

Rebecca Jean Emigh, Dylan Riley & Patricia Ahmed

CHANGES IN CENSUSES FROM IMPERIALIST TO WELFARE STATES

How Societies and States Count

Changes in Censuses from Imperialist to Welfare States

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

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PART I

How Societies, States, and Their Interaction Affect Information Gathering

How do states and societies shape censuses? In the United States, it is common knowledge that censuses entail politics. Most censuses have been surrounded by political controversies over redistricting, privacy, sampling, and undercounting (e.g., Anderson and Fienberg 2000b:783; Choldin 1994:1, 5; Spencer 2010:A8). These debates create dismay among scientists and political commentators about the politicization of the census and calls for the renewed autonomy of the scientists at the US Census Bureau (Choldin 1994:3–4, 11–12, 237–238).

While there is no doubt that the census intersects with these visible political battles, there is a surprising consensus, from virtually opposite ends of the political spectrum, that the census also stems from the nefarious, but largely invisible, power of the bureaucratic state. For example, the debates over the 2010 US census suggested that right-wing Republicans in the US House of Representatives believed that the state controls society through the census. Some of them strongly criticized the 2010 census, claiming that its questions (other than the question about the number of people in the household specifically needed for legislative apportionment) invaded individuals' privacy, making it easier for the government to fine households or to abuse its power (Dinan 2009:n.p.; Editorial 2010:20P; Hooper 2010:4; Spencer 2010:A8; Weiner 2009; cf. Dinan 2012:n.p.).

Perhaps even more astonishing is that most academics—who generally tend toward the left on political and social issues—would agree with the overall thrust, even if not the details or politics, of right-wing Republicans' argument that the state gains extensive

knowledge through censuses that makes it easier to maintain power over society. The highly influential work of Foucault (1979:27) on "power-knowledge relations" implies that censuses are instruments of state control, shaping individuals' thoughts and actions, whether they realize it or not (e.g., Kertzer and Arel 2002:5–7). A benign variant of this view comes from the US Census Bureau (2010a:1) itself, which suggests that the census "affects our lives in ways we don't often realize." Its brochure reminds readers, that in addition to redistricting, the census is used to plan schools, roads, the production of commodities, and hospitals (US Census Bureau 2010a:1). These views represent variants of a "state-centered" perspective implying that states, not societies, influence censuses. In turn, these censuses affect society. Thus, the state-centered perspective suggests that states influence societies through censuses.

However, the extensive social mobilizing—in addition to partisan politics—that surrounds the US census seems to contradict this state-centered perspective. Some ethnic and national origin groups organized extensively to encourage their members to participate—or not—in the 2010 census (Abdulrahim 2009:A6; Ludden 2009; Watanabe 2009:A3). Lobbying by multiracial individuals, ethnic minorities, and groups representing them influenced the US Census Bureau's decision to allow individuals to check more than one race in the 2000 census (Perlmann and Waters 2002:13). Social influence may extend beyond this visible lobbying: just as the state-centered view points to the state's visible and invisible influence on the census, there may be fundamental and strong, but invisible, social forces that affect the census. Thus, there is a "society-centered" perspective analogous to the state-centered one, but the causal influence of states and societies is reversed. The "society-centered" perspective suggests that societies, not states, shape censuses. In turn, these censuses affect states. The society-centered perspective therefore suggests that societies influence states through censuses.

Of course since both state and social influences are apparent, both must have some effect. They may have differential influence in different contexts or they may interact in some way to produce censuses. These broad state and social influences on censuses, however, are not easy to examine by looking only at the United States in the present (or in any single case at a single point in time). The influences of state and social actors on censuses are not necessarily explicitly intentional, so actors may not be able to provide direct evidence about them. These influences may also have long-term causes and effects that are not understood by actors in the present or in the absence of temporal

information. Finally, in any given social setting, actors often take for granted how a particular institution, such as the census, works, which may be quite different in different societies. The United States, for example, is virtually unique in constitutionally mandating that the census apportions representation, so using the US census as a single example of state and social influences may be misleading.

Thus, we employ a historical and comparative method that analyzes censuses or census-like information in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy, starting in England about 1000 years ago. In Volume 1, we analyzed these developments up to the nineteenth century. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, censuses finally became taken for granted parts of the institutional landscape in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy. One common way of interpreting the rise of censuses is to treat them as outcomes of state formation, which also occurred during this period of time. This volume, drawing on the model developed in Volume 1, offers a different perspective. We suggest that censuses arose out of an interaction between bureaucracies and social interests. Censuses constituted public, official knowledge not where they were insulated from social pressures but rather where there was intense social and political interaction around them. During the period of time we examine here, we show how this interactive process came to be most developed in the United States, was relatively less developed in the United Kingdom, and was the least developed in Italy. Chapter 1 begins with a theoretical overview and ends with chapter summaries. Our empirical analyses begin in Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 1

States, Societies, and Censuses

To start, we review relevant work that explains the relations between the state, society, and science. These literatures were long dominated by state-centered perspectives, but they have recently taken a more interactionist turn. We then turn to summarizing the general theoretical model that we developed in Volume 1. We argue that it represents a fully interactive view of the way that societies and states affect censuses. Our model thus draws on the interactionist turn exhibited by the larger literature on states, societies, and science. However, we argue that we develop this interactive view much more fully than this previous literature.

From Society to the State in Contemporary Political Sociology

Until the 1980s, the dominant approach in political sociology used to analyze the relation between the state and society was society centered. This approach had Durkheimian, Marxist, and Weberian roots. Pluralists, following Durkheim (1958:45; [1893] 1984:171), suggested that the state arose either out of the needs of organized social groups or the division of labor. Pluralism sometimes suggested that the state did not even constitute a distinct institution (Dahl 1971:1–2; review in Mann 1993:46–57). Marxists had a more nuanced view. They developed an instrumentalist account of the state suggesting that the state was directly controlled by the dominant economic class and a structuralist one suggesting that the state guaranteed the overall conditions for dominant classes to exploit subordinate classes (Held and Krieger 1984:4; Lenin 1975:314; Marx and Engels [1932] 1972:187; Miliband 1970:56; Poulantzas 1969:70). The structuralist position explained state autonomy under capitalism as a consequence of the separation of economic exploitation and political domination.

However, Marxist accounts never fully theorized the state as an organization, and subsequent theorists used Weber's theory of bureaucracy to fill this gap (e.g., Therborn 2008:49–63). A more recent development, combining Weberian and rational choice theory, suggests that the state bargains with its society. Rulers seek to maximize revenue while negotiating with officials and taxpayers (Ardant 1975:164–172; Kiser and Schneider 1994:190; Levi 1988:1–4; Tilly 1990:102; Wilson 2011:1437–1438). Through this process, state administrations come to reflect the social structures they govern (review in Wilson 2011:1437–1438). All these theories suggest that societies shape states insofar as the theories derive features of states from social relations (productive or exchange relations, or power and resources more generally).

Despite the emergence of this combination of neo-Weberian and rational choice accounts, most neo-Weberian work has been decidedly state centered (Hintze 1975:215; Mann 1992:148; Skocpol 1979:14; 1985:7–8; reviews in Gorski 2003:3–10; Tilly 1990:5–16). These scholars followed Weber (1958:77–78) in defining the state by its means—its bureaucratic and infrastructural capacities—not its ends, suggesting that states might pursue a variety of ends not imposed by society, such as war making or economic development. The neo-Weberians did not ignore the relations between the state and society, but they analyzed them to understand the state and how it controlled its society (Migdal 1988:21–25).

These state capacities to penetrate society and to implement decisions determine a host of social, economic, and political outcomes (Evans 1995:10–12; Mann 1986:170; O'Donnell 1978:9–15; Slater 2008:253–254). State power or strength stems from a combination of autonomy from society and embeddedness within it (Evans 1995:12). Politicians were the ultimate source of political ideas, social priorities, and economic policies (review in Furner and Supple 1990:9). The participation, collaboration, cooperation, and trust of dense networks and organizations of social actors, as well as the transfers of information and resources they support, are also crucial to the success of states (Evans 1995:248–249; Hoffman and Norberg 1994:2–5; Lange 2003:374). Unsuccessful states are constrained or even dominated by their societies (Migdal 1988:33–39). Given this overall Weberian emphasis, the once influential Marxist focus on patterns of production and class relations and the pluralist focus on interest groups no longer predominate, but these social features are often seen as important characteristics that can weaken or strengthen states (reviews in Carroll 2009:558; Gorski 2003:3–10; Tilly 1990:5–16). Thus, though there are notable exceptions (Furner and Supple

1990:9; Mann 1986:22–28; Putnam 1993:9; Riley 2010:1–3), most works discussing the relationship between state and society, even the most society-centered perspectives such as Migdal's (1988:28–35, 40–41; 2001:22), generally analyze social influences (conceptualized as social organizations or social networks) to understand state capacity but are relatively uninterested in social dynamics per se. Indeed, the neo-Weberian literature so effectively brought the "state back in" (Skocpol 1985:3–4), that the social foundations of political struggle in their own right have been relatively neglected over the past several decades.

During the last two decades, a new cultural position challenged this neo-Weberian consensus. Many Weberians and Marxists hold that the state is the locus of a relative monopoly over the means of violence (Bourdieu 1999:58; Carroll 2009:555–556; Evans 1995:5). This "bellicist" tradition notes the close connection between war making and state making (reviews in Centeno 2002:11–20; Gorski 2003:5–10). Of course since Gramsci (1971:12) and Foucault (1979:7–24; 1980:142; Gorski 2003:166), it is common to argue that states, at least in the advanced capitalist world, exert their control more often through widespread, everyday cultural practices rooted in society (e.g., hegemony or knowledge) than by overt violence.

These influences, along with Weber's cultural writings and the cultural turn more generally, created interest in the cultural processes of the state (reviews in Carroll 2009:560–573; Loveman 2005:1653; Orloff 2005:201–202; Steinmetz 1999:19–29). States often exploit cultural, religious, and scientific institutions in society to enhance their power (Carroll 2006:168; Gorski 2003:15–22; Loveman 2005:1655). Nevertheless, state administrations do not merely reflect but also refract the societies they govern (Wilson 2011:1443).

Although the cultural turn coincided with a trend toward "bringing society back in" (Evans et al. 1985:347; Orloff 2005:207), in many ways, this work has been just as statist as the neo-Weberian literature. For example, although Foucault (1991:103–104; 2007:93–94) decentered the state by focusing on the diffuse nature of power and everyday practices of governmentality that sustain it, like the neo-Weberians, he also emphasized how state power is enhanced through its interaction with society (cf. Carroll 2009:561; Eyal and Buchholz 2010:130; Kerr 1999:175; Murdoch and Ward 1997:311; Power 2011:49; Rose et al. 2006:86–87). Thus, although ambiguous, Foucault's work has been open to a highly statist interpretation. Bourdieu (2012:14–15, 60, 228, 231, 326) is more openly statist, defining the state as having a relative monopoly over "legitimate physical and symbolic violence"

and claiming that it possesses great cultural power. Thus, the cultural turn has strengthened the statist approach by suggesting that states control the way social actors perceive the world.

States and Societies in the Sociology of Science

This state-centered bias of the cultural turn is also apparent in studies of science, knowledge, and technology (also called the sociology of science and knowledge, science and technology studies, the sociology of scientific knowledge, social studies of science). Before the 1990s, ethnomethodological and phenomenological perspectives that emphasized the local and contingent nature of knowledge production were influential in science studies, especially in micro studies of scientific work and talk in laboratories (Lynch 1988:71–72; Mukerji 1994:151–153; Shapin 1995:295–296, 305). However, since the 1990s, the focus of these studies expanded beyond formal scientific settings and the construction of knowledge within laboratories to understand the broader dimensions of public engagement with science and technology and the social role of intellectuals and scientists (Carroll 2009:582; Epstein 2008:166; Eyal and Buchholz 2010:128; Irwin 2008:583; Jasanoff 2004b:14; Schweber 2006:8). Durkheim and Foucault influenced the analyses of the interface between science, society, and the state at this macro level (Law 1986:1–3).

This macro perspective often subtly emphasizes the power of science and experts, and where these experts overlap with governmental officials, it also emphasizes the power of the state (cf. Eyal and Buchholz 2010:128). For example, actor-network theory emphasizes how scientists build their authority by positioning themselves in central positions of networks composed of other scientists, objects, and the general public (Callon 1986:196; Latour 1987:258–259; Law 1987:111; reviews in Epstein 2008:168–169; Lynch 1993:109–111; Sismondo 2008:16–17). Scientists work to assure that "actants" (anything that acts, biological or natural), arranged into networks, work together in a consistent way (Callon 1986:196; Latour 1987:258–259; reviews in Epstein 2008:168–169; Sismondo 2008:16–17). Scientists' control over science enhances their control over society (review in Epstein 2008:168–169). Thus, actor-network theory considers how knowledge is a combination of humans and materials, echoing Marx's dialectical theory of ideal and material forces. Similarly, "performativity," an outgrowth of actor-network theory, also emphasizes the power of experts, especially economists, to induce social reality to reflect

their own theories (Callon 1998:23, 30; MacKenzie 2004:305–306). Thus, ideas come from scientists, and social forces are mostly important in broadcasting the ideas. Another theoretical variant of actor-network theory, "co-production," suggests that natural and social orders are produced together, as scientists work with material objects (Jasanoff 2004a:2–6). This perspective acknowledges the social context that surrounds scientists, but it focuses on the role of scientists and experts.

Though there are important differences, actor-network theory and its variants have strong affinities with Foucauldian analyses of governmentality because both emphasize diffuse power held by actors and material objects (Carroll 2009:573; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006:213; Eyal and Buchholz 2010:129–130; Mukerji 1994:144–146; Murdoch and Ward 1997:310–312; Rose et al. 2006:93; Sánchez-Matamoros et al. 2005:185). The dialogue between actor-network theory and Foucault, when applied to social phenomena, again subtly emphasizes how formalized knowledge reinforces states' power when expert or scientific knowledge is adopted and deployed by states (Sánchez-Matamoros et al. 2005:185; e.g., Carroll 2006:20–27; Mukerji 1997:309–320; Murdoch and Ward 1997:310–313).

The analysis of classificatory schemes—censuses provide one example—is an important aspect of this new agenda focusing on the relationship between state, society, and science (Barnes et al. 1996:46–47; Bowker and Star 1999:1; Camic et al. 2011:2–3; Carroll 2009:561; de Santos 2009:468; Epstein 2007:282–283; 2008:166; Lynch 1993:112; Martin and Lynch 2009:246; Orloff 2005:223–224; Shapin 1995:303). Yet, much of this research also emphasizes the state's power to shape scientific categories and thus reinforces the statist trends within the state-society literature (Epstein 2007:278, 282–283). Similarly, the creation of standards and standardization has been linked more strongly to state than to social power (Timmermans and Epstein 2010:82–83). Of course, society is not ignored; recent science studies that look at the relationship between science, society, and the state necessarily examines social forces more explicitly than earlier studies that focused on scientific workplaces. Nevertheless, this body of work also subtly privileges state power.

In sum, our theoretical call for the equal consideration of state and social influences in the political sociology literature applies to the science studies literature as well. Our agenda redresses the current focus of these literatures on the power of the state over society. We now turn to our investigation of censuses, as we take them as one example of a phenomenon at the interface of science, the state, and society.

States, Societies, and Censuses

In Volume 1, we showed that during the early modern period, the purpose of collecting population information shifted slowly from fiscal extraction to demographic description. After the mid-nineteenth century, the purpose of censuses changed dramatically from description to intervention. Initially, states were concerned primarily with assessing resources with descriptive censuses. There was little sense that the governed themselves were changeable, so social intervention was not central to this form of governance or information gathering. In contrast, after the mid-nineteenth century, interventionist information gathering was linked to the concept of population—the idea that individuals could be combined into aggregates and analyzed with statistics (Curtis 2002:506–509; Foucault 1991:99–101; Loveman 2014:8, 25–26; Murdoch and Ward 1997:308–310; Rose et al. 2006:86–87; Scott 1995:202; Ventresca 1995:32). Thus, the population was a unit that could be altered through reflection and intervention (Buck 1982:29; Curtis 2002:506, 509; Foucault 1991:99; 2007:105–106; Higgs 2004a:20; Sánchez-Matamoros et al. 2005:184; Singer and Weir 2008:59). The state justified its governance in terms of how it defined the welfare, needs, wants, and interests of this population, so statistics became important rhetorical sources that supported these definitions (Carroll 2009:561; Foucault 1991:99–100; Rose et al. 2006:87; review in Higgs 2004a:20).

A well-developed state-centered literature, not surprisingly, explains the shift from descriptive to interventionist censuses as a product of state actions. From this perspective, censuses are linked to broad projects of social control either directly through policing or indirectly through the provision of welfare (Foucault 1978:139–141; 1979:28; 1991:96, 98–99, 102; 2007:274–275; Hannah 2000:8; review in Higgs 2005:3–4). States can use information for planning, administration, and controlling their societies (e.g., Dandeker 1990:12–13; Loveman 2005:1657, 1660–1661, 1678; Rule 1973:13–14; Skocpol and Rueschemeyer 1996:4–6; Stapleford 2009:7, 384; review in Higgs 2004a:16; cf. Bowker and Star 1999:322). States exercise symbolic power by creating or reinforcing categorical distinctions within populations (Bourdieu 2012:24–25; Corrigan and Sayer 1985:198–199; Hacking 1991:194; James and Redding 2005:191; Kertzer and Arel 2002:2, 6; Loveman 2014:14–19; Starr 1992:281; Urla 1993:819). Furthermore, this perspective suggests that censuses are most likely to be conducted where strong bureaucracies, staffed by experts who are structurally separated from elite and nonelite social actors, collect

information (Anderson 1988:83–115; Higgs 2004a:83–91; Ipsen 1996:50–89). Although the rise of the international statistical movement during this period of time in some ways curbed state power, it also reinforced it vis-à-vis social power because state elites shaped censuses within the international environment, and thus, these elites were more responsive to interstate pressure than to domestic social pressure (cf. Loveman 2014:9–10; Ventresca 1995:10–11, 68–98).

Despite the predominance of the state-centered view, some work points to social influences on the census. The rise of industrial capitalism led to greater demands for information from business groups and labor (Wright 1900:81–82). Organized elite and nonelite social interests emerged in the advanced capitalist world after 1850 (Clemens 1997:1–2; Hobsbawm 1987:44–45; Weber 1958:102; 1978:224). They demanded and produced information (Giddens 1981:218; Starr 1987:20; Szreter 1984:525; review in Higgs 2004a:11–13, 87–88). During the early nineteenth century, the production of numbers more generally was a response to social pressures and reinforced the idea that society had a substantial reality outside the state (Crook and O'Hara 2011:11). Mass literacy and numeracy eased the task of census taking.

Finally, some work points to how the interaction between states and societies shaped censuses by considering how state actors, usually located in state bureaucracies, interact with social actors. Several authors, rediscovering Weber's (1978:984–985) argument that social, nonbureaucratic pressure helps maintain state bureaucracies (Volume 1, Chapter 2), emphasized that state bureaucratic autonomy is a response to highly organized interests (Carpenter 2001:3–5; Kolko 1963:57–59; Orren and Skowronek 2007:90–91; Sarti 1971:1–3; Skowronek 1982:32–33, 50–52). Elites come from the private sphere into the bureaucracy, and bureaucracies serve elite interests (Cammack 1989:274–278; Mann 1993:470; Searle 1971:19–20; Szreter 1996:158). Loveman (2005:1661–1662) argued that as state actors strive to establish censuses, they interact with nonstate actors in four ways: innovation, imitation, incorporation, or usurpation. These arguments suggest that census bureaucracies emerged under intense social pressure and that social actors brought their ideas and interests into census bureaucracies through a variety of interactions. The form of interaction also varied historically (review in Volume 1, Chapter 1). In the period covered in this volume, there were two main phases. During the first half of the twentieth century, elite lobbies became intensively involved in censuses. However, in the second half of the twentieth century, there was greater pressure from below from a wider

variety of social groups (Bowker and Star 1999:223; Kertzer and Arel 2002:27–31; Nobles 2000:19–22).

Toward an Interactive Model

Despite this scholarship, the interactivist position remains underdeveloped; here we seek to understand fully its implications for censuses. In Volume 1 (Chapter 2), we created a model that well represented the state-centered perspective, the society-centered perspective, and a fully interactive one. We review briefly here our model, depicted in figure 1.1. It is based on a distinction between domains and levels. Domains are aspects of reality, and we focus on the domains of state and society. Levels indicate the scale of reality. The macro level refers to systemic structural features, the meso level refers to specific organizations, and the micro level refers to individuals and their interaction. We combine these domain levels to suggest a fully interactive model of information gathering. Figure 1.1 implies that information intellectuals, other social actors, and state actors located in the domain levels of micro society and micro state are embedded within the domain levels of macro state, macro society, meso state, and meso society. Thus, the actions, capacities, power, and common-sense knowledge of social and state actors are conditioned by the macro and meso levels of state



Figure 1.1 Interactive Model of Information Gathering

and society. The domain levels are linked by flows (represented by solid lines with directional markers). These flows represent sequences of exchanges and interaction between positions held by actors within institutions and structures. We attach mechanisms of categorization and classification to these flows to represent, respectively, the processes of social and state actors' marking and dividing on the basis of social attributes. Similarly, we attach mechanisms of power to represent actors' ability to influence their environment. Thus, the actual deployment of information gathering depends on the relative balance of power among these different actors.

Each of our substantive chapters examines five empirical implications derived from the relationships in figure 1.1 (see Volume 1, Chapter 2). First, we examine the state strength argument. If the state strength perspective is correct, then differences in state strength should correspond to differences in census outcomes in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy. When states are strong, they should be able to conduct censuses. When they are weak, they should not. When levels of state strength converge or when states establish close ties with one another in international statistical organizations, their censuses should also converge. Empirically, then, we consider the relative strength of these states and the overall nature of their censuses. In general, our evidence does not confirm this argument.

We also consider three society-centered processes. First, we consider the role of lay categories in shaping censuses. The society-centered perspective implies that categorization originates from social actors' common sense that is given by structural social patterns in macro society and instantiated in institutions and organizations in meso society. Empirically, we consider whether information gathering was based on lay categories. We show that state actors drew from lay categories to create census categories, and when census categories and lay categories conflicted, censuses produced little socially relevant information. Thus, our evidence supports this argument.

Our second society-centered argument investigates the role of "information intellectuals" or "census intellectuals." The society-centered perspective implies that information or census intellectuals should be prominent social actors who translate lay categories into scientific ones to create information. (By definition, information intellectuals, in our technical usage, are social, not state actors, though of course, state actors also influence information intellectually.) Thus, empirically, we look at whether information or census intellectuals exist or not, and we try to locate them socially within their meso-level social organizations and institutions and macro-level

social structures. In particular, the society-centered argument suggests that states should not be able to innovate or usurp the role of such intellectuals, relying instead on co-optation and imitation. Our evidence broadly confirms this point.

The third society-centered argument concerns power. It suggests that social actors have enough power vis-à-vis state bureaucrats to force them to adopt their translated categories as the basis for information gathering. We can empirically examine the relative balance of power of nonstate elites, nonelites, and state actors to shape information gathering, and we can consider actors' political struggles over these categories. We also consider how meso-level organizations and institutions and macro-level structures influence the balance of power of these state and social actors. Our cases show how social actors' power was highly influential in shaping where and when information was collected and thus broadly support this argument. Taken together, then, the investigation of these three society-centered arguments provide evidence to illustrate the counterclockwise flows of social power and categorization in figure 1.1, because our evidence shows how information categories derived from lay categories by census intellectuals or information intellectuals were then taken up by state actors and incorporated into the practices of the state.

We call the fifth implication the "historical trajectories" argument. The main point of figure 1.1 is to show that the interaction between states and societies determines where and when information is collected. Thus, the figure suggests that the mechanisms of classification and categorization and state power and social power work together to create information gathering. We illustrate empirically how states and societies interact, and in particular, we show how information gathering creates historical patterns that both constrain and enable states and societies. We examine this argument by tracing out the temporal sequences of information gathering for our cases through our historical narrative, highlighting how information gathering at any particular point in time is influenced by the rounds of information gathering that preceded it.

Chapter Summaries

Chapter 2 discusses censuses conducted in the United Kingdom between 1841 and 1931. Though the United Kingdom was a world power at this time, the census remained relatively weak. Despite the growth of a census bureaucracy, data collection remained dependent upon local administration. The strong emphasis on social class and

occupation already apparent in the first censuses was strengthened. Expert lobbies, supported by social elites, pushed for censuses to solve problems of social unrest and public health created by capitalism. In some ways, this period was the golden age of the UK census, though it still never reached the level of institutionalization that it had in the United States or Italy. Nevertheless, the relative weakness of the census as well as resistance to it meant that even during this period the census never was as socially relevant as in the United States.

In contrast, the United States between 1850 and 1930 (chapter 3) had a weaker state than the United Kingdom, but its census was more developed, better institutionalized, and more socially relevant. Elite lobbies that supported eugenics were also important in the United States, but they focused on racial categories, not occupational ones as in the United Kingdom. The format of the race questions coincided with a cross-class interest in creating a monolithic white identity that would include recent European immigrants and exclude all nonwhites, especially blacks. The US census bureaucracy was firmly institutionalized as a semi-autonomous agency, with strong links to both the state and society. This created intense interaction between the state and society over the census, leading to a highly interventionist census in the next time period.

Chapter 4 covers Italian censuses between about 1814 and 1921. Before unification in 1861, the Italian regional states, though relatively weak politically, had already conducted nominative censuses, based on strong histories of information collection. And in 1861, Italy, though newly unified and relatively weak, conducted a precocious interventionist census, with the express purpose of trying to strengthen the country as a cultural and political unit. The main categories of the Italian census drew on lay categories of place and residence (as opposed to class in the United Kingdom and race in the United States). Italian intellectuals had a distinctively important role in the census, partly because of the relative weakness of other social elites. Census intellectuals suffered neither the resistance of powerful landowners that their UK counterparts did nor enjoyed the level of collaboration from industrialists that their US counterparts did. A strong statistical tradition continued through the liberal regime and Italy's first halting experiences with democracy after 1918. As a result, the Italian census was more developed than the UK one but less developed than the US one.

Since World War II, all three of our states have had the capacity to conduct censuses, and they all are pressured by the same international census-taking norms. However, neither the convergence in state

capacity nor international influences explain why differences remain in these censuses. The UK census became well developed (chapter 5), but the influence of interest group politics on it was always partial. Increased postcolonial immigration shifted the focus of census debates from class to race, but most debates revolved around whether or not racial information should even be collected. Resistance to information gathering, including information about race, was always difficult to overcome. The 1991 census was widely regarded as unusually unsuccessful for a modern census. In contrast to the US and Italian ones, the UK census was never as fully institutionalized and not as strongly supported by social groups. It never garnered widespread social support as in the United States, and with the recent conservative turn in politics, it was an easy target of budget and government cuts. The census will continue after 2011 but in an altered format.

In the United States (chapter 6), the census was strongly influenced by interest group politics, organized and mobilized around race, that developed out of the 1960s civil rights movements. These influences created a cultural understanding of "rights" that could be both demonstrated and ascertained through censuses. This politics formed the core of the post–World War II understanding of censuses as ways for groups to show their numerical strength and thus political power. Although the census was firmly institutionalized with its own research staff, these interest groups, as well as academics, strongly shaped the content and format of information because they formed powerful lobbies that influenced the census. In turn, the Census Bureau made explicit appeals to these groups for input and included them in the process of planning the census. In contrast to the United Kingdom where a conservative turn threatens the census, in the United States, there is little support to eliminate the census (though there is considerable partisan disagreement over it). In the United States, a strongly interventionist, instrumental census used for many social purposes, developed out of the interaction between state and society because of the way that the census had been institutionalized.

In Italy, the census still serves a largely symbolic purpose (chapter 7). It was institutionalized as a partially autonomous agency during the fascist period. Census officials supported the demographic project of the regime, but the ambitious attempt to use census data to reverse declining fertility failed. The depoliticization of the census after the fascist period coupled with the autonomy of the agency that conducted it undermined the development of intense interaction

between the state and society over the census when mass democracy developed after 1945. Census officials had the power to implement information gathering as they chose. Censuses were well developed and used for academic and scientific purposes, but in sharp contrast to the US censuses, they were not socially relevant. Although regional parties espousing new forms of linguistic cultural identity became important in Italy after the 1970s and although immigration increased massively, census authorities excluded language and ethnicity from their forms. The census is not a target for social groups and serves relatively few social purposes. The census—actually no longer a census but a cross between a register and a census—remains only weakly interventionist because there is little interaction between the state and society about its information.

In chapter 8, we review our theoretical and empirical contributions. Our general empirical conclusion is that where there is intense interaction around the census (the United States), the census is a vibrant social institution. Where there is little interaction or where interaction is narrowly focused (Italy), the census is less socially relevant. The UK censuses, we argue, fell between these two extremes. We also note six surprising conclusions we can make with our interactive model of information gathering, examined by combining a historical and a comparative method. First, though the previous social science literature emphasizes the role of the state in information gathering, we find that its role has been variable, important at some times but not at others. Second, we find that censuses produced public and official knowledge to the degree that they faced social pressures. Third, we find that the quality and usefulness of information as such also depends on social pressure. In fact, an interventionist census depends on a social setting in which many parties are involved in the production of information, creating an environment in which knowledge is produced, understood, and used. Fourth, we find that society has a massive and largely unrecognized role in censuses, because it is the source of systems of lay categories. Censuses are most successful not when populations are coerced to provide information through the introduction of novel state categories but when censuses draw on lay categorization that respondents understand. Fifth, we find that no census categories are inherently controversial or uncontroversial. We show that occupational categories, locations, or racial designations can all be equally controversial in different times and places. Finally, we emphasize the role of ordinary actors in the production of official knowledge. The

census is ultimately not a bureaucratic document, but an interactive achievement; censuses cannot produce knowledge if they do not elicit the willing or unwilling collaboration of millions of respondents. In general, we use our framework to explain how the census consolidated as a vibrant social institution in the United States, a somewhat important but contested institution in Britain, and an institution with little social significance in Italy.

PART II

The Emergence of Interventionist Censuses

Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, the purpose of censuses shifted from description to intervention. The first censuses in the United Kingdom and the United States were descriptive. They were connected with political purposes such as apportioning representation or determining population growth or decline. The first Italian census differed because census takers linked the count to the project of constructing Italian national identity. Thus, the Italian census was precociously interventionist but in symbolic rather than in policy terms. However, all three censuses shifted from being counts of subjects to instruments of social scientific public policy (Anderson 1988:33; Curtis 2002:509; Foucault 1991:99–104). They became interventionist because they constituted the population as an object of political intervention rather than simply a fact to be registered. Though they were interventionist in intention, they rarely were interventionist in practice. Because of the relatively restricted nature of political participation, links between state and society were often tenuous, leading to difficulties in collecting information. It was only with the (highly uneven) rise of democracy after World War II—which created a much more intensive level of interaction between states and societies, both elites and nonelites—that the census became both interventionist and instrumental.

The Influence of States and Societies on the Interventionist Censuses

From the state-centered perspective, the routinization of census taking in the mid-nineteenth century and the shift to interventionist information gathering forms part of a broad state response to social

and administrative problems. For example, Skocpol and Rueschemeyer (1996:3) argued that states began to collect extensive information to address class conflict and industrialization. The emergence of planning, especially after the 1930s, required new forms of information about demography and resources (Desrosières 2008:42–44, 86–87). Intellectuals, allied with states, collected information relevant to social problems and deployed that information in policies (Frankel 2006:1–2; Heclo 1974:304; Higgs 2004a:131–132; James and Redding 2005:191; Lacey and Furner 1993:35–37; Schweber 1996:189; Skocpol and Rueschemeyer 1996:5; Weir and Skocpol 1985:118–119; Woolf 1989:601). Statistical offices devoted to taking censuses also emerged and consolidated (Anderson 1988:83–115; Desrosières 1998:195; 2008:41–44; Higgs 2004a:83–90; Ipsen 1996:50–89; Marucco 1996:128–138; Skocpol and Rueschemeyer 1996:6; Ventresca 1995:20–21, 59–61; Wiebe 1967:147). Thus, not surprisingly, Curtis (2001:11–12) linked the failure of the Canadian census to its relatively weak state. European states became leaders in the International Statistical Congresses that pressed for census uniformity (Higgs 2004a:84; Loveman 2014:89; Ventresca 1995:61). Censuses could reinforce and naturalize social differences or even help create nations and empires (Beaud and Prévost 1997:421–423; Carroll 2006:112; Kertzer and Arel 2002:5–8; Lam 2011:55; Nobles 2000:25–26; Patriarca 1996:124, 197–209).

In contrast, the society-centered perspective points to social influences on censuses, but this perspective is not well developed for this period of time. However, the growing sophistication of quantification and statistics are linked to broad social changes such as the maturation and expansion of capitalism, democracy, and bureaucracy (Giddens 1981:218; Porter 1995:35–37, 75–76; reviews in Higgs 2004a:11–13; Starr 1987:18–23). The consolidation of a public sphere, especially when it included public information criticizing the government, spurred the development of statistical knowledge (Crook and O'Hara 2011:10–11; Higgs 2011:70–75).

These state-centered and society-centered arguments have been applied to the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy. Higgs (2004a:131–132), arguing from the state-centered perspective, posited that an "information state" emerged in the United Kingdom between 1880 and World War I. Its more centralized government collected more information and sought to use it for policy purposes (Higgs 2004a:131–132). Levitan (2011:5), however, noted that by the 1850s, the UK census was subject to social pressures from many elites. For the United States, state-centered scholars argued that the

bureaucratization of the state in the nineteenth-century increased demands for knowledge and shaped national and racial identities (Prewitt 2013:14; Schor 2009:11; Schweber 1996:189; Skowronek 1982:164–166; Wiebe 1967:147). In contrast, Anderson (1988:33) linked census changes to social structural ones. In Italy, the success and accuracy of the census is assumed to reflect the institutional history of the state bureaucracy (Ipsen 1996:78–89; Marucco 1996:128–138). Nevertheless, it sharply reflected the social salience of categories based on place of residence and was strongly shaped by local concerns and organizations (Favero 2001:44–52; Petraccone 2005:7–10; Salvadori 1960:28–29). However, even authors who acknowledged social influences generally emphasized an information explosion linked to the construction of autonomous bureaucracies devoted to taking censuses and thus focus on the state (Anderson 1988:83–115; Higgs 2004a:83–91; Ipsen 1996:50–89).

To develop a more interactive view of information gathering, we consider our five empirical implications (state strength, lay categories, census intellectuals, power, and historical trajectories). Generally there was little relationship between state strength and the ability to collect official information in this period. The United Kingdom remained a powerful state, even though it declined geopolitically. The United States centralized, but its bureaucracy remained comparatively underdeveloped. The Italian peninsula was unified as a single state but oscillated between oligarchic liberalism, quasi authoritarianism, and democracy. In general, information gathering depended more on effective democratic claims making than on bureaucratic autonomy. Where democracy was most developed, as in the United States, more information was gathered. Where it was less developed, as in the United Kingdom and in certain times and locations in Italy, less information was gathered. These trends support our argument that the interaction between states and societies spurred information gathering. But to develop our claim, we must specify the social influences on the census more carefully.

Three social influences were important. First, class, race, and place were highly salient systems of lay categorization in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy, respectively. All three cases exhibited a conflict between expert classifications and lay categorizations. Despite powerful elite attempts to impose new categories on the population, experts reinforced preexisting lay categories rather than transforming them.

Second, information intellectuals pushed censuses toward interventionism in all three countries. This was true of the UK public

health lobby, US racist and anti-immigration forces, and the Italian patriotic statistical movement. However, information intellectuals were organized differently in the different countries. In the United Kingdom, they organized as elite interests groups composed of scholars, notables, and experts who sought to influence the administration. In the United States, intellectuals organized similarly, but they sought to influence Congress. In Italy, autonomous intellectuals were also scholars, notables, and experts, but many of them eventually entered state service (and therefore ceased to be information intellectuals as we define them).

Third, power relations among elite social groups influenced census takers' ability to collect information. In all three countries, a new industrial elite began to undermine agrarian dominance in the late nineteenth century. Census intellectuals, consequently, had to find new allies, so censuses depended on their ability to do so. In the United Kingdom, the central concerns of the census during this period reflect the economic shift from agriculture to industry, though elites in both sectors continued to influence census intellectuals. In the United States, industrialists were strong enough, especially after the Civil War, to support information gathering. In Italy, the fragmentation of the social elite prevented an alliance among intellectuals, agriculturalists, and industrialists; instead information intellectuals came to identify their interests closely with those of the national bureaucracy.

Finally, the historical trajectory of the census created lasting legacies. The UK census originated from the pressures of elite social actors on the government; this created a pattern of state-society interaction through social elites. This pattern of elite interaction continued as intellectuals organized into interest groups and as the census bureaucracy became institutionalized. State actors created the first US censuses, but social elites were immediately involved because of the political role of the census. This pattern of elite social influence also continued, but the influence of elites was intense because interest groups and the census were firmly institutionalized in American society. Italy's census grew out of routinized interaction over information gathering before unification; this pattern continued as autonomous intellectuals entered the national census bureaucracy.

These social factors combined with the historical trajectories explain the national censuses. Though there were all interventionist in principle, none were in practice. There were also important differences: the UK census was underdeveloped and not highly politicized, the US census was well developed and becoming increasingly politicized, and the Italian census well developed and directed toward national unification. These arguments are summarized in Table P2.1.

Table P2.1 Censuses in the Nineteenth Century and Early Twentieth Century

	The United Kingdom (1841–1931)	*The United States (1850–1940)*	*The Italian peninsula/Italy (1814–1921)*
Summary of the evidence for the empirical implication(s) of:			
State-centered perspective			
1. State strength	strong	weak to moderate	weak to moderate
Society-centered perspective			
2. Lay categories	class	race	place
3. Information intellectuals	elite interest groups of scholars	elite interest groups of scholars	autonomous intellectuals
4. Power	alliances among agrarians, industrialists, and elites	alliances between industrialists and elites	elites identify with the state, not other elites
Interactive perspective			
5. Historical trajectory	increasing but limited interaction between states and societies; partial institutionalization	increasing interaction between states and societies; increasing institutionalization	increasing interaction between states and societies; partial institutionalized
Outcome:			
	comparatively underdeveloped census, interventionist in intention	well-developed census, interventionist in intention	well-developed census, interventionist in intention

CHAPTER 2

The Dominance of Class in the UK Censuses

From 1841 to 1931, the UK census ceased to be a simple population count and started to be used in analysis and policy intervention. This shift toward interventionism shaped three sets of censuses. The public health movement strongly influenced the first censuses from 1841 to 1881. This intellectual lobby was shaped by industrialization and its attendant social problems and by the continuing dominance of agrarian elites. The public health censuses were connected to a paternalist model of interventionism that responded to social problems from an agrarian perspective.

The second group of censuses from 1891 to 1911 continued to show the influence of the public health lobby, but new lobbies of social scientists (both economists and eugenicists) strongly shaped them. These lobbies aimed to address the social problems of the late nineteenth century associated with the dramatic increase in the size and complexity of economic units and the increasing use of chemicals, hydrocarbons, and electricity. The rising power of British manufacturers within the English social elite after 1873 also strongly influenced these censuses. These lobbies sought to influence individual behaviors to produce some desirable social outcome rather than to protect the poor and disadvantaged. Thus, they developed a new model of interventionism that was technocratic instead of paternalist. Elite lobbies had somewhat less influence over the third set of censuses conducted between 1918 and 1931 because of the rise of democracy and the growing links between the census and social policies, including state-provided pensions and health care. By the early 1930s, the UK census was thus becoming interventionist as well as instrumental.

Public Health and the Victorian Meridian

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom continued to be the most powerful state in the world but remained politically archaic. It was a monarchy without either a constitution or universal suffrage even after the political reforms of 1832 and 1867. Nevetheless, state-building activity continued during the Victorian period. From the 1830s, the state centralized, collected more information, and began to promote social reform (Corrigan and Sayer 1985:123–125; Furner and Supple 1990:27, 35; Nairn 1970:15). From roughly 1840 to 1873, the United Kingdom experienced the world's first transition to fully industrial capitalism. Although these were decades of economic boom and relative social peace, an industrial working class and the social problems associated with urbanization emerged for the first time (Eyler 1979:16–17; Nairn 1970:5; Stedman Jones 1971:10–11; Thompson 1990:8).

By the mid-nineteenth century, the industrial working class was concentrated in metals, mines, and transport, in which production was accomplished in large, machine-intensive factories (Mann 1993:600, 611). The United Kingdom had the first trade union federation (1868) and the highest rates of union membership of any advanced country prior to 1914 (Eley 2002:69–70; Mann 1993:631). Unionism, focused on the unskilled, was broader and more class oriented than preexisting craft organizations (Eley 2002:72). Furthermore, a working-class culture, highly resistant to middle-class propaganda, formed during this period (Stedman Jones 1983:207–208, 236). Residential patterns reinforced working-class cohesion as tramcars and railroads allowed the middle class to move to the suburbs (Mann 1993:603; Stedman Jones 1983:186). After 1850, competition from these new industries, concentrated in northern England, led to the relative deindustrialization of London. In northern England, a true industrial working class consolidated; in London, workers split between skilled artisans and casual labor (Stedman Jones 1971:30–31). This large casual labor force provoked intense middle-class worry (Stedman Jones 1971:27, 125). The British middle class saw these new forms of organization (trade unions) and cultural autonomy as serious threats (Semmel 1960:22). In sum, the organization and culture of the modern British working class developed after 1850.

The working class also entered Parliament in this period, although not as an independent political force. After the expansion of suffrage in 1867, most skilled workers could vote. Despite organizational advances, nonelites generally remained subordinate political actors.

Initially, working-class voters supported the Liberal Party, which pursued a moderate reformist policy (Eley 2002:67; Mann 1993:601). Issues of poverty and income distribution entered the political arena (Higgs 2004a:101–103; Semmel 1960:20).

At the top of the social structure, the landed elite continued to dominate. Between 1858 and 1879, 95 percent of British millionaires were landowners (Rubinstein 1977:102). Indeed, the continuing alliance between the working class and industry in the Liberal Party after mid-century reflected their common antagonism to agrarian interests (Nairn 1964:40).

The second half of the nineteenth century was also a key period in the formation of intellectuals as an organized social stratum. After 1850, the activities of local government expanded partially in reaction to social dislocations created by the industrial revolution (Szreter 1996:192–193). This expansion created new positions such as factory inspectors, local medical officers of health, and teachers. The occupants of these new professions began founding their own organizations and journals after 1850 (Szreter 1996:190). This stratum of local intellectuals interacted with philanthropic organizations and local social investigators, forming a milieu that was an important recruiting ground for information intellectuals who would influence the census (Szreter 1996:197–198). Further up the social scale, elite intellectuals around Oxford and Cambridge (Oxbridge) became influential starting about 1850. Their influence expanded with the introduction of formalized government service examinations. They espoused moderate reformism but viewed British society as a meritocratic hierarchy topped by an intellectual aristocracy (Szreter 1996:148, 159).

The expansion of the intelligentsia in local government and emergence of an Oxbridge elite were the twin pillars of the statistical movement, starting in the late 1830s and continuing into the late nineteenth century. This movement included a group of social organizations: The British Association for the Advancement of Science; the statistical societies of Belfast, Bristol, Glasgow, Leeds, London, and Manchester; and the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (Cullen 1975:21, 77; Goldman 1991:419). These organizations collected and disseminated masses of information on education, housing, and the living conditions of the urban working class and were closely connected to social elites (Eyler 1979:16–17). Professionals such as lawyers, medical men, and Unitarian divines founded the Bristol society (Cullen 1975:122). Businessmen founded the Manchester society (Cullen 1975:105). A reforming doctor and employers' lawyer founded the Glasgow society (Cullen 1975:119–120).

These organizations sought to establish environmental causes for social phenomena (Eyler 1979:23). They blamed poverty on ignorance, bad urban planning, poor water, and unsanitary conditions (Szreter 1996:87). The invocation of environmental factors in explaining poverty constituted an important change in the public discussion of social issues because it challenged the methodological individualism of classical political economy focused on individuals acting in the market (Goldman 1991:423–425). For example, Malthus ([1798] 1976:40), in the context of attacking the Poor Law, had argued that relief undermined the disciplining effects of the market and thus removed "the strongest incentives to sobriety and industry, and consequently happiness." Drawing on the Malthusian idea that poverty was the result of natural indolence and uncontrolled fertility, many early nineteenth-century social thinkers wanted to instill morality in the poor (Levitan 2011:49–57). In contrast, environmentalists went beyond explaining poverty as a moral or behavioral problem and tried to establish causes for it above the individual level (Hilts 1970:143).

Because of the predominance of environmentalism within the statistical movement, many of its leaders were deeply concerned with public health (Goldman 1991:421). As a result, local activists of the statistical movement were often doctors who sought to identify preventable causes of urban mortality. The leaders of the statistical movement, in sum, provided no radical critique of industrialization, but their nonindividual-level explanation for poverty required political action (Eyler 1979:22; Szreter 1996:87).

While most members of the statistical movement rejected criticisms of the factory system and focused instead on reform, their writing had a strongly agrarian tinge. For example, most of them believed that cities negatively affected the working class (Cullen 1975:36; Eyler 1979:22, 23). They also promoted reforms that emulated traditions of agrarian paternalism (Szreter 1996:87). The statistical movement thus carved out a limited but legitimate role for the state in protecting the urban poor from preventable disease (Eyler 1979:23–27).

Furthermore, state transformations opened up access to government posts for the intellectuals in the statistical movement. Three organizational transformations were key: the rise of the Statistical Department of the Board of Trade (founded in 1832), the rise of the General Register Office (GRO), and the establishment of the Royal Commission of Enquiry as a new state institution (Goldman 1991:419). These organizations responded to new demands for information linked to two key pieces of legislation aimed at regulating society: the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act and the 1848 Public Health Act (Higgs 2004a:65–66).

This legislation was primarily aimed at establishing common standards across units of local government: a regulatory strategy that required constant monitoring and, therefore, information. Thus, during the mid-Victorian period, members of the statistical movement could enter government through these new state agencies that created new connections between the state and society (Cullen 1975:82).

Consequently, there was a constant circulation of leading information intellectuals in and out of the government bureaucracy (Cullen 1975:27). George Richardson Porter, the first person to run the statistical department of the Board of Trade, belonged to the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (Cullen 1975:21). William Farr, an upwardly mobile physician who ran the statistical department of the GRO and influenced the census from 1841 until the turn of the century, was a member of the Statistical Society of London for 40 years, holding the positions of president, vice president, and treasurer (Eyler 1979:6–7, 14). Farr used his position to advocate for the public health agenda by using census evidence to press for reforms (Eyler 1979:51–52). This advocacy used a regulatory approach in which targets were set from London for local government units. Thus, one primary use of census information was to provide evidence to local health boards established in 1848. These organizations were supposed to undertake sanitary reforms if mortality superseded twenty-three per thousand—the regulatory target (Higgs 2004a:90). The GRO used census information to wage an intense campaign to promote the public health movement by aggressively publishing reports identifying unhealthy districts (Higgs 2004a:88; Szreter 1984:525; 1996:91). Furthermore, even when members of the statistical movement did not directly enter government service, they substantially influenced official statistics because statistical societies often gave advice about the census (Eyler 1979:41).

The Mid-Victorian Era: 1841–1881

The GRO conducted the censuses from 1841 until after World War II (Eyler 1979:41). Parliament established this organization in part to overcome the problem of the growing number of non-Anglicans missing from parish registration (Desrosières 1998:167). Their exclusion was not only a religious issue but also created legal problems because property claims were closely connected to birth, death, and marriage certificates (Higgs 2004b:7–17). In 1836, the GRO replaced the parish registration system (Eyler 1979:37; Higgs 2004b:72, 74). The head of this organization, the registrar general, was a senior

civil servant. Initially, the GRO was under the nominal control of the Home Office (the agency responsible for internal security); however, the position in fact had wide autonomy (Higgs 2004b:113). After 1871, the registrar general was responsible to the president of the Local Government Board, who represented the GRO's interests in Parliament and regulated the GRO more closely than the Home Office had (Szreter 1996:70–71). The GRO established local registrars who recorded births, marriages, and deaths and sent the information to London (Higgs 2004a:74).

Like other agencies in the mid-nineteenth-century United Kingdom, the GRO, especially in its early years, had a surprising degree of latitude. Its leading officials interacted intensively with voluntary organizations and professional societies, and it could pursue a quasi-political agenda under the cover of expertise (Higgs 2004b:59–60). Thus, the mid-nineteenth-century UK censuses were relatively insulated from Parliament but tightly linked to expert opinion and expert lobbies.

The censuses conducted by the GRO collected information in registration districts that were the old Poor Law districts; many of the local registrars were Poor Law officers (Desrosières 1998:167; Higgs 1996:421; 2004a:74; UK Census Office 1873:xxxi; 1883:2). Throughout this period, the machinery to conduct a census had four main levels: the central GRO office in London, several hundred superintendent registrars, a few thousand registrars, and tens of thousands of enumerators at the local level (UK Census Office 1873:x).

Although the emergence of the GRO was a step toward centralization, the new system of information gathering was still heavily reliant—as it had been for centuries—on local officials. The Census Act of 1851 stipulated that "Overseers of the Poor," "Constables," "Tithingmen," "Headbouroughs," and "other Peace Officers" were bound to act as enumerators (UK House of Commons 1860:8). Indeed, one of the most important responsibilities of the registrar was to identify qualified enumerators, who were likely to be local notables. The instructions for the 1851 census describe the ideal enumerator:

> The Enumerator, in order to fulfill his duties properly, must be a person of intelligence and activity: he must read and write well, and have some knowledge of arithmetic: he must not be infirm, nor of such weak health as may render him unable to undergo the requisite exertion: he should not be younger than eighteen years of age, nor older than sixty-five: he must be temperate, orderly, and respectable, and be such a person as is likely to conduct himself with strict propriety, and to deserve the goodwill of the inhabitants of his District. (UK Census Office 1851:3)

The report for the 1861 census states, "No difficulty was experienced in procuring the services of a highly respectable body of enumerators including clergymen and many other professional men who undertook the work from public motives" (UK Census Office 1863:1). Despite this somewhat optimistic assessment, testimony from 1890, the only year for which minutes are available explaining how the census worked at the local level, suggests that patronage played a large role. One registrar, when asked how he hired enumerators, explained: "I cast about amongst my own immediate friends" (UK Parliament 1890:40).

These recruitment methods may not have produced highly competent enumerators. According to Dr. William Ogle, the superintendent of statistics at the GRO in 1890, the enumerators were "on the whole rather a poor lot" (UK Parliament 1890:2). He testified before a parliamentary committee in 1890 that low pay and temporary work did not attract high quality people (UK Parliament 1890:2). Indeed, Ogle claimed that the only reason that the census worked was because it relied on local persons who worked as amateurs to collect the information. As he testified:

> The Enumeration would be very much worse than it is if it were not that there is always about the country a certain number of gentlemen who are curious and interested in the matter, and are ready to be enumerators, not for the small payment, but because of their interest in the matter,—clergymen, schoolmasters, and people of that kind,—and they of course are very useful persons, but on a limited scale. (UK Parliament 1890:3)

This reliance on "gentlemen" had characterized information gathering for hundreds of years. The local census machinery relied on patronage, depending heavily on the clergy and other local elites. The enumerators themselves were probably clients of local notables. In sum, the GRO did not replace older methods of information gathering; it incorporated them into a national framework.

The emergence of the GRO led to a reorganization of enumeration. Instead of sending questionnaires to the overseers of the poor and other local officials so that they could gather information orally, from 1841 onward, the GRO printed standardized forms called "household schedules" and passed them out to enumerators (Chapman 1990:5; Higgs 2004a:72–73; UK Parliament 1843:4). The enumerators were then responsible for distributing, collecting, and correcting the forms as well as for copying down the information contained in them into their books (Higgs 2004a:72–73; UK Census Office

1873:x; UK House of Commons 1860:8). Transferring information to enumeration books at the local level was a necessary step, for as the director of the GRO, Dr. William Ogle, noted in 1890, "It would be impossible for us to deal with all these loose flimsy pieces of paper, so they are copied into an enumeration book" (UK Parliament 1890:2). Therefore, while the 1841 reform reduced the workload on the enumerators, because they no longer collected all the information orally (as they had done for the first four censuses), they continued to play an active role in collecting and transmitting the information (Higgs 1996:409–410; 2004a:73). Furthermore, they were the key conduits between local information and the London office, because the central GRO compiled its tables from enumeration books filled out by enumerators, not directly from household schedules completed by household heads.

The 1841 census (the first GRO census) represented a break with previous practices and is generally considered the first modern British census (Eyler 1979:41). Names and birthplaces were collected for the first time (Chapman 1990:5; Higgs 2004a:72; Leech 1989:2). However, this census was still simple compared with the following ones (Higgs 2005:11–13; UK Parliament 1843:4). The 1851 and 1861 censuses were identical; the 1851 census added questions on the relationship to the head of the household, marital status, occupation, and disabilities (UK Census Office 1851:5; 1863:75). The 1871 census was identical to the prior two, except that it also attempted to collect more information about congenital diseases by elaborating the "if deaf-and-dumb or blind" disability question. In 1871, the census listed four possibilities: "(1) deaf and dumb, (2) blind, (3) imbecile or idiot, (4) lunatic" (UK Census Office 1873:167). The 1881 census asked the same questions as the 1871 census (UK Census Office 1883:117). Under the influence of Farr, the statistical director of the GRO from 1841 onward, the censuses of 1851 through 1881 augmented the information they collected about medical disabilities (Eyler 1979:41; Higgs 1996:409; 2004a:72; UK Census Office 1851:5).

From 1841 to 1881, the GRO increased its efforts to collect information on occupations. In 1841, respondents were asked to list their occupation without any explanation of how to do so (UK Parliament 1843:3). Household schedules starting in 1851, in contrast, included instructions to the respondents about how to answer the "rank, profession, or occupation" question. The instructions on the 1851 census form included 13 main divisions from peers to almspeople, distinctions that were mostly repeated in 1861 (UK Census Office 1851:6;

1863:76). The number of occupational categories increased in 1871 to 23 and to 24 in 1881 (UK Census Office 1873:168; 1883:116).

The occupation question in these censuses left considerable leeway to the respondent in three ways. First, the instructions provided neither a defined list of occupations nor a defined set of statuses (UK Census Office 1851:6). Thus, occupational information was based on self-description. Second, the criteria for filling out this question were not entirely consistent because "rank, profession, and occupation" were somewhat different, although closely related, dimensions of social difference. For example, a respondent might easily be both a peer (the holder of an honorific title) and a landowner (a proprietor of land in England and Wales), although the instructions to the occupation question presented these as alternatives. To resolve this, the form asked that "A person following more than One Distinct Business, should insert his several occupations in the order of their importance" (UK Census Office 1863:76). However, it gave no criteria about what importance meant for the census, leaving this instead to the respondent. Third, many of the categories encompassed very broad social positions. For example, "persons engaged in commerce" could include bankers and merchants as well as hawkers and peddlers (UK Census Office 1863:76). Persons required to list themselves as having no occupation could include people living in almshouses as well as annuitants of independent means (UK Census Office 1863:76).

Throughout the mid-Victorian period, then, the occupation question relied heavily on self-classification. In a rapidly industrializing society with a constantly transforming division of labor, self-classification created considerable conflict and ambiguity. For example, one enumerator for the 1881 census in a part of London called Mile End described two interactions. The enumerator was a "gate porter at the Mile End Old Town Workhouse and Schools" (UK Parliament 1890:81). Before this, he had been a "poor law officer, and under the school board for several years" (UK Parliament 1890:81). According to his testimony, this gave him "special advantages" because of his local knowledge (UK Parliament 1890:81). As he noted, "Unless you know something of those people, the census, although it may appear very accurate, is not likely to be so" (UK Parliament 1890:82). Still, this well-positioned observer faced considerable resistance as exemplified in two vignettes that he sketched to Parliament.

In the first situation, he had to collect the household schedule from a partially paralyzed man whom he had known as a poor law officer. The man did not fill out the household schedule, perhaps partly because he could not write. The enumerator helped him complete the

form but challenged his answer to the occupation question. The paralyzed man stated that he was a cooper. But the enumerator rejected this description stating, "you only labour about in a cooper's shop" (UK Parliament 1890:82). The man then admitted that he was a "labourer" (UK Parliament 1890:82). The enumerator then pressed him to specify what sort of laborer he was, and eventually the respondent admitted that he was a shoeblack (UK Parliament 1890:82).

In the second episode, the enumerator came to a brothel. He knew the woman in charge of the establishment had been recently arrested as a "procuress" (UK Parliament 1890:82). She initially filled out the census schedule as the female head of household and listed herself and her two sons. The enumerator, however, forced her to redo the entire form by excluding the sons, who "were in a home at Deptford" and by including "the girls" of the brothel, who were listed as "unfortunates" (UK Parliament 1890:82).

Household heads also may have resisted placing themselves in an occupational hierarchy. William Ogle testified before Parliament:

> I do not think there are a thousand people in the whole census who put themselves down as journeymen, though some few put themselves down as masters. The great mass of tailors, for instance, put themselves down simply as tailors, and you are left in doubt whether it is a master or a journeyman tailor. (UK Parliament 1890:6)

He suggested that people became angry if they were asked to state whether they were masters or journeymen (UK Parliament 1890:6). These episodes indicate that enumerators and respondents negotiated occupational classifications; respondents considered these classifications to be evaluative, not neutral or descriptive.

The rise of manufacturing also influenced the census. As the GRO recognized, the division of labor created new occupations (UK Census Office 1873:xxxviii). Local names of occupations created considerable difficulties for census workers making tables in London. In many cases, the same occupation had different names. An even more difficult problem was the use of the same name for different occupations. The census report of 1881 stated:

> By Clothier is meant in some parts a Cloth-maker, whereas in other parts it means Clothes-dealer. By Bricksetter is in some parts meant a Bricklayer, whilst in most parts it means a man who performs certain operations in Brickmaking. By Bank Manager is ordinarily meant the manager of a money bank, but in mining parts it is also occasionally used for the man who superintends the operations at the pit's mouth.

> By Drummer may either be meant a Musician or a Blacksmith's hammerman; by Muffin-maker, either a man who makes the eatable that bears that name, or the man who makes what is known as a muffin in China manufacture. (UK Census Office 1883:27)

To address this problem, the GRO encouraged respondents to specify the occupation in enough detail so that clerks in London could create the tables (UK Census Office 1883:27). The GRO also created dictionaries of occupations by sending a letter "to leading manufacturers, asking for the information as to the designations used in their branches of industry, and the information thus collected was supplemented by searches through trade directories, and especially by a preliminary examination of the enumeration books from the chief industrial centres" (UK Census Office 1883:26). According to the final 1881 census report, occupations were "grouped into some 400 headings under which they were to be abstracted; and these headings again, were grouped in sub-orders, orders, and classes, these larger groupings being taken with some modifications from the Census of 1871" (UK Census Office 1883:26). The GRO thus relied on the lay knowledge of manufacturers to interpret occupations listed by respondents and gathered together by enumerators.

The link between the GRO and the public health movement also influenced the census. The most obvious manifestation of the public health agenda of the GRO was that the 1851 and 1861 censuses asked if the respondent was "deaf-and-dumb" or "blind" (UK Census Office 1851:5; 1863:75). Concerns with public health were also evident in the instructions on how to answer the occupation question in the 1851 and 1861 censuses. Farr, the statistical director of the census, believed that the work environment and materials were a key factor in explaining health (Higgs 2004a:88–89; Szreter 1996:77). Thus, a key part of his agenda was to explain "occupation-specific causes of death" linked to exposure to specific "materials and activities" (Szreter 1996:77). The instructions on the household schedules for occupation composed under Farr's leadership prompted workers to explain "the particular *branch* of work, and the *material*" that they worked upon (UK Census Office 1851:6). These instructions were part of Farr's elaborate classification system (included in an appendix to the final report of the 1861 census) that divided the population according to two main criteria: the materials with which people worked and their position in relation to the final product of these materials (which Farr called "process") (UK Census Office 1863:226). On the basis of these conceptual distinctions, he distinguished five "classes" and

one residual group. The five principal classes were: the *andrici*, who worked on people; the *oikei,* who worked in houses; the *agorici,* who worked in the market; the *georgici,* who worked on land; and the *technici,* who worked in handicrafts (UK Census Office 1863:231). The sixth class included all those who were "indefinite" or "nonproductive." Within the classes, Farr distinguished a number of orders. For example, within the *technici,* Farr distinguished persons who worked with various combinations of materials from those who worked primarily with textiles, and with food, animal, vegetable, and mineral products (UK Census Office 1863:232). The classification proposed in the instructions for the occupation question in the 1861 census closely reflected Farr's scheme. The instructions began with services (the *andrici*), followed by merchants (the *agorici*), agriculturalists (the *georgici*), artisans and manufacturers (the *technici*), and finally the indefinite and nonproductive classes (UK Census Office 1863:76).

Farr's concerns with public health dovetailed with his more ambitious attempt to create an unambiguous system of occupational classification rooted in the characteristics of the work materials. He stated:

> As man as a living being has his place in the animal kingdom, so the working-men of various types form groups in the economic kingdom; and the groups require distinctive names, framed on the analogies which have already, in reference to single occupations, been discussed. (UK Census Office 1863:231)

His ultimate ambition was to produce a naturalistic terminology for occupations (UK Census Office 1863:30). This view of social order was conservative because it suggested that the division of labor and occupational hierarchies were fixed by nature. It is strongly reminiscent of a specific feature of nineteenth-century conservative British ideology: its obsession with rigid social hierarchy (Nairn 1970:7). This perhaps suggests the continuing influence of the agrarian elite throughout the period of Farr's dominance. As we will see in the subsequent section, Farr's classification became increasingly problematic as manufacturing and manufacturers played a greater role in producing census classifications. These new social actors demanded a more flexible and economically oriented scheme of occupations.

The mid-Victorian censuses may have been shaped by international considerations because the international statistical congresses were established in the mid-nineteenth century. The 1860 meeting was held in London (Ventresca 1995:183). Yet the transition to

nominative censuses in the United Kingdom occurred prior to the first International Statistical Congress in 1853. Although many of the recommendations of this Congress, such as the focus on health questions, were exemplified by the UK censuses, domestic reasons were probably as important as international ones, given the historical timing (Ventresca 1995:61, 183).

The Challenge of National Efficiency

During the late nineteenth century, the social configuration that had produced the public health and statistical movements shifted. The percentage of millionaires who made their living from manufacturing increased substantially between 1858–1879 and 1900–1914. Over the first 21 year period, about 9 percent of British millionaires were manufacturers, a figure that increased to 23 percent in the second period (Rubinstein 1977:102). In contrast, the number of millionaires who were primarily landowners dropped to 31 percent between 1900 and 1914 (Rubinstein 1977:102). This was the culmination of the gradual rise of a new class of elites within the integument of the old order (Corrigan and Sayer 1985:110–111). After the 1832 electoral reform, the dominance of agrarian interests in Parliament declined somewhat. By the late nineteenth century, manufacturers mostly supported the Liberal Party and were a key component of what was called the "national efficiency" movement that demanded greater state support for industry (Scally 1975:63; Semmel 1960:151–153).

The increasing weight of manufacturers within the social elite coincided with increasing worry among the intelligentsia about the perceived decline of the United Kingdom (Searle 1971:4–5; Semmel 1960:89). Three main processes produced this worry: the Great Depression of 1873–1896, the rise of an increasingly combative working class especially after 1889, and the relative decline of the United Kingdom as an international industrial power even as industrialists became more important within the social elite (Nairn 1964:42). These challenges produced an explosion of reformist energy aimed at increasing national efficiency (Scally 1975:10). The national efficiency program was interventionist because it called for the state to alter society through science. However, it was not paternalist because many exponents of national efficiency praised the virtues of individuals' struggles for survival and recommended harsh treatment for the poor.

A central strand of the national efficiency program aimed to create a tighter link between science and government. For example, the London School of Economics, founded by the famous Fabian

reformers and supporters of national efficiency, Sydney and Beatrice Webb, provided training in economics and political science for future government leaders (Searle 1971:84–85). Supporters of national efficiency also often held up newly industrializing societies, such as Germany and Japan, as examples for the United Kingdom to follow because their social development was supposedly based on planned models that were guided by science (Searle 1971:56).

During the 1880s, many associations formed to push the program of national efficiency. The Tariff Reform League that advocated protective tariffs for industry and embodied an alliance between manufacturers and intellectuals was concerned with stemming the United Kingdom's long-term economic decline using state power (Scally 1975:21–22, 66, 75–77; Searle 1971:85–86; Semmel 1960:63, 75–77, 102). The British Institute of Social Service, the Charity Organization Society, the Guild of Help Movement, and the Personal Service Association were concerned with social policy and were often sites of intense interaction between formal academic knowledge and practical social reform programs (Harris 1992:120–121). In the early twentieth century, a group of intellectuals called the Coefficients established an informal dining club to discuss social reform policies (Semmel 1960:73, 76). These organizations tried to use social scientific knowledge to alter society.

Supporters of national efficiency linked domestic reform and geopolitics. The United Kingdom's share of world trade dropped from 37 to 25 percent between 1883 and 1913. In contrast, the share of the rising powers of the United States and Germany increased substantially (Higgs 2004a:99). Maintaining the British empire counteracted this decline because the imperial territories potentially provided markets for relatively low-quality domestic goods that were no longer competitive in newly industrialized countries (Hobsbawm 1987:74; Searle 1971:10; Semmel 1960:85–86). This empire, however, required an effective army staffed by healthy men, so population quality became a major concern (MacKenzie 1981:39). The Boer War (1899–1902) gave urgency to these issues. A large UK army defeated the irregular Boer force with great difficulty, setting off a wide-ranging debate (Searle 1971:38). Experts adduced the poor physical condition of the troops to explain the perceived debacle (Higgs 2004a:100; Soloway 1982:144; Szreter 1996:73). According to many, the war indicated race degeneration that might sap the empire's strength (Higgs 2004a:99–100; Soloway 1982:138–139).

Within the national efficiency camp, three groups of intellectuals were particularly important for the census. The public health lobby

within the statistical movement, discussed above, continued to be one crucial player, but it underwent a relative decline. It was challenged by a new group of social scientists (exemplified by Charles Booth and Alfred Marshall) and the eugenics lobby (exemplified by Francis Galton).

Social Scientists' Interest in Unemployment: 1891–1911

By the 1880s, the long depression of the late nineteenth century posed a challenge to classical political economy (Szreter 1996:107). Persistent unemployment and misery especially in London seemed to contradict the optimistic beliefs of the 1860s and 1870s (Cannadine 1984:134). To explain chronic urban poverty, early economists such as Alfred Marshall, widely considered a founder of neoclassical economics, espoused the theory of urban degeneration, which argued that a disorganized and demoralized urban underclass distorted the workings of the free market (Fourcade 2009:148, Stedman Jones 1971:128; Szreter 1996:111). This argument allowed Marshall to reconcile his generally *laissez-faire* stance with a recognition of persistent misery among the urban poor. It was based loosely on social Darwinist assumptions suggesting that urban life was creating a new degenerate human type (Soloway 1982:138–139). Evidence about unemployment was crucial to this discussion.

The 1881 census was virtually identical to that of 1871; the 1891 and 1901 censuses added details to the occupation question, and the census of 1911 added a question on nationality and marital fertility (UK Census Office 1883:117; 1893:139; 1904:322; 1917:258). One of the crucial changes in the censuses from 1891 to 1911 (1891, 1901, and 1911) concerned information about employment. Census forms before 1891 did not distinguish between employment status and occupation because respondents had to indicate both together in their answers to the "rank, occupation, or profession" question, even though part of the substantive justification for a census was to separate the "idle" from the "industrious" (Volume 1, Chapter 5). For example, to gather information about unemployment, the 1881 instructions indicated that "persons ordinarily engaged in some industry, but out of employment at the time of the census should be so described: as 'Coal Miner, unemployed;' 'Printer, unemployed'" (UK Census Office 1883:116). The 1891 census separated occupation from employment status in the census form for the first time. The form included three columns after the occupation question: "employer," "employed," and

"neither employer nor employed but working on own account" (UK Census Office 1893:138). The 1901 census changed the employment status question slightly. The first column asked respondents to indicate occupation and the second asked whether they were an employer, a worker, or an "own account" worker (UK Census Office 1904:321). The census of 1911 provided four columns: the first asking the respondents' personal occupation; the second asking the industry or service of the occupation; the third asking whether the person was an employer, a worker, or an "own account" worker; and the fourth asking whether the person worked at home (UK Census Office 1917:258). These changes reflected the partial (and as we show highly paradoxical) victory of the social science lobby.

Charles Booth, a social investigator and colleague of Alfred Marshall who oversaw a massive study of the London poor published in 1886, was one of the main advocates for separating the question on employment in the census from one on occupational status. He was convinced that laborers in intercity London were subject to progressive degeneration; therefore, the city's working population required regular replenishment from healthy provincial stock (Stedman Jones 1971:127–128). As one of Booth's collaborators argued:

> London is to a great extent nourished by the literal consumption of bone and sinew from the country; by the absorption every year of large numbers of persons of stronger physique, who leaven the whole mass, largely direct the industries, raise the standard of health and comfort, and keep up the rate of growth of the great city only to give place in their turn to a fresh set of recruits, after London life for one or two generations has reduced them to the level of those among whom they live. (Smith 1892:65–66)

To muster evidence for his theory, Booth tried to show that the unemployed living in London were predominantly born in London, not the provinces. He argued that this concentration of unemployment among London natives over successive generations suggested their progressive degeneration.

This theory may have been behind Booth's testimony to a commission in preparation for the 1891 census. In this testimony, Booth proposed the addition of three columns to the household schedule asking whether the respondent was an employer, employed, or neither (UK Parliament 1890:56). Specifically Booth suggested three additional columns in the census form headed, "employer in any trade," "employed," and "not employing nor employed by others in any trade" (UK Parliament 1890:122). He had been interested in

unemployment since the late 1880s and wrote in his introduction to *Life and Labour of the People of London* that "The unemployed are, as a class, a selection of the unfit, and, on the whole, those most in want are the most unfit" (Booth 1892:149–150). Booth's interest in unemployment then was likely linked to an attempt to show that the unemployed had special quasi-biological features distinguishing them from other workers. This idea extended and specified the older distinction between "industrious" and "idle" people that had influenced discussion of the census from its beginnings (Volume 1, Chapter 5). In any case, Booth proposed to separate information about employment status from occupation for the first time.

The 1891 census form incorporated much of Booth's suggestion, although it differed in an important way from what he had proposed. The census transformed his last column, "not employing nor employed by others in any trade," into "neither employer nor employed but working on own account" (UK Census Office 1893:138). This is a significant, highly paradoxical change because it removed information on unemployment, which was what Booth likely wanted. Indeed, whereas the earlier censuses had at least made it possible for respondents to indicate unemployment as a status, in the new form that now separated employment status from occupation, unemployment no longer appears to have been an option: certainly a surprising result given Booth's interests.

Parliament's reluctance to include an unemployment question may reveal that there was some resistance to this designation among respondents. There is direct evidence that employment status produced classificatory problems. The final report of the 1891 census suggested that employment questions were very sensitive. For a number of occupations, the number of employers of labor exceeded the number of employees, indicating "the foolish but very common desire of persons to magnify the importance of their occupational condition" (UK Census Office 1893:36). Furthermore, in many cases, respondents checked all three boxes, indicating that they were employees, employers, and self-employed. The GRO considered the results "excessively untrustworthy" (UK Census Office 1893:36). In the 1901 and 1911 censuses, these problems seem to have been overcome because they are not mentioned in the final reports.

The social science lobby, in sum, had an important impact on the censuses after 1891. After this date, separate columns for types of employment status emerged in the census form. Yet this victory was highly paradoxical. First, although Booth's main interest in employment status was unemployment, the census forms after 1891 did not

present unemployment as a possible status. In preceding censuses, respondents could add unemployment as a status after their occupation. Paradoxically, then, Booth's partial victory probably produced less information about unemployment than was available previously. Second, the employment status columns do not seem to have produced useful information. Thus, influence of the social scientific lobby on the census in this period did not directly translate into the successful production of evidence.

The Eugenicists' Concern with Fertility: 1891–1911

In addition to the social scientists, the eugenicists were the second major lobby that influenced the censuses of this period. Eugenics, the doctrine of racial improvement, formed a key part of the national efficiency program. The eugenicists thought that populations could be engineered to enhance international competitiveness (Searle 1971:60; Semmel 1960:40–42). Karl Pearson, founder of the prestigious demographic journal *Biometrika*, was the most important exponent of this position. Pearson began his political career as a socialist. In the early 1880s, he studied Darwin, Marx, and Lasalle at the universities of Heidelburg and Berlin (Semmel 1960:36). When Pearson returned to the United Kingdom, he gave lectures to socialist workingmen's clubs, where he argued for the labor theory of value (Semmel 1960:37). But he combined his socialist convictions with a specific interpretation of social Darwinism in which nations or races (instead of individuals) struggled among one another for supremacy (Semmel 1960:29, 40). In this conflict, the underlying threat to British world dominance became racial degeneration (Searle 1971:95–97; Semmel 1960:49).

Although the British eugenicists viewed populations as races to be cultivated scientifically, class categories and *laissez-faire* ideas continued to influence their outlook. The eugenicists thought that despite their genetic weakness, the lower classes continued to reproduce at a higher rate than the middle classes because of misguided public health policies. Poor relief, public health, and improved sanitary conditions (the key policy prescriptions of the public health movement) led to an unhealthy "survival of the unfit," lowering the overall quality of the English population (Soloway 1982:139, 145; Szreter 1984:525). At the same time, the middle classes failed to reproduce rapidly enough. This differential fertility threatened to weaken the race as a whole (Semmel 1960:49; Soloway 1982:145). To redress this problem, eugenicists developed two policy prescriptions: first, the

elimination of public health and poverty relief for the urban poor and second, the promotion of high middle-class birth rates (MacKenzie 1976:499).

The eugenicists posed a challenge to the GRO's public health orientation because they attacked sanitary reform as misconceived and harmful. The first public attack on the GRO's public health agenda came in 1874 when Henry Letheby, the president of the Society for Medical Officers of Health, argued that the death rate of London was unchanged over the last 30 years (Szreter 1996:90). He concluded that this showed that the sanitary reforms of the period had been useless (Szreter 1996:90). Letheby also argued that public health measures might simply be preserving weak biological specimens, thereby degrading the quality of the population (Szreter 1996:94). However, these pressures initially failed to shift the census away from its public health focus (Higgs 2004b:84; Hilts 1970:143, 146).

From the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, the eugenics lobby became increasingly organized. In 1907, eugenicists founded the Eugenics Education Society that had over a thousand members by 1914 (mostly academics, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other professionals) (MacKenzie 1976:503, 506; 1981:22–23). Indeed, the key leaders of the Eugenics Education Society formed part of the British "intellectual aristocracy" that was tightly integrated with the social elite (MacKenzie 1981:32–33).

The eugenics lobby prompted the inclusion of a marital fertility measure in the 1911 census (Higgs 1996:409; Szreter 1996:69, 74; UK Census Office 1917:257–258). The GRO included this question to provide evidence that would be directly relevant to the lively debates about differential fertility (Szreter 1996:70). The final product of this effort was a report published in 1923 that tabulated the results (UK Census Office 1923:lxvii).

The eugenics lobby also influenced how information on occupations was tabulated for reporting purposes. In 1900, the GRO abandoned Farr's model of tabulation. In 1913, Registrar General T. H. C. Stevenson developed the "professional model" to tabulate 1911 census data (Szreter 1984:523; 1996:74, 78). Stevenson's model distinguished among five hierarchically ranked groups: professionals, a group that was intermediate between professionals and skilled workers, skilled workers, a group intermediate between skilled and unskilled workers, and unskilled workers (Szreter 1996:74). Through a process that remains somewhat mysterious, the GRO assigned occupations to these social classes to construct its tables (for an opaque discussion of this process, see UK General Register Office 1913:xli).

This class scheme may have been heavily influenced by the one developed in 1880 by the Anthropometric Committee of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, a leading eugenics organization headed by Francis Galton between 1879 and 1885 (Szreter 1984:525). Galton argued that different occupations were comprised of people with different levels of inherited natural ability (Szreter 1984:525–526). He thought that he could prove this point by showing that the population was normally distributed according to a hierarchically ranked class scheme similar to the one the GRO used to tabulate occupational data in the 1911 census (Galton 1892:12–32; Szreter 1984:526; 1986:344; 1996:138). Both schemes put professions at the top of the social hierarchy and unskilled workers at the bottom, and both adopted a five-class schema that was based conceptually on a three-part division among deviants, the useful working classes, and professional classes (Szreter 1984:532; 1996:74).

However, the GRO did not adopt the eugenics program wholesale. Many officials at the GRO undermined the eugenicists' views, although there is also evidence of cooperation and influence (Higgs 2004b:139; Szreter 1996:81–82). In general, the eugenics lobby's influence on occupational classification was probably relatively indirect. The GRO used a version of Galton's scheme because the eugenics lobby had created an atmosphere in which providing evidence relevant to the eugenics debate seemed important (Szreter 1984:526, 531). The development of a hierarchical scheme of UK occupations was thus closely connected to a political struggle pitting eugenicists against environmentalists in a debate about solutions to social problems of poverty and inequality produced by industrialization.

The continuing salience of class mediated the impact of eugenics on the census. The British eugenics lobby affected both occupational classifications and fertility information because British eugenic thought focused on class as the main unit of eugenic intervention (Higgs 2004a:105; MacKenzie 1976:501; 1981:18–19; Pearson 1911:20–25, 37–38, 45; Soloway 1982:145; Szreter 1984:525). Primarily, eugenicists influenced the census by encouraging the collection of information relevant to differential class fertility.

The Rise of Democracy in the Interwar Period

UK society and politics underwent a second important evolution at the end of World War I. In 1918, as a result of the war, Parliament, under the control of a Liberal government, established universal

manhood suffrage (Eley 2002:67). As a direct consequence, the Labour Party finally separated itself from the Liberals. For the first time, the United Kingdom approximated a democratic state. This political opening corresponded to a shift in the census away from being interventionist on behalf of restricted expert lobbies to being interventionist on behalf of large groups of people. The eugenicists' influence rapidly declined in this new climate (Higgs 2004b:141). Connected to this shift was an increase in the effectiveness of the census to influence policies. By the interwar period, the census was not only interventionist in intention but was also used in social policy.

The first significant change in the censuses concerned its legislative basis. The 1920 Census Act removed the necessity of obtaining parliamentary approval for every census. Instead, it provided ongoing legislative authority to the government to undertake a census by issuing an "Order in Council," a legislative instrument resembling an executive order or decree law (Abbott 1922:832; Newman 1971:3–4; UK House of Commons 1930). In theory, the government could now conduct a census every five years, although this never happened.

There was also an important change in the institutional position of the census. The GRO moved under the newly established Ministry of Health. This transformation subjected the census more closely to ministerial control than before and further tightened the long-standing link between public health and the census (Bisset-Smith 1921:52; Higgs 2005:190; Newman 1971:4). The 1920 Census Act also allowed local government authorities to apply to the Ministry of Health to take local censuses if they could be shown to be necessary (Abbott 1922:832; Newman 1971:4). In general, the censuses after 1918 were more insulated from the elite lobbies and more open to nonelite public opinion than the previous ones.

The Defeat of the Eugenics Lobby: 1918–1931

After 1911, the fertility question, supported by the eugenics lobby, was not included in the census, but evidence relevant to social policies that would directly benefit nonelites was collected. The 1921 census removed the marital fertility question, added questions about coresident children and children's number of surviving parents, and added a small box asking about the number of rooms available to the household (UK Census Office 1927:203). The final report of the 1921 census emphasized that the fertility question was removed because of space constraints despite its scientific importance, implying that its elimination was primarily practical (Abbott 1922:836). As the

census report stated, "the schedule already appeared to have reached the extreme limits of its capacity for expansion" (UK Census Office 1927:1). Therefore, the questions asked needed to promise "results of the greatest general utility for present and future needs" (UK Census Office 1927:1). For the first time, then, the census sharply posed an alternative between scientific interests and the needs of social policy.

There was also an important political dimension to the removal of the fertility question. The eugenic view implied that the professional middle class was reproducing at a lower rate than manual workers to the detriment of the British "race." These views were still widely current in the 1920s. In a work devoted to popularizing the census, a Scottish enumerator argued:

> Good stocks are checking their growth. Weak and careless oafs continue to have abundant offspring. Selective deterioration is thus operating in both ways: the good tree is not growing, while the bad is branching out in all directions. The parasite may kill that upon which it feeds and flourishes. We are now in these Isles face to face with the hydra headed problem of the fatal fertility of the unfit, probably accentuated by the effects of the Great War. (Bisset-Smith 1921:77)

To redress this perceived demographic imbalance, eugenicists supported a program of reverse welfare in which already privileged middle-class parents would receive tax breaks for having children, a policy that proved impossible as democracy emerged after 1918 (Bisset-Smith 1921:77).

The eugenics lobby continued to advocate for including a fertility question in the 1931 census. In a letter of 1927, Leonard Darwin (in his capacity as president of the Eugenics Society) urged Neville Chamberlain to consider reintroducing the marital fertility question of 1911 and to establish "improved methods of determining the degrees in which the different social classes are contributing to the make up of the nation as a whole" (Darwin 1927:1). At roughly the same time of this letter, the Eugenics Society was involved in a highly contentious campaign to promote voluntary sterilization. However, the census resisted the efforts of the eugenics lobby to reinstate the fertility inquiry (UK General Register Office 1950:4–5). Indeed, by the 1930s, this elite lobby's power was clearly waning mostly because of the interrelated rise of the Labour Party and democracy. Most of the Labour Party leadership was convinced that the eugenics movement was hostile to the working class; the Ministry of Health was acutely aware of this. There was also stiff public opposition to the

voluntary sterilization programs associated with the eugenics lobby. Thus, while government officials were sympathetic to eugenic arguments, after 1918, their ability to act on these sympathies was constrained (Macnicol 1989:161–166).

The tighter connection between the census and popular demands was also evident in two new questions in the 1921 census: one asking children under 15 years of age how many surviving parents they had and the other asking married men, widowers, and widows to state the number of living children under the age of 16 years living in the house (Bisset-Smith 1921:207). The census authorities seem to have considered these questions, unlike the fertility question, as immediately useful for policy (UK Census Office 1927:1–2). Both were partially a response to World War I that left many orphans and widows and that was a major stimulus for social legislation (Newman 1971:9). According to the final report of the 1921 census, the evidence from the questions on orphans and dependents was used "in preparation of the financial framework of the Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act" (UK Census Office 1927:2). The 1931 census differed little from that of 1921. It eliminated the questions on orphans and widows and included a question about usual place of residence to establish more precisely the difference between the legal and factual population (UK GRO 1950:193–194). During the interwar period, then, the power of elite lobbies to shape the census declined. Instead, the GRO was pressured to provide information relevant to policy making that benefitted a broad range of class interests. This transformation from a census that was interventionist in intention but not in practice to a census that was interventionist in practice would only be complete after 1945.

Conclusions

The United Kingdom was arguably the most powerful state in the world during this period. It held a vast overseas empire, and despite the prevailing ideology of *laissez-faire*, it tightly regulated society through a highly articulated structure of local government agencies (Higgs 2004a:64–69; Hobsbawm 1987:74). Indeed, the British invented the modern welfare state. And yet, its census was surprisingly underdeveloped.

Social factors shaped the UK census in three main ways. First, class was an important system of lay categorization in the nineteenth-century United Kingdom, and it continued to be the primary focus of these censuses (e.g., Booth 1892:156–171; UK Census Office

1863:231). This focus continued throughout the shift from a census that was influenced by interests in public health to one that was more influenced by interests in social science and eugenics. The census questions influenced by the eugenicists focused on differential fertility among classes, not nationalities, races, or ethnic groups. The United Kingdom was the home of the first working-class movement in the modern world (Chartism) that self-consciously blended the struggle for the vote with class mobilization. Class ways of thinking were also ubiquitous among social elites (Nairn 1970:5). The pervasiveness of class as an organizing concept for the census reflected the lay salience of class as a social category.

Second, social influences shaped the UK censuses through elite lobbies of information intellectuals. From the 1830s, partly because of local government expansion and partly because of the establishment of Oxbridge as key conduit for administrative posts, a distinctive intellectual aristocracy emerged (Szreter 1996:148, 159). At the local level, many of these people formed organizations devoted to collecting quantitative information about the population, and in particular the working class. They were active in the public health, social science, and eugenics movements, and they provided staff for the GRO. The tradition of establishing associations concerned with social knowledge continued into the late nineteenth century as elite-linked lobbies pushed for the collection of specific information to strengthen the United Kingdom geopolitically and to solve problems of social unrest. Many of these intellectuals became major figures in the UK's emerging census bureaucracy. Thus, they were co-opted by the state (Loveman 2005:1661–1662).

Third, the census reflected the shifting power relations, particularly among the different fractions of the social elites—agriculturalists, industrialists, and professionals. After the mid-nineteenth century, manufacturers became a more important segment of the British dominant class than before (Hobsbawm 1987:170–171; Rubinstein 1977:102). The rise of manufacturing roughly corresponded to the shift away from the public health censuses to the social science and eugenics censuses. The public health censuses, particularly under Farr, were based on a deeply conservative vision of the social order as graded into natural and fixed occupational categories. Furthermore, public health was a paternalist movement that sought to protect the working class from the harms of urban life. The social science and eugenics lobbies that influenced the censuses of the late nineteenth century, without entirely displacing the public health lobby, recommended a program of policy intervention that would mete out harsh

treatment to the poor, not protect them. This was a technocratic rather than paternalist ideology. In sum, the shifting focus of the UK census reflected broader shifts in the power relations among the social elite from an older paternalist agrarian elite to a new manufacturing elite. After 1918, nonelites also began to influence the census more decisively because of the rise of democracy.

We can also describe the historical trajectory of the census, and in particular how previous interactions between the state and society influenced information gathering. There had been relatively little interaction between the state and society with respect to the first UK censuses (Volume 1, Chapter 5). Little demographic information had been collected in the fiscal information gathering that had preceded the first censuses. Social elites had pushed for the introduction of the census, and they had provided most of the ideas that shaped their content, while state actors reluctantly agreed to them. The first censuses were conducted mostly with preexisting local administrative structures, and they were relatively underdeveloped and underused head counts. This established a pattern of limited interaction between state and mostly elite social actors.

During the time period considered here, however, the level of interaction between the state and society increased, though it remained limited. Organized lobbies, formed by social elites, began to collect information about the urban poor. Through the lobbies, more social actors (though rarely nonelites) became involved with the census and had more influence over it than before. Furthermore, more state actors became directly involved in the census, and their involvement became institutionalized. Although the GRO was not a fully autonomous office, it served as a permanent bureaucratic home for the census, and after 1920, the census had a firmer legislative basis than before. However, in comparative terms, the census was not fully institutionalized because it was not mandated through a constitutional document, as in the United States.

These three social influences, combined with the historical trajectory, explain the UK censuses: they continued to be comparatively underdeveloped and asked relatively few questions (Abbott 1922:835; Higgs 1996:420; 2004a:163). Their focus on class was strongly shaped by lay categories, and the influence of the elite lobbies shaped the specific way class was investigated though questions about health, employment, and fertility. However, beyond these elites, few social actors influenced the census, and intense social and political interaction around the census never emerged. The relative insulation of the census from political conflict inhibited its development.

However, despite its comparative backwardness, there was an important historical transformation of the census away from description and toward intervention. For the first time, UK census data became potentially usable for public policy. For example, the eugenics lobby probably intended for the fertility question in the 1911 census to support their program. The information from the interwar censuses was used to plan pension schemes. These censuses were interventionist in intention, although they became practically instrumental only after they were linked to policies that had broad popular support.

CHAPTER 3

The Development of Race and Occupation in the US Censuses

Starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, the US census underwent a transition analogous to its UK counterpart. It was transformed from a rough headcount to one of the world's most developed information-collection tools. Around 1900, the census became an object of intense elite lobbying. During the 1930s and 1940s, these trends accelerated as census data were linked to the distribution of resources during the New Deal and associated with social mobilization. This shift toward interventionism occurred in three stages. First, during the 1840s and 1850s, congressional struggles and individual conflicts refracted a brooding social divide that pitted the traditional southern planter aristocracy against the emerging northern industrial bourgeoisie. The planters were generally hostile to the collection of information because they saw it as threatening their paternalistic labor control. The industrialists, in contrast, were more interested in information. Second, roughly between 1870 and 1920, the influence of the planters declined, while the influence of the elite lobbies linked to the northern industry increased. These lobbies attempted, with limited success, to recast the census as a document relevant to their political and intellectual concerns. Third, the 1930 and 1940 censuses became tightly linked to social policies and lobbying and became objects of social mobilization. Concerns over immigration declined, and the census refocused on a dichotomous understanding of race through the categories of white and black.

The Census in the Cauldron of American State Building

The United States had a relatively weak centralized bureaucracy in the mid-nineteenth century (although the courts played a central

role in regulation and therefore were, at least in part, functionally equivalent to bureaucracies) (Furner and Supple 1990:35; Skowronek 1982:28–29). US political parties, however, were relatively well developed by this period of time. Thus, in the United States, party democracy preceded bureaucratic development. This sequence undermined the consolidation of a professional civil service, because the strong parties penetrated the relatively underdeveloped federal bureaucracy and converted it into a source of patronage (Clemens 1997:27; Skowronek 1982:8, 26).

In the late nineteenth century, however, international strife and increased class conflict shook American political institutions, leading social elites to reorganize political authority (Furner and Supple 1990:31–32; Nugent 2010:26; Skowronek 1982:11). The opportunity for rebuilding the American state came with the rise to preeminence of the Republican Party, backed by industrialists, from 1896 to 1920 (Clemens 1997:17–18; Skowronek 1982:167–168).

The institutional history of the census closely tracked these broad developments. Congressmen in the mid-nineteenth century viewed the census as a source of patronage, just like other parts of the federal bureaucracy, and they funded it on the condition that they could offer its jobs to loyal party bosses (Anderson 1988:100). As a result, the agency was often run by mediocre political appointees and thoroughly open to pressure from organized interests (Anderson 1988:50–51). But during the second half of the nineteenth century, in part as a result of the perceived debacle of the census of 1840 (Volume 1, Chapter 6), educated reformers with university jobs struggled to improve the staff's quality and to insulate the organization from congressional pressure (Anderson 1988:86). Joseph C. G. Kennedy reorganized the institution as the Census Board that included the secretary of state, the attorney general, and the postmaster general. The Census Board, in consultation with experts, developed the census forms, a task previously left to Congress (Anderson 1988:35; Schor 2009:47–56; Wright 1900:40–41).

However, the census did not become a permanent part of the federal government until the 1902 establishment of a permanent Census Bureau under the Department of Commerce and Labor. (The agency was officially called the Bureau of the Census, but it is commonly called the Census Bureau. The census was moved to the Department of Commerce when the two were separated in 1913 [Anderson 1988:12, 118, 128; Conk 1978:112–113; Eckler 1972:9, 17].) The 1902 Permanent Census Act charged the Census Bureau with conducting the decennial censuses that had an official status and

mid-decade population censuses that had an unofficial status (US Code 1954:Title 13, Chapter 5, Subchapter II, Section 141).

The Background to the First Interventionist Census

During the 1830s and 1840s, a movement for social statistics developed in the United States. This movement, which became increasingly organized in lobbies toward the late 1840s, played a major role in the reorganization of the 1850 census (Anderson 1988:28; Schor 2009:45–47). These reformers focused on race rather than on class or occupation. One of the most important groups of actors in this movement were ethnologists and doctors who espoused the doctrine of polygenesis, or multiple creation, and sought to use the census as a source of information for their theories (Nobles 2000:30; 2002:51). The supporters of polygenesis formed a loose intellectual group called the American School of Ethnology centered in Philadelphia, which achieved considerable intellectual prestige by the 1840s (Gould 1996:101–105; Horsman 1981:125; Nobles 2000:37). This work made respectable the idea that races were biologically distinct entities with different capacities (Horsman 1981:131–132; 1987:82–83).

The most important proponent of polygenesis for the census was Josiah Nott, a religiously unorthodox cosmopolitan southern slaveholder and doctor, who encouraged the collection of racial statistics (Horsman 1987:18–19, 52). Nott was particularly interested in collecting evidence on mixed-race people to demonstrate their relative infertility compared to pure races (Horsman 1987:86–87; Nobles 2000:37). He argued that evidence showing that mixed-race offspring were less fertile than their nonmixed counterparts would demonstrate that races existed, because men and women from different races could not produce fertile offspring (Horsman 1981:129; Nobles 2002:51). Nott directly influenced the 1850 census schedules (Anderson 1988:40; Nobles 2000:38–39; 2002:51; US Congress 1850:676). His close collaborator and friend James DeBow, a political economist and statistician from Louisiana, who published numerous articles from the polygenic perspective, was also the superintendent of the census after 1853 and emphasized the relevance of census data to this debate in his magazine, *DeBow's Review* (Anderson 1988:51; Eckler 1972:7; Horsman 1987:106; Schor 2009:82–87).

Despite Nott's and DeBow's interest in polygenesis, southern slaveholders resisted Nott's attempt to collect information on mixed-race people partly because of their general reluctance to collect any

information on slaves. One point of particular resistance was the shift to the enumeration of individuals (Anderson 1988:36–38; Wright 1900:47). Before 1850, slaves were enumerated as part of their masters' households. This resonated conceptually with slaveholders' paternalistic ideology (Wilson 2012:35–36). The new form for 1850, however, proposed to collect information directly on individual slaves, showing that slaves had families and making it possible to track their migration patterns (Anderson 1988:40). This information challenged the notion that slaves were subordinate members of the plantation family.

Southern senators attacked individual-level information about slaves as useless. For example, Senator Butler argued:

> The census heretofore has taken only the required number of slaves and I see no useful information the obtaining of the names of the slaves can afford. On a plantation where there are one, two, or three hundred slaves, there are perhaps several of the same name, and who are known simply by some familiar designation on the plantation. (US Congress 1850:672)

Senator Clemens objected to obtaining information on the names of slave children because the enumerator "would be obliged to send the census taker to the negro quarters himself to ascertain the information" (US Congress 1850:673). Senator King claimed that collecting information on the number of children born to slave women was equally impossible: "The woman herself, in nine out of ten cases, when she has had ten or fifteen children does not know how many she has actually had" (US Congress 1850:674). One southern senator had additional, more specific objections about the collection of information concerning "removal from pure blood" (US Congress 1850:674). Senator Borland objected to this question because its accurate answer would require "a high degree of science, an acute discrimination" (US Congress 1850:674). Thus, Senator Underwood's position that "It is not a matter of scientific investigation at all, but a mere inquiry as to facts—whether an individual is a quadroon, a mulatto, or any other proportion of blood" (US Congress 1850:675) must have faced some skepticism.

The inclusion of these questions about race, therefore, was a project of experts who wanted to gather evidence relevant to their racial theories, not a project of southern elites. In fact, southern elites resisted efforts to collect information on slaves' name, their number of children, and the extent to which they were mixed race (Nobles

2000:38). They were successful: the 1850 census only collected slaves' age, sex, and race ("color," black or mulatto) (Nobles 2000:38–40; Schor 2009:70–74; Wright 1900:153).

This debate highlights a particular configuration of relations among census intellectuals, social elites, and the census. In the mid-nineteenth century, census intellectuals were not well organized. Nott, DeBow, and others acted as individuals; they were not members of powerful professional organizations. Although they were southerners, they did not represent the planter aristocracy, which resisted information gathering about slaves, even information that could have justified slavery racially. Furthermore, Nott and DeBow did not seek to use the knowledge to influence policy directly but to confirm their theory about the existence of races. In the end, their project was only a partial success because they lacked powerful elite allies. Still, they shifted the census in important ways.

Nott's and DeBow's attempts to collect evidence about race were not isolated. Lay categorization was shifting in the same direction as ethnology, as race became more salient in the South and North in the 1840s. Racial exclusion in the South hardened with the spread of the "Cotton Kingdom": a system of agricultural production geared toward supplying English textile mills (Du Bois [1935] 2007:2, 5, 354). The legal hardening of slavery together with the racialization of African Americans reached its high point in the Dred-Scott decision of 1857 that guaranteed federal protection of slavery in the territories as well as denying free blacks equal rights with whites, regardless of their residence (Wilson 2012:27). Free blacks had been allowed to vote outside of Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but as the nineteenth century progressed, these rights were stripped away (Du Bois [1935] 2007:4). During the same period, the legal rules defining who could be considered white were becoming more rigid across the South (Schor 2009:85).

Furthermore, during the nineteenth century, some slaves lived in southern cities. They often worked for wages and paid their owners a rent, making them similar to a working class. These urban slaves lived together in distinct black communities, instead of living with the plantation households. Consequently, the growth of the black urban population led to residential segregation. Race then may have become an increasingly salient marker not only because of the hardening of slavery but also because of urban growth that created visible black neighborhoods (Wilson 2012:37–40).

Starting in the 1840s and continuing through the Civil War, the color line also hardened north of the Mason-Dixon line, where

racialization was linked to the formation of the northern working class. During these years (or perhaps before), proletarians in the North developed a racial identity as white independent workers distinct from black slaves in reaction to the deteriorating status of artisans as industrialization proceeded (Allen 1994:164; Arnesen 2001a:15–16; 2001b:88–89; Kolchin 2002:163; Roediger 2007:13–14, 46–47). The northern working class in this decade formed an alliance with the racist Democratic Party, and many workers rioted and killed blacks following the Emancipation Proclamation (Du Bois [1935] 2007:71, 83). The status of African Americans in the North also declined during the 1840s (Roediger 2007:57). The census reflected this hardening of racial categories.

The Last Antebellum Racial Categories: 1850–1860

The 1850 census introduced a dramatic change by listing the name and characteristics of each individual; previous censuses were headcounts that listed only the name of household head (Anderson 1988:85). The census asked questions about name, age, sex, race, occupation, value of real estate, place of birth, new marriages, school attendance, literacy, and disabilities (Wright 1900:147). This shift created many possibilities for analysis and allowed the census to move beyond its original use for political apportionment (Anderson 1988:33; Schor 2009:66). This transformation is especially apparent in the questions about occupation and race.

The census of 1850, unlike the previous ones, asked individuals to state their occupation (Conk 1978:111; Wright 1900:32–33, 147). The instructions for filling out this question, however, were vague, stating simply, "insert opposite the name of each male the specific profession, occupation, or trade which the said person is known and reputed to follow in the place where he resides—as clergyman, physician, lawyer, shoemaker, student, farmer, carpenter, laborer, tailor, boatman, sailor, or otherwise, as the fact may be" (Wright 1900:152). The census of 1860 seemed to have followed a similar procedure, although we have not been able to locate specific instructions to the enumerators for this question (cf. Wright 1900:154). The 1860 census also added a question about personal assets (Wright 1900:154). The 1850 and 1860 census reports printed lists of occupations without any classification or cross tabulation of the results (US Census Office 1897a:lxxv). Thus, although the census collected occupational information in this period, census officials seemed to have had little idea of what to do with it.

The 1850 census's second main innovation was to pose an unambiguous race question. Earlier censuses combined race with legal status reflecting the social coincidence of slavery and blackness in the South (Emigh et al. forthcoming). The 1850 census registered legal status with different forms: schedule 1 for "free inhabitants" and schedule 2 for "slave inhabitants" (Wright 1900:147). ("Indians not taxed" were not enumerated in this census [Wright 1900:151].) Both schedules asked about "color," largely—though not completely—building the conceptual separation of race and legal status into the census schedule. For schedule 1, the instructions stated, "in all cases where the person is white, leave the space blank; in all cases where the person is black, insert the letter B; if mulatto, insert M" (Wright 1900:152). For schedule 2, the instructions stated, "insert, in all cases, when the slave is black the letter B; when he or she is a mulatto, insert M" (Wright 1900:153). The instructions emphasized that "the color of all slaves should be noted," something that no previous census had done (Wright 1900:153). In 1850, enumerators were to leave the color column blank for whites; in 1860, they were instructed that it should never be left blank (Wright 1900:152, 157). This perhaps was a small movement toward the marking of white as a race. Notably, however, there was no possibility of slaves being white, as this was not a relevant social category, so race and legal status were not completely independent (Emigh et al. forthcoming). Enumerators assigned each individual free person or slave a race (white, black, or mulatto in the case of free persons; black or mulatto in the case of slaves) (Nobles 2002:50–51; Wright 1900:142–143, 147).

There may have been some international influences on the US census because Joseph C. G. Kennedy, the director of the census, took a trip to Europe during the summer of 1851. However, there is little direct evidence of intentional imitation of international models, and Kennedy's trip occurred after the 1850 census was fielded (Ventresca 1995:182). In general, the development of the US census may have been exceptionally free from international influences because it developed before most other national censuses (Ventresca 1995:180).

The Transformation of the American Social Elite and the Rise of the Experts

In 1850, there were few professional organizations in the United States, but their numbers increased around 1900 as higher education expanded (Skowronek 1982:33, 43; Wiebe 1967:115, 121). Experts became independent policy advocates outside the framework of the

parties (Skowronek 1982:33). They often worked at the local level for movements that aimed to improve municipal government, and they argued that political problems could be solved through technical competence (Wiebe 1967:145–155). These experts tried to link government decisions to systematically collected evidence, and they often pushed for governmental fact-finding commissions such as the Bureau of Corporations, the Dillingham Immigration Commission, and the Children's Bureau (Nugent 2010:58–59). Doctors, lawyers, teachers, reformers, and social workers established organizations between the late 1870s and early 1900s (Clemens 1997:36; Wiebe 1967:115–123). These groups, although nongovernmental, often demanded a strengthened civil service as a strategy for breaking the control of the parties that characterized American politics in the mid-nineteenth century (Skowronek 1982:52–53, 55). This new professional elite also often sought to establish a link between knowledge collection and public policy (Hofstadter 1956:153–155; Wiebe 1967:153–155).

The increasing organizational weight of these intellectuals coincided with the rise of a new type of race thinking—social Darwinism. Unlike polygenesis, it conceived of races as human groups developing through a struggle for survival, not as permanent essences (Hofstadter 1955:40–41, 59–60, 170–200; Nobles 2000:53). Because races developed through mechanisms, such as population change, they could improve or deteriorate. An interest in fertility, therefore, dominated the census but for reasons that were different than in the era of polygenesis in the 1840s (Nobles 2000:56). Social Darwinism inspired many eugenics groups in the late nineteenth century (Jacobson 1998:77–78). The turn to eugenics in the United States, however, occurred in a context in which race was a well-established lay category. Indeed, race was becoming increasingly important during the late nineteenth century for two reasons: the collapse of the slave-holding South and the rise of immigration from southern and eastern Europe (Nugent 2010:16; Wiebe 1967:110).

The emergence of the newly organized professionals, combined with changes in the American social elite, created a new social context for official information. The Civil War was a clear-cut victory of an industrial bourgeoisie over a precapitalist agrarian elite (Du Bois [1935] 2007:172–175). It laid the foundations for the political dominance of the industrialists. This new set of elite power relations solidified in 1877 at the end of Reconstruction (1865–1876). Northern industry dominated the federal government, but the planter class remained in absolute local dominance in the South (Bensel 1984:81). These two wings of the social elite, which had been sharply opposed in the 1860s,

came to a rapprochement in part because of the northern industry's increasing investment in the South (Wilson 2012:56). Northern capitalists were leery of provoking serious white resistance by attempting to guarantee civil rights in the South and thus jettisoned their former support for radical Reconstruction (Bensel 1984:77).

About 1880, a remarkable development coalition emerged. It centered on an alliance cemented by the Republican Party between northern industry and sectors of the northern industrial working class (Bensel 1984:62). This coalition was solidified through a combination of high tariff barriers and the Civil War pension system. Tariffs, supported by northern industry and sharply opposed by the postbellum agriculturalists, funded a pension system aimed exclusively at the northern Civil War veterans, which operated as a patronage machine for the Republican Party (Bensel 1984:62–63). Thus, by the late nineteenth century, experts, organized professionally into lobbies, had potentially extremely powerful allies in northern industrial capitalists. This alliance came to fruition around eugenics and immigration.

Late Nineteenth-Century Eugenics and Immigration

Although the Republican Party had a strong base of support linked to tariffs and redistribution, its hold over the northern working class was always tenuous. During the late nineteenth century, Republican hegemony was threatened by the rise of often ethnically linked political machines connected to the northern Democratic Party (Hofstadter 1956:173–177; Wiebe 1967:30–31). This threatened the Republican Party with a cross-class alliance of southern planters and northern workers (Bensel 1984:72). In this political context, immigration became a major political issue. As immigration increased, the Republican industrial elite began to suggest the existence of "racial" differences among people of European ancestry (Jacobson 1998:76–77). Just as southern Progressives often embraced Jim Crow, their northern counterparts often swathed anti-immigrant positions in the language of good government (Wiebe 1967:60–61). For example, Theodore Roosevelt, widely regarded as the first Progressive president, established the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Nugent 2010:41).

A new elite lobby emerged in 1893—the Immigration Restriction League (Jacobson 1998:77). A group of Harvard graduates founded it, and important financial and industrial elites (including the founders of Kellogg Foods and the National Geographic and the vice president of the American Security and Trust Company) as well as

prominent private foundations, such as Rockefeller and Carnegie, supported it (Anderson 1988:136–137; Tucker 1994:88). The lobby became closely linked to politics.

By 1900, the population of the big eastern cities was growing faster than that of the rural or western areas—immigration from southern and eastern Europe drove much of this growth (Anderson 1988:137). This became a serious political issue after 1910. The size of the House of Representatives was fixed at 435 members, and after 1912, it was no longer possible to admit new states to gain political advantage (Anderson 1988:139). Immigration thus threatened to shift the center of political power to the eastern seaboard cities that were dominated by Democratic ethnic political machines.

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Republican-controlled Congress stood to lose from these demographic changes and sought to restrict immigration. Between 1907 and 1911, the Immigration Committee heard testimony and developed a bill proposing immigration quotas (Anderson 1988:141). The attempt to undermine the political power of immigrants was successful in the short term. In 1920, the US Congress, dominated by agrarian representatives and supported by the Immigration Restriction League, refused to apportion congressional representation on the basis of the census returns that indicated for the first time that the urban population was greater than the rural population (Nugent 2010:121). Congress then passed a 1921 emergency immigration law that established quotas according to the percentage of the foreign-born population of different regions as revealed in the 1910 census and a much more restrictive National Origins Act (also called the Johnson Act) in 1924 that based its quotas on the 1890 census (Anderson 1988:143, 147). The intellectual justification for this legislation was scientific racism. The Immigration Restriction League pushed for information on national origins in the interests of restricting immigration, and its agitation for a national origins quota was couched in terms of protecting the American race (Jacobson 1998:83–84).

By the 1910s and 1920s, many people, particularly men who were involved in the census, linked census evidence and racial thought. Francis Walker, the census superintendent in the 1880s, was a leading proponent of immigration restriction (Anderson 1988:137). After his death, other leading figures associated with the census, such as Joseph Hill, S. N. D. North, and William Rossiter, continued to promote these views (Anderson 1988:137). The ideas of these census officials were incorporated into the Immigration Commission that produced the key immigration legislation of the 1920s (Anderson 1988:137; Tucker

1994:96). From the perspective of those pushing for restrictions, a fundamental distinction existed between "old" immigrants and "new" immigrants. The old immigrants were from a superior race with higher intelligence and better work ethics than the new immigrants who threatened to weaken the Nordic racial stock (Anderson 1988:143; Tucker 1994:71–97). The eugenicists' specific racial theory, inspired by these groupings of immigrants, however, stood in considerable tension with the dichotomy of black and white that had consolidated in the early part of the nineteenth century. Crucially, this eugenic thought threatened the coherence of the category of "white." For example, many eugenicists in the late nineteenth century distinguished among "Nordics," "Mediterraneans," and "Alpines," as well as "Negroes" and "Jews" (Tucker 1994:89–91). These distinctions gained official sanction through the Dillingham Commission (Jacobson 1998:82–83). In sum, the rise of eugenic thinking was tightly connected with northern industrialists and their political allies in the Republican Party. Census officials subscribed to similar eugenic ideas.

Mobilizing for Whiteness: A Class Struggle Over Race

Despite the rise of eugenic thinking, the racial divide between blacks and whites was continually reinforced in the South and the North during this period of time. In fact, whiteness became a powerful focus of political mobilization in the late nineteenth century. Emancipation and the defeat of the Confederacy hardly meant the end of racism. Apart from the most radical abolitionists, most northern Republicans who supported the war hoped that blacks would either emigrate or die out (Anderson 1988:69; Du Bois [1935] 2007:66, 216; Nobles 2000:46–47). Of course, the postbellum period created new possibilities. However, these were eliminated in a complex process involving popular struggles in both the North and the South.

The outcome of the late nineteenth-century struggles in the South was Jim Crow, a regime of racial segregation given constitutional legitimacy by the decision of the Supreme Court in *Plessy versus Ferguson* in 1896 (King 1995:18). This regime, symbolically anchored in the distinction between black and white, was the unintended consequence of struggles that reconfigured the political economy of the South after the Civil War. It was fully in place only in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Directly after the defeat of the Confederacy, the former planters attempted to reimpose slavery through legislation known as the "Black Codes." Under the cover of vagrancy laws,

these codes attempted to make it impossible for blacks to leave their employer (Du Bois [1935] 2007:136–137; Wilson 2012:53). But the radical Reconstruction governments of the late 1860s blocked these codes, making any return to chattel slavery, even in a modified form, impossible. In 1867 and 1868, planters began to break up their large holdings into small plots assigned to single families (Wiener 1979:976). However, after the end of Reconstruction, the planters were able to reimpose a labor repressive agricultural system (Emigh 2009:184; Wiener 1979:978–981). Through debt peonage, planters reasserted their control over black labor.

The second element of Jim Crow was the solidification of the white racial group that partly bridged the deep class divides in the South. Under Reconstruction, blacks exercised significant political and civil rights. The compromise of 1877 eroded these gains, but African Americans continued to vote and hold local office (Woodward 1974:33). Segregation was neither as consistent nor as pervasive as it would become. As late as 1900, blacks voted in considerable numbers in many southern states including Virginia, Texas, and North Carolina (Tuck 2009:139).

Jim Crow legislation swept through the South, reversing blacks' relatively enhanced position in the 1890s. Most southern states passed laws to exclude blacks from voting between 1895 and 1910 (Woodward 1974:84). Changes in the federal government and the strategy of the Republican Party may partly explain this reversal of African American rights (Tuck 2009:141, 143). The reversal was also closely linked to class struggles among whites. At the end of Reconstruction, the Democratic Party reemerged as the dominant political organization in most southern states. Men with paternalistic and conservative outlooks on race, who were often former plantation owners, led this party. They initially supported black suffrage because it could offset poor whites' opposition to policies that were favorable to business (Wilson 2012:55, 57; Woodward 1974:52–57).

The political scene shifted during 1890s. The Populist Party arose, and it threatened to create a different political alliance between blacks and whites with antibusiness proclivities. These Populists severely threatened the political position of the southern elite organized in the Democratic Party because it might unify nonelites across race. For example, the Populist platform of 1896 denounced lynch laws, and the famous Populist leader Tom Watson argued that racial prejudice was a tool to divide the poor in their struggle against the rich (Woodward 1974:62–64). In the face of this threat from below, the same conservative politicians who once supported black suffrage now

opposed it, and they cemented an alliance with openly racist elements among the insurgents to split the Populist interracial coalition (Nugent 2010:21; Wiebe 1967:107–110; Wilson 2012:58; Woodward 1974:79). By the 1890s, many important Populists, including Tom Watson, converted to white supremacy positions, and Populism degenerated into the technocratic and racist political movement known as Progressivism (Katznelson 2013:144–145; Nugent 2010:30, 53–54; Wiebe 1967:105; Woodward 1974:89). Many Progressive candidates came to power by supporting black disfranchisement (Woodward 1974:91). The reassertion of a unified white interest in the South in the 1890s thus stemmed from social struggles in which southern elites successfully incorporated poor whites in a cross-class racial coalition against African American agriculturalists.

The reconsolidation of the black-white divide in the 1880s and 1890s was not simply a matter of white assertion. African Americans resisted encroachments on their rights, and they increasingly did so as blacks. For example, the number of black voluntary organizations exploded as many southern whites tried to reverse the gains of Reconstruction. Black fraternal lodges developed most dramatically in two distinct periods in the 1880s and the first decade of the twentieth century (Skocpol and Oser 2004:381). Strikingly, certain key national-level organizations, such as the Odd Fellows, spread more rapidly among blacks than whites (Skocpol and Oser 2004:386). Blacks used these organizations to defend their eroding rights and also to assert their equality or superiority to whites (Liazos and Ganz 2004:486–487; Tuck 2009:146). In sum, during the late nineteenth century, in the South, the consolidation of the racial categories of white and black was the outcome of class struggles and alliances between races outside of the bureaucratic politics of census taking.

The consolidation of a white interest group was hardly confined to the South. Immediately after Reconstruction, the position of African Americans in the North improved somewhat. Prior to the exodus of black agriculturalists from the South in the 1890s, there were few African Americans competing with whites for northern jobs (Wilson 2012:62–63). However, African Americans' position deteriorated sharply in the 1890s in the North (King and Tuck 2007:221). *Plessy versus Ferguson* was almost as consequential in the North as it was in the South because it permitted segregation in both locations (King and Tuck 2007:238). Although there was no formal Jim Crow legislation, political parties were uninterested in African American votes; blacks were mostly excluded from the patronage opportunities available to party organizers, and northern employers used race to split

black and white workers in ways that mirrored the attack on interracial, southern Populism (King and Tuck 2007:225). As in the South, the white working class responded to the use of black labor by aggressively and violently organizing itself as a white interest (Wilson 2012:83). Thus, incidents of per capita violence against African Americans were nationally dispersed and not just concentrated in the South between 1889 and 1918. Over these decades, African Americans were more likely to be lynched in Wyoming, New Mexico, and Oregon than they were in the Deep South (King and Tuck 2007:227). Furthermore, Nebraska, Missouri, and Iowa all had higher rates of lynching than South Carolina, Virginia, and North Carolina. The deteriorating position of African Americans was linked to the rising tide of white supremacy nationwide (King and Tuck 2007:243).

Popular mobilization focused on whiteness even, and perhaps especially, among groups whose "white" status was contested. In the late nineteenth century, many new immigrant groups tried to link themselves rhetorically to the putatively white project of American imperial expansion (Jacobson 1998:209). The panethnic white category offered an escape valve for groups with low status in the American racial hierarchy, such as the Irish, the Jews, and the Italians (Jacobson 1998:109–117; King 2000:39–47). The ethnic boundaries separating the new immigrants from the old were much more permeable than the one distinguishing white from black (Fox and Guglielmo 2012:334). Most importantly, the category, "white," remained in the censuses despite the eugenicists' development of racial thinking that discriminated among different types of whites.

Paradoxically, then, the formation of this white interest occurred at exactly the historical moment when monolithic whiteness was under intellectual attack by the eugenicists. However, the eugenics movement, unlike broader mobilizations around whiteness, had no popular base. Its influence over the US census was due to the strategic positions that its leading proponents occupied, not their mass appeal (Tucker 1994:55–56). Indeed, American eugenicists tended to be contemptuous of democracy, elitist, and disdainful of mass politics in general (Tucker 1994:104–106). The eugenicists' greatest triumph, the National Origins Act of 1924, turned out to be a defeat. By halting European immigration, the act reinforced white racial solidarity and undermined ethnic distinctions within the white bloc (Wilson 2012:72–73). The racial project of these elites was defeated by the reassertion of the black-white dichotomy. Although this dichotomy was certainly institutionalized in the US state, it was primarily the result of a series of decisive social struggles in the late nineteenth

century, not an imposition on the population by experts in race science. The elite groups that led the eugenics movement failed to transform the racial scheme of either the US population or its census because their racial scheme ran against lay categorization. These class struggles about race were reflected in the development of racial categories in the late nineteenth-century US census and in the reassertion of the primary division between whites and blacks in the census by 1930 (Jacobson 1998:82–84; Nobles 2000:71).

The Expansion of Occupation and Race: 1870–1920

The census of 1870 resembled that of 1860 except that it added questions about parents' place of birth and voting rights (Bohme 1989:26–27, 48–49). There were two primary changes in the censuses in this period. First, occupational statistics became much more developed. From 1870 onward, in the jargon of the census, there was a shift from an "industrial" to an "occupational" classification, meaning that the census was supposed to collect evidence on the type of work, not on the branch of industry within which this work was performed. As the instructions stated, "You are under no obligation to give any man's occupation just as he expresses it. If he can not tell intelligibly what it *is*, find out what he *does*, and characterize his profession accordingly" (Wright 1900:159). The censuses of 1880, 1890, and 1900 repeated this instruction (Wright 1900:171–172, 189–191).

The second change in this period was the development of ever more elaborate racial and ethnic questions. But the occupation and race questions developed differently. While census officials collected an enormous quantity of occupational evidence, they struggled to classify it. Instead, tables generally listed occupations under branches of industry. In contrast, census officials had no difficulty in generating racial and ethnic maps of the US population.

Census officials wanted three different sorts of occupational information: branch of industry, type of activity, and position within the work place. However, until 1910, the form had only one question that asked for a description of the occupation (Edwards 1943:88). Because the single question had multiple purposes, it could not produce clear information. Thus, the instructions for the 1890 census cautioned:

> Be careful to distinguish between the *farm laborer*, the *farmer*, and *farm overseer*; also between the *plantation laborer*, the *planter*, and *plantation overseer*. These three classes must be kept distinct, and each occupation separately returned.

> Do not confuse the *agricultural laborer*, who works on the farm or plantation, with the general or day laborer, who works on the road or at odd jobs in the village or town. Distinguish also between *wood choppers* at work regularly in the woods or forests and the laborer who takes a job occasionally at chopping wood. (US Census Office 1897a:lxxvii)

Enumerators faced the impossible task of distinguishing full time from part time work and in differentiating between the position in employment and branch of industry, without a clear guide or a form that asked each of these questions separately. Not surprisingly, the census results did not produce an occupational classification. The 1900 census simply lists occupations under the headings: agricultural pursuits, professional service, domestic and personal service, trade and transportation, and manufacturing and mechanical pursuits (US Bureau of the Census 1904:xxiv–xxv).

Starting in 1910, the census questions were supposed to locate occupations within the hierarchy of production. They no longer asked simply for the respondent's occupation but also provided a separate column asking whether the respondent was an employee, employer, or working on his own account (Conk 1978:113). The Census Bureau's classification of occupations based on these actual questions was somewhat altered but not fundamentally changed (Edwards 1943:88; US Bureau of the Census 1914:17). The notion of skill was apparently used to a limited extent to classify occupations; however, the occupational tables of the 1910 census were not organized according to skill but according to broad industrial categories (Edwards 1911:621, 636; Conk 1978:126). The form for the 1920 census was similar to its 1910 counterpart. It distinguished profession from industry and asked about workers' position in the hierarchy of production (US Bureau of the Census 1922:1377).

Strikingly, in contrast to the conceptual vagueness of the occupation question and its tabulation, queries on race and ethnicity were elaborated during this period. In line with the concerns of nativist northern elites who dominated the census from 1870, the census began to ask about place of foreign birth. In the 1870 census, there were three questions: "place of birth" that required the respondent to list "country, if of foreign birth," "father of foreign birth," and "mother of foreign birth" (Wright 1900:154–155). The first question required the respondent to state the country of his or her birth as specifically as possible, while the second two questions required "yes" or "no" responses. In 1880, these questions were further developed under the

general rubric of "nativity." This census required respondents to list their birth place as well as their fathers' and mothers' birth place (it removed the question on voting rights) (Wright 1900:166). The form was similar for all of the censuses from 1890 to 1920, although the 1910 and 1920 censuses also asked a question about language (US Bureau of the Census 1921:693–694; Wright 1900:177).

The census of 1890 added questions on fertility, ability to speak English, unemployment, and property ownership. In both the 1880 and 1890 censuses, officials used the evidence produced by these questions to tabulate the immigrant population by country of origin (US Census Office 1883:482–487; 1897b:68–114). The 1900 census simplified these tables by distinguishing primarily between native-born and foreign-born whites (Bohme 1989:41–42; US Census Office 1901:xcviii–cx). By 1910, the distinction between "nativity" and "color" or "race" was well codified in the reports (Bohme 1989:48–49). As the abstract of the 1910 census stated, "classification by color or race distinguishes six groups, namely, white, negro, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and 'all other' (consisting principally of Hindus and Koreans)" (US Bureau of the Census 1913:77). In contrast, nativity was a distinction among the "white population" (US Bureau of the Census 1913:77). The report distinguished four groups: "natives of native parentage," "natives of foreign parentage," "natives of mixed parentage," and "foreign born" (US Bureau of the Census 1913:77). By 1920, the census reports graphically represented foreign-born whites becoming part of the "native white" population over time (US Bureau of the Census 1922:24–25).

The older race question also developed in the period. The 1870 census asked respondents to indicate one of five "colors": white, black, mulatto, Chinese, or Indian (Wright 1900:154). In 1880, the instructions to the enumerators again reinforced the importance of color:

> It must not be assumed that, where nothing is written in this column "white" is to be understood. The column is always to be filled. Be particularly careful in reporting the class *mulatto.* The word is here generic, and includes quadroons, octoroons, and all persons having a perceptible trace of African blood. Important scientific results depend upon the correct determination of this class in schedules 1 and 5. (Wright 1900:171)

Similar instructions recur in all of the late nineteenth-century censuses. The 1890 census attempted greater precision. Now the form

distinguished among "white, black, mulatto, quadroon, octoroon, Chinese, Japanese, or Indian" (Wright 1900:177). These various colors were specified in the census instructions that state:

> Write *white*, *black*, *mulatto*, *quadroon*, *octoroon*, *Chinese*, *Japanese*, or *Indian*, according to the color or race of the person enumerated. Be particularly careful to distinguish between blacks, mulattoes, quadroons, and octoroons. The world "black" should be used to describe those persons who have three-fourths or more black blood; "mulatto," those persons who have from three-eighths to five-eighths black blood; "quadroon," those persons who have one-fourth black blood; and "octoroon," those persons who have one eighth or any trace of black blood. (Wright 1900:187)

The three censuses thus developed increasingly complex racial categories, distinguishing especially among different degrees of color. The 1900 racial categories were different: instead of attempting to track different quantities of "black blood," the schedule counterposed white to black. The form continued to treat Chinese, Japanese, and Indians as separate races (Bohme 1989:41). The 1910 census reintroduced the "mulatto" category while also adding an "other" option to the race question (Bohme 1989:50). The 1920 census appears to have followed the same racial categories as the 1910 census, although unlike the other censuses, the instructions to the enumerators on how to fill out the forms are not included in the published census volumes (Bohme 1989:58; Lee 1993:77–79; US Bureau of the Census 1921:693–694).

The censuses of 1890, 1900, and 1910 constitute a distinctive set within this group. They asked women how many children they had had and how many of them were alive at the time of the census (Bohme 1989:34, 41, 48). Although these questions were not explicitly focused on racial and ethnic groups and although census officials did not tabulate the results of them, they were probably driven by a concern with racial demography that permeated these censuses more generally. For example, the official Census Office reports for the 1900 census tabulated data according to race and used the previous decennial censuses to conclude that "The negro race may be said to have represented, in effect, a steadily decreasing proportion of the total population since the first census was taken in 1790" (US Census Office 1901:cxv). This information provided evidence for the debate in the late nineteenth century about the demographic future of the African American population (Nobles 2000:57). Francis Walker argued that blacks were capable of living only in semitropical areas,

and that they would be pushed into the southern United States and toward the Mexican border. He was thus interested in investigating the geographical distribution of the "colored population" (Walker 1899:127–128).

Another key concern evident in these censuses is the foreign population. A comparison between the 1890 and 1900 censuses showed that the largest increase in the foreign population arose from immigrants from "Austria," "Bohemia," "Poland," "Russia," and "Italy" rather than from northern and western Europe (US Census Office 1901:clxxii). Census officials were interested in racial and ethnic categories because they wanted to provide evidence relevant to an intense political debate about the racial balance of the population.

The designation of "Indian" was also central to the US census. However, the enumeration of Native Americans throughout this period was uneven. Unless they lived in white residential areas and were subject to taxation, they were not considered part of the US population (Jobe 2004:70–71). Native Americans were more often classified in racial categories like whites and blacks after they were granted citizenship in 1924 (chapter 6; Jobe 2004:74–75).

The purpose of the US census in this period, in sum, was to document differences in the racial and ethnic composition of the population. Although occupational statistics began to develop, census officials had no conceptual framework for either collecting or using the information to paint a general image of the population. The census focused on immigrants, blacks, and whites. Furthermore, despite the rise of nativist eugenics ideology in the late nineteenth century, the deployment of racial categories in the census shows clearly that the distinction between black and white was by far the most socially salient one.

The Rise of Interest Groups

During the Progressive Era, expert advocacy shaped American politics. However, the era of interest group politics, which would become very important for the US census in the mid-twentieth century, really only began in 1920s and 1930s. The three main pillars of this new form of politics were an agrarian interest embodied in the National Grange and the American Farm Bureau Federation, a business interest embodied in the US Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, and, in a distinctly subordinate position, a labor interest embodied in the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (Key 1958:39–46,

59–62, 97–100). These three interest groups were institutionalized during the New Deal of the 1930s, which was a period of fundamental reconfiguration of the relationship between the US state and society.

This reconfiguration was two sided: there was a massive expansion of the state and a reorganization of society. During the New Deal, government agencies exercised unparalleled power that was outside of congressional control. Indeed by the end of World War II, the government owned 40 percent of capital assets in the country (Katznelson 2013:342–346). This meant that decisions made in agencies had a huge potential impact. At the same time, interest groups proliferated, and they directly pressured agencies in new ways.

The rise of agrarian interest group politics was closely connected with the depression in agricultural prices that began in the early 1920s. The National Grange was a leftover from the Populist mobilization of the 1880s; by the 1920s, it lobbied for wealthy northeastern farmers (Key 1958:38). The American Farm Bureau Federation had different origins. Starting in 1914, the federal government provided grants to land grant colleges to hire county agricultural agents to disseminate information about agricultural techniques. Associations then formed that transferred this information from the county agents to the farmers. These associations were the precursors of local farm bureaus (Key 1958:31). As these associations spread, they federated, establishing the American Farm Bureau Federation. In the 1920s, this organization was an extremely powerful lobby that influenced Congress (Key 1958:31). In the wake of the great depression, the American Farm Bureau Federation was a central player in shaping the politics of Roosevelt's New Deal, which in turn had a large impact on interest group politics. As an organization representing primarily large midwestern corn farmers and southern cotton farmers, the American Farm Bureau Federation tended to represent the interests of agricultural employers rather than workers. Although it embraced price supports for agricultural crops, it lobbied successfully against policies to aid low income farmers, tenants, and seasonal workers (who were often African American in the South) (Katznelson 2013:251; Key 1958:42, 45–46).

The formation of this agrarian interest was a major reason why the American working class also organized itself as a pressure group rather than as a class. Cut off from their natural agricultural allies, industrial workers organized mostly in the northeast and upper midwest under the aegis of American Federation of Labor and the slightly more militant Congress of Industrial Organizations. Both of these organizations—the American Federation of Labor to a greater

extent—focused on collective bargaining to improve the material conditions of their particular members rather than on advocating for the interests of workers as a class (Katznelson 2013:241; Key 1958:65–69). Thus, during the New Deal, labor, like agriculture, emerged as an interest group (Katznelson 2013:479).

Business emerged as the third key interest group in American politics. Until the turn of the century, direct political activity by American businesses was unusual. Yet as political protection became increasingly necessary, business organizations began to try to influence public opinion directly. The most important organizations were the Chamber of Commerce and the more extreme National Association of Manufacturers (Key 1958:105–108).

Cross cutting the interest group pluralism was the continuing division between white and black. During the New Deal in the 1930s, a cross-class alliance, similar to the one that formed during the early years of Populism, emerged. Northern labor organizations, particularly the Congress of Industrial Organizations, began in this period to organize black and white workers together as a class. This strategy had some limited success, yet the southern wing of the Democratic Party that was a pillar of Roosevelt's coalition sharply resisted it (Katznelson 2013:156–194; Wilson 2012:77–78). The New Deal in fact in some ways solidified racial differences by excluding domestic and seasonal agricultural work—overwhelmingly dominated by African Americans, especially in the South—from the Social Security Act (Katznelson 2013:260).

The Institutionalization of Social Interests: 1930–1940

In comparison to the earlier censuses, the 1930 and 1940 ones changed in two fundamental ways. First, interest groups directly lobbied the Census Bureau more than before, and this consultation started to become institutionalized. Second, the census became much more focused on economic issues than before. Race never disappeared as a framework, but issues of unemployment and occupational distribution moved to the fore.

The Census Act of 1929 that governed both the 1930 and the 1940 censuses gave the authority to ask specific questions to the director of the Census Bureau instead of leaving this authority to Congress. These decisions then had to be approved by the secretary of commerce. Thus, to a certain degree, the census became insulated from congressional pressure (Jenkins 1985:3). However, it became more open to

social pressure because many consultative bodies were established that brought social scientists and business people directly into census decision making. There was some precedent for this: in 1918, a Census Advisory Committee had been established that was jointly sponsored by the American Economic Association and the American Statistical Association (Anderson 1988:128–129). But institutionalized consultation with experts and organized interests developed in the 1930s. The most important of these new bodies was the Committee on Government Statistics and Information Services established in 1933 by the American Statistical Association and the Social Science Research Council (Jenkins 1985:5). It was established by a grant from the private Rockefeller Foundation to the Social Science Research Council. The committee secured space in the Department of Commerce building and became a conduit linking academics to the census (Jenkins 1985:5). The annual report of the Census Bureau to the Department of Commerce for 1930 described "meetings of committees of economists, statisticians, experts and others" to determine the census questions (US Department of Commerce 1930:69). The 1940 forms were first drawn up by the director of the census and then presented in a conference held in March of 1939 and presided over by Louis I. Dublin, an employee of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. The schedule was subsequently discussed at an April conference of the National Bureau of Economic Research. In addition, the Census Advisory Committee held meetings between April and June of 1939 (Jenkins 1985:11). The 1940 annual report of the Census Bureau described "numerous conferences with groups representing the government, business, and specialized interest groups" and claimed that in drawing up the schedules "more than a thousand persons were consulted directly, and several thousand contributed their ideas to group representatives who came to Washington to present their recommendations" (US Department of Commerce 1941:38–39). The censuses of 1930 and 1940 were thus much more directly the products of organized interest groups than the previous censuses in which social influence had usually been filtered through Congress.

Census officials also tried to mobilize interest groups to collect information. The Census Bureau's report to the secretary of commerce in 1930 described attempts to secure "the cooperation and assistance of local organizations, such as chambers of commerce, boards of trade and business clubs" (US Department of Commerce 1930:69). The annual report of the secretary of commerce in 1940 described the census as "a national undertaking, the Bureau of the Census being but the instrumentality for the census" (US Department of

Commerce 1941:37). This report claimed that cooperation had been established between the Census Bureau and local committees sponsored by chambers of commerce and by state, county, and municipal officials (US Department of Commerce 1941:40). Thus, during this period of time, there were multiple social influences on the census, but the decisive ones came from economic elites. However, the model of consultation established in the 1930 and 1940 censuses could be opened to broader influences, as we show (chapter 6).

The 1930 census added questions about employment and veteran status, and it asked a few questions about the value, characteristics, and amenities of the home (Bohme 1989:60). There were two important changes in the 1930 census with respect to the 1920 census. First, in 1930, the census asked a question on unemployment for the first time since 1910. This was a controversial addition. In 1928, the Census Advisory Committee opposed asking an employment question for the 1930 census (Anderson 1988:128–129, 164). However, Senator Robert Wagner, one of the more progressive politicians during the New Deal, included a question on unemployment in the final census bill, in part to embarrass the Hoover administration (Anderson 1988:164–5; Bohme 1989:61). Second, the census changed its question about the value of respondents' homes and added other questions about the respondents' residential characteristics and living conditions (Bohme 1989:58, 60). These questions point to an attempt to understand better the economic circumstances of the population; the questions about housing were later separated from the population census (Anderson 1988:186).

The 1940 census was a new departure. The census added questions on residence, employment, occupation, and income (Bohme 1989:64–68). It instituted a separate survey for housing characteristics (Jenkins 1985:16). For the first time, in 1940, the Census Bureau used sampling for some questions. Sampling theory had been developed in the nineteenth century, but it was only with the incorporation of trained statisticians into the census staff that sampling became widely used (Jenkins 1985:3). They capitalized on the existing format: the census form looked like a large spreadsheet with each individual listed on one of 40 lines. To implement sampling, 2 of the 40 respondents on each lined sheet were asked 13 questions in addition to the ones asked of all the respondents (Jenkins 1985:14). These 13 questions focused on parents' place of birth, occupation, and the fertility of married women.

The most dramatic expansion in both the 1930 and 1940 censuses concerned occupational statistics. There were two main developments.

First, these censuses collected data on unemployment and could report an unemployment rate. Questions about unemployment had been asked since the 1890 census. However, they remained vague; prior to 1930 they simply stated either the number of weeks a person was unemployed in the previous year or whether or not the person was unemployed on a specific day. No unemployment question was asked during the 1920 census. The 1930 census, in contrast, asked respondents who were unemployed to fill out an unemployment schedule that determined the reason for unemployment and whether or not the respondent was looking for a job (Bohme 1989:62). Unemployment was also a central concern of the 1940 census. This was the first census to establish a statistic for the "labor force" understood as all the persons either working or seeking work during the week from March 24 to March 30, 1940 (Jenkins 1985:12).

The questions in the censuses of 1930 and 1940 laid the foundations for viewing occupations, in particular, and class, more generally, as a social structure. The 1910 census asked respondents to identify as employers, employees, or working on their own account (Bohme 1989:49; Conk 1978:124). However, these data were generally not tabulated to produce an image of the occupational or class structure of the US population. The tabulation of census data to understand the occupational structure began with the 1930 census and was largely the work of Alba M. Edwards.

Edwards (1938:1) was particularly interested in skill as a criterion to discriminate among types of occupations, and it became one of the main criteria of the "social-economic group" that he used to analyze the 1930 census data. He recognized the empirical problems posed by this classification: "it is plainly impossible to draw a hard and fast line between those occupations characterized principally by the exercise of muscular force or manual dexterity and those characterized chiefly by the exercise of mental force or ingenuity" (Edwards 1938:1). However, he suggested that "such a line of demarcation probably may be made sufficiently exact for our purposes" (Edwards 1938:1). However, the basic problem with this classification was that the census never attempted to gather any information on the skill content of jobs. Despite this absence, Edwards proceeded with reclassification, but it was somewhat arbitrary. In his discussion of the 1930 census, for example, Edwards listed carpenters and coopers under the heading "skilled workers and foremen," while "fishermen and oystermen" and "coal mine operatives" were "unskilled workers" (Edwards 1938:3–6). The codebook for the 1940 classification of occupations was based on the same basic categories as Edwards's

(1940:2) analysis of the 1930 census. The arbitrary skill differentials were still apparent. For example, "photographic process workers" were considered "operatives," while "loom fixers" were "craftsmen" (Edwards 1940:13, 15).

There is unfortunately almost no evidence about exactly how Edwards and his collaborators decided to place certain occupations under certain skill headings. In an early paper, in which Edwards was first developing the classification, he suggested that sometimes demographic characteristics other than skill were used to decide if an occupation was skilled or not. Thus, Edwards (1917:653; Conk 1978:130) wrote, "certain specific occupations which, technically, are skilled occupations were classified as semiskilled because the enumerators returned so many children, young persons, and women as pursuing these occupations." A further piece of evidence comes from one of Edwards's colleagues, Gladys Palmer (1939:696), who lamented the absence of information about skill in the census, "In most surveys, however, the returns must be used as given or can be edited only by using supplementary information such as the age, sex, race, and education of the person for whom the return is made." This evidence suggests that the skill level of specific occupations was determined at the Census Bureau at least partially by the race, gender, and age of the jobholder. Thus, in the construction of skilled and unskilled occupations, race (as well as gender and age) may have become a marker for skill.

The racial categories of the census referring to blacks and whites were simplified during this period, even though a few other racial categories, such as Indian, Mexican, and Filipino appeared (Lee 1993:78). From 1930, the census reversed its earlier tendency to proliferate distinctions of color among blacks and adopted the "one drop rule" in defining nonwhite racial membership (Nobles 2000:68). The instructions to the enumerators stated, "A person of mixed white and Negro blood should be returned as a Negro, no matter how small the percentage of Negro blood" (US Bureau of the Census 1933:1398). Furthermore, the earlier concerns with distinctions among the white population diminished. The tables in the 1930 census report were organized around two primary distinctions: "color or race" and "nativity." There were three primary race categories: white, Negro, and other. The only remnant of the earlier eugenics concerns was a distinction within the white population between native and foreign-born whites. However, by 1930, census officials were less concerned than they had been earlier with establishing precise distinctions within the white population (US Bureau of the Census 1933:25). The racial categories of the 1940 census were quite similar to those of the

1930 census. Again, for reporting purposes, the census distinguished between "three major race classifications . . . white, Negro, and 'other races'" (US Bureau of the Census 1943:3). However, in one important departure, this census counted Mexicans as whites, perhaps partially in response to popular pressure but also in response to pressure from the Mexican government (Petersen 1987:223). "Hispanos," Spanish speakers, who had lived in the Southwest before the territory was annexed to the United States, were reluctant to classify themselves as Mexicans (Petersen 1987:223). Mexicans were classified in later censuses as non-English-speaking whites or in accordance with Spanish surname.

Both the racial and occupational categories were politically relevant, especially for the 1940 census. With the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 that distributed funds for programs addressing health and welfare, the federal government massively expanded its system of allocating chunks of money to the states. The census now became a crucial tool for distributing these resources (Anderson 1988:179).

Race may have entered into the occupation statistics in a more profound way. In 1937, the Works Project Administration commissioned a survey of unemployment in Philadelphia. To check the reliability of the survey, its administrators selected a sample of households to reinterview with the same survey but using different enumerators between seven and ten days after the initial survey. The survey provided information about the head of the household, but different members of the household, for example, spouses, were the respondents who gave the information about the head of the household during the reinterview. The Works Progress Administration workers tabulated this information by question. They compared whether or not each question had received the same or different responses from the same or different respondents on different dates. This evidence shows two important characteristics of social classification in 1940. First, there was virtually no disagreement about race. Over 99 percent of the enumerators put down the same racial categories even when the respondent to the survey differed (Palmer 1938:42). In contrast, occupation was highly variable. When the respondent was the same, the occupation differed over 20 percent of the time. When the respondent differed, this figure rose to 28 percent. Thus, in the United States, in 1940, racial categories were easily ascribed, with little variation. Occupational categories, in contrast, were difficult to ascribe (Palmer 1938:37). In this context, it is possible that the enumerators' relatively fixed perceptions of race may have shaped how they recorded occupations that they perceived to be racially marked.

This evidence is important in understanding the meaning of the occupational statistics of the 1930 and 1940 censuses. In tabulating the 1940 census, Edwards (1943:189) found that African Americans were overwhelmingly concentrated in "semiskilled" or "unskilled" work. Because the census contained no evidence about the skill content of jobs, because race was sometimes used to determine whether an occupation was skilled or not, and because race was apparently a much more fixed lay category than occupation, Edwards's tables are profoundly ambiguous. They suggest that the racial character of the US census goes much deeper than its explicit questions about race. The occupational statistics were probably already racialized prior to being tabulated by race. Racialization probably occurred in two ways. First, enumerators probably perceived the occupation of their respondents through a racial lens, and second, the tabulators in the Census Bureau probably perceived their occupational statistics through a racial lens.

Conclusions

In sum, the history of the US census during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is surprising. In contrast to the implications of the state-centered perspective, in the United States, an effective system of information gathering emerged where the state was weak: political parties and mass political participation consolidated prior to the emergence and institutionalization of bureaucracies (Clemens 1997:27; Skowronek 1982:8. 26). This case demands, therefore, a society-centered, rather than state-centered, account. Social factors were important, in particular, in three ways.

First, the US census demonstrates the importance of schemes of lay categories. It incorporated racial categories that had strong social salience: black and white. Eugenicists worked within this preexisting set of lay categories. Indeed, when experts tried to transform these racial categories, they failed. Thus, although social Darwinists had many successes, such as the passage of the Johnson Act establishing strict quotas for southern European immigration in 1924, the white category in the census was never threatened. By 1930, the mixed race categories that initially had been included to test hypotheses drawn from racial theories were abandoned, and white and black were again adopted as the main race categories of the census. The disappearance of these multiracial categories followed the reassertion of a unified white interest in both the North and the South around the turn of the century (Jacobson 1998:109–117). The US census was never fully

converted to the interventionist purposes associated with racial theories because these purposes seemed to threaten white interests that emerged around viewing the differences among whites as relatively less important than the differences between whites and blacks. Indeed, during this period, the census came to focus on racial demography by showing where different ethnic and racial groups were located in the United States.

Second, information intellectuals motivated the major changes in the census. At the beginning of this period, many census intellectuals were still independent scholars with sources of income from agriculture or industry. During this period, however, they became academics or members of scientific societies, and they formed organized groups (Clemens 1997:36). In particular, elite lobbies connected to the new social science professions pressed the US state to collect more information and were key in attempting to push the census beyond a narrow focus on political apportionment (Anderson 1988:85). They proposed questions and analyzed data. The census co-opted these intellectuals who acted as conduits through which supposedly scientific categories entered into the census and were reflected in the official tables (cf. Loveman 2005:1661–1662). Thus, the idea of an interventionist census—that the census could be used for public policy in addition to apportionment—came from information intellectuals, not from census bureaucrats. There is little evidence that the US government was imposing new categories or usurping the position of established information intellectuals.

Third, power relations crucially shaped the US censuses. The establishment of the interventionist census in the United States was the achievement of an alliance between elite lobbies and industry. This alliance, solidified in the Progressive movement and the Roosevelt administration, created the Census Bureau. The central concerns of this census were also closely connected to the interests of the industrialists (Hofstadter 1956:9). Race provided a politically innocuous explanation for the problems of early industrial America, and it even became a partial stand-in for skill in the occupational classifications.

The historical trajectory of the US census was created by the past patterns of interaction between the state and society. State actors were primarily responsible for the first few US censuses, but they were institutionalized in a way that assured high levels of controversy and social participation (Volume 1, Chapter 6). Thus, social actors, mostly elites who participated as individuals, were quickly drawn in, as census data became relevant for political and social struggles and for the apportionment of resources. This pattern of interaction was reinforcing: as

more parties were affected by the census, more were drawn into the debates surrounding it. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, organized lobbies and interest groups arose around major social issues concerning race relations, immigration, and business. Industrialists wanted information, and they formed alliances with intellectual lobbies to get it. Not surprisingly, given that the census was easily entangled in social controversies, members of these elite lobbies turned to census politics. Indeed, exactly during the period in which the Census Bureau emerged as a relatively distinct and autonomous bureaucratic organization within the Department of Commerce, formalized consultation was established between elite lobbies groups and census bureaucrats (cf. Clemens 1997:1–2). The US Census Bureau was thus institutionalized firmly between state and society. It was housed within a well-structured bureaucracy, but it was also highly open to social influences. Thus, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the level of interaction between the state and society around the census increased. The formalization of this consultation established the pattern of intense state-society interaction that would become democratized in the second half of the twentieth century.

This historical trajectory, in combination with the consolidation of racial categories, the emergence of elite lobbies, the rising power of the industrialists, explains the outcome: a well-developed census that was interventionist in intention. This high degree of state-society interaction created a census that produced a considerable amount of information focused around a racial demographic project linked—though not always successfully—to the social interests of elite lobbies who were allied with industrialists. By the early twentieth century, this information was potentially relevant for public policy. Many census bureaucrats wanted to use the census to improve the quality of the American population or at least to inform lawmakers of the key issues raised by immigration, fertility, and unemployment. The census in this period was thus linked not only to administrative activities but also to public policy. By 1940, the US census was becoming an interventionist institution.

CHAPTER 4

Regionalism, Nationalism, and the Italian Censuses

The UK and US censuses took off in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in a relatively uncluttered institutional landscape. On the Italian peninsula, in contrast, there was a well-developed system of information collection in the regional states that predated an Italian national census by centuries (Volume 1). As we show in this chapter, during the *Risorgimento* (national Resurgence, 1815–1860), before Italy became a nation-state, well-developed censuses and census-like activities already existed in the preunification states. The makers of the Italian census faced the problem of repurposing this administrative apparatus to serve new aims. Thus, the difficulties of coordinating information gathering at several levels (e.g., the communal, municipal, state, national, imperial) continued to exist.

This history strongly influenced the development of the Italian national censuses that started in 1861. The three censuses from 1861 to 1881 were generally descriptive, although they had some interventionist overtones, given the lateness of unification and the contested status of an Italian nation. The purpose of these censuses was to describe the underlying population. Description was intrinsically political because the existence of an Italian people was not a taken-for-granted fact in the nineteenth century. Although lobbying around information was rare, individual agrarian elites often conducted major inquiries, and the first three Italian censuses drew on their examples.

From 1880 to 1921, the census became linked to political and economic interests rather than being an exclusively symbolic project, as political, civil, and social rights expanded. At the same time, a new group of information intellectuals committed to creating quantifiable knowledge about Italian society emerged. Thus, the censuses of 1901, 1911, and 1921 were more politically relevant, addressed more

specific social interests, had more policy goals, and were more detailed than earlier ones, although they continued to have a symbolic role. By the end of the period, the census was more interventionist than at the beginning.

Positivism, Knowledge, and Development in the *Risorgimento* and Unification

After 1815, the Congress of Vienna restored many of the absolutist dynasties that ruled the Italian peninsula before the French invasions (Duggan 1994:89, 99; Patriarca 1996:3; Procacci 1971:219). During this so-called Restoration, Austria—which supported the reimposition of absolutism—directly or indirectly ruled, substantially influenced the politics of, or was the ally of all of the Italian states except Piedmont (alternatively called the Kingdom of Sardinia or the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont [Patriarca 1996:65, 94]) (Duggan 1994:99–100).

There were eight main political units: the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (southern Italian peninsula), a formally independent monarchy controlled by Italian Bourbon rulers of Spanish descent closely allied with the Austrians; the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia (northeastern Italian peninsula), a vice regency of the Austrian Empire; the Grand Duchy of Tuscany (center-north Italian peninsula) ruled by a restored Austrian duke; the Papal States ruled by the restored Pope who was also an Austrian ally; three small states, Lucca, Modena, and Parma; and Piedmont (northwestern Italy) that remained independent (Duggan 1994:99; Meriggi 2002:112–113; Procacci 1971:219). (The Republic of San Marino, also located on the Italian peninsula, remained independent and is not part of the modern nation-state of Italy.)

Despite this political patchwork, French rule brought a measure of economic and cultural unity to the Italian peninsula that the restoration of the former political units could not reverse (Duggan 1994:96–97). The Restoration rulers accepted many of the Napoleonic reforms even though they resisted the establishment of representative institutions (Duggan 1994:100–114; Procacci 1971:220–221; Riall 2009:11–13, 56–62).

Beleaguered modernizers lacking either representative governments or support among the rural population contended with outright reactionaries for control in the Italian states until 1848 when constitutional governments were created in many of them. They soon collapsed everywhere except in Piedmont, which became a refuge for liberals and democrats from across the peninsula (Duggan 1994:114, 120; Procacci 1971:246–247; Riall 2009:65–66).

The consolidation of bureaucracies during the Restoration affected class relations because the middle class used government positions to attain wealth and power (Riall 2009:78). Because educational credentials were the basis of their social position, this "humanistic bourgeoisie" was mostly composed of intellectuals (Riall 2009:78). During the nineteenth century, the nobility's status declined. In southern Italy, the abolition of feudalism favored middle-class speculators (Riall 2009:111). Nevertheless, the aristocracy never disappeared, although during the Restoration it did not generally regain its previous privileges, such as judicial immunity or the right to have its cases heard in special courts (Meriggi 2002:124).

After 1848, with the repression of the nationalists in other parts of the peninsula, Piedmont emerged as the center of the Italian nationalist movement that was split between conservative moderates and more radicals: a distinction that became the basis for the opposition between the right and the left in Italian politics after unification (Banti 1996:6–7; Ragionieri 1976:1675–1685; Riall 2009:26–27, 141).

Administrative Statistics during the *Risorgimento*:1815–1860

The Restoration states established censuses and population registers as tools of government (Patriarca 1996:6, 106–107). Nevertheless, both also had deep historical roots (Volume 1). The first nineteenth-century nominative censuses that coincided with state boundaries were taken in most parts of Italy from the late 1830s to the late 1850s.

Table 4.1 summarizes where and when these censuses were conducted and what information they collected. They were clustered between 1838 and 1858. The first censuses were conducted in Parma and Piedmont in 1838, and the last one was conducted in Piedmont in 1858. Thus, they seem to have become more common as the *Risorgimento* nationalists became more active. The number of questions varied: the Parmesan census asked 13 questions, and the Piedmontese asked 5 questions. The content of the questions also varied. All of the censuses collected information about age, marital status, and occupation. The focus on occupation reflected the decline of the corporate organization linked to the guilds, particularly in Florence (Gozzini 1987:226–227). The Lombard-Venetian, Piedmontese, and Tuscan censuses also had questions about religion. The Parmesan census collected information about income, and the Lombard-Venetian census asked about the ownership of animals; these questions point to a mixed informational and fiscal purpose that was less pronounced

Table 4.1 Censuses of the Italian Peninsula before Unification

Questions	*Preunification state*				
	Lombardy-Venetia (1857)	*Papal States (1853)*	*Parma (1838)*	*Piedmont (1838, 1848, 1858)*	*Tuscany (1841)*
Number of questions	8	7	13	5	7
Age or date of birth	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Marital status	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Occupation	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Religion	yes	no	no	yes	yes
Income	no	no	yes	no	no
Health	no	no	yes	no	no
Education	no	no	yes	no	yes
Nationality	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Sources: Lombardy-Venetia (Rossi 2012:322), Papal States (Italy MAIC 1862:24), Parma (Italy MAIC 1862:68–69), Piedmont (Italy MAIC 1862:250), Tuscany (Italy MAIC 1862:49). The tables exclude regional states that did not take censuses or for which there is no available information. We did not count name or surname, the house address or the street name, or the column for notes or observations in the number of questions above. These censuses did not always specify respondents' sex explicitly, but it is almost always known from their name. Nationality was usually recorded only for persons born outside of the preunification state conducting the census (*forestieri*). There also may have been a census in Lombardy-Venetia in 1856 (Italy MAIC 1862:228–229). The censuses in Piedmont in 1848 and 1858 added a few questions to the five questions that were asked in 1838 (Sonnino 1974:436).

in other preunification censuses. Furthermore, the Parmesan census had a question about health, and both the Parmesan and Tuscan censuses had questions about education. Finally, all of these censuses asked about nationality.

More broadly, the table suggests a distinctive clustering of census taking in northern and central Italy. These censuses had a similar format and asked similar types of questions. This patterning suggests the emergence of a model of census taking that began with Piedmont and then spread through north and central Italy, following the networks of information intellectuals as they travelled among the preunification states in response to the turbulent events of the *Risorgimento*. Piedmont had a strong tradition of collecting information, statistics, political arithmetic (Favero 2001:27; Patriarca 1996:95–103). In 1836, the minister of the interior instituted the Royal High Commission

on Statistics (*Regia Commissione Superiore di Statistica*), along with provincial councils (Del Panta and Rettaroli 1994:50–51; Favero 2001:27–28; Patriarca 1996:98; Sonnino 1974:419). These councils provided a variety of statistical information (Patriarca 1996:100). Camillo Cavour, a central figure in Italy's unification and a member of the Royal High Commission on Statistics, emphasized the role of civil society: scientific institutions, agrarian and commercial associations, landowners, and manufacturers should be involved in data collection, and the data should be made public (Fracassi 1961:14; Patriarca 1996:101, 102).

The first project of the Royal High Commission on Statistics was the nominative census of Piedmont in 1838 (Del Panta and Rettaroli 1994:51). Its members prepared the forms and instructions (Del Panta and Rettaroli 1994:51). Local authorities and parish priests then conducted the data collection (Sonnino 1974:419, 435–436). The columns of the survey consecutively numbered each dwelling place, as well as the households and individuals with in the dwellings, gave the name and surname of each individual in each household, and gave each individual's age, marital status, nationality, occupation, and religion (Del Panta and Rettaroli 1994:51). A final column noted any individuals who were enumerated with in the household but lived in another location (Del Panta and Rettaroli 1994:51). The censuses in 1848 and 1858 used the same format but with additional questions on education, migration, and the location of the respondent's residence, and the results were published in 1839, 1852, and 1862, respectively (Del Panta and Rettaroli 1994:51; Patriarca 1996:103; Sonnino 1974:419, 436).

Piedmont's preeminence in *Risorgimento* census taking may have been a consequence of its ability to attract information intellectuals from across the peninsula as the Restoration governments became increasingly reactionary. Two key figures in the development of information gathering from Lombardy-Venetia, Pietro Maestri and Cesare Correnti, participated in the failed 1848 uprising in Milan and subsequently fled to Piedmont (Patriarca 1996:149). Furthermore, the Piedmontese census became a model for other states, particularly in Tuscany (1841) and the Papal States (1847) (Del Panta and Rettaroli 1994:51). Other preunification states referenced the criteria of the Piedmont Commission (Del Panta and Rettaroli 1994:51; Rossi 2012:319).

Another remarkable feature of these preunification censuses is their level of detail about occupation. The instructions for the 1853 census in the Papal States indicated that respondents should

be classified according to a list that included 36 descriptions ranging from "owner" to "midwife" (Italy MAIC 1862:24). Unemployed respondents were to be noted as such (Italy MAIC 1862:25). In Tuscany, census enumerators were supposed to classify respondents according to their primary source of income. The main categories were owners and workers, with the latter divided into skilled artisans and others (Italy MAIC 1862:48).

The preunification states took censuses because of protonational pride, fiscal concerns, and the desire to increase government efficiency. For example, the instructions to the communal census councils in the Papal States in 1852 stated that the collaboration of parish priests and other local authorities would ensure that the census "would have nothing to envy in England, France, Austria, Piedmont, or Belgium, not to speak of the other states" (Italy MAIC 1862:23). In Parma, a circular from the Ministry of the Interior to local statistical commissions entrusted with undertaking the census mentioned the importance of following the model of Piedmont (Italy MAIC 1862:69). Thus, small Restoration states asserted their viability through censuses. Other preunification censuses served fiscal, military, or administrative purposes. For example, the main purpose of the censuses in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and Lombardy was tax collection and military recruitment (Italy MAIC 1862:121–122; Rossi 2012:319–320). Finally, the Piedmont census was part of a broader effort by moderate liberals to gather information to improve the government's effectiveness (Italy MAIC 1862:247).

The preunification states, to collect this information, incorporated local elites. All established councils or commissions, consisting of doctors, landowners, lawyers, priests, and teachers, to gather information (Italy MAIC 1862:23–24, 48, 69, 119, 204, 249). Priests were particularly important. Thus, although these censuses were clearly bureaucratic projects, they were highly dependent upon local elites. This pattern of elite consultation continued after unification. In sum, censuses during the *Risorgimento* were well developed. By national unification, Italy had a long history of information gathering and recent experience with nominative censuses.

Patriotic Statistics

Alongside, and dependent upon, this tradition of administrative statistics, developed an intellectual current of patriotic statistics consisting of works on statistical theory and practice produced by nationalist intellectuals (Greenfield 1965:150–198; Patriarca 1996:6–7, 24–25,

122). Patriotic statisticians formed a close intellectual network, publishing in the same journals and cooperating politically (Greenfield 1965:166; Patriarca 1996:149). These publications used administrative statistics to construct a picture of the Italian peninsula and its subdivisions and to evaluate their levels of social development (Patriarca 1996:25). Patriotic statisticians compiled numbers produced by the Restoration states to try to create a national consciousness and identity by showing that Italians belonged to a large aggregate of individuals in an identifiable territory (Greenfield 1965:165–170, 241; Ipsen 1996:37–38; Patriarca 1994:363–364; 1996:4–7, 123–124, 130–131, 151–154). Their work was mostly descriptive, but it was also political. Italy did not exist as a territorial unit; therefore, a description of it suggested a unification project (Patriarca 1994:363; 1996:25, 61).

Because they used statistics to emphasize the unity of Italy despite its political fragmentation, the patriotic statisticians tried to document social progress through statistics about the economy and morality (Greenfield 1965:147–149, 244–247). Patriotic statisticians thus focused on society rather than the state, although they relied on state-produced administrative statistics. By the late 1840s, their social investigations were linked to protonationalist mobilization. They developed a form of inquiry that embraced the notion of social progress and claimed a limited role for the state (Lanaro 1993:27).

During the *Risorgimento*, then, two traditions of information gathering developed. Restoration states developed an administrative tradition by collaborating informally with elites serving on councils and in consultative bodies. Patriotic statisticians created the other tradition by trying raise a national consciousness about the existence of an Italian society. After unification, these traditions fused as many of the information intellectuals who had been prominent in the tradition of patriotic statistics were incorporated into the new national institutions responsible for collecting Italian censuses (cf. Loveman 2005:1662–1663).

The Italian State and Social Elite after Unification

Cavour's political heirs, the "moderates," (a group of conservative modernizers) led the state that emerged from the *Risorgimento* in 1871. Correspondingly, unification was a defeat for the democratic Party of Action associated with Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872) and Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882). Cavour won Napoleon III's consent to the annexation of central Italy by ceding Nice and Savoy to France

and ensuring that Garibaldi's democratic forces played a subordinate role in the new state (Seton-Watson 1967:6–7). The outcome of these maneuvers was a nondemocratic constitutional monarchy with a lower chamber elected through a highly restricted franchise and a royally appointed upper chamber (Pombeni 1995:75–76; Ragionieri 1976:1731). This postunification state was weak (Corner 2002:288). By taming the democratic forces who wanted to redistribute land, the moderates undermined unification's appeal to the southern population. Most southerners viewed the state as a foreign power, and between 1861 and 1865, the Italian army was locked in combat with much of the southern peasantry (Seton-Watson 1967:26). Regional divisions were also strong in unified Italy because former bureaucrats from Piedmont dominated the prefectural corps, a group of centrally appointed plenipotentiaries who exercised wide powers over all aspects of local government (Ragionieri 1976:1687–1689).

The state also had to deal with the Catholic Church, which lost substantial territory in the *Risorgimento* settlement. On September 20, 1870, the Italian army breached the walls of Rome, effectively ending the Church's temporal power (Ragionieri 1976:1705; Seton-Watson 1967:41, 53). This set off a long conflict. In 1871, the Pope forbade Catholics to vote, and he encouraged the establishment of organizations that would insulate the population from political involvement (Ragionieri 1976:1711; Seton-Watson 1967:59).

Socialism posed another challenge. 1871 was the year of the Paris Commune—the uprising of workers against Napoleon III set off by French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. This event produced sympathy for revolutionary socialism on the Italian left (Seton-Watson 1967:67–68). The Italian political class, then, faced a triple political challenge in the form of a regional revolt, Catholic hostility, and socialist threat.

Italian state builders also began to realize that their country was poor and backward (Seton-Watson 1967:86–87). Italy suffered from a lack of industrial capitalism manifested in two interrelated phenomena: first, regional disparities between northern and southern Italy reflected different forms of agriculture and levels of industrialization, and second, emigration reflected a southern agrarian crisis (Banti 1996:86; Emigh 2009:196; Federico 1979:398–399; Petraccone 2005:12–13; Seton-Watson 1967:21–23; Zamagni 1993:4, 60–61, 68, 73, 110, 203). To address these problems that northern elites often saw as rooted in quasi-racial differences, Italian state builders paid for the construction of physical infrastructure by taxing the rural population (Lanaro 1979:20–21, 33; Petraccone 2005:6; Salvadori

1960:28–30). However, this program of industrialization failed (Milward and Saul 1977:254). By the late nineteenth century, state builders viewed mass emigration as a sign of economic backwardness and a threat to the new nation (Petraccone 2005:145–152; Salvadori 1960:59). Nationalism, economic development, and demography were therefore closely linked in unified Italy.

The most important social elite in Italian society was the *borghesia*, a group living in urban areas but gaining income from land ownership or professional credentials (Banti 1996:65–69; 99–142). This group was not connected closely to industrial capitalism; the industrial bourgeoisie remained relatively weak (Banti 1996:144–153, 159; Ragionieri 1976:1722–1723). The mixed composition of the *borghesia* (land owning and professional) reflected an economic strategy in which investment in land and education constituted alternatives. In some instances, professionals invested in land, mostly in local markets near their hometown, which they either managed themselves, especially in the Po Valley, or rented using long-term leases or sharecropping (Banti 1996:70, 77). In other instances, landowners invested in professional credentials. These two processes created, over time, a mixed group of intellectual landholders or landholding intellectuals. After unification, a strategy of transitioning from the professions to landholding predominated. Between 1862 and 1867, many church lands came on the market and rents rose, attracting considerable investment, sometimes from people who had previously made their money as lawyers, doctors, or engineers (Banti 1996:66–67). The nobility, in contrast to the *borghesia*, was not particularly significant because it was small, regionally fragmented, and lacked a national political institution (Banti 1996:52–57). The census fell quickly under the control of the intellectual wing of the *borghesia*. Because autonomous intellectuals rather than interest groups or lobbies influenced the census, broad ideologies of social development rather narrow policy goals had a strong effect on the census.

The Role of Liberalism

Both the northern nobility and the *borghesia* supported a liberal view of the state: the government should provide basic services but otherwise let society develop according to its own tendencies. Italian liberals were skeptical of cities and industry because they viewed them as the causes of political turbulence in France and the United Kingdom. Italy, argued its liberals, should specialize in agricultural production and avoid modern factories and class conflicts (Banti 1996:144).

Thus, according to Italian liberalism, the demand for a restricted and nonactivist state was associated with the preservation of existing agrarian social relationships.

Italian information intellectuals' understanding of the relationship between information and policy exemplified this attitude. After unification, information intellectuals continued the descriptive project of the *Risorgimento.* They sought to collect information but were cautious about linking it to policy. This descriptive project resonated with a broader positivist cultural current in mid-nineteenth-century Italy, an orientation shared by individuals across the entire political spectrum. The positivists embraced careful empirical documentation and an evolutionary view of history (Bobbio 1995:5, 12–13; Patriarca 1996:185; Petraccone 1998:813, 816–817; 2005:142; Ragionieri 1976:1716). Both government and private individuals collected social information, often in the form of descriptive letters written by officials who were sent to southern Italy to report on conditions there (Gambi 1980:825; Pazzagli 1980:787; Petraccone 2005:21–22; Salvadori 1960:39).

During the 1870s and 1880s, there were three important and systematic information-gathering efforts: the privately funded inquiry conducted by two wealthy Tuscan aristocrats, Sidney Sonnino and Leopoldo Franchetti, on agrarian conditions; the private study of emigration carried out by the sociologist Leone Carpi; and a parliamentary inquest devoted to agriculture headed by the Lombard aristocrat Stefano Jacini. The Sonnino-Franchetti and Jacini reports documented the plight of the southern rural population, but both also demurred from suggesting any substantial government intervention (Salvadori 1960:71–73, 78; Villani 1978:895–899). Carpi's report, made possible by his personal connections to the government, also rejected intervention, suggesting emigration as a solution to rural poverty and social unrest (Franzina 1980:979–980; Lanaro 1979:31).

This information collection remained consistent with the liberal-positivist framework. Italy, for these intellectuals, was undergoing a gradual modernization process that could be furthered by better education and emigration policies that required little or no state intervention. Immigration, for example, was considered a natural and spontaneous way of solving social unrest. Information gathering was primarily descriptive. It guided and documented but did not serve as a basis for radical intervention. Liberal-positivist information gathering, although rooted in empiricism, relied heavily on the social reputation of the local informants—not on the methodological or

mathematical rigor of the data collection or analysis—to guarantee the validity of the information.

Describing and Registering the Nation: 1861–1881

This liberal-positivist environment shaped the first three Italian censuses taken in 1861, 1871, and 1881. The census organizers considered two models: a centralized one in which statistics would be collected by a unified government organization and a decentralized one in which statistics would be collected by a nongovernmental body with the voluntary cooperation of local authorities (Fracassi 1961:33). The debate between supporters of these alternative models reflected a broader struggle over the organization of the Italian state. Initially, all of the major figures pushing for Italian unification supported the concession of considerable local autonomy because they viewed the United Kingdom with its system of extensive local self-government as a useful political model, while rejecting France, with its high degree of centralism (Ragionieri 1960:473).

However, this elite consensus broke down over the "southern question." For many political elites, autonomy seemed acceptable for northerners but not for southerners. Italian state builders turned to centralism out of fear of peasant's revolts and nobles' reactionary tactics (Ragionieri 1960:490–491). Indeed, men who went to southern Italy sometimes became fanatical proponents of French-style centralism when they had previously admired English-style self-government (Ragionieri 1960:496; 1967:166–167). Thus, the differences among the preunification states that had characterized the Italian peninsula for hundreds of years took on a new meaning after 1861 as the difference between northern and southern Italy became a key issue for national unification (Petraccone 2005:14). Differences were now interpreted in terms of a social evolutionary scheme in which regions—now northern and southern Italy instead of preunification states—existed at different levels of development. This reconfiguration of the social meaning of regional differences was paradoxically a result of unification.

The debate between the promoters of centralization and decentralization within the liberal political class played out within the Italian census as well. Filippo Cordova (1811–1868), an important figure in the *Risorgimento* and the first person to conduct the Italian census, was an ardent centralizer who rejected any participation of commissions or provincial councils in the census (Fracassi 1961:24; Marucco 1996:7; Ragionieri 1960:499). Others, however, had different views.

Cavour insisted on the need for extensive lay elite participation in the production of official statistics (Favero 2012:125; Patriarca 1996:102). Pietro Maestri, who became the director of the central office of statistics in 1862, was a Milanese supporter of federalism and decentralization (Favero 2012:123–124). Drawing on the arguments of other Lombard liberals, Maestri claimed that government should be based on what he called *compartimenti*, natural territorial divisions roughly corresponding to the preunification states. He argued that substantial political power should be devolved to these *compartimenti* (Patriarca 1996:189). This led him to emphasize differences among the various parts of Italy both at the level of the communes or local municipalities and at the broader level of the *compartimenti* as he strove to identify what he considered to be a scientific division of the country (Patriarca 1996:189).

The solution that the political elite eventually found was an uneasy combination of centralization and decentralization. In particular, the census administration combined bureaucratic centralization, voluntarism, and collegiality (Marucco 1996:4, 14). The agency called *Ministero d'agricoltura, industria e commercio* (Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce—MAIC) conducted the 1861 census through a directorate (an organizational unit below the ministry) subsequently called *Direzione generale della statistica* (General Directorate of Statistics—DIRSTAT), under the control of Cordova (Fracassi 1961:32–33; Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:34; Ipsen 1996:38). (For simplicity, we refer to all the central statistical offices of this period as DIRSTAT following Ipsen [1996:38]). MAIC was unusual within the Italian state both because it had few local employees and because it was run largely by multiple collegial bodies rather than by a single strong minister (Melis 1993:463).

DIRSTAT conducted the censuses of 1861, 1871, and 1881 through a three-level organization that remained virtually unchanged until after World War II. At the bottom level, municipal governments had a central role. Mayors organized and oversaw a census commission, which in turn selected and oversaw the work of communal census clerks, who were unpaid volunteers responsible for the collection of information and for aiding respondents in filling out the household forms (Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:35). A local volunteer council checked the accuracy of the returns and resolved questions about classifications arising from differences in local usages. In 1861 and 1871, municipal employees tabulated the returns (Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:36; Marucco 1996:15). In 1881, the information was instead tabulated centrally in Rome (Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:37).

At the provincial level, in 1861, permanent statistical offices were established. They were flanked by volunteers who were supposed to be hired if the statistical office was short of staff (Fracassi 1961:36, 39; Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:35; Marucco 1996:15; Patriarca 1996:180–181). In 1862, this institution was abandoned in favor of the provincial statistical council chaired by the prefect and composed of five members elected from the provincial council (Marucco 1996:15). This provincial institution sent forms out to the municipal governments and sent the tables produced by them back to Rome (Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:35). At the center, DIRSTAT coordinated this work (Fracassi 1961:34). However, the central statistical office lacked its own local officials and therefore always had to rely on municipal personnel aided by volunteers (Fracassi 1961:145–46).

At the central level, DIRSTAT was also responsible to a collegial body, first called the *Giunta consultiva di statistica* (Consultative Council of Statistics), then termed the *Giunta centrale di statistica* (Central Council of Statistics—GCS), and finally named the *Consiglio superiore di statistica* (High Council of Statistics—CSS) by a royal decree in 1872 (Italy MAIC 1872:1, 4–6). The director of statistics, experts, and representatives from various government ministries participated in this organization, but it was somewhat insulated from parliamentary influence (Fracassi 1961:78–79; Marucco 1996:33, 76–77). To summarize, DIRSTAT possessed many of the same features as MAIC: DIRSTAT had a collegial central organization and lacked peripheral employees reporting directly to it. Thus, the collection of census information depended on the collaboration of local elites who were not DIRSTAT employees for its operations.

GCS/CSS was a consultative body comprised mainly of scientific experts who came from the same social and regional background as the patriotic statisticians (Italy MAIC 1872:1–3; Riley et al. 2015). Its jurisdiction over Italian official statistics was somewhat limited. While the body could directly influence statistics collected by MAIC, it could only give advice about statistics collected in other ministries. Furthermore, the overall purpose of the council, and specifically the purpose of the census that it administered, remained ambiguous: halfway between an administrative and social scientific one.

The indeterminacy of GCS's/CSS's power created considerable conflict. The director of statistics after 1871, Luigi Bodio (1840–1920), was constantly trying to centralize the collection of information, so that there were no competing sources of statistics, and to transform DIRSTAT, so that it was a social scientific enterprise rather than an information service for parliamentary ministers (Fracassi

1961:93; Marucco 1996:34). This project was not entirely successful because representatives from the ministries on GCS/CSS often blocked Bodio's efforts (Fracassi 1961:92–95; Marucco 1996:33).

The work of full-time bureaucratic employees at DIRSTAT was supported by collegial bodies made up partly of persons outside the government at both the local and national levels. This institutional design deliberately linked official statistics to elite social groups and thus to elite lobbies (Marucco 1996:15). For example, local chambers of commerce were key supports for information collection (Marucco 1996:36). Indeed, DIRSTAT was put under the authority of MAIC, a ministry particularly close to agrarian and industrial economic interests, precisely to encourage cooperation between it and elite associations (Marucco 1996:41). Volunteers were crucial; while Italy had a national office of statistics, it had no field workers to collect and tabulate information. Instead, DIRSTAT relied on municipal employees and volunteers. This feature of Italian censuses endured: a relatively underdeveloped national apparatus depended heavily on the cooperation of local elites.

The census during this period was basically concerned with four issues: the symbolic assertion of the Italian nation, the provision of evidence on economic development, population registration, and political apportionment. Although all censuses have a symbolic dimension, Italian census takers were unusually aware of this dimension, perhaps because of the novelty of the Italian state and the doubtful existence of Italy as a cultural and linguistic entity (Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:33; Ipsen 1996:38; Patriarca 1996:4, 124, 177; Romanelli 1980:769). For the Italian census takers, following their *Risorgimento* predecessors, the census was never simply a documenting of facts; it was also an act of national consciousness-raising, pointing to the putative existence of an Italian society. The collection of statistics on economic development was closely connected to the symbolic project of the census. The census collected little direct evidence about the economy, but demographic evidence was used as an indicator of economic development (Patriarca 1996:182, 198).

In 1864, the government established a national policy of population registration based on the first census (Gallo and Palluzzi 2012:37). Furthermore, ministerial instructions sent to the prefects in 1872 stated that communal population registers should be based on censuses (Italy MAIC 1873:324). Given role of the census as a check on, and source of, population registers, it was always concerned with establishing both the de facto population and the de jure population; these figures often differed (Italy MAIC 1881:43,

78–79; Marucco 1996:40). Debates about the correct definition of the population ensued from these differences (Italy MAIC 1881:42, 78). Further tensions were created when Bodio tried to separate the two functions of the census to focus on counting the de facto population (Italy MAIC 1881:26–27). Bodio wanted the census to provide information about the population, not simply to enumerate it or to supplement the communal registers.

Another purpose of the Italian census was political apportionment. Immediately after unification, the Italian electoral system was based on electoral districts (*collegi*), in which each district had a single parliamentary deputy. There were initially 443 electoral districts; this number increased to 508 after the annexation of Rome. The initial electoral law failed to link these districts to the population distribution. Indeed, because the law passed prior to the execution of the first census, there was no relationship between the apportionment of the deputies and the census (Italy Consiglio dei ministri 1861). After 1882, however, the number of deputies for each province was made proportional to the population of the province as given by the census (Italy Consiglio dei ministri 1882). After this date, the Italian census could have been drawn into apportionment conflicts.

There is very little evidence, however, that apportionment was ever controversial. There were probably two reasons for this. First, the territorial unit that the census used to apportion deputies, the province (which was controlled politically by a prefect), had little political weight within the Italian state, and, unlike the *compartimento*, it did not correspond to the historically and culturally important preunification states (Patriarca 1996:193–195; Ragionieri 1967:156–157). Thus, because deputies were not necessarily potential political allies or adversaries, their number had relatively few political consequences. Second, parties were weak, especially among the social elite. Therefore, shifts in the number of deputies per province had virtually no implications for the control of Parliament. Party affiliation and therefore the number of deputies from a particular political party, had little effect on political alliances. A prime minister might survive considerable turnover in parliamentary deputies, or conversely, an unchanged chamber might create a series of unstable governments. In short, elections mattered relatively little for the formation of governments (Patriarca 1996:193–195; Ragionieri 1967:156–157).

For the censuses from 1861 to 1881, the information was collected using a household form (*foglio di famiglia*) filled out and signed by the head of the household (*capo famiglia*) or an assistant to the local census office who read the questions (Marucco 1996:129; Mastroluca

and Verrascina 2012:85). Where more than one family coresided, additional household forms were distributed to the residence (Mastroluca and Verrascina 2012:83). These three censuses were nominative, collecting information on every individual in the household and asking relatively comprehensive questions about name, sex, marital status, age, literacy, occupation, relation to the head of household, place of birth, place of residence, language spoken (in 1861), religion, and infirmity (Fracassi 1961:39–40; Italy ISTAT 1959:4–13; Patriarca 1996:199).

The census forms from 1861 to 1871 were almost identical—the only difference was that in 1871 the form contained detailed instructions about how to fill out the occupation question that the 1861 census lacked. Rather than simply asking the respondent to note "the occupation [*condizione o professione*] by which the individual is principally employed" (Italy ISTAT 1959:5), the 1871 form defined the principal occupation as the one that provides the respondent with "the major part of his means of subsistence" (Italy ISTAT 1959:7). The census form of 1881 asked basically the same questions as in 1871, although there were slight differences in the instructions for filling out the forms (Italy ISTAT 1959:10–11).

The censuses of liberal Italy continued to collect information about both the de jure and the de facto population. They typically did so by asking questions about all individuals living in the household, regardless of whether they were family members or unrelated persons, and by asking about all family members who were living outside of the household. The 1861 form, in addition to requesting information about those present in the household, asked the household head to list all persons who were part of the family but living elsewhere (Italy ISTAT 1959:4). In addition, the census contained a form asking for information on all family members who had emigrated, their destination, and their dates of departure and return (Italy ISTAT 1959:4). In 1871, the forms asked how many months every absent individual had been gone, and in 1881, the respondents had to stipulate whether the individual was still in Italy or had left the country (Italy ISTAT 1959:4–13). In 1871 and 1881, each respondent also filled out a summary sheet indicating the number of persons who were present in the household, the number of persons who were present and usually lived in the household, the number of persons who were present and occasionally lived in the household, and the number of family members who were absent from the household for more or less than six months (1871) or who were still outside of Italy (in 1881) (Italy ISTAT 1959:6, 11).

The Problems of the Italian Liberal Census

With respect to the purposes they sought to achieve—the establishment of a national consciousness and an accurate accounting of the level of social development—these censuses were relatively unsuccessful. The census almost immediately was used as an instrument for symbolically splitting the nation rather than unifying it, and it was not reliable as an indicator of social development. Against the wishes of the liberal, patriotic state builders, the census became a key reservoir of information used by thinkers who sought to interpret regional differences between northern and southern Italy as racial ones (Patriarca 1996:178, 236–238).

From 1861, municipal statistical councils reported census data to the central statistical office using the province as a territorial unit. Their data were tabulated centrally in three different ways: by province, by *compartimento*, and by northern and southern Italy. For example, Bodio's report on the illiteracy question of the census of 1871, as well as his report on the origins of Italian immigration, used both provinces and *compartimenti* (Italy MAIC 1872:296–297; 1873:206–207). In addition, his maps of Italy showed large differences between the northern and southern parts of the country. Bodio apparently viewed the differences between northern and southern Italy as more important than the ones among the *compartimenti* because he provided some tables for the *compartimenti,* but he did not map them (Italy MAIC 1872:296).

Even Maestri, who established the *compartimenti* as a statistical reporting unit and clearly viewed them as important, perhaps inadvertently emphasized the difference between northern and southern Italy (Patriarca 1996:193–195, 197). The census reports produced directly under his leadership repeatedly emphasized the difference between northern and southern Italy even when these differences did not correspond to *compartimenti.* The relevance of these differences between northern and southern Italy is clearest in the way that Maestri treated small and large communes in different parts of the country. Census takers had difficulty classifying regions as urban or rural. Putatively more advanced northern Italy had communes that paradoxically tended to be less populous than supposedly backward southern Italy because settlement patterns in the two zones differed. In southern Italy, even relatively small populations tended to concentrate in towns mostly because patterns of land ownership concentrated landless populations in urban areas. Maestri thought that this pattern would inflate estimates of urbanization for southern Italy

and thus would obscure or distort the difference between the two parts of the peninsula. He thus adopted two conventions designed to avoid this outcome. He first established a higher population threshold to designate urban centers than that used in other European countries. Only communes over 6,000 inhabitants were considered "urban." With this population size, urban communes would also be overwhelmingly northern ones. He further distinguished between agglomerated and scattered settlements. The agglomerated type was more prevalent in southern than northern Italy (although Lombardy also had many agglomerated settlements). In general, Italian census officials presented their data in a way that reinforced the difference between the northern and southern regions more than the differences among *compartimenti* (Italy MAIC 1864:xxii–xxv; 1872:280; Patriarca 1996:192).

Thus, it was not mainly Maestri's federalist project but the social and economic differences between northern and southern Italy that mattered (in opposition to Patriarca's [1996:124, 197, 199, 207–209] state-centered view and in support of Petraccone's [2005:7–10] and Salvadori's society-centered view [1960:28–29]). At the elite level, social scientists influenced by Spencer and Darwin interpreted this difference by proposing a theory of southern backwardness based on the idea that two races existed on the Italian peninsula: Aryans in northern Italy and Mediterraneans in southern Italy (Petraccone 2005:46–87; Salvadori 1960:185–186, 191). Differences between northern and southern Italy, not differences among *compartimenti,* were thus racialized (Lanaro 1979:48–49). Some members of the northern working class and their socialist representatives shared this vision (Petraccone 1998:816–822; 2005:83). The regional scheme that divided the peninsula into an advanced northern part and a backward southern part often trumped the official class analysis of Second International Marxism that formally dominated the Italian socialist leadership in this period. Thus, the socialist leaders advocated a class alliance between the northern working class and the northern bourgeoisie against the backward southern inhabitants, rejected the extension of universal suffrage to the southern agricultural population, and supported apportionment schemes that would increase the weight of the northern electorate in Italian Parliament (Gramsci 1995:20–21; Petraccone 1998:831–832).

In sum, a regional scheme shaped the interpretation of Italian statistics, but it was not, or at least not exclusively, Maestri's scheme based on *compartimenti* with preunification roots. Of course, *compartimenti* continued to be important, and local systems of information

gathering, especially the population registers, were crucial. However, the overarching symbolic distinction was between northern and southern Italy. The failure of the symbolic project of unifying the country, to conclude, should primarily be attributed to the fact that the census documented social and economic differences between northern and southern Italy—not to the fact that it created a new way of thinking about regions ex nihilo by reifying them through state action.

Aside from symbolically representing the nation, the second main purpose of the liberal census was to track social development (Cordova 1893:349). MAIC, as Cordova wrote in 1860, had the task of "promoting the public and private wealth of the country" and thus "felt the need to know the conditions of the state" (Cordova 1893:359; cf. Patriarca 1996:198). A key part of this project was the collection of occupational statistics, which built on these questions in preunification states. However, standardizing occupational terms was difficult and produced paradoxical results.

When Bodio took over DIRSTAT, he replaced Maestri's reporting scheme that was based on the type of workplace material with a modified version of a scheme approved at the International Statistical Congress in 1872 (Patriarca 1998:150). Italy unified after the first International Statistical Congress in 1853. In 1867, the International Statistical Congress met in Florence, and Italian census takers in general seem to have been highly aware of international models, although they were never bound by them given the plethora of Italian ones (Italy MAIC 1881:65–66; Ventresca 1995:69). The reports from the first Italian census grouped the population into 12 large categories: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, commerce, liberal professions, religion, public administration, internal and external security, property owners, domestic servants, the poor, and those without occupations (Patriarca 1998:148). However, the censuses did not consistently distinguish among types of work (e.g., mental or manual), and within each of these 12 categories, respondents were only asked to indicate whether they were masters or apprentices (Patriarca 1998:148).

Census takers wanted to use the occupation question to establish the respondent's "means of subsistence" (Italy ISTAT 1959:10). Primary occupations were those that provided the "major part of the means of subsistence," while secondary ones were of "less importance" (Italy ISTAT 1959:10). The census form prompted respondents to self-classify in these terms. However, the notion of a primary and a secondary occupation linked to the means of subsistence was difficult to apply in late nineteenth-century Italy. In this largely preindustrial society,

many people, especially in the countryside, had numerous sources of income (Patriarca 1998:151). For example, many rural inhabitants directly worked their own small plots but also supplemented their income by working as wage laborers on other plots or by renting land (Villani 1978:942). This created considerable uncertainty about the classification of the agrarian population.

Italian census takers also faced linguistic barriers. Bodio and his collaborators on GCS/CSS complained about the many local terms for occupations, some of which could not be translated into official Italian (Patriarca 1998:151). In his report on the 1871 census, Bodio appended a list of occupational names whose meaning he could not precisely determine despite consulting "persons who possessed the living language of the province" (Italy MAIC 1877:75). Other terms, such as *contadino* that could refer both to "peasant" and to a person living in the immediate environs just outside of a city, were inherently ambiguous (Villani 1978:936). The tables on the distribution of the agricultural population from 1861 to 1881 therefore were not comparable across census years, nor did they include mutually exclusive categories (Villani 1978:937–939).

The problems of classifying occupations were particularly acute in the case of women from southern Italy. For example, in 1881, if a woman was listed on the census form as a housewife (*attendente alla casa*) and a spinner, she was classified as a spinner. In 1901, the reverse rule was applied. If a woman was listed as a spinner and a housewife, she was classified as a housewife. Thus, it seemed that a thriving textile industry in southern Italy had suddenly collapsed though the decline probably had been gradual (Patriarca 1998:152; Villani 1978:956–957). These problems were derived from the general difficulty of applying standard occupational categories to a diverse society in the midst of rapid social change (Villani 1978:935). As a result of these problems, the use of the census as a tool for measuring Italian social development was limited.

The late nineteenth-century descriptive censuses thus failed in two of their main aims. First, instead of fostering national consciousness by symbolically representing the Italian nation, the census emphasized the peninsula's divisions. Second, instead of providing clear evidence about social development, the census left a legacy of ambiguity.

The Emergence of Interest Group Politics

The world economic crisis of 1873–1896 manifested itself in Italy as an agrarian crisis. The misery of rural direct producers increased

during the later 1870s as a result of declining prices for agricultural goods, high taxes, and the collapse of handicrafts, especially in southern Italy. As a result of these economic difficulties, land ownership declined between 1860 and 1900 instead of rising, as might be expected, given the alienation of church lands. This new landless population produced by privatization did not find employment in industry because industrialization was insufficient to absorb the excess agrarian population (Seton-Watson 1967:85–86; Villani 1978:905).

These economic conditions radicalized urban and rural direct producers. Trade unions developed in Italy after 1870. Furthermore, the number of strikes increased sharply between 1871 and 1885 (Seton-Watson 1967:89). In the countryside, rural direct producers often responded to deteriorating economic conditions by establishing politicized cooperatives linked to the socialist or Catholic movements that undertook public works projects or collectively rented and worked land (Degl'Innocenti 1981:8–9, 21; Ridolfi 1997:306; Seton-Watson 1967:60–61, 158). In general, during the late nineteenth century, pressure on the state from below increased.

Industrialization developed slowly, and industrialists were fragmented between the successful silk manufacturers who wanted open markets and low tariffs and the cotton, wool, and metallurgy sector that wanted high tariffs and state support. The lobbies that demanded state support were more successful than their free trade counterparts, producing a very close connection, reinforced by tightened credit markets, between certain sectors of industrial capitalism and the state (Adler 1995:22; Banti 1996:166–169; Zamagni 1993:79–80). Furthermore, elites remained fragmented. Although many elite organizations copied one another's statutes and names, they were usually concerned with local problems, and the circulation of elite newspapers was confined to small geographic areas (Banti 1996:189–193). To summarize, Italian industry remained weak and highly state dependent, and Italian elites remained locally oriented.

Initially, this combination of fragmentation at the top and increasing pressure from below produced an authoritarian backlash, especially after the rise of rural unrest in southern Italy in the 1890s, and then a democratic opening (Ragionieri 1976:1806–1807, 1812–1813). A series of strong parliamentary leaders oversaw these political changes: Agostino Depretis (1813–1887), Francesco Crispi (1818–1901), and Giovanni Giolitti (1842–1928). These men's political power reflected the continuing tendency of Italian social elites to organize themselves in restricted regional cliques that supported governments formed in Parliament rather than parties with programs. Elite fragmentation

made possible a technique of rule, called *trasformismo* (transformism). Ruling coalitions formed in Parliament—they were not elected into office on the basis of a preexisting program. This technique was perfected with the election of Depretis, the first representative of southern interests to hold the position of prime minister in 1876 (Seton-Watson 1967:50). It was subsequently extended to include broader social and political groups, until eventually Giolitti even tried to incorporate the socialists and the Catholics (Pombeni 1986:226; Sabbatucci 2003:21–22; Seton-Watson 1967:50–52). Transformism could be used to support either authoritarian policies as under Crispi or more liberal ones as under Giolitti (Corner 2002:278–279; De Felice 1969:120–121; Ragionieri 1976:1749, 1757; Seton-Watson 1967:129–132). But whatever the specific policy or the political makeup of Parliament, the chamber from the late nineteenth century until the eve of World War I lacked any firm distinction between deputies loyal to the existing government and deputies opposing it. Instead, the members almost always supported the existing government and focused on providing for their vast array of clients and subclients who ensured their political career (Banti 1996:193–212). Thus, Italian politics continued to lack party alternation, which had important consequences for the census.

Within this overall structure, there were important variations. The authoritarian trend in Italian politics, beginning with the first Crispi administration, culminated in a military dictatorship at the turn of the century (Gaeta 1982:68–72). After the election of the Zanardelli-Giolitti government in 1901, a new political period began (the Giolittian period). Giolitti's governments were based on a compromise among the northern industrial working class, northern industry, Catholic smallholders, and southern landowners at the expense of the rural proletariat in both northern and southern Italy (Carocci 1971:51). Although political reform was limited by the organizational weakness of the Italian state and elite intransigence, the Giolittian period was the most democratic in Italy's history up until that point because political and social rights expanded even if they did not extend to the entire population (Carocci 1971:133–134; Corner 2002:279–287; De Grand 2002:298–299; Ragionieri 1976:1869–1872; Seton-Watson 1967:237–239). This gradual opening of the political system also led to intensive associational development among elites and nonelites (Adler 1995:30–54; Aquarone 1987:63–64; Riley 2010:34–41).

The political context surrounding the early twentieth-century censuses, therefore, differed from the one in the late nineteenth century.

There was more organized social pressure on the state and a sense that government should address social problems. However, the political system disconnected the census from political struggle, despite the development of interest group politics. Although the census was now used to reapportion seats in the Parliament and although the Italian state was becoming more democratic, the census was not politicized. One reason for its continued insulation from intense political struggle was the absence of a nationally organized party system that could have translated differences in the distribution of deputies into substantial changes in political authority.

Crisis and Reemergence: The Missing Census of 1891 and the Censuses of 1901, 1911, and 1921

During the 1880s, the central administration of Italian official statistics developed rapidly. Crispi laid the foundations of a professional bureaucracy in the Italian state by separating departmental administrators from parliamentary leaders and by recruiting them through formal examinations rather than personal relationships (Melis 1996:196). Official statistics benefited from these reforms, although DIRSTAT shifted between ministries several times in the late 1870s (Fracassi 1961:99, 101; Marucco 1996:40–41, 60). In 1884, the central directorate had established control over the dissemination of most information (Fracassi 1961:101; Marucco 1996:61). During this period, then, a new group of more technically trained information intellectuals began to influence the census (Marucco 1996:59–65).

This consolidation, however, proved short lived. The census was cancelled in 1891 due to a lack of funds (Marucco 1996:65). This cancellation is surprising because Crispi, who made this decision, was a major state builder and an advocate for official statistics (Fracassi 1961:118; Marucco 1996:40, 65). Bodio left DIRSTAT in 1898 and was replaced by Carlo De Negri, a career bureaucrat (Marucco 1996:47). Furthermore, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the office suffered budget and staff cuts (Marucco 1996:73). DIRSTAT also began to lose its relative monopoly over information production as ministries and local governments produced competing statistics (Fracassi 1961:129; Marucco 1996:74). DIRSTAT suffered further losses of prestige because of continuing moves among ministries (Marucco 1996:87, 89).

Despite these bureaucratic travails, the censuses from 1901 to 1921 were relatively successful. These censuses were conducted in a period of

relative liberalization and coincided with the Giolittian period; despite this political opening, the period is usually viewed as one of crisis and decline for official statistics (Fracassi 1961:117–139; Marucco 1996:73–76). Yet in most respects, they were the most advanced and ambitious attempts to gather information until after World War II. In particular, the 1901 census, which added a question on unemployment, is considered one of the most successful in the history of Italian information gathering (Alberti 2012:186; ISTAT 1959:14).

The basic purposes of the censuses of this period were quite similar to those of the late nineteenth century. However, in the new century, the census started to have a more central role in the distribution of political and social rights. Officials used it to determine the number of local government officials, whether communes could form separate budgetary units, the distribution of parliamentary representatives according to provinces, the classification and salary level of school teachers, and the level of some taxes (Italy MAIC 1904:280–283).

The censuses of 1901 and 1911 introduced a new method of collecting information. In 1901, the information was collected through a household form that doubled as an envelope and through a series of individual forms for each household member (Ceccotti 1957:360–361; Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:38). This new system was adopted to ease the use of the census for maintaining the population registers (Italy MAIC 1904:ii). However in 1901, the two purposes of the Italian census—a population register and a provider of information about the population— continued to coexist. The instructions to the 1901 census, for example, stipulated that an individual form had to be filled out for each household member who was present and for each family member who was absent (Italy ISTAT 1959:14). If family members were absent, the head of the household had to indicate how long they had been gone and where they were living (Italy ISTAT 1959:15).

Furthermore, in 1901, the question about occupation changed. Agriculturalists were required to state whether they were owner-operators, sharecroppers, renters, or day laborers. Industrial employees had to indicate whether they were a boss, technician, or worker. The possible categories were given on the form, and the respondent had to underline one of the job classifications (Italy ISTAT 1959:14).

Occupational classifications continued to create problems. For example, very similar Italian words meant walnut and pine beater in Tuscany but butcher in Naples (Italy MAIC 1904:lxxvi). In some cases, the occupational question may have received inconsistent

responses partly because respondents attempted to upgrade their social status. For example, the final report of the 1901 census suggested that some respondents wrote "day laborer" as their occupation but then stated that they were also an "owner" under the forced response section of the census. The authors of the final report interpreted these sorts of responses as attempts at occupational upgrading and seem to have incorporated these upgrades into their tabulations (Italy MAIC 1904:lxxxi). Thus, the number of agricultural proprietors may have been overestimated.

The 1911 census used three forms: a household form, an individual form, and a head of household form (Italy ISTAT 1959:17–19). It removed the question on unemployment and added one on property taxes. The instructions indicated that only persons who were present when the census was conducted needed to fill out the individual form. Information on members who were temporarily absent from the household was collected on the household form to be filled out by the head of the household (Italy ISTAT 1959:17). The 1911 census continued to use the standardized titles to determine the position of each respondent within occupations (Italy ISTAT 1959:18).

The 1921 census reversed the separation between the household form and the individual form and collected information on a single sheet divided between persons present and temporarily absent (Italy ISTAT 1959:23; Mastroluca and Verrascina 2012:87). This census reintroduced completely open responses for the occupation questions. The 1921 census attempted to collect information about unemployment. For example, if a respondent was an unemployed bricklayer, he would be expected to state "bricklayer (unemployed)" (Italy ISTAT 1959:14, 18, 21). Furthermore, these censuses all had a question about ownership. The beginnings of this question went back to the 1881 form that asked if the respondent possessed land or factories. However, the censuses from 1901 to 1921 asked if the respondent paid a property tax or had land and factories that were eligible for taxation (Italy ISTAT 1959:14, 18, 23).

Thus, these early twentieth-century censuses were significantly more detailed than those from 1861 to 1881. This expansion of the census was perhaps connected to a more intensive interaction between state and society in Italy during this period. As social groups, such as parties and associations, became more highly organized and interacted more intensively with the state, the social salience of the census increased. However, this development in Italy was cut off by the rise of fascism (chapter 7).

Conclusions

The Italian census certainly stemmed from state building because the postunification political elite wanted to use the census to unify their country symbolically and administratively (Patriarca 1996:177; Romanelli 1980:769). Nevertheless, this state-centered view is limited. The Italian state was weak after unification and threatened with social divisions and conflict, yet it instituted a successful national census. Furthermore, the history of the Italian census in this period does not closely track the development of the Italian state. During the liberal period, from unification to 1881, the census relied heavily on the cooperation of local elites. In the Giolittian period, from 1901 to 1921, the census became more open to a broader range of social pressures. In contrast, the census entered its most profound crisis under the premiership of Francesco Crispi, who is widely considered Italy's most important late nineteenth-century state builder. Thus, although the Italian census was generally linked to the development of a national state, the periods of state building and census development did not neatly correspond. We turn then to our four social explanations.

First, systems of lay categorization strongly affected information collection and use. Italian censuses were particularly concerned with place, exhibited by their questions on place of residence and nationality in the preunification censuses and by their counts of both the de facto and the de jure population. Census officials tried to capitalize on these lay usages to use the census to create a new placed-based social unit: Italy (Patriarca 1996:4; Romanelli 1980:769). To describe this unified Italy, they could deploy comparisons among provinces that were socially meaningless, *compartimenti* that corresponded to the defunct preunification political units, or aggregates of northern and southern Italy that corresponded to social differences created by different historical patterns of capitalist development. The latter set of differences came to be emphasized. But instead of unifying the country symbolically, the description of these differences of northern and southern Italy, stemming from their different social and economic histories and conditions, emphasized regional differences.

Second, autonomous intellectuals, scholars from different fields united by their interest in positivism, were crucial in establishing the Italian interventionist census. Before unification, these intellectuals had documented Italian society, with its underlying political fragmentation. After unification, tracking social progress was also key. Intellectuals' knowledge was tightly tied to policy making, because Italian political elites were self-conscious modernizers who wanted

to track Italian social development. The intellectuals usually came from the background of *Risorgimento* patriotism rather than from bureaucratic positions in the preunification states (Favero 2001:45). The Italian census co-opted these figures and drew on their expertise (cf. Loveman 2005:1661–1662). After unification, there was a transition in the type of information intellectuals who influenced the census. In the immediate postunification period, these were mostly liberal positivists committed to a descriptive model of information collection. After the 1880s, a new more technically oriented group influenced the census.

Third, power relations were important. Social elites remained regionally fragmented (Banti 1996:562–557). In contrast, information intellectuals developed a more national perspective that was consistent historically with their panpeninsular affiliations. They faced neither great resistance nor enjoyed great cooperation from agrarians and industrialists. During the liberal period, from unification to 1881, the census relied heavily on the cooperation of local elites. In the Giolittian period, from 1901 to 1921, the census became more open to a broader range of social pressures. But few social groups were nationally organized. Distinctively, then, in Italy, information intellectuals remained somewhat autonomous from specific social groups and organized themselves as a self-conscious caste oriented to the state rather than to elite social groups (although they did form some alliances with elites in the early twentieth century).

The historical trajectory of the Italian census was crucial. The first national censuses were based on centuries of information gathering in the preunification states that reflected sustained interactions between their societies and states, mostly at the local or municipal level. Elites and nonelites were familiar with censuses, and many social elites actively advocated for the refinement of information gathering techniques. Thus, the first three censuses (1861, 1871, and 1881) essentially continued this pattern: elites assured that censuses would be collected in the new nation; nonelites complied. These elites, however, were often co-opted into the agencies that conducted the census. In fact, elite fragmentation encouraged their alliance with the state. These agencies were partially institutionalized during this period, and they established a pattern of social consultation. As a result, the pattern of interaction changed somewhat in the next three censuses (1901, 1911, and 1921), as individuals who might have been autonomous census intellectuals in previous periods became census officials. Nevertheless, these census officials established close ties to other elites, thus creating another form of state-society interaction.

In addition, nonelite influences grew. These censuses were based on a broader alliance in which organized workers and industrialists began to have some input. Across the entire period then, the historical trajectory was one of increasing interaction between the state and society over the census.

The combination of these social influences (the focus of lay categories on place, the influence of the autonomous intellectuals, and the fragmentation of the social elite), with the historical trajectory explains the outcome: a relatively weak state able to conduct a comprehensive, detailed census that collected information about the de jure and de facto population with the assistance and support of social elites. It was certainly interventionist in intention, though it did not produce the intended intervention of national unification. The historical trajectory also suggestively maps onto the sorts of censuses that were produced in each period. The earlier censuses were relatively successful but were not linked to any ambitious interventionist project beyond the symbolic unification of the country. The later censuses, in contrast, were the most detailed and successful until after World War II. Although they were not yet interventionist, they might have developed in an interventionist direction had the rise of fascism not precluded this development (chapter 7). Thus, as the interaction between the state and society increased, the censuses became more detailed.

Part II: Conclusions

The late nineteenth and early twentieth-century censuses were closely linked to attempts to intervene in social reality. By the late nineteenth century, census takers were no longer content to describe populations. They adopted theories and sought information that would allow them to alter these populations. Experts, backed by elite allies and armed with scientific knowledge, could help to strengthen the national state and solve social problems. We acknowledge that the emergence of interventionist censuses was by definition an extension of state power (e.g., Desrosières 2008:42–44, 86–87; Frankel 2006:1–2; Heclo 1974:304; Higgs 2004a:131–132; James and Redding 2005:191; Lacey and Furner 1993:35–37; Schweber 1996:189; Skocpol and Rueschemeyer 1996:3, 5; Weir and Skocpol 1985:118–119; Woolf 1989:601). Of course, statistical offices devoted to taking censuses also emerged and consolidated during this period (Anderson 1988:83–115; Desrosières 1998:195; 2008:41–44; Higgs 2004a:83–90; Ipsen 1996:50–89; Marucco 1996:128–138; Skocpol and Rueschemeyer

1996:6; Ventresca 1995:20–21, 59–61; Wiebe 1967:147). The state-centered explanation, however, is not compelling. The most technically advanced interventionist censuses occurred in the relatively new states of Italy and the United States. In the United Kingdom, where the first welfare regime developed, the census remained backward. Furthermore, the emergence of the census as a state institution was the result of underlying social changes, particularly the gradual waning of the power of the agrarian elite. Thus, we examined three social influences on the census and its historical trajectory.

First, the censuses continued to reflect strongly the systems of lay categorization of these three countries, despite the pressure of the international statistical conferences. In the United Kingdom, the main social division was class. The United Kingdom was the home of the first mass working class movement, Chartism. During the nineteenth century, democratic and republican language was adapted to create a new language of class counterposing producers to nonproducers. In the United States, the census focused on race. In contrast to the United Kingdom, where occupational statistics were used to produce a class map of the British population, in the United States, the census was used to produce a racial map of the American population. In Italy, the census interacted with lay usages of place. Census intellectuals tried to use these usages to interpret social differences as regional distinctions. In both the popular and elite imagination, Italy was a new political unit combining regionally distinct societies that existed at different points on an evolutionary trajectory. Region, in the sense of advanced northern part of Italy and backward southern part of Italy, became decisive for interpreting official information. These differences were also interpreted racially.

These differences cannot be explained from the state-centered perspective because political elites on both sides of the Atlantic linked the census to theories of race. However, the society-centered perspective recognizes that race was more socially relevant in the United States than in the United Kingdom or in Italy. Indeed, where class awareness developed in the United States, it tended to be closely tied to racial consciousness. Thus, the common international shift toward a concern with the quality of populations was interpreted very differently in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy because of the different lay categories.

Second, information intellectuals pressed for interventionist censuses. In all three countries, these intellectuals were scholars, who took on characteristics of academics by the end of the period. In Italy, these actors were autonomous intellectuals, who shared a common

panpeninsular Italian culture. In the United Kingdom and the United States, these intellectuals were organized into interest groups or lobbies to press for their causes. In contrast, in Italy, these actors continued to act independently, not in groups, but they increasingly oriented themselves to the state. Despite these organizational differences, the information intellectuals in all three countries were deeply engaged in political and social issues. Technical knowledge was thus closely linked to social and political engagement (Porter 2011:38). Information intellectuals sought to use the census, and more generally official information, to reshape the social order. They supported a new and distinctly public and open form of knowledge based on the collection of quantitative evidence that was relatively valid across different individuals (Porter 1995:46–47). Censuses shaped by these information intellectuals in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy were viewed as a vehicle for collecting information relevant to debates over social policy.

Third, the changing distribution of social power created an opening for the interventionist census. During the late nineteenth century, industrial capitalists for the first time became one of the dominant partners of ruling social coalitions in the United Kingdom, the United States, and to a lesser extent in Italy. They sought a more interventionist state that would create the public infrastructure necessary for accumulation. This elite was a potentially powerful ally for census intellectuals. In contrast, the interventionist census held little appeal for the landed elite; members of this group tended to be more attached to a classic liberal ideology demanding low tariffs and a minimal state. In all three cases, the relative power of land and industry shifted in favor of the latter during the late nineteenth century. This transformation of the social elite went furthest in the United States, was considerably less complete in the United Kingdom, and was only beginning in Italy. As a result, census intellectuals in the United States had much more powerful elite allies than in either of the other two cases. In the United Kingdom, census intellectuals faced a much stronger agrarian elite, and the census remained, as a result, a somewhat backward institution. Finally, in Italy, where industrial capitalism was least developed, census intellectuals had some elite allies, especially in industry, but they developed more autonomously from other social elites than in the other two cases. As a result of these social relations, they identified more closely with the central state than did their counterparts in the United Kingdom and the United States.

The historical trajectory varied in our three cases. Social elites pressed for the first UK censuses as individuals. This elite influence

continued during this period of time, and perhaps expanded to some extent, as these elites formed lobbies and interest groups to influence state bureaucrats. In the United States, state actors instituted the census, but social elites as individuals soon came to interact with census officials. In the United States, this elite influence expanded and was politicized during the period we consider here, as social elites formed lobbies and interest groups to pressure census bureaucrats. Interest group politics in the United States expanded in general and spilled over into the census, increasing the level of state-society interaction around the census. The Italian case was somewhat different, as the first censuses grew out of centuries of routinized state-society interaction around information gathering at the local and municipal level. This pattern continued, but a new one was also initiated: autonomous intellectuals directly pressed state actors for national censuses, and these intellectuals were quickly co-opted into the new census organization. Thus, the level of state-society interaction around the census increased in all of our cases during this time period and most of this interaction was between social elites and state actors.

These social factors, along with the historical trajectories, explain the outcomes. By the 1930s, the US census was a vibrant social institution deeply linked to powerful groups, and it focused on race. In the United Kingdom, the census was a somewhat weaker institution with fewer powerful allies, and it focused on class. The Italian census was well developed, focused on place of residence, and reflected the influence of autonomous intellectuals. All three censuses became interventionist in intention because populations now emerged as potential objects of political action. However, none of these censuses were highly instrumental; that is, they did not usually effectively change their populations. Experts' schemes to collect information and transform the population either by engineering class or racial demography (the United Kingdom and the United States), or by raising national consciousness (Italy) failed. The specific categories that experts proposed were not well translated into lay categories as a consequence of the limited degree of social interaction. Censuses would only become instrumentally interventionist in the twentieth century with the extensive democratization of information gathering.

PART III

The Consolidation of Interventionist Censuses

In the twentieth century, censuses became hallmarks of modern states; collecting information became part of the taken-for-granted institutional landscape. Worldwide, the lack of a national census in fact signaled that a state's government did not function effectively. Censuses were designed to provide information for academics, government, and businesses. Especially after World War II, censuses became increasingly interventionist, with explicit designs to alter society. They also became increasingly instrumental—that is, effective—in doing so. This trend occurred in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy. Nevertheless, our three cases exhibited important differences. Censuses were most interventionist in the United States, where the interaction between state and social actors over the information contained in them was most intense. The US census remains a vibrant social institution. The Italian census, actually a hybrid between a census and a register, was the least interventionist, was the purview mostly of experts, and it entailed little interaction between state and nonelite social actors. The United Kingdom was an intermediate case: some social interaction produced a moderately interventionist census. The UK census was increasingly politicized after the 1970s, more social actors became interested in it, and the information was more widely used. Yet, there is considerable doubt about the 2021 census.

The Influence of States and Societies on Contemporary Censuses

Most academic literature emphasizes the role of the state and specialized bureaucracies in creating highly instrumental interventionist censuses in the second half of the twentieth century. States extended

their control through counting and categorizing in censuses (Kertzer and Arel 2002:6–7). State classification systems legitimized and standardized social change through bureaucratic and technical means (Robbin 2000a:398). The methods of census takers influenced their results (Alonso and Starr 1987:2). In turn, state agencies used census methods and data as instruments of governance (Nobles 2000:1). Despite—or from the Foucauldian perspective because of—this state-driven view, this period is also viewed as a time of increasing social influence on the census. Most notably, social movements emerged as important influences on censuses (Kertzer and Arel 2002:27–31; Mora 2014b:83–118; Nobles 2000:19–22). Generally, this work argues that once census categories are established by the state, they subsequently become an object of political contestation (James and Redding 2005:191). While much of this literature hints at the interactive nature of information gathering in the twentieth century, it does not specify its theoretical underpinnings or analyze it comparatively.

These state-centered and society-centered views have been applied to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy. For example, Higgs (2004a:168–176) noted the explosion of data collected for the government's purposes starting in the 1950s, crystallizing the UK "information state." Similarly, a well-established argument for the twentieth-century United States underlines the connection between racial formation and census categories: censuses helped create the racial and ethnic groups that they purport to count (Nobles 2000:25; Schor 2009:10). For Italy, the literature emphasizes the connection between censuses and fascist demographic policies (Bertaux 1999:591–592; Ipsen 1996:195–204; Prévost 2009:122–125).

Social influences were especially profound in the United States, where government benefits and programs based on race or ethnicity came to be allocated using census data (the "affirmative action model" of censuses [Kertzer and Arel 2006:670–671]). The US census was a uniquely public enterprise because census data were a public resource (Anderson 2008:2). Thus, censuses became politicized because majorities and minorities gained official recognition through them (Kertzer and Arel 2002:30). The pursuit of entitlements became quests for the "right" numbers (Kertzer and Arel 2002:30). Thus, Kertzer and Arel (2002:27) noted a shift from census categories crafted from above to those crafted through a complex political struggle involving interest groups representing the categorized (i.e., a shift to "statistical citizenship" [Hannah 2001:516]). Choldin (1994:1, 5) argued that the census that "once appeared to be an innocuous bookkeeping exercise to count the American people,

has been drawn into a forceful political controversy" involving census administrators, mayors, and governors.

We do not deny the influence of states, bureaucracies, or social movements on censuses, but we again wish to present a more comprehensive view of their contributions by examining our five empirical implications. First, all three of the states we examine were clearly strong enough to conduct a census during this period of time. Yet, this convergence in state strength does not explain the differences in the three censuses.

Second, censuses were, and continue to be, strongly shaped by schemes of lay categorizaton. The UK census slowly shifted from an emphasis on social division based on class to one based on race and ethnicity. This shift stemmed from increasing democratization and from an influx of postcolonial immigrants. The focus of the US census on race and ethnicity intensified as minorities used the census to reinforce their identity politics. The Italian census continued to focus on place, through questions on residence and citizenship.

Third, census intellectuals interacted with the state actors in three different ways. In the United Kingdom, this interaction was highly structured and limited but gained momentum in the late 1970s, when various interest groups began to press for and resist changes. In the United States, the census staff explicitly courted input from social leaders, academics, and interest groups. The Italian census staff were isolated, so there was relatively little social input, except from key social elites. Thus, there were few census intellectuals. The Italian census became the purview of highly specialized academics, such as statisticians and demographers, and state bureaucrats.

Fourth, the power of different groups was important. In the United Kingdom, the ruling party exerted influence over census particulars; furthermore, the parliamentary system gave it the power to eliminate the census. UK society was democratized after World War II, creating room for the influence of social movements on the census. Likewise, in the United States, the details of the census and its methodology depended, at least to some extent, on the party composition of the legislature and the presidency. More fundamentally, however, democratization was more widespread in the United States than in the United Kingdom and the influence of social movements more profound. The civil rights movement shifted power toward previously marginalized groups; they used the census to push for their rights. In contrast, the Italian census is relatively immune to these power dynamics because the party system there has few links to the census. The power of Italian industry instead shapes the census there.

Fifth, our analyses of the three historical trajectories of information gathering show that censuses grew not out of states' immediate demands or categories but out of previous rounds of information gathering. Of course, highly instrumental interventionist censuses may have been specifically, at one point in time, a result of one party's intentions, but they more broadly stemmed from the interaction—or lack thereof—between states and societies. In the United States, the census had been institutionalized early in history to involve many parties; once they were involved, they had a stake in it. This pattern continued and accelerated in the twentieth century. In the United Kingdom, the census developed somewhat later, the interaction between the state and social actors over the census was less intense than in the United States. Finally, in Italy, contemporary censuses developed out of a largely symbolic census that represented national unity, while much practical information gathering was done by local agencies. It had a large degree of autonomy from other governmental agencies, so fewer social actors were directly involved in it than in the United Kingdom and the United States. Elite social actors were involved as members of advisory committees of institutionalized census bureaucracies; this form of state-society interaction was intense, but limited. These varying degrees of state-society interaction correspond to varying levels of census politicization: very high in the United States, intermediate in the United Kingdom, and virtually nonexistent in Italy.

Thus, these historical trajectories, along with the three social factors, explain the census outcomes. The UK censuses are instrumentally interventionist; they are used for social purposes. The US censuses are also instrumentally interventionist, but they are much more widely used than the UK ones. The contemporary Italian censuses were highly developed technically but socially irrelevant—they have few interventionist aims.

Neither the increase in societies' vis-à-vis states' roles nor the rise of the influence of social movements on the census in the late twentieth century was part of an invariant historical trend. Instead, where these trends did occur—and they did not inevitably do so—they were linked to the historical trajectories of censuses. The influence of social movements was particularly strong in the United States, where the census was institutionalized in a way that affected many social groups and created many interests in it. Social influences on the census were not new; only organized social movements were. Not surprisingly, given the long history of racial and ethnic classification,

controversies often revolved around undercounts of minorities. These issues became especially salient when the allocation of entitlements based on race and ethnicity became tied to census numbers. This pattern was also found in the United Kingdom, although in later decades and to a lesser degree than in the United States. Undercounts never became highly politicized in the United Kingdom probably because fewer resources were tied to the census in the United Kingdom than in the United States. In contrast, the Italian census was not highly politicized after fascism nor subject to the influence of social movements. It was used relatively little for practical social purposes and relatively few actors had a stake in it. Therefore, there was relatively little conflict about it and no social mobilization around it. These arguments are summarized in Table P3.1.

Table P3.1 Censuses in the Mid-Twentieth Century

	The United Kingdom (1941–2011)	*The United States (1950–2010)*	*Italy (1931–2011)*
Summary of the evidence for the empirical implication(s) of:			
State-centered perspective			
1. State strength	strong	strong	strong
Society-centered perspective			
2. Lay categories	class to race	race	place
3. Information intellectuals	some; interest groups of academics and activists	many; interest groups of academics and activists	few; academics and statisticians
4. Power	party politics; some democratization	party politics; democratization	industry
Interactive perspective			
5. Historical trajectory	some interaction between states and societies	intense and widespread interaction between states and societies	intense but highly limited interaction between states and societies
Outcome:			
	moderately instrumental interventionist census	highly instrumental interventionist census	weakly interventionist census

CHAPTER 5

The Turn to Race and Ethnicity in the UK Censuses

During this period of time, the UK census shifted from a relatively isolated institution that focused on measuring social class to a more openly politicized one that included questions on race and ethnicity. Democratization and immigration changed British society, making it more equalitarian and pluralistic than before. The census responded to these changes. Furthermore, some ethnic and racial groups mobilized to influence the census. The ensuing controversy mostly focused on whether any sort of question about race or ethnicity should be asked in the census. In some ways, though, the census still reflected the United Kingdom's long history of secrecy surrounding information gathering—the neoliberal attack on the census was particularly vicious and influenced the proposed format for the 2021 census.

Politics, Society, and Knowledge

The rise of the Labour party to political preeminence and the establishment of the welfare state were the main political developments of the immediate postwar United Kingdom. From 1946 to 1979, the United Kingdom pioneered the development of the welfare state even as its geopolitical and economic position deteriorated. The Atlee government created a mixed economy based on direct state ownership (Judt 2005:330; Morgan [1984] 2010:633). It implemented numerous reforms including nationalization of coal, railways, roads, aviation, utilities, and the Bank of England (Morgan [1984] 2010:634). It also greatly extended publicly financed social welfare, most notably in the National Health Service introduced in 1946 (Morgan [1984] 2010:634).

There was some democratization. The influence of the House of Lords waned after its attempt to block the Labour Party's nationalization of the steel industry in 1947 (Black [1996] 2003:303). In

response, Atlee got the Parliament Act of 1949 passed, reducing the number of times the Lords could block the House of Commons' legislation from three to two (Black [1996] 2003:304). The Life Peerages Act (1958) further breached tradition by creating nonhereditary peerages based on merit (Black [1996] 2003:304). The Peerage Act (1963) permitted peeresses to sit in their own right (Black [1996] 2003:304). The House of Lords Act of 1999 implemented more reform by removing all hereditary peers, except for 92 (10% of the membership) (Black [1996] 2003:328; Bogdanor 2009:5,145; Dorey 2006:611; Russell 2009:119).

These democratic reforms, however, were limited. The only institutional positions filled by elections are seats in Parliament and in local government. This leaves both the courts and a broader network of agencies outside democratic control (Leys 1989:296–297). Furthermore, the United Kingdom is a secretive state that lacks any legislation forcing agencies to divulge their documents to the public (Leys 1989:297). Subcommittees, led by cabinet heads, set many government policies, but the composition and even the names of these subcommittees are often kept secret (Leys 1989:300). Policymaking authority is vested in the prime minister's office, the cabinet, and the bureaucracy; it does not extend into parliamentary committees, and access to policy makers is restricted (Campbell and Pederson 2011:175; James 1993:492). Governments can also hide details of decisions behind the claim of "Royal Prerogative" because in theory, the government is the Queen's (Leys 1989:301).

The state has two major political parties competing in a winner-take-all electoral system and the parties are well disciplined, so members of Parliament generally follow the party line (Campbell and Pederson 2011:175; Denham and Garnett 2004:232). The ruling party typically controls the legislative and executive branches; therefore, it operates with limited opposition (Anderson and Guillory 1997:68; Campbell and Pederson 2011:175). State institutions exhibit a high degree of political unity (Furner and Supple 1990:27, 35). Furthermore, the United Kingdom has a highly professional, extensive, and permanent civil service that endures despite changes in the ruling party (Campbell and Pederson 2011:175; Furner and Supple 1990:35; James 1993:492). State power is concentrated at the national level.

After the war, the position of the working class improved economically (Black [1996] 2003:315–316; Morgan [1984] 2010:636). Homes were better furnished, and more families had cars and vacationed abroad (Morgan [1984] 2010:644). Working-class families

benefited from higher wages and shorter hours as real disposable household income increased significantly (Black [1996] 2003:316; Morgan [1984] 2010:644). Class differences remained but were less marked than before (Black [1996] 2003:318, 326; Morgan [1984] 2010:644). Workers were engaged in a class compromise based on high economic growth rates and on wages large enough to support families.

Increasing affluence paradoxically accompanied a period of economic decline starting in the 1960s, which sparked popular discontent with the Labour Party. Starting in 1979, a new era of neoliberalism ensued. The shift between the two periods was heavily shaped by the politics of the working class. By the 1970s, growth slowed across the advanced capitalist world leading to a more racialized class politics in which white identity compensated for increasingly meager pay and deteriorating public services (Mann 2013:156; Nairn 2003:36). Conservative Party leader Margaret Thatcher won the 1979 election on a platform that privileged free enterprise, a competitive market economy, restriction of trade unions, reduced income tax, and drastically reduced social services (Reitan 2003:25). She implemented an agenda of comprehensive privatization, deflation, deregulation, and reduction of the public sector (Cragg and Dyck 1999:476; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002:556). The UK state has become increasingly centralized over time, although its regulation of the economy remains limited (Birch [1967]1998:21; Campbell and Pederson 2011:175; Higgs 2004a:197).

The United Kingdom is a liberal market economy, with a closed, centralized state (Campbell and Pederson 2011:175). Neither the state nor business associations directly coordinate economic activity (Campbell and Pederson 2011:175). State ownership had been limited to a few infrastructural sectors but was cut even further in the 1980s under Thatcher's conservative government (Campbell and Pederson 2011:175; Morgan [1984] 2010:660). Thus, markets and corporate hierarchies are key components of economic governance (Campbell and Pederson 2011:175).

This political economy shapes modes of knowledge production and creates distinctive organizations (Campbell and Pederson 2011:171). "Scholarly research units" are staffed by scholars, professional researchers, and analysts, often with joint university appointments (Campbell and Pederson 2011:171; Stone 2000:45). These units are publicly funded and typically nonpartisan (Campbell and Pederson 2011:171). Some scholarly research units emerged following World War II in response to political exigencies and the

inadequacies of existing research facilities (Campbell and Pederson 2011:175). University research centers engage in a variety of activities, including policy briefing, networking, and government advising, thus connecting the academic and policy realms (Stone 2007: 264). "Advocacy research units" have their own staff and research capacities, and they tend to be privately funded and politically and ideologically partisan (Campbell and Pederson 2011:171–172; James 1993:498; Stone 2007: 263). They function as interest and pressure groups. "Party research units" provide advice and analysis for party members (Campbell and Pederson 2011:172). Finally, "state research units" are tied to specific government departments or ministries or created on an ad hoc basis to counsel the government on particular matters (Campbell and Pederson 2011:172).

Beginning in the 1970s, in response to the perceived failure of Keynesian economics, more advocacy research units emerged with a conservative slant, including the Centre for Policy Studies and the Adam Smith Institute (Campbell and Pederson 2011:175–176; Denham and Garnett 1998:32; Desai 1994:30). Financial institutions also began developing on-site research capacities that cultivated and disseminated neoliberal ideas. This conservative ideology sparked privacy and cost concerns about the census (Thompson 2010:379). In the late 1980s and 1990s, leading figures from academia, business, and the unions set up alternatives, such as the Institute for Public Policy Research, to reverse the conservatives' intellectual dominance (Campbell and Pederson 2011:176). These advocacy research units were aligned closely with either the Conservative Party or Labour Party, but they were not party research units because they were not established by the parties (Campbell and Pederson 2011:176).

The United Kingdom has state research units in most government departments, staffed by civil servants, who enjoy a degree of autonomy from policy makers and administrators (Campbell and Pederson 2011:176; James 1993:497). There are also state research units staffed by outside appointees, such as the prime minister's policy unit (Campbell and Pederson 2011:176; James 1993:497). The civil service also has semidetached inspectors that provide independent professional opinions on issues such as social services (Campbell and Pederson 2011:176; James 1993:497).

We characterize the UK knowledge regime as somewhat open and competitive. It has this form for three reasons. First, advocacy and scholarly research units have limited funding (Campbell and Pederson 2011:176; James 1993:500). Most of these research units are established under law as charities, and thus, they are required to

be educational and nonpartisan (Campbell and Pederson 2011:176). This restricts their ability to lobby and undertake other political activities because tax laws do not favor charitable giving (Campbell and Pederson 2011:176; Wright 2002:18–19). Corporations also provide financial support for advocacy and scholarly research units, but their funding decreases during economic recessions (Campbell and Pederson 2011:177; James 1993:500).

Second, the civil service is extensive and entrenched, reaching up to the permanent bureaucratic counterpart of a minister (Campbell and Pederson 2011:177; Higgs 2004a:196). It enjoys internal policy-making ability, protects its dominant role as provider of policy advice, and views itself as an intellectual elite qualified to handle any problem (Campbell and Pederson 2011:177; James 1993:492). Civil servants, not politicians, initiate most policy changes through departmental memoranda (Birch [1967] 1998:23). Civil servants are employed by the Crown and are not obliged legally to consider parliamentary opinion (Birch [1967] 1998:24). Outside experts are rarely invited to policy debates. The constitutional principle of neutrality requires civil servants to maintain a distance from external policy organizations (Campbell and Pederson 2011:177).

Finally, opportunities for advocacy research units are restricted because the centralization and insulation of political decisions allow few opportunities for outside input, and these few access points are controlled by the prime minister (Campbell and Pederson 2011:177; James 1993:491–492). Thus, the prime minister's approval dramatically affects the efficacy of research units. For example, in 1983, Thatcher abolished Heath's Central Policy Review Staff, but she was quite open to the Adam Smith Institute and appointed John Redwood to direct the No. 10 Policy Unit's program on privatization because of his previous work with the Centre for Policy Studies (Campbell and Pederson 2011:177; Denham and Garnett 1998:30; Stone 2000:52). In contrast, John Major shut out virtually all advocacy research units (Campbell and Pederson 2011:177). Tony Blair's relationship with advocacy units was not as open as Thatcher's, but it was more open than Major's. (Campbell and Pederson 2011:177). This pattern carries over to the census: outside stakeholders may propose new categories, but they must do so in a highly structured manner that is limited to a period of time about four years before the census (Benjamin 1970:243). The state research units have a more permanent influence, but advocacy research units in particular sit precariously on the edge of the political process, using publicity to affect public opinion and the government as best as they can (Campbell and Pederson 2011:177).

The number of advocacy units has increased since the 1970s, thus increasing the competitiveness of the United Kingdom's marketplace for knowledge. An increased demand for practical solutions as opposed to abstract ideas tied to political ideologies further fuels this competition (Denham and Garnett 2006:156). This competiveness is also enhanced by the winner-take-all electoral system that pushes advocacy research units to pursue high public profiles. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom has relatively few advocacy research units because of limited funding, few points of political access, and the state's own in-house analytic abilities (Campbell and Pederson 2011:177). In sum, although democratization and waning class distinctions created some space for census mobilization, it remains sporadic because of this knowledge regime.

The Rise of a White Interest in the United Kingdom

The structure of group conflict in the United Kingdom shifted in the 1950s. Prior to World War I, few blacks lived in the United Kingdom (Layton-Henry 1984:17). The UK Nationality Act of 1948, however, conferred British citizenship on all peoples living in the British Commonwealth, colonies, or the former British Empire (Peach and Gale 2003:473). As a consequence of this act, large-scale black and Asian immigration to the United Kingdom started in the 1950s, transforming the United Kingdom into a multiracial society and increasing the salience of racial and ethnic divisions (Black [1996] 2003:305–306, 326; Modood 2005:458; Small and Solomos 2006:242). The minority population grew at an astonishing speed (Peach and Gale 2003:473). Almost half of this population was of South Asian descent, but large numbers also traced their ancestry to the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East (Peach and Gale 2003:473). The National Health Service, railroads, and other potential employers recruited early waves of immigrants to address large-scale labor shortages (Layton-Henry 1984:17; Peach and Gale 2003:473).

Neither members of the Conservative Party nor the Labour Party initially sought to racialize immigration; instead they denied the salience of race (Katznelson 1973:127–128). However, many whites, especially nonelite ones, viewed nonwhite immigration unfavorably (Black [1996] 2003:305–307; Small and Solomos 2006:243). By the 1950s, widespread racism fueled popular pressure to stem immigration (Modood 2005:458). Pubs and nightclubs established "color bars."

Hostilities and riots broke out against blacks and Asians (e.g., Small and Solomos 2006:242). Right-wing politicians exploited dubious accounts of dramatic increases in the black population for political gain (Dale and Holdsworth 1997:161). The conservative government introduced legal restrictions on immigration in 1961 (Modood 2005:458). Enoch Powell, a conservative member of Parliament, exaggerated the size of the black community and warned that immigration would spark violence, in speeches he gave between 1965 and 1975 (Black [1996] 2003:306; Bulmer 1986:472). The reaction to this racist sentiment was a series of ever more restrictive immigration policies (Nairn 2003:262–263).

The state's expanded agenda to monitor the UK population, and in particular the housing and employment of new immigrants, may have been linked to demands to measure ethnicity (Southworth 2005:76). The politics of immigration control, particularly among conservatives, sparked calls to enumerate nonwhites accurately with a direct ethnicity question (Bhagat 2003:689). Census officials also pursued the ethnic measure because many minorities were UK born; thus, officials desired an "objective measure of the numbers and conditions" of ethnic groups (Dewdney 1985:4).

Other politicians were concerned about the low status of blacks and Asians (Bhagat 2003:689). Successive labour governments introduced legislation to curb overt racial discrimination in employment and housing (Modood 2005:458). They also established national agencies and funded local governments to coordinate voluntary organizations focused on immigrant welfare and community relations (Modood 2005:459). In sum, a white nativist interest group was actively working to racialize immigration in the United Kingdom by the 1960s, while more progressive political forces were trying to limit racism.

The Census in the Postwar Period: 1951–1971

Reliance on the census increased after World War II because of a demand for more complex and efficient government services that required local information (Jones et al. 1973:507). Census data informed state policy making and planning and the formulation and administration of local social policies (Higgs 2001:176; Jones et al. 1973:506).

The 1951 census broadened the scope of the 1931 census, which only gathered basic data because of the severe economic depression (Nissel 1987:77). (The 1941 census was cancelled because of the war.)

The census tried to address the social and legislative changes of the intervening 20 years by expanding the number of questions (Nissel 1987:77). It added questions on marital fertility, education, and place of work (UK GRO 1951:n.p.). The detailed occupational questions reflected the importance of social class. For example, unemployed or retired persons were to state their usual or former occupation (UK GRO 1951:n.p.). Persons working in trades and manufacturing were to state the particular work done, the material used, and any articles entailed in the production process (UK GRO 1951:n.p.). Students were asked to specify their area of study, such as "law student" or "medical student" (UK GRO 1951:n.p.). It was the first census to ask about household amenities and appliances (the 1931 census only asked about the number of rooms in a residence), as the United Kingdom cleared slums and rebuilt housing following World War II (UK GRO 1951:n.p.). These housing questions were retained, sometimes with slight alterations, in a short section of the population census, in all subsequent forms through 2011.

The 1961 census included a short form and a long form that was administered to 10 percent of all households (Newman 1971:3, 12; Nissel 1987:80). Questions on occupation and education were removed from the short form, and questions on marriage and home ownership were added (UK GRO 1961:n.p.). It also included a Welsh language question for Wales that was included in subsequent Welsh censuses (UK GRO 1961b:n.p.; 1961c:n.p.). The long form asked additional questions about employment, qualifications in science and technology, and persons absent from the household on census day (UK GRO 1961a:n.p.). This was the last census implemented by the GRO (Gregory and Ell 2005:421).

Starting in 1971, the new Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) fielded censuses in England and Wales, though the registrar general retained equal standing in census matters and coordinated with the OPCS through committees and other means (Dewdney 1981:6). The census retained its functions of counting local populations and delineating national trends; local-level data became more vital due to increased government grants based on the estimates of the local population and internal migration (Jones et al. 1973:505). The 1971 questionnaire added measures about parents' country of birth, means of transportation to work, the respondent's occupation one year prior to the census, and marital fertility (Lawton 1971:110; UK OPCS 1971:2–7). The 10 percent long-form sample was eliminated in the 1971 census (Nissel 1987:80). Checks on the 1961 long-form sample showed significant bias among the elderly

and foreign nationals (Nissel 1987:80). Apparently, enumerators were reluctant to distribute the long forms to persons who would have difficulty completing them (Nissel 1987:80).

A proposal to include a religion measure in the 1971 census was introduced by Wallis Taylor, a member of the Census Advisory Committee; however, it lost out to a language question (Southworth 2005:76). Before the 1981 census, Taylor, Peter Brierley (the eventual director of Christian Research), and Tom Houston, the executive director of the Bible Society, again argued for the religion question: it was asked in many other countries, it would be valuable in planning religious buildings and in providing social services, and it could be used to correlate religion with social behaviors (Southworth 2005:76). However, their request was denied, partly because it had been made only two years prior to the census and lacked the support of senior church leaders (Southworth 2005:76). The proposed measure, too, primarily would have benefitted Christian organizations; thus, it failed to pique the interest of the census officials who were more concerned with testing a religion measure geared toward South Asians (Southworth 2005:76).

Government intrusion and privacy became political issues again in the 1960s (Higgs 2004a:168; Taylor 1951:715). In the mid-1960s, the registrar general revisited the possibility of a national register (Redfern 1989:1; 2004:222). A temporary population register was created during World War I. In 1916, Registrar General Sir Bernard Mallet proposed a permanent national register that would be coordinated with other databases, including the decennial census (Redfern 1989:1; 2004:222). However, nothing came of this proposal (Redfern 1989:1; 2004:222). During World War II, a new register was created but scrapped in 1952 (Nissel 1987:75; Redfern 2004:222). The renewal of the idea in the 1960s also had little effect; ministers deemed the idea politically unacceptable and scrapped it (Redfern 1989:1; 2004:222). A key issue was public resistance to seemingly overbearing actions by the government (Redfern 1989:21). A national register was reminiscent of "Big Brother" and "surveillance society" and thus was contrary to the "English Spirit" because it violated privacy rights (Redfern 2004:222).

This concern extended to the census. Historically, census officials tried to reconcile an "absolutist view of confidentiality" that no census results beyond bare totals should be disclosed with a "pragmatic view of confidentiality" that statistical information should be available, provided that it could not be used to identify individuals (Moore 1973:587). This tension was exacerbated when it became known that

computers would be handling, processing, and storing the 1971 census data (Moore 1973:583; Nissel 1987:79–80). Personal information had become, at least theoretically, a seamless resource (Higgs 2004a:170). Various organizations, including the National Council of Civil Liberties, organized against the compulsory census, and the Liberal Party urged people not to complete their census forms (Higgs 2004a:168; Nissel 1987:80). Other groups pressed for safeguards over the state's use of information (Higgs 2004a:168). Despite these struggles over religion and privacy, however, the censuses of the immediate postwar period were not particularly politicized, and they were not embroiled in the racialization of immigration. This would change to some extent in the following period.

The Controversies over Personal Identity: Race, Ethnicity, and Religion

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was growing concern over racial inequality. Survey data showed that nonwhites had higher unemployment rates, lower-paying jobs, and poorer housing conditions than whites and that their children had lower educational attainment than white children (Bulmer 1996:35; Karn et al. 1997:xv; Sillitoe and White 1992:141). These disparities prompted the 1976 Race Relations Act that enjoined local authorities to be mindful of the need to eliminate racial discrimination and to promote equal opportunities and good relations among different racial groups (Bhrolcháin 1990:546; UK Parliament 1976:1–3).

However, programs geared toward promoting racial equality required reliable data on disadvantaged populations, particularly at the local level (Bhrolcháin 1990:546; Bulmer 1996:35; Sillitoe and White 1992:141; UK House of Commons 1983a:v). Central government funds were available to local authorities to provide services to ethnic minorities (Bhrolcháin 1990:546; UK House of Commons 1983a:xi-xiii). Data, however, were needed to plan services geared to local minorities, such as English classes, and to determine where to build facilities to provide these services (Bhrolcháin 1990:546–547). Baseline statistics also were required to monitor the use of services and their efficacy and to lobby the state for more resources as needed (Bhrolcháin 1990:547; UK House of Commons 1983a:vi).

Despite the intended use of census data for service provision, the proposed ethnicity measure for the 1981 census sparked controversy. Many minority leaders harbored concerns over a direct ethnicity measure because the state, the media, and racial majorities expressed open

hostility toward nonwhites (Ballard 1996:11; Bhrolcháin 1990:552). Consultations between the OPCS and minority groups revealed strong objections based on mistrust about how the data might be used (UK House of Commons 1983b:58). Minorities feared that the state would use ethnicity data to detect illegal entry and unauthorized employment and to increase surveillance of already closely watched black communities (Leech 1989:9, 23). Activists burned census forms in Trafalgar Square (Hicks and Allen 2000:14). Black and Asian leaders urged coethnics not to participate in test runs of the ethnicity question. Their "Say No to Racist Census" campaign was successful: only 14 percent of West Indians and 34 percent of Asians participated in a 1979 test of the measure (Leech 1989:9; Sillitoe and White 1992:146–147; UK House of Commons 1983b:67). Some whites also resisted the suggested question, equating it with an official acknowledgement of a new pluralistic United Kingdom (Waterman and Kosmin 1986:484). Furthermore, race was a controversial cultural concept because of its history of political misuse in Nazi Germany (Bulmer 1996:35).

Lay understandings of who was ethnic also varied considerably, fueling more dissent (Parekh 2001:692). Nonwhites opposed several proposed ethnicity measures that did not mesh with their identity (UK House of Commons 1983a: xxxvi). Many West Indians protested a newly proposed "Afro-Caribbean" category, arguing that it compromised their Britishness. Afro-Caribbeans objected to being classified as "black" because that would group them with Africans, while West Africans complained about being lumped with West Indian descendants of slaves (Ballard 1996:14). Afro-Caribbeans approved of the classification of nonwhites as black-British, but South Asians objected to this category, leading one commentator to suggest that the category "brown" might better describe people of Indian, Arab, African, West Indian, and southern European descent (Leech 1989:21). Pilot tests of the ethnicity measure also indicated that some minority groups found the categories confusing (Bhrolcháin 1990:559).

Academics also challenged the ethnicity measure's validity because it conflated groups from distinct cultural, religious, and geographical backgrounds (Karn et al. 1997:xix). The ethnicity question aimed to identify the most "visible" ethnic groups in the United Kingdom, that is, individuals who could be distinguished from the majority population on the basis of skin color (Bulmer 1996:35). Thus, academics argued that the question measured race—widely held to be a meaningless category—rather than ethnicity (Bulmer 1996:35–36). As a consequence of this dissent, the proposed ethnicity measure,

along with the previous question on parents' birthplace, was excluded from the final 1981 census (Dewdney 1985:5; Martin 1993:22; UK House of Commons 1983a:v).

During the 1980s, nonwhite opposition to the ethnicity question declined because of improving race relations (Ballard 1996:22). Poor minority communities also realized that the state intended to make good on its assurances to use the ethnicity data to improve their access to government goods, services, and funding. The controversy abated, and the ethnicity measure was included in the 1991 census.

However, a new wave of activism by whites, who opposed how the census conceptualized ethnicity, soon followed. Its use of ethnicity mirrored British political discourse, in which the term "ethnic" was applied to nonwhites (Parekh 2001:692). The ethnicity measure may have suggested a false homogeneity because it suggested that 95 percent of the British population was "white" and therefore lacked "ethnicity" (Aspinall 2000:33; Kosmin 1999:4). The census question on ethnicity was intended to provide information to redress discrimination based on race and thus ignored historically disadvantaged white groups, including Jews and Irish (Hickman 1998:289; Parekh 2001:692). This perceived oversight sparked a wave of engagement with census officials over the ethnicity measure among Irish activists.

The Irish are one of the largest minorities in the United Kingdom (Hickman 1998:291; Ryan 2007:416). They played a vital role in developing the United Kingdom's infrastructure as coal miners, factory workers, and house builders (Mac an Ghaill 2000:138). Yet, throughout the history of British colonialism in Ireland and Irish immigration to the United Kingdom, the Irish were portrayed as fundamentally different from the British, prompting racial discrimination against them (Hickman 1998:288–289, 291; Mac an Ghaill 2000:137; Ryan 2007:416). For example, signs posted until the 1960s boldly stated, "No Irish. No Blacks" (Ryan 2007:421). The "No Irish" signs outnumbered the "No Blacks" signs in some areas (Hickman 1998:298).

Though the Irish were a disadvantaged, racialized minority for over a century in the United Kingdom, the association of the term ethnic with nonwhites in the census rendered the Irish invisible (Hickman 1998:289; Ryan 2007:421). Thus, the Irish disrupted the simple binary of white versus black immigrants (Ryan 2007:421). The absence of a reliable Irish ethnicity measure led Irish activists to campaign against their "statistical invisibility" and to lobby for official recognition as an ethnic minority to gain access to resources (Mac an Ghaill 2000:140, 142). Ultimately, this mobilization proved

successful: the 2001 census included an Irish ethnicity measure (Aspinall 2000:34; Dixie and Dorling 2002:291–292; Hicks and Allen 2000:16; Vidler 2001:14).

Still, however, some continued to question the validity of the ethnicity measure. Despite extensive testing, it may have been created in a conceptual vacuum, with little input from those being measured (Southworth 2005:76). Furthermore, some South Asians and Jews argued that religion was fundamental to their self-identity; the addition of a religion question to the census would therefore specify their identity and culture better than a single ethnicity question (Dixie and Dorling 2002:288; Graham and Waterman 2005:91; Southworth 2005:78). Many British Muslims campaigned for a religion measure because they viewed the idea of pan-Asian identity as outdated (Southworth 2005:78). The push for a religion question was an attempt by minorities to have more influence in how they were counted (Southworth 2005:76).

Many Jews also supported a religion measure (Aspinall 2000:37). Previously, most Jews fell into the white category and lacked a means to express their religious identity (Graham and Waterman 2005:91). Jewish leaders needed data to address the health and welfare needs of their community (Graham and Waterman 2005:91). Jewish proponents also believed that a religion census measure could be used to monitor social inequalities and exclusion (Graham and Waterman 2005:91).

The salience of religious identification in the United Kingdom, however, was not new; it was historically related to the social and political perceptions of religion in its different national contexts (Weller 2004:9). In Northern Ireland and Scotland, for example, religion functions as a crucial part of ethnic and communal identity and a key aspect of sectarianism because of the conflicts between Catholics and Protestants (Weller 2004:9). Thus, not surprisingly, a religion question has been included in all censuses in Northern Ireland (Weller 2004:6).

The Office of National Statistics (ONS) proposed the religion question at the request of the Departments of Health, Social Security, and Education and Employment (Hicks and Allen 2000:12). The Department of Health wanted the data to assess health indicators and inequalities; the Department of Education and Employment wanted the data for policy development, for identifying disadvantaged groups, and for the establishment of educational priorities (Hicks and Allen 2000:13; Vidler 2001:12). The Home Office, the department responsible for immigration, security, and policing, wanted to use it for ethnic monitoring and for its research program on race relations

(Hicks and Allen 2000:13; Vidler 2001:12). Academics hoped that the religion question would spark debate on the links between social exclusion and religion (Hicks and Allen 2000:13). For example, the data could be used to correlate economic and religious characteristics (Hicks and Allen 2000:13). The Religious Affiliation Subgroup was established, consisting of various representatives of religious organizations and communities and key academics (Southworth 2005:75; Weller 2004:10). The proposed question was, "What is your religion?" (Hicks and Allen 2000:11). The prospective categories were "none," "Christian," "Buddhist," "Hindu," "Muslim," "Sikh," "Jewish," and "other" (a write-in category) (Hicks and Allen 2000:11). Initially, the religion question was supposed to be mandatory (Hicks and Allen 2000:10). However, there was some concern in the House of Lords about the legality of a question about religion, so the question was made voluntary (Hicks and Allen 2000:10).

The proposed measure was well received by some South Asian ethnic groups because their religion strongly affected their ethnic identification. They believed that the measure legitimately supplemented the question about ethnicity (Hicks and Allen 2000:12). Religious minorities forcefully called for the addition of the question; perhaps, they had come to trust the state more than before (Hicks and Allen 2000:14). The Commission for Racial Equality, the Home Secretary's Race Relations Forum, and the press also supported the question (Hicks and Allen 2000:12).

Others, however, opposed the question. Some objected to it because it grouped all Christians together (Hicks and Allen 2000:13). The Secular Society expressed concerns that the question would overestimate the number of individuals who participated actively in religions events and services because most individuals would self-identify as Christian, even if they rarely attended church (Hicks and Allen 2000:13–14). Furthermore, many people would refuse to answer the question because it was voluntary (Hicks and Allen 2000:14). Some Jews expressed concerns because population information had been misused in Nazi-occupied Europe (e.g., Graham and Waterman 2005:91). Some Muslim organizations feared that the data would be used to brand some members of their community as fundamentalists (Graham and Waterman 2005:91). The "Big Brother" issue also reemerged: many people considered religion to be a personal matter and viewed the measure as intrusive and as a potential violation of civil liberties (Dixie and Dorling 2002:288; Graham and Waterman 2005:90; Weller 2004:10). To make fun of the question, 390,000 persons recorded their religion as "Jedi" (Graham and Waterman 2005:93).

The question took different forms in each national context because the lay understandings of the social significance of religion varied (Weller 2004:6–9). The census question in Northern Ireland and Scotland varied in at least three ways from its counterpart in England and Wales. First, in Northern Ireland and Scotland, the questions offered options specifying different Christian denominations; the questions in England and Wales did not (Weller 2004:8). Second, in Northern Ireland and Scotland, the censuses asked respondents about "belonging" to a particular religious group. Respondents who indicated that they belonged to a religion were given a follow-up that asked them to specify the religion in which they had been raised. In contrast, the censuses in England and Wales asked respondents "what" their religion was (Weller 2004:8).

There may have been three reasons for these differences (Weller 2004:8). First, differentiation within the category of Christian is important publically in Northern Ireland and Scotland because of their unique political histories (Weller 2004:9). Phrasing the question in terms of religious belonging speaks to a deeply rooted communal sense of religion (Weller 2004:9). Second, Wales may have used the same question as England because the Welsh Assembly had less power over its census than the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Scottish Parliament had over theirs (Weller 2004:9). Finally, Wales and England had social policies (with the exception of language) that were more similar than the ones of England, Northern Ireland, and Scotland (Weller 2004:8).

The controversy about the religion question carried over to the 2011 census, even though the question was voluntary. The British Humanist Association launched a campaign against the measure, arguing that it underestimated the number of unreligious people and inflated the Christian population (Butt 2010:n.p.; 2011:n.p.). Statistics indicated that 37.3 million people stated their religion as Christian; however, church attendance remained low (Butt 2010:n.p.; 2011:n.p.). The British Humanist Association argued that people who checked off the Christian box but who never went to church inflated the numbers used to justify public funding of religious groups, increasing the number of faith schools and keeping bishops in the House of Lords (Butt 2010:n.p.; 2011:n.p.). The British Humanist Association launched a poll just prior to census day and discovered that while 61 percent of respondents belonged to a religious denomination, only 29 percent claimed to be religious (Butt 2011:n.p.). It claimed that these findings bolstered its position against the question (Butt 2011:n.p.). However, the voluntary religion measure was retained in the 2011 census (UK ONS 2011:28).

The Neoliberal Censuses: 1981–2011

In addition to these issues of identity politics, the shift to neoliberalism, beginning with the election of Thatcher, strongly affected the censuses. Starting in 1981, the censuses were streamlined because of growing privacy and budgetary concerns (Thatcher 1984:223; Thompson 2010:379). Conservative politicians, in particular, lobbied against an intrusive census. Margaret Thatcher, for one, expressed concerns over government intrusion into the private affairs of individuals and ordered several questions to be cut from the 1981 census (Thompson 2010:379). The OPCS dropped questions about the respondent's previous address and occupation, marital fertility, date of first marriage, date of first divorce, and parents' country of birth (Thatcher 1984:230; UK OPCS 1981:n.p.). The overall number of questions was reduced from 36 in 1971 to 21 in 1981 (UK OPCS 1971:1–9; 1981:n.p.).

The 1991 census retained the key features of the 1981 census (Thompson 1995:204). It added a new question on long-term illness (Thompson 1995:207; UK OPCS 1991:n.p.). However, the most noteworthy difference was the controversial addition of a direct ethnicity measure, with categories for "white," "black-Caribbean," "black-African," "black-other," "Indian," "Bangladeshi," "Chinese," and "any other ethnic group" (UK OPCS 1991:n.p.). Enumerators delivered and collected forms. However, the OPCS conducted a follow-up survey through the mail to households missed by the enumerator to reduce nonresponse rates (Thompson 1995:205).

The undercount was very high in 1991 partly because of the 1990 poll tax implemented by Thatcher (Dorling and Simpson 1994:544–545). The poll tax, a flat rate community tax levied on all residents over the age of 18 in a particular area, replaced the residential property tax (Burns 1992:11; Smith 1991:421). This event sparked widespread protests, civil unrest, and extensive nonpayment (Burns 1992:176; Smith 1991:422). This unpopular tax led young men, in particular, to avoid census enumeration (Raleigh and Balarajan 1994:287).

Though there was little controversy about the undercount, the OPCS used imputation to adjust the 1991 census (Ratcliffe 1996:10). It imputed information for missing households from returned forms using four key items: the household's location, the number of people in the household, the number of rooms noted or guessed by the enumerator, and whether the residence was self-contained or not (Ratcliffe 1996:10). A higher percentage of the nonwhite population was imputed than of the white population (Ratcliffe 1996:10).

The 2001 census was among the most advanced national censuses ever conducted worldwide (Boyle and Dorling 2004:103). It was conducted by the new ONS that was created following the merger of the Central Statistics Office with the OPCS (Pullinger 1997:291). The ONS added questions about health care for a disabled family member, friend or neighbour; the number of people employed at the respondent's workplace; and religion (which was voluntary) (Boyle and Dorling 2004:103; Dixie and Dorling 2002:283; UK ONS 2001:6–7). It expanded the white category in the ethnic question to include "British," "Irish," and "any white background" (UK ONS 2001:6). The most advanced component of the 2001 census was the capture-recapture imputation procedure used to estimate and adjust the undercount, even though the undercount remained relatively uncontroversial (Boyle and Dorling 2004:103). The census generated little controversy because the data were not used for political apportionment, and the United Kingdom has never mandated US-style affirmative action programs (Archibong and Sharps 2013:31; Edwards 2011:34; Lieberman 2005:499).

Various procedures were implemented to improve coverage, including an easier-to-complete census form, mail-in return of census forms, and the concentration of resources in low response rate areas (Diamond et al. 2002:295). The One Number Census project aimed to measure the undercount, to provide a definitive link between the census counts and population estimates, and to adjust census counts for underenumeration (Diamond et al. 2002:295–296). This project consisted of a census coverage survey that reenumerated a sample based on postal codes to adjust undercount (Diamond et al. 2002:296–297). Data from the census coverage survey were then matched to census records (Diamond et al. 2002:297). Next, combined regression and dual system estimation produced population estimates based on sex and age data from both the census and the census coverage survey. These estimates were compared to a set of 1991-based estimates to assess their plausibility (Diamond et al. 2002:297). Next, individual-level and household-level records were imputed for those presumed to have been undercounted (Diamond et al. 2002:297).

The 2011 census included the standard questions on household accommodations, sex, age, marital status, education, and occupation (UK ONS 2011:6–32). The white ethnicity category was expanded to include "gypsy" or "Irish traveller" "(ONS 2011:8). It added "same-sex civil partner" to the relationship categories and added "same-sex civil partnership" to its marital status categories (ONS 2011:4, 7). Several new questions were added, attesting to the increased popular

salience of race and ethnicity, including ones asking about national identity, primary language, English language proficiency, and passports (UK ONS 2011:8–9). Also, for the first time, respondents had the option of completing the census online: 16 percent of returns were completed online (UK ONS 2015:121).

In addition to cutting questions, conservative politicians, influenced by neoliberalism, pushed to eliminate the census. The government considered ending the decennial census as a cost-saving measure (Boyle and Dorling 2004:103; Dorling 2013:3). Censuses are very expensive: the 2001 census alone cost £ 259 million; the 2011 census cost £ 480 million (Boyle and Dorling 2004:104; Walker 2013:n.p.). In 2010, the coalition government seriously considered canceling the 2011 census, but the implementation process had advanced too far (Dorling 2013:3).

The 2011 census will probably be the last one in the traditional format. The conservative UK Cabinet Minister Officer Francis Maude vowed to end the population census following the 2011 enumeration (Hope 2010:1). Maude claimed that the census was intrusive, immoral, expensive, and inaccurate and argued for more cost-effective ways to count the population (Dorling 2013:6; Hope 2010:1; Johnston 2011:19). There was also a growing popular disquiet over the 2011 census, suggesting that it threatened privacy and that unsavory characters could use census data for questionable ends (Edwards 2011:35). This disquiet drew upon a long-standing fear among the British that information gathering would violate their privacy. These concerns were exacerbated when Lockheed Martin won the contract to conduct the census on behalf of the ONS. The company produced nuclear missiles and other military weaponry and was associated with US government agencies that engaged in surveillance and data processing (Edwards 2011:35; Sharrock and Doward 2011:n.p.). Furthermore, all US companies were subject to the Patriot Act that allowed the US government to access any data in the company's possession (Edwards 2011:35). Protesters warned that this could give the US government access to detailed, personal information on the entire UK population (Edwards 2011:35). Nonetheless, the proposal to eliminate the census proved controversial. A compromise was reached; the 2021 census will be given primarily online (Maude 2014:n.p.).

This compromise was reached through interaction among state and social actors: politicians, census bureaucrats, census intellectuals, and individuals from advocacy and scholarly research units. Several broad arguments were offered in support of continuing the census. First, routine national estimates of the population by key

demographic characteristics are a fundamental necessity in complex societies (Bhrolcháin 1990:543). Second, the census collects a wide range of data on the socioeconomic and housing circumstances of households. These data can be cross tabulated to show various relationships such as the housing circumstances of the elderly and educational attainment by age (Bhrolcháin 1990:543). Third, the census provides data for geographical areas below the national level (Bhrolcháin 1990:543). These data are crucial for effectively administrating local areas (Bhrolcháin 1990:544).

Given the importance of the census, stakeholders from academia, scholarly research units, business, and local governments opposed the proposed elimination of the census and testified before Parliament in support of the census. Professor Philip Rees of the Royal Geographical Society stressed the importance of census data in government planning:

> The census has a vital role in many of the resource allocation formulae that central Government Departments use. For instance, in allocating the NHS budget, the Department of Health has to have reliable information on the number of patients and the potential number of patients in the future. (UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012a:10)

Furthermore, the Tyne and Wear Research and Information Service, a policy and research organization, pointed out that census data were needed for local planning. It stressed that census data could be used to calculate various local social and demographic indicators and noted that without census data, unless local districts undertook their own data collection, such analyses would be impossible (UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012b:Ev w16). It also stressed that if local authorities collected their own data, they would probably not be comparable and thus not particularly useful to social scientists (UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012b:Ev w16).

Others emphasized the national coverage of the census as vital to the research enterprise more generally. Professor Martin of the Royal Statistical Society argued for the value of the census as a nationally coordinated data-collection system: "My personal view is that the independence of the census as a nationally consistent exercise is one of the great strengths that any replacement system would have to have" (UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012a:13). The Joseph Rowntree Foundation, a nonpartisan charitable trust,

noted that while other official surveys were carried out in the United Kingdom, these surveys gathered information for the formulation of specific policies. These data were problematic because of their inadequate detail, small geographical scope, and lack of comparability. Consequently, it would be difficult to generate accurate, aggregate information through the use of these data (UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012a:16). Professor Edward Higgs, an academic who studied information gathering, echoed this sentiment and noted that "he could not see how one would guarantee that data collected from a multitude of different sources would not relate to people at different dates and so be open to double counting" (UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012a:w21). Higgs also pointed out that swapping information from various government and private agencies could exacerbate privacy concerns (UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012b:Ev w21).

Even the British Library entered the debate, noting the utility of census data in conjunction with other sources, such as the registrar general's reports, for historical demographers and social historians to track temporal changes in populations, housing, household composition, and employment (UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012a:14). The library also stressed the use of census data by various community, voluntary, and self-help groups to provide them with a detailed understanding of local populations and socioeconomic conditions (UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2012a:16).

Parliament also got involved: the House of Commons Treasury Committee (2008b:11) recommended that the Statistics Authority develop a set of objectives to ensure that the 2011 census would be the final one counting the population through the collection of forms. Caught between these various factions, the ONS implemented the Beyond 2011 project in 2009 to develop alternatives to the current census (Dugmore et al. 2011:622). After considering several options, the ONS settled on two options. The first keeps the decennial census but shifts it to a primarily online format (UK ONS 2013:10). The second would reuse data from other government sources, supplemented by an annual compulsory survey of approximately 4 percent of UK households (UK ONS 2013:15). The UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (2012a:26), in particular, voiced strong concerns over the quality of data generated by the latter option; therefore, the ONS proposed the online enumeration scheme. The government accepted the proposal, and the 2021 census is currently

scheduled to be conducted in an online format (Maude 2014:n.p.). However, the government has stressed that censuses conducted after 2021 should be derived from alternative data sources and should provide more timely information (Maude 2014:n.p.).

While the debate over the retention of the UK census was intense, it revolved narrowly around the value of specific questions and the utility of the census itself, which were never taken for granted. The usefulness of the census was weighed against privacy concerns and costs. The debate thus echoed, in large part, the ones about personal identity: most of the debate revolved around the value and intended use of the ethnicity question.

Presently, the United Kingdom does not have a single census but rather a series of censuses conducted in the different countries (Martin 2006:6). Responsibility is shared between the ONS for England and Wales, the GRO Scotland, and the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (Martin 2006:6). Each national census differs in topic, coverage, methodology, and outputs; each is subject to independent planning and review (Martin 2006:6). Historically, the GRO made arrangements to conduct a census in accordance with a formal census order (Hough 2013:6; UK House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008a:5–6). However, the 2007 Statistics and Registration Services Act transferred this duty from the ONS to the autonomous UK Statistics Authority (Hough 2013:6; UK House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008:a5–6). Previously, the ONS reported to a board composed of government ministers; after the transferral, the ONS reported to the autonomous Statistics Authority (UK House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008a:6). As a result, the census was less partisan and less politicized than it had been previously.

Each UK census must be proposed in advance and then approved by both Houses of Parliament (UK Cabinet Office 2008:104–105). The Census Act of 1920 limits the information that can be gathered from household members to their name, sex, age, occupation and employment status, nationality, birthplace, race, language, place of and character of residence, marital status, relation to head of household, and children born in marriage (UK Parliament 1920:8). Parliament may also consider adding other categories to ascertain the social or civil condition of the population (UK Parliament 1920:8). Thus, the Census Amendment Act of 2000 had to amend the Census Act to allow for a voluntary religion measure (Hicks and Allen 2000:10; UK Parliament 2000:n.p.). Parliament had been advised that religion was neither a civil nor social condition; therefore, a change in legislation was necessary (Hicks and Allen 2000:10). Thus, new questions

are only added after extensive consultation, discussion, and debate (Weller 2004:5). Civil servants, not social scientists, provide advice and guidance to government ministers about the census (Higgs 2004a:163).

The ONS can propose new census questions to Parliament. As in the case of the census itself, debates center on the usefulness of proposed topics because census questionnaires are typically short (Higgs 2004a:163). Competition for placement on the form is intense (Bhrolcháin 1990:553). The ONS weighs requests for space against other considerations such as cost and user requirements (Southworth 2005:75). Therefore, the ONS proposes topics that have been "shown to be most needed by the major users of census information and for which questions have been devised that can be expected to produce reliable and accurate data" (UK Cabinet Office 2008:38).

Outside engagement with the ONS occurs within a very structured, institutionalized context, which may also temper politicization of the census. The ONS consults with multiple parties about the census, but it typically entertains debate only for short time frames. The ONS directly solicits requests for census categories from various stakeholders, including government departments, local authority organizations, university departments, research centers, and commercial users (Benjamin 1970:243; Jones et al. 1973:508; Martin 2006:6; Thompson 1995:204). It begins the consultation process about four years before the next census (Benjamin 1970:243). Advisory panels and the head of the Government Statistical Services consider the proposals (Benjamin 1970:244). Stakeholders must justify their request for specific data (Thompson 1995:206). For the 1991 census, solicitors of census questions were asked to describe the costs they would incur without the requested information and to explain why it could not be obtained from other sources (such as administrative surveys and samples) (Thompson 1995:206).

The process is involved, and various parties campaign vigorously for inclusion of their requested measures, given space and other restrictions. For example, many of the individuals and organizations using the census data repeatedly proposed an income question (Dixie and Dorling 2002:285; UK Cabinet Office 2008:60). Also, central and local governments desired income information for resource allocation, public policy development and review, and the assessment of social inequalities (UK Cabinet Office 2008:62). An income measure could be more useful than ones on occupation or housing for identifying areas of affluence and deprivation and for conducting economic and social research (UK Cabinet Office 2008:61–62). However,

the government rejected this request once again for the 2011 census citing public disquiet about a compulsory measure, doubts about reliability of income information, and the availability of alternative data sources (UK Cabinet Office 2008:62). The ONS also came out against the measure, stating that inclusion of an income question reduced response rates in a test of the 2007 Census (Hough 2013:22; UK House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008a:Ev 257).

In sum, this period was marked by spurts of engagement between the state and society over the census. While the controversy over the ethnicity measure that was designed to address postcolonial immigration abated by the late 1980s, discontent reemerged when activists demanded an Irish ethnic category. Irish leaders felt the ethnicity measure, geared toward delineating specific nonwhite groups, did not mesh with their view of the Irish as a vulnerable and distinctive ethnic minority (Mac an Ghaill 2000:140, 142). South Asian activists also campaigned for a religion measure, as they believed religion was crucial to their ethnic identity (Southworth 2005:78). The proposed measure, however, elicited privacy concerns; thus, the religion question was voluntary (Dixie and Dorling 2002:288). Privacy and cost concerns led some conservative politicians to call to end traditional census enumeration (Dorling 2013:6; Johnston 2011:19). These demands proved controversial, leading various stakeholders from government, academia, and civil society to oppose this proposal. Ultimately, a compromise was reached; the current plan is for the 2021 census to be offered in an online format (Maude 2014:n.p.).

The engagement between the state and society over the census was sporadic for three reasons. First, the census is not legally required, and the types of questions that can be asked are constrained by preexisting legislation. This shapes the nature of the debates and limits the level of its intensity. Second, the United Kingdom does not mandate affirmative action entitlements, so census categorization translated into the recognition of ethnic minorities but not substantial material benefit (Archibong and Sharps 2013:31; Lieberman 2005:499). Third, the structure of the UK knowledge regime limited both the degree and time frame within which the interaction between state and social actors over the census could occur. Proposals to add, amend, or remove particular topics were only entertained for a short time prior to the census; arguments had to be framed in a highly standardized and structured way (Benjamin 1970:243). The stakeholders, consequently, tend to be relatively homogenous and apolitical. They are often nonpartisan, consisting of members of various scholarly research units and local government authorities.

The bureaucratic structure of this process of consultation limits the degree of interaction between the parties.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the contemporary UK case is an intermediate case of census politicization. We link this outcome to our five central arguments. First, the UK state remains powerful and clearly possesses the technological sophistication necessary to conduct an extensive census (Higgs 2004a:149–157). However, the strength of the UK state is also a weakness when it comes to the census. The UK civil service—elite, secretive, and insulated—limits social engagement over the census (Leys 1989:296–297). This may explain both the state's initial resistance to asking a question about ethnicity and the public's initial mistrust in the census when the question was included. Thus, the contemporary UK illustrates again our broader point that censuses function best when there is intense interaction between the state and society, not when censuses are insulated in highly autonomous bureaucracies that allow for outside proposals only in highly structured and time-constrained ways.

Second, the substantive nature of the information gathered was directly linked to lay categories. Social class was still the most salient social category following World War II. Thus, it is not surprising that the 1951 census retained the previous focus on occupational categories. However, an influx of nonwhite immigrants from Commonwealth countries heightened the significance of race and ethnicity in the British social imagination. This change occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, 30 to 40 years prior to the inclusion of an explicit ethnicity question in the UK census (Modood 2005:458; Small and Solomos 2006:242). After considerable public debate and specific input from ethnic and racial minorities, a direct question about ethnicity was included in the census. Furthermore, the state discovered that the initial versions of the proposed racial and ethnic categories often did not resonate with those it intended to measure. For example, West Indians objected to being classified as "Afro-Caribbean" and South Asians objected to be classified as "black" (Ballard 1996:14). Therefore, these categories were reflections of people's every day perceptions of themselves, as opposed to independently crafted bureaucratic constructions.

Third, there is also evidence of an interaction between the state and census intellectuals who are members of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities; advocacy and scholarly research units; and

academics. The proposed ethnicity question for 1981, crafted by the census officials, sparked a firestorm of protest by various minority organizations and was dropped from the final census questionnaire (Ballard 1996:11; Bhrolcháin 1990:552; UK House of Commons 1983a:v). The question was included in the 1991 census—a partial example of the state innovating by creating a new category—but the form it took had been shaped greatly by minority activism. More recently, some religious organizations mobilized to have the religion question added to the 2001 census, as they felt their religious identity (e.g., Muslim) trumped their ethnic or racial identity (e.g., South Asian) (Dixie and Dorling 2002:288; Graham and Waterman 2005:91; Southworth 2005:78). Census officials acceded to their demands and added a voluntary religion measure. This is clearly an example of census officials co-opting a category previously developed by nonstate information intellectuals (cf. Loveman 2005:1661–1662).

Fourth, the contemporary UK census has been and continues to be shaped by the distribution of political power. The rise of neoliberalism at the end of the 1970s and the increased power of the conservative politicians affected the census. The forms were shortened, and the very existence of the census was threatened. Conservative politicians expressed concerns over intrusive censuses that echoed long-standing British fears of information gathering. Conservative politicians also questioned the value of census data and the costs of census implementation (Hope 2010:1). These concerns led to credible demands to eliminate the UK census altogether.

Fifth, we can describe the historical trajectory of the UK census. The UK census was shaped heavily by elite social influence from its inception. This influence took the shape of elite lobbies during the first part of the twentieth century. These elites, first as individuals, and then as lobbies, pressed state actors to conduct censuses with particular categories. State actors responded, and the censuses were institutionalized. These influences were at least partially democratized in the second half of the twentieth century, as nonelite lobbies also become involved in census politics. Their engagement with state actors helped to routinize the census as it became institutionalized in various state offices. Thus, over time, the amount of interaction between state and society increased, nonelites became more engaged, and the census became more politicized. Nevertheless, this interaction has been sporadic. This is due, in large part, to the structure of the British knowledge regime that limits engagement between state and social actors overall.

These three social factors (lay categories of class, race, and ethnicity; elite and nonelite lobbies; and the balance of power of UK political parties), along with the historical trajectory, explain the UK census. It is moderately politicized and interventionist. Although it is used for the distribution of some resources and for planning, it is used neither for political apportionment nor to administer large mandatory UK-wide programs to address inequality. The UK censuses are technologically advanced, but they are not extensive. They ask relatively few questions and are under threat of being eliminated.

CHAPTER 6

Interest Groups, Racial Mobilization, and the US Censuses

The US census, though it had only a few questions in 2010, remains a vibrant social institution. While numerous debates have always surrounded the US census, they became increasingly heated after the 1960s, involving issues of undercounting and the wording of the categories. Census data were increasingly used for administrative, commercial, and social purposes, including affirmative action. In turn, historically marginalized groups, at least partially empowered by the democratization of US society, pressed the Census Bureau to respond to their demands.

Politics, Society, and Knowledge

A historically unprecedented economic boom raised the US standard of living after World War II. The economy expanded rapidly during the 1950s and early 1960s because of pent-up demand for durable goods during the war; a demographic boom; and massive government spending on the military, infrastructure, and subsidies (Bowles et al. 1986:134; Link et al. 1984:471). Economic growth led to relatively widely shared prosperity: between 1945 and 1966, per capita income increased by 120 percent and median family income doubled (Link et al. 1984:471).

However, by the mid-1960s, this rapid expansion undermined itself as excess capacity put downward pressure on profits (Link et al. 1984:471). The US government's Keynesian response to the crisis only exacerbated the problem, sparking high inflation and dragging down the value of the dollar (Link et al. 1984:471). The economy entered a period of deepening and spreading crisis, extending even through the highly touted Reagan recovery, and the era of unprecedented prosperity ended (Bowles et al. 1986:134).

The social movements that would profoundly democratize the United States emerged against the background of this darkening economic context. The first, and in many ways the model for the others, was the civil rights movement. The movement emerged when southern black organizations, frustrated by resistance to change, mobilized a mass following in the South (Omi and Winant 1994:98). The civil rights movement linked black cultural and religious themes to international social movement strategies, and it rearticulated black collective subjectivity, racial identity, and thus race itself (Omi and Winant 1994:99). Ultimately, the movement prompted legislation that changed the political context and purposes of racial classification, as racial categories were presumed now to remedy, not bolster, discrimination (Nobles 2000:76; 2002:57). The crowning achievement of this mobilization was the Great Society legislation of the 1960s that addressed inequities in several areas, including income, education, housing, health care, and civil rights (Brown-Collier 1998:260). Native Americans living in urban areas likewise mobilized, encouraged by the civil rights movement and a plethora of government resources earmarked for minorities (Nagel 1995:955). This prompted the rapid growth of political organizations, newspapers, and community programs (Nagel 1995:955). It also increased ethnic pride, renewed tribal identities, and increased the counts of Native Americans in the subsequent censuses (Link et al. 1984:486; Nagel 1995:955, 961).

The feminist movement also emerged during the late 1960s and contributed to democratization and equality. Married women entered the workforce in large numbers in the 1960s, helping to fuel the women's movement. The National Organization of Women, founded in 1966, fought discrimination and fostered consciousness-raising (Link et al. 1984:483). In 1967, President Johnson signed an executive order banning sex discrimination in federal employment, and between 1973 and 1974, Congress passed several laws improving women's status (Costain 1981:106; Soule et al. 1999:242; Zinn [1980] 2003:509).

Changing immigration patterns increased racial and ethnic diversity during this period. Between 1920 and 1965, policy dictated that immigrants were from northern and western Europe (Johnson et al. 1997:1057). The Hart-Cellar Act of 1965, however, increased the number of immigrants, especially Asians, using criteria based on scarce skills or family ties (Johnson et al. 1997:1057; Saxenian 1999:10). Latino immigration also increased significantly. Puerto Rican immigration gained momentum during World War II because of wartime

employment opportunities. The Mexican community grew rapidly despite concerted efforts to deport suspected illegal Mexican immigrants (Link et al. 1984:480). Cubans arrived after Fidel Castro's rise to power in 1959; a second wave arrived after he temporarily lifted emigration restrictions in 1980 (Link et al. 1984:480). Political upheaval in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala from 1974 to 1996 sparked an influx of Central American political refugees (García 2006:1). Asian and Latino organizations grew in number and strength. Along with African Americans, they became increasingly concerned about their representation in the census. The positive benefits of racial categorization and data stimulated attempts to protect, change, and add categories (Nobles 2002:58).

These movements emerged in a political context of interest group pluralism that had developed before the civil rights movement at the end of the New Deal (chapter 3; Bensel 1984:148–149, 173; Katznelson 2013:392–400, 477). Politics became a competitive struggle—dominated by business interests—among groups that were pursuing their particular agendas in Washington because business and labor organization that crosscut economic sectors were few and weak (Katznelson 2013:401–402). This system of interest group politics greatly contributed to the decentralized, open, and competitive US knowledge regime (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:172; Furner and Supple 1990:35).

After World War II, the United States became a relatively open, fragmented state (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:172; Furner and Supple 1990:35). Its federalist structure and the separation of powers among the branches of its government create ideological diversity and political conflict within the state (Furner and Supple 1990:27). Two major parties operate in winner-take-all elections; however, the parties are weak and poorly disciplined because they are mostly privately funded (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:172). Different parties can control the legislative and executive branches of government (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:172; Furner and Supple 1990:35). Furthermore, the permanent civil service is neither extensive or nor well developed. Following an election, many high-ranking cabinet members and administrative personnel are replaced in what amounts to a political spoils system (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:172). This instability creates outside influence and partisanship. Moreover, dozens of congressional committees afford outsiders access to policy making (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:172; Furner and Supple 1990:35). This structure creates engagement between the Census Bureau and outside stakeholders, particularly minorities who want to be classified

and enumerated accurately to ensure access to entitlements based on affirmative action and civil rights.

There are over 1,000 research units in the United States and over 100 inside Washington (Abelson and Carberry 1998:531; Campbell and Pedersen 2011:172). The first ones, created in the early twentieth century, applied scientific expertise to policy issues (Abelson 1998:110; Abelson and Carberry 1998:532; Rich 2011:195). Following World War II, a new generation of scholarly research units were established because of the federal government's wish to make contracts with these organizations for them to conduct policy research (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:173). These developments meshed with the principles of liberal market economies, which promote private-sector activity (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:173). Scholarly research units relied on census data for their research and thus were stakeholders in census enumeration. The climate of the Cold War bolstered scientism in the social sciences as well as the natural sciences (Ross 2003:231). Research employing variables—a style of work congruent with census data—dominated the research of many social scientists (Ross 2003:232). Emphasis on research professionalized academics and diminished their educational role (Grace 2000:71). These changes put new demands on the Census Bureau, as their data were used for sophisticated analyses of socioeconomic conditions (Anderson 1988:203). Programs tied to the civil rights and antiwar movements catalyzed the emergence of liberal scholarly research units in the 1960s (Abelson 1998:115; Campbell and Pedersen 2011:174).

Ideologically driven institutes grew in prominence starting in the 1970s (Abelson 1998:113). New conservative advocacy research units developed in the 1970s and the 1980s, along with a few liberal organizations, creating a spectrum of organizations, which in turn, increased partisanship (Abelson 1998:115–117; Campbell and Pedersen 2011:173–174). These groups often synthesized existing studies rather than conducting research, and they resembled interest groups because they pressured decision makers to implement policies congruent with their ideological positions and those of their benefactors (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:173; Rich 2011:195; Weaver 1989:567). Minority advocacy groups also emerged in the 1960s and 1970s and pressured lawmakers to implement policies on their behalf (Mora 2014b:18–24).

The United States lacks party research units (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:173). However, there are some state research units, including the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget Office (Bimber 1996:2; Campbell and Pedersen 2011:173).

There is also the President's Council of Economic Advisors, which appoints experts, often from universities, to conduct policy analysis (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:173). Most cabinet-level departments have research units supervised by assistant secretaries (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:173). The departments create new statistical offices in response to pressures to generate information relevant to public policy (Norwood 1995:25). An internal corps of experts, generating its own analysis, provides Congress with data, analysis, technical advice, and political rationales, making it the most well-staffed legislature in the world (Bimber 1996:2; Campbell and Pedersen 2011:173). The research capacity of some state research units exceeds that of the research units in civil society and has increased over time (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:173). This trend reflects a decentralization of the American statistical system, in which statistical operations are split among various government departments (Norwood 1995:25, 61). The separation of powers and the fragmentation of the executive and legislative branches creates a large number of state research units and sparks competition and controversy among branches, agencies, and their research units (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:173; Furner and Supple 1990:27). The organizational landscape of these research units increases the access for outside influences, heightening the overall level of controversy and competition. Nevertheless, scholarly and advocacy research units, not state and party units, dominate the US knowledge regime (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:173).

Political and economic institutions also contribute to the US knowledge regime (Abelson 1998:115–118; Campbell and Pedersen 2011:174; Weaver 1989:570–571). US tax law favors the creation of tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations (Abelson 1998:117; Abelson and Carberry 1998:538; Campbell and Pedersen 2011:174). The liberal market economy supports corporate financing and private sector volunteerism (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:174; Weaver 1989:571). Thus, many organizations are bound to the ideological positions of their donors, and these relationships further politicize knowledge production in the United States.

The decentralized, open US state provides scholarly and advocacy research units with many opportunities to reach policy makers and their staff (Abelson and Carberry 1998:542; Campbell and Pedersen 2011:174). The separation of powers enables these research units to establish ties to the legislative and executive branches (Abelson and Carberry 1998:542; Weaver 1989:570). Furthermore, temporary appointees rather than career bureaucrats dominate the civil service, so policies are frequently discontinued after elections (Campbell and

Pedersen 2011:174; Furner and Supple 1990:37; Weaver 1989:571). This encourages reliance on outside sources of intelligence, analysis, and policy advice (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:174). Because parties are undisciplined, American politicians often fail to tow the party line and frequently seek policy advice and expertise from scholarly and advocacy research units (Abelson 1998:117; Abelson and Carberry 1998:543; Campbell and Pedersen 2011:174). In sum, the United States has a competitive marketplace for ideas. A large number of advocacy research and scholarly research units compete for media attention and influence public opinion (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:174). This highly competitive knowledge regime in turn promotes and sustains a highly politicized census.

The Regularization of the Census and Its Machinery: 1950 and 1960

The primary function of the US census continues to be political apportionment (Anderson and Fienberg 2000d:87; Hannah 2001:515; Hillygus et al. 2006:18). Reapportionment is controversial because it entails a legislative act that depends on data provided by an executive agency, the Census Bureau. Thus, it crosses one of the major fault lines of the federal government (the executive and legislative branches). Small changes in the population can trigger the reapportionment of seats because the winner-take-all, two-party electoral system translates these changes into political differences (Anderson 1988:208; Anderson and Fienberg 2000b:783). The US Code (1954:Title 13, Chapter 5, Subchapter II, Section 141[c]) requires officials or public bodies with responsibility for legislative districting to submit a plan to the secretary of the census, identifying topics for specific population tabulations three years before the census. The secretary of the census uses their input to develop the census. If a dispute arises between the officers and public bodies responsible for apportionment and the secretary of the census, then the secretary has final authority.

Moreover, the Census Bureau is subject to legislative oversight. No later than three years before a census, the Census Bureau must report proposed census topics to Congress (US Code 1954:Title 13, Chapter 5, Subchapter II, Section 141[f2]). No later than two years prior to a census, the Census Bureau must submit the questions (US Code 1954:Title 13, Chapter 5, Subchapter II, Section 141[f2]). A network of subcommittees and advisory committees provides congressional oversight of the census (Anderson and Fienberg 1999:33). This division of labor between the executive and legislative branch creates

conflicts, which are exacerbated when the branches are controlled by different parties (e.g., Anderson and Fienberg 2000b:783).

The 1950 census covered the continental United States and its territories (US Census Bureau 2002:136). The census short form included questions about the relationship to the household head, age, sex, marital status, race, and the labor force status of household members (US Bureau of the Census 1955:49–60). It also distinguished between institutions, households, and quasi households (five or more nonrelatives of the household head, other than employees) (US Bureau of the Census 1955:49; US Census Bureau 2002:70). The race category was changed from "color or race" to "race," and the Native American racial category was changed from "Indian" to "American Indian" (Bennett 2000:170).

An effort to approximate the US Mexican-origin population, which had been classified as "white" in previous censuses, was made in the five southwestern states (California, Texas, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico), by matching returns to a master list of Spanish surnames (Hayes-Bautista and Chapa 1987:64; US Bureau of the Census 1955:51). This became known as the "white person of Spanish surname" group (Hayes-Bautista and Chapa 1987:64). The Census Bureau attempted to identify Latinos, as it recognized the need for information to guide studies of their communities (US Bureau of the Census 1955:51).

The Census Bureau increased the sample size for the long form—it asked 18 additional questions, including ones on migration status, birthplace of parents, and educational attainment—from 5 percent in 1940 to 20 percent in 1950 (Anderson 1988:199; US Bureau of the Census 1955:53–55). An additional 3.3 percent of respondents were asked the long-form questions as well as supplemental questions, including their number of marriages and the duration of their marital status (US Bureau of the Census 1955:7). Census officials also wrote a procedural history of the decennial census process to guide their own and their users' data interpretation (Anderson 1988:199).

To improve accuracy, officials publicized the 1950 census in newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts (Anderson 1988:199; US Bureau of the Census 1955:3). It also enhanced enumerator training and appointed a supervisor for about every 15 enumerators. The schedule contained a card for infants born after January 1, 1950 because they had been undercounted (US Census Bureau 2002:136). Special provisions were made to count Americans abroad though cooperative arrangements with the Department of Defense and other relevant government agencies (US Census Bureau 2002:136). A special enumeration of persons in hotels, transients, and anyone else missed in the

initial enumeration was made on April 11, 1950 (US Census Bureau 2002:136). District supervisors provided preliminary population estimates, so that undercount concerns could be submitted before field offices closed (US Census Bureau 2002:136). If the evidence suggested an appreciable undercount, the area would be reenumerated. Population changes were studied to assess the enumeration's completeness (US Census Bureau 2002:137). Computers tabulated some of the data (Anderson 1988:147; US Census Bureau 2002:128).

In the 1950s, activists concerned about legislative representation filed malapportionment cases (Anderson 1988:208). The 1950 census undercounted nonwhites by 12 to 13 percent (Anderson and Fienberg 1999:30; Snipp 2003:569). The growing populations of suburban middle-class whites also may have been underrepresented (Anderson 1988:208–209). Demographers first attempted to estimate census coverage in the 1940s, and they increased their efforts after the 1950 census (Choldin 1994:43). In the 1950s, Ansley Coale laid the groundwork for the demographic method of measuring census coverage (Choldin 1994:43). Birth and death certificates, along with other administrative records, were used to estimate the population size by age, gender, and race (Anderson and Fienberg 2000d:88–89; Choldin 1994:44–45; Freedman and Wachter 2001:27). These data were then used to estimate the overall population, the difference between it and the census figure, and thus the undercount (Anderson and Fienberg 2000d:89). However, the estimates were not precise; for example, migration data were limited and speculative (Freedman and Wachter 2001:27).

The Census Bureau introduced another method in 1950, the post enumeration survey (PES) (Choldin 1994:46). This method entailed recanvassing a probability sample of about 3,500 small areas and comparing them to the original census listings to identify missed households (US Census Bureau 2002:137). Additionally, 22,000 households were reinterviewed to determine the number of persons omitted in previously counted households (US Census Bureau 2002:137). Like demographic analysis, the PES had drawbacks. In particular, both the PES and the census usually missed the same groups of people (e.g., the homeless) (Choldin 1994:47). Neither method was used to adjust the undercounts; they remained primarily an uncontroversial, academic concern during this period (Choldin 1994:43; Espiritu 1992:114).

The Census Bureau consulted individuals and organizations, including researchers using population and housing data, to plan the 1960 census (US Bureau of the Census 1966:2). The 1960 census was streamlined; the short form included only five items: the

relationship to household head, age, sex, color or race, and marital status (US Bureau of the Census 1966:9). An additional citizenship question was added to the short forms distributed in New York State and Puerto Rico (US Bureau of the Census 1966:9). The 1960 census increased the sample size of the long form to 25 percent of households. The long form added questions about place of work, means of transportation used to get to work, enrollment in public or private school, and the length of residence (Anderson 1988:201; US Bureau of the Census 1966:7, 9; US Census Bureau 2002:137). The Census Bureau changed the sampling unit from the individual to the household to gather information from the sample for all family members (Anderson 1988:201; US Bureau of the Census 1966:7). The 1960 census was the first to be conducted extensively by mail and employing self-enumeration (Hillygus et al. 2006:19; US Census Bureau 2002:128). The questionnaires were delivered in the mail; respondents completed them and held them for enumerators (Anderson 1988:201; Snipp 2003:569; US Census Bureau 2002:128). When enumerators collected the questionnaires, they left a long form at every fourth household that was supposed to be returned in the mail (US Census Bureau 2002:137). The data were tabulated by computers to increase efficiency and lower costs (US Bureau of the Census 1966:8).

The Census Bureau introduced self-enumeration because of problems with enumerator assessment (Anderson 1988:201; Hannah 2001:520; US Bureau of the Census 1966:6). Enumerators performed well on questions about sex and age, but interviewer agreement was low on questions about occupation and industry, and racial classification was especially problematic (Anderson 1988:201). Census enumerators often formed their own judgments about respondents' races, regardless of respondents' opinions (Hannah 2001:520; cf. Snipp 2003:569). In sum, the early postwar censuses retained their primary function to provide population data for political apportionment, and censuses therefore remained contentious, but undercounts were not highly politicized.

The Civil Rights Era

The social changes and civil right movement that gained momentum in the 1960s increased the politicization of the census and produced heated battles over undercounting. In 1962, the Supreme Court declared malapportioned state legislatures unconstitutional, leading to a series of cases in the 1960s that overthrew apportionments in many state legislatures and in the US Congress (Anderson 1988:208–209;

Cox and Katz 2002:4). Subsequent rulings enjoined the Census Bureau to cross tabulate data for progressively smaller areas to ensure equitable reapportionment (Anderson 1988:209). Ironically, calls for more accurate enumeration coincided with increasing public resistance to being interviewed and growing hostility toward the government, as evidenced by urban disturbances in 1968 (US Bureau of the Census 1976:7-1). In response, census legislation addressed issues such as privacy versus public need, citizens' freedom to give or withhold personal information, and the government's obligations to secure the data (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-16). In 1967, there were efforts, both within and outside of Congress, to limit the amount of information gathered (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-16). The Census Bureau feared the possibility of organized resistance and made plans for new and more intensive outreach (US Bureau of the Census 1976:7-1).

The Great Society legislation and new civil rights laws and programs affected the census starting in the 1960s (Espiritu 1992:115). They allocated benefits to minorities and required racial and ethnic census data to monitor legislative compliance and service provision (Ellis 2000:185; Nobles 2002:57; Robbin 2000b:130; Snipp 2003:571). The now positive use of minority census data sparked popular movements to protect, change, or add certain racial and ethnic categories to the census (Nobles 2002:57–58). The shift to census self-enumeration contributed to the controversy: ethnic and racial groups could control their own enumeration and categorization and thus directly affect the allocation of benefits (Kertzer and Arel 2002:29).

Once the government allocated minority entitlements based on census numbers, controversy over the differential undercount erupted (Espiritu 1992:115). A coalition representing historically undercounted groups, including Hispanics and African Americans, declared the undercount to be the "civil rights issue of the decade" (Hillygus et al. 2006:38). In 1967, Daniel Patrick Moynihan (a sociologist and senator) declared that the differential undercount—the 1960 census missed 9.5 percent of blacks versus 2.2 percent of whites—denied racial and ethnic minorities their constitutional rights (Conk 1987:175; Hillygus et al. 2006:33). African Americans pressured the Census Bureau to measure and adjust the differential undercount (Prewitt 2010:243; Robbin 1999:474). Latino groups in the 1960s also demanded better accounting of their community (Hayes-Bautista and Chapa 1987:64; Mora 2014b:17, 83). They also wanted Census Bureau to create national origin categories (e.g., Mexican and Puerto Rican) to demonstrate, for example, that some Mexican Americans had higher unemployment and poverty rates than whites and blacks (Mora 2014b:83).

The categorization of race and ethnicity was historically one of the most controversial aspects of the US census. No racial classification scheme appeared in more than two censuses (Williams 1999:121). However, these schemes all strongly reflected the significance of the black versus white color line in US society (Robbin 2000a:403). The "one-drop" rule (chapter 3) increasingly dictated racial classification across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, both in law and in practice, and the censuses from 1930 to 1960 reflected it (chapter 3; Robbin 2000a:403). Furthermore, census officials had classified nonwhites with little input, review, or accountability from minorities and majorities (Nobles 2000:78). The civil rights movement pressured the Census Bureau to rework this entire framework.

The shift to self-enumeration in the 1960 census intersected with these social changes. For example, the count of Native Americans, especially in the eastern states and California, increased after the adoption of self-enumeration (Eschbach 1993:650; Nagel 1995:951; Snipp 2003:569–570). The causes are debated, but demographic factors alone cannot explain this increase. Self-enumeration allowed individuals to switch their categorizations, especially when they were not strongly governed by conventions of hypodescent (Nagel 1995:951, 961; Skerry 2000:60). Indeed, Native Americans had a fluid, multiracial identity because of their long history of intermarriage with other groups (Eschbach et al. 1998:35). For many Native Americans, self-enumeration allowed them to choose the racial identity of American Indian for three reasons (Eschbach et al. 1998:35).

First, the previous censuses may have underenumerated Native Americans (Eschbach 1993:637). Enumerators ascribed American Indian identity by estimating an individual's amount of "Indian blood" (US Bureau of the Census Bureau 1933:27). Census workers may have been disinclined to classify urban middle-class or working-class respondents of mixed descent as American Indian because such a classification conflicted with perceptions of Native Americans as a poor, reservation-bound minority (Nagel 1995:951; Snipp 2003:569). Second, civil rights legislation and affirmative action programs may have motivated some respondents to identify as Native American to access these resources (Skerry 2000:60). There was considerable controversy among Native Americans over who should be considered American Indian for the purposes of receiving tribal services and federal benefits, including ones based on affirmative action (Nagel 1995:950).

Third, the upsurge in Native American census returns may have been driven by 1960s ethnic militancy that challenged white hegemony (Nagel 1995:955). Off-reservation Native Americans figured

prominently in social movements that focused attention on American Indian rights (Eschbach 1995:90). These movements fostered ethnic pride and likely contributed to the resurgence of American Indian self-identification (Eschbach 1995:90; Nagel 1995:955). The classification of Native Americans thus stemmed from a methodological change that was initially state driven. However, the census results changed only in combination with social changes that increased the desirability of individuals' identification as Native American. These social changes affected other minority groups as well, and they became directly involved with the lobbying efforts in the next few censuses.

The Census, Race, and Civil Rights: 1970, 1980, 1990

For the 1970 census, the Census Bureau directly solicited suggestions and comments through intensive dialogue and public meetings with individuals, organizations, and federal agencies (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-3). The 1970 census short-form questions were unchanged (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-3–1-4). Some of the race categories, however, were modified. The Census Bureau changed the wording of the category "Negro" to "Negro or black" after reviewing pretest responses to the "color or race" item and consulting with various national and regional organizations and persons concerned with race relations (US Bureau of the Census 1976:15-9). A "Korean" category was added because of increased Korean immigration (Bennett 2000:173). The long form was divided into 15 and 5 percent subsamples (Anderson 1988:210; US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-3). Both samples added a question about the respondent's work activity five years before the census (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-4). The 5 percent sample was asked several additional questions not in the 15 percent sample, including questions about citizenship, year of immigration, Mexican or Spanish origin or descent, and disabilities (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-4). The Census Bureau asked 60 percent of respondents to mail in their forms; enumerators collected the rest (Anderson 1988:210; Hillygus et al. 2006:19; US Census Bureau 2002:138–139).

The Census Bureau attempted to reduce the undercount in 1970. It created an address register that was corrected and updated by postal carriers and verified by census employees (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-7; US Census Bureau 2002:138). It improved training of enumerators working in traditionally hard-to-enumerate areas (US Census Bureau 2002:138). The Census Bureau also embarked on

a major advertising campaign with the assistance of the Advertising Council (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-10). In the months before the enumeration, it posted advertisements, articles, and cartoons in newspapers and magazines and created content for radio and television shows (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-10). Fears of resistance to census enumeration, fueled by public antigovernment sentiment in the late 1960s, proved unfounded (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-14).

The Census Bureau made concerted efforts to improve minority coverage, especially of Spanish-speakers and African Americans (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-11). Materials for newspapers serving ethnic communities were translated into 23 different languages (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-10). It printed Spanish and Chinese posters for public buildings and geared others toward Native Americans (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-10). In Spanish-speaking areas, a Spanish instruction sheet was included with the questionnaire, although the form was in English, leading activists to question the efficacy of this effort (Mora 2014b:86; US Census Bureau 2002:139).

Although the Census Bureau adopted a heterogeneous approach to improve Latino coverage in 1970, most were still classified as "white" (Hayes-Bautista and Chapa 1987:64; US Bureau of the Census 1976:15-9). The Census Bureau defined the "Spanish heritage" population in terms of Spanish surname or language in both the 15 and 5 percent samples in the southwestern states and in terms of Spanish language in the 15 percent sample (Hayes-Bautista and Chapa 1987:64; US Bureau of the Census 1976:15-13–15-16). Additionally, respondents in the 5 percent sample could choose among several Hispanic-origin options (Rodríguez 2000:102; US Bureau of the Census 1976:15-13). Because this form only went out to a small percentage of households, Latino leaders viewed the resulting data as unsatisfactory (Choldin 1986:407; Humes and Hogan 2009:119; Perlmann and Waters 2002:8; Snipp 2003:572). In addition, it provided little local information (Mora 2014b:88).

Activists questioned enumerating Latinos in terms of Spanish surnames rather than self-identification (Choldin 1986:407; Mora 2014b:86; Petersen 1987:223–224). Because some Latinos had non-Spanish family names, this measure probably undercounted the population (Humes and Hogan 2009:119). This undercount had implications for the Latino community: federal funding was allocated to disadvantaged minorities based on group size (Ellis 2000:185). The US Commission on Civil Rights called the Census Bureau's minority estimates, especially those of Spanish-speaking minorities, a disaster (Mora 2014a:189). Latino activists pressed the Census Bureau for

better coverage of their communities. Some Mexican American leaders, for example, sued census officials and filed complaints with their senators and congressmen (Choldin 1986:409; Espiritu 1992:114).

A series of legislative hearings in the 1970s addressed the concerns of Latino leaders (Humes and Hogan 2009:119; Robbin 2000c:439). Congressman Roybal of California identified gaps in census data, statistical series, and administrative records, pointing out that the National Center for Health Statistics could not provide reliable estimates of health issues and that the Bureau of Labor Statistics lacked adequate employment and unemployment statistics (Robbin 2000c:439). Other Latino activists accused federal agencies of being indifferent to the needs of Spanish speakers and stressed the inadequacy of existing data, citing numerous agencies that did not collect data; the result, they argued, was discrimination against Latinos. These activists encouraged the development of a uniform national, regional, state, and small areas statistical system, including Latinos as an identifiable statistical set (Robbin 2000c:439).

Similarly, the increasing political and demographic visibility of Asian Americans sparked movements to improve Asian origin measures (Humes and Hogan 2009:120–121; Lott 1998:27). The increasing Asian population, coinciding with civil rights legislation and expanding grants-in-aid programs, sparked interest in the accuracy, precision, and usefulness of census data (Espiritu 1992:117). Asian Americans grasped the importance of the census, were concerned about underenumeration, and engaged in enumeration politics (Espiritu 1992:117). In 1970, the "color or race" census category identified five Asian Pacific groups: Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, Hawaiian, and Korean (Espiritu 1992:118). Other Asian Pacific Americans were relegated to the "other" category (Espiritu 1992:120). In early 1975, Asian American advocacy groups and Asian American legislators lobbied the Census Bureau to form an Asian Pacific American Advisory Committee for the next census (Espiritu 1992:119). Senators Inouye and Matsunaga filed a resolution with the Committee of Government Affairs outlining the fiscal impact of census undercoverage for Asian and Pacific Americans, and they complained that Asian and Pacific Islanders could not obtain adequate assistance from government programs because they lacked the data needed to request services (Espiritu 1992:119). These efforts succeeded. In March 1976, the Census Bureau sanctioned the formation of the Asian Pacific Advisory Committee (Espiritu 1992:120). The committee's most protracted struggle was over Asian Pacific American representation in the race question (Espiritu 1992:120). The committee fought to increase the

number of Asian Pacific categories in the race question to generate larger and more accurate counts (Espiritu 1992:120–121).

In 1977, the US Office of Management and Budget adopted the "Standards for Maintaining, Collecting and Presenting Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity"; it came to be called Statistical Policy Directive 15 and governed racial and ethnic census classification (Anderson and Fienberg 2000d:93; Robbin 2000b:130; 2000c:440). Directive 15 mandated a four-race classification system distinguishing among: "American Indian or Alaskan Native," "Asian or Pacific Islander," "black/Negro," and "white." The directive also included an ethnic category, "Hispanic," defined as "a person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South America, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race" (Hayes-Bautista and Chapa 1987:64; Robbin 2000a:399, 404). The 1980 census classification of non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, non-Hispanic Asians, non-Hispanic American Indians, and Hispanics reflected successful Latino mobilization to change the census (Hirschman et al. 2000:382; Perlmann and Waters 2002:8).

Asian American individuals, advocacy groups, and legislators fought the Census Bureau's attempt, through Directive 15, to collapse the separate Asian Pacific categories into the panethnic category, "Asian or Pacific Islander" (Humes and Hogan 2009:119). They feared the change would underenumerate their community because Asian immigrants and those with limited English skills identified with national origin categories, not racial ones (Espiritu 1992:123). This prompted further census activism among Asians in the 1980s.

The Census Bureau consulted a diverse group of census intellectuals in planning the 1980 census. It received advice from advisory committees representing academic institutions and minority groups, professional and business associations, community and national service associations, consumer interests, elected officials, and clergy (US Bureau of the Census 1986:1-7). The Census Bureau also solicited comments about their plans from minority organizations (US Bureau of the Census 1986:1-7). Nevertheless, the 1980 census was one of the most litigious ones (US Bureau of the Census1986:1-23).

The 1980 census resembled the previous one (US Bureau of the Census 1986:1-4). The short form contained the questions from the previous census with an additional question on Hispanic origin (US Bureau of the Census 1986:1-8). Ultimately, the Census Bureau acquiesced to the pressure from Asian activists, abandoned the single Asian or Pacific Islander category, and used a question with nine separate Asian Pacific subcategories (Espiritu 1992:123–124). The long form added questions about current language, English proficiency, travel

time to work, carpooling, and ancestry (open ended) (US Bureau of the Census 1986:1-8; Waters 1990:10). There were a few other changes. First, 95.5 percent of housing units were enumerated through the mail (US Bureau of the Census 1986:1-4). Second, coverage features were enhanced, such as improved procedures to compile addresses (US Bureau of the Census 1986:1-4). Finally, the Census Bureau used an extensive outreach and advertising campaign to increase public awareness of the census (US Bureau of the Census 1986:1-4; US Census Bureau 2002:139). It made special efforts to reach minority groups to reduce the coverage differential between minorities and whites (US Bureau of the Census 1986:1-7). For example, specialists at the Census Bureau's Community Services Program contacted leaders of minority organizations and American Indian reservations (US Bureau of the Census 1986:1-7). The Census Bureau also solicited support from national Latino, African American, and Asian and Pacific Islander media organizations and associations (US Bureau of the Census 1986:1-7).

In 1987, the Census Bureau announced that it would replace the multiple subcategories used in the 1980 census with a single "Asian or Pacific Islander" category (Espiritu 1992:126). This format would require respondents to check "Asian or Pacific Islander" and write in the name of their subgroup (Espiritu 1992:126). The Census Bureau announced that it would not tabulate write-in responses from the short form, outraging Asian American activists (Espiritu 1992:126). Arguing that detailed information was needed for policy decisions and service delivery, US Representative Robert Matsui drafted a bill mandating that the Census Bureau tabulate 100 percent of these data, and the Census Bureau complied (Espiritu 1992:126).

Next, Asian American legislators and political organizations demanded that the Census Bureau return to the 1980 question, with its separate subcategories for Asian and Pacific Islanders (Espiritu 1992:126). Various advocacy groups, such as the Chinese for Affirmative Action, the Organization of Chinese Americans, and the Japanese American Citizens League, initiated a lobbying campaign (Espiritu 1992:126). The newly formed National Coalition for an Accurate Count of Asian Pacific Americans pushed for detailed subgroup enumeration (Espiritu 1992:126–127). Without efficient access to a 100 percent count for as many specific groups as possible, Asian Pacific activists feared that the data required for services and other special needs would be unavailable (Espiritu 1992:129). Millions of dollars in public funding and services were at stake (Espiritu 1992:129). Undercounting negatively affected minorities'

access to affirmative action and federal aid (Espiritu 1992:129). Moreover, underenumerated minority populations were not identifiable as markets; consequently, their businesses had difficulties securing loans and investment, and their experiences and perspectives received minimal media representation (Espiritu 1992:129).

The Census Bureau defended the elimination of the previous subcategories, arguing that recent immigration produced an Asian Pacific population that was larger and more ethnically diverse than before (Espiritu 1992:128). Therefore, the Census Bureau could not afford politically or economically to enumerate all the groups separately (Espiritu 1992:128). Activists countered that collapsing all Asian and Pacific groups into one category would promote stereotyping and misinformation about their communities and took their fight to Congress (Espiritu 1992:128). Asian and Pacific Islander leaders argued that the use of a single category might generate undercounts because new immigrants might not identify with the panethnic category (Lee 1993:90). Representative Matsui testified that these new arrivals had unique health, education, and welfare concerns that needed to be identified (Espiritu 1992:128). The newcomers, however, knew little English, so they would be unable to write in their ethnicity (Espiritu 1992:128). Furthermore, Matsui argued that hand-tabulated write-in categories would delay the release of Asian and Pacific Islander data (Espiritu 1992:128).

Apportionment, and therefore undercount adjustment, remained controversial. The Census Bureau tested an adjustment technique called dual system estimation (DSE) after the 1980 census (Hillygus et al. 2006:33). DSE was an outgrowth of the PES (Freedman and Wachter 2001:27; Prewitt 2010:243). It compared the original census to a PES to identify: (1) those counted in the original census but not in the PES, (2) those counted in the PES but not in the census, (3) those counted in both the census and the PES, and (4) those counted in neither the census nor the PES (Anderson and Fienberg 2000d:89; Hannah 2001:525). Thus, this method could derive the undercount and thus the total population size (Hannah 2001:525).

However, the Census Bureau decided that design and execution issues precluded the reliable adjustment of the 1980 census numbers (Hillygus et al. 2006:33–34). Thus, it would not adjust unless directed to do so by the courts (US Bureau of the Census 1986:1-24). The complexity of DSE, too, provoked political criticism (Hannah 2001:525). Nonetheless, the Census Bureau promised to improve DSE in preparation for the next census (Hillygus et al. 2006:34). Some groups questioned the Census Bureau's 1980 decision against adjustment

because they believed that it undermined minority rights (Hillygus et al. 2006:34). Over 50 lawsuits were filed to enforce adjustment based on DSE to compensate for missed minorities and urban residents (Hillygus et al. 2006:34). The most serious challenge, brought by Detroit, New York City, and New York State, sought to block the release of census results until they were adjusted (Hillygus et al. 2006:34). Some federal district courts ordered the Census Bureau to adjust the undercount and prevent the known undercount of blacks and Hispanics as well as whites (Anderson 1988:230). The Supreme Court stayed these orders pending appeal (Anderson 1988:230).

The Census Bureau responded by noting its improved coverage efforts (Anderson 1988:231). It insisted that lawsuits were inappropriate before the release and analysis of the results (Anderson 1988:231). It also pointed out that the available methods did not adjust at the state or local level (Anderson 1988:231). Ultimately the courts upheld the Census Bureau's decision (Anderson 1988:231; Hillygus et al. 2006:34).

For the 1990 census, the Census Bureau consulted about the content with multiple parties, including representatives from civic, professional and business organizations, academia, and state and local governments (US Bureau of the Census 1995:1-10). The National Conference of State Legislatures polled state legislatures about their data needs, given the importance of reapportionment and redistricting (US Bureau of the Census 1995:1-10). The 1990 census short form asked the same questions as the previous census (US Bureau of the Census 1995:1-13). The long form was sent to approximately one in six households and added new questions about length of military service, the time of departure for work, and limitations with respect to mobility and self-care (US Bureau of the Census 1995:1-13; US Census Bureau 2002:139). A number of measures were dropped from the long form, including ones about the respondent's work activity five years before the census, carpooling, marital history, and the number of weeks of unemployment during the previous year (US Bureau of the Census 1995:1-13).

As in 1980, the Census Bureau advertised extensively for the 1990 census to encourage mail response, reduce differential undercounts, and foster a positive census-taking atmosphere (US Census Bureau 2002:140). The campaign promoted two key messages: that census data were confidential and that communities benefitted politically and economically when their members were counted (Bryant and Dunn 1995:92–93). Promotion activities included "complete count" committees; information kits for schools, churches, and the media;

workshops; free public service announcements sponsored by the Advertising Council; and local government outreach and partnerships (US Census Bureau 2002:140). Because of the controversy over the differential undercount, the Advertising Council employed minority advertising agencies to reach African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian and Pacific Islanders (Bryant and Dunn 1995:97; US Bureau of the Census 1995:1-20). The Institute of American Indian Arts created promotional materials for American Indians and Alaskan Natives (US Bureau of the Census 1995:1-20).

In the 1990 census, the Census Bureau responded to Asian Pacific demands by reverting to the previous subcategories and by including a category for other Asian Pacific Islanders (Bennett 2000:176; Espiritu 1992:129–131; Lee 1993:90). The crucial role assumed by Asian American legislators in these census disputes underscored the importance of ethnic representation in political struggles (Espiritu 1992:131).

Apportionment remained an issue. In 1990, the Census Bureau believed that DSE could be applied to adjust the undercount (Prewitt 2010:244). However, politics rendered this decision controversial (Prewitt 2010:244). Because power was closely divided between Republicans and Democrats, minute changes in reapportionment and redistricting would have decided who controlled Congress or the White House (Hillygus et al. 2006:34). Minorities, who were more likely to vote for Democrats, were disproportionately undercounted (Hillygus et al. 2006:21). Democrats favored adjustment as it would probably increase their representation in Congress; Republicans opposed it as it would probably lower theirs (Hillygus et al. 2006:21). Mosbacher, the Republican secretary of commerce, overruled the recommendation of the director of the Census Bureau to adjust the 1990 census, because adjustment would favor Democrats by increasing the count of urban minorities (Hillygus et al. 2006:35; Prewitt 2010:244). The allegation of the secretary of commerce—that the Census Bureau might make decisions purposefully to favor one political party—was unprecedented (Hillygus et al. 2006:34; Prewitt 2010:244).

A coalition of groups and agencies fought Mosbacher's ruling (Hillygus et al. 2006:34). The plaintiffs included a number of individuals, states, counties, cities (including New York City), and organizations (US Bureau of the Census 1995:1-41). A 1989 out-of-court settlement allowed the Census Bureau to include a PES in the 1990 census but gave the secretary of commerce the final say on adjustment (Hillygus et al. 2006:34; Hogan 1993:1047). The plaintiffs agreed to withdraw their suit in exchange for the Department of Commerce's

commitment to reconsider adjusting the 1990 census (US Bureau of the Census 1995:1-41). In 1991, Mosbacher decided against adjusting the 1990 census (Hogan 1993:1047). He acknowledged that adjustment would probably create more accurate counts of minorities; however, he concluded that the adjusted numbers would not increase distributional accuracy, the measurement related to congressional apportionment (US Bureau of the Census 1995:1-42). The secretary also expressed concern that the adjustment could be politically manipulated (US Bureau of the Census 1995:1-42). The plaintiffs returned to court to rectify the acknowledged undercount (US Bureau of the Census 1995:1-42). In 1996, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld Mosbacher's decision (US Census Bureau 2009b:20).

Others questioned the need for adjustment because the size of minority undercounts declined over time (Darga 2000:124; King and Magnuson 1995:460; Skerry 2000:83). The 1990 census had the second lowest estimated undercount in US history (Darga 2000:124). Furthermore, the undercount rate varied within groups (Skerry 2000:84). The 1990 census undercounted black males 20 to 64 years of age by 11.2 percent and black males 30 to 34 years of age by 14 percent (Skerry 2000:84). Among black females 55 to 59 years of age, the undercount was 4.9 percent; black females 60 to 74 years of age were overcounted substantially (Skerry 2000:84). Thus, payoffs of undercount adjustment were unclear (Choldin 1994:232; Skerry 2000:191).

In conclusion, the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were marked by highly contentious and politicized interaction among the state, the Census Bureau, and society over an increasingly interventionist census, reflecting the relatively open US state and knowledge regime. This openness afforded stakeholders access to the policy-making process and led to sustained engagement with the Census Bureau. The Census Bureau solicited feedback from various census stakeholders for census planning, content, and implementation (US Bureau of the Census 1976:15-9). It employed targeted advertising to improve minority coverage, responding to pressures to address the differential undercount, now framed as a civil rights issue because new race-based programs were allocated with census data (US Bureau of the Census 1976:1-10). Minorities demanded more accurate census categories and adjustment of differential undercounts to improve their census numbers and thus their access to federal entitlements based on race and ethnicity. Different political parties controlled the legislative and executive branches, sparking highly politicized and partisan battles over proposed adjustment measures.

The Census and Identity Politics

Interracial marriage increased in the second half of the twentieth century, and the offspring of these unions did not fit into single-race census categories (Hirschman et al. 2000:383; Lee and Bean 2004:221; Xie and Goyette 1997:549). In 2004, 1 in 40 persons identified as multiracial; this figure was twice as high for those under 18 years of age (Lee and Bean 2004:222). The previous censuses had placed multiracials into a single, nonwhite racial category (e.g., black, Asian) in the census based on the "one-drop rule" or "hypodescent" (Ellis 2000:186; Spencer 2004:361). Some multiracials checked multiple categories on their census forms, but the Census Bureau classified these individuals using their mothers' race if possible (Ellis 2000:185–186). In the absence of information about mothers' race, where possible, individuals were classified using information they had written next to their selection of the "other" race category (e.g., white-black was coded as white, black-white was coded as black, multiracial or biracial was coded as other) (Ellis 2000:185–186; Lee 1993:83).

The creation of a multiracial category was also socially driven. Pressure for a multiracial category stemmed from the confusion that biracial individuals felt when they were forced to select one racial category (Ellis 2000:187; King 2000:197; Perlmann and Waters 2002:13; Snipp 2003:576). Organizations representing mixed-race couples who felt that their children were inadequately identified by existing racial categories pushed for a multiracial category (Ellis 2000:187; Perlmann and Waters 2002:13). Interracial couples lobbying for this change found the single-race restriction offensive and distressing (Snipp 2003:576). Some multiracial individuals likened the selection of one racial identity to social death (Robbin 2000a:414). The demand for a multiracial category may have stemmed more from a desire for recognition than for political or economic advantage, or it may have been a part of a larger US movement toward multiculturalism (Perlmann and Waters 2002:13; Prewitt 2013:132–133).

Demands for a multiracial category proved contentious because it challenged the mutual exclusivity of US racial classification (Nobles 2000:82). Furthermore, minorities and civil rights organizations lobbied against it (Anderson and Fienberg 2000d:94; King 2000:205; Nobles 2002:59; Perlmann and Waters 2002:13; Robbin 2000a:408; Spencer 1999:137). They believed that a multiracial category would reduce minority counts thereby undermining civil rights legislation (Ellis 2000:187; King 2000:205; Perlmann and Waters 2002:13; Spencer 1999:137). Some African Americans suggested that proponents

of the category wanted to shun their blackness (Spencer 1999:137). This conflict exposed divisions between those viewing racial data as a means to gain power and fight discrimination and those viewing data as a means of oppression because its categories did not reflect multiracial identity (Ellis 2000:187).

Despite the controversy, a small number of persistent advocates effectively challenged the single-race classification system (Farley 2002:40). They found sympathizers in the Clinton administration and Congress (Farley 2002:40; Snipp 2003:576). Extensive review and hearings by interagency governmental and congressional committees ensued (Perlmann and Waters 2002:13). Eventually, the Office of Management and Budget concluded that the race question should be changed, given the social reality of racial blending (Perlmann and Waters 2002:13). This prompted a revision of Directive 15, introducing the "mark one or more" racial-origin question in the 2000 census (Perlmann and Waters 2002:13; Prewitt 2013:133–134). Afterward, debates shifted to how the responses would be used for understanding social patterns and for enforcing civil rights (Perlmann and Waters 2002:13).

Multiracial individuals operated in the post–Directive 15 world of specific categories for specific groups, as well as in the more general social context of identity politics and the importance of quantitative information brought about by the post–World War II social and economic changes and the civil rights movement. Thus, the preexisting census categories set the terms of the debate, predetermining that classification was important and consequential. Nonelites, however, demanded changes in the categories, and they often won. Furthermore, the push for a multiracial category was primarily an issue of identity, not one of federal affirmative action (the category, in fact, complicated such attempts) (Perlmann and Waters 2002:13). It also forced the Census Bureau to revise its categories. These outcomes, therefore, reflected the interaction between the state and society.

The Debates Continue: The 2000 and 2010 Censuses

The Census Bureau began planning for the 2000 census in the early 1990s; much of the planning reflected dissatisfaction with the 1990 census by the agency itself, Congress, data users, and the public (US Census Bureau 2009b:27). The secretary of commerce reestablished the African American, Hispanic, American Indian and Alaskan Native, and Asian and Pacific Islander Advisory Committees (US

Census Bureau 2009b:37). He also assembled a 2000 Census Advisory Committee consisting of over 30 representatives from associations representing business, labor, minorities, data users, state and local governments, and others (Citro et al. 2004:87). The Census Advisory Committee recommended that the Census Bureau test sampling and estimation techniques to enumerate nonresponding households (US Census Bureau 2009b:10). Advisory groups, professional statisticians, and demographers generally reacted positively to the proposal (US Census Bureau 2009b:10). Some congressional critics believed that using probability sampling to produce reapportionment data violated the Constitution, the Census Bureau's operating statute (Section 195, Title 13, US Code), or both (US Census Bureau 2009b:10).

The 2000 census short form contained the same questions asked in the 1990 census (Citro et al. 2004:375). One notable exception was that the race question had an option for multiple races (Bennett 2000:176; Citro et al. 2004:375). The single Asian Pacific Islander category was divided into "Asian" and "Native Hawaiians/Pacific Islander," at Senator Daniel K. Akaka's urging (Prewitt 2013:131). Akaka, a native Hawaiian, argued that this change was necessary because native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders tended to have lower incomes and less access to key services than Asians and because the combined category denied Hawaiians their identity (Prewitt 2013:131). The 2000 long form added questions about the coresidence of grandchildren, the responsibility for their care, and the characteristics of disabled household members (US Census Bureau 2002:122–123).

Partisan differences over adjustment boiled over during this period (Anderson and Fienberg 2000c:795). Republicans generally opposed adjustment, whereas Democrats favored it (Byrant and Dunn 1995:148). Political polarization over the proposed use of sampling or other techniques to determine apportionment intensified following Democratic challenger Clinton's narrow defeat of Republican incumbent Bush in 1992 (Hillygus et al. 2006:36). Tensions heightened following the 1994 congressional elections that gave Republicans control of the House of Representatives, which they retained during the planning and implementation of the 2000 census (Hillygus et al. 2006:36; US Census Bureau 2009b:10). Congressional Republicans felt that adjustment would damage their electoral prospects (Prewitt 2010:244). In 1999, Representative Maloney of New York stated that "the Chair of the Republican National Committee said that the 2000 Census was 'an issue of unusual importance to the future of the Republican Party,' and that at stake is 'our GOP majority in the House'" (US

Congressional Record 1999:H3371–H3372). Some further claimed that the Constitution required apportionment to be based on an actual enumeration, not sampling (Anderson and Fienberg 2000c:796). The Democrats, in control of the White House, conversely viewed the census as a means to improve their political fortunes (Hillygus et al. 2006:36). The Congressional Black Caucus—all Democrats—in turn took up the census as a leading civil rights issue and was often joined by Hispanic and Asian representatives (Prewitt 2010:244). A civil rights coalition with 180 member organizations echoed this latter sentiment (Prewitt 2010:244). In 1999 and 2000, the House Subcommittee on the Census held 17 hearings on census planning and progress; Republicans challenged the Census Bureau's sampling strategies, and Democrats defended them (Hillygus et al. 2006:37).

Two lawsuits filed in 1998, *Glavin v. Clinton* and *US House of Representatives v. Department of Commerce*, challenged the constitutionality of using sampling to adjust the Census (US Census Bureau 2009b:21). The Supreme Court sided with the plaintiffs stating that Section 195 of Title 13 of the US Code precluded the use of sampling for congressional apportionment (US Census Bureau 2009b:16). However, the Supreme Court did not rule on the constitutionality of sampling; thus, it did not resolve the issue of whether census data could be adjusted for apportionment and federal fund allocation (Prewitt 2010:244; US Census Bureau 2009b:21). Ultimately, the Census Bureau discovered serious technical issues with DSE in 2000. Thus, it decided not to adjust the undercount based on DSE results (Prewitt 2010:244).

Another issue was the use of data from sources other than the census to apportion representation for US citizens living abroad, including military personnel and federal civilian employees (Johnston 2002:621). These individuals were supposed to be included in the apportionment calculations for their home state (Johnston 2002:621). However, they were not distributed to the smaller, within-state political divisions used to determine congressional districts and other electoral boundaries (Johnston 2002:621). Therefore, the Census Bureau used other material in addition to the census in making these determinations (Johnston 2002:621).

Utah challenged this practice in federal courts, arguing that it lost a seat to North Carolina as a result (Johnston 2002:621). Utah claimed that this practice did not account for Mormons on overseas missions and that the Census Bureau should use Mormon Church records to verify their usual residence (Johnston 2002:621). However, the case was dismissed. Utah appealed to the Supreme Court, which likewise dismissed

the case, stating that the Census Bureau's imputation technique was not sampling and therefore constitutional (Johnston 2002:621).

Partisan divisions contributed to the demise of the census long form, previously sent to one in every six households (Hillygus et al. 2006:76). Data from the long form, which had become increasingly lengthy, were used to design, construct, manage, and evaluate hundreds of government programs (Hillygus et al. 2006:77). Each year, $200 billion in federal funds were allocated using long-form data (Hillygus et al. 2006:77). The political context of the 2000 presidential election, coupled with growing popular concerns over privacy issues, sparked partisan controversy over the long form (Hillygus et al. 2006:2, 29). Conservative talk show hosts and editorial writers complained about it (Hillygus et al. 2006:74). Late night comics chimed in, as did a wide spectrum of political leaders, from small town mayors to the presidential candidate, George W. Bush, who informed the press that he understood "why people don't want to give that information to the government. If I had the long form, I'm not so sure I would do it either" (quoted in Hillygus et al. 2006:74). The Senate entered the fray, passing a nonbinding resolution urging that no American should be fined, prosecuted, or harassed by the federal government for not answering certain long-form questions (Hillygus et al. 2006:74).

With the 2000 elections approaching, Republicans denounced the long form as a privacy invasion (Hillygus et al. 2006:74). Congressman Robert W. Schaffer (R-CO) found some questions "too nosy" (Hillygus et al. 2006:74–75). Trent Lott (R-MS), the Senate majority leader, urged voters not to answer questions that they felt violated their privacy (Hillygus et al. 2006:75). Long-form opponents introduced six congressional bills that would affect the Census Bureau's ability to collect long-form data. However, none passed (Hillygus et al. 2006:2, 10, 75). Nonetheless, criticism of the long form remained (Hillygus et al. 2006:2, 10). The Libertarian Party framed the issue succinctly: "Real Americans don't answer nosy Census questions" (Hillygus et al. 2006:79). It added that refusing to answer all the questions, except for number of people in your home, struck a "blow for privacy, equality, and liberty" (Hillygus et al. 2006:79). Political criticism exacted a toll: response rates for the long form were dramatically lower than the ones for the short form (Anderson and Fienberg 2000a:19). Members of Congress thought that the long form contributed to nonresponse rates (Citro and Kalton 2007:22).

In 2005, the American Community Survey (ACS)—a large, continuous sample survey—replaced the census long form (Hillygus et al.

2006:115; US Census Bureau 2009a:iii, 2-1). Various stakeholders testified before Congress in support of the ACS. David Crowe, speaking on behalf of the National Association of Homebuilders, stated that the information gathered "promotes growth and improves the quality of life" (US House of Representatives 2001:52). Chuck Fluharty, director of the Rural Policy Institute, noted that the ACS was a unique resource because it facilitated "better informed and more precise local policy support infrastructure" (US House of Representatives 2001:84). He added that without accurate, timely data, local jurisdictions were disadvantaged in terms of planning and applying for state and federal funding (US House of Representatives 2001:84). Other witnesses expressed concerns about privacy and government intrusiveness, including Dr. Edward L. Hudgins of the Cato Institute who testified with surprising lack of decorum that "Most of the census questions are none of your damned business," a sentiment that extended to the ACS (US House of Representatives 2001:71). Richard Kulka of the Research Triangle Institute endorsed most of the fundamentals, goals, and objectives of the ACS but expressed concerns about the private sector's ability to compete with the Census Bureau's proposals that expanded the use of government data (US House of Representatives 2001:93). He believed that the ACS could damage private survey research (US House of Representatives 2001:93).

Despite these differing opinions, the ACS went forward. The Census Bureau administers the ACS to about three million households annually and provides yearly estimates of population and household characteristics for communities of 65,000 or larger. The ACS also addresses another drawback of the census long form—it produced stale data (Hillygus et al. 2006:116). Because the long form was administered only once every ten years, a community or business had to use information that grew increasingly out of date (Hillygus et al. 2006:116). The ACS instead provides annually updated information (Hillygus et al. 2006:116).

The Census Bureau works closely with the Office of Management and Budget and the Interagency Committee for the ACS (cochaired by the Office of Management and Budget and the Census Bureau) in designing the ACS (US Census Bureau 2009a:5-1). The Interagency Committee was established in July 2000 and represented more than 30 federal departments and agencies that used decennial census data (US Census Bureau 2009a:5-1). It was charged with verifying and confirming legislative justifications for every ACS question on the basis of the 2000 long form (US Census Bureau 2009a:5-1). The agencies were asked to evaluate each question and to provide the

justification for its subject matter, the legal authority for its use, the lowest geographic level required for it, the variables needed for its cross tabulation, and how frequently they needed the data from it (US Census Bureau 2009a:5-1–5-2).

Though adjustment and undercounting continued to generate controversy, it became clear that the Census Bureau would not pursue sampling for this purpose after the Supreme Court ruling that the adjustment of apportionment numbers using sampling was illegal. Gary Locke, President Obama's nominee for secretary of commerce, testified that the Census Bureau would abide by the Supreme Court's ruling during his confirmation hearing in 2009 (Williams 2011:14). Robert M. Groves, at his 2009 confirmation hearing when he was Obama's nominee for Census Bureau director, stated that he agreed with Locke's testimony and that statistical adjustment would not be used for redistricting (Williams 2011:14).

Nevertheless, the politics around the census continued. Latino organizations, frustrated over increased deportation of illegal workers, called for a boycott of the 2010 census unless the Obama administration stopped the deportations (Israel 2010:n.p.; Watanabe 2009:A3). While some Latino activists used the threat of a census boycott as a "bargaining chip" in the battle over these deportations, other Latino organizations viewed this tactic as irresponsible (Israel 2010:n.p.; Watanabe 2009:A3). This prompted speculation that up to 50 percent of the Latino community might not participate in the 2010 census (Israel 2010:n.p.). Indeed, the benefits to being counted led to extensive census outreach campaigns directed toward Latinos (Fessler 2010). The Census Bureau offered a Latino outreach toolkit to all interested organizations (US Census Bureau 2009c:n.p.). Apparently, the outreach campaigns were effective, as a 2010 Pew Hispanic Center survey showed that nine out of ten Latinos intended to participate in the 2010 census, and the census results showed that Latino participation was high (CBS News 2010:n.p.; López 2005:43).

The growing influence of libertarians in the Tea Party movement, encouraged by activists such as Texas Congressman Ron Paul, spurred opposition to 2010 census (Canadian Press 2010:n.p.). Paul argued that the only question the Census Bureau had the constitutional right to ask Americans was, "How many people live here?" (Murphy 2010:n.p.). Paul and other Tea Party leaders were so vocal before the census was conducted that some high ranking Republicans appealed to supporters to fill out their forms (Canadian Press 2010:n.p.). They feared underreporting would adversely affect the number of voting districts for Congress and state legislatures (Canadian Press 2010:n.p.).

Because of the demise of the long form and the introduction of the ACS, the 2010 census used only a short form, with ten questions about age, sex, race, ethnicity, housing characteristics, household size, and the relationship to person completing the form (US Census Bureau 2010b:n.p.; Williams 2011:3). Accuracy and coverage issues persisted. The Census Bureau sought to convince as many people as possible to complete their questionnaires (Williams 2011:16). It attempted to improve minority representation in the census. It awarded the 2010 communications contract to Draftfcb that headed a team of communications firms specializing in minority outreach, including Global Hue for blacks and Hispanics, IW Group for Asians and Pacific Islanders, G&G for American Indians and Alaskan Natives, and Allied Media for other ethnic groups (Williams 2011:16). This media strategy built upon the program, Census in Schools, as well as on paid advertising via network and cable television, radio, the Internet, newspapers, and magazines (Williams 2011:16). The Census Bureau partnered with local governments, businesses, community organizations, neighborhood groups, and the media to encourage participation, including cooperation with enumerators during nonresponse follow-ups (Williams 2011:16).

The short 2010 census was a reversal of a long-term historical trend toward censuses collecting more information. However, it was also the culmination of the development of highly instrumental, interventionist censuses. The 2010 census was designed specifically to apportion the vote and provide a few other pieces of information, including ethnicity, race, sex, and age (Williams 2011:3). Taken cross sectionally, it seems to be the epitome of a highly bureaucratized government office designing and then implementing an information-gathering project. However, seen historically, it is the result of intense interaction by the state and society in the United States, where the census was institutionalized in a way that implicated numerous interests.

Conclusions

The contemporary US census is highly politicized and produces an extensive amount of widely used information. We connect this outcome to our five key arguments. First, the United States, although in some ways an extremely powerful state, is also an open and fragmented one (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:172; Furner and Supple 1990:35). The Census Bureau is under continuous and intense social pressure. It is this interaction between the state and society that produces so much relevant information. Even the methodological advances in the

census, for example, in sampling procedures or in the ACS, are the result of political pressure, not institutional isolation and separation from society.

Second, the substance of the information gathered was directly linked to lay categories. The US census reflects the predominance of race as a key social divide. In this period, however, the social meaning of race changed as the civil rights movement pressed for equal rights for minority groups. New civil rights laws and programs allocated benefits to minorities based on census data. Immigration and intermarriage also created changing categorization schemes. This prompted many minority leaders to demand census categories that corresponded to their conceptions of identity and that improved their census representation (Nagel 1994:159). The push for a multiracial category, in fact, was for such recognition and not solely for material benefit (Perlmann and Waters 2002:13). The open structure of the US knowledge regime allows for sustained engagement between the Census Bureau and minority activists, further reinforcing the social significance of race.

Third, census intellectuals have a strong influence on the US census. These intellectuals include civil rights activists, leaders of ethnic and racial minorities, and academics. These individuals draft proposals, lobby, and testify to Congress and the Census Bureau, and they mobilize supporters on their behalf. The US knowledge regime and liberal market economy support their activities as this knowledge regime encourages Congress and the Census Bureau to solicit private-sector expertise (Campbell and Pedersen 2011:173). Indeed, these actors are formally co-opted into the census making through the Census Advisory Committee (cf. Loveman 2005:1661–1662).

Fourth, the US census continues to be shaped by the distribution of political power. Support (or lack thereof) for minority undercount adjustment is split along party lines. Republicans tend to oppose adjustment because minority communities typically vote for Democrats (Hillygus et al. 2006:21). Conservative Republicans view the census as intrusive and actively seek to limit the amount of information gathered (Hillygus et al. 2006:74). They successfully mobilized to eliminate the long form. More fundamentally, civil rights legislation redistributed political power starting in the 1960s. While not eliminating inequality and racism, it shifted social power, giving ethnic and racial minorities, who had been largely excluded from political participation, leverage over the census. They successfully lobbied for changes in the census categories.

Fifth, the historical trajectory of the US census is characterized by intense, long-term interaction between state and social actors.

The census was institutionalized in a way that assured this interaction because of its key role in political apportionment. However, the involvement of state and social actors has a self-reinforcing dynamic: the initial use for apportionment made the census relevant for many actors, and once they were involved, they found additional uses for the information, creating more controversy and politicization, and in turn involving more actors. These actors were influenced by the census categories, widely used throughout society, but they also pressed for their own changes. Interest group politics arose before World War II, but at that time, its influence was limited and its membership restricted mostly to elites. After World War II, the politics of interest groups greatly expanded and democratized, creating an open and competitive knowledge regime that surrounds the census. Because of the self-reinforcing dynamic of state-society interaction over the census, more nonelite actors and their organizations were drawn into census politics after World War II. Thus, the census gives rise to sustained engagement with diverse and politically and socially active stakeholders.

These three social factors, along with the historical trajectory, explain the outcome, a highly politicized and instrumentally interventionist census that focuses on race and ethnicity. The level of interaction between the state and society gave rise to a highly instrumental interventionist census starting in the 1960s, when census data started to be used to implement programs designed to redress inequality, especially among minorities, whose power was increasing and whose organizations were mobilizing. The stakes are high. Remarkably, local governments bring lawsuits to have their populations counted. Census data routinely affect the distribution of large amounts of money, resources, programs, and political and social benefits. The US census has not been immune to downsizing; it now only asks a few questions. There is little serious thought, however, of eliminating it.

CHAPTER 7

The Insulation of the Italian Censuses

During the twentieth century, the Italian census was depoliticized; consequently, it may lose its centrality as a source of official statistics. In 2011, it began to use local population registers to constitute its population lists (Italy ISTAT 2011:2). This may indicate a shift away from the census toward the use of administrative data. To understand these changes, we sketch how the census developed in the mid-twentieth century under the fascist regime (1922–1943) and the long-term legacies of this development. We begin with the census under fascism because the institutional arrangements for twentieth-century Italian censuses were established during this period. Furthermore, the fascist period was a historical turning point establishing the census as a highly technocratic institution. The fascist government established a knowledge regime in which individual technocrats together with specific elite economic interests strongly influenced the census at the expense of broader public influences. As a consequence, during the 1930s, an intellectual elite dominated the census. This elite entrenched its power in a statistical organization that housed the census but cut it off from popular political pressure. As a result, although the Italian census collected a huge amount of information, its social relevance is limited.

The Emergence of an Intellectual Stratum

The economic crisis of the late nineteenth century split the dominant property holders from the intellectuals. As prices for agricultural goods collapsed in the 1870s and 1880s, so did land rents. To escape this problem, many elites' children turned to university education, reversing their earlier investments in land (chapter 4). Therefore, during the agrarian crisis, the number of Italian students enrolling in secondary and university education, who were mostly sons of agrarian elites, doubled (Banti 1996:101–102). Higher education could have

facilitated careers in industry. There was not enough industry, however, to create adequate employment opportunities.

The industrial bourgeoisie's failure to develop the country thus affected the intellectuals (chapter 4). Late nineteenth-century Italy had one of the highest illiteracy rates in Europe and a higher proportion of university students in the population than Germany, France, or Holland (Barbagli 1982:14–15; Charle 1996:41–42). Because there were so many highly educated people in a predominantly agricultural economy with low literacy levels, intellectual unemployment emerged. Despite improving material conditions, Giolitti and the liberalism he represented, was widely perceived among the intelligentsia to have failed to develop the country (Gentile 1982:37, 49–53). In this context of failed development, the intelligentsia began to see the state as a vehicle of reform; consequently, government positions became economically central to this group. Between 1891 and 1923, the number of state employees increased from 126,000 to 509,000, their regional origins shifted from the north to the south, they established councils and commissions that studied and made recommendations about social problems, and they formed their own unions and associations (Barbagli 1982:37; Cassese 1981:478; Melis 1995:200–201, 203). Therefore, the state became highly relevant both as a source of income and as a tool for social transformation (Charle 1996:296–297).

Thus, within the social elite, a distinct stratum of intellectuals and professionals emerged that had somewhat different interests from the older agrarian elite, from whom they nevertheless often sprang. Agrarian conservatives worried about the rise of the employees and professionals and saw the link between the urban ruling classes and the landowners weakening (Villani 1978:904). Changes in suffrage laws may have strengthened the power of these intellectuals. The government extended political citizenship after 1882 beyond a narrow circle of the propertied to a broader group of educated urban dwellers (Seton-Watson 1967:50–51). It became possible to vote by demonstrating the capacity to write (Villani 1978:917). Thus, the intellectuals gained some political autonomy from the agrarian elites.

Some of these intellectuals were attracted to technocratic reform based on a new understanding of the relationship between state and society in which public entities (*enti pubblici*)—hybrid agencies composed of some state employees and many outside technocrats and intellectuals—tried to solve social problems or to buy off radical organizations (Carocci 1971:19; Corner 2002:284–5; Melis 1995:204). By the end of the Giolittian period, an autonomous intellectual technocracy emerged that was bent on using the Italian state to execute social reforms.

The intellectuals' turn toward the state affected their ideological outlook. After the agrarian crisis of the late nineteenth century, liberalism and *laissez-faire* lost their plausibility, and the idea took root that the state could solve the country's problems (Lanaro 1979:33; Salvadori 1960:94–97, 241–248). Across the political spectrum, ideologies of intellectual activism emerged that broke with the perceived passivity of liberalism. The neo-Machiavellians (Vilfredo Pareto 1848–1923, Roberto Michels 1876–1936, and Gaetano Mosca 1859–1941) rejected an eighteenth-century image of history as a story of gradual progress as outdated (Bobbio 1995:37, 45–46, 109; Michels 1962:50; Mosca 1968:11). Antonio Labriola (1843–1904) critiqued evolutionary interpretations of Marxism, giving intellectuals an active role in history (Bobbio 1995:8; Labriola 1903:105, 108). Benedetto Croce (1866–1952) and Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944), influenced by Labriola, also emphasized the role of intellectuals in transforming society (Bobbio 1995:66, 79, 80). Italian social scientists, too, embraced an interventionist model of the relationship between science and politics (Gervasoni 1997:1088–1089). Men such as Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909), a doctor and anthropologist, linked theoretical reflection, analytic arguments, and policy recommendations (Gervasoni 1997:1095). The same general idea reappeared in the Italian version of pragmatism influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) and Henri Bergson (1859–1941), which rejected philosophy as contemplative and demanded action (Bobbio 1995:39–44). Despite their differences, all these intellectual currents critiqued *laissez-faire* philosophy and justified intellectual activism (Bobbio 1995:42–43). During the 1920s, these intellectuals formed lobbies oriented to the state. The most important of these for the census was the eugenics lobby.

Italian Eugenics as a Critique of Liberalism

Italian eugenics had three distinctive characteristics: it supported state intervention, it viewed differential class fertility as an opportunity rather than a concern, and it attended to regional differences (Cassata 2006:105–106; Lanaro 1979:48–49; Pogliano 1984:62). These characteristics emerged during the 1920s in debates between Malthusians, who were worried about overpopulation and the survival of the weak, and anti-Malthusians, who argued that eugenics should improve medical conditions (Pogliano 1984:73–74). In 1924, two eugenics societies sponsored conferences in which the anti-Malthusians predominated. Under pressure from the Catholic Church, the conference participants focused more on medical hygiene than on

artificial selection (Pogliano 1984:76). Italian eugenicists tended to reject birth control, sterilization, and abortion (Ipsen 1996:45).

One of the most important eugenicists was Corrado Gini (1884–1965), a polymath well known for his contributions to statistics. For Gini, wealthy nations had a greater proportion of the population in higher social classes that had low fertility than in the lower classes that had high fertility. In contrast, poor nations had a greater proportion of the population in lower social classes that had a high fertility rate than in the higher social classes that had a low fertility rate. The lower, more fertile, social classes were a reservoir from which new elites would emerge (Cassata 2006:21; De Grazia 1992:53; Ipsen 1996:222; Lanaro 1979:47). From this perspective, emigration, far from being a safety valve as many of the liberal social scientists of an earlier period had thought, potentially threatened Italy's national existence. In 1912, Gini argued that the Italian upper classes were still fertile enough to replace themselves, that this forced members of the lower classes to emigrate, and that it led to the outbreak of war (Bertaux 1999:575; Lanaro 1979:47). In the future, as the fertility of the upper classes declined, Italy would face the problem of an aging population (Bertaux 1999:575). Gini's pronatalist eugenics was widely shared among Italian intellectuals. Eugenics became something of a fad with conferences, university positions, and academic study groups (Pogliano 1984:62–64). This interest in eugenics prompted the foundation of organizations in the early 1920s that were curious about demographic information (Pogliano 1984:69–71).

The Rise of Fascism

The shock of World War I and the threat of revolution between 1918 and 1920 undermined the ramshackle compromise subtending the Italian state during the liberal period (chapter 4). The constitutional monarchy that issued from the *Risorgimento* was bureaucratically organized into a few key ministries. The census had always been housed in one of these (chapter 4). Ultimately, then the Italian census in the liberal period was under some indirect parliamentary control through Parliament's oversight of its ministry. The fascist seizure of power transformed this situation. By 1922, Mussolini was in power, and by 1926, the fascists were in control. Initially, the fascists imposed a hiring freeze in the old ministries. Salaries were cut, and personnel grew older. However, public entities exploded. Although insulated from Parliament and widespread popular pressure, they were quite open to organized interests, especially those of major proprietors in industry

and agriculture (Aquarone 1987:60–61, 92; Melis 1995:215–218). Decision making in public entities tended to be secretive and informal because of their hybrid character. These organizations could receive funding from both the government treasury and private groups. Groups that gave money to the entity were represented on the board of directors and thus could advocate for their interests. Consequently, groups pursued their interests by having a representative on the board of the public entity relevant to them (Salvati 2006:228–230). Paradoxically, then, at exactly the time when the fascist regime was trumpeting the newly found power of the Italian state, organized interests were increasingly penetrating it (Melis 1996:368).

This transformation of the state influenced Italian statistics. Official information gathering developed considerably under the fascist regime (1922–1945), especially after the establishment of the *Instituto nazionale di statistica* (National Institute of Statistics—ISTAT) in 1926, following the recommendation of the last director of DIRSTAT, Alberto Aschieri (Bertaux 1999:580; Ipsen 1996:79). The organization was a typical of public entity. Thus, the emergence of ISTAT was not simply a technical reorganization or modernization of Italian statistics (as suggested by Fracassi 1961:142–152 and Leti 1996:156). Instead, it established a new pattern of interaction between the state and society around information.

The creation of ISTAT was also the culmination of a longer struggle. Between 1887 and 1920, many ministries had developed their own statistical departments as DIRSTAT lost control over the production of statistics (Leti 1996:66–68). Elite Italian statisticians saw this dispersal as a serious problem for two reasons. First, with information gathering scattered throughout the government, it was difficult to enforce uniform standards for its collection and distribution. Second, statisticians working in the ministries could not advance their careers except by ceasing to specialize in statistics and becoming full-time administrators, thus wasting their expertise (Leti 1996:127–128). ISTAT's emergence out of a subdepartment of the ministerial bureaucracy centralized official statistics and repositioned it in relation to society. It was dedicated to centralizing and standardizing the collection of statistics and to providing a career path for professional statisticians. Because of its hybrid nature as a public entity, ISTAT could make private contracts to hire workers and sell its products; however, it retained the type of authority that was characteristic of a state organization so it could obligate governmental agencies to cooperate with it (Leti 1996:82–83). Within the organization, the president had wide authority (Leti 1996:111).

ISTAT was closely linked to Mussolini. Because it was placed directly under the Office of the Prime Minister (*Presidenza del consiglio dei ministri*), the organization's president had access to the highest political authority in the state (Fracassi 1961:143–145; Ipsen 1996:83). ISTAT undertook an ambitious program of publication and training, establishing statistical schools, examinations, and prizes (Impicciatore and Rettaroli 2011:6; Ipsen 1996:195; Italy ISTAT 1936a:41–43).

ISTAT, like other public entities, had a close relationship to organized social interests, called syndicates in fascist jargon. When ISTAT was founded, its board—the *Consiglio superiore di statistica* (High Council of Statistics—CSS)—was also created. Like the boards of directors in other public entities, the CSS was composed of technocrats and representatives of organized social interests. On the CSS, there was one representative from industry, one from agriculture, and one from the unions (Leti 1996:300). These syndicates, unlike lobbies in liberal democracies, were official organizations established by the fascist government. Yet, despite their formal connection to the authoritarian regime, their leaderships were effective advocates for some economic interests, especially from agriculture and industry. Consequently, the presence of their leaders on the CSS indicated some formalized consultation between ISTAT and social interest groups. Thus, the CSS represented an important point of social influence in an otherwise authoritarian organization and regime. While fascist propaganda trumpeted this organization as a manifestation of the new centralized state, in reality, ISTAT was paradoxically under greater private influence than its liberal predecessors, such as DIRSTAT, had been.

Mussolini chose Corrado Gini to head the new institute. He had been active in extreme right-wing nationalist political circles prior to World War I, and after the fascist seizure of power in 1922, he was one of the most important intellectuals to support the regime (Bertaux 1999:578; Gini 1927:102; Ipsen 1996:81). With Gini's appointment, a major figure of the eugenics movement had enormous influence over the collection of statistics, and he was eager to reorient the organization toward demographic statistics (Ipsen 1996:81). Mussolini was also interested in demographic statistics: he inspected the page proofs of the statistical bulletin and met with Gini bimonthly between 1927 and 1928 (Ipsen 1996:83).

Gini's project of centralizing official Italian statistics provoked sharp resistance from the other ministries because their staffs feared that in centralizing information, ISTAT would begin to take power

away from them. Gini initially overcame this resistance because of his close personal connection to Mussolini. But this dependence on the leader, even if it was successful in the short term, left him vulnerable to further bureaucratic intrigue later on. Given the overall authoritarian context in which he was working, he could not use popular support to legitimize ISTAT's centralization and to counteract bureaucratic attacks after Mussolini abandoned him (Leti 1996:135–156). Furthermore, Gini was involved in an ongoing struggle with the local Fascist Party office over his hiring practices. As a result of these conflicts, he eventually lost political support and had to resign (Cassata 2006:92–101; Leti 1996:136–156). Franco Savorgnan replaced Gini. He was involved in few bureaucratic struggles and complied with the anti-Semitic legislation that forced the agency to fire many of its collaborators in 1938 (Ipsen 1996:207).

During the fascist period, official information gathering assumed increased importance. The scientific status of the discipline of statistics was established, and ISTAT had an important position in the Italian state. In the absence of elections, official statistics legitimized the regime. As Gini (1927:103) pointed out, the justification for the dictatorship was its pursuit of the national against individual interests, and official information helped define this national interest. Information collection increasingly aligned with the regime's pronatalist demographic policies, especially during the "battle for births" in which the fascists tried to reverse declining fertility and to increase the population from 40 to 60 million (De Grazia 1992:42–60; Impicciatore and Rettaroli 2011:6; Ipsen 1996:65–68). The Fascist Grand Council, a consultative body, declared that the demographic problem was "the problem of problems," and a decree taxed bachelors, gave subsidies to young married couples, and discouraged migration to urban areas, considered to be harmful for fertility (Impicciatore and Rettaroli 2011:6). The regime outlawed abortions and established a national organization to encourage childbearing to implement these policies (De Grazia 1992:48; Ipsen 1996:66–67). These actions resonated with Gini's view that the state should promote the growth of the most vigorous hereditary lines, which for him, meant poor southerners with large families (Lanaro 1979:47–48; Pogliano 1984:79).

The Fascist Censuses: 1931, 1936, and 1938

Two population censuses were conducted in 1931 and 1936. A census of the Jewish population was conducted in 1938. The administrative organizations for first censuses resembled the ones in the liberal

period. The 1931 census added questions about fertility, religion, and occupation (Italy ISTAT 1959:26–27). Local governments, under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior, conducted the census, and ISTAT had no direct administrative presence (Fracassi 1961:144–145; Ipsen 1996:198; Italy ISTAT 1978:8; Marucco 1996:189–190). Propaganda linked the census to the regime. For example, the date to conduct the census was shifted to April 21st, the birthday of Rome, which had become an official fascist holiday (Ipsen 1996:198). Films and pamphlets explained the purpose of the census (Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:44; Ipsen 1996:198).

The 1931 census distributed household forms that had separate lines for each household member's information and distributed individual forms that had separate questionnaires to persons living in institutional settings, such as hotels (Italy ISTAT 1959:24, 32). This census introduced three innovations. First, the occupation questions asked about "occupational category" that referred to branches of economic activity, such as industry and agriculture. This question conceptualized society as an interdependent set of economic groups, not as a set of divisions based on class or occupation (Ipsen 1996:200; Italy ISTAT 1959:27; Mastroluca and Verrascina 2012:104). This category outlived fascism. Second, the 1931 census eliminated the question on property ownership. In this respect, the fascist census produced less information than its liberal counterpart. Third, a question on fertility was included to support the fascist pronatalist agenda (Italy ISTAT 1936b:9).

The 1936 census used the same machinery as the 1931 census, except that ISTAT officials were more involved at the local level (Ipsen 1996:208–209). The census form eliminated nine columns, removing questions about religion, unemployment, fertility, and place of birth (Italy ISTAT 1959:36–37). Furthermore, the definitions of the family and occupational categories were altered, making comparisons with the 1931 census impossible (Ipsen 1996:210).

The occupational categories were most difficult to apply in agriculture. There were two problems. First, especially in the southern Italy, an individual might own, rent, and sharecrop land, as well as work as a salaried employee for another farmer. Before 1936, individuals who were engaged in multiple relationships had been forced to classify themselves either as salaried employees or owners (Albertario 1936:588–589). The second problem was the gap between census terminology and lay usage, as well as the regional variability of the latter (Albertario 1936:596–597).

The 1936 census made two changes in its question on occupations to address these problems. First, the instructions distinguished

among four broad types of individuals engaged in agriculture: manager cultivators (*conduttori coltivatori)*, who worked land themselves but also supervised business operations; individuals who worked and managed their own farms and worked as wage laborers on other farms; administrators and white collar employees; and workers (Italy ISTAT 1959:39). Second, the census constrained respondents to a set of predefined occupational categories, and ISTAT drew up lists of occupations in local terms that were equivalent to the ones on the census form (Albertario 1936:598).

These reforms, however, may not have produced a more accurate picture of the Italian countryside. For example, "manager cultivator" was one of the most ambiguous categories. It included a huge range of individuals including small sharecroppers and large tenant farmers (Albertario 1936:594). This category may have been intentionally broad to give the impression of widespread family farmer ownership, which was the regime's policy goal (Ipsen 1996:113). But it blurred important social distinctions by grouping wealthy agrarian entrepreneurs together with very poor farmers (Albertario 1936:594). Thus, the political project of these state-imposed categories probably undermined the production of useful information.

The government undertook a third, more sinister census in 1938 of the Jews. The Ministry of the Interior conducted it, but ISTAT counted and analyzed the data. The census asked questions on religious convictions, occupation, and membership in the Fascist Party (Cavarocchi 2007:121). This is the only Italian census, aside from the colonial ones, in which race was central. Even in this census, there was no race question as such because all of the respondents were previously identified as belonging to the Jewish race (Cavarocchi 2007:121). This census also departed from previous ones because it violated laws on secrecy of information established in the liberal period and released the respondents' names to other agencies. The Germans and the radical fascists who governed Italy as a Nazi puppet state may have used the census to deport Italian Jews (Cavarocchi 2007:129; Leti 1996:201–207).

This census, however, did not fully serve the government's purposes. Official documents defined Jewishness racially by the percentage of "Jewish blood" (Sabatello 1976:30). Authorities relied heavily on local informants, including building superintendents and parish priests to collect this information (Cavarocchi 2007:124). These people, however, operating with lay understandings, tended to think of Jewishness as a religious category, not a racial one (Sabatello 1976:31). For this reason, secularized Jews probably largely escaped

enumeration (Cavarocchi 2007:124). Indeed, the main source of information on Italian Jews came from the Jewish Congregations. Thus, the attempt to impose the category of race for Jews even in the fascist period was largely unsuccessful.

Despite the importance of official information to the fascist regime, their censuses failed in four ways. First, the fascist censuses collected less information than the liberal ones because they eliminated questions and forms (Italy ISTAT 1959:14–52). Second, these censuses sought but failed to integrate pronatalist policy with information collection. The 1931 and 1936 censuses showed no increase in the number of children and a decrease in the percentage of the married population (although it remained high relative to other European countries) (Ipsen 1996:210).

Third, the fascist censuses did not centralize information collection. The period after the founding of ISTAT was not one of revival and reorganization (see opposite argument in Fracassi 1961:152; Ipsen 1996:79; Marucco 1996:196; Prévost 2009:12). Centralization occurred only in Roman bureaucracies. The provinces, however, where information was actually collected, remained mostly outside ISTAT's formal control, although the agency repeatedly tried to establish provincial statistical offices only to be blocked by other parts of the government. Local authorities often dominated information collection and tended to claim inflated numbers for their legal population. Legislation in 1929 increased the power of local authorities because it required them to update population registers through a survey in the years between censuses (Leti et al. 2002:10–11). In some instances, this local control took the form of fraud as communal officials lengthened or invented streets, made up families, and included families who had emigrated from the commune (Ipsen 1996:198; Leti 1996:177). Pronatalist policies and the increasing number of resources distributed according to the census results may have encouraged local officials to inflate their numbers.

Finally, during the fascist period, regional categories continued to confound the nation-building project that always accompanied the Italian census. The regime's ideologues proclaimed that fascist policies of rural development had erased regional differences between the north and south and ended rural to urban migration (Petraccone 2005:189–190). Mussolini's press secretary during the early 1930s, Gaetano Polverelli, pressured newspapers to drop the terms, *Mezzogiorno* and *Italia meridionale*, used for southern Italy (Petraccone 2005:190). However, fascist demographic statistics, particularly Gini's large survey on fertility, were strongly stamped by

regional thinking. Gini argued that Italy's great demographic advantage consisted of the existence of a still backward agricultural south with high fertility rates. Fascist immigration policies, which retained these large families in Italy, were essential to maintaining the vitality of the Italian race (Cassata 2006:105–106). Indeed, Gini interpreted Italian unification itself in demographic terms as a process of mixing different regional races (Ipsen 1996:224). This regional thinking even influenced information gathering during the fascist period when southern Italy came to be understood as the demographic reservoir of the country.

In the fascist regime, in sum, the census became even more insulated from the concerns of the lay population than in the liberal period. Although it would be easy to assume that this trend occurred because of the authoritarian nature of the regime, it stemmed more from the way that only elite social interests were embedded in public entities and syndicates, therefore tying the census particular elite social interests and isolating it from widely relevant social debates.

Politics, Society, and Knowledge

Even after World War II, with the emergence of mass democracy, the form of the interaction between state and social actors never produced a politicized census. Italy became a representative, democratic republic with universal adult suffrage, a strong Parliament, an elected Senate, and a largely ceremonial president (Allum 1973:78–79). Political participation was high with 80 to 90 percent of the eligible population voting up until the 1990s. Despite these changes, there was considerable continuity between the fascist regime and the Republic. The personnel of the bureaucracy was largely unreformed, and much of the new constitution remained without effect (Pavone 1995:118–119, 133). Nonelites groups, therefore, had little influence on the state. Furthermore, as in the fascist period, political parties rather than local or provincial governments were the central institutions linking individual citizens to the state (Fioravanti 2001:816). The constitution institutionalized the role of these political parties (Scoppola 1980:20–21). It embodied a conception of democracy that encouraged popular participation and the representation of the interests of a single, national people instead of a conception of democracy that facilitated the alternation of elected governments. The territorial distribution of the population played little role in governance.

Despite the centrality of political parties, Italy did not develop a political system in which these parties alternatively held power. After

the war, elections occurred in an atmosphere of ideological tension, pitting the forces of the center and right organized as *Democrazia Cristiana* (Christian Democracy—DC) against the Italian communist party, the *Partito Comunista Italiano* (Italian Communist Party—PCI) (Allum 1973:78–79). Although regular elections continued to occur, they did not affect which political party held power. Fear of communism meant that the PCI was generally excluded from political power. Consequently, the DC controlled the Italian government until the early 1990s (Galli 1974:354–356; 1975:7–9). Effectively, the Republic was governed by a single party, just as it was during fascism.

Because of the DC's political monopoly, much political struggle took place within the party rather than across party lines. Shifting coalitional politics within the party could rapidly bring down particular governments even though the same politicians were repeatedly recycled in different cabinet configurations (Galli 1974:357). Successive governments thus formed through shifting coalitions in Parliament rather than through popular elections of slates of candidates. Different governments represented different currents within the party and shades of opinion, but different governments did not possess sharply differently political and ideological agendas. Members of the same party, the DC, controlled all the governments.

Government agencies for welfare, insurance, and planning continued as public entities after fascism (Pavone 1995:155–158). These entities often relied on specific social groups for the information and expertise that they needed to operate, creating tight links between the two sets of actors (LaPalombara 1964:121, 262). Unions, women's organizations, and cooperatives blossomed in the decades after the war, as did serious protest movements, including radical land occupations in the south. By the early 1960s, there were thousands of interest groups, including sports and leisure organizations, Catholic confraternities, cultural groups, trade unions, and employers' associations. These often had close links to political parties and public entities, creating a distinctively politicized associational sphere (Almagisti 2007:111; Ginsborg 1989:139; LaPalombara 1964:74–76, 84, 128–130).

These political and social features—little party alternation, a highly centralized state, public entities, and interests groups—shaped a particular knowledge regime. Although Italian politics are extremely polarized, much of the policy process, the framing and passing of legislation, is not. It is conducted through compromise within the ruling majority or secretively in public entities (Lucarelli and Radaelli

2004:94–95). Italy has think tanks and policy experts, and there is a permeable boundary between the government and academia (Lucarelli and Radaelli 2004:89–90; Radaelli and Martini 1998:61). However, the think tanks avoid highly partisan postures because they try to influence the policy-making process, much of which happens in the public entities or within a single party rather than in the electoral arena (Lucarelli and Radaelli 2004:95). As a result, this knowledge regime is not highly politicized. Information comes into the Italian state through particular relationships formed between specific groups, particularly industrialists, and the agencies that regulate their key interests (LaPalombara 1964:275–284). Official information is not drawn into an open political struggle.

Two features of the constitutional position of the census also make it politically uncontroversial. First, it provides the de jure population to apportion seats in Parliament. The constitution stipulates that the lower chamber is composed of 630 deputies. It divides these seats by the population of each electoral circumscription as enumerated in the census (Italy La Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana 1948:Part 2, Title 1, Section 1, Articles 56–57). This process produces little struggle for two reasons. First, preunification regions, such as Lombardy or Piedmont, have no national representation that linked to the census returns. Second, representation is proportional (Ginsborg 1989:131). Several representatives from different parties represent single constituencies. Shifts in the population may slightly change the political complexion of the district, but they will not deliver it to any particular political party. Thus, the census is used for apportionment, but it is an uncontroversial technical task.

The second link between the constitution and the census concerns social rights (Barbagallo 1994:114–116). The constitution is committed to social equality, the right to employment, the promotion of family welfare, the protection of health, professional development, and ensuring that private property ownership does not conflict with public purposes (Italy La Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana 1948:Fundamental Principles, Article 3–4, Title 2, Articles 31–32, Title 3, Articles 41–44). Because these social rights are constitutional, the state, must collect a wide range of data on living conditions, employment, and health (Sandulli and Baldassarre 1971:62). Although nothing in the constitution demands that this information be collected through a census, the document establishes a strong link between official information gathering and social rights. Thus, because apportionment is largely uncontroversial and because the constitution is heavily focused on social rights, the census tends to be

oriented to tracking progress toward material well being. Its results are not directly politically relevant because they have little effect on political representation.

Despite this new constitutional framework, the institutional position of ISTAT changed relatively little after the fascist period. Until 1981, it was governed by the fascist legislation of 1929 that established it as a public entity (Giannini 1987:55; Ginsborg 1989:196; Italy ISTAT 1978:16–19; Parenti 1971:17). This institutional position continued to insulate ISTAT from parliamentary oversight (Parenti 1971:13). The president of ISTAT drew up the census forms, set the overall research agenda, and dealt with the personnel (Italy ISTAT 1978:29–30). The CSS provided input, but professional statisticians dominated ISTAT, and they were supposed to guarantee its impartiality and political insulation (Sandulli and Baldassarre 1971:68–69). Even the representatives of interest groups that did sit on the CSS tended to be professional statisticians (Parenti 1994:12–13). Furthermore, the president of ISTAT was also the president of the CSS; he set the agenda for meetings and controlled the debate (Parenti 1994:21). Parliamentary approval was not required for the census forms. The law responsible for the execution of the 2001 census indicated, "The information that constitutes the subject of census reporting is collected through designated questionnaires and forms provided by ISTAT" (Italy Presidente della Repubblica 2001). Some Italian politicians challenged the subordination of ISTAT to the executive branch and argued that it should be linked to the legislature or even should be an "instrument of legislative power" (Fortunati 1968:48–49; Italy ISTAT 1978:16). These attempts, however, proved unsuccessful, and thus, the legislative branch has no direct control over ISTAT.

After the war, there was an attempt to establish an oversight commission in addition to the CSS; such a reform might have politicized the census. This commission was comprised of three senators, three parliamentary representatives, and two representatives, one from the employees' organizations and one from the employers' organizations (Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:48). However, the CSS resisted, and the commission was not used after 1951 (Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:67; Parenti 1994:83).

After the war, ISTAT continued to depend on private interests. To collect information, ISTAT depended on 15,000 local organizations, a combination of communes, local prefectural offices, provincial statistical offices in local chambers of commerce, agricultural inspectors, provincial boards of tourism, and other organizations (Italy ISTAT 1978:35). One of the most striking examples of this dependence is

the importance of chambers of commerce in organizing the census. In the late 1950s, there were proposals to establish peripheral ISTAT offices at the provincial level and to absorb the statistical offices that had been previously inside the local chambers of commerce (Parenti 1994:69–70). The opposite, however, occurred. There was an increasing coordination between ISTAT and the chambers of commerce, particularly about the census. From 1971, the statistical offices of local chambers of commerce were specifically requested to oversee the collection of census data at the communal level (Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:50). The 2001 census expanded the role of chambers of commerce by making them part of the national statistical system (Italy ISTAT 2006:73).

ISTAT's position changed with a law passed in 1989, creating a national statistical system. This reform aimed to provide ISTAT with the peripheral organizations that it had previously lacked. These included other government statistical offices; regional, provincial, and communal statistical offices; and the statistical offices of the chambers of commerce (Italy Consiglio dei ministri 1989). However, this organizational transformation had little effect on the census. Thus, the Italian census remained insulated from parliamentary oversight, as well as highly dependent on its collaboration with private interests because it was housed in a public entity. Given these circumstances, the primary purpose of the census became the collection of information on economic development. The knowledge regime combined with constitutional and political factors created a depoliticized census.

The postwar censuses emerged during the era when national statistics became linked to international agencies such as the United Nations and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Ventresca 1995:85). Throughout the postwar period, but especially after the 1990s, Italian census takers were influenced by international norms. Yet this international pressure mostly reinforced the already preexisting technocratic character of the Italian census by removing the census even further from domestic politics.

Thus, the basic organizational problem of the Italian census remains the same as it was in the nineteenth century. The primary statistical agency is highly centralized, with a weak peripheral bureaucracy. Without these local systems of information gathering, ISTAT is an empty shell. Furthermore, all of these local information-gathering efforts are oriented to the local population registers (*anagrafe*). Population registers have long historical roots, and they developed in constant interaction with the census (chapter 4; Volume 1, Chapter 7; Italy ISTAT 1996:53). These registers establish legal residency that can

determine taxation, insurance rates, and voter eligibility (Leti et al. 2002:33–35). The population registers for any particular commune are supposed to include all persons who habitually live there. The populations in the registers and the census should be mutually identifiable and strictly comparable because Italian censuses are designed to measure the de jure and the de facto populations (Italy ISTAT 2006:15). However, the population registers tend to give higher estimates than the census, probably because local officials are reluctant to remove people from the registers just as in the fascist period (Cortese 2007:5–6). If an individual is listed in the register but not in the census, he or she will be considered temporarily absent but still part of the legal population of the commune (Leti et al. 2002:35). Indeed, the censuses from 1961 to 1991 reported a smaller population than the registers reported—in some southern communes, this difference reached into the tens of thousands (Italy ISTAT 2014:16–17; Leti et al. 2002:20).

These two systems of information collection have never been fully coordinated. The relationship between the de jure and the de facto populations shifts, and it is hard to specify. It is not always entirely clear whether the census or the registers are the better measure of the official population: in some censuses, the registers have been used to correct the census forms, while in others, the census has been used to correct the registers (Leti et al. 2002:11). Thus, census politics revolve around a bureaucratic struggle between information gathering at the local and national levels of government. This politics reflects a form of combined and uneven information development distinctive to Italy. A hyperdeveloped, very old, local system of information collection has never been fully replaced by a uniform national system.

Documenting the Economic Miracle: 1951–1981

The first Italian postwar census began in 1944 using the remainder of the ISTAT staff, in cooperation with the allied economic commission (Baldi and Cagiano de Azevedo 2000:19). This census was never completed; there was fear that the allies might use by the results to contest Italian requests for postwar economic aid (Baldi and Cagiano de Azevedo 2000:20). A complete census was conducted in 1951. After that, a regular decennial census was conducted (the last one was in 2011). Italy is one of the few countries in the world in which 100 percent of the individual census data are available for analysis outside of the census agency (Openshaw et al. 1985:113).

Between 1945 and 1951, ISTAT primarily collected economic statistics, including the first ones on national income (Fracassi 1961:166–167). An effort was made to centralize the collection of this information that, despite Gini's efforts, had continued to be collected by an overlapping set of agencies in the fascist period (Fracassi 1961:165). In 1949, the CSS reconvened for the first time after the fall of fascism. Prime Minister De Gasperi addressed the council in terms that harkened back to the institution's positivist origins, "We need secure data" he said "because on them must be founded both administrative and legislative decisions" (quoted in Fracassi 1961:168).

The census was more detailed in 1951 than in 1936 (Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:47; Italy ISTAT 1959:53–54, 57). It included a question about years of education that replaced the older question about literacy, and it added questions about absent household members (Italy ISTAT 1959:56–57; 2014:10). This format followed closely the ones used in 1931 and 1936, but the explanation of how to complete the form was more detailed. For the occupation question, respondents were to describe "the art or trade effectively exercised, specifying it with the most appropriate words, using even words of local use, and even dialect, but preferably technical terms, or those included in contracts or labor books" (Italy ISTAT 1959:60). To answer the question about their position within their occupation, respondents were supposed to select 1 of 10 possible categories if they worked in agriculture and 1 of 11 if they worked outside of agriculture. For the agricultural sector, most of the response categories reflected tenurial arrangements related to combinations of owning, working, and leasing land. The response categories for the nonagricultural sector included "entrepreneur," "independent professional," "worker," and "subaltern" (Italy ISTAT 1959:60–61). The 1951 census abandoned the fertility question; ISTAT wanted to distance itself from discredited fascist policies.

The Italian economy developed rapidly after 1960. Italy's economy shifted from a predominantly rural and agricultural one to an overwhelmingly urban and industrial one in approximately a decade. As it opened to the European Common Market, Italian industry found a niche in high-end consumer goods and appliances produced by a qualified low-cost labor force. These developments remained regionally concentrated, with the social differences between the north and the south increasing (Ginsborg 1989:286–292).

During the same period, the demographic structure and women's social position in it changed. Italy's birthrate began to decline after World War I in the north but plummeted in the 1970s (Ginsborg

1998:138–139, 141; Perez and Livi-Bacci 1992:162, 164). Italian women gained rights to birth control, abortion, and divorce, but Italian men still contributed little to the household division of labor, so women restricted their fertility (Ginsborg 1998:133–143; Livi-Bacci 2001:146–147). Consequently, Italians have one of the lowest fertility rates in the world, and the population is aging (Livi-Bacci 2001:139, 142).

The censuses from 1961 to 1981 reflected some of these new realities. For the 1961 census, personal information was collected on a form divided between two sections: one asked questions about the respondent's age, civil status, and residence and the other focused on occupation (Italy ISTAT 1970:171–172). The census was almost identical to 1951, but it added questions about absent household members and marital fertility (Italy ISTAT 1970:171–173, 176). The 1961 census abandoned the elaborate instructions on rural occupations. The instructions now requested that respondents answer questions about the supposedly "visible" aspects of their occupation that outsiders could see, such as the type of work performed and the classification of that type of activity, and the supposedly "invisible" aspects of their occupation that only the respondent could describe, such as whether the respondent was an employer or employee (Italy ISTAT 1970:177–182). A question on fertility, absent from the 1951 census, returned in the 1961 census. It closely followed the 1931 question, asking women who were married, widowed, or divorced, how many children they had had (Italy ISTAT 1970:28).

The 1971 census was very similar to that of 1961. It retained the 1961 fertility question, but it moved it off of a separate form and onto the main one (Italy ISTAT 1977:32, 189–205). There were, however, several innovations in the 1971 census. The responses were precoded, so respondents simply checked off boxes. The census asked a language question for the provinces of Bolzano and Trieste. The forms used in Bolzano were translated into German, perhaps reflecting the growing relevance of northern regionalism in the 1970s (Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:50). A new battery of questions asked about the length of the commute to work or school and the means of transportation used. It also asked whether respondents received a pension and asked them to specify the type of pension (Italy ISTAT 1977:32). In 1981, ISTAT began to conduct postenumeration surveys and systematic comparisons with the population registers to check data quality (Gallo and Paluzzi 2012:51–52). To encourage participation, ISTAT carried out a publicity campaign through television, radio, and newspaper advertisements developed by an advertising agency (Gallo and Paluzzi

2012:52). The 1981 census form resembled the 1971 one, except it removed the fertility question (Italy ISTAT 1985:n.p.).

These censuses responded to the economic changes that occurred after 1960, but they were relatively unresponsive to changes in Italian demography. For example, earlier censuses carefully classified agricultural positions, but this focus was abandoned in response to changing occupational patterns. Another major social change was the increase in women's social and economic status and their related fertility decline. The census was less responsive to this change. Although there was a fertility question in the 1961 and 1971 censuses, this question was dropped in 1981 and has not reappeared. Indeed, a group of researchers seeking to expand the boundaries of official statistics conducted a large-scale fertility survey outside the ISTAT framework in 1979 (Impicciatore and Rettaroli 2011:11).

The responsiveness of the census to economic but not social changes reflected its position in the Italian political system. The primary task of the census was to document social progress, but it has been relatively isolated from direct political pressure since 1926, so it responded slowly to social changes outside of the economic sphere (Impicciatore and Rettaroli 2011:14). Furthermore, after the deep entanglement of Italian official statistics and demography with fascism, ISTAT officials were reluctant to participate in any information-gathering effort that could be linked to population policy (Baldi and Cagiano de Azevedo 2000:9–10; Impicciatore and Rettaroli 2011:10–11). Thus, the censuses from 1961 to 1981 focused on documenting the economic boom in the mid-twentieth century.

Demography, Immigration, and Regionalism

During the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, three political and social struggles developed that could have politicized the census. First, in the last few decades, the declining birthrate has been a major issue in the popular press and academic circles. Italy's aging population may not support its pension system or economy (Livi-Bacci 2001:144–145). Many actually fear that Italians will not survive as a distinctive people. An article in *La Repubblica* painted a gloomy image of a small town in Lombardy abandoned by its inhabitants. "After the school," the article reported, "the tobacco shop, the local medical service, and the food store disappeared" (Messina 2002:13). Thus, the populationist concerns of the fascist period reemerged in recent years, with much greater empirical justification than in the 1930s. Indeed, Massimo Livi-Bacci, a demographer from Florence, emerged as a public figure,

warning about the country's impending demographic decline and blaming Italy's weak welfare state for it (Altarocca 1997:26).

Second, regionalism, particularly in the sense of the development of a strong northern identity, increased. Italian national identity is weak (Agnew 1995:158). Italian has multiple dialects, so its status as a national language is contested (Salvi 1999:27–31). Furthermore, Articles 3 and 6 of the Constitution protect the rights of linguistic minorities (Salvi 1975:9–10). Nevertheless, despite the rise of regionalist politics in northern Italy in the 1990s and the overall weak Italian identity, Italian censuses never paid much attention to linguistic minorities (Salvi 1975:25). This lacuna links to the long-term project of the census to represent Italy as a unified people. With the institutional insulation of ISTAT, this project froze.

Social reasons also explain this weak mobilization around linguistic minorities despite the rise of northern regionalism. Over the last couple of decades, there has been an attempt to assert a linguistic identity for residents of "Padania," a putative nation based in the northeast (Giordano 2000:466; Salvi 1999:49–57). This movement gained considerable political traction during the corruption of scandals of the early 1990s that destroyed Italy's established party system and opened the way for the Northern League (*Lega Nord*) to emerge as a serious political player (Agnew 1995:158–159). By the mid-1990s, the Northern League was trying to create a cultural identity for Padania and for northern Italy more broadly against the putative laziness and parasitism of southern Italy (Giordano 2000:454–455, 466–467). Part of the political strategy of regionalist groups such as the Northern League has been to count linguistic minorities (Salvi 1975:24–26). Nevertheless, the Northern League opposes the legal protection of linguistic minorities. In fact, a 1999 law protecting the rights of historical linguistic minorities passed with support from the left and against fierce opposition from liberals and nationalists (Ainis 2010:45; Strassoldo 2006:46). The party's official reason for this opposition is that legislation aimed at protecting minority languages did not recognize the people who spoke the regional dialects of Piedmont and the region around Venice as linguistic minorities. This proffered reason may not have been the real one, however. A linguistic definition of social groups threatened the regional identity that the Northern League sought to represent, and furthermore, as an anti-immigrant party, the Northern League was suspicious of legislation that might protect non-European linguistic groups (Silipo 1998:6; Strassoldo 2006:46).

In any event, the potential for social mobilization around issues of linguistic minorities is limited in both northern and southern Italy. The majority of the recognized linguistic minorities are concentrated in the north, in the zones bordering France, Austria, and Slovenia. Apart from the island of Sardinia and some small pockets of Greek, Albanian, and Serbo-Croatian speakers, no southern zone claims a distinctive linguistic identity (Salvi 1975:14–16). Furthermore, there are no strong parties based on a southern identity. Therefore, mobilization for the protection and representation of linguistic minorities is a movement of a relatively restricted group of small entrepreneurs in rural northern Italy. Regionalism has a weak hold as a political movement elsewhere (Giordano 2000:456–458).

Third, immigration increased. It began to expand rapidly in the late 1980s, and the popular press discussed it extensively. For example, journalists regularly reported the number of immigrants from eastern Europe and northern Africa (Di Vico 2001:27). Census forms reflected this change, but it has yet to produce intense politics around the counts of ethnic and racial minorities. Thus, these political issues, demographic decline, regionalism, and immigration, have not created much interaction between state and social actors around the census. This is surprising because each of them involves the identification and counting of types of people: Italians as whole, linguistic minorities, and immigrants. The census continued to be insulated from social pressures.

While social interaction around the census remained relatively weak, the influence of international factors on the census increased in the second half of the twentieth century because Italian census takers were more oriented to European Economic Community census-taking standards. For example, after 1991, the Italian census changed its criteria for classifying occupations for reporting purposes to better align its results with international standards (Italy ISTAT 2013:13). Furthermore, for the 2001 census, the committee entrusted with developing the census forms studied numerous examples of forms from other countries, as well as the results of a conference held in Rome in April 1999 devoted to coordination between ISTAT and the European statistical agency (Italy ISTAT 2006:19). Europeanization has reinforced the technocratic nature of Italian censuses. For example, according to one official, the ideal statistical agency—the goal for ISTAT—is autonomous from both the government and the private sector, and therefore, it produces statistics as a "public good" (Tabarro 2012:10, 12). This aspiration follows closely the European Statistical System's *Code of Practice* that states as its first principle that

the professional independence of statistical authorities gives official statistics greater credibility (EUROSTAT 2011).

Italians, Europeans, and Immigrants: 1991–2011

The 1991 census was almost identical to the 1981 census, except that it added a question about date of marriage for married people, and it included a form for foreigners who were not Italian residents (i.e., those not enrolled in the local register) asking about citizenship (Italy ISTAT 1995:n.p.). The 2001 census resembled the 1991 one except that it eliminated the special form for nonresidents because census officials used a broader definition of residency that allowed them to distribute the main census form to foreign citizens as well as Italians (Italy ISTAT 2006:42). This census also asked whether the respondent was a naturalized citizen. This question, in combination with the question on place of birth, made it possible to identify, though somewhat indirectly, second-generation immigrants (i.e., naturalized citizens born in Italy) (Italy ISTAT 2006:42). However, there has been little movement toward the enumeration of ethnicity because the census uses exclusively legal categories. Linguistic, racial, and ethnic minorities never appeared in the Italian census in the postwar period (Italy ISTAT 2006:43).

The 2001 census established some formal consultation with interest groups. The Study Commission for Censuses of Housing and Population (*Commissione di studio per i censimenti delle popolazione e delle abitazioni*) headed by two university professors (Massimo Livi-Bacci and Gian Carlo Blangiardo) was established. This commission held a number of conferences devoted to the definition of reporting units, the content of census forms, the methods of collecting evidence, and the presentation of information. Although information about who participated in these meetings is difficult to find, most participants seem to have be university professors and bureaucrats (Italy ISTAT 2006:19).

The 2011 census form resembled the 2001 one (Italy ISTAT 2011:58). This census also added a question about the place of birth of the respondent's father and mother, which could directly identify second generation immigrants (Italy ISTAT 2011:54). Several institutional changes occurred in conjunction with the 2011 census. Until 2001, the Italian census was conducted without reference to the local population registers (Italy ISTAT 2011:3). However, the 2011 census used the registers to identify census respondents (Italy ISTAT

2011:3–4). Thus, the census can no longer be used as an independent check on the accuracy of the registers. Of course, this resurrected the centuries-old link between registers and censuses (Volume 1, Chapter 7).

There is no evidence that census officials consulted with interest groups for the 2011 census. ISTAT's main concern was to bring the census up to European Union standards and to ensure that various levels of government were included in the decision-making processes (Ferruzza et al. 2007:1; Grossi and Stoppoloni 2010:11–13). The only role ascribed to associations and nonprofit entities in the census-reporting manual was to convince foreign citizens to respond to the census. These organizations were encouraged to highlight that failure to respond could result in removal from the registers with loss of access to social services (Italy ISTAT 2011:120). As a newspaper article noted, if they failed to respond to the census, "foreign citizens who live in Florence risk seeing their enrollment in the Italian registers cancelled, and as a consequence, they risk losing their residency, health care, and identity card" (*La Nazione* 2012:11).

The census remains strikingly insulated from most social pressures in Italy. Indeed, it is difficult to write about the censuses because of the isolation of ISTAT. Another major difficulty is that the minutes of the meetings of the CSS were not published, many of them have been lost, and after 1989, the CSS was abolished (Leti 1996:13–14). Perhaps for this reason, almost all the historical literature focuses on the liberal and fascist periods; there is relatively little work on the censuses of the Italian Republic. There is relatively little debate surrounding these censuses. Virtually no secondary academic literature discusses their sociology or epistemology. Thus, despite their high quality and their vast amount of data, they were rarely used for social purposes. The marginality of the censuses to political struggle is well indicated by the pleading of a local official from Pistoia in Tuscany. He stated, "the census is an annoyance; however, it must be faced" (*La Nazione* 2011:9). His arguments, though, never addressed concerns over political representation and minority rights. The census, he explained, "is an extraordinary instrument for the knowledge of the demographic structure of the country" (*La Nazione* 2011:9). The basically bureaucratic nature of the document could not be more clearly stated. The Italian census is detailed and produces vast quantities of data, but it creates virtually no socially used information. The information it produces has little connection to political and social conflicts, and there is very little evidence of social movements or pressure groups organized around a politics of numbers.

Conclusions

We link the technocratic and insulated character of the Italian census to our five main arguments. First, the state-centered argument predicts a relatively developed census because the Italian state by the mid-twentieth century was one of the strong states that were common across the advanced capitalist world (Ginsborg 1989:196–204). The Italian census is technically advanced, but it is not politically or socially relevant. As state strength increased, in fact, the census became increasingly less relevant to most of the population. Thus, the state-centered argument cannot explain the nature of Italian information gathering.

Second, the census focused on place through categories of residency and citizenship, just as before unification (chapter 4). Through these categories and regional presentations of data, census officials tried but generally failed to use these widespread lay understandings of locational belonging to create regional or national identities (Patriarca 1996:189–197; Petraccone 2005:183–195). Nevertheless, the census collects no information on regional dialects or other indicators of regional identity that might generate political activity, and indeed, no regional movements engage the census. Other questions clearly reflect social changes. For example, the increase in immigration may have spurred the addition of the questions about the citizenship of the respondents, their mothers, and their fathers. And, as Italy became a more urban and industrial society, the census stopped asking detailed questions about tenurial arrangements and focused on urban occupations. The introduction of classifications not based on lay understandings was unsuccessful. With the important exception of the 1938 Jewish census, ethnic and linguistic identity was never a central concern of the census. Census officials' definition of race failed to transform Italians' understandings of Jewishness, and in fact, it may have undermined their attempts to count Jews. In sum, the Italian census is sluggishly responsive to shifts in lay categories, but there is little evidence that the census categories shape lay ones.

Third, the Italian census engages few information intellectuals outside of academia. The few census intellectuals are usually elites, such as statisticians closely linked to industry, and they are quickly co-opted by the state (cf. Loveman 2005:1661–1662). Though intellectuals' influence on the census was always limited, it waxed, waned, and then waxed during this period. In the early twentieth century, census intellectuals found few social allies for their ambitious projects of linking demography to policy. Fascism seemed to offer precisely this link, and many information intellectuals closely allied with the

regime (Ipsen 1996:80–82). Indeed, official statistics in this period were premised on the co-optation of a new cadre of quantitative social scientists led by Corrado Gini. Yet, this alliance with an authoritarian regime actually undermined the ability of information intellectuals to reestablish links to the public after the regime's collapse. Despite the importance of demographic issues with the rise of women in the 1970s, there was little change in the characteristics of census intellectuals. In the very recent period, information intellectuals reemerged as demography and immigration became ever more pressing issues.

Fourth, power relations also affected the Italian census: since the 1930s, it has been linked to industrial interests. After the decline of agrarian liberalism (chapter 4), a main support of the census in the liberal period, industrialists played a more important role in society and as a result in the census. In fact, Italian chambers of commerce have been the key social allies of ISTAT at the local level in the effort to survey the population (Italy ISTAT 1978:35). Because of this, the Italian census focused heavily on economic statistics. It documented Italy's impressive post-war growth and was relatively sensitive to the changing occupational structure.

Fifth, the historical trajectory of the Italian census over the twentieth century has been crucial. The liberal censuses arose out of intense, highly routinized interaction between the state and society. The new state easily conducted a first census. At the same time, state-society interaction was refocused toward the consultative board that oversaw the census. With the rise of fascism and the establishment of ISTAT as a public entity, this mode of interaction, direct influence on the body taking the census, was institutionalized. Interest groups influenced the census by getting representatives of their interests, such as industrial or agricultural, placed on its board. This was a direct mode of political action rather than one mediated through the party system. Thus, there is relatively little census politics in Italy even though Italian society has been democratized and politicized. The many political conflicts in the electoral arena do not transfer to the census because of this historically developed pattern of interaction. The form of state-society interaction over the census is intense but extremely narrow and excludes most of the population.

The combination of these social factors and the historical factors explain the outcome: the Italian census is well developed, but elicits little public interest. Census enumeration is linked to few social benefits. The census documents social progress, partly because of the numerous social rights in the constitution and partly because of its close links to economic elites. However, census counts do not shift

the distribution of power between groups, and groups rarely mobilize around census politics. To the extent that there are census politics in Italy, they focus on the one hand on differences between the counts produced by the local population registers and the official census and on the other hand on overall demographic dynamics. Both issues produce some discussion in the press and the public more generally, but they do not generate extensive political conflict.

Part III: Conclusions

By the twentieth century, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy had the capacity and strength to conduct a census, and their populations knew how to provide the information requested. Their censuses shared common characteristics of style, methodology, and questions asked. Permanent government bureaucracies conducted all the censuses. Furthermore, the bureaucratic officials were committed to a model of knowledge based on specialized techniques that could be taught to other staff members. The descriptive amateur model of information collection had disappeared as a more formal and potentially egalitarian system of knowledge production arose (Porter 1995:46–47). Censuses became tools to implement policies effectively. Nevertheless, these censuses diverged in important ways. These divergences correspond to our empirical implications about lay categories, census intellectuals, power, and historical trajectories.

A central claim of the state-centered perspective is that states' classifications shape social actors' categorizations (e.g., Alonso and Starr 1987:2; Bourdieu 1999:61; 2012:262; Kertzer and Arel 2002:6–7; Robbin 2000a:398). While this is true, we show that systems of lay categorization strongly shape censuses. Race continued to be the focus of the US census. Racial and ethnic counting—and undercounting—sparked controversies. The focus on class in the UK census shifted toward race and ethnicity, as postcolonial immigration changed the population of the United Kingdom. The centuries-old focus on place, reflected in questions about region and citizenship, characterized the Italian census. With the exception of the fascist period, it never focused on race or ethnicity.

Of course, censuses do not simply reflect lay categories; their deployment depends on the ability of census intellectuals to translate them into census categories. Census intellectuals in the United Kingdom and the United States are similar—activists and academics. These intellectuals are just more plentiful in the United States than in the United Kingdom because the United States has a more open

knowledge regime than the United Kingdom. In both countries, census intellectuals are organized into interest groups that place pressure on the census. Again, these interest groups are more plentiful in the United States than in the United Kingdom. In contrast to the specific demands of US census intellectuals, the UK ones are more general: to continue the census, to ask a question, to remove a question. These intellectuals make overall appeals for the usefulness of the census—this sort of pleading occurs rarely in the United States where census intellectuals press for the details of the phrasing of questions. In contrast, there are relatively few census intellectuals outside of academia in Italy, and the few that do exist are often demographers or statisticians with ties to industry. The census bureaucrats are isolated, and the census is a technical exercise. There is no comparable social group outside of academia that even appears vaguely interested in the Italian census, in sharp contrast to the US and UK cases. Thus, all three censuses reflect the position of intellectuals in these knowledge regimes.

The nature of these intellectuals is linked to the changes in power relationships. In the United States and the United Kingdom, immigration and democratization shifted social power toward groups that historically had little influence. In the United States, the civil rights movement helped to redress at least some long-standing inequities, and the census assisted this process. Furthermore, these groups latched onto the census to promote their social position. Unlike the United States, however, the United Kingdom did not have a long history of contentious racial census classification, and it did not become a highly politicized issue until planning for the 1971 census commenced. Even then, race and ethnicity were less contentious in the United Kingdom than in the United States, probably because they were not always primary to individual's identification. Nevertheless, some historically disadvantaged groups of UK whites and nonwhites successfully mobilized around census issues. Italy, like the United States and the United Kingdom, was shaped by increasing democratization and immigration. But these shifts in power, other than altering a few questions, had little effect on the Italian census. Instead, the power dynamics of the Italian census are more similar to the ones in the United Kingdom and the United States during the first half of the twentieth century. They reflect the late industrialization of Italy and the continued influence of the industrialists in collecting economic information.

In addition, shifts in the power of political parties also affected the census. Conservatives in the United States and the United Kingdom are hostile to the census and seek its elimination. These forces have more influence in the United Kingdom, where they intersect with

long-standing objections to information gathering as an invasion of privacy. Conservatives in the United Kingdom came much closer to eliminating the census than in the United States where they were only able to eliminate the long form. Stakeholders from academia, business, and local governments mobilized against the proposal, and the 2021 census is currently scheduled to proceed online. However, the future of the UK census beyond 2021 remains questionable. Thus, the UK state may be relatively uninterested in statistical knowledge of its citizens (Higgs 2004a:163). In Italy, in contrast, the census remains in the background of party struggle.

Censuses became part of the institutional landscape in the twentieth century. In the twenty-first century, registers may replace them—this has already occurred in Italy to some extent. However, the historical trajectories of the US, UK, and Italian censuses differ. In the United States, the census was instituted by state actors. A pattern of intense interaction between social elites and census bureaucrats was established and institutionalized in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century and then democratized in the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, the interaction between state and social actors over the census is intense. In the United Kingdom, the initial census stemmed mostly from the pressures of social actors, but then followed the same overall pattern as in the United States. However, the overall level of interaction between state and social actors is less in the United Kingdom than in the United States. In Italy, the first censuses arose out of a routinized, institutionalized state-society interaction over information in the preunification states. But the form of this interaction narrowed as the census was institutionalized. Elites influenced the Italian censuses through advisory boards, not social mobilization. This interaction between elites and census bureaucrats was intense but limited. The routinized, institutionalized, and society-wide form of social interaction is still evident in the plethora of local information-gathering systems, but it has disappeared from the census.

The combination of the social factors (lay categories, census intellectuals, power) and the historical trajectories affect the census outcomes. In the United States, the intense interaction between state and social actors, and in particular racial and ethnic minorities, created an instrumentally interventionist census that provides much-used information. The census is highly politicized. The United Kingdom has a similar outcome, but the census is less socially relevant because less social interaction surrounds it. The Italian census is highly technical, but it is socially irrelevant.

The case of the United States exemplifies the importance of social movements to the census (Kertzer and Arel 2002:27–31; Mora 2014b:83–118; Nobles 2000:19–22). However, our comparative analysis shows that the influence of these movements was variable. Extensive social mobilization around contemporary censuses is mostly a US phenomenon. The process occurred in the United Kingdom but to a lesser extent than in the United States. In Italy, neither identity struggles nor political representation were important motivations for collecting census information. The rise of mass lobbying with respect to the census that occurred from the 1970s onward in the United States and in the 1990s in the United Kingdom had no counterpart in Italy. This was so despite the fact that many issues emerged in Italy that would appear ripe for a politics of numbers such as demographic decline, immigration, and regionalism. However, the Italian knowledge regime is relatively closed. Few interest groups penetrate the bureaucracy, and widespread social mobilization simply does not occur around the census. The census is relatively depoliticized because of the weak tradition of party alternation, the absence of federalism, and the adoption of the public entity model for information-gathering bureaucracies. This creates a technocratic environment for the census.

Furthermore, in stark contrast to the United States, undercounts did not generate controversy in the United Kingdom or Italy, probably for two reasons. First, census data were not used for political apportionment in the same way as in the United States. Second, neither the United Kingdom nor Italy mandate US-style affirmative action entitlements. Of course, the US Constitution mandates the census; the UK one does not. However, apportionment is not necessarily the crucial factor: the census in Italy also could have taken this turn, but it intersected with political structures in such a way that it never really mattered for political outcomes despite its use for apportionment. The Italian census simply generates little interest.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusions

There is wide spread agreement that official information is socially constructed—it is never a collection of neutral facts (Alonso and Starr 1987:1; Burke 1987:27; Desrosières 1998:324–25; Espeland and Stevens 1998:338–339; Kertzer and Arel 2002:2; Nobles 2000:1; Petersen 1969:868; Porter 1995:33–34). Most of this literature, however, somewhat paradoxically asserts that this "social construction" is accomplished by the state, not society (Desrosières 1998:324–27; Nobles 2000:3; Woolf 1984:89; review in Ventresca 1995:8). States, according to this view, develop and conduct official information gathering that in turn shapes social classification (Anderson [1983] 1991:164–170; Cohn 1987:230; Hacking 1990:2–3; Patriarca 1996:11; Star and Lampland 2009:8; Starr 1992:264–265). Social forces received less attention (e.g., Burke 1987:125; Cohen 1982:219; Giddens 1981:218; Lee 1993:80–81; Petersen 1969:868; Starr 1987:20; Ventresca 1995:14; review in Higgs 2004a:11–13).

Our position, in contrast to much of this sociology of statistics, rejects the assumption that the state is always the most powerful constructor of official information, but of course society is not always the most powerful constructor either. Thus, instead of embracing either a state-centered or society-centered theory, we examined the historical conditions that explain how states, societies, or their interaction influence information gathering. To do so, we traced three historical cases (the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy), introduced in Volume 1, forward to the contemporary period. These cases provided a range of state and social conditions that make it possible to show how and when these social and state forces and their interaction affected censuses.

In Volume 1, we showed how states came to conduct the first censuses. States mostly systematized information that social actors already knew. State actors interacted with social actors—census intellectuals—who could convert the available social information into

the information that states wanted. States had administrative and fiscal goals that the information addressed, but most of this information already existed in social, religious, and economic institutions and structures. Here in Volume 2, we showed how censuses came to be taken-for-granted institutions. Unlike fiscal information gathering, which most social actors at best grudgingly tolerated or at worst openly resisted, social actors actively pressed for the establishment of censuses especially when they coincided with their economic interests in capitalism or political interests in democracy. Around the mid-nineteenth century, censuses started to resemble, more or less, modern ones, with standardized printed forms and regular, periodic collections. Government census bureaus were established and institutionalized, with specialized bureaucrats who supervised the work. Where there was strong interplay between state and social actors, the census was a vibrant social institution that created information and knowledge that was widely used (the United States). Despite many criticisms and debates about the politicization of the census, the use of US census data is ubiquitous. In contrast, where the census became insulated, it collected much data, but they were rarely used by a wide array of social actors (Italy). Thus, the census had little social and political relevance. (The United Kingdom formed an intermediate case.)

We explained these outcomes, through our general theory, the model derived from it, and its empirical implications in chapters 2 through 7. First, we showed that in each case, state strength could not have been the crucial determinant of official information gathering. Weak states often collected considerably more information than strong ones. Furthermore, as states in all of our cases strengthened in the contemporary period, the censuses diverged in important respects (despite the influence of the International Statistical Congresses). Second, we showed that systems of lay categories deeply shaped official information gathering. For much of history, class, race, and place were the central categorical systems of the censuses in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy. These systems are not impervious: in the United Kingdom, this focus on class has been replaced, to some extent, by a focus on race and ethnicity. Third, we identified social actors, whom we call information or census intellectuals, crucial to the collection of official information. They shaped how amorphous content was squeezed into narrow census questions and forms. Their ideologies and interests developed first outside the state, and then came into the census, usually through processes of co-optation and imitation by state actors. States could not innovate without these intellectuals (cf. Loveman 2005:1661). Fourth, we noted that power

relations were crucial in determining where and when information or census intellectuals could translate lay categories to scientific ones. Powerful social actors could facilitate or block information gathering, as well as influence how it was gathered.

Finally, in all of our chapters, we examined the historical trajectories of information gathering, and in particular, how the temporal pattern of the interaction between states and societies produced information. All information gathering was constrained by previous rounds; neither state nor social actors could escape these patterns. State-society interaction was often, though not always, reinforcing. Once particular state or social actors were implicated in the information, they had stakes in its future collection, so they wanted to influence it. In the first period discussed here, organized elite lobbies interacted with central states. In the latter period, there was some uneven broadening of social pressure to include a more active and explicit political role for nonelites. However, the earlier period left important historical legacies for the later one. In the United Kingdom, democratic pressures increased after 1918, but the census, like many other parts of the government, remained relatively insulated from social pressures. In the United States, in contrast, intense lobbying around the census by a range of social groups in the late twentieth century expanded upon the tradition of a politicized census in earlier centuries. Finally, despite centuries of intense state-society interaction around information gathering, in Italy, the census consolidated in the fascist period as a technocratic institution insulated from popular pressure, and this continued after the rise of mass democracy. Local information gathering (through registers) remained important, as it had for centuries. We reviewed these five empirical implications in our chapters in detail, so we now turn to specifying how we can use our findings in conjunction with figure 1.1 to illustrate the full interactive model.

Reprise of the Interactive Model

We developed an interactive model of information gathering, linking micro, meso, and macro levels in the domains of state and society. The clockwise flows in figure 1.1—the state-centered perspective—form a foil for understanding the counterclockwise flows—the society-centered perspective. The state-centered perspective—that states influence censuses, and through them, the populace—most generally suggests that states redact censuses for an administrative purpose, find staffs to conduct them, and provoke the populace to respond with information. States' purposes varied historically over the two

main periods discussed in this volume. In the first period, states identified populations as objects of intervention (chapters 2 through 4). In the second period, states in general, understood populations as a group of rights holders entitled to a claim to numerical recognition (chapters 5 through 7). We acknowledge that these shifts in the state were important. However, our analysis also shows the limits of these arguments: they underestimate society's power to shape information, they downplay the importance of interaction between states and societies to produce information, and they have no model for showing the historical variability of states' and societies' influences.

Because the society-centered position is underdeveloped, we emphasized societies' influence on information gathering. At the macro social level, we showed that common-sense knowledge or systems of lay categories were always the basis for information gathering. As evidence, we adduced the striking durability of the categorical frameworks that censuses used to divide up their populations, even when state actors taking censuses wanted to alter these divisions. Thus, in the United Kingdom, class remained the most salient principle of social division until postcolonial immigration shifted interest to race and ethnicity. This change was driven by social, not state actors. In the United States, race, and in particular the black-white dichotomy, continued to be the most salient division up until the civil rights movement. When this dichotomy was challenged in the 1960s, it was from social, not state pressure. In Italy, place remained the dominant lay categorical scheme at the macro level. Social actors, elite and nonelites, had powerful influences on censuses through these lay categories.

Social actors (information intellectuals) at the micro level, located within social institutions at the meso level, determined where, when, and how the common-sense knowledge described above entered—or not—into official information. The translation of lay categories was selective because not all lay knowledge became incorporated into official information and transformative because lay categories were altered when they were translated into official categories. Information intellectuals developed techniques and official categories that could capture lay knowledge that populations would understand. Such intellectuals included public health activists in Britain, social scientists in the United States, and autonomous intellectuals in Italy. Over this period, these intellectuals entrenched themselves in formal organizations such as census bureaus, advisory bodies, and statistical agencies, with varying degrees of autonomy from other state and social institutions. In short, intellectuals were frequently co-opted by states (cf. Loveman

2005:1661). Our empirical analysis reveals that states themselves rarely innovated without the assistance of these socially located actors. Instead, state administrators showed a striking lack of ambition and interest in extracting new forms of information. Information intellectuals had to cajole and pressure states to expand their census forms. The influence of census intellectuals was also historically variable: they were relatively unimportant in the early US censuses and in the contemporary Italian ones but strikingly important in the preunification states of the Italian peninsula, in the contemporary United States, and in the United Kingdom through the early 1900s. Elites were also important influences on information gathering, sometimes opposing such collection and sometimes advocating for it. In general, elites were more supportive of information collection in this period than in the period discussed in Volume 1, perhaps because of the increased importance of industrialists in the three countries after 1850. In all of the cases, elites in alliance with information intellectuals advocated for censuses and specific categories.

Actors in the state then systematized the social information—this process occurred at the micro state level. The translation to official categories was an important and contested historical process. In the United Kingdom, census takers fixed and reified the lay categories of class against resistance from respondents who sought to upgrade their occupational status. Similarly, in the United States, state actors hypostatized race, and in Italy, place. This was an important process, although over this time period, it generally reinforced rather than transformed the categories that came from lay actors.

Finally, our approach is unusual in that it traces the historical trajectory of the interaction among the domain levels presented in figure 1.1. The state-driven perspective embodies a cross-sectional methodology: it starts with the establishment of censuses, an approach that always supports a clockwise interpretation of figure 1.1. Our analysis, in contrast, shows how previous rounds of information gathering—both the clockwise and counterclockwise flows in figure 1.1—shaped subsequent ones. For example, in all three cases for specific social reasons, censuses came to be institutionalized in this period but in strikingly different ways that had important consequences. In the United Kingdom, the census developed in interaction with elite social reformers, but it was not politically central. This relatively limited pattern of interaction continued after the rise of democracy. In the United States, there was intense and highly political interaction even when the census was dominated by elites in the nineteenth century. When nonelite pressure increased in the mid-twentieth century, this

pattern was reinforced. In Italy, there was intense interaction around local information gathering, but the national pattern was different. During the nineteenth century, elites influenced the census by influencing the advisory body that governed it. This pattern continued through the fascist and democratic period. Thus, it came to be highly insulated from Parliament, even though it was close to industrial interests. Taken together, these factors explain why the UK census remained relatively underdeveloped and politically unimportant, why the US census was both highly developed and crucial for policy, and why the Italian census was highly developed but irrelevant for social purposes. Painting on such a broad canvas, we have undoubtedly missed—or misconstrued—aspects of the interactive process of information gathering, and we may have obscured crucial points about how these patterns unfolded in specific times and places that more detailed archival evidence would have provided. However, we would stress, as stated in Volume 1, that our framework is a heuristic, and we hope that other scholars investigate and challenge the model we presented here. We now turn to considering how figure 1.1 fits to our particular cases in more detail.

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom was the most powerful state in the world through much of this period, yet it remained a relative laggard in the collection of official information. Its censuses developed slowly, elites dominated them, and social actors worried about the privacy of information. Recently, serious calls for the elimination of the census emerged, and it is unlikely to continue in its current format. This relative failure of information gathering can be linked to a pattern of state and social interaction. The UK census has been relatively insulated from popular pressure, which has been sporadic even after the limited and uneven democratic expansion of the state. Thus, many decisions are made about the census in secrecy, with little public input.

We can interpret these processes using figure 1.1. We start by tracing the counterclockwise flows through the mechanisms of social power and categorization to understand a society-based form of information gathering, rooted in social power. Starting with "macro society" and moving counterclockwise, we note that the United Kingdom was rigidly divided by class, a division that provided the lay categories for organizing information throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (macro society). Not surprisingly, given that the industrial revolution started in Great Britain, workplaces

such as factories and agrarian estates, provided the primary organizational sites (meso society) for individuals' representations (micro society) of their economic activities that supported their families. Class and occupational awareness was widespread, and information intellectuals, often elites involved in the eugenics movement, formalized occupational categories that state representatives then used to collect information (micro state). A bureaucracy developed to house this information (the GRO) (meso state) and became the basis of state efforts to improve public health and engage in economic planning (macro state). The state in turn reinforced class awareness by producing tables that divided the population into social classes (macro society). In the twentieth century, democratization and postcolonial immigration shifted the structures and categories of lay society (macro society) and social organizations (meso society), and social actors (micro state) and their interest groups struggled with racial and ethnic categories. As in the earlier period, census officials made use of this information, incorporated it in their forms, and used this information in programs that tried to redress social inequality, which in turn shaped social structures. Thus, the counterclockwise flows explain how social structures shape categorization: social forces shape lay categories, and information intellectuals translate lay categories into scientific ones, which are then taken up by state actors. This information then shapes state institutions and structures, which in turn shape social structures and institutions.

We can also consider the clockwise flows that trace the state influences on information gathering. The power of the UK state in this period was based not solely on fiscal and military extraction but also on promoting capitalist growth (macro state). The state, then, instituted information gathering to track social development. The United Kingdom created the GRO (meso state) and sent its representatives to collect information through local officials (micro state). These officers interacted directly with respondents (micro society) in the earlier period and were most effective when they intimately knew their districts and the individuals who lived in them. Later, individuals filled out forms (micro society). These information-gathering efforts reinforced interest groups who used the information produced to further their lobbying (meso society). Broadly, information secured capitalist private property by identifying problems associated with industrialization (macro society). The state then recognized these issues as policy problems (macro state). In the later period, the democratization of the state created an interest in ethnic and racial equality that spurred a similar dynamic of state-centered information gathering,

as state officials mobilized the census bureaucracy to combat racism, added categories to census forms, and encouraged individuals to fill out these forms. In turn, the census helped to spread these categories throughout British society. By combining the clockwise and counterclockwise patterns, we show that information gathering was an interactive process between the state and society.

However, we can also use the model to note where the interaction between the state and society was absent, and therefore, how information gathering was blocked. British society had relatively few links to the census bureaucracy, and they were often concentrated among social elites. And, many social actors, elites and nonelites, stubbornly resisted information gathering. Thus, there were limits to how much information census takers could collect. In terms of figure 1.1, the flow between micro society and macro society was often blocked. Censuses collected comparatively little information, and proposals emerged in the twenty-first century to eliminate them.

We can also understand the long-term consequences of the UK pattern of interaction between the state and society on censuses. During the early nineteenth century, the United Kingdom emerged as the world's first industrial society with a mass working class (macro society). Landholders remained important but their power declined as industrialists emerged and supported organizations for collecting knowledge (meso society). Elite social actors (micro society) responded to industrialization and pressured state actors (micro state) in Parliament to collect information relevant to public health and population management. The GRO (meso state) emerged to collect this information, and Parliament drew on it. This information reinforced the relatively closed form of the UK state (macro state) and was used to implement social policy (macro society). This form of interaction remained elite dominated. The census was associated with upper-class reformism and never established close links to UK democracy even in the twentieth century. Not surprisingly, then, racial and ethnic minorities never enthusiastically embraced the census as a tool for equality.

The United States

The US census is uniquely politicized, socially relevant, and interactivist. Existing at the core of a struggle pitting parties, states, and branches of government against one another, the census has been extraordinarily politicized especially as the United States consolidated as a multiethnic society in which demographic distributions

were tightly linked to political and social power. Over the period of time discussed in this volume, there was a broad transition from census politics dominated by the elite to ones in which nonelites also had explicit and active roles. The transition in the meaning of racial demography—from scientific racism to the distribution of resources and rights—also exemplifies this shift.

To link our analysis to figure 1.1, we first traced the counterclockwise flows. The United States consolidated as an industrial capitalist society in this period, especially after the Civil War. However, lay categories remained structured by race (macro society). Industrialists wanted information about markets and the distribution of people, and information intellectuals wanted information about race and its link to social and legal institutions (meso society). These interests were increasingly organized into lobbies, social movements, research units, and advisory groups (meso society) during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and these groups came to have considerable political influence. Few social actors opposed gathering information especially after the defeat of plantation slave owners, and again, over time, more social actors, and especially racial and ethnic minorities, actively pressed for their own categorizations (micro society). Nonstate actors, especially after 1850, were increasingly recruited as census bureaucrats (micro state) to collect information and staff central census operations (meso state). Thus, the mechanism linking state and social actors was co-optation, not usurpation or innovation (cf. Loveman 2005:1661–1663). Census intellectuals allied with social elites to establish a bureaucracy devoted to the census. Thus, the emergence of an insulated bureaucracy stemmed from social pressure. The census was crucial to representative government, as it apportioned the legislature (macro state). The government's use of public information pressured it to be accountable and open. In turn, a democratic state reinforced a vibrant, competitive knowledge regime (macro society).

Similarly, we can trace the flows in the opposite direction. Democracy rose prior to bureaucracy in the United States (macro state), but by the late nineteenth century, substantial bureaucracies developed (meso state). Congress remained powerful but was now flanked by agencies that could regulate with relatively little oversight (meso state). Bureaucrats (micro state) in these new agencies—the Census Bureau was a key example—could make decisions with some autonomy from Congress. They developed census forms that posed questions to individuals (micro society). Individuals organized groups and lobbies (meso society), in part, around census categories. Organized groups were linked directly to the government agencies

through advisory councils, inserting census categories back into society (macro society). Of course, the widespread use of census categories, such as class, race, and region, reinforced these distinctions, as the state perspective classically emphasizes, and affected the nature of representation (macro state).

The US historical trajectory clearly shows how a pattern of intense interaction around the census between the state and society was firmly institutionalized. This state-society interaction supported information collection. In terms of figure 1.1, the flows are strong between all of the domain levels. For example, social and state actors (micro society and micro state) openly advocated for the collection of information. It related directly to their political and social interests because census information was closely related to the distribution of resources and political power. Through debates and struggles with each other, they shaped the format and use of the information. Census intellectuals revised lay categories that were taken up by state actors and used in censuses (counterclockwise flow). At the same time, the use of the census categories reinforced these lay ones (clockwise flow). The US case also illustrates very clearly the bidirectional flows between the different parts of the state. The requisites of democracy (macro state) led the legislature, the executive branch, and the census agency (meso state) to collect information about the population being represented through census bureaucrats (micro state) (clockwise flow). At the same time, however, the collection and collation of this information through these census bureaucrats (micro state) meant that these state bodies (meso state) responded openly to the information provided, which increased their accountability and reinforced democracy (macro state) (counterclockwise flow). In the United States, the strong social support for the census, its multiple social uses, and politicians' practical use of it to apportion the vote and distribute resources, institutionalized it in such a way that assured its longstanding influence even as censuses in our other two cases have been brought into question.

Italy

The Italian national census emerged in a context of already well-developed local systems of information collection. Census takers drew on preexisting systems of information gathering, but they also had to try to coordinate local systems with new national ones.

We use figure 1.1 to show how the Italian census developed. Italy emerged as an advanced industrial society after 1950. Place remained the most important system of lay categorization. Italians saw social

differences as strongly linked to where people lived (macro society). These place-based categories were rooted in local and municipal organizations and institutions (meso society). Autonomous intellectuals (micro society) drew on these systems of lay categories and proposed various placed-based schemes for organizing and tabulating census data. These intellectuals were often co-opted to work on the census and thus became census bureaucrats (micro state) (cf. Loveman 2005:1661; Patriarca 1996:122–154). These state actors drew on the long traditions of Italian bureaucracies dedicated to information gathering to assemble a census bureaucracy (meso state). These bureaucracies were relatively autonomous from other state agencies, and the Italian form of mass democracy (macro state), combined with the public entity model of administration, created few struggles over the census. Moreover, census categories rarely transformed lay ones (macro society). The census neither successfully created a national identity nor did it play a central role in regionalist movements, even though census officials were deeply engaged in both nationalism and regionalism. This outcome stemmed from the narrow form of interaction between the state and society. Thus, the case of Italy shows that where strong links between the state and society were lacking, census intellectuals and officials could not transform lay categories. This further illustrates the dependence of official statistics on the macro structure of society, socially located actors, and socially relevant categorizations.

Likewise, we can interpret the clockwise flows that trace state influences on information gathering. The Italian state was a weak constitutional monarchy in the liberal period, an authoritarian regime under fascism, and a mass democracy after 1945 (macro state). After the rise of ISTAT, official information gathering was institutionalized as a public entity (meso state) that was autonomous from Parliament but highly dependent on elite private interests. The characteristics of the agency shaped the census officials' actions (micro state): they became insulated in the bureaucracy and cut off from broader political movements while at the same time they became highly dependent on industrialists. Bureaucrats (micro state) were responsible for developing techniques of information collection, including census forms that individuals filled out (micro society). The information collected in the Italian census was most relevant to elite interest groups in industry (meso society). In general, the Italian census, although it drew on place-based systems of lay categories, it did not transform them. Instead, the census supported elite interests in promoting capitalist growth (macro society). Finally, the Italian census was

not particularly important for the distribution of power in the state (macro state). This process created an interactive pattern between the state and society, but it was distinctively depoliticized and insulated from nonelite pressure.

Figure 1.1 also explains the historical trajectory, that is, how social and state interaction created legacies for information gathering. As we showed in Volume 1, the Italian peninsula had a strong tradition of information collection, during unification and prior to fascism. However, the consolidation of an autonomous statistical agency in the 1930s insulated the Italian census from nonelite social pressures and to some extent weakened the vibrant tradition of interaction around information that characterized the country historically (this tradition continues in the population registers). State actors (micro state) were insulated in the state bureaucracy and had few ties to social actors (micro society) other than to a few elites who were largely co-opted into the information-gathering apparatus. Mussolini's grandiose project of linking statistics to authoritarian governance cast a long shadow over Italian official statistics in the twentieth century.

Implications of an Interactive View of Information Gathering

Our interactive view has some broad implications for the social construction of information gathering. First, the form and intensity of state-society interaction around the census changes over time but not in linear ways. Consequently, transhistorical theories of this interaction are unlikely to be satisfying. For example, recent literature on the cultural foundations of the state suggests that in the early modern period, interaction between state and society was necessary to establish the structure of governance (Gorski 2003:164–168; Loveman 2005:1655, 1678). Once states accumulated enough power, however, they became more autonomous from society (Gorski 2003:170–172; Loveman 2005:1657–1659). Thus, Loveman (2005:1658) argued that the establishment of a census may require intense state-society interaction; once established, however, a census may operate mostly in the realm of the taken for granted, with protest restricted to the details of questions and methods but with little debate or interaction over whether the census should be conducted or not. There is perhaps a newer, third stage, where the contestation of the state's basic right to conduct previously legitimate activities has reemerged, recreating some of the state-society interaction that characterized the early

modern period (Loveman 2005:1658). Thus, from the early modern period to the present, society's influence may have declined, with a possible upturn in the present.

However, this argument contrasts with another seemingly obvious point, that there was a historical shift with the rise of democracy in the second half of the twentieth century from a predominantly top-down determination of census categories to a highly politicized process that included bottom-up influences, including popular mobilization that mostly developed out of resistance to census categories (Bowker and Star 1999:223; Kertzer and Arel 2002:27–31; Nobles 2000:19–22). Thus, during this shorter period of time, the opposite temporal trend—an increase in society's influence—may have occurred. One possible reconciliation of these two trends suggests that Kertzer and Arel are pointing to protests that Loveman would consider to be directed against the details of categories and methods, not the state's fundamental rights to conduct censuses. However, our model suggests that this reconciliation is insufficient. Instead, it is necessary to consider how lay categories, census intellectuals, and power underlie patterns of state-society interaction.

Second, we conceptualize bureaucracy as a dialectic not as an organizational form. We return to Gramsci (1971:227–228) and Weber (1958: 108–111; 1978: 1398–1399) to recall how bureaucratic organizations and organized social interests are internally related. The ability of any state or state agency to constitute itself as a public official and nonpartisan purveyor of information requires social pressure. Where bureaucracies do not face nonbureaucratic pressures, they cease to operate as formally rational organizations, instead degenerating into an insulated caste. Throughout this volume, we demonstrated a number of positive and negative instances of this process. Positively, the rise of the US Census Bureau within the Department of Commerce was the consequence of social pressures that became more intense during the Progressive Era. Negatively, the inability of ISTAT to monopolize public statistics effectively even when backed by an authoritarian government shows that ambitious informational projects without adequate social support are likely to fail. Indeed, the very insulation of ISTAT from broad public pressures made it highly dependent on specific private interests, paradoxically undermining its capacity to constitute public information.

Thus, we extend Porter's (2011:36–37) observation that censuses are linked to a critical and engaged public opinion. The domination of census taking by highly technical social scientists may undermine the social foundations of the census by sundering its connection with

the public. Even well-established censuses—in fact, we would argue, any sort of information gathering—can be questioned if their links to public issues are destroyed. Our argument implies some provocative implications for the most recent period. If, as we have argued, censuses developed because of social pressure, and this social pressure has increased in the period of democracy during the twentieth century, how can we understand proposals to eliminate censuses in Britain or modify them in Italy by linking them closely to population registers? Registers or continuous surveys like the ACS may be better technical solutions, but a technocratic solution, as the Italian census shows, is not always socially relevant. Because these are very contemporary events, our answers must be somewhat speculative. Yet, there is a striking coincidence between the decline of democracy across the advanced capitalist world embodied in declining voter turnout, collapsing parties, and horrendous levels of political corruption and self-dealing and the decline of censuses. It may be the case that after a long period of increasing social pressure after 1945, we are entering a period of less political interaction around censuses. But if this is the case, censuses are likely to be weaker institutions than they have been in the twentieth century.

Third, information from censuses is the result of political and social conflict and participation, not just the development of particular techniques or inquiries aimed at a particular purpose. Social contexts in which numerous parties debate what should be collected and how the information should be used are likely to create the most socially relevant censuses. Debate makes the information better, and the methods used to analyze it, more rigorous. As we know from the sociology of knowledge, knowledge is a social product in which many parties interact and have a stake in the outcome (Volume 1, Chapter 2). For example, here we noted that the US census has been one of the most widely debated and the most socially and politically relevant. The UK census has been somewhat less debated and less relevant, while in Italy, the modern census sparks the least controversy and is the least socially relevant. These outcomes bear little resemblance to state strength; in all of these cases, there were relatively strong bureaucratic apparatuses by the late twentieth century. The noncorrespondence between state strength and census relevance is particularly troubling for state-centered theories; so is the continuing national divergence among the censuses that we documented. As both Loveman (2014:11) and Ventresca (1995:59) suggested, censuses are not constructed solely with reference to domestic societies but also to the international system of states. In the three cases we

examine, however, these international influences were relatively weak and heavily mediated by local social forces.

Fourth, although our theoretical model is fully interactive, we emphasized societal factors because they have been neglected. We focused on instances where society, not the state, led: an occurrence that is more frequent than might be anticipated given the general thrust of sociology of statistics. For example, we focused on the resistance of lay categories to transformations by census bureaucrats and the reliance of census agencies on information intellectuals. In the United Kingdom, elites focused on class, in the United States, they focused on race, and in Italy, autonomous intellectuals focused on place. Although censuses often reinforced these categories by reifying them, we found no instances of census classifications transforming lay categorization. In fact, perhaps the most important, and perhaps the most invariant, social influence on the census, is that of lay categorization, which most state-centered perspectives miss. States cannot collect information that societies do not know. However, it is not our intention to replace a one-sided focus on the state with an equally one-sided focus on society. Instead we wish to encourage research about their interaction.

Fifth, however, we note finally that the relation between states and societies around information gathering varies according to the purpose and timing of the effort. Questions about ethnicity, unemployment, or occupational position were often contested and controversial. They were topics that were considered too delicate to discuss in public when they were first proposed. As these queries became part of common sense through the process by which state classification transformed social categorization (figure 1.1), however, they became less controversial. Some issues, such as ethnic belonging, may also be more intrinsically controversial in some periods. However, it is difficult to make any general statements in this regard. Being classified as an owner for an Italian small farmer in the mid-twentieth century was likely to be important to the respondent; similarly, being counted as mixed race for some respondents in the late twentieth-century United States was also crucial. Being counted as white may have been crucial to some Mexican immigrants in the 1930s. Being counted as Latino mattered to later generations. Thus, what is controversial and not controversial in censuses is a matter for detailed historical research; research that is likely to belie any general scheme built on the idea of what has come to be taken for granted, and what, in contrast, is problematic.

Finally, in general, by emphasizing the influence of social actors, we have presented a "bottom-up" version of power that includes the

influence of ordinary, everyday individuals. Neither state actors nor social elites could impose information gathering on the populace. Nevertheless, there is perhaps a dark side to this social influence. After all, it was these ordinary people (building supervisors) who provided evidence to the fascist authorities in their Jewish census of 1938, even though their understanding of Jewishness did not correspond to fascist racial theory. Similarly, lay categories of white and black were hard to shift because of the entrenched racism of American society in the early twentieth-century United States. Censuses seem to have the most power over their populations not where states had an abstract agenda that they imposed on the population—such schemes almost invariably failed—but where states successfully took up social categories so that information gathering strongly resonated with the population. These categories, however, often embody historical legacies of cruelty, inequality, and oppression. It is perhaps co-optation, not coercion, that gives states what control they have through censuses. In sum, it is perhaps time for sociologists of knowledge to reread Marx on the Jewish Question, to remind themselves that the origins of our categories of understanding, cruel or benign, lie in the dark recess of civil society, not in the elegant and illuminated halls of the modern state.

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