians and the Europeans found it much more difficult to suppress the culture of critical discourse.

The rise of the political press in the late 1870s, combined with the severe crisis of the state in 1879, put enormous strains on the system of functional ambiguity. Even at the risk of having their newspapers abolished, publishers openly engaged in incisive criticism of government policies in regard to autocracy, taxation, and European influence. Several reasons may be adduced for this change. Since most intellectuals and journalists still received substantial patronage from nobles or notables, divisions within the ruling elite tended to get aired in the press. Many journalists, moreover, genuinely believed in parliamentary government, as liberal small-time capitalists in a society whose quasi-feudal political institutions seemed increasingly archaic. Ambiguity did not disappear, except in a few instances that brought swift retribution, but it certainly became far less opaque.

Some government actions may have made it easier for the press to adopt a substantially more oppositional role in the late 1870s. The abolition of government subventions to most newspapers in 1879 removed a major positive incentive for publishers to treat the regime gently. Ismaʿil’s own use of the nativist faction in the spring of 1879 to dislodge the Europeans from their stranglehold on the budget naturally delivered more power into the hands of the liberal journalists and their patrons. Market forces also drove the publishers to take advantage of the politicization of the public by providing what the latter wanted, that is, more detailed and less ambiguous information about government policies and their implications. The logic of print capitalism, the search for subscribers, helped push expatriate editors to elaborate a culture of critical discourse.

The conventions of viceregal censorship forbade anonymous writing as potentially subversive. Other criteria for the imposition of sanctions were so

vague that editors themselves said they often did not know what exactly their infraction had been. Throughout, however, substance held a less important place than presentation. A tone of directness, a descent into details from a more appropriate level of ambiguity, attracted an angry government response. Authors, in turn, evaded censorship through sarcasm, through embedding reproaches of the state in their articles, or through quotation of government critics. The game became even more complex when the European wing of the dual elite became increasingly involved with attempts to censor anti-imperialist newspapers in the early 1880s, as it developed strong local administrative and economic interests that these editorial policies threatened. Between Egyptian journalist and European consul general no shared system of functional ambiguity existed, giving clashes a raw frankness that contrasted with the games Egyptian editors played with Egyptian censors.

The expansion of the police, the military, and the bureaucracy under Isma'îl depended on the vastly increased tax revenues generated by the cotton boom, and allowed the Egyptian state to invade the lives of its subjects in a more wide-ranging manner than perhaps ever before. If such institutions gave Isma'îl no added authority or legitimacy, they certainly bestowed on him power. In his heyday he could have hundreds of peasants killed for opposing him, and could close newspapers that did not report the news as he wanted them to. He could also employ cotton revenues to bribe various key political players into supporting him. The cotton wealth, then, underlay the strength of his institutions of social control.

Contrary to some theories of cultural hegemony, the viceregal state was never able to impose its political and religious ideology on the rest of society.⁵⁹ Illiterate peasants and imaginative artisans and merchants often departed from the orthodoxy of both the palace and the mosque. The elites could, because they commanded such great financial and administrative resources, partially control what appeared in print as long as they remained united with one another. Clearly, however, many journalists and intellectuals managed at some times to sneak criticism of the government past the censors. Only the first generation of journalists, such as at-Tahtawi and Abu's-Su'ud, adhered by and large to Viceroy Isma'îl's vision of civilization and progress. The journalism of the late 1870s encompassed a wide array of political views, from *al-Ahram*, which supported enlightened despotism and European influence, to *at-Tijarah*, which advocated anti-imperialism and parliamentary government. Both sorts of publisher encountered problems with censorship in 1879, underscoring the degree to which the state had its own agenda, and the degree to which it failed to attain real cultural hegemony.

In the spring and summer of 1882, functional ambiguity broke down, and a widespread frankness became apparent. The very administrators in charge of the censorship apparatus, such as Muhammad 'Abduh, went over to the

‘Urabists, and so the system became useless to the khedive and the Ottoman-Egyptian elite. By this point moreover, attacks on European interference had become very useful screens for criticism of the khedive, whom many ‘Urabists blamed for allowing it. Here I can reply to Loseff’s argument that Aesopian language naturally breaks down over a period of twenty years or so, simply because the audience tires of it. Rather, it is a crisis of the state that most often ends censorship regimes, by destroying the consensus among the ruling elite over the shape of legitimate discourse.

The viceregal institutions of social control proved vulnerable to the same crises that beset the wider society. Their weakness, moreover, snowballed, with every demonstration of frailty provoking yet more popular defiance. The weakness derived from structural contradictions in the viceregal state of the 1870s. Just as the cotton boom allowed Isma‘il to create a huge army and bureaucracy, so the debt crisis forced him to dismantle it. The insistence of the European members of the dual control on a smaller armed forces proved decisive. These comptrollers probably took only budgetary considerations into account, and did not, as some thought, intend to impair Egypt’s ability to resist a European invasion. Unwittingly, their attention to double-entry bookkeeping had the effect of weakening the state against the people, and of weakening the whole of the armed forces against any particular regiment. The insistence of the European wing of the dual elite that servicing debts to European concerns came before virtually every other policy consideration led to a massive demobilization of the army, a less robust police force, and a diminution in state influence over the press. The military feebleness derived not only from sheer reductions in force, but also from the effect on officers’ morale of arrears in pay and fewer opportunities for promotion. The new, compact armed forces did not by any means allow the country to fall into anarchy. The state and the army could still control most of Egypt, though they suffered defeats in the Sudan. In the new situation, however, urban riots lasted perhaps two or three hours longer than they might have in the early 1870s, when ubiquitous troops moved in quickly. The extra hours led to higher death counts from riots, and European consuls and journalists felt about deaths of expatriates rather like Chicken Little felt about the sky. In short, the new weakness of the army and police, which partially derived from officers’ and troops’ sympathies with populist demonstrations and riots, allowed an image of anarchy to be built up in the minds of European observers. Ironically, the same Europeans who had most strongly advocated the small army complained most vociferously that the military was failing to maintain order three years later. The struggle over and within the armed forces proved pivotal for the revolution of 1881–82, to which I will now turn.

Nine

Social and Cultural Origins of the Revolution

REVOLUTIONS, as a form of turbulence, entail an untidy conjuncture of several types of collective action, carried on in an often uncoordinated manner by different social groups. Western historians of the revolution of 1881–82 have tended to focus on officers and high officials, relegating to relative insignificance other social actors. The tradition of writing about the Revolution in republican Egypt, on the other hand, has tended to reduce the conflict to one between the “agrarian bourgeoisie” (village notables) and the “feudal nobility” (the Ottoman-Egyptian elite). The junior officers in the army, in this view, can be subsumed under the heading of this agrarian bourgeoisie, since many were sons of Egyptian village headmen. More recently, however, some Egyptian historians have stressed the multiclass character of the Revolution, especially Latifah M. Salim, who has made a persuasive case for important participation by intellectuals, the merchants’ and artisans’ guilds, and both the rural middle class and peasants. No one has, however, investigated the urban “crowd” as a revolutionary actor in its own right in 1881–82. Thanks to the work of Salim and others we have a notion of how the subaltern groups participated, but I think we can attain a better understanding of why they acted than can be provided by the usual recourse to relative deprivation.

Our approach so far would indicate that much can be explained by asking about who precisely the challengers were, and about their interests, culture, and resources, and the ways in which they mobilized those resources. What repertoires of collective action emerged among these various social strata in the course of the Revolution? I have found signed petitions and arrest-lists that give occupations often enough for me to identify fairly precisely the main social actors in the Revolution. Indeed, I believe I am the first to have assembled the names (and often occupations) of nearly 1,000 persons arrested by the restored khedivial government in the fall of 1882. I will also present new evidence on the signatories to the manifesto of 29 July 1882, which effectively deposed the khedive. Several of these lists have never been used at all by historians, and none in a systematic way. The Czech historian Miroslav Hroch demonstrated how useful such lists could be in more precisely delineating the social composition of protonationalist movements.¹ They will allow me to suggest a rough scale of importance by which the actions of the various social strata can be ranked against one another. Such a ranking may help settle the question of whether the struggle of the village headmen against the nobles really had the primacy many historians have maintained.

If we find a multiclass revolution, one in which parts were played by tailors and journalists, women street hawkers and village peasants, merchants and colonels, Circassian bureaucrats and Coptic clergy, are we not then in danger of losing our moorings? What were the most important conflicts, and how can we weight them? What really drove the Revolution? I think Hroch is right to suggest that most protonationalist movements in the nineteenth century involved two sorts of conflict.² One, a struggle among social classes, often hinged on the privileges characteristic of the nobility in estates-type societies, which became matters of contention in societies moving toward capitalism. The second, a movement of regional patriotism, overlapped with the class struggle, yet involved cultural differences between ruler and ruled, and aimed at integrating the subaltern classes on the bases of linguistic, religious, ethnic, and territorial identity. In other words, the disintegrative struggle of classes coincided with the creation of an integrative nativist coalition that allied the oppressed or blocked classes.

The Political Struggle

The Egyptian junior officers began the first phase of the Revolution (January 1881–August 1881), with their agitations against Ottoman-Egyptian discrimination and against reductions in force among both officers and enlisted men in the army.³ When, on 1 February 1881, Colonel ʿAli Fahmi and other officers were arrested for having petitioned the state to cease discriminating against Arabophone Egyptians, a number of other officers and men released them forcibly and then rioted. The British exerted strong pressure on the khedive not to resort to treachery and Machiavellian means of retaliating, since England and France were represented on the council of ministers. The British insistence that Tawfiq respond in what they considered an upright manner helped paralyze him, so that he made no response at all.⁴ At the beginning of this phase, the officers had few allies outside their own ranks. Many intellectuals, for instance, at first distrusted the military and thought it unlikely to support real reform.

The military demonstration of 9 September 1881 brought several social forces together in unity against the Riyad cabinet. The junior officers who confronted the khedive in front of his palace at ʿAbidin had the backing of their largely peasant-origin troops, of course. But the urban crowd swarming the square and its environs also appears to have supported the officers.⁵ Colonel Ahmad ʿUrabi demanded the reinstatement of the chamber of delegates and the drawing up of a constitution, complained of Ottoman ethnic dominance, and insisted on the restoration of the army to 18,000 men.⁶ In so doing, he created a platform upon which a variety of forces in civil society could agree. The khedive responded to the mixed military and civilian demonstration by asking Sharif Pasha once again to form a cabinet, in a victory for the Helwan Society

over Riyad. Tawfiq, even in acquiescing to free elections for a chamber of deputies, worried that delegates might ask for “extended right of discussion and the establishment of a constitution,” to which he remained opposed.⁷

The village notables, who had constituted most of the delegates to Isma‘il’s chamber of deputies, rejoiced in the prospect of again having some influence on government policy, and they mediated between a wary Sharif and the rebellious officers, setting up a compromise that allowed a tactical alliance between the two. For the first time, the Egyptian government formally accepted a doctrine of the separation of powers, with the yet-to-be-elected chamber of deputies explicitly representing the legislative. The Egyptian rural gentry had split, into an elite of very great landowners and high officials, and a larger number of medium landowners. Sharif Pasha instructed the provincial governors to summon prominent village headmen to their seats of government for the elections of 15 November 1881, and to allow them to vote without any interference. The elections appear to have been fairly conducted, but the procedures adopted by Sharif’s officials favored the great landlords among the notables over the medium and smaller landowners, as Alexander Schölch has argued. The provincial governors, after all, decided whom to invite, and they naturally favored prominent families. The *nouveaux riches* great landlords therefore did best in the elections, though about half of the eighty-three delegates who first met on 26 December had either served in previous chambers or belonged to families that had a tradition of being represented. Although more conservative than the rural middle class taken as a whole, these families included strong supporters of ‘Urabi.⁸

An-Nadim, who had successfully campaigned for pro-‘Urabist candidates in several provinces, was dismayed at the overall election returns.⁹ When he complained to ‘Urabi about the magnate Muhammad Sultan Pasha’s emergence as speaker of the chamber, the colonel observed that a hunter has to associate with dogs.¹⁰ The urban guilds also had earlier had some representation in the chamber, and elections benefited them. Mahmud al-‘Attar and ‘Abdu’s-Salam al-Muwaylihi, Cairene great merchants, and the latter a mason once close to Sayyid Jamalud-Din, were elected. Exiled intellectuals and journalists such as Adib Ishaq joyfully returned to Cairo, and gradually many intellectuals identified themselves with ‘Urabi. ‘Urabist newspapers were founded. The sultan in Istanbul, however, opposed any constitution for Egypt since “it was not possible for him to allow a constitution in one province of his dominions and to withhold it from the others.”¹¹ The early opposition of the sultan-caliph, with his powers of moral suasion among at least the urban Egyptians, boded ill for the movement, though his negotiator, Derviş Pasha, gave the officers conflicting signals as to the seriousness of his antagonism.

Save for Sharif Pasha and his Ottoman-Egyptian fellow cabinet members, who felt rather as though they were riding a tiger, most members of the loose reformist coalition were ethnic Egyptians or Arabized Circassians who iden-

tified with them rather than with the Turcophone nobility. ‘Urabi widely appealed to these Egyptians as a hero, and he had in fact articulated his nativist ideas fairly clearly. Colvin reported that ‘Urabi told him on 1 November, 1881, that

the Govt. of the Mamelukes and that of the present Dynasty [were] equally oppressive to the Arab population. His point was to show that up to the present the Egyptians have had no security of life or property. They were imprisoned, exiled, strangled, thrown into the Nile, starved, robbed, according to the will of their masters. . . . The most ignorant Turk was preferred and honoured before the best of the Egyptians . . . He then went on at great length to explain that men came of one common stock and had equal rights of personal liberty and security. . . . Tewfik, while heir-apparent, had been loudest in complaints of his father: but since he had come to power, he had tried to get power into his own hands and to exercise it in the old Turkish way. That must be prevented. Let him restrict himself to his proper sphere, leaving government to his ministers. For the rest, the Khedive, to them, represented the Sultan: the Sultan, the Prophet, God.¹²

The struggle, in December–February 1881–82, between the newly elected chamber of delegates on the one hand, and Sharif and the European Powers on the other, led to the first defection from the polyglot coalition of the previous September–October. The chamber of delegates, supported by the Egyptian officers, demanded control over that half of the budget not already pledged to servicing European debts.¹³ Parliamentary influence over the budget has been an essential feature of representative regimes since at least the time of Henry VIII, and this demand signaled the chamber’s determination to transform itself from a debating society into a closer approximation of a parliament. Sharif and other reformist Ottoman nobles, however, could not accept the devolution of this power from their cabinet to the Arabophone chamber of delegates. Sharif’s government fell on this issue on 2 February 1882.

The formation of a new cabinet by the Circassian Mahmud Sami al-Barudi symbolized the change that had occurred. Few Ottoman nobles any longer supported the ‘Urabists, excepting close relatives of Tawfiq’s rival ‘Abdu’l-Halim Pasha. The Circassian nobles and notables themselves split into pro-‘Urabi and pro-Ottoman factions. Al-Barudi led the pro-‘Urabi nobles. One difference between al-Barudi and Sharif can be seen in their land possessions. In 1870 Sharif owned 2,507 feddans of land, whereas al-Barudi had only 150. By 1881 or so al-Barudi had built his holdings up to 1,705, still less than Sharif had possessed ten years earlier, and Sharif in the meantime had no doubt much increased his holdings. Al-Barudi represented the lower stratum of the nobles in terms of his land holdings, since even an Arab notable such as Sultan Pasha, the head of the chamber of delegates, had around 13,000 feddans in 1882.¹⁴ Al-Barudi appointed ‘Urabi minister of war, promoting him to major-general, and thus won over the Egyptian officers. The chamber of deputies, represent-

ing the Arabophone great notables, also at first largely supported the al-Barudi cabinet, as did many among the intellectuals, guilds, village headmen and peasants. The loss of the reformist Ottoman nobles inevitably hurt the 'Urabist cause, however, given their vast wealth and influence. So too did the Syrian Christians defect, including journalists and intellectuals such as Salim an-Naqqash, since they feared the movement's turn toward an Egyptian nativism that excoriated Levantines.¹⁵

An attempted coup against the 'Urabist officers, engineered by Circassian staff officers resentful of the wholesale promotion of sons of the soil, provoked the next political crisis in the spring of 1882. The autochthonous officers averted the plot, then had the conspirators court-martialed and sentenced to exile in the Sudan. Tawfiq, however, intervened and reduced the sentence to exile in Turkey. 'Urabis saw the khedive's meddling as an attempt to overthrow the principle of cabinet rule and to restore viceregal absolutism, as well as an expression of the privileges protecting Ottomans and Circassians from the consequences of their deeds (exile to Turkey being hardly a harsh punishment for an Ottoman officer).¹⁶ Tawfiq's challenge to the rule of law and to cabinet government provoked a constitutional crisis. The al-Barudi cabinet insisted that the chamber of deputies, by now gone home for the year, return for an extraordinary session. The chamber took up the khedive's right to overrule the cabinet concerning the Circassian rebel officers, and the magnates that dominated it attempted to find a compromise that would reconcile the khedive with his cabinet. These efforts might have succeeded, had not Britain and France brought their gunships into Alexandria harbor and, on 25 May, presented an ultimatum requiring the dismissal of the al-Barudi cabinet.

Ever since the demands by the chamber of delegates for control over the portion of the budget not already mortgaged to the Europeans, the French and British had expressed fears that the new Egyptian nativism would place debt service payments in doubt. What if the chamber of delegates spent more than their share of the budget? Would not the shortfall come from the mortgaged funds, putting payments to bondholders in arrears? The khedive, complying with the European demands, dismissed the al-Barudi cabinet along with 'Urabis, but an ensuing national uproar compelled him to reinstate 'Urabis only a few days later. 'Urabis agreed to return, but he wanted the European fleets to leave, and he insisted on some constitutional reforms, such as an organic law spelling out clearly the limits of power for the khedive and the cabinet.¹⁷ A majority among Egyptian intellectuals, the bureaucrats, the guilds, the village headmen, and peasants, appear to have continued to support 'Urabis. But the great provincial magnates in the chamber, such as Sultan Pasha, appear from this point to have increasingly sided with Tawfiq. Another major faction in the coalition of the fall of 1881 now withdrew.

The pressure the British put on the khedive, especially through their gunboats in Alexandria's harbor, and their insistence that work on the port's

fortification cease, enraged the city's inhabitants. On 11 June a serious Euro-Egyptian riot broke out that left around 250 Egyptians and 50 Europeans dead. The manner in which the British diplomatic corps and press in particular transmogrified the Alexandria riot into an 'Arabist "massacre" of the "Christians" may have been as overtly dishonest as Elbert E. Farman, the American ambassador, thought.¹⁸ This interpretation of the events, however, certainly became the turning point for the Revolution, insofar as such a "massacre" constituted a matter of honor that absolutely required a British elite trained at Eton and other public schools to respond in a "manly" (i.e., violent) manner. Fear of Muslim insubordination spreading to India also tortured Victorian imperialists. Ironically, the French—Britain's supposed ally against the 'Arabists—saw most clearly the psychological dynamics driving the British, and commented with Gallic irony. Viscount Lyons reported from Paris late in June:

M. de Freycinet seemed to me to desire to ascertain whether I thought that England attached the greater importance to obtaining satisfaction for the Alexandria massacres or to seeing the financial Control re-established in Egypt, and, moreover, to discover whether I conceived that the prospect of attaining either or both of these objects would induce her to acquiesce in letting Arabi Pasha alone.

I said that to obtain reparation for the Alexandria massacre appeared to me, personally, to be a question of national honour and of the safety of European residents in Egypt and other Mussulman countries. . . . [T]he necessary preliminary to obtaining either . . . was . . . the overthrow of Arabi Pasha and the Military party in Egypt.¹⁹

Some British principals had long desired to intervene forcefully in Egypt or even incorporate it into the empire. These merchants, diplomats, and officials, however, were not in power in 1882, and Gladstone was a Little Englander. The riot and the spin put on it by the jingoists went a long way toward overcoming the opposition of the liberals to involvement in the internal affairs of Egypt.

The riot did not turn Tawfiq against 'Urabi with nearly the same fierceness, however, and in the short term he simply used it as a way of attempting to rein his "peasant officer" in. By the end of June, however, the khedive had decided to throw in with the foreigners. Partially at his urging, the British bombarded Alexandria on 11 July and landed troops, essentially occupying the summer capital and taking Tawfiq under their wing. The 'Arabists in Cairo, in response, held two national congresses. The first decided to attempt to reason with the khedive, and sent him a six-man delegation, including the educator 'Ali Mubarak. The delegation could not enter into any serious negotiations, and by Mubarak's own admission he and another of its members actually defected to the khedive upon seeing the British strength at Alexandria.²⁰ The British factor proved crucial in the calculus of allegiances; Tawfiq's own cabinet in Alexandria sent a clandestine note to Cairo of their willingness to come over to 'Urabi's side should the British withdraw.²¹ In the meantime, Tawfiq

dismissed ʿUrabi once more from his cabinet, and declared him a rebel. Those opposed to the khedive then called another national congress, on 29 July, at which nearly 400 notables and nobles, some arriving by train from the provinces, decided to depose the khedive and to inform the sultan-caliph of their decision. From this date the state was run by the assistant ministers of the various ministries, along with some officers and other officials, as a “conventional” or “common-law” (*ʿurfi*) government until the spiritual cachet of the sultan-caliph could be secured. Such an informal cabinet had been set up earlier in July, but the 29 July congress formalized its authority.²²

Schölch argues that the national congress and the subsequent common-law cabinet did not actually depose the khedive, but simply called upon the sultan to do so.²³ This point of view cannot be maintained in the face of the evidence; the manifesto of 29 July declared Tawfiq’s orders nonbinding and stated that he had apostatized from Islam, a subtle way of declaring him deposed.²⁴ How this document was interpreted by its signers is clear from a decision of the common-law cabinet saying that the congress had decided that the orders of the khedive and his royalist cabinet “will not be listened to,” and that the sultan “has been informed of this decision.”²⁵ The very constitution of the deputy ministers as a “common-law” cabinet contains the revolutionary step that eluded Schölch. The ʿUrabists had temporarily put themselves outside divine governance; until Abdülhamid replied, they were running a secular government in rebellion against the caliph’s appointee, a government set up with no more legitimation than the conventional (*ʿurfi*) will of the Egyptian people as represented in the national congresses and the army.

The common-law cabinet, as Schölch has demonstrated, quickly began acting as though it were *the* government of Egypt. It claimed to head up not only the civilian bureaucracy, but also the army. It protested to the British in August over their occupation of Suez. It dismissed openly counter-revolutionary provincial governors and officials, putting some of them under house arrest, and appointed more moderate men in their stead, by no means all of them strident revolutionaries or hangers-on of the clique in power in Cairo. The government imposed strict censorship, not only on the pro-khedive and pro-European press, but also on what it saw as overly fanatical statements by revolutionary journalists. Without doubt, fear of provoking an extension of the British occupation was the primary impetus for the government to suppress “fanaticism.” The common-law cabinet also attended to the needs of the 60,000 refugees who fled to its territory from Alexandria. It fixed the prices of food, set and paid out salaries, and in general kept the country running. It on occasion overruled ʿUrabi, demonstrating that, although martial law had been declared, the civilian bureaucracy had not been completely overwhelmed by military dominance. Indeed, Schölch blames the failure of ʿUrabi to adopt a forward defense, rather than simply sitting in Kafr ad-Dawwar and waiting for

the British to attack, on the way in which the overly cautious common-law cabinet reined in the general.²⁶

The revolutionary state lasted from 29 July until 15 September, when the British took Cairo. In this period it had broad support from Egyptian intellectuals, from bureaucrats, from the guilds, from village headmen, and from peasants (see Table 9.1). The coalition included a number of high-ranking Circasian officials as well. Let us examine the ways in which these groups inscribed new discourses on Egyptian politics, mobilized resources, employed organizational networks, and engaged in collective action.

The Intelligentsia

The various segments of the intelligentsia did not always agree with one another. Ulama disapproved of the westernizing intellectuals, and intellectuals could be critical of army officers. These groups were thrown together in 1881–82, however, holding common grievances against the khedive on the grounds that he had become a mere tool in the hands of the Europeans. The spiritual and material resources of this stratum could be enormous. They controlled the press and the telegraph, administered the railroads and steamship lines, controlled the central and provincial bureaucracies, and exerted decisive influence over the military, and through a network of seminaries and mosques the ulama exerted broad moral influence over the populace. How, precisely, did the intelligentsia mobilize these resources on behalf of the Revolution?

The role of the junior officers should be apparent from the summary given above. Here, we will concentrate on other groups. Evidence exists that provincial officials showed great enthusiasm for ^ʿUrabi, and in November the British consul in Tanta described “the upper classes of officials as actively propagating the new ideas which have come into fashion since the 9th of September.”²⁷ The ulama also took up the more nativist themes of the officers and intellectuals, and staged their own internal coup against the pro-khedive Shaykhul-Islam and rector of al-Azhar, Muhammad al-^ʿAbbasi, mounting demonstrations and making speeches. Tawfiq finally acquiesced in dismissing al-^ʿAbbasi, a Hanafi in rite like the Ottomans, and 4,000 ulama and seminarians elected in his place Shaykh al-Inbabi, a Shafiʿi like most Egyptians.²⁸ The support of large numbers of ulama, especially in the provinces, proved an important infrastructural asset to the ^ʿUrabists, since the network of mosques and seminaries still constituted a potent organizational force in Egypt. In the summer of 1882, the ulama obliged the common-law government by declaring an Islamic holy war (jihad) against the British.

Another segment of the intelligentsia with special access to the public, the Egyptian journalists, also provided crucial aid to the Revolution.²⁹ Ahmad

TABLE 9.1All-Egypt List of Persons under Arrest, 14 November 1882^a

<i>Place</i>	<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage of Each Province</i>
Cairo	Ruling Elite		
	Pashas	2	2
	High Officials	9	7
	Members, Chamber of Deputies	3	2
	Subtotal	14	11
	Intelligentsia		
	Officials	16	13
	Officers	56	45
	Professionals	19	15
	Ulama	9	7
	Subtotal	100	80
	Urban Groups		
	Urban Notables	1	1
	Artisans	1	1
Unknown	9	7	
Total Cairo	125	100	
Minufiyyah	Ruling Elite		
	Beys	1	3
	Intelligentsia		
	Professionals	1	3
	Officers	3	8
	Workers, Peasants, Troops		
	Artisans	1	3
	Peasants	3	8
	Soldiers and NCOs	7	19
	Unknown	21	56
Total Minufiyyah	37	100	
Daqahliyyah	Elite		
	High Officials	1	–
	Intelligentsia		
	Officials	4	2
	Clerks	3	2
	Officers	3	2
	Ulama	3	2
	Subtotal	13	8
	Urban Groups		
	Merchants	1	–
Mansura Townspeople	117	71	
Subtotal	118	72	

TABLE 9.1 (cont.)

<i>Place</i>	<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage of Each Province</i>
	Peasants		
	Village Headmen	3	2
	Village Notables	3	2
	Villagers	14	8
	Subtotal	20	12
	Troops	1	–
	Unknown	11	7
	Total	164	99*
Sharqiyyah	Town Notables	1	6
	Village Notables	15	94
	Total	16	100
Gharbiyyah	Intelligentsia		
	Officials	1	–
	Ulama	2	1
	Townspeople		
	Basyun	10	3
	Mahallat al-Kubra	15	5
	Sanhur al-Madinah	3	1
	Talkha	19	7
	Ziftah	4	1
	Subtotal	51	18
	Villagers	231	81
	Unknown	4	1
	Total	285	100
Esna	High Officials	1	25
	Professionals	3	75
	Total	4	100
Qena	Intelligentsia		
	Officials	1	5
	Clerks	1	5
	Ulama	1	5
	Town Notables	16	76
	Village Notables	2	9
	Total	21	100
	Total Charged	652	100

Source: PRO, FO 141/161, "List of persons under arrest in connection with the suppression of the rebellion," Raphael Borg, Cairo, 14 November 1882.

* Does not equal 100 because of rounding.

^a Excludes Alexandria, Damietta and Buhayrah.

Rifʿat, head of the Publications Bureau, enthusiastically threw in with the challengers, and he sent the head of his European section at one point early in the Revolution to Alexandria to make contact with ʿUrabi. Rifʿat had his subordinates translate articles from European newspapers about the attitude of the British parties, especially the Labor party (*al-Hizb al-Hirfi*) toward Egypt, and also took a keen interest in Bismarck's views.³⁰ His and other journalists' role can be seen from a long and fascinating deposition by Ridwan Fahmi, a translator of Turkish in the Publications Bureau. Rifʿat was appointed to take notes at the cabinet meetings, and often denied information on cabinet decisions to Tawfiq. He prepared the correspondence of the ʿUrabists with Istanbul, translating the letters into Turkish. During the war he dictated fiery articles to the young Saʿd Zaghlul, then an official in the Interior Ministry, for publication in the newspaper *al-Mufid*.³¹

According to Fahmi, Muhammad ʿAbduh opposed the officers' actions on 9 September in calling for the fall of his patron, Riyad. But he came to support the chamber of deputies' demand for control over the budget, developing alliances with some of the deputies who were village headmen, and he worked for the fall of the Sharif cabinet. Thereafter, while remaining editor of the official gazette, he became the ʿUrabists' political theorist ("the Aristotle of their philosophy," in Fahmi's words). He encouraged the army to fight the British because they were, he said, a naval power that would not be able to wage combat effectively in Egypt's interior, and because the other Powers would never agree to let them conquer Egypt. Other young intellectuals who wrote against the khedive or the Europeans in the press included Saʿd Zaghlul, his brother Fathu'llah (a student at the school of administration), and several members of the staff of the official gazette.³² The radical journalists not only cued an audience of thousands to the important political events of the period, but they put an anti-Establishment spin on the news. They also pioneered in a new sort of frank public discourse that signaled the end of functional ambiguity. ʿAbdu'llah an-Nadim wrote in his *at-Taʿrif* on 6 May 1882 that the khedive was a "deluded traitor" (*khaʿin makhduʿ*), finally tearing away all Aesopian veils and speaking plainly. (His newspaper in consequence was closed for a month by a cabinet attempting to reach a compromise with the angry khedive).³³

The participation of important segments of the intelligentsia in the rebellion in Alexandria can be shown from subsequent arrest-lists. These lists do not tell us much, however, about the underlying organizational resources of this stratum. We know from other sources that ʿAbdu'llah an-Nadim was involved with a political society at Alexandria in 1881–82, called the Young Men's Association (*Jamʿiyyat ash-Shubban*). Many sons of prominent families joined, holding frequent meetings at which an-Nadim gave stirring speeches. The association supported ʿUrabi and demanded a national bank; it sent a congratulatory delegation to al-Barudi on his becoming prime minister.³⁴ This one club probably had a membership only in the hundreds, but it stands as

an example of the sort of links the literate classes in Alexandria were developing during the Revolution. The intelligentsia active in Alexandria included officers, bureaucrats, clerks, and professionals. Ulama appear not to have played a particularly important role in Alexandria, where the modern intelligentsia and the guilds exercised greater influence. The officers arrested there included ten lieutenants, nine army captains, six majors, and five lieutenant-colonels, but only two colonels and one lieutenant-general. Several captains of steamers were also arrested.³⁵ In Alexandria, the officers were probably arrested for failing to stop the riot sooner; they did not lead it, and it probably hurt them politically. The indecision that the politicization of the officers corps created had a crucial impact, since both urban crowds and peasants could more freely employ collective violence where the state's organs of security could not agree to act quickly.

Two high officials were arrested in Alexandria, including Hasan ash-Shari'i, the minister of pious endowments, and Yusuf Bartu, the director of the Alexandria city council (*ad-Da'irah al-Baladiyyah*). Government employees implicated in the rebellion included the supervisor of Ra's at-Tin Palace and three administrators, two at the coal department and one at the viceregal estates. The state further charged a police department interpreter, an employee at the excise department, and six clerks. To the two physicians who worked for the state we must add some private professionals such as 'Abdu'r-Rahman al-Buzah, an attorney who styled himself "the Sword of God" and whom the pro-khedive compiler of the arrest-list labeled a "great rebel."³⁶ Although they could not find him to arrest him, the journalist 'Abdu'llah an-Nadim was also accused of making inflammatory speeches and of writing anti-European articles in his newspaper *at-Ta'rif*, and other intellectuals who harangued the populace had blame placed on them, as well.³⁷ Ahmad al-'Awwam, an employee in the department of the navy, gave stirring speeches and published articles in newspapers supporting 'Urabi and inciting rebellion against the khedive. Although, as mere lists of arrests, they cannot be conclusive, these documents suggest participation by both state-employed and private professionals in the leadership of the rebellion at Alexandria, 25 May through 12 July.

I have systematically analyzed for the first time a complete list of signers at the second national congress held on 29 July (Table 9.2). I recognize the problems in using this list for analysis of attitudes, since reports suggest that some delegates may have been forced to sign. On the other hand, I suspect that the attenders knew why they were being called to the Interior Ministry, and those strongly in favor of Tawfiq by then were fleeing to Alexandria or found excuses for absenting themselves. It is, moreover, possible that even the khedive's erstwhile supporters were so disgusted with his collusion in the British bombardment and occupation of Alexandria that they may have been swayed by the sentiment in favor of declaring him incompetent for his post. One suspects, in any case, that those who signed under duress constituted a minority,

TABLE 9.2
Occupations of Signers of the Second National Congress Manifesto
Deposing the Khedive, 29 July 1882

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Ruling Elite		
Princes	3	1
Pashas (no office listed)	23	6
High Officials	30	8
Beys (no office listed)	11	3
Subtotal	67	18*
Intelligentsia		
Officials	34	9
Clerks and Secretaries	7	2
Professionals	18	5
Military Officers	15	4
Clergy	86	22
Subtotal	160	41*
Urban Groups		
Urban Notables (<i>a^cyan</i>)	9	2
Merchants and Ser-tuccars	85	22
Artisans and Crafts Guildmasters	5	1
Communal Leaders	1	—
Subtotal	100	25
Rural Groups		
Village Headmen	53	13
Provincial Notables	1	—
Subtotal	54	13
Occupation Unknown	12	3
Total	393	100

Sources: DWQ, Mahafiz ath-Thawrah al-^cUrabiyyah, 42, Wathiqah 1216, "Surat al-qarar al-mu^ta min al-ummah al-misriyyah bi diwan ad-dakhiliyyah yawm as-sabt, 13 Ramadan 1299" (copy of the decision taken by the Egyptian nation in the Interior Ministry building on Saturday, 29 July 1882); collated with the list in *al-Waqa³i^c al-misriyyah*, 31 July 1882, repr. in ar-Rafi^ci, *ath-Thawrah*, pp. 390-94.

* Percentages agree with subtotals.

and they may have been fairly evenly spread among various social classes, so that their presence may not invalidate use of the list for determining the social composition of the congress.

The middle and lower ranks of the intelligentsia constituted a massive 41 percent of delegates.³⁸ Half of the 160 members of this stratum were Muslim or Christian clergy. The Muslim element, of course, overwhelmingly predominated, with many ulama of al-Azhar present along with large numbers of provincial Islamic court judges. Several of the high ulama, including

Shaykhs ʿIllaysh, ʿIdwi, and Khalfawi, called for Tawfiq's deposition on the grounds that he had apostatized in going over to the Europeans.³⁹ Most of the other half were officials, clerks, and secretaries. Only fifteen military officers signed the manifesto deposing the khedive, though many more appear to have been present, and this statistic suggests an attempt to legitimate the congress's decision with reference to civilian rather than military predominance. The same strategy may have been followed by the modern intellectuals. Muhammad ʿAbduh convened the meeting by reading out the charges against the khedive, and an-Nadim spoke in favor of deposition, but their signatures do not appear on the manifesto.⁴⁰ High officials, nobles, and the higher reaches of the intelligentsia made up another 17 percent of signers. This latter percentage may be inflated, however, insofar as some of the high Ottoman officials, such as Mustafa ʿAkush, inspector of factories in Upper Egypt, almost certainly signed reluctantly.

The interplay of ethnic identity at these conferences is demonstrated by ʿAkush's account of how when, at the first congress, Latif Pasha began speaking in Turkish, the Arabophone delegates raised a clamor and insisted the meeting be conducted in Arabic alone.⁴¹ ʿAli Mubarak describes how, at the second congress, the Coptic leadership insisted that the attenders act on a pro-tonationalist rather than a purely Islamic basis. A spokesman for Egypt's indigenous Christians said that if the war against the British was religious they would leave, since they were Copts. He continued: "But if it was otherwise, that is patriotic (*wataniyyah*), then they were sons of the fatherland; but our view is that war can only be fought if the sultan commands it."⁴² Muhammad ʿAbduh attempted to reassure them that the conference in Alexandria before the British bombardment, which had decided on the need to resist, had included Derviş Pasha, the sultan's representative in Egypt (an exaggeration, though Derviş did favor coopting ʿUrabi).⁴³ The insistence of the delegates on the use of Arabic underlines the political struggle between the Arabophone notables and the Turcophone Ottoman nobles settled in Egypt. The story of the Coptic stand, however, demonstrates how complex were the nativist sentiments of many Egyptians at this point. The Copts insisted on having the sultan's cachet for the war, showing that even they recognized the continuing authority of Istanbul. Yet they demanded that the delegates explicitly employ the discourse of *Landespatritismus* or regional patriotism, rather than that of Islamic holy war, suggesting they did not recognize an Islamic character for the Ottoman Empire (a reasonable stance after 1856). Certainly, the revolutionaries did have the ulama declare an Islamic holy war, as a way of mobilizing the Egyptian masses against the British, so the Copts did not entirely get their way. But for the Muslim delegates, after all, regional patriotism and Islam did not conflict, and most were willing to employ both sorts of rhetoric.

Let us turn now to the lists of those incarcerated after the British invasion, for further clues to the importance of the intelligentsia (Table 9.3). Among 136

TABLE 9.3Occupations of Rebel Prisoners in Cairo and Alexandria, 18 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1299/1 October 1882^a

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Ruling Elite		
Pashas (civilian)	4	
High Officials	8	
Members, Chamber of Delegates	5	
Other Notables (Beys, Landlords)	2	
Palace Eunuchs	2	
Subtotal	21	14
Intelligentsia		
Officials	17	12
Secretaries (katib)	5	3
Professionals	26	18
Officers	56*	38
Ulama	11	7
Subtotal	115	78
Merchants and Guildmasters	4	3
Workers (<i>shaghghal</i>)	1	—
Village Headmen	1	—
Unknown	6	4
Total	148	99*

Source: DWQ, Mahafiz ath-Thawrah al-'Urabiyyah, 40, dossier 190, "Asma' al-masjunin bi mahallat sujun dabiyyat misr," 18 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1297/1 October 1882, pp. 11–12; and "Jadwal yatadamman bayan asma' al-masjunin," pp. 14–22.

* Includes one police lieutenant.

* Does not equal 100 percent because of rounding.

^a Excludes eleven persons arrested only because they might know the whereabouts of Hasan Musa al-'Aqqad and 'Abdu'llah an-Nadim.

persons arrested in September 1882 in Cairo, officers made up 33 percent. In addition to nine high officials, the jails held thirteen middle-level bureaucrats. The state arrested eight ulama (6 percent). Though these were seminary teachers in Cairo, we know that provincial qadis and sermonizers supported the Revolution in great numbers. One of the other arrest-lists supports de Jong's contention that Sufi leaders may not always have been as conservative as is sometimes assumed, since it includes Shaykh Muhammad al-Jadhbi, "servant of religious knowledge and of al-Khalwatiyyah Sufi order in Beni Suef."⁴⁴ In the Cairo list, modern intellectuals and professionals such as journalists, teachers in the civil schools, physicians, telegraphers, engineers, a lawyer, a pharmacist, and a translator, came to twenty (15 percent). The manner in which the authorities focused on journalists, telegraphers, and railway employees shows they recognized the importance of professionals who held the keys to the use

of modern media of communication.⁴⁵ About sixty-five of those listed could be categorized as belonging to the civilian intelligentsia, and if one adds them to the officers, we may conclude that about 80 percent of those revolutionaries arrested in the capital belonged to the intelligentsia. The authorities appear to have placed little importance on arresting guild leaders, whether merchants or artisans, and of course few village headmen were in the capital. Arrest priorities and venue help account, then, for the vast disproportion of the intelligentsia in the list of revolutionaries captured that fall in Cairo. Still, this result draws attention dramatically to the vanguard role played by the civilian and military members of this stratum.

Despite the undeniable importance of the officers as a leading segment of the intelligentsia, these lists demonstrate that journalists, officials, professionals, and ulama also played indispensable roles. Forty-one percent of those who signed the declaration of Tawfiq's deposition at the national congress of 29 July came from the intelligentsia, and the percentage of this stratum among total attenders was even higher. Disputes over the political culture of the new Egypt were resolved in favor of Arabic as the language of discourse, and a dual ideological basis of regional patriotism and Islamic nativism. In making arrests the state naturally concentrated on the rebellious officers, but its preference in Cairo for professionals, ulama, and officials over equally guilty merchants and guildmasters suggests a conviction that the former outweighed the latter in the degree of political danger they posed. Even where both events and arrest-lists plainly attest the role of the ordinary folk, as in Alexandria, the restoration state still jailed large numbers of intellectuals and professionals whom they blamed for stirring up the crowd. The members of the intelligentsia, with their literate skills, their political clubs, their dominance of the state and religious bureaucracy, their ability to co-opt the military rank and file, and their access to and even control over the media, appear to have struck the khedive as the single most menacing social force arrayed against him—much more significant than the village headmen, his primary foes in Nasserist historiography.

Guilds

The guild leadership clearly participated in the Revolution, though the actions of the rank and file guild members are more difficult to recover. The urban corporations, as centers of wealth, manpower, and organization, proved among the more important actors in the Revolution. If cities were "power-containers," then the guilds possessed the key to opening them. Of the four sorts of guilds (merchant, craft, service, and transportation), some had more potential significance than others. The merchant and broker guilds had at their disposal large amounts of money and wide patronage and political influence in cities such as

Alexandria. The other guilds could offer manpower and sometimes their special skills to the cause. Since demonstrations formed an important repertoire of collective action during the Revolution, the ability of guilds to call up crowds of demonstrators could be important.

Even provincial merchants began to be swept up in the nativist fervor associated with 'Urabism in the fall of 1881, and the Tanta consul reported in November that "business transactions between natives and foreigners are affected, and that the confidence necessary in such matters, which existed formerly, has been greatly impaired."⁴⁶ Colonel 'Abdu'l-'Al, appointed governor of the city of Damietta, quickly won over its urban notables to the 'Urabist cause.⁴⁷ We have seen that when, on 25 May, the khedive dismissed Major-General 'Urabi as minister of war, under pressure from Britain and France, the people expressed their support for him. On 28 May a delegation of Cairene notables went to Tawfiq to plead for 'Urabi's reinstatement. This delegation included "the chiefs of the corporations."⁴⁸ Members of the delegation then met at the house of Sultan Pasha with 'Urabi, who accused Tawfiq of having apostatized from Islam and said he deserved to be deposed. The heads of the merchant corporations tended to agree with 'Urabi's sentiments at this meeting, whereas several ulama and Sufi leaders declined to oppose the khedive so vigorously.⁴⁹

The support for 'Urabi of great merchants such as Hasan Musa al-'Aqqad and 'Abdu's-Salam al-Muwaylihi of Cairo, and Amin Bey Shamsi, the Ser-tuccar of Zaqaq, possessed great importance. They, along with the wealthier village headmen, were the most obvious source of extra funding for military and other revolutionary activities.⁵⁰ Their merchants' guilds, moreover, could be potent tools for the mobilization of an important sector of the urban populace. These guilds overlapped with newer sorts of organization, such as the masonic order to which 'Abdu's-Salam al-Muwaylihi belonged.

Evidence abounds that many in the artisanal, service, and transportation guilds also supported the Revolution. Sharubim wrote that after war had broken out between the common-law government and the British, urban artisans expressed warm support for their revolutionary state. He reported that "The cobblers, coffee servers, and tailors swarmed the streets, shouting 'O God, destroy the army of the infidels.'"⁵¹ Many other examples of workers and artisans supporting 'Urabi can be given; in Port Said, the guild of coal heavers staged a strike against their guild officers and British employers in the spring of 1882 that had nativist overtones, and that summer more than forty guards working for the Port Said Canal Authority had to be dismissed because they had formed an armed 'Urabist band.⁵² Five hundred fishermen volunteered to join in the work of strengthening the fortifications at the fortress in Damietta.⁵³ Although Egyptian workers in the modern industrial sector were few, they often had the closest contact with Europeans, one of the Revolution's primary enemies. A Mr. Hamilton of the Bulaq works faced increasing insubordination

among the Egyptian workers under his supervision, and some finally attempted to kill him. Only the presence of soldiers in the yard saved him. Here, class and national cleavages overlapped so forcefully that workers who rose up against their managers could be seen as 'Urabist heroes.⁵⁴

In the clash between Egyptians and Europeans in Alexandria on 11 June 1882, which we will discuss in detail below, guild leaders took some part. The list of those Alexandrians "implicated in the rebellion" and arrested by the restored government of Tawfiq includes, among the civilian leadership, fourteen merchants; along with Hasan Mansur, broker at Mina' al-Basal; and Isma'il and Ibrahim Sha't, inspectors of the same market.⁵⁵ As we have seen, the merchants in Alexandria were members of guilds with elected leaderships, and it seems unlikely that they acted purely as private persons. The long history of Egyptian mercantile interest in displacing or controlling the European merchants at Mina' al-Basal in Alexandria has been discussed in previous chapters. Remember the struggle over whether weighing would be public (controlled by the state) or private (and therefore open to the influence of European money). Remember too the contest for the post of market inspector, in which the European merchants managed to have a say, in 1878. One of the candidates the Europeans had rejected was from the Sha't clan, which appears nevertheless to have regained control over the market, and to have remembered how the Europeans voted.⁵⁶

Members of the artisanal and service guilds also took part, insofar as this list includes a weigher and two heads of guilds. Hasan al-Misri, guildmaster of the tailors in Alexandria, is described in a marginal note as a "Great Rebel"; he was accused by eyewitnesses of stirring up popular support for 'Urabi throughout the spring and summer of 1882.⁵⁷ 'Umar Hasanayn, guildmaster of the porters on the viceregal estates (the Da'irah Saniyyah), was also arrested. Although the arrest of guild leaders cannot prove widespread guild participation, given what we know of the authority of guildmasters it seems most likely that the tailors and the porters joined their leader and acted in the rebellion together as a guild. European imports into Egypt most directly affected those in the textile trades, such as the tailors, and that they should have developed militantly anti-European sentiments occasions no surprise. The administrators of the viceregal estates often paid their workers badly, and from 1879 the profits of the estates were mortgaged to European investors and creditors, which may have given guilds working on them even more interest in seeing the foreigners displaced. Of course, insofar as they had an organized guild, they also had the capacity to mobilize for collective action.

Among the 291 Alexandrians arrested, either for rebellion in general or for participation in the riot of 11 June in particular, large numbers derived from groups typically organized by guilds.⁵⁸ Altogether twenty-three (8 percent) were merchants, brokers, and coffeehouse owners. Seventeen, or 6 percent, were guildmasters, artisans, and skilled workers. Fifteen (5 percent) were do-

mestic and menial workers. Eight Nubians and two North Africans were arrested, and both groups were organized by ethnic and occupational guilds. Other sorts of corporate organization, akin to the guilds, also proved important. Three heads of city quarters were arrested. Altogether, about a quarter of those arrested can be shown to have belonged to trades where guild or corporate organizations were important, and the arrest of some guildmasters and heads of quarters suggests strongly (though not conclusively) that guild and guild-like leaderships played a significant role in the rebellion in Alexandria. Many of the 30 percent to whom I have been able to assign no ethnic or occupational identity would also have most likely been workers of some sort. The riot itself remained disorganized, the work of a crowd, and it is possible that amorphous crowd action was the most important repertoire of collective action here employed. But the presence of guild leaders and so many members of guild-organized trades suggests guild networks may have played a part in mobilizing merchants and artisans. The state recognized the guilds' importance for social organization when, in the aftermath of the riot, it asked guildmasters to help restore calm.⁵⁹

The National Congress called together by the 'Urabists on 29 July 1882 included a significant percentage of merchants, along with some guild officers. Out of 393 delegates, about eighty-five, or 22 percent, were men of commerce, including some heads of merchant guilds. Only five, or about 1 percent, were from the artisans' guilds. Altogether about a fourth of the delegates derived from urban groups typically organized by guilds. The delegates were called to Cairo by the deputy (actually the acting) minister of the interior, who instructed 'Urabist notables in various cities and provincial areas to bring along with them some ulama and merchants. The impromptu nature of the gathering explains the dominance of the merchants' ranks by merchants from Cairo, led by their guildmaster, Mustafa Bey al-Hijin. Guildmasters of merchants' corporations in individual quarters in Cairo also attended. The large and diverse contingent of Cairo traders included Christians and North Africans. Only a few merchants are identified as deriving from outside the capital. The heads of the merchants' guilds in Rosetta and Damietta signed, along with several vendors from the latter city. Merchants from Zaqaziq and from Daqahliyyah province added their signatures as well. Aside from delegates from the merchants' corporations, only a few guild officers attended. These included the head of the tobacconists' guild, the guildmaster of the traditional pharmacists and confectioners, and a guild officer from the Cairo butchers' corporation. (Remember the butchers' alliance with dissidents in the spring of 1879.⁶⁰) A list of those arrested in September 1882 includes, in addition to the above guild officers, the guildmaster of merchants in the Upper Egyptian town of Qus, and a city quarter head from Asyut.⁶¹

These lists, of course, tell us little about the culture of the guilds during the Revolution. Mahmud Fahmi, one of al-Barudi's cabinet members, however, gives us in one sentence a striking evocation of popular urban culture in this

period. He wrote that from May 1882, "Problems and clashes occurred, and evening gatherings multiplied, and every person began saying whatever he had to say, and expressing whatever thoughts occurred to him."⁶² The sense of release, and of multiplied networks in the urban areas, comes through starkly in this description. In short, functional ambiguity broke down decisively—the cultural counterpart of the disintegration of the khedive's power and authority. I have suggested earlier, and want to argue again here, that many guilds supported the common-law government, not only because of their economic interests, but because of their political culture. Most guilds had relatively little internal stratification, and as we have seen earlier in this book, from 1865 or so they began practicing a form of shop democracy. The weight of an ordinary individual's vote constituted a denial of privilege, and I believe that many of the revolutionaries aimed at the abolition of privilege. The privileged groups in Egyptian law and practice were the Ottoman-Egyptian nobles and officers on the one hand, and the Europeans and their compradors on the other. The merchants and artisans wanted a parliamentary regime that reflected on a national scale the kind of political system they practiced every day in their own guilds. The weighers had struck and agitated for wages based on individual effort and merit, an ethos, to which the corporate privileges of Ottomans and Europeans stood as an affront.

The Crowd in the 'Urabi Revolution

The Euro-Egyptian riots of the previous two decades had demonstrated that under certain circumstances Europeans and Egyptians were willing to resort to collective violence in their struggles with one another. As the political crisis of the state unfolded, and the passions of the populace became aroused, the possibility of large-scale urban collective violence loomed large. The most important instance of this phenomenon, the Alexandria clash of 11 June 1882, elicited two primary explanations from imperial observers at the time. British officials saw it as a "massacre" instigated by 'Urabi and his supporters, thus denying the autonomy of the urban laborers. The rioters took, in this view, a quite centrally political action, but on direction from notables higher up. The French, on the other hand, tended to interpret the violence as a mere harbor fracas, of a type that often broke out even in European ports.⁶³ From this perspective the riot was an autonomous action of the laboring and dangerous classes, but without political content or implication. No close observer would now accept either of these views as adequate. What we learned about Euro-Egyptian fights in Chapter 7 suggests a third possibility: that the crowd acted both politically and spontaneously.⁶⁴

The Franco-British joint note of 25 May 1882, demanding the dismissal of the al-Barudi government and a year of leave for 'Urabi and the other activist officers, sent a jolt of electricity up and down the Nile Valley. Alexandrians

felt the intervention even more powerfully, since they could see the British and French ships of war anchored off their seaport. ‘Urabi wanted fortifications improved at Alexandria, whereas the European Powers insisted that such works contained a hostile intent toward their fleets. He also put pressure on the Europeans to remove their vessels from the harbor to avoid “the excitement of the public mind caused by their presence.”⁶⁵ By the second week of June, passions ran high. On 7 June a quarrel broke out between some Egyptians and Greeks. A European witness said the Egyptians greatly outnumbered their Hellenic adversaries and beat them with sticks. Then some Egyptian soldiers arrived and joined in the attack on the Greeks, refusing to obey their officers when they ordered them to desist. A hundred Europeans subsequently went to the British consulate and demanded that measures be taken for their protection.⁶⁶ In response, the British and Greek consulates passed out arms to their subjects.

The diplomats’ decision to intervene in Egyptian domestic politics so forcefully, and to underline the move with the threat of gunships, put the ordinary Europeans in Alexandria in the center of a political struggle between the privileged nobles allied with European financiers on the one hand, and the angry working and middle classes on the other. Every European walking the street became a symbol of oppression. In a political revolution a Manichaean logic comes into play, dividing the world into allies and traitors. Politics, operating like a kaleidoscope, reconstituted the colorful ethnic pattern of cities like Alexandria—with their fractious Maltese, Greeks, Italians, Nubians, and Egyptians—into a black-and-white contrast of “them” and “us.”

On Sunday afternoon, 11 June 1882, Alexandria’s seething Euro-Egyptian frictions set off a major conflagration. For many reasons, the social composition, motive, and leadership of this clash became a matter of debate. A mere port riot had little political significance, and seeing it that way would justify the French reluctance to interpose themselves militarily. If, on the other hand, the action could be traced to ‘Urabi, then it offered a *casus belli* to a Great Britain whose men on the spot were eager to intervene. In retrospect, of course, no convincing evidence exists that the riot formed part of an orchestrated conspiracy, either by ‘Urabi or by the khedive (as the latter’s enemies charged). Historians who have treated the riot, such as M. E. Chamberlain, have in my view missed its spontaneity and its social character, in an attempt to understand it within the framework of high politics.⁶⁷ ‘Urabi had staked his reputation on his ability to keep order, and to foment a riot would have been to shoot himself in the foot. If one remembers the history of Italian, Greek, and French riots in the preceding two decades in Alexandria, and of clashes among Europeans, compradors, and Egyptians in many other towns during the same period, the riot seems less remarkable.

The turbulence started, as does all turbulence, in a small, simple thing that grew inexorably in complexity. A fight between a Maltese and an Arab, per-

haps begun by a wager, took a serious turn. Greeks came to the defense of the Maltese. The Maltese stabbed the Arab to death, and local Egyptians gathered to take revenge. One recalls here the Maltese-Nubian riots in Port Said. An American eyewitness reported,

As the news spread, the crowd increased and became turbulent, but it was not until the Greeks and Maltese had commenced firing from their windows and flat house-tops upon the unarmed natives, and some of their number had been killed and others wounded, that they were aroused to violent acts of vengeance.⁶⁸

The testimony of Egyptian wounded, given from their hospital beds the next day, lends support to Farman's account. Ahmad Abu's-Su'ud, a groom for an Alexandria notable, was walking in the street when he was struck by sniper fire from a window. Leather merchant 'Abdu'r-Rahim, tobacco-grinder Ahmad Husayn, and cobbler 'Ali Salamah suffered the same fate—saying they were simply pedestrians shot from windows by Greeks or Maltese. As-Sayyid al-'Ajjan, dough kneader, was stabbed by a European because he took the side of a fish seller in a dispute. Ahmad an-Namaki, a secretary for a noble's estate, prayed at a Sufi center, and on emerging was stabbed by two Greeks. Sabihah bint Abu'l-'Aysh said she was beaten by Christians when she went to see the fight.⁶⁹

The governor and subprefect of police accompanied the British consul to the quarter where the fighting first broke out around 1:30 P.M., and they thought they had quelled it. At 3:30 P.M. the authorities again summoned all the consuls to the police station, since fighting had broken out once more, and this time the mob attacked them. Only the British consul suffered a serious wound. The image of a furious Egyptian crowd attempting to overturn the carriages of the European consuls, who had so superciliously lorded it over them for two decades, eloquently expresses the entirety of the Revolution. The crowd, enraged by sniper fire, invaded the European quarter and began beating Europeans and smashing and pillaging shops, and one suspects some felt they were reappropriating wealth lost to sharp Mediterranean shopkeepers. On Sunday most of the Europeans sought out the cooler suburbs at Ramlah, so looters found their empty houses easy targets. The small number of Europeans helps explain why, despite their firearms, they did not more easily dispatch the Egyptians.⁷⁰ The Europeans huddled in their houses, continuing to snipe at the crowd with revolvers. In this fire two Egyptian gendarmes fell dead, infuriating the other gendarmes, who began firing back at the Europeans. Some Europeans attempted to take refuge with these angry police, finding death instead. The angry Alexandrians chanted religious slogans, such as "O God, succor the Lord of Islam, and destroy the depraved unbelievers!"⁷¹ Late that afternoon army units under the command of the governor of Alexandria moved in to halt the hostilities.⁷² Thousands took part in the collective violence; about fifty Europeans died, and several times that number of Egyptians, perhaps 250.

The wounded included about thirty-six Europeans, thirty-five Egyptians, and two Ottomans.⁷³

Although the Egyptian army thereafter restored tolerable order to Alexandria, tens of thousands of frightened Europeans streamed out of the country. A riot in Cairo on 13 June was narrowly averted by firm police action.⁷⁴ The provinces, with fewer security forces, became the site of several further Euro-Egyptian clashes. On 26 June rioters killed ten Greeks and three Jews in the Lower Egyptian town of Banha. This action, along with the Alexandria events, helped to convince the earl of Dufferin, then in conference with other European diplomats, that he should support Ottoman military intervention (though the British later changed their minds and invaded Egypt themselves).⁷⁵

Although the standard accounts of the riot attribute it to the action of “thugs” (*awbash*) or common laborers, we have already seen that the crowd composition and leadership were quite complex, as is demonstrated from the arrest-list the Egyptians shared with the British foreign office (see Table 9.4). About a quarter of those arrested specifically for involvement in the riot of 11 June belonged to trades usually possessing guilds, and artisanal leaders such as the guildmaster of the tailors played a large political role. A substantial role for skilled tradesmen is discernible in the lists, moreover. Killers of Europeans included such unlikely figures as a seller of sweet beverages (*shurbatli*) and a petition-writer (*‘ardhalji*). The arrest-list included persons from not only low trades such as porters, street-sweepers, and dyers, but also skilled artisans such as carpenters, tailors, and butchers. Status and economic position did not always overlap, moreover. Although a wagoner suffered low social esteem, he often had his own capital in the form of draft animals and his wagon. The list gives no indication of occupation in about a third of instances, so we cannot be sure that a large number of day-laborers was not included. But most of the occupations mentioned suggest that the crowd was composed, not of the unemployed or the entirely unskilled and unorganized day-laborers, but rather of individuals belonging to recognized guilds and possessing at least some skills. Nor was the crowd entirely male. Police arrested nine women for looting or possessing loot, or for “talking sedition,” and ten more for buying it later on (thus, nineteen women were tried, constituting about 9 percent of those accused). Some of these women came from artisan families—one, for instance, stood trial in the same lot with the carpenter mentioned above. The crowd was, moreover, overwhelmingly civilian, despite the support it received from some gendarmes.

Beyond the ordinary tradespeople and laborers, can persons be described who might have constituted a crowd leadership? Hourani’s thesis (discussed in Chapter 7 above)—that premodern Middle Eastern politics derived primarily from the notables—would suggest we look for ulama, heads of garrisons, and landed, secular notables. We find, however, persons of somewhat lesser stat-

TABLE 9.4

Known Occupations of Persons Convicted of Participating in the Alexandria Riot of 11 June 1882, and Subsequent Events in That City

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Elite		
High Officials	2	1
Intelligentsia		
Officials	5	2
Professionals	4	1
Officers	50	17
Clerks and Employees	8	3
Subtotal	67	23
Urban Middle Strata		
Notables	1	–
Quarter Heads	3	1
Merchants, Brokers, Coffeehouse Owners	23	8
Guildmasters, Artisans, Skilled Workers	17	6
Subtotal	44	15
Unskilled Workers and Troops		
Domestic and Menial Workers	15	5
Constabulary and Police	29	10
Army Troops	5	2
Seamen	7	2
Miscellaneous Ethnic and Gender Categories		
Women	19	7
Sudanese	1	–
Nubians	8	3
North Africans	2	1
Syrians	1	–
Europeans	3	1
Subtotal	34	12
Unknown	88	30
Total	291	100

Source: PRO, FO 141/161, “Kashf ‘an bayan al-ahkam al-mutawaqqa‘ah min majlis ‘askariyyah Iskandariyyah ‘ala madhkurin nazaran li ta‘alluqihim bi’l-‘isyan wa ishtirakihim fi al-waqa‘i‘ allati hadathat”; “Officers, non-commissioned officers and men connected with the rebellion, the disturbances of the 11th June and the subsequent events”; “Government employees implicated in the rebellion”; “Civilians implicated in the rebellion”; “Persons implicated in the pillage and massacre of the 11th June and subsequent events.”

ure, not patricians but leaders of the ordinary folk sometimes sprung from their ranks. As we have seen, the military court charged three heads of city quarters (*shaykh al-harah*), accused of inciting rebellion or even taking part in the plundering. The state singled out two guildmasters for indictment. Beyond the workers and workers' organizations, the only other important leadership appears to have derived not from notables, but from the middle classes. Brokers, merchants, professionals, and civil servants appear as the civilian leaders of the rebellion in Alexandria, along with numbers of junior officers.

The vicious British bombardment of Alexandria a month later, on 11 July 1882, led to another round of plundering, since it caused a withdrawal of security forces from the city. Admiral Seymour, who planned the assault, did not bother to make plans for securing the city thereafter. In the confusion, many buildings caught fire, leading to the wholesale destruction of Alexandria. Some alleged that the revolutionaries deliberately burned the city to deny its resources to the invading British. The civilian populace fled on foot or on trains, taking refuge in interior cities. The news of this new outrage provoked anti-European riots in several towns in Lower Egypt. On 13 July in Tanta the guards of the provincial administration helped attack Europeans, and riots occurred. Similar riots erupted in Samanud and Damanhur. In al-Mahallah al-Kubra, an eyewitness reported that the crowd, bearing staffs and sticks, rolled through the quarters shouting slogans and picking up new members. On reaching the commercial district, they shouted, "O merchants, close your shops, for the Christians have begun killing Muslims on the bridge!" Later on the crowd looted stores, especially clothing stores, and in the violence nine Christians died, including three Europeans and six Eastern Orthodox (presumably Levantines). When 'Urabi heard of these riots, he immediately sent troops to restore order, and put trains at the service of Europeans wishing to flee to the coast.⁷⁶ Crowds rioted at a number of villages, as well, as in Kafr az-Zayyat and Shirbin, the latter the site of a very major disturbance, to be discussed below. In Cairo a crowd plundered the mansion of Sultan Pasha, the great notable who collaborated with Tawfiq and the Europeans, and on another occasion a crowd pulled down the statue of Ibrahim Pasha, Tawfiq's grandfather, under the direction of the puritanical Shaykh 'Illaysh.⁷⁷ A final round of rioting occurred on the British invasion of the interior in mid-September. In Mansura, Daqahliyyah province, 117 persons were arrested for "creating disturbances" on 16 September, apparently engaging in a large-scale violent protest of the British invasion.⁷⁸

Neither the British conspiracy theory nor the French suggestion of riotous laborers, then, can account for Alexandria and the other riots. Not generals in Cairo, but guildmasters and quarter heads in Alexandria, seem most implicated as instigators of the collective action. The crowd in Alexandria appears to have contained substantial numbers of skilled artisans, rather than being composed only of the indigent. Both of these observations probably hold for a number of

the other riots as well. Moreover, these conflicts occurred in the context of a history of Euro-Egyptian clashes during the previous two decades, against the background of which they do not appear so unusual, except in scope.

The degree to which these urban movements of collective action hit specifically European or comprador targets stands out starkly. Aside from the Cairo crowd's attack on Sultan Pasha's unoccupied mansion, one is hard put to discern any urban crowd action taken specifically against the khedive and his Ottoman-Egyptian or Egyptian supporters. Even the burning of Alexandria, if deliberate, seems to have been aimed at depriving the British of a useful base of operations, rather than at denying the city to the khedive. As with preindustrial crowds in Europe, hatred of the rich and hatred of foreigners help explain the collective violence.⁷⁹ Hatred of the rich and hatred of foreigners, moreover, had different implications in Africa and Asia during the age of capital than in eighteenth-century London. The foreigners had the upper hand, and were seeking to change the local economy so as to incorporate it into their own industrial capitalism. They brought an increased monetization of the economy, increased wage labor, increased social stratification. They enjoyed extraterritoriality and exemption from most taxes, and they had the ear of the indigenous state. The rich, then, were often also foreign consuls, speculators, and money-lenders, or local persons with links to such groups. This foreign coloration or implication also held true at the lower levels of the "rich," whom the crowd saw more often. Even the successful shopkeepers in Alexandria were often Greek, Italian, or Syrian Christian.

Hatred of the foreigner had many dimensions, one of them the religious, although it is admittedly hard in this instance to separate Christian-Muslim conflict from xenophobia and class conflict. Specifically religious ethnicity and ideology nevertheless did form a background to the riots. Here, the suggestion by Natalie Zemon Davis that preindustrial religious riots represented a kind of vigilante effort may be applicable.⁸⁰ The common folk took it upon themselves to purify their religious environment from outside threats, acting as they thought the civil and ecclesiastical authorities would or should. The Alexandrians, aware of the impasse between 'Urabi and the European Powers, took action themselves on behalf of Islam. Likewise, the European crowd used firearms against the Alexandrians, just as they expected the police or offshore European forces should have done.

The Rural Middle Class and the Peasants

The urban population of Egypt represented only 12 percent or so of the whole in 1882, and we must now turn to the countryside, where the majority of the country's inhabitants dwelt. I will in this discussion treat the village notables and smaller proprietors, as well as peasants (defined as farmers that worked the

land themselves, hiring no nonfamily labor). These rural dwellers had many things in common from the point of view of law, administration, and styles of life, and differed as a group from the Ottoman-Egyptian nobility and from urban dwellers. Village notables and peasants paid taxes on their land at a much higher rate than did the nobles, which incidentally depressed the value of their land in relation to the *'ushuri* estates. The rural Egyptians also enjoyed a cultural solidarity of the autochthonous versus the "foreign" Ottoman-Egyptians, rather as English yeomen resented the "Norman yoke." The village notables stood between the Ottoman-Egyptian aristocracy on the one hand, and the peasants on the other. They often required peasants to render them free labor, some of them encroached on the land of other peasants, and they could be cruel and oppressive tax collectors for the state. Some of them built huge estates in the 1870s.⁸¹ But many among the medium-landowning gentry appear on the whole to have forged an alliance with the peasants in 1882. Given the history of rural revolts in Egypt, a history first systematically established by Gabriel Baer, the resort to collective action in the countryside during the 1882 revolution might have been expected. A weakening of the state and of the military has also been suggested by Theda Skocpol as a frequent contributor to the outbreak of peasant revolt.⁸²

Until the thousands of dossiers on the 'Urabi revolution in the Egyptian National Archives are more thoroughly explored and quantified, it remains difficult to estimate the relative importance of peasant action. The few easily quantifiable indexes we have, such as lists of prisoners and of signatories to the declaration of the khedive's deposition, suggest that rural collective action played a substantially less important role than urban revolutionary activity. Only 13 percent of the signers of the manifesto of 29 July 1882, which declared Tawfiq incompetent to hold his post, consisted of village headmen and provincial notables. Merchants and heads of merchant guilds, in contrast, formed 22 percent of signers, and the urban intelligentsia provided 41 percent. One list of prisoners from the provinces held for trial gives occupations for about sixty-seven persons, and of known occupations on this list village headmen constituted 31 percent. The rural intelligentsia, of officials and ulama, dominated the list at over 50 percent.⁸³ The much more detailed list of provincial cases sent by the Egyptian authorities to the British and translated by Raphael Borg confirms this impression of minority peasant involvement (Table 9.5).⁸⁴ In Minufiyyah, about 8 percent of those arrested appear to have been villagers; in Daqahliyyah, 12 percent. In Qena and Esna most of those arrested derived from towns such as Qus. In Sharqiyyah, only sixteen persons—mostly peasants—were jailed. The only province in which peasants constituted both a large absolute number and a large proportion of total prisoners is Gharbiyyah. There, 18 percent of those incarcerated came from towns or cities in the province (such as Basyun, al-Mahallah al-Kubra, and Zifta). The rest of those charged were apprehended in villages, but by no means all were

TABLE 9.5

Known Occupations of Civilians Charged with Rebellion in Provincial Cases Tried at Cairo (Autumn 1882)^a

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Nobles and Notables		
Member, Chamber of Delegates	1	1
Intelligentsia		
High and Medium Bureaucrats	17	25
Secretaries	7	11
Professionals	2	3
Ulama	8	12
Subtotal	34	51
Merchants, Guildmasters, Quarter Heads	3	5
Village Headmen	21	31
Tribe Leaders and Members	8	12
Total	67	100

Source: DWQ, Mahafiz ath-Thawrah al-'Urabiyyah, 40, dossier 185, "Bayan awraq al-qadaya al-mawjudah bi lajnat at-tahqiq: Qadaya al-aqalim bi misr."

^a The large number of defendants whose occupation was not shown on the list has simply been excluded.

themselves villagers. In Shirbin, where officials took 165 persons into custody after the Revolution had ended, 27 percent of these were village artisans and shopkeepers, or refugees from large cities such as Alexandria, Cairo, and Tanta. Altogether, then, about 65 percent of persons listed in Gharbiyyah as rebels were peasant villagers. We have no returns from Buhayra, but these, even if dominated by peasant arrests, might be offset by those jailed in Damietta, an important urban area for which we also lack an arrest-list. Of course, the question of why Gharbiyyah should have had such a large number of peasant insurgents, as compared to neighboring rural provinces in Lower Egypt, deserves further investigation.

These figures suggest that authorities thought, at least, that urban and rural participation in the Revolution had been more serious than peasant action everywhere but Gharbiyyah. Even outside that rebellious province, however, rural notables and peasants took a significant part in the uprising. Signs of peasant support for 'Urabi's movement have been spotted as early as the spring of 1881, when villagers near Tanta were said to have risen up in support of the officers' demonstration at Qasr an-Nil that February.⁸⁵ Certainly, petitions for the dismissal of the Riyad government circulated widely among village notables in February 1881.⁸⁶ In the summer of 1881, the junior officers got in contact with 'Abdu'llah an-Nadim, and asked him to circulate printed petitions in the countryside. Many village notables signed these petitions, calling for the convening of the chamber of deputies. When, a few months

later, Sharif Pasha came to power, great numbers of village notables came to Cairo carrying copies of two petitions signed by 1,500 village headmen, and they succeeded in meeting with Tawfiq.⁸⁷

As summarized by Schölch, these members of the rural middle class “declared that the world and human society could be ordered lastingly only on the basis of justice and freedom, so that everyone could enjoy security of life and property, freedom of thought and action, and thus genuine happiness and prosperity.” This aim, they thought, could be achieved only through the establishment of a just, consultative government (*hukumah shuriyyah ʿadliyyah*), free from tyranny and speculation. “For this reason, assemblies of people’s representatives had been created in the civilized kingdoms to protect the rights of the community against its government and as a means of carrying out the just orders of this government.” They asked that Tawfiq reconvene the Egyptian chamber of deputies, so that Egyptians might enjoy “rights vis-à-vis the government equal to those of a people’s representatives in civilized Europe.”⁸⁸ Schölch thinks these petitions crucial constitutional documents, since they emanated from the rural notables themselves rather than from European-inspired sources, though he probably understates the importance of urban intermediaries such as an-Nadim in spreading these ideas.

The signing of petitions in support of ʿUrabi printed up by intellectuals and distributed in the countryside, the most frequent sort of peasant and rural middle-class participation, continued with the constitutional crisis of the spring–summer of 1882.⁸⁹ During the revolution rural notables went beyond these tepid petitions, expressing, through their conversations in the village, ideals clearly inimical to the old khedivial order and its property relations. ʿUthman Hasan, headman of the village of Abu Husaybah in El Minya, stood accused of having announced to the peasants that

ʿUrabi and his helpers were completely prepared, and would soon prove victorious, thus achieving such goals as the comfort of the subjects and the return of the *çiftlik* landgrants back to their original villages; the sugar factory would belong to the people, and the lands bought by Talʿat Pasha and Sultan Pasha near his village, from the viceregal lands, would belong to the people, with no compensation given to its owners. He continued in this vein throughout the war.⁹⁰

Barakat notes a concentration of viceregal estates and of great estates owned by magnates such as Sultan Pasha in the province of El Minya, which may have made notables and peasants there especially unhappy with the status quo. Nobles typically built up such estates by expropriating peasant lands.

An almost millenarian rhetoric appears in the dossiers on rural rebellion, and Mikhaʿil Sharubim reports that speculation about a supernatural transformation did indeed abound in this period. The appearance of comets, and the close approach of the Muslim year 1300, provoked the people to listen to the dreams of Sufi mystics and soothsayers with especial attention.⁹¹ In one village

ulama proclaimed that the Muslim scriptures prophesied that ʿUrabi would become ruler of Egypt instead of the khedive, that injustices would be abolished, that “the Europeans and the Turks” would be defeated. ʿUrabi would become king of the Arabs generally, these ulama said, including those in Syria and the Hijaz, and bureaucratic posts in the new state would be filled by the village headmen.⁹² Elsewhere, three villagers were accused of saying that ʿUrabi had become khedive, that government posts would now be open to them instead of to “Turks and Europeans,” and that both the national debt and the debts of the people would be renounced. Another village headman said that the lands of the nobles would be confiscated and made available for homesteading, and the government would be a government of village headmen, not of “Turks.”⁹³

Some rural dwellers went beyond such radical talk. In two instances villagers raided European rod and gun shops for arms and gunpowder, which they sent to the army, and “many of the people made donations from the goodness of their hearts” of livestock and grain to the army for its war effort.⁹⁴ Nathan J. Brown has sharply questioned the idea that peasants made any substantial donations voluntarily, arguing that “contributions” were levied on them by local officials, and they simply acquiesced in this extra tax.⁹⁵ But Brown means by “peasants” only the landless and the smallholders and he in any case does not cite archival evidence in support of his a priori skepticism. Ismaʿil Sarhank, writing long after the revolt failed, was an eyewitness with no obvious reason to lie about rural “people” volunteering aid.

Mustafa Ayyad, the British consular agent in Luxor, reported in mid-June 1882 that the governor of Qena in Upper Egypt attended meetings of village headmen and reported to them that ʿUrabi “is gaining a victory over the foreigners and over the government and on hearing this they of course become encouraged and used the most seditious and frightful language.”⁹⁶ Rural banditry revived in the region on a scale not seen since 1879, making some roads impassable and striking terror into the hearts of merchants and the well-to-do. Ayyad blamed the outburst of banditry on the “weakness” of the pro-ʿUrabi governor, but the crisis of the state had probably produced that weakness. We do not know what the bandits thought of the Revolution, but Hobsbawm’s idea that rural bandits were often in tune with the problems and aspirations of the peasantry may actually apply here.⁹⁷ Their expropriation of the wealthy and of the Europeans mirrored, after all, on a small scale the revolution against the khedive and the more conservative and wealthy Ottoman-Egyptians, along with their European supporters.

The pro-ʿUrabi governor also took a strongly anti-European stance, seeing an invasion as imminent: “The Moudir informs the natives to hold themselves in readiness, as the Europeans intend to occupy their country and will outrage their women, and consequently they are enraged and awaiting to hear of some movement in Cairo. All the Europeans here are confining themselves in

doors.”⁹⁸ An element of Muslim-Christian conflict may have been wrought up with anti-Europeanism, especially in Upper Egypt, where relations between Muslims and Copts were sometimes tense. This local communal element appears lacking in Lower Egypt, where one hears nothing of anti-Coptic as opposed to anti-Levantine sentiment.

From late spring and early summer of 1882, as the political crisis unfolded, some villagers began refusing to pay their debts, especially those contracted from foreigners. In early May 1882, some peasants near Tukh attacked a foreign bill collector and tore up their IOUs. Rural debtors began defaulting on a large scale, and threatened creditors when pressed, leading money-lenders and merchants to flee to the big cities for security.⁹⁹ ‘Urabi had been concerned earlier to reassure Europeans of the safety of their investments, but the conjunctures of peasant renunciations of debt and the British landing pushed him and his colleagues toward a more radical position. The evidence points to ‘Urabi’s support in August for changes in relations of property where the property was owned by Europeans or pro-khedive nobles, and here I take issue with Brown’s assertions to the contrary. In the summer of 1882 the Cairo-based government pledged that peasants would not have to repay their loans contracted from foreigners.¹⁰⁰ This pledge was widely known and was quoted by peasants for several years to exasperated British officials after the institution of the veiled protectorate. The degree of indebtedness to foreign money-lenders may have helped determine which villages supported the Revolution. The headman of Tafaḥ al-Azar told Stuart that he refused to carry out the orders of the ‘Urabi government, adding in the same breath that his village had comparatively little debt, and that he had kept usurers out by lending at lower interest rates to the peasants himself.¹⁰¹ It was not necessary for the state to have a theory of the transformation of property relations for a social revolution to occur, as the French instance demonstrated. There, too, most of the land confiscated came from absentee nobles who fled the country, and its confiscation represented more an attack on the nobility and the clergy than on property. The result, however, was a redistribution of 5 percent of France’s land to the peasantry. It is the result that counts, though we cannot yet put a percentage on the changes in Egypt, which were in any case ephemeral since the revolutionary state lasted only a month and a half.

Some peasants on occasion took decisive action against the persons or property of Egyptian members of the old power elite, as well. In the province of Beni Suef, at the train station of al-Wasiti, a group of peasants recognized an official loyal to Tawfiq who was making a bid to contact the family of the great landlord Sultan Pasha at El Fayum. An eyewitness reported that “he was grabbed by a group of peasants, and he asked me to save him from them. Lo and behold, he was ‘Uthman Bey Ra’fat, the Khedive’s Amirakhur [pipe-bearer].”¹⁰² The peasants delivered him over to the provincial authorities, who, however, released him. Aside from a few such anecdotes, our knowledge of

the specifically political actions taken by peasants remains vague. The charges filed against them on the arrest-list preserved in the British Public Record Office at Kew make it clear that villagers did take some part in the Revolution. Villagers from Killa and Matus in Gharbiyyah, including a village headman and a mosque preacher, were charged with being “associates of rebels.” Khedivial authorities charged villagers from Mahallat Abu ‘Ali, Safiyah, and Kafr Zayat (pop. 1,000) with complicity in massacre, pillage, and inciting to massacre. As noted above, the state arrested 165 residents of the village of Shirbin on the same charges (Table 9.6). Villagers in Minufiyyah were jailed for “assisting rebels, inciting the population and holding seditious language after the defeat of rebels.” Village headmen in Daqahliyyah province were listed as “accomplices of rebels.”¹⁰³ A relatively small proportion of those arrested in the autumn of 1882 derived from villages, but even if peasant action accounted for only 15 or 20 percent of the collective action taken by social groups during the Revolution, these rural actors would remain significant players in the drama.

Brown is perfectly correct that the Revolution was not led by groups with much initial interest in issues such as land reform, and that village headmen appear to have been the primary rural supporters of the Revolution.¹⁰⁴ If we are interested in conjunctures as a means of explanation, however, this point becomes relatively unimportant. Once peasants, led by their headmen, launched

TABLE 9.6

Arrests in the Village of Shirbin, Gharbiyyah Province, Fall 1882

Townsppeople in Village		
Shopkeepers/Peddlars	5	
Artisans	15	
Soldiers	2	
Servant	1	
Official	1	
Tantans	9	
Cairenes	3	
Alexandrians	8	
Subtotal	44	27
Villagers		
From Other Villages	8	
Shirbin Villagers	113	73
Total	165	100

Source: PRO, FO 141/161, “List of persons under arrest in connection with the suppression of the rebellion,” Raphael Borg, Cairo, 14 November 1882. (Shirbin, a village [*qaryah*], served as a rural administrative center [*markaz*] and had a police station ‘Ali Mubarak, *Khitat*, 12:127.)

attacks on European or noble property, revolutionary officials had to side either with the peasants or with those they attacked, leading to a further polarization of politics. The typical protest of peasants against the oppressive and inefficient estates imposed on them by rural magnates takes the form all over the world of the land invasion, especially in regard to hacienda-type estates.¹⁰⁵ During the war with the British in August and September 1882, peasants carried out several such land invasions. In the district of as-Samhah in Buhayra, in the summer of 1882 the village headmen and peasants divided up the *vasiye* estates of nobles among themselves and began raising crops on them. Near Asyut, armed peasants from the village of Dilga attacked a *çiftlik* estate and divided its lands among themselves, planting vegetables. Some peasants, on the other hand, combined such land invasions with an altruistic rhetoric of helping the Revolution, showing a commitment to national political goals along with local economic ones. In Gharbiyyah province, peasants in the village of Qalin, led by their headman, attacked the estate of Haydar Pasha, confiscated his grain crops, and turned them over to the revolutionary authorities. Likewise, armed peasants led by village headmen in Bahtim, Qalyubiyah, invaded the *ib^c adiyah* estate of Muhammad Bey Sidqi, confiscating his crops and livestock, and saying they would present them to the army.¹⁰⁶ Whereas Eric Wolf argues that it was the rural middle class that was most likely to be revolutionary, Jeffery Paige sees an important role for landless peasants. In the instances just mentioned, we see a cooperation among the two. Village notables and peasants jointly invaded the large estates and divided the land among themselves.¹⁰⁷

As ever more Ottoman-Egyptian nobles fled to Istanbul, ‘Urabi himself is said to have laid before the council of ministers a proposal that all the property of those fleeing should be confiscated.¹⁰⁸ If he did take it, the general’s action undoubtedly came in response to, and as an attempt to accommodate, peasant land invasions. In some instances, peasants took possession of land that had come into European hands, often through foreclosures on peasant debt and by the instrumentality of the Mixed Courts. Some peasants in Manfalut divided lands owned by Europeans among themselves.¹⁰⁹ In Kafr Abusir, about ten miles from Cairo, two British subjects had to flee when former employees, whom they had dismissed, attacked their house at night. In their absence, the village headman divided up their property among the villagers, and began cutting down trees on it. “The same Shaikh has been very violent in his language for some time past, declaring that on the first cannon-shot from the Citadel all European property in Egypt will be given up to pillage.”¹¹⁰ Much of the peasant collective action visible in the arrest-list of fall 1882 had to do with pillaging European establishments and attacking Europeans or their compradors, and many anti-European actions broke out after the British bombardment of Alexandria on 11 July.

Finally, large numbers of peasants put their lives on the line by serving in

the army. Since inhabitants of Cairo and Alexandria had been exempted from conscription until 1880, most Egyptian troops were peasants in uniform. Peasant soldiers played a key role throughout the political crisis, as for instance when they came to 'Urabi's aid on 9 September 1881. Barakat argues that in the summer of 1882 many peasants volunteered to fight for the common-law government, citing documents indicating that in July, 2,000 persons volunteered from Girga in Upper Egypt. In El Minya a villager with an al-Azhar degree convinced 2,600 peasants to join the military forces at Kafr ad-Dawar.¹¹¹ Brown, again, challenges the likelihood that peasants suddenly were seized by a desire to serve in the military, and suggests they were actually conscripted by provincial officials.¹¹² The wording of Barakat's archival documents, however, does indicate that private persons such as the village Azharite played a role in convincing villagers to join up, undermining Brown's argument that local officials simply dragooned hapless peasants. Dragooning no doubt occurred, but simple skepticism cannot establish any particular case one way or another.

The village headmen, enjoying prestige and often elected by their peasants, could easily coordinate on a local level for collective action. The spread of the telegraph, railroad lines, and newspaper distribution in the 1860s and 1870s allowed villages far apart to keep abreast of key political intelligence. Some headmen developed an almost chiliastic faith in the Revolution, foreseeing the rise of an Arab kingdom or khedivate, and the opening up of government jobs at all levels to the sons of village notables. This visionary rhetoric may have played a key role in the political culture of the countryside. Many among the rural middle class expressed political support for the Revolution by donating grain and livestock to the army, and at least some peasants probably volunteered for military service. Other villagers acquiesced in the extra taxes and conscription the war effort entailed, rather than fighting for the Old Regime as French peasants in the west did during the Vendée. The village notables and peasants took other actions, however, that suggest a social content to their aspirations. They refused to pay back foreign creditors, placing in jeopardy millions of pounds of investment capital. They sometimes invaded the large estates of the Revolution's primary class enemies, the European bourgeoisie and the Ottoman-Egyptian big agrarian capitalists. The prospect of dividing up these lands may have been a leading motive for cooperation between the rural middle strata and poorer peasants. In those provinces controlled by the common-law government no military force existed hostile to peasant interests. Under these circumstances the village notables essentially controlled the major resources of the rural areas, including foodstuffs, livestock and beasts of burden, communications, transportation routes, and manpower, and the headmen often put these at the service of the insurgent state.

The descriptive approach taken by most writers to the politics of the major social groups during the Revolution has obscured key analytical and quantita-

tive questions. What proportion of peasants actively supported the Revolution? How many land invasions occurred, exactly? If we judge by the arrest-lists, peasant and rural-notable action appears no more important than that taken by the guilds and the crowd in urban areas. At this point it is impossible to say whether this result derives from bias among those making the arrests, or whether it accurately reflects the proportional contributions of urban and rural groups to the Revolution. It is fair to say, however, that even on the basis of present evidence we may discern an important role for the rural population in the Revolution, and that at least some of their collective action had overtones of a social revolution.

The Egyptian revolution of 1882 entailed both a conflict between social strata and a protonationalist struggle. Let us begin with the issue of social conflict. Forty-one percent of the signers of the manifesto of 29 July, essentially deposing the khedive, derived from the intelligentsia, and 80 percent of those arrested in Cairo by the khedivial forces after the British occupation also came from this stratum. Many members of the intelligentsia had powerful material interests in the overthrow of the ancien regime. Officials found themselves blocked by Ottomans from the highest posts, and increasingly having to compete for middle management positions with Syrians and Europeans. The junior officers faced massive military cuts and the permanent exclusion of indigenous Egyptians from the officer corps, primarily because of the mortgaging of half the national budget to debt-servicing of European loans. Professionals and intellectuals likewise felt increasing competition from Europeans and Syrian Christians, and changes in the cultural and legal structure such as the introduction of Mixed Courts favored the foreigners. The ulama feared a further erosion of their influence, already much reduced by Muhammad 'Ali, with the rise of what they saw as Christian hegemony over Egypt. A dictatorial role for the army in the Revolution seems unconfirmed in this survey of collective action by the major social groups. Although the insubordination of the armed forces allowed ordinary Egyptians to act in ways they normally could not have, civilians plainly took the initiative in many instances. The military officers appear as only one segment of an intelligentsia that broadly supported the Revolution, at least after 9 September 1881.

The intelligentsia had a whole arsenal of resources that they could bring into play against the Europeans and the Ottoman-Egyptian elite that had allied with them. The Arabophone junior officers employed their ethnic relationship with the peasant soldiers to subvert the military to their cause. The intellectuals put their media, such as newspapers and telegraph, at the service of the common-law government. The ulama employed their mosque networks and the officials their control over the bureaucracy. Although no precise data are available, a majority of the rebellious intelligentsia appear to have had their origins in the rural notable class, deriving from the families of village headmen. On the other

hand, most of them had left the villages long behind, and they usually acted as urban, literate individuals seeking the interests of the intellectuals, officers, bureaucrats, or ulama. Some of the ulama in Cairo and other centers may have had longer urban roots, and some of the intellectuals, such as 'Abdu'llah Nadim, came from an artisan background. The prominence of the intelligentsia, of course, comes as no surprise, and this finding accords with that of Miroslav Hroch for the small nations of Europe: "interest in national agitation was at its greatest among the highest category of professional groups, which was as yet accessible to the members of the oppressed nationality."¹¹³

The next important group, the artisans' and merchants' guilds, has on the whole been slighted by historians. I see them, however, as central to its course and outcome. Several authors, including John Walton, have recently argued for the importance of townspeople in revolutions and in nationalism, against theorists who give the primacy to peasants.¹¹⁴ The merchants' guilds often differed in their material interests from the artisans' guilds, but in this period of transition to capitalism these urban petty commodity producers and marketers still had much in common. Above all, both merchants and artisans often felt themselves hurt by the new European dominance. Egyptian goldsmiths, who had to pay steep taxes, felt unable to compete with European goldsmiths, who were exempted by extraterritoriality from such imposts. Egyptian cotton brokers felt that the European merchants had been able to buy their way into a dominant position, even suborning the weighers and measurers. The influx of European textiles appears to have hurt tailors and other textile-related guilds. All paid relatively high taxes in order to defray debt-servicing to European financiers, while Europeans in Egypt went untaxed.

The merchants provided much-needed financial resources to the common-law government, and could collect and funnel the money easily because of their guild organizations. The artisans contributed what they could, mainly manpower and skills. Wagoners provided transport to the military, and guildsmen helped build fortifications. The workers' guilds provided a network of communications and group decision-making that allowed them to call out a crowd for demonstrations and collective action when needed. Women probably played their most important role in such actions of the crowd, and were able, obviously, to draw on feminine networks of communication and solidarity about which we know too little. We do know women were later arrested for looting and for "talking sedition." The guilds' organizational ability probably accounts for the manner in which the restored khedivial government branded Hasan al-Misri, guildmaster of the tailors, as a "Great Rebel" once it had apprehended him in the fall of 1882. The elective practices of the guilds promoted among their members a sense of the justice of representative institutions, and the injustice of despotic ones. The urban guilds provided a quarter of the signers of manifesto of 29 July (mostly merchants), and at least a quarter of those arrested in Alexandria in connection with the rebellion and riot there

(mostly service, transportation, and artisanal workers). They therefore vied in significance with the intelligentsia.

The village headmen and the peasants had an interest in halting the European encroachments on their land going on under the auspices of the Mixed Courts, in reversing the Ottoman-Egyptian encroachments that had already been accomplished under the auspices of Isma'îl. They also desired to get free of their increasing indebtedness to foreigners and Levantines, and to see the tax breaks given to nobles and to Europeans extended to themselves. The chiliastic speculations of wandering mystics combined with celestial phenomena, the approach of the Islamic year 1300, and rumors of the rise of a Mahdi, or Muslim messiah in the Sudan, to create a culture of visionary expectations among many rural dwellers. A few expected Khedive 'Urabi to unite the Arabs. The rural middle class and peasants had a different relationship to each member of the dual elite. Village notables and peasants wanted the nobles' land, not only because it had often once been theirs, but because they knew they could far outproduce the nobles on it. They had needed the European money-lenders, but saw them as usurers and were in great alarm at the new European instrument of mortgage foreclosure, a practice that contravened their Egyptian-Islamic norms. Village notables provided 13 percent of the signatures on the manifesto of 29 July, and rural dwellers constituted about 23 percent of those arrested in the fall of 1882 according to available arrest-lists (that is, excluding Buhayra and Damietta). The vast majority of peasant arrests, however, came from Gharbiyyah province (especially the village of Shirbin), and several of the collective actions they took against nobles' estates occurred in El Minya, a province with a concentration of large estates. According to such crude indices, villagers participated in the Revolution slightly less than guilds, and there is no evidence for the revolt being overwhelmingly a peasant affair. Most important, the counter-revolution was provoked, not primarily by peasant debt renunciation and a few land invasions, but by the urban crowds' clashes with Europeans and attacks on European property.

The Revolution, then, united elements of the intelligentsia, the urban guilds, and the villagers against the dual elite of the Ottoman-Egyptians and the Europeans (and their compradors). The two latter groups possessed special privileges related to taxation and to the acquisition of posts in the government. Both groups vastly increased their landholdings in the 1870s and early 1880s, at the expense of the peasants, and both made plays for increased dominance or monopoly in various state institutions (the Ottoman-Egyptians in the military, the Europeans in the bureaucracy). In a subsistence economy with slow population growth, the nobles' privileges might not have provoked revolt. Even the European role looked suddenly different in the years after 1862. The Capitulations were originally granted quite willingly by Ottoman authorities in order to create a legal space for the operation of European merchants and diplomats in their realm. On the one hand, enhanced rates of population

growth increased competition for land after 1850. On the other, the cotton boom and the advent of large-scale agrarian capitalism in Egypt served as a relentless machine that concentrated wealth in the hands of both the nobles and the Europeans on an unprecedented scale. The privileges of the dual elite were not symmetrical, of course, which in itself helps explain some anomalies. Whereas the Ottoman-Egyptians paid low taxes on land, the Europeans were supposed to pay a land tax. Ottoman-Egyptians had no special advantage in urban trade, whereas the European merchants and workers in urban areas paid little to the Egyptian government. The urban guilds and crowd, unlike the intelligentsia and the peasants, especially targeted the Europeans, without taking any major action against the Ottoman-Egyptians. The intelligentsia, on the other hand, acted against the interests of both segments of the hegemonic elite, as did the peasants.

Finally, this struggle of social classes occurred within the framework of a protonationalist conflict. The three insurgent groups were united not only by material interests conflicting with those of the dual elite, but also by a sense of ethnic and territorial solidarity. This complex ethnicity involved Arabic language and Egyptian regional patriotism, and both Islam and Coptic Christianity played a part in it. The Europeans offered the starkest symbol of the Other, sharing none of these elements at all. The Syrian Christians could be excluded on the basis of everything but Arabic language, and even there they spoke a different dialect (contrary to the arguments of Adib Ishaq). The Ottoman nobles fit only one of these categories, in their Islam. But Egyptians perceived the Turcophone officials' acquiescence in European hegemony to rob them even of this common element, rendering the Ottoman nobles only pseudo-Muslims or even apostates. The Circassians had largely become Arabophone, and many claimed to be descendants of the Prophet, and therefore ultimately Arabs themselves. Perhaps because of this ethnic ambiguity, the Circassians split, some supporting the common-law government and others the khedive. The intelligentsia suffered worst from the ethnic stranglehold of the Ottomans on the top positions, and so adopted most noticeably a rhetoric of regional patriotism. The villagers on the whole had less patriotic and more economic motivations for action, though even some headmen clearly had adopted a language of Arab autonomy.

Each of the three challenger strata had a powerful interest on a national scale in the elimination of the privileges enjoyed by the Europeans and the Ottoman-Egyptians, insofar as this exceptionalism was left over from an Old Regime, estates-type society, and fit increasingly poorly with the emergent agrarian capitalism. Village notables who had become cash-crop entrepreneurs saw the tax privileges of the nobles as not merely a signal of inequality, but an impediment to accumulation. Artisans attempting to compete with imported European goods and even large numbers of imported European artisans found in the latter's tax privileges not merely a sign of the monarch's determination to

protect foreigners, but a vital threat to their ability to compete in the marketplace. The changing meaning of the privileges, and their altered economic effects, under conditions of incorporation into the capitalist world economy as a producer of cash crops helped cause the conflagration as well.

Material interests, organizational abilities and resources, and cultural conceptions and discourse together go a long way in explaining how and why the Revolution occurred. Leaving out any one of these three elements, I believe, would substantially reduce explanatory cogency. The actors' ability to articulate a discourse that challenged the hegemonic idiom of Ottoman-khedivial rule proved just as crucial for mobilization as their use of organizational infrastructures, such as guilds, mosques, peasant councils, and the clubs of the intellectuals. A variety of ideologies coexisted among the allied challengers, of course, from Islamic irredentism to an incipient Arab patriotism. These ideologies cut across class lines, with some intellectuals committed to an Islamic diction, and some peasants dreaming of an Arab king, though on the whole the intelligentsia advocated regional patriotism and the rural mosques resounded with calls for holy war. Finally, the way in which the events of the Revolution occurred, their sequence and the reactions they set up, helped determine its course. It is time to explore the significance of conjuncture.

Conclusion

THIS BOOK has focused mainly on structure, organization, and ideology so far, in analyzing the manner in which segments of a troika of social strata formed a vague alliance against Egypt's dual elite of Ottoman-Egyptians and Europeans. Structure, in my view, counts for a great deal in dynamic systems; yet what makes them so unpredictable is the interaction of small individual events with large complex patterns, an interaction that alters the patterns themselves in unexpected ways. Although both are useful, I find greater value in Theda Skocpol's work in her stress on conjuncture (which she tends to hide in her footnotes), than in her approach to social structures (which she highlights in her text).¹ The events of the Egyptian Revolution demonstrated not a simple dialectic between two major classes, but a swirling eddy of turbulence encompassing a most diverse cross-section of the population. Not only structural preconditions but also nonlinear, unpredictable escalations of small events into large ones proved crucial for the course of the Revolution.

The final explanatory gesture to which I will here appeal derives, then, from a conjuncturalist approach. Skocpol contends that the fundamental tension in Old Regime states lies not between the bourgeoisie and the landed classes, but rather in a conflict of producing classes with dominant classes and states.² In Egypt the state did come into conflict with the producing classes, partially as a result of the debt crisis, and partially under the influence of a dual elite that benefited from state taxation and other policies. The subaltern classes, then, developed an interest in displacing the ruling elites. In a revolution against an informally colonized state with its dual elite, a broad multiclass coalition of producers, marketers, those in the service sector, and the intelligentsia comes to believe that a foreign elite has hijacked the state for its own purposes, in cooperation with the local magnates. The members of the coalition blame the state for policies such as raises in taxes, price controls, reductions in force in the bureaucracy and military, the hiring of foreign experts at high salaries, and foreign acquisition of local property, and they develop an opposition to the elites who control the state on the grounds of their subservience to foreign interests.

In Egypt, important elements among the intelligentsia, guilds, and peasants rebelled against either the Ottoman-Egyptian agrarian capitalists, or against the expatriate Europeans, or against both. Within the intelligentsia, for instance, the middle management in the bureaucracy appears to have feared losing jobs to Europeans and Syrian Christians much more than it resented the Ottoman-Egyptian hammerlock on the highest state offices. On the other

hand, the junior officers from a small-landholding background resented the privileges of the nobles much more than they did those of the Europeans. The junior officers saw European influence as baneful primarily because the foreigners had caused a huge reduction in the military, thus limiting their careers and those of their clients. Although the merchants and merchant guilds in Egypt participated in the Revolution, they appear mainly to have directed their energies against their European competitors. Their antagonism toward the Ottoman-Egyptians derived, not from resentment of the land-tax privileges enjoyed by the latter, but from the nobles' contracting of an alliance with European merchants, financiers, importers, and speculators. Artisans, too, seemed more upset about the impact of European capitalism and of immigrant European merchants and workers than about the taxes levied on them by the indigenous elite. The village notables, in a few instances, set their sights on the great landlords and the khedivial state, though even the villagers conducted a good deal of its collective action against Europeans and European property. The dual elite was so closely intertwined in interests, however, that opposition to either on the part of a challenger ultimately led to conflict with both.

Despite the many differences between an independent Old Regime state and a government incorporated into an informal empire, many of the conjunctures Skocpol finds crucial to the unfolding of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions also figure in this Egyptian one. First, lost foreign wars and fiscal dilemmas clearly did weaken the Egyptian state.³ The disastrous Ethiopian war of 1876 hurt the treasury and badly weakened the faith of the Arabophone junior officers in their Ottoman-Egyptian staff command. The loss of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78, in which Egyptian troops participated, further hurt military morale. The debt crisis and the establishment of the Franco-British Dual Control led to a massive demobilization of Egyptian troops and a reduction of the armed forces in 1879, first to 18,000, and then to 12,000. The slots for officers shrank so alarmingly that Ottoman-Egyptians grew loathe to share them with Arabophone Egyptians, engineering new regulations that would freeze the latter permanently out of the officer corps. This ethnic exclusion provoked petitions, secret organizations, and finally riots and demonstrations among the Arabophone officers in the military, badly splitting it. The external debt crisis led the khedives to abolish privileges, not among the nobles, but among the notables. The *ser-tuccars* or head merchants of each city began having to pay taxes. The khedive's government reneged on the tax relief given village headmen in the 1870s in return for the payment of six years' taxes in advance (the *muqabalah*). The state simultaneously lost the support of the village notables, who felt cheated by the restoration of high taxes, and of their sons in the officer corps, who felt blocked from career advancement. We do not find a similar diminution of the Ottoman-Egyptian elites' privileges, but the rural notables had become sufficiently important in

the state administration that their alienation had serious implications for its ability to function normally.

The weakened army, riven with ethnic and class infighting, allowed other sectors of the society to act in insubordinate ways they previously avoided. The seminary demonstrations that provoked the deposition of the Hanafi Shaykhu'l-Islam, the increasing refusal of peasants to pay their European and Levantine creditors, the flurry of evening meetings and seditious talk in the cities, all signaled a civil society liberated from fear of sudden and ruthless repression. As I have argued, once the security apparatuses are weakened, the challenger strata need perceived interests, a fairly high degree of social organization, means of communication, and a uniting discourse to take advantage of the situation. I disagree with any vision of all workers and peasants as perpetually poised to revolt successfully as soon as the state lifts its repression a bit. It is here that the Goldstone thesis becomes important, for we have noted the shift in population increases every year from five per 1,000 at the beginning of the century to twelve per 1,000 from the late 1840s, helping create greater competition for land and for lucrative government posts, as well as high price inflation. More decisive for the revolution of 1882, however, were other socio-economic developments such as overtaxation and the rise of private property in land, of village councils and elections, and of keener competition by villagers with nobles and Europeans for land (driven not only by population increases, but also by increased land values owing to cash-cropping).

The displacement of many guilds by the impact of capitalism, technology, and European competition, the scramble for jobs and the price inflation caused by population growth, high taxes, along with advances in the sophistication of guild organization, both impelled and allowed guilds to act collectively once the police and army were weakened. The intellectuals, too, increasingly had to compete with Europeans for posts, and had developed political clubs and secret societies that each linked hundreds of them together. All such organizational ability on a national scale presumed, of course, the innovations in communication, urbanization, and transportation that marked the 1860s and 1870s. The elective and consultative practices introduced from 1865 among peasants and guildsmen, moreover, helped create a popular constituency for this style of government at a national level. Among the elite and intellectuals, the example of the Young Ottoman movement and the short-lived constitutional period of 1876–78 in the Ottoman Empire proved an important precedent. Elective and representative government had the further advantage, in the eyes of many among the populace, of being more impermeable to further claims on resources from the local European elite than khedivial despotism had been.

The two wings of the dual elite reacted differently to the reform movement of the challengers. Whereas the Ottoman-Egyptians dreaded the rise of Arabophone Egyptian power in the form of the junior officers, the middle bureau-

crats, and above all the elected chamber of deputies, they consistently backed down when pressed. Tawfiq did not act decisively against rioting officers in February 1881, in part because he was forbidden from surreptitiously doing so by the European consuls, who feared tainting the European members of the cabinet with covert action against the army. Tawfiq later gave in to the junior officers' demand for elections and a new cabinet in the fall of 1881. The Ottoman-dominated Sharif cabinet accepted defeat and fell when it refused to devolve entire authority over the uncommitted half of the budget to the chamber. Egyptian officers such as ʿUrabi became major-generals, and employed their new rank to have others of their ethnicity promoted, infuriating hard-line Circassian staff officers and provoking them to an attempted coup. The failure of this coup marked the end of any serious obstacles to the emergence of the notables' sons as coequal partners in the officer corps and highest administrative ranks.

Some among the European partners of Egyptian elite, on the other hand, hardly reacted so sanguinely to these developments. I have sought to avoid easy generalizations about the "Europeans," who were in fact a very mixed group. Expatriates differed among themselves, and argued with their foreign ministers back in the metropole. For our purposes here, however, it will be useful to focus on French and British official actions in Egypt and in Paris and London, since these had the greatest consequence. In the fall of 1881 the French took a hard line, and, with the British, made Sharif swear to abide by international agreements before allowing him to assume office as cabinet president. The pledge he made to the foreigners, as much as his Ottoman pride in the face of "peasants," explains his opposition to giving the reins of the budget into the chamber's hands. After the chamber began demanding control over the budget, the British and French issued their first "joint note," affirming their support for Tawfiq, a coded manner of declaring their opposition to the chamber assuming final power over fiscal issues. Thereafter, however, a new, less hawkish French government came to power, and British comptroller Auckland Colvin emerged in Cairo as the major exponent of a hard line, the representative of the expatriate merchants and officials. The British consul general, Sir Edward Malet, pressed the khedive to oppose the exile of the Circassian plotters to the Sudan, helping provoke a constitutional crisis. When the khedive, negotiating through a recalled chamber, looked as if he might compromise over the sentencing issue, the British and French presented their infamous joint note of 25 May 1882, demanding the dismissal of the al-Barudi government and the one-year ostracism of the activist officers, seeking to make Tawfiq act decisively against his new partners in government. Popular support for ʿUrabi from the ulama and the guilds, however, helped sway the khedive to reinstate him as minister of war. Only in late June did Tawfiq cease equivocating about whether to throw in with the reformers or the British, by which time he was imploring the British admiralty to bombard Alexandria. For most of the crisis,

the state was pulled in opposite directions by the hard-line Europeans and the 'Urabists, with the Ottoman-Egyptians in the middle.

The intervention of the French and British governments demonstrates a paradox of client states under informal imperialism or neocolonialism. On the one hand, the state's relationship to the foreign power(s) gives state actors a sense of independence from the populace of the country. Tawfiq declined to call the chamber of deputies into session in the winters of 1879 and 1880 and instituted Draconian censorship partially because he knew that he had the backing of the European cabinet members and their governments. He resisted the 1881–82 chamber's demands for fiscal control, not only because the Europeans did not want it, but because he felt the support of the foreigners obviated any need for him to depend on the social groups represented in the chamber (mainly the large property-owning rural middle class along with a few heads of merchant guilds). Tawfiq's revocation of the tax breaks to the village notables likewise indicated that he thought them negligible politically. That he did not take the discontents of his junior officers more seriously also seems odd. In an agrarian state such as Egypt, the khedive could not have imagined he had such independence from key social sectors like these without his strong foreign connection. On the other hand, the foreign connection came at a price. The foreigners not only made the state feel relatively independent of the public, but they suggested, for their own purposes, the implementation of wildly unpopular policies. Client states are, then peculiarly vulnerable to riot and revolution, because they are easily perceived as kowtowing to foreign interests rather than serving local subjects or citizens, and because they are often wrapped in the illusion of invulnerability generated by their connection with a powerful foreign patron, which makes them unwilling to trade horses with disgruntled local forces.

The opposition of most British men on the spot to the changes in the status quo derived primarily from their realization that the reformers intended to curtail not only the privileges of the local elite, but also of the European one. As we have seen, in October 1881, a French newspaper editor had to flee the country after maligning the Prophet Muhammad, with death threats flying about his head. His fate forcefully signaled the end of a privileged European discourse in Egypt. The rising nativist feelings began interfering with British investment in the provinces as early as November 1881, indicating a threat to European money-making prerogatives in Egypt. A chamber empowered to pass budgets could conceivably fire the 1,300 European civil servants on the Egyptian rolls at high salaries. Colvin, the highest-ranking of these expatriates, defended their corporate interests as British comptroller for the Dual Control (a cabinet-level post, though without voting rights). He wrote the dispatches from Egypt for the *Pall Mall Gazette*, Gladstone's favorite newspaper, and wielded great influence over Sir Edward Malet, the British consul general. Colvin and Malet worried that the chamber of duties would create deficits in

its half of the budget that might impinge on the state's ability to ear-mark the other half for debt-servicing. The villagers' increasingly bold refusal to repay their private debts ("business transactions between natives and foreigners are affected") certainly created financial anxieties throughout the resident expatriate European community, of which the consuls formed a tightly knit part. The new daring of the villagers probably also played a part in turning the Ottoman-Egyptians and the upper strata of Egyptian notables, occupied by Sultan Pasha and many of his colleagues in the chamber of duties and rural administrative offices, against the reform movement. Villagers' actions before the summer of 1882 remain poorly documented, however, and the reaction to them is even less clear.

The onus of explanation for the emergence of a revolutionary situation in June–July 1882 must fall not on peasant protest or revolt, but on the collective action of urban crowds. Here my conjunctural explanation differs from that of Skocpol, which is fine, since mine is a different sort of revolution. She argues that historians have been mistaken to concentrate on urban lower-class actions in the great modern revolutions, that peasant revolts were much more crucial.⁴ The divisions within the ruling elite and within the state produced by falling behind foreign competitors, she asserts, makes it impossible for security apparatuses to monitor and control the peasants in the accustomed manner, and they take advantage of the situation to reclaim land from the nobles. Peasant action in turn creates a further split in the ruling class, with conservative landlords opposing this spontaneous "land reform" and reformists embracing the peasants' cause and shifting to the left. The irreconcilable divorce between conservatives and reformists over the peasant issue finally paralyzes the Old Regime state and allows a new, revolutionary bureaucratic elite to emerge from the margins of the old administrative families, which creates a mass-incorporating bureaucracy and weakens the conservative great landlords by redistributing significant amounts of their land (5 percent in the French instance) to the peasants.

We so far know of only a few peasant land invasions in Egypt, however, and these took place in July and August, too late to serve as the linchpin of revolutionary causation even if many more of them occurred than historians have so far discovered. For the European half of the dual elite, however, certainly the 11 June Euro-Egyptian riot proved pivotal in their decision to take decisive action against the Egyptians. Many European consuls and journalists imaginatively transformed the riot into a willful massacre of Christians, premeditated and planned out by 'Urabi himself. The American ambassador believed the *Times* correspondent (a British merchant of large property) actively and dishonestly colluded in the creation of this false impression. The Ottoman negotiator Derviş Pasha "reported on attempts by European Consuls to heighten tension in Egypt by distributing handbills among the Christian population encouraging them to flee Egypt."⁵ The local population feared that the Europeans

were clearing the ground for a bombardment of Alexandria. The consuls and journalists thus bear a great deal of blame for exacerbating tensions. Some 50,000 Europeans immediately left the country, overcrowding all available passenger transport; by July one receives the impression that hardly a European remained in Egypt, out of the 90,000 residing there before the crisis. This precipitate flight was perceived by imperial diplomats and officers to damage European prestige, and of course it placed in grave danger all European property and investments in the country. The Alexandria riot almost certainly came about spontaneously, and it was not desired by the 'Urabist officers or bureaucracy. It created an unexpected conjuncture that led to multiple sovereignty and then war between Egypt and Great Britain.

Ironically, much more energy has been expended in explaining why the British opposed the reformers and invaded Egypt than in explaining why the Revolution occurred. As noted in the introduction, the classic account, *Africa and the Victorians*, claims only to examine the motives of British officials. In fact, of course, it puts forward a theory of the "imperialism of free trade," the statesman Palmerston's policy of employing trade and influence to guard strategic resources in the Near East, rather than formal colonization. The authors suggest, without resolving them, several contradictory theories about the objective impact of the imperialism of free trade. In one version, referred to in the introduction, "Moslem conservatism and Russian intrigue blocked every attempt at liberal reform; and as a result the technique of the collaborating class did not work."⁶ The impenetrability of Islamic immobility, in this view, prevented Palmerstonian "free trade" from working its magic. The authors have another vision, however, writing that by "1881 the khedivate was going the way of many Oriental regimes eroded by the penetration of European influences."⁷ In this view, Palmerstonian free trade did in fact penetrate stagnant Islamic Egypt, but the Oriental system could not sustain the penetration, collapsing like a rape victim put into shock. Finally, they suggest that the Egyptian crisis "stemmed from what were essentially indigenous African disturbances."⁸ To maintain at the same time that "Moslem conservatism" blocked attempts at liberal reform and prevented the formation of a collaborating class, yet that the imperialism of free trade so successfully co-opted the khedives as to cause the collapse of the system, involves an obvious inconsistency. The further assertion that 1882 was an essentially indigenous disturbance seems to deny both the previous formulations and to suggest the irrelevance of the imperialism of free trade as an explanatory concept in approaching the Egyptian crisis. Of course, the account also ignores the way in which the primary opposition to liberal reforms such as the chamber of deputies elected late in 1881 came from the British themselves. In fact, the debt crisis does not appear to have grown out of Palmerstonian free trade practices. The gouging and charging of exorbitant interest rates and "service fees" engaged in by the European banks that loaned the Egyptian government so much money are surely not

what Palmerston had in mind when he spoke of free trade. The privileged position of Europeans in Egypt, who were exempted from most taxes, virtually immune from prosecution for crime, and supported by the military might of their respective imperial states, sounds a great deal more like mercantilism than free trade. The same may be said of the manner in which Britain and France intervened as states to ensure the Egyptian payment of debt-servicing, rescuing the European bondholders and creditors from any risk they might have incurred in lending to Khedive Isma'îl. To the extent that European actions and institutions had anything to do with provoking the reform movement, an anachronistic European mindset of mercantilism, in which the state backs up commercial enterprises and seeks monopolies and privileges for its subjects, seems more to blame than "free trade."

A. G. Hopkins insightfully reviewed the literature on the British occupation of Egypt produced in the 1970s and 1980s to show the ways in which the Robinson and Gallagher account fails, even by its own lights.⁹ He shows that British policy-makers under the conservatives insisted much more stridently on Egypt paying its debts, whatever the domestic cost, than Robinson and Gallagher recognize, thus becoming part and parcel of the oppressive khedivial regime. These authors also fail to recognize the huge influx of foreign private capital and capital goods into Egypt after 1876, and the increasingly commanding position of the European expatriates resident in that country. No Britisher in a position of power in the spring–summer of 1882 thought the Suez Canal in any real danger from the 'Urabists, so that Robinson and Gallagher's odd characterization of the Egyptian Revolution as a "Suez crisis" seems especially inappropriate (protecting the canal formed no more than an *ex post facto* justification by politicians for the occupation). The Egyptian state did not collapse in May–June 1882, and even in the Alexandria riot it moved to restore order fairly quickly. Of course, an impression of anarchy may have been created, but it is suspicious that this impression made its greatest impact on politicians already set on a jingoist course. Finally, Robinson and Gallagher do not take account of the influence of hawks like Hartington, on the cabinet, and Dilke (undersecretary of the foreign office) off it, in the Gladstone government.

The Robinson–Gallagher thesis that the British were sucked into Egypt by instability employs loaded terminology and an inappropriate metaphor. They correctly identify Egypt as part of Britain's informal empire (shared, of course with the Ottomans, French, and others in the vague way that informal empire allows). Thereafter they exempt the agents of informal empire, the men on the spot, from any conscious, active role in the crisis. The Europeans simply served, like acid, unwittingly to corrode Egypt's Ottoman social system. Yet the very idea of informal empire would predict that the expatriates had as much to defend as the Ottoman-Egyptians themselves. The enmity of the expatriates, of course, did not in itself guarantee that 'Urabî would be viewed with hostility

in Whitehall. But several of Gladstone's ministers, especially Hartington, inclined to the hawkish side, and the propaganda of the men on the spot helped convince several more of the need for action. The weakening of the Egyptian state because of conflicts within the army and between the cabinet and the khedive allowed not instability or anarchy, but the emergence of a new order that did not grant prerogatives to Europeans and European property. The expatriates wanted British troops to come in, not to restore order (relatively little disorder existed), but to block a process of state formation that would exclude the Europeans.

The refusal of peasants to pay back usurious loans, and the manner in which the Alexandria crowd fought back when faced with the superior firepower of European rioters, underlined the sea change. Several times as many Egyptians died on 11 June as did Europeans, and the riot might best be characterized as a "massacre" of unarmed Muslims by armed Christians. Yet the powerful European expatriates put their own interpretation on the event, seeing Egyptian-inspired anarchy everywhere. In fact, of course, Alexandria and Banha, virtually the only instances of genuine civil disorder in June, each lasted for only a few hours, when Egyptian government forces suppressed the violence. The riots themselves differed little from the sorts of urban strife that recurred in Egypt throughout the previous two decades, except in the magnitude of loss of life in Alexandria (attributable primarily to European use of firearms against civilians and gendarmes, leading the latter to return fire).

How, then, were the expatriates able to get their way with Gladstone's liberal government? Schölch employs the micropolitical analyses characteristic of the official mind school of imperial studies to uphold the "bond-holders" thesis. He demonstrates that European diplomats, investors, speculators, and merchants resident in Egypt, worried about their property or influence, created through diplomatic dispatches and the press an image of the 'Urabists as dire threats to European interests in the minds of many in the cabinet.¹⁰ Schölch, however, may go too far in denying substantial changes during the spring and summer of 1882, since he depends on dispatches from the German consul general who mainly had his eye on the central administration in Cairo. He ignores the deteriorating authority of European merchants and money-lenders in the countryside, and the implications of crowd action in Alexandria. Schölch is right to dismiss the charge of anarchy, but he appears to have missed a genuine transformation—the decline in European privilege that accompanied the emergence of a new political discourse.

Complementing Schölch, John S. Galbraith and Afaf Marsot examine decision-making in London.¹¹ They find an uninformed and detached Gladstone and an equivocating foreign minister, who allowed policy toward Egypt to be hijacked by the admiralty and by the most jingoistic of the cabinet members (the latter made Egyptian policy in meetings that Gladstone did not even attend). The British admiralty committed itself to the bombardment of Alexan-

dria virtually without consulting Gladstone, though members of his cabinet approved. Schölch never recognizes the symbolic importance of the 11 June events for the British imperialists. That he knows the charge of massacre of the Christians to have been a perhaps willful misinterpretation blinds him to the manner in which even an imaginary affront may have serious consequences. The British had, at least since the Indian uprising of 1857, a paranoia about losing their empire to fanatical Muslim mobs, and anything resembling the assaults on British women and children in Delhi and Lucknow sent them reaching for a gun. Even a Little Englander such as Prime Minister Gladstone had, earlier in his career, spoken out against the Ottoman "atrocities" against Christians in the Balkans in 1876. The prospect of saving the rest of the world is the chief inducement for a liberal to become an imperialist, and the European and Egyptian crowds unwittingly offered the liberal government that stimulus in June. The Gladstone cabinet was tricked into thinking Egypt was in anarchy (or that British vessels in Alexandria harbor were in danger) by ambitious men in the admiralty and in British consular and business offices in Alexandria. Ironically, most instances of instability that did surface tended to derive from the hard-line actions of the British jingoists themselves.

Tawfiq appointed a royalist cabinet in Alexandria, whereas in Cairo a common-law government was formed in the wake of a national congress that declared Tawfiq an apostate and incompetent to hold his post. The common-law council (*al-Majlis al-ʿUrfi*) had influence over most of the country, though its control was often loose and in some provinces anti-ʿUrabist officials remained in power. The work of ʿAli Barakat and Latifah Salim shows that peasants engaged in land invasions and other actions against landlords mainly in July, August, and early September, well after the onset of a crisis in the state. The consequent flight of Ottoman-Egyptians to Turkey, in turn, gave the common-law government an excuse for expropriating their land and using it as a carrot to ensure the loyalty of the peasants. We do not have any idea if a substantial amount of land actually changed hands in July–September, but it seems indisputable that a process of land distribution had already begun spontaneously, and that the state showed a willingness to acquiesce in the expropriation of estates owned by absentee pro-khedivial forces. The simple renunciation of private European loans, an action the state formally took, represented a social revolution of some magnitude.

The revolutionary elite that emerged in late July and August resembled that of the classic social revolutions, insofar as it consisted mainly of ambitious individuals from outside, or from the margins, of the old governing elite, for whom the state served as a means of self-promotion as well as of national salvation.¹² In a revolution against informal empire the revolutionary leadership typically excludes both the previously powerful foreigners and those from local ruling classes tainted by collaboration. The prominence on the common-law cabinet of middle managers among the officials, now leading their minis-

tries, underlines the importance of the bureaucracy and of bureaucrats in the reconstruction of the state. Tawfiq in Alexandria had a cabinet with no ministries and an officer command staff with few loyal troops.

Unlike the states Skocpol examines, Egypt had undergone such a high degree of foreign economic and diplomatic penetration that one may speak, after 1876, of a dual elite. The cabinet-level appointments of European representatives of the Dual Control over the budget vividly underscore the manner in which the cosmopolitan elite had inserted itself into the indigenous state. The establishment of the Mixed Courts (with a majority of European judges) and the substantial transfer of land from Egyptian peasants to European money-lenders they fostered ironically began in 1876, the same year the Dual Control was instituted. The popular challengers to the state and to the indigenous elite perceive clearly that they face a dual elite, and they act against both its wings. The first and primary target of urban crowds in such a situation, however, may be the foreigners, their compradors, and their centers of business and diplomacy rather than local landlords or bureaucrats, since the people often blame objectionable actions of the state on foreign influence. The tendency of the foreign wing of the dual elite to reside in easily accessible urban centers helps explain the saliency, in revolutions against informal imperialism, of urban riots. The availability of a foreign enemy, moreover, gives the coalition of challengers the ability to use a nativist language of opposition. In Muslim countries, the Islam of the ulama becomes highly useful in this regard, given the clerical vision of a community of believers who must rule, who cannot accept non-Muslim government, and who are bound to fight a holy war against a non-Muslim aggressor or even a non-Muslim obstacle to Islam's expansion. Such a use of Islam can usually, moreover, be mixed successfully with a regional or territorial nativism.

This nativist rhetoric has two uses. It can help identify both wings of the dual elite as illegitimate interlopers, consolidating the movement's target. Thus, Egyptian ulama declared Tawfiq an apostate by virtue of his alliance with the Christian Powers against his own people. The Ottoman-Egyptians are not only an oppressive class of foreign landlords, but they become crypto-Christians as well. Second, a nativist discourse temporarily helps subsume the class differences among the challengers under a broad proto-nationalism.¹³ For the moment, conflicts between journeymen and guildmasters, between artisans and merchants, between medium peasants and rich village headmen, all seem less important than those between the sons and daughters of the Nile and the foreigners. Such a coalition cannot last very long before class contradictions reemerge, but its formation even on a temporary basis allows a nativist revolution to occur. The very removal of the agreed-upon enemy, and the emergence of any particular class among the coalition as newly dominant, suffices to break the coalition down and to provoke further conflict. The Egyptian revolution of 1882 did not last long enough for such internal conflicts to become

decisive. If a nativist discourse can play such a key role in a political revolution, moreover, then language, rhetoric, and ideology clearly must be much more central to revolution-making than materialists allow.

I would like to suggest that the social structures and conjunctures that helped produce the Egyptian revolution of 1882 also shed light on other revolutions against informal empire and neocolonialism. The prefix "neo," however, is very important here. Just as the peculiarities of the neocolonial situation give such revolutions a different trajectory than the rebellions against Old Regime states discussed by Skocpol, a very different set of explanations, it seems to me, are also required for revolutions against colonial regimes, such as Algeria, where the indigenous state has been entirely displaced and a European colonial administration takes its place. In an informally colonized or neocolonial state, a local ruling stratum shares power with an expatriate elite. This dual elite employs the state to ensure its privileges and to alienate resources from the subaltern classes. The dual elite, because of their necessity of sharing tax monies and other resources, often become extortionate toward the subaltern strata. Other sources for a fiscal crisis of the state may exist, of course, including Goldstone's demographic expansion or Skocpol's military competition with other states, but in a country with a dual elite the extra claims on resources can exacerbate the other problems. Where the local state becomes militarily weakened by divisions within the elite, and where subaltern classes acquire sufficient interests, organization, resources, and ideological radicalism, a revolution can break out. The revolution consists of several discrete, often uncoordinated, sets of actions by a number of social classes or strata, which play off one another in a nonlinear fashion. Small events mushroom, under such circumstances, into large changes, just as can happen in nature when dynamical systems become chaotic.

The challengers rebel against both wings of the dual elite, but tend to concentrate on the foreigners. Urban riots against foreign property or expatriates drive the foreigners to take hard-line positions. The indigenous elite equivocates about whether to throw in with the rebels or to honor its alliance with the foreigners, but most often is forced to act harshly against the challengers. This hardening of positions leads to the establishment of multiple sovereignty, and thus to a revolutionary situation. In such revolutions a nativist rhetoric emerges as a highly useful tool against the dual elite, whether based in religion or regional patriotism. The political discourse of neocolonial rebellion sometimes even denies any intention of revolting against the indigenous ruler, and the revolutionaries represent themselves as freeing him from foreign control. Where the revolutionaries expropriate the vast properties of the foreigners, and of the collaborating old elite as well, they make the revolution a social one. Either the foreigners flee the country and their home states acquiesce in the revolution, or the danger to foreign interests provokes imperial intervention. Between 1757 and the mid-twentieth century, the intervention

of a European power in Afro-Asian conflicts most often ended with the establishment of a full colonial regime.

Even comparative historians are more cautious than sociologists, so I hesitate to produce a long list of comparable revolutions against informal empire or neocolonialism. I will suggest, however, that similar structural and conjunctural factors appear to have been at play in the Boxer uprising in China at the turn of the twentieth century.¹⁴ This peasant movement based on invulnerability rituals (not martial arts) arose in the northern Shandong province in response to a complex set of changes, including commercialization of agriculture, natural disasters, the spread of Christianity, and European (especially German) informal and economic imperialism. In some districts it was led by village notables, in others it took a more egalitarian form. The movement may have begun as antidynastic, as with most Chinese secret societies, with the slogan "Overthrow the Qing, wipe out the foreigners." But as conservative courtiers in Beijing, and even the Empress Dowager, began to support the movement as a means of dislodging the European Powers, the peasants changed the slogan to "Support the Qing, wipe out the foreigners." One is reminded here of the 'Urabists' sworn loyalty to the Ottoman sultan-caliph. At some points the court seemed as if it might move against the peasant militias, despite the latter's rhetoric of defending the dynasty. As in Alexandria, so in Beijing the foreign consular officers and the European quarter were besieged, provoking an eight-nation International Expedition in the summer of 1900, which crushed the movement. The widespread attacks on foreign missionaries, on converts to Christianity, and on the visible signs of European hegemony during the uprising, along with hostility to Chinese officials seen as collaborators with the foreigners, signals a revolt against a dual elite. Action occurred in both Shandong and Beijing, though the peasants dominated the movement, attracting members of the urban popular classes only relatively late. But no clear center emerged in the uprising, despite some conservative courtiers' tacit support for it, and European military intervention swiftly ended it once it spread from the countryside into the capital. Here, as in Egypt, action in the cities most threatened the European wing of the dual elite, provoking an invasion.

Joseph W. Esherick insists that the movement should be called a rebellion rather than a revolution because it ended up being prodynastic. From what he says about the emperor's coolness toward it and about the court coming close to banning it in the winter of 1900, the boxers' rhetoric of support for the Qing might have been of the "church and king riot" variety. The 'Urabists also represented themselves as champions of a reluctant emperor. The Chinese movement certainly challenged the state's monopoly on the use of force. Moreover, if we see the Europeans as part of the Chinese state structure at this point, as part of a dual elite, then there was a revolutionary quality to the movement. Here I think John Walton's point apt: that no objective inter-

nal differences distinguish revolutions from rebellions or uprisings. The same sorts of repertoires of collective action and crises in power tend to occur in both, but we give successful transfers of power a special terminological status.¹⁵

The twentieth century has seen many revolutions that might in some sense be classed as neocolonial (as opposed to simply anticolonial movements such as India's Freedom Movement or Algeria's FLN), and it might even be possible to see the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe in this light. Let me end by discussing, however, another parallel to Egypt's 1882, which may be more apposite, that is, Iran's Islamic revolution of 1978–79, which I think could be characterized as a neocolonial social revolution.¹⁶ The dual elite did not exist in the blatant form typical of the nineteenth century, with full cabinet representation or local judgeships for the Westerners. But some 50,000 Westerners lived in Iran in the 1970s, 35,000 of them Americans. The Americans and other allies occupied Iran during World War II, and deposed Riza Shah (r. 1925–41) for his Axis sympathies, placing his son Muhammad Riza Shah (r. 1941–78) on the throne. In the early 1950s a populist politician, Muhammad Musaddiq, led a campaign to nationalize Iranian oil, and in the domestic and international turmoil that followed, the shah was essentially deposed and forced to flee to Rome. In response to the oil nationalization, the United Kingdom and the United States launched a world-wide oil boycott, putting pressure on third parties like Italy to toe the line, and managed to induce a severe economic contraction in Iran. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency implemented a plan to put the shah back on the throne and overthrow Musaddiq, which succeeded. The shah therefore owed his throne to the Americans twice over. The CIA later helped train the shah's dreaded secret police, SAVAK. In 1963 American servicemen stationed in Iran were granted a form of extraterritoriality, and were thenceforth tried in American military courts for offenses rather than in Iranian civil courts. This law attracted the early ire of Ayatu'llah Khomeini.

After the great rise in oil prices of the early 1970s, Iran emerged as an extremely wealthy state, attracting massive investment from American multinationals. Because of state ownership of the petroleum industry, oil revenues went directly into government coffers, making Iran a "rentier" state that lived off a foreign income and had relatively little need to develop a close relationship with its own people. Mark Gasiorowski has argued that the strong support given the shah's regime as a "client state" by the United States further increased the independence of the regime from the people of Iran.¹⁷ The shah became ever more autocratic, and his technocrats' prejudices shaped economic policies. The development banks greatly favored urban businesses over farms in the loans they granted, and unemployed farm workers flocked to the cities in search of work, living in grimy tin-roofed slums. The shah also adopted punitive measures against the petty-commodity producers and marketers of the old bazaar, favoring instead the new millionaires and billionaires that

the boom and his policies were creating. Ironically, the Pahlavi regime brought a huge new middle class into being, and greatly expanded the school and university system, as well as sending thousands of students abroad for study. On the one hand, the number of educational opportunities was far smaller than the number of aspirants, and on the other the system produced more intellectuals than could be comfortably employed. Jack A. Goldstone notes that demographic pressure helps account both for the growth of slums filled with displaced farm workers, and for the restless, young, new middle class impatient with the shah's autocracy and their limited career opportunities.¹⁸ On the other hand, Iran's population nearly quadrupled between 1911 to 1978, growing from 9 million to 35 million, so that the demographic explanation says little in and of itself about why the revolution occurred in 1978 rather than in 1935 or 1957.

In the wake of the U.S. defeat in Indo-China, the Nixon–Kissinger doctrine designated Iran as a regional surrogate power in the Middle East, hoping it would defend U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. As a quid pro quo, the shah was sold virtually any weaponry he wanted from the American arsenal. The shah's forces did in fact pursue adventures in the Gulf in the 1970s, such as their police action against the supposedly Marxist Dhofar tribe in Oman. The presence of large numbers of influential Western expatriates and multinational companies, the strong leverage of the U.S. embassy, the designation of Iran as a proxy for protection of U.S. foreign policy interests in the area, all indicate a neocolonial situation. The new oil billions that accrued to Iran after 1973, in the wake of the boycott of the West by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent quadrupling of petroleum prices, created as many problems as they solved. The outflow of capital from the industrialized world was potentially disastrous for it, and apparently the United States and others put great pressure on OPEC allies to recycle the money to the West through purchases and investments. The shah's acquisition of impressive amounts of American and other military weaponry that was too sophisticated for his armed forces to use effectively was seen by local opponents as part of his compliance with the request to repatriate the billions hemorrhaging from the West. The shah refused to expand political participation in his system, which functioned as a repressive capitalist dictatorship, and proved unresponsive to popular demands for greater democratization. Contrary to a widespread impression, the administration of President Jimmy Carter put relatively little pressure on the shah to improve his human rights policies, and certainly treated him differently than it did the South American military dictatorships.

At home, the rise of petroleum income from a few hundred million dollars a year to 30 billion per annum between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s caused extremely high inflation. When oil prices dipped in the late 1970s, persistent budget deficits developed in Iran because planners had assumed higher revenues. In response, the regime tripled taxes on salaried workers, and,

in order to be seen as fighting inflation, imposed fines on tens of thousands of shopkeepers, as well as taking other invidious steps. In view of the budgetary crunch, resentments about the outward flow of oil money to pay for unneeded American and European high-technology weaponry and other commodities came to a boil among many Iranians. Some of the first major demonstrations leading to the Revolution, early in 1978, were against large banks with substantial foreign or minority ownership.

As Misagh Parsa has argued, bazaaris, industrial workers, slum dwellers, white-collar workers, and the Shi'ite clergy, each with their own interests, organizations, and ideology, mobilized conjuncturally in 1977–78 to overthrow the shah.¹⁹ These groups operated primarily in urban areas. Escalating strikes and demonstrations, met by a state that vacillated between the velvet and the iron fist, eventually led to the fall of the government. Importantly, the shah's troops became increasingly unwilling to fire on urban crowds. In January–February 1979 some radical young officers, especially in the air force, went over to the revolutionary forces, as did most of the rank and file troops. Many members of the vague coalition of 1978 were united by a rhetoric of Iranian and Shi'ite nativism alongside an emphasis on consultative government and human rights but each had its own emphases. The clergy emphasized nativist Islam, the new middle class talked of an end to tyranny, and the bazaaris and other groups had their own aspirations. Only in the clear light of the postrevolutionary situation did the incompatibility of the interests and ideologies of the coalition partners become manifest, when the Shi'ite ulama, having learned organizational and modern rhetorical skills from the middle class and leftist parties and possessing a charismatic leader of the first rank in Imam Ruhullah Khomeini, managed to take power.

The panic among Westerners in the fall of 1979 emptied Iran of foreigners in the same way that the Alexandria riot had led to an exodus of expatriates from Egypt. Once in power from February 1979, the new Islamic government nationalized much of the property of the multinational corporations, as well as local banks and heavy industries. The taking of U.S. embassy personnel hostage by left-wing students in November 1979 constituted, not one more piece of anarchy during a revolutionary period, but rather a deliberate strike at the continuing influence of the United States on Iran, a final blow against the foreign member of the dual elite. Most accounts of the Iranian crisis relegate its neocolonial aspect to the back burner, but I would suggest it was quite central to the Revolution, and certainly played a pivotal role in the mind of the masses.

Parsa plays down the degree to which any ideological unanimity existed among these various social forces, and emphasizes the social conflicts that broke out among them during the first two years after the Revolution. Yet the ideologies of the various groups had in common a rhetoric of nativism, whether secular or religious, Marxist or national, that served to unite them

superficially long enough to make a revolution. Although the victory of Shi'ite clericalism came late in the Revolution, surely one of the reasons this Islamic discourse ultimately gained such wide appeal lay precisely in its nativism, its rejection of Western models for an Iranian authenticity that could only lie in the unique national religion. The very popularity of nativism points to the Revolution having been against not only the shah, but against the neo-colonial Western elite of multinationals, expatriates, arms dealers, and pin-striped diplomats as well.

Like the Egyptian revolution of 1882, the Islamic Revolution involved a broad coalition of subaltern social classes united at least temporarily against the state and against a dual elite, indigenous and foreign. In both, peasants played a subordinate role to that of the urban crowd, with its mass demonstrations, riots, and strikes. The Iranian Revolution ended in the sort of redistribution of wealth and power that characterizes social revolutions, and although the Egyptian case is less clear, a good deal of the evidence points to a social revolution there as well. Although the clerical regime established a safety net for many of the poor who had had few advocates under the shah, it also used the "barefoot" for cannon fodder during the bloody Iran-Iraq War of 1980–88, and the Islamic Revolution's success has been at the expense of most of the ideals for which the generality of Iranians fought in 1978. At the political center, the most fascist and autocratic elements won out, and these ruthlessly suppressed rival political parties, executed several thousand members of the leftist-Muslim Mujahidin party, and even launched pogroms against the apolitical and harmless Baha'i religious minority. In the course of the 1980s, new and wealthy elites emerged to take the place of those overthrown with the shah, so that reduction in wealth stratification may have been short-term.

The events in Iran since 1979 underscore how easily revolutions, especially nativist ones, can go bad. It cannot, however, be simply assumed that the 'Urabists would have betrayed their own ideals of egalitarianism and consultative government had they won out. In any case, the Iranians succeeded in establishing a revolutionary government, whereas the nineteenth-century Egyptians and Chinese failed, not only for internal reasons, but also because the gap between the north and the south in social and political mobilization is less stark late in the twentieth century than it had been late in the nineteenth. I have argued that outcomes should not determine our typologies of popular movements, and if we look at conjunctures, demographic situation, and at what groups mobilized against whom, similarities between Egypt's 1882 and Iran's 1979 certainly exist. In one of history's little ironies, Muhammad Riza Shah lies buried in the same mosque in Cairo as Khedive Isma'il.

Notes

Introduction

1. Cf. Morris, ed., *Africa, America and Central Asia*, 1984.
2. My reworking of Karl Griewank's formulation as used in Hobsbawm, "Revolution," in Porter and Teich, eds., *Revolution in History*, 1986, p. 9.
3. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 1979.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 298, n. 44.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 60–64, 99, 112–13.
6. Moore, *Dictatorship and Democracy*, 1966; Wolf, *Peasant Wars*, 1973; Paige, *Agrarian Revolution*, 1975; Gerber, *Social Origins*, 1987.
7. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion*, 1991.
8. Raymond, *Grandes villes arabes*, 1985, pp. 55–58; Panzac 1982:99.
9. McNeill, *Population and Politics*, 1990, pp. 42–48.
10. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution*, pp. 42–43; Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, pp. 146–47 (see pp. 120–21 on France); Somers and Goldfrank 1979:447.
11. Sewell 1990.
12. These specific points from essays in Zald and McCarthy, eds., *Social Movements*, 1987, pp. 4–12, 84, 319–36; see also Zald and McCarthy, eds., *Dynamics*, 1979; Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 1978; *idem*, *Contentious French*, 1986; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, *Rebellious Century*, 1975; a survey is Jenkins 1983:527–53.
13. Parsa, *Iranian Revolution*, 1989.
14. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 48; for a contrasting characterization, see pp. 116–17. Her promise in the latter discussion of an analysis of "historically specific institutional arrangements," it seems to me, is not fulfilled in her later discussion of the three revolutions.
15. Gleick, *Chaos*, 1987, p. 23.
16. Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 1977, esp. pp. 95–100.
17. Sewell 1985:57–85.
18. Skocpol 1985:92; cf. p. 87.
19. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, pp. 125–26.
20. Rudé, *Ideology and Popular Protest*, 1980; Darnton, *Great Cat Massacre*, 1985; Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 1971; Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, *Dominant Ideology Thesis*, 1980; Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, 1985.
21. Eisenstein, *Printing Press*, 1985; Graff, *Legacies of Literacy*, 1987; Gouldner, *Future of Intellectuals*, 1979; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 1983; Hroch, *Social Preconditions*, 1985; I am grateful to Geoff Eley for drawing my attention to Hroch's work; see also Eley 1981.
22. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, pp. 288–92.
23. See Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism," in Owen and Sutcliffe, eds., *Theory of Imperialism*, 1972, pp. 117–42 (a great improvement on his earlier theory of "collapse on the periphery"; see below).

24. Skocpol 1982:265–83.
25. Walton, *Reluctant Rebels*, 1984, p. 16.
26. Robinson and Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians*, 1981, pp. 77–78.
27. Said, *Orientalism*, 1978.
28. Hopkins 1986:373–74.
29. Tignor 1962; Schölch, *Ägypten den Ägyptern*, 1972, trans. *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, 1981.
30. Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, p. 283.
31. Arjomand, *Turban for the Crown*, 1988, pp. 189–210.
32. Owen, “Egypt and Europe,” in Owen and Sutcliffe, eds., *Theory of Imperialism*, pp. 193–209.
33. Mayer, *Changing Past*, 1988.
34. Salim, *al-Quwa*, 1981.
35. Ramadan, “Social Significance of the Urabi Revolution,” in *L’Égypte*, pp. 187–94.
36. Mayer, *Changing Past*, p. 63.
37. Wolf 1977, esp. p. 8. Brown, *Peasant Politics*, 1990, p. 29, discerns the growth of a “rural middle class” separate from the “peasantry” in the nineteenth century. He means by this “rural middle class” the rich peasants, most of them village headmen.

Chapter One

Material and Cultural Foundations of the Old Regime

1. See the articles in Islamoğlu-Inan, *Ottoman Empire*, 1987; much of this volume is inspired by the work of Immanuel Wallerstein. I am here citing an intellectual debt to some conceptions, not announcing adherence to a school; I think the world-systems approach pays too little attention to indigenous social and ideological formations.
2. Most points of specialized information in this paragraph derive from Raymond, *Grandes villes arabes*, 1985; *idem* 1972:203–10; Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, 1981; and Panzac 1982:83–100; cf. Goldstone’s comments, *Revolution and Rebellion*, p. 400, where I think the population estimates are too overconfident and inferior to those of Panzac.
3. Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad ‘Ali*, 1984.
4. This is my own conclusion, but a similar argument has been made on other grounds by Toledano, *State and Society*, 1990, pt. 1.
5. Shamsu’d-Din Muhammad b. Ramadan as-Su’udi al-Hanafi, “al-Lu’lu’ al-manthur fi nasihat wulat al-umur,” Cairo, Egyptian National Library, Taymur Ijtima’, MS 34, p. 10. (Copied 11 April 1751.) Also Tasawwuf Tal’at, MS 1308.
6. Ahmad ad-Damanhuri, “an-Naf’ al-ghazir fi salah as-sultan wa al-wazir,” Cairo, Egyptian National Library, Taymur Ijtima’, MS 32, pp. 10, 29. For ad-Damanhuri, see al-Jabarti, *‘Aja’ib*, 1879, 2:25–27.
7. Taymur, *A‘lam*, 1967, pp. 64–65.
8. Mirza Malkum Khan/Nasiru’d-Din Shah (telegraphic), 21 Rajab 1297/30 June 1880, Iranian archives, repr. in Safa’i, ed., *Asnad*, 1349 s./1970, p. 119; Egyptian peasants often denied to the British that they accepted the sultan as caliph. See Stuart, *Egypt after the War*, 1883, 1:103.
9. Taymur, *A‘lam*, pp. 93–95.

10. Kenny 1965:142–55, 211–21.
11. Amr ʿAli ila Hukmdariyyat as-Sudan, 6 Shaʿban 1279/27 January 1863, in Sami, *Taqwim*, 1916–36, 3, ii:452–53.
12. Ismaʿil/Arslan Bey, governor of Qena and Esna, 30 Rajab 1279/21 January 1863, in Sami, *Taqwim*, 3, ii:443.
13. Amr ʿAli ila Hukmdariyyat as-sudan, 2 Shaʿban 1279/24 January 1863, in Sami, *Taqwim*, 3, ii:448–49.
14. Iskandar Abkarius al-Armani, “al-Athar al-misriyyah wa al-manaqib al-khi-dwiyyah,” Cairo, Egyptian National Library, Taʿrikh Talʿat, MS 1832, esp. fol. 12b–14a.
15. Ahmed Yusuf/Sheikh Abdal Aziz, 15 Shawwal 1292/16 November 1875, encl. no. 239 with Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office 141/101, King/Derby, no. 202, Zanzibar, 28 December 1875 (hereafter, PRO, FO).
16. Ar-Rafiʿi, *ʿAsr Ismaʿil*, 1982, 2:96–97.
17. “Al-Laʿihah al-asasiyyah li majlis shura an-nuwwab,” and “al-Laʿihah an-ni-zamiyyah,” 12 Jumada II 1283/22 October 1866, repr. in ar-Rafiʿi, *Asr Ismaʿil*, 2:314–24; an extended discussion is Hunter, *Egypt*, 1984; cf. Becker, *Civility and Society*, 1988, p. 17.
18. Owen, *Middle East*, 1981, pp. 128–30.
19. Toledano, *State and Society*, pp. 68–93.
20. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, personal communication, 10 December 1990.
21. Nubarian, *Mémoires*, 1983.
22. Muhammad, *al-Wujud*, 1985, pp. 18–25.
23. Baer, *Social History*, 1969, pp. 220–21, and 220 n.; the figure of 100,000 for “Turks” and Circassians is given in War Office, Intelligence Branch, “Report,” 13 July 1882, Confidential Print, in Bourne and Watt, eds., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, 1984, 9:133.
24. Muhammad ʿAqil b. Muhammad Kashif al-Bukhari, “Irshad al-walad,” Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyyah, Cairo, MS Taymur Akhlaq 356.
25. Muhammad ʿAqil b. Muhammad Kashif al-Bukhari, “Durar as-suluk fi man hakama misr min an-nuwwab wa al-muluk,” Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyyah, Cairo, MS Taʿrikh 4077.
26. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot was perhaps the first author writing in English to draw attention to al-ʿAttar’s importance in her “Modernization among the Rectors of al-Azhar, 1798–1879,” in Polk and Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization*, 1968, pp. 273–76; the major academic biography is Gran, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism*, 1979, which, despite some strengths, suffers from what Raymond Williams brands “reflection theory.” See the debate on this work by de Jong and Gran 1982:381–400. See also Delanoue, *Moralistes et politiques musulmans*, 1982, 2:344–57.
27. Muhammad b. Muhammad al-ʿInabi al-Jazaʿiri, “as-Saʿi al-mahmud fi taʿlif al-ʿasakir wa al-junud,” Cairo, Egyptian National Library, Taymur Majamiʿ, MS 219, completed 24 Rajab 1242/21 February 1827.
28. Muhammad b. Ahmad at-Tamimi, “Tarjamat al-ʿallamah Ahmad at-Tamimi al-Khalili, Mufti Misr,” Cairo, Egyptian National Library, Taʿrikh Taymur, MS 1096, pp. 2–9.
29. *Wadi an-nil*, vol. 4, no. 71 (14 Shawwal 1287/7 January 1871); see the discussion of these issues in al-Sayyid Marsot, “Modernization,” pp. 276–79. For al-ʿAbbasi

al-Mahdi, see Taymur, *A^ʿlam*, pp. 62–72; and Delanoue, *Moralistes et politiques musulmans*, 1:168–82. For the place of al-Azhar in Egyptian Islam, see Eccel, *Egypt*, 1984.

30. *Rawdat al-madaris*, vol. 3, no. 2 (30 Muharram 1289/9 April 1872):11–13.

31. The bibliography for at-Tahtawi is vast, but see, crucially, Delanoue, *Moralistes et politiques musulmans*, 2:383–487, and the sources cited therein.

32. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 1970, p. 82.

33. At-Tahtawi, *Manahij*, in *al-A^ʿmal*, 1973, 1:280.

34. *Ibid.*, 1:533.

35. All quotes in this paragraph from *ibid.*, 1:516–17.

36. Montesquieu, *Oeuvres complètes*, 1964, p. 530.

37. At-Tahtawi, *Manahij*, in *al-A^ʿmal*, 1:519.

38. Zolondek 1964:90–91, 94; cf. at-Tahtawi, *al-A^ʿmal*, 1:519–21.

39. Schacht, *Islamic Law*, 1966, p. 91; Mahmassani, *Falsafat*, 1961, p. 128; Inalcik 1969:105–39; Heyd, *Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, 1973.

40. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 1986, p. 8; see also pp. 193–200. A more extended treatment of this literature is Fleischer 1983:198–220.

41. At-Tahtawi, *Manahij*, in *al-A^ʿmal*, 1:519.

42. Isma^ʿil/Sharif Pasha, Ra^ʿis Majlis al-Ahkam, 6 Sha^ʿban 1279/27 January 1863, trans. Sami, *Taqwim*, 3, ii:452.

43. Muhammad ^ʿAbduh recommended at-Tahtawi’s *Anwar tawfiq al-jalil*, the first original history of ancient Egypt from the pen of a modern Egyptian, as a history text for young Egyptians: ^ʿAbduh, *al-A^ʿmal*, 1973, 3:51.

44. Cole 1980:29–46.

45. At-Tahtawi, *Manahij*, in *al-A^ʿmal*, 1:346.

46. At-Tahtawi, “Takmil al-kalam ^ʿala wilayat al-jaza^ʿir,” *Rawdat al-madaris*, vol. 2, no. 24 (end of Dhu^ʿl-Hijjah 1288/11 March 1872):14.

47. At-Tahtawi, *Manahij*, in *al-A^ʿmal*, 1:268–69. For the Saint-Simonians in Egypt, see ^ʿIsa, *San Simun*, 1959; and Hanna, “Saint-Simonians,” in Hanna, ed., *Medieval and Middle Eastern Studies*, 1972.

48. Quote in at-Tahtawi, *Manahij*, in *al-A^ʿmal*, 1:316; other points in the paragraph are found at 1:310.

49. At-Tahtawi, *Manahij*, in *al-A^ʿmal*, 1:326–27.

50. Stoler 1989:134–61.

51. Said, *Orientalism*, 1979.

52. Rhoné, *L’Égypte*, 1877, pp. 17–18.

53. Blunt, *Secret History*, 1922 [1907], p. 151.

54. Colvin, *Making of Modern Egypt*, 1906, p. 9.

55. *Ibid.*

56. Blunt, *Secret History*, p. 152.

57. Zincke, *Egypt*, 1873 [1871], p. 341.

58. Quote on *ibid.*, p. 340, along with other points there and on pp. 342–44.

59. Duff Gordon, *Letters from Egypt*, 1969, p. 132.

60. Kusel, *Englishman’s Recollections*, 1915, pp. 19–20.

61. PRO, FO 141/100, Vivian/Derby, no. 7, Cairo, 20 October 1876.

62. Duff Gordon, *Letters from Egypt*, p. 86.

63. Kusel, *Englishman's Recollections*, p. 157.
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 179–83.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 199; Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 1988, p. 128.
66. E. Kedourie, "Ghanim, Khalil," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 5 vols., suppl. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954–); Ghanim, *al-Iqtisad*, 1879.
67. Rambaud, *Histoire*, 1909, pp. 436–43; Gide and Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines*, 1948, pp. 329–52.
68. See the suggestive discussion in Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, 1985, chap. 8.

Chapter Two

Economic Change and Social Interests

1. Davies, "J-Curve," in Graham and Gurr, eds., *Violence in America*, 1969; cf. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 1970, pp. 85–91, 105–9.
2. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 1978.
3. Barakat, *Tatawwur*, 1977, esp. chaps. 2–4; Hunter, *Egypt*, 1984.
4. Cuno 1988:111–35; 1985, chap. 3; Rodinson, *Islam and Capitalism*, 1973.
5. Chartier, *Cultural History*, 1988, chap. 6; Brym, *Intellectuals and Politics*, 1980, pp. 15–17.
6. Cuno 1980:245–75.
7. "Al-Hawadith ad-dakhiliyyah," *Wadi an-nil*, vol. 4, no. 22 (9 Rabi^c II 1287/9 July 1870).
8. Panzac 1982:100; population estimates, p. 99.
9. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion*, 1991, pp. 24–37, 283–84.
10. At-Tahtawi, *Manahij*, in *al-A^cmal*, 1973, 1:316–17.
11. Pacha, *Essai sur les causes de renchérissement de la vie matérielle au Caire au courant du XIXe siècle (1800–1907)*, trans. in Issawi, *Economic History*, 1966, pp. 450–51; Issawi's own remarks on p. 449.
12. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion*, pp. 88–89.
13. The definitive treatment of the cotton boom is Owen, *Cotton*, 1969, chap. 4; the tale of one European company operating in Egypt during this period is told in Landes, *Bankers and Pashas*, 1958.
14. Baer, *Social History*, 1969, p. 70; cf. PRO, FO 78/2186, L. Moore, "Memorandum," Alexandria, 26 September 1871.
15. Owen, *Cotton*, pp. 147–49.
16. Stuart, *Egypt after the War*, 1883, 1:103.
17. Owen, *Cotton*, p. 151.
18. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution*, 1975, pp. 11–17, 120.
19. Stuart, *Egypt after the War*, 1:150; 2:312–15.
20. *Ibid.*, 1:34; Barakat, *Tatawwur*, pp. 71–148.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
22. PRO, FO 141/20, Carr/Borg, no. 14, Tanta, 11 June 1878.
23. Barakat, *Tatawwur*, pp. 338–39.
24. Owen, *Middle East*, 1981, pp. 146–47; Brown, *Peasant Politics*, 1990, pp. 14–15 and *passim*.
25. Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, 1981, pp. 319–20, n. 28.

26. Foreign Office Confidential Print 4661, War Office Intelligence Branch, "Report," 13 July 1882, in Bourne and Watt, eds., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, 1984, 9:140.

27. Just as an example, let me cite Egypt, Dar al-Watha'iq al-Qawmiyyah [Egyptian National Archives, hereafter DWQ], Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah [Ministry of Interior, hereafter ND], Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 10, "Taqrir min fallahin [sic] hissah Barwi al-Madlu'," 21 Safar 1289/30 April 1872, wherein peasants denounce three of their headmen to the central government for tyranny. Afaf Marsot informs me that petitions from villagers complaining of the tyranny of the 'umdah were plentiful in the Muhammad 'Ali period as well (personal communication, 10 December 1990).

28. War Office Intelligence Branch, "Report," in Bourne and Watt, eds., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, 9:140–41.

29. Baer, *Landownership*, 1962, p. 36; Richards, *Egypt's Agricultural Development*, 1982, pp. 41–42.

30. DWQ, Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara' [cabinet correspondence], Haqqaniyyah, 2/1 Qawanin Mutanawwa'ah, Ministry of Justice dossier dated 1882, "Commissions de Conciliation dans l'Égypte."

31. Stuart, *Egypt after the War*, 2:20.

32. Sewell, *Work and Revolution*, 1980, chap. 7.

33. Moore, *Injustice*, 1978, pp. 119–226.

34. Goldberg, *Tinker, Tailor, and Textile Worker*, 1986, esp. p. 78; see also Lockman and Beinun, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, pp. 32–35; although they recognize the guilds' persistence, their characterization of guilds as primarily fiscal and administrative links with the state lacking corporate autonomy or social significance strikes me as likely incorrect, even for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As I will show, it certainly does not accurately portray the guilds in 1858–82.

35. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 10, Ahmad Tal'at/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 20 Safar 1290/ 20 April 1873; 22 Safar 1290/ 22 April 1873.

36. PRO, FO 141/73, "Report," Borg/Stanton, 20 September 1870.

37. DWQ, Bitaqat ad-Dar [card files], 266 Dara'ib, Qarar al-Majlis al-Khusus, 11 Ramadan 1280/19 February 1864.

38. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 13, Mansurah petition of Safar 1291/ March–April 1874; Mahfazah 14, Muhammad 'Asim Wakil al-Muhafazah/Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Cairo, 13 Sha'ban 1291/25 September 1874; Kusel, *Englishman's Recollections*, 1915, pp. 19–20.

39. PRO, FO 141/73, Borg/Stanton, 20 September 1870.

40. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 11, 'Ardhal Ahmad Muhammad, Shaykh Ta'ifat al-'Arabajiyyat al-kisar, encl. with Muhammad Zaki/Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 3 Sha'ban 1290/26 September 1873. For construction works in the fashionable al-Azbakiyyah district of Cairo in the early 1870s, see Behrens-Abouseif, *Azbakiyyah*, 1985, chap. 7.

41. I am grateful to Professor Hassanein Rabie of Cairo University for this information.

42. Masters, *Western Economic Dominance*, 1988, p. 54.

43. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 11, Taqrir min shaykh wa 'umad ti-jariyyat al-ghalal wa al-aqtan bi Mina' al-Basal [report from the guildmaster and senior

masters of the textiles and cotton trade at Mina' al-Basal], 10 Rabi' I 1290/8 May 1873; about forty signatures, mostly Muslim.

44. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 11, Muhafiz Iskandariyyah/Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 21 Jumada II 1290/16 August 1873.

45. DWQ, Sijillat Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah [Ministry of Interior registers], Warid Dabtiyyat [police reports], 19 Lam/24/24, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah/Dawawin, 18 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1296/3 November 1879.

46. Moore, *Injustice*, p. 203; cf. p. 189.

47. The very next day after the decision against *ar-rukah*, the ministry received a communication that some measurers were complaining about the idea of each worker being paid only for his individual labor time; the phrasing suggests, however, that they were only a minority (DWQ, Sijillat Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/24, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah/Dawawin, 19 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1296/4 November 1879).

48. PRO, FO 141/130, Vivian/Nubar, no. 10, Cairo, 10 February 1879.

49. Gouldner, *Future of Intellectuals*, 1979, pp. 28–43, 4n, 38n.

50. Hroch, *Social Preconditions*, 1985, p. 16.

51. "Natijah ihsa'iyyah," *Rawdat al-madaris*, vol. 4, no. 5 (15 Rabi' I 1290/13 May 1873):22.

52. DWQ, Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara', Nizarat al-Ma'arif 5 Alif, "Rapport de la commission pour les reformes dans l'organisation de l'instruction publique," pp. 29–32, encl. with 'Ali Ibrahim, minister of public education/Riyad Pasha, president of the council of ministers, 19 December 1880.

53. Ninet 1883:118–19.

54. For teachers and the pension issue, see DWQ, Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara', Nizarat al-Ma'arif, 1/1/Alif, Shu'un Muwazzafin, Ministre de l'Instruction Publique/Conseil des Ministres, 9 October 1880. The petitions discussed are in DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi: Mahfazah 6, Ra'is Majlis 'Umum as-Sihhah/Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 14 Muharram 1286/26 April 1869; Mahfazah 10, 'Ardhal Abu'n-Na'as Musa, 1290/1873; Mahfazah 15, 'Ardhal 'Ali Effendi Rasikh, 1292/1875; Mahfazah 29, 'Ardhal Muhammad Tawfiq, 1296/1879; Mahfazah 29, Wakil Ra'is Majlis 'Umum as-Sihhah/Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 27 Rabi' I 1296, 20 March 1879; Mahfazah 31, Wakil Riyasat Majlis as-Sihhah/Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 20 Rajab 1296/10 July 1879; *idem*, 22 Rajab 1296/12 July 1879.

55. PRO, FO ZHC1/3652, Rogers, Cairo, 1872.

56. Brym, *Intellectuals and Politics*, pp. 13–29.

57. Stuart, *Egypt after the War*, 1:30.

Chapter Three

Body and Bureaucracy

1. A similar process occurred in early twentieth-century Iran; see Arjomand, *Turban for the Crown*, 1988, pp. 27–35.

2. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion*, 1991, pp. 92–109, 196–212.

3. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 1988; Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 1979, pp. 195–228.

4. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 30–34, 49.
5. The budgets floated by the Egyptian government are reported in PRO, FO 141/82, Rogers/Vivian, 5 October 1873; and FO 141/99, “Report by Mr. Gave on the Financial Condition of Egypt,” Confidential Print, 22 March 1876; for 1877, see Hunter, *Egypt*, 1984, p. 188.
6. Issawi, *Economic History*, 1966, p. 431; the even higher estimate of per capita indebtedness given in this source probably depends on an underestimation of Egypt’s population.
7. Farman, *Egypt and its Betrayal*, 1908, p. 217; Hunter, *Egypt*, pp. 184–86.
8. PRO, FO 141/106, Vivian/Derby, no. 97, Cairo, 14 April 1877. For report of conversation with an appeals court member, see Vivian/Derby, pol. no. 22, Cairo, 28 January 1877.
9. PRO, FO 141/107, Vivian/Derby, no. 211, Alexandria, 12 July 1877.
10. PRO, FO 141/112, Borg/Vivian, confidential, Cairo, 27 December 1877, arch. no. 651.
11. PRO, FO 141/112, Borg/Vivian, no. 42, Cairo, 29 December 1877.
12. PRO, FO 141/120, Carr/Borg, no. 14, Tanta, 11 June 1878.
13. PRO, FO 141/115, Vivian/Salisbury, no. 182, Alexandria, 23 May 1878.
14. Farman, *Egypt and its Betrayal*, p. 248.
15. PRO, FO 141/120, Borg/Vivian, no. 25, Cairo, 1 July 1878; FO 141/125, Vivian/Salisbury, no. 43, Cairo, 6 February 1879; *Gazette des Tribunaux*, 28 February 1879, encl. with FO 141/128, Borg/Vivian, no. 3, Cairo, 3 March 1879; Baer, *Social History*, 1969, pp. 100–101.
16. PRO, FO 141/129, Surur/Calvert, Damietta, 16 June 1879, encl. in Calvert/Lascelles, Alexandria, 4 September 1879; FO 141/129, Borg/Lascelles, no. 26, Cairo, 29 July 1879.
17. Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, 1969.
18. Some of these taxes are discussed in PRO, FO 141/120, report of acting consular agent at Zaqaзиq, encl. with Borg/Vivian, no. 15, Cairo, 14 June 1878.
19. DWQ, Sijillat Diwan al-Wirku [Wirku council tax registers], 10 Mim/1/9, Muhafazat Misr/Diwan al-Wirku, Jumada II 1286/September 1869, transmitting decision of al-Majlis al-Khususi, Rabi’ II 1286/July 1869.
20. DWQ, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Mukatabat ‘Arabi, Mahfazah 7, ‘Ardhal ta’ifat as-sayyadin, rec’d. 16 Rabi’ I 1288/ 5 June 1871.
21. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ‘Arabi, Mahfazah 5, ‘Ardhal ta’ifat as-sanadiqiyyah, rec’d. 9 Ramadan 1285/ 24 December 1868.
22. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ‘Arabi, Mahfazah 5, Wakil Diwan Muhafiz Misr/ Wakil ad-Dakhiliyyah, 23 Ramadan 1285/ 7 January 1869.
23. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ‘Arabi, Mahfazah 5, Muhafiz Misr/Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 11 Sha’ban 1285/ 27 November 1868.
24. DWQ, Sijillat Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah [hereafter SND], Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/23, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah/Dawawin, 19 Ramadan 1296/6 September 1879.
25. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ‘Arabi, Mahfazah 36, Shahadat 55 Tujjar Magharibah, Sha’ban 1295/ August 1878, encl. with Ministry of Interior memo, 29 Shawwal 1297/5 October 1880.
26. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ‘Arabi, Mahfazah 28, Mahmud Bey al-’Attar, Ser-Tuccar Misr/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, rec’d. 4 Safar 1296/ 28 January 1879.

27. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 17, ʿArdhal taʿifat as-suyyagh, undated but filed Dhuʿl-Hijjah 1292, approximately January 1876. As might be expected, almost all the names are Christian and Jewish, though these goldsmiths clearly had Egyptian-Ottoman citizenship since had they held European passports they would have been exempt from such taxation. The complaints by the goldsmiths continued, at least into 1877 (Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 23, ʿArdhal taʿifat as-suyyagh, recʿd. 1 Jumada II 1294/ 5 July 1877).

28. *Abu nazzarah zarqa*, 25 February 1879.

29. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 23, Surah ma sadara ʿan ad-Dakhiliyyah ila al-Maliyyah, 4 Jumada II 1294/ 8 July 1877.

30. DWQ, Sijillat ad-Daʿirah al-Baladiyyah [Cairo city council registers], 9 Mim/ 14/6, memoranda of 7 Dhuʿl-Qaʿdah 1296/23 October 1879 (p. 9); memoranda of 18 Dhuʿl-Qaʿdah 1296/3 November 1879; memoranda of 25 Dhuʿl-Qaʿdah 1296/10 November 1879 (p. 15).

31. The January 1880 decree of Khedive Tawfiq abolishing some taxes and setting lower rates for others is reprinted in an-Naqqash, *Misr*, 1884, 4:38–39; for the remarks of the finance minister in a memo to the khedive, see 4:37.

32. PRO, FO 926/14, Felice/Borg, Zaqaziq, 16 April 1880; cf. 141/134, Malet/Salisbury, no. 37, Cairo, 20 January 1880, which reports that “artisans, clerks, weighers who paid from 70 to 500, now pay 50 to 200 piastres, while a general tax of 15 to 45 piastres has been abolished. The purchase of salt at the gov’t stores which was obligatory whether required or not is now optional and at reduced price.”

33. Stuart, *Egypt after the War*, 1883, 2:280.

34. For the building inspectors, see DWQ, Dabtiyyah [police], Mahfazah 1, Viceroy/Maʿmur, 24 Shaʿban 1280/ 3 February 1864; for the requirement of medical degrees and the story of the Tanta druggist, see the same series, Viceroy/Maʿmur Dabtiyyah, Cairo, 29 Rajab 1273/ 25 March 1857; the fining of Shaykh as-Sadat is in Viceroy/Maʿmur, 9 Ramadan 1277/21 March 1861; for changes in powers of the guildmaster, see Haridi, *al-Hiraf*, 1985, p. 33.

35. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 35, ʿArdhal al-Kurdliyyah wa al-Magharibah bi Iskandariyyah, recʿd. 16 Shaʿban 1297/24 July 1880.

36. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 37, petition of fifteen merchants of al-Jamaliyyah, n.d. Filed under Dhuʿl-Hijjah 1297/November 1880, but mentions Safar 1293/March 1876 as being recent.

37. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 6, Nazir Diwan al-Ashghal al-ʿUmumiyyah/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 3 Rabiʿ I 1286/ 13 June 1869.

38. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 31, Muhafiz Iskandariyyah/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 24 Rajab 1296/ 14 July 1879 (the guild in the original is the *mawaʿinjiyyah*, probably makers of receptacles for oil or other products); Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 25, Wakil Muhafiz Misr/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 7 Rabiʿ II 1295/ 10 April 1878.

39. Dar al-Mahfuzat, Milaffat al-Mustakhdimin, dossier 4818, Mahfazah 211, ʿAyn 4, Dulab 9; dossier 4806, Mahfazah 211, ʿAyn 3, Dulab 9.

40. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 18, Muhafiz Iskandariyyah/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 20 Muharram 1293/ 16 February 1876.

41. The estimates for the number of local officials derive from European observers, and are cited in Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, 1981, p. 354, n. 105.

42. Stuart, *Egypt after the War*, 2:460.
43. Muhammad Effendi Fanni, "Baḳiyyat al-mutamanni fi tarjamat Fanni," Egyptian National Library, Cairo, Tarikh Taymur 1126, p. 5.
44. As-Suruji, *al-Jaysh*, 1967, pp. 546–47.
45. PRO, FO 141/120, Borg/Vivian, no. 18, Cairo, 21 June 1878.
46. For the case of Muhammad Fahmi, see DWQ, SND, Awamir ʿardhalat, 19 Lam/18/2, Amr ʿAli 4 Safar 1299/26 December 1881, wherein he was finally pardoned; other points in this paragraph from PRO, FO 141/128, Borg/Vivian, no. 1, Cairo, 18 February 1879; FO 141/125, Vivian/Salisbury, no. 57, Cairo, 15 February 1879.
47. PRO, FO 141/125, Vivian/Salisbury, no. 59, Cairo, 19 February 1879; see Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, pp. 63–93; and Hunter, *Egypt*, pp. 215–16.
48. PRO, FO 141/25, Vivian/Salisbury, no. 71, Cairo, 22 February 1879.
49. PRO, FO 141/128, Borg/Vivian, no. 2, Cairo, 3 March 1879.
50. DWQ, SND, Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/23, ad-Dakhiliyyah/Dawawin, 6 Shawwal 1296/23 September 1879, no. 486.
51. For this figure and his administrative context, see de Jong, *Turuq and Turuq-Linked Institutions*, 1978.
52. Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, p. 88.
53. PRO, FO 141/125, Lascelles/Salisbury, no. 180, Cairo, 1 April 1879; no. 178, 3 April 1879; no. 180, 4 April 1879; FO 141/128, Borg memorandum, 20 March 1879.
54. PRO, FO 141/125, Vivian/Salisbury, no. 259, Cairo, 5 May 1879.

Chapter Four

The Long Revolution in Egypt

1. Williams, *Long Revolution*, 1984.
2. Giddens, *Critique of Historical Materialism*, 1983, p. 6.
3. Baer, "The Beginnings of Urbanization," in *Social History*, 1969, pp. 133–48. Baer's numbers are low overall, and need to be revised, since demographers have brought the accuracy of the censuses on which they were based sharply into question; but the proportion between urban and rural population might not be much affected by such revision.
4. Giddens, *Critique of Historical Materialism*, chap. 1, esp. p. 38.
5. Vatikiotis, *History of Egypt*, 1985, p. 79.
6. PRO, ZHC1/3565, Consul Stanley, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Alexandria for the Year 1871"; ZHC1/3652, Consul Rogers, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Cairo for the Year 1872."
7. For the place of literacy in premodern societies, see Graff, *Labyrinth of Literacy*, 1987, pp. 28–29; *idem*, *Legacies of Literacy*, 1987, pp. 15–74.
8. For the modern schools and Bentham, see Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 1988; for literacy and authority, see Lankshear, *Literacy, Schooling and Revolution*, 1987, pp. 58–59.
9. Chartier, *Cultural Uses of Print*, 1987, p. 5; cf. Goody, *Logic of Writing*, 1986.
10. Cressey, *Literacy and the Social Order*, 1980, pp. 45–46. For education in nineteenth-century Egypt, see ʿAbduʿl-Karim, *Taʿrikh at-taʿlim*, 1938; *idem*, *Taʿrikh at-taʿlim*, 1945; Heyworth-Dunne, *Education in Modern Egypt*, 1938; for printing, see Ridwan, *Taʿrikh*, 1953; and Sabat, *Taʿrikh at-tibaʿah*, 1966.

11. For popular reading habits in Europe, see Darnton, *Literary Underground*, 1982; for at-Tahtawi's press run, see Sabat, *Ta'rikh*, p. 186.
12. "Natijah ihisa'iyyah li al-madaris al-mulkiyyah wa al-makatib al-ahliyyah," in *Rawdat al-Madaris*, vol. 3, no. 21 (15 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1289/14 January 1873), pp. 7–8; cf. anon., "At-tarbiyah wa ma yatarattab 'alayha min taqaddum ash-shu'ub," Cairo, Egyptian National Library, Ijtima', Arabic MS 130, esp. fol. 24a.
13. Szyliowicz, *Education and Modernization*, 1973, p. 142.
14. DWQ, Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara', Nizarat al-Ma'arif, 5 Alif, "Rapport de la commission pour les reformes dans l'organisation de l'instruction publique," p. 79, encl. with 'Ali Ibrahim, minister of public education/Riyad Pasha, president of the council of ministers, 19 December 1880. For Isma'il's promotion of literacy among troops and among the children of village headmen, see DWQ, Mawdu' at-Ta'lim, Mahfazah 7, Amr Khidiwi/Isma'il Pasha, Nazir al-Jihadiyyah, 20 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1280/28 April 1864 (art. tr. from Turkish of Daftar 539, al-Ma'iyyah as-Saniyyah, no. 44); and Amr 'Ali ila Hukmdariyyat as-Sudan, 6 Sha'ban 1279/27 January 1863, in Sami, *Taqwim*, 1916–36, 3, ii:452–53.
15. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 1989, pp. 44–46, 64–68.
16. See Habermas, *Public Sphere*, 1989; and *idem*, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, 1979, esp. chap. 5. I think ineffective the critique offered by Marker, *Publishing*, 1985, pp. 9–12.
17. Eisenstein, *Printing Press*, 1985.
18. Ahmad Faris ash-Shidyaq, "Fi taghyir al-akhlaq," *al-Jawa'ib*, 15 February 1871, repr. in *Kanz ar-ragha'ib*, A.H. 1288–1298, 2:165.
19. Namik Kemal, "Mukaddime" [preface] to *Celaleddin Harezmsyah*, 1315/1897–98, pp. ba'-jim.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. dal-ra'.
21. 'Abduh, "al-Kitabah wa al-qalam," *al-Ahram*, no. 8, 1876, repr. in 'Abduh, *al-A'mal*, 1972–74, 3:9–14.
22. For his call for a constitution, see Pasha, *Lettre*, repr. 1897.
23. Mardin, *Young Ottoman Thought*, 1962.
24. For the distribution in Egypt of the Istanbul-based *Havadis*, see DWQ, Mahafiz *al-Waqa'i' al-misriyyah*, box 6, "Diwan al-Jurnal," 17 Jumada 1283/27 September 1866, for *Muhibb*, see *Wadi an-nil*, vol. 1, no. 18 (11 Rajab 1284/9 November 1867).
25. For Isma'il's subvention of *al-Jawa'ib*, see DWQ, Bitaqat ad-Dar, Jara'id 136, Mihrdar Khidiwi/Diwan al-Maliyyah, 3 April 1878 (orders that LE 1930 be sent to ash-Shidyaq); DWQ, Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara', ad-Dakhiliyyah, 1/2 Sahafah wa Matbu'at, Conseil des Ministres/Ministre de Finance, 20 January 1879 (reduces subvention to £300 sterling per annum); the issue is treated at length by as-Sulh, *Ahmad Faris*, 1987, esp. pt. 2.
26. Ash-Shidyaq, "Fi nisbat al-fitnah ila al-faransiyyin," *al-Jawa'ib*, 26 October 1870, repr. in *Kanz*, 1288–98, 2:76–78.
27. Quotes from *al-Jawa'ib*, in as-Sulh, *Ahmad Faris*, pp. 216–17.
28. *Al-Jawa'ib*, no. 848 [1877], in as-Sulh, *Ahmad Faris*, pp. 218–19.
29. Quotes in as-Sulh, *Ahmad Faris*, p. 220.
30. Shaw and Shaw, *Ottoman Empire*, 1977, 2:180–87.
31. PRO, FO 141/106, Vivian/Derby, no. 32, Cairo, 8 February 1877.
32. *Abu nazzarah zarqa'*, 8 January 1879.

33. DWQ, Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara', ad-Dakhiliyyah, 1/2 Sihafah, Les Directeurs des Contentieux de l'État, "Avis: Réclamation Salim Naccache," Cairo, 24 April 1883.
34. See the introduction by 'Awni Ishaq to his edition of Ishaq, *ad-Durar*, 1909, p. 9.
35. As-Sa'id, *al-Asas*, 1967, p. 105.
36. Ninet 1883: 127–28.
37. Sharubim, *al-Kafi*, 1898–1900, 4:258–59.
38. 'Abduh, *al-A'mal*, 1:482; 'Anhuri, *Sihir Harut*, 1885, p. 183.
39. Jayyid, *Tatawwur*, 1985; the following paragraph draws esp. on pp. 167–71, 203–7, and 237–41.
40. DWQ, Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara', ad-Dakhiliyyah, 1/2 Sahafah, Salim an-Naqqash/president of the council of ministers, 14 February 1883.
41. Sabat, *Ta'rikh*, p. 204.
42. *Wadi an-nil*, vol. 4, no. 8 (1 Safar 1287/3 May 1870); vol. 4, no. 61 (2 Ramadan 1287/26 November 1870).
43. Phelps 1978, citing 'Abduh, *Jaridah*, 1964, pp. 74–76.
44. Cf. Censer, *Prelude to Power*, 1976, pp. 5–6.
45. An-Naqqash/president of the council of ministers, 14 February 1883.
46. *At-Tijarah*, 1 August 13/1879 Sha'ban 1296 (for delinquent subscribers); subscribers often justified themselves, complaining of nondelivery of their newspaper by the postal service: see *at-Tankit*, 18 September 1881.
47. *Al-Mahrusah*, 10 January 1880.
48. *At-Tijarah*, 15 May 24/1879 Jumada I 1296.
49. *At-Tijarah*, 8 June 17/1879 Jumada II 1296, 14 July 25/1879 Rajab 1296, and 2 September 16/1879 Ramadan 1296.
50. DWQ, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 22, Masha'ikh Qism Halfa bi Korosko/al-Ma'iyyah as-Saniyyah, 12 Rabi' II 1294/26 April 1877.
51. *Al-Mahrusah*, 10 January 27/1880 Muharram 1297.
52. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 1983.

Chapter Five

Political Clubs and the Ideology of Dissent

1. Censer, *Prelude to Power*, 1976, esp. p. 128. For general considerations of this and related issues, see Eisenstein, "On Revolution and the Printed Word," in Porter and Teich, eds., *Revolution in History*, 1986, pp. 186–205; and Darnton and Roche, eds., *Revolution in Print*, 1989.
2. Phelps 1978.
3. Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures*, 1973, chap. 8.
4. Eco, *Role of the Reader*, 1979.
5. Several of these clubs are insightfully but preliminarily discussed by Landau 1965:135–86; Landau tends to ignore the participation in such movements of Ottoman nobles, seeing them as primarily middle-class Egyptian in character.
6. Smith and Momen, "The Babi Movement: A Resource Mobilization Perspective," in Smith and Momen, eds., *In Iran*, 1986, p. 59.
7. Molotch, "Media and Movements," in Zald and McCarthy, eds., *Dynamics*, 1979, pp. 71–93.

8. Gendzier, *Practical Visions*, 1966, pp. 49–65.
9. Landau, “Prolegomena,” pp. 142–48.
10. PRO, FO 141/119, Borg/Vivian, no. 8, Cairo, 29 March 1878.
11. *Abu nazzarah zarqa*², vol. 6, no. 4 (3 February 1882).
12. See Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal al-Din*, 1972, pp. 10–22. For recent works on Shaykhism, see Corbin, *En Islam iranien*, 1971–72, vol. 4; and Bayat, *Mysticism and Dissent*, 1982. For Babism, the major work is Amanat, *Resurrection and Renewal*, 1989. Also useful generally is Momen, *Shi‘i Islam*, 1985.
13. ‘Anhuri, *Sihr Harut*, 1885, pp. 178–79n.
14. DWQ, Afghani dossier, Ahmad Salman al-Jirkasi/Sayyid Jamalud-Din, n.d.; this student at al-Azhar’s Riwaq al-Atrak expresses a desire to study *hay’at* (cosmography) with Sayyid Jamalud-Din, saying he had found no other competent teachers in such philosophical sciences.
15. Algar, *Mirza Malkum Khan*, 1973; Bakhash, *Iran*, 1978, esp. chap. 1.
16. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamalal-d-Din*, p. 93; documentation in Afshar and Mahdavi, eds., *Majmu‘ih*, 1963, pp. 24–25, pl. 40.
17. Niqula Sakruj/Sayyid Jamalud-Din, Cairo, 7 January 1878, repr. in Afshar and Mahdavi, eds., *Majmu‘ih*, pl. 41.
18. DWQ, Afghani dossier, “Bayan ‘an at-ta‘rifat allati hasalat min ash-Shaykh Jamalud-Din,” 5 Ramadan 1296/23 August 1879.
19. DWQ, Afghani dossier, Salim an-Naqqash/Sayyid Jamalud-Din, Alexandria, 2 August 1879; since this letter postdates the closing of Star of the East Lodge 1355, the lodge in question seems likely to have belonged to the French order of masonry, to which Adib Ishaq said al-Afghani turned after his expulsion from the Star of the East: Ishaq, *ad-Durar*, 1909, pp. 221–22.
20. DWQ, Afghani dossier, ‘Abdu’r-Rahim Kabulji, Niqula Sakruj, Jibrān Qudsi, and Niqula ‘Aruqji/Sayyid Jamalud-Din, Cairo, 1 July 1879; this group also denounced Sayyid Jamalud-Din in the conservative *al-Waqt*. See “al-Jam‘iyyah al-masuniyyah fi ash-sharq,” *at-Tijarah*, 10 July 21/1879 Rajab 1296.
21. DWQ, Afghani dossier, “‘An bayan at-ta‘rifat,” *op cit*.
22. Ibid.
23. *At-Tijarah*, 3 June 12/1879 Jumada II 1296.
24. DWQ, Afghani dossier, Niqula Sakruj/Ra‘is Luj al-Kawkab ash-Sharqi, n.d.
25. DWQ, Afghani dossier, Salim an-Naqqash/Sayyid Jamalud-Din, 2 August 1879.
26. DWQ, Afghani dossier, Adib Ishaq/Sayyid Jamalud-Din, 12 December 1878.
27. Details from ‘Awni Ishaq’s introduction to Ishaq, *ad-Durar*, pp. 5–7; and ‘Anhuri, *Sihr Harut*, pp. 143–45n, 179–80n. Ishaq has been undeservedly ignored in Western scholarship, but see Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs*, 1974, pp. 81–100.
28. For the importance to Ishaq of the masonic idea of serving humanity, see DWQ, Afghani dossier, Adib Ishaq/Sayyid Jamalud-Din, Alexandria, 9 June 1879.
29. Ishaq, *ad-Durar*, 1886, pp. 49–51 (from *Misr*); one passage I found slightly corrupt and corrected it by referring to the Beirut revised and expanded edition edited by ‘Awni Ishaq in 1909.
30. Ishaq, *ad-Durar*, 1886, p. 50.
31. Ishaq, *Adib Ishaq*, 1978, p. 281 (from *Misr al-Qahirah*, 30 January 1880).
32. Ishaq, *ad-Durar*, 1886, pp. 55–57.
33. Ibid., p. 55.

34. For recent work on the Babi movement, see Smith and Momen, "Babi Movement"; and Amanat, *Resurrection and Renewal*; Ishaq notes that his information on Babism came from Sayyid Jamalud-Din, as one would expect. The extremely favorable view of Babism here expressed, as an essential part of the story of modern movements for liberty, should reopen the question of whether Sayyid Jamalud-Din did not himself at some point incline to this movement.

As for the substance of the account, the story of the Babis attacking the shah in 1878 seems suspect. The attackers could simply have been disgruntled soldiers (said to have complained about the length of their conscription), who, upon protesting, were branded Babis. Throwing stones sounds more like an impromptu expression of grievances than a planned assassination attempt. The Azali Babis did continue to attempt to assassinate the shah and joined dissident movements in the late nineteenth century, though the majority of Babis joined the pacifist and universalist Baha'i movement (for the latter, see Smith, *Babi and Baha'i Religions*, 1987).

35. The series began in *at-Tijarah*, 23 May 1879.

36. [Ishaq], "Akhbar al-mahrusah," *at-Tijarah*, 9 June 19/1879 Jumada II 1296.

37. "Ash-Sharqiyyun fi ash-sharq," *at-Tijarah*, 27 September 11/1879 Shawwal 1296; "al-Watan," *at-Tijarah*, 27 October 11/1879 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1296; Ishaq, *ad-Durar*, 1909, p. 117.

38. Ishaq, *ad-Durar*, 1886 (from *Misir*), pp. 64–66.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

40. "Al-Muhdirun wa al-fallah," *at-Tijarah*, 20 September 4/1879 Shawwal 1296; "al-Majalis," *at-Tijarah*, 18 October 2/1879 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1296. For an extended treatment of this issue, see Cannon, *Law and the Courts*, 1988.

41. "Akhbar al-mahrusah," *at-Tijarah*, 27 May 1879.

42. "Akhbar al-mahrusah," *at-Tijarah*, 8 August 30/1879 Sha'ban 1296; Adib Ishaq, "al-Fallah wa at-tahsil," *at-Tijarah*, 28 October 12/1879 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1296; "Ital al-fallah," *at-Tijarah*, 3 November 18/1879 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1296.

43. *At-Tijarah*, 3 July 14/1879 Rajab 1296; "Akhbar al-mahrusah," *at-Tijarah*, 8 August 30/1879 Sha'ban 1296.

44. Landau, "Prolegomena," p. 155, citing FO 78/3324, Malet/Granville, Cairo, 25 September, 1881.

45. For the social significance of code-switching, see Gumperz, *Discourse Strategies*, 1982.

46. *Abu nazzarah zarqa*², vol. 2, no. 3 (22 August 1878); no. 4 (30 August 1878).

47. "Iftitah ashghal ad-darajah al-ula," Asnad-i Sayyid Jamalud-Din, Majlis Library, Iran (microfilm, University of California, Los Angeles, Research Library), n.d., on *Mir² at ash-sharq* stationery. *Mir² at ash-sharq* was first owned by Salim 'Anhuri, then by Amin Nasif. See DWQ, Sijillat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/22, ad-Dakhiliyyah/Matbu'at, 11 Jumada II 1296/2 June 1879, no. 297.

48. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal al-Din*, pp. 102–12; Kenny 1966:19–27; Kudszi-Zadeh 1971:1–12; Kedourie, *'Abduh and Afghani*.

49. "Bab ma ya'ul ilayhi amr al-muslimin fi al-mustaqbal," Asnad-i Sayyid Jamalud-Din, Majlis Library, copied by Sayyid Ahmad al-Hakim al-Azhari al-Bahrawi, 12 Safar 1294/26 February 1877. Although unsigned, this piece clearly bears the hallmark of Sayyid Jamalud-Din's thinking; the reference to Islamic awakening in India, for instance, would have been based on his own experiences there. It has not to my knowledge been cited before.

50. PRO, FO 141/96, G. Lansing and A. Watson/Vivian, 2 January 1878; see also Vivian/Lansing, 26 December 1877. The British consul later complained to Sharif Pasha that this episode contravened the Ottoman sultan's firman of 1856 guaranteeing freedom of religion. Sharif Pasha agreed in principle, and said he would see the father and urge him to give his son his freedom, but he noted that interfering in a family matter of this sort was a delicate matter. As far as I know, I am the first to cite this incident.

51. Sayyid Jamalū'd-Din, "al-Hukumah al-istibdadiyyah," *Misr*, 22 Safar 1296/15 February 1879, discussed and translated in Kenny 1966:19–27.

52. DWQ, Afghani dossier, Yahya Qadri/Sayyid Jamalū'd-Din, Suez, 21 February 1879.

53. Kenny 1966:20; 'Anhuri, *Sihr Harut*, p. 183n.

54. "Akhbar Dakhiliyyah," *at-Tijarah*, 21 May 30/1879 Jumada I 1296.

55. *Al-Watan*, 1 February 10/1879 Safar 1296.

56. Ibrahim al-Laqqani/Sayyid Jamalū'd-Din, Beirut, 15 February 1883, repr. in Afshar and Mahdavi, eds., *Majmu'ih*, pl. 109; see also Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs*, 1974, pp. 29–30.

57. Jam'iyat Ittihad Misr al-Fatah, *La'ihat al-islam*, 1879, repr. in al-Jumay'i, ed., *ath-Thawrah al-'Urabiyyah*, 1982, pp. 46–64; passages discussed on pp. 53–54.

58. Laqqani/S. Jamalū'd-Din, 15 February 1883, in Afshar and Mahdavi, eds., *Majmu'ih*, pl. 108–9.

59. Taha, *Ahmad 'Urabi*, 1986, pp. 40–41, citing the nineteenth-century biographical dictionary Zakhurah, *Mir'at al-'asr*, 1978, 1:103; and PRO, FO 407/21, encl. in no. 931 ext. from the *Observer* of 23 July 1882. Taha unfortunately goes on to conflate the officers' society with Young Egypt (*Misr al-Fatah*), for which I see no evidence. Such conflation is common—Landau confuses the officers' society with the Helwan group.

60. See 'Urabi, *Taqrir*, 1982, p. 5 of the Arabic text; p. 18 of the English text.

61. *Abu nazzarah zarqa'*, vol. 2, no. 30 (13 March 1879).

62. Al-Jumay'i, 'Abdu'llah an-Nadim, 1980, pp. 51–53.

63. *At-Tijarah*, 9 June 18/1879 Jumada II 1296.

64. DWQ, Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara', Sharikat wa Jam'iyat, 3 alif Jam'iyat, "Talab i'anaah li madrasat al-jam'iyah al-khayriyyah fi Iskandariyyah" with table of income and expense dated 11 Shawwal 1297/16 October 1880.

65. A précis is given in Ninet 1883:131.

66. *Ibid.*, 131–32.

67. Kedourie, 'Abduh and Afghani, pp. 18–22.

68. The formulation of this and subsequent issues in this conclusion derives from points made in Zald and McCarthy, eds., *Dynamics*, pp. 1–5.

Chapter Six

Guild Organization and Popular Ideology

1. Al-Jabarti, 'Aja'ib, 1879–80, 3:329–36; Raymond 1975:281–98; Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad 'Ali*, 1984, pp. 43–52; Baer, *Fellah and Townsman*, 1982, esp. pp. 245–47.

2. For guild involvement in the June 1882 anti-European struggle in Alexandria on behalf of 'Urabi, see Cole 1989:106–33. For the guilds and 'Urabi in general, see Salim, *al-Quwa*, 1981, pp. 337–58, esp. p. 355 for the demonstration by cobblers and other groups.

3. See Rudé, *Ideology and Popular Protest*, 1980; other classics of the (internally diverse) Anglo-Marxist tendency include Thompson, *English Working Class*, 1968; and Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, 1965.

4. For nineteenth-century urbanization, see Baer, *Social History*, 1969, pp. 133–48; for the estimate of the number of tradespeople, see Owen, *Middle East*, 1981, pp. 148–49. The Egyptian Interior Department's own list of specifically craft guild membership in 1870, with 55,808 members, is PRO, FO 141/75, arch. no. 147; it is translated and discussed in PRO, ZHC1/3496, Stanton/Granville, 17 November 1870, where its apparent incompleteness is remarked. ʿAli Mubarak, probably writing in the early 1880s, gives guild membership in Cairo alone as 63,487 (out of a total population of about 400,000 and an adult male labor force of perhaps 144,000). But he includes groups beyond the craft guilds, such as merchants and money-changers; see his *al-Khitat*, 1886–89, 1:99–100. Note that the taxation purposes of guild rolls often caused guildmasters to claim fewer men than they actually had working with them.

5. Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, 1964.

6. Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, 1973–74, 2:503–85.

7. Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, pp. 133–34, quote on p. 134.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 29 and n. 78.

9. Baer, "Ottoman Guilds: A Reassessment," in Okyar and Inalcik, eds., *Turkey (1071–1920)*, 1980, p. 100; Inalcik, *Ottoman Empire*, 1973, pp. 151–62; Gerber 1976:59–86.

10. Toledano, *State and Society*, 1990, pp. 225–30.

11. Leeson, *Travelling Brothers*, 1979, p. 14.

12. Raymond, *Great Arab Cities*, 1984, p. 19; for the old image of Middle Eastern cities as military camps wherein the governors dictated to fragmented city groups, see Weber, *Economy and Society*, 1978, 2:1226–34.

13. Petitions from guilds are scattered among other documents at the Egyptian National Archives in the boxes preserving original letters to the Interior Ministry (*Mahafiz Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah*, hereafter ND), Arabic correspondence (*Mukatabat ʿArabi*) for 1862–80, boxes 3–37. Before the late 1860s there are single boxes with rather slim contents. By the late 1870s several boxes are needed to cover all the Arabic correspondence, including a wealth of petitions from various individuals and groups. Egyptian historians are beginning to exploit this newly organized material; for instance, see Salim, *al-Quwa*, pp. 337–58. I am grateful to Madame Sawsan ʿAbdu'l-Ghani for drawing my attention to this series. Further copies of petitions and material to set them in context may be found in the registers (*Sijillat*) of the Ministry of the Interior, the Tax Bureau (*Qalam al-Wirku*), and the city council (*ad-Da'irah al-Baladiyyah*) of Cairo, all in the Egyptian National Archives. Similar petitions from Turkish guilds late in the nineteenth century have been used by Quataert, *Social Disintegration*, 1983, esp. chap. 5.

14. For the increasing recognition of the importance of these groups in nineteenth-century societies, including Europe, see Crossick and Haupt, eds., *Shopkeepers and Master Artisans*, 1984.

15. Baer, *Social History*, pp. 155–56.

16. Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, 2:552–53; Ahmad, *Dirasat*, 1980, chap. 2, esp. pp. 66–67.

17. Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, pp. 71–72.

18. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 15, Raʿis Majlis Ibtidaʿi [judge of the Court of First Instance]/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah [minister of the interior], Muharram 1292/ February 1875; Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, p. 71, cites similar legislation, but does not seem to realize its full implications.

19. DWQ, Sijillat Diwan al-Wirku, 10 mim/1/9, Surat Qarar al-Majlis al-Khusus, Shaʿban 1286/November 1870, encl. with Muhafiz Misr/Diwan al-Wirku, 12 Shaʿban 1286/17 November 1870.

20. DWQ, Sijillat ad-Daʿirah al-Baladiyyah (Cairo city council registers), 9 mim/14/5, ad-Daʿirah al-Baladiyyah/Qalam al-Wirku, 15 Jumada I 1296/7 May 1879.

21. DWQ, Sijillat ad-Daʿirah al-Baladiyyah, 9 mim/14/5, ad-Daʿirah al-Baladiyyah/Qalam al-Wirku, 2 Rajab 1296/22 June 1879.

22. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 31, Wakil Dabtiyyat Misr/ Wakil ad-Dakhiliyyah, 5 Shaʿban 1296/ 25 July 1878.

23. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 7, Muhafiz Misr [governor of Cairo]/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 2 Rajab 1288/ 18 September 1871. The guild is called in Arabic simply “helpers” (*taʿifat al-musaʿidin*).

24. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 26, Muhafiz Iskandariyyah [governor of Alexandria]/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 18 Shaʿban 1295/ 18 August 1878. Muhammad and Ismaʿil Shaʿt, inspectors at the Minaʿ al-Basal bazaar, were arrested four years later for plundering Europeans during the ʿUrabi revolt; perhaps they remembered which way the European exporters had voted.

25. DWQ, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 24, Muhafiz Misr/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 27 Dhuʿl-Hijjah 1294/ 3 January 1878. For the historical background to the Sudanese slave trade, see Walz, *Egypt and Bilad as-Sudan*, 1978; for the nineteenth century, see Toledano, *Ottoman Slave Trade*, 1982, esp. pp. 215–19 for Egypt in this period; Baer, *Social History*, chap. 10; Tucker, *Women in Nineteenth Century Egypt*, 1985, chap. 5.

26. *Wadi an-nil*, 4, no. 70 (1 Shawwal 1287/25 December 1870); the organization was called the Dar Nadwat at-Tujjar or al-Bursah.

27. DWQ, Sijillat Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/24, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah/Dawawin, 1 Muharram 1297/15 December 1879.

28. PRO, FO 141/73, “Report,” Borg/Stanton, 20 September 1870; see also Mubarak, *al-Khitat*, 1:100–101; and Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, pp. 84–93.

29. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 36, Mudir/Wakil ad-Dakhiliyyah, 9 Ramadan 1297/16 August 1880.

30. DWQ, Sijillat ad-Daʿirah al-Baladiyyah, 9 Mim/14/5, memo of 5 Shawwal 1296/22 September 1879.

31. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 23, Qumandan ʿAsakir Muhafazah [governorate military commander]/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 20 Jumada II 1294/ 2 July 1877.

32. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 24, ʿArdhal taʿifat suq al-magharibah [petition of the guild of the Maghrebi market], rec’d. 7 Jumada I 1293/ 1 June 1876; Muhafiz Iskandariyyah/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 3 Jumada II 1293/ 27 June 1876. Several of the fifty signers of the petition had been pilgrims to Mecca, as one might expect of North African long-distance merchants. For the background of this group in Egypt, see ʿAbduʿr-Rahim, *al-Magharibah*, 1982.

33. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat ʿArabi, Mahfazah 24, ʿArdhal taʿifat as-samasirah [Peti-

tion of the brokers' guild], rec'd. 29 Shawwal 1294/ 6 November 1877; Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah/ Muhafiz Misr, 10 Shawwal 1294/ 19 October 1877. The latter quotes the police chief as saying that if the guild wants the new man instead of Salim with Zayid as his agent, they should be able to have the official of their choice. The petition is signed with fifty-two seals; most of the names are Muslim. For a history of Bulaq as a commercial center, see Hanna, *Urban History of Bulaq*, 1983.

34. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 20, 'Ardhal kayyalin [petition of the weighers], with Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah/ Muhafiz Misr, 14 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1293/ 2 December 1876; Muhafiz Misr/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 19 Dhu'l-Qa'dah/ 7 December 1876. The measurers mention bakers among their clients, so they may have been especially grain measurers.

35. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 10, Ahmad Tal'at/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 20 Safar 1290/ 20 April 1873; and 22 Safar 1290/ 22 April 1873.

36. PRO, FO 141/73, "Report," Borg/Stanton, 20 September 1870. The deputy guildmasters were called *mukhtar*, and the agent was a *wakil*. "These officers are named by the Sheikh with the concurrence of the Omads to whom the former pays one half of the sum received by him on the appointment of those Officers."

37. Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, pp. 27–29; esp. p. 29.

38. DWQ, SND, Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/24, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah/Dawawin, 1 Dhu'l-Hijjah 1296/16 November 1879, notes elections of *mukhtars* for the guild of bakers and bread makers for the Thumns of Bab ash-Sha'riyyah, Darb al-Ahmar, al-Khalifah, and al-Jamaliyyah.

39. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 15, 'Ardhal 'Ali 'Uthman Shaykh Barabirat Tanta Gharbiyyah, encl. with Mudir Gharbiyyah/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 28 Muharram 1292/ 7 March 1875. For insecure conditions in Egyptian towns in the 1870s and the practice of private individuals hiring guards to supplement the police, see PRO, FO 141/72, Stanley/Stanton, no. 104, 5 March 1870, and encl. Tanta itself had been the scene of a major Greco-Egyptian riot in 1872; see chap. 7 below. Police reports from all over Egypt on security and crime in the 1860s and 1870s, as yet unstudied, are in DWQ, SND, 19 Lam, 28 Warid Jihat [reports from the provinces].

40. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 14, 'Ardhal ta'ifat 'arabajiyyah [petition of the wagoners' guild], rec'd. 29 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1291/ 8 January 1875; DWQ, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 15, 'Ardhal Ahmad Muhammad Shaykh ta'ifat al-'arabajiyyah, rec'd. 4 Muharram 1292/ 11 February 1875 with Ra'is Majlis Ibtida'i/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah of the same date.

41. Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, pp. 66–67. The deputy guildmaster (*mukhtar*) was often chosen by guild members, just as was the guildmaster, contrary to Baer's assertion that these officers were summarily appointed and dismissed by the state. Direct government interference in appointments did occur, but more commonly guild members chose a candidate who was then ratified by the government. Nor was it only senior guild officers who expressed an opinion, as Borg wrote; rather, even journeymen voted.

42. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 34, 'Ardhal 'Aqqadin, rec'd. 22 Jumada II 1297/2 June 1880.

43. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 29, Ma'mur Dabtiyyat Misr/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, Rabi' I 1296/ February–March 1878. The importers were referred to in Arabic by the vague *al-mawaridiyyah*.

44. For the secession of the china-ware dealers, see DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi,

Mahfazah 31, Ma'mur Dabtiyyat Misr/ Wakil ad-Dakhiliyyah, 8 Sha'ban 1296/ 28 July 1878; and Wakil Dabtiyyat Misr/ Wakil ad-Dakhiliyyah, 24 Sha'ban 1296/ 19 August 1878; for a refusal to recognize a guild of only five members, see DWQ, Sijillat ad-Da'irah al-Baladiyyah, 9 mim/14/6, ad-Da'irah al-Baladiyyah/Thumn Bulaq, 20 Muharram 1297/3 January 1880.

45. Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, 2:555–57.

46. Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, p. 32; see also pp. 29–31.

47. Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, 2:523–26, esp. p. 524, n. 2; Baer, “Ottoman Guilds,” pp. 98–99.

48. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 8, 'Ardhal 'arabaiyyat barabirah wa sudaniyyah, rec'd. 19 Sha'ban 1288/ 3 November 1871. All the signatories signed themselves as masters (*usta*).

49. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 14, Muhafiz Iskandariyyah/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 11 Sha'ban 1291/ 23 September 1874; the “bribe takers” is in the Arabic original *al-bartaljiyyah*. The guildmaster of the Upper Egyptians protested his removal from authority over the guards in DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 14, 'Ardhal Ahmad 'Abdu'l-'Aziz Shaykh Ta'ifat as-Sa'ayidah Iskandariyyah, rec'd. 1 Ramadan 1291/ 12 October 1874.

50. Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, pp. 33–40.

51. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 29, Mudir al-Minya/ Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 20 Rabi'I 1296/23 February 1878. For the position of Copts, see Behrens-Abouseif, “The Political Situation of the Copts, 1798–1923,” in Braude and Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews*, 1982, 2:185–205; for Coptic merchants in Upper Egypt, see Walz 1978:113–26.

52. DWQ, ND, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 34, Ma'mur Dabtiyyat Misr/Wakil ad-Dakhiliyyah, 29 Rabi' II 1297/11 April 1880.

Chapter Seven

Of Crowds and Empires: Euro-Egyptian Conflict

1. See Rudé, *Crowd in the French Revolution*, 1959; *idem*, *Crowd in History*, 1964; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, *Rebellious Century*, 1975; Tilly, *Contentious French*, 1986; Davis, *Society and Culture*, 1975, esp. chaps. 1 and 6; Underdown, *Revel, Riot and Rebellion*, 1985; and Holton 1978:219–33.

2. Raymond, “Quartiers et mouvements populaires,” in Holt, ed., *Political and Social Change*, 1968, pp. 104–16; *idem*, 1975:281–398; Baer, “Popular Revolt in Ottoman Cairo,” in his *Fellah and Townsman*, 1982, pp. 225–52. Cf. Abrahamian 1969:128–50; and Cole and Momen 1986:112–43.

3. Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of the Notables,” in Polk and Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, 1968, pp. 67–68; see also pp. 44–49 for the definitions involved.

4. See Shoshan 1980:459–78; Peters, “The Battered Dervishes of Bab Zuwayla,” in Levzion and Voll, eds., *Eighteenth-Century Renewal and Reform in Islam*, 1987, pp. 93–115; Baer, “Popular Revolt,” pp. 225–34.

5. PRO, FO 78/381, Bowring Report, March 1839.

6. Tilly, *Big Structures*, 1984, pp. 1–13, 53–56; p. 55 cites Nelson, *Access to Power*, 1979, p. 108; Toledano, *State and Society*, 1990, pp. 199–200.

7. Nubarian, *Mémoires*, 1983, pp. 151–52; PRO, FO 141/125, Vivian/Salisbury, no. 53, Cairo, 15 February 1879.
8. PRO, ZHC1/3496, Stanton/Granville, Cairo, 17 November 1870, reports that even inferior Greek workmen received between 3s. (14.6 tariff piasters) and 5s. (24.4 piasters) per day, whereas Egyptians got 2s. (9.75 piasters) per day. Twenty shillings (20s.) equaled one British pound, which equaled 97.5 tariff piasters or not quite an Egyptian pound.
9. *Al-Watan*, vol. 2 (1 February 10/1879 Safar 1296).
10. See, e.g., Sabry, *La genèse*, 1924; *idem*, *L'Empire*, 1933; ar-Rafi'i, *Asr Isma'îl*, 1982; Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal al-Din*, 1972.
11. For recent work on 1857 in India, see Mukherjee, *Awadh in Revolt*, 1984; and Cole, *North Indian Shi'ism*, 1988, chap. 10; for evidence of return migration after the British conquest, see, e.g., az-Zayn, *Fusul*, 1979, p. 132. Indians in Cairo and even in the provinces were numerous enough to have chosen their own local leaders or shaykhs (FO 141/111, Carr/Wallis, no. 19, Kafr Zayat, 22 December 1876).
12. PRO, FO 141/36, pt. 1, West/Green, Suez, 5 July 1858.
13. PRO, FO 141/36, pt. 1, Walue/Green, Cairo, 5 July 1858.
14. PRO, FO 141/48, Drummond Hay/Colquhoun, Cairo, 18 February 1863.
15. *Ibid.*
16. DWQ, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 3, Ma'mur Siwah/Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 7 Safar 1276/5 September 1859.
17. PRO, FO 78/1871, Colquhoun/Russell, no. 27, Cairo, 5 March 1865; no. 32, Cairo, 11 March 1865; no. 41, Cairo, 24 March 1865; see also Sarhank, *Haqa'iq*, 1895–98, 2:281; Baer, *Social History*, p. 99.
18. Quoted from French Archives, Correspondance politique, Egypt, vol. 37, 19 November 1865, in Sabry, *L'Empire*, pp. 220–21.
19. Viceroy/ Muhafazat Misr, 25 Ramadan 1279/ 19 March 1863, tr. in Sami, *Taqwim*, 1916–36, 2:466.
20. Reimer 1988:531.
21. Ilbert 1987:177–78; Awad 1987:94–101; Reimer 1988:531–53.
22. PRO, FO 78/1871, Colquhoun/Bulwer, no. 2, Alexandria, 22 May 1865; Colquhoun/Russell, no. 56, Alexandria, 25 May 1865; Colquhoun/Russell, no. 58, Alexandria, 27 May 1865.
23. For the Italians in Alexandria, see Volait 1987:137–56.
24. *Wadi an-nil*, vol. 1, no. 6 (15 Rabi' II 1284/16 August 1867).
25. DWQ, Sijillat Diwan al-Wirku, 10 mim/1/9, Muhafazat Misr/Diwan al-Wirku, 25 Shawwal 1285/8 February 1869.
26. The disputes over authority are treated in Politis, *L'Hellénisme*, 1929–30, 1:273–79; the riot is described in PRO, FO 78/2139, Stanton/Clarendon, no. 3, Cairo, 7 January 1870; FO 141/71 Lane/Clarendon, Alexandria, 15 January 1870.
27. PRO, FO 78/2186, Stanton/Granville, no. 5, Alexandria, 29 June 1871; Stanton/Granville, no. 60, Cairo, 14 December 1871; Nubar, *Mémoires*, pp. 394–97; Sabry, *L'Empire*, pp. 219–20.
28. See Najm, *Bur Sa'id*, 1987, chap. 2, esp. pp. 74–75. See also Dori 1956:1–46.
29. PRO, FO 141/72, Zarb/Stanley, Port Said, 21 February 1870, encl. with Stanley/Stanton, Alexandria, 24 February 1870, arch. no. 92.
30. PRO, FO 141/68, Joyce/Stanton, Cairo, 6 March 1872, arch. no. 118.

31. The establishment in the 1860s and 1870s of provincial Greek commercial colonies in Egyptian towns such as Zaqaqīq, Tanta, Mansura, and Asyut is chronicled in Politis, *L'Hellénisme*, esp. 1:317–402; 2:195–209.

32. PRO, FO 141/78, pt. 2, Borg/Stanton, Cairo, 28 May 1872.

33. PRO, FO 141/92, Baker/Cookson, Port Said, 15 September 1875, arch. no. 406.

34. PRO, FO 141/120, Captain Beamish/Vice-Admiral Hornby, no. 32, Alexandria, 17 June 1878; FO 141/115, Vivian/Salisbury, no. 21, Alexandria, 22 June 1878.

35. For an example of a French-Italian fracas in a Port Said coffeehouse, see DWQ, Sijillat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/23, ad-Dakhiliyyah/Aqalim, 25 Ramadan 1296/12 September 1879, no. 95; for a threatened duel between foreigners after an altercation in front of Port Said's Alkazar Coffeehouse, see the same series, 19 Lam/24/24, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah/Aqalim, 4 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1296/28 October 1879. For passport control, see Sijillat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/23, ad-Dakhiliyyah/Dawawin, 28 Shawwal 1296/7 July 1879, no. 36 Ifranji; for the exile of the indigent, see Bitaqat ad-Dar, 263 Dabtiyyah, al-Majlis al-Khususi/Diwan al-Maliyyah, 1 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1291/10 December 1874.

36. PRO, FO 141/82, West/Vivian, no. 42, Suez, 8 September 1873.

37. Ibid.

38. FO 141/84, Rogers/Granville, no. 34, Cairo, 24 September 1873.

39. DWQ, Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara', Haqqaniyyah, 2/1 Qawanin Mutanawwa'ah, Ministry of Justice dossier dated 1882, "Commissions de conciliation dans l'Égypte," n.d. memorandum, [late 1870s].

40. PRO, FO 141/100, Vivian/Derby, no. 7, Cairo, 20 October 1876.

41. Ibid.

42. PRO, FO 141/106, Vivian/Derby, no. 97, Cairo, 14 April 1857.

43. PRO, FO 141/106, Vivian/Derby, no. 100, Cairo, 19 April 1877.

44. PRO, FO 141/106, Vivian/Derby, no. 186, Alexandria, 21 June 1877; trans. in FO 141/111, comm. by Acting Vice Consul Borg, 21 June 1877.

45. PRO, FO 141/111, Carr/Borg, no. 32, Kafr Zayyat, 31 May 1877.

46. PRO, FO 141/111, Borg/Atkin, no. 15, Cairo, 30 July 1877.

47. PRO, FO 141/107, Vivian/Derby, no. 298, Alexandria, 29 September 1877.

48. PRO, FO 141/106, Vivian/Derby, no. 158, Cairo, 3 June 1877.

49. PRO, FO 141/120, Carr/Borg, no. 14, Tanta, 11 June 1878.

50. PRO, FO 141/110, petition, encl. with Wallis/Vivian, no. 4, Cairo, 6 February 1877.

51. PRO, FO 141/120, "Report of Acting Consular Agent at Zaqaqīq," tr. encl. with Borg/Vivian, no. 15, Cairo, 14 June 1878; for Zaqaqīq, see Mubarak, *al-Khitat*, 1304–6/1886–89, 11:931–32; the city had a population of around 20,000 in 1882.

52. PRO, FO 141/120, Orfa/Cookson, Alexandria, 25 June 1878; deposition encl.

53. DWQ, Sijillat Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/vol. 24, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah/Dawawin, 26 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1296/11 December 1879.

54. Ibid.

55. PRO, FO 141/125, Vivian/Salisbury, no. 256, Cairo, 4 May 1879.

56. The 1858 Jiddah riot is analyzed in detail in Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State*, 1984, pp. 140–52; see also PRO, FO 141/36, pt. 2, Green/Malmesbury, telegram, Alexandria, 6 July 1858. Captain William Pullen of the HMS *Cyclops*, anchored in Jiddah's harbor at the time, reported, "object of the rising said to be the extermination

of Xians in the Holy land” and that one unconfirmed rumor suggested that an Indian Muslim holy man in Mecca had helped stir up the trouble (FO 141/36, pt. 2, précis of Pullen/Sec. Admiralty, no. 2, Jiddah, 25 June 1858).

57. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 1983, chap. 1; for corroboration, see Salibi, “1860 Upheaval in Damascus,” in Polk and Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization*, pp. 185–202.

58. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 1983.

Chapter Eight

Repression and Censorship

1. Patterson, *Censorship*, 1984, quote on p. 74; other points on pp. 17–18.

2. DWQ, Dabtiyyah, Mahfazah 1, Sa'id/Ma'mur Dabtiyyat Misr, no. 115, 25 Rajab 1276/17 February 1860; Sa'id/Ma'mur, no. 116, 3 Ramadan 1276/26 March 1860.

3. For beatings, see DWQ, Dabtiyyah, Mahfazah 1, Jinab 'Ali/Ma'mur, no. 125, 5 Sha'ban 1279/26 January 1863; for the police, see Ramadan, *al-Hayah*, 1977, pp. 40–41.

4. *Wadi an-nil*, vol. 1, no. 6 (15 Rabi' II 1284/16 August 1867).

5. For the requirement of police forces in provincial capitals, see DWQ, Bitaqat ad-Dar, 263 Dabtiyyah, Qarar al-Majlis al-Khususi, 29 Rabi' I 1289/6 June 1872. For the numbers given from 1870, see as-Suruji, *al-Jaysh*, 1967, p. 373.

6. PRO, FO 141/72, Zarb/Stantley, Port Said, ND, encl. with Stanley/Stanton, 5 March 1870, arch. no. 104.

7. PRO, FO 141/72, Stanley/Zarb, 28 February 1870, encl. with Stanley/Stanton, 5 March 1870.

8. DWQ, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Mukatabat Ifranji, Mahfazah 7, Sharif Pasha/Préfets de Police au Caire, d'Alexandrie, et de Tantah, 18 December 1872; Bitaqat ad-Dar, 263 Dabtiyyah, al-Majlis al-Khususi/Dabtiyyat Misr, 5 Safar 1290/4 April 1873; the authorities in Port Said also felt the need for at least a few European policemen (263 Dabtiyyah, al-Majlis al-Khususi/al-Ma'iyah as-Saniyyah, 22 Rajab 1295/22 July 1878).

9. DWQ, Bitaqat ad-Dar, 263 Dabtiyyah, Amr Karim/Muhammad Rida Pasha, 6 May 1877.

10. DWQ, Sijillat Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah (hereafter SND), Warid Dabtiyyat, 19/Lam/24/23, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah/Dawawin, 12 Ramadan 1296/30 August 1879, no. 460.

11. For treatment of the indigent see DWQ, Sijillat Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/24, ad-Dakhiliyyah/Dawawin, 20 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1296/5 November 1879; and Bitaqat ad-Dar, 263 Dabtiyyah, al-Majlis al-Khususi/Diwan al-Maliyyah, 1 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1291/10 December 1874 (for the expulsion of the indigent). For police whipping of factory workers, see Kusel, *Englishman's Recollections*, 1915, p. 20.

12. DWQ, SND, Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/23, 14 Ramadan 1296/1 September 1879, no. 322; 19 Lam/24/24, ad-Dakhiliyyah/Dawawin, 17 Muharram 1297/31 December 1879; Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 37, petition of six police officers to Ma'mur Dabtiyyat Misr, Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1297/6 October 1880.

13. This and the subsequent paragraph are based on the careful work in the Egyptian archives of as-Suruji, *al-Jaysh*, pp. 357–86.

14. Sarhank, *Haqa'iq*, 1895–98, 2:367; an-Naqqash, *Misr*, 1884, 4:15.
15. Is the weaker army signaled already late in 1879 by bedouins refusing to pay their debts to urban merchants? See DWQ, SND, Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/24, ad-Dakhiliyyan/Dawawin, 5 Dhu'l-Hijjah 1296/20 November 1879, detailing a revolt of the al-Mashahir tribe when a member was pressed by a local creditor, reported by the commander of the fort at Qal'at Muwaylih.
16. DWQ, SND, Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/24, ad-Dakhiliyyah/Dawawin, 10 Muharram 1297/24 December 1879; the officer suffering the verbal abuse here was the governor of the fortress of Upper Egypt (Muhafiz Qal'at al-Wajh).
17. Muhammad Effendi Fanni, "Baqiyyat al-mutamanni fi tarjamat Fanni," *Tarikh Taymur*, MS 1126, Dar al-Kutub, Cairo (incomplete, with no colophon, but apparently an autograph MS).
18. Sharubim, *al-Kafi*, 1898–1900, 4:226.
19. Fanni, "Baqiyyat al-mutamanni," pp. 65–66.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 66–67 for the Arabic text of the officers' anonymous petition. The British intercepted the document as it circulated, and had it translated into French (PRO, FO 141/134, Malet/Granville, no. 210, Cairo, 25 May 1880, and encl.).
21. Fanni, "Baqiyyat al-mutamanni," pp. 77–91; Sharubim, *al-Kafi*, 4:226; DWQ, Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara', Haqqaniyyah, 1/1/1 Alif, khedivial decrees of 1881.
22. DWQ, Mahafiz ath-Thawrah al-'Urabiyyah, Mahfazah 42, dossier G 47, Riyaz Pasha/Stone Pasha, 30 January 1881; cf. Mahfazah 20, dossier 164, testimony of Muhammad Bey Hamdi, 20 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1299/3 October 1882.
23. Monge/Saint-Hilaire, Cairo, 30 May 1881 and 13 June 1881, in Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques français (1871–1914)*, ser. 1, 4:24–25, 31–32.
24. Patterson, *Censorship*, pp. 47–48, 57–58.
25. Loseff, *Censorship*, 1984, p. 6.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 228–30.
27. Gouldner, *Future of Intellectuals*, 1979.
28. For the law against cursing, see DWQ, Abhath Mahfazah 52, "La'ihah tahdhibat," 3 Shawwal 1283/8 February 1867; for Port Sa'id's blasphemous greengrocer, see SND, Warid Dabtiyyat, 19 Lam/24/24, ad-Dakhiliyyah/Aqalim, 4 Muharram 1297/18 December 1879; for the beginnings of Egypt's long history of persecuting Bahais, see Browne, *Year amongst the Persians*, 1926, pp. 362–64; Momen, ed., *Babi and Baha'i Religions*, pp. 257–64.
29. PRO, FO 141/36, pt. 1, Hasan/Green, Cairo, no. 67, 23 January 1858. The 1857 law is reprinted in Kudret, *Abdülhamit*, 1977, pp. 83–85. A French version is in PRO, FO 141/36, pt. 1, "Réglement émané par la Sublime Porte pour les imprimeries de l'Empire," 20 Jumada II 1273/15 February 1857.
30. DWQ, Dabtiyyah, Mahfazah 1, Jinab 'Ali/Ma'mur, no. 122, 11 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1277/21 May 1860. On al-Jaza'iri, see Commins 1988:121–31.
31. PRO, FO 141/50, Sharif/Consul General, Cairo, no. 785, 7 October 1863; this decision was reiterated several times to recalcitrant foreign consuls and publishers; for example, see DWQ, Bitaqat ad-Dar, Jara'id wa Matbu'at 136, Amr Karim/Nazir al-Kharijiyyah, end of Ramadan 1281/26 February 1865.
32. DWQ, Bitaqat ad-Dar, Jara'id wa Matbu'at 136, Amr Karim/Nazir al-Maliyyah, 9 Rajab 1283/17 November 1866.

33. See Cole, "Orientalism and the Limits of Discourse," forthcoming in the John S. Galbraith Festschrift edited by Roger Long.

34. Quote in PRO, FO 141/70, Dhu'l-Fiqar/Stanley, no. 520, Alexandria, 18 August 1869; problems of gathering information noted in DWQ, Mahafiz al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyyah, box 6, file "as-Sahafah," 'Abdu'r-Rahman Rushdi, Mudir al-Waburat as-Saniyyah/al-Ma'iyah as-Saniyyah, 19 Sha'ban 1279/9 February 1863.

35. For examples of payments to the press, see DWQ, Bitaqat ad-Dar, Jara'id wa Matbu'at 136, Amr Karim/al-Maliyyah, 7 Shawwal 1291/17 November 1874 (payment of F 5,000 per year to help *Finance*); Mihrdar al-Khidiwi/Diwan al-Maliyyah, 3 April 1878 (LE 1930.50 for Ahmad Faris ash-Shidyaq, editor of *al-Jawa'ib*); al-Majlis al-Khususi/al-Maliyyah, 12 Jumada I 1295/14 May 1878 (payment of LE 964.37 to *an-Nil* for government advertising). For the budget, see PRO, FO 141/82, "Budget of the Egyptian Government," encl. with Rogers/Vivian, Cairo, 5 October 1873. For the phrase "reptile fund," see Ruud, *Fighting Words*, 1982, p. 198.

36. For al-Hamawi, see DWQ, Bitaqat ad-Dar, Jara'id wa Matbu'at 136, Sharif Pasha/al-Ma'iyah as-Saniyyah, 22 Jumada II 1290/17 August 1873; Mihrdar Khidiwi/Dabtiyyat Iskandariyyah, 5 Sha'ban 1290/28 September 1873; for *Le Crocodile*, see PRO, FO 141/72, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Direction de la Presse/Consul General, Cairo, 2 February 1870, arch. no. 52.

37. 'Abdu'llah Abu's-Su'ud Effendi, inaugural editorial, *Wadi an-nil*, vol. 1, no. 1 (3 Rabi' I 1284/5 July 1867); a full biographical notice of this figure is "Tarjamat Abu's-Su'ud Effendi," Cairo, Egyptian National Library, Ta'rikh 3 qaf, MS 1048; trained in Muhammad 'Ali's civil schools and at at-Tahtawi's School of Languages, he served every viceroy as a translator in some governmental department, though he ended his career teaching history at Dar al-'Ulum and as a member of the local Cairo appeals court bench.

38. "Al-Hawadith ad-dakhiliyyah," *Wadi an-nil*, vol. 3, no. 1 (11 Muharram 186/23 April 1869).

39. DWQ, Bitaqat ad-Dar, Jara'id wa Matbu'at 136, Mihrdar Khidiwi/Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, 14 Sha'ban 1291/26 September 1874; Amr Karim/Maliyyah, 21 Dhu'l-Hijjah 1291/29 January 1875.

40. Gendzier, *Practical Visions*, 1966, pp. 9–21.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 34–39; Ninet 1883:128.

42. Gendzier, *Practical Visions*, pp. 49–65. A set of the Paris-based *Abu nazzarah* was republished in Beirut in 1878 by Dar Sadir.

43. DWQ, Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara', Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, 1/2 Sahafah wa Matbu'at, council of ministers/minister of finance, 20 January 1879.

44. DWQ, Mahafiz al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyyah, box 6, "Ikhtar Rasmi," *al-Waqa'i' al-misriyyah*, 14 Muharram 1296/7 January 1879; "Ikhtar Rasmi min Idarat al-Matbu'at," *al-Waqa'i' al-misriyyah*, 15 Jumada I 1296/ 6 May 1879.

45. *Al-Watan*, 13 February 22/1879 Safar 1296.

46. "Akhbar dakhiliyyah," *at-Tijarah*, 15 May 24/1879 Jumada I 1296.

47. "Akhbar al-mahrusah," *at-Tijarah*, 8 July 19/1879 Rajab 1296.

48. Ibrahim al-Laqqani/Sayyid Jamalud-din, Beirut, 15 February 1883, repr. in Afshar and Mahdavi, eds., *Majmu'ih-'i*, 1963, pl. 108.

49. *At-Tijarah*, 24 September 8/1879 Shawwal 1296.

50. DWQ, SND, 19 Lam/24/24, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah/Dawawin, beginning of Dhu'l-Hijjah 1296/16 November 1879; *at-Tijarah*, 10 November 25/1879 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1296.

51. Ibrahim al-Laqqani/Sayyid Jamalud-Din, Beirut, 15 February 1883, repr. in Afshar and Mahdavi, eds., *Majmu'ih-'i asnad*, pl. 108 and 109; see also Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs*, 1974, pp. 29–30.

52. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, personal communication, 10 December 1990 (based on family lore—al-'Aqqad's son married her great-aunt).

53. Hassan Mousa el-Accad, "Petition envoyée a M. Wilson le 4 Mai 1880," *La Reforme*, 17 May 1880; DWQ, Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara', Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, 1/2 Sahafah, Jules Barbier/Président du Conseil des Ministres, 14 February 1882; Ministre de Finance/Conseil des Ministres, 25 September 1881.

54. PRO, FO 141/134, Malet/Granville, no. 210, Cairo, 25 May 1880; other quotes in this paragraph come from the same source; a more detailed discussion of this and subsequent issues in European censorship is in Cole, "Orientalism and the Limits of Discourse."

55. PRO, FO 141/144, Malet/Granville, no. 254, Cairo, 25 September 1881; Malet/Granville, no. 270, 6 October 1881.

56. Egypt, *Dikriat wa taqiriat*, 1881–83, 3:58–60; PRO, FO 141/149, Cookson/Malet, Alexandria, 13 December 1881, with encl. Philip/Cookson, 6 December 1881.

57. Blunt, *Secret History*, 1922 [1907], p. 117.

58. "Further Account given by Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, December 22nd, 1903," in *ibid.*, pp. 378–79.

59. Cf. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, 1985; and Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, *Dominant Ideology Thesis*, 1980.

Chapter Nine

Social and Cultural Origins of the Revolution

1. Hroch, *Social Preconditions*, 1985.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 177–90.

3. DWQ, Mahafiz ath-Thawrah al-'Urabiyyah (hereafter MTU), Mahfazah 42, dossier G47, Riyad Pasha/Stone Pasha, 30 January 1881.

4. PRO, FO 141/143, Malet/Granville, no. 46, 6 February 1881.

5. Sharubim, *al-Kafi*, 1898–1900, 4:245–46.

6. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 41, folder 128, khedive/sultan, 9 September 1881 (telegraphic); and khedive/sultan, 11 September 1881 (telegraphic).

7. PRO, FO 141/144, Malet/Granville, no. 273, Cairo, 7 October 1881.

8. Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, 1981, pp. 164–67, 193–94.

9. Sharubim, *al-Kafi*, 4:259.

10. An-Nadim, *al-Mudhakkirat*, 1956, p. 61; for Muhammad Sultan, see Hunter 1983:537–44.

11. PRO, FO 141/144, Malet/Granville, no. 246, Cairo, 21 September 1881, reporting a conversation with Abdülhamid in Istanbul. Cf. FO 141/154, Malet/Granville, Cairo, no. 82, 20 February 1882, where the sultan advises Tawfiq to throw the revolutionaries in the Nile; Ottoman anti-'Urabi policy is analyzed in Deringil 1988:3–24.

12. PRO, FO 78/3326, memorandum of 2 November 1881, quoted in Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, pp. 185–86.
13. PRO, FO 141/154, Malet/Granville, Cairo, no. 33, 23 January 1882; Cairo, no. 56, 6 February 1882.
14. Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, pp. 27–28.
15. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 19, dossier 89, Shahadat Saʿid al-Bustani, Mutarjim Farangi bi Qalam al-Matbuʿat, 24 Dhuʿl-Qaʿdah 1299/6 October 1882; Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzaraʿ, ad-Dakhiliyyah, 1/2 Sahafah, “Avis: Reclamation Selim Nacache,” Les Directeurs des Contentieux de l’État, Cairo, 24 April 1883.
16. Fahmi, *Mudhakkirat*, 1976, pp. 33–35.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
18. Farman, *Egypt and its Betrayal*, 1908, pp. 306–8.
19. FO, Confidential Print 4716/1, Viscount Lyons/Earl Granville, 30 June 1882, in Bourne and Watt, eds., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, 1984, 9:44.
20. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 19, dossier 140, “Taqrir ʿAli Mubarak Pasha,” 29 Dhuʿl-Qaʿdah 1299/12 October 1882; cf. an-Nadim, *Mudhakkirat*, p. 71.
21. Vorges/Freycinet, Alexandria, 25 July 1882, in Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques français*, 1921, 4:449–50.
22. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 18, dossier 39, Iskandar Fahmi, letter of 29 Dhuʿl-Qaʿdah 1299/11 October 1882.
23. Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, p. 272.
24. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 42, Wathiqah 1216.
25. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 21, dossier 15, Qarar al-Majlis al-ʿUrfi, 17 Ramadan 1299/2 August 1882.
26. The decisions of the common-law cabinet are in DWQ, MTU, 21, and these documents have been usefully summarized by Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, pp. 273–80, 292–303.
27. PRO, FO 141/144, Malet/Granville, no. 335, Cairo, 17 November 1881.
28. PRO, FO 141/144, Malet/Granville, Cairo, no. 350, 28 November 1881; and no. 377, Cairo, 12 December 1881.
29. See Phelps 1978: 157–255.
30. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 19, dossier 89, Shahadat Saʿid al-Bustani, Mutarjim Farangi bi Qalam al-Matbuʿat, 24 Dhuʿl-Qaʿdah 1299/6 October 1882.
31. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 19, dossier 85, Ridwan Effendi Fahmi, Mutarjim Turki bi Qalam al-Matbuʿat, letter of 24 Dhuʿl-Qaʿdah 1299/6 October 1882.
32. *Ibid.*
33. Al-Jumayʿi, ʿAbduʿllah an-Nadim, 1980, pp. 86–87.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 76–77; for Nadim’s addresses to this group in late May 1882, see an-Nadim, *al-Mudhakkirat*, p. 66.
35. PRO, FO 141/161, “List of Officers who have been taken prisoner or have surrendered,” and “Officers, non-commissioned officers and men connected with the rebellion, the disturbances of the 11th June and the subsequent events,” encl. with Jafo/Malet, Alexandria, 28 October 1882.
36. *Ibid.*, “Government employees implicated in the rebellion,” and “Civilians implicated in the rebellion.”
37. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 18, dossier 13, Ibrahim Bey an-Nasuri, letter of 18 Dhuʿl-Hijjah 1299/31 October 1882.

38. DWQ, MTU, 42, Wathiqah 1216, "Surah al-qarar al-mu'ṭa," 13 Ramadan 1299/29 July 1882.
39. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 20, dossier 187, "Istijwab Muhammad Effendi 'Abbasi, Qadi Rashid," 23 Dhu'l-Hijjah 1299/5 November 1882.
40. Ibid., dossier 197, Muhammad Mustafa as-Suyufi, letter dated 26 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1299/9 October 1882.
41. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 20, dossier 213, "Ma'lumat Mustafa 'Akush Pasha, Mufattish Fabriqat Wajh Qibli," n.d. [October 1882].
42. "Taqrir 'Ali Mubarak Pasha."
43. Deringil 1988:12.
44. DWQ, MTU, 41, miscellaneous lists, a list of thirty-two subjects found guilty of rebellion. The Khalwatiyyah order was widely implicated in the rebellion, unlike the orders under Shaykh al-Bakri. See de Jong 1984:132–39; and, more generally, de Jong, *Turuq and Turuq-Linked Institutions*, 1978.
45. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 40, dossier 190, "Asma' al-masjunin bi mahallat sujun dabtiiyat misr," 18 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1299/1 October 1882 (the list contains three journalists and five telegraphers); see also Mahfazah 18, dossier 39, Henry P. Lullesurier/Isma'il Pasha Ayub, 12 October 1882, which asks why Iskandar Fahmi, head of the railways administration, kept railway shipments running smoothly during the revolt, since in doing so he was clearly acting against the khedive.
46. PRO, FO 141/144, Malet/Granville, Cairo, no. 335, 17 November 1881.
47. Sharubim, *al-Kafi*, 4:254.
48. PRO, FO 407/20, Malet/Granville, Cairo, no. 932, 25 June 1882; Malet says a controversy existed as to whether the notables acted as a result of threats from the military, but the evidence in the Egyptian archives suggests the guildmasters' support for 'Urabi was genuine.
49. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 19, dossier 117, letter of 'Abdu'r-Rahman al-Bahrawi, 27 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1299/9 October 1882.
50. Salim, *al-Quwa*, 1981, pp. 344–51, citing documents from the MTU.
51. Sharubim, *al-Kafi*, 4:332; cited in Salim, *al-Quwa*, p. 355.
52. See Najm, *Bur Sa'id*, 1987, pp. 390–91, for the guards. For the coal heavers' strike, see Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, 1964, p. 136. Baer's interpretation of the strike as an instance of stratification within a guild has been challenged (on the grounds that Port Said had no guilds and the British documents mentioned none) by Lockman and Beinin, *Workers on the Nile*, 1987, pp. 27–30. Najm has found in the Egyptian archives extensive documentation on the guilds in Port Said, however, including that of the coal heavers, and there can be no doubt that Baer's interpretation is perfectly sound (see Najm, *Bur Sa'id*, pp. 77–80).
53. Salim, *al-Quwa*, p. 356, citing *al-Waqa'if al-Misriyyah*, 6 September 1882.
54. PRO, FO 141/161, Beaman/Malet, no. 46, Cairo, 4 July 1882.
55. PRO, FO 141/161, "Civilians implicated in the rebellion," encl. with Jafo/Malet, Alexandria, 28 October 1882.
56. The case of the Sha'ṭs and European interference in elections is described in DWQ, Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah, Mukatabat 'Arabi, Mahfazah 26, Muhafiz Iskandariyyah/Nazir ad-Dakhiliyyah, 18 Sha'ban 1295/18 August 1878.
57. FO 141/161, "Civilians implicated in the rebellion"; cf. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 8, dossier 53/d/2, cited by Salim, *al-Quwa*, p. 354.

58. PRO, FO 141/161, “Kashf ʿan bayan al-ahkam al-mutawaqqaʿah min majlis ʿaskariyyah iskandariyyah ʿala madhkurin nazaran li taʿalluqihim biʿl-ʿisyan wa ishtirakihim fi al-waqaʿiʿ allati hadathat.”
59. Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, pp. 78–79.
60. “Surah al-qarar al-muʿta.”
61. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 40, dossier 185, “Bayan awraq al-qadaya al-mawjudah bi lajnat at-tahqiq: qadaya al-aqalim bi Misr,” n.d. [fall 1882].
62. Fahmi, *Mudhakkirat*, p. 37.
63. PRO, FO 407/20, extract from the *Journal Officiel* of 14 June 1882, encl. no. 1018, Lyons/Granville, Paris, 14 June 1882.
64. A more extended treatment of the Alexandria collective violence, in comparative perspective, is Cole 1989:106–33.
65. PRO, FO 407/20, Malet/Granville, no. 933, Cairo, 6 June 1882.
66. PRO, ZHC1/4503, *Correspondence Respecting the Riots at Alexandria on the 11th June, 1882*, Granville/Malet, 17 August 1882, encl., statement of Carmelo Polidani.
67. Chamberlain 1977:14–39, otherwise a very workmanlike exploration of the British sources for the high politics of the riot, I think errs in tending to blame it on Tawfiq’s machinations.
68. Farman, *Egypt and its Betrayal*, 1908, p. 304.
69. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 18, dossier 1, Taqrirat as-saʿibin fi hadithat 11 Yuniyu 1882, 21 Dhuʿl-Qaʿdah 1299/4 October 1882 (testimony of wounded at the government hospital).
70. An-Naqqash, *Misr*, 1884, 5:3–6.
71. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 18, dossier 26, testimony of Ahmad Qabudan [October 1882].
72. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 18, dossier 1, testimony of ʿUmar Lutfi Pasha [fall 1882]; Mahfazah 18, dossier 20, testimony of Ahmad Salamah, Muʿawin Dabtiyyat Iskandariyyah, 8 Dhuʿl-Hijjah 1299/21 September 1882; Mahfazah 19, dossier 131, testimony of ʿAli Hasan, broker and petition-writer [fall 1882]; Mahfazah 20, dossier 183, testimony of Muhammad Tahir, Muʿawin bi Dabtiyyat Iskandariyyah, 4 Dhuʿl-Hijjah 1299/17 October 1882; PRO, FO 407/20, Cookson/Malet, Alexandria, 16 June 1882, encl. no. 1 in Cookson/Granville, no. 1447, Alexandria, 20 June 1882; Mr. A. A. Ralli/Mrs. Ralli, Athens, 17 June 1882, encl. in no. 1553.
73. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 18, dossier 1, Taqrirat al-Atibbaʿ wa al-Qanasil, 21 Dhuʿl-Qaʿdah 1299/4 October 1882; Farman, *Egypt and its Betrayal*, pp. 305–7; PRO, FO 407/20, Calvert/Granville, no. 903, Alexandria, 12 June 1882, medical report of European consular corps in Alexandria, encl. no. 7 in no. 1447, Alexandria, 12 June 1882.
74. *Correspondence Respecting the Riots at Alexandria*, Granville/Malet, 17 August 1882.
75. PRO, FO 407/21, Dufferin/Granville, no. 332, Therapia, 28 June 1882.
76. An-Naqqash, *Misr*, 5:140–42.
77. Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, p. 282.
78. “List of persons under arrest,” Borg, 14 November 1882.
79. Rudé, *Crowd in History*, 1964, pp. 61–64.

80. Davis, *Society and Culture*, 1975, chap. 6.
81. Barakat, *Tatawwur*, 1977, pp. 238–39, 281, 285.
82. Baer, *Social History*, pp. 93–108; and *idem*, *Fellah and Townsman*, 1982, pp. 253–323.
83. “Bayan awraq al-qadaya al-mawjudah bi lajnat at-tahqiq: Qadaya al-aqalim bi mistr.”
84. PRO, FO 141/161, “Return of persons under arrest in connection with the suppression of the rebellion,” Raphael Borg, Cairo, 14 November 1882.
85. Salim, *al-Quwa*, p. 293, citing Ya‘qub Sannu‘’s *al-Hawi*.
86. Ring/Saint-Hilaire, Cairo, 10 February 1881, in *Documents diplomatiques français*, 3:354–55.
87. Sharubim, *al-Kafi*, 4:239, 245–46.
88. Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, p. 170.
89. Barakat, *Tatawwur*, pp. 420–21; Salim, *al-Quwa*, pp. 324–25.
90. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 12, dossier 224, quoted in Barakat, *Tatawwur*, pp. 429–30.
91. Sharubim, *al-Kafi*, 4:237.
92. Salim, *al-Quwa*, p. 324, citing MTU, Mahfazah 7, dossier 24; and Mahfazah 13, dossier 241.
93. Barakat, *Tatawwur*, p. 430.
94. Sarhank, *Haqa’iq*, 2:401; Salim, *al-Quwa*, p. 323; Barakat, *Tatawwur*, pp. 422–33.
95. Brown, *Peasant Politics*, 1990, pp. 184–89.
96. PRO, FO 141/161, Ayad/Beaman, Luxor, 13 June 1882, tr. in Beaman/Malet, no. 41, Cairo, 1 July 1882.
97. Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, 1969.
98. Ayad/Beaman, 13 June 1882.
99. Sharubim, *al-Kafi*, 4:237; Stuart, *Egypt after the War*, 1:55 and *passim*; Salim, *al-Quwa*, p. 320; Barakat, *Tatawwur*, p. 434.
100. Brown, *Peasant Politics*, p. 183; that the common-law government promised to cancel debts to foreigners in the summer of 1882 seems incontestable; see, e.g., Stuart, *Egypt after the War*, 1:155; and F. L. Bertie, “Memorandum on Egyptian Affairs,” 31 January 1884, Foreign Office Confidential Print, no. 5067, in Bourne and Watt, eds., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, 9:316.
101. Stuart, *Egypt after the War*, 1:46, 155.
102. DWQ, MTU, Mahfazah 8, dossier 47, quoted in Barakat, *Tatawwur*, p. 424.
103. “Return of Persons arrested,” Raphael Borg, 14 November 1882.
104. Brown, *Peasant Politics*, pp. 193–94.
105. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution*, 1975, p. 70.
106. Barakat, *Tatawwur*, pp. 430–32.
107. The point is cogently made by Gerber, *Islam, Guerrilla War and Revolution*, 1989, pp. 123–24; cf. Wolf, *Peasant Wars*, 1973, Chapter 5; and Paige, *Agrarian Revolution*, esp. the conclusion.
108. Royle, *Egyptian Campaigns*, 1886, 1:113.
109. Salim, *al-Quwa*, p. 319.
110. PRO, FO 141/161, Beaman/Malet, no. 46, Cairo, 4 July 1882.

111. Barakat, *Tatawwur*, p. 423.
112. Brown, *Peasant Politics*, pp. 185–89.
113. Hroch, *Social Preconditions*, p. 181.
114. Walton, *Reluctant Rebels*, 1984; cf. Hroch, *Social Preconditions*, pp. 52–54.

Conclusion

1. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 1979, p. 320, n. 16.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 48–49.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 41, 60–64.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 112–26.
5. Deringil 1988:12.
6. Robinson and Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians*, 1981, p. 78.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, p. 475.
9. Hopkins 1986:383–84.
10. Schölch 1976:773–85.
11. Galbraith and Marsot 1978:471–88.
12. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, pp. 165–85.
13. For the early stages of nationalism, see Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1990, chaps. 1 and 2.
14. See especially Esherick, *Boxer Uprising*, 1987.
15. Walton, *Reluctant Rebels*, 1984, p. 37.
16. The following analysis draws on the following studies: Fischer, *Iran*, 1980; Keddie, *Roots of Revolution*, 1981; Abrahamian, *Iran*, 1982; Bakhash, *Reign of the Ayatollahs*, 1988; Arjomand, *Turban for the Crown*, 1988; Parsa, *Iranian Revolution*, 1989; Green, ed., *Revolutions*, “Countermobilization in the Iranian Revolution,” in Goldstone, 1986; and Akhavi, “Shi‘ism, Corporatism and Rentierism the Iranian Revolution,” in Cole, ed., *Comparing Muslim Societies*, 1992.
17. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah*, 1991.
18. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion*, pp. 473–74.
19. Parsa, *Iranian Revolution*.

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Diwan al-Madaris
Diwan al-Wirku
Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah (abbr. SND)
Warid Dabtiyyat
Warid Aqalim

b. Boxes (*Mahafiz*)

Abhath
Dabtiyyat Misr
Diwan al-Ahkam
Jamalu'd-Din al-Afghani
Mahafiz ath-Thawrah al-'Urabiyyah (abbr. MTU)
Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara'
Nizarat ad-Dakhiliyyah (abbr. ND)
Mukatabat 'Arabi
Mukatabat Ifranji
al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyyah

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