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Hu Shih

English Writings of Hu Shih

National Crisis and Public Diplomacy

Volume 3



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ISSN 2195-1853

ISBN 978-3-642-33163-3

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-33164-0

Springer Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

ISSN 2195-1861 (electronic)

ISBN 978-3-642-33164-0 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2012955944

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Acknowledgments

Hu Shih's English writings, except his doctoral thesis *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China*¹ and *The Chinese Renaissance*² (adopted from his Haskell Lectures at Chicago University in 1933), were rarely published in a book format. The rest of his essays, speeches and articles were all scattered in various journals, magazines, and newspapers. The wide time span and geographic distance from the original publications have made the task of collecting Hu's English writings extremely difficult.

In his later years, Hu had planned to organize his scattered English writings and edit some of them for publishing. The first person who proposed this idea was Yang Liansheng, a professor at Harvard University at the time. Yang first brought up this idea in a letter to Hu on February 11, 1961. In the letter Yang wrote:

I've now obtained an offprint copy of your speech at Harvard on immortality in Chinese intellectual history. Initially I wanted to post it to you, but since you are coming soon, I may well present it to you in person when we meet. I am also thinking about your article on religious history—the one for the 300th anniversary of Harvard University—and the one about Zen (maybe there are others that I don't remember, only your English articles). If you agree, it might be good to put these articles together and publish a collection, so it would be easier for students to read. For this purpose, an approval from Harvard University might be necessary. Maybe I should just ask President Pusey. The second question is where to publish this book. If you don't have a specific preference, I can discuss with the press to which I've recently agreed to be an editorial advisor. To be honest, English language materials about Chinese religion and thought are too scarce, so this book will definitely be very popular among students.³

¹ Hu Shih (Shih Hu), *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China* (Shanghai: The Oriental Book Company, 1928).

² Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934).

³ Hu Shih Memorial Hall edited, *Lun xue tan shi er shi nian: Hu Shih Yang Liansheng wang lai shu zha* (correspondence between Hu Shih and Yang Liansheng), Taipei Linking, 1998: 390.

Hu Shih was hospitalized for a serious illness at that time, so he asked Lao Gan to reply to Yang's letter regarding the publication of his English writings. The letter said:

Mr. Hu is interested in the idea of publishing a collection of his articles. The articles you selected were all fine. Furthermore, there are a few other pieces on religion, culture and thought that might well be included in such a collection. These articles need copyright clearance, but Dr. Hu is ill and could not go over them one by one. In any case, these articles are all in journals and magazines, so it should be easy to find. Please arrange for publishers at your discretion. Dr. Hu would only be most appreciative of your help.⁴

Yang replied to this letter on April 21 to report on the compilation progress:

I've discussed with Karl Hill, editor from Beacon Press, about your book. I showed him your "Immortality" and the article on Zen history in *Philosophy East and West*, and I told him that we should also include "Indianization" and the one on Zen published in the *Journal of North China Branch of Royal Artistic Society*. The editor suggested enlarging the content to 300 pages or even slightly more. They want to publish a hardcover copy. If we can deliver the manuscript in January then it could be published in 1962. I wonder how you feel about this arrangement. The publisher also would like you to write an introduction for the book. Whether it is long or short will be up to you. I believe this is a reasonable request.

I think your "Natural Law in the Chinese Tradition" article should be included and I have yet to see "Authority and Freedom in the Ancient Asiatic World." If we wish to enlarge the book content by adding some articles on law, there is this speech about Wang Huizu and some others on Song Dynasty scholars and law. Would it be possible for you to edit these speeches as well? Please also instruct on how many papers should be included and I shall discuss with Hill again.

We also need permission from Harvard University for publication. If you are too busy to tend to these matters, you could authorize me to write them a letter on your behalf.⁵

On July 29 Yang wrote to Hu Shih again on this matter:

Beacon Press is very enthusiastic about publishing your book, they've asked twice about our progress. I told them that your health condition does not allow you to engage in writing at present. My suggestion is that we do not limit our selection to journal and magazine articles. We can also include chapters in your other books (for example the "Chinese Renaissance" speech at Chicago). What do you think? I truly hope that you could write me a letter in English to authorize to solicit copyrights for your articles. You may wait until the whole list of content is completed to write an introduction.⁶

On October 12, Yang wrote yet another letter to Hu Shih to inform him of the publishing progress, indicating that the publisher had been secured and the copyright with Harvard University had been settled as well. The publishing contract would be signed immediately once the manuscripts are ready, but according to available evidence, Hu Shih never answered Yang's letters himself. After Hu's sudden death from a heart attack on February 24, 1962, the publication of Hu Shih's English writings was suspended.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 393.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 394.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 395.

Yang was one of the persons appointed by Hu Shih to collect and publish his English works. On October 20, 1986, a letter was sent to Wu Daqiu, president of “Academia Sinica” in Taiwan at the time, stating that the Hu Shih Memorial Hall intended to invite Yang to edit the collection of Hu’s lectures at the University of California on Chinese intellectual history. However, Yang replied with significant apprehension:

The English manuscript sent to me earlier by Mr. Wang Zhiwei might be an unfinished manuscript on Chinese intellectual history and it is different from Hu’s lecture notes. This unfinished manuscript still requires a lot of amendments, notes and updates. But 10 years ago when I just recovered from a serious illness, and I had no energy to finish it, so I asked Professor Yu Ying-Shih to handle it. But given the current academic conditions, it takes a lot of discretion to find a way to get the best out of Hu’s works. I am afraid it probably will even compromise Dr. Hu’s academic reputation if we take an easy option here and just publish this manuscript as it is. This matter must be handled prudently.⁷

So, until as late as 1986, there was still no one to finish collecting and editing Hu Shih’s English writings.

Before Yang, the first person who had a vision to collect Hu Shih’s English writings was an American, Mr. Eugene Livingston Delafield. He died in Florida on April 6, 2001, at the age of 96. Delafield initially met Hu Shih in the 1940s when they were living in the same apartment complex, located at 104 E, 81 Street in New York City. Delafield worked as a rare books dealer then, and he often purchased books for Hu. The two men struck up a friendship throughout the years based upon mutual respect. Their close relationship lasted until 1958 when Hu returned to Taiwan. Occasionally, Hu would also ask Delafield to help him gather some research materials. On October 1, 1950, Hu gave an article to Delafield as a gift. On the cover he wrote: “To Eugene Delafield, who has been very helpful to me in obtaining the materials I needed in writing this essay. Hu Shih, Oct. 1950.” Gradually, Delafield was extremely impressed by Hu’s integrity and erudition and arrived at the intention to compile a collection of Hu’s English writings. This idea got Hu’s approval. Then, starting from the 1940s, Delafield started collecting Hu’s articles published in various English language books, journals and newspapers. According to Delafield’s account, Hu would often give him copies of speeches that he presented at conferences and other occasions. After decades of continuous effort, Delafield gathered a significant amount of Hu Shih’s speeches and a few manuscripts. In order to further understand Hu Shih’s thought, Delafield expanded his own knowledge by purchasing and reading a large number of English books related to Hu Shih’s work.

In 1957, Delafield and the famous late Chinese librarian Yuan Tongli co-edited a “Selected Bibliography of Dr. Hu Shih’s Writings in Western Languages,” which was published in the 28th volume of the *Bulletin of the Institute of Phonology and History*, “Academia Sinica.” This bibliography was an indispensable reference for compiling Hu Shih’s English writings.

⁷The original letter is kept in Hu Shih Memorial Hall, Taiwan.

In 1993, while compiling the Collection of Hu Shih's English writings, I had contacted Delafield by telephone. On September 20, 1996, I met him for the first time at my office in Princeton University. I gave him a set of the three-volume *Collection of Hu Shih's English Writings* (Taipei Yuan-Liou, 1995) that I edited as a gift. On May 27, 1998, he wrote me a registered letter in which he kindly expressed his desire for me to take care of his collection of Hu Shih's works. Part of the speeches included in *A Collection of Hu Shih's Unpublished English Essays and Speeches* (Taipei Linking, 2001) were provided by Mr. Delafield.

During the Christmas holiday season of 1998, I went to Florida to visit Mr. and Mrs. Delafield and to express my profound gratitude for their generosity. I spent one afternoon in their apartment carefully listening to his recollections of how he met Hu Shih, the erudite and hardworking scholar who also possessed a great sense of humor. I was deeply moved by the extreme effort, sincerity, and painstaking work he had put into collecting Hu Shih's writings, all of which were evident as he showed me each of Hu's original, autographed manuscripts. Hu Shih's pictures had also been neatly arranged next to the three-volume *Collection of Hu Shih's English Writings* that I had presented to him. Delafield devoted so much to collecting Hu Shih's English works; all those who have studied Hu Shih's thought should salute his efforts.

Hu Shih's English articles were scattered in various university journals and magazines. The first published collection of his works was the photo-engraved copy of *A Collection of Hu Shih's English Writings* (three volumes and 1,589 pages altogether) edited by me and published by Taipei Yuan-Liou in 1995. This edition has been out of print for years and copies are very difficult to find now. Articles included in this collection were photocopies of journal and magazine pages; some were already blurry and illegible. In 2001, Taipei Linking Press published *A Collection of Hu Shih's Unpublished English Essays and Speeches*, which was 677 pages long compiled by me. At that point, the collection and compilation of Hu Shih's English writings had essentially reached completion. When Anhui Education Press published *Complete Works of Hu Shih*, they also relied on these two titles as English resources.

In memory of the 120th anniversary of Hu Shih's birth in 2012, Mr. Wu Hao from the Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press in Beijing proposed to select and re-edit the best of Hu Shih's English articles and to publish them under three themes: "Chinese Literature and Society," "Chinese Philosophy and Intellectual History," and "National Crisis and Public Diplomacy." This three-volume collection differs from the previous editions in that it aims to represent the gist of Hu Shih's academic thoughts rather than providing a comprehensive collection. Hence, only the most important and most representative pieces of Hu Shih's are included in this collection.

It should be noted that traces of historical backgrounds and social contexts at the time of composition could be found in details of the works, such as dynasty appellations, national relationship descriptions and the use of Wade-Giles Romanization. These are kept intact to present the original style of his work. Because the collected

articles were written and published at different times, they may not be completely consistent with each other in format and style (or even spelling of certain words).

2012 is also the 50th anniversary of the death of Hu Shih. I hope that the publication of this three-volume collection of Hu Shih's English writings will, to a certain extent, contribute to enhancing and popularizing the research of Hu Shih's scholarship and his thought. This short article is to commemorate the formation of this collection.

Princeton University
17 January 2012

Chih-P'ing Chou

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Chapter 1

A Republic for China

The New Year bells, as Tennyson sang, did “Ring out the old, ring in the new.” Amidst their merry chimes there was brought forth, in the ancient land of China, a republic. Liberty rejoices in it. China’s sons are rejoicing in it. Yet the world hesitates to join in our voices of rapture and gratification. There are still sneers and laughter at the idea of a republic for China. It is in the defense of this “chosen music” of Liberty for China that I venture to submit to our American friends a justification of that new birth in China.

The world seems to have the misconception that democracy is entirely a new thing to the Chinese. I call it a misconception because, though China has been under monarchical government for thousands of years, still, behind the monarchs and the aristocrats there has been dominating in China, a quiet, peaceful, oriental form of democracy. *The Book of History*, the oldest of China’s Classics, has the Golden Rule for the rulers:

The people should be cherished.
And should not be downtrodden.
The people are the root of a nation:
If the root be firm the nation is safe.

Mencius, the Montesquieu of the Orient, said: “The people are to be regarded most; the sovereign, the least. He who gains the favor of a feudal prince may become an official; he who gains the favor of an emperor may become a feudal prince; but he who wins the hearts of the people is the son of heaven, that is, the emperor.”

That the people are to be regarded most has been the essence of the laws of China. Most founders of the dynasties were men who won, not conquered, the people. “Neglect of the people” has always been a pretext in every declaration of the numerous revolutions which terminated old dynasties and established new ones.

The power of the Chinese rulers has always been limited, not so much by constitutionalism as by the ethical teachings of our sages. The sovereigns had to

Chapter Note: *The Cornell Era*, (Cornell Papers), January 1912, 240–242.

observe that a ruler, as defined by the sages, was “one who shepherds the people.” Very few rulers in Chinese history have dared to indulge in such extravagances and brutal cruelty as are described in English and French history. There were ministers and censors to censure, and revolts to dread. Such was the Chinese despotism: such was the democracy or “people’s strength” in China.

So much for the past. Now let us look into the China of today. There are on the Manchu throne the baby Emperor, the Regent, and the Empress Dowager. There are numerous Manchu princes who are born nobles and born officials. But among the Chinese¹ there is no class of nobility. There are no princes, no lords, no dukes. “The officials,” to quote from an article written by Dr. Wu Ting-fang, formerly Minister to the United States, and now Foreign Minister of the new Republic, “spring from the people, and to the people they return.” With the Manchu throne there will go all the Manchu princes! And there is no recognized royal family to set up in place of the departing royal house. Thus, as Dr. Wu further remarks, “with the Manchu throne removed there is left a made-to-order republic.”

A leading weekly in this country argues that “political history almost universally shows that a monarchy, limited by constitutionalism, must in the development of nations, precede a republic of purely democratic form.” I am no student of political history, but so far as I can see, if the purely democratic form of government had never come into existence, or if it had once appeared and been obscured by ages of monarchy and aristocracy, then a limited monarchy might precede a republic. But when men have beheld the example of this great country and of other nations where liberty and equality prevail, and have realized the merits thereof, they will never be satisfied with a monarchy. When the eyes of the people of Eden had once been opened, even the Almighty could not but let them go. This is precisely the situation in China. That the Manchu dynasty² must disappear goes without saying. And, as I have said, there is no recognized royal family to set up in place of the departing house. Shall we, after so much struggle and so much bloodshed, be so ridiculous as to offer a crown to some individual, and set him up as a national ornament, merely for the sake of fulfilling a theory of political history?

And even if China needs a monarchy, who will be the emperor? The world looks upon Yuan Shih-kai, the Imperial Premier, as the fittest man for the throne. But alas! the world has been greatly deceived by its short-sighted newspaper correspondents in China! To the minds of the Chinese Yuan Shih-kai is a mean man, a traitor! It was he who betrayed the late emperor and brought to a disastrous end the Reformation of 1898, which would have succeeded but for the treason of Yuan, and which, if it had succeeded, would have spared the world the Boxers’ War and saved the Chinese from the shame and the weighty burden of indemnity which resulted from that war. During the short period of his premiership thousands of lives and millions of property were lost which would have been spared but for the ambitious efforts of Yuan. He is not in the hearts of the people: he has sinned against his country.

¹ 此处Chinese特指汉族.

² 清朝(Qing Dynasty).

Others may suggest that we offer to some of our own revolutionary leaders, a crown instead of a presidential seal. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, or General Huang Hin would be the man. But while these are men who would willingly die for the welfare of their country, they are not fighting for personal ambition. They do not want to be Caesars or Diazes; they want and the people expect them to be only Washingtons or Franklins.

And even if China has the fit man for the crown, and a monarchy is set up, then, when the Chinamen have come to such a political standard as the Americans of the eighteenth century, what shall we do with the monarchy? The English people have spent a number of years trying in vain to diminish the power of the House of Lords,—not to speak of the Royal House. Why should we pave the way for bloodshed in the future, when it is now in our power to prevent it?

We have thus far seen the impossibility of the establishment of a monarchical government in China today. For several years China has had her provincial assemblies and her national senate. The Chinese have learned to elect representatives. They now decide to have a republic. Their decision is a wise one, for the world is tending toward democracy. You have all seen the “Young Turks” cast their Sultan into prison; you have all seen Portugal exile her king; and you have all seen Mexico elect her first President of the new Republic. China simply responds to the world’s mighty, irresistible call. She has rung the first bell of Liberty in that great continent of Asia. May that sweet sound be prolonged and echoed throughout the whole earth, and

Long may *our* land be bright
With freedom’s holy light!

Chapter 2

Analysis of the Monarchical Restoration in China

“What do the Chinese students think of the present political changes in China?” That I do not know. I can only say what I personally feel about this matter. First of all, I welcome the change from a republic to a monarchy. There are a thousand and one reasons why I should welcome this change, and for brevity’s sake, I only mention a few.

(1) The change is no change at all; it is only calling the present Chinese Government by its proper name. The Republic of China died a premature death 2 years ago, and the Government has ever since been an absolute monarchy under the name of a republic. This insult to the good name “republic” has now been removed by frankly calling the government what it really is. It is of supreme importance that things should be called what they really are. “If names are not right,” said our great sage Confucius, “words are misused. When words are misused, affairs go wrong.”

True Character of Chinese Government Revealed

(2) The second reason why I welcome this change is this: it reveals to the world the real character of the Chinese Government. In particular, it shows to the whole world the real character of Mr. Yuan Shih-kai whom the American public has long delighted to call “the strong man” of China and who has of late publicly sworn to Heaven and Earth that he would never forsake the cause of republicanism. “It should be understood,” said the Strong Man of China, “that my patriotism is not a whit less than any other man’s.” Probably not; for Brutus is an honorable man.

Chapter Note: *Columbia Spectator*, January 14, 1916 7.

New Foreign Opinion Effected by Change

(3) The third reason is a corollary from the first two. The political changes in China have opened the eyes of the American editors and have brought about a perceptible change in the attitude of American public opinion towards Mr. Yuan Shih-kai and his government. Any one who has followed the editorials of the leading American papers of the last few years cannot fail to notice that change. This change of attitude on the part of American public opinion is of great moral value to Young China. The reactionaries in China have done their best to poison American public opinion; they have succeeded even in inducing Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, formerly of Columbia, now President of Johns Hopkins University, to volunteer to act as the spokesman of Chinese reactionism. The many eulogies that have been piled upon the head of Mr. Yuan by the superficial American observers, have been simply disgusting. One writer, for example, in his enthusiastic praise of Mr. Yuan, pointed out that he had appointed a Board of Censors whose duty it was to criticise the President and his government. This was regarded by one writer as sufficient proof of Mr. Yuan's greatness; for, he asks, what other ruler has ever dared appoint a board to criticise himself? Our Yuanite critic has failed to learn that the Board of Censors is an institution which has existed in China for at least 23 centuries! Examples of this kind can be easily multiplied, but it suffices to say that most of these eulogies have been actuated by good intentions without being supported by profundity of observation and accuracy of facts. It is very encouraging to notice that many an American editor is now willing to "eat his own words" and treat Mr. Yuan as he actually is. What Young China demands of the American public is simply an impartial and unprejudiced judgment based on actual facts. And this is exactly what the present political change has brought about.

Danger Under New Regime: New Hereditary Class

What, it may be asked, are the dangers which are likely to result from this change?

In the first place, it will revive many of the evils which are necessarily attached to the monarchical form of government and which have been swept away by the Revolution of 1911. One of the most obvious evils already brought about by the present change, is the creation of a hereditary class of nobility. It has been authentically reported that this class is to consist of six ranks, namely, prince, duke, marquis, earl, viscount and baron, all to be hereditary as long as the Government lasts. The establishment of a privilege class of nobility in an age when the more advanced nations are questioning the right of inheritance of property, is beyond all doubt a step deserving the just condemnation of the whole world. But, fortunately, this class is to be hereditary only "as long as the Government lasts!"

Reinstatement of Corrupt Official Class

In the second place, the monarchy will in all probability reinstate the old and corrupt official class which has been the greatest evil in the history of China. It is no exaggeration to say that the bought-and-sold officialdom in China was a greater evil than opium-smoking or even foot-binding. And if the Revolution of 1911 accomplished nothing more than sending this bought-and-sold official class back to their "cold benches" at home, that alone is sufficient to counterbalance all the condemnation which has of late poured upon the Revolution. But alas! this class is being resurrected from oblivion and placed in positions to govern and rule the Chinese nation, because it has succeeded in getting on the bandwagon of the new dynasty and has helped the making of the emperorship!

Revolution, an Inevitable Result

In the third place, the monarchical restoration will naturally arouse a series of disturbances and revolutions throughout the country. Already a revolution has been started in the province of Yunnan under the leadership of Gen. Tsai Ao, and it is highly probable that it will spread to the other parts of China. It must be remembered that, when men like Dr. Goodnow advocated a monarchy for China, they urged that it was necessary "in order that all tendencies toward the disintegration of the country might be checked." Unfortunately they failed to see that China could not be united in a monarchy and that a reactionary government with arbitrary powers necessarily breeds disintegration and invites revolution.

Cessation of Constructive Policies

Lastly, and perhaps this the worst outcome of the whole situation, there will be a complete cessation of all constructive and productive policies in every department of the Government. The Government is at present wasting all its energy in the monarchist propaganda, in suppressing all expression of dissatisfaction on the part of the people and in arming itself against the revolutionists. And the discontented youths of the nation, too, will also be wasting their time and life in political plotting and revolting against the Government, until they can finally overthrow it and re-establish the government which they desire. And all this waste of energy and opportunity is due to the selfish ambitions of some most unscrupulous politicians!

Chapter 3

Is There a Substitute for Force in International Relations?

*Prize essay, International Polity Club Competition, awarded
June 1916.*

I

The question “Is there a substitute for force in international relations” implies a serious ambiguity which, if not clearly understood at the outset, will greatly hamper our understanding of the real issue involved. Those who raise this question really mean by “force,” not force *qua* force, but only the frequent and unrestrained resort to armed force for settlement of international disputes. But the way in which the question is put not only begs the question from a logical standpoint, but also seriously obscures the real meaning intended by the questioner. For the wording “a substitute for force” seems to suggest that the substitute to be sought is to be antithetically opposed to force—is to be devoid of force. Such a substitute there is none. For, in the words of Mr. John A. Hobson, “there is no display of moral force in any act of human conduct which does not make some use of physical force as its instrument.”¹

This point will become clear if we consider a doctrine which is commonly supposed to be diametrically opposed to force, namely, the doctrine of non-resistance. When this doctrine is advocated, it is very often confronted by two sets of questions. Its advocate is asked either, “What would you do if you saw your wife or your sister attacked by a criminal?” or, “Did not Christ himself use force when he drove the venders and moneychangers out of the temple of God?” It is regrettable that the zeal of the non-resister often makes him blind to the truth underlying these questions.

Chapter Note: *International Conciliation: Special Bulletin*, (New York: American Association for International Conciliation, 1916), 15 pages.

¹ *Towards International Government*, p. 88.

The first question implies that the problem of force cannot be solved by any sweeping condemnation of its use, but must be considered in relation to the specific and concrete circumstances which demand the application or the non-application of force. The second question points clearly to the fact that the Christian command "Resist not evil" does not necessarily mean a condemnation of force as such. It seems that the doctrine of non-resistance may be interpreted as another way of saying "Vengeance belongs to God." The question is not, whether force is condemnable or justifiable, but, whether the administering of justice should be done by the interested parties themselves or by some higher and impartial power.

In recent discussions on this doctrine, it has been often pointed out that this principle implies no total denial of force, but only a firm belief that the attitude of passivity is capable of leading the offender or the criminal into repentance and goodness. It is this belief which has led some writers to call this doctrine that of "super-resistance" or "effective resistance." "The non-resistance doctrine," says Professor John Dewey, "can only mean that given certain conditions, passive resistance is a more effective means of resistance than overt resistance would be."²

I have indulged at some length in discussing the doctrine of non-resistance, because I believe that much of the vagueness and confusion in current discussion of international problems has been due to a misunderstanding of the real nature and place of force in human society. The point I wish to make clear by the foregoing discussion is that it is futile to look for an international policy which shall not involve a use of force; that even the so-called doctrine of non-resistance is *not* really a condemnation of force as such; and that the search for a "substitute for force" can only mean seeking a substitute for the most crude form and most wasteful use of force.

II

What is wrong with the international situation is not that force prevails, but that force does not prevail. In the present war, we are witnessing the most stupendous manifestation of force that has ever happened in human history. And yet what has this tremendous display of force so far accomplished? Has the twenty-one months' world war resulted in more than a deadlock on all battle-fronts? Will all the unprecedentedly great sacrifices of lives and property, all defeat and victory, be able to settle any of the questions which somehow drove the nations into this war two years ago? The truth is that the nations have not yet learned how to make force really count for something in international relations. They have only been lavishing their available forces in a most wasteful manner with the least returns.

Why has force of such an unprecedented magnitude yet been unable to secure peace and order, to achieve the ends for which such force was manifestly intended? Because force has not been efficiently used, because it has been wastefully applied.

²"Force and Coercion," *International Journal of Ethics* xxvi, 3, 365.

Force cannot prevail, if it is unorganized, unregulated and undirected. Under existing conditions, force is employed to resist force, or, more correctly speaking, force is so employed as to create for itself hosts of rival forces. The result has been a mutual cancelment of force: both the acting force and that acted upon are wasted in this process of mutual resistance and annulment.

Our problem, therefore, is not to condemn force in toto, nor yet to seek for any substitute-policy which will involve no use of force, but to find a way to make force actually prevail, that is, to avoid the wasteful use of it which leads nowhere but to self-exhaustion and annihilation. The solution of our problem lies in the organizing of the existing forces of the nations in such a manner as to minimize resistance or friction and to insure maximum economy and efficiency in their expenditure.

The experience of mankind in gradually passing from the lawless state of the savages into the civilized state of government by law, is the best illustration of the way in which isolated and conflicting forces or energies are gradually organized for the economical and efficient direction of human activities. "Law," says Professor Dewey, "is a statement of the conditions of the organization of energies which, when unorganized, would conflict and result in violence—that is, destruction or waste."³ The reign of law simply means a state of conditions where our conduct is governed by, to use a recent expression of President Wilson, "a prescribed course of duty and respect for the rights of others which will check any selfish passion of our own, as it will check any aggressive impulse of theirs."⁴ It is this "statement" or "prescription" of the rules of conduct that enables men to avoid the wasteful expenditure of force which would necessarily result if the activities and energies of men were allowed to run wild and clash with one another.

Unfortunately, what mankind has at last learned to practice within the nations themselves, has not yet to any considerable extent found its way into the realm of international dealings. What is termed international law to-day is only a little way in advance of what may be called the stage of regulated dueling. The few provisions for pacific settlement of international disputes have not been extensively applied by the nations, and fourteen years' reign of international law under the Hague Conventions has not only failed to avert the present world calamity, but also failed to effectively regulate the conduct of war in the relations both between the belligerents themselves and between belligerents and neutrals.

Since the outbreak of the present war, however, there has developed, especially in the English-speaking world, a fairly wide recognition of the fact that the only way to safeguard civilization from repeating any such calamity lies in some international arrangement or organization for pacific and judicial settlement of disputes. Such opinion has found exponents not only in many of the publicists who have given thought to the international situation, but also in such official representatives of powerful states as Premier Asquith and President Wilson. The latter, in his speech before the League to Enforce Peace, declared his desire for "a universal association

³ *Ibid.*, p. 362.

⁴ Speech before the League to Enforce Peace, May 27, 1916.

of nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent war, begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world.” In short, many there are who have come to realize that the failure to organize the conflicting forces of the nations for some definite common purposes has been the fundamental cause of international strife, insecurity and war; and they have also realized that such stupendous waste of energy, vitality and resources as we witness to-day, cannot be prevented until there is found some method of direction and organization for a less wasteful and therefore more efficient expenditure of the force of the nations.

III

We have so far arrived at the conclusion that in order to make force work effectively in achieving the contemplated ends of peace and security, we must seek to convert the now isolated and conflicting energies of the nations into some organized form—into some form of international association under a prescribed course of reciprocal duties and rights. We may now consider the directions in which the future task of organizing the forces of nations may possibly and profitably proceed. Such a discussion can best be undertaken by reference to the present status and defects of the law of nations.

First, it seems that in the coming international arrangement, the scope of the category of justiciable disputes should be greatly enlarged. At present, only “disputes of an international nature involving neither honor nor vital interests, and arising from a difference of opinion on points of fact,”⁵ are justiciable or arbitrable. This naturally excludes from the process of juridical settlement many of the disputes which are most likely to lead the nations into war. Furthermore, each nation is at liberty to declare “that in its opinion the dispute does not belong to the category of disputes which can be submitted to compulsory arbitration.”⁶ Thus an insult to a flag may be a question of honor, and a boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela may be a matter of vital interest to the United States.

It seems therefore necessary to the permanent interest of the world to gradually enlarge the category of justiciable disputes so that many of the cases now beyond the reach of international law may be made either arbitrable or at least subject to inquiry and conciliation by an international commission. In this connection, it is encouraging to note that the treaties negotiated by ex-Secretary of State Bryan with the several powers on the subject of an international commission of inquiry, provide that “all disputes between the contracting parties, of every nature whatever, which diplomacy shall fail to adjust, shall be submitted for investigation and report to

⁵Hague Conventions of 1907, I, art. 9.

⁶Hague Conventions of 1907, I, art. 53.

an International Commission.” It is to be hoped that this principle will find wider application in international law than it has hithertofore received. Without some such extension of jurisdiction, the law of nations can only “strain at a gnat and swallow a camel.”

In the second place, the charge has often been made that international law is itself imperfect and uncertain, and does not cover the needs of the times. One illustration is the fact that international law has not been able to keep pace with the rapid increase of new weapons of warfare such as are being used in the present war. It is also silent on such important subjects as the definition of “spheres of influence” by certain powers in the “backward” states, or the definition of the so-called “war zones” in neutral territory by belligerents, neither of whom the suffering neutral is in a position to resist. It seems therefore evident that, in order that international law may guard itself against archaism and against evasion through its own loopholes, there must be frequent periodical revision and codification of the law, or, better still, some form of international legislature which shall periodically meet and progressively extend the law over fields which it does not now cover.

In the third place, the most serious weakness of international law is that it has no effective means of enforcement. Without enforcement, which Professor Roscoe Pound calls “the life of law,” international law is not much more than a mere scrap of paper. Under existing conditions, a nation might refuse to submit a justiciable case to arbitration, or it might decline to accept or carry out an arbitral award which went against its interests. In case of unarbitrable disputes, a nation might refuse to submit to inquiry; it might actively prepare for eventual resort to arms during the prescribed period; or it might refuse a pacific settlement after the Commission has made its report.⁷ Any one of these recalcitrant acts will suffice to render a reign of law impossible.

To remedy this defect of the existing law of nations, it has been proposed that some kind of sanction should be provided in the form of a concerted use of the economic and military forces of the signatory powers against any transgressor of the law. There are certain obvious advantages in such an international organization of force. In the first place, it will avoid unnecessary duplication and waste. It is the indispensable condition of a general reduction of armaments: it will free the nations from the alleged necessity of each so arming itself as to be stronger than every other. Secondly, it will minimize the use of force. Where the object of employing force is clearly defined and understood, where, as some writer has put it, “all the cards are on the table,” where a breach of public law carries with it a possibility of public punishment, there we have the beginning of a reliable structure to safeguard civilization from sudden and periodic breakdown. Thirdly, the combining of the forces of the nations for the enforcement of public law and maintenance of peace will perhaps have an educative value in inculcating the sentiments of international solidarity and good-will. At least it will tend to liberate the nations from those artificial barriers and prejudices which now prevail.

⁷ See Hobson: *Towards International Government*, p. 77.

IV

But, while readily admitting the advantages of an effective sanction of international law, we must not ignore the indispensable preliminary conditions without which no international organization can ever hope to succeed. One of these conditions is that there must be a sufficiently strong body of interests which demand the enforcement of the law. At present, there are a number of practical interests of an international nature. Of these we may mention commerce, finance, investment, communication, transportation, the freedom of the high seas, immigration and the exchange of labor. All these interests have long transcended national lines and have become what has been termed "trans-national" in character. National defence, too, has become a "trans-national" problem. No nation can now rely on its own isolated force for safety and for satisfaction of injured interests, violated honor and outraged justice. Interests of such an international or trans-national nature need only to be made articulate and conscious of their own needs in order to become a firm foundation on which to build an effective international structure.

But such interests alone are not sufficient. Government by law has not been created by private interests alone, but has come about as a result of many centuries of conscious thought and deliberation, of the development of political and legal philosophy. Likewise, international government by law and combined force cannot arise from practical interests and inarticulate needs alone. There must be a radical change of the attitude of nations towards one another: there must be a new political philosophy and a new jurisprudence. First, we must have a new theory of the sovereignty of the state. Instead of the old theory that sovereignty consists in freedom from external juridical responsibility, we shall teach that the sovereignty of a state is a *right* the existence and validity of which entirely depend upon a tacit or explicit recognition and respect on the part of the other nations. As a right valid only by reciprocal understanding and recognition, the sovereignty of the state is not impaired but strengthened by becoming a member of a society of sovereignties.

We must also, in this revolution in international thinking, gradually modify our nationalism. Instead of "Right or wrong, my country," we must regard the state as merely one of the many groups to which the individual belongs and which, to use the words of Professor Harold Laski, must "compete for his allegiance just like his church or race or trade union, and when conflict arises the choice of the individual must be made on moral grounds."⁸ Instead of exalting the nation-state "*über Alles*," we must realize that the state is only a means to the well-being and free development of the individuals that compose it; and that whatever improvement of world-organization tends to enhance the safety of the state from external threats of aggression and destruction, is entitled to the devotion and support of every patriotic citizen.

⁸ See *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., February 17, 1916.

Furthermore, there is needed a new conception of the nature, place and function of force in human society. While admitting the necessity and value of force as a means to a desired and desirable end—thus avoiding the one-sided condemnation of force in toto—we must realize that, if the forces of the world are not co-ordinated to a definite common purpose but are allowed to rival one another for superiority in magnitude and deadliness, then force cannot be used for productive ends and is of necessity squandered in the endless process of overpowering the rival forces. In order to avoid this resultant waste and sterility and in order to insure a maximum economy and efficiency, it is necessary to organize and direct the rival forces, not towards mutual resistance and therefore mutual cancelment, but towards the co-operative achievement of some positive ends of common interest. Force cannot be rationalized until its use is socialized or internationalized. Not until such a conception of force shall be widely popularized and intelligently applied to international as well as to national life, can there be a really reliable substitute for the present wasteful and destructive employment of force in international relations.

And, lastly, those who desire and work for a better international order will have constantly to fight against that inveterate habit of thinking which may be termed “historical fatalism.” They are frequently reminded that deliberate planning and conscious effort have little or no place in determining the course and destiny of mankind. “The march of events rules and overrules human action,”—these memorable words of McKinley are frequently quoted in justification of groping and muddling in international affairs. Such determinism in political thinking practical idealism must repudiate and seek to replace. That the march of events rules and overrules human action is a frank declaration of the bankruptcy of statesmanship and human intelligence. It might find some justification in those olden times when one part of the world lived in complete isolation and ignorance of the other parts. But in these days when rapid transportation and almost instantaneous diffusion of intelligence have actually placed the entire earth “under our immediate notice, acquaintance and influence,” in these days when we actually have at our command the equipment for the effective diagnosis and control of the international situation, it is only intellectual laziness and senility that still seeks to explain away political blunders by the fatalistic *deus ex machina*. Never before has traditional statesmanship—the statesmanship of drifting along with the tide of time and events—wrought so much devastation and suffering to the world. Never before has the possibility of conscious planning and control of international relations appeared so well within the power of human intelligence and resourcefulness. Shall we, then, again permit our statesmen to muddle through and be hurled along by “the march of events”—ever comforting ourselves with the thought: “After us, the millennium?”

Chapter 4

Manufacturing the Will of the People

A Documentary History of the Recent Monarchical Movement in China.

When in December, 1915, I was reading the numerous telegraphic messages from the provinces urging Mr. Yuan Shih-kai to become emperor, my curiosity was aroused by the fact that while the messages differed from one another both in conception and in execution, there were 40 odd words which occurred together in all of them. These words were:

We, representatives of the citizens, by virtue of the will of the people, do hereby reverently nominate the present President Yuan Shih-kai as Emperor of the Chinese Empire, and invest him with all the supreme sovereign rights of the state. May he serve Heaven and lay the foundation to be transmitted to his heirs throughout ten thousand generations!

To any observant reader it was apparent that some master hand had been behind all those lengthy and flowery memorials; for otherwise it would be utterly inexplicable how the province of Kansuh and the province of Kiangsu (to take the two extremes), could use the same highbrow language of “the will of the people” and “the supreme sovereign rights of the state.”

This surmise was not incorrect. These words, 45 in all in the original, were secretly telegraphed from the monarchist headquarters in Peking to all the military and civil governors of the provinces on October 23, 1915, with the instruction that they must be inserted in the “memorials of nomination.” This and many other secret telegrams sent from the monarchist headquarters in Peking to the various provinces, all of which to be deciphered either with the *Hua* code or with the code of the executive mansion, have been collected from those provinces later taking part in the third revolution and have since been published in several languages. No better

Chapter Note: *The Journal of Race Development* 7, no. 3 (1917): 319–328.

introduction to this most remarkable collection of historic documents is needed than the following passage from the last telegram in this collection dated December 21, 1915:

Since the promulgation of the law on the formation of the convention of the citizens' representatives, we, who are devoted to the welfare of the state, have desired to see that the decisions of that convention do not run counter to the wishes of the people. We have therefore striven so to apply the law as to meet the real needs and circumstances, adhering to the law whenever possible, and yielding to expediency whenever necessary. In carrying out this policy, there may have been certain letters and telegrams, both official and private, which have transgressed the bounds of the law. They will become absolutely useless when the affair is finished. Moreover, no matter how carefully their secrets are guarded, they will always remain as concrete records which might seriously compromise us; and...should they be handed down as part of the national records, they will stain the opening pages of the history of the new dynasty. The central government, after carefully considering the matter, has concluded that it would be better to sort out and burn the documents in order to remove all unnecessary records and prevent regrettable consequences. For these reasons, you are hereby requested to sift out all telegrams, letters and despatches concerning the change in the form of government (excepting those required by law to be filed on record), and cause the same to be burnt in your presence.

But this measure of precaution was already too late. It was sent out on the 21st of December, and on that very day troops were mobilized in the province of Yunnan, and two days later the famous Yunnan ultimatum reached Peking, demanding the immediate punishment of the leaders of the monarchist propaganda. The independence of that province was proclaimed on December 25, thus beginning the third revolution which lasted until the death of Yuan Shih-kai on June 6, 1916.

A complete history of the monarchist movement in China has yet to be written. Only a brief summary of its important steps can be given here. We shall not go back to Yuan Shih-kai's expulsion by force of the opposition members in the national assembly, and the consequent dissolution of that body for lacking a quorum. Nor need we to take up the long story of the revision of the constitution and of the presidential election act which gave the president absolute powers and made his term of office not only permanent but also hereditary.¹ Suffice to say that Yuan Shih-kai and his clique were not satisfied with a virtually permanent and hereditary presidency. They wanted a full-formed monarchy, and they set out to realise that aim with a political skilfulness and dexterity which must surprise many a professional politician of the West.

The first step in the grand scheme for the overthrow of the republic and for the establishment of a monarchy was to call for "voluntary" petitions from the people urging a change in the form of government. We quote from the code telegram to the governors of the provinces dated August 30, 1915:

We propose that petitions be sent in the name of the citizens of the respective provinces to the administrative council acting in the capacity of national legislature, so as to demonstrate the wish of the people to have a monarchy.... The plan suggested is for each province to

¹ See my article in *The Outlook*, September 1, 1915.

send in a separate petition, the draft of which will be made here and wired to the respective provinces in due course of time... At all events, the change in the form of the state will have to be effected under the color of carrying out the people's will.

From another code telegram, dated September 10, 1915, we learn that "not fewer than one hundred petitions for a change in the form of the state have been received from people residing in all parts of the country." That was sufficient to prove that "the people were of one mind concerning this matter." By this time the administrative council had passed a law providing for a general convention of the representatives of the people to decide upon the question of a change in the form of government. A national convention bureau was established by the government with the monarchist clique in full control of it. On September 10, the bureau sent telegraphic instructions to the governors, "explaining confidentially, article by article, how to apply the law in order to produce the desired results." We quote the first two sections of the instructions:

Article I of the law provides that "the petitioning for a change in the form of the state shall be decided by the general convention of the citizens' representatives." ... The words "shall be decided by the general convention of the citizens' representatives" refer to nothing more than a formal approval of the convention, and are by no means intended to give room for discussion of any kind. Indeed, it was never intended that the citizens should have any choice between a republic and a monarchy. For this reason, at the time of voting all the representatives must be made unanimously to advocate a change of the republic into a monarchy. It behooves you, therefore, prior to the election and voting, privately to search for *such persons as are willing to express the people's will in the sense above indicated*. You will also make the necessary arrangements beforehand so that there may be no divergence of opinion when the time arrives for putting the question to a vote.

Article II provides: "The citizens' representatives shall be elected by separate ballot signed by the person voting. The person obtaining the greatest number of votes cast shall be declared elected." Now, the citizens' representatives, though nominally elected by the electors, are in reality appointed beforehand by you acting as Superintendent of Election. The principle of separate signed ballot is adopted in this article with the object of preventing the voters from voting otherwise than as directed, and of awakening in them a sense of responsibility for their votes. Again, since the law says that the person obtaining the greatest number of votes cast shall be declared elected, it is necessary for you to have everything prepared beforehand. You should, prior to the voting, divide the electors into groups, and assign to each group the names of the persons intended to be elected.... Furthermore, deputies should be appointed to supervise the proceedings, and the voters are to be privately instructed to vote according to the secret list of names. In this way the persons elected will not be such as will get beyond our control.

But all this red tape, though very ingeniously devised, was still too slow for the impatient would-be founders of the new dynasty. Thus spoke Mr. Sun Yu-chun, the impetuous president of the Chiu-An-Hwei (Society for the Preservation of Peace) in a code telegram dated September 26, 1915:

... Moreover, the situation is critical and the country is in great unrest. How can we wait for the convention of the citizens' representatives which will not meet until several months hence! Thus a new method for obtaining the people's will has to be devised.

This “new method” consists in this:

The military and civil governors of the provinces are requested to call an extraordinary meeting of the general convention of citizens, in which each district (hsien) is to be represented by one person to be selected from among the gentry or common people of the district who are residing in the provincial capital. The voting shall take place by signed ballot on which the word “monarchy” or republic is to be written. The military and civil governors and the military commandants, acting as superintendents of election, shall open the ballots then and there. In case a majority of the votes are in favor of a monarchy, the persons so voting shall forthwith name a person who is to be the emperor. The military and civil governors and the military commandants shall then report by telegram to the administrative council the number of votes and the name of the person recommended as emperor; and the general convention of citizens shall simultaneously despatch a telegram to the administrative council, authorizing the latter to announce the number of votes in favor of a monarchy and the name of the person nominated. You are earnestly requested to make immediate preparations therefor.

...We may add that though this plan is proposed by us alone, it will differ in no material respect from that which the administrative council will eventually adopt.

The last sentence which I have put into italics, is worth noting. These are the words of the head of a nominally private organization which was founded for the purpose of “studying the problem of the form of government,” and which had the audacity to predict what plans the administrative council acting in the capacity of national legislature, would “eventually adopt”!

The administrative council, however, did not have the courage to dispense with the formality of a national election. Says a code telegram from the Chiu-An-Hwei dated September 27, 1915:

In order to clothe the proceedings with an appearance of gravity, the representatives of the districts, though really appointed by the highest authorities of the province, should still be nominally elected by the districts. As soon as the representatives of the districts have been appointed, their names should be communicated to the magistrates of the respective districts, who are to be instructed to draw up the necessary documents formally nominating the persons designated. Such documents, however, should be properly antedated.

But the administrative council, as predicted, did abandon the plan of holding the general convention of the citizens’ representatives (kuoh-ming tai-piao ta hwei), and adopted instead the device of holding a convention of citizens (kung-ming ta hwei) in each provincial capital. There was to be a primary election at which a certain number of electors were to be elected whose duty it was to proceed to the provincial capital where a second election was to be held for the selection of delegates to the convention. On October 10, 1915, the national convention bureau telegraphed these interesting instructions:

All the superintendents of the primaries (i.e., the district magistrates) are absolutely responsible for having the proper persons elected within their respective districts. They should, before the elections, carefully consider what sort of men are those who are qualified to be elected, and select those who are good-natured and obsequious and of the same mind as ourselves. These are to be considered as the persons who should be elected. The superintendents will then judiciously assign their names to the several voters, and

request them to vote as directed. If they find any difficulty in carrying out these instructions, *they should not hesitate to use measures that are invisibly coercive, in order to obtain the desired results from the voting....*

The method of manipulating the electors after their arrival at the provincial capital is contained in another telegram dated October 11.

... When the electors of the districts have reported themselves at the provincial capital, a reception committee should be appointed to meet them and exchange views with them. The superintendents of election should then, under pretext of inviting them to a social gathering or dinner party, request their presence at their official mansion and improve the occasion by explaining to them the fundamental principles of the monarchical movement as well as the general situation of the country, and by making known to them the names of those who are to be elected. *No methods should be left untried until our objects are achieved.*

On October 26, the national convention bureau sent out this code telegram:

After the form of the state has been put to a vote, the nomination of an emperor should be made forthwith without further voting. You should address the delegates and tell them that a monarchy having been decided upon, not a single day should pass without a monarch; that the delegates should now nominate Yuan Shih-kai as the Great Emperor of the Chinese Empire; and that if they are in favor of the proposal, they should signify their assent by a standing vote. This done, the text of the proposed petition of nomination should be handed to the delegates for their signatures. After that, you should again address them to the effect that in all matters concerning the nomination and the petition for immediate enthronement, they may, in the name of the citizens' representatives, invest the administrative council with general powers to act in their behalf and to take the necessary steps until the petition is finally granted. The prepared text of the telegram from the delegates to the acting legislative council should then be shown to the delegates for approval.

... As for the exact words to be inserted in the petition of nomination, they have been communicated to you in our telegram of the 23rd inst. These characters, forty-five in all,² must on no account be altered. The rest of the text is left to your discretion.

The rest of the story the world well knows. These secret instructions were carried out to the letter. The citizens' conventions were held at the various provincial capitals. The voting was done by signed ballots in the presence of the military and civil governors and military commandants as superintendents of election, and with armed troops surrounding the convention halls for the protection of the delegates and for the preservation of peace and order. The voting was of course unanimous in favor of changing the republic into a monarchy. Memorials of nomination were then signed by the delegates, "reverently nominating the present President Yuan Shih-kai as the Great Emperor of the Chinese Empire." The administrative council was then authorized by the delegates to act as their national agent, and the votes of the provincial conventions were transmitted to that body for final counting and announcement. The climax of the drama was reached when on November 11, 1915, the administrative council met and announced that out of 2043 votes cast, 1993

²Quoted at the beginning of this article.

voted in favor of changing the republic into a monarchy. Thereupon, the council immediately petitioned President Yuan Shi-kai, urging him to accept the throne so unanimously tendered him by the people. President Yuan of course declined the honor, and it was not until the petition had been presented to him the second time that he reluctantly declared his acceptance and ordered that "all the ministers and departments make the necessary preparations for the enthronement." The last order was entirely unnecessary, for the bureau on preparations for the great ceremony had long been at work with its offices in the presidential palace.

The will of the people having so unanimously expressed itself, it became necessary to reward the founders of the new dynasty who had so dexterously brought this will into articulate expression. Thus, for example, in 2 days (December 21 and 23), 206 titles of nobility were awarded by Emperor-elect Yuan Shih-kai, of this number there being 6 dukes, 9 marquises, 13 counts, 10 earls and 36 barons, all of the First Order; 1 duke, 3 earls and 19 barons of the Second Order; 30 barons of the Third Order; 55 Knights of the Light Chariot of the First Order, 19 Knights of the Second Order, and 4 Orders of Merit. These honors did include Messrs. Sun Yu-chun, Yang Tu, Ku Ngao, Liang Sze-yi, Tuan Chi-kwei, et al., the real founders of the dynasty. It was reported that this delay was caused by the fact that these gentlemen were unable to reach an agreement as to the proper titles they were to receive from the new emperor.

Before any workable agreement was reached among the emperor-makers themselves, the third revolution had spread over several provinces. The government's well-paid but very poorly disciplined troops proved to be no match for the patriotically inspired soldiers of the punitive expedition. One province after another declared independence, and joined the revolution. But Mr. Yuan still hoped to retain his presidency at the price of his emperorship. So a decree was issued on March 22, 1916, pleading for his "lack of virtue," cancelling his acceptance of the imperial throne, and ordering that all the petitions for a change in the form of the state and for his enthronement be returned through the administrative council to the original petitioners to be burnt and destroyed.

But this act of virtue and repentance had no longer any effect on the rebellious provinces which continued to secede from the central government, until finally even Governor Chen Yi of Sze-chuen and Governor Tong Shiang-ming of Hu-nan, both of whom had long been regarded by Mr. Yuan as his most loyal supporters, were compelled by the popular uprising to proclaim the independence of their respective provinces. That came like a death blow to the ex-emperor who, according to reports, fell ill 5 days after the secession of Hu-nan, and died on June 6, 1916, after an illness of 1 week.

After Yuan Shih-kai's death, the vice-president, General Li Yuen-hung, who had defied the many threats of the monarchists and had persistently refused all the honors which the new dynasty insisted upon giving him, automatically became president of the republic. On June 29, the first constitution of the republic proclaimed on March 11, 1912, was restored. And on July 14, the military congress which had been the central authority of all the rebelling provinces, was dissolved and the third revolution was declared to be at an end.

Here ends our story. It has not been a pleasant duty for me, a Chinese, to tell it to the world. Although I have greatly rejoiced that a false god which the world had created through its own credulity, has at last been shattered to dust, I have, however, no present interest in once more disclosing Yuan Shih-kai's "lack of virtue." Mr. Yuan has written his own epitaph with his own deeds, and it is no courage to slay the slain. What has really inspired me to write this account, is my belief that the whole episode may furnish the world with a fresh proof of China's sincerity in her democratic aspirations and in her strife for an upright and enlightened government. An American writer has well said: "I do not believe that the Chinese Revolution has failed, for I do not believe that it is finished."³ The first Chinese republic of 1912 has not failed, for it has never been given a fair trial. It died an abortive death, but its spirit has persisted and grown despite the skill and the organized strength of the reactionary forces under the leadership of Yuan Shih-kai and his clique. The internal political struggle in China during the last several years has been a struggle of New China, the child of the intellectual revolution of the last quarter of a century, against Chinese officialdom which has been corrupting and weakening the nation for centuries. The dramatic episode of the monarchical restoration which I have documentarily sketched above, sufficiently illustrates the personnel, the spirit and the method of official China. It achieved its consummate success on the day when the administrative council announced to the world that out of 2043 representatives of the people, 1993 voted for the immediate enthronement of Yuan Shih-kai. But official China miscalculated its own strength and misunderstood the spirit of the nation. It failed to see that when it had to put up at least the appearance of "going to the people" for approval and sanction of its actions, its death knell was already tolled and its final downfall assured. Its last efforts of political engineering and downright corruption only helped to consolidate new China and to drive the moderates and even the conservatives into the camp of the revolutionists. The third revolution was not undertaken by the ultra-radicals of the type of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It was led largely by such moderate leaders as Tsai Ao and Liang Chi-chao, and supported by the radicals. Against this consolidated new China, Chinese officialdom was impotent. And great was the fall of it.

It is true that official China has not yet entirely given up the fight, and that the Chinese revolution is not yet finished. But the monarchist movement has helped to bring its main issue into prominent relief: it is a fight between New China and Chinese officialdom. May what has been said above serve to convince the world that young China is earnest in her struggle for democracy and enlightenment!

³Gardner L. Harding, *Present-day China*, p. 9.

Chapter 5

Reconstruction in China

A digest, prepared for Asia by Dr. Hu Shih, of his important address at the Institute of Pacific Relations during its conference in California.

My British friend Mr. G. E. Hubbard has elsewhere defined Chinese reconstruction as “the evolutionary process which is taking place in economic, social and cultural spheres of China.” The Chinese term for this movement simply means “construction,” or building up. It is reconstruction in the sense that what is being built up is actually remaking and reshaping the surface of an old country and the life of an ancient people.

Broadly speaking, Chinese reconstruction has three phases—first, the building up of a physical basis of national unity; second, the improvement of the physical well-being of the people; and, third, the remolding of our cultural life for a better adjustment in the new world.

All progress in the field of transportation—the railways, the highways and the air lines—comes under the first category of providing the nation with a physical basis for political unity. The sense of national unity, which now extends from Manchouli to Yunnanfu, from Kalgan to Canton, from Shanghai to Tibet, is largely one of racial, cultural and historical unity. There has been lacking a material or physical basis to strengthen this historical-cultural unity and bind the various distant parts of the country more closely together. Chinese leaders early recognized the urgent need of modern means of transportation and communication; but unfortunately, ever since the outbreak of the World War in 1914 when foreign capital ceased to come to China on any large scale, China has made very little progress in railway building. It is only within the past few years that the government has taken up the railway projects with new vigor and has succeeded in extending old lines and constructing new ones.

Chapter Note: *Asia Magazine*, November 1936, 36, no. 11, 737–740.

The Lunghai Railway is now extended beyond Sian; the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway is being connected by the construction of the bridge across the Chientang River; and the Canton-Hankow Railway is completed and is now open to through traffic. Of the newly planned lines, the Hangchow-Nanchang Railway which connects the Yangtze delta with the capital of Kiangsi and the Hwai-nan Railway which connects the Hwai River with the Yangtze are the most important ones that have already been completed. For the first time, we are having trunk lines running from Canton to Peiping and thence to the Northwest, and from the eastern coast westward into the heart of interior China.

In the development of provincial and interprovincial highways, even greater progress has been made. The first modern roads were started in 1920–1921 as a relief measure during the famine of those years. After the establishment of the Nanking government in 1927, road-building was undertaken with nationwide enthusiasm. From the 1,185 km of modern roads in 1921, the total length had increased to over 100,000 km in 1935. In some of the provinces, notably Kiangsi and Kwangsi, the provincial trunk roads reach every *hsien* with local roads connecting all the important towns within the province. For the first time we are now able to motor from Shanghai to Nanchang and Changsha and thence to Canton.

Commercial aviation has helped to connect the more distant centers which have not yet been linked up by transport on land. One can now fly from Shanghai to Chengtu, a distance of about 1,300 miles, in 7 h; and from Peiping to Chengtu, via Chengchow in Honan and Sian in Shensi, in 10 h. Beginning with last July, one could breakfast in Peiping, fly to Shanghai to keep a luncheon engagement and return to the old capital for supper at home—a distance which usually takes 80 h to complete the round trip if one travels by railway.

All this improvement in transportation is building up a new physical basis for a modern national state. When the Hwai-nan Railway was being built early last year, there was a great famine in northern Anhwei and there was no means for transporting food stuffs from the more plenteous regions. The starving population requested the railway engineers to make temporary provision for grain transportation before it was ready for passenger traffic. The request was complied with, and the population was saved from starvation. It was the improvement in roads which greatly aided the government troops in their final campaign against the Red army in Kiangsi in 1934. And it was also the modernized roads which enabled the government to suppress the armed rebellion in Fukien in less than 2 months. The railways and highways are accelerating the process of economic and political unification.

Under the second main category—the betterment of the livelihood of the people—may be grouped all those processes of rural rehabilitation, water control, formation of coöperatives, reform in taxation and improvement of public health. The task of rural economic reconstruction in a vast country like China is a gigantic one, and the recent achievements in its various phases can hardly be said to be more than a mere humble beginning. Irrigation schemes in Shensi and the Northwest are now watering millions of *mou* of farming fields, and the repairing of dikes and dredging of rivers along the Yangtze Valley are lessening the danger of possible recurrence of catastrophic floods such as those of 1931. But these and other similar

works barely scratch the surface of the gigantic problem of water control and famine prevention in a country which has the reputation of a "land of famines" and which has to face the tremendous task of irrigating a vast hinterland where annual rainfall is often below 20 in..

It is true that we now have made some progress in crop improvement, agricultural research and education, and the coöperative movement. But the progress already achieved appears so infinitesimally small when compared to the magnitude of the problems involved. What, for instance, is 2 million members in 38 coöperatives in a population of 450 millions?

It is also true that, in the realm of reforms in taxation, the provincial and municipal governments have in the past 2 years abolished 5,200 items of exorbitant and unjust taxes and surcharges. But these are merely insignificant relief measures compared with the untouched fundamental problem of land tenure in a country where 85% of the population is congested on about 17% of the land, and where the boldest stretch of imagination has so far failed to find a formula for an equitable distribution of land which will give the agricultural population a minimum level of decent living.

Under the third category may be grouped all the improvements and reforms in the field of education and culture in general. As I have touched upon some phases of educational and cultural improvement in an earlier issue of *Asia* [March, 1935, "An Optimist Looks at China"], I shall now confine myself to one item which seems to me most important. Beginning with 1935, the Ministry of Education is endeavoring to carry out a Five-Year Plan of Compulsory Education by which it aims to give every child of school age at least 1 year of free and compulsory education. A second Five-Year Plan is to begin in 1940 when the government hopes to lengthen the period of compulsory education to 2 years. The success of the first year has given us reason to hope that this very moderate program can be successfully carried out.

It has been pointed out by some recent observers of Chinese events that there is a reactionary tendency in the social and cultural movements in China, evidenced by the revival of the worship of Confucius and by the frequent exaltation of Confucian virtues in the "New Life Movement" sponsored by important leaders of the government. As a die-hard advocate of liberalism and modernization, I must confess that such a reactionary tendency does exist and has a following chiefly among party workers and office-seekers. The explanation is clear. China is now in the midst of her nationalistic development, and all nationalistic movements easily lead to an apologetic attitude toward the indigenous civilization of the past. Moreover, there is no doubt that the reactionary movements in certain quarters of Europe and Asia have had their influence, direct or indirect, over some of the political leaders in China. The tomb and temple of Confucius, for example, were ordered by the Chinese government to be repaired and the worship of Confucius was revived as a state rite, when China learned that our neighbors in Japan had completed a new temple of Confucius at the cost of more than 2 million *yen*, and were inviting Chinese scholars to attend the ceremony of unveiling! Such reaction abroad has greatly strengthened our reactionary movements at home, with the result that there is really a vogue for such slogans as "an authoritarian or totalitarian state," "the revival of our glorious

past,” and “cultural reconstruction on the basis of the revival of an indigenous civilization.”

But I must confess that such reactionary tendencies are merely passing moods which do not appeal to the imagination and thinking of the younger generation. The social and cultural movements of the past 20 years have been on the whole unmistakably in the direction of liberalism and democracy, and I am fully inclined to believe that China may yet be one of the last strongholds of liberalism in the world.

.....

I now come to the question. What are the international implications of China's program of reconstruction?

The reconstruction work in all its phases has largely been carried out by Chinese personnel and financed by Chinese money. But, of course, there are international implications which may be summed up in these words: from the United States we get the training of the Chinese personnel; from the League of Nations, the technical advice of experts; from Great Britain, an important portion of the money; and from Japan, all the obstruction.

Since the return of the first portion of the Boxer Indemnity to China in 1908 for the purpose of educating Chinese youths in American universities, the United States for 27 years has been educating Chinese students in scientific technique, technological training and administrative ability. It is these men who form the nucleus of that vast personnel which is planning, leading, directing and executing the multifarious activities of Chinese reconstruction.

The League of Nations has been very helpful to China in furnishing her with a large number of technical experts whose advice and assistance have been found most useful in the planning of transportation, public health, water control and rural reform. Of these advisers, mention must be made of Sir John Hope Simpson, whose great contribution to the relief work during the great floods of the Yangtze region in 1931 will surely be long remembered in China. The League has recently decided to undertake the training of Chinese technicians by allowing them to be attached to the appropriate sections of the League Secretariat.

There has been comparatively little financial aid from the outside in this reconstruction work except the American wheat and cotton loan which made possible the initial formation of the National Economic Council as the central organ for the direction and planning of many of the projects of reconstruction, and the railway loan from the British banks for the construction of the Chientang River bridge. But mention must be made of the part played by the British portion of the Boxer Indemnity in the financing of the reconstruction projects. This fund, which had accumulated from the end of 1922 and was returned to China in 1928, has been used in the financing of productive activities, and for each amount thus used the Chinese government guarantees to pay an annual interest of 5%, which interest is again spent on the educational and cultural activities in China. About 7 million pounds sterling have been thus spent in this reconstructive work.

The greatest obstruction to Chinese reconstruction work has come from Japan, from whom we had a right to expect sympathetic understanding and friendly assistance. This obstruction has come in at least three main directions.

In the first place, the whole series of events from the sudden invasion and occupation of Manchuria in 1931, and the Shanghai War in 1932, down to the invasion of Jehol and the war along the Great Wall in 1933, created a war situation which made it absolutely impossible for the government to pay attention to any constructive work. The invasion of Manchuria took place at a time when China was faced with the unprecedented catastrophe of the Yangtze floods which affected 25 million people in 131 *hsiens* in 5 provinces, and which resulted in a total material loss of 2 billion dollars. The Shanghai War, which lasted a little more than a month, caused untold losses in human lives and destruction of property and paralyzed the Yangtze delta for many months during which the government found it difficult to pay the school teachers and governmental employees. For two whole years, the whole nation could not settle down to any constructive work. It was not until after the failure of the Lytton Report and the League of Nations and after the war along the Great Wall that China came to a fuller realization of the significance of the new situation. She now realized that all the peace machinery of the Pacific region had been torn to shreds by the armed fist of an aggressive power, and that she had only herself to rely upon for her own national salvation. China, as it were, was aroused from the slumbers of a false sense of international security. It was not until then that China finally settled down to work on her own program of internal reconstruction. But what a change has come in the meaning and content of the program! A sense of the imminent danger of national perdition has gripped the whole people, and national defense has become the generally accepted necessary guiding principle in everything we undertake. Even the students of the universities and schools are demanding of their teachers that their educational curriculum be reorganized in order that they may be better prepared to meet the needs of what they call the "extraordinary times!"

In the second place, Japan has not only interrupted the peaceful reconstruction work in China, but also openly told the whole world that she does not allow any other nation or nations to render to China any assistance in her reconstruction. In the famous Amau Statement of April 17, 1934, Japan warned the whole world that, because of her "position and mission" and "special responsibilities in East Asia," she could not tolerate any joint operations in respect to China "undertaken by foreign powers, even in the name of technical or financial assistance." In the same statement, Japan threatened that, in case of her warning being unheeded, she might be forced to "act alone on her own responsibility." Indeed, this threat she has tried to carry out more than once. Last November, China promulgated her new currency reform law, which was accepted by all Chinese banks, and which had the full coöperation of the English and other foreign banks. But Japan, in her anger against China for not having previously informed her, and in her suspicion of British participation and coöperation in the reform scheme, began to stir up serious troubles in North China, which, it is commonly believed, were intended not merely to weaken the authority of the Chinese government in China, but also to punish the British through the punishing of the Chinese.

Lastly, Japan seems to have determined not to tolerate any government that may have a chance to unify and consolidate China. At least her militarists have never concealed such intentions. Throughout the whole summer of 1935, Japanese military officers of high rank both in North and South China repeatedly issued

statements to the effect that Japan would not deal with the Nanking government as long as General Chiang Kai-shek remained as its powerful leader. In an equally famous Tads Statement of September, 1935, the Japanese military leader in North China declared that the Empire of Japan could not coexist with Chiang Kai-shek and his party. "Shall the Empire surrender to them? or shall they be crushed by the Empire?" These and other similar declarations have convinced us that our neighbor is fully determined to oppose any government that shows any capability of achieving political unity in China.

Such are the international implications of Chinese reconstruction.

Shall China abandon all her activities of political, economic and social reconstruction and prepare to die without an effort to save herself? No, a thousand times No! We are determined to go on with our work of putting our own house in order, of solving our own urgent problems, and, if necessary, of fighting for our own existence.

Chapter 6

The Pacific Changes Color

Address delivered by Hu Shih at the Chinese Students' League of Greater New York (date unknown), taken down by Mr. and Mrs. C. P. Tsu, Graduate School, Columbia University.

With Japan, Russia and China as main actors, the Pacific stage is undergoing a process of change.

After the World War, until September 18, 1931, when Japan captured Manchuria, Japan's supremacy in the Far East was an established fact. For 7 years, from 1914 to 1921, Japan ruled the Far East almost without a rival. In 1915 she forced on China the notorious "Twenty One Demands." Four years later, in 1919, despite the vigorous protest of the Chinese, she was given by the Allied Powers the right of free disposition of the former German concessions in Shantung. The Washington Conference was called to check the flood of Japan's preponderate power in the Far East, but achieved a negative result. During the first 10 years after the conclusion of the Washington Treaties in 1921 Japan's power reached a new peak.

Since 1931, however, there has been a shift of power in the Pacific, and Japan's supremacy no longer remains an undisputable fact. As the result of Japan's violence committed in Manchuria, new forces of great import have emerged.

First, Russia has become a first-rate Power in the Far East. Since 1931 the Soviet Union has brought up a huge army estimated at between 300,000 and 500,000 well trained and equipped men for defense work in the Far East. She has developed the strongest air force in the world, her air fleet figured at more than 7,000. Her submarines and destroyers stationed in the Pacific are said to have quintupled. Finally, she has constructed 7,000 miles of new railways along the Mongolian and Siberian borders, and has double-tracked 3,000 miles of railways already existing.

Secondly, the rearmament of the non-Asiatic nations bordering the Pacific or having possessions there, is being rapidly pushed forward. The construction of the

Chapter Note: *The Chinese Mercury*, January 1937, 1, no. 1, 44–45.

British naval base at Singapore was resumed after the Sino-Japanese war at Shanghai early in 1932, and is drawing to its completion. New Zealand and Australia, having never dreamed of the necessity of arming, are now vigorously mapping out their schemes of coastal defense. Each recruits an enlarged militia, manufactures its own planes, and extracts gasoline from coal and shale. This chain of nations newly armed or rearmed constitutes another new force in the Far East. Also, it is the net result of Japan's aggression in Manchuria.

Thirdly, there is the revival of China, which is even more important than the above two forces. Under the National Government at Nanking, the country has been united. National reconstruction has made headway in many directions. Generally it may be grouped under the following three phases:

1. Improved physical unity of the country as expressed in the increased network of railroads, large-scale construction of highways and the opening of various air routes.
2. Improvement of the physical well-being of the people through large rural reconstruction projects, improvement of crops, extension of habitation work, irrigation of the large waterless hinterland, repairing of dikes and dredging of rivers in order to lessen the dangers of floods and famines.
3. Extension of educational and cultural work, particularly the introduction of obligatory elementary education for each child for a period of 1 year, and the adoption in 1921 of one widely-spoken dialect as the national language to be used in all schools replacing the classical written language, which was not understood by the masses.

Under the present circumstances a war with Japan is inevitable as China can find no other way out for her existence. For 25 years I had been a pacifist, and my friendship for Japan had withstood the seizure of Manchuria and Japan's other warlike acts. Since June 10, 1935, I have been converted into a champion for armed resistance. That was the day the Japanese army compelled the Chinese government to order the Chinese people to cease expressing dissatisfaction with Japanese policies toward China.

But before dealing Japan an effective blow, China must bend every effort to build up a strong, unified state. Indeed, a strong unified China, once built up, will be the chief stabilizing power of the Far East.

Chapter 7

The Changing Balance of Forces in the Pacific

Broadly speaking, there are only two views of the Far Eastern situation. There is the view of those who regard it as completely beyond any peaceful remedy. They are the defeatists. But there are still a few optimists who hold the view that recent changes in the balance of power in the Pacific may yet provide far-sighted and constructive statesmanship with an opportunity of devising some kind of peaceful adjustment. I shall try to state in the following pages the reasons for my being one of these optimistic few.

Many believe that there is no longer any balance of power in the Far East, that there is only the supremacy of one nation—Japan. They believe that the semblance of international equilibrium and order which obtained during the period of the Washington Treaties (1921–1931) was ruthlessly and irrevocably destroyed by the acts of Japan beginning in September 1931. They believe that where one Power is in a position of such absolute preponderance, and where that Power happens to be intoxicated with the successes it has met with in carrying through an apparently irresistible program of militaristic expansion, there cannot be any remedy or modification of the situation without an international war.

From such a major premise only defeatist conclusions can be drawn: either the Powers of Europe and America must acknowledge their helplessness in this situation, and each of them plan to withdraw the commercial and financial interests of its nationals from the Far East in order to avoid a possible conflict; or they must appease the predominant Power by sacrificing all principles of international justice and the sanctity of treaty obligations in order to retain a minimum share in the spoils; or each must go on with its military and naval preparations in anticipation of an inevitable clash in the not-too-distant future.

Such seemed to be the state of mind prevailing at the round table discussions of the Institute of Pacific Relations in which I participated last summer. Shortly after that meeting, a liberal journal of opinion in the United States advocated editorially

Chapter Note: *Foreign Affairs*, January 1937, 15, no. 2, 254–259.

that all American merchants and firms trading in China should be withdrawn from that country and that the American Government should undertake to compensate their losses out of the money saved from scrapping the American navy. I need not mention the other organs of opinion which advocate creating a big navy and a big air force as the only sort of language which Japan can understand. I do not propose to comment on such views. I only wish to point out that there is this defeatist attitude toward the international situation in the Pacific. To build a big navy without backing it with a constructive policy is defeatism. To advocate the abandonment of the principle of non-recognition—the only surviving reminder of the sanctity of a set of great and idealistic treaties—is defeatism. And the mere pious wish to avoid a clash by scrapping the American navy and abandoning a continent of commerce and investment is no less defeatism.

I venture to suggest that this defeatism in all its forms is based upon an erroneous understanding of the present situation in the Pacific area. It is erroneous today to think of that situation as one of Japanese supremacy unmitigated by any changes in the balance of forces. Such changes have been taking place since 1931.

The plain historical truth is this: *“Japan’s supremacy in the Far East” was a fact in the period of seventeen years from 1914 to 1931; but since 1931 it no longer has been a fact.*

It is unnecessary to recount how at the outbreak of the World War in 1914 the semblance of a balance of power which had prevailed since the close of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 completely broke down. Great Britain, Russia and France were engaged in a life and death struggle in Europe. The Far East was left in the hands of Britain’s ally, Japan, who proceeded to wipe out all German possessions and influence on the Chinese coast and in the Pacific Ocean. For 7 years, from 1914 to 1921, Japan ruled the Western Pacific almost without a rival. This supremacy was evidenced by Japan’s “Twenty-one Demands” on China in 1915. It was still more clearly evidenced at the Peace Conference in 1919 when the victorious Allies, against the nationwide protests of the Chinese people and against a worldwide sentiment for the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, conceded to Japan the right of free disposition of the former German concessions in Shantung.

The Washington Conference was called to readjust the problems of naval disarmament and the Pacific problems left unsolved by the Paris Peace Conference. It had a direct bearing on the Pacific situation in four ways. First, the question of Shantung was amicably settled between China and Japan. Secondly, the eight signatory Powers (other than China) of the Nine-Power Treaty pledged themselves “to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; ... [and] to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.” Thirdly, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not renewed and its place was taken by the Four-Power Treaty. Fourthly, the ratio 5-5-3 was adopted for the naval strengths of Great Britain, the United States and Japan, respectively.

While it is true that the Washington Treaties aimed at the establishment of a set of new checks and balances on Japan's preponderate power in the Far East, it is no less true that the supremacy of Japan was never in fact curtailed by the actions taken at Washington. On the contrary, Japanese power in the Pacific was never greater than during those first 10 years after the Washington Treaties (1921–1931). The real result of the Conference was to rectify some of the most pressing troubles between China and Japan, remove much of the tension between Japan and the other naval Powers, and thereby secure Japan's preponderate position in the Western Pacific by practically legalizing it.

There is such a thing as power becoming greatest when it is made innocuous. The best example is the supremacy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Japan's position in the family of nations was the highest when she abided by the results of the Washington Conference and remained one of the Big Four in the League of Nations. Since she began to abuse that power in 1931, and particularly since she withdrew from the League in 1933, she has not again attained her former heights of power and prestige.

Thus we may say that "the supremacy of Japan in the Far East" was not only true of the period of the World War and the years immediately following its conclusion, but also true of the 10 years after the Washington Conference. While the League Covenant and the Washington Treaties and the Pact of Paris prevailed there was no balance of power in the Pacific. There was only a New World Order, or at least the semblance of it, within which Japan was tacitly acknowledged by all as the undisputed leader in the Far East and in the Western Pacific.

But since September 18, 1931, that is to say, since Japan's militarists started their aggressive campaigns in Manchuria, in Shanghai, and in North China—what a tremendous change has taken place! By those acts of aggression, Japan threw into the discard the whole postwar machinery of peace. Japanese power ran wild. It upset not merely the East, but the entire world. It destroyed that semblance of international order which alone had legalized and tacitly protected Japan's supremacy.

What are the new factors brought forth since 1931 as a result, at least in part, of Japan's violent action?

In the first place, Soviet Russia has come back to the Pacific as a first-rate military Power. At the time of the Washington Conference, she had not yet been recognized by the other Powers. She was neither a participant in the Conference nor a signatory to the Washington Treaties. But since 1931 the Soviet Union has brought to the Far East a huge armed force estimated to include between 300,000 and 500,000 finely trained and well equipped men. She is developing one of the greatest air forces in the world. Since 1931, her submarine and destroyer fleet in the Pacific is reported to have quintupled and the coast guard fleet to have increased elevenfold. In these years she has constructed about 7,000 miles of new railways along the Mongolian and Siberian borders, and 3,000 miles have been double-tracked. And behind all these there has taken place the most remarkable progress in industrialization, not only in European Russia but also in the Soviet Far East.

In other words, Russia has now definitely returned to the Pacific area as a fully armed Power. She comes, too, possessed of new and vast industrial resources. Japan must now reckon with her more than ever as a factor in the Pacific scene.

The second new factor is the rapid rearmament of all the non-Asiatic nations bordering the Pacific or having possessions there. A continuous ring extends from the Aleutian Islands to Singapore and the Dutch East Indies¹. We read the other day that for the month of July 1936, the Dutch Indies were the heaviest buyers of American ammunition. The construction of the British naval base at Singapore, after being suspended for a time, was vigorously resumed after the fighting at Shanghai early in 1932. This most gigantic naval base in the world is now practically completed. New Zealand and Australia, the two paradises of the Southern Pacific Ocean which had never dreamed of the necessity of arming, are now seriously working out their own schemes of coastal defense. Each is recruiting an enlarged militia, manufacturing its own planes, and laboriously extracting gasoline from coal and shale. Recently when I was in Winnipeg I read in the *Free Press* that Canada, too, is going to have a new navy. And the United States is constructing new armaments and fortifications from the Philippines to Alaska, and undertaking a heavy naval building program.

This ring of nations newly armed or rearmed must be considered a new factor produced since 1931 by Japan's actions.

Last but not least we must note the rapid rise of the national state of China. The unification of China under the National Government at Nanking is the outcome of Japan's aggression. In the dark shadows of national humiliation, a unified Chinese state is taking form.

During the first 2 years following Japan's aggression in Manchuria, Japanese spokesmen everywhere declared that China was not an organized modern state and should not be accorded the full rights and privileges which such states enjoy. In the last 3 years such pleadings have ceased. In their place we constantly hear statements from Japanese militarists to the effect that the Empire of Japan cannot co-exist with Chiang Kai-shek's government. "Shall the Empire surrender to him? Or shall it crush him?" Such were the alternatives stated recently by General Tada. Long before the outside world became aware of it, the shrewd eyes of the Japanese military had begun to see the growth of a nationalistic China and perceived that it would have an increasing power of resistance to external aggression.

This new factor in the Pacific scene may indeed turn out to be the most important of the three which I have enumerated. For, as John Hay knew, an independent and strong China is necessary not only for the maintenance of the Open Door² but also for the stability and peace of the Far East. For over 30 years China failed to live up to Hay's expectations. Now she is earnestly endeavoring to qualify herself as one of the stabilizing forces in Asia.

Such are the new factors which now are entering into the balance of forces in the Pacific and changing that balance so that Japan, though she still plays a mighty role, is no longer supreme.

Evidently if these new factors are not properly organized they may lead towards a terrible international conflagration. It might begin with a war forced on China

by Japan's continued aggression, and gradually it might involve Soviet Russia, Great Britain and ultimately the United States. In the modern world war is as truly "indivisible" as peace. No nation bordering on the Pacific, or interested in its fate, can hope to escape being involved in any major Pacific conflict.

But wise statesmen may also discern in this changing balance of power new possibilities for a peaceful adjustment of the Pacific world. They may now discover a way to create a regional peace machinery which has as participants the United States, the Soviet Union and the British Empire (with all its Pacific members), as well, of course, as Japan and China. What is certain is that the alternative to such a peaceful collective arrangement will be another world conflagration the magnitude and the horror of which will be beyond anything we now envisage in the boldest stretch of our imagination.

Chapter 8

China's Chances of Survival

Except for the opening, the rest of this article was published again under the title, "My People and the Japanese."

I

In their new book, *Can China Survive?*, my friends Hallett Abend and Anthony J. Billingham propound an interesting theme and arrive at a terrible conclusion:-

Unmolested, China might survive and eventually achieve real unification, particularly if she were given intelligent help from outside. But with Japan exerting a constantly growing pressure, with the Japanese government avowedly determined to keep other nations from playing a large part in China's future development, and with Soviet Russia occasionally filching away large areas of the northern territories, the prospects for survival, except under Japanese direction, or as an adjunct to the Soviet Union, seem gloomy indeed.

I am not interested in refuting the thesis of my journalistic friends, which, I must confess, is sufficiently refuted by the main body of the book itself. For, though they have told us in the opening chapters that Chinese unification is a "myth" and that "today China seems to expect every other nation to do its duty, while making no concrete plans to do anything for itself," the reader of the book can readily see that unification is a reality. For example, we find this:

Today things are different...Reforms, modernizations, and reconstruction projects are...being carried out in a surprising and ever increasing measure. There have probably been more actual physical and beneficial changes made in China in the last five years than in the preceding half century. This is no doubt due to the increasing power and authority of the Central government, but must also in a large measure be attributed to a new vigour which seems to be released in the land.

Is it necessary for me to point out to the authors that political unification exactly means the "increasing power and authority of the Central government?"

Chapter Note: *The People's Tribune*, March 1, 1937, XVI, no. 5, 373–382.

I am, however, more interested in a sentence of my own which another friend, Mr. Lin Yu-tang, has done me the honour to quote in his book, *My Country and My People*. This sentence is:—"If China does not perish, God is blind." As Mr. Lin Yu-tang has quoted this saying without its context, which alone can make it intelligible, and as this remark seems to have some bearing on the question of the survival of my country, I am tempted to offer a few words of explanation.

I remember distinctly when and under what circumstances I made such a sweeping condemnation of my own country. It was in the summer of 1920, when I was talking with an editor of the *Peking Morning Post*, under the shades of a 600-year-old fir tree in the Central Park, which had for centuries been a part of the imperial palace. I was in a mood of lecturing to him, because he was one of my mature students. I said that our ancestors had committed many grave sins, every one of which could have ruined a nation and destroyed a race. I enumerated half a dozen of them—foot-binding by the women for a 1,000 years, opium smoking for over 300 years, wasting the best brains of the intelligentsia in mastering the octopartite ("eight-legged") form of classical composition for 600 years, the use of torture in the law courts for obtaining confessions for all the centuries, conversion to an other-worldly religion of India for 2,000 years, and so on. I said to my friend:—

These sins of our fathers are visited on us. And we have not done enough to eradicate their evil effects. When I look back into history and contemplate these deadly burdens of a terrible heritage, I often tremble and say to myself, 'If China does not perish, there is no divine justice.' And it was really sheer luck that China did not perish during the last 80 years of her contact with the militant powers of the West.

That was the origin of the much quoted and misquoted saying of mine of 16 years ago. It was said in all earnestness as a stern warning to my own people, especially to those whose uncritical reading of history had led them to place too much reliance on what they called our glorious past and to those who saw in old China only the "China of blue porcelain bowls and exquisite silk scrolls" and forgot it was also the nest of vice, dire poverty, prevalent ignorance, and unbelievable cruelty. Our past was neither all glory nor all beauty. Whatever glory and beauty there was belonged to the past and does not help us to achieve our own survival today.

Our own survival and salvation must depend on our own success in rectifying the evil effects of the sins of our fathers and in positively solving our new problems, which living in a new world has forced upon us. In the last two decades, I have watched my people work in both these directions and I am convinced that our successes in these efforts warrant us to believe that, however the present crisis in the East may turn out. China can survive.

II

Herbert Spencer once said that nature was kind, in that acquired characters are not transmissible, for, if they were, the feet of the descendants of a Chinese mother of bound feet would become smaller and smaller throughout the generations. The same

consideration applies to all the evil institutions of our ancestors, which, though great evils in themselves, were man-made and capable of being unrooted by human efforts. Once the Chinese girl is freed from the fetters of foot-binding and is given the benefits of modern schooling and physical exercises, she bursts forth in full blossom as one of the most beautiful and graceful species of womanhood. And her brother, when he gives up the octopartite composition and submits himself to the discipline of the modern school and the scientific laboratory, is capable of surprising the world by his dexterity in handling the test tube and the microscope, and by his quick understanding and creative ingenuity in scientific research. Six centuries of wasteful literary gymnastics apparently have not disabled the Chinese mentality any more than 1,000 years of foot-binding have permanently crippled the feet of the Chinese girls.

These sins of our fathers are merely institutional, social, and educational. They are not biological or racial. New institutions have replaced old ones, which soon lose all their traces, because the people, once brought back to their senses, are so ashamed of them that they destroy all reminders of their former sins. I am afraid future directors of historical and sociological museums will find it very difficult to collect women's footwear of the foot-binding days or the exquisite tools of opium smoking, if such articles are allowed to disappear with the rapidity they are today. It is really amazing and indeed amusing to see that, whereas in the old days women with large feet would resort to artificial devices to make them appear small, today elderly ladies having bound feet are inventing new devices to make their feet appear "natural." And all this change of psychology has taken place in my lifetime.

It must be admitted, however, that habits of thinking and acting formed under certain social institutions for long centuries cannot be easily eradicated. The use of torture in the law courts, for example, represented a mental habit—the habit of demanding speedy justice of impatience with careful search, argument, and sifting of evidence. The new codes and courts and the prohibition of torture, it is pointed out, cannot do away with this impatience for the "due process of law," which is necessarily slow and expensive. It is this old mental habit which endears to the peasants of Shantung their military governor, General Han Fu-chu, who, "acting as governor, magistrate judge, jury, and lawyer at the same time," hands out "rough justice" to the people. Mr. Abend says of him that he "gets results," and Mr. Lin Yu-tang, who elsewhere most enthusiastically praised Hanfeitse for advocating a government by law, thinks "the province is lucky which sees the type of enlightened despotism of General Han Fu-chu." It is probably the same old mental impatience that has made Mr. Lin Yu-tang dream of a "Great Executioner" as the "Saviour of China."

Behold, here the great Saviour comes. The Great Executioner nails the banner of Justice on the city wall... Whosoever says he is above the law and refuses to bow before the banner will be beheaded and his head will be thrown into the lake... And of those whose heads the Great Executioner chops off, great is the number... and the lake is dyed red with their blood of iniquity.

When I read these beautifully written pages, I cannot help sighing, "Truly the old mental habits die hard!"

But I do not despair. Education and experience will change and rectify these hard-dying habits. And they are changing with a truly amazing rapidity. Mr. Lin Yu-tang has said:—

We are an old nation... We do not want to race about in a field for ball, we prefer to saunter along willow banks to listen to the bird's song and the children's laughter... We do not ache to reach the foot of the mountain when we are in the middle of the lake, and we do not ache to be at the top of the hill when we are at its foot.

All this is no longer true, fortunately. We are no longer an old nation. We are a changing and rejuvenated nation. We—Mr. Lin and I and thousands of others—are witnessing our own sons and daughters running about in a field for a ball, swimming the open seas, and aching to scale the highest peaks of the mountains.

In short, China has been more successful in the uprooting of old evils than the outside world has suspected. In the course of a quarter of a century, my people have thrown off the monarchy, together with its huge paraphernalia of vice, which had existed from time immemorial; the practice of foot-binding, which had existed a 1,000 years; the whole system of education in useless literary gymnastics, which had prevailed at least 1,400 years; the old laws, which were the best examples of what Sir Henry Maine called the ancient laws based on the conception of status; and the law courts, which resorted to torture as the legitimate means to obtain confessions of guilt. These and hundreds of other things have gone overboard almost overnight and, I am quite sure, never to return.

These changes have been tardy in coming. China paid sufficient penalties for their tardiness. But no change is ever too late. A nation that has the pluck and resolve to discard her basic social, political, educational institutions of thousands of years' standing is a nation of vitality and youth who cannot perish. She will survive.

III

And the most marvelous thing about these fundamental changes in China is that they have all come from below and not from the top down. This is the point which men like Messrs. Abend, Billingham, and Lin Yu-tang have all failed to see. These men, who are most enthusiastic over Japan's successes in modernization and who belittle China's more recent efforts in the same direction, do not realize the fundamental difference; that, while in Japan all reforms began with a powerful ruling caste, in China all reformers have been men without political power who have often had to fight against the rulers in order to bring about a change. I have elsewhere pointed out that the process of modernization in Japan is a type of "centralized control" and that in China it is one of "diffused permeation."

Japan was at the height of military Feudalism when Western civilization knocked at her shores. She was ruled by a military caste, the *daimio* and the samurai, who in those days numbered 260,000 families and who were politically the most powerful class in the land. When that class was finally convinced of the necessity of change, it had the power to carry out all the reforms it wished. And that class happened to be highly trained in the art and discipline of war. When the samurai put on his new

uniform and was equipped with the modern arms, he was a ready-made soldier. That is why, of all the non-European nations with whom the Western civilization has come into contact, Japan is the only one who readily succeeds in mastering the military arts and making the fullest use of them. When the military caste had succeeded in solving the problem of national defence and security, the efficacy of the Western civilization was clearly demonstrated to the whole nation, and the remaining task of modernization of the country was smooth sailing.

Not so in China. China had no ruling class, and the ignorant imperial household was deaf and blind to the demands of a new age. And because for 20 centuries the soldier and the arts of war had always been looked down on by the whole nation the early attempts at modernization of the army and the navy were doomed to fail miserably. All the changes in the direction of modernization—from the political revolution to the literary renaissance, from foot-binding to bobbed hair—have originated with the people themselves. Every reform has begun with a few advocates, spread with slow diffusion and voluntary following, and finally succeeded when the following became sufficiently powerful.

Let us not be too easily dazzled by the brilliant success of Japan's modernization. That type of reform under centralized control has the advantages of rapidity, orderliness, and capability for large-scale enterprises. But it also has its great disadvantages. The power of initiative is centered in a small but powerful class which is conscious of its effective leadership and is unwilling to surrender it. It is up to that class to build or to ruin. And the rest of the nation is not accustomed to contest leadership with it. Moreover, class interest and prejudice on the part of that ruling class often lead to the conscious effort to protect certain phases of Japanese national life from modern influence and peaceful change. To-day the whole world is seeing how those unchanging phases of mediaeval Japan are now running wild, disturbing the peace of the East, and heading that island empire toward unknown and dubious destinies.

IV

On the other hand, changes through "diffused permeation," as typified in modern China, are necessarily slow, sporadic, and often wasteful because of the amount of undermining and erosion that must take place before any change is possible. Moreover, without centralized direction and control it is often impossible to effect reforms in such gigantic undertakings as nationwide militarization or industrialization. Nevertheless, there are also distinct advantages. Such changes, because voluntary, go deeper and often are more permanent. The people must be first convinced of the superiority of the new over the old, before a change is accepted. When a change is at last generally accepted, its reasonableness has already become apparent, and there is little chance of a return of the old order. Moreover, because of the lack of centralized control by any powerful class, everything is subjected to the contact and influence of new ideas and new institutions. Nothing is protected from this contact and nothing is too sacred to change. In this way, the cultural changes that have taken place in China are invariably more thorough than in Japan.

There is no doubt that the social, political, and intellectual modifications in China are far more profound than those in Japan. Political thinking in Japan today is still largely mediaeval in its predominant tenets, and some of the recent persecution of "dangerous" thought are simply ridiculous in the eyes of the Chinese intelligentsia. The political revolutions in China since 1911, however unsuccessful in their constructive aspects, have created an environment conducive to free and independent thinking on social, political, and cultural matters which is impossible in Japan under dynastic and militaristic taboos. In religious thought and practice, Japan is slavishly mediaeval and is naively ambitious to reconvert China to the mediaeval religions which Japan once borrowed from her but which Chinese iconoclasm and rationalism have long since undermined and discarded. In social changes, China has forged far ahead of Japan—in a democratized social structure, in the absence of a ruling military caste, and in the much higher and more emancipated position of women.

Thus, contrary to all superficial observations of Japanese modernity and Chinese backwardness, life and institutions in China are more modernized in their essential aspects than in Japan. And the explanations thereof are not far to seek.

Last year, I asked a group of Japanese newspaper correspondents in Peiping, "Who are the thinkers in Japan today?"

After consulting with one another, one of them said:—"I am sorry to say that we have no thinkers at the present time, and we shall have none until after a war with Soviet Russia."

I put the same question to a prominent member of the Japanese delegation at the Yosemite conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations last August, and his reply was: "I don't think there is any Japanese whom we can call a thinker."

Twelve years ago, I raised the same question with a Japanese professor of philosophy in one of the imperial universities and received the same negative reply: "There are teachers of European philosophy, of Chinese philosophy, and of Indian philosophy. But there are as yet no Japanese thinkers."

Without going into the more complicated question as to why there are no Japanese thinkers, let us pause and reflect upon the modernity of a nation which either cannot or dares not think for herself. Where there is no free and creative thinking, there cannot be fundamental reforms; and traditional Japan lingers on under the protective shell of superficial modernity till she shall burst in volcanic eruption.

Our greater successes in the more fundamental social and political changes have been due, I believe, to the intellectual leadership of our veteran thinkers. Liang Chi-chao, Tsai Yuan-pei, Wu Ching-heng, and Chen Tu-shiu, who have influenced the nation for the last 40 years, are men who know our historical heritage critically and who have the moral courage ruthlessly to criticize its evil and weak aspects and to advocate whole-hearted changes. Neither Confucius nor Lao-tse nor the Buddha nor Chu Hsi was too sacred to escape their criticism. Even Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whom the Western world often belittles as a demagogue, was essentially a courageous thinker. He earned his exalted position in the nation by his moral courage to initiate the revolutionary movement for the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty as an alien rule and the monarchy as an undesirable form of government.

A nation that has the moral courage to criticize her most sacred sages and her most time-honoured institutions, a nation that can and dare think for herself will surely have the vitality to survive all adversities.

V

“But,” the pessimists say, “all your arguments do not convince us of the ability of China to survive the present international crisis, which is essentially political and military. Will all the social and intellectual changes that China may have achieved give her a political and military machine that can fight your aggressors? How will you answer Mr. Lin Yu-tang’s complaint that in China individually men are more mature, but politically and nationally we are as mere children?”

As a matter of common-sense, Mr. Lin Yu-tang has answered his own question when he asks, “Why are we individually mature but politically and nationally mere children?” It is precisely because we are individually mature that we are *not* politically and nationally mere children, easily to be led by a “leader half the size of a Gandhi.” Only those races which are politically and nationally mere children can be led by the nose by a Hitler, a Mussolini, an Araki, or a “leader half the size of a Gandhi.” A mature race cannot be led by the Great Executioner of whom Mr. Lin Yu-tang dreams as the Saviour of China.

I am quite sure that future historians will record that China has not been without leadership during all these years of her national crisis. A government that has been able to rally all the centrifugal forces that have been running wild since the collapse of a central authority and to bring about a political unity in 5 years cannot be without leadership. A government that, in the face of incredibly provocative and humiliating aggressions and in the face of a nationwide outcry for immediate war on the invader, has held out for 5 years without a war, in order to gain time for better consolidation and greater strength of resistance, cannot be without leadership. Only this leadership is of a type so different from that of the Hitlers and Mussolinis that impatient souls can never appreciate or recognize it.

And, let it be said clearly and unmistakably, this political unity and this better consolidation and greater strength of resistance are no myths but realities. Even as I write to-day in a San Francisco hotel, the morning papers print a long dispatch from Mr. Roy Howard who, cabling from the Orient, says:—

America and Europe necessarily must readjust judgments and evaluations of a sensationally revitalized, unified China... Today that unification which foreigners long have regarded as impossible, is an undisputed accomplishment. From Canton to Peiping, and from coolie to capitalist, Chinese appear to have a common determination to resist any further invasion and any further challenge to China’s sovereignty.

“There is no hysteria. There are no student demonstrations demanding war. Everywhere leaders, hoping for peace, are obviously and methodically preparing for war.

This is how an individually mature nation acts. She will survive without a Hitler, a Mussolini, or an Araki.

Chapter 9

The Issues Behind the Far Eastern Conflict

*Address delivered before the Foreign Policy Association,
New York, November 13, 1937.*

In my humble opinion, the real issues behind the present conflict in the Far East are two: first, the clash of Japanese imperialism with the legitimate aspirations of Chinese nationalism; and secondly, the conflict of Japanese militarism with the moral restrictions of a new world order.

The primary issue behind all the fighting and slaughtering and bombing, which you read every day during the last 3 months, is Chinese nationalism driven into a desperate resistance against an external aggression which apparently knows no limit.

Nationalism is a new word in the Chinese dictionary, but national consciousness has never been absent in Chinese history. It has its firm foundation in the racial, cultural and historical unity of her vast population. It always asserted itself whenever China came into contact with a foreign race or culture, especially in those historic periods when she was conquered by a foreign invasion or dominated by an alien civilization. It was Chinese national consciousness that gradually revolted against Buddhism as an alien religion, and finally killed it. It was Chinese nationalism that overthrew the Mongol Empire and drove the Mongols beyond the deserts. It was Chinese nationalism which brought forth the numerous anti-Manchu secret societies and open revolts in the 18th and 19th centuries, and which finally overthrew the Manchu monarchy 26 years ago.

Frankly and truthfully speaking, what Japanese apologists loudly advertise to the world as “anti-Japanese sentiments and acts in China” is simply Chinese nationalism resenting and resisting the real and undeniable aggressions of a foreign power, Japan. And in so far as the aggressions are real, Chinese resistance is justifiable and justified. That is why China is having the sympathy of almost the entire world on her side during this war.

Chapter Note: *Pamphlet* (New York: China Institute in America, 1937), 8 pages.

In each and every case of outburst of anti-Japanese feeling or anti-Japanese boycott there was invariably a long series of Japanese aggressions preceding it. It was the presentation of the famous 21 Demands with a threat of war that was responsible for the anti-Japanese boycotts of 1915. It was the Japanese refusal to restore Shantung to China at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 that was responsible for the birth of a nationwide Student Movement in China, which revived the anti-Japanese boycotts and which had great influence in contributing to the success of the Nationalist Revolution of 1925–1927.

And, of course, it was the six long years of unwarranted, unlimited and insatiable Japanese invasions and aggressions involving a total loss of Chinese territory as large as a fifth of the Continent of Europe and carrying with them the most humiliating intrigues and insults which no human patience could long forebear,—it was these 6 years of most bitter and acute suffering of my people that is now bursting, boiling and burning behind this undeclared war in China.

The issue, therefore, is pure and simple: It is Chinese nationalism resisting Japanese invasion; it is the Chinese nation fighting for its very existence.

It is unnecessary for me to develop the thesis that a healthy and normal growth of Chinese nationalism is necessary to the stabilization of the peace of the East. It has been pointed out that, wherever there is a vast country rich in resources but weak in government and self-defence, that country is sure to become a centre of international strife, an arena of imperialistic powers fighting for special concessions and privileges. For decades, the weakness of the Chinese Government has been a temptation to aggressive powers, and the map of China to this day shows clear traces of that imperialistic struggle which prevailed in southeastern Asia during the last decades of the last century. Far-sighted statesmen of the world have always maintained that peace in the Far East is only possible when there is a free and independent China to ward off encroachments from outside. That was the idea underlying John Hay's Open Door Policy in China, and that was undoubtedly the political philosophy behind the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington under which the signatory powers pledged "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China and to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government."

China had failed to live up to such expectations until the last decade when, as the world knows, she has actually begun in earnest to unify the country, modernize her institutions and her means of transportation and communication, and build up an "effective and stable government." But our nearest neighbor won't tolerate this endeavor on the part of China. Indeed, she has done everything possible to prevent the rise of a modern national state in China. China needs peace, but Japan gives us seven wars in 6 years; China wants unification, but Japan insists upon tearing China asunder and setting up bogus governments everywhere under Japanese control. China needs financial and technological assistance from all friendly powers, but Japan openly declared to the world on April 17, 1934, that she would not tolerate any concerted help to China "even in the name of financial and technical assistance." China needs "an effective and stable government," but Japan's military authorities

have repeatedly declared that the Nanking Government under Chiang Kai-shek must be crushed at any cost.

In short, Japan cannot allow a unified and modernized China to exist, and she has openly avowed her determination to crush it. She has been doing it for all these years, and she is doing it now on a much grander scale. Is it exaggerating the issue when I say that China is fighting for her very existence?

This, then, is the first issue behind the war.

But there is another and larger issue involved in the present conflict, which concerns not China alone, but the whole world. This issue I have stated as the clash of Japanese militarism with the moral restrictions of a new world order. This is the issue which formed the central thesis of President Roosevelt's Chicago speech and of Secretary Hull's Toronto speech. This is the issue of the resolution adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on October 6, and of the statement of the American Government made on the same date endorsing the League resolution. And, curiously enough, this is the same issue behind the theory of the so-called "have-not" nations having a "right" to invade and plunder the possessions of the "have" nations.

Historically, the so-called "have-not" nations, Italy, Germany and Japan achieved their political unity about the same time—around 1870—and arose to the position of world powers much later than the other great powers. They entered the arena of imperialistic strife at a time when the earth, with the exception of a few storm centres, was already almost completely appropriated by the few colonial empires. During the last decades of the last century, the struggle for colonies and special concessions was very acute, and the law of the jungle reigned in those regions where the absence of a strong native government had invited imperialistic encroachment.

But, with the turn of the century, a new and more humane kind of international relationship was slowly making its first appearance. The same Tsar of Russia, who had been grabbing territories in eastern Asia, was calling the first Hague Conference which resulted in the establishment of the first International Court. The Open Door Policy in China was announced by America in 1900. Peace movements and peace foundations were coming up in the democratic countries. A new international idealism was visibly at work for the rise of a new and more idealistic world order.

Even the World War did not uproot this new internationalism, which, because of the terrible sacrifices of the War, had even more sympathetic and enthusiastic supporters and advocates throughout those agonizing years of the War and the Armistice. Even in the war message of President Woodrow Wilson of 20 years ago, we read that "we are at the beginning of an age where it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states... A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations." The great American President was universally acclaimed the leader of this international idealism, whose state papers and in particular whose "Fourteen Points" were eagerly read and accepted as the tenets of the new world order that was to come after the War.

However disappointing the Versailles Peace Treaty may have been to some of us—a Treaty which the Chinese delegation refused to sign—the Peace Conference has left to the post-war world at least one monumental edifice of Wilsonian idealism in the founding of the League of Nations. The Covenant of the League pledges to respect the territorial integrity of the Member States, stipulates international inquiry, arbitration and conciliation as the means for settling international disputes, and provides economic sanctions against nations resorting to war in violation of the provisions of the Covenant. For more than a decade, the League stood as the most concrete embodiment of the ideals of international peace yet invented by mankind.

During that memorable decade, a number of similarly idealistic pacts and treaties were produced to supplement the League Covenant. These include the Nine-Power Treaty, the Naval Disarmament Treaties, the Treaty of Locarno which brought Germany into the League of Nations and which was then heralded as the stabilizer of the peace in Europe, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris which was to “outlaw war” as a means for settling disputes between nations.

Thus for more than 10 years, there actually existed a new and more civilized world order supported by an interlocking and overlapping set of international treaties.

Now, it is not true that this new world order has been beneficial only to the small or weak nations. Law and order, national or international, protects and benefits the strong as well as the weak. If there be any partiality, it is usually in favor of the strong. For law and order the world over is usually made and maintained by the strong and powerful, who naturally derive greater benefits from it. Within the new world order which prevailed in those years the great powers were the greatest beneficiaries. France, for example, never felt safer than in those years. Great Britain practically gave up naval building and abandoned her project of constructing a great naval base at Singapore. Even Japan, who was always grumbling about the naval ratio of 5:5:3 and felt herself oppressed under the Washington Treaties, has never attained such height of international prestige and respect as she enjoyed in those years. She sat in Geneva as one of the “Big Four” Permanent Members in the Council of the League; and she was the undisputed supreme power of the western Pacific where she enjoyed her new possessions in the Mandate Islands and where her navy was strategically invincible.

Unfortunately, there were certain militaristic groups in certain countries who found the restrictions of this new world order to be detrimental to their aggressive ambitions and who were determined to destroy them at the earliest possible opportunity.

Thus, all of a sudden, this new world order was scrapped by the brutal hand of the Japanese military on the evening of September 18, 1931! In 3 months, the Japanese army had invaded and occupied all the three provinces in Manchuria. In January, 1932, she started the first Shanghai War which lasted 40 days and which cost 120,000 lives and damaged property estimated at over \$400,000,000 gold. China appealed to the League of Nations and to the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty and of the Pact of Paris, but Japan defied the world by leaving the League and by declaring that she was fighting a war of self-defense and that all the

idealistic treaties to which she had been a signatory were no longer applicable to her. With economic depression deepening everywhere, the whole world was powerless and helpless in coping with the situation and saving the new world order from ruin.

On January 7, 1932, the United States, through her Secretary of State, Mr. Henry L. Stimson, proclaimed the "doctrine of non-recognition" in identic notes to China and Japan. This doctrine was adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations in a resolution which reads: "The Assembly declares that it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League or to the Pact of Paris." This Stimson doctrine remains to this day the solitary reminder of the sanctity of a set of great and idealistic treaties, one of which, the Nine-Power Treaty, however, is recently revived by the calling of its signatory powers to meet in a conference at Brussels to discuss the Far Eastern situation.

Undoubtedly, the destruction of the new world order by denying the sanctity of treaty obligations is the greatest crime committed by the Japanese military, by the Japanese Government which submitted to them, and by the Japanese nation which tolerates them and rationalizes and apologizes for them. By her acts of violence, Japan has released all forces of violence which had been placed under check within the new world order. It has been reported that, when Japan finally withdrew from the League of Nations in open defiance of the world, a German Cabinet Minister said to the Japanese Delegate: "We do not think you are right, but we thank you for your example." That was in the year 1933, the year of Hitler's ascendancy to power, and the year in which Mussolini began to plan his invasion of Ethiopia! Japan's example has been faithfully copied by other powers who were signatories to all the early resolutions of the League condemning the action of Japan, including the one embodying the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition, but who, when they saw Japan's acts of violence go unchecked and undisciplined, were inspired to join her in their common cause to fight against the troublesome restrictions of a new world order.

In a sense, China may be said to be fighting the war on behalf of the whole world: After two years of ardent appeals to the League of Nations and to the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, and after six long years of futile attempts to maintain peace and avoid a war, China is at last forced to fight for her own existence as well as for the maintenance of law and order in the family of nations.

But it is not only the weak nations like China that are the victims of the destruction of the world order which, as I have shown, protects and benefits the strong as well as the weak. In the last 6 years of international anarchy, all the great powers of the world have been worried, troubled, humiliated, and even seriously threatened by the aggressor nations. Soviet Russia has had to amass a huge army of nearly half million men on her Far Eastern frontiers. Great Britain has hurriedly resumed and speedily completed her long abandoned naval base at Singapore, and is now spending \$7,500,000,000 on her rearmament program. Even the peace-loving United States has had to revive her huge naval building program and to strengthen her

naval fortifications in the Pacific. Even Australia and New Zealand, the two peaceful paradises of the southern Pacific, are seriously worried and are trying hard to build up their forces of national defense against possible attacks from the northern Pacific.

Truly, as President Roosevelt has said in his Chicago speech, “there can be no possibility of peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small.”

This, then, is the second and larger issue behind the present conflict in the East. It is the issue of International Anarchy versus World Order.

And, because this era of international anarchy began with Japan’s invasion in Manchuria in 1931, Japan must be named “Public Enemy Number One” in the Family of Nations, and must be held responsible for the crime of destroying the New World Order which represented decades of idealistic thinking and which it may require another world conflagration to rebuild.

Chapter 10

The Westernization of China and Japan

Almost simultaneously there have appeared two very good books dealing with China and Japan during their periods of transition, that is, during the last 300 years, and in particular during the last seven decades. They are *The Invasion of China by the Western World*, by E. R. Hughes (Macmillan), and *Japan in Transition*, by Emil Lederer and Emy Lederer-Seidler (Yale University Press). Both are excellent books, yet how different they are, and what fundamentally different stories they tell of the cultural changes in the two Oriental countries now at war!

Mr. Hughes' book is full of historical facts and details, but he almost never indulges in theorizing. The Lederers' book promises "to proceed step by step from phenomena to underlying intangibles" and therefore gives us more of interpretative theories than factual details. Mr. Hughes was for many years a missionary in the interior of Fukien, has later lived in Shanghai and Peiping, and speaks the language of the country. With the pragmatic mentality of an Englishman, he proceeds to describe the gradual changes in every phase of Chinese life without apparently thinking of the necessity of theorizing about them. The Lederers were in Japan only for 2 years; and their Germanic philosophical training naturally leads them to seek to understand the vast and complicated changes in Japan by the aid of theories.

The outcome is that Mr. Hughes' work is often over-burdened with names and details, some of which are liable to errors, while the Lederer book, which is little more than a traveling philosopher's penetrating interpretation of a people, sometimes errs in the tendency of over-theorizing without being sufficiently supported by facts.

The factual errors in the Hughes book are of minor importance, but some of them should be corrected in a new edition. For instance, Yen Fu never translated Darwin's *The Origin of Species* (p. 209), and the translation "which brought him fame and influence" was of Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*. The name of the Chinese Jesuit scholar, Li Chih-tsao, was correct on page 200, but was spelled as Li Chi-tao on page 11; and the Index lists both names as if they were two different persons. Ku

Chapter Note: *Amerasia*, July 1938, II, no. 5, 243–247.

Han-min on page 107 must be Ku Hung-ming; Ku Yen-wu on page 11 is the same Ku Ting-lin who was more than a “geographer”; Li Shih-tseng (p. 218) was never a “physicist”; and Tsui Tung-pi, the man Mr. Hughes selected to represent the “Han Learning School” (p. 257), happened to be a scholar least affected by the intellectual fashion of his time and was essentially a loyal supporter of the “Sung School.”

But these errors in detail do not diminish the value of Mr. Hughes’ book as a truthful history of the epic drama of China’s gradual westernization. This story may be summed up in his own words (pp. 286–287):

“First, at the beginning of the 17th century came the urbane welcome of the Jesuit Fathers...

“Second, at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, there arose...an acute mistrust and contempt for the rough traders from the southern ocean, followed by a recognition on the part of a few responsible people that the military arts of these traders must be learnt.

“Third, after the middle of the century came the discovery by a few scholars that the peoples of the West had something more than superiority in arms, something of culture and learning which China must take into account.

“Fourth, in the 20th century came the sudden conversion of educated youth to the idea that their own culture was effete, unfitted for the modern world in which China had to join in the biological struggle for existence.

“Fifth, came the suspicion that the West was neither as friendly nor as moral as the reformers had been thinking, and that it was time that China worked out her own salvation in her own way.

“Finally, ...the post-Nationalist Revolution stage through which China is now passing. Here we find a new attitude emerging with increasing clarity and force. It is marked in men of all classes by a new confidence in themselves and their ability to adjust their half-traditional, half-newborn national conditions so as to produce unity, efficiency, and the well-being of the whole community.”

The main body of the book is a detailed narration of these stages of cultural change as they have appeared in the sphere of political thought, of education, of science and medicine, and of literature. In the Author’s Preface, Mr. Hughes speaks of his own attitude of approach, which is: “In China, European culture has met a civilization as old or older than itself in the past. That civilization has expressed itself nobly in literature, poetry and art, and in the present is competent to give reasoned reflection and have a critical reaction to the results of its contact with the West.” Elsewhere in the book (pp. 273–274), he repeats this point of view:

“Looking at the situation all round, there has been widespread experimentation by this new class [the urban-minded class], and now its members have reached the point where they know what they like and what they do not. They hold the West in fee, rejecting some of its features, welcoming others, and where they welcome, not hesitating to transform to suit their own taste. In other words, a distinctive Chinese mind is at work, a distinctive Chinese sense of taste, a distinctive judgment of moral and aesthetic values.”

Simple as this general approach may seem, it is all the more generous and impressive because it comes from the pen of a life-long missionary. And we think it is on the whole true. As I have expressed it elsewhere, Chinese modernization has been the result of “long exposure” to the contact and influence of Western ideas and institutions. Because of the thoroughly democratized social structure and because of

the failure and incompetence of the reigning dynasty to direct the changes, all westernization in China has come as a result of gradual diffusion and permeation of ideas, usually initiating from a few individuals, gradually winning a following, and finally achieving significant changes when a sufficient number of people is convinced of their superior convenience or efficacy. From the footwear to the literary revolution, from the lipstick to the overthrow of the monarchy, all has been voluntary and in a broad sense "reasoned." Nothing in China is too sacred to be protected from this exposure and contact; and no man, or any class, was powerful enough to protect any institution from the contagious and disintegrating influence of the invading culture. And because the changes have been on the whole voluntary, there is no regret and no retrogression.

What a different story we find when we read the equally epic drama of modernization in Japan as told by Professor and Mrs. Lederer! This story can also be summed up in the authors' own words:

"In this rise of a people which had hardly cast aside its medieval vestments...the crucial step was taken with the decision to master the Occidental methods of warfare. Japan took over the entire system of Western armaments and attained to proficiency and even to mastery of sorts in using it..."

"In the beginning the full import of this process was not yet grasped... Lafcadio Hearn, though a Westerner, was typical of the general attitude. Having become himself a Japanese, he was passionately concerned over the preservation of the genius of the people and championed the idea of building up a Western war apparatus which should be made to serve as a protective wall behind which everything should be preserved unaltered.

"It could hardly be foreseen at this early stage that in this case one step leads inexorably to a second.

"The army always represents the technological high-water mark of an age. To build up an army in Japan, to keep it efficient, to adapt it to the peculiar conditions of the land, required a corresponding education and training. Compulsory military training and the development of a large staff of officers meant that the most active sections of the entire population had to be wrenched every so often out of their specifically Japanese setting... A comprehensive organization had to be developed which would provide all types of schools for most thorough-going technical training in all the natural sciences, and make it possible for industrial factories to produce the implements of war.

"In short, since a modern military state is possible only on condition that it is an industrialized state, Japan had to develop in that direction. But industrialization, by reason of the economic interrelationship between various types of production, means also the development of branches of industry which are not essential to the conduct of war... Just as militarism reaches beyond itself into industry, so the technological system of industrialism has far-reaching implications for the social system. Here lies the heart of the problem of westernization." (pp. 179-181)

Here in these masterful paragraphs, the authors have told the true history and significance of Japanese westernization. It began with the adoption of militarism, was vindicated when the military machine won the wars over China and Russia, has greatly expanded with the ever-increasing needs and demands of the militaristic system, and is still centering round what Professor Lederer has aptly termed "the militaristic industrial system." The whole movement was unified, directed and controlled by a ruling class which happens to be a militaristic caste, and which had been profoundly trained and molded in the medieval feudalism of the Tokugawa period

(which is masterfully described by the authors in a separate chapter) when it was called upon to build up a modern machine of warfare (p. 150). That is to say, this class that set the ball rolling in the direction of westernization never realized what it was doing, nor did it ever understand the disturbing, liberalizing, and even revolutionizing forces contained in Western civilization. The leaders of that class thought, as Lafcadio Hearn had thought, namely, that it was possible to build up a modernized war machine which was to serve as a protective shell within which all the traditional values of the Tokugawa Japan could be preserved unaltered. And when modernization tended to run wild and threatened to be liberating and revolutionizing, it was soon checked and suppressed. "That part of the West which continued to be accepted in Japanese life was only what was necessary associated with the development of a new power state" (p. 183). And the authors have shown concretely that Western influence has produced very little transformation in the fundamental aspects of Japanese life such as the state (p. 150), religion, and social institutions (pp. 184–189).

Reluctantly but inevitably, the Lederers have come to the conclusion that, in spite of seven decades of dramatic modernity, the basic elements of the old Japan still continue to exist and resist all threats of westernization. I say "reluctantly," because the authors really like and admire the old Japan and sometimes even consider it "fortunate" that some of the faddisms could not go very far in Japan (p. 182, for instance). But being honest observers, they could not escape the inevitable conclusion that "it is clear that the tenacity and relative vitality of the ancient Japanese civilization, and the completed perfection of its forms, are offering strong resistance to the facile assimilation of foreign elements" (p. 190). At this point, one is tempted to ask: Have the authors given us here a satisfactory explanation of this strange phenomenon? Has this resistance to change been really due to the "vitality of the ancient civilization" and the "completed perfection of its forms"? Are not "vitality" and "completed perfection" contradictory terms? May not this resistance to change suggest rather an absence of vitality, an incapability to adapt itself to new conditions without losing its entity, and therefore a great fear for new contacts and influences which naturally expresses itself in all extreme forms of artificial solidification and reactionary protection against dangerous contagions?

My own view is that the latter seem to be the more satisfactory explanations. Indeed the authors themselves are greatly troubled by what they have observed as the most strange phenomenon of "immunity to the dialectic play of deep-lying evolutionary forces" (p. 47). I regret to read that a penetrating mind like Professor Lederer should think that "it is a way of life entirely different from the Occidental process of genesis and growth, for it is devoid of dialectic and dynamic" (p. viii). This is nothing peculiar to any part of the Orient or of the human race. It is a universal law that any phase of culture tends to be more conservative in its colony than in its mother country, because it is usually more carefully and consciously preserved and perpetuated in a colony, while in its mother country it is allowed to undergo the natural processes of evolution and innovation. And conscious and artificial preservation can always retard the working of the natural processes of change and decay. Buddhism, for example, died out in India many centuries before it began to decline

in China, and it now only survives in Buddhist colonies like Ceylon, Burma, Siam, and Japan. Tokugawa Japan was essentially a cultural colony of China; it was therefore natural that many cultural elements of that period took on the appearance of “immunity” to change, which simply means that artificial solidification of culture was peculiarly effective during those 260 years of hermetic seclusion. Sitting on the floor, for example, was discarded in China so long ago that historians have difficulty in dating the first use of chairs and tables; but the Japanese to this day continue to sit on the floor. That does not mean the custom of sitting on the floor has any special “vitality” or has attained “completed perfection in form.”

Therefore the Japanese resistance to modernization in all their basic aspects of national life must be simply explained by the undeniable facts of artificial protection against change. And this is sometimes reluctantly admitted by the authors themselves when they speak of the “deliberate cultivation of national peculiarities” (p. viii), of “the Japanese spirit fighting to the last ditch against being submerged in the process of proletarianization” (p. x), and of “the old spirit of Japan...showing itself in powerful secret societies and in open fascist movements in which national pride, economic radicalism, the adherence to tradition, drive toward the ‘resuscitation’ of the whole nation, battling ‘enemies’ from within and from without, risking the structure of old Japan as well as her position as a world power” (p. xi). Herein lies the tragedy of Japan and its true explanation.

This work of the Lederers is most beautifully written—the first chapter on “The Land” reads like a beautiful poem—but is not without its defects. One of its apparent defects is its fondness of theorizing. They have, for instance, tried to explain the origin of the shogunate by the “principle of mediation” (p. 49), which is that “in all relations of life the Japanese conducts his most important affairs through an intermediary... It is almost impossible for the Japanese to give direct expression to his will or to fight through a conflict with resolute opposition.” Which, of course, is not true. And the authors know it is not true in the case of Japanese warriors fighting in their own right, but the absurdity of the theory in this case is defended by another theory that the warrior’s antagonist “is not so much an actual person as a formal foe.”

This fondness of theorizing is at its worst in the chapter entitled “The Forty Thousand Symbols of the Far East,” which deals with the subject of language. Among the numerous theories brought in, the principle of “mediation” again makes its appearance (p. 82): “In Japan nothing speaks directly, not even the word.” Which, of course, is not true. In the same chapter, the authors tell us that “the basic content of the spoken language in China is even more meager than in Japan” (p. 69). Do they realize that there are only about 60 syllabic sounds in the Japanese language, which is the poorest in sounds of all languages?

The danger of over-theorizing without sufficient evidence is best illustrated by a long passage in the chapter on the Japanese state, where the authors speak of the lofty place of the loyalty to the sovereign in the Japanese hierarchy of loyalties: “Parents, wife, children give way to the emperor in case of conflicting loyalties. To the Chinese such a violation of family affection is inconceivable. In Japan it has been responsible for many tragedies” (p. 141). And the authors proceed to

illustrate this peculiarly Japanese virtue by telling the “famous Japanese story” of the exiled nobleman, Michizane, whose son’s life was saved by the loyalty and sacrifice of a former vassal who succeeded in substituting his own grandson for the real heir of Michizane. And they further comment on this story. “Such a violation of family love would be altogether incomprehensible to the Chinese” (p. 142). As a matter of fact, this “famous Japanese story” is no more than a Japanese version of an equally famous Chinese drama, *The Orphan of Chao*, which was among the earliest Chinese dramas translated into European languages, which inspired Voltaire to produce his play under the same title, and which is still frequently enacted on the Chinese stage today. How hazardous it is to generalize about nations and peoples!

Chapter 11

To Have Not and Want to Have

Almost exactly 18 months ago, in the same hotel and under the same auspices, I had the pleasure of speaking from the same platform with a distinguished Italian scholar who defended the right of the have-not nations to seek outlets for their population pressure and to control sources of supply for raw materials. He frankly said: “Force is the only solution. The inferior races must be sacrificed for the benefit of the strong.”

These words, which still ring in my ears, sum up the philosophy of force as preached by the dictators and apologists of the aggressor nations which choose to call themselves “the have-nots,” as if to have not would somehow justify their right to plunder the haves! They have been saying to the world:

To have not and want to have, the only way is by the use of military force. Down with the status quo, and down with every form of international order which recognizes and protects the status quo! And all the inferior peoples (meaning the weak and the militarily ill-prepared) must be sacrificed for the sake of the strong.

What has happened in the world during the last 7 years—ever since the first acts of Japanese aggression in China in September 1931—is nothing but this philosophy of force of the so-called have-not nations being ruthlessly but methodically tested out in actual application.

It is the purpose of this paper to point out that this philosophy is economically unreal, politically self-defeating and suicidal, and philosophically impossible. As I come from a country which is one of the victims of this barbaric philosophy, I shall draw most of my illustrative materials from the Far Eastern regions of conflict.

Chapter Note: *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1938, 198, 59–64.

The Population Question

Let us first take up the problem of population pressure. Population pressure is solved by birth control, by voluntary emigration, by increased productivity of the soil, and by industrialization. Military conquest and political domination of territories already densely populated or climatically unsuited to large-scale emigration have never contributed much towards solving the population problem.

Japan, for instance, has possessed Formosa¹ for 43 years, but the Japanese population there is only 264,000 in a total population of 5,000,000—that is, 5.2%. She has had Korea for 30 years, but the Japanese population in Korea is 560,000 in a total of 21,000,000—i.e., 2.6%. She has had dominating influence in Manchuria for over 30 years (ever since the Russo-Japanese War), and has completely occupied it for the last 7 years. But before 1931, the Japanese population in Manchuria was always below 1% of the total population; and even since 1931, while the number of Japanese soldiers, officials, and job-seekers has greatly increased, the actual number of agricultural emigrants to Manchuria has been only 5,000. And this in spite of several large-scale government subsidies to encourage agricultural emigration to Manchuria.

After all, emigration must be a voluntary affair, and its success largely depends upon the ability of the emigrants to survive the new climatic conditions and compete economically with the indigenous population. The Japanese agricultural emigrant is never at home in the severe climates, and as an individual he is not able to compete successfully with the Chinese farmer or trader. Therefore, 30 years of military conquest and political domination in Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria have not helped to solve the Japanese problem of population pressure.

It seems quite clear that, after all, much of the talk about population pressure is unreal, and is entertained only as a thin justification for naked territorial aggression; for it is an undeniable fact that the have-not nations are the very nations which are consciously and most energetically encouraging rapid growths in their population. Only yesterday (March 31) we read Mussolini expressing his great satisfaction in the fact that “within the current year Italy will have forty-four million inhabitants” and “in ten years it will attain in its home territory alone fifty million.” And the explanation is not far to seek; for Mussolini said in the same speech: “Without men the battalions cannot be made, and it takes many men to make big battalions.”

Certainly Japan, which prohibits the sale of birth control literature and appliances and which repeatedly refuses to permit Mrs. Margaret Sanger to land in Japan, is not really worried about the pressure of population!

The Question of Raw Materials

Next, I wish to point out that it is equally fallacious to say that it is necessary for a nation to rely upon force for insuring supplies of raw materials. It is a generally accepted truism that, in time of peaceful and normal commerce, raw materials of all

¹ Sixteenth-century Portuguese colonists' address of Taiwan.

nations are open to all who can pay for them. A nation like Japan, which imports rubber, oil, iron ore, pig iron, scrap iron, tin, lead, nickel, and aluminum from foreign countries, is always welcomed as a best customer. No force or political domination is necessary to insure the constant supply of all needed materials for her industries.

Moreover, it does not pay a nation to replace the normal supply of raw materials by artificially and politically creating new sources, because such attempts at economic self-sufficiency often lead to ill feeling, resentment and retaliation on the part of old suppliers of such materials. Suppose Japan can control North China and convert it into a politically dominated region for increased production of cotton and wool, which shall in the not too distant future replace a great portion of her present import of cotton from America and India, and of wool from Australia. The economic dislocation thus created in the cotton and wool countries will naturally produce international reactions, the seriousness of which no amount of economic gain can easily offset.

And, after all, it is physically impossible for any nation, or even for any economic bloc of nations, to secure political control of all possible sources of raw materials. That is to say, strictly speaking, economic self-sufficiency is impossible. Even the United States must depend upon the outside world for rubber, tin, nickel, and manganese; even the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is deficient in rubber, tin, bauxite, and nickel. Even the British Empire has to rely upon outside supply of petroleum and cotton.

The case of Japan is even more serious. By conquest of the whole of Manchuria, she can increase her supplies of coal, iron ore, timber, salt, and soy beans. But she needs cotton, wool, coking coal, and more iron and coal; so she has been talking about an economic bloc of Japan and the so-called Manchukuo, and North China. Suppose she secures complete control of North China (which I am sure she cannot), it will take decades to develop the new supplies of cotton and wool, and it will take stupendous capital investments to develop mining and new transportation in order to make the coal and iron of Shansi and Shensi accessible to Japanese industry. But, even then, she will have further to conquer southwestern China in order to control the supply of antimony, tungsten, tin, and wool oil. And suppose she could complete her Chinese conquest (which, again, she cannot), she would still be completely lacking in oil, rubber, potash, bauxite, and nickel, and partly deficient in copper, lead, zinc, phosphates, and wool.

The logical conclusion of economic self-sufficiency is the conquest of the whole world!

Political Ambition

Apart from its economic absurdities, the force philosophy of the have-nots is politically suicidal. As a matter of historical truth, the philosophy of the have-nots is essentially political in nature and origin, its economic doctrines being largely

superimposed rationalizations. It is absurd, for example, to talk about population pressure and at the same time actively encourage population growth! Behind the economic jargon, the real motivating force is a fantastic dream of unlimited political power. Hitler dreams of his new Germanic Empire; Mussolini, his new Roman Empire; and the Japanese military, their great continental Japanese Empire and their world empire which, as Hideyoshi dreamed 300 years ago, shall cover the whole world wherever the sun shines.

In attempts to secure political power, the dictators of the have-not nations have been fairly successful. Mussolini, in 13 years, has remade Italy; Hitler, in 6 years, has forcefully brought about many redresses of Germany's grievances under the Peace Treaty of Paris. And the Japanese military, too, have succeeded in at least temporarily reconsolidating their political power against the dangers of a rising industrial democracy which threatened to limit the political control of the military caste.

But this political success of an individual or a class should not blind us to the stupendous losses which their respective nations have had to sustain in increased national economic burdens, in sacrifices of individual liberty and standards of living, and in the international enmity and antagonism aroused all round.

Take the case of Japan. In the 7 years since her first invasion of China in 1931, Japan has had to increase her national expenditure by four times, her military and naval expenditure by eight times, and her national debt by almost 100%. And the war in China is only 8 months young. It is estimated by expert economists that the total gold reserve of Japan, including her newly mined gold, will be exhausted by the end of 1938, and that by the same time there will be at least 5 billion yen's worth of unsold government bonds which the market cannot possibly absorb.

And what a degradation of Japan's position in the family of nations in these 6 years! Prior to 1931, Japan sat at Geneva as one of the "Big Four," enjoying the honor and respect of the whole world. Now, she is the nation unanimously condemned by 60 nations as the lawbreaker, the aggressor, and the disturber of world peace! Instead of enjoying the highest respect of an ordered world, she is now finding herself in the necessity of fighting desperately in order to maintain her prestige and position!

Without indulging in idle speculations as to the ultimate outcome of the war, it is safe to say at least that Japan is much worse off today than she was in 1931, and that politically she has lost everything she enjoyed before she embarked on her path of aggression. Politically she has degraded herself from an unquestionably supreme power of the Western Pacific into one of the belligerents fighting desperately, as she herself claims, for her very existence.² And it is quite possible for a nation to throw overboard almost overnight all the wonderful achievements of six decades of hard labor.

² See Hu Shih, "The Changing Balance of Forces in the Pacific," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan 1937.

Fallacy of Aggression

Herein lies the fundamental political fallacy of this philosophy of the have-nots which seeks to destroy the status quo in order that they themselves may have more possessions at the expense of other peoples. It fails to understand and appreciate the political importance of an international order which not merely protects the status quo of the small and weak nations, but also guarantees and legalizes the possessions, the power, and the prestige of the great and strong nations. It fails to understand that law and order, internationally as well as internally, however troublesome and inconvenient they may seem to our selfish desires, are better than anarchy and chaos.

The same restrictions of law and order that restrain the strong from plundering the weak, at the same time protect the status quo of the great and the powerful. You cannot destroy the status quo of somebody else without at the same time undermining the very foundation of law and order which, *and* which alone, guarantees your own rights and your own security.

It has taken political science a century to accept the view that there is no such thing as a natural right of the individual, and that a right is that which society or the state recognizes and guarantees an individual to enjoy against its infringement by others. It is high time for political thinkers to prove to the aggressor nations that there is no such thing as a natural right of the strong in the family of nations; that the possessions of the strong are just as much protected by a generally accepted scheme of law and order as those of the weak; that no nation, however strong, can ever feel secure in a situation of international anarchy; and that the aggressors, in their ruthless strife for more possessions by disregarding all legal restrictions and treaty obligations, are constantly in danger of losing what they already have.

Where is Austria now, which was one of the great powers before 1914? And where is that great Germany now, which in 1914 was first in science and art, in education and social legislation, in technology and industry—first in all arts of peace as well as of war—where is she now?

Even the comparative success of Hitler and Mussolini in their use of force to upset the postwar status quo does not prove an exception to these general considerations. Indeed, Hitler and Mussolini are exceptions that prove the rule. Have they not been seriously troubled by the Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition of situations brought about by force in violation of existing bonds of international law and order? Why is it that the “recognition of Manchukuo” by tiny Salvador some years ago was hailed in Tokyo as a great Japanese diplomatic success? Why is it that British willingness to reopen the question of recognition of Italian conquest of Ethiopia at the coming meeting of the League of Nations should figure so prominently in the new British-Italian negotiations? Is it not because those who have set out to destroy the status quo of the postwar world have also found it most inconvenient to have its new status unrecognized and therefore unprotected by the very international order against which they had loudly protested?

A Chinese philosopher of the second century B.C. once told his Emperor: “Sire, you have conquered the empire on horseback, but can you rule it on horseback too?” Even the aggressors themselves are demonstrating to the world that mere might does not make right, and that no nation is secure in its possessions and dominion without being recognized and legitimized by some form of international order.

The Philosophy of Force

This brings me to a discussion of the philosophy of force in general. The greatest tragedy in international thinking today, it seems to me, lies in the fact that both the chauvinists and the isolationist pacifists agree in their reliance upon force. They both believe that force is the only solution. They all fail to see that what is wrong with the world today is not that force prevails, but that force does not and cannot prevail.

In the whole history of mankind, there has never been a greater display of force than the last World War, in which 200 billions of dollars were spent and 65 million men were mobilized by both sides, of which 8.5 million were killed and 21 million were wounded. What did that most stupendous use of force accomplish? Nothing—practically nothing!

Why could not the greatest employment of force achieve anything? Because force was not used in an organized form. Because force was wasted in the process of creating rival forces which canceled each other and resulted in mutual destruction.

Force cannot prevail until it is organized and directed towards a common desirable objective, so as to minimize resistance and friction and to insure the maximum economy and efficiency in its expenditure. When force is thus organized and directed toward the coöperative achievement of some positive ends of common interest, it becomes law and order. For law is nothing but, in the words of John Dewey, “a statement of the conditions of the organization of energies (forces) which, when unorganized, would result in violence—that is, destruction and waste.”

The best example of organized and efficient use of force is the traffic signals at the street-corners in the cities. These green and red light-signals are not always guarded by policemen armed with guns or machine guns, and yet they are respected by all motorists and pedestrians who understand that they represent the organized force of the community directed towards a generally acknowledged objective of common interest. These automatically operated light-signals have become a part of the law and order of the community.

As a philosopher, I may be permitted to venture a prophecy that the gravity of the world situation, the prevalence of international anarchy, and the frightfully costly wastefulness of “rugged individualism” in armaments and defense, will before long compel mankind to realize the futility of unorganized force, and to endeavor to revive, reform, and reinforce that world order which represented

decades of idealistic thinking, and the destruction of which by the aggressor nations is now threatening to plunge humanity into the abyss of another world conflagration.

It is only in a world under some form of law and order that the have-nots and the haves may live in peace and prosper by sharing what they have.

Chapter 12

What Can America Do in the Far East Situation

Address delivered over the Columbia Broadcasting Network in New York on June 24, 1938. Also in Amerasia II, no. 6 (August 1938), 293–295.

This is my proposition: While I fully sympathize with your nationwide desire to keep out of the war, I cannot help thinking that mere negative pacifism without being backed by a constructive peace policy is never sufficient to guarantee to you the peace you so dearly desire. What China expects of America—indeed what the whole civilized world expects of America—is an active and positive leadership for international peace and justice, a leadership to prevent wars, to call a halt to aggressions, to plan and cooperate with the democracies of the world to bring about collective security, and to make this world at least safe for humanity to live in.

“I am sure that the people of this great republic have enough imagination to realize that this country is sufficiently powerful to undertake such active constructive leadership for peace without incurring the risk of being involved in international intrigues and wars. On the contrary, it may turn out that such active international leadership may be after all the only effective means to achieve the end of keeping yourselves out of the war.

“When 32 years ago, a great American President called a halt to a bloody war and brought about peace between Japan and Russia, did he thereby involve this country in a war?

“When again 17 years ago, the American Government called the Washington Conference which gave ten years of peace to the Far East and which put a brake on the rivalry in naval armaments for ten years, did it thereby involve this country in a world war?”

That was what I said to the American nation 9 months ago. During these 9 months three sets of events have developed in connection with the Far Eastern situation, and I am sure these developments have not escaped your notice. First, China has been

Chapter Note: *The China Weekly Review*, 86, September 24, 1938.

literally bleeding to death. There have been 1 million war casualties, including the killed and wounded. These are now, according to most conservative estimates, at least 60,000,000 civilian sufferers who are fleeing the armies of the invader and are roving the country without shelter, without medical aid, and in most cases without the barest means of subsistence. And there are every day hundreds of innocent non-combatants being murdered and slaughtered by the bombers of the Imperial Army of Japan. And the floods of the Yellow River are adding other million of civilian sufferers.

The second development has been the gradual intensification of the sympathy of the American people for China in the present conflict. The American people have never been neutral in the Sino-Japanese war. You cannot be neutral in a situation where the right and wrong are as clear as day and night: nay, your sympathy is at least 99 % on the side of China and against Japan. Your sympathy is best evidenced in your generous response to all kinds of appeals for medical aid and civilian relief in China, in your enthusiastic participation in the voluntary boycott against Japanese goods, and particularly in your recent outburst of indignation against the ruthless and inhuman bombing of the civilian population in Canton and other cities. When I was traveling in Canada a few months ago, a newspaper interviewer asked me: "What good can all this sympathy do to China in the war?" I said to him: "Young man, don't underestimate the value of this overwhelming sympathy. It makes a world of difference in a modern war whether you are fighting with the conviction that the sympathy of the civilized world is with you or you are fighting in the consciousness that the whole civilized world is condemning or cursing you." And we are quite confident that the day will come, as it did come in 1917, when the immense sympathy of a great nation, under idealistic leadership, will express itself in collective action and practical statesmanship.

The third development has been the definite formulation of an American policy toward the Far Eastern situation. In a series of widely published documents, dated from last July to March and May of this year, the great leaders of the American Government have announced to the whole world a definite and consciously thought-out policy with regard to the Far Eastern situation. The gist of that policy, as you all well know, is an unreserved condemnation of international anarchy and a determined advocacy of the maintenance of international peace and justice by the restoration of the reign of law among the nations. On several occasions, your Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, has declared: "The interest and concern of the United States in the Far East are not measured alone by the number of American citizens residing there, or by the volume of investment and trade. There is a much broader and more fundamental interest—which is, that orderly processes in international relationships be maintained." And last October, President Roosevelt said in his famous Chicago speech: "Most important of all, the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself, to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of other will desist from a course. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace." These statements represent the central points of the American Government's Far Eastern policy, which is exactly the type of positive and constructive international leadership that the peace-loving

people of the whole world have been expecting, and have a right to expect, from the people and government of the most powerful and most peace-loving nation in the modern world.

These are the things that have developed during these terrible months: first, China is rapidly bleeding to death; second, the immense sympathy of the entire American nation on the side of China is becoming more and more intensified and articulate; and thirdly, the American Government has been proclaiming to the world that there must be positive endeavors to preserve peace and restore order.

As a representative of a suffering nation in a most unjust war, I can only express my own pious hope and the pious hope of my people that the positive and constructive policy pledged by the great leaders of the American Government may be effectively carried out before long, and that the unanimous sympathy of the American nation for my people in distress may express itself in an active support of the Government in its "positive endeavors to preserve peace." I ask for no more. And I am sure my people ask for no more.

But I do wish to add one more word of appeal. For almost fully 12 months, my people have been making a supreme effort in resisting the invader and fighting for our threatened national existence. You and the whole world are witnesses of this supreme effort. But that supreme effort is not enough. There is a limit to the ability of human flesh and blood in fighting against much superior mechanical equipment. And there is always the danger of collapse through sheer exhaustion. It is simply irresponsible wishful thinking that China can save herself by her own military resistance alone. I am not ashamed in saying so, because even France which had had 44 years of intensive military preparation could not save herself in 1914. I am realistic enough to admit that, in order to shorten this terrible war, restore international order in Pacific area, and relieve the acute suffering of scores of millions of people, some positive international action is absolutely necessary. And if China is worth saving at all, and if there can be "positive endeavors" to preserve peace and save a suffering nation, that salvation must come before the collapse of the unified and effective central authority in China which it has taken 27 long years to build up.

Chapter 13

Japan's War in China

*Resumé of an address by His Excellency Dr. Hu Shih,
Chinese Ambassador to the United States of America.
New York, December 4, 1938. Additional bibliographic
information is not known.*

If I were asked to sum up in one sentence the present conditions in my country, I would not hesitate to say that China is literally bleeding to death.

We have been fighting for more than 16 months against an aggressor which is one of the three greatest naval powers, and one of the four or five greatest military powers of the world. We have suffered 1 million casualties, including the killed and the wounded. We have vast territories being occupied by the invading armies. We have lost all the important cities on the coast and along the Yangtze River: Peiping, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Tsinan, Shanghai, Hangchow, Nanking, Wuhu, Kiukiang, Amoy, Canton and the Wu-Han cities. Practically all the cities that are generally known to the outside world as centers of commerce and industry, of education and modern culture, of transportation and communication, are now either devastated or occupied by the invaders. Of the 111 universities and colleges, more than two-thirds have been either destroyed, occupied, or disabled; and the very few that are still functioning in the interior are working without equipment and under constant dangers of air raids. And, in addition to the vast number of casualties in the fighting forces, there are now 60 million civilian sufferers who have been driven from their destroyed homes, farms, shops and villages, and who are fleeing the invader and are roving the country without shelter, without medical aid, and in most cases without the barest means of subsistence. And there are every day hundreds of innocent non-combatants being murdered and slaughtered by the bombers of the Imperial Army of Japan.

And, most serious of all, with the loss of Canton in October, China is now entirely cut off from all access to the sea,—that is, from all access to fresh supplies of arms

Chapter Note: *Pamphlet* (New York: Chinese Cultural Society, 1938).

and munitions from abroad. We have to rely upon three back doors for future war supplies from abroad, namely, the overland route to Soviet Russia, the route through French Indo-China, and the route through British Burma. All these three routes are very difficult and not always dependable. After repeated threats from Japan, the French are reported to have now closed the Indo-China Railway to Chinese munitions. The overland motor road to Soviet Russia is open, but it is 3,000 miles from the Russian border to the present capital at Chungking, a distance longer than that from San Francisco to New York. No heavy pieces of munitions can be transported over such a long road with very few service stations. The Burma route is not yet quite ready for use. So for the present we are actually completely cut off from the sea and from our sinews of war. This also means that we are faced with tremendous difficulties in sending out our exports with which to secure our foreign exchange.

This is our present situation. Have I overstated the case in saying that China is literally bleeding to death?

It was natural that, after the fall of Canton and Hankow, there was a brief period of doubt, hesitation and even despair on the part of many of our people and of our leaders. As I have repeatedly pointed out to my American friends, there is a limit to the ability of human flesh and blood to fight against much superior mechanical and metal equipment; and there is always the danger of collapse through sheer exhaustion. It was quite natural, therefore, that my people should have had this period of doubt and indecision during which, as the press reported, there were talks of peace,—that is, there were serious thoughts of giving up the fight. In fact, our enemy, too, made it quite clear that they wanted peace.

But this period of hesitation was also a period of great decisions. It did not take very long for our leaders to come to the conclusion that it was impossible for China to have peace at the present moment simply because there was not the slightest chance for a peace that would be reasonably acceptable to my people. After serious considerations of all difficulties and potentialities, our leaders have definitely decided to continue our policy of resisting the invader and to fight on.

In announcing this new determination to the nation and to the world at large, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek laid special stress on these points: that China will continue her policy of prolonged nation-wide resistance; that as the war has become really “nation-wide” and the enemy is drawn into the interior, both time and geography are on our side; that our war of resistance during the past 16 months has succeeded in retarding the westward advance of the enemy, thus enabling ourselves to develop communications and transportations in the vast hinterland and remove some industries thither; that we can only hope to win final victory through the greatest hardship and sacrifice; and that this war of resistance must be understood as a “revolutionary warfare” similar to the wars of American Independence, French and Russian Revolution and Turkish Emancipation, and in such revolutionary warfare the spirit of the people will ultimately win out.

This is the solemn declaration of China's new determination.

What will the world think of this new decision of my people to fight on against tremendous and apparently unsurmountable difficulties? Will it regard this determination as sheer folly built upon no better foundation than the logic of wishful thinking?

Whatever the world may think of us, I can assure you that a nation that has sacrificed a million men and is prepared to make even greater sacrifices in fighting for its national existence cannot be accused of basing its hopes and aspirations upon mere wishful thinking. We are making a deliberate decision on the basis of the 16 months' terrible but very instructive experience of the war. We have learned during these terrible months that our soldiers and officers are capable of heroic bravery and supreme sacrifices, that our people are bearing their losses and devastations without complaining against their Government, and that the sense of national unity and solidarity throughout the country including the parts temporarily under the military occupation of the enemy is beyond question. And we have also learned that our enemy is actually feeling the burden of the prolonged war; that Japan's finances are nearing the breaking point; that she is employing her full armed strength in fighting a nation which she had never seriously considered as capable of putting up a fight; that she is terribly worried by the vast expenditure of her store of war munitions intended for greater wars against more formidable foes; and that it is not impossible for us to wear out our enemy if we can only fight on long enough.

Moreover, it seems to me as an amateur historian that there is much truth in the statement that our war of resistance is a kind of "revolutionary warfare" which can best be understood in the light of the history of the revolutionary wars of America, France, Russia and Turkey. Surely an American audience can appreciate this historical analogy. Not very long ago, an American friend wrote me these words: "China is now at Valley Forge; but I hope she will soon be at Yorktown." These words were written before I read General Chiang Kai-shek's message referred to above. It may not be entirely out of place for me to develop this historical analogy a little further.

John Fiske, one of your most scientific historians, said: "The dreadful sufferings of Washington's army at Valley Forge have called forth the pity and the admiration of historians. As the poor soldiers marched on the 17th of December (1777) to their winter quarters, their route could be traced on the snow by the blood that oozed from bare, frost-bitten feet... On the 23rd, Washington informed Congress that he had in camp 2,898 men 'unfit for duty, because they are barefoot, and otherwise naked.' Cold and hunger daily added many to the sick-list; and in the crowded hospitals,... men sometimes died for want of straw to put between themselves and the frozen ground on which they lay. So great was the distress that there were times when, in case of an attack by the enemy, scarcely 2,000 men could have been got under arms." (Fiske, *The American Revolution*, II, pp. 28-29.) That was Valley Forge in the winter of 1777.

Shortly after that, the English Government under George III and Lord North offered peace by unconditionally repealing all the laws which had led to the revolt of the American Colonies. It was declared that Parliament would renounce forever the right to raise a revenue in America. And commissioners were sent to America to deal with Congress, armed with full powers to negotiate a peace.

That was an offer of an honorable peace. Had the Fathers of this Republic accepted it, it could have avoided four more years of bloodshed and sacrifice, but there would have been no Independence and no United States of America.

The founders of the American Republic rejected the peace of 1778 and fought on for 4 years longer and won the final victory at Yorktown in October, 1781.

We must remember that those intervening years were often almost as difficult and perilous as the dreary winter at Valley Forge. There were military reverses and losses of territory, and there were internal troubles and even high treason. There was no continental government; after 3 years' discussion, the Articles of Confederation had not yet been adopted. The Continental Congress had rapidly declined in reputation and authority. Congress had no power to tax the States; it could only go on printing more and more "greenbacks" to finance the war. This paper money soon depreciated until, Washington said, "it took a wagon-load of money to buy a wagon-load of provisions." "Early in 1780 the value of the dollar had fallen to two cents, and by the end of the year it took ten paper dollars to make a cent... The money soon ceased to circulate, debts could not be collected, and there was a general prostration of credit... A barber in Philadelphia papered his shop with bills." "Under these circumstances, it became almost impossible to feed and clothe the army... When four months' pay of a private soldier would not buy a single bushel of wheat for his family, and when he could not collect even this pittance, while most of the time he went bare-foot and half-famished, it was not strange that he should sometimes feel mutinous." (Fiske, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 196–200.)

Such were the conditions in 1780. Yet Washington and his colleagues did not give up the fight. A year later, the final victory came at Yorktown which ended the military phase of the War of American Independence.

I have gone into some details in describing the hardships and the difficulties of the War of 1776–1781, not only to show that the conditions of the Continental Army of Washington were not much better off than those of the National Army of China in the present war, but also to illustrate what General Chiang Kai-shek means by characterizing our war of resistance as "revolutionary warfare in which the spirit of the people will ultimately win out." All revolutionary wars were fought by poorly equipped but idealistically inspired peoples against the well-equipped regular armies of an oppressor or aggressor. In the end, final victory almost invariably came to those whose idealism and heroism could overcome the greatest hardship and sacrifice.

If this is still wishful thinking, it is a type of wishful thinking so inspiring and so enticing that millions of my people are determined to test it out with their blood and their lives.

* * * *

Before concluding, I like to make another observation,—again based on historical analogy. I like to ask a question: How did the fathers of this Republic ever get out of Valley Forge and march on to the final victory of Yorktown?

All historians agree that two factors were responsible. The first was that the Revolutionary Army fought on in spite of almost unsurmountable difficulties. But there was another and equally important factor, namely, that the cause of the American Revolution was greatly aided by the international situation of the time. The England of George III was disliked and hated by the great powers of Europe, whose sympathies were naturally on the side of the American colonies. The Continental Congress sent a diplomatic mission to Europe, directed primarily to the

French Court of Louis XVI. Among the members of the mission was Benjamin Franklin who later became the first American Minister to France, and who concluded a commercial treaty and a treaty of alliance with France and secured from France not only loans and subsidies totalling 45,000,000 *livres*, but also important military assistance in the form of a large and well-equipped expeditionary force. Even the most ardent advocate of American isolationism, Professor Samuel Flagg Bemis, tells us that "the combination of French armies and fleets in America with General Washington's forces brought about the final fortunate victory of Yorktown. The French alliance was decisive for the cause of American independence. No American should forget that." (Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, p. 31.)

But it was not the direct assistance from France that alone was decisive for the American cause. The whole international situation at that time was directly and indirectly advantageous to the American Revolution. France and England were in an undeclared war as early as 1778. Spain declared war on England in 1779. In 1780, Empress Catherine of Russia proclaimed the principle of the freedom of the seas and the right of neutrals, a principle which was immediately accepted by all the enemies of England. In 1780, too, Holland was at war with England. But the year before the British surrender at Yorktown, England was practically at war with the whole European world and her colonial possessions everywhere were seriously menaced by France and Spain. It was this adverse international situation which made it impossible for England to reinforce her armies fighting in America and to deal any effective blow to the relatively small forces of Washington.

The moral of this historical analogy is quite clear. The final victory of China in her war of resistance to the aggressor, too, must depend upon two things: first, she must fight on, and she has no choice but to fight on; second, in her prolonged war, the time may come when the international situation may turn in her favor and against her enemy. She does not expect any other nation, however friendly and sympathetic, to take up arms and fight on her side. But she does expect, and she has a right to expect, that the sense of justice and the feeling of common humanity may yet be strong enough to move the men and women of the democratic and peace-loving countries to put a stop to the inhuman traffic of supplying weapons of war and essential raw materials for the manufacturing of weapons of war to a nation which was unanimously condemned by over 50 nations as the violator of solemnly pledged treaties and as the breaker of world peace, and which I do not hesitate to name as Public Enemy Number One among the family of nations.

Chapter 14

National Crisis and Student Life

The gist of the address given before the C.S.C.A. (Chinese Students Christian Association) Summer Conference in Chicago, July 1, 1938. For a Chinese article with similar subject, see Hu Shih Wencun III, Aiguo yundong yu qixue, 720–725.

It is a great honor to come to this gathering of Chinese Christian students, although you know I am not a Christian. One of the Chinese characteristics is tolerance towards religion. For example, I always like to tell my American friends that I am a non-believer; yet I am a trustee of a Catholic university which has a Protestant president.

My topic today is “National Crisis and Student Life.” Our trouble today is that we are beginning to wake up only when it is too late. Our old proverb says, “You should repair your roofs and walls before the rain comes and do not try to drill a well when you are already thirsty.” But things as they are now, with the conflagration already in full force, we are just beginning to be worried: what shall we do and what can we do?

At the very outset, we must clearly understand that this crisis is too stupendous. In a crisis of such magnitude we as individuals can do very little. Even as a small group, very little contribution can be made.

Propaganda? What will your propaganda amount to? How many people can you reach? Of those whom you can reach, how many can you move? My speaking experiences in the last 9 months led me to believe that very little can be achieved through speaking. Those who are with you are always with you, while those who are against you are always against you. For example, can you expect to convince some of the Senators who are against you? The purpose of speaking is to win sympathy and to get action. There is 100% sympathy, but no action.

Chapter Note: *The Chinese Christian Student*, 29, no. 2 (December 1938), 3–4.

To raise money? How much can you raise? A few dollars towards the relief fund? What good does that amount do? Then, to urge boycott? How difficult it is to urge American women to wear cotton stockings instead of rayon. So what effect can boycott do? No. These are not of the first importance. The thing which is really needed is international action to restore peace in the Far East which we can legitimately expect. It is the positive action to stop war. This you and I cannot get.

Let us also clearly understand that this war is not an accident. Nor are our losses and our suffering accidental. They are expected by everybody including ourselves. The causes of our losses are so fundamental that we can't help admitting them. The fundamental cause is that we are backward; backward in education, in science, in industry, in technology as well as in military preparation. The modern war is a war of machine, of scientific and technological achievements; it is a war of social and political organizations, of education and administration.

We know that, but we do not admit it. Only very few dare to admit it. We lack intellectual honesty if we talk about winning the war. General Chiang knew the situation much better than we do. On July 17, 1937, he told the educational leaders at the Kuling conference that if war could be avoided, we must prepare for two things: first, to fight a long war of retreat and defeat, and, secondly, to be ready to endure the most acute suffering. Irresponsible civilians did not know the real situation, so they talked about war lightly. We must also understand that the war cannot and will not alter the level of our backwardness; it only accentuates it. It is a heavy and cruel penalty for our backwardness. It publicizes and advertises our backwardness and makes the whole world see it. At least, it should make ourselves see it more clearly than ever before. Even winning the war does not make us a great nation. Our backwardness remains; the destructions, devastations, and sufferings will only make this backwardness all the more backward.

Our task is, therefore, very clear. It is to do our part to remove a little bit of the backwardness. It is to contribute our utmost to the future building of the nation. Our task is of the future. At present, we can't do very much. We should dedicate ourselves to the great task of eliminating our backwardness and of building up the future of our national life. We are builders; at least, workers of the future China. What we need to do at present is to find out what China needs most and what we can best fit ourselves to do.

My advice to you may seem to be heartless. I, however, earnestly hope you would not be too much disturbed by the present and forget the future. Don't be depressed by the reports of defeats in the papers. It may be necessary for us to forget and ignore the present in order to devote ourselves to prepare for the future. Goethe, a German, told us in his chronology that in any national trouble he tried to forget the present by devoting himself to study. He studied the color effect of light on plants. He even devoted himself to the study of Chinese language. To give you another example. Chu Kuo Liang plowed his field in the days of turmoil and lived a retired life at Nanyang. When Liu Pe called on him, he predicted the things which would happen in the coming decades of years. In one of his letters, he advised, "Be calm and tranquil in order that you may cover the longer distance." Tseng Tze also taught us:

“The burden is heavy and the journey is long.” We, therefore, have to think in terms of a long distance, or a long journey.

It is also necessary to remember that the war may be a long one. General Itagaki who took part in the plot of the Manchurian affair knew the situation very well. He predicted that the war might last 10 or 20 years. If there were no international action, there would be no end of war. War has the tendency of perpetuating itself. The Spanish war was expected to end long ago, but it is still going on. Therefore, this war of ours will not end so soon. Even after the war is over, the war against poverty, against disease, against general backwardness must still be very long and bitter.

But this should not lead us to despair. A Chinese proverb says: “For a seven-year disease, it is not too late to start preparing the cure which requires three years’ labor.” It is never too late to prepare ourselves for the future. Today, it is too late to do anything of immediate effectiveness. But to prepare for the future, you are never too late. This is high time to work hard. Don’t worry. Worrying leads you nowhere, but hard work will lead you somewhere. Japanese are stupid; they know it. But in the first lesson of their primer, they learn the lesson of the race between a tortoise and a hare. It is the tortoise which wins the prize. If you do not add the hare’s rapidity to the tortoise’s industry, you can go nowhere. Mr. Wen Hau preached hard work long ago in the magazine edited by himself. If there were any religion worth believing now, it is this new religion of hard work.

For the time being, we may ask, what China needs most and what I can do. Some think the first question is more important. It is not. Individual ability should be emphasized. Three hundred and sixty professions are all needed. It is, therefore, not necessary for anyone to give up his own line of work and to change to what he considers China needs most. Positively not. The future of China needs everything. We can’t be proficient in all fields, but only in one or at most in two, so don’t try to sacrifice a first-rate preacher, poet, etc., to become a third or fourth rate electrician or aviator. It is important not to be deceived by an easy assumption and not to let the apparent national needs becloud our individual fitness. If you are good for nothing at present, you may be good for the future. So follow your own interests and aptitudes and prepare yourselves!

But how do you know your own interests? In most cases, you don’t know. You must find out by exploring, by adventuring into the unknown and the unfamiliar. Find yourself by cultivating as many interests as you can. Galileo first studied medicine, then painting. One day, he happened to listen to the lectures on Euclid’s geometry which interested him so much that he gave up medicine and painting to take up physics. Let us not be mistaken by our own attitudes. China needs men of every ability and every profession. So develop yourselves according to your aptitudes, and work hard.

As you are Christians, let me give you a living example of a Japanese Christian. You may be interested in one article in the *Christian Science Monitor* which said that in these days of war, Kagawa was still working very hard and continuing to use the proceeds from his writings to support 19 churches, 17 kindergartens and schools, 6 cooperatives, 1 research center and 2 monthly publications.

In conclusion, this national crisis is stupendous. We must confess our impotence and backwardness in order to change the course of events. You are for the future and of the future. Remember not to be disturbed by the present. Ignore the present, if possible, and dedicate yourself to the future China!

Chapter 15

The Far Eastern Situation

Summary of address given before the C.S.C.A. Summer Conference in Chicago, July 3, 1938.

It is a great pleasure to have the privilege of speaking to you again this evening. In my last lecture, I have pointed out that the situation in China now was very grave. France could not save herself with 40 years of military preparation. It is a wild dream that we could save our country by military force alone.

Since 1931, I have been fighting against the enthusiasm for war. Japan has 60 years of preparation, while China has less than 6. Those who have been talking of war lightly thought that Russia, England, or America would come to our help. There is no ground for believing that they will help us militarily. Russia claimed to have 1,000 planes in Siberia, seeming to be most ready to jump in. England might easily get involved because her important interests in the Far East would be at stake. America is thought to be able to assist us on account of her traditional friendship with China. But those who really understand the international situation know that the condition is exactly what the Japanese militarists have surmised; that is, neither one of the above mentioned nations would come to our assistance militarily.

After our continual failures in wars as well as in diplomatic relations, the “paper tiger” was torn up and so there was no more dignity attached to it. Japan was clever enough to punch the “paper tiger.” That is why for 6 years I have been writing against war. Since 1935, I saw that war was inevitable, and I changed my attitude. Even as late as last August, I tried to avoid the war or, at least, to postpone it. But once the war is declared, the only way by which China can be saved is international action. We can’t easily say that Japan would be exhausted. Peffer and other pacifists and isolationists cherish this wishful thinking to meet the psychology of Americans as well as Chinese. “Let China win the war and let us do nothing.” That is the psychology of the pacifists. Don’t be mistaken by such an optimistic estimate!

Chapter Note: *The Chinese Christian Student* 29, no. 3 (December 1938 and January 1939), 9–10.

At present, we must be realistic. In my broadcast, I said that blood and flesh could not fight machine guns and bombs. Some thought that I was too pessimistic or I was giving an unpatriotic speech. But I want you to think in a more realistic way. If international action alone could save China, the next question is, was there any hope for such an action. After having studied the world situation, my answer is yes. My duty here is not to do propaganda work but to study the situation. I may tell you a little about the results of my study.

There are three powers in the Pacific which could help us; namely, Russia, England and America. England is out of the question. She is tied up by the European situation and is also handicapped by her lack of preparedness. Her naval force is lagging far behind and could not even checkmate Italy. Now she has to spend \$750,000,000 for rearmament.

Russia is helpful. She has sent us 300 planes and pilots. Two hundred more are coming. Tremendous amount of war material has been coming to our assistance from Russia. Yet Russia cannot move militarily. In spite of her strength, she cannot fight Japan for at least four reasons:

1. In the West, there is Germany to be afraid of.
2. Internal instability as shown by the persecutions and executions.
3. The new regime in Russia has adopted a new foreign policy; that is, she no longer embraces the ambition of a world revolution, but now devotes herself to internal reform in order to bring about a social order. The Soviet policy is to avoid war so as not to let it interfere with her internal construction.
4. Strategically, she has difficulty in the Far East. All Japanese communications in Korea, Manchuria and North China are directed toward Russia, so Russian positions are vulnerable at every point.

The only country that can move at present is America. But in America there are the organized peace movement and the traditional policy of isolation. These factors were once so influential that America was prevented from joining the World War until the fourth year of fighting. America always waits until the last minute. America and England are of the same race and speak the same language, yet she waited for 3 years to come to England's assistance. What right do we have to expect America's immediate action? Nevertheless, there is a chance. By studying the governmental documents and authentic news, I conclude that America would move.

Why?

America is not easy to move because of her traditional policy of isolation and because of her pacifistic temper. England and France are helping us, but America hasn't done anything substantial.¹ However, once America moves, it will be substantial. America is movable because of her positive and constructive international policy. This policy has been expressed successively by the Secretary of the State and the President. On July 16, 1937, Secretary Hull issued a statement of American foreign policy asking other nations for comment. On August 23, he issued another

¹ Since this was spoken, America has granted China a 25-million dollar Import-export Bank loan.—Ed.

statement reiterating his foreign policy. On October 5, the President's speech in Chicago was very significant. After a careful study of all the documents and speeches, I conclude that there is a policy throughout. The only thing is to have confidence in the integrity of these men.

What is the policy? It is the condemnation of international anarchy and the restoration of world peace. International anarchy threatened world security. Pacifists urged the withdrawal of American warships and denounced governmental protection of her nationals remaining in the war areas. But Secretary Hull declared that the interests and concern of the United States could not be measured by American residents and the volume of trade. The more fundamental interest is the orderly process of the world, the maintenance of peace through law. This is the principle.

In a more concrete form, it is the President's speech in Chicago; that is, a positive endeavor to preserve peace by quarantine. Many think that the President has forgotten his quarantine policy. No. As the head of a leading power, he could not have declared his policy lightly. If we follow the naval policy since October, everything has been in the direction of quarantine; that is, a naval blockade or an economic blockade by a naval blockade. On January 22, the *Christian Science Monitor* reported the possibility of this policy. The naval bills, the moving of American navy to the middle Pacific, sending cruisers to participate in Singapore's celebration, the refusal to limit the range of naval action, etc., all indicated this policy.

England is desiring to bring about peace with other nations in Europe. If it could be done, Chamberlain's peace policy is favorable to us. America needs the cooperation of European nations in the realization of her policy; therefore, peace in Europe is necessary in order that England and other democratic countries may have free hands to cooperate with America in the Far East. There are facts indicating that America approves the appeasing policy in Europe, such as the recognition of Austria. All these things happening in the last 9 months are only preliminary steps.

Then the last question is, when will this policy take effect. This is impossible to predict. In 1916, during the re-election of Wilson, one of the slogans was: "He kept us out of war." But 1 month after his election, he declared war. So no one can predict what is going to happen. The isolationists may preach their policy, but they do not know when war is coming. The German ambassador wrote to the Minister in Mexico instructing him to stir up border trouble and to befriend Japan. This might lead to action. Another incident—like the bombing of Panay—might have the same effect. Even if there is no such incident, the policy is still insistent. The policy is not to save China, but to restore world peace. The time for the coming of this policy will not be too long.

Chapter 16

An Open Letter to the Guardian

To the Editors of the *Harvard Guardian*:

I wish to thank you for your courtesy in asking me to send you an article to “state why the Government of China is resisting the fulfillment of these Japanese aims” as stated by Mr. Yakichiro Suma in his article entitled “New Deal in the Far East.”

It is my policy not to reply to propaganda speeches and articles by Japanese spokesmen. I have complete confidence that the common sense of the American people is sufficient safeguard against such propaganda.

As to the reason “why the Government of China is resisting the fulfillment of these Japanese aims,” may I refer you and your readers to the fact that, for 22 months, literally millions of my people have been shedding their blood and laying down their lives to resist Japanese invasion and domination? And I am sure you and your readers understand the reason why.

I cannot, however, conclude this letter without pointing out, in passing, one of the examples of the very clever way in which these Japanese writers and speakers are twisting and distorting facts to suit their propaganda purposes. In the Guardian article, Mr. Suma said:

“But those who believe that Japan’s responsibility is axiomatic would do well to read the letter which W. H. Donald, Chiang Kai-shek’s Australian adviser, wrote to a friend a few days after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident near Peking. It was published in a Saturday Evening Post article last March. Donald wrote ‘Now at this moment of writing we are trying to shake up a real war with Japan... Before you get this the Central Government forces will be in action against the Japanese.’

“Chiang certainly succeeded in ‘shaking up a real war!’”

Anyone who does not take the trouble to look up the Saturday Evening Post article will naturally believe that Mr. W. H. Donald wrote these words “a few days after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.” Being a trained historian, I looked up the original article (by H. B. Elliston, published on March 19, 1938), which clearly

Chapter Note: *Harvard Guardian* III, no. 6 (June 1939), 3–4.

stated “Donald wrote me on July 30 (1937).” Now the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, with which the Japanese Military started the present war, took place on the night of July 7, 1937—that is fully 23 days before Mr. W. H. Donald wrote the letter which Mr. Suma so much treasured.

During these 23 days the Japanese had moved army corps after army corps into North China, had occupied large sections of the province of Hopei, and finally started full-fledged modern warfare on the 26th, 27th and 28th of July, which destroyed the Chinese city of Tientsin and the western and southern suburbs of Peiping, killing thousands and resulting in the Japanese occupation of Tientsin and Peiping on the night of July 28th.

In short, Mr. Donald said on July 30, 1937, “Before you get this the Central Government forces will be in action against the Japanese”—this he said 23 days after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 2 days after the Japanese occupation of the historic cities of Peiping and Tientsin, 4 years after the occupation of the Province of Jehol, and almost fully 6 years after the Japanese occupation of the whole of Manchuria. And yet Mr. Suma wants to use this treasured quotation to prove to the readers of the Harvard Guardian that China started the war!

May I request you to print this letter in full in the next issue of the Guardian, and oblige.

Yours faithfully,
(Signed) Hu Shih
The Chinese Ambassador

Chapter 17

The Meaning of October Tenth

Address delivered at the New York World's Fair, October 10, 1939. For an essay dealing with the same subject in Chinese, see Shuangshijie de ganxiang, Duli Pinglun, no. 122 (October 14, 1934), 2–4.

First of all, I want to express the appreciation of the Chinese Community to the New York World's Fair authorities for their gracious act of designating this day as "China Day" at the Fair. This act is all the more generous because China, as you all know, withdrew last year from her original plans of participating in the national exhibits at the Fair. By this kind invitation today, the Fair authorities have shown us that they have forgiven China's desertion in a worthy cause,—a desertion which was forced upon her by the necessities of a protracted war of aggression on her own soil.

We are assembled here to commemorate the 28th Anniversary of the Chinese Revolution of 1911. October Tenth is to every Chinese what the Fourth of July is to the American citizen. The Revolution of 1911, which broke out on that day, not only overthrew the Manchu Dynasty, but also put an end to all monarchical rule in China. Thus the Chinese Revolution was of a twofold significance: it was a racial or nationalistic revolution in that it threw off an alien yoke of 270 years; and it was a political revolution of the first magnitude in that it was the first successful overthrow of the monarchical form of government on the continent of Asia.

At that time, and for many years afterwards, this twofold significance was not fully appreciated. It was easy for the world to see that the Manchu rule was successfully overthrown, and never to return. But it was not easy for the casual observer to admit that the Chinese Revolution was equally successful in building up a truly lasting democratic political structure.

This failure to recognize the achievements of the political phase of the Revolution is understandable. You can overthrow an old monarchy overnight, but you cannot

Chapter Note: *The Chinese Christian Student* 30, no. 1–2 (October/November 1939), 4.

build up a democracy within the brief space of one or two decades. The world only saw the years of internal strife and civil wars that followed the Revolution of 1911. But it has failed to see that, beneath the surface of apparent disorder and disintegration, great changes were taking place and were affecting basically the social and political life of the nation.

To the vast number of the people, the success of the Revolution meant that "even the Emperor must go." That idea is most revolutionary. For what else can have greater power and greater permanence than the institution of the Emperor, which seems to have stood the test of time for thousands of years? If the emperor can be swept away by the tide of the times, nothing else seems sacred enough to remain unaffected by the onslaught of the new ideas and practices.

That was exactly what was happening in the years following the Revolution. With the downfall of the Dynasty, there were gone all the numerous institutions which had been for centuries its paraphernalia,—among other things, the Manchu garrisons, the ignorant parasitic nobility born to power, the eunuch, the state religion, the public sale of office, and the absolute power of the monarch to punish, to imprison, and to kill. The mere overthrow of these long sanctified institutions and usages has had a liberating influence far greater than the outside critic was capable of imagining at the time.

The political significance of the Chinese Revolution of 1911 consisted chiefly in the removal of a center of blind and unenlightened power which could have easily suppressed any idea or movement not to its liking. The old Monarchy together with its vast paraphernalia was incapable of effective leadership for reform, but it had the power to retard progress. The many reforms of the year 1898, for example, were nullified overnight by the ignorant and much over-rated Empress Dowager, who imprisoned her own Emperor son and beheaded without trial six leaders of the reform movement. A movement such as the "Literary Renaissance" of the last 20 years could have been easily killed under the old Monarchy; a Memorial to the Throne from one of the Imperial censors would have been sufficient to imprison the leaders and suppress the whole movement.

The downfall of the absolute power of the monarchy, therefore, furnished the precondition of an age of intellectual freedom and social and political change. The 28 years under the Republic have been most important in the intellectual and social history of the Chinese nation. During these decades a thorough and fundamental process of modernization has been going on in China and has affected almost every phase of the cultural, social and political life of the people. As one who has not only watched but also participated in these changes, I can testify that these changes, these intellectual and social movements, would have been impossible without the success of the Revolution of 28 years ago.

The most characteristic feature of the Chinese intellectual and social movements of the last two or three decades is the almost complete freedom with which Chinese intellectuals have discussed and criticised every phase of national life. Nothing seems too sacred to be subjected to criticism. The legendary Sage-Emperors, Confucius and Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, family life, marriage, filial piety, God or the gods and spirits, immortality,—none of these has escaped the new spirit

of searching criticism and doubt. I sincerely believe that this spirit of freedom in thought, research, and expression would have been absolutely impossible if the Fathers of the Republic had not overthrown those terrible forces of oppression in the command and under the protection of the old Monarchy.

These blessings of freedom will be better appreciated if we only cast a critical glance at the intellectual, social and political life of our closest neighbor, the so-called "Modern Japan." When we realize how little freedom is allowed to scholars and thinkers in Japan and how solicitously some of the intellectual absurdities and dynastic and religious myths of Japan are protected from the so-called "dangerous thought,"—then, but not until then, will we fully understand the great liberation which was brought about in China 28 years ago.

Therefore, I invite you all to join me today in commemorating this 28th Anniversary of the Chinese Revolution that, not only freed the Chinese Nation from almost three centuries of alien domination, but also liberated the Chinese mind and Chinese life and brought about three decades of liberal thinking and critical scholarship—which, to me, mean far more than military strength or naval power.

Chapter 18

The Present Situation in China

*Speech delivered at the Town Hall Meeting of New York City,
Tuesday, December 5, 1939.*

I

Japan's aggressive war in China which began in September, 1931, has been going on for more than 8 years. Its latest phase of continued large-scale hostilities has been going on for exactly 29 months. By the New Year Week, the war will be 2.5 years old.

Four weeks ago, on November 12th, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek summed up the first 2.5 years of the war by saying that as the war went on, Japan had become weaker and weaker, while our power of resistance had become stronger and stronger. Has he been over-optimistic or unrealistic?

First, it is not difficult to show that China's power of resistance has become greater today than ever before. In the same speech, General Chiang said that, since the outbreak of the war in 1937, our military strength today had been more than doubled. These words of the Chinese Commander-in-Chief were confirmed a few days ago by the Japanese Premier, General Nobuyuki Abe, who told the Osaka commercial leaders that General Chiang Kai-shek still had about 2,000,000 soldiers in the field, and that the final solution of the "China Incident" might take from 5 to 10 years.

Our great strength lies in what the Physicist calls "Mass," that is, vast space and great numbers. Japan with her 70 million is trying to conquer a population of 450 million. The war fronts now extend from beyond the Great Wall to the Western River Valley, fully 2,000 miles. It is estimated by conservative neutral observers

Chapter Note: *China Monthly* 1, no. 2 (January 1940), 4–5, 12–13.

that, on the various fronts taken together, Japan has been and is losing at least from 800 to 1,000 men every day, without any major frontal battles. That is about 300,000–360,000 men in a year!

During the last 8 months, our soldiers have been doing very well, not only in guerrilla warfare, but also in frontal battles. We have inflicted severe defeats on the invaders in Southern Shansi and Northern Hupei. And in the first days of October, the Chinese armies in Northern Hunan and Northern Kiangsi scored a series of signal victories over the Japanese troops attempting to capture the city of Changsha. Japanese dead were estimated at 30,000. And the Japanese Army Headquarters declared that the city of Changsha was of no military value!

General Chiang has elsewhere told the world that the strategy of the Chinese defender consists of “trading space for time” and of “achieving a great victory by accumulating small victories”. One can best appreciate the meaning of his famous phrase “trading space for time,” when one recalls the lightning rapidity with which Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, and even Poland were overpowered and extinguished by their aggressors.

We have temporarily lost some very important territory. But we have gained 2.5 years of time! And we are quite confident that we can “achieve a great victory by accumulating small victories.” One can fight on for another 2.5 years, or as the Japanese Premier has predicted, from 5 to 10 years. Time is our ally. The longer we fight on, the more confident we become, and the stronger we become.

II

Nor is it hard to demonstrate that, the longer the war goes on, the weaker becomes Japan. Indeed the war is already exposing to the world many weaknesses of Japan as a nation.

I shall not dwell on the low opinion which foreign military experts have expressed about Japan as a military power. Nor shall I stress the moral depravity of the Japanese fighting forces as evidenced in their conduct in occupied areas in China, or in their peculiarly Nipponese method of conquest by poisoning the conquered population by army-controlled traffic in highly concentrated narcotics.

Nor shall I try to emphasize the great political and intellectual weaknesses of the Japanese nation by pointing to the complete disappearance of liberalism and radicalism with the outbreak of the war, or to the complete absence of national leadership after 8 years of continental warfare.

I shall confine myself to one phase of Japan’s weakness which can be seen in statistical figures, namely, her economic weakness. It has been estimated that the cost of the first 2 years of the war, plus the cost of the Manchurian invasion and occupation, is eight times the combined costs of the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905).

Sino-Japanese war.....	200,000,000 yen
Russo-Japanese war.....	<u>1,720,000,000 yen</u>
	1,920,000,000 yen
Manchurian invasion.....	1,273,000,000 yen
New Sino-Japanese war.....	<u>14,000,000,000 yen</u>
	15,273,000,000 yen

And the national budget of 1939 is seven times that of 1931:

1931.....	1,476,000,000 yen, 100%
1937.....	5,436,000,000 yen, 370%
1938.....	8,393,000,000 yen, 570%
1939.....	9,450,000,000 yen, 700%

To meet this gigantic expenditure, the Japanese Government has had to resort to such inflationary methods as the increase of paper notes and of loan issues:

Loan Issues

1937.....	3,300,000,000 yen
1938.....	5,400,000,000 yen
1939 (estimated).....	5,924,469,000 yen

This is far beyond the capability of the Japanese bond market to absorb. By the end of 1938, there was already 3,160,000,000 yen’s worth of new bonds left in the hands of the banks.

Moreover, the war has necessitated the drastic curtailing of Japanese exports, which has led to the unfavorable balance of trade. And the imports of ammunitions and of raw materials for the war industries must be paid in gold. The result has been the rapid disappearance and exhaustion of the Japanese gold reserve.

Japanese Gold Sold to the U.S.A.

1937.....	\$246,470,000
1938.....	168,740,000
1939 (January–October).....	<u>136,018,000</u>
	\$551,228,000

Being weak in such “key commodities” as oil, scrap-iron, copper, lead, nickel, rubber and metal-working machinery, Japan must import them from abroad. Therefore, the decrease in her export trade and the exhaustion of her gold constitute a very serious situation. And there seems to be no end of the war in sight.

I am, therefore, justified in saying that, during these 28 months of the war, Japan’s weaknesses are fully and clearly revealed to all who can read. The world is witnessing one of the greatest tragedies of human history, namely, a great nation light-heartedly

throwing overboard its glorious achievements of 60 years and foolhardily committing hara-kiri on a gigantic scale. The world is witnessing the greatest weakness of the Japanese nation, namely, its inability to control its military machine even at the risk of national perdition.

III

There is another way of looking at the situation in the Far East. China is fighting her war of resistance to aggression, and she is fully conscious that she not only has the sympathy of the civilized world on her side, but has been actually fighting with the material and political assistance of the friendly nations. On the other hand, Japan stands isolated and condemned as the "Public Enemy Number One" in the family of nations. She has been recently deserted by her friend and partner, Germany, and is now shamelessly trying to bluff the democratic nations by threatening to join hands with Soviet Russia!

I wish I could make you all fully appreciate what a world of difference it makes whether you fight a war with the sympathy or with the condemnation of the whole civilized world on your side! This almost unanimous sympathy on the side of China has been an important factor in buttressing our morale throughout these months of distress and tribulation. And it is this same sympathy that has been largely responsible for the not inconsiderable amount of material and political help from all of China's friends.

Of course, there were Chinese optimists who had entertained extravagant expectations of the friendly powers and who naturally felt greatly disappointed when China had to fight Japan single-handed for more than 2 years without any other Pacific Power jumping into the war on our side. But those of us who know the international situation and who understood the war-weary psychology of the peace-loving nations, never cherished great hopes for China to secure military, financial or material aid from her foreign friends.

Yet, the Chinese cause was so convincingly appealing and the conduct of Japanese military so horribly aggressive that China soon found every friendly power quite ready to give her assistance in every way possible. Indeed, China could not have fought so well and so long without the help of Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia and the United States.

Soviet Russia, which is nearest to us and least afraid of Japan's military strength, and which has the least vested interests in China at stake, naturally feels most free to give China assistance. The aid from the Soviet Union has been twofold: first, by amassing a great military force along the Manchurian and Mongolian borders, thereby making it necessary for Japan to maintain at least a third of a million of her best-trained and best-equipped troops in Northern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia; and, secondly, by selling to China partly on credit, and partly by barter, a large amount of arms, ammunitions, war planes and quantities of oil.

I take this opportunity to point out that this assistance from the Soviet Union has been given to us, not only because it is to her national interest to do so, but also because Soviet Russia was for years at the height of her international idealism and was therefore sympathetic with China's resistance to Japanese aggression. As far as I know, there has not been any string tied to this assistance, neither ideological surrender nor territorial concessions.

Great Britain and France both have vast interests in various parts of China which can be easily threatened by Japan. Moreover, ever since 1935, both Great Britain and France had been so much occupied by the European situation that they were unable to devote much attention to the Far East. Yet, in spite of these great difficulties, both Britain and France have been quite generous in their help to China during these 2.5 years of the war. Great Britain has rendered great assistance to China by supporting the Chinese national currency ever since the days of November, 1935, when the new currency policy was first proclaimed by the Chinese Government. For 15 months, the British colony of Hongkong was the greatest port of entry for Chinese munitions and war materials; and, even after the loss of Canton, Hongkong is still one of the most important side-doors for free China. And it is Great Britain and France which now give to China the use of her two great back-doors, the two great accesses to the sea: namely, the French Indo-China Route and the British Burma Route.

It is unfair to say that such aid from Great Britain and France has been given to China simply because British and French Imperialism is anxious to defend itself against the menace of Japanese Imperialism. It is, I repeat, largely the manifestation of deep-rooted sympathy. This sympathy we can understand better now that these democracies are actually engaged in a terrific war which, in the words of Mr. Neville Chamberlain, aims at "the defeat of that aggressive, bullying mentality which seeks continually to dominate other peoples by force, which finds brutal satisfaction in the persecution and torture of inoffensive citizens, and which, in the name of the interest of the state, justifies any repudiation of its own pledged word whenever it finds it convenient."

Naturally my people have expected more moral, political and material support from the people and government of the United States. In this expectation, we have not been disappointed. You all know that, under the Silver Purchase Act, your Department of Treasury has bought vast quantities of our nationalized silver which purchase has been of the greatest help to China. And you all know of the \$25,000,000 credit which the Export-import Bank gave to a Chinese trading corporation last December, and which has been indirectly responsible for China's securing subsequently more credits from other countries amounting to over 50 million dollars. But the world little realizes that that 25 million dollars' credit was a thousand times more significant than the figures might indicate, because this financial assistance came at a time when China's last main access to the sea had been cut off with the loss of Canton, and her morale probably at the lowest ebb. Future historians will surely say that the Export-import credit of last December, not a very large amount in itself, had the magic effect of reviving and buttressing the spirit and morale of

Chinese resistance, because it made China understand that she had not been deserted by her friends in her darkest hours of distress.

The same magic touch was again given to China by the American Government on July 26, 1939, when it suddenly but apparently nonchalantly notified Japan of the abrogation of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. This action has once more given the greatest encouragement to the Chinese nation because it came at a time when Great Britain had just been forced to make an important concession to Japan in her negotiations in Tokyo, and China was beginning to wonder whether practical difficulties and threatened interests were actually compelling her friends to desert her. The American Government's action once more dispelled all such doubts; it gave moral encouragement to China by strengthening her friends and dumbfounding her enemies.

IV

The abrogation of the Commercial Treaty with Japan was announced in Washington on July 26. At that time, the European situation was rapidly and radically deteriorating. On August 23, the text of the Non-Aggression Pact between Soviet Russia and Germany was published. German invasion of Poland began shortly afterward and the great European War broke out in the first days of September. This great war has now been going on for over 3 months.

What effects has the European War had or will it have on the Sino-Japanese War in the Far East?

For weeks there were grave apprehensions on the part of the Chinese leaders and the Chinese people. There was the danger of Great Britain and France being forced to make important concessions to Japan at the expense of China; there was even the danger of the Indo-China and the Burma Routes being closed by the French and British at the point of the Japanese bayonet; and there was the danger of Soviet Russia abandoning her policy of assistance to China.

I am happy to say that so far the situation has turned out to be very much better than it had first appeared. The Soviet-German Pact, apparently negotiated and concluded without the knowledge of Japan, was considered by Japan as a betrayal by her supposed friend and ally, Germany. In her strong resentment against Germany, the Japanese Government declared the Anti-Comintern Pact dead. She now feels herself more isolated than ever. She does not know where to turn next. She will probably remain in that state of bewildered isolation for some time to come.

In this state of resentment and bewilderment, Japan has so far not dared to attack the British and French possessions in East Asia. Recently Britain and France have slightly reduced their armed forces in North China. It is quite possible that the European situation may force the British and the French to make some other minor concessions to Japan on the mainland of Asia. But we are reasonably confident that these democratic powers which have undertaken to fight a terrific war for the purpose

of defeating the continual threat to dominate the world by force, surely will not betray or desert China which, for over 2 years, has already been fighting the world's first battles against aggression. Indeed such a betrayal of China would emphatically belie all their professed war aims and peace aims.

As to what Soviet Russia will do in the Far East, no one can tell. But this much I can say: After almost 4 months of intermittent warfare on the Mongolian-Manchurian border, Russia and Japan signed on September 15 an agreement which brought about a cessation of hostilities and established a joint commission to examine the disputed boundaries. On October 31, Premier Molotoff of the Soviet Union, in the course of his report on Foreign Affairs to the Supreme Soviet, said that "the possibility has been established of starting Soviet-Japanese trade negotiations" and that they (the Soviets) "look with favor on Japanese overtures of this kind." A few days later, however, the Communist International in Moscow issued a manifesto calling upon the workers and farmers of the world to rise and support the Chinese people in their heroic resistance to Japanese aggression. So far there has been no indication that the Soviet Union has abandoned or will abandon her policy of assistance to China.

In short, there have been "beginnings of improvement of relations" between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, and there have been "Japanese overtures" for trade negotiations; but Soviet Russia apparently is still continuing to give help to China in her war against Japanese invasion.

Whatever effects the European War may produce on the Sino-Japanese conflict, and whatever changes may come in the international line-up in the Far East, one thing is certain: namely, that the Chinese people are determined to fight on, for many more months and possibly for many more years to come, until our enemy is economically so exhausted and militarily so bogged down that it will be willing to accept a just and endurable peace. This is not impossible. You will remember that in November, 1918, when the Armistice came to the last world war, Germany was still occupying almost the whole of Belgium and a large portion of France, but the war had been lost for the Germans.

And this break-down of Japan can be greatly accelerated by an effective boycott of Japanese goods and an effective embargo of essential war materials to Japan by the peace-loving and democratic peoples who have been supplying Japan with foreign exchange and with scrap-iron, oil, copper, cotton and metal-working machinery. When Japan's unfavorable trade balance is becoming unbearable, when her domestic loan issues can no longer be absorbed by the native banks and investors, when her gold holding is completely exhausted and when she has nowhere to go to replenish her exhausted war supplies, then a little pressure from without will tell effectively just as the proverbial last straw breaks the back of the camel.

In conclusion, I cannot help quoting once more from the November 12 speech of General Chiang Kai-shek, in which he says: "It is fortunate for the world that the European War was started 26 months after China had taken up our war against Japanese aggression." "Today Japan no doubt still has the ambition to seize the opportunity of the war in Europe to fish in troubled waters; but she has been deeply

bogged down and greatly weakened by our armies and is no longer powerful enough to effectively threaten the world with her forces of aggression.”

It is in this sense that China may be said to have been fighting these 30 months on behalf of the civilized and peace-loving world. This is the larger historical significance of China’s war of Resistance.

Chapter 19

We Are Still Fighting

Published by the China Society of America, New York.

Two years ago, I pointed out that the issues behind the Far Eastern conflict were: (1) the clash of Japanese imperialism with the legitimate aspirations of Chinese nationalism, and (2) the conflict of Japanese militarism with the moral restrictions of a new world order. I still believe that these are the real issues. But I now see they are closely related to each other.

In order to see these issues in their close relationship, we must go back a few decades in history when three of the seven great world Powers, Germany, Italy and Japan, first succeeded in achieving their internal unity and began to embark on their new national life in a world which had been, for the most part, already appropriated by the more advanced colonial empires. These three Powers are now calling themselves the “Have Not” nations simply because they came to the world too late—Italian independence, German unity, Japanese restoration being almost contemporaneous events taking place about 1870. Naturally in their expansionist movements, they turned to those regions which Walter Lippmann once called “the stakes of diplomacy,” regions vast in territory, rich in resources, but weak in government and in the power of resisting an external aggression. Parts of Africa, Arabia, Persia, the Balkan States, Turkey and China were among these “stakes of diplomacy” where, during the last century, the struggle for colonies and special concessions was very acute and where the “law of the jungle” reigned almost supreme.

It did not require special wisdom to see that an international conflagration was brewing out of these imperialistic struggles. In fact, an international war—a “world war”—did break out in China in 1900 and was participated in by eight Powers of the world, including Japan and the United States. The allied forces of these eight Powers stormed the forts of Taku, and marched on the ancient capital of Peking, which they

Chapter Note: *China Magazine* XVI, no. 1 (February 1940), 4–6.

occupied for several months. In the meantime vast hordes of Czarist Russian armies poured into Manchuria. There were loud outcries of "Partition of China" and there was imminent danger of a real world war to be fought on the unequal division of spoils in China.

That international conflagration at the turn of the century was averted by the gradual working out of an international order in the Far East under the leadership of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. An Englishman, Alfred E. Hoppisley, and an American, William W. Rockhill, worked out the principle of the Open Door policy in China and the American Secretary of State, John Hay, adopted it as early as 1899 and proclaimed it to the world in a series of notes to the various Powers interested in China. Throughout the years of the so-called "Boxer War" and the peace negotiations following it, the American insistence on the Open Door in China, and the British support of that policy had a sobering effect on the more aggressive Powers, especially Russia, Germany and Japan. And the result was the evacuation of the allied forces after the peace protocol had been signed and put into effect. Thus was China saved from the fate of being the seat of the first world war in the 20th century.

The Open Door policy has since been the cornerstone of the international order in the Far East. It has been incorporated in all the international agreements affecting China, and it has been regarded as one of the few great principles of the foreign policy of the United States.

The principles of the Open Door policy are most explicitly stated in the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, Article I of which says:

"The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

- (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
- (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
- (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
- (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."

From this statement we can see that the Open Door principle is not merely an economic policy with its sole emphasis on equal opportunity for commerce and industry. It is a political doctrine of great historic significance in that it, as is shown by the first Article of the Nine Power Treaty, stresses the importance of respecting "the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China" and providing "the fullest and the most unembarrassed opportunity for China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." As recent historical scholarship has indicated, the founders of the Open Door policy clearly conceived from the very beginning that the economic phase of the Open Door, namely, equal opportunity of trade, was dependent upon the political independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China. The door of China can be kept open only by an independent, sovereign state of China with a modern govern-

ment sufficiently effective and stable to protect the rights and interests, not only of China herself, but of the nations having friendly relations with her.

This Far Eastern international order, dating back to the end of the last century and receiving its full and unmistakable restatement in the Nine Power Treaty, naturally became a part of the new post-War world order which, as we all know, not merely stands on the Covenant of the League of Nations, but is also supported by a series of other idealistic treaties, such as the treaties of the Washington Conference and the Kellogg-Briand Pacts. It is this international order of the Pacific region, in its older and newer forms, that has been responsible for the sheltering and protection of China throughout the first three decades of the century against many a threatening aggression; and for enabling her to work out the necessary steps in her process of developing a modern effective and stable government for herself. Under its shielding, China brought about two important and fundamental political revolutions (1911–12 and 1926–27), fought several civil wars and, at least from 1927 on, was beginning seriously to convince the outside world of her ability to develop and maintain for herself a modern national state. She was successfully unifying the country, modernizing her institutions and her means of transportation and communication and building up a modern national life.

But unfortunately the rise of a modern national state in China was not to the liking of our nearest neighbor, Japan, whose military caste had long believed that Japan had a divine mission to dominate, not only Eastern Asia, but the whole world. These militarists, and in particular the young officers, could not and would not tolerate China's endeavors to build up a unified and modernized state. They were determined to crush nationalistic China before it could attain stability and strength. So 8 years ago on the evening of September 18, 1931, the Japanese army in Mukden created the "Mukden Incident" and in a few months the Japanese troops were occupying the major portion of the Three Eastern Provinces of Manchuria.

But Japan could not invade China and occupy Chinese territory without at the same time destroying the international order both in the Far East and in the world at large, under which the respect for Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity had been explicitly pledged and China was solemnly promised "the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity" to work out her national development. China naturally appealed to the League of Nations and to the signatories and adherents of the Nine Power Treaty. What happened during those memorable years of 1931 and 1932, when the League of Nations attempted to mediate for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute, need not be retold here. Suffice it to say that the world at that time was not prepared to support that international order by curbing the aggressions of Japan. The League pronounced a judgment and proposed a settlement which was tantamount to a surrender to Japan's wishes. But when Japan refused to accept the settlement and withdrew from the League, nothing more was done by the supporters of Collective Security.

When Japan left the League, a German Cabinet Minister said to the Japanese representative at Geneva: "We don't think you are right, but we thank you for your good example." The good example of Japan has since been successfully followed by other aggressor states in East Africa and Europe.

The whole structure of post-War world order, which had cost 8.5 million lives and \$200 billion to bring into existence and under which the nations, the great and strong as well as the small and weak, lived in comparative peace for more than a decade, now rapidly broke down and was finally scrapped when the new European War began 5 months ago. The failure of this new world order in sustaining its own principles during this early stage of the Sino-Japanese dispute doomed it to ultimate downfall.

These, then, are the fundamental issues involved in the Sino-Japanese conflict. A new national state of China has arisen and become the object of fear and attack by the Japanese Imperialists. In trying to crush nationalistic China, Japan has also destroyed the international order, under the shadow of which the Chinese national state had been growing up and gaining strength. In the place of this international order, Japan's militarists are trying to set up the "New Order" of East Asia, which Mr. Hallett Abend has aptly called the "New Disorder."

Japan's war in China has been going on for more than 8 years. Its latest phase of open and continuous hostilities has been going on for 31 months. After 31 months, China's resistance is as determined as ever before, and the war will go on for many months and possibly years to come and will be ended only when China can be assured of a just and honorable peace.

It is not necessary to remind you that our enemy is bogged down more and more deeply and has shown some anxiety to terminate the so-called "China Incident" which has cost Japan a million casualties, is killing 1,000 of her men a day without a major frontal battle, and has exhausted her gold reserve in two years.

Under these circumstances, and with the European War going on, many of our American friends are beginning to think that an early peace may be possible in the Far East.

But I wish to point out to these friends that, as far as I can see, there is no prospect of an early peace. Why? Because the Japanese militaristic caste has not yet repented their aggressive policy, and because so far there is no power, either inside Japan or elsewhere in the world, which can bring that militaristic caste to its senses and make it accept a peace that will be just endurable.

A just and endurable peace in the Far East must offer satisfactory adjustment to the fundamental issues behind the war. It must fulfill these basic conditions:—

- (1) It must satisfy the legitimate demands of the Chinese people for an independent, unified, and strong national state.
- (2) It must not result in vindicating any territorial gain or economic advantage acquired by the use of brutal force in open violation of international law and solemnly pledged treaty obligations.
- (3) It must restore and greatly strengthen the international order for the Pacific region so that orderly and just international relationships shall prevail and recurrence of such an aggressive war shall be impossible.

I repeat: such a just and enduring peace is not in sight, and therefore my people are determined to fight on until such a peace is achieved.

Chapter 20

The Modernization of China and Japan

Also in C. F. Ware for the American Historical Association, ed., Cultural Approach to History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 243–251.

In recent years I have published some of my reflections on the modernization of Japan and China. What I am now going to state is a summary and restatement of what I have been thinking on this fascinating subject during these years.

I

First of all, we must state the problem of our inquiry. What special aspect of the modernization of China and Japan arouses our curiosity and requires our study and explanation?

Generally speaking, there are two aspects of the question that have puzzled the outside world and demanded some explanation.

For many decades, down to very recent years, the question often asked was: Why was Japan so successful in her task of modernization, and why was China so unsuccessful? That is the first aspect of the question, which has called forth many explanations.

But in recent years, the problem has radically changed. After almost a century of hesitation and resistance, China has emerged as a modern nation, not sufficiently westernized (it is true) in her material aspects, but fully modern in her outlook on life and feeling completely at home in the modern world. On the other hand, Japan,

Chapter Note: Ruth Nanda Anshen, ed., *Freedom: Its Meaning* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940), 114–122.

after 70 years of apparently rapid modernization, is suddenly discovered by the outside world as having never been transformed in all the fundamental aspects of her national life. Professor G. C. Allen, one of the most sympathetic interpreters of Japan, said: "If the changes in some of the aspects of her [Japan's] life have been far-reaching, the persistence of the traditional in other aspects is equally remarkable... The contrasts between these innovations and the solid core of ancient habit are as striking as ever they were." Professor Emil Lederer and Emy Lederer-Seidler, in their joint work on *Japan in Transition*, another most sympathetic interpretation of Japanese life, have dwelt on the most strange phenomenon in Japan, namely, her "immunity to the dialectic play of deep-lying evolutionary forces," her being "devoid of dialectic and dynamic" and her ancient civilization "offering strong resistance to the facile assimilation of foreign elements."

In short, the new problem is just the opposite of the older puzzle. It is: Why has China at last succeeded in overthrowing her old civilization and in achieving a Chinese Renaissance? And why has Japan, after seven decades of extraordinarily successful modernization, yet failed to break up her "solid core of ancient habit"? That is the second aspect of the problem.

Any theory that attempts to explain the first set of questions must also explain satisfactorily the second set of questions. And vice versa.

II

In 1933, I was trying to solve the first set of puzzles: Why and how has Japan succeeded, and China failed, to achieve a speedy and orderly cultural readjustment and bring about the modernization necessary for national survival in the new world? The explanation I offered then was that China and Japan had been going through two distinct types of cultural response. The modernization in Japan I described as the type of cultural transformation under centralized control, made possible by the existence of a powerful ruling class—the feudal militaristic caste—from which came the leaders of the Reformation who not only decided for the nation what to change and what not to change, but who also had the political power to carry out their decisions. On the other hand, I pointed out, China, because of the nonexistence of a ruling class and because of the thoroughly democratized social structure, could only go through the slow and often wasteful process of cultural transformation through the gradual and diffused penetration and assimilation of ideas and practices, usually initiating from a few individuals, slowly winning a following, and finally achieving significant changes when a sufficient number of people are convinced of their superior reasonableness, convenience, or efficacy.

The advantages of the Japanese type of modernization under the centralized control of a ruling class are easy to see. It is orderly, economical, continuous, stable, and effective. But, I point out, "it is not without very important disadvantages. The Japanese leaders undertook this rapid transformation at so early a time that even the most farsighted of them could only see and understand certain superficial phases of

the Western civilization. Many other phases have escaped their attention. And, in their anxiety to preserve their national heritage and to strengthen the hold of the State and the dynasty over the people, they have carefully protected a great many elements of the traditional Japan from the contact and contagion of the new civilization... Much of the traditional medieval culture is artificially protected by a strong shell of militant modernity. Much that is preserved is of great beauty and permanent value; but not a little of it is primitive and pregnant with grave dangers of volcanic eruption."

The disadvantages of the Chinese type of cultural changes through gradual diffusion and penetration are numerous: they are slow, sporadic, and often wasteful, because much undermining and erosion are necessary before anything can be changed.

But they have also undeniable advantages. They are voluntary. From the lipstick to the literary revolution, from the footwear to the overthrow of the monarchy, all has been voluntary and in a broad sense "reasoned." Nothing in China is too sacred to be protected from the contact and contagion of the invading civilization of the West. And no man, nor any class, is powerful enough to protect any institution from this contact and change. In short, this process of long exposure and slow permeation often results in cultural changes which are both fundamental and permanent.

III

This, in general, was my theory regarding the modernization of China and Japan. Japan was modernized under the powerful leadership and control of a ruling class, and China, because of the nonexistence of such control from above, was modernized through the long process of free contact, gradual diffusion, and voluntary following.

We may ask: Can this theory satisfactorily explain all the four phases of our main inquiry? Can it explain the marvelously rapid westernization of Japan and at the same time the unchanging solid core of medieval Japan? Can it explain both the long failures and the recent successes in China's modernization? I think not only that it can, but that it is the only hypothesis which can satisfactorily resolve all the apparent contradictions of the problem.

According to my theory, the early and rapid successes of the Meiji Reformation were brought about by the effective leadership and powerful control of the ruling class, which happened to coincide with the militaristic class of feudal Japan and which naturally was most anxious and at the same time best fitted to undertake the adoption of the Western armaments and methods of warfare. As Professor Lederer has pointed out, "It could hardly be foreseen at this early stage that in this case one step leads inexorably to a second." "Since a modern military state is possible only on condition that it is an industrialized state, Japan had to develop in that direction. But industrialization, by reason of the economic interrelationship between various types of production, means also the development of branches of industry which are

not essential to the conduct of war.... Just as militarism reaches beyond itself into industry, so the technological system of industrialism has far-reaching implications for the social system." The leaders of Japanese westernization started out with the desire to adopt Western militarism and have thereby brought about what Professor Lederer calls the "militaristic industrial system."

Of all the non-European countries with which the European civilization has come into contact, Japan is the only nation that has successfully learned and mastered that one phase of the occidental civilization which is most coveted by all races, namely, its militaristic phase. Japan has succeeded where all these non-European countries have invariably failed. This historical mystery can only be explained by the fact that no other non-European country was so favored with the existence of a militaristic caste which has been the governing class of the country for over 12 centuries.

But this militaristic caste was not an enlightened or intellectual class. Its leaders were courageous, pragmatic, patriotic, and in some cases statesmanlike. But they were limited in their visions and in their understanding of the new civilization that had knocked at their shores. They thought, just as Lafcadio Hearn thought, that they could build up a Western war machine which should be made to serve as a protective wall behind which all the traditional values of Tokugawa Japan should be preserved unaltered.

Unfortunately for Japan and for the world, the military successes of Japan against Russia and China tended to vindicate these narrow-visioned leaders. The result has been an effective artificial protection and solidification of the traditional culture of medieval Japan against the "dangerous" contact and influence of the new ideas and practices of the ever-changing world. By the use of the modern means of rigidly controlled education, propaganda, and censorship, and by the use of the peculiarly Japanese methods of inculcating the cult of emperor-worship, Japan has succeeded in reinforcing and consolidating the "solid core" of unchanging medieval culture left over from the 250 years of Tokugawa isolation. It was the same centralized leadership and control which made possible the rapid and successful changes in militarization and industrialization and which has also deliberately protected and solidified the traditional values and made them "immune to the dialectic play of deep-lying evolutionary forces."

The same theory also explains the history of modernization in China. The early failures in the Chinese attempts at westernization were almost entirely due to the absence of the factors which have made the Japanese Meiji Reformation a success. The Chinese leaders, too, wanted to adopt the Western armaments and methods of warfare and to build up the new industries. Their slogan was "Fu Ts'iang" (Wealth and Strength). But there was in China neither the militaristic tradition, nor an effective and powerful governing class to undertake the leadership and direction in such gigantic enterprises. China had come out of feudalism at least 21 centuries ago; the social structure had been thoroughly democratized; and governmental policy, religion, philosophy, literature, and social usage had combined to condemn militarism and despise the soldier. Whereas the Samurai was the most highly esteemed class in

Japan, the soldier ranked the lowest in the Chinese social scale. Therefore the new Chinese army and the new Chinese navy of the 1980s and 1990s of the last century were doomed to failure. With the destruction of the Chinese navy in 1894–1895, all the new industries—the shipyard, the merchant marine, the government-operated iron and steel industry—which were to feed and support the new war machine, gradually came to nought. The government and the dynasty were thus discredited in their early efforts in modernization. After the failure of the reforms of 1898 and the tragedy of the Boxer Uprising of 1900, the discrediting of the dynasty and the government was complete. From that time on, China's main endeavor was to destroy that center of ignorance and reactionism—the monarchy and its paraphernalia—and then to build up a new center of political authority and leadership.

Thus, while Japan's first successes in westernization were achieved under the leadership and control of her feudal-militaristic class, China has had to spend three or four decades in the effort of first removing the monarchy and later destroying the newly arisen militarists. It has been found necessary for China to bring about a political revolution as the precondition for her modernization.

In 1911–1912, the revolution succeeded in overthrowing the alien rule and the monarchy together with its historical accompaniments. The political revolution was in every sense a social and cultural emancipation. In a country where there is no ruling class, the overthrow of the monarchy destroys the last possibility of a centralized control in social change and cultural transformation. It makes possible an atmosphere of free contact, free judgment, and criticism, free appreciation, free advocacy, and voluntary acceptance.

What has been called the Chinese Renaissance is the natural product of this atmosphere of freedom. All the important phases of cultural change in China have been the result of this free contact and free diffusion of new ideas and practices, which are impossible in Japan under rigid dynastic and militaristic taboos. The net outcome is that modern China has undoubtedly achieved more far-reaching and more profound transformations in the social, political, intellectual, and religious life than the so-called “modern Japan” has ever done in similar fields.

I wish to cite one important and fundamental fact as illustration of the character of the cultural change in China. I refer to the spirit of free and fearless criticism which the leaders of China have applied to the study and examination of their own social, political, historical, and religious institutions. It is no accident that all the men who have exerted the greatest influence over the Chinese nation for the last 40 years—Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, Wu Ching-heng, Chen Tu-shiu, and others—have been men who know our historical heritage critically and who have had the moral courage ruthlessly to criticize its evil and weak aspects and to advocate wholehearted changes. Neither Confucius, nor Lao-tse, nor the Buddha, nor Chu Hsi; neither the monarchy, nor the family, nor religion, is too sacred to be exempt from their doubt and criticism. A nation that has encouraged honest doubt and free criticism even in matters touching the sacred and most time-honored institutions is achieving a modernity undreamed of by its neighbors whose intellectual leaders are persecuted and punished for having taught 30 years ago a certain theory

of constitutional law or for having suggested that certain Sacred Treasures at a certain shrine might be of doubtful authenticity.

To sum up, the modernization in China illustrates the view that, in the absence of centralized control from above, cultural changes of basic importance may take place through the process of free contact and slow diffusion. It is the reverse side of what has happened in Japan. The breakdown of the monarchy and its paraphernalia has removed the possibility of artificial protection and solidification of the old culture, which is then thrown open to the natural processes of cultural transformation through free contact and voluntary acceptance.

IV

If I have any moral to present it is this: freedom of contact and choice is the most essential condition for cultural diffusion and change. Wherever two civilizations come into contact, there are natural tendencies (or laws) of one people learning and borrowing from the other what each lacks or recognizes as of superior utility or beauty. These natural tendencies of cultural diffusion will have free play if only the peoples are allowed free contact with the new ideas and practices.

Where such freedom is denied to a people, where artificial isolation and solidification are consciously and effectively carried out with regard either to a whole culture or to certain specially prized aspects of it, there arises the strange phenomenon of the "solid core of ancient habit" "devoid of dialectic and dynamic," such as has been found in present-day Japan.

There is really no mystery in this unchanging Japan after 70 years of marvelously rapid change in the militaristic industrial system. There is no truth in the theory, for example, that the Japanese civilization has been able to resist change because it has its peculiar vitality and has attained "the completed perfection of its forms." The fashion of men's dress in the Western world does not change so rapidly as that of women—can we say that men's dress has achieved special vitality and "the completed perfection of form"? In the same way, sitting on the floor, for example, was discarded in China so long ago that historians have difficulty in dating the first use of chairs and tables. But the Japanese to this day continue to sit on the floor. That does not mean the custom of sitting on the floor has any special "vitality" or has attained "completed perfection of form."

Nor is there much truth in the view that the Japanese are naturally clumsy in understanding and conservative in their outlook. Lack of understanding never prevents a people from accepting new fads. Japan probably never understood the various schools of Buddhism when she accepted them. (Certainly China did not understand some of them when she adopted them.) Besides, a people can always learn. European observers in the seventeenth century recorded that the Japanese knew "nothing of mathematics, more especially of its deeper and speculative parts." But we now know the Japanese can become accomplished mathematicians.

As to their native conservatism, the history of early Japanese contacts with Korea, China, and Europe only proves the contrary. They learned from these foreign peoples everything they could learn, not excluding things affecting their social, political, and religious institutions. In recording the success of the Jesuits in Japan,¹ Sansom said: "Though a number of their converts were beyond all doubt genuine to the point of fanaticism and adhered to their new faith in the face of great danger, one cannot but suspect that it had, by one of those crazes which have often swept over Japan, become the fashion to ape the customs of foreigners, including their religion. We know that rosaries and crucifixes were eagerly bought and worn by many who were modish to wear foreign clothes and to be able to recite a Latin prayer."

I cannot therefore escape the conclusion that it will be the element of freedom that may yet some day break down the "solid core of ancient habit" in Japan just as it has already broken it down in China.

¹ In the sixteenth century.

Chapter 21

A New World Order Cometh!

I am most appreciative of the honor of addressing this distinguished assembly of school administrators. As a university professor for 21 years, and as a former college president and dean, I salute you as fellow-workers in the field of education.

I notice that the theme of this convention is threefold:

- To provide for the Common Defense
- To promote the General Welfare
- To secure the Blessings of Liberty

And you have asked three of us from foreign lands to speak to you on international relations—on the world situation. This invitation implies a clear realization that it is the international situation that is threatening your common defense, your general welfare, and your blessings of liberty.

I am here, not strictly as a diplomatic representative of a nation at war, but as a university professor in absentia. Therefore, I shall not burden you with a report on the state of the Chinese War of Resistance to Aggression which is now in its 44th month. Nor shall I try to convey to you the gravity of the Far Eastern situation in its relationship to your national defense, to your own security, and to your own liberties. The American public is so well informed on these questions of international relations that I find it quite unnecessary to speak on them.

I am here to present to you an interpretation of this threatening world situation and to make a forecast as to the outlook. I was uncomfortable when I heard the chairman mention the forecast I made in 1936. If my forecast today can be as prophetic as the one I made then, I am sure the world and ourselves will be the gainers.

My interpretation of the world situation is that all the present troubles are the natural outcome of the breakdown of the post-war international order which had cost mankind over 200 billions of dollars and 8.5 millions of human lives to bring into existence.

Chapter Note: *American Association of School Administrators Official Report*, 1941, 148–153.

My forecast of the future is that, in spite of all the present troubles, even in the midst of all the wars and the conquests of free and peace-loving peoples, there are signs which point to the rise of a new world order to take the place of the old order which has succumbed not only because of the ruthless assaults on it by the law-breakers but also because of the inherent weakness of its own constitution.

There is no denying that there was a kind of world order set up after the last World War. As one who lived through those days of world agony and anguish and as one who comes from a country greatly benefited by that world order, I must solemnly testify that that post-war international order was a real thing.

It is not true that the post-war world order was entirely the creation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. It stood on a much broader basis. It was supported by a host of international treaties and agreements all of a more or less idealistic kind, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, the treaties of the Washington Conference, the Treaties of Locarno, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris.

It was in a real sense a world order embracing practically all nations, and not excepting the United States of America which is signatory to the Washington Conference treaties and to the Pact of Paris.

And it was trying to solve some of the knotty problems left unsolved by the Peace Conference of Paris. The Washington Conference has helped to solve the problems of Shantung and of naval power. The Locarno Treaty sought to bring about a better relationship between France and Germany. Under this international setup, the nations of the world, great and powerful as well as small or weak nations, did enjoy a period of peace and relative disarmament.

In short, the world order was good enough for most of the nations. It was good enough for all the peaceful and peace-loving nations of the world which were coming to look upon that period of comparative tranquillity as a good beginning for a lasting peace. But unfortunately that world order was not good enough for the trouble-makers, the evildoers, and the determined breakers of the peace. It made practically no provision to guard itself against them. Its whole structure was the product of a war-weary world which wanted peace but would do nothing effective to insure peace. It was destined to failure because there was lacking the essential element of enforcement of its own law and order by means of organized power.

To be sure, under Articles X, XV, and XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the states members of the League have all committed themselves to the collective obligation to apply "sanctions" against any violator of the law and breaker of the peace. But a war-weary world somehow vaguely hoped that peace might be maintained without having to resort to such "sanctions." When occasions did arise calling for the enforcement of peace by applying such economic sanctions against aggressor states, the peace-loving members were cowed by the outcry that "sanctions mean war." There was neither the will nor the necessary organization and preparation for the enforcement of peace by collective force behind the law. The net result was that the post-war peace of the world could be, and was, actually, more than once threatened and broken down by the determined and lightning-like acts of some unscrupulous and fully armed aggressor.

The first assault on this old world order was the Japanese military invasion and occupation of Manchuria in September 1931. The second was the Japanese war in Shanghai during the first month of 1932. The third assault was the Japanese invasion beyond Manchuria and beyond the Great Wall into North China in 1933. These marked the beginning of the breaking down of the post-war world order.

China appealed to the League of Nations and to the signatories of the Washington Treaties and of the Pact of Paris. But the world was then completely unprepared to apply effective sanctions to check the aggressor state. The League Commission of Inquiry made a report on this conflict in China and recommended a settlement which was tantamount to complete compliance with Japanese wishes in Manchuria, except in name. Even that almost complete surrender to Japan was rejected by Japan which withdrew from the League in 1933. Neither the League of Nations nor the larger world order, as I have described, could do anything beyond a declaration of the principle of nonrecognition of any situation or territorial change obtained by the use of force in open violation of treaty obligations.

These first assaults on the world order were rapidly followed, because they were unchecked, by others undertaken by aggressor states in other parts of the world. The Ethiopian War came in 1935. The Spanish War began in the summer of 1936. The fresh outbreak of Japanese aggression in China on a full-fledged scale took place in July 1937. Austria was wiped from the map in a few hours in March 1938. The Czechoslovakian crisis engaged the attention of the whole world throughout the summer months of 1938 which saw practically the last and funereal session of the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva, just before the famous Peace of Munich which was negotiated and signed in complete ignoring of the League. Six months after the Peace of Munich, Czechoslovakia became a German province. Less than one-half year after the extinguishment of Czechoslovakia, Poland was invaded and England and France declared war on Germany. Thus began this present phase of the European War. The breakdown of the world order was now complete. The world once more reverted to international anarchy and the "law of the jungle."

It is, therefore, a historic fact that all the wars today, all the cruelty, misery, and suffering, all "man's inhumanity to man," which you and I are witnessing are the natural consequences of the overthrow of that resemblance of a world order which had taken \$200,000,000,000 and 8.5 million human lives to bring into being, and which prevailed for more than a full decade after the last great war. And it is no less a historical fact that that overthrow has been due to the absence of measures and means for effective enforcement of law and order against their unscrupulous violators.

The moral of this tragic lesson should be plain to all who can read. It is this: Law and order do not mean the absence of force, but only force organized for the support or realization of a generally acknowledged beneficial object. Government by law can function only when it has some form of effectively organized force for the enforcement of order against the lawbreakers and the peace-disturbers. Enforcement is the Alpha and Omega of the law. Without this element of effective enforcement all law and order are empty words and are doomed to failure. This lesson is true in

internal government and we are now learning at terrific cost that it is equally true in international order and government. That is my interpretation of the situation.

The second part of my thesis is that a new and more promising world order is discernible. It is not yet a reality. But there are many signs which seem to herald the coming of a better day and a better world.

Even the tragic story of the outbreak of the war in Europe 18 months ago may be cited as the first of these encouraging signs. As you may recall, after the dismembering of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Great Britain and France suddenly realized the gravity of the situation and adopted a new, totally new, policy of pledging automatic military assistance to Poland, Romania, Greece, and later Turkey in case of the national independence of any one of them being violated and such violation being resisted with armed forces. Apparently the statesmen of these two great democratic powers, Britain and France, hoped to save the peace of Europe by this last-minute desperate undertaking of definite and almost automatic military action. Unfortunately, as you remember, it was too late. The aggressors could not believe it and were ready to risk it. So Poland was invaded, and France and Great Britain automatically declared war on Germany. We may say that the great European war was started to test the validity and sincerity of a solemn pledge, which was contained in one paragraph as you remember, by Britain and France to give automatic military aid to the victim of unwarranted aggression. I am confident that future historians will say that totalitarian aggressors met their first defeat when they had to fight a war at all. If there will ever be any chance of reviving or rebuilding a new world order nearer to our heart's desire, that revival must date its beginning back to that moment when two great powers voluntarily gave such a pledge and afterwards honored it in the face of imminent war and destruction to themselves.

I think you will agree with me that this historical event of Great Britain and France taking up arms to fight a most desperate war in fulfilment of a solemn pledge to a weaker nation must be regarded as the first sign pointing to the rise of a new kind of international order.

The second important sign of the times is the coming together of the great Anglo-Saxon democracies in a common struggle against totalitarian aggression. First came the voluntary but active participation in the war by all the self-governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth. The significance of this fact is often overlooked by people who have been accustomed to thinking of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa as colonies of Great Britain. They do not realize that since the last World War, and especially under the new constitution of the British Commonwealth of 1926, these self-governing Dominions have attained the status of free and independent nationhood. The neutrality of Ireland throughout these 18 months of the war and the narrow margin of the voting in the Parliament of the Union of South Africa on the question of participation in the war should make us appreciate all the more the significance of this participation by these members of the British Commonwealth as the free and voluntary action of self-determining and self-governing states. This gives us hope that a combination or federation of such free and democratic states can rally together of their own free will to fight against a common enemy that threatens their free and democratic way of life.

But the more significant historic event is the wholehearted manner in which the government and people of the United States have come to the assistance of the British nations in the present war. We know that there is no commitment of any kind which binds the United States to such assistance. And we know that this all-out aid to Britain, just as the aid to China, to France before its collapse, and later to heroic Greece, is never motivated by any economic, commercial, or financial interest. Nor is it actuated by a feeling that "blood is thicker than water," for similar aid has been and is given freely to other nations of different blood but fighting the same battles.

What binds these Anglo-Saxon democracies together in the present fight is the realization and the conviction that their common civilization, their ways of life, their social, political, religious, and cultural institutions are threatened and menaced by an aggressive force inspired by a philosophy of force. Their common tie is their common defense of their historic democratic institutions from the conquest and domination by that force and by that philosophy of force. It is a bond that requires no treaty obligation or diplomatic commitment. It is a cause that transcends economic and commercial interests and even national and racial differences. I cannot help viewing this great movement of nationwide American aid to Great Britain as another sure sign pointing to the coming of a new world and a new world order.

I have cited only two concrete facts as sure signs heralding the coming of a new world order: first, the entrance of Great Britain and France into the present world war in fulfilment of a solemn pledge of automatic military assistance to a victim of aggression, and second, the coming together of all the Anglo-Saxon democracies in a common fight against a common enemy who threatens the conquest and destruction of democratic civilization. I said in the beginning that the old world order broke down because it made no provision for checking or curbing the evildoers and law-breakers, and because there was neither the will nor the preparation on the part of the nations to check and curb the aggressors and to enforce peace, but these few signs I have mentioned point to a new, a fundamental change apparently in the world. To me these signs and events are the most cheering beacon lights in a world of darkness. Dimly but unmistakably I envisage a new world after this terrible war—a world wherein the naval power of all the aggressor states will have been destroyed; wherein all the sea power will be in the hands of free and democratic nations whose powerful navies will become the most natural and most effective international police force for a new international order; wherein the law and order among the nations will be effectively enforced by a sufficient amount of organized force operating in the interest of human decency and orderly relationships; wherein aggressive wars shall be made impossible because international legislations for economic and military sanctions against all possible violations of peace and order will have been made so clear and so unmistakable that no evasion of responsibility for war and for the enforcement of peace will be possible.

Such is the new world order that I see coming in the midst of all this turmoil.

Chapter 22

China's Power of Resistance

Address on the 44th annual celebration of the Founder's Day at the Carnegie Institute in the Music Hall on Thursday evening, October 23, 1941, at 8:00 p.m., in Pittsburgh.

I am very glad to be here tonight to celebrate Founder's Day in honor of Andrew Carnegie, who did so much for peace in the world. This beautiful Carnegie Institute has always devoted itself to the founder's ideals of a common brotherhood and the establishment of the peace and security of all men.

By the first week of November, Japan's war in China will be 52 months old. China has been fighting for 4 years and 4 months.

You will probably ask me how it is possible for China to fight on so long under such great handicaps against such a formidable foe. China's 4 years' fight against Japanese aggression has been called a modern miracle, and I shall devote my allotted time to an explanation of the factors which have made this miracle possible.

In brief, there are five main factors which have made up China's sustaining power:

1. Space
2. Number
3. Historical unity
4. Internal reconstruction
5. External aid

First—space. China has the rich inheritance of vast space to move about in. After 10 years of intermittent war, and especially after 4 years of large-scale hostilities, our enemy can barely claim to have occupied more than 10% of China's territory. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has told the world that the principle of his strategy in the war against Japan is “to trade space for time.” The spatial factor has been most

Chapter Note: *The Carnegie Magazine* 15, no. 6 (November, 1941), 163–171.

important in China's ability to bog down the Japanese invader and gain 4 years' time. This factor of space was not fully understood until Hitler's blitzkrieg succeeded in conquering more than a dozen European countries in the brief space of a few months. Those countries in western and northern Europe and in the Balkans have fallen one after another because, among other things, they were lacking sufficient space with which to trade for time. The recent success of Soviet Russia in so far withholding the onslaught of the German panzer divisions has furnished fresh proof that the most effective weapon against a blitzkrieg is time, and time can only be gained by means of vast space and large man power.

The second factor is number, that is, vast population as actual and potential supply of man power. In all these 4 years, China has suffered great military reverses in the face of superior mechanized armies of the invader, but, because of our numerical superiority, the enemy has never been able to encircle or trap any large Chinese army. And we have been able to utilize the time gained in training more and more new divisions and new officers so that even the Japanese military High Command states that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek still has at least 3 million trained soldiers under his command. That is to say, even our enemy admits that the size of the Chinese army, not counting the vast guerilla forces, is greater today than it was 4 years ago when the war started. And we are confident that a nation of 70 million Japanese can never conquer a nation of 450 million.

The third factor is our historical national unity. It is not true, as you have been frequently told, that China has been unified by the Japanese invasion and by 4 years of war. Such a miracle cannot happen in so short a time. Let it be said once and for all that the Chinese national unity has been of 21 centuries' making. China was unified into an Empire about 200 B.C. During these last 21 centuries and a half, there have been short periods of separation and of foreign invasion. But broadly speaking, the Chinese people have been living continuously for over 21 centuries under one Empire, one government, one system of law, one written language, one form of education, and one historical culture. This continuity of unified national life has no parallel in the history of any race, nation, or continent, so that it is rarely fully appreciated by the foreign observer, who often writes about Chinese disunity during the first two decades of the Republic, and fails to grasp the fundamental feeling of national unity behind, and in spite of the internal political strife. It is this age-long sense of historical unity that is now holding the whole country together, inspiring the people to fight on most heroically for the deliverance of their country from the invader, comforting them in their adversity and misery and making it possible for millions of them patiently to bear great humiliation and agony in enemy-occupied territory, never despairing that final victory would be with their long-lived Fatherland.

The fourth factor in China's sustaining power has been a whole decade of internal reconstruction. As you will remember, Japanese war of aggression in China was actually started 10 years ago, in September 1931, by her invasion in Manchuria. At that time, China was caught totally unprepared to fight an enemy who happened to be a first-rate military and naval power. Our leaders fully realized that as soon as

a large-scale war began, China would have to lose all the modern cities on the eastern and southeastern coast and possibly all along the lower half of the Yangtze River, and to face defenselessly a rigid blockade by the powerful navy of the enemy. Therefore, during those years of apparent appeasement, our leaders were not only drilling, training, equipping, and, as far as possible, modernizing our army units, but were also taking important steps in mapping out a long-term economic and industrial reconstruction in the vast hinterland of China's west and southwest in anticipation of the imminent war and naval blockade.

The first step in this direction was to build railroads and highways toward the west, northwest, and southwest. A great network of motor roads has been built up during these 10 years, which includes the transcontinental highway to Russia and the famous Burma Road. Only recently, F. Tillman Durdin, of *The New York Times*, reported from Burma on the wonderful feat of the Burma Road. I quote a few sentences from his dispatch to give you a picture of China's achievement in the field of interior transportation. "The Burma Road," says Mr. Durdin, "has never been adequately described. Built almost entirely by hand labor, the road is a staggering achievement and without doubt the greatest highway construction feat of modern times. It twists over seemingly impassable 18,000-foot mountains and finds its way through 3,000-foot gorges. At places the road has been chiseled into the face of sheer mountainside, with thousands of feet of canyon below. The southern section runs through the worst malarial jungles in the world."

Equally important was the step to establish modern industrial plants in the interior. Shortly before the outbreak of the war, the Government took the decisive step in dismantling more than 400 factories and transporting their mechanical equipment to the interior, including the equipment of machine works, metallurgical plants, chemical works, cotton mills, flour mills, and paper factories. The total weight of the machinery thus transported with Government help amounted to over 70,000 tons. In addition, blast furnaces, iron and steel furnaces, and other related materials necessary for the steel industry were also sent into the interior. In order to feed the planned industries in the interior, mining equipment, including hoisting, pumping, and other equipment, was transported from the great mines of Honan into the southwestern provinces in order that coal mines may be operated with more up-to-date equipment. The total weight of these materials from the mines and the furnaces thus transported was about 50,000 tons. To supplement these transported plants, the Government also started a number of new factories including electrolytic copper plants, electrical apparatus factories, and machine works. This new equipment totaled over 10,000 tons in weight.

It took from 1 to 2 years to transport, set up, and operate these factories in the hitherto unindustrialized interior. They are widely distributed in the vast interior in localities unknown even to myself and are now in full operation. It is these almost miraculously transported and transplanted factories which have been making arms for our defensive warfare, feeding the mechanical needs of our vast war machine, mining our old and new mines and producing chemicals, textiles, flour, and paper for the military and civilian needs of Free China.

These measures for building up a vast system of communication and transportation and for the industrialization of the interior provinces constitute the fourth factor of China's power of resistance—the reconstruction of the great west.

The last, but not the least, factor is external assistance to China. It is no exaggeration to say that China has been able to fight on all these years because we have been able to receive important assistance from our friends abroad. Throughout these years we have been receiving aid in one form or another from Soviet Russia, Great Britain, the United States, and France before her collapse. This assistance has taken various forms—sometimes in the form of loans or commercial credits, sometimes in the form of military supplies purchased under barter, sometimes in the direction of maintaining our air routes and trade routes for our communication with the outside world and for transportation of our exports and imports, and sometimes in the form of economic embargo of important military and industrial supplies and materials against our enemy.

Of these four friendly powers aiding China, the United States has been most consistent and generous in her policy of giving assistance to countries resisting aggression. Even in those early days of isolation sentiment and neutrality legislation, the American Government took great pains in searching for ways and means to help China in her distress. The first American aid came in the form of purchasing Chinese silver, which gave my people the first source of foreign exchange with which to buy our war supplies in America. The second aid was the commercial credit of 25 million dollars given to China in December 1938—at a time when China had just lost Canton and Hankow and was probably at the lowest ebb in her national morale. Since that first loan, there have followed the 20 million dollar commercial credit of April 1940; the 25 million dollar commercial credit of September 1940, and the 100 million dollar loan of December 1940. The total sum of American credits and loans to China since December 1938 amounts to \$170,000,000.

In addition to these forms of financial aid, the United States Government has taken other steps which have proven as effective as these loans in helping China and curbing her enemy. These steps include the various forms of limited embargo of essential war materials against Japan. A very important step was taken in March 1941, when Congress passed the Lease-Lend Act and appropriated 7 billion dollars to carry out the national policy of giving material assistance to the countries resisting aggression. In one of his historic speeches, President Roosevelt said: "China shall have our help." During these several months, China has been receiving important material assistance under the Lease-Lend Act. A special mission of military and technical experts under the leadership of Brigadier General John Magruder has gone to Chungking to take charge of the Lease-Lend materials at the China end.

Another and probably the most important step in this direction was undertaken by the American Government, in the last days of July, when Japanese assets in this country were ordered frozen, all aviation gasoline and motor fuel and all oil products from which these could be derived were placed under embargo, and Japanese commerce and shipping with this country were virtually entirely stopped.

This last economic pressure on Japan has been made more effective by the support and parallel action of the entire British Empire and the Netherlands East Indies.

This most effective economic weapon against Japanese aggression, which American public opinion had been advocating all these years, has now been in full operation for about 6 weeks. It is already beginning to show important effects on the national life and militaristic tempo of Japan. For Japan is a nation most vulnerable to this economic embargo. While she can manufacture most of her weapons of war, she is extremely lacking in the raw materials with which to manufacture these weapons. She is also lacking in oil and motor fuel. Seventy-five percent of her oil has been coming from the United States. More than half of her imported iron ore and scrap iron and steel also came from America. From this country came also over 80% of her imported raw cotton. As recently as 1939, 57% of her imported machines and machine tools came from the United States, the remaining 43% coming from Germany, Britain, and other countries.

An American embargo, supported by the British and the Dutch East Indies Governments, on all these vital materials, is therefore the most powerful weapon to curb the aggressive and destructive power of Japan.

I am quite confident that the American people, once fully realizing the wonderful efficacy of this economic weapon, will not lightly relax or abandon it until its enforcement has succeeded in driving home to the Japanese military and the Japanese people the plain lesson that aggression does not pay and war is suicide.

These, then, are the five factors which go to make up China's power of resistance. We still have the vast space. We still have the unlimited man power. Our historical sense of national unity has gone through a new baptism of fire and blood and has come out of it more solid and more unshakable than ever. Our internal economic and industrial reconstruction in the interior is showing more and better results every month: we are making more arms and producing more goods for export and home consumption. And, on top of all these, the whole international situation has turned more and more in our favor and against the enemy. The political isolation and moral ostracizing of Japan has long been completed by her own action. And the economic encirclement and strangling of Japan is now being completed—again by her own action.

China has long left her Valley Forge and is now confidently marching on to her final victory at her Yorktown!

Chapter 23

Our Honorable Enemy

*Speech at the China Society of America's 28th annual dinner
in honor of the Chinese Ambassador on December 19, 1941.*

Three days ago, the President of the United States sent to Congress a great document setting forth the long record of Japanese-American relations of the last 80 years, and in particular of the last 9 months, “the record for all history to read in amazement, in sorrow, in horror and in disgust.”

This record will make all of us, Chinese and Americans, better understand the character of our common enemy, Japan.

Tonight, I wish to take a few minutes to add a historical note. I want to speak on Japan in the light of history.

In order to understand Japan and her recent record of aggressive expansion, we must remember the fundamental historical fact that Japan has been governed by a militaristic caste for the last 1,200 years, and especially for the last 300 years, and was at the height of a fully developed militant feudalism when Commodore Perry knocked on Japan's doors in 1853.

This historical Japan has always been totalitarian in political organization, militaristic in training and imperialistic in aspiration.

Sir George Sansom, the most sympathetic authority on Japanese history, has pointed out these feudalistic totalitarian features in a recent article:

From 1615 or thereabouts, Japan was ruled by a feudal oligarchy which anticipated in many respects the methods of government used by modern totalitarian states. The distinguishing features were there—the rule of a self-constituted elite, the disabilities imposed upon certain classes, the restriction of personal liberty, the sumptuary laws, the monopolies, the censorship, the secret police and the doctrine that the individual exists for the State. When in 1868 this regime was overthrown it was replaced not by a popular government, but by a powerful bureaucracy which...perpetuated the essential features of totalitarianism.

Chapter Note: *China at War* VIII, no. 1 (January 1942), 11–13.

It is this historical totalitarian tradition which has readily linked Japan with the totalitarian states of present day Europe. In the same article, Sir George Sansom quotes Mr. Shiratori, formerly Japanese Ambassador to Rome, who wrote in 1938:

The country (Japan) is fast reverting to totalitarianism, which has been the fundamental principle of Japan's national life for the past 30 centuries... It makes our hearts warm to see ideas that have influenced our race for centuries in the past embodied in the system of modern states of Europe.

From these words from one of the authors and signers of the Tripartite Axis Pact, we can understand it is no mere historical accident that Japan readily and willingly becomes a partner of the European Axis and regards that partnership as "the immutable policy of the Empire."

The same historical tradition also explains the ease and rapidity with which Japan has transformed herself into a first class militaristic power. It explains one of the greatest historical puzzles. The puzzle is why, of all the non-European nations, Japan alone has been successful in adopting and mastering the martial and militaristic aspects of Western civilization. Neither China nor India nor Persia nor Korea nor Annam nor Siam could do it. Japan alone was best qualified to undertake this rapid militarization because her ruling class, the daimyo and samurai, had been educated, trained and imbued in the militaristic tradition, and because what a ruling class does is always eagerly emulated by the whole nation. So it was again no mere historical accident that Japan of all the non-European nations alone succeeded in becoming one of the greatest military powers within the short space of a few decades.

And lastly, the same historical tradition also explains Japan's policy of imperialistic expansion. When the famous *Tanaka Memorial* was first published in China in 1931, the Japanese vigorously denied its authenticity, and the outside world was skeptic about its gigantic program of continental expansion and world conquest. But the events of the last 10 years have proved beyond any doubt that that seemingly fantastic program truly represents the imperialistic ambition of the policy-makers of Japan.

For us in China and on the Asiatic continent in general, it is unnecessary to go to the *Tanaka Memorial* for documentation of the imperialistic tradition of Japan. World conquest has been the national ideal of Japan for all these 350 years.

Exactly 351 years ago, in 1590, Hideyoshi, the great military hero of medieval Japan, sent letters to Korea, China, the Philippines, the Liuchiu Islands and India to inform them that he was planning to embark on a program to conquer the Asiatic continent and the islands. I quote a few sentences from his letter to the Kings of Korea:

Hideyoshi, the Supreme Imperial Advisor of the Emperor of Japan, hereby addresses His Excellency the King of Korea—

Although I was born to a family of low rank, my mother conceived me immediately after she had dreamed that the Sun had entered into her bosom. A physiognomist interpreted this dream and predicted that I was destined to extend my authority to all parts of the world where the sun shines. When I came to manhood, my benevolent rule would be admired by nations in every direction. People within the four seas would all come under my influence and power. Because I was born with great destiny, which was revealed by this omen, those who have fostered feelings of enmity and opposition have been crushed and destroyed.

Whenever and against whomever I have waged war, the victory has always been mine. The lands and districts invaded by me have always been conquered. Now our empire has entered upon a period of peace and prosperity—I am not willing to spend the remaining years of my life in the land of my birth. According to my idea, the nation that I would create should include them all. In starting my conquest, I planned that our forces should proceed to China and compel the people there to adopt our customs and manners. Then that vast country, consisting of more than 400 provinces, would enjoy our imperial protection and benevolence for millions of years to come.—You, King of Korea, are hereby instructed to join us at the head of all your fighting men.

Hideyoshi mobilized an army of 305,000 men and sent that huge force across the sea to invade Korea in 1592. This war of invasion lasted 7 years and ended only after the death of Hideyoshi. At the outset of his campaign, Hideyoshi worked out a timetable which reminds us of the timetables of modern conquerors. According to his timetable, his army was to conquer Korea before the end of May 1592 and to occupy Peking, the capital of China, before the end of the year. By 1593 the Imperial Regent would proceed to Peking to assume the title of the Imperial Regent of China. By 1594 the Japanese Imperial Court would be removed to Peking where the Emperor would be enthroned as the Emperor of the newly created empire. When China, Korea and Japan were thus united into the first unit of the great Asiatic Empire, Hideyoshi would establish himself at Ningpo, China (the birthplace of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek). After that, his military leaders would proceed to carry the military campaign into India and other Asiatic countries.

The timetable of Hideyoshi was not carried out, but the man became the idol and ideal of the Japanese nation all these 350 years. Only 2 days ago, you read a letter of Admiral Yamamoto, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Navy, written on January 24, 1941, in which he said that he would not be content merely to capture Guam and the Philippines, and to occupy Hawaii and San Francisco, and that he was looking forward to dictating peace to the United States in the White House in Washington. This is no joke. It is an authentic echo of the spirit of Hideyoshi.

In the words of General Chiang Kai-shek to your great President on December 9, “to our now common battle we offer all we are and all we have to stand with you until the Pacific and the world are freed from the curse of brute force and endless perfidy.”

Chapter 24

Factors Necessary for a Durable Peace in the Pacific Area: A Chinese View

*The Merrick-McDowell Lectures of Ohio Wesleyan University,
Delaware, Ohio for 1942. This address was also published in
Free World 2, no. 1 (February, 1942), 9–13.*

I

Over 2 years ago, in October, 1939, in a speech before the China Society in America, I said that a just and durable peace in the Far East must fulfill these basic conditions:

1. It must not result in vindicating any territorial gain or economic advantage acquired by the use of brutal force in open violation of international law and solemnly pledged treaty obligations.
2. It must satisfy the legitimate demands of the Chinese people for an independent, unified, and strong national state.
3. It must restore and greatly strengthen the international order for the Pacific area and in the world at large so that orderly international relationships may always prevail and aggressive wars may not recur.

More than 2 years have since passed, and the world has radically changed. But I still think that these three fundamental principles sum up the factors necessary for a durable peace in the Pacific area. So I shall present these three points as a basis for discussion and criticism by this distinguished assembly.

The first point is merely a reaffirmation of the “Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition” which was stated in the United States Government’s note to China and Japan on January 7, 1932, as follows:

The American Government...does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact

Chapter Note: Francis J. McConnell et al., *A Basis for the Peace to Come* (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942), 115–125.

of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

This principle of nonrecognition was adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on March 11, 1932, when it unanimously passed the following resolution proposed by the British Government:

The Assembly...declares that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.

This principle was reaffirmed by the League of Nations on February 24, 1933, when in adopting the Lytton Report it declared that its members "will continue not to recognize this regime [the puppet regime in Manchuria] either de jure or de facto."

Since 1933, the same doctrine has been applied to similar situations created by aggressor states in other parts of the world.

In its specific application to the original dispute in the Far East, this principle means the nonrecognition of the puppet regime in Manchuria. Clearly the same principle should now apply to any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by means contrary to international law and solemnly pledged treaty obligations. This should include not only the puppet regimes in Manchuria, Peiping, Nanking, and other occupied areas of China, but also any situation, or treaty, or agreement that may be brought about by the aggressors in any other parts of the Pacific area, or in any other parts of the world.

It is to be noted, however, that the principle of nonrecognition was proclaimed by the American Government and by the League of Nations at a time when the war-weary world was not prepared to take more positive action to curb armed aggression and help its victims to redress the injuries already done to them. Nonrecognition is a negative doctrine with a positive purpose. As Mr. Henry L. Stimson himself has said in his famous letter to the late Senator Borah of February 23, 1932:

If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by the other governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such [aggressive and lawbreaking] action which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived.

Ten long years have passed and the civilized world is now better prepared to take a more positive stand on this issue of armed aggression and international brigandage. Thus the Atlantic Charter in its second and third articles goes much further than the doctrine of nonrecognition.

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

I willingly and gladly accept these two articles as positive amplifications of my first principle.

In specific application, this first condition therefore means the complete restoration to Chinese sovereignty and government of all the territories of Manchuria, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, as well as the occupied parts of North, Central, and South China.

And this also means that, at the peace conference at the end of the war, the wishes of the 22,000,000 people in Korea should be given a fair hearing and just consideration and steps should be taken to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to these people.

II

The second principle I have proposed—namely, that a durable peace must satisfy the legitimate demands of the Chinese people for an independent, unified, and strong national state—needs no detailed explanation to such a learned assembly.

“An independent, unified, and strong national state of China” means a sovereign China free from all forms of so-called political and economic “co-operation and collaboration” which her aggressive neighbor has been forcing upon her; free from the remaining legal or extraterritorial restrictions that have survived from the early relations between China and the foreign countries seeking to trade with her; free from domination and control by any foreign power; free, in the words of the Nine-Power Treaty, “to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government”; free, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, to choose the form of government under which the people will live.

To this distinguished assembly, it is unnecessary to defend this thesis except by way of pointing out that the central idea in the traditional Far Eastern policy of the Anglo-Saxon powers throughout the last 40 years has always been a desire to see China develop into an independent, unified, modernized, and strong national state as the stabilizing force for the peace and prosperity of the entire Pacific area.

The American and British statesmen who formulated the “Open Door” policy in China at the turn of the century apparently had a clear conception of the dangers of an international war which was certain to come on the Asiatic continent and in the Pacific area if and when the sovereignty and the territorial and administrative integrity of China could not be preserved. They saw clearly that the principle of equality of economic opportunity was dependent upon the political independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China. They saw clearly that the door of China could be kept open only by an independent, sovereign state of China with a modern government sufficiently stable and effective to protect the rights and interests not only of China herself, but also of all nations having friendly relations with her.

This fundamental concept seems to have consciously motivated and inspired all successive stages in the development of the “Open Door” policy in China, from the John Hay notes of 1899–1900 down to the Nine-Power Treaty and the other treaties of the Washington Conference of 1921–1922. Because a weak, disorganized, and backward China would always be a temptation to the territorial designs of aggressive powers and therefore constitute a constant source of danger to the peace of the Far

East, the China policy of the Anglo-Saxon powers has consistently and consciously aimed at the setting up of an international arrangement which should provide to China “the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.”

Viewed in the light of history, however, this policy has suffered from one fundamental and inherent weakness, namely, that it is essentially, in the words of Mr. Henry L. Stimson, “a covenant of self-denial among the signatory powers in the deliberate renunciation of any policy of aggression” in China. As there is no provision for effective sanctions against possible violations, the whole structure of Far Eastern peace breaks down whenever a strong and selfish power refuses to be bound by this “covenant of self-denial.” The history of the last 10 years clearly demonstrates that determined and premeditated aggression cannot be checked by voluntary pledges of self-denial and may at any moment break out, wreck the entire peace structure of the Pacific area, and endanger the peace and order of the whole world.

An independent, unified, modernized, and strong China is therefore an indispensable condition for an enduring peace in the Pacific area. A China strong enough to resist unprovoked aggression and defend her own territory and political independence—such a China can and will serve as the most reliable and effective guarantee of the peace and prosperity of the Far East.

Such a China will be able to keep her doors open to all nations seeking to trade with her on terms of equality and justice. Such a China will be able to participate fully in carrying out the greater “Open Door” policy proclaimed in the fourth and fifth articles of the Atlantic Charter, namely:

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic adjustment, and social security.

III

The third condition necessary for a durable peace in the Pacific area, I believe, is the restoration, strengthening and reinforcing of the international order for the Pacific area and for the world in general so that orderly international relationships may always prevail and recurrence of aggressive wars may no longer be possible. This newly restored international order must have overwhelming power for the enforcement of peace.

You will agree with me that during the years between the first and second world wars there actually existed an international order both for the Far East and for the larger world—a real world order founded on a series of highly idealistic international covenants, treaties, and agreements, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, the treaties of the Washington Conference, and the Pact of Paris. The peace structure in the Pacific area, which dates back to the earlier pronouncements on the

“Open Door” policy and which primarily centers around the Nine-Power Treaty and the other treaties of the Washington Conference—this international order of the Pacific area has been linked with the larger world order by the Covenant of the League and the Pact of Paris.

The events of the last 10 years have proved beyond any doubt that there was a fundamental weakness common to the general international order and the Far Eastern peace structure. Neither had the power or force to enforce its own peace and order. That international order was a reality as long as it was not subjected to any severe test by determined and forcible violation. It became “sham and pretense” when it was challenged and was found powerless to enforce its own law and order.

The moral of the tragic events of the last decade should be plain to all. The moral is that peace must presuppose an effectively maintained order or rule of law; and that law and order do not mean the absence of force, but, on the contrary, are always dependent upon some effective form of organized power for their maintenance and enforcement. The moral, in short, is that peace must have power to enforce itself. Without this essential element of enforcement, all law and order are empty words.

Therefore, the new world order which we want to see set up as the necessary condition or precondition for a durable peace in the Pacific area, or in any other part of the earth, must be a “League to Enforce Peace”—it must be, in the words of President A. Lawrence Lowell, “some kind of international organization based upon the principle of a threat of overwhelming power to prevent aggressive war.” This new world order must command a sufficient amount of organized force to support its law and judgment, and thereby effectively to enforce peace. Its provisions for economic and military sanctions against all possible violations of peace and order must be so clear and so unmistakable that no evasion of responsibility will be possible and that both aid to outraged victims and penalty to the aggressors will not be unduly delayed.

In the above discussion I have purposely stressed the idea of “overwhelming power or force” for the enforcement of peace and order. The old idea of “balance of power” seems now untenable, because a balance of power can be easily upset by a slight preponderance of force or a new combination of forces on any one side. The peace of the community, both nationally and internationally, can be maintained only when the organized force of the whole community is placed overwhelmingly on the side of the law and the public safety.

I want, therefore, a new world order which will devote its first efforts to the organization of the postwar world for the effective enforcement of international peace and order. All other ornamental things such as intellectual co-operation or technical co-operation can wait. First things must come first.

What has been outlined above seems to conform in general to the plan of peace contained in the sixth, seventh, and eighth articles of the Atlantic Charter, which hopes “to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries.” I am particularly interested in the eighth article, which proposes that it is essential to disarm those “nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers.” I am sure that my

government and people will heartily support the disarming of Japan as one of the necessary factors in the maintenance and enforcement of peace in the Pacific area.

And I am also in hearty support of the idea expressed in the eighth article of the Atlantic Charter that “they will aid and encourage all other practical measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.”

But I venture to suggest that the most practical measure to lighten the burden of armaments and to establish lasting peace in the world is not through “the abandonment of the use of force,” but through pooling and organizing the overwhelming forces of the peace-loving peoples for the sole purpose of enforcing the peace and collective security of the world.

Chapter 25

Speech Before the Economic Club of New York

Mr. President, Your Excellencies, Members and guests of the Economic Club of New York:

Nearly 2 years ago, on May 9, 1940, the Economic Club of New York did me the great honor of inviting me to address your annual dinner in this same hall. It was just 1 month after Hitler had invaded Denmark and Norway by air, sea and land. On that occasion I spoke to you on the thesis that the war in Europe and the war in China were merely two phases of one and the same war—the Second World War, which began not in September, 1939, but in September, 1931, when Japan first invaded Manchuria.

I said in effect: “The Second World War became inevitable when the post-war World Order was attacked and scrapped by the aggressive acts of Japan. In this world of ours, war as well as peace is indivisible. A world that could not give China peace and security, is a world in which no nation, great or small, can feel secure. And a civilization which cannot accord protection and security to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, three of the most civilized countries on the earth, is a civilization not worth preserving!”

You may recall that on that memorable night of May 9, 1940, as you left this hall and bought the midnight editions of the morning papers, you were again shocked by the news that Hitler’s panzer divisions had invaded Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg at 5:30 A.M. European Time!

A month later, Italy entered the war. Six weeks later, France capitulated. The battle of France was lost.

In September, 1940, Japan, Germany and Italy signed the Tripartite Pact of Alliance.

From June 22, 1940, when France signed the Armistice with Germany, to June 21, 1941, when Germany invaded Soviet Russia,—for a whole year, there were practically only two great powers left fighting the aggressors: there were only China

Chapter Note: *Cornell Papers*, March 16, 1942.

fighting Japan in Asia and the British Empire fighting Germany and Italy in Europe and Africa.

Then the tide began to turn. The German attack on Soviet Russia on June 21, 1941, and the heroic and successful resistance of the Russian army and people ever since, have radically changed the picture of the war in Europe.

But the Axis partners in aggression were rapidly moving in other parts of the world. A month after the German invasion into Russia, Japan was moving troops into southern Indo-China. On July 23, the Vichy regime accepted the Japanese demands for complete military occupation of French Indo-China, which, as the world soon realized, was to be made the base for Japanese invasions into Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines, and the Netherland East Indies.

On July 25, President Roosevelt, in the hope of effective warning Japan against further aggression in the Southern Pacific, issued an executive order freezing all Japanese assets in the United States. This step of economic embargo against Japan was followed by both the British Empire and the Netherland East Indies governments. All trade and shipping between Japan and these countries virtually completely ceased.

In August, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met somewhere in the Atlantic Ocean and on August 14 the "Atlantic Charter" was proclaimed to the world.

In the meantime, for many months, the Japanese Ambassador was carrying on "peace" conversations with your great Secretary of State. In November, Japan sent a special Ambassador to assist in the negotiations.

Under the cloak of these peace conversations, Japan's military rulers were actively preparing for a concerted surprise attack on the important Pacific outposts of the United States and the British Empire. This concerted attack came on December 7.

Within a few days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, more than a score of nations declared war against Japan, Germany and Italy. On January 1 and 2, 1942, a joint declaration was signed in Washington by the representatives of 26 United Nations.

The United Nations comprise the United States, nine countries of Central America and the Caribbean Sea, six members of the British Empire including India, the Soviet Union, China, the Netherlands, and seven other European nations whose territories have been overrun by the Axis powers.

By the terms of our joint declaration, the United Nations have solemnly pledged to employ our full resources, military or economic, in our common fight, and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

In the preamble of our joint declaration, the United Nations have signified their adherence to the common program of purposes and principles as embodied in the Atlantic Charter. It is not true that the Atlantic Charter is limited to the Atlantic area. These principles, said Mr. Cordell Hull on August 14, "are universal in their practical application."

China as the nation which has been fighting aggression for the longest time, has more than once reaffirmed her unflinching and unswerving faith in these principles and has, in the words of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, offered to the United Nations "all we are and all we have to stand with you until the Pacific and the whole world are freed from the curse of brute force and endless perfidy."

Let me take this opportunity to express the gratification of my government and my people in the historic fact that China is now no longer fighting alone but is fighting on the same side with 25 allied nations including three of the greatest powers in the world. Let me assure you that to us in China this is a great dream come true, a great faith tardily but at last fully vindicated!

But it has taken a long, long time for this dream to come true! China had had to fight alone for 2 years and 2 months before the European war broke out. She had had to fight alone for fully 4 years before the United States and the British Empire began to enforce a complete economic embargo against Japan. She had had to fight alone for 4 years and 5 months before the treacherous acts of Japan forced you and the other United Nations to declare war on her.

The faith of my people has now been vindicated. But victory is not yet in sight. But my people have not the slightest doubt about the ultimate and not too distant victory of our common fight against our common foes. Let me assure you that my people will not cease fighting until that ultimate victory is won. My people who have been fighting for over 4 years and a half single-handed, will never desert you and the other United Nations, but will work with you and fight with you until the coming of that day when, in the cheering words of Mr. Roosevelt, "the sun shines down once more upon a world where the weak will be safe and the strong will be just."

Chapter 26

China's Fighting Strength and Fighting Faith

*Address delivered at the Chamber of Commerce dinner
at East Orange, New Jersey, on March 11, 1942.*

My friends, I come to you in the midst of news reports most disheartening to all the United Nations. As President Roosevelt has warned us, “there is peril ahead for us all and sorrow for many.” The Prime Minister of Great Britain has also warned us that “many misfortunes, severe torturing losses, remorseless and gnawing anxieties lie before us.”

In this dark hour, I ask you to think of your old friend and new ally, China. In his recent broadcast to the Empire and to the Allied Nations, Prime Minister Churchill spoke of China's heroic and single-handed fight against the Japanese aggressor, and said “this should be a comfort and reassurance.” I too want you to think of China's heroic fight as “a comfort and reassurance.”

My people have been fighting Japanese aggression for 4 years and 8 months—longer than the Civil War in the United States, longer than the First World War. Indeed, Japanese invasion into China began over 10 years ago—it began in September, 1931. A peaceful and peace-loving people, caught ill-armed and ill-supplied with munitions, was at last forced to take up the fight for its independence and freedom, indeed, for its very existence.

In the first 15 months of the war, China lost all the important coast and river cities, all the modern centers of industry and manufacture, and all direct accesses to the sea. The Government lost over 90% of its revenue. Tens of millions of people were made homeless, jobless and penniless. War casualties were tremendous, and civilian suffering was terrific. Financial distress was extreme.

Yet, with no money, with very little modern equipment, and with no direct access to the sea, my people have fought on—for 56 long months!

Chapter Note: *China Monthly* 3, no. 5 (April 1942), 4–5.

You will ask me, how did you do it? What are the main factors which make up China's fighting power?

As we look back, we can see there are many factors which have enabled us to fight on so long and, on the whole, so well.

First, there is the factor of large space—large space to move about in, and large space “to trade for time.” After all these years of war, our enemy can scarcely claim to have effectively occupied 10% of Chinese territory.

Second, there is the factor of large numbers,—large population as actual and potential supply of man power. Because of our numerical superiority, our enemy has never been able to trap any large army. In all these 4 years and 8 months, you have never read of the surrender of any Chinese army. And the size of our army today is much greater than it was 4.5 years ago.

Thirdly, there is our age-long sense of national unity which is the result of our living together continuously for over 21 centuries in a unified empire life under one government, one system of codified law, and one system of uniform National Civil Service.

Fourthly, there is our capacity for hard work. Without modern tools, my people have built up thousands of miles of highways in the interior by hand labor,—in some cases, as in parts of the famous Burma Road, they literally “chiseled a road into the face of sheer mountainside with thousands of feet of canyon below.” And my people have moved thousands of tons of machinery and industrial equipment into the interior, most of this weight being carried on human backs and human shoulders!

And fifthly, there is the factor of friendly assistance by all our friends abroad,—assistance from Soviet Russia, the British Empire, the United States, and France before her collapse. Before December 8, 1941, this international aid had taken all forms “short of war.” From financial and material aid to China to effective economic embargo against Japan, these various forms of international assistance have been invaluable in strengthening our fighting power and morale.

But, above all these, and behind all these, there was another and the most essential factor, namely, China's patient and unflinching faith in the ultimate triumph of her just cause. From the very beginning, the leaders of China clearly realized and repeatedly warned the peace-loving nations that Japan's aggression in China, if unchecked, would surely result in wrecking the new international order then existing, and would sooner or later involve the whole world in a second world war. In those years of international complacency and isolationism, very few people took seriously our warning that Japan's war in China would surely develop into a second world conflagration, and that my people were in reality fighting the first battles of that world war.

But my people never doubted that the aggressive acts of our enemy would sooner or later force the British Empire and even the United States to fight on the side of China.

On October 1, 1937, in a speech at San Francisco, broadcast over the Columbia System, I said to my American friends:

In this world of ours, war as well as peace is indivisible. Any war that is fought on for a sufficiently long period will not fail to gradually involve many other nations into it. Neither neutrality nor pacifism will ever succeed in keeping you out of it. And the same stupidity of the militarists of an aggressor nation which forced you into the last war, will not be lacking to drag you into the present one.

On December 4, 1938, in a speech in New York City, I said again:

The final victory of China must depend upon two things: First, she must fight on, and she has no choice but to fight on; second, in her prolonged war, the time may come when the international situation may turn in her favor and against her enemy.

I have cited these words to show what I mean by China's fighting faith which has formed the backbone of her fighting morale. For a long time this faith was ridiculed by many as a day dream, as wishful thinking. Let me assure you that a wishful thinking becomes a living faith when millions of people are willing to fight and die for it.

China has had to fight for 2 years and 2 months before the European war broke out. She had to fight fully 4 years before the United States and the British Empire began to enforce a complete economic embargo against Japan. She has had to fight 4 years and 5 months before the treacherous acts of Japan forced you and the other Anglo-Saxon democracies to declare war on her.

The tide has now turned. The faith of my people has been vindicated. China is no longer fighting alone, but with 25 allies on her side. But victory is not yet in sight. A long and hard war still faces your nation, my nation, and all our allies. But we have not the slightest doubt about the ultimate and not too distant victory of our common fight against our common foes.

Let us, therefore, learn from China a little lesson of patience. Let us remember that this is the greatest war in all human history, which cannot be won in 3 months. Let us swerve not from our common faith, best expressed by Mr. Churchill the other day, that "the gigantic, overwhelming forces which now stand in the line with us in this world struggle for freedom...will be found pretty capable of squaring all accounts and setting all things right for a long time to come." Let us work together, work hard, but work with patience, for the coming of that day when, in the cheering words of Mr. Roosevelt, "the sun shines down once more upon a world where the weak will be safe and the strong will be just."

Chapter 27

Peace Has to Be Enforced

There is no denying that there was a kind of world order being built up after the First World War. As one who lived through those days of world agony and anguish, and as one who comes from a country greatly benefited by that postwar international order, I must solemnly testify that it was a real thing.

But, beginning with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the world reverted to international anarchy and the “law of the jungle.” The moral of this tragic historical lesson should be plain to all who can read: it is that peace must presuppose an effectively maintained order or rule of law; and that law and order do not mean the absence of force but are always dependent upon some effective form of organized force for their maintenance and enforcement. Peace, in short, must have power to enforce itself.

The League to Enforce Peace which was started in 1915 was the spiritual father of the League of Nations. This great movement was sponsored by men who understood human psychology and were wise enough not to indulge in impracticable utopian ideas. The plan was contained in four simple articles. Article I required “all justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiations” to be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment. Article II stipulated that “all other questions not settled by negotiation shall be submitted to a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.” The heart of the idea of the League to Enforce Peace lay in Article III: “The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their member that goes to war or commits acts of hostility against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.” Article IV provided for periodic conferences to formulate and codify rules of international law which shall govern in the decisions of the judicial tribunal.

President Lowell of Harvard, in telling in the *Atlantic Monthly* of August, 1940, the story of the League to Enforce Peace, had a moral for us in our present world crisis. He wanted all honest and unselfish people working for permanent peace on

Chapter Note: *Asia Magazine* XLII, no. 5 (May 1942), 263–266.

earth to reach a “unity of plan that will command general respect, and have some chance of popular adoption.” He warned us that “people seem to think that devising some new variant is adding to the wealth of expedients from which a choice may be made, whereas it is reducing the chance of agreement upon any effective policy.”

Although Dr. Lowell modestly regarded the League to Enforce Peace as a movement “which failed,” I am still inclined to think that the central idea of that movement—namely, “some kind of international organization based upon the principle of a threat of overwhelming power to prevent aggressive war”—was more practical and feasible than any other plan that has so far been suggested by our international-minded thinkers. This idea has never been given a fair trial. It was supposedly embodied in Article XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations, but the complacent Members of the League thought so little of the “sanctions” or were so fearful of them that the League never made preparations for the possible application of that Article to would-be aggressor states. When Article XVI was at long last invoked in 1935 in the case of Italian invasion into Ethiopia, the Italian delegate asked in the Assembly: “Why, in the Sino-Japanese conflict and in the Chaco affair, had there been no talk of sanctions?” And even in the Italian-Ethiopian conflict there was only application of a part of the economic sanctions, which were withdrawn as soon as the Ethiopian resistance had collapsed. There was no attempt, nor any serious thought, of applying effective military, naval or air force “to protect the Covenants of the League.” No wonder that the delegate from the Union of South Africa raised the question during the Assembly debate: “Did the fifty nations, when they solemnly bound themselves to collective action under the Covenant of the League, make the successful resistance of Ethiopia a condition precedent to the fulfillment of their collective obligation?” And the Right Honorable Anthony Eden frankly replied: “In our view it is only military action that could now produce this result [of reestablishing Ethiopia]. I cannot believe that, in present world conditions, such military action could be considered a possibility.” So sanctions were withdrawn and Ethiopia was abandoned.

In contrast to such a weak organization, the New World Order which we want to help set up after the present war must be a real “League to Enforce Peace.” Only such a League with overwhelming power to enforce law and order can avoid the mistakes and remedy the weaknesses of the old system of international order.

As one who not only was one of the first converts to the idea of a League to Enforce Peace, but also has been one of its philosophical defenders for exactly a quarter of a century, I now propose to consider some of its philosophical implications. My purpose is to try to break down some of the prejudices against the idea of force as an essential factor in the maintenance of peace and order. It is true that prejudices cannot be cleared up by argument or logic. But it is always possible that, by analyzing a prejudice into its elemental ingredients, one may convert the unconscious assumptions into conscious ideas and thereby make them open to thought and reasoning.

The most deep-rooted objections to the idea of enforcement of peace by overwhelming power have come from the religious pacifists, the advocates of “moral rearmament” and the believers in the doctrine of nonresistance. In the first days of

the movement for the League to Enforce Peace, some speaker coined the witticism that it had put "fist" in the pacifist. But many pacifists have continued to object to the "fist." To them, no real peace and order can be built upon a reliance on force or power.

Let us take the extreme doctrine of nonresistance, and see if its great teachers really meant to imply an absolute denial of the use of force or power. Parenthetically, I wish to confess that for many years I was a reasoned believer in the doctrine of nonresistance and wrote much both in prose and in verse about it. I was greatly attracted by the doctrine, first, as it was taught by the Chinese philosopher Lao Tze more than 500 years before Christ, and, later, as it was taught by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. In 1915, when the League to Enforce Peace was started, I was still a "nonresister." I too thought that any use of force or reliance on force must be incompatible with the doctrine of nonresistance. It took me many years to realize that, whatever the doctrine may mean, it was never intended to be a condemnation of all force or power. I began to understand that the doctrine of nonresistance can only mean either that nonresistance is under certain conditions an effective form of resistance, or that nonresistance is in reality the individual yielding the right of revenge to a higher and supposedly more impartial power. In neither case is there an absolute denial of power or force.

The first of these two interpretations came from my professor Dr. John Dewey, who, in 1916, wrote: "The nonresistance doctrine can mean only that, given certain conditions, passive resistance is a more effective means of resistance than overt resistance would be. Sarcasm may be more effective than a blow in subduing an adversary; a look more effective than sarcasm."

This view is amply borne out by the teaching of Lao Tze and his followers, who often explicitly maintain that the weak can conquer the strong and the soft can overcome the hard. Lao Tze frequently uses water as an illustration of the efficacy of nonresistance. "Nothing in the world is softer and more yielding than water. Yet those who can storm a stronghold cannot overcome water." "Because it resists not, it is therefore irresistible."

But the doctrine of nonresistance is capable of another interpretation. It can be interpreted to mean another way of saying "Vengeance belongeth to God." Both Lao Tze and Jesus were convinced of the existence and reality of a supreme power and a well-ordered universe under the rule of that power. That supreme power, Jesus called God, and Lao Tze called Tao, or the Way of Heaven. Instead of denying force, the doctrine of nonresistance assumes as its very foundation the reality of a supreme power or force. The real issue involved in this doctrine is not whether force is justifiable or condemnable, but whether "vengeance and recompense" should be carried out by the interested parties themselves or should be left with that higher and impartial power.

As Jesus describes that supreme power with such poetic appeal: "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? And one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear ye not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows." This faith in a world order wherein an omniscient and omnipotent power reigns supreme is the foundation of the teaching

“That ye resist not evil.” In such an order, there is no need for the individual to be his own judge and take the law unto himself. Thus Jesus taught his followers to pray: “Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven...for thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, forever.”

A more or less similar conception of a supreme order underlies the ancient Chinese doctrine of nonresistance. Lao Tze conceives of the universe as an order which seems to do nothing yet achieves everything. Thus says he: “It is the way of Heaven not to strive, but none the less to conquer; not to speak, but none the less to respond; not to beckon, yet things come of themselves... The Net of Heaven is wide; its meshes are coarse, but nothing slips through.”

Again he says: “There is always the Great Executioner who executes. To do this task for the Great Executioner is like doing chipping for the master-carpenter. He who does the master-carpenter’s chipping for him rarely escapes cutting his own hand.”

In these passages are set forth Lao Tze’s conception of a well-ordered universe wherein the Way of Heaven (which also means the law of nature) rules apparently indifferently and nonchalantly, but always effectively and absolutely. It is this faith in a universal order and in the power of the “Way of Heaven” embodied in that order which underlies Lao Tze’s teaching: “Requite injury with kindness.” “He who resists not is irresistible.”

It is, therefore, a mistake to think that the great teachers of nonresistance have intended that we should condemn all use of force. Under certain circumstances, passive resistance may prove a more effective force than physical violence. But under other circumstances even the great teacher of nonresistance did not hesitate to use force to drive the venders and money-changers out of the temple of God. And, behind all the sublime teaching of nonresistance, there is always the deep conviction that there exists a supreme power ruling over the universal order and that judgment and the execution of judgment (that is, vengeance and recompense) should be left with that supreme power.

When that conviction is weakened, when human suffering becomes so acute and widespread and that supreme power and divine justice seems so slow in manifesting itself, then men will cry out in despair, with the ancient Psalmist, “Lord, how long shall the wicked, how long shall the wicked triumph?... Who will rise for me against the evil-doers? Who will stand up for me against the workers of iniquity?”

All human progress in law and government, internally and internationally, is in a sense an imitation, however imperfect, of that supreme moral order implied in the doctrine of nonresistance, by creating on earth some higher power to which all interested parties in a dispute may resign their private and “natural” rights of redressing injury and administering rough justice by themselves. Thousands of years of political experience have taught mankind to accept the use of organized force for the establishment and maintenance of internal law and order as a matter of course. Shall we still allow our prejudices to blind us to the necessity of the use of organized force for the creation and preservation of peace and order internationally?

This discussion of the implications of the doctrine of nonresistance is intended to clear the way for a more positive conception of the nature of force and its place and

function in human society. The need for such a new conception of force was keenly felt in those years of the previous World War, and a number of thinkers and public men were compelled to give much serious thought and attention to the question. But the war was soon over and there came the era of exorbitant hopes and expectations. The last great war to end all wars had been fought and won. The problem of the nature and function of force seemed no longer pressing and was soon ignored and forgotten.

A quarter of a century passed away, and mankind is once more faced with the problem of force and how to deal with it. As I look over the political and philosophical writings of those thought-provoking years of the previous war, I have found not a few fruitful ideas which are aptly applicable to our own times.

John Dewey, writing early in 1916, proposed a very important theory of force and a theory of law based upon it. "What is force," asked Dewey, "and what are we going to do with it? This is the acute question of social philosophy in a world like that of today. A generation which has beheld the most stupendous manifestation of force in all history is not going to be content unless it has found some answer to the question this exhibition has stirred into being." How strikingly up to date these words of 25 years ago sound today!

Dewey's answer to this question begins with the observation that "Force figures in different roles. Sometimes it is energy; sometimes it is coercion or constraint; sometimes it is violence."

"Energy is power used with a eulogistic meaning; it is power of doing work, harnessed to accomplishment of ends. But it is force none the less—brute force if you please, and rationalized only by its results." Power or energy "denotes effective means of operation; ability or capacity to execute, to realize ends." "It means nothing but the sum of conditions available for bringing the desirable end into existence." "It is force by which we excavate subways and bridges, and travel and manufacture. It is force which is utilized in spoken argument or published book. Not to depend upon and utilize force is simply to be without a foothold in the real world."

"Exactly the same force running wild is called violence. The objection to violence is not that it involves the use of force, but that it is a waste of force: that it uses force idly or destructively."

"Energy becomes violence when it defeats or frustrates purpose instead of executing or realizing it. When the dynamite charge blows up human beings instead of rocks, when its outcome is waste instead of production, destruction instead of construction, we call it not energy, but violence."

"Coercive force occupies a middle place between power as energy and power as violence." "There are different centers of force and they go their ways independently. They come into conflict; they clash...two men...are driving opposite ways on the road and their vehicles collide. The subsequent waste in quarreling is as certain as the immediate waste in the smash-up. The rule that each shall turn to the right is a plan for organizing otherwise independent and potentially conflicting energies into a scheme which avoids waste, a scheme allowing a maximum utilization of energy. Such," says Dewey, "if I mistake not, is the true purport of all law."

The most important thing in this theory is that it completely ignores the conventional connotation and treats “force” as power or energy which achieves ends. It becomes violence only when it runs wild and results in waste or destruction. “No ends,” says Dewey, “are accomplished without the use of force... The criterion of value lies in the relative efficiency and economy of the expenditure of force as a means to an end.”

The other important contribution made by Dewey is his theory of law as the formulation of the conditions of the organization of force. Law and government are instrumentalities instituted to deal with a situation of “actual or potential conflict and resulting waste in the absence of some scheme for distributing the energies involved.” The same criterion of economy and efficiency holds here. “To use energy to make a man observe the rule of the road is a case of coercive force... When it is exercised to assure the means which are needed for the successful realization of ends, it is a case of constructive use of power.”

Dewey’s instrumentalistic conception of force and of law naturally led him to view with favor the idea of an international league to enforce peace. “If law or rule is simply a device for securing such a distribution of forces as keeps them from conflicting with one another, the discovery of a new social arrangement is the first step in substituting law for war.” “Unless pacifism puts its faith in constructive inventive intelligence instead of in an appeal to emotions and in exhortation, the disruptive unorganized forces of the world will continue to develop outbreaks of violence.”

“The passage of force under law occurs only when all the cards are on the table, when the objective facts which bring conflicts in their train are acknowledged, and when intelligence is used to devise mechanisms which will afford to the forces at work all the satisfaction that conditions permit.”

I have dug out of the now more or less forgotten writings of 25 years ago this simple and reasonable philosophy of force and of the organization of force (which is law). I believe that such a philosophy is badly needed as an intellectual aid to the popular understanding, appreciation and support of the idea of an international order based upon overwhelming force behind law. It will help us to realize that what is wrong with the international situation today is not that force prevails, but that force does not prevail. It will help us to understand that the real tragedy of mankind today is that the nations have never learned to use force effectively and efficiently, that a stupendous amount of power is being expended in most wasteful and destructive ways, and that force cannot prevail when it is not organized and directed towards some common beneficial end. It will help us to see that the real problem for the present and for the future is not to condemn force in toto, nor to despair of peace and order in the face of unprecedented violence and destruction, but rather to prepare world opinion for another and more intelligent “push” to organize the available power of the nations in such a manner as to avoid waste and destruction and insure maximum efficiency and economy in its expenditure. It will help us to realize that probably the most efficient and economical use of force in human society is to socialize and internationalize it—to place overwhelming force behind the maintenance of international peace and order.

Chapter 28

China, Too, Is Fighting to Defend a Way of Life

*Address delivered to the Radcliffe Club on March 23, 1942
at Washington D.C. Reprinted with accompanying Chinese
translation by Zhang Weilin in a pamphlet published
by Hu Shih Jimianguan (Taipei: 1972).*

I

The issue at stake, as far as the Western world and the Western civilization are concerned, is, therefore, despotism versus democracy: it is freedom versus oppression and peace versus the lust for conquest by brute force.

Now, the issue at stake in the Pacific is exactly the same issue which faces you in the Western world. It is the issue of the totalitarian way of life versus the democratic way of life: it is freedom and peace versus oppression and aggression.

Just as in the West the issue is focused on a conflict between Nazi Germany and the Western European and the Anglo-Saxon democracies so is the issue in the Pacific best symbolized by the conflict between Japan and China.

The conflict between China and Japan is basically a conflict between the way of freedom and peace and the way of despotic oppression and militaristic and imperialistic aggression.

The best way to understand this basic conflict in the Pacific is to remember these plain historical facts in contrast:

- (1) China discarded feudalism when she became a unified empire 21 centuries ago, whereas Japan was still at the height of a fully developed militaristic feudalism as late as the middle of the nineteenth century when Commodore Perry knocked on her doors.

Chapter Note: *Pamphlet* (San Francisco: The Grabhorn Press, July 1942), 17 pp.

- (2) China for 21 centuries has developed an almost classless social structure and has been governed by civilian officials selected through an open and competitive system of civil service examinations, whereas Japan has been governed at least for the last 800 years by a militaristic caste which has always occupied the unchallenged position of a ruling class.
- (3) China, even at the height of her power and glory, has never encouraged the arts of war and has always condemned wars and imperialistic expansion, whereas continental expansion and world conquest have long been the national ideals of militant Japan.

These contrasting historical facts are of the greatest significance in the life and civilization of China and Japan. They have shaped and moulded the national life and institutions of these two peoples. In short, they have made China a democratic and peaceful country, and Japan, a totalitarian and militaristic nation.

II

Let us have a look at historic China and see how it has worked out its free, democratic and peaceful ways of life.

China was unified into a great Empire in 221 B.C. Before the unification, there had been a long period when there existed many separate and independent states, some of which developed into great powers. It was during this period of separate and contending states, especially during the period from 600 to 200 B.C., that Chinese thought and culture attained their creative development and full flowering comparable to the Hellenic period of Western thought and civilization.

It is from this period of original and creative intellectual and philosophical development that China has derived the ideas and ideals of free, democratic and peaceful life. Of these philosophical foundations for a democratic China, I shall mention only a few.

First, there was the ideal of *laissez faire* (*wu wei*) as the highest form of government. Lao-tze and his followers taught that the best government is one whose presence is least felt by the people, and that the worst government is one which is feared by the people. "Follow nature. Nature does nothing, and yet there is nothing it does not accomplish."

Second, there was the ideal of universal peace taught by Mo Ti and the Mo School. Mo Ti condemned all wars and devoted his whole life to the teaching of the Will of God which he interpreted as Love for all men and peace among all nations.

Thirdly, there was the ideal of a classless society to be brought about through the infinite teachability of man. "Men," said Confucius, "are near one another by nature, but practice sets them apart. Only the wisest and the most idiotic cannot be changed." "With education, there is no class."

Fourthly, there was the ancient tradition of free speech and frank political criticism. A statesman of the eighth century B.C. is said to have laid down this wise dictum: "To gag the voice of the people is more dangerous than to dam the flow of a river. The wise manager of the river deepens its basin and facilitates its flow. The wise ruler of men encourages them to speak out freely." A little classic, the *Book of Filial Piety*, has this saying of Confucius: "If an Emperor has seven outspoken ministers, he could not lose his empire in spite of his misdeeds. If a prince of a feudal state has five outspoken ministers, he could not lose his state in spite of his misdeeds... Therefore, in the face of a wrong or unrighteousness, it is the duty of the son to oppose his father and the duty of the minister to oppose his sovereign."

Fifthly, there was the conscious recognition of the people as of the supreme importance in a state, and there was the scriptural justification of rebellion against tyrannical government. Mencius said: "The people are of the first importance; the state comes next; the ruler is the least important." "When a ruler treats his people like grass and dirt, then the people should regard him as a bandit and enemy." On such democratic and revolutionary grounds, Mencius held that the rebellion of the people against tyrannical government and even the killing of despotic rulers by the people were justifiable.

Sixthly, there was the ideal of equitable distribution of wealth in society. "He who rules a state," said Confucius, "should worry, not about the poverty of the people, but about the inequality in distribution. For with equitable distribution, there is no poverty."

These are some of the theoretical and philosophical foundations for a peaceful and democratic China. All these ideas and ideals have come down to us from the great thinkers of that first period of Chinese intellectual maturity before the third century B.C. My friend Dr. A. W. Hummel, Chief of the Division of Orientalia, the Library of Congress, in commenting on the democratic doctrines of Mencius, says: "The surprising thing is that these revolutionary utterances and many like them could survive through more than 20 centuries of monarchical rule, and that the classics containing them should have been used in the competitive civil service examinations for the selection of government officials."

Many of these philosophical ideals of the classical age have been put into practice and become institutionalized in the 21 centuries of unified empire life.

- (I) A huge unified empire has made peace a possibility and laissez faire a necessity. The Chinese empire of the second century B.C. was almost as big as China is today. To govern such a large empire without modern means of communication and transportation was no easy matter. The founders of the First Empire tried to govern it in a militaristic and totalitarian way and failed miserably. The Empire lasted only 15 years and was overthrown by a revolution. The Second or Han Empire lasted 400 years. The statesmen had learned from history and were determined to establish a reign of peace by gradually developing a permanent system of civilian government and by consciously practising the political philosophy of *wu wei* or laissez faire. There was a conscious attempt to let the people learn to enjoy the benefits of a unified empire life without undue interference by the government.

The system of civilian government and laissez faire policy, worked out during the long reign of the Han Empire, has been more or less continued by the later dynasties throughout the ages.

Peace and practical disarmament have been possible in a country comparatively free from the dangers of foreign invasion by strong and militaristic neighbors. Even the few disastrous invasions by the nomadic and warlike tribes from the North, never taught China the necessity of armament and militarization. Governmental policy, philosophy, religion and literature have conspired to condemn war and the arts of war.

Peace and laissez faire have been conducive to the development of individual freedom, local autonomy and self-government. There has grown up in China an inveterate tradition of political individualism almost anarchistic in its solicitous avoidance of governmental action and control.

This ideal is best expressed in the Chinese proverb:

“I begin to work at sun-rise.
I rest at sun-set.”

It is also best expressed in the famous song:

“Heaven is high;
The Emperor is far away.
I drill my own well and get my drink;
I plow my field and get my food.
What has the Emperor’s power to do with me!”

That is a free and democratic ideal possible only under a laissez faire policy of government.

- (II) With the early discarding of feudal society, there was abolished the institution of primogeniture throughout the Empire. It was a conscious policy of the statesmen of the Han Empire to encourage the division of big family estates equally among the male heirs. From titled nobility down to the plain merchant and farmer, it has become the accepted custom throughout the ages to divide the family property equally among the male heirs. “No great family can stand three generations of equal sub-division.” Twenty-one centuries of absence of feudalism and primogeniture have brought about an equalization of wealth and landed property and gradual democratization of the social structure.
- (III) Chinese society was further democratized through 20 centuries of civil service examinations. These examinations originated in the demand for men who knew the classical language of ancient China—the language of Confucius and Mencius which, though no longer spoken by the people, had become the necessary medium for empire communication and for all scholarly writings. As education gradually spread and as the system of civil service came to be more firmly established, the examinations were open to more and more people who were prepared to take them. In the course of time, the examinations became the only legitimate and the only respectable channel of civic advancement, through which sons of the poorest families could steadily rise to the highest offices in the empire. As the subject-matter of the examinations was, in later ages, largely confined to the “Four Books” of Confucianism, it was

possible for promising and ambitious youths of the poor and lowly homes to acquire a classical education and pass the examinations. The development of the civil service examinations was an institutional embodiment of the Confucianist ideal that “with education there is no class.”

- (IV) Just as China fought the battle of equality through the early abolition of primogeniture and through the system of open and competitive examinations for the civil service, so has she fought the battle of freedom through the peculiarly Chinese institution of censorial control of the government. The institution of Censors dates back to very ancient times when courageous ministers braved the wrath of despotic rulers by their outspoken advices. In later ages, the right of petition was enjoyed not only by the Censoria Tribunal, but by all officials above a certain rank. And there grew up a semi-religious tradition under which even the most notorious despots dared not subject the outspoken censors to severe punishments. Tolerance to outspoken censure has always been regarded as a supreme virtue of the ruler. And those great censors who lost their lives or suffered severe penalties at the hands of tyrannical rulers, were always honored and even deified by the nation as great heroes who championed the interests of the people against tyranny and misrule.
- (V) But the most important and most positive phase of China’s fight for freedom has been in her intellectual life and tradition. Independent thinking and courageous skepticism have always been the characteristics of the best periods of Chinese thought. Confucius, the sanest of Chinese thinkers, laid down this sagacious rule: “Learning without thinking leads to confusion; thinking without learning is perilous.” “Knowledge,” said Confucius, “is to know that you know and to know that you don’t know.”

It is this great tradition of reasonable skepticism which has made possible the free and critical spirit of Chinese thinking. Wang Chung, who lived in the first century A.D., boldly subjected all the religious and occult ideas and beliefs of his age to a highly scientific technique of philosophical criticism. This critical spirit was responsible for China’s gradual emancipation from the powerful medieval religions of Buddhism and Taoism. Even within the schools of Confucianism or Neo-Confucianism themselves, there was always much independent thinking and critical doubt. Textual criticism and “Higher” criticism of the Confucianist Canon were early developed and the scholars had little hesitation in rejecting a part or the whole of a highly venerated text as spurious or interpolated. This spirit of free criticism went so far that, by the last decades of the nineteenth century, there was hardly any major text of the Confucianist Canon that was accepted without serious questioning by the liberal scholars.

The same spirit of doubt and criticism has characterized all the social and political thinking of China during the last half of the century. Practically all the great leaders of Chinese thought of this period have been men who have studied the national cultural heritage critically and who have had the moral courage to subject every aspect of it to searching and unsparing criteria of doubt and criticism. Neither religion, nor the monarchy, nor the towering sages of the past, nor the institutions of marriage and the family, was too sacred to be critically examined in the light of their survival value in a new age and a new world.

It is important to note that this free and critical spirit in Chinese intellectual life is not imported but indigenous. Last year, when I deposited my father's unpublished manuscripts at the Library of Congress for safe keeping, I pointed out to the Library authorities that, on every page of the regulation note-books used by my father in an old-fashioned Chinese college about 80 years ago, there were printed in red these words:

“The student must first learn to approach the subject in a spirit of doubt... The philosopher Chang Tsai [1020–1077 A.D.] used to say: ‘If you can doubt at points where other people feel no impulse to doubt, then you are making progress.’”

It is this spirit of free criticism and doubt that has overthrown the dynasty and the monarchy, discarded the classical language as a tool of education and literature, and brought about a new age of political and social revolution and cultural renaissance in modern China.

III

How totally different is historic Japan!

Historic Japan has been totalitarian in political organization, slavishly credulous in intellectual life, militaristic in training, and imperialistic in aspiration.

The totalitarian and dictatorial form of government in historic Japan has been noted by both native and foreign observers. Sir George Sansom, the most sympathetic authority on Japanese history, says: “From 1615 or thereabouts Japan was ruled by a feudal oligarchy, which anticipated in many respects the methods of government used by modern totalitarian states. The distinguishing features were there, the rule of a self-constituted elite, the disabilities imposed upon certain classes, the restriction of personal liberty, the sumptuary laws, the monopolies, the censorship, the secret police and the doctrine that the individual exists for the state. When in 1868 this regime was overthrown, it was replaced not by a popular government, but by a powerful bureaucracy...which perpetuated the essential features of totalitarianism.”

Mr. Shiratori, former Japanese Ambassador to Rome, and one of the authors and signers of the Tripartite Alliance of September, 1940, goes even further than Sansom by saying that “totalitarianism has been the fundamental principle of Japan's national life for the past thirty centuries.”

It is therefore no mere historical accident that Japan readily and willingly becomes a partner of the European Axis Powers and regards that partnership as the “immutable policy” of the Empire.

Secondly, much has also been written about the slavish acceptance of authority and tradition in Japanese intellectual life. The historical scholar in Japan must not question such traditionally accepted myths as those of the divine descent of the Japanese dynasty and nobility, of the Sun Goddess, of the date of February 11, 660 B.C. as the founding of the Empire or of the three Sacred Treasures—the Mirror,

the Jewel, and the Sword—handed down by the gods. Many years ago, Professor Tetsujiro Inoue of the Imperial University of Tokyo, in one of his learned works, ventured to express the opinion that the Three Sacred Treasures at the Shrine of Ise might be of possibly disputable authenticity. For this mild expression of doubt, Dr. Inoue was persecuted for years, was turned out of the University, and was actually subjected to the physical violence of the enraged mob resulting in the loss of one of his eyes. No scholar came forward to defend him or his scientific doubt.

In such an atmosphere of authoritarian and mob control of the intellectual life, it is most natural that not only “dangerous thoughts” are rigorously prohibited, but all thinking is regarded as dangerous.

Thirdly, the same historical tradition also explains the ease and rapidity with which Japan has transformed herself into a first class militaristic power. It explains one of the greatest historical puzzles. The puzzle is why, of all the non-European nations, Japan alone has been successful in adopting and mastering the martial and militaristic aspects of Western civilization. Neither China, nor India, nor Persia, nor Korea, nor Annam, nor Siam, could do it. Japan alone was best qualified to undertake this rapid militarization because her ruling class, the *daimyo* and the *samurai*, had been educated, trained and imbued in the militaristic tradition, and because what a ruling class did was always eagerly emulated by the whole nation.

So it is again no mere historical accident that Japan of all the non-European nations has alone succeeded in becoming one of the greatest military powers within the short space of a few decades.

Fourthly, the same historical tradition also explains Japan’s “immutable policy” of imperialistic expansion. Continental expansion and world conquest have been the national ideal of Japan for all these 500 years.

Over 350 years ago, in 1590, Hideyoshi, the great military hero of medieval Japan, sent letters to Korea, China, the Philippines, the Liuchiu Islands and India, to inform them that he was embarking on a program of world conquest. I quote a few sentences from his letter to the King of Korea in the translation of Professor Yoshi Kuno:

“Hideyoshi, the Supreme Imperial Advisor of the Emperor of Japan, hereby addresses His Excellency the King of Korea... Although I was born to a family of low rank, my mother conceived me immediately after she had dreamed that the Sun had entered into her bosom. A Physiognomist interpreted this dream and predicted that I was destined to extend my authority to all parts of the world where the sun shines... Because I was born with so great a destiny which was revealed by this omen, those who have fostered feelings of enmity and opposition have been crushed and destroyed. Whenever and against whomever I have waged war, the victory has always been mine. The lands and districts invaded by me have always been conquered. Now our empire has entered upon a period of peace and prosperity... I am not willing to spend the remaining years of my life in the land of my birth. According to my idea, the nation that I would create should not be separated by mountains and seas, but should include them all. In starting my conquest, I planned that our forces should proceed to China and compel the people there to adopt our customs and manners. Then that vast country, consisting of more than four hundred provinces, would enjoy our imperial protection and benevolence for millions of years to come... You, King of Korea, are hereby instructed to join us at the head of all your fighting men when we proceed to China...”

When he received no satisfactory reply from Korea, Hideyoshi sent an army of 305,000 men across the sea to invade China through Korea early in 1592. This war of unprovoked invasion lasted 7 years and was ended only after the death of Hideyoshi himself.

At the outset of his campaign, Hideyoshi worked out a timetable in which his army was to conquer Korea before the end of May 1592, and to occupy Peking, the capital of China, before the end of the year. In 1594, the Japanese Imperial Court would be removed to Peking where the Emperor would be enthroned as the Emperor of the newly created empire. Hideyoshi would then establish himself at Ningpo, China. After that his military leaders would then proceed to carry the military campaign into India and other Asiatic countries.

The timetable of Hideyoshi was not carried out, but he has become the idol and ideal of the Japanese nation all these 350 years. What has happened during these decades and what has happened during these last few months on the Asiatic continent and in the Pacific are not historical accidents. They are the authentic echoes of the spirit of Hideyoshi.

This authoritarian, slavishly credulous, militaristic, and fantastically imperialistic Japan is "our honorable enemy," against whom China has been fighting for the last 5 years, and against whom and her European partners in aggression, the United Nations representing four-fifths of mankind are now waging a common war to the finish.

IV

Out of these totally different historical backgrounds, there have grown up two fundamentally opposite ways of life. The free, democratic and peaceful ways of my people are now dangerously threatened by the totalitarian, oppressive and militaristic ways of Japan.

China is fighting Japan, in the first place, because Japan is not only reviving in this modern age the cult of emperor-worship, is not only actually restoring the monarchy in parts of China, but is solemnly undertaking on herself the "divine mission" of imposing her emperor-worship and her totalitarianism on the continent of Asia and the whole world.

China is fighting Japan, in the second place, because my people, who have always regarded doubt as a virtue and criticism as a right, do not wish to be dominated by a people who condemn all thinking as dangerous.

And lastly, China is fighting Japan, because my people who have always loved peace and condemned war, cannot afford to live under the yoke of a people who have always glorified wars and always dreamed of world conquest.

Chapter 29

To Win and Keep the Peace

Naturally we are all deeply interested in the future, in the outcome of the present war and of the peace that will follow. We are all confident that the United Nations will come out completely victorious in our common war against our common enemies. But we are also interested in the kind of peace, the kind of future world, that will come after this war.

Will this war be really the last war that will end all wars? Or will it end as all past wars ended—only to break out again with ever-increasing brutality and deadliness?

Will the new world after the war be nearer to our heart's desire and worthy of all the great sacrifices of mankind? Or, will all our work, hardship, sacrifice and suffering be once more in vain?

The objectives for which we are fighting have been clearly stated by the great leaders of the United Nations. They are summarized in the eight principles of the “Atlantic Charter” which, as President Roosevelt said on February 23, 1942, “applies not only to the parts of the world that border the Atlantic, but to the whole world.”

These principles of the Atlantic Charter are:

- (1) No territorial or other aggrandizement.
- (2) No territorial changes that do not accord to the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.
- (3) Self-determination of all peoples as to the form of government under which they will live; and restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.
- (4) Access by all nations, on equal terms, to the trade and raw materials of the world needed for their economic prosperity.
- (5) Collaboration of all nations in the economic fields to secure improved labor conditions and social security.

Chapter Note: *The Peabody Reflector* 15, no. 11 (December 1942), 406–408.

- (6) Establishment of “a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.”
- (7) Freedom of the seas.
- (8) Ultimate abandonment of the use of force by all nations; and, “pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security,” the disarmament of those nations “which threaten or may threaten aggression outside their frontiers.”

In a joint declaration signed on January 1, 1942, the 26 “United Nations” have signified their subscription to this common program of purposes and principles.

Such, then, are the accepted objectives of your country, my country, and our associates in our common fight.

The question that is now uppermost in our mind, is, How much assurance is there for the realization of these great principles? Will they be mutilated as the great principles of Woodrow Wilson were mutilated at the Peace Conference? Will the disarming of the aggressors, for example, be more successful than the disarming of Germany after the last war? Will the peace, which is to afford general security to all nations be more effective and more enduring than the League of Nations?

We all have a right to ask these questions. The young men who are already in the fighting forces, or are being called to the services; the men and women who are working in the war industries, and the men and women who are making all forms of sacrifices for victory,—all these have a right to ask these questions, and are actually asking them.

Can our faith in these principles be given some measure of reassurance?

No man can satisfactorily answer these questions or satisfactorily reassure us in our faith in these great objectives. The kind of peace that will follow the war, and the kind of “new order” that will be created, will entirely depend upon the vision, the wisdom, the effort which the leaders of the nations can apply to the task of making the peace, and upon the intelligent support which those leaders will receive from their peoples.

In other words, the future will be what the leaders and the peoples of the world can make of it.

But, as a student of history, I would like to speculate on the future possibilities of these peace objectives in the light of the historical lessons of the last world war. I believe that a study of the causes which were responsible for the failure of the Wilsonian program of peace may help us to form some idea of the possibilities of success in the realization of the Roosevelt-Churchill program of world peace.

From this historical view, I have formed my personal belief that we have a better chance to win a just and effective peace this time than the last time. My opinion is based on the fact that some of the historical causes which defeated Wilson and his idealistic peace program fortunately either no longer exist today or exist only in much diminished force.

In the first place, there are no aggressor states among the allied and associated nations on our side.

You will recall that the group of Allied Powers which fought Germany in the last war, included Japan and Tsarist Russia. It was too unholy an alliance to be a fertile soil for Wilsonian idealism. It was after the March (1917) Revolution in Russia that Wilson felt more at ease in deciding to associate with the Allied Nations in the war.

In this respect, the international alignment in the present war is much more clearly and rationally defined. All the aggressor states have now flocked together by ideological affinity, and the 28 United Nations on the whole can be classed as a group of peaceful and peace-loving nations, eager to co-operate to bring about a just and durable peace.

In the second place, there exist among the United Nations no secret treaties of territorial aggrandizement or division of spoils.

The last war began as a purely old-fashioned war of power politics and only at very late stages took on some idealistic coloring under the impact of Wilsonian influence. This new conversion came so late that many secret treaties of intrigue, bribery, and division of spoils had long been concluded among the Allied Powers. It was those secret treaties which later caused so much trouble for Wilson both at Paris and in America. The Wilson program of idealistic peace was mutilated and wrecked largely by these secret treaties.

In this respect, the Second World War presents a much more favorable outlook for the future. The present war has from the very beginning assumed the general character of a clearly defined fight for national freedom against wanton aggression. From the British and French pledges to Poland and Greece in 1939, the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the United Nations Declaration of 1942, to the Soviet-British treaty of May, 1942, there have been no secret treaties of bribery or territorial aggrandizement concluded among the countries which now form the United Nations. The absence of secret treaties and the existence of such open and idealistic declarations as the Atlantic Charter, I believe, will greatly enhance the chances of success of idealistic and constructive statesmanship in the peace-making after this war.

In the third place, I believe the world has learned much in these terrible years, and may be more ready to recognize the need for a better and more effective peace.

The world at large in 1919 certainly was not quite ready to understand and accept the Wilson principles. The armistice of November, 1918, came so unexpectedly early that even the best minds were not fully prepared for the great task ahead. Many nations,—the neutrals and even some of the allies and associates in the war,—had not been severely touched by the evil effects of the war. The radio had not come; the airplane was still a novel and ineffective weapon; the great space of the oceans still gave ample protection to several continents. Many peoples still thought that it was possible to keep out of wars, however gigantic they might be. Neutrality and isolation were still considered possible. And to many people, Wilsonianism appeared shockingly aggressive in trying to interfere in world politics.

In this respect, we have learned better—at least we should have learned better in these years.

There are now practically no neutral countries left in Europe or anywhere else. The most peaceful and most peace-loving countries have been ruthlessly invaded and conquered by the aggressors. The greatest oceans no longer afford protection to the formerly isolated nations. The most powerful nation in the world,—the United States,—has been attacked and has suffered unprecedented defeats.

All these have brought about a new and more realistic way of thinking on world affairs. President Roosevelt, in his speech of December 9, 1941, has put it most forcefully:

“It is our obligation to our dead—it is our sacred obligation to their children and our children—that we must never forget what we have learned.

“And what we all have learned is this:

“There is no such thing as security for any nation—or any individual—in a world ruled by the principles of gangsterism.

“There is no such thing as impregnable defense against powerful aggressors who sneak up in the dark and strike without warning.

“We have learned that our ocean-girt hemisphere is not immune from severe attack—that we cannot measure our safety in terms of miles on any map.”

Full realization of such undeniable facts should inevitably lead to the conviction that the world has not been made safe for democracy, not even for the most powerful of the democracies, and that there is real necessity for the effective establishment of “a peace that will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries.” Such psychological preparedness will probably increase with the progress of the war and may pave the way for the statesmen who are to “win the peace” for all of us and our children.

These, then, are some of the historical lessons which have given me personally some ground for a more hopeful outlook regarding the possibilities of realizing the great program of future peace as outlined in the Atlantic Charter. For these reasons, I believe that the United Nations have a better chance to win the peace this time than the last time.

But, I must warn you, the task is tremendous and over-optimism may be unwarranted. Much remains to be done by all of us in order to prepare ourselves and our fellowmen for the great task ahead.

Let me warn you, if we wish to win the peace after this war, much clear thinking will be necessary. For there will surely be a great deal of prejudice for us to help to break down and there will be a great deal of loose and irresponsible thinking for us to help combat.

Let me give you an example of the kind of prejudiced and loose thinking which has paralyzed and will continue to paralyze all effective efforts in constructive international planning. I refer to the deep-rooted prejudice against the use of “force” as the necessary element for the enforcement of peace and order.

You have no doubt heard this prejudice expressed in various forms. Fundamentally it is this: that force is something essentially evil, something to be avoided as incompatible with any new and higher order of international relationship.

I say this is a prejudice and a form of loose thinking, because it is entirely based upon an unfortunate association of the word “force.”

A quarter of a century ago, John Dewey, the great American philosopher, wrote: "No ends are accomplished without the use of force." "It is force by which we excavate subways and bridges, and travel and manufacture." Substitute the word "power" for "force," and these sentences will sound fine. And substitute the word "energy" for "force," and they even sound scientific!

Dewey points out that "force" figures in different roles: "sometimes it is energy; sometimes it is coercion or constraint; sometimes it is violence." Force becomes violence only when it runs wild, is not directed to constructive ends, and is therefore wasted. When force is organized as a public instrumentality to deal with actual or potential conflict of forces, it becomes the cornerstone of law and government, of peace and order.

The best example of the use of organized coercive force for a common and constructive end is the traffic lights at your street corners. These mechanically controlled red and green lights which are not watched by policemen armed with pistols or machine guns are effectively obeyed because the people have learned to recognize that these mechanical devices are symbols of the law and public order and that the organized force of the community is behind them for their enforcement.

But because in a civilized society the actual resort to force is reduced to a minimum, the peace-loving and law-abiding citizens tend to lose sight of the important role of force in the maintenance of peace and order. They tend to forget that law, order and peace do not mean the absence of force, but, on the contrary, are always dependent upon some form of effectively organized power for their enforcement against possible violation by determined gangsters.

The international order set up after the last world war was probably good enough for the peaceful and peace-loving nations such as Denmark, Switzerland, China and the United States. But it was not good enough for the premeditated and determined aggressor states such as Japan, Italy and Germany. That international order became "sham and pretense" as soon as it was challenged by those armed aggressors and was found powerless to enforce its own law and order.

Professor Douglas Johnson, the noted geographer who had served as an expert with the American Peace Delegation in Paris in 1919, declared in a recent public statement that he saw no hope that any of the schemes of international peace would "ever bring durable peace so long as each of them lacks that one vital element to make it practically effective."

"What is the missing element?" he asks. "It is the element of force,—force to maintain just territorial and economic settlements against attacks by violence for selfish ends,—force to implement agreements to outlaw war, restraining the nation that battles in defiance of its most sacred pledges,—force to compel resort to peaceful methods of settling disputes,—force to assure acceptance of decisions reached through orderly procedures mutually agreed upon,—force to prevent armed conquest of a neighbor's lands,—and force to give all nations that security and confidence which is the essential prerequisite to general disarmament."

With this view, I am in complete agreement. The new world order which we want to see set up after this terrible war must be a "League to Enforce Peace." It must be an international organization based upon the principle of a threat of

overwhelming power to prevent aggressive wars. It must command a sufficient amount of internationally organized and internationally supported force for the effective enforcement of its own law and judgement.

In short, we want a new world order which will devote its first efforts to the organization of the economic and military power of the post-war world for the effective enforcement of international peace and order. All other ornamental things such as “international intellectual co-operation” can wait. First things must come first.

I was very happy, therefore, to read the Memorial Day speech of your Under Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, in which he declared that after this war, the United Nations should undertake “the maintenance of an international police power” until a permanent system of general security is fully established. Such a statement of policy by a responsible official of the American Government, I am sure, will be supported by all peace-loving nations.

But, let me warn you, there will be strong opposition to such proposals as “an international police power” or “a league to enforce peace.” Much of the opposition will surely be forthcoming from well-meaning pacifists with strong prejudices against the use of force as a necessary means for the enforcement of peace...

We must learn to think that there is nothing essentially evil in force which is but another name for the power or energy necessary for doing work or achieving ends; that force is only an instrument which, if properly controlled and directed, can become the very cornerstone of justice and order; and that all law, all peace and order, internal or international, are empty words if they cannot be effectively enforced by the organized power of the community. We must remember these wise words uttered by the French philosopher Pascal almost 300 years ago:

Justice without force is impotent.

Force without justice is tyrannical.

We must, therefore, combine justice with force.

Chapter 30

Asia and the Universal World Order

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What kind of world order does Asia want? What problems does Asia expect this world order to solve? What benefits, national, international, continental, and worldwide, does Asia hope to derive from its establishment? What contributions can the peoples of Asia make to the future well-being and civilization under it?

No one can answer these questions in behalf of Asia as a whole. What I have to say here barely scratches the surface of some of these questions and only represents the thinking of an individual Asiatic with some training in thinking internationally. Needless to add that my conclusions are predicated on the conviction that the United Nations will completely win the war and therefore will be in a position to win the peace.

I

The first and greatest concern of Asia and of mankind, after this terrible war, will be security and order. Without some satisfactory solution of this primordial problem, all other problems of freedom, justice, economic well-being, and cultural advancement cannot be successfully tackled.

The first problem, therefore, is the establishment of a world order which will afford to all nations some effective form of collective security and will aim at making aggressive wars impossible. In the words of the Atlantic Charter, this world order should “afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries.”

Chapter Note: *Contemporary China* II, no. 15 (December 14, 1942), pp. 1–4.

It now seems fairly generally agreed by the thinking public the world over that any jural international order to be set up after this war must have an internationally organized and internationally supported force for the effective maintenance and enforcement of peace, order, and law. Mankind must learn from the history of internal political development the plain lesson that government begins with the police power, that is, the power of enforcing public order and safety. Just as private individuals have learned to resign to their internal government their "natural right" to possess arms and to take justice in their own hands, so nations must now learn to rely more and more upon an international order for the effective maintenance of collective security. Recent history has brought home to us the painful truth that, in this modern world of ours, no nation, however powerful, can single-handedly defend itself against determined armed aggression by powerful aggressor states; that international law and solemnly pledged treaties can no longer protect the peaceful peace-loving states from aggressive wars; that no geographical isolation can afford such protection; and that, just as war has become global, so must mankind seek peace by means of a worldwide system of general security.

Pacifists, religious or philosophical, need not be scared by the concept of international police power for collective security. It does not necessarily mean the policing of Germany by Anglo-American troops, or the policing of Japan by Chinese, Russian, and American soldiers. The concept of collective security, as I understand it, merely means the organizing of the economic and military power of the nations under definite and unmistakable terms of arrangement for the explicit purpose of preventing a possible outbreak of aggressive invasion and war. It means the setting up of machinery with clearly defined duties and responsibilities for the possible application of economic sanctions against would-be aggressor states in whatever corner of the globe. And it means the pooling and distribution of the international police force for the effective implementation of the economic sanctions against aggression.

Let us take the Covenant of the League of Nations as an illustration. It is my firm belief that if the member-states of the League had from the start worked out and set up international machineries for the possible carrying out of effective economic sanctions, such as oil embargo, arms embargo, mineral and metal embargo against conceivable sources of aggression, if such procedure had been worked out and such machineries of control had been set up, the would-be aggressors would have been fore-warned and the catastrophic war might have been indefinitely postponed and possibly averted. Unfortunately, the League wasted 20 years without ever working out a procedure and setting up the necessary machinery for the possible invocation of Articles 10, 15, and 16 of the League Covenant. So when aggression came as it did to China in 1931, to Abyssinia in 1935, to Spain in 1936, to Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938, the League was caught totally unprepared and the aggressors carried the day.

Therefore I strongly advocate that the framers of the next peace should seek the advices of such geological and mineralogical experts as Sir Thomas Holland of Britain and Professor C. K. Leith of the United States in working out detailed plans for the effective control of minerals and metals as an essential part of future

economic sanctions against aggression. The United Nations control more than three-quarters of the world's strategic mineral and metal resources and should have no hesitation to convert this source of international contention into an efficacious weapon of collective security.

As to the military aspects of this question, it is only needful to point out that when the war is won by the United Nations, they will surely have complete control of the sea power of the world, and that it should not be difficult to work out some satisfactory scheme of converting an adequate portion of that overwhelming power into a police force of our new world order.

The concept of international police and collective security, in short, merely means that the time has come for the community of civilized nations to think seriously about some kind of a joint police department to regulate traffic, to control fires, and to deal with crime. That is practically all there is to it.

What is necessary for us to emphasize now is the platitudinous fact that law and order, national or international, do not mean the absence of force, but are always dependent upon some form of organized force for their effective enforcement. Any attempt to set up a jural order of the nations without some overwhelming force to back its own law and judgment will inevitably be scrapped in face of determined armed aggression. "Justice without force," said Pascal almost 300 years ago, "is impotent. Force without justice is tyrannical. We must, therefore, combine justice with force."

II

When the war is over, Asia will have about a dozen free and independent states: The Soviet Union, China, Japan, the Korean Republic, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, Thailand, the Commonwealth of India, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. With the exception of Japan, all these Asiatic states are peaceful and peace-loving states. The deep-rooted pacifistic tradition of China, India, and Korea cannot be doubted, and that tradition will grow in a new world wherein aggressive wars will be placed under control through the establishment of a system of collective security. The Moslem states have had a martial tradition; but in a new world order wherein the old imperialism of the European powers will be dead or rapidly disappearing, there is ample ground for hope that the Moslem world will be an important power for peace and continental solidarity. And the truly fundamental change in Russian foreign policy brought about since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 has marked the Soviet Union as one of the great pacifist powers and one of the earliest advocates of collective security. The recently published Soviet-British Treaty of May 26, 1942, furnishes the best proof that the U.S.S.R. will remain one of the greatest stabilizing powers in our new world order.

A few problems, however, should be satisfactorily solved before the Asiatic states can settle down to enjoy "the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries."

The most urgent of these will be the disarming of Japan. Some necessary steps will be undertaken by the United Nations during the period of "prolonged armistice." These steps will most probably include the surrender of the remaining Japanese navy, air force, and artillery; the international control of the mandated islands; the destruction of Japanese naval bases and fortifications as well as the evacuation of Japanese forces from all occupied territories on the continent of Asia and in the Pacific Islands.

All these steps are in the direction of disarming Japan. The most necessary step, however, will be the discrediting of the militaristic caste and the militaristic policy by the final defeat of her army and navy and the destruction of their remaining equipment. This explosion of the myth of the invincibility of Japanese arms will go very far toward a psychological disarmament.

Equally important will be the early establishment of an effective system of collective security in the postwar world. An international control of the mandated groups of islands and the organization and distribution of an international police in Asia and the Pacific Area, I believe, will have the desired effect of discouraging the rearming of Japan.

Effective international control of strategical minerals and metals as an integral part of the system of collective security will be another method for the prevention of Japanese rearmament.

The basic deficiency of Japan in minerals and metals needed for her industries must be considered as a most important factor in any future scheme of collective security. A scientific and judicious control of the sale to Japan of iron, steel, scraps, petroleum, antimony, aluminum, chromite, lead, nickel, manganese, tin, tungsten, and zinc may in time result in converting her "militaristic-industrial system" into an industrial system for the production of goods for peacetime consumption and for the economic well-being of her people. Such an international control of raw materials, I believe, can most effectively assist in the disarming of those "nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers."

In short, I believe that the disarming of Japan can be best achieved by the defeat of Japanese arms, the discrediting of her militaristic tradition, the establishing of an international scheme of general security, and a judicious and efficient system of metal and mineral control as a part of the machinery for the enforcement of peace.

Another problem of continental and world importance is the relationship between China and Soviet Russia. Japan's aggressions in Manchuria since 1931 have turned the attention of the Soviet Union to the Far East, brought hundreds of thousands of her troops to the Maritime Provinces and Siberia, and thereby made her once more a dominating power on the Pacific. Before this war is over, she will in all probability be forced to fight a great and difficult war in the Far East against Japan, and on the side of China, the United States, and Canada.

Even long before Russia's heroic resistance turned the tide of the war in its European theatre, the U.S.S.R. had already been extending her helping hand to China throughout the 5 years of our war with Japan. This friendly assistance has been given to China without any condition of territorial concession, ideological

surrender, or political interference. The only form of repayment has been a barter payment in Chinese goods and materials needed by Russia. Such friendly relations will surely develop into closer ties when Russia and China will be fighting the common enemy in Asia.

It is my sincere hope that the time will soon come when China and the Soviet Union may work shoulder to shoulder not only in fighting a common foe, but in all times to come. With a common frontier extending nearly 5,000 miles, China and Russia should work out a permanent scheme of peace, non-aggression, mutual assistance, and general security, somewhat along the same lines as the latest British-Soviet Treaty. The historic example of 3,500 miles of undefended common frontier between Canada and the United States can be emulated by China and Russia to our mutual benefit. The peace and prosperity of Asia demand such a mutual understanding between these two great countries which comprise three-quarters of the continent.

III

What of the future of democratic development in Asia?

It is my firm belief that two great historical events, namely, the defeat of Japan, Germany, and Italy by the United Nations and the establishment of a new world order capable of effective enforcement of peace and general security, will greatly inspire and aid the spread and development of democratic institutions in Asia. In this new world, China, the first non-European country to discard the monarchy, to establish a republican form of government, and to work out its own constitutional development, will undoubtedly continue her democratic evolution along the main lines laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The U.S.S.R., which has definitely come to the side of the democracies, will continue her political evolution in the direction of a great socialistic republic as outlined in her democratic constitution of 1936, and her influence will undoubtedly continue to be felt throughout Europe and Asia. The people of India, who have had the valuable experience of active political agitation and organization during the last quarter of a century, will be able to work out some form of federation under a democratic constitution. The Moslem world, following the successful experiments of modern Turkey, may also work out its own form of constitutional development. Even Japan, under such favorable conditions, may yet surprise the world by developing a more modern and democratic type of constitutional monarchy.

All these democratic tendencies, I repeat, will be greatly aided and strengthened by the victory of the United Nations in the present war and by the successful establishment of a world system of collective security. Both of these historical conditions are necessary for the revival and revitalization of Asia's faith in the democratic ideals and institutions.

For, we must remember, the faith of the people of Asia in the democratic form of government has been greatly shaken in the last quarter of a century. For many decades

prior to 1917, liberals of Asia had been accustomed to believe that representative constitutional democracy was unquestionably the most perfect form of government ever invented by the political genius of man. The first violent attack on democracy came with the Communist Revolution in Russia. It was held by the advocates of the dictatorship of the proletariat that representative democratic government was the political concomitant of economic capitalism and should be smashed together with all other vestiges of bourgeois rule.

Then came the equally violent attacks on democratic government from the extreme Rightist Reaction, from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. These new advocates of totalitarian dictatorships would shout to us that democracy is the decadent form of government, and that the democratic nations are decadent peoples doomed to be dominated by the more vigorous super-races. "The goddess of Liberty," said Mussolini in March 1923, "is dead and her body is putrescent."

These vehement attacks on democratic ideals and institutions, whether from the Left or the Right, were carried out by the most aggressive weapon of propaganda. Through what Hitler describes as the technique of "thousand-fold repetition of the most simple ideas," this anti-democratic propaganda was able gradually to undermine the faith of thousands of people in representative democratic government. It has certainly succeeded in converting the Japanese people among whom I have heard professed "liberals" tell me that the Anglo-Saxon people had become decadent and their political institutions hopelessly antiquated. And, I must confess, this propaganda has also made many converts in other Asiatic countries including my own.

Such repercussions are quite natural and understandable. These wavering Asiatics, being human, cannot help sometimes mistaking glamorous military efficiency and success as evidences of possible soundness in social organization and political philosophy.

Any one of my generation who can vividly recall the wonderfully thrilling and stirring experience on receiving the news of the last Armistice of November, 1918, and who has watched the great emotional, intellectual, social, and political upheavals in the subsequent months, can readily agree with me that a crushing defeat of Germany, Japan, and Italy by the United Nations in this war will surely have the electrifying effect of reviving and revitalizing Asia's faith in democracy. Such a final victory of the United Nations would completely nullify the evil effects of the anti-democratic propaganda of the last 25 years, and would transform and revolutionize the thought and imagination, and the whole social and political outlook of millions upon millions of people in Asia.

But the other historical condition—the successful establishment of "a wider and permanent system of general security"—is equally necessary as a prerequisite for the peaceful development of democratic institutions in the Asiatic countries. Woodrow Wilson is eternally right in laying down the great dictum that the world must be made safe for democracy. The great tragedy of the last 20 years has been that the world had not been made safe for the peaceful and peace-loving democracies. A world that cannot afford security and peace to Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Czechoslovakia, is a world in which the most powerful democracies,

France, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the United States, cannot possibly feel safe.

The early history of mankind, both in the East and in the West, has taught us that ancient democratic states could not survive powerful foreign aggression. It was no historical accident that the first modern development of democratic institutions took place in the British Isles protected for centuries by the English Channel and the English Navy from continental invasion. Nor was it mere historical accident that the second and more important development of democratic government on an unprecedented continental scale took place in North America protected by the two greatest oceans. A comparison between the history of the American Republic and the French Republic during the last 150 years will convince us of the tremendous importance of the factor of security from aggression as an essential condition for the peaceful and continuous development of democratic life and institutions.

If, therefore, we are really desirous to see democratic ideals spread and prevail in the postwar world, we must make our new world order so effective that it shall be able to make the world safe for democracy. The world must not forget that the splendid military resistance of Soviet Russia during the past year has been made possible by tremendous sacrifice and postponement of internal social, economic, and political progress. Nor must we forget that the Constitutional Convention which was to convene on November 12, 1936, to ratify the final draft of a democratic constitution of the Republic of China has been postponed for 6 years because of the threat of Japanese aggression and war.

Whatever universal world order may be set up after this war, therefore, must devote its very first labors to the organization of the economic and military power of the nations for the effective maintenance and enforcement of peace, justice, and orderly relationships throughout the world. It must create the necessary condition for one of the Four Freedoms, the freedom from fear of aggression, without which the other three freedoms will have no leg to stand on.

I firmly believe that when the Asiatic nations, including Japan, are thus assured of the freedom from fear of aggression under a system of collective security, they will steadily develop their own forms of democratic government and society. The revolutionizing effect of the military defeat of the aggressors on the social and political thinking of the peoples of Asia will then be strengthened and perpetuated by the more positive conditions of general security under which the nations will be enabled to work out their own problems of social, economic, and political reconstruction in peace without fear of external interference and without the necessity of squandering preponderate amounts of national income on preparations for defense and war. A quarter of a century of general peace and security will see the flowering and fruition of democratic ideas and institutions throughout the continent of Asia.

Some people seem to be troubled by the thought that the absence of high percentage of literacy among the peoples of Asia may be a great hindrance to the development of democratic institutions. I believe that with peace and with modern technological improvement, it is not impossible for the nations of Asia to eliminate illiteracy in the near future. Japan did it in 50 years, and Soviet Russia has done it in 20 years. China can do it in even less time. But mere literacy without freedom in

education and thought will merely qualify a people to be the willing victims of controlled propaganda. The future of Asiatic democracy will, therefore, depend on the spread and progress, not of mere literary education, but of freedom of thought and higher education.

From other quarters the fear has been expressed that the centuries of colonial and semi-colonial status of many peoples of Asia must have made it difficult for them to develop into free and democratic nations. The real fact is that a people who have long been denied freedom are more anxious to acquire and enjoy it. When Ibsen was asked why he sent his son to Russia and not to America, the great Norwegian liberal and prophet replied: "Because the Russian people have no freedom and therefore better appreciate it." It is over 150 years since Jeremy Bentham published his pamphlet *Emancipate Your Colonies!* The time has now come to put his idea into execution. The best way to emancipate the colonies is to give them freedom which is the best schoolmaster of freedom itself.

Other pessimistic thinkers hold that the economic poverty of the peoples of Asia may be another and more fundamental impediment to the development of democratic institutions. I have heard that rich men may not enter the Kingdom of Heaven but I have failed to see why poverty should disqualify a people from creating their own Kingdom on Earth. And I believe the program of economic reconstruction as envisaged in the Atlantic Charter and in the master lease-lend agreements recently concluded between the United States and the beneficiary nations will go very far in the alleviation of economic suffering and the betterment of general economic conditions in the postwar world. But these and other equally absorbing problems I prefer to leave to more competent savants to discuss.

Chapter 31

Foundations of Friendship Between the Chinese and the Americans

Address at the Annual Meeting of the Immigrants, Protective League, Chicago, April 12, 1944.

I gladly join the members and friends of the Immigrants' Protective League in celebrating the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws by the Congress of the United States. All Chinese people, here and elsewhere, will gladly join with you in this celebration and in expressing to members of the present Congress our warm and deep appreciation for this action. The repeal of the Exclusion Laws means the removal of the last, but not the least, impediment to the friendship between the peoples of our two countries.

Nearly 40 years ago as a young lad of 14 or 15, I witnessed the Chinese boycott of American goods as an act of retaliation against the American exclusion of the Chinese. I cite this long-forgotten boycott to show how serious the situation was at one time. The exclusion law has always mystified my people, because it came from a people most friendly to China. It could have had more serious effects on the relationship between our two peoples if our people had not always had confidence that the people of the United States would surely some day do us justice and remove and repair this dangerously fractured link in the historic chain of Sino-American friendship.

Now that this rusty link is removed and a historical wrong is redressed, it is worth while to re-examine the foundations on which the friendship between our two peoples has rested during all these years. Such an examination might give us new inspiration to rededicate ourselves to the task of further strengthening these foundations of our friendship.

Sino-American friendship has rested upon three great foundation stones:

1. One hundred years of nonaggressive and friendly policy on the part of the United States government toward China.

Chapter Note: *The Social Service Review* XVIII, no. 2 (June 1944), 141–144.

2. A century of American missionary work in China.
3. Three-quarters of a century of the educating of Chinese students in American universities and colleges.

China's political relationship with the European powers during the last 100 years, as you all know, has not been happy. But her relationship with the United States has been most friendly from the very beginning. Chinese soon began to see that here was a great Western nation which had no territorial or political designs on her and which desired only the right to trade in China. From the very beginning, the American policy was one which was later described as "the Open Door Policy."

As the United States became more and more powerful and as her voice carried more weight in the family of nations, this friendly and disinterested attitude toward China was more than once responsible for rescuing China from grave dangers of imperialistic aggression in the hands of the other Great Powers. It was John Hay whose strong notes on the Open Door Policy in China saved China from the great international crisis at the turn of the century. It was the Washington Conference of 1921–1922 which helped China to get back the former German possessions in Shantung which Japan had taken at the beginning of World War I in 1914. It was the treaties of the Washington Conference which gave the Far East a decade of peace, until that peace was ruthlessly broken by Japan's aggression in Manchuria in 1931.

And, whatever you may have heard said about the small amount of American aid to China during her 7 years of war against Japan, I can say to you that it is the American government and the American people who have been the main support of our courage and fighting morale throughout these terrible years of a devastating war.

This—the 100 years of nonaggressive and pro-Chinese policy—has been the first foundation stone of Sino-American friendship.

The second foundation stone of friendship has been the missionary movement. I am no Christian and have not been a student in any missionary school, but I can testify that the work of the American educational and medical missionaries in China has played a very important part in bringing about the mutual understanding and friendship between our two nations. Numerically, the American missionaries probably did not make many converts. Their main contribution has been in the direction of educational and medical service—in opening schools and hospitals, in translating Western books—religious, scientific, and educational works—into Chinese and in agitating for social and political reforms. They were the pioneers who brought to China not only new ideas and ideals but, more important still, a new way of looking at Chinese life and Chinese civilization.

Together with their British and Canadian fellow-workers, the American missionaries have done very good pioneer work in many fields of social and educational reform. The education of women, the education of the deaf and the blind, the introduction of modern medicine, hospitals, and nursing—these are a few of their most notable achievements.

Many of the missionary schools have in more recent decades developed into universities and colleges of good standing. The greatest of these—the Peking Union

Medical College, which has been taken over by the Rockefeller Foundation, but whose name testifies to its missionary origin—has been largely responsible for the training of young Chinese leaders in modern medicine, surgery, graduate nursing, and medical research.

The missionary movement has not been a one-way traffic. The missionaries came into close contact with Chinese civilization and played their part as interpreters of China to their friends at home. When they returned to America, either on furlough or after retirement, they became the spokesmen for the Chinese people and their cultural life. Their voice was heard by the hundreds of churches whose membership had supported the missionary schools or hospitals. Think of the thousands of Yale men who have given financial support to the Yale-in-China throughout the years and decades.

Think of the University of Pennsylvania graduates who have supported Dr. McCracken in his medical work all these years. The missionary in this way has served as the bridge between two peoples—the benefactors and their beneficiaries. This bridge has been one of friendship, service, and understanding.

The third foundation stone of Sino-American friendship has been the many thousands of Chinese students educated in the American universities and colleges.

About the middle of the last century there was only one Chinese graduate of an American university, Mr. Yung Wing, of Yale University. But for the last 30 years there has been an annual average of 1,500 Chinese students in your colleges and universities.

The substantial increase in the number of Chinese students began with the return of the “surplus” portion of the Boxer Indemnity by the American government in 1908. The return of the Indemnity was made without any conditions. But President Theodore Roosevelt, in his message to Congress, expressed a hope that the money might be used in educating young Chinese in the American universities. The Chinese government adopted the suggestion and pledged the use of the returned funds for the education of our students in this country. The first group of Indemnity Scholarship students, 47 in number, came in 1909. From 1909 to 1941, for over 30 years, the average number of such students has been about 75 each year: about 2,500 in 32 years.

As usual in such cases of student migration, these scholarship students have brought many other students to this country—students who came either on other government scholarships or on their own private means. Thus the total number of students has been, year after year, many times the number of scholarship students. Take an average of 1,500 students a year, and you get the amazing figure of more than 15,000 students who have spent from 3 to 4 years in the American universities. Many of these men and women are now in the prime of life and are holding positions of leadership in all walks of life in China. The scholastic standing of the Chinese students has been systematically studied in some of your leading institutions. At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for example, a statistical study has been made of the scholastic standing of all national groups of students at the institution since its founding, and the result of this study has shown that the Chinese students as a national group have attained the highest average throughout the years. At Bryn Mawr College, some years ago, a Chinese student, Miss Ting, broke all

records of scholastic excellence in the history of the college; and when she was studying medicine at the University of Michigan, the dean of the Medical School one day made a speech to the medical students, in which he is reported to have said: "The students of the Medical School can be divided into two classes: Class A, Miss Ting; and Class B, the rest of you!"

Such vast numbers of selected young Chinese men and women doing excellent work in your best universities and colleges and carrying away high academic honors have served a purpose as valuable as that of the American missionary: they are the unofficial ambassadors of good will while they are in your midst, making the people of your college towns understand and appreciate the intellectual and moral capabilities of the Chinese youth; and when they return to China, they are the best "missionaries" and "salesmen" of American goods, tools, and machinery and the American ways of life. They—the 15,000 Chinese students from the American universities and colleges and research laboratories—have been the builders of the third and perhaps the strongest foundation of friendship between our two peoples.

But beneath these three great foundation stones of Sino-American friendship, there is something even more fundamental, which is the foundation of all foundations. That something is the sense of common humanity which 100 years of contact and association have enabled our two peoples to discover and appreciate in each other. We have found that we love the same things and laugh at the same jokes, that we have the same moral and spiritual standards and agree in the things we honor or despise. That is what I mean by our sense of common humanity.

Some of the guests at this luncheon may have noticed a young American soldier coming to visit me at the speakers' table and present me to his young bride. I cannot resist the temptation to tell you a story about this American youth as an illustration of the point I have been making.

This young soldier was once my chauffeur at the Chinese Embassy. His name is Donald C—; and he comes from a Chicago family of Scandinavian origin. He was with me for a little over a year. At the end of 1940, he came to tell me that he had to leave my service and go back to Chicago to finish his college education. "Mr. Ambassador," said he after we had bid each other goodbye, "I had never met any Chinese before coming to the Embassy. During this last year, I have learned much about your people. I want to tell you, in particular, how much I have learned from observing your cook and Mrs. Hu's maid. I have learned to entertain the greatest respect for both of them. If your people are all like these two, Mr. Ambassador, your people must be a very great people." My young Scandinavian-American friend has hit upon a great truth: he has discovered in a Common Man and a Common Woman of China something which his own people have always considered noble and great. He has found the true foundation of all international friendship and understanding.

Chapter 32

Maker of Modern China: The Story of Sun Yat-sen

One of the messages and articles commemorating 7 years of China's continuous resistance to aggression, with a foreword by H.E. Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo. Prepared by the London Office of the Chinese Ministry of Information.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen was born in a farming village in Hsiang Shan Hsien, in the Province of Kwangtung, in 1866—2 years after the ending of the great Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) and 222 years after the Manchus entered China and founded the Ching dynasty (1644).

He once said of himself: “I am a coolie and the son of a coolie. I was born with the poor, and I am still poor. My sympathies have always been with the struggling mass.”

When 12 years old, he went to Honolulu in 1879 to visit his emigrant elder brother, and was sent to a boys' school where, at the end of the third year, he was awarded the second prize in English grammar. He returned home in 1883. From 1884 to 1886, he studied at Queen's College, Hong Kong. It was in Hong Kong that he became a baptised Christian.

In 1886, he took up medicine under the American missionary surgeon, Dr. John A. Kerr, in Canton. When the new Medical School was established in Hong Kong in 1887, Sun Yat-sen was the first student to register. Here he studied for 5 years and was graduated in 1892 with a certificate of Proficiency in Medicine and Surgery.

He practiced medicine and surgery in Macao and then in Canton. But his professional career did not last long. For he had become interested in other and more important things. He had already become the leader of a secret movement for the reform and remaking of China.

Dr. Sun tells us that his revolutionary plans dated back to the year 1885 when China fought France and was defeated, resulting in the loss of Annam: “I resolved

Chapter Note: *Into the Eighth Year*, 1944, 17–23.

in that year that the Manchu regime must go and that a Chinese republic must be established.” He was then in his nineteenth year. From that time on, says he, “the school was my place of propoganda, and medicine my medium for entrance into the world.”

In 1893, on the eve of the first Sino-Japanese War, Dr. Sun made a visit to North China, and presented a memorandum to the Chinese statesman, Li Hung-chang. The memorandum is remarkable as a record of the young revolutionary’s early political ideas. In this paper, Dr. Sun formulated the four fundamental objectives of a modern state: (1) to enable man to exert his utmost capability; (2) to utilise land to its utmost fertility; (3) to use material nature to its utmost utility; and (4) to circulate goods with the utmost fluidity.

The next year (1894) war broke out between China and Japan. China was badly defeated; and the weakness of the old regime was clearly exposed to the whole nation and to the whole world.

Dr. Sun thought this was the best opportunity for the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. He went to Honolulu and founded the Hsing Chung Hui (Society for the Restoring of China). He returned to China early in 1895, and began to plot for an armed uprising and seizure of the city of Canton as a base of the Revolution. It was an elaborate plot, requiring half a year of preparation and involving hundreds of people. But it failed, and over 70 were arrested. Three were executed, including one of Dr. Sun’s intimate comrades. A price of 1,000 dollars was set on Sun’s person. He was only 29.

After his escape from Canton, Dr. Sun went to Japan, whence he proceeded to Honolulu and visited the United States for the first time. In September, 1896, Dr. Sun sailed from New York for England, arriving in London on October 1st.

On October 11th, 1896, Dr. Sun was kidnapped by officials of the Chinese Legation. He was imprisoned there for 12 days and it was undoubtedly the intention of the Chinese Government to smuggle him back to China to be executed as the arch-enemy of the Throne.

By winning the sympathy of an English servant in the Legation, Dr. Sun succeeded in sending a message to his English teacher and host, Dr. James Cantlie. Through the efforts of Dr. Cantlie, the story was published in a London newspaper, and the Chinese Legation immediately became the centre of newspaper reporters. The Secretary of the Legation had to admit the presence of an involuntary guest at the Legation! At the request of the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Sun was released on October 23rd.

This dramatic episode made his name known throughout the United Kingdom, Europe and America. It made him a world figure at the age of 30.

For 2 years (1896–1898) he remained in England and Europe. These years were most fruitful in the development of his political and social ideas. “What I saw and heard during those two years,” said Dr. Sun, “gave me much insight (into the situation in the West). I began to realise that, in spite of great achievements in wealth and military prowess, the great powers of Europe have not yet succeeded in providing the greatest happiness of the vast majority of the people; and that the reformers in these European countries were working hard for a new social revolution. This led my

thought toward a more fundamental solution of China's problems. I was, therefore, led to include the principle of the people's livelihood on the same level as the principles of nationalism and democracy. Thus were formulated my three principles."

It was about this time that he made a study of the socialistic literature of England and continental Europe. He was especially influenced by Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*. He never became a Single Taxer; but George's theories on the social origin of the rise of land value and the importance of public control of land left a permanent impression on his social teachings.

After leaving Europe in 1898, he returned to the East and resided in Japan for 2 years (1898-1900). He came into contact with the leaders of the popular parties of Japan.

China was then going through turbulent times. Japan, Russia, Germany, Britain, and France had seized important territories from China. The country was being mapped out into "spheres of influence" of imperialistic powers. There was much talk about the "partitioning of China."

The glamorous "one hundred days' reforms" came in 1898 and were swept away by the reactionary forces under the leadership of the ignorant Empress-Dowager. Then came the Boxer movement in 1900, which resulted in the armed intervention by the joint forces of eight foreign powers.

Dr. Sun saw in this situation his opportunity for another attempt to start his anti-monarchical revolution, which was launched in the autumn of 1900 at Canton and Huichow.

During the first years of the new century, thousands of Chinese students were flocking to Japan to study at her schools and universities. Dr. Sun found many of these mature students ready to listen to his teachings and follow his leadership. So in 1905, he founded in Tokyo the Chung-kuo Tung-meng Hui (The Chinese Society of Covenanters), with original members representing 17 of the 18 provinces of China. Each member must pledge under oath solemnly to carry out the terms of the covenant, to wit: (1) Drive away the Tartars; (2) Recover China for the Chinese; (3) Establish a Republic; (4) Equalise Ownership of Land.

From 1906 to 1911, at least 10 uprisings were started. (He counted only nine as under the direction of himself or the Party). Nine times they failed, each time costing the lives of many heroic martyrs. But the tenth uprising which broke out at Wuchang, opposite Hankow, on October 10th, 1911, finally succeeded. In the brief time of a month, 13 of the 18 provinces responded to the revolutionary call and declared their independence of the Manchu dynasty.

Dr. Sun was then in America and read the news of the Wuchang success in a morning paper at a small hotel in Denver, Colorado. He quietly travelled eastward to New York and thence to England and Europe, finally sailing from Marseilles in November and arriving in Shanghai on December 24th.

On December 29th, 1911, the Provisional Senate of the Republic met and, by a vote of 16 to 1, elected Sun Yat-sen Provisional President of the Republic. On New Year's Day, 1912, he was inaugurated President at Nanking.

Meanwhile, negotiations had been going on for a peaceful coming together of the provinces. The dynasty was no longer capable of making any resistance.

But a powerful Chinese politician, Yuan Shih-kai, was in command of a formidable army. The objective in the negotiations was to win over Yuan Shih-kai to the support of the Revolution.

On February 12th, the Throne abdicated, thus terminating 267 years of Manchu rule in China. On the 13th, Dr. Sun presented his resignation to the Provisional Senate. The next day, his resignation was accepted, and Yuan Shih-kai was elected Provisional President.

Dr. Sun was Provisional President only 45 days. His resignation was an act of self-sacrifice best symbolising his great patriotism and his Christian spirit.

Unfortunately, the man on whom Dr. Sun had placed his mantle, turned out to be reactionary and a traitor to the Republic.

In the next few years, a fierce struggle went on between Dr. Sun's newly re-organised party, the Kuomintang (The People's Party) and the reactionary forces under Yuan Shih-kai. The Kuomintang had an overwhelming majority in both Houses of the new Parliament elected in 1913. But the reaction had military and financial power on its side. The Kuomintang was dissolved by force, and finally the Parliament was dissolved by force. Dr. Sun went into exile in Japan, and Yuan Shih-kai soon made himself Emperor. All liberal parties united in fighting against this monarchical restoration. Yuan Shih-kai died a disappointed man on June 6th, 1916. But the dark forces he had released lived on after him and ran amok for a number of years to come.

For the next decade (1916–1925), Dr. Sun sometimes lived in Shanghai, devoting his time to studying and writing, but, on many occasions, he took an active part in revolutionary campaigns against the militaristic reaction. His successes were only intermittent and insignificant.

In 1924, he undertook a radical re-organisation of his party on the model of the Communist Party in Soviet Russia. This re-organisation, in the light of history was far more significant than his many political and military campaigns since the founding of the Republic. The important steps taken at that time included (1) the enlargement of the party membership by soliciting the enrolment of younger men and women throughout the country; (2) the formal admission of members of the Chinese Communist Party to active membership in the Kuomintang; (3) the employment of a number of Russian political and military advisers; (4) the revival of nationalism as the paramount issue aiming at the freeing of China from the historical shackles of the "unequal treaties" which the imperialistic powers had imposed on China for nearly a century; (5) the founding of the Whampoa Military Academy under the directorship of Chiang Kai-shek, for the training of new and ideologically inspired officers as a nucleus of a new Revolutionary Army.

None of these important measures had shown tangible results when Dr. Sun died in Peking on March 12th, 1925. But he had the satisfaction to read on his deathbed the cheering news that, in that very week, his armies under the lead of the young officers of the Whampoa Academy were scoring crushing victories over the reactionary forces. Two weeks after his death, the province of Kwangtung was entirely free from opposing forces, and thus became the consolidated base for the new Nationalist Revolution of which Dr. Sun had dreamed for years, but which did not succeed in unifying the nation until a few years after his death.

In 1918, Dr. Sun planned to write a series of books under the general scheme of "planning for National Reconstruction." His plan was interrupted by subsequent political activities, and only the following works were published: (1) *The Philosophy of Sun Wen* (1919); (2) *The First Step in Democracy* (which is a translation of an American text-book on parliamentary rules) (1919); (3) *The International Development of China* (1921)¹; (4) *An Outline of National Reconstruction for the National Government* (1924); (5) *Sixteen Lectures on San Min Chu I* (1924).

Dr. Sun's greatest contribution to Chinese nationalism lies in the great vigour and force of his personal leadership which revitalised the nationalistic consciousness of the Chinese people and made it the irresistible driving force, first against the alien rule of the Manchu dynasty, and later against foreign domination in China. He lived to see the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. But history will undoubtedly give him full credit for his part in the new nationalist movement which has made possible the political unification of China, the long and successful resistance to Japanese aggression, and, last but not least, the final abolition of the "unequal treaties" which was realised last year by the new treaties concluded between China and Great Britain and between China and the United States respectively.

It was fortunate for China and for the world that the movement of Chinese nationalism was led and guided by Dr. Sun whose Anglo-Saxon education, scientific training, and international outlook were all great assets in directing what might have been a destructive and explosive force into moderate and constructive channels.

Of the six lectures he had planned on the people's livelihood, only four were delivered. In the incomplete documents he has left us, there is not much in his economic programme which can be regarded as truly new. His contribution consists in his moderation and usual eclecticism. Although he was at one time willing to co-operate with the Communists, he was never converted to the Marxist theories of class struggle and materialistic interpretation of history. He had great faith in the power of the non-economic factors in history—the power of the mind, the will, and the ideas. Indeed his book, *The Philosophy of Sun Wen*, was published with the sub-title, "Psychological Reconstruction." He was never tired of preaching that a psychological and intellectual revolution must precede any important political and economic change. And the story of his life was the best proof of the validity of this faith.

A concise summary of his economic programme is found in his "Outline of National Reconstruction." It contains these:—

- (1) The government must provide for the four basic needs of the people: namely, food, clothing, housing, and locomotion.
- (2) Each hsien (county) government, inaugurating self-government, must first determine the value of all privately-owned land within its jurisdiction. The owners shall themselves report the land value, and the government shall assess taxes on the basis of the declared value. All subsequent rise in land value due to political improvement and social progress shall be considered as the public property of the people. (Note the influence of Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*).

¹ Recently published in this country on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of Information by Hutchinson & Co.

- (3) All “unearned increment” of land value, all products of public domain, all yield from the natural resources of the nation (such as mines, water-power, and forests), shall be the public property of the local governments, and shall be used for public enterprises and for public benefit.
- (4) When a local government is incapable of undertaking alone the developing of its natural resources, industries, or commercial enterprises, the central government shall give aid to secure the needed capital.
- (5) A plank not included in the “Outline” but often discussed in his lectures is the idea of “regulation of capital.” Dr. Sun never advocated the abolition of private enterprise or private capital. But capital must be subject to the proper regulation of the government in the interest of the people.

Throughout his whole life, Dr. Sun was essentially under the influence of the political thinking and political institutions of the Anglo-Saxon nations. The democratic ideas and practices of Switzerland and France also had great influence on him.

But he was always interested in two political institutions developed by the Chinese people throughout the ages. The first is the competitive examination system for the civil service. This he wished to preserve in a modernised form. The other is the system of censorial control over the government. This was a peculiarly Chinese institution by which the Chinese government created its own check and opposition, and which empowered a special branch of the government to censure and impeach the government, not excepting the Emperor himself and his family. This institution Dr. Sun also wished to preserve in his new constitution.

Therefore, Dr. Sun works out what he calls the five-power constitution, the five being executive, legislative, judiciary, examinational, and censorial control.

The examinational power means placing all civil service under the merit system. The power of censorial control means taking out of the traditional parliament those semi-judicial powers of interrogation, inquiry, public investigation and hearing, and impeachment, and making them into a separate and independent power of the government. It should also include the checking and auditing of all governmental accounts.

Dr. Sun had no use for the negative or laissez-faire theory of government. He wanted a government with tremendous powers to do big things for the nation and the people. He said that the fear of a powerful and effective government was due to a fundamental defect in political thinking—a lack of confidence in the power of the people to control a government when it becomes too powerful. This defect can be remedied by a proper conception of the difference between political sovereignty and administrative capability or efficiency. The government must have administrative capability to do things, but the people should have the sovereign power to control it. It is foolish to assert popular sovereignty at the expense of administrative capability. The objective of democratic control of the government, therefore, should not be to paralyse administrative effectiveness, but only to safeguard the people against possible abuse of power by the government.

Dr. Sun thinks that the safeguard lies in extending the political powers of the people. The people must have four political powers: (1) the power of voting at

the elections; (2) the power of recall (that is, recall of elected officers); (3) the power of initiative (that is, of initiating legislation); (4) the power of referendum (that is, having legislation referred back to the people). These institutions of "direct democracy" have been taken by Dr. Sun from Switzerland and such northwestern states of the U.S.A. as Oregon. Dr. Sun was confident that the full exercise of these four powers by the people in a constitutional democracy will insure against the danger of any government becoming too powerful for the safety and well-being of the people.

The tragic experiences of the early years of the Republic had modified the early optimistic enthusiasm of the Father of the Chinese Revolution and led him to work out his theory of the "Three Stages of National Reconstruction." The three stages are: (1) the military or revolutionary stage; (2) the tutelage or guardianship stage; and (3) the constitutional stage.

Any province which is fully unified and pacified shall immediately inaugurate its second stage of political tutelage. During the tutelage period, the government should dispatch trained and selected officials to assist the localities in achieving self-government. When a county has completed its population census, its land survey, its road-building programme, and when the people of the county have been sufficiently trained in the exercise of their fourfold political powers, such a county shall be declared to have attained the status of self-government, and shall henceforth elect its own executive and legislative officers.

Any province wherein all the counties have attained self-government shall inaugurate its constitutional government. When more than half of the total number of provinces have attained self-government, there shall be called the national assembly which shall decide upon a national constitution and proclaim it. Hereafter, the people shall hold the national election in accordance with the constitution. The provisional national government shall resign 3 months after the completion of the elections and transfer the administration to the popularly elected government.

The real enemies of the revolution and national reconstruction, says Dr. Sun, are psychological and philosophical. Experience had taught him that the greatest obstacle to a successful revolution in China was to be found in the proverbial philosophy of the Chinese people which holds that "to know is easy, but to act is difficult." Dr. Sun maintains that it is this traditional philosophy which has paralysed action and retarded progress.

To counteract this psychological defeatism, Dr. Sun proposes his own philosophy of life and action: "To know is difficult, but to act is easy." This apparently paradoxical dictum he tries to establish in his book, *The Philosophy of Sun Wen*.

He cites 10 groups of facts as proofs of his philosophy. To eat, for example, is easy; yet how many persons can claim to know all the scientific facts concerning the physiology of feeding and digestion and the chemistry of nutrition and dietetics? Does this lack of knowledge ever deter any one from the simple and necessary act of eating?

Similarly, it is exceedingly easy for everybody to spend money, but it is very difficult indeed even for the trained social scientist to grasp the subtleties and mysteries of that wonderful branch of knowledge called economics.

His other proofs include house-building, ship-building, electricity, and such early chemical industries as the making of soya-bean curd and the manufacture of porcelain. In all these, he points out that action often comes before knowledge and sometimes even without knowledge; that the task of knowing is necessarily confined to the few—the architect who plans the skyscraper or designs the ocean liner, or the inventor of the telephone or the wireless telegraphy, or the chemist who analyses the bean curd and theories about its nutritional value; and that, for the vast majority of people, action even in such difficult matters as modern ship-building is possible and easy if they will only follow the blueprints worked out by those who know.

All action becomes impossible only when people are frightened by the defeatist preachings of the false prophets “who fear what they ought not to fear, and who fear not what they ought to fear.” They teach that knowledge is easy whereas it is in fact not easy. And they fear that action is difficult whereas it is not difficult at all.

Dr. Sun’s philosophy of action, therefore, teaches “that most men can act even without knowledge, that they surely can act with the aid of knowledge, and that they will act better with the increasing knowledge which comes from the experience of action.” Follow leadership, and respect those who know. But do not let your adoration of knowledge deter you from the courage to act!