

International Handbooks of Population 4

Rogelio Sáenz
David G. Embrick
Néstor P. Rodríguez *Editors*

The International Handbook of the Demography of Race and Ethnicity

 Springer

The International Handbook of the Demography of Race and Ethnicity

International Handbooks of Population

Volume 4

Series Editor

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The *International Handbooks of Population* offer up-to-date scholarly summaries and sources of information on the major subject areas and issues of demography and population. Each handbook examines its particular subject area in depth, providing timely, accessible coverage of its full scale and scope, discusses substantive contributions for deeper understanding, and provides reliable guidance on the direction of future developments.

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Rogelio Sáenz • David G. Embrick
Néstor P. Rodríguez
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The International Handbook of the Demography of Race and Ethnicity

 Springer

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To people of color around the world struggling against racism, injustice, and marginalization.

Ethnicity will remain an important dimension and is an important element in understanding differences in demographic behaviour. However, too often the complexity of the role of ethnicity and its linkages with economic and social processes are ignored or understated.

—In Memory, Graeme Hugo (1947–2015)

Acknowledgments

We initiated this project with a somewhat idealistic intellectual curiosity for addressing a very important demographic phenomenon that will surely affect many countries around the world. In particular, we wanted to gain an international perspective on the race/ethnic transition that is well underway in many corners of the globe, a product of prior demographic transitions associated with changes in fertility, mortality, marriage and family, longevity, and aging patterns. Moreover, we wanted to examine the race/ethnic transition in the larger context of stratification and conflict.

Surely, a piece of cake!

In a short matter of time, we recognized that this was a very ambitious project. It quickly became apparent that many countries around the world do not collect data by race and ethnicity. In fact, some countries even deny that racial and ethnic divisions exist or matter in their societies. Furthermore, locating authors for certain countries proved greatly difficult, and in at least one case the chapter authors had to write under fear of political reprisals.

Nonetheless, we managed to complete the international handbook which features an excellent international cast of scholars who developed important analyses of the race/ethnic transition in 26 countries and one region (Southeast Asia).

This work, however, would not have been completed without the assistance of many people who made our job easier.

We begin by thanking the authors of the chapters included in our international handbook. We graciously thank each author for their willingness to prepare the chapter, for their responsiveness in addressing issues that we asked them to tackle, for the fine works and insights that they have provided to help us understand the race/ethnic transition, and for their great patience in the long process that it took to complete this work.

In addition, we owe profound gratitude to Kasey Henricks, Doctoral Candidate at the Loyola University Chicago, who worked as a Research Assistant to us in a vast number of capacities. Kasey was absolutely instrumental at various times over the last few years in making sure that the project continued to progress. We greatly appreciate the important work that he carried out along with his cheerfulness and sense of humor.

Moreover, we owe an immense amount of thanks to Evelien Bakker, Senior Editor of Population Studies and Health, and Bernadette Deelen-Mans, Senior Editorial Assistant of Population Studies and Health, at

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Furthermore, we thank Dudley Poston, Series Editor of Springer's International Handbooks of Population Series, for his initial encouragement for us to develop this international handbook and his strong encouragement throughout the process. The three of us have been very fortunate to have been associated with Dudley in many capacities, including as student, colleague, collaborator, and, most importantly, as friend. Thank you, Dudley, for your enormous encouragement.

Closer to home, we each have people to whom we are thankful for their support. For Rogelio, his sons, Daniel, Joseph, and Jesse, for their love, encouragement, and support—muchísimas gracias Mijitos; his Lavaca hood *raza* including Luis Dávila and Oliva Treviño, as well as in San Antonio more generally, Ricardo Pimentel for their friendship, humor, and laughter; and Janie Valadez for being part of his life and for her love, encouragement, support, humor, and laughter. For David, to Rogelio and Néstor—for all of the laughs, anxieties, jokes, inspirations, camaraderie, and countless beers on the journey to finishing this project. You guys are the best! And, to all of my colleagues, friends, and family who have remained steadfast loyal and consistent in their support. You know who you are and you have my unwavering thanks and appreciation. For Néstor, to all his friends, students, colleagues, and mentors across the world who have made his life an intellectual adventure for understanding the nature of humankind.

San Antonio, TX
Chicago, IL
Austin, TX

Rogelio Sáenz
David G. Embrick
Néstor P. Rodríguez

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Part I

Introduction

Introduction: A Framework for Understanding the Race and Ethnic Transition

1

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and Néstor P. Rodríguez

Countries around the world are experiencing tremendous variations in growth rates across the diverse subgroups that form their populations. We see this occurrence at the global level, where people in developing countries who account for more than four-fifths of the world's population are projected to make up almost all (97.5 %) of the world's population growth between now and 2050 (Population Reference Bureau 2013). We also see varying rates of population growth in many developed countries (e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, and others) where the combination of an aging population and a voluminous young immigrant population from the developing world set in motion demographic futures that will drastically change the racial and ethnic composition of their populations. Moreover, we see such

demographic shifts taking place as part of the remnants of colonization where indigenous populations continue to be subjugated and marginalized while expanding numerically in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and other countries. Finally, we see these demographic changes in countries (e.g., Brazil) where descendants of slaves continue to occupy the bottom rungs of the stratification system while their numbers continue to disproportionately increase.

Growth disparities across varying subgroups of countries around the world are largely due to the interaction between place in the stratification system and demographic attributes. Those occupying elevated positions in the stratification system have higher socioeconomic resources (e.g., education, income, wealth, occupational prestige, status, political power, and land) which are associated with lower fertility and longer life expectancies. As such, this group of people tends to have aging populations alongside slow growth. In contrast, those situated at the lower rungs of the stratification system have lower socioeconomic resources which are associated with higher fertility and shorter life expectancies. Hence, this segment of the population is characterized by its youthfulness and rapid growth. Because race and ethnicity continue to play a prominent role in either enhancing or stymieing upward mobility, members of minority groups are disproportionately represented in groups that have low socioeconomic resources, youthful populations, and rapid growth.

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While the interaction between resources and demography play out and are perhaps best understood along racial and ethnic lines, there are other relevant factors. For instance, we find the links between stratification and demography arising on the basis of tribal, linguistic, and religious lines as well. Regardless of whether we are talking about racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious distinctions, it is clear that demographic processes and the position of groups in the stratification system influence each other. Furthermore, the role of history and colonization are important in understanding the dynamics between stratification, demography, and conflict. In many instances, the roots of the interaction between stratification and demography extend back over centuries. Moreover, in other cases the foundation of the linkage between stratification and demography reflects the divide-and-conquer tactics that colonizing powers use in propping some groups and subjugating others. A prominent example of these tactics concerned the racial apartheid system that whites imposed in South Africa in which the colonizing whites promoted the presence of Indian-origin communities to serve in “middleman” capacities in institutional relations with the severely oppressed black Africans inside the country (Bonacich 1973).

There are numerous recent examples around the world where the trinity of stratification, demography, and conflict has emerged. For example, the recent annals of genocide point to Rwanda, Kosovo, and Darfur, where issues of stratification, demography, and conflict resulted in tremendous loss of lives. We also find that despite the dismantling of the apartheid machinery in South Africa, this country (along with Brazil) continues to exhibit one of the greatest levels of inequality along color lines in the world. In the Middle East, we see the long and ongoing conflict between Palestinians and Israelis alongside their vastly different demographic profiles and varying demographic futures. Moreover, the U.S. invasion of Iraq and subsequent long-term U.S. involvement in the country have unleashed massive conflict between numerous competing ethnic and religious groups in the country, especially between the Sunni and Shiite Muslims. In

addition, we also have witnessed conflict arise in Australia, France, the Netherlands, and other countries with an established aging European population and a disenfranchised youthful immigrant population. Finally, we also find the emergence of racist and vigilante groups in the United States seeking to quell the increasing presence of immigrants, particularly Mexicans, from entering the country and changing the nation’s demography. Such extremists groups are not solely situated along the Mexico-U.S. border, but have set up elaborate camps in major U.S. cities such as the Chicago area and can be found even in places that are almost exclusively white (e.g., New Hampshire) (Marcovitz 2009; Southern Poverty Law Center 2012).

Given the diverse ways in which stratification, demography, and conflict play out and the significant ways in which this interplay is shaping the future course of many countries, an international handbook on the demography of race and ethnicity is essential. Such a book will allow us to better comprehend the roots and consequences of many situations around the globe involving the interplay of stratification, demography, and conflict. To get a full portrait of the complexity of this issue, we need to gain knowledge derived from broad theoretical perspectives, methodological approaches, and disciplines. We need an understanding of how stratification (along numerous lines), demography, and conflict interact with each other to better understand some of the most fundamental issues that many countries around the world confront. Unfortunately, demographers have relied largely on demographic-oriented frameworks to understand what some call the racial and ethnic transition (Coleman 2006, 2007; del Campo 2007). We need race-based perspectives to provide a contextual basis for understanding the racial and ethnic transition. We have brought together a group of scholars who help us gain this perspective, where demography and race perspectives are in dialogue.

The racial and ethnic shifts in the demography of countries around the world can be understood from the demographic transition perspective and the various transitions that have spawned from

the original demographic transition. Moreover, theoretical perspectives from the race and ethnic literature allow us to broaden our understanding of the changing race and ethnic compositions of countries around the globe.

The Demographic Transition

The demographic transition model developed by Thompson (1929) nearly a century ago and elaborated by Notestein (1945) continues to be a useful perspective for understanding the timing of demographic shifts brought about by alterations in fertility and mortality rates (Stokes and Preston 2012). The model describes how countries go through the varying stages comprising the demographic transition from stage 1 characterized by high rates of fertility and mortality, population stability, and a young age structure to stage 5 depicted by low rates of fertility and mortality, population stability and eventual population decline, and an older age structure (Weeks 2011). As originally conceived, the timing at which countries started the demographic transition depended on their level of socioeconomic development. As such, countries in the most socioeconomically developed region of the world, northern and western Europe, were the first to experience significant population growth due to declining mortality rates and high fertility rates in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Coale 1972). In contrast, African countries underwent this demographic transition beginning in the last several decades.

Accordingly, today, more developed countries, consisting of all of Europe and North America along with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, are situated at the most advanced stage of the demographic transition. More developed countries had a total fertility rate of 1.6, a life expectancy at birth of 75 for males and 82 for females, and 16 % of the population being less than 15 years of age and 17 % being 65 or older in 2013 (Population Reference Bureau 2013). Based on an older age structure, the population of more developed countries is projected to increase by a mere 5 % and represent only 2.5 % of the world's

projected population growth between 2013 and 2050. In contrast, less developed countries had a total fertility rate of 2.6, a life expectancy at birth of 67 among males and 71 among females, and 29 % of the population being less than 15 and only 6 % being 65 or older. Thus, given a youthful age structure, the population of less developed countries is expected to rise by 43 % between 2013 and 2050. In fact, almost all of the world's growth (97.5 %) between 2013 and 2050 is projected to occur in less developed countries.

The demographic transition spawns a series of additional transitions. For example, as fertility rates decline, the population increasingly moves to urban areas, thus bringing about an urban transition. Economic growth of cities is less dependent on large families in contrast to less-developed agricultural areas where large families are an important source of the labor supply. In addition, as educational opportunities increase for women along with lower levels of childbearing and shifting norms related to marriage, people tend to delay or forego marriage, dissolve marital bonds, or enter alternate relations such as cohabitation, thus bringing about a marriage transition. Furthermore, with declining levels of fertility, increasing longevity, and rising marital dissolution, people are more likely to live in households that increasingly diverge from traditional household forms with people more likely to live in smaller households as well as in one-person households, thus bringing about the household transition.

Moreover, the combination of low levels of fertility and rising levels of longevity is associated with a greater share of the population being elderly, thus bringing about the aging transition. Finally, as more developed countries experience aging through declining fertility and inclining longevity, they experience a race/ethnic transition. This transition comes about through external and internal demographic forces. In the external realm, the populations of more developed countries experience mounting racial and ethnic diversity as immigrants enter the country primarily originating from less developed countries located in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. In the internal context, countries experience enhanced racial/

ethnic diversity as groups of color go through the demographic transition later than the majority white group due to lagging socioeconomic levels reflecting racial/ethnic stratification (Coleman 2007).

Demographers have paid much attention to transitions associated with marriage, household, and aging patterns. In a general sense, these transitions have been grouped and referred to as the *second transition* (Bystrov 2012; del Campo 2007; Coleman 2006, 2007, 2009). Research on marriage, household, and aging are thriving in the field of demography (Poston and Micklin 2005). Moreover, the second transition is fairly universal. Thus, while developed countries have experienced marriage, household, and aging transitions which experienced the demographic transition first, there is clear evidence that developing countries show signs of undergoing these transitions as well. Demographers, however, have paid less attention to the race/ethnic transition. This does not suggest that demographers have completely ignored race and ethnicity in their research, for these factors are commonly included in such research (Saenz and Morales 2005). On an international scale, David Coleman (2006) was the first scholar to bring attention to the race/ethnic transition, what he refers to as the *third transition* or the *race and ethnic transition* (see also del Campo 2007). Coleman (2006) demonstrates that numerous developed countries—e.g., European countries, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States—have undergone significant shifts in their racial/ethnic composition due primarily to high volumes of immigration from non-European countries in the developing world. With a focus on the situation in Western Europe, Coleman (2006) asserts that:

The ancestry of some national populations is being radically and permanently altered by high levels of immigration of persons from remote geographic origins with distinctive ethnic and racial ancestry, in combination with sub-replacement fertility and accelerated levels of emigration of the domestic population (p. 401).

Coleman (2006) draws on population projections to show that the white/European-origin populations of seven Western European countries

that he examines are projected to range from 15 to 32 % in the relative size of the foreign-born populations by 2050 with their share likely to continue to grow thereafter. Coleman (2009) finds similar trends when he expands the time frame to 2060 and introduces additional European countries as well as others outside of Europe. However, as is well known, in generating population projections, assumptions are the most uncertain in the case of the demographic component associated with international migration (Coleman 2006, 2009). Still, Coleman (2006) suggests that international migration to developed countries is likely to continue at relatively high levels into at least the near future.

Nonetheless, Coleman's (2006, 2009) research exposes the difficulties in dealing with race/ethnic matters internationally. In particular, many countries, especially those in Europe, do not collect data on race and ethnicity. The absence of such information is very much in line with color-blind ideologies suggesting that race is not important, that there are no racial barriers across people, as is the case in France (Coleman 2006; Tribalat 2004). Thus, the data that Coleman (2006, 2009) uses relies on foreign-born status as a way to capture the expanding share of non-Europeans in the population of the countries he examines given that the source of immigration is primarily from non-European countries. Yet, there are issues here as well. For example, offspring of immigrants born in the country of destination are not categorized as foreign-born even though they may remain segregated and marginalized from the mainstream European population. Similarly, in countries with greater levels of tolerance for racially and ethnically diverse populations, offspring of immigrants may intermarry with European people presenting challenges in identifying social and identification markers of race and ethnic diversity.

Coleman (2006, 2007, 2009) primarily highlights the race/ethnic transition occurring in developed countries. In fact, Coleman (2006, 2009) suggests that in contrast to the second transition which is widely generalizable and universal, the third transition is limited to the developed world. To illustrate, Castles (2013) points out that in 2010

ten of every 100 persons in developed countries were immigrants compared to only 1.5 of every 100 persons in developing countries. Similarly, Fargues (2011) notes that the percentage of migrants worldwide that are located in the most advanced countries (designated as “very high” on the Human Development Index, HDI) rose from 40 % in 1960 to 56 % in 2010, while the portion in the least advanced nations (designated as “low” on the HDI) remained relatively stable at 4–5 % during this period. In sum, Coleman (2006, 2009) conjectures that in the future it is likely that the racial/ethnic composition of the populations of developed countries will come to be increasingly similar to those of developing countries, but not the other way around. Coleman (2009) suggests that the increasing racial/ethnic heterogeneity in developed countries is not likely to take place due to such factors as the large population base of the developing world, the restrictive policies of many developing countries regarding immigration, as well as the projected labor shortages that are likely to occur globally in the coming decades.

However, this perspective hides the great diversity that exists within countries, much of it structured along the lines of racial, ethnic, religious, and tribal membership. The fact that people are stratified along these lines in many countries suggest a pecking order relative to how early or late groups undergo the demographic transition, with groups higher in the stratification system enjoying lower levels of mortality due to better access to health care followed by declining levels of fertility. In countries featuring such internal diversity, certain racial, ethnic, religious, and tribal groups situated at the lower levels of the stratification system are the latest to experience the demographic transition, resulting in greater levels of population growth compared to groups who are better off socioeconomically and who underwent the demographic transition at an earlier time.

Furthermore, Coleman’s (2006) race/ethnic transition perspective is centered exclusively in demographic transition and lacks linkages to racial and ethnic theoretical perspectives. While Coleman (2006) describes the conflicts that occur

in the fact of the race/ethnic transition, it tends to focus on the reaction of the Western European native population. Coleman (2006) illustrates some of these concerns of Western European natives regarding the increasing presence of non-Western immigrants:

Some concerns about minority growth arise not specifically from alarm about “ethnic replacement” but from a more general view that even the current level of diversity is problematic, and that therefore in the absence of more successful integration policies, further growth will simply exacerbate difficulties. These points are all controversial but need to be noted. Some immigrant groups now occupy a more elevated educational, economic, and social position than the average native population, as among Indians in Britain....A high proportion of the population of other groups, usually less economically successful, remain encapsulated, especially Muslim populations: Turks in Belgium... Bangladeshis in Britain....Later generations may be no further assimilated than the first, or even more alienated, as appears to be the case among young North Africans in France, Moroccans in the Netherlands, and Pakistanis in Britain, leading to serious problems of security. When democratic societies acquire multiple cultures, new wedges may be driven into the social structure....Identities and welfare concerns can remain focused on kin, community, and religion, not on a universal secular citizenship in a broader society....It is also claimed that diversity threatens the solidarity required to maintain and fund universal welfare systems, undermining the moral consensus that underpins them....(pp. 425–426).

While illustrating the potential consequences of the race/ethnic transition, this perspective falls short of providing the full spectrum of discourse from the native and foreign populations involved.

Theoretical Insights from Race and Ethnic Perspectives

There is a major need for demographers to use critical perspectives to better comprehend stratification and inequality (Horton 1999; Saenz and Morales 2005). Indeed, critical race and ethnic perspectives call attention to the fact that the rapid growth of groups who lack political and economic power threatens the existing power structure. Thus, groups in power do not sit idly

while their relative share of the population erodes. This interaction between the demographic dynamic and the power dynamic reflects the theoretical insights of Blalock (1967) more than four decades ago. Blalock argued that the growth of minority populations threatened the power and privilege of whites with the result being that whites set in motion a variety of policies and practices designed to limit the political power and economic possibilities of minority groups. There is a long line of research that shows the continued applicability of Blalock's relative size perspective to understand racial stratification in the United States (Bodapati et al. 2008; Free 2005; Market 2010; Saenz 1997; Tienda and Lii 1987).

Conflicts emerge when the dominant population perceives the group not only as an economic and political threat, but also as a threat on the culture, values, and ethos of the country. In the case of immigration, this is likely to occur when immigrants exhibit transnational tendencies which allow them to circulate in all manners—physically, socially, economically, and politically—between the countries of origin and destination (Ballard 2003; Castles 2013). The noted Harvard political scientist Huntington (2004), for example, raised major concerns that Mexicans and other immigrants from Latin America “threaten to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages” (p. 30). In such cases, the dominant group in the receiving country often resents immigrants for not becoming invested in their new country by learning the language, culture, and customs of their new neighbors. Nevertheless, in some cases immigrants as well as minority-group members of a country may be segregated and marginalized with the result being that they are not welcome to become acculturated and integrated into the larger society.

Moreover, the last few decades have seen the development of race perspectives that provide us a more profound understanding of how racial stratification—white supremacy—is sustained due its deep roots in the social, political, economic, and legal foundations and structures of societies (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2001, 2004, 2013; Feagin 2006, 2013; Omi and Winant 1984). White supremacy is reproduced because it becomes part

of what is considered natural and whites derive privilege and rewards from their whiteness. In the post-Civil Rights era, white supremacy is not maintained due to a few overt racists who spew hatred and venom in their speech and actions, but rather by regular people who claim that they are not racists and who often assert that we now live in a color-blind society, one in which we are beyond race. As long as these regular folks continue to gain from their whiteness and unconsciously accept their advantages and privileges, white supremacy is maintained. The white supremacy system is further supported through the censoring of people of color who criticize and seek to expose racial inequality by defining them as malcontents, people who have a chip on their shoulder, people who “play the race card,” and people who want to promote racial divisions. The system is also supported by regular people of color who actively or passively accept the existing racial inequities and the status quo.

Thus, given theoretical insights from scholars such as Blalock (1967), Bonilla-Silva (1997, 2001, 2004, 2013), Feagin (2006, 2013), and Omi and Winant (1984), while people of color and other subordinate groups may become the numerical majority, forces are in place for the majority group to maintain its dominant political and economic power. In the United States, it is not uncommon to hear whites assert that when they become the “minority,” they will experience increasing levels of inequality. Yet, it will be pretty certain that while whites become a numerical minority, they will maintain their dominant and advantaged position. For example, in South Africa under the apartheid system as well as even today in the post-apartheid period, whites enjoy political and economic power despite being the numerical minority in the country. Thus, even with the racial/ethnic transition in motion where people of color are projected to increase substantively and in some cases outnumber whites (people of European origin) in the developed world, it is unlikely that whites will cede their economic, political, and social power and assume the role of a subjugated minority.

The United States provides an illustration of efforts that have been undertaken over the recent

past to curtail the political and economic power of an expanding population of color, particularly Latinos. Today Latinos account for approximately 55 % of the annual growth of the U.S. population and are projected to make up approximately two-thirds of the projected population gain of the country between 2010 and 2050 with the Latino population nearly tripling during this time period (Saenz 2010).

There has been a litany of policies and programs taken—and in some cases, not taken—which have collectively served to limit the political and economic power of Latinos as well as other groups of color. For example, even though there is widespread agreement by the American public that the immigration system is severely broken and that it needs to be fixed, efforts to legislate immigration reform continue to fail. There is significant opposition by Republicans to the establishment of a path to U.S. citizenship for the approximately 11 million undocumented immigrants in the country (Pew Hispanic Center 2013). Without U.S. citizenship, undocumented immigrants—many who are Latino—remain marginalized economically, politically, and socially in the United States and, of course, are ineligible to vote. Furthermore, there have been large-scale efforts to establish ordinances across communities and states targeting undocumented immigrants. Arizona’s SB 1070 policy exemplifies the harshness that immigrants, especially Latinos, have encountered in the United States (Saenz et al. 2011).

In addition, gerrymandering has occurred in a fairly overt manner in political redistricting following the 2010 census which has served to limit the political power of Latinos as well as African Americans. Moreover, 31 of the 50 U.S. states have laws requiring voter identification in order to vote (National Conference of State Legislatures 2014). Persons most likely to lack a government-issued form of identification are not a random segment of the population. Rather they tend to be disproportionately African American, Latino, poor, young, and old. The actual number of voting fraud cases has been shown to be miniscule—“almost nonexistent” (Minnite 2014, p. 1). Also, the disproportionate incarceration of

African Americans and Latinos in the largest prison system in the world has served to disenfranchise members of these minority groups. Relatedly, the much more severe sentencing for the possession of rock cocaine (used disproportionately by African Americans, Latinos, and the poor) compared to powder cocaine (used disproportionately by whites and people with economic resources) has contributed significantly to the rising share of African Americans and Latinos in the prison system.

These policies and practices do not explicitly target Latinos and African Americans—indeed they are color-blind—for disparate treatment. Nonetheless, these groups of color are the most likely to possess the characteristics being targeted with the outcome being the restriction of the political and economic power of African Americans, Latinos, and, more generally, other groups of color.

The Need for an International Handbook on the Demography of Race and Ethnicity

The set of chapters in this handbook allow us to gain a better understanding of the linkages between stratification, demography, and conflict. Moreover, the authors of the chapters provide an overview of the demographic patterns in their country of concern and place these changes in a broader context that captures the dynamics of disparate population growth and inequality. The authors also address what the future is likely to hold as the racial/ethnic transition progresses. We have assembled a diverse set of countries here that go beyond the limited group of countries that are commonly associated with the race/ethnic transition (Coleman 2006, 2007, 2009). Indeed our lens to understand the race/ethnic transition extends beyond immigration as the sole factor impelling the race/ethnic transition. We also consider internal diversity within countries to be important in allowing us to comprehend the full spectrum of the race/ethnic transition. In sum, the approach that we take in this book is couched within the critical demography tradition (Horton

1999), which aims to understand the underlying dynamics generating the reproduction of racism, stratification, and inequality.

We now turn to an overview of the chapters included in this handbook.

Overview of the Chapters

As with any undertaking of this size, we struggled with the challenge of being as inclusive as possible in terms of the countries and regions we wanted to cover. We quickly found that such a massive undertaking was a logistical nightmare. In addition to finding suitable scholars who agreed to contribute to this book, there were variations in available data that could speak to the demographics of countries or even access to those data. Beyond the obvious shortcomings of this book, we have managed to put together 26 chapters which we have divided into seven global regions: North America, Latin America, Asia, Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Oceania.

North America (Canada, United States)

The first section of this handbook includes chapters by Monica Boyd on the contemporary ethnic and racial landscape of Canada, and Jenifer Bratter who provides a comprehensive overview of the complexities of the rapid demographic transition taking place in the United States. As two of the more developed countries in the world situated at the most advanced stage of the demographic transition, Canada and the United States provide interesting comparison cases of how demographic processes and the position of groups in the stratification system influence one another. Although the two countries share a border and have a long and varied history with one another, the political, economic, and even social policies of each country has produced quite different outcomes in terms of how race and ethnicity are understood. Both countries face a combination of an aging population and an increase in the presence of immigrants that

portend drastic future changes in the racial and ethnic composition of their populations. And in both countries, markers of race and ethnicity continue to be salient in determining and shaping life chances.

In Chap. 2, Boyd notes that today's ethnic and racial landscape of Canada is vastly different from previous centuries. Today's Canada is seemingly a mosaic of racial and ethnic camaraderie that includes over 200 different ethnic groups, with at least 11 sub-groups identified by the state as indigenous populations or "visible minorities." However, according to Boyd, while the government has been vigilant in initiating policies that promote bilingualism and multiculturalism, endorsing minority inclusion, and promoting content to eradicate extreme ethnic disadvantages, these measures have been largely symbolic and have not led to a significant change in terms of the amelioration of disparities between newcomer groups and aboriginal populations and the dominant groups in Canada.

In contrast to Canada, the United States has politically, economically, socially, and psychologically embraced a "post-racial" attitude that suggests that the United States has reached the "promised land" in regards to equal opportunity for all. Because issues of race and ethnicity are heavily discounted in the United States, government policies directed at equalizing existing racial and ethnic inequities are less likely to be legislated, and when they are, less likely to be enforced. According to Jenifer Bratter in Chap. 3, regardless of the tendency to minimize issues of race, the racial and ethnic composition of the United States has significantly changed over the past few decades, to the point where scholars unanimously agree that the majority share of the white population in the United States will soon be replaced by non-whites, due primarily to large-scale growth of the Latino and Asian populations. Such rapid growth over a short period has already created growing antagonism on the preservation of white privilege, even as data continue to suggest that race remains a salient determinant for folks of color for virtually every socioeconomic and demographic indicator available to social scientists.

Latin America (Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil)

In the second section, we see the shared complexities across a group of countries that are dealing with recent changes in migration patterns and its ensuing politics in the historical context of deeply rooted systems of racial and ethnic oppression (e.g., slavery), unique mix of European, African, and indigenous populations, and growing economic and social marginalization of the working class and poor.

In Chap. 4, Ayala provides a historical analysis of race and ethnicity in Mexico. Specifically, she deconstructs the notion of a *mestizo* nation, which generally refers to a post-colonial, mixed-race population (comprised of Europeans, Africans, and indigenous ancestry) all the while reintroducing a population of non-mestizo peoples that often go understudied or unaddressed altogether. It is within this vein that Ayala reviews ongoing demographic trends such as fertility, mortality, and migration in the context of the many complexities of Mexican identities and the current climate of hostile infringements on basic human rights and other social and economic inequalities.

Chapter 5 brings a group of scholars together, spearheaded by Cook-Martín, to delve into the recent political trends redefining Argentina not as a nation of immigrants like in the past, but as a nation of migrations. The country's European-origin population is aging, emigration rates are rising, and immigration from neighboring countries is increasing. Argentina's ancestral homelands are, in many ways, being "returned" to Argentines who predate European colonization. Furthermore, what constitutes being an Argentinean is undergoing definitional expansion. The *New Law of Migrations*, passed in 2004, permits citizens to live abroad and still democratically participate in national affairs, like exercising the right to vote. This law, along with other developments, has positioned Argentinean policymakers to address how new and old Argentines can be effectively integrated. The former group refers to those neighboring newcomers who represent a relatively cheap source

of labor, consumer base, and younger cohorts, while the latter refers to those of European origin who reside outside national borders but yet still provide sizeable remittances. All the while, many remaining Argentines are still economically recovering from many neoliberal policies forced upon them by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank and backed by the United States. Whether such conditions will create new social cleavages, and how demographers will measure these, remain questions that only time can answer.

The last three chapters of this section (i.e., Chap. 6 by Page, Chap. 7 by Paredes, and Chap. 8 by Telles), address the deep historical legacies of racial and ethnic inequality in Venezuela, Peru, and Brazil, respectfully. All three countries continue to be affected by policies and practices long institutionalized by European colonial powers, policies that favor lighter skin tones, wealth, physical traits and certain ethnicities. Venezuela's deep history of racial and ethnic inequality, dating back to the colonial period, has not only led to the social, political, and economic marginalization of non-white racial and ethnic groups, but has also made it very difficult to implement significant changes partly because of the on-going denial that racism exists but also because of a privileging of class over race in Venezuelan politics. Likewise, Brazil's legacy of slavery, coupled with eugenicist policies to whiten the population, and unprecedented population growth that was largely the result of immigration created a unique environment, according to Telles, that was conducive to policy changes resulting in changes in racial classification as opposed to actual measurements of race by blood.

Similarly, Paredes notes that current relationships between racial and ethnic groups in Peru are best characterized by unresolved conflict with deep roots in the country's colonial past. The materialization of this conflict is reflected in the socioeconomic stratification, which is severely associated with its ethno-racial hierarchies, in which the most disadvantaged people are the indigenous populations. Not only were they historically dominated, but they were also isolated from the mainstream ideal of nation and excluded

over time. To explore these ethno-racial power dynamics further, Paredes offers an analysis that is divided into six dimensions that begins with a demographic overview of ethnicity in Peru and concludes with a discussion that anticipates the emerging demographic patterns of Peru in the near future.

Asia (Southeast Asia, India, Japan, China, Indonesia, Vietnam)

The third section covers five countries and one region (Southeast Asia) in Asia. The explosive economic growth of these countries in the past few decades coupled alongside population growth (e.g., India and China), immigration and emigration patterns, and existing and previous conflict (e.g., Vietnam), have made for interesting speculation as to their economic, political, and social well-being in the coming decades. Both China and India, for example, have transitioned into capitalist powerhouses and it remains to be seen at what future point they become the next global superpower. Other countries such as Vietnam, still very much in recovery from the Vietnam War conflict, have seen tremendous recent economic growth in their major cities as corporate powerhouses have relocated their main headquarters there.

Kaur heads this section with Chap. 9 covering Southeast Asia. This large swath of countries covering the area south of China and east of India is historically tied together economically and socially. Internal migration within the Southeast Asia area as well as immigration from India and China have helped to alleviate labor shortages and according to Kaur, have become a defining and enduring feature of the region's demographic history.

Chapters 10, 11, and 12 cover the three major economic and political powerhouses in Asia: India, Japan, and China. In Chap. 10, Maharatna offers an historical overview of the demography of social stratification in India and identifies some of the broader implications of these trends. Stratification in India is unique from most other countries of the world. It has a caste system

whereby groups are ranked not by racial markers like skin tone, but markers of social descent. Where Indians come from, in terms of heredity, affects their social networks of friends, family, and romantic relationships. It shapes their occupational trajectory and general location within the division of labor. Perhaps above all though, it indicates where a person stands in terms of a fixed continuum of inferiority/superiority. The number of castes has varied over time, as clearly documented by India's censuses dating back to 1870. While this is true, demographic measures between castes have become increasingly obsolete since no country-level census of caste differences has been tabulated since 1941. The end of this data collection, however, has not meant an end to caste stratification in India. New census approaches to measuring the legacies of India's caste system include enumerating broad social groups of tribal and lower-caste peoples. Measures of these groups indicate that relative disadvantage persists today for minority groups in areas such as access to and achievements in education, health facilities and human development, and livelihood patterns, among others.

In Chap. 11, Ono and Ono unravel previously held notions of Japan as an isolationist country. While previous scholarship has largely downplayed or ignored the presence of ethnic minorities in Japan, Ono and Ono offer an analysis that focuses on these ethnic groups and the vital role they have played in Japanese society. In particular, these authors relate these ethnic minority experiences to the prevailing national identity of *Nihonjinron*. This identity associates "Japanese-ness" with qualities such as purity and uniqueness, which can then be ideologically deployed to explain the nation's economic, political, and economic success. It represents, the authors contend, a type of cultural determinism that rationalizes the suppression of minority groups, all the while upholding both mono-ethnic and nationalist tendencies.

Poston, Chang, Deng, and Venegas headline Chap. 12 by giving specific attention to the demographic and socioeconomic patterns of Muslim and other ethnic minority groups in China. Using data from China's 2000 census, they measure and compare differences between groups across an

array of indicators like age, dependency, fertility, education and literacy, occupation, residential segregation, and geographic differentiation. They situate this analysis within the broader social context of the ethnic dynamics that have dominated the country's history: Han-minority relations.

In Chap. 13, Graeme notes that as the fourth largest country in the world, Indonesia prospers as also being one of the most multicultural nations, with over 300 distinct ethnic groups speaking more than 250 distinct languages. It is home to nearly every major world religion to include a number of indigenous religions, as well. On the opposite end of the spectrum, and in comparison to mostly homogenous countries, Indonesian governments since gaining independence from the Dutch in 1945 have struggled to overcome the divisiveness of this diversity. The national motto of 'unity in diversity' captures this imperative. According to Graeme, some of the greatest challenges faced by Indonesia have been conflicts which have had a significant ethnic dimension. His chapter aims to analyse the changing nature of diversity in Indonesia and examines some of its demographic implications.

Finally, section three ends with Chap. 14 on Vietnam, authored by Walther, Embrick, Thakore, and Henricks. In this chapter, the authors explore how ethnic disparities are reproduced over time, with attention placed on the Vietnamese and their relations with other countries. They organize their discussion in five parts: (1) general demographic trends, (2) Vietnam in the racialized world system, (3) ethnic conflict and inequality in Vietnam, (4) intergroup conflict outside of Vietnam, and (5) future trends and what can be expected. In each of these sections, they sketch an empirical overview describing various historical and contemporary trends, and then offer some theoretical assessments and explanations of these data.

Middle East (Afghanistan, Israel, Palestine, Iran, Iraq)

If there is one word that best captures the commonality of the countries in the fourth section, it is this: conflict. Ongoing decades long

war and conflict has stymied economic growth (the exception being Israel), and created havoc on mortality and fertility rates, migration patterns, economic growth, border disputes, and other important human rights issues such as education and health care.

Chapter 15 by El-Badry and Swanson explores population and stability in Afghanistan. The authors suggest that U.S.-driven development projects in Afghanistan, which were initiated as part of an overall strategy for defeating the Taliban, are more likely to succeed if investments in supporting women are increased. These include matters of health care; reproductive health; and both academic and vocational training. If stability and sustainability for both the country and region are viable goals, Afghanistan and foreign interests must squarely address demographic patterns that feed Taliban insurgency and cause persisting instability. In particular, policy implementation that addresses high rates of poverty and illiteracy, high fertility rates, low human capital investment, and infrastructural barriers to national economic growth is urgently needed.

Chapters 16 and 17 examine ethnic stratification, territory, and migration patterns. In Chap. 16, Haim and Semyonov survey the state of ethnic stratification in Israel. Their discussion begins with the formation of the state, and what implications this has had on national migration flows as well as ethnic incorporation and exclusion. Throughout this overview, they also pay close attention to how socioeconomic status intersects with matters of ethnicity. In Israel, they argue, ethnicity has nearly as much to do with an economic status as it does a cultural or geographic one. Many of those at the bottom of Israel's stratification ladder are migrants who have recently transitioned from countries like Romania, Turkey, China, Nepal, and the Philippines, or general regions like Latin American and Africa. Arabs migrating from these countries particularly stand out. Disparity between members of these ethnic minority groups and Jews of European origin exist in most socioeconomic measures available, including indicators that span the institutions of education, employment, and politics, among others.

In Chap. 17, Hovsepien argues that contemporary demographic trends in Palestine are reflective of power relations, ones that are highly racialized, between Israelis and Palestinians. This is summed up by one historical trend: the in-migration of one group and the displacement of another. What makes Palestinian demographic trends unique from many other nation-states in the world is that it has not necessarily been individuals who have migrated across territorial boundaries, but territorial boundaries that have migrated across individuals. The Palestinian territory has steadily become occupied by the Israeli state over the past six decades, and these shifting lines of where Israel draws its borders raises a host of human rights issues for Palestinians caught in the borderlands of this national project. Namely, this annexation process puts into question the rights of many Palestinians who can no longer make claim to territorial belonging.

Finally, the last two chapters of this section (Chap. 18 by Mohebbi and Mohebbi and Chap. 19 by Ulack) cover Iran and Iraq. Both countries are considered to represent the cradle of civilization, made notable by the presence of many distinct ethnic groups (e.g., Turkish, Baluch, Kurdish, etc.). In addition, both countries have seen their fair share of political turmoil, religious conflicts, warfare, and social and economic influence from outside forces. The authors discuss the context of constant conflict on the future of Iran and Iraq in regards to their economic, political, and social well-being.

Africa (South Africa, Nigeria)

Chapter 20 on South Africa and Chap. 21 on Nigeria are covered in this section. In the former, Griffith and Zuberi first contextualize racial classification in the census. Much of their discussion highlights settlement experiences in Cape Colony, but also Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State, and the political implications these have on measuring demographic trends. Subsequently, the authors discern how colonial administrators performed racial enumeration in

their own version of the census-taking. Their findings, which were not systematically gathered nor did they require constitutional mandate, were used to inform policy decisions about South Africa's internal capacity to be "civilized" by Western institutions like education. Third, they provide an in-depth analysis of how racial classification developed in Cape Colony and then was adapted to other regions of South Africa. This discussion offers a contextual foundation for understanding the demography of race and ethnicity during South Africa's period of formal apartheid. And finally, Griffith and Zuberi contrast the apartheid period with the contemporary "post" apartheid period. In doing so, they predict what demographic trends of race and ethnicity can be anticipated in the future.

Chapter 21, by Reed and Mberu, examines ethnic, religious and demographic patterns in Nigeria. According to the authors, in Nigeria, ethnic, religious and, regional identities generate the fiercest contestation among the country's estimated 250–400 ethnic groups around the control of state power, resource allocation, and citizenship. Of all these forms of identity though, ethnicity is arguably the most salient because it pervasively shapes the most basic and political ways people see themselves and others. It has been a central source of conflict in a nation filled with a history of disintegration, secession, civil strife, civil war, minority agitation, and violent conflicts. To better understand this intersection of where history meets ethnic conflict, Reed and Mberu examine demographic patterns of (a) the country's population structure; (b) fertility; (c) morbidity and mortality; (d) migration; and (e) other socioeconomic outcomes. The authors narrow their analytic focus throughout to Nigerian matters of stratification for Muslims or traditionalists living in the North, how poverty is concentrated among these groups, and compounded by rural residence, agricultural employment, high fertility, and low levels of education. Following this discussion, the authors outline what future demographic trends can be expected and possible public policy options available to reduce disparities between ethnic groups.

Europe (Italy, Turkey, Ireland, France, Hungary, The Netherlands)

The sixth section in the Handbook includes a collection of countries that are similar in terms of their aging population, low fertility rates, and recent racial and ethnic demographic shifts as immigrant newcomers, most notably from Muslim countries, have looked to these new destination countries as potential sites for long-term settlement. A good example of the recent political and social turmoil that has taken place due to these immigration issues can be found in Chap. 22 on Italy. In this chapter, Ambrosetti and Cela contend that two of the largest shifts in Italy's population during the past few decades have been its aging population, one of the oldest of all countries worldwide, and the reversal of international emigration as Italy became a destination nation for many immigrants. Italy's aging population structure results, in part, in the country's low fertility rates. The expanding foreign presence in Italy, on the other hand, is largely a result of worldwide regional conflicts and political asylum seekers. These demographic shifts have served as a recipe for recently elevated racial and ethnic conflict. Many of the immigrant newcomers come from countries such as Morocco, Albania, Romania, China, Tunisia, Poland, and the Ukraine, among others, and some long-time Italians have responded as though these groups threaten their social and economic position. Nativist reactionaries deploy stereotypical tropes to further stigmatize these groups, alleging they are taking away Italians' jobs, refusing to assimilate to Italian culture, and posing a general threat to "the Italian way of life." In response to these demographic shifts and a reconfiguring Italian population, a number of immigration restriction laws have been enacted. These conflicts remain ongoing to date.

Chapter 23, by Eryurt and Koc, take into account Turkey's geographic location as symbolic of its demography. That is, the authors contend that as a boundary between Asia and Europe, Turkey reflects an amalgam of both traditions. It comprises a complex history of multiculturalism and a multi-ethnic social structure. Though the

expectations of modernization theorists have been that Turkey should become increasingly characterized by social homogeneity and demographic convergence, the empirical realities show that quite the opposite is true. Ethnic disparities persist and remain a central feature of daily life in Turkey. In particular, the country's two main groups, the Turks and Kurds, are radically different in terms of a variety of demographic measures such as age structure, life chances, fertility, childhood mortality, contraception, reproductive health, marriage, and migration, among many other indicators.

Garner and Gilligan cover Chap. 24 on Ireland. They note that Ireland is unique in that it is a demographic anomaly or outlier compared to other "developed" Western nations. It is the only European nation to comprise a population that was smaller in the twentieth century than in the nineteenth (largely due to the Famine, or *An Gorta Mór* in Gaelic), even despite its highest fertility rates since the 1970s. When analyses are narrowed in scope, observations include much more complexity and have left many researchers to ask, "Exactly which Ireland are we talking about?" In truth, there are many. It is possible to construct a narrative that centers on the historical and ongoing Catholic-Protestant divide in which ethnic demography drives the political landscape. One could also create a broad-sweeping narrative about regional political fault lines between South and North Ireland. Another might tell a tale of a changing cultural composition, as recent immigration laws have revised who has claims to citizenship and caused surges in immigration that now outnumber emigration. Still, these narratives leave open the question of what it means to be Irish Catholic or Irish Protestant, Northern or Southern, immigrant or native, and how do these identities complicate, and become complicated by, other forms of identity like nationalism, urbanism/ruralism, and multiculturalism, among many other markers that go unmentioned?

Chapter 25 examines the census and racial identity in France. In this chapter, Léonard notes that France is colorblind by definition if not practice. Its census, conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, does

not include racial or ethnic categories. This is because it is illegal for French institutions (e.g., universities, employers, corporations, public administrations) to request information that includes racial or ethnic categories. In fact, social norms of discussing race and ethnicity help to reinforce this colorblind façade. Words like minority, minorities, or minority groups are virtually nonexistent in most French people's everyday language. These trends leave a number of questions unanswered for those who study racial and ethnic inequality in France. Namely, how can social scientists know without knowing? How can they learn of potential patterns without access to data that would enable the measurement of these patterns? And why do many French men and women support the collective denial of reality, or not make any attempt to unmask it?

Chapter 26 examines the demography of race and ethnicity in Hungary. In this chapter, Schafft and Kulcsár note that although Hungary is mostly an ethnically homogeneous country by today's standards, it has not always defined itself this way. In fact, its territory expanded well beyond the borders that define it today. This all changed though in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Hungarian areas where ethnic minorities were concentrated, like the Carpathian Basin, were redefined as foreign territory. It was the rise of nationalism and ethnic conflict that spurred this change. Though historical Hungary dissolved and reduced its national borders, this did exclude all minority groups from the country. The Roma remain the nation's only recognized ethnic minority group. This group has been subjected to a wide range of negative treatment, from persecution and exclusion to paternalistic assimilation and lip-service integration, not to mention experiencing considerably worse socioeconomic conditions compared to other groups. Despite this marginal status of disempowerment, the Roma continue to be scapegoated by majority groups as the source of Hungary's social, political, and economic problems.

Finally, this section ends with Chap. 27 on The Netherlands. Weiner notes that while the Netherlands is widely known for its tolerance and multiculturalism, this has more to do with the

country's permissive drug and prostitution policies, although there is also some history of the country serving in the 1980s and 1990s as a bastion of hope for religious refugees. This history, combined with the Dutch history of colonialism, resulting in migrants from former colonies, and their recruitment of "guest workers" in the 1960s and 1970s, has resulted in considerable racial diversity among the population, as well as considerable stratification and conflict. Recently, like much of Europe, Dutch popular and political discourse has taken a turn to the right with restrictive immigration policies and the reversal of multicultural policies for which the country was globally lauded (and sometimes derided). Weiner highlights the history of race, racial diversity, and racism in The Netherlands that laid the foundation for its diversity today. Following this historical overview, she offers an in-depth examination of the current demographic and socioeconomic trends.

Oceania (Australia)

Oceania is represented by Chap. 28 on Australia, contributed by Biddle, Khoo, and Taylor. In this chapter, the authors discuss the interaction between race and ethnicity and broader demographic trends in Australia. Their focus is narrowed to two categorical groups: indigenous Australians and the overseas-born population and their descendants. These groups represent umbrella categories that collapse multiple groups into one, even though the demographic representation of Australia is admittedly diverse. In this country, no one ethnic subgroup within these two groups holds a numerical majority. While this is true at the current time, this observation may be subject to change in upcoming years. Immigration is an important source of Australia's population growth, which also serves as the driving engine behind the nation's economic growth. Rising immigration rates are rapidly reconfiguring the country's ethnic composition. Though in other countries this may serve as a recipe for social conflict, Australia's experience, the authors contend, is one characterized by cohesion and

multiculturalism. Immigrants of diverse cultures are rapidly absorbed into the country's major institutions and are able to achieve relative social inclusion in a short amount of time.

This broad set of countries reflects a wide variety of illustrations regarding the race/ethnic transition, the dynamics that produce it, and the conflicts that result from such changes. In light of such demographic changes and conflicts that emerge between groups, it is important to consider policies to ameliorate racial and ethnic strife across groups and to ensure that the diverse set of groups forming the populations of countries around the world reach their full human potential as citizens of those countries and that their human rights are respected. We now turn to a reflection of the implications of policy for this larger societal goal.

Implications for Policy

The conflictive developments witnessed in the second decade of the twenty-first century in regions such as the Ukraine, Iraq, Pakistan, and countries in Africa demonstrate the continuing linkages and interconnections between demography, stratification, and conflict. All of these world regions have populations growing in sociohistorical contexts that have been affected by external domination at some time in their development. Moreover, the populations in these and in similar other settings are highly divided by ethnic, religious, and other sociocultural and political identities. In many cases, colonialism or other forms of external domination forced the diverse populations into artificial countries and states that were maintained by force. That is to say, the populations did not develop into unified societies that evolved through a natural historical course of social integration.

High population growth and expansive energies especially among subpopulations looking for survival in the most dire economic situations has led to greater inter-ethnic contacts in sociocultural environments that remain sensitive to, and defensive of, religious and other cultural boundaries. Over time these contacts for commerce,

intermarriage, and other institutional exchanges have become normalized in some population settings, but have led to new conflicts in other settings, especially with the arrival or emergence of intolerant ideologies that set severe requirements of intergroup separation. Population growth thus affects inter-ethnic contacts, and in stratified conditions conflict can surface at the level of the whole society due to differences in access to institutional participation and rewards or due to growing pressures for sociopolitical reconstitution led by militant ethnic movements. Moreover, as the beginning of the twenty-first century has shown, conflictive conditions in distant regions are not isolated to remote small countries, but can quickly draw the political (and military) involvement of large advanced industrial populations, especially those situated in the West.

Colonialism by Western powers and the organizing of the Soviet Union strove for the political and administrative consolidation of the affected populations, but the externally ruled regions (for example countries in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe) remained replete with the social forces of disintegration, often based on differences of ethnicity or national heritage. An example is the exodus of millions of Muslims into Pakistan and of millions of Hindus and Sikhs into India after independence from British rule in 1947 in what had been the British Indian Empire. While the Pakistani-Indian case highlights ethnic (religious) tension, the internal social conflict in the Ukraine in the second decade of the twenty-first century demonstrates the divisive power of national-heritage, as ethnic Russians in the eastern provinces of the Ukraine undertook armed struggle (with Russian support) to link their Ukrainian region to Russia with whom they felt a connection of national-origin, and to maintain distance from western Europe.

Moreover, contrary to some theories of globalization (see Kellner 2002), global processes have not erased international differences and created a more unified world; indeed, to some extent the opposite has occurred in some population regions. That is, some populations have undertaken struggles to resist change, including cultural change that accompanies economic

globalization, and often times these struggles originate in the cultural, ethnic sphere.

It is illogical to think that states around the world can be divided into ethnic nation-states in order to diminish social conflict as populations grow within the constraints of social stratification. Yet, this does not mean that policies to reduce social tensions in conditions of population, stratification, and conflict cannot be entertained. Indeed, the failure to do so is a backhanded way of supporting the status quo. The overarching value for a policy to promote stability among populations in ethnically diverse and stratified countries should be one that promotes autonomy among ethnically diverse populations to organize and participate in their core cultural institutions such as religion. But autonomy granted by the state should consist of more than giving ethnic populations the freedom to organize their cultural institutions; policies of constructive autonomy also require the state to support cultural developments in ways to draw the energies of different populations to strengthen the country as a whole. The thrust of such a policy approach must be towards greater participatory equality among all populations in the primary institutions of society such as in government, justice, health, and education.

All world regions are vulnerable to internal strife due to changing population compositions propelled by different ethnic growth rates and migration from culturally different regions. Asia and Africa, however, will be especially vulnerable as they are projected to lead in population growth by large measures from 2013 to 2050. While North America and Europe are expected to remain stable at populations of 400 million and 700 million, respectively, from 2013 to 2015, Asia and Africa are projected to grow in population by 1.0 billion and 1.3 billion, respectively, during the same time period (Haub and Kaneda 2013).

Whenever possible, Western governments should seek to support policy programs of stability and inclusion, since these governments often created or supported cleavages in colonial settings that today manifest inter-ethnic strife, if not all-out warfare. Moreover, Western societies continue

today in the post-colonial era to draw benefits (petroleum and other raw materials, migrant labor, cheaply produced commodities including foods, etc.) from regions of developing countries to further their own growth and affluence vis-à-vis other world populations.

Policies to promote greater cultural autonomy as a strategy of inclusion should not be seen by governmental leaders as options among many others that can be considered to promote national development and stability. The variables of time and high natural increase rates in less-developed and the least-developed countries indicate that policies of social inclusion must be prioritized. To put it in simple terms, against the background of sustained population growth, enduring (if not strengthening) rigid ethnic identities, and stifling stratification, time is running out. Governments in these world regions must undertake policies to promote inclusion in ethnically diverse environments if they are to deter even higher levels of social conflict than have been witnessed thus far in the first two decades of the twenty-first century.

Summary

The demographic transition involving the decline of mortality and fertility has spawned numerous subsequent transitions, some of these likely unanticipated as the demographic transition was initiated. The latest transition that many of the countries around the world are experiencing is the race/ethnic transition involving disproportionate population growth across racial and ethnic groups, increasing levels of racial/ethnic diversity, and rising conflicts due to such changes. Demographers have for the most part relied on demographic perspectives to understand the race/ethnic transition. Yet, to more fully comprehend the racial/ethnic transition and the conflicts that emerge, we need to draw from theoretical perspectives from the race and ethnic literature. We also need to understand the important need for the development of policies to mitigate racial and ethnic strife that often arises with the

race/ethnic transition. It is our hope that this book generates wide interest among scholars and policymakers in engaging the racial and ethnic demographic forces that are well underway in some countries and that will increasingly be arising in other nations.

We now turn to the race/ethnic transition in North America, followed by Latin America, Asia, Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Oceania.

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Part II

North America

Monica Boyd

The ethnic and racial landscape of Canada in the twenty-first century is significantly different from its earliest demographic history. Aboriginal peoples, English and French settlers are the original founding pillars of Canada, but over the centuries, immigration has made Canada more diverse with arrivals from many Western, Northern, Southern and Eastern European countries. Migrants and their descendants from areas other than Europe now are transforming Canada's ethnic and racial composition again. Today, Canada includes over 200 different ethnic groups, at least 11 sub-populations defined by the state as visible minorities (non-Caucasian, non-aboriginal, and non-white), and an indigenous aboriginal population which also includes diverse sub-populations.

The ethnic composition of Canada is continually changing, not only as the result of immigration but also because of fluctuation by individuals in their choices of ethnic labels. Nonetheless, ethnicity continues to be a defining characteristic of Canada, particularly because it is related to language use among Anglophone and Francophone populations. Additionally, race is salient in discussions of "what Canada is and what it will become." Race, or rather its social construction, now is an important component of

demographic change and highly correlated with socioeconomic advantages and disadvantages experienced by newcomer groups and by Aboriginal peoples. Following a brief orienting overview of Canada's geography and demography, this chapter reviews ethnic flux in Canada, English-French populations and their language origins and use, changes in immigration sources and the growth in people of color, and the demographic and socioeconomic profiles of Aboriginal groups.

Understanding Canadian Geography and Demography

Canada is located in the northern hemisphere of the Americas, sharing a western land border with Alaska and the remainder of the United States to the south. Canada has a slightly larger land mass than the United States. As a significant percent of Canada lies in colder regions which are neither arable nor hospitable to dense settlements, most of the population lives within 100 miles of the 3,145 miles shared with the United States. There are ten provinces along this border, with the eastern Atlantic provinces of New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island having a smaller land mass. Three territories are located north of the provinces: the Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut.

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Canada's population stands at 33.5 million in 2010 (Statistics Canada 2011a), a figure that contrasts with the 313 million estimated for the United States and 113 million for Mexico (United Nations n.d.). Demographically, the population is extremely diverse with respect to ethnic origins and race, hailed by researchers as an exception – if not an outlier – among western democracies (Kymlicka 2010). This diversity is rooted in the settlement history of Canada where from the beginning immigration has played an important role in population growth and national development (Boyd and Alboim 2012).

Starting in the 1500s, the arrival of French and English explorers altered the exclusive settlement by aboriginal peoples and reduced their numbers. By July 1, 1867, when the federal Dominion of Canada was formed, the areas now known as Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia mostly comprised those of British and French origins. Canada's westward expansion added new provinces, and in 1905, the unity of nine provinces and territories was complete; the last of the ten provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador, joined in 1949. Finally, in 1999, the area of Nunavut (which means "our land" in Inuit) became a new territory created from the original larger Northwest Territories.

The relative size and population share of the four groups – Aboriginal, British, French, and other groups – has changed between 1867 and today, but each group continues to constitute an important defining characteristic of Canada. Two groups, Aboriginals and the French, are national minorities, seeking to remain distinct societies with some political autonomy, including self-government and self-representational rights within Canada's larger political and social institutions (Kymlicka 1996).

Historically and currently, immigration is a major source of population growth and ethnic diversity. Fertility declines starting reached below replacement in 1976. Today, 1.7 children are born per woman, well below the population replacement level of 2.1. Because the aging of the post-World War II baby boom cohort means more seniors, death rates are increasing and converging with fertility levels. In this context of low levels

of natural increase, immigration accounts for about 67 % of Canada's population growth and could account for 80 % by 2031 (Statistics Canada 2011a). Many recent immigrants are from Asia and other non-European areas, thereby increasing the racial diversity of Canada.

Canada's Statistical Systems

Much of the knowledge of the ethnic, racial and immigrant populations in the "Dominion of Canada" was – and still is – collected by Canada's federal statistical agency, Statistics Canada (see: Worton 1998). The 1871 census was the first after Confederation and was followed by successive censuses every 10 years; since 1976, censuses are taken every 5 years. Statistics Canada also fields surveys on various aspects of social conditions; such surveys include Canada's General Social Survey and the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey. All forms of data collection routinely include questions on ancestry (called ethnic origins in Canada), language use, immigrant origins, and race. Federal government departments, ranging from Citizenship and Immigration Canada to Heritage Canada, along with provincial and municipal governments, are active users of such data. In short, the federal government is a major instigator of ethnic and racial data; its centrality in data collection also means that classification systems are legitimated by state action (Boyd 1999; Nagel 1997).

A new dimension of government centrality is evident with the June 2010 Federal Cabinet decision that Statistics Canada field a voluntary National Household Survey (NHS) in lieu of the long form of the mandatory census in 2011. This decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it indicates the growing consolidation of power at the highest level of the executive (Savoie 2010). Second, because the long form (the 2B form) is used to collect data on ancestry (ethnic origins), race, immigration, labour market, and housing characteristics, the accuracy of data may be seriously impaired by the omission of 31 % of Canadian private dwellings that did not respond to the NHS (Statistics Canada 2011b).

At the date of writing (July 2012), no estimates exist for item non-response to specific questions by the 69 % who returned the form, and no data from the National Household Survey are available. Hence, the mandatory 2006 long form census remains the most recent available source of detailed information on ethnicity and race in Canada.

Since the mid-1990s, the ethnic origin question in the Canadian census has been accompanied by a question capturing phenotypical differences among non-aboriginal groups and by several questions on aboriginal identity. Like ethnic origins, “race” and aboriginal origins are socially constructed, both by individuals and by events in the larger society. Data collection practices create and also reflect these constructions. Canada has a long history of collecting data that distinguish between individuals on the basis of their supposed genetic and physical differences, much of it reflecting the need by settler groups to create colour lines to regulate power and privilege. Elaborate descent or lineage rules exist for enumerating white, aboriginal, and other non-white groups in Canada from the 1900s on. The explicit use of racial origins as part of the census questions on origins between 1901 and 1941 was abruptly dropped in 1951, a decision generated by the genocide in Europe during World War II (Boyd et al. 2000). However, as discussed in this chapter, developments in federal-aboriginal relations underlie recent additions of census questions on aboriginal identity and status. In the second half of the twentieth century, the principles of equality and human rights became part of political, legislative, and data gathering initiatives, including collecting information on people of colour.

English, French, and/or Canadian? The Social Construction of Ethnicity

During the initial period of European settlement (1500–1750), people of British and French origins were the largest demographic groups inhabiting Canada. Over the centuries, high fertility rates in Québec have helped maintain the

demographic share held by those of French ethnic origins, despite shifts in the ethnic composition of Canada’s population away from British ethnic origins. In the 1871 census held after the 1867 Confederation Act, approximately 60 % had British origins, 31 % claimed French origins, with Aboriginals representing less than one percent of the population and those of other origins another 8 %. Compared to 100 years earlier, census data for 1971 reveal a declining share for British ethnic origin groups (45 %), a slight decline for those of French origins (29 %), a slight growth in the representation of those declaring aboriginal origins (1.5 %), and a very sharp increase in the percentages with other origins (25 %). Changes reflect immigration trends; before the 1960s, immigrants from the United Kingdom were replaced by those born in Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe, after that, by those from non-European areas. Meanwhile, the French origin population maintained high fertility rates until the 1960s, keeping this group at about 30 % (calculated by the author from Basavarajappa and Ram 1983).

Earlier censuses restrict ethnic origin responses to reports of ancestry on the father’s side and permit only one response (White et al. 1993). Starting with the 1981 census, multiple responses are permitted, and ancestry refers to both maternal and paternal origins. Inter-marriage along with a long history of residency in Canada for those with ancestors arriving in the 1700s and 1800s underlie multiple responses, making ethnic origin trends from 1981 non-comparable to those earlier. As well, shifts in immigration source countries add to the diversity of ethnic categorizations. Today, only 8 % of Canada’s population give a single response to the ethnic origin question indicating a British origin; another 27 % indicate a British origin along with at least one other ethnic origin. Comparably, only 4 % indicate French ethnic origin, with another 12 % saying they are of French and at least one other ethnic origin (calculated from Table 2.1).

Meanwhile, ethnic origins are obtained in the 2006 census by asking each respondent the following question: “What were the ethnic or cultural origins of this person’s ancestors?” The

Table 2.1 Canadian, British Isles and French/Québécois Ethnic Origins, Canada 2006

Ethnic origins	All ages		Age 15 and older ^b			
	Total ^a	Percent, single responses	Total generation status	1st generation	2nd generation	3rd generation or more
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All of Canada ^c	31,241,030	58.6	100.0	23.9	15.6	60.5
Canadian	10,066,290	57.1	100.0	1.4	7.7	90.9
British Isles	11,098,610	23.0	100.0	9.6	18.1	72.4
French	5,000,350	25.1	100.0	4.5	7.1	88.4
Québécois	146,590	66.1	100.0	0.9	4.0	95.0
Québec ^c	7,435,905	74.1	100.0	4.3	2.2	93.5
Canadian	4,474,120	71.8	100.0	0.5	1.5	98.0
British Isles	711,960	21.9	100.0	2.7	4.6	92.7
French	2,173,835	40.1	100.0	3.1	2.6	94.3
Québécois	140,075	67.7	100.0	0.5	2.8	96.7
Rest of Canada ^{c,d}	23,805,125	53.8	100.0	24.3	15.9	59.7
Canadian	5,592,170	45.3	100.0	1.4	8.1	90.5
British Isles	10,386,650	23.0	100.0	9.6	18.1	72.3
French	2,826,515	13.7	100.0	4.6	7.3	88.1
Québécois	6,515	29.9	100.0	1.0	4.1	94.9

Sources: Statistics Canada 2006 Census of Canada. : Data products. Topic-based tabulations: Ethnic origin and visible minorities. Table 1. <http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/tbt/Lp-eng.cfm?LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=1&PID=0&PRID=0&PTYPE=88971,97154&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2006&THEME=80&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=>

^aData for the Canada, Québec and Rest of Canada rows are total population counts. However the numbers for specific groups such as Canadian or British Isles include multiple responses, and such responses may overlap. For example, a response of Canadian and British Isles appears in the Canadian counts and in the British Isles count

^bQuestions on parental birthplace, necessary for deriving generational status, were asked only for census respondents age 15 and older

^cAll ethnic origin responses for the specified geography including other ethnic origins

^dRest of Canada refers to areas other than Québec

accompanying census guide states: “An ancestor is someone from whom a person is descended and is usually more distant than a grandparent. Other than aboriginal persons, most people can trace their origins to their ancestors who first came to this continent. Ancestry should not be confused with citizenship or nationality” (Statistics Canada 2008d).

These contemporary statistics are not the result of demographic processes of births, deaths, and migration, although those factors were of greater importance in earlier decades; instead the proportion declaring British or French ethnicities mostly reflects the practices of data capture, the broadness of the ancestry question, and ethnic flux. In response to the census question, “what were the ethnic or cultural origins of this person’s

ancestors?” respondents now are allowed to record up to four responses; as many as six responses are possible as a result of hyphenation (Italian-Canadian). Increasing ethnic options means that few are likely to report having only British or only French ethnicity. Further, although ancestry is emphasized, the use of a single question to elicit responses increases the likelihood of replies derived from selective knowledge or memory of ancestral origins as well as self-identifications. Also, depending how people respond, race and religion are captured by the official ethnic origin question used in the census (Boyd et al. 2000; Ryder 1955; White et al. 1993). As in previous censuses, some indicate “Jewish,” others indicate “Black” or “North American Indian,” and still others provide self-

categorizations that may indicate regional origins but also may convey phenotypical characteristics (such as Chinese).

Ethnic flux, sometimes labeled ethnic mobility, underlies the diminishing numbers who cite British and/or French ethnicities. Ethnic origins, ethnic identities, and racial categorizations are human creations; far from being fixed, they are constructed through social interaction, including interpersonal contact, participation in dominant social institutions (families, schools, politics, and the workplace), and exposure to ideas and ideologies (Cornell and Hartmann 1998; Lieberson 1985; Nagel 1994). As a result, people may select from many possible ethnicities and may change their selections over time or in various settings. New labels also may emerge.

In fact, a new phenomenon, the Canadian equivalent of what Lieberson (1985) terms “the un-hyphenated American,” starts in the 1990s. Because the concept of ethnic origins was envisioned as reflecting ancestry, “Canadian” was strongly discouraged as a response in earlier censuses, not permitted until 1951, and not part of the published ethnic origin classifications. Less than one percent of respondents gave a “Canadian” ethnic origin in the 1981 and 1986 censuses (Thomas 2005). However, in 1991 approximately 4 % of the Canadian population declared “Canadian” as an ethnic origin, and in the 2006 census, ten million out of 31 million reported a Canadian ancestry either as a single response or in combination with other ethnic origins (Table 2.1).

Three factors underlie one-third of the Canadian population reporting Canadian as part of their ancestral repertoire: (1) changing responses to “who am I?”; (2) protocols surrounding the ethnic origins question in the census; and (3) terminology derived from Canada’s history (Boyd 1999). The “Canadian” label is particularly strong among those who in earlier censuses declared British or French origins and who therefore may have family histories going back many generations in Canada (Boyd and Norris 2001). Additionally, immediately before the 1991 census, a media instigated campaign of “count” me “Canadian” influenced responses.

Question protocols are important as well; following the prevailing practices of Statistics Canada, “Canadian” joined a list of ancestry examples in the census questionnaire, thereby increasing the responses in 1996 and thereafter (Boyd 1999).

A final important factor underlying increasing “Canadian” ethnic origin responses is the resonance of the French word “Canadien.” The word was commonly used by the people of New France to describe themselves. Its meaning is thus imbued with over 300 years of differences in history, language, culture, and institutions. Rather than referring to membership in a pan-ethnic or national group, “Canadien” captures membership in Québec society. The label “Québécois” has similar meanings, while also emphasizing membership in the Québec nation. Table 2.1 shows that the selection of “Canadian” is extremely strong in Québec followed by reporting of a French ethnicity. Over two-thirds (70 %) of these Canadian responses in Québec are single responses. Multiple ethnic responses in general are higher in the rest of Canada (46 %) than in Québec (26 %); this also is true for those declaring Canadian (55 %), British Isles (77 %), French (86 %), and Québécois (70 %) ethnic origins (calculated from Table 2.2). Over nine out of ten of those giving a Canadian ethnic origin are members of the third-plus generation, meaning that at a minimum, they are Canadian-born with both parents Canadian-born. Third-plus generation response is highest in Québec, both for those indicating Canadian/Canadian ethnic origins and for those declaring Québécois, French, and British Isles ethnic origins (Table 2.1).

Evolving Dualisms: Ethnicity and Languages

European settlement during the 1500s and 1600s did more than create two major population groups. It also created the setting for ethnic stratification and contemporary language policies. The initial British intention of transforming New France into a society with British institutions and an Anglo-majority population was thwarted

Table 2.2 Birthplace of foreign-born permanent residents, by period of immigration, Canada 2006

	Total	Before 1970	1970–1979	1980–1989	1990–1999	2000–2006
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Birthplace, Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
United States of America	4	4	7	3	2	3
Other Central & S. America, Caribbean	11	4	17	17	12	10
United Kingdom	9	23	13	6	2	2
Other Europe	28	59	25	18	17	14
Africa	6	1	3	7	9	9
West Central Asia and the Middle East	6	2	6	5	7	10
Asia	35	6	27	43	51	50
Eastern Asia	15	3	10	15	23	21
Southeast Asia	9	1	9	17	11	9
Southern Asia	12	2	9	10	17	21
Oceania and other	1	1	2	1	1	1
Visible minority status, Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Not a visible minority ^a	46	91	52	32	25	25
Visible minority	54	9	48	68	75	75

Source: Customized table produced by the author especially for this volume from the 2006 Public Use Microdata File on Individuals, 2006 Census of Canada

^aIncludes persons with aboriginal identities

by slow immigration from Britain and geopolitical factors (Breton 2005). Instead, the British established control over Québec by building on the pre-existing quasi-feudal system previously established by France. Compliance and what Breton (2005) terms “indirect rule” were enhanced by the strong presence of the Catholic Church, which undertook responsibility for the spiritual well-being of its flock and for its health and education. Over the centuries, the continued use of the French language, the institutional dominance of the Catholic Church, and high fertility rates helped to maintain a distinctive society, although political and economic elites remained Anglophone. In the rest of Canada, immigration from Great Britain and later from other European countries provided workers, stimulated demand for products, and settled vast stretches of territory. English was the dominant language used by individuals, government, and business.

Not all ethnic groups have their own languages, but when they do, language becomes a powerful marker of the “ethnos.” From the Greek root for ethnic, *ethnos* denotes membership in a group based on shared ancestry and/or culture. Ethnic-specific languages help maintain boundaries that ethnic groups either create or have imposed on them; therefore, language assimilation – the loss of distinctive mother tongues – can be threatening because it represents a step in the assimilation of the group (Liebersohn 1981, Chapter 1; Williams 1999). Ethnic-specific language maintenance also has the potential to reaffirm belief in the distinctiveness of groups. Thus, language, culture, religion, and geographic concentration of the Francophone population within Québec are the basis of a distinct identity and the concept of a “nation within” (Breton 2005; Kymlicka 2010). In such situations, any erosion of the demographic base of minority nation claims is

threatening. It is no accident that language loss within the Francophone population is viewed with concern by Québeckers and by Francophone communities outside of Québec.

By the early 1900s, the fact that Canada indeed consisted of two linguistic groups was gaining growing acceptance (Breton 2005). The 1960s Quiet Revolution in Québec was a time of rapid change that included dismantling the old order, including Anglophone control of major institutions (Breton 2005; Conrick and Regan 2007). Concerned over the growing nationalist sentiment in Québec, the Canadian federal government struck the 1963 Royal Commission on Bi-Culturalism and Bi-Lingualism to report on bilingualism and biculturalism and to make recommendations on the basis of an equal partnership between the English and French founding populations while taking into account the contribution of other groups to Canada's cultural enrichment (Conrick and Regan 2007: 37).

The federal government of Canada passed the Official Language Act in 1969, declaring English and French to have equal status as official languages. Aspects of Canada's two official languages captured in contemporary government surveys and censuses are: *mother tongue* (the first language a person learns at home in childhood and still understands); *official language knowledge* (can this person conduct a conversation in English and/or French?); *home language use* (languages used mostly in the home and additional languages used regularly); and starting with the 2001 census, *work language* (languages used most at work and other languages used regularly) (see Lachapelle and Lepage 2010: Appendix).

Despite the 1969 Act, the 1988 Official Languages Act and the encouragement of federal civil servants to become bilingual and express themselves in either language, English is used by the majority of people outside Québec, and French retains its prominence in Québec. In 2006, the Anglophone mother tongue population represented 58 % of Canada's population – 8 % of the Québec population and 73 % of the population outside Québec. Conversely, having a

French mother tongue characterized one in five of Canada's population, but in Québec, 80 % had a French mother tongue, and 82 % spoke French most often at home. Only 4 % of the population outside Québec had a French mother tongue (Statistics Canada 2007b).

Percentages with English or French mother tongues are declining over time with the Francophone population most affected. At the time of the 1951 census, 59 % of Canada's population had an English mother tongue, 29 % had a French mother tongue, and 12 % had mother tongues other than English or French. By 2006, comparable percentages were 58, 22, and 20 % respectively (Statistics Canada 2008b: Figure 32). The declining share of the French mother tongue population occurs both in and outside Québec: in 1951 the French mother tongue population represented 82.5 % of Québec's population, declining to 79.6 % in 2006. Outside Québec, the French mother tongue population represented 7.1 % of Canada's population in 1951, declining to 4.1 % in 2006 (Lachapelle and Lepage 2010: Table A.1).

The more modest declines in the proportions with a French mother tongue within Québec reflect a demographic balance between massive declines over time in Francophone fertility levels, the outmigration of the Anglophone population to other areas of Canada, and recent international migration of "allophones," defined as those whose mother tongues are neither English nor French. Historically, Québec's higher fertility levels, compared to other provinces, created "the revenge of the cradle" in which the French loss to the British in the 1700s and the threat of assimilation were compensated by high levels of population growth, fueled by high fertility. But along with the rest of Canada, Québec experienced declining fertility throughout the twentieth century, plummeting to levels below those of Canada in the 1960s (Krull and Trovato 2003). Post-World War II immigrants disproportionately were going to areas outside Québec, and the numbers destined for Québec could not compensate for the declines in population size due to smaller families. Moreover, immigrants to Québec during the 1950s, and 1960s displayed a

decided preference for sending their children to English schools and for learning English rather than French. In response to fears over declining population size and the attenuation of Francophone speakers, a number of legislative bills were passed in Québec from 1969 on. These bills sought to prevent the erosion of French by regulating signage on stores and public places and by mandating the enrollment of the children of Anglophones in Francophone schools (Conrick and Regan 2007). In response, a substantial exodus of *les Anglais* (the English in Québec) occurred after 1965, particularly between 1976 and 1981 (Statistics Canada 2007b: Table 13). Because Anglophones were leaving the province, the percentages of French mother tongue only slightly declined during the final quarter of the twentieth century despite the arrival of international migrants who increasingly were allophones (Lachapelle and Lepage 2010).

Mother tongue (the language one first learns in childhood and still understands) is an indicator of linguistic origin, while language use measures current behaviour. From the 1950s on, increasing percentages in Canada indicate they know French in response to the official language question. However, this reflects trends occurring within Québec where the population is becoming increasingly bi-lingual, up from 26 % of the population in 1951 to 41 % in 2006. Over two-thirds of the Québec English mother tongue population reports being bilingual in the 2006 census as does half of the allophone population (Lachapelle and Lepage 2010). Outside Québec, the acquisition of French is less robust. Over the 10 year period between 1996 and 2006, the percentages knowing French declines among the English mother tongue population aged 15–19. Further, if cohorts are tracked, the retention of French declines over the life course for Anglophones who knew French in their late teenage years. Language transfer from French to English is substantial for the population living outside Québec; for this French mother tongue population, those speaking English most often at home rose from 30 % in 1971 to 35 % in 1991 to 39 % in 2006 (Statistics Canada 2008b). Overall, it appears that the use of French is being maintained in Québec but flagging elsewhere in Canada.

Immigration, New Source Regions, and Race

The 1963 Royal Commission on Bi-Culturalism and Bi-Lingualism proposed a two nation conceptualization of the country, where English and French Canada were recognized as equal founding nations with majority status in their respective domains. But from the beginning, immigration was and remains an important part of Canada's nation-building endeavours and non-British and non-French ethnic groups lobbied to be included in any federal policy developments. As a result, a policy of official multiculturalism in a bilingual framework was announced by the federal government in 1971 followed by: (1) the Constitution Act 1982 which officially incorporated the commitment to multiculturalism in Section 27 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and (2) the 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act which had as its objectives to assist in the preservation of culture and language, to reduce discrimination and eradicate racism as ways of fulfilling Canada's human rights obligations, and to enhance cultural awareness and understanding. Following a major policy review, the program was renewed in 1997. Although the policy refers to federal jurisdictions, a number of provinces have adopted multiculturalism policies (Dewing 2009; Kymlicka 2010).

Much has been written about Canada's multiculturalism policy, comparing it with policies of other countries and asking if it goes beyond the three Fs of fun, food, and folk dancing. Symbolically, it has a huge presence in Canadian discourse and law for it emphasizes the right of groups to maintain their cultures, beliefs, and languages (so long as they are not in opposition to laws and human rights), the rights of groups to have full participation in society, and the accommodation of difference by Canadian institutions. The timing of the policy's birth in the early 1970s also is instructive, for it occurs precisely at the start of seismic shifts in the origins of Canada's newcomers.

Given Canada's 400-year history of immigration, regulating who shall enter Canada is fairly

recent. The early legislation of the twentieth century essentially prohibited migration from places other than Europe although workers from China and Japan were grudgingly admitted in small numbers from the mid-1800s to build railways and supply manual labor. As is true for the United States, legislated immigration restrictions began in the late 1880s, with major acts passed in 1910, 1927, and 1952. These acts permitted only the entry of immigrants from the United States or Europe, making nationality the criterion of admissibility. By the 1950s and early 1960s, the blatant racial discrimination associated with nationality restrictions became problematic for the federal government which sought leadership roles within the Commonwealth. During the 1960s, regulations replaced the nationality criterion with family and economic contribution, and the 1976 Immigration Act formalized the criterion of humanitarian concerns. As reaffirmed in the recent 2002 Immigration and Reform Act, there are three main principles of admissibility under which most immigrants enter Canada: family reunification, humanitarian criteria, and economic contribution. Increasingly, migrants are entering Canada on the basis of labour market contributions. Additionally, rising numbers come to study or to take up temporary employment (Boyd and Alboim 2012; Picot and Sweetman 2012). According to the 2006 census, out of a population of 31 million, nearly 6.5 million (or 20 %) are foreign-born (Chui et al. 2007).

With the regulatory and legislative changes from the 1960s on, persons from all over the world can settle in Canada if they meet admissibility criteria. As a result, the origins of migrants and the ethnic/racial composition of Canada are dramatically changing. Table 2.2 shows birthplace regions of the immigrant (permanent resident status) population enumerated in the 2006 census by period of arrival. Those entering Canada before 1971 mostly are born in the United States, the United Kingdom, or Europe. In contrast, of those arriving between 2001 and 2006, only one-quarter (28 %) are born in those areas. Nearly half come from Asia, particularly from the People's Republic of China, India, and the Philippines. Unlike the United States, the popula-

tion from Mexico is very small; less than 1 % of the immigrant population is born in Mexico.

Changing source regions diversify more than just ancestral origins. To the extent that phenotypical differences vary by geographical areas around the world, they also carry the potential to alter the colour composition of a society and to be used in the social construction of race. Table 2.2 shows the increasing percentages of persons of colour by period of immigration. After shunning the collection of "race" data in the aftermath of World War II, the Canadian federal government now collects data on persons of colour, using the term "visible minorities."

This data collection change reflects the development of human rights legislation paralleled by concerns over discrimination. The incorporation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom in the 1982 Constitution Act spelled out a number of fundamental freedoms, democratic rights, mobility rights, legal rights, equality rights, official language rights, and minority language educational rights (see Canada. Department of Justice 1982). Section 15(1) on equality rights stipulates: "Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." In 1983, the federal government struck a Royal Commission on Employment Equity to study how to achieve equality in the Canadian workplace and correct the conditions of disadvantage experienced by four groups: women, aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities, and members of visible minority groups. These four groups remained the target populations in the 1985 Employment Equity Act and its successor in 1995. The Acts cover private sector employers under federal jurisdiction as well as almost all employees of the federal government (Department of Justice 1995; Human Resources and Skills Development Canada 2010). In 2009, the federal legislation covered 14 % of Canada's 2009 employed population. All employers must submit an annual report in which they review the representation of designated groups in their

workforce, analyze any underrepresentation of groups, review their employment practices, and develop plans to remove barriers.

“Visible minority” was first used in the early 1980s to denote groups distinctive by virtue of their race, colour, or “visibility.” The term is socially constructed in that its origins rest on discussions and then legislation on employment equity and program requirements. A (federal) intergovernmental committee ultimately drafted a list of groups, albeit with different degrees of specificity; rather than following a narrow definition of “race,” the list rests on dimensions of race, ethnicity, and culture. Before the 1996 census, visible minorities were identified by combining data on birthplace, religion, and mother tongue. From 1996 on, the following question is found in the censuses and surveys fielded by Statistics Canada: “Is this person?” Pre-coded response categories include (in order of listing): White; Chinese; South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, etc.); Black; Filipino; Latin American; Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Cambodian, Malaysian, Laotian, etc.); Arab; West Asian (e.g., Iranian, Afghan, etc.); Korean; Japanese; Other (to be specified by the respondent). Respondents who place themselves in one or more category other than white are considered members of Canada’s “visible minority” groups. Multiple responses are permitted. When white and one of the designated visible minority groups are both selected, the response is treated as indicating visible minority status. However, when a response is White-Arab or White-West Asian, or White-Latin American, it is placed in the non-visible minority group. This procedure partially follows the United States census practice of considering Arabs and West Asians to be “white.” But it also suggests gradations, if not ambiguity or inconsistencies, in how “colour” is defined. Other criticisms include the use of broad categories such as Black, South Asian, or Chinese that homogenize groups with different geographical origins, cultures, languages, and discriminatory experiences.

Data on the visible minority composition of Canada’s population serve both specific and general functions. The specific *raison d’être* for the

officially mandated collection of data is the need to calculate appropriate levels of representation within the workplace to comply with Employment Equity programs established by the federal government. This is accomplished by first establishing the “Labour Market Agreement” (LMA) availability, or the share of designated group members in the workforce from which employers can hire. The LMA is calculated from data on visible minorities collected in each quinquennial census. For example, based on the 2006 census, the overall LMA used for visible minorities is 14.5, indicating that approximately 14.5 % of the workforce are visible minorities that can be hired in federally regulated public and private sectors. In 2009, visible minorities are 14.1 % of the actual workforce in these sectors. Although representation is only slightly below availability, there are large sector variations. In private sector businesses, including banks and transportation firms, 17 % of the workforce are visible minorities (with an LMA of 15.3), whereas in the public sector (including the federal public service) only 8.3 % are visible minorities compared to an LMA of 13 (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada 2010: Table 7.1).

In addition to being an essential component of compliance with employment equity legislation, data on visible minorities offer two insights: (1) they speak to fundamental changes in Canada’s demographic profile; (2) they show the well-being of groups defined by colour relative to the white majority, thereby indicating where inequalities exist. With respect to the first topic, the removal of the national origins criterion from immigration regulations underlies the growth of Canada’s visible minority population. Percentages that are members of visible minority groups rise from 4.7 % in 1981 to 16.2 % of Canada’s population in 2006. Almost all reside in cities of 100,000 or more (96 % in 2006) compared with slightly over two-thirds (68 %) of the country’s total population. As gateway cities for migrants, Toronto and Vancouver attract a substantial number of visible minority groups. In 2006, two out of five residents in Toronto (43 %) and Vancouver (42 %) are visible minorities (Statistics Canada 2008c).

The Chinese, South Asian, and Black groups are the largest visible minority populations in Canada (Table 2.3). Unlike the white population where only one in ten is a foreign-born permanent resident, immigrants are the majority in most visible minority groups. The Japanese visible minority is an exception; many arrived before the 1920s, and immigration from Japan did not resume when restrictions were lifted in the 1960s. Visible minority groups also are recent arrivals, with over half of the Arab, West Asian, and Korean visible minority immigrants arriving between 2001 and 2006. Consistent with their immigration histories, most visible minority groups in Canada are allophones, where the mother tongue first spoken and currently understood is neither English nor French. The sole exception is the Black population, which includes migrants from Caribbean and African countries. Groups with higher percentages of immigrants and with high percentages who are allophones also are most likely to be using languages other than English or French most often in the home (Table 2.3).

In terms of their socio-economic status, how do visible minority groups in Canada compare with the white population? One in five (19 %) of the white population age 25 and older have a university or higher degree. This is also the case for the Black and Southeast Asian visible minority groups in Canada, but educational attainments are higher for the remaining visible minorities. Over half of those who belong to the Korean visible minority group have university degrees or higher, followed by over one third for the Chinese, South Asian, Filipino, Arab, West Asian, and Japanese visible minorities. At the same time, however, census data indicate that labour force participation rates among visible minority groups are slightly lower, and for most visible minority groups, unemployment rates are higher than those for the white population.

In stratification research, income is considered an important indicator of the well-being of groups, in part because in monetized societies, income is highly associated with what Max Weber calls “life chances,” including access to education, health, and housing. Despite higher percentages having university degrees or above,

many of the visible minority groups have lower average or median employment earnings (wages, salaries, and self-employment income) than the white population. Further, all visible minority groups have higher percentages of their populations living in households considered poor¹ given the proportion of income spent on basic necessities of food, shelter, and clothing. The incidence of being poor takes on additional importance given the higher percentages of children under the age of 15 in visible minority groups. Table 2.3 shows that fewer than one in ten white children reside in low income families, compared with approximately one-fourth of those who are Chinese, South Asian, and Southeast Asian visible minorities. Between one-third and one half of children who are members of Black, Latin American Arab, West Asian, and Korean visible minorities reside in low income families.

Many of these indicators of socio-economic characteristics are correlated with immigration status. Recent arrivals need time to become established, and the shift in origin countries implies that many new arrivals will not necessarily have the same English or French language skills as the Canadian-born (Derwing and Waugh 2012). Nor do groups share similar characteristics, particularly with respect to human capital related skills such as education and training. However, recent studies show: (1) lower earnings for visible minorities compared to whites with Black and South Asian visible minorities having lowest earnings; (2) the persistence of this gap during the past 15 years (1996–2006); (3) small differences between visible minorities and whites in the public sector but larger in the private sector where black men and women are particularly

¹The definition of “poor” is derived from a Statistics Canada measure called low income cut-offs (LICOs). Statistics Canada does not officially call this measure a poverty indicator, but it is used by many researchers as an indicator of economic deprivation. Low income cut-offs are calculated for individuals living in economic families, defined as a group of individuals related by blood, marriage, or adopted and living in the same dwelling, or persons living alone or not in a household where they are related to others in that dwelling. These cut-offs are specific to the size of the city or town in which people reside and to the size of family, for those living in families.

Table 2.3 Demographic, social and economic characteristics of the white and visible minority populations, Canada 2006

Characteristics	Single responses										Multiple responses		
	White (1)	Chinese (2)	South Asian (3)	Black (4)	Filipino (5)	Latin American (6)	South east Asian (7)	Arab (8)	West Asian (9)	Korean (10)		Japanese (11)	Visible minority. n.i.e. (12)
Characteristics	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Total size, in '000s	24,772	1,165	1,232	694	389	301	231	265	156	138	60	71	458
Percent of total population ^a	79.7	3.7	4.0	2.2	1.3	1.0	0.7	0.9	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.2	1.5
Percent allophone	10	86	71	25	65	87	79	75	90	90	61	19	26
Percent with no knowledge of English and/or French	1	16	8	1	1	7	9	4	8	10	4	2	2
Percent with English or French not spoken mostly at home	4	67	50	11	32	55	58	42	65	73	30	12	15
Nativity and residence status	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Canadian ^b	89	23	28	39	22	21	29	27	15	13	53	34	67
Immigrants ^c	11	74	70	58	74	72	69	69	83	72	34	64	32
Non-permanent residents ^d	0	3	2	4	4	7	2	4	3	15	14	2	2
Percent of immigrants ^e who arrived between 1996-2006	17	41	49	36	44	40	21	53	61	60	43	29	38
Percent aged 25-plus with bachelors degree or higher	19	37	34	19	39	23	19	41	39	52	36	15	35
Age 25-54													
Labour Force Participation rate	87	80	82	84	89	82	81	74	75	68	76	83	85
Unemployment rate	5	7	7	9	4	8	7	13	9	7	5	7	7
Average employment income in 2005	44,692	37,465	34,894	31,857	32,326	29,682	32,572	33,032	30,479	30,253	50,559	35,102	38,784
Median employment income in 2005	36,081	28,929	27,691	27,898	29,476	25,073	27,393	22,892	21,254	19,752	36,364	30,665	31,266

Ratio, Average employment income in 2005	100	84	93	91	101	92	110	101	92	99	167	69	110
Ratio, Median employment income in 2005	100	80	96	101	106	85	109	84	93	93	184	84	102
Percent in low income (after tax) all economic family members 2005	6	20	16	24	8	21	19	33	32	38	9	16	15
Percent in low income (after tax) for persons not in economic families	26	54	44	44	42	51	49	56	55	70	41	42	38
Age 0–14													
Percent of total population under age 15	16	16	23	25	19	19	21	26	20	17	7	20	44
Percent in low income (after tax) economic families, 2005	9	23	23	36	12	31	26	43	44	48	18	24	17

Source: Calculated for this chapter from: Statistics Canada 2006 Census of Population. Data Products, Topic-based tabulations: Ethnic origin and visible minorities, Table 14 – Population Groups, Age Groups, Sex and Selected Demographic, Cultural, Labour Force, Educational and Income Characteristics, for the Total Population of Canada. <http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/tbt/Lp-eng.cfm?LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=0&GID=0&GK0&GRP=1&PID=0&PTYPE=88971,97154&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2006&THEME=80&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=>

^aWhen the 3.7 % of Canada’s population who declare aboriginal identity are included, columns sum to 100 %

^bIncludes a small fraction that were born outside Canada but are Canadian by birth

^cImmigrants are defined as those foreign born persons who have been legally admitted to Canada and have permanent resident status

^dNon-permanent residents are those legally admitted on a temporary basis for studying, for work or as refugee claimants awaiting adjudication of their claims

disadvantaged; and (4) no gaps or positive differences between the Chinese and white workers (Hou and Coulombe 2010; Pendakur and Pendakur 2011). Occupational segregation, location in the bottom of firm hierarchies and the existence of a glass ceiling not only exist for visible minorities but, at least in firm based studies, explain a great deal of the earnings gaps compared to white workers (Fearon and Wald 2011; Yap 2010; Yap and Konrad 2009).

The question of how well various visible minority groups are doing is important not only because answers provide insight into Canada's ethnic and racial stratification, but also because the visible minority population will substantially increase in the near future. Recent estimates say that within 20 years (2031) three in ten Canadians will be a member of a visible minority group. This expected growth is related to immigration trends; at least one-quarter of Canada's population in 2031 is likely to be foreign-born. Labor force changes also will occur with approximately one-quarter expected to be visible minorities by 2031 (Martel et al. 2011). By 2031, close to three-quarters of the foreign born (71 %) will belong to a visible minority group; nearly half (47.5 %) of the second generation, who are the Canadian born children of immigrants, will be visible minorities. These changes will be more intense in Canada's large cities where many visible minorities (and immigrants) reside. In 20 years, approximately three persons in five in Toronto and Vancouver could belong to visible minority groups. At that point, these groups will no longer be a demographic minority (Malenfant and Morency 2011).

Canada's First Peoples: A Changing World

Within the Canadian discussions on race, stratification and disadvantage, the situation of the Aboriginal population is the most troublesome. The narration of Canada's demographic history foregrounds the arrival of French explorers in the early 1500s, quickly followed by the arrival of the British Hudson Bay Company. The fact that

Canada's aboriginal peoples preceded the arrival of Europeans by thousands of years is lost in this saga of French and British settlement. Yet from the 1500s, aboriginal-non-aboriginal relations have been important in how Canada has developed politically and economically. Without the early assistance of Aboriginals, French and British explorations, settlement endeavours, and fur trade development would have been far more problematic (Dickason and Newbigging 2010; Frideres and Gadacz 2008).

However, the initial influence and centrality of the aboriginal populations in the settlement by Europeans were not to be maintained for demographic and political reasons. New diseases, particularly smallpox, accompanied European traders and decimated large numbers of Aboriginals with no previous exposure or immunity. The size of the aboriginal population before the 1400 and 1500s is estimated at approximately 500,000, arguably a conservative number. In the aftermath of population declines, slightly over 100,000 Aboriginals in Canada were recorded in the 1871 census (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 1996: volume 1, chapter 2).

The population has rebounded since then. By 2006, approximately 1.7 million persons indicated at least one aboriginal ethnic origin, representing 3.8 % of the total Canadian population, in contrast to Australia and the United States where indigenous peoples make up approximately 2 % of the respective populations (Statistics Canada 2008a). In just under 100 years, from 1911 to 2006, the ethnically defined aboriginal population increased 11 times, compared to the total Canadian population's four and a half-fold increase. The faster growth rate of the former reflects higher fertility levels, increased life expectancy, improved enumeration, and a greater propensity to report aboriginal ancestry and/or aboriginal identity, partly in response to a growing awareness of aboriginal issues as a result of judicial decisions. This "ethnic mobility" component of growth is particularly strong for the Métis, who are of mixed European and aboriginal ancestry. This group grew by 33 % between 2001 and 2006; some of the growth is attributed to a court decision which provided an expanded definition

of Métis (O'Donnell and Wallace 2011; Newhouse and Belanger 2010; Statistics Canada 2008a).

With growing European settlement from the 1600s on, the aboriginal population rapidly became a minority vulnerable to the models of governance used by the French and British. The victory of the British over the French at the end of the Seven Years War began the process in which aboriginal communities gradually became wards of the state. The stance adopted by the British was twofold: first, Aboriginals under their dominion would become extinct, a real demographic possibility given the rapid declines in population; second, those who did not disappear would be assimilated. However, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 recognized aboriginal interest in, and use of, ancestral lands, stipulating that no lands could be bought or infringed upon without treaties or consent and that such treaties involved both the British government and the aboriginal population (Dickason and Newbigging 2010: 104; Frideres 2011: 9). Numerous treaties involving land followed these stipulations, with most diminishing the area under aboriginal stewardship (see Dickason and Newbigging 2010). These treaties were accompanied by domiciling increasing numbers of Aboriginals on reserves. As Newhouse and Belanger (2010:341) cogently observe, the history of the aboriginal peoples became shaped by a dual paradigm of the "Indian problem" in which the federal government saw assimilation and absorption as the solution and the "Canada problem," which from the aboriginal perspective meant establishing sovereignty over a territory that would permit them to retain their culture and to have decision-making powers.

The British North American Act of 1867 (sometimes called the Confederation Act) recognized the special relationship of Canada's Aboriginals within the Confederation, declaring them and their lands federal responsibility. The Indian Act of 1876 made the aboriginal population living on reserves legal wards of the state and stipulated who was deemed Indian (a discussion of terminology follows). Metis, then described as "half-breed," were not considered to have Indian status. White women who married

males considered "status" or "registered" Indians acquired Indian status; however, Indian women who married white men were considered full participants in Canadian society and to have lost their Indian status. The 1985 amendment to the Indian Act removed the patrilineal definition of status Indian, leaving it up to the bands to determine their membership lists. As a result, although women who lost their status have been legally reinstated as Status Indians, bands are not required to include them and they do not necessarily have access to band resources. Most recently, the Gender Equity in Indian Registration Act (Bill C-3), enforced on January 31, 2011, makes possible the acquisition of registered Indian status for approximately 45,000 grandchildren of women who lost status as a result of marrying non-Indian men.

These definitional changes are partly responsible for changes in the size of the status Indian population in recent times. Other groups fall under the more generic "aboriginal" terminology. The 1982 patriation of Canada's constitution from the United Kingdom gives Canada sole power to amend its constitution and to determine its laws. Within the Constitution Act 1982, Part II Section 35 spelled out the rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada, defined as the Indian, Inuit, and Metis of Canada. Indian has both a general and specific meaning; registered Indian (most commonly referred to as status Indians) refers to those registered under the Indian Act who can prove their band signed a treaty. But because bands are now allowed to determine membership, some band members are not necessarily registered Indians. Inuit refers to those inhabiting the uppermost Northern and Arctic regions.

In addition to surveys that bands may sponsor, data also are collected by the department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (AAND) for the reserve population and by Statistics Canada through Aboriginal specific surveys and through quinquennial censuses. The census offers the most comprehensive count because it enumerates aboriginal populations in and outside reserves. However, some reserves refuse to be enumerated; in others, only partial data are available (Statistics Canada 2008a);

finally, undercounts remain a concern both on and off reserves (Statistics Canada 2010). The 2006 Canadian census collects information on *aboriginal ancestry* through its ethnic origin question on ancestry; data on *aboriginal identity* are collected by asking respondents if they are North American Indian, Metis, or Inuit. Additional information is collected on *Band* or *First Nation membership* and whether the respondent is a *Treaty Indian* or a *Registered Indian* as defined by the Indian Act of Canada (Statistics Canada 2007a). Not only do the counts for the registered Indians differ between Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development and Statistics Canada, but numbers fluctuate depending on the definitions used in the census. In 2006 1,678,200 persons reported aboriginal ancestry (ethnic origins); 1,172,790 reported an aboriginal identity; 620,340 reported band or First Nation membership; 623,780 reported having registered Indian status (Statistics Canada 2010). Among the groups declaring an aboriginal identity in the past 20 years, the Metis are the fastest growing; their 33 % growth contrasts with 12 % for the Inuit population, 15 % for North American Indians, and 12 % for those with registered Indian status (Statistics Canada n.d.).

The “status” or “registered” Indian concept that governs past and present relations between First Nations aboriginals and the Canadian federal government remains thorny. On the one hand, it permits sovereignty rights to Aboriginals living on reserves within Canada. For these persons, the federal government through Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (also known as the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada) provides funds for housing, elementary and secondary education, health services, and social assistance, mostly delivered by bands or tribal councils. They may also benefit from various treaty entitlements and from eligibility for post-secondary schooling assistance (Frideres 2011; Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1995).

On the other hand, from the many legacies of the pre- and post-Confederation policies that Aboriginals are wards of the state and should be assimilated, two capture the systematic and sys-

temic disadvantages experienced by Aboriginals at the hands of the federal government. First, despite the expectations of Indians that schools would be established within their communities, off-reserve residential educational institutions were created during the nineteenth century; they were only dismantled starting in the 1970s, with the last school closing in 1996. Children were removed from their families and communities and placed in boarding schools that forbade the use of native languages and the practice of traditional religions and other cultural customs such as boys wearing long hair. As well, mental and physical abuse occurred, resulting in thousands of lawsuits by victims in the early millennium, formal apologies by churches running the schools, and the Residential Schools Settlement Agreement in 2007 in which the federal government compensated an estimated 80,000 survivors of specific schools. The Prime Minister made a formal apology on behalf of the Canadian government in June 2008 (Dickason and Newbigging 2010; Frideres 2011: Chapter 4).

A second consequence of the historical treatment of Aboriginals is the persisting low standard of living. Some reserves such as the Attawapiskat First Nation lack adequate housing, electricity, water, and schooling. In fact, poor living conditions, along with high poverty rates, food security, and health, describe a number of aboriginal populations, both on and off reserves.

The existence of 22 incompletely enumerated reserves in the 2006 census (down from 30 in 2001 and 77 in 1996) limits the available information on the reserve population and affects the measurement of temporal changes. However, it appears that the status Indian population increasingly is not living on reserves.² According to the 1981 census, 41 % lived off reserves; in 2006, 52 % lived off reserves (O'Donnell and Wallace 2011: Tables 3 and 5). In the census, a broader concept, “First Nations,” includes those

²“On-reserve” refers to “legally defined Indian reserves, Indian settlements, other land types created by the ratification of Self-Government Agreements and other northern communities affiliated with First Nations according to the criteria established by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada” (Statistics Canada 2010).

identifying themselves as North American Indian; 60 % of this group lives off reserves (Statistics Canada 2008a).

Aboriginal groups also differ in geographical distribution. As shown in Table 2.4, those reporting they are aboriginal in the 2006 census are concentrated in the prairie provinces, British Columbia, and Ontario. Nearly four out of ten declaring as North American Indian or Registered Indian and over half of those identifying as Métis reside in the three western provinces of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Alberta. In contrast, over half of those reporting themselves Inuit live in Northern Canada and in the northern regions of Newfoundland and Labrador and Québec. Altogether, over three quarters of the Inuit population resides in “Inuit Nunaat” or the “Inuit homeland,” a northern region representing about one third of Canada’s land mass (Statistics Canada 2008a: Tables 6, 13, and 17).

Table 2.4 also shows the impoverished conditions of the Aboriginal population compared to non-Aboriginals. At least one in three in aboriginal groups is a child under the age of 15, with the Inuit having the youngest population. Compared to the non-aboriginal population, these children are more likely to be living in common-law families or in single-parent families; with the exception of Inuit children, they also are likely to be living with more than one family. Household and dwelling characteristics for the aboriginal population confirm the concerns over poverty and housing quality. All groups are more likely than the non-aboriginal population to have higher average household size and higher percentages of households below Canada’s LICOs that frequently serve as indicators of poverty. The percentages living in crowded conditions, using the measure of more than one person per room (excluding halls, bathrooms, entrance ways), is higher for all aboriginal groups as are the percentages residing in dwellings that require minimum or maximum repairs (based on the census question, “Is this dwelling in need of repairs?”).

Labour market indicators also confirm the economically disadvantaged circumstances of aboriginal populations. Compared to the non-

aboriginal population, labour force rates are lower, and unemployment rates are higher for North American Indians, Registered Indians, and the Inuit. Approximately one in five of those in the labour force is unemployed in the week before the census (May 16, 2006). Of those working at least a week in 2005 and thus reporting earnings, aboriginal populations are more likely to work part-time, especially those with Inuit identity, and the average number of weeks worked is lower than for the non-aboriginal population. Average earnings range from 59 to 77 % of the 2005 earnings of the non-aboriginal population.

The next generations appear likely to continue the saga of economic disadvantage, poverty, and poor housing. Of the population aged 20–24 in 2006, nearly half of those identifying as North American Indian, Inuit, or Registered Indian have not yet graduated from high school compared to one in ten of non-Aboriginals (Table 2.4). The Canadian census does not collect data on student grade level, complicating the calculation of accurate drop-out rates. A measure used in the past is to calculate the percentage of the population age 20–24 who do not have high school diplomas and who were not attending schooling in the previous year. This measure, shown in Table 2.4, suggests that approximately four out of ten young adults who identify themselves as North American Indian, Inuit, or registered Indians have permanently dropped out of high school. Another measure of economic marginality is the percentage who are not employed and not in school; compared to one in ten white young adults, North American Indian, Inuit or registered Indians are three to four times more likely to be in this category.

Funding education is the constitutionally mandated responsibility of provinces. However, treaties and the Constitution Act 1867 give federal authority for providing education to the registered Indian population, and services are now provided by the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs. Since 1996, a cap of 2 % annually is placed on funding increases even though school age populations on reserves are rapidly growing in response to high fertility levels. In

Table 2.4 Selected demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the non-aboriginal and aboriginal populations, Canada, 2006

Characteristics	Single response					
	Non-aboriginal (1)	Total aboriginal identity ^a (2)	North American Indian (3)	Metis (4)	Inuit (5)	Registered Indian ^b (6)
Region	100	100	100	100	100	100
Northern Canada	0	5	3	1	57	3
Nova Scotia and Labrador	2	2	1	2	9	1
Other maritime provinces ^c	6	3	4	3	1	4
Québec	24	9	9	7	22	9
Ontario	39	21	23	19	5	20
Western provinces ^d	16	43	42	53	5	46
British Columbia	13	17	19	15	1	18
Population age 0–14						
Percent of total population	17	30	32	25	36	32
Type of household	100	100	100	100	100	100
One family, married couple	65	36	32	47	33	30
One family, common-law couple	14	22	23	18	30	23
One family, lone parent family	16	31	32	30	18	32
More than one family	5	11	13	6	19	14
Two or more persons not in census families	0	1	1	0	0	1
Household characteristics, all ages						
Average number of persons in household	3	4	4	3	5	4
Percentages						
Of households below poverty line (LICO)	15	32	38	22	18	39
Of household below poverty line (LICO) after taxes	11	24	29	16	12	30
Of population living in crowded dwellings	3	9	12	3	25	13
Of population in dwellings requiring minimum repairs ^e	28	33	32	35	32	32

(continued)

Table 2.4 (continued)

Characteristics	Single response					
	Non-aboriginal (1)	Total aboriginal identity ^a (2)	North American Indian (3)	Metis (4)	Inuit (5)	Registered Indian ^b (6)
Of population in dwellings requiring maximum repairs ^c	7	24	29	15	28	30
Employment profile, ages 25–54						
Not in the labour force	15	26	29	19	28	30
In the labour force	85	74	71	81	72	70
In labour force but unemployed in reference week	6	15	18	10	19	19
Employment activity, ages 25–54 (worked at least 1 week in 2005)						
Percent working mainly part time in 2005	17	19	18	19	27	18
Average number of weeks worked in 2005	45	41	39	43	37	39
Average market income ^d	\$41,898	\$28,570	\$25,612	\$32,387	\$30,883	\$24,845
Ratio of market income to non-aboriginal income	(RG)	68	61	77	74	59
Education, ages 20–24						
Percent with less than high school diploma	12	39	48	25	50	49
Percent high school dropout ^e	10	30	36	19	44	37
Percent not in school, not employed	9	27	34	16	38	35

Source: Customized table produced by the author especially for this volume from the 2006 Public Use Microdata File on Individuals, 2006 Census of Canada

^aReponses to the census question: “Is this person an Aboriginal person, that is, North American Indian, Metis or Inuit (Eskimo)?” Approximately 2.8 % of Aboriginal responses were multiple aboriginal responses or aboriginal responses not covered by the three main categories. These replies are included in the total Aboriginal counts of this table (column 2)

^bPersons who answered in the affirmative to the census question: “Is this person a Treaty Indian or a Registered Indian as defined by the Indian Act of Canada?”

^cProvinces of Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick

^dProvinces of Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Alberta

^eExamples of minor repairs are missing or loose floor tiles, bricks or shingles, defective steps, railing or siding, etc. Examples of major repairs are defective plumbing or electrical wiring, structural repairs to walls, floors or ceilings, etc

^fMarket income refers to wage, salary and self-employment income

^gCalculated as the proportion of those age 20–24 who have not completed high school and who were not attending school in the 12 months prior to the census

addition to woefully underfunded education, critics charge that on-reserve schools are run by inexperienced teachers who are paid less than those in public schools, the physical structures are inadequate, and schools lack computers or libraries. Not surprisingly, pressure is mounting to legislate a First Nations education system, with a First Nations Education Act expected sometime in 2012 or 2013 (Harper 2012; Ibbitson 2012; Library of Parliament n.d.).

The aboriginal population of Canada will continue to grow; projections estimate totals between 1,682,000 and 2,220,000 within two decades, causing the aboriginal share of the Canadian population to rise from 3.8 % in 2006 to between 4 and 5.3 % in 2031 (Malenfant and Morency 2011). These increases reflect ethnic mobility factors and demographic factors. Numbers are expected to increase not only because of strong identity retention among aboriginal groups, but also because of the greater tendency of respondents in surveys to change or augment their selection of aboriginal identities or aboriginal ancestry. Demographically, the aboriginal populations have higher levels of natural increase, a term that refers to the positive gains when increases due to fertility are higher than the losses caused by mortality. Numerous studies show that mortality levels are higher for aboriginal peoples than for non-aboriginals, often substantially higher. But fertility is even higher. The total fertility rate in 2005/2007 is estimated as 1.6 for the non-aboriginal population compared to 2.7, 2.4, and 1.7 for women who respectively identify themselves as Inuit, North American Indian, and Métis (Malenfant and Morency 2011).

The projected growth of aboriginal populations means that the median age will rise from 27 years in 2006 to 35–37 in 2031. Even so, overall, the population will still be younger than the non-aboriginal population, with the Inuit substantially younger than North American Indians and Métis. The concentration of Inuit in Canada's northern region, particularly in Nunavut, will persist, but the numerical growth of the North American Indian and Métis populations means increased concentration in Saskatchewan and

Manitoba. Estimates suggest that minimally one in five of the inhabitants of these provinces will identify as American Indian or Métis. In the context of historical and contemporary disadvantages, the impending demographic changes make socio-economic improvements for Canada's aboriginal peoples imperative.

Conclusion

Canada is distinctive among European and Australasian democracies (Kymlicka 2010) because racial and ethnic diversity and equity and human rights based discourse both derive from and continually reshape the country's demographic, social, and political landscape. In response to Canada's ethnic and racial diversity and to issues of inequality, federal action includes: (1) policies of official bilingualism and multiculturalism; (2) policies that promotes equality particularly with respect to minority groups, including groups of color; and (3) numerous reports that call for the eradication of extreme disadvantage and emphasize the rights of aboriginal people to self-government.

The first arises from the legacy of English-French settlements, and the geographical concentration of the French in one province, Québec. The attentiveness to multi-culturalism as opposed to bi-culturalism also reflects the growth in ethnically diverse populations as a result of continued immigration throughout Canada's history. The second recognizes – and affects – new immigrant groups of color. The third also rests on the earliest of Canada's settlements and acknowledges persistent economic disadvantage over hundreds of years. This chapter presents data on language, changing immigration patterns, and on the socio-economic characteristics of visible minority groups and the Aboriginal populations.

Data on each of the target populations – French language groups, visible minorities and Aboriginal peoples – is collected by state agencies, in particular Statistics Canada. As a result, the definition of each group is constructed, resting on particular policy objectives and decisions. This chapter inventories how data are collected

and what dimensions are collected for ethnic and racially defined groups.

Definitions, however, are never static as shown in the changing measurement of ethnic origins and in the increasing questions asked about Aboriginal background, identity and band membership. Furthermore, ethnic flux often underlies shifts in ethnic and racial composition. Since the 1990s, people increasingly are selecting “Canadian” as an option although the meaning of the term differs for those in Québec compared to those living elsewhere. Among the Aboriginal populations, variations also exist, fueled in part by changes in legal eligibility to acquire labels. A third contribution of the chapter lies in showing how ethnicity and race are dynamic and changing in response to social content and social interaction.

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The Demography of Race and Ethnicity in the United States

3

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The 2008 election of Barack Obama, the nation's first non-white president, brought forth a barrage of attempts to identify the root causes of the election. Were we moving into a post-racial phase of American race relationships? Or was this a demographic phenomenon, driven by the infusion of new, largely young voters who were more racially and ethnically diverse than voting populations had been in the past. One indicator that this was a by-product of demographic changes was the fact that while Obama had won handedly, he had done so with only 55 % of the White vote. Indeed, the voting population had—changed color in demographic terms, suggesting a new social significance of an increasingly diverse population.

This chapter aims to bring into focus some of the core themes of the United States race/ethnic demography. Since 2000, there has been a veritable explosion of edited volumes, books, and articles that provide comprehensive overviews of race/ethnicity (e.g., Smelser et al. 2001; Krysan and Lewis 2004; Farley and Haaga 2005; Perlmann and Waters 2002). Trends from the 2010 Census are likely to pro-

duce as many volumes to document the changes. This chapter aims to provide an overview of much of that work and provide a few key updates in those trends. As is detailed below, the 1990s witnessed many shifts in race/ethnic composition and many questions arose as to both the source and the implications of a more diverse nation, particularly for patterns indicating increasingly or declining racial inequality. In addition, documenting these changes has also coincided with an increased interest in the ways large-scale administrative bodies, like the Census classify race and ethnicity. Morning (2008a, b)'s survey of 141 national censuses uncovers tremendous variation in how the concept of race, ethnicity, and national origin are adopted to measure demography of the public. Understanding the nuances of measuring race is important because tracking shifts in population size, composition, and indicators social well-being rely on consistently applied techniques of classification and categorization. However, the classification by race, historically, has been anything but consistent (Lee 1993; Snipp 2003). The current Census 2010 represents one of the only whose racial categorization mirrors that of the previous Census.

Therefore race/ethnic demography is centered on understanding three thematic issues, the ever-changing population composition by race/ethnicity, indicators of racial inequality, the complexity of race/ethnic identity.

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Definitions of Race and Ethnicity

At the outset, a discussion of race and ethnicity requires definition of the terms. While both are deemed socially constructed (Omi and Winant 1994), ethnicity generally has more cultural or behavioral connotations that are linked to a specific ancestral line, while race tends to emphasize physical distinctions between broader ancestral groupings. The socially constructed nature of both concepts implies that these distinctions are not necessarily grounded in a set of hard facts, but rather hinge upon linkages that are believed in or agreed upon to be similar (Weber 1978; Cornell and Hartmann 2007), are developed through interactions between in-group and out-group members (Barth 1969), and, as in the case of race, imply a structure that represents designations of advantage and disadvantage (Cornell and Hartmann 2007). For simplicity of terminology, I employ the standard groupings used by the Office of Management and Budget (1997): White, Black, Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic/Latino, and Native American and when possible, the category of Two or More Races to highlight the most commonly applied race/ethnic distinctions made in demographic literature. I, however, acknowledge that all carry substantial internal demographic, cultural, political and historical variation.

Demographic Profile of United States

In this section, I provide a brief overview of the demographic profile of the United States by race and ethnicity. Many scholars have described U.S. racial and ethnic demography using data from Census 2000 (e.g., Farley and Haaga 2005; Lee and Bean 2004; Perez and Hirschman 2009; Perlmann and Waters 2002). I present an update to their work using the 3 year combined estimates

of the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2006 to 2008.¹

Over the course of the twentieth century, there have been many dramatic changes in the racial demography of the U.S., all of which have continued unabated during the early years of the 21st. Shifts in racial composition show this population growth has not been evenly distributed across all race/ethnic groups. The large majority of U.S. history has been characterized by a bi-furcated racial structure, with very large numbers of White Europeans and relatively small, though prominent, numbers of Blacks or African Americans, and very small number of other groups (i.e. Asians, American Indians, and Hispanics). The late twentieth century and the 21st has witnessed a shift to multifaceted structure (Lee and Bean 2004; Bonilla Silva and Glover 2004; Pollard and O'Hare 1999), with Whites occupying a diminishing share of the U.S. population, African Americans ultimately stabilizing their growth, and Asians and particularly Hispanics gaining in numbers (Durand et al. 2005). At the century's end and moving in the new century, the growth of the Hispanic population has confirmed the projections that this group would overtake African Americans as the new major minority group (Lee and Bean 2004). Meanwhile Asians, while relatively small, represent one of the fastest growing populations (Saenz 2005) (Table 3.1).

I begin with the U.S. racial composition for Hispanics and non-Hispanics. For comparative purposes, I include distributions from the 1990 and 2000 Census, Summary File 3 files (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993). As of 2000,

¹The information gathered is similar to the—long-form Census questionnaire. Unlike the—snapshot provided by the decennial census, the ACS is an on-going monthly survey that gains information from approximately two million households a year. These data are—...period estimates that average 12, 36, and 60 months of data, respectively for a 1, 3-, and 5 years periods (National Research Council 2007: 1), therefore they are more akin to averages across that time period.

Table 3.1 Racial composition of the United States by Hispanic ethnicity, 1990, 2000 and 2006–2008 estimates

	1990		2000		2006–2008 (A CS)		Margin of error ^a
	Estimate	Percentage	Estimate	Percentage	Estimate	Percentage	
Not Hispanic/Latino (all races)	226,809,784	91.2	246,183,425	87.5	255,805,545	84.9	±5,825
White alone	188,424,773	75.8	194,514,140	69.1	198,420,355	65.9	±10,793
Black or African American alone	29,284,596	11.8	33,707,230	12.0	36,397,922	12.1	±23,532
American Indian and Alaska Native alone	1,866,807	0.8	2,091,206	0.7	2,041,269	0.7	±11,520
Asian alone	6,994,302	2.8	10,067,813	3.6	13,000,306	4.3	±16,990
Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander alone	n/a	n/a	342,743	0.1	413,294	0.1	±5,340
Some other race alone	239,306	0.1	447,552	0.2	737,938	0.2	±12,595
Two or more races	n/a	n/a	5,012,741	1.8	4,794,461	1.6	±30,020
Hispanic/Latino (all races)	21,900,089	8.8	35,238,481	12.5	45,432,158	15.1	±5,828
White alone	11,402,291	4.6	16,839,585	6.0	25,544,654	8.5	±61,932
Black or African American alone	645,928	0.3	654,510	0.2	733,849	0.2	±14,163
American Indian and Alaska Native alone	148,336	0.1	356,783	0.1	378,626	0.1	±10,151
Asian alone	232,684	0.1	104,007	0.0	163,863	0.1	±5,136
Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander alone	n/a	n/a	36,039	0.0	32,870	0.0	±3,044
Some other race alone	9,470,850	3.8	14,989,372	5.3	16,801,052	5.6	±56,711
Two or more races	n/a	n/a	2,258,185	0.8	1,777,244	0.6	±24,448
Total population	248,709,873		281,421,906		301,237,703		

Source: 1990 United States Census, Summary File 3 (U.S. Census Bureau 1993); 2000 United States Census, Summary File 3; 2006–2008 American Community Survey. These estimates are taken between January of 2006 to December 2008 and represent an average estimate of this time period (National Research Council 2007: 61–62). Although single year estimates of the ACS are more current, these represent an average based on a larger sample size and coverage of a larger range of geographic units, those inclusive of a population of 20,000 or greater

n/a this categorization was not available during the corresponding Census year

Multiple categories. This option was not available in 1990, therefore persons of multiple racial heritages may have declared themselves in any number of single race categories

^aMargin of error provides the boundaries of estimates around a 90 % Confidence interval

^bCorresponding figures represent the aggregation across all races and should not be added to race-specific figures below

the population count of the United States was in excess of 281 million, representing an additional 32.7 million persons since 1990. In only 6–8 years since, an average of 19 million persons have been added to the population.² The largest race/ethnic population continues to be non-Hispanic Whites representing an average of nearly two-thirds (65.9 %) of the U.S. population, followed by Hispanics (all races combined),³ who emerged as the second largest race-ethnic group in 2003, representing 15 %, then African Americans (12.1 %), and finally non-Hispanic Asians (4.3 %). Only one percent of the U.S. population, or 2.5 million persons on average, belong to the remaining race/ethnic communities: Native Hawaiians and American Indians. Finally, 2.2 % of the population (when added between Hispanics and non-Hispanics) reported two or more racial categories. The racial composition of the Hispanic population is listed in the panel below. The most apparent difference in racial composition is the relative size of the—Some Other race category, which is more than 16 million among Hispanics compared to less than one million among non-Hispanics.⁴

Table 3.2 reports the distributions of nationality for Asians (Panel A) and Latinos (Panel B). As in 2000, this composition reflects the post-1965 immigration waves (Durand et al. 2005; Xie and Goyette 2005). Chinese, Asian Indians, and Filipinos continue to be the three largest Asian ethnic groups, representing 60 % of the Asian population, followed by Vietnamese and Koreans who combined represent about 20 % of the popu-

²Identifying these counts and distributions as averages across a time period is the preferred way of referring to the information derived from the 3 year estimates (National Research Council 2007: 62).

³Hispanics are technically identified as an ethnic group that may be of any race. However, it is highly common for demographers enumerating race to include this group among other racial populations under the label of race/ethnic group.

⁴Over 40 % of the Hispanics population reported their race as—Some Other Race in 1990 and 2000, although this figure diminishes somewhat as of the most recent estimate. The percentage of Hispanics selecting—some other race is 43 % in 1990, 42.5 % in 2000, and 37 % in 2006 to 2008 (calculation by author).

Table 3.2 Nationality Composition of Asian (alone) and Hispanic, 2006–2008

	Estimate	Percent
Panel A. Asian (alone)		
Chinese	3,051,605	23.2
Asian Indian	2,503,921	19.0
Filipino	2,366,501	18.0
Vietnamese	1,464,611	11.1
Korean	1,329,342	10.1
Japanese	776,640	5.9
Other Asian	1,671,549	12.7
Total	13,164,169	100.0
Panel B. Hispanics/Latinos		
Mexican	29,318,971	64.5
Puerto Rican	4,127,728	9.1
Cuban	1,572,138	3.5
Dominican (dominican republic)	1,249,471	2.8
Central American	3,592,810	7.9
South American	2,544,070	5.6
Other Hispanic or Latino	3,026,970	6.7
Total	45,432,158	100.0

Source: American Community Survey, 2006–2008 3 year estimate

lation. Among Hispanics, Mexicans represent nearly two thirds of total (64.5 %) and this group is also among the fastest growing (Camarillo and Bonilla 2001; Rumbaut 2005). All other groups represent less than 10 %. I now turn to age, sex, and nativity patterns as these represent the key demographic roots fueling the expansion of diversity via immigration and population momentum.

Table 3.3 displays distributions of the population by nativity (i.e. percent foreign born) age, and sex. The patterns document the duality between a slow-growing White population and an expanding non-White population. Relatively few whites enter the county as immigrants as barely 4 % are foreign born, compared to 8 % of the Black population, 67 % of the Asian population and 39 % of the Latino population. Whites are also the oldest population by every measure. Over 15 % of White population is in the elderly age range (i.e. 65 and over) while every other group's elderly numbers at less than 10 %. The median age is nearly 40 for men and over 40 for women. Hispanics continue to be the youngest

Table 3.3 Selected demographic characteristics by race/ethnic background

Racial/ethnic background	Foreign born		Children (aged 0–18)		Elderly aged (65+)		Median age		Female	
	%	Estimates	%	Estimates	%	Estimates	Male	Female	%	Estimates
White alone (not Hispanic)	3.9	7,713,238	21.0	41,668,275	15.5	30,755,155	39.5	42.2	50.9	100,995,961
Black or African American alone	8.0	2,988,574	28.7	10,656,818	8.6	3,193,332	29.6	33.6	52.4	19,457,048
American Indian and Alaska Native alone	5.9	143,775	28.8	696,930	7.4	1,790,722	30.0	32.4	50.3	1,217,207
Asian alone	67.1	8,834,349	22.3	2,935,610	9.4	1,237,432	34.7	36.5	51.7	6,805,875
Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander alone	23.1	102,975	27.3	121,803	6.1	27,216	28.8	30.7	50.0	223,082
Some other race alone (incl. Hispanic)	42.8	7,501,844	33.2	5,822,945	4.1	719,099	27.5	27.5	47.9	8,401,176
Two or more races	7.8	509,868	48.6	3,193,849	4.5	295,727	18.2	19.1	50.1	3,292,424
Hispanic/Latino (all races)	39.1	17,753,901	34.3	15,583,230	5.5	2,498,769	27.2	27.6	48.4	21,989,164

Source: American Community Survey, 3 year estimates of 2006–2008

Note: Because several of the above categories include Hispanics and Non-Hispanics, it is inappropriate to total estimates to construct a count of the total population

population (Durand et al. 2005), with a median age of 27, 34 % under age 18 and less than 5 % in the elderly category. The sex structure, by contrast, shows remarkable consistency over race/ethnic groups. Overall, half or close to half are females. The slight minority of women among Hispanics is due to the male-dominated immigration streams meanwhile, the slight majority of women among African Americans reflect the higher life expectancy of Black women and the higher mortality of younger Black males (Gorman and Read 2007).

The youth of the population selecting two or more races, over half of whom are under 19 years old, deserves special note. This group's age structure arguably demonstrates the dynamics of racial identification as opposed to the youth of the multiracial population. Some propose this arises from generational shifts in the likelihood of identifying as multiracial or the possibility that many of the more than one race population as labeled as such by their parents who complete U.S. Census forms (Jones and Smith 2001; Tafoya et al. 2004). The latter rationale is quite likely for Black-White individuals, whose average age is less than 10 (Tafoya et al. 2004).

Historical Overview of Race/Ethnic Related Conflict

The demography of racial/ethnic communities has a long a complicated past. There are many wonderful sociological historical reviews detailing the development of race in the United States, many dealing directly with the thesis that notions of racial difference that allotted status privilege and disadvantage was fundamental in the development of the American republic (e.g., Feagin 2000, 2006; McDaniel 1995; Nobles 2000; Omi and Winant 1994; Parrillo 2003; Rumbaut 2005; Smedley 1993; Thornton 1987; Winant 2001; Wray 2006; Wu 2008; Winant 2000; Zuberi 2001). This overview divides the history of race and ethnicity into three periods – (1) Initial Contact (1400s–1800s) (2) the rise of institutionalized race (antebellum period – 1950s) and (3) the decline of institutionalized race and the rise of racial mobilization (1960s–1990s).

Initial Contact

While the Black-White divide is highly salient in this discussion of early American race relations, interactions between various groups informed the creation of the racial divide. The initial experience of American Indian depopulation marks one of the first incidences of contact and conquest in the New World (Snipp 1992; Thornton 1987, 2001). The size of the pre-contact American Indian population has been estimated to range between one to eight million (Snipp 1992; Thornton 2001). This figures dwindled to less than 250,000 as of the 1800s. Snipp (1992) outlines three causes of the decline: (1) deaths due to infectious illnesses that American Indians had never encountered carried by the European population (e.g. small pox, influenza), followed by (2) warfare between the Europeans and American Indian, and then (3) genocide (Snipp 1992; Thornton 1984, 1987). While genocide generated the least direct depopulation, Snipp (1992) and Feagin (2000) argue that an expanded definition that includes all manners of decimation of tribal cultures and acts of tribal removals (e.g., the—Trail of Tears) would classify the between ninety to one hundred million lives lost from European intervention between the late 1400s to the 1900s (Feagin 2000; see also Thornton 1984).

By contrast the institution of chattel slavery defined the relationships between African population and Europeans (Feagin 2000; Winant 2001). Between 1600s and 1820s, an estimated eight million Africans were transported via the middle passage and between 15 and 30 % of those kidnapped died aboard ships (Desmond and Emirbayer 2010). The mid- Atlantic slave trade, the ensuing legislation that aimed to control the African population (i.e. the—slave codes),⁵ and the rise of a system of racial classification all

⁵The emergence of slave codes, laws specifically applied to slaves, nullified any capacity to become citizens, in that slaves could not vote, own land, bear arms, marry, socialized with free blacks, leave their plantations without master's permission, among other indignities. This status extended to free blacks as well, as they were categorically defined as non-citizens by lying outside of the definition of—free white persons.

served to solidify and racialize the statuses of servant (or slave) and master as intractable differences of “Black” and “White”. This justified the development of a free-labor pool for the developing plantation economies (Smedley 1993; Zuberi 2001; see also Desmond and Emirbayer 2010: 63–73; Feagin 2000: 35–57). The extent of this unique lower status is registered in the high frequency of sexual coercion between white slave masters and slave women, and not surprisingly slaves were also barred from testifying against whites in open court limiting the degree to which incidences of rape could be charged or even enumerated (Feagin 2000).

The entrée of Latin Americans into the New World, begins with a sustained Spanish presence within the North American territories that pre-dates that of the English colonists.

Beginning in 1513 with the arrival of Ponce de Leon, and the creation of La Florida, the ensuing Spanish presence (and rule) in many territories in the Southern and eastern territories has left an indelible mark on the history of the United States. This presence existed over two centuries, longer than that length of the independent nation of the United States (Rumbaut 2005: 24–28; Weber 1992). Names of places, including six U.S. states, bear the mark of this influence. As Rumbaut (2005) argues, “In the United States, the collective memory of these silent antecedents is clouded by remnants of prejudices and stereotypes whose roots go to the colonial rivalries in the sixteenth century between Spanish America and English America” (p. 26).

The Rise of Institutionalized Race (Antebellum Period – 1950s)

Prior to the civil war until the 1950s, interracial and interethnic encounters were controlled by series of policies aiming to cement the concept of race as defining privilege from disadvantage. For American Indians, this occurred by attempting to phase out the sovereign power of American

Indian tribes,⁶ encouraging this population to convert to Christianity, and enrolling children into public and private schools⁷ whose educational aims were to minimize attachment to American Indian culture, language, and religion. These policy attempts thwarted nearly every opportunity to fully incorporate the African population at the close of slavery. The era of reconstruction which lasted from 1863 to 1877 aimed to reincorporate the Southern states into the Union, following the civil war.⁸ Despite the institution of the Black codes, laws akin to the slave codes, the passing of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments instituted the end of slavery, the citizenship of the Black population, and the right for Black men to vote, respectively. At the close of reconstruction was the institution of “Jim Crow” segregation, which established the racial separation of public and private facilities under the auspices of maintaining separate but equal spaces. Morris (1999) writes, “The Jim Crow regime was a major characteristic of American society in 1950” ... (Morris 1999: p. 518). This era was characteristic of tremendous economic depression of the Black population, formal and informal policies of social segregation, and overt acts of violence, such as lynching (Beck and Tolnay 1990; Morris 1999). While this characterized relations in the South, the rise of the “urban ghetto” symbolized relations within Northern and

⁶For example, in 1871 Congress enacted legislation that served to destroy tribal sovereignty. This policy was later amended in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act, which granted the American Indian population the ability to organize for its common welfare. Later, United States government the special status of many tribes, and 61 tribes were officially terminated (Snipp 1992; Thornton 2001).

⁷The most well-known of the private schools was the Carlisle Indian School that aimed to educate and remove all traces of cultural knowledge. Colleges, such as Dartmouth, Harvard College, and William and Mary, held charters which specified intent to educate and civilize the American Indian population (Thornton 2001).

⁸During this brief period, an estimated 40,000 Blacks were granted 40 acres of land under General Sherman (known as “40 acres and a mule”) and several southern states included newly elected Black delegates. However, these attempts were short lived as Blacks were removed from the land by president Andrew Johnson (Feagin 2000).

Midwestern cities. Most accounts trace the beginning of urban segregation to the mass exodus of southern Blacks to industrialized cities and to actions of realtors and lending institutions to both openly discourage Blacks from buying homes in certain neighborhoods and facilitating the movement of Whites to the outer suburbs (Massey and Denton 1993; Charles 2006; Meyer 2000).

For Latin American and Asian populations, institutionalizing race would come in the form of immigration policies. For example, because citizenship was initially restricted to “free white persons”, several cases deliberated over what type of criteria (scientific vs. popular ideas) to determine whiteness of foreign born persons (Haney Lopez 1996). Citizenship for Mexicans was initially contested, even as this group was never officially defined as—non-white.⁹ The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo of 1848 annexed half of Mexico’s lands to U.S. territories and shifted the national origin status of an estimated 75,000 Mexicans to American residents (Griswold del Castillo 1984). In the case of Puerto Rico, the resolution of the Spanish-American War in 1898 established that the island would be an occupied territory of the U.S. It was not until the Jones Act of 1917 that Puerto Ricans were defined as United States citizens by birth, at which point men from the island became eligible to serve in the military at World War I (Camarillo and Bonilla 2001). The island was later redefined as a commonwealth. Cuban stands as the last of the Spanish territories to achieve independence from Spain in 1902. Despite the status as a sovereign nation, the U.S., under the Platt Amendment, maintained the ability to intervene in Cuban affairs until 1934, when the amendment was rescinded.

Asians faced severe policies banning their immigration to the U.S.. The first Asian immigrants to the U.S. were the Chinese arrived between 1840 and 1860 during the California gold rush and later worked on railways (Parrillo

2003; Takai 1989). Similar to Mexicans, these first waves came for work and intended to be temporary to return for their families. As Chinese laborers, and later the Japanese, often occupied low-skilled positions and were deemed competition to White working class laborers. Anti-immigrant sentiment resulted in the implementation of ethnically restrictive legislation, namely the—Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and later the National Origins Act of 1924. These laws had clear demographic consequences, as Chinese where initially the largest ethnic majority among Asians, dwindled in their numbers soon after. This was due to few co-ethnic options for marriage and childbearing and legal restrictions on marriage with the White population. The Japanese often migrated as families and became the most demographically dominate Asian population from 1910 to 1950 (Xie and Goyette 2005).¹⁰ However, the Japanese faced the brunt of being racialized when World War II began and over 100,000 were placed in internment camps. Population growth of the Japanese increased from 1910 to 1960 because did not continue post-1965 as Japan’s economy was well developed, providing an incentive for Japanese to remain in Japan (Xie and Goyette 2005).

Decline of Institutionalized Race

From the mid 1950s onward, several legislative acts allowed for a decline racial separation as an institutionalized mandate. While there are several, the most major pieces of legislation were the Supreme Court decision of *Brown v. Board of education* (1954), which desegregated schools, and the Platt Amendment, which removed national origins quotas, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (and other corresponding pieces of legislation, which declared discrimination by race unconstitutional in public institutions). These acts dismantled desegregation and made unconstitutional actions that overtly discriminated.

⁹Despite never being defined as non-white, as Foley (1999) outlines Mexicans have lived under—Jim Crow like circumstances, particularly within the southwestern States.

¹⁰It bears noting that Asians were banned from intermarriage with laws as strict as those applied to African Americans (Moran 2001).

Coinciding with this shift were an array of political movements that served to advocate for the rights and community survival of race/ethnic specific groups. Movements such as the civil rights movement, and later the Black power, Red Power (Nagel 1994), and La Raza, and Pan-ethnic movements (Espiritu 1992) reshaped the cultural, political and social landscape for their communities and in doing so sought to define, more thoroughly, the meaning of ethnic identity for individuals and institutions through defining political interests, advocating for ethnically specific education projects (e.g. African American, Asian American Studies)

Demographic Growth, Change, and Differentiation

The next section examines two key issues in capturing demographic change. First, how does demographic change impacts race/ethnic composition (Bean et al. 2005; Lee and Bean 2004, 2007; McDaniel 1995)? Second, how do demographic processes reflect the potential (and reality) for social incorporation and/or the persistence of inequality across race? These two questions lie at the heart of many scholarly discussion of race/ethnic demography. I draw on patterns of mortality and fertility and the related mechanisms that drive the differentials across race and ethnicity.

Demographic Growth and Change

Growing diversity has been fueled primarily by the growth and expansion of the Asian and Latino population and the relatively slow growth of the White population. Between 1990 and 2000, the nation's population has grown 13 % while non-Hispanic Whites have only increased by 3.4 % (Saenz 2005: 356). Immigration accounted for a little more than half of the growth of the Latino population during the 1980s a little less than half during the 1990s (Durand et al. 2005). The population of Asians doubled between 1980 and 1990 and then grew by 39 %

from 1990 to 1997, a rate higher than any other race/ethnic group. This demographic repositioning reflects the dual impact of: immigration and the impact of excess fertility over mortality on the age structure.

International Migration

We are currently in the fourth wave of immigration, defined as the—Globalization Wave, which began in 1965 and continues to the present (Martin and Midgley 2003). This wave differs from previous waves in both the source and volume of immigration. In the early twentieth century, the majority of immigration originated from European nations, while at century's end, the large majority of immigrants hail from Latin American, Asia, or Africa (Alba and Nee 2003; Lee and Bean 2004; Pollard and O'Hare 1999; Riche 2000). As of 1950–1959, 70 % of the more than 2.4 million legal residents entering the U.S. hailed from Europe or Canada, however, this proportion diminished to 13 % as of 1980 to 1989 (Department of Homeland Security 2009). These shifts reflect the removal of national origin quotas, literacy tests, and other types of restrictions that reduced immigration to exceedingly low levels from 1920 until the 1950s (Lee 1998; Martin and Midgley 2003). Secondly, the sheer size of the immigration flows sets this period apart. According to Kritz and Gurak, one-fifth of the 175 million foreign born individuals in 2002, worldwide, reside in the United States. Interestingly, the share is smaller than in 1910, where 15 % of the U.S. population was foreign born, compared to 11 % in 2000. As an example, migration contributes to at least one fifth of the growth of the total Black population between 2001 and 2006 (Kent 2007), meanwhile the number of Mexicans living in the US in 2000 was comparable to the number of total foreigners in 1960. Ultimately, the combined forces of change in the composition of sending countries, the size of immigration flows, and changes in the policies governing these moves have guided the enhanced diversification of the United States population.

Declining Mortality and Sustaining Fertility

Population growth has also been fueled by natural increase (i.e. excess of fertility over mortality). The most pertinent question in the study of mortality is establishing whether all racial groups participated in the mortality transition of the twentieth Century. Over the course of the twentieth Century, life expectancy at birth, a common index of standard of living (Yaukey et al. 2007: 110–141), increased across all populations, Black and White. A baby born in 1900 could expect to live until age 47.3 (Elo 2001) and in 2006 that figure rose to 77.7 (Heron et al. 2009). For Blacks in 2006, this figure was 73.2 (76.5 for women, 69.7 for men) and for Whites it was 78.2 (80.6 for women, 75.7 for men) (Heron et al. 2009). Despite these gains, there has been little evidence of convergence of mortality profiles, in some cases differentials have expanded, making resolving this inequality a central focus of public policy.

Increasing diversity is also driven by racial pattern of fertility. Table 3.4 shows the total fertility rates by race and Hispanic origin for 2008, and the percent of births to unmarried mothers (Hamilton et al. 2010). The total fertility rate (TFR) refers to the number of children born, on average, to women within their childbearing years of 15–44 (Yaukey et al. 2007). While the U.S. population is replacing itself, with a TFR of 2.1, both American Indians/Alaskan native and Whites have fertility rates below replacement level of 2.0.

Meanwhile, all other race/ethnic groups have on average more than two children. Hispanics have, on average, close to three children per woman. These patterns mask highly disparate contexts for childbearing. While 40 % of births overall are to unmarried mothers, the level is much higher among Hispanics (52.5 %), Blacks (72.3 %) and American Indians (65.8), continuing long-standing patterns of race/ethnic variation child bearing outside of marriage (Qian et al. 2005).

Table 3.4 Total fertility rates and percent of births to unmarried mothers by race/ethnic origin

Race/ethnic background	Total fertility rate	Percent of births to unmarried mothers
All races and origins (incl. those not stated)	2.1	40.6
Non-Hispanic white	1.8	28.6
Non-Hispanic black	2.1	72.3
American Indian or Alaska Native total	1.8	65.8
Asian or Pacific Islander total	2.1	16.9
Hispanic (of any race)	2.9	52.5

Source: “Births: Preliminary data for 2008” National Center for Health Statistics by Hamilton et al. (2010)

Note: Original “Total Fertility Rates” presented by authors were divided by 1,000 to make interpretable as the number of children born per women. See the original report for discussion of race and ethnic classification

Demographic Differentiation and Disparities

These forms of demographic change also demonstrate the enduring forces of racial stratification (Beck and Tolnay 1990; Hummer 1996; Williams and Collins 1995). I begin with explanations for persistent gaps in mortality across racial groups. Mortality and health-related differentials across race are understood as outgrowths of racial inequality (Hummer 1993, 1996; Williams and Collins 1995), as opposed to biologically based tendencies toward ill or superior health (Frank 2001, 2007). Mortality differentials reflect, in part, differing age, gender, or nativity compositions (Gorman and Read 2007; Hummer et al. 1999; Rogers 1992). Most attention is directed toward the role of socioeconomic conditions, such as education, income, and employment, (Hummer 1993; Warner and Hayward 2006). Finally, race and ethnic differences in frequency of exercising and risky behaviors such as alcohol consumption and smoking are also potent sources of health differences (Pampel and Rogers 2004; Rogers et al. 2005).

While this range of explanatory factors is extensive, it is not exhaustive. Scholars have

identified other ways that racial stratification may be reflected in gaps in health, such as the role of perceived racial bias as a source of stress (Williams and Williams-Morris 2000; Paradies 2006) and neighborhood-level influences (Robert 1999). Empirically, these issues have shown to be powerful determinants of health and mortality.¹¹ These new approaches demonstrate a myriad of ways to capture minority status which is essential to understanding how and why racial gaps in mortality persist.

Fertility and Family Formation

The context of family formation varies tremendously by race. As of 2000, 67 % of Whites 25–44 year olds were married, compared to a little more than one third (37.7 %) of African Americans. Among Latinos, Mexicans, particularly immigrants, have some of the highest rates of marriage in 2000 (75 %) (Saenz 2005). Among Asians, marriage is nearly—universal as between 78 and 80 % of Asians aged 35–44 years are currently married, meanwhile between 85 and 90 % of this group has ever been married, with the highest among Asian Indians, Chinese, and Koreans (Xie and Goyette 2005: 437). The reverse is true for African Americans, who both have lower marriage rates currently and declining marriage rates over time (Tucker and Mitchell-Kernan 1995).

From 1960 to 1980, marriage rates for white women declined from 67 to 60 %, meanwhile the drop for Black women declined by 60 to 45 % (Tucker and Mitchell-Kernan 1995; Stoll 2004). This is due in part to an imbalanced sex

ratio favoring women in marriageable age ranges, and even starker imbalances of “marriageable” spouses, defined in terms of economic viability. The dearth of marriageable men has been linked to high rates of incarceration, unemployment, and mortality (Wilson 1987).

The emphasis placed on patterns of racial differences in marriage reflects increasing concerns over the growing number of children reared in non-marital households, particularly when child-bearing occurs before age 20. According to 2008 estimates, birth rates for women in their late teens are highest among Hispanic, Black, and American Indian young women. As these women tend to be unmarried, this racial pattern points to the rising prominence of female headed households. Estimates by Kreider and Ellis (2011) using the Survey of Income and Program Participation show that just over half, or one out of two Black children live within a mother-only household, compared to a quarter of Hispanic children, 16 % of White children, and less than 10 % of Asian children. Exploring the family structural conditions surrounding a child’s birth (i.e. are the parents married, cohabiting, living apart) are considered salient indicators life chances that reflects extant and future racial inequality (Massey 2007; McLanahan and Percheski 2008), particularly given the links between family instability and the challenges faced by children and the fact that female-headship is increasingly associated with life in poverty (McLanahan 2004).

Explaining racial differentials in fertility and family formation underscore both structural (i.e. economic), and cultural (i.e. group-specific orientations toward behavior) forces. Cultural explanations explore the roles of traditions that usually remain hidden when focusing on the dynamics of the nuclear family (Griswold del Castillo 2001). One example is the notion of *familism* (Griswold del Castillo 2001), which refers to “...the values, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, associated with Mexican American extended family” (p. 92). Similarly, the family

¹¹ For example, rates of infant mortality and adult mortality are highly sensitive to the level of concentrated poverty and adjusting for the fact that African Americans more often occupy impoverished neighborhoods goes a long way to explain the Black-White gap. Other research has found consistently that perceiving racial bias, regardless of a person’s social class, corresponds to higher rates of depression, hypertension, and lower self-rated health, regardless of their socioeconomic background (Paradies 2006).

dynamics of African Americans reflect the roles of economic structures and cultural traditions that extend the kin network beyond blood relationships (e.g., notion of fictive kin) and are linked, according to many historians, to African traditions presumed by most to have been lost in slavery (Billingsley 1968; Stack 1974; Sudarkasa 2001). Most recently, Lundquist (2004) shows by observing those serving in the military the racial gap in marriage is severely minimized by examining these dynamics within the—total institution of the military.

Theorizing Racial Stratification

I now turn to sociological approaches to understanding racial inequality, which I will refer to as racial stratification. Stratification, according to Massey (2007), refers to “...the unequal distribution of people across social categories that are characterized by differential access to scarce resources” (p.1). The two mechanisms that maintain social stratification are first the process of allocating people to those social categories and second the mechanism is the process by which the pattern of uneven distribution is maintained.¹² Racial stratification explores the ways race operates as a primary organizing principle, both historically and currently, for ascribing individual identities, allocating material resources, shaping social interactions (e.g., Winant 2001; Krysan and Lewis 2004; Feagin 2000; Massey and Denton 1993; Oliver and Shapiro 1995).

Although addressing all of these issues is a huge task; this section aims are modest by focusing briefly on the following: (1) what are the new meaningful racial distinctions that signify privilege and disadvantage in light of the growing racial diversity? Second, (2) how can we theorize the sources of differences in well-being? These questions are built on a long-standing debate on the source and stay-power of racial stratification. Specifically can differences in outcomes be explained by non-racial forces (i.e. social or

human capital, culturally-inscribed decision-making) and thereby can/will be rectified with increasing incorporation which would enhance capital and alter social values (e.g. Alba 2009), or does it demonstrate the impact of enduring (and likely stable) formal and informal discriminatory barriers which are deemed rational within a racialized social system (Bonilla Silva 1996; Feagin 2000).

Rungs of the Ladder: What Are the Meaningful Racial Distinctions?

Majority/Minority Paradigm

Understanding how race stratifies life chances first requires a discussion of what are the meaningful racial distinctions. The black/white divide characterizes the most enduring racial divide in modern American history and much of the discussion of black/white differences has focused on the sources of differential access to power and resources. In their review of Asian American socioeconomic attainment, Sakamoto and authors (2009) characterize the focus of the discussion of racial and ethnic inequality as employing majority/minority paradigm (also referred to as the White/non-white paradigm) that notes that majorities and minorities differ in their standing because of differences in power (Eitzen and Zinn 1997). This perspective draws on what Feagin (2007) refers to as “power-conflict” theories which “place much greater emphasis on economic stratification and power issues than one finds in assimilation and competition theories” (p. 36).

The majority/minority paradigm does not neatly fit all race-based patterns. For example, patterns of Asian American socioeconomic attainment do not fit this model and leaves this group absent from a discussion of inequality (Sakamoto et al. 2009). Recent discussions of immigrant experiences draw on the ways status as non-white may impact how likely immigrants assimilate (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Ogbu and Simons 1998; Waters 1999; Telles and Ortiz 2008; Kalmijn 1996; Bashi and McDaniel 1997). These accounts show how some immigrant groups do not immediately identify with American-based minority

¹²These issues refer to—categorical inequality, a concept developed by Tilly Charles (1998) as discussed in Massey (2007: 5–6).

communities (e.g., Waters 1999; Ogbu and Simons 1998), but then may progressively assimilate into life as racial minorities (Telles and Ortiz 2008; Portes and Zhou 1993). Similar claims are made for integrating the immigrant population into the classic binary model of health disparities, as Mexican immigrants experience an—epidemiological paradox of better health outcomes than expected, regardless of socioeconomic status (Markides and Correll 1986).

New Models: Latin Americanization or a Black/Non-Black Divide?

These gaps have inspired scholars to develop alternative models of racial stratification. According to Zuberi (2001), racial stratification remains constant even as who composes racial categories has been unstable. Some advocate that the new demography yields a more complex system of racial stratification (Lee and Bean 2004, 2007) that implies either a highly differentiated continuum of advantage (Bonilla Silva and Glover 2004) or one where the category of White is either expanding to include previously non-white groups of Latinos and Asians (Gallagher 2004; Lee and Bean 2007; Gans 1999; Yancey 2003). Bonilla-Silva and Glover (2004; see also Bonilla-Silva et al. 2004) argue that there has been a—Latin Americanization of American racial stratification, where racial privilege is indexed along lines of skin color while others argue that the most meaningful divide continues to place Blacks at the bottom and other groups at the top (Yancey 2003; Gans 1999). Whether the color line is shifting (i.e. reorganizing where groups are placed) or becoming more differentiated will have tremendous consequences for the issues presented in the next section—how we understand the inequality across race.

Explaining Race-Based Variation: Theorizing the Sources of Racial Stratification

Initial theorizing about the differences between races began as a discussion of biological differences. While biology as a basis for racial difference in the social sciences has been

challenged since the days of Franz Boas and WEB Dubois, the concept has had a long history (Morning 2008b). Early claims of biologically based racial differences drove a variety of tests of thesis, most ending in failure. For example, the presumption of species-like differences between Blacks and Whites fueled interest in census classification that differentiated between persons whose background was a mixture between the two (Nobles 2000). Experimentation during the early twentieth century tested whether physiological differences in head or brain size could be mapped onto races (Gould 1996). Beliefs about that biological differences between Blacks and Whites could result in differential manifestations of illness grounded the Tuskegee experiment which lead to the death of Black male respondents from untreated syphilis long after the discovery that penicillin could cure the disease (Jones 1993). Even categories of class were also founded in biology, with theories that conditions of poor whites could be traced back to—hook worm disease and genetic degradation instead the harsh circumstances of poverty, a belief system that lead to sterilization in some cases (Wray 2006).

Three Social Explanations for Racial Inequality

Sociological research on the racial stratification routinely draws on social explanations for the differences in social well-being. The next section provides a broad overview of these perspectives. Sociological research on racial inequality generally draws on one of three classes of explanations. The first are class-based explanations, which assert that racial differences in social well-being (e.g. education, housing attainment, health) either wholly or mostly reflect differences in human, social, and cultural capital.¹³ Class disadvantage represents the inability to accumulate resources that would enhance social well-being. Housing patterns that indicate residential segregation, for example, reflect the inability of minorities to afford housing within more diverse or less segregated spaces. This explanation has

¹³Please see Massey et al. (2003) and Charles (2006) for examples on how this argument is applied to racial differences in education achievement or housing.

received less empirical support, particularly for African Americans, in light of research showing that segregation operates for middle class *and* low income Blacks (Charles 2006). In health research, social class inequality is deemed the—fundamental cause of health disparities (Link and Phelan 1995). In the realm of education, racial differences in material and nonmaterial investments of parents, such as engaging in parenting strategies that—cultivate their success (Lareau 2003; Massey et al. 2003), are one root of racial differences in educational achievement.

While important, accounting for social class differences does not entirely close the racial gap in health, education, or co-ethnic neighborhood presence (Crimmins et al. 2004; Charles 2006; Massey et al. 2003). Alternatively, this could result from choices that racial minority or majority members make, independent of the class background. A second set of explanations emphasize culturally-based behavior – whether that is expressed as preferences to be amongst one’s own in a neighborhood, adopting norms of behavior that do or do not value or privilege educational success (i.e. oppositional culture thesis) (Ogbu and Simons 1998; Downey 2008), or choosing to engage in risky behaviors that can be detrimental to one’s health (Pampel and Rogers 2004; Rogers et al. 2005). There is qualified support for a cultural thesis. For example, in-group preferences may explain residential choices for Whites; however African Americans, the most segregated group, regularly report a desire to live in diverse spaces (Emerson et al. 2001). In addition, in-group preferences do not explain how the knowledge that African Americans live in a neighborhood is associated with reporting the area as lower quality relative to when occupied by similarly-classed Whites (Krysan and Farley 2009). For educational achievement, Ogbu and Simons (1998) argued that low achievement among African Americans represents the impact being descended from involuntary immigrants (i.e. slaves) that translates into disinvestment in mainstream standards and a stigma attached to those standards as they would lead to an accusation by peers of—acting white. Downey (2008)’s

argues there is little consistent empirical evidence to support this thesis among Black youth, and that it is unlikely that—oppositional culture can explain the remaining racial gap in education.

Class and culture are usually regarded as insufficient to fully explain the patterns of racial and ethnic inequality providing an empirical basis for the final explanation of discrimination.

According to Nancy Krieger (2000: 40) “... [discrimination] refers to all means of expressing and institutionalizing social relationships of dominance and oppression. This refers to institutional forms of discrimination that result in limiting access to social and economic resources or interpersonal interactions that are perceived to be unfair or racially charged”. Discrimination, as opposed to prejudices, stereotypes, or ideologies,¹⁴ may occur as either differential treatment due to one’s race or disparate impact of the same treatment (Blank et al. 2004; Pager and Shepherd 2008; Williams and Williams-Morris 2000; Paradies 2006). Most studies of discrimination focuses on differential treatment. In housing, differential treatment by realtors, lenders, and renters can limit potential tenants’ access to housing as well as influence the quality of their experiences while living as tenants (Roscigno et al. 2009; Meyer 2000). Reports of unfair treatment have also been linked to a variety of poor health outcomes, independent of social class background (e.g. Brondolo et al. 2003; Krieger 2000; Paradies 2006; Williams and Neighbors 2001; Williams et al. 1997). Ultimately, the impact of various forms of racial discrimination signifies how disadvantage is not merely a by-product of class or culture, but arises to maintain the divide between the “privileged” and the “disadvantaged”.

¹⁴By ideologies, I refer to the same definition adopted by Bonilla-Silva et al. (2004) who define it as “...broad racial frameworks or grids that racial groups use to make sense of the world, to decide what is right or wrong, true or false, important or unimportant” (p. 556). While this provides the context and rationalization for racially discriminatory action, it is conceptually distinct from treatment.

Debates on the Measurement of Race and Ethnicity

In this section I provide a brief overview of the debates of measurement of demographic characteristics of race and ethnicity. There have been two themes in this discourse: the need for coverage and second is the need for proper recognition and identification. Both issues lie under the purview of large-scale data collection systems. Systematically miscounting race/ethnic groups directly influences the allocation of resources, the distribution of representation across states and other locales, and more broadly the ability of groups to exercise their political power (Anderson and Fineburg 1999; Prewitt 2005). In addition, these figures set the sampling frames of survey data collections (Clogg et al. 1989) and survey analyses using faulty numbers may misestimate race-specific patterns of demographic behavior or differentials between racial populations (e.g. Raley 2002; Williams et al. 2003). Similarly, systems of racial classification provide telling markers of how societies construct all types of ethno-racial distinction (Lee 1993; Snipp 2003; Morning 2008a) or how individuals navigate these categories to convey various ways of racially identifying (Perez and Hirschman 2009; Saperstein 2006; Liebler 2004; Hitlin et al. 2007). This section examines methodological debates of coverage and classification.

Issues of Coverage: Race and the Undercount

Census counts producing disproportionately fewer persons of certain characteristics (e.g. race, age, gender, immigrant status) are called—differential undercounts (Prewitt 2005: 12–15; Anderson and Fienberg 1999). These undercounts may arise because populations are deemed too difficult to reach, because they may opt not to fill out their Census, or because they

are systematically reclassified.¹⁵ The 1940 Census marks the first time when a differential undercount was uncovered when enumeration done by the military was compared to the Census.¹⁶ The comparison revealed a 3 % undercount of the total male population, and as high as 13 % for the Black male population. The undercount for Blacks that is three to four times higher than for non-Blacks across every Census from 1940 to 1990 (Prewitt 2005). Correcting an undercount requires the use of either (1) demographic analysis or (2) dual-system estimation. Demographic analysis refers to using vital statistics records to construct a population estimate to contrast to the Census estimate (Robinson et al. 2002). Dual-systems estimation involves taking a second count, using a post-enumeration survey that is also contrasted with the Census estimate.

What are the implications of a racial undercount? Inaccurate estimates most directly impact counts for political representation (Prewitt 2005) but also influence the practice of social science research (Clogg et al. 1989). These issues have been traced in analyses of race and marriage. Raley (2002) estimates that the differential undercount of the non-married and married is between two and four times as higher, depending on the method used to assess the undercount. The analyses revealed this differential has only a small impact on the distribution of marital behavior, which is particularly noteworthy for the analysis of men. Differential undercount by race is also a salient issue for tracking racial disparities in health, plaguing our estimation of Black health (Williams et al. 2003).

¹⁵ Reclassification affected the enumeration of same-sex couples in 1990 who reported themselves as married, and persons selecting more than one race on their 1990 Census form were also reclassified as monoracial (Saperstein 2006).

¹⁶ The first case appears in the first U.S. Census by employing the three-fifths compromise where slaves were counted as three-fifths of a person to equalize representation between the slave states of the South and the Northern territories (Nobles 2000).

Racial and Ethnic Classification

While debates on 1990 Census was dominated the potential undercount, discussions of 2000 U.S. Census witnessed a veritable explosion of work focusing on classification, such as Perlmann and Waters (2002) edited volume, *The New Race Question: How the Census counts multiracial Americans*, in addition to several books (e.g. Nobles 2000; Williams 2006), review articles on the significance of Census classification (Farley 2004; Nobles 2000; Snipp 2003; Lee 1993) and its implications for social research (Mays et al. 2003) and the socially constructed nature of racial identity (Perez and Hirschman 2009; Harris and Simm 2002; Campbell and Rogalin 2006). The fascination with the dynamics of racial enumeration has not waned. This literature, which capitalized on the availability of datasets that provided more complex measures of racial classification, focused on populations on the margins of classification, such as multiracial persons, Latinos, and to a lesser extent American Indians to assess the flexibility of racial identity (Perez 2008; Eschbach et al. 1998; Eschbach 1995; Harris and Simm 2002) and the durability of ideologies of racial assignment (e.g., the one drop rule) for determining identity (Lee and Bean 2007; Roth 2005).

Complexity of Data

There have been many methodological innovations in data collection affecting both Census enumeration and social science data collection. Here I provide a list of some of the most often used in recent analyses of racial identity. The most basic change has been the addition of racial categories and providing more markers of ethnicity and race to accommodate the growing heterogeneity of the population. The first Census only distinguished between free white males, females, all other free persons (by sex, color, and age) and slaves (U.S. Census Bureau 2002). As of the 2010 census, this has grown to 14 mutually exclusive categories, including write-in options for Other Pacific Islander, Other Asian, American Indian tribal affiliation, and Some other race, and an option to select

more than one race. Among the more controversial changes has been the addition of Hispanic ethnicity as separate from the race question (Rodriguez 2000). Prior census's allowed Hispanic ethnicity to be registered as Spanish surname, or country of origin. Declaring Hispanic ethnicity is done either immediately before or after the question on race, opening up a discourse on whether the general public and Latinos view this designation as a distinct race or an ethnic label to be combined with other races (e.g. White – Hispanic). In addition there are questions on primary and secondary ancestry (Farley 1991; Waters 1990), American Indian Tribal affiliation, language used at home, and country of origin (Anderson and Fineburg 1999; Lee 1993). This literature and issues covered are vast, I maintain a focus on new methods to measure race that have emerged in the wake of check all that apply and methodological approaches to resolve the differences between new and old modes of data collection.

New Approaches to Measure Race

Several surveys now allow interviewers to report the race of a respondent separately from the self-reported race or include questions on either perceived or self-declared skin tone (ranging from light to dark) (e.g. Hill 2002).¹⁷ Both sets of identifiers allow us to test to what degree patterns of racial inequality hinges on how one is appraised by outsiders or themselves (Saperstein 2006; Penner and Saperstien 2008; see Telles and Lim 1999 for discussion in a Brazilian context) and to what degree that impact varies along lines of phenotype *within* racial communities (Hunter 2007; Keith and Herring 1991; Hill 2000). Finally, the *National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health* takes racial information at multiple points and the comparisons reveal how racial declarations can vary within respondents.

¹⁷Hill (2002) finds the intriguing pattern that Whites perceive less phenotype variation among African Americans than African Americans do themselves and that Whites will rate African American's skin color as darker than an African American individual will rate their own skin.

Analyses reveal the ways racial identity is affected by context of where the question is asked (e.g. Harris and Simm 2002), age (Doyle and Kao 2007; Hitlin et al. 2006), and are not perfect renditions of parental ancestry (Perez 2008; Campbell and Eggerling Boeck 2006).

Resolving Disparate Data Collections

What will collecting new types of racial data mean for tracking social inequality in the long-term—an issue many researchers have examined in reference to multiracial enumeration (Mays et al. 2003; Sandefur et al. 2006; Snipp 2003; Liebler and Halpern-Manners 2008; Bratter and Gorman 2011). According to Mays et al. (2003), if those selecting multiple races share common advantages or risk factors, single racial groups may appear either better off or more at – risk without any change in their behaviors. Several alternatives have been suggested, two bear special mention. The first, offered by Liebler and Halpern-Manners (2008) suggests a complex form of bridging between datasets that employ single-race responses to those employing multiple race responses. Essentially, this method employs a complex algorithm that predicts single-race classification for a multiple race reporting person would have chosen given their responses to other characteristics. Secondly, data users may opt to simply allocate multiracial respondents to a single self-selected category. Some surveys now provide the question, “Of the races you selected, which race best describes you?” This improves upon the strategy of the U.S. Census of allocating respondents to one minority population (Goldstein and Morning 2002) by allowing persons to select this race themselves (Mays et al. 2003; Snipp 2003). Recent analyses conducted by Bratter and Gorman (2011) find that this strategy does not create perfect parity between multiracial and single-race respondents, particularly for those of partial American Indian ancestry, who tend to select a non-Indian race as the—race that best describes.

Conclusions and Implications for Policy

What are the policy implications of these patterns, trends, and theories? In this final section, I explore the potential for policy intervention by first discussing the public’s perception of racial inequality. Views of the general public on racial outsiders continue to be a viable indicator of racial social distance that can reveal the persistence or receding of racial stratification.

Increasingly, support for overtly racist principles of racial separation, also referred to as traditional prejudice or Jim Crow racism, has declined (Bobo et al. 1997; Schuman et al. 1997; Bobo 2001). This trend has been met with both the interpretation that racism is disappearing (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1999) as well as the notion that racism is reconstituted into forms more covert that do not require the use of racial terminology, and renders racial inequality invisible (Bobo 2001; Omi and Winant 2009). *Laissez-Faire* racism and *Color-Blind* racism are two recent paradigms that elaborate on this position. *Color-Blind* racism provides a variety of interpretative frames that view patterns of racial inequality as a natural out-growth of living in a meritocracy (Bobo 2004). It allows for the perpetuation and understanding of racial segregation in neighborhoods and other social spaces as rational and unconnected to racial biases (Bonilla-Silva 1996). Meanwhile *Laissez-Faire* racism, involves persistent negative stereotyping of African Americans, a tendency to blame blacks themselves for the black-white gap in socioeconomic standing and resistance to meaningful policy efforts (Bobo et al. 1997: 16; see also Bobo 2004).

What are the implications of these perspectives for policy? These ideologies are thoroughly marked by a disinvestment in formal interventions that place ameliorating racial inequality as its central goals (e.g. Affirmative Action) even as respondents advocate principles of equality. Data from the 1970s shows a higher rate of white Americans tracing African American

disadvantage back to slavery and discrimination than today (Bonilla-Silva et al. 2004).

Advocating for the reduced role of government has also corresponded with a resistance to affixing the label of racism to discriminatory actions even as discrimination as an explanation for racial differences in health, housing opportunities, and employment has strong empirical bases (Pager and Shepherd 2008). Ignoring discriminatory practices becomes even more detrimental in light of increasing evidence that inequality is literally reproduced at the intersection of race, gender, and class disadvantage. As an example, Roscigno et al. (2009) show that low-income women with children are highly likely to confront various forms discrimination, due to what respondents understand as a presumption of low morality, when seeking and occupying rental housing. Demographically speaking, the need for intervention at this site of gender and racial stratification has grown as living in poverty, and income inequality in general, has become increasingly associated with living in female-headed family structures (McLanahan and Percheski 2008).

The potential for policy interventions may also be thwarted by the reemergence of a biological as opposed to a social construction of race. Although closing racial gaps remains a central public policy priority, genetic notions of race persist within the biomedical sciences (Morning 2008b; Duster 2003; Frank 2001, 2007). Notably, we have seen the first race targeted drug with the advent of BiDil, a heart failure drug that is specifically targeted for African Americans. While the Food and Drug Administration perspective maintains that the data support a race-specific usage (Temple and Stockbridge 2007), critics charge that this draws on not only a faulty usage of race as a characteristic, but also draws on a longer history of using race as a way to target drug markets (Kahn 2004). Many have asserted that genes are an imperfect marker of racial difference because of an inability to trace a stable ancestral genetic line (see Collins 2004; Frank 2001). Regardless, the notion that racial variation in health signifies genetic variation lives on (Frank 2001, 2008; Duster 2003).

In closing, there are several sites of policy intervention that research could focus on to understand the mechanisms that lead Blacks and Whites to continue to lead socially separate lives. Whether the public views these issues as driven by ideologies of inequality, as opposed to natural by-products of living in a meritocratic society will undoubtedly influence the degree to which racism can be irradiated permanently.

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Part III

Latin America

The Demography of Race and Ethnicity of Mexico

4

María Isabel Ayala

Mexico is a country in North America with a rich social, cultural, economic, and political history that is comprised of 31 states and one Federal District. Racially and culturally, Mexico is the product of advanced Pre-Columbian civilizations (the Aztec, the Maya, the Olmec, the Teotihuacan, and the Zapotec), as well as Spaniard and African immigrations, and more recently, Asian, Caribbean, and European. Unfortunately, even when the complex socio-cultural history of Mexico is subject of admiration, because of *Mestizaje*, the richness of its racial and ethnic demography is often unacknowledged. Poynton (1997) describes *Mestizaje* as a “post-colonial, mixed race population” that defines Mexico as a country of *mestizos* (people of mixed European, African, and Indian ancestry) (66). Largely, to engage in the study of Mexico’s demography involves the examination of the size, structure, and distribution of the country’s population. Specifically, the demographic dynamics are determined by the characteristics of the Mexican population, including its racial and ethnic characteristics. Regrettably, because Mexico’s racial and ethnic diversity has been reduced to ethnicity alone, the critical study of the demography of

race and ethnicity in Mexico encounters some conceptual and methodological limitations. In this chapter, the conceptual and methodological shortcomings are overcome by presenting a historical analysis of Mexico, by engaging in the social deconstruction of *mestizo*—which may be considered the foundation of Mexican nationalism, as well as by addressing the importance of the validation of non-mestizo identities to develop effective public policy.

As a result of the considerations previously mentioned, this chapter is divided in four sections. The first section presents a critical historical and demographic portrait of race and ethnicity in Mexico in the Colonial and Post-Independence periods. In particular, this section covers the process of creating Mexico as a *mestizo* nation and its relationship to *Mexicanness*. The theoretical issues behind the construction of Mexico as a mestizo nation and the assimilation or resistance of Indians and Afrodescendants to the mestizo national consciousness are also explored. The second section describes Mexico’s demography by contemplating existing fertility, mortality, and migration patterns and addresses the theoretical considerations necessary to understand these relationships. The third section focuses on the conceptual and methodological shortcomings of the study of demography in Mexico, paying particular attention to the absence of analytically-founded racial and ethnic indicators. Finally, the fourth section presents a discussion on Mexican identity and public policy considerations.

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The Historical Construction of Mexico as a Mestizo Nation

Race and ethnicity are social constructions that not only organize society, but are historically and context specific. Whereas early in Mexico's history, racial and ethnic distinctions were used as sources of stratification, through mestizaje, specific techniques of social distinctions were expected to disappear. In practice however, inequalities based on racial and ethnic categories never disappeared. Therefore, to address the complexity behind the process of mestizaje and its relationship with the Mexico's demography, this section presents a critical historical analysis of the country.

Spanish Colonization

Mexico has a rich cultural history that dates back to 2000 Before the Common Era (BCE). Throughout the Mexican territory, pre-Columbian civilizations developed into strong empires including the Maya (2000BCE–900CE), the Olmec (1400–400BCE), the Zapotec (400BCE–1521CE), the Teotihuacan (100BCE–750CE), and the Aztec (1200–1521CE). To acknowledge this rich Indian presence is imperative not only because of its cultural and technological significance, but also because at this time, the Indian population encompassed the numerical and dominant majority. Nevertheless, with the Spanish colonization of the Americas (1492), the dominance of the existing Indian groups came to an end.

In 1521, the Spanish conquest indisputably began to alter the demographic landscape of Mexico. Motivated by “religious fervor, ultranationalism, and the search for personal gain,” the Spanish presence not only brought about military conflict and forced cultural exchange, but planted the seed for the racial and ethnic construction of the *mestizo* nation (Carroll and Lamb 1995:406). During the conquest and colonization periods, sickness, slavery, and hard work were responsible for the dramatic decline of the

Indians in Mexico (Burkholder and Hiles 2000; Carroll and Lamb 1995; Rabell Romero 1993; Vinson 2005). Moreover, the extreme reduction of the Indian population—from an estimated 12–25 million to less than one million—elicited Spaniards to engage in the forced immigration of an estimated 110,000 African slaves (Cruz-Carretero 2005; Darity 2005; Palmer 1976:28; Vinson 2005). While African immigrants were distributed uniformly across the Mexican territory, the small concentration of Indians along the coast and lower regions gave the impression that Africans were overrepresented in these areas (Carroll and Lamb 1995; Cruz-Carretero 2005). Today, most Afrodescendants¹ in Mexico are found in the States of Oaxaca, Veracruz, and the Costa Chica region. The Costa Chica region encompasses the territory “southeast from Acapulco down the coast of Oaxaca, and from the Pacific Coast to Sierra Madre del Sur mountain range 50 km to the north” (Lewis 2000:903). Interestingly, regardless of the negative perception that Spaniards had of Indians and Afrodescendants, the imbalance of Spanish sex ratios—one woman for every two men—triggered interracial unions (Cruz-Carretero 2005:73). Since these unions blurred the racial boundaries that had, up until that point, dictated the social hierarchy in the sixteenth century, a simple form of racial and ethnic classification was developed: the caste system (*sistema de castas*) (Vinson 2005).

The Spaniard administration created the caste system to re-organize the perceived disparities created by interracial unions (Vinson 2005). Nutini (1997) suggests that the caste system was composed of “Blanco (white), Europeo (European), Indii (Indian), negro (black), Mestizo (various combinations of white and Indian), mulato (various combinations of white and black; a rarely used term), criollo (originally a Spaniard born in Mexico, but now a hopelessly contextual

¹Afrodescendent is a term that was adopted in the International Conference Against Racism and Xenophobia by the black organizations to differentiate themselves from blacks in the United States (Hoffman and Pascal 2006).

and imprecise term), and variations on these basic terms” (228–229). Although no agreement subsists on the actual number of castes that existed within this system, most scholars agree that the fluidity of the boundaries within it made the racial framework of colonial Mexico more monolithic than the black/white racial framework of British America and thus, more challenging to manage (Vinson 2005). Additionally, through phenotyping, the caste system produced a racial system of stratification that socially and legally subordinated non-Spaniards. Phenotyping is defined as “the social process that provides or withholds life-chance opportunities and psychic benefits from individuals according to the extent to which their ethno-racial appearance is similar to or different from representative members of the dominant culture” (Montalvo 2004). Consequently, during colonial Mexico (1521–1810), race was dependent not on individual classification, but on the race as per the neighbors—*reputational race*—(Vinson 2005:65). Ultimately, the subjectivity and inefficiency of the caste system provided avenues for change (Montalvo 2004).

For Afrodescendants and Indians, a mestizo phenotype became the path for assimilation and, thus, social mobility (Montalvo 2004). During the colonial period, the smaller number of Indians and Afrodescendants became conducive to higher rates of interracial unions, leading to mestizo look-a-like offsprings (Blau 1977; Carroll and Lamb 1995; González Navarro 1968). Particularly, African slaves and Afrodescendants were twice as likely to marry outside their group as whites and four times more likely than Indians (Carroll and Lamb 1995:414). Moreover, the rate to which a mestizo phenotype was conducive to social mobility increased when a person internalized the Spaniard culture (a process referred to as “whitening” or “*blanqueamiento*” (Carroll and Lamb 1995; Harris 1964; Montalvo 2004; Wade 1997). In the end, the demographic structure of the Colonial period and the social and political conflicts that originated in Mexico’s Independence provided the context for mestizaje to transpire.

Independence of Mexico and the Creation of the Mestizo National Identity

In 1810, Mexico gained its independence from Spain. This independence brought about social, political, and economic changes. Additionally, Mexico’s independence triggered an interest from the new government to create a strong, unified, and independent identity where racial mixture would take priority over purity of the racial groups (Gall 2004; Wolfgang 2001). As such, mestizaje became the quasi “egalitarian policy that allowed for the contact, mixture, and confusion of the races” (González Navarro 1968:37). What is more, mestizaje became to be perceived as the powerhouse of economic prosperity (Doremus 2001; Vasconcelos 1925). As a consequence, mestizo transcended from being a racial-ethnic category to becoming the symbol of Mexicanness.

To become the basis of Mexico’s national consciousness, mestizaje entailed the biological fusion of the different races and also the ethnic extinction of “pure” Indian groups (Gall 2004; Walsh 2004). This extinction took place threefold: biologically, administratively, and culturally. Biologically, founded on Social Darwinism, mestizaje involved the extinction of Indians and Afrodescendants—who were considered poor and weak species—through a process of racial mixing that would eventually give space to “better” species (Doremus 2001). The product of this process was a mestizo population or what Vasconcelos’ (1925) defined as “the cosmic” Mexican race (Carroll and Lamb 1995; Poynton 1997). The biological extinction of the non-mestizo races was accompanied by their administrative removal. On September 27th, 1822 race became omitted from all documents. In principle, this government policy intended to ensure the equality of residents regardless of race and origin. In practice, the removal of race from all documents dramatically contributed to the overnight erasure of the Afrodescendant and Indian populations (Gall 2004; Mac-Lean y Estenos 1960; Ramírez 1971; Vinson 2005). Also, the biological and administrative extinction of Indians and

Afrodescendents was advanced by the deliberate cultural extinction of the groups. Through *mestizaje*, *mestizo* emerged as the basis of Mexican nationalism and of Mexicanness. As a result, the country's racial and ethnic diversity was reduced. In the end, the government policies of the early nineteenth century set the stage for what has become a racial and ethnic "assimilationist" form of discrimination (Gall 2004).

Mexico in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries

At the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, *mestizaje* continued to be thought of as conducive to a modern image of Mexico. Despite being recognized as elements of Mexico's national history, Indians and Afrodescendents were perceived as irrelevant to the contemporary nation that was desired. Consequently, during the Porfiriato (1876–1910) attempts were made to biologically and culturally "whiten" the population encouraging European immigration and expelling Asians and Afrodescendents (González Navarro 1968; Lewis 2000; Stephan 1991; Vasconcelos 1925).

On top of racial miscegenation, cultural miscegenation took place. Indians and Afrodescendents were encouraged to transcend their minority identity by adopting the "modern behaviors, clothing, and manners" of *mestizos* (González Navarro 1968; Poynton 1997:65). In fact, during Camacho's (1940–1946) and Aleman's (1946–1952) presidencies, the goal became "not to Indianize Mexico, but to Mexicanize the Indian while at the same time preserving indigenous culture (language, dress, religion, customs, etc.)" (Doremus 2001:377). In this process, Afrodescendents were more likely to culturally assimilate to *mestizos* than Indians. The geographic proximity and cultural contact of Afrodescendents with the *mestizo* population compared to the segregation experienced by Indian groups contributed to the Afrodescendents' higher rate of assimilation. Ultimately, the racial and cultural miscegenation that took place has covertly contributed to the inequality experienced by Indians and Afrodescendents.

The critical role of both culture and phenotype is further observed in the dynamics of social mobility and stratification (Nutini 1997). Traditionally, Indian groups in Mexico are defined by the culture they practice and their regional social position. Not surprising, this social position is dependent on "sociocultural attributes [and] phenotypic characteristics" (Nutini 1997:227). According to Nutini (1997), depending on the social class being examined, culture or phenotype will be the most significant attribute for classification. For example, at the lower socioeconomic classes, Nutini (1997) mentions that phenotype is not as important as culture. Thus, Indians—who are more likely to experience poverty—may be able to achieve social mobility by internalizing the "sociocultural baggage" of *mestizos* (Nutini 1997:228). The social mobility of Indians is possible because there are no real visible phenotypical differences between them and *mestizos* in the lower classes. However, because the middle and upper classes "consists mostly of genetically European populations" and these populations are very susceptible to maintaining the phenotypic distinctiveness of their group, people will try to reduce their phenotypical African or Indian traits (Nutini 1997:228). Overall, Nutini (1997) suggests that in Mexico, as in the rest of Latin America, there is a constant cultural and phenotypical manipulation for purposes of inclusion and mobility. So while in theory *mestizaje* is the absence of racial identity, these racial unwritten forms of stratification in Mexico have covertly legitimized racism (Poynton 1997). Specifically, "the ethnic becomes a social stratification element" as it materializes "in the scarce social mobility, in the lack of formal employment opportunities for the indigenous groups, and in the low sociocultural and labor valuation of bilingual education" (Paris Pombo 2000:97). However, the omission of the Indian and Afrodescendent presence from national consciousness began to be challenged in the early twentieth century.

For the first time, during the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) and Cardenas' presidency (1934–1940), a real effort was made to incorporate Indians to the cultural life of the

country. The first step to do so was taken with the creation of the Indian Affairs Autonomous Department in 1917. Structural initiatives during the 1930s followed, including a switch from industrial to agricultural models and the development of funds for school construction and cooperatives. These policies were developed to reduce the inequality experienced by Indians (Doremus 2001). At the same time, anthropologist Aguirre Beltran began to conduct a series of ethnographic studies that produced cultural descriptions of the Costa Chica region that acknowledge the Afrodescendent presence in the nation (Hoffman and Pascal 2006). In his work, Aguirre Beltran hypothesized that the disappearance of the Afrodescendent population reflected its cultural and racial blending into the mestizo category. Nevertheless, the data he collected demonstrates the existence of a group of Afrodescendants who did not assimilate into the mestizo category (Lewis 2000). Unthinkably at the time, this study provided a clear example of how ascription and self ethnic identification do not always collide (Wolfgang 2001). Moreover, Aguirre Beltran's studies triggered the critical reexamination of Mexico's racial and ethnic roots. In the middle of the twentieth century, the National Indigenous Institute—headed by Bonfil Batalla—funded a series of studies on the Afrodescendent population of Mexico which he labeled “Our Third Root” (Cruz-Carretero 2005; Lewis 2000). As a result and for the first time, the African and Afrodescendent role in Mexico's multiculturalism was acknowledged (Valencia Valencia 1993; see also Lewis 2000). Unfortunately, because mestizaje and its imposing ideology have been so powerful, Afrodescendants have not pressed for a Mexican national consciousness that addresses blackness.

Afrodescendent Assimilation

For many Afrodescendants, blackness or *Afromexican* were not meaningful or desirable identities in Mexico. In her study of Afrodescendants in the town of San Nicolas in the state of Guerrero, Lewis (2000) finds that

Afrodescendants identify as *morenos* because *moreno* is a term located between the black and white racial continuum. *Moreno*, per se, is an identity that conforms to the “nationalist mestizaje discourse [that privileges]... mixture over purity” (Vaughn 2005:51). The fluidity of the *moreno* boundaries allows Afrodescendants to conceptually ally with Indians and thus, force others to recognize them as Mexican (Lewis 2000:917). An example of this effort is witnessed during the Mexican Independence Day's celebration as Afrodescendants in San Nicholas choose to wear Indian costumes to connect to their Indian background (Lewis 2000).

Nevertheless, it is important to note that in some cases, the Indian-Mexican association does not go unchallenged. In his study of blackness in the Costa Chica region, Vaughn (2005) finds that because Afrodescendants hold a pejorative view of Indians, Indianness is never confused with blackness (Vaughn 2005). The social distance between Indians and Afrodescendants may date back to the colonial period when Afrodescendants were hired to supervise Indian workers and continuous to be reinforced by the existing economic divisions (Vaughn 2005). And yet, contrary to other countries in Latin America like Brazil or Cuba, in Mexico, Afrodescendent culture lacks cultural or religious demonstrations that represent their afro identity (Argyriadis and Capone 2004, Hoffman and Pascal 2006). Given that individual identity is the result of historical, contextual, and individual forces, Afrodescendants' connection to Africanness may lead to their empowerment and thus, their questioning of the Indian-Mexican connection. However, for many Afrodescendants in Mexico, the ideology of mestizaje has been so powerful that Africanness is seen “as an outside imposition that conflicts with their sense of themselves as Mexican [and thus]... reinforces their political and economic marginality” (Jackson 1995; Lewis 2000:897; Torres and Whitten 1998). For the most part, what these examples demonstrate is that for Afrodescendants it is not ethnic identity or racial identity per se what organizes social life, but identity practices in relationship to others (rituals, politics, ancestry, production) (Hoffman and Pascal 2006). In the end, the lack of

interest of many Afrodescendents to associate with blackness explicates their lack of mobilization. On the contrary, Indians are pressing for change to take place.

Indigenous Resistance

In 1992, the Mexican constitution was amended to identify Mexico as a pluricultural country. In part attributed to “changes in the constructed identities of rural indigenous groups,” this amendment entailed the recognition of Indians as part of Mexico (Eisenstadt 2006:108; Poynton 1997). For the first time in Mexico’s history, the legal framework existed to not only increase the national and international visibility of the Indian population, but also to politically redefine the nation. Therefore, in 1994, the National Liberation Zapatista Army (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional) mobilized to formally counter the ideology of *mestizaje*. Specifically, the National Liberation Zapatista Army pushed for an end to the “stigmatization of Indian identity” by redefining the Mexican identity (Poynton 1997:67). One of the most significant outcomes of the Indian mobilizations is the 1996 San Andres Accords. The San Andres Accords produced constitutional reforms that address Indian rights including but not limited to the eradication of the “subordination, inequality, and discrimination” of Indians (Poynton 1997:71). Overall, what the Indian mobilizations in Mexico exemplify is a trend in which ethnic identity is put on top of a class identity (Brysk 2000; Eisenstadt 2006; Gall 2004). As a result, the topic of racism has begun to be part of Mexico’s political agenda.

For the most part, *mestizaje* was intended to create a unified post racial nation that would bring about a cohesive egalitarian population. However, the critical decomposition of Mexico’s demographic, racial, and ethnic history discussed challenges many of the assumptions that have presented Mexico as a post-racial nation. Ultimately, the purpose of this historical exploration is to provide an account of the diversity of Mexico’s past to be used as a tool to critically examine the demography of contemporary Mexico.

Mexico’s Demography and Theoretical Considerations

The demography of Mexico is socially, culturally, and economically wealthy, and thus, it is reflected in the complexity of its population dynamics. In this section, a description of Mexico’s demographic diversity is presented. In addition, an exploration of some of the fertility, mortality, and migration theories and their application to the Mexican case is conducted.

Mexico and the Census

In Mexico, there is a history of collecting information on the size of the population that dates back to the pre-Colonial period. According to the National Institute of Geography and History (INEGI), there are records that show that political, economic, and religious reasons drove the Chichimecas (early 12C), the Aztecs (14C), and evangelists’ friars (16C) to count the population (INEGI 2010). Since 1895, the General Direction of Statistics has been in charge of conducting a census—every 10 years—of the general Mexican population. The General Population Census provides information on the demographic, social, and economic condition of the total population that aids in the development of public policy. Beyond the data provided by the ethnographic studies that have been conducted of the Indian and Afrodescendent populations, the data gathered by the 1995 and 2000 Counts of Population and Dwelling (CPD) and the 2000 General Census of Population and Dwelling is the most valid and reliable macro level data on the Indian population and its socioeconomic condition. However, due to methodological shortcomings that will be thoroughly discussed in the next section, the racial and ethnic diversity of the country, which includes the Afrodescendent population, has not been fully accounted for in these counts. Contrary to other countries’ census, the questionnaire used in the Mexican General Population Census does not include analytically founded indicators of racial and ethnic classifications that

would permit an in-depth understanding of the demography of race and ethnicity in Mexico. Instead, a language and an ethnic belonging question have been used to distinguish between the Indian and non-Indian populations. Based on the information available, a description of Mexico's demographic landscape is offered.

Demographic Landscape and Theoretical Overview of Mexico

As of July 2011, Mexico had an estimated population of 113,724,226 people which makes it the 11th most populous country in the world (World Factbook 2012). While the exact number of Indians in Mexico is difficult to determine based on the available data, according to the National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Towns (Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas) it is estimated that today there are about 12 million Indians in Mexico (2010). The largest concentration of this Indian speaking population is found in the states of Chiapas (1,330,981), Oaxaca (1,594,490) and Yucatan (981,499) (INEGI 2010). Whereas the General Census of Population and Dwelling does not allow for an estimation of the size of the Afrodescendent population, Davis (1994) suggests that in the 1990 decade it consisted of about 474,000 people (see also Vinson 2005). Next, a description of fertility, mortality, and migration is presented.

Fertility and Mortality

To develop a critical understanding of the dynamics of Mexico's population, it is important to examine the fertility and mortality transformations that have taken place in the last decades. In terms of fertility, Mexico has shown a remarkable decline in the total fertility rate (TFR) of its population. Since the late 1960s, Mexico has experienced a tremendous fertility decline from 7.3 in 1960 to 2.0 in 2012 (Instituto Nacional de Geografía e Historia 2012). The nationwide decline in Mexico's fertility is very significant

not only because of its magnitude (5.3 children), but also because of the short period (five decades) of time that it required. Yet, small group and regional variations in fertility rates remain. On the one hand, the national fertility reduction in Mexico has not been accompanied by a dramatic reduction in the number of births to women younger than 20 years which in between 1990 and 2010 remained stable around 20 %. In addition, given that Indian women are more likely to marry or cohabite at younger ages than the national average, they still continue to have a higher fertility than non-Indian women.

On the other hand, there are regional variations. For example, for the most part states that have a large concentration of people who speak an indigenous language (Chiapas and Guerrero) have the highest fertility rates (2.2), Mexico City—with a small concentration of this population—has the lowest fertility (1.7) (INEGI 2012). Furthermore, the higher percentage of births to women younger than 20 years tend to occur in northern border states like Chihuahua (22.8), Nayarit (21.6), and Baja California and Durango (20.7) rather than in the central part of the country in states like Mexico City (15.3), Jalisco (16.3), and Queretaro (16.6). This regional variation in fertility may be explained not only by the composition of the state's population, but also by the people's socioeconomic condition. While central states have historically experienced economic stability, Mexico's northern and southern states have not.

To understand fertility reduction differentials worldwide, many explanations have been developed. In particular, the literature suggests that it is the product of a combination of social, cultural, and economic factors that make the postponement and decline of fertility rational responses (Kohler et al. 2002; Poston 2000). In the case of Mexico, it could be argued that the existing occupational structure resulting from today's educational and labor market opportunities may be playing a role in people's fertility behavior (Frank and Heuveline 2005).

Moreover, the national reduction in fertility has been accompanied by a reduction in mortality rates and an expansion of life expectancy.

Between 1990 and 2010, the infant mortality rate declined from 39.2 to 14.2 (INEGI 2010). For many people of low socioeconomic, the general reduction in mortality rates is the result of the growth of the health services coverage provided by the Popular Insurance (CDI 2006). Specifically, because historically the Indian population has experienced higher levels of stratification than the national average, the importance of the Popular Insurance needs to be underscored. In addition, the decline in mortality rates is also directly related to the life expectancy of the population. Between 1990 and 2010, life expectancy in Mexico improved from 70.6 years to 75.4 years even when gender and regional variations remain. On average, women live longer (77.8 years) than men (73.1 years) and people from Mexico City have a higher (76.3) life expectancy than people from the coastal states of Guerrero (73.8), Veracruz (74.3), and Chiapas (74.4).

Overall, the impact of the fertility and mortality reduction is observed in the composition of the population. First, Mexico is beginning to experience the emergence of a rapidly aging population. Whereas between 1950 and 1990 the median age for Mexico remained stable (19 years old), in 2005 the median age was 24 (23 for males and 25 for women). Also, Mexico is experiencing a substantial reduction of the relative cohort size. Specifically, in the case of the Indian population, there has been a reduction in the number of people between 0 and 9 years old; a sign of what may be the beginning of a change in the racial or ethnic composition of the country. While individual and contextual indicators have been used to explain the fertility and mortality reductions in Mexico and throughout the world, for the most part, it has been argued that these reductions are the result of large scale transformations.

In particular, the Demographic Transition Model (Notestein 1945; Thompson 1929) and the Epidemiological Transition Theory (Omran 1971) have attempted to explicate the fertility and mortality transformations that have taken place throughout the world. The Demographic Transition Model distinguishes industrialization and modernization as the basis for large scale demographic transformations including the

reduction of fertility and mortality (Notestein 1945; Thompson 1929). According to this model, as Mexico becomes more industrial (demonstrated by indicators such as higher levels of women's employment), mortality declines, including infant mortality rates. Once mortality declines, it is expected that the decline of fertility will become a rational outcome. However, when applied to the Mexican case, the demographic transition model has two main shortcomings. First, it fails to explain how Mexico has been able to dramatically reduce its fertility and mortality levels even when the country has not become a highly industrialized nation. Also, this model fails to address the role that the Mexican government and the church have played in influencing fertility behavior (Greenhalgh 1990). In the case of Mexico, it has been suggested that the economic pressures from the World Bank, the secularization of the church, and Mexican's conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism and Evangelism (8 %) have contributed to the decline of fertility. Hence, due to the limitations of the Demographic Transition Model in explaining the fertility and mortality declines in Mexico, some scholars have turned to the Epidemiological Transition Theory.

The Epidemiological Transition Theory explains the decline of fertility and mortality as the product of changes in the causes of mortality. The theory's underlying argument is that infectious diseases have been replaced by chronic or degenerative diseases as the dominant diseases responsible for the decline of mortality (Omran 1971). Once mortality declines, it is argued that fertility decline will follow. In the case of Mexico, the higher percentages of chronic diseases—which in 2007 were heart disease (16.95), diabetes (13.71) and cancer (12.66)—together with higher life expectancy give some support to this explanation (INEGI 2010). Nevertheless, it is argued that the social characteristics (educational attainment, income, wealth) of the Mexican population rather than the transformation of the type of disease may be the reason behind the reduction of mortality, the increase in life expectancy, and the reduction of fertility. In particular, when the educational attainment of the Mexican population

is examined, there is a notable reduction in the gap between Indians and non-Indians. Whereas in 2005 Indians had higher illiteracy rates (21.6) than the national average (6.3), their overall educational attendance and attainment is comparable (CDI 2006). In 2005, 91.5 % of Indian children between 6 and 14 years old attended school—compared to 94.5 of the national sample—(CDI 2006). In addition, the level of educational attainment within the Indian population between 15 and 64 years of age is increasing (CDI 2006). The relevance of the reduction of the educational gap between the Indian and non-Indian population lies in the importance that education has not only for social mobility but also for its cumulative effect on mortality and life expectancy. In the end, the fertility and mortality transformations taking place in Mexico and its impact on the country's population seem to be the product of multidimensional causes including migration.

Migration

Whereas the effect that fertility and mortality declines have had for Mexico's demographic landscape cannot be denied, it is important to highlight the critical impact that migration has had for this country. The causes and consequences of the internal and international movement of the Mexican population are varied and complex, and thus make this demographic issue a very salient one affecting the nation and its population. Since the 1970s, Mexico has established itself as a country with a large internal and international migrant population. Traditionally, women have been more likely to engage in internal migration whereas males have driven the international movement. Overall, between 2000 and 2005, 3 % of the total population and 2.5 % of the indigenous one changed their residence. Environmental conditions negatively impacting food production, limited alternative opportunity structures, family reunification, insecurity and a quest for a better life are some of the reasons that many young and mature individuals are engaging in this movement. Indeed in some cases, people have chosen to settle in large metropolitan areas

such as Cancun, Guadalajara and Monterrey in hopes of finding work opportunities. And yet, scholars like Elu and Santos (2005) have found that as a result of the economic restructuring process observed in Mexico in the past decades, many internal migrants are moving to cities of different sizes.

Now, while the reasons behind people's migration and the factors influencing their decision to settle in a particular place vary, one thing is certain, that these internal and international migrations of people are altering the population distribution of the country in general and of states in particular. For example, between 2005 and 2010, while Baja California experienced the highest (5.0) median population growth, Mexico City experienced the smallest one (0.3) (INEGI 2012). Furthermore, these changes in the distribution of the general population across Mexico have resulted in some states experiencing a critical transformation of their population. For example, while the Indian population has grown more than ten percent in the states of Aguascalientes, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Zacatecas, it has declined between 1 and 2 % in the states of Baja California, Hidalgo, Guanajuato, Mexico, Michoacán, Queretaro, Sonora, and Veracruz (CDI 2006).

Moreover, the population transformation of the nation has been further impacted by international immigration and emigration. In terms of immigration, the country has a history of international immigration of people from Asia, the Caribbean, and Europe. Interestingly, whereas between the 1960s and 2000 the percent of the total Mexican population that was born in another country remained stable (around 0.5 %), in the last decade, a growth has been observed (.86 %). One of the most interesting outcomes of this immigration—beyond its demographic impact—is its role in the informal classification of people based on their physical and cultural characteristics. For example, up until the middle of the nineteenth century the term *blanco* (white) was only used to refer to people of Spanish descent. However, as immigration from Europe and Eastern countries has increased, *blanco* (white) is now being used to refer to nationality e.g. Gringo,

Americano, Lebanese, or to allude to phenotypes e.g. “Güeros (light skinned), citrines (city slickers), criollos güeros (blondish Creoles)” (Nutini 1997:230). Based on these considerations, to assume that a mestizo, Indian, or Afrodescendent category implies cohesion or social unity would be erroneous (Wolfgang 2001).

In contrast to the small percentages of immigration, Mexicans have internationally emigrated in large numbers. Between 2005 and 2010, a little more than one million people (1,112,273) emigrated and about 90 % of them did so to the United States (INEGI 2012). As of 2000, the states with the largest percentages of international emigrants were Zacatecas (4.9 of the state’s population), Michoacán (4.2), and Guanajuato (3.5). On the other hand, Chiapas, Tabasco, Quintana Roo, and Campeche sent less than .3 % of their total population. Interestingly, this international movement has been responsible for the decline in the indigenous population of 10–24 years of age observed in the past decade. Given that international migration has had a tremendous impact on Mexico as a sending country and for the United States as a country of destination; many theories have been developed to explain it.

In the case of Mexico, the Neoclassical, the Segmented Labor Market, and the Social Capital perspectives provide a critical explanation of the macro and micro level forces driving people’s movement. The Neoclassical perspective understands migration as originating in differences between the sending and receiving communities. Structurally, the Neoclassical Economic perspective explains Mexicans’ movement as the result of geographic and wage differences in the supply and demand for labor between the U.S. and Mexico (Massey et al. 2002). However, this perspective may be easily applied at the regional level as Mexico is a country with contrasting socioeconomic geographies. On the other hand, at the micro level, the Neoclassical economic perspective assumes that Mexicans conduct cost-benefit calculations to decide whether or not they will migrate. The cost-benefit calculation is

directly related to the human capital that they possess. The argument is that if people consider that their human capital will be better regarded in the country of destination, they will migrate. However, the reduction of migration decisions to rational cost-benefit calculations prevents this perspective from capturing the full picture of Mexican’s movement.

The Segmented Labor Market Perspective also addresses international migration from a household level. However, contrary to the Neoclassical model, the Segmented Labor Market Perspective does not explain Mexican’s migration as the result of wage rates, social capital, or failure of the Mexican government. Instead, the Segmented Labor Market perspective explains migration as originating from a demand for immigrant labor in advanced industrial societies. The theory’s underlying argument is that as the labor demand in the United States increases, so does the likelihood of migration (Massey et al. 2002). Even when the theory presents a critical explanation driving people’s movement, the theory’s neglect of the critical role that the Mexican government plays in the migration process remains its major shortcoming.

Moreover, the Social Capital perspective permits the micro and macro level examination of people’s mobility both internally and internationally. Social capital represents the social relations that exist among family or community members. Portes and Zhou (1993:1322) states that social capital is made up of “those expectations for action within a collectivity that affect economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its members, even if these expectations are not oriented to the economic sphere.” Therefore, social networks are distinguished as the most important factor driving people’s migration. The application of the Social Capital Perspective to the Mexican case advances the neoclassical model in two ways. First, it assumes an inverse relationship between networks and the cost-benefit evaluation of migration and thus explains the increasing rates of Mexican’s migration to the United States. Second, and contrary to neoclassical arguments

that portray networks as sources of information, the Social Capital Perspective emphasizes their critical role in people's cost-benefit calculations (Massey et al. 2002; Massey and Espinosa 1997). Overall, while none of these perspectives in isolation can explain the factors driving Mexican's migration, together they allow for the recognition of the micro and macro level social, cultural, and economic factors that are part of the process.

Overall and regardless of the forces driving people's international migration, what can be noted is that beyond the impact that the international migration of Mexicans has had for the United States; this movement has had important implications for Mexico in general, but also for specific states, communities, families and individuals. Economically and socially, Mexico and its population have benefited from the amount of economic remittances that have been sent by Mexicans abroad even during a period of worldwide economic recession. For example, according to the Inter-American Development Bank (2010), even when remittances declined 15 % in 2009, they still contributed \$58.8 billion dollars to the national economy. At the same time, and as noted by Levitt (1998), social remittances have impacted Mexico's population as well as influenced the existing normative structures and systems of practices.

In addition, the large internal movement of Mexicans has had a tremendous demographic impact in their sending communities. Today, many rural villages or communities are composed of a disproportionate number of children and old adults who have stayed behind as the working age population has engaged in migration. In some cases, the communities are not equipped to provide the services needed by this unique population and thus, the old and the young are required to provide for themselves. Under these conditions, many children are forced to drop out of school to provide for younger siblings and older family members. Sometimes, the lack of opportunities makes this particular population target of delinquent bands that offer them a better life and recruit them with promises of money,

food, and power. This is an alarming event product of the environment of insecurity existing in Mexico in the past few years.

Furthermore, in addition, to the economic, demographic, political, and social issues and challenges confronting the State and its population, Mexico is beginning to face a new demographic and economic event. Just as the rate of international emigration has declined (14 %), the duration of the international movement has increased. For example, compared to the 22.5 % of people who returned between 1990 and 1995; only 16.6 % did so between 1995 and 2000. The decreasing rate of emigration and the increasing duration or permanency of this international movement may be explained by the worldwide economic recession on the one hand, and the increasing border patrol presence, anti-immigrant sentiments, and stringent policies that have negatively impacted undocumented border crossings and economic remittances between Mexico and the United States. Unfortunately, in the case of the people who choose not to continue their engagement in transnational migration or who never intend to migrate, what is certain is that many of them are left facing limited work opportunities, challenging family dynamics, but also an environment of insecurity which many of them had not experienced before.

Overall, as the previous examination shows, Mexico is a country with a dynamic demography. In particular, not only has the country experienced tremendous reductions in fertility and mortality levels, but together with migration these events are contributing to the country's demographic and sociocultural transformations. Largely, it is difficult to project the demographic future of Mexico. However, if the existing demographic, social, political, economic conditions remain stable, it is possible to predict that the reduction in fertility and mortality levels will stabilize and the trend of international migration of its population will continue. Still, these projections should be taken with caution since the increasing Asian, Caribbean, and European

immigrations may impact current demographic trends as they have done abroad.

Quality of Data and Methodological Shortcomings

In 1992, the fourth article of the Mexican constitution was amended to recognize the country's pluricultural composition—one mostly based in its Indian population. This self-definition has forced the Mexican government to not only identify the racial and ethnic diversity of the population, but to measure it. Although many agree that Mexico's population has predominantly Indian, Spanish, and African origins, Mexicans are often times unaware of this diversity. Earlier in this chapter, it has been argued that a critical examination of Mexico's history uncovers the process by which this unawareness developed. Through time, *mestizaje* led to the blending of racial and ethnic boundaries and the creation of *mestizo* as the dominant racial and ethnic category. Based on this monolithic pseudo post-racial ideology, in 1822 the Mexican government stopped measuring race and in doing so, undermined and legitimized an existing process of racial and ethnic stratification (Mac-Lean y Estenos 1960). In this section, a discussion on some of the problems that exist in the quality of data available for the study of Mexico's population is presented.

Self-Identity, Level of Analysis, and Classification

Mestizo, *Indian*, and *Afrodescendent* categories are social constructions whose membership is historically and context specific. As a result, the development of indicators to classify and measure their respective populations is a challenging endeavor (Waters 2001). In 2000, to distinguish between the Indian and Non-Indian populations in Mexico, the General Population Count of Population and Dwelling included a question on ethnic belonging—Do you consider yourself *nahuatl*, *zapotec*, *mixtec*, or from any other Indian group?—. Although this type of classifica-

tion of the population or typification is necessary to uncover large scale patterns, it is important to recognize that classification based on self-identity has limitations. While self identification is a critical element to classify and quantify a population, it is the product of a very complex set of individual and social processes shaped by social location. At the individual level, a person classifies him or herself as a *mestizo*, *Indian*, or *Afrodescendent* after making calculations that include phenotype (racial) and level of ethnicity (cultural) as part of the equation. This individual association results from individuals either assimilating the identity of the group associated with the higher social status (*mestizo*) or by developing ethnic resilience in which case, an *Indian* or *Afrodescendent* identity becomes salient.

Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that racial and ethnic identities are not only the product of individual but also of social processes. In other words, racial and ethnic membership (classification) is not always validated outside the individual. Socially, the Mexican government and the "other" population—defined as people from outside the person's racial and ethnic group—classify an individual based on his or her phenotype and culture. This social process of classification is not only dependent on socio-economic conditions of the "other" but also on the individual being classified and the geographic location in which this classification takes place (Eisenstadt 2006). As a consequence, the conceptualization of any racial or ethnic categories requires an analytical understanding of their membership something that has been rarely addressed in the studies of the population in Mexico. In the end, the lack of recognition of the complexity of self-identity processes in the ethnic-belonging indicator brings about questions of validity and reliability of the data gathered. The validity and reliability of any racial or ethnic indicators for classification may be further impeded if the level of analysis used to define a group varies.

In Mexico, different levels of analysis are used in the working definitions of racial and ethnic groups. For example, at the individual level, *Indian* refers to:

every individual that feels he/she belongs to an indigenous community; that conceives himself/herself as Indigenous, because this member's conscience cannot exist but when the culture of the group is accepted completely; when individuals have the same ethic, esthetic, social and political ideals of the group.; when one participates in the sympathetic and disagreeable collective and is itself willingly collaborating in its actions. That is to say, that is Indian the one that feels to belong to an indigenous community (Caso 1948:215, see also Doremus 2001).

On the other hand, Indian, as a social group is defined as the people who:

descended from populations that were living in the country in the epoch of conquest and colonization and at the time of the establishment of the States' frontiers, and that, whatever may have been their legal situation, conserve their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, or parts thereof. The consciousness of their indigenous identity must be considered as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which these dispositions will be applied as indigenous peoples (Poynton 1997:71).

Whereas these definitions vary in their level of analysis (individual vs. group), they both base their measurement on self-identity (Serrano Carreto et al. 2002). Therefore, if scholars fail to identify the level of analysis used if the definition of a category may result in measurement problems. Although most micro and macro level studies that have been conducted of the Mexican population have been able to address these analytical considerations, the methodology they follow and the data they produce have some shortcomings.

Type of Study: Micro vs. Macro

The micro level analyses of Indian and Afrodescendent populations have been beneficial in the study of minority groups in Mexico. In the absence of large scale data in the second half of the twentieth century—as a result of the omission of race measures in Mexico and the limitations of ethnic indicators—qualitative methodologies have permitted an inductive method of study that consents the analysis of these groups. Nevertheless, while these ethno-

graphic studies have contributed to increasing the visibility of Indians and Afrodescendents, they have several shortcomings. One of the main limitations of ethnographic studies lies in its failure to produce data that can be generalized. In the particular case of Afrodescendents, most studies have been conducted in the Costa Chica region. Therefore, they have ignored other communities with large concentrations of Afrodescendents, including but not limited to the state of Veracruz, that prevent the generalization of their results. Also, most of the studies conducted have focused on intragroup relationships. This means that studies have been done of Afrodescendents or Indians in isolation or in relationship to the non-Afrodescendent or non-Indian populations. The homogenization of the population and the lack of Afrodescendent-Indian comparisons impede the in-depth analysis of intergroup dynamics that is pressing. To overcome some of these shortcomings macro level analysis have been conducted.

Even when there are analytical considerations that need to be made in any study of human populations, in the end, the typification of the population is needed. In the case of Mexico however, the country's pluricultural diversity has been reduced to ethnicity. As previously discussed, since the 1990s, the Count of Population and Dwelling and the General Population Count of Population and Dwelling have included two indicators of ethnicity that measure ethnic belonging and language. Because a discussion on the shortcomings of the ethnic belonging question has been presented, in this subsection, the discussion will concentrate on the language indicator. The language indicator is a dichotomous indicator that measures whether a person 5 years or older speaks an indigenous language (Eisenstadt 2006; Fernández and Serrano 2002). The relevance of including a language indicator goes beyond the recognition of the language diversity of the country. The importance of the language indicator for ethnic classification lies in its role as one of the remaining identity markers of Indian groups (CDI 2009a). In addition, because through language ethnic groups share a common view of the world and of themselves,

language is an important element in identity creation and development (Hawkins 1990; see also CDI 2009a).

However, measuring ethnicity through language is problematic for several reasons. The first shortcoming of including this measure in the census is its role in reducing the Indian and non-Indian populations in Mexico to language. By doing so, this measure impedes the desegregation of the Indian population to recognize the socio-demographic differences within them (CDI 2009a). Consequently, within group diversity is undermined. In addition, the language indicator fails to address the existence of the Afrodescendent populations and thus, erodes the power of *mestizaje* in encouraging assimilation. Furthermore, the language measure poses validity and reliability problems in determining the size of the Indian and non-Indian populations. First, with the number of Indian language speakers decreasing, this measurement of the Indian population is becoming more fragile. Second, because many studies have added “children 0–4 years of age that reside in households where the head of household or partner is speaker of an indigenous language, to the total population older than 5 years old that speaks any of the indigenous language when both correspond to different universes; the latter to individuals, and the former to households” (CDI 2009b:2). Finally, the data available from the macro level studies of the Mexican population that have been conducted is cross-sectional. As such, only a snapshot of the dynamic of the population’s demography is available.

While many micro and macro level studies have been conducted to understand the diversity of Mexico’s population, it is important to be aware of the shortcomings and limitations of the available methodology and data. These shortcomings pose validity and reliability issues not only for the count of the different racial and ethnic groups that are part of Mexico’s demography, but also for the in-depth study of their socioeconomic condition. Therefore, it is crucial to engage in the critical analysis of the existing population measures to develop valid and reliable indicators that analytically address the racial and ethnic

diversity of the nation and that permit the development of appropriate public policy.

Non-mestizo Identity Empowerment

Historically, the Spanish Colonization of Mexico brought about remarkable demographic and socio-cultural transformations. Not only did the local Indian population experienced a considerable reduction in its size, the Afrodescendent roots of the country were founded, and the racial and ethnic boundaries blurred (as a result of the increasing interracial unions), but the system of racial and ethnic stratification that still exists today began to develop. It was not until after the country’s independence, however, that the legitimacy of this system materialized under the ideology of *mestizaje* contrived within this pseudo post-racial modern (newly independent) nation.

Today, even as Mexico celebrates its 200th anniversary of independence from Spain, its population continues to experience the same social stratification along racial and ethnic lines. The process’s survival is attributed in part to the founding of Mexican nationalism and consciousness on a mestizo identity, which created the demographic, social, and economic conditions that have prevented non-mestizo minority groups (e.g., Indians and Afrodescendants) from accessing opportunity structures. Equality is, then, a basic human right that many Mexicans do not possess due to the invisibility of their non-mestizo identities. And until an environment of inclusivity—one that identifies and values the heterogeneous racial and ethnic composition of the Mexican population—is created and supported by a legal framework, the existing structures of inequality will not disappear. Accordingly, for policies to effectively address the centuries-long social system of discrimination and foster social equality, it is crucial that they recognize, empower, and value the diversity of mestizo and non-mestizo identities.

Overall, identities are conceptualized as the meanings people hold for themselves that define what it means to be who they are as a person, role

occupant, and group member (Burke 2004). At the same time, it has been argued that both cognitive and non-cognitive (cultural, social, and psychological) factors play an important role in defining people's identities. As a result, identities are expected to be fluid and multifaceted categories that change according to contexts and experiences (Feliciano 2009).

As has been mentioned throughout this chapter, Mexico's national identity has been founded on *mestizaje* (post-racial identity). As such, a non-mestizo identity has been discouraged within the mestizo nation state as observed, for example, by the absence of racial and ethnic identity indicators in the Mexican census and by the grouping of all non-mestizo identities under the unofficial category of *Other*. But, because the first step towards an inclusive environment requires that the population's diverse individual and collective identities be recognized and valued outside the in-group, this must change. It is important to start by simultaneously identifying the heterogeneous racial and ethnic identities of the Mexican population and empowering the people holding those identities. To do this, the State must play an active role in validating the racial and ethnic diversity of identities. It is until individuals holding non-mestizo identities engage in positive interactions with others (in-group and out-group) that accept and validate the existence of non-mestizo identities that the non-mestizos will be more likely to develop positive emotions about their own identity and, thus, be empowered to push for continuous and increasing recognition, and, consequently, for equality of opportunity as well.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that even when the mestizo identity has been behind the foundation of Mexican nationalism, many people have still been able to adopt or maintain a minority racial or ethnic identity. Hence, it is also significant to attend to the strategies used by non-mestizo individuals to develop or maintain a positive non-mestizo identity in a predominantly majority (mestizo) space. This issue is of critical importance as it may be responsible for influencing the individual's self-esteem (Burke and Stets 1999; Stryker and Burke 2000).

In addition, given the dialectic relationship between identities and social structures, one should expect to see changes at the micro level having an impact at the macro level. Generally, identities are socially constructed and conveyed by social structures (Stets and Burke 2000); this means that the environment (e.g., geographic, social) and the interactions that take place within it influence people's definition of self (e.g., Mexican, Indian, Afrodescendent). As previously addressed, Mexico has continued to covertly support (or reinforce) a mestizo identity as the basis of its nationalism. Consequently, the legitimation and internalization of a mestizo identity—and the false consciousness it promotes among non-mestizo minorities—are two of the major factors preventing the massive mobilization of marginalized populations. This mobilization would very likely involve demanding existing power figures equal access to the opportunity structures that all Mexicans deserve.

Of importance is not only the need to appraise the role that existing institutions have developed to undermine (or, on the contrary, perhaps instigate) an inclusive environment, but also the fact that the identification, validation and empowerment of mestizo and non-mestizo identities in Mexico should encourage different governmental and nongovernmental entities to collaborate in the systematic measurement—hence, the recognition—of all racial and ethnic populations conforming the nation. This task involves engaging in an interdisciplinary dialogue that results in the conceptualization of the Indian, Afrodescendent, and mestizo (among other) categories. Once these racial and ethnic categories are clearly defined, it will be easier to operationalize them and, thus, create valid and reliable indicators that measure not only the size of the population but also its socioeconomic condition.

Indeed, the relevance of measuring race goes beyond challenging the myth of the cosmic race. Its importance lies in challenging the legitimation of discrimination that it has created. Therefore, by developing racial classifications, it will be possible to measure more accurately not only the demographic trends across racial/ethnic groups but also people's experiences of inequality.

To give an example, the identification, validation and empowerment of mestizo and non-mestizo identities in Mexico could have strong implications in education and, as a consequence, in work and labor opportunities as well. It is widely known that the relevance of education lies in its critical role for social mobility as it influences occupational opportunities and people's level of empowerment. In terms of the relationship between identity and education, several studies have found that an inclusive environment produces a positive self-esteem, which in turn can have a positive impact on educational attainment. In fact, Caldwell and Kamau (2003) have argued that when addressing issues such as "social alienation, racial identity, academic self-concept, and help-seeking, students usually feel more empowered, equipped, and efficacious to pursue [and attain] a post-secondary education" (34). As a result, it would be expected that the educational gap among racial and ethnic minority groups in Mexico would decline.

However, it is important to develop an educational curriculum that does not push for assimilation. Instead, there is a need to develop educational curricula that focuses on addressing the uniqueness of Mexico's minority groups (e.g., Indian and Afrodescendent). For example, Pan-Mayan ethnicity in Yucatan has been strengthened by the expansion of bilingual education during the 1970s, where the driving philosophy went from "planned acculturation and integration" to "participative indigenism" (Wolfgang 2001:477).

Simultaneously, as the Mexican population increases its level of education, it is crucial for the Mexican government to invest in developing corresponding work opportunities for its population. Specifically, the government has to work on developing employment opportunities that not only address the needs of people in urban communities but also of those who live in rural Mexico—where most of the minority populations (Indians and Afrodescendents) are concentrated. Beyond reducing poverty, these opportunities may be responsible for reducing international migration rates and, thus, indirectly

contribute to balance the unequal distribution of resources that characterize some communities. Additionally, the development of opportunity structures may indirectly impact and thwart negative institutions that have emerged as a byproduct of high migration rates, including smuggling enterprises.

By and large, while stratification in Mexico exists, the extent to which some racial and ethnic groups are more stratified than others is troublesome to determine. Nevertheless, and based on the discussion presented in this chapter, Mexico is a clear example that the identification, validation and empowerment of non-mestizo identities is critical to develop measures and create the social and structural conditions to address inequalities. When made part of the Mexican identity, the validation of non-mestizo identities as part of the Mexican nationalist ideology will aid in developing measures that contribute to a more accurate demographic study of the Mexican population. But more importantly, this validation will contribute to give voice to groups that have been, over centuries, socially and economically marginalized. Ultimately, once mestizo and non-mestizo identities attain parity, transformative structural changes that address and resolve the marginality that minorities have experienced may begin to take place.

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Who Counts? Demography of Race and Ethnicity in Argentina

5

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Contemporary population dynamics in Argentina reflect a distinctive demographic history and way of conceptualizing national populations. This chapter (1) gives the main threads of this history, (2) explains official population classifications like the census, (3) offers a current demographic profile of Argentina, and (4) identifies key demographic challenges.

Location and History

Argentina becomes an independent republic in 1816 although its revolution against the Spanish Crown starts in 1810. It is located in the southern most part of South America and is bordered by Chile to the West, Bolivia and Paraguay to the North, and Brazil and Uruguay to the East. It ranks 10th in the world in terms of land surface

(2,736,690 km²), 30th in population size (40,518,951 estimated for 2010, INDEC), and 24th in GDP (PPP) (CIA, The World Factbook 2010).

Relative to an initial population of about 1.8 million at the time of the first census in 1869, Argentina received more European migrants by 1932 than any other country (12 % of the approximately 60 million who migrated to the Americas beginning in the early nineteenth century), and was second only to the United States in the absolute number of European arrivals (Table 5.1). To put these flows in perspective consider that more Europeans disembarked in the port Buenos Aires in the 3 years before the outbreak of World War I (1.1 million), —than had arrived in all of Spanish America during more than *three centuries* of colonial rule. Nothing like it would happen again until a second wave of global migrations began in the last decades of the twentieth century... (Moya 2006).

The dilemma faced by Argentine state-makers in the early 1860s was how to govern and to stimulate an economy with growing ties to global trade but a miniscule population and labor force. The promotion, management and incorporation of migration flows has in many ways been the central determinant of Argentina's demographic profile. Juan Bautista Alberdi – principal framer of the Constitution of 1853 – defined the central task of governance as increasing the national population. The chief means to this end was to be the promotion of European migration, a

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Table 5.1 Destination of European migrants, ca. 1820–1932

Country	Year data begins	Arrivals	Percent of total
United States	1820	32,564,000	58
Argentina	1840	6,501,000	12
Canada	1821	5,073,000	9
Brazil	1821	4,361,000	8
Australia	1840	3,443,000	6
Cuba	1880	1,394,000	2.5

Source: Moya (1998:46) (cf. Germani 1962:198)

preference that remained in effect throughout the twentieth century. Political elites and subsequently the masses remained committed to free and unhindered immigration. While the constitutional and implicit preference was for European immigration, the Argentine Law of Colonization and Immigration (# 817/1976) as well as its Law of Citizenship (# 346/1869) made no ethno-racial distinctions among would be immigrants.

Most countries in the Americas preferred European immigration over the alternatives (Asian or African origin migrants) and many wrote immigration and citizenship laws that reflected these preferences (Cook-Martín and FitzGerald 2010:30). However, only some of these countries received substantial immigration from Europe. Why did European immigrants come in such numbers to Argentina? A confluence of political and economic factors that Moya (1998) has described as five major revolutions resulted in massive migration to Argentina. A critical factor was relative *political unification* after 1860 and the military conquest of territories formerly controlled by Amerindians (Rock 1987). Military expropriation of these lands made them available for agricultural exploitation. Increased *efficiency and productivity*, lower costs and the advent of cheap, relatively fast transportation and of refrigeration technologies made it possible for Argentine products to compete in the Atlantic economy (particularly the British market).

Improved transportation technologies, including port facilities, made it possible for the same vessels that carried products to Europe to return with the labor required to fuel increased production. Changes in agricultural production and *industrialization in Europe* had generated a

large pool of surplus laborers especially in countries like Italy, Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal who had experienced considerable demographic growth since the eighteenth Century. Finally, what Zolberg (2007) has called the —exit revolution (i.e. diffusion of the political ideal of the freedom to migrate) also played a part. The two main sources of migration to Argentina, Italy and Spain, had liberal departure policies since the mid nineteenth century. The coming together of these economic, technological, demographic and political factors fostered Argentina's growth, its insertion into the Atlantic economy and linkages European countries as labor suppliers.

Beginning in the 1860s, Argentina experienced unprecedented economic and social transformations. This formerly—poor and forgotten backwater of the Spanish Empire (Vázquez-Presedo 1974:30), saw its per capita GDP increased by 64 % between 1870 and 1890, and by 28 % in the last decade of the nineteenth Century (Maddison 2003). Between 1900 and 1912, per capita GDP grew by 70 % (see Fig. 5.1). Wool, grain, and beef exports underlay some of these early transformations but, as Rocchi (2006) has recently argued, by the 1920s industrialization accounted for as much of Argentine wealth as agriculture. The port city of Buenos Aires grew disproportionately in large part due to its role in processing export commodities and local manufacturing.

What was the source and composition of migration to Argentina? Immigrants came primarily from Italy and Spain, but also from Germany, Poland, France, the Middle East and Russia (see net migration figures in Table 5.2). As noted earlier, about 6.5 million immigrants arrived from Europe by 1932. The inter and post war periods saw additional European immigration, but this flow subsided by the early 1960s when France, Germany, and Switzerland became European destinations for migrants that would have otherwise gone to Argentina. Early flows from Italy were primarily from the center and North of the unified kingdom but southern Italians made up a significant proportion of later, massive arrivals. Early Spanish arrivals were mostly from Catalunya and the Basque Country while later flows were primarily from Galicia.




Fig. 5.1 Per Capita GDP in Argentina, 1870–2001 (1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars) (Source: Maddison 2003)

Table 5.2 Net migration to Argentina: major overseas nationalities, 1857–1976

Year	Nationality					
	Italian	Spanish	Polish	French	Turkish	Russian
1857–1880	93,616	42,092	NA	15,576	672	549
1881–1920	1,015,885	877,695	NA	91,268	88,559	95,104
1921–1940	372,180	243,923	150,910	1,365	20,576	9,091
1941–1960	394,874	209,700	17,109	6,472	3,146	5,168
1961–1976	–15,935	6,730	1,316	1,351	248	18
Totals	1,860,620	1,380,140	169,335	116,032	113,201	109,930

Source: República Argentina (1998)

An historically underemphasized source of migration was from neighboring countries like Bolivia to the sugar mills of northwest Argentina and from Paraguay and Brazil to the northeastern region of the country (Benencia 2003). Residents from neighboring countries accounted for 10–20 % of the foreign-born population enumerated in censuses between 1869 and 1914. In part the lack of attention to immigrants from neighboring countries is attributable to the bias of administrative apparatus dedicated to measuring the success of efforts to attract European immigration. In addition, immigrants from neighbor-

ing countries settled in rural and border regions far from the urban agglomerations of the humid Pampa. Early immigrants to Argentina encountered a population comprised of the descendants of Spanish colonists, a small group of indigenous tribes, and a small population of former slaves who were administratively whitened (Andrews 1980) or died in the —conquest of the desert, a euphemism for early campaigns to exterminate indigenous tribes. This demographic —starting point distinguishes Argentina from other major immigration countries like the United States and Brazil.

Table 5.3 Select demographic measures for Argentina, 1869–2001

Census year	Total population (thousands)	Mean annual growth rate	Percent foreign-born	Percent urban population	Total fertility rate	Life expectancy at birth
1869	1,737		12.1	28.6	6.8	32.9
		3.2				
1895	4,124		25.4	37.4	7.0	40.0 ^a
		3.6				
1914	8,162		29.9	52.7	5.3	48.5
		2.0				
1947	15,894		15.3	62.2	3.2	61.1
		1.7				
1960	20,014		13.0	72.0	3.1	66.4
		1.5				
1970	23,264		9.5	79.0	3.1	65.6
		1.8				
1980	27,950		6.8	83.0	3.3	69.0
		1.5				
1991	32,700		5.0	88.4	2.9	72.1
		1.0				
2001	36,260		4.2	89.3 ^b	2.4 ^c	74.1 ^c

Sources: Recchini de Lattes 1991; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos. Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda, 1980. Total del País, por Provincia, Departamento y Localidad, Serie D, Población (Buenos Aires); Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos. Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda 1991. Resultados Definitivos, Características Seleccionadas, Total del País, Serie B, N° 25 (Buenos Aires); Recchini de Lattes and Lattes 1974; Pantelides, A. (1974).

^aCorresponds to the period 1895–1914

^bProvisional results of the 2001 Census

^cPeriod 2000–2005

One of Argentina's most salient demographic features has been the rapid and early growth of its urban population and the consequent decline in its rural population over the last century (Recchini de Lattes and Lattes 1974). Table 5.3 shows that the urban population in Argentina grew steadily between censuses so that by 1960 it accounted for almost three quarters of the country's inhabitants and by the most recent census almost 90 % of the population. Domestic and international migration have placed a fundamental role in this development.

Taking a retrospective view, the stock of foreign born population in Argentina remained at a quarter of the total population between 1895 and 1930, a figure that underestimates immigrants' presence and impact because newcomers stayed largely in and contributed to making Argentina's urban centers, contrary to the stated desires of policy makers. European migrants settled disproportionately in Buenos Aires, Rosario, and Santa

Fe, and to a limited extent in Córdoba and Mendoza (see Table 5.4). The number of migrants settled in the port city of Buenos Aires dwarfed the number of migrants in any other Argentine city (or for that matter any other Latin American city). In 1852, Buenos Aires had a population of 85,400, but by 1889, it had grown to more than half a million. By 1909 the city's population had grown to 1,224,000 and it doubled again by 1929 (Romero 1956:175–176). By 1910, three quarters of adults in Buenos Aires were European-born. Buenos Aires' population multiplied 26 fold in the 80-year period between 1855 and 1936. In contrast, New York, another major urban recipient of European migration, saw its population increase sevenfold in the 60-year period between 1860 and 1920.¹ Further, the foreign-born were disproportionately represented among males in the economically active population (Bourdé

¹ Calculated with figures from Baily (1999:58–59).

Table 5.4 Percent foreign residents in three regions of Argentina, 1869–1947

Years	Region		
	Buenos Aires	Buenos Aires (province), Entre Rios, Mendoza, Santa Fe, La Pampa	Rest of the country
1869	48	42	10
1895	39	52	9
1914	41	49	10
1947	44	42	14

Sources: Germani (1962:186)

1974:222). In terms of the country's overall population, 52 % of foreigners lived in rural areas in 1869, but only 37 % did so in 1914 (Cortés Conde and Bethell 1993).

Census figures paint a persuasive picture of an increasingly urban country: in 1869, 71 % of the country's population was rural, but by 1895, this percentage dropped to 63 % and by 1914 only 47 % of the population lived in rural areas (República Argentina 1916; República Argentina et al. 1898). Urbanization was paralleled by the relative decline of primary production (Taylor 1995). Between the 1895 and 1914 censuses, the percentage of workers employed in agriculture dropped from 24 to 16 %, while the proportion of those in industry and service rose from 22 to 26 % and 29 to 33 % respectively. As more migrants arrived, agriculture declined, but continued to be an important sector, and secondary and tertiary activities increased. The participation of migrants in industry and commerce was significantly higher than that of native-born Argentines (Vázquez-Presedo 1974). The growth of industry included the emergence of agricultural processing plants (Rocchi 2006; Taylor 1995). In brief, economic transformations were closely linked to urbanization and immigration.

Who Counts in Argentina: A Short History of Enumeration

This section addresses the institutions responsible for counting people in Argentina, how they have gone about their work, and the population categories important from a state-organizational

perspective. Like any emergent nation-state, Argentina made efforts at enumeration early in its history. However, it was on the eve of massive migrations that municipal and provincial governments began to count people (e.g. Maeso 1855). Indeed, some of the earliest counts of—Italians abroad were taken by the City of Buenos Aires and cited by Italian scholars (República Argentina 1925; Virgilio 1868). If a common pattern of state formation has been organizational development through the mobilization required for war-making and taxation, in the Argentine case it has been the development of infrastructural capacity to attract, count, and manage immigration (Cook-Martín 2008).

A precursor to today's Argentine Census Bureau (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo* or INDEC), the Office of National Statistics, carried out a first partial census in 1857. It included 8 of 14 provinces and in response to a mandate for a decennial census in the

Argentine Constitution of 1853 (Republica Argentina. INDEC 2010). Estimates based on this and other sources suggest a population of 1,210,000 in 1857. Subsequently, censuses were completed in 1895 (*Comisión Directiva del Censo*), 1914 (*Comisión Nacional del Censo*), 1920 (only of national territories in the Northeast and South by the *Asesoría Letrada de Territorios Nacionales*), 1947 (*Dirección Nacional del Servicio Estadístico*), 1960 (*Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos*), 1970 (INDEC), 1980 (INDEC), 1991 (INDEC), and 2001 (INDEC) (see Table 5.3 for summary statistics from these censuses) (Goyer and Domschke 1983; Republica Argentina. INDEC 2010). A new census will be conducted on October 27, 2010.

Table 5.5 shows the categories of information collected in Argentine censuses since 1869. The absence of race and the infrequent use of ethnicity as census categories are conspicuous when compared to other censuses in the Americas. While it is a truism that race is contextually fashioned and used, it is no less true that scholars are influenced in their assumptions by globally diffused notions about race, many derived from the historical experience of the United States. In the Argentine case, these assumptions may translate

Table 5.5 Categories of information collected in Argentine censuses, 1869–2001

	1869	1895	1914	1947	1960	1970	1980	1991	2001
Demographic and household indicators									
Sex	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Age	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Date of birth				x	x	x			
Place of birth	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Marital status					x	x	x	x	x
Civil status	x	x	x	x	x	x			
Orphaned	x	x							
Age at marriage			x	x					
Year of marriage or union					x				
Surviving children				x		x	x	x	x
Relationship to the head of household or family				x	x	x	x	x	x
Property ownership		x	x						
Disability	x	x	x	x	x				x
Years of marriage		x	x	x					x
Live births		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Dead children						x			
Main household income						x			
Education									
Literacy	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
School enrollment	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x
Educational attainment						x	x	x	x
Current or completed grade/year in school			x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Level of instruction				x	x	x	x	x	x
Other specialized studies				x					
Reason for dropping out of elementary school				x	x				
Degree earned				x					
Occupational status									
Occupation or profession	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Specialty or career				x	x	x	x		x
Occupational category				x	x	x	x	x	x
Second occupation					x				
Migration, citizenship and ethnicity									
Place of usual residence				x	x	x	x	x	x
Place of previous residence				x	x	x	x	x	x
Length of residence			x	x	x	x	x		
Naturalization			x	x	x		x		
Ethnic origin		x							x
Religion		x		x					
Labor market status and characteristics									
Labor market status				x	x	x	x	x	x
Sector of economic activity				x	x	x	x	x	x
Dedicacion del establecimiento laboral							x		

(continued)

Table 5.5 (continued)

	1869	1895	1914	1947	1960	1970	1980	1991	2001
Size of work place							x	x	x
Location of work place							x		
Jurisdiction of the work place								x	x
Social welfare									
Retirement withholding								x	x
Pension or retirement plan								x	x
Health coverage								x	x

Source: Elaborated with information from Republica Argentina (2010)

into surprise that official enumeration practices have not focused on racial categorization of newcomers and residents. They may also lead to skepticism about claims that Argentina has been a country of open doors that attracted predominantly European immigration and where class has been the main axis of social differentiation. It is noteworthy that census officials did not correlate a respondent's ethnicity via the proxy of parental nationality with labor, educational or linguistic integration although political elites did on occasion fret about the persistence of parental languages, limited inter-ethnic marriage, and ethnic concentrations in particular labor market sectors.

Whatever an analyst's assumptions, these should not hide the extent to which phenotype and racist ideas have intersected with other ways of sorting people into an unequal social hierarchy. Argentine culture and argot is replete with —colorful terms that subtly combine skin tone and positional indicators in the construction of a pecking order (e.g.: *cabecita negra*, *negro*, *colorado*, *ruso*, *gringo*, etc.). The impetus to distinguish people as belonging to different kinds has been present in political and everyday discourse. However, ethnicized distinctions have not been institutionalized as they have been in other Latin American countries and in the United States.

In practice, this has meant that the various iterations of the Argentine census bureau have not categorized respondents or asked them to self-identify by ethnic or racial origin. It has, however, tracked the national origins of its resident

population (place of birth), which is consistent with a longstanding concern of Argentine political elites to attract migration especially from Europe. Loveman (2009) following Otero (2006) argues that censuses may be racialized even when they do not include a direct —race question. She cites the 1914 Argentine census schedule as an example of how national origin categories available to census takers and the collapsing of results into officially recognized categories implicitly legitimated a particular racial classificatory scheme, affirmed Argentina's whiteness, and hid the presence of indigenous inhabitants and Afro-origin Argentines. Insidious as this administrative white-washing has been and continues to be through the erasure of Afro-Argentine and indigenous histories, it has had a different organizational history and consequences. Racialized exclusions have been operative in everyday practices of categorization and identification rather than in classification systems supported by Argentine state. This has meant the lack of an organizational infrastructure of exclusion but also the absence of a basis on which to organize for collective resources.

The treatment of autochthonous groups in official enumeration efforts attests to how partial or no naming can make communities invisible. Indigenous peoples received partial recognition in the censuses of 1869, 1895, and 1914 but not in those of 1947, 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1991. Although there was a National Indigenous Census (1966–68), it was not until the 2001 Census and its associated *Encuesta Complementaria de Pueblos Indígenas* (ECPI) in

2004–2005 that this population received detailed official attention (Republica Argentina. INDEC 2010). It is not coincidental that indigenous groups in Argentina have begun to advance collective claims in the last two decades. Selectivity among transatlantic immigrants and disregard for migration from bordering countries of mostly indigenous or mestizo populations also speak to Argentine political elites' euro-fixation and the erasure of officially undesirable groups. Statistical reports prepared by immigration service in Argentina capture data on neighboring migration beginning in the early 1920s, but summary charts focus primarily on immigrants from—ultramar (overseas) and especially Spaniards and Italians. Moreover, scholarly treatments of migration in Argentina rarely recognize flows from neighboring countries or do so only as an appendix (Benencia 2003). As we note below, migration from neighboring countries has become more visible in public and academic discourse because of relatively recent socio-demographic changes, but as we showed in the introduction it is a longstanding flow. The recent urban visibility of migration from neighboring countries has motivated INDEC to implement the *Encuesta Complementaria sobre Migraciones Internacionales* (ECMI), a new survey that examines flows regardless of sending country. The passage of a new migration law in 2004 (Ley de Migraciones, No. 25871) reflects a shift from a positive preference for particular ethnic groups towards more universalistic criteria that safeguard the —fundamental rights and guarantees conferred by the Argentine constitution to all inhabitants of its territory. This last development comes in the wake of the diffusion of global ideas about racism.

Current Demographic Snapshot

Current demographic dynamics in Argentina feature a slow rate of population growth, early decline in fertility, an aging population, a stagnant mortality rate, a fall in immigration, rise in emigration to the U.S. and Europe, and increased urbanization. Table 5.3 above synthesizes

Argentine demographic evolution since the end of the nineteenth Century to the present.

In contrast to most Latin American countries, Argentina experienced a decline in fertility towards the end of the nineteenth century (Schkolnik and Pantelides 1975). For this reason, some refer to this case as a —non-orthodox model of demographic transition where the early decline in fertility has followed a trajectory parallel to that of mortality since the beginning of the twentieth century (Pantelides 1974). As a result of these processes, Argentina currently has a low growth rate and an age structure skewed towards its older echelons. Current projections are that the aging of its population will become even more pronounced in upcoming decades (see Figs. 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6).

The social, political, cultural, and economic structure of the country have determined the composition and dynamic of Argentina's population. Table 5.6 synthesizes the values of select socio-demographic indicators in Argentina like its growth rate, age distribution, dependency ratio, sex ratio, urban population, fertility, and mortality. In 2010, Argentina's estimated population is 40,518,951 and it grew at an annual rate of 0.97 % which marks a decrease relative to the preceding period. Concerning the country's age structure, a tenth of Argentina's population is older than 65 years. Of that age group, 43 % are older than 75. Argentina is clearly experiencing an aging of its population.

The potential dependency ratio is almost 55 % of the population. The greater proportion of this value is attributable to the relative weight of children and youth over adults (38.8 %), but the weight of the adult elderly population is increasing (16 %). The potential dependency assumes that the young and the elderly are not economically active and rely on others age groups for support. The percentage of the population living in urban centers continues to grow and is currently at 91 %. Argentina has undergone a secular trend of increasing urbanization which has slowed in the last decade. Fertility is currently 2.25 children per woman during the period 2005–2010. A decline in fertility to about three children per woman had become consolidated in the 1930s which is attributed to European migration and the





Fig. 5.2 Total Population of Argentina by Age, Sex, and Place of Birth, 2001 (Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo 2001)

Fig. 5.3 Total Population of Argentina by Age and Sex, 1950 (Source: compiled with data from the Boletín Demográfico de CELADE N° 73)



transmission of cultural expectations and roles to the children of immigrants (López 2000). As a result of these processes, the net reproduction rate which reveals the generational renewal process through the supposed replacement of each generation of mothers – shows that Argentina is barely above the level of generational replacement a trend which is projected to persist in coming decades.

Life expectancy at birth and the *infant mortality* rate are two solid indicators of health and mortality conditions that are not affected by the age structure and hence are useful to measure social development. During the 2005–2010 period, life expectancy at birth for the Argentine population has been 75.2 years and the infant mortality rate in 2006 was 12.9 deaths per 1,000 births.

Fig. 5.4 Total Population of Argentina by Age and Sex, 1990 (Source: compiled with data from the Boletín Demográfico de CELADE N° 73)




Fig. 5.5 Projected Total Population of Argentina by Age and Sex, 2015 (Source: compiled with data from the Boletín Demográfico de CELADE N° 73)




Fig. 5.6 Projected Total Population of Argentina by Age and Sex, 2050 (Source: compiled with data from the Boletín Demográfico de CELADE N° 73)




Table 5.6 Select sociodemographic indicators for Argentina, 2010

Total population	40,518,951
Annual growth rate (%)	9.7 ^a
Age structure	
% 0–14 years	25.1
% 15–64 years	64.6
% 65 or more years	10.4
Potential dependency indices	
Total	54.8
Youth	38.8
Elderly	16.0
Distribution of the population 65 and older	
% 65 a 69 years	31.7
% 70 a 74 years	25.5
% 75 years or more	42.8
Sex ratio	96.0
Urban population (%)	91.2
Fecundidad	
Crude birth rate (%)	17.5 ^a
General fertility rate	2.25 ^a
Net reproduction rate	1.08 ^a
Mortalidad	
Tasa bruta de mortalidad (%)	7.8 ^a
Esperanza de vida al nacer	75.2 ^a
Mortalidad Infantil	12.9 ^b

Source: Elaboración en base a estimaciones realizadas por el Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC)

^aCorrespondiente al período 2005–2010

^bCorrespondiente al año 2006

International migration to Argentina at the turn of the twenty-first Century has been radically altered. Flows have been comprised of immigrants from neighboring countries and, more recently, from Peru rather than of Europeans. Table 5.7 captures the shift in origins of the foreign-born population in Argentina in the last three rounds of censuses and in the changing migratory dynamics of the last decades. On the one hand, census figures reveal a substantial reduction in the number of foreigners from European countries as a result of the aging and death of past transatlantic immigrant cohorts. On the other hand, immigrants from bordering and neighboring countries exhibit a distinct demographic dynamic. In 1980–2001, the only migrant groups that have increased significantly in numbers are those from Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru.

The study of international migration in Argentina presents challenges similar to those faced in other countries including the availability of suitable data. By virtue of scope and regularity, censuses are the primary source of information on the volume and intensity of migratory currents, and allow for an analysis of variation in stocks of foreign-born and for a characterization of groups according to socio-demographic features. However, census data have a series of limi-

Table 5.7 Foreign born population in Argentina, 1980–2001

	1980	1881	2001	Growth rates		
				1980–1991	1991–2001	1980–2001
Total	1,903,159	1,615,473	1,513,940	–15.1	–5.2	–19.5
Italia	488,271	328,113	216,718	–32.8	–34.0	–55.6
España	373,984	224,500	134,417	–40.0	–40.1	–64.1
Polonia	57,480	28,811	13,703	–49.9	–52.4	–76.2
Alemania	24,381	15,451	10,362	–36.6	–32.9	–57.5
Ex-Yugoslavia	22,904	12,858	3,210	–43.9	–75.0	–86.0
Paraguay	262,799	250,450	325,046	–4.7	29.8	23.7
Chile	215,623	244,410	212,429	13.4	–13.1	–1.5
Bolivia	118,141	143,569	233,464	21.5	62.6	97.6
Uruguay	114,108	133,453	117,564	17.0	–11.9	3.0
Brasil	42,757	33,476	34,712	–21.7	3.7	–18.8
Perú	8,561	15,939	88,260	86.2	453.7	931.0
Resto	174,150	184,443	142,055	5.9	–23.0	–18.4

Source: Cerrutti (2009)

tations. They describe stocks of immigrants, not movements. They offer a snapshot of the phenomenon at a given moment which is in turn the result of prior flows and hence includes surviving immigrants and those who did not return to the sending country (Maguid 1996:444). As is well known, censuses tend to underestimate unauthorized migration. Fundamentally, censuses operationalize the concept of migration as a change in place of usual residence which presumes the existence of a single and permanent residence and does not register more definitive modes of spatial mobility.

Scholars have directed several criticisms at a conception of migration that does not capture a diverse range of movements across jurisdictions by individuals and groups. Important advances in the conceptual methodological arena attempt to give an account of the multiplicity of situations encompassed by migration. Bertonecello (1995) proposes the replacement of migration with territorial movement of the population so as to include a range of modalities from immobility to constant mobility. Picouet and Domenach (1990) are an exemplar of this conceptual approach. Building on Courgeau's (1988) life space where an individual carries out vital activities they advance the notion of base residence: place or set of places to which departing individuals are likely to return during their life times whatever the duration of their stay elsewhere. This notion tries to overcome the dichotomy between origin and destination to include a set of movements that have as referent the base residence. They construct a typology that includes different forms of mobility and evaluations of duration (temporary v. Permanent) by focusing on the reversibility of flows, their duration, periodicity, and motivations.

A reconceptualization of spatial mobility poses the clear methodological challenge of how to capture a population's movement with adequate measures. Censuses continue to include questions aimed only at measuring changes in usual residence. Argentina's Supplemental Survey on International Migrations (*Encuesta Complementaria sobre Migraciones Internacionales* or ECMI) is, however, an attempt to implement the conceptual developments

outlined earlier. It has been administered in conjunction with the National Census of Population, Households, and Housing (2001). Specifically, ECMI explores the trajectories, social networks, and processes through which resources circulate and are exchanged as people move. The general objective of this survey has been to supplement census data on the population born in neighboring countries —by means of knowledge about attributes of spatial movement unknown until now at the statistical level (INDEC 2006:9). Specific objectives of the survey include detection of migration networks, their flows, and nodes, in depth knowledge of migrants' last place of residence in the birth country, identification of territorial routes followed by migrants in Argentina, assessment of ties to the birth country, detection of economic exchanges that accompany migration flows, formulation of a socio-demographic profile of migrants from neighboring countries and the quantification of actual and potential returns to the birth country.

The most significant demographic trends of the last decades have been: (a) an increase in urbanization, (b) slowing in population growth, (c) a more even spatial distribution of Argentina's population due to growth in provinces with lower population density and a decrease in concentration in the greater Buenos Aires area, (d) an increase in the proportion of women, (e) slight decline in internal migrations, (f) steady decline in mortality and in rate of natural increase, and (h) an aging population. The most salient trends in migration include: (a) a decline in migration related population growth due to a decrease in immigration and an increase in Argentine emigration; (b) a growing but fluctuating migratory from bordering countries; (c) influx and greater visibility of Asian immigrants; and (d) decrease in the proportion of foreign residents. This snapshot understates substantial regional and class disparities (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo (INDEC) 2001; Mazzeo 1993). In view of Argentina's history as a country of European immigration and an attendant national imagining, it is worth exploring in detail the impact of recent immigration from neighboring countries and of the emigration of Argentines often to ancestral homeland states.

Migrations

Latin American population movements have shown important transformations. The scholarly consensus identifies three migratory patterns. Transoceanic migration, especially from Europe, has shown an undeniable exhaustion. Intraregional migration is of moderate intensity and is highly feminized. Migration towards developed countries continues to be dominated by the United States which receives about three quarters of Latin American migrants but a relatively new trend of extra-regional migration is becoming apparent. This flow is directed towards Japan and Spain, two of the more dynamic receiving centers. Latin America is exporting workers, often women, to destinations where they are very vulnerable even as they generate important remittances.

These transformations in patterns of Latin American migration are also reflected in Argentina where we identify two major trends. First, as we have shown earlier, there has been a shift away from European migration to flows from bordering countries like Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil. The neighboring country of Peru has also been a recent source of migration flows. Second, a growing flow of Argentines have been migrating abroad since the 1960s, but the trend reached unprecedented proportions in the aftermath of the profound economic, political and social debacle that rocked the country beginning in December 2001. Immigration from neighboring countries and the emigration of Argentines are the two principal challenges faced by contemporary Argentine migration policy.

Migration from Neighboring Countries

The presence of immigrants from neighboring countries long sublimated in public discourse and imaginings has a long history in Argentina and its incidence has barely changed. It has consistently hovered between 2 and 3 % of the total population although as noted earlier it has reached

higher levels. The greater visibility of migration from neighboring countries in recent years is attributable to its growth as a proportion of all foreigners, changes in the nationalities represented, and the movement of migrants from border areas to urban centers.

The movement of migrants from neighboring countries has a long history in border areas (De Marco and Sassone 1983; Maguid 1997). In its early phases, this flow was associated with labor for agricultural work: Paraguayans harvested yerba-mate (a South American tea leaf) and cotton in the provinces of Formosa, Chaco, Corrientes and Misiones; Bolivians worked in the cultivation of tobacco in Salta and Jujuy, of sugar in Tucuman and horticulture in Mendoza; Chileans sheared sheep and worked construction and oil in Patagonia, and harvested pears and apples in Rio Negro. The exception were the Uruguayans who tended to concentrate in the city of Buenos Aires in the service sector (Benencia 1997:68). Migration from neighboring countries gains importance with the emergence and expansion of regional economies (Ceva 2006:29) and the dearth of labor created in the primary sector of border regions (Balán 1990; Benencia and Karasik 1994; Marshall and Orlansky 1983). Workers from Bolivia, Chile and Paraguay moved to fill seasonal jobs in Argentina's Northwest, South and Northeast. This flow increased at mid-century and was affected by wage differentials between Argentina and surrounding countries.

Political and economic conjuncture in sending countries acted as push factors. In Bolivia, for instance, the transformations that followed the Chaco War (1932–1935), the consequences of the revolution of 1952, political agitation and agrarian reform turned Bolivian labor into a feasible alternative for plantations in Argentina (Balán 1990:272). In Paraguay, the Chaco War, the civil war (1946–1950), and the 1954 military coup contributed to the usual flow of workers a cohort of opposition members and political exiles (Maguid 1997:35). Modes of agrarian exploitation and landholding patterns also contributed to these flows (Cerrutti and Parrado 2006:102). The contraction of the Chilean economy between 1956 and 1960 as well as military governments

during the 1970s also motivated important migratory flows from those countries (Maguid 1997:35).

Beginning in the 1970s, flows from nearby countries increasingly include the great Buenos Aires metropolitan area as the main destination. There migrants find better paying jobs in the construction, manufacturing and service industries (Balán 1990) The fall in product pricing, greater mechanization, and the restructuring of labor markets that followed advances in agro-industry contributed to crises in regional economies of the 1970s. In turn, this restructuring redirected migration from the interior and from neighboring countries to the City of Buenos Aires and its environs (Balán 1990; Benencia 1997; Benencia and Gazzotti 1995; Benencia and Karasik 1994; Cacopardo and López 1997). As noted by Cerruti and Parrado (2006: 103), Argentina's substantial economic growth between 1970 and 1965 happened in a context of labor scarcity so that migration from neighboring countries played a significant role in the dynamics of the Economically Active Population. Conjunctural factors like growth and currency exchange differentials also affected this dynamic.

In sum, migration from neighboring countries has a long history captured by early censuses and has represented a relatively small percentage of the population, but recent shifts in destination and origins have increased its social visibility. Migrants from neighboring countries have grown as a proportion of all foreigners just as Europeans flows have declined. The spatial distribution of migrants from neighboring countries has also moved from border areas that offered jobs in agriculture to urban centers. Finally, there has been a change in the composition of flows from nearby countries. Whereas Uruguayan migrants historically dominated these flows, Paraguayans have constituted the main group since mid-twentieth century followed by Bolivians since the 1990s. These last two national origin groups share the lowest rungs in Argentina's ethnoracial hierarchy. These processes raised the visibility of migration from neighboring countries and shattered the ideal of Argentina as a European enclave in Latin America so dear to the hegemonic

national myth. Grimson (2006:70) argues that these shifts are also linked to a key sociocultural change: the ethnic visibility regime in Argentina is altered from one in which diversity had been hidden to one in which difference is hyper visible. The global context for this change is one of greater debates about multiculturalism and minority recognition. In Argentina, this has included, among other developments, a mobilization of indigenous, black, and European origin identifications.

Argentine Emigration

Like other countries in Latin America, Argentina has become a source of migration to more developed countries like the U.S. and, more recently, Europe. In a Latin American migratory context of low transatlantic and intra-regional migration as well as declining fertility scholars and policy-makers have worried about a loss of human capital with attendant negative consequences for economic and social development (Bajraj 2003). Brain drain, political exile, and economic crisis have played a critical motivating role in the departure of Argentines for several decades and have scholarly concern since the 1960s although there has been significant Argentine emigration – primarily wives and children of foreign immigrants – since the early twentieth century (Lattes et al. 2003). The first wave of postwar emigrants was comprised primarily of highly skilled and/or trained intellectuals or professionals, and migration was a strategy carried out with considerable planning and organization (Schneider 2000; Zuccotti 1987:33–40).

Beginning in the 1960s, emigration had as its origins traumatic political events like military coupes and the ensuing repression. After the return of democracy in 1983, migration has been linked to slow economic growth and falling wages. Over time Argentine flows have become more diverse in their human capital profile. Migration networks have likely lowered the cost for less skilled workers and economic woes have motivated the departure of workers who would have otherwise received a greater payoff in their home country.

The precise scope of emigration is difficult to estimate because the Argentine state keeps limited data on departures and destinations as well as on the stock of Argentine's abroad. Net migration figures show a growing number of departures that peaked in the first 6 years of the new millennium (Table 5.8) with the highest number of departures in 2005 (Table 5.9), 4 years after the financial debacle of December 2001 and likely as a result of lagged visa emigration procedures. The negative migration balance between 2000 and 2006 is the largest in absolute numbers since mid twentieth century. However, these figures suggest a trend and do not speak to the actual number of Argentines abroad. The two main destinations of Argentine emigration – the U.S. and Spain – conservatively account for half a million Argentines. U.S. Census estimates are of about 200,000 in 2008 (American Factfinder), a figure that likely underestimates a population that increased significantly in the aftermath of Argentina's

Table 5.8 Net migration of Argentines to international destinations, 1950–2006

1950–1959	-75,543
1960–1969	-102,161
1970–1979	-198,308
1980–1989	-172,109
1990–1999	-203,309
2000–2006	-450,225
1950–2006	-1,201,655

Source: Elaborated with data from Lattes (2003a), INDEC (2004), and Direccion Nacional de Migraciones, April 2006 and 2007

Table 5.9 Arrivals and departures of Argentine Travelers via Ezeiza International Airport, 1999–2006

Year	Arrivals	Departures	Net
1999	1,539,077	1,540,390	-1313
2000	1,670,485	1,745,295	-74,810
2001	1,481,717	1,546,591	-64,874
2002	859,640	946,852	-87,212
2003	976,782	997,368	-20,586
2004	1,066,398	1,096,219	-29,821
2005	1,234,639	1,394,334	-159,695
2006	1,336,231	1,349,458	-13,227

Source: INDEC (2004) and *Dirección Nacional de Migraciones* (April 2006 and 2007)

economic crisis and after the loss of favored nation in the U.S. visa waiver program after which many Argentine's simply overstayed existing visas. Argentines in Spain number about 270,000 according to municipal registration figures (INE 200?). The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs calculates the number of Argentines living abroad in 2008 at 1,350,000, up from 960,000 in 2002.

The socio-economic profile of Argentine emigrants has changed significantly over the last few decades but remain primarily remains of a higher human capital than immigrants to Argentina and to other receiving countries. Especially in the wake of the political turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s, Argentine emigrants were highly educated and skilled relative to compatriots and to immigrants in receiving countries.

Argentines in the U.S. are well-educated relative to the general population: 32 % have college or graduate degrees relative to 26 % of natives (US Census 2008). Actis and Esteban (2006) note that Argentine migrants to Spain have, until the recent crisis driven emigration, had higher than average educational attainment. Recent migrants have lower levels of education than European counterparts but are also below Brazilian, Cuban, and Chilean migrants to Spain. Preferential migration and nationality policies for the descendants of Spaniards in Argentina likely explain lower educational capital requirements. Still, procedures to obtain Spanish immigration or citizenship papers require considerable cultural capital and indicate middle class backgrounds. Young professionals and students represent a sizeable portion of potential emigrants to Spain still in Argentina (Novick 2007). In brief, while early Argentine flows to other countries have historically been associated to historical and political conjuncture (military repression) and have comprised primarily scientists, intellectuals, and professionals, recent economically induced migration shows a greater diversity in human capital and the presence of trades people, technicians and students. Concerns remain that the departure of this still self-selected population represents a loss of resources invested by Argentina's public education system to wealthier countries.

Contemporary Trends and Issues: Argentina Reconceived in Migration Law and Practice

Historically at the center of Argentine national imaginings, migration continues to be a critical demographic and identitarian concern. Given the aging of Argentina's European origin population, a declining growth rate, an increase in migration from neighboring country and its recognition, and the —return of Argentines to putative ancestral homelands, what does migration portend for Argentina? Will it continue to be a destination for people from neighboring countries just as it sends Argentines abroad? What population policies will the Argentine state pursue in view of increasing poverty and shrinking public coffers? In this closing section, we reflect on migration policy as a mirror for profound demographic and political change in Argentina.

The most significant migration policy development in over a century has been the passage of the *New Law of Migrations* (No. 25,871/January 2004) which superseded the military era *Law of Migrations and Immigration Promotion* (No. 22439/1981) or *Ley Videla* named after the infamous head of the repressive junta and in effect since repealing the 1876 *Law of Immigration and Colonization* (No. 817/1876). The *New Law* marks a shift in the political conception of Argentina as a nation of migrations rather than of immigration. This shift recognizes actual flows to and from Argentina in stark contrast with past laws that focused almost exclusively on transatlantic immigration. The *New Law* even contains a section on Argentines abroad and has prompted Province 25, an initiative for Argentines —in the world run by the Ministry of the Interior. The program name is in reference to Argentina's 24 official provinces or states and the constitution of a 25th province by its citizens abroad. According to the Ministry, the program has been conceived so that Argentines who reside abroad can fulfill their status as citizens including democratic

participation and the right to vote.² In addition, the program offers information on how Argentines abroad can access citizenship, and incentives for return to Argentina. These programs are more similar to those of emigration countries like Italy and Spain than to anything Argentina had previously attempted. Even the language of a district of Argentines abroad is reminiscent of Spanish and Italian policies.

The *New Law* also adopts the language of universal and equal rights. Article 4 guarantees the right to migrate which is—essential and inalienable ... on the basis of the principles of equality and universalism. This is a significant departure from Law No. 817 (1876) which took as its starting point an 1853 constitutional mandate to foster European immigration and the Videla law which put a premium on control of new immigrants. While Argentine immigration law never had formal exclusions against particular racial or ethnic groups, it has historically favored European immigrants. The *New Law* is consistent with past immigration policy in its strategic decision to be widely inclusive in furtherance of national demographic policies (Article 3). Inclusion in the past has meant not adopting formal exclusions based on racial-ethnic criteria when most countries in the Americas were doing the contrary. Today it means extending a full complement of rights including access to social services, education, justice, work and social security on the same conditions as natives (Article 6). Most of these rights are guaranteed regardless of legal status (Articles 7 and 8). Article 11 even hints at the possibility of local level voting by foreigners. Article 13 proscribes discrimination against immigrants on the basis of ethnicity, religion, nationality, ideology, political opinions, sex, gender, class or abilities. A gap remains between the law on the books and praxis concerning the rights of immigrants although it is unclear if it is attributable to the vulnerabilities of the poor or to the immigrant status. Nevertheless, the strategy of

²http://www.mininterior.gov.ar/provincias/provincia_25.php?idName=provincias&idNameSubMenu=provinciasProv25 (last accessed on September 14, 2010).

legally welcoming immigrants and maintaining links to Argentines abroad is a radical departure from precedent (Giustiniani 2004). It is also an indication of the importance of universal human rights and treaties discourse to a country that has experienced a substantial reversal of fortunes in the postwar and accommodating to the status of developing country.

This shift in migration law has also translated into concrete practices. In its implementation of the *New Law*, the National Migration Service (*Dirección Nacional de Migraciones* or DNM) designed a plan to bring unauthorized immigrants into status and to integrate them (Decree 836/2004). Another administrative measure (Decree 578/2005) provided for the regularization of foreigners from MERCOSUR member countries.³ These residents have privileged temporary residential status according to Article 23 (Section L) of the New Law. This last decree launched is referred to as the *Patria Grande* (Great Nation) Program. It has provided expedited 2-year temporary residence to citizens from the expanded MERCOSUR (Uruguay, Brasil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Perú, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panamá). Eligible individuals can then apply for permanent residence after 2 years provided they can verify they have —lawful means of work (CELS 2007).

Programs to give legal status to unauthorized immigrants have had a significant on the most vulnerable workers in the Argentine labor market. Just over 400,000 immigrants gained legal residence through the *Patria Grande* Program and another quarter million through the provisions form members from the expanded MERCOSUR (see Table 5.10). A total of 680,834 immigrants gained legal residence through both procedures. Paraguayans, Bolivians, and

Peruvians received the greatest number of residence permits. Individuals from these national groups have been among the most exploited in

Table 5.10 Residence by normal and *Patria Grande* procedures, 2006–2009

Nationality	PG Residence procedure ^a	Normal residence procedures ^b	Total residence procedures
Bolivia	105,017	97,790	202,807
Brasil	4,600	9,727	14,327
Chile	5,360	12,311	17,671
Colombia	1,247	13,538	14,785
Ecuador	930	4,495	5,425
Paraguay	248,086	55,519	303,605
Perú	47,464	53,625	101,089
Uruguay	10,790	7,003	17,793
Venezuela	217	3,115	3,332
Panamá	1	–	–
Total	423,712	257,123	680,834

Source: Compiled by the Office of International Issues (*Oficina Temas Internacionales*), *Dirección Nacional de Migraciones*, September 2009

^aEstado de trámites (primera etapa) por el Programa de Normalización Documentaria Migratoria. Período desde 16/02/2006 hasta 30/04/2009. Aplicable a migrantes ingresados al país con anterioridad al 17/04/2006

^bExcluye trámites por *Patria Grande*

the Argentine labor markets due in no small part to a lack of formal legal status. It is an historic development to stake a legal claim for workers rights regardless of migratory status even when natives and foreigners suffer due to a lack of enforcement of existing labor laws in Argentina.

These measures may be seen as a constitutive of a population strategy that aligns with an emergent perception of Argentina as a destination for migrants from neighboring countries and a source of high human capital emigration to more developed countries. In this view, Argentina faces the challenges of legally and effectively integrating newcomers and keeping links to Argentines abroad. The former are a source of relatively inexpensive labor, a consumer base, and source of younger age cohorts while the latter represent a source of remittances.⁴ In addition, new migration

³The *Mercado Común del Sur* (MERCOSUR) is a regional trade association whose main member countries include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Associate members include Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. Venezuela is in the process of becoming a member.

⁴Remittances to Argentina were U\$S 853 million in 2009, down from U\$S 955 million in 2008 and up from U\$S 100 million in 2001. In other words, remittances to Argentina increased almost ten times between 2001 and 2008. These figures are based on data from the Inter American Development Bank: http://www.iadb.org/mif/remesas_map.cfm?language=Spanish

policies represent an adoption at the national level of regional and global discourse on human rights.

These shifts in Argentine migration and population policy may seem incomprehensible in light of its recent social, political, and economic experiences. Latin America's socio-political outlook at the turn of the twenty-first century would suggest, after all, the relegation of population concerns to a secondary plain especially in consideration of high levels of foreign debt, political instability, and high unemployment rates. Washington Consensus neo-liberal prescriptions have widened the gap between countries and aggravated inequalities among social classes, regions and even neighborhoods in the same city. In Argentina – arguably the Washington Consensus' most zealous adherent during the 1990s – the implementation of neo-liberal policies wreaked havoc on its economy and sent many scurrying abroad. The growth rate of Latin America and Argentina's population may have slowed but not its poverty (Macció 1993; Villa 1995; Benitez Centeno 1999). And yet, it is precisely the dire economic, political, and demographic outlook that has motivated a sea change in Argentina's migration policies. It remains to be seen how this change will impact demographic indicators and the ways in which Argentines conceptualize the kinds of people that count and that it counts. In view of the significant number of European descended Argentines with a citizenship option for an ancestral European homeland and of increasing numbers of —new Argentines from countries with larger indigenous populations, what – if any – cleavages will emerge in the discourse and practice of social classification?

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Venezuela, like many countries, has a long history of racial and ethnic inequality. Dating back to the colonial period, structures of racial and ethnic inequality were established, leading to the social, political and economic marginalization of non-white racial and ethnic groups. Although changes have occurred in Venezuela over the centuries, with some significant changes in the last 15 years, these populations continue to be overrepresented among the poor, and continue to face discrimination. This is partially due to the on-going denial that racism exists, and partially due to a privileging of class over race in Venezuelan politics both historically and today. Much of the scholarship on race and ethnicity in Venezuela lacks a theoretical framework that effectively identifies the dynamics shaping the empirical outcomes across historical periods, or that elucidates how race and inequality fit into larger social and political processes in the country.

Burawoy's (2003) theoretical framework, which integrates ideas from Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi, can yield useful insights into the dynamics that produce continuities and changes in racial and ethnic inequality in Venezuela over time, as well as how these fit into broader national political trends. On an empirical level, one obstacle to identifying the impact

of social structures and political processes on the Afro-Venezuelan population has been the limited quantitative data that exists on this population. This should change, however, now that people were able for the first time to self-identify as Afro-Venezuelan on the 2011 census after hundreds of years of exclusion from the census. And, finally, on a methodological level, a potentially fruitful approach to the continuing study of racial and ethnic inequality and its impacts on society is through participatory action research (PAR). PAR could effectively empower these marginalized communities to determine the focus and nature of research in their communities, and allow them to produce data that these groups can use in their struggles for greater social, political and economic equality.

Profile of Venezuela

Located in the northern part of South America, Venezuela is a highly urbanized nation of 30 million people. As of 2012, 94 % of the population lived in urban areas, with 32 % of the population living in urban areas of more than one million people (World Bank 2013). As in other countries that have experienced mass rural-to-urban migration, shantytowns encircle urban areas and the local economies have been unable to generate enough jobs. The shortage of jobs in Venezuela is exacerbated by the fact that oil undermines the development of other economic sectors due to its impact

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on the country's exchange rate.¹ As a result the informal sector of the economy in Venezuela is significant.² Nonetheless, there have been improvements in formal sector employment. Weisbrot and Sandoval (2008:13) document an increase in formal sector employment from 4.4 million in 1998 to 6.17 million in 2007, leading to an increase in formal sector employment as a percentage of total employment from 45.4 % in 1998 to 50.6 % in 2007. The unemployment rate (as of 2012) was 8 %, down from 16.8 % in 2003 (World Bank 2012).

Venezuela's aggregate economic indicators are above average for the region. As of 2012, the gross national income (GNI) per capita was \$12,460 compared to the regional average of \$8,981. However, Venezuela's GNI per capita is only 24 % of the GNI per capita for the United States (World Bank 2012). The gross domestic product grew by 5.6 % in 2012, but the country has been struggling with high levels of inflation. In 2012, inflation was 21 %. In June 2013, it reached 42.6 % (World Bank 2013). Both its wealth and its inflation problem are in large part a result of the extraction of oil. The country's abundant oil resources have generated significant income for the government, particularly over the past decade of high oil prices. Oil constitutes 30 % of gross domestic product (2011), 96 % of the country's exports (2012) and nearly 50 % of its fiscal income (2012) (World Bank 2012).

The Chávez government used oil income to fund social programs. Social indicators in Venezuela are slightly higher than the average for the region. Venezuela's life expectancy (as of 2011) is 74 years and the mortality rate for children under the age of five is (as of 2010) 18 per 1,000 newborns, compared to 23 for the region. The primary school completion rate is 94 % in Venezuela, while the

literacy rate (as of 2007) is 95 %. The poverty rate in Venezuela fell from 50 % in 1998 to 25 % in 2012. The World Bank attributes this fall in poverty to both economic growth and the redistribution of resources under the Chávez government. Inequality fell alongside this decline in poverty. The gini index fell from .49 in 1998 to .39 in 2011. According to the World Bank (2012), this is one of the lowest levels of inequality in the region, though Latin America is the region with the highest level of inequality in the world (Hoffman and Centeno 2003).

As in most parts of the world, social and economic indicators vary across race and class. In the 2011 census, nearly half of the population identified as *moreno* (dark-skinned), 42 % as white, 2.8 % as black, 2.7 % as indigenous, 0.7 % as afro-descendent (Instituto Nacional Estadístico 2012). While only about 3.5 % self-identified as either black or afro-descendent, the Network of Afro-Venezuelan organizations estimates that there are seven million black Venezuelans, which suggests at least nearly a quarter of the population has African ancestry (Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United States 2011:1). Later in this chapter, I will discuss the way race and ethnicity has been treated historically, as well as the continuing racism that exists today. In light of these considerations, it is not surprising that only a small percentage of the population with African ancestry would self-identify as afro-descendent or black. In Venezuela, as in many other parts of the world, race, class and power intersect. Lighter-skinned people disproportionately hold prominent positions in business, politics and the military (Sharma et al. 2004), while the majority of municipalities with Afro-Venezuelan population are characterized by extreme poverty (García 2005:37).

The election of Hugo Chávez, the first President to identify as being non-white in 1998 marked a significant shift in political power. His supporters were predominantly non-white and from the lower class (Sharma et al. 2004). In order to understand the roots of the racial and ethnic inequality that exists today, as well as the significance of the shift in political power that occurred at the end of the twentieth century in

¹ See Terry Karl's (1997) *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States* for more information on how the oil sector impacts other sectors of the economy, and in particular how it has impacted Venezuela.

² Because the informal sector is by definition undocumented economic activity, it is difficult to find reliable estimates of its size. Weisbrot and Sandoval (2008:13) estimate that informal sector employment (as of 2007) accounted for about 49.4 % of total employment.

Venezuela, we must consider how racial and ethnic inequality first emerged in Venezuela, and how it has been perpetuated through the centuries.

Historical Overview

Venezuela was a colony of Spain from 1496 until 1830 when the country gained independence (Herrera Salas 2007). It was considered a peripheral area of the Spanish empire because it did not have abundant gold and silver. Nonetheless, people from all over Europe came during the sixteenth century and slaves were brought from Africa (Wright 1990). The colonial social structure consisted of the Spaniards, the *criollos* (people born in the colonies of Spanish descent), the *pardos* (people of mixed race/ethnicity), the indigenous peoples and black slaves.

When the Spanish arrived in the late fifteenth century there was an indigenous population living in the area. The Spaniards and their descendents tried to force the indigenous to labor on the cacao plantations they established. However, many indigenous fled south into the interior of the country (Wright 1990). Cultural resistance and survival occurred through indigenous trade networks, which facilitated information exchange between indigenous groups and the formation of alliances (Pérez 2000). “This system was based on a sociopolitical integration but was horizontally composed of indigenous groups who maintained their own political-economic autonomy and culture proper within that system” (Ibid 528). While some indigenous groups were able to survive the colonial and post-colonial experience, others were not.

The economic basis of the Spanish settlers’ and their descendents’ power came primarily from the production and export of cacao. Over time, as their profits increased, landowners replaced indigenous labor – which they felt was unreliable – with African slave labor (Wright 1990). The Spaniards brought 100,000 African slaves to Venezuela, mainly to work on the plantations along the northern coast of Venezuela (Herrera Salas 2007:101; Halperín Donghi 1993). The slave trade lasted for over three centuries and was

eventually abolished in 1811 during the struggle for independence from Spain. Slavery, however, continued until the government passed an emancipation law in 1854 (Lynch 1973).

The *criollos* increasingly came into conflict with the Spanish government. They were particularly upset by policies that they felt elevated the status of *pardos* and improved conditions for slaves. The *criollos* tried to prevent the social ascent of *pardos* by opposing popular education and lobbying for their exclusion from the militia. In 1794, the *criollos* succeeded in overturning a Spanish law passed in 1789 that sought to improve conditions for slaves (Lynch 1973).

The *criollos* saw their opportunity to increase their power vis-à-vis the Spanish government by bringing up the issue of independence in 1808 when the French invaded Spain. The Spanish repressed this movement and tried to stir up the already bubbling discontent of the *pardos*, indigenous and blacks to undermine the budding independence movement. They disseminated propaganda among non-whites that *criollo* power would be harmful to them (Ibid). Until 1817, the Spanish had the support of the *pardo* population in the interior plains (Halperín Donghi 1993).

The independence movement eventually marked a shift in racial and ethnic relations in Venezuela. At the beginning of the Independence movement in 1810, 45 % of the population was mixed race/ethnicity, 15 % were slaves, 15 % indigenous and 25 % white, but 90 % of the latter group most likely had some non-white ancestry (Wright 1990:13–14). Although they were unwilling to recognize this at first, the *criollos* needed the *pardos*, blacks and indigenous people in order to gain independence from the Spanish. The early attempts to establish an independent nation were undermined by the exclusion of these groups.

The junta in 1810 was dominated by cacao-growers (Halperín Donghi 1993). This first attempt at establishing independence, and which ultimately failed, involved the drafting of a constitution in 1811. Legal forms of inequality were technically abolished in this constitution; however, the right to vote was based on ownership of property so the poor, and non-white population,

continued to be excluded. Moreover, the constitution preserved slavery (Lynch 1973). The Spanish took advantage of this and worked to provoke insurrection among the slaves. The first republic failed as a result of those divisions. The *criollos* fought to replace the Spanish and establish their supremacy. The *pardos* and slaves fought for their own liberation (Ibid 199).

Simon Bolivar, one of the independence leaders, tried and failed to get *criollo* support for a law that promised freedom to slaves who joined the republican forces. The law was passed, but not enforced. Nevertheless, slaves stopped fighting the republic as they had earlier in the wars of independence (Ibid). Moreover, black and mulatto fishermen along the coast began attacking the Spanish (Halperín Donghi 1993). According to Wright (1990), the inclusion of *pardos* and blacks in the military campaigns against the Spanish began to transform the colonial social order. *Pardos* came to have “greater expectations from wartime social mobility” and “greater opportunities for advance to higher ranks and offices” (Lynch 1973:212). The independent nation of Venezuela was ultimately formed in 1830.

Upon independence, the social structure did not change dramatically, but the Spanish were removed from the top of the hierarchy. Many of the Spanish were killed or fled back to Spain. Venezuela’s population was about 900,000 (Lynch 1973:227). The post-independence social structure consisted of the *criollos* at the top, with poor whites from the Canary Islands who worked as laborers below them, followed by the *pardos* (who constituted more than half of the total population), then the slaves (who made up 20 % of the population) and finally the indigenous (who were less than 10 % of the population) (Sharma et al. 2004:62). “This colour/class system was rigid enough to earn the soubriquet of a ‘caste system,’ as in India” (Ibid). In the post-independence period, coffee replaced cacao as the principal export crop, and some slaves, who were granted freedom during the independence struggles, were enslaved once again in order to ensure a labor force on the coffee plantations. In addition, laws were put in place to end the nomadic lifestyle of the *pardo* population in the interior plains. Those promised land during the independence

struggles found it difficult to actually obtain that land or hold onto it in the post-independence period (Halperín Donghi 1993). Although the *pardos* fared better with independence than other non-white groups and gained some political power, they still were socially, politically and economically marginalized. Some were able to ascend the social ladder, but “they made this ascent only by disavowing their class and becoming culturally white themselves” (Lynch 1973:226).

The whites continued to dominate the economic and political realms of society. They had “a Eurocentric approach to society and nation building, and a deep mistrust of native and African conceptions of community and society” (Cannon 2008: 735). The *criollos* imposed the institution of private property; and the indigenous lost much of their land in the process. Land became concentrated either directly in *criollo* hands or in their hands via the state, which they controlled (Herrera Salas 2007); and until oil was discovered land and agriculture were the basis of economic power in Venezuela.

As part of the nation-building project and in an effort to create social stability, the elite began to promote the ideology of *mestizaje* (miscegenation), also referred to as the “racial equality” ideology. The argument was that as groups mix, racism would disappear. Elites wanted to create a unified, national, *mestizo* identity and deny recognition to Afro-Venezuelans and indigenous peoples. The education system was one means used to create a homogenous culture; everybody was educated in Spanish in order to linguistically and culturally assimilate non-European ethnic groups. In addition, there was an attempt to erase the indigenous ethnic identity by classifying indigenous as *campesinos*, or small-farmers (Herrera Salas 2007). By mid-twentieth century, approximately 70 % of the population was considered *mestizo* (Wright 1990:2). The “racial equality” ideology masked the racial discrimination that continued to exist in the post-colonial society.

At the same time that the elites were creating a *mestizo* identity for Venezuela, they implemented immigration policies with the goal of “whitening” the population. Immigration from Europe was encouraged, while black and Asian immigration

was prohibited. Given the relative lack of mineral deposits compared to other parts of Latin America, there was little economic incentive for Europeans to immigrate to Venezuela prior to the discovery of oil, and so few came. However, poor immigrants – who included blacks from the Antilles and Guyana as well as Chinese immigrants – came to Venezuela during this time in search of work, mainly in agriculture. It was only after the discovery of oil and after World War II that Europeans – mainly from Italy and Spain – came in significant numbers (Wright 1990).

The discovery of oil in the early twentieth century also attracted many Afro-West Indian and Chinese immigrants. The foreign oil firms created an ethnic/racial division of labor in which non-white Venezuelans found themselves at the bottom of the social hierarchy, even below non-white immigrants. Dutch, British and U.S. citizens held managerial and technical positions in the oil companies. West Indians were mainly employed in clerical work. And, Chinese held menial positions. The Venezuelans found themselves to be the only group without stable employment as they were hired mainly as day laborers (Ibid). Oil companies preferred West Indian laborers over Venezuelans because of negative stereotypes that existed about the work ethic of Venezuelans, the West-Indian's knowledge of English, their experience with the British colonial and education systems, and the expectation that they were less likely to join Venezuelan labor unions. Language barriers and their relatively higher positions in the oil companies created conflict between them and the lower class Venezuelans (Tinker Salas 2009). In 1929 the government ordered the expulsion of Afro-West Indians and Chinese as part of its efforts to defuse internal tensions. The government, however, still ended up approving work requests by West Indians due to pressures from the oil industry (Ibid). In 1936, in reaction to discontent among poor Venezuelans, the government passed a law requiring 75 % of employees in the oil companies to be Venezuelan. The size of the Afro-Venezuelan population grew when many Afro-West Indians became Venezuelan citizens in order to keep their jobs.

In the early twentieth century, the country's political system was characterized by dictatorship. Among the white elite, it was widely believed that a democratic political system could not be established because the non-white majority was not capable of self-governance (Wright 1990). In an effort to establish a democratic political system, the party *Acción Democrática* (AD) was founded under the leadership of middle-class *mestizos*. They adopted the myth of racial equality – the idea that Venezuelans were all *mestizo* and hence there was no racial discrimination – as their official position. Consequently, when they clashed with the white elite, they did so in class terms rather than along racial lines. AD governed from 1945 to 48 before being overthrown by a military coup. During these 3 years they passed reforms that benefited non-whites, including removing racial discrimination from the immigration laws and opening up positions for non-whites in the state bureaucracy. However, much of this was later overturned by the dictatorship that followed (Ibid). In 1958, a democratic political system was established and has lasted to the present day. AD and the party *Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente* (COPEI) alternated power until the mid-1990s.

During the period of struggle for the establishment of democracy in the mid-twentieth century, a significant demographic shift began to occur. Mass rural-to-urban migration took off as a result of the decline of the agricultural sector that accompanied the discovery and subsequent exploitation of the country's oil reserves. While today 94 % of the total population lives in urban areas (World Bank 2012), in 1936 only 34.7 % of the population did (Suárez and Torrealba 1979:291). At the beginning of the twentieth century, 72 % of the population lived in the central-western and coastal-mountain areas of Venezuela (Ibid:293). Most of the population migrated from the coastal-mountain zone where cacao, one of Venezuela's main export crops, was grown (Ibid). The labor force on these plantations was composed mainly of Afro-Venezuelans, a legacy of the colonial period during which black slave labor was used on these plantations. Even when coffee production – concentrated in the coastal

and Andean mountain slopes – became more important than cacao production, the ports along the coast remained key population areas due to the economic activity associated with them. During the period 1950–1974, there was a 21 % decline in the percentage of the population employed in agriculture, leaving only 22 % of the population working in agriculture by 1974 (Ibid:297).

This rural-to-urban migration led to the growth of the urban periphery. In the 1930s, one of the first working-class neighborhoods was established in Western Caracas. The people of this neighborhood built makeshift homes into one of the hillsides that surrounded the capital. The government owned this land and most of the people who established themselves there were squatters. These recent migrants were mainly Afro-Venezuelans who had been living and working along the coast. There was a second major wave of internal migration to Caracas in the 1950s. The dictator Pérez Jiménez demolished some of these makeshift homes, prohibited the construction of new ones, and set-up some popular housing projects. Urban social movements developed during this period as residents of the urban periphery confronted the government over their social, economic, and political marginalization. Residents in these areas of Caracas helped hide the people participating in the guerilla movement of this period (Fernandes 2010). In the 1960s, with the establishment of democracy both parties – AD and COPEI – created clientelistic relations with people living in the urban periphery in an attempt to establish political stability (Halperín Donghi 1993).

In the 1970s a cultural struggle began in these urban areas in response to the segregation of the non-white population in the urban periphery. Cultural groups like *Grupo Madera* emerged. This group sought to “revive a sense of black pride and dignity...With their natural Afro hairstyles and African clothing” (Fernandes 2010:55). Members of this group learned about Afro-Venezuelan history, including about the various places within Africa from which slaves had been brought to Venezuela. “Grupo Madera reclaimed black subjectivity and revindicated black culture

as the basis of an autochthonous culture” (Ibid 55). They made music that addressed Afro-Venezuelan history and culture, as well as took part in social projects and activism in their community.

This celebration of their Afro-Venezuelan roots and the emerging political consciousness along racial lines took place in reaction to the persistent denial of racism that had existed since state formation in the post-independence period. Elites used the fact that race intersected with class (as a result of the legacy of colonial institutions) to claim racism did not exist in Venezuela. Wright (1990) explains, “Rather than attribute their anti-black feelings to racist attitudes or racism, Venezuelans argued that they did not like blacks because they lived in poverty” (5). Blacks who did succeed despite the racist social structures tended to sever their ties with other blacks. Moreover, they made an effort to not call attention to their race; and they tried to identify themselves with the white culture (Ibid). Wright (Ibid) argues that Venezuelans do not have as dualist a conception of race as people in the United States. Rather, race is conceptualized in more fluid terms. “A series of contiguous racial categories marked the gradations of a racial continuum” (Ibid 7). Blacks could be upwardly mobile by mixing with lighter-skinned individuals. Moreover, Wright posits that blacks and *mestizos* in Venezuela were more successful at upward mobility than non-whites in Brazil and Argentina. Critics, however, point out that lack of statistical data on Argentina and Venezuela means that this claim can only be made based on anecdotal evidence (Skidmore 1992).

While the conflation of race and class in Venezuela obscured some of the racism embedded in society, there was also overt racism. As the price of oil soared in the 1970s, overt racism decreased (Herrera Salas 2007). The standard of living of the poor improved. However, oil prices plummeted in the early 1980s, which launched Venezuela into an economic crisis. In response to that crisis, President Carlos Andres Pérez went against his campaign promise in 1989 and began to implement a neoliberal restructuring program that involved, among other measures, a decrease in state subsidization of gasoline. This caused the

price of public transportation to rise, which led to a popular uprising. The government reacted with force, killing hundreds of people in what came to be known as the *Caracazo* (Wilpert 2007). “Establishment presentations of the *Caracazo* unearthed once again the barely latent classism and racism buried under the official myth of a classless and non-racial Venezuela” (Cannon 2008:739). In this depiction, the lower class, non-white population was portrayed as primitive barbarians, and those in positions of power portrayed themselves as the civilizers.

The *Caracazo*, as well as two failed military coups in 1992, illustrated the faltering legitimacy of Venezuela’s political system. The percentage of people living in poverty increased from 32.2 % in 1991 to 48.5 % in 2000, while the rate of extreme poverty increased from 11.8 to 23.5 % (World Bank Development Indicators 2006:1). Social, economic and political exclusion came to be seen as permanent features of Venezuelan society for the poor, non-white majority.

Racism became more overt as the non-white poor became scapegoats for the country’s problems. The government’s handling of the cholera epidemic, which killed 500 people in the Orinoco Delta in the early 1990s provides one striking example. Briggs (2001) argues that public health authorities racialized the cholera outbreak as a way to legitimize and naturalize “the acute social inequality that was emerging throughout Venezuela in the wake of globalization and neo-liberal policies” (666–667). The government ignored petitions “for improved medical services, political representation, and human rights, and a halt to land expropriation and environmental degradation” (Ibid 670). Rather, it shifted the blame onto the victims of cholera by depicting the epidemic as an “indigenous problem.” Indigenous culture – its customs and food – were used to explain why cholera supposedly affected only indigenous populations. The government considered the supposedly faulty cultural practices to be too ingrained to be changed. This focus on culture deflected attention away from the social, political and economic structures that “limit[ed] access to adequate schooling, potable

water and sewage facilities, health education and medical treatment,” contributing to the cholera epidemic (Ibid 671–672). The government provided short-term aid and neglected long-term solutions that would improve the standard of living in the region. Briggs (Ibid) concludes that the long-term impact of government intervention in the cholera epidemic not only failed to improve conditions, but, rather, led to a worsening of social, economic and health conditions in the areas affected.

In response to the increasingly overt racism in the 1980s and 1990s, movements for social change gained momentum. After a decline of urban popular movements in the early 1980s, by the mid-1980s *barrio*-based organizations began to emerge in response to the increasing poverty, inequality, and crime, as well as the decline in public services (Fernandes 2010). Afro-Venezuelan and indigenous groups formed organizations to identify their interests and advocate on their behalf. A movement of cultural resistance emerged with the issue of national identity at center stage (Herrera Salas 2007). Among the groups formed were the *Unión de Mujeres Negras de Venezuela*, or the Organization of Black Women, in the early 1990s, the *Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas*, or the Network of Afro-Venezuelan Organizations (NAVO), which was established in 2000, and the *Consejo Nacional Indio de Venezuela* (CONIVE), or the National Indian Council of Venezuela, a network of indigenous organizations established in 1989 (Ibid).

Some scholars, such as Pollak-Eltz (1994), have concluded, based on their analysis of Venezuelan history and the social and political ascent of some non-whites, that racism has not existed in Venezuela for a long time, and that there have been significant opportunities for non-whites to be upwardly mobile. This belief seems to stem from the hegemony of the “racial equality” ideology that has dominated in Venezuela for many decades. The evidence, however, suggests that these optimistic views of the elimination of racism do not accurately represent life in Venezuela.

Demographic Trends and Issues Today

The political crisis that started in the late 1980s eventually led to the dissolution of the two-party system and resulted in the election of Hugo Chávez, who had become a folk hero after his failed coup in 1992 (Wilpert 2007). His election in 1998 represented a significant shift in racial/ethnic power dynamics. Chávez proudly identified as a mix of Indigenous, European and African: “Hate against me has a lot to do with racism. Because of my big mouth, because of my curly hair. And I’m so proud to have this mouth and this hair, because it is African” (Hugo Chávez as quoted in Cannon 2008:741). The opposition called Chávez “negro,” “Indian” “monkey” and “thick-lipped” (Herrera Salas 2007:109). Many of his supporters came from the lower class and tended to be darker skinned than the white elite who had ruled since the colonial period (Sharma et al. 2004). The middle and upper classes tended to support the opposition. Cannon (Ibid) argues that their opposition to Chávez was based on deeply rooted racism. According to García (2005), the Venezuelan media, which were largely controlled by the elite, were guilty of more than 1,154 racist messages related to the African heritage of Chávez and some of his Ministers (36). Herrera Salas (2007) argues that by identifying himself as “Indian,” “mixed breed,” and “black,” Chávez transformed these intended insults into positive traits.

The 2006 presidential race illustrated how deeply racism was infused in people’s thinking on both the political right and left. The opposition candidate Manuel Rosales, in an attempt to gain support from the lower classes, promised if elected to create a welfare debit card for the poor. He called the card “*mi negra*,” which translates to “my black woman.” Afro-Venezuelans with missing teeth were featured in the political advertisements for the *mi negra* card. Valencia Ramírez (2009) argues that Chávez supporters did not object to the opposition’s use of “a pre-modern, subordinated black subject” (120). Rather, their objections to the proposal were based on the

individualistic nature of such a social program, which was counter to their socialist project.

The issue of race was subsumed into the class-based framing of the political struggle underway in Venezuela. “It is quite common for Bolivarian revolutionaries [supporters of Chávez] to dismiss the Afro-Venezuelan movement as divisive, a small minority, and thus unimportant or even nonexistent” (Ibid 120). Cannon (2008) argues that while Chávez highlighted race and class in his discourse, most of his social programs tackled the issue of class, “with race issues being subsumed within these more general programmes” (744).

Under the Chávez government, however, indigenous people and Afro-Venezuelans made gains. Valencia Ramírez (2009) argues that “Chávez’s recognition of his African ancestry and the high-profile leadership of Afro-Venezuelan cabinet members” opened the way for discussions about race, and Afro-Venezuelan groups have taken advantage of this to bring attention to the issues that specifically affect them (122). Chávez was the first President of Venezuela to appoint an Afro-Venezuelan to his Cabinet (Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United States 2011). Changes in school curriculum were made to replace the Eurocentric account of Venezuelan history with an account that included the roles played by Afro-Venezuelans and indigenous people. In addition, each group was granted a national day recognizing its contributions to Venezuela. Since Afro-Venezuelans and indigenous were concentrated in communities characterized by high levels of poverty, communities that had traditionally lacked access to adequate health care, education and other basic services, Afro-Venezuelans and indigenous benefited from the large number of social programs the Chávez government implemented. They also benefited from land redistribution and government funded community development projects (Herrera Salas 2007; Harris 2007). Nonetheless, Afro-Venezuelans remain concentrated in the poor, urban periphery, while indigenous tend to be located in more rural areas, also characterized by poverty and limited access to basic infrastructure and social services.

The indigenous fared better than Afro-Venezuelans in terms of gaining political recognition and rights. During the drafting of the 1999 constitution, the indigenous managed to gain multiple seats at the table. One of the first actions taken by Chávez after his election was to hold a referendum asking the people of Venezuela if they wanted to draft a new constitution. Ninety-two percent of the electorate voted in favor (Wilpert 2007:21). Chávez designated three seats for indigenous delegates in the 131-seat Constituent Assembly that was tasked with drafting the constitution, and the indigenous won two additional seats during the Constituent Assembly elections. Moreover, the indigenous organization CONIVE was able to establish a stronger presence in the country's capital, Caracas, when the state provided office space and technical support to the organization in 1999 (Van Cott 2003). "The granting of special status to Indians was unprecedented in Venezuelan history and established the precedent for the special treatment that Indians would receive in the new constitution" (Ibid:55). This was the first time the indigenous had participated in Venezuela's political process on a national level, both through their participation in the drafting of the constitution and through appointments to high-level posts in government (Herrera Salas 2007).

As a result, the constitution recognized for the first time the right of the indigenous to their languages, cultures and territories, giving the state the responsibility of promoting indigenous culture and languages through funding bilingual education for the indigenous population. The state was also made responsible for legalizing their land ownership, as well as protecting the intellectual property rights of the indigenous. In addition, the constitution promised that natural resource exploitation in their territories would not harm them. As in the Constituent Assembly that drafted the constitution, the indigenous were guaranteed three seats in the National Assembly, the legislative body of the state (Wilpert 2007). Van Cott (2003) describes the 1999 constitution as "containing the region's most progressive indigenous rights regime" (63). Not only did the Venezuelan constitution incorporate many of the

"symbolic and programmatic rights" that other Latin American constitutions of the early twenty-first century, it went beyond these other constitutions to guarantee "political representation at all levels of government" (Ibid 63). The Venezuelan constitution, for example, was the only constitution in Latin America to guarantee indigenous representatives seats in state assemblies and municipal councils. Through the new constitution, the indigenous successfully established a permanent space within the state (Ibid).

Misión Guacaipuro, one of the Chávez government's social programs, was established in 2003 to ensure that the rights of the indigenous outlined in the constitution were implemented. Its activities included restoring "communal and indigenous land titles and defend[ing] indigenous rights and resources against corporate exploitation" (Harris 2007:2). In 2005, indigenous activists denounced coalmining operations in the state of Zulia because of the respiratory diseases it had caused, as well as the deforestation associated with it.³ Two years after the coalmining protests Chávez banned the expansion of coalmining in Zulia because the operations were in violation of the constitution's guarantee that natural resource exploitation on indigenous land would not harm them (Ibid:2). The contradiction between the continuation of coalmining and what was outlined in the constitution brought attention to the question of whether the model of development pursued by the Chávez government was in fact that distinct from earlier projects of development in Venezuela. The indigenous advocated for a more sustainable model of development than the model pursued by the government, one that protected biodiversity and indigenous cultural practices.

Another conflict emerged between the indigenous and the Chávez government in 2008. The Yupka called on the government to fulfill one of the promises of the 1999 constitution. They

³Interestingly, the urban protesters who supported the indigenous activists also used the indigenous identity as a way to frame their struggles. They painted murals of indigenous leaders in their *barrios* and created narratives based on indigenous history as they struggled over issues related to urban poverty (Fernandes 2010).

requested that the government grant them 130,000 hectares of land that had been occupied by their ancestors. State-level government employees and national-level government employees came into conflict, with the former siding with local elite opposed to the redistribution. The national government's compromise in 2009 was to give the indigenous part of the land they demanded, parcels that were isolated from each other rather than contiguous. Moreover, the military was to maintain its presence in the area, and the large estates were to basically remain intact. This divided the indigenous. The Land Institute granted 40,000 hectares to those who supported the compromise. This led to intra-tribal conflict that resulted in two deaths, and several arrests. Indigenous activists demanded that the government release those who were arrested and let the indigenous justice system decide how to deal with them. In 2010, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice ruled that the indigenous could deal with what happened through their own judicial system, which they did in June 2011 (Suggett 2011).

The semi-autonomy of indigenous communities, granted by the government via the new constitution and the Organic Law on Indigenous Peoples and Communities, also brought other types of indigenous institutions in conflict with government institutions. One of the ways the government sought to empower communities and increase popular participation had been through the creation of communal councils. In these councils, members of the community were supposed to come together to identify their needs, put together projects and request funds from the appropriate government agencies. The indigenous had preexisting communal organizations that were structured in a different way than the communal councils promoted by the government. Some members of the indigenous community felt that the communal councils undermined traditional authority in indigenous communities. As a result, conflict emerged between the government and indigenous communities over these communal councils, as well as created divisions within indigenous communities. In his description of the debate over coalmining among the Wayúu, Suggett (Ibid:6) explained: "Throughout the process, none of the communal councils

were genuine expressions of the people's political participation or indigenous identity. The rush to form the councils had the effect of dividing the Wayúu into competing factions and undermining organic political processes." Although one of the ideas behind the communal councils was that it was a way to transfer resources directly to communities and bypass potentially corrupt local government institutions, it created difficulties and conflict when applied to indigenous communities with preexisting governing structures.

While the new constitution recognized the 36 indigenous nations in Venezuela, it did not recognize Afro-Venezuelans. Moreover, Afro-Venezuelans were not granted designated seats in the National Assembly to represent them like the indigenous were (Valencia Ramírez 2009). García (2005), leader of the Afro-Venezuelan Network (NAVO), argued that the 1999 constitution left out the role played by Africans and their descendants in the independence struggles, as well as failed to accord rights to Afro-Venezuelans or recognize them as a distinct ethnic group.

On the legislative front, NAVO managed to incorporate Afro-Venezuelans into the draft language of the Law of Culture and the Law of Education. However, with the changes in Ministers and Vice-Ministers that took place during the writing of the laws, any references to Afro-Venezuelans were ultimately eliminated. The explanation by officials in the government was "here 'we are equal.' To incorporate the variable **afro** is to create a false problem because here we are all *mestizos*" (Ibid 35, bold in the original). García also pointed out that Afro-Venezuelans were neglected in the "strategic conception of the programs, plans and projects [of the government]," which "illustrates the lack of institutional recognition of Afro-Venezuelan communities in state planning" (35). Afro-Venezuelans were not written into the constitution or into legislation, nor was there any state agency tasked with ensuring the rights of Afro-Venezuelans like there was for the indigenous.

While Afro-Venezuelans did not make it into the 1999 constitution, they did manage to get into one of the constitutional amendments supported by President Chávez and the National Assembly that was put up to popular vote in 2007. The

amendments were grouped into two packages, which the population voted on. Ultimately, both packages of amendments were voted down, and Afro-Venezuelans were unsuccessful yet again at gaining political recognition in the constitution.

There are several factors that help explain why the indigenous were more successful at gaining political recognition than Afro-Venezuelans. These include the external legitimization of their ethnic rights through a “decade-long Latin American trend toward the codification of a coherent set of indigenous constitutional rights” (Van Cott 2003:61). Secondly, their prior political experience and the legal precedents established during the drafting of the 1993 State of Amazonas constitution – which accorded the indigenous special rights and which they used as a basis for their claims during the writing of the 1999 national constitution – prepared them politically and legally to participate in the drafting of the 1999 constitution (Ibid). Third, the government stopped collecting census data on the black population in 1854 when slaves were freed (Wright 1990), which obstructed their efforts to gain recognition. And finally, their differing experiences during the colonial period resulted in a less cohesive Afro-Venezuelan culture and ethnic identity. While the indigenous escaped into the interior of the country, isolating themselves somewhat from the Spanish and their descendents, African slaves – who came from a variety of linguistic and cultural groups in Africa and hence did not have a cohesive culture (Wright 1990) – were more integrated into the colonial society.

Although in support of the Chávez government and its political program, Afro-Venezuelans were critical of their exclusion from the processes of change that were underway in the country (Valencia Ramírez 2009). Their exclusion seemed, in large part, to stem from the continuing power of the racial equality ideology. “In the first 3 years of the Chávez government, all the top officials of the government self-identified as ‘mestizo,’ expressing phrases like ‘in this country racism does not exist’” (García 2005:38). NAVO tried to get the government’s National Statistics Institute (NSI) to collect data on the Afro-Venezuelan population in the 2000 census. Its request was

rejected because, according to the director of the institute, “Venezuela has already overcome its racial differences, period” (Ibid 37). NAVO, however, was successful in 2004 when the Minister of Planning agreed to include questions about Afro-Venezuelans in a social survey that the NSI was planning to carry out. After the 2002 coup, the racism of the elite, as expressed through the private media, became more overt and the government and its supporters recognized the racism that many had been denying existed. But as this particular conflict cooled, “the theory of *mestizaje* and that we are a country that is racially equal returned” (Ibid 40). In 2011, however, the census allowed people for the first time to identify themselves as Afro-Venezuelans.

Afro-Venezuelan groups had been focusing on consciousness-raising in their communities in order to establish an Afro-Venezuelan political identity (Valencia Ramírez 2009). Fernandes and Stanyek (2007) argued that rap music emerged in Venezuela as the poor became increasingly vocal politically. “The forms of consciousness that are reflected and created through Venezuelan rap are less of the militant, black nationalist variety predominant in Cuban rap music and more related to the continuing urban reality of crime, extreme poverty, and death by gang violence” (Ibid 204). Although the rappers point out racial inequality, their “reflections on race do not become demands for racial equality, as people of color in Venezuela still do not have the tendency to see themselves as distinct groups, less still political groupings” (Ibid 204–205). They argued that this was because in postcolonial Venezuela, race-based organizing did not exist. “Being black or of mixed-race in Venezuela is not generally seen in terms of a political identity; rather it is associated with the lived experience of poverty, violence, and marginality” (Ibid 205). They argued, however, that through rap music Afro-Venezuelans were beginning to claim a black identity.

Some analysts argued that with the political shift that took place over the first decade of the twenty-first century, racism no longer existed or soon would no longer exist. Cole (2009), for example, claimed that whiteness – a “structural system of oppression” – is “rendered irrelevant” (258). He argued that Venezuela’s twenty-first

century socialism – as Chávez named the social, political and economic project of his administration – is “a way forward to an anti-racist socialist world” (263). Harris (2007) also held an optimistic view of these changes, suggesting that they were on the way to eliminating “the systemic nature of racism from Venezuelan life” (3). The optimistic view of the end of racism seemed to stem from a faith in Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution. The case of Cuba, however, suggests that there is no reason to assume racism necessarily disappears with the transition to socialism.

There were improvements in the political and economic situation of racial and ethnic minorities under the Chávez government and the successor government of Nicolás Maduro. The indigenous made some legal gains and the poor, where racial and ethnic minorities were disproportionately concentrated, benefited from a number of social programs. However, the forgoing discussion illustrates that there continued to be resistance to recognizing racism, and inequality of opportunity and outcome for racial and ethnic minorities persisted in Venezuela. While the election of Chávez and the institutional and programmatic changes implemented meant a significant shift in racial/ethnic power dynamics in Venezuelan society, the practice of sweeping the issue of race under the rug – long a part of the elite-instituted racial equality ideology that dominated Venezuela in the twentieth century – remained to the detriment of racial and ethnic minorities, and of the Afro-Venezuelan population in particular.

Theoretical Issues

Anthropologists⁴ and historians⁵ have done much of the research on race and ethnicity in earlier periods in Venezuelan history, while political

scientists⁶ have been responsible for much of the analysis of race and ethnicity in the contemporary political context. The anthropological and historical accounts of the situation and conditions of ethnic and racial groups in Venezuelan history are rich in detail, but tend to have less of an emphasis on the larger social, political and economic processes that help explain the dynamics and outcomes they identify. Pérez (2000:519) argues that anthropological scholarship on Venezuela is fragmented, that it lacks “postulates, models and paradigms.” She pushes anthropologists to engage more deeply with each other in order to be able to build macrointerpretative models. Meanwhile, the more recent works by political scientists on racial and ethnic minorities under the Chávez government tended to focus on the degree to which these groups were benefiting from the political changes. The scholarship on race and ethnicity in Venezuela lacks a larger theoretical framework in which to situate and understand the rich body of empirical data that exists, as well as to connect the study of the past and the present.

Burawoy’s (2003) theoretical framework, based primarily on the synthesis of Antonio Gramsci’s and Karl Polanyi’s ideas, is useful for understanding the historical development of racial/ethnic inequality and conflict in Venezuela, as well as to evaluate to what extent the current historical moment is a juncture of radical change. Because the racial equality ideology has played such a powerful role in producing consent for the social and political structure of Venezuelan society, and has been so difficult to overcome even after repeated crises of legitimacy, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony⁷ – as a form of domination that combines force and consent – is an apt theoretical starting point.

Burawoy (Ibid) explains that consent is organized through institutions. In particular the expansion of the state – through education, the law and welfare agencies – plays a role in the formation of consent. The more that consent expands, the

⁴Including Arvelo-Jiménez (2000), Briggs (2001), Gassón (2000), Heinen and García-Castro (2000), Hill (2000), Luis Rodríguez (2000), Margolies (2006), Navarrete (2000), Pérez (2000), Pollak-Eltz (1994), Scaramelli and Tarble (2000), Valencia Ramírez (2009), Vidal (2000).

⁵Including Lynch (1973), Tinker Salas (2009), Wright (1990).

⁶Including Cannon (2008), Herrera Salas (2007), Van Cott (2003).

⁷His concept of hegemony is developed in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (1983).

less visible the use of force need be, such that it is only used in individual cases of deviance and/or in moments of crisis. Moreover, when those in power use force, they attempt to make it look as if it is based on the consent of the majority. To effectively exert hegemony, the dominant class will have to make economic concessions to other classes, but will never let those concessions fundamentally affect their profit-making abilities. Once hegemony is created, Gramsci posits, one sees the transition within capitalism from political dictatorship to political hegemony. Burawoy (Ibid) explains that under political hegemony there is “a configuration of class domination in which negotiated compromise replaces irreconcilable interests, in which cooperative antagonism replaces zero-sum conflict” (225). This is how the national elite develop hegemony, but what are the conditions under which this hegemony becomes challenged, opening the possibility for a fundamental shift in economic and political power?

Burawoy (Ibid) points out that although Polanyi⁸ neglects the power of capitalist hegemony in his analysis, he does propose something that can be the basis for counterhegemony. Polanyi highlights how the experience of the market can lead to cross-class collaboration in that the negative impact of market forces does not necessarily confine itself to a particular class. Burawoy (Ibid) goes on to point out that we see this in the contemporary period in response to the neoliberal ideology adopted by the ruling elite in the 1980s and 1990s, which has given rise to what some call the “anti-globalization” movement. This multi-class movement in reaction to the dismantling of protective measures that kept market mechanisms in check resembles to a certain degree Polanyi’s “double movement.” Mouffe also helps explain how counterhegemony can develop.⁹ She argues that the working class

builds on existing ideologies, “valorizing those that are most consonant with its interests” (Burawoy citing Mouffe 2003: 225). For example, they may adopt “notions of social justice, of equality, of democracy” (Ibid).

For Gramsci, history shapes the plane on which class struggle occurs and out of which crises can emerge. In moments of crisis, a country can shift from one political form to another. He views economic crises as potential openings for the spread of alternative ideologies, but also as an opportunity for the dominant class to reassert its hegemonic power. It is political crises, or crises of hegemony, which can be turning points in the trajectory of a society, historic junctures that open up the possibility for radical change (Ibid).

While this theoretical framework focuses exclusively on class and ignores race and ethnicity, it can shed light on the perpetuation of racial and ethnic inequality in Venezuela, as well as provide tools for assessing the implications of the shift in political power that took place at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In Venezuela, the colonial period was characterized by the use of force to maintain the racial/ethnic hierarchy. During the wars of independence and the establishment of the republic, the *criollo* elite had to make some concessions to the non-white population, though these concessions were mainly made to the *pardo* population and not extended to the black and indigenous populations. The new national elite developed the ideology of “racial equality” as part of their strategy to ensure political stability. As this idea took hold among the population, the use of force could be increasingly hidden from view and the socio-political system could be maintained primarily through consent. In this process, one sees the transition Gramsci describes from political dictatorship to political hegemony.

Eventually in 1958, the Venezuelan elite negotiated the founding of a formally democratic political system that alternated power between two parties. The Venezuelan state, with its access to oil industry revenues, was perfectly positioned to make economic concessions to the predominantly non-white poor to maintain the stability of the political system. Here, one sees the realization

⁸Polanyi develops his ideas in his 2001 book *The Great Transformation*.

⁹Burawoy draws on Mouffe’s ideas from her piece “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci,” in the book she edited and published in 1979 *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*.

of Gramsci's idea of a "cooperative antagonism" replacing "zero-sum conflict." This, however, fell apart in the 1980s when economic crisis hit Venezuela. The plunge in the price of oil eventually led the elite, who ran the state, to cut back on social programs that benefited the poor. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the elite began to blame the non-white poor for the country's economic problems. The increasing economic marginalization of the lower class, combined with the increasingly overt racism, began to shatter the "racial equality" ideology that underlay the hegemonic form of domination used to hold the country together for decades. Social unrest ensued. The *Caracazo* of 1989 illustrated the breakdown of consent and the need of the elite to shift back to the use of force to maintain its power.

The economic crisis in Venezuela ultimately led to a political crisis that brought an end to the AD-COPEI dominance of the political system that had been in place since democracy was established. The elite tried to maintain their control over government. One of the founders of COPEI, Rafael Caldera, broke with his party and ran independently for President in 1994. He won the election. And, as a concession to the dissatisfied poor, he pardoned Hugo Chávez, the folk hero who was incarcerated for his failed coup attempt in 1992. This, however, did not prove to be enough to maintain the power of the political elite.

A major shift in political power took place with the election of Chávez to the presidency. Not only was the control of the state, and hence the country's oil revenues, wrested from the old political elite, but a President with African and indigenous ancestry was elected, non-whites appointed to key government positions, and a new constitution written that expanded the rights of many previously marginalized groups. Chávez was initially brought to power with the support not only of the lower class, but of the middle class as well. In line with Polanyi's argument, the increased exposure to the market as occurred during the neoliberal era in Venezuela created a social countermovement that united the lower and middle classes, at least to the extent of bringing an end to the AD-COPEI system.

Chávez's political program was not initially radical. As Mouffe argues, Chávez and his supporters

began by working within existing ideologies. They continued to support capitalism as an economic system, but wanted to increase state intervention to protect those hurt by the market. They used the language of social justice, equality and the expansion of democracy to include those who had been socially, politically and economically marginalized under previous governments, but did not frame, for the most part, the struggle in racial/ethnic terms. In the struggle of Afro-Venezuelans, especially early on in the Chávez government, we can see the continuing power of the "racial equality" ideology that obstructed a more radical shift in the structures of racial and ethnic inequality. Although blatantly shattered at various points – during the 1980s and after the 2002 coup – this ideology still wielded tremendous influence in the thinking of many Venezuelans, who consequently denied the continuing racial/ethnic inequality in the country. As his program became more radical, Chávez increasingly lost the support of the middle class, but his support at the election booth did not decline as the lower class became increasingly politically mobilized.

The elite's unwillingness to accept its loss of political power led its members to repeatedly attempt to overthrow the government through both legal and illegal means, including a referendum to remove Chávez from the presidency, a shutdown of the national oil company and the economy more generally, and a *coup d'état*. This only radicalized Chávez and his supporters (Wilpert 2007). As Gramsci argues, the political crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s – during which the two main political parties lost legitimacy and support – opened up the possibility for a shift in political power. However, the more radical change that set Venezuela on a new trajectory – a trajectory that Chávez eventually identified as twenty-first century socialism – only occurred later as the old elite continued to struggle from their weakened position to regain control. They increasingly used force (as in the 2002 coup) since the ideologies that they had promoted – racial equality and neoliberalism – were waning in power. If the old political elite had pursued a less confrontational strategy – and less egregiously used force – Venezuela might not be on the political trajectory that it is on today. Despite this

radicalization of Venezuela's social, political and economic project, the power of the old ideologies still informed the thinking of the new political elite and its supporters. This created internal conflict in Chávez's Bolivarian Revolution as documented by Ellner (2008). The more radical faction sought to purge the old ideologies entirely, and the less radical faction continued to cling to elements of the old ideology. These tensions played out in the area of racial/ethnic inequality as well. Tensions within the Bolivarian Revolution seemed to intensify with the death of Chávez in March 2013. His successor, Nicolás Maduro, had difficulty holding together these factions, and only narrowly defeated the opposition in the Presidential election immediately following Chávez's death. According to Ellner (2013), Maduro is likely to continue with the political program initiated by Chávez, though at a slower pace given his narrow electoral win. The degree to which a truly counterhegemonic project takes root will depend in part on how these internal tensions of the Bolivarian Revolution unfold.

Burawoy (2003) offers useful theoretical tools for understanding how the historical legacy of the colonial and postcolonial experience continues to inform politics and society today. His focus on hegemonic power highlights how the ideas promoted by the previous ruling elite remain deeply embedded in the consciousness of Venezuelans, including those committed to a radical transformation of the political and economic system. This, in turn, brings attention to the obstacles that exist to the realization of a counterhegemonic project that empowers the entire population to participate in the political process through the establishment of a participatory democratic political system, that empowers workers in the economic realm, and that eradicates all sources of inequality.

Methodological Issues

Much of the historical study of Venezuela is based on document analysis. Wright (1990), for example, has uncovered elite opinions on race and ethnicity in historical documents, as well as

through the analysis of migration laws and other public policies. Lynch's (1973) account of the revolutionary period also relies heavily on historical documents, including legal documents such as the early constitutions which were drafted by the white elite, as well as first person accounts by these same people. The limitation of historical documents is that many tend to reflect the opinions and biases of the people on the top of the social hierarchy. The opinions, attitudes and actions of more marginalized groups – racial and ethnic minorities and the poor more generally – tend to be underrepresented in the archive. Anthropologists have also analyzed historical documents, but combined this method with ethnographic studies of indigenous communities, archaeological data, interviewing and oral histories. This combination of methods has the potential to yield a more comprehensive view of the social and political dynamics involved. Anthropologists, however, have mainly focused on indigenous peoples, ignoring other marginalized racial and ethnic groups, such as *mestizos* and Afro-Venezuelans.

Studies of the current political context have relied on document analysis, ethnographic fieldwork and poll data. Valencia Ramírez's (2009) examination of the Afro-Venezuelan movement and Fernandes's (2010) study of urban social movements, for example, were based on participant observation and interviewing. Cannon (2008), in contrast, based many of his conclusions about the contemporary political scene on poll data collected by others. The validity of poll data depends on the wording of the questions, which should be tested through focus groups, cognitive interviews and/or field pretests before the survey is carried out (Fowler 1995), as well as the generalizability of the sample (Chambliss and Schutt 2003). When relying on survey data collected by others, particularly when the methodology used is not provided in detail and when it was collected in a polarized political context like Venezuela, one must question its reliability. In terms of quantitative data, the most significant limitation on the study of ethnic and racial minorities in Venezuela is the lack of aggregate statistical data on Afro-Venezuelans that has resulted

from their exclusion from the national census for over 150 years. However, as previously mentioned, this has changed now that they have been included in the census as of 2011.

To arrive at reliable conclusions concerning the social and political dynamics surrounding race and ethnicity in the contemporary context, extensive fieldwork is necessary. The information one can get from both private and government media is biased by the political agenda of those disseminating the information. Consequently, information from these sources is often distorted and unreliable.

Moreover, any fieldwork done should involve interviewing a variety of groups (e.g., people who live in the shantytowns surrounding Caracas and in middle- and upper-class neighborhoods of the capital, people who live outside the capital in both urban and rural areas, employees in the government institutions responsible for implementing policies that affect racial and ethnic minorities, activists in organizations like NAVO, as well as politically active members of the opposition to the government) and engaging in participant observation in a variety of contexts. Through the study of a variety of groups, one can gain a more comprehensive understanding of the complex, racial and ethnic dynamics at play in Venezuela today.

Participatory Action Research (PAR) – a methodological approach that emphasizes the participation of research subjects – could improve the quality of research findings in the study of race and ethnicity. Pain and Francis (2003:46) argue, “Participatory diagramming [a set of research techniques used in PAR] has proven useful in undertaking research with marginalized groups who are often living in cultures very different from those of researchers.” Moreover, they cite studies that suggest that PAR produces, “robust, good quality data in an ethical way” (Ibid 46). Through teaming up with Afro-Venezuelan, indigenous and *mestizo* communities in Venezuela, researchers can better identify the questions that need answers, as well as involve these communities in the research, which can empower them and provide them with the data they need to make their voices heard in the political realm.

Future Issues and Trends

Most of the changes in Venezuela in the early twenty-first century – fundamental as they were – require long-term government support. Changing deeply ingrained beliefs does not occur over night, and many of the measures taken either require on-going government funding or government enforcement. Consequently, the continuation of this long-term project depends on those who support it maintaining power. Maduro’s hold on power has been more tenuous than that of Chávez. Moreover, the continuation of the programs and projects that the non-white poor have benefited from depends on the price of oil remaining high. The government has managed to maintain many of the programs during oil price declines by increasing the domestic debt, increasing the value added tax, reducing salaries of top government officials, cutting the 2009 budget by 6.7 % and increasing interest rates (World Bank 2009:2). But, as the experience of the 1980s illustrates, accumulating debt is not a sustainable solution to low oil prices. Beyond these political and economic considerations is the question of the sustainability of the changes underway. To what extent are alternate structures, an alternate political culture and a truly participatory democracy being created?

In terms of areas for future research, more studies are needed on the obstacles Afro-Venezuelans encounter in trying to achieve political recognition in the contemporary context. “Activists argue that government claims of ‘racial equality’ prohibit any scientific studies of the number, location, and social status of Afro-descendants” (Valencia Ramírez 2009:119). The historical account of blacks in Venezuelan society has been primarily understood through the lens of the light-skinned elite, who have denied them their own ethnic identity and rights. Academic recognition of Afro-Venezuelans and the study of their histories, as well as current conditions and struggles can provide them with the “scientific data” that lends credence to their claims and helps them in their political struggles for recognition. Participatory Action Research is

a promising methodological approach through which this can be achieved.

Assuming that the political situation continues along the path it is on, Afro-Venezuelans may gain greater political recognition. Political recognition alone, however, does not eliminate racial inequality. Legislation and policy, as well as its implementation and enforcement, are needed to realize what is laid out in the constitution. Moreover, on a cultural level, a shift in the way people think and view the world is necessary for racial and ethnic discrimination to disappear.

Another important area of study is the question of how the recognition of ethnic and racial minorities under the current government is or is not translating into changes in the material conditions in their lives. How is the implementation of constitutional rights playing out? Are indigenous and Afro-Venezuelan communities empowered to participate in decision-making in regards to both local development projects and the construction of Venezuela's twenty-first century socialism? Is paternalism or clientelism developing between these groups and the government? Or are they maintaining their autonomy vis-à-vis the government such that they are able to critique the government when they disagree with it?

While new opportunities and political openings have emerged for racial and ethnic minorities in Venezuela in the twenty-first century, the contemporary political situation is complex, and there are many contradictions present in the reforms underway. Nothing is guaranteed. Only through continued mobilization and fostering of political debate can marginalized racial and ethnic groups continue to make progress in their struggles to ensure their increasing participation and equality in the political system, the economy, and the society, while maintaining their autonomy vis-à-vis the government.

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Cristian L. Paredes

This chapter examines the significance of ethnic and racial issues in Peru from the perspective of demography and stratification with emphasis on quantitative analysis. My premise is that demographic changes have a significant influence on several aspects of race and ethnicity. The dynamics of ethnic/racial identities formation, ethnic/racial ideologies, discrimination, and exclusion are impacted by the dynamics of development and urbanization, and all these dynamics are likely affected by internal migration as well as by fertility and mortality regional disparities. Yet, explaining these aspects is a particularly complicated analytic endeavor. As in other Latin American countries (Telles and Bailey 2013; Telles and Sue 2009), fluid ethnic/racial boundaries coexist in Peru with discourses of ethnic/racial equality and inclusiveness – ideologies of *mestizaje* – that often mask the prevalence of discrimination and exclusion. While several studies have quantitatively analyzed ethnic and racial issues, many aspects of race and ethnicity have not been sufficiently theorized using empirical frameworks, or analyzed with quantitative methods.

The foundation of social science literature on race and ethnicity in Peru is composed of theoretical studies developed with historical and

qualitative approaches. Quantitative research on ethnic and racial issues is relatively recent (to my knowledge, since the 1990s), and still infrequent. Recent studies, however, reveal an eager interest in quantitatively examining ethnic/racial differences seeking to explain the prevalence of discrimination and exclusion in several socioeconomic dimensions (e.g., Sanborn 2012; Galarza 2012; Moreno et al. 2012). This chapter intends to “make an inventory” of what (and how) has been studied aiming to facilitate the identification of pending topics of analysis as well as possible ways of examining these topics in the future.

This chapter is divided in six sections. I begin by offering a national demographic profile of Peru, and an overview of Peruvian *mestizaje* and *mestizo* identity for which I use an interdisciplinary approach. Then, I examine two social trends associated with demographic changes and race and ethnicity. After that, I present several theoretical issues in the analysis of race and ethnicity as well as methodological approaches in ethnic/racial stratification studies. Finally, I offer an outline for future research on ethnic and racial issues with an emphasis on the aforementioned trends and pending topics.

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National Demographic Profile of Peru

According to the 2007 census (INEI 2008), the national population size was 28,220,764 people. The sex ratio was 98.8 males per 100 females, the same sex ratio found in the 1993 census. The national population size has been increasing over time, and it will likely grow due to the significant proportion of Peruvians in reproductive ages who were born between 1960 and 1980 during the stage of demographic explosion (Aramburú and Mendoza 2003). The mean annualized growth rates, conversely, have been decreasing (Fig. 7.1a). The national population pyramids for the years 1993 and 2007 depict the current stage of demographic transition toward an older society (Fig. 7.1b). Its triangular shape, however, still associates Peru’s age and sex structures with those of less developed regions. The projected

population for 2015 is 31,151,643, growing at the annual rate of 1.10 (INEI 2009a).¹ Figure 7.1c, d depict these projections until 2050.

The national total fertility rate (TFR) decreased from 4.01 children per woman in 1993 to 2.56 in 2007 (INEI 2009b). The 2007 national TFR is similar to the 2007 TFR in Latin America and the Caribbean (2.5), South America (2.4), and Asia (2.4). It is, however, greater than the 2007 TFR in North America (2.0) and Europe (1.5); although lower than the 2007 TFR in Africa

¹Fertility and mortality were estimated and projected using indirect methods (Brass, Hill and Trussell variant for fertility; Brass, Trussell variant with Coale and Demeny life tables for mortality models South and West), and direct methods as well as different official surveys and census data. The estimation and projection of international migration is based on different sources of data for 5-year periods. It is assumed that the migration balance will remain negative, but it will yearly decrease in absolute terms after 2010. The base population was obtained in 1983 (see, for more details, INEI 2009a).




Fig. 7.1 (a) Population size and mean annualized growth rates, 1940–2007; (b) Population pyramids, 1993 and 2007; (c) Projected mean annualized growth rates and population size, 2008–2050; (d) Projected population pyramids, 2025 and 2050 (Sources: Censos nacionales de población y vivienda, 1940, 1961, 1972, 1981, 1993 y

2007 (INEI 2008); Censos nacionales de población y vivienda 1993 y 2007 (INEI 2008); Estimaciones y proyecciones de la población total, por sexo y años calendario, 1950–2050 (INEI 2009a); Distribución relativa de la población según sexo y grupos de edad, 2020–2050 (INEI 2009a))

(5.0). National TFRs and age-specific fertility rates are expected to keep decreasing over time (Fig. 7.2a). Moreover, the national infant mortality rate (IMR) decreased from 53.5 deaths per 1,000 live births per year in 1993 to 18.5 in 2007 (INEI 2009c). The 2007 national IMR is lower than the 2007 IMR in Latin America and the

Caribbean (24.0), South America (24.0), Asia (48.0), and Africa (86.0). It is, however, greater than the 2007 IMRs in North America (6.0) and Europe (6.0). Based on the projected life tables for the period 2010–2015, the life expectancy at birth for men is 71.5 years; and for women, 76.4 years (INEI 2009a).




Fig. 7.2 (a) Projected national total fertility rates and age-specific fertility rates (official middle scenario); (b) Percentages of urban and rural populations in poverty; (c) Estimates of urban and rural mortality rates (ENDES 2004–2006); (d) Estimates of urban and rural total fertility rates; (e) Estimates of urban and rural age-specific fer-

tility rates (ENDES 2004–2006) (Sources: Proyección de las tasas por edad y estructura de la fecundidad, 2010–2050, hipótesis media (INEI 2009b); Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) 2004–2010 (INEI 2012); Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud Familiar (ENDES) 2004–2006 (INEI 2007); Indicadores de la fecundidad (INEI 2009b))

According to the 2007 census (INEI 2008), the urban population was 20,810,288 and the rural population was 6,601,869, 75.9 % and 24.1 % of the enumerated population, respectively. During the 1993–2007 intercensal interval, the urban population grew by 34.6 % and the rural population, by 0.2 %. The urban population is still growing, but at a slower pace since the 1960s. The urban population grew by 5.1 % per year during the 1961–1972 intercensal interval; by 3.6 % per year, during the 1972–1981 interval; and by 2.8 % per year, during the 1981–1993 interval. In contrast, the rural population has increased by less than 1 % per year.

Urban and rural disparities roughly depict ethnic differences between non-indigenous and indigenous populations taking into account that indigeness has been traditionally associated with rurality (CVR 2008). In 2010, 61 % of the rural population was below the poverty line; and 23.8 %, below the extreme poverty line. In contrast, 20 % of the urban population is below the poverty line; and 1.9 %, below the extreme poverty line (INEI 2012). Although poverty rates have been decreasing over time (Fig. 7.2b), urban and rural disparities are still strikingly severe, and are also reflected in other demographic dimensions. Figure 7.2c summarizes the estimates of neonatal, infant, post-infant and child mortality rates based on the 2004–2006 *Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud Familiar* survey (ENDES). Compared with the 2000 ENDES estimates, the rural IMR decreased from 60 to 36 per 1,000 live births, and the urban IMR decreased from 28 to 21 (INEI 2007). Figure 7.2d, e depict urban and rural estimates of TFRs and age-specific fertility rates over time. These disparities reveal unequal access to health services, efficient contraceptive methods, and information about planning motherhood (Aramburú 1994).

Peruvian emigration is a relatively recent phenomenon that started in the 1980s, and that became massive over the past two decades (Durand 2010). According to the *Dirección General de Migraciones y Naturalización* data (INEI, OIM, DIGEMIN 2010), 2,038,107 Peruvians emigrated and did not return to Peru from 1990 to 2009. They represent 7 % of the

national projected population for 2009. From this group, 95.8 % declared that they were traveling for tourism. This percentage suggests that most emigrants move abroad in non-formal ways. Moreover, 85.7 % of those who emigrated from 1994 to 2009 were aged between 15 and 49. From those who emigrated from 1994 to 2009, 51 % were born in Lima, the capital city; 50.4 % were females and 49.6 %, males. Also, 9.4 % of the men and 9.9 % of the women who emigrated from 1994 to 2009 aged 14 and over were professionals, scientists or intellectuals. According to their country of residence, 32.6 % of the emigrants live in the U.S.; 16.6 %, in Spain; 13.5 % in Argentina; 10 % in Italy; 7.8 % in Chile; 4.2 % in Japan; and 3.9 % in Venezuela.²

The annual number of Peruvians who emigrated (see Fig. 7.3) notably increased from 1995 to 2009, but it slightly decreased in 2009 (INEI, OIM, DIGEMIN 2010). During these years, international migration was motivated by unstable democratic governments, a productive system incapable of adequately incorporating workers (significant underemployment and unemployment), and, most importantly, dramatic socioeconomic disparities (Abusada and Pastor 2008). Nonetheless, 76,501 emigrants returned to Peru between 2007 and 2009 (18,852 in 2007, 22,559 in 2008, and 35,090 in 2009). The annual number of those who returned notably increased every year possibly because of the international economic crisis and the fast economic growth by the end of the 2010s (see Altamirano 2009; Yamada et al. 2012a).

An Overview of *Mestizaje* and the *Mestizo* Identity in Peru

In Peru, *mestizo* is the most popular ethnic/racial self-identification according to official surveys. At the individual level, *mestizo* means mixed-race, and refers to the mixed-race condition of a

²These are percentages of emigrants who were registered in the *Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil* (RENIEC) –those who had a Peruvian identification card with a foreign address– up to June 2010.




Fig. 7.3 Annual emigrants (1994–2009), and emigrants who returned by year of emigration (2007–2009) (Sources: Dirección General de Migraciones y Naturalización (INEI, OIM, DIGEMIN 2010))

person as its etymological meaning suggest. Although the *mestizo* self-identification implies the partial acceptance of an indigenous (or non-white) heritage, it also implies self-differentiation from the indigenous (or non-white) condition by highlighting whiter phenotypic or cultural characteristics. Due to the presence of many distinct ethnic heritages, and the viability of miscegenation inherent to the *mestizo* condition, Peruvians who self-identify as *mestizo* are phenotypically heterogeneous. At the societal level, the mainstream ideology of *mestizaje* suggests that all Peruvians are mixed-race regardless of the appearance, and consequently equals. The popular saying *quien no tiene de inga tiene de mandinga*, “she/he who does not have indian [ancestry], has African,” accurately summarizes this discourse (see Golash-Boza 2010b; Portocarrero 2007).

Nevertheless, despite this premise of equality, many aspects of the current Peruvian social order still resemble its inherited colonial past. Indigenous and Afro-Peruvian populations still suffer discrimination and exclusion (CVR 2008; Benavides et al. 2006; Huayhua 2006; Trivelli 2005). Racism in Peru prevails, but it is relatively “invisible,” neither openly acknowledged by Peruvians nor sufficiently addressed as a major problem by the mainstream (Carrión and Zárate 2010; Valdivia et al. 2007). Although recent laws target specific ethno-racial issues such as the 2006 anti-discrimination law and the 2010 Law

of Previous Consultation of Indigenous Peoples, the state does not offer an organized response against discrimination, and does not have clear intentions to protect indigenous communities from corporate interests (Wright and Martí i Puig 2012; Golash-Boza 2010b).

By the time of colonial independence and the creation of Latin American nations (during the first half of the nineteenth century), old systems of castes that sanctioned socioracial distinctions among Spaniards, *criollos* (descendants of Spaniards), *mestizos* (mixed-race people with indigenous and Spanish heritage), *indios* (indigenous people), and blacks were already irrelevant because of miscegenation (Mörner 1967). In Peru, the former conceptualizations of development after the independence were influenced by the prevailing views on European modernity and scientific racism, which thwarted the idea of a nation as a feasible project (Portocarrero 2007; Nugent 1992; Quijano 1980).³ Old debates suggested that a solution was promoting the immigration of European “strong races” that were capable of improving the weak genes of the indigenous populations, who composed the majority of Peruvians. However, Peru never

³According to Gootenberg (1991), post-colonial *mestizaje* was delayed in Peru during its initial years as an independent nation. An interpretation suggests that this delay is the consequence of Peru’s halting patterns of *criollo* state building and capitalism (see Gootenberg 1991 for more interpretations).

became an attractive destiny for massive European immigration. Hence, the only possibility was converting the indigenous person into a *mestizo* through education (the acculturation process of *acriollamiento*, or “becoming a *criollo*”). In order to become a citizen, the indigenous person was “invited” to leave her/his “heinous” condition behind: her/his language, tastes, and cultural beliefs (Portocarrero 2007: 22). This invitation was extended to those immigrants who came later to the nation in adverse conditions as cheap labor after the abolition of black slavery in 1854, especially Asians (see Casalino Sen 2005; Takenaka 2004); and increased the degree of phenotypic diversity through more miscegenation. Thereby, several Peruvians who self-identify as *mestizo* not only show white and indigenous features in different degrees, but also Asian and Afro characteristics.

Peru became a *mestizo* nation under the assumption that everybody was supposed to be mixed, therefore, equal (Portocarrero 2007; Oboler 1996; see Wade 2010 for Latin America). The ideology of *mestizaje* gradually incorporated cultural symbols, traditions, and practices from indigenous, Afro-Peruvian and Asian heritages assimilated to the local mainstream. Indigenous textiles, Afro-Peruvian music, or *Chifa* (the fusion between Chinese and *criollo* food) exemplify national mainstream symbols, rather than mere manifestations of specific ethnic enclaves. *Mestizo* discourses on equality are emphasized and disseminated in the celebration of Peru’s diversity through its cultural, aesthetic manifestations, and in the recognition of dialogues and fusions whether they were conflictive or not among Peru’s ethnic heritages (see Romero 2007; Rozas 2007; Lloréns Amico 1983). However, neither have these discourses been exhaustively and significantly inclusive with the great diversity of Peruvian cultural manifestations nor have they significantly shortened the sociocultural distances and asymmetrical relations among Peruvians (see García 2013; Vigil 2003).

Cultural dynamics of differentiation are also at the core of the ideology of *mestizaje*. On one hand, *mestizaje* offered a legitimate path for upward mobility through education. On the other

hand, *mestizaje* invited Peruvians to reject their indigenous roots because of their abject nature (Portocarrero 2007). Despite the claim of equality supported by the mainstream ideology of *mestizaje*, the *mestizo* identity is fissured to the extent that its indigenous traits, either physical or cultural, point out the distance between the self and the ideals of whiteness that have been promoted over time by the *criollo* elites (Portocarrero 2007; Callirgos 1993). Indeed, *mestizaje* does not invalidate the symbolic value of whiteness because whiteness has always been a tacit, desired component of the *mestizo* mix regardless of whether or not this component is evident in the phenotype or heritage of the individual. Whiteness refers to the European/Spanish heritage that counterweighs the burdens of indigenousness. Whiteness represents “Westernness,” beauty, and power; thus, it is perceived and promoted as superior in the mainstream along with the ideology of *mestizaje* (see Galarza et al. 2012; Portocarrero 2007; Bruce 2007). Individuals actually claim (and promote) the equality of *mestizaje* especially when that equality is threatened by others who can claim a better ethnic/racial status.

Even though the white identity prevails in Peru either as *blanco* or *criollo*, the white/non-white boundary is fluid. It is problematic to determine whether those who self-identify as white have the phenotypic characteristics of European/Spanish whiteness in a nation built over the ideology of *mestizaje*. These phenotypic characteristics are more concentrated among individuals of higher socioeconomic status (in private beach clubs or in the most expensive schools in Lima), and less evident among individuals of lower socioeconomic status who may self-identify as white. Individuals who self-identify as white do not necessarily resemble phenotypic European/Spanish whiteness, and even may suffer anxieties about their “contaminated” racial heritages (see Bruce 2007; Larson 2004; Venturo Schultz 2001; de la Cadena 2000). Nevertheless, they eventually pass as whites because they can convince others of their white condition to a certain extent if they are capable of negotiating the white identity. They might be closer to individuals of higher socioeconomic status (they can better imitate

Table 7.1 Percentage distribution of the population aged 12 years and over (estimates) by ethnic/racial self-identification

	Mestizo	Quechua	Aymara	Amazonian ^a	Black ^b	White ^c	Other
National	59.5	22.7	2.7	1.8	1.6	4.9	6.7
Urban	64.1	18.7	2	1.2	1.7	5.4	6.9
Rural	44.7	35.7	5.1	3.8	1.5	3.2	5.9

Source: Encuesta Nacional Continua, ENCO 2006 (INEI 2006)

^aDe la Amazonía

^bNegro/Mulato/Zambo

^cBlanco

them), and often have whiter phenotypic attributes compared with those who self-identify differently.

Similarly, individuals who self-identify as *mestizo* often pass as whiter individuals with respect to the indigenous individual and the Afro-Peruvian. Not only may individuals who self-identify as *mestizo* take advantage of their cultural/ethnic whiter characteristics, but they also may successfully highlight their whiter phenotypic traits. *Mejorar la raza* (to “improve the race”) became a normal (and eventually tacit) everyday attempt (see Nugent 1992; Quijano 1980; Rowell et al. 2011; see cultural whitening and *mestizaje* in Golash-Boza 2010a and Wade 2010). Individuals who succeed in these circumstantial negotiations are less likely to suffer the negative consequences of discrimination at least compared with those who cannot leave the lower rungs of the ethnic/racial hierarchy: indigenous individuals and Afro-Peruvians. Consequently, the *mestizo*/non-*mestizo* boundary is also fluid, and open to those who have any phenotypic or cultural resources to negotiate their *mestizo* condition.

Moving beyond the mainstream premise of equality, other sociocultural dynamics associated with *mestizaje* reveal the weak social closure among *mestizos* at the national level. Peruvians who self-identify as *mestizos* in certain areas could be more influenced by regional beliefs, which are locally adapted according to their needs and preferences, than national standards. From this perspective, de la Cadena (2000) suggests that the process of *de-indianization* associated with *mestizaje* does not necessarily lead to assimilation and thus to cultural disappearance. In regions such as Cusco, de la Cadena argues,

education does not necessarily make *mestizos* who reject the indigenous condition, but *mestizos* who embrace indigenous discourses influenced by past *indigenista* stances as compatible with literacy and progress.⁴ Not only have indigenous cultural manifestations been influenced by *mestizo* cultures in the past (e.g., the use of string instruments in indigenous music), but indigenous aesthetics have also influenced views and tastes in more sophisticated ways (see Lloréns Amico 1983). *Mestizo* individuals who embrace indigenous discourses, however, still self-distinguish from the indigenous status. They locally justify social hierarchies based on ethnic/racial beliefs by differentiating themselves from those who are perceived as more *indios* (e.g., the peasants) while they honor their indigenous heritages (see de la Cadena 2000; García 2005). Indigenous-*mestizo*/indigenous distinctions have been made not only in urban areas, but in traditionally indigenous regions where criteria such as geography and occupational activities (e.g., highland peasants who live in isolated areas) have determined a greater degree of “indianness” (Fuenzalida 1970; Bourricaud 1970).

Table 7.1 presents the estimated percentage distribution of the population by ethnic/racial self-identification according to the categories used by official surveys (based on the 2006 *Encuesta Nacional Continua*). Those who self-identify as white in Peru are a minority. Quechua

⁴*Indigenismo* refers to the sociopolitical and economical stance that advocates the vindication of the indigenous populations, to the study of Indo-American indigenous groups, and to Indo-American indigenous themes in art and literature. See the theoretical issues section.

and *Aymara* refer to the predominant indigenous Andean ethnicities. Amazonian refers to the geographic region where *mestizos* and numerous indigenous ethnicities coexist. Most Peruvians self-identify as *mestizo* with respect to other categories. It is noteworthy that 44.7 % of those who live in the rural realm, which, as mentioned above, is traditionally associated with indigenosity, self-identify as *mestizo*. Therefore, it is safe to assert that the *mestizo* category is overall salient. Rural people travel more to urban areas due to their connections with their families and friends as the result of internal migration, and bring back urban habits, values, behaviors, and tastes (Diez 1999). It is necessary to point out, however, that the term *mestizo* could be unrecognized in monolingual indigenous communities or in too isolated populations.

Although the official ethnic/racial categories are commonly acknowledged by Peruvians, they are not necessarily the most popular categories used in racialized interactions. Other terms that refer to the *mestizo*/indigenous distinction – ethnic words, regional categories, or ambiguous epithets – are eventually preferred in daily life (e.g., the use of *Huamanguinos* in Leinaweaver 2008 or the use of *chutos*, *campesinos*, and *mistis* in Muñoz et al. 2006). In highly racialized contexts, these words are understood as insults or inappropriate expressions. Otherwise, they even may be used as endearment terms or in statements of regional pride. In consonance with the ideology of *mestizaje*, the contradictory meanings of terms such as *serrano* (from the *sierra*, the Andean highlands) and *cholo*, which pejoratively refers to the “indianness” of indigenous or *mestizo* people who have adopted urban manners (Oboler 1996; Nugent 1992; Quijano 1980; Bourricaud 1970), indicate, on one hand, the acceptance of the other as an equal, and on the other hand, the racialized rejection of what represents indigenosity.

To summarize, the *mestizo* distinction is salient, not only politically as an official category, but also socially, as the most popular ethnic/racial identification. Although *mestizo* might not necessarily be the more frequently ethnic/racial term used in daily life, it is commonly associated with the *mestizo* claim of equality. Also, the social

closure among self-identified *mestizos* is weak because it is only supported by the circumstantial self-differentiation from the indigenous condition. However, while several self-identified *mestizos* may enjoy the benefits of not being associated with indigenosity in daily life (only eventually in specific circumstances), others may suffer the consequences of being associated with indigenosity more frequently. There are other criteria for cultural differentiation among *mestizos* that refer to the fluidity of the *mestizo* condition in ambiguous ways such as the racialization of the region associated with the individual, the condition of immigrant in urban areas (Matos Mar 1986), and the phenotype by degrees of “indianness.” The *mestizo* differentiation has prevailed as a structuring principle in Peru in spite of its fluid condition, and its variations of meaning over time and across regions.

Trends Associated with Demographic Changes and Race and Ethnicity in Peru

Two trends mainly influenced by internal migration have affected the dynamics of ethnic and racial issues in Peru: the dynamics of urbanization, and the prevalence of indigenous languages. As in other Latin American countries (Roberts 2011), urbanization dynamics have notably been affected by internal migration, which was motivated by significant regional and urban/rural inequalities (see poverty, fertility and mortality urban/rural disparities in Fig. 7.2b–e). Lima has been the main urban migration destiny (Degregori et al. 1986; Matos Mar 1986). In 2007, almost one-third of the population (8,445,211 people, 30.8 % of the population) resided in the department of Lima (INEI 2008).⁵ Metropolitan Lima has been much more densely populated than the rest of the nation (Table 7.2). Even if metropolitan Lima’s density ratio is increasing more slowly (37.7 % from 1981 to 1993 compared with

⁵Peru is subdivided in 24 departments. Lima, the capital city, is in the province of Lima (metropolitan Lima), which is in the department of Lima.

Table 7.2 Population density ratios (number of people per km²)

	1940	1961	1972	1981	1993	2007
Peru	5.5	8.1	11.0	13.8	17.6	22.0
Department of Lima	23.8	58.4	99.8	136.4	183.5	242.7
Lima Provinces ^a	8.3	12.4	15.3	18.1	21.2	26.1
Metropolitan Lima ^b	228.8	654.7	1,171.4	1,634.5	2,250.9	3,008.8

Source: INEI – Censos Nacionales de Población y Vivienda, 1940, 1961, 1972, 1981, 1993 y 2007 (INEI 2008)

^aIncludes the department of Lima, except the province of Lima

^bIncludes the province of Lima and the Constitutional Province of Callao

33.7 % from 1993 to 2007), metropolitan Lima's 2007 density ratio is almost 137 times the 2007 national density ratio.

According to Matos Mar (1986), internal migration “overflowed” Lima, which attracted Peruvians from different regions and ethnic heritages, especially from the *sierra* (Degregori et al. 1986), with better access to opportunities. The traditional, post-colonial Lima gradually became a disordered city that grew without planning during the twentieth century, especially after the 1950s. The number of migrants in conditions of poverty massively increased especially in areas where there was not even access to basic services. They formed peripheral slums formerly labeled as *barriadas*. Local authorities were incapable of efficiently managing Lima's growth, and developing the regions abandoned by migrants (migration “overflowed” the capacities of official institutions). Several abandoned regions, especially in rural areas, were later devastated by the violence of the war against terrorism after the 1980s (CVR 2008). Rather than pressuring the state for working on strategies toward national development, elites only defended their own interests (Matos Mar 1986). The absence of the state is still noticeable in several peripheral areas (Roberts and Portes 2006). In 2007, for instance, 31 % of urban households did not have access to clean water at home (INEI 2008).

Immigrants were perceived and depicted as invaders whose values and habits clashed with those of urban inhabitants in metropolitan Lima. Ethnic characteristics of immigrants – indigenous languages, tastes, and phenotypes – as well as their poverty, informality, and marginality were labeled as uncivilized, and racialized as

more indigenous. Later, several *barriadas* became districts that have economically improved in recent years. The informality initially associated with peripheral Lima, however, has expanded throughout the city, and coexists with signs of modernity that showcase an imbalanced economic growth. Although individuals from Lima, and immigrants and their descendants who could assimilate or move upward to the traditional, non-peripheral middle class cohabit in neighborhoods with individuals perceived as more indigenous, ethnic and racial boundaries still prevail. While these boundaries are fluid in certain dimensions or spaces, which portray a more heterogeneous and integrated society, they block more indigenous/non-white individuals in others (La Cruz Bonilla 2010).

According to a recent report on internal migration from 2002 to 2007 (INEI 2011), Lima is, up to 2007, the only metropolis in Peru based on its number of inhabitants (more than a million individuals). Large cities, up to 2007, did not qualify as metropolis: Arequipa had 805,150, Trujillo 709,566, and Chiclayo, 526,010 individuals. Migration intra-system of cities, understanding cities as towns with more than 20,000 people, reveals that, up to 2007, Lima is the only city with positive net migratory flows. Migration between the system of cities and other populated communities reveals that net migratory flows are decreasingly negative for small communities, small cities, and intermediate small cities, and increasingly positive for intermediate large cities, large cities, and Lima (see Fig. 7.4). Not only is Lima still overwhelmingly preferred as the main migration destiny, but large cities still do not attract immigrants as much as Lima. The planning




Fig. 7.4 Migration “Intra-System-of-Cities” (above) and between the system of cities and other populated communities (below) of individuals aged 5 years and over (2002–2007). Note: Metropolis ($n \geq 1,000,000$), large ($500,000 < n \leq 999,999$), intermediate large ($100,000 < n \leq 499,999$),


intermediate small ($50,000 < n \leq 99,999$), small ($20,000 < n \leq 49,999$), towns have less than 20,000 inhabitants. Non-migrants are correspondingly ordered (Source: Perú: Migración interna reciente y el sistema de ciudades, 2002–2007 (INEI 2011))

of regional growth should aim to foster alternative development poles. Although economic growth might have impacted the development of other departments in recent years (after 2007), and might have increased internal migration in other large cities, probably in a chaotic way due to the absence of the state, government is still centralized and major state organizations are still well-rooted in Lima.

Based on the analysis of ethnic self-identification by Moreno and Oropesa (2012), rural-origin migrants and individuals from the highlands in urban Peru have greater odds of self-identifying as indigenous with respect to *mestizo* compared with non-migrants and with individuals

from Lima, respectively. It is necessary to keep examining the extent to which rural to urban migration will be associated with indigenous self-identification if we consider that about 45 % of rural inhabitants already self-identify as *mestizo*. Moreover, it is necessary to investigate if rural-origin immigrants’ descendants are self-identifying as indigenous or *mestizo*. While there are rural-origin immigrants’ descendants who moved upward, kept their traditions, and did not necessarily (or only partially) integrate with the traditional middle class (La Cruz Bonilla 2010), other rural-origin immigrants’ descendants may self-identify as *mestizo*, and adopt values and tastes that conform to those of the mainstream

Fig. 7.5 Percentage distribution of individuals aged 5 years and over by mother tongue. Note: Percentages of “other native languages” are not indicated (numbers lower than 3.5 %) (Source: INEI – Censos nacionales de población y vivienda, 1993 y 2007 (INEI 2008))



regardless of whether or not the mainstream accept them as equals.

The second trend refers to whether or not indigenous languages are going to prevail. Moreno and Oropesa (2012) also found that individuals who speak indigenous languages have greater odds of self-identifying as indigenous with respect to *mestizo* compared with Spanish monolingual individuals. Nonetheless, *Quechua* and *Aymara* native speakers are decreasing over time (see Fig. 7.5).

Although there are official efforts to formalize and strengthen intercultural bilingual education, especially in rural areas (MINEDU 2013; Vásquez et al. 2012), there may be other factors that will possibly keep this trend. Migration to urban areas with no access to intercultural education, a general preference for Spanish among bilingual individuals (Spanish-indigenous language) in reproductive ages (see Valdivia 2007), a stronger influence of mainstream values and tastes in areas with lower degrees of urbanization, the rejection of intercultural education by indigenous individuals in certain areas (García 2005), or local authorities incapable of efficiently orchestrate intercultural bilingual education policies in the future might contribute to decrease the number of native speakers of indigenous languages over time. Keeping in mind that indigenous language is a potential cause of indigenous self-identification rather than a straight measure of indigeness (Moreno and Oropesa 2012), it is necessary to investigate how the descendants of speakers of indigenous languages who mostly speak Spanish are going to ethnically/racially self-identify in the future. We do not know if they will self-identify as

mestizo, or if they will be capable of successfully negotiating the *mestizo* status.

Theoretical Issues in the Analysis of Race and Ethnicity in Peru

The analysis of ethnic and racial issues in Peru is founded on *indigenismo*, a paradigm that problematized the mistreatment of indigenous populations (*el problema del indio*) with critical approaches during the first half of the twentieth century. While some *indigenista* views advocated cultural and institutional reforms for the incorporation of indigenous populations into the society directly orchestrated by the state (Gonzales 2012), other views, influenced by socialism, denounced a feudal economic system as the cause of oppression of indigenous populations that needed radical reforms, and that disregarded the impact of racial diversity as well as the role of humanism and education as possible solutions (Mariátegui 1995). Subsequent studies, published during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, influenced by post-Marxism, and dependency theories applied to the Peruvian reality, emphasized development, national integration, internal migration, and modernization as relevant frames for understanding the evolution of the indigenous situation (see, for a review, Degregori 1995). In his review of the analysis of ethnicity in Peru, Degregori (1995) criticized “hierarchizing” views that are incapable of conceiving Peruvian social change as a plausible step toward an endogenous modernity that integrates the nation,

and leads it toward a representative democracy. Possibly, several scholars of that generation had confidence in a better future based on social and cultural changes that would lead to national integration in spite of the prevailing inequalities and problems; confidence in a potentially integrative culture forged by the persistence of immigrants who were attempting to emerge as recognized legitimate actors (Quijano 1980).

These studies, however, only suggested theoretical frameworks usually developed with ethno-historical analysis or ethnographic case studies. To my knowledge, the work by Macisaac (1994), a chapter in a World Bank's edited volume that examined poverty and indigeness in Latin America, was the first study that analyzed ethnic disparities using quantitative methods.⁶ In this study, Macisaac (1994) examined how indigenous populations are in disadvantage compared with non-indigenous people in several dimensions: labor force participation, housing, health, school attendance, educational attainment, migration, and earnings. This study served as the foundation of subsequent stratification analyses (presented in the next section), which prioritized the use of quantitative methods for estimating indigenous/non-indigenous disparities, and occasionally capturing ethnic/racial fluidity, rather than offering cohesive theoretical frameworks that explained these disparities, the ethnic/racial heterogeneity within each indigenous/non-indigenous categories, and the current nature of the ethnic/racial condition in Peru. Dynamics of de-indianization and indigenous *mestizaje* were instead anthropologically theorized by de la Cadena (2000), who pointed out that the *mestizo* identification was appropriated and redefined to connote indigenous identities with the purpose of empowering the

indigenous status. These redefinitions incorporated "infinite degrees of fluid indianness or *mestizonez*" in fixed identities (de la Cadena 2000: 6).

In the 2000s, some studies began to pay attention to the social structure with more empirical analytic intentions, and emphasized that structural mechanisms excluded ethnic/racial groups from participating in several spheres. Figueroa's Sigma theory (2003, 2006) is an unusual theoretical endeavor that exemplifies the emphasis on the social structure. Sigma theory is an economic theory that explains exclusion at the structural level, and the persistence of discrimination at the micro level. Sigma theory disputes neoclassical economics theory applied to multiethnic societies with different assumptions and propositions. Figueroa (2006) argues that there are different hierarchical levels of citizenship for each ethnic group with different initial levels of human and economic capital; that labor markets offer mechanisms of integration, but also have a main role in reproducing inequality; and that the most disadvantaged ethnic group lacks access to basic services. The significance of ethnicity is not just reflected in ethnic inequalities, but also in the existence of an excluded underclass incapable of moving upward with respect to those who enjoy the benefit of not being excluded. Moreover, other studies introduced in their frameworks the notion that race is a social construct – a notion that was uncommon in past Peruvian ethnic and racial analyses – that structures social relations and discrimination in order to qualitatively examine the latter (Planas and Valdivia 2007; Reyes and Valdivia 2010; Valdivia et al. 2007).⁷

To my knowledge, only two quantitative studies of race and ethnicity focused on topics beyond stratification. Moreno and Oropesa (2012) analyzed how "ethno-racial" self-identification is associated with characteristics linked to primordial and circumstantial theoretical perspectives on ethnic/racial identification. They found evidence to suggest that self-identification in urban Peru is explained by primordial and circumstantial perspectives associating indigenous language and

⁶Degregori (1999) also criticized the definition of racial/ethnic groups with variables as differentiated, well defined blocks as they are in the World Bank's analyses, arguing that the ethnic/racial boundaries among Peruvians are not as clear as the racial boundaries in the U.S. This critique as well as his critique of "hierarchizing" approaches could be aligned with views that denounce the reification of race as an issue that perpetuates inequality. Maybe Degregori's views illustrate the reluctance of several scholars to accept the usefulness of quantitative methods for the analysis of race and ethnicity.

⁷The work by Valdivia et al. (2007) is not entirely qualitative. It is a mixed-methods study that also includes descriptive statistical analysis.

European heritage with primordialism and income and education with circumstantialism. Moreno and Oropesa (2012) also expanded the discussion by pointing out the relevance of the effects of geography and migration status as well as the role of discrimination on self-identification, particularly, on indigenous self-identification. Moreover, Sulmont (2011) examined whether the awareness of horizontal ethnic/racial inequalities led to political action in three different communities. As he expected, political conflict was not ethnically framed in these communities in spite of how indigenous individuals are commonly the most affected population by the causes and consequences of conflict. Based on these cases, it is possible that self-identification processes do not lead to ethnic group consciousness.

Furthermore, Golash-Boza (2010a, 2011) used ethnographic methods to analyze blackness in Ingenio, an Afro-Peruvian community. She argues that the local discourse of blackness in Ingenio, a discourse that is not isolated from other global discourses, emphasizes the predominance of skin color, and has its own set of meanings. This discourse may challenge the extent to which generalizations can be made about the black experience across the African diaspora, and the extent to which Latin American exceptionalism can be invoked to reject such generalizations (Golash-Boza 2011). Golash-Boza (2010a) did not find a “mulatto escape hatch,” cultural and social whitening, or a continuum of racial categories among Afro-Peruvians in Ingenio based on the conceptual distinction of race and color in her analysis of the discourse of blackness. These views should be considered to investigate the extent to which individuals with Afro-Peruvian heritage are inclined to be accepted as *mestizos* in other regions.

Methodological Approaches in the Quantitative Analysis of Race and Ethnicity in Peru

The analysis of inequality between indigenous and non-indigenous populations has been a major analytic objective of quantitative race and ethnicity research in Peru. As suggested above, these studies

do not offer theoretical frameworks that explain issues of fluidity, multidimensional ethnic/racial conditions, and heterogeneity associated with *mestizaje* and indigeness in contexts of discrimination and exclusion. Instead, they acknowledge the relevance of indigenous/non-indigenous disparities in several socioeconomic dimensions, and deal with ethnic/racial issues emphasizing the needs of innovative methods. Probably, the emphasis on methods is the result of lacking data with ethnic/racial characteristics (see Moreno and Oropesa 2012). Official surveys have measured ethnic/racial self-identification in the 2000s, but it was not included in the 2007 census. Indigenous language has been the official indicator of ethnicity. Moreover, beyond the Latin American Public Opinion Project survey (LAPOP) that includes data from the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA), I do not know if there are data with measures of attitudinal prejudice and behavioral discrimination. Data scarcity may reflect a generalized lack of interest in recognizing ethnic/racial inequality as a major obstacle toward development and integration (Carrión and Zárate 2010), or a lack of understanding of the importance of ethnic and racial empirical analyses in a society characterized by diversity (see Figueroa and Barrón 2005).

Measuring Race/Ethnicity

The core methodological issue is how indigeness should be operationalized taking into account that indigeness and non-indigeness do not represent homogeneous populations. These studies do not use a consistent set of ethnic/racial measures (Sulmont 2011). Therefore, they often estimate effects that are not comparable. Indigenous language has been normally used to capture indigeness, formerly as a foundational measure of ethnicity used by the World Bank (Macisaac 1994). Later, some studies worked with indigenous language either alone for comparative purposes (Trivelli 2005; Yamada et al. 2012b), or combined with other variables like ethnic/racial self-identification or language of parents (Trivelli 2005; Castro et al.

2012; Valdivia 2007). Moreno and Oropesa (2012) problematize the use of indigenous language as an indicator of ethnicity because it is a possible cause of self-identification, which is, for them, a key concept to examine population segmentation. In contrast, Figueroa and Barrón (Figueroa and Barrón 2005; Figueroa 2006; Barrón 2008) followed a different path, and argued that region of birth as a proxy for ethnicity seems to be the most appropriate because it takes into account geographic and historical characteristics of individuals that emigrated out of the highlands and rainforest to Lima and the coast.

Ñopo and coauthors (2004, 2007; Torero et al. 2004) also followed a different path by taking advantage of uncommon data to propose innovative methodological approaches for statistically analyzing ethnic disparities. They used the 2000 Living Standards Measurement Survey, and its additional module for gathering information on ethnicity, which included self-reported racial scores and scores assigned by the interviewers. These scores were ordinal variables of intensity for the categories white, indigenous, black and Asian, ranging from zero (lowest) to ten (highest) in each independent category. There were self-reported measures as well as scores assigned by the interviewers.⁸ Only white and indigenous categories assigned by the interviewers were used in their studies because black and Asian samples were not representative, and because the respondents self-perceived less indigenous compared to how they were perceived by the interviewers. External perception is, according to the authors, more important than self-perception in the analysis of ethnic/racial discrimination. Ñopo et al. (2007) captured racial intensities with a single indicator of degrees of whiteness that combined degrees of indigeness and whiteness, and with two indicators of racial intensities that simultaneously take into account white and indigenous dimensions.

Quantitative Methods and Some Findings

Several methods were applied in quantitative ethnic and racial studies in Peru. Attitudinal prejudice and behavioral discrimination (Carrión and Zárate 2010) as well as differences in poverty, access to basic services, health condition, and education (e.g., Valdivia et al. 2007; Macisaac 1994) were examined using descriptive statistical analysis. Multivariate regression analysis also was a common approach to examine significant associations. Moreno and Oropesa (2012) used multinomial regression modeling, and Sulmont (2011), ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis for their theoretical endeavors. Differences in poverty, health, schooling and educational attainment were also investigated using OLS and discrete multivariate regression analysis (e.g., Valdivia 2007; Figueroa and Barrón 2005; Trivelli 2005). Moreover, income and wages were examined using regression analysis as well as several decomposition techniques aimed to recognize discrimination and exclusion in labor markets.

Using the 2001 *Encuesta Nacional de Hogares* (ENAH), Trivelli (2005) found that indigenous households were between 11 and 15 % more likely to be poor compared with non-indigenous households taking into account different measures of indigeness. Trivelli (2005) found that the income gap between non-indigenous and indigenous individuals (defined by indigenous language) is 49 % in average. Using the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition method, she found that 43 % of the income gap is explained by differences in endowments, with 32 % attributed to years of schooling. Differences in endowments, according to Trivelli (2005), explain only 29 and 37 % of the income gap for rural men and the income gap for women in Lima, respectively. Later, Yamada et al. (2012b) used a different specification and three decomposition methods (Blinder-Oaxaca, propensity score matching, and Ñopo's nonparametric exact matching technique) to examine the gap in hourly wages between non-indigenous and indigenous individuals (defined by indigenous language) using the 1997 *Encuesta*

⁸To my knowledge, these measures of racial intensity were only gathered through this survey.

Nacional de Niveles de Vida and pooled data from the 2005–2009 ENAHO. Based on the exact matching technique, Yamada et al. (2012b) found that the gap in wages in both periods is mostly explained by differences in endowments (74 and 72 % in 2005–2009 and 1997, respectively), especially educational attainment (29 and 17 % in 2005–2009 and 1997, respectively) and rurality (49 and 63 % in 2005–2009 and 1997, respectively).

In addition, Barrón (2008) followed Sigma theory (Figueroa 2003, 2006) to examine differences in the returns to education in annualized income between indigenous and non-indigenous individuals. Using the 2003 ENAHO, Barrón (2008) worked with hurdle models to avoid dropping out the observations of unpaid workers, and with instrumental variables for addressing endogeneity. The average returns to education in income, according to his hurdle model with Heteroscedastic Two-Stage Least Squares, are 18 % for non-indigenous people compared with 14 % for indigenous people. Moreover, Barrón (2008) examined the extent to which exclusion and discrimination contribute to income inequality by performing simulations. In accordance with Sigma theory, discrimination was the unfair compensation for people from the underclass compared to those from other better ranked racial groups with the same qualifications, and exclusion was the existence of an underclass – the indigenous – incapable of moving upward. His simulations revealed that, without discrimination, income inequality, measured by the Gini index, would be reduced by 20 %; and without exclusion, by 28 %.

Furthermore, Ñopo et al. (2007) analyzed racial disparities in hourly wage earnings among private wage earners and self-employed individuals. They approached these disparities in two different ways. To begin with, they worked with a parametric approach using the single indicator of degrees of whiteness mentioned above, also incorporating a polynomial of degree four in the Mincer equation with the purpose of better capturing the heterogeneity and nonmonotonicities of the effect of racial characteristics on earnings. According to this analysis, net of the effects of

controls, a predominantly white private wage earner earns, on average, 65 % more than a predominantly indigenous private wage earner. The difference among self-employed individuals was not statistically significant.

Nevertheless, Ñopo et al. (2007) argued that this approach did not allow them to incorporate multiplicative interacted effects nor polynomials of race effects in the regression due to the ordinal nature of the intensity indicators. Therefore, they developed a semi-parametric approach that obtains linear parametric estimators for the typical predictors and ethnicity-related variables in earnings regressions, as well as nonlinear, non-parametric estimators for the racial intensity indicators, considering the white and indigenous dimensions simultaneously, without aggregating them as in the single-dimension indicator of whiteness. They obtained the nonparametric estimators by dividing the sample in groups of different sizes: a coarse classification of individuals with terciles of the distribution of race intensities, an intermediate approach with quintiles, and a finer approach with deciles. Bootstrap techniques were used to create joint distributions for all possible effects of the nonlinear component of the equation. Among private wage earners, the earnings difference between a predominantly white group and a predominantly indigenous group is 35 % according to the deciles approach. Again, the difference among self-employed individuals was not statistically significant using this approach. While their findings using both approaches are not significantly different, Ñopo et al. (2007) argued that their methodological contribution could be useful in other mixed-race settings.

It is unusual to statistically examine the disadvantages of Afro-Peruvians because they represent a small proportion of the population, and they are rarely oversampled (see Benavides et al. 2006). Castro et al. (2012), however, were able to depict the lack of educational opportunities of Afro-Peruvians by examining school drop-out risks by race and ethnicity (captured by the combination of indigenous language and ethnic/racial self-identification) using Cox models and pooled data from the 2004 to 2009 ENAHO. They found

that, net of the effects of controls, the drop-out relative risks of Quechuas/Aymaras, Afro-Peruvians, and Amazonians are higher compared with the white/mestizo group: 14 % higher for the Quechua/Aymara 25–30 cohort, and 42 % higher for both the Afro-Peruvian and Amazonian 25–30 cohorts. These risks were lower for the Afro-Peruvian and Amazonian older cohorts, and about the same for the Quechua/Aymara older cohorts.

Furthermore, Castro et al. (2012) relaxed the proportionality assumption of their Cox models in order to capture the heterogeneity of these risks over time. They depicted the educational disadvantage of Afro-Peruvians, whose drop-out relative risks were dramatically higher during the initial years of schooling: about 120 % greater compared with white/mestizo individuals after 2 years of schooling. The drop-out relative risk of Afro-Peruvians compared with the white/mestizo group was 42 % higher as reported above only after 12 years of schooling. Similarly, Castro et al. (2012) depicted the educational disadvantage of females compared with males. While the initial analysis did not suggest noteworthy differences in the 25–30 cohort, the Cox models with the relaxed proportionality assumption revealed that females had a significantly greater drop-out risk during the years of primary school. This risk was about 100 % greater compared with males after 1 year of schooling, which gradually decreased until it equaled the risk relative to males after 9 years of schooling.

Two recent studies used the audit study methodology (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004) to examine discrimination. Instead of creating a fictitious pool of job applicants, Moreno, et al. (2012) designed a natural field experiment with real applicants from the job intermediation service of the Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion in Lima. Before the applicants were sent to their real interviews, they were interviewed for this project in order to gather data such as the racial intensities (Ñopo et al. 2007) that complemented what was provided by the administrative databases of the intermediation

service. Moreno et al. (2012) found evidence of positive discrimination that favored females in salespersons occupations and negative discrimination against indigenous females when they were applying to secretarial positions.

Moreover, Galarza et al. (2012) sent 4,820 fictitious resumes during 22 weeks in 2011 to apply for professional, technician, and unqualified positions. Even though it is against the law to request resumes with the applicant's picture, several employers still demand resumes with pictures. European and indigenous last names were assigned to resumes with pictures in order to analyze discrimination against Andeans with respect to whites with equivalent qualifications in response rates. Pictures also were ranked according to beauty scores assigned in focus groups. While they found evidence to suggest that whites, captured by last name, had a greater response rate compared to Andeans, this evidence disappeared when the beauty variable was incorporated in the regressions, and the effect of the latter was only significant among professionals. Galarza et al. (2012) acknowledge that lack of beauty in Peru is usually racialized. Although the findings of these studies cannot be generalized to Lima's labor market, they offer insightful hints about the prevalence of discriminatory practices in the hiring process.

The Future of Ethnic and Racial Issues in Peru

Can social scientists of race and ethnicity in Peru have confidence in the rise of an integrative *mestizo* culture (Quijano 1980) that unifies Peruvians toward an endogenous modernity as the basis for development (Degregori 1995)? If disorganization in Latin American culture has a more constructive role that encourages reorganization and updated forms of cohesion (Roberts 2011), it is possible that the *mestizo* cultural development is still in progress with some positive outcomes (see de la Cadena 2005). However, regardless of their level of confidence on *mestizo* culture, social

scientists should pay attention to the dynamics of ethnic and racial issues that structure *mestizo* cultures by examining whether or not these issues are socially significant. Also, regardless of their disciplines and their methodological (and political) preferences, scholars should take advantage of quantitative approaches for analyzing the social significance of ethnic and racial issues. Quantitative methods are not perfect. These methods are often fairly criticized for their limited usefulness, their intrinsic weaknesses, and eventually for their frail assumptions. These methods are also politically contested in certain academic settings because they are often associated with mainstream academic views. Nevertheless, quantitative methods are useful for obtaining more objective evidence – not totally, flawlessly objective evidence – that aims at representativeness to support the relevance of our arguments. Quantitative studies are consequently necessary for consistently expanding the scope of the local literature of race and ethnicity as well as for enriching the quality of the debate on ethnic and racial issues.

I particularly doubt that political disagreement has a profound impact on the limited use of quantitative methods in Peru. Although certain scholars may be inclined to politically criticize the role of quantitative methods, other reasons seem more plausible. While several ethnic/racial disparities have been statistically analyzed in several socioeconomic dimensions, quantitative methods have rarely been used to examine other ethnic and racial issues beyond stratification. Moreover, quantitative studies have underlined the relevance of their methods to approach ethnic and racial issues in stratification analyses, but they have not offered new theoretical frameworks that explain the relevance of the fluid ethnic/racial condition in Peru, or have not intended to update or test other theories of race and ethnicity. It seems that economists use quantitative methods more frequently whereas other social scientists only use quantitative methods occasionally. It is possible that theoretical work on race and ethnicity supported by statistical

evidence is not amply produced because economists pay more attention to other topics, and because race and ethnicity scholars from other disciplines do not frequently use quantitative methods.

This situation represents an interesting challenge for race and ethnicity scholars in Peru regardless of their discipline and methodological preference. In order to face this challenge, interdisciplinary endeavors that aim the analysis of ethnic and racial issues using quantitative methods should be encouraged. In this way, several theoretical interests commonly approached by social scientists with qualitative methods should be statistically examined. Moreover, interdisciplinary endeavors require that social scientists in general develop stronger interests in quantitative methods, and that quantitative scholars develop stronger interests in the topics and perspectives on race and ethnicity of other social sciences. Several chapters in the volumes edited by Sanborn (2012) and Galarza (2012) as well as other mixed-methods studies (Valdivia et al. 2007; Benavides et al. 2006) reveal that interdisciplinary initiatives already exist. These research efforts should be expanded in order to keep heuristically improving our understanding of the conceptual complexity of these issues. In addition, these studies also should point to the data – quantitative and qualitative – that are needed to further research on racial and ethnic issues, and that hopefully will be gathered by official surveys. Ideally, the salience of the studies presented in this chapter should have a positive impact on data production. At minimum, data with ethnic/racial self-identification and use of indigenous languages should be systematically gathered in Peruvian surveys.

There are several topics that require more interdisciplinary theorization with more empirical analytic intentions for which more quantitative data are needed. Possibly, these ideas may help local initiatives to collect more data on ethnic and racial information. To begin with, it is necessary to debate the current relevance of race and

ethnicity as theoretical concepts in settings characterized by fluid ethnic/racial boundaries in order to explain their meaningfulness at the individual and at the societal level. In other words, we need to clarify what race and ethnicity means in Peru, and why these constructs structure our society in several dimensions. These explanations should be addressed in future ethnic and racial stratification studies as well as in self-identification studies. Moreover, it is necessary to theoretically and empirically examine the significance of ethnic and racial traits beyond self-identification. Scholars should explain how and why phenotype is relevant as a racial characteristic, as studies in other Latin American settings suggest (Villarreal 2010; Telles and Flores 2013).

Furthermore, it is likely that internal migration to urban areas will continue due to the pervasiveness of regional and rural/urban inequalities. It is also likely that internal migration is already affecting the dynamics of urbanization of other large cities. It is necessary to analyze whether these upcoming internal migration dynamics will have an impact on ethnic self-identification. *Mestizo* self-identification may increase, but ethnic/racial inequality among self-identified *mestizo* not only may prevail, but grow. Self-identification alone will probably be insufficient to examine ethnic/racial inequality among acculturated *mestizo* people who are also becoming monolingual Spanish speakers. Acculturation issues need to be addressed in order to assess the evolution of a more integrative *mestizo* culture. While several studies have analyzed the stratification of several socioeconomic outcomes, there are other dimensions that have never been quantitatively analyzed: the stratification of culture consumption, and the stratification of cultural capital beyond education. In this way, we could identify whether boundaries of culture consumption/appreciation may be differentiating individuals between and within ethnic/racial categories as well as by immigrant status. Moreover, different patterns of incorporation of successive generations, or segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993), may be occurring. It would be interesting to quantitatively examine whether there are any significant cultural boundaries within the

middle class that separate those who belong to the mainstream from those who are attempting to assimilate, and whether there are middle class immigrant communities that deliberately self-differentiate from the mainstream.

Future research also should pay attention to the dynamics of international migration. It would be interesting to learn more about emigrants who are returning to Peru as well as from those who stayed in Peru, but are engaged with relatives and friends in transnational activities. Peruvian emigrants may have learned to ethnically/racially self-identify differently according to foreign ethnic/racial ideologies. While it is possible that the formation of Peruvian enclaves may be culturally influencing receiving countries, it is also likely that Peruvian emigrants are learning to overcome the contradiction inherent to the *mestizo* condition by learning new foreign whitening strategies, and are becoming role models for those relatives and friends who stayed in Peru. Conversely, discrimination against Peruvian emigrants in foreign countries may contribute to develop stronger bonds, and strengthen their *mestizo* pride based on nationality and regardless of phenotype.

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Edward Telles

The Portuguese first landed on Brazilian shores in 1500, and soon after they began to enslave the native population for their incipient sugar economy. By the mid-sixteenth century with the rapid decimation of the indigenous population through wars and disease brought by the Europeans, the Portuguese colonizers began to bring Africans as slave laborers for the expanding sugar production. Roughly 300 years later, when the slave trade ended in 1850, 34.9 million enslaved Africans (roughly twelve times the number brought to the United States) had been brought to Brazil as slaves, mostly to labor in the production of raw materials for export to the North Atlantic. At first, Brazil produced mostly sugar, then the economy shifted to mining and cattle raising in the eighteenth century and finally to coffee growing in the nineteenth century (Curtin 1969).

In 1888, Brazil became the last country in the Western Hemisphere to abolish slavery, although a series of government reforms gradually emancipated slaves before then. Just as independence in 1822 had been a smooth transition from colony to independent country, the transition from slavery also did not involve war or rupture in local values or the social structure, as it did in the

United States. According to Carvalho (2004), the colonial aristocratic system remained fairly intact and a Brazilian national identity was thus slow to develop. Elite doubts about its mostly nonwhite population further impeded the formation of a positive national self-image.

As early as 1755, the king of Portugal had encouraged his subjects in Brazil to “populate themselves” and “join with the natives through marriage.” In the same year, the Marquis of Pombal rose to power in Portugal as the war minister, eventually becoming prime minister, and during his 22-year reign went to great lengths to encourage such intermarriages (Boxer 1969). However, the Portuguese crown did not encourage intermarriages of the white colonists with blacks and mulattos, and the Catholic Church condemned miscegenation in general, but that meant that interracial marriages were simply not recognized by the church.

Such prohibitions against race mixture were easily ignored, especially given such a highly uneven sex ratio among the colonizers. The Portuguese colonizers in the early historical period were mostly males in search of wealth rather than settlement (as in the U.S. case) and Portuguese women were often forbidden to migrate, creating a very high gender imbalance among the white colonial population. This led Portuguese colonizers to seek out Indian and African mates, and the number of progeny of these mixed unions grew throughout most of the colonial period.

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However, given the racial hierarchy imposed by the slave-based economy, relationships between the white colonizers and nonwhite Brazilian women were highly unequal. White men frequently raped and abused African, indigenous, and mixed-race women. Indeed, mixed-race Brazilians were largely spawned through sexual violence throughout the period of slavery, although cohabitation and marriage between whites and nonwhites was not uncommon (Russell-Wood 1982). Thus, a tradition of race mixture was established in Brazilian society through both violent sexual relations as well as informal and formal unions. Although the relative frequency of the different forms of miscegenation is not clear from the historical record, by the 1872 census—when the male-female balance had been largely restored but before slavery was completely abolished—5.1 % of marriages in the federal district of Rio de Janeiro were between whites and mulattos, and another 0.8 % involved whites and blacks.

As slavery was being abolished throughout the Americas in the nineteenth century, science would validate racial domination by claiming that Caucasians were inherently superior to nonwhite people (Stepan 1991; Wade 1993). Prior to that, when race mostly described one's descent rather than a hierarchy of biological types, the subjugation of Indians and Africans proceeded on the basis of moral and religious reasoning rather than on scientific argument. Scientific interest in the issue of race in Brazil began in the late nineteenth century, and concern grew over how race would affect Brazil's future development. This was especially true in the emerging science of eugenics, which set out to discover "the social uses to which knowledge of heredity could be put in order to achieve the goal of better breeding" (Stepan 1991, 1). Eugenics, at that time, viewed blacks as inferior and mulattos as degenerate. Furthermore, eugenicists believed that tropical climates like Brazil's weakened human biological and mental integrity, and therefore the Brazilian population exemplified biological degeneracy.

Brazilian eugenicists accepted the racist predictions of black and mulatto inferiority but thought this inferiority could be overcome by

miscegenation. Based on their interpretation of eugenics, and their own sensitivities to theories about racial and tropical degeneracy, Brazilian scholars used a theory of constructive miscegenation and proposed a solution of "whitening" through the mixing of whites and nonwhites. Based on the higher white fertility rates and their belief that white genes were dominant, these eugenicists concluded that race mixture would eliminate the black population, eventually resulting in a white or mostly white Brazilian population. Brazilian eugenicists also successfully countered scientific claims that tropical climates were unhealthy for whites, which originally had limited their ability to import European laborers.

Whitening, as prescribed by the eugenicists, became the major basis of Brazil's immigration policy. To accelerate the whitening goal, Brazilian elites and policy makers looked for workers in Europe, where a demographic transition was producing surplus labor. In Brazil, as in other Latin American countries, the elites sought out and subsidized European immigrants to "improve the quality" of its work force and replace the former slaves (Skidmore 1974; Vainner 1990). In particular, the state of São Paulo, in collusion with coffee planters, encouraged, recruited, and subsidized European immigration, while the federal government restricted available Asian immigration until 1910. This new supply of labor supplanted the former African slave population in places like São Paulo and at the same time acted as a "civilizing agent" by whitening the Brazilian gene pool. These white settlers were expected to mix eventually with the nonwhite population, thereby diluting Brazil's large black population (de Castro 1995; Andrews 1991).

Population History of 1872–1940: Whitening the Black Out of Brazil's Population

The large number of Europeans that immigrating to Brazil since the second half of the nineteenth century, coupled with ongoing miscegenation, made several Brazilian eugenicists confident that their country was successfully whitening. For

example, in 1912, João Batista Lacerda believed that miscegenation would eventually produce whites and predicted that by 2012, the Brazilian population would be 80 % white, 3 % mixed (mestizo), 17 % Indian, and there would be no more blacks (Skidmore 1974, 67). The extent to which the whitening process actually occurred can be gauged through a review of Brazil’s racial composition across its censuses.

Figure 8.1 shows Brazil’s changing racial composition from its first census in 1872 until its most recent in 2000. In 1872, the only year that a national census was taken during the period of slavery, Brazil’s population consisted of roughly ten million persons. The census enumerated 37 % of the population as white, 44 % as brown, and 19 % as black. The brown category in 1872 consisted of pardos (42 %) and caboclos (1.8 %), the latter referring to persons of predominately Indian origin. Since the slave trade ended in 1850 (and few blacks have migrated to Brazil since then), the percentage of the black population diminished in subsequent censuses. By 1890, in Brazil’s first census after abolition, data began to capture the influence of massive European immigration. The white population increased as a share of the total Brazilian population from 37 to

44 % between 1872 and 1890. The brown population decreased from 44 to 41 %, and the black population fell from 19 to 15 %.

Figure 8.2, based on immigrant entry data, shows that European immigration began to increase significantly in the 1880s, reaching its peak in the 1890s. In the 1890s, more than 1.2 million European immigrants were added to a population of about five million whites. In the following three decades, more than two million more immigrants had come mostly from Europe. In the 1930s, as the Brazilian economy reeled as a result of faltering coffee prices and a world economic crisis, and clearly by the 1940s, with the war raging in Europe, mass immigration came to an end. Immigration recovered somewhat in the 1950s; but the relative impact of immigration on national racial composition greatly declined by then since the native population had already grown tremendously.

Figure 8.2 shows the trends in total immigration and immigration from the four largest sending countries from 1872 to 1969. In 1880, persons from Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Germany represented nearly all immigrants to Brazil, but by 1930, they constituted only half of all immigrants. Lesser (1999) notes that Brazil’s eugenics-influenced





Fig. 8.1 Racial composition: Brazil, 1872–2000. (1872, 1890, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1980, 1991, and 2000 censuses of Brazil. Based on estimates (est.) for remaining years)

Fig. 8.2 Immigrants into Brazil by decade and national origin, 1872–1969



immigration policy favored the entry of immigrants from these countries as agricultural laborers, but a fear of non-assimilation and social and labor activism among those groups led policy makers eventually to seek immigrants of other nationalities. The newer immigrant groups came largely from Eastern Europe, including many Jews, and from the Middle East. Immigrants from these other countries often negotiated to be in the “desirable” white category, leading to a significant shift in notions of Brazilianness and whiteness between 1850 and 1950. While Brazil’s immigration policy had previously barred Asians from coming to Brazil, immigration from Japan began in 1910, and by the 1930–1939 period, constituted 30 % of all immigration to Brazil.

Although Brazilian eugenicists expected that whitening would occur through both “natural selection” and European immigration, the actual extent to which the Brazilian population whitened could not be assessed after 1890 until 50 years later in 1940. There were no censuses in the intervening years with data on race, and no censuses were taken in 1910 and 1930. The question about color was omitted in the 1900 and 1920 censuses, although a 1920 census publication includes an article by Oliveira Vianna (1922) announcing the rapid reduction of the “inferior

blood coefficient” in the Brazilian gene pool. The omission of race in those years was probably due to the elite’s intent to downplay Brazil’s racial composition, as well as the overall low level of resources given to census, taking in the period.

Shifting Views of Race: 1910s to 1920s

With the ending of large scale European immigration in the 1920s, concerns about miscegenation and Brazil’s racial future resurfaced. A new generation of Brazilian eugenicists challenged the more racist views of earlier Brazilian eugenicists. Unlike many of their foreign counterparts, most of Brazil’s eugenics community after World War I had become critical of the simplicities of race-thinking and came to discredit the concept of race altogether. However, faced with the proposal to restrict Japanese immigration and the planned immigration of Afro-North Americans to Brazil, the so-called eugenic problem of immigration would find its way back into policy and scientific discussions as late as 1929 but the turn to certain racist solutions found in the United States and Germany would receive little support in Brazil.

Gilberto Freyre and Racial Democracy: 1930 to 1980s

Race mixture became a central feature of Brazilian national identity largely due to a single publication. Gilberto Freyre's highly influential *Casa Grande e Senzala* transformed the concept of miscegenation from its former pejorative connotation into a positive national characteristic and the most important symbol of Brazilian culture. Under the influence of his mentor, anti-racist anthropologist Franz Boas—who proposed that racial differences were fundamentally cultural and social rather than biological—Freyre effectively proposed a new national ideology.

Although he did not coin the term and elements of the concept were promoted well before him, Freyre fully developed, expressed, and popularized the idea of racial democracy, to where it dominated Brazilian race thinking from the 1930s to the early 1990s. Freyre argued that Brazil was unique among western societies for its smooth blending of European, Indian, and African peoples and cultures. As a result, he claimed that Brazilian society was free of the racism that affected the rest of the world. Although the notion that Brazil had a more benign system of slavery and race relations than the United States was longstanding, Freyre turned this contrast into a central aspect of Brazil's emerging national identity, granting it scientific, literary, and cultural status that would prevail for many decades.

According to Freyre, miscegenation was possible early on because of gender imbalance among the Portuguese colonizers and also because of a Portuguese predisposition to cultural and biological mixing. Freyre believed that the Portuguese possessed a high degree of plasticity that enabled them to conform to and blend with other societies and cultures, especially in comparison with the cultural rigidity, seclusion, and self-reliance found among other Europeans. Ruled by the Moors for more than 500 years, the Portuguese had developed a culture that was accustomed to and welcomed darker-skinned peoples, Freyre alleged. Indeed, miscegenation

with the Moors had long been practiced in Portugal. Like his Portuguese contemporaries, Freyre considered Portugal itself to be non-European and a bridge between Christian Europe and Islamic North Africa. Freyre's doctrine of "Lusotropicalism" justified Portuguese colonialization, arguing that they were the only European colonizers to create a new civilization in the tropics, an accomplishment attributable above all to their racial tolerance.

Academic and Literary Support for Racial Democracy

Freyre's theories received great attention and academic support in the 1940s. In 1942, American sociologist Donald Pierson reported that race did not seem to affect social relations, based on his study of Salvador; Bahia. Like Freyre, Pierson believed that "bonds of sentiment" arose from a tradition of miscegenation, which attenuated racial prejudices and put mixed blood offspring in a socially advantageous position through intermarriage. He concluded that racial groups did not exist and thus reasoned that racism could not exist, and that: it was class, not race, that created social barriers between whites and nonwhites (Bacelar 2001). For Pierson, existing color hierarchies simply reflected an incompleteness of the assimilation process—which had only begun with abolition a half century before and the persistence of surviving African cultural practices among the darkest segment of the population.

Pierson's conclusions about Brazil stood in sharp contrast to the findings about U.S. cities by the early Chicago school, where Pierson had been a student of Robert Park. Through his study of Bahia, Pierson has sought to demonstrate that there was nothing natural about North American racism. He concluded that Brazil was a "multiracial class society," which was in the process of breaking down racial differences and assimilating the descendants of African slaves, and therefore was much more advanced than the United States.

Getulio Vargas became president of Brazil in 1930 and would promote Brazil's racial democracy

in contrast to the openly racist nature of many other societies. Vargas received support from Brazilians of all colors as he sought to modernize the predominately agrarian Brazilian society. Despite being elected 7 years earlier, he announced a new constitution that effectively gave him full dictatorial powers. As dictator, Vargas instituted a series of modernizing and nation-building reforms that emphasized racial unity. Vargas remained in power until he resigned in 1945, when democracy returned to Brazil. Vargas was later elected again as president and took office in 1951, where he remained until his suicide in 1954. Vargas was followed by a series of democratically elected presidents until the military coup of 1964.

As a part of Vargas's modernization efforts, Brazil established its first modern census in 1940. After an absence of 50 years, race was reintroduced in that census at the very same time that the racial-democracy ideal began to take hold. The new official belief that race was not problematic is demonstrated in the following quote from a Brazilian government publication in 1950:

The preparation of the 1940 Census developed in a period in which racist aberrations appeared on the way to global predominance. Nevertheless, the national Census Commission not only wanted to remain faithful to the most honorable tradition of modern Brazilian civilization, the equality of the races, but it also sought to eliminate any suspicion that the question on color, introduced in the census purely with scientific objectives, was to serve as a preparatory instrument for social discrimination. 1151

If racial distinctions were no longer believed to be important, then why ask the race question? Despite the emerging belief in racial democracy, belief in whitening also persisted among some sectors of the Brazilian elite. Concerns about Brazil's racial composition surely remained and the 1940 census would be an opportunity to measure the effects of massive European immigration during the previous six decades. A government document published in 1961 claimed that as a result of the 1940 census:

Many educated Brazilians ... were anxious to see the exact percentage of the progressive predominance of the white group in the national popula-

tion, which, with triplicate impropriety, was customarily called aryanization, and according to the then widely diffuse ideas, seemed supremely desirable.

The results of the 1940 census revealed that mass European immigration had brought Brazil closer to its whitening goal. As Fig. 8.1 shows, 64 % of Brazilians were white in 1940, a 20-percentage-point increase from 1890. During the same period, the relative size of the black population hardly changed, while the proportion of the mixed-race population declined by more than half from 41 to 20 %. In absolute terms, the Brazilian population more than quadrupled in size from 10 million in 1872 to 41 million in 1940. The white population grew by more than six times, the black population quadrupled, and the mixed race population merely doubled. Although the growth of the white population and the decrease in the proportion of the brown population would have led to some optimism for whitening supporters, like the early Brazilian eugenicists, the fact that the proportion of the black population did not change during this period would have surely discouraged them.

By 1962, Gilberto Freyre had become a self-proclaimed defender of Brazilian patriotism and the growing military presence in the Brazilian government. In that year, Freyre first used the term "racial democracy," which he would ardently defend (Guimarães 2002). The concept of racial democracy reached its peak as a dogma under the military governments from 1964 to 1985, which also encompassed the period of Brazil's greatest economic growth. The military governments turned Freyre's doctrine into an obsession and an uncontested principle of the Brazilian nation. In a 1977 speech to the National Congress, the year in which President Ernesto Geisel shut down that institution, its president proclaimed:

We have all inherited common attributes and what we are building-socially, economically and culturally-proves the correctness of our rejection of the myths of racial superiority.

Even in the dark days of authoritarian rule from 1967 to 1974, the ideology of racial democracy was well entrenched and widely

understood. The mere mention of race or racism was met with social sanctions, which would often result in one being labeled a racist for bringing up the issue. If such sanctions were not enough, any protest like those occurring in the United States at the time would surely have been met by the repressive power of the military government and the willingness to use it.

The Browning of the Brazilian Population: 1940–1991

From 1940 to 1991, census findings began to show that miscegenation became the primary force driving changes in Brazil's racial composition. The whitening goal was greatly advanced from 1940 to 1991, in the sense that the black population fell from 15 to 5 %. However, the white population also continued to decline from its recorded peak of 64 % in 1940 to 52 % by 1991, with an increase to 54 % in 2000. The brown population was the only population to grow, more than doubling its proportion from 21 to 43 % during the same period. Thus, the second half of the twentieth century was characterized by browning, rather than whitening, *strictu sensu*.

As a result of rapidly declining mortality levels in the early part of the period without correspondingly sharp declines in fertility until the latter part of this period, Brazil's total population nearly quadrupled from 41 million in 1940 to about 153 million in 1991. Whereas previous population growth was mostly through immigration, these decades witnessed unprecedented natural growth, encompassing the "Brazilian demographic transition." From 1940 to 1960, women had, on average, more than six children each, and life expectancy increased from 44 to 59 years (Goldani 1999). Fertility declines began to occur sharply in the 1960s for white women, well before similar declines for browns and blacks (Berkovich 1991). Although racial differences in fertility decline were partly offset by earlier mortality declines among whites as well, the differences could account for greater natural growth among the nonwhite population since about 1960.

Changing racial classification rather than actual race mixture may also account for the growth of the brown population. Miscegenation affects racial composition from one generation to the next, while racial classification may change for individuals over the course of their lives. Demographer Charles Wood (1991) finds that 38 % of 10 to 19 year-olds classified as black in the 1950 census, reclassified as brown in the 1980 census, when they became 40–49 years of age. Thus, at least part of the reduction in the size of the black population in the second half of the twentieth century is probably due to a growing tendency of blacks to reclassify as brown. If we assume that these estimates are roughly similar for all age groups, then such reclassification would account for most of the decline in the black population and about one-third of the growth in the brown population from 1950 to 1980. In any case, the period from 1940 to 1991 was marked by the growth of the brown population, which can primarily be attributed to miscegenation.

Beginnings of Democratization

Brazil again returned to democratic rule in 1985, although the resumption of some constitutional guarantees had been reestablished as early as 1978. Although it occurred slowly and unevenly, democratization would begin to yield political space to social-movement activists representing a variety of concerns and ideologies. A modern black movement emerged in the late 1970s and it encountered especially intense resistance, because their cause seemed to threaten central tenets of Brazilian nationalism, particularly the racial-democracy ideology. It would limit the black movement's ability to resonate with the Brazilian elite, especially during the 1980s when it continued to be advocated. At the same time, Brazil had grown enormously and consistently in the previous five decades, but the 1980s saw economic decline. This would limit social-movement gains as the government focused on the economy and on granting basic political and civil rights. By the mid-1980s, the small but growing black move-

ment began to exert a limited influence on the federal and a number of local governments.

Brazilian rights advocates began making some progress in securing legislative and constitutional reforms to expand the democratic rights of all citizens and create new rights for historically disadvantaged groups. Black and feminist groups in particular were successful at including important antiracist and antisexist laws in the 1988 Constitution. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution revolutionized the legal basis of the defense of human rights. The Constitution also recognized principles of tolerance, multiculturalism, and individual dignity, rights and identities, and became the basis of hundreds of antiracist laws at various jurisdictional levels (Mitchell 1985). Specifically, Article 5 (paragraph 42) made the practice of racism an unbailable crime, subject to imprisonment. The Constitution also mandated some important structural changes in the judiciary in the direction of expanding individual and collective rights. These included the strengthening of the constitutional role of the Federal Supreme Court and major reforms in the functions of the Public Prosecution (Ministerio Publico).

Beginnings of Affirmative Action

Despite the resistance by the federal government to implementing large scale policies to combat racial inequality and discrimination, various sectors of Brazilian society began to develop a limited set of affirmative action policies by the mid 1990s, including initiatives established by progressive local governments and demonstration projects of various sorts by the government and private sector.

In the 1990s, Brazil's black movement gained greater influence on the Brazilian government by reaching beyond national borders. Although globalization presented new problems, such as the spread of racism on the Internet and a greater vulnerability of poor populations to the decisions of international capital, the transnationalization of human rights provided new opportunities for social movements generally. Informally, through

the Internet, e-mail, and expanding international media, the work and visibility of international human-rights networks expanded greatly. The black movement, often in cooperation with other human-rights organizations, seized on these new opportunities and established ties with black-movement organizations throughout Latin America, the United States, and South Africa.

In particular, globalization helped in the consolidation of a United Nations Human Rights System including the San Salvador Protocol and the Interamerican System. This would include international courts that try human-rights cases that previously exhausted judicial processes in member countries and allegedly received unjust outcomes. More generally, the globalization of human rights enhanced the idea of universal human rights and the need to protect disadvantaged members of society, such as nonwhites in Brazil.

Durban World Conference Against Racism

One of the most apparent consequences of social-movement trans-nationalization has been the growth and consolidation of an international human rights system, consisting of international conferences and legal conventions. International conferences, beginning with Rio de Janeiro's Conference on the Environment in 1992, served as strong examples to Brazilians about the power of a global civil-society involvement regarding social justice and human-rights issues. Through the presence of social-movement NGOs and countries with progressive human rights, these international conferences and their conventions serve to pressure countries to position themselves with respect to human rights in the eyes of the international community, declare their support (or not) by becoming signatories, and thus commit to international human rights laws. While core countries, particularly the United States, often disregard these treaties, arguing that their rule of law and democratization are well established, peripheral countries are concerned that their position regarding these treaties affects their

international reputations, especially regarding their level of democratization. The UN Race Conference in 2001 and the activities leading up to it were typical and coincided with changing activities inside of Brazil's organized black movement.

The much-awaited World Conference occurred in late August 2001. The black movement was able to send between 150 and 200 activists to Durban as part of an NGO delegation, with the financial support of various private foundations and local governments as well as some self-financing, which involved great personal sacrifice. It also counted on representatives from other human-rights NGOs, including those representing indigenous peoples, women's rights, and economic, social, and cultural rights. The importance of the Brazilian delegation was heightened as a Brazilian black-movement activist and director of a São Paulo NGO, Edna Roland, became the general rapporteur for the official World Conference. The Brazilian government delegation consisted of about 50 representatives, which included the minister of justice, the secretary of human rights, several congressional delegates, local officials, and the national committee on race and racial discrimination with both its government and civil-society delegates.

The Post-Durban Transformation

The Durban conference ended on September 8, 2001, with continuing debate and interest on racial issues in the Brazilian media. Regardless of the failure of Durban for the United States, the results were unequivocally positive for the black movement in Brazil. On September 5, the Brazilian government seemed to be well on its way to initiating race-specific affirmative action on a large scale. In response to the demands of the World Conference, the minister of agrarian development, Raul Jungmann, announced a "Program of Affirmative Action for Black Men and Women." The program would strive to reduce the inequalities of opportunity among civil servants (*servidores*) and beneficiaries of agrarian reform and family agriculture by mandating race-based

quotas for the participation of black men and women in administrative positions and positions in public exams (*concursos publicos*); guaranteeing black communities access to rural financing; and promoting seminars, research, and programs that focus on gender, race, and ethnicity.

Specifically, 20 % of all administrative positions in the ministry was to be reserved for negroes, with this number increasing to 30 % by 2003; and 30 % of the ministry's budget allotted to predominately black rural communities. The program also mandated that all quilombo lands on federal and state lands should be recognized and titled.

However, the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States suddenly sidelined Brazilian media attention and public discussion of race in Brazil for at least 1 month, slowing the momentum and political payoff of Durban. Then on October 9, the State Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro announced that 40 % of admission slots in state universities would be reserved for blacks and browns. Also, at about the same time, a judge ruled in favor of a case brought forth by the Public Ministry, stipulating that public universities in the state of Minas Gerais should constitutionally be required to reserve 50 % of its slots for students from public schools. By December, a series of affirmative action measures would be implemented in many Brazilian public institutions.

The Lula Administration

Lula began his presidency in January 2003. Lula's election signaled further progress in increasing black representation. Soon after his election, he chose three blacks or mixed-race persons to head ministries, an unprecedented act in Brazilian history. He later created a secretariat for Promoting Policies of Racial Inclusion (SEPPPIR) and installed a black woman in that position. The Senate elected a black man as their first vice president shortly after Lula's inauguration and for the first time in its 174 year history, President Lula nominated Joaquim Barbosa Gomes to the Brazilian Supreme Court.

Since Lula's election, affirmative action seems to be gaining a hold in Brazilian policy circles and especially in public universities. All of Brazil's federal universities now require race and class-based affirmative action and there is much discussion about how to best include blacks and mulattos in the university (Telles and Paixão 2013). Through SEPIIR the Lula administration laid out extensive plans for "promoting racial equality." It supports racial quotas and other forms of affirmative action, including the continuation of the Itamaraty fellowships and the diversity in the university program.

Lula signed into law a plan that introduces African culture and history into the curriculum for elementary and secondary schools. Most importantly, he made the "overcoming of racial inequalities" a priority in his multiyear government plan. The black movement-federal government dialogue is at unprecedented levels. The future of real government action in combating racism will surely depend on the political will of the new PT administration and the black movement's ability to negotiate and influence the new government. Most of Brazil's black-movement leadership seems to be from the Worker's Party, as is the leadership of most social-movement organizations, and Lula apparently recognizes this.

Racism and racial inequality are now widely accepted as prevalent in Brazilian society, after several decades of a strongly held racial democracy ideology. This represents a major transformation in Brazilian society. Unexpected in the 1990s and before, there is now large-scale affirmative action in most Brazilian universities. Moreover, there are now real signs that racial inequality and overall income inequality is beginning to decline from historically very high levels and this is due to a series of mostly universal policies implemented by the Brazilian government (Telles 2010). Race-based solutions continue to be controversial but many Brazilian universities have adopted them though most have shied away from them. In any case, there seems to be a serious attempt at including Afro Brazilians in Brazil's prestigious public universities, whether they end up using race or class-based

solutions. Despite legal challenges, there does not seem to be any major threat to even race-based affirmative action in Brazilian universities. Large reductions in racial inequality are possible in Brazil but this may take several decades. This is likely to occur only if Brazil makes serious policy attempts to include its large afro-descendant population at all levels of society, utilizing policy measures that extend well beyond the university.

Racial Composition Since 1991

During the 1990s, the white and black end of the Brazilian population began to grow, ending the browning trend of the previous 50 years, as the 2000 Census revealed (see Fig. 8.1). Proportionally, the brown population began to decrease, while the white and black populations increased. Specifically, the black population increased from 5.0 % in 1991 to 6.1 % in 2000, and the white population went from 52.1 % in 1991 to 53.4 % in 2000. By contrast, the brown population decreased from 42.1 to 38.9 %.

Since about 2000, the brown population began to increase again and the black population increased slightly, making the white population a numerical minority again, for the first time since nineteenth century! Although the data from 2010 has not yet been released, the annual Brazilian household surveys (Pesquisa Nacional de Amostragem Domiciliar or PNAD) since then have shown a progressive increase in the non-white and especially the brown population with a corresponding shrinkage of the white population. Specifically, data from the 2008 PNAD revealed that the white population has shrunk to 48.4 % of the population while pardos have increased to 43.8 % of the population and pretos to 6.8 %. Thus, the white population has declined a full 4 % points and the brown population increased by about 5 % points! That much browning through classification is most likely due to destigmatization of the pardo category for persons on the border between white and brown, who may have classified as white in the past but are no longer hesitant to classify as brown. Perhaps for

the first time, there are actually incentives such as in affirmative action that favor identity as brown rather than white (Telles 2010). This may be perhaps the most significant period of racial reclassification in Brazilian history. The following sections describe events that began in the 1990s and led to affirmative action for the majority population and have changed race-thinking in Brazil.

Racial Classification

The changing Brazilian population is due in part to changing classification by individuals and reveals the fluidity of Brazilian racial data and statistical representation of race relations in general. Unlike the United States and South Africa, Brazil has never had laws defining racial-group membership, at least in the post-abolition period. The decision by Brazil's elites to promote whitening through miscegenation, rather than to segregate, precluded the need for formal rules of classification, and thus classification was left to individual perception. Whitening centered on a relational system with tensions that were often situationally resolved about who would be classified as white or as whiter than others, thus leading to a large amount of ambiguity. As a result, racial classification in Brazil became more complex, ambiguous, and fluid than in those countries with segregatory legal traditions. According to Harris and Kottack (1963), the ambiguity of Brazilian racial classification is apparent in how particular persons are classified and in the racial categories themselves.

This ambiguity is further complicated by the presence of at least three major systems of classification, as Sansone (1997) notes. These systems employ different conceptions of race, each implying different levels of ambiguity, and where they use the same terms, their conceptions vary depending on the system. Currently, three major systems of racial classification are used to characterize the vast majority of Brazilians along the white-to-black color continuum, each with a set of categories that vary in number and degree of ambiguity. The systems are (1) the census system which uses three major categories—branco, pardo,

and preto—along the continuum; (2) the popular system, which employs an indeterminate number of categories, including the popular, but especially ambiguous, term *moreno*; and (3) the newer classification system—which I call the black-movement system, since that is where it originated, which uses only two terms, negro and branco.

While the official census estimates of Brazil's racial composition suggest precision (e.g., 55.3 % of the population is white), Table 8.1 also shows that national percentage figures by color depend on whether racial classification is by interviewer, respondent, or both. If one includes all persons who self-classify or are classified as white by members of the white population, then the sample would be 61 % white while the percent nonwhite would be only 39 %. Conversely, if the criteria restricted whites to only those who were consistently classified as white, then the proportion white would be only 49 % and nonwhites would constitute 51 %. Thus, Table 8.1 suggests that, depending on the method of classification used, the proportion of the population that is white could vary from 49 to 61 %. The 1991 census figure of 52 % suggests that the official count represents a point between the two equally acceptable methods for counting whites.

In the case of racial classification, there is no clear "color line" in Brazil but a large grey or brown area. Racial-classification laws never existed in Brazil, so there are not rigid rules for classification as in the United States and South Africa. In Brazil, race is ambiguous because there are several classification systems, there are

Table 8.1 Percent distribution of sample across interviewer-classified and self-classified race cells: adult population in urban Brazil, 1995

Self-classification	Interviewer classification			Total
	White	Brown	Black	
White	49	6	0	55
Brown	6	23	3	31
Black	0	5	8	13
Total	55	34	11	100

Source: Data Folha Survey, 1995

Note: Numbers in rows and columns may not add to total figures because of rounding

several categories along the white-black continuum, and they are affected by class and gender. The racial labeling of others also depends on the social situation, the relation of the classified to others and regional and historic specificities. Also, individuals in Brazil generally have a relatively weak sense of belonging to a racial group, compared to their gender and class identities and the racial identities of North Americans. Although Brazilian racial categories and labeling by others are often ambiguous and racial identity is often weak, the racial categories themselves are differentially valued. For some Brazilians, this implies the ability to escape into more positively valued categories, although for most Brazilians, their racial classification is unambiguous.

Miscegenation has been central to Brazilian concepts of race. First of all, Brazilian miscegenation has affected the large majority of the Brazilian population. Even much of the white population has African or Indian blood, while miscegenation has been limited to the roughly 12 % of the U.S. population that is called “black.” Concepts of racial purity for whites, like those in the United States, are virtually absent in Brazil. Also, unlike the United States, where segregation separated the population into black and white, Brazil has celebrated middle categories and avoided legislating rules for racial classification. An ideology of racial democracy and cordiality uses ambiguity and middle categories to avoid the placement of others in particularly stigmatized categories. The term *moreno* is particularly exemplary.

However, Brazil’s traditional system of classification is being challenged as the black social movement gains greater legitimacy and calls for a system that excludes the middle categories increase, forcing the vast majority of Brazilians (Asians and Indians excepted) to identify as either black or white. Despite their absence from the census, the terms *moreno* and *negro* are central to the racial terminology and racial perspectives of Brazilians. These two terms increasingly capture a tension between a traditional Brazil of racial ambiguity with its presumed inclusion of nonwhites and a modern Brazil characterized by widely recognized racial exclusion and growing

racial affirmation and resistance. The term *moreno* is emblematic of the fluidity of the traditional Brazilian system, while *negro* seeks to rescue pride in a black identity, which has long been stigmatized.

Racial Income Inequality: A Comparative Perspective

The World Bank’s 2000 report shows Brazil as having the third highest Gini index of income inequality among 150 countries, preceded only by the small countries of Swaziland and Sierra Leone. South Africa is also near the top, in fourth place. In Brazil, the average income of the highest-earning 10 % is twenty-eight times the average income of the bottom 40 % (de Barros et al. 2001). For many analysts and for its elite, Brazil’s severe inequalities are at the root of nearly all of Brazil’s major social problems, including its poverty, poor health and education systems, high rates of crime, and the lack of social and political integration of the majority of the population (Sorj 2000; Reis 2002).

As long as whites, browns, and blacks are unevenly distributed along the income structure, racial inequality exists. However, both the shape of that structure and the relative position of the population by race along it determine overall levels of racial inequality. In other words, the fact that black and brown men earn 40–50 % of white men in Brazil, while black men earn 75 % of white men in the United States, could simply reflect Brazil’s far greater income inequality.

In comparative terms, the top 10 % of Brazilians earn incomes worth 52 % of the total income of all Brazilians, while South Africa has the second most unequal structure among large countries, in which the top 10 % of South African earners control 47 % of the country’s total income. The country with the greatest inequality among the so-called industrialized nations is the United States, with a comparable figure of 25 % of total income for the top 10 % of earners.

Figure 8.3 portrays the dual effect of income structure and the distribution of whites and nonwhites along that structure for Brazil, South




Fig. 8.3 Percent distribution of the population by monthly income (in U.S. dollars) and race for Brazil, South Africa, and the United States (Brazil, 1996 figure: 1996 Brazilian National Household Survey [PNAD];

South Africa, 1998 figure: 1998 Survey of Socioeconomic Opportunity and Achievement; United States, 1996 figure: 1996 Current Population Survey)

Africa, and the United States. It portrays the shape of these three nations' income pyramids, using data from recent censuses or surveys for all persons with income. For Brazil and South Africa, the steps on the pyramids are calculated in categories of approximately \$50 (U.S.) each,

and for the United States, in increments of roughly \$100, due to the greater incomes generally found in that country. As a rough guide, the income or socioeconomic shape of a society with a large middle class should be larger in the middle rungs, while a society with large income unequal-

ities or a large proportion of poor people tend to look: like a wide-based pyramid. The wide base of the income structures of Brazil and South Africa illustrate the existence of many poor persons. This high rate of poverty, coupled with a sizable number of persons in the top rung, reflects their status as the two most unequal large countries in the world. A more rectangular shape for the United States shows that. Income is more evenly distributed there than in Brazil and South Africa.

The right half of the pyramids, with darker bars, represents the distribution of nonwhites in the three countries while the left side represents the income distribution for whites. The pyramids are not symmetrical because whites and nonwhites are not evenly distributed by income. Thus, the extent of the asymmetry reveals the extent to which there is racial inequality. In all three countries, whites tend to be concentrated near the top and blacks near the bottom, although the differences in racial distribution along the pyramids vary. The figure reveals that South Africa is clearly the most racially unequal of the three societies. Blacks and coloreds are concentrated in the bottom income rungs, where there are few whites. For example, about 27 % of non-white South Africans are in the lowest income bracket compared to only 4 % of their white conationals. Seventy-six percent of black and colored South Africans earn under \$300 per month, roughly the poverty rate, compared to 15 % of white South Africans. This is not surprising given that country's recent emergence from apartheid, which legally mandated a racial hierarchy.

According to Fig. 8.3, Brazil's racial inequality appears to be intermediate to the United States and South Africa. Browns and blacks are concentrated in the lowest rungs, as they are in South Africa, but many more whites are also at the lowest income levels in Brazil. Persons earning less than \$200 (those in the bottom four rungs) represent the lowest-earning 40 % of Brazilians with at least some income. This group includes 52 % of nonwhites but only 29 % of whites. Unlike South Africa, where the poor are almost exclusively nonwhite, a significant proportion of the

Brazilian poor is white, as it is among the North American poor.

The difference between Brazil and the United States tends to be at the top end. Racial inequality in Brazil derives mostly from the near absence of nonwhites in the middle class and above, rather than from the absence of whites among the poor. For example, the highest income bracket shown for Brazil (\$2,000 or more) consists of 7.5 % of the national white population but only 1.5 % of nonwhites. Thus, whites are about five times as likely as nonwhites to be in the top income bracket in Brazil. By comparison, whites in the United States are only twice as likely as blacks to be in the top end of the income structure. On the other hand, white South Africans are about ten times as likely as blacks and coloreds to be in the highest income bracket.

The highest income bracket in Fig. 8.3 also includes persons making much more than \$2,000. The numbers of income categories could have been extended higher, but I closed this interval because the numbers in each bracket would become nearly imperceptible in the figure, especially for nonwhites. The very top of the income distribution—which includes Brazil's business and media executives, judges, doctors, and other high-level professionals—is almost all white. For example, according to the 1996 PNAD, whites outnumbered nonwhites as judges by more than ten to one. Johnson (1996) estimated that 29 “black” representatives served in the federal Congress between 1988 and 1995, out of a total of more than 2,000 representatives. Johnson probably included those that were very obviously mulatto or black or that had declared themselves as such. Currently, at an even more prestigious level, approximately 2 of roughly 1,060 diplomats, 1 of over 100 generals and 8 of 600 members of the Federal Public Prosecution 6 are black or brown. Until Lula became president on January 1, 2003, all of Brazil's presidents and ministers in recent memory, except Pele, were white. A 2003 survey of the 500 largest businesses in Brazil found that only 1.8 % of managers are negro (Skidmore 1974; Omi and Winant 1986; Graham 1990; Jenkins 1998; Nobles 2000). Although the nature of Brazilian classification makes it impos-

sible to get uncontested precision about the number of nonwhites in such elite positions, there is no doubt that the proportions are very small.

Racial Discrimination

We often assume that racial inequality is due to discrimination, but there is really no automatic link. In Brazil, racial inequality is sometimes thought to be simply the result of historical inequalities such as those created by slavery, so that its disappearance simply requires the passage of time. Thus, the nondiscriminatory mechanism of class rather than racial discrimination reproduces racial inequality, according to this perspective. Racial inequality has also been explained as being due to the lower human capital and disadvantaged geographical characteristics of browns and blacks, which may or may not be related to discrimination. For example, some argue that nonwhites have lower incomes than whites largely because they are more likely to reside in the poorly resourced Northeast or simply because they have lower levels of education, which is presumably unrelated to discrimination. Another explanation is that because “money whitens,” then racial inequality is overestimated. The extent of racial inequality is so great in Brazil and an earnings and mobility gap between whites and nonwhites persists that cannot be explained by observed variables like education and region (see Telles 2004 for a review of this literature). Moreover, despite how one measures classification though, racial inequality persists in Brazil (Telles and Lim 1998). In the next section, we show a test that provides especially strong evidence of a racial discrimination gap in Brazil.

The Ultimate Test: Multiracial Siblings


It is not uncommon for brothers and sisters in Brazil to be distinctly classified by race. With a data set as large as the 1991 census, the existence of a large sample of sibling pairs that were distinctly classified by race permits a natural experi-

ment that can isolate the effects of racial discrimination from neighborhood location, various class effects, age and gender. Since these siblings are all residents of the same household, it seems racial differences in their current schooling success can be directly attributed to racial or color discrimination, including differences in treatment by parents and school personnel. Treatment by parents may include the decision of enrolling the child in the same school. The accumulation of racially biased actions, including gestures and comments, by teachers, school personnel, and other members of society may result in unequal educational outcomes by race, even among siblings. In this section, I examine the extent to which white, brown, or black siblings remain in the age-appropriate grade, as opposed to dropping out or repeating grades. Grade repetition is especially important in Brazil where many adolescents remain in school but are not passed to higher grades and thus fall behind the normative grade for their age (Klein and Ribeiro 1991).

Figure 8.4 shows differences in educational progress among age-proximate siblings of the same sex but of different colors from ages 9 to 16. Figure 8.4 samples all pairs of brothers, who are separated by two or fewer years of age, where one is white and the other is brown or black. I then plot the percentage of brothers who are in the age-appropriate grade by race and age. Those not in the age-appropriate grade have either begun school late, have fallen behind because of grade repetition, or have dropped out of school entirely. Similar results are found for female siblings, although I do not show these here.

Figure 8.4 shows that white brothers are more likely than their nonwhite siblings to be in the age-appropriate grade. The advantages accruing for white brothers persist throughout ages 9–16; although the differences are particularly great from 9 to 11 and narrow thereafter, when less than 30 % of these children remain in the age-appropriate grade. At age 10, 47 % of the whites in the sample are in the age-appropriate grade compared to 37 % of their nonwhite brothers. The drop is greatest for browns and blacks from ages 9 to 10, while the sharpest fall for the white brothers is; between ages 10 and 11. Differences by race

Fig. 8.4 Percent of white males ages 9–16 and their brown-black brothers with age differences of 2 years or less in age-appropriate grade: Brazil, 1991 (1991 census)



among siblings are not as great for females, as Fig. 8.4 shows. Nevertheless, white sisters tend to do better than their nonwhite siblings.

I believe the educational differences shown in Fig. 8.4 for multiracial siblings are a rigorous test of racial discrimination for two reasons. First, they seem to control well for social effects on color' classification. Color is likely to be as fluid among sibling pairs as it is among the general population. However, I suspect that the designation of children by parents as white, brown, or black best reflects the relational nature of racial classification in Brazil, since race in these cases is being designated by the same person (the census respondent of that household, which is usually a parent), who I presume is intimately knowledgeable about the comparative color of each household member. Second, even though the differences may appear small, they provide strong evidence that race makes a difference, independently of class, family, neighborhood, and a host of other social- and cultural-capital factors. Of course, these findings greatly underestimate overall racial inequality, because such siblings represent a small numerical minority of the Brazilian population, and racial differences in schooling across families are likely to be much greater than those within families.

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Part IV

Asia

Amarjit Kaur

Southeast Asia as we know it today is a product of the region's colonial past. The borders of the present nation states largely coincide with imperial borders established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The region was originally integrated into the world trade system during the period of European seaborne empires centered on major trading ports. These trading empires resulted in greater intra-Asian trade and facilitated new migratory and cultural connections between countries in Asia. Subsequent European political expansion and conquest after the 1870s and the greater incorporation of Southeast Asian states into the imperial world economy had major consequences for the region. The coalescing of political and commercial interests of the colonizers fuelled the exploitation of resources or 'commodities of empire' for the ongoing industrial revolution. Crucially, against the backdrop of low population densities in most Southeast Asian states, the colonizers' trans-regional connections and trade policies reinforced an empire-wide sourcing of migrant labor. Alongside this development, the concept of race became highly-context dependent in the multiracial colonial societies that developed in the region. Concurrently, since colonial administrations

had dismantled the traditional power structures in the colonies, they socially constructed ethnicity to distinguish between the dominant language groups, migrants and minorities in their respective territories.

After the Second World War and the end of colonialism, the post-colonial independent governments devised national development strategies against the background of the internationalization of the world economy. Of the then ten Southeast Asian states, five states (Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia) maintained open economies under different regimes. These states also endorsed industrial policies and benefited from the relocation of labor-intensive manufacturing processes from industrialized countries to the region. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, Singapore and Malaysia (and subsequently Thailand) faced labor shortages and the widening wage gap in the region resulted in an increase in interstate and transnational mobility in the region.

This chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1 examines the integration of Southeast Asia into the global economy after the 1870s, the globalization of commodity production and labor immigration especially from China and India. Migration from the two countries, which was driven by push-pull factors and the opportunity differentials in Southeast Asia, resulted in demographic changes in the region. In the 1930s, falling world demand led to implementation of

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international commodity restriction schemes by the colonizers, the ending of open immigration policies and repatriation of surplus foreign workers. Part 2 investigates the second wave of globalization in the region, associated with the rise of the United States in the 1950s and the further integration of economic activities and labor markets. International labor migration (ILM) once again became an integral component of broader socio-economic transformative processes in Southeast Asia. The new geography of migration in the region was related to the rise of newly-industrializing economies, trade liberalization and the regulation of labor markets.

Data Sources and Methodology

Most of the data on labor migration in colonial Southeast Asia was sourced from colonial records and also from published official and non-official sources and publications on immigration, emigration and net migration. Colonial Census Reports have also been very useful in reporting population changes and the construction of ethnicity in Malaya. In recent years, the Malaysian government (Malaysia is the case study) has also published statistics on foreign labor and the workers distribution/employment in the designated sectors. Local Non-governmental organizations (especially Suaram and Tenaganita) have also included tabulations on foreign workers' participation in some sectors. Other sources include Media Reports (print and online).

Information on the various work permits and passes is available on the government human resources website: Ministry Of Human Resources – MOHR *Portal Rasmi Jabatan Tenaga Manusia*, <http://www.jtm.gov.my/ver25/index.php/ms/>

Publications of International NGOs (for example, Human Rights Watch; Amnesty International); International Organizations (ILO, IOM) also provide information on the working conditions of migrant workers, as do regional and national NGOs' studies on the subject.

Methods of Analysis


The main analysis in Part 2 focuses on the government's foreign labor policy and qualitative analysis of working conditions and pay scales. In addition to the sources cited above, the author also referred to the United States' annual *Trafficking in Persons' Reports* to obtain information on working conditions in the country and employer infringements. These Reports corroborated information gleaned from information provided by NGOs, research collaborators and interviews with some workers. These sources confirmed knowledge and facts on labor problems and exploitation by employers.

Introduction: Colonialism and Socio-economic and Demographic Perspectives

Southeast Asia has conventionally been divided into two geographical divisions based on linguistic, religious and cultural characteristics. The first geographical area, generally referred to as Mainland Southeast Asia, comprises the present day mainly Buddhist countries of Burma, Thailand, Viet Nam, Lao PDR and Cambodia. The second, usually known as Archipelago/Insular Southeast Asia, consists of Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Brunei (and Timor Leste). Indonesia is currently the most populous country in Southeast Asia with the fourth largest population, followed by the Philippines and Vietnam (in 12th and 13th positions). Indonesia and Philippines (and the former Indo-Chinese states and Burma) have also become major labor-exporting states in contemporary Southeast Asia.

The main political divisions in Southeast Asia are shown in Map 9.1.

Historically, Southeast Asia had a markedly low population growth relative to the extent of its cultivable area and a much lower population density than China and South Asia. Reid (1987, 35) suggests that average annual growth did not



Map 9.1 Southeast Asia *Source: Kaur (2004a)*

exceed 0.2 % and may have even been lower in many parts of the region in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the mid-nineteenth century, only the islands of Java and Bali and the North Vietnamese delta area (Tonkin) could be considered densely settled (Reid 2001, 45–62). Most of the population of Southeast Asia was predominantly agricultural, and labor, rather than land, was the principal source of value in most states. This in turn largely determined social and economic relations including authority patterns, patron-client relationships, the existence of and forms of slavery, and types of landholding.

The main pressures underlying state formation, capital accumulation practices, economic rationalization and political centralization necessitated centrally controlled human resources. A resource and labor pool that expanded the capacities of the state was thus a key component of social organization. This labor pool had its basis in servitude and there were three main types of servitude, namely slavery, bondage or peonage and labor obligations. In contrast to the first two categories, the third was flexible and negotiable and since people were an index of power, exactions on peasants was normally constrained. Labor

obligation or *corvée* was utilized more for public purposes, while the first two types of servitude were for private purposes. Slavery was primarily a consequence of war and made available to the state a group of prisoners for the labor pool. Reid (1993, 64–69) states that slavery was one of the “most important means of interaction between ethno linguistic groups” in Southeast Asia. It also had a “milder” character in comparison to other slave-owning societies. The larger trade in slaves in the archipelago involved indigenous traders/ship owners, Chinese traders and the European trading companies.

The second common form of servitude was created in relation to debt and was known as debt slavery or debt bondage. While debt bondage could be hereditary, in most cases the bonded person or his/her family worked for the creditor until the debt was repaid. The main difference between this form of servitude and slavery was that the bonded person was part of a community and had kinship ties. Bondage was also a consequence of the vertical obligations in society. For the poor, security and opportunity were acquired through bondage that had a monetary value. Bondage was also transferable and even saleable and in practice the right to redemption was little more than nominal (Reid 1983:8–11).

The region was integrated into the world trade system within the broader framework of European seaborne empires between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries and took on an expanded role in intra-Asian trade. Anthony Reid (1988, 1993) has labeled the era as the ‘age of commerce’. The acquisition of territory and resources, the establishment of power bases and rapid export growth that resulted in expanded settlements typified the era. The jurisdiction of the Europeans was centered on fortified trading centers such as Melaka and Batavia. The Europeans organized their trading activities through chartered companies, the most prominent of which were the English East India Company (EIC) and the Dutch East India Company (VOC). These Companies were largely independent of the home governments; they had the authority to conclude treaties with local rulers and had military establishments to defend themselves. Competition between the

Europeans was strong and the intention was to dominate trade networks through monopolies and exclude Asian middlemen who traditionally controlled the spice trade. Despite their naval superiority, Europeans were really only one group of traders among many commercial interests, and Southeast Asia was little more than a profitable field for trade.

In the late nineteenth century the situation changed dramatically and the balance began to shift decisively in Europe’s favor. The Industrial Revolution prompted a more aggressive approach to Southeast Asia by the Europeans (especially the British) who sought to attain the imperial dominance on land that they had been unable to achieve in earlier centuries. Against the onslaught of western military and technical superiority and progressive weakening of their powers, the Asian states succumbed one by one, excepting Thailand. The United States annexed the Philippines, (formally under Spain) at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The political map of the area was also redrawn during this period and a major economic system connected Europe, India, East Asia and Southeast Asia. The new Southeast Asian geographical frame comprised six major states – Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Although Thailand remained outside formal colonial rule, it acceded to trade demands from Britain and other western countries. All the states were mobilized for export production of foodstuffs, industrial crops, stimulants and mineral ores to boost the fiscal resources of the home countries. The new economic and social arrangements also influenced spatial, socio-cultural, economic and demographic changes. Concurrently, political and economic integration resulted in increased flows of capital and commodities and by 1940 most states had export-dominated economies. Southeast Asia’s role in the International Division of Labor was thus assured following the transformation of Southeast Asia’s countries into export-oriented economies and specializing in primary commodities intended for the industrialized West. Crucially, labor shortages necessitated the importation of workers from India and China or the circulation

of Southeast Asian inhabitants between colonies to work on plantations and mines. Indigenous peasants too were drawn into the international economy, either through state-directed coercion or in response to increased market opportunities.

The proletarian migrations in Southeast Asia owed their origins to the labor regimes under which migrants travelled, and these distinguish the movements from previous migratory movements. The migrations necessitated involvement of various players, including private labor recruiters, intermediaries and prospective employers who were responsible for organizing recruitment, transportation, and placement of migrant workers, initially under indentured labor conditions. Colonial governments were also involved in regulating the trade. Although the indentured labor system closely resembled “forced” servitude (cf. Tinker 1974), there were vital differences. First, Chinese and Indian economic migrants normally travelled voluntarily to Burma, Malaya and the other Southeast Asian states. In return for passage and guaranteed employment, they signed contracts for specific service periods. Moreover, although the labor regimes depended on sanctions to enforce labor agreements, these had their limits, especially when demand for labor outstripped supply. Second, despite cyclical migrations, many migrants established permanent settlements in the destination countries. The workers had many characteristics in common: they were young, predominantly unskilled adult males who emigrated as individuals. They were mainly hired for mineral and agricultural commodities production, construction and maintenance of transportation systems and government projects, and in urban and port occupations. After periods of employment, they usually, but not always, returned to their countries of origin. Women’s migration was mainly associational, but the growth of Indian wage labour incorporated women as well as men (see below).

Colonial economic spaces primarily evolved as mainly agricultural or extractive hubs rather than as urban-based economies. The plantations were “factories in the field” and the small urban centers where small-scale processing was carried out were oriented to the major ports or the extractive

hinterland. Ports for instance Singapore, Penang, Batavia, Rangoon and Manila, from where the commodities were shipped out and where migrant labor entered the countries, also functioned as processing centers. The colonizers also had preconceived ideas about race and ethnicity and these influenced interpersonal relations and social and cultural relationships, especially in the plantation and mining sectors and in the towns. Racial classification and attributes were deemed central in the management of the ‘new’ wage labor systems and the success of networks through which commodities were produced and circulated in the global trading system (Kaur 2004a, chs 2 & 3).

Migrant workers were regarded as guest workers/sojourners and were not expected to remain in the country on completion of contracts. Moreover, the design of an ethnic division of labor via political and economic mechanisms guaranteed labor segmentation along ethnic, gender and occupational lines. Concurrently, the colonial authorities developed systems of labor and race relations to control immigrant populations and promote economic growth in their territories. Legal codes enforced ‘labor’ control over workers and economic interests and profits determined social relationships, spawning “new” societies comprising Europeans, foreign Asians and indigenous groupings. These also led to new political class arrangements with Europeans in the highest echelons.

Chinese immigration into Southeast Asia was associated with the demand for tin and, until about the second decade of the twentieth century, Chinese capital controlled the industry. Chinese labor emigration was chiefly spontaneous and unregulated and migrants either paid their own passage or came under the credit-ticket system. There were thus two main networks: a kinship-based migration network and the credit-ticket system network. The kinship-based migration network involved recruiter-couriers who recruited migrants from their particular villages/regions and relatives or friends from the migrants’ hometown generally guaranteed the passage money and travel expenses. The credit-ticket (steerage) system, which most migrants depended on, involved the passage money and travel

expenses being covered by labor brokers, captains of junks or labor agencies. Upon arrival at their destinations, the migrants' employers paid the passage money owed by the migrants, and the migrants entered into a written contract for the repayment of their debt in the form of labor service. When they had repaid their debt, the workers were released from their obligation and were free to choose their employer and place of employment.

The location and accessibility of the tin deposits and a cheap labor supply explain Malaya's comparatively low production costs and attraction for Chinese capital. Workers also moved to new places when tin deposits were depleted in a particular area. Mining was organized through the communal *kongsi*, or on the basis of brotherhood ties and partnership in economic activity. The isolation of the tin mines from settlement areas or towns meant that the *kongsi* had to provide a multiplicity of ancillary services needed by the workers. Mine owners maintained control over workers through the indenture contract mechanism, compulsory triad or secret society membership, and the 'truck' system whereby workers usually received their wages at long and irregular intervals. Wages were tied to the prevailing tin price, some workers' wages were task-based, and profit-sharing arrangements were also common. In some areas, opium was often provided in lieu of wages (Wong 1965; Yip 1969). Working conditions gradually improved following the establishment of Chinese Protectorates to supervise Chinese labor, license recruiting agents and register labor contracts; the abolition of the indenture contract for Chinese in 1914, the banning of secret societies, and the lessening of the degree of control exerted by mine owners over workers.

Mining was customarily restricted to men and women were not allowed in mines or in the proximity of mine shafts. Tin mining was a speculative undertaking and Chinese miners believed that women brought misfortune to mining ventures. The migration of Chinese women (from China) to Malaya increased when the Malayan administration established a new framework for border controls in the 1930s. During this period, and

despite the earlier policy of unrestricted immigration, the Malayan Administration introduced restrictions on Chinese male immigration by implementing a quota system on new arrivals. This move coincided with depressed economic conditions globally and falling demand for rubber and tin. Unlike Indian plantation workers who could be, and were, repatriated to India, the British had no legal means at their disposal to repatriate the 'alien' Chinese migrants to China. The British subsequently introduced restrictive immigration legislation to limit the entry of male foreign Chinese migrants, who were considered aliens. Nevertheless, the Colonial Administration did not impose any restrictions on the admission of Chinese women and children below 12 years. This exemption was withdrawn in 1938 against the background of worsening economic conditions in Malaya and globally. It is probable that this was done since the British did not want to cut off Chinese immigration completely and be confronted by labor shortages when economic conditions improved.

Estimates of Chinese migration outflows to selected Southeast Asian countries are shown in Table 9.1.

Chinese women's immigration was also linked to the colonial policy of improving the sex ratio in the Chinese community and ensuring the establishment of stable mining labor force. In Malaya the Chinese sex ratio ranged from a 70:30 ratio at the beginning of the 1880s to a 75:25 ratio at the end of the 1920s. By 1938 it had risen to 43:57. Most Chinese women migrants worked as *dulang* washers or panners in mining areas. Their job was to concentrate the tin ore from tin tailings in large sluice boxes. Panning was a tin recovery method rather than a mining method as such and

Table 9.1 Estimated population outflows from China to selected Southeast Asian countries, 1801–1925 (thousands)

Year	Malaya	Indonesia	Philippines
1851–1875	350	250	45
1876–1900	360	320	20
1901–1925	125	300	n.a

Source: Adapted from Pan (2000)

Note: n.a not available

the Malayan administration regulated this work by means of a pass or permit system. During the 1930s, and in the period immediately after the Second World War, this job was reserved solely for women and was intended to provide them with employment opportunities. Though not in the same league as the male miners' economic role, *dulang* workers made an important input to the mining industry. Chinese women also contributed to improving the sex ratio in the Chinese community and the reproduction of the mining labor force. Women's migration additionally facilitated the transition from sojourning to settlement for Chinese migrants and many larger mining areas evolved into townships (Kaur 2008). By 1947 the Chinese had outnumbered the original inhabitants in the main economic centers and this development led to further racial stratification by the colonial government in its construction of ethnicities in Malaya.

Compared to the Chinese migrants, who were involved in a variety of activities, Indian workers were hired either as law enforcers/auxiliaries (see Kaur 2010) or as laborers/colonists in the agricultural and urban manufacturing sectors (Burma) and the transportation and plantation sectors (Malaya). Crucially, the British colonial government in India played a premier role in Indians' recruitment as laborers and in the determination of labor conditions. Rubber was an important commodity of Empire and the related ancillary transportation and other activities, all of which required a large, cheap and "disciplined" workforce that had to be settled and organized for work under pioneering conditions in Malaya. Thus British India with its teeming poverty-stricken millions and caste-ridden society was the logical choice for rubber cultivation with its built-in dependent relationship between management and workers. Indian workers were less expensive to employ and considered less aggressive than the Chinese. The historical trade and cultural networks between the two countries hence expanded to create an integrated labor market extending from Southern India to Southeast Asia.

Indian migration was principally organized using open regulated recruitment arrangements. Two migration methods were used, namely the

indenture system and the *kangani* system. The indenture method allowed employers to utilize enforceable, usually written labour contracts. The workers were contracted or rather bonded to individual employers for between 1 and 3 years and planters used these contracts to handle their labour costs and supply. Breaches of written contracts were regarded as criminal rather than civil offences. Since most workers were impoverished, they were re-indentured for further periods. Some planters relied on an intermediary or *kangani*, to recruit Indian labour. The *kangani* method was a personal recruitment system and it became more popular when indentured labour was abolished in 1910 (final contracts ended in 1913). The Indian government (India Office) was also involved in some operational aspects, intervening in specific cases to ensure a specified gender ratio. The specific political and economic relationship between the Colonial Office in London, the India Office and the British administration in Malaya played a major role in Indian migrations.

The Malayan administration's specific labor requirements for government projects (for example, road and railway construction), together with growing competition for labor and an upsurge in the practice of poaching workers foreshadowed centralization of recruitment. Accordingly, in 1907 the Malayan administration established a central quasi-official body, the Indian Immigration Committee (IIC), to facilitate and regulate South Indian labor migration to Malaya. An associated fund, the Tamil (later Indian) Immigration Fund was also established to provide free transportation for Indian emigrants. The administration also enforced a quarterly levy or tax on all employers of Indian labor to cover the travel and related costs of free Indian labor immigrants. These measures led to increased voluntary immigration to Malaya. By the mid-1930s free Indian migration had become the norm and migration networks facilitated subsequent Indian migration from other regions in India. Generally therefore, Indians settlement was supported by the paternalistic policy of the India Office in collaboration with the Malayan Administration. From the perspective of general colonial policy, a liberal immigration policy underscored the Malayan

government's migration goals and immigration remained largely unrestricted until the 1930s. Nevertheless, these restrictions never attained the importance they did until after Malaya achieved independence.

A third major migrant workforce comprised Javanese migrants. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, some British administrators had recommended that Javanese workers be recruited for plantations. The reasoning was that Javanese workers had cultural and religious commonalities with the Malays and would find it easier to assimilate with local Malay society. Subsequently, as rubber prices soared against the backdrop of labor shortages, the Malayan authorities introduced new legislation in 1908 and 1909 for Javanese labor recruitment. This legislation, which was modeled on legislation enacted in 1904 to regulate South Indian indentured labor recruitment, led to the employment of indentured Javanese labor on short-term contracts. The legislation was then used to regulate Javanese labor recruitment until 1932 without any significant amendments. Nevertheless, the Malayan government did not establish specific recruitment procedures to oversee Javanese recruitment and immigration. Thus, Malayan planters wanting to recruit Javanese workers had to apply for authorization permits from the Dutch Governor-General via the Dutch Consul-General stationed either at Penang or Singapore. Subsequently, they were required to utilize the services of professional recruiters licensed by the Dutch colonial government to obtain these workers. Since the process was time-consuming, most planters turned to European firms in Java to recruit workers.

Consequently, Javanese labor recruitment was regulated by the Dutch colonial authorities and Javanese workers could only be hired through licensed recruiters, who in turn were required to provide accommodation for labor recruits both at the place of recruitment and at the port of disembarkation. Additionally, recruiters were prohibited from charging the labor recruits for expenses incurred during the journey (including food and medical costs). Some workers were hired from the *coolie* depots in Singapore where Javanese workers were housed en route to East

Sumatran plantations. But their numbers were small. On the whole, the process was unsatisfactory because recruiters were paid on the basis of the number of labor recruits and they often delivered 'unsatisfactory' recruits (Bahrin 1965:64).

Not all Javanese workers were recruited through recruiting firms. Jackson notes that there were four categories of Javanese workers. The first category included those recruited directly from Indonesia under the official permit system. The second comprised workers who were hired locally either in Singapore or on expiration of their previous contracts. The third category included workers who had 'settled' in the country and worked on the plantations on a monthly basis. Indeed, it was fairly common for Javanese workers to acquire land from Malay landowners when their contracts expired. The fourth category comprised gangs of Javanese and Banjarese workers who, working under their own contractors, were hired to undertake tasks such as digging drains and tree felling in the initial establishment of estates. These gangs were to be found mainly in Perak. After 1914, numbers in this category declined since most estates used their own labor to open estates (Jackson 1961:129–130).

Despite recurring appeals by planters, it appears that Javanese labor was primarily hired during periods of Indian labor shortages only. Moreover, despite the abolition of Indian and Chinese indentured labor in 1910 and 1914 respectively, Javanese indentured labor continued to be utilized into the 1930s for two main reasons. First, the Dutch colonial authorities in Indonesia (who also relied heavily on Javanese indentured workers) favored the retention of indenture because employment contracts could be regulated and excessive abuses avoided. Second, the number involved was small; abuses were rare and did not raise an outcry among concerned groups (Parmer 1960:108–109). In 1927, the Dutch colonial authorities began negotiations with the Malayan authorities for the abolition of Javanese indentured labor, which was finalized in 1932 with the abrogation of the 1909 *Netherlands Indian Labour Protection Enactment*. At any rate the number of indentured Javanese workers on 2- to 3- year contracts had dwindled over the years

Table 9.2 Malaya: structure of federated Malay states estate (plantation) labor force by race, 1907–1938

Year	Indians	Chinese	Javanese	Others	Total	Indians as % of labor	No of estates
1907	43,824	5,348	6,029	2,872	58,073	75.5	287
1911	109,633	31,460	12,795	12,127	166,015	66.0	711
1915	126,347	27,446	8,356	8,592	170,741	74.0	719
1920	160,966	40,866	8,918	5,808	216,588	74.3	1,105
1925	137,761	37,879	4,165	4,549	184,354	74.7	1,206
1930	132,745	30,860	3,665	2,411	169,681	78.2	1,757
1935	118,591	29,950	1,941	2,658	153,140	77.4	2,345
1938	137,353	28,925	1,762	2,892	170,932	80.4	2,388

Source: Adapted from Parmer (1960)

(in 1932 there were only seven Javanese indentured workers). Subsequently, attempts were made to recruit free Javanese labor through the intermediary of Javanese workers resident in Malaya, but this had limited success. In 1941 the Colonial Office ‘acceded to the proposal’ to import more Javanese workers but these plans were thwarted by the Japanese Occupation.

The distribution of the plantation labor force in the Federated Malay States for the period 1907–1938 is provided in Table 9.2.

In his study of Indonesian immigration to Malaya, Bahrin (1967:233–257) states that the Indonesian population in Malaya grew from 117,600 in 1911 to 346,800 in 1957. Interestingly, the Census Superintendent of the 1931 Census concluded in 1934 that “only a negligible fraction of the Malay population (of the peninsula) consists of descendants of pre-nineteenth century immigrants and ... more than half of it has less than 50 years’ prescriptive rights to the title “owners of the soil”” (Fisher 1969:636). Fisher notes, however, that there were wide variations in the growth of the Indonesian population in the country and that the Census Superintendent’s remarks applied primarily to the western Malay states where capitalist development of rubber and tin had taken place. In the northern and east coast states the Malay population had grown through natural increase (1969:636). The colonial administration’s inclusion of the Javanese in the category “Malays and Other Natives of the Archipelago” thus establishes the social construction of ethnicity

by them since they envisaged the Malayan state as being built around an ethnic majority (see below)

The resulting demographic change is reflected in the Malayan Census figures for the period 1911–1947, as shown in Fig. 9.1.

As presented in Fig. 9.1 a specific category – Malaysian, an ethnic classification that was created by the British in the Straits Settlements in the 1891 Census Report. This policy subsequently influenced the usage of the term and “Malayness” in Malaya.

Compared to the Chinese, Indian labor migrants were hired solely in the British territories of Malaya and Burma in Southeast Asia. Moreover, Indian migration to Burma was regarded as an “internal” movement from one British territory (India) to another British territory. Not surprisingly, Indians formed the largest group of foreign Asians in Burma, as shown in Fig. 9.2. The Indian share of the population in Burma ranged from 4.9 % in 1872 to 6.9 % in 1931 (Baxter 1941, 5).

According to Huff and Caggiano (2007), gross migration into Burma, British Malaya and Thailand was over twice as high as gross migration into the United States between 1911 and 1929. A significant proportion of the migrants who migrated to Southeast Asia were sojourners, but by the 1930s and 1940s most of them had settled in Southeast Asian states. Maddison (2003, 160) also states that Southeast Asia experienced much faster population growth in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century compared to either China or India.





Fig. 9.1 Malaya: Population by Racial Group, 1911–1947. Notes: (1) ‘Malaysians’ include Malays and Indonesians. (2) Indians includes Pakistanis after 1947.

(3) The Table excludes ‘other’ races (Source: *Malaya: Census Reports 1911–1947*)

Fig. 9.2 Indians in Burma and Malaya, 1910–1935 (Source: Adapted from Sandhu (1969))



This demographic change in Southeast Asian states is shown in Table 9.3.

Generally, falling mortality rates and stable or slight increases in growth rates impacted on population growth in the period prior to the Second World War. The average annual growth in population was over one per cent, and the British territories of Burma and Malaya experienced over two per cent average growth rates. This rapid growth also coincided with the development of export

industries in the region, political stability and labor migration. Crucially, changes in Southeast Asian population size, distribution, and structure “were closely intertwined with the economic, social, and political transformations” (Hirschman and Bonaparte 2012, p.2; c.f. Booth 2008; Kaur 2004a, b chs 3 and 4). Migrant Asians in Indonesia formed a much smaller percentage of the Indonesian population and most Chinese migrants worked on the rubber plantations in Sumatra or the tin mines

Table 9.3 Population growth in Southeast Asia, 1890–1950 ('000)

Country	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950
Brunei	14	18	30	26	32	39	48
Cambodia	815	1,103	1,488	2,403	2,806	N/A	4,346
Indonesia	35,081	40,209	46,086	52,823	60,727	70,476	79,538
Lao PDR	364	473	614	799	944	1,350	1,755
Malaysia	684	985	1,419	2,044	2,945	4,242	6,110
Burma	3,738	4,850	6,293	8,165	10,593	13,744	17,832
Philippines	5,572	7,158	8,876	11,007	13,649	16,356	19,996
Singapore	406	419	303	398	715	755	1,022
Thailand	N/A	6,320	8,951	9,308	13,383	15,717	19,626
Viet Nam	11,914	12,276	14,674	17,540	20,965	25,060	27,367
TOTAL	58,588	69,446	88,734	104,513	126,759	147,739	175,904

Source: <http://www.populstat.info/>

on other islands. In the Philippines and Thailand where the Chinese did not have residential segregation, there was better integration into the local communities. In Thailand the Chinese committed themselves to adopting a Thai identity and the fact that Thailand was not colonized, facilitated acculturation (Skinner 1957). Likewise in the Philippines, people were enumerated on the basis of citizenship rather than race.

By the 1930s therefore, colonial rule had resulted in extraordinary rates of population growth, the formation of plural economies and divided societies and there was a close correlation between ethnicity and economic roles. According to Furnivall (1948, 304–305), 'plural societies' had emerged in Southeast Asia. The various ethnic groups mixed, but did not combine. Economic plurality had resulted in specific economic roles, residential segregation, separate languages, different religions and even different educational experiences. Moreover, since many indigenous populations had embraced the opportunities presented by international trade and become rubber smallholders or grew pepper and other food crops, most also became indebted to Chinese or Indian moneylenders which led to growing antagonism against the Chinese in Indonesia and Indians in Burma. This was largely due to the volatility of commodity trade and production in the 1920s and 1930s. In Burma, the first anti-Indian riots led to competition between Burmese and Indian workers. Falling rice prices also led to foreclosures of land to Indian Chettiars (money-

lenders) and racial conflict between Indians and Burmese inhabitants (Mahajani 1960). The economic downturn in the 1930s also had major consequences for in-migration in the region.

In Malaya, despite the fact that the Malayan administration regarded Chinese and Indian migrants as sojourners, Indian settlement was promoted in keeping with the Indian administration's emigration policy and the need for a settled working class on the plantations. Chinese continued to be regarded as aliens and although Chinese women were allowed admission into Malaya, the worsening trade conditions of the 1930s and the Great Depression resulted in the implementation of more restrictive legislation to curb migration of Chinese into Malaya.

During this period, it had become obvious that a national consciousness based on ethnic consciousness had taken shape in the region. Subsequently, the fall of Southeast Asia to the Japanese in 1941–1942 led to further transformations in the region. Japanese rule exacerbated ethnic sensitivities but at the same time emphasized unitary national identities. Thus, when the colonial powers returned, they found a completely changed environment in the region. Although they subsequently negotiated for nation states that would include all minority groups, most colonialists did not have the resources to implement their plans (Christie 1996, Part 1). The demand for indigenism, which accelerated during the Japanese Occupation (Booth 2007, ch. 9), was subsequently followed by tight border controls and racial/ethnic logics

became more pronounced in the region. People were subsequently categorized on the basis of their nationality, skills and the new national governments effectively closed access to the labor market (Kaur 2004b).

The Construction of Ethnicity – Malaysia as a Case Study

Alongside the differentiation of the workers on the basis of race in the census records in Malaya, there was a surreptitious move whereby the British constructed ethnicity by classifying the Malays under the category of “Malays and Other Natives of the Archipelago” (or Malaysians). According to Bahrin (1967:233–257), the Indonesian population in Malaya increased from 117,600 in 1911 to 346,800 in 1957. Interestingly, the Census Superintendent of the 1931 Census concluded in 1934 that ‘only a negligible fraction of the Malay population (of the peninsula) consists of descendants of pre-nineteenth century immigrants and ... more than half of it has less than 50 years’ prescriptive rights to the title ‘owners of the soil’ (Fisher 1969: 636). Fisher notes, however, that there were wide variations in the growth of the Indonesian population in the country and that the Census Superintendent’s remarks applied primarily to the western Malay states where capitalist development of rubber and tin had taken place. In the northern and east coast states the Malay population had grown through natural increase (1969:636).

The distinction between ‘Malays’ and ‘Malaysians’ (based on birthplace in or outside Malaya), as recorded in the 1947 census, is shown in Table 9.4.

Interestingly, the British had created the category of “Malays and Other Natives of the Archipelago” (or Malaysians) as early as 1891 in the Straits Settlements census. Table 9.4 also shows how the British determined the boundaries of Malay ethnic identity in the census records and this categorization also assisted in deciding the size of the dominant ethnic group. The shaping of ethnicity and the “fluidity” of the boundaries of Malay ethnicity demonstrates that the Malay eth-

Table 9.4 Malaya, 1947 census: statistical and other information on the category of “Malaysian” in Malaya’s population

Ethnicity	Birthplace	Numbers
Malays	Malaya	2,199,598
Javanese	Java	187,755
Sundanese	Java	751
Boyonese	Sumatra	20,429
Achinese	Sumatra	1,143
Menangkabau	Sumatra	10,866
Korinchi	Sumatra	2,412
Palembangan	Sumatra	1,116
Djambi	Sumatra	980
Other Sumatran peoples	Sumatra	9,806
Bandjarese	Borneo	62,356
Bugis	Celebes	6,962
Total other Malaysians ^a		343,971
Total all Malaysians		2,543,569

Source: Adapted from Fisher (1969), Table 85

Note: ^aTotal other Malaysians include minor groups not separately enumerated

nic majority was also a colonial construction, and done to preserve the numerical superiority of the “Malays” in their “own” land (see also Nagata 1974).

Following Malayan independence in 1957, the independent Malayan government introduced two major changes. First, in the area of immigration policy, The British instigated additional restrictive legislation to prevent “unskilled” Chinese and Indian immigration into Malaya and this was largely dictated by economic and socio-political considerations. Second, border controls and internal enforcement measures assumed greater importance and were associated with the prevailing political conditions in the country after the Second World War. The Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) in particular led to the introduction of the Internal Security Act, and a compulsory system of identification cards for all residents aged 12 years and over. The identity cards categorized people on the basis of their nationality/race and residential/occupational status and, in effect, created the outsider. Both these internal enforcement measures were an enduring legacy of colonial rule, and were adapted/modified to suit the needs of the national state in subsequent years (Kaur 2005, 15).

The Global Economy, New International Division of Labor (NIDL) and New Geographies of Migration

By the 1970s, following decolonization and post-war readjustment, two broad groups of countries had emerged in the region. There were those that under Communist or Socialist regimes withdrew from the international economy to a large extent. These included Vietnam, Cambodia, and Lao PDR, whose trading relations were focused on Eastern-Bloc countries, and Burma, which remained politically neutral and became economically isolated. This group of countries experienced economic stagnation and continued to have capita incomes among the lowest in the world. The other countries, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, maintained open economies and achieved sustained levels of high economic growth based on exported development strategies.

Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia maintained open economies under various regimes. These states also promoted industrial policies and benefitted from the relocation of labor-intensive manufacturing operations from industrialized countries to the region. Singapore and Malaysia subsequently faced labor shortages and the widening wage gap in the region assisted labor migration from Thailand (mainly to Singapore), and from Indonesia and the Philippines to Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysian nationals also went to Singapore, particularly after Malaysia introduced affirmative action policies for Malays. Accordingly, labor migration became a structural feature of Southeast Asian economies, persisting beyond cyclical fluctuations in labor supply (Athukorala and Manning 1999). Crucially, the previous informal arrangement of transnational mobility in Southeast Asia reasserted itself in the new Southeast Asian economic and demographic structures.

Subsequently, two primary migration corridors, specifically the archipelagic Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) corridor and the Mekong sub-regional corridor also developed,

and mirrored the demographic (and racial) divide in the region. Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei emerged as the major destination countries in the first corridor, recruiting workers predominantly from Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Thailand was the main destination for migrants in the second corridor, originating from countries with shared land borders, mainly Burma, Cambodia and Laos. Essentially, the destination countries' immigration policies provided incentives for skilled workers, improved less-skilled workers' circular migration, and concentrated on stringent border-control regimes to exclude unauthorized migrants. The guest worker programs were also dependent on networks, intermediaries and brokerage firms and a thriving migration industry. Moreover, most of the migration movements did not operate spontaneously, but took place within networks, both within the sending and receiving countries. Chain migration within family, extended kinship, or close-knit village-based groups, also assumed a vital role in disseminating information about opportunities available in the destination countries, since it minimized both financial and removal disruption costs that migrants faced.

Women's migration also expanded in the region and was associated with more women migrating independently for work. This gendering of the migrant labor force is related to the gender-selective policies of labor-importing countries and the emergence of gender-specific employment niches. This in turn resulted not only in the self-sustaining feature of this migratory stream, but also the appearance of particular female migratory linkages between groups of countries. Generally, gendered labor migration expanded due to three main reasons: overall changes in labor markets; the newly-industrializing countries' trade liberalization strategies; and the growth of specific production niches (electronics, textiles, garments), all of which were associated with the New International Division of Labor. These developments facilitated the increased labor force participation of women in the formal sector in these countries and were related to the modernization of the agricultural sector and rural-urban migration (Kaur 2004a, b, ch. 8).

In comparison with the colonial period, ethnicity and social class also become even more pronounced in migration patterns, and governments and particular segments of the populations in receiving countries expressed both overt and covert hostility towards migrants. Moreover, the migrants were also forced into segmented labor markets, characterized by wage discrimination, which then led to social tensions.

Concurrently, the expanding inter-connections and shared land borders between countries also facilitated the establishment of growth triangles or sub-regions in ASEAN. These were designed to facilitate trade, capital and labour flows and resulted in three sub-systems, namely, the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), linking Singapore with the Indonesian provinces of Riau and West Sumatra and Johor in Malaysia; the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN growth area (BIMP-EAGA); and the Northern ASEAN sub-region comprising Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand (Battistella and Asis 2003, pp. 4–9). Additionally, the phenomenon of daily commuting workers had been in existence on the Singaporean-Johor and Malaysian-Thai borders since the 1950s at least. Increasing hostility subsequently led to attempts by the Malaysian government to restrict movement along the Thai-Malaysian border and a 27 km wall was built in the late 1990s to stop

Thai migrants who did not possess valid documents from entering Malaysia (Kaur 2006). The Malaysian government has also made efforts to restrict irregular Indonesian workers who traveled by water transport. Notwithstanding this, the dynamics of demography and development between Sarawak and Kalimantan have resulted in the Malaysian and Indonesian governments co-operating on the establishment of a number of large projects at the Entikong –Tebedu Border post area to enable Malaysia to control irregular Indonesian migrant movements. (Agustiar 2000, p. 235). Thus, migration policies continue to be shaped by economic and security concerns of nation-states. Like trade regimes, countries with a comparative economic advantage (that is, labor-importing countries) also had an advantage in setting the terms for bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations on migration policy.

Comparative economic indicators for Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand and the labor-sending neighbors is listed in Table 9.5.

In the 1990s, labor-importing states in Southeast Asia adopted circular temporary migration programs (CTMP). The adoption of the CTMP meant that a particular type of migration mobility that is regulated by both sending and receiving countries became the norm in Southeast Asia as well. Against this backdrop and competition for labor in Asia, the Malaysian government also

Table 9.5 Southeast Asian migration corridor: main economic indicators

Country	Per Capita GDP ^a (current international) (US\$)	Human development index ^b	Per Capita foreign direct investment ^a (US\$)	Unemployment ^b (% of total labour force)	% of population below poverty line ^c
Cambodia	2,000.92	0.556	10.89	2 %	35.9
Indonesia	3,227.81	0.682	(–15.69)	6 %	18.2
Malaysia	9,130.40	0.790	12.06	4 %	7.5
Philippines	4,171.06	0.751	14.58	10 %	34.0
Singapore	24,006.40	0.884	339.26	3 %	...
Thailand	7,009.47	0.768	58.00	2 %	9.8
Viet Nam	2,304.78	0.688	16.35	n.a.	28.9

Sources: Cited in Asian Development Bank, *Workers' Remittance Flows in Southeast Asia*, 2006, p.3

Notes: FDI foreign direct investment, GDP gross domestic product, HDI human development index, n.a. not available

^aUnited Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Index 2001*

^bWorld Bank, *World Development Indicators 2004* (figures from 2001)

^cAsian Development Bank, *Key Indicators 2004*

embraced the concept of circular migration. The Philippines and Indonesia (and later South Asian states) also realized the significance of the program since it was designed to bring benefits to both sending and receiving countries. Labor-exporting states were also able to come to an agreement on wages and working conditions for their nationals. The circular temporary migration programs also widened the export market for Southeast Asian states.

Both Indonesia and the Philippines initiated policies specifying the number of workers they planned to send abroad and these figures were incorporated in their economic development plans. These policies led to increased migration flows and labor exports rose to 1.25 million workers in the 1994–1999 economic development plans and 2.8 million in the 1999–2003 economic development plans (Kaur 2004a, b, ch. 9). The Philippines also established legislation on overseas deployment based on comprehensive governmental structures to provide oversight over private recruitment firms. The labor-exporting states thus became more involved in promoting and organizing labor emigration through government-to-government agreements or Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and also supervise the operation of private recruitment agencies.

In Singapore, immigration is a key policy strategy to maintain the country's economic health and is also compatible with its population policy. In 1990, for example, Singaporeans comprised 86 % of the total population of 3 million and this figure dropped to 64 % in 2009 (*Economist*, 14 November 2009). By 2004 foreign workers comprised a third of the almost 3 million strong labor force (Southeast Asia 2010). Malaysia's labor force was approximately 12 million, and of this number about 3 million were migrant workers but only about 2.2 million were documented workers. In Thailand there were about 1.8 million migrant workers at the end of 2008, but only about half a million were registered (*Bangkok Post*, 11 January 2009; Martin 2007, p. 4).

The three major labour destination countries' immigration policies have similarities, but there are major differences as well, indicative of how

adequately the policies have been integrated into the broader economic and social policy frameworks. Singapore stands at one end of the continuum. Since the state's guiding principle on migration is closely intertwined with the national population policy, its immigration policy consists of an elaborate arrangement of migrant levies (taxes or charges) on less-skilled workers and incentives for highly skilled professionals. In Thailand, policies have been in place for the recruitment of professionals and skilled workers since 1978. However, there is no "specific" policy for recruitment of voluntary, short term and cross border migrant labor (Numnak 2005; Wongboonsin 2006). Malaysia lies somewhere in between and has made significant policy shifts in recent years. The government's espousal of CTMP has also underpinned the country's "managed-migration" policy since the government aspires to promote innovation and upgrading in the manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, Malaysia continues to have problems reconciling its demand for foreign workers with its race-based preferential policies, Malay nationalism and quota system. Thus, as before, the linkages between demography, migration and race reverberate in the region. In this context, the role of civil society, faith-based groups and non-governmental organizations in advocacy work for less-skilled migrant workers resonates with the earlier work of the International Labor Organization and the International Trade Union Congress.

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Social stratification in some way or other perhaps has remained nearly inextricable in the entire post-primordial human history and civilisation. In fact, the role played by *social* hierarchy and/or inequality in humanity's relentless march towards material, scientific, and technological progress sounds pretty intricate, controversial and of course inconclusive. However, in the ultimate analysis *social stratification* turns out to be more of an ideological and/or ascription-based construct than an inevitable fallout (as is sometimes thought) of physical, biological or genetic diversities of humankind. Despite physiological, genetic and/or racial differentials being held by some quarters to be the key to the genesis of *racial* stratifications, the latter almost inescapably boil down to socially formed constructs and/or social ascriptions (Saenz and Morales 2005:171).

Social stratification, based on *humanly devised* ascriptions as they are, can well have perceptible bearings on demographic processes (e.g. population growth) and behaviours (e.g. fertility), which are also mediated by such diverse domains as biology, ecology, sociology, politics, and culture. What this, thus, implies is that the linkage between social differentiation and its demography

is not exactly unidirectional. The former can, as just noted, have ramifications for the latter, which can generate, in form of somewhat chain reactions, further implications for the former, with a resultant dynamics between the two. In fact, demographic underpinnings of, and their interactions with, social stratification are, of late, gaining prominence in both sociological and demographic research. This has given rise to a (relatively) new and growing academic field, namely, the demography of race and ethnicity or the demography of social stratification. Indeed the chief object of the present chapter is to capture the salient features of the long-term trends in India's demography of social stratification, with a view to delineating their wider ramifications and key policy insights for the days ahead.

India's Social Stratification: Issues and Ingredients

Social stratification can be viewed in a broad comprehensive perspective that encompasses a multitude of differentiations and/or ascribed social identities of a population on economic, religious, ethnic, racial, cast-based, and such other criteria. But this could become too broad a canvass to be tackled meaningfully in its entirety in any effort to understand its complex ramifications and dynamics. From a more simplistic standpoint, social stratification could be seen just

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as a *social* phenomenon that quintessentially entails *social* differentiation and hierarchy distinct from economic, religious, racial, or ethnic stratifications as such. From this latter perspective, India is well-known to be a land of deeply divisive social structure founded on its enormously complex 'caste system', which Kingsley Davis called 'most peculiar' (Davis 1951:162) and, of course, distinct from globally common social stratifications based on race, ethnicity, or sometimes even religiosity.¹

For example, the term 'ethnicity' is eminently *inapplicable* in the Indian context (see Manor 1996 for a succinct discussion of the subtle issues involved). 'Caste' subsumes two kinds of *social* categorization. One derives directly from the Hindu religious principle (or precept?) of *varna*, according to which the Hindus are divided into four caste groups (interior), together with a fifth group, the 'untouchables', that is exterior to the caste system.² The other categorization is based on what is called *jati*, an endogamous (i.e. in-marrying) birth grouping that determines a person's social position or rank. Thousands of *jatis* exist, often with highly contested and changing rankings by *varna* (and even within a specific *varna*).³ Thus, to quote from Louis Dumont's (1970:21) succinct characterisation of the essence of the Indian caste system:

[T]he caste system divides the whole society into large number of hereditary groups, distinguished from one another and connected together by three

characteristics: *separation* in matters of marriage and contact, whether direct or indirect (food); *division* of labour, each group having, in theory or by tradition, a profession from which their members can depart only within certain limits; and finally, *hierarchy*, which ranks the groups as relatively superior or inferior to one another.

Since social descent, not the physical or skin colour characteristics, is the single most important criterion for caste identification, the difference between castes is largely one of differential social status ascribed by birth/ancestry, not by any physical feature or skin colour. Indeed, the caste-based social inequality, hierarchy, and various forms of social discrimination and exclusion have, for ages, remained embedded within India's predominantly Hindu society, of course with the backing of its various social institutions, customs, and practices/precepts widely observed by people. The caste hierarchy is distinct from a starker racial or racist (and sometimes ethnic or even religious) stratification found in other parts of the world.⁴ Although the notion of race has often been invoked in the multitude of theories and hypotheses relating to genesis and/or foundation of the caste system, it has remained somewhat implicit, or even sometimes overshadowed, within the prevailing caste-based modes of social order and behaviour. Consequently, unlike black-white compartmental societies in the US or South Africa, 'castes are not self-sufficient but interdependent; caste unites while it divides' (Galanter 1984:9). In a similarly paradoxical vein, the 'untouchables' in traditional Hindu society are excluded *doctrinally* from the *chaturvarna* scheme developed by Brahminical jurists, but they are *existentially* an indispensable element in local society (Béteille 1969:92).

Notwithstanding a uniqueness and vast complexity of the caste system itself, the major preoccupation of Indian anthropology has for long been with tribes, who, unlike castes, have been both doctrinally and (in large part) existentially outside the *varna* social system (e.g. Béteille 1969). Although tribes are generally viewed as

¹ Kingsley Davis (1951:162) was perhaps the first demographer to have attempted at a meticulous scrutiny and analysis of the census data towards understanding of the demography of castes and caste-based social stratification in the British India.

² *Varna* system – more precisely *chaturvarna* scheme – includes the four caste groups as follows: *Brahmins*, whose duties are confined to religious scholarship and priest-craft; *Kshatriyas*; *Vaishyas*, the agriculturists, cattle herders, and traders; and *Sudras*, who must serve the other three classes. Beyond these four castes are the 'outcastes', lowest of the low, who along with *Sudras* are generally considered as 'untouchable'. In *Dharmashastra*, the vast Hindu religio-legal texts, the unequal rights and duties of these four *varnas* are spelt out in detail, with those of the 'untouchables', *Chanadals*, who are, of course, 'the object of extreme stigmatization' (Fuller 2003:479).

³ See Basu (2003):117.

⁴ For a lucid, albeit penetrative, discussion on this question, see Gupta (2001).

distinct groups of people who remain outside the mainstream civilisation, in the Indian context the task of defining tribe and its identity is particularly difficult. Because, unlike most other parts of the world, the rising civilisation in Indian sub-continent neither eliminated nor quite absorbed the primitive inhabitants of the land, thereby leaving room for their continuity side by side the 'mainstream'. Thus, apart from the question of its origin, the nature of tribal evolution through long-standing processes of transformation and assimilation within the Indian mainstream caste society constitutes a major facet of tribal identity. This is often described as the 'tribe-caste continuum', of which understanding has entailed protracted controversies, debates, and dilemmas.

How far and/or whether India's tribes are the indigenous and autochthonous people of the land has also been a subject of much academic debate (e.g. Xaxa 1999, 2003:377–379; B eteille 1998a; Guha 1999:1–9 among others). As the mainstream narrative goes, tribes had long been settled on the plains and river valleys before the Aryan invasion (see Ray 1972: especially 11–15). Compared to the invading Aryans, the indigenous peoples were in a lower stage of development; many were still in hunting-gathering economy, not knowing the use of metal; they seem to have lived in isolated settlements and spoke of variety of languages; they belonged ethnically to a variety of physical types⁵; they practised what anthropologists call 'primitive' religion, and lived in closed and well-knit, undifferentiated, and homogenous social units generally presided over by a headman or chief.

Indo-Aryan speaking peoples with a superior social organisation and techno-economy are believed to have forced these indigenous peoples to move bit by bit to more and more inaccessible region of forests, hills and mountain slopes. Then followed the period of prolonged rise and spread of Hindu civilisation, in which caste-based social organisation eventually became its nucleus, while 'tribes' continued living in their 'natural setting' even very close to such renowned ancient and

medieval centres of civilization as Gaya, Ujjain and Madurai well into present days (B eteille 1986:309; also Mandelbaum 1970:585).

Indeed, the relationship between Hindu and tribal societies is somewhat paradoxical. For instance, although a traditional tribal society is generally far more homogenous and far less stratified than a typical Hindu society, both these societies share certain homology in their strikingly similar ways of perpetuating respective collective identities. In Andre B eteille's (1986):311 words, '[i]t is no accident that observers down the ages have so persistently mistaken castes for tribes, and tribes for castes'. This signifies *inter-penetration*, rather than just unidirectional adaptation of one by the other. In fact, while many individual tribes appear similar, at least on some counts, to the Hindu caste segments, they at once turn quite different in terms of lifestyles, modes of livelihood, habitations, values and cultural practices. As D. D. Kosambi, an eminent Indian historian (quoted in B eteille 1986:312) writes, '[t]he entire course of Indian History shows tribal elements being fused into a general society'. Similarly, the tribal practice of endogamy reflects, arguably, the influence of Hindu civilization on tribal societies. Nevertheless the prolonged fusion of tribal elements could hardly prevent the collective identities from 'outliving the conversion of tribe into caste' (B eteille 1986).

On the longstanding (and slow) process of assimilation or absorption of diverse tribes within the mainstream society, one received explanation – so-called 'Hindu method' – harps on a symbiotic, albeit unequal, relationship between tribes and the larger caste society (Bose 1941, 1975). As the argument runs, when technologically less advanced tribal economic base became precarious due to population expansion or for other reasons, they or a section sought economic security through closer attachment to the wider and superior Hindu society. In this view (based on fieldwork as well as historical and classical texts), the newly attached tribe was given the lowest position in the Hindu caste hierarchy. There are however a few instances of some richer and more powerful sections of tribal groups laying claim to being Kashatriyas [warrior caste],

⁵They are Proto-Australoids, Mongolians, and to a limited extent Negritos strains (Mamoria 1958:20–21).

though they originally had started their career as tribes (Srinivas 1977:227).

The Hindu absorption of tribes should have been relatively more pervasive in interior hilly and forested areas which could remain detached from the influences of other civilisations (e.g. Islamic or Chinese). Bhil, Munda, Santal, Oraon, Saora, Juang and other tribes have been under the orbit of such Hindu influence, and they account for the bulk of the tribal population of the country.⁶ Because of very gradual nature of the shift of tribes into *jati* society along with an inherent permeability, there have always been borderline cases with 'very little difference between a group that considers itself a tribe and one that claims to be a *jati*' (Mandelbaum 1970:574; see also Bétéille 1986:317). This contrasts sharply with the American attempt at *complete* assimilation of aboriginal tribes into mainstream society in a *shortest possible time* – an attempt which (almost inevitably) failed and culminated into tribal identity/existence only as 'deviant groups'.

A sustained process of emulation of higher caste lifestyles and scriptural norms by lower rung peoples including tribals – the so-called Sanskritization coined by M. N. Srinivas – could have historically been a parallel route to socio-cultural transformation of a few tribes such as Bhils of western India, the Gonds and Oraons of Central India, and the Pahids of the Himalayas (see Srinivas 1966; also Roy-Burman 1993). One case in point is the emulation by tribal societies of Hindu custom of child marriage, which exerts downward pressure on the age at marriage among tribal females. In some places, however, after failing to get absorbed in the Hindu mainstream, many tribals return to their indigenous customs and traditions – a process which has sometimes been referred to as 'retribalization' (Thakur and Thakur 1994:22).

Notwithstanding a symbiotic relationship between tribal and caste societies, the latter often

have had an exploitative character, inter alia, pushing off tribes to the fringes with relatively precarious economic base (Ray 1972; Roy-Burman 1983). This process has been continuing in varying degree even now (Fürer-Haimendorf 1982, 1989; also relevant papers in Chaudhuri 1992, vol. 3). However, the tribes – whether pushed out or pulled in – have hardly ever been entirely free of the influences of the dominant currents of Hindu society (Mandelbaum 1970:576; and Jay 1968).⁷ Yet, the former at large never lost completely its own distinctive existence and identity.⁸ This persisting co-existence of 'the old and the new' and consequent ethnic heterogeneity is attributable, as Fürer-Haimendorf (1985:1) observed, to 'an attitude basic to Indian ideology which accepted the variety of cultural forms as natural and immutable, and did not consider their assimilation to a single pattern in any way desirable'.

Consequently, it has never been anomalous to regard Indian tribal world as a large assortment of communities, differing widely in size, mode of livelihood and social organisation. They have all been tribes, not because they were all at exactly the same stage of evolution, but because they all stood somewhat outside the Hindu civilization. This does not preclude the continuity of the protracted process of tribal assimilation within the mainstream Hindu society – albeit with varying degrees of haziness and pace across diverse Indian locations. The so-called tribe-caste

⁷Some discreet evidence of the remnants of Hindu customs and practices amid many tribal areas has sometimes led some scholars to claim that tribes have always been a part and parcel of the Hindu caste-based society (Ghurye 1959).

⁸There exist, of course, some converse instances, namely, of a caste adapting itself to the *tribal* socio-cultural milieu, either because of a specific/local caste group having been surrounded by tribal communities (e.g. the Badagas in Nilgiri of Tamil Nadu; see Hockings 1999), or due to the former's political defeat/surrender to some dominant tribes (e.g. Bhils and Girasia of Rajasthan; see Chauhan 1978, and Unnithan-Kumar 1997). In some regions (e.g. in Dravidian south and central India) many tribal groups, while dependent on the Indo-Aryan caste structure, continue to maintain some of their own socio-cultural distinctions e.g. clan-tribal social organisation, and gender equities (e.g. Volchok 1964).

⁶A number of tribes, who continued to remain outside the influence of Hindu caste society, include the indigenous ones of Andaman Islands, namely the Onge, Jarwa, and some of the north-eastern hill areas namely, Abor, Dafla and a few others.

continuum through passage of time has never wiped out differentials between them at any given point of time. Even socio-cultural differences amongst tribal groups across Indian regions could not obliterate core common features of the aggregate tribal population (Mandelbaum 1970:576–585). In fact the present chapter seeks to throw useful light on the key demographic differences and their socio-cultural underpinnings between the three broad social categories of India, namely tribes *as a whole*, lower caste people, and the mainstream caste society.

A fairly rich tradition of anthropological research on India's tribes since the nineteenth century was initiated by painstaking and detailed ethnographic works of some dedicated and eminent British anthropologists and administrators (see e.g. Bêteille 1974:62; Vidyarthi 1978:9), though some of the staunch nationalist persuasions viewed the latter as being motivated essentially by the parochial purpose of facilitating colonial rule and control over India's tribes.⁹ The process of preparing lists of tribes (apparently with the view to giving them some administrative and political concessions) acquired systematic character from the 1931 census. While the British official view of tribal peoples thus treated them as distinct from the Hindu caste society, to the eyes of many nationalist leaders, the British policy of making tribal tracts 'excluded areas' from direct colonial administration was a reflection of a 'divide and rule's strategy (see e.g. Bates 1988).

The Government of India Act of 1935 entailed some special provisions for the tribal people, and a list of Backward Tribes was promulgated in 1936 with the immediate purpose of their representation (not protective provisions) for all the provinces except Punjab and Bengal (Kulkarni 1991).¹⁰ These administrative identifications of

diverse tribal groups, with a potential of offering special benefits, hardly faced academic contestations. Thus what we see, especially since the British colonial administration, is a co-existence of two somewhat distinct discourses on the deeply contentious question of identity/notion/category of castes and tribes: 'academic' (involving anthropology, history, sociology), and 'administrative' or 'working'. While each has drawn on the other, nevertheless a peaceful separation has not perished. As one eminent sociologist once remarked, '[w]hile it might be necessary for the administration, in the process of distributing benefits and privileges, to consider particular societies as *either* tribes *or* elements in a caste system, there is no reason why we, as sociologists, should do this' (Bailey 1961:15). Alas, subsequent development of the discourse on caste and tribe and the real-life experiences do not seem to bear clear testimony to an allegiance to this spirit. Thus we now turn to the scope, influence and implications of using census and other official information towards understanding the demography of the broad social stratification in India.

Castes and Tribes in Indian Censuses

India is indisputably one of the very few non-Western countries for which fairly rich decennial census information is available since the early 1870s, without a single break so far. The beginning of population censuses in the early 1870s heralded what one could call an administrative/official domain or discourse of caste, which has been distinct and somewhat insulated – not surprisingly – from the actual reality and

⁹Indeed, after Independence, the emerging discipline of sociology became disproportionately favourable to the study of castes, while anthropology with its preoccupation with the study of tribes was derided 'because of its colonial associations' (Unnithan-Kumar 1997:14).

¹⁰The British had begun enacting special laws for tribal communities much earlier e.g. the Scheduled Districts Act of 1874 declaring a detailed list of Scheduled districts immune to provincial acts (e.g. Kulkarni 1991:205).

Subsequently, the Government of India Act 1919 empowered the Governor General to declare any territory as scheduled/backward. Special provisions were offered to the *areas* inhabited by tribal communities, without debarring non-tribal peoples, if any, from enjoying the provisions in those specified areas. This coupling of tribal identity with *areas* had continued even in post-independence period well until 1976 when the Removal of Area Restrictions (Amendment) Act was passed.

functioning of caste in day-to-day life of the society. While the first Indian census in 1871–1872 came up with ‘twenty-odd identities’ in terms of ‘an elaborate classification of peoples based on racial, religious, and caste criteria’, the number grew to several hundred by the fourth census of 1901, which in fact cross-tabulated caste with education, occupation, and marriage (Kreager 1997:165). The census, though often posited as neutral, tended to create new relationships amongst constituent groups by fixing explicit identities onto shifting collective representations. Therefore, census enumerations of people by caste, occupation, and other characteristics could not but have bearings on social consciousness and politics both by widening possibilities of complex social transformations and innovations on the one hand and by brewing social conflicts/movements on the other. Indeed, the British authorities’ elaborate efforts towards enumerating diverse castes and/or sub-castes have often been viewed as a step towards utilizing socially divisive forces inherent in the caste system to neutralise nationalists’ reformist ideals of eradicating caste-based social hierarchy/stratification and inequities (Galanter 1984). As Fuller (2003:481) writes, ‘British rule did not create the hierarchical caste system and the Brahmanical ideology that legitimated it, but it did give the system a centrality and inflexibility which it had not had before’. This said, the colonial administration, by undertaking elaborate initiatives at enumerating the people of India by numerous castes, tribes, and religious communities, sowed the seeds of the key ingredients necessary for constructing and understanding the *demography* of social stratification and its important demographic underpinnings and ramifications.

Castes

Beginning in 1881 the census reports of British India and the accompanying statistical tables had presented key demographic and socio-cultural information for most individual castes – albeit until 1941 census when tabulation on caste has been, and continued to remain, scrapped at the

country level until its revival again in the 2011 census. While detailed census information on individual castes prior to 1941 has been considered by many as what Kingsley Davis called a ‘rich harvest’ yet to be fully reaped, India after independence scrapped the entire scheme of caste-wise census enumeration on the ground of its perceived (and potential) incongruence with broader goals of social harmony, justice, and equality.

Given the fluidity of the notion of caste both across space and time and related confusions in the names of castes and sub-castes and their classification, it has been almost impossible to ascertain the exact number of castes (and sub-castes) in the country. In 1901 census (which marks the last attempt at a complete tabulation of all castes), the number of ‘main’ castes and tribes was 2,378 – some of which ran into the millions and others had a mere handful. In any case, the British census authorities’ efforts on caste enumeration fed chiefly into the anthropological and sociological research reports written mostly by British administrators such as E. A. Gait, H. Risley, D. Ibbetson, R. V. Russell, R. E. Enthoven, E. A. H. Blunt and J. H. Hutton. As Kingsley Davis, the doyen of India’s historical demography, stated in his celebrated book published around the time of the country’s Independence, ‘much of what is known about caste in India during modern times comes from the census’ (Davis 1951:162). This contrasts with the US and UK where chief official motif behind the collection of census information on ethnic group and race has not been the exploration into religious or cultural differences between them, but only an inquiry into the relative material disadvantage (Sundar 1999:101–102)

In an effort to derive sense out of the maze of numerous castes and sub-castes, some grouping of them is imperative enough. A prominent line of division is the one between ‘clean castes,’ who are interior to the Hindu society, and the ‘unclean’ or ‘outcaste’ or ‘untouchable’ or ‘exterior’ castes, whom the British clubbed together under the name, ‘depressed’ caste/class. Although this broad (binary) division is not uniform across the wide regions of the country, it is ‘the deepest cleavage’ in Hindu society that persists independently of

religion. British censuses used to apply several criteria for the membership in the depressed castes. However an extremely wide variation in its degree and form made it too difficult to count the number of persons belonging to 'depressed castes' with reasonable level of consistency.¹¹ Keeping in mind the possible errors and discrepancies of interpretation, we utilize what Kingsley Davis arrived fairly meticulously at the population estimates for 'exterior castes' or 'depressed castes' (excluding Muslims and Christians) during the pre-Independence period (see Table 10.1).

Over several decades preceding the Independence, organised social and political movements of the 'depressed' classes had gathered momentum along with, or as an offshoot of, the escalating Hindu-Muslim communal politics within the broader context of independence movement (Bayly 1999). By the 1930s, it became almost imperative for the government to evolve a suitable term for the 'untouchable' because of the growing resentment against the odium attached to it. The Government of India Act 1935 introduced a single term 'Scheduled Castes' to refer to a cluster of groups hitherto variously called 'untouchables', or 'depressed castes', or 'exterior castes', of whom a country-wide list was prepared in 1936 as a separate Schedule in the Act. The preparation, modification, and official approval of this list (or rather Schedule) became increasingly the responsibility of the Government of India as enshrined finally in the Indian Constitution promulgated in 1950 (Béteille 1969:87).¹² In the latter, President is empowered to specify, after consulting with the Governor of a state, those castes or groups who, for the purposes of the Constitution, would be deemed to

be Scheduled Castes in relation to the State. Once thus promulgated, this schedule can be changed only by Act of Parliament. The first President of independent India did promulgate a Scheduled Castes Order in 1950, which basically re-enacted the 1936 list, with only few additions.¹³ In 1951, there were a few changes, 'but these were in the nature of adjustments and elimination of anomalies, rather than any basic change in policy' (Galanter 1984:132).

In fact, the Constituent Assembly, which drew up the Indian Constitution after protracted deliberations between 1946 and 1949, set out with the *ideal* of abolishing the pre-existing caste-based social order. This was amply reflected in the provisions for equality of status and opportunity as enunciated in the final vision of the Constitution (Radhakrishnan 1999:167–169). Ironically enough, the ideals and popular rhetoric – visible mostly in political manifestos and official documents, reformist discourses, and in textbook teachings – of achieving a 'casteless' society are not echoed in the Constitution of India adopted in 1950, which appears rather unclear about the *position* of caste groups in Indian *social* life. For example, the ambivalence of the Constitution took the form of its clear recognition of the logic of caste in its undertaking to abolish and fight 'social injustice'. While Article 17 of the 1950 Constitution bans 'untouchability' and its practice in any form, its Article 46 vows to 'promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes' who deserve, as it proclaims, to be protected 'from social injustice and all forms of exploitation'.

Indeed fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution include: equality before the law; absence of discrimination on grounds of

¹¹ For various reasons and illustrations of the difficulties in classifying depressed castes, see Davis (1951: 166–167). See also Bhagat (2006) for a useful discussion on the pertinent issues and dilemmas surrounding census enumeration of caste both in the British and post-Independence periods.

¹² The Government of India had refrained from announcing an official classification until 1936 allegedly to avoid official stigmatization of these 'depressed' groups with a low social rank/status (e.g. Galanter 1984:123).

¹³ In this list, Christians, Muslims and the hill and forest tribes, with tribal religion were categorically excluded. Indeed some other conflicting claims of the aborigines were settled by Government of India (Provincial Legislative Assembly) Order 1936 with a separate list of backward tribes. For a useful discussion on the origin and evolution of scheduled castes people, see Gupta 1985, especially chapters 1 and 2.

Table 10.1 Comparative long-term trends in growth and sex-composition among backward castes (SC), tribal (ST), and other castes (OC) populations, India, 1881–2001

Year	Population [% to the total population]			Decadal growth rate (%)			Sex-ratio (female/1,000 males)		
	OC	SC	ST	OC	SC	ST	OC	SC	ST
Pre-independence India									
1881			6,426,511 [2.57]						
1891			9,112,018 [3.26]			41.79			992
1901			8,184,758 [2.88]			-10.18			1,021
1911			9,593,695 [3.17]			17.21			1,016
1921	162,187,077 ^{d,c} [53.1]	52,700,000 [17.2]	9,072,024 [3.00]			-7.2			996
1931	188,513,108 ^d [55.8]	50,200,000 [14.9]	7,629,959 [2.45]	16.23/	7.31	15.9			1,009
1941	212,585,929 ^d [55.0]	48,810,000 [12.6]	8,791,354 ^f [2.26]	12.77	12.50	6.17			985
			2,47,12,000 ^g [7.85]						
Independent India									
1951 ^a	286,418,998 [80.25]	51,343,898 [14.39]	19,111,498 [5.29]				938	991	1,021 ⁱ
1961	344,938,156 [78.53]	64,417,366 [14.67]	30,130,184 [6.86]	16.97	25.46	33.84 ^a	941	957	987
1971	430,156,213 [78.47]	80,005,398 [14.60]	38,015,162 [6.90]	19.81	24.20	26.17	924	935	982
1981 ^b	508,878,675 [76.49]	104,754,623 [15.75]	51,628,638 [7.76]	15.47	30.93	30.6 ^b	930	932	983
1991 ^c	632,627,761 [75.44]	138,223,277 [16.48]	67,758,380 [8.08]	19.56	31.95	25.68	923	922	972
2001	777,629,408 [75.60]	166,635,277 [16.20]	84,326,240 [8.20]	18.65	20.56	24.50	928	936	977
2011	904,910,453 [74.75]	201,378,086 [16.60]	1,04,281,034 [8.6]	16.37	20.80	23.70	933	945	990

Source: For most of the British India figures, Davis (1951), Table 77, p. 179, Table 75, p. 169 and p. 167; *Fifth report of the commissioner for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes for 1955*, Appendix Table VII, p. 31; Mamoria (1958), p. 26; Galanter (1984), Table 14, p. 131; and Natarajan (1971), p. 9. For post-Independence period, *Census Reports*, Nag (1984), pp. 15–16; Bose (1996)

Note: (1) In the 1951 census the tribal population was for the first time enumerated according to a statutory list of scheduled tribes notified by the president under Article 342 of the constitution, which was enlarged through Modification as per order in 1956. According to the 1956 Modification order the tribal population for the 1951 census was revised upward as being 22, 511, 584, with the revised percentage rising to 6.23. Since tribal population in 1961 was enumerated according to the 1956 Modification list of scheduled tribes, the decadal growth rate of tribal population during 1951–1961 has been calculated on the basis of this revised tribal population for 1951. (2) Figures in [] brackets are respective percentage shares to the total enumerated population

^aSee note 1 above

^bExcludes Assam. The decadal growth rate during 1971–1981 has been calculated by excluding the population of Assam.

^cExcludes Jammu and Kashmir. The decadal growth rate during 1981–1991 has been calculated excluding population of both Assam and Jammu and Kashmir

^dExclusive of people belonging to the religions other than Hindu

^eExcludes 2,331,332 persons in NW Frontier Prov. Not numerated by religion but believed to be Muslim

^fIn view of a change in classification in the 1941 census, this is an estimate – made for the purpose of achieving comparability with the figures of tribal population identified as Animists till 1931 or as people practising tribal religion in 1931 census – of tribal population in 1941, derived after adjustments to the enumerated population of ‘tribal origin’. See Davis (1951), Appendix J for adjustments and assumptions involved in obtaining this estimate

^gTribal population for 1941 census represents population of Tribes or Communities having tribal origin

^hThis has been calculated on the basis of revised estimate of tribal population for 1971 (which is 39,489,232 excluding Assam) after taking account of the abolition of hitherto imposed area restriction for most tribes by an Act of parliament in 1976, which resulted in larger population of several tribes in many states according to 1971 census than were actually enumerated (see Sinha 1986, Tables 10.4.1, 4.2, and Appendix). In fact the office of the Registrar General worked the revised population of tribals for states where the revision was necessary (see Sinha 1993)

ⁱFor India and Pakistan together (Visaria 1969, Table 10.2.9)

race, caste, sex, place of birth, and equality of opportunity in public appointments; and of course, a ban on the practice of 'untouchability'. But the simultaneous gestures of the Constitution in identifying the socially depressed classes in the pursuit of providing them with special protection and benefits could easily bring in some anomalous outcomes, which clearly fell far short of the ideal of stamping out the caste system that has been so deep-rooted so long in the Indian society. Consequently, the official aim and programme for complete removal of 'untouchability' in the matter of drinking water provision in villages across the country ended up creating *separate* wells for the unofficially 'untouchables', thus lending indirectly to a virtual recognition or cognizance to the perennial social evil and inequity (Roy-Burman 1974).

On the other hand, the provision of protective or compensatory discrimination impelled the delimitation of the three social categories of recipients clubbed under a label, Backward Classes (BC), on the ground of the age-old caste-based social inequities and disabilities experienced by them. The two major groups, namely, the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST), the recipients of the largest proportion of special government funds and expenditures on the welfare of the backward classes, are accorded with special constitutional provisions for reservation of seats in parliament and state legislatures, and of posts in government services, while the third, called Other Backward Classes (OBC) was neither defined clearly nor offered any specified provisions.¹⁴ A permanent office of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, to act as a watchdog of the progress and welfare of these sections, is also provided for by the Constitution.

¹⁴The OBC is a heterogeneous category, varying widely from state to state, composed mostly of castes (and some non-Hindu communities) who are low, but not as low as SC, in the traditional social hierarchy. A few tribal and nomadic groups, as well as converts to non-Hindu religions from the SC, and in some areas the Denotified Tribes, formerly called 'criminal tribes' by an Act of 1924 and subsequently 'ex-criminal' tribes by another Act of 1952, are also included in the OBC.

In the decades following the Independence, there was a steady rise of ascriptive identity politics surrounding social stratification on caste lines mostly at the regional level across the country. The politics of castes derived its major sustenance from the affirmative action policies revolving around reservations and other protective/special benefits for scheduled groups whose attractiveness in the context of electoral democracy lies chiefly in their role as vote banks. In fact such caste politics swept up to the point whereby the voice for the revival of caste enumeration as part of census operations began to be pressing particularly since the 1990s (Sundar 1999 and relevant literature cited therein). Indeed after a somewhat heated controversy and debates, the government in power did accede in 2010 to a caste census as the part of 2011 population census in the country (Gupta 2010; Vijayanunni et al. 2010; Béteille 1998b; Srinivas 1998). As noted earlier, while demography is key to the construction and continuity of social stratifications in India, the census operation, caste enumeration in census, the data produced exert major influences on the patterns and trends in the demography of social stratifications themselves (Sundar 1999).

Tribes

In all the censuses of British India (except in 1941), religion has been one prominent criterion for classification of the country's population, with tribes being categorised as those practising hundreds of different 'primitive' religions. In fact, they used to be classified as 'animists' until the 1931 census in which they were enumerated under the heading 'tribal religion'. Thus, up to 1941, the use of religious category in the census enumeration enabled the census authorities to bypass many complex issues – anthropological, sociological, and historical – involved in the notion and/or identity of diverse tribes across the country.

It was only in 1941 that the tribes were defined, for the first time in the history of Indian census, not in terms of their religion or faith, but their 'origin'. Of course, this major shift in the criterion of enumeration brought in a serious difficulty of

comparability between 1941 and the preceding census enumerations by people's religious affiliation (Davis 1951, Appendix J). This calls for appropriate caution in drawing conclusions. In examining the long-term trends, the question of comparability of data from one census to other could be of key importance, while in a *comparative* demographic analysis of two sub-populations for a single census year, the question of *relative* accuracy and coverage of enumeration is of greater significance.

Around the time of India's independence, a serious rethinking on the notion of tribal identity was evoked by political leaders who wanted to bring up tribal and other backward sections to the mainstream level through 'affection', 'friendliness' and some special protections and provisions. The Constitution of India empowered the President to declare any tribal community or part thereof as 'scheduled tribe' to be eligible for those special provisions and benefits. With the adoption of the Constitution in 1950 the President promulgated in the same year a list of Scheduled Tribes (ST thereafter) and Scheduled Areas, which was based, in a large measure, on the list of Backward Tribes promulgated in 1936 by the British colonial administration. At the first census of independent India in 1951, the number of scheduled tribal communities or part thereof was 212, with specific areas being earmarked for each. The Constitutional provisions – bolstered by the tradition of census operations having substantialized the broad caste and tribe groups – 'sealed the boundaries between tribe and non-tribe' and gave to the tribal identity 'a kind of definiteness it lacked in the past' (Béteille 1986:318). Thus since the 1950s there emerged not only a definite tribal identity with legal sanction, but also a distinct political interest forging that identity.

Without laying down specific criteria for scheduling a tribe, the Indian Constitution has empowered the President of the country to appoint a Backward Classes Commission, with three major tasks: to evaluate conditions of socially backward classes; to recommend policy for amelioration of their hardships and deprivations; and to re-examine existing list of STs for suggesting its revision, if necessary. The first such Backward

Classes Commission was appointed in 1953, which came up with a recommendation for declaring some additional communities as scheduled. Accordingly, a modified (and enlarged) list of scheduled tribes was notified by the President in 1956, and the list was published under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Modification) Order, 1956. Consequently, by the 1961 census the number of scheduled tribe rose to 427 (which was an increase by more than twice the number identified and enumerated in the 1951 census), and further on to 432 by the census of 1971.

Owing to various problems and complaints, the Removal of Area Restrictions (Amendment) Act of 1976 was passed to remove the area restriction for tribal identity which was thus made equally applicable to all the areas of state. Consequently, STs began to mean, for all practical purposes, 'tribal population' of the country. Difficulties, of course, remained due inter alia to 'the varying definition of a tribe, by changes to the list of officially recognised tribes, by qualitative deficiencies in demographic data, administrative changes to India's regions and by the reclassification of tribes as castes' (Wiercinski 1996; Sundar 1999:104–114), but these possible defects of census data have usually not been so serious as to obliterate the discernible distinctions in demographic features and parameters between the tribal and mainstream populations (Maharatna 2005).

Preparations of schedules for tribal (ST) and lower castes (SC) people had gone simultaneously. There might have been some anomalies in the official recording of these two social identities, but this does not preclude possibilities of fruitful and imaginative use of census information (at least) for some specific purposes. In fact, as we would see below, census data do often depict contrasting (demographic) patterns between these two social groups and their changes over time. While these two groups do not seem to have been historically much different in terms of overall *economic* footing, they have been pretty distinct socio-culturally (Maharatna 2005). Indeed, the early Backward Classes Commission reports used to distinguish between the STs and the SCs not exactly on the criterion

of economic conditions and related variables, but in terms of the differentials in lifestyle and other socio-cultural characteristics (Singh 1997). In fact the SC communities, unlike overall STs, have not been free of 'the influence of the ethically loaded, partly puritanical theology and world-view of literate upper caste Hindus, whose messages they receive through verbal communication, and through cultural performances, such as dance, drama etc' (Sinha 1957:116). Given all this as background, we now turn to examining castes and tribes from the standpoint of their demographic trends, structure, behaviour, and outcomes, as the latter can be useful for deeper insights into the notions of castes and tribes themselves and into the dynamics of India's broad social stratification.

Population Growth Among Broad Social Categories

As noted already, the demographic processes are central to the deeper understanding of the dynamics of diverse social groups, social structure, and stratifications. Despite British-laid tradition of census enumeration by caste, race, and religion and despite a rich mass of information thereon, the demographic dimensions and dynamics did not, for long, find an adequate prominence in the otherwise voluminous sociological and anthropological literature on India's castes and tribes. Until recently there has been relatively little effort towards the important task of collating demographic features, trends, processes with the socio-cultural features and dynamics in diverse social groups of India. [There have recently been a few attempts in this direction with reference to aggregate tribes (e.g. Maharatna 2000a, b, 2005; Mitra 2008).] In this context, the present section of the paper focuses on the demographic dynamics of India's social stratification, particularly amongst the three broad social groups, namely, ST, SC and others (OC).

Keeping in mind the above qualifications/cautions about the census data on these three broad social groups, we can examine the aggregative long-term changes in their absolute and relative

population sizes and sex-composition since the late nineteenth century (see Table 10.1). As noted already, the census information on the distribution between lower (SC) and other/upper caste (OC) populations – both under the Hindu fold – is too patchy as to arrive at respective reliable counts until 1921 census (Davis 1951:167). In any case, over the decades preceding the Independence there had been declines in the enumerated SC population as against moderate increases in the OC population. Although this catches one's eyes, this could be more apparent than real, and cannot safely be taken to represent a 'trend', both because of lack of data for an extended series and partly due to changing definition or connotation of 'lower castes' (Davis 1951:167). However, declines in the enumerated size of SC population in the pre-Independence years reflect, to a considerable extent, a tendency amongst many members of lower caste communities to improve their status 'by changing their caste names or otherwise dissimulating' (ibid, p. 167, fn 45; Bhagat 2006:124). This, of course, illustrates how the census of population by caste, as was practiced in the pre-independence period, infused some in-built forces that might have produced demographic artefacts pertaining to social composition and structure of the Indian society. Indeed, post-independence India, as we would see below, could not be entirely free of this murky (and perhaps somewhat muddling) element of intermediations between social categories/hierarchy, politics, and numeric composition of social stratification. After a prolonged suspension of caste enumerations in Indian censuses since independence, it has been resurrected in the latest census of 2011, despite considerable debates and opposition particularly in the academic and scholarly arenas (see Sundar 1999 and relevant references cited therein). This clearly shows an inextricable link between the escalating caste-based identity politics on the one hand and the numeric and enumerative dimensions of caste identity on the other.

At any rate, while the post-independence period witnessed a positive rate of growth of enumerated population for all major social categories, it has been much higher among the ST and SC groups than that of OC. The proportions

of SC and ST in total population have both risen respectively by about 2 and 3 % points – between 1951 and 2001, along with a drop of about 5 % point from OC's initial share at around 80 %. The explanation for the rises in the proportion of SC population since independence seems to be broadly twofold. First, there have been repeated expansions of the list of SCs and concomitant 'infiltrations' into its enumerated size particularly until the 1980s (for an authoritative account of these processes up to the mid-1970s, see Galanter 1984, especially chap 5). This expanding list of SCs has been linked with rapid acceleration of the mobilisation politics (played both by newly aspiring regional as well as national parties) since the 1960s over special state provisions and benefits for the scheduled classes (Bayly 1999: especially chapter 7). Thus, the extent to which the rise of the proportionate share of SC population is contributed by the enlargement of its list reflects essentially a reshuffling of the existing population, rather than differential *patterns and changes* in real demographic parameters (e.g. fertility, mortality rates) and processes. However, 'real' demographic processes, namely, differential rates of fertility, mortality and natural increase, have played no negligible part in pushing up the proportionate share of SC in the total population in the post-independence period (at least) up to 1991. For example, as we would discuss shortly, the human fertility level of overall SC population has been always higher than those of the two other groups throughout post-independence period until the early 2000s when the former went below that of the ST community at the national level.

Tables 10.2 and 10.3 present detailed information pertaining to growth of SC, ST, and total population across regions and states of India as well as patterns and trends in their spatial distribution. Consistent with India's geographic vastness and immense diversities, neither the rate of population growth for the major social groups, nor the social composition of population is uniform across regions and states. For example, the northern region is the home of a little less than a third of the country's total SC population, followed by about a quarter each in the east and southern

regions, followed by western, central, and north-eastern regions in that order. Although this broad spatial distribution of SC population across regions has remained almost unchanged over the entire post-independence period, there have been some distinct increases in the share of SC population in western and southern regions over the period starting from 1961. This is of course corroborated by the higher than national growth rates for SC population in these states up to the 1991 census, with Karnataka particularly standing out with an exceptionally high growth rate of enumerated SC population in the 1971–1981 decade. The relatively faster growth of enumerated SC population particularly in the southern and western states has in large measure been linked to escalation of politics involving SC vote banks, reservation and special benefits for SC people.

Of late, however, i.e. in the 1991–2001 decade, the SC category has witnessed the largest *absolute* decline in its population growth rate vis-à-vis those of ST and others both at the national level and in the majority of the regions and states. As will be seen, this reflects (at least partly) a relatively faster pace of fertility transition among the overall SC community of the country. Indeed, in Kerala the SC community had begun reducing fertility the earliest among all the major social groups and they have also evinced the lowest fertility rate over the several preceding decades.

Unlike lower castes (SC) population, tribal (ST) people's enumerated size is available from the early 1880s. Table 10.1 depicts broad features of long-term growth of the latter in comparison with total population since the late nineteenth century. Except for three decades, namely, 1891–1901, 1911–1921, and 1921–1931, aggregate tribal population registered increases in the other periods. For example, during 1881–1891 decade the enumerated *total* population increased by about 12 %, while the corresponding figure recorded for tribal population was three and half times larger. This could partly be a reflection of improvements in enumeration coverage of tribal peoples in remote and isolated terrains. However, over the following decade of 1891–1901, tribal population had experienced a substantial *decline* in their *absolute* number vis-à-vis some increase

Table 10.2 Proportion of SC and ST population, 1961–2001

State/UT	Proportion of SC population						Proportion of ST population					
	Total population						Total population					
	1961	1991	2001	1961	1991	2001	1961	1991	2001	1961	1991	2001
India States	14.67	16.33	16.20	100.0	100.0	100.0	6.90	8.08	8.2	100	100	2001
North-Eastern	3.15	6.85	3.66	1.34	1.56	1.48	22.9	25.8	27	11.0	12.0	12.3
Assam	6.75	7.4	6.85	1.14	1.20	1.1	10.74	12.82	12.4	3.86	4.24	3.9
Manipur	1.71	2.02	0.48	0.02	0.03	0.04	31.92	34.41	34.2	0.82	0.93	0.9
Meghalaya	0.16	0.51	0.48	0.00	0.01	0.01	83.07	85.53	85.9	2.11	2.24	2.4
Nagaland	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	–	0	93.92	87.7	89.1	1.13	1.57	2.1
Tripura	0.85	16.36	17.37	0.19	0.33	0.33	31.52	30.95	31.1	1.19	1.26	1.2
Arunachal Pradesh	–	0.47	0.56	0.00	0.00	0.01	88.59	63.61	64.2	0.98	0.81	0.8
Mizoram	0.00	0.1	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	98.1	94.75	94.5	0.86	0.96	1.0
Eastern	16.31	18.12	17.94	25.09	24.46	24.48	10.6	9.4	6.7	34.7	25.9	15.9
Bihar	14.00	14.56	14.77	10.10	9.10	7.83	9.05	7.66	0.9	13.93	9.76	0.9
Orissa	15.75	16.2	16.53	4.29	3.71	3.65	24.06	22.21	22.1	13.99	10.38	9.7
West Bengal	19.73	23.62	23.02	10.70	11.63	11.07	5.88	5.6	5.5	6.8	5.62	5.2
Sikkim	–	5.93	5.02	–	0.02	0.02	–	22.36	20.6	–	0.13	0.1
Central	13.14	14.55	14.26	6.60	6.96	6.95	20.6	23.3	20.3	–	–	14.5
Madhya Pradesh	13.14	14.55	14.26	6.60	6.96	6.95	20.62	23.37	20.3	22.13	22.73	14.5
Western	8.58	11.74	11.27	10.80	14.08	13.92	9.4	11.6	11.4	25.0	28.2	27.7
Gujarat	6.63	7.41	7.09	2.12	2.21	2.16	13.34	14.92	14.8	9.12	9.09	8.9
Maharashtra	5.63	11.1	10.20	3.46	6.34	5.93	6.06	9.27	8.9	7.94	10.8	10.2
Rajasthan	16.67	17.29	17.16	5.22	5.50	5.81	11.66	12.44	12.6	7.79	8.08	8.4
D. & N. Havel	1.70	1.97	1.86	0.00	0.00	0.00	88.43	78.99	62.2	0.16	0.16	0.2
Goa	–	2.08	1.90 ^a	–	0.02	0.01	– ^a	11.54 ^a	0.04 ^a	– ^a	0.02 ^a	0.0 ^a
Daman and Diu	–	3.83	3.06	–	–	0.00	–	–	–	–	–	–
Northern	20.20	20.86	20.93	31.08	30.01	31.54	0.16	0.35	0.2	–	0.74	0.3
Jammu and Kashmir	7.98	–	7.59	0.44	–	0.46	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Haryana	18.18	19.75	19.35	2.14	2.35	2.45	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Punjab	22.75	28.31	28.85	3.93	4.15	4.22	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Chandigarh	–	16.51	17.50	–	0.08	0.09	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Uttar Pradesh	20.88	21.04	20.99	23.91	21.18	21.1	–	0.21	0.1	–	0.42	0.1

(continued)

Table 10.2 (continued)

State/UT	Proportion of SC population					Proportion of ST population					
	Total population					Total population					
	1961	1991	2001	1961	1991	1961	1991	2001	1961	1991	2001
Himachal Pradesh	21.18	25.34	24.72	0.92	0.95	4.34	4.22	4.0	0.4	0.32	0.3
Delhi	12.85	19.05	16.92	0.53	-	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Southern	14.16	16.07	16.07	24.29	22.93	1.8	3.6	4.8	6.5	10.3	11.3
Andhra Pradesh	13.82	15.93	16.19	7.72	7.66	3.68	6.31	6.6	4.38	6.2	6.0
Karnataka	13.22	16.38	16.20	4.84	5.33	0.81	4.26	6.6	0.63	2.83	4.1
Kerala	8.49	9.92	9.81	2.23	2.09	1.25	1.1	1.1	0.7	0.47	0.4
Tamil Nadu	18.01	19.18	19.00	9.42	7.75	0.74	1.03	1.0	0.83	0.85	0.8
Puducherry	15.40	16.25	16.99	0.09	0.09	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Islands	-	-	-	-	-	5.3	-	20.6	5.4	0.10	0.1
A. & N. Islands	-	-	0.00	-	-	22.22	9.54	8.3	0.04	0.04	0.0
Lakshadweep	-	-	0.00	-	-	97.02	93.15	94.5	0.07	0.07	0.1

NA not available

^aIncludes Daman and Diu

Table 10.3 Average annual growth rates (SC and ST population), 1961–2001

State/UT	Average annual growth rates (total)				Average annual growth rates (SC)				Average annual growth rates (ST)			
	1961–1971	1971–1981	1981–1991	1991–2001	1961–1971	1971–1981	1981–1991	1991–2001	1961–1971	1971–1981	1981–1991	1991–2001
India	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.4	3.1	3.2	2.1	2.2	2.7	2.3	2.4
North-Eastern	3.5	2.6	2.7	2.2	3.0	5.8^a	4.9^a	1.4	3.1	3.1	12.6	2.7
Assam	3.5	2.3	2.4	1.9	2.5	–	–	1.0	3.2	–	–	1.5
Manipur	3.8	3.2	2.9	1.8	2.2	0.8	10.9	6.2	2.9	1.5	4.9	0.9
Meghalaya	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.1	20.8	4.1	6.5	2.3	2.1	2.8	3.4	3.1
Nagaland	4.0	5.0	5.6	6.5	–	–	–	–	2.8	3.5	4.7	6.7
Tripura	3.6	3.2	3.4	1.6	6.1	6.1	4.5	2.3	2.2	2.6	3.8	1.6
Arunachal Pradesh	3.9	3.5	3.7	2.7	–	–	3.9	5.3	2.1	1.8	2.2	2.8
Mizoram	2.5	4.9	4.0	2.9	–	–	–	–	1.8	4.0	3.3	2.8
Eastern	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.4	3.0	3.0	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.7
Bihar ^b	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.7	2.2	2.8	2.4	2.9	1.6	1.7	1.3	1.9
Orissa	2.5	2.0	2.0	1.6	2.0	1.7	3.3	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.7	1.6
West Bengal	2.7	2.3	2.5	1.8	2.8	3.6	3.4	1.5	2.1	1.7	2.2	1.6
Sikkim	2.9	5.1	2.8	3.3	–	9.2	3.2	1.3	–	–	2.1	2.2
Central	2.9	2.5	2.7	2.3	2.8	3.5	3.1	2.0	2.3	2.0	2.5	2.6
Madhya Pradesh	2.9	2.5	2.7	2.3	2.8	3.5	3.1	2.0	2.3	2.0	2.5	2.6
Western	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.9	4.3	5.2	1.9	3.1	3.8	2.8	2.2
Gujarat	2.9	2.8	2.1	2.3	3.4	3.4	2.6	1.7	3.0	2.6	2.4	2.1
Maharashtra	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.3	3.6	4.8	9.5	1.3	2.1	4.1	2.4	1.7
Rajasthan	2.8	3.3	2.8	2.8	2.1	4.3	3.0	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.7	3.0
D. & N. Havel	2.8	4.0	3.4	5.9	3.5	5.3	3.4	5.0	2.3	2.2	2.9	2.6
Goa	3.5	2.7	1.6	1.5	–	4.5	1.8	–0.2	– ^c	3.4 ^c	1.2 ^c	5.1 ^c
Daman and Diu	7.1	2.6	2.9	5.6	–	2.1	3.8	2.4	–	–	–	–
Northern	2.2	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.5	3.0	2.5	2.7	1.6	2.6	1.8	2.0
Jammu and Kashmir	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.1	3.4	3.0	–	–	NA	NA	NA	NA
Haryana	3.2	2.9	2.7	2.8	3.7	3.0	3.2	2.6	NA	NA	NA	NA
Punjab	2.2	2.4	2.1	2.0	3.2	3.5	2.7	2.2	NA	NA	NA	NA
Chandigarh	11.5	7.6	4.2	4.0	–	11.9	6.7	4.9	NA	NA	NA	NA
Uttar Pradesh ^b	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.0	2.6	2.5	2.5	–	1.6	2.1	4.2

(continued)

Table 10.3 (continued)

State/UT	Average annual growth rates (total)				Average annual growth rates (SC)				Average annual growth rates (ST)			
	1961–1971	1971–1981	1981–1991	1991–2001	1961–1971	1971–1981	1981–1991	1991–2001	1961–1971	1971–1981	1981–1991	1991–2001
Himachal Pradesh	2.3	2.4	2.1	1.8	2.9	3.7	2.4	1.5	1.5	3.3	1	1.2
Delhi	5.3	5.3	5.1	4.7	8.6	7.6	6.0	3.1	NA	NA	NA	NA
Southern	2.3	2.2	1.9	1.4	2.0	3.4	2.6	1.4	2.5	8.5	2.1	3.6
Andhra Pradesh	2.1	2.3	2.4	1.5	1.6	3.8	3.3	1.6	2.2	3.6	2.8	2.0
Karnataka	2.4	2.7	2.1	1.8	2.4	4.5	3.2	1.6	1.8	19.4	0.5	8.1
Kerala	2.6	1.9	1.4	0.9	2.4	4.4	1.3	0.8	2.3	3.1	2.1	1.3
Tamil Nadu	2.2	1.7	1.5	1.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.1	2.1	1.5	1	1.3
Puducherry	2.8	2.8	3.4	2.1	2.8	3.3	3.6	2.0	NA	NA	NA	NA
Islands	6.8	5.6	4.5	2.5	–	–	–	–	2.7	2.6	2.5	1.6
A. & N. Islands	8.1	6.4	4.9	2.7	–	–	–	–	2.5	2.1	1.8	0.7
Lakshadweep	3.2	2.7	2.8	1.7	–	–	–	–	2.3	2.5	2.4	1.9

NA not available

^aExcludes Assam for North East region^bBihar Includes Jharkhand & Uttar Pradesh includes Uttaranchal for 2001^cIncludes Daman and Diu

of total population, reflecting (presumably) greater mortality tolls among the former in two consecutive large-scale famines of 1896–1897 and 1899–1900.¹⁵ But in the following decade of 1901–1911 the enumerated tribal population had increased much faster than the general population. This could be due to lessened severity of famines in this decade in frequency, scale, and coverage, and also (presumably) due to quicker recovery in the post famine years [e.g. through higher than normal levels of fertility] of tribal population who had suffered a greater (proportionate) population loss in the preceding major famines (see Maharatna 1996:1–18).¹⁶

Growth of total population was negligible during 1911–1921 decade, within which occurred the great influenza pandemic of 1918, causing heavy toll of human lives including substantial depopulation among STs. Again, during 1921–1931 Indian tribes appear to have experienced a decline in aggregate population, while there had been an increase in the total population. This differential seems attributable to the heightened politics over religious divisions around the 1931 census, with, for example, an active political pressure on the authorities to return ‘everyone of doubtful status as Hindu’ (Davis 1951:188). Furthermore, the shift from religious affiliation to ‘tribal origin’ as the basis of tribal enumeration in the census 1941 was (at least partly) responsible for a record of their comparatively slow pace of increase in 1931–1941 (Table 10.1). Except for the years of dramatic effects of famines and epidemics, the enumerated tribal population up to

1921 was growing at rates no less (or may indeed be sometimes higher) than those for the total population. And relatively sluggish recorded growth of ST population over the three decades preceding the Independence could largely be an artefact due to the social and political turmoil on religious lines in that period.

Another noteworthy feature of the pre-Independence growth of population is a relative constancy of tribal proportion to the total since the late nineteenth century, as against a secular decline in the proportion of the Hindus. While the tribal proportion ranged between 2.26 and 3.26 % during 1881–1941, the Hindu proportion dropped from 75.1 to 69.5 % (Davis 1951:178). Although this differential, according to Kingsley Davis, was due to higher fertility of tribal population than that of the Hindus, there are highly plausible reasons for attributing this to *relatively* lower infant and child mortality levels among tribes vis-a-vis Hindus, rather than higher tribal fertility vis-à-vis that of the Hindus (Maharatna 2000a, b, 2005).

In the first census of independent India in 1951, the enumerated size of tribal people turned more than twice its size in the preceding census, despite the geographic truncation following the partition of the erstwhile India in 1947. This might have been *partly* because the regions (e.g. north-western parts and eastern Bengal) that were carved out from erstwhile India were historically of low tribal concentration. However, this can hardly be a full explanation, especially when total population of the country declined by about 7 % in 1941–1951. For example, just after declaration of Independence and partition in August of 1947, the newly formed Government of India published in September of that year a handbook on population by communities and states, basing itself on the 1941 census. Notably, this official publication posited the total tribal population of independent India as being twice as large as the size of enumerated tribal population for undivided India (Government of India 1947). The clue lies largely in the fact that enumeration of tribal (STs) and lower caste (SCs) people was made for the first time on the basis of respective statutory schedules prepared and approved by the government. Many persons not considered as

¹⁵Famines might have killed tribal peoples *more* severely, as their mortality is likely to have been affected ‘more quickly and completely’ by changes in external environment such as those in famines (Davis 1951:191). See also Merewether (1898:156–160) for a brief narrative of the Gonds of central India being hardest hit by the major large-scale famine of 1896–97. Moreover, as Wood (1998:131) points out, ‘[g]eneral lack of food storage facilities’ among hunter-gatherer communities could make them more vulnerable to famines.

¹⁶There are several standard demographic reasons why a population, which has experienced *larger* proportionate excess mortality (*vis-à-vis* other population) in a famine, is expected to witness a *quicker* recovery of the pre-famine population size (for details, see Maharatna 1996: 1–11).

‘tribal’ on the criterion of their religious affiliation and/or otherwise before Independence could find themselves so identified in the 1951 census. Thus, with the decadal growth of enumerated tribal population being higher than that of the total population in the post-Independence period, the former’s proportion rose from 5 % in 1951 to nearly 9 % in 2011 (see Table 10.1). Note, however, that the gap in these two recorded growth rates has been the highest during the 1951–1961 decade, and it narrowed down over the following decades (perhaps with the exception for 1971–1981 decade). This relative surge of ST population in the post-independence period does *partly* reflect expansion of the ST schedule. As Bêteille (1986) writes succinctly, ‘[p]aradoxically, the number of communities deemed to be tribes has increased with the modernisation of India between 1950 and 1976’.

However, fairly rapid enlargement of the ST list, especially up to the late 1970s and early 1980s, as well as removal of area restriction in 1976, account for the recorded surges of tribal population that resulted from mere reclassification and hence redistribution of existing population. But there is reasonably strong evidence suggesting a higher *real* natural growth of tribal population (Sinha 1986). A higher growth of tribal population in the newly independent country could partly be related to the new development and modernisation initiatives, which via changes in traditional customs, values, and some material improvements, albeit with little spread of modern contraception, could induce rises in fertility (so-called ‘pre-transition rise of fertility’ i.e., rises of fertility just prior to the beginning of its secular decline).¹⁷ In fact such pre-transition fertility rise has probably been delayed, prolonged,

and pronounced among the ST population *vis-à-vis* SCs, as the former have evidently lagged behind the latter on the process and pace of modernisation.

What emerges, on the whole, (ignoring periods of dramatic losses of population during famines, epidemics and the like) is a scenario of tribal population having grown – much like general population – at very moderate rates during pre-independence decades. But in the post-independence period tribal population growth has been at much higher rates both due to inclusion of new tribal identities and because of relatively delayed occurrence of the ‘pre-transition rise’ of fertility with their lagged modernisation. However, despite modest, if not weak, indications of the onset of a declining trend in the growth of overall tribal population in more recent decades, it is far from certain and clear as to what demographic trends are going to take shape among the tribal population in the near future and even beyond (more on this later). Such hazy and uncertain scenario of tribal demography ahead is greatly compounded by a multiplicity of factors including relatively acute poverty and material deprivation in majority tribal pockets especially in the regions where they constitute a minority (World Bank 2011), incidence of high and sometimes even rising mortality and under-nutrition amongst tribal infants and children (Das et al. 2010), political and social unrest, strife, and instability in the tribe-concentrated areas (e.g. north-eastern states of India), distinct signs of stalled fertility transition or sometimes even of rises of fertility amongst the tribes in the mid-transitional societies in some regions (Sinha 2011).

A broad regional pattern of India’s tribal population – namely, tribal people being numerically largest (in descending order) in central, eastern (including north-eastern) and western regions (these together constituting about 90 % of total tribal population) – has remained largely unaltered. But strikingly enough, there have been distinct declines in the proportion of tribal people in the eastern states (particularly Bihar including Jharkhand and Orissa) in the post-Independence

¹⁷Four standard changes in the early phase of modernisation process generally contribute to a pre-transition fertility increase: a reduction in breastfeeding intensity and duration, a reduction in postpartum abstinence, a reduction in widowhood, and reduction in sterility due to improvement of public health services (see Nag 1980; and Dyson and Murphy 1985 for details). To these might also be added the erosion of traditional and indigenous methods of fertility control among tribal communities as a contributory factor to a temporary ‘fertility rise’ (e.g. Ssenoyonga 1993).

period. The seriousness of its implication is glaringly attested by about 20 % point drop in the eastern region's share in the country's total tribal population between 1961 and 2001 (see Table 10.2). Notwithstanding possible enumeration biases (e.g. over-enumeration of tribals in southern and western regions particularly up to 1981), the large part of the explanation for the changing pattern of regional composition of tribal population lies in the inter-state differences in real demographic processes e.g. birth, death rates and their trends, patterns of spatial mobility and movements of tribal people (Maharatna 2005). In contrast, there have been distinct increases in the share of enumerated tribal people of western and southern regions. Indeed the growth rates of population of some major tribes of central and western states (e.g. Bhil, Gond, Mina) have been above national average and have even accelerated in the post-independence period, at least up to the 1980s.

This rapid growth of tribal population, especially over several decades since the independence, seems to have been contributed *inter alia* by relatively delayed occurrence of their both mortality improvement and 'pre-transition fertility rise'. In contrast, the major tribes of eastern India (e.g. Santal, Orao, Munda, Khond) have registered much smaller population increases *vis-à-vis* both general population in this region and aggregate STs of western and central India. *Relatively* greater extent of under-enumeration of STs in this region, especially in the late 1970s, could be a factor, since official recognition of tribal identity on the basis of 'area restrictions' continued here for some time even after latter's formal repeal in 1976 (see Roy-Burman 1993:200). But this can hardly be a complete explanation. A relative *mortality disadvantage* and *comparatively* low fertility among these tribes (*vis-à-vis* those of central and western India) have also been likely contributors – especially over the recent past. Furthermore, specific historical circumstances might have made major tribes of eastern India more prone to long-distance migration and movement (e.g. Roy-Burman 1993:201–202).

Despite the number of scheduled tribes having already exceeded 500, it is only a few *major* tribal groups that constitute a large bulk of the

aggregate tribal population of the country. About nine tribal groups constitute nearly half of the country's total tribal population, and they are concentrated mostly in the central, western and eastern parts. The tribe-composition has remained broadly unaltered over the post-Independence period, notwithstanding proliferation of a few tribal sub-groups. For example, relative shares of Bhil and Gond populations have risen, admittedly marginally, with a meagre reduction in the share of Munda population (Maharatna 2005, 2011).

There are quite a few tribal groups – each constituting (e.g. as per 1971 census count) slightly more than 1 % of total tribal population, namely Ho (1.42) in eastern India, Naga (1.23) in north-eastern states (Sinha 1986, Table 3.4). Apart from them, there are numerous smaller tribal groups dispersed across the country. In fact there are some 'small' and so-called primitive tribes of which enumerated populations range from as low as 20. Many of such small tribes are indeed on their way toward extinction. However, the phenomenon of so-called 'vanishing' tribes, if at all, is extremely localised and indeed specific to very *small* groups situated in very special circumstances. These most vulnerable tribal groups, who currently number around 75, constituting nearly 2 % of total tribal population, include Onges, Shompens, the Greater Andamanese, Rajjis Didayis, Hill Korwas, Bondas (Seminar Report 2001). An acute food deprivation and extreme vulnerability to death and disease have generally been responsible for the diminution of some small tribal groups in specific pockets (e.g. Bhagwan 1997).

The 'vanishing tribes' phenomenon, of course, deserves attention and effective public action in its own right, but it is important to keep in mind that the former does not hold true for the *aggregate* tribal population in India.¹⁸ In fact the

¹⁸ Some specific non-tribal groups too (e.g. informal sector workers living in city slums or workers in mining and/or such other hazardous industries), because of poverty and health vulnerability, can experience extraordinarily high mortality and hence low or even negative population growth. For example, survival chances among black men in the Harlem district of New York City – while vastly

positive rate of population growth is not even uniform among the major tribal groups (except some small ‘vanishing’ ones). While Bhil and Gond – dominant central and western tribes – have had accelerating population growth since the early 1960s, Santals, Mina and Munda – mostly eastern tribes – have fared less well in terms of population increase. For example, the population of Katkari, an originally nomadic tribe of Konkon region of Maharashtra, have, as per census counts, been almost stationary during 1961–1971 vis-à-vis nearly 2.3 % average annual growth rate of aggregate ST population of the state (Kulkarni 2002). While the former scenario could be related to acute material deprivation, other possibilities (e.g. effect of removal of area restriction) cannot be entirely ruled out.

In sum: three major tribal groups, namely Bhil, Santal, Gond constitute nearly 40 % of the country’s total tribal population, and this *numeric* dominance of just a few major tribes amidst hundreds of tiny groups and sub-groups across India has been continuing for a long time past. This strengthens the usefulness of *aggregative* analysis of India’s tribal population (despite a general disfavour voiced often by anthropologists and others).

Differentials in Sex-Composition of Population

Perhaps the most glaring – albeit hitherto downplayed – difference between tribal and non-tribal population lies in the sex-composition of population i.e. the female–male ratio (FMR hereafter) (Table 10.1). In sharp contrast to India’s overall FMR being always unfavourable to females, it

inferior to those of other districts of the city or of US as a whole – are even worse than those even in some poorest countries (e.g. Sen 1999:23 and references cited therein). But the alarmist attention to the excessive death rate of black men of Harlem is not equally warranted by the entire black male population of the US. Likewise, the ‘vanishing tribes’ phenomenon, being restricted to some specific subgroups under particular circumstances, should not necessarily induce us to take an alarmist position on the future of India’s overall tribal population.

has been far more balanced among tribes until rather recently. In fact, females outnumber males in the entire western world and in many developing countries outside Asia and North Africa. Such excess female scenario derives both from females’ *biological* edge over males in natural survival chances as well as from their relative mortality advantage in wars, accidents and lifestyles. Thus a large deficiency of females, as indicated by low FMR in general population, reflects adverse social discrimination outweighing females’ intrinsic (biological) advantage in survival.¹⁹ There have been several attempts at estimating what Amartya Sen famously called ‘missing women’ in countries with lower than a ‘benchmark’ FMR obtainable in the absence of anti-female social environment).²⁰ India’s figure of about 37 million missing women estimated on the basis of sub-Saharan FMR of 1.022 as a benchmark, provides a broad sense of how many more females could have remained alive now if anti-female social environment had been absent.²¹

A long-term *deteriorating* trend in FMR among India’s general population since the early twentieth century (see Table 10.1) has been a source of concern in academic and official circles alike. After several decades of systematic research, a few stark facts have emerged almost indisputably in the Indian context: a) that low overall FMR in total population is largely related to a female mortality disadvantage (*vis-à-vis* males), especially in infancy and young childhood; b)

¹⁹The imbalance of sex ratio in India’s total population (which seems bizarre in the light of expected patterns) used to draw attention of the Census Commissioners since quite early days of the census operations. After many decades of systematic analyses by scholars it is clear that a relative deficiency of females in India’s population is real, not an artefact of data bias or of sex-selective migration.

²⁰See Sen (1999:105–106). There has been, over the recent past, a considerable discussion relating to various issues (including methods of estimation) and implications surrounding the notion of missing women in the wider Asian context (e.g. Klasen (1994, 2008), Coale and Banister (1994)).

²¹See Sen (1989, 1999:104–107), Drèze and Sen (1995), Croll (2000), Agnihotri (2000), Klasen and Wink (2002), Oster (2009), Klasen (2008), Das Gupta (2005), among others.

that this relative female disadvantage is in a large part a manifestation of familial discrimination and neglect particularly against girls in respect of distribution of resources, especially medical attention and health care; c) apart from worsening *relative* share of females in the distribution of benefits of modern improvements in health and medical facilities, there are indications of *intensification* – along with overall development and a large-scale transition to lower fertility regime – of anti-female biases, often more *selectively* against higher parity daughters born already or abortion of high parity female foetus.²² Finally, the above anti-female outcomes are generally traced to a pervasive culture of ‘son preference’ or a gender bias (i.e. preference for sons over daughters), which is a prominent expression of fundamental Asian cultural and patriarchal values in which female status and autonomy is relatively low.

Against these disquieting (and even perhaps growing) imbalances in FMR of India's general population, the tribal record of a *more* balanced sex-ratio is of considerable interest (*see* Table 10.1). This implies, in lines with our the foregoing discussion, a much lesser degree of anti-female discrimination (especially against female infants and children) in tribal societies *vis-à-vis* the mainstream – an implication which often gets vindicated by relevant research and evidence (e.g. Agnihotri 2000:153). Besides, there exists substantial anthropological evidence elucidating relatively little (or perhaps almost

total absence of) gender biases in traditional tribal society and culture.²³ In this context, a ten-point drop of tribal FMR from 983 to 972 during 1981–1991 decade is particularly noteworthy, pointing strongly to the plausibility of tribal trends in the direction of the mainstream pattern of growing deficit of females. Although there have been some improvements in FMR across all social groups in the following decades namely 1991–2001 and 2001–2011, the extent of improvement among ST has been less than that for SC, leaving FMRs still substantially below the corresponding levels of 1961.

Differentials in Fertility, Mortality, and Health

Table 10.4 presents relevant available information on fertility, mortality, and health indicators of the three broad social groups over a span of about three decades beginning from the late 1970s. The fertility level of the non-ST/SC group has, rather unsurprisingly, been the lowest among the three. But it is of interest to note that the tribal fertility has remained lower than that of SC population until the late 1990s. Our recent research attributes this historically lower tribal fertility (at least, partially) to their several traditional socio-cultural characteristics (e.g. relatively higher age at female marriage, comparatively higher female status and autonomy, prolonged breastfeeding and abstinence, and use of traditional contraceptives), which have had much potential for producing net fertility-inhibiting effects (Maharatna 2000a, b, 2005).²⁴

More lately, however, the overall tribal fertility regime has become more intricate and sundry owing to mounting complexities of their livelihood patterns, survival, habitation and environment.

²²The low FMR in India's aggregate population hides a remarkable ‘north- south’ regional contrast (Miller 1981; Dyson and Moore 1983; Sopher 1980). More specifically, north and north-western regions with low FMR are characterised by a pronounced patriarchal family structure, with concomitantly low female status, autonomy and other discriminatory biases particularly against female children. In contrast, the Indian ‘south’ – which broadly encompasses states lying south of Satpura hills – historically evinces relatively more balanced FMR, with much lesser patriarchal domination and hence with more balanced gender relations. It is a moot question – albeit beyond the scope of the present paper – whether relatively balanced FMR and gender relations in the south are the outcomes of deeper overall infusions of tribal socio-cultural features and culture as compared to the northern India (Maharatna 2013, especially Chap. 20).

²³The FMR is fairly balanced in the sub-Saharan Africa of which socio-cultural and lifestyle features have broad resemblance to those of the Indian tribes, often with concomitant evidence of (relative) advantage of females in nutritional and mortality indicators in the former (Svedberg 1990).

²⁴There is a fertility-enhancing tribal socio-cultural feature, namely widow remarriage *vis-à-vis* OC.

Table 10.4 Fertility and mortality differentials among board social groups: all-India

	SC	ST	Others
TFR (CF)			
1978 ^a	4.8	–	4.5
1984	5.2	(4.7)	4.4
1990–1992	3.9	(5.4)	3.3
1995–1998	3.2	(4.9)	2.7
2003–2005	2.9	(4.5)	2.6
IMR [mortality under 5]			
1978 ^{a, b}	152.0	120.0	NA
1984 ^b	126.5 [51.6]	101.1 [45.0]	99.2 [36.0]
NFHS-1 1981–1991 ^c	107.3 [149.1]	90.5 [135.2]	82.2 [111.5]
NFHS-2 1987–1997 ^c	83.0 [119.3]	84.2 [126.6]	61.8 [82.6] ^d
NFHS-3 2001–2005 ^c	66.4 [88.1]	62.1 [95.7]	48.9 [59.2] ^d
Predicted probability of mortality per 1,000 persons, 2004–2005^e:			
Before age 1 year	30.9 {33.5}	38.0	4.2
1–5 years	4.0 {4.1}	7.4	1.8
45–64 years	8.7 {9.6}	6.9	7.7
CDR			
1984	16.2	14.7	11.7
1994 ^a	13.0	9.0	11.0
Odds ratio of mortality, 2004–2005 ^f	1.72 {1.47}	1.37	1.00
Malnutrition of women 14–49 years (%), 2005–2006			
BMI	41.3 {35.7}	46.6	29.2
Anemia (moderate/severe)	19.0 {16.2}	23.7	14.2

{ } refers to other backward classes

CDR crude death rate, *IMR* infant mortality rate, *0–4 M* estimated death rate for age group 0–4, *CF* completed fertility expressed as the average number of children ever born to women in the age group 40–49, *NA* not available

^aRural

^bEstimated death rate in relevant age groups

^cProbability of dying per live 1,000 births before the relevant number of birthday

^dExcludes OBC except

^ePredicted probability of mortality per 1,000 persons given the individual is a male living in the city who belongs to the High Caste and living in the top quartile of household income, assets, ownership and monthly consumption per capita

^fTaken from Poand Subramanian (2011), NCAER

For example, availability of modern medicines, together with weakening of traditional fertility-suppressing socio-cultural practices (e.g. reductions in the traditionally long durations of breastfeeding and post-partum abstinence, and reduction in average female age at marriage in the lines of Hindu socio-cultural influences), have induced a delayed pre-transition fertility rise or have stalled fertility decline if already underway (see Table 10.4). In fact the fertility-raising effects of deeper percolation of traditional Hindu patriarchal practices, customs, and norms such as early female marriage and restrictions on

female autonomy/voice in family seem, of late, to have in some cases (especially when family planning programme is neither widespread and effective nor has it faltered since the adoption of ‘target-free’ approach) pushed up fertility, or in some cases stalled fertility decline if underway already.

For example, the most of the tribal-majority states of the north-eastern India have experienced a stalling of fertility decline since the 1990s, which was accompanied in some cases by a stall or even rise in infant and child mortality (Sinha 2011). In fact, as can be seen from

Table 10.5, except for the western and southern regions, the ST fertility rate in the rest of India has experienced either a rise or stagnation in the first decade of the present century. This contrasts with continuing declines – albeit marginal – in SC fertility across Indian regions. Consequently the latest NFHS in 2005–6 data have posited the SC fertility level having been *lower* than that of the ST for the first time (see Table 10.4). While this might *partly* reflect the growing subservience and submergence of traditional socio-cultural moorings of tribal communities into predominantly patriarchal Hindu mainstream patterns (Maharatna 2011), there are quite a few deep relevant issues and forces typically at play in those tribal-inhibited regions, namely acute (and sometimes even accentuated) material deprivation, hunger, under-nutrition, displacement, migration, ethnic clashes, socio-political unrest and insurgency.

Apropos social differentials in the recent trends of infant and child mortality, a similar reversal of the relative positions between ST and SC has occurred. For example, as late as the early 1990s the infant mortality (and child mortality) rates of ST have generally been *lower* than those among SC population. This seems to be in conformity with ST's longstanding historical advantage on this count emanating from several favourable features of tribal traditional culture and environment (*vis-à-vis* SC). [Note that recorded overall death rates or mortality levels of ST group have been generally *lower* than those for SC people even up to 2004–2005) (see Maharatna 2005, 2011 for relevant evidence and explanations). In reaping the benefits of general improvements in the spheres of poverty eradication, reproductive health, and related medical facilities over the recent past in the country, tribal communities on the whole have suffered a relative disadvantage manifest in their distinctly *smaller* magnitude of mortality improvement than those for SC and OC populations. By 2005–2006, the child mortality rates of ST have become somewhat highest and noticeably higher than even those of SC across entire country. Interestingly, insofar as the mortality levels of babies at the time of birth or soon thereafter (as indicated by IMR or neo-natal mortality

rates) are concerned, the ST group hardly shows any disadvantage vis-a-vis those of SC community (Table 10.4). But as they grow up, tribal children die proportionately more than their SC counterparts (see also World Bank 2011).

It is indeed remarkable that infant and child mortality rates for ST have *surpassed* the respective SC levels in most of the regions of the country by the late 1990s (except perhaps in north-eastern region with largest tribal concentration and very tiny SC population) (Table 10.5). This outcome derives in large measure from that the fact that the pace of declines in infant and under-5 mortality rates has been extraordinarily sluggish among STs vis-a-vis non-ST groups, especially in the large tribal belts of eastern, north-eastern and central regions of India, where the fertility transition also has stalled of late (Table 10.5). During the first half of the first decade of present century the large tribal areas of eastern and north-eastern regions have witnessed even distinct *rises* in infant or childhood mortality rates. For example, according to NFHS-2 and 3 data, the mortality rate of tribal children aged 1–4 years in the eastern state of Orissa has registered a sharp increase from 44/1,000 live births in the late 1990s to 62.5 by 2005–2006. And the eastern region as a whole has recorded a dramatic increase in the average child mortality rate during this period from 35.6 per 1,000 live births to 56.3 (Table 10.5). A recent World Bank study on the tribes of India also notes succinctly on their dismal plight particularly in terms of health and educational indicators thus: '[t]he Scheduled Tribes have fared the worst, locked out geographically from most development' (Das et al. 2010: 4).

The relatively adverse position of the STs lately in terms of infant and child mortality rates seems consistent with, and perhaps reaffirmed by, their most *sluggish* improvements in the spheres of poverty reduction, child nutrition, and health facilities over the preceding decades (Ibid; and Shah and Sah 2004). For example, a study of poverty trends by social groups in the 1990s concludes that 'the poverty situation of the ST households worsened relative to both the SC households and the average population in the rural and the

Table 10.5 Trends in fertility and mortality indicators in six broad regions of India, 1990–1992 to 2004–2006

	North-eastern			Eastern			Central			Southern			Northern			Western			
	1992/1993	1998/1999	2005/2006	1992/1993	1998/1999	2005/2006	1992/1993	1998/1999	2005/2006	1992/1993	1998/1999	2005/2006	1992/1993	1998/1999	2005/2006	1992/1993	1998/1999	2005/2006	
TFR	3.7	2.1	3.2	3.1	2.5	3.4	3.9	3.4	3.4	3.1	2.6	2.5	5.2	4.4	5.3	3.4	3.4	2.8	
SC	2.8	2.6	2.3	3.7	3.0	3.1	4.7	3.7	3.2	2.7	2.3	2.0	5.5	4.3	4.3	3.5	3.3	2.8	
Other	3.5	2.4	2.7	3.5	2.6	2.8	3.4	2.3	2.2	2.5	1.9	1.8	4.6	3.7	3.1	3.0	2.8	2.2	
CF																			
ST	6.3	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.7	5.8	4.7	5.0	5.4	5.0	4.1	6.3	6.2	3.9	4.7	4.8	4.4	
SC	–	4.6	3.8	5.0	4.9	3.1	5.7	5.8	5.0	4.9	4.3	3.4	6.4	5.8	5.9	4.9	4.7	3.7	
Other	5.6	4.4	4.2	5.3	4.4	3.4	5.0	4.7	3.8	4.3	3.2	2.5	5.8	5.3	4.7	4.4	3.9	3.4	
IMR																			
ST	89.6	59.3	53.7	105.9	89.3	85.9	103.1	101.0	95.6	78.1	89.2	74.4	167.5	83.3	–	77.2	75.8	69.4	
SC	–	–	76.0	141.6	78.6	65.1	124.1	101.5	81.9	93.8	62.3	61.7	138.1	110.0	–	84.9	76.2	69.8	
Other	95.3	68.2	68.9	91.1	62.2	63.9	90.1	72.4	66.8	67.6	33.9	38.9	110.2	82.3	–	61.4	58.3	46.6	
Under5 mortality																			
ST	150.3	73.5	77.3	140.3	121.5 [35.6]	137.4 [56.3]	166.6	179.6	140.7	118.8	117.8	98.1	222.9	124.5	–	115.1	112.3	98.1	
SC	–	56.3	104.4	167.2	116.2 [40.9]	93.2 [30.3]	167.8	156.0	110.1	122.3	96.4	70.7	202.1	158.1	–	122.4	108.1	86.3	
Other	144.5	86.9	93.3	120.8	85.1 [24.8]	84.4 [21.6]	129.8	94.8	79.9	89.8	57.3	52.9	151.3	112.1	–	83.3	77.9	55.1	

Note: (1) Figures for each region are weighted means of the respective figures of the individual states belonging to that region. (2) The average figures for north-eastern region need to be read with caution as there have been some new states created out of erstwhile Assam over the period covered by the NFHS surveys. For example, although NFHS-3 figures for 2005–2006 in Mizoram of the north-eastern region are not given separately for ST, SC, and others, we have applied the same figures for Mizoram's total population, while calculating averages for the north-eastern region on the ground that ST population constitute about 95% of the total population in Mizoram.

TFR total fertility rate, CF completed fertility average number of children ever born to ever married women aged 40–49 years, IMR infant mortality rate, Under5 child mortality under 5 years of age per 1,000 live births. Figures in [] brackets are respective child mortality rates between 1 and 4 years of age per 1,000 live births

urban areas of the country' (Sundaram and Tendulkar 2003). Another recent review of population health interventions among various social groups including STs has found that '[d]espite pursuing affirmative action for more than 50 years, there are persistent gaps in health and well-being between STs and non-STs' (Mohindra and Labonte 2010:10). In some states such as Maharashtra and Orissa, the media reports of starvation or under-nutrition-related deaths of tribal children in specific tribal pockets of the backward districts (e.g. Gadchiroli, Kalahandi, Koraput, and parts of north Bengal) over the recent past have indeed generated some stirs and debates in academic and political circles alike.

No less worrying is the stalling of the pace of tribal fertility transition and its unwelcome effects on the process of population stabilisation due to growing tribal (relative) adversity. As can be seen from Table 10.5, the relatively tribal-concentrated regions of north-eastern and eastern India have witnessed *rises* of fertility levels especially among ST population since the 1990s, while western and central India has recorded a distinct stall of fertility decline among STs vis-à-vis others by 2005–2006. Although such stalling or even reversals of fertility transition have been noted by authors in the recent past, there can be little doubt that ST communities, the most glaringly deprived social group, deserves more urgent attention and research towards understanding and remedying their slowest tempo of mortality and nutritional improvements (particularly among infants and children). In fact ST's fertility transition could get further compounded not only by their growing (relative) material adversity and insecurity, but also by the shifts and priorities of family planning programmes too. For example, a stalled fertility transition since the late 1990s at an aggregate country level appears attributable (at least partly) to a distinct shift away, of late, from the terminal methods of contraception in favour of spacing and traditional ones which are well-known to be less effective in averting conceptions (Chaurasia 2006).

All this sounds, indeed, ironic, as tribes historically used to enjoy a *relative* superiority in mortality (*vis-à-vis non-tribal* groups) even in

not-too-distant past, when the practice of modern medical science was at a rudimentary stage in India; and adaptability with natural environment and lifestyle was comparatively dominant determinant of mortality (Maharatna 2005, 2011). In any case, one noteworthy implication of the above noted demographic trends, if not arrested quickly, could be a corresponding hiatus in the process of population stabilisation among India's ST population, with concomitant rises in its proportionate share in total population over the decades to come. This, in turn, could trigger complex bearings on the dynamics and intensity of social stratification and conflict. For example, the tilt in the country's population composition in favour of tribal social group (owing to inter alias a starker stall in tribal demographic transition vis-a-vis non-tribal mainstream) could bring further imbalances, adverse influences, and greater barriers toward achieving social harmony, equilibrium, and stability at least in the tribal-concentrated areas and regions.

Concluding Remarks

That demography is one of the key levers of social stratification is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in India for two distinct reasons. First, Indian society is long known to have been historically caste hierarchical and socially differentiated in myriad complex forms – a phenomenon of which persistence and sustenance rests, in a large measure, on its demographic dimensions and dynamics. Second, India's population censuses, beginning as back as the 1870s, have historically been instrumental to the build-up of a demographic/census approach to the construction and continuity of social division and stratification. The colonial tradition set up by the British India's censuses to attempt to capture social and cultural differentiations as a part of the enumeration operations, has not ceased to haunt the post-independence India's society, public administration and policy. It is, of course, somewhat intriguing to try to envisage the complex interplays between such demographic facts and dimensions of social stratification on the one

hand and the sociological, religious, and cultural processes and transformation on the other. This is particularly so when, as it is in India, the census is not simply a matter of enumeration or counting of people, but it purportedly transcends to be 'conceptual' (and hence often contested) in its pursuit of classifying population into various social identities on caste or race lines.

Given a broad background of positive population growth rates for all major social categories in the entire post-independence period, the ST and SC groups have grown at a faster pace than that of non-SC/ST population, culminating into increases in proportionate share of each of the two scheduled communities. However all this has been an outcome of complex interplays between demographic behaviour and processes, politics of caste and ethnicity, and patterns and political economy of development. For example, over the decades following independence there has been a phenomenal expansion of the schedules both for SC and ST categories, along with increasing provisions of protective benefits to them. Also, the SC group initially has had highest fertility rates of which transition towards a secular decline took markedly longer – for almost obvious reasons – to materialize than that for the non-scheduled mainstream population. While SC population, of late, have shown clear signs of decline both in population growth rates and fertility levels, ST group is yet to evince a steady onset of the fertility and demographic transitions across the whole country. Despite general improvement among India's overall children in the last decade or so, child mortality rates in rural tribal people have almost stagnated. This matches both with the evidence portraying the slowest pace of poverty reduction, a higher risk of child malnutrition, and lowest level of accessibility to medical and health facilities among ST communities (with perhaps a few exceptions in the north-eastern region). In its sequel, tribal population growth rate could still remain relatively high (or indeed the highest) at least for some time in future, pushing their proportion in country's total population further up. The extent to which this in turn will alter the dynamics of social stratification seems to depend (largely) on the pace at which improvements take

place *inter alia* in their material levels of living, health, infant and child mortality, and nutritional profiles.

Over the recent past, India's social science research both at national and global planes has been increasingly devoted to comparative evaluations of socio-economic and demographic outcomes among broad social groups. The results overwhelmingly posit the scheduled social groups (SC and ST) in distinct (relative) disadvantage, particularly in terms of access and achievements in education, health facilities, human development and livelihood, with ST faring worst. All this, however, typically brings forth more questions and puzzles than remedies, as India's social stratification is as much numerically, enumeratively, and politically fashioned as it is sociologically and socio-culturally. Consequently, a stubborn obscurity and its deeply anomalous ramifications and riddles are going to remain to haunt the country at least in the near future. For example, the evident elusiveness as to how far the scheduled social groups and their present material (relative) deprivations are direct results of inherent and/or intrinsic *social* discriminations/hierarchy in the day-to-day functioning of society and state, or how far they are the creations of longstanding bureaucratic, activist, political, and even somewhat animated discourse and the related muddling and peddling in a polity otherwise proclaimed as 'casteless' by its Constitution, does not seem to die down soon.²⁵

²⁵ Meanwhile, the ongoing processes of so-called 'reforms', 'globalisation' and 'liberalisation' of the Indian economy seem, on balance, to keep complicating the dynamics and politics of social stratification involving castes, tribes, and others. Ironically, there does not seem to be any abatement in the manufacture of confounding, biased, and sometimes even nebulous understanding, discourse, and speculations. For example, researchers even today appear to contemplate rapid waning or disappearance of India's caste identity/hierarchy by the strokes of domineering and liberalised 'market' epitomised by big 'shopping malls' wherein a traditionally low caste job of sweeping (with handmade/primitive brooms) is thought to become caste-neutral once it is performed by a designated horde of 'housekeepers' each with a trouser, shirt, cap, and shoes on (Prasad 2008; World Bank 2011).

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Hiroshi Ono and Hiromi Ono

Throughout history, Japanese society has placed a high value on the idea of its monoethnicity. The concept of one-nation-one-race had particularly strong weight during the years of heightened nationalistic sentiment prior to the Second World War, and was an effective tool for uniting the nation against wartime enemies. In contrast to the perceived virtues of monoethnicity, racial or ethnic heterogeneity was seen as a cause of social ills. The U.S., for example, was seen as a country that lacked harmony and societal strength.

Today, the idea of monoethnicity is largely viewed as a “myth” (e.g., Howell 1996; Murphy-Shigematsu 1993), and no longer has serious political or social meaning. In fact, after a long history of downplaying (if not denying) the existence of ethnic minorities, there is now renewed interest in examining race and ethnic relations in Japan. This chapter is devoted to the description of these ethnic groups and their role in Japanese society.

Although a number of ethnic groups coexist in Japan, their numbers constitute only a tiny fraction of the Japanese population – at most 2.8 %. Yet while Japan may not be a monoethnic society,

it is still *relatively* monoethnic (Gill 2001; Murphy-Shigematsu 1993), and remains ethnically homogeneous, at least in comparison to the industrialized nations of Europe and the U.S.

We focus mainly on the postwar period because economic development, accompanied by the influx of working immigrants, has altered the ethnic composition of the Japanese population. This trend has been slow and incremental, and is likely to persist in the foreseeable future. Undeniably, the Japanese, like the peoples of other countries, are “the product of a long period of mixture” (Yoshino 2004, p. 254). As early as the ninth century, Japan experienced large-scale migration from China and Korea (Murphy-Shigematsu 1993). During the prewar period, there was a steady flow of laborers coming primarily from Korea, as documented by Weiner (1994) and others. These are important events in the history of race and ethnic relations in Japan, but are beyond the scope of this chapter. We refer to certain historical aspects of the prewar period in our analysis, but dedicate most of this chapter to the postwar period.

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***Nihonjinron*: A Model of Cultural Determinism**

Race and ethnic relations in Japan have been influenced and constructed by historical events, namely the island country’s prolonged period of complete closure to the outside world (seventieth

to nineteenth centuries), by the two world wars which profoundly altered its relationship with Asian neighbors, by the history of migration to and from South America, and more recently, by the economic downturn of the 1990s. A number of theories of race and migration have been applied to the Japanese context, but typically these are specific to one ethnic group in a certain time period, e.g. push-pull migration and the case of *Nikkei Brazilians*. There is no singular theory of race and ethnicity that uniformly guides us through all historical events.

The concept of *Nihonjinron*, however, may be construed as a “cultural model” that better informs us about the role of Japanese culture and mentality in shaping the discourse of race and ethnicity in Japan. *Nihonjinron* literally means Japanese-ness or theories of the Japanese. According to Befu (2001), *Nihonjinron* is defined by its objective: “to demonstrate unique qualities of Japanese culture, Japanese society, and the Japanese people” (p. 4). It is a model of cultural determinism attributing the behavior of the Japanese, and the country’s social, economic and political phenomena, to Japanese culture (Yoshino 2004). The emphasis on Japanese uniqueness and purity can manifest itself subtly in everyday life as a means to construct national identity, or in perverse ways as witnessed by the war-time extremists and nationalists to promote “oneness” and exclusion. The idea of monoethnicity, for example, can be viewed as an outcome of the ethos of *Nihonjinron*. We will henceforth refer to *Nihonjinron* and its emphasis on Japanese uniqueness in our discussions where relevant, and revisit its role in contemporary Japan in the conclusion.

Profile of Race and Ethnic Groups in Japan

This chapter focuses on race and ethnic minorities of Japan, and not minorities per se. It should also be clarified here that ethnicity and nationality require separate treatments, although some of the earlier studies have equated the two categories. Figure 11.1 maps out the premise of this




Fig. 11.1 Mapping of ethnic minorities in Japan

chapter. Our distinction thus excludes minority groups such as the *burakumin* and *hibakusha* (Category A in Fig. 11.1). These are considered to be socio-economically depressed minority groups, but are nevertheless of the same ethnic origin as the Japanese, and will not be reviewed in this chapter.¹

Category B represents the group known as the *Nikkeijin*, a majority of whom are from Brazil, Peru and other South American countries.² These are return migrants from the Japanese Diaspora which took place between the late 1800s and early 1900s. *Nikkeijin* are direct descendants of the Japanese race. Although most are well beyond the second or third generation, they are still of the Japanese ethnic origin. Technically, they are not an ethnic minority in Japan, but an ethnic minority in the South American countries from whence they emigrated. The *Nikkeijin* are

¹ For example, although Lie (2001) treats *burakumin* as an ethnic minority, Gill (2001), argues that they are not, and describe them as a cultural or social minority. By some accounts, the survivors of the atom bomb (*hibakusha*) are considered to be minorities in Japan because of their marginalized status (De Vos et al. 1983; Murphy-Shigematsu 1993).

² *Nikkeijin*, broadly defined, refers to Japanese emigrants and their descendants. In this chapter, we use the term to mean Japanese emigrants and their descendants that are currently residing in Japan.

“Japanese by virtue of lineage,... (but) distinctively ‘non-Japanese’ in terms of cultural lineage” (Sellek 2001, p. 224). Most *Nikkeijin* do not speak the Japanese language. Most do not have Japanese citizenship, and are counted as foreigners in the Japanese census. The *Nikkeijin* are sometimes referred to as “newcomers” because of their recent arrival (relative to the other ethnic groups discussed below), and because their migration to Japan was largely voluntary.

Categories *C* and *D* represent the ethnic minorities of Japan. These minority groups belong to the category of “old timers” because they are mainly the subjects of Japan’s colonization prior to the Second World War (Motani 2002). The Ainu are the indigenous people of Japan. The Ainu have a distinct physical appearance from the Japanese population, mostly recognized for having more body hair than the average Japanese (De Vos et al. 1983). They primarily inhabit the northern island of Hokkaido. Like the indigenous minorities of other nations, the Ainu struggled to be recognized as an ethnic group distinct from the Japanese population, and it was only in 2008 that the Japanese government granted them this distinction. There are no official census figures for the Ainu population. Estimates usually point to somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000. The Hokkaido government reported that their population was 24,381 in 1984. The Ainu Association of Hokkaido reported that there were 23,782 Ainu people living in 72 cities, towns and villages in Hokkaido in 2006. But the Association also speculates that the actual population may be considerably greater.

The Ryukyans occupy the southern Ryukyu islands, the largest and most populated of which is Okinawa. For this reason, the Ryukyans are sometimes referred to as Okinawans. Although the classification of Ryukyans as an ethnic minority may be debatable, we treat them as an ethnic group separate from the mainstream Japanese population because of their distinct culture. In some parts of the Ryukyu region, they also use a distinct language. Their population was estimated to be 1.4 million in 2010 (Census

data), thus making them the largest ethnic minority group in Japan.

Group *D* consists of the various ethnic groups in Japan that are registered as foreign nationals. Until recently, the Koreans were the largest group of ethnic minorities residing in Japan. They were surpassed by the foreign population from China and Taiwan in 2007. The foreign nationals from North America and Europe are small in comparison to those from Asia.

Adding Up the Numbers

Table 11.1 shows the distribution of foreign nationals in Japan, and Fig. 11.1 shows how this population and its composition have changed over time. In 2010, the population from China and Taiwan, and from South and North Korea made up 59 % of the foreign population in Japan. Brazil and Peru also appear high in the rankings. The majority of this population is believed to be the *Nikkeijin*. Overall, the population of foreigners in Japan has nearly tripled in size compared to 1975, from 752,000 to 2.134 million. The percentage share of foreigners in Japan increased from 0.7 to 1.7 % during this period. All groups of foreign nationals expanded over this time period, with the exception of the Korean population. The largest growing foreign population in absolute size is Chinese and Taiwanese, which swelled from 49,000 in 1975 to 687,000 in 2010. The fastest growing population groups were Peruvians and Brazilians, followed by Filipinos. The population of Americans residing in Japan remained relatively stable, increasing to 2.3 times its size in 1975. Overall, the share of Americans declined from 2.9 to 2.4 % of the foreign population during this time period. The expansion of the “other” category is also noticeable, pointing to the pattern that the ethnic composition of the foreign nationals has become more heterogeneous over time. The majority in the “other” category are ‘newcomers’ from the Asian countries, mainly Thailand, Vietnam, India and Indonesia (Ministry of Justice 2010) (Fig. 11.2).

The geographical distribution of foreign nationals roughly mirrors the distribution of the

Table 11.1 Foreign nationals by country of origin (1,000 persons)

	1975		2010		Ratio
	Population	% share	Population	% share	2010/1975
<i>Foreign nationals by country</i>					
China and Taiwan	48.7	6.5	687.2	32.2	14.1
South and North Korea	647.2	86.1	566.0	26.5	0.9
Brazil	1.4	0.2	230.6	10.8	162.6
Philippines	3.0	0.4	210.2	9.8	69.3
Peru	0.3	0.0	54.6	2.6	177.4
U.S.	22.0	2.9	50.7	2.4	2.3
Other	29.2	3.9	335.0	15.7	11.5
Total – Foreign nationals	751.8	–	2,134.2	–	2.8
Total – Japanese population	110,573		127,510		1.2
% Foreign nationals	0.7		1.7		

Source: Ministry of Justice (2010)




Fig. 11.2 Changes in the population of foreign nationals (Source: Ministry of Justice 2010)

overall Japanese population. Of the total population of foreigners, 18.1 % live in Tokyo, followed by 10.3 % in Aichi prefecture and 9.6 % in Osaka prefecture (Ministry of Justice Statistics 2008).

If we add up the numbers reported above – 1.4 million Okinawans plus the upper limit of 50,000 Ainu – to the population of 2.1 million foreign nationals in Japan, we have a total of approximately 3.6 million foreign nationals and ethnic

groups residing in a country of 128 million people. This population comprises 2.8 % of the entire Japanese population.

Historical Overview of Race and Ethnic Conflict in Japan

Pre-modern to Modern Japan

Historically, Japan experienced a prolonged period of extreme seclusion and isolation under the *sakoku* policy (literally, lockup of the country) of the Tokugawa regime (1603–1868). Complete closure was believed to be the necessary precondition for the stability of the Tokugawa system (Toby 1977). During the *sakoku* period, trade was restricted to a handful of countries – mainly with the Dutch, Chinese and Koreans – and entry into Japan from foreign countries was strictly prohibited. Reischauer (1988) argues that the origins of Japanese uniqueness, with its emphasis on purity and aspects of inclusion or exclusion, can be found in its long history of isolation. In fact, to this day, isolationists in Japan are sometimes referred to as *sakoku* proponents. These groups generally are opposed to opening up Japan to international trade and immigration as they feel the need to preserve the purity of Japanese culture (Brody 2001).

In 1853, Commodore Perry of the U.S. Navy and his “black ships” landed in Tokyo Bay. He demanded that Japan sign a treaty to end the seclusion and to open up trade relations with the U.S. Commodore Perry threatened to use force if the treaty was not signed. The Japanese complied, and effectively ended the *sakoku* policy.

As Japan opened up for trade, so did its interest in acquiring knowledge from the outside world. In fact, as Japan learned more about Western civilizations, it became painfully aware of its technological backwardness, and eager to learn from the West. The slogan, *wakon yosai* (Japanese spirit, Western technology) flourished as Japanese leaders “acknowledged Western superiority and sought to emulate the West” (Lie

2000, p. 76). Japan went through a period of massive borrowing from the Western countries. The state sought the advice of foreigners (*oyatoi gaijin*, or *yatoi* for short), and dispatched students abroad (Burks 1990). Most of the foreign advisers were invited from the U.S. and Europe. The foreigners brought advanced technology and specialized knowledge to Japan, providing also technical assistance which subsequently played an important role in the country’s modernization.

Three major groups of foreigners resided in Japan during the period from 1859 to the Second World War: the Westerners who were mainly British and Americans, the Chinese, and the Koreans (Yamawaki 2000). The Westerners were mostly the *yatoi* professionals and traders, while the Chinese and the Koreans were predominantly unskilled laborers. The Chinese were the largest group of foreigners, but they were surpassed by the Koreans soon after Japan’s colonization of the Korean peninsula in 1910.

Nihonjinron and the Social Construction of Race

The period leading up to the Second World War was one of heightened Japanese nationalism, and of a strong sense of Japanese cultural uniqueness. Cultural determinism was further conditioned by genetic determinism (Yoshino 2004), leading to the notion of one nation, one culture, and most importantly, *one race*. In a striking example of how race is socially constructed (e.g. Omi and Winant 1994), the notion of a unique Japanese race became widespread amidst the frenzy of wartime slogans and propaganda. What made the Japanese unique from foreigners was their blood. For example, Yoshino (2004) writes: “Since a scientifically founded ‘racial’ classification of the Japanese and non-Japanese is meaningless, ‘Japanese blood’ is, first and foremost, a case of social construction of difference” (p. 253).

The fusion of race, culture and nation, fueled by the Japanese obsession for “purity” has

profoundly influenced the ways in which the Japanese conceptualize race. Reischauer (1988) explains:

Race looms large in the self-image of the Japanese, who pride themselves on the “purity” of their blood, despite the obvious mixture that went into the forming of the Japanese people as late as early historic times. We often think of racial prejudice as being a special problem of the white race in relation with other races, but it actually pervades the world. Nowhere is it greater than in Japan and the other lands of East Asia. Because the Japanese have merged their feelings about race, culture, and nation together, they have probably made their attitudes toward race all the stronger. It is almost as if they regarded themselves as a different species from the rest of humanity. (396–397)

The discourse of *Nihonjinron* and Japanese uniqueness led to the construction of an “imagined community” (Anderson 1992) where members were unified through the heightened sense of national identity and “groupism.” Indeed, group consciousness and harmony are virtues in Japanese culture, while individualism is not.³ Consequently, the pursuit of the one race, one blood ideology intensified a sense of exclusion toward the minority groups who did not fit this profile. Ethnic relations in wartime and in the postwar period evolved and were largely patterned against this backdrop, as we discuss below. Anti-immigration arguments and Japanese attitudes towards foreign workers, for example, have been greatly influenced by notions of cultural and racial purity (Brody 2001).

Ethnic Koreans and Ethnic Chinese

Rapid industrial expansion that accompanied Japan’s entry in the First World War led to increased recruitment of colonial labor (Weiner and Chapman 2009). Workers from colonial Korea and Taiwan were “pulled” into Japan to meet the demand for cheap flexible labor. The

migration of Koreans in the prewar period was thus a response to the changing demands of Japan’s labor market conditions.

Japan faced a massive labor shortage during the Second World War. The wartime mobilization of Korean workers began in 1939 to meet this demand (Yamawaki 2000), and the recruitment of Koreans reached a peak in the years leading up to 1945 (see Fig. 11.3). Government statistics report that there were close to two million Koreans residing in Japan in 1944.

Chinese migration picked up following the termination of the *sakoku* policy, at the end of the nineteenth century. Early migration took place through kinship networks, and they settled in Chinese residential quarters located in Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki (Liu-Farrer 2009). To this day, the Chinatown in Yokohama remains the largest Chinatown in Japan, followed by those in Kobe and Nagasaki. Early migrants from China were mostly students, as they took advantage of the “linguistic, cultural and geographic proximity” (p. 118). However, most of these students returned home in protest after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, to become part of the nationalist movement in China (Vasishth 1997). Over half of the Chinese merchants in Kobe, Osaka and Yokohama also returned home at this time. The Chinese population in Japan fell from 30,836 in 1930, to 17,043 in 1938.

Like the Koreans, Chinese workers were brought in from mainland China to fill in for the labor shortage during the Second World War, although their numbers were significantly smaller than to the Koreans’. According to statistics cited in Liu-Farrer (2009), 38,935 Chinese laborers arrived in Japan between April 1943 and May 1945.

The majority of Korean, Chinese and Taiwanese laborers were repatriated by the American Occupation in the years immediately following the end of the Second World War. The Korean population fell sharply, as 1.4 million returned to the Korean peninsula within 7 months of Japan’s surrender in 1945 (Weiner and Chapman 2009). The Korean population in Japan has remained relatively stable since this time (see Fig. 11.3). In 1948, the total number of resident

³For example, the role of group consciousness and harmony within the Japanese organization is illustrated by Rohlen (1974)’s anthropological study, *For Harmony and Strength*.




Fig. 11.3 Korean population in Japan (Source: Korean Residents Union in Japan)

Chinese was reported to be about 34,000 (Vasisht 1997). This population then expanded gradually, to over 650,000 in 2008, and now represents the largest ethnic group in Japan.

The Koreans, Taiwanese and Chinese who remained in Japan after the Second World War lost their Japanese citizenship with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 which officially concluded its territorial claim to the Korean peninsula (Murphy-Shigematsu 1993). Although the preservation of the nation of one pure blood was never implemented in practice, acquiring Japanese citizenship remains a controversial issue for the ethnic Korean and Chinese populations to this day. The current law does not automatically grant Japanese citizenship to persons born in Japan, and the government restricts the number of naturalizations within a given year. The rate of naturalization remains low for the ethnic Korean and Chinese, and most reside as resident aliens.⁴

⁴Recent estimates point to about 9,000 cases of naturalization per year for the Korean population in Japan (Weiner and Chapman 2009). Between 1996 and 2005, the Chinese were naturalized at the average rate of 4,600 per year (Liu-Farrer 2009).

For these foreign residents, the naturalization issue is complex. Some show resistance or ambivalence towards becoming a Japanese national. In the case of ethnic Koreans, many – even the third- and fourth-generation Koreans – do not seek Japanese citizenship because of the brutal history and treatment of Koreans in Japan (Murphy-Shigematsu 1993). Also, those who are granted Japanese citizenship are forced to convert their names into Japanese.⁵ Many Koreans resist this because they feel that they are being forced to surrender their ethnic identity and their cultural heritage (Motani 2002).

Within the ethnic Korean group, there has been a persistent division between the pro-South and pro-North groups. In the years following the Second World War, the ratio of North to South among the ethnic Koreans was estimated to be

⁵In spite of changes in naturalization procedures enacted in 1987 which allow the use of non-official characters, Japanese officials have been known to exert extra-legal pressure to convert foreign names into Japanese names (Murphy-Shigematsu 1993; Weiner and Chapman 2009). According to survey results cited in Fukukoka (2004), over 90 % of ethnic Koreans have a Japanese-sounding alias in addition to their Korean names, and some 80 % use Japanese names when in Japanese company.

3 to 1. More recently, this ratio has been overturned, and the majority of ethnic Koreans residing in Japan today are believed to be from South Korea (Fukukoka 2004).

Over time, the South and North groups formed their own organizations – *Mindan* representing the South, and *Chongryon* representing the North. Most ethnic Koreans in Japan belong to one of these two groups. *Chongryon* openly pledges their allegiance to North Korea, and has been the more politically controversial of the two. Members of *Chongryon* maintain a greater sense of ethnic identity, and are more strongly opposed to assimilation into Japanese society. For example, *Chongryon* discourages its members from naturalization and from intermarriage with the Japanese.

The distinct positions on assimilation between these two groups are illuminated through the example of education and the schooling of the ethnic Korean children.⁶ *Chongryon* operate their own schools in Japan, and classes are taught entirely in the Korean language. According to Fukukoka (2004), there were 150 schools operated by *Chongryon* in 1993. *Mindan*, which is more positive about assimilation, send most of their members to mainstream Japanese schools. Citing 1986 statistics, Fukukoka explains that 86 % of the school-age children (of ethnic Koreans) attended Japanese schools, 13 % attended North Korean schools, and 1 % South Korean schools.

The Korean schools operated by *Chongryon* have been at the center of controversy because of the Japanese Ministry of Education's refusal to recognize these schools as legitimate. In the past, these schools taught a curriculum which had an openly pro-Pyongyang bias. This has changed in recent years as the schools increased their teachings of Japanese history, society and language (Motani 2002). In spite of these efforts, the Ministry holds that the *Chongryon* curriculum does not meet the requirements of the Japanese School Education Law, a claim that prevents their graduates from applying for admission into the

Japanese universities. The Ministry now maintains that the decision to allow these graduates to apply will be left to the individual universities. In practice, with the exception of the national universities, the majority of the Japanese universities now allow the *Chongryon* graduates to take their entrance examinations (Fukukoka 2004).

Ainu

At the turn of the century, the Meiji government pursued an aggressive policy of forced assimilation to integrate the Ainu people into the Japanese mainstream population (Lie 2001), putting into place a number of measures to ban aspects and practices of the Ainu culture. The Ainu people were required to adopt Japanese names. They were automatically granted Japanese citizenship, which effectively dissolved their indigenous status. They were forced off their land to make way for Japan's expansion and development of the Hokkaido territories (Siddle 2009). In fact, Japan's expansion into Hokkaido has been likened to the Japanese version of the American western frontier (Lie 2001), and the treatment of the Ainu population to the experience of the Native Americans (De Vos et al. 1983).

One of the most notable acts of forced assimilation by the Japanese government was the 1899 Hokkaido Aborigine Protection Act. The legislation was ostensibly enacted to protect the Ainu peoples, but in reality, it was aimed to disintegrate the Ainu culture (Lie 2001). The Japanese government took control of their land, and the dispossessed Ainu were forced to become either farmers or day laborers. They were banned from speaking their own language. Special schools designated for the preservation of the Ainu culture were abolished in the 1930s.

The status of the Ainu people improved somewhat during the 1990s. The United Nations' International Year of the World's Indigenous People in 1993 generated publicity and heightened awareness of the Ainu people and their culture. In 1994, living Ainu and prominent activist Shigeru Kayano gained entry into the upper house as the first Ainu ever to sit in the Japanese

⁶I am grateful to Morgan Swartz for her suggestions on the literature relating to the topic of ethnic Korean schools.




Fig. 11.4 Changes in AINU employment by industry sector (Source: AINU Association of Hokkaido)

parliament (Howell 1996). During his term, Kayano was instrumental in promoting and preserving the AINU culture. He founded 15 AINU language schools. He posed questions in the AINU language during Diet sessions.⁷ More importantly, in 1997 he played a key role in overturning the Hokkaido Aborigine Protection Act, nearly a century after its enactment. The AINU were granted minority status from the Japanese government later that year, which subsequently improved funding for the AINU’s struggles for rights (Hohmann 2008).

In 2008, the Japanese Diet finally voted to recognize the AINU as “an indigenous people with a distinct language, religion and culture” (Minority Rights Group International 2008). The recognition was a welcome step towards the preservation of the AINU culture, but the move was also met with some skepticism. Some claimed that it was taken in haste, as a cosmetic gesture, in an attempt to improve the government’s image in the international community just prior to the G-8 Summit in Hokkaido that same year. Some were disappointed

by the absence of apologies for the cultural repression and forced assimilation of the past.

In spite of these recent efforts to recognize and preserve the AINU culture, today the AINU traditions have almost completely disappeared. The AINU is not a written language; it can only be transmitted through an active and living oral culture (De Vos et al. 1983). Because the spoken language was banned under the forced assimilation policies, the language was lost over generations. Today, fewer than 100 native speakers remain (Hohmann 2008). Further, widespread intermarriage has reduced the outward physical appearances between the AINU and the Japanese (Howell 1996).

The AINU of today continue to be economically disadvantaged. They earn significantly less than do the average Japanese households. They are less likely to advance to higher education, and they are more likely to be recipients of public assistance (AINU Association of Hokkaido statistics). In accordance with Japan’s economic development, the AINU’s employment also shifted away from the primary (or agricultural) sector. In 1972, the majority of the AINU population was employed in the primary sector (see Fig. 11.4). This proportion gradually declined to 29 % by 2006. In its place, the employment in the tertiary sector expanded, from 15 % in 1972 to 41 % in

⁷The Japanese Diet is a two parliamentary system, consisting of the lower house (or House of Representatives) and the upper house (or House of Councillors). The Diet is responsible for passing laws, and for selecting the Prime Minister.

2006. This percentage share of employment in the tertiary sector, however, is still considerably lower than the national average of 74 %.

Ryukyuan/Okinawans

Like the Ainu, the Okinawans became ethnic minorities in Japan because they were colonized (Lie 2001). Ryukyu was an independent kingdom until its formal annexation by imperial Japan in 1879. According to Taira (1997), the period between 1879 and 1895 is known as the “period that preserved old custom.” Many of the cultural and institutional features of the Ryukyu kingdom were retained.

The situation changed with the arrival of Governor Shigeru Narahara who instituted cultural integration and aggressive Japanization. Standard Japanese (instead of the local Ryukyuan dialect) was taught in the schools. Traditional clothing was discouraged, and surnames had to be changed to conform to the Japanese registry system (Lie 2001). Privatization and the advancement of the market economy further depressed the welfare of the Ryukyuan people, and many fled to start a new life in the main Japanese islands, or in other countries. Thus Taira explains that “(the) Japanization of Okinawa and global dispersion of Okinawans went hand in hand” (p. 157). The earliest of these migrants was a group of 27 Okinawans who left for Hawaii in December 1899. Other destinations included the Philippines, Mexico, Brazil, New Caledonia, Taiwan and Micronesia. According to statistics cited in Lie (2001), up to one-sixth (or 75,000) of the Okinawan population had migrated abroad by the 1940s, and another 50,000 had migrated to the main Japanese islands.

With the end of the Second World War, Okinawa was placed under the rule of the U.S. military government. The U.S. forces remained in Okinawa with a strong presence. With the beginning of the Cold War, the strategic value of Okinawa increased. The military base played a key role in both the Korean and the Vietnam Wars. The presence of the U.S. military was no longer transient, but became a long-term strategy.

In 1954, 20 % of Okinawa’s arable land was occupied by the U.S. military (Lie 2001). The sovereignty of Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, but the U.S. forces are still there. As part of a larger plan to disperse U.S. troops across the Asia-Pacific regions, the governments of Japan and the U.S. announced in April 2012 that approximately one half of the 18,000 troops currently stationed in Okinawa will be transferred to U.S. bases in Guam, Hawaii and elsewhere (see for example, Barnes and Hayashi 2012). The move was welcomed by Okinawans and the greater Japanese public as there have been at times serious local tensions with U.S. forces.

Given Okinawa’s precarious history of sovereignty, it is not surprising that independence remains an issue. While many Okinawans consider themselves to be part of the mainstream Japanese culture, others call for autonomy. A quote by Junji Nishime, three-time governor of Okinawa, sums up this ambivalence: “Although vis-à-vis Americans, Okinawans insisted that they were Japanese, they felt that in Japanese society they were a different kind of people from the Japanese” (cited in Taira 1997). Nishime uses the expression “sub-nation” to be more fitting of Okinawa’s present-day status. Chojo Oyama, the former mayor of Koza (in Okinawa), decries Okinawa’s “enslavement to Japan,” and calls for Okinawa’s separation from Japan (cited in Lie 2001).

Nikkeijin

Most of the *Nikkeijin* who currently reside in Japan originate from the large-scale out-migration that took place after 1899. Initially, the greatest receiving nation of the Diaspora was the U.S. However, as disagreements between Japan and the U.S. intensified in the early twentieth century and entry of Japanese citizens into the U.S. became more restricted, greater numbers of Japanese emigrants flowed into Latin American countries.

The flow of migrants between Japan and South America is best understood by push-pull migration

(Brody 2001).⁸ In the early twentieth century, the Japanese government encouraged migration because it feared a population explosion. The South American countries welcomed new labor to assist in their development (Sellek 1997). Today, the largest Japanese ethnic community outside of Japan is located in Brazil, a population estimated to be about 1.5 million in 2012 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). In accordance with this large Japanese representation in Brazil, the largest group of *Nikkeijin* residing in Japan is Brazilian – or *Nikkei Brazilians* – followed by *Nikkei Peruvians* (see Table 11.1 for population statistics).

The return migration of *Nikkeijin* essentially started with the Immigration Control Act of 1990. Until this time, immigration of foreign workers was limited to foreigners with specialized skills that were not possessed by Japanese nationals. Immigration of unskilled laborers was strictly prohibited. This restriction came under scrutiny during the 1980s with the expansion of the Japanese economy, and the accompanying labor shortage in the unskilled occupations. Japanese workers deserted the so-called 3D jobs – dirty, dangerous and demeaning – and an increasing number of illegal migrants (most of them overstayers) started to occupy the unskilled labor positions left vacant by Japanese workers.

The Immigration Control Act of 1990 was a move to pull the *Nikkeijin* back to Japan; it was enacted specifically to allow *Nikkeijin* to work legally in Japan without restrictions. The passage of the Act benefited employers because they could now legally hire low-wage workers without relying on undocumented workers.

Ostensibly, the original intent of the 1990 Act was to allow *Nikkeijin* to be reunited with their Japanese families. Entry was thus restricted to *Nikkeijin* and their spouses because the Japanese authorities believed that “*Nikkeijin* would fit in better with Japanese society” (Rebick 2005, p. 160). The decision to target the *Nikkeijin* reflected in part “the government’s concern with

an individual’s bloodline in determining ‘Japaneseness’” (Shipper 2008, p. 37). *Nikkeijin* are, after all, “ethnic Japanese” by blood. They are foreigners because they are foreign born, but the Japanese government considered them to be “almost Japanese.”

What the government did not anticipate was a subsequent massive influx of *Nikkeijin* (Sellek 2001). According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs statistics (cited in Sellek 2001), the number of *Nikkeijin* from South America was about 8,500 in 1988. By 1991, this number swelled to over 140,000, of which 119,000 were Brazilians and 26,000 were Peruvians. More recent numbers show that there were over 230,000 Brazilians and 54,000 Peruvians in 2010 (see Table 11.1 and Fig. 11.2).

This explosion of the *Nikkeijin* population caused ethnic frictions in Japan, especially in regions populated with a high concentration of *Nikkeijin* (see next section). The tension increased during the 1990s, as Japan sunk into a protracted economic stagnation that worsened labor market conditions (see discussion on “job competition” in next section). In 2009, the Japanese government took the extraordinary step of asking the *Nikkeijin* population to leave the country, offering cash incentives and (one-way) airfare. Participants in this voluntary program must sign an agreement never to pursue employment in Japan.

Demographic Trends and the Issue of Immigration

There are several key demographic changes taking place in Japan. First, in the postwar period, fertility has steadily declined. The total fertility rate decreased from 4.54 in 1947 to 1.26 in 2005. In 2006, Prime Minister Koizumi created and appointed, for the first time, the Minister of State for Gender Equality and Births, a move that signaled the state’s commitment to address the low fertility problem in Japan. Second, the population is aging rapidly. In 2005, Japan became the oldest national population in the world (Ogawa et al. 2009). Improved economic and social conditions

⁸I am grateful to Yuki Hashimoto for her suggestions on the literature relating to *Nikkei Brazilians* and migrant workers in Japan.

have led to longer life expectancy at birth. The combination of declining fertility and improved life expectancy has increased the share of older persons (aged 65 and over) in the population, from 5 % in 1950 to 20 % in 2005. This proportion is predicted to reach 31 % in 2021. Third, and most importantly, the size of the overall population peaked in 2005, and has been declining since. According to population projections by the United Nations (2001), the Japanese population is expected to shrink to 105 million by 2050 (from the current level of 128 million recorded in 2008). The working age population (aged 15–64) is expected to shrink (from 87.2 million in 1995) to 57.1 million in 2050.

How should Japan deal with these demographic changes? The shrinking labor force threatens to undermine Japan's economic output. This alarming trend, coupled with the aging population and the increasing share of pensioners in the population, is straining the social security system. The decline in Japan's population was foreseeable, and policymakers have been wrestling with this problem for decades. Three demographic groups have been identified as possible sources to augment the workforce: women, the elderly, and foreigners. Increasing the supply of workers from these demographic groups has been a key priority, but each group introduces complications.

Increasing the labor force participation rate (LFPR) of women has been a persistent but unmet priority for the Japanese economy. Women's LFPR in Japan has increased over time, but it remains well below the OECD average. The loss in economic output from women's *non-participation* in the labor force is not negligible. Ono and Rebick (2003) estimate that if Japanese women's LFPR increased to a level equivalent to that of the OECD average, then the productive labor supply of women can rise by some 13–18 %. The increase in women's labor supply could raise the potential growth rate of the Japanese economy by roughly 1 % per annum over a 10-year period.

However, measures to encourage women to participate in the labor market may at the same time discourage them to have children, which

could further exacerbate the declining population problem. At present, most women in Japan must choose either work or family; programs that allow women to manage both options are sorely needed. Although work-family balance initiatives have been introduced in both public and private spheres, they remain limited to only a handful of organizations.

Increasing the supply of older workers by raising the mandatory retirement age also brings challenges. Older workers today, on average, are in better health than those of previous generations, as indicated by improvements in life expectancy. Many are willing to work even after retirement. However, raising the age of retirement also affects wages and employment opportunities for younger workers. From the employer's perspective, the mandatory retirement age marks the last year that the employer is obligated to pay workers' salaries. If that age is extended, then the employer must further prolong the duration of payment. This has the overall effect of flattening out the earnings profiles (Lazear 1979). Hence such a measure could face opposition from younger workers who stand to earn less. Further, if employers are required to retain older workers longer, then the employers will be forced to hold back on hiring younger workers. In other words, increasing the supply of older workers will come at the price of decreased job opportunities for younger workers.

Immigration is an obvious solution to the labor shortage problem. However, in spite of the clear benefit of increasing the labor supply, the Japanese attitude towards immigration has always been one of ambivalence. To begin with, the Japanese government is opposed to large-scale immigration (Rebick 2005; Sellek 2001). Public sentiment towards immigration and acceptance of foreign workers has not been favorable. According to survey results reported in Ogawa (2004), only 17 % responded that Japan should "accept (unskilled) foreign workers without condition." In contrast, 39 % responded that Japan should "accept with certain conditions," and 26 % responded that Japan should "not accept foreign workers now nor in the future." In response to the question of accepting foreign

workers during times of labor shortage, 45 % answered that this should be considered only after exhausting the option of employing women and the elderly to the fullest extent possible. The number one reason for not accepting foreign workers was related to disruptions in public peace and safety. This is not surprising since perceptions of unskilled foreign workers in Japan usually are closely associated with crime. Moreover, this response rate has gained ground over time, from 54 % in 1990, 63 % in 2000, and 74 % in 2004 (cited in Ogawa 2004). The costs of immigration may thus outweigh its benefits if we consider the perceived social costs associated with the influx of foreigners in Japan. For these reasons, Goto (2004) and others suggest that the expansion of the female labor force may be a more viable and prudent way to grow the labor force.

Theoretical Issues Relating to Stratification, Hierarchy and Conflict

Exploring contemporary race and ethnic relations requires an understanding of the structural and historical context that evolves around the ethnic minority groups (Wilson 1980). This is particularly true in the case of Japan, where ethnic relations are profoundly shaped and constructed by social and historical forces. If we consider the ethnic groups and their corresponding categories in Japanese history (not necessarily in chronological order), we have: (i) Assimilation – Ainu and Okinawans; (ii) War-time domination/invasion – Chinese, Taiwanese, and Koreans; (iii) Unskilled labor migration – *Nikkeijin* and other Asian groups such as the Filipinos; (iv) War-time defeat – Americans; and (v) Technical assistance (*yatoi* phenomenon) – Americans and Europeans.

The first three categories here are considered to be subordinate to the Japanese race. The Ainu and Okinawans became ethnic minorities through forced assimilation. The Chinese, Taiwanese and Koreans are peoples from territories that were under Japanese invasion during the prewar period. Speaking to the annexation of the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan and Korea, Taira (1997) explains

that, “(w)hen these new imperial subjects migrated to Japan proper, they were incorporated at the bottom of the Japanese social stratification” (p. 143). In addition, the *Nikkeijin* were pulled back to Japan in response to chronic shortage of manual labor.

This socially-constructed racial hierarchy is further complicated by the element of skin color. The Japanese associate lighter skin with beauty (Wagatsuma 1967). In postwar Japan, the perception of upper-class “almost inevitably referred to white North Americans and Europeans” (Lie 2000, p. 75). Befu (2001) surmises as follows:

If the Japanese felt lower than Westerners who happened to be white, by the same token, they felt superior toward the peoples of Southeast Asia and Africa, whose technological level is below Japan’s and who are not white. In short, the cultural as well as ‘racial’ hierarchy has placed the West above Japan, and Africa and rest of Asia below it. (p. 73)

Moreover, Japan’s devastating loss in the Second World War has left enduring sentiments inferiority vis-a-vis the U.S. As Befu (2001) explains, the war confirmed the “technological, military, and economic inferiority of the Japanese civilization” (p. 75). A sense of inferiority, reinforced by the history of technical assistance and admiration towards Western civilization, sets the U.S. and Europe as superior to Japan.

The racial hierarchy can be observed in the occupational distribution of foreign workers. As shown in Table 11.2, just about half of all foreigners in Japan are employed as laborers compared to only 28 % of the Japanese labor force.

The occupation is categorized across skill levels, and its distribution varies greatly by country of origin. At the high end of the skill distribution are the specialists. The Japanese government has made conscious efforts to open its doors to highly-skilled foreign workers in business management and professional services (Usui 2006). The majority of foreigners from the U.S. and U.K. are employed as specialists. In contrast, the majority from the other countries are employed as laborers, with the exception of Koreans who appear to be well distributed across occupations. Not surprisingly, the workers from Brazil and

Table 11.2 Occupational distribution of foreigners by country of origin (percentages, 2005 data)

Country of origin	Specialist	Management	Clerical	Sales	Service	Agriculture/fishery/forestry	Transport	Laborer	Others
Korea	10.1	4.9	14.3	17.4	17.3	0.4	4.0	27.1	4.5
Philippines	10.2	0.2	3.1	4.0	20.3	3.1	0.5	55.2	4.8
Thailand	6.4	0.4	3.9	5.8	17.9	4.0	0.6	55.6	5.5
Indonesia	6.1	0.3	1.9	1.4	8.0	7.6	0.2	71.8	2.8
Vietnam	3.9	0.3	1.9	3.1	4.2	0.8	0.5	79.0	6.4
China	10.9	1.1	7.0	6.8	13.1	3.1	0.5	52.8	4.7
Brazil	2.0	0.2	1.9	1.3	2.1	0.3	1.0	87.8	3.5
Peru	1.4	0.1	1.4	1.9	2.8	0.3	1.1	84.7	6.3
U.S.	69.8	2.7	10.4	5.3	2.6	0.2	0.4	5.6	3.0
U.K.	75.3	2.3	8.6	5.0	2.7	0.3	0.2	3.4	2.2
Average (Foreigners)	12.7	2.1	7.6	8.6	11.8	1.4	1.6	49.7	4.6
Average (Japanese)	13.8	2.4	19.5	14.6	10.0	4.8	3.4	28.1	3.5

Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare statistics

Peru – at well over 80 % – have the highest concentration of employment as laborers. The occupational distribution thus suggests a system of stratification by employment status, with Japanese workers occupying the more desirable jobs, Europeans and Americans occupying a handful of “elite” jobs, and the rest of the foreign workers clustered into the low-end, low-wage temporary jobs.

Furthermore, there is stratification *within* foreign manual workers based on their legal status (Inagami et al 1992, cited in Sellek 1997). The Immigration Control Act of 1990 legalized the employment status of *Nikkeijin*, but not of other unskilled workers. This privileged position has elevated their status above that of the other illegal migrant workers. Sellek explains that (as a result of the 1990 Act), “legal migrant workers, i.e. *Nikkeijin*, have emerged as a sort of migrant labor ‘aristocracy,’ with illegal migrant workers from Asia existing at the other end of the spectrum” (p. 193). Their upgraded status is reinforced by the fact that the *Nikkeijin* workers are paid higher wages than are the illegal migrant workers.

A possible source of ethnic conflict in contemporary Japan is job competition. One of the reasons that Japan opposes immigration is the concern that foreign workers will displace Japanese workers in certain sectors. Empirically, Nakamura (2009) shows that the concentration of foreign workers in particular regions has the effect of crowding out workers in low-wage occupations, e.g. high-school graduates. He warns that high concentration of foreign workers may discourage some high-school graduates from seeking (local) employment in those regions.

Given the public’s sensitivity and the potential conflict between Japanese and foreign workers, the government has taken an extremely cautious position on immigration. For example, in 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi pledged that immigrant workers will be admitted only on an as-needed basis in order to avoid clashes (cited in Kashiwazaki and Akaha 2006). Foreign workers thus provide a flexible source of labor that allows employers to adjust employment in response to business cycle fluctuations. This is certainly the case with the employment of *Nikkei Brazilians* in Japan, the majority of which are employed as

laborers (see Table 11.2). In empirical work, Hashimoto (2009) shows that the demand for Brazilian workers in Japan is highly sensitive to seasonal and economic fluctuations.

The high concentration of foreign workers in particular regions has led to the formation of ethnic towns and enclaves. Over half of the *Nikkeijin* settled in the remote prefectures – Mie, Aichi, Shizuoka, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Gunma, among others – mainly because these were the areas where subcontractors of large manufacturing companies set up their factories (Sellek 2001). There is now an organization known as the Committee for Localities with a Concentrated Foreign Population (CLCFP), which unites 28 cities (as of this writing) in an effort to address issues and problems confronting immigrants. The Committee works with local and national authorities with the general aim of improving the assimilation of immigrants and elevating their quality of life, for example, through reforms in public education and the national health insurance (Tegtmeyer Pak 2006).

Among the localities with large concentrations of foreigners, Oizumi-city in the Gunma prefecture is considered to be “the most Brazilian town in all Japan” (De Carvalho 2002). Seventeen percent of the city’s residents are foreigners, and over 70 % of the foreigners are Brazilian (followed by Peruvians and Chinese; CLCFP statistics 2009). The Brazilian population began to grow in response to the city’s chronic labor shortage, for example with the recruitment of foreign laborers by a local automobile parts manufacturer.

Ethnic towns have evolved in the greater Tokyo area as well. According to some accounts, foreigners make up 40 % of the residents in the Ohkubo area of Tokyo (Inaba 2008). The majority are Koreans, followed by Chinese, Vietnamese, Thai and others. These communities have clashed with the local Japanese residents (Sellek 2001).

Measurement Issues

There are several major data sources that researchers can use to track the demographics of foreigners in Japan. These include the *Japanese Census*, *Statistical Survey on Legal Migrants*,

and *Statistical Survey of Registered Foreigners*, among others.

The data are collected by government agencies, but measurement issues do persist, for example in the accurate counting of foreigners. According to the minutes of a Cabinet Office meeting, the census count was 10 % lower than the number of foreigners registered in Japan (Cabinet Office 2009). Committee members from the Census Bureau who participated in the meeting attribute the error to the number of foreign students who have left the country, and conclude that the census may be more accurate than foreigner registration because many foreign students return to their home country without removing their registration.

Tracking illegal immigrants also is difficult. Most of the unauthorized immigrants in Japan are overstayers, i.e. immigrants whose duration of legal stay has expired. According to the 2009 Ministry of Justice statistics, over 50 % of illegal immigrants were from Korea, China and the Philippines, and 77 % had entered Japan as short-term visitors (without visas). These numbers, however, are much lower than in the past. In 2004, the Japanese government cracked down on illegal residents and pledged to reduce their numbers by half within 5 years.

A serious limitation of the existing immigration statistics is the dichotomous categorization of Japanese and foreigners. When immigrants become Japanese citizens, e.g. through naturalization, they are registered and counted as Japanese nationality holders. Background information about their country of origin, etc. is no longer recorded. This simple classification makes it difficult to assess the racial diversity of the country (Kashiwazaki and Akaha 2006).

Finally, from the perspective of scholars and researchers, data accessibility remains a real problem. Unlike in the research environments of the U.S. and Europe, most of the statistics collected by the Japanese government are not available for secondary or scholarly analysis. Data are available only as (published) aggregate statistics. Access to microdata, such as surveys on immigration as listed above, is strictly limited. This over-regulation is precluding high-quality empirical research in this area in Japan.

Future Trends

Japan desperately needs to admit foreign workers more systematically in order to augment its shrinking labor force population. According to one scenario described by the United Nations (2001), Japan needs 33.5 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or an average of 609,000 immigrants per year during this period, in order to maintain their working age population at 1995 levels. Such a huge influx of immigrants would alter the ethnic composition of the Japanese population dramatically. In fact, the UN estimates that the proportion of immigrants would account for 30 % of the overall population in 2050. These are simulated results based on a number of fixed assumptions, and projections could change if conditions improve, say if fertility levels rise. For now, however, the numbers point unequivocally to the urgency of Japan's shrinking population problem, and of the need to seriously (re)consider immigration as one remedy for the chronic labor shortage.

Yet Japan is ill-prepared for immigration. The country sorely needs a set of institutional reforms on a wider scale (Shimada 1994; Shipper 2008) to address the problems of its labor force. Tensions between local residents and foreign workers arise because Japanese society is not well-equipped to accommodate foreign workers. For starters, Shimada suggests new basic laws governing the employment of foreign workers. Further, Japan needs policies promoting education and training programs to help foreign workers gain appropriate skills.

Japanese ministries must design and implement a well-integrated, comprehensive policy on immigration (Sugiyama 2008). Some government ministries estimate the numerical target for immigration to meet the demands of a shrinking labor population. Other ministries draft policies to improve the social assimilation of these immigrants. Instead of separate ministries pursuing their own agendas, Japan needs a coordinated, unified vision on immigration.

***Nihonjinron* Revisited**

Globalization is leaving its imprint on Japan, as it is on all other countries. The long-term trend in mixed-race marriages is increasing, perhaps as foreigners are now more likely to reside in Japan for longer periods than in the past (Sellek 2001). Signs in foreign languages like English, Chinese and Korean, previously nonexistent in Japan, are now easily seen in large metro areas like Tokyo and Osaka.

In 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi launched the “Invest in Japan” initiative, in a concerted effort to increase foreign direct investment in Japan. Interestingly, the *Financial Times* article which featured the story referenced this rhetoric back to Commodore Perry and the need to trigger modernization (Pilling 2004). Owing to Japan’s history of prolonged isolation, it still has a culture of protectionism and self-preservation that could thwart its integration with the global economy. Against this backdrop, “Invest in Japan” was intended to (re-)open Japan’s doors to foreign direct investment. Statistics from Japan External Trade Organization indicate a greater inflow of foreign capital and a larger presence of foreign firms in Japan since the initiative was launched (Ono 2007).

We have argued, throughout this chapter, the role of *Nihonjinron* in shaping the discourse of race and ethnicity in Japan. What role will *Nihonjinron* play as Japan moves into the global economy of the twentieth century? The rhetoric of “one race” has quieted in the postwar period, but resurfaces in public discourse at unexpected moments. In 1986, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone referred to Japan as a “homogenous nation.” More recently in 2005, Taro Aso (who was later appointed Prime Minister from 2008 to 2009), spoke in a public ceremony and described Japan as having: “One nation, one civilization, one language, one culture and one race. There is no other nation that has such characteristics” (Japan Times 2005). The head of a citizens’ group that works to preserve Ainu culture is quoted in the same article: “The fact that top government officials have repeatedly made similar

remarks shows the government has never sincerely listened to our protest.”

As another example, during the U.S.-Japan trade imbalances of the 1980s, Japanese negotiators argued that Japanese people have longer intestines which make it difficult for them to digest beef (see for example, Jameson 1988). This line of reasoning was used to restrict beef imports from the U.S. Meanwhile, public perceptions of immigrants and foreign workers remain unfavorable, with some fearing the erosion of harmony and social order. These instances, though infrequent, remind us that Japan has not completely departed from its isolationist past. *Nihonjinron* will continue to influence ethnic and racial relations in Japan for the foreseeable future, maybe not in its original name and form, but under the guise of Japanese cultural uniqueness.

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The Social Demography of China's Minority Nationalities

12

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According to data from the 2010 Census of the People's Republic of China, China's 55 minority nationalities numbered over 111 million people, comprising almost 8.4 % of China's total population. By comparison, in 2010 the minority populations of the United States comprised 36.3 % of the country's population, numbering just under 112 million people (Humes et al. 2011). Thus there are about as many minorities in China as there are in the United States, even though China's percentage share is one-fifth that of the United States. If the minorities of China were a single country, it would be the 12th most populous in the world, outnumbered only by India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Russia, Japan, Mexico, and the Han population of China.

All 31 provinces of China, and most of the more than 2,800 counties of China, have some minority residents. However, most of the minorities reside in the border areas rather than in the interior regions of the country. In China, the geographic locations of the minority populations have to a significant degree been invariant for centuries. This situation is very much unlike that, say, in the United States, where the locations of the racial and ethnic groups largely result from

patterns of immigration to the country, length of time the groups have been in the U.S., differences in the groups' rates of natural increase, age and sex composition, and other factors (Lieberson and Waters 1987, 1988).

Table 12.1 lists alphabetically by name China's 55 minority populations and the Han majority population, their population sizes in 2010, and their major locations in China. The largest minority group is the Zhuang, with a population of over 16.9 million persons, and the smallest is the Tatar, with a population size of just over 3,500 persons. The average size of a minority population in China in 2010 was just over two million persons with, as expected, a very sizable standard deviation of almost 3.7 million.

Much of the research on Chinese minority populations conducted by Chinese and non-Chinese scholars pertains to specific minority groups and often tends to be more ethnodemographic than quantitative. These studies provide us with detailed social histories of specific minority groups and classifications according to their predominant forms of sustenance organization, marriage norms and patterns, religious and cultural orientations, and linguistic practices (Lu 1986). However, since this work has been conducted by many different scholars, the research lacks standardization in concepts and methodology, and the findings are usually not directly comparable from one group to the next. Moreover, demographic analyses of the Chinese minorities have focused largely on their fertility patterns

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Table 12.1 Size and location of China's minority nationalities, 2010

Group	Chinese	Population size	Location
Zhuang	壮族	16,926,381	Guangxi, Yunnan, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Guizhou
Hui	回族	10,586,087	Ningxia + nine other areas
Manchu	满族	10,387,958	Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jilin
Uyghur	维吾尔族	10,069,346	Xinjiang
Miao	苗族	9,426,007	Guizhou, Hunan, Yunnan, + three other areas
Yi	彝族	8,714,393	Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Zhejiang, Guangdong
Tujia	土家族	8,353,912	Hunan, Hubei
Tibetan	藏族	6,282,187	Tibet, Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan
Mongol	蒙古族	5,981,840	Inner Mongolia + six other areas
Dong	侗族	2,879,974	Guizhou, Hunan, Guangxi
Buyei	布依族	2,870,034	Guizhou
Yao	瑶族	2,796,003	Guangxi, Hunan, Yunnan, Guangdong, Guizhou
Bai	白族	1,933,510	Yunnan
Korean	朝鲜族	1,830,929	Jinlin, Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Shandong
Hani	哈尼族	1,660,932	Yunnan
Li	黎族	1,463,064	Hainan
Kazakh	哈萨克族	1,462,588	Xinjiang
Dai	傣族	1,261,311	Yunnan
She	畲族	708,651	Fujian, Zhejiang
Lisu	傈僳族	702,839	Yunnan
Dongxiang	东乡族	621,500	Gansu, Xinjiang
Gelao	仡佬族	550,746	Guizhou
Lahu	拉祜族	485,966	Yunnan
Va	佤族	429,709	Yunnan
Sui	水族	411,847	Guizhou
Nakhi	纳西族	326,295	Yunnan
Qiang	羌族	309,576	Sichuan
Tu	土族	289,565	Qinghai, Gansu
Mulao	仫佬族	216,257	Guangxi
Xibe	锡伯族	190,481	Liaoning, Xinjiang
Kyrgyz	柯尔克孜族	186,708	Xinjiang
Jingpo	景颇族	147,828	Yunnan
Daur	达斡尔族	131,992	Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang
Salar	撒拉族	130,607	Qinghai, Gansu
Blang	布朗族	119,639	Yunnan
Maonan	毛南族	101,192	Guangxi
Tajik	塔吉克族	51,069	Xinjiang
Pumi	普米族	42,861	Yunnan
Achang	阿昌族	39,555	Yunnan
Nu	怒族	37,523	Yunnan
Ewenki	鄂温克族	30,875	Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang
Gin	京族	28,199	Guangxi
Jino	基诺族	23,143	Yunnan
De'ang	德昂族	20,556	Yunnan
Bonan	保安族	20,074	Gansu
Russian	俄罗斯族	15,393	Xinjiang
Yugur	裕固族	14,378	Gansu
Uzbek	乌孜别克族	10,569	Xinjiang

(continued)

Table 12.1 (continued)

Group	Chinese	Population size	Location
Menba	门巴族	10,561	Tibet
Oroqen	鄂伦春族	8,659	Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang
Derung	独龙族	6,930	Yunnan
Hezhen	赫哲族	5,354	Heilongjiang
Gaoshan	高山族	4,009	Taiwan, Fujian
Lhoba	珞巴族	3,682	Tibet
Tatar	塔塔尔族	3,556	Xinjiang
Han	汉族	1,220,844,520	Majority, ex. Tibet & Xinjiang
All of China	中国	1,332,810,869	

(e.g., Qiu and He 1984; Li et al. 1984; Jia and Poston 1987). Other features of socioeconomic and demographic composition have received but scant attention.

This chapter examines the demographic and socioeconomic composition of China's 55 minority populations. Using data from China's 2010 census, we have developed characteristics variables for each of these groups dealing with age, dependency, fertility, education and literacy, occupation, residential segregation, and geographic differentiation. After a brief review of the history of Han-minority relations, we discuss and describe the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the minorities. Also, since around one-fifth of China's minorities are Muslim, we present at the end of our chapter a brief discussion of the Muslims of China.

Historical Background

When considering the origins of the geographical distribution of China's ethnic minorities, it is helpful to refer to two Chinas, one inner and one outer. If we were to draw a perpendicular line from the western extremity of the Great Wall in the upper part of Gansu Province south to the provincial boundaries of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Tibet, Inner China would lie to the south of the Great Wall and to the east of the drawn line. About 95 % of the country's population lives in this half of China, and most of them are Han. "In the other half, including the far north of Manchuria (i.e., Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces), the lonely steppes of (Inner

Mongolia, the icy plateau of Tibet and Qinghai and the deserts of Xinjiang, live only one in twenty of China's people" (Sinclair 1987: 10), and most of them are minorities. However, this generalization, itself, is somewhat misleading, because there are many places in Inner China, for instance, Guangxi, Guizhou, and Yunnan, where there are many minorities.

Ethnic conflict has been a recurrent feature of China's historical record. Two thousand years ago, the nationalities recognized today were subdivided into many ethnic groups living in the Central Plains of Asia. Power struggles between and among the different groups were frequent. With population growth and technological advancement, the Han Chinese became increasingly dominant. They moved more and more into areas originally inhabited by non-Han peoples. Through military conquest and cultural diffusion, they widened their spheres of political control. Some of the non-Han Chinese were forced either to assimilate or to migrate southward to live in the mountains and forests outside the direct reach of the Han. The eventual expansion of the Han to the south was easier than that to the areas of the north and west, which were populated by large, tightly knit tribes. In the latter areas, the Chinese imperial government often engaged in a range of coercive measures, including direct military force and other persuasive methods, to control the minority populations.

Han Chinese control has thus been sporadic, depending on the strength of the particular dynasty relative to the strength of the minority resistance. In some instances, assimilation was out of the question, and little more than control

was possible. For instance, the Ming philosopher-statesman Wang Yang-Ming noted in the late 1400s that the “barbarians are like wild deer”; any attempt among the Han magistrates to institute direct civil service administration would be akin to “herding deer into the hall of a house and trying to tame them” (Dreyer 1976: 13).

Chinese history reveals some of the social origins of this pattern of spatial distribution. During the Qin dynasty (221–207 B.C.), Qin Shi Huangdi ruled as the First Emperor of a united country. Previously, various independent states populated the territory. Indeed, historians refer to the last 200 or so years of the pre-Qin era in China as the Warring States period. It was during the Qin dynasty that construction of the Great Wall was begun, with the purpose of keeping the minority nationalities to the north outside the newly formed country. To the south, agricultural peoples protected by the Great Wall formed a united state with the Han in control. Gradually, the Han became stronger and more advanced than any of the other ethnic groups and eventually became the numerical majority. This means that the Han Chinese, themselves, are the product of the intermixing of various peoples who originally settled in the area south of the Great Wall.

The Han were agriculturalists and “were even in those early times contemptuous of the peoples around them, the hunters and gatherers or nomads” (Heberer 1989: 18). These non-Han differed from the Han both in sustenance activities and social and cultural organization. Over the centuries, the Han pushed the non-Han progressively into the borderlands; thus today there are large numbers of minorities in the far southern provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi. In addition, contempt for the non-Han peoples resulted in the geographical segregation of these minorities from the Han majority.

The Chinese do not think of their minority populations as races; they are seldom distinguished solely by physical and anthropometric criteria. Instead, minority identification depends to a much greater degree on persistent cultural and linguistic differences. Despite the stability of the cultural differences, the actual identification

of the minority populations is not an easy matter. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Chinese leaders have struggled with questions such as: How many nationalities are there in China? What are the criteria for ethnic identification? How does one know whether a group of people is indeed a national minority or a part of the Han majority?

Fei Xiaotong (aka Fei Hsiao T’ung) (1910–2005) was a social anthropologist in China who obtained a doctoral degree in 1938 at the London School of Economics under Bronislaw Malinowski and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown. Fei carried out extensive sociological and social anthropological research in China that provided important answers to the above questions. His government-sponsored travels throughout China enabled him to penetrate the nearly inaccessible mountain areas and remote villages inhabited by many of his country’s minority inhabitants. On the basis of Fei’s and others’ recommendations, the Chinese government has distinguished many of the minority nationalities from the Han majority largely on the basis of their distinctive cultural and linguistic differences that have persisted for centuries (Fei 1989).

Spatial, Socioeconomic and Demographic Composition

Spatial Structure

With data from the 2010 census of China, we have assembled for each of China’s 55 minority populations, and the Han, the following measures of socioeconomic and demographic composition: age, education, literacy, fertility, occupation, geographic differentiation, and residential segregation from the Han. The measures are self-explanatory and are commonly used indicators of socioeconomic and demographic composition, except for the last two, which are spatial measures. We focus first on spatial structure.

The “index of geographic differentiation” is adapted from the so-called M1 index described by Gibbs and Poston (1975). It measures the degree of geographical distribution of a minority

population across China's 31 major geographic areas. The index is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Geographical Differentiation Index} = 1 - \frac{\left[\sum_{i=1}^{31} X_i^2 \right]}{\left(\sum_{i=1}^{31} X_i \right)^2},$$

where X is the number of persons of a specific minority group in each of China's 31 main geographical areas. The more even or balanced the distribution of the members of a group across the 31 areas, the higher the measure of geographical differentiation. The theoretical value of the index ranges from 0 (all members of a minority group are residing in one and only one Chinese province) to a value approaching 1.00 (members of the minority group are residing in every one of China's 31 areas and are equally distributed throughout these areas).

In China, the minority people live over vast areas covering about 50–60 % of China's total land. However, as noted earlier, they are mostly concentrated in the country's western half. China's long borders are chiefly populated by the minorities. Among them are the Gaoshan in Taiwan and the Li on Hainan Island in the south. In the northeast, the Koreans reside along the Tumen River, the Hezhen along the Wusuli River, and the Ewenki and the Oroqen along the Heilongjinag River. The Mongolians are located in Inner Mongolia; the Kazakh, the Uygur and the Kyrgyz in Xinjiang; the Tibetans, the Menba and the Lhoba in Tibet; the Lisu, the Derung, the Jingpo, the Va, the Dai and the Yi in Yunnan; and the Zhuang and the Gin in Guangxi. These groups live in key defense areas. Over the generations,

they have developed the border areas and have defended the country.

Due to various and special historical factors, some minority groups are dispersed all about the country such as the Hui. Some of the Hui live in compact communities in the Ningxia area, but the rest are scattered all over China in virtually all the big cities, and even in Xinjiang and Tibet. This wide distribution is reflected in the geographic differentiation index score for the Hui of greater than .91, one of the highest scores of all the groups (see Table 12.2). The Hui and the Gaoshan are the two most broadly distributed geographically of all the minority groups in the Mainland China, with geographic differentiation scores of .91 and .93 respectively. The groups that are least geographically dispersed among all the minority peoples over the 31 major geographic locations are the Uygur, the Jino and the De'ang nationalities with scores of .01, .03 and .04, respectively. Overall, 40 of the groups have geographic differentiation scores of .5 or lower. Of those, 15 have scores below .10. In other words, 40 of the minority nationalities are more likely to live quite concentrated in certain geographic areas. Also, 15 of these groups live mainly in only one area. This is a result of migration, dispersion and isolation.

Another spatial index, the "index of residential segregation," measures the extent to which the minority group is residentially segregated from the Han majority people. We use the index of dissimilarity to compare the provincial level patterns of residence of each minority group from the pattern of the Han majority (see Table 12.2). This is a commonly employed measure of residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1988) and is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Residential Segregation Index of Dissimilarity} : \frac{1}{2} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{31} \left| \frac{M_i}{M} - \frac{H_i}{H} \right| \right)$$

where M_i is the number of persons of a specific minority group living in **province**, H_i is the number of Han persons living in **province**, M is the total number of persons of a specific minority group in China, and H is the total number of Han

persons in China. The absolute differences between M_i/M and H_i/H are summed over all 31 provinces, and the sum is divided by 2. When multiplied by 100, the residential segregation index value for a minority group represents the

Table 12.2 Spatial characteristics of China's minority populations, 2010

Group	2010 population	Geographic differentiation index	Dissimilarity index (percentage)
Zhuang	16,926,381	0.26	87.66
Hui	10,586,087	0.91	53.96
Manchu	10,387,958	0.68	78.47
Uygur	10,069,346	0.01	98.60
Miao	9,426,007	0.75	73.33
Yi	8,714,393	0.56	87.24
Tujia	8,353,912	0.78	77.23
Tibetan	6,282,187	0.70	88.38
Mongol	5,981,840	0.49	80.67
Dong	2,879,974	0.65	80.97
Buyei	2,870,034	0.23	85.67
Yao	2,796,003	0.63	78.57
Bai	1,933,510	0.33	87.02
Korean	1,830,929	0.63	80.16
Hani	1,660,932	0.04	95.60
Li	1,463,064	0.25	93.09
Kazakh	1,462,588	0.06	96.37
Dai	1,261,311	0.06	94.44
She	708,651	0.66	80.27
Lisu	702,839	0.09	92.58
Dongxiang	621,500	0.22	96.06
Gelao	550,746	0.19	88.08
Lahu	485,966	0.04	95.24
Va	429,709	0.13	90.77
Sui	411,847	0.28	83.77
Nakhi	326,295	0.10	92.78
Qiang	309,576	0.08	89.74
Tu	289,565	0.49	79.90
Mulao	216,257	0.35	87.02
Xibe	190,481	0.48	84.79
Kyrgyz	186,708	0.07	97.35
Jingpo	147,828	0.06	94.20
Daur	131,992	0.57	87.13
Salar	130,607	0.32	92.51
Blang	119,639	0.05	94.93
Maonan	101,192	0.50	87.63
Tajik	51,069	0.14	94.06
Pumi	42,861	0.04	95.60
Achang	39,555	0.07	93.71
Nu	37,523	0.28	86.68
Ewenki	30,875	0.28	88.60
Gin	28,199	0.31	83.10
Jino	23,143	0.03	95.83
De'ang	20,556	0.04	95.69
Bonan	20,074	0.18	95.04
Russian	15,393	0.60	83.87
Yugur	14,378	0.18	91.42
Uzbek	10,569	0.08	94.99

(continued)

Table 12.2 (continued)

Group	2010 population	Geographic differentiation index	Dissimilarity index (percentage)
Menba	10,561	0.16	91.48
Oroqen	8,659	0.62	83.21
Derung	6,930	0.16	89.68
Hezhen	5,354	0.54	68.56
Gaoshan	4,009	0.93	35.75
Lhoba	3,682	0.10	95.22
Tatar	3,556	0.17	90.45
Han	1,220,844,520	0.95	NA
Mean		0.33	87.00
Total population:	1,332,810,869		

Source: 2010 Census of China, authors' calculations

percentage of persons in the minority group who would have to move to certain other provinces for their percentage distribution across China's 31 provinces to be the same as the percentage distribution of the Han. The higher the index value, the greater the degree of residential segregation of the minority group from the Han.

In Table 12.2, we present residential segregation values for each of China's 55 minority nationalities. Generally speaking, the minority populations of China in 2010 are highly segregated from the Han majority. Most minority people would have to move to other provinces for their group residential distributions across the provinces of China to be the same as that of the Han majority. In 2010 in China, the Gaoshan minority group is the least segregated from the Han; about 36 % of them would have to move to certain other provinces to have the same residential distribution as the Han. Twenty-four of the minority populations have residential segregation scores above 90 %.

In research conducted several years ago, Poston and Micklin (1993) calculated segregation scores for the 55 minority groups using data from the 1982 Census of China. A comparison of their data with the segregation data in Table 12.2 reveals that the minority populations of China were more segregated from the Han in 1982 than in 2010. In 1982, almost 97 % of the minority peoples, on average, would have to move to other provinces for their minority group residential distributions across the provinces of China to be the same as that of the Han majority. At that time, the

Hui minority was the least segregated from the Han, and the Tajik group was the most segregated from the Han.

There has thus been a modest decrease in minority residential segregation between 1982 and 2010. The mean value of the dissimilarity index dropped from 97 to 87. But these are still very high segregation scores. According to Massey and Denton (1988), dissimilarity index scores above 80 are considered to be very high. Hence, in 2010, most of the minority nationalities of China remain highly segregated from the Han nationality.

Age Structure

Among the 55 minority nationalities in 2010, their age structures differ greatly. People aged 0–14 and 65 above are considered to be dependents, that is, they do not usually participate in the labor force and depend on the population aged 15–64, who are most often in the labor force. Therefore, demographers usually calculate two dependency ratios for population groups. Data for these two dependency ratios for all the nationalities are shown in Table 12.3.

The child dependency ratio refers to the number of population aged 0–14 per 100 persons in the population aged 15–64. The highest ratio is found among the Lhoba, 47.9. This means that in 2010 among the Lhoba, there were almost 48 people under the age of 15 per 100 people aged 15–64. The child dependency ratio was 45.0 for the Bonan,

Table 12.3 Age data and dependency ratios of China's minority nationalities, 2010

Nationality	Percent		Dependency ratios			
	0–14	65 and 65+	Child dependency ratio	Rank	Aged dependency ratio	Rank
Zhuang	20.27	8.76	28.56	36	12.35	7
Hui	21.17	7.32	29.60	33	10.23	17
Manchu	16.90	6.71	22.13	52	8.79	26
Uygur	25.87	4.79	37.31	15	6.91	46
Miao	25.47	7.15	37.80	13	10.61	16
Yi	27.24	5.89	40.74	9	8.80	25
Tujia	22.49	8.74	32.70	27	12.71	3
Tibetan	25.64	5.91	37.45	14	8.63	27
Mongol	19.66	4.78	26.02	45	6.32	48
Dong	22.63	8.73	32.97	24	12.72	2
Buyei	26.49	8.13	40.51	10	12.44	5
Yao	23.99	6.93	34.73	19	10.04	18
Bai	21.05	7.90	29.63	32	11.12	12
Korean	8.39	11.20	10.44	56	13.93	1
Hani	23.13	5.97	32.63	28	8.42	31
Li	22.89	5.88	32.13	30	8.25	34
Kazakh	23.76	3.90	32.85	26	5.39	54
Dai	20.06	6.22	27.21	40	8.44	30
She	20.75	8.24	29.22	35	11.61	10
Lisu	22.91	5.82	32.15	29	8.17	36
Dongxiang	27.50	6.06	41.39	7	9.13	21
Gelao	28.44	7.58	44.45	3	11.84	9
Lahu	19.83	5.42	26.52	43	7.24	41
Va	19.84	5.53	26.58	42	7.41	39
Sui	27.46	7.25	42.06	6	11.11	13
Nakhi	16.87	9.18	22.80	51	12.41	6
Qiang	18.91	7.20	25.60	46	9.74	19
Tu	21.04	4.67	28.32	38	6.29	50
Mulao	20.98	7.58	29.36	34	10.61	15
Xibe	17.79	6.02	23.35	49	7.91	37
Kyrgyz	26.07	5.01	37.82	12	7.26	40
Jingpo	24.43	4.48	34.37	20	6.31	49
Daur	17.87	4.43	23.00	50	5.70	52
Salar	28.53	5.41	43.20	4	8.20	35
Blang	24.01	5.08	33.86	21	7.16	43
Maonan	22.62	8.63	32.89	25	12.54	4
Tajik	26.22	4.79	38.01	11	6.94	45
Pumi	23.74	5.95	33.77	22	8.46	29
Achang	28.39	4.79	42.49	5	7.17	42
Nu	23.30	6.40	33.15	23	9.10	22
Ewenki	20.51	2.74	26.72	41	3.57	55
Gin	23.82	7.73	34.80	18	11.29	11
Jino	20.79	6.19	28.47	37	8.48	28
De'ang	25.61	4.48	36.62	16	6.40	47
Bonan	29.23	5.84	45.01	2	9.00	23
Russian	15.46	8.13	20.24	55	10.65	14
Yugur	18.53	6.73	24.79	47	9.00	24

(continued)

Table 12.3 (continued)

Nationality	Percent		Dependency ratios			
	0–14	65 and 65+	Child dependency ratio	Rank	Aged dependency ratio	Rank
Uzbek	22.19	5.96	30.88	31	8.30	33
Menba	27.72	4.83	41.09	8	7.16	44
Oroqen	21.15	2.61	27.73	39	3.42	56
Derung	24.90	5.20	35.63	17	7.43	38
Hezhen	17.15	4.41	21.86	53	5.62	53
Gaoshan	18.43	6.31	24.49	48	8.39	32
Lhoba	31.07	4.05	47.89	1	6.24	51
Tatar	19.32	6.86	26.17	44	9.30	20
Han	16.07	9.10	21.48	54	12.16	8

Source: 2010 Census of China, authors' calculations

and 44.5 for the Gelao; seven other minority groups have child dependency ratios higher than 40. For these ten minority groups, 100 adults are responsible for supporting at least 40 children under 15 years of age. On the other hand, the Korean child dependency ratio is as low as 10.4. Koreans are the only minority group with a child dependency ratio under 20. Russians also have a low child dependency ratio of 20. The Russian and Korean ratios are even lower than the ratio of 21.5 of the Han majority. There are 25 minority groups with child dependency ratios under 30.

We next turn attention to the aged dependency ratio, that is, the number of people aged 65+ per 100 people aged 15–64. Some minority groups have high ratios, namely, the Koreans and the Dong. Their aged dependency ratios are 13.9 and 12.7, and both are higher than the Han's 12.2. This means that among the Koreans and the Dong, there are more than 12 old people aged 65 or above for every 100 persons aged 15–64. In addition, another 43 minority groups have aged dependency ratios higher than 7.0. In general this is an indication that population aging has spread to more than half of China's minority groups. The lowest aged dependency ratios are found among the Oroqen, the Ewenki, the Kazakh, the Hezhen and the Daur. All these groups have aged dependency ratios lower than 6. These low values are largely due to their higher fertility rates (discussed later in this chapter).

Several nationalities need attention for their distinguished age and sex structures. The Kazakh are moving from a growing population to a

declining population, as may be seen in the shrinking base of its population pyramid. Therefore, its youth dependent population is not great (Fig. 12.1). The Korean minority group is encountering population aging because of the increasing number of older people, as well as the declining youth (Fig. 12.2). Finally, it seems that the Yi minority have a relatively stable population (Fig. 12.3).

Educational Structure

We turn now to a consideration of education. In the 2010 Census, data were provided for nine categories of educational attainment for the population 6 years of age and older: Post Graduate, University, Junior College, Secondary Technical School, Senior Secondary School, Junior Secondary School, Primary School, Less than Primary school, and No-schooling.

We first focus on illiteracy, the percentage of the population with no schooling (Table 12.4). The percentages among the minority groups with no schooling vary considerably; the highest is 37.4 % for the Menba, and the lowest is 1.1 % for the Xibe. Four minority groups, the Menba, the Tibetans, the Lhoba, and the Salar, have illiteracy percentages higher than 20, and 21 groups have percentages higher than 10. Compared with an illiteracy percentage of 4.7 % for the Han, 38 minority groups are more illiterate than the Han.

Next we consider the percentages of the minority populations having some college. Not unex-




Fig. 12.1 Population pyramid, Kazakh Minority Nationality, 2010 (Source: 2010 Census of China, prepared by authors)




Fig. 12.2 Population pyramid, Korean Minority Nationality, 2010 (Source: 2010 Census of China, prepared by authors)




Fig. 12.3 Population pyramid, Yi Minority Nationality, 2010 (Source: 2010 Census of China, prepared by authors)

pected, the data in Table 12.4 show a pattern in complete reverse of that shown for illiteracy. The highest percentage with at least some college is 29.3 for the Russia, and the lowest is 2.0 for the Dongxiang. As many as 15 minority groups have a higher percentage with some college than the 9.7 % of the Han. And all minority groups have scores of at least 2 %. The education data indicate that four minority groups have over 20 % of its population illiterate, and no minority groups have less than 1 % of its population with at least some college.

Educational attainment and occupational position are highly related. Among the 55 minority groups, there is a positive correlation of 0.96 between the percentage having at least some college and the percentage employed in a professional occupation.

Fertility

We show in Table 12.4 fertility values for each of China's minority groups, and also for the Han

majority. Our measure of fertility is the average number of surviving children to women aged 15–64. Data are not available in the 2010 census that allow us to calculate more common fertility measures, such as the general fertility rate or the total fertility rate. The Oroqen have the lowest fertility score of all the minority groups, 0.9. The Sui minority group has the highest fertility, a value of 1.8. This means that Sui women between the ages of 15 and 64 have an average of 1.8 surviving children, a value much higher than the corresponding figure of 0.9 for Oroqen women.

The fertility data in Table 12.4 show extensive diversity among the minorities of China. As noted, the fertility scores range from 0.9 to 1.8. Twelve minority groups have scores lower than the Han's value of 1.3, namely, the Oroqen, the Russians, the Hezhen, the Koreans, the Xibe, the Ewenki, the Gaoshan, the Manchu, the Daur, the Mongols, the Tatar, and the Yugur. The fertility scores for most of the minority groups are quite low; the Oroqen, the Russians, the Hezhen, and the Koreans all have scores below 1.

Table 12.4 Social characteristics of China's minority nationalities, 2010

Group	2010 Population	% Illiterate (no schooling)	% Some college and over	% Professional or party leader occupation	Fertility rate
Zhuang	16,926,381	4.75	5.65	4.77	1.60
Hui	10,586,087	8.57	9.36	8.42	1.48
Manchu	10,387,958	2.14	11.37	9.16	1.15
Uygur	10,069,346	3.51	6.35	4.71	1.64
Miao	9,426,007	10.25	4.40	3.68	1.70
Yi	8,714,393	14.30	3.78	3.33	1.71
Tujia	8,353,912	6.11	7.20	6.00	1.50
Tibetan	6,282,187	30.56	5.47	5.85	1.41
Mongol	5,981,840	3.31	14.24	10.71	1.23
Dong	2,879,974	6.62	6.17	5.24	1.57
Buyei	2,870,034	12.23	4.55	4.13	1.70
Yao	2,796,003	6.67	5.55	4.24	1.59
Bai	1,933,510	5.83	7.96	6.74	1.49
Korean	1,830,929	1.29	15.96	17.31	0.98
Hani	1,660,932	14.52	3.03	3.00	1.66
Li	1,463,064	6.49	3.95	3.47	1.75
Kazakh	1,462,588	1.59	8.82	8.60	1.50
Dai	1,261,311	11.29	4.03	3.59	1.48
She	708,651	6.28	6.15	6.49	1.53
Lisu	702,839	18.43	2.62	2.17	1.62
Dongxiang	621,500	17.65	2.01	1.97	1.69
Gelao	550,746	9.05	7.70	7.63	1.70
Lahu	485,966	15.78	2.74	2.31	1.53
Va	429,709	13.76	2.54	3.10	1.57
Sui	411,847	13.11	3.90	3.44	1.79
Nakhi	326,295	7.65	11.73	8.42	1.32
Qiang	309,576	7.04	8.34	4.91	1.47
Tu	289,565	10.81	9.61	7.94	1.45
Mulao	216,257	4.19	8.88	8.15	1.43
Xibe	190,481	1.12	17.12	12.17	1.01
Kyrgyz	186,708	3.15	8.20	8.02	1.57
Jingpo	147,828	9.44	3.72	3.46	1.71
Daur	131,992	1.16	17.73	16.07	1.15
Salar	130,607	21.18	5.10	6.27	1.67
Blang	119,639	14.27	3.57	3.22	1.63
Maonan	101,192	4.23	7.84	6.81	1.48
Tajik	51,069	3.50	7.68	5.93	1.64
Pumi	42,861	14.55	8.05	5.31	1.58
Achang	39,555	8.02	4.94	4.14	1.66
Nu	37,523	15.05	6.18	5.22	1.63
Ewenki	30,875	1.24	18.19	12.92	1.12
Gin	28,199	5.53	11.68	8.73	1.39
Jino	23,143	9.09	6.43	5.93	1.56
De'ang	20,556	19.34	2.13	1.82	1.69
Bonan	20,074	11.02	5.15	5.91	1.60
Russian	15,393	1.26	29.33	28.48	0.93
Yugur	14,378	6.12	14.95	10.63	1.24

(continued)

Table 12.4 (continued)

Group	2010 Population	% Illiterate (no schooling)	% Some college and over	% Professional or party leader occupation	Fertility rate
Uzbek	10,569	2.04	21.28	16.98	1.42
Menba	10,561	37.43	7.08	3.93	1.51
Oroqen	8,659	1.38	23.34	22.06	0.92
Derung	6,930	16.37	6.45	5.08	1.70
Hezhen	5,354	1.90	25.89	19.67	0.94
Gaoshan	4,009	2.59	21.75	12.84	1.12
Lhoba	3,682	27.45	5.88	2.69	1.43
Tatar	3,556	1.42	27.07	18.09	1.23
Han	1,220,844,520	4.71	9.74	8.85	1.32
Mean		9.26	9.30	7.69	1.47
Total	1,332,810,869				

Source: 2010 Census of China, authors' calculations

The Relationship Between Social Differentiation and Spatial Differentiation

A classic hypothesis of sociological human ecology expects a positive association between social distance and spatial distance. That is, the more similar people are to one another socially, the closer they live to one another. This hypothesis had its origins in a paper published in 1925 by the sociologist Robert E. Park (1925; see also Guest 1984). In his paper, Park wrote the following:

It is because geography, occupation, and all the other factors which determine the distribution of population determine so irresistibly and fatally, the place, the group, and the associates with whom each one of us is bound to live that spatial relations come to have ... the importance which they do... Social relations are ... frequently and ... inevitably correlated with spatial relations ... Physical distances are, or seem to be, the indexes of social distances (Park 1925: 14).

Park's expectation of an association between residential segregation and social differentiation, in the words of Frisbie and Kasarda (1988: 640) "resides in the inequalities that constitute the overall system of stratification ... Greater affluence allows some persons to acquire housing in more desirable areas, leaving other locales for the less wealthy." Therefore, the greater the socioeconomic dissimilarity between groups, the greater the residential dissimilarity between them (Poston and Micklin 1993; Poston et al. 1998).

Duncan and Duncan (1955) conducted one of the first empirical tests of this hypothesis in their study of the association between residential segregation and occupational differentiation among the majority and minority populations residing in the neighborhoods of Chicago. They found the hypothesized positive association.

Subsequent studies have replicated and for the most part confirmed various aspects of the Park hypothesis in the United States (Farley 1977; Hwang et al. 1985), England (Collison and Moge 1959), India (Mehta 1968), Egypt (Latif 1974), and the Philippines (Costello and Palabrica-Costello 1982), among other countries and areas.

However, given the historical situation of the minority nationalities in China as previously reviewed, the causal nature of their social and spatial relationship with the Han majority is likely ordered in an opposite way from that in the West. We suggest that the Chinese minorities are socially different from the Han because they have been spatially segregated from them for centuries.

To test this hypothesis we use data from the 2010 census to calculate indexes of residential segregation of each of the minority populations from the Han, as previously discussed and presented in Table 12.2. We next employ the same index of dissimilarity, but this time we calculate three different measures of social differentiation of each of the minority populations from the Han majority, according to (1) occupation (seven categories: Heads of government agencies, party agencies, enterprises, Institutional organizations;

Professional personnel; Clerks and related personnel; Employees in commerce and service sectors; Employers in farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery Sectors; People operating manufacturing and transportation equipment and related personnel; and Unclassified workers); (2) education (nine categories: Post Graduate; University; Junior College; Secondary Technical School; Senior Secondary School; Junior Secondary School; Primary School; Less than Primary; and No-schooling); and (3) marital status (five categories: Single; First Marriage with spouse; Remarriage with spouse; Divorced; and Widowed). Table 12.5a presents summary statistics for the residential differentiation index and the three measures of social differentiation among the 55 minority nationalities of China in 2010.

Next, to test the Park hypothesis among China’s 55 minority populations, we calculate zero-order correlation coefficients between the residential differentiation index and each of the three social

differentiation indexes. The correlations are shown in Table 12.5b. All the associations are positive, as hypothesized, and the correlations between spatial segregation and educational differentiation and occupational differentiation reach statistical significance. The correlation coefficients are 0.35 between educational differentiation and spatial segregation, and 0.60 between occupational differentiation and spatial segregation.

Finally we selected the 18 largest minority populations, each with a population in 2010 of at least 1,000,000 people, and tested the Park hypothesis among these groups. We chose this strategy because when the population size of a group is small, random factors tend to play a larger role influencing the residential patterns of the group than is the situation when population size is large (Massey and Denton 1988).

Table 12.5c shows the correlation coefficients between residential segregation and the three measures of social differentiation among the 18

Table 12.5a Descriptive data: One measure of spatial differentiation from the Han, and three measures of social differentiation from the Han: 55 Minority Nationalities, China, 2010

D index	N	Mean	Std. dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Spatial	55	87.00	10.63	35.75 (Gaoshan)	98.60 (Uygur)
Education	55	22.68	12.47	3.14 (Gin)	49.96 (Dongxiang)
Marital status	55	5.80	4.28	0.31 (Bai)	17.06 (Menba)
Occupation	55	26.86	10.29	6.24 (She)	43.29 (De’ang and Lisu)

Table 12.5b Zero-order correlation coefficients between residential differentiation from the Han and three measures of social differentiation from the Han: 55 Minority Nationalities, China, 2010

	Spatial index	Education	Marital status	Occupation
Spatial index	–			
Education	0.35**	–		
Marital Status	0.10	0.16	–	
Occupation	0.60***	0.71***	0.32*	–

Source: 2010 Census of China, authors’ calculations
 N = 55; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

Table 12.5c Zero-order correlation coefficients between one measure of residential differentiation from the Han and three measures of social differentiation from the Han: the 18 Largest Minority Nationalities, China, 2010

	Spatial index	Education	Marital status
Spatial index	–		
Education	0.2660	–	
Marital status	0.3270	0.2670	–
Occupation	0.7746***	0.6083**	0.5928**

N = 18; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

largest minority groups. The coefficients between the three social differentiation variables and spatial differentiation range from 0.27 with education to 0.33 for marital status to .77 for occupation.

Overall, there is good support among China's minorities for the Park hypothesis regarding the relationship between physical distance and social distance. The more spatially segregated the minority populations from the Han, the more socially differentiated they are from the Han. Minority groups highly differentiated from the Han majority on any one of three social indexes tend to be segregated from the Han in physical space.

The Muslim Populations of China

Ten of China's 55 minority nationalities are predominantly Muslim; they comprise roughly one-fifth of China's minority peoples. Population size data from the 2010 census show slightly less than 23 million Muslims in China. China has the 16th largest population of Muslims of any country in the world (see Table 12.6). There are more Muslims in China than there are in every other Middle Eastern Muslim nation, except Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Egypt; and there are more Muslims living in China than there are, for instance, in Malaysia, Yemen, Mali, Tunisia, or Somalia.

Figure 12.4 is a map of the Islamic World. Northwest China, where most of China's Muslims reside, is clearly a part of the Islamic World. Of the Muslim countries bordering or near China, only Pakistan and India have truly large total populations. For several reasons the ties of China's Muslims with those in Pakistan are the more important. The other Muslim-dominated countries neighboring China have many fewer Muslims (esp. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), and in the case of Tajikistan, the Muslims there are Shi'ites, not Sunnis.

The two numerically largest Muslim nationality groups in China are the Hui (almost 10.6 million people in 2010 and 9.8 million in 2000) and the Uygur (almost 10.1 million in 2010 and 8.4 million in 2000); these two groups comprise 90 % of all of China's Muslims. The remaining

eight Muslim groups are the Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, Tatar, Kyrgyz, Salar, Dongxiang and Bonan, ranging in size, in 2010, from almost 1.5 million (the Kazakh) to over 3,500 (the Tatar).

The Muslims of China defy demographic and sociological generalization. Other than the fact that most are Sunni, on most other demographic and socioeconomic dimensions, they are far more different from one another than similar. The data we presented earlier in Tables 12.2, 12.3 and 12.4 support this statement.

Also within the Hui and Uygur, there are vast differences. The Hui may be distinguished from the other Muslim groups in China by virtue of the fact that unlike all the others, the Hui are Chinese people who practice Islam. The Uygur and most other Chinese Muslim groups are of Turkic ancestry, and those who are not Turkic, are of other non-Chinese ancestries. Also, although some Hui speak other languages in addition to Mandarin Chinese, they are primarily Sinophone. It is not a surprise that our data in Tables 12.2, 12.3 and 12.4 showed that the Hui peoples are much closer to the Han spatially and socially than to any of the other Muslim groups. They have assimilated the Han culture more so than any of the other minorities. They wear Han-style clothing and indeed are often referred to as "Chinese-speaking Muslims" to distinguish them from Uygur, Kazaks and other Muslim groups who are clearly not Chinese by virtue of their distinctive cultures and languages.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have undertaken an in-depth descriptive examination of the 56 Chinese nationality groups, that is, the 55 minorities and the Han majority. We have examined these populations using a standardized methodology enabling us to more closely compare each minority group with the others. We have shown that each group is quite distinct, and many are very different from one another in various demographic and socioeconomic dimensions.

Historical variation over the centuries has brought together in China many groups of people

Table 12.6 Ten countries of the world with the largest Muslim populations, and China: 2010 and 2030

Rank 2010	Country	Total population (2010)	% Muslim	Muslim population (2010)	Total population (2030)	Muslim population (2030)
1	Indonesia	240,676,485	86.1	207,222,454	293,482,460	252,688,398
2	Pakistan	173,149,306	96.4	166,915,931	231,743,898	223,401,118
3	India	1,205,624,648	13.4	161,553,703	1,476,377,903	197,834,639
4	Bangladesh	151,125,475	89.5	135,257,300	185,063,630	165,631,949
5	Nigeria	159,707,780	50.0	79,853,890	273,120,384	136,560,192
6	Iran	74,462,314	98.0	72,973,068	91,336,270	89,509,545
7	Turkey	72,137,546	99.8	71,993,271	86,825,345	86,651,694
8	Egypt	78,075,705	90.0	70,268,135	102,552,797	92,297,517
9	Algeria	37,062,820	99.0	36,692,192	48,561,408	48,075,794
10	Morocco	31,642,360	99.0	31,325,936	39,190,274	38,798,371
16	China	1,359,821,465	1.7	23,142,104	1,453,297,304	30,014,860
	World	6,916,183,482	22.74	1,572,740,124	8,424,937,474	1,915,830,782

Sources:

% of Muslims data: CIA 2013

2010 Muslim population: total population of 2010 * % of Muslims

2030 Muslim population: total population of 2030 * % of Muslims

2010 and 2030 Muslim population of China: authors' calculation

Total population 2010 and 2013: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, New York, 2013




Fig. 12.4 The Islamic World (Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_maps/muslim_distribution.jpg. Map prepared with 1995 data of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency)

with considerable diversity. Though living under one nation, i.e., the Peoples' Republic of China, the minorities are very different geographically; this was noted especially in our analyses pertaining to geographic differentiation and residential segregation. We calculated an index of geographic differentiation and found that almost 40 of the Chinese minority nationalities live in very concentrated geographic areas. Indeed, 15 of these groups live mainly in one area. At the same time, our analysis of residential segregation showed that the minority populations of China in 2010 are very segregated from the Han majority. For many minority nationalities, as many as 90 % of them would have to move to certain other provinces for their residential distributions to be the same as that of the Han majority.

We also examined such social and demographic characteristics as age, education, occupation and fertility and saw major differences between many of the minority groups. Among the 55 minority nationalities in China, their age structures are greatly different. Although many of the groups are younger than the majority Han, population aging has begun to spread to more than half of China's minority groups. Since 1949, economic development and policies aimed at promoting minority education have increased access to formal education in China. But it seems that most of China's minorities still remain behind the Han with respect to the indicators of education used in this chapter. Indeed, 38 of China's 55 minority groups have illiteracy percentages higher than that of the Han. Finally, with regard to fertility, the rates vary greatly among the different minority groups. The Oroqen nationality has the lowest fertility of all the minority groups, and the Lhoba minority group has the highest.

Our discussion of spatial structure and social differentiation informs us that the more spatially segregated the minority population from the Han, the more different the group from the Han socially. The so-called Park hypothesis is strongly supported. Physical distance is as related to social distance in China as it is in Western countries.

Ten of China's minority groups are Muslim and they make up about one-fifth of the minority

population. China has the fifteenth largest population of Muslims of any country in the world. Actually there are more Muslims in China than in most Middle Eastern Muslim nations. The two largest Muslim nationality groups in China are the Hui and the Uygur. Hui people, unlike most other Muslim groups, reside all over China in virtually all the big cities, even in the far west in Xinjiang and Tibet. Their communities exist nearly everywhere in China. Most Hui are culturally similar to Han Chinese, except that they practice Islam. Since many excel at business, sometimes people refer to them as "Chinese Jews." They are also often referred to as "Chinese-speaking Muslims" to distinguish them from Uygurs, Kazakhs and the other Muslim minorities.

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Graeme Hugo

Introduction

Indonesia is the fourth largest country in the world and is also one of the most multicultural of nations as Hildred Geertz (1963, 24) summarises:

There are over three hundred different ethnic groups in Indonesia, each with its own cultural identity, and more than two hundred and fifty distinct languages are spoken ... nearly all the important world religions are represented, in addition to a wide range of indigenous ones.

Within ethnic groups, too, Indonesians have loyalties to kinship, regional and local groupings and frequently their behaviour is influenced by group norms formalised into a body of customary law (adat). Such groupings are of significance when studying demographic behaviour.

One of the major tasks which has confronted successive Indonesian governments since gaining Independence from the Dutch in 1945 has been to overcome the divisiveness of this diversity. The national motto of 'unity in diversity' captures this imperative. Some of the greatest challenges faced by Indonesia has been conflicts which have had a significant ethnic dimension. This chapter seeks to analyse the changing nature of diversity in Indonesia, some of the challenges it has presented and examine some of its demographic implications.

G. Hugo (deceased)

The Indonesian Context

Indonesia's cultural and ethnic diversity is matched by enormous geographical diversity. It is an archipelago of more than 13,000 islands extending over 40° of latitude. A contrast is frequently drawn between 'inner' Indonesia (the islands of Java, Madura and Bali) and 'outer' Indonesia (Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, West Papua and many other smaller islands). The dichotomy is usually expressed in terms of an uneven distribution of the population with 59.1 % in 2010¹ living in Inner Indonesia which had only 6.9 % of the national land area. In inner Indonesia rural population densities exceed 500 persons per square kilometre, more than five times the density in the Outer Islands. Indonesia's 'uneven' distribution of population largely reflects geographical differences in soil quality, rainfall and the capacity of the land to support sustained intensive cultivation. Population is concentrated in a number of favourable 'ecological niches', especially coastal plains, alluvial valleys and volcanic slopes (Williams and Guest 2012).

Indonesia has experienced a significant structural change in its economy. At the time of Independence, Indonesia was emphatically a rural, geographical country. Even by 1971, only

¹ Indonesian Population Census data used here is obtained from the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics, website – <http://www.bps.go.id/eng/>

17.2 % of Indonesians lived in towns and cities and 67.2 % of workers were engaged in agriculture. However, the subsequent four decades have seen significant economic development and social change. By the 2010 population census 49.8 % of Indonesians were enumerated in urban areas and only 40.5 % worked in agriculture. Although there have been fluctuations, there has been significant economic growth in most years with a growth of 6.1 % in 2010. There has been a significant reduction in the proportion of the population living in poverty although Indonesia remains within the ranks, albeit in the upper echelons, of low income countries.

Some Data Issues

The importance of the ethnic dimension in Indonesia was recognised at the last colonial census undertaken by the Dutch in 1930. This high quality census (Volkstelling 1933–1936) included a question on ethnicity and it still provides the most comprehensive picture of Indonesian cultural diversity since it adopted detailed coding by ethnic group and information down to subdistrict level.

Although ethnicity is one of the most salient population dimensions in Indonesia it was not until the 2000 Census of Population that a question was included which sought to capture this characteristic. The potential divisiveness of ethnic identity in Indonesia was such that the regimes of President Soekarno (1945–1968) and Suharto (1968–1998) forbade the inclusion of an ethnicity question in the 1961, 1971, 1980 and 1990 censuses. This decision was influenced in the early years of Independence by a number of ethnic and religious based rebellions as is demonstrated in a later section.

There was some relaxation of concern with the divisiveness of ethnic diversity in the 1980 population census when a question on language spoken at home was included. However, by that time efforts by the government to encourage the use of Bahasa Indonesia saw 11.9 % of the popu-

lation reporting speaking Indonesian at home. Indonesian is a lingua franca which developed as a trading language throughout the Malay archipelago. Indonesia's post-Independence encouraged its use to encourage unity and reduce identity with separate ethnolinguistic groups. They gradually introduced it into schools where local languages were previously used, especially in the early years. Nevertheless, the formal and informal sensitivity regarding the Chinese in Indonesia is reflected in the fact that no separate language category was allocated to them at the 1980 census.

In 2000, however, for the first time in the post-Independence period a question on *sukubangsa* (ethnic group) was asked. Suryadinata et al. (2003, 6) have made a thorough analysis of that data and point out that there is no explicit definition of *sukubangsa* in the census questionnaire and that respondents were asked to self-identify as belonging to a particular ethnic group. They argue, however, that this may not always be the real ethnic identity of the individual (Suryadinanta et al. 2003, 9). It is complicated by intermarriage between ethnic groups which is very common in contemporary Indonesia but also has a 'situational' dimension where some groups, especially the Arabs and Chinese, may report the dominant ethnicity in the area where they are living. This is reflected in the fact that at the 2000 census only 0.86 % of the population (1.74 million) self-identified as ethnic Chinese although most commentators suggest that the Chinese make up between 2 and 3 % of Indonesia's population (Coppel 1980, 792). Accordingly, as is the case in most countries, the responses to questions on ancestry and ethnicity need to be interpreted with caution.

At the time of writing the 2010 census had been completed and much of the data published, however that on *sukubangsa* had not been released. This reflects the sensitivity of such information in Indonesia. The results were being checked with a large number of potential and actual stakeholders who could respond negatively to the findings. This is an indication of the

fact that even after 65 years of Independence, concern about the potential divisiveness of ethnicity remains.

Indonesia's Ethnolinguistic Mosaic in 1930

The first time that a question on ethnicity was included in an Indonesian census was in the colonial Dutch East Indies enumeration of 1930 (Volkstelling 1933–1936, 36) and this has been used here to construct an ethnic map of Indonesia at the time. The cultural diversity is reflected in the complexity of this map; indeed, it has been necessary to construct two maps to indicate the distribution of the major ethnolinguistic groups

by province. In the maps, the dark circle represents the size of the total population and the shaded wedges indicate the proportions of that population made up of particular ethnic groups. The problems of vast differences in total numbers has meant that, in provinces with comparatively small populations, a light, larger, standard-sized circle was superimposed to effectively show the proportional representation of each ethnic group.

The first map (Fig. 13.1) shows the distribution of the dominant Java-origin groups. In 1930, 47 % of the indigenous population were ethnic Javanese. Figure 13.1 shows their dominance in their central Java heartland and in East Java. Significant numbers have moved into the eastern and northern parts of West Java, to the plantation areas on the northeast coast of Sumatra as




Fig. 13.1 Indonesia: distribution of java-origin and foreign ethnic groups, 1930 (Source: Hugo et al. 1987, 19). Note: In this map the dark circles are proportional to the size of the population of provinces. Where these are very

small, a standard-sized light-edged circle has been superimposed and this circle has been divided up to show the proportional representation of the various ethnic groups

'contract coolies' in the first three decades of this century, and in the land settlement areas of southern Sumatra. Post-Independence transmigration programs and transfer of government employees have increased the representation of Javanese outside Java and in Jakarta, but the broad pattern depicted in the map still generally holds.

The second largest ethnolinguistic group are the Sundanese (14.5 % in 1930) who are largely confined to their West Java heartland with small numbers in Central Java and South Sumatra. Again it is striking that a significant number of Sumatran residents are Sundanese due to colonial migration. The third largest ethnic group, the Madurese (7.3 %), have spread out from their small island home area to settle in East Java. In 1930, some 11.7 % of indigenous residents were reported as being 'Batavians'. This group, now referred to as the 'Jakarta Asli' or 'Betawi', emerged as a distinct ethnolinguistic group during the colonial period through the intermarriage in Jakarta (then called Batavia) of indigenous groups (especially Balinese) with Chinese, Arabs and Europeans. They are confined mainly to Java in and near Jakarta. The Balinese in 1930 were concentrated almost entirely on Bali and Lombok (in Fig. 13.1 Sassaks from Lombok are included with the Balinese).

Figure 13.1 also shows the distribution of non-indigenous groups in 1930, of which the Chinese were, and still are, the most significant. Ethnic Chinese make up around 2–3 % of Indonesia's population (Coppel 1980, 792), although their dominance in some sectors of the economy is perceived by some to give them a significance out of proportion to their numbers. The map shows that, in 1930, the Chinese were significantly represented in most areas, mainly in the urban sectors of those provinces. However, they were especially strong proportionately in areas where they had been brought in by the Dutch to work as coolies on plantations and in mines (northern and eastern Sumatra and West Kalimantan).

Figure 13.2 shows the distribution of the major outer island-origin groups recognised at the 1930 census. The situation here is much more complex than in Java since there are many small

groups which have their own distinctive language and culture. In 1930, 71 % of Indonesians belonged to Java-origin groups. The largest single outer island group was the Minangkabau (3.4 % of all indigenous people) whose heartland is West Sumatra, but whose peripatetic nature has ensured that they have spread widely throughout the archipelago. They have spread widely through Sumatra and make up the largest single Sumatran-origin group. The Bataks comprise a number of distinct groups which together, in 1930, accounted for 2 % of the native population. Their concentration in North Sumatra is readily apparent in Fig. 13.2. Another significant group are the 'coastal Malays' who make up 7.5 % of the total indigenous population in 1930, but who comprise a number of subgroups. Their distribution along the east coast of Sumatra and the Kalimantan coast is evident.

Figure 13.2 shows that, in Kalimantan in 1930, three indigenous groups dominated – the coastal Malays referred to above, the Dayaks (1.1 % of the total) who lived in the interior, and the Banjarese of the southern coastal area. The Banjarese made up 1.5 % of the total indigenous population in 1930.

In Sulawesi, the southern half is dominated by the Bugis who make up 2.6 % of the total Indonesian indigenous population in 1930. In South Sulawesi, however, there are also other distinct and significant ethnic groups like the Makassarese (1.1 % in 1930), Torajanese (0.9 % in 1930) and Mandarese (0.3 %) and these – together with the Minahassans who dominate the northern part of the island (0.9 % in 1930) – are the largest ethnic groups in Sulawesi. Figure 13.2 shows that, in the remaining islands, the largest groups are the Moluccans, Timorese and Papuans, although a host of other (albeit smaller) distinct ethnic groups live in those areas. In eastern Indonesia, there are groups who are ethnically and culturally much more similar to the Melanesian groups further east than to the Malay groups in the rest of Indonesia.

In pre-Independence, and indeed the Indonesia of the 1950s and 1960s, each area of the nation was overwhelmingly dominated by particular




Fig. 13.2 Indonesia: distribution of outer island-origin ethnic groups, 1930 (Source: Hugo et al. 1987, 23). Note: In this map the *dark circles* are proportional to the size of the population of provinces. Where these are *very*

small, a standard-sized *light-edged circle* has been *superimposed* and this *circle* has been divided up to show the proportional representation of the various ethnic groups

ethnolinguistic groups – the Sundanese in West Java, Javanese in Central Java and East Java, Minahassans in North Sulawesi, Batak groups in North Sumatra, Banjarese in South Kalimantan, the BBM (Bugis-Butonese-Makassarese) in South Sulawesi, Minangkabau in West Sumatra, among others. This is evident in the ethnic data collected at the 1930 census (Hugo et al. 1987, 18–24). Only in Jakarta was there substantial mixing of the ethnolinguistic groups as Castles (1967, 153) points out:

... it is paradoxically the most – even the only – Indonesian city ... (the) metaphor of the melting pot comes to mind – into the crucible, Sundanese, Javanese, Chinese and Batak: God is making the Indonesian.

In other provinces particular ethnolinguistic groups dominated, and this continued in the early years of Independence.

Processes of Change

Before examining the contemporary ethnic profile of Indonesia it is important to briefly mention some of the processes which have impinged upon the picture presented in the previous section. Intermarriage between ethnic groups has been a feature of post-Independence Indonesia where greater personal mobility has resulted in increased migration and travel beyond the ethnic heartlands evident in Figs. 13.1 and 13.2. However, Suryadinata et al. (2003, 6) argue that:

Even if the person has a multiple ethnic identity, there is always a major or dominant ethnic identity.

Another difference relates to fertility. The growth of an ethnic group since 1930 will be




Fig. 13.3 Indonesia: total fertility rate by province (Source: Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik – BPS) and Macro International 2008, 50)

influenced by the fertility rate of women in that group. While there are no data on the fertility levels of different sukubangsa in Indonesia, there are significant variations between provinces and since several provinces represent the heartlands of particular ethnic groups these data give some useful indications. Figure 13.3 shows the Total Fertility Rates of provinces in 2007 and some striking differences are apparent. Provinces in which the Javanese, Madurese

and Balinese are dominant have very low fertility levels and this has been a consistent pattern over a long period (Hugo et al. 1987). On the other hand several Outer Island provinces have, in East Indonesia and North Sumatra, significantly higher fertility levels reflecting higher rates of fertility among such groups as the Batak in North Sumatra and several Sulawesi, East Nusatenggara and Papua based ethnic groups.

Just as there are differences between ethnic groups in fertility, there are differences in their propensity to move. Ethnographic studies have shown that migration has become institutionalised within some ethnic groups in Indonesia, such that it has become the norm for particular people within those groups to spend at least part of their life span outside their village of birth. This explanation has been particularly invoked in the case of the highly peripatetic Minangkabau people of West Sumatra (Naim 1973; Murad 1980).

Similar sociocultural influences have been observed to be a factor in causing high levels of population mobility among several other ethnic groups, including the Acehnese (Siegel 1969) and several Batak groups from the northern part of Sumatra (Bruner 1972), the Rotinese people of East Nusatenggara (Fox 1977, 56), the Banjarese of South Kalimantan (Rambe 1977, 25) and the Bugis of South Sulawesi (Lineton 1975, 190–191). The institutionalisation of migration operates in Indonesia, not only at the scale of the ethnic group but also on regional and local levels. Naim (1979) examined 1930 and 1961 census data to produce a typology of ethnic groups according to their propensity to move and this is shown in Table 13.1.

Table 13.1 Intensity of migration for the twelve main ethnic groups in Indonesia

Intensity of migration	Ethnic group	Migrants as percent of resident population	
		1930	1961
High	Minangkabau (W. Sumatra)	11.0	31.6
	Batak (N. Sumatra)	15.3	19.5
	Banjar (S. Kalimantan)	14.2	12.2
	Bugis (S. Sulawesi)	10.5	6.6
	Menado (N. Sulawesi)	9.5	NA
	Ambon (Maluku)	9.1	11.5
Low	Javanese		
	Sundanese (Java)	3.4	3.4
	Madurese		
	Balinese (Bali)	0.1	1.4
	Acehrese (Aceh)	1.1	2.6
	Malay (S. Sumatra)	3.4	3.3

Source: Naim (1979, 289)

Increased levels of interprovincial movement in the Suharto era considerably reduced the dominance of single ethnolinguistic groups in individual provinces. This was assisted by a determination of the central government to enhance the feeling of unity across the Indonesian archipelago and downplay the separatist tendencies associated with individual ethnic groups and their cultures. This was evident in such policies as the replacement of local languages with Indonesian as the medium of instruction in schools, the refusal to ask questions on ethnicity in censuses so that the relative size of ethnic groups could not be determined, encouraging the use of the Indonesian language over local languages in all media, government etc. and the exclusive use of the national language in mass media.

The improvement of interprovincial transport (Hugo 1981), the transmigration program (the insertion of Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese and Balinese in Outer Island communities), the transfer of government employees and centralisation of financial, policy making and decision making issues in Jakarta all downplayed the strength of dominant ethnic groups in the provinces. Moreover, the Suharto regime repressed all aspects of ethnicity and religion in what has been referred to as burying them ‘under a rhetoric of forced tolerance’ (Dhume 2001, 56).

The Contemporary Situation

The difference in fertility levels between groups also has influenced their relative representation. The changes which have occurred in the ethnic profile of Indonesia since Independence will be demonstrated here with reference to data derived from the 2000 population census since, as was indicated earlier, the 2010 data had not been released at the time of writing. The 2000 census ethnicity data has been extensively analysed by Suryadinata et al. (2003). Figure 13.4, drawn from this work, compares the ethnic composition of Indonesia at the 1930 and 2000 census enumerations. It is important to note that the 1930 diagram excludes groups like the Chinese, Arabs




Fig. 13.4 Indonesia: ethnic group compositions, 1930 and 2000 (Source: Suryadinanta et al. 2003, 13)

and Indians who were differentiated from the ‘native’ population by the Dutch colonial regime.

At the 2000 census, 1,072 separate ethnic groups were coded (Suryadinanta et al. 2003, 10) but information was published only on 101 groups which represented 93.1 % of the total

population. Moreover, of these there were 15 groups with more than one million representations making up 84.1 % of the total population.

Comparing the 2000 and 1930 census data it is interesting that the Javanese population proportion, while increasing from 27.8 to 83.9 million,




Fig. 13.5 Indonesia: distribution of Javanese population, 2000 (Source: Drawn from Suryadinata et al. 2004, 34)

its proportion of the national population fell from 47 to 41.7 %. This reduction may be in part due to the very low fertility over an extended period among the Javanese, at least as it is represented in their heartland in Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java (Fig. 13.3).

One of the most interesting trends over the 1920–2000 period, however, has been the dispersal of Javanese throughout the archipelago. This was partly associated with the Transmigration Program which has been a consistent feature of Indonesian governments for over one hundred years. This program has relocated around ten million people from Inner Indonesia to Outer Indonesia over the last century with the majority being Javanese. In addition there has been substantial spontaneous migration of Javanese to other islands, often by transfer of government and private employers. Accordingly, Fig. 13.5 shows the distribution of Javanese across Indonesian provinces in 2000. The largest numbers are in the heartland provinces of Central Java (30.3 m) and East Java (27.2 m) where

they make up 98 and 78 % of the provincial populations. However, they also make up more than half of the population in the provinces of Yogyakarta (96.8 %), which is also a heartland area, and Lampung (61.9 %). The latter is especially interesting because it was a major destination of transmigrants over much of the twentieth century (Hugo 2012). In fact, 4.1 million of the 6.6 million inhabitants of Lampung are Javanese. There are also large numbers in Jakarta (2.9 million) where they are over a third of the residents and in North Sumatra (3.8 million – 32.6 %) which was a major destination of Javanese to work on rubber plantations going back to colonial times. There is also a large Javanese population in West Java (3.9 m) but they are only 11 % of the total provincial population.

The remaining provinces with large Javanese populations tend to be those targeted in the Transmigration Program – South Sumatra (1.8 m – 27 %), Riau (1.2 m – 25.05 %), East Kalimantan (721,351 – 29.6 %), Jambi (664,931 – 27.6 %), West Kalimantan (341,173 – 9.1 %) and




Fig. 13.6 Indonesia: distribution of Sundanese population, 2000 (Source: Drawn from Suryadinata et al. 2004, 38)

South Sulawesi (212,273 – 2.7 %). In fact, Javanese make up more than 10 % of the resident population in 17 of Indonesia's 30 provinces. The Javanese are the largest ethnic group in the provinces of Central Java, Jakarta, East Java, Lampung, Bengkulu, Jakarta, East Kalimantan and Banten.

The diffusion of the Javanese throughout the archipelago of Indonesia thus has been an important post-Independence trend in both ethnicity and migration. The second largest ethnic group in Indonesia are the Sundanese whose heartland is in West Java, especially the inner Priangan upland areas (Hugo 1975). They have a different language and culture to the Javanese who are dominant in East and Central Java. Their proportion of the national population increased slightly from 14.5 to 15.4 % between 1920 and 2000 and their numbers more than trebled from 8.6 to 31 million. They grew more rapidly than the Javanese and this is a function of them having higher fertility levels traditionally (Hugo et al. 1987). Figure 13.3 shows that in 2007 the Total Fertility Rate in West Java and Banten was 2.6 slightly

more than Central (2.3) and East (2.1) Java. If we were to go back to 1961–1971 the TFR in West Java was 5.5. Fertility was higher among the Sundanese and slower to decline and accounts for the faster growth rate. Some 85 % of all Sundanese in Indonesia live in West Java where they make up 73.7 % of the total population. Most of the rest live in adjoining provinces in Java – Banten (5.9 %), Jakarta (4.1 %) and Central Java (1.9 %). Figure 13.6 shows that there has not been the extent of dispersion outside of Java that has characterised the Javanese with less than 4 % living outside Java and almost half of these (1.88 %) being in the transmigration province of Lampung which is separated from West Java only by the Sunda Strait.

The third largest ethnic group was the Malay population which is the largest of the 'Outer Island' ethnic groups and is comprised of a number of subgroups (Suryadinata et al. 2004, 41). They made up 3.45 % of the national population and are mainly found in Sumatra, especially South Sumatra. The Madurese whose heartland is on the island of Madura in East Java province are,

like the Javanese and Sundanese, an 'Inner Indonesian' ethnic group. They had a low rate of growth between 1930 and 2000 increasing from 4.3 to 6.7 million and their proportion of the national population declining from 7.3 to 3.4 %. Like the Javanese they have low levels of fertility. Most Madurese are in East Java (92.8 %) but there has been some diffusion, especially to West Kalimantan where a strong migration connection has developed. Accordingly, 3 % of Indonesia's Madurese population in 2000 lived in West Kalimantan (203,612) where they made up 5.5 % of the local population. The other provinces of Kalimantan account for 2 % of the Madurese population and there is a large community in Jakarta (47,055).

The fifth largest group are the Bataks whose heartland is in North Sumatra and are made up of a number of subgroups – Karo, Toba, Mandailing, Tapanuli etc. Their numbers increased fivefold between 1930 and 2000 to reach 6.1 million and their share of the national population increased from 2 to 3 %. They are well known as a group with relatively high fertility (Hugo et al. 1987) and this is evident in Fig. 13.3 which shows that North Sumatra has the third highest fertility in Indonesia. The Bataks have been well known (Bruner 1974) as a relatively mobile group and in 2000 slightly more than a fifth lived outside the homeland of North Sumatra where Bataks made up 42 % of the total population. Some 8.8 % are found in the neighbouring provinces of Riau and West Sumatra but they have been an important group moving to Jakarta where 5 % of Bataks live and they make up 3.6 % of the resident population.

The sixth largest group – the Minangkabau – are one of the most interesting (and studied). As indicated earlier, they are well known as the most mobile of Indonesian sukubangsa (Naim 1979). This has been partly associated with the matrilineal inheritance system of the Minangkabau (Murad 1980). The numbers of Minangkabau increased from two million in 1930 to 5.5 million in 2000 but they fell from the fourth to the sixth largest group over this time and their share of the national population from 3.4 to 2.7 %.

The distribution of the Minangkabau population is shown in Fig. 13.7. Their heartland in West Sumatra is immediately apparent but only 68.4 % of the Minangkabau live in this province – the lowest for any of the major ethnic group heartland. This reflects the strong tradition of merantau. However, Fig. 13.7 does not give a full picture of their extent of dispersal across Indonesia and perhaps reflects that those who move do so to the urban centres of the province and the fact that many in fact return to West Sumatra after living for an extended period in another province. They also have traditionally moved in large numbers to neighbouring Malaysia. The diagram shows that the bulk of movement has been to neighbouring provinces in Sumatra and to Western Java, especially Jakarta where they make up more than 3 % of the population.

The next largest group, accounting for 2.5 % of the population is Betawi that made up 1.7 % in 1920. The Betawi are a group which has evolved from the mixing of a number of Indonesian and foreign groups in Jakarta over several centuries (Castles 1967). The regional growth of the group is undoubtedly associated with the expansion of Jakarta into neighbouring provinces. While only 45.7 % of the Betawi live in Jakarta, another 37.7 % live in West Java and 9.6 % in Banten. This reflects the 'suburbanisation' of Jakarta which has seen continuous megalopolis development overspilling the official provincial boundaries so that much of the Jakarta functional urban area is in Banten and West Java provinces (Jones 2004). These three provinces have 98.8 % of the Betawi population.

The Bugis, the fifth largest group in 1930, had fallen to eighth in 2000 although their numbers increased from 1.5 to 5 million. Their distribution is shown in Fig. 13.8 and it will be noted that there is a concentration in the heartland of South Sulawesi. However, only 65.2 % of Bugis live in this province reflecting the peripatetic nature of this group (Lineton 1975). They have been very active in moving to other parts of the archipelago, especially Eastern Indonesia. They have not only moved into other parts of Sulawesi but have been important colonisers in East Kalimantan, Papua and Riau in Sumatra.




Fig. 13.7 Indonesia: distribution of the Minangkabau population, 2000 (Source: Drawn from Suryadinata et al. 2004, 54)




Fig. 13.8 Indonesia: distribution of the Buginese population, 2000 (Source: Drawn from Suryadinata et al. 2004, 61)




Fig. 13.9 Indonesia: distribution of the Banjarese population, 2000 (Source: Drawn from Suryadinata et al. 2004, 67)

The Bantene are the ninth largest group in Indonesia with 4.1 million in 2000 and 2.1 % of the Indonesian population. They are strongly concentrated in the province of Banten in the far west of Java where 92 % live. Most of the rest live in adjoining provinces of Lampung, West Java and Jakarta. They are an interesting group speaking a language which is closer to Javanese than Sundanese and tracing their origins to colonisation by Javanese in the western margins of Java in the sixteenth century. It was invaded by the Islamic Acehnese Faletahan in 1527 who was acting in the name of the sultan of Demak (Central Java). Even today there are linkages with North Sumatra which has the fourth largest Bantene population in Indonesia.

The Banjarese are the tenth largest ethnic group in Indonesia and the largest within its heartland in Kalimantan. They increased their share of the national population from 1.5 to 1.7 % between 1930 and 2000. Their distribution is shown in Fig. 13.9 and the concentration in Kalimantan, especially South Kalimantan, is apparent. Nevertheless they too traditionally have been one of Indonesia's most mobile sukubangsa with less than two thirds (65 %) living in South

Kalimantan and important communities being established not only elsewhere in Kalimantan but also in East Sumatra (Naim 1973).

The Balinese are the next largest group with 1.5 % of the national population. They are a distinctive group not only because of their own language and rich culture but because most are Hindu. Figure 13.3 shows that Bali has one of the lowest fertility rates of all provinces reflecting the low fertility of the Balinese. Some 92.3 % of the Balinese live on the island of Bali where they account for 88.9 % of the population. There are small but significant numbers of Balinese in Central and Southwest Sulawesi where they moved under transmigration schemes.

The Sasaks in 2000 numbered 2.6 million making up 1.3 % of the national population. They are mainly concentrated in the province of West Nusatenggara, especially on the island of Lombok. The next largest group are the Makassarese (two million) who are concentrated in their heartland in the south of South Sulawesi. They have, like the Bugis who they share their heartland with, been quite mobile in Eastern Indonesia and Malaysia. In fact, the term BBM (Bugis-Butonese-Makassarese) is used to

Table 13.2 Indonesia: scenarios of number and percentage of ethnic Chinese with Indonesian citizenship, 2000

Assumption of ethnic Chinese not identified as Chinese	Assumption of ethnic Chinese in the remaining 19 provinces		
	0.00 %	0.60 %	2.00 %
0.00 %	1,738,936 (0.86 %)	2,119,687 (1.05 %)	3,008,104 (1.49 %)
25.00 %	2,318,523 (1.15 %)	2,826,178 (1.40 %)	4,010,705 (1.99 %)
50.00 %	3,477,872 (1.73 %)	4,239,373 (2.11 %)	6,016,208 (2.99 %)

Source: Suryadinata et al. (2004, 78)

Note: Figures in brackets are the percentage of ethnic Chinese to the total Indonesian population, including the foreigners

designate the three groups of Sulawesi origins who have become dominant in the informal sector in Eastern Indonesia, especially in urban areas. The Butonese heartland is in Southwest Sulawesi and they numbered 578,231 in 2000 – the 21st largest ethnic group.

The next largest group were the Cirebon suku-bangsa. They, like the Bantenese, are a distinct group resident in West Java, in this case the north coastal eastern margins of the province. Their language is close to Javanese and reflects earlier colonisation by the Javanese. They numbered 1.9 million in 2000. They were followed by the Gorontalo from North Sulawesi (974,175), Acehese from North Sumatra (871,994), Toraja from South Sulawesi (750,828), Nias from Eastern Indonesia (731,620) and Minahassa from North Sulawesi (659,209).

The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are a significant group but as Suryadinata et al. (2004, 74) point out, there is considerable difficulty in estimating the size of the population because the self identification methodology in the 2000 census would have resulted in significant numbers of those with an ethnic Chinese origin not identifying themselves. There has been a history in post-Independence Indonesia of governments acting to suppress expression of Chinese ethnicity. These have included:

- During the Sukarno era there was a substantial repatriation of Chinese to China and in some provinces they were restricted to living in urban areas.
- The Suharto regime adopted an assimilationist policy which banned three pillars of Chinese

culture – Chinese organisation, Chinese media and Chinese schools.

- Chinese were strongly encouraged from the 1960s onward to adopt Indonesian names and discard their Chinese names.
- There were periodic anti-Chinese riots in cities, most recently in May 1998.

This operated so as to encourage some Chinese to hide their Chineseness so that the number identifying as Chinese in 2000, 1.74 million, is undoubtedly an underestimate.²

In 1930 the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia numbered 1.23 million. It is likely that their growth over the 1930–2000 period was slower than for the Indonesian population as a whole. This is due to them having lower fertility than the total Indonesian population but also significant emigration including a repatriation of over 100,000 in 1960 (Hugo et al. 1987). Nevertheless, it is apparent that there has been significant underenumeration of ethnic Chinese. Suryadinata et al. (2004, 78) have produced a number of estimates of the ethnic Chinese population of Indonesia using assumptions about their representation in the 19 provinces for which there is no data available and for the extent of non-identification. These are presented in Table 13.2 and range between the 11 province census figure of 1.74 million up to 6 million. Their best estimate is 2.92 million, representing more than a doubling since 1930.

²Data on ethnic Chinese were only reported in 11 out of Indonesia's 30 provinces where they are most strongly represented.




Fig. 13.10 Indonesia: distribution of the ethnic Chinese population, 2000 (Source: Drawn from Suryadinata et al. 2004, 81)

The 2000 data is only available for the 11 provinces with the largest ethnic Chinese population enumerated at the 2000 census and the numbers are depicted in Fig. 13.10. Recognising that these underestimate the strength of the ethnic Chinese population they show that a quarter of Indonesia's Chinese population lives in Jakarta where they make up 5.5 % of the population. The second largest group is in West Kalimantan which has long been recognised as having one of Indonesia's largest Chinese communities (Ward and Ward 1974) and census data indicate about 1 in 10 residents are Chinese. The only larger representation is in Bangka–Belitung in Eastern Sumatra where they make up 11.5 % of the population. In addition the province of Riau has the fourth largest Chinese community in Indonesia. Other large numbers are in Inner Indonesia in East Java, Central Java, Banten and West Java.

Ethnic Related Conflict in Indonesia

The post-colonial era in Southeast Asia has seen significant conflict within and between countries and several of these conflicts have

had an ethnic dimension (McNicol 1968). In Indonesia the first two decades following Independence there were a number of conflicts as the government sought to bring together the many different groups into a single nation. Indeed, the only two things which all groups had in common when the new nation was formed were geographical propensity and a common Dutch colonial heritage. Inevitably the early years of nation building saw conflict between groups, some of which had an ethnic dimension.

The Javanese made up between 50 and 60 % of the new nation's population and assumed many of the elite positions in the new government. There were a number of challenges to the new government in regions of the nation where the Javanese were not dominant. Figure 13.11 shows the location of the main areas of conflict during the first twenty years of Independence in Indonesia. The forced movements that resulted from this have been discussed in detail elsewhere (McNicol 1968; Hugo 1975, 1987, 2002; Goantiang 1965; Naim 1973) but the major conflicts were as follows and, as will be seen, several have an ethnic aspect:




Fig. 13.11 Conflicts creating outmigrations in Indonesia, 1950–65 (Source: Hugo 2002, 304)

- The struggle for Independence from the Dutch saw substantial movements such as the evacuation of virtually the entire Indonesian population (approximately half a million people) from Bandung in 1946–1948 (Hugo 1975, 254). Naim (1973, 135) reported a large scale evacuation in West Sumatra from Dutch occupied coastal areas to the republican areas of the interior. In addition, there was an attempt to set up a Republic of the South Moluccas in Maluku where many were fiercely loyal to the Dutch and indeed several followed their colonial masters back to the Netherlands where they settled and established a strong ‘Free Moluccas’ Movement (Kraak 1957, 350).
 - Religion based conflicts such as Darul Islam in West Java (1948–1962), South/Southeast Sulawesi (1955–1965), Aceh (1953–1957, 1959–1961) and South Kalimantan (1950–1960) aimed at making Indonesia an Islamic state and initiated substantial movement (McNicoll 1968, 43–48; Hugo 1975, 1987; Harvey 1974; Castles 1967, 191). While these rebellions were ostensibly to make Indonesia an Islamic state, they had a strong regional focus and tended to be dominated by particular ethnic groups.
 - Internal ethnic conflicts not related to autonomy/separatist dimensions emerged in the 1960s and earlier. In 1967, some 60,000 ethnic Chinese were forced out of the interior areas of West Kalimantan due to longstanding hostility against the Chinese (Ward and Ward 1974, 28). Similarly, displacement of Chinese occurred in West Java in the 1950s (Hugo 1975, 245).
 - Inter-elite power struggles in the 1950s were marked by the PRRI-Permesta Rebellions in Central Sumatra and North Sulawesi. These struggles were against the authority of Jakarta and were supported mainly by the educated elite. It caused substantial movements, both during the rebellions and after authority was restored (McNicoll 1968, 44; Naim 1973, 139).
 - Ethnic conflicts with autonomy/separatist dimensions such as those in Irian Jaya/West Papua at times initiated refugee flows (Roosman 1980) as did the 1970s conflict in East Timor (1979, 1981) which involved the displacement of about half of the population.
- Each of these rebellions was put down and for much of the 1970s and 1980s there was little ethnic related conflict apart from occasional anti-Chinese riots such as occurred in the city of Bandung in 1973. However, the period following the onset of the financial crisis in Indonesia in 1997 and the collapse of the long serving Suharto regime in 1998 saw dramatic political as well as economic and social change. Instability was created by the economic crisis which saw the loss of around three million jobs in urban areas and a




Fig. 13.12 Total numbers of IDPs throughout Indonesia (as of 31 March 2002) (Source: Hugo 2002, 307)

devaluation of the currency making many key imported goods very expensive (Hugo 1999). Moreover, Indonesia moved away from several decades of highly centralised and controlled government to a system based on regional autonomy. Since more power and decision making went to the regions and there was less control from the centre, this inflamed any simmering regional tensions between natives and newcomers, different ethnic groups, different economic groups and Muslims and Christians. Nevertheless, such resentments have had more complex origins than simply being due to ethnicity. They have been of long standing in many Outer Island areas and events have been the trigger rather than the underlying causes of conflict. In the first year following the ousting of Suharto there was a substantial displacement of IDPs so that by August 1999 there were around 350,000 (United Nations 2002, 3). However, separatist, inter-ethnic and religious based conflicts resulted in 1,107,193 persons (277,836 households) in 2002 (Hugo 2002).

Figure 13.12 indicates that at the time, 20 of Indonesia's 26 provinces had people classified as IDPs. While the reasons for that displacement are complex, there was an ethnic element

involved in that particular ethnolinguistic groups were influenced more than others. It does not include the several large physical disasters which have displaced large numbers of Indonesians over the last decade like the 2004 tsunami and the Padang earthquake of 2008. All of the 20 provinces shown in Fig. 13.12 have not experienced conflict but some have become the destination of people displaced from other provinces which have seen conflict. The main sources of IDPs associated with bloodshed have been Aceh, Maluku, East Timor (now the independent nation of Timor Leste), Central Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan, Irian Jaya and West Kalimantan. Some refugees remained in the areas of conflict. Many of those who were displaced were former migrants, or more often, the descendants of former migrants, and some have returned to their areas of origin or usually the case, the origin of their parents or grandparents. Hugo (2002, 308) found that many of these migrants have not retained linkages with their areas of origin so they have not been able to seek refuge in the homes of family members in their origin areas. Accordingly, many were forced to enter government-run camps in their

destination province or in their origin areas. The major conflicts are as follows:

- In Northern Sumatra the Acehnese have been seeking independence from Indonesia from the earliest days of the republic. In the 1950s there was a major campaign to turn Aceh into an independent Islamic state and in 1976 the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was formed. As the United Nations (2002, 27) points out:

Foremost among grievances has been that the revenues generated by the province's resources have gone to the Central Government rather than benefiting Aceh, resulting in a slow pace of development. Other issues include the continued presence of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) in the province, the violence against civilians and the GORI (Government of the Republic of Indonesia) shortcomings in bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.

The post-1998 situation saw several hundred people killed, arbitrary arrest, torture, hundreds of public buildings burned down and more than 200,000 displaced by fighting. The tsunami of 2004 devastated much of the province and displaced many more.

- In West Kalimantan there has been a history of clashes between local Dyaks (or Dayaks) and Madurese who came from their island home near East Java as official transmigrants or spontaneous settlers throughout the twentieth century. The United Nations (2002, 48) summarised the situation as follows:

Ethnic Madurese families have been migrating to West Kalimantan for the past 100 years in search of economic opportunities. The indigenous ethnic Dyaks and Malays have typically viewed the Madurese as invaders, given their different language, cultural norms and unwillingness to conform with, and participate in, the routine of established society. Misunderstandings and anger between these populations has simmered for decades until the late 1990s when the rage was unleashed, resulting in hundreds of brutal deaths and the displacement of 60,000 Madurese into the capital city of Pontianak.

Similar conflicts have occurred in Central Kalimantan.

- Maluku in Eastern Indonesia has a history of being a flashpoint. Both the island of Ambon in the south and the northern islands have been

subject to violence and movement of displaced persons. There is a long history of conflict between Christians and Muslims in the province including when Christian separatists sought to break away from the new Indonesian republic in 1949. However, for most of the subsequent period there has been a local tradition of *pela gambong* (non-violence) although over this period consistent immigration of Muslims from Southern Sulawesi has reduced the Christians' demographic dominance (McBeth and Djalal 1999). While the conflict in Maluku is usually depicted as a Muslim-Christian conflict, the situation is in fact more complex. As the United Nations (2002, 39) has pointed out:

The root cause of the conflict has never been determined or agreed upon, although it is believed that a mixture of religious and ethnic differences, shifting economic position, political struggles and a general downturn in the financial fortune of the region following the Asian financial crisis contributed to the fighting. Overall instability and political struggles in Indonesia have certainly also played their part in preventing a quick resolution to the conflict. In addition, outside influences in the form of militias and support of religious and independence struggles have contributed to prolonging the tension and the fighting.

- In Far Eastern Indonesia there is a distinct ethnic difference with the indigenous populations being Melanesian compared with the Malay groups which are dominant west of Wallace's Line. In West Papua there has been a separatist movement (the OPM) ever since the former Dutch colony became part of Indonesia in 1963. This was quite weak through much of the 1980s and early 1990s but there has since been an upsurge of opposition to Indonesian sovereignty (Murphy 1999; Dolven 2000). There has been violence directed at immigrants from other parts of Indonesia (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 12 October 2000, 14) and reported displacement of local populations by military activity.
- Ethnic and sectarian violence has occurred also in Central Sulawesi. The United Nations (2002, 33) explained this as follows:
... a consequence of communal violence between Christians and Muslims. However, this is only part

of the explanation. Tensions between different ethnic groups involving the local or indigenous population and migrants from other parts of Sulawesi or other islands in Indonesia, turf wars between criminal gangs, as well as political rivalries involving different parties, and longstanding historic animosity between coastal traders and upland farmers constitute the major causes of the conflict. Central Sulawesi is a “complex emergency”, causes and complicated by civil strife. The violence has led to rising tensions between Christians and Muslims, irrespective of the original trigger.

It is common in the media for these conflicts to be attributed to differences between ethnic groups in Indonesia but their causes are much more complex and especially to perceptions of differences in access to resources. These inequalities often result in tensions between ethnic and religious groups which usually have an element of newcomers versus longer established residents in them. The ‘newcomers’ in many cases are not first generation immigrants but are descendants of earlier generations of immigrants who are of a different ethnicity and/or religion of the local population. Accordingly, an interesting dimension of

the forced movements associated with conflict is that in many cases they represent a reversal of earlier flows, although many of those involved may never have lived in their area of origin and may not retain linkages with family in that area.

The most discussed group among the ‘newcomers’ who have been made IDPs are former transmigrants from Java and their descendants that have been forced to leave and enter local refugee camps or return to the area that they or their ancestors had left several decades ago. The government transmigration program which aimed at resettling farm population from Java-Bali in less crowded outer island areas relocated up to ten million people in more than a century of operation (Tirtosudarmo 2001). The distribution of transmigrant settlers in the Outer Islands is shown in Fig. 13.13 but it is apparent that there is by no means a correlation between location of transmigrants and of the outbreak of conflict inducing forced outmigration. Indeed, the largest concentration of transmigrants located in Southern and Central Sumatra have been free of such conflict.




Fig. 13.13 Destination of transmigrants, 1968–2000 (Source: Hugo 2002, 315)




Fig. 13.14 BBM (Bugis-Butonese-Makassarese) migrations from South Sulawesi (Source: Hugo 2002, 317)

The areas where transmigrants have come into conflict with local populations have been in West and Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi and West Papua. These are areas where a predominantly Muslim transmigrant population from Java has come into contact with a local Christian or animist local population. However, in all cases it is far too simplistic to portray the conflict as a Muslim-Christian confrontation. There have been elements of the newcomers being seen as intruders and given privileges denied longstanding residents, coastal dwellers versus inlanders, ethnolinguistic differences mixed with long simmering local resentments released with the national political transformations and the activities of criminal groups. The transmigrant:local clashes have perhaps been greatest in Kalimantan where the predominantly Madurese newcomers have been settling in West and Central Kalimantan, both under the auspices of the transmigration program and spontaneously, for a century.

While the Java-Outer Island movements associated with transmigration have dominated discussions of settlement in the Outer Islands, in fact there has been another diaspora which has been of greater scale in the eastern part of Indonesia. This has involved the so-called BBM representing the Bugis, Butonese, Makassarese – the three main ethnic groups originating in

Southern Sulawesi. This group has a long history of seafaring and movement (Naim 1979), and for several centuries they have migrated westward to Eastern Kalimantan and Eastern Sumatra (Lineton 1975). In the post-Independence period, however, the bulk of the outflow from Southern Sulawesi has been toward the east. Figure 13.14 shows that these predominantly Muslim migrants have settled in areas dominated by Christian local populations in Maluku, East Nusatenggara, West Papua and, formerly, in East Timor. The movements have not only involved settlement but also long term circular migration. Hence like many of the transmigration flows it involved the insertion of a Muslim population into a Christian local community. However, the resentments which have grown among the BBM and local populations in some parts of Eastern Indonesia are not just religion based. Unlike the transmigrants, the BBM have not engaged in agriculture in their Eastern Indonesia destinations but have been involved in fishing, trading and small scale business, especially the latter. Their domination of local economies, shopkeeping, trading etc. has created some resentment among the longstanding populations (e.g. see Adicondro 1986).

Hence while the conflicts are often depicted as an example of the effects of clashes between Islam and Christianity or Malay and Melanesian, this is greatly oversimplifying a complex situation.

Conclusion

As an independent nation, Indonesia has confronted and continues to face many challenges. It is one of the world's most diverse nations not only in terms of ethnicity but geographically, culturally and economically. Ethnicity will remain an important dimension and is an important element in understanding differences in demographic behaviour. However, too often the complexity of the role of ethnicity and its linkages with economic and social processes are ignored or understated. The inherent difficulties in measuring ethnicity in a population census are exacerbated in Indonesia by political sensitivity, intermarriage and extensive mobility beyond the heartland of different ethnic groups. However, the inclusion of an ethnicity question in the censuses of 2000 and 2010 reflects an increasing maturity in Indonesia about its multicultural population. Although there has been considerable dispersal of different ethnic groups, there remains concentrations of particular groups in particular areas. Several of the smaller groups are concentrated in more peripheral parts of the archipelago and there are perceptions of neglect from the centre – Jakarta and Inner Indonesia, Java, Bali. It is easy for such resentments to gain an ethnic dimension. Accordingly, ethnic issues and sensitivities remain strong in Indonesia. However, the founders of the Indonesian state were emphatic in their insistence of equality between *sukubangsa* in the newly independent nation. There remains a relationship between ethnicity and political behaviour in Indonesia (Suryadinanta et al. 2003, 179) but it is not the only factor involved.

Indonesia is potentially entering a new era of increasing economic prosperity which could see it move from being the 16th largest economy in the world to the 7th by 2030 (Oberman et al. 2012, 1). Whether or not this is achieved will rely heavily on the maintenance of the political stability which has characterised it over the last decade. Ethnicity is one of the elements in the mix of potential threats to harmony. Maintenance of the vision of Indonesia's founders to maintain 'Unity

in Diversity' must be an important imperative of contemporary political leadership.

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Vietnam is a nation-state located in Southeastern Asia, sharing borders with Cambodia and Laos to the west, China to the north, the Gulf of Tonkin to the east, and the South China Sea to the south (see Fig. 14.1). It spans more than 331,210 sq. km, which compares in size to New Mexico in the United States (CIA 2014). It is a country historically rife with conflict. In part, this can be traced to ongoing legacies of colonialism. France began its conquest of Vietnam in 1858, and completed it in 1884 (Woods 2002). In 1887, France incorporated Vietnam into what it self-declared as the French Indochina. French rule continued until 1954, even though Vietnam declared independence at the end of World War II, but this finally came to an end once France was defeated by communist forces led by Ho Chi Minh (CIA 2014). International intervention then occurred, under the Geneva Accords of 1954, and divided Vietnam into two sections: Communist North and anti-Communist South. This division was

not intended to be permanent, but conflict quickly escalated between political leaders from both regions, Ho Chi Minh in the north and Bảo Đại in the south (Kahin and Lewis 1967). Soon after, the US government provided economic and military support to South Vietnam and this sparked what would become commonly remembered to Americans as “the Vietnam War” or “the Vietnam Conflict”; to Vietnamese, this conflict is commonly referred to as the “Second Indochina War” (Hirschman et al. 1995).

Linking the spread of communism in Vietnam to “the Red Scare” and Soviet threat, the US government justified military intervention to protect economic and political interests (Loewen 1995). This justification rested on a dominant political theory of the era, domino theory, which can concisely be summarized as follows: if one country goes they all go (Zinn [1990] 2003). It poses that absolute security and control, through military force if necessary, is required to foster a world where democracy and liberty reins. Therefore, Vietnam became the battlefield to stop the spread of communism and prevent any potential threat to the self-declared “free” world. US military servicemen and women would not completely return home from military intervention until 1975, the year communist northern Vietnam officially declared victory (Woods 2002). In the years following the war, Vietnam was left as a war-ravaged country with difficulty establishing a political identity and economic self-sufficiency (Woods 2002).

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Fig. 14.1 A map of contemporary Vietnam and its surroundings (Source: Central Intelligence Agency 2012c)



Today, the country is self-governed and (formally) free from external control. Initiated in 1986, *doi moi*, or “renovation” or “reform” signaled the change of Vietnam’s centralized and planned system to a market economy (Murray 1997). Industrialization and urban growth stimulated growth of Vietnam’s new economy and increased rural to urban migrants. In the 1990s, Vietnam was considered to be on the “correct course” with just enough state control and a few new capitalistic programs. Vietnam withdrew from Soviet influence and economically expanded. In the 1990s, Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia and established the first “Export Processing Zone” near Ho Chi Minh City (Corfield 2008). This “correct course” had Vietnam join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and a treaty of cooperation with the European Union. In 1997, Vietnam opened its first stock exchange. By 2005, large cities in Vietnam had attracted many foreign investors. Vietnam has continued to rapidly grow into the global economy, by joining the World Trade Organization and following the path of other socialist or formerly socialist countries (Hoogvelt 1997; Schaumburg-Müller and Choung 2009; WTO 2006). Vietnam exported 20 % of its goods and increased in tourism especially from China. Ho Chi Minh City accounts for over 35 % of Vietnam’s gross national product (Pham 2003). However, ethnic minorities have remained in rural areas with increasing ethnic conflicts and social inequalities in health, education, and income.

The following chapter is organized under five general themes: (1) general demographic trends, (2) Vietnam in the racialized world system, (3) ethnic conflict and inequality in Vietnam, (4) intergroup conflict outside of Vietnam, and (5) future trends and what can be expected. In each of these sections, we sketch an empirical overview describing various historical and contemporary trends, and then we offer some theoretical assessments and explanations of these data. Though our analysis is not exhaustive, it nonetheless highlights a number of social problems that merit further examination and scrutiny if ethnic inequality in Vietnam is to be reduced.

General Socio-demographic Trends

This section provides an overview of a number of demographic measures that describe the Vietnamese population as a whole. At times, we focus narrowly on trends within Vietnam to provide a richer, more nuanced account, but in other instances we situate Vietnam within an international context to show how its trends compare to those in other nation-states. (For a detailed overview of some of these trends, see Table 14.1). Vietnam has one of the densest populations in the world. Additionally, the majority of the population lives between Hanoi and the north and Ho Chi Minh City in the south. The Vietnamese population is relatively younger than other similar countries. Internal migration has significantly shifted the population. Even during times of colonialism and war, the population internally migrated to urban

Table 14.1 Demographic overview of Vietnam

Measure	Numerical value or rate	World rank
Total population (2014)	93,421,835	15
Population growth rate (2014)	1.00 %	119
Birth rate (2014)	16.26 births per 1,000	119
Death rate (2014)	5.93 death per 1,000	171
Net migration (2014)	−0.32 migrants per 1,000	129
Urbanization (2010–2015)	3.03 % annual rate of change	N/A
Sex ratio (2014)	1.12 males/1.0 female	N/A
Maternal mortality rate (2010)	59 deaths per 100,000 live births	102
Infant mortality rate (2014)	18.99 deaths per 1,000 live births	95
Life expectancy at birth (2014)	72.91 years	129
Fertility rate (2014)	1.85 children per woman	147
Health expenditures (2011)	6.8 % of GDP	8.6
Education expenditures (2010)	6.3 % of GDP	33
Unemployment, youth ages 15–24 (2012)	5.5 %	135

Source: CIA (2012b)

locations, except for ethnic minority populations that remained in rural areas of the country.

Internal Population Shifts, Historical Migration Patterns, and Contemporary Trends

Vietnam's population approximates 90 million people, which places it among the highest population densities for all countries throughout the world (Dang 2010). Recent data show that Vietnam's population ranks 14 in size among all countries, which compares in size roughly to Mexico, the Philippines, Ethiopia, and Germany; in fact, the Vietnamese population is nearly three and a half times larger than the population of the state of Texas (CIA 2014). The country's age distribution shows a relatively younger population and is comprised as follows: 24.3 % are between 0 and 14 years, 17.8 are between 15 and 24 years, 44.8 are between 25 and 54 years, 5.7 are between 55 and 64 years, and 5.6 % are 65 or older (CIA 2014). The median age is 29.2 years. Though Vietnam's population is both sizeable and young, growth is relatively slow compared to other countries and measures at a rate of about 1 % per year, which internationally ranks at 119 (CIA 2014). This growth is relatively small despite a birth rate that far exceeds the death rate by nearly three-fold. In Vietnam, the birth rate is 16.26 births per 1,000 people while the death rate is 5.93 (CIA 2014). This small population growth can be partly explained by looking at net migration patterns. More people have migrated from Vietnam than they have to Vietnam in recent years. In fact, the country experiences a net loss of migration as a rate of 0.32 per 1,000 (CIA 2014).

Historically speaking, internal migration has been a social fact of Vietnamese life predating the emergence of colonialism and capitalism. Dang et al. (1997), for example, highlight how successful feudal states often developed incentives that encouraged migration to newly-acquired territory such as land-ownership or tax-exemptions. Such practices, as Fryer (1979)

highlights, led to the inhabitation of what is now the southern region of Vietnam, which was virtually vacant land. Even when the feudal period ended and colonialism began, internal migration remained significant.

During the nearly 100-year French conquest of Vietnam (1859–1954), migration increased from the previous era (Woods 2002). This, in part, can be attributed to a number of seemingly endless wars that destroyed many communities and led to much environmental degradation. As Dang et al. (1997) note, this migration essentially took three forms: “rural to urban migration of landless people, wage laborers' movement between subsistent rural villages and plantation/mining zones operated by the French, and peasants' cyclical movement between rural areas during transplanting and harvesting seasons in search of contemporary employment” (p. 315). In fact, Thompson (1968) estimates that as much as two-thirds of the Vietnamese population, if not more, migrated for at least part of the year during to the 1930s to gain employment.

Internal migration slowed significantly after French colonial rule ended and US military intervention began (Dang et al. 1997). Though it slowed, migration did not end. Patterns shifted according to how the regions were divided by the Geneva Accords. In the north much of the population shifted to rural countryside areas to avoid warfare and combat zones, whereas in the south some of the population transitioned to urban areas in search of economic opportunity and to avoid combat zones (Barbieri et al. 1995). After the war, Vietnamese urban and rural areas remained relatively stable in terms of population until the 1980s (Dang et al. 1997). During this period, the Vietnamese government radically changed the country's economic mode of production to one that was less state-regulated and more market-oriented (Murray 1997).

The economic shift had salient consequences for migration trends, in that the country has experienced steady urbanization since the policy change. The rate of urbanization is expanding at just over 3 % per year, and now 31 % of Vietnam's

population resides in large urban areas (CIA 2014). The country's largest cities include Ho Chi Minh City (population 5.976 million), Hanoi (population 2.668 million), Haiphong (population 1.941 million), and Da Nang (population 0.807 million) according to recent estimates (CIA 2014).

Dang et al. (1997) highlight a number of push-pull factors, such as the effects of distance, income, the physical costs of migration, information, personal characteristics, individual expectations, and community and kinship ties that contribute to Vietnam's recent urban mobilization, in which migrants, especially women, have relocated to industrialized urban areas where approximately 30 % of the total Vietnamese population lives (CIA 2014).¹ Nonetheless, much of the population, especially ethnic minorities, still reside in rural areas. Nearly 71 % of the 54 national minority ethnic groups live in rural areas such as the mountainous regions of the North East, North West, and Central Highlands, whereas a clear majority (64 %) of the dominant ethnic group reside within urban areas located in lowland regions and the two major river deltas (Taylor 2011; World Bank 2006).

Emigration Trends

Once US military intervention ended and communist control extended over both northern and southern regions (circa 1975), Vietnam experienced massive flows of emigration (Chan 2011). Povell (2005) reports that nearly two million people have fled Vietnam since 1975. Approximately 94 %, settled in Western countries (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1995), and more than half of these migrated to the US (Feagin and Feagin [1978] 1999). The mass exodus from Vietnam can be conceptualized in two different categories of departure. Migration channeled through the proper legal channels occurred under

Table 14.2 Distribution of Vietnamese emigrates to major resettlement countries, by departure type from 1975 to 1995 (in percents)

Country	Type of departure		Total
	Boat and land	ODP	
Australia	14.7	7.7	11.6
Canada	13.7	9.7	11.9
France	3.6	3.3	3.4
United States	56.3	72.9	63.6
Other ^a	11.8	6.5	9.5
<i>N</i>	754,717	591,845	1,346,562

Source: UNHCR (1995)

^aFor statistical significant, this category compiles a number of countries including Japan, New Zealand, and a number of European nations

the Orderly Departure Program, and nearly 40 % of all migrants departed in this way, whereas the remaining 60 % departed illegally by boat or land to whichever bordering country they could reach first (Chan 2011). As reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1995), from 1975 to 1995, major resettlement countries such as Australia, Canada, France, Hong Kong, the United States, and others received more than 1.3 million Vietnamese migrants. (For a detailed overview of these migration patterns, see Table 14.2).

Because Vietnamese migrants fled the country in small, overcrowded boats at such high rates, some observers, as Moos and Morrison (1981) note, labeled them "boat people." From 1975 to 1977 more than 277,000 refugees left by boat from Vietnam, and another 190,000 fled between 1977 and 1979. This migration process was one characterized by great risk and uncertainty. Many would migrate to nearby countries, especially Guam, without knowing what was to come. "[T]hey fled in American planes, ships and small boats, and eventually, after spending weeks and sometimes months in refugee camps, first in Guam and then in the continental United States, were resettled" (Moos and Morrison 1981:32). Guam was an intermediate site strategic geographic convenience, as one of the US military stations located there was utilized to provide temporary shelter.

¹Others suggest that as much as 60 % of the total Vietnamese population lives in urban areas (e.g., Agergaard and Thao 2011; Poston et al. 2006).

Meanwhile in the US President Gerald Ford signed the Indochina Migration and Refugee Act of 1975. According to Povell (2005), this legislation came to be referred to as “Operation New Life,” and it granted Vietnamese (and Cambodians) special refugee status and provided financial assistance for relocation. US immigration restrictions were further eased by President Jimmy Carter, under the justification of humanitarian reasons, with the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. This law eased the process for Vietnamese refugees to become legal permanent residents, by limited residency status in the US to 1 year; citizenship requirements were also streamlined and Vietnamese refugees could become naturalized after 4 years of residency (Povell 2005). Between 1981 and 2000, this law helped 531,310 Vietnamese refugees become US citizens.

Economic Infrastructure

Vietnam’s economy is currently undergoing transformation from being centrally organized and planned by the state to being deregulated, liberalized, and internationally integrated (Murray 1997). This shift coincides, and no doubt dialectically intertwines, with a shift from an agrarian to industrial-based economy (Dang 2010). In 2005, large cities in Vietnam had attracted many foreign investors creating new global cities in Vietnam (Sassen 2001). Vietnam has continued to grow into a global economy, by joining the World Trade Organization and following the path of other socialist or formerly socialist countries (Hoogvelt 1997; Schaumburg-Müller and Choung 2009; WTO 2006). The changing infrastructure of the economy has helped elevate standards of living, albeit unevenly along ethnic lines. Now Vietnam reports a 5.2 % national average growth rate per capita, which more than doubles many low- and middle-income countries (Dang 2010). Per capita income is estimated at \$836 (US dollars), according to the World Bank (2008). What this has meant for many Vietnamese is a steadily increasing income and quality of life.

Table 14.3 Gini index of Vietnam and other selected countries

Rank	Country	Gini index value	Date of data source
1.	Namibia	70.7	2003
2.	Seychelles	65.7	2007
3.	South Africa	65.0	2005
4.	Lesotho	63.2	1995
5.	Botswana	63.0	1993
...			
77.	Japan	37.6	2008
78.	Lithuania	37.6	2008
79.	Tanzania	37.6	2007
80.	Vietnam	37.6	2008
81.	Indonesia	36.8	2009
82.	Uzbekistan	36.8	2003
83.	India	36.8	2004

Source: CIA (2012a)

Despite steady economic growth since the 1980s and increasing wages, much income inequality exists within the Vietnamese population. According to the Gini Index, Vietnam ranks 80th among all countries in terms of income inequality with a value of 37.6 as of 2008 (CIA 2012a).² Countries with similar index values include Japan, Lithuania, Tanzania, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, and India. (See Table 14.3 for a more detailed account Vietnam’s Gini Index score in relation to other countries.) Though the Gini Index is a significant indicator of inequality within a country, it is a relative scale measure that does little to compare inequalities between countries. Comparing income levels of Vietnam to those of other countries, it becomes quite clear that the country is confronted with high levels of impoverishment. The World Bank (2006) reports that at least 16 % of the general population falls under the official poverty line, with ethnic minorities and those who live in northern rural areas being disproportionately overrepresented.

²The Gini Index is a scale that measures the degree of income disparity, ranging on a scale from 0 to 1. When a Gini index value approaches 0 this means that the income distribution within a country is polarized, whereas when the value approaches 1 a country’s income distribution achieves more parity.

Cultural Markers in Vietnam

Vietnamese culture is one characterized by diversity, as evidence by its linguistic and religious plurality. Though Vietnamese is the official language spoken by most throughout the country, English has become increasingly popular in recent years and many residents still speak other languages such as French, Khmer, and mountain area languages (CIA 2014). In terms of religion, most Vietnamese do not identify with any particular faith but 9.3 % identify as Buddhist, 6.7 % Catholic, 1.5 % Hoi Hoi, 1.1 % Cao Dai, 0.5 % Protestant, and 0.1 % Muslim (CIA 2014). Because of Vietnam's growth into a global economy, many researchers assert that ethnic minority groups have assimilated to the dominant Vietnamese, urban culture (Condominas 1977; Dournes 1980; Hickey 1993). This assimilation of ethnic groups suggest that oppression within Vietnam and between the countries creates a world system divided by three types of countries: core, semi-periphery, and periphery.

The work of Wallerstein (1974) has shown that the interconnected, globalized world—in which the economy, politics, and society become one—has emerged from more than six centuries in the making. It has created a world system divided by core, semi-periphery, and periphery nation-states, all the while organizing both material and symbolic resources and opportunities along ethnic and racial lines both *within* and *between* countries (Bonilla-Silva 2000). Such divisions have been rationalized by a developing ideology rooted in binary oppositions (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996). “Whites” and racialized others became defined in dichotomous fashion along lines of human/subhuman, civilized/savage, pure/tainted, rational/irrational, superior/inferior, and so on. Such rationale has justified the conquest and colonization by many Western European nations over Asiatic peoples like those of Vietnam in the name of nobility and civilizing the world. In the words of English poet Rudyard Kipling (1899), this is “the white man’s burden.”

Among the first colonial occupations of Vietnam was initiated by France, which was also among the first to build an international empire (Corfield 2008;

Woods 2002). Beginning in the fifteenth century, France colonized much of Africa, South America, the Middle East, and eventually Indochina (Roberts 1963). The French empire, however, began to erode after World War I, leaving them faced with much economic instability and new political alignments that undermined their ability to preserve their international hegemony (Bonilla-Silva 2000). This is when the US first became directly involved with Vietnam. It first intervened to help France preserve its colonial control, but when France ended its rule in 1954, the US allied with South Vietnam, which was an anti-communist political dictatorship (Feagin and Feagin [1978] 1999).

Reasons for prolonged US military occupation Vietnam remain open to interpretation (Loewen 1995). It is linked most often to stopping the spread of communism, but other plausible explanations point to associations with masculinity and paternalism (Faludi 2000; Kimmel 2011). Such is exemplified by President Johnson’s comments in that no president wants to be the first in US history to lose a war (Loewen 1995). Regardless of the reason(s), US military involvement began in the early 1950s and did not end until the mid-1970s only after an estimated one million Vietnamese citizens had perished.³

Though many Americans were persuaded to support US military occupation on the basis of presidential deceit (see Hagopian 2009), many scholars and organic intellectuals alike voiced their criticism and used Vietnam as a platform to elevate a global critique of US-centered capitalism rooted in racial oppression. Civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King and Muhammad Ali adamantly opposed this war for these reasons, and attempted to bridge civil rights struggles with global struggles of human rights.

³Casualty estimates for how many Vietnamese citizens died due to US military intervention range broadly. A conservative estimate approximates one million, while others report as many as three million dead (Lewy 1978; Thayer 1985; Turley 1986). All of these numbers, however, tower the official number of American soldiers and marines who reportedly died due to war-related injuries which amounts to 56,000 (Hirschman et al. 1995). This means that citizen casualty rates for Vietnamese were 10–30 times more than that of US military servicemen and women.

In his infamous speech “Beyond Vietnam,” Dr. King (1967) broke the silence and encouraged others to do the same by condemning the US government as the greatest purveyor of violence throughout the world. He also noted how it was disproportionately black men sent to the front lines of Vietnam to combat the Vietnamese, a racialized other. This occurred all in the name of spreading liberty and freedom, meanwhile black men and women were still formally deprived of these in the US. In a later speech, Dr. King ([1967] 1986) also raised fundamental questions about the wholeness of society. He asked why people of color have half the social rewards (e.g., income, wealth) and twice the social penalties (e.g., morality rates, education attainment), while white elites control fundamental resources necessary for the preservation of life (e.g., water) and other resources that capitalism is built upon (e.g., oil, iron ore).

Meanwhile, Muhammad Ali used his celebrity athlete status to rebuke the Vietnam conflict as what he saw as US imperialism (Chon-Smith 2006). His sentiments amplified when he was drafted into the US armed forces in 1967, a decision he legally contested and evaded through much controversy on religious grounds (Quintana 2007).⁴ Ali nonetheless refused to serve in what he labeled “an illegal war aimed at increasing oppression throughout the globe” (Zirin 2012:Para. 3).

The US military intervention nonetheless served a functional purpose in the racialized world system: to preserve power and control. It ensured that a war-torn Vietnam remained a periphery nation, in which its natural resources were extracted and low skilled, intensive labor pool was utilized to serve the interests of core Western nations such as the US. The country was literally left in ruins, causing great difficulty for Vietnam to gain any social, economic,

and political access to a global system that was (and remains) largely Western-controlled. These factors, among others, solidified the country’s disempowerment. Any surplus value created by Vietnam and other periphery nation-states was to be redistributed to core nations through an intricate global division of labor organized by capitalism. Using this concept of the racialized world system, it becomes more discernible to understand how unearned enrichment and unjust impoverishment is organized between nation-states.

Ethnic Conflict and Inequality in Vietnam

Ethnicity is a social construct, and therefore its meanings can and do change according to socio-historical context (Winant 2001). Cultural markers such as language and religion tend to define ethnic lines, but these ethnic distinctions are also organized by factors of economic class. After the end of French colonial rule in the 1960s, the Vietnam government began recording ethnic data to serve policymaker, researcher, and public interests (ADB 2002; Dien 2002). They divided the population into 54 separate ethnic groups, with the majority (87 %) comprised by the Viet (ethnic Vietnamese) or Kinh (GSO 2001). Of the remaining population, the Tay, Thai, Muong, Khmer (ethnic Cambodian), Hoa (ethnic Chinese), and Hmong comprise approximately 10 %, and the more than 40 other groups comprise nearly 4 % (GSO 2001; Taylor 2011) (Table 14.4).

Vietnam Census data, while robust, remain a contested topic as a number of analysts and groups disagree with how ethnic groups are defined (ABD 2002; Dien 2002; Taylor 2011). The Nguôn, for example, identify themselves as a distinct group, but previous censuses classified them with the majority Kinh group. Other groups, such as the Sui, were omitted from the census altogether. Because of this controversy, the census has become a contested battleground among ethnic groups. Consequently, census categories can and do change. In fact, Vietnam will be revising its list of ethnic groups to include one

⁴For these actions Ali was convicted of a felony and unusually punished with a 5-year imprisonment sentence, but this decision was eventually overturned through appeal by the US Supreme Court in 1971 (Quintana 2007). Ultimately, these events cost Ali his heavyweight boxing title as the industry revoked his license and disacknowledged his champion status.

Table 14.4 Ethnic groups in Vietnam and their composition of the population (1999 census)

1. Kinh (86.2 %)	19. Ra Glai (<1 %)	37. Phù Lá (<1 %)
2. Tày (1.9 %)	20. M'Nông (<1 %)	38. La Hủ (<1 %)
3. Thái (1.7 %)	21. Thổ (<1 %)	39. Kháng (<1 %)
4. Mường (1.5 %)	22. Xtiêng (<1 %)	40. Lự (<1 %)
5. Khmer Krom (1.4 %)	23. Khơ Mú (<1 %)	41. Pà Thẻn (<1 %)
6. Hoa (1.1 %)	24. Bru-Vân Kiều (<1 %)	42. Lô Lô (<1 %)
7. Nùng (1.1 %)	25. Giáy (<1 %)	43. Chứt (<1 %)
8. H'Mông (1 %)	26. Cơ Tu (<1 %)	44. Mảng (<1 %)
9. Dao (<1 %)	27. Giẻ Triêng (<1 %)	45. Cờ Lao (<1 %)
10. Gia Rai (<1 %)	28. Tà Ôi (<1 %)	46. Bô Y (<1 %)
11. Ê Đê (<1 %)	29. Mạ (<1 %)	47. La Ha (<1 %)
12. Ba Na (<1 %)	30. Co (<1 %)	48. Cống (<1 %)
13. Sán Chay (<1 %)	31. Chơ Ro (<1 %)	49. Ngái (<1 %)
14. Chăm (<1 %)	32. Hà Nhì (<1 %)	50. Si La (<1 %)
15. Xơ Đăng (<1 %)	33. Xinh Mun (<1 %)	51. Pu Péo (<1 %)
16. Sán Dìu (<1 %)	34. Chu Ru (<1 %)	52. Brâu (<1 %)
17. Hrê (<1 %)	35. Lao (<1 %)	53. Rơ Măm (<1 %)
18. Cờ Ho (<1 %)	36. La Chí (<1 %)	54. Ô Đu (<1 %)

Source: Population and Housing Census Vietnam (1999)

more group, Pa Ko, in the coming years (Associated Press 2008).

Some of Vietnam's ethnic groups have resided within its territorial area since early times (e.g., the Viet and Tay-Thai groups), yet others have arrived in recent historical times; the Hani, Lahu, and Lolo groups, for example, located in the area between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries (Dang et al. 2000). After gaining their independence from the Chinese empire around the eleventh century, Vietnamese rulers instituted a number of frontier policies expanding the country's borders southward to encompass the Red River Delta and most of what is known today as central and southern Vietnam (Keyes 2002). This expansion resulted in bringing ethnic groups such as the Cham and Khmer, who were often characterized as barbarian and savage, under Vietnamese rule (Hickey 1982; Woodside 1971). The dominant Vietnamese ethnic groups proceeded from approximately the fifteenth to the nineteenth century to engage in a "civilizing" project of these newly incorporated minority groups, especially the Khmer but other minority groups as well, and these practices would not end until French colonization (Woodside 1971). This often caused minority groups to retreat in isolation to the country's highland areas (Hickey 1982; Woodside 1971) Thus, interethnic conflict

within Vietnam preceded the period of European colonialism.

Throughout the rest of this chapter, we use the term ethnic minorities to reference the various subgroups in Vietnam that are not considered the Kinh (or Hoa).⁵ This usage does not imply that these groups share uniform experiences or a singular, coherent identity, but instead it signifies what unifies them as a collectivity: their ethnic position in terms of social relations. Therefore, issues of power and differential access to social opportunity and resources are central to our terminology.⁶

⁵If majority and minority groups were defined strictly along numerical lines, the majority would be comprised by the Kinh while the minority would include all other groups. Such definition, however, does not capture the power dynamics of ethnic relations in Vietnam. Scholars such as Dang (2010) and van de Walle and Gunewardena (2001) note how members of the Hoa ethnic group have high rates of cultural assimilation with the Kinh and are among the wealthiest groups within Vietnam. Based on these factors, among others, we include them within majority group and designate the term ethnic minority for the remaining groups.

⁶Our theoretical position draws heavily from the work of Amanda Lewis (2004) on racial inequality in the United States. Here, she provides a framework for analyzing racial (and ethnic) inequality *between* groups, while at the simultaneously addressing intragroup variation *within* groups.

Ethnic conflict is embedded across a host of issues in Vietnam. Though these range broadly, they are often intertwined within a broader fabric that interconnects ethnic inequality. A simple example of this can be found by linking disparities that emerge in the institution of education culminate to shape the occupational division of labor and affect wage gaps between ethnic groups. This foundational understanding, which is inherently institutional and structural in nature, guides our analysis throughout the following discussion of contemporary ethnic conflict in Vietnam. For practical purposes, we isolate different inequalities from a variety of institutional areas and discuss them independently. Areas of focus we take up include poverty, labor, income, human capital, and health. Though we discuss each area of inequality independently, our analysis is holistic in that we situate each of these within the broader context of ethnic inequality.

Social Stigma

Identity spoilage is at the heart of social stigma (Goffman 1963). It can come in a variety of forms—such as physical deformation, psychological illnesses, and problematic behavior—but in regards to Vietnamese ethnic minorities it predominantly derives from negative stereotypes. Stereotypes themselves, though rooted in faulty generalizations, yield maps of distinction that people draw from and apply in interaction (Allport 1958). Walter Lippman (1922) is often credited for coining the term stereotype, and he describes it as a form of short-hand thinking that people utilize absent of other information. In his own words, he contends that people use stereotypes to simplify a complex world that “is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting, for direct acquaintance” (Lippman 1922:16).

The power of stereotypes lies in their ability to transform subjective meanings into objective fac-tivities (Berger and Luckman 1967).⁷ Though

⁷The concept articulated by Berger and Luckmann (1967) can be traced back much earlier, to at least the work of W.I. and Dorothy Thomas (1928). In what would later

stereotypes often exist under false pretences, people can come to rely upon them particularly when no other alternative information is available. When this happens, lies based on false pretenses appear as though were true in the first place, thus manifesting self-fulfilling prophesies. They produce expectancy-based behavior, and therefore legitimate the status quo of ethnic inequality. Stereotypes, as Bobo (1998) argues, influence how people perceive and interact with racial insiders and outsiders.

The function of stereotypes is to legitimate status differentials between racial and ethnic groups, as they are expressive of a group’s structural position within the racial or ethnic hierarchy (Bonilla-Silva 2001). In Vietnam, a number of minority groups are stigmatized by a number of negative stereotypes, often characterizing them as untrustworthy, backward, superstitious, and traditionally conservative (Jamieson et al. 1998; Taylor 2011). When these stereotypes are acted upon, particularly by members of the dominant group, ethnic domination is preserved. Their symbolic meanings become real in their consequences, transforming these stereotypes into self-fulfilling prophesies and solidifying concrete, tangible ethnic consequences. Simply put, they have the potential to reinforce each group’s hierarchal location.

Poverty

Decades removed from the Vietnam War, Vietnam’s poverty counts—both general and extreme (e.g., lacking food)—have steadily declined in recent times, falling an average nearly 3 % per year (World Bank 1993, 2002, 2006).⁸ For example, the official poverty rate fell from 59.1 % to 16 % between 1993 and 2006. Though

become labeled “the Thomas Theorem,” they wrote: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (p. 572). In other words, regardless of whether a lie has any merit, its consequences are the same nonetheless.

⁸Interestingly, most of the ethnic minorities dealing with poverty live in the same central mountains where development is promoted (Asian Development Bank 2002).

Table 14.5 Poverty in Vietnam by ethnic majority/minority and urban rural divides snapshots of 1993, 2002, and 2006 (in percents)

	Ethnic majority		Ethnic minority	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
1993				
Not poor	75.6	37.6	51.5	12.9
Poor	24.4	62.4	48.5	87.7
Extreme poor	7.8	24.5	12.9	53.3
2002				
Not poor	94.5	70.9	65.9	27.9
Poor	5.5	29.1	34.1	72.1
Extreme poor	1.1	8.3	21.3	43.2
2006				
Not poor	97.2	86.6	68.9	46.0
Poor	2.8	13.5	31.1	54.0
Extreme poor	0.5	4.3	19.3	30.0

Source: World Bank (2000, 2006)

poverty has generally fallen for Vietnam as a whole, this trend has not been consistent across ethnic groups. (See Table 14.5 for a detailed overview.) Dang (2010) observes this trend by noting that general poverty rates for the majority group decreased by 71 % between 1993 and 2006, while only 42 % for ethnic minority groups. This means that ethnic minorities suffer from poverty at five times the rate as their ethnic majority peers. Similar, and arguably worse, patterns are observed for extreme poverty counts. Nearly 29 % of ethnic minorities are considered to live in extreme poverty, which is nearly nine times the rate of the ethnic majority (Dang 2010). These divergent trends actually increase the poverty gap between majority and minority groups, despite the trend of overall poverty reduction throughout the nation.

Ethnic minorities are overrepresented in terms of poverty, but why? Some attribute this observation, in part, to spatial reasons. According to van de Walle and Gunewardena (2001), ethnic minorities are predominantly concentrated in rural areas where access to education, (nonfarm) employment, healthcare, and the general market economy is remote. Such isolation essentially cuts them off from opportunities and resources necessary for social mobility, and translates into lower standards of living.

These authors stress, however, that spatial factors do not provide an exhaustive explanation of poverty disparities among ethnic groups. van de Walle and Gunewardena (2001) also argue that ethnic minority groups are disproportionately impoverished due to their own cultural shortcomings. Similar to “culture of poverty” arguments that explain racial inequality in the United States, first espoused by Lewis (1959), this explanation places sole responsibility of social position on marginalized groups. Because ethnic minorities subscribe to inferior values, norms, and morals, like not investing in the future and having an absent work ethic, social problems such as poverty result from their own doing. This narrative is another way of “blaming the victim,” and underscores other social forces such as history, institutions, and structures that create and recreate the status quo of inequality.

Others provide contrary explanations for poverty disparities among ethnic groups. Baluch et al. (2002) point out that cultural values preferred and rewarded in a deregulate, liberalized market economy (e.g., individualism, “competition”) are ones that are normative to the dominant culture, whereas cultural values common to ethnic minority groups such as communalism and altruism are discouraged, if not labeled as inferior and “backwards.” Minority culture is not inherently inferior to the other, but a value judgment is placed on the minority culture from a particular vantage point of power.

Still, additional social forces play a role in these poverty trends. The Vietnam-Sweden Mountain Rural Development Project (2000), for example, points out ethnic minorities lack access to particular natural resources such as high quality land and water supplies, and these circumstantial factors prevent them from developing and retaining resources. In addition, Vietnam’s labor force is organized along ethnic lines with most minority members working in the agrarian sector where wages remain low and many majority members working for higher wages in the industrial sector (UNHCR 2006). Other spatial factors also play a role in the accumulation of resources. Access to financial institutions heavily favors the majority ethnic group given that most live in urban set-

tings where these institutions are primarily located, whereas a disproportionate number of ethnic minorities have very limited access to banks because they live in rural areas (World Bank 2009). This lack of access to banking is significant because it prevents people from functioning in what is often a bank-centered world. They cannot establish a formal credit record, gain loans when needed, or in some cases, save money for the future.

Labor and Income

The shift in Vietnam's political economy and mode of production has increased rural-to-urban migration patterns for ethnic minority groups, but agrarian work still accounts for more than half (55 %) of all employment for ethnic minorities (Dang 2010). All the while, a much higher share of private sector workers belong to the ethnic majority group. This means that the urban-rural divide is also one embedded with a division of labor organized along ethnic lines. As the dominant ethnic group is overrepresented at the highest income ranges, minority ethnic groups are overrepresented at the bottom. Nearly 72 % of all minority ethnic groups are positioned within the lowest three deciles of the income distribution, whereas 88 % fall below the lower half (World Bank 2006). Controlling for other factors, Dang (2010) finds average ethnic majority members earns 15 % more than their ethnic minority counterparts.

These ethnic inequalities emerge at an early age. Minority children between the ages of 6 and 18 are more than three times more likely to work while they attend school; nearly 14 % of ethnic minority children work and attend school compared to only 4 % of their ethnic counterparts (Dang 2010). As time evolves this gap becomes more disparate when Vietnamese children turn 15, the legal working age. Such inequalities at an early age have other consequences later during the life course. Time spent doing work can take away time that child may have devoted to other activities such as education. Beegle et al. (2009) found that child labor has a negative effect on school

participation and attainment, and the more a child works at early ages the more likely she or he is to become a wage worker later in life. These factors taken together, among many others that remain unmentioned, child labor is embedded within a web of other disparities that cumulate over time to produce vast ethnic inequalities among a host of socioeconomic variables.

In terms of the globalized economy, the Vietnamese population provides a significant source for labor. Many cross borders to neighboring countries for work, which typically comes in the form of strenuous manual labor such as construction, agriculture, fishing, mining, logging, and manufacturing (CIA 2014). In fact, Vietnam is among several counties to implement government policy that promotes the exportation of migrant workers for several stated reasons such as unemployment reduction, foreign exchange, skill development, and so on (Hugo 1995). Employers that attract Vietnamese workers are typically located in Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea, Laos, United Arab Emirates, and Japan, but Vietnamese workers also migrate in fewer numbers to other countries such as China, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Indonesia, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, Russia, and other Middle Eastern countries (CIA 2014).

As mentioned above, Vietnam began to change its primary mode of production and develop itself economically as an industrialized nation under the doi moi plan (Murray 1997). Situated within a larger context, many other poorer, "underdeveloped" countries have also followed this trajectory, and such trends have significantly impacted international migration patterns (Massey 1999). Many populations from periphery nations like Vietnam are migrating to core nations to fill their labor needs. Consequently, as Massey (1999) notes, this is further creating and reinforcing bi- or multi-furcated workforces along ethnic lines in wealthier nations. Native workers of these core nations, which tend to be "white" or phenotypically light-skinned, retain jobs in primary markets where pay is higher and work is less physically strenuous, whereas people of color and immigrants are fill-

ing labor needs of secondary markets in which pay is lower and stability more fragile (Balibar and Wallerstein [1988] 1991).

A discussion of labor inequalities inherently warrants topical inclusion of human rights, as these areas can, and often do, impact the other. The integration of national economies into a unified global one is among the primary causes for contemporary migratory patterns. Large corporations have continually outsourced their labor needs by relocating from one country to the next, each time leaving displaced populations in their wake (Blau and Moncada 2005). Capital has become increasingly impatient and unstable, and populations have consequently become also transnational; people are crossing borders to obtain work and satisfy basic levels of sustenance (Sassen 1998). Transnational populations, such as many Vietnamese, are situated in a tenuous position. International laws place little to no restrictions on the free flow of capital across borders, but numerous national restrictions restrict the free movement of labor (Golash-Boza 2011).

Human Capital

In Vietnam, ethnic disparities manifest in education as minorities have less access, high dropout rates, and later enrollments (Dien 2002). Data from the World Bank (2006) show that fewer proportions of ethnic minorities have attained education at virtually every level, whether primary, secondary, vocational, or higher education. (For an overview of these trends, see Table 14.6). Though these data sketch broad parameters of who has completed education and who has not, they lack a certain type of richness that illustrates what type of education these children achieve. Such studies indicate little about how education experiences diverge within schools.

When quality measures are considered, it becomes evident that education gaps in Vietnam are deeper than can be counted. Children belonging to the majority ethnic group are more likely to have access to higher quality learning materials and equipment such as books, science labs, and computers (Dang 2010). They are also more likely

Table 14.6 Education Attainment, 15 years or Older by Ethnic Group (in percents)

	Ethnic minority	Ethnic majority	Total
Still in school	11.5	12.5	12.4
None	23.5	5.6	7.8
Incomplete primary	23.7	16.6	17.5
Complete primary	25.5	26.0	26.0
Complete lower secondary	16.8	25.9	24.8
Complete upper secondary	7.6	15.5	14.5
University	0.9	5.3	4.7
Vocational education	1.9	5.1	4.7

Source: World Bank (2006)

to attend extra classes and have access to private tutors (Dang 2007). On the contrary, ethnic minority children are less likely to have parents with high educational attainment levels, and therefore lack a particular type of cultural capital needed to ensure a more rigorous education (Dang 2010). These very children must also travel much longer distances to attend school, which can affect how much they can invest in their studies (Dang 2010; Dien 2002). And once they arrive at school, they are less likely to have teachers that identify with their ethnic background. Bilingual education will not be presented to ethnic minorities who prefer an alternative to Vietnamese (Aikman and Pridmore 2001). All these factors collectively considered, it becomes apparent that education disparities remain even when attainment levels are the same.

Though attainment of human capital such as education helps to elevate the socioeconomic status of those able to attain it (van de Walle and Gunewardena 2001), the rewards of education are unevenly distributed along ethnic lines. Scholars such as Dang (2010) and Plant (2002) found that even when indigenous groups of Vietnam have been able to close education achievement gaps disparities of poverty and earnings remain relatively constant. In fact, every additional year of education attainment corresponds with a 2 % higher income rate for ethnic majority members over ethnic minority members (Dang 2010). These disparate returns further

diverge when one considers that ethnic minority members on average have 2.5 more years of education attainment than their ethnic counterparts.

Like general attainment (and poverty) trends, illiteracy has steadily declined during recent decades. They have done so, however, unevenly across ethnic lines. World Bank (2006) data show illiteracy for the general population decreased from 24 to 12 % between 1993 and 2006, but a disproportionate number of those who are illiterate are ethnic minorities. In 2006, 29 % of ethnic minorities are illiterate, a number that remains higher than the 1993 rate for ethnic majority members.

Health Access and Outcomes

Health disparities can be explained by a host of factors, ranging from education to area of residence, but these inequalities are also organized by ethnicity. Virtually every health outcome available confirms this, from mortality rates to immunizations to life expectancies. (See Table 14.7 for a general overview.) Like the disparities discussed above, health inequities emerge at early ages and socially embedded within the larger fabric of ethnic inequality.

Comparing mortality rates, the total population has an infant mortality rate of 23.9 per 1,000 while the mortality rate for children under 5 years is 30 per 1,000 (Committee for Population, Family and Children [Vietnam] and ORC Macro 2003).

When these figures are further examined according to ethnic group, differences become apparent. Ethnic minorities have an infant mortality rate of 30.4 per 1,000 compared to their ethnic majority peers who have a rate of 22.5 per 1,000. In terms of mortality rates of children under five, the ethnic minority has a rate of 41.1 per 1,000 while the ethnic majority has a rate of 27.7 per 1,000.

Disparities extend to the area of vaccinations. Children are considered by the World Health Organization (2005) to be fully vaccinated if they have received a *Bacillus Calmette-Guerin* (BCG) shot for tuberculosis, the DPT shot which consists of three doses for diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus, a vaccine for polio (three doses), and the measles vaccine. The total vaccination rate for Vietnamese children is 67.1 % for the total population, but a sizeable gap persists among ethnic groups: 38 % for ethnic minority children and 73 % for their ethnic majority counterparts (Committee for Population, Family and Children [Vietnam] and ORC Macro 2003). One may be inclined to regard these vaccination disparities as products of rural/urban differences, as most ethnic minorities live in rural areas and this prevents many from having adequate access to healthcare. Thang et al. (2007) caution against such a presumption. They found that ethnic minority children between 11 and 23 months who live in rural areas are 15 % less likely to be fully vaccinated, even when other factors are controlled. Rates vary by each vaccination, but what remains constant are ethnic disparities across all vaccinations.

Table 14.7 General health trends by ethnic majority/minority and urban rural divides, 2002

	Ethnic minority	Ethnic majority	Urban	Rural	Total pop.
<i>Mortality rates (per 1,000 live births)</i>					
Infant mortality rate	30.4	22.5	13.0	26.2	23.9
Under-5 mortality rate	41.1	27.7	15.6	33.0	30.0
<i>Vaccination rates, children</i>					
<i>Ages 12–23 months (in percents)</i>					
BCG	82.3	95.8	99.1	92.1	93.4
DPT (3 doses)	48.3	77.7	89.7	68.5	72.4
Polio (3 doses)	58.3	79.9	94.8	71.8	76.1
Measles	68.1	86.5	94.3	80.7	83.2
All of the above	38.1	73.4	87.1	62.5	67.1

Source: Committee for Population, Family and Children (Vietnam) and ORC Macro (2003)

In terms of child malnutrition, rates have improved along with Vietnam's economic development but this measure still lags behind a number of other health indicators. Thang and Popkin (2003) argue that these economic developments have largely bypassed a number of socio-demographic groups including the poor, rural dwellers, and minorities. In fact, these authors found that minority children are 14.1 % more likely than their ethnic counterparts to suffer from undernutrition, even when other factors are held constant. This disparity is only further exacerbated when considering that minority families are disproportionately poor and reside in rural areas. In summary, ethnic minority groups have significant social inequalities when compared to the dominant ethnic group. The remainder of the chapter focuses upon land and religious conflicts within Vietnam's ethnic composition.

Significant Ethnic Conflicts in Vietnam

In many instances, government policies in Vietnam have done more harm than good for local populations. For example, deforestation policies were initially implemented to make more lands available to migrant populations, particularly in the Central Highlands. (Asian Development Bank 2002: 17–18). The Central Highlands region is situated on the western side of the Annamite Mountains between Cambodia and Laos and has received a lot of focus both from the government of Vietnam and its inhabitants. This area is considered the Western Plateau of Vietnam and is comprised of four provinces: Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Gia Lai, Kon Tum (UNHCR 2006:2). Before the twentieth century, ethnic minorities comprised the population of the area. Now, with the government's focus on migration into the area, the majority ethnic Kinh group makes up the majority of the area.

Relocation policies adversely affected the indigenous groups of the area as the policies reduced the amount of land available to cultivate. According to a report by the Asian Development Bank, in 1943, 43 % of land in Vietnam was forest,

but shrunk to 26 % by 1990, with some areas only having 8–9 % of forests (ADB 2002:18). This deforestation process has led to a great deal of erosion, making it difficult to cultivate land, grow crops, and access basic resources like timber to build houses. In addition, many groups within these forest areas remain unclear about land ownership. The murkiness of who has rights to particular lands set circumstances where conflict between groups is likely to arise. In particular, these land ownership policies raise issues in a country where land has historically been owned by the community or state.

Deforestation has allowed the Vietnam government to resettle people to economic development zones in the Central Highlands. As a result, there have been many struggles over lands in the area (U.N. High Commission for Refugees 2006). On one hand, minority groups claimed land based on spiritual purposes for particular farming needs. On the other hand, the government attempted to control land as a community. The North Vietnamese government had nationalized the forests since the 1950s. After the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the government issued policies to nationalize crop lands all over Vietnam, including tea, coffee, and rubber plantations, and implemented state-owned farms (SFs – *nong truong*) and state forestry enterprises (SFEs – *lam truong*) (UNHCR 2006:27–28). In 1988, there were 83 SFEs in the Central Highlands which included more than three million hectares of forest land, about 70 % of land total (UNHCR 2008: 28). There were also 79 SFs that had commodity crop production like coffee and rubber. For example, according to the 2002 UNHCR report, coffee cultivation in Dak Lak rose from 10,000 ha in 1976 to 250,000 ha in the late 1990s (UNHCR 2002:28). Vietnam became the second largest coffee distributor in the world, after Brazil. In 1999, Dak Lak province made US \$600 million in coffee exports, which accounted for almost 60 % of Dak Lak's cultivation in 2000 (UNHCR 2006:28).

The coffee boom in the 1990s also led to more land conflicts as Kinh migrant settlements pushed minorities further into forest areas. Kinh outsiders created a labor market for minorities to work on coffee plantations. As a result, coffee prices

have a great deal of influence on local economies. For example, in Dak Lak, incomes were up 9 % in 1996 but dropped by 10 % by the 2000s (UNHCR 2006:31). Forty-five percent of coffee growing households in Dak Lak did not have adequate food, 66 % had debts, and 45 % had household members that worked outside agriculture in wage labor (UNHCR 2006:31).

There were also tensions and conflicts in Vietnam along religious lines. In 2001, and later in 2004, ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands regions of Vietnam protested against disenfranchising government policies and perceived persecution against them for their evangelical Protestant beliefs (UNHCR 2006:4). During the protests, there was a great deal of violence by police against ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands. As a result, many Vietnamese ethnic minorities fled to Cambodia but were soon under scrutiny regarding their actual classification as refugees. The UNHCR became involved to determine the status of the Vietnamese who moved out of the country as a result of the protests. In January 2002, the Vietnamese government worked with the UNHCR to sign an agreement to repatriate those who left back to the Central Highlands of Vietnam, leading to the return of 120,000 people (UNHCR 2006:9). However, there was much criticism over the agreement, as there was no monitoring of the safety and security of refugees returning. The UNHCR had refugee camps in Cambodia, but there were many concerns. In 2002, after an offer from the US government, refugees had the option of seeking asylum in the United States (UNHCR 2006:11). As a result, migration to Cambodia slowed.

In 2005, the Cambodia officials requested that UNHCR close their office, even though the UNHCR felt the office was still needed. Vietnamese and Cambodian officials met with the UNHCR in 2005 to discuss a new stance of Vietnamese refugees. Refugees were now given 1 month to decide whether they wanted to return to Vietnam or relocate to another country. However, this agreement was also critiqued, particularly the 1-month timeline which was seen as too imposing for the native Central Highlanders.

The reasons for these protests have much to do with the extreme issues of poverty and

overcrowding in the Central Highlands region. While the opening of the Vietnamese economy in the 1980s has decreased the levels of poverty, this is less the case for ethnic minorities. According to data presented in the UNHCR's report, while ethnic minorities made up 13 % of the population in 2004, they comprised 29 % of Vietnamese's poor population (UNHCR 2006:22). In the Central Highlands in particular, 91 % of ethnic minorities in the area lived in poverty, a level that rose significantly in 2002 (UNHCR 2006:23).

From the perspective of the Vietnamese government, these issues were already being addressed. The Vietnamese government's Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction program (HEPR) began in 1998. HEPR targeted those under a certain standing of living, which often was almost all ethnic minorities. These programs included support for agriculture production, subsidies of salt, fertilizer, school and medical materials, and other basic items for those in mountainous areas (UNHCR 2006:42). Even though the government targeted many poverty and hunger policies toward this region with HEPR, there was little benefit in these areas.

Government officials in Vietnam acknowledged the economic reasons for the protests and in January 2002 implemented a 5-year socio-economic development plan for the Central Highlands. The government not only agreed to limit relocation to the Central Highlands, but agreed that land in the Central Highlands should be returned to the native groups. Ethnic minority families would receive small areas of farming and residential land. In 2005, the government reported 9,378 households had received land, including 5,443 ha redistributed in Dak Lak (UNHCR 2006:44). However, most families only received 0.5 ha of land, which did little to improve poverty for those Vietnamese in need.

There has been a great deal of pressure on the Vietnamese government from international forces to improve their position on religious freedom, including in the Central Highlands. Traditionally, ethnic groups in the Central Highlands follow animistic religious and worship gods and spirits in the rocks, trees, and land (UNHCR 2006:33–34). It was during the period

of French colonization that missionaries spread Christianity throughout Vietnam. For example, Catholic missionaries in Kon Tum province converted many, and even today the area remains heavily Catholic. There have also been many religious converts in the Central Highlands. For example, Dak Lak saw a 742 % increase in Protestants between 1975 and 1995, compared to 641 % in Gia Lia, 432 % in Lam Dong, and 3 % in Kon Tum (UNHCR 2002:34).

After the initial 2001 protests, the Protestant-based Evangelical Church of Vietnam (South) (ECVNS) developed. It is estimated that two-thirds of the Central Highlands population follow this church. However, between 2002 and 2004, there have been accusations against the government for forcing villagers to renounce their religion. There has been a great deal of pressure on Vietnam by the United States and other countries to support religious freedom. The US Commission on International Religious Freedom was set up by the US State Department to monitor these issues around the world. This commission has a watch list of “countries of concern” (CPC) for their violations of religious freedom. Religious policies in Vietnam were first noted by the commission in 2003 and first appeared on their list in 2004. In November 2004, the Vietnamese government responded by passing the “Ordinance on Beliefs and Religions” in which religious freedoms were guaranteed to the Vietnamese people. However, this ordinance has been criticized for placing tighter restrictions of religion. In February 2005, the US State Department met with Vietnam to work on a bilateral agreement. In the agreement, Vietnamese Protestants were guaranteed the ability to run “house churches” in the Central Highlands, but were required to be affiliated with recognized churches, have pure religious intentions and not have ties to anti-government practices (UNHCR 2002:38).

The effects of policies on religious freedom in Vietnam have been mixed. In 2004, Christian leaders in Dak Lak and Dak Nonh reported religious prohibitions. The happenings in the Central Highlands were kept private by the Vietnamese government both internationally and internally.

Ethnic minorities are at a disadvantage in Vietnamese society and have trouble speaking out, especially compared to local and national groups for youth, women, veterans and the elderly (UNHCR 2006:46–47).

In summary, Vietnamese governmental policies and economic growth have increased social inequalities among ethnic minorities. We have discussed Vietnam within the world system perspective, and we will now discuss the world system perspective *between* Vietnam and the United States.

Racial and Ethnic Conflict in the US

In the United States, immigration and naturalization laws were restricted by various acts to favor immigrants from the northern and western regions of Europe throughout its history until 1965 (Roediger 2005). The immigration regulations prior to a new law in 1965 streamlined pathways to citizenship for those who were “white” and restricted immigration for non-white groups like the Vietnamese. Beginning with the Naturalization Act of 1790, for example, citizenship could only be conferred to “any alien, being a free white person” (qtd in Jacobson 1998:22). Nearly 100 years later, the federal government would regulate immigration with the introduction of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. This law was fueled by nativist resentment that drove many whites to fear “the Yellow Peril” and label the Chinese, and later most Asians, as a threat to their economic and cultural wellbeing (Takaki 1989). Thereafter in 1917, Congress enacted additional legislation that would bar all Asian persons from immigrating to the US (López [1996] 2006). The National Origins Act of 1924, which would remain in effect until the 1960s, only reinforced this exclusion, as it instituted a quota system that heavily favored northern and western Europeans (López [1996] 2006).

Vietnamese migration patterns to the US remained consistently low until the 1960s. Between 1941 and 1960, for example, only 335 people were reported to have migrated from Vietnam to the US, but between 1961 and 1980

Table 14.8 Asian immigration in the United States, from 1941 to 1993

	1941–1960	1961–1980	1981–1993
Chinese	41,910	347,564	647,880
Filipino	19,307	453,363	681,235
Korean	6,231	302,164	402,322
Vietnamese	335	177,160	593,741

Source: Feagin and Feagin (1978, 1999)

this number increased to 177,160 (Feagin and Feagin [1978] 1999). This trend can be attributed to primarily two factors. First, the US changed its immigration law and ended a nearly 100-year-old ban of most Asian countries (Wu 2002), starting in the 1940s when the Chinese became US allies against the Japanese. The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 was signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, increasing overall immigration by nearly a third.⁹ Second, many Vietnamese fled their country after US military intervention ended in 1975 seeking refugee status (Povell 2005). Additional legislation was later signed by Presidents Ford and Carter directly targeting the Vietnamese, as discussed above, further encouraging their migration to the US (Povell 2005). Prior to this legal revision migrants from Asian countries comprised less than 4 % of all immigrants in any given year, but afterwards, Asian migrants accounted for more than a third (Office of Immigration Statistics 2006) (Table 14.8).

Though three presidents endorsed legislation that encouraged relocation to the US, this does not mean Vietnamese immigration was uncontroversial and well-received by many Americans. Schaefer and Schaefer (1975) report that more than half of Americans (54 %) opposed providing refugee sanctuary to Vietnamese migrants shortly after the abrupt end of the war, while another 11 % remained undecided. Many Vietnamese immigrants were nonetheless often welcomed into local US communities, particular by coastal communities experiencing labor shortages in the fishing industry, but this warm welcome turned

cold when the US economy entered a downturn. Many Vietnamese became scapegoats for unemployment and disillusionment with the Vietnam War, and nativist resentment amongst whites came to the surface (Feagin and Feagin [1978] 1999). Such hostility is comparable to other immigrant experiences, such as the Chinese in the 1860s (Takaki 1989), the Irish in the early 1900s (Ignatiev 1995), and Latina/os (particularly those of Mexican origin) in the modern context (Sáenz and Murga 2011). In the early 1980s, for instance, areas in which Vietnamese migrants were heavily concentrated, such as Boston, Southern California, and the Texas Gulf Coast, experienced an increase of hate crimes in which whites directly targeted Vietnamese (US Commission on Civil Rights 1986).

In the twenty-first century, most Vietnamese remain located in ethnic enclaves often located nearby large urban areas like Boston and Orange County (Aguillar-San Juan 2005). These environments enable them to preserve their culture and identity, and proximity to urban spaces allow them to access consumer items native to their homeland such as food and pop culture items. That said, the Vietnamese community remains a target of Americans' white racism. The work of Zhou and Bankston (1998) has documented that nativist resentment has not receded. Many Vietnamese Americans remain the objects of violence because they are perceived as both a cultural and economic threat.

Future Trends and What Can Be Expected

In many ways, Vietnam as a country has experienced much progress over the past few decades. The standard of living has improved for all, more citizens have attained higher levels of education, literacy rates have improved, health risks and disparities have been reduced, among many other trends. Despite this positive progress, ethnic inequality has remained a common fact of everyday social life in Vietnam, and in some ways, has grown even worse. While the Kinh ethnic group remains approximately 86 % of the population,

⁹The 1965 legislation replaced the National Origins Quota Act of 1924 with a preference system based on family and employer sponsorship.

other Vietnamese ethnic minorities still face challenges in those areas in which advancement is assumed. According to a 2010 report by the Chronic Poverty Research Centre, ethnic minorities are particularly overrepresented in Vietnamese poverty and health assistance, and are at significant disadvantages in educational attainment and employment (Baluch et al. 2010).

In the United States, Vietnamese-Americans have succeeded in terms of education and professional employment, and have influenced many aspects of American life through food, holidays, and their participation in the political process (Do 1999). However, the perceptions of difference based on racial and ethnic minority status will continue to influence the experiences of newer generations of Vietnamese-Americans. On one hand, the rhetoric of the Vietnamese as refugees will continue to stigmatize them along class lines. Additionally, the growing Vietnamese communities in major metropolitan cities will continue to have a “ghettoizing” effect on Vietnamese and other Asian groups (Do 1999). While it may be presumed that the Vietnamese may benefit from their “model minority” Asian status, Wu (2002) and others have discussed the harm of this myth (Chou and Feagin 2008). Specifically, the assumption that the Vietnamese (or any other Asian group) are inherently smarter than other groups not only presupposes a racial hierarchy but fails to acknowledge the differences within the Vietnamese population. Thus, while it remains to be seen the extent to which the Vietnamese will be perceived in the West and throughout the world, what remains constant is the racialized social structure that maintain racial and ethnic minority groups as “other.”

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Part V

Middle East

An Exploratory Examination of Population and Stability in Afghanistan

15

Samia El-Badry and David A. Swanson

In 2009 American tax payers spent US\$200 billion to defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. According to the Center for Arms Control and Non Proliferation (2010) the US accounts for 47 % of the world's military spending totaling \$965 billion per year. Given this type of investment, we wonder if the US can succeed because while the population continues to grow few infrastructures are available to sustain the population.

This paper addresses demographic characteristics and patterns that pose significant challenges to security and development in Afghanistan. We suggest that the development projects introduced by the U.S. as part of the overall strategy for defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan are more likely to succeed if investments in supporting women are not increased, to include health care, reproductive health and both academic and vocational

training.¹ Our suggestion is based on Afghanistan's population growth, which we argue fosters a demographic pattern that feeds the Taliban insurgency and, as such, serves to diminish the possibility of country and regional stability (Fig. 15.1).

Afghanistan's 2009 population was estimated to be about 23.9 million people.² If the current fertility and mortality rates remain constant by 2050 the country's population will reach 111 million *and* will be growing at 3.6 % per year, a rate that **will double a population in only 19 years**. Policy makers and strategists need to be aware of this impending population growth in order to devise programs that not only develop the country at today's population levels, but put processes in place that anticipate this population surge.

In concert with the establishment of security and gaining the trust of the local population, development projects be developed that address

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¹In a December 2009 briefing Major General Mike Flynn, Senior Intelligence Officer for ISAF, said "The solution, therefore, is about securing the Afghan population, enabling good governance by the GIRA, and supporting development projects that can provide sustainable jobs and a healthy economy." "State of the Insurgency Trends, Intentions and Objectives" Michael Flynn, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.

AS OF: 22 DEC, 2009.

²CIA data shows an estimate of 28 million, 2009.




Fig. 15.1 The population pyramids showing growth by sex and age (Composite | U.S. Census Bureau, International Division | Afghanistan | <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php> | accessed 20 MAR 2010 |

USG Agency fact sheet). International Division of the U.S. Census Bureau (Article | Stewart, R. and G. Knaus.. *Can Intervention Work?* New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 2011)

population growth and meet the calls by women’s groups for reproductive health care. This is a critical step in establishing long term stability.

Women’s overall health care and education (both academic and vocational) has been shown in many countries as a key variable in lowering birth rates, reducing poverty, and increasing the status of women.³ As in Iraq, the establishment of the Baghdad Development Plan has increased good ill towards Americans, as well as helped women and children gain access to health care and education.⁴

Sources of Data and Methods

The majority of data for this study are derived from the *Afghanistan: A Socio-Economic and Demographic Profile, Household Listing 2003–2005*. While the margin of error in the *Profile* is not reported, mathematical tests conduct by the author indicate that the margin of error may be wide. For example, to test the accuracy we conducted a test on Life Expectancy at Birth. There is, fore example, a large difference between the authors’ mathematical estimate of life expectancy at birth (33.55)⁵ and that reported by the Central Statistical office (43.8). However, even with levels of error in the range of this one example,

³Report | United Nations Population Division, Economic and Social Affairs | World Population Prospects, 2006 revisions| New York | 2006 | reference publication.

⁴Report | Samia El-Badry, David Gibson and Charlie Jackson | The IC² Institute, The University of Texas at Austin | Baghdad Economic Development Project | February 2004.

⁵Article | David A. Swanson and James Palmore | East-west Population Institute, Asian and Pacific Census Newsletter | Two Parameters regression estimates of current life Expectancy at Birth: Part I | November 1976 | Vol. 3, No. 2 5–10.

we believe that the overall demographic pattern remains the same.

Unfortunately the Government of Afghanistan did not release Public Use Micro Data (PUMS) files derived from the 2003–2005 Census. Hence, we used the available secondary source data which do not show variations by age, sex and ethnicity, religiosity, tribal affiliation by city/town/village or provincial local. Further analysis could be done once the PUMS are made available; also needed are Demographic data for refugee camps as well as Migration data.

Moreover, it is unclear as to the margin of error and the uncertainty of the data from CSO. We do not know the size of the reported sample of households, nor the number of households and do not know the sample frame.

Information gleaned from field reporting, including ISAF Joint Command and CIDNE among others are used when possible. Unfortunately field data collection is sparse and none of the available sources (including USAID or other funding agencies) shows data for programs that relate to the number of educational and health programs for women.

Since we also do not know the successes and failures of the PRT or USAID projects, data collection and systemization is indicated. For example tabulating project information by city and by the characteristics of the intended population (e.g., by age and sex) would be helpful. We have made several attempts to contact members of USAID and the State department to get figures which show projects by type and cost. Moreover we have asked for data that would show the success of a project. To date, all responses indicate that such data are likely not kept.

It is important to note that as is the case of the CSO data, the methodology used by USAID, and the CIA in making their population estimates and projections is not well documented. In addition, they are quite different from those of the UN and the Central Statistical Office of Afghanistan. However for the sake of consistency we have used the most recent data (2003–2005) provided by the CSO and UNFPA.

Why Demography?

The demographic factors that are likely to pose significant challenges to security and development are not population growth, but population distortions, in which populations grow too young or too fast, and become too urbanized. Social Scientist and demographers including Richard Cincotta, a consultant to the National Intelligence Council, identified that population distortions “...will make it difficult for prevailing economic and administrative institutions to maintain stable environments and labor force absorption, leading to risks of mass migrations, government breakdowns, and international civil conflicts and a reduced ability of the United States and its major allies to respond to these challenges”.^{6,7,8}

In Afghanistan, the scarcity of socio-economic development; the habitually growing youth population coupled with high Total Fertility Rates (TFR)⁹; and the lack of adequate development and healthcare for women are critical variables that will severely impact resources and are linked to country and regional instability.

Democracy and Age Structure

Richard P. Cincotta,¹⁰ amongst other demographers, economist and social scientists, have written extensively on democracy and age structure indicating that countries with a large proportion

⁶Article | Jack A. Goldstone | Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Research and Development Directorate | Demography and Security | January 2010 |

Western scholars with good reliability.

⁷Article | Richard Cincotta, Robert Engleman and Daniele Anastasion | The Security Demographic | Population Action International | 2003.

⁸Article | Elizabeth Leahy with Robert Engelman, Carolyn Gibb Vogel, Sarah Haddock & Tod Preston | The shape of things to come | Population Action International | 2007.

⁹Total Fertility Rate (TFR)=the total number of children that a woman will have in her lifetime.

¹⁰Cincotta is consulting demographer to the Long Range Analysis Unit of the National Intelligence Council

of young adults, referred to as the ‘youth bulge’ are “much less likely to attain a stable democracy than countries with a more mature age structure”. While Afghanistan does not have a “youth bulge” the high Total Fertility Rate (TFR) indicates that the population is continuing to grow through births, and with increased immunizations, as shown by USAID¹¹ populations are less likely to die at the infant/child stages. If current rates of births and death continue, a youth bulge is likely within the next 20 years as can be seen from the population Pyramids provided by the International Division of the U.S. Census Bureau.¹²

A youthful age structure has been shown in many studies to influence political regimes.^{13,14,15} Accordingly if much of the population is young and potentially jobless, studies have shown that under such circumstances support for authoritarian regimes should rise. Such conditions, some argue facilitate political mobilization and recruitment of young adults, particularly young men – by non-state and state supported organizations capable of political and criminal violence.^{16,17}

Hence it is also important to keep in mind that the interaction between population growth (at an annual rate of over 3.6) and the preponderance of its young age structure (children born and continuing through adult hood) may also diminish the possibility that a coherent state could remain intact.¹⁸ Afghanistan is likely to face a youth bulge in the near future which further diminishes the possibility of stability.

Predictable Consequences

A key element is the interaction between demographic variables (births, deaths and migration, age structure) and the social terrain/environment that are most likely to impact socio-economic development; transitions to liberal democracies as well as stability and long term security.^{19,20} Having said that, we take note that the interplay of demographic patterns and population composition (age structure, births, deaths and migration); coupled with the vastly different cultures and historical experiences; as well the “idiosyncrasies of leaders”, among a host of other factors, provide such complexity in their interactions as to make cautious predictions.²¹

Nevertheless, a good place to start is: what is happening demographically today has predictable consequences for the populations of regions, states and countries. “Equally important, it

¹¹(U)USAID Profile | Asia – Afghanistan | USAID Asia – Countries – Afghanistan | last updated 29 OCT 2009 | <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia/countries/afghanistan> | accessed 2 MAR 2010 | USG Aid Agency fact sheet.

¹²Profile Data | U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base | Afghanistan | Washington, DC | 2009 | <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php> | accessed 12 MAR 2010 | USG Aid Agency fact sheet.

¹³Article | Elizabeth Leahy, Robert Engelman, Carolyn G. Vogel, Sarah Haddock and Tod Preston | Population Action International | The Shape of Things To Come: Why age structure matters to a safer equitable world. | 2007 | Western scholar with good reliability.

¹⁴Article | Henrik Urdal | International Studies Quarterly | A Clash of Generations? Youth bulges and political violence | 2006 | No. 50 607–629 | Western scholar with good reliability.

¹⁵Article | Jack A. Goldstone | Foreign Policy | The New Population Bomb: The Four Megatrends That will Change the World | January/February 2010 | Vol. 89 P 31–44 | Western scholar with good reliability.

¹⁶Article | Richard Cincotta | Environmental Change and Security Program Report | Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy | 2008–2009 | Issue 13 | Western scholar with good reliability.

¹⁷Book | Jack Goldstone | Revolution and Rebellion in early Modern world | Berkeley, CA: University of California Press | 1991 | Western scholar with good reliability.

¹⁸Article | Richard Cincotta | Foreign Policy | Could Demography Save Afghanistan? | November 16 2009 | www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/16/could_demography_save_afghanistan | Western scholar with good reliability.

¹⁹Article | Jack A. Goldstone | Population and security: “How demographic change can lead to violent conflict” | Columbia Journal of International Affairs | 2002 | No. 56 245–263 | Western scholar with good reliability.

²⁰Article | Richard Cincotta | Environmental Change and Security Program Report | Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy | 2008–2009 | Issue 13 | Western scholar with good reliability.

²¹Manuscript | United States Joint Forces Command | The JOE 2010 Joint Operating Environment | February 2010 | p10 | Comments by General J.N. Mattis good reliability and excellent information.

possesses implications for future strategic postures and attitudes”.²² It is important to keep in mind that “population factors, if unaddressed, diminish the possibility that a coherent state, if one emerges, could remain intact.”²³

Afghanistan: Demographic Profile

We begin by identifying the demographic variables that are catalysts to developmental projects for Afghanistan, and essential for the long term stability of the region.

This has been a country with stable and high birth rates for many years, where the average woman may have about eight children; and where infant and childhood mortality was high (Twenty percent before the age of 5).²⁴ However, it appears that these demographic patterns are changing and could very well impact the socio-economic and political stability of the country and the region. In 2009 the estimated population was around 24 million with a median age of 15. This indicates not only a young and dependent population but with a decline in childhood mortality, a very quickly growing population (Table 15.1).

Total Fertility Rate (TFR)

This variable is generally used to establish present and future resource demands including food, water, housing, childcare, healthcare, the number of schools, and to examine prevention measures such as reproductive health. Using estimates derived from a number of recent surveys, the

²²Manuscript | United States Joint Forces Command | The JOE 2010 Joint Operating Environment | February 2010 | p11 | Comments by General J.N. Mattis good reliability and excellent information.

²³Article | Richard Cincotta | Foreign Policy | Could Demography Save Afghanistan? | November 16, 2009 | www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/16/could_demography_save_afghanistan | Western scholar with good reliability.

²⁴Report | United Nations Population Division | Demographic profile 2003 Afghanistan | New York | 2007 | reference publication.

United Nations estimates the current TFR at 6.6 children per woman²⁵ suggesting that while the number of births per woman are still high they represent a decline from the past (7+), and the onset of decline has been quite recent.^{26,27,28}

Of the 34 provinces Nuristan has the lowest estimated Total Fertility Rate indicating that in a woman’s lifetime she will likely bear 5.4 children. Compared to Helmand, Zabul, Farah, Nimroz and Uruzgan where the rate is 7.6. Women in Logar and Kandahar (location of US force activity) are likely to have even higher fertility rates during their lifetime, 7.8 and 7.7 respectively.²⁹ Such rates are only similar to those of sub-Saharan Africa and indicate that the country will have to establish socio-economic measures to care for the population.

See Fig. 15.4.

Age Dependency Ratio

An indicator of economic productivity and care-taking is the age dependency ratio. It is the ratio of persons in the dependent ages (generally under age 15 and over 64) to those in the “economically productive” ages (15–64) in a population. This is often used as an indicator of the

²⁵Total Fertility Rate (TFR)=the total number of children that a woman will have in her lifetime.

²⁶Report | United Nations Population Division, Economic and Social Affairs | World Population Prospects, 2006 Revisions | New York | 2006 |

²⁷The Central Statistical Office and UNFPA have not reported the exact reason for the decline. However, the fertility decline could be due to the sample size, to better data gathering and reporting at the provincial level, or because of the wars people are having fewer children or a combination of all. Statistical test should be conducted to get a better picture.

²⁸The Household Level Census precludes direct calculations of the most common demographic variables such as birth and death rates. However, statistical estimates were produced and adjusted by UNFPA for age and sex misreporting.

²⁹Report | United Nations Population Division, Economic and Social Affairs | World Population Prospects, 2008 revisions | New York | 2008 | reference publication.

Table 15.1 Afghanistan, demographic indicators 1980–2025^a

Demographic indicators for Afghanistan, Neighboring countries and world regions around 2005

	Afghanistan	India	Iran	Nepal	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Sub Saharan Africa	South Central Asia
Population	25,067	1,134,403	69,421	27,094	158,081	153,281	769,348	1,645,790
Male (thousands)	12,985	587,618	35,200	13,427	81,328	78,470	382,596	847,660
Female (thousands)	12,082	546,785	34,221	13,667	76,753	74,811	386,752	798,130
Sex ratio (males per 100 females)	108.0	107.5	102.9	98.2	106.0	104.9	98.9	106.2
Median age	16.4	23.8	23.4	20.1	20.3	22.2	18.0	23.2
Population change per year (thousands)	1,064	17,156	971	561	3,054	22,671	19,520	26,318
Births per year (thousands)	1,337	27,077	1,462	800	4,515	3,972	31,792	40,813
Deaths per year (thousands)	552	9,671	391	219	1,178	1,200	12,068	13,827
Population growth rate %	3.90	1.50	1.40	2.00	1.80	1.70	2.40	1.50
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	48.2	23.0	20.3	28.1	27.2	24.8	38.9	23.8
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	19.9	8.2	5.4	7.7	7.1	7.5	14.8	8.1
TFR	7.1	2.8	2.0	3.3	3.5	2.8	5.1	2.9
Infant mortality (per 1,000 births)	157.0	55.0	30.6	53.9	67.5	52.5	93.3	58.1
Life expectancy at birth (both sexes in years)	43.8	64.7	71.0	63.8	65.5	64.1	50.0	64.5
Le Male	43.9	63.2	69.4	63.2	65.2	63.2	49.0	63.1
Le Female	43.8	66.4	72.6	64.2	65.8	65.0	50.9	66.1
Women aged 15–49 (thousands)	5,356	283,374	19,850	6,782	38,896	39,175	180,689	415,104
Percent	44.3	51.8	58.0	49.6	50.7	52.4	46.7	52.0
Population aged 0–4 (thousands)	4,656	126,894	6,092	3,611	18,886	18,916	128,441	186,538
Percent	18.6	11.2	8.8	13.3	11.9	12.3	16.7	11.3
Population aged 0–14 (thousands)	11,775	374,144	19,961	10,556	58,736	53,927	334,020	552,269
Percent	47.0	33.0	28.8	39.0	37.2	35.2	43.4	33.6
Population aged 65+ (thousands)	555	56,455	3,114	991	6,158	5,413	23,784	77,230
Percent	2.2	5.0	4.5	3.7	3.9	3.5	3.1	4.7
Age dependency ratio	1.00	0.61	0.50	0.74	0.70	0.60	0.87	0.62
Child dependency	0.90	0.53	0.43	0.68	0.63	0.60	0.81	0.54
Old age dependency	0.00	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.06	0.08
Child woman ratio	0.90	0.45	0.31	0.53	0.49	0.50	0.71	0.45

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects

^aReport | Central Statistical Office, Kabul and the United Nations Fund for Population activities (UNFPA) | Afghanistan, A Socio-economic and Demographic Profile, Household Listing 2003–2005 | 2007 | reference publication

economic burden the productive portion of a population must carry—(even though some in the dependent ages may be productive and those in the productive ages may be dependent).^{30,31} See Table 15.2.

Countries with very high birth rates—as is Afghanistan—usually have high rates of age dependency ratios because of the large proportion of children in the population.³² As a whole Afghanistan has a dependency ratio of .97—indicating that for every 100 working age persons (15–64) there are 97 persons depending on them. Moreover, the data indicates that 95.5 % of the dependents are children who are less than 15 years of age. This is the highest in South-Central Asia. By comparison, Iran, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh have a ratio of 0.74, which is a 25 % reduction in burden compared to Afghanistan. Nepal is slightly higher at 0.77, and for another perspective the dependency ratio for the U.S. is 0.59.³³

At the provincial level, the age dependency ratio varies from 0.90 in Panjshir to 117 in Uruzgan. Notably, the provinces of Herat, Kandahar, Nimroz, Logar, Helmand, Zabul, and Kunduz show that for every 100 economically active persons there are 110 dependents relying on their support.³⁴ See Fig. 15.2.

Average Household and Sex Ratio

With a high birth rate it is not surprising that the average household size is also large. According to the Socio-Economic and Demographic Profile: Afghanistan, 2003–2005³⁵ the average household size ranges from 5.6 persons in Daykundi to 7.15 in Logar, Helmand, and Khost. These are very large households and more than likely do have extended family members as well as children. Regardless, this may indicate that the economic burden is also quite substantial. (For comparative purposes, the average household size in the U.S. is much smaller at 2.59 showing its nuclear family structure).³⁶

At times the sex ratio is used to indicate if females are subjected to infanticide. At a country level there appears to be a slightly higher number of males than females, the sex ratio is 103.2 (males per 100 females). While this may be due to better data collection, it is not surprising as generally more males are born than females. Regional comparison show that Nepal is slightly lower at 99.9 while the remaining countries all show a slightly higher number of male births (Iran 103.1, India 105.2, Pakistan 110.2, and Bangladesh 113.7)³⁷ (Again for comparative purposes The U.S. has a sex ratio of 97.3 and Parity is at 100.) (Table 15.3)³⁸

³⁰ Report | Central Statistical Office, Kabul and the United Nations Fund for Population activities (UNFPA) | Afghanistan, A Socio-economic and Demographic Profile, Household Listing 2003–2005 | 2007 | Western and Afghan organization with good reliability.

³¹ Definition of Dependency Ratio: The dependency ratio measures the % of dependent people (not of working age)/ number of people of working age (economically active). OR Number of Children (0–15)+Number of Pensioners (>65)

³² Book | Population Reference Bureau | Population Handbook | 6th edition | 2007 |

³³ Survey | U.S. Bureau of the Census | American Community Survey, United States and States | Age Dependency Ratio of the Total Population: 2005 | 2005 |

³⁴ Report | Central Statistical Office, Kabul and the United Nations Fund for Population activities (UNFPA) | Afghanistan, A Socio-economic and Demographic Profile, Household Listing 2003–2005 | 2007 | Western and Afghan organization with good reliability.

³⁵ Report | Central Statistical Office, Kabul and the United Nations Fund for Population activities (UNFPA) | Afghanistan, A Socio-economic and Demographic Profile, Household Listing 2003–2005 | 2007 | reference publication.

³⁶ Report | U.S. Bureau of the Census | American Fact Finder | Washington, DC | 2009 | reference publication.

³⁷ Report | Central Statistical Office, Kabul and the United Nations Fund for Population activities (UNFPA) | Afghanistan, A Socio-economic and Demographic Profile, Household Listing 2003–2005 | 2007 | reference publication.

³⁸ Report | Central Statistical Office, Kabul and the United Nations Fund for Population activities (UNFPA) | Afghanistan, A Socio-economic and Demographic Profile, Household Listing 2003–2005 | 2007 | Western and Afghan organization with good reliability.

Table 15.2 Demographic indicators: Afghanistan, Neighboring Countries and the U.S. around 2005

	World	More developed		Less developed		Least developed		Sub Saharan Africa		South Central Asia		Iran	Nepal	Pakistan	Bangladesh
		World	More developed	Less developed	Least developed	Saharan Africa	South Central Asia	Afghanistan	India						
Population	6,514,751	1,215,636	5,299,115	766,816	769,348	1,645,790	25,067	1,134,403	69,421	27,094	158,081	153,281			
Male (thousands)	3,282,525	590,071	2,692,454	383,599	382,596	847,660	12,985	587,618	35,200	13,427	81,328	78,470			
Female (thousands)	3,232,226	625,565.0	2,606,661	383,217	386,752	798,130	12,082	546,785	34,221	13,667	76,753	74,811			
Sex ratio (males per 100 females)	101.6	94.3	103.3	100.1	98.9	106.2	108.0	107.5	102.9	98.2	106.0	104.9			
Median age	28.0	38.6	25.5	19.0	18.0	23.2	16.4	23.8	23.4	20.1	20.3	22.2			
Population change per year (thousands)	78,361	3,364	74,997	19,316	19,520	26,318	1,064	17,156	971	561	3,054	22,671			
Births per year (000)	136,327	13,538	12,789	29,272	31,792	40,813	1,337	27,077	1,462	800	4,515	3,972			
Deaths per year (000)	57,965	12,687	45,278	9,985	12,068	13,827	552	9,671	391	219	1,178	1,200			
Population growth rate %	1.20	0.28	1.40	2.40	2.40	1.50	3.90	1.50	1.40	2.00	1.80	1.70			
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	20.3	11.1	22.4	35.9	38.9	23.8	48.2	23.0	20.3	28.1	27.2	24.8			
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	8.6	10.4	8.3	12.3	14.8	8.1	19.9	8.2	5.4	7.7	7.1	7.5			
TFR	2.6	1.6	2.8	4.6	5.1	2.9	7.1	2.8	2.0	3.3	3.5	2.8			
Infant mortality (per 1,000 births)	49.4	7.1	54.1	87.9	93.3	58.1	157.0	55.0	30.6	53.9	67.5	52.5			
Life expectancy at birth (both sexes in years)	67.2	76.5	65.4	54.6	50.0	64.5	43.8	64.7	71.0	63.8	65.5	64.1			
Le Male	65.0	72.9	63.7	53.4	49.0	63.1	43.9	63.2	69.4	63.2	65.2	63.2			
Le Female	69.5	80.2	67.2	55.8	50.9	66.1	43.8	66.4	72.6	64.2	65.8	65.0			
Women aged 15–49 (000)	1,680,290	301,038	1,379,252	183,808	180,689	415,104	5,356	283,374	19,850	6,782	38,896	39,175			
Percent	52	48.1	52.9	48.0	46.7	52.0	44.3	51.8	58.0	49.6	50.7	52.4			
Population aged 0–4 (000)	624,071	66,471	557,601	119,974	128,441	186,538	4,656	126,894	6,092	3,611	18,886	18,916			
Percent	9.6	5.5	10.5	15.6	16.7	11.3	18.6	11.2	8.8	13.3	11.9	12.3			
Population aged 0–14 (000)	1,845,020	206,820	1,638,200	318,420	334,020	552,269	11,775	374,144	19,961	10,556	58,736	53,927			
Percent	28.3	17.0	30.9	41.5	43.4	33.6	47.0	33.0	28.8	39.0	37.2	35.2			
Population aged 65+ (000)	477,358	185,644	291,714	24,938	23,784	77,230	555	56,455	3,114	991	6,158	5,413			
Percent	7.3	15.3	5.5	3.3	3.1	4.7	2.2	5.0	4.5	3.7	3.9	3.5			
Age dependency ratio	0.55	0.48	0.57	0.81	0.87	0.62	1.00	0.61	0.50	0.74	0.70	0.60			
Child dependency	0.44	0.25	0.49	0.75	0.81	0.54	0.90	0.53	0.43	0.68	0.63	0.60			
Old age dependency	0.11	0.23	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.00	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.10			
Child Woman ratio	0.37	0.22	0.40	0.65	0.71	0.45	0.90	0.45	0.31	0.53	0.49	0.50			

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects




Fig. 15.2 Age dependency ratio by province, around 2005

Median Age

This variable is commonly used as indicator of the labor force, educational and school needs, fertility awareness, health and socio-economic development. According to the Household Listing, fifty percent (50 %) of the Afghan population is below the age of 15. Compared to other countries in the region, Nepal is 20.1, Pakistan at 20.3, Iran at 23.4, and India at 23.8. Afghanistan’s median age is closest to the aggregate median age of Sub-Saharan Africa (18 years) and that of the broad category “Least Developed Countries” which was 19 years.³⁹ Hence this country is likely to have a youth bulge as seen from the projections and will need socio-economic structures that support that population. See population Pyramids above.

At the provincial level wide variations appear in the median age and the range is from 13.66 years in Uruzgan to 17.19 years in Jowzjan.

³⁹ Report | United Nations Population Division, Economic and Social Affairs | World Population Prospects, 2006 revisions | New York | 2006 | reference publication.

(Recall that Uruzgan also had the highest dependency ratio). Eleven out of 34 provinces (largest provincial group) have a median age between 14 and 15 years: Helmand, Nimroz, Kandahar, Farah, Logar, Kunduz, Paktika, Kunar, Herat, Laghman and Paktiya.⁴⁰ See Fig. 15.3.

Child-Woman Ratio

Unlike the age dependency ratio, this measure looks at the number of children cared for by women as it is an indicator of economic progress and the status of women. In this case consider the size of the group that is under 5 years of age and note that if women are caring for a large numbers of children, they are less likely to pursue education or join a labor force or take care of their overall health; particularly if travel may be involved.

⁴⁰ Report | Central Statistical Office, Kabul and the United Nations Fund for Population activities (UNFPA) | Afghanistan, A Socio-economic and Demographic Profile, Household Listing 2003–2005 | 2007 | reference publication.

Table 15.3 Selected economic indicators Afghanistan, neighboring countries 2002–2016

Country	Subject descriptor	Units	2001	2004	2005	2009	2010	2011	2015	2016	Estimates start after
Afghanistan	GDP, constant prices	Percent change	n/a	1.055	11.176	20.866	8.227	7.067	8.797	9.506	2010
Afghanistan	GDP, current prices	Billions U.S.	n/a	\$5.28	\$6.27	\$12.47	\$15.54	\$17.89	\$25.57	\$28.49	2010
Afghanistan	GDP per capita, current prices	U.S.	n/a	\$213.51	\$244.10	\$425.87	\$514.98	\$575.37	\$730.99	\$790.51	2007
Bangladesh	GDP, constant prices	Percent change	4.834	6.108	6.302	5.91	6.375	6.32	7.052	7.152	2010
Bangladesh	GDP, current prices	Billions U.S.	\$47.19	\$59.12	\$61.13	\$94.87	\$105.56	\$114.97	\$159.47	\$173.82	2010
Bangladesh	GDP per capita, current prices	U.S.	\$329.36	\$392.24	\$399.21	\$584.84	\$641.99	\$689.67	\$905.25	\$973.22	2010
India	GDP, constant prices	Percent change	3.885	7.591	9.033	6.771	10.094	7.839	8.128	8.14	2010
India	GDP, current prices	Billions U.S.	\$487.80	\$688.74	\$808.67	\$1,264.86	\$1,631.97	\$1,843.38	\$2,738.27	\$3,026.91	2010
India	GDP per capita, current prices	U.S.	\$467.24	\$629.99	\$728.53	\$1,077.40	\$1,370.80	\$1,527.35	\$2,152.59	\$2,348.59	2009
Iran	GDP, constant prices	Percent change	3.669	5.084	4.668	3.538	3.244	2.515	4.573	4.581	2010
Iran	GDP, current prices	Billions U.S.	\$115.44	\$161.26	\$188.05	\$362.57	\$407.38	\$475.05	\$588.75	\$629.86	2010
Iran	GDP per capita, current prices	U.S.	\$1,787.36	\$2,359.51	\$2,709.99	\$4,922.86	\$5,449.15	\$6,259.99	\$7,307.75	\$7,702.04	2009
Iraq	GDP, constant prices	Percent change	n/a	n/a	-0.728	4.213	0.844	9.648	8.841	9.805	2010
Iraq	GDP, current prices	Billions U.S.	n/a	\$25.77	\$31.39	\$64.23	\$81.11	\$108.60	\$173.15	\$194.69	2010
Iraq	GDP per capita, current prices	U.S.	n/a	\$950.85	\$1,124.43	\$2,056.48	\$2,531.15	\$3,306.15	\$4,822.52	\$5,316.10	2004
Nepal	GDP, constant prices	Percent change	5.629	4.683	3.479	4.411	4.553	3.484	3.823	3.855	2009
Nepal	GDP, current prices	Billions U.S.	\$5.89	\$7.27	\$8.18	\$12.85	\$15.71	\$18.32	\$28.67	\$31.57	2009
Nepal	GDP per capita, current prices	U.S.	\$235.87	\$273.55	\$304.65	\$460.44	\$557.37	\$643.73	\$969.00	\$1,056.59	2005
Pakistan	GDP, constant prices	Percent change	1.967	7.483	8.958	1.722	3.759	2.56	5	5	2010
Pakistan	GDP, current prices	Billions U.S.	\$72.27	\$98.09	\$109.60	\$161.82	\$176.87	\$204.08	\$283.26	\$303.12	2010
Pakistan	GDP per capita, current prices	U.S.	\$514.88	\$655.48	\$718.52	\$962.18	\$1,029.93	\$1,164.11	\$1,492.14	\$1,566.48	2010




Fig. 15.3 Median age by province around 2005 (Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011): World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision. New York)

Between 2003 and 2005 there were 871 children under 5 years of age per 1,000 women of child-bearing ages (15–49). This one of the highest in the world and by comparison to Nepal, a south-central Asian country with the closest demo-

graphic profile, the child-woman ratio is only 532. Other countries in the area, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Iran all show at least a 50 % lower ratio, 486, 483, 448, and 307 respectively. Interestingly, this ratio is comparable to



Fig. 15.4 Child-woman ratio by province around 2005

some of the poorest and least developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. See Table 15.2.

Provincial variations range from a low of 596 in Nuristan to a high of 1,131 in Uruzgan. The highest levels of fertility are in Zabul, Helmand, Nimroz, Farah, and Uruzgan where the child-woman ratio is between 1,043 and 1,131. A Slightly lower ratio (between 800 and 900) can be found in eight provinces including Kunduz, Logar, Kandahar, Kunar, Badghis, Nangarhar, Herat and Paktiya (Fig. 15.4).⁴¹

⁴¹ Report | Central Statistical Office, Kabul and the United Nations Fund for Population activities (UNFPA) | Afghanistan, A Socio-economic and Demographic Profile, Household Listing 2003–2005 | 2007 | reference publication.

Findings: A Youthful and Growing Country

To recap, these reported data show that the country as a whole and at the provincial level Afghanistan is primarily a very young country (median age), has a very high fertility rate (TFR), a high rate of child dependency (child woman ratio and age dependency). In addition, world bank indicators show a country with low literacy, education and labor force participation. It is not surprising that many NGOs and Afghan government institutions have called for development projects that will help women lower fertility and ultimately reduce the size of the upcoming youth bulge.

While taxpayers are spending 200 billion a year, the USAID Afghanistan Obligations FY

2009 shows that \$93 million USD were used for Health and a similar amount for Education. These amounts reflect 4 % each of the total budget for Afghanistan Obligation and a substantial decline from 2008 (7 and 8 %) respectively.

It is important to provide and invest in projects that the population wants because they will then invest their efforts in the project's success. Supporting projects that have been called for by various Afghan groups, such as those for improvements in health care, expansion and accessibility to women's reproductive health and expanding the locality specific vocational education may lead to better sustainable development. As will be discussed later, such projects may be the way to curb the population growth which in turn may curb the rate of insurgency recruitment as well as state and regional stability (Table 15.4).

Alternatively, Afghanistan will face far greater stability issues in 10–20 years and pose an even greater threat to regional stability. By overlooking long term beneficial programs in favor of short term remedies such as infrastructure developments, we will be magnifying the demands of the inevitable doubling of the population, the corresponding youth bulge coupled with increased immigration to urban areas where employment may be limited.

Slow Sustainable Development

The real question now is, what about the country's demographic future? According to The United Nations constant-fertility projection, if the TFR remains at 6.6, by 2050 the country's population would reach 111 million *and* will be growing at 3.6 % per year, a rate that **would double a population in only 19 years**. Knowing that this is a likely scenario, based on today's measures, policy makers and strategists have a window to devise programs that not only develop the country, but put processes in place to heed the upcoming doubling population and its socio-economic demands.

While the health status of Afghans is still one of the worst in the world, aid and development programs appear to have dramatically improved

conditions.⁴² According to USAID today, 85 % of the population has access to some health care, up from 9 % in 2002. Infant mortality (not childhood) has dropped by 22, and 90 % of children less than 5 years old have been vaccinated for polio since 2002.⁴³ (Low confidence as we have not been able to verify these data) (Table 15.5).

Values, Beliefs and Norms

In 2003, the government of Afghanistan embarked on an ambitious program, the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS), to rebuild the country's shattered health sector and to introduce services to many underserved rural areas where the bulk of the population lives. The delivery of reproductive health services is essential for couples that wish to limit their family size and there appears to have been good progress, judging by contraceptive use rates. Despite the increase, knowledge of contraception remains rather low with only about one in three women saying that they knew of a modern method.^{44,45,46,47}

Not surprisingly, contraceptive use varied greatly with travel time to a health facility. Among women whose travel time was less than

⁴² USAID Afghanistan Obligations: FY 2009 shows that \$93 million USD were used for Health and a similar amount for Education. These amounts reflect 4 % each of the total budget for Afghanistan Obligation and a substantial decline from 2008 (7 and 8 %) respectively.

⁴³ USAID Profile | Asia – Afghanistan | USAID Asia – Countries – Afghanistan | last updated 29 OCT 2009 | <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia/countries/afghanistan> | accessed 2 MAR 2010 | USG Aid Agency fact sheet.

⁴⁴ Survey | UNICEF | United Nations, New York | 2003 Multiple Index Cluster Survey (MICS) | reference publication.

⁴⁵ Survey | Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Washington DC | 2005 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) | reference publication.

⁴⁶ Survey | Afghan Ministry of Health | 2006 Afghanistan Health Survey (AHS) | 2007 | reference publication. The AHS was taken in rural areas only. The provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Nuristan, Uruzgan, and Zabul could not be covered due to the security situation.

⁴⁷ Report | UNICEF | United Nations, New York | 2000 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) and 2003 MICS, 2000 and 2003 | reference publication.

Table 15.4 Basic health comparison, 2010

Basic health indicators	Maternal mortality [per 100,000]	Infant mortality [per 100,000]	Total fertility rate [per woman]
United States	12	7	2
Afghanistan	1,700	152	6.9
Least developed countries	1,000	92	5.2

Source: WHO National Health Accounts (NHA) Country Health Expenditures database, Geneva, World Health Organization, February 2010

2 h (about 60 % of respondents), modern usage was 19.4 %, but among women with 2 h or more travel time, it was 9.1 %. About 75 % of travel to a health center was on foot, reflecting the rural nature of the population and the general lack of motorized transport.^{48,49,50,51}

While geographic local is challenging, cultural norms, beliefs and values also play a role⁵² (Barfield 2010). Afghan women have been and continue to be denied schooling, freedom of movement, and most significantly, denied access to health care. Young girls are married off to older men with little legal recourse, which affects their ability to fully engage in programs. Those in rural areas are also subject to more stringent cultural restraints such as not leaving the home without a male escort.

Impact: Population Growth and Stability

Sixty-eight percent of the population of Afghanistan is under the age of 25. This serves to make adolescents and children a critical policy

⁴⁸ Report | UNICEF | United Nations, New York | 2000 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) and 2003 MICS, 2000 and 2003 | reference publication.

⁴⁹ Survey | Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Washington DC | 2005 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) | reference publication.

⁵⁰ Survey | Afghan Ministry of Health | 2006 Afghanistan Health Survey (AHS) | 2007 | reference publication. The AHS was taken in rural areas only. The provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Nuristan, Uruzgan, and Zabul could not be covered due to the security situation.

⁵¹ Report | UNICEF | United Nations, New York | 2000 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) and 2003 MICS, 2000 and 2003 | reference publication.

⁵² Book | Barfield, T. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2010.

group. Hence, applying gender specific policies to reduce the potential youth bulge and its long term consequences are necessary⁵³ to mitigate the potential for national and regional instability.

The demographic factors that are likely to pose significant challenges to security and development are not population growth, but populations which grow too young or too fast, and become too urbanized making it difficult for governments to maintain stable environments and labor force absorption. As presented earlier, it is the interaction between demographic variables and the social terrain that greatly impact socio-economic development, stability and security.

Insurgency and Religious Schools (Madrasas)

Some academic and scientific studies, that the combination of boredom, frustration, poverty, oppression – youths may be more likely than not to join insurgencies or religious Madrasas.^{54,55,56,57,58} General J.N. Mattis recently indicated that, "...in developing countries where the combination of demographics and economy permits populations to grow, but makes meeting rising expectations difficult...will inflame ethnically or religiously

⁵³ (U) Report | United Nations Development Programme-Afghanistan | National Joint Youth Program 2008 | www.undp.org.af/WhoWeAre/UNDPinAfganistan/projects/dcse/prj_youth.htm | accessed February 2010 | reference publication.

⁵⁴ Article | Jack A. Goldstone | Foreign Affairs | The New Population Bomb | 2010 | p31 |.

⁵⁵ (U) Article | Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam | "The arrested Development of Afghan Women" | in *The Future of Afghanistan* | J. Alexander Thier editor, United States Institute for Peace, Washington, DC | 2009 |

⁵⁶ (U) Article | Jack A. Goldstone | Population and security: "How demographic change can lead to violent conflict" | Columbia Journal of International Affairs | 2002 | No. 56 245–263 | Western scholar with good reliability

⁵⁷ Article | Pebley, A. 2002. "Demography" An entry in the *Encyclopedia of Public Health* (<http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/demography.aspx>)

⁵⁸ Article | Poston, D., and P. Morrison. 2002. "China: Bachelor Bomb." *New York Times*, September 14, 2005 (<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/14/opinion/14iht-edegner.html>)

Read more: <http://www.allgirlsallowed.org/category/topics/gender-imbalance-china#ixzz1hlffwSSR>

Table 15.5 Health expenditures 2000 and 2007 Afghanistan, neighboring countries and the United States

Health expenditure	Member state health expenditure on health as % of GDP		General government expenditure on health as % of total expenditure		General government expenditure on health as % of total expenditure		Per capita total expenditure on health at average exchange rate (US\$)		Per capita total expenditure on health at average exchange rate (US\$)		Per capita total expenditure on health at average exchange rate (US\$)		Per capita total expenditure on health at average exchange rate (US\$)	
	2000	2007	2000	2007	2000	2007	2000	2007	2000	2007	2000	2007	2000	2007
Afghanistan ^a	6.5	7.6	2.9	23.6	9	42	16	83	<1	10	<1	10	<1	20
Bangladesh	2.7	3.4	38	33.6	9	15	22	42	3	5	3	5	8	14
Iraq	1.4	2.5	28.7	75	17	62	37	78	5	46	5	46	11	58
India	4.4	4.1	24.5	26.2	20	40	66	109	5	11	5	11	16	29
Iran	5.9	6.4	37	46.8	290	253	382	689	107	118	107	118	142	322
Nepal	5.1	5.1	24.9	39.7	12	20	43	53	3	8	3	8	11	21
Pakistan	3	2.7	21.3	30	15	23	48	64	3	7	3	7	10	19
United States of America	13.4	15.7	43.2	45.5	4,703	7,285	4,703	7,285	2,032	3,317	2,032	3,317	2,032	3,317

Source: WHO National Health Accounts (NHA) Country health expenditure database. Geneva, World Health Organization, February 2010 (www.who.int/nha/country/). The regional, income and global figures are calculated using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. When the number is smaller than 0.05 % the percentage may appear as zero. For per capita expenditure indicators, this is represented as <1. In countries where the fiscal year begins in July, expenditure data have been allocated to the later calendar year (for example, 2008 data will cover the fiscal year 2007–2008). Absolute values of expenditures are expressed in nominal terms (current prices). National currency unit per US\$ are calculated using the average exchange rates for the year. For 2008, the use of yearly average exchange rates (compared to year-end exchange rates) may not fully represent the impact of the global financial crisis WHO, World Health statistics 2010

GDP gross domestic product

^aGDP includes both licit and illicit GDPs (for example, opium). Government expenditures include external assistance (external budget)

based violent movements.”^{59,60} We believe that the socio-economic and demographic situation in Afghanistan could make this a reality.

Where Can American Tax Money Help? Smaller Families....Better Economic Conditions

Development projects that focus on women and their needs are possibly the best path to stability and eventual female socio-economic integration. As noted earlier, the potential adverse effects of population growth and high birthrates include poor health among women and children, slow economic growth and poverty, overcrowding in schools and clinics and an overburdened infrastructure, as well as the depletion of environmental resources.⁶¹ In addition, high unemployment and inequality among rapidly growing young populations may contribute to the spread of political violence and civil strife.^{62,63}

Many demographers including John Bongaarts and Steve Sinding, have written extensively on the positive correlation between reproductive health, socio-economic development and security. For example these relationships have been established in many developing countries such as Bangladesh, Cuba, Sri-Lanka, and India, Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Morocco and, Tunisia to name a few. All of them had high

birth rates and a rapidly growing population which then led to policies of increased access to reproductive health. Reports indicated that less than 20 years after the policies were established high levels of literacy and female empowerment and low infant mortality along with socio-economic development occurred.⁶⁴

The situation in Afghanistan today is similar to the other developing countries during the 1960s–1980s. Since 2002 prominent Afghan groups have asked “How do we make women’s rights and human rights relevant once more to a population that is largely illiterate and that has known nothing but war and violence for the past two decades” Moreover, “women are learning that smaller families result in better health for themselves and their children, better economic conditions and more chances for their children to be educated”.⁶⁵

Years of war and Taliban rule have taken a toll on women – not only those that live in Afghanistan, but also on those who have fled the wars. Birth control was banned during the reign of the Taliban and maternal death rates are among the highest globally. Moreover, Afghan women who fled to neighboring countries are not fairing much better as the influence of fundamentalists who oppose women’s health care is great in the refugee camps.⁶⁶

Women’s reproductive health is not possible without improving the status of women through economic and political empowerment. At the same time ...empowerment is not possible without access to reproductive health care and the knowledge and means to control the number and spacing of

⁵⁹Manuscript | United States Joint Forces Command | The JOE 2010 Joint Operating Environment | February 2010 | p12 | Comments by General J.N. Mattis good reliability and excellent information.

⁶⁰Article | Elizabeth Leahy, Robert Engelman, Carolyn G. Vogel, Sarah Haddock and Tod Preston | Population Action International |The Shape of Things To Come: Why age structure matters to a safer equitable world. | 2007 | Western scholar with good reliability.

⁶¹Book| Nancy Birdsall and Allen K Sinding | Oxford University Press | Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World | 2001 |.

⁶²Article | Richard Cincotta | Foreign Affairs | How Democracies grow up | March/April 2008 | P 80–82 |.

⁶³Report | National Commission on Terrorist Attacks | The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States | 2004 | USG Report.

⁶⁴For a more detailed discussion see John Boongaarts is vice president and distinguished scholar of the Population Council. Steve W. Sinding is a senior fellow of the Guttmacher Institute.

⁶⁵Calls for change, implementation and financial assistance by internal advocates such as the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission headed by Sima Samar; The Ministry of Women’s Affairs; parliamentary members Shukria Barakzai and Malalai Joya; cabinet member Dr. Sohaila Seddiqi and Habiba Sorabi, Afghanistan’s first-ever female governor Habiba Surabi. Also see 2008 MOA study “Women in Afghanistan”.

⁶⁶Article| The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs | An Agenda for State Building in the Twenty-first Century | | Winter 2006 | pp101–123 | Vol. 30:1 |.

children. For women's health to improve and for women's lives to be saved in Afghanistan, resources and commitments are needed to make it possible for comprehensive reproductive health care and women's empowerment will happen.^{67,68}

International calls for the advancement and education of women have also come from the United Nations and the World Health Organization, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and UNESCO. Additional calls have come from the local organizations such as Afghan Women's Network (AWN), Women for Women (womenforwomen.org); Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) to name a few. All are asking for help encouraging families to make accommodations that lead to more gender equitable outcomes. "Families need to be reassured that the state can provide safe ...environment in which women can be allowed to emerge and operate, without, for instance the threat of public violence".^{69,70,71}

With this, women are then likely to go after their reported goal of smaller families, education and employment without the threat of insulting or taking away the job of male, this is critical

⁶⁷**Simar Samar, Creating an enabling Environment: Successes and Constrains**, Chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). Dr Samar, who is from the minority Hazara ethnic group, has been placed in charge of women's affairs in Afghanistan.

<http://web.unfpa.org/parliamentarians/ipci/ottawa/docs/samar.doc>

⁶⁸ Studies in countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia have systematically shown a statistically significant relationship between educational attainment, a decline in the number of births and women's empowerment.

⁶⁹ Article1 Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam "The arrested Development of Afghan Women" | in The Future of Afghanistan | J. Alexander Thier editor, United States Institute for Peace, Washington, DC | 2009 |.

⁷⁰ For a more detailed list see for example Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam "The arrested Development of Afghan Women" in The Future of Afghanistan, J Alexander Thier editor, United States Institute for Peace, 2009.

⁷¹ Article1 The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs | An Agenda for State Building in the Twenty-first Century | Winter 2006 | pp101-123 | Vol. 30:1 |.

because without a viable and functioning poverty reduction strategy the lives of million of women and girls will not improve.⁷²

Conclusions

This paper suggests that a portion of sustainable development must be allocated for women's reproductive health, academic and locality specific vocational education otherwise Afghanistan will face far greater stability issues and threaten regional stability in 20-30 years than it does now. By omitting/limiting specific long term beneficial education and reproductive health issues in favor of short term structural "fixes" we will be magnifying the already inevitable population growth and its corresponding youth bulge. We stress the importance of this demographic information, which was a factor not taken into account when the U.S. and International organizations intervened in Bosnia that led to heavy costs.

We suggest that development projects should follow the lead of Afghan organizations and apply sustainable development to the advantage of families and women, particularly that of reproductive health and vocational training. While we are not in a position to suggest programs per se, it is reasonable to think of projects that could help. For example, since schools are being built, why not train women in furniture making instead of importing furniture from places like Pakistan.

Improved security is yet another potential benefit from lower fertility. High fertility in many countries of Africa and the Middle East has resulted in very young age structures, with up to half the population younger than 15. The inability of countries to provide adequate educational and employment opportunities is a socially and politically volatile mix, often pro-

⁷² For a more detailed list see for example Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam "The arrested Development of Afghan Women" in The Future of Afghanistan, J Alexander Thier editor, United States Institute for Peace, 2009.

ducing frustrated youth who are potentially susceptible to the appeals of radical political ideologies. Policy makers should keep in mind that a growing population that feeds the pool of illiterate, oppressed and poor is potentially the greatest gift for the Taliban.

Finally, while the Taliban may be “gone” it is their legacy and that of others who seek to oppress women that continues. Focusing on 50 % of the population, the women who are

responsible for bearing and rearing children, will help to keep the door open to having the political power and implementing slow sustainable development.

A cautionary note, while we suggest investment in socio-economic development we are cognizant that money given to anyone may be used for violence. Hence we suggest that funding must be within the parameters of “who gets the money and how is it spent”.

Eyal Bar-Haim and Moshe Semyonov

In this chapter we review major trends that shaped the population composition of Israeli society and its system of ethnic stratification. We focus on the historical circumstances associated with the establishment of the state and the ways through which migration flows to Israel and the absorption of immigrants into society have formed socio-economic disparities between population sub-groups. More specifically, we argue that the flows of immigrants arriving from a wide variety of countries at different periods have created the current system of ethnic stratification in which distinct geo-cultural ethnic groups are differentiated according to their socio-economic attributes.

When doing so we also examine the unique social and economic position of the Arab minority in Israeli society. Israeli Arabs can be viewed as indigenous ethnic minority that has lived in the region for generations mostly as traditional, rural village population. The social and political status of the Arab minority in Israeli society has changed dramatically after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. From a numerical

majority Arabs have become a subordinate ethnic minority in the new state. They are subordinate to the Jewish majority in every aspect of stratification (i.e. politically, socially, economically and culturally). Currently Arabs (the vast majority are Muslims and the rest Christians and Druze) compose about 20 % of the population of Israel.

In the recent decades, a new group of immigrants, non-Jewish global labor migrants (often referred to in Israel as 'foreign workers') has begun arriving in Israel and joining the Israeli labor market. The labor migrants who arrived from a variety of countries (e.g. Romania, Turkey, Thailand, China, Nepal, the Philippines, Latin America and Africa) compose about 10 % of the Israeli labor force. These labor migrants are placed at the bottom of the Israeli stratification system. Most are employed in temporary employment in construction, agriculture, service and in other low-status low-paying menial jobs. The non-Jewish labor migrants are not citizens of Israel. Nor can they become citizens or permanent residents.

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The Israeli Population and Immigration: A General Overview

Israel is a multi-ethnic society inhabited by 7.5 million people. In 2010 the population of Israel included 5,874,300 Jews and 1,600,100 non-Jewish Arabs (also citizens of Israel) (Central Bureau of

Statistics 2011). Currently, about 30 % of the Jewish population of Israel is first generation immigrants and 40 % are second generation immigrants (i.e. sons and daughters of immigrants). The remaining are third-generation (Israeli-born to Israeli-born parents). Indeed, immigration has accounted for more than 40 % of the population growth of the Israeli population (DellaPergola 1998).

Immigration of the Jewish people to Israel had begun at the turn of the twentieth Century and has continued to these very days. The Jewish immigrants have arrived from a wide variety of countries across the globe. Specifically, Jewish immigrants arrived from more than 100 countries; countries that differ dramatically in level of economic development, cultural orientation and political system. For example, while some arrived from highly developed-industrialized countries such as the US, Canada and Germany, France and England others have arrived from traditional less-developed Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East and Central Asia and from Ethiopia in East Africa. Many immigrants arrived from Eastern European countries and from the Former Soviet Union as well as from South-Africa and the Latin American countries.

Every Jew in Israel, thus, is also an American, Iraqi, Romanian, Russian, Yemenite, Iranian, Polish, Moroccan or Ethiopian. In spite the differences in their specific country of origin the Jewish population is usually distinguished by two major ethnic groups: European-Americans (mostly Ashkenazim) and Asian-Africans (mostly Sephardim). The former group is characterized by higher status than the latter in every aspect of social stratification including education, occupation, earnings, wealth and standard of living (Smootha and Kraus 1985; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1986; Semyonov et al. 1996, Semyonov and Lewin Epstein 2011).

Students of Israeli society have repeatedly noted that the Jewish immigration to Israel is unique and substantially different from migration flows to other traditional immigrant societies such as the United States, Canada and Australia. As oppose to the conventional view of economic

migration, the Jewish immigrants are considered a “returning Diaspora” (Amit and Semyonov 2006; Semyonov and Gorodzeisky 2005). That is, Israel is considered to be the ‘homeland’ of the Jewish people and immigrants are treated as returning citizens.¹ Therefore, the state has acknowledged the right of Jewish people to immigrate and reside in Israel through two laws: The Law of Return (1950) and the Law of Nationality. According to these laws, every person of Jewish origin (or having a Jewish relative) has the right not only to immigrate to Israel but also to be granted Israeli citizenship upon arrival. By way of contrast, persons of non-Jewish origin do not have the right to immigrate to Israel or to become a citizen of Israel, even if their ancestors were born in the Israeli state (Carmi and Kneebone 2010).

The state of Israel is highly committed to the successful integration of its Jewish immigrants into society. It supplies the new immigrants with a series of economic benefits and support, including temporary housing, easy terms loans and subsidies for purchasing a home. In addition immigrants are provided with Hebrew lessons and direct transfers of economic support. Furthermore, the state of Israel actively encourages Jewish migration to Israel through public campaigns and diplomatic actions and in some cases (e.g. in the case of Ethiopian Jews during the 80s and the early 90s or during the civil war in Yugoslavia) even sponsors rescue operations in order to bring to Israel Jewish people which consider being in danger and under a threat.

Immigration Flows: Historical View

The Jewish migration to Israel has taken place through a series of flows which started toward the end of the nineteenth century- turn of the twentieth century till these days (Lewin-Epstein et al. 2003; Amit and Semyonov 2006). The first wave

¹ It is important to note in this regard that the Hebrew term for Jewish immigration, “Aliya”, means “going upward” which has positive connotations (Almog 2000).

of Jewish migration took place during the pre-statehood era (till 1948) mostly from Central and East European countries. These early immigrants were part of the Zionist movement. That is, they arrived with a clear ideological mission to establish a home-land state for the Jewish people in Palestine. Subsequently, the early immigrants established the social, political and economic institutions of the pre-state. These pre-state institutions had become later on the foundation of the Israeli state. As a result, when Israel was established the early immigrants of European origin were in an advantageous position to occupy the highest status and most powerful political, economic and social positions in the new state.

Upon its establishment, the state of Israel was faced with a mass of Jewish immigrants (the immigrants that arrived immediately after the establishment of the state were for all practical purposes refugees). During this short period (1948–1952) the Jewish population of Israel grew by almost threefold: from 600,000 persons to almost a million and a half persons. The overwhelming majority of these immigrants were either European Jews who survived the holocaust or refugees from the Muslim countries in the Middle-East and North-Africa. These immigrants came with very little resources and the state had to accommodate their needs in terms of housing, jobs and the provision of food and social services (Ofer 1996; DellaPergola 1998).

In the three following decades, the flow of immigrants to Israel had declined considerably. That is, the rate of immigration between 1953 and 1989 was very moderate and sporadic. During this period immigration flows of Jews to Israel were affected mostly by push factors in countries of origin (e.g. political unrest in South-American countries or South Africa or Muslim revolution in Iran). During these three decades the population of Israel had increased from 2,000,000 to 4,600,000. Immigration had contributed 20 % to the growth of Israeli population (Central Bureau of Statistics 2008).

After the collapse of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) in 1989 Israel was faced with an influx of a new wave of immigrants. Specifically, between

1989 and 1991 about 400,000 immigrants arrived in Israel and by 1995 the population in Israel had increased by 20 %, mainly due to the arrival of another 300,000 immigrants from Russia and the other former Soviet Union republics. About the same time, in 1991, Israel had also actively rescued more than 14,000 Ethiopian Jews. The immigration from Ethiopia continued during that period and about 100,000 Ethiopians Jews arrived in Israel overall.

After 1995, immigration from the former Soviet Union had considerably decreased with only 50,000 immigrants arriving between 1995 and 2006 (Central Bureau of Statistics 2008). Other immigrants arriving in Israel during this era can be divided into two distinct groups: The first group is composed of Jewish immigrants who had arrived mostly from highly developed countries such as the United State, Canada and France motivated mostly by Zionist ideology and religious sentiments (Cohen 2009). The second group is composed of Non-Jewish global labor migrants that had begun arriving in Israel in substantial numbers after the first Intifada (Palestinian uprising in 1987) many as replacement to Arab laborers from the West-Bank and Gaza Strip. They had come from a wide variety of countries including the Philippines, China, Thailand, Turkey, Romania and several African countries. Whereas Filipinos are employed as care takers and in domestic help, Thais are employed mostly as agricultural laborers and Romanians, Turks and Chinese are employed in construction (Eckstein 2007). The labor migrants are not citizens of Israel. Nor can they become citizens or permanent residents. The number of the global migrants in Israel is estimated around 200,000 persons (Bank of Israel 1996) and half of them are estimated to be in the country without legal work permit. Indeed, non-Jewish labor migrants in Israel can be understood within the framework of the global migration phenomenon.²

² Unfortunately we do not have reliable data for this group. Therefore we cannot present valid statistical information on labor migrants.

Socio-economic Disparities Among Jewish Geo-cultural Groups

Although Jews are often distinguished by specific country of origin, they are also often classified into two major ethnic categories (i.e. Sephardim and Ashkenazim). However, in this chapter we divide the Jewish immigrants in Israel into the following five distinct categories (using either specific country of origin or continent of origin): Europeans, North Africans, Asians, Former Soviet Union (Russians), third generation Israeli born Jews and Ethiopians. Each group has unique socioeconomic characteristics that set them apart from the others. The position of each group in society is largely influenced by the characteristics of the specific country (or continent) of origin, time of arrival in Israel and the policy that the Israeli government had implemented to support their integration in society (e.g. Semyonov and Lerenthal 1991). Figure 16.1 demonstrates the percentage of each one of these groups in each of the four major immigration flows that were discussed at the outset of the paper.




Fig. 16.1 Geo-cultural origin groups by immigration flow (in percentages) (*AS* Asian immigrant, *AF* North African immigrant, *EUAM* Europe and American immigrant, *ETH* Ethiopian immigrant, *FSU* Former USSR immigrant)

As can be seen in Fig. 16.1, European Jews were the first to come to Israel. In fact, the overwhelming majority of those arriving before state's independence were originated in Europe. Subsequently, the European immigrants that arrived during the period of mass immigration (immediately after statehood and the war of independence) had more (and better) ties and connections (formal as well as informal) to those holding positions of power and authority in the newly established state as compared to immigrants that arrived from the Muslim countries of the Middle-East and North Africa.

The immigrants from the Asian and North-African countries had no connections in the new country. They came from societies with traditional orientation, with large families and with little economic resources. They also lacked human-capital resources that were needed for integration and success in a society characterized by western-modern orientation (such as Israel). They suffered therefore a-priori from multiple disadvantages. Subsequently, they were highly dependent on the state and state authorities in assimilating to the society. Many of the immigrants from the Asian and North-African countries were directed in disproportional numbers by state agencies to development towns and to rural communities in the periphery of the country. Indeed, part of the socioeconomic disadvantages of the immigrants from North-Africa and Asia as compared to the immigrants from Europe can be attributed to the circumstances associated with their arrival in Israel and their spatial location in the country (Spilerman and Habib 1976; Semyonov 1981). The socioeconomic disadvantages of the immigrants from Asia and North Africa have not vanished over the years; they are still apparent among the third-generation immigrants from the Middle-East and North Africa (Cohen et al 2007; Haberfeld and Cohen 2007).

It is important to note that the socioeconomic disadvantages among North-African immigrants (as compared to the Europeans) are somewhat more pronounced than the disadvantages among immigrants from Asian countries. Although Asian Jews suffered basically from the same

difficulties as the North African Jews in terms of integration policy, many of the Jewish communities in the Asian countries (mostly in Iraq and Iran) were highly educated and presented less traditional orientation than those in the North African countries (Khazzoom 2005). Therefore, while the immigrants from Central Asia and the Middle East faced similar difficulties as the North African Jews, their starting point in terms of human capital was somewhat advantaged. Therefore, Jews from Asian origin were able to attain a better position in the stratification system than of African Jews, although they were unable to entirely close socioeconomic gaps with European Jews.

The Jewish immigrants that arrived in Israel during the decades that followed the period of mass immigration arrived from a variety of countries of origin. Many of the immigrants arrived from highly developed and rich countries in the Americas and Europe as well as from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union; they were characterized by higher levels of formal education and with better professional training than the earlier immigrants. During this period public resources for absorption of immigrants were also abundant. The number of immigrants was relatively small. Consequently, the immigrants that arrived during the three decades that followed the mass immigration had an advantage in assimilating to Israeli society (Raijman and Semyonov 1997). That is, they were able to close socioeconomic disparities with native-born and with early arrivals from Europe much faster than any other group.

The mass immigration of Jews from the (former) Soviet Union had started in 1989 just before of the collapse of the Soviet regime. This group is characterized by high socioeconomic characteristics (especially high education and professional training). Specifically, more than two-third of the immigrants from the former Soviet Union had obtained academic education and professional training or scientific skills. Nevertheless, they faced difficulties and hardships in transforming their human capital resources into occupational status achievement in Israel. These difficulties are associated with the unique circumstances

associated with their arrival in Israel. They came in very large numbers during a short period of time with very little economic resources, exerting substantial pressure on the local economy. Although researchers have observed some occupational and earnings mobility among the Soviet immigrants over the years (Raijman and Semyonov 1997; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2011; Haberfeld et al. 2000) these highly skilled immigrants have not been able to close the earnings gap with early immigrants and native born populations.

Migration of Ethiopian Jews to Israel started in the mid 80s (mostly between 1984 and 1985) through a government organized operation ("Mivzta Moshe") to rescue Ethiopian Jews who were in refugee camps in Sudan. In this operation, about 18,000 Jews were brought to Israel. During the next decade, a similar operation ("Mivzta Shlomo") was conducted to evacuate another 15,000 Jews, this time from refugee camps in Ethiopia (Ojanuga 1993; Baen-Ezer 2002). Although the Israeli government actively brought the Ethiopian immigrant to Israel, their inclusion in the Israeli society is highly problematic. First of all, the Ethiopian Jews came mostly from the rural part of Ethiopia, without relevant skills for living in modern Israel. They had no economic resources and a substantial numbers were illiterate. Moreover, The Ethiopians Jews suffer from institutional discrimination as well as everyday racism (Seeman 1999; Walsh and Tuval-Mashiach 2011; Offer 2007). Subsequently, Ethiopian Jews are placed at the bottom of the Jewish stratification system in Israel, with lower income, lower education and high residential segregation than any other Jewish group. Indeed, a series of studies have consistently revealed difficulties associated with incorporation of the Ethiopian immigrants into Israeli society (Seeman 1999; Offer 2004; Ben-Eliezer 2008) Ethiopian immigrants have not been able to overcome socioeconomic disadvantages in the Israeli society.³

³The sample numbers are too small to include Ethiopians as a distinct category in the analysis.

Arabs: Native Inhabitant

Whereas socio-economic disparities across geo-cultural groups within the Jewish population of Israel are apparent and quite substantial, the most meaningful ethnic split in Israeli society is between Arabs and Jews. Israeli Arabs compose approximately 20 % of the Israeli population. They have been living in the region for generations and should be viewed as an indigenous population. Most of the Arabs in Israel are Muslims (over 80 %) and the remaining are Christians, Druze and other very small minority groups.⁴ Arabs and Jews are highly segregated socially and residentially; they hardly live in the same communities. In fact, there are only seven cities that are defined as ‘mixed communities’ but even in these mixed communities Arabs and Jews do not share the same neighborhoods (e.g. Semyonov and Tyree 1981).

Prior to the establishment of the state of Israel, Arabs constituted the majority of the population in Palestine. Jewish immigration and the war of independence in 1948 had changed the social and political status of the Arab population. From a numerical majority Arabs had become a subordinate minority in every aspect of stratification (culturally, politically, socially and economically). Although they are citizens of the country and can participate in the political system, years of segregation and discrimination had placed them at the bottom of the Israeli system of ethnic stratification in terms of social, economic, political and cultural status.

Notwithstanding the differences between the Arab and the Jewish population, some meaningful differences within the Arab population must be noted. That is, while the Muslim and Druze are characterized by low socioeconomic status (i.e. education, occupations, income and wealth) and are heavily concentrated in village-rural communities, the Christian Arabs (mostly belong to the Greek Orthodox Church and the Eastern

Catholic Church) (Pacini 1998) tend to reside in urban communities. They are less traditional than the Muslims and have access to a better educational (mostly private schooling) system (Okun and Friedlander 2005; AL-Haj 1995). Likewise the Christians are characterized by higher levels of education, occupational status and earnings than Muslims Arabs and Druze (Shavit 1990; Okun and Friedlander 2005).

The Druze minority population has a somewhat a complex position within Israeli society and state. On the one hand, they suffer from socioeconomic disadvantages similar to those experienced by Muslim Arabs. On the other hand, they are entitled to similar privileges that Israeli Jews receive from the state (due to their military service and career opportunities in the Israeli Defense Forces).

In terms of socio-economic attributes, Muslim Arabs and Druze are placed at the bottom of the Israeli ethnic stratification ladder. Christian Arabs, however, can be viewed as ‘middleman minority’ population. They are mostly urban population and their socio-economic characteristics (especially education, occupational status and earnings) are considerably higher than all other Arab groups in Israel (Okun and Friedlander 2005). Yet, Arabs in Israel (when combined into one broad minority group) are characterized by lower socio-economic status than Jews in every aspect of stratification and economic outcomes (Haberfeld and Cohen 2007; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993).

Descriptive Overview

In order to examine differences in socio-economic standing of ethnic groups in Israel we make use of the most recent income survey (2009) released by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) that is available for researchers. The data contain information about 35,500 Israelis (citizens and residents). The respondents are proportionally sampled from a cluster sample of localities (excluding Kibbutzim and Bedouin settlements). The data contain information regarding respondents’ personal earnings, occupation (at the

⁴There are also very small groups (a few hundreds at most) of non-Arabs natives, such as Adygs people and Samaritans.

2-digits classification level), education, gender, place of residence (urban =1) and age (in years).

We measure earnings using monthly income from salary (for people who worked in the time of the survey); Occupational status is measured using the international socio economic index (ISEI)⁵ which is a 100 point scale derived from the International standard classification of occupations. The index was validated for international and for country specific use (Ganzeboom et al. 1992). Education is measured as formal years of schooling. We compare these socio-economic attributes across ethnic groups and by generation in Israel. We distinguish between 10 geo cultural groups based on their ethnic origin and immigrant generation: Asian immigrant (hereafter AS), African immigrant (hereafter AF), Europe and American immigrant (Hereafter EUAM), Former USSR immigrant (FSU), Ethiopian immigrants (ETH)⁶ second generation Asian immigrant (IBAS), second generation African immigrant (IBAF), second generation European or American immigrant (IBEUAM), third generation Israeli Jews (IBIB) and Arabs (AR).

In Table 16.1 we detail the characteristics of the 10 geo-cultural groups. The data clearly reveal the hierarchical order of the Israeli system of ethnic stratification in all aspects. Generally speaking, Jews have higher socio-economic status than Arabs; European Jews are characterized by higher socioeconomic status than the Jewish immigrants from Asian and African countries; and second generation immigrants have attained higher socioeconomic status than the respective first generation immigrants. Finally, men have higher earnings than women regardless of ethnic origin.

⁵The converting of the country specific occupation code into ISEI done with conversion table supplied by the Israeli CBS and a syntax supplied by H.B Ganzeboom (<http://home.fsw.vu.nl/~ganzeboom/pisa/>).

⁶Unfortunately, the CBS does not separate Ethiopians from other African origin Jews in the Income Survey. Therefore, data regarding earnings of Ethiopian immigrants are not available. We present the descriptive findings on Ethiopians (without earnings) for very small sample.

The groups that attained the highest level of formal education are the Europeans (first and second generation) immigrants. Specifically, the average education of IBEUAM and EUAM, respectively, is 15 and 14 years of formal schooling. FSU immigrants have attained an average of 13.7 years of formal education. IBIB have an average of 13.4 years of schooling. The IBAS and IBAF are the Jewish sub-groups with the least amount of formal education among second generation Jewish immigrants (with 13.2 and 13.1 years of schooling respectively). However, their formal education is considerably higher than the respective first generation immigrants. First generation immigrants from Asian (AS) and North Africa (AF) countries are characterized by the lowest level of formal education among the Jewish population of Israel (with average of 10.5 and 10.25 years, respectively). The Arabs have about the similar level of education as the Jewish immigrants from Asia and Africa, with an average of 10.5 years of schooling. The Ethiopians are the group with least formal education in Israel with only 7.6 years of schooling on average.

The ethnic gaps in education are mirrored in the sphere of occupational attainment. That is, European immigrants (whether first or second generation) are placed at the top occupational ladder and the Ethiopians and Arabs at the bottom of the occupational scale. IBEUAM and EUAM have the highest average ISEI score in the Israeli labor market (average of 55.3 and 55.5 status points, respectively). IBIB are ranked fourth in terms of educational attainment; they are ranked third in terms of occupational status (average of 50.8 points). Among Israeli-born Jews IBAS and IBAF have the lowest ISEI with 48.1 and 47.6 status points, respectively. FSU immigrants are characterized by relatively high level of education but by relatively low level of occupational status (45.1 status points). Apparently, due to their recent arrival they still experience difficulties in converting education to occupational status. AS and AF immigrant are characterized by relatively low level of formal education and also by low level of occupational status (ISEI of 43.2 and 44.3 respectively). The occupational attainment of Arabs (43.5 status points) is quite

Table 16.1 Mean values (SD) or per cent of variables by gender, and sub-population group (only salaried workers)

	IBIB	AS	AF	EUAM	IBAS	IBAF	IBEUAM	FSU	ETH	AR
Men										
Education	13.42 (3.58)	11.05 (6.44)	11.03 (7.23)	14.58 (6.44)	13.11 (3.98)	13.12 (3.88)	15.22 (4.38)	13.64 (4.23)	8.28 (10.26)	10.74 (3.49)
Age	28.1 (12.1)	62.98 (14.74)	57.22 (16.53)	57.5 (20.1)	42.73 (12.83)	36.59 (11.74)	45.22 (15.45)	46.6 (19.17)	36.38 (18.2)	36.86 (16.99)
% living in Metropolitan area	59	60	43	62	56	40	66	42	33	34
Occupation (ISEI)	47.68 (18.78)	43.81 (15.18)	42.77 (16.5)	53.12 (18.78)	44.44 (17.12)	44.28 (17.01)	54.02 (17.78)	43.84 (16.51)	35.26 (10.55)	39.9 (14.31)
Income from salary	9,923 (9966.28)	9,278 (8078.58)	9447 (8481.41)	12,465 (10395.52)	10,163 (7162.39)	9,844 (7869.38)	14,819 (12095.71)	8,646 (7297.91)	–	5,865 (3612.66)
N	1,475	267	422	555	851	917	924	1,691	300	1,104
Women										
Education	13.37 (2.74)	9.99 (9.08)	9.46 (5.15)	13.58 (5.08)	13.4 (4.26)	13.12 (2.64)	14.8 (3.73)	13.79 (4.69)	7.06 (7.72)	9.92 (4.69)
Age	28.57 (12.77)	60.62 (16.23)	58.25 (16.39)	58.34 (19.92)	42.62 (13.1)	37.08 (12.04)	45.27 (15.39)	48.88 (19.4)	34.71 (16.47)	37.82 (16.8)
% living in Metropolitan area	60	59	45	66	54	42	67	42	34	34

Metropolitan area												
Occupation (ISEI)	53.48 (14.31)	42.73 (10.44)	45.99 (11.88)	55.91 (14.54)	51.32 (13.47)	50.59 (13.59)	56.48 (13.76)	48.06 (13.94)	38.9 (10.60)	52.24 (14.5)		
Income from salary	5,942 (5350.39)	4,668 (3277.4)	5,505 (4924.94)	7,837 (6053.67)	6,971 (5766.96)	6,159 (4847.58)	8,354 (6835.83)	5,780 (5061.76)	–	4,295 (2442.01)		
N	1,688	353	405	573	976	1,019	999	1,959	292	451		
Total												
Education	13.39 (3.16)	10.45 (8.04)	10.26 (6.29)	14.07 (5.78)	13.26 (4.13)	13.12 (3.28)	15.00 (4.05)	13.72 (4.48)	7.62 (8.98)	10.50 (3.87)		
Age	28.35 (12.46)	61.64 (15.58)	57.72 (16.44)	57.93 (19.99)	42.67 (12.97)	36.85 (11.89)	45.25 (15.41)	47.82 (19.29)	35.48 (17.31)	37.14 (16.92)		
% living in	59	59	44	64	54	41	66	42.00	34	34		
Metropolitan area												
Occupation (ISEI)	50.78 (16.54)	43.20 (12.68)	44.35 (14.41)	54.54 (16.75)	48.12 (15.27)	47.60 (15.3)	55.30 (15.81)	46.10 (15.18)	37.05 (18.93)	43.48 (14.36)		
Income from salary	7799 (7845.75)	6654 (5839.39)	7517 (6961.93)	10115 (8465.15)	8458 (6451.00)	7905 (6454.2)	11461 (9719.83)	7108 (6197.11)	–	5410 (3314.12)		
N	3,163	620	827	1,128	1,827	1,936	1,923	3,650	5,902	1,555		

similar to that of the Jewish immigrants from Asia and North Africa. The group with lowest occupational status is the Ethiopians, with an average of 37 status points.

When comparing the average earnings of each ethnic group, the results are highly similar to those observed for education and occupational status. Europeans enjoy highest level of earnings in Israeli society with EUAM and IBEUAM having higher earnings than any other ethnic groups (10114.74 and 11460.51 NIS, respectively). The IBAS with an average of 8458.5 NIS are ranked below the European groups but above the Israeli born to immigrants from North Africa (IBAF). The IBIB have only slightly lower income (7798.8 NIS) than the other groups born in Israel. This is so, perhaps, because they are much younger than all other sub-groups. The AF have higher earnings than both the FSU and the AS (7516.81 NIS, 7108.45 NIS and 6653.76 NIS, respectively). The Arabs have the lowest earnings with an average of 5409.9 NIS, less than a half of the average earnings of the IBEUAM. Indeed, the data reveal an ethnic system of stratification in which Jews of European origin are placed at top (the most advantageous sub-groups) and Arabs are placed at the bottom (the most disadvantageous ethnic group).

Gender differences in educational attainment exist only for the first generation immigrants (of all origins except for FSU) and among Arabs. First generation immigrant Jewish men of AS, AF, ETH and EUAM origin have an average of about one more year of formal schooling than immigrant Jewish women. Arab men have an average 0.6 more year of schooling than Arab women. Second and third generation Jews have about the same level of formal education for men and women. The ethnic hierarchy in educational attainment that was observed for the total sample (men and women pooled together) remains for each gender group.

Differences in average occupational status between men and women are relatively small, with women having slightly higher occupational status than men (mostly due to the white collar occupations in which women are likely to be employed). However, the hierarchy of geo-cultural

groups on the occupational ladder is the same for men and women. Both men and women of EUAM and IBEUAM origin have attained the highest average ISEI score while ETH men and Women have the lowest ISEI score. The only group that deviates from the hierarchical order observed for the total sample is the group of Arab women. Arab women have relatively high ISEI (52.2 status points) which places them above all first generation immigrant sub-groups and above Arab men. The high occupational status of Arab women can be explained by processes of self-selection and seclusion mechanisms in the Arab society (Semyonov et al 1999). The majority of Arab women in Israel do not participate in the economically active workforce. Therefore, Arab women who integrate in the labor market are highly selective (in terms of educational skills), hence, they hardly represent the entire population of Arab women. Furthermore, due to seclusion mechanisms they are likely to be employed in professional and semi-professional jobs (e.g. teachers, nurses, social workers) that limit interactions with men. Consequently, economically active Arab women enjoy better access to professional positions than men (Semyonov et al 1999).

Earning differences between men and women are consistent with previous research. Women earn about 60–70 % of the earnings of men in all of the geo-cultural groups. The ethnic hierarchy in earnings is the same for men as for women. Earnings of second generation immigrant groups are higher than those of first generation immigrants; average earnings of Europeans (EUAM) are considerably higher than the earnings of AF, AS and FSU; average earnings of Arabs, whether men or women, are lower than those of any Jewish sub-group in Israel.

Occupational Attainment

Although the descriptive data presented in Table 16.1 reveal meaningful differences across ethnic groups in Israel, it does not provide us with an accurate picture of inequality in access to labor market outcomes by ethnicity. The geo-cultural groups in Israel are distinguished by

demographic characteristics such as age, place of residence and mostly by education. In order to provide accurate estimates of the extent to which the ethnic stratification system in Israel is a result of socio-demographic differences across sub-groups or can be attributed to ethnic origin, we estimate a series of regression equations predicting socio-economic outcomes. In each equation we let socioeconomic outcomes (i.e. occupational status and earnings) be a function of ethnic origin plus socio-demographic attributes of individuals. In other words, by controlling for demographic variations among individuals belonging to the different geo-cultural groups, we can estimate the net advantage or net disadvantage of any group origin (on income and occupational status) that is due to ethnic origin.

In the analysis presented in Table 16.2 we estimate the model for the entire sample and for men and women separately. The values of the estimated coefficients for group membership serve as indicators of the size of the net advantage (positive value) or net disadvantage (negative value) that a group had in its occupational attainment in comparison to the IBIB (Israeli born to Israeli born fathers – IBIB – third generation Israeli-born Jews) that serves us as the reference category.

The data presented in Table 16.2 reveal that, regardless of gender, occupational status tends to increase with education, and to be higher among residents of metropolitan areas. It also tends to increase with age. Women have advantage of 4.75 status points over men, other things being equal. The ethnic hierarchy that was revealed by the analysis is similar to the one observed in the descriptive overview. The IBEUAM is the most advantageous group in attainment of occupational status. The net occupational advantage of IBEUAM (in comparison to IBIB) amounts to 1.47 points of occupational status. IBAS and IBAF, however, are disadvantaged in attainment of occupational status as compared to IBIB. Their net occupational disadvantages amount to 3 and 3.3 status points, respectively. Among the first generation immigrants, the EUAM have no significant advantage or disadvantage when compared to the reference group. All other sub-groups

Table 16.2 Coefficients (SE) from linear regression predicting occupational ISEI for salaried workers (men and women)

	Men	Women	Total
Constant	14.21*	25.50*	23.10*
	(1.49)	(1.29)	(1.00)
AS	-3.93*	-10.26*	-7.30*
	(0.99)	(0.75)	(0.62)
AF	-3.36*	-5.15*	-4.26*
	(0.83)	(0.71)	(0.55)
EUAM	1.44	0.00	0.62
	(0.76)	(0.60)	(0.49)
IBAS	-3.54*	-2.92*	-3.29*
	(0.64)	(0.51)	(0.41)
IBAF	-2.97*	-3.00*	-3.00*
	(0.62)	(0.50)	(0.40)
IBEUAM	2.42*	0.63	1.47*
	(0.63)	(0.50)	(0.41)
FSU	-4.69*	-6.19*	-5.53*
	(0.55)	(0.43)	(0.35)
AR	-3.92*	-0.57	-3.56*
	(0.59)	(0.65)	(0.43)
Education	1.43*	1.10*	1.27*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.52*	0.58*	0.49*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Metropolitan area	2.81*	0.97*	1.89*
	(0.33)	(0.27)	(0.21)
Male	–	–	-4.74*
			(0.21)
adj. R ²	0.18	0.18	0.20

*p<0.005

are significantly disadvantaged in attainment of occupational status when compared to IBIB. The net occupational disadvantage of AS and FSU amounts to 7.3 and 5.5 status points and the net disadvantage of Arabs and AF is 3.5 and 4.3 status points, respectively.

The data analysis reveals that disadvantages associated with ethnic origin in attainment of occupational status are quite different for men and women. For men, the most advantageous group in attainment of occupational positions is IBEUAM, with net occupational advantage of 2.42 Status points over IBIB. Other Israeli born Jews are disadvantaged as compared to IBIB by 2.97 and 3.54 status points, respectively, for IBAS and IBAF. Arab men are the most disadvantageous

group in Israeli society. The net disadvantage in attainment of occupational positions of Israeli Arabs amounts to 3.92 status in comparison to IBIB.

For Women, the size of the net advantages (or disadvantages) in attainment of occupational positions due to ethnic origin differs from those observed for men. The data reveal no significant differences in attainment of occupational status between IBIB and IBEUAM, EUAM and Arabs. Israeli born women of either Asian or African origin, however, experience some occupational disadvantage in attainment of occupational status. The net occupational disadvantage of IBAS and IBAF is 2.92 and 3.00 status points, respectively, as compared to IBIB. Among first generation Jewish immigrants, AF women face a net disadvantage of 5.15 status points while the net disadvantage of AS women reaches 10.26 status points. The net disadvantage of recent immigrant women from FSU is considerable as well. It amounts to 6.19 status points on the occupational status scale.

Earnings Outcomes

The second indicator for social economic stratification of ethnic groups in Israel is the distribution of earnings across the geo-cultural subgroups. In Table 16.3, earnings are estimated as a function of education, age, marital status, metropolitan residence, ISEI and a series of dummy variables representing sub-group membership (third generation Israeli born Jews – IBIB – are used as the comparison group). Similar to the analysis of occupational status, the coefficients for group membership serve as indicators of the net advantage (positive sign) or disadvantage (negative sign) that each group has over the comparison group (IBIB). The model is estimated separately for men and women and for the entire sample with control for gender.

The findings presented in Table 16.3 reveal that regardless of gender, income tends to increase with education and with ISEI and that age has curve linear effect on earnings. Individual's earnings tend to increase with age for young people but to decline at older age.

Table 16.3 Coefficients (SE) from linear regression predicting log monthly income for salaried workers (men and women)

	Men	Women	Total
Constant	5.73* (0.08)	4.85* (0.08)	5.09* (0.06)
AS	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.10* (0.03)
AF	-0.11* (0.04)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.10* (0.03)
EUAM	-0.00 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
IBAS	-0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)
IBAF	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)
IBEUAM	0.16* (0.03)	0.11* (0.03)	0.13* (0.02)
FSU	-0.16* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.12* (0.02)
AR	-0.20* (0.03)	-0.24* (0.04)	-0.20* (0.02)
Education	0.03* (0.00)	0.03* (0.00)	0.03* (0.00)
Age	0.11* (0.00)	0.12* (0.00)	0.12* (0.00)
Age 2	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Metropolitan area	0.02 (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.04* (0.01)
Male			0.53* (0.01)
ISEI	0.01* (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)
adj. R ²	0.25	0.23	0.29

*p<0.005

Women who live in metropolitan areas earn significantly more than women who live in peripheral areas. The effect of metropolitan residence, however, is not significant for men.

Other things being equal, the data clearly reveal that immigrants of European origin – IBEUAM – are the most advantageous group in terms of earning (regardless of gender). The net earnings advantage of IBEUAM amounts to 13 % (in comparison to IBIB). Arabs, by contrast, are the most disadvantageous group in terms of earnings. The net disadvantage of Arabs reaches 20 %

(in comparison to IBIB). When variations in social and demographic characteristics across sub-groups are taken into consideration, earnings disparities between Jewish sub-groups are reduced considerably and become insignificant. That is, Israeli-born (second generation) Jewish immigrants of non-European origin are neither advantaged nor disadvantaged in attainment of earnings as compared to IBIB. The lower earnings of AS and AF can be attributed to low education and demographics. However, the disadvantage of Arabs and FSU immigrants cannot be fully attributed to education and demographics. Apparently, these disadvantages are associated with their unique status and circumstances associated with their placement in Israeli society.

It is worth noting that among men, the net earnings disadvantage of AF immigrants and FSU immigrants (compared to IBIB) amounts to 11 and 16 %, respectively. The net earnings disadvantage of Arab men reaches 24 %. Among women, FSU and AR are the only groups with net significant earnings disadvantage. The earnings penalty (as compared to IBIB) among FSU and AR is 7 and 24 %, respectively.

Conclusions

The data presented in this chapter describe and delineate the emergence and creation of the ethnic stratification system in Israeli society. Israel is a country inhabited by Jewish immigrants from a variety of countries and by a native minority of Arabs. The sub-groups differ considerably in their level of formal education, occupational status and earnings. Occupational and income disparities among ethnic and geo-cultural groups and inequality in access to occupational positions and to earnings can provide, thus an accurate description of the ethnic system of stratification in Israeli society.

In this paper we reviewed the main demographic groups and the circumstances associated with their arrival and location in the Israeli stratification system. Variation in absorption policy, differences in human capital, time and seniority in immigration and social connection to the elite

groups in Israel have determined, to a large extent, chances and opportunities of each geo-cultural group in attainment of socio-economic rewards and outcomes, hence, the formation of the Israeli ethnic stratification system.

The data reveal that Jewish immigrant of European origin enjoy better access to social and economic resources; they occupy the highest positions in Israeli society; they are characterized by highest level of formal education; they hold jobs with the highest occupational status; and their average earnings is higher than any other sub-group in Israel. By contrast, Israeli Arabs are placed at the bottom of the stratification system; their average educational level is lower than any Jewish sub-groups (except for the newly arrival immigrants from Ethiopia); their occupational status is lower than any Jewish sub-group; and their average earnings is the lowest in Israeli society. Jews that immigrated from Asia and Africa and their offspring are placed between the European and the Arabs.

The ethnic stratification of Israeli society that had initially emerged following the establishment of Israel has reproduced itself over the years. It prevails not only among first-generation immigrants but also among second-generation immigrants. Although the sons and daughters of the Jewish immigrants have improved the relative socio-economic status (in terms of education, occupational status and earnings) as compared to their parents, disparities between Jews of European and American origin and Jews of Asian and African descent have remained substantial even among second-generation Israelis. Likewise, ethnic disparities between Jews and Arabs have not declined over the years and have remained. Arabs, for all practical purposes, are still placed at the bottom of the Israeli stratification system. Furthermore, when compared to Jews they are disadvantaged in terms of access to socioeconomic opportunities and rewards. Although the education of the Arab population of Israel has risen considerably, they still experience considerable disadvantages in access to high status occupational positions and to lucrative jobs.

The newest major group of immigrant to Israel, those arriving from the former Soviet Union,

has not been able yet to fully convert their human-capital resources into socio-economic success and to close socio-economic disparities with the other Jewish sub-groups. Although most immigrants from the Former Soviet Union are of European origin, hence most belong to the super-ordinate ethnic group in Israel, and although they possess high human capital resources (i.e. education), they still lag behind other Jewish sub-groups in attainment of socio-economic rewards. Apparently, the unique circumstances associated with their mass migration to in Israel have prevented them, thus far, from fully converting their human capital resources into socio-economic success as comparable Jews. Indeed, the data presented in this chapter clearly reveal that more than six decades after the establishment of the state of Israel, ethnicity still plays a major role in the formation of its stratification system. The central role of ethnicity is apparent not only between Jews and Arabs but also within the Jewish population.

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The Politics of Demography: Background¹

Unequal demographic changes in Palestine have both created and continue to reproduce the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – a conflict that has historically revolved around issues of land control, settlement, and depopulation² dating back to the end of the nineteenth century (Masalha 1992; Zureik 2003). The major demographic changes in Palestine could be traced to three racialized processes: the settlement project of the late 1800s, the exclusive state building project of the mid twentieth century, and the colonial system since the late 1960s. The corresponding relationship of supremacy that transpired between European settler and native other, Jewish migrant and native other and Israeli and Palestinian dictated

the demography of Palestine and the differential group migration processes and entitlements.

Since 1882, European Jewish in-migrations to Palestine occurred as part of a secular Zionist nationalist project by European Jewry in response to the sharp rise of anti-semitism in Europe, and as a solution to the “Jewish Question” in Western Europe of how to assimilate the incoming Jewish refugees (Farsoun 1997). The project was carried out at the time in the context of the European colonialist expansion (Rodinson 1973), yet the choice of Palestine was legitimated on the basis of a religious ideology.³ The European settler project resulted in an increase in the size of the Christian and Jewish populations between 1849 and 1914, relative to the majority Muslim population, from 11 % to 16 %, and 4 % to 10 % respectively (Farsoun 1997: 49). Although other religious and ethnic groups migrated to Palestine

¹ Palestine since Roman times referred to the land between Lebanon and Sinai, excluding the east side of the river Jordan (see Hitti 1959).

² For an account of the Palestinian villages depopulated by Israel in 1948 see Walid Khalidi (ed.), *All That Remains* (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1992). The former inhabitants of these villages and their descendants constitute the residents of the refugee camps of the occupied territories and the surrounding countries.

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³ Both European Christian and Jewish immigrants legitimized their settlement in Palestine beginning in the nineteenth century on the basis of religion. Jewish settlement was legitimized by a religious ideology even though the in-migrations were part of the Zionist project which was at its core a secular national project. The European Christians who settled in Palestine since 1868 also used a religious ideology declaring themselves heirs to the Promised land; the most famous of which was the Association of Templars – an offshoot of the German Protestant movement, but their numbers remained minimal (Farsoun 1997: 47).

during the nineteenth century,⁴ Jewish in-migration represented a decisive factor in a demographic shift due to its sheer numbers, and more importantly, its eventual integration into a coherent process of nation-building for Jews to the exclusion of other ethnicities residing in Palestine.

Successive waves of Jewish migrations to Palestine⁵ shifted the population distribution between Jews and non-Jews (Christians and Muslims), and changed the composition of the Jewish population itself making it increasingly of European origin. The first three Jewish migration waves brought migrants from Eastern Europe of mostly Russian origin, the fourth one brought Polish Jews of mostly middle class background, and the fifth wave between 1932 and 1938 corresponded with the rise of Nazism in Europe; Thus leading to European Jews (Ashkenazim) comprising 59 % of the total Jewish population in Palestine by 1916 up from 32 % in 1845 (Farsoun 1997: 57) (see Table 17.1).

The new European Jewish immigrants, unlike the Jewish natives of Palestine, settled in separate quarters in the main cities, and in the coastal plains of Palestine.⁶ They acquired arable land up from 3 % in 1922 to 24 % in 1947 creating economic hardships for Palestinian peasants, whose landlessness turned them into seasonal wage-workers and forced their rural out – migrations to the shantytowns surrounding the coastal cities of Haifa and Jaffa by the 1930s.⁷ In general,

⁴Small number of Muslims migrated to Palestine from lands that were previously under Ottoman rule like Maghrebis from North African areas that were colonized by the French, Bosnians from Yugoslavia escaping Austrian repression, and Circassians from the Russian Caucasus (Smith 1984: 15 in Farsoun 1997: 45)

⁵See Yair Aharoni. *The Israeli Economy: Dreams and Realities* (London: Routledge, 1991), 56.

⁶The Jewish population in urban areas increased from 23,500 to 73,000 between 1882 and 1914, compared to the agricultural areas where their numbers increased from 500 to 11,990 for the same period (see Farsoun 1997: 57, 58).

⁷In general, the new immigrants settled in the urban areas of Palestine as at no point until 1947 did their ratio come close to a fifth of the total farm population in Palestine (Farsoun 1997: 80); Eighty-five percent were concentrated in three major urban centers: Jaffa-TelAviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa (Farsoun 1997: 76).

Table 17.1 Population Distribution in Palestine, 1880–1947

	Arabs		Jews	
	Numbers	%	Numbers	%
1880	300,000	94	24,000	6
1917 ^a	504,000	90	56,000	10
1922	666,000	89	84,000	11
1931	850,000	83	174,096	17
1936	916,000	72	384,078	28
1945–1946	1,242,000	69	608,000	31
1947 ^b	1,300,000	67	640,298	33

Source: *Facts and Figures About the Palestinians* (Washington, DC: Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, 1992), 7 in (Farsoun 1997: 78)

^aBalfour Declaration

^bUN partition

European Jewish settler encroachments on grazing fields and communal agricultural lands in Palestine⁸ were met with early native peasant and bedouin resistance⁹ (Rodinson 1973: 49).

Under Ottoman rule, Palestine was divided into districts (Sanjaks) and incorporated into Greater Syria.¹⁰ After WWI, a British mandate in Palestine¹¹ backed the Zionist national program¹² and facilitated further European Jewish in-migra-

⁸The new immigrants were able to establish agricultural colonies initially in an unsystematic form between 1870 and 1900 where they depended on land purchases with the backing and the direct financial support of wealthy Europeans of the like of French Jewish banker Baron Edmund de Rothschild, and between 1900 and 1914 agricultural land settlement became more systematic with the turning over of the financing of the settlements to the Jewish Colonization Association (ICA) (see Farsoun 1997: 57).

⁹Khalidi (1988: 207–203), Farsoun (1997: 58).

¹⁰The Sanjaks were Gaza, Jerusalem, Nablus, Latrun, and Safad (Smith 2007: 10). In 1900, over 80 % of the Palestinians were Sunni Muslims, and the Christians were about 10 % of the Palestinian population divided between Roman Orthodox and Roman Catholics (McDowall 1998: 4)

¹¹Britain was officially granted in 1922 a mandate over Palestine by the League of Nations – controlled by the colonial powers of the time – to maintain the status quo until a Palestinian future was decided (Farsoun 1997)

¹²Under the Balfour declaration of 1917, the European Zionist leader Lord Rothschild was informed that “His Majesty’s government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people...” (Rodinson 1973: 46; Smith 2007: 73).

tion and settlement.¹³ The first population census under the mandate took place in October of 1922 and estimated the total Palestinian population¹⁴ at 752 thousand; a second census in November 1931 estimated it at 1.03 million; and a demographic survey in 1944 raised the estimate to 1.74 million (PCBS 2009). Between 1917 and 1947, the Jewish population had increased from 10 to 33 % (see Table 17.1).

Uneven economic development policies initiated under the British mandate between 1920 and 1948 created a bimodal economy with a modern Jewish agricultural sector for export (citrus plantations) with access to irrigation, credit and marketing, and a traditional non-Jewish (Palestinian) sector of cereal and olive oil production for the local market.¹⁵ Many of the Jewish immigrants had a human capital advantage over the locals and higher educational levels at the time of their arrival¹⁶ (Tuma et al. 1993).

The population of Palestine in December 1946 stood at 1,972,000 divided between 1,364,000 Palestinians and 608,000 Jews; the latter constituting more than 50 % of the population in only one sub-district (Jaffa-TelAviv) out of the 16 sub-districts of Palestine (Khalidi 1997: 11, 14). However, when a United Nations General Assembly resolution in November 22, 1947 recommended the partition of Palestine, it demarcated 55 % of the landmass as a Jewish province (Farsoun 1997), this represented a 900 % increase

in Jewish land ownership up from 7 % (Khalidi 1997: 11–15). The partition was uneven in terms of the disproportionate territory allocation and in representing a step forward and affirmation of the new migrant minority project – establishing exclusive Jewish sovereignty in Palestine – at the expense of the native majority (Khalidi 1997; Farsoun 1997). Moreover, the partition delineated the frontiers of the Jewish state so as to accommodate 99 % of the Jewish colonies and all Jewish urban and suburban pockets, and in the process engulfed the best and most fertile lands, the citrus producing areas – half of which belonged to the natives – which provided the main export crop of Palestine, the cereal producing areas which were mostly controlled by natives, the major sources of electric supply, control over water supply, lake Tiberias and its fishing industry which was traditionally in Palestinian hands, the main port, the only airport with international connections, and more than half of the 800 Palestinian villages (Fig. 17.1) (see Khalidi 1997: 13–14).

Demographic change in Palestine accelerated after Britain ended its mandate on May 15, 1948, unleashing a major transformation in Palestinian society. The war that erupted ended with the Jewish state incorporating 80 % of Palestine within its borders (Bonds et al. 1981: 79). The Israeli policy to oust non-Jews from its midst left between 133,000 out of the 860,000 Palestinians in the area that became Israel (Smith 2007: 207), and 150,000.¹⁷ Within this context, the destruction and depopulation of 418 Palestinian villages initiated a massive exodus of the indigenous population (Khalidi 1992), who for fear of military attacks were forced to leave their villages and take refuge in parts of Palestine that were still under Arab control (Tamari 1981). About three quarters of a million Palestinians were displaced into the rest of Palestine and a host of Arab countries (Farsoun 1997). The expulsion of the Palestinians followed by the prevention of their

¹³ According to Rodinson (1973: 45) “The Europeanism of the Zionists made it possible for them to present their plan as part of the same movement of European expansion... Hence, the many statements pointing out that it was in the general interest of Europe or civilization (which amounted to the same thing), or in the particular interest of this or that power, to support the Zionist movement.”

¹⁴ All persons born or naturalized in British Palestine were given British (Palestine) passports and were considered legally British (see Shiblak 2008).

¹⁵ Britain gave monopolistic concessions to Jewish settlers including rights to use waters (Auja) and rights over the supply of electric power throughout Palestine (see Farsoun 1997).

¹⁶ Eighty-five thousand immigrants (mostly Polish) of the fourth migration wave between 1924 and 1931 were of middle class background. See *A Survey of Palestine*, Chapter 7, 187–203.

¹⁷ See Ghanem, A. (2001: 1). *The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel: 1948–2001*. New York: State University of New York Press.




Fig. 17.1 Ethnic Distribution of Population, Palestine, 1946 (Source: Khalidi, Walid, *The Institute for Palestine Studies*, 1992, xxviii)

return allowed Israel to achieve a majority Jewish population within its borders, otherwise its population would have been 50 % non-Jewish (Fig. 17.2) (Zureik 2003: 620) (Table 17.2).

Concurrently, the remainder of Palestine was divided between an Egyptian rule – trusteeship – over a reduced southwestern coastal area of Palestine known as Gaza, and a Jordanian control (annexation in 1950) of a reduced area of central Palestine known as the West Bank (including the old city of Jerusalem or East Jerusalem).¹⁸ Both the war of 1948 and the two regimes governing Gaza and Egypt from 1948 to 1967 had a lasting impact on the populations and the economic structures of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Khawaja 2000: 331). The influx of refugees more than doubled Gaza’s population of 80 thousand, and added to the West Bank between 350,000 and 400,000 thousand refugees.¹⁹ As a consequence, the West Bank population under the Jordanian administration was estimated at 667 thousand in the 1952 census and 805 thousand in the 1962 census (PCBS 2009).

After the June war of 1967 Israel occupied the territories of the West Bank,²⁰ the Gaza Strip,²¹ and East Jerusalem – thereafter referred to as Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) (PCBS 1995). The Israeli occupation unleashed a third stage of demographic transformation in

Palestine when the inhabitants of the occupied territories became subjects to its rule (Shafir and Peled 2002: 19), differentiated from other Third World colonial subjects only in having lagged behind.²² Palestinians experience Israeli policies of land confiscation and settlement in the areas captured in 1967 not as mere settlement of newcomers amidst the natives but as colonization that encompasses surrounding the natives and laying siege to the land.²³ Israeli historians often hesitate to compare early Zionism with colonialism, but are more willing to apply the comparison to the period of Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories.²⁴ Israeli historians who invoked the difference between the colonial project and the Zionist project in the territories arguing that the latter has been totally focused on the dispossession of the natives, theorize that the Israeli project in the territories has been a nationalist project that nonetheless applies colonialist methods to achieve its goal.²⁵

To control the natives, Israel reassigned the Palestinian inhabitants of the OPT as foreign residents along a hierarchical continuum differentiated by color-coded identity cards depending on their residence in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza.²⁶ Moreover, the Israeli occupation, in the process of ensuring Jewish sovereignty, controlled the economic development of the territories, retarding and reversing whatever

¹⁸ Between 1950–1967, Jerusalem was the spiritual capital of Jordan and Amman was the capital and the place of residence of King Hussein of Jordan. See Jahshan, Ghattas, and Maheeba Jahshan. *Guide to the West Bank of Jordan*. 3rd Edition. Jerusalem: Franciscan Press. (undated)

¹⁹ PCBS (2009); Different figures are given by different authors: 365,000 in Abu Lughod (1987: 3); 350,000 in Farsoun (1997). 360,000 in Sayigh (1979: 65). For a discussion of Palestinian refugees in Gaza see Hammami, Rema. “Between Heaven and Earth: Transformations in Religiosity and Labor among Southern Palestinian Peasant and Refugee Women, 1920–1993.” Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, 1994.

²⁰ The area of the West Bank is listed as approximately 22,770 square miles in (1994: 269, 271); as 3,629 square miles in the Atlas of the Middle East and Northern Africa (Hammond 2006: 27)

²¹ The area of Gaza is listed as 140 square miles in Roy (1994: 14), and as 224 square miles in the Atlas of the Middle East and Northern Africa (Hammond 2006: 27)

²² See for example Taraki (2006). *Living Palestine: Family Survival, Resistance, and Mobility under Occupation*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press; Bamyeh, Muhammad. (2003) Listening to the Inaudible. *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102 (4), 825–849; Khalidi (1997). *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*. New York: Columbia University Press, 21.

²³ See Fanon (1989). *Studies in a Dying Colonialism*. London: Earthscan. P. 51.

²⁴ Pappé (2008) Zionism as Colonialism: A Comparative View of Diluted Colonialism in Asia and Africa. *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 107, p. 631.

²⁵ See Pappé (2008).

²⁶ Bornstein, A. (2002) *Crossing the Green Line between the West Bank and Israel*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 2.




Fig. 17.2 Areas Conquered by Israel Beyond 1947 UN Partition Plan (Source: R. Owendale, *The Longman Companion to the Middle East Since 1914* (London:

Longman Group, 1992), 355. In Samih Farsoun, *Palestine and the Palestinians* (Boulder, Oxford: West View Press 1997), 115)

Table 17.2 Palestinian Refugees

Field of operations	Official camps	Registered refugees in camps	Registered refugees
Jordan	10	350,899	1,999,466
Lebanon	12	227,718	455,373
Syria	9	149,822	495,970
West Bank	19	206,123	848,494
Gaza Strip	8	518,147	1,167,361
Agency total	58	1,452,709	4,966,664

January 2011. UNRWA Statistics about Palestinian Refugees. <http://www.unrwa.org>

development existed prior to 1967.²⁷ The Israeli military governor and the military orders were not limited to the political administration of the territories for the former could deny industrial licenses and block economic initiatives²⁸ and the latter were used to approve applications of all sorts by Palestinians²⁹ and to control agriculture.³⁰ Eventually, the Palestinian economy got integrated – albeit in a subordinate manner – into Israel (Ryan 1974), through the labor and commodity markets (Van Arkadie 1977: 108) irrespective if, as is often argued, the Israeli conqueror was never interested in revenues but in vacant land on which to settle its own people (Benevenisti 1984: 34). The peace process and the institution of the Palestinian Authority in the territories in the mid 1990s was accompanied by a reorganization of the occupation system³¹

²⁷Sara Roy uses the term “De-Development” to describe how Israel blocked development in Gaza guided by Israel’s concerns with Jewish sovereignty and the military force needed to back it up (Roy 1994: 6, 2001).

²⁸Samara, Adel (1992). *Industrialization in the West Bank: A Marxist Socio-Economic Analysis*. Jerusalem: Al Mashriq, p. 58.

²⁹Out of 1,950 Israeli military orders issued until mid-1984, 935 orders dealt with customs, industry and crafts, commerce, land, water, and taxation amongst other areas (Samara 1992: 106, 107).

³⁰See for example Uri Ur-Alouf, Order No. 1015: Order Regarding Monitoring the Planting of Fruitful Trees, Israeli Defense Forces, August 27, 1982, 1–3.

³¹The West Bank, for example, got partitioned into Area A (full Palestinian civil jurisdiction and internal security), Area B (full Palestinian civil jurisdiction, joint Israeli-Palestinian internal security), and Area C (Israeli civil and overall security control). (see Dictionary of Palestinian Political Terms, Jerusalem: PASSIA, April 2004) By March 2000, Israel retained control over 59 % of the West

allowing for the control of the OPT inhabitants through different means³² as all the roads to enter and exit the cities and towns in the autonomous areas were controlled by the Israeli state and the military who monitored all mobility of people and commercial traffic within Gaza and the West Bank, as well as between them.

Demography, Race, and Exclusive Nation Building

Demographic change since 1948 centered around two inter-related yet contradictory processes: the steady concentration of Jewish immigrant presence accompanied by the dispersal and marginalization of the indigenous Palestinians population, who until 1948 constituted the majority of the population (Khalidi 1992: xxxi).

The vast majority of the Jewish immigrants³³ after the establishment of the Israeli state arrived from the Middle East and North Africa. These were the Arab Jews (people of Jewish faith historically linked to the Arab Muslim world) who came to be referred to as Mizrahim (literally “Easterners” or “Orientals”)³⁴ in Israel. Between

Bank, and given that part of the areas under Palestinian control (about 23.8 % of the West Bank) was subject to Israeli security control resulted in actual Israeli control of over 83 % of the West Bank, and 20 % of the Gaza Strip (Roy 1994: 340). By 2002 the West Bank got divided into eight cantons requiring permits from Israel for movement in and out of them (Hammami and Tamari 2006: 266, 267)

³²Danny Rubinstein, “Continued Rule by Other Means,” Daily Selection in *Ha’aretz Daily*, June 30, 1997. (Internet edition: ha’aretz.co.il)

³³The origin of the Jewish immigrants to Israel until the early 1990s was mainly from the Soviet Union, Romania, Morocco, Poland, Iraq, and Iran. Colbert, Held C. *Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 257.

³⁴The term “Mizrahim” emerged as an umbrella identity out of the massive encounter between Jews from varied regions from Maghreb to Yemen, and it replaced the term Sephardim (literally referring to those of Spanish origin) which was used oppositionally until the 1980s but still privileged the links to Europe; Mizrahim “began to be used only in the early 1990s by leftist non-Ashkenazi activists who saw the previous term such as *anei edot hamizrah* (“descendants of the oriental ethnicities”) as condescending; non-European Jews were posited as “ethnicities,” in contradistinction to the unmarked norm of

1948 and 1953, close to 718,000 new Jewish immigrants arrived doubling the Jewish population, and were settled in the north and the south of Israel where they were provided with low-cost or free housing in development towns to encourage the textiles and food industries to locate there and use their labor.³⁵ Shohat (1999: 9–11) argues that “creating a Jewish national homeland required along with the purchase and expropriation of Arab land, the creation of a de facto Jewish population on the land whence the need for Mizrahim,” who were seen as cheap labor that had to be brought to Palestine, and included, at least in later stages, in Zionism’s national project albeit in a subordinate position at the same time that the Palestinians were constructed as an enemy that had to be expelled. The northern and southern parts of Israel were already inhabited by the Palestinians who did not flee during the war of 1948 the area that was incorporated into the state of Israel. The settlement of the Mizrahi immigrants in the Arab populated periphery in Israel reflected not only the plan to outnumber the Arab populations in all areas in Israel and create a Jewish majority, but also the construction of a racial hierarchical order within Israeli society.³⁶

Once in Israel, the Mizrahis were urged by official Israeli/Zionist policy – that posits Arabness and Jewishness as irreconcilable opposites – to reject the Arab part of their identity, even though the Mizrahis had closer cultural and historical links to the East and the Arabs than to the West

and the Ashkenazi Jews who descended on Palestine from Europe, and to see Judaism and Zionism as synonyms in order to share nationhood under the banner of “one people” reunited in their ancient homeland (Shohat 1999: 5–8). Although the Arab-Jews might have welcomed the migration to Israel as an improvement over their status as a minority in the Arab world (Shohat 1999), their migration process varied from European Jews, and their secondary position within Israel raised questions about issues of identity and the simplistic understanding of the Jewish nation, let alone Israel, as a homogenous entity.

Nonetheless, the Israeli state that transpired in 1948 defined itself as belonging to the Jewish nation – both inside and outside its borders to the exclusion of others and did not recognize a secular Israeli nationality.³⁷ As the state endorsed the right of any Jew – regardless of place of origin – to unrestricted immigration and automatic citizenship, it nullified the rights of the non-Jewish population – displaced in the process of its establishment – to return to their homes (Shiblak 2008).

The globalization process of the 1990s led to a large influx of Soviet Jews into Israel (Bank of Israel 1991; Shafir and Peled 2002). In 2010, 24,500 immigrants arrived in Israel, 65,000 of whom were immigrating citizens.³⁸ By 2011, the population of Israel was 7,746,000 – compared to 806,000 in 1948: 75.3 % Jewish,³⁹ 20.5 % Arab,

“Ashkenaziness” or Euro-Israeli “Sabraness,” defined simply as Israeli” (Shohat 1999: 13); the term references more than just origin as it evokes the specific experiences of non-Ashkenazi Jews in Israel. Shohat (1999: 14) argues that the term “Mizrahim” “condenses a number of connotations: it celebrates the Jewish past in the Eastern world, it affirms the pan-Oriental communities developed in Israel itself; and it invokes a future of revived cohabitation with the Arab Muslim East.”

³⁵Paul Rivlin. *The Israeli Economy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 23. More than 121,000 of the 130,000 Jews in Iraq, and 44,000 of the 45,000 Jews in Yemen were flown in. Colbert Held (1994: 255,256).

³⁶The phenotypical similarities between Mizrahis and Palestinian Arabs at times led to Mizrahis being mistaken for Palestinians and arrested or beaten. (Shohat 1999: 16)

³⁷The nationality designation in the personal identity cards in Israel were based on religious categories (Jew, Muslim, Christian, and Druze), and following a law approved in the Israeli parliament (Knesset) in 2002 the interior ministry developed around 132 national designations for the identity cards including Jew, Arab, and Druze, thus lumping Christians and Muslims in the state under the category “Arab” while still not acknowledging a secular “Israeli nationality” (Zureik 2003: 627).

³⁸Person born to Israeli citizen while staying abroad, who entered Israel with the intention of settling. From 13 months prior to May 2011 the population grew by 2 % (Linger 2011).

³⁹Within Israel, the Israeli born Jewish population has increased to 70 % compared with 35 % in 1948 (Linger 2011)

and 4.2 % immigrants and their offspring who are not registered as Jews.⁴⁰

The judicial system in Israel legitimized the privileging of Jewish ethnicity in immigration and naturalization, employment, and access to land with some 30 laws (Cook 2010); including the Israeli Citizenship law, and the Law of Return enacted in 1950 whereby Jewish immigrants become Israeli citizens upon arrival (Shafir and Peled 2002: 18) thus endorsing the right of any Jew – regardless of place of origin – to unrestricted immigration and automatic citizenship (Shiblak 2008). Guaranteeing the Jewishness of the Israeli state translated into a preoccupation with securing the demographic dominance of the Jewish over the non-Jewish populations, and dictated that successive Israeli governments initiate policies that increase the number of Jewish immigrants while simultaneously contain and/or reduce the number of Palestinian non-Jews (Dakwar 2007: 63; Shiblak 2008; Zureik 2003: 619–620). Hyper-concern with demographic dominance increased during periods of falling Jewish in-migration rates, falling Jewish birth-rates, and rising Palestinian birth-rates and made the extreme idea of the “transfer” of whole non-Jewish Palestinian populations as a solution more appealing (Zureik 2003), an idea that actually has been integral to both the Zionist discourse and project prior to the establishment of the Israeli state (Masalha 1992).

The preferential ethnic entitlements created and reproduced political, social, and economic hardships for the non-Jewish citizens of the state who were relegated because of their status as Palestinian natives-whom the 1948 borders of the Israeli state surrounded and eventually transformed into Israel’s indigenous so called Arab minority – to the bottom of the social structure within Israel, despite their Israeli citizenship status, as third class citizens after the Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Israelis, and restricted in their entitlement to land.⁴¹ They constituted 20 % of the population

of Israel, 50 % of the Israeli families below the poverty line, and two thirds of the Israeli children suffering from malnutrition in 2010, and talks of stripping away their citizenship remain alive into the twenty-first century (see Pappé 2011: 6–7). Although some writers theorize the situation of Israel’s native non-Jewish minority as one of ethnic inequalities between groups within a democratic state (Smootha 1997), others see the need for a more historical account that grasps the structure that reproduces the inequalities and deem the concept of “internal colonialism” as more useful (Zureik 1979). However, there is a need for a theoretical framework that advances an analysis of the racialized Israeli state in the context of a racialized world system.

The exclusive Jewish identity of the Israeli state has long influenced its position regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its discourse of security and survival, and thus frames the conflict in demographic terms, and feeds population counting and demographic debates in Israel (see Zureik 2003: 621). Consequently, Israel objects to the return of Palestinian refugees, and rejects any solution to the conflict that does not guarantee that Israel absorbs the most land with the least number of non-Jews in the final settlement (Zureik 2003). There are deep repercussions for democracy and human rights when implementing policies that favor the dominance of one population over another. The exclusive nature of the Israeli state politicizes demography and situates demography above democracy, and permits Israeli state policies to incorporate declarations like the one by Shlomo Gazit, (a retired army general and first military governor and coordinator of Israeli government activities for the occupied territories) who argued that there are times when democracy has to be subordinated to demography (Galili 2002; Zureik 2003). Such positions also shape Israeli policies towards the

⁴⁰Linger, Aviad. 2011. Press Release. Central Bureau of Statistics. State of Israel, May 8.

⁴¹ See Shafir and Peled. “The Frontiers Within: Palestinians as Third Class Citizens” in *Being Israeli: The Dynamics*

of Multiple Citizenship (Cambridge; UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 110–136. For a discussion of how Israeli law is used to restrict access to land by Israeli Palestinians see Abu Hussain and McKay, *Access Denied: Palestinian Land Rights in Israel* (London; New York: Zed Books, 2001).

OPT, its demography and in the process exacerbates the conflict.

The Politics of Demography in the OPT

When the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation began in 1987, Israel had conducted only one census for the OPT in 1967, whereas two additional censuses in 1972, and 1983 were conducted for Israel (Central Bureau of Statistics 1987). Thereafter, Israeli figures for Palestinian deaths and births in the territories were estimated using parallel figures from inside Israel and the neighboring Arab countries. Accordingly, in September of 1967, the Palestinian population was counted as 599 thousand in the West Bank and approximately 400 thousand in the Gaza Strip. By 1987, the Palestinian population in the West Bank was estimated to have increased to 858,000 (CBS 1987: 27). Come the early 1990s, more OPT Palestinians resided in the West Bank (60 %) compared to Gaza (30 %), and East Jerusalem (10 %).⁴²

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) that was established after the arrival of the Palestinian Authority and the signing of the Oslo peace agreement in 1994 conducted its first census of the Palestinian population of the OPT in 1997, followed by a second census in 2007. One of the main issues complicating OPT Palestinian population counting is the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and the expansion of its border.⁴³ Although the PCBS uses the term “Palestinian Territories” to account for the territories of the West Bank including East Jerusalem,

and the Gaza Strip, its’ census does not always include the part of Jerusalem which was annexed by Israel. According to the first PCBS census in 1997 the population of the West Bank (excluding the annexed part of East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip was 2.6 million, and only an estimate of the Palestinian population in annexed East Jerusalem could be provided – estimated at 210,000 –, for the Israeli occupation prevented their national census team from surveying the population there (PCBS 2009: 16). In general though, the West Bank figures usually include annexed East Jerusalem. The PCBS provides data for governorates – Jerusalem being one of 16 governorates of the Palestinian territories. According to a 2003 PCBS survey, the population of the Jerusalem governorate was estimated at 394,105 persons, of which 249,270 resided in the annexed part of East Jerusalem and 144,835 in the rest of East Jerusalem. In comparative terms, the population in the Jerusalem governorate constituted 17.1 % of the population in the West Bank, and 10.8 % of the total population in the Palestinian Territories in 2003. Moreover, the survey estimated the total refugee population in the Jerusalem governorate at 30.0 %: 24.1 % in the annexed part against 40.3 % in the rest of the Jerusalem governorate. As for the sex ratio in the Jerusalem governorate, it stood at 102.1 males per hundred females, the figure being 100.5 for annexed East Jerusalem and 105.0 for the rest of the Jerusalem governorate. The corresponding figure for the Palestinian Territory is 102.3, 102.5 for the West Bank and 102.0 for Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian population of the OPT in 2007 was estimated at 4,016,416: 2,350,583 in the West Bank and 1,499,369 in the Gaza Strip.⁴⁴ It also was more male than female in both the 1997 and 2007 censuses. Its sex ratio at birth for 2007 was 103.1 (1,911,955 males & 1,855,171 females), and its annual growth rate was 2.6 % for the period between the two censuses of 1997 and 2007. By the end of the year 2010, it was approximately 4.1 million (Table 17.3).

⁴² Salim Tamari, “The Transformation of Palestinian Society,” in Mariane Heiberg and Geir Ovensen, *Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank, and East Jerusalem: A Survey of Living Conditions* (Oslo: FAFO, 1993, 1994) 24.

⁴³ Israeli 1980 Basic Law (Jerusalem, Capital of Israel) annexed Jerusalem as Israel’s “complete and united” capital and modified the city’s municipal borders. The UNSC Resolution 478 does not recognize the 1980 law. The European Union as well did not recognize any changes to the pre-1967 border. EU Heads of Mission, Jerusalem Report 2010, p. 2.

⁴⁴ See PCBS, Population, Housing and Establishment Census 1997, and 2007; Population by Sex, PCBS, 2009: 57. <http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/pcbs>

Table 17.3 Estimated population in the Palestinian Territory by region and sex (2010)

Region	Male population	Female population	Total population
Palestinian Territory	2,085,996	2,022,635	4,108,631
West Bank	1,293,146	1,253,579	2,546,725
Gaza	792,850	769,056	1,561,906

Source: Palestine in Figures: 2010. PCBS, May 2011, 10

Israel usually provides statistics for the population of the Jerusalem district as well, but its Jerusalem district classification varies from the Jerusalem governorate classification for it includes annexed East Jerusalem along with West Jerusalem (the part of Jerusalem that was incorporated within the border of the Israeli state in 1948). The district gets classified as a Jewish locality listing a large Jewish majority and a considerable Arab minority of Muslims and Christians (CBS 2010). Both Jewish citizens and non-Jewish natives of annexed East Jerusalem considered by Israel as permanent residents have been included in the Israeli census since 1967, while Israeli citizen settlers of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been included since 1972, in estimates of the total population of Israel which numbered 7,746,000 in 2011.⁴⁵ Then, East Jerusalem residents were estimated at 70,900 in 1967 (CBS 2010), up to over 140,000 Palestinian residents in the city by 1990 (Colbert 1994: 269).

According to Israeli statistics, by the end of 2009, the total Jerusalem district population in thousands was 924.1, including, 622.5 Jews and 285.5 Arabs; Of the Arab population, 273.8 were Muslims, and 15.1 Christians; and of the Christians 11.6 were Christian Arabs (CBS 2010: 92–93).

⁴⁵Statistical Abstract of Israel estimates are based on the December 2008 population census survey. The population of Israel estimates include permanent residents who live in the area of the state of Israel, and Judea and Samaria (West Bank) and who are either Israeli citizens or permanent residents without Israeli citizenship—including those who have been out of the country for less than a year at the time of the estimate. Their number at end of 1967 was 70,900. In 1972, Judea and Samaria (West Bank), and the Gaza Strip were added. Since 2008 tourists, temporary visitors for more than one year, and foreign workers staying for more than one year were no longer included in the Israeli estimates (see Population, CBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2010)

Refugee status and refugee camp residence have been differentiating features of the West Bank and the Gaza strip population. A survey of living conditions in the territories in the mid-1990s revealed that two thirds of the Gazan population and one fourth of the West Bank population were registered as refugees, and one third of Gazans and one tenth of the West Bank population resided in refugee camps.⁴⁶ In other words, two out of three Gazans and one out of four West Bankers were refugees in the 1990s.⁴⁷ In 2007, 42.6 % of the OPT inhabitants were registered as refugees in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, 1.1 % were non-registered refugees, and 55 % was non-refugee (PCBS 2009).


The Gaza Strip is characterized by a stifling population density, where the population is squeezed into a tiny strip of land, more than half of which lives in the northern part in the greater Gaza city, and the rest reside in a dozen villages and eight refugee camps, and in the West Bank the population is distributed in nine medium sized urban centers and 430 villages.⁴⁸ Even

⁴⁶Salim Tamari, “The Transformation of Palestinian Society,” in Mariane Heiberg and Geir Ovensen, *Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank, and East Jerusalem: A Survey of Living Conditions* (Oslo: FAFO, 1993) 23, 24. By 1993, the population was 830,000 people, 99 % of whom are Sunni Muslims. 70 % (583,000) of Gazans are refugees of the 1948 war and their descendents, and according to UNRWA figures for 1992, over half of the refugees live in camps (Roy 1994: 15).

⁴⁷Hasan Abu Libdeh et al., “Population Characteristics and Trends” in Mariane Heiberg and Geir Ovensen, *Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank, and East Jerusalem: A Survey of Living Conditions* (Oslo: FAFO, 1993), 41.

⁴⁸Hasan Abu Libdeh et al., “Population Characteristics and Trends” in Mariane Heiberg and Geir Ovensen, *Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank, and East*

Table 17.4 Settler Population in the OPT including East Jerusalem in thousands. (Source: Hever 2010, 60)



though Gaza refugee camp dwellers have smaller households than non-refugees and than refugees living outside the camp, they live in crowded quarters with more than three persons per room.⁴⁹ Poverty levels are higher in Gaza, and the refugees living in the camps are the worst off compared to any other group either in the West Bank or Gaza in terms of employment.⁵⁰ The differentiating features of the two regions continue to influence the opportunities and obstacles that Palestinians face with significant consequences for Palestinian social life.

A 1992 survey of the territories estimated the average household size in Gaza at 8.9, the West Bank at 7, and East Jerusalem at 5.7.⁵¹ The mean household size in the OPT excluding East Jerusalem in 1995 was 7.06, and higher in Gaza at 7.81 than the West Bank at 6.7 (PCBS 1997: 31).

The West Bank and the Gaza strip witnessed a substantial increase in their populations despite a sustained emigration and the rate of natural population growth rose from 2.2 % in 1968 to nearly 5 % by 1993 (PBS 1994) due in large part to the rise in birth rate since the onset of the Palestinian uprising in 1987, mainly in Gaza (Khawaja 2000: 333, 334). An increase in the proportion of women married at younger ages during the uprising par-

tially explains the temporary rise in fertility given that all birth in the territory occurs within marriage (Khawaja 2000: 335). Overall, fertility declined faster in the West Bank than in Gaza (Khawaja 2000: 334) but it still remained high in both, and higher in Gaza than the West Bank.

The OPT demography is largely influenced by the establishment of Jewish settlements and the increase in the Jewish settler population since 1967 (see table 17.4). The average increase in the settler population in the West Bank between 1968 and 1978 was 770 per year and at peak was 2,300 per year and between 1977 and 1988 the average annual increase was 5,960 with a peak during 1984 reaching 16,646 settlers that year (CBS 1987: 32). However, information on the municipal boundaries and the jurisdiction of the settlements have not been available from the Israeli government until 2005, when they were released following a petition by the Associations for Civil Rights in Israel, whereas information on the settlers in East Jerusalem are not easily available as even the non-governmental Israeli organizations that survey the size of the settlements adopt the Israeli perspective that East Jerusalem is annexed and that settlement there is legal irrespective of international law (Hever 2010: 57, 59).

Data on the demography of East Jerusalem varies between Israeli and Palestinian figures and is politicized given that Israel has been expanding the municipal boundaries of East Jerusalem and the settlement project deep into the West Bank. Moreover, size of the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem is affected by Israeli

Jerusalem: A Survey of Living Conditions (Oslo: FAFO, 1993) 42.

⁴⁹ Hasan Abu Libdeh, 1993, 1994, 44–47.

⁵⁰ FAFO Summary Report, 1994, 14.

⁵¹ Geir Ovnsen, *Responding to Change: Trends in Palestinian Household Economy*. FAFO, 1994, pp. 128, 129

municipal policies that places limits on Arab housing expansion and construction based on calculating potential units that might be approved to be built in each Arab neighborhood without precipitating a change in the ratio of Arabs to Jews in the city (Chechin et al. 1999: 31).

Conclusion

Palestinian demography adds to the demographic literature by illustrating how population issues enter into power strategies and influence national policies (Fargues 1993: 1–2), and more importantly, how power relations between groups, and a racialized state (exclusive for one group as well as its origins and connections to the racialized world system) influence population issues. The changing demography in Palestine reflected the power differential between Israelis and Palestinians that shaped the history of in migration of one group and the dislocation of another. Although the Israeli state's strong stance against Palestinian in-migration (Mualam 2002) might conjure comparisons with anti-immigration policies of the 21st century elsewhere, the difference is "that in Israel the state immigrated into the indigenous community" (Pappe 2011: 6). This means, understanding population policies in this context requires a situating them in the context of the logic of colonial and internal colonial systems. More significantly, a better understanding of the racialized state in Israel and its historical connection to the racialized world system will help in understanding the demographic predicament of Palestine.

The political process of demographic change in the OPT created human rights issues including exile and internal displacement. This has been accomplished in a number of ways in the territories besides wars. For example the Israeli built barrier to separate Israel from its occupied territories forced the displacement of Palestinians.⁵²

⁵²UNRWA, OCHA OPT, Seven Years after the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Barrier: The Impact of the Barrier in the Jerusalem area, <http://www.ochaopt.org>

The barrier's route, its deviation from the Green line, was predominantly determined by engulfing into Israel and protecting the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories including East Jerusalem.⁵³ The denial of residency right to over 4,000 Palestinian born in Jerusalem to reside in the city (Halabi 2000) was motivated by a plan to empty the city from its non-Jewish inhabitants⁵⁴. These demographic changes remain centered around a national project that sees the nation building of one group as dependent on the transfer of another group.

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⁵³The barrier swapped the major Israeli settlements on the West Bank and East Jerusalem into the Israeli side of the barrier including the settlements of Shomron bloc, Ariel, Giv'at Ze'ev, Ma'ale Adummim, and the Fush Etzion settlement bloc. 71. UN map projections show that the barrier incorporated 85 % of the West Bank settler population along with their 71 settlements (out of a total of 150 settlements on the West Bank) into the Israeli side of the barrier.

⁵⁴Daoud Kuttub, "Jerusalem should be at the center of peace efforts", 1/4/2010 accessed 1/28/2010.

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Mehri Mohebbi and Zahra Mohebbi

Introduction

*The sons of Adam are limbs of each other,
بنی آدم اعضای یک پیکرند
Having been created of one essence. ز یک گوهرند
که در آفرینش
When the calamity of time affects one limb
چو عضوی به درد آورد روزگار
The other limbs cannot remain at rest. را نمائد قرار
دگر عضوها
If thou hast no sympathy for the troubles of others
تو کز محنت دیگران بی غمی
Thou art unworthy to be called by the name of a
human. نشاید که نامت نهند آدمی.
“Saa’ di Shirazi”*

As the saying of the most famous popular poet of Iran, “Saa’ di Shiazhi”, mankind is one large family, created by God from a single soul. According to the same ideology, the diversity of languages and colors is simply a manifestation of divine power, and does not imply any notion of preference or privilege (Kamil 1970).

Social conceptions and groupings of races vary over the time, involving folk taxonomies that define essential types of individuals based on

perceived sets of traits. Scientists consider biological essentialism obsolete (Sober 2000), and generally discourage racial explanations for collective differentiation in both physical and behavioral traits. While race as a concept is a few centuries old – Marco Polo in his thirteenth century travels, for example, described the Persian race: “They are in general a handsome race, especially the women, who, in my opinion, are the most beautiful in the world” (Polo 1920). The nineteenth and twentieth century concepts of its meaning and modern sensibilities about how society views race date back only to the seven-teenth century (Smedley 2007).

The world is a place of various racial and lingual groups. Iran is not an exception and could be called a multi-ethnic community (Rashidvash 2009). Iran was called “Aran Shotor” in Sasanid dynasty. In Achaemenian dynasty, it was named “Iria”. It was the name of an Iranian tribe. This word was applied by Caucasian nations as “Irvoun- Ir- Irou”. Some words such as Arians, Aria and Iran are derived from the same root. Iran has been serving as an important bridge between the East and the West from ancient times (Rashidvash 2009). It is the land of dialogue among civilizations. Furthermore, Iran is among the cradles of civilization, the most ancient civilized society in the world.

There are numerous considerable documents that indicate Iran has been a living place from the Stone Age (Rashidvash 2009). The ancient Iranians grown in the southwest of Asia and they

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are physically and culturally direct ancestors of Aryans (Thomas et al. 1969). The Iranians are among the oriental race; Indo-European who have immigrated to this plateau from Axus and Caucasian mountains in late 2000 B.C. (Rashidvash 2009; Malyarchuk et al. 2002).

In the present situation of the Middle East, aggrandizement of ethnicity and ethnographic issues and conflicts is a kind of ignorance of the process of history. This only happened in developing countries under the forces of exterior powers. This kind of approach is considered as “Social Dementia” in social sciences, “Social Dementia” encourages a nation to live in the past and ignore the present (Yordshahian 2001). A blind approach to such a point of view will cause disintegration; what exactly happened throughout the history of the Middle East. People of every country gain their identity under the flag of integration of ethnic groups, and it is a preface to reach a global identity as a nation.

The present discussion focused on study of ethnicity and ethnic groups of Iran, based on their cultural values and social approach. How we treat a multi-cultural nation is what should be described in detail. During the field work related to the present study, many interviews with local inhabitants all over the country have been made.

Methodology

Art Studies on ethnic groups lead us to a more comprehensive understanding of their daily life. Handicrafts, architectural ornaments and all related art works can lead us to what exactly an ethnic group is and how they live (Mohebbi and Mohebbi 2010). In this chapter, methodology is focused on social values and the meaning of daily life which can be the guidance to a better understanding of numerous cultural ambiances at national level. As an instance, all art works from Seljuk era have Persian background with Chinese and Turkish details. Furthermore, nomadic life of their ancestors affects their architecture significantly, and representation of their nomadic life

can be researched in Turkmen life of Caspian region. So many motifs have been studied along with a comprehensive study on their historic background and political point of view.

In a research about ethnicity of a country with a great historical background, one should refer to the historical side of the life of those people and their country. In this regard, Iran as a part of the great civilization in the world, ethnicity of the people has a huge route to the history of the nation. Authors tried to look at the present research according to historical trace as well as Sociological, Ethnographical and Political Issues. It was a brief description of author’s 2 years studies on ethnicity in Iran (Figs. 18.1 and 18.2).

Iran as a historical, cultural and scientific ancient country has a prosperous status in the human life and world’s education. Considering large number of ethnic groups in Iran, there is a scarcity of data on each tribe and race. However a couple of studies have been done, still there is a necessity for further research on ethnic groups and their sub-division.

Iran’s Country Profile

The Islamic Republic of Iran (Persia) with 7,622,9516 populations (Statistical Center of Iran 2012) located in the highlands of south western Asia. The country is bordered on the north by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Caspian Sea, on the east by Afghanistan and Pakistan, on the west by Iraq and Turkey, and on the south by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The topography of Iran consists great salt flats (Kavir) and desert. These areas are virtually uninhabitable. Most of Iran’s population lives in the northern and north-western areas of Iran. Two mountain chains dominate the landscape. The Zagros Mountains originate in north-western Iran; extends southward to the Persian Gulf coast, and the skirt eastward along the Gulf of Oman. The second range, the Alborz Range, extends along the southern coast of the Caspian Sea (Tables 18.1, 18.2, and 18.3).



Fig. 18.1 The influence of Turkmen beliefs on the Architecture of Seljuk Era: Façade of “Kharaghan Twin Towers” and Holy “3” (Birth, Life and Rebirth) in Cemetery Architecture (Personal Archive)



Fig. 18.2 The meaning of Life which affects the Interior Design of Qashqaei’s Home (Their tent) directly: Forms, Colors and their geometrical combination have especial meaning related to their thoughts on their duties in life

Table 18.1 Province based presentation of Iran's population

Provinces	Total			Urban contexts			Rural contexts			Nomadic life		
	Family	Population	Population	Family	Population	Population	Family	Population	Population	Family	Population	Population
Whole country	17,501,771	70,495,782	48,259,964	12,405,584	48,259,964	22,131,101	5,074,866	22,131,101	21,321	104,717		
East Azerbaijan	911,930	3,603,456	2,402,539	635,966	2,402,539	1,200,820	275,943	1,200,820	21	97		
West Azerbaijan	655,961	2,873,459	1,724,954	422,439	1,724,954	1,148,505	233,522	1,148,505	0	0		
Ardabil	281,901	1,228,155	715,597	170,971	715,597	512,195	110,844	512,195	86	363		
Isfahan	1,224,763	4,559,256	3,798,728	1,025,827	3,798,728	758,890	198,606	758,890	330	1,638		
Ilam	111,560	545,787	331,231	70,085	331,231	210,703	407,67	210,703	708	3,853		
Bushehr	190,150	886,267	577,465	128,256	577,465	303,409	60,794	303,409	1,100	5,393		
Tehran	3,730,396	13,422,366	12,260,431	3,443,307	12,260,431	1,161,889	287,067	1,161,889	22	46		
Chehar Mahal Bakhtiari	194,594	857,910	442,298	105,330	442,298	414,624	89,102	414,624	162	988		
Southern Khorasan	142,394	636,420	326,695	69,343	326,695	308,305	72,774	308,305	277	1,420		
Khorasan-e-Razavi	1,445,116	5,593,079	3,811,900	999,493	3,811,900	1,779,980	445,384	1,779,980	239	1,199		
Northern Khorasan	199,850	811,572	392,458	98,127	392,458	414,365	100,760	414,365	963	4,749		
Khuzestan	866,914	4,274,979	2,873,564	611,797	2,873,564	1,383,946	251,865	1,383,946	3,252	17,469		
Zanjan	236,117	964,601	559,340	143,080	559,340	405,261	93,037	405,261	0	0		
Semnan	160,062	589,742	440,559	120,968	440,559	149,183	39,094	149,183	0	0		

Sistan and Baluchestan	470,064	2,405,742	226,139	1,193,198	242,655	1,206,547	1,270	5,997
Fars	1,022,746	4,336,878	644,195	2,652,947	371,651	1,650,614	6,900	33,317
Qazvin	294,539	1,143,200	203,356	777,975	91,179	365,203	4	22
Qom	262,477	1,046,737	246,519	983,094	15,954	63,639	4	4
Kurdestan	337,688	1,440,156	209,667	855,819	128,021	584,337	0	0
Kerman	615,936	2,652,413	367,382	1,552,519	246,400	1,089,748	2,154	10,146
Kermanshahan	445,863	1,879,385	309,092	1,255,319	135,710	618,718	1,061	5,348
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad	126,514	634,299	60,883	302,192	65,140	329,849	491	2,258
Golestan	380,244	1,617,087	196,607	795,126	183,123	819,584	514	2,377
Guilan	669,695	2,404,861	368,479	1,295,751	301,213	1,109,104	3	6
Lurestan	384,099	1,716,527	237,600	1,020,150	145,570	691,448	929	4,929
Mazandaran	783,737	2,922,432	424,665	1,554,143	359,054	1,368,233	18	56
Markazi	364,564	1,351,257	252,100	932,073	112,464	419,184	0	0
Hormozgan	304,513	1,403,674	150,178	661,325	153,765	740,605	570	1,744
Hamedan	428,289	1,703,267	256,195	980,771	171,857	721,225	237	1,271
Yazd	259,095	990,818	207,538	789,803	51,551	200,988	6	27

Statistical Center of Iran 2012

Data for new province; "Alborz" which is founded in late 2011 is not available

Table 18.2 Demographic profile of Iran’s population

Population growth rate (average annual %)	2010–2015	1.1
Urban population	2010–2015	1.9
Rural population	2010–2015	–0.9
Fertility rate, total (live birth per woman)	2010–2015	1.7
International migrant stock (000 & % of total population)	Mid-2010	2,128.7/2.8

UN Data – Iran. <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Iran%20%28Islamic%20Republic%20of%29>. Retrieved 22 March 2012

Table 18.3 Religious profile

Muslim	Shi’a	90 %
	Sunni	8 %
Non-Muslim	Zoroastrians	2 %
	Jews	
	Baha’is	
	Mandaeans	
	Christians	

CIA World factbook. “Iran”. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html>. Retrieved 22 March 2012.

Ethnical Categorizes in Iran

“At the present time, a nation can settle in a country with clear borders or can be separated immigrations” (Safizadeh 1999). Based on lingual dialects, there are eight branches in Iran which in many cases they have common roots: Turkish, Baluch, Kurd, Hyrcanian, Larestani, Lur, Azeri and some others. All of them have an Aryan and Iranian ethnical root, common past of 1,000 years history, culture and land inherit. None of them can be known as a separate nation. Although there are some differences among their dialects and languages, but lingual similarities are considerable that the collection of their dialects has made a common language as Persian language. Generally, there are three significant races in Iran: Persians, People of Mazandaran and Guilan & Azeri people (Rashidvash 2009; Shiel 1856) (Table 18.4).

Table 18.4 Major ethnic groups

					Turkmen		
Persian	Azeri	Baluch	Arab	Kurd	& Turkic	Lur	Other
65 %	16 %	2 %	2 %	7 %	1 %	6 %	1 %

USA Library of Congress. “Country Profile: Iran”. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Iran.pdf>. Retrieved 22 March 2012.

Persians who have settled in Alborz and Zagros mountains in the south and the north to White River (Sepidroud); whose languages have their roots in ancient Persian language. The Lurs live in the west parts of Iran and have thick hairs and lighter skin physically. Most of them are tall, their skulls are pressed and round. The Kurds are the other group who lived in this area. About origin of the Kurds there are three main theories:

- The first theory: They are considered as part of Indians and European races immigrated in the seventh century B.C.
- The second theory: It considers Kurds as the relatives of other Asian nations like Khaleds, Georgian and Armenians.
- The third theory: “Kurd race is the diagram of Zagros, Gouti, Lolubi, Kasi, Orartouie and other tribes of Zagros or Kurdistan during the history. They joined Indo-European nations and have the same race” (Saidiyan 1991).

People in the south of Iran have darker skin than usual Arabs in Iraq. Perhaps, they have the most rate of similarity with early people of the northern Arabia and desert of Syria (Rashidvash 2009). But according to the form of their skull and other anthropological documents, they do not belong to the black people of Africa.

Kurds

The original stock from which the Kurds came is not known exactly, but it is believed that in their blood is a mixture of Chaldean, Babylonian, Assyrian, and Arabian. In 3000 B.C., in Zagros Mountains and southern coast of Uromiyeh Lake, there were patriarch societies living on the mountains (Mirniya 1990). They have been called Kurtti or Kutti and their land was Karkada. They became weak after Ashur tribe

and little by little they have been a part of Medes. Kutti tribe is origin of Kurds (Yordshahian 2001).

The word “Kurdistan” first was used in Seljuk era, in the time of “Soltan Sanjar”. There was no Kurd government during the history of the region, only in the contemporary history there are traces of western powers encouraging local tribes to struggle for autonomy and independence; it dates back to nineteenth century (Van Bruinessen 2000).

Their language is mated old “Parsee”. Their religion is Islam; some are Shias (Adamec 1976). Their dialect is a comparatively pure survival of the ancient language of Persia. Their language is a north-west Iranian language of the Indo-European family of languages (Van Bruinessen 2000). In Kurdistan and Kermanshah, what is called the Guran dialect is spoken. By far the greater numbers of Persian Kurds who are sedentary and pastoral, a great many farm and till the hill slopes, while many more are shepherds. Nomad Kurds are largely Turkish subjects or live on the Turkish border and perhaps the wealthiest members of the tribe belong to this class. The Kurd in variably carries arms of some sort (Adamec 1976). Presently the Kurds mainly reside in Kermanshah, Kurdistan and south of the Western Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan-e-Gharbi). The most important point is that the Kurds are originally Iranian and they do belong to the same race as all other Persian ethnic groups do.

Lurs

Lorestan, the land of Lurs, is set in the part of the Zagros Chain in the south of Azeri land and has been inhabited for centuries by pastoral semi-nomads of Persian stock. Luristan is peopled by sedentary Kurds and semi-nomadic tribes such as the Bakhtiyari. The Lurs have settled predominantly in and around the capital Khorramabad, originally a Sassanid Persian settlement (Adamec 1976). One theory said that the Lur people appear to be of the same origin as the Kurds. The Luri language is affixed to the Old Iranian language, which suggests the length of time that the Lurs

have lived in Iran. It is close to Kurdish, but it is an independent language in its own right (I. C. S. 2010). It has three main dialects: Luri, Laki and Bakhtiyari. Aryans went to presently Lurestan and mixed with ancient inhabitants, Kasit (کاسیت). Believes of the Lurs have been influenced directly with Islam as well as other ethnic groups in Iran (Farid Zadeh 2010).

Baluchis

The Baluchies reside mainly in a dry region in the south-eastern part of the Iranian plateau. It extends from the Kerman desert to the rest of Bam and Bashargard mountains, and to the western borderline of the Sind and Punjab provinces of Pakistan. Historically, the Baluchies moved to Makran from Kerman to flee an expedition of the Seljuk in the eleventh century. At the time, the Baluchies were nomads. They have never had a centralized government and have been living under a tribal system. It is unclear when the name Baluchestan came into general use. It may date only from the twelfth/eighteenth century when Nassir Khan of Kalat during his long regime in the second half of twelfth/eighteenth century became the first indigenous ruler to establish autonomous control over a large part of the area. Baluch identity in Baluchistan has been closely tied to the use of the Baluchi language in inter-tribal relations (Yarshater 1989).

The Iranian Baluch tribes are divided into a number of clans. The most important are the Bameri, Balideh, Bozorzadeh, Riggi, Sardaar Zaie, Shahbakhsh, Lashari, Mobaraki, Mir Morad Zaie, Naroyee, Nooshsiravani, Barohooyee, Baram-Zehi and Shir-Khanzayee tribes. A few tribes in the Sistan area are also regarded as Baluch, but they speak Sistani; the language is an abandoned dialect of Persian. The notable ones of these tribes are: Sarbandi, Shahraki, Sargazi, Zamir-Farsyoon, Mir-Arab and Sanjarani (I. C. S. 2010). The Baluch generally claims that all Baluch are Hanafite Muslims, although, there some small Shi'ite communities on the northwestern of Iranian Baluchistan (Yarshater 1989).

Baluch tribal organization is not uniform, unlike Persian; Baluchi make no terminological distinction between matrilineal and patrilineal kin. The tribal ideology extends through Baluchistan and beyond, but each family belongs to one or another small community, whose size and stability is related to the local conditions of pastoralism or agriculture. These primary groupings are strung together in chains of hierarchical relations, which integrate the various types of larger grouping. Each individual is identified by memberships in a tribal group, and each tribal group belongs to one of the four classes (Hakomzat, Baluch, Shahri & Golan). Marriage between classes occurs (especially in the few cases where a tribe which is Baluch or Shahri has a branch which has become Hakomzat), but a woman should not marry down (Yarshater 1989).

Wedding is a major event in the society. Weddings are not the same in all rural and urban contexts. In big cities many weddings are not in the traditional manner, but in the rural contexts and among the families that honor tradition, they change little from generation to generation (Hinckley 1973).

People of Mazandaran and Gilan

They are settled in the Caspian seaside rural contexts separated from the Persians in Alborz Valleys. They are original Iranians. Their difference with Persians is resulted from the separation on the side of Alborz and geographical climate condition and not for race (Rashidvash 2009).

Indigenous peoples of Mazandaran include the ethnic Mazandarani speaking an Iranian language which most resembles Gilaki and Sangiseri. The culture of Mazandaran is closely to that of neighboring Gilan. The local inhabitants are religious but not restricted one, and women have had greater social freedom and independence than their other Persian cousins. The cuisine of the provinces is very rich in seafood due to its location by the Caspian Sea, and rice is present in virtually every meal. Indeed, the rest of Iran was introduced to rice through Gilan and Mazandaran. Before the 1800s, Persians,

Kurds, and other Iranian ethnic groups used bread rather than rice. But nowadays bread remains very popular among those groups, in Gilan and Mazandaran, rice remains the choice staple of the indigenous inhabitants. Mazanderani or Tabarian is a Northwestern Iranian language. Various Mazandarani's dialects exist which are spoken in Mazandaran province and the neighbor province Gloestan such as Mazandarani, and Gorgani. There are Qadikolahi and Palani which may be considered as dialects. Mazandarani mostly resemble Gilaki. Also, a dialect of Azeri has been used in the town of Galoogh (Lewis 2009). Presently, Mazandarani use Persian (Western Persian) in writing and speaking.

Azeri People

All population of the northwestern and west of Iran, in a place called Azerbaijan (Atropatgan) is Azeri people. Although there are some who speak Persian, most of them are Turkish. It is worth mentioning that there are many differences between Iranian Turks and other Turkish nations. The Iranian Azeri people are original Iranians with Aryan race (Rashidvash 2009). Azeri people are original inhabitants of Iran on whom the invaders (many of them, Turkish invaders) have imposed their languages throughout the centuries of occupation. The Iranian Turks live mainly in three provinces of Azerbaijan territory and the Zanjan province up to Qazvin, in and around Hamedan, in Tehran, around Qom and Saveh, Khorasan province, and are scattered throughout mainly other parts of Iran. Some of the central and southern ethnic groups, as an instance, the Qashqaies are Turkish speaking. The Turkish dialect spoken in the Azerbaijan province of Iran is Oghuz. The southern accent of Oghuz is what has been spoken in Iran which is influenced by Farsi (I. C. S. 2010). Almost present Turkish has been considered as the language of the region after the invasion of Turkish tribes and it has been mixed with ancient languages of the northwestern Iran, Ancient Azeri (Yordshahian 2001). Azeri Turkish contains between 20 and 30 % Turkish words, normally the verbs, and other words are Persian, Arabic, and Azeri (Fig. 18.3).

mountainous and pastoral parts. The area is a fertile plain near the Iranian border with the Republic of Turkmenistan. It extends from the Atrak River in the north, to the Caspian Sea in the west, Quchan Mountains to the east and the Gorgan River to the south. Iranian Turkmens are divided into two sections: Charva (mostly herder) and Chamor (mostly farmer). The most important Iranian Turkmen tribes are Kuklans and Yamotes. The Kuklans have six branches, and live in the central and eastern Turkmen Sahra. The Yamotes have two large clans (Atabai and Jafarbai), and live to the west of Turkmen Sahra. There are also smaller tribes to the east of the region in a few rural contexts (Khiabani and Baghosian 2010). The largest group of Turkmen Muslims follows the Hanafi branch of the Sunni sect, but some others are followers of the Naqshbandieh Sufism (Khiabani and Baghosian 2010).

The role of marriage in the tribal system is due to the need for manpower. Women play an important role in the tribal system. They are productive, as they make felt, spin wool, weave carpets and cloths, milk cows and sheep, prepare dairy products for the family, build cottages and help with men in cultivation, maintenance and harvesting of agricultural products and, most important of all, they give birth to children and help their husbands in other activities too. The ceremony is usually held in open spaces and desert, and a traditional musical instrument (2-tar) is played in almost all wedding ceremonies. In Turkmen Sahra all weddings and other celebrations end in horse racing and wrestling as the main parts of celebrations (Khiabani and Baghosian 2010).

Nomadic Life

According to the definition, the migratory nomads are:

- (a) Dependent on livestock raising
- (b) Organized in tribal structure with clear patterns of kinship and relationships
- (c) Conscious of their tribalism

The nomadic tribes in Iran are of several major ethnic origins: Kurds, Lurs and Laks, Baroohoyee,

Arabs, Baluchis and Turk-o-Turkmens (Salari 2010). Hence, they speak a variety of languages and are spread all over the country. Only Kurdistan and Yazd are the provinces without nomadic tribes; but some tribes cross through the latter to get to their winter and summer territories. The Kurdish tribes are in Bakhtaran province. The disarming of the nomadic tribes, the increased power of the central government and its intervention in tribal affairs, the promotion of labor markets in the regional towns and the expanding urbanization were all factors that contributed to the changes in the social structure of nomadic life. Migration was also modernized because of the technological development.

Forced settlement of nomadic tribes became a concern of the government under the first Pahlavi during 1920s and 1930s. In the period that elapsed between two tribal censuses in 1974 and 1985, 94,418 nomadic households settled, in 89,653 in towns (I. C. S. 2010). Presently, they live their nomadic life and local governors help them in their seasonal movement.

“IL” (ایل) is a Mongolian word which means friend and tribe (Salari 2010). Iranian Nomadic ethnic groups (Ilat) are categorized as bellow: (Afshar 1987) (Table 18.1).

- Turkmen & Turk Nomads: Khalaj (Qashqaei (Dare Shuyee, Sheesh Boloki, Kashkooli,...) {Beighi}, Shahsavans (Baghdadi, Ainallu, Afshar, Darian, Kurdbaiglu, Khojehbeglu, ...)
- Kurd & Lur Nomads: Jalali, Kalhur, Milani, Zanghene, Piran, Bakhtiyari, Mamasani, Cheghini,
- Lak Nomads: Chehar Doli, Hadavand, Minavand,
- Arab Nomads: Bani-Tamim, Khoochi.
- Baluch Nomads: Nahtani, Mastan Zei, Zeid Kari, Eissa Zei, Shahi Zei,
- Mazandarani Nomads: Elikaei, Nouri, Kalbadi,
- Kurmanji Nomads: Zaferanlu, Amarlu

The most important nomadic tribes in Iran are: Qashqaei, Shahsavan, and Bakhtiyari. “Shahsavan” is a very large tribe of Persia to be met with chiefly in Azerbaijan and the great central plateau. The Shahsavans are divided into five

main branches: the Baghdadi, Ainallu, Afshar, Darian, Kurdbaiglu, and extend from the plain of “Mughan” in Russian territory north of Azerbaijan to Zanjan, Qazvin and Saveh, and there are also some few families in other parts of Iran. Other sub-tribes frequently mentioned are Gilklu, Khwaja, Khujalins and Khuwaja Geglus. They spend part of the year in the plain of Mughan and the other part, around Ardabil and Zanjan (Adamec 1976). The “Khojehbeglu” are the most powerful of the Mughan Shahsavans. The Shahsavans comprise a number of tribes of Turkish speaking origin that live on the steppes of central Asia for the large part; they are now semi-nomadic and live in semi-permanent settlements. They are divided into several sub-groups by reference to the grazing lands habitually use; thus, there are Shahsavans from Mughan, Hashtrud, Khamseh, Saveh, and Varamin (Adamec 1976).

“Qashqaei”: The Turkish speaking Qashqaei tribe is the most reputed tribe in southern Iran. The Qashqaei territory extends from Abadeh and Shahreza in the Isfahan province to the Persian Gulf coast. The tribe comprises numerous clans. One school of thought maintains that the Qashqaei descended from the ancestors of the Turkish Khalaj clan, who lived between India and Sistan region of Iran, and then migrated to central and southern Iran. Each clan has a chief, and there was a general tribal leader who was appointed in the old days.

“Bakhtiyari”: The Bakhtiyari tribe is composed of the clans living in the mountainous regions between the Chaharmahal, Fars, Khuzistan (the Taftoon Field), and Lurestan provinces. Bakhtiyari is divided into two separate branches: Haft Lang and Chahar Lang (Karimi and Digard 1983). The Arabian and Lur clans mix together in the Bakhtiyari tribe. The Bakhtiyari overlords have been influential in political developments since the era of the Safavids and the Nader Shah. Some of their leaders helped constitutional revolutionaries conquer Tehran during the Period of Minor Despotism. That was when the Qajar king, Mohammad Ali Shah, suspended the parliament and the constitution in 1907 (I. C. S. 2010; Beighi 2007).

Arabs

Some historians maintain that the first Arabian tribes migrated to Khuzestan, a section in southwest of Iran where they now live, in the early centuries AD, probably moving in from the Arabian Peninsula. Arabian tribes are scattered in an area between the Arvandroud and the Persian Gulf in the south and Susa in the north. The most important of Arabian tribes in Iran is “Bani-Kaab”, which is also the largest. There are Bani-Lam, Bani-Saleh, Bani-Torof, Bani-Tamim, Bani-Marvan, Al-Khamiss, Bavi and Kenane (I. C. S. 2010). The Arabians have retained their Arabic language but they have lost some of their ethnological characteristics. According to the anthropological studies, it is notable that their anthropological characteristics are not similar to common Arabic race (Rashidvash 2009).

Diversity of Languages and Dialects

Persian, the official language of the country, is spoken as a mother tongue by at least 65 % of the population and as a second language by a large proportion of the remaining 35 %. Other languages and dialects in use are Azeri, Kurdish, Luri, Arabic, and Baluchi (US L. C. 2008).

In the historical manuscripts after Arab conquest, from third to tenth century, there were more than 40 dialects and in some cases languages related to ancient Persian spoken all over Iran plateau. Some instances are: Arani, Maraghi, Hamadani, Zanjani, Kurdish, Khuzi, Deylami, Guilaki, Tabari (Mazani), Ghashtasef, Ghumes, Razi, Ramhormozi, Pahlavi, Kermani, Mokri, Baluchi, Khuchi, Neyshaburi, Heravi, Bukharaei, Mervi, Khwarazmi, Samarghandi, Soghd, Bamiyani, Balkhi, Basti, Ghuri, Chachi, Ghazvini, shirazi, Khorasani, Neyrizi, Isfahani, Azeri, Ardabili, Tajiki, Luri, Bakhtiyari, Dari-e-Afghani, Tati, Takistani, Talyshi, Yazdi, Kashani, Anaraki, Mehrejani, Araki (Abolghasemi et al. 1978). Among them, the most significant and used dialects and languages of contemporary history of Iran are Tajiki, Luri, Kurdish, Dari-e-Afghan,




Fig. 18.4 The variety of dialects related to ancient Persian language in present situation of IRAN (Bruck and Apenchenko 1964)

Baluchi, Tati, talyshi, Guilaki, Tabari (Mazani), Pashtu, Aasi, Kashani, Yazdi, Khuri, Anaaraki, Semnani, and Araki (Abolghasemi et al. 1978).

As an instance, the Talyshi language is a Northwestern Iranian language spoken in the northern regions of the Iran’s provinces of Guilan and Ardabil and the southern regions of the Azerbaijan. Historically, the language and its

people can be traced through the middle Iranian period back to the ancient Medes. It includes many dialects usually divided into three main clusters: Northern, Central and Southern. There is a dialect which is related to Talysh language, it is called Tati. Tati is spoken in some parts of Qazvin provinces as well as its neighborhood (Babylon 2010) (Fig. 18.4).

Conclusion

Iran is the home to one of the world's oldest continuous major civilizations. It is a community of numerous tribal groups who have same roots with thousand years of history. The main ethnic groups in Iran are Persians (65 %), Azeri Turks (16 %), Kurds (7 %), Lurs (6 %), Arabs (2 %), Baluchis (2 %), Turkmens (1 %), Turkish tribal groups such as the Qashqai (1 %), and non-Persian, non-Turkic groups such as Armenians, Assyrians, and Georgians (less than 1 %) (US L. C. 2008). As a multi-cultural country, the anthropological and ethnographical study is a necessity, but our approach to this research should be based on respecting the present situation of the country. This attempt tried to mention the importance of local culture and historical facts to go forward an integrated nation. However this opportunity was not sufficient to present the whole tribal groups as they deserve, it is a brief introduction for those who are interested to know Iran as the cradle of civilization.

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Chris Ulack

Since the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the country has come to be viewed as a focal point of ethno-sectarian violence and conflict. Given the United States' careful involvement with the re-structuring of the Iraqi government, even after the partial withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in September 2010, many policy makers, think tank analysts, journalists, human rights groups, and academic scholars weighed in on a broad dialogue over what should happen with Iraq's political and societal future. This issue remains significant after the full withdrawal of American troops in December 2011 as Iraqi politicians attempt to hold the newly formed government together through the face of a continued insurgency in the country. Power sharing among the main religious factions and ethnicities in the country remains, for many, a major concern and consideration although the probability of true power sharing within the government seems less and less likely and is a major reason for the ongoing insurgency.

The discourse over the political future of Iraq (especially before the full withdrawal of American troops) revolves primarily around the dual issue of perceived ethnic and sectarian divi-

sions within the country. One popular strategy for Iraq's future which was advocated by analysts and high level government officials in the U.S. was to make Iraq a federal democracy along ethnic lines, dividing the country into three states mirroring the *vilayets* (provinces) of the Ottoman period: a predominantly Kurdish state in the north, a central Sunni-dominated state, and a Shi'ite state in the south of the country (Biden and Gelb 2006; Joseph and O'Hanlon 2007; Biden 2006). This viewpoint was strongly debated as it was based on the notion that those three regions of Iraq are comprised of stable, mostly homogenous groups (Cole 2004; Williams and Simpson 2008; Cordesman 2006). Not only did the idea disregard the existence of other minority groups within the country but it also discounted that these regions and the populations residing within them are quite heterogeneous. Furthermore, the approach disregarded other possible demographic ramifications such as the eventual need for major population transfers. To be sure, demographic considerations play a major role in the future of Iraqi unity and attention to history shows how government sponsored demographic engineering, large-scale migratory patterns, or foreign military intervention can not only change the demographic composition of a city or region but also fuel ethno-sectarian divisions (Fig. 19.1).

In Iraq ethnic groups are primarily clustered into four main groupings: Arabs, Kurds,

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Fig. 19.1 Country of Iraq and major cities (CIA World Factbook)



Turkmen, and Chaldo-Assyrians. While population statistics are not presently available for the different ethnic and sectarian groupings in Iraq, many analysts do estimate on the numbers. Looking at the various ethnicities within Iraq, the US government estimates that Arabs make up approximately 75–80 % of the population while Kurds account for 15–20 %.¹ Turkmen, Chaldo-Assyrian, and other minority groups make up an estimated 5 % of the overall population. According to Stansfield, although Turkmen scholars put the Turkmen population at 10–15 % of the total, it is more likely that the actual Turkmen population is under 5 % (2007, 71). In terms of religious groups within Iraq, it is estimated that Muslims compose about 97 % of the population with approximately 60–65 % of those

Muslims being Shiite and 32–37 % being comprised of Sunnis. The Christian community in Iraq is rather small and becoming smaller due to the ongoing violence. It is estimated that the number of Christians in Iraq number no more than one million although the number now may be far lower due to large scale refugee outmigration of Christian populations. Within the Christian community, the two main groups are the Chaldeans and the Assyrians with as much as 70 % of Iraq's Christians belonging to the Chaldean Catholic Church (Stansfield 2007, 73).

Ethno-sectarian is a word often used when describing Iraq's different populations. In this chapter, it is used broadly and inclusively as the intricate associations and linkages between and among groups in Iraq makes it misleading to use only one term or the other. To call Iraq a multi-ethnic society, for example, is quite misleading as well as it disregards the existence of different

¹ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>

religions such as Islam and Christianity. The term multi-ethnic also ignores different sects within religions such as the differences between Sunni and Shiite Muslims or between Chaldean Christians and Assyrian Christians. This becomes a bit more complicated when one considers that those members within a specific ethnicity may also belong to different religious sects. This is exemplified by the fact that 80 % of Kurds are Sunni while approximately 15 % are Shiite (Stansfield 2007, 217). The challenges of finding a viable and lasting solution for the future of Iraq are more easily understood when considering the diversity and complexity of the Iraqi population.

Whatever the political outcome in Iraq, discussing demographic patterns and trends in the country is a difficult endeavor. Estimates of Iraq's overall population today range from 28.9² to 32³ million people although there has not been an official census taken in Iraq since 1997 and that census is largely contested and considered to be of little value to demographers and the Iraqi population at large (Anderson and Stansfield 2009). The main reason the 1997 census is viewed as inadequate is largely because data was not compiled (and thus not included) for three of the country's northern provinces. Taking this into consideration, the 1987 census was the last complete census carried out by the Iraqi government. This census, however, as are all censuses conducted during the rule of the Ba'ath regime, is also considered to be of little use due to the government's tampering with the data and demographic engineering of whole regions and cities. With this in mind, the last census which is considered to be useful for demographers is the 1957 census which was conducted prior to the fall of the Hashemite monarchy in 1958.

War and violent conflict in general also plays an important role in shaping Iraq's past, current, and future population and demography. Major

movements and shifts in the country's population due to the three Gulf wars (the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, the first American-led Gulf War in 1991, and the current American-led military endeavor starting in 2003) makes it extremely difficult to speculate on aspects of demography in Iraq. Due to these multiple international conflicts since 1980 along with other internal skirmishes over the years, large segments of the population have either fled from their homes as refugees crossing international borders or have become internally displaced peoples (IDP's) within Iraq. The increase in violence has also raised the death toll of civilians and military personnel in Iraq, changing characteristics of Iraq's population while also making it difficult to produce reliable demographic data.

These conflicts are taking place in a time of extreme population changes in Iraq. Some of these changes are shown to increase the possibility and severity of internal conflict. One such change is the "youth bulge" Iraq is currently experiencing. Along with Yemen and the Palestinian Territories, Iraq has the highest fertility rate in the Middle East region and approximately 40 % of its population is currently under 15 years of age (Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi 2007). Goldstone shows that populations with a disproportionately large number of youths are at an increased risk of violent political or ethnic conflicts (Goldstone 2002). As Iraq has one of the fastest growing populations in the world, this fact is important to consider when discussing the links between demography and ethno-sectarian conflict.

The main objective of this chapter is to explore the linkages and disputes surrounding ethnicity, sectarianism, and demography in Iraq. This will be achieved by first taking into account historical developments which have played a role in shaping the current political and social context within Iraq. The purpose of this section is to highlight the historical trends and events which have led Iraq to be viewed as a focal point of ethno-sectarian conflict and violence. Secondly, the chapter will examine demographic data to put the historical and current situations into context. Moreover, looking at the demographic data will

² <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>

³ <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2007&ey=2010&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=433&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CLP&grp=0&a=&pr.x=54&pr.y=11#cs5>

bring to light some of the trends and patterns observed in Iraq today and allow one to make predictions about the future especially as they are related to policy, human rights, and more broadly, the creation of a new government in Iraq. Thirdly, theoretical issues surrounding the linkages between ethnicity, sectarianism, demography, and conflict will be considered.

Lastly, it should be noted that when discussing various ethnic groups and/or religious sects in this chapter, they are in no way meant to be conveyed as homogenous, stable groups with a uniform set of characteristics. In fact, the different ethnic and religious groups in Iraq are fluid, dynamic, often changing and differing politically, socially, and culturally even within a single group. Additionally, members of multiple ethnic and religious groups in Iraq are intermixed and intermarried, an often overlooked matter in discussions about dividing Iraq along ethnic lines.

History and Ethnicity in Iraq

The land that is now Iraq has a long and complex human history. The three main historical periods which occurred before the creation of Iraq as a state after World War I and which are of great relevance to current political, geographical, and social debates are those of ancient Mesopotamia, the Islamic empires, and the Ottoman Empire which ruled what is today Iraq for over 400 years until the end of World War I (Marr 2004, 4–8). While detailing these different periods is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to note the way in which these periods have affected Iraqi citizens' collective memory of the country and ways in which aspects of these different historical periods contribute in various ways to Iraqi self-identification. Moreover, these different periods have been used and promoted by various ruling entities, political parties, and organizations in Iraq since its formation as a nation-state as a means to either legitimize themselves or to strengthen control over society (Davis 2005). This was often accomplished through the use of ethno-politicized discourse and in order to high-

light the primacy of one ethnic group or religious sect over another.

The ancient empires of Iraq such as the Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian Empires, are often viewed in modern Iraq as a pre-Islamic Golden Age. Although the pre-Islamic age is often referred to as *jahiliyya* (Age of Ignorance) within the Islamic faith, the period of ancient Mesopotamia evokes for many Iraqis a sense of continuity upon the land, and at the same time provides a national symbol around which a distinctly Iraqi identity could be carved out among various groups (Davis 2005, 13–15). Ancient Mesopotamia also conjures a source of pride for Iraqis as out of these various Mesopotamian empires came two major advances of humankind: the origins of agriculture and the development of urban life. Additionally, the development of writing, the wheel, metal working, and specific types of temple architecture found their roots in what is today Iraq (Marr 2004, 4).

Islam Arrives in Iraq

Even in ancient Mesopotamia, the land of Iraq was often ruled and influenced by “outsiders”, not indigenous to the area. With these foreign rulers came cultural, political, and social influences, some of which still affect the structure of Iraqi society today. By the time of the early seventh century AD, Iraq had been ruled for centuries by the Persian Sassanid Empire. The inhabitants of the land were a mixture of semi-autonomous nomadic tribes in the desert, what were to become the Kurds in the mountainous north, and what Stansfield refers to as, “pockets of Greeks, Indians, and Africans scattered across the region” (Stansfield 2007, 17). It was at this point in history when a new outside power began to impact the social, cultural, and political character of Iraq which has lasted to the present day.

After the death of the prophet Mohammed in 632 AD, the Islamic faith was beginning to spread throughout the Middle East. With the prophet's sudden death, however, came an immediate internal division among the early followers

of Islam. This schism was over who should succeed Mohammed and rule over the quickly expanding Islamic empire. While some followers believed that someone related to Mohammed should succeed him, others thought the successor (*caliph*) should be elected by leaders within the Muslim community. The former supported Ali, Mohammed's cousin and son-in-law, to be his successor. These members of Islam became known as *Shi'at Ali* (literally, supporters of Ali) or *Shi'i*. The latter, those who believed Mohammed's successor should be elected by leaders of the community became known as *sunnis* as they were followers of the *sunnah*, the customs and practices of the Prophet Mohammed (Marr 2004). This rift within the early Muslim community persists today and is a crucial point for understanding the current political, social, and cultural situation within Iraq.

The caliphate, or Islamic system of governance, that came to power in the middle of the eighth century AD and which is important specifically when discussing the history of Iraq is the Abbasid caliphate. In 750 AD, after defeating the previous ruling caliphate, the Umayyads, the Abbasids moved their capital from Damascus to the land of Iraq and built a city there which came to be known as Baghdad (Bennison 2009, 5). The first two centuries of Abbasid rule are known as one of the golden ages of Islamic history. With Baghdad at its center, the Abbasid caliphate ushered in a new era in the development of the Islamic faith and of commerce in the region. More importantly, however, it was a multicultural center of learning and education which was encouraged by many of the early Abbasid caliphs. As Bennison states, the Abbasid caliphs played a major role in, "welcoming at their court, not only Muslim scholars, poets and artists but also Nestorian Christian and Jewish physicians, astrologers of all faiths, and pagan philosophers" (Bennison 2009, 5). This can be seen as an early example in which multiple ethnicities, cultures, religious sects and faiths were living together in cooperation within Iraq.

Iraq Within the Ottoman Empire

The third major stage in the history of Iraq prior to it becoming a nation-state is the Ottoman period. The Ottoman conquest of the land of Iraq began in 1514 and occurred in stages with Mosul being taken in 1516–1517, Baghdad in 1534, and Basra between 1538 and 1546 (Çetinsaya 2006, 4). Four centuries of Ottoman rule left an impact on the future Iraqi state, so much so that it led Marr to assert that, "in patterns of government, in law, and in the outlook and value of the urban classes, the Ottomans played a role in shaping modern Iraq second only to that of the Arab tribe and family" (2004, 5). The Ottoman system of governance, which had recently undergone a number of reforms, was what the British encountered when they began forming a geopolitical interest in the territory of Iraq and subsequently when the British took control of Iraq through the mandate system following World War I. With this in mind, it is important to put the late Ottoman period in Iraq into proper context.

The *vilayet* system, the Ottoman system of provincial organization, was not established until 1864, somewhat late in the four centuries of Ottoman rule over Iraq (Çetinsaya 2006, 15). The three main *vilayets* (provinces) of Iraq were Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul and were not maintained as such on a consistent basis until 1884 (Çetinsaya 2006, 15). This provincial division under the Ottoman Empire has turned out to play an important role in perceived ethnic divisions within Iraq as many U.S. policy makers advocate for the division of the current Iraqi state into three main provinces similar to those set up by the Ottoman administration. While supporters of a federal democracy in Iraq (or of a hard partition of the three proposed provinces) base their argument around the idea that these regions are for the most part ethnically homogenous, Visser does well to show how the three Ottoman provinces have been misrepresented in much of the literature on Iraq. Visser criticizes the ubiquitous

misperception that the Ottoman *vilayet* of Mosul was historically Kurdish, Baghdad was Sunni Arab, and the province of Basra was Shiite Arab. On the contrary, Visser states that, “in the early twentieth century, Basra had important Sunni elements, Baghdad was in fact the largest Shiite province in the region, and Mosul was inhabited by a mix of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, and Christians” (Visser 2008, 5). What may have played a larger role in dividing the peoples of Iraq at this time was not ethnicity or religion, but the rift between rural and urban populations and their resulting influence on the governing of the provinces (Batatu 1978, 13).

To put the Ottoman period into further context, population statistics are useful. In 1914 the total population of Ottoman Iraq was an estimated 3,650,000 (including Kuwait and Najd) (Çetinsaya 2006, 13; citing McCarthy 1981, 39). Çetinsaya also cites Hasan when giving total population estimates of each of the three Iraqi *vilayets*: Baghdad, 1,300,000; Basra 1,150,000; and Mosul, 828,000 (Çetinsaya 2006, 13; citing Hasan 1966). As noted above, one source of tension among the Iraqi population at this time was not so much ethnic divisions, but rather the rural-urban divide. Batatu’s seminal work on Iraq does indeed make mention of the numerous ethnic and religious groups in Iraq at the beginning of the twentieth century such as the Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, Persians, Assyrians, Armenians, Chaldeans, Jews, Yazidis, and Sabians, but the author goes on to state that, “a wide chasm divided the main cities from the tribal country. Urban and tribal Arabs...belonged to two almost separate worlds” (Batatu 1978, 13). In 1905 it is estimated that the urban population in Iraq accounted for 24 % of the total population (Çetinsaya citing Hasan 1966, 157). The separation between these urban and tribal worlds was not only physical and demographic, but also social and psychological. This social and psychological distance between the two groups had mainly to do with levels of religiosity and the role of Islam in everyday life, Turkish/Ottoman cultural influence, the development of class positions, and general attitudes towards government (Batatu 1978, 13–14). It should be noted that

Batatu does not just highlight the urban-rural “chasm” as the primary social division of the age. He goes further to state that important changes at the turn of the century such as technological advances, economic changes, and the intensification of British involvement in the country not only affected the relationship *between* urban and rural groups but among them as well.

Thus, in the late Ottoman period in Iraq, the literature begins to produce not only some fairly reliable demographic estimates, but also notions of social divisions between the different populations of Iraq. What has not yet been discussed were the religious and sectarian differences in Iraq at the time. Batatu does generally divide Ottoman Iraq geographically along religious/ethnic lines stating that to the south of Baghdad the population was primarily (but not entirely) Shiite Arab, north of Baghdad along the Euphrates River and north along the Tigris between Baghdad and Mosul was predominantly Sunni Arab, and the mountainous regions northeast of Baghdad were primarily Kurdish Sunni but with a sizeable Christian population in Mosul (Batatu 1978, 38–39). Baghdad itself is left out of this description as it consisted of a large number of Shiite and Sunni Arabs, as well as pockets of non-Muslim minorities, especially Jews. Visser states however that the Ottoman province of Baghdad was actually the largest Shiite province in the region (Visser 2008, 5). Regardless, the various ethnic and religious groups living in Baghdad were separated primarily by city quarters (*mahalle*) with populations in Baghdad identifying quite strongly with their local city district (Batatu 1978, 18–21). While Baghdad and all three regions had populations of non-Muslim religious groups, these groups were not of high enough numbers to make an impact politically on the country.

Politically, it is important to note, that the Ottoman government which was ruling Iraq (and the rest of the Ottoman Empire) was a Sunni dominated government. For the majority Arab Shiite population in Iraq, this was a problem. It should be mentioned, however, that Arab Shiites only made up a numerical majority in Iraq beginning in the nineteenth century (Stansfield 2007,

57–59). It was at this point that the Arab Shiite majority began to feel the effects of being under-represented in the governing of the country. Despite the majority population of Shiite Arabs, Iraq would continue to see Sunni Arabs dominate the political leadership until the fall of the Baath regime in 2003. The continued presence of a repressive Sunni Arab minority leadership in Iraq would ultimately play a large role in future sectarian divisions, even if these divisions occurred largely within the government and military and less so in the everyday lives of ordinary Iraqis.

Batatu does mention a divide between Sunnis and Shiites in the Ottoman period but, significantly, he remarks that the division between the groups comes less from differences in religious positions and has more to do with issues of class. The “mutual estrangement” between Sunnis and Shiites, if expressed religiously, Batatu states, had its roots in economic and social causes (Batatu 1978, 18). This was to turn out to be an ongoing issue between the groups throughout the remainder of the twentieth century.

Iraq After World War I

Sunni political leadership continued after the fall of the Ottoman Empire following the end of the First World War. This was in spite of the population statistics at the beginning of the British mandate period of which over 50 % of the total population was Shiite, approximately 20 % was Kurdish, less than 20 % was Sunni, and roughly 8 % was composed of other minorities such as Jews, Christians, Yazidis, Sabaeans, and Turkmens (Tripp 2007, 31). The governmental structure thus changed from a loose web of Ottoman appointed local Sunni (mainly urban) administrators to a foreign (British) controlled and centralized Sunni monarchy which was put in place by the British in 1921. The person chosen to be king of the monarchy by the British authorities in Iraq was Faisal ibn Hussein who had played a key role in helping the British during the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottomans during World War I.

The transfer of power from Ottoman to British was a watershed moment in Iraq’s history. It was this moment in time that prompted Tripp to remark, “The history of Iraq begins here” (Tripp 2007, 30). While the British built a new political and social system from the existing Ottoman structure, the lives of Iraqis would change drastically in a number of ways. Overall, while Ottoman control was “gradual and sporadic” and rarely extended outside of the urban areas (at least until the mid-nineteenth century), British involvement specifically looked for ways to pacify and control the countryside (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 2–3). In other words, while many ordinary citizens in the area of Iraq may not have felt as if they were a part of a larger empire for the majority of Ottoman rule, those living in Iraq after World War I quickly became aware that they were living under a new set of rules and expectations.

Not only did Britain alter the political and social systems of the Ottomans, but they also reformed the actual physical boundaries of Iraq, cobbling together the three previously separate Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra into one country. This event did not come without some struggle, however. After the British gained control of Iraq, negotiations immediately began concerning the physical borders of the country. One of the main disputes over the redrawing of the country’s borders had to do with the large Kurdish population in the north. The Kurds, who initially welcomed the British takeover of Iraq, soon felt misled as they had originally been promised their independence through the creation of a Kurdish state in the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. This promise was reneged upon, however, in the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 which permanently ended the possibility for Kurdish autonomy in the region; as a result, the Kurds have since been in an almost constant state of rebellion in Iraq (Stansfield 2007, 66–67). With the inclusion of the entirety of the former Ottoman province of Mosul the British were subsequently including a large and rebellious non-Arab ethnic minority in the country who were to play a major role in the future of Iraq.

One major population shift that was beginning to take place at the outset of the period of British rule and the monarchy was rural-urban migration. This pattern of migration took place primarily among agricultural workers (*fellahin*) in the south moving principally to Baghdad but also to Basra. The shift at this time was due in part to a law enacted by the government in the 1920s called the Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators, the outcome of which was the encumbering of fellahin into colossal debt which they were rarely able to pay back (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 33–34). One of the only solutions for the fellahin at this point was to escape the farm and move to the city to find work and new sources of income. This pattern of migration became especially acute after the beginnings of the oil boom in the 1950s. Again, the levels of outmigration from the countryside at this time were highest from the southern provinces. This is due largely to high levels of oppression of the fellahin by the landlords in this part of the country (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 34). Phillips shows the effects of this migration trend in that even in spite of a natural increase in population at this time within the country in general, the southern provinces experienced a population loss. Meanwhile, the population of Baghdad, the foremost destination of the fellahin migrants, increased from 600,000 to 800,000 between 1947 and 1956 (Phillips 1959, 409).

Rural-urban migration was not a static phenomenon, however. Even after the revolution of 1958 which overthrew the monarchy in Iraq and after the Baath regime was finally successful in permanently taking over the reins of Iraq in 1968, rural-urban migration continued. Between 1977 and 1980, the annual growth rate in urban areas was approximately 6.1%. At the same time, the growth rate in rural areas was negative, estimated at -2.9%. By 1980, the percentage of the population living in cities as opposed to the countryside had almost exactly reversed from the situation in 1947 (the year of the first official census in Iraq) with 69% living in urban areas and 31% living in rural areas (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 246). The vast majority of these urban in-migrants

were settling in Baghdad and by 1977 the city comprised 26.4% of the national total.

What were the outcomes of this rural-urban migration? One obvious result was the increasing population density in urban areas, especially Baghdad. As the vast majority of the in-migrants to Baghdad from the 1920s to the 1980s were poor *fellahin*, there was thus a parallel increase in the erection of poorly built informal housing districts not only on the fringes of Baghdad but in the city center as well. By the late 1950s informal dwellings (*serifas*) numbered 44,000 which was 44.6% of the total number of houses in Baghdad (Lawless 1972, 121). Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett point to the informal expansion of two areas of Baghdad in particular: Madinat al-Thawra and al-Shula. They state that although Baghdad had tripled in total population between 1962 and 1975, these two areas specifically had increased tenfold over the same period and, “developed into a tremendous physical and social slum” (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 247).

One of the characteristics thus observed within the literature covering rural-urban migration during this period is that much of the migration to Baghdad was from the southern provinces and that the vast majority of the southern migrants were Shiite. Already adding to a sizeable Shiite population in Baghdad, the relationship between Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs in urban areas was rarely a focus among authors writing on rural-urban migration. Lawless, however, does speculate on this relationship stating that another result of rapid urbanization over the previous decades “must be the formation of new allegiances founded not on religion or language but according to occupation, wealth and social class” (Lawless 1972, 100–101). While Lawless’ observation of large scale Shi’a migration to the central Iraqi provinces may have had some merit, divisions between allegiances of any kind made between Sunni and Shiite were intensified by the continued political control of the Arab Sunni minority. This point can be exemplified by looking at the structure of Iraq’s military throughout the middle decades of the twentieth century. While recruits for the Iraqi army during these

decades were made up primarily of Arab Shiites, the officer corps consisted almost wholly of Arab Sunnis. The military thus became the main mode of political and social progression for Sunni Arabs at this time (Stansfield 2007, 83). It will be seen below that the military played a large part in carrying out ethnic violence and demographic engineering in the following decades.

After the British granted Iraq independence in 1932 a number of events occurred within Iraq and regionally which at once affected the demography of Iraq and contributed to violence inside of the country. The first of these events concerns one of the smaller ethnic minorities in Iraq, the Assyrians. The Assyrians, a Christian community from Anatolia that was re-settled in Iraq as refugees under British sponsorship during the First World War, was given a good deal of protection by the British authorities during the war as the population was charged with supplying troops for the British-officered Iraq Levies (Tripp 2007, 73). As independence approached, however, and British protection of the community of about 35,000–40,000 members waned, the Assyrians worried about their future as their relationship with Arabs in the area as well as Kurds was largely strained on either religious grounds, or because the Assyrians were thought to be encroaching on Kurdish land (Stansfield 2007, 73). The situation between the Assyrians and the surrounding communities came to a head when the Assyrians' request for an autonomous enclave inside Iraq was rejected. After some skirmishes between the former (and well-trained) Assyrian levies and the Iraqi army, the army, in 1933, massacred over 300 Assyrians in the north which was followed by the looting of over 40 Assyrian villages (Husry 1974).

The resulting reaction to the massacre inside of Iraq was one of excitement and victory. It exemplified for many the success of the army over those who threatened the unity of the new country (Tripp 2007, 78). Moreover, as Stansfield makes clear, it was the first instance of the Iraqi military acting against populations within its own borders (Stansfield 2007, 85–86). Further, the incident produced an example of tension and conflict between ethnicities and religions in the

country. The event was at once an opportunity for the Iraqi army to demonstrate their power to others who may wish to rise against the newly formed government and for Kurdish groups to exact revenge on a group who contested their own claim to territory in northern Iraq. This would not be the last incident of clashes between groups or of demographic change initiated through violence by either colonial or internal powers.

Another change to the overall ethnic makeup of Iraq was caused by regional issues. In 1948, as a result of the Arab-Israeli War, there was an overall backlash against the longstanding Jewish community in Iraq, primarily Baghdad. In 1947, the Jewish population in Iraq totaled 117,000 or 2.6 % of the total Iraqi population (Tripp 2007, 120). The events of the Arab-Israeli War had violent ramifications for the Jewish community in Iraq despite attempts made by the Jewish leadership in Baghdad to make known that they were not supporters of the Zionist enterprise. Nonetheless, Jews in Iraq were targeted regardless of whether or not they supported Zionism and the community as a whole was soon to disappear entirely from Iraq.

An additional matter concerning ethnicity and demographic changes in Iraq in the post-World War I period was the intense Arabization of parts of the northern regions of the country, especially the city of Kirkuk. Outlined in detail in Anderson and Stansfield, the Arabization of Kirkuk underwent five successive phases all of which were an attempt to increase the Arab population in the city relative to the Kurdish population. This would mean the government could lay claim to Kirkuk in the face of Kurdish assertions that the city is predominantly Kurdish and should be incorporated into a future independent Kurdistan (2009, 30–42). The main cause of importance of Kirkuk for the Iraqi government and subsequently, for all parties laying claim to Kirkuk is the vast oil reserves found there. The first phase of Arabization thus took place shortly after independence when Kirkuk became one of Iraq's most important economic centers due to its immense oil reserves. By 1935, Iraq had become one of the world's major exporters of oil and the

monarchy, aware of ongoing Kurdish hostility due to a succession of Kurdish revolts, “moved to socially engineer Kirkuk in order to weaken the Kurdish presence there” (Anderson and Stansfield 2009, 32).

Policies of Arabization in the 1930s were just the beginning of a long series of events in the demographic engineering of Kirkuk and other regions which were comprised of a combination of natural resources and diverse ethnic and religious populations. Anderson and Stansfield describe the intensity during the second phase of Arabization between 1963 and 1968 stating:

Kurdish neighborhoods in Kirkuk were demolished; Kurdish villages near the city were destroyed; Kurds in Dibis were expelled and replaced with Arab tribes, in some 35 villages; similar numbers of villages were Arabized in Sargaran and Kandinawa districts; Kurds working in the oil industry were expelled or transferred outside the province; Arabs were brought into the local police force; names of schools and streets were changed from Kurdish to Arabic; and a large-scale militarization of the province was undertaken, including the establishment of security zones around oil facilities (2009, 35–36).

Although it is generally thought that the oppression and marginalization of the Kurdish population was carried out primarily by Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath regime, these examples highlight that Arabization policies had been taking place at least since Iraq’s independence in 1932.

Unfortunately, Arabization policies did not ease after 1968 and in fact continued until the U.S. led invasion in 2003. One Human Rights Watch Report documents the expulsion of ethnic minorities from areas of northern Iraq between 1991 and 2002 (Mufti and Bouckaert 2003). This report is similarly troublesome. Estimates of those Iraqis forcibly displaced between 1991 and 2002 due to Arabization policies range from 58,000 to 140,000. These estimates include not only Kurds but also Turkmen and Assyrians who were expelled from their homes (Mufti and Bouckaert 2003, 4). Changing the demographic makeup of Kirkuk and surrounding areas was not carried out only by the forcible expulsion of people from their homes but later by Decree 199

which was passed by Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council which “allowed” non-Arab Iraqis over 18 years of age to change their official ethnic identity by applying to register as Arabs (Mufti and Bouckaert 2003, 6). Many ethnic minorities who refused to officially change their ethnicity faced harassment by the Iraqi police until they either left on their own accord or until they were forcibly expelled from their homes and moved to specific locations inside of Iraq.

The Iraqi government’s record of dealing with ethnic minorities, especially Kurds, who constitute the largest minority population and have been in a state of continuous rebellion against the government, is problematic at best. From the 1933 massacre of Assyrians to the violent expulsion of the long-established Jewish community after 1948, to the numerous clashes with the Kurdish population, the government of Iraq since independence has taken an aggressive approach in shaping the social, cultural, demographic, and physical makeup of Iraq in a way that allows for decisive control over all aspects of society.

Controlling all aspects of society was one of the defining characteristics of Saddam Hussein’s long dictatorship. After the fall of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958, there was a decade of political power struggles within the country which culminated with the permanent seizing of power by the Ba’ath Party in 1968. It was not until 1979 that Hussein came to rule the country, a position in which he was to remain until the fall of his regime in 2003. Hussein’s treatment of ethnic minorities and of Kurds in particular was incredibly harsh. Additionally, his treatment of the Arab Shiite population was similarly unforgiving.

One example of Saddam’s tactics against the Kurdish ethnic minority which cannot be left out is the infamous al-Anfal Campaign. This operation, which took place from February through August 1988, was in response to Kurdish militias gaining control over certain areas of Iraqi Kurdistan during Iraq’s debilitating war with Iran which lasted from 1980 to 1988. By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Hussein was determined to regain control of those regions in the north of which the government had effectively lost control. The al-Anfal campaign was violent and swift

as it used chemical weapons to carry out a scorched-earth policy in all areas of Kurdish resistance. Victims of the operation included women and children and by the end of the campaign in the three governorates which contained factions of the Kurdish resistance, approximately 80 % of all the villages had been destroyed and an estimated 100,000 people had been killed (Tripp 2007, 235–236). This event is a striking example of Hussein's policies towards ethnic minorities in Iraq. Moreover, the specific example of al-Anfal demonstrates that violence bordering on the genocide of a specific population was not beyond the atrocities Hussein was willing to commit to achieve his political, economic, and societal objectives.

Demography in Iraq After the 2003 Invasion

As noted in the introduction, it is generally difficult to find acceptable demographic statistics for Iraq after 1957. General trends seen in Iraq since the end of the post-World War I period are: a significant increase in the total population of the country which continues to grow at a rapid rate; a reversal in the percentage of the rural-urban population; Baghdad becoming the only major urban center in the country; a decrease in the fertility rate in both urban and rural areas, yet these rates still remain high overall; a “youth bulge” in which 40 % of Iraq's population is now under 15 years of age; an overall decrease in infant mortality rates throughout the 1970s and 1980s contrasted with a subsequent rise in infant mortality rates in the last 20 years; increased mortality rates due to ongoing conflict in the region; and intermittent periods of large scale migration (internally and internationally) due to conflict in the country. It is important to note that reliable demographic characteristics grouped by religion or ethnic affiliation are not presently available. The delicacy of the current political situation in Iraq makes even the idea of conducting a major census controversial and potentially dangerous as there are high stakes involved for all parties.

Even without reliable population statistics since the last full census was carried out in 1987, other researchers and organizations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank have provided estimates on aspects of Iraq's demography. Further, there have been numerous plans since 2003 to conduct a census in Iraq but due to large scale protests over the controversy of such an action, the plans have been cancelled each time. One census was even planned to focus strictly on the ethnic structure of the country in 2009 but it was also promptly cancelled by the government (al-Ansary and Ryan 2009). Another full census planned to take place in October 2010 by the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT) in Iraq was cancelled at the last minute due to concerns of the controversy such a census could stir, especially in a country without a functioning government (Kami 2010a, b). Illustrating the potential controversy the census of 2010 could have caused, the questionnaire was purposefully designed not to ask Muslims whether they were Shiite or Sunni.

Even without an official census in Iraq, knowing more about population and demography in the country is important, especially during a time of war and a time in which a new government is forming. The first study to be conducted to measure the effects of war on the population was carried out in 2004 by a team of public health researchers and published in *The Lancet*, the well-known weekly medical journal (Roberts et al. 2004). The study itself was conducted to compare mortality rates before the U.S. led invasion and after. After the invasion of Iraq which began in March 2003, the authors of the study found that the risk of death after March 2003 was 2.5 times higher than during the pre-invasion period. Further, the study estimated that by October of 2004 there had been approximately 100,000 excess deaths due to the violence. This study became quite controversial as the authors' estimates were much higher than those of the US governments estimates at the time. The results were also controversial as they showed that the majority of non-combatant deaths were among women and children and that air strikes from

coalition forces accounted for most of the violent deaths (Roberts et al. 2004, 7).

Beyond the conclusion of the Roberts study, the authors demonstrated that a study of demography could be carried out using sound methodology even in a time and place of extreme violence. The Roberts study was conducted through a national cluster sample survey which was performed in 33 clusters of 30 households each. The target sample size was 4,300 individuals. The participants were asked about household composition, births, and deaths since January 2002. In households reporting death, the date, cause, and circumstances of violent deaths were recorded. This study represented the first in a line of subsequent reports tabulating and analyzing demographic data in post-2003 Iraq.

The largest and possibly most significant of the studies to be conducted in the post-Saddam period in Iraq was the Iraq Living Conditions Survey (ILCS) 2004. Published in 2005, this report was separated into three volumes: the tabulation report (Volume I), the analytical report (Volume II), and the socio-economic atlas of Iraq (Volume III). This study was carried out in 2004 by the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT) under the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation in Iraq in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme and the Norwegian-based Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies. This study, conducted in the second half of 2004, was carried out in all 18 governorates in Iraq, despite the security situation in many parts of the country. Two separate questionnaires were used to conduct the overall survey: first, the household questionnaire, which covered the characteristics of each household and the individuals within it and second, the woman and child questionnaire which dealt with issues of reproductive health and health care as well as the health and nutrition of children in the household.

Taking into account the use of both questionnaires within a total of 21,668 households across Iraq, the COSIT was able to accumulate data on many different aspects of the living conditions in Iraq such as population estimates, demographic

data including mortality and fertility rates, information on housing and infrastructure, health, education, employment, and household income and wealth (UNDP 2005a, b, c). As a full census of all the governorates in Iraq has not been carried out by the central government since 1987, the purpose of this study is not only to assess the effects of the current war upon the whole of Iraq, but also to measure the demographic effects of the Iran-Iraq War, the first gulf-war, and the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq from 1990 to 2003. Some of the main findings of the surveys offer significant insight into the conditions inside the country.

One important finding concerns child mortality rates. The under-5 year mortality rates for boys and girls according to the ILCS is 40 deaths per 1,000 live births. While this statistic is lower than estimates in other studies (see for example Ali et al. 2003) it is still quite high for the region. While studies such as Ali et al. (2003) show a spike in the child mortality rate in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, the ILCS measurements show a steady increase in under five child mortality. Either way, child mortality is rising in Iraq and it is due most likely to ongoing wars and sanctions that were imposed on the country. As child mortality is largely due to infectious diseases, malnutrition, and poor neonatal conditions, compounded by poor medical infrastructure, the improvement of the child mortality rate in Iraq looks bleak due to the ongoing violence there (UNDP 2005b, 57). Moreover, past and current conflicts along with years of sanctions have seriously affected the levels of malnutrition among children in Iraq. The ILCS study shows specifically that 8 % of children between the ages of 6 months and 5 years experience acute malnutrition (UNDP 2005a, 11). Some areas in the south of the country experience acute malnutrition levels much higher than 8 %. In the al-Qadisiya governorate, for example, acute malnutrition rates among children between 6 months and 5 years of age is estimated to be about 15 % (UNDP 2005b, 59).

As stated above, the fertility rate in Iraq is in decline although still relatively high in the region. According to the ILCS, the fertility rate in Iraq in 2003 was 3.8 children per woman. Within the

Middle East, this statistic puts Iraq behind only Yemen and the Palestinian Territories as having the highest fertility rates. Variations in the number of children a woman has in Iraq can be seen primarily between urban and rural areas and between educated and non-educated women. The fertility rate, for example, for an urban woman between 1999 and 2003 was 3.7 while the rate for a woman living in a rural area during the same time period was 5.2 (UNDP 2005b, 48).

Migration in the country has been intermittent due to war and internal conflict between the regime of Saddam Hussein and segments of the population. Aside from the forced relocation of Kurds and Turkmen from strategic oil-producing areas in the north through the central governments Arabization tactics, there have additionally been some notable refugee movements based largely upon ethnic and sectarian violence in Iraq. One example of this is the Kurdish refugee crisis beginning in 1991. After the Iraqi army had been expelled from Kuwait by coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm, a variety of groups used this moment of weakness of Saddam's power to attempt to overturn the government. The first uprisings to be crushed by Saddam's forces however, were in the south of the country and were primarily Shiite acts of revolt. After defeating the Shiite uprisings in the south, Saddam moved his forces to the north where Kurdish revolts were taking place. The brutal tactics of Saddam's Republican Guards forced many Kurds out of the cities and into the mountains along the Iran and Turkey borderlands. Because of previous large-scale attacks on Kurdish populations, it was not just Kurdish fighters to flee the cities, but also many civilians who feared for their lives. Despite the actions of the United Nations in passing UN Resolution 688 which approved humanitarian assistance to the Kurds who had fled and the imposition of Iraqi no-fly zones north of the 36th parallel (fearing another attack on Kurdish civilian populations), nearly two million Kurds were displaced in a matter of days and an estimated one million had reached the Turkish border alone (Stansfield 2007, 134; Tripp 2007, 248). Even after the central government was satisfied that the Kurdish uprisings in the north were over, Saddam

imposed a domestic economic embargo on the Kurdish population within Iraq denying them economic interaction with Arab Iraq (Stansfield 2007, 135).

While the Kurdish refugee crisis of 1991 was massive in scale it pales in comparison to the refugee migrations after the 2003 American led invasions. Highlighting the way in which war can affect demography in a country, this crisis, which began in earnest in 2005–2006, is defined by the largest movement of refugees in the Middle East since the 1948 Palestinian exodus (Petee 2007; Banta 2008). Since the beginning of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis, as it has been referred to in American and European media sources, over four million Iraqis have been displaced from their homes, about two million of whom have crossed international borders and are living in neighboring countries, primarily Syria and Jordan (O'Donnell and Newland 2008). Of the two million who have fled Iraq, an estimated 60 % are Sunnis, 15 % Iraqi Christians, and the remainder being primarily secular Shiites, Mandean, Yazidis, and Kurds (Amos 2010, x). This massive exodus of people from and within Iraq has had a destabilizing effect on the region economically and socially as well as on the country itself. One of the main groups to first flee the country in 2005 and 2006 were the educated professionals such as doctors, engineers, and university professors, siphoning off the very population that may have helped build a more open-minded and efficacious civil society (Struck 2006; Amos 2010, xii). Whether crossing neighboring borders or displaced within Iraq, refugees are fleeing their homes primarily due to ethno-sectarian discrimination and violence.

With an estimated two million Iraqis displaced within Iraq and at least another two million who have fled to neighboring countries, one can see the additional challenges to conducting a legitimate census inside the country. While the ILCs provides useful demographic information, much of the refugee migration had not yet begun as the study itself was carried out in 2004. Although living situations in neighboring countries is far from ideal for Iraqi refugees, continuing violence and instability in Iraq keep the majority of those who

have left from returning (Ridderbos 2007; Leenders 2008). And while many continue to reside in countries such as Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt, thousands have now been resettled through official channels to countries such as Sweden and the United States. As of the end of the 2010 fiscal year on September 30, 2010, the United States has resettled a total of 52,680 Iraqi refugees since October 2005.

The Iraq refugee crisis and the Kurdish refugee crisis of 1991 illustrate some of the effects of war on population movements and, more generally, on the broader demographic effects. Refugee movements are just one of a number of population trends in Iraq, however. Studies conducted after the invasion of Iraq on specific issues such as mortality and other broader studies such as the Iraq Living Conditions Survey show that some of the population trends in Iraq are intensifying. Some of these include high fertility rates, an increasingly young population, and increasing rates of mortality and malnutrition among children in the country. What are the effects, if any, however, of these statistics and trends upon the current situation in Iraq? The following section will take a brief look at some of the different theories explaining why ethnic and sectarian violence is so prevalent since the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Theoretical Considerations and Future Prospects for Iraq

Many theories exist as to the reasons for the current ethno-sectarian tension and violence in post-Saddam Iraq. Without espousing a single theory, this section will cover a variety of possible reasons that ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq has been so widespread and extensive. One of the dominant approaches for explaining the current violence in Iraq, especially among policy-makers and analysts in Washington, is to simply, “impose a primordial template onto the political and societal complexities of the situation” (Dodge 2007, 24). Proponents of this argument insist that there are three sectarian communities in Iraq (Sunni, Shiite, and Kurds) which are mostly homoge-

nous, have been forced into geographical proximity with one another under a Sunni authoritarian dictatorship, and have been and always will be hostile towards each other due primarily to long held sectarian or ethnic hatred. This argument, however influential it may be, essentializes Iraqi society and culture as a static and unchanging entity. The ethno-sectarian fighting occurring in Iraq today is most likely not caused by long held antipathies between homogenous groups. As this paper has strived to show, the various ethnic and sectarian groups in Iraq are far from homogenous. Nor is the current violence due to any one single explanation, however, but is in all probability due to a combination and merging of different events, processes, and developments.

While many analysts, journalists, and observers have blamed the United States’ invasion of Iraq for the current ethno-sectarian violence, this event cannot be held solely accountable either. Other forces, events, and processes must be and are offered in explaining the violence reported in Iraq on an almost daily basis. First, a number of scholars and analysts point to the legacy of colonialism in Iraq as being a cause of tensions within the country which are still present today (Dodge 2003; Khalidi 2004). Certainly the imposition of artificial boundaries in the creation of the Iraqi state as well as other effects of post-World War I British colonialism had dire consequences for the future of the country. The creation of the state of Iraq by the British leads to what Stansfield calls, “the artificiality debate”. Stansfield describes this debate as follows:

The territory of Iraq, so this argument would tend to go, was brought together in the aftermath of World War I because of the geopolitical and economic needs of victorious Western powers, and most notably those of Britain. From a constellation of dissociated peoples living in different geographical spaces, the modern state of Iraq was doomed to succumb to various manifestations of authoritarian rule because this was the only mechanism by which the fractious country could be held together (Stansfield 2007, 28–29).

This argument thus presupposes that the various ethnic and religious groups in Iraq cannot live together without an authoritarian ruler holding them together and therefore, when Saddam

Hussein's regime fell in 2003, there was nothing left to keep the groups from competing for power. These groups of people had been living in geographical proximity to one another long before British colonialism, however. The difference implied in this argument is that for the first time under the British, the population was brought together under the rule of a foreign-imposed central government located in Baghdad, the Hashemite monarchy. Moreover, the Iraqi population was expected to adhere to the new rules of governance which were to serve British economic interests and, moreover, which shattered previous notions of government, society, and identity among the population at large. As Tripp states, "It (the new British regime of power) demanded new forms of identity and new strategies to exploit the opportunities that presented themselves" (Tripp 2007, 30).

While British colonialism in Iraq is often cited in discussions of the country's ongoing violence, other authors point to continuing forms of colonialism or imperialism, referring primarily to the actions of the United States in Iraq before and after 2003 (Gregory 2004; Ali 2003; Khalidi 2004). These authors argue that even before the US-led invasion in 2003, America was playing an imperial-like role in Iraq. The invasion in 2003 was simply an extension of previous American actions in the country and one which solidified it, for these authors, as an imperial power in the Middle East. While the US may have been involved in the politics and economy of Iraq before 2003, America certainly became even more heavily involved in political, social, and economic issues in the country after the invasion as it has been a primary player in the formation of Iraq's new government.

The 2003 invasion and the events that occurred afterward are often viewed through the lenses of failed American policy and military planning with an emphasis that the US went into Iraq with little understanding of and unprepared for the cultural, political, and societal complexities of the country. Many have criticized and blamed America's planning (or lack of planning) in the lead up to the war for the current violence in Iraq (Sidahmed 2007, 79; Cole 2003). Writing about

the influential Sadrist movement not long after the initial invasion of Iraq, Middle East historian Juan Cole writes, "in planning the war on Iraq, the American Defense Departments and intelligence organizations appear to have been unaware that millions of Iraqi Shi'ites had joined a militant and puritanical movement dedicated to the establishment of an Iran-style Islamic Republic in Iraq..." (Cole 2003, 543). Cole's article illustrates first, that the US government may indeed have been unprepared for the complex sectarian dynamics which led to the violence which began and intensified after the invasion. Secondly, Cole's article highlights the fact that many of the movements and groups which have since taken part in the ethno-sectarian violence were not created in a vacuum but instead were in existence and organized long before the fall of Saddam. This is not meant to evoke the idea, however, that these groups have been organized and waiting to inflict violence upon one another at the first given opportunity. While tensions have existed in varying degrees between certain ethnicities and sects within Iraq (at times more than others), Cole argues that the ethno-sectarian violence observed in Iraq today is due more to the economic and political influence in Iraq by the US government. As Cole states, "Iraq's problems have for the most part derived from the extreme concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a succession of minority cliques—a state of affairs that the Americans may be in the process of fostering once again by their extreme economic liberalization policies" (Cole 2004, 31). Although Cole argues that accumulation of the country's wealth and power in the hands of a small minority group is a primary reason for the current problems Iraq faces, one cannot discount the effects of 30 years of authoritarian dictatorship.

The strategies and effects of Saddam Hussein's regime are well-documented in Makiya's landmark work, *Republic of Fear* (1998). This work illustrates the way Hussein used fear and violence as a primary tactic in securing control over the population. Further, many of Hussein's policies have directly affected the existence of ethno-sectarian violence seen in Iraq today. According to Sidahmed, the effects of Saddam's regime on

the current situation are two-fold. First, Saddam's strategy of suppressing all organizations and movements that were not explicitly tied to the Iraqi Baath Party meant that there were few, if any, alternative groups to play a role in post-Saddam Iraqi politics. As Sidahmed states, "Years of systematic oppression and prohibition of independent political or organizational activity resulted in the gradual destruction of national and secular platforms, whether political parties, trades unions, or other civil society organizations" (Sidahmed 2007, 74). Many of the religious groups and organizations were able to continue to exist, albeit under circumstances of high levels of oppression and discrimination, and became some of the only alternatives for political mobilization during Saddam's rule. Along with the continued existence of religious organizations, the ideological approach of Saddam's regime became overtly more religious after the failed invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the onset of the devastating UN sanctions which lasted for more than a decade. With the subsequent drop in Saddam's popularity as a result of these events, the regime began to employ religion, Islam, as a way to regain legitimacy and popularity. Throughout the 1990s and until the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there was a growing tendency among the Iraqi population towards Islam due to the hardships of the time. Religion thus started to play a greater role not only within the political ideology of the regime, but in the lives of the population at large (Sidahmed 2007, 75–76).

Alongside the importance of the 30 years of authoritarian rule in Iraq is the issue of the country's vast reserves of natural resources. The interest of imperial powers such as Britain and the United States in Iraq has since the First World War revolved partially around the vast amount of oil the country possesses. A number of authors have drawn attention to the role of oil in influencing the US to invade Iraq in 2003 (Khalidi 2004; Jhaveri 2004). It is important to point out, however, that Iraq's oil wealth also played a major role internally in shifting the political culture within Iraq in the 1970s. The exponential growth in oil revenues in the 1970s allowed Saddam's regime to rely much less on tax revenue and also

to employ much of the population with government jobs. This created a greater dependency of the population upon the central government for their health, safety, and welfare (Stansfield 2007, 95–96). Tripp identifies the importance of the political economy of oil in Iraq as well, illustrating its effect and influence on the relationships between those in control of state revenues and various sectors of the population (Tripp 2007, 6).

Those relationships are playing out currently along ethnic and sectarian lines as specific regions and/or provinces in Iraq which are either majority Kurdish, Shiite, or Sunni are calling for control over the natural resources present in their specific areas. One example of this, reported in the *New York Times*, is taking place in Anbar province, traditionally a majority Sunni province, where local Sunni politicians are challenging the central government's control and expropriation of a natural gas field in the province. As the *Times* reporters write, "The conflict — which pits a Sunni province against a mostly Shiite administration — adds a new battle line in one of the country's most divisive and volatile issues: who controls the vast untapped oil and gas reserves that are necessary to restart Iraq's crippled economy" (Leland and Ali 2010). Similar conflicts have been playing out in the Kurdish dominated north and the Shiite south and will be a major issue confronting the central government in the future.

While oil wealth may have played a part in creating a dependence of the general population upon Saddam's regime in the 1970s, the UN sanctions on the country played a much different role and cannot be left out of the discussion. The UN sanctions which were imposed on Iraq from 1990 to 2003 created a reliance among sectors of the population upon their affiliated religious and/or ethnic communities and invariably played a part in the strengthening of ethno-sectarian identities and thus in the current ethno-sectarian violence observed in the country. The sanctions of Iraq had dire consequences on much of the Iraqi population and by 1995, it was estimated that approximately 20 % of the population was living in conditions of extreme poverty (Stansfield 2007, 140). Certainly, the sanctions were influen-

tial in the deteriorating levels of nutrition among the population and more generally among their welfare and well-being. Due to the dismal conditions during the era of the sanctions, the population was forced to rely more on groups and organizations affiliated with religion or ethnicity rather than the central government, to which they were accustomed (Sidahmed 2007, 76). This point may have facilitated not only the allegiances among sectors of the populations and specific organizations, but may have also aided in increasing the power of those groups.

A final explanation as to why ethno-sectarian violence is occurring at this specific moment has to do with theories relating to state collapse. Even before the US-led invasion in 2003, the Iraqi state was on the verge of collapse due to two devastating wars and debilitating international sanctions which led to rampant crime throughout the country (Dodge 2007, 29). After the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the US-led coalition was unable to gain control of the country or to instill a legitimate or accepted central government. According to Dodge, this lack of reliable administrative state institutions can have dire consequences on a population. In the aftermath of state collapse, "Politics becomes both international and highly local...public goods, services, economic subsistence, and ultimately physical survival are to be found through ad hoc and informal channels" (Dodge 2007, 26). These channels, in the aftermath of state collapse in Iraq, have led to membership and affiliation among broad sectors of the population with "industrial strength" criminal gangs, independent militias, and organizations of the insurgency whose main purpose is to fight the US-led occupation and the Iraqi government (Dodge 2007, 31–32).

These combined various historical events and processes: the legacy of colonialism, three wars, 30 years of authoritarian dictatorship, extreme state violence against large sectors of the population as a form of control and coercion, debilitating UN sanctions, rising Islamist tendencies, infighting over natural resources, and a collapsed state which has yet to be fully reestablished, have all played an indelible role in structuring and restructuring collective societal identities in

Iraq. When these characteristics are linked with specific and significant demographic trends such as an increasingly large youth population, increasing urbanization and urban poverty, extremely high mortality rates due to violence, and large-scale refugee outmigration after 2005, the future of Iraq appears bleak. Only through continued and intense state-building efforts will Iraq have the ability to rebuild as a nation and as a people.

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Part VI

Africa

Fareeda McClinton Griffith and Tukulufu Zuberi

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a demographic profile of South Africa. First, we focus on the Cape because we suggest that the Cape experience has general implications for other settlements in South Africa such as Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State, and helps in understanding the emerging national context of racial classification in the census. Secondly, we turn to the use of Race in the efforts to conduct censuses by the Colonial administrators. These enumerations are different from the census, in that they were not as systematic, nor did they have the same authoritative mandate as censuses. Next, we turn our attention to how the system of racial classification developed in the Cape Colony was expanded and extended to other regions of South Africa. The colonial history provides a foundation for a discussion of race and ethnicity in the segregation period. Finally, we move to an examination of apartheid and post apartheid periods and provide an outlook of the future in post apartheid South Africa. We conclude by mentioning how these enumerations were related to European

colonial domination and racial classification more generally and are associated the racial stratification system.

Introduction

Colonial South Africa provides an example of how racial classifications have been used to define citizenship and social status. Racial classifications have been made in South African enumerations since 1657. Because the colonial authorities were adamant about enumerating the “inhabitants” of the colonies and surrounding territories regardless of “race” (Macartney 1797 in CC 1898:103, 123), South African census data offer us the opportunity to gain a better understanding of the relationship between colonialism, census taking, and the African continent. More specifically, for our purposes, these census data allow us the opportunity to examine the historical development of official schemes of racial classification in the southern African region. In this chapter, we examine the history of racial classification in population “enumeration.” We begin with a focus on the Cape because we suggest that the Cape experience has general implications for other settlements in South Africa such as Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State, and helps in understanding the emerging national context of racial classification in the census (See Fig. 20.1).

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


Fig. 20.1 South Africa circa 1904

Current day, post apartheid South Africa provides a unique demographic profile. For example, the population increased from 40.5 to 44.8 million between 1996 and 2001, with a growth rate of approximately 2 % per year.¹ According to 2010 midyear estimates, the population size is approximately 50 million; the life expectancy at birth for males is 53.3 years and women 55.2 years. Based on the aforementioned data, the population continues to grow; however, this chapter addresses the current day consequences of the historical process of racial injustice.

Our strategy in this chapter is as follows: first we discuss how race was used in Colonial efforts to enumerate the population in the Cape Colony. The Colonial efforts at enumerating the population provide a record of the development of the systems of racial classification. We discuss how these developments were related to social change in Colonial South Africa. Secondly, we turn to the use of Race in the efforts to conduct censuses by the Colonial administrators. These enumerations are different from the census, in that they were not as systematic, nor did they have the

same authoritative mandate as censuses. Next, we turn our attention to how the system of racial classification developed in the Cape Colony was expanded and extended to other regions of South Africa. The colonial history provides a foundation for a discussion of race and ethnicity in the segregation period. Finally, we move to an examination of apartheid and post apartheid periods and provide an outlook of the future in post apartheid South Africa. We conclude by mentioning how these enumerations were related to European colonial domination and racial classification more generally and are associated the racial stratification system.

Racial Classification in Colonial South Africa, 1657–1904

Historical demographers of Africa noted the lack of quantitative data available in Africa before the mid-twentieth century (Cordell 1999, 2000; Zuberi and Mbacke 1999; Gervais and Marcoux 1993). Most of the quantitative historical data for

Africa is not in the format of data found in Europe and the United States. Colonialism required information regarding the economic performance of the colony; and the colony's internal capacity to be "civilized" by Western education and the payment of a head tax to finance the colonial administration. The road to "civilization" by taxation and education both required estimates of the population size. These estimates were often mistakenly labeled "censuses" or "population enumerations." Although these data were collected throughout the various European colonies the data for Africa was rarely preserved and in most cases of an inferior quality.

Often administrative records that enumerate the population for a non-demographic purpose can serve as the database for African historical demography. Gouws (1987) study of the white population of South Africa and McDaniel's (1995) study of Liberian immigrants are good examples of this process. A more systematic examination of these data are needed if we are to grasp Africa's demographic history (see Zuberi and Mbacke 1999; Cordell 1999, 2000; Gervais and Marcoux 1993 on this point). In this chapter, we look at racial classification in efforts to "enumerate" the following historical moments in South Africa: the colonial period, the segregation era, and the apartheid and post apartheid epochs. Our main concern regards the process, the implications, and consequences of differentiating the European colonizers from the indigenous colonized population. We do not attempt to estimate the size of the population. However, our goal is to provide a demographic profile of the country through a historical overview of the country and racial/ethnic conflict.

The collection of racial statistics in South Africa can be traced to the fifteenth century contact between Africans and Europeans. In 1488, African herdsmen and farmers encountered the Portuguese explorer Bartholomew Dias when his ship reached the southern tip of Africa. The African contact with Dias was followed by the arrival of the Dutch traders of the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie² (VOC) and the European colonization of the southern coast of Africa. Over the period from 1657 to 1819 the

European-origin population at the Cape of Good Hope, the principal European outpost in southern Africa, is estimated to have increased from 134 to almost 43,000 (see Tables 20.1a and 20.1b). The establishment of the settlement at the Cape of Good Hope naturally introduced the need to distinguish between the settlers and the "native" population. The colonial administrators, Landlords, Boer/Afrikaner nationalist, capitalist farmers, and skilled white workers built their hegemonic power base on the foundations of colonial conquest that racialized the colonized Africans as the outside "other" (Posel 1991; Zuberi 2001:17–26; Jordan 1968). The process of racial classification developed within the discourse about African inferiority and the increasingly important world of racial science (Zuberi 2001:17–26, 42; Bank 1996). For example, within the Colonial Cape the use of phrenology, especially among the British settler community on the Eastern Cape and the colonial elite thorough-out the colony, is clear evidence that this public discourse took place. Internationally, the African population came to represent the racially inferior human. This tendency was exemplified in Sir Francis Galton's rise to intellectual stardom in the British scientific community on the basis of his accounts of African inferiority in his 1850 book, *The Narrative of an Explorer in Tropical South Africa*.

Race and Colonial Enumerations in the Cape Colony

The areas of the present Republic of South Africa contained various colonies that operated as independent administrative units and conducted various population enumerations. The most extensive and systematic enumerations took place in the Cape of Good Hope Colony. The Cape of Good Hope Colony had one of the earliest and longest running enumerations of the population in southern Africa beginning in the late 1650s.

Successive colonial administrations conducted annual "enumerations" of various resident populations in between 1657 and 1785 and from 1805 to the early 1900s. The Dutch East Indian Company

Table 20.1a Racial classifications in the population data of the cape of good hope colony, 1657–1904

Year	A. European	B. Colored	C. Asians	D. Africans	E. Slaves	F. Servants	G. Free Blacks	H. Others
1657	Vryliede	(included in A)			p. Slaves	Knegte		Amptenare
1667	Vryliede	"					Free Blacks	Amptenare
1677	Vryliede	"					Free Blacks	
1687	Vryliede	"			p. Slaves	Knegte		
1698	Vryliede	"					Free Blacks	
1707	Vryliede	"						
1718	Vryliede	"			p. Slaves	Knegte		
1727					c. Slaves			
1738	Vryliede	"			p. Slaves	Knegte		
1748	Vryliede	"			p. Slaves	Knegte		
1760	Vryliede	"			p. Slaves	Knegte	Free Blacks	
1768					p. Slaves			
1777					c. Slaves			
1786	Vryliede	"			p. Slaves	Knegte		
1797	Vryliede	"			p. Slaves			
1807	Christians			Hottentots	p. Slaves	Servants	Free Blacks	Negro
1817	Christians			Hottentots	p. Slaves	Servants	Free Blacks	Apprentinices
1827	Whites				p. Slaves		Free Blacks	
1834/5	All Free Persons				p. Slaves		(included in A&E)	Apprentinices
1845	Whites	Colored Population						
1855/56	Whites	Coloured	Malays	Heathen				Various, Aliens
1865	European or White			Hottentot/Kafir				Other
1875	European or White		Malay	Hottentot/Fingo/Kafir and Betshuana				Mixed & Other
1891	European or White		Malay	Hottentot/Fingo/Kafir and Betshuana				Mixed & Other
1904	Persons		Malay	Hottentot/Fingo/Kafir and Betshuana				Mixed & Other

(continued)

Table 20.1a (continued)

Sources: Khalfani et al. (2005)

Gray Shaded area: Not enumerate during Dutch rule

General Muster Rolls 1657–1707; Opgaafrolle; Records of the Cape Colony 1793–1827, vols 1–35, Cape of Good Hope Blue Book 1840–1856; De Wet (1978), Patterson (1975), De Lima (1854), Elphick and Giliomee (1988) Armstrong and Worden (1987), Official Census Reports for the 1865, 1875, 1891 & 1904 Censuses

Notes:

^aRefers to the Free Burghers, most of whom were Europeans. However, some “Coloureds” were included in this population^bCape Town only, c. Company owned slaves, p. Privately owned slaves

took the first wave of enumerations of the colonial populations at the Cape of Good Hope from the 1650s to the late 1700s. The British took the second wave when they took control of the colony in 1805.

From 1682 to the 1800s, enumerations were taken every 3–5 years in the *Opgaafrol*, or Citizens Tax Rolls (CGH 1682; also see Potgieter and Visagie 1974). The actual name of the enumerations changed over time from “*Rol*” to “*Opneemrolle*” to “*Opgaafrol*.” The *Opgaafrols* contain information on individual households, including the names of the head of the house, numbers of men, women, children, servants, slaves (according to sex and adult/child), livestock, and produce. Some of the earliest enumerations of populations in South Africa were the registrations of the V.O.C.’s staff and slaves, Free Blacks, the *Vryliede* (which included Free Burghers and Free Coloureds). These enumerations were taken shortly after the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck and the other settlers that established a refreshment station in the Western Cape in 1652 for the Dutch East India Company (VOC). The *Vryliede* consisted mainly of Europeans, however there were a few Coloureds included (De Wet 1978). There were probably enumerations of slaves in all of the locations where *Vryliede* are enumerated (see Eldredge and Morton 1994). Gouws (1987) suggests that slaves and their children were also registered in some of these earlier enumerations. The VOC also maintained a registry of those enslaved by the company. Jeffreys (1944:120) stated that the earliest enumerations available of South Africans were published in the *Journal* on October 12, 1672. However, in addition to Jan van Riebeeck’s diary, which contains counts of the individuals

disembarking from the three ships that arrived with him in 1652, the Cape Town Archives maintains the *Monsterrollen van Vrije Lieden* (Muster Rolls of *Vryliede*), which contains the names of Free Burghers, their wives and children; some contain lists of soldiers from 1657 to 1791 (there are some years missing from the manuscripts). The colonial authorities made a series of proclamations concerning population in the eighteenth century. For example, in June and July of 1797, the Earl of Macartney issued two proclamations mandating the enumeration of the population, property, livestock and produce – for consumption and selling (CC 1898). The June proclamation stated that all “Inhabitants” of the Cape Colony over 16 years of age (i.e. the taxable population) were to be entered into the Colonial Registers. Africans in Cape Colony were often enumerated by proxy, the expressed intent was to estimate the colony’s capacity to pay the head tax.

There was no definition of the term “race” in any of these early documents, however the language had become racialized. For example, the term Free Blacks referred to people of African and Asian descent, primarily the latter, and people of mixed parentage (Patterson 1975). This term was introduced as early as 1667 (see Table 20.1a). To complicate matter more, the enslaved population consisted of captives from East Africa (Mozambique and Zanzibar), Dahomey, Delagoa Bay, Indonesia (including Malaysia), India, Madagascar and indigenous South Africans (see Eldredge and Morton 1994; Armstrong and Worden 1987). The majority, 65 %, of the enslaved population came from Madagascar. None of the enslaved population had their origins in Europe. The act of exclusively enslaving non-European origin populations

Table 20.1b Population of the cape of good hope colony, 1657–1904

Year	A. European	B. Colored	C. Asians	D. Africans	E. Slaves	F. Servants	G. Free Blacks	H. Others	Total
1657	14	"						134	148
1667	102	"					6	518	626
1677	199	"					14		213
1687	573	"			310	39			922
1695	1,036	"					45	711	1,792
1698	934	"					26		960
1707	468	"							468
1718	2,055	"			2,436	92			4,583
1727					597				597
1738	3,612	"			5,757	136			9,505
1748	4,508	"			4,922	81			9,511
1753	5,419	"			6,045	114			11,578
1768					5,757				5,757
1777					559				559
1786	11,815	"			12,898	23			24,736
1797	21,746	"			25,754				47,500
1807	25,488			17,431	29,303	126	1,134		73,482
1817	39,461			23,436	32,046	173	1,876	543	97,535
1827	55,675				32,272		37,852		125,799
1834/5	110,803				34,241		(included in A & E)	34,241	179,285
1845	69,031	74,486							143,517
1855/56	102,156	129,167	6,099	1,669				27,153	266,244
1865	181,592			182,134				132,655	496,381
1875	236,783		10,817	386,200				87,184	720,984
1891	376,987		13,907	888,524				247,806	1,527,224
1904	579,741		15,682	1,516,047				298,334	2,409,804

Source: Khalfani et al. (2005)

was critical in the establishment of a racially stratified society in South Africa.

The enslavement of non-European-origin populations was by the seventeenth century a common practice among European Diaspora populations (Drake 1987: Chapter 7). The act of identifying settlers as a distinct population symbolized European dominance over the native African population. The settlers were viewed as being different and better than the “native” population. The use of racial classification as a marginalizing process preceded the “legalization” of racial stratification (see Ross 1993:71–74, 82–86; Crais 1992:125–146; Bickford-Smith 1995:67–90; Nasson 1991:7–10). Likewise, the usage of

racial classifications in South Africa preceded the reference to “racial categories” in official census questionnaires and documentation. Thus, prior to legalized racial stratification the Cape Colonists thought of themselves as racially White (Bickford-Smith 1995:67; Posel 1991). The practice of racial classification helped naturalize the socially constructed idea of racial differences.

Between 1805 and 1865, yearly enumerations were taken with a few exceptions (Table 20.1b). These enumerations took place at the request of the colonial administrator in Britain, and the timing was set so the entire British Empire was enumerated simultaneously. The classifications of the various populations in

the annual enumerations of the Cape Colony were not stable (Table 20.1a). They changed considerably over time and even tended to vacillate between types of classifications. In 1806 there was a category for “Free Blacks” in which no one was enumerated; however, in 1807 1,134 people were enumerated as “Free Blacks.” This classification was dropped from the published returns in 1808 and did not return until 1817 when 1,876 people were counted. This vacillation also occurred with other categories. For instance, the “Coloured” classification was introduced in 1705; however, after 1744 it was not used again until 1840. It was again abandoned in the 1865 Cape Colony census and was not seen again in the tables of the colonial enumerations. Discussions about the “Coloured” population did occur in the census reports of 1875, 1891, and 1904; however the “Coloured” classification was not included in the official tables.

From 1806 to 1824 the European origin population was classified as “Christian” in the annual enumerations. This religious classification was deleted and changed to “Whites” in 1827. As more non-Europeans were baptized, the “Christian” category became inadequate for differentiating between the dominant group and the subordinate groups. By 1827, the census returns consisted of three racial classifications “Whites,” “Free Blacks,” and “Slaves.” The change from Christian to White was an important acknowledgment of racial identification in the Cape Colony. Although the word race was still not used, by adopting this new nomenclature, the state institutionalized the process of racial classification.

The change from Christian to White occurred in the midst of much discussion about the maintenance of slavery, taxation on the earnings from slaves being hired-out and the rights of slaves. The Boer/Afrikaner farmers argued for the maintenance of the slave system or at least a very gradual process of manumission so that there would be little impact to the slave owners and “as little inconvenience or danger to the public as possible” (CC 1905:358). It is likely that these societal changes influenced the decisions regarding racial classifications of those who compiled

the enumeration data. By classifying the enslaved by their social status, the European settlers identified them relative to their subordinate social status in the colonial state. As Sheila Patterson notes:

There were a number of similarities between the Cape and the colonies set up in the Caribbean area by the Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, French and English. This applied particularly to the colonizers’ objectives—gain, gospel-spreading, or glory—and to their firm conviction of their superiority as Christians and Europeans over the peoples they dispossessed, conquered or enslaved (1975:164).

The British abolished legal slavery in 1833 and eliminated the slave classification in colonial enumerations. Beginning in 1840, the formerly enslaved were reclassified as the Coloured population in the Cape.

The meaning of race is derived from social context. Miscegenation not only undermines the biological basis of race, but also challenges the social meaning of racial categories. This was the case in the Cape Colony in the mid-nineteenth century. From 1841 to 1854, there were two racial classifications in all the enumerated districts of the Cape Colony, except for Cape Town where there was only a total of the population by gender. It became harder to distinguish between the various populations because of miscegenation (van den Berghe 1967; Patterson 1975). There was considerable miscegenation between European males and slaves or “Khoikhoi” (indentured servants). In fact, according to George Fredrickson “by 1850 [‘Indos’] accounted for more than half of those legally classified as European” (Fredrickson 1981:97). The Indos were the offspring of Dutch-born men and Indonesian women living in South Africa. For Cape Town the enumerators distinguished between the races again in the published reports of the 1854 enumeration. It is interesting to note that this problem of identification occurred in a city that was only about 9.5 mile² – by far the smallest in all the colonial districts. The other 13 districts averaged 8,480 mile² and had a population density of about 1.3 persons per square mile, whereas in Cape Town it was about 2,363 persons per square mile (CGH 1847:248–7).

In addition to miscegenation, Cape Town's population density may have contributed to the difficulty of making racial distinctions during the annual enumerations; however, the crystallization of White supremacy may have been as strong a factor. British ethnic mobilization was reflected in the increased use of negative stereotyping of the African and so-called Malay population. The British brought the racial ideas of Britain with them. As indicated above British scientist had discussed South Africa's population as proof of African inferiority. And, in the early 1800s, they compared the White settlers as another example of the triumph of civilization over barbarism (Crais 1992:125–133; Bank 1996). As South Africa, especially the Cape, was incorporated into British imperialism, individual economic opportunities were increasingly linked to their racial classification. The English section of Cape Town's population continued to distinguish itself from the "others" in its popular journals the *Cape Times* and the *Lantern* in the 1870s. The city of Cape Town served as the ground for the ideological basis for the developing system of racial classification. While the level of interracial copulation resulted in a very mixed population; the needs for a racialized other was met by civil administrators dedicated to the idea of racial stratification that proved essential for labor regulation in the increasing profitable British South Africa.

The 1855 enumeration included three classifications of the population – White, Coloured, and Aliens. J. Suasso De Lima directed the independent Cape Town enumeration (CGH 1854). The Cape Town district had three population classifications – Various, Malays, and Heathen. However, De Lima (CGH 1854), who compiled these data for Cape Town, used the phrase "Prize Negroes [etc.]" instead of "Heathen." The term "Prize Negro" referred to Africans who were emancipated from captured slave-ships (Peires 1988). Interestingly enough, "white," "European," and "Christian" were not included as classifications. The inclusion of "Various" as a category is further indicative of the confusion surrounding the process of racial classification and the impact of miscegenation on the racial classification. The inclusion of Malays in the Cape Town enumera-

tion reflected the growing opinion among the British settlers regarding what was viewed as a hardworking, but increasingly problematic, distinct racial group (Bickford-Smith 1995:69–72). By the 1870s the independent minded Malay's were viewed as a political and economic obstacle to English economic profit. By the time of the 1856 enumeration, we see the expansion of the Cape Town system of racial classification to the rest of the Cape Colony.

Race and Census Taking in the Cape Colony

The first official census in the Cape Colony occurred in 1865. The official mandate was originally enacted in 1862 and scheduled to occur earlier; however, for financial reasons it did not take place until 1865 (GG 1864:1; CGH 1892:iii). The word "race" was used in the 1865 census as a category to describe the various population groups in South Africa. The classifications under the race category – European, Hottentot, Kafir, and Other – confounded the distinction between race and ethnicity, particularly because the three latter groups all contain what was also believed to be Africans. The derogatory term "Kafir" encompassed all the various Bantu populations, including the Zulus, Sothos, and Xhosas. The "Hottentots" consisted of a mixed population of Khoikhoi, San, and individuals who were the products of miscegenation between Khoikhois and Europeans. Europeans were products of Afrikaners, British, French (Huguenots), Germans, Portuguese and Dutch.

The Colony/Territory of the British Kaffraria, an area Northeast of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, was annexed into the Cape Colony on May 27, 1865.³ Therefore, the enumeration for the Kaffraria's population was not included in the Cape Colony's first official census on March 5, 1865. In anticipation of the territory's annexation, the Cape's Governor requested, on May 12, a "Copy of the Latest Returns of the Population of British Kaffraria, distinguishing, so far as possible, the different Races of which it is composed" for the year ending December 31, 1864

(CGH 1865:A.38). Although the Cape Colony's census was not perfect, the enumeration of the British Kaffraria was probably even less reliable because it was based on information 5 months prior to the date requested. There were two sets of returns published, one for "Natives" and the other for "Europeans." The latter included Africans who worked on European farms. It also made a distinction between Europeans who were farm residents, Germans and Other Europeans. It is not known if the latter distinctions were considered to be racial distinctions or not. On other such occasions nationality was used as a distinction for race.⁴

The annexation of the British Kaffraria increased the African population and thus the potential number of African voters in the Colony. Knowledge of the magnitude of this threat to White political supremacy was of great interest. However in reality, the power to grant the "Certificate of Citizenship," the basic qualification for the right to vote, lay in the hands of White farmers (Crais 1992:194–195).

In 1875 the number of racial classifications was increased to six (see Table 20.1a). The additional classification of Fingoes was added along with the Malay classification introduced in the 1855 enumeration of Cape Town (see Table 20.1a). Three of the six racial classifications were referred to as "Coloured" classes: Hottentot, Fingoes, and Kafir and Betschuana. The "Hottentot" classification included returns from the Hottentots, Namaquas, Hill Damaras and Korannas, and the scanty remnant of Bushmen still surviving within the Colony. Here also many persons of mixed race have been enumerated as Hottentots.... The enumerators evidently in the somewhat perplexing task of deciding on race were in this and other cases guided by the predominance of European or Hottentot characteristics in the person of those who were to be classified (CGH 1877:3).

The process of defining the "Hottentot" for the purpose of census enumeration was confused with defining the Europeans because the enumerators could not make decisive distinctions between the "mixed" population. Otherness – in this case Hottentot identity – and the self, or the Europeans,

became intertwined because of the attempt by European settlers to biologize race. We are not told what a "European or Hottentot characteristic" is, but we can surmise that it was based on some physical characteristics. These characteristics were taken as a definitive indication of racial identity. This effort, by the census Director's own admission, was a failure; however, the enumerating bureaucracy presented the data from the enumeration in the census tables as though the categories were real and clearly distinct. The effort and need to demarcate the population on the basis of race is evident in these early returns, and reflect the administrative efforts to institutionalize the White efforts to racially distinguish themselves as they had done in the past.

The Fingo provide another example of how the census was used to define the African population in the context of European colonial desires. The Fingo population assumed a particular role in Cape Colonial society in contrast to other African groups.

The Fingoes form part of the Bantu Family, but their peculiar relations with the Colony as involuntary immigrants within its boundaries, and their exceptional intelligence and progress in civilization lead to their being here separately considered (CGH 1877:3).

The Fingoes were greatly assimilated into European culture based on their association with the Wesleyan missionaries (McGregor 1930). The Colonial government used the Fingoes as a buffer between the Colony and the Xhosas. Direct British rule was not able to destroy the political structure of Xhosa society, instead, indirect rule through the chiefs had to be settled for in British Kaffraria (Crais 1992:142).

Collectively, these events led to Fingoes being granted particular considerations and privileges within the Cape Colony. There was even a special Citizenship Act passed in 1864 "for preventing Colonial Fingoes and certain Subjects of Her Majesty from being mistaken for Kafirs and thereby aggrieved" (GG 1864). The Citizenship Certificate itself said that a Fingo "is an inhabitant of this colony, and a subject of Her Majesty the Queen, and is not to be obstructed or impeded by any person upon the ground or supposition

that he is a Kafir without a pass” (GG 1864). According to McGregor (1930), Fingo was the European name given to the Ama-Mfengu (meaning hungry people in search of work), who had fled the Zulu expansion and sought refuge with the Gelekas and then in the Cape Colony.

The third Coloured classification was the “Kafirs Proper, among whom are representatives of all the tribes south of Delagoa Bay, are classed the kindred race of the Betsuana, of whom the mass in the Colony belongs to the Basuto branch. The last class includes the great and increasing population which has sprung from the intercourse of the colonists with the indigenous races, and which fills the interval between the dominant people and the natives. Among them are an inconsiderable number of foreigners” (CGH 1877:3). Here we see that there was considerable confusion in regards to the racial classification of the Colonial population. However, the colonial administrators were clear in the need to distinguish between themselves as the colonizing population and the colonized Africans. Three of the Coloured groups were composed of “mixed” people. This confusion suggests that the enumerations of the Coloured and the European population were not accurate. There was considerable “passing” occurring in South Africa, particularly after 1875 when institutionalized racial segregation increased.

Between 1875 and 1902 the Cape experienced increased segregation (Bickford-Smith 1995:210–211; Fredrickson 1981:260). During this period, segregation changed from a class based system in which it mainly applied to the elite, to a system that reached down to the lower classes of Africans, Coloureds and Whites. Africans were forced to live in certain sections of town. Both Africans and Coloureds were confronted with increasing instances of educational segregation. By 1902, segregation was practiced in the city’s hospitals, prisons, asylums and sports. The majority of Cape Town’s Colonial elite were English and imbued with the race consciousness of counterparts in Britain, and saw their social status in both racial and class terms. While they sympathized with poor whites, they saw African peonage in largely racial terms. This

attitude would come to characterize the future state of South Africa. Given this political context of the enumerations, most of the non-White populations had some reluctance to being enumerated because in addition to being raced; the government used the results for tax collection (CGH 1877:1).

Classifying the Fingoes as a racial group in the colonial censuses caused two problems in the census enumeration. First, the colonial authorities confounded the distinction between race and ethnicity. In fact, race was used mainly as a distinguishing factor between Europeans and non-Europeans. Second, the enumerators would have had a difficult time determining who was a “Kafir Proper” or Xhosa and a Fingo because both were from Bantu tribes and would have looked similar. Their identification was further complicated because, Fingoes actually consisted of several populations from various tribes and some Fingoes joined other tribes (McGregor 1930). The only way for the enumerators to distinguish between the various Bantu people was by their residential locations and with the assistance of government appointed Headmen and Chiefs. It is noted in both the Census Reports and in the Blue Books that it was difficult for enumerators to determine who belonged to what racial group. For example, the Final Report for the 1904 Cape of Good Hope Census said: “As a result of ... intermarriage—which is every year becoming less exceptional—the biological line between these three Race Groups is growing more and more confused and less easy to determine, but notwithstanding this fact it can hardly be gainsaid that for all intents and purposes the three will for many years to come remain distinct classes, each with its own peculiar social and religious and political problems” (CGH 1905:xxi). The most distinguishing features among the various African populations may have been cultural (Schapera 1930; Wilson 1975:46). As the twentieth century progressed the various European administrations of the South African government enacted policies to ensure that these artificial racial boundaries were not further eroded (see the Natives Land Act of 1913 and the 1950 Group Areas Act). In fact, in 1903 the Native Affairs Commission “produced a

report in 1905 which reflected the High Commissioner's own concern for social planning and introduced new rigidities into South African thinking about race relations which had an immense influence on later political debate. It formalized the idea of segregation in a new way" (Davenport 1991:207).

The published census reports were believed to be evidence of the degree of civilization of the colonizing European population. The censuses enumerated the number of people, their social classifications and the country's relative wealth by showing the amount of land, livestock and agricultural produce owned by the inhabitants. The Census Commissioner for the Natal Colony advised the citizens of the Colony in 1904 that "The figures showing the results will be read with interest all over the world, and it should be [our] endeavor to give the truest and fullest possible returns" (CN 1904:6). In a similar letter, the Cape of Good Hope Census Director stated, "It must be remembered that the published results of the enumeration will go forth to the world and be accepted in conclusive proof of the condition of the Colony" (de Smidt 1890:1). The census not only had a practical local benefit for the colonies, but it was also seen as part of making a statement to the world that the country existed and had been civilized by European colonization.

The Cape Colony Census Director's reports confirm the colonial perspective that the "native" population embraced the process of enumeration (CGH 1877:2; CGH 1892:ix; CGH 1905:xxi). For example in the preliminary report for the 1904 Cape Colony census, it was stated that.

It is specially gratifying to be able to state that throughout the Native Territories, as well as within the Colony itself, the Natives responded most readily to the appeal made to them. The various Supervisors speak in glowing terms of the assistance rendered by the Chiefs and Headmen, more particularly the Pondos, and of the intelligent replies given to the Enumerators. Those who were absent at the time of the enumeration actually traveled long distances to ascertain if a proper record of themselves and their families had been made (CGH 1905:xxi).

The colonial state used census enumeration for the collection of taxes. The Chiefs received revenues from the taxes contributed by their people. This may have helped motivate Chiefs and Headmen to participate in the colonial enumeration and was a part of indirect colonial rule. However, African participation in the enumerations exemplifies the colonial administration's ability to exert its hegemony over the indigenous population. In the practice of racial classification, the colonial state became the "definers" and the Africans and others the "defined." The process of racial classification also became an important aspect of indirect colonial rule as the system encouraged Chiefs to both accept the definition of the colonial state and to impose these definitions of personhood on their subjects—the African majority.

Enumerations Beyond the Cape Colony

The legal formalization of the color line occurred with the annexation of the Transkei in 1877, Griqualand East in 1879, the Gcalekaland and Thembuland in 1884, and the Pondoland in 1894. The colonial authorities extended the racial distinctions developed in the settlement process to the mining industries. The labor force was split between the European-origin workers and the African-origin workers. Supervisory roles, opportunities for advancement and relatively high wages were reserved for the European-origin workers. African-origin workers were denied opportunities for skilled or supervisory jobs, paid poorly, and forced to live in all-male compounds. Freedom in the new colonial state would be racialized.

The Transvaal colonial administration took censuses between 1890 and 1904. These censuses were modeled on the Cape Cost censuses, yet they probably contained the most documented system of racial classification out of all of the colonial censuses. In the census publication, there were numerous pages explaining the different racial groups. Much of the explanation was devoted to discussing the various ethnic groups

within the racial categories. The actual number of classifications used by the Transvaal colonial government changed drastically throughout the published census volumes. At times the Asian population merged into the “Mixed and other Coloured” population category, and at other times there were only three broad racial classifications. For the 1890 Transvaal census only the European population was enumerated, and in 1904 a complex web of racial classifications was used.⁵ The instructions given to the enumerators for this census illustrate the complexity and confusion surrounding the classifications of the races. It will also be observed that the “Race Distinctions” column of the Enumerator’s Book a distinction is drawn between “Aboriginal Natives” and “Other Coloured Races,” the former of which includes Basutos, Bechuanas and Kafirs, and all coloured persons excepting Malays, Asiatics, Hottentots, and the descendants of white and coloured parents (Transvaal 1904a:4). Here we see another example of the State’s involvement in the social construction of race. Other than the social distinctions made by the colonial officials there probably would not have been any differences between the two “coloured” populations mentioned above. Lastly, in the “Census of uncivilized Natives” the enumerators used colored beads to indicate a particular household size and composition.⁶ This was another indication that the early enumerations were not reliable estimates of the population size or composition of the African-origin population.

As a central part of the Transvaal, Johannesburg was a developing metropolitan area. In the later part of the Nineteenth century mining companies and farmers used the system of racial classification to control population movement (see Evans 1997; Crush et al. 1991; Wilson 1972). The industrialists supported laws of racial classification that restricted African movement in order to keep African laborers from escaping dangerous mining work or from leaving unsatisfying farm labor. Again the indirect rule via the traditional Chiefs was important in the regulation of labor as well. Chiefs became a crucial element in the governmental efforts, never fully successful, to control the movement of the African population.

The mineral revolution fuelled development in Johannesburg’s economic activity and its demographic composition. Of crucial importance in this transition was the growth of new divisions of labor and their relationship to racial classification, racial stratification, and residential segregation. Johannesburg’s municipal administrators were dissatisfied with the “unreliable” data from the 1890 colonial census and thus decided to conduct a census of the municipality in 1896 (Evans 1997; Transvaal 1906b; Johannesburg Sanitary Department 1896). This effort was repeated in 1908 and 1910; the Municipal Council of Johannesburg administered the latter (MCJ 1911). The 1896 census had racial categories that were confounded with nationality and ethnicity. For example, Eurafican was included as a racial classification. In the 1910 census report, the Council attempted to justify and clarify its rationale for making certain racial classifications. In doing so, their discussion of the Eurafican racial classification demonstrates how the Council used race to facilitate the administration of racially marginalized populations.

The term Eurafican has been introduced, as most other terms used to describe persons of mixed European and African Native birth are ambiguous and have been employed in various senses. The term “mixed” is clearly ambiguous. Thus South African Coloured is sometimes used to denote people of mixed descent, and again as a group-term including these people and also Natives. In Johannesburg Statistics this term, viz., South African Coloured has been used to denote all coloured people from the pure-blooded native to the half- or quarter-caste: in fact to anyone either or all of whose parents or grandparents have been aboriginal natives.

There are many reasons that make it advisable to classify the half-caste separately from the Native. While admitting that *no hard and fast line can be drawn between European and the Eurafican on the one hand, nor between the Eurafican and the Native on the other*, yet practically there is a large class of people in South Africa who politically and socially can be, and who actually are, recognized as “Coloured

People”; they are here designated Eurafricans. *Apart from any political interest such a classification may have, there is and undoubted importance from a social eugenic and public health point of view, in keeping this group distinct from the group Native.* Their mode of life, liability to disease, etc., differs considerably from both Europeans and Natives (MCJ 1911:5–6; emphasis added). This quote from the Census Supervisor illustrates the municipality’s partisan reasons for developing racial classifications. The reference to “social eugenic” must be understood in the context of South Africa’s Victorian fears of their “minority” status, the growing African population, the social transformation accompanying industrialization and urbanization, and their need to provide a rationale for the colonial subjugation of the non-White populations. This lucid and candid articulation by the Census Supervisor is exemplary of the state’s establishment of a racially stratifying system of enumeration. It used this system to marginalize certain populations based on the established racial classifications. The resulting system was both confusing and complex and reflected the lack of consensus on the part of the colonial administrators. This confusion and lack of total domination is consistent with what other researchers have reported regarding the South African bureaucracy (see Evans 1997).

The Swaziland census was taken in conjunction with the Transvaal census of 1904, both of which were conducted at the request of the Colonial Office in London (Milner 1904). The results for both censuses were published in one report by the Transvaal colonial government. In the final report, 12 racial categories were identified for Swaziland and Transvaal in Table 25 of the report. However, in subsequent tables (26–29) only 11 categories are tabulated. The data for the “Asiatics” racial group was included in the “Mixed and other Coloured” category in these subsequent tables. Additionally, the *Supplementary Tables* for the 1904 Transvaal Census Report contain 16 different racial classifications. Here Asians are divided into four groups and the African populations are further subdivided into “racial” categories (Transvaal 1906a, b).

In the Natal Colonial census of 1891, there were three racial classifications—“All Nationalities,” “Natives,” and “Indians.”⁷ The census proclamation on December 22, 1890, stated that the census would be taken “exclusive of the Native population.” The Secretary for Native Affairs instructed the Administrator of Native Law to produce an estimate of the African population by taking a sample of the various tribes in the colony. A census was also taken in this colony in 1904. In fact, on October 21, 1903, a conference took place in Pretoria, with representatives from most of British South Africa.⁸ This conference was intended to facilitate the coordination and standardization of the 1904 census throughout British South Africa.

An enumeration of the Basutoland population appears in the Cape of Good Hope Census Report for 1875. The racial categories were “European or White,” “Hottentot,” “Fingo,” “Kafir and Betschuana,” and “Mixed and Other.” The table is presented without any discussion about the census or these classifications. In the census reports for 1891 and 1904, there were three racial classifications – Natives, Whites, and Coloureds; again only tables were presented. In 1904, the census for the Cape of Good Hope included an enumeration of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), which was established as a British Protectorate in 1885 and annexed as a district of the Cape Colony in 1895. This was done at the request of the Barolong and Bamangwato tribes in protest of South African Boer confrontations. Kama, chief of the Bamangwato, argued that the Boers’ “actions are very cruel among us black people.... We are like money, they sell us and our children.” (*Encyclopedia Britannica* 1929, vol. 3:288).

There were three censuses in the Orange River Colony prior to unification in 1910.⁹ Its first two censuses contained two racial classifications—“European or White” and “Coloured.” For the 1904 census, the Coloured classification was divided into two categories—“Aboriginal Natives” and “Mixed and Other Coloured Persons.” There was no discussion about the process of racial classification.

The enumerations of South Africa’s indigenous populations were important to the colonists

for estimating the size of the cheap labor pool, and colonial and municipal revenue via Hut, Poll, Squatter, and Horse taxes. They were also important in the assessment of the size of any potential military threat from the “non-Europeans,” as well as possible African military enlistees for the colony. During the colonial period, these enumerations involved all of British South Africa – including Basutoland, Southern Rhodesia, and Bechuanaland Protectorate.

Colonial regulation required three interrelated processes: the procedures of acquiring, distributing, and exploiting the lands and resources of the colony; the procedures of transforming indigenous institutions and modes of organization to support the colonial process; and the policies of redefining and “domesticating” the African population.¹⁰ Population enumerations were part of the process by which Africans have been redefined into European subjects. Population enumeration in South Africa was part of the effort to provide a context for discussing the redistribution of African land and wealth to the European settler population. By racially classifying each individual, the colonial government could regulate the process of colonization that included the control and distribution of resources.

The European colonial government differentiated between the African population and the European settler population. The concern of the administrators was principally that of documenting, and thereby legitimating, the presence of the settler colonial population. This documentation also facilitated the transformation of South Africa into a European construct. The European references to Africans as natives, slaves, Free Blacks, Hottentots, Bushmen and Negro Apprentices help reduce all differences into a sameness that was however different from the white norm.

Residential Segregation in South Africa: A Historical Overview

It is essential to address the historical context in which apartheid arose because it remains a salient factor in South Africa’s current residential patterns in South Africa. Beinart and Dubow (1995)

provide a thorough historiography of segregation and apartheid. In 1652, Dutch settlers arrived in the Cape of Good Hope and the first practices of segregation began. Segregation under Dutch rule meant that native Africans were enslaved and separated from White settlers. The Dutch remained in power until 1806, followed by the British colonizers through the nineteenth century (Beinart and Dubow 1995). British colonizers gained power as a result of the Kaffir Wars (1835, 1847, 1851, and 1879).¹¹ During this period, the ideology of segregation was refined and fully integrated into everyday life (Beinart and Dubow 1995). Additionally, after the Union of 1910, individuals of White ancestry used their political, economic, and social power to impose one of “the most extreme forms of racial segregation in the twentieth century world” (Beinart and Dubow 1995). Next, I will discuss the major legal acts that provided the foundation for institutionalized racial discrimination

From 1910 to 1948, several legislative acts were passed to insure the separation of the races, including the *Mines and Works Act of 1911*, the *Native Land Act of 1913*, the *Urban Area Act of 1923*, and the *Native Trust and Land Act of 1936*. Each of these acts worked to instill White supremacy in South Africa. The *Mines and Works Act of 1911* and *1926* reserved specified jobs in mining and railroad for Whites and established the color hierarchy in South Africa by restricting Blacks from the equal economic rights. Additionally, the *Native Land Act of 1913* limited land ownership for Blacks and also restricted them to all Black areas, setting the stage for apartheid. The *Native Trust and Land Act of 1936* reinforced the *Native Land Act of 1913*; however it gave Blacks exclusive rights to their “homelands” but ownership was unlikely for most Blacks as a result of high rents and low availability of land.¹² The highlighted laws depicted the measures in which the South African government sought to ensure racial residential segregation and economic disempowerment of certain racial groups.

Segregation did not only occur residentially during the late 1800s and early 1900s; other areas include the health care system. Deacon (1996)

focuses on the timing and nature of the emergence of racial segregation through the health care. The Breakwater Prison and the General Infirmary on Robben Island are the two key colonial institutions of the nineteenth century in Cape Town in which the author delves into. The key institutions provide evidence of systematic segregation practices from the 1860s and 1870s. The practices of the health care system became the delineating role in urban segregation in the twentieth century. Though some Cape Town institutions were racial segregated before 1890, residential segregation in Cape Town began in 1901. According to Deacon (1996), along racial and class lines, institutional segregation occurred earlier due to the controlled atmosphere and space for experimentation. The author concludes that the nexus between health care and racial segregation is a complex one, due to the favored settler notion of social separation. The author helps to solidify the historical aspect of foundation and origins of residential segregation in South Africa by addressing other relevant institutions. However, in this chapter, the purpose is to investigate residential segregation only but the institutional segregation provides useful evidence of the impact of apartheid.

Segregation transformed into apartheid in 1948 and continued until 1990 (Thompson 2000). The initial transition occurred after the election of the Nationalist Party in 1948 and several legislative measures were enacted. Specifically, the *Population Registration Act of 1950* formally classified individuals at birth as Native (Bantu), Asiatic, Coloured or White.¹³ Apartheid forbade interracial sexual relationships and marriages; in addition, social institutions, such as schools, restaurants, and libraries were firmly divided by race. These are most clearly illustrated through the *Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act of 1949*, *Immortality Act of 1950* and *Bantu Authorities Act of 1951*, all of which sought to govern society through racial division. Following 1948, Blacks were allowed to work in White designated areas but citizenship into larger South Africa was a dream. Additionally, the *Group Areas Act of 1950* residentially divided the nation of South Africa.

Blacks were forced to live far from the center of the city and migrated into the city for work only and thus the city was characterized as “White by night” because of the mandates, which forced Blacks to return to their homelands (Seidman 1999).¹⁴ However, Evans (1997) contends that governmental officials lacked the necessary infrastructure to efficiently separate Blacks, Indians, Coloureds, and Whites, in accordance to the Group Areas Act of 1950. The author also contends that the *Group Areas Act of 1950* faced opposition from city councils in racial zoning; however control over the removal of Whites from Black rural areas received less resistance.¹⁵ Similarly, Marks (1986) argues that in fear of a Black insurgency, the apartheid regime never fully organized to complete the legal acts in an efficient manner.

Apartheid encompassed four ideas: the dichotomization of all four racial groups, Whites control all power over the state, Whites interests triumphed Blacks interests and equal rights was not apart of the state’s agenda, and Whites belong to one single nation and Blacks belong to several nations (Thompson 2000). The first idea was accomplished through the *Population Registration Act of 1950*. An example of the second idea in practice was an increase in the Senate to ensure that the white Nationalist Party would receive its two-thirds majority by 1954 (Omond 1985). Racial inequality was evident in the allocation of land in the *Groups Area Act of 1950*; White comprised of approximately 10 % of the total population but received over 50 % of the land. The final idea became a reality when the government classified nine national units for Blacks on the basis of spoken language.¹⁶

Several legal actions enforced the apartheid system for several decades. By 1951, the government eliminated the only Black institution, the Natives Representative Council. The South African government to give Blacks a voice established the council; however Blacks were not able to vote directly in Parliament but designate three Whites to represent them in a Parliament of 150 members. In addition, the government clustered the reserves into eight territories (eventually ten), in which each territory became a “homeland”

which was designated for Blacks, separated by ethnicity and governed by White administrators.¹⁷ The homelands remained in economic turmoil as a result of Hendrik Verwoerd, the Minister of Native Affairs and Prime Minister who prohibited White capitalists from investing directly in homelands as the South African economy prospered in the 1950s.

From 1948 to the 1960s, apartheid and capitalism grew in union, as a result of the cheap labor supplied by Black farmers and miners, however as time progressed, weaknesses of the apartheid system emerged and ultimately stagnated by 1975. During the 1960s and 1970s, Afrikaner leaders developed policies which turned existing reserves into self governing ethnic statelets or “homelands” (Beinart and Dubow 1995).¹⁸ However, reforms of apartheid policies emerged during the late 1970s, followed by economic sanctions and protest in the 1980s. Protest led by the African National Congress called for consumer boycotts, rent strikes, and making the townships ungovernable by dismantling the administrative system (African National Congress 1980). Furthermore, the Nationalist Party began to worry about the money required to maintain segregated areas, in a period of economic crisis.

Finally in 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from prison by Frederick Willem De Klerk, thus legislatively beginning the ending of apartheid, after decades of domestic protest led by the African National Congress, and other anti-apartheid political organizations such as the Pan-Africanist Congress and the South African Indian Congress and extensive international outcry from the United States, Barbados, Nigeria, Tanzania, India and Canada. The first all race election was held in 1994 and Nelson Mandela was elected the president of South Africa.

Apartheid lasted 42 years in South Africa and created numerous social and economic disparities between and within racial groups and continues to impact the residential location of certain racial groups. This overview of segregation and apartheid set the stage for the current demographic trends and post-apartheid racial residential segregation in South Africa.

Post Apartheid Demographic Data and Trends

An updated analysis of demographic trends in South Africa requires data collected in the post-apartheid period. The post-apartheid censuses are especially useful and interesting because they include information on Blacks, who were previously excluded and/or under enumerated from censuses (see Zuberi et al. 2005). This section of the chapter employs data from 1996 and 2001 South African Population Censuses. The 1996 and 2001 censuses provide information on age, sex, race, religious affiliation, fertility measures, and economic and educational attainment on all individuals in a household. There are approximately 9.1 and 11.2 million households in 1996 and 2001 datasets, respectively in the Republic of South Africa.¹⁹ The 1996 Census is the first South African census that included the category for “African/Black” instead of just “Black”. Khalfani et al. notes, “the 1996 census may have been the most complete enumeration ever taken in South Africa” (Pg, 19).²⁰ The post apartheid South African census provides the most complete outlook of the current conditions to compare different racial groups. The purpose of this section is to highlight the social, economic, and residential conditions of South Africans approximately 10 years into the democratic regime.

The population of South Africa between 1996 and 2001 increased by approximately 4.2 million people during the 5 years time span. However, the percentage of people increased in four provinces, specifically Mpumalanga, Western Cape, Gauteng, and KwaZulu-Natal and decreased in Northern Cape, Free State, North West, Limpopo, and Eastern Cape (See Fig. 20.2). The largest percentage increase occurred in the province of Gauteng, approximately 1.6 % over 5 years. Between 1996 and 2001, the percentage of the population in South Africa by population group also changed (see Figs. 20.3 and 20.4).²¹ Specifically, the percentage of the population that identified as Black African increased from 77 to 79 %; in contrast, the percentage of the population the self identified as White decreased from 11.03 to 9.6 %.




Fig. 20.2 Percentage of people in each province, 1996 and 2001




Fig. 20.3 Percentage of the population in South Africa by population group, 1996




Fig. 20.4 Percentage of the population in South Africa by population group, 2001

The Reconstruction and Development Programme of 1994 sought to tackle the inequities in schooling attainment among population and gender groups. In the post apartheid era, schooling policies changed dramatically with compulsory for all children between the ages of 7 and 15 years, access to all schools for all children, and implementation of outcome based

teaching. However, racial and gender schooling inequalities remain in South Africa (see Fig. 20.5). For example, 4.9 and 5.2 % of Coloureds and Black Africans, respectively, attain higher schooling compared to 29.8 % of Whites in 2001.²² Additionally, 4.5 % more females do not attend school compared to males in 2001, an increase of .8 % between 1996 and

2001. In summary, access to schooling amongst population and gender groups is increasing but schooling inequalities remain present in the post apartheid period.

The South African census also provides information on the labour force and income levels of individuals. Overall, 42 % of South Africans were not economically active and 34 % were employed in 2001 (see Fig. 20.6). A disaggregation by population group shows 28 % of Black Africans were employed compared to 46, 49, and 61 % of Coloureds, Indians, and Whites. Furthermore, 31 % of Black Africans that are employed recorded an annual household income of R1-R9 600 compared to 13, 2, and 1 % of Coloureds, Indians/Asians, and Whites, respectively (see Fig. 20.7).²³ However, 43 % of Whites that are employed recorded an annual household income of R 153 601+ compared to 2.9, 7.9 and 21.4 % of Black Africans, Coloureds, and Indians/Asians, respectively.

It is also important to understand the racial and gender divide by industry. Majority of employed South Africans work in the community and trade industries (see Fig. 20.8). However, Approximately 75 % of all employed Indians/Asians worked in three industries, specifically, community, trade and manufacturing, 27, 25, and 23 %, respectively. In contrast, White males worked in a wider array of industries including finance, trade, community and manufacturing, 18.7, 18.5, 17.5 and 17.3 %, respectively. A larger percentage of Black/African women worked in the private household industry, approximately 30.4 %.

The number of people in a household and the distribution of type of household are compared to describe the dynamics of living conditions between 1996 and 2001. In the country as a whole, the number of people per household decreased between 1996 and 2001 (See Fig. 20.9). For example in KwaZulu-Natal, households of one increased from 15.3 to 18.5 % between 1996 and 2001. There were also changes in the type of dwelling between 1996 and 2001. For example, the proportion of households' head by Black Africans and Coloureds living in formal dwellings increased from 45 to 56 % and 82 to 87 %

between 1996 and 2001, respectively (see Fig. 20.10).

The 1996 census does not ask about ownership of household goods and therefore we cannot access the change between 1966 and 2001; however, in 2001 respondents were asked if they possessed the following items: radio, television, refrigerator, cellular telephone, landline telephone, and/or computer, in order of importance. Possession by household of at least one radio varied by province slightly, from 79.1 % in Western Cape to 64.3 % in Eastern Cape (See Fig. 20.11). In contrast, household ownership of a computer varied significantly by province, from 2 % in Limpopo, 4 % in North West, 15 % in Gauteng and 18 % in Western Cape.

Until now, a systematic analysis of racial residential segregation in the South African province of Gauteng did not exist in the literature. This chapter provides evidence that racial residential segregation has decreased over time and there has been a shift in inter-racial residential segregation patterns. This chapter investigates historical levels of racial residential segregation during the segregation and apartheid periods. Additionally, the purpose of this chapter was to measure the levels of residential segregation in South Africa by estimating the index of dissimilarity (ID_{XY}), isolation index (P^*_{XX}) and interaction index (P^*_{XY}) using post-apartheid data.

The indices range from 0 to 100. The index of dissimilarity is interpreted as the percentage of the minority population that would have to move in order to create neighborhoods with racial compositions identical to that of the magisterial district (Duncan and Duncan 1955).²⁴ Both exposure measures vary between 0 and 100 and are interpreted as the percentage of the minority group that shares a magisterial district area with a member of the majority group (the interaction index) or the percentage of the minority group X that shares a magisterial district with a member of his or her own group (the isolation index).

There are two major findings. First, despite improvements, racial residential segregation remains a problem in the twenty-first century in the province of Gauteng. Coloured-White and Black-White segregation in major metropolitan




Fig. 20.6 Distribution of the working-age population (aged 15–65 years) by labour market status within each population group, 1996 and 2001




Fig. 20.8 Distribution of the employed by industry within population group and sex, 2001




Fig. 20.9 Distribution of household in each province by the number of people in the household, 1996 and 2001




Fig. 20.10 Distribution of households by type of dwelling within population group, 1996 and 2001




Fig. 20.11 Percentage of households in each province that possessed selected household goods, 2001

areas of Gauteng, such as Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Soweto, remains extremely high in 2001. This finding is supplemental to the comparison made by Massey and Denton (1993) of the American residential segregation patterns to the South African context. According to Massey and Denton (1993) Black-White residential segregation in the United States was akin to Black-White residential segregation in South Africa. Two problematic issues arise in the Massey and Denton (1993) comparison. First, the author ignores the significance of the Coloured population in the context of South Africa. Secondly, as a result of the apartheid regime, Blacks in South Africa are the majority in size and the minority in power; however in the United States, Blacks are a minority in both size and power.

Second, by 2001, Black isolation from Whites in the magisterial districts of Gauteng is on aver-

age higher than Coloured and Indian isolation from Whites. A possible explanation for the high Black isolation indices is white flight. This is similar to the white flight phenomenon in the United States during the migration of Blacks to the North from the South in the latter half of the twentieth century. However, unlike white Americans, White South Africans are not relocating internally. Instead, White South Africans not only move away from Blacks, they are leaving the country entirely and emigrating to the United States, France, and Australia. The analysis in this chapter shows that racial residential segregation has begun to decline in the province of Gauteng between 1996 and 2001; however the level of racial residential segregation among all racial groups is still high in most of the magisterial districts, especially the metropolitan areas (Table 20.2).

Table 20.2 Black, coloured, and Indian residential segregation from whites in Gauteng province, South Africa, 1996–2001

Magisterial District	Blacks			Coloureds			Indians		
	Dissimilarity (96–01 Δ)	Isolation (96–01 Δ)	Interaction (96–01 Δ)	Dissimilarity (96–01 Δ)	Isolation (96–01 Δ)	Interaction (96–01 Δ)	Dissimilarity (96–01 Δ)	Isolation (96–01 Δ)	Interaction (96–01 Δ)
<i>Northeastern</i>	78(+9)	90(-4)	33(-6)	74(-6)	17(-3)	23(+1)	59(-11)	10(4)	46(+1)
Bronkhorstspuit	71(+3)	89(-1)	42(-6)	58(+18)	7(+2)	39(+18)	51(-6)	18(-8)	45(0)
Cullinan	70(+21)	86(-10)	35(-5)	88(+6)	16(-16)	8(+3)	67(-12)	6(0)	31(+12)
Kempton Park	92(+3)	95(-2)	22(-7)	76(-7)	27(+23)	21(-18)	58(-15)	7(-3)	62(-10)
<i>Northwestern</i>	85(-2)	75(+4)	38(-15)	80(+2)	16(+10)	21(-8)	83(4)	47(+10)	19(+1)
Krugersdorp	85(-1)	93(+3)	25(-5)	90(+4)	4(-2)	7(+2)	84(-2)	71(+9)	26(0)
Pretoria	78(-9)	83(+12)	19(-5)	75(-6)	58(-17)	39(-16)	91(-3)	57(+11)	9(+4)
Randburg	74(+1)	83(+2)	30(-6)	80(-18)	5(-31)	21(-22)	94(-3)	18(+12)	4(+2)
Soshanguve	99(0)	100(0)	97(-56)	63(+3)	8(+4)	34(-5)	56(-8)	81(+19)	56(-3)
Wonderboom	89(0)	94(+1)	21(-4)	92(+8)	3(-3)	2(+2)	90(4)	6(-2)	1(+1)
<i>Southwestern</i>	86(3)	92(2)	36(-10)	82(-2)	47(-11)	18(+3)	87(+1)	28(+2)	33(-7)
Johannesburg	71(-6)	80(+13)	34(-10)	61(+10)	60(-17)	38(+3)	60(+10)	56(+6)	64(-12)
Randfontein	83(+4)	88(-2)	29(-5)	69(-4)	67(-7)	36(-3)	88(+11)	5(-2)	43(-24)
Roodepoort	87(-1)	90(+1)	21(-7)	94(-1)	40(4)	3(-1)	86(-2)	9(+5)	44(-26)
Oberholzer	86 +3)	93(0)	39(-17)	90(-3)	4(+1)	6(+1)	91(4)	3(+1)	10(+4)
Soweto	96(+4)	99(-1)	74(-4)	97(0)	86(+81)	9(+7)	99(0)	4(-2)	2(2)
Vanderbijlpark	93(+2)	96(-2)	19(-4)	75(+2)	4(-1)	16(-1)	97(+1)	5(-3)	32(+11)
Vereeniging	92(-3)	95(+3)	29(-7)	94(0)	61(-9)	3(+1)	93(-1)	67(+5)	5(0)
Westonaria	81(+12)	93(+3)	46(-22)	73(+8)	56(-3)	36(+15)	83(-5)	77(+8)	64(-8)
<i>Southeastern</i>	91(-2)	93(+2)	18(-5)	82(-4)	39(+6)	17(-2)	78(-5)	42(+11)	28(+1)
Alberton	97(-1)	97(0)	14(-3)	81(+5)	72(-11)	15(+2)	81(-6)	39(+22)	18(+4)
Benoni	94(+2)	96(-1)	19(-5)	92(+8)	9(-2)	19(-4)	77(-11)	58(+14)	18(+5)
Boksburg	93(0)	94(0)	15(-4)	74(+2)	75(-8)	30(+9)	82(-3)	18(+21)	48(-22)
Brakpan	96(+1)	96(-1)	14(-6)	75(+11)	63(-12)	11(+3)	76(4)	28(+6)	12(-0)
Germiston	75(-18)	80(+20)	22(-7)	78(0)	9(-13)	19(4)	78(-10)	10(-5)	18(+5)
Heidelberg	89(+2)	95(-2)	21(-6)	91(+3)	14(-3)	6(+1)	71(-17)	43(+23)	37(+22)
Nigel	92(-2)	94(0)	23(-6)	84(-1)	61(-10)	14(4)	84(-5)	65(-6)	12(+2)
Springs	90(+1)	93(-1)	18(-5)	82(+4)	5(+1)	19(-5)	76(+13)	75(+12)	60(-13)

Conclusion

South Africa has the longest running consecutive racial classification in Africa. The official classifications of different racial groups have been dynamic. Not only has the terminology changed, but also the groups represented by the terms have changed. Racial classifications in South Africa are related to the European (especially the Dutch and British) settler colonial efforts of military, political and economic domination. White attitudes toward non-Whites in South Africa, especially the Africans, changed during the late nineteenth century in ways consistent with a belief in the racial inferiority of the population. Such an attitude was necessary as a justification for imperialism and continued domination of the indigenous population.

As efforts at direct colonial domination became increasingly unsuccessful the colonial administrators, especially the British, turned to methods of indirect colonial governance. As part of the international growth of European colonial domination, South African settlers became the link between the southern African region and the modern world economy (see Ross 1989; Patterson 1975). South African colonial enumerations were related to international efforts of European colonial domination and racial classification. This modern world was in part based on racial hierarchies of domination (Zuberi 2001:5–16; Winant 2001:95–99). And, these racial hierarchies depended on the systems of racial classification outlined in this chapter.

In this way, South Africa's experience was similar to the experiences of populations as distinct as Malaysia, the United States, and Brazil (see Zuberi 2001; Nobles 2000; Hirschman 1987). Indeed the use of racial classifications in each of these cases was the need of colonial powers to justify the domination of the indigenous population. Racial classifications organize the population in ways that support and justify domination. Thus, racial classifications both justify and organize the population for a system in which racial stratification can be justified. It also, provides the necessary data for "scientific" explana-

tion of why racial stratification continues in context that are purportedly free of domination, and injustice (see Zuberi 2001).

Colonial population enumerations provided the social contexts for political discussions about racial categories. In this way, South African racial classifications were incorporated into the administration of the state. South African colonial governments found it necessary to racially classify the population in order to levy taxes and allocate benefits. The racial classification of the African population facilitated the process of exploiting the colony and transforming indigenous identities to support the colonial process and to incorporate South Africa into the larger effort of racial stratification being developed by various European powers towards the end of the nineteenth century. In this way racial classification in South Africa can be directly connected to the efforts to develop notions of race that were based on science and served as a justification for European colonial efforts in not only Africa, but Asia and Latin America as well (also see Zuberi 2001:17–26). Racial classification was important in defining colonial citizenship and social status. The efforts at enumerating the population were a key element in the colonial process of racializing the identity of the African subject.

Official classifications have historically influence personal identities as well as political processes in what became the Republic of South Africa. Likewise the political processes have influenced the processes of racial classification. In South Africa, there has been a symbiotic relationship between the state's efforts to develop and use racial classifications, and the societies adherence to and development of racial colonialism and oppression.

The third post-apartheid census data were collected during October of 2011. According to the Pali Lehohla, the Statistician General, the government continues to make a concert effort to address the undercounting of individuals by proposing a target of less than 2 %. Furthermore, the South African Human Rights Commission was established in 1994 to ensure all individuals are treated equally and "take steps and secure appropriate

redress where human rights have been violated". The governmental agencies are addressing the racial inequality within South Africa on national and local levels; however, the remnants of apartheid remain due to the extreme and systemic racism of the past.

Apartheid significantly impacted the current residential segregation patterns. Using the historical overview as a foundation, we proceed to examine the current racial residential segregation patterns in the province of Gauteng (See Table 20.2). Racial residential segregation measures are calculated for 1996 and 2001 for comparison purposes; the measures include index of dissimilarity, isolation index, and interaction index. The findings incorporate post-apartheid, small unit of analysis data to determine if residential segregation levels have begun to decrease in the Gauteng. The analysis confirms that racial residential segregation remains a problem in the twenty-first century in the province of Gauteng, although at a lower level when compared to data collected during segregation and apartheid periods. Specifically, Coloureds and Blacks are the most residentially segregated racial group in 1996 and segregation between Indians and Blacks is the highest in 2001. Furthermore, the findings also suggests that isolation among Whites is the highest in comparison to other racial groups in 2001 and provides empirical evidence that Whites are emigrating to the United States, England, and Australia. The whites that emigrate are skilled professional (Bhorat et al. 2002). The post-apartheid analysis of the most comprehensive census data sets reveals new patterns of residential segregation levels and explanations for understanding current race relations in South Africa.

Notes

1. Statistics South Africa.
2. This is the Dutch name for the Dutch East Indian Company.
3. The residents of the area called the British Kaffraria referred to it as a colony, and the Government of the Cape of Good Hope referred to it as a territory.

4. See the *Government of South Africa*, Vol. 1, 108, (CNA 1908).
5. "Racial" classifications for 1904: European or White, Basuto, Bechuana, Cape Colony Kafirs, Portuguese and East Coast Tribes, Rhodesian Tribes, Swazi, Transvaal Tribes, Zulu, Unspecified Aboriginals, Cape and Bastard, Mixed and Other Coloured, Asiatics Other than British, Indian, Malay, and Other Asiatic British Subjects.
6. "A big black bead represented an adult married Native, a big yellow bead a grown up single man. As regards the females, a big blue bead signified a married woman, and a white bead a single woman over 15 years of age. A small yellow bead stood for a boy and a small white bead for girl" (Transvaal 1904b). The Headman would pass by each hut and place a bead on a string for each person residing at that location.
7. Although indentured and unindentured Indians were presented in separate tables, they are presented as one racial group.
8. The following areas were represented: Transvaal, Orange River Colony, Natal, Cape Colony, Basutoland, and Bechuanaland. Although Swaziland and Southern Rhodesia were not represented at the conference, they also took censuses in 1904. And as we have seen above, Swaziland's census was conducted in conjunction with the Transvaal's.
9. From 1848 to 1854 this territory was known as the Orange River Sovereignty, and as the Orange Free State Republic from 1854 to 1899. From 1900 to 1909 it was called the Orange River Colony and the Orange Free State Province after 1910. These changes indicate the geopolitical evolution of this territory. In 1995 it became the Free State Province.
10. For a philosophical discussion on this process of colonization of the African self see: Mudimbe (1988).
11. In the current South African context, the word kaffir is a derogatory word and in 2000, the parliament of South African enacted *Act No. 4 of 2000: Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act* hoping to abolish the use of the word.

12. The land allocated for homelands were often the worst and most underdeveloped areas in South Africa.
13. The racial classification system in South Africa continuously changed since 1911 and was a direct result of the notions of race, nationality and ethnicity (Khalfani et al. 2005).
14. Pass laws were enacted in order to control the flow of Africans into the city. During the segregation era, Africans were forced to carry passes to ensure that White farmers did not lose their African labor (Thompson 2000). Approximately 100,000 Blacks were arrested every year during apartheid for not carrying the proper permits (Omond 1985).
15. Sophiatown and District Six were two racially diverse areas prior to the enactment of apartheid laws. For example, during apartheid, Sophiatown, a suburb of Johannesburg, a mixed racial neighborhood during apartheid was destroyed and a white suburb, Triomf (Triumph), was established in place of it. Prior to the enactment of apartheid laws, Sophiatown was a symbolic center for Black culture and the arts. District Six, a neighborhood in Cape Town, was one of the harshest forced removals of the apartheid regime. Approximately, 60,000 inhabitants were removed during the 1970s (District Six Museum). It was comprised of mostly Coloureds but Blacks, Whites and Indians also resided in the neighborhood. It was deemed a Whites only area under the Groups Area act.
16. The national units were: North Sotho, South Sotho, Tswana, Zulu, Swazi, Xhosa (two units), Tsonga and Venda.
17. The ten homelands included four independent states (TBVC): Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei and six self governing states (SGT): Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, and Qwaqwa (Zuberi et al. 2005).
18. Afrikaners are the Afrikaans speaking group of people of mainly European descent.
19. The purpose of the comparison of 1996 and 2001 South African census data is to provide trends between the time periods and not a direct comparison due to changes in the questionnaire. There were approximately 40.5 and 44.8 million people residing in South Africa in 1996 and 2001 respectively according to the Statistics South Africa.
20. All figures have been adjusted for the undercount by a post enumeration survey.
21. Population groups are racial groups in South Africa as denoted by the government. "Membership of a population group is based on self-perception and self classification, not on a legal definition (Statistic South Africa 2005)."
22. We distinguish between educational attainment and school attainment because of the history in the quality of schooling for certain individuals in South Africa. We prefer school attainment for this analysis because it does not assume the number of years of schooling equates similar level of education.
23. R is denoted for the Rand, the South African currency. Approximately one US dollar equals 7.5 rands.
24. Minority and majority population is based on resources and power. Therefore, in the South African context, Whites are referred to as the majority population although they represent a smaller share of the total population. Furthermore, Blacks, Coloureds, and Indians are the minority population because relative to Whites, they have significant less power and resources.

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Holly E. Reed and Blessing U. Mberu

Nigeria, like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), is made up of a complex mix of ethnic, religious, and regional groups. This diversity creates a web of individual, intersecting, and recursive identities, which are considered by many to be the main sources of the violent conflicts that frequently erupt there (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2009; Smyth and Robinson 2001; Osaghae and Suberu 2005). Ethnic, religious and regional identities generate the fiercest contestation among Nigeria's estimated 250–400 ethnic groups around the control of state power, resource allocation, and citizenship. Consequently, disintegration, secession, civil strife, civil war, minority agitation, and violent conflicts, are recurrent common threats or actual occurrences in post independence Nigeria (Osaghae and Suberu 2005).

Ethnic identity is the most basic and politically salient form of identity in Nigeria. In competitive and non-competitive settings, Nigerians are more likely to define themselves in terms of their ethnic affinities than any other identity. Achebe (1984) underscored ethnic ubiquity when

he wrote that a Nigerian child seeking admission to a federal school, a student seeking to enter university, a graduate seeking employment in public service, a businessman tendering for a contract, or a citizen applying for a passport, filing a report with the police, or seeking access to any of the hundred thousand avenues controlled by the state, will sooner or later fill out a form which requires him to confess his tribe (or less crudely and more hypocritically, his state of origin).

In addition to ethnicity, religious identity is also important in Nigeria; religion is usually classified as one of three categories – Christian, Muslim, or Traditional. Of the three, Christian and Muslim identities have been the mainstay of differentiation and conflict, with Nigerian Muslims much more likely to express a religious identity compared to their Christian counterparts (Lewis and Bratton 2000; Osaghae and Suberu 2005). Closely related to the first two identities is the third, which is regional identity. This third identity evolved from the North and South regional structures created and consolidated by the colonial authorities in the process of state formation in Nigeria. These two regions were administered separately even after the two units were amalgamated in 1914. The introduction of a three-region structure (North, East, and West) in 1946, and a fourth region, the Mid-West, in 1963, added to the fray. The creation of 36 states and a federal capital territory and six nominal geopolitical zones did not alter the meaning of regional

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identities established around the “North for Northerners”, “East for Easterners” and “West for Westerners.” These identities have entrenched and strengthened a discriminatory system under which indigenous groups have routinely prevented settlers from owning land or businesses, or accessing political power, jobs and education, inevitably causing tensions (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2009).

The inter-connectedness of ethnic, religious, and regional identities and their often mutual reinforcement is shown by their sometimes being compounded as ethno-regional and ethno-religious. The ethno-regional reference evolved from the old regional structures of the Nigerian federation, where identities were shaped by leaders of the dominant ethnic groups – Hausa/Fulani in the Northern region, Igbo in the Eastern region, and Yoruba in the Western region – that exercised some form of hegemonic control over the regions. This is the sense in which conflicts among the three dominant groups are generally referred to as ethno-regional. Similarly, ethno-religious identities have been used to differentiate the predominantly Muslim North from the predominantly Christian South. These categories have also been used to differentiate the dominant Muslim group in the North from the non-Muslim minorities in the region. Indeed, unlike the South, where majority groups are distinguished from minority groups on the basis of ethnicity, majority-minority distinctions in the North have been more religious than ethnic. Thus, conflicts between Hausa/Fulani and minority ethno-religious groups are described as ethno-religious. Moreover, the increased politicization of religion by the state, including the adoption of Islamic penal law by several Northern states in the Fourth Republic, has led to the generalization of ethno-religious conflicts all over the country (Osaghae and Suberu 2005).

Nigeria’s complicated web of ethnic and religious identities and history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts and instability has been linked to specific demographic behavior and outcomes. The chapter begins with a brief historical overview of Nigeria and its challenge of ethnic, regional, and religious conflict. This section

is followed by five sub-sections examining the ethnic and religious dimensions of, in turn, (a) the country’s population structure; (b) fertility; (c) morbidity and mortality; (d) migration; and (e) other socio-demographic outcomes. We particularly focus on the phenomenon of overlapping stratification in Nigeria for those living in the North who are Muslim or Traditionalist, and how poverty is concentrated among these groups, compounded by rural residence, agricultural employment, high fertility, and low levels of education. We discuss the methodological issues surrounding the measurement of ethnicity and religion, future research needs, and data availability and data quality challenges. Finally, in the concluding sub-section of the chapter, we outline key elements of future demographic trends and population policy options in Nigeria. Much of the demographic analysis is based on data from the 2003 and 2008 Demographic and Health Surveys, but when other data sources are used, they are cited.

The History of Ethnic, Religious, and Regional Conflict in Nigeria

Pre-colonial History of Ethnic Groups

Prior to British colonization, the territory called Nigeria was occupied by different ethnic groups that interacted mainly through trade and, in some cases, warfare. They existed as autonomous socio-cultural, political, and economic units. The North was dominated by monarchical feudal formations: the Hausa-Fulani emirates and the Igala and Jukun kingdoms. The South was dominated by several kingdoms and empires such as the Edo, the Yoruba, and various clans, including the Igbo. In the Niger Delta, the kingdoms of the Efik and Izon were predominant (Anikpo 2002). These autonomous formations and structures were disrupted by the British colonial intervention, which began with the annexation of Lagos colony in 1861. The establishment of the Protectorate of Yorubaland followed in the 1880s and 1890s. The Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria were established in 1900 and amalgamated as the British colony of Nigeria in 1914.

British Colonialism and Independence

The British colonial administration introduced “indirect rule,” a strategy of governance that gave power to the traditional rulers who administered their people on behalf of the colonial authority. The system distanced ethnic groups from each other, reinforced ethnic divisions, and complicated the task of welding diverse elements into a Nigerian nation (Coleman 1958:194; Nnoli 1980:113). In Northern Nigeria, the indirect rule system enabled the Islamic Sokoto Caliphate to extend its influence and rule over the non-Muslim areas, to the chagrin of the ethnic minorities there. Even after independence in 1960, the perception of the Caliphate as a symbol of domination remained a constant source of tension and suspicion between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities in northern Nigeria. Segregation within the Nigerian colony was reinforced by colonial laws that limited the mobility of Christian Southerners to the Muslim North, created a separate settlement for non-indigenous citizens in the North, and limited the purchase of land outside one’s own region (Afigbo 1989; Okonjo 1974). Prejudice and ethnic hatred became rife in the provinces and unequal and differential treatment of ethnic groups created disparities in educational achievement and widened the political and economic gap between northern and southern Nigeria.

The single most divisive policy of the British, however, involved the establishment during the late colonial era in 1954 of a federal structure of three units, namely, the northern, western, and eastern regions (Osaghae and Suberu 2005). The tripartite federal structure particularly fostered ethnic majority chauvinism and secessionism by erecting the boundaries of the northern, western and eastern regions around the identities of the major ethnic groups: Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo respectively. This structure denied the country’s non-Hausa-Fulani, non-Yoruba and non-Igbo groups the security of their own regions, fuelled ethnic minority agitations and encouraged an enormous degree of ethno-regional polarization. The imbalanced structure became even more

structurally lopsided with the creation of the Mid-West region in the south in 1963. These contradictions have bred inter-ethnic violence before independence, immediately after, and ever since. The 1953 Kano riot presaged subsequent large-scale ethnic violence in Nigeria, including the 1966 anti-Igbo massacre in Kano and other northern cities that would accelerate the country’s descent into catastrophic civil war (Suberu and Diamond 2003). Consequently, the stage for the explosion of violent identity conflicts in post-independence Nigeria and the huge challenge of national restructuring that would be required to hold Nigeria’s multiple identity constituencies together in a single political community, was firmly set up during the colonial era (Osaghae and Suberu 2005).

Civil War (1967–1970)

Since 1960, when Nigeria declared its independence, the country has been fraught with ethnic politics whereby the elite from different ethnic groups scheme to attract as many federal resources to their regions as possible, neglecting issues that could have united the country. The anarchy, competition, and insecurity led to the demise of the first republic in 1966. Military intervention culminated in the gruesome ethnic war from 1967 to 1970, when the Igbo of eastern Nigeria (Biafrans) threatened to secede from the federation. The Igbo grievances were caused by the denial of their basic human needs of equality, citizenship, autonomy, and freedom (Burton 1997), and in the ensuing civil war the Igbo lost a great deal in terms of lives, money, and its image in the world. It is estimated that about two to three million people may have died due to the conflict, most from hunger and disease. Reconstruction, helped by the oil money, was pursued after the war but the old ethnic and religious tensions remained a constant feature of Nigerian politics, with accusations of Nigerian government officials diverting resources meant for reconstruction in the former Biafran areas to their ethnic localities.

Military Rule

While the politicians tried to cope with the colonial legacy that lumped incompatible ethnic groups into one country, the military elites staged coups and counter-coups beginning with the January 15, 1966 coup that led to the July 1966 counter-coup that ushered in the civil war in 1967. The corruption, ineptitude, and confusion that marked the military era plunged Nigeria into economic problems, poverty, and ethno-religious conflicts until the 1990s. The military intervened because they viewed the civilian leaders as inept, corrupt, and indecisive.

However, military rule was widely distrusted by Southerners, because they were seen as focused on maintaining Hausa-Fulani hegemony in Nigeria. The distrust boiled over following the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, won by Chief Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba from southwestern Nigeria. In retaliation, southern Nigerians began to form militant organizations to protest unfair treatment and to demand a democratically-elected government.

During the authoritarian rule of General Sani Abacha, a Muslim from the North, Southerners increasingly feared political marginalization and demanded an end to the Hausa-Fulani domination of the political arena.

Ethnically-inspired protest groups emerged across the country, some threatened secession, and violent protests intensified across the country. General Sani Abacha used brutal tactics to keep ethnic rivalries in check, but it was not only during military rule that conflicts occurred. Since the election of a democratic government in 1999 and throughout Olusegun Obasanjo's 8-year presidency, ethnic conflicts surged in both number and intensity, as various ethnic groups demand political and fiscal restructuring of the federation.

Oil Industry, Land, and Resource Conflicts

In addition to the regional political conflicts, the Niger Delta region has been the scene of violent competition for land, political power, and oil wealth. The government's failure to ensure security,

limit environmental damage, deliver social development, or establish effective local institutions led to an armed insurgency that escalated dramatically in early 2006. Moreover, there is a religious dimension to the ethnic competition for power and oil wealth in Nigeria over the period. The multiple ethno-religious conflicts in the northern cities of Kano, Kaduna, Jos, and Zamfara spring from the introduction of Muslim Sharia laws, and the South's demands for autonomy and oil resource control have continued to bedevil the national's political system.

Militias have clashed with the Nigerian army, kidnapped numerous foreign workers, and destroyed installations (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2009). Estimates suggest that about 480,000 persons were displaced between 2006 and 2008 in oil-related clashes in the region. The 2009 fighting between government forces and militants of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) displaced thousands of people as well. Consequently, Ikelegbe (2006) concluded that the economic interface between the Nigerian state, multinational oil companies, the international community, and youth militias underpins the extensive proliferation of arms and the pervasiveness of crime, violence, and communal/ethnic conflicts in the Niger Delta. In recent months, relative calm is returning to the region following programs for disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation, including amnesty for militants and increased allocation of the Delta's oil revenues to the region. The urgent need for economic and human development of the Delta region, including the creation of the Ministry for Niger Delta Affairs to focus on the development of infrastructure and the empowerment of the youth population, have become a new flagship intervention program of the federal government (Government of Nigeria 2008).

Muslim and Christian Conflicts and Anti-government Sectarian Violence

Religion is also a major source of continued conflict in modern Nigeria. As mentioned, religious identity is closely related to ethnicity in Nigeria.

In parts of the North commonly referred to as the ‘core’ or ‘Hausa-Fulani North’ – which roughly coincides with those states that adopted Sharia law in the Fourth Republic – religious [Muslim] identity is more critical than ethnic identity, and in fact serves to activate ethnicity (Abah and Okwori 2003), with Nigerian Muslims much more likely to articulate a religious identity than Christians (Lewis and Bratton 2000). In the last three decades, Nigeria has experienced a surge of radical and fundamentalist activities, especially among Muslim youth, resulting in the emergence of some fundamentalist sects, notably the Maitatsine, the Izala movement, the Muslim Brothers or Shiites, and, most recently, the Taliban, who demand, among other things: a pure Islam based on Sharia law, the eradication of ‘heretical’ innovations, and the establishment of an Islamic state or theocracy. The activities of these sects were a major cause of the religious conflicts that proliferated in the North during the 1980s and 1990s. Most of these involved conflicts between Muslims and Christians, with ethnic undertones, but some, especially those involving the Izala and (recently) the Boko Haram, also entailed anti-state mobilization that demanded the eradication of all dimensions of Western civilization— including Western education—and the establishment of an Islamic theocracy in Nigeria.

Factors that have hastened the politicization of Muslim identities include: state policies and interventions, which Christians allege are pro-Muslim (state sponsorship of pilgrimages to Mecca and membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference are cases in point); attempts to extend Sharia law to the federal level; and the adoption of Sharia law as the basic law by a number of states (see Osaghae and Suberu 2005). The introduction of Sharia served as a catalyst to alert the non-Muslim ethnic minorities of the need to resist and fight perceived domination by Hausa-Fulani Muslims (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2009). There is little doubt that the worsening security situation in Nigeria is leading more and more people into revivalist and millenarian religious sects, which are both ultra-conservative and also accept holy wars as divinely ordained (Ibeanu 1998).

The other source of conflict in northern Nigeria is the growing pressure on land resources as a result of migration. The Hausa-Fulani, who are mainly migrant traders, have established sizable communities among ethnic minority groups in different states. And in recent decades the rate of southward migration has been accelerated by the advance of the Sahara Desert. Many Hausa-Fulani farmers are therefore seeking land for agriculture. They are generally richer and have a more advanced system of social organization with links to the emirate system, so they are often appointed to head chiefdoms or districts in the places where they have settled. Attempts to exercise this power often lead to confrontation as resentful local populations resist them, which results in conflicts with ethno-religious character (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2009).

Ethnicity, religion, and regional divisions have been in the past and still remain important boundaries in the ongoing political and economic conflicts in Nigeria. Moreover, the divisions between various groups are reinforced and perpetuated by demographic differences between the groups, and these demographic patterns can often serve to further ignite violence and discord. In the next few sub-sections of the chapter, we explore the demography of Nigeria through the lens of ethnic, religious and regional differences, and discuss the real and potential impacts of these demographic differences.

Nigeria’s Population Structure

Age and Sex Distribution

The total population of Nigeria (according to the 2006 Census) is 140,431,790. About 50.8 % are male and 49.2 % female; the sex ratio is 1.03. Although the population growth rate has been falling since its peak of about 3 % in 1975, and is now a little over 2 %, population momentum due to high fertility means continued growth in total numbers. The United Nations projects that the country’s population will double to nearly 300 million by the year 2050 (United Nations 2008). Nigeria’s population is also young but aging

relatively quickly. The median age for 2010 is 18.6 years and it is expected to increase by almost 10 years (28.2) by 2050 (United Nations 2008). This trend indicates a growing percentage of the population in the productive or working ages. This potential for an economic boom that could be created by having more working people is commonly known as the demographic dividend. Nigeria has the potential for a demographic dividend, but it also has high rates of unemployment, particularly among younger workers.

As more young people attempt to enter the labor force, if they do not find jobs, this could enflame simmering ethnic and religious tensions. Many political analysts have suggested that if there is a large concentration of youth in a population, particularly young men, a country may be more at risk for social conflict and violence. Recent quantitative research, however, suggests that as the working age population increases relative to their older and younger dependents (i.e., the dependency ratio declines), as is happening in Nigeria, the threat of violence decreases (Urdal 2006; Urdal and Hoelscher 2009). It is possible that levels of violence in Nigeria may decrease as the demography of the country changes. Nevertheless, Nigeria's high levels of unemployment and economic disparity, combined with existing ethnic, religious and regional tensions suggest that policy analysts must pay attention to the distribution of the population.

The three biggest ethnic groups in Nigeria, according to the 2008 DHS, are Hausa (22.5 %), Yoruba (18 %), and Igbo (15.5 %). Fulani and Ijaw/Izon comprise only 6 and 4 % of the population, respectively. The ethnic diversity of Nigeria is made clear by the fact that the category of "other" for ethnic affiliation comprises approximately 29 % of the total population. There does not seem to be any major difference in median age by ethnicity, but it is important to remember that the DHS only collects data for working age adults. The youngest ethnic groups are the Tiv and the Igala (median age: 26 years) and the oldest is the Fulani (29 years).

In terms of religion, Islam is the largest religious group in Nigeria but the percentage Muslim is rapidly declining, while the percentage of

Christians (other than Catholics) is increasing. According to tabulations of the DHS, the number of Muslims has declined from 50.6 % of the population in 2003 to 44.7 % in 2008. Catholics are also declining in Nigeria (from 13.4 % in 2003 to 11.5 % in 2008). But other Christians are growing as a percentage of the total population; this category grew from 34.7 to 41.8 % between 2003 and 2008.

Traditionalist religions have not changed much during this period, and remain steady at around 1.2 % of the population. The mean age of traditionalists (34 years) is much higher than the other religious groups, not surprisingly (they are more likely to be older persons). Muslims are also slightly older, on average, than Catholics or other Christians (about 30 years vs. about 29 years). This may account for their decline as a proportion of the total population as well.

Finally, in terms of distribution by regions, some regions of the country have seen their population decline, while others have had steep increases. The general trend is of decreasing numbers in the North and increasing numbers in the South. The population in the northern regions of the country is decreasing, most notably in the North East and North West regions. The North East declined from 18 % of the total national population in 2003 to only 12.5 % by 2008. Likewise, the North West region declined from 27 to 24 % of the national population over the 5 years period. In contrast, the population of the southern part of the country has increased over the 5 years period. The South East region increased from 9.5 % in 2003 to 11.8 % in 2008, the South West region increased from 13 to 16.7 % over the period, and the South South region increased from 18 to 20.7 %.

Urbanization and the Growing Rural and Urban Divide

Nigeria, like much of SSA, is rapidly urbanizing. The UN estimate for 2005 was 46.2 % urban, and Nigeria's urban population is projected to increase quite rapidly, with over half of the population living in urban areas by 2015 and over

three-quarters in urban areas by 2050 (United Nations 2009).¹

In terms of growth, the UN estimates that the urban population in Nigeria is growing currently at a rate of about 3.84 %, and it will continue to grow at a rate of at least 2.59 % annually through 2030.

Meanwhile, the growth rate for the rural population is already less than 1.0 % and expected to continue to decline, reaching negative growth by 2025 (United Nations 2009). This was adjusted somewhat from the 2007 projections, which estimated rural growth currently at less than 0.5 % and reaching negative growth by 2020, yet this seems quite low, considering the high rural fertility rates. It suggests that mortality may be much higher in some rural areas than in urban areas.² In general, natural increase (fertility minus mortality) represents a greater share of urban growth in sub-Saharan Africa than it does in other regions (Chen et al. 1998), so these urban growth rates in Nigeria likely capture relatively high (although now declining urban fertility rates). Although urban growth was higher in Africa than in the rest

of the world, the continent still experienced an overall decline in urban growth during the 1990s and 2000s (Bocquier 2003, 2005; Potts 1995, 2000, 2006), which corresponds with the UN estimates.

Nevertheless, even if these projected rates are not exactly right, one can anticipate that the percentage of Nigeria's urban dwellers will increase while the percentage of rural dwellers will decrease over time. Addressing the needs of these increasing numbers of urban residents, including their access to food, housing, education, employment and services will be a major challenge for Nigeria's government in the coming decades. Some of these new urban residents will be migrants from rural areas, so there will likely be additional challenges in integrating them into the cities, but many will be the children of current urbanites, as natural increase (fertility) is also contributing to urbanization.

Ethnicity, Religion, and Fertility

Fertility Differentials Across Nigeria's Sub-populations

Persistent high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa and evidence of its potential adverse effects on the region's development efforts has been well documented. Recently, however, new concerns have emerged; some demographers believe that the slow but ongoing fertility decline in Africa has stalled in the late 1990s and early 2000s in 15 countries that were at the forefront of fertility decline in the region (Westoff and Cross 2006; Bongaarts 2006, 2008; Garenne 2007; Moultrie et al. 2008; Shapiro and Gebreselassie 2008; Schoumaker 2008). Nigeria is one of the countries where fertility decline has stalled over the last decade. Nigeria's total fertility rate (TFR) of 5.7 children per woman in 2008 falls roughly in the middle of the group of West African countries where data are available (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal); TFRs for the region range from 4.0 in Ghana to 7.0 in Niger (NPC/ICF Macro International 2009). While the country's current

¹Despite the fact that the 2008 DHS relied on the 1991 Census EAs as its sampling frame (perhaps with some adjustment for newly urbanized EAs, although this is not clear from the 2008 DHS final report) and the fact that the UN projections were released before the 2006 Census data were available and thus must also be based on the 1991 Census data, vast discrepancies between the two sources remain. Few would dispute that it is likely that the population residing in states with smaller populations actually make up the majority of residents—rural people. However, sources at the United Nations Population Division who produce these estimates and projections suggest that their estimation and projection techniques account for the poor data quality and lack of current Census data in a way that the DHS data do not. However, they readily admit that the UN projections have been erroneous in the past in a number of cases and that it is nearly impossible, particularly for a country like Nigeria with such erratic data collection efforts, to ascertain the correct number. For obvious reasons, the UN sources do not wish to be quoted on the record regarding issues of data quality for particular countries. Likewise, their internal analyses of data quality are generally not published.

²Note that rural residents probably generally have poorer health and lower life expectancies than urban residents (with the exception of some slum populations) (Montgomery et al. 2003), although no research from Nigeria is available that supports this possibility.

Table 21.1 Total fertility rate (TFR) by background characteristics, Nigeria, 2003 and 2008

Variable	2003	2008
Region		
North Central	5.7	5.4
North East	7.0	7.2
North West	6.7	7.3
South East	4.1	4.8
South South	4.6	4.7
South West	4.1	4.5
Education		
None	6.7	7.3
Primary	6.3	6.5
Secondary or higher	4.2	4.2
Place of residence		
Rural	6.1	6.3
Urban	4.9	4.7
Household wealth status		
Poorest	6.5	7.1
Poor	6.3	7.0
Middle	5.7	5.9
Rich	5.9	5.0
Richest	4.2	4.0
Total	5.7	5.7

Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, 2003 and 2008

TFR is a drop from 6.3 in 1990, it has stalled at 5.7 since 2003. Moreover, the national rate substantially masks the disparity between socio-demographic groups and regions within the country. In general, fertility rates in the northern regions of the country, among women with less than a secondary education, among women from the poorest backgrounds, and among residents of rural areas are much higher than the national average (Table 21.1).

Table 21.1 shows the variations in Nigeria's TFR by geo-political zone, education, household wealth status, and place of residence. The North East and North West regions, predominantly Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri and Muslim, not only have pre-transition TFRs, but the rates increased between 2003 and 2008. On the other hand, though all three regions in the South—composed of the Yoruba, Igbo, and ethnic nationalities of the Niger Delta (Urhobo, Isoko, Edo, Ijaw, and Ibibio, among others) and predominantly Christian—are experiencing the stalled fertility decline, all three geo-political zones have a TFR

between 4.5 and 4.8, about 2.5 children lower than the TFR of the two core Northern regions. The North Central region has a TFR that is lower than the core northern regions, but which is still, on average, one child more than the TFR of the Southern regions during the inter-survey period.

Fertility rates were lower for each additional level of education in both survey years. Women with a secondary or higher education have a TFR of 4.2 compared with women with no education with a TFR of 7.3 in 2008. Likewise, women in households in the highest wealth quintile have an average of three children fewer than women in the lowest quintile in 2008 (4.0 and 7.1 births per woman, respectively). The 2008 NDHS data also show that rural areas have a much higher TFR than urban areas (6.3 compared with 4.7). Across all background characteristics, similar fertility patterns were shown in 2003.

These indicators are consistent with the gloomy demographic and socioeconomic features of Northern Nigeria, corresponding with the region's worse poverty, literacy, family planning, and reproductive health indicators and outcomes compared to the rest of the country, combined with the highest rates of early marriage in the world (Olurode 2000; USAID 2003; Population Council 2005). The gap between the northern regions and the rest of the country has persisted over time so that, for key indicators, the northern average distorts national trends and contributes to the widening political, socio-cultural, and development gulf in the country (APHRC 2007). For example, the TFR in the North has been over two children per woman higher than that of the South in both 2003 and 2008. Likewise, the mean number of children ever born (a measure of past fertility) was 3.1 in 2003 for Nigeria as whole, but a difference of over one child per woman was observed between the North and South.

Similar variation remains between the two regions in the 2008 DHS survey. While there is general evidence of a stalled fertility decline for Nigeria, the regions of the North are stalling at higher fertility levels relative to the regions in the South, as demonstrated by Table 21.2.

These fertility differentials are directly related to differences in levels of contraceptive use and other

Table 21.2 Mean number of children ever born (CEB) by region, Nigeria, 2003 and 2008

Variable	2003	2008
Region		
North Central	3.0	2.9
North East	4.0	3.9
North West	3.7	4.0
South East	2.1	2.4
South South	2.6	2.3
South West	2.0	2.3
Religion		
Catholic	2.3	2.4
Protestant	2.5	2.5
Traditionalist	5.3	3.7
Islam	3.7	4.6
Other	2.3	2.3
Education		
None	4.6	4.6
Primary	2.1	1.9
Secondary	1.4	1.6
Higher	3.5	3.8
Place of residence		
Rural	3.3	3.4
Urban	2.6	2.3
Household wealth status		
Poorest	4.1	3.9
Poor	2.2	3.8
Middle	3.5	2.0
Rich	2.7	2.8
Richest	4.0	3.2
Total	3.1	3.0

Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, 2003 and 2008

markers of reproductive health. The prevalence of modern contraceptive use among married women was 5.3 % in the North and 12.5 % in the South, and the maternal mortality ratio was about 1,287 per 100,000 live births in the North compared to about 225 per 100,000 live births in the South (NPC/UNICEF Nigeria 2001). The 2008 NDHS report recorded an even higher disparity in contraceptive prevalence between the two regions of the country.

While the average contraceptive prevalence for any method for currently married women age 15–49 was 6.6 % for all three Northern geopolitical zones (2.8 % for North East, 4.0 % for North West, and 13.0 % for North Central), the average for the three Southern geopolitical zones was

27.1 % (23.4 % for South East, 26.2 % for South South, and 31.7 % for the South West) (NPC/ICF Macro International 2009).

Several researchers in Nigeria have examined the high and unchanging fertility levels in the North and the low prevalence of contraceptive use among women and identified key explanations. Both qualitative and quantitative studies have identified ethnicity and religion as significant determinants of reproductive behavior and fertility outcomes, particularly in Northern Nigeria. A recent qualitative study (2007–2008) implemented in Kano and Jigawa States using in-depth interviews (IDIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) found that fertility is a key socio-political, cultural, and economic resource in the region and identified several factors that contribute to the continued high fertility levels there. The Koranic inheritance doctrine (which engenders childbearing competition among co-wives in mostly polygynous households), the framing of contraceptives as an American/Christian strategy to reduce the population of Nigerian Muslims, and the pervasive depiction of contraceptives as un-Islamic and extremely injurious to women's health in dominant local religious and cultural discourses are among the major drivers of fertility behavior in northern Nigeria (Izugbara et al. 2009). The study found that fertility and family planning are framed in local preaching by imams in terms of power and population, and are articulated in broader political ideologies of the region's supremacy and destiny as leader over the rest of the country. Fertility is depicted as a way to honor God, so that having many children is a way of 'helping the religion'. People who 'help the religion' by having many children acquire religious merit. Also according to this perspective, Allah, as the giver of children, will also cater for them; anxiety about how one's children will survive is to question the creator's capacity to provide and care for what he has created.

Apart from these perspectives anchored in religion, other drivers of fertility in northern Nigeria include the young age at which most women continue to marry, the threat of polygyny and divorce, confusion regarding expectations surrounding spousal communication on fertility

and reproduction, the marked high status attached to having large families, the persistent unavailability of contraceptives and trustworthy family planning providers (especially in rural and semi-rural areas), and the general lack of adequate and comprehensive information on contraceptives in the region. Despite widespread pro-natalist beliefs and opinions, it is important to note that people in the study were not infinitely supportive of unregulated childbearing. A contrary perspective that supports fertility regulation is anchored on the position that Islam recognizes the centrality of the family to social life. Matching family size with economic resources was reported as key to rearing children who will not bring the religion of Allah to disrepute. Consequently, while fertility could provide insurance in old age, ensure a wider social network for siblings, guarantee the continuity of the religion, provide cheap domestic and economic labor, improve one's social standing, act as insurance against child mortality, and serve political ends for the region, it was also recognized that it could expose a household to poverty shocks, lead to parental inability to care effectively for one's children, reduce the life-chances of children, and put children at risk for delinquency and anti-social behavior (Izugbara et al. 2009).

Teenage Pregnancy and Childbearing

Early childbearing, particularly among teenagers, has been linked to negative demographic, socioeconomic, and socio-cultural consequences. Teenage mothers are more likely to suffer from severe complications during labor and delivery, which leads to higher morbidity and mortality for them and their children. In addition, the socio-economic advancement of teenage mothers in terms of educational attainment and job opportunities may be curtailed (NPC/ORC Macro International 2004; NPC/ICF Macro International 2009).

Table 21.3 shows the percentage of women ages 15–19 who are mothers or pregnant with

their first child by background characteristics. One in five (21 %) teenage women in Nigeria was a mother and another 4 % were pregnant with their first child in 2003. This contrasts with 18 % who were mothers and 5 % who were pregnant with their first child by 2008. Clearly, early motherhood and pregnancy is more of a rural phenomenon, with 25 and 23 % of rural women ages 15–19 already mothers, compared with 14 and 9 % of urban women, in 2003 and 2008, respectively. Similarly, adolescent pregnancy is higher and increasing more rapidly in rural than in urban Nigeria between 2003 and 2008. A similar pattern of pregnancy and childbearing outcomes follow the educational attainment gradient; adolescents who have the lowest levels of schooling also have the highest levels of motherhood and pregnancy. Table 21.3 also shows that teenagers with no education were twice as likely to be mothers as those with primary education (44.5 % versus 20.5 % in 2003, and 44 % versus 21 % in 2008). This sharply contrasts with only 8 % in 2003 and 7 % in 2008 of teenagers with secondary education who have become mothers. The proportion is even smaller among those with higher education. Similar patterns are observed by household wealth status, with adolescents from the poor and the poorest households having the highest levels of motherhood and pregnancy over the same period.

A comparison of the geo-political zones within Nigeria shows that adolescent motherhood and pregnancy are lowest in the South West and South East regions in 2003. In 2008, while motherhood was lowest in both regions as in 2003, pregnancy was lowest in the South South. In contrast, 38 and 37 % of adolescents aged 15–19 in the North East and North West were mothers in 2003, the highest level in the country. In 2008, despite a marginal decline, the proportion of motherhood remained highest in both geo-political zones (31 % in the North East and 35 % in the North West). Similarly, Table 21.3 shows very profound variation in terms of adolescent pregnancy across the regions of the North and the South over the same time period. One significant

Table 21.3 Percentage of female adolescents (ages 15–19) who are mothers or pregnant with their first child, by background characteristics, Nigeria, 2003 and 2008

Variable	2003		2008	
	Mothers	Pregnant with first child	Mothers	Pregnant with first child
Region				
North Central	13.0	2.6	17.1	5.1
North East	38.1	6.3	31.1	8.3
North West	36.9	8.3	34.7	9.9
South East	5.3	0.8	6.3	1.8
South West	4.1	0.6	6.9	1.9
South South	11.3	3.0	10.4	1.5
Education				
None	44.5	9.5	44.0	11.2
Primary	20.5	3.0	21.0	5.5
Secondary	7.6	1.8	6.8	2.1
Higher	^a	^a	2.7	0.0
Place of residence				
Rural	24.8	4.8	22.9	5.8
Urban	13.6	3.1	8.9	3.1
Household wealth status				
Poorest	27.4	4.8	35.7	10.1
Poor	30.2	5.4	26.3	6.3
Middle	22.8	5.6	16.2	4.5
Rich	18.0	4.7	13.0	2.7
Richest	10.1	1.0	3.1	1.7
Total	21.0	4.3	18.0	4.8

Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, 2003 and 2008

^aFewer than 25 cases; suppressed

point to note in the adolescent motherhood and pregnancy outcomes in northern Nigeria is that this region has the highest rates of early marriage in the world (Population Council 2005).

Overall, fertility is very high in Nigeria, particularly in comparison to the rest of the world, but even in comparison to its own region of West Africa. Nigeria, although it began the fertility transition, seems to have stalled in completing that transition. Low rates of contraceptive prevalence (and correspondingly, high rates of fertility) among subpopulations like northerners, Muslims and traditionalists, the poor, and the uneducated play a large role in this stalled transition. These subpopulations also have high rates of teenage marriage, pregnancy and child-bearing, which, of course, also contribute to continued high fertility levels.

Ethnicity, Religion, and Mortality

Infant and Child Mortality and Ethnicity and Religion

Infant mortality (the probability of dying before the first birthday), and child mortality (the probability of dying between the first and fifth birthdays) are basic indicators of a country's socio-economic situation and quality of life (UNDP 2007). These rates are important for identifying population groups at risk; for planning, monitoring, and evaluating population and health programs and policies; and for monitoring progress towards the Millennium Development Goal to reduce child mortality by two-thirds by the year 2015 (NPC/ICF Macro International 2009).

Table 21.4 Infant, child, and underfive mortality rates in the 5 years preceding the survey, Nigeria, 2003 and 2008

	Infant mortality (1q0)	Child mortality (4q1)	Underfive mortality (5q0)
2003	99	97	187
2008	75	88	157

Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, 2003 and 2008. Infant and underfive mortality rates are estimated based on deaths per 1,000 live births, and child mortality is estimated based on deaths per 1,000 children aged 12–59 months.

Early childhood mortality rates based on data from the 2003 and 2008 Nigeria DHS surveys are presented in Table 21.4 and have generally shown a decreasing trend. The under-five mortality rate for the 5 years preceding the 2003 survey is 187 per 1,000 live births and this decreased to 157 by the 2008 DHS. Infant mortality has decreased from 99 deaths per 1,000 births in 2003 to 75 deaths per 1,000 in 2008. Child mortality decreased from 97 to 88 deaths. This means that out of every 1,000 children who survived to 12 months of age, 97 did not reach their fifth birthday in 2003, but the figure decreased to 88 by the 2008 survey.

In terms of childhood mortality differentials, Table 21.5 summarizes mortality estimates calculated for the 10-year period before the 2003 and 2008 surveys so that the rates are based on a sufficient number of cases in each category to ensure statistically reliable estimates. As in most countries, childhood mortality rates differ substantially between urban and rural areas for all mortality categories and survey years. For example, despite the consistent childhood mortality decline in both urban and rural areas during the 10 years preceding both the 2003 and 2008 surveys, all childhood mortality rates are higher in rural than urban areas. The general disadvantage of the northern regions in child mortality outcomes is also clearly shown in the data across all survey years. Despite its advantage over all other regions in the 10 years preceding the 2003 survey, it is important to note the deterioration of childhood mortality rates in the South East region during the 10 years preceding the 2008 survey.

Nevertheless, the North East and North West remain the zones with the worst childhood mortality indicators in Nigeria across the two survey years. For example, while child mortality increased from the lowest 40–60 deaths per 1,000 children aged 12–59 months in the South East, child mortality decreased from the highest 176 in 2003 to yet the highest 139 deaths per 1,000 children in 2008 in the North West. Similarly, while under-five mortality increased from the lowest 103–153 deaths per 1,000 births in the South East in 2003 and 2008, it decreased from the highest 269 deaths to 217 deaths per 1,000 births in the North West over the same period. It is important to observe that the South West zone maintained the lowest rates for all childhood mortality estimates compared with the other zones in the 10 years preceding both the 2003 and the 2008 surveys. It has been observed that the regional differentials in childhood mortality are consistent with regional differentials in basic indicators of maternal care, such as antenatal care visits and content, as well as delivery assistance (NPC and ICF Macro International 2009).

In terms of education and household wealth status, the estimates consistently show that higher levels of educational attainment among mothers are generally associated with lower childhood mortality rates. Despite a secular downward trend over the two survey years, children born to mothers with no education have the highest prevalence of childhood mortality across all indicators and survey years, but rates decline sharply as mother's level of education increases. Similarly, childhood mortality rates are lowest for children in households in the highest wealth quintile and increase sharply as one moves down the wealth quintile, with the highest rates among children in households in the lowest wealth quintile across all indicators and survey years. Again, while we observe marginal increases in childhood mortality rates among women with secondary and higher education and among women from the highest wealth quintile between 2003 and 2008, they still remain the most advantaged of the subgroups.

Table 21.5 Infant, child, and underfive mortality rates for the 10 years period preceding the survey, by socioeconomic characteristics, Nigeria, 2003 and 2008

Socioeconomic characteristics	Infant mortality (1q0)		Child mortality (4q1)		Underfive mortality (5q0)	
	2003	2008	2003	2008	2003	2008
Place of residence						
Rural	121	95	139	106	243	191
Urban	81	67	78	58	153	121
Region						
North Central	103	77	70	62	165	135
North East	125	109	154	126	260	222
North West	114	91	176	139	269	217
South East	66	94	40	64	103	153
South West	120	84	63	58	176	138
South South	69	59	47	32	131	89
Mother's education						
None	124	97	166	124	269	209
Primary	111	89	85	77	186	159
Secondary	71	70	45	49	113	116
Higher	61	48	20	22	80	68
Household wealth status						
Poorest	133	100	143	132	257	219
Poor	140	103	178	121	293	212
Middle	110	86	118	87	215	165
Rich	87	73	101	60	179	129
Richest	52	58	29	31	79	87
Total	109	87	121	92	217	171

Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, 2003 and 2008

Maternal Mortality

Maternal deaths were defined as any death occurring during pregnancy, childbirth, or within 2 months after the birth or termination of a pregnancy. The maternal mortality rate is an important indicator of the performance of women's reproductive health programs.³ The 2008 estimates of maternal mortality were calculated by dividing the number of maternal deaths by woman-years of exposure. The results indicate that the rate of mortality associated with pregnancy and childbearing is 1.0 maternal death per 1,000 woman-years of exposure. The estimated

age-specific mortality rates displayed a plausible pattern, being generally higher during the peak childbearing ages than at the younger and older age groups. However, the age-specific pattern should be interpreted with caution because of the small number of events—only 398 maternal deaths for women of all ages were identified. The maternal mortality rate can be converted to a maternal mortality ratio and expressed per 100,000 live births by dividing the rate by the general fertility rate of 0.186, which prevailed during the 2008 survey period. Nigeria's maternal mortality ratio (MMR), calculated as the maternal mortality rate divided by the general fertility rate is put at 545 per 100,000 live births in 2008 (NPC and ICF Macro International 2009).

Despite the difficulty of obtaining data on ethnic and religious distribution of maternal mortality, one study points to significant ethnic

³Note that death rates overall have been observed to be much lower among adults, and estimates for particular subgroups are problematic because it can be distorted by small sample sizes (NPC and ICF Macro 2009).

variation in the use of skilled assistance at childbirth and postnatal care in Nigeria. Babalola and Fatusi (2009) found that Fulanis and Kanuris (in the North) are not statistically different from the Hausas (in the North) in terms of utilization of skilled medical personnel for childbirth and postnatal care. In contrast, the level of service utilization was significantly higher among the Igbo (in the South) and “minority” tribes compared to the Hausa. They argued that the pattern is consistent with the general picture of wide regional disparity in health status in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic settings as shown, for example, in several NDHS reports.

In earlier work on the social context of childbirth among the Hausa, Wall (1998) drew attention to the strong influence of cultural beliefs and practices on childbirth and other fertility-related behaviors among the Hausa and their significant contribution to maternal morbidity and mortality in the region. In addition to the disadvantage which is related to the high proportion of teenage girls who are married to much older men, (including child brides, sometimes as young as 9 or 10 years of age), there is a high prevalence of maternal-related morbidities such as vesico-vaginal fistula (VVF). Wall (1998) also identified cultural norms such as *Kunya* or shame, which restrict women from readily seeking health-related assistance in pregnancy and childbirth. As Wall noted (in Babalola and Fatusi 2009), “*Kunya*, or ‘shame’ plays an extremely important role in Hausa childbirth, particularly in the first pregnancy. The newly pregnant girl should not draw attention to her gravid state, and all mention of the pregnancy should be avoided in conversation and action. These social pressures to remain ‘modest’ may well prevent her from asking questions about childbirth, and create a major barrier to her seeking skilled assistance for delivering in hospital.” As Wall further noted, the pregnant girl’s “mother, other relatives, and a local midwife usually stay with her during labor, but her *kunya* and her fear may be so great that she does not say anything until labor is well advanced.” (p. 353). Moreover in the cultural context of the Hausa, delivering one’s first child alone – unattended to by anyone – is viewed with pride. The convergence of

ethno-cultural and religious factors as *kunya*, the perceived social need for women’s reproductive capacities to be under strict male control, the practice of *pardah* (wife seclusion), which restricts women’s access to medical care, marriage at an early age, pregnancy often occurring before maternal pelvic growth is complete, a high rate of obstructed labor, almost universal female illiteracy, inadequate facilities to deal with obstetric emergencies, a deteriorating economy, and a political culture marked by rampant corruption and inefficiency has resulted in a very poor level of female reproductive health (Wall 1998).

HIV/AIDS

Consistent with its youthful demographic profile and increasing risky sexual behavior such as casual sex and keeping of multiple partners, some of whom may include commercial sex workers (Arowujolu et al. 2002; Isiugo-Abanihe 2003; Smith 2000), Nigeria recorded an increasing HIV/AIDS prevalence rate between 1992 and 2001 (1.8 % in 1992 to 3.8 % in 1994, 4.5 % in 1996, 5.4 % in 1999 and 5.8 % in 2001). Most of the new cases are found among the youth (Federal Ministry of Health 2001), as shown in Fig. 21.1. However, through a concerted effort by the Nigerian Government, the prevalence rate has begun to decrease in recent years (5.0 % in 2003, 4.4 % in 2005 and 4.6 % in 2008) (WHO 2009). Nevertheless, Nigeria still ranks third in terms of the number of people infected with HIV, after India and South Africa. In 2007, 2.6 million people were living with HIV/AIDS, and approximately 170,000 people died from AIDS in that year (Fig. 21.1) (UNAIDS 2008a, b).

Mother-to-child transmission has been identified as a major route of the epidemic; most of the estimated 220,000 children who are living with HIV were infected through their mothers (UNAIDS 2008b). With AIDS claiming so many lives, Nigeria’s life expectancy has declined significantly. In 1991 the average life expectancy was 53.8 years for women and 52.6 years for men, but by 2007 these figures had fallen to 46 for women and 47 for men (WHO 2008).




Fig. 21.1 HIV prevalence, Nigeria, 1991–2008 (Source: World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa, 2009)

Nigeria's complex mixture of diverse ethnic groups, languages, cultures, religions, and regional political groupings has been identified as part of the major challenge for HIV prevention programs in the country. Other factors linked to the rapid spread of the disease in the country include: high rates of casual and transactional unprotected sex in the general population (particularly among youth between the ages of 15 and 24), sexual networking practices such as polygamy, a high prevalence of untreated sexually transmitted infections (STIs), low levels of male and female condom use, poverty, low literacy levels, poor health status, low status of women, and stigmatization, discrimination, and denial of HIV infection risk among vulnerable groups (NACA 2009; AVERT 2010).

The ethnic and religious dimensions of the HIV/AIDS epidemic are linked to cultural practices among Nigeria's diverse ethnic and religious groups. Women are particularly affected by the epidemic in Nigeria; accounting for 58 % of all adults aged 15 and above living with HIV by

the end of 2007 (UNAIDS 2008a). Traditionally, women in Nigeria marry young, although the average age at which they marry varies between states. A 2007 study revealed that 54 % of girls from the North West aged between 15 and 24 were married by age 15, and 81 % were married by age 18 (Population Council 2007). The study showed that younger married girls lacked knowledge about reproductive health, including HIV/AIDS. They also tend to lack the power and education needed to negotiate safer sexual practices with their partner, such as condom use. Consistent with the high probability that the husband will be significantly older than his wife, and therefore more likely to have had more sexual partners in the past, young women are more vulnerable than men to HIV infection within marriage. Related to this is evidence that past attempts at providing sex education for young people were hampered by religious and cultural objections (Odotulu et al. 2006).

In terms of management of the epidemic, WHO (2008) reported that only about 30,000–40,000 of

the estimated 520,000 people living with AIDS (PLWAs) that need drugs actually have access to anti-retroviral therapies (ART). Over the last two decades, Nigeria's health care system has deteriorated as a result of political instability, corruption, and a mismanaged economy. Large parts of the country lack even basic health care provision, making it difficult to establish HIV testing and prevention services, such as those for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission. Sexual health clinics providing contraception, testing, and treatment for other STIs are also few and far between. This makes it particularly difficult to keep the spread of the epidemic under control (Sofu et al. 2003). The challenges that need to be addressed in this area include: building the capacity of the health system (personnel training and institutional strengthening), strengthening the procurement and supply management system to ensure continuous provision of medicines, reagents, and other consumables, and the institution of an effective monitoring and evaluation system (Averting HIV and AIDS 2010). Programs to control the future course of the disease in Nigeria must adequately address levels of HIV and AIDS-related knowledge among the general population, social stigmatization, risk

behavior modification, access to quality services for STIs, provision and uptake of HIV counseling and testing, and access to care and ART, including prevention and treatment of opportunistic infections.

Other Health Challenges in Nigeria

Nigeria continues to suffer from a double burden of both communicable and non-communicable diseases (NCDs), with high levels of epidemic outbreaks, periodic occurrences of man-made and natural disasters, and a rising incidence of NCDs (WHO 2009). Apart from HIV/AIDS, malaria and pulmonary tuberculosis (TB) are key communicable diseases that constitute significant health challenges in Nigeria. Table 21.6 summarizes Nigeria's malaria and TB indicators between 2000 and 2007.

Malaria infection is identified as the most significant public health problem in Nigeria. It is associated with high proportions of disease and deaths (30 % of all under-five mortality and 11 % of all maternal mortality) and is a major cause of poor child development (WHO 2009). Estimates suggest that at least 50 % of the population will

Table 21.6 Malaria and tuberculosis indicators, Nigeria, 2000–2007

Indicators	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Malaria prevalence rate (per 100,000)	2,024	1,859	2,203	1,727	1,157	1,157	1,157	1,157
Death rates associated with malaria	0.23	0.19	0.15	0.19	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures	15.74	12.01	12.57	21.75	7.07	7.07	7.07	7.07
Tuberculosis prevalence rate (per 100,000)	15.74	12.01	12.57	21.75	7.07	7.07	7.07	7.07
Death rates associated with tuberculosis	1.57	2.24	1.58	2.5	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50

Source: World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa, 2009

have at least one episode of malaria annually, while children under the age of five will have two to four attacks of malaria annually. The economic cost of malaria may be as high as 1.3 % of economic growth per annum and increasing drug resistance has added to the burden.

Linked to the 2.86 million people living with HIV/AIDS in 2007 and the high prevalence of HIV and STIs among the age group 15–24 years, is the resurgence of TB. Nigeria ranks fifth among the 22 high-burden countries for TB in the world. In 2005, 66,848 new cases were reported nationally from the Direct Observation Therapy Sites (DOTS); of these new cases, 35,048 (52 %) were positive. The HIV-positive rate among TB cases was 27 % in 2005 (WHO 2005, cited in WHO 2009). At the end of the third quarter of 2006, there were DOTS services in 599 local government areas (LGAs), 643 TB microscopy centers in 548 LGAs (1 per 230,000 population) and 2,117 health facilities providing DOTS TB treatment (1 per 70,000 population). However, fewer than 500 of the 2,117 DOTS centers were implementing TB/HIV collaborative activities. TB and HIV/AIDS program staff have not been trained in infection control measures, and isoniazid prophylaxis among HIV positive individuals is still in the pilot phase (WHO 2009).

Communicable diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria are still responsible for the greatest burden of morbidity and mortality. Nevertheless, non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are becoming a significant burden in sub-Saharan Africa. Obesity, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, cardiovascular disease, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, epilepsy, and mental illness are some of the important chronic NCDs that pose significant challenges in terms of management and follow-up in the region. A mapping of NCDs in Nigeria identified over five million Nigerians as hypertensive, at least one million as diabetic, and over 600,000 with Sick Cell Anemia (Akinkugbe 2009). A wide range of risk factors for hypertension have been identified, including: excessive salt consumption, lack of exercise, being overweight, tobacco use, overindulgence in alcohol, and stress. Beyond this there is an unholy alliance

between hypertension, coronary heart disease, and diabetes, in that all three diseases share almost the same range of risk factors (Akinkugbe 2009).

One major non-communicable health challenge in modern Nigeria relates to acute medical conditions, disabilities, morbidity, and premature deaths associated with accidents and disasters. Nigeria has one of the highest road traffic accident rates in the world (Asogwa 1999). Accidents and injuries are the major cause of death in adults under 50 years in the country (Ezenwa 1986). The number of potential life years lost due to acute medical emergencies, especially accidents and injury, has resulted in tremendous economic and social loss to the country. A study of road traffic accidents in the country showed that between 1960 and 1969, about 18,000 deaths occurred, but the figure significantly increased to 92,000 deaths between 1980 and 1989 (Oluwasanmi 1993). The incidence of unintentional and intentional injuries is increasing rapidly in Nigeria. Despite insufficient data, anecdotal evidence from media reports and hospital records indicate several thousand additional cases of injuries in the country in recent years due to numerous ethnic, religious, and civil conflicts in the country. Ethno-religious crises that have engulfed Nigeria since 1979 have cost over one hundred thousand Nigerian lives, with those injured triple of the dead (Yusuf 2009). This has equally resulted in mass internal displacement of people and frequent unplanned journeys under tense conditions. It is almost universally accepted among Nigerians that accidents and associated injuries are major and neglected causes of preventable mortality and morbidity in the country (Zakari 2002).

The ethnic and religious prevalence of NCDs in Nigeria is generally unknown. However, triangulating evidence from various sources presents us with initial patterns that are consistent with ethno-regional prevalence differentials. For instance, while the prevalence of breast cancer in Nigeria as a whole is unknown, studies in Zaria and other centers showed that it is either the first or second commonest cancer affecting women in the country (Kene et al. 2010). Presenting data from cancer registries across the

country, Oluwatosin and Oladepo (2006) reported the relative frequencies of breast cancer among women: 35.3 % in Ibadan, 28.2 % in Ife-Ijesha, 17 % in Eruwa, and 37.5 % in Lagos (South West Zone); 44.5 % in Enugu (South East Zone); 20.5 % in Zaria (North West Zone); and 29.8 % in Calabar (South South Zone). Further reports showed that majority of cases occurred in premenopausal women, and the mean age of occurrence ranged between 43 and 50 years across the regions. The youngest age recorded was 16 years, from Lagos and the peak age of incidence is 42.6 years.

On hypertension, Iyalomhe et al. (2008) reported that over 4.5 million people of over age 15 as hypertensive, with many of them not aware of it, adding that the highest prevalence was found in Kano in Northern Nigeria and Lagos in the South West region. In Lagos, a screening exercise of the Non-Communicable Disease (NCD) surveillance system held between May 19th and 23rd, 2008 of 50,598 people found 4.2 % to be diabetic and 17 % hypertensive.

Following a national blindness and visual impairment survey by the International Centre for Eye Health (ICEH) and other collaborators in 2005–2007, Kyari et al. (2009) reported significant increase in the prevalence of blindness with increasing age: from 0.8 % at 40–49 years to 23.3 % among those aged 80 years. Females had a higher prevalence of blindness than males (4.4 % versus 4.0 %), while illiterate participants had far higher prevalence of blindness than those who could read and write (5.8 % versus 1.5 %). The South West geo-political zone had the lowest prevalence of blindness (2.8 %) and the North East zone had the highest (6.1 %). The estimates suggest that a total of 4.25 million adults aged 40 years and above in Nigeria are visually impaired or blind. The prevalence of blindness varied across the different ecological zones being highest in the Sahel (6.6 %) and the lowest in the Delta (3.3 %). The survey concluded that these differences may reflect differences in access to eye care services as well as variation in the incidence of diseases. Recent evidence from neighboring countries in West Africa, have shown similarities in the blindness profile in populations

residing in the same ecological zones in northern Cameroon, the Volta region of Ghana and Mali, necessitating the call for eye services across Nigeria and for planning at regional levels.

The national blindness and visual impairment survey screened for obesity, and found a quarter of survey participants with a body mass index of 25, the rate being higher in females than males (32.8 % versus 21.7 %).

Rates of obesity declined with increasing age, more common in urban than rural areas (15.1 % versus 6.4 %) and in the south of the country than in the North. Overall 8.3 % of the population had a BMI of 30.

The study of coronary artery diseases (CAD) and its complications such as myocardial infarction and other degenerative disorders have been hampered by the lack of diagnostic facilities. However, studies in Kano, northern Nigeria found a 1.3 % prevalence rate of ischemic heart disease, which is very rare in the Niger Delta of Southern Nigeria (0.24 %). In keeping with findings from other centers in the developing world, the rate is 1.53 % in Cameroon. The absence of peri-partum cardiac failure among patients in southern Nigeria, contrasts sharply with reports from northern Nigeria where the incidence of peri-partum cardiac failure, from peri-partum cardio-myopathy, is probably the highest in the world (Onwuchekwu and Asekomeh 2009). The presence of anemia in nearly 80 % of cases, and the postpartum customs and practices of taking hot baths and lying on heated beds to stay warm, as well as the ingestion of large amount of local salt to ensure adequate breast milk flow in northern Nigeria, have been mentioned as important factors in its pathogenesis (Danbauchi 2002), a situation and practice that has not been reported in the various populations in the Niger Delta basin of southern Nigeria (Onwuchekwa and Asekomeh 2009). Despite the limitations of these results following their narrow focus on hospitals, particular cases or communities, they point to significant differences in the prevalence and determinants of NCDs across the geopolitical zones of Nigeria and possible socio-cultural explanations. The limitations of available data underscore the need for concerted investment in

nationwide representative research into the challenges posed by NCDs in the country.

Ethnicity, Religion and Migration

The link between Nigeria's complex web of ethnic and religious identities, its history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts and instability, and its migration system has been deeply researched. In this sub-section, we discuss the country's significant ethnic and religious dimensions of internal migration and mobility patterns, emigration, and brain drain.

Ethnicity, Religion, and Patterns of Internal Migration

Following conflicts resulting from the ethnic-based competition for political and economic power since independence, Zachariah and Conde (1981) and Brockerhoff and Hongsook (1993) have shown that the proportional representation of some ethnic groups in West Africa is much higher among urban migrants than among the population as a whole, suggesting differential propensities to migrate. However, poor economic opportunities in the rural areas in which an ethnic

group is concentrated, rather than the socio-cultural characteristics of an ethnic group, are often cited as the main reason underlying a group's propensity to migrate (Amin 1974). Gugler and Flanagan (1978) linked this to how some ethnic groups in West Africa have established social networks in urban areas that encourage in-migration through the prospect of superior income-earning opportunities, housing, and social activities for members of that group. In the case of Nigeria, research on internal migration processes has generally been fragmentary (see Makinwa 1981; Adepoju 1983, 1986; Pittin 1984; Peil 1985; Gugler 1991; Olurode 1995). However, a national-level analysis based on nationally-representative data from the 1993 Migration and Urbanization Survey, simultaneously examined the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of rural-rural and rural-urban migrants and of non-migrants who stay in rural origins. This study identified ethnicity and religion as key independent predictors of internal migration in Nigeria (Mberu 2004, 2005). The result of the bi-variate analysis summarized in Table 21.7 show that the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba are mostly rural non-migrants and rural-rural migrants. The Igbo-Ibibio are evenly spread across all internal migration streams. The Kanuri-Shua Arabs are mostly non-migrants (62 %), with little

Table 21.7 Percentage distribution of lifetime migration status by religion and ethnicity, Nigeria

Variable	Rural non-migrants	Rural-rural migrants	Rural-urban migrants	Total
Ethnic origin***	-47.0	-42.1	-10.9	-14,472
Hausa-Fulani	45.5	41.6	12.9	6,496
Yoruba	35.3	31.1	33.6	11,798
Igbo-Ibibio	62.2	34.9	2.9	1,856
Kanuri-Shua Arab	35.4	27.4	37.2	5,408
Tiv-Igala-Idoma	40.4	13.6	46.0	1,964
Urhobo-Isoko-Edo	24.4	58.1	17.4	1,682
Nupe-Kamberi-Gwari	1.7	74.6	23.7	118
Others religion***	-	-40.7	-12.7	-23,585
Muslim	46.6	33.6	31.4	22,118
Christian	35.0	30.7	3.7	1,185
Animist/other	65.7			

Source: Mberu (2004)

N=46,960

*** χ^2 tests, $p < 0.001$

Table 21.8 Multinomial logistic regression models predicting rural outmigration to rural and urban destinations (full model)

Ethnic origin	Rural–rural odds ratio	SE	Rural–urban odds ratio	SE
Hausa-Fulani	1.00	–	1.00	–
Yoruba	0.47***	.07	1.56***	.09
Igbo-Ibibio	0.44***	.08	4.29***	.10
Kanuri-Shua Arab	0.86**	.06	0.26***	.15
Tiv-Igala-Idoma	0.37***	.07	2.68***	.08
Urhobo-Isoko-Edo	0.18***	.10	9.23***	.11
Nupe-Kamberi-Gwari	1.01	.09	1.95***	.11
Other Nigerian Religion	0.42***	.07	0.30***	.11
Muslim	1.00	–	1.00	–
Christian	1.40***	.03	1.52***	.05
Animist/other	0.72***	.08	0.10***	.20
2-Loglikelihood (d.f.)	31,107.1 (60)			

Source: Mberu (2005)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (Control variables for the full model include age, gender, educational attainment marital status, labor force status, relationship to head of household, household size, and region of residence)

participation in urban-ward migration. The Nupe-Kamberi-Gwari ethnic groups are predominantly rural–rural migrants. Both the Tiv-Igala-Idoma and the Urhobo-Isoko-Edos have high propensities for rural–urban migration.

In further analysis using multinomial logistic regression (shown in Table 21.8), Mberu (2005) confirmed the independent influence of ethnicity and religion in Nigeria's internal migration system. The Hausa-Fulani are significantly more likely to be rural–rural migrants relative to other ethnicities, except the Nupe-Kamberi-Gwari. The dominance of the Hausa-Fulani in rural–rural migration can be attributed to the nature of economic activities associated with the group. Survey data indicate that they constitute over 30 % of farmers in Nigeria, predominantly in cattle-rearing. Beyond urban centers such as Kano (the northern region's commercial capital, which attracts migrants from all over Nigeria and West Africa), much of the northern region is unattractive for settlement, particularly due to an adverse environment. However, areas around Sokoto and Katsina in the North West are densely populated due to, among other factors, the availability of irrigated agricultural land and water resources (NISER 1997). For the Nupe-Gwari-Kamberi, their predominance in rural-rural migration could

also be linked to their region of origin in central Nigeria, which is largely associated with tremendous agricultural resources and production.

In the rural–urban migration stream, most ethnic groups are more likely to be rural–urban migrants than the Hausa-Fulani. A notable exception is the Kanuri-Shua-Arabs, a political minority, representing a distinct group in North Eastern Nigeria, built around the pristine Kanem-Bornu empire state, which was and remains a contending centre of Islamic civilization and influence (Osaghae 1998). Despite a dry and harsh environment due to proximity to the Sahara desert, the area is reputed to be an oasis of beauty, serenity and peace relative to other areas in Northern Nigeria. The region's economic mainstay is agriculture, which involves cattle-rearing and a massive irrigation-supported farming. Given these factors, it is logical that migration is very low among the group relative to other groups. However rural–rural migration within the region, to the shores of Lake Chad and the wetter areas, has been identified as significant (Osaghae 1998).

Two other profound results on ethnic differentials in migration were identified. Compared to the Hausa-Fulani, the Urhobo-Edo-Isoko were 9.2 times more likely and the Igbo-Ibibio were

4.3 times more likely to be rural–urban migrants. The migration of the Igbo-Ibibio has been explained historically, culturally, and geographically. Chukwuezi (2001) linked the historical impact of the Nigerian civil war with spurring the outward-directedness of the Igbo into the private sector, specializing in trading that takes them to all parts of the country. Linked to this is the culture of kinship, which Smith (1999) identified above all other factors as the thread that links particular rural and urban communities in Nigeria and connects individuals and communities with access to resources and opportunities to the state and the wider economy. Part of the kinship network among the Igbo operates through kin-based business apprenticeship that links urban business success to continuous labor recruitment from the rural home base (Chukwuezi 2001). The geographic explanation is related to the high population density in the Igbo-Ibibio region of origin, which puts pressure on land resources. This is exacerbated by the economic neglect and stagnation in the Igbo-Ibibio region following government discriminatory investment patterns after the Nigerian civil war. Limited opportunities for wage employment, due to the low level of industrialization and underdevelopment in the organized private sector, make the Igbo region economically unattractive, engendering the out-migration of these groups (NISER 1997; Chukwuezi 2001; Ajakaiye and Adeyeye 2001; Nwachukwu and Uzoigwe 2004). Nwajiuba (2005) identified the motivations for migration out of the southeast region as economic (80.28), education (16.20 %), climatic (1.41 %), political (1.41), and religious (0.70 %).

For the Urhobo-Isoko-Edo, Makinwa (1981) suggested an earlier history of high levels of rural–urban migration in their local region, but Mberu (2005) places the migration propensity of the group on a national scale, showing their far higher rural out-migration propensity than any other ethnic group in Nigeria. While a full explanation will require further studies beyond the scope of this chapter, it is instructive to note that the region of origin of the groups is substantially the Niger Delta, where recent conflicts and youth militancy have heightened awareness of poverty

and economic exclusion, a situation which is exacerbated by environmental degradation due to massive oil exploration and exploitation, which, in turn, has impaired agricultural enterprises, including fishing. In contrast, the country's South West region, the homeland of Yoruba ethnic nationality, attracts migrants from all over Nigeria as the region hosts the nation's two largest seaports, 65 % of industrial plants, about 75 % of the manufacturing workforce, large numbers of educational and research institutions, and opportunities for large agricultural plantations (NISER 1997).

This research also highlights the influence of religion in Nigeria's internal migration dynamics. The bivariate analysis indicated that Muslims predominate among rural non-migrants and rural–rural migrants. However, Christians constitute 70 % of rural–urban migrants. In the multivariate analysis, religion stood out as a significant predictor of migration propensities. As expected, Christians are significantly more likely to be rural–rural and rural–urban migrants than Muslims. There are several plausible explanations identified by migration researchers in the region. Oucho (1997) pointed to the manipulative use of both religion and ethnicity (by both the colonial regimes and military dictators) in perpetuating differences in access to political and economic resources and engendering different demographic responses and outcomes. In Nigeria, the relationship between religion and demographic outcomes (particularly migration) remains largely unexplored, but studies in Northern Nigeria and parts of the South West indicate movement restrictions among Muslims, in particular *pardah* (the practice of married women living in seclusion) and residential restrictions separating indigenes and strangers into enclaves 'Sabon-Gari' or 'Sabon-Layi' (Pittin 1984; Oluode 1995). This tendency with significant negative implications for migration is supported by findings among Muslims in other African countries (Santen 1998; Hogan and Biratu 2004). Nigeria is predominantly Christian in most of the southern regions and predominantly Muslim in the core northern regions and issues relating to movement restriction practices

and enclave settlements are basically associated with Muslims in Northern Nigeria. The recent introduction and implementation of Islamic Sharia law in core Northern states of Nigeria, together with consequent ethno-religious conflicts and accompanying loss of lives and massive destruction of property and economic goods of migrants, has been identified as a potent tool for restricting economic migration to the region (Odey 2000; Anugwom 2008).

Circular Migration and Urban-Rural Linkages

In recent years, scholars have come to underscore the importance of circular migration as a special aspect of urbanization and local development in Africa. Migrants most often maintain links with their rural communities of origin long after migration. These linkages, associated with a strong commitment to hometown development, challenge the strict dichotomous view of rural and urban areas and have major implications for local development (Trager 1988, 1998, 2001; Gugler 1991, 2002; Smith 1999).

The territorial fragmentation of Nigeria, the aftermath of the Nigerian civil war, and the perennial ethno-religious conflicts rendered urban-rural linkages increasingly important for migrants' survival. With the political division of the country into 36 states and 776 local government areas (LGAs) between 1967 and 1996, the number of opportunities for elected positions in federal, state, and local government councils proliferated. However, the reality is that a migrant to a city outside of his or her state of origin is considered a stranger in the host state, irrespective of the number of years of residence in the city (NISER 1997; Trager 1998). The same holds for children born in the city to non-natives. The result is that internal migrants are often excluded from political participation in their places of residence. The reluctance of government at all levels to address this issue suggests a tacit institutionalization of place of origin as the only viable access point to political participation.

Consequently, a migrant who aspires to contest any elective position has to return to his hometown to run if he ever hopes to succeed. It is therefore desirable, from the point of view of the migrant, to maintain strong ties with his or her hometown and to demonstrate a strong presence through residential buildings or business investments (NISER 1997; Smith 1999; Chukwuezi 2001).

Beyond personal goals, migrants also maintain ties with their communities of origin as a survival strategy in times of crisis. During the Nigerian civil war, millions of Southerners displaced in the North who kept contact with hometowns through investments in residential buildings or through correspondence with relatives were able to return and resettle easily. By contrast, those who did not maintain contact with their roots lacked the resources and contacts and found resettlement more difficult (NISER 1997).

Following endemic ethno-religious conflicts, migrants also see hometowns as the most secure place for investment. For example, in the aftermath of the Nigerian civil war, the Igbo lost land and property located outside Igboland before the war. Igbo property was seized by indigenes under the Abandoned Property Decree, which claimed that fleeing Igbo "abandoned" their property when seeking safe haven in Igboland. Consequently, after the war, significant Igbo investments in housing, small scale industries and transportation have been securely located in places of origin (Smith 1999; Chukwuezi 2001). These patterns of entrepreneurial ventures have been linked to enhanced rural economic viability and reduced rural isolationism, mostly in Southern Nigeria.

However, circular migration and rural-urban ties may also have less beneficial impacts on local development. Aja-Nwachuku (2004) found a high incidence of pre-marital pregnancy, STIs, and clandestine high-risk abortions among non-school rural-urban migrant youth in Aba, the commercial hub of Southeastern Nigeria. This finding is supported by evidence from South Africa that being a migrant and having lived in four or more places were independent and significant risk factors for HIV infection, with the primary route of infection being migrants

returning to places of origin to infect their partners (Lurie 2004). A high rate of circular migration has the potential for the transmission of disease from urban to rural areas; this is a legitimate concern that remains to be systematically investigated in Nigeria.

Ethnic and Religious Conflict and Patterns of Internal Displacement

Under several successive military governments, brutal tactics generally kept ethnic and religious rivalries in check. However, since the election of a democratic government in 1999, ethnic and religious conflicts have surged in both number and intensity leading to a sizeable number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria (Nigerian Red Cross Society 2007). While the figures fluctuate considerably due to complex displacement patterns and the lack of any comprehensive and reliable survey data, the number of IDPs in Nigeria was estimated to be approximately 3.2 million between 2003 and 2008 (National Commission for Refugees 2007, 2008).

The most pronounced case of ethnic-related internal displacement in Nigeria's history occurred before and during the Biafran War of 1967–1970. Approximately one million Igbo fled from their homes in other parts of Nigeria to the safety of the independent state of Biafra. This period was also marked by the movement of other Nigerians back to their home regions (Udoh 1997).

In the more recent past, the reasons for internal displacement vary by geo-political zones. In the Niger Delta about 480,000 persons were displaced between 2006 and 2008 in the on-going clashes surrounding the benefits of oil exploration and exploitation. The implementation of the International Court of Justice ruling that gave control of the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon created an unexpected wave of displacement of over 755,000 persons into the neighboring Cross River and Akwa Ibom states between 2007 and 2008. Between 2005 and 2008, in the Northern States of Kano, Kaduna, Kwara, Taraba, Adamawa, Benue, Plateau, and Kogi, the

displacement of a total of 1.25 million persons was linked to ethno-religious and political conflicts. Yet in other northern states- Yobe, Jigawa, Kebbi, and Gombe- about 450,000 persons were displaced by flooding between 2004 and 2007. Finally, between 2000 and 2007, over two million people were forcibly evicted from their homes in cities such as Lagos, Abuja, and Port Harcourt following government urban maintenance and/or renewal programs (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions and Social and Economic Rights Action Center 2008). Internal displacement, often (although not always) related to ethnic and religious conflict, is clearly a massive issue in Nigeria.

Emigration and Asylum Seekers

In terms of international migration, large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers have left Nigeria to settle elsewhere in Africa and across the global North. Between 1996 and 2005, Cameroon received 60,380 Nigerian refugees, the majority of these in 2001, when ethnic conflict between Hausa-Fulani herdsmen and Mambila farmers prompted the Hausa-Fulani to flee *en masse*. About 77,000 Nigerians sought asylum in industrialized countries between 1992 and 2001 (Stock 2005). The UNHCR estimated that the United States resettled 13,863 Nigerians between 1996 and 2005, followed by the United Kingdom (11,749), Germany (10,406), and Canada (9,378). Asylum seekers from Nigeria also headed to Ireland (21,378 between 1996 and 2005), South Africa (14,107), Austria (8,244), and France (6,510). In 2006, Nigerians registered asylum applications in 17 countries around the world. Following renewed ethnic and religious unrests and conflicts in the country in 2008, Nigerians lodged 26,998 asylum applications in 2008 and 2009 in 44 industrialized countries, ranking 7th in terms of country of origin of global asylum seekers behind Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Russian Federation, China and Serbia (UNHCR 2008, 2010). Stock (2005) have showed earlier that the economic stagnation of the 1990s and political and religious violence have made Nigeria a much

less attractive migration destination in recent years. While there is significant skepticism in the global north about the legitimacy of asylum applications from Nigeria, the persistent conditions of political unrest, turmoil, violence, conflicts and dislocations that have killed, injured, displaced and dislocated hundreds of thousands and destroyed their livelihoods are indeed the valid criteria that qualify citizens of a given country to seek asylum elsewhere. The overarching perspective following escalating waves of insecurity is that, any view that Nigeria is by any means better than any of the war-torn countries amounts to begging the issue. Consequently, asylum seeking and the growing tendency of Nigerians to leave the country, are simply attempts to escape from the harsh and dehumanizing effects of the poor socio-economic conditions in the country generally induced by ethnic and religious forces (Daily Independent 2009).

Ethnicity, Religion and Other Socio-demographic Characteristics

Education

Although they remain quite poor, educational levels in Nigeria are improving slowly. In 2003, the mean years of education for the total population (according to the DHS) were 5.6, but this increased to 6.8 years by 2008. There is a large gap between men and women that remains fairly steady over time. In 2003, men had, on average,

7.2 years of education, while women had only 5.1 years. By 2008, men had an average of 8 years of education and women 6.2 years. In terms of literacy, the population remains relatively illiterate overall. In 2003, 44 % of the population could not read at all; this percentage declined to 38.7 % by 2008.

As shown in Table 21.9, the percentage of the total population that had no education at all decreased from 36.9 to 31.2 % between 2003 and 2008. This decrease was especially salient for women; there were 41.6 % with no education in 2003 but only 35.8 % in 2008. The percentage of the population that had secondary education improved from 33.4 to 38.1 over the time period (from 31.1 to 35.7 % for women and from 40.9 to 43.3 % for men). The percentage of people who obtained a higher education also improved from 7.3 to 10.6 % over the 5-year period.

Although in general the educational levels of Nigerians have improved over time, there continues to be a sharp difference in these improvements between different religious groups. Catholics and Christians have higher levels of education compared to Muslims and Traditionalists. In 2003, 10.8 % of Catholics and 10.5 % of Christians had reached the level of higher education, and 50 % of Catholics and 54.5 % of Christians had reached the secondary level of education. Yet, only 17 % of Muslims and only 7 % of traditionalists had secondary education, while 61.7 % of Muslims and 61.2 % of Traditionalists had no education at all.

Table 21.9 Educational levels by key characteristics, Nigeria, 2003

	None			Primary			Secondary			Higher			Total
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Males	Female	Total	Males	Female	Total	
Sex	21.6	41.6	36.9	25.7	21.4	22.4	40.9	31.1	33.4	11.8	5.9	7.3	100 %
Religion													
Catholic	4.4	14.7	12.1	27.7	26.9	27.1	53.5	48.7	49.9	14.3	9.7	10.8	100 %
Other	3.3	8.5	7.3	27.9	27.7	27.7	55.8	54.1	54.5	13.0	9.7	10.5	100 %
Christian													
Islam	37.8	69.0	61.7	24.5	15.1	17.3	28.6	13.6	17.1	9.1	2.4	3.9	100 %
Traditionalist	38.1	67.4	61.2	45.8	27.6	31.5	14.4	5.0	7.0	1.7	0.0	0.4	100 %
Other	36.9	74.3	55.1	8.7	8.1	8.4	26.4	17.6	22.1	28.1	0.0	14.4	100 %

Source: Demographic and Health Survey, 2003

Table 21.10 Educational levels by key characteristics, Nigeria, 2008

	None			Primary			Secondary			Higher			Total
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
Sex	21.2	35.8	31.2	21.3	19.7	20.2	43.3	35.7	38.1	14.2	8.9	10.6	100 %
Ethnicity													
Hausa	46.3	77.1	67.1	21.8	12.4	15.4	23.3	8.9	13.6	8.6	1.6	3.9	100 %
Yoruba	5.3	10.0	8.5	17.1	21.5	20.1	55.1	51.6	52.7	22.4	17.0	18.8	100 %
Igbo	2.1	5.4	4.4	29.3	20.8	23.3	52.6	58.7	56.8	16.0	15.2	15.4	100 %
Fulani	75.0	89.3	85.1	14.8	6.7	9.1	23.3	3.6	4.8	2.6	0.4	1.1	100 %
Ijaw/Izon	2.3	10.3	7.3	14.9	23.8	20.5	66.5	58.1	61.2	16.3	7.8	11.0	100 %
Ibibio	3.6	4.0	3.9	28.2	27.8	27.9	51.0	53.2	52.5	17.3	15.0	15.8	100 %
Tiv	5.9	32.3	23.8	27.2	34.0	31.8	57.2	29.2	38.2	9.7	4.5	6.1	100 %
Other	14.1	28.6	24.1	21.2	24.5	23.4	49.4	38.5	41.9	15.3	8.4	10.6	100 %
Religion													
Catholic	3.0	11.1	8.5	27.6	23.9	25.1	55.0	51.6	52.7	14.4	13.4	13.8	100 %
Other Christian	4.1	9.5	7.9	20.4	23.6	22.6	55.8	52.7	53.7	19.6	14.2	15.9	100 %
Islam	41.1	66.0	58.1	19.9	14.8	16.4	29.6	16.3	20.6	9.3	2.9	5.0	100 %
Traditionalist	33.7	63.7	54.1	40.5	25.7	30.5	22.8	9.4	13.7	3.0	1.3	1.8	100 %
Other	8.9	26.7	17.0	17.9	28.8	22.8	42.1	36.9	39.7	31.2	7.6	20.5	100 %

Source: Demographic and Health Survey, 2008

Educational levels improved for every religious group in 2008, but the differences were still evident. Christians with higher education increased from 10.5 to 15.9 % and Catholics from 10.8 to 13.8 %. Likewise for those with secondary education, Catholics increased from 50 to 52.7 % (Christians actually decreased slightly over the time period). Traditionalists nearly doubled their percentage with secondary education (from 7 % in 2003 to 13.7 % in 2008). Muslims also improved from 17.1 % with secondary education to 20.6 % in 2008. Yet both traditionalists and Muslims both still had fewer than half of the percentage with secondary education and higher education compared to their Christian and Catholic counterparts. The gaps between men's and women's levels of education are also much larger among Muslims and traditionalists than they are among the other religious groups (Table 21.10).

Although ethnicity was not collected in 2003, in 2008, as shown in Table 21.10, there are some clear differences in education between ethnic groups. Well over three-quarters of both Hausas and Fulanis have no formal education, compared to fewer than 5 % of Igbo and Ibibio. The Hausa and Fulani also have the lowest percentages with

higher education and secondary education. Almost 19 % of the Yoruba have higher education and over half of them have secondary education. Large percentages of Yoruba, Igbo, Ijaw/Izon, and Ibibio have attained secondary or higher education. And across almost all groups, at every educational level, there are significant differentials between men and women.

Employment, Wealth and Poverty

In terms of employment and general socioeconomic status, the DHS gives details on employment status (in the last year), occupational type, and wealth (as measured by a wealth index). Table 21.11 shows employment characteristics for the whole population in 2003 and 2008. Unemployment decreased slightly over the 5-year period from 38.1 % in 2003 to 30.6 % by 2008. Yet, this is still an incredibly high unemployment rate, even if one assumes that some percentage of those who are unemployed are students.

Table 21.11 also shows that any employment increase has been concentrated in the skilled manual, agricultural, and clerical areas (in other

Table 21.11 Employment and occupational characteristics, Nigeria, 2003 and 2008

	2003 DHS			2008 DHS		
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
Worked last year? (%)						
Yes	73.6	58.3	61.9	83.7	61.1	68.7
No	26.4	41.7	38.1	16.3	37.2	30.6
Occupation (%)						
Not working	27.1	41.7	38.3	13.4	37.3	30.7
Professional/technical/managerial	11.6	4.7	6.3	7.7	4.1	5.3
Clerical	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.4	1.2	1.3
Sales	13.5	32.7	28.2	12.9	28.9	23.8
Agricultural-self-employed	27.8	15.0	15.7	34.1	15.2	21.2
Household & domestic	0.1	0.8	0.6	9.6	3.8	5.6
Skilled manual	15.2	5.6	7.8	15.2	8.7	10.7
Unskilled manual	3.8	1.5	2.1	2.3	0.3	0.9

Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys, 2003 and 2008

words, lower-paying jobs). The percentage of people employed in professional, technical, and managerial occupations has decreased (from 6.3 to 5.3 % over the 5-year period). The sales and unskilled manual labor sectors also show declining percentages. Although the details are not shown here, there was little difference in employment and occupation among ethnic and religious groups (Table 21.12).

The mean number of household members decreased over the 5-year period in Nigeria from 6.7 to 6.0 (see Table 21.12). The percentage of female-headed households increased slightly, while the mean age of the household head decreased slightly between 2003 and 2008, but these were not large changes. Nevertheless, about 15 % of households are female-headed as of 2008. In terms of overall socioeconomic status, Nigerian households seem to be improving slightly over the time period. The percentages of people in the poorest, poorer and middle levels of wealth have declined over time, while the percentage in the richer and richest levels have increased (Table 21.13).

In terms of ethnic differences in wealth, there are significant disparities among the various ethnic groups. As shown in Table 21.13, in the 2008 DHS, while 61 % of Fulanis, 53 % of Kanuris, and 44 % of Tivs are in the poorest quintile, over 70 % of Ibibios, 68 % of Igbos, and 55 % of

Yorubas are in the top two quintiles. It seems likely that there is a bit of undercount of the poorest segments of the population in the DHS survey, as there are larger percentages overall in the richer and richest quintiles. Yet, these differences are too stark to not be true (Table 21.14).

Finally, in Table 21.14, religion is shown by the five wealth/socioeconomic status levels, again according to the 2008 DHS. While over 52 % of Catholics and over 59 % of other Christians are in the top two wealth quintiles, about 53 % of Muslims and 63 % of traditionalists are in the poorest or poorer socioeconomic quintiles.

Overlapping Stratification in Nigeria

Nearly every measure of well-being for the Nigerian population that has been examined in this chapter indicates that there is severe stratification in Nigeria along ethnic, religious, and regional lines. Muslims and traditionalists, those who live in the northern regions, and those who are Hausa, Fulani, Tiv, and Kanuri are, on average, worse off compared to their Catholic/other Christian, southern, Ibibio/Igbo, Yoruba counterparts.

Although the ethnic differences are sometimes less pronounced than the religious and regional differences (at least according to the DHS data

Table 21.12 Household characteristics and wealth index, Nigeria 2003 and 2008 (weighted)

	2003 DHS			2008 DHS		
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
Mean number of household	6.3	6.9	6.7	5.5	6.3	6.0
Members						
Mean age of household head	43.9	45.1	44.8	42.9	44.7	44.1
Sex of household head (%)						
Male	91.5	84.7	86.3	93.1	81.8	85.4
Female	8.5	15.3	13.7	6.9	18.2	14.6
Wealth index (%)						
Poorest			18.4			18.1
Poorer			18.6			18.1
Middle			19.6			18.9
Richer			20.4			21.4
Richest			23.0			23.5

Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys, 2003 and 2008

Table 21.13 Wealth index by ethnicity, Nigeria, 2008

Wealth index (%)	Ekoi	Fulani	Hausa	Ibibio	Igala	Igbo	Ijaw/Izon	Kanuri	Tiv	Yorub	Other	Total
Poorest	6.7	61.3	27.9	4.0	3.8	3.3	9.0	53.4	44.4	2.3	18.5	18.1
Poorer	24.3	22.5	31.0	7.4	22.6	7.7	18.4	15.3	25.4	8.9	18.5	18.1
Middle	35.9	9.0	19.0	18.3	33.0	21.1	26.7	14.4	15.4	13.9	21.3	18.9
Richer	24.0	4.8	14.2	38.4	26.5	30.0	26.2	11.8	8.1	27.0	21.6	21.4
Richest	9.1	2.4	8.0	31.8	14.1	38.0	19.6	5.2	6.7	47.9	20.1	23.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Demographic and Health Survey, 2008

Table 21.14 Wealth index by religion, Nigeria, 2008

Wealth index (%)	Catholic	Other Christian	Islam	Tradition	Other	Total
Poorest	10.4	8.4	28.5	36.5	7.5	18.0
Poorer	14.2	12.5	24.3	26.5	17.2	18.1
Middle	23.0	19.7	17.3	17.6	21.2	19.0
Richer	25.2	26.3	16.1	11.8	27.0	21.4
Richest	27.2	33.2	13.9	7.6	27.2	23.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Demographic and Health Survey, 2008

used here), these relatively disadvantaged groups are more likely to live in rural areas, are less mobile, have lower levels of educational attainment and higher levels of poverty, and have higher fertility and mortality levels. These over-

lapping characteristics of those who are doing well and doing poorly in Nigeria point to the key roles that ethnicity, religion, and region play in day-to-day lives of Nigerians. Those who are born into certain ethnic groups, religious groups,

and/or regions are likely to do poorly in the face of continued absence of interventions by the government to improve socioeconomic status and its related outcomes. These widening chasms in terms of welfare do not bode well for future improvement in inter-ethnic, inter-religious, and inter-regional relations in Nigeria, particularly in light of its persistent history of conflict and violence.

Data and Research Needs

Data Quality and Availability

Although the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics has a good website (<http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/>), with lots of data available on various aspects of the economy, social and demographic statistics are less readily available to researchers. For example, the 2006 Nigerian Census microlevel data are still not completely publicly available, 9 years on. The 2006 Nigerian Census was the first census conducted in Nigeria since 1991 (a 15-year interval) and, like its predecessors, the census was again surrounded by controversy and conflict. According to numerous news reports, there were charges of fraud, protests and boycotts occurred, and there were at least 15 deaths attributed to the conflict over the census. Thousands of census takers quit because they had not been paid and several areas of the country were subject to a massive undercount (Lalasz 2006).

The controversy surrounding the census is largely due to the fact that both the allocation of federal funds and the apportionment of parliamentary seats are based on the census results. The coastal, more-urbanized (and largely Christian) southern regions accuse the population in the north (largely Muslim and traditionally the base of the party in power) of census fraud in their favor for political and economic gains (Lalasz 2006). The country's last census in 1991 also led to conflict and upheaval and was widely criticized for undercounting the population by as many as 20 million people (Okolo 1999; Lalasz 2006). It is no surprise then, that the 2006 Census

results were not released (as previously promised) before the 2007 general elections, but rather have only become available in 2009. There were critiques from some camps that former President Obasanjo, the first elected leader from the southern region of Nigeria, was extending the census controversy for political gain (Lalasz 2006). There is no doubt that census-taking is a politically charged exercise in nearly every country, but these political difficulties and obstacles to conducting a census in Nigeria are undoubtedly compounded by the enormity of the enterprise in a large, populous country with a lack of trained staff, poor transportation networks and roads, and a lack of funds.

A full analysis of the quality of the 2006 Census data is not yet available, but the total figure of approximately 140 million (in 2006) is about 18 million shy of the UN's projection of 158 million people by 2010, so it is possible that either fertility is falling more rapidly in Nigeria than originally anticipated, that there was a substantial undercount, or that both scenarios are at play. Given the assumed undercount in Nigeria's 1991 census of up to 20 million people, and the controversy in 2006, undercount was likely. Note, however, that the UN currently estimates that Nigeria's population in 1991 was about 97 million, which is only 8 million more than the official 1991 count of about 89 million people.

In this chapter, the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have been the primary data sources. There have been 5 DHS surveys conducted in Nigeria: 1990, 1999, 2003, 2008, and 2013. The 2008 data were released in December 2009, so this chapter focuses primarily on the results of that survey and compares them to the results from the 2003 survey (The 2013 data were unfortunately released too late to be included in this chapter). The DHS surveys, primarily funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, are generally considered to produce high-quality nationally representative data. The technical expertise of DHS survey advisors, in conjunction with local in-country statistical agencies and survey staff generally lead to a high level of data quality. In addition, DHS data are heavily edited and recoded to fix errors or impute missing val-

ues as much as possible before they are publicly released. The DHS also evaluates the data quality of each of its surveys. The 2008 data seem to be of relatively good quality, when sampling errors and age distributions, as well as other key indicators are evaluated (NPC ICF Macro International 2009).

There are some other surveys available for Nigeria, but, again, they are not always easy to access. The National Integrated Household Survey (NISH) was begun by the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics in 1981 and included data from modules including (in various years): the General Household Survey (GHS)—health, literacy, etc.; the Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire (CWIQ)—household welfare and infrastructure, access to water and sanitation and electricity, and health care access; the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS)—child health and survival; Rural Agricultural Sample Survey (RASS); National Consumer Survey (NCS); Health and Nutritional Status Survey (HANSS); Labour Force Survey (LFS); National Agricultural Sample Census (NASC); Survey of Internal Migration (SIM); Survey of Household Enterprises (SHE); and the Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey (HNLSS), among others. In theory, most of these data are publicly available (although actual level of access is unknown and information is difficult to obtain). The Bureau of Statistics website seems to prevent outside researchers from accessing most of this data.

Technology has improved the production and collection of data by the National Bureau of Statistics, whose own infrastructure has been vastly improved in recent years, but major challenges remain. The biggest challenge is undoubtedly maintaining adequate financial resources and sustainability; most surveys are still funded by overseas donors and therefore priorities are correspondingly donor-driven. Other major challenges include poor computing infrastructure, a paucity of skilled staff, and a resulting lack of data analysis and dissemination (Onyelisi 2009). An investment by the Nigerian government in data collection, analysis, and especially dissemination would probably be very worthwhile.

The measurement of ethnicity and religious preference is fraught with difficulties in most contexts. In Nigeria, there appear to be two issues related to accurate measurement of these concepts. First, ethnic and religious identities are fluid over time and many Nigerians seem to prefer religious identity, ethnic identity, or regional identity at different times in their lives or under different political or social circumstances (Lewis 2007). This complicates the measurement of these concepts and particularly makes it difficult to see if the percentages of various groups are changing over time due to population changes or due to ethnic affiliational changes. Second, ethnic and religious identity are so strongly associated with conflict in Nigeria, that they can be sensitive topics to discuss on a survey questionnaire, and sometimes are even left off as in the 2006 Nigeria census when questions of religion and ethnicity were officially left out. This scenario generally hampers studies on changes over time, not only in terms of ethnic and religious affiliation, but also how these are related to other socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics and outcomes, more so in the context where social identity factors of such as religion and ethnicity are strong predictors of social choices and behaviors.

Conclusion: Future Trends and Policy with Regards to Ethnicity and Religion in Nigeria

Demographic Trends

With respect to its age structure, at first glance Nigeria appears to be in a very promising situation overall, with a large cohort of young people entering adulthood (and, presumably, the labor force) while fertility rates are falling. Nevertheless, the population of children and youth will still be quite a large (albeit declining) percentage of Nigeria's total population by 2050 (28 %). Even though the percentage of elderly will be relatively small, the elderly population is projected to grow and the numbers of both youth and elderly are staggering, given the overall

population of Nigeria. Policies must address the needs of these groups, including education, child immunizations and basic health care, the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases and reproductive health for adolescents, and old-age support and pensions and health care for the elderly who are disabled or chronically ill.

The dependency ratio suggests that the working age population will support these other two portions of the population, and in fact produce a surplus, but in order to do that, they must be employed, and the data presented here make that prospect seem rather dim. Despite some improvement between 2003 and 2008, unemployment rates are very high across nearly every region and every subgroup in the population. Increased employment seems to be mainly agricultural, which may not provide enough income to adequately support Nigerian families and could have deleterious environmental consequences if not done properly.

In terms of population trends, Nigeria's TFR remains quite high compared to the rest of the less developed countries (over 5 children per woman) and although it is projected to continue to decline, there are questions about whether this decline is inevitable and whether it will continue apace. There is some evidence of decline from the 2003 and 2008 DHS data, however. Regardless of how the fertility rate changes, Nigeria's population growth will continue through 2050 due to simple population momentum. Fertility remains particularly high among certain subgroups, especially Muslims and traditionalists, rural dwellers, and those in the northern regions at pre-transition levels.

Age at first sex, age at first marriage, and age at first birth for women still remain low in Nigeria (17.2, 17.8, and 19.4, respectively, according to the 2008 DHS), although they have increased since 2003. Policies must be implemented that raise these average ages to reduce fertility overall. Unmet need remains high and the public health infrastructure – particularly the family planning and reproductive health infrastructure – is in great need of reform and improvement (Blattner et al. 2008). Confronting and assuaging Nigerian pronatalist attitudes, particularly among

men, is potentially difficult, but also necessary. This requires investment in education for women and an overall focus on improving the status of women. But investment in education, particularly for women, will yield little, without a benefit in terms of employment and economic mobility.

The labor market currently does not have many opportunities for women (or men, for that matter) and underemployment is widespread as well, particularly for youth (World Bank 2009). What can be done? This is a question for the development economists, but it would seem that at this point in time, with the current technological resources available and Nigeria's substantial oil wealth, some creative forms of education, training, and job creation should be a focus.

Key subgroups within the population deserve special emphasis in population and economic policies. The northern regions, Muslim and traditionalist populations, and rural areas, in particular, are in need of increased resources and infrastructure, particularly in the areas of family planning, education (especially female education), job creation, and public health. These programs should not exclude other regions or parts of the population, particularly as Nigeria is rapidly growing and there is also a large and growing urban population base in the south. Supporting change in underserved areas and among underserved groups without alienating those who are somewhat better off will require stronger governmental and civil society institutions (Bloom et al. 2007).

Health

Nigeria's mortality and health indicators continue to lag far behind other countries as well. Life expectancy lags severely, due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic as well as other infectious and non communicable diseases, and poor health care infrastructure, particularly in rural areas (Blattner et al. 2008). Public health investments should be made to avoid Nigeria falling even further behind its neighbors in life expectancy and health. Little attention has been given to health information generation and management or health systems

research to build evidence for a response to emerging needs. Currently, there is little linkage between health research and health policy. Reliable data are lacking, there is often under-reporting, and data obtained from sources are often inaccurate or conflicting.

Nigeria has one of the largest stocks of human resources for health in Africa, comparable only to Egypt and South Africa. There are 39,210 doctors and 124,629 nurses registered in the country; this averages out to about 30 doctors and 100 nurses per 100,000 persons (Labiran et al. 2008). This compares favorably to the sub-Saharan African average of 15 doctors and 72 nurses per 100,000 persons (WHO 2006, cited in WHO 2009). Yet, there are rural-urban disparities as well as regional disparities in the distribution of health staff. Remuneration packages for health professionals vary between federal and state levels and also between states, with the result that health professionals tend to gravitate to the better-paying federal facilities and states. Private providers (except faith-based ones) mainly operate in urban settings where income levels are generally highest, resulting in reduced access to qualified and competent health professionals for people living in rural and deprived areas that bear a greater portion of the disease burden.

Funding of the health sector relies on a mixture of government budget, health insurance (social and private), external funding and private out-of-pocket spending. The level of spending on health is relatively low at less than 5 % of gross domestic product. Household out-of-pocket expenditure as a proportion of total health expenditure averaged 64.5 % between 1998 and 2002, which is very high. It is estimated that on average health care consumes more than half of total household expenditure in about 4 % of cases and over a quarter in 12 % of cases (WHO 2009). The Federal Government and some state governments have substantially increased allocations to health care since 2003. The Federal Government has also tried to increase the resource allocation to PHC by other means, such as the National Health Bill, which created a Primary Health Care Development Fund. A review of the challenges in

the health sector indicates a weak system with disconnections and less than optimal function of the subsystems. There is inadequate decentralization of services, weak referral linkages, dilapidated health infrastructure, and weak institutional capacity. The full implementation of the National Health Insurance Scheme will eliminate 60–70 % out-of-pocket expenditure on health by Nigerians and curb rural urban drift. Operators of the NHIS will need to work rapidly to expand the scheme to accommodate more Nigerians with a view to bringing quality and affordable health care to their door steps.

This weak system has to cope with a rising population, a heavy burden of both communicable and non communicable diseases, and specific problems such as high maternal and child mortality. The epidemiological concept of “prevention” is usually defined as either primary prevention, for people who have not been diagnosed with a particular disease, or secondary prevention, aimed at reducing recurrence or complications of a previously diagnosed illness. Advocacy to make Nigerians adopt new lifestyles that will check diseases, leading to a healthy life will be one of the ways to address this challenge.

Finally it has been observed that the regional differentials in childhood mortality are consistent with regional differentials in basic indicators of maternal care, such as antenatal care visits and content, as well as delivery assistance (NPC and ICF Macro International 2009). Therefore policy and programs to address regions and groups with the poorest indicators need to primarily tackle access to and utilization of maternal and child health services.

Conclusion

Continuing urbanization, at least partially due to internal migration from rural areas, but also natural increase within cities, means that urban labor markets will need more jobs and infrastructure over time. Will this increasing urbanization lead to a more rapid fertility decline? Perhaps, as urban fertility norms continue to decline and

rural migrants assimilate to urban norms (see, for example, White et al. 2008). But it is important to recognize that even if urban fertility declines without many policy changes, Nigeria's rural population will still be large in numbers (even if they are a declining percentage of the population), and rural fertility change may require significantly more intervention. In terms of international migration, the Nigerian diaspora continues to grow globally, but little is known about how much they are sending in remittances and how these funds are used.

While the government have recently began to engage the Diaspora as partners in development, such initiatives are at early stages and yet to result into tangible outcomes. Consequently, whether or not the Nigerian diaspora is indeed a potential engine for growth at home or simply a brain drain is a question that needs further study by academic researchers and policy makers.

One clear message however, is that Nigeria is greatly understudied and population data are of dubious quality and access to them is generally difficult for researchers. Nigeria, despite being one of the largest countries in the world, is not well-studied by demographers, at least not as measured by published literature in the major peer-reviewed population studies journals. Nigeria and those who are interested in its development need to improve data access, availability, and quality, and promote research on its demographic trends.

The demographic dividend as a potential boon for overall development was first recognized in the case of the East Asian tigers. There is some debate in the literature about whether or not Africa can follow their model and capitalize on this one-time demographic bonus of a large working age population and relatively small dependent population (Bloom et al. 1998, 2007; World Bank 2009). It is a tall order, particularly for a country like Nigeria, given all of its challenges as highlighted in this analysis. Nevertheless, Nigeria's population, in combination with its relative wealth, could be a dynamic engine of growth if harnessed properly. The Nigerian

government, as well as international donors, must focus on the key challenges of investing in basic public infrastructure, including health, family planning, schools, and basic services; and of reinvesting oil profits in job creation. These sound like simple prescriptions, but of course they are not. Nevertheless, time is passing quickly and unless these investments are made now, the demographic dividend and its golden opportunity will pass Nigeria by.

None of this will matter if ethnic, religious and regional conflicts are not kept in check. Surveys of public opinion in a number of African nations indicate that Nigerians are more wedded to ethnic identity than they are to national identity, in comparison to many of their counterparts on the continent (Lewis 2007). The government must clearly articulate and promote a national identity, bringing marginalized groups into the fold and addressing concerns of underserved groups and regions. The political will to deal with ethno-religious conflicts and forces that engender and fuel the embers of discord often seems to be absent. The over-arching perspective is that the hydra-headed crises in the North had made the people in the Northern states to be among the poorest in the country (Awofadeji 2010). Constitutional issues of citizenship and justice for victims of religious and ethnic conflicts will help to calm frayed nerves and bringing perpetrators of religious extremism and violence to justice will be a deterrent for impunity and wanton destruction of lives and property in the name of religion and ethnicity. Addressing socio-cultural and religious factors implicated through IEC programs need to be prioritized as the first order of future political business. Because ethnic identities are so fluid, this means they are not set in stone, but may be mutable and even transferable to national, democratic loyalties (Lewis 2007). But this can only happen in a society that values the contributions of all groups and works to ensure that they are included in political processes and that their needs are justly and properly addressed.

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Part VII
Europe

Elena Ambrosetti and Eralba Cela

Racial and ethnic stratification is a property of many societies and represents an important issue to examine in order to address social policies (Saenz and Morales 2005). Nevertheless, only recently has demography shown a growing interest for this topic. This section is organized as follows: first, an introduction of the concept of race and ethnicity focusing on the differences between the American and European debates; second, an overview of the European countries' use of statistics on race and ethnicity; third, the Italian legislation on race and ethnicity; and fourth, data collection in Italy on this topic.

Race and ethnicity are distinct terms; nevertheless they are often used as interchangeable (Saenz and Morales 2005). Both are socially constructed and are not permanent over time and space; on the contrary, they adapt and change (Waters 2002; Brady and Kaplan 2009; Morning 2011). In the US, race and ethnicity are used in

legislation and in statistics in order to shape anti-discrimination measures. In the European context, the emergence of race and ethnicity is a natural result of the migratory inflows and past colonial expansionism. Compared to the American context, the situation is quite different in Europe. The main reason of this difference, which applies particularly to continental European countries, is the involvement of many European states in the Holocaust (Suk 2007; Grigolo et al. 2011). The racial and ethnic categorization performed immediately before and during World War II (WWII), can explain the reluctance of many continental European countries in using categorizations based on race and ethnicity that are commonly used in the US and UK. Immediately after the end of WWII, UNESCO condemned through four different declarations, the notion of race in its scientific-biological meaning (Banton 2002; Grigolo et al. 2011). This leads Balibar (1991) to define the paradox of "racism without race", meaning that several European countries are addressing anti-discrimination and antiracist policies without using racial categorizations. An example of this kind of policies is the Racial Equality Directive (RED) adopted in 2000 by the Council of the European Union (Grigolo et al. 2011). The paradox of "racism without race" is then combined with another paradox: "antiracist policies without race". Several European scholars are nowadays concerned with these paradoxes as they believe

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that, in order to fight discrimination and exclusion based on race and ethnicity, the latter should be defined and used by the legal and statistical fields. To overcome the absence of racial and ethnic statistics, often European countries use “nationality” or “citizenship” as “proxies for race” (Grigolo et al. 2011: 1640).

So far, “racial skepticism” and “racial constructionism” have characterized the European legal and normative approach on race and ethnicity (Möschel 2011). The former concept denies the existence of race, the latter defines race as socially constructed. On this ground, several European countries, and the European Commission tried to erase the word “race” from their public discourses and laws. Möschel (2011: 1654) argues that not only is race “being silenced in normative and legal discourses but equally-and even more problematically-in the few legal instruments supposed to protect against racism”. The author then stresses how Critical Race Theory (CRT), an American legal theory, can contribute to the European debate on race and ethnicity. For instance, in 2009 the US Supreme Court case *Ricci v. DeStefano*, U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009) it was established a symmetrical correspondence between the use of race to exclude people from society and the use of race to include people into society. Thus, race cannot be used neither in a negative nor in a positive way. In particular, according to this line of thinking, “the use of race is just as bad when used in legislation during the Nazi regime as when it is written in the German or French Constitutions’ equality provisions” (Möschel 2011: 1660). CRT scholars have contested this approach as detrimental for racial minorities in the US. The same concept adopted by the US Supreme Court is now adopted by the European colour and race-blind legislation (US Supreme Court 2009).

The production of racial and ethnic statistics is different from place to place according to the definition given in each country. In addition, in several countries around the world, this is a “contentious issue” (Simon and Piché 2012: 1358). Questions arise about the opportunity for producing ethnic statistics. Those who support the collection and the use of these types of statistics,

think that it can contribute for the understanding of discrimination (by ethnic group or by race) and to policy making. However, a number of scientists and politicians claim that collecting data on racial and ethnic origin may exacerbate the existing stigmatization of certain groups in the population. Europe is an interesting example: human rights institutions ask for the reconsideration from many countries of the so-called “colour-blind” statistics (Simon 2012: 1366) in order to strengthen anti-discrimination policies. In a review of 41 European countries statistics Simon (2012) found that only proxies of race and ethnicity, i.e. country of birth and citizenship, are almost always collected (in 39 out of 41 countries). However, 19 countries out of the 41 rely on those two pieces of information to identify ethnicity. The justification for not collecting data on race and ethnicity is still to be found on the ground of post-WWII policies and the UNESCO declarations mentioned above. Other problems arise from the absence of homogeneity in the data collected: ethnic categories and race are not stable over time and space. Population census questions are not homogeneous in those states that collect data on that topic. Some states use pre-defined categories (pre-coded list) while others, use open-ended questions leaving to respondents the choice on how to identify themselves.

Italy is among the countries with a “colour-blind” approach: during Fascism, the 1938 race Italian legislation, openly discriminated against Jews and Roma. In the post-WWII period, discourses about race and ethnicity (“razza” in Italian) became a taboo. Nevertheless, race is mentioned in Article 3 of the Italian Constitution, where equality of citizens is stated. The Italian Constitution, not only guarantees equality of citizens but also establishes a “positive clause” (Article 3.2) in order to “remove those obstacles of economic or social nature which constrain the freedom of equality of citizens”. In addition, Article 6 recognizes and protects historic linguistic minorities. The term ethnic is therefore not used in the Constitution for the obvious above-mentioned reasons (Hermanin 2011). Historical ethno-linguistic minorities are protected by the Italian Law n. 482 (15 December

1999), that recognizes the historical linguistic minorities and their rights, defines how many there are, and creates a special fund to promote positive actions in favor of these minorities. A special agreement called “ethnic proportion” (*proporzionale etnica* in Italian) was reached with the German-speaking minority, living in the northern Italian region, Trentino Alto-Adige. Unlike several European countries, Italian legislation is “entrusted with the promotion of positive actions for ethno-racial minorities” (Hermanin 2011: 1740) and the National Office against Racial discrimination (UNAR), was established to perform such positive actions. In fact, data collection on linguistic minorities is allowed in those Italian regions where minorities live, in order to apply the above mentioned positive actions (Hermanin 2011). This data collection is nowadays voluntary and anonymous. In the past, in the Bolzano province (Trentino Alto-Adige region), residents had to declare their “ethnic affiliation” choosing between Italian and German. The declaration was not, at that time, anonymous and neither voluntary. Only in 2005, following the opinion of the Data Protection Authority (*Garante della Privacy* in Italian), data declaration on ethnic affiliation and language became, in the province of Bolzano as well, anonymous and voluntary. Law 482 recognized 12 linguistic minorities. According to the last population Census, the most numerous are the “Sardo”, a language spoken for the most part by inhabitants of the Sardinia islands (over one million), the “German” (about 350,000), the “Slovenian” (about 60,000) and the “French” (about 70,000). Ethno-racial statistics are not permitted in Italy, apart from the specific case of those historic ethno-linguistic minorities guaranteed by the Constitution and law. Therefore, in the Italian census, race and ethnicity are identified with proxies: citizenship, place of birth, former citizenship for Italians and citizenship of parents (the latter since the last Census of 2011). Data on religion and language is not collected in the Census. The only exception is data on language of ethno-linguistic historical minorities. Data on religion and language is collected only in specific surveys on migration and integration

(e.g. Integrometro survey, Cesareo and Blangiardo 2009).

Demographic Profile of Italy

Italy has witnessed deep economic and political transformations during the last 60 years. At the end of World War II, the Italian economy was mainly based on agriculture; nowadays it has become one of the wealthiest post-industrial economies in the world panorama; nonetheless the current financial crises has, like in many other European countries, slowed down the economic performance and generated many problems such as economic downturn and unemployment. The Italian population has also increased substantially during the same period of time. In this section, we will present the most important demographic changes in Italy during the last 60 years. We will present separately the evolution of mortality, marriage and fertility and lastly the evolution of immigration patterns.

During the last decades, Italy, like Western European countries, has been involved in the first and second demographic transition (Chesnais 1986; Van de Kaa 1987). The major consequences of the demographic transitions are population increase, due to a non-simultaneous decrease of mortality and fertility (in the first transition), and the process of deep changes in the marriage and family formation patterns that have followed the legalization of divorce in several European countries (in the so called “second demographic transition”). Nowadays, couples decide to marry later or eventually to forego marriage. As a consequence, in countries like Italy, where birth outside marriage is still low compared to other European countries, fertility has fallen to very low levels (Salvini 2011).

Mortality

The losses of WWII were significant for the Italian population (about 380,000 people died and among them three out of four were soldiers). The mortality rate, which was quite high at the end of the war (20.5 per thousands), started to decrease in the early 1950s. Since then, it has

been quite stable: about 9 per thousands (Table 22.1).

In the post-war period, infant mortality in Italy was still high compared to other European countries. Progress was slow but consistent (Table 22.1): in 1946 the infant mortality rate (during the first year of life) stood at 87 infant deaths per thousand live births. Only 15 years later, in 1961, the infant mortality rate was halved (41 per thousand). During the 1970s the progress realized on infant mortality reduction was still important and in 1975 the rate dropped further to 20 deaths per thousand live births (Baldi and Cagiano 2005). Between the 1980s and 1990s infant mortality continued its decline: in 1990 the infant mortality rate was about 8 per thousand. Nowadays the rate is stable at a very low level (4 per thousand).

The decreasing trends of general and infant mortality, have steadily led to high levels of life expectancy at birth. Italy has become, over the last 60 years, one of the countries with the highest life expectancy at birth (Table 22.2) (Italian National Institute of Statistics) (ISTAT). The main consequences of the increase of life expectancy at birth for the Italian population will be discussed below.

Marriage and Fertility

In the first period after WWII, the number of marriages and the birth rate increased rapidly in Italy. At the beginning of the 1950s the total fertility rate (TFR) was 2.5 children per woman, and it increased during the so-called “baby boom” period of the 1960s. It reached its maximum in 1967, when a rate of 2.7 children per woman was recorded (Baldi and Cagiano 2005). Since then, the TFR has started to decrease: it fell to 1.4 in 1990, 1.24 in 2000 and 1.4 in 2011 (Table 22.3) (Italian National Institute of Statistics) (ISTAT).

Marriage was quite stable until the 1970s when the marriage rate started to decline. This trend continues today. At the same time, the divorce rate has increased (divorce became legal in 1970), but it remains quite low compared to other European countries.

Over this period the Italian population increased from about 47 millions of inhabitants in 1951 to about 60 million in 2011 (Italian

National Institute of Statistics) (ISTAT). Italy is nowadays the fourth largest European country in terms of number of inhabitants after Germany, France and UK (Salvini 2011).

The history of the Italian population may be reconstructed through age pyramids: comparing the population pyramids in 1951 and 2011, we notice that the age structure has been deeply modified, due to the changes in mortality and fertility described above (Italian National Institute of Statistics) (ISTAT) (Fig. 22.1). The base of the pyramid has become smaller due to the fall of the birth rate while the top of the pyramid is larger, due to the increase of life expectancy at birth, during the whole period.

International Migration

Italy has been transformed in recent decades from a pool of labor suppliers to a target country for mass immigration. In the aftermath of the oil crises of 1973, northern European countries, the main destinations of international immigration in Europe during the first post-War II decades, adopted restrictive immigration policies. Labour migration was no longer encouraged, although migration flows to Northern Europe did not stop because of family reunification. The direction of migration, however, diverted towards Southern European countries, characterized so far by emigration and transit migration. The lack of legislation on immigration in those countries facilitated migrants’ efforts to enter into Southern Europe and transformed it into their final destination. Among South European countries Italy represents the most interesting case for trends, timing and dimension of immigration flows (Cela et al. 2013; King 1999). Mass emigration, internal migration and mass immigration have characterized its territory over a time span of less than one and a half century; between 1846 and 1932 Italy has experienced a mass emigration involving about 11.1 million people, firstly from the northern regions and afterwards from the southern ones, towards the Americas (Livi Bacci 1998). After the World Wars it experienced both external, mostly towards northern Europe, and internal migration from the poor agricultural South to the Northern industrial Triangle of Turin-Milan-Genoa.

In total Italy provided in about 110 years (1876–1985) almost 26.6 million immigrants to the United States, Australia and North Europe (Birindelli 1989).

Only in the late 1970s did Italy turn into a mainly immigrant-receiver country, becoming in less than 35 years one of the principal destination countries in the Southern Europe. Italy represents one of the most interesting case studies within the “Mediterranean Southern European Model of migration” defined by King (1999). Unlike the main features of immigration flows toward North Europe during the post-war economic boom, immigration in Italy is characterized by the globalization of origins, presence of both urban and rural migrants, skilled migration, gender specific flows, and high proportion of irregular migration¹ King (1999).

Over time the foreign resident population has rapidly grown, passing from about 556 thousand individuals (0.6 % of the total population) reported in the Census of 1991 to four million residents according to the Census of 2011 (Figs. 22.2 and 22.3) and representing over 6.8 % of the total population, as measured by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). The official figures exclude irregular immigrants, the so-called *clandestini*, whose numbers are very difficult to determine. One of the main features of immigration phenomenon in Italy is the globalization of the countries of origin. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and especially after 2002 the foreign population growth rate has recorded its highest values. The increase is due to the regularization process, the improvement in data collection and the enlargement of the European Union as well as the massive arrivals from Eastern European countries, especially from Romania, Albania, Ukraine and Poland (Bonifazi et al. 2009).

An important traditional area of immigration to Italy is North Africa, in particular, countries like Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia, with increasing arrivals during the recent years as a consequence of the Arab Spring. Another significant presence is represented by foreigners from the Far East, in particular from China and the Philippines, as well as from Latin America (Ecuador and Peru).

Overall, according to the last Census data in 2011 the foreign-born population of Italy originated from 196 different countries: Europe (53 %), Africa (21 %), Asia (18 %), the Americas (8 %) and Oceania (0.1 %) (Fig. 22.4).

Currently, Central Eastern Europe (Romania and Albania) and Northern Africa (Morocco) are the largest regions of origin, followed by the Far Eastern Asia (China) and again East Europe (Ukraine and Moldova). Since 2007 the increase in immigrants’ stocks is largely attributed to flows of Eastern European citizens. On October 2011, about 49.5 % of the foreign residents (nearly two million individuals) comes from Eastern European countries, in particular nearly one million from new EU countries and one million from extra EU Eastern European countries (Fig. 22.5 and Table 22.4). In 2011 the five largest ethnic groups represented half of the total foreign population residing in Italy, while in 1994 they were only about one-third of immigrants resident in Italy (Morocco, Yugoslavia, Tunisia, Germany, and the Philippines). A further novel characteristic of immigration in Italy is that flows are gender specific; mostly females from Catholic countries and males from Muslim ones, who (both) later created their networks and attracted other family members, relatives, etc. The female presence in Italy has increased from 47 % in 1991 to 53.3 % in 2011, due to family reunification processes as well as to the emergence of mainly East European female immigrants, like for example the Ukrainians (79.5 %), Poles (73.9 %) and Moldovans (66.6 %). There are strong differences in the sex ratios between nationalities as shown in Figs. 22.6 and 22.7 (Italian National Institute of Statistics) (ISTAT).

Immigration growth is also the result of the migratory chains and the process of stabilization of many foreign communities. Family migration, family reunification and a growing number of births from at least one foreign parent have resulted in a rapid increase in the presence of immigrants’ children. In 2012 79,894 births were recorded in Italy: 15 % of those births are from foreign parents. More than half a million children of immigrants were born in Italy – the so-called second generation. Only 30 % of these births

consisted of one of the parents being Italian (20 % father and 10 % mother), thus being Italian according to the Italian Law on citizenship. Further details on the Italian Law on citizenship will be discussed below (section “[The future of existing demographic related trends](#)”).

The demographic characteristics of racial and ethnic groups resident in Italy are quite different. First of all looking at age pyramids by major countries of origin and macro area of origin it is evident that the age structure of those populations is diverse compared to the Italian one (Fig. 22.8).

The youngest populations are of African, Asian and American origin. Of course, the age structure is largely affected by the fact that migration to Italy is still a recent phenomenon. A large part of the population is in the working-age and especially in the age group 25–44. The number of young people under 15 years has increased recently because of family reunification process.² The sex ratio is unbalanced for foreigners of African (151 men for 100 women) and Asian (119 men for 100 women) origin: as stressed above, those migration flows are essentially male dominated. The phenomenon is reversed for migration from Europe and America (Central and South): in this case the sex ratio is also unbalanced but female are predominant. Hence, as in other countries, the sex ratio is associated with sex selectivity in migration (Saenz and Morales 2005). Looking at the pyramids of the five largest foreign-born groups in Italy (Romania, Albania, Morocco, China and Ukraine), the same features of the pyramids by continent are emerging. The extreme case of Ukraine with a sex ratio of 25 men every 100 women is highly illustrative of the situation of certain ethnic minorities in Italy. Compared to the Italian population as a whole, foreign-born populations are consistently younger. Again this characteristic is the consequence of the relatively recent phenomenon of immigration in Italy.

As the immigrant population is younger than the Italian one, we can also expect varying levels of fertility. Table 22.5 shows a comparison of fertility between Italians and foreigners living in Italy. As we already mentioned above, the TFR is very low in Italy. The TFR of for-

eign residents in Italy is about 2.1, nevertheless its value is decreasing over time, in 2008 it was 2.3. Over the years, the fertility of immigrants has become similar to that of the native-born population. Nevertheless strong differences in fertility behaviour do exist among foreign residents. Table 22.6 clearly underlines that for some citizenships fertility is relatively high in Italy, even higher than in their country of origin. The great variation in fertility levels can be attributed to different migration patterns (family, work or other) and to different contexts of origin (Mussino and Strozza 2012). Some scholars (Billari 2008; Ferrara et al. 2009) highlight that the increase in the TFR of the Italian population in the last decade is at least partially due to the fertility of female immigrants.

In 2009, Istat carried out for the first time a survey on “Income and living conditions” on a sample of 6,000 families with at least one component of foreign origin in Italy, using the same methodology of EU-SILC survey “Income and Living Conditions” (ISTAT 2011a, b).

At the end of 2009, foreign residents in Italy numbered about 4.2 million (7 % of the total population); families with at least one foreign member account for 2.7 million (8.3 % of families in the country). The 22.6 % of them is represented by mixed families (made up of both Italians and foreigners), an indicator of the degree of integration into the local community.

These families reside mainly in the northwest (32.9 %), center (27.3 %) and northeast (24.3 %) of Italy; they are younger than Italian households (the average age being 30 years, compared to 43 for Italian households), and on average the family size is not very different from that of the Italian families (2.44 against 2.38). Yet, living alone is more frequent among foreigners (35.5 % vs. 30.9 %) and so is the presence of families of five or more components (9.1 % vs. 4.7 %).

With relation to the housing conditions the majority of families with foreigners live in rented or sublet houses (58.7 % compared to 16 % of Italian households), and only 23 % live in own dwellings (vs. 71.6 % of Italian households). Compared to Italian families, those with at least

one foreigner live more often in conditions of severe housing deprivation or in overcrowding conditions and poor quality houses.

About 34.5 % of households with foreigners live in such conditions of material deprivation (vs. 13.9 % of Italian households). The gap is higher in the northern and central regions rather than in the south.

In all age classes, the share of employment income earners among foreigners is higher than that of the Italians (75.4 % versus 66.3 % among 15–64 years age classes). Families with foreigners have a net annual income that amounted to 14,469€ (median value); accordingly, half of them have a maximum of 1,206€ monthly, which becomes 1,033€ when families are composed only by foreigners and rise up to 2,136€ in the case of mixed families. On average, 90.6 % of the net income of households composed only of foreigners is represented by income employment, compared to the 63.8 % of the Italian households.

Economic deprivation is more prevalent among immigrants. Approximately 44 % of people living in a household with foreigners is at risk of poverty compared to 17.4 % of Italian households and it is higher in the South Italy (64.2 %) rather than in the Centre (47.7 %) and Northern part of the country (37.8 %). The percentage rises to 49.1 % if the family is composed only by foreigners and drops to 32.7 % if it is mixed. The length of permanence in Italy has a positive impact on the economic conditions of foreign families. According to Istat's estimates the income of families with at least one foreign member, compared to the Italian families is the following: Ukraine (42.9 %), India (48 %), Morocco (50.3 %) and Moldova (50.9 %) are the most distant from the standard Italian families; those originating from Poland (65.4 %), Peru (64.7 %) and the Philippines (59.2 %) are the closest (ISTAT 2011a, b).

Main Demographic Issues in Italy

In the previous section we described the main characteristics of current Italian population. Two major changes have occurred in Italy in the last

several decades: first, as a consequence of the process of first and second demographic transition, Italy has become one of the most “aged” populations worldwide; secondly, the reversing trend of international migration: Italy, historically an emigration country, has become over the last 40 years, one of the major immigrant-receiving countries in Europe.

As a consequence of the first change, the Italian population's age structure has witnessed deep modifications. The number of people aged 65 and more has increased and the number of young people under 15 years has decreased. Thus, since the early 1990s the natural increase of the Italian population is negative, i.e. the number of deaths during 1 year is higher than the number of births during the same period of time. Population ageing is a consequence of: changing probability of death at mature ages, increased life expectancy and a drop in the fertility rate. This scenario has implications for Europe as a whole, although there are some differences among countries.

In Italy, the proportion of people over 65 years has increased rapidly during the last decades: 9.5 % in 1961, 15.3 % in 1991, and 20 % at present. At the same time, the proportion of young people under 15 years has declined in the overall Italian population. The ageing index (calculated as the number of persons 65 years old or over per hundred persons under age 15) was 38.9 in 1961, 96.6 in 1991 and it is now 144. This means that over nearly two decades the number of people aged 65 and older exceeds the number of young people under 15.

Because of the demographic changes of Italy over the last several decades, the country is facing today as well as in the future a variety of social, cultural and economic challenges (Cagiano and Ambrosetti 2004). The old welfare system, totally unsustainable in demographic terms, has been revised and changed several times since 1992. The issue of the sustainability of the welfare state in Italy has been exacerbated by the present “debt crisis”: since 2010, the consequences of the international economic downturn have been particularly strong for the Euro zone and thus for the Italian economy. The

European Commission asked member states to implement several economic reforms in order to face the crisis. Thus, the last reform of the retirement system (DECREE-LAW 6 December 2011, n. 201) was approved by the Italian parliament with the aim to cope with the sustainability of the welfare system. According to the new rules, within 2018 the minimal age at retirement will be 66 years for everyone. Starting from 2013, age at retirement will be updated according to the increase on life expectancy. In addition, the European Commission obliged member states to increase the age at retirement to 67 years within 2021.

Historical Overview of Racial and Ethnic Conflicts in Italy

In 1861 Italy became a single nation-state and until the nineteenth century, it adopted an open-borders policy, likewise other liberal European states. The 1865 Civil Code guaranteed foreign residents the same civil rights of the Italian citizens, and religious freedom, even though the Catholic religion was “the State religion” (art. 1 of the Constitution 1848).

Till the beginning of World War I foreigners were almost refugees and exiled from Hungary moving to Turin and from Russia to Liguria. After the 1st World War, many immigrants from the Soviet Union settled in Milan, where their presence is still visible today thanks to establishment of the Orthodox churches; in the same period Armenian refugees escaping from massacres, as well as students and merchants from Albania, reached Italy and settled (Colombo and Sciortino 2004). The census of 1921 identified about 250,000, Italians belonging to French, Albanian, Slovenian, Greek, Catalane, German, and Croatian minorities present in the prewar borders. Furthermore, there were 327,000 Italians speaking Slovenian, 228,000 speaking German and 98,000 speaking Croatian (Einaudi 2007: 31). The adoption of racial laws in 1938 changed the situation of all foreigners and especially for some foreign categories and Jews, who were forced to leave Italy.

Although the dimension of foreign presence in Italy is modest, the Italian censuses show that

between 1871 and 1941, foreigners represented around two to three per thousand of the Italian population (Table 22.7). According to Colombo and Sciortino (2004), the main nationalities are Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Yugoslavia and Switzerland, but also non-European ones like Americans, Russians, Argentines, Brazilians Turks and Chinese; foreigners residing in Italy are not only refugees or modest workers, but also wealthy businessmen, members of the religious orders, as well as “‘elective residence’ immigrants, attracted by Italy’s image as a Mediterranean land rich in history and natural beauty” (Colombo and Sciortino 2004: 52).

Ethnic and Racial Conflicts and the Policy Context of Migration in Italy

Policies aimed at regulating immigration in Italy started only in the late 1980s. Thus far the few rules regarding migration were those encompassed in the T.u.l.p.s – “Testo Unico delle leggi di pubblica sicurezza” (Unique Text of public order laws) of 1931, issued during the fascism period and aimed at controlling the movements of foreigners in relation to public security and order.

During the 1970s Italy turned into an immigrant-receiving country: one of the first migration waves came from Tunisia and was directed to a small fishing town of Sicily, Mazara del Vallo. The geographic proximity and the easy procedures to get a tourism visa for 3 months facilitated the movement of many Tunisians to Sicily. Italy was not ready to receive immigrants, not only because of the absence of migration legislation but also because the presence of foreigners was quite unusual especially in Southern Italy and Sicily, the major areas exporting migrants abroad or to Northern Italy. Subsequently, in 1972, racial tensions between Italians and Tunisians were reported. The classic stereotype related to foreigners stealing the jobs of natives or bringing dangerous diseases was at the core of the conflict between the two parties. The police tried to cope with the events expelling about 50 Tunisians per week. Touristic visa regu-

lations expect tourists to have enough money to live in Italy for 1 week (Einaudi 2007: 103): if Tunisians failed to declare that they had the money to the authorities they were expelled. The Tunisians found rapidly a system to bypass the controls, eventually declaring to the police that they were tourists, that they had the money and that they will spend only 1 week in Italy. Between Italy and Tunisia there were several collisions involving fishing rights on territorial waters. That led, 3 years later, in 1975 to other racial tensions in Mazara del Vallo, which were caused by an attack to an Italian boat and the murder of an Italian fisherman by a Tunisian fleet. By way of revenge, Italians attacked Tunisians with some forced to leave Italy.

The first immigration law is issued only a decade later in 1986 (law n. 943/1986), and was introduced in order to regularize the illegal immigrant workers present in the national territory. The success of the law was relatively low, only 24 % of the immigrants (the main nationalities were Morocco, Sri Lanka and Philippines), about 105,000, could benefit from the amnesty (Guarnieri 2005). Based on the assumption that Italy was affected by the pull of labor demand migration, the law was aimed at addressing the regularization of immigrant workers – those who had already a job, or were registered in the unemployment lists. Nevertheless, it totally ignored both the role of the push factors in migration process as well as the importance of the informal Italian labor market; as a result it underestimated the number of immigrants employed in the informal economy or self-employed, as well as the presence of refugees.

The increase in the number of immigrants gave rise to new episodes of racism and xenophobia. A large part of the public opinion did not accept migration at that time. According to a survey of ISMU (Foundation Initiatives and Studies on Multiethnicity) realized in 1987–1988 and cited by Einaudi (2007: 134), almost 50 % of the interviewed declared to be opposed to immigration and almost 50 % thought that there were too many foreigners in Italy. During 1988 several episode of racism were recorded: they were boosted by the media and were condemned by

left-wing parties, the Church and labour unions. In the majority of the racism's episode, violence against immigrants was verbal, and only in few cases involved physical aggression. While the need for new regulations on migration was evident, it was because of the murder of a South African refugee, Jerry Masslo, in August 1989 that it became suddenly urgent. The police discovered later that the murder was not based on racist motivations, but it happened during an attempt of robbery to a group of extra European immigrants, including Masslo, working on the tomatoes farming. The killers, four young Italians, planned to rob that group of extra European immigrants living in an abandoned warehouse on the countryside near Naples where they worked. Eventually, part of the immigrants reacted to the robbery, in particular Masslo that was shot to death. After the homicide there was large-scale mobilization of the public opinion culminating in a demonstration in Rome to request a new migration law (Einaudi 2007).

In that changing climate, a new law regulating immigration (Martelli law) was introduced in 1990, extending the possibilities for the regularization to all those already present in the national territory at the end of 1989 (extending the possibility also to self-employed immigrants). The Martelli law represents the first attempt of the Italian legislature to control the immigration phenomenon, due to, not only the progressive awareness of the many pull factors attracting immigrants in Italy, but basically also to comply with Schengen Treaty and allow the process of Italy's access into the Schengen free movement area. However the mass immigration of the beginning of the 1990s especially from the Balkans and Albania disclosed the many gaps and restrictions of the new law.

Immediately after that Martelli law was approved, a new episode of racism against immigrants was at the center of political and media debate in Italy. A group of inhabitants in Florence, in the last day of Carnival, assaulted several immigrants. Previously, in Florence, a huge demonstration against the immigrants' presence and the associated increasing criminality was not condemned by the left-wing mayor (Einaudi

2007). Because of the high number of illegal immigrants present in Italy at that time, another issue at the core of political and media debate was housing for immigrants. In Rome, in 1991, a former pasta factory called “la Pantanella” was occupied by 2,500 immigrants. The central location of the factory and the unhealthy conditions inside the building pushed the Rome mayor to decide a relocation of immigrants in various city neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the initiative failed because of the protests of Italian citizens living in the involved neighborhoods. The crisis was finally solved moving immigrants to residences and hotels outside Rome. In the same period (1991) overcrowded ships of immigrants arrived from Albania and revealed the weakness of the Italian migration policies, unable to manage the increasing immigration. The gaps of the new migration law and the incapacity of the politicians to cope with these new flows caused a rise in negative feelings toward immigration. According to a survey cited by Einaudi (2007), in 1991, 61 % of Italians were against immigration and 62 % disagreed that immigration is positive because it allows the exchange between cultures. Few years later, in 1995, clashes and demonstration against immigrants in Turin reopened the political and media debate on immigration. Immigrants were considered to be the cause of the increased crime rate and of the growing feeling of insecurity in several Italian cities (Turin, Rome, Milan, Genoa). In Northern Italy the debate was also animated by the “Lega Nord” a political party that was openly against immigrants. At the beginning its racist purposes focused on its opposition to internal immigrants that moved from Southern to Northern Italy but the focus shifted by the end of the 1980s toward international immigrants. In 1997 and 1999 two new waves of migration from Albania exacerbated the feelings of the local population against migration. The mass media did not help at that time. In 1999 a series of murders in Milan were portrayed as a consequence of the growing insecurity and criminality due to the presence of immigrants (Einaudi 2007).

The failure of the previous legislation in discouraging clandestine entry and illegal residence,

and in promoting immigrants’ social integration generated the following two most important Italian laws: Turco-Napolitano law of 1998 approved by a left-wing government and Bossi-Fini law of 2002, under a right-wing government. Between the 1990 and 1998 several other provisions and emergency measures regarding immigration were issued.

The Turco-Napolitano law of 1998 represents the first attempt of the Italian legislature of a comprehensive and systematic approach towards migratory issues. It created a unitary corpus of norms concerning both immigration control (such as entry, residence and expulsion) as well as issues related to socioeconomic and cultural integration (such as health, education, housing, participation in public life, etc.), and norms against discrimination on racial, ethnic, national or religious membership. The Law guaranteed equal rights to legal immigrants concerning social rights and abolished the norm requiring the documentation of the unavailability of Italian or EU workers before an immigrant worker was allowed entry into Italy. The Law also included the possibility of family reunification with children and spouses for those immigrants who had a 1-year permit of stay, allowing the reunified relatives to work. Moreover minors, regardless of their legal status, were guaranteed the right to compulsory education, and illegal immigrants were guaranteed the right to medical treatment (Zincone 2006b: 356).

Furthermore a multicultural approach is followed by legislation resulting in the establishment of a National Integration Fund (80 % of the Fund is allocated to the regions) in order to finance multicultural activities and create a new professional figure called “cultural mediator”. The implementation measures for the social integration of immigrants occur mostly at the regional and local levels in cooperation with immigrants’ associations and voluntary organizations.

Other important innovations of the 1998 Law was the introduction in Italian legislation of a triennial planning document, which provides guidelines concerning future flows, as well as a yearly planned quota system determined by one

or more annual entry flow decrees which were made compulsory. Furthermore the introduction of a 1-year job-seeker visa was envisaged, according to which, immigrant workers could enter the country thanks to the “sponsorship” by private citizens or associations, as well as public regional or local authorities (Zincone 2006a, b).

With concern to illegal immigration the Turco-Napolitano law had introduced special centres of temporary detention that made it possible to identify undocumented immigrants in order to distinguish among those having the right to asylum status and others to be escorted to the border.

The norms introduced by the Law highlighted the attention of the Italian authorities to consider immigration as a long-term phenomenon demanding ordinary, rather than extraordinary and emergency, measures (Veikou and Triandafyllidou 2005). However, despite governmental efforts to uproot illegal immigration, the phenomenon has continued to persist, due to the structural features of the specific socio-economic context of the Italian society. Furthermore the periodic amnesties of 1986, 1990, 1996 and 1998, have acted as a pull factor encouraging further irregular immigration waiting for the next amnesty.

The attitudes against migration have persisted over time. In 2001, a couple of Italian teenagers murdered the mother and the younger brother of the girl. The girl initially accused a group of Albanian immigrants of the murder. The reaction in the media and the demonstrations instigated by the “Lega Nord” against immigrants were immediate. Even when the culprits were found to be Italian, the equation migration=criminality was still strong in the country (Einaudi 2007). During the same year, the Ministry of Interior commissioned a report coordinated by the Italian sociologist Marzio Barbagli in order to assess the security situation in Italy. A special section of the report was dedicated to the criminality of immigrants. The report was published also in 2003, 2004 and 2005. According to the results the crime rate did not increase during the 1990s (Einaudi 2007). The majority of immigrants involved in criminal activities were illegally residing in Italy;

their origin was Eastern European and North African. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that they represent a small minority of immigrants living in Italy (0.1 %).

Another growing anti-immigrant campaign was directed at Muslims. The “Lega Nord” party was among the major promoters of this campaign; it was accompanied by some Cardinals and Bishops that were against the building of mosques and in favor of privileging Catholic to Muslim immigration to Italy. The events of September 11 in the US did not help to eradicate racism against Muslims. The political debate shifted from the criminal activities of immigrants to the risk of Islamic terrorism. Several Muslims were arrested with the suspicion of preparing terrorist attacks.

The Bossi-Fini law introduced in 2002 adopted a worsening approach towards immigration even though many of the previous norms were not altered. The most relevant measure introduced by the law was the tightened link between employment and permit to stay, making the latter dependent on the former, creating a new document called stay-employment contract (a mix between permit of stay and employment contract), thus making the immigrants heavily dependent on their employers and easily subject to being blackmailed by them, since the loss of employment represents the waiting room for deportation. The Bossi-Fini law abolished the sponsorship that was the only mechanism to enter Italy through the front door in regular position. It reduced from 12 to 6 months the period of unemployment allowed and introduced more frequent renewal of residence permit, thus leaving immigrants under a continuous control of the police forces. Furthermore if an immigrant is escorted to the borders and subsequently found for the second time in Italian territory without a permit of stay, the law provides for the mandatory imprisonment from 6 to 12 months; in case of a further violation the detention period increases from 1 to 4 years (Zincone 2006a, b).

As far as social rights were concerned the Bossi-Fini reform did not alter the measures of the previous law. In line with the previous laws, the 2002 Law envisaged not one but two amnesties;

the first one was addressed to domestic workers and care givers; the second one (Decree 195/2002) included all immigrant workers. The regularization involved 634,728 immigrants, and represented the largest effort ever until then in Europe (Zincone 2006a: 32).

The development of the Italian migration legislation, since the first steps, has been in a continuous pendulum between the adoption of restrictive practices, in line with other EU Member States, and the Italian labor market demand for foreign labor, alternating measures against (bad) irregular immigration in the name of the safety of Italian citizens and measures pro “good immigration” useful to the national economy. The distinction between the two categories is done according to the legal status: illegal immigrants without a regular residence permit who are considered as dangerous and inclined to engage in criminal activities; legal immigrants who deserve to be integrated into the society (Finotelli and Sciortino 2008).

During 2006–2008 two consecutive government coalitions developed different kinds of migration policy. Under the centre-left government coalition of Romano Prodi, legislation on Asylum was finally adopted by the Italian Government (the Decree no. 251 19th November 2007 and Decree no. 25 28th January 2008). Until that moment Italy was the only EU country without such kind of legislation. Furthermore, following the EU directives, measures regulating the entry and the residence in Italy of researchers coming from non EU countries were introduced (decree no. 17, 9th of January 2008). The contradiction between integration and discrimination policies came out with the adoption of an emergency decree nr 181/2007, which allowed the deportation of EU citizens from Italy, if they were considered dangerous for the public order. The decree was the political answer to the murder of an Italian woman by a Rumanian citizen, and affected mostly the Roma community (Hermanin 2011; Sigona 2008).

After the general elections of April 2008, a right-wing government headed by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi introduced restrictions in the new Asylum legislation adopted by the previous

government, as well as restrictive measures on migration in general. Since immigration and public-order related issues played a pivotal role during the electoral campaign, it is not surprising that the first measures adopted by the government were those related to public security issues targeting undocumented immigrants. The Berlusconi government adopted a law decree on public security, converted into Law no. 125, 25th of July 2008, that envisaged among other measures, instruments to prevent and repress irregular immigration even by deporting a non-EU or EU citizen guilty of a crime (Finotelli and Sciortino 2008). Later on in 2009 it was enacted the Law 15 July n. 94 that partially modified Turco-Napolitano Act, in particular it introduced the crime of illegal immigration, punishing with a fine (between 5,000 and 10,000 Euros) and immediate deportation a foreigner entering Italy illegally. That crime exists also in other European countries, where it is considered as a civil law dispute; conversely in Italy it is a penal code crime.³ The public debate was also focused on the Roma people, the new government allowed the monitoring and the census by the regional authorities of their nomad camps. Another decree openly targeting the Roma community was the one regarding the conversion into national law of the directive 2004/38/CE on the free circulation of EU citizens. This decree allows European citizens to reside in Italy for a period longer than 3 months only if they register and have a legal income.

A further step forward towards the state of emergency in relation to nomad communities was executed by the ordinance nr. 3676 of 30/5/2008, which closed several informal nomad camps in Lombardia, Lazio and Campania, and ordered the census of the “nomads” (President of the Council of Ministers 2008) as well as the collection of fingerprints of minors, with the excuse that it was aimed at protecting minors from exploitation and guaranteeing them school registration (Finotelli and Sciortino 2008). The decree provoked wide concern both at the national and international levels and the European Parliament adopted a resolution considering the census as an “ethnic census” (EP 2008; Hermanin 2011).

In Italy the label “Roma” is usually considered as an “umbrella term” to indicate different groups who speak a Romanì dialect such as Roma, Sinti and Camminanti (Hermanin 2011; Sigona 2005). There are different juridical situations regarding the status of citizenship under the umbrella “Roma”: Italians citizens, European citizens, extra EU citizens, coming from the Balkan region, stateless and refugees (Loy 2009; Sigona 2005). It is believed that the Sinti arrived from the Balkans to centre-north of Italy; the Roma crossed the Adriatic Sea reaching the southern Italy; the less known Camminanti live in Sicily and travel most of the year throughout Italy (Sigona 2005).

There are no official statistics on the overall presence of Roma and Sinti population in Italy and their legal status, education, employment, mortality, etc. (Hermanin 2011). According to the data gathered by the European Council approximately 170,000–180,000 Roma are currently living in Italy, representing about 0.2 % of the total population, the lowest presence in Europe. About half of them are Italians and the remainder arrived in Italy recently and mostly from Romania, ex-Yugoslavia and Albania (Ministero dell’Interno 2006). Among the latter many of them are *sans papier* and in the case of Balkan origins many are stateless (Hermanin 2011; Sigona 2005).

In Italy, Roma are considered “a residual population in a residual space” (Sibley 1995: 68). Despite the citizenship status diversity, one out of four Roma and Sinti in Italy live in communities (camps) where the common denominator is represented by ethnicity; this means that they are target of the same treatment, regardless of their own rights and juridical status (Sigona 2005). Their authorized and unauthorized camps (*campo nomadi/Rom*) are located in the cities’ suburbs, near to dumps, which, to some extent, indicate the willingness to isolate them from the rest of the population. Unauthorized camps are often without running water, toilets and electricity. The physical segregation, coupled with socio-economic, cultural and political isolation and marginalization, represent the outcome of a long period of political approach towards Roma

(Sigona 2005). Camps were meant to serve as temporary residence, but in most of cases they became permanent solutions. The result is that today two to three generations of Roma/Gypsies are essentially born and lived in places not very dissimilar from landfills, with all the human and social consequences that this situation entails.

According to the report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI 2002: 20), “the situation of practical segregation of Roma/Gypsies in Italy appears to reflect a general approach of the Italian authorities which tend to consider Roma as nomads and wanting to live in camps”.

The Roma represent for the local authorities an issue of public order and security. According to the results of a qualitative and quantitative survey carried out in 2008 by the Institute for the Study of Public Opinion, 35 % of respondents overestimated the number of Roma and Sinti in Italy, placing it between one and two million people. About 92 % of respondents believe that Roma and Sinti in many cases exploit minors; 92 % believe they are thieves; 83 % feel that they have chosen to live in areas isolated from the rest of the city (ISPI 2008). Again the Eurobarometer survey (2008) on discrimination in the EU, show that 47 % of Italians surveyed would feel “uncomfortable” with the idea of having a Roma neighbor, against an EU average of 24 %.

The emergency decree of May 2008 was adopted after some xenophobic attacks against Roma camps in Ponticelli, Naples. It was the result of strained climate generated not only by crimes committed by immigrants and members of minority groups and by their role in the media debate and public’s perception.

The media campaign against crimes committed by undocumented immigrants and nomads was used by policy makers in order to restrict the existing immigration policies and introduce new repressive ones.

During this period there was an overlap among Roma and Romanians in the public opinion due to both the increasing number of immigrants from East Europe, especially after the admission of Romania and Bulgaria in the EU in 2007, and to the media campaign on the murder of the

Italian woman by a Rumanian immigrant in 2007 (Hermanin 2011; Sigona 2008).

The restrictive political measures of the 3rd Berlusconi Government does not target only the “undesirable” EU citizens, but aimed its efforts at immigration as a whole. Indeed the decrees 5/2007 and 251/2007, aimed at converting into national law the EU directives 2003/86 and 2004/83 on the right to family reunification and minimum standards for the qualification of the refugee status have been modified by restricting the possibility of family reunification with children over the age of 18 (only to the case of children with handicaps) and parents as well as by restricting the right of free circulation for asylum seekers by introducing specific areas for their residence (Finotelli and Sciortino 2008).

Despite the efforts of different governments to reduce the phenomenon of irregular immigration, it still represents an important feature of the Italian context. As Finotelli and Sciortino (2008) have pointed out, irregular immigration to Italy represents just a small piece of a huge puzzle that is the informal economy, which represents a powerful pull factor for irregular migrants and a context that easily embeds them. According to the authors the fight to irregular immigration would be effective only if the reform of the labour market is taken into account, rather than focusing only on border controls and repressive measures.

The integration of immigrants in the host society is also linked to political participation. Political participation itself is closely related to the acquisition of citizenship. In Italy the acquisition of citizenship is regulated by Law 91 of 5 February 1992. The Law 91 has been partially modified in 1995, 1996, 2000, 2006 and 2009. The access to citizenship in Italy is based on the *ius sanguinis*, i.e. by descent from an Italian (father or mother). Foreign minor children adopted by Italian parents acquire Italian citizenship. Italian citizenship can be obtained also by *ius soli* i.e. birth and residence or residence in Italy. A child who was born in Italy and who has non-Italian parents can become a naturalized Italian at age 18 if he/she had uninterrupted residence in Italy since birth. A foreigner who intends to apply for citizenship by naturalization, which

is a discretionary act of governmental authority, can apply for naturalization after 10 years of legal residence in Italy; for EU citizens, the period is reduced to 4 years and for stateless persons and refugees to five (Ambrosetti et al. 2002). Italian citizenship can be granted by marriage to an Italian: if the couple is resident in Italy, the foreigner husband or wife can apply for naturalization after 2 years since marriage. If the couple lives outside Italy the period after marriage becomes 3 years. Law 91 clearly discriminates naturalization by birth and residence. Many attempts were made since the approval of the Law to change the condition of the naturalization by birth and by residence. Several political parties ask for the acquisition of citizenship by birth for the second generation immigrants that will favor their integration in the Italian society. In addition, they want to shorten the length of the period of residence for non-European (until now 10 years) in order to speed up their integration process. Both left- and right-wing coalitions did not succeed in changing Law 91. The changes that were made lately in 2009 worsened the condition of the applicants to citizenship by marriage, prolonging the period of residence in Italy from 6 months to 2 years since marriage. However, several attempts related to the acquisition of citizenship by birth for the second generation immigrants have been made by political parties and civil society. A first result was that of art.33 of the Decree 69/2013 containing “Urgent provisions for economic recovery” that simplified the procedure for the acquisition of citizenship for foreigners born in Italy.⁴

The Future of Existing Demographic Related Trends

The process of population ageing is expected to continue and intensify over time. The age pyramid of the Italian population (Fig. 22.9), according to Istat population forecast (Medium variant) for January 1, 2030 and 2050 (compared to the pyramid of 2011), shows clearly this trend. The population will certainly increase, but only for certain age groups. As a result of this ageing pro-

cess, the pyramids will assume the shape of a rectangle, due to the fact that the number of children will be smaller than the number of adults. Compared to the population age structure of today, we can also see the progress on life expectancy, especially for women: many of them will live beyond the threshold of 100 years. According to Istat population projections, in 2030 the Italian population will reach 63,482,851 inhabitants, the percentage of population over 65 years will be 24.5 % of the total population and that of children under 14 will be 12.6 %. In about 20 years, therefore, the Italian population, including foreigners, will be much older than today's. The ageing index will be 207 in 2030 and 262.7 in 2050, while nowadays it is 144.5. The population projection for the foreigner population residing in Italy, shows a similar but slower pattern. In 2030 foreign residents in Italy will be 8,053,125, almost double the number of foreign residents of 2011. The age structure will change as well. Figure 22.9 shows clearly that the foreign resident population will face population ageing during the next 20 years. The ageing index is today about 12; it is projected to increase to 47.6 in 2030 and 129 in 2050 (Italian National Institute of Statistics) (ISTAT). Therefore, the shape of the foreigner population pyramid will be much more similar than today to that of the Italian population with a smaller young population and a larger adult and old population.

The age structure of the Italian population in 2030 suggests, therefore, that foreigners in the long run cannot do much to cope with ageing. The reproductive behavior of foreigners tends, in fact, in the long term to be similar to that of natives; in addition they will face ageing as is already taking place among Italian natives.

Looking Ahead

Italy, like other southern European countries, has struggled to find the right approach towards ethnic relations (Hamilton 2002). Its geographical position and the immigration policies implemented by the different governments in the last three decades have strongly affected the pecu-

liarities of Italian immigration. Since the late 1970s, when Italy turned into an immigration country, many efforts and steps forward have been undertaken to address the several challenges generated by immigration and ethnic relations. However, Italy is still an easy destination for irregular immigration. Push factors like worldwide regional conflicts, poverty and ethnic persecutions have generated an increase of asylum seekers and labour migrants, further diversifying the kaleidoscope of the many nationalities present in Italy.

The challenges that Italy is currently facing are related not only to immigration, but also to that of an ageing population. Indeed, like many other developed countries, Italy has to address problems related to the demographic patterns of its society such as one of the lowest total fertility rates (1.4) in the world. In such context of demographic changes, immigration will remain a challenge for the future governments, although it is not 'the' solution to population ageing, but "'one' solution, which in some cases may be useful, but is not sufficient" (Paterno 2011: 79).⁵ While the contribution of foreigners to reduce or slow down population ageing is important, it is minimized by a political class that argues that Italy can do without foreigners or even that they are a threat to national identity and to our economy.

Managing immigration flows will remain an important issue for policy makers. However, rather than focusing on repressive policy measures and border control, the efforts of policy makers should be directed to reform the labour market and to fight the informal economy; the latter is, indeed, a deep structural phenomenon of the Italian economy that operates as a powerful pull factor for foreign workers (Finotelli and Sciortino 2008). As Mingione and Quassoli point out, in Italy "the main way to participate in the economy is to access the underground economy" (2002: 53).

Efficient migration policies are a challenge in relation to irregular migration and the quality of border control, and even more in relation to the integration policies, in particular those addressing the integration of the second generation of so many different nationalities. A larger number of

immigrants would be more acceptable for Italy, in terms of integration, if the immigrants were transformed into citizens. The revision of naturalisation policies is then an important issue for policy makers. The direction and willingness of future policies will affect social adjustments and ethnic relations of the Italian society in the coming decades.

Notes

1. The term irregular migration is defined according to IOM ([International Organization for Migration, Key Migration Terms](#)) as follow: “From the perspective of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations.”
2. According to the Single Act of Immigration, known as Turco-Napolitano law (Law n.40), approved in 1998, and partially modified by Legislative Decrees of 8th January 2007 n. 5: eligible family members for family reunification are considered spouse, minor children, and children over 18 age who cannot live independently due to health reasons (100 % invalid); parents who do not have adequate family support in the country of origin. The permit of stay for family reunification is granted according to the effectiveness of family ties, by providing official supporting documents (i.e. contract of marriage, certificate of birth) and its validity should be at least 1 year.
3. In January 2014 the Italian Senate abolished the Penal Law crime of illegal entry in the Italian territory converting it in an administrative offence.
4. Foreigners born in Italy can apply for citizenship even if their parents or the population register did not keep as record the right documentation concerning their uninterrupted residence in Italy. To show their continuous residence in Italy since birth they can use any kind of official document, such as school diplomas or medical certificates. Furthermore,

always in order to encourage naturalizations, municipalities should send an official communication to the minors in order to inform them about the possibility to get the Italian citizenship. This communication should be sent 6 months before they turn 18 years old.

5. For an Italian debate on the role of immigration as an answer to the ageing problem in lowest-low fertility country see: Genus – Journal of Population Sciences, Vol. LXVII, N. 3, 2011.

Annex 1

Tables and Figures

Table 22.1 Italy, birth, marriage, mortality and infant mortality rates 1946–2011 (per thousand)

Year	CBR	Marriage rate	Mortality rate	Infant mortality rate
1946	23	9.2	12.1	86.8
1947	22.3	9.7	11.5	84.2
1948	22	8.4	10.6	72.2
1949	20.4	7.8	10.5	74
1950	19.6	7.7	9.8	63.8
1951	18.1	6.9	10.1	66.6
1952	17.7	7	10	63.5
1953	17.5	7.1	9.9	58.5
1954	18	7.5	9.1	53
1955	17.9	7.5	9.2	50.9
1956	17.9	7.4	10.2	48.8
1957	17.9	7.4	9.9	50
1958	17.6	7.6	9.3	48.2
1959	18.1	7.7	9.1	45.4
1960	18.1	7.7	9.6	43.9
1961	18.4	7.9	9.3	40.7
1962	18.4	8	10	43.8
1963	18.8	8.2	10.1	40.1
1964	19.7	8.1	9.5	36.1
1965	19.1	7.7	10	36
1966	18.7	7.4	9.5	34.7
1967	18	7.2	9.7	33.2
1968	17.6	7.1	10.1	32.7
1969	17.5	7.2	10.1	30.8
1970	16.8	7.4	9.7	29.6

(continued)

Table 22.1 (continued)

Year	CBR	Marriage rate	Mortality rate	Infant mortality rate
1971	16.8	7.5	9.7	28.5
1972	16.3	7.7	9.6	27
1973	16	7.6	10	26.2
1974	15.8	7.3	9.7	22.9
1975	14.9	6.7	10	21.2
1976	14	6.4	9.9	19.5
1977	13.2	6.2	9.8	18.1
1978	12.6	5.9	9.6	17.1
1979	11.9	5.8	9.6	15.7
1980	11.3	5.7	9.8	14.6
1981	11	5.6	9.7	14.1
1982	10.9	5.5	9.4	13
1983	10.6	5.3	9.9	12.2
1984	10.3	5.2	9.3	11.8
1985	10.1	5.2	9.5	10.2
1986	9.7	5.2	9.5	9.7
1987	9.6	5.3	9.3	9.5
1988	9.9	5.5	9.3	9
1989	9.7	5.4	9.2	9
1990	9.8	5.4	9.3	8.3
1991	9.9	5.5	9.7	8.1
1992	10	5.5	9.6	7.7
1993	9.6	5.3	9.7	7.1
1994	9.3	5.1	9.7	6.5
1995	9.2	4.9	9.7	6.2
1996	9.2	4.7	9.7	6.1
1997	9.3	4.7	9.8	5.6
1998	9.2	4.8	10	5.4
1999	9.1	4.8	9.8	4.9
2000	9.3	4.9	9.7	4.5
2001	9.2	4.6	9.6	4.4
2002	9.4	4.7	9.8	4.5
2003	9.4	4.5	10.3	4.3
2004	9.5	4.3	9.7	3.9
2005	9.5	4.2	9.4	3.8
2006	9.5	4.2	9.5	3.6
2007	9.5	4.2	9.6	3.5
2008	9.6	4.1	9.8	3.3
2009	9.5	3.8	9.8	3.4
2010	9.3	3.6	9.7	3.4
2011	9.1	3.5	9.7	3.3

Source: Baldi and Cagiano (2005) for the years 1946–2003; ISTAT for the remaining years

Table 22.2 Italy-life expectancy at birth 1950–2011

Period	Males	Females
1950–1953	63.7	67.2
1960–1962	67.2	72.3
1970–1972	69	74.9
1981	71	77.8
1995	74.6	81
1996	75	81.3
1997	75.3	81.7
1998	75.5	81.8
1999	76	81.8
2000	76.5	82.4
2001	76.7	82.7
2002	76.8	82.8
2003	76.9	82.9
2004	77.9	83.7
2005	78.1	83.7
2006	78.4	84
2007	78.7	84
2008	78.8	84.1
2009	79	84.1
2010	79.1	84.3
2011	79.4	84.5

Source: Baldi and Cagiano (2005) for the years 1970–2003; ISTAT for the remaining years

Table 22.3 Italy total fertility rate 1970–2011


Year	TFR
1970	2.43
1975	2.21
1980	1.68
1985	1.45
1986	1.37
1987	1.35
1988	1.38
1989	1.35
1990	1.36
1991	1.33
1992	1.33
1993	1.27
1994	1.22
1995	1.20
1996	1.21
1997	1.21

(continued)

Table 22.3 (continued)

Year	TFR
1998	1.21
1999	1.22
2000	1.24
2001	1.25
2002	1.26
2003	1.30
2004	1.3
2005	1.32
2006	1.35
2007	1.37
2008	1.42
2009	1.41
2010	1.41
2011	1.42

Source: Baldi and Cagiano (2005) for the years 1970–2003; ISTAT for the remaining year

**Fig. 22.1** Italy-age pyramids 1952 and 2011 (Source: Istat)




Fig. 22.2 Foreign population resident in Italy at 1st January. Year 1995–2013 (Source: Istat)




Fig. 22.3 Incidence % of foreigners on the total population resident in Italy year 2002–2013 (Source: Istat)




Fig.22.4 Foreigner population resident in Italy in 2010 and 2011 according the continents of origin (%) (Source: Istat)




Fig.22.5 Foreigners resident in Italy in 2011. First 20 nationalities (%) (Source: Istat, Census data)

Table 22.4 Foreigners resident population in 2011. Top 20 nationalities

Country of origin	Total	%	% F	% M
Romania	823,100	20.4	56.6	43.4
Albania	451,437	11.2	47.8	52.2
Morocco	407,097	10.1	45.9	54.1
China	194,510	4.8	49.2	50.8
Ukraine	178,534	4.4	79.5	20.5
Moldova	130,619	3.2	66.6	33.4
Philippines	129,015	3.2	57.1	42.9
India	116,797	2.9	40.5	59.5
Perù	93,905	2.3	60.0	40.0
Poland	84,619	2.1	73.9	26.1
Tunisia	82,066	2.0	39.7	60.3
Equador	80,645	2.0	58.7	41.3
Bangladesh	80,639	2.0	33.1	66.9
Macedonia	73,407	1.8	45.3	54.7
Senegal	72,458	1.8	26.9	73.1
Sri Lanka	71,203	1.8	45.2	54.8
Pakistan	69,877	1.7	37.5	62.5
Egypt	65,985	1.6	35.2	64.8
Nigeria	47,338	1.2	54.7	45.3
Ghana	44,031	1.1	43.4	56.6
Total 20 Countries	3,297,282	81.9	52.1	47.9
Total	4,027,627	100.0	53.3	46.7

Source: Istat, Census data


**Fig. 22.6** Foreigners resident in Italy in 2011 according the nationality and gender (%) (Source: Istat, Census data)

Fig. 22.7 Foreigners sex ratio. Year 2001–2004–2012 (Source: Istat)





Fig. 22.8 (a) Age pyramid, Asian population resident in Italy, 2011. (b) Age pyramid, African population resident in Italy, 2011. (c) Age pyramid, American population resident in Italy, 2011. (d) Age pyramid, EU27 population resident in Italy, 2011.




Fig. 22.8 (continued) in Italy, 2011. **(e)** Age pyramid, Romanian population resident in Italy, 2011. **(f)** Age pyramid, Albanian population resident in Italy, 2011. **(g)** Age pyramid, Moroccan population resident in Italy, 2011. **(h)** Age pyramid, Ukrainian population resident in Italy, 2011. **(i)** Age pyramid, Chinese population resident in Italy, 2011 (Source: Istat)

Table 22.5 Births and total fertility rate, Italian and Foreign population 2008–2012

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number of births	576,659	568,857	561,944	546,607	534,186
Births from at least one foreign parent	96,442	102,140	106,710	105,975	107,339
Births from Italians	480,217	466,717	455,284	440,632	426,847
TFR	1.42	1.41	1.4	1.39	1.42
Mean age at birth (women)	31.1	31.2	31.3	31.4	31.4
TFR Italians	1.32	1.31	1.29	1.30	1.29
Mean age at birth (Italian women)	31.7	31.8	31.8	32.0	32.0
TFR foreigners	2.31	2.23	2.13	2.04	2.37
Mean age at birth (Foreign women)	27.9	28	28.9	28.3	28.4

Source: Istat

Table 22.6 Total fertility rate for the main citizenship groups in Italy and in their home country in 2005

Country of citizenship	TFR in the home country (a)	TFR in Italy	General fertility rate (births per 1,000 women aged 15–49)	Mean age at childbearing	% with Italian partner
Morocco	2.76	4.19	151	28.6	6.8
Albania	2.29	2.75	108	26.4	9.9
Romania	1.32	1.98	72	26.8	28.0
China	1.70	2.92	103	27.3	3.0
Tunisia	2.00	4.52	175	29.3	5.5
Poland	1.24	1.54	55	28.1	69.8
Ukraine	1.12	1.23	26	27.4	62.2
Philippines	3.22	1.81	47	28.6	9.2
Ecuador	2.82	2.03	64	27.4	24.1
Egypt	3.29	5.53	205	26.2	3.3

Table 22.7 Foreigners in Italian censuses, 1871–2011

Year	Total foreigners	Resident Italian population	Total foreigners per 1,000 residents
1861	–	22,182,377	–
1871	60,982	27,303,509	2.2
1881	59,956	28,953,480	2.1
1901	61,606	32,965,504	1.9
1911	79,756	35,845,048	2.2
1921	110,440	38,943,528	2.8
1931	137,797	41,651,617	3.3
1941	108,597	42,943,602	2.5
1951	129,757	47,515,537	2.7
1961	62,780	50,623,569	1.24
1971	121,116	54,136,547	2.24
1981	320,778	56,556,911	5.7
1991	625,034	56,778,031	11.01
2001	1,334,889	56,995,744	23.42
2011	4,027,627	59,433,744	67.77

Source: Colombo & Sciortino p. 52, Istat




Fig. 22.9 (a) Age pyramid, Italian population 2011–2030–2050. (b) Age pyramid, Foreign population resident in Italy, 2011–2030–2050 (Source: Istat)

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Mehmet Ali Eryurt and İsmet Koç

Turkey stretches across the Asia and Europe. The country looks like a bridge connecting Europe and Asia to each other. The country can be qualified as a European, Asian, Middle Eastern, Mediterranean and Black Sea country. Therefore the culture of the country reflects both Eastern and Western traditions (Fig. 23.1).

Throughout its history, the land of Turkey welcomed many cultures and societies. Modern Turkey was founded on the land of Ottoman Empire, and took over a complex, rich multi-cultural, multi-ethnic social structure. Therefore studying socio-demographic characteristics of different ethnic groups in Turkey has a special importance.

Definition of ethnicity is a complex issue and numerous definitions can be made. Hutchinson and Smith (1996) define ethnic groups considering six main features: (1) a common proper name, (2) a myth of common ancestry that included the idea of common origin in time and place, (3) shared historical memories including heroes, events, and their commemoration, (4) one or more elements of common culture like religion, customs and language, (5) a link with a homeland, a symbolic attachment to the ancestral land, (6) a sense of solidarity among members of ethnic group. One or more of these features can be used

to identify an ethnic group. Although 51 ethnic groups have been identified in Turkey (Andrews 1992), the three largest groups in terms of their population sizes are Turks, Kurds and Arabs. As members of these three ethnic groups are mostly Muslim, the main marker of the ethnic groups is the language in the case of Turkey. Therefore in the study mother tongue information is used as a proxy of ethnicity.

Due to deep-rooted historical and political reasons, ethnicity in Turkey has largely remained a sensitive subject and not discussed until recently even in academic circles. Consequently, there are few studies on socio-demographic characteristics of ethnic groups in Turkey. Moreover, most of them have been politically driven and highly speculative (Koç and Hancıoğlu 1999; Koç et al. 2008). This study is an attempt to fulfil this emptiness. The first objective of the study is to estimate total number of populations and spatial distribution of main ethnic groups in Turkey. The second objective is to compare demographic characteristics and socio-economic circumstances of these ethnic groups. The third objective is to measure the prevalence of intermarriages between different ethnic groups as a measure of the level of integration. The fourth objective is to analyze migration magnitudes and patterns for different ethnic groups. The fifth objective is to compare experiences of different ethnic groups in terms of basic life course events. Finally the study aims to provide some estimation about future size of ethnic groups.

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Fig. 23.1 Map for geo-strategic location of Turkey

A Historical Overview

The Ottoman Empire (1299–1922) throughout its history exceeding 600 years spread over three continents and hosted many culture, religion and ethnic groups. The Ottoman Empire controlled the most important trade roads such as the Silk Road, the Spice Road and Mediterranean, and connected many cultures and societies to each other.

The Ottoman system, founded on the basis of the protection of diversity rather than assimilating the conquered societies. Ahmad (1996) says on this issue that "...the Ottoman Empire differed, however, from other pre-modern empires in that its ruling class made no attempt to integrate conquered peoples culturally. The sultans had no policy of converting the non-Muslims of the Balkans or Anatolia to Islam or Turkifying the non-Turks; the idea of nationality simply did not exist, and the Turks—at least, the rulers called themselves Ottomans...".

The Ottoman's approach to different cultures was hidden in the concept of "millet", a concept meaning communities subject to customary law. The "millet" system dates back to the period of Mehmet II (1451–1481), the Conqueror of the Constantinople in 1453. Mehmet II after having conquered the Constantinople guaranteed the Greek Church religious freedom, and the head of the Church granted full authority (religious and civil) over the Greek Orthodox community. Later on, the same privileges were given to Armenian and Jewish communities (Ahmad 1996). Muslim, Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities constituted four main parts of "millet" system. The concept of "millet" had a religious meaning rather than ethnic identity. While Greek community were Orthodox, Armenians were mostly Catholic. All of Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Bosnians, and Albanians constituted "Muslim Millet".

In the last period of the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand change of trade routes and industrialization in Europe left the Ottomans economically

backward, on the other hand nation-states which were founded after the French Revolution strengthened nationalist movements among minority groups within the Ottoman Empire and undermined the unity of the Empire.

There were three options to find a way of salvation for Ottoman intellectuals and politicians. The first option was to create an "Ottoman millet" covering Christian communities. This "Ottomanism" politics was asserted by Tanzimat intellectuals. After understanding the impossibility of keeping Christians within the Empire, the idea of keeping Muslim communities in unity and "Islamism" politics developed, and it was applied by the Sultan Abdulhamid. The third way was "Turkism". The consideration of Muslim constituents who are not Turk will leave the Empire has nurtured Turkism politics (Akçura 1976). As a result of this process the Republic of Turkey was established on 29 September 1923 as a nation-state. In the early years of the Republic, Turkey aimed to construct a national identity.

On 24 July 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne recognised the sovereignty of the new state. The Treaty of Lausanne accepted existence of "minorities" but the concept of minorities was limited to non-Muslim groups like Greeks, Jews and Armenians. Kurds were excluded from the scope of the Treaty and Kurds were evaluated as one of the main constituent of the Republic of Turkey instead of a minority (Akyol 2006).

In the first constitution Turkishness was defined on a territorial base instead of an ethnic base. All people living within the boundaries of Turkish Republic were labelled as Turkish. This approach has been criticized as a denial of other ethnicities (Sirkeci 2000; Yeğen 2004).

In the early years of the Republic to strengthen national identity a series of reforms has been implemented. The alphabet changed from Arabic to Latin on 1 November 1928. In the following years the Turkish Historical Society and the Turkish Language Association were established. These institutions studied history and language on nationalistic ground and developed Turkish History Thesis and Sun Language Theory. The Resettlement Law of 1934, aimed to reach a homogenous population needed for nation state,

by distributing different ethnic and religious groups into Turkish population (Özbay and Yücel 2001). During this period many Turkish speaking migrants migrated from Balkan countries and Russia to Turkey. According to an estimation between 1923 and 1938, over 800 thousands migrants migrated to Turkey (Kazgan 1983). Considering Turkey's population was around 13 million in 1927, it would be better understood how large this number is.

Early years of the Republic witnessed many small scale rebellions of Kurdish tribes in the East region. Some Kurdish tribes who used to have a relative autonomy during Ottoman Empire were against the nation-building process. Most of these rebellions were small-scale and short-term since some tribe leaders and big landowners were represented in national parliament (Bruinessen 1992; Akyol 2006).

In 1946 Turkey passed into a multi-party political system and a newly organized right-wing party, Democratic Party, won the election in 1950. In 1960, the Turkish armed forces seized power in a military coup. Ironically, the 1961 constitution adopted after the coup, led the expansion of civil and cultural rights. In the following decades, the democratic political system was interrupted two more times because of military coupes. The second coup occurred in 1971 and the third coup in 1980. Especially the impact of 1980 military coup was severe. On September 12, the National Security Council, headed by Kenan Evren overthrow the civilian government, extended martial law throughout the country, abolished the Parliament, suspended the Constitution and banned all political parties and trade unions. Turkish Armed Forces ruled the country through the National Security Council for the next 3 years. With a law which passed on 19 October 1983, the use of any language other than Turkish in public spaces was banned. A new constitution which narrowing civil liberties of the previous constitution proposed by military forces and it was "accepted" with a high rate of voting in the referendum on 7 November 1982. After the acceptance of the new constitution the ban on political parties has been lifted. New political parties were established and on 6 November 1983, one

of newly established party, the Motherland Party, took over power from military government in general elections.

In 1984 an illegal party, the Kurdish Workers Party (in Kurdish: *Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan – PKK*) was established and began terrorist attacks with a guerrilla style especially in south-eastern region of Turkey. During the low-level warfare against PKK, governments took some measures. Some Kurdish villagers were armed as village guards by government against PKK in 1985. Afterwards in 1987 “the state of emergency” declared in the ten provinces of the Eastern part of Turkey. Special governors having extraordinary powers were appointed to these provinces. As a part of this chain, in 1991 the “Anti-Terror Law” entered into force and restricted freedom of expression. Another upsetting result of conflict was mass migration of Kurdish population from villages to city centers or other cities. According to the survey of Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies on “Survey on Migration and Internally Displaced Population” between 1986 and 2005 the number of displaced population were estimated in the range of 953,680 and 1,201,200 (HUIPS 2006). Most of the displaced population forced to migrate due to security reasons in the period of 1991–1995. This period was the most intense period of low-level warfare between PKK and Turkish military forces.

Starting from 1990s two presidents of Turkey, namely Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel, recognized “Kurdish reality” in their speeches. In 1991, the ban on usage of Kurdish language on public sphere was lifted. In 1999, the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured and arrested. In the following years some important reforms implemented by governments, increased civil rights of Kurdish population. Broadcasting by public and private media in Kurdish was permitted in August 2002. In the same year, state of emergency administration was lifted from all of the ten provinces and teaching of the Kurdish language in private courses was permitted. Pro-Kurdish Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) was allowed to join 2002 general elections. Government introduced a ‘Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project’ to compensate losses of displaced population in year 2004. In 2009

TRT-6, a state television channel broadcasting in Kurdish went on air. Teaching Kurdish language in private teaching institutions and as an elective course in some of public universities were allowed, Department of Kurdish Language and Literature and an Institute to study Kurdish Language in an advanced level were established.

All of these steps increased cultural rights of Kurdish population. Of course these steps do not solve the “Kurdish issue” totally. The issue remains unsolved and is still a major problem for Turkey. There are still some demands for further cultural rights and local political autonomy. The presence of illegal PKK and the conflict continues. To take further steps to solve the problem, in addition to increasing the sphere of cultural and political rights, socioeconomic inequalities between Eastern and western parts of the country needed to be minimized.

Data Sources

The data availability on ethnicity is both a practical and a political problem in Turkey. Although an ethnicity question has been included into national censuses until 1990, the last time that national data on ethnicity was collected and published was in 1965, in the Population Census, which included questions on mother tongue. Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in ethnicity studies, in a more relaxed and less censored atmosphere. However, most studies have been speculative and politically driven in nature, especially in terms of quantifying the sizes of ethnic groups and assessing their demographic behaviour patterns. Recognising the potential explanatory power of data on ethnicity on demographic processes, a number of questions on mother tongue and spoken languages were included in the individual questionnaires of the nationwide Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys conducted in 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008 (TDHS-1993, TDHS-1998, TDHS-2003 and TDHS-2008). Given the impracticality of including all possible questions useful for identifying ethnic groups, the demographic surveys only included questions on mother tongue and spoken languages to be used as proxy variables for this

purpose. In TDHS-2008, the primary data source of this study, interviews were completed in 10,525 households, from which 10,798 women age 15–49 were asked for information on ethnicity (HUIPS 2009). Besides the data of TDHS-2008, the data of previous three surveys is employed as a supplementary data for this study in order to compare differentiation of the demographic behaviour of Turkish women and Kurdish women in 15-year period. This comparison is useful to testify whether trends of demographic indicators of Turks and Kurds indicate any integration. The sampling strategy of these surveys allows analyses by a variety of background characteristics and region-based analyses.

Given the impracticality of including all possible questions useful for identifying ethnic groups, the TDHS only included questions on mother tongue/spoken languages to be used as proxy variables for this purpose. These questions included the mother tongue of the respondent (the ever-married woman and the never-married women), of her husband (or last husband), of her parents, of her parent-in-laws, and languages known by the respondent and her husband in addition to her/his mother tongue. Analyses showed that the information on mother tongue and on spoken languages by the respondent and her husband were sufficient to determine in which “language group” the respondent or her husband fell into (Dündar 1998; Koç and Hancıoğlu 1999; Koç et al. 2000, 2008). Information on the mother tongue of the previous generation did not provide additional useful information for the identification of ethnic groups.

Mother tongue/spoken language is only one potential variable that can be used as a proxy for ethnicity, but in the Turkey context, it appears to be quite sufficient, especially when the nature of ethnic group identification and the absence of alternative information is taken into account. More precisely, ethnic identity in Turkey is mainly symbolic, imagined, private or unrecognised in nature, rather than being full ethnic identity (Yinger 1994; Hutchinson and Smith 1996). Furthermore, in the absence of any other alternative data on ethnicity, the TDHS data on language groups remains a valuable data set that can be used to quantify various aspects of ethnic groups

and their demographic and health behaviour patterns. Previous studies accept the strength of THDS data for estimating current percentage and characteristics of Turkish and Kurdish populations in Turkey (Dündar 1998; Koç and Hancıoğlu 1999; İçduygu et al. 1999; Koç et al. 2000, 2008; Cindoğlu and Sirkeci 2000; Hoşgör and Smits 2002; Sirkeci 2000; Smits and Hoşgör 2003; Yavuz 2006).

Mother tongue questions asked in the ever-married questionnaire and never-married module included in the household questionnaire, that is the question asked almost all women aged 15–49. The language in which the interview was conducted also recorded. This information used to construct ethnicity variable in the household data. While determining ethnicity of household members mother tongue of the women assigned to all her household members. If there is no women aged 15–49 in the household, the ethnicity of the household members assigned looking at the language in which the household interview was conducted.

Another supplementary data source of the study is from the Survey on Migration and Internally Displaced Persons in Turkey, 2005 (TGYONA-2005). TGYONA-2005 is a nationwide representative sample survey covering 5,009 households and 7,319 men and women age 18 and over. The survey aimed to provide information about the origin of the displaced persons, their destinations and their social and economic characteristics before and after the displacement (HUIPS 2006). The survey covered 14 origin and 10 destination provinces with their urban and rural areas. The analysis on migration status of Turks and Kurds in this study is performed by using the individual data sets of TGYONA-2005.

Sociodemographic Profile of Ethnic Groups

Size and Spatial Distribution

While there are no less than 51 ethnic groups in Turkey according to a comprehensive study (Andrews 1992), little is known on their present sizes and spatial distribution. Even on the size of

the second largest ethnic group, the Kurds, estimates vary between 3 and 20 million (Özsoy et al. 1992; Mutlu 1995; Koç and Hancıoğlu 1999; Koç et al. 2008). Results of TDHS-2008 show that 80 % of women age 15–49 in Turkey are Turks, 17 % are Kurds, 2 % are Arabs and the remaining 1 % belongs to other ethnic groups (Table 23.1). As a conservative estimate, if we assume that the percentage distribution of women at reproductive age to ethnic groups is representative of the distribution of the whole population, then our finding compares very favourably with independent studies. Namely, the percentage of the Kurdish population for the 1990s was found to be 12–14 %; for the first half of the 2000s was found to be 15–16 % by other independent studies (Özsoy et al. 1992; Mutlu 1995; Sirkeci 2000; Koç et al. 2000, 2008; HUIPS 2006). Based on our above-mentioned assumption, these figures imply that the Kurdish component of the population has increased from 3.1 million in 1965 to

approximately 12.3 million in 2008. This rapid increase (of 3.2 % per annum, compared to 1.5 for the national average) of the Kurdish population must have primarily been due to high fertility, as well as declining mortality rates. Besides the demographic explanations, this increase may also be explained by the fact that Kurds took more and more courage to declare their ethnic identity in this period.

The third largest language/ethnic group is the Arabs in Turkey. Figures from different sources indicate that the percentage of the Arab population has remained more or less stable. Other ethnic groups such as Greeks, Circassians, Georgians, Armenians and Jews complete the list of sizeable language/ethnic groups in Turkey. In total, however, they appear to account for less than 1 % of the population in 2008.

The largest percentage (44 %) of Turks lives in the Western part of Turkey, while a majority of the Kurdish population (60 %) live in the East.

Table 23.1 Percent distribution of ethnic groups in Turkey

Ethnic groups	1935 ^a	1965 ^b	1990 ^c	1992 ^d	1993 ^e	1998 ^f	2003 ^g	2005 ^h	2008 ⁱ
Turks	89.2	90.1	–	85.8	82.7	83.2	82.6	80.7	80.0
Kurds	9.2	7.6	12.6	12.4	13.0	14.4	14.5	16.2	17.2
Arabs	1.0	1.2	–	1.4	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.5	2.1
Other	0.6	1.1	–	0.4	2.6	0.5	1.0	1.6	0.7

^a1935 Population Census

^b1965 Population Census

^cMutlu (1995)

^dÖzsoy et al. (1992)

^eKoç and Hancıoğlu (1999)

^fKoç et al. (2000)

^gKoç et al. (2008)

^hHUIPS (2006)

ⁱAuthors' calculations using the data from TDHS-2008

Table 23.2 Percent distribution of ethnic groups by region

Ethnic groups	Regions					Total	Number of cases
	West	South	Central	North	East		
Turks	43.6	11.7	27.7	8.6	8.3	100.0	8,588
Kurds	26.1	10.7	3.2	0.1	60.0	100.0	1,849
Arabs	2.2	61.5	1.1	0.0	35.3	100.0	224
Other	75.6	1.4	9.1	8.6	5.3	100.0	774
Total	39.9	12.5	22.8	7.0	17.7	100.0	10,738

Source: Authors' calculations using the data from TDHS-2008

Table 23.3 Percentages and populations of the Kurds, by region

Regions/settlements	1965 ^a		2008 ^b	
	Percent	Population	Percent	Population
West	0.9	88,420	11.2	3,135,925
South	5.0	190,220	14.7	1,300,730
Central	4.1	262,640	2.4	359,785
North	0.5	28,720	0.2	10,408
East	47.6	2,562,380	58.2	7,494,093
Urban	–	–	14.9	8,118,621
Rural	–	–	24.0	4,182,320
Total	7.6	3,132,390	17.2	12,300,941

^aFigures from the 1965 Census were corrected by Mutlu (1995)

^bAuthors' calculations using the data from TDHS-2008 and population size of Turkey in 2008

A great majority of the Arabic population (97 %) live in the Southern and Eastern parts of Turkey (Table 23.2). An interesting finding is that more than a third of the Kurdish population lives in areas outside the Southeast. A significantly high percentage of the Kurdish population lives in the West region (26 %).

There appears to have been a massive movement of the Kurdish population from the Eastern parts of the country towards the Western and Southern provinces (Table 23.3). In 1965, Kurdish population constituted only less than 1 % of the population in the Western provinces, and 5 % in the Southern provinces. By 2008, the shares of the Kurdish population have reached 11 and 15 % respectively in these two regions. There was an eleven-fold increase of the Kurds in the West and a three-fold increase in the South. This overall increase may be explained by the effect of migration from the East to other parts of the country but also it must be due to high fertility, as well as declining mortality rates of Kurdish population. The claims that as many Kurds live in the Western region as in the Eastern region do not appear to be true, despite very substantial increases of Kurds in the Western parts of Turkey. Most of the Kurds still live in the East; 82 % of the Kurdish population were in this region in 1965. After 43 years of massive migration movements out of the Eastern provinces, a large majority of Kurds (60 %) are still living in the Eastern provinces (Table 23.2).

Another considerable feature of Kurdish population is its concentration in rural areas and

its lower urbanization rates (66 %). As a whole the urbanization rate is 76 % in Turkey. However in the West, the percentage of Kurds living in the urban areas (approximately 97 %) is higher than their Turkish counterparts (approximately 85 %). A similar pattern is also apparent in the South; 76 % of Kurds live in the urban areas as opposed to 73 % of Turks. This may be originated from the massive rural-to-urban migration from the East to the urban centres of Turkey which are located in the Western and Southern parts of Turkey with few exceptions in other regions. In the central region, majority of the Kurds (51 %) are living in the rural areas, whereas this figure is only 47 % in the East. The lower rural share in the East is mainly related with the massive evacuations of villages and hamlets from mid-1980s to the late-1990s that pushed hundreds of thousands of Kurds to the urban centres of the East, as well as urban centres of other regions. In this period, due to the armed conflict between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and Turkish military/security forces, the total number of people who experienced internal dislocation was estimated in the range of 954,000 and 1,200,000. The great majority of the conflict-induced migrants (79 %) were from the rural areas of the region (HUIPS 2006).

Age and Sex Structure

A comparison of mean age of Kurdish population (22.6 years) with those of Turkish population (31.8 years) clearly shows that Kurds has a

younger age structure as opposed to Turks in Turkey. The Kurdish population is composed of a large proportion of young population under 15 years old (40 %), a large proportion of working age population (57 %), and a small proportion of elderly population, population over 64 years old, (3 %). However, the Turkish population differs with its smaller proportion of young population (24 %), and larger proportions of working age population (69 %), and elderly population (8 %). As a result of these differentials, the total dependency ratio among Kurds is much higher (76) than that among Turks (45). The higher total dependency ratio among Kurds is mainly related with the higher proportion of the children as compared with the Turkish population.

The population pyramid of Kurdish population also confirms its young age structure with a wide base and with a concentration of the population under 15 years of age. This pattern is typical for a population that have experienced relatively high fertility in the recent past. The effect of recent fertility decline is also evident in the fact that the proportions of children under age 5 are smaller than successive birth cohorts. Although the age structure of Kurdish population is quite dissimilar with the overall population, the age structure of Turkish population is almost the same with the overall population due to the huge share of Turkish population in overall population. Both of the population pyramids of Turks and overall Turkey are typical for populations at the onset of aging process with a narrowing base, and widening the share of adult and elderly populations with the effect of the population momentum (Fig. 23.2).

Life Chances


There are considerable amount of variation among ethnic groups with respect to socioeconomic conditions and life chances, specifically, household and dwelling characteristics, educational attainment, labour force participation, social security and household wealth status. The average household size is four persons per household in Turkey. More than a fourth of the households

have less than four members, while another quarter of the households have four members, and the remaining a half of the households consists of five or more members in Turkey. In general, mean household size of Kurdish population (6.4 persons) is much larger than those of Turkish population (3.7 persons) and other population (4.9 persons). Approximately three-fourth of the Kurdish households contains six or more members, while corresponding figure is just less than one-fourth in the Turkish households. The share of two persons households among Kurdish population is less than 2 % as opposed to 10 % among Turkish population, and 6 % among other households. The mean person per sleeping room, as a crowding measure, shows that Kurdish households (3.4 persons per room) are much more crowded than Turkish households (2.1 persons per room) and other households (2.6 persons per room) in Turkey (Table 23.4).

Like crowding measure of the households, the toilet and drinking water used by the households are highly correlated with hygienic conditions of the households as well as they are indicative of socioeconomic status of the households. Overall, 81 % of households have flush toilet in Turkey. Differentials in the availability of flush toilet by ethnic groups are substantial. Among Turkish population, the percentage of households with flush toilet increases to 83 % while it drops to 68 % among Kurdish population, and 59 % among other ethnic populations. In terms of having safe water in the households, Kurdish household is, once more, in a disadvantage position compared with Turkish households (Table 23.4).

Although TDHS-2008 did not collect data on consumption or income, the survey collected detailed information on dwelling and household characteristics and access to a variety of consumer goods and services, and assets which are used as a measure of socio-economic status. The wealth index is a recently developed measure that has been tested in a number of countries in relation to inequities in household income, use of health services, and health outcomes (Rutstein et al. 2000). The wealth index was constructed using household asset data including ownership of a number of possessions ranging from a television

Fig. 23.2 Age structure of Turks, Kurds and overall Turkey (Due to small number of cases, the population pyramid for “other” ethnic group is not given here) (Source: Authors’ calculations using the data from TDHS-2008)



to a car, as well as dwelling characteristics, such as source of drinking water, sanitation facilities, and type of flooring material. The welfare status of the household variable constructed based on wealth index indicates that while the Turkish

households are dispersed almost evenly over the wealth quintiles, the Kurdish households are over-represented among the poorest households (45 %) and under-represented among the richest households (2 %).

Table 23.4 Household characteristics by ethnic groups

Variables	Turks	Kurds	Other	Total
Household size				
1	1.8	0.2	0.3	1.5
2	10.0	1.4	5.6	8.6
3	18.0	3.9	8.3	15.5
4	28.3	8.3	20.0	24.9
5	18.6	11.5	19.2	17.5
6 and +	23.4	74.8	46.7	32.1
Mean household size	3.7	6.4	4.9	3.9
Mean person per sleeping room	2.1	3.4	2.6	2.2
Type of toilet				
Flush	83.2	68.1	58.7	81.1
Non-flush	16.8	31.9	41.3	18.9
Type of drinking water				
Safe	75.1	67.1	60.0	74.0
Non-safe	24.9	32.9	40.0	26.0
Welfare status				
Poorest	14.2	45.1	42.8	20.0
Poorer	17.8	31.0	23.5	20.0
Middle	21.3	15.2	12.4	20.0
Richer	22.8	6.9	12.5	20.0
Richest	23.9	1.8	8.8	20.0

Source: Authors' calculations using the data from TDHS-2008

TDHS-2008 results indicates that labour force participation rate among women in reproductive age is slightly over 30 % in Turkey. The percentage of women in the labour force among Kurdish women (17 %) is just a half of the percentage of Turkish women (33 %). Almost all Kurdish women in the labour force works without social security, while the corresponding figure is one-third among Turkish women. Although almost no differentials between labour force participation rates of Turkish and Kurdish husbands, the percentage of working with social security is much higher among Turkish husbands (66 %) than Kurdish husbands (35 %). It is striking that over a half of the Kurdish husband are working without social security. Approximately 85 % of the Turkish population is under the health insurance while this percentage drops to 80 % for Kurdish population, and further to 75 % for other ethnic population. For Kurdish and other ethnic populations, the share of green card coverage, a health insurance system for the poor population in

Table 23.5 Working and health insurance status of women/husband by ethnic groups

Variables	Turks	Kurds	Other	Total
Working status of women				
Never worked/not working	67.2	82.8	60.9	69.3
Working with social security	11.0	1.1	3.7	9.4
Working without social security	21.8	16.1	35.3	21.4
Working status of husband				
Never worked/not working	10.1	14.4	13.3	10.9
Working with social security	65.7	34.5	39.3	60.3
Working without social security	24.2	51.1	47.4	28.8
Health insurance status				
No health insurance	15.3	19.1	24.5	16.1
Coverage under SGK	75.3	38.9	48.6	69.2
Coverage under green card	8.4	41.9	24.5	13.7
Coverage under private companies	1.0	0.2	2.4	0.9

Source: Authors' calculations using the data from TDHS-2008

Turkey, is quite higher compared with Turkish population. This finding, once more, confirms that the poverty is much more prevalent among non-Turkish populations in Turkey (Table 23.5).

Table 23.6 presents that Turkish population are more educated than other ethnic groups in Turkey. The percentage of non-educated population is just 18 % among Turkish population, while it is 36 and 28 % among Kurdish and other ethnic populations respectively. Furthermore, whereas one-fifth of the Turkish population have more than secondary school education, it is just 7 % among Kurdish population. The mean years of schooling by ethnic groups also confirms Kurdish population is the most disadvantaged group compared with the other groups. A closer examination of educational level by sex and ethnic groups reflects much more alarming trends for females. For all ethnic groups, females compared with males are in a backward position in the educational attainment. Especially educational level of Kurdish women are worse than worse, a half of them are non-educated, and only

Table 23.6 Educational level of population by sex and ethnic groups

Ethnic groups	No education	Primary incomplete	Primary complete	Secondary incomplete	Secondary complete	Higher	Don't know	Mean years of schooling
Males								
Turks	13.0	11.0	26.2	6.5	15.9	27.1	0.3	6.81
Kurds	25.0	19.2	23.3	7.4	15.1	9.7	0.2	4.62
Other	20.5	11.7	28.9	7.0	16.1	15.6	0.2	6.10
Total	15.1	12.3	25.8	6.6	15.7	24.1	0.3	6.45
Females								
Turks	21.9	12.1	29.9	7.8	8.6	19.5	0.1	5.53
Kurds	46.4	20.7	16.5	5.5	7.3	3.6	0.0	2.74
Other	34.0	14.5	26.9	5.9	6.3	12.4	0.0	4.80
Total	26.2	13.5	27.7	7.4	8.3	16.8	0.1	5.07
Total								
Turks	17.5	11.6	28.1	7.2	12.2	23.3	0.2	6.17
Kurds	35.8	19.9	19.9	6.5	11.2	6.6	0.1	3.67
Other	27.6	13.2	27.9	6.4	10.9	13.9	0.1	5.42
Total	20.7	12.9	26.8	7.0	12.0	20.4	0.2	5.75

Source: Authors' calculations using the data from TDHS-2008

4 % of them are with more than secondary school education. The mean years of schooling of Kurdish women (3 years) is just a half of the level observed among Turkish women (6 years).

In terms of school attendance ratios, both Kurdish males and females are in disadvantageous positions compared to Turkish males and females in all groups (Fig. 23.3). At the same time, there exists a gender gap for Turkish as well as for Kurdish. However, the gender gap for Kurdish children is wider than that for Turkish children. Although starting from age 6–7, 8-year schooling is compulsory in Turkey; many Kurdish female children drop out school just after first level primary school in Turkey. As presented by Kırdar (2009), the educational gap between Turkish and Kurdish children widens substantially in the further age groups, especially for Kurdish female children.


Marriage and Inter-marriage

The two groups are also significantly different in terms of marriage patterns. When mean ages at transition to first marriage are calculated for the marriage cohorts of the three groups, it is clearly observed that Kurdish women marry earlier than their Turkish and other counterparts in all

marriage cohorts. For both Turkish and Kurdish women, ages at first marriage appear to be increasing over time. However, for the national average, the difference seems to be diminishing for the youngest cohort. The mean age of first marriage among Turkish and other ethnic groups are very similar to the overall means in all marriage cohorts, while those among Kurdish women are much more divergent from these two groups as well as overall levels (Table 23.7).

Whether inter-marriage between Turks and Kurds is a common practise in Turkey is a major issue, which can be analysed directly from the TDHS's data. Inter-marriage between Turks and Kurds is quite uncommon, as indicated by Hoşgör and Smiths (2002) and Koç and Eryurt (2010). A great majority of women from both language/ethnic groups prefer endogamy within their own language/ethnic groups. Ninety-seven percent of Turkish women are married to Turkish males, while 93 % of Kurdish women are in endogamous marriages. While only 2 % of Turkish women are married to Kurdish males, 6 % of Kurdish women are married to Turkish men. These results may be an indication of the reluctance of both Turkish women and their parents and at the same time Kurdish women and their parents to prefer getting into an exogamous marriage.

Fig. 23.3 School attainment ratios by sex and ethnic groups of children (Due to small number of cases the figures for the “other” ethnic group is not given here) (Source: Authors’ calculations using the data from TDHS-2008)



The age patterns of Turkish women observed in the Table 23.8 do not provide any evidence of changing practises in terms of inter-marriage, while inter-marriage seems to be quite common especially among young Kurdish women. But these figures should be interpreted suspiciously since only a few of Kurdish women are married in early ages. When the change in the level of inter-marriage is compared based on TDHS-1993, percentage of Kurdish women married to a Turkish husband has even decreased in the 15-year period. It is noteworthy that during the intensive forced migration periods of Kurdish population due to

Table 23.7 Mean age at first marriage by ethnic groups and marriage cohort

Marriage cohorts	Turks	Kurds	Other	Turkey
2004–2008	22.35	20.64	22.79	22.09
1999–2003	21.44	19.41	21.21	21.17
1994–1998	20.95	18.59	19.43	20.63
1989–1993	20.09	17.74	18.69	19.73
1984–1988	19.51	16.94	19.60	19.18
1979–1983	18.08	16.00	16.91	17.82
<1979	15.62	14.58	15.46	15.42
Total	20.38	18.30	19.90	20.08
Number	6,119	1,071	215	7,405

Source: Authors’ calculations using the data from TDHS-2008

Table 23.8 Percentage distribution of women by ethnic group of husband by age groups

Marriage cohorts	Percentage of Turkish women married to:			Percentage of Kurdish women married to:		
	A Turkish husband	A Kurdish husband	A husband of another ethnic group	A Kurdish husband	A Turkish husband	A husband of another ethnic group
2004–2008	98.1	1.5	0.5	90.8	7.8	1.4
1999–2003	96.0	2.8	1.2	90.7	7.1	2.2
1994–1998	98.7	1.2	0.1	96.6	2.8	0.6
1989–1993	96.1	2.7	1.2	95.9	2.0	2.0
1984–1988	97.8	1.5	0.7	93.1	6.4	0.6
1979–1983	97.7	1.7	0.6	93.0	6.5	0.5
<1979	97.4	1.9	0.6	92.9	5.7	1.4
Total (TDHS-2008)	97.4	1.9	0.7	93.4	5.7	0.9
Total (TDHS-2003)	97.8	1.6	0.6	92.4	6.6	1.1
Total (TDHS-1998)	98.5	1.1	0.5	89.1	9.3	1.6
Total (TDHS-1993)	96.8	1.4	1.8	90.2	8.3	1.5

Source: Authors' calculations using the data from TDHS-1993, TDHS-1998, TDHS-2003 and TDHS-2008

the security reasons, namely during 1989–1998 period, from the East to the urban centres of other regions the percentage of Kurdish women married to a Turkish men decreased significantly (Table 23.8).

Fertility and Family Planning

Fertility levels of Turks and Kurds are significantly different. The percentage distribution of the number of children ever born indicates that approximately a half of the Kurdish women have four or more children, whereas the corresponding figure is just 15 % among Turkish women. Moreover, around 70 % of the Turkish women have two or less children. Consistent with these findings, the mean number of children ever born and the mean number of children surviving, under the condition of higher child mortality among Kurdish women, are comparatively higher among Kurdish women compared with Turkish women. The mean number of children ever born at the end of reproductive age groups indicates that a Kurdish woman would have 2.5 more children than a Turkish woman until the end of her reproductive life. Consistent with this finding, Yavuz (2006) found that the probability of having

Table 23.9 Number of children ever born and children surviving by ethnic groups

Variables	Turks	Kurds	Other	Total
Number of children ever born				
0	9.5	7.9	8.3	9.3
1	21.4	12.6	17.6	20.0
2	35.2	15.8	25.0	32.1
3	18.9	14.6	20.8	18.4
4 and +	15.0	49.1	28.3	20.2
Mean number of children ever born	2.20	3.91	2.98	2.47
Mean number of children surviving	2.08	3.58	2.73	2.31
Mean number of children ever born (45–49)	3.14	6.72	4.05	3.51
Mean number of children surviving (45–49)	2.84	6.02	3.50	3.17

Source: Authors' calculations using the data from TDHS-2008

third child is much higher among Kurdish women than that of Turkish women (Table 23.9).

Considering current fertility rates, total period fertility rates, Turkish women will give birth to an average of 1.92 children during their reproductive years. The corresponding figure is 3.25 children for Kurdish women. Kurdish women will have almost 1.5 children more than Turkish

Table 23.10 Age specific fertility rates (ASFR) and total fertility rates^a (TFR) by ethnic groups

Age groups	Turkey			East	
	Turks	Kurds	Total	Turks	Kurds
15–19	0.0325	0.0351	0.0349	0.0319	0.0465
20–24	0.1147	0.1674	0.1255	0.1457	0.1803
25–29	0.1222	0.1793	0.1328	0.1272	0.1928
30–34	0.0793	0.1558	0.0908	0.0975	0.1767
35–39	0.0299	0.0613	0.0358	0.0538	0.0816
40–44	0.0062	0.0391	0.0099	0.0125	0.0481
45–49	0.0001	0.0110	0.0014	0.0028	0.0186
TFR (TDHS-2008)	1.92	3.25	2.16	2.28	3.72
TFR (TDHS-2003)	1.88	4.07	2.23	2.36	4.72
TFR (TDHS-1998)	2.25	4.27	2.61	2.84	4.84
TFR (TDHS-1993)	2.29	4.57	2.74	2.93	5.27

Source: Authors' calculations using the data from TDHS-1993, TDHS-1998, TDHS-2003 and TDHS-2008

^aRates are for 3 years preceding the surveys

women. The current level of fertility among Kurdish women has decreased from 4.6 in 1993 to 3.3 in 2008 without any interruption, while the level of current fertility among Turkish women appears to be stagnant during the 2000s at the level of 1.9 children per woman. For Turkish women, childbearing is concentrated in the age group 20–34, which contributes more than three-fourths of total fertility. For Kurdish women, on the other hand, fertility is characterised by a substantial amount of late childbearing, 40 % of total fertility is accounted by births to women age 30–44. The corresponding figure is only 29 % for Turkish women. The fertility level declines sharply beyond age 30 and childbearing is negligible for Turkish women in their forties. In short, fertility levels, as well as fertility age-patterns of the two ethnic groups are radically different (Table 23.10).

Since a majority of Kurds live in the Eastern parts of Turkey, where fertility is highest, it is useful to compare the fertility levels and patterns of the two ethnic groups by confining the analyses to the East region. Kurdish women will have 3.72 children at the end of their reproductive life span, while the comparable figure is only 2.28 children for Turkish women living in the East. The difference is slightly higher than that calculated for the entire country. The current fertility level of Kurdish women living in the Eastern parts of the country has decreased by approximately two children in the last 15 years, whereas the

corresponding figure is just a half child among Turkish women. In terms of the age pattern of fertility, both groups experience quite different fertility rates in all age groups. Fertility rates of the Turkish women decline rapidly beginning from the age group 25–29, while fertility rates of the Kurdish women decline more gradually thereafter (Table 23.4).

Given the differences in levels and patterns of fertility, it is interesting to see whether the two groups also differ significantly in terms of contraceptive use patterns. In Turkey, 73 % of currently married women were using a contraceptive method in 2008. The majority of these women were modern method users (46 %), but a substantial proportion was using traditional methods (27 %). Considering ethnic groups, Turkish women were more likely to practice contraception than Kurdish women. Overall, around 60 % of the Kurdish women were contraceptive users, while the corresponding figure for Turkish women was 76 %. In terms of contraceptive mix, the two groups were also dissimilar; of Kurdish contracepting women, larger proportions were using traditional methods compared to their Turkish counterparts. During the 15-year period between 1993 and 2008, both groups have experienced a significant increase in contraceptive use. This tendency makes the difference observed in contraceptive usage smaller between two groups in the 15-year period. The main reason behind the narrowing gap in the contraceptive

Table 23.11 Contraceptive use pattern of women by ethnic groups

Contraceptive use	Turks	Kurds	Other	Total
TDHS-1993				
Modern using	36.8	20.1	26.7	34.5
Traditional using	30.2	13.7	24.2	28.0
Currently not using	18.1	14.9	16.4	17.6
Never used	15.0	51.3	32.7	19.8
TDHS-2008				
Modern using	48.4	34.8	33.0	46.0
Traditional using	27.4	25.2	25.9	27.0
Currently not using	17.4	22.7	20.8	18.3
Never used	6.8	17.4	20.3	8.7

Source: Authors' calculations using the data from TDHS-1998 and TDHS-2008

prevalence rates of two groups is the transition of never contracepting Kurdish women to the current user status in the last 15-year period. The percentage of never contracepting Kurdish women has declined from 51 % in 1993 to 17 % in 2008 (Table 23.11).

Contraceptive prevalence for Turkish women appears to be similar in all regions, including the Eastern region where overall contraceptive prevalence rate is low, whereas regional differentials exist for Kurdish women. In all regions, Kurdish women are less likely to use contraceptive methods, and be inclined more towards modern methods. This latter finding may at least be partly explained by the extensive family planning programs carried out by the central government, which mainly aim to increase modern contraceptive use. Differences in contraceptive prevalence rates between the two ethnic groups increase as one moves from more developed (West, South, and Central) to less developed regions (North, and East). In the East, only 5 in 10 Kurdish women use any kind of contraception, while 7 in 10 Turkish women are contraceptive users.

Mother and Child Health

Ethnic groups also vary in terms of infant mortality and access and use of health services. Survival chances of Turkish and Kurdish children differ significantly. When the national average is considered, differences are apparent between the two

Table 23.12 Infant and under-5 mortality rates^a by ethnic groups

Surveys/ethnic groups	Infant	Under-5
TDHS-2008		
Total ^b	17	24
Turks	14	19
Kurds	27	38
East		
Total ^b	25	34
Turks	20	21
Kurds	26	37
TDHS-1993		
Total ^b	53	61
Turks	46	54
Kurds	69	78
East		
Total ^b	60	70
Turks	50	61
Kurds	74	84

Source: Authors' calculations using the data from TDHS-1993 and TDHS-2008

^aRates are for 5 years preceding the surveys

^bTotal rows include mortality rates of children of mothers of other ethnic groups

groups especially in terms of infant and under-5 mortality rates in two surveys under examined here. TDHS-2008 puts forward that during the infancy period, the survival chances of Kurdish children are significantly lower than that of Turkish children. As a consequence, the infant mortality rate among Kurdish children is 93 % higher than Turkish children, and 59 % higher than the national average. Almost the same differentials between two groups are also valid for the under-5 mortality rates (Table 23.12). Analyses have also shown that differences persist between the two ethnic groups even when calculations are confined to the Eastern region. When the changes in the early age mortality rate between Turks and Kurds in the 10-year period is examined, a much more rapid decrease is observed among Turkish population as opposed to Kurdish population. This widens the disparity between Turks and Kurds in terms of the level of childhood mortality.

The results on childhood mortality are hardly surprising, when selected reproductive health indicators are examined by ethnic group. For the national average, for 96 % of Turkish children

born during the 5 years preceding the TDHS-2008, antenatal care was received from health professionals, while the corresponding figure for Kurdish children drops to 81 %. Turkish women appear to have their births at medical institutions (97 %), and be assisted at delivery by a health professional (98 %) more than Kurdish women do (71 and 74 % respectively). When all three indicators are considered in a collective variable, the proportion of Turkish children whose mothers received antenatal care from a health professional, were born in a medical institution and were assisted by a health professional is 92 %, while the corresponding figure for Kurdish children is as low as 43 %. It is striking to note that the percentage of women using such services has increased by three times among Kurdish (from 14 to 43 %) women while it has just increased only 41 % among Turkish women (from 65 to 92 %) in the period of 1993–2008 (Table 23.13). Confining analyses to the Eastern region makes little difference on the magnitude of differentials, although general levels of antenatal care, delivery care and

delivery assistance are lower in the Eastern region than the national average.

There exist marked differences in postnatal care by ethnic groups. The percentages of postnatal care for mothers and babies among Turkish population are over 90 % while they are around 70 % for Kurdish population. There are also substantial differentials in full vaccination rates by ethnic groups. Overall 62 % of Kurdish children are fully vaccinated that is much lower than the proportion for Turkish children (86 %). In Turkey, only 3 % of under-5 children are underweight. The proportion of underweight children among Turkish population appears to be negligible (less than 2 %), while it is three times higher (6 %) among Kurdish population (Table 23.13).

Figure 23.4 provides information on both child and adult mortality patterns on the basis of ethnic groups in Turkey. The probability of death values (${}_nq_x$) are derived from the infant mortality rates of Turkish and Kurdish populations based on the West Model Life Tables. Both of the ethnic groups have “J shape” mortality patterns implying that both of the populations are on the way of mortality transition from traditional pattern of mortality to the modern pattern of mortality. Not only in the childhood period the Kurdish population has much higher mortality risks than those for Turkish population in all age groups without any exception. The gap in the probability of deaths widens between two groups especially after age 30. The implied values of the life expectancy at birth calculated from the probability of deaths of both groups are 77 and 69 years for Turkish and Kurdish components of Turkey’s population respectively.

Table 23.13 Mother and child health indicators by ethnic groups

Variables	Turks	Kurds	Other	Total
Antenatal care by a health staff (%)	95.6	70.7	85.6	92.2
Place of delivery in a health facility (%)	97.8	70.7	79.3	90.3
Assistance during delivery by a health staff (%)	98.0	74.0	81.3	91.3
All of above (%)	91.6	42.5	55.2	76.0
Postnatal care of mother (%)	90.2	66.2	78.5	84.6
Postnatal care of baby (%)	94.1	72.3	77.7	88.9
Full vaccination rate ^a (%)	86.0	62.4	78.8	80.5
Underweight children ^b (%)	1.9	6.3	4.0	2.8

Source: Authors’ calculations using the data from TDHS-2008


^aA child at the age of 15–26 months is accepted as fully vaccinated if she has received BCG, measles, and three doses of DBT and polio

^bThe weight-for-age index takes into account both acute and chronic malnutrition and often is used to monitor nutritional status on a longitudinal basis. It is a useful tool in clinical settings for continuous assessment of nutritional progress and growth. Children whose weight-for-age is below minus two standard deviations from the median of the reference population are classified as “underweight”

Migration

Turkey has been affected by diverse forms of migratory movements throughout its history. Starting from 1950s, Turkey has experienced a massive wave of internal migration from the rural areas to major cities, especially to Istanbul. With the mechanization in the rural areas, the need for manpower in the modern sectors forced the people to move to the major cities. Analysis of the data

Fig. 23.4 Probability of death by ethnic groups (Source: Authors' calculations using the ${}_1q_0$ values from the TDHS-2008)



from the “Survey on Migration and Internally Displaced Persons in Turkey, 2005” (TGYONA-2005) also confirms that Turkey is a migration country, approximately two-thirds of the population over age 17 years has migrated at least once in their lifetime. Mean number of migrations per person is around 1.2 times. The ethnic groups also vary with respect to their propensity for migration within Turkey. A higher proportion of the Kurds (72 %) takes part in the waves of internal migration as opposed to that of Turkish population (61 %). The lower proportions of urban and rural immobile population among Kurds also support the argument that Kurds are much more mobile than that of Turkish population. The main direction of the Turkish population is the migration from urban to urban while it is rural to urban migration for the Kurdish population.

The data on the period of migration clearly shows that Kurds and other ethnic groups entered into the internal migration process later than Turks. The most frequently declared reason for migration among Turkish population is the individual-related reasons while it is the family-related reasons among Kurdish population. Approximately 12 % of the Kurdish population stated that the reason behind their migration is the security-related reasons (Table 23.14). The conflict-induced migration experienced by Kurdish population especially in the period of 1984–1999 from Eastern parts of Turkey to urban

Table 23.14 The status, direction, period and reason for migration by ethnic groups

Variables	Turks	Kurds	Other	Turkey
Ever migrated	61.1	71.7	82.7	63.3
Mean number of migration	1.1	1.4	1.3	1.2
Direction of migration				
Urban-Urban	30.4	21.2	47.3	29.3
Rural-urban	22.7	34.3	33.1	24.9
Urban-rural	3.4	5.5	0.6	3.7
Rural-Rural	3.6	10.5	0.6	4.7
Urban immobile	24.7	11.2	13.6	22.2
Rural immobile	15.2	17.2	4.7	15.3
Period of migration				
2001–2005	22.8	16.2	41.2	22.2
1996–2000	16.8	17.8	10.8	16.8
1991–1995	12.5	21.1	15.5	14.2
1986–1990	12.3	17.2	10.1	13.1
1981–1985	9.3	7.9	8.1	9.0
Before 1980	26.2	19.9	14.2	24.7
Primary reason of migration				
Economic related	17.2	18.3	27.0	17.7
Individual related	42.9	29.5	19.6	39.7
Family related	36.5	32.3	41.9	35.9
Security related	0.1	12.1	6.8	2.5
Other	3.2	7.8	4.7	4.1

Source: Authors' calculations using the data from TGYONA-2005

centres of the country is the migration originated from the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military/security forces.




Fig. 23.5 Timing of life course events in Turkey by ethnic groups (Source: Authors’ calculations using the data from TDHS-2008)

Timing of Life Course Events

Examination of the experiences of different ethnic groups on sequential life course events (graduation/drop out, marriage, fertility, menopause and death) provide a holistic picture about demographic behaviours of ethnic groups. The results obtained from Kaplan-Maier Survival Analysis indicate that, on average, a woman in Turkey drops out/graduates the school at age 12.8, marries at age 19.5, becomes mother at 20.7, has second, third and fourth child at age 25, 31.6 and 33.9 respectively, stops menstruation at age 48.3, and dies at age 74.3. The sequence of events implies that an average woman in Turkey spends 38 % of her life under exposure of fertility. In terms of timing of life course events, substantial differentiation has been observed by ethnic groups. An average Kurdish woman exits school life, and enters into the childbearing much earlier than an average Turkish woman, and then reaches up to four children within 9 years. The corresponding duration for an average Turkish woman is approximately 24 years. There is no marked difference between two groups in the age of

menopause, the reproductive period ends around age 48 for both groups. However, with the effect of high mortality rates in all age groups, an average Kurdish woman dies 8 years earlier than an average Turkish woman. The timing of life course events of an average woman from other ethnic groups appears to be in line with the overall average (Fig. 23.5).

Conclusion

Modernization is expected to eliminate differentiation among sub-population groups over time. Despite starting from last periods of the Ottoman Empire, modernization process has no chances spreading to the whole country and sub-population groups because of its inherent weaknesses. Consequently, homogenization of social behaviour and demographic convergence, which are expected to arise as a result of the modernization process, has not been sufficient. Considering social and demographic characteristics, regional, residential and ethnic disparities are still valid in Turkey.

The analyses of the data from demographic surveys shed light on a number of issues regarding ethnicity in Turkey from a demographic perspective. It is clearly observed from the findings that information on ethnic background has to be an indispensable piece of information for any researcher of Turkish demography, since the largest two groups, the Turks and Kurds, appear to be radically different in terms of age structure, life chances, fertility, childhood mortality, contraception, reproductive health, marriage, and migration among others. Any analyses, therefore, and especially multivariate analyses, have to include information on ethnic background.

Although both of the groups are having experienced a fertility decline, profound differences exist between the Turkish and Kurdish groups; the latter's fertility levels are reminiscent of the fertility level of Turkey in as far back as the early 1980s. Regarding childhood mortality, rates for Kurdish children equal those that the country experienced in the early 1990s. Similar differences between the Turks and the Kurds also exist in regard to age structure, contraception, childhood mortality, reproductive health, marriage, childbearing, and migration. These results show that the Turks and Kurds are indeed actors of different demographic regimes in Turkey. Not only are these two groups different in many respects, but also tend not to converge through inter-marriage. Both groups prefer endogamy to a large extent.

The ethnic groups also vary with respect to socioeconomic opportunities and life chances, specifically educational attainment, employment, health insurance, hygienic conditions, and poverty in Turkey. The Kurdish population has certain difficulties to access the human capital resources that are crucial for socioeconomic achievements, and lacks the minimal economic resources required to sustain their livelihoods.

In terms of the distribution of the ethnic groups, Turks comprise a large majority of the population of Turkey. Kurds compose some 17.2 % of the total population. This figure implies a total Kurdish population of around 12.3 million, an intermediate figure when compared with

overestimated and underestimated figures produced by politically oriented analysts. Turks exist at significant proportions in all parts of the country, while the Kurds dominate the Eastern provinces. A popular claim that as many Kurds live in Western Turkey as the East appears not to be accurate. Indeed, Kurds constitute significant proportions of the populations of all regions with the exception of the North, but a large majority of them are still in the Eastern provinces.

The analysis of birth history data of the TDHS-2008 indicates that approximately one-fourth of the births that occurred in the 20-year period preceding the survey are from Kurdish mothers. This simulation clearly implies that 10 years later from today the Kurdish component of Turkey will be one-fourth of the total population. The future ethnic composition of Turkey may be explained demographically by higher fertility rates as well as declining mortality rates of Kurdish population.

Given the absence of quantitative information on ethnic groups in Turkey, the results of the TDHS-2008 suggest a number of new analyses to be carried out to further examine the ethnic composition of the population of Turkey, and to describe the demographic behaviour patterns of different ethnic groups. Our study is one of the first attempts at describing various aspects of ethnic groups in Turkey for a long time, and should be followed by numerous further studies. It would be interesting to find out, for instance, about the possible cultural/political/economic barriers preventing the Kurdish population from displaying demographic behaviour patterns like the other ethnic groups, or the national average. To further explore the integration level of two groups through inter-marriage, new studies appear to be needed on increasing trend of mix marriage by cohort via qualitative research techniques. Another further investigation area via qualitative research techniques seems to be the reasons behind high fertility regime among Kurdish population and its relationships with the gender relations, and the current conflict between the Kurds and Turks in Turkey.

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Steve Garner and Chris Gilligan

Introduction: Contested Terms and Frameworks

The recent demography of Ireland has been dominated by contrasts, both with the rest of the world and within itself. Ireland became highly exceptional among the populations of Europe by the mid-nineteenth century and has remained so almost up to the end of the twentieth. Ireland's remarkable example – North and South – has challenged any attempt to establish general rules for the demographic behaviour of modern industrial societies (Coleman 1999, p. 69).

Ireland is alone in Europe, and possibly in the world, in having a twenty-first century population (5.8 million) which is lower than its nineteenth-century level (over eight million). This is primarily because of a catastrophic Famine (*An Gorta Mór* in Gaelic) during which over three million people died. This also generated huge levels of emigration, both to Britain and the Americas in the mid-nineteenth century.

This is not to say that prior levels of emigration were low: indeed ongoing and sporadic peaks of emigration accompanied Ireland's extremely uneven economic development or underdevelopment, depending which perspective one takes. Ireland is an interesting, and challenging, case-study to include in a collection on ethnic demography because it does not fit easily with many of the assumptions dominating the study of demography in the post-WW2 period (Caldwell 1976; Courtney 1995; Coleman 1999). Coleman, for example, notes that as recently as 1970, 'Irish fertility, whether measured by the total period fertility rate (TFR) or by the completed fertility of cohorts of women ... was by far the highest of any Western developed country' (Coleman 1999, p. 69). One way we could interpret these exceptionally high fertility rates in Ireland is to suggest that Ireland is an outlier, and that the models of demographic transition which have guided theories of modernity in the study of demography are basically sound. Another way we could interpret the figures is to suggest that the Irish case refutes the dominant models of demographic transition.

When we add the concept of ethnicity into the mix, the Irish case immediately becomes more complex. Until recent immigration to Ireland, the literature on ethnicity in Ireland was dominated by the distinction between the 'native Catholic Irish' and the 'English and Scottish Protestant settlers, and their descendants'. This shorthand has come to represent not only a religious but a

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political distinction. Since partition in 1920, the former have been the majority in the South, the minority in the North, and in the principal supporters of Irish independence from Britain. The latter are the majority in the North, a minority in the South, and the principal supporters of the Union (with Britain). Identities on the island of Ireland tend to coalesce around the ‘national question’, i.e. Irish independence. However, we urge caution in understanding these categories as fixed, stable and self-explanatory.

In a speech delivered to the National Literary Society of Dublin in 1892, Irish nationalist leader Douglas Hyde spoke of:

“The Necessity for de-Anglicizing the Irish Nation”... not as a protest against imitating what is best in the English people... but rather to show the folly of neglecting what is Irish... this failure of the Irish people in recent times has been largely brought about by the race diverging during this century from the right path, and ceasing to be Irish without becoming English (cited in Kohn 1965, p. 147).

At first sight, this seems to be a standard Irish nationalist speech in favour of ethnic (or racial) cultural fidelity. Hyde was a fluent speaker of Irish, the native tongue of Ireland. He made his speech in the context of fears about the Irish language, and Irish culture more broadly, being eroded by the influence of the English language and English influence more broadly. He was a founder of *Conradh na Gaeilge* (the Gaelic League), was a leading figure in the Irish Literary Revival and went on to become the first President of the Irish Free State (1938–1945). Hyde, however, was not a ‘native’ Irish Catholic: he was the son of a Protestant minister and remained a Protestant throughout his life. He was of Anglo-Irish (or ‘Old English’, or ‘West Briton’) stock. Boyce (1995) notes the key role that the Anglo-Irish played in the revival of the Irish language and Irish folklore (William Butler Yeats, for example, is another Protestant Anglo-Irish figure active in the Irish literary revival). He goes on to suggest that the Anglo-Irish played this role, in part at least, in order to provide a rationale for their place in Irish society. Pritchard (2004) notes that the politicisation of the Irish language,

however, promoted an anti-Unionist ideology (i.e. against the Union with Great Britain, and in favour of Irish political independence) and led to Hyde resigning as president of *Conradh na Gaeilge* in 1915. This move, she suggests, ‘was an important milestone in undermining the Irish language as a badge of identity common to both traditions in the country’ (Pritchard 2004, p. 46). The questions of identifying ‘who are the Irish?’, and ‘what does it mean to be Irish?’ have been core preoccupations of Irish nationalists such as Hyde. However, Hyde’s case draws our attention to the fact that the answers given to these questions have varied and are essentially contested (Gilligan 2002). Many Unionists in Northern Ireland continue to identify with all-Ireland cultural institutions, such as the Ireland rugby team, while supporting the political partition of the country (Greer 1997). The study of ethnic demography relies on the use of stable ethnic categories. In practice, however, the content and meaning of these categories can be variable, contextual and disputed, rather than fixed and stable.

Moreover, the story of Ireland’s ethnic demography is impossible to understand if the island is viewed as two distinct political entities. The most immediate problem that we encounter when we examine the ethnic demography of Ireland is the question ‘which Ireland are we talking about?’ Is it the island of Ireland, which currently includes two different political jurisdictions; the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland? Or is it the Republic of Ireland, which is internationally recognised as the Irish state? Since the partition of Ireland in 1920, the two parts of Ireland have had their own distinct trajectories and histories. For this reason there is a good case for treating them separately, and many academic studies which claim to be studies of ‘Ireland’ are actually studies of the Republic of Ireland (e.g. Tovey and Share 2003). There are also, however, good reasons for treating both parts of the island of Ireland together. An obvious rationale for doing so is that, until partition, they were not separate entities. Since partition, however, ethnic demography has arguably been even more salient, casting a long shadow across the border between both parts of the island of Ireland throughout the twentieth century.

Jackson's (1971) characterisation of the Northern Ireland problem as being one of a 'double minority' provides one example of an articulation of ethnic demographic thinking. The 'double minority' refers to the position of Catholics as a minority within Northern Ireland, but a majority on the island of Ireland, and the position of Protestants as a majority in Northern Ireland, but a minority on the island of Ireland. This demographic fact was commonly alluded to in the, largely rhetorical, anti-partitionist politics which played a key ideological role in the Southern state (Bowman 1982). Fears that Catholics in Northern Ireland were a fifth column for Irish Nationalist aspirations to a united Ireland were fundamental to the political ideology and organization of that part of the island (Farrell 1983).

Data

Demographic analysis is limited by the reliability of the available data. The nineteenth century data on civil registrations of births, marriages and deaths in Ireland is incomplete. The first completed Census of population on the island dates from 1821, 'but the census in Ireland was not considered to be reliable until that of 1841, the first to be based on household canvass' (Coleman 1999, p. 72). The inclusion of a voluntary question on religious affiliation in Irish Censuses – North and South – since 1861, has facilitated analysis of ethnic demography. Despite a century and a half of census taking in Ireland, however, there are serious limitations to using these data for extensive comparative historical and cross-national (including all-Ireland) analysis. Partition, for example, disrupted Census taking in Ireland; there was no Census in 1921, and since then the Northern and Southern censuses have been held a year apart from each other. Political campaigns of non-cooperation and violent intimidation produced an under-representation of Catholics in the Northern Ireland Census in 1971 and 1981. Other sources of demographic data are also incomplete. 'Until 1922', writes Coleman (1999, p. 73), 'migration to Britain and between Southern and Northern Ireland was "internal"

migration and was not directly counted'. Since then, the Common Travel Area agreement between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom has permitted unchecked movement between the two countries. There is data on which demographic analysis can be based, but often demographers have to draw it from a range of different sources – such as Labour Force Survey and/or Social Security statistics – and fill in some of the gaps with statistical guesswork.

Frameworks

Demographic analysis is also shaped by the conceptual framework employed to explore the data. Coleman (1999) suggests that the Irish case has challenged any attempt to establish general rules for the demographic behaviour of modern industrial societies. This assumes that there is a standardized entity called 'modern industrial society'. Does such an entity exist? Ireland, like the Catholic countries of Southern Europe shares a history of significant outward migration. Unlike these countries, however, Ireland has been economically, politically and culturally dominated by the first major modern industrial society in the world; Britain. In this sense Ireland has more in common with the 'Old Commonwealth'; Australia, Canada and New Zealand. These countries, however, are immigrant nations, while Ireland's history, has until very recently, been one of emigration. Another way that social scientists have approached the Irish case is to argue that one, or both parts of Ireland, North and South, are better thought of as post-colonial societies, rather than modern industrial ones. There has been significant ongoing debate about whether Ireland, and particularly the Southern part of the island, is best characterized as a modern industrial society or a 'Third World' country (CONGOOD 1991; Goldthorpe and Whelan 1992; Shirlow 1995). In the context of Ireland, the 'national question', or the 'Irish question', has provided the dominant conceptual framework which has utilized ethnicity as an analytical category (Gilligan 2007b; Boyce 1995; McGarry and O'Leary 1995), and constructed the Protestant/Catholic dichotomy.

Since the mid-1990s, the migration ‘turnaround’ in the Republic of Ireland has led to an increasing interest in the demographics of immigration and ethnicity (Garner 2004; Fanning 2007; Lele 2008). In Northern Ireland, the demography of the sectarian division, between Catholics and Protestants, remains a topic of academic and policy interest (Anderson and Shuttleworth 1998). In the early years of the twenty-first century, this has been joined by an interest in immigration and ethnicity.

Our reading of ethnic demography on the island of Ireland, is that it is intrinsically linked to nation-building, which means three overlapping forms of this process: Irish nationalism; Unionism (pro-British nationalism by the Northern Ireland majority Protestant population); and British nationalism (of the British State claiming territory and the right to govern).

The structure of this chapter will take the following form. In section one, we will suggest a brief historical background up to the partition of Ireland into two political entities in 1921. The object of this will not be to provide a detailed account, but to set out some bases for understanding ethnic demography on the island after 1921. This necessitates a long-term view of how the religious categories ‘Protestant’ and ‘Catholic’ have become politicised, and how the national question has assumed significance.

Section two aims to provide an overview of emigration in terms of approximate figures and timings, and points to the massive impact of the Famine since the middle of the nineteenth century. We then look at each of the two political components of the island of Ireland; Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

Section three addresses Northern Ireland, from its inception in 1921 to the present through three key periods; the 1920s (state formation); the 1960s and 1970s (the birth of the ‘Troubles’); and the 1990s (peace process), and the inward migration of the twenty-first century. The themes addressed are segregation, gerrymandering, discrimination, fertility rates/mortality rates, and emigration/immigration.

The section on the Republic of Ireland will be split into three parts: the first will focus on the

ethnic distinctions between the dominant Catholic majority and its minorities; Protestants, Travellers, Jews, and the ongoing role of emigration in the nation’s demography. The second identifies the period 1996–2008 as crucial to the modern dynamics of ethnic demography, as it is then that the Republic becomes a nation of net immigration. The third part, traces the phenomenon up to 2010, using a case study of the State’s attempts to use ethnic demography to redefine formal Irishness in the 2004 referendum on citizenship.

In the concluding section, we put forward a framework for an alternative interpretation of Irish ethnic demography that acknowledges its complexity, beyond a bipolar and essentialising Catholic-Protestant dichotomy, and stressing the importance of nationalisms on the island.

Section One: Historical Overview of Ethnic Demography up to Partition (1921)

Up to the Plantations

There is much debate on the ethnic origins of the Irish. Although the dominant narrative places the Celts as the key ancestors, there are other dissenting voices that indicate alternative sources; Scotland and the Iberian peninsula being foremost in them (Boyce 1995). The Celts certainly provide the principal demographic background, and their numerical dominance continued through the Viking invasions (c. 800–1000 AD); to the 1167 invasion of the Norman, Welsh and Flemish forces led by exiled King Diarmuid; this triggered Henry II’s invasion, and the subsequent settlement of Englishmen. The Normans however remained a strong political force in Ireland until the latter half of the thirteenth century. At that point the English became the dominant force. However, in 1348 the Black Death disproportionately hit the English, who were particularly concentrated in urban settlements and garrisons. After this, real English power shrank to a zone of English and Anglo-Catholic influence called ‘The Pale’ (*An Pháil*), around the city of *Baile*

átha Cliath (Dublin). This area took its name from the Latin term ‘palus’ meaning stake: stakes and ditches marked the boundary of the Pale, which extended beyond the current boundaries of Co. Dublin. After centuries of fluidity, this marks the first ethnic division of territory. English law reigned in The Pale, while Gaelic (or Brehon) Law held sway elsewhere. This situation was formalised in the 1366 Statutes of Kilkenny (a city within the Pale), which prohibited, *inter alia*, inter-marriage between English settlers and Irish natives; the use of the Irish language by settlers; and the adoption of other Irish cultural forms (dress, etc.). The aim then was to establish a section of Irish territory in which performing Irishness was outlawed. It seems clear however, that beyond the political and military elite, many ordinary people continued to pursue the cultural norms that involved using the Irish language and customs, and that this was increasingly the case.

The Reformation and Plantation

The Reformation had significant ramifications for Ireland. When the English Crown broke with Rome, Protestantism became the official religion of England and Ireland. While there had been a very clear discrepancy in Ireland between Gaelic and English forms of Catholicism, both groups had nominally been Catholics. However, from the mid-sixteenth century onwards, the English nobility and military would be primarily if not exclusively comprised of Protestants. In the period from the 1530s to the end of the seventeenth century, religious affiliation became the basis not only of resource distribution, but of social and political dominance in Ireland.

The first pilot ‘Plantation’ (i.e. mass settlement) schemes were in Counties Offaly and Laois in the Midlands, under Queen Mary in 1556. These efforts were followed up by more extensive settlement of the South-West (under Elizabeth I) in the 1580s; the North-East, and a strip running North–south through the Midlands (see Fig. 24.1) (under James I) from 1609 onwards. The objectives were to pacify Ireland, reduce the possibility of revolt, and make the country a more stable source

of revenue. The form that Plantation took shifted from ‘exemplary’ to punitive in this 50-year period. A colony set up in Co. Cork under Elizabeth I was designed to demonstrate the superiority of English farming and implicitly, Protestant working practices. However, the principal context of Plantation elsewhere was punitive: i.e. the confiscation of land as a punishment for disloyalty to the Crown (in the 1560s and 1570s) in Offaly and Laois, and a privately-organised Plantation in East Ulster. The 1580s witnessed the first ‘mass’ plantation, in Munster (South-West): where confiscated land was sold off to ‘undertakers’ who guaranteed to people the land with tenants. Although a target of 15,000 settlers was established, only a few thousand ended up on the approximately 2,000 km² of land, split into parcels. During a rebellion at the end of the sixteenth century, the settlers were easily chased off their lands, and it was only in the first decade of the seventeenth century that the land was reclaimed and settled again.

Here, the English State assumes the role of organising the process of Plantation, and aiming to alter the demographic and social balance of the country. This marked an important phase of colonisation. Previously, both colonisers and colonised had been Catholics, differing in forms of religious observance, language and culture. The shift of power to Protestantism in England, and Elizabeth I’s ascendancy meant that this was no longer the case. The beginnings of modern Ireland’s religiously polarised society are to be found here. However, it should also be underscored that relations to land were not entirely determined by religious affiliation. Some Catholics still held land, even if the vast majority were landless.

The Plantation of Ulster

The Plantation of Ulster took place after the Nine Years’ War (1594–1603). The ascendance of James I to the Crown also altered the picture. He was King of both England and Scotland, and the settlement of Ulster was sold to him as a joint ‘British’ venture between the English and the Scots.




Fig. 24.1 The English plantation of Ireland in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Encyclopædia Britannica)

The latter stages of the Nine Years' War had been marked by the policy of forced famine, where the English commanders burned crops and attempted to reduce the amount of food available in order to weaken and destroy the local population's capacity to feed the rebel armies. Ulster had traditionally been the province in which English rule was weakest. William Lecky's (1892) *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century* paints a very stark and grim picture of the tactics used and the underlying ideas that dehumanised the Irish in the eyes of the settlers, making the scorched earth policy justifiable to them.

The Plantation of Ulster had been designed not to replicate the problems raised by the Plantation of Munster (see above). Instead of disparate and indefensible strips of isolated land, entire areas were to be cleared of tenants and owners, and replaced by Scots and English settlers around towns and garrisons. Land had to be settled by English-speaking Protestants and it was illegal to sell it on to Catholics. This was an effort to make land confiscation and its ensuing re-settlement sustainable in a context where, overall, Protestants would be a minority vulnerable to rebellion. Former soldiers who had fought in Ireland then petitioned the Crown for a share of the land, and they were allowed to purchase land, with City of London financial backing, in and around Derry (hence the city's official name 'Londonderry'). Moreover, there was also an unofficial private plantation, of Antrim and Down (in the North East), which had been under way since 1603.

Although these plantations were by some measures successful, according to the aims of their architects (with larger numbers of people settled), in other ways they still did not run to plan. Settlers on poorer (wooded and marshy) ground left, and headed for the more fertile land, meaning that they had to rent out their original land to Irish-speaking Catholics, despite the official ban on doing so. Moreover, the displacement of Irish Catholics from the land seems to have been relatively piecemeal and not fully enforced: many remained not as landowners but as landless labourers. The plan aimed at *complete* ethno-religious separation thus ended in a far more

blurred division of population. However, it is clear that the Protestants of Ulster emerged as by far the privileged group, owning land and the resources stemming from such dominance. We should also note the beginnings of a pertinent distinction *within* that group between Anglicans and Presbyterians (the latter not exclusively, but primarily Scots). As the Church of England became the largest landowner in Ulster, taking over the Catholic churches' confiscated land and buildings, the Presbyterians came to see themselves as the marginalised Protestant group. Later in the seventeenth century, Presbyterians were disproportionately represented in the numbers of settlers who moved on to the new American colonies.

The Rebellions and the Cromwellian Settlement

So in the period after 1607, the most relevant ethnic distinctions emerged as no longer necessarily between 'Gaelic Irish' and 'Old English' (all Catholics), but between Catholic and Protestant. The cultural gap between the first two was closing through shared language, patronage of the arts and common religious affiliation as Catholics. Yet the Protestant settlers' continuing attempts to confiscate land from the Catholic gentry, and after 1630 a more vigorous attempt managed by Charles I's adviser Thomas Wentworth, led to a build-up of resentment. Indeed, the group that Nicholas Canny (1976) refers to as 'New English' were by now dominant. They represented a more Puritan form of Protestantism, were interested in the rapid acquisition of land and wealth, and were much less sympathetic to Gaelic culture and people than the 'Old English'. Indeed, Canny notes that the late 1500s witnessed a range of ill treatment of civilians by the authorities involving harsher punishments and even massacres.

The uprisings of 1641–1642, which began in Ulster, saw Gaelic Irish attempts to overthrow the new colonisation settlement imposed over the previous 80 years. The rebellions in Ireland, then Scotland, and Civil War in England created crisis conditions across Britain and Ireland.

When Cromwell's army had finished subduing Royalist revolt in England and Scotland, it headed for Ireland to restore Protestant order: doing so with more scorched earth policies in the 1649–1653 period. In the aftermath of the Cromwellian campaign, thousands of Irish people were executed, banished, or sold to the new Caribbean colonies (that is 'barbadoesed') (Kenyon and Ohlmeyer 1998, p. 134) or the new American colonies. The conditions imposed by Cromwell were designed to punish insurrection and pay for the loans raised to conduct the military campaign. The latter involved writing off debts incurred against confiscated land, thereby transferring ownership from the remaining Catholic landowners to New English Protestants based in England. It is calculated that roughly 20 % of the land was owned by Catholics before the Cromwellian War, but that the figure fell to 8 % as a result of this settlement. Moreover its impact on the geographic patterns of Irish demography was significant. Catholics could henceforth only own land West of the River Shannon, i.e. in the province of Connaught, hence Cromwell's apocryphal ultimatum to Catholic resisters: 'To hell or Connaught'. It was the late eighteenth century before Irish Catholics could legally buy land East of the Shannon again.

Between 1691 and 1759 a range of laws were enacted to secure the dominance of the English Crown in Ireland (the 1707 Act of Union with Scotland established the Kingdom of Great Britain, Wales having been incorporated within the English Crown in the mid-sixteenth century). These laws restricted the religious, political and economic activities of Catholics and Dissenters (Presbyterians and other non-established Protestant denominations). These were labelled the 'Penal Laws'.¹

This historical introduction has demonstrated that the contemporary Catholic-Protestant distinction that forms the political focus of studies of ethnicity in Ireland should be understood as the *outcome* of an historical process of colonisation and rebellion. There were internal distinctions between colonists (by religion and nationality), as well as between Protestants (by nationality and form of worship). However, the political map

of Ireland by the end of the eighteenth century showed power and land-ownership in the hands of the Protestant minority, with the poorest areas being the Western segment of the island. In the following section we shall introduce the role of nationalism into this picture in order to establish the particular Irish context.

Eighteenth-Century Nationalism and the Role of Ethnicity

Ethnicity is a social construct (Fenton 2010; Brubaker 2004). What counts as an 'ethnic' distinction is shaped by social forces. The cultural distinction between the Irish (Gaelic)-speaking rural population of Ireland, and the urban English-speaking population, for example, has never been a socially salient *ethnic* distinction. Rather, until inward migration to Ireland in the twenty-first century, the two main pertinent factors utilised as markers of ethnic distinction were religion and nationalism. The relationship between nationalism and ethnicity in Ireland has been complex. Some strands of nationalist ideology have sought to overcome ethnic distinctions, while other strands have promoted ethnic distinctions between people on the island of Ireland. Nationalism, as an ideology and a discourse, dates from the latter half of the eighteenth century (Hobsbawm 1992). The United Irishmen, an organisation inspired by Enlightenment ideas of equality, liberty and fraternity, fought for the principle of the equality of peoples of all religions – Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter. The leaders were also republicans, democrats and nationalists: they opposed the idea of the Crown as the head of state and they sought an independent Irish parliament. Most of the leading figures were urban-based Presbyterian merchants and professionals, but the mass base was in the rural Catholic peasantry.

Inspired by the French Revolution, the United Irishmen organised a rebellion against British rule in 1798. They were defeated by British forces, but the rebellion led to a significant reorganisation of British rule in Ireland. The 1801 Act of Union, which incorporated Ireland into the

United Kingdom, was one response. The other was the gradual removal of the Penal Laws restricting the religious, political and economic activities of Catholics and Dissenters. The suppression of the rebellion broke up the nationalist movement. The dismantling of the Penal Laws removed one of the main sources of grievance of Dissenting Protestants. This had significant consequences for ethnic demography in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Subsequent Irish nationalist movements contained both universalist, anti-sectarian strands and particularist ethnic strands. Protestants, however, were always a minority presence in Irish nationalism. After the Act of Union, the majority of Protestants in Ireland supported British nation-building efforts.

From the middle of the nineteenth century the 'Irish Question' was a recurring issue in British politics (Boyce 1988). The British establishment was divided over how to deal with Ireland. The issue eventually led to a split in the Liberal Party on the issue of whether to grant Home Rule (a form of devolved government similar to the present day Scottish parliament) to Ireland. Initially, the Unionist opposition to Home Rule viewed Ireland as a unified political entity. When it seemed that Home Rule was inevitable, Ulster Unionism emerged as a political force. The majority of Protestants in Ireland favoured the Union with Britain. Yet they only constituted a majority of the population in the North-East corner of the island (Loughlin 1995), whereas the Catholic majority on the island of Ireland felt that they were disadvantaged by British rule, and they tended to support some form of Irish independence (Boyce 1995). Unionist opposition, including the opposition of leading establishment figures such as Winston Churchill, was to lead to the partition of Ireland after it gained independence in 1921. The particular boundaries along which Ireland was partitioned was a source of considerable debate. In the end the British Government conceded to lobbying by the Ulster Unionist Council, and settled on a six county entity, rather than the nine counties of historic Ulster, which the British Government's Irish Committee had previously advocated. The rationale behind six counties was that it would guarantee a permanent

Unionist majority, whereas in nine counties Protestants constituted only a slender majority, and thus a tenuous Unionist majority (Boyce 1988, pp. 61–67; Mansergh 1965, pp. 206–217).

From this historical overview we can see that ethnic demography in Ireland was profoundly shaped by the colonisation of Ireland by England, and the consolidation of the domination of Ireland as England expanded to become Britain. Initially the distinction was between coloniser and colonised. After the Reformation this distinction became overlaid with a religious distinction between Catholic and Protestant. During the nineteenth century the colonial and religious distinction became overlaid with a political distinction between Irish Nationalism and British, later Ulster, Unionism. In 1921 Ireland was partitioned into the Irish Free State, in which Protestants constituted a small minority of the population, and Northern Ireland, in which Catholics constituted a significant minority of the population. This division of the island was, to a considerable extent, motivated by considerations of ethnic demography. Demographic consciousness, however, was never the sole determinant. There were other factors, some of which cut across or challenged ethnic demographic consciousness. Since the emergence of nationalism as a major ideology which structured political relations on the island, for example, there has been a tension between civic universalist tendencies and ethnic particularist ones. These tensions, as we shall go on to see in later sections, continue to have relevance to the issue of ethnic demography today.

Section Two: Emigration

There have been high and sustained levels of permanent and temporary emigration from Ireland from the 1600s. Patterns of seasonal labour migration between Ireland and Britain also emerged in the eighteenth century. Although the principal countries of destination for this Irish diaspora were the American colonies, Canada and Great Britain, the diaspora also took in Continental Europe, Australasia and South America. Particularly acute in times of economic

depression, the pattern of emigration is notable for its distribution of the excess population.

In the 1790–1845 period, it is estimated that 300,000 Irish emigrated to the USA, of whom half were natives of Ulster. Akenson (2000) is convinced that the majority of those who had settled in the USA and Canada prior to the Famine were of Protestant origin. He argues that population drops in the provinces of Ireland in the second half of the nineteenth century, plus the ‘province of origin’ figures for migrants suggest that a substantial proportion of post-Famine migrants were also Presbyterians or Anglicans. Figures suggest that between 1812 and 1841, between 1 and 1.5 m people emigrated. So prior to the 1840s, the population was slowly increasing, and it is likely that it actually topped the official 1841 Census figure of eight million.

The Famine

While mass emigration had been underway since the second half of the eighteenth century, the levels experienced during and after The Famine (1845–1852) were unprecedented, and not repeated. Between 1842 and 1854, 1.25–1.5 m people emigrated (with 250,000 leaving in 1 year alone) (Killen 2003). It is the key historical turning point in Irish demography: the moment at which population declines, so far not to be regained. Indeed, the combined current population estimates (4.25 m for the Republic, and 1.8 million for Northern Ireland) still fall 25 % short of 1841s peak (see Tables 24.1 and 24.2). It is possible that the actual population was undercounted in the 1841 Census, potentially bringing the total number of lives lost in Ireland *plus* emigration (including deaths on the ‘coffin ships’ and loading points in England, Scotland, the USA and Canada) toward the three million mark.²

Moreover, because the Famine was most devastating in areas of subsistence farming, on very small plots of land on which potatoes were the staple crop, it disproportionately impacted upon the West, where higher concentrations of Catholic and Gaelic-speaking populations were to be

Table 24.1 Population of Ireland 1821–1901

Year	Population (m)
1821	6.8
1831	7.75
1841	8.2
1861	5.8
1901	4.5

Table 24.2 Population of the island of Ireland, 1926–2009

Year	Republic of Ireland (m)	Northern Ireland (m)	Total (m)
1926	2.97	1.26	4.2
1971	2.98	1.54	4.5
2002	3.92	1.69	5.6
2007 ^a		1.8	
2009 ^a	4.25		c. 6


^aEstimates

found on the island (Fig. 24.2 shows the relative population loss).

Not only did overall population numbers plummet as a result of the appalling death toll and subsequent exodus, but so did the proportion of Gaelic-speakers, as can clearly be seen in the figures. Between 1851 and 1926 (the first Census of the independent Irish Free State), the proportion of Gaelic-speakers fell from 29.1 to 18.1 % overall (excluding the six counties of Ulster that now form Northern Ireland). In some Western areas this decline was much more marked; County Clare’s share fell from the majority, 59.8 %, to 30.3 %; County Limerick (not including Limerick City) dropped from 37.4 to 13.7; County Sligo, from 38.3 to 7.5. However, both the Eastern province of Leinster, and the remaining three counties of Ulster saw their proportions of Gaelic speakers *rise* over the same period, albeit from much lower base lines.

So, in summary, emigration from Ireland had been long established prior to the Famine. It had involved both Protestants and Catholics, and movement to both the New World and Great Britain. However, in the 1840s and 1850s, the impact of the Famine generated extraordinary levels of emigration, and these were overwhelmingly

Fig. 24.2 Population change in Ireland and post-famine (Source: Edwards and Williams (1956), Figure 20, p. 260. Produced for www.irelandtheisland.com. Unlike the rest of this site, this map is declared to be in the public domain)



drawn from the worst-hit parts of the country, poor rural areas with virtually all-Catholic populations.

The Irish population (remember that the whole island was still part of Britain until 1921) registered a drop in every inter-censal period until 1961–1971, before rising again. The average annual emigration rate stood at around 14 per 1,000 of the population, between 1951 and 1961. As a point of comparison, its current level of 9 per 1,000 in 2009 is twice as high as that of the next highest European Union nation, Lithuania. That rate fell below 5 in the 1961–1971 period. Geographer Jim McLaughlin (1994) characterises Ireland as an ‘emigrant nursery’, while Mac Einri

(2000) fills in the specifics, arguing that the majority of emigrants have come from rural areas and the more disadvantaged social groups. Cork, Kerry, Mayo, Donegal and Galway were the counties from which most people emigrated in the period between the 1926 and 1961 Censuses. As emigration flattened out in the 1960s and 1970s (to the point where there was net immigration for a few years), it rose again dramatically in the 1980s into the early 90s, with more than 450,000 people leaving the Republic between 1982 and 1993. This is an average of 43,000 p.a. (14.33 per 1,000), with a peak of 70,000 departures in 1989 (Courtney 1995) (Fig. 24.3).




Fig. 24.3 Geographical distribution of Irish born (32 counties) persons abroad, 1841–1951

However, even during the peak economic boom years of 1996–2008, emigration was ongoing, albeit it at a lower level: wavering between 25,000 (1997) and 45,000 in 2008 at an average of 31,000 (i.e. 7.5 per 1,000) (CSO 2009), which is still a substantial rate.³

In the section ‘Ireland as a country of Immigration’ below, we will look in detail at the most modern era, from the mid-1990s. However, the next part of the story relevant to ethnic demography is the partition of the island into two political entities, and the basis on which this was implemented. We thus look first at Northern Ireland.

Section Three: Northern Ireland

A recent study of ethno-demographic change and elite perceptions of change in Northern Ireland found ‘a comparatively strong and constant interest in sectarian demography [which]... penetrate[s] even the most serious journalism,

government documents and academic analyses, while politicians claim that they influence party and even government policy’ (Anderson et al. 2004, p. 7). The researchers go on to suggest that these demographic narratives are not based on a considered analysis of the available data, but rather an *a priori* ‘sectarian worldview’, which divides the population into the dichotomous blocs ‘Catholic-Nationalist-Republican/Protestant-Unionist-Loyalist’. The study analysed data from, and discourses around, the 2001 Census. A strong interest in sectarian demography, however, is not a new phenomenon in the region. Indeed, concerns about sectarian demography provided the basis on which the boundaries of Northern Ireland were drawn up. Interest in sectarian demography has been shaped by the wider environment in which it has been viewed and interpreted. There have been three significant ruptures which have reshaped ethnic demography and perceptions of ethnic demography in the region: the founding of Northern Ireland in the early 1920s; the crisis of the state and outbreak of

political violence in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and; the peace process of the 1990s. In this section we examine the issue of ethnic demography through a focus on these three periods.

The Founding of Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland had a turbulent birth. From its inception the Unionist Government viewed the Catholic minority as a threat to the existence of Northern Ireland. The creation of Northern Ireland involved some significant changes to the structuring of life in the region. The creation of the new political entity was simultaneously the division of Ireland into two political jurisdictions. It also involved a rupture from direct Westminster rule and the institutionalising of sectarianism into the political life of the region. The Unionist political elite opted to exercise their right to have their own Northern Ireland parliament, and in doing so they partitioned the country. They did so because they did not trust the intentions of Irish Nationalists and because they believed it was in their interests to remain part of the United Kingdom. The Northern Ireland parliament opened against a backdrop of mounting violence in the region. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) conducted a military campaign against the police and government offices. The all-Protestant reserve police force, the Ulster Special Constabulary, carried out attacks on Catholic civilians. The violence escalated in early July 1921, as a Truce between the British government and the IRA was being agreed, and again in August, after the rejection of the Southern Irish parliament by Irish nationalists. Hundreds of Catholics, and a small number of Protestant socialist trade unionists, were driven out of their jobs in the shipyards by angry mobs. There was street rioting and house burnings. One estimate suggests that between 1920 and 1922 in Belfast, the area of most intense violence, 'between 453 and 463 people were killed and over 1,100 wounded. The vast majority of those killed were civilians; an estimated 159 Protestants and 258 Catholics, in a city where Protestants were in the majority' (Lynch 2008, p. 375).

The drawing of the borders to secure a Protestant majority helped to ensure that the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) gained a majority in the Northern Ireland parliament and formed the Government (a position that the UUP enjoyed until the collapse of the parliament in 1972). Nationalist politicians who were elected to the parliament operated a policy of not taking their seats in protest at what they considered to be an illegitimate parliament. The Opposition in parliament was the pro-Union Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) (Farrell 1983). The Northern Ireland Government used its legislative powers to consolidate Unionist rule. The Government enacted special emergency powers, most notoriously the use of internment without trial, which were used almost exclusively against Catholics suspected of sedition (Donohue 1998). The Government also gerrymandered the electoral boundaries of local government (more on that in a minute). These legislative changes were buttressed by a range of informal and semi-official practices which favoured Protestants over Catholics. These practices included the use of the USC to police the Catholic population, a glass-ceiling for Catholic promotion to senior positions within the civil service, employment discrimination against the recruitment of Catholics in private sector companies (most notoriously in the Belfast shipyards), the allocation of public housing and a special role for the explicitly anti-Catholic Orange Order as a key institution through which the relationship between the state and civil society was regulated (Farrell 1980; Whyte 1983).

Ethno-Demography from the 1920s to the 1960s

The birth of Northern Ireland was accompanied by significant population movements. The creation of a border was part of the process of creating two new political entities. This process produced 'non-mobile migrants', people who found themselves in a newly created state, but one in which they did not feel 'at home' (Fitzgerald and Lambkin 2008, p. 212). A significant proportion of the Protestant population of the Irish Free

State, particularly from the Ulster counties of Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan, moved across the border to Northern Ireland. An even greater volume of movement was in the opposite direction, composed mainly of Catholics fleeing sectarian tension and violence in Belfast and other northern towns. The largest volume of flow, from both parts of Ireland and for both Catholics and Protestants, was, however, West–East migration to England and Scotland. In addition to movement in and out of Northern Ireland, there was significant internal migration and an accompanying increase in sectarian segregation as people, Catholics in particular, who lived in ‘ethnically mixed’ areas moved to areas where their co-religionists lived. An estimated 25 % of the Catholic population of Belfast fled their homes in the period 1920–1922 (Fitzgerald and Lambkin 2008, pp. 208–217). Segregation in Belfast increased significantly in this period, prior to this period segregation levels had been relatively stable (Hepburn 2008, p. 48).⁴

There are ethno-demographic dimensions to other aspects of population change in Northern Ireland in this early period. Existing research indicates that Catholic women had higher fertility rates than their Protestant counterparts. Catholic women from the marriage cohort of 1920 had, on average, more children than their Protestant counterparts (5.29 and 3.56 births per woman respectively) (Coleman 1999, p. 91). Despite higher fertility rates, however, the Catholic proportion of the population of Northern Ireland remained fairly static until the 1960s. In the 35 years from 1926 to 1961 the proportion of Catholics in the region only rose one and a half percentage points (from 33.5 to 34.9 %), against a backdrop of general population increase.⁵ The main reason for this relatively low growth was the greater propensity for Catholics to emigrate. In the period 1937–1951, the emigration rate for Catholics was an estimated 6.5 per thousand compared to 2.3 for non-Catholics, and in the decade 1951–1961 the respective figures were 10.8 and 4.6 per thousand (Simpson 1983, p. 102).

Ethno-demographic considerations shaped many aspects of public life in Northern Ireland. Perhaps most obviously, and notoriously, in the

gerrymandering of the electoral boundaries for local government in Londonderry Corporation. Londonderry, or Derry as it is known to the Catholic population, is the second largest city in Northern Ireland. Unionist leaders felt particularly vulnerable in Derry/Londonderry because Protestants were in a minority in the city, which is only a few miles from County Donegal, on the other side of the border created by partition. In 1922 the Northern Ireland Government abolished proportional representation for local government elections, and in 1923 redrew the electoral boundaries in many constituencies. Official papers show that these changes were motivated by Unionist concerns to gain, or maintain, control in districts where they were in a minority. The securing of Unionist majorities was, however, assisted by the contemporary British practice of placing a property qualification on the franchise, a practice which impacted disproportionately on Catholics (Whyte 1983). This historic marginalisation of the Catholic majority in Derry/Londonderry was a significant contributory factor to Derry/Londonderry becoming the epicentre of violent conflict, when it erupted in the late 1960s (Gilligan 2007a).

The Crisis of the Northern Ireland State and the Birth of ‘The Troubles’

In the early 1960s, Northern Ireland began to undergo a number of significant changes. The decline of traditional industries, such as shipbuilding and linen-making, and shifts in UK central government policy towards the regions, led the Government of Northern Ireland to seek overseas investment from multi-national corporations (MNCs). The Unionist Government began to talk about modernising the region (O’Dowd et al. 1980). In two significant departures from Government tradition, Terence O’Neill, the modernising Prime Minister, met with the *Taoiseach* (Prime Minister) of the Republic of Ireland, and visited a Catholic convent. These attempts at modernisation encouraged the development of a civil rights movement which sought to end discrimination against the Catholic minority.

The civil rights movement included some liberal and socialist Protestants, but its popular base was amongst the Catholic minority. The popularity of the civil rights movement amongst Catholics signalled a shift from traditional Irish nationalist politics of demanding a united Ireland to demanding equal rights for Catholics in Northern Ireland. This paradigm shift is also indicated by the (Irish) Nationalist Party's dropping of their policy of abstentionism in the Northern Ireland parliament, to take up the role of the opposition (Purdie 1990). This reform agenda alarmed sections of the Protestant Unionist population. Protestant militants began a bombing campaign against utilities, which was blamed on the IRA. Significant Unionist figures claimed that the civil rights campaigns were an Irish Nationalist attempt to destroy Northern Ireland from within. As the civil rights campaign mounted, the Ulster Unionist Party became increasingly divided over the reform agenda, and this split went to the heart of the Government itself.

The conflict within the Government came to a crisis point in August 1969. Violence erupted onto the streets of Northern Ireland's second city, Derry/Londonderry, when a parade by the anti-Catholic Orange Order went ahead despite a Government ban that had prevented civil rights marches earlier in the year. Rioting and other kinds of violent disorder spread to other parts of Northern Ireland, and was particularly intense in 'mixed' residential areas of Belfast at the interface between segregated Catholic and Protestant areas. In Belfast, an estimated 1,505 Catholics (5.3 % of the Catholic population of the city) and 315 Protestants (0.4 % of the Protestant population) were permanently displaced from their homes. The police force were unable to cope with the intensity of the violence, and in some cases were guilty of inflaming tensions. The British Army was brought in to quell the disturbances (Gilligan 2007a). The Catholic minority was becoming increasingly politicised, and increasingly mobilised by civil rights demands.

The Unionist Government proposed a range of reforms, and the Catholic minority was divided over these proposals. The more conservative sections were appalled at the mounting violence and

sought to encourage the reform agenda. The more radical sections demanded even more radical reforms. The Unionist Government was being overtaken by the pace of events on the ground, and wracked by divisions within. Rioting now became a constant background feature of life in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry, and Catholics became increasingly hostile towards the British Army, which they perceived to be acting in support of the Unionist Government. By mid-1970 the IRA had regrouped and rearmed, and had begun attacking a range of targets, including the British Army. They argued that the British state and Unionist Government was incapable of reforming Northern Ireland and only a united Ireland would improve the lot of the Catholic minority. This argument, which only a few years earlier had seemed out of date, now appealed to many Catholics and a small minority of left-leaning Protestants who had been radicalised by the civil rights protests (McCann 1980). When, in August 1971, the Government introduced internment without trial in an attempt to quash the IRA, it only served to escalate violence even further, as increasing numbers of young people were drawn to the IRA by their experience of state repression. By mid-1972 Unionist rule had become unsustainable and the UK Government suspended the Northern Ireland parliament and imposed direct rule from Westminster onto the region. After the failure of the attempt to establish a power-sharing coalition Northern Ireland Government, between moderate Irish Nationalists and reform minded Unionists, direct rule was re-imposed and the British state and the IRA settled into a 'long war', which was to last for more than two decades.

Ethno-Demography from the 1960s to the 1990s

The turbulence of 'The Troubles' generated significant population movements. In Belfast, between August 1969 and February 1973, at least 8,000 families (6.6 % of the population of Belfast), and possibly as many as 15,000 families (11.8 % of the population), moved from their homes as a result of intimidation and violence (Darby 1974).⁶

The majority of those who moved were Catholics. The Government of the Republic of Ireland established refugee camps near the border to accommodate those fleeing the violence. Residential segregation, which was high but had been declining, increased in Belfast, and some other Northern Irish towns. Due to ongoing violence, the extent of segregation continued to rise throughout the 1970s and 1980s, although the rate of the rise was much slower in the 1980s (Doherty and Poole 1997). When the British Government took over the direct administration of Northern Ireland they considered the possibility of repartitioning Northern Ireland 'to move the dissident Republican population out of the United Kingdom {Northern Ireland} retaining only the Unionist population' but concluded that it was 'extremely doubtful whether a transfer of territory, or population, could be effectively accomplished, or maintained' (Office of the Prime Minister 1972: notations in the original).

During 'The Troubles', Catholics were more likely than Protestants to be casualties of the violence. 1,521 Catholics and 1,287 Protestants were killed between 1969 and 2001 (in a region where Protestants are a majority). Further analysis of these deaths indicates the nature of the conflict. The majority of the Catholics who were killed were civilians (1,011). The rest were either Republican paramilitaries (365) or members of the security forces (55). Of the Protestants who were killed, slightly more of them were civilians (570) than members of the security forces (548).⁷ The vast majority of the rest of the Protestants who were killed (166) were members of (exclusively Protestant) Loyalist paramilitary organisations, but three of the Protestant casualties were Republican paramilitaries (a reflection of the non-sectarian 'uniting Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter' strand of Irish Republicanism). The guerrilla nature of the warfare is reflected in the facts that civilians account for slightly more casualties (1,842) than combatants (1,619); and that of the combatants killed, the majority were members of the security forces (1,105 compared to 377 Republican paramilitaries, and 137 Loyalist paramilitaries). The sectarian dimension to the conflict is indicated by the fact that Loyalist

paramilitaries were responsible for killing the largest number of Catholic civilians (684), and Republican paramilitaries were responsible for the largest number of Protestant civilians (393).⁸

In the 30 years from 1961 to 1991, the proportion of Catholics in the region rose significantly (from approximately 35 % to approximately 42 %). By 1991 the Catholic share of the population of the six counties of Northern Ireland was 'higher than at any time since the Great Famine' (O'Grada and Walsh 1995, p. 264). Part of the explanation for the growth in the proportion of Catholics is provided by differentials in fertility. In 1971 the General Fertility Rate (GFR) for Catholics was 649, for Protestants who gave their denomination as Church of Ireland it was 461 and for Presbyterians it was 442. In 1991 the respective figures were 424, 329 and 298 (O'Grada and Walsh 1995, p. 265).⁹ Another part of the explanation is that the non-Catholic population is an increasingly ageing population, and thus suffers a higher mortality rate. In 1990 the death rate for Catholics was about 9 per 1,000 compared to 11.5 for non-Catholics (Coleman 1999, p. 92). The size of the Catholic population has also been bolstered by the fact that since the outbreak of the Troubles, Protestants have been increasingly likely to emigrate. Estimates suggest that Catholics accounted for 54 % of net migration in the intercensal period 1961–1971, but this declined to 50 % in the periods 1971–1981, and 1981–1991 (Jardine 1994, p. 203). The growth in the Catholic proportion of the population was reflected in a rising vote for the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), the 'moderate' Irish nationalist party, and the rise of Sinn Fein, (the political wing of the IRA), after its entry into electoral politics (Murray and Tonge 2005).

The Peace Process and After

In the 1990s secret talks between the IRA and the British Government led to a ceasefire and, after faltering attempts, to a negotiated peace agreement. The talks developed on the back of increasing Anglo-Irish cooperation and shifts within Irish

Republicanism, which were influenced by the end of the Cold War (Arthur 2000; Ryan 1994). The 1998 Peace Agreement attempted to reconcile the competing aspirations and interests of Irish nationalism and Ulster unionism. At its core is a compromise between the different interested political bodies involved with the conflict. It was negotiated and signed by the British and Irish Governments, the main political parties in Northern Ireland (including Sinn Fein) and representatives of Loyalist paramilitary groups. The 'hardline' Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was the only major party which dissented from the Agreement. The Agreement led to the Government of the Republic of Ireland removing their constitutional claim to Northern Ireland. Unionists had long complained about this irredentist claim on their beloved Ulster. The British Government reiterated its claim, made during the secret negotiations, that it would not stand in the way of a united Ireland if that is what the majority in Northern Ireland voted for. The institutions which were created by the Agreement are usually characterised as consociational: a form of government which guarantees group representation (O'Leary 1999). The Agreement created a devolved power-sharing Northern Ireland Assembly, which is accountable to the British government at Westminster. The most powerful political Office in the Assembly, the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM), must by law be jointly shared by a Nationalist elected representative and a Unionist elected representative. The heads of government Departments are allocated on the basis of party strength in the Assembly. The Agreement also established a North/South Ministerial Council where Ministers from Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland meet to discuss matters of mutual interest, this element was established to satisfy Irish Nationalist demands for an all-Ireland dimension in the present. The Agreement also instituted a range of equality and human rights measures to tackle existing inequalities and to protect minorities in the present and future (Gilligan 2008). Academics and the political class are divided in their attitudes towards the Agreement. Supporters argue that it is a

compromise, and as such it is unsatisfactory to all, but it helped to bring an end to decades of violent conflict and provides protections against conflict re-emerging (Dixon 2005). Critics say that the consociational nature of the Agreement amounts to the institutionalising of sectarianism, and they point to greater levels of segregation and ongoing low-level communal conflict as evidence of the entrenching of sectarian division (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006).

The peace Agreement has been greeted with different levels of enthusiasm by Catholics and Protestants. Catholics tend to feel that their position in Northern Irish society is improving (Mitchell 2003a). Protestants tend to feel that the Agreement 'unduly benefits nationalists at the expense of unionists' (McAllister et al. 2005, p. 4). Protestant concerns have focused on: 'terrorists' (by which they mean Sinn Fein) serving in Government in the Northern Ireland Assembly; the reorganisation of the police force, and in particular the 50:50 Catholic/Protestant quotas on recruitment to the new force; and restrictions on contentious Orange Order parades (Mitchell 2003b). Concerns about Catholic encroachment and Protestant retreat have been discussed in relation to a wide range of topics. Prominent amongst these have been: the loss of a Unionist majority in Belfast City Council in 1997 (Belfast Protestants have been more likely than their Catholic counterparts to move to suburban areas of the Belfast Urban Area which lie outside the electoral boundaries for Belfast City Council); and the Protestant 'brain drain'. Protestant school leavers who go to university are more likely to do so in England and Scotland, Catholic school leavers tend to prefer one of the two universities in Northern Ireland (Osborne et al. 2006). Over the course of the peace process, the 'more moderate pro-Agreement [Unionist and Nationalist] parties of the UUP and SDLP' have been electorally eclipsed by 'the stouter defenders of their ethnic blocs' in the DUP and Sinn Fein (Tonge 2006).

One of the conceptual shifts which enabled the peace process was a move from "'will"-based conceptions of politics', which emphasised concepts such as sovereignty, self-determination and interests, to identity politics which emphasised

concepts such as cultural diversity and group belonging (Gilligan 2007b). In this context, academics and minority advocates began to highlight the presence of small ethnic minority populations, mainly Irish Travellers and people of Chinese and South Asian origin (Hainsworth 1998). The non-indigenous ethnic minority population grew dramatically in the twenty-first century. After the accession of eight countries from the former Soviet bloc to the European Union in 2003, Northern Ireland experienced a shift from its long-term trend of net outmigration to becoming a region of net immigration. Discussions about ethnic minorities and their experiences in Northern Ireland has been shaped by existing 'sectarian worldviews' and the realities of sectarian division in everyday life. A lot of media attention became focused on the extent of racist attacks in Northern Ireland. These attacks have been interpreted in a number of different ways. The most popular explanation in the mass media has been to explain the attacks as a substitute for sectarian attacks, as hatred attempts to find new outlets through which it can be expressed (Knox 2010). Others have pointed to an 'elective affinity between Loyalism and racism against minority ethnic groups', and pointed out that most of the attacks take place in residential areas that are predominantly Protestant, and working-class (Lentin and McVeigh 2006, p. 151). However, the same authors also point out most recent migrants live in predominantly Protestant inner-city areas 'characterised by poor community structures, an ageing population and a pool of poor housing stock', rather than the 'congested ghettos of Republican west and north Belfast', and thus might be less likely to be attacked by Catholics (Lentin and McVeigh 2006, p. 154). It has also been suggested that the issue of racism has been highlighted in an attempt to help legitimise some of the new institutions established as part of the peace Agreement (McVeigh and Rolston 2007). In this context it has been suggested that, relative to the rise in numbers of immigrants, the number of racial incidents has actually been declining (Gilligan 2009). Developing policy on dealing with sectarianism and racism has proven difficult for the government

in Northern Ireland and the *Shared Future* policy, and its successor the draft Strategy for *Cohesion, Sharing and Integration*, have both been stalled in their passages through the Assembly.¹⁰ The issue of whether Northern Ireland is more sectarian since the peace Agreement, or whether the divisions of the past can be overcome, remains a significant question mark over the future. It seems likely, however, that 'new' ethnic minorities are likely to feature in discussions, and practical developments, regarding the future of sectarianism in Northern Ireland (Gilligan et al. 2011).

Ethno-Demography Since the 1990s

Ethnic demography continues to be a topic of interest to politicians and the mass media. It is a particularly salient topic in relation to some specific events, most notably the publication of Census data, voting trends and territorial control of residential areas. Levels of residential segregation between Catholics and Protestants remain high in Northern Ireland, particularly in the major urban centres. The proportion of the population who are Catholic continues to grow, and some of this growth is highly symbolic. The fact that there are roughly equal proportions of Catholics and Protestants in the Belfast City Council area, in what historically has been a Protestant majority city, is sometimes taken as a barometer for the future.¹¹ If Catholics become a majority in the city, this is likely to be viewed as highly significant. The other important development in the twenty-first century has been the growth of immigration from places other than the Republic of Ireland and the rest of the UK. While the largest volume of flow has been from the new EU member-states, largely from Central and Eastern Europe (A8 countries), there have been significant flows from other parts of the world (see Table 24.3).

Immigrants have not only increased the population of Northern Ireland by moving to the region, they have also been more likely than people born in Northern Ireland to have children. According to government figures, 'the number of births to mothers born outside the UK and Ireland

Table 24.3 Non-UK nationals entering Northern Ireland and allocated a National Insurance Number, by year of registration and continent of origin

	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004	2004/2005
EU accession countries	31	38	33	145	1,572
EU excluding accession countries	1,694	1,781	1,276	2,065	1,708
Europe non-EU	79	106	142	247	425
Asia and Middle East	371	541	620	1,247	1,259
Australasia and Oceania	178	183	152	182	146
The Americas	200	234	172	221	245
Africa	132	121	141	206	210
Total	2,686	3,005	2,536	4,314	5,568

has risen over the last decade, from 2 % of births in 1998 to 9 % of births (2,300 births) in 2008' (ONS 2009, p. 93). Given that non-UK and Republic of Ireland immigrants account for less than 2 % of the population, this shows that immigrants are much more fertile, but part of the explanation may be to do with much younger age profile of the immigrant population.

Conclusion

Ethnic demographic considerations were implicit, and sometimes explicit, in a wide range of areas of Northern Irish society. These included area of residence, membership of the police force, rates of employment, voting rights and political influence. Ethnicity was also a factor in key features of demographic change – principally emigration rates and birth rates. The outbreak of violent conflict in the late 1960s came after a decade in which an apparent move away from ethnic demographic consciousness amongst some in the Unionist elite, and civil rights campaigners, stoked the forceful assertion of ethnic demographic consciousness from other sections of the Unionist elite, and amongst sections of the Protestant working-class. The period of the 'Troubles' saw some aspects of ethnic demography – such as residential segregation – ratchet upwards. Over the same period, and particularly in the 1980s, some socio-demographic features – such as employment discrimination – became less ethnicised. There were also shifts in other aspects of ethnic demography – such as an

increasingly likelihood of Protestant emigration, relative to that of Catholics. The development of a peace process in the 1990s, and the signing of a peace Agreement in 1998, has led to a paradoxical situation in which some aspects of Northern Irish society have become more ethnicised, while in other areas of life ethnic difference has declined in salience. This picture has been further complicated by inward migration and a more extensive ethnic pluralisation of Northern Irish society. The historic compromise between Irish Nationalism, Ulster Unionism and the British Government, which the Agreement encapsulates, suggests that the process of nation-building in Northern Ireland may have been finally resolved, or exhausted, and the issue of ethnic demography has become historically redundant. The features of the Agreement which institutionalise sectarianism, however, mean that ethnic consciousness continues to fundamentally shape many aspects of Northern Irish society. The end of the conflict over nation-building, and the future of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, does not necessarily mean the end of inter-ethnic antagonism *within* Northern Ireland.

Section Four: The Republic of Ireland

The state that is today officially known as 'Ireland' covers the 26 counties which the 1920 Government of Ireland Act designated were to be ruled from Dublin in the event of any partitioning of the country. As of the 1926 Census, the Irish

Free State (*Saorstát Éireann*) (1922–1937) was left with just under three million people. Of these, 92.6 % gave their religion as Catholic; 7 % as one of the Protestant churches; 0.12 % Jewish; and 0.3 % as ‘Other’. The non-Catholics were clustered in Dublin and the three counties of Ulster which were not included in Northern Ireland. These figures altered relatively little over the next seven decades, as the political entity became the Republic of Ireland. Religion continued to be the principal salient ‘ethnic’ line of social identification. It was not until the 1990s when the most noteworthy demographic trend began to occur. Ireland shifted from a country of net emigration to one of net immigration in 1996, and remained so until the April 2009 Population Estimates (CSO 2009). In this section we shall provide a brief historical overview of the portion of Ireland which seceded from the United Kingdom. We shall focus in particular on the key ways in which the newly founded state was ideologically legitimised, and the consequences that this had for ethno-demographic consciousness. Following this focus on Irish nationalist ideology we shall focus on a group that comprised the ‘Other’ in Irish society since the establishment of the Irish Free State, and which was later to attain the official status of ethnic minority: Irish Travellers. In the third part we shall look at changes in the 1990s, when the Republic of Ireland experienced a shift from the historic pattern of emigration, to becoming a significant destination for immigrants.

Irish Nationalist Ideology South of the Border

The Irish Free State was born out of violence. In the 1918 election to Westminster Sinn Féin won 73 of the 105 seats in Ireland. Their election manifesto promised that they would withdraw Irish representation from the British parliament, use ‘any and every means available to render impotent the power of England to hold Ireland in subjection’ and establish a constituent assembly ‘as the supreme national authority to speak and act in the name of the Irish people’ (extracted in: Hepburn 1980, pp. 110–112). In other words,

their election manifesto was a declaration of independence which was endorsed by a majority of the voting population on the island of Ireland. Every available means included the use of violence, and Sinn Féin supported the IRA’s guerilla campaign against the British in the Irish War of Independence (1919–1921). The war was formally brought to an end by the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921). The Treaty was a negotiated compromise in which the British granted semi-autonomous Dominion status within the British Empire. Ireland gained an independent Irish parliament, but all parliamentarians had to swear an oath of loyalty to the British Crown, the British retained control of some key military harbours and the right of Northern Ireland to secede from the rest of Ireland, and remain part of the UK, was also written into the Treaty (extracted in: Hepburn 1980, pp. 118–121). The terms of the Treaty provoked a split within the Irish nationalist movement. The partition of Ireland featured as a moral and tactical issue, but the central issue of dispute was the oath to the British Crown. The split spilled over into the Irish Civil War (June 1922–May 1923) between pro and anti-Treaty sides. The anti-Treaty side lost the war, in the sense that they were militarily defeated, but they won the peace, in the sense that the political party – Fianna Fail – which emerged out of the anti-Treaty side became the dominant party in Irish politics from its ascent to power in 1932 to the present day. Fianna Fail shaped the ideological contours on which the Irish Free State, and later the Republic of Ireland, was legitimised.

Four core components of the national identity of the newly independent state – anti-Britishness, the aspiration to Irish unity, Catholicism and Gaelicism – provided lenses through which ethno-demographic consciousness was refracted. Anti-Britishness was expressed through what is colloquially known as Civil War politics. Fianna Fail continually invoked their anti-Treaty origins to promote the idea that they were the party that was the staunchest defender of Irish independence against the former colonial master, Britain. And it was under a Fianna Fail government that Ireland revoked the constitutional position of the British Crown and declared Ireland a Republic.

Fianna Fail also presented themselves as the only Nationalist party which could feasibly bring about the end of partition and unite the country. The party often talked belligerently about ending partition, but in practice adopted a pragmatic approach. This is perhaps most clearly seen in articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, drawn up by Fianna Fail in 1937. Article 2 was an irredentist claim to the entire island as the national territory, while article 3 ‘accepted *de facto* Partition “pending the reintegration of the national territory”’ (Bowman 1982, p. 150).

The Catholic Church was a powerful social and political force in nineteenth century Ireland. In areas such as education, for example, ‘denominational control of Irish schools lay to an exceptional degree in the hands of clergy and religious orders’ and this control extended ‘to a more limited extent in a number of other social services, including hospital services, [and] the care of orphaned and homeless children’ (Fahey 1992, p. 252). Most of the political class in the Irish Free State, both the pro-Treaty Cumann na nGaedheal (which later evolved into the present day Fine Gael) and the anti-Treaty Fianna Fail, were observant Catholics. So it is unsurprising that the Catholic church was able to extend its power after 1921. The Church, for example, successfully lobbied to get legislation which banned divorce and a Censorship of Publications Act, which banned obscene or indecent publications (Lee 1989, pp. 157–159). The newly founded state attempted to promote an ‘Irish Ireland’, the central plank of which was an attempt to revive the Irish language. This involved making Irish a compulsory subject in schools, and a qualification in the language a requirement for employment as a school teacher (Brown 1985, pp. 45–78).

There was significant emigration of Protestants from the twenty six counties of what was to become the Republic of Ireland during the War of Independence and the Civil War. Some of these population movements were a direct result of the withdrawal of the colonial power. Coakley, for example, estimates that in the intercensal period 1911–1926 the proportion of Protestants employed in the security forces declined by 94 % and those employed in public administration by

almost 60 % (1998, p. 92). During the Truce and Civil War periods there was a dramatic increase in agrarian unrest which included attacks on wealthy landowners. Protestants, because they were disproportionately represented amongst the large landowners, also suffered disproportionately from these disturbances. In some towns resentment against the wealthy combined with sectarian animosity in which Protestant homes became the target of attacks. The Protestant population declined from 327,179 (10.4 % of the total) in 1911 to 220,723 (7.4 % of the total) in 1926 (Coakley 1998, p. 89).

For those Protestants who remained in the Irish Free State, the core components of Irish national identity provided little comfort. Protestants were often viewed, and often viewed themselves, as British (Brown 1985). The mistreatment of Catholics by their brethren in Northern Ireland was a recurring theme in politics south of the border (although Protestants in the south were not generally considered culpable). The important role of the Catholic Church confirmed the subordinate status of Protestantism. Gaelicism was open to Protestants, and we have already noted that Douglas Hyde was a leading figure in the Gaelic revival movement. Gaelicism, however, often involved ‘an ethnic dogmatism that cast Anglo-Ireland in the role of alien persecutor of the one true faith’ of ‘Irish Ireland’ (Brown 1985, p. 107).

The core components of the national ideology of the state in the south of Ireland have been gradually eroded since the 1960s. The insularity of ‘Irish Ireland’ was eroded by the opening up of the country to external capital, in a move which paralleled the ‘modernisation’ promoted by reforming Unionists in Northern Ireland (O’Hearn 1995). The increasing urbanisation and industrialisation of Ireland also been accompanied by changes in the moral values, and religious adherence, of Catholics in the Republic of Ireland. Levels of church attendance have declined, and there has been ‘a weakening of the absolute prescriptions and prohibitions of the Catholic Church that once used to prevail in areas of sexual morality and family life’ (Hardiman and Whelan 1998, p. 84). In this context Protestants

in the Republic have undergone ‘a steady shift from British to Irish ethnic allegiance’ (Coakley 1998, p. 104). The military campaign by the IRA to achieve ‘Brits Out’ confronted the political elite in the Republic of Ireland with the dilemma of how to reconcile this attempt to end partition and bring about a united Ireland, with their own stated intention of bringing about a united Ireland. This dilemma was resolved through revising some of the core tenets of Irish nationalist ideology, the promotion of a pluralist framework of recognising the rights and identities of the two communities and the promotion of close cooperation between the British and Irish Governments on trying to end the conflict in Northern Ireland (Gilligan 2007b).

These social and political changes have meant that the place of Protestants in the Republic of Ireland no longer questioned, or is even held up as a badge of the pluralist and modern nature of society in the Republic. These changes, however, also mean that the Republic has been uncoupled from its ideological moorings. One commentator has warned that with the erosion of ‘the stabilising influence of nationalism, there is now the potential for social instability in the South which never existed before’ (Ryan 1994, p. 117). Writing in 1998, during the economic boom of the Celtic Tiger, in the year that the historic peace Agreement was signed and at the beginning of large-scale immigration, Hardiman and Whelan noted a ‘fundamental shift going on in people’s attitudes towards authority, not only towards religious authority. Almost all major social institutions suffered a drop in confidence levels in recent years’ (1998, p. 84). The crisis of political authority in the Republic Ireland became a meltdown at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century as Ireland was particularly hard hit by the global financial crisis (O’Toole 2010).

Irish Travellers


At the 2006 Census, Travellers accounted for 22,435 of the population (0.5 %) of the Republic of Ireland. They are principally urban based (93.5 %), and 1 in 4 live in the Greater Dublin area.

Travellers are an indigenous Irish ethnic minority who can be traced back according to various accounts, from any point from the Middle Ages to the post-Famine relocation of landless people. However, it is argued that semi-nomadic people defined by their language and customs become identified as specifically Irish in the last part of the nineteenth century (Ní Shuínéar 1994). Their presence since then has been defined by the State as problematic. If we look at the two major reports of the twentieth century, we note that there is a change of attitude:

Loosely speaking, the *Report of the Commission on Itinerancy* (1963) argues for assimilation, while the 1995 *Task Force on the Travelling Community* offers a more progressive recognition of difference.

However, there are three main caveats to this. Firstly, the targets agreed by the State in terms of provision of halting sites, as well as education and health have not been met. The 1995 Task Force report, for example, recommended the construction of over 2,000 halting sites. The second report of the Department of Justice monitoring committee (Department of Justice 2005) on this legislation, found that fewer families nationwide were living in permanent sites than 1996 (prior to the Act). Second, there is a contradiction in the way Travellers are ‘hailed’ by the State. On one hand they are now an official ethnic minority recognised in equality legislation, yet on the other, hand, legislation at the turn of the twenty-first century effectively criminalised the central aspect of their culture: mobility, by turning trespass into a criminal rather than civil offence (Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002).¹² Third, the uneasy relations of Travellers with local authorities (rather than the central State) have arguably been more relevant to the daily lives of Travellers, who are in conflict with local authorities over accommodation. Local authorities have found a variety of ways to exclude them from their duty to provide accommodation for their populations (Fanning 2002). These include excluding them from housing provision on the basis that they do not belong in an area, and offering accommodation in marginal spaces that Travellers do not want to live in.

Fig. 24.4 Asylum applications and work permits issued in the Republic of Ireland, 1996–2012



The main issues are the characterisation of Travellers in official and popular discourse as criminal and disorderly, dirty and backward. While the construction of such discourse about nomadic and semi-nomadic people is far from being specific to Ireland (Taylor 2008; Bancroft 2005), the way it has worked out there is revealing. First, there are a number of measurable, material outcomes for Travellers; lower life expectancy; lower levels of education; worse health profiles; higher levels of poverty relative to the sedentary population (Department of Justice 2005). Second, the State and local authorities have failed to provide adequate levels and types of accommodation for them, despite agreeing targets and responsibilities for doing so. Thirdly, even in the post-1998 era of equality legislation,¹³ Travellers were removed from the list of protected groups by the then Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Michael McDowell, so that they were prevented from using legislation designed to combat discrimination in the provision of services (the Equal Status Act, 2000). Prior to the implementation of the Equality Acts, Travellers had responded to refusals to serve them in licensed premises by using the Licensing Act. In 2003, their use of Equal Status Act and therefore the Equality Tribunal to contest refusals to serve them was withdrawn by Minister McDowell, and removed to the Intoxicating Liquor Act (2003), under the jurisdiction of the District Courts. This places their grievances relating to service provision against pubs, clubs and hotels beyond the remit of the Equality Authority. However, a substantial proportion of the casefiles dealt with under the ESA are

instigated by Travellers' claims against discrimination, primarily in relation to accommodation and primary schools (19 % in 2007; 13 % in 2008).

Immigration and Diversity, 1996–2009

In terms of ethnic diversity, Ireland has undergone rapid change in the period since 1996, when it became a country of net immigration. Although it had dealt with relatively small numbers of refugees from specific arenas; Hungary in the 50s; Vietnam in the 80s and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Fanning 2002, 2007; Maguire 2004), Ireland had little experience of immigration or the levels of asylum-seeking we now associate with Western Europe prior to the mid-90s. Figure 24.4 shows the relative weight of applications for asylum (peaking in 2002) and work permits (required by non-European Union workers, peaking in 2003).

However, this gives only a partial picture of demographic change. Direct comparison between the 2006 Census (CSO 2006) and previous ones is not possible because the former is broken down by 'place of origin'. Prior to this, it was 'country of birth (or usual residency)', which is a highly uneven proxy of ethnicity. What the 2006 data tells us is the following. The population of the Republic in 2006 was 87.4 % white Irish; 6.9 % 'other' White, and 0.5 % Travellers. This means an overall total of 94.3 % white. The figures for other groups are; 'Other' (incl. Mixed) 1.1 %; African 0.97 %; Chinese 0.4 %; Other Asian 0.85

Table 24.4 Republic of Ireland: usual residents by ethnic or cultural background, Census 2006

Category	Thousands	%
White		
Irish	3,645.2	87.4
Irish Traveller	22.4	0.5
Any other White background	289.0	6.9
Black or black Irish		
African	40.5	1.0
Any other Black background	3.8	0.1
Asian or Asian Irish		
Chinese	16.5	0.4
Any other Asian background	35.8	0.9
Other (including mixed background)		
Not stated	72.3	1.7
Total	4,172.0	100.0

Source: CSO (2006)

(see Table 24.4). We can speculate, given the numbers of work permits issued, and asylum applications made by nationals from these countries, that the 'Other Asian' group is dominated by Filipinos, Indians, Malaysians and Pakistanis.

In a separate table, by nationality, it is indicated that 90 % are Irish (hyphenated or otherwise). The discrepancy of 2.6 % (90–87.4) can be seen as an indicator of ethnic minority Irish. Moreover, the demographic balance of the non White-Irish group is tilted toward the younger end of the scale: in the 0–4 age group, only 88 % are white (c.f. all the other cohorts, where this proportion is between 90 and 98).

So while, the main stream of migration appears to be through work permits rather than asylum applications (to the tune of a ratio of 6:1 in some years.¹⁴ In every other year from 1996, there have been more permits issued), there are other ways to fill in the picture. One is through increasing religious diversity: (Feldman 2003). What is meant by religious diversity is not only the introduction (or extensions) of observance of Islam and Hinduism, but a diversity of Protestant churches (many African-dominated) and forms of Catholicism. The diversification of population, in terms of ethnicity and religion; and diversity within Christian churches, impacts

on everything to do with the dominance of Catholicism and the Protestant-Catholic divide in the country. Although, as we argue, religion is *made into* a proxy of political positions and relative power in Ireland, this trend toward diversity in the round is profoundly changing the bases of affiliation for future generations: 'religion' argues Feldman (2003, p. 24), 'may be conceptualised as more than just a marker of identity, as an indication of political preference or a vehicle for a thin, exclusive nationalism that maintains a framework of essentialised, static identities that belie its inherent and changing diversities'.

Ireland may well be, as Feldman maintains, beginning a path that leads to a situation in which Protestant and Catholic can no longer be read off as unproblematically as they are today in terms of their relation to the national question (although we argue that this is already a problematic practice).

Another way to interpret the post-1996 changes is to see shifts in Irish ethnic demography as more to do with a diversification of whiteness than the overall diversification of the population. This story is tied to the changing boundaries of the European Union in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Remember that work permits are only required for workers from countries that are not members of the EU. Before 2004, the majority of work permits were issued to either 'returning migrants' (from the Irish diaspora) or Central and Eastern European nationals. We can assume that is group is virtually all white. After the accession of the Eastern and Central European countries to the EU, their nationals no longer required work permits and significantly, are no longer counted in the official statistics under that heading. Later research based on social security numbers gives rise to estimates of the number of such nationals in Ireland (Krings et al. 2008). These numbers are falling but not dramatically. Combined with the fact that the largest single minority in the Republic is UK nationals, this leads us to the 2006 Census figure of 7 % in the 'Other white' category (Table 24.4), relative to the total of 4.32 % of Mixed and non-white people in the same Census. Whichever way you look at these figures, the only conclusion is that white

Europeans are the largest group of migrants to the Republic of Ireland in the period when that country became a net importer of labour. A hint of the crucial role played by new EU migrants in Irish demography is that in the April 2008–April 2009 period, on which the 2009 CSO population estimates are based, the largest group cited as emigrating (and thus contributing to the first 12-month period of net emigration from Ireland since 1995) is ‘EU 10’ nationals (i.e. those from the Eastern and Central Europe whose countries became members of the EU in 2004). Any discussion of ethnic demography in contemporary Ireland must therefore be qualified: what counts as diversity? What type of migration is viewed as problematic and why? By whom?

Integration and Social Change

Two tales reveal end points on the spectrum of what is considered problematic and successful integration for international migrants: the Brazilians of Gort, and the school-admissions crisis of Dublin 15.

Between the late 1990s and 2007, when the Irish economy was expanding, the small town of Gort, in County Galway, became home to an estimated 1,500 Brazilians, mainly from Anápolis (a city in a rural state in central Brazil). The bulk of them came from a meat-packing plant that closed in Brazil to a meat-packing plant in Ireland with a labour shortage. However, people later branched out into other fields of work, and made up half the town’s population. This proportion began to shrink after 2007 when the recession began to bite, and many left the area, either to return to Brazil or try their luck elsewhere (Dowd 2009). There are few reports of tension between locals and newcomers in a situation that appears from the testimonies of local Irish and Brazilians (Sheringham 2009) to have been largely positive for all concerned.

In Dublin, figures from the 2006 Census (CSO 2006) indicate that the spatial concentration of minorities is at its highest in some Inner City and some North-West electoral divisions.

One high-profile outcome of rapid population growth in Blanchardstown (North-West Dublin, with the postcode Dublin 15) was the opening of what was described as Ireland’s ‘first all-black school’ in September 2007. In the early part of that year, schools in Balbriggan (an area in Blanchardstown) were receiving very high numbers of applications at both primary and secondary levels.

Prospective pupils were being refused admission based on the criterion that places were reserved for Catholics only. Remember that the vast majority of public education in the Republic is still provided through the Church bodies, mainly Catholic, but also Protestant. Over the summer holidays, a new school was established very quickly by Educate Together (a non-denominational charity) (Sharrock 2007). Its first intake was comprised of around 80 black children (primarily those of Nigerian and Congolese migrants) who had been unable to find school places elsewhere in the area. Two major reports have addressed the issue of school admissions in Ireland; McGorman and Sugrue (2007), who focus on Dublin 15; and the ESRI report that has a national scope (Smyth et al. 2009).

The context for this is the area’s rapid population growth. Between 2002 and 2006 the population in the school’s electoral division increased by more than three times the national average. Indeed, Blanchardstown-Blakestown increased more than any electoral division in the country (by nearly 8,000 from a starting point of 24,400, i.e. +33 %). Other wards saw their populations treble or multiply by two and a half. Amid this population increase has also come local settlement of non-white migrants in the area (at least 13 % overall in 2006) and in some electoral divisions, between 1,000 and 2,000. Using ‘qualification for rent supplement’ (a welfare benefit) as a proxy, estimates are that 60 % of the claimants are non-Irish nationals, and by far the largest group of the latter are African (61 %), especially from Nigeria and DRC, followed by Central and Eastern Europe (28 %). The overall younger demographic is according to Mc Gorman and Sugrue (2007), an urgent educational issue

because the number of school-age children also rose dramatically between 2004 and 2006. Attention to the proportion of children with English language support (ELS) for the area's schools shows highly demarcated patterns; some have fewer than 20 % in this category, while two have more than 50 %. Moreover, more than 1 in 4 ELS pupils are from Central and Eastern Europe, so it should be borne in mind that the correspondence between ethnic background and English language support requirements is more complicated than white/non-white. Indeed, around 1 in 3 visible minority residents are Anglophone (including Nigerians) and therefore do not require ELS. The Dublin 15 report also notes a high turnover in movement from schools with an ethnic base:

In relation to Irish children, 82 pupils left in the period while only 40 joined these classes. This represents a movement of 2:1 out of Dublin 15 by Irish pupils. By contrast, the number of newcomer children joining these classes was 152, which represented 79 % of the total cohort of new children joining (McGorman and Sugrue 2007, p. 59).

The corresponding ratio for foreign national children was 5:3 into Dublin 15 (i.e. for every three that left, five came in). So, is this the Irish version of 'white flight'? The *Sunday Tribune* ran a series of articles on ethnic segregation in November 2007 (Sunday Tribune Editorial 2007; McMorrow 2007; Bracken 2007; McInerney 2007). In relation to McGorman and Sugrue's report on Dublin 15 and the Balbriggan school incident, interviewees who were headteachers in Cork, Dublin and Roscommon (Sunday Tribune Editorial 2007) suggested that some schools were deliberately excluding non-Irish children (by hiding behind 'sibling' and/or 'Catholics-only' policies), and that there was a current of 'white flight' to these schools. McGorman and Sugrue's figures certainly indicate discrepancies in the proportions of minority children in different schools, and between who is moving into and out of Dublin 15 schools. Moreover, in a more critical report, Smyth et al. (2009, p. 60) conclude that current criteria for admissions implemented by Irish schools; siblings, date of application, religion, children of past pupils or current staff, primary

school attended, –combine to discriminate against newly-arrived families. They go on to argue that there is more clustering of 'newcomer children' at primary than secondary level, and there is a trend of parents removing white Irish children from schools known as 'newcomer schools' (Ibid., 68).

It is clear that there are a variety of social changes simultaneously occurring in North-West Dublin (such as large-scale building development without the corresponding infrastructure; capacity for private rented accommodation that attracts migrant families; demographic bulge in the young school-age children cohort; the State's failure to plan for demographic shifts), and this story is not only about racial discrimination. However it is an excellent case study exactly because it demonstrates interconnected processes, and how institutional racism functions in the middle of a set of processes that are not necessarily about 'race' at all. We might think of the discourse around the Citizenship Referendum (2004), (below) as a national discussion of the issues raised locally in Balbriggan. One last story concentrates on the role of the State in controlling ethnic demography.

The Citizenship Referendum, June 2004

As a case study of how ideas about the nation, belonging and demography fit together, you would be hard pressed to find a richer story. This referendum raises some pertinent issues about how nation-states reflect on ethnicity and link it to membership. Details and interpretations can be found in a number of studies (Lubhéid 2004; Garner 2007; Lele 2008), so here we will present a brief overview, identifying only the most salient elements.

Ireland's nationality laws prior to 2004 allowed for *jus soli*, i.e. the right to citizenship obtained through being born in Ireland. In March 2004, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Michael McDowell, announced that there would be a referendum on changing the wording of article 9 of the constitution, which

relates to citizenship. The Minister's amendment was aimed at restricting the right to citizenship based on place of birth, so that not every child born on the island of Ireland could claim citizenship through *jus soli*. The amendment would add qualifications to this right, based on the length of time for which the child's *parents* had been legally resident in Ireland. In the event, the amendment was carried by just under 80 % of the vote, and the ensuing Citizenship Act (2005) stands today. The constitutional amendment aimed to divide Irish children into two groups: those whose parents were Irish nationals already and those that were not, and then treat the rights of the children differently in each case, with the latter having no access to citizenship unless the parents had been legally resident for 3 years prior to the child's birth (time spent as an asylum seeker awaiting a decision did not count). What has this got to do with ethnicity and demography?

The only people for whom the child's nationality would provide them with advantages in terms of rights were non-EU citizens. Over the period since 1985 there has been a relentless trend toward a unified core European Union immigration policy, and now, the most salient line of distinction within EU immigration regimes is not the one dividing Belgian from Greek, or Irish from Spanish, for example, but the one distinguishing EU nationals from non-EU nationals (Or 'Third-Country Nationals', to use EU parlance). As treaties now enable EU citizens to reside and work in other EU nations without visas or work permits, there has been a concomitant tightening of external border controls, a phenomenon loosely referred to as 'Fortress Europe'. The difference in the rights open to a non-EU national living in Ireland (maybe waiting for an asylum application to be processed, or on a 1-year work permit, for example), and a non-EU national *whose child is Irish* (born in Ireland) is significant: *de facto* unlimited right of residence, access to social security, employment, etc. This is because a December 1989 supreme court ruling ('Fajujonu') granted non-Irish parents the right to reside in Ireland with their Irish children according to articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution (on the position of the family in Irish society). So, for

EU nationals this right is not advantageous: they already have the equivalent (and more). The only people who could benefit from this form of access are non-EU nationals. In the case of Ireland, this means asylum seekers and people on work permits. While clearly this does include white Eastern Europeans, Australians, Americans, Canadians, etc., the majority of the potential public that would benefit are African, Asian and Latin American. Moreover, at the same time, the right of people with one Irish grandparent but who have never set foot in Ireland to obtain Irish citizenship, is unaffected by the change to the law voted in the referendum. The constitutional amendment thus constitutes institutional racism, i.e. discriminates against some groups of people while offering advantage to another, based on blood lines.

So what is this story about? If we go to the context in which the referendum was announced this will become clearer. Minister McDowell argued that a proportion of children born in Ireland over the previous year had been born to 'non-national' mothers, and that he had been asked by the Masters (senior executives) of Dublin hospitals to do something about this phenomenon, because it was jeopardising the hospitals' capacity to provide adequate maternity care. The Masters later denied having approached the Minister in this way, and the figure cited by McDowell turned out to include all births including those to foreign women who were in Ireland legally, but the facts are of secondary importance to this tale: the object is growing concerns about differential rates of fertility, and the strain on limited national resources.

Lele (2008) points out that fertility was actually low, and by the 2002–2006 period, it had only just regained the 1986 figure. However, he maintains that the context was that of a 'perfect storm' of factors: net out-migration in previous times meant that there were fewer women of childbearing age. There was a higher fertility rate but fewer babies born. Yet by 2004, life expectancy was up; in-migration was superior to out-migration; there were more childbearing age women in Ireland; and women were, on average, having children later. Indeed over that intercensal period of 2002–2006 – only 1 % of

babies were born to non-EU mothers. Lele concludes that:

It is clear that the recent increase in births is an increase only relative to the immediate previous 15 years, during a time of chronic emigration, and the more recent increase in births also stands in relation to lower overall fertility. Part of my argument is that the discussions surrounding population growth were due to a number of forces: lower total fertility rate, return migration, slight increase in births, lower infant/child mortality, higher life expectancy, inflow of foreign (US) capital, immigration from new EU countries as well as from countries not part of the EU, and other effects of EU membership. In short, lower fertility and higher immigration serve as sensitive cultural indices of European modernity and the 2004 Citizenship Referendum is its overt political symbol (Lele 2008, p. 10).

Moreover, the debates around constitutional change ran in parallel with the more longstanding racialisation of discourse on immigration and asylum. The association of ideas underpinning the successful campaign to change the Constitution linked non-white migrants to access to welfare without having paid contributions (Garner 2004). Despite the mainly Eastern European and 'returning Irish migrant' character of the (much more numerous) economic migrant body, political discourse had amalgamated immigration and asylum, and focused on their non-white and Roma components. The concept of 'citizenship tourism' (women travelling in advanced stages of pregnancy in order to deliver children in Ireland so that the child got Irish nationality) was coined in 2004 (Breen et al. 2006). Yet anxieties had coalesced around this notion even before it had been turned into an issue by the 'Yes' campaign during the referendum. Among the ways in which popular response expressed itself were verbal and physical abuse of black and Asian women, particularly pregnant ones (Lentin 2003). The racialised and gendered body of the Other thus became, for some, the illicit conduit to Irishness in a period when national identity was being transformed by economic growth, rising immigration and ethnic diversification of the population.

The 'search for modernity', as Lele calls it, is thus expressed not only in the low birthrate, but

in the State's struggle to control access to citizenship and inflect it in a particular way: to dissuade some bodies from embarking on a path to Ireland in the first place. Irish demography then is about biopower (Foucault 2003) through the Census, the Citizenship Referendum, and managing messages of economic growth and decline. Despite the pro-Amendment lobby's much-repeated claim in 2004 that the change to the citizenship laws was nothing to do with 'race' or ethnicity, the objectives of the Irish state here were to manipulate membership of 'the nation' in terms of bloodlines. If it were not so, then why change the qualifications in this particular way, at that particular moment?

The contingency of the 2004 moment is worth reflecting on. As this chapter was being finalised, the economy was contracting to the point of a multi-billion euro bail out by the European Union, former Minister McDowell has withdrawn from politics, and the numbers of Irish people leaving the country is returning to pre-1996 levels (Beesley 2010). Indeed the 2009 population estimates indicate that emigrants outnumber immigrants for the first time in 14 years (CSO 2009). This is in spite of lower death levels and a spike in births since 2008, meaning that the Republic of Ireland's natural population growth and rate of emigration are –simultaneously – the highest in the European Union as of 2009.

Conclusions

Faced with the atypical political landscapes of the Republic (nationalist and populist, devoid of a feasible Left), and Northern Ireland (an ideological cul-de-sac of consociationalism), it is tempting for political scientists to stress Irish exceptionalism. The same temptation is present as regards ethnic demography.

It would be possible to construct a narrative that centres the Catholic-Protestant divide as the narrative spine of Irish demographic politics. The politicisation of ethnicity (if religion is ethnic identity) and its specific concomitant political and paramilitary formations could thus be viewed as an inevitable outcome of centuries of ethnic

conflict over control of resources and territory. However, this perspective sidelines the national question (or at least relegates it to a position secondary to religion) and also ignores the significant changes deriving from the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement (1998), and the transition to a country of immigration (1996–2008). These two events have already begun to impact upon long-standing patterns of identification and ways of thinking about Ireland as a single political space.

The inter-connectedness of both political entities and the overlaying of territory, culture and bloodlines is illuminated by the ‘Chen ruling’ sub-plot to the Republic’s 2004 Citizenship Referendum (see above). Prior to the 2005 Citizenship Act (passed as a result of the referendum), children born in Ireland acquired Irish nationality through *ius soli*. In December 1989, the Supreme Court’s ‘Fajujonu’ Ruling had established a precedent for non-nationals to obtain the right of residence through having children *born in Ireland* (who were *de facto* Irish). The Supreme Court judges agreed that Irish children are entitled to the ‘company and protection’ of their family (as set out in Articles 41 and 42 of 1937 Constitution). This of course occurred at a time when Ireland was still a country of mass emigration. By 1998, the year of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement however, the number of immigrants had begun to outnumber that of emigrants.

The 1998 Agreement led to a series of constitutional adjustments, both North and South of the border. As a *quid pro quo* for the Irish government formally relinquishing designs on the whole territory of Ireland (as set out in the 1937 Constitution), the nationalists obtained a geographical extension of the compass of Irish nationality, as hitherto anyone *born* on the island of Ireland is offered ‘membership of the nation’. The subsequent Citizenship Act, 2001 thus granted Irish nationality directly to nationalists in the North, who had previously only been able to claim nationality through a grandparent born before 1922.

One of the major arguments put forward by the Minister for Justice, Michael McDowell in favour of amending the Constitution to restrict Irish nationality rested on the Chen case, then

before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ‘Chen’ decision was referred to as an exemplar of the phenomenon labelled ‘citizenship tourism’. Man Levette Chen, a Chinese national resident in the UK with her husband and one child, had been refused long-term residence rights. She did not want to return to China when she became pregnant with her second child because of the ‘one child’ rule there. On her lawyer’s advice, she travelled to Belfast (Northern Ireland / the UK) to give birth so that her ‘Irish Born Child’ (in the Irish Department of Justice parlance), Catherine, would benefit from an EU nationality. This in turn would guarantee her mother residence rights in the UK: provided she would have no recourse to public funds, a crucial criterion for the ECJ. In May 2004, the ECJ Advocate-General ruled in Chen’s favour, overturning the British Supreme Court’s decision to deport her, a decision later ratified by the ECJ in October.¹⁵

What is extraordinary is that Chen made no claim on Irish state resources; she never set foot in the Irish Republic; and her daughter was born in a British NHS hospital. Yet her case was held up by Minister McDowell as the thin end of the wedge, indicative of the alleged overburdening of Irish maternity services. ‘Irish citizenship law’, argued the Minister, was ‘being used in an attempt to circumvent UK immigration control through the exercise of EU free movement rights’.¹⁶

So in this element of the story, questions arising from the overlapping territorial jurisdiction of the Irish Citizenship Act, 2001, brought into play the UK government; the National Health Service in Northern Ireland, the ECJ; the Chinese State and the Irish state. As of 2004, Chen’s daughter could claim Irish nationality through being born in Belfast (thanks to the changes embodied in the 2001 Citizenship Act); the consequence for Chen, a Chinese national, was that she could be quite confident of being granted Irish residence rights. This was a legal safety net for her, but an incident undermining the integrity of the Irish immigration system, for McDowell. To grasp the complexities of the multi-layered set of processes that constitute Irish identity in the early twenty-first century, we require frames of reference far wider than the simplistic Catholic v Protestant

binary, however influential this still is for the Irish polity, particularly in the North.

Finally, we have been concerned here to focus on the State as the key ‘ethnic demographer’, and try to find ways in which its ‘demographisation’ of Ireland can be seen clearly or made more visible. So while we have focused in the sections on the North and the Republic on projects to do with exclusion, it should be pointed out that such discourses are not one-way traffic; that there are also shades of understanding of Irishness as being far more complicated, processual and open-ended than can be gleaned from the limited but highly illustrative examples provided.

One part of this discourse, to finally underscore the fallacy of the binary construction of Irishness, stresses three points;

To reiterate Feldman’s (2003) argument that the new immigration has already engendered increasing complexity even if you look at what it means to be Catholic or Protestant in Ireland in the twenty-first century. The identifications and allegiances with the various forms of nationalism and the stories about what Ireland is are not necessarily shared by those swelling the ranks of the Catholic or Protestant churches.

Second, the unique case of the North of Ireland actually highlights and illustrates wider points, and cannot be locked away in its own exceptional experience. Andrew Finlay (2007) argues compellingly that the peace process in its institutional form in the North reflects the paradox of liberalism and multiculturalism (i.e. the individual as the basis of rights-distribution v. the community). Its Irish version relies on a binary view, forcing people to identify with one or other tradition, even if they don’t want to, and thus providing an obstacle to cultural pluralism rather than an including and enabling mechanism to allow the plural part to flourish. In the existing set-up, there can only be two elements in the plural.

Lastly, commentators have indeed been discussing the profound social and cultural changes since the 1960s, and the different permutations of Irishness for a long time. Fintan O’Toole (1999) neatly sums up this recognition of change in an article concisely summing up the distinctions between Irishness as a nationalist project, and the

way people actually live out their Irishness(es?) at the end of the twentieth century. He concludes:

It is worth remembering, too, that nobody, anywhere, has ever been able to define a nation clearly except by a process of exclusion and, in extreme cases, of elimination. The Irishness which was invented in the early years of this century wasn’t the work of God or nature, it was a political project. As such, it achieved a certain kind of simplicity only by excluding large categories of Irish people, including, in its purest versions, anyone who wasn’t Catholic, nationalist, rural, living in Ireland, and, preferably, heterosexual male.

One of the reasons we are losing a clear sense of Irishness, in other words, is because we have stopped telling these comforting lies about ourselves. Whole varieties of Irish people who always existed have merely become visible.

Notes

1. Texts of the Penal laws are available @: <http://library.law.umn.edu/irishlaw/>
2. Joe Lee in *The Modernisation of Irish Society* (Dublin: Gill) in his review of the published scholarship, suggests that realistic estimates are of the order of ‘at least 800,000’.
3. As yet, there appears to be no academic literature addressing emigration during times of economic growth (c. 1995–2006).
4. Analysis of the census figures shows a ‘dissimilarity index’, a measure of segregation on a scale from 0 to 100, for Belfast of 39.3 in 1901 and 1911 and 49.4 in 1926.
5. Figures from CAIN website: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/religion.htm#1a>
6. The lower figure only refers ‘to families which contacted either official or unofficial agencies; so they exclude many of those who squatted without informing any agency, many of those which emigrated or which moved to Britain or the Republic of Ireland, private homeowners who sold their houses and families who sought refuge with their relations’ (Darby 1974, p. 109).
7. These figures are a reflection of the fact that the local security forces were predominantly Protestant.

8. Figures are derived from the *Sutton Index of Deaths*, available on the CAIN website at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/index.html>
9. GFR is defined as the number of children aged 0–4 per 1,000 women aged 15–44 years.
10. The debate in the Northern Ireland Assembly <http://www.theyworkforyou.com/ni/?id=2009-01-27.5.1>
11. According to estimates from 2008 ‘the city is roughly equally split between those people of a ‘Protestant and other Christian’ community background (48.6 %) and those people of a ‘Catholic’ community background (47.2 %): Belfast City Council website: <http://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/factsandfigures/demographics.asp>
12. This law is the blueprint for the creation of the offence of ‘intentional trespass’, put forward by the incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in the UK in 2010: a tool aimed squarely at Travellers who have settled in camps where planning permission is applied for retrospectively.
13. Establishment of the Equality Authority, 2000; Equal Employment Act, 1998; Equal Status Act, 2000.
14. Asylum applications outnumbered work permits issued only in 1999.
15. The Chen decision (2004) can be found at: <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&newform=newform&alljur=alljur&jurcdj=jurcdj&jurtpi=jurtpi&jurftp=jurftp&alldocrec=alldocrec&docj=docj&docor=docor&docop=docop&docppoag=docppoag&docav=docav&docsom=docsom&docinf=docinf&alldocnorec=alldocnorec&docnoj=docnoj&docnoor=docnoor&radtypeord=on&typeord=ALL&docnodecision=docnodecision&allcommjo=allcommjo&affint=affint&affclose=affclose&numaff=&ddatefs=&mdatefs=&ydatefs=&ddatefe=&mdatefe=&ydatefe=&nomusuel=chen&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100&Submit=Submit>
16. Speech by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Michael McDowell, on Private Members Motion in Seanad Éireann on 7 March 2004. The theme was repeated for example, in his speech at the launch of

the Progressive Democrats’ referendum campaign, on 25 May 2004, and in his *Irish Times* article, ‘Yes’, on 13 June 2004.

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Marie des Neiges Léonard

The question of racial and ethnic statistics is part of a debate in France that has been going on for 20 years now (Simon 2008): indeed France's census (performed by the INSEE, Institut National de la Statistique et des études économiques or National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) does not include racial or ethnic categories. Furthermore, it is illegal for French structures and institutions (schools, universities, employers, corporations and public administrations) to request and hold information that includes racial or ethnic categories. In fact, it is also even unusual that anyone would use the words minority, minorities, or minority groups in every-day language. Arguably this would make France one color-blind society by definition.

At the same time, over the years, there have been several attempts –mostly unsuccessful- by scholars, non-governmental organizations and also elected officials, to argue in favor of the inclusion of ethnic statistics, as it has come to be called. The most recent attempt came from a group of local elected officials from different minority groups who advocate a change in the law.¹ However, a report written by the Comedd

(Comité pour la mesure de la diversité et l'évaluation des discriminations, or Committee for the measure of diversity and the evaluation of discriminations, presided by demographer François Héran)² claims that no law is needed as France already has the necessary statistical tools to measure the diversity of the French population. And then finally, 2012 presidential candidate and socialist François Hollande proposes to eliminate the word “race” altogether that is in Article 1 of the French Constitution: “there is no place for race in the Republic”.³

This chapter will first present a demographic profile and trends of France, and then expose the methodological and theoretical issues related to the seemingly color-blindness of the French census.

Demographic Profile and Trends of France (See Table 25.1)

As published in the 2012 INSEE report (Pla and Beaumel 2012), by January 2012, France counts more than 65 million inhabitants, 51.6 % of which are women. France is the second largest country of the European Union in geographical area, second most populated country of the E.U. (right behind Germany) Indeed, in January 2011, 12.9 % of the 502 million of Europeans reside in

¹Le Monde, 08-18-2011.

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²Le Monde, 05-02-2010.

³Le Point, 11-03-2012.

Table 25.1 Summary demographic data for the French population (INSEE)

Statistics	Value (rank in EU out of 27 member states)	Average EU
Population	65 M (2nd)	–
Population density	99.6 per km ² (14th)	116 per km ²
% women	51.6 (–)	51.2
Life expectancy	F: 84.8 (–), M: 78.2 (–)	F: 81.9, M: 78.9
Fertility	2.01 (2nd)	1.59
Mean age of women having first born	30.1 (–)	–
% childless women	10 % (–)	–

France, for 16.3 % in Germany, compared with 12.4 % in England and 12.1 % in Italy. France is only fourteenth in terms of population density. Sixty percent of the population in France is concentrated on 8 % of the French territory and urban centers are experiencing the most population growth. Life expectancy is 84.8 years on average for women, for 78.2 years on average for men.

Fertility (See Table 25.1)

France has the second highest fertility rate of the European Union with 2.01 children born per woman (right behind Ireland with 2.02, and well before Germany with 1.39 children born per woman). The average fertility rate for the European Union is 1.59 in 2010. The numbers are low in Southern and Central Europe (like Germany, Italy, Spain or Poland) and higher in Nordic countries and well as in the United Kingdom. Experts ponder about France's high fertility rate and it seems that the French exception still puzzles social scientists (Badinter 2010): if France and Ireland are both Catholic nations, the influence of the Church in France is very low compared with Ireland, and contraception and abortion rights are both legal and widely socially accepted in France. Immigration does not explain the fertility rate either for France: according to the Pla's and Beaumel's analysis (2012), if immigrant women fertility rate is higher in the first years, the next generation tends to reach the level of French nationals.

Additionally, in 2012, the mean age of women having their first birth is 30.1, which would show that having children isn't a priority in terms of age. Some have argued that the pro-birth policies by the French government (maternity leave policies, free daycares, subsidies for families) have helped push the fertility rate (Badinter 2010). However, those policies are far less generous and less thorough than those of Scandinavian nations (Sweden, Finland), and yet these countries have lower fertility rates than France (Badinter 2010). Finally, what distinguishes French women compared with their European counterparts is that very few of them choose not to have children at all (Badinter 2010). One out of 10 woman in France will not have children ever in their life (which has not changed much from the 1940s), compared with 17 % in England, 20 % in Austria and 29 % for Germany. Demographers and sociologists predict an increase in the number of "childless" women (childless by choice).

These dynamic demographic numbers can be explained by a high birth rate and a relatively low death rate, as well as the net migration rate to a lesser extent. By comparison, Belgium and Sweden have a population growth superior to that of France since 2006, but it mostly is due to immigration rather than natural population growth.

Marriages and Unions

In the 2011 INSEE report (Davie 2011), the number of marriages in 2011 was estimated to be 241,000, which continues to decline since the peak of 2000 (with more than 305,000 marriages). More French adults seem to favor civil union pacts to make their relationships official. This pact, called PACS (Pacte Civil de Solidarité or Pact of Civil Union), is essentially a "contract between two adult persons, of different sexes or of the same sex, to organize their cohabitation." It was promulgated by the Law of 15 November 1999. It sets the rights and obligations of the parties in terms of material support, housing, estate, taxes and social rights. However, it has no effect on the rules of parentage and parental authority if one of the parties is already a parent. The PACS

may be dissolved at the request of one of the two parties by sending a declaration to the court of instance. It is automatically broken by the marriage or death of one of the two parties. In 2010, 251,000 marriages were celebrated while 195,000 PACS had been contracted between partners of opposite sexes (three PACS for four marriages). Same sex partners represent 6 % of all the PACS and 64 % of those same sex PACS are men. It is between age 27 and 31 that the percentage of PACS is the highest, and after 34 years old the percentage decreases. Amongst individuals age 39, 60 % are married, 7 % are divorced and only 2 % are PACS. Almost half (46 %) of the individuals between age 18 and 39 who are in a PACS are without children. According to the INSEE analysis (Davie 2011), it is very possible that the people in a PACS decide to get married before having children because the PACS does not guarantee the same rights as marriage does regarding filiation and parental rights.

Additionally, as explained in a 2014 INSEE report (Bellamy and Beaumel 2014), France passed a law legalizing same sex marriage in May 2013, and since then it is estimated that 7,000 same sex couples have celebrated their marriage in 2013. Three same sex couples out of five are men. According to the 2014 INSEE report, the French Census now estimates that 1 % of all couples in France are same sex couples, and 60 % of this percentage are male couples. Furthermore, there are now ten countries in Europe that have adopted same sex marriage between 2001 and 2014 (the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Portugal, Iceland, Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, from the oldest to the most recent year of adoption).

As Buisson and Lapinte (2013) note, sharing residence as a married heterosexual couple is one of the forms of conjugality in France, but it isn't the only one anymore. Current demographic trends show a significant evolution of patterns of behavior in terms of conjugality. New surveys, Buisson and Lapinte (2013) point out, need to capture the increasing diversity of households in terms of conjugality. For example, Buisson and Lapinte (2013) show that aside from heterosexual married couples, new census surveys are counting

people living under the PACS regime, same sex married couples, heterosexual or same-sex couples in de-facto unions, unmarried and un-PACSeD couples who live in separate residences.

French, Immigrants and Foreigners (See Table 25.2)

The INSEE reports make a distinction between French by birth, French by acquisition of the French nationality, and then immigrants and foreigners. In 2008, the French persons by birth represent 89.8 % of the total population (of then 62.1 million); the number of French persons by acquisition of the nationality is 4.4 %.

The INSEE defines foreigners as individuals who live in France but do not possess French nationality. A foreigner is not necessarily an immigrant and may have been born in France. By contrast, under the terms of the definition adopted by the HCI (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration or High

Table 25.2 Summary statistics of nationality and ethnicity of people living in France on record (INSEE) in 2011

Statistics	Value 2011
% French persons by birth	89 ^a
% of French persons by acquisition of nationality	4.4 ^a
% of immigrants living in France	8.4
% of Foreigners living in France	5.8
% of immigrants women	50
% of all immigrants less than 30 years old	15
% of all immigrants 60 or older	36
% of all immigrants from Europe	38
% of all immigrants from Africa	42.5
% of all immigrants from Asia	14.2
% of all immigrants have been in France for at least 40 years	20
% of all immigrants have been in France for 10–40 years	50
% of all immigrants have been in France for less than 10	30
Direct descendants of all immigrants (in % of the population)	11
% of direct descendants of immigrants between ages 18 and 50	50

^a2008 data

Council for Integration), an immigrant is a person who is born a foreigner and abroad, and resides in France. Immigrant status is permanent: an individual will remain part of the immigrant population even if they acquire French nationality. It is the country of birth, and not nationality at birth that determines the geographical origin of an immigrant.

According to a 2011 report published by the INSEE (Breuil-Genier et al. 2011), 8.4 % of individuals who live in France are immigrants (or 5.3 millions) and 5.8 % are foreigners (or 3.7 millions). Half of all the immigrants are women, 15 % are less than 30 years old and 36 % are 60 or older. Amongst immigrants, 38 % are from Europe (place of birth), 42.5 % are from Africa (Maghreb and other African countries), and 14.2 % are from Asia (including Turkey). According to Tavan (2005), after having doubled between 1946 and 1975, the number of immigrants has very moderately increased, but has remained stable. As explained by Breuil-Genier et al. (2011), the years of residence in France of those populations are a reflection of the different waves of immigration. The most senior (in number of years in France) immigrants mostly come from Southern Europe (36 % of immigrants who have been in France for 40 years or more), particularly Spain and Italy. The development of Algerian immigration started around the 1950s (Breuil-Genier et al. 2011) and has progressed ever since. In 2008, 25 % of immigrants from Algeria have been in France for 40 years or more, whereas 29 % have lived in France for less than 10 years. Generally, 20 % of all immigrants have lived in France for at least 40 years, 50 % have lived in France since 10–40 years, and 30 % arrived in France less than 10 years ago.

Additionally, direct descendants of immigrants represent 11 % of the population in France (6.5 millions): amongst those, almost half are between age 18 and 50, and among this group, half have only one parent who is an immigrant. According to Breuil-Genier et al. (2011), the origin of the parents is connected to the history of the different immigration waves mentioned above.

Summary

Beumel and Breuil-Genier (2011) show that in 30 years, between 1981 and 2011, France's population increased by ten million inhabitants. This growth is superior to the three other most populated European Union nations (three million for Germany, four million for Italy, and six million for the United Kingdom). French demographers explain this growth in part with the high fertility rate France has experienced in the past 30 years. The interest in France's high fertility rate comes from the fact that although fertility is a significant factor in population growth, social scientists still ponder about factors explaining it, as discussed above. Life expectancy is a second factor explaining France's superior population growth over Germany and Italy, particularly for women (one of the highest in the European Union). As Beumel and Breuil-Genier (2011) note, the increase in life expectancy over the past 30 years translated into a population growth of 3.1 million people. A third factor explaining the significant population growth is the net migration indicator. Over 30 years, France's net migration exceeds two million people, comparable to that of the United Kingdom, whereas Germany's (six million) and Italy's (four million) net migration rates are superior to France's. The net migration rate has had a direct impact to population growth. Additionally, an indirect effect of net migration, as noted by Beumel and Breuil-Genier (2011), is that it increases the number of births in the long term. Combined, the direct and indirect effects of net migration account for three million of the demographic growth of France.

France's demographic trends of population growth, high fertility rate, transformation in the marriage and union landscape, as well as immigration patterns are all pertinent reflections of social changes. The specific demographic trends explored above are also representative of the challenges that member states of the European Union are all facing, since the more important concerns the EU faces are related to fertility rates, an ageing population and the migration flows. Finally, France's demographic patterns also reflect the changes in how a society chooses

to enumerate its people. However, as this chapter demonstrates, the remarkable absence of racial and ethnic categories in the French census makes it challenging for social scientists to get a complete picture of demographic trends and issues.

Current Structure and Contradictions of the French Census Regarding Race and Ethnicity

The census in France is operated by agents (public servants recruited by the mayor of each town in France). They receive a training from the city and from the INSEE. The INSEE is in charge of the production, analysis and dissemination of official population statistics in France. It is a public administration that is attached to the Minister of Economy, Industry and Employment, but it is by law (2008) independent professionally from the government.

As Monson and de Saint Pol (2007) show, although under the Ancien Régime, information was collected by officials in the form of “hearth rolls” for the kingdom, there was no notion of a direct population census for the entire nation. It is only in the eighteenth century, with the “police act” of July 22, 1791, that we see the introduction of the notion of a direct census (Monson and de Saint Pol 2007). However, to be more precise, “if, by census population, we mean a detailed per-capita listing of a country’s inhabitants, we can say that no true general census was conducted in France before the nineteenth century.” (Monson and de Saint Pol 2007) Then in 1833 France established a Statistical Office (Bureau des Statistiques) and started to conduct a census every 5 years. This is also the time when we witness the construction of the French nation-state (Monson and de Saint Pol 2007).

Missing Data: Social and Historical Context of the Census

A close look at demographic data from the INSEE shows data about sex, age, nationality, country of

origin, immigration status, matrimonial status, professional status, residence, etc....which the law authorizes, but no data regarding racial or ethnic categories, as seen in the American census. “It is the rule, it is the interdiction”, that “we cannot collect and treat data which only goal is to classify people according to their ethnic origins”, says Marie-Hélène Mitjavile (2011, State Advisor at the CNIL or Commission nationale informatique et libertés, or CNIL).⁴

Indeed, French society does not legally acknowledge race or ethnicity as a social identity marker. Officially, ‘race’ or racial categories do not exist in the census, on the job market or in the school system. So not only the census doesn’t count race, but other public (schools, universities) and private institutions (corporations) are not allowed to collect information about someone’s race or ethnicity for the purpose of classifying them. Furthermore, it also means that those institutions (INSEE, INED, CNIL)⁵ do not have a working definition of race or ethnicity. Again, a closer look at their website shows a remarkable absence of definitions for race or ethnicity. The closest data to a possible ethnic origin has to do with the national origin of immigrants, foreigners, the acquisition of nationality, or something about the former colonies. Monson and de Saint Pol (2007) explain that the point of the census is to give a picture of different characteristics of the population and that looking at the national origin wasn’t a priority originally. It was added gradually, connected to the migration flows and also changes in French nationality law (Monson and de Saint Pol 2007). The conceptualization of the foreigner, in regards to the idea of nationality emerged relatively recently (Weil 2002). The first law on “nationality” appeared in the Napoleonic Civil Code, although the concept itself only appeared later in the early nineteenth century. And so, they conclude, the term ‘nationality’

⁴Le Monde, 25/07/2011.

⁵INED: Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques or National Institute of Demographic Studies; CNIL: Commission Nationale de l’informatique et des libertés or National Commission of information technology and liberties.

coincides with the implementation of the first real census of the French population. By the late nineteenth century there was a shift from the concept of the foreigner to the idea of the ‘immigrant’. Then was the debate and issue of how to deal with ‘naturalized French’ individuals. Since 1851, the census categorizes people into three positions in terms of nationality, distinguishing French by birth, French by acquisition and foreigners (Simon 2003).

Furthermore, not only racial or ethnic categories (including the category of “minorities”) are absent from the French census, but they are seldom used in social science studies. In France, the CNIL (National Commission for Information Technology and Liberties) decides of the legal frame for all surveys in France that include so-called “sensible” questions (i.e. questions about religious, organization membership, or health condition and sexual preferences). In that regard, French law authorizes data collection based on nationality or the birth place of an individual and his/her parents, but it forbids collecting data regarding the “real or presumed” racial or ethnic origin. This idea is based on eighteenth century values from the French Revolution with the emergence of a new republican citizenship: when France became a Republic, its social actors all became citizens of the Republic. Citizenship is then based on the universalistic Revolution principle “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”, which intends to integrate and ‘equalize’ everyone in rights.

However, it’s not as if France has never included specific data related to the status of individuals in its censuses. For example, there was the Livret d’ouvrier (first appearance in 1781, but abolished during the French Revolution, only to be reintroduced by Napoleon in 1803, and finally abandoned in 1890). It basically was a way to control the hours and movements of workers (because they had to have the livret with them stating when and where they worked). A worker without his livret was considered a vagabond and could be arrested and punished as such. The Livret was more than data collection, it was a means of social control of the workers.

Also, as noted by Monson and de Saint Pol (2007), during the Vichy regime from 1940 to 1944, the Germans ordered a census of Jews in the “northern zone (i.e. the part of France under direct Nazi occupation). At that point, there were two Jewish statutes that defined a person as Jewish 1) on the basis of the number of his/her Jewish grandparents, and 2) on the basis of religion. The statutes actually referred to the “Jewish race”, and this was not, as Monson and de Saint Pol (2007) note, imposed by the Nazis but was implemented by the Vichy government itself. These statutes were obviously motivated by anti-Jewish policies. According to Weil (2002), the Occupation marks an important moment of the “ethnic crises of French nationality.”

Finally, censuses that took place in French colonies enabled statisticians in Algeria to divide “French persons by birth” into two categories, “Muslims of Algerian origin” and “Other than Muslims of Algerian origin”. In other words, they made the distinction of whether the person was a “Muslim French person” or not (Kateb 2004).

Rhetoric and Semantics About the Current System

Héran (2005) argues that there is a misconception about the French census and the question of ethnic statistics. He says that it is in fact possible to differentiate French individuals in terms of their origins, and describe the origins of immigrants and their children who have acquired French nationality. So in other words, it is possible to know if people are French by birth or by acquisition of citizenship. This is in place since 1871. That way, the French census is perfectly capable, Héran (2005) argues, to estimate the number of “Polish, Italians, Spanish, Portuguese, Algerians, Turks, Vietnamese, etc....” who have acquired the French nationality.

There have been some public discussions about the semantics of French nationality as a social category. Simon and Stavo-Debaugé (2004) talk about the controversy of the demographers in 1999: that’s when a generic defiance

towards ethnic statistics emerged after a violent debate on the content of statistics regarding the status of immigrants in the census. The controversy opposed the believers of a status quo in terms of categories and the challengers who wanted to introduce new categories going beyond the nationality criteria. This controversy has been presented as the opposition between the “ethnicians” and the “republicans” (defenders of the ideals of the French Republic). From then on, the first camp has been convinced that including racial or ethnic categories will ethnicize France further in how individual experience their social relations and identities. The controversy was particularly violent because the stakes go beyond the simple scientific or technical aspect of the question. It is not just an issue of analytical concept or principles, for Simon and Stavou-Debaugé (2004), but it is about transforming the way experts and all individuals construct knowledge about their world and how they represent it.

Then in 2006, the INED proposed to measure the social integration of second generations of Turks and Moroccans: the idea got the authorization of the CNIL but not everyone’s support. For example, the leaders of MRAP (Movement Against Racism and for Friendship between Peoples), LDH (Human Rights League) and SOS Racisme, three major French human rights organizations, said that including race and ethnicity in census statistics was dangerous and unnecessary. They argued that including racial or ethnic categories was not “a necessity to fight against discrimination.”⁶ They claimed instead that it would legitimize the notion of “race” which has no scientific basis. Similarly, in 2007, under the initiative of Professor Jean-François Amadieu (director of the Observatory of Discriminations), about 30 researchers, union leaders and other associations leaders published a petition claiming that ethnic statistics were useless and dangerous. They all explain that the introduction in France of an ethno-racial reference and of the filing of the population according to such criteria would legitimize the notion of race which has no biological

character.⁷ Didier Fassin (2006a) explains that the reason the people concerned by the problem are in denial is because they just want to assimilate and “disappear”.

Furthermore, the case of the HALDE (Haute Autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité, or High Authority for the Struggle Against Discrimination and for Equality) brings some interesting contradictions. The mission of the HALDE, an independent administrative institution created in 2005 and dissolved in 2011 was to address and investigate all cases of discrimination (direct or indirect) and promote equality in rights on the French territory. The eighteen criteria of discrimination considered illegal have to do with: origin, sex, family status, pregnancy status, physical appearance, last name, health status, disability, genetic characteristics, morals, sexual orientation, age, political opinions, workers’ union activities, membership, real or assumed to be, in a particular ethnic group, a nation, a race or a religion. Despite this underlying acknowledgement of the existence of race and ethnicity as possible criteria of discrimination to be addressed, the HALDE fiercely opposes the inclusion of ethnic/racial data in census statistics and other data gathering processes.

Finally, Héran (2005) responds to the criticisms of color-blindness by saying that it is not that the French census is blind or in denial or avoiding consciously to recognize race, it is a “active opposition to take the ‘visible’ into consideration when it is about the fate of individuals.” Of course, Héran (2005) admits, everyone can perceive and see personal signs or symbols of differences (language, accent, last name, clothing, physical appearance) that may connect to a foreign origin, but in France, Héran (2005) says, there is an understanding that although visible in the public space, those differences should not be taken into consideration legally or practically when it comes to job or university applications. So in that perspective, the so-called color-blindness of the French census, Héran argues, is in fact a special effort to neutralize the differences

⁶Le Monde, 12-04-2007.

⁷Le Monde, 12-04-2007.

in that those differences are taken aside, in spite of their visibility. The whole idea behind this is to say that the French system is able to differentiate but does not discriminate.

Contradictions

The French Constitution proclaims that the French Republic, one and indivisible, only recognizes equal citizens, “without distinction of origin, race or religion.” On the one hand, it looks as if the French Constitution is trying to promote the idea of equality through a raceless society. But what it effectively does is in fact to pronounce the word race itself, which seems to be a contradiction in terms. In other words, how can something exist and be denied to exist in the same sentence? That is the core contradiction at the heart of the issue of race in France.

The law makes it illegal for any categories in the census to include racial categories of any population residing in France. As a matter of fact, the law says that keeping ethnic data in databases is illegal according to the Penal Code and can be severely punished. Additionally, according to Héran (2005), there is no need to create new categories when the census already has operating classifications. Indeed, Héran says (2005), the French system uses a pretty straightforward and simple category to describe the situation of the immigrants and French of immigrant descent in terms of their birth place and national origins. In Héran’s perspective (2005), it is similar to the ‘foreign-born’ category of the American census. However, it seems that this detailed categorization of national origins only focuses on immigrants and second generation immigrants or French of immigrant descent. As a matter of fact, it is a very typical expression in the French press when talking about minorities living the suburbs: there are no such categories as “ethnic minorities” but rather “French of immigrant descent” regardless of the fact that these may be France-born citizens. And finally, Héran (2005) explains that the law can actually authorize the use of racial and ethnic data under strict conditions and under exceptional circumstances, which also supports the idea that no new categories need be added.

In fact there are structures that seem to acknowledge the idea of race, racial or ethnic categories without calling it out officially. The 1978 law *Informatique et Libertés* classifies as “sensible data” (i.e. as a possible harm to people’s privacy) any questions related to ‘racial’, political, union, religious or philosophical membership. The word race is pronounced but not defined, said but immediately silenced. The experts at the CNIL, Héran (2005) argues, were wary of asking individuals about their ethnic heritage because of the confusion that might result; there may be several ethnic groups per country or several countries per ethnicity. In 1999, several organizations are created at the initiative of the government (but independent from the government) to look at, analyze, explain and combat discrimination based on (but not limited to) race and ethnicity: for example the GELD (Groupe d’Etude et de Lutte contre les Discriminations or Group to study and combat of Discrimination), CODAC (Commissions départementales d’accès à la citoyenneté or Departmental Commission for an access to citizenship) and FASILD (Fonds d’Action et de Soutien pour l’Intégration et la Lutte contre les Discriminations or Funds for Action and Support of Integration and Fight against Discriminations) are entities bringing together politicians, scholars and members of the civil society to discuss issues related to racism and discriminations. In 2000, the government put in place a free hotline to collect grievances of individuals who were victims of racial discrimination and who might want to engage in lawsuits. Following that path, after a 2001 law passed, employers accused of racial discrimination have the burden of proof of their innocence, when it was the reverse previously. Finally, the law of December 30th 2004 proclaims that everyone “has the right to equal treatment, regardless of his/her national origin, his/her membership, real or presupposed, in a ethnic group or a race” and it is this same law that also ratifies the creation of the HALDE.

Additionally, the STIC (Système de Traitement des Infractions Constatées or Database system of

reported infractions) is a police database that has for objective to identify the authors and victims of crimes, and contains detailed information on 8.7 % of the French population (or 5.5 million people). It includes about ten “types” (mediterranean-caucasian; african-antilles; metis and other; maghrebin; middle-easter; asian; indo-pakistani; latino-american; polynesian-melanasian).⁸ And the system Edvirsp (Exploitation documentaire et valorisation de l’information relative à la sécurité publique), also a police database, is a system of exploitation, documentation and valorization of information pertaining to public safety. It is supposed to be used particularly for counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence efforts.⁹ It collects racial/ethnic data, but excludes the data collection regarding health information or sexual orientation and sexuality. Both systems have been criticized by the CNIL and are controversial in the French public opinion, but for the question of individuals’ privacy rights, not specifically because of the collection of racial and ethnic data.

Also, at the corporate level, companies are using ethnic or racial statistics as a marketing tool (when targeting a specific population of customers). For example, the non-governmental organization against racism called SOS Racisme claims in their 2009 report (Thomas 2009) that several public or private entities in France have used ethnic or racial statistics to discriminate against minorities. It cites several case studies (hotels, restaurants, employment agencies, airline companies, entertainment industries) that are using ethnic statistics of their customers, clients or employees to establish quotas against minorities. Demographer François Héran says that identifying customers or clients with such or such profiling method is not necessarily a statistics because it is not measuring anything, so it’s not seen as problematic.¹⁰ But at the same time, in a 1998 report published by the HCI explicitly recognizes that most of the discrimi-

nations affect “French people of color, notably from overseas French territories or of non-European foreign origin.” Didier Fassin (2002) explains that this is a fundamental recognition that the basis for those inequalities are racial in nature and therefore that races are socially relevant and significant.

Furthermore, as noted by Didier Fassin (2006a), racial categories have been used by scholars in their research and teachings for the description of pathologies in France: for example, sickle-cell disease (the drépanocytose of the Blacks); Tay-Sachs disease (the Tay-Sachs disease of the Jews); cystic fibrosis (the mucoviscidose of the Caucasians).

Finally, in 2007, the Constitutional Council in France validated Article 13 of an immigration law introducing DNA testing regarding legal rights for foreigners, but at the same time it rejected Article 63 that would have allowed ethnic statistics. The DNA testing is supposed to help prospective migrants prove (by DNA) their links to relatives living in France. This bill was judged very controversial by many human rights groups in France who argue that the law is reminiscent of French policies under Nazi occupation that discriminated against Jews by virtue of their ‘biological’ heritage. However, the Constitutional Council made it clear that ethnic statistics were the “yellow line” not to cross.¹¹

Here resides the true paradox and maybe impasse of the color-blind French census. Simon (2003) says that on the one hand, social actors are creating their own categories which include race and/or ethnicity, “believe in their existence”, and also formulate stereotypes and prejudices based on those constructed and perceived racial or ethnic categories, which may in turn lead to discrimination; and on the other hand, there still isn’t a working legal or administrative definition of the word race, of the category race. For Simon (2003) though, the French census is actually, through the use of euphemisms (the “national origin” question), already acknowledging the existence of presupposed racial or ethnic characteristics.

⁸Le Monde, 04-12-2008.

⁹Le Monde, 04-12-2008.

¹⁰Le Monde, 05-02-2010.

¹¹Le Monde, 11-16-2007.

Explanation of a Malaise, Ambivalence of a Position

So there seems to be a contradiction between the discourses and practices. On the one hand, it is illegal to use racial or ethnic categories in the census with the reason that it would reinforce the stigmatization of minorities and support racism. But on the other hand, racial categories are already in use by different institutions and structures, however officially and controversial, and most French social scientists outside of the INSEE seem to agree that measuring racial or ethnic membership has become a necessity.

The question that many social scientists are asking is what is at the heart of this contradiction and what the implications of such avoidance are.

Terminology

First, the only concept mentioned in the French debate is “ethnicity” or ethnic categories, not race. And so for example, the debate has been presented in terms of “ethnic statistics” rather than racial statistics or statistics that would include race. In fact, explains Hérán,¹² legal scholars have used the word ethnic and racial as synonymous, when, as he notes, “anthropologists don’t accept that.”

Second, besides the categories mentioned above of immigrants, foreigners, French by birth, French by acquisition of nationality, there is an underlying category that social scientists use: “majority population”, defined as “all the French that are not immigrants or sons or daughters of immigrants or of persons born in the French overseas departments.” (Beauchemin et al. 2010) This “majority” group consists of French persons born abroad and their children born abroad, which includes repatriates from the former colonial empire and their children born in France. It also includes the grand-children of immigrants (Beauchemin et al. 2010). So according to that definition, people of color born in France and

of French nationality are part of the majority population.

According to Sabbagh and Peer (2008), the debates over ethnic statistics in France is a reflection of the degree of confusion “regarding both the kind of statistics that one is talking about and the purpose(s)” the statistics are supposed to achieve. There is a profound malaise, at the heart of the debate, of the Whites in France unable to say the words because saying them (this person is Black, this person is Arab), naming the categories, making them official, would force them to include themselves in the equation and admit therefore that they are part of the system of oppression, admit the colonial past when calling someone “Nègre” was viewed as acceptable. Counting racial categories would mean counting Whiteness as well, counting others and be counted, and also be held ‘accountable’. Didier Fassin (2006a) goes further and argues that, it might even be ok for ‘us’ to do it, but when minority organizations are claiming Blackness then ‘we’ think they’re threatening the Republican order (Didier Fassin 2006a).

In 2005, French philosophers Pierre-André Taguieff and Alain Finkielkraut signed a call/petition against what they call a “anti-Whites racism”, denouncing the shift of French society towards multiculturalism and communitarianism (Eric Fassin 2006b). Taguieff and Finkielkraut say in their call that “we talked about David, we talked about Kader, but who talks about Sebastien?”, and denouncing anti-Whites aggression they claim that’s because “they are French.” (Eric Fassin 2006b) The call was heavily criticized by anti-racist associations and intellectuals. But as Eric Fassin notes (2006b), what’s remarkable is the fact that the petitioners are basically denouncing something while at the same time acknowledging the existence of it: indeed, it is interesting that they call against communitarianisms and against the use of “race” to define identities for that precise reason, and at the same time, they name the races (they say “Whites”, and by silent opposition, also name the “Other”, through the use of “ratonnades” (which is a derogatory French term to name people from North Africa, and which usually means racist

¹²Le Monde, 04-02-2010.

violence committed against North Africans or individuals of North African origins). In other words, says Esther Benbassa,¹³ it is a “claim of whiteness.” And at the same time, as argued by Eric Fassin (2006b), one might argue this is a hidden acknowledgement of a very French multiculturalism, since the first names used in the call refer to an idea of a Jewish, Arabic and White France. So, by affirming, as Alain Finkielkraut, that there is a “francophobia” like there exists an islamophobia, on the one hand we’re de facto acknowledging that different racial groups exist and can experience racism, and on the other hand, by putting in parallel a “anti-White racism” and a “francophobia”, we are implying that French equals White and White equals French. And so, the argument that says that we need to be against racial statistics in the name of a struggle against communitarianism is in fact claiming the existence of races and the existence of a superior race somehow since, in this case scenario, only White people in France are French.

Universalism and Neutrality

In effect, the debate over racial statistics is raised (by some scholars and politicians) in terms of a supposed opposition between a Republican universalism on the one hand, and a differentialist communitarianism on the other hand. The French Republic universalism goes back to the ideal that, after the 1789 French Revolution from which emerged the Republic of France, all subjects would become French citizens under a single political system with all equal rights. This constructed ideal is opposed to a plural, pluralistic France of diverse identities which would divide the nation into separate communities.

However, as Castel (2007) proclaims, this idealized universalism has become blind to diversity and has in fact led to a stigmatization of ethnic differences where those stigmatized by the labels feel trapped in a ascribed identity that has become denigrated. It is a contradiction in terms: on the one hand there is a resistance to using the concept

of race because it’s emphasizing the differences too much; so there is a fear of division, of people thinking in community terms rather than one unified national identity, and thinking in terms of races would then be against the whole model of integration à la française which implies a universalism without plurality; on the other hand, French people of color are reminded every day that they are in fact different and that they have a different skin (and also perhaps different accents and customs, and foods) and that they’ll never be considered like the ‘real’ French because of the skin (or food, etc...), regardless of the fact that they were born in France. Isn’t it then that the real underlying ideal and assumption is that being truly French means you have to be White? And how could French integration possibly achieve that? This is an endless paradox created by a color-blind census which, by denying the existence of racial categories, the social significance of race, also denies the rights of minorities.

Nationality and Race

The debate itself shows how problematic it is to say and think about the concept of race, let alone address issues of racism and discrimination in France. So when employers don’t know how to describe the social status of a person, they will say “a person of foreign origin”, (or foreigner, or immigrant, or “of immigrant descent”, “of second generation”, “visible minority”) defending themselves from being racist because at least they have not use the “r” word (race). But then this is far greater suspicion over the heads of individuals: whether or not they are French citizens, they can never be seen as such because they’re not white. If they’re not white, they can’t be a ‘real’ French person, they must be coming from somewhere else, which makes them de facto a foreigner or an immigrant. The suspicion therefore is that an individual cannot truly be French if he or she is not white. That person will be seen an immigrant forever, and will never be legitimate and legitimized, regardless of his or her I.D. So this ‘discomfort’ in naming shows a “profound and unacceptable truth” (Didier Fassin 2006a):

¹³Le Nouvel Observateur, 31-03-2005.

that “the actual nationality matters far less than the perceived otherness.”

As Didier Fassin notes (2006a), when mentioning racial minorities, the French connect the idea of being a racial minority with not being French, with being an immigrant (hence the expressions of “second generation”, or “of immigrant descent”, etc.). Someone’s French nationality will always be questioned according to their skin color: Yet, the controversy is set on the fact that someone might be using the word race inappropriately. Didier Fassin (2006a) says that the confusion that currently exists between the categories “foreigner” and “immigrant”, or between “foreigner” and “of foreign origin”, and between “racial” and “ethnic” does not result from a mistake or an error as to how to define those categories correctly. For example, he argues, it wouldn’t help (as some have suggested) to replace the detestable expression “of French stock” (referring to a supposed idea of purity of a French blood) by the expression “French person of France” (which is highly problematic as well). This reflects a discomfort, to say the least, of admitting that the effective nationality of a person matters less than the perceived otherness and that there are people in France who despite being French continue to be perceived as “not from around here”.

As Castel (2007) argues, it’s as if minorities will always have a “deficient habitus”. As Balibar (2007) claims as well, it is as if was created “the social category of the hereditary condition of immigrant”. That way, we can always talk about the “foreigners from inside” regardless of having acquired French nationality. It’s an accumulation of handicaps (Balibar 2007).

France’s Past and Concerns

For some scholars this avoidance of using racial statistics reflects a malaise vis à vis the French immigration past because these “visible minorities” as they’re often called in the media, carry the weight of a history marked with colonization and oppression.

A theoretical argument has been made by several scholars claiming that the use of race and racial categories (and the essentialist concept of race) has historically served to create hierarchies between groups and promote systems of oppression. Following Foucault’s concepts of biopower and biopolitics, we could see how using racial categories in the census might mean the regulatory control of the population which Foucault is critical of. And considering the history during WWII in particular, when identification data was collected on Jews and Communists in France by the French police helping the Gestapo deport thousands of people to extermination camps, we see that the relationship France has with “fichier” and “fichage” (government databases) is a bit more complicated than previously thought.

Indeed, Pap Ndiaye (2006) explains it is now established that the modern notion of race was created to justify colonial domination in general, and slavery in particular. Therefore, any reflection about skin color is inevitably linked to an acknowledgement of the relationship between domination and means of production. And so, on the one hand, by not using race/racial categories, the underlying assumption is that racism will be avoided (Didier Fassin 2006a). On the other hand, the fear is that if essentialist categories are produced and used (based on real or constructed biological differences), difference and otherness become essentialized, which in turns justifies a political order that already does so, and essentialized populations are therefore officially stigmatized. Héran¹⁴ has the same argument when he argues that France has known a long period of legal discrimination against Black and Asian minorities where classification methods were used against them, and so there is something of a real concern regarding the misuse of those types of statistics because it has been done before with the impunity of the state.

Also, according to Eric Fassin (2006b), the social sciences (sociology, psychology, anthropology) have given reasons to be concerned about the use of such terminology. For example, when *The Bell Curve* was published, it basically

¹⁴Le Monde, 05-02-2010.

established a “scientific” connection between social inequalities and race, “proving” that if Blacks are at the bottom of the social ladder it is because it’s engrained in their genes (hence supposedly linking someone’s IQ to their genes). Linking biology and race somehow is a form of “racialism” or even racism which further would help justify the repeal of Welfare policies or Affirmative Action policies (Eric Fassin 2006b). So there is a real fear of seeing Eugenics or social Darwinism reemerge in France if the government was to allow the collection of racial statistics.

Finally, groups like SOS Racisme are against the use of ethnic statistics: they launched a call on October 26, 2007 saying that they “oppose a State that is trying to rehabilitate a racial nomenclature based on skin color or that is trying to establish an ethnic-religious reference on the basis of origins or religious membership.” For them ethnic statistics would only bring back a “colonial France or the one from before August 1944”, and it would only support “racial stereotypes.”¹⁵

In that regard, statistician Stéphane Jugnot¹⁶ argues that the American approach to counting races conveys a “racial vision, or even racist, of humanity” and that discriminations come from “the eyes of the beholder who sees the other as a Black, as a ‘dark-skinned’ person.” And so, by classifying people of color into racial categories, we would give reason to those who rank them as ‘Black’ or ‘dark-skinned’, i.e. endorse a racist version of society.

Remedies and Implications

As demonstrated above, the main problem French demographers and social scientists face when attempting to examine France’s demography of race and ethnicity is the absence of official data due to the legal limitations prohibiting data collection on race. Another challenge is access to unofficial reliable data. Social scientists have had to develop their own methods to collect

race-related data through indirect ways: for example, as shown by Castel (2007: 130), some population surveys include data about parents’ origins (birth place), last names and residency. Castel (2007) demonstrates that by comparing the parents’ origins between individuals (European origins and non-European origins), one is able to unveil racial discrimination and inequality patterns on the labor market at the hiring level, with unemployment or access to education. Other studies (Castel 2007: 134) use the place of residence as a reliable indicator of urban segregation where non-white families are concentrated. Weil (2005) confirms that urban segregation in France can be studied by examining the place of residence of students in higher education (particularly elite schools). Weil (2005) and Castel (2007) conclude that current studies combining parents’ origins, last names and residency produce reliable satisfactory data to study the demography of race and ethnicity in France in the absence of official data.

Simon (2012) identifies a similar method with the country of birth citizenship (former citizenship for French by acquisition). Simon (2012) explains that the use of “geographical origin” is the closest to what other European countries would call ethnicity. Of course as underlined by Simon (and others) this method creates the assumption that nationality and citizenship are equivalent to race, which they are not. Silverman (1992: 37) also points out that the word immigrant is used as a euphemism for race, but one that blurs the distinction between blacks and Arabs or North Africans, as underlined by Schneider (2008: 141). Furthermore, Simon (2012: 1385) states that the “immigrant” terminology leads societies like France to remain in what he calls the “migration paradigm”. This categorization based on the “migration paradigm” prevents social scientists from accounting for racial enumeration and treats the issues related to discrimination as “immigration” or “integration” problems of the immigrants. Simon (2012) explains that the European Commission’s statistical office, Eurostat, has decided to introduce an information request on the country of birth of the parents in the 2008 Labour Force Survey. This should provide data for scholars to

¹⁵ Le Monde, 11-16-2007.

¹⁶ Le Monde, 10-09-2007.

analyze the social realities on the labor market of immigrants and their descendants, focusing on the discrimination affecting the second generation. Simon calls it a “diplomatic alternative” to overcome the resistance to racial and ethnic categorization.

Population statistics not only reflect the structural divisions of societies but also affect them in that they inform the way social scientists and policy makers frame categories. Particularly, the statistical representation of race and ethnicity reveals political choices and foundational principles of societies.

In a 2006 statement, the European Commission emphasizes the crucial role played by statistics in advancing anti-discrimination policies and promoting diversity and equality (Simon 2012). This position has also been recommended by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) in 1996 and by the United National Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD; see Banton 2001).

Nonetheless, French demographers and governmental agencies are still debating the question “should we count?” It is still a contentious issue amongst social scientists (Simon and Piché 2012). Weil (2005: 88) even goes to say that “counting by race, ethnicity, religion or minority is contrary to our [France’s] traditions.” As explained in this chapter, previous collection of racial data in France has been used historically to exclude, oppress, discriminate and even eliminate groups and individuals identified as undesirable. However, as Azouz Begag (2007: 101), former (and first) Minister for Equal Opportunities in France during Sarkozy’s Presidency, notes, “public intervention is necessary in order to fight this very real inequality of opportunity” most affecting Maghrebis and blacks in France. There are still heated debates and disagreements first on the methods to capture the racial composition of the French population, and second on the possible policies and measures targeting discrimination issues.

However, in order to address discrimination issues, national governments and governmental agencies are facing a growing demand for evidence-based policies. Additionally, policies

and measures intended to address racial discrimination issues will require accurate definitions and data in order to be effective. The current regime of data collection in France stands in the way of public action because it perpetuates the “integration” narrative. French scholars understand the urgency to act. The question of enumeration of race and ethnicity, and the production of consistent reliable racial statistics is a pressing issue for European states, particularly France, if an anti-discrimination paradigm is to emerge and create positive social change.

Conclusion

As Blum (2002) notes, the French debate over racial statistics reveals that “in the relationship between research and politics, there are no straightforward political cleavages.”

The question for social scientists is how can we know without knowing? How can we know without having access to knowledge? What we have here is a collective denial of a reality.

Indeed, one of the key issues for social scientists using demographic data is to be able to measure discriminations. And the absence of racial categories in the census prevents them from obtaining objective data to observe discrimination and racism. As Beauchemin et al. (2010) observe, measuring discriminations in France still remains a “sensible topic politically and complicated methodologically.” Patrick Lozès (President of the CRAN, National Council of Black Associations) asks: “when the use of a racial criterion is blatant, why not refer to it?” (Le Monde, April 12th, 2007). Similarly Eric Fassin¹⁷ wonders, “how can we justify not using tools” to measure discriminations when we know that there exist systematic mechanisms of discrimination? The only way, currently, for social scientists to analyze discriminations, is to refer to the categories of immigrants or children of immigrants, and then the “majority population” (as previously explained in the section on terminology). The difficulty in mea-

¹⁷Le Monde, 04-17-2007.

asuring discriminations then is that, if racial data cannot be collected, researchers looking at the “majority population” will have to rely on questions regarding the “national origin” of the grand-parents. The question for social scientists in the future will be about the cut-off generation and how many generations they will have to go back (and be able to) to gather data.

Furthermore, Goodey (2007) shows that one of main challenges that Europe faces in fighting against racist violence and racist crime has to do with terminology and data collection. First, there is no common working legal definition of racist violence and racist crime in Europe, mostly because most European jurisdictions have no specific legal definition of racist violence. This is related to the fact that with the exception of the United Kingdom which, since 1991, has a categorization system somewhat similar to that of the United States, Goodey (2007) explains, most European countries do not collect data on race or ethnicity, including France. And so for example, while England and Wales record 57,902 racist incidents and 37,028 racially or religiously motivated crimes in 2004–2005, France only records 974 racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic acts and threats for 2005. This discrepancy, Goodey (2007) argues, is due to the fact that France has no official data collection on race and ethnicity. One of the ways to remedy to this problem would be for the European Union to promote a EU-wide legislative reform regarding the inclusion of race and ethnicity in data collection. But if that is not possibly in the short term, at least individual Member States could learn from each other’s legislation in terms of data collection and states with somewhat similar legal cultures could create common reforms on collecting data on race and ethnicity that would help the overall goal of fighting racist crimes and racist violence in the long term.

According to Héran (2005), it has been argued that the Netherlands is a source of inspiration for census experts: indeed, the Netherlands have developed a system that includes data about “ethnic minorities” that also has to do with national origins. Héran says that obstacles to this idea in France are no legal but rather sociolinguistics: the French don’t generally speak of families of

Italian origin as “Italian ethnic group” or “Italian ethnicity”, Héran argues, and if a sociologist were to use such a vocabulary, no one would understand what he or she refers to. This repulsion towards the idea of ethnic groups or ethnicity remains attached to the historical use of it in France, Héran claims. The terms ethnic and racial are not seen or perceived as different and have been used to mean the same thing: both of the terms are remembered as categories used in the French colonies to categorize the “indigenous” persons in a derogatory way, or by the Vichy regime against the Jews. Hence the words race and ethnicity have lost any credibility and positive value they may have carried and no one is ready to reclaim or reinclude such a discredited expression into common or academic language in France, Héran says.

However what’s interesting is that even when scholars (like demographer Héran) are advocating for the inclusion of ethnicity in statistics, they will argue that it is only possible to do so for research surveys but would be excluded from a national statistics like the French census. Additionally, they also argue that using self-identification (as the United States does) would be possible but that it would be preferable to use more “objective” criteria (place of birth, parents’ nationality).

Simon and Clément (2006) argue that whether based on information about the ascendance, the self-declared national origin of parents, or a self-declared “ethno-racial” identity, or a combination of the three, there is a pressing need for finding a method of data collection that would take into account the diversity of the French population and that would account for discriminations.

In the end, Didier Fassin (2006a) believes that there is the possibility of a “racial thought without racism.”

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Hungary, located in the middle of Central Europe with a land mass slightly smaller than the state of Virginia, has for over millennia been a point of convergence for multiple cultures, populations and ethnicities. At the same time, the Hungarians, as a people, are unique in Central Europe, originating from the Russian steppes on the border of Europe and Asia, and speaking a language that is distantly related to Finnish, and not at all related to any of the other major European language groups. In relation to its past, present-day Hungary is by most standards an ethnically homogenous country. However, social and political issues related to national and ethnic minorities have played central roles in the country's formation and development, and continue to fundamentally shape both the character of its civic sphere as well as its national and international policies.

In recent decades Chinese, Arabs, Turks, Vietnamese and other groups have immigrated into Hungary, forming ethnic enclave communities (Nyíri 1999). However, these populations have remained comparatively small and largely confined to urban areas. Unlike these relatively new arrivals, most minority groups in Hungary can trace

their roots back within Hungary to the seventeenth century or earlier, and as a consequence are linguistically and culturally assimilated into the broader Hungarian society (Eiler and Kovács 2002; Szalai 2003). In addition, most minority populations in Hungary are geographically dispersed across its more than 1,700 settlements and, with only some exceptions, form distinct numeric minorities at the settlement level as well. In the 2001 Hungarian census, out of a total population of about 10.2 million, about 314,000 persons self-identified as minority, with about 166,000 persons indicating that their first language was a language other than Hungarian (see Table 26.1).

These figures, however, unquestionably underestimate the total number of minorities in Hungary. In part this is due to the cultural assimilation of most minority groups and a self-identity understood as primarily Hungarian. However, under-identification may in many cases also be connected to stigma associated with non-Hungarian ethnic identity, as is certainly the case with the Roma or Gypsy¹

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¹The term “Gypsy” increasingly is being replaced by “Rom” (singular) and “Roma” (plural), endonymic terms which some feel avoid the more pejorative connotations often associated with the term “Gypsy.” However, in Hungary, many Roma refer to themselves as “*cigány*,” the Hungarian term for “Gypsy,” with “Roma” often denoting those who speak *Romanes* as a mother tongue, a group which makes up a relatively small proportion of the total Hungarian Gypsy population (see, e.g., Szuhay 1995, 2005). In this chapter however we predominantly use the term “Roma.”

Table 26.1 Self-identified minority status in Hungary and by Language Spoken, 2001

Population	Self-reported	By language spoken	Estimated
Roma/Gypsy	189,984	53,075	400,000–600,000
German	62,105	52,912	200,000–220,000
Slovakian	17,693	18,057	100,000–110,000
Croatian	15,597	14,779	80,000–90,000
Romanian	7,995	8,215	25,000
Ukrainian	5,070	4,519	2,000
Serbian	3,816	4,186	5,000
Slovenian	3,025	3,108	5,000
Polish	2,962	2,659	10,000
Greek	2,509	1,974	4,000–4,500
Bulgarian	1,358	1,118	2,500–5,000
Ruthenian	1,098	1,068	6,000
Armenian	620	300	3,500–10,000
Total	313,832	165,970	~843,000–1,093,000

Source: Eiler and Kovács (2002), Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000)

population. Discrepancies between Hungarian census data and other estimates simply point to the fact that minority status, as a social construct, is inherently fluid, contested and changeable.² Regardless, the ways people identify themselves, and are identified by others, have significant consequences for life chances, access to a wide range of formal and informal resources, and for full participation in political and civic spheres (Ahmed et al. 2007; Gheorghe and Acton 2001; Székelyi et al. 2003).

In 1993 Hungary passed Act 77 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities which officially recognizes minority groups with an historical presence in Hungary for 100 years or more, whose members are Hungarian citizens but who comprise a numeric minority, and who can be distinguished from the larger population on the basis of distinct cultural practices, traditions and/or languages. With these criteria, the Act identifies 13 groups (Armenian, Bulgarian, Croatian, German, Greek, Roma, Polish, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serb, Slovak, Slovene, and Ukrainian) within Hungary as minorities whose cultural autonomy and traditions receive special protection, and who are granted limited provisions for minority

²In Hungary by law it is the right of the individual to declare an affiliation to a national or ethnic minority group – or not. Answering questions related to ethnicity is not mandatory on the Hungarian Census.

self-governance, a subject we discuss at greater length later in this chapter.

However, of these groups identified by Act 77, the Roma minority is immediately distinguished from other national and ethnic minority populations within Hungary based on several fundamental criteria. First, at about 500,000 Roma are at least as numerous as all other minority groups combined. They are also exceptionally diverse (Gheorghe and Acton 2001; Ringold et al. 2003; Szuhay 2005). Within Hungary there are at least three main groups and many more sub-groups, which often maintain strict inter-group distinctions,³ including Vlach Roma (who speak Romanes and refer to themselves as Rom or Roma), Beashi Roma (who speak a dialect of Romanian), and Hungarian speaking Roma or *Romungro*, who make up the distinct majority of Hungary's Roma population (Szuhay 1995, 2005). This intra-ethnic diversity complicates any generalizations that can be made about the Roma population as a whole. Second, the Roma population is not European in origin, but instead

³These include prohibitions against marrying outside one's subgroup, and informal inter-group segregation, for instance in the areas of housing and residence (Szuhay 2005). Even into the early 1990s hardly more than 10 % of all marriages in which a Roma was a partner was interethnic (between Roma and non-Roma) (Valuch 2001). However, see Ladány and Szélényi for a fascinating analysis of historically variable patterns of residential and social segregation between Roma and non-Roma (2003).

left northern India sometime around the sixth century, arriving in Hungary between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.⁴ Because of this, they are a “stateless” ethnic minority; they have no historical connection to any geopolitical entity and therefore they lack the protections and political power afforded national minorities (Barany 2002; Deets 2008; Jenne 2000; Marushiakova and Popov 2001). Third and most significantly, Roma are characterized by their long history of political and socioeconomic exclusion from mainstream Hungarian society and indeed European society more broadly (Barany 2002; Barth 1970; Crowe 1991). Along multiple socio-demographic indicators, from health outcomes and life expectancy to educational attainment, occupational status and housing, Roma fare markedly worse than the majority and other minority groups in Hungary (Crowe 1991; Human Rights Watch/Helsinki 1996; Kósa et al. 2007)

We begin this chapter with an historical background to trace the ways in which political and demographic issues associated with national and ethnic minorities have fundamentally shaped Hungary’s past and present. We then focus on contemporary Hungary, paying particular attention to the Roma minority. We conclude with a discussion of what we interpret as the most salient social and demographic trends as well as theoretical and public policy concerns related to minority populations as Hungary moves forward into the twenty-first century.

Historical Context

Prehistory to the Formation of the Hungarian State

The Carpathian Basin, the location of present day Hungary, consists mainly of large plains along with the hilly regions of Transdanubia, bordered by the Carpathian Mountains to the east, the Tatra Mountains to the north, and the mountainous regions to the south and west in the former Yugoslavia and Austria. This region, with

evidence of prehistoric settlements dating back 500,000 years, has historically been a cultural and demographic crossroads with multiple ethnic and national groups occupying its territory at various points in time (Kontler 2002).

No written sources exist dating back to the early history of the Hungarian people, and the bulk of what is known about the origins of Hungarians comes from the linguistic record (Balázs 1997; Kontler 2002). However the scholarly consensus is that Hungarians originated in the central Volga region of present day Russia near the border of Europe and Asia, and originally were a Finno-Ugric people who gradually moved southward and then west, ethnically and culturally intermingling with other groups, including people from what are now Iran and Turkey, as well as others from the Balkan and Carpathian regions (Csepeli and Örkény 1996; Lázár 1996). By the mid fifth century B.C., proto-Hungarian tribes had migrated south towards the Black Sea, joining the existing Bulgar-Turkic *Onogor* tribes.⁵ These tribes remained in the Black Sea region until the late seventh century when demographic shifts and conflicts with groups to the east began to push them into the Carpathian Basin, which at that time was occupied primarily by relatively weak and unorganized Slav and Bulgar groups.

A loose Hungarian nation consolidated into a substantial regional power under the Hungarian leader Árpád in the late 800s, using the Carpathian Basin as a base for raids and military expeditions that extended far into Western Europe. However, military resistance and a strategic rout in 955 by German forces associated with the Holy Roman Empire ultimately put an end to regional raids and spurred the further consolidation of a more unified Hungarian nation. By the thirteenth century, the kingdom of Hungary extended as far north as present day Poland, across the northern two-thirds of what is now Romania, and south to

⁴Like the origins of the Hungarian people, the record of Roma origins and migrations is primarily derived from linguistic evidence (Barany 2002).

⁵The terms “Hungary” and “Hungarian” (as well as other linguistic counterparts such as the German “ungarn”) originate from the word “Onogur,” an archaic Bulgarian-Turkic word meaning “ten arrows” or “ten tribes” which referred to the tribal confederation that existed at that time (Balázs 1997). The word Hungarians use to describe themselves, “Magyar,” is Finno-Ugric in its linguistic origin (Molnár 2001).

the Adriatic seacoast in present day Croatia and Serbia (Hupchick and Cox 1996), the inhabitants of the region representing a remarkably diverse mix of people with significant variation in ethnic, linguistic and cultural backgrounds.

Expansion of the Ottoman Empire

The Middle Ages in Hungary were a time of relative stability with the population of ethnic Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin increasing from about 200,000 at the formation of the Hungarian state to nearly five million by the close of the fifteenth century (Csepele and Örkény 1996). However, by the early 1500s, the Ottoman Empire expanding in size and strength, extended its reach into the southern part of the Hungarian kingdom. Ottoman forces, outnumbering Hungarian soldiers two to one, maneuvered a decisive victory at the battle of Mohács in 1526 (Molnár 2001). At this point Hungary was divided into three parts: the southern region of the Hungarian *Alföld*, or Great Plain, controlled by the Ottomans with territorial holdings as far north as Budapest, a second section containing present day Slovakia, western Croatia and portions of the western present day Hungary which fell under the control of the Austrian Hapsburgs, and a third section to the east, including the Transylvanian region of present day Romania which also ultimately came under the control of the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottomans held control over much of Hungary until the late 1600s when in 1699 the Austrians Hapsburgs were able to force the Ottomans south into present day Serbia. During the preceding two centuries of Ottoman rule, however, the demographic consequences were pronounced, and wars, disease and deprivation had taken a harsh toll. Some scholars estimate that the total population of Hungary dropped from 3.5 to 2.5 million between the beginning and end of the sixteenth century (Lendvai 2003). Hungary's total population essentially remained unchanged from the end of the fifteenth century to the end of the seventeenth century – a period of time in which Europe's population overall (excluding Russia) increased by a third in size. Population declines as a

consequence of population displacement, increased mortality and lowered fertility were accompanied by demographic change resulting from the in-migration of groups from outside of Hungary, including the movement of Serbs into Hungarian territory occupied by the Ottomans, as well as other groups including Slavs and Romanians (Molnár 2001). Thus, though Magyars made up about 75 % of Hungary's population around the time of the defeat at Mohács, by the end of the seventeenth century ethnic Hungarians represented only about one half of the total population.

Liberation from Ottoman Rule and Assimilation into the Habsburg Empire

By the end of the seventeenth century and after over 150 years of Ottoman rule and a failed siege of Vienna, the Turks were finally driven from Hungary by the Austrian Habsburgs, and Hungary was incorporated into the Austrian Empire. Despite an often ambivalent association with the Habsburgs, Hungary enjoyed a relatively high degree of internal autonomy, which increased with the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, establishing the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a dual monarchy.⁶

This historical period was also a time of rapid modernization after the long period of stagnation under the Ottomans. Hungary also experienced significant in-migration of other groups, including Jews, Greeks, Armenians and others, often to cities where minority groups integrated into rapidly expanding entrepreneurial classes.⁷ At the same time there were also serious efforts to consolidate Hungary's national identity. A series of Education

⁶This development followed pronounced separatist and Hungarian nationalist movements including the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 in which Hungarian President Kossuth Lajos, and Prime Minister Battyány Lajos rejected Austrian rule and established the first Republic of Hungary. This government lasted for only one year, however, as it was defeated by Austrian and Russian forces and brought back under the influence of the Hapsburgs.

⁷For example, while in the late 1700s the Jewish population in the Carpathian Basin numbered about 80,000, that figure had grown to 238,000 by 1840 and 911,000 by 1910 (Lendvai 2003).

Laws in the 1800s made the Hungarian language compulsory in kindergarten through secondary school, and as the nineteenth century drew to a close, “Magyarization” was increasingly pursued as a matter of national policy (Paikert 1953). Advocates of Magyarization also pushed legislation that “Hungarianized” the names of localities, and encouraged individuals with insufficiently Hungarian surnames to do the same (Kontler 2002).

Hungarian liberalism at the time was ideologically, and perhaps paradoxically, centered around the notion of civic equality for all who professed membership within the greater Hungarian nation. The Law on Nationalities of 1868, for example, asserted that “all Hungarian citizens constitute a nation in the political sense, the one and indivisible Hungarian nation,” and that “every citizen of the fatherland enjoys equal rights, regardless of the national group to which he belongs” (Kontler 2002, pp. 282–283; see also Hévízi 2005).

And yet stronger forms of ethnic nationalism often prevailed, leading to incidents like the 1912 killing of 12 ethnic Slovaks in the northern Hungarian village of Csernova who attempted to prevent a new church from being consecrated by a (non-Slovak) priest from outside their village. The Hungarian Jewish population in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was characterized by a high degree of support for pro-Magyar nationalism and Magyarization. Yet, Jews also experienced anti-Semitism, and, especially in Hungary’s border areas where non-Hungarian nationalities were in the majority, “Jewish Hungarians functioned virtually as outposts of Hungarian culture” and were exposed to enmity and resentment not only as a consequence of anti-Jewish sentiment, but also because they represented, *de facto*, the greater Hungarian nation in areas that were for the most part ethnically non-Hungarian (Kontler 2002, p. 335).

The Treaty of Trianon and the Ethnic Homogenization of Hungary

The assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 in Sarajevo catalyzed tensions between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, leading

quickly to war that ultimately spread across Europe as the First World War. At the conclusion of the war, and with the defeat of Austria-Hungary, a peace treaty was signed (under protest) by Hungary and the principal Allied Powers in June, 1920. The Treaty of Trianon reestablished Hungary’s borders, stripping away two-thirds of its territory, much of the land dating back 1,000 years to the original Hungarian Kingdom of Stephen I, including Transylvania and much of what is now Slovakia. In the process, almost three million, or about one-third of ethnic Hungarians found themselves suddenly living in the successor states of Romania, Czechoslovakia and the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (see Fig. 26.1).⁸ With the radical reduction of Hungary’s territory, Hungary became far more ethnically homogenous, with only slightly over 10 % of the population speaking a mother tongue other than Hungarian⁹ (Lendvai 2003). This included approximately 550,000 ethnic Germans who were widely scattered across Hungarian territory although with some concentrations around Budapest as well as southwestern Hungary (de Zayas 2006).

Bideleux and Jeffries (2007) argue that a major distinguishing factor contrasting nation formation in Western and Eastern Europe was that Western European nations generally were made up of more or less culturally homogeneous populations, with nationalist doctrines developing coincident to or after the formation of nation states as a means of unifying national identity and allegiance. In Eastern Europe, however, the dissolution of feudalism occurred in the context of the rise of imperialist nation-states that covered large areas with culturally and ethnically heterogeneous populations (Palády-Kovács 1996; Roshwald 2001). That is, “In western Europe states have often defined ‘nations,’ but ‘nations’

⁸Among European populations only Albanians and Irish currently have proportionally more members living outside the border of their country than Hungarians (Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998).

⁹This included Germans, at 6.9 % of the population and Slovaks at 1.8 % of the population (Lendvai 2003, pp. 375; see also de Zayas 2006).




Fig. 26.1 The Territory of Hungary pre- and post-treaty of Trianon

have rarely defined states” (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007, p. 324). This meant that

...in the eastern half of Europe nations were destined to be conceived and defined in more exclusive cultural or ‘ethnic’ terms, since these nations neither derived from nor corresponded to the existing multinational states within which they resided (ibid.).

Demographically, politically and in terms of the Hungarian national consciousness, the redrawing of Hungary’s national boundaries had (and continues to have) profound consequences.¹⁰ What had been a vast national territory extend-

ing from the southern areas of Poland down to the Adriatic seashore and from Austria well into northern Romania, an area encompassing multiple national and ethnic groups, had been reduced to a far less diverse, and far smaller, “rump” state. Yet, as many historical observers have argued, despite Hungary’s 1,000 year history, the contradictions represented by its internal multi-ethnic characteristics on the one hand and nationalist imaginations as a unified nation-state had never been satisfactorily resolved (Anderson 1991; Beissinger 2005; Csepei and Örkény 1996), a dilemma that played a fundamental role in greater Hungary’s ultimate dissolution (Kontler 2002; Molnár 2001).

¹⁰See, e.g., Deets (2008) for a discussion of controversies surrounding the 2001 Hungarian Status Law that legally recognizes a “nation” of Hungarians extending beyond Hungary’s geopolitical borders. See also King (2005).

Hungary's ethnic homogeneity became even more pronounced during and immediately after World War II.¹¹ The Arrow Cross, a Hungarian fascist party some 250,000 strong gained increasing political influence, and Hungary's Jewish population which especially in urban areas had experienced relative social tolerance, found itself facing increasingly repressive anti-Semitic laws. Largely due to the protections of the government, most Hungarian Jews did not face immediate persecution or internment. However, with the German military occupation of Hungary in March, 1944, over 430,000 Jews were quickly deported to concentration and death camps, from which 320,000 did not return (Kontler 2002; Molnár 2001), an effort often directly abetted by Hungarian municipal and provincial authorities. Scholars estimate that over 560,000 Jews from 1941 Greater Hungary were killed in the Holocaust, and nearly 300,000 from Trianon Hungary (with about one-third from Budapest itself) (Lendvai 2003). Of those who survived, many left Hungary after the war's conclusion, never to return.¹²

The other ethnic group suffering significant losses in the Holocaust were Roma. While estimates regarding Roma Holocaust deaths are wide-ranging and intensely debated (Barany 2002), most European-wide estimates fall between 200,000 and 250,000, with some estimates as high as 500,000 (Fraser 1995; Lewy 2000). Within Hungary, approximately 30,000 Roma were killed of the estimated 200,000

pre-war Roma population, although this figure is also, at best, a rough estimate (Crowe 1991; Kemény 2005; Kontler 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004). Hence, although Roma losses in the Holocaust were not nearly as pronounced as those experienced by the Hungarian Jewish population, as much as 15 % of Hungarian Roma were killed by the end of the war.

Yet another factor contributing to increased ethnic homogeneity within Hungary was the expulsion of ethnic Germans, the largest national minority group in Trianon Hungary (Csepeli and Örkény 1996; de Zayas 2006; Lázár 1996). The Potsdam Agreement initiated by the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR after the Second World War mainly concerned tripartite military occupation and post-war reconstruction. However, it also included provisions for the forced "transfer" of German populations from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, a policy in equal parts intended to ethnically reorganize post-war Eastern Europe and respond to German atrocities and ethnic cleansing during the war (Prauser and Rees 2004). Some German minority groups had lived in Hungary since the eleventh and twelfth centuries, while others had arrived in Hungary as part of a German resettlement by the Habsburgs following the withdrawal of the Ottomans in the 1700s. Regardless, most ethnic German populations in post-war Hungary were both assimilated and long established within Hungarian society. Despite this, some 200,000 ethnic Germans were expelled from Hungary and sent to Germany in the years immediately following the Second World War. This was followed by an exchange agreement with Czechoslovakia that resulted in the departure of over 73,000 ethnic Slovaks from Hungary (Apor 2004) replacing ethnic Hungarians displaced in Czechoslovakia at the same time.

Ethnic Policies and National Demographic Trends in Post-war Hungary Under State Socialism

Following the minority displacement policies after the Second World War, by the 1950s Hungary became as ethnically homogeneous as it had ever been in its thousand-year history. The

¹¹ Hungary, early in the war allied itself with Germany, politically supporting the Axis, in part with hopes of regaining territory of pre-Trianon Historical Hungary lost in 1920, while at the same time attempting to delay or avoid military engagement outright (Csepeli and Örkény 1996). This strategy proved somewhat successful, at least in the short term, as Axis Powers between 1938 and 1941 granted Hungary nearly half of the territory lost in 1920, including large swaths of southern Slovakia and Ukraine, much of Transylvania, and parts of northern Yugoslavia, all land that had fallen under Axis control. This, briefly, had the effect of increasing Hungary's ethnic heterogeneity since nearly 50 % of the populace in the returned territories were not ethnic Hungarians. The proportion overall of non-ethnic Hungarians living within Hungarian-controlled territory rose from 7.9 %, post-Trianon to 22.5 % (Lendvai 2003). After the war, Hungary's borders reverted to those established under the Trianon Treaty.

¹² Currently approximately 100,000 Hungarian citizens are Jewish (Csepeli and Örkény 1996).

communist constitution declared the equal status for all minorities, but the official ideology promoted internationalism following the Soviet model, under the assumption that national identities would eventually fade away as society approached the final stages of communism. Moreover, because of their long-term residence within Hungary, most ethnic groups were already well assimilated both culturally and linguistically and represented no particular concern for the state. The communist party set up carefully controlled ethnic organizations to provide institutional frameworks for preserving minority language and culture, but otherwise remained largely uninterested in ethnic issues.

The only minority group that in any way represented a distinct social issue from the standpoint of the Hungarian government was the Roma population, and since the Roma were a “stateless” minority, their status was treated differently than that of other (national) minorities. In 1961, when the top officials of the communist party first addressed the “Gypsy-question,” the Premier of the party, Kádár János explicitly stated that the Roma were not a national minority (Márfi 2009). As such, the “Gypsy-question” was primarily considered a *poverty* issue, best addressed with a set of paternalistic assimilation policies (McCagg 1991; Stewart 1990, 1997, 2001).¹³

In the 1960s and the early 1970s rural (or at least a more decentralized) industrialization provided job opportunities and steady income for many Roma. There were efforts to eliminate extreme forms of spatial segregation, notably the ethnic slums, and provide somewhat better housing (Vermeersch 2007). There was also considerable attention paid to integrating Roma children into formal educational settings. While these efforts led to an improvement in the living conditions of Roma, these policies also had important social control functions, and worked to undermine

distinct ethnic cultures and traditions (especially those the state deemed “backward”) while further consolidating the socialist labor force. The jobs and housing provided for Roma were of better quality as compared to what had been previously available, although most jobs were still unskilled and low-status, and housing was basic. In other words, efforts promoting cultural assimilation through employment resulted in assimilation into the lowest strata of society, reproducing the already strong social and economic distinctions between Roma and the majority population. Since the state and the communist party possessed considerable moral authority, the difficulties and failures of assimilation (the only accepted way for improving a group’s social status) were always blamed on the Roma themselves. The popular perception therefore was that even though the state had provided significant resources to elevate Roma, their culture and undesirable personal characteristics made full assimilation all but impossible.

The discourse and state policies regarding Roma integration and assimilation was also linked to the issue of differential fertility, especially given the rapidly decreasing birth rates in Hungary. Hungary’s rate of natural increase began to decline after the Second World War, and became negative shortly after the last surge of births in the mid-1970s.¹⁴ By 1959, the total fertility rate sank below replacement level, and since then has exceeded that level only during the 1974–1977 period (see Table 26.2). Communist era policy-makers in Hungary, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s attempted a variety of policy interventions designed to increase fertility. These included maternal benefit programs, special taxes on childless couples, and the banning of abortions. These interventions, however, could not offset the general fertility decline, in part because a competing policy aim was to incorporate

¹³The strong paternalism of these programs meant to incorporate Gypsies into the Hungarian state labor force and the socialist society in general is indicated by a common term used in association with these efforts, “felnevelni,” which means to “bring up” or “raise” (as in a child) (Stewart 1990).

¹⁴This fertility surge was actually an echo of a one-time increase of births right after a strict abortion regulation in 1952. Shortly after, however, abortion became again the only accessible mean of birth control, and between 1959 and 1974, the number of induced abortions exceeded the number of live births (Frejka 1983).

Table 26.2 Population dynamics in Hungary, 1950–2000

	Population (1,000 s)	Total fertility rate	Life expectancy at birth	
			(Males)	(Females)
1950	9,293	2.62	59.88	64.21
1960	9,961	2.02	65.89	70.10
1970	10,322	1.97	66.31	72.08
1980	10,709	1.92	65.45	72.70
1990	10,375	1.84	65.13	73.71
2000	10,043	1.33	67.11	75.59

Source: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (2007)

women into the socialist labor force. With social policies working at cross purposes (Bradatan and Firebaugh 2007), the fertility decline was similar to that experienced in Western Europe, reflecting the changes in public policy, social norms around family size, and, more broadly the unfolding second demographic transition (Lesthaenge 1983).¹⁵

Melegh (2006) notes that these policies, however, raised concerns about their unintended effects, and as early as the 1960s there was increasing anxiety regarding the extent to which pro-natalist policies would disproportionately affect the fertility of “lumpen” groups. In particular there was concern regarding the Roma,¹⁶ whose children were assumed to be at higher risk for a number of adverse circumstances including substandard child care and “deformities” as a consequence of inter-marriage between cousins. One report from the time noted that marriage between cousins occurred at a rate of 6–8 % among Roma populations as opposed to .3 % among the general population. This anxiety over the possible unintended consequences of pro-natalist policies contributed to the rationale behind the “declining progressivity of child allowances after the third child in a family” a policy ultimately implemented by the Hungarian government (Melegh 2006, p. 86).

Employment and education provide examples of how social stereotypes were inadvertently reproduced by communist assimilation policies. During the communist period, full employment was an important goal promoted by state ideology. In a workers’ state unemployment was a misdemeanor offense, punishable by law. Employment was registered in personal identification documents, and the lack of such entry was a red flag for authorities. Since many Roma lacked formal employment at various stages of their forced assimilation, the stereotype of “lazy and unemployed Gypsies” was reinforced within the public discourse.

Similar was the discrimination in public education. According to the 1971 survey, only one in four persons aged 20–29 among the Roma population had finished elementary school (Valuch 2001). Efforts were made to improve the education of Roma children, but the results were mixed. By the early 1990s, close to 60 % of Roma aged 20–29 finished elementary school, but only a very small minority had completed secondary education or beyond. The lack of participation in formal education was partly cultural (as until about the mid-1970s, the adult Roma generations found little use of what has been taught in school vis-à-vis their traditional occupations), and was partly based on institutional discrimination (Hermann 1998; Kemény and Janky 2005). In many cases, Roma children were put in special education classes, which further hindered their integration, strengthening the common stereotype of the intellectual inferiority of Roma. This stereotype was unfortunately reinforced by the resistance of many Roma towards formal schooling, an unsurprising stance given institutional discrimination, educational quality and access, and broader social prejudice that diminished returns on Roma investments in education.

¹⁵Fertility decline was a general trend in most Eastern European countries during the socialist period. Total fertility rates were between 2.5 and 3.0 in 1950, but by 2000 they declined to the 1.1–1.5 level (United Nations 2001).

¹⁶In Czechoslovakia during the communist era Roma women were presented with financial incentives to undergo voluntary sterilization with some reports of coerced sterilization as late as the 1990s (Barany 1992; Human Rights Watch 1992; Kosner 2005).

The Changing Face of Race and Ethnicity in the Context of Post-socialism

While much of the attention in the 1990s to the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe was focused on the intricacies of economic reform, a

second and no less significant consequence of regional restructuring was the resurgence of ethnic and national identity politics. The consequences of this ranged from movements toward cultural and political autonomy to separatism, irredentism and ultimately war and genocide as in the case of the former Yugoslavia (Bugajski 1994). The negotiation of these claims had profound significance for the region, and the evolving status of ethnic and minority groups was regarded by many as an important diagnostic in determining the regional character of the unfolding socio-political transformation (Gheorghie 1991; Hockenos 1993; Poulton 1993).

Within Hungary, the political and economic changes and the hardships that followed for many created fertile ground for racial and ethnic scapegoating, new right wing political parties, and xenophobic political rhetoric. This included the formation in the early 1990s of new skinhead and racial extremist groups. During the early 1990s the Budapest police investigated between 20 and 26 skinhead attacks per year targeting Roma, Jews and non-white international students, although by the end of the 1990s that number had dwindled. In 1993 the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, or MIÉP) was formed by Csurka István on an explicitly nationalist and anti-Semitic platform which included restoration of Hungary to its pre-Trianon borders and a slogan of “Hungary for the Hungarians.” While MIÉP remained something of a fringe political party and only gained parliamentary seats in 1998, it did have the effect of shifting the political discourse to the right and making more acceptable certain forms of discourse, including anti-Semitic and racist statements. Prime Minister Horn Gyula (1994–1998) regularly referenced the laziness and criminality of Hungary’s Gypsies, and Orbán Victor, the head of Fidesz, the major coalition party (and current prime minister) has made several appearances on a controversial political television news program, *Sunday News*, which the National Radio and Television Commission claimed incited hatred against Jews, Roma and other minorities (Bernáth et al. 2005).

In addition to increased anti-Roma popular sentiment, Roma suffered disproportionately negative effects from the economic changes. Their persistent low status made them especially vulnerable to the economic and social challenges of the post-socialist transformation. Free market economic systems and the ideological vacuum caused by communism’s collapse only increased hardship for Roma in the form of hate crime, job and housing discrimination and diminished social safety nets. At the time of the political and economic changes in the early 1990s the Roma labor force was disproportionately represented by undereducated unskilled and semi-skilled workers. In 1993 while the national unemployment rate stood at 14 %, the percentage of unemployed Roma was between 60 and 70 %. By 1995 the Roma unemployment rate rose to 75 %, while the national unemployment rate fell below 11 % (Kertesi 1994; Havas et al. 1995). Educational disparities continue to put Roma at further disadvantage. Survey data indicated that by 2000 about three quarters of Roma had only a primary education or less and only two tenths of 1 % had any higher education. By contrast, only 35 % of non-Roma Hungarians had a primary education or less and 12 % had completed some amount of post-secondary education (see Table 26.3).

Table 26.3 Educational attainment in Hungary, Roma and non-Roma, 2000 (18+)

	Non-Roma	Roma
<i>Primary or below</i>	35.0	76.4
No education	0.3	4.3
Incomplete primary	10.7	22.1
Complete primary	24.0	49.9
<i>Some secondary</i>	53.0	23.4
Combined primary and apprenticeship	25.5	19.0
Incomplete general secondary	6.1	1.5
Completed general secondary	17.5	2.7
Secondary and vocational	3.8	0.2
<i>Higher education (completed and inc.)</i>	12.0	0.2
(Missing data)	0.1	0.1

Source: Ringold et al. (2003)

Table 26.4 Distribution of Hungary's Roma population by region and settlement type, 1971 and 1994

	1971		1994	
	Percentage of total Roma population	Percentage of entire population	Percentage of total Roma population	Percentage of entire population
<i>Region</i>				
North	20.4	6.5	24.3	9.0
East	23.0	5.0	19.9	6.3
Great plains	16.0	3.0	12.0	4.1
Budapest	19.0	2.0	18.2	2.4
South-transdanubian	20.0	4.0	22.8	6.5
West	1.4	1.3	2.9	2.0
<i>Settlement type</i>				
Budapest	7.9	–	9.1	–
Towns	13.9	–	30.4	–
Villages	78.4	–	60.5	–

Source: Havas et al. (1995)

The economic circumstances of Hungarian Roma during the post-socialist transition reflected not only the additional hardships posed by stereotypes and discrimination, but also by the distribution of the Roma population across Hungary's settlements (Kemény 2005). Over time Hungary's Roma population has urbanized to some degree. However, the majority still live in villages and areas of the country where the effects of the economic transition were felt especially severely (see Table 26.4). Survey data from 1971 and again from 1994 showed that while Roma were increasingly concentrating in larger towns and in the metropolitan area of Budapest, by 1994 over 60 % of Roma still lived in villages. Similarly, over 40 % of Roma in 1994 were concentrated in northern and eastern Hungary where unemployment rates rose especially high in the economic downturn of the early and mid 1990s. In 1994 while about 8 % of Budapest residents were living in poverty, in villages that figure jumped to about 25 %, and about half of households were in poverty in which the household head's occupation was based in agriculture or natural resources. These spatial inequalities reflected the disproportionate targeting of new foreign investment towards urban and suburban places as well as the collapse of sectors such as agriculture and industry which had been heavily subsidized before the political and economic changes (Brown and

Kulcsár 2000; Kovács 1999; Kulcsár 2003) and had also provided a ready source of employment for Roma.

Act 77 and Provisions for Minority Self-Governance

Despite increasingly adverse economic circumstances as well as growing hostility towards Roma and other minorities too far from the Hungarian mainstream, the political and economic changes also ushered in new opportunities for ethnic political mobilization. In 1993, after three years of negotiation between the coalition government and the minority roundtable,¹⁷ The Hungarian Parliament enacted Act 77 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities. This legislation represented a fundamental shift away from communist era assimilationist minority policies, and towards policies that recognized national and ethnic identities, guaranteeing the right of minorities to use minority languages, organize educational institutions, politically self-organize, and establish connections with minority groups and institutions beyond Hungary's

¹⁷The Minority Roundtable was a group modeled after the Opposition Roundtable, a collection of dissident and opposition groups that negotiated Hungary's transition to a multi-party system in 1989 (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki 1996; Swain 1992; Vermeersch 2007).

borders, all of which was folded into the concept of “cultural autonomy” (Vermeersch 2007).

One of the law’s most distinguishing features was its creation of the legal context for a unique and unprecedented system of minority self-governments operating at both national and municipal levels. Under this legislation, representatives from recognized national and ethnic minority groups are elected at the same time as local government officials. Once formed, local minority self-governments work with established local governments, which by law are required to include representatives from the minority self-government in all council meetings. One municipality can have several minority self-governments, one for each qualifying minority.¹⁸

The main role of the minority self-government is to act as a liaison between the minority community and the municipal government, advocating for the interests of the minority they represent. Thus, their main function is as a consultative body that has the right to attend and participate in all local government meetings. The law additionally states that minority self-governments have the authority to maintain local public education institutions, local printed and/or electronic media, and also establish and run enterprises and other economic organizations, announce competitions and establish foundations (Schafft and Brown 2000). Local minority governments also have limited veto power over some municipal decisions involving cultural, educational or language issues that have a direct effect on the minority group in question.

National minority self-governments representatives are elected by local minority self-government representatives and have similar consultative right at the national level, although they do not possess any veto power over national-level decision-making. The relationship between the national and local minority self-governments is not clearly defined, however, and in practice

the regular functioning of the local minority self-government takes place with minimal support or input from the national minority government (Molnár and Schafft 2003a).

Minority Self-Government Formation and Operation

This law arguably had the most significant implications for the Roma minority, given its size and its historical political and economic disenfranchisement. Two rounds of elections for minority self-governments were held in December, 1994 and November, 1995. At that time 817 local minority self-governments were established (see Table 26.5); well over half were Roma self-governments (477) with the next largest group being German minority self-governments (162). In the last several election cycles the number of minority self-governments has steadily increased, with the total number of local minority self governments nearly tripling. In the latest round of elections held in late 2010, over 2,300 local minority self-governments were formed. Consistent with previous election cycles, over half of those governments (1,248) represented Roma communities.

In March, 1998, surveys were mailed to leaders of all Roma minority self-governments identified as actively operating by the Hungarian Office of National and Ethnic Minorities (Schafft 1999; Schafft and Brown 2000). The survey, which gathered data on Roma self-government operations and local minority-majority ethnic relations, had a nearly 60 % response rate, and documented a range of activities initiated as a result of minority self-government initiatives. This included the organization of various social welfare programs by over three quarters of respondents, as well as cultural programs and festivals, education and job training, and agricultural support by over half of the respondents (see Table 26.6). Nearly 58 % of respondents reported that they had challenged administrative decisions made by the local council. Of those respondents, 41 % reported that decisions were reversed as a

¹⁸The size of the minority self-government varies depending on the size of the municipality. In villages with 1,300 or less people, minority self governments consist of three elected representatives. In all other municipalities there are five representatives except in the capital, Budapest, where there are nine (Eiler and Kovács 2002).

Table 26.5 Minority self-government formation, 1994–2010

Minority group	1994–1995	1998	2002	2006	2010
Roma/Gypsy	477	764	1,004	1,117	1,248
German	162	272	335	378	424
Croatian	57	75	107	115	127
Slovak	51	75	112	116	122
Serb	19	35	43	40	48
Armenian	16	25	30	31	39
Romanian	11	31	44	46	71
Polish	7	33	50	47	49
Slovene	6	10	13	11	11
Greek	6	19	30	34	37
Bulgarian	4	15	30	38	41
Ruthenian	1	10	31	52	75
Ukrainian	0	5	12	19	23
Total	817	1,369	1,841	2,044	2,315

Source: Rytko (2006), Schafft (1999), Eiler and Kovács (2002), <http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/onkval2010/>

Table 26.6 Roma self-government reported local development initiatives, 1998

Since 1994 has the Roma minority self-government been involved in or helped to start...	% Answering yes
...social welfare programs directed toward the Roma community?	78.8 (N= 182)
...cultural programs or events which promoted the local Roma culture?	61.1 (N= 140)
...educational or job training programs directed towards the Roma community?	60.7 (N= 139)
...agricultural support programs directed towards the Roma community?	58.4 (N= 135)
...local media programs (TV or newspaper) which were directed towards the Roma community?	45.5 (N= 105)
...economic enterprises or businesses which directly benefited the Roma community?	42.4 (N=97)

Source: Schafft (1999), Schafft and Brown (2000)

consequence of the intervention of the minority self-government.

In open-ended responses Roma self-government leaders elaborated on their activities. “Together with the local governments we have built a school gym, medical clinic and housing” wrote one respondent. Another related “Recently there have been family homes built for 13 families. I am the president of the housing committee and we have been involved in the construction of

social homes...and educating people for skilled labor positions” (Schafft 1999, p. 94).

While many respondents reported positive working relations with municipal governments, there were many who reported substantial challenges as well. Table 26.7 shows the variability in responses regarding the relationship between Roma self-governments and local councils. Ambiguities around access to resources, ill-defined political power of minority self-governments and frustrations regarding the working relationship with the municipal government left many Roma leaders cynical and frustrated. One respondent wrote “we are only puppets and (the local government) makes us move however they want.” Another wrote, “The minority self-governments are relegated only to pretend political activity. This is just showcase politics handled as if by play-acting” (Schafft 1999, p. 96).

The minority elections in 2006 featured 16,151 candidates representing 213 local minority organizations. About 192,000 minority citizens registered to vote, less than two thirds of the minority population identified by the 2001 census, with an actual participation rate of about 64 %. Participation rate varied among the minorities. The highest was for Slovenes and Germans (75 and 72 % respectively) and the lowest was for Ukrainians and Bulgarians (48 %

Table 26.7 Roma minority self-government/local council relationship, 1998

	Strongly disagree				Strongly agree
	1	2	3	4	5
The concerns expressed by the Roma minority self-government have made the local council more sympathetic to the needs of the Roma minority	17.3	18.1	30.0	17.3	17.3
Relations between the Roma minority self-government and the local council are generally friendly and cooperative	12.5	13.4	32.2	21.4	20.6
The Roma minority self-government can depend on the local council for advice, technical assistance and information to help make the minority self-government a stronger, more effective organization	17.5	9.6	21.9	21.5	29.4
The Roma minority self-government can depend on the local council for financial and material support to help make the minority self-government a stronger, more effective organization	22.3	15.7	19.2	16.3	26.6
The local council is generally interested in the opinions of the Roma minority self-government	23.3	15.0	25.6	18.9	17.2
The Roma minority self-government has an important role in local politics and decision-making	26.3	14.9	26.8	14.9	17.1

Source: Schafft (1999)

for both). There were also considerable spatial variations in participation rates. In Pest County (surrounding Budapest) there are almost as many local governments as settlements, although the voting participation rate at the election was not above average.


Minorities themselves are also unevenly distributed. For example, 31 of the 38 Bulgarian self-governments are in Budapest or Pest County. Eight of the 11 Slovene self-governments are in Vas County, bordering Slovenia. Others also follow spatial patterns of historical settlements in Hungary or proximity to neighboring countries. Roma minority self-governments are located across Hungary's territory, although again with considerable spatial variation ranging from Komárom-Esztergom County, bordering Slovakia, where only one in every four self-government is operated by Gypsies to Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok County in central Hungary where 43 of 44 self-governments are Roma self-governments. In terms of absolute numbers, most Roma self-governments are in those counties that are located in the mountainous northeast and south featuring small villages with historically high Roma population.

In terms of their electoral participation, more Roma voters registered (102,000) than all other minorities combined. However, their actual participation rate was only 60 %, the third lowest among the 13 minority groups. On the other hand, they had the highest number of candidates per municipalities where local minority elections were held (9.2, interestingly followed by Romanians who had 8.1).

Criticisms of Hungary's Minorities Law and Provisions for Minority Self-Governance

Despite positive developmental outcomes for some minority self-governments (Pallai 2003; Partners Hungary 2000), Hungary's Minorities Act has also faced substantial criticism. Some commentators have argued that the law was not intended so much as a means of providing social and cultural protections to minorities within the country, but rather as a means of facilitating an early European Union accession by demonstrating progressive minorities policies (and this particularly in the light of the ethnic conflict and subsequent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia).

Fig. 26.2 Roma Minority self-government formation as compared to all other minorities (Source: Rytko (2006), Schafft (1999), Eiler and Kovács (2002))



At the same time such legislation could potentially be used to leverage similar minority policies in neighboring countries such as Slovakia and Romania where there are significant ethnic Hungarian populations (Burton 2007; Kovacs 1999; Molnár and Schafft 2003a, b; National Democratic Institute 2006; Vermeersch 2007; Waters and Guglielmo 1996),¹⁹ populations in which the Hungarian government has expressed clear interest (Fig. 26.2).²⁰

Second, a law conceived around the notion of “cultural autonomy” in the case of the Hungarian Roma is arguably of limited value because the main problems affecting Hungarian Roma are not “cultural” in nature, so much as social and economic (Pallai 2003). Minority self-governments

have limited administrative authority, and receive only a nominal operating budget provided by the national government. Otherwise they are dependent upon the municipal government for resources and whatever can be obtained through other sources such as grants from non-profit organizations. Because of this, as Molnár and Schafft argue,

Roma self-governments have little power to meaningfully address the often severe social privations of their constituencies. At the same time, municipal governments are often eager to pass responsibility for welfare issues to the minority self-government which Roma leaders have neither the mandate nor the resources to handle (2003a, p. 58; see also Waters and Guglielmo 1996).

This is problematic for several reasons. First, as a National Democratic Institute Report points out, because of the limited resources of the minority self-governments and the narrow scope of activities in which they may engage, the term “self-government” is inherently misleading and in fact “actually damages the credibility and legitimacy of the entire system among Roma as it raises unrealistic expectations on the part of constituents regarding what they can accomplish” through the minority self-governments (2006, p. 6). Additionally, the temptation for municipal governments to pass responsibility of minority social welfare, in whole or in part, onto the minority self-government risks ethnicizing social problems, by conflating the ethnic and social dimensions of local problems, thereby strengthening Gypsy social exclusion and reinforcing the perception

¹⁹To date no neighboring country has implemented similar legislation (Burton 2007).

²⁰The Hungarian Constitution states that “The Republic of Hungary recognizes its responsibilities towards Hungarians living outside the borders of the country and shall assist them in fostering their relations to Hungary.” The Hungarian Prime Minister Antall József (1990–1994) echoed these sentiments when he famously stated that he envisioned himself as the prime minister “in spirit” to the 15 million Hungarians worldwide, and furthermore that it would be “impossible to have good relations with a country that mistreats its Hungarian minority” (Inder Singh 2001, pp. 104–105). In 2001 the Hungarian parliament passed the Hungarian Status Law that enables Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia and the Ukraine to obtain a “Hungarian Identity Card” which grants fee reductions on Hungarian public transportation, some limited educational and health benefits, and public access to Hungarian institutions such as libraries (Deets 2008).

that Roma impoverishment is a “natural” condition (Molnár and Schafft 2003a, b).

Last, while the minority self-governance is premised upon “cultural autonomy,” until 2006 there was no provision established whatsoever to prevent non-minorities from voting for minority representatives or even running for office as a minority self-government representative. This has resulted in numerous irregularities dating to the inception of the first minority self-government elections. For example, in 1994 16,000 votes were cast for minority self-government representatives for Serb self-governments, even though only about 5,000 members of the Serb minority were estimated to live in Hungary (Riba 1999). In 2006, twice as many Ruthenians and more than three times as many Armenians registered to vote as were counted in the 2001 Census. In another instance in a large industrial city in northeastern Hungary 4 out of 5 of the Roma minority self-government representatives were Romungro although in that particular city, about two thirds of the Roma population was Olah. In an interview the minority self-government president explained the outcome by the fact that the Romungro candidates, who were known outside the Gypsy population, were elected on the basis of ethnic Hungarian votes (Molnár and Schafft 2003a).

The legal loopholes created by the right of individuals to self-identify their minority status has ironically led in some instances to the complete co-optation of minority self-governments. In the frequently cited case of Jaszladány there were significant tensions between local Roma and the municipal government, in part stemming from efforts on the part of the municipal government to establish a private school that would exclude Roma students. After protests by local Roma and agitation on the part of the Roma minority self-government, ethnic Hungarians put themselves on the ticket for the Roma minority self-government in the 2002 elections. Four out of 5 representatives elected were ethnic Hungarians, including the mayor’s wife, a result that effectively eliminated any further challenge to the political and social status quo from the Roma minority

self-government. It also effectively eliminated any semblance of minority political representation or cultural “autonomy” (Burton 2007; Molnár and Schafft 2003a, b).²¹

Amendments to the Minority Self-Governance Provisions

Because of inconsistencies and contradictions that enabled scenarios such as the 2002 elections in Jaszladány, the Minorities Law went through several amendments in 2005. This included new provisions that those voting for minority representatives are required to register as minority voters with the local office of elections.²² Voters must register within three months of the election and must re-register before every subsequent election as the minority status registration lists are destroyed after each election cycle in order to protect the confidentiality of registrants.²³ While these measures were adopted as a means of preventing the influence of non-minorities on minority elections, ethnic identity continues to be self-ascriptive by law and there are therefore no restrictions on how and whether any eligible Hungarian citizen registers to vote in a minority election. Candidates running for seats on the minority self-government are also now required to be fielded by established minority civil society organizations. The amendments also require separate polling places for minority self-government

²¹Vermeersch recounts a Roma activist who argued, “The electoral system is...absolutely ill-defined. Everyone can vote for the minority self-government. It is as if the prime minister (of Hungary) would be elected in Germany. How should a non-Roma who is not involved in Romani communities be able to decide who is a good representative and who is not?” (2007, p. 73).

²²This was done despite protests from some Roma groups who objected to the provisions given the history of Roma persecution during the Holocaust (National Democratic Institute 2006).

²³While this particular set of provisions was introduced as a means of limiting the extent to which non minorities can influence minority election results, there is still no practicable way to prevent a non-minority from registering as a minority and voting in an election for minority self government representatives.

elections, whereas previously all voters voted in one polling place and received ballots for both the municipal and minority self-government elections (National Democratic Institute 2006).

The amendments, however, also remove a minority “beneficial mandate” that existed previously. This mandate enabled minority candidates to win a seat on the municipal council if, in places with 10,000 persons or less that candidate receives over half of the smallest number of votes to win a mandate, and in larger places the candidate receives over 25 % of the smallest number of votes for a mandate. The beneficial mandate could be used in instances in which no representative of that particular minority had won a local council seat in the election. According to the National Democratic Institute (2006), about 70 % of Roma local council representatives had gained their seats in this manner. The mandate was rescinded in the amendments because non-minority candidates in the 1998 and 2002 elections had allegedly identified as minority candidates in order to win local council seats through the beneficial mandate. While the removal of the mandate was done as a means of preventing its abuse, it also eliminated an important way for minority candidates to assume seats on municipal councils where political and representative powers are far more comprehensive than within the minority governments.

As many observers have pointed out, the Minorities Law and the minority self-government system have substantial shortcomings which the 2005 amendments only partially remedy. Nonetheless, Hungary’s system of minority self-governance deserves close attention, especially given the sheer number of minority self-governments that have formed since the Law’s inception. Despite this, there has been woefully little systematic research completed on these governments, their effects on minority political participation, how minority groups have utilized self-governments, and what the Minorities Law has (and has not) meant for creating more democratic and inclusive societies at both local and national levels.

Conclusion: Hungary’s Changing Demographic Landscape

Eastern Europe presents a fascinating case for investigating the demography and political dynamics of race and ethnicity. Both political and ethnic boundaries have changed significantly in the past hundred years in the region, making nations and populations especially sensitive to ethnic questions. The rise of nationalist and ethnic parties as well as the intensity and persistence of ethnic discourses indicate that this issue is a concern for many Eastern Europeans while at the same time an important mobilizing force for various political interests across the political spectrum (Inder Singh 2001; Stein 2001).

However, Hungary is unique even within this context. Contemporary Hungary is by most standards ethnically homogeneous, and yet historically the Carpathian Basin has been a region shared by multiple distinct national and ethnic groups, a diversity which, in the wake of nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ultimately contributed to Historical Hungary’s dissolution and the radical reduction of its borders. This in turn led to Hungary’s current ethnic homogeneity, but also established a reference point for the formation of national policies regarding ethnic Hungarians *outside* Hungary’s borders. At the national level then ethnic questions are often framed *vis-à-vis* the neighboring countries’ ethnic policies. Accordingly, domestic ethnic policies, such as the system of local minority self-governments, also implicitly serve *international* political purposes while purporting to further the goal of cultural autonomy for a defined set of minorities within Hungary.

Second, in its policies Hungary maintains a clear conceptual distinction between national and ethnic minorities, with the Roma identified as the only ethnic minority group. National minorities are mostly accepted, partly because they are well assimilated and partly because their numbers are small. However, Roma have been subjects of a wide range of negative social responses

from persecution and exclusion to paternalistic assimilation and lip-service integration. Complicating the situation is that the Roma are as numerous as all other minorities combined, although experiencing markedly worse socioeconomic conditions. Thus, minority policies regarding national minorities can be superficial and politicized in a historical-comparative manner, while policies related to the integration of Roma are more strongly associated with debates around social welfare policies, exposing the Roma minority to further scapegoating, racism and exclusion.

The conceptual difference between the 12 national minorities and the Roma make ethnic policies in Hungary complex and often contradictory, especially since Hungary's minorities are different in terms of their socioeconomic situation, social needs, political capital, and level of self-organization. Policy makers need to find the balance between addressing the special needs of Roma populations while maintaining a coherent set of minority policies. Unfortunately, one particular problem Hungary has is the lack of reliable information on minorities, and especially for Roma. There are obvious political interests for both inflating and underestimating the size of minority populations. This is further complicated by the general anti-Gypsy sentiment, making self-identification as the basic (and appropriate) method of enumeration particularly problematic from the standpoint of basic validity and reliability.

Finally, Hungary has the institutional structure of minority self-governments, now firmly established within the local, regional and national political arenas. With its benefits and flaws, it provides unique insights into the political dynamics of race and ethnicity. These include lessons about the transformation of institutional structures during the post-socialist period in general, but also the utilization of this institution by various minority groups. This system however also starkly illustrates the dilemmas and contradictions of ethnic identity, how identity is constructed and contested, and how it may be manipulated in accordance with shifting institutional and social conditions.

The 2010 national elections in Hungary resulted in a decisive victory for the center-right *Fidesz* party, headed by Victor Orbán. This political base was only reinforced in the 2014 national elections in which *Fidesz* received 45 % of the popular vote. Prior to the 2014 national elections, and under Orbán's administration, Hungarian minorities living outside Hungary (e.g. in Slovakia and Romania) were granted dual citizenship as well as voting rights. About 95 % of the vote from these new voters supported *Fidesz* in the 2014 elections.

Given recent political currents, it is likely that discussion regarding ethnic Hungarians living beyond Hungary's borders will continue to occupy a prominent position within the national political discourse. This, however, will probably not result in any fundamental change in the minority self-government structure. If anything it will likely enhance the likelihood of new legislation that in various ways attempts to refine and redefine the status of ethnic Hungarians abroad and their connection with Hungary, and/or capitalize on Hungary's nationalist imaginations (such as recently making June 4, the day of the Treaty of Trianon, the National Day of Remembrance).

A more disturbing possibility is an increase of anti-Roma sentiment and prejudice, especially given that the third largest party in the Parliament, *Jobbik*, ran on an openly anti-Gypsy platform and received substantial support in rural areas where the proportion of Roma is higher than the national average. *Jobbik* is different from *MIÉP*, Hungary's previous incarnation of extreme right wing politics, in two respects. First, the defining feature of *MIÉP* was anti-Semitism, while for *Jobbik* it is more predominantly anti-Roma in nature. Second, while *MIÉP* was a typical urban party with about 400,000 votes in its heyday in 1998, *Jobbik* has a rural electoral base, and it is especially popular among the younger voters who are deeply dissatisfied with the political and economic changes of the past 20 years. The fact that a political party regularly employing anti-Gypsy rhetoric can garner 20 % of the popular vote illustrates how deeply this tension runs, and indicates both the general failure of Roma integration and its challenges ahead.

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The Demography of Race and Ethnicity in The Netherlands: An Ambiguous History of Tolerance and Conflict

Melissa F. Weiner

Considerable debate (and fear) over expanding immigrant populations exists in The Netherlands, especially since school populations in the largest cities are nearly 50 % non-Dutch. But contrary to popular and political discourse in The Netherlands, the nation remains overwhelmingly white (and Christian) with nearly 80 % of all residents of white Dutch background (Table 27.1).¹

Historically, The Netherlands has simultaneously welcomed and repressed religious minorities and exported oppression overseas through colonialism of Indonesia, Suriname, and the West Indies and the slave trade. The Dutch state, in partnership with corporations, recruited guest workers from Turkey and Morocco and enacted progressive multicultural policies to contend with ethnic differences, particularly in education and employment, which have since the 1990s been rescinded. This history of racial, ethnic and religious conflict and ambivalent tolerance, has produced ambivalent citizenship (Cain 2010) for many Dutch minority groups, particularly post-colonial subjects.

¹The Netherlands meticulously documents its population with regular press releases from the national Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (www.cbs.nl), upon which data for this chapter primarily relies, in regards to topics ranging from general demographics, to health, crime, and employment.

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Race in The Netherlands

Before describing racial demography in The Netherlands, “race” in The Netherlands must first be addressed. Many Dutch scholars and policy makers reject the applicability of the term “race,” or the existence of racism, in their society (Essed and Nimako 2006; Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006; Hondius 2009; Mielants 2009; van der Valk 2002; van Dijk 1993). In The Netherlands there is no “race” box to check when filling out census or voter registration forms or when applying for a job. Instead, policy makers and scholars alike prefer the term “ethnicity” which evokes notions of culture but fails to account for hierarchical power and value implications central to racial identities and racialization processes embedded in Dutch society (Cornell and Hartmann 2007; Essed and Nimako 2006; Essed and Trienekens 2008; Omi and Winant 1994). This preference for “ethnicity” over “race” finds most scholars explaining immigrants’ socioeconomic disadvantage as a function of their “inferior” or “backward” cultural differences, while simultaneously obscuring the reality of institutional racism (Essed and Nimako 2006; Essed and Trienekens 2008; Wodak and van Dijk 2000). Categories used in this chapter reflect existing categorization within The Netherlands featuring ethnicity. However, this chapter argues that these ethnic categories have been racialized through institutional structures, described in depth below, privileging

Table 27.1 Dutch demographics, 2013

Group	Total	Total (%)	2nd Gen	% 2nd Gen
National population	16,779,575	100.00	1,749,892	10
Dutch (white)	13,236,494	78.88		
Western	1,576,986	9.40	870,474	55
Dutch + Western	14,813,480	88.28		
Non-Western	1,966,095	11.72	879,418	45
Morocco	368,838	2.20	200,721	54
Turkey	395,302	2.36	199,099	50
Turkey & Morocco	732,962	4.37	399,820	55
Dutch Antilles & Aruba	145,499	0.87	63,023	43
Suriname	347,631	2.07	165,289	48
Dutch Antilles, Aruba & Suriname	493,130	2.94	228,312	46
Other	740,003	4.41	251,286	34

Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, cbs.nl

Dutch whiteness and disadvantaging both Dutch and non-Dutch non-whites.

Race is more than just an identity or social category. It is an ideology and involves the social process of “racialization” that assigns groups to different categories reflecting perceptions of inferiority and superiority based on perceived biological and/or cultural differences. This system of power relations and structurally embedded meanings are then maintained by social policies and practices that enforce racial boundaries (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2006; Essed 1991; Feagin 2006; Omi and Winant 1994). Residing largely in the covert domain of social practices and “colorblind” policies, racial boundaries structure inequality by inhibiting minority access to important social resources such as political power, jobs, education, quality housing stock, healthy neighborhoods, and accurate group representation in the media. Whites’ ability to routinely access these resources, and exclude minorities from doing so, constitutes privileges to which many are unaware they maintain (Frankenberg 1993; McIntosh 1997). This “new,” or “laissez faire,” racism allows members of the dominant group to retain racially-informed ideologies, and blame minorities’ cultural differences, rather than structural inequalities, for their inability to assimilate, and consign them to perpetual outsider status (Balibar 1991; Bobo et al. 1997; Essed and Trienekens 2008; van Dijk 1993). This hegemonic ideology, combined with

enduring stereotypes of minority inferiority ensures that deeply embedded structures of racism go undetected and unchallenged and perpetuate racial inequality in many Western societies (Bonilla-Silva 2000; Feagin 2009; Winant 2001). Thus, although the Dutch eschew “race,” modern racial identities and structures are nevertheless inextricably linked to historical and contemporary relations between former colonial powers and the formerly colonized.

Although their society is, and always has been, multiracial, most Dutch attribute “Dutchness,” and thus membership in the national community, to white Christian Europeans born in The Netherlands (Essed and Trienekens 2008). This is manifest in the terms, which appeared in the 1980s, used to describe Dutch, *autochtonen*, and non-Dutch, *allochtonen*. The definition of *allochtonen* used by the Dutch government, “residents born elsewhere, as well as their children, even when born in The Netherlands and even when one parent was born in The Netherlands” (Essed and Trienekens 2008: 57), could theoretically include the child of a German diplomat who married a Dutch citizen. However, this term usually signifies “non-white” or “alien” (Jacobs 2002). *Autochtoon* indicates the opposite of *allochtoon* – indigenous, native, and authentic Dutch – and reflects the explicitly higher value attributed to this identity. In everyday discourse, these words stand in for “Dutch insider” and “minority outsider.” Although a 3rd-generation

Curaçaoan born in Amsterdam may only speak Dutch, act culturally Dutch, and be a Dutch citizen, to European Dutch, he is considered allochtoon and not “from here” (Essed and Trienekens 2008). To be “Dutch” is to be “white,” and with this identity come special privileges (Essed and Trienekens 2008; McIntosh 1997) in all realms of Dutch society.

This boundary creation and policing inhibits the social acceptance of multiple-generation non-European immigrants who share nativity, language, culture, and citizenship with “native Dutch.” While current and former Afro-Dutch colonial subjects exist as ambiguous citizens (Cain 2010), adherence to Islam is the dominant marker of cultural difference (Ahmad 2004) resulting in discourse highlighting their cultural incompatibility with “modern” “Democratic” Dutch society (Mielants 2009). These privileges and exclusions have important historical antecedents, rooted in The Netherlands’ long history of racism, both at home and overseas, and which impact contemporary racial demographics, stratification, and conflict within Dutch society today.

Researching Dutch Race and Ethnicity

The Dutch government and social scientific scholars in The Netherlands rely primarily on quantitative data to address ethnicity, not race. Although of exceptional quality in many ways, including the regularity with which reports are produced and articles are published, some critiques are warranted. The Dutch government’s categorization of Western and non-Western groups, the lack of qualitative research, and the lack of attention to intersections between race, class, gender, sexuality and religion all suggest that The Netherlands is ripe for more in-depth research regarding these issues. Indeed, as Rath (2001) noted over 10 years ago, most research on race/ethnicity in The Netherlands is descriptive and more attention could be paid to processes of division and identity formation, role of the state in perpetuating racial identities and ideologies as well as links between race, ethnicity, gender and social class.

Categories used by the Dutch government for Western and non-Western groups make identifying some trends difficult given the diversity within them, as they refer to national, or ethnic, rather than racial, groups. While Surinamese, Antilleans, Turks, Moroccans, and native Dutch are described separately, the Dutch government aggregates data for other Western and non-Western groups and the definitions of these groups are not necessarily intuitive. Western groups include Europeans (except Turks), those from North America, and those from Japan and Indonesia. Non-western groups are all those from Africa, Latin America, Turks, and Asians with the exception of Indonesians and Japanese. In addition to the problematic definition of Turks as non-Western, when part of Turkey is in Europe, these aggregate categories complicate efforts to identify trends among Asians, between groups from different countries, or between individuals from Mexico, Canada and the United States.

Although some qualitative and mixed methods research addresses individuals’ and groups’ experiences in social institutions such as education (de Haan and Elbers 2005; Leeman and Saharso 1991; van den Berg and van Reekum 2011; Vermeij et al. 2009) and employment (cf. Essed 1991, 1993, 2002; Essed and Trienekens 2008) and in regards to identity formation, elite discourse and social inclusion (Bartels 2003; Den Uyl and Brouwer 2009; Ghorashi 2009; van Dijk 1993; Vermeij 2004), far more is needed. The vast majority of research addressing race and ethnicity is quantitative and fails to qualitatively capture minorities’ experiences with racial discrimination in daily life and subsequent opportunities for short- and long-term social, political, and economic acceptance at the local and national level. Therefore considerable space exists to probe both Dutch and, particularly, non-Dutch sentiments regarding racial identities, experiences, and attitudes in The Netherlands (Stevens et al. 2011).

Three additional methodological issues regarding research about race and ethnicity in The Netherlands should also be considered. First, the interpretation of statistical data (Zuberi 2008) and the lack of qualitative studies regarding

minorities' sentiments and experiences, particularly protest against discrimination (with the exception of Klandermans et al. 2008), are likely affected by the dearth of minority scholars in the universities (Mullard et al. 1991; Wekker 2009). Second, the majority of research regarding minorities focuses on Turks and Moroccans, who most assume to be Muslim, while research addressing current and former colonial subjects, i.e. Dutch Antilleans and Surinamese, has waned. And third, most scholarship relies on large-scale longitudinal surveys of children; More research into adult sentiments, both among European Dutch and those considered allochtonen, is necessary.

A Brief History of Dutch Immigration and Race, at Home and Abroad

Dealing with Diversity at Home

The Netherlands has a long history of immigration and racialization (Lucassen and Lucassen 2011). The Netherlands required tolerance because of the many different groups who made the nation, as a center of world trade, their home, and led to explicit social practices to ensure a functioning pluralist social system. The Dutch contend with difference through the *verzuiling* (or pillarization) system, a tradition akin to "separate but equal," which allows religious groups their own social, religious, and educational organizations. Historically, a Catholic youth in the 1950s grew up reading Catholic newspapers and watching Catholic TV programs, while his parents listened to Catholic radio shows, after attending Catholic church and playing with friends at Catholic youth groups after a day at Catholic school. The different religious pillars were then joined at the upper-most level with a bar formed across the top of the pillars uniting them through political representatives who mingled in political chambers to ensure national cohesion across communities. This social system implies homogeneity within each pillar and fails to address significant religious, economic, and

cultural differences between contemporary immigrant groups, who are often considered a single pillar.

Although The Netherlands' offered Jews and Catholics a modicum of freedom, compared to other countries, where they faced death for practicing their religion (Buruma 2007; Lofland 2007; Mak 2001), the Dutch engaged in a variety of social practices that belied xenophobic attitudes and social norms. The Dutch harshly punished "outsiders," identified by language, dress, and culture, who stepped outside the boundaries of what they considered proper, staunch Protestant values. The Dutch government regularly employed torture and physical violence for open displays of difference throughout their colonies and at home. Natives in the East Indies, enslaved Africans and "indentured servants" in South Africa, Jews, Catholics, Gypsies, homosexuals, and other "heathens" in The Netherlands itself (Fredrickson 1981) were all subject to this violence. Throughout Amsterdam, in buildings still standing, such as the Waag and the Town Hall, stood torture chambers, whipping rooms, and dungeons (Mak 2001). In public spectacles, the Dutch utilized beheadings, hangings, quartering, spiked masks, hanging cages, the ladder (similar to contemporary waterboarding), thumbscrews, spiked chairs, starvation, whipping, and the Judas chair. This public humiliation served to ensure submission of those different from the dominant group while unifying members of this group in opposition to an "other."

Jews

The Dutch are well-known for the story of Anne Frank, the young Jewish girl who, with her family, was hidden by Dutch family friends and business partners in an Amsterdam attic for nearly 2 years during the German occupation. But relying on Anne Frank's story to holistically describe Dutch attitudes towards difference and tolerance of other cultures obscures the reality not just of Dutch actions and reactions to German occupation during WWII, but the entire history of Dutch treatment of religious outsiders. In the case of Anne Frank, the story ignores both the Dutch betrayal of Anne, her family, and the van Daans

and the Dutch role in Jewish persecution during the Nazi occupation. Throughout the war, Germans stationed only 50 Nazi officers in the entire nation to maintain order. No more were needed. Although some Dutch resisted, other government bureaucrats handed over the names of every Jew in the nation and created handy maps of their addresses, which Germans could use to root them out. During WWII, the occupying Nazis, with Dutch collaboration, deported more Dutch Jews for extermination, 85 %, than any other nation besides Poland (cf. Croes 2006; Bovenkerk 2000). This treatment during WWII is in line with Jews' historical experiences in the Dutch kingdom.

Initially, the Dutch state banned Jews from entry to some provinces, with the punishment for settling flogging, branding, and death for first, second, and third offenses. Laws were later amended so that Jews could enter but only if "their behavior was beyond reproach, and provided they were capable of earning an honest living" (Lucassen and Penninx 1998: 79). When the Dutch state established religious freedom and political equality in 1796, the 30,000 Jews in The Netherlands (representing 10 % of the population) did not find equality. Excluded from guild membership, as advocated by the Court of Holland, Jews were barred from the lucrative fish trade. As a result, half of Amsterdam's Sephardic Jews during this era were so poor that they relied on begging to survive. By the end of the 1800s, two thirds of Ashkenazi migrants did the same. The canals, so much a part of Amsterdam's landscape, segregated Jews with bridges raised at sundown (Mak 2001). Even as Jews attempted to assimilate into Dutch society by moving out of these ghettos and teaching their children Dutch, anti-Jewish sentiment persisted. Anti-Semitic comments could be heard on the streets, in professional societies prohibiting Jewish membership, and social reform organizations, such as the Society for Public Welfare, excluding them, among Protestants actively attempting to convert them, and in anti-Semitic organizations which flourished during and after World War I (Lucassen and Penninx 1998). Therefore, while Jews in The Netherlands were more tolerated than their peers

in other European nations, where they were often confined to locked ghettos, social and legal practices constructed a de facto ghetto from which few Jews escaped.

The treatment of Jews throughout the Americas under the Dutch should also be considered. In the Dutch colony of New Amsterdam (present day Manhattan), Peter Stuyvesant rejected the first Jews attempting to migrate there. The Dutch West Indies Company forced him to accept them but he did so grudgingly and forced them to live outside the city walls and prohibited them from owning land, voting, or bearing arms (Foote 2004; Grinstein 1947). There, they had less citizenship rights than formerly enslaved Africans who had petitioned the same company for their freedom (Foote 2004).

Catholics

Catholics in The Netherlands fared better than Jews but were also subject to fierce discrimination. Dutch religious tolerance, even for Christians was limited to different types of Protestantism and freedom of religion only extended to groups content to practice in hiding, as did Catholics. True cosmopolitanism, often posited as a feature of Dutch society, requires that citizens accept public expression of difference. The Dutch did not afford Catholics living in The Netherlands during its Golden Age this privilege. Public discrimination occurred as the Dutch engaged in anti-Catholic riots, tortured and murdered Catholic priests in the late 1500s, and excluded Catholics from towns and provinces (Lucassen and Penninx 1998; Mak 2001; Parker 2008).

The Roma

Gypsies, or Roma, have faced considerable persecution since their first arrival in the 1500s, when town proclamations throughout the Dutch provinces prohibited their settlement (cf. Lucassen 1991; Lucassen and Penninx 1998). Punishment for remaining included confiscation of all possessions, public flogging, which other women and children were forced to watch, or death. Even if living peacefully, they were not safe. The Dutch government sanctioned Roma

hunts by rewarding Dutch who turned them in, dead or alive. No Roma were recorded in The Netherlands for the 150-year period between 1725 and 1869. Even after this era, when rules eased and torture eradicated, the Dutch state did not welcome Roma. The Ministry of Justice regularly expelled those living legally within The Netherlands's borders. A 1940 regulation officially restricted their entry into the nation. Problems for Roma continued through the Nazi occupation with many rounded up and sent to concentration camps, particularly Westerbork (Bovenkerk 2000). Throughout Dutch history, popular cultural forms and ideology depicted Roma as thieves and criminal, giving the public license for their treatment of them, with children's books, in particular, often picturing them as kidnappers, and as in many other European countries.

Conquest and Colonialism Overseas

Indonesia

As a nation with the fastest fleets, the most reliable shipping, and the central port for much of Europe, the Dutch dominated the sea-going trade between the fifteenth and seventeenth century. In addition to acting as a near monopoly on shipping, the Dutch mobilized their shipbuilding and seafaring skills to acquire and then dominate the spice and coffee trades by violently appropriating the islands where many of these commodities grew. The Dutch companies enslaved and massacred residents of Malacca, Run, Java, Sumatra, and dozens of other islands in present-day Indonesia on which these precious commodities grew (cf. Corn 1999; Lape 2000). Dutch soldiers used native labor to build forts and houses, appropriated natives' homes in the interim, and condemned those who refused to death. In the Spice, or Banda, Islands, under the dictatorship of the notoriously brutal Jan Pieterszoon Coen, governor-general of the Dutch East India Company and a national hero, the Dutch killed, enslaved, or banished 90 % of the islands' original residents after which reports of heroic conquests of barbarians appeared in Dutch newspapers (ibid).

Dutch literature later revealed the reality of the coffee industry to the Dutch populace resulting in large-scale knowledge but only small-scale protest. Multatuli, the pen name of Eduard Douwes Dekker, exposed the treatment of Javanese natives as The Netherlands sought to reap as many profits as possible from these lands through cultivation of coffee using virtual slave labor. In 1860, after returning from his post, he wrote *Max Havelaar, Or the Coffee Auctions of a Dutch Trading Company*. In great detail he described and challenged the Dutch to consider the "more than *thirty million* subjects [who were] maltreated and exploited" (Multatuli 1987 [1860]: 320, emphasis in original). The book highlights existing perceptions of the islands' natives as heathens who were often referred to as black (*ibid* 245, 251). This anti-colonialist novel also reveals the Dutch government's investment in these islands such that those who tried to end abuses were removed from their positions and sent home, often to die in poverty, as did the main character of this "fictional" account.

South Africa

Originally established as a way station where sailors could acquire fresh food and supplies between The Netherlands and its colonies in Indonesia, South African society became the epitome of potential Dutch racism (cf. Fredrickson 1981). Throughout much of the colony's history, particularly after the importation of white settlers, the Dutch enslaved natives, massacred them when they resisted, and expropriated their homelands (Fredrickson 1981). The Dutch imported and enslaved Africans from across the continent, Madagascar, China, and India until 1834. The small Dutch population used force to guarantee subservience even though, with firepower, Africans had few options to successfully resist. Although not always sanctioned by the Dutch government, brutal enslavement and punishment for transgressions under a system that resembled American sharecropping existed. Throughout this history, the Dutch settlers referred to African tribes as "abject savages," "the laziest people under the sun," "who occupy the lowest position in the evolutionary scale"

(Fredrickson 1981: 34, 56, 196). Whites wholly believed that they “were naturally masters and members of a privileged group while nonwhites were meant to be their servants and social inferiors” (Fredrickson 1981: 93) and established a *herrenvolk* democracy to maintain apartheid social relations, prior to its official inception under British rule in 1948.

Enslavement

The Dutch West Indies Company (WIC) transported few enslaved Africans to The Netherlands itself since slavery was illegal on Dutch soil (although contemporary research challenges the contention that *no* enslaved Africans lived in The Netherlands [Hondius 2011]). However, during the Dutch Golden Age, the trade in Africans affected nearly every citizen of the nation, including Renaissance thinkers and artists (Horton and Kardux 2005; Schama 1997). Profits from the trade in enslaved Africans, shared by members of the WIC (high-ranking government employees and wealthy, well-connected, shareholders), financed the massive explosion of Dutch art that centered in The Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These burghers used profits from this trade to purchase artwork from the likes of Rembrandt van Rijn, Jan Steen, Frans Hals, and Johannes Vermeer. Indeed, Dutch society as a whole benefitted from the WIC’s trade as the government used profits to, for example, found orphanages and homes for the elderly. Outside The Netherlands, the Dutch enslaving enterprise spanned the globe, across every continent except Australia and Antarctica, and, as a result, too did the consequences of racial profit and destruction.

The Dutch established enslaving colonies and trading posts throughout the “new world” (Muhlenfeld 1944; Vandenbosch 1941; Vink 2003). Like coffee plantations in the Indonesia, coffee, sugar cane, cocoa and cotton plantations in the western colonies of the Dutch Antillies (Aruba, Curacao, Bonaire, Sr. Martin, St. Eustatius, and Saba), and Surinam supported the Dutch empire. The Dutch also introduced enslavement to the British colonies, which now constitute the United States, when they delivered

twenty enslaved Africans to the colony of Virginia in 1619. The Dutch continued trading in enslaved men, women, and children even after it was outlawed in 1814 by acting as middlemen with Spain (Postma 1972). Unlike in the U.S. and the U.K., in The Netherlands, while a few individuals, particularly clergy, opposed enslavement, widespread abolitionism and abolitionist movements were largely absent (Drescher 1994; Emmer 1972). The Dutch legally abolished slavery in 1863, one of the last European powers to do so, but then required a 10-year “apprenticeship” (Drescher 1994; Oostindie 2005), which Whites paternalistically argued was necessary for the enslaved to understand the meaning and responsibilities of their freedom and determine how much former master enslavers should be compensated (Nimako and Willemsen 2011).

Only recently have the Dutch begun to address the trade and enslavement of Africans in their national history (Horton and Kardux 2005; Oostindie 2009). But this recognition is ambivalent and, like contemporary textbooks, remains mired in Eurocentric conceptions normalizing enslavement and dissociating it from contemporary racial identities and inequalities (Hira 2012; Nimako and Willemsen 2011; Small 2011; Weiner 2014). Although largely excluded from The Netherlands’ national narrative, critical scholars have recently begun offering significant challenges to the dominant narrative regarding The Netherlands’ minimal role in both enslaving internationally and generating profits for the nation (Hira 2012; Nimako and Willemsen 2011; van Stipriaan 2006; Zunder 2010). More research in this area, which is underway among a burgeoning contingent of critical scholars, particularly graduate students, is needed.

Racist African Imagery

In The Netherlands, Africans and their descendants represented only a miniscule proportion of the population but their images have permeated popular cultural forms such as art, music, advertisements, architecture, and holiday iconography for centuries (cf. Blakely 1993). For most of the

twentieth century, Dutch could purchase “tobacco, coffee, liquor, cleansers, rice farina, candy, shoe polish, metal polish, and toothpaste” (Blakely 1993: 164) with stereotypical African images on the packaging. Children play with cards and board games, tell jokes and eat sweet treats (such as the *negerzoen*, or “Negro’s kiss,” which was only recently discontinued, although many still refer to the candy by this name) featuring images of Africans as clowns and buffoons (Hondius 2009). Houses throughout The Netherlands contain ashtrays, coin banks, dolls, and toys, used to demean and caricaturize Africans (Blakely 1993). Throughout The Netherlands, people encounter Moor’s heads on buildings, Gapers in front of stores, and Smoking Moors at tobacco shops (Blakely 1993). These dissociated appendages, on buildings and family and town coats of arms, symbolize Dutch traders’ capture of Africans and harkens back to the Dutch colonial past, even though many white Dutch today choose to ignore them. Nor are these images new, their great-great grandparents would have encountered similar images in songs, folklore, books, and art.

At the peak of the Dutch Golden Age, Dutch art, music and literature communicated to the millions of Dutch, who would never encounter an African in person, their ascribed negative characteristics and unfitness for inclusion in Dutch society (Blakely 1993; Schama 1997). Hundreds of family portraits paint Blacks in servile acts, holding parasols, placing jewelry on women’s wrists, acting as a valet or butler in the background, or kneeling at the feet of leaders. Oftentimes they exist so far in the shadows and background that they are unnoticed by the untrained eye. Religious paintings, a dominant theme in Dutch art, often deployed African imagery to symbolize their inability to be Baptized into civilization, such that they became known as an expression of futility; just as leopards cannot change their spots, Blacks cannot change their color, or inferior culture. Other religious motifs depicted Africans referencing the Hamitic legend, representing temptations and worldly evils. Others more blatantly perpetuated stereotypes as Africans

danced and sang or engaged in rape of white women. Contemporary art exhibits exoticize “Black beauty” using colonial tropes depicting Africans as objects to possess and dominate (Davis 2009).

Woodcut prints, books, travel literature featured Africans in tribal costumes as savages, brandishing spears and roasting white children over spits. These books, some dating back 300 years, reveal the longstanding use of the word “nigger” in Dutch colloquial language. Native South African Khoikhoi, referred to derisively as Hottentots, were described as “grimy, filthy and ugly” (Blakely 1993: 149). Other Africans, both in Africa and in Europe, are targets of humor as they attempt to understand Western technology, in need of missionary efforts to change their pagan practices, or sympathetic recipients of a romanticized form of slavery that never existed. Even when just mentioned in passing, black skin is depicted as sinister and symbolic of hypersexuality, the Moor as the devil, and Africans as primitive. Music of the time followed suit with Moors and Africans serving as servants.

Children’s books, especially dictionaries, have long equated blackness with evil and infused with scientific racism, describing Blacks as having a strong reeking scent, an unclean lifestyle, prone to cannibalism, and religiously superstitious (Blakely 1993; Kapelle and Tang 2008). Some stories still read to children use Black bogeymen to scare children into conforming to Dutch values and enforcing conventions of what is right and wrong; misbehaving children are taken away from their homes and parents by Black figures, long synonymized with the devil. Likewise, stories of Black children who do not know how to behave correctly convey their lack of sense, stupidity and the horrible fate it is to be Black. In “Tien Kleine Negertjes” (Ten Little Niggers), similar to the poem of the same name in the U.S., along with Ten Little Indians, finds Black children disappearing in horrific ways symbolizing the general population’s desires to be rid of them. In these and other nursery rhymes, Black children are simple objects to be counted, things rather than people. Still sung by teachers

and children in schools today, this song remains “a cute, harmless counting exercise” (Blakely 1993: 67). In schools, “most basic texts have racist content advanced through such fundamental subjects as geography, history, and biology” (Blakely 1993: 198; Mielants 2009), in addition to explicit messages about Western superiority (Weiner 2014).

One of the oldest images is that of Zwarte Piet, Sinterklaas’s Black slave/servant/helper (Blakely 1993; Helsloot 2012; Hondius 2009; Lindsay 2008). Children are threatened that if they are not well-behaved, Black Pete will stuff them in his sack and drag them away. Older books refer to him as the devil, or a servant caught and chained into service to St. Nicholas. For months before December 5, shops sell Black Pete toys, cakes, balloons, candies, and other trinkets. Arriving by boat in mid-November, children and adults dress up like Black Pete by applying blackface (the official brand name is “Negro paint”). At public events Sinterklaas is surrounded by dozens of Black Petes, highlighting the historical link to Dutch slavery with a singular white master served by multiple “helpers.” Like minstrel shows, these images of Black Pete as a happy servant or kidnapper explicitly juxtapose European civilization with Black anti-intellectualism and barbarism. Significant protest has arisen since 2011, led by Quinsy Gario, but 91 % of the Dutch populace are loathe to abandon this holiday tradition, claiming that it is “an important part of Dutch heritage that should not be taken away” (Hondius 2009: 42; de Hond 2013).

Historical images institutionalized negative stereotypes of Africans as a servile population spread to continental Europe and obscured their representation in a variety of jobs across the trades. As in America (Dates and Barlow 1993; Gabriel 1998), these images generate negative stereotypes and racial attitudes. Indeed many images closely resemble those which existed in the U.S. that served to justify slavery and mistreatment of African Americans afterward (Fredrickson 1971).

A Case Study of “Integration”: The Moluccans

The relative success of Moluccans, former residents of Dutch Indonesia, in integrating into Dutch society is often pointed to as an example of the society’s openness. However, this narrative obscures their treatment upon arrival and subsequent discrimination and isolation they experienced for the following 25 years (cf. Dalstra 1983; Smeets and Veenman 2000; van Amersfoort 2004). The 12,500 Moluccans that arrived in The Netherlands in 1951 were descendants of those on the Dutch-conquered Spice Islands. Many had joined the Royal Netherlands East India Army that aided the Dutch in their attempts to maintain control over Indonesia as natives sought independence from its colonial ruler and over which The Netherlands did not want to relinquish. When the Dutch relinquished power of Indonesia to its native populations in 1949, the Moluccans were left without a country. Since the Indonesian government forbid their demobilization in Indonesia, the Dutch government brought the soldiers and their families to The Netherlands, “temporarily.”

Immediately upon their arrival, the Dutch made their social integration virtually impossible. The Dutch government decommissioned all Moluccan soldiers on the plane. Arriving in The Netherlands, they lacked any recompense, could not collect pensions, and could not find jobs since laws restricted their access to work visas. The Dutch government housed them in former concentrations camps far from jobs, towns, and communities, resulting in both social and economic isolation.

Thirty years later, seeking to call attention to their plight, young, frustrated Moluccans who had been born on Dutch soil yet were shut out of the post-war economic “Dutch Miracle,” engaged in highly visible, and sometimes violent, protest. Moluccans occupied the Indonesian Embassy in 1970, destroyed an Indonesian Airways office in 1974, and in 1975, hijacked a train and occupied the Indonesian Consulate taking 30 hostages. During the train hijacking, Moluccans demanded apologies from the Dutch government for their

treatment and the publication and redress of their grievances. These actions called international attention to Moluccans in The Netherlands and put pressure on the Dutch government to generate policy to aid their assimilation as Dutch, rather than temporary, residents, nearly 25 years after their arrival in The Netherlands (Bartels 1986).

Now in the third generation, Moluccans have higher rates of intermarriage than other immigrant groups in The Netherlands (Bartels 1990). However, they also have higher rates of unemployment, underemployment and educational attainment than both their Dutch peers and Surinamese and Antilleans, particularly in times of economic duress, as well as higher rates of perceived social distance than all other groups besides Moroccans and Turks (Hagendoorn and Hraba 1989; Kleinpenning 1993; Smeets and Veenman 2000; van Ours and Veenman 1999; Veenman 1990).² Indeed, many Dutch continue to see Moluccans as “foreign,” which Moluccans themselves recognize (Verkuyten et al. 1999). Therefore, even the group that the Dutch hold up as an example of assimilation lags far behind white Dutch in social and economic integration.

These histories of exclusion, ambiguous tolerance, and outsiders’ experiences within The Netherlands reveal that while immigrants have long been accepted, they have been tolerated rather than embraced. This has resulted in a national narrative featuring Dutch aphasia and social forgetting (Bijl 2012; Horton and Kardux 2005; Nimako and Small 2012). In addition, these histories offer useful antecedents from which to begin an exploration of contemporary immigrant and non-white groups in The Netherlands.

²Most research regarding Moluccan educational and occupational attainment uses 1990 data (with the exception of van Ours and Veenman 2008, which uses data from 2000). Therefore, it may be outdated and the continued integration of this immigrant group warrants continued research.

Racial Minorities in The Netherlands Today

Racial Demographics

Minorities’ complex history in The Netherlands has important implications for contemporary demographics and stratification. While approximately 21 % of the population is non-Dutch, when considering Dutch citizens and immigrants from Western nations together (many of whom are from European nations and will likely be perceived ethnically as Dutch since most are physiologically white), only 11.7 % of the population is from non-Western nations (CBS 2013). Non-western immigrants tend to reside in the Randstad area comprised of the four largest cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht. Nearly half of all immigrant groups are of the second generation. The vast majority of Dutch citizens speak English as they begin learning it in the early years of primary school. Therefore while immigrants quickly learn Dutch in the schools (although acquisition depends significantly on whether Dutch is spoken at home), Westerners who speak English but no Dutch have few language problems in their daily lives.³ A recent increase in Europeans, both from the EU and outside it, will likely ensure the stability of a largely white and European nation.⁴ Finally, and also contrary to popular and political discourse, the proportion of the population that is Muslim remains relatively small (4 % of the population; CBS 2013).

Antilleans, Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans represent the four largest non-Western minority groups in The Netherlands today (see Table 27.1). Considering these groups alongside native white

³There are some caveats to this. For example, government officials will not speak English on the phone and those who have not learned Dutch are not taken as seriously in situations ranging from simply shopping to attempting to acquire a job as those who have.

⁴In the last 5 years, the population from Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania, has doubled due to the in-migration of nearly 150,000 from these nations.

Dutch reveals a racial hierarchy in The Netherlands, with former colonial subjects nestled between Dutch on the top and Turks and Moroccans on the bottom, resulting in corresponding access, or lack thereof, to social resources and opportunities.

Surinamese and Dutch Antilleans (largely from Curaçao) began arriving in The Netherlands in large numbers in the mid-1970s and 1980s, respectively, as a result of Surinam's independence and the Antilles' economic downturn (Lucassen and Penninx 1998; Oostindie 1988; Van Niekirk 2007). The first immigrants were light-skinned elite members of society. However, diminished economic opportunities on the islands, particularly for those considered low-skilled workers, has resulted in continuous immigration among those hoping for better educational and economic opportunities in The Netherlands. Large-scale immigration has been facilitated by these islands' status as current or former Dutch colonies. While Antillean immigrants are Dutch citizens and speak Dutch, their Afro-Caribbean background inhibits their ability to "blend in" to Dutch society resulting in continued socioeconomic disadvantage. The same is true of Surinamese, who have not been citizens since the nation declared its independence in 1975.⁵ Though they experience discrimination in multiple social contexts, the 347,631 Surinamese and 145,499 Antilleans no longer reside on the lowest rungs of the socioeconomic ladder (Essed 1991; CBS 2013). This place is currently reserved for Turks and Moroccans.

Turks' and Moroccans' immigration to The Netherlands as guest workers began in the 1960s (Crul and Doornik 2003; Lucassen and Penninx 1998). Though often aggregated since both are largely Muslim, their immigration histories are quite different. Turks arrived in small numbers from larger cities beginning in the 1960s. When the Dutch economy surged beginning in 1968, The Netherlands aggressively recruited less urbanized workers until 1974, after which the nation no longer admitted them as

labor migrants (Böcker 2000). Turkish immigration increased again when many sought asylum after a 1980 military coup. Throughout their migration, most immigrants came from developed areas and were literate. Moroccans (Crul and Doornik 2003; Nelissen and Buijs 2000), many of whom are Berbers who experienced discrimination and marginalization in Morocco, originate in the densely-populated, rural Rif region, where a lack of educational facilities results in high illiteracy rates. After the nation's independence in 1956, a number of factors coalesced to produce large-scale migration – dissatisfaction with minimal representation in Moroccan politics leading to rebellion against rulers resulting in further marginalization in nation's economy, war in Algeria, and decolonization in Tunisia which limited opportunities for seasonal labor within the immediate region. When European nations sought laborers in the mid-1960s, the Moroccan government directed them to the Rif for the dual goals of staunching the area's political opposition while simultaneously relieving economic duress. As occurred with the Turks, large-scale immigration ended in 1974 when the Dutch decided it no longer needed Moroccan laborers. But migrants seeking family reunification continue to arrive. Differences in educational background and initial reasons for immigration have jettisoned in importance for the, approximately, 395,000 Turks and 369,000 Moroccans in The Netherlands, representing less than 3 % of the Dutch population (CBS 2013; van de Worpforst and van Tubergen 2007).

Racially Stratified Educational Outcomes

Educational outcomes in The Netherlands reveal significant inequality between students of different ethnic groups. The Dutch school system, which includes a variety of primary and secondary school options, generates considerable differences in educational attainment. All schools in The Netherlands are public and are either "regular," denominational (Jewish, Hindu, Muslim,

⁵In 1975, the Dutch government gave Surinamese five years to decide whether to apply for Dutch citizenship.

Protestant, or Catholic), or pedagogical (i.e. using Montessori, Dalton, or Waldorf-based pedagogy). The Dutch Ministry of Education allocates funding based on the immigrant and parental education status of students with schools receiving more money for children of immigrants and parents with lower educational backgrounds.

The *verzuiling*, or “pillarization,” system, institutionalized by Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution, allows individual groups the freedom to found schools and determine the content and structure of curriculum in their classrooms, provided they also include the Ministry of Education’s set of basic curriculum components. Parents can enroll their children in any school. Conflict over Muslims schools, which produce similar educational results as non-Muslim schools (Driessen and Bezemer 1999), has resulted in the closing of Muslim schools throughout the country. However, many Muslim schools face shortages of students because of parents’ fear of negative images of the schools in the media and because of their desires for them to attend a mixed ethnic and religious school, which is more likely to occur in regular public as well as Catholic and Protestant public schools.

After primary school, which usually consists of one classroom for each grade (SCI 2008) students have a variety of secondary school options akin to tracking systems in many Western nations (Cheng et al. 2007; Turner 1960). These include lower vocational (VMBO, the least selective), intermediate general (HAVO), and university preparatory (VWO, the most selective). Although students can theoretically move from the VMBO to the VWO track, few do given the need to complete a “bridge year” for each move that can add years to educational progress. Track assignment is based on national standardized test scores (CITO) and the primary school teacher’s recommendation. Parents unhappy with their child’s recommendation can appeal to either the teacher or principal. However, language differences and lack of cultural resources inhibit immigrant parents’ ability to advocate on behalf of their children, which compounds existing inequalities

rooted in segregated primary education (Gramberg 1998; Heath et al. 2008).

Residential segregation, “white flight” away from “black” schools, and immigrant parents’ lack of knowledge about school choice has produced diminished educational opportunities, and in-school conditions in Dutch cities resembling those in New York City’s South Bronx (Crul 2007; Doornik 1998; Koopmans 2008; Ladd et al. 2009; Paulle 2005; Pels 2001; Vedder 2006). In segregated “black” and “white” schools, minority students in The Netherlands lag behind their white Dutch peers in placement in higher secondary educational tracks, high school graduation, and college attendance to form an ethnic queue with white Dutch students at the top, Antilleans and Surinamese in the middle, and Turks and Moroccans at the bottom (Driessen 2000; Gramberg 1998; Hustinx 2002; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2003; Mollenkopf 2007; Penninx 2006; Rijken et al. 2007; van Ours and Veenman 2003).

Regardless of test scores, teachers disproportionately recommend minority youth to highly segregated vocational secondary education tracks resulting in three quarters of Moroccan and Turkish, and over two thirds of Surinamese and Antillean students educated in VMBO schools, compared to only half of white Dutch students (Crul and Schneider 2009; van de Werfhorst and van Tubergen 2007; Yazer and Kalkan 2007). In the lowest of level of VMBO schools, described as “prison-like” and “the garbage can of the educational system,” and which emphasize social control over education, teachers confer over 80 scolds to students per hour (Crul and Doornik 2003: 1051; Crul 2007; Paulle 2005; Pels 2001). Although only 6.7 % of the student population, minorities represent 30 % of “special needs” students and are often placed in VMBO schools lacking aid sufficient to promote academic success (Brug 2006). These experiences, combined with discrimination at the hands of peers and teachers, lead to alienation, frustration, and correspondingly high drop out rates for minority youth (Crul 2007; Leeman 2007; Leeman and Saharso 1991; van Ours and Veenman 2003).

Compared to the small proportion of white Dutch students (6 %) who leave school without a diploma, 17 % of Moroccans, 21 % of Turks, 23 % of Antilleans and 11 % of Surinamese do so (Crul and Holdaway 2009; Crul and Schneider 2009; De Graaf and Van Zenderen 2009). At the other end of the educational spectrum, nearly 20 % of white Dutch students pursue university study but only 10 % of Surinamese and Antillean and between 5 and 7 % of Turkish and Moroccan students do similarly (Brug 2006; Lechner 2008; Tolsma et al. 2007; van de Werfhorst and van Tubergen 2007). Although some find that, controlling for parents' education and social class, minority students have achievement disproportionately higher than Dutch students of similar social class, the preponderance of minority students with lower class backgrounds promises to inhibit their educational attainment for years to come (Snel et al. 2005; Thränhardt 2004; van de Werfhorst and van Tubergen 2007; Vasta 2007). Minority women appear to outperform their male peers (CBS 2010; Crul and Doornik 2003; Crul and Holdaway 2009; Ouarasse and van de Vijver 2005) and Surinamese students have shown improvement since 2003 (CBS 2010). However, a dearth of minorities among the professorate in The Netherlands (Mullard et al. 1991; Wekker 2009) will likely affect minority college completion rates (Ramnares 2010).

Racialized Socioeconomic Stratification

Segregated education and the racial hierarchy of educational outcomes have profoundly impacted minorities' socioeconomic opportunities in The Netherlands. Competing with native Dutch for scarce positions, Turks and Moroccans who have the lowest educational outcomes of minority groups are increasingly disadvantaged in The Netherlands' service economy (Crul and Doornik 2003; Crul and Schneider 2009) and experience high levels of unemployment (Vasta 2007). Surinamese and Antilleans are twice as likely, and Turks and Moroccans are nearly four

times as likely, to be unemployed than their white Dutch peers with similar educational qualifications (Crul and Doornik 2003; Crul and Schneider 2009; Snel et al. 2005; Thränhardt 2004; van Ours and Veenman 2003; Vasta 2007).

Employment-based discrimination is both overt, with employers preferring to hire white Dutch citizens, particularly in visible positions, and paying them more than minorities in similar positions, and covert, with job agencies giving white Dutch citizens more help in finding jobs than immigrants and minorities (Bovenkerk et al. 1995; Essed 2002; Houtzager and Rodrigues 2002; Vasta 2007). Given their knowledge of Dutch culture and language, and a slight preference for their group, Surinamese and Antilleans, have entered the professions in small, though significant, numbers. However, once employed, minorities face isolation, exclusion, and overt and covert discrimination from peers, colleagues, supervisors, and subordinates (Essed 2002). Those who challenge this culture of racism face repercussions, such as low performance evaluations, decreased opportunities for promotion, and high rates of psychological stress (Essed 2002).

Popular arguments that the established population has fostered "illegal immigration," and stereotypes of these groups "violent," "dishonest," "intrusive," "slackers," "complainers," and neither law abiding nor assimilable into society, find both Turks and Moroccans experiencing overt discrimination in schools, in public, and in the labor market (Engbersen and van der Leun 2001; Heath et al. 2008; Lechner 2008; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2009). Thus, even though they represent a small percentage of the population, fears of these groups loom large on the political stage and in the public imagination.

Persistent economic disadvantage in The Netherlands, has produced low-income 2nd- and 3rd-generation residential and economic immigrant enclaves with Turks, Antilleans, Surinamese, and Moroccans (Euwals et al. 2007; Hartog and Zorlu 2009; Koopmans 2008; Pettigrew and Meertens 1996). These enduring inequalities in the educational and economic domains, combined with persistent negative

racial attitudes, have profoundly limited minorities' life chances and socioeconomic integration.

Immigrant Policies and Their Effects on Race

Immigrant policies, rooted in both historical *verzuiling* and contemporary multicultural policies, initially attempted to equalize resources and opportunities and allow for collective identity maintenance and cultural retention but have instead contributed to unequal opportunities and racialization of targeted groups (De Zwart and Poppelaars 2007; Lucassen and Penninx 1998; Modood 2007). To decouple resource inequality and stigmatization of devalued identities, welfare programs provided immigrants with job training, housing, and Dutch language courses rooted in each community to minimize ethnic dissociation and alienation, facilitate rapid socioeconomic integration and discourage Dutch prejudice of immigrants (Carle 2006; Entzinger 2003; Penninx 2006; Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). However, implementation of anti-discrimination laws and voluntary agreements to promote minority employment has been erratic and ineffective resulting in these policies' failure to facilitate immigrant integration (Mielants 2009; Penninx 2006). Since the 1990s, without addressing deeply embedded structures of racism inhibiting immigrant integration, politicians and the public have expressed frustration with immigrants' "slow" integration believing them to be too separatist and a drain on national welfare benefits. This has resulted in a corresponding shift towards policy necessitating immigrants' rejection of native cultures to experience the benefits of Dutch society (cf. Ali 2008; Scheffer 2000). These policies, which limit benefits and enhance punitive measures, have exacerbated racial stratification (Carle 2006; Lechner 2008; Vasta 2007).

Like many Western European nations, The Netherlands has recently begun experiencing a political shift to the right, with policies reflecting growing attitudes that immigrants comprise too high a percentage of the population. A recent television show, which only ran one

episode, focused on Dutch immigration policy by pitting individuals who did not receive asylum (including an aeronautical engineer and a languages graduate student), against each other for €4,000, while the losers received bullet-proof vests and tulip bulbs. The show, meant to critique Dutch immigration policy, garnered international media attention. For those seeking to stay in the country, restrictive immigration legislation has enhanced difficulties in acquiring citizenship. While the Dutch government previously paid for recent immigrants to take the language and culture courses necessary to pass the citizenship exam, they no longer do so (Jacobs and Rea 2007). Immigrants who have been in the country for 10 years are currently being sought by the government and will need to pass this exam if they intend to stay. Since 2009, immigrants must swear an oath to Dutch values and, since July 2011, be able to sing the Dutch national anthem. In addition, immigrants must prove that they have either 2 years vocational training or work experience, income, and will no longer be able to maintain dual citizenship (Radio Netherlands Worldwide 2011). A judge recently ruled that spouses of Dutch citizens living abroad do not have to pass Dutch language and culture tests in their home country first, as the government had proposed. This policy burdened potential immigrants from poor countries, where women are more likely illiterate, particularly given that spouses from richer nations (other EU countries, the U.S., Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand), were exempt.

The Dutch Ministry of Education's attempts to address educational inequalities, like national policies, have shifted from multiculturalism, which allowed for bilingual instruction and intercultural education curriculum, to assimilation (Driessen 2000; Rijkschroeff et al. 2005; Vasta 2007). In rapid success, the Ministry of Education stopped promoting ICE curriculum, which was never universally implemented, and advocated rapid language assimilation. In 2007–2008, the Ministry of Education finalized a new Dutch History canon emphasizing the nation's role in European history and 50 people and objects that

“represent” The Netherlands. While appearing as units within the Canon, the freedom of education laws allowing teachers significant autonomy to implement curriculum within their own classrooms finds few teachers introducing the nation’s history of conquest and exploitation of minorities, women, and the working classes in The Netherlands to their students (de Vos 2009), even though studies find students of all races interested in learning about these historical phenomena (Grever et al. 2008). The government has defunded the canon beginning January 2014, thereby, for all intents and purposes, eliminating it (*NRC Handelsblad* 2013). Dutch educational authorities’ failure to address in-school mechanisms, such as school culture and teacher practices, that affect racial differences in educational attainment, combined with scholars’ tendency to attribute these differences to cultural deficiencies, rather than discrimination, inhibits researchers and policy makers alike from identifying specific mechanisms of minority underachievement (Alkan 2001).

While some scholars and policy makers blame migrants for their inability to socioeconomically integrate into Dutch society, a burgeoning contingent of Dutch critical race scholars highlight institutionalized racist policies and practices inhibiting immigrants’ and non-whites’ socioeconomic integration (cf. Alkan 2001; Cain 2007; Essed 1991; Essed and Nimako 2006; Essed and Trienekens 2008; Hondius 2009; Nimako and Willemsen 2011; van der Valk 2002; Vasta 2007). Multicultural policies, these scholars argue, have failed because of inadequate implementation, inattention to specific needs of immigrant groups, and perhaps most important, negligence of the explicit effects of racial discrimination on immigrant integration. Furthermore, these policies, were generated by a political system embedded in a society structured by racism, since they address neither underlying racist structures nor existing discrimination, they replicate, rather than rescind, inequality (De Zwart and Poppelaars 2007; Vasta 2007; see also Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2006; Feagin 2006, 2009).

Contemporary Racial Attitudes and Implications

Racial images and a history of unequal treatment, compared to native, Christian white Dutch, have produced racial ideologies in The Netherlands not indistinct from other Western nations. Although the Dutch eschew the word “racism,” research finds that it persists among a considerable segment of the population. For example, while most Dutch reject overtly discriminatory statements, between 10 and 20 % believe in biological differences between the Dutch and minorities, and 30–50 % demonstrate aversive racism (i.e. do not want them as neighbors, classmates, or an intimate partner; Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn 1993). Similarly, the Dutch rate high on subtle forms of racism (Pettigrew and Meertens 1996) which have the potential to convert to blatant racism and impact policies when used by politicians to frame contentious issues such as immigration (Buruma 2007; Lechner 2008).

Subtle racist attitudes have impacted support for social policies designed to promote racial equality. Recent surveys find decreased support for multicultural policies and welfare programs (Penninx 2006; Vasta 2007), and an increased willingness to blame inequality on immigrants rather than structural forces inhibiting their integration (Mielants 2009) resulting in policies which place the onus of integration on immigrants (Carle 2006; Entzinger 2003; Lechner 2008; Vasta 2007). Race and racial differences are likely to become more salient in the future as recent research finds the Dutch exhibiting increased nativism, prejudice, and social segregation, particularly with regard to Muslims (Carle 2006; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2009; Verkuyten 2008).

Negative racial attitudes also find immigrants experiencing frequent interpersonal discrimination in public places (on the street, in stores, and on public transportation) from the general public, business owners, and the police (Boog et al. 2006;

Crul and Doornik 2003; Hondius 2009; Leeman and Saharso 1991; Siebers 2009; Van Niekirk 2007). This overt and covert racism testifies to Dutch perceptions of Surinamese, Antilleans, Turks, and Moroccans as outsiders and the “continuing significance of race” (Feagin 1987) in Dutch life. This “migrant hostile discourse” in the media negatively affects immigrants’ career trajectories leading to downward segmented assimilation and maintains racial closure at the highest levels of society (Siebers 2010; Vermeulen 2010). Furthermore, some argue that contemporary commitment to pillarization, a system of “voluntary segregation,” especially in the face of increased society-wide secularization, justifies racial inequality without addressing relevant power inequalities that inhibit minority integration and socioeconomic success in modern Dutch society (Pettigrew and Meertens 1996; Sturm et al. 1998).

While The Netherlands has historically been a nation of immigrants (Lucassen and Lucassen 2011), there is no language available for migrants to claim multiple identities (i.e. Ghanaian Dutch) (Ghorashi 2009; Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2010). Although roughly 30 % of all immigrants identify as Dutch, and many have integrated elements of Dutch society into their own lives (Crul and Doornik 2003; Den Uyl and Brouwer 2009; Ouarasse and van de Vijver 2005; van Wel et al. 2006; Verkuyten and Slooter 2008), the necessity of being either Dutch or something else, but not both, will likely have important implications both psychologically and socioeconomically (Weiner 2011). Although children, teens, and adults express elements of hybrid identities (de Leeuw and Rydin 2007; Ghorashi 2009), experiencing discrimination in the Netherlands decreases immigrants’ commitment and identification with the host nation (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). Unable to be seen as fully Dutch by a nation that consigns non-whites to outsider status (Ghorashi 2010; Weiner 2014), discursive racism will continue to justify the ubiquitous public, education- and employment-based discrimination across the skills spectrum, including among the highly educated (Bovenkerk et al. 1995;

Ghorashi and van Tilburg 2006; Vasta 2007; Verkuyten and Thijs 2002).

Conclusion

A national identity based on the belief that they are tolerant and racism-free (Brown 2012; Hondius 2009) exists alongside historical exclusion and contemporary inequalities rooted this history of ambiguous tolerance and will likely continue to impact the socioeconomic integration of non-Dutch. Currently representing less than 20 % of the population, non-whites in The Netherlands face increasing anti-immigrant attitudes and legislature which may enhance these groups’ difficulty in multiple social realms, particularly education and employment. With minorities’ lower educational and occupational attainment now entering the third generation, policies that do not assist immigrants in integrating, a culture of discrimination in the workforce, longstanding racial hostilities, and a global economic crisis resulting in increased job competition in all sectors, these phenomena have the potential to entrench racial stratification for generations to come. More research into racializing mechanisms, particularly from a qualitative perspective would not only enhance sociological understandings of these phenomena but lead to improved socioeconomic integration and outcomes for racial minorities in The Netherlands. This should include ethnographic studies of schools, work places, public venues (for interactions with the police), interviews with students and parents, and community leaders of color (particularly those involved in the burgeoning social movements addressing race in The Netherlands such as Comité 21 Maart and Zwart Piet Niet), and content analysis of contemporary popular cultural media, and government policies. Furthermore, the Dutch history of colonial wealth accumulation and its impact on contemporary socioeconomic inequalities and racialized ideologies and images must continue to be excavated to fully document the role of colonial era policies on racial realities in The Netherlands today.

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Part VIII

Oceania

Indigenous Australia, White Australia, Multicultural Australia: The Demography of Race and Ethnicity in Australia

28

Nicholas Biddle, Siew-Ean Khoo, and John Taylor

Introduction and Overview

With an estimated population of 21,875,000 in June 2009 and a surface area of around 7.7 million km², Australia is a continental-scale country with a medium sized population (ABS 2009a). It is a relatively wealthy country with an overall high standard of living ranking second (behind Norway) according to the 2009 Human Development Report (UNDP 2009, 171). However, amongst the ‘Very High Human Development’ (VHHD) countries, Australia has a reasonably high level of income inequality, ranking equal 7th and 9th out of 28 countries according to the ratio of the wealthiest 10 % of the population to the poorest 10 % and the Gini index respectively (UNDP 2009, 195).

For the most part, Australia has been populated by a process of international migration. According to the most recent (2006) Census, 23.9 % of the Australian population was born overseas. Furthermore, only 56.1 % of the

population had both parents born in Australia. Migrants to Australia originate from a diverse range of source countries. While the two major sources remain the United Kingdom (23.5 % of the overseas-born population) and nearby New Zealand (8.8 %), a large and increasing share of Australia’s population was born outside these English-speaking countries. This includes China (4.7 % of the overseas-born population), Italy (4.5 %), Viet Nam (3.6 %) and India (3.3 %). This migrant profile has produced an ethnically diverse and multicultural society.

A population subgroup in Australia that assumes an importance in discussion of race and ethnicity way beyond their minority share of national population is the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (Indigenous) population. Collectively, Indigenous Australians are those who identify as descendants of the first human inhabitants of the Australian continent and nearby islands (Flannery 1994). According to estimates from the 2006 Census, 2.5 % of the total Australian population self-identified as being Indigenous. Indigenous Australians have a relatively young age profile and their numbers are projected to grow in relative size.

This chapter outlines the interaction between demography and Australian interpretations of race and ethnicity. The discussion focuses on the two population groups mentioned above—Indigenous Australians (in section “[Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians](#)”) and the

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overseas-born population and their descendants (in section “[Migration and multicultural Australia](#)”). A recurring theme is the degree of variation within these groups (especially for the migrant population), both in terms of ethnic identification and demographic or socioeconomic outcomes. In the final part of the paper (section “[Social cohesion and multiculturalism](#)”), we provide a summary of sorts, focussing on the notions of social cohesion and multiculturalism.

A Demographic and Socioeconomic Profile of Australia

Demography

Like most developed countries, Australia has an ageing population. In 2009, 2.9 million Australians were aged 65 years and over (13.3 % of the population). Under reasonably conservative assumptions, this is projected to increase to 6.6 million Australians by 2039, or 21.2 % of the population. The two factors driving this trend are relatively low and declining rates of fertility and relatively high and increasing life expectancy. At 81.4 years, life expectancy at birth in Australia in 2007 was bettered only by Japan, Hong Kong, Iceland and Switzerland amongst the VHH countries (UNDP 2009). Although the total fertility rate of 1.8 was around the average for VHH countries, it was still substantially below replacement level.

By international standards, Australia is a sparsely populated country with an average population density of about 2.8 persons per km². However, its population is unevenly distributed, with 76 % of the people concentrated close to the coastline on less than 1 % of the land area (Hugo 2003). Australia is also a highly urbanised country, with two-thirds of its population residing in cities with populations over 100,000.

These population concentrations are found along the south-east and south-west areas of the continent. The interior of the continent is sparsely settled with very few cities or towns of any reasonable size. Some of the reasons for this concentration are historic—the largest cities

grew around the administrative centres of the six original colonies, all of which were located on the coast.

Australia is also the driest (inhabited) continent, has the poorest quality soils and the most variable rainfall on a year-to-year basis (BoM 2010). Much of the country is unsuitable for high-density urban centres and patterns of European agriculture are also unsustainable (McNicol 2003).

Defining Race and Ethnicity in Australia—Data, Methods and Identification

The five-yearly population census is the main source of information on race and ethnicity in Australia. However, the 1976 Census was the last one to include a question about racial origin, with no direct question in recent censuses by which individuals can identify their race or ethnic origin (apart from as an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander). In the 1986 Census, in response to community interests and lobbying, a question was included asking about each person’s ancestry. While the question was discontinued in subsequent censuses, it was reinstated for the 2001, 2006 and 2011 Censuses. Because of the importance of immigration to Australia, the census has always included questions on the country of birth of each person and the country of birth of each person’s parents. Since 1976, the census has also asked a question about language spoken at home.

Before the inclusion of the ancestry question, data on country of birth and language spoken at home from the census provide an indication of people’s ethnic origins. While this works quite well for migrants from countries such as Italy and Greece, where most people are of Italian or Greek origin and speak Italian or Greek, it is more problematic for people who come from countries which have racial or ethnic minorities, or other countries of immigration where a person’s country of birth is not necessarily an indication of their ethnicity. Examples are the Maoris who have migrated from New Zealand or ethnic Indians who have migrated from Fiji or Malaysia. Country of birth also does not identify the ethnic

origin of people born in Australia whose parents or grandparents are immigrants—the second and third generations.¹ In these cases ancestry data may provide a better indicator of ethnicity. Language is also not a good indicator of ethnicity when not all persons speak their ethnic language at home.

However, there are also limitations with using the census ancestry data as identifiers of ethnicity. In 2006, 24 % of the Australian population identified their ancestry as ‘Australian’. Most of these people are at least third-generation Australians and are unable to identify their ethnic origin. It can be assumed that many are of English, Irish and/or Scottish origins. Eight percent of the population did not answer the ancestry question. In the 2006 Census, each person can identify up to two ancestries and 28 % of the population did so, with the most common combination being English-Australian (stated by 1.2 million people or 6 % of the total population).

Country of birth information is also collected in vital registration records, allowing for the calculation of fertility and mortality rates by birthplace and providing information on ethnic differentials in fertility and mortality. Data on the country of birth of couples available from marriage registration records have been particularly useful for the study of intermarriage rates between immigrants by country of birth and the Australian-born (see Price 1982, 1989; Price and Zubrzycki 1962).

While the Indigenous population can identify themselves as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander in the census ancestry question, the direct question on Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander origin provides a better estimate of the size of the Indigenous population. Only 0.6 % of the population identified as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander in the ancestry question compared

with 2.3 % of the population who responded that they were either Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander in the direct question on Indigenous status. However, 5.7 % of the population did not respond to this question at all. While the ABS uses a Post Enumeration Survey to estimate census net undercount and distributes non-response to Indigenous status pro rata in developing post-censal estimates of the Indigenous population, census error remains an issue that hampers Indigenous population analysis in Australia (Kinfu and Taylor 2005; Taylor and Biddle 2010). Lack of consistency both within and between statistical collections in the count of Indigenous population has been a hallmark of contemporary attempts at enumeration. One source of this inconsistency is the adoption by the Australian government of a ‘working’ three-part definition of an Indigenous Australian:

- That an individual has Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent;
- Identifies as an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander; and
- Is accepted as an Aboriginal or a Torres Strait Islander by the community in which he or she lives.

It can be argued that the Indigenous population revealed by the census conforms with only the second of these criteria, but only to the extent that a collection of individuals tick the appropriate box on a census form which asks if they are of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander origin. The first criteria is strictly only verifiable with genealogical evidence (though it is implied by the second), while the third criteria is only rarely tested (for example in accessing certain special programs) and is certainly not applied in the census or in most survey and administrative applications of the standard Indigenous status question.

Even though the Indigenous status question is reasonably consistent across administrative data collections, there is still uncertainty around the way in which it is asked. This is especially problematic in instances where the question is filled in by a third party who is unlikely to personally know the individual. For example, according to ABS (2009c, 12) while ‘Australia maintains a high quality registration system of deaths, the

¹ In the censuses before 2001, country of birth of parents can be used to identify the second generation by their parents’ country of origin. Since 2001, although the questions on country of birth of each person’s father and mother are still included in the census, the data are coded in two categories only: Australia and overseas. While this allows the second and third or more generations to be identified, it provides no information about their likely ethnic origin.

level of Indigenous identification can vary across collections, across geography and over time.’ Furthermore, it is ‘likely that most deaths of Indigenous Australians are registered. However, some of these deaths are not identified as Indigenous when they are registered.’ The ABS has attempted to mitigate this issue by statistically linking administrative data on deaths to census records. However, this technique is highly reliant on good quality information on names and addresses. Ultimately, the fact that Indigenous Australians are in many ways a socially defined population has led and will continue to lead to ongoing uncertainty around key demographic indicators, as discussed in the following section.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians

Australia has two broad Indigenous population categories: Aboriginal peoples are those who share biological ancestry back to the original occupants of the continent and Torres Strait Islander peoples are those whose Melanesian roots are traced to the archipelago between the Australian mainland and Papua New Guinea. While the archaeological evidence is limited, there is a general consensus that the ancestors of Aboriginal Australians reached the continent some 70,000 years ago (Smith 2002, 11). Torres Strait Islanders as a distinct group are much more recent arrivals. Over the millennia prior to European exploration and colonisation, Indigenous peoples occupied all parts of the continent as well as the island of Tasmania. They developed a diverse range of hunter-gatherer economies and societies that were well suited to the wide variety of Australian climates and ecosystems (Butlin 1993). Overall these were low-growth, stable populations with densities tied to environmental carrying capacity. Recent scientific estimates by Mulvaney and Kamminga (1999) using available knowledge of the capacity of the Australian continent to support the Indigenous economy produced a population range of 750,000–800,000 at the time of European colonisation. While point-in-time numbers were

low, because of the extensive period of occupation it is estimated that some 2.5 billion individuals had been born on the Australian continent before the arrival of Europeans (Smith 2002, 13).

Systematic charting of the Australian coast by European navigators started in the early seventeenth century. It took 200 more years to chart the entire continent, by which time permanent British settlement had commenced in the south-eastern corner. Unlike earlier in North America and later in New Zealand, the British did not sign treaties with Indigenous peoples. This was based on a presumption that Indigenous people did not cultivate and hence own the land (*terra nullius*)—a legal fiction that was finally overturned by the landmark Mabo decision in 1992, but which had profound implications for the rights of Indigenous Australians in the meantime (Broome 2010).

In 1787, the British government dispatched a fleet of around 1,000 people (mostly convicts) to found a colony in New South Wales. In 1788, the colony was established in what was then the land of the Eora people and would soon be known as Port Jackson, and then Sydney. The wider Sydney region was ‘the country of about thirty distinct groups of Aboriginal people’ (Karskens 2009, 3). Further settlements, and then colonies, were established in Van Diemen’s Land (later Tasmania) in 1803, Western Australia (1826), South Australia (1836), Victoria (1851) and Queensland (1859), with settlement gradually encroaching inland from coastal ports. With time, usurpation of the Aboriginal land base had a profound impact on the economy and demography of Indigenous peoples across the continent and three broad phases of this process are discernable. The first covers the colonial period up to 1901.

History of the Indigenous Population, 1788–1901

Of the seven factors that shaped the early interaction between the British colonisers and the Aboriginal people that they came into contact with that were identified by Broome (2010, 18), three have particular relevance for this chapter – ‘first, the British brought no treaty with them;

second, they came with a particular exclusivist view of land and society; third, the British held preconceptions of Indigenous people as savage.’ It is not surprising, therefore, that the early colonial period was marked by tension at best and outright conflict and violence on a number of occasions. The first Governor of the colony, Arthur Phillip, was speared (though not fatally) by an Eora man, probably in response to earlier kidnappings by the British as they sought to gain knowledge from the Aboriginal population about how to utilise the continent’s resources (Broome 2010).

Not surprisingly, this early and ongoing conflict had demographic implications, particularly for the Indigenous population. The first complete census (in the standard sense) in any of the early Australian colonies was conducted in New South Wales in 1828. The first to explicitly enumerate Indigenous peoples was the Tasmanian Census of 1847, though ironically after they had been virtually extinguished on that island by the combined effects of disease, guerrilla resistance and government-sponsored clearances. In subsequent censuses, Indigenous people in scope tended to be those who interacted directly with the settler population either through proximity or employment. This was partly because of difficulties in collecting information on nomadic populations in colonial hinterlands, but also because of state policies towards Indigenous people, as the Queensland Registrar-General writing with regards to the 1886 Census of that colony makes clear:

The aboriginals of the colony have not been included either in this or in any previous Census. Their wandering habits, their apparent incapacity for civilisation, and the state of vagabondage in which they seem to fall whenever brought permanently into contact with the whites, would render any enumeration of them difficult, and the result not to be relied on to any extent; and although, for some purposes, it might be desirable to ascertain their numbers, and whether increasing or decreasing, for electoral purposes, one of the most important objects of the census, they are altogether out of the question (Smith 1980, 16).

Estimates of the Indigenous population based on the 1901 Census at the time of Australian Federation indicate a population of 93,000

(Smith 1980). Even taking into account the potential for large undercount in earlier colonial censuses, a comparison of the 1901 estimate and generally accepted 1788 estimates indicates a precipitously large population decline over the colonial period. Mulvaney (2002) identifies three reasons for this decline: the introduction of European diseases; decreased fertility due to disruptions to the Indigenous economy; and frontier violence. Based on analysis in Reynolds (1987), Mulvaney (2002) suggests an estimate of up to 40,000 deaths from the latter. While this is large relative to population size, it nonetheless suggests that much of the decline in Indigenous population was due to the first two (demographic) factors. Broome (2010) details the consequences of this ‘demographic disaster’ as follows:

The death of 80 % of the population created huge gaps in the kinship system, left children without close guardians, made correct marriage partners scarce and ceremonial obligations difficult to perform... Stress, and perhaps even mental illness pushed people to alcohol abuse and violence. The bodies of Aboriginal people were emaciated by colonisation—some even scarred from the violence (Broome 2010, 78–79).

A third reason for a lack of data on the Indigenous population was the assumption that the Indigenous population was part of a ‘dying race’ that would either be incorporated into the non-Indigenous population through intermarriage or die out through excess mortality or low fertility (Smith 1980). Based on the size of the Indigenous population during the late colonial and early Federation period (around 1881–1911), this assumption was not demographically unfounded. However, in the climate of Social Darwinism that prevailed in Australia at the time, the cause of this population decline was attributed to inherent racial inferiority. As cited in Markus (1974, 66), the *Age* newspaper editorialised in 1896 that ‘the black race has decayed, and is rapidly dying out from causes quite outside the power of the white man to control’. Broome (2010, 106) argues that ‘the law of Social Darwinism absolved settlers for the disappearance of Aboriginal people—it was the workings of this law, not white colonialism, that was at fault’.

History of the Indigenous Population, 1901–1967

The first census of contemporary federated Australia did not occur until 1911. The enumeration strategy related to Indigenous Australians in this and subsequent censuses up until 1971 was dominated by a specific clause in the Australian constitution (number 127) that stated:

in reckoning the numbers of the people of the Commonwealth, or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal natives shall not be counted (Smith 1980, 20).

There is debate as to the specific meaning and intent of this clause, with some arguing that it was never intended to apply to census or other population counts but instead to financial quotas only (Sawer 1966). Whatever the intention, the effect of clause 127 was that, up until the 1971 Census, many Indigenous Australians were explicitly excluded from the count of the total Australian population. The specific criteria varied through time and were confusing even for those responsible for the collection and dissemination of the data (Smith 1980).

The general principle was that those of less than half Aboriginal descent (even if living tribally) were fully enumerated and included in the statistics of the general population (Smith 1980, 34). So-called ‘half-castes’, or those deemed to have equal Indigenous and non-Indigenous parentage, were distinguished as such, whilst those deemed as so-called ‘full-bloods’ were generally excluded from published statistics despite having a range of information collected about them.

Statistical practice over the period reflected social and political views of the time. Thus, the Native Welfare Conference in 1937 determined that ‘the destiny of the natives of aboriginal origin, but not of the full blood, lies in their ultimate absorption by the people of the Commonwealth and it therefore recommends that all the efforts be directed to that end’ (cited in Broome 2010). One facet of this policy was the control of female sexuality (Hollinsworth 2006). A second aspect was the forced removal from families of half-caste Indigenous children and their relocation into

institutions of State care. This continued as government policy up to the 1970s and led to what was eventually became known as the ‘Stolen Generations’ (HREOC 1997). This policy had devastating and long-lasting effects on the children removed and their birth families (HREOC 1997). Resolution of the social and economic effects of removal remains one of the fundamental challenges of race relations in Australia today.

In truth, the distinction between ‘half-castes’ and ‘full-bloods’ was often confusing and tended to vary depending on the wording of specific questions in the census. What did not change, however, was reliance on some form of ‘blood quantum’ as the defining characteristic. Despite UNESCO (1950) arguing strongly against the use of such racial categorisation in public policy it continued in the Australian census until 1966. In the 1971 Census, there was a self-identified ‘racial origin’ question, but this was replaced in 1976, with respondents able to choose one option from the following: (1) European origin, (2) Aboriginal origin, (3) Torres Strait Islander origin, (4) Other origin (give one only). Respondents were explicitly told that—‘If of mixed origin, indicate the one to which he considers himself to belong’ (Smith 1980, 44).

History of the Indigenous Population, 1967 to Present

The overwhelming ‘yes’ vote to the 1967 referendum question concerning deletion of section 127 of the Australian constitution may be considered a watershed in the demographic history of Indigenous Australians. Most directly in this context, it had the effect that Indigenous people were to be counted (or rather included) for the first time in ‘reckoning the number of the people of the Commonwealth’. The practical consequence of this was inclusion in the 1971 Census of a question on self-reported Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander origins. With subsequent variation in wording, this form of question in the census, and increasingly in survey and administrative data

collections, has provided a basis for charting transformations in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations to the present and beyond.

A further effect stemmed from the symbolic force of the referendum result in bestowing responsibilities on the Commonwealth for the 'good governance' of Indigenous people nationally. This stimulated the development of targeted policy along with an attendant requirement for comprehensive data to establish benchmarks and monitor progress. Accordingly, both the scale and nature of initiatives subsequently aimed at achieving social justice have been guided by information regarding the size, composition and changing location of the officially identified Indigenous population. In effect, it has been data drawn from five-yearly censuses and increasingly from surveys and administrative collections that have assisted in determining the global quantum of Indigenous need for government-type works and services (Commonwealth Grants Commission 2000). More recently, the recognition has also grown that some measure of the dynamics of demographic change is important for the formulation of policies that are based not solely on current or historic assessment of government obligations, but also on some estimation of anticipated requirements (Taylor and Hunter 1998).

Notwithstanding the crucial role of demographic data in public policy development, fundamental

uncertainties are inherent in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population counts. At the root of this difficulty lies the very nature of changing race relations in Australia—indeed the demography of Indigenous Australians has been described ultimately as a 'political demography' (Gray 1985).

In the not so distant past, these sociological and political processes served to exclude, devalue or deter Indigenous representation in official statistics whereas, by contrast, the contemporary politics of data collection have sought to encourage identification (Ross 1999). This is manifest most recently in the greater involvement of Indigenous personnel in the collection of census and survey data as well as in ministerial-level agreements for the priority adoption of the standard self-reported Indigenous status question in Commonwealth State and Territory collections. These cover vital registration as well as a wide range of functional areas such as health, welfare, education, housing, employment and training. Put simply, since the 1967 referendum there has been an increasing desire on the part of governments to count the descendants of the first Australians and this has coincided with an increasing willingness on the part of Indigenous peoples to be counted.

Table 28.1 shows the number of Indigenous people counted in the eight censuses since the landmark 1967 referendum.

Table 28.1 Indigenous census counts^a 1971–2006

Census year	Census count	Change from previous census		
		Number	Percent	Annualised percent
1971	115,953			
1976	160,915	44,962	38.8	6.8
1981	159,897	-1,018	-0.6	-0.1
1986	227,645	67,748	42.4	7.3
1991	265,459	37,814	16.6	3.1
1996	352,970	87,511	33.0	5.9
2001	410,003	57,033	16.2	3.0
2006	455,031	45,028	11.0	2.1
1971–2006	n/a	339,073	292.4	4.0

Source: Respective censuses

^aRecognising the fact that many Indigenous Australians are missed from the census (despite the ABS' best intentions), the ABS has provided a separate Estimated Resident Population (ERP) to supplement the census count. In 2006, this ERP was 517,000, representing an undercount of 12.0 %

The first thing this table shows is that growth over the last 35 years has been very high and way beyond the bounds of natural increase. The number of Indigenous Australians counted in the census has nearly trebled, with an annualised growth rate of 4.0 %. This represents a sharp break from pre-referendum population trends. The second thing to note is the uneven nature of the population increase. For example, between 1971 and 1976, the Indigenous count grew at an annualised rate of 6.8 % per annum. Over the next intercensal period, the population count declined slightly, with high rates of growth returning between 1981 and 1986 and again between 1991 and 1996.

There are two main reasons for these excessive growth rates. The first is socio-demographic in that Indigenous male exogamy has incrementally added to the stock of Indigenous-identified births. The second, and more prominent reason, reflects political, administrative and cultural processes involved in the construction of Indigenous demography—in particular the efforts made by governments to enumerate and categorise Indigenous peoples and the choices made by respondents to such overtures (Gray 1985; Kinfu and Taylor 2005; Smith 1980).

As the enumerated Indigenous population increased over the period leading up to and since the 1967 Referendum, so too has the attention paid to conflict between Indigenous Australians and the Australian State with regards to land rights. As mentioned, there were no treaties negotiated between the original inhabitants of the continent and the British. While never disappearing, Indigenous claims as original owner of the land became more organised and more prominent from the 1960s onwards. Perhaps the most visible aspect of these claims is what became known as the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, an assembly of mainly Aboriginal Australians on the lawns of Old Parliament House in Canberra. The Aboriginal Tent Embassy, which celebrated its 40th anniversary on January 26th, 2012, and has argued for a Sovereign Treaty between the Australian State and the Indigenous population of Australia (Daw 2000).

Although the demands for a Sovereign Treaty have gone unheeded, the decision by the

Australian High Court in 1992 to grant Native Title rights to three islands in the Torres Strait in what came to be known as the Mabo case (named for Eddie Mabo, one of five claimants who died only a few months before the decision was handed down). According to Broome (2010, 284) the ‘Mabo judgment, which overturned 200 years of understanding about ownership, caused 15 months of fear and turmoil’ as claims were made about Indigenous Australians taking ownership of mining and pastoral areas, cities, and even suburban back yards. While these claims were later shown to be alarmist, there have been a number of successful and unsuccessful Native Title claims since, as well as a number currently under consideration.² These are likely to have ongoing demographic implications, particularly for migration patterns, as Indigenous Australians respond to improved access to land and, in some cases, improved economic circumstances following successful claims.

The Contemporary Demography of Indigenous Australians

Indigenous Australians have high rates of fertility and mortality compared to national averages. The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for Indigenous females in 2008 was estimated at 2.52 compared to 1.97 for the total population (ABS 2009b). Life expectancy at birth in 2005–2007 was estimated at 67.2 years for Indigenous males and 72.9 years for Indigenous females. This was 11.5 and 9.7 years lower than the respective life expectancy estimates for the non-Indigenous population (ABS 2009c). Historically, high rates of mortality and fertility (relative to the rest of the population) have led to an age distribution that is heavily skewed towards children and youth, as shown in Fig. 28.1.

The overwhelming feature of Fig. 28.1 is the very youthful composition of the Indigenous population and a rapid tapering in age distribution, with advancing age due to high adult mortality.

²For up-to-date details, go to <http://www.nntt.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx>




Fig. 28.1 Age distribution of the indigenous and non-indigenous Australian population, 2006 (Source: ABS 2008)

As a consequence, 57 % of the Indigenous population was aged under 25 years in 2006 compared to just 33 % of the non-Indigenous population. At the other end of the age distribution, only 12 % of the Indigenous population was aged over 50 years compared to 31 % of the non-Indigenous population. This contrast in age distribution has consequences for social and economic policies. For the non-Indigenous population, these are increasingly concerned with the effects and implications of ageing and retirement funding (Commonwealth Treasury 2010). For Indigenous Australians the focus is on the provision of education, training and entry into employment (SCRGSP 2009).

Customised calculations from the 2006 Census show that 6.8 % of Indigenous Australians were away from their place of usual residence on census night (a rough proxy for rates of temporary mobility); 22.2 % changed their place of usual residence over the preceding 12 months, and 46.5 % changed their place of usual residence over the preceding 5 years (both proxies for rates of residential mobility). These percentages were 1.56 times, 1.33 times and 1.08 times the rates for the non-Indigenous population respectively.

The national figures with regards to fertility, mortality and mobility hide substantial variation by geography and across the lifecycle. There is a clear interaction between demography and geography. Although the majority of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations live in cities and other large urban centres, Indigenous Australians are much more likely to reside in remote Australia than non-Indigenous Australians. This is demonstrated in Fig. 28.2, which shows the percentage of the population across Australia who identify as being Indigenous as well as the percentage of the total Indigenous population who live in that region. Results are given for 37 Indigenous Regions, the least disaggregated level in the Australian Indigenous Geographic Classification (ABS 2008), based loosely on the old Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) Regions.

The difference between the absolute and relative distribution of the Indigenous population is highlighted by a comparison between the Sydney and Apatula Indigenous Regions. Of the total Indigenous population, 9.07 % live in Australia’s largest city, Sydney. However, only a very small share (1.10 %) of the total population of Sydney



Fig. 28.3 Propensity to change usual residence between 2001 and 2006 across the life course, indigenous and non-indigenous Australians (Source: Authors' calculations using the ABS Census of Population and Housing 2006)

engagement with formal education (Biddle 2010b). However, the non-Indigenous population in their mid- to late-20s reach a much higher peak than their Indigenous counterparts. For example, almost three-quarters of non-Indigenous females aged 25–27 years changed their place of usual residence in the 5 years before the 2006 Census. Biddle and Hunter (2006) speculate that this is partly due to lower rates of employment-driven mobility for the Indigenous population.

Ultimately, Biddle and Yap (2010) showed that once the respective age distributions of the Indigenous population were controlled for, Indigenous Australians were less likely to have changed usual residence over the previous 5 years compared to the non-Indigenous population. Over a 5-year period at least, it is not that Indigenous Australians were more likely to change usual residence than the non-Indigenous population, but rather that they are more likely to be of the age at which residential mobility is relatively high. Once socioeconomic characteristics had been controlled for, Biddle and Yap (2010)

showed that Indigenous Australians were even less likely to have moved.

A similar story emerges when comparing fertility across the lifecycle. Figure 28.4 summarises age-specific fertility rates for Indigenous and non-Indigenous females.

The results presented in Fig. 28.4 show the clear disparity in the age distribution of fertility rates between Indigenous and non-Indigenous females. With a median age of 24.7 years, Indigenous mothers are substantially younger than the average mother in Australia (30.7 years). There are more than four times as many births for Indigenous females aged 15–19 years and two-and-a-half times as many births for Indigenous females aged 20–24 years. These high fertility rates for young Indigenous females are likely to result in substantial disruptions to education and labour force participation (Bloom et al. 2003). Equally though, the causality is likely to run the other way with disengagement from formal education and the mainstream labour market leading to a low opportunity cost of having children.

Fig. 28.4 Age-specific fertility rates for Indigenous females and all Australian females, 2008 (Source: ABS 2009b)




Figure 28.4 also shows that fertility rates for non-Indigenous females aged 30 years and over are in fact higher than Indigenous females of the same age. However, while non-Indigenous females are clearly more likely to delay child-birth into their thirties, this is never at a high enough rate to ‘catch up’ with Indigenous females. Biddle and Yap (2010) show that for all age groups, the ‘number of children ever born’ is higher for Indigenous compared to non-Indigenous females (even after controlling for socio-economic characteristics).


While the high rates of Indigenous fertility clearly contribute to the proportionally large number of Indigenous births per year, a second contributing factor is high rates of exogamy and births of Indigenous children to non-Indigenous mothers. In 2008, 27.1 % of children that were identified as being Indigenous were born to a non-Indigenous mother (presumably with an Indigenous father). This proportion varies substantially by geography. In New South Wales, the state with the biggest Indigenous and non-Indigenous population, 35.2 % of births of Indigenous children were to non-Indigenous mothers. On the other hand, in the Northern Territory, a jurisdiction with a relatively small non-Indigenous population, only 8.3 % of Indigenous births were to non-Indigenous mothers.

In 2006, 52 % of partnered Indigenous males had a non-Indigenous partner, slightly lower than the corresponding figure of 55 % for Indigenous females (Heard et al. 2009). These percentages represent a steady increase from the previous 2001 Census, rising from 49 and 53 % respectively. Once again though, there was substantial variation by geography in rates of exogamy. In Sydney and Melbourne, around 82–83 % of partnered males and females had a non-Indigenous partner. This is compared to 4 % of Indigenous males and 8 % of Indigenous females in parts of remote Australia.

It is clear from the analysis presented in Heard et al. (2009) that the Indigenous share of the area in which Indigenous Australian live was the main determinant of the rate of exogamy. The authors also argue that the results ‘indicate that Australia’s history of socioeconomic and cultural division between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities does not inhibit intermarriage in settings where there is plenty of opportunity for interaction between the two’ (Heard et al. 2009, 11).

This high rate of intermarriage can also have implications for the calculation of dependency ratios (O’Reilly 1994, 154). For example, the dependency of Indigenous children cannot simply be related to aggregates such as the number of working-age Indigenous parents, as significant

Fig. 28.5 Percent of the population predicted to be alive at the end of each age cohort: indigenous and non-indigenous males aged 0–45, 2005–2007 (Source: ABS 2009c)



numbers of non-Indigenous parents also contribute to the support of Indigenous children.

While high rates of fertility and mobility can reflect, in part, culturally informed preferences, relatively low life expectancy is a clear indication of ongoing Indigenous disadvantage. Of the 181 countries in the HDR that had an observation for life expectancy, Australia's estimate of 81.4 years was ranked fifth (behind Japan, Hong Kong, Iceland and Switzerland). Taking the average of the Indigenous male and female estimates from ABS (2009c), Indigenous Australians, on the other hand, would rank equal 101st with Guatemala (slightly below Indonesia and slightly above Azerbaijan).

Excess Indigenous mortality is demonstrated in Figs. 28.5 and 28.6. Both give the per cent of Indigenous and non-Indigenous males and females who are estimated to die between the ages of 0–1, between the ages of 1–3 and over subsequent 5-year age periods up until 80–85. Given the increase in mortality rates over the lifecycle, Fig. 28.5 focuses on the first nine age cohorts (covering the ages of 0–45), whereas Fig. 28.6 focuses on the remaining eight cohorts (covering the ages of 45–85).

Results presented in Figs. 28.5 and 28.6 show consistently higher rates of age-specific mortality for Indigenous males and females compared to

their non-Indigenous counterparts. Indigenous Australians are generally at least twice as likely to die over a 5-year period compared to non-Indigenous Australians, with the difference greatest between the ages of 20 and 60.

According to AIHW (2010), using data from the four jurisdictions with sufficiently robust death records (Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and the Northern Territory), the five leading causes of death for Indigenous Australians between 2001 and 2005 were 'diseases of the circulatory system, external causes of morbidity and mortality (predominantly accidents, intentional self-harm and assault), neoplasms (cancer), endocrine, metabolic and nutritional disorders (mainly diabetes), and respiratory diseases'. Of these, diabetes had the highest Standardised Mortality Rate (SMR), with 10.8 times as many deaths for Indigenous males (compared to mortality rates for non-Indigenous males) and 14.5 times as many deaths for Indigenous females (compared to non-Indigenous females).

Indigenous Socioeconomic Outcomes

Using the best available proxies for education, life expectancy and income, Yap and Biddle (2010) estimated an HDI score of 0.737 for




Fig. 28.6 Percent of the population predicted to be alive at the end of each age cohort: indigenous and non-indigenous males aged 45–85, 2005–2007 (Source: ABS 2009c)

Indigenous Australians in 2006 compared to 0.965 for the non-Indigenous population. A score of 0.737 indicates that Indigenous Australians have similar human development levels to the populations of Fiji and Sri Lanka, both Middle Human Development countries. This reflects in part the lower life expectancy already discussed. However, Indigenous Australians have substantially worse outcomes across the other two components of the HDI (education and income).

The following table summarises Indigenous socioeconomic outcomes using nine variables across four dimensions—employment, education (participation and attainment), income and housing. The variables are expressed such that higher values indicate more favourable socioeconomic outcomes. Results are based on the 2001 and 2006 Censuses.

The results presented in Table 28.2 show that across all nine socioeconomic measures, Indigenous Australians have, on average, worse outcomes than the non-Indigenous population. Indigenous Australians were less likely than non-Indigenous Australians to live in a house that is owned or being purchased and less likely to live in a house with at least one bedroom per

Table 28.2 Indigenous and non-Indigenous socioeconomic outcomes, 2001 and 2006

Variable	Indigenous		Non-indigenous	
	2001	2006	2001	2006
Employed ^a	41.9	46.1	59.0	61.7
Employed as a manager or professional ^a	6.5	7.3	16.6	17.8
Employed full-time in the private sector ^a	15.4	17.4	31.9	39.5
Completed high school ^a	19.5	23.9	42.9	49.7
Completed a qualification ^a	17.0	23.7	39.6	45.9
15–24 year olds attending an educational institution	33.4	34.5	54.8	55.3
Individual income above half the Australian median ^a	60.1	56.8	74.0	71.6
Lives in a house that is owned or being purchased	25.0	27.3	69.9	69.7
Lives in a house with at least one bedroom per usual resident ^b	38.2	42.5	64.5	67.6

Source: Authors’ calculations using the ABS Census of Population and Housing, 2001 and 2006

^aCalculated for those aged 15 years and over

^bWhile this is a relatively unsophisticated measure of overcrowding that does not take into account household composition, it correlates very highly at the area level with other measures that do (Biddle 2010a)

usual resident. Those aged 15 years and over are less likely to be employed, less likely to have completed high school or have a post-school qualification and less likely to have a personal income that is above half the Australian median (a standard measure of income poverty). Finally, Indigenous Australians aged 15–24 years were less likely to be attending an educational institution.

There was general improvement in measured Indigenous socioeconomic outcomes over the 2001 to 2006 intercensal period. However, there was only one variable where the improvement was large enough to significantly decrease the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous outcomes—the per cent of the population who had completed a qualification. For two of the variables—full-time private sector employment and income—the gap between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous population actually widened over the most recent intercensal period.

In the same way that demographic outcomes can vary by geography, so too do Indigenous socioeconomic outcomes. Using the nine variables presented in Table 28.2, Biddle (2009) calculated an Index of Relative Indigenous Socioeconomic Outcomes. This index included a ranking of all 37 Indigenous Regions across Australia. Across the nine input variables the large capital city regions were the least disadvantaged. Of these, Adelaide and Perth rank slightly lower than the eastern capitals. At the other end of the distribution, remote regions ranked relatively poorly, especially in the Northern Territory. Other regions outside of the Northern Territory in the bottom quarter of the distribution were Cape York, Port Augusta, Kununurra and Derby.

Current Policy Discussions

Governments of all levels in Australia are keenly aware of the socioeconomic disadvantage faced by the Indigenous population. In 2008, the Council of Australian Governments (CoAG) committed itself to six targets as part of the ‘Closing the Gap’ framework. Specifically, CoAG is committed to:

1. Close the life expectancy gap within a generation (that is by 2031);
2. Halve the gap in mortality rates for Indigenous children under five within a decade (by 2018);
3. Ensure access to early childhood education for all Indigenous 4 year olds in remote communities within 5 years (by 2013);
4. Halve the gap in reading, writing and numeracy achievements for children within a decade (by 2018);
5. Halve the gap for Indigenous students in year 12 attainment or equivalent attainment rates by 2020; and
6. Halve the gap in employment outcomes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians within a decade (by 2018) (FaHCSIA 2009, 5).

While there is considerable agreement in Australia across the political spectrum with regards to the need to make significant inroads into the Indigenous/non-Indigenous socioeconomic gap, there is less consensus on how to achieve that aim. Arguably the most contentious and certainly one of the most expensive set of Indigenous policies in Australia of recent years are those that fall under the broad banner of the Northern Territory Intervention or Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER). The NTER, announced on the 21st of June 2007, was instigated by the conservative government of the time (led by former Prime Minister John Howard). The initial rationale for the intervention was a response to the *Little Children Are Sacred* report (Wilde and Anderson 2007) and focussed initially on child health checks, alcohol and pornography bans, as well as increases in policing levels. The NTER soon became much broader though and included compulsory management of income support payments, changes in access to Indigenous communities and removal of particular labour market programs.

While the individual measures received a range of support (for example, most people at the time felt that there was a need for increased policing and education infrastructure in the Northern Territory), the most contentious aspect of the NTER was the fact that the ‘operation of the

Racial Discrimination Act 1975 was explicitly suspended and the protection of anti-discrimination law in the Northern Territory was removed for the purposes of the NTER' (Yu et al. 2008). While a change in government eventually led to the Racial Discrimination Act being restored (in 2010), much of the substance of the NTER is still in place. Release of 2011 Census data since the drafting of this chapter has shown very uneven change in Indigenous outcomes with relative worsening in some outcomes (SCRGSP 2014).

Whatever the policies used to meet the CoAG targets, there are clear links between these targets and a number of standard demographic indicators. Demography and geography impact on the ability to meet the Closing the Gap targets, with the link between the targets and Indigenous deaths quite clear. Also, if the COAG targets are achieved, there are likely to be significant impacts on the standard demographic variables. For example, the demographic and economic literature demonstrates a clear link between the education and employment status of females and fertility rates (Bloom et al. 2003). In essence, as education and employment levels rise, the opportunity cost (or income foregone) from having children also rises, leading to falls in fertility rates. Improved mortality rates can also lead to a reduction in fertility as fewer children need to be born for a given number to reach adulthood.

Migration and Multicultural Australia

Australia has always been a multicultural society, in reality if not always in policy. Before European colonisation, there were over 250 separate Indigenous languages spoken across 18 major regions and numerous clans and kinship groups (Horton 1994). We have already discussed the effect of European colonisation on the Indigenous population and the eventual demographic and political dominance of the non-Indigenous population across the majority of the continent. However, although the first non-Indigenous colonisers were almost exclusively from an Anglo-Celtic background, successive waves of migrants have come from all corners of the globe.

British migration to, and settlement in, Australia commenced in 1788. Until the mid-nineteenth Century, migrants to Australia were almost exclusively from the United Kingdom and Ireland. This narrow range of source countries was partly a result of supply, with the cost of migration to Australia from most European countries being relatively high, and restrictions on emigration from a number of other potential source countries (Jupp 2007). There were also substantial restrictions on the entry of other migrants to Australia, often enforced by British colonial administrators in the country of origin.

During the gold rush of the 1850s, there was a much greater incentive for migrants outside of the British Isles to come to Australia and there was substantial migration of Chinese to work on the gold fields. However they encountered resistance from European miners which culminated in a number of riots and public demonstrations.


In 1861 the Chinese Immigration Act (which imposed a £10 entry tax per Chinese migrant and caps based on the tonnage of the ship) was passed and this prevented nearly all Chinese immigration. While nationwide legislation would not occur till Federation in 1901, a conference of colonial administrators in 1888 effectively marked the start of the White Australia policy, a policy that would remain in different guises for around 85 years.

Figure 28.7 shows the evolution of the Australian population from 1881, the year of the first coordinated censuses where all Australian colonies were enumerated.

Immigration policy during the colonial period and especially restrictions on non-European migration had a predictable impact on the demography of Australia at federation in 1901. The 1901 Census resulted in a total count of around 3.8 million persons. Of these, 73.0 % of males and 80.1 % of females were born in Australia. Of those who were born overseas, 45.4 % were born in England,³ 11.8 % in Scotland and 21.3 % in Ireland. In total, nearly four out of five migrants

³Those born in Wales were grouped with those born in England for the Queensland component of the 1901 Census. They have therefore been grouped together for national figures. In the remaining jurisdictions, they made up 2.9 % of the combined England/Wales total.

Fig. 28.7 Percent of the population born overseas, per cent of the migrant population born outside of Great Britain and Ireland and census count by census year. As mentioned, censuses up to the 1960s excluded large numbers of Indigenous Australians. Hence, the figure in effect refers to the characteristics of the non-Indigenous population (Source: Historical Censuses)



in Australia at the time of federation were from Great Britain or Ireland.

The first half of the twentieth century witnessed a steady decline in the percentage of the overseas-born population in Australia. This was caused in part by a more restrictive migration policy, but also by a reduction in the number of people wanting to migrate to Australia. Two World Wars and a Great Depression substantially reduced migration to most settler societies. Between the 1901 and 1947 Censuses, the Australian population increased from around 3.8 to around 7.6 million. However, most of this growth had come from natural increase, with the overseas-born population declining from 22.9 to 9.8 %.

Following the end of the Second World War, Australia launched a migration program to increase its population by 1 % per year through immigration. This was driven in part by concerns that a population of around 7.5 million people could not adequately defend a country of the geographic size of Australia. Initially this migration was to have come from the United Kingdom. However, as the ‘Bring out a Briton’ campaign failed to be completely successful and Britain and north-west Europe failed to provide enough migrants, southern Europe became an acceptable recruiting ground, then Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey (Jones 2003).

Combined with the post-war baby boom, Australia’s population did grow substantially over the period. Between the 1947 and 1971 Censuses, the Australian population grew from around 7.6 to 12.7 million, an annualised growth rate of 2.18 %. By 1971, 20.0 % of the Australian population were born overseas, with 57.5 % of the overseas-born population born outside of the UK and Ireland.

The country of origin of Australia’s migrants changed substantially over the period. By 1971, 11.3 % of the overseas-born population were born in Italy, 6.3 % were born in Greece and 5.0 % were born in Yugoslavia. There had been a gradual loosening of restrictions on non-European migration, especially after 1966 and in 1972 the White Australia policy was dismantled. By the end of the 1970s the policy emphasis on assimilation of migrants was replaced by the notion of Australia as a multicultural society (Hollinsworth 2006).

Following the end of the White Australia policy, immigration from Asia and the Middle East increased, first with the arrival of refugees from Vietnam and Lebanon, followed by family reunion migration from these and other countries in the region. The introduction in 1979 of a points system for selecting economic or skilled migrants, modelled on one used in Canada, led to further immigration from other Asian countries during

the 1980s and 1990s. Immigration from European countries aside from Britain and Ireland declined after 1970. The result of these changes in migration patterns was a change in Australia's ethnic composition, with an increase in the number and proportion of the population that is of non-European in ethnic origin. In 1976, people born in the UK and other European countries were 81 % of the overseas-born population. By 2006, their share of the overseas-born population had decreased to 47 %. People born in the UK were still the largest overseas birthplace group in 2006, at 5.9 % of the total population, with people born in other European countries at 5.4 % of the total population. While only 1.8 % of Australia's population in 1976 was born in Asian countries and 0.5 % in Africa and the Middle East, this has increased to 6.5 and 2.4 % respectively in 2006.

In the 2006 Census, 37 % of the population stated their ancestry as Australian (either as a sole or multiple response to the ancestry question), an increase from 22 % in 1986. Most of these people are at least third-generation Australians and are of British or other European origin. The ancestry with the next highest percentage was English (identified by 34.4 % of the population, a decline from 42.3 % in 1986) followed by Irish (9.9 %) and Scottish (8.2 %). Clearly, the Australian population predominantly identifies as being from an Anglo-Celtic background. No non-Anglo-Celtic ethnic group exceeds 5 % of the population. The largest according to ancestry are Italian (4.7 %), German (4.4 %) and Chinese (3.7 %).

The ethnic diversity of Australia's population is not observed uniformly across the country. Immigrants, particularly those from non-English-speaking countries, tend to settle in the major cities, particularly the gateway cities of Sydney and Melbourne. Between 20 and 30 % of the population in the large cities are overseas-born compared with 10–15 % of the population in regional areas (Khoo 2003). Of the population born in Australia, 63.3 % lived in a major city at the time of the 2006 Census. For those born overseas, this rises to 85.0 % of the population. Some groups such as those born in Vietnam, China, Greece, India or Malaysia are even more concentrated in urban areas, with more than 90 % located

in the major cities. Also, different immigrant groups seem to prefer certain locations because of the presence of relatives and friends, employment opportunities and lifestyle or climate considerations. The largest community of Greeks live in Melbourne while the Lebanese community is highly concentrated in Sydney.

The Demography of Australia's Ethnic Groups

One of the consistent facets of Australia's migration policy since the colonial period has been political and bureaucratic control. The policy levers and motivations have changed substantially through time with an evolution from ethnic/racial to economic criteria and assisted passage to points testing. However, the effect has been the creation of a migrant population that is diverse in terms of its country of origin and economic status. This diversity is also evident in their family formation patterns and fertility and mortality rates.

Studies of family formation patterns of first- and second-generation Australians have identified differences by ethnic origin. Immigrants from the English-speaking countries such as the UK and New Zealand have similar patterns of family formation to the Australian-born (Khoo and Shu 1996; Khoo et al. 2002; Price 1982). Australians of Southern European and Middle Eastern origins have relatively low rates of intermarriage and rates of cohabitation, ex-nuptial births and divorce (Khoo and Shu 1996; Khoo et al. 2002). The fertility rate in the 1970s was higher for women from these countries than for women born in Australia (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald 2000). However, in more recent years, the fertility rate of women born in Southern European countries has fallen to below that of Australian-born women. Women from the Middle Eastern countries continue to have relatively high fertility rates, mainly due to a pattern of early marriage and childbearing. There is also diversity in the family formation patterns of Asian migrants by country of origin. Women from Vietnam and the Philippines have higher fertility than those from Malaysia, China and Hong Kong, although the




Fig. 28.8 Total fertility rate by mother's country of birth, Australia 2008

lower fertility rates of these countries are due partly to the presence of students who are temporary residents in Australia (Carmichael 2003; Khoo et al. 2002).

Figure 28.8 shows the diversity in the total fertility rate in 2008 by country of birth. The differences are similar to those observed in studies discussed above. Among the birthplace groups shown, women from Lebanon and Pakistan have the highest fertility rate at about 3.57. Women from the small Pacific Island countries and other Middle Eastern countries have even higher TFRs at 3.7 (not shown in the chart). The fertility rate for all overseas-born women in 2008 is slightly lower than the rate for Australian-born women, 1.81 compared to 1.93. This is due to the lower fertility of women from many European and Asian countries.

When the family formation patterns of the second generation (people born in Australia with one or both parents born overseas) are compared with those of at least third-generation Australians, no difference is found between the second generation of British origin and the third generation (Khoo et al. 2002). There is also little difference

between the second generation of German or Polish origin and the third generation. However, the second generation of Southern European origins has much lower rates of cohabitation, low rates of single independent living, and low divorce rates, and those of Greek or Italian origin also have relatively low fertility rates (Carmichael 2003; Khoo et al. 2002). Cultural maintenance is stronger among the first and second generations of Southern European and Middle Eastern origins than those of Western or Eastern European origins, and this is demonstrated by greater retention of the ethnic language and lower rates of intermarriage (Khoo 1995, 2004; Price 1990, 1994).

Studies of intermarriage between immigrants and native-born residents have considered it an important element of assimilation theory and an indicator of social integration into the local community (Jones 1994; Price and Zubrzycki 1962). This is because intermarriage is seen as the outcome of close social interaction between people of different cultural or ethnic backgrounds. Because Australia is a country of immigration, demographers have had a long-standing interest in patterns of intermarriage between different

ethnic groups and between immigrants and the Australia-born.

The early studies of intermarriage in Australia show that Southern European migrants had lower rates of intermarriage than migrants from Western or Eastern European countries, suggesting that the Southern European migrants were integrating more slowly than other European migrants (Price 1982, 1989; Price and Zubrzycki 1962). The second generation of Southern European and Middle Eastern background also had lower intermarriage rates than those of Western European background, although there was an increase in the intermarriage rate from the first to the second generation (Price 1994). Studies based on ancestry data from the 1986 Census show that the rate of intermarriage between a particular ethnic group and the dominant ethnic group was found to be related to the social distance between the two groups: the greater the social distance the less likely intermarriage will occur (Giorgas and Jones 2002; Jones and Luijkx 1996). In the studies, social distance between groups was indicated by ethnic group characteristics such as the percentage speaking only English at home, the percentage who were Catholic, and the percentage living in metropolitan areas. Before 1986, group size was found to have an effect on the intermarriage rate, with larger groups having lower rates of intermarriage (Jones 1994). Groups that had a more dispersed pattern of residential settlement such as the Dutch and Germans had higher rates of intermarriage, but gender imbalance had no effect. Education had a strong effect only in those groups that had relatively low educational attainment.

Analysis of the 2001 Census ancestry data show that intermarriage rates increase from the first to the second to the third generation for all ancestry groups examined (Khoo 2004). Although differences by ethnic origin in the intermarriage rate persist from the first to the second generation, there is convergence in the rates by the third generation, with 70 % or more of the third generation of ethnic groups that migrated to Australia before 1970 married to spouses of a different ancestry.

In 2006, 17 % of married couples were of an overseas-born partner married to a person born in Australia. However, in 45 % of these couples the overseas-born spouse is from the UK or New Zealand and is likely to be of similar ethnic background as the Australian-born spouse. Migrants from North-Western European countries or of Anglo-Celtic origins have the highest rates of exogamy. For those born in the UK, 43.4 % of married men were married to a person born in Australia with the corresponding value for women being 40.8 %. For those born in Germany these figures were 45.2 and 38.6 % respectively, whereas for those born in New Zealand they were 42.9 and 38.3 %. At the other end of the distribution, migrants born in Viet Nam, China and India have much lower rates of exogamy. Only 2.0 % of married men born in Vietnam and 5.2 % of married women had a partner who was born in Australia (Khoo et al. 2009).

On average, migrants to Australia tend to have better health than the native-born population. This is related to both immigrant self-selection and health requirements. Immigrants from some countries, particularly immigrants from non-English-speaking countries, have a lower incidence of chronic disease upon arrival than the Australian-born population, but the gap tends to narrow with time in Australia (Biddle et al. 2007, 16). The standardised mortality ratio for the overseas-born population for the period 2005–2007 was 0.93 compared to the Australian-born as the standard, indicating that the overall death rate for the overseas-born population is 7 % less than that for the Australian-born population (AIHW 2010). SMRs for the overseas-born by country of birth range from 0.59 for people born in Vietnam to 1.01 for people born in Poland, UK and Ireland. Migrants from countries such as Greece and Italy have SMRs of 0.77 and 0.87 respectively, while most Asian birthplace groups have SMRs of 0.6–0.7.

Australia's ethnic demography is one of diversity. Although more than 40 % of the population is overseas-born or has one parent who is overseas-born, aside from the English-speaking majority, no one ethnic group predominates.

More than 250 ethnicities were recorded in response to the 2006 Census question on ancestry. There is a diversity of demographic outcomes by ethnicity as measured by country of birth. This diversity is also seen in socioeconomic outcomes in the first and second generations (Khoo et al. 2002). The situation is dynamic, as different waves of immigrants and their children face different migration contexts and adjust to different socioeconomic conditions on arrival. Thus research findings in this area may not necessarily indicate a continuation of the observed trends and ethnic differentials in demographic behaviour. It is therefore necessary to undertake new analyses as new data become available. With immigration becoming increasingly important in sustaining Australia's population growth this century, there is a need for continuing research in the demography of its ethnic groups.

Social Cohesion and Multiculturalism

It has been suggested that Australia has been relatively successful in absorbing millions of immigrants of diverse cultures with minimal divisiveness because of its steady economic growth, high living standards, stable democratic institutions and isolation from conflict (Jupp et al. 2007). Most serious policy discussions in Australia relate to the size of the immigrant intake, as opposed to the ethnic or racial composition. Among the immigrant population there is no ethnic minority of any significant size that is also seriously disadvantaged and/or geographically concentrated that is likely to lead to marginalisation and conflict. Australia's universal health and welfare systems provide an economic and social safety net. As a settler migration country, Australia also expects its immigrants to become Australian citizens and they are eligible for citizenship after 4 years of permanent residence, a relatively short period compared to many other countries. This lessens the sense of social exclusion that can occur in ethnic minority communities where the process of naturalisation is more difficult or prolonged. The children of immigrants

also do not appear to be disadvantaged in terms of access to public education. A recent OECD report has shown that in Australia students of migrant origin and native students come from similar socioeconomic background and attend schools with similar resources, and other studies have shown that the second generation of most ethnic origins have higher school enrolments and higher proportions of tertiary qualifications compared to the third or more generations (Khoo 2007; Khoo and Birrell 2002; OECD 2006).

While there has not been a development of a significant ethnic minority underclass amongst migrants to Australia, there is nonetheless latent concern about ethnic diversity and social cohesion. There are some low income areas in Sydney and Melbourne where there is a high concentration of low-skilled migrants and problems of youth unemployment that have raised concerns about potential ethnic tensions. Riots occurred in a Sydney beach suburb in 2005 between youths from a predominantly Lebanese background and youths from a white, Anglo background. There is also concern about the integration of the Muslim migrant community following the terrorist attacks in the US and elsewhere since 2001.

The Australian government has had a long-standing immigrant settlement program that helps new migrants to settle into Australian society. Current immigrant settlement policy focuses on helping refugee and other humanitarian arrivals by providing English language classes for adults, a telephone translating and interpreting service, help with accommodation on arrival and funding for a network of migrant resource centres. There has been a policy of multiculturalism since the late 1970s that has evolved over the years, with successive governments recognising the cultural diversity of Australian society and emphasising its positive aspects. The current policy has a specific focus on promoting social cohesion, and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship provides funding for a range of community activities related to that objective under its 'Diverse Australia' program.

Much depends on the social, economic and demographic outcomes among the very diverse migrant groups and ethnic communities.

Government policies can be important in reducing racial and ethnic disparities in these outcomes and encouraging a sense of belonging and a shared future. It must also be noted that social institutions, attitudes and cultural-religious norms that are related to ethnicity have a role to play, particularly in relation to demographic outcomes such as intermarriage and childbearing patterns.

The mostly successful integration of migrant groups into Australian society and the Australian economy is not, however, replicated for the Indigenous population. We have noted already that disease, dislocation and frontier violence led to a profound decline in the number of Indigenous Australians after colonisation such that the most recent population estimates are still well below those of the pre-colonial population. Indigenous Australians are still the most disadvantaged members of Australian society from a socioeconomic point of view, with this disadvantage being present in both remote and non-remote Australia.

There are, however, significant differences between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians in terms of the perceived reasons for disadvantage amongst Indigenous people. According to data from a recent (2010) survey, 77 % of Indigenous Australians see race-based policies of the past as being very important in creating Indigenous disadvantage. In addition, 81 % see poor access to health and education services as being very important. For the Australian community as a whole, however, only 39 and 34 % see race-based policies and access to services respectively as being very important.

Despite these differences in views regarding the cause of Indigenous disadvantage, there is some evidence that outcomes are improving for Indigenous Australians. Altman, Biddle and Hunter (2009) showed improvements in employment, income and education participation and attainment for the Indigenous population between 1996 and 2006. However, the period in question was a time of strong economic growth in Australia and, in the case of employment and income, these improvements in Indigenous have not been as rapid as improvements in non-Indigenous outcomes. A lot has happened since 2006 including a change

in government at the Federal level, the Global Financial Crisis and the NTER. The impending release and analysis of 2011 Census data will be keenly watched to see whether Indigenous outcomes have maintained their steady improvement and, more importantly, whether socioeconomic gaps between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians have closed or continued to widen.

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