


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The Netherlands and Japan in  
the Age of Globalization

**Michael O. Sharpe**



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# Postcolonial Citizens and Ethnic Migration

The Netherlands and Japan in the Age  
of Globalization

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# 1

## Postcolonial Citizens, Ethnic Migration, and Political Incorporation in Liberal Democracies: Locating the Dutch and Japanese Cases

As far as the judicial system goes, and constitutional system, we [Dutch Antilleans and Arubans] are Dutch, full stop.

– *Dutch Antillean Origin Official of the Dutch Council of State*, 9 January 2007

In any country, if people have blood ties or descendants from that nationality, the same nationality, then of course it is easier to accept those people. It is also true to say in Japan ... This ... is not limited just to the South American *Nikkeijin* [Japanese descendants], it also includes of course, the US, China, all around the world, anyone who has got Japanese blood connections.

– *Japanese Official of Japan Ministry of Justice's Immigration Office*, 1 August 2006

The Netherlands is said to be a 'reluctant country of immigration' and Japan a 'latecomer to immigration' (Cornelius et al., 1994). Both countries present critical cases because, in the last century, these 'older' (Dahl, 1989) liberal democracies have had contentious experiences with mass postcolonial citizen and ethnic migrations. If political incorporation is difficult for advantaged legal immigrants, it should be even more daunting for others. Hence, postcolonial citizens and ethnic immigrants in the Netherlands and Japan can act as miners' canaries (Guinier and Torres, 2002) for all. This book is the first to comparatively shed light on the political stories of Dutch Antillean and Aruban citizens in the Netherlands, and Latin American *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendants) in Japan, who inherit host state access as postcolonial citizens and ethnic immigrants. It is among a very few works to investigate cross-regionally the role of citizenship and ethnicity

in migration, political incorporation, and political transnationalism in the age of globalization.

Several host states allow legal immigration for their overseas postcolonial citizens and co-ethnics. There is an intuition that legal citizenship or ethnicity will facilitate integration. However, between ongoing legislative attempts to limit immigration and stigmatization in the media, where they are often depicted as criminals, immigrants are often not made to feel welcome in their new homes (Castles and Davidson, 2000). This is the case for Puerto Ricans in the US, Dutch and French Antilleans in the Netherlands and France, Commonwealth immigrants in the United Kingdom, *Aussiedler* (German descendants) in Germany, and *Nikkeijin* in Japan.

As Dutch Kingdom<sup>1</sup> members, Dutch Antilleans and Aruban Dutch islanders are legal Dutch citizens/nationals with the right to live, work, and vote in the Netherlands. Latin American *Nikkeijin* have access to an ethnic visa (*teijusha*) that allows residence and employment in Japan. Commonsense notions of the Netherlands and Japan lend assumptions that these nations would effectively incorporate their respective overseas citizens and co-ethnics. Many of today's debates about immigration have to do with arguments around the positive and negative effects of increased ethnic diversity and who should be entitled to legal membership. With 214 million migrants today, many legal residents of immigrant or minority background are effectively excluded from many political systems. By studying the political incorporation of legal immigrants who share either legal citizenship<sup>2</sup> or dominant ethnicity<sup>3</sup> with those of their host society, we can learn a great deal about what impedes or facilitates the political incorporation of all new immigrants and marginalized groups. These issues are of particular relevance to the maintenance of democracy around the world. The book fills a critical gap in studies of globalization and migration.

## **Globalization and instrumental use of postcolonial Dutch citizenship and Japanese ethnicity**

The post-1970s and post-1980s market liberalization associated with globalization<sup>4</sup> and state policies produced a convergence in the use of citizenship and ethnicity in Dutch Antillean and Aruban (Dutch citizens) (henceforth Antilleans) and Brazilian, Peruvian, and other Latin American *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendant) (hereafter *Nikkeijin*) ethnic migration to the Dutch and Japanese metropolises. In both cases, Dutch citizenship and Japanese ethnicity were used by the state as symbols of inclusion and affinity to solve an international or national crisis or problem that required the extension of some form of membership to appease important political actors. The Netherlands after a brutal Indonesian colonial war tried to improve its international image within the context of international decolonization. As a consequence, Dutch citizenship and equal membership in the



Dutch Kingdom were extended to the Dutch Antilles (then including Aruba) with the hope of later independence for these islands.

Japan conceptualizes itself as a homogeneous society and consequentially bans unskilled foreign labour. In an attempt to satisfy its domestic need for low-cost unskilled foreign labour, a political compromise was made in the establishment of a visa for Japanese co-ethnics that provides them free access to the labour market. The actions taken by the Dutch and the Japanese governments have assisted to increase these postcolonial and ethnic migrations to the Netherlands and Japan. In each case, however, legal residence in these metropolises was predicated on a *temporary* stay and not the increasing *permanence* that has become more recently apparent.

There have been a number of excellent studies on globalization, labour recruitment, and accelerated illegal migration (Cornelius et al., 1994; 2004; Castles and Miller, 1998; 2003). Hollifield (2000) has noted the insufficient use of citizenship as an explanatory variable in political theory and, more generally, the lack of research on the relationship between immigration and incorporation in political science (Hollifield, 2000:168,175). Despite the obvious popularity of the subject matter, there is little comparative analysis of globalization and the political incorporation and political transnationalism of postcolonial citizen and ethnic legal immigrants. Moreover, there is a dearth of systemic cross-regional comparative analysis of the topic in the historically linked older liberal democracies of the Netherlands and Japan. This book's analysis contributes new insights to scholarly and policy debates about migration, political incorporation, and political transnationalism of new immigrants and marginalized groups.

The Netherlands and Japan provide a unique opportunity for comparative analysis. They are wealthy, liberal 'older' democracies (Dahl, 1989) that share histories of colonialism, trade, and commerce but have different regime types, state policies, national ideologies, political systems, historical contexts, and experiences regarding immigration. The theoretical context of this research lies at the intersection of political science, sociology, and cultural studies and contributes important insights into the factors that produce migrations as well as what limits or facilitates immigrant political incorporation and political transnationalism.

The voices in this book include advocates, immigrants, parliamentarians, city councillors, government officials, bureaucrats, professors, researchers, lawyers, journalists, social workers, community and union leaders, business people, and activists. During interviews, I was often warmly welcomed and told I was the first to ask 'political' questions about the migrant groups of my study. My findings on the national, local, and civil society levels in the Netherlands and Japan suggest that the legal Dutch citizenship of Antilleans and the Japanese ethnicity of *Nikkeijin* that have enabled legal emigration have not necessarily led to their political incorporation or political transnationalism.<sup>5</sup> Instead, a symbolic politics created around

the extension of membership on the basis of citizenship or ethnicity in order to solve a political problem or to gain political leverage has facilitated migrations, but, in both cases, this has been without a clear accompanying policy strategy of accommodation. Political incorporation and political transnationalism are not necessarily based on sharing the same cultural background, legal citizenship, or class status. I argue shared citizenship with a common thread of 'civic' and 'liberal' ideology in the Netherlands, and ethnicity in an 'ethnically exclusive' and 'conservative' Japan does not necessarily lead to immigrant political incorporation. Based on six years of research, my analysis demonstrates that regime type, limited political opportunity structure, along with the difficulties of small group size, language, and a 'myth of return' hinders immigrant political incorporation. I contend home country level of dependency on migrant remittances, electoral rules and practices that complicate overseas voting, and a dearth of active host country ethnic advocacy organizations further limit the emergence of political transnationalism.

### **Re-ethnicization in the Netherlands and de-ethnicization in Japan?**

In course of conducting interviews, I observe a marked contrast between the pragmatic, modest, sometimes open collared clothing worn by some Dutch politicians and the conservative dark suits and neckties of Japanese politicians<sup>6</sup> in their parliaments, small details which bolster the impression that some take as reflective of the ethos of the two respective countries. However, in spite of generally held notions about the Netherlands' civic and Japan's ethnic orientations, my findings suggest that the traditionally liberal, tolerant, multicultural Netherlands seems to be *re-ethnicizing* (reinforcing ties with emigrants abroad across foreign born generations) in ways that privilege Dutch ethnicity, while Japan appears to be *de-ethnicizing* (easing access for all immigrants) (Bartolini, 2000; Joppke, 2003). This is visible in the Netherlands in the classification of Antilleans and their descendants in official categories of '*Niet Westers allochtoon*' or 'non-Western' 'non-native' Dutch, a reversal of previous multicultural policies, in assimilatory integration tests, and in home country remigration policies for ethnic minorities. Additional indicators are increased barriers to naturalization and dual nationality and eased access to Dutch nationality and dual nationality for overseas former Dutch nationals. In contrast, despite an ethnic visa and tendency towards revisionist history, Japan, which is commonly thought of as illiberal, conservative, and monocultural, appears to be in some ways *de-ethnicizing*. Signs of this include: obstacles to *Nikkeijin* co-ethnic inclusion, a recent program to repatriate *Nikkeijin*, decreased barriers to naturalization, rising naturalizations from the long-excluded *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese communities, some local government policy innovation for foreign residents, and a contentious recognition of an increasingly multicultural Japan.

Although racism and discrimination are important factors facing the Antilleans and *Nikkeijin* communities in the Netherlands and Japan, they do not appear to be the most important factors limiting political incorporation. Some Dutch Caribbeans, particularly Creole (African descent) Surinamese, are now counted as among the most socio-economically and educationally better off of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. A member of Dutch parliament echoed a sentiment raised by many that the issue in the Netherlands 'is not black vs. white but more Muslim and non-Muslim'.<sup>7</sup> Klausen (2005) points out that Muslims are simply an important 'new interest group' and 'new constituency' in European political systems (Klausen, 2005:3). In contrast to the increasing naturalizations of *Zainichi* Koreans and ethnic Chinese in Japan, most Latin American *Nikkeijin* in Japan lack Japanese citizenship and hence voting rights. In both the Netherlands and Japan, political parties prioritize and seek out older excluded and larger groups such as Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands and *Zainichi* Koreans and Chinese in Japan, rather than recent immigrant co-nationals or co-ethnics. This has much more to do with the relative size and status of these potential constituencies than a politics of affinity due to shared citizenship or co-ethnicity.

### **Factors limiting Antillean and Nikkeijin political incorporation**

Some argue that a political culture engendered by the legacies of colonialism and slavery limits Antillean political incorporation and political transnationalism (Fennema and Tillie, 2001). However, I find this explanation relatively insufficient. Despite histories of colonialism and dependence, the two most populated Dutch islands Aruba and Curaçao have and maintain active and participatory civic cultures characterized by contentious elections and a rich associational life. The indicators of a contemporary liberal democracy are present including regular and peaceful democratic alternations of governing parties and coalitions, rule of law, independent judiciary, and guaranteed political and civil liberties. Ethnicity can be an important factor in Antillean politics. Although the Dutch media often portrays Curaçaoan as well as other Antillean and Aruban politics as plagued by clientelism, patronage, and corruption, these Dutch islands display medium to high voter turnout, as well as participation in local referenda and civil society organizations.

However, it seems Antilleans do not yet have enough of a shared political identity to present a cleavage in formal Dutch politics. In many interviews, the importance of organizations was pointed out. There are a few formal Antillean organizations headed by assimilated elites who are often at great social distance from the more recent lower class arrivals from the islands. Although there are many informal Antillean social cultural organizations, they are generally engaged in service delivery, are rarely political, and exhibit a characteristic lack of a shared Antillean identity. By the time Dutch political parties and immigrants found each other in the 1990s, there was

only a fragmented Antillean political identity and limited available funding for Antillean political advocacy organizations under the Integration Policy. I contend that civil society has been restructured in the Netherlands through the transformation of the Dutch system of government funding for ethnic minority groups under the 'Minorities Policy' to an assimilationist oriented 'Integration Policy'. This kind of policy tends not to fund ethnic organizations and provides few incentives for Antillean organizing around political advocacy. Moreover, Antillean ambivalence about a Dutch or an Antillean political identity compounds and undermines their political organizing.

Along with the fact the Netherlands has characteristic low trade union membership, my research indicates that there is much higher unemployment among immigrants and ethnic minorities in comparison to the native Dutch. My findings suggest that unions have tended to look out for the interests of their members and not necessarily Antilleans.

Similar to the Dutch case, I find there is very limited *Nikkeijin* political incorporation in Japan. Although there has been some policy innovation on the local level towards immigrants and ethnic minorities, this has been for most part inadequate and lacks central local policy coordination. There is a conspicuous lack of *Nikkeijin* civil society organizations that are dedicated to political advocacy. When asked why there are limited *Nikkeijin* organizations that engage in political advocacy, the responses varied. These ranged from cultural arguments, for example, a suggestion that Latin Americans are simply disorganized, to the belief that the *Nikkeijin* are fixated on repatriation to Latin America. I contend that the structure of Japanese civil society, which, up until recently, made it very difficult to incorporate and engage in political advocacy, has limited *Nikkeijin* immigrant political incorporation.

### **Formal electoral politics and party systems**

Proportional representation and multiparty systems are argued to be particularly favourable for the inclusion of women and minorities (Lijphart, 1968; 1984; 1994; 1999). In the early 1990s, Japan reformed its former one-party dominated multimember district electoral system to a mixed-member system combining single-member districts and proportional representation. This has resulted in more long-excluded groups and women being elected through proportional representation and additional political parties. However, as of this writing, no *Nikkeijin* have been elected in any national contest. In contrast, the Dutch proportional representation and multiparty system has elected many ethnic minorities to its lower house but very few Antilleans have been elected to national office. Norris (2004; 2005) argues that some reasons for the discrepancy in the inclusion and political support of women and minorities in proportional systems, as compared to majoritarian systems, may be due to geography and other factors. These cases highlight the problems of geographically concentrated groups in

proportional systems and the problems of representation of small national minorities in both proportional and mixed member systems.

My analysis reveals that social, economic, and political incorporation are not necessarily correlated. Hence, it is possible for a group to be well incorporated in one area and not in others. Although Antilleans are politically marginalized groups, they are better socially and economically integrated than other immigrant and minority groups in the Netherlands. *Nikkeijin* are better economically incorporated than other recent immigrants in Japan because of their ethnic visa, which allows them legal access to the labour market and segmentation in the manufacturing industry. However, they are much less socially and politically incorporated than older minority groups such as the *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese communities.

### **From symbols of inclusion to exclusion**

The Dutch citizenship and the Japanese ethnic visa that were originally used by these countries to symbolize inclusion and affinity in an attempt to address solve international and national crises have now been turned on their heads to symbolize 'foreignness' and criminality. In both the Netherlands and Japan, immigrant youth from the Dutch Antilles and Aruba or Latin American *Nikkeijin* have come to be associated as 'foreign' with a tendency for criminality. These young people are often depicted in the media and in popular imagination as anti-social or socially deviant. This appears to have an effect on the perception of political elites, who then regard these groups overall status as rather low and unimportant, which in turn deters political elite interest in these small constituencies. Both the Netherlands and Japan had immigrants and ethnic minorities elected to formal politics in the 1990s and 2000s, and these cases indicate that legal citizenship can make a difference in political incorporation. Antilleans are better politically incorporated in the Netherlands than *Nikkeijin* in Japan in part, because citizenship provides access to formal politics and hence the possibility of being pursued by political parties and leaders. However, electability in terms of the viable group size and status along with legal citizenship remains critically important.

### **Limited political transnationalism**

Despite an active and participatory political culture on the Dutch islands Curaçao and Aruba and millions of dollars in remittances being sent from Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities in Japan back to their home countries, there is little evidence of political transnationalism in either group. Hence, the evidence suggests extensive transnationalism, or sociocultural attachment and interaction between home and host country, but very limited political transnationalism in terms of formal and informal political activity between home and host countries. There seems to be very little sustained political interest in the Antillean communities living in the Netherlands

from political actors on their home islands. Despite this, there are signs of the beginnings of some interest by Brazilian and Peruvian political actors in the respective *Nikkeijin* communities in Japan, arguably, due to the high levels of remittances.

Moreover, in addition to being characterized as transnational and diasporic, these groups can also be seen as pan-ethnic. But, although many *Nikkeijin* are employed in the manufacturing industry in Japan and Antilleans are spread throughout all levels of the labour force in the Netherlands, there is little in the way of collective action around pan-ethnic identity. Pan-ethnic collective action has not occurred for Antilleans and *Nikkeijin* in their host societies due to intra-ethnic competition that has hampered the pan-ethnic label from being used for political mobilization.

The ways in which globalization, immigration, citizenship, and ethnicity interact provide a means to understand some of the strains and contradictions of membership in contemporary liberal democratic states. As these groups are relatively new arrivals in their host societies, it may be a matter of time before they are better politically incorporated or engage in political transnationalism. I argue for state policy reform that recognizes cultural rights and equal membership to facilitate political incorporation. This book shows the ways in which, despite the extension of rights, the state and various political actors can manipulate political membership in liberal democratic states towards some political leverage or benefit. These actors may not necessarily prioritize political incorporation and political transnationalism on the basis of shared citizenship or co-ethnicity. Comparative analysis of the linkage between immigration and incorporation for legal immigrants, who are assumed to easily integrate, can help to inform immigration policy for all immigrants by identifying barriers to inclusion.

### **Events triggering migration**

Two events triggered the post-1985 mass migrations of Dutch Antilleans, particularly Curaçaoans, and Arubans to the Netherlands and the post-1990 migrations of Latin American *Nikkeijin*, that is, Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* to Japan: (1) The 1985 closing of Curaçao's and Aruba's oil refineries (once their main sources of employment and income) and Aruba's 1986 'status aparte' from the Netherlands Antilles and establishment as a Dutch Kingdom 'overseas country' initiated a massive migration of poor and working class people to the Netherlands. Since 1984, Arubans and Antilleans in the Netherlands have numerically tripled to about 131,841 (2). Japan's official policy only allows entry to 'skilled' workers. The Japanese government responded to the need for unskilled labour and the increasing presence of foreign workers from the declining Middle East oil industry in the wake of the oil price aftershocks of the 1980s with the 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Act. The Act created a 'side door' (Brody, 2002) for unskilled labour by allowing *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendants) to legally

live and work in Japan. The government contended that these immigrants' Japanese 'ethnicity' presented less of a risk to public order. Since 1990, some 372,305 Brazilian and Peruvians have become legal residents in Japan.

## Purpose

The purpose of this comparative study is twofold: (1) to analyse the role of the social, political, and economic forces and state policies that enabled Antillean and *Nikkeijin* migration to the Netherlands and Japan; (2) to identify what limits or facilitates the political incorporation and political transnationalism of postcolonial Antilleans in the Netherlands and Latin American *Nikkeijin* in Japan. Although the former Dutch territory of Surinam is part of the Dutch Caribbean, this book centres on the contemporary main sources of Dutch Caribbean migration from the Dutch Kingdom 'overseas countries' of Curaçao and Aruba as well as *Nikkeijin* from Brazil and Peru. The comparison examines the determinant factors impacting the political incorporation and political transnationalism of legal immigrants who inherit access as postcolonial citizens in the Netherlands and ethnic immigrants in Japan. This work includes research and analysis of electoral systems, party systems, unions, and organizations of the four geographical areas of the study and is built on a triangulation of evidence from documentary materials, statistical data, and about 160 in-depth interviews.

## Conceptualizing citizenship and ethnicity

Shared legal citizenship and co-ethnicity imply a 'region of legal equality' (Brubaker, 1992) and 'full community membership' (Marshall, 1992) that facilitates immigrant political incorporation. States, markets, and communities have assumed that the shared citizenship or co-ethnicity of these Antillean and *Nikkeijin* immigrants would ease their integration in the host society. Shared citizenship and co-ethnicity are often presented as two factors that would intuitively facilitate an immigrant's life in a new society to which they have legal or ethnic ties. Citizenship is often identified as the outcome or goal of the immigrant as proof of his/her ultimate integration (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2000; 2001). Carens (1987) sees citizenship in Western liberal democratic states as 'the modern equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one's life chances' (252). Co-ethnicity is posited as a factor that should ease integration because 'those people are part of us and much more like "us" than like "them"' (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Salter, 2004). Citizenship and ethnicity are different in that one is a legal construction and the other is an association with a belief in a common bloodline or biological ancestry. However, both are social constructions that facilitate forms of social closure, commonly passed down by descent, and assumed to have an impact in immigrant social and political integration.

Several other studies echo my finding of a lack of Antillean political incorporation in the Netherlands (Buijs, 1986; Buijs and Rath, 1986; Rath, 1990; Tillie, 2004; Jacobs and Tillie, 2004). Much literature suggests that postcolonial immigrant groups in Europe and elsewhere are reluctant to politically participate in their host societies (Falcón, 1983; Miller, 1989; Sagar, 1998; Fennema and Tillie, 2001). Brody's (2002) *Nikkeijin* and German *Aussiedler* (German descendant) immigrant comparison finds that immigrant co-ethnicity does not necessarily facilitate smooth integration. Up until the early 2000s, *Aussiedler* were treated as 'returnees' and provided with legal citizenship, language instruction, and funding by the German government. They were pursued by German political parties that emphasized their shared German heritage and the 'otherness' of non-ethnic German guest workers. Both the *Aussiedler* and *Nikkeijin* are at the lower ends of the labour market, but the *Aussiedler* have German legal citizenship that enables their formal political participation. Other studies reflect the difficulties of co-ethnic immigrant integration (Brubaker, 1992; Smith, 2003). However, Pak (2000) notes that a few Japanese local governments are positively reacting to their proximity to *Nikkeijin* legal immigrants and defying the policies of the national government by including them in definitions of 'local citizens'.

### **Why is this significant?**

As stated above, postcolonial citizens and ethnic immigrants who inherit access to a liberal state can act as miners' canaries for all immigrants and other marginalized groups. Discerning the forces that produce these migrations and the determinants of immigrant political incorporation and political transnationalism can inform important policy decisions. Among the most critical of these are questions of equal political membership in increasingly multicultural democracies. Much of the work in this area of scholarship deals with illegal or undocumented immigration. Few compare the political incorporation and political transnationalism of legal immigrants who inherit access to their national communities by virtue of citizenship and co-ethnicity. The citizen and non-citizen co-ethnic statuses of Antilleans and *Nikkeijin* enable an analysis of whether the shared citizenship or ethnicity of immigrants with the host society has any effect on their political incorporation and political transnationalism in host societies.

One of the principle contributions of this book to political science, and social science in general, is the comparative use of citizenship and ethnicity as independent variables in immigrant political incorporation and political transnationalism. This allows an analysis of the role of small minorities and political mobilization of older and larger immigrant and minority groups in liberal democracies. It provides an opportunity to examine the impact of new legal immigrants on electoral systems, party systems, and civil societies of these advanced industrialized democracies.



Understanding how groups are impacted and interact with the mechanisms of power as well as with one another is particularly important. Immigrant political incorporation can be viewed as an acid test to see how well a society deals with diversity. An analysis of what conditions facilitate or limit the emergence of political transnationalism for two groups who already exhibit patterns deemed 'transnational' contributes to new research and knowledge about these diverse communities and adds two relatively new and understudied cases to the body of literature.

Although there are marked differences between the Dutch and Japanese states, the conditions of their legal immigrants as marginalized political outsiders and some of their policy reactions are remarkably similar. Moreover, despite what has been described as the transnationalism of these legal immigrant groups, the fact that little to no political transnationalism has emerged for either group as yet is equally fascinating. I show by means of interviews, documentary materials, and statistical data how the constructions of political membership emerging in the two countries have been impacted by migration and how both challenge and reinforce traditional notions of citizenship and ethnicity. As a result, they offer critical insights around political membership for the direction of future theorizing on migration and citizenship.

The Netherlands and Japan conjure quite different public images as the Netherlands is considered among the most 'liberal' and 'open' societies and Japan is seen as one of the more 'conservative' and 'closed' societies in the world. Since the post-Second World War period, these two countries have emerged as two of the most successful advanced capitalist liberal democracies and provided much for their populations in terms of economic, social, and political rights and security. However, there have been limitations to their democracies. Most striking is the fact that two countries in two different parts of the world with very different cultural histories have produced somewhat similar outcomes with regard to their legal immigrants who inherit access as members of their national communities, but who are not fully included in the polity as members regardless of the extension of formal political rights. What accounts for the limited political incorporation and emergence of political transnationalism for these legal immigrants?

## Theoretical framework

The shared legal Dutch citizenship of Antilleans in the Netherlands and the ethnic heritage of *Nikkeijin* in Japan suggest that both groups are 'insiders'. Castles and Davidson (2000) contend that globalization has produced contemporary migration to metropolises where increasing numbers of immigrants are citizens who do not belong to the cultural nation state (viii). Brubaker (1992) argues citizenship is an abstract, formal construct that has nothing to do with the principle of ethnocultural nationality and a form

of 'social closure' that determines who are 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. Hale (2004) suggests that the usual ways to define ethnicity in terms of 'primordialism' and 'constructivism' are miscast. He contends that the key motive driving group formation and categorical thinking is 'uncertainty reduction' and concludes that ethnicity derives from an individual's need to make sense of the world and structure action. Although Antilleans possess Dutch citizenship, they are generally not regarded as part of the Dutch cultural nation state. Despite the fact that most *Nikkeijin* are considered part of Japan's ethno-cultural nation state, most lack formal legal Japanese citizenship. In both cases, these groups are politically marginalized. What explains these phenomena?

### **Determinants of immigrant incorporation**

Several determinants of immigrant political incorporation have been identified as having the effect of either facilitating or limiting immigrant political incorporation. Some studies indicate a tendency to participate in organizations given a prior experience of participation (Rosenstone, 1993; Verba et al., 1995). Van Niekerk (2002) argues that pre-migration conditions have a determinant effect on the socialization of immigrants. For her, the pre-migration conditions of the Afro-Surinamese provide them some social advantage in Surinam and competitive advantage over their Indo-Surinamese counterparts in the Netherlands. Following this, a correlation can be made between the respective poor and working class and middle class origin identities of much of the Antillean (Van Hulst, 2000) and *Nikkeijin* populations (Yamanaka, 2000) to explain differences in political incorporation. However, Hirabayashi et al's. (2002) analysis of the close knit middle class ethnic communities and political activity of *Nikkeijin* populations in Latin America and Van Hulst's (2000) study of the fragmented poor and working class Dutch Antillean communities in the Dutch Antilles does not account for similarities in limited political incorporation in the Netherlands and Japan. What can explain the divergence in political incorporation between countries of origin and host countries?

Brubaker (1992) points to a distinction between 'civic and ethnic citizenship regime types' and their linkages with national ideology and political institutions. The Dutch Kingdom has a primarily *jus sanguinis* or 'right of blood' basis for citizenship. However, it can also be classified as a 'civic citizenship' regime because of its, up until recently, fairly open naturalization policy. Japan is noted for an 'ethnic citizenship' regime (Brubaker, 1992) that is less integrative of immigrants because of its racially and ethnically determined *jus sanguinis* citizenship and its changing but still rather closed naturalization policy. Castles and Miller (2003) classify three models of immigrant incorporation: exclusionary, assimilationist, or multicultural (249–252). However, these models can be overly simplistic or countries may

fit into several categories. They don't provide a good fit to explain the lack of incorporation in the Antillean and *Nikkeijin* cases.

Bloemraad (2006) argues that the 'context of reception' (i.e. government policy) matters in determining immigrants' interest in and pursuit of full citizenship. She cautions against institutionalist approaches that pay insufficient attention to individual agency and behaviouralist approaches that inadequately account for institutional contexts (Bloemraad, 2006:7,9). Weiner (1996) notes state policy as a 'social contract' between states and immigrants and argues that the 'mode of political incorporation... whether or not migrants become naturalized citizens, whether they can vote, form their own community organizations, be integrated into class organizations such as trade unions, and become officeholders' (452) influences the role of immigrant communities. He contends this determines whether the efforts of immigrants and their descendants 'to express their ethnicity through group action' are regarded as legitimate (452). Despite a once multiculturalist oriented Netherlands and an earlier more overtly articulated mono-ethnic Japan, there are difficulties for these groups to legitimately express their respective ethnicities through group action.

Borrowing from the social movements literature, there has been much scholarship that has focused on the utility of the concept of political opportunity structure for immigrant political incorporation (Ireland, 1994; Soysal, 1994; Koopmans and Statham, 1999; 2005; Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2009). Tarrow (1994) defines political opportunity structure as 'consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure' (85). He notes the possible changes in political opportunity structure as 'the opening up of access to participation, shifts in ruling alignments, the availability of influential allies, and cleavages within and among elites' (Tarrow, 1994:86). Tarrow's (1994) notion of political opportunity structure can be used to describe the Netherlands' and Japan's political system or political resources *external* to Antillean and *Nikkeijin* communities and not purely in the sense of collective action or social movement in the way the term was developed. In this way, the Netherlands' and Japan's political opportunity structure can be addressed through the lens of the formal liberal democratic political system at the national and local levels and changes that have opened and closed access to participation, particularly for immigrant and minority groups.

Organizations are said to play an important role in teaching the ways of democracy through democratic practice and in this way facilitate political incorporation (Toqueville, 1945; Putnam, 1993; 2000). Gittel (1980) has shown how community organizations can be co-opted by the state and made into service delivery agents rather than advocates. Pekkanen (2006) points to the ways in which the state structure of incentives makes for a dual pattern of civil society in Japan in which there are many neighbourhood associations

but very few professional advocacy organizations. This phenomenon of many informal organizations but few organizations dedicated to political advocacy is observed in both the Antillean and *Nikkeijin* communities in the Netherlands and Japan.

Several social scientists point to socio-economic status, group size, language, and degree of social ties in the host country as factors that can impede or facilitate political incorporation. Marshall (1992) argues in his discussion of citizenship, social class, and the extension of civil, political, and social rights 'there is a basic human equality associated with full community membership which is not consistent with a superstructure of economic inequality' (45). Miller (1989) explains the higher voter turnout of some Asian Indian groups in the United Kingdom as a product of their higher socio-economic status when compared to Afro-Caribbean other immigrant and ethnic minority groups. In contrast, Fennema and Tillie (2001) contend the greater integration of Turks in the political arena and Surinamese in the labour and educational arenas in Amsterdam demonstrates that political integration does not necessarily correspond with economic or social integration.

Castles and Davidson (2000) argue that the size and status of minorities groups may impede their effective political participation. They use the example of the small population of indigenous people in Australia and their limited opportunities of securing representation in most constituencies without special representative bodies (108). Their analysis of minorities and political rights points to the problem of political incorporation in both the *Nikkeijin* and Antillean cases; 'the formal denial of political rights... for noncitizens and the formal possession of political rights but the actual inability to enjoy them' (Castles and Davidson, 2000:109). The minority status of a group, that is, those economically marginalized, may be such that they possess formal political rights but lack viable opportunities for participation in established political structures with voices virtually absent from parties and parliaments (109). Castles and Davidson (2000) contend that this may present a condition for minorities in which they have limited access to information, media control, or are excluded because of language and lack real opportunities for participation, which translates into 'social exclusion' that 'often' means 'political powerlessness' (109). Carens (1989) argues that citizenship claims vary with degree and length of social ties and residence. Yamanaka (2000) has noted that a 'myth of return' or belief that one is going back to their home countries can constrain ties and thus incorporation in the host country.

The dilemmas of Antillean and *Nikkeijin* political incorporation speak to the distinctions between 'formal' and 'substantive' citizenship (Bottomore, 1992). Bottomore cites Brubaker's (1989) argument that 'one can possess formal state-membership yet be excluded (in law or in fact) from certain political, civil, or social rights, or from effective participation' (66). Some

contend that this can occur because of a group's low socio-economic status and the length or degree of the group's social ties to the host country. A group's immigrant or ethnic minority status can cause it to be overlooked and not recognized as an important political actor. Oommen et al. (1997) contend that the conceptual confusion in the conflation of citizenship, national identity, race, and ethnicity is essentially an argument about 'identity and equality'. Castles and Davidson (2000) argue that social citizenship or 'a minimum economic and social standard to secure political participation' (110) is a precondition for political participation and thus it is necessary to add gender and cultural rights to Marshall's three rights. Others point to other factors such as low social cohesion, self-organization, language problems, and cultural familiarity that can produce sentiments of ambivalence and resentment (Van Hulst, 2000; Hirabayashi et al., 2002; Tsuda, 2003).

I find that the Antillean and *Nikkeijin* communities in the Netherlands and Japan differ in their marginality with regard to economic and social integration in their host societies, but share in the phenomena of limited political incorporation. These groups are *de jure* and *de facto* minorities and sometimes demonized in the media through an association with crime. This book addresses why some *Nikkeijin* are being included as 'local citizens' by a few local governments. Simultaneously, it examines the reasons why Antilleans who are born and raised as Dutch citizens appear more reluctant to politically participate than other larger immigrant and ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands. The book shows despite the advantages of inherited postcolonial or ethnic legal immigrant status, social and economic integration and equal political membership in host societies are not necessarily correlated.

Given the limitations of 'straight line' assimilation (Park, 1928; Warner and Strole, 1945), some argue that the political, economic, and social forces associated with globalization enable a political transnationalism and/or postnational citizenship to emerge that can facilitate political incorporation (Schiller et al., 1992; Bauböck, 1994; Soysal, 1994; Portes et al., 1996; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Itzigsohn, 2000). Some of the literature on transnationalism contends that the increased flow of remittances from migrants in more economically advanced countries to their lesser-developed home countries leads to the development of politicized transnational communities. The rationale for this is because home states become dependent on the financial flows and ties of their citizens abroad and thus seek to increase these linkages while in turn migrants seek more of a voice in their home country's affairs (Guarnizo, 1998; Guarnizo, 2001). This mobilization through political transnationalism is said to increase political incorporation in the county of origin and residence. Antillean as well as *Nikkeijin* groups in the Netherlands and Japan have been identified as 'outsiders' (Lucassen and Penninx, 1997; Van Hulst, 2000; Brody, 2002; Hirabayashi et al., 2002) and 'transnational' communities (Yamanaka, 2000; Oostindie and Klinkers,

2003). Fennema and Tillie's (2001) hypothesize Antillean transnationalism is limited by a political culture that is a by-product of their postcolonial and post-slave holding countries of origin. However, Dominicans (Guarnizo, 2001) as well as Haitians (Pierre-Louis, 2001) are postcolonial Caribbean groups that experience the legacies of colonialism and slavery, yet their transnationalism has become a political transnationalism that facilitates their political incorporation in the home and host countries. Yamanaka (2000) and Tsuda (2003) describe the transnationalism of *Nikkeijin* communities in Japan but with little reference to political activity. Despite amounts in remittances ranging from very little to millions of dollars, there is little evidence of political transnationalism.

Although Antilleans and *Nikkeijin* have been legal residents in their host countries for a similar period of time, both groups display limited political incorporation and limited political transnationalism, regardless of formal political rights and transnational connections. What explains these phenomena despite shared legal citizenship or co-ethnicity? This analysis of immigrant political incorporation and political transnationalism for these legal immigrants can inform important policy decisions around political inclusion in increasingly multicultural advanced industrial democracies and future theorizing on migration and citizenship.

### **Methodological reasons for comparison**

The Netherlands and Japan provide unique comparative cases for examining globalization, the politics of migration, and the political incorporation and political transnationalism of legal postcolonial citizens and ethnic immigrants.<sup>8</sup> I chose the Netherlands and Japan because I wanted to do an international, cross-regional, and cross-cultural comparison. Moreover, I wanted to look at legal immigrants who arrive in their host countries around the same time period to facilitate comparative longitudinal measurability. Hence, I opted for Dutch Antillean (Curaçaoans) and Arubans in the Netherlands and Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* in Japan as the groups of the study. Members of these groups are legal immigrants with a form of considered membership of their host countries' national communities by virtue of shared citizenship and ethnicity. The formal Dutch citizenship of Antilleans and non-citizenship of *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendants) enables an analysis of whether either a shared citizenship or ethnicity of immigrants with the host society has any effect on their political incorporation or political transnationalism within their host societies. The Antillean and *Nikkeijin* migrations share the traits of occurring within the same time period, beginning in 1985/1990, originate in the Latin American and Caribbean region, have cross-regional destinations, and introduced among the largest and newest ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands and Japan.

By 2008, the largest and most prominent ‘*Niet Westers allochtoon*’, ‘non-Western’, ‘non-native’ Dutch ethnic minority immigrant groups in the Netherlands were Turks (372,714), Surinamese (335,799), Moroccans (335,127), and Antilleans and Arubans (131,841) out of a total ‘non-Western’ foreign population of 1,765,730 and a total foreign population of 3,215,416.<sup>9</sup> In Japan, by 2008, the largest legally resident foreign national groups were the Chinese (655,377), Koreans (589,239), Brazilians (312,582), and Peruvian (59,723) followed by the Philippine community at (210,617).<sup>10</sup> The Latin American *Nikkeijin* groups had become the ‘third largest group of foreigners in Japan’ and the ‘country’s newest ethnic minority’ (Tsuda, 2003: x, xii) at some 372,305 of the total number of 2,217,426 registered foreign nationals in Japan (Ministry of Justice, 2009).

### **The Netherlands and Japan: 400 years of similarities and differences**

The Netherlands and Japan have had a 400-year history of ties of trade and commerce that bind them but they also have different political traditions, institutions, and practices. Both the Netherlands and Japan are wealthy liberal capitalist democracies, constitutional monarchies, and members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, European Union (the Netherlands), and ASEAN (Japan); both find themselves dealing with the effects of globalization. However, there are significant differences in terms of overall population size, immigrant population size, political systems, economies, and attitudes towards immigration. On the United Nations Development Programme’s 2009 Human Development Index that focuses on measurable dimensions of human development – life expectancy, literacy, school enrolment, and GDP per capita – the Netherlands was ranked six and Japan was ranked ten.<sup>11</sup> Both the Netherlands and Japan experienced dramatic increases in their legal immigrant populations during the 1990s. Whereas about close to 11 per cent of the population of the Netherlands was of foreign background in 2008, 1.74 per cent of Japan’s total population was comprised of foreign nationals in 2008.<sup>12</sup> The Netherlands remains ‘reluctant’ about and Japan a ‘latecomer’ to immigration (Cornelius et al., 1994). The Netherlands is a decentralized unitary state with some traditions of autonomy for local government. Japan shares the distinction of a unitary state but with a more recent trends towards the decentralization of local government. The Netherlands is a parliamentary democracy with a proportional electoral system and multiparty party system. Japan is also a parliamentary democracy but characterized for decades by single-party dominance. However, since its electoral reform of the 1990s, Japan has a mixed-member electoral system combining proportional presentation and single-member districts (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 Political systems and demographics of the Netherlands and Japan

Government type	The Netherlands	Japan
	Constitutional monarchy/ parliamentary democracy	Constitutional monarchy/ parliamentary democracy
State type	Unitary	Unitary
GDP	US\$870,811,147,325 (2008)	US\$4,879,861,435,468 (2008)
GDP (PPP)	US\$42,915 (2008)	US\$33,802 (2008)
UNDP's Human Development Index (2009)	6	10
Electoral system	Proportional representation	Mixed member (proportional and Single Member District)
Total population	16,405,399 (2008)	127,692,000 (2008)
Total foreign-origin population	1,765,730 (Non-Western foreign background)	2,217,426 (Total foreign nationals)
Top numerically important foreign-origin groups	Turks – 372,714 Surinamese – 335,799 Moroccans – 335,127 Dutch Antillean and Aruban – 131,722	Chinese – 655,377 Korean – 589,239 Brazilian/Peruvian ( <i>Nikkeijin</i> ) – 372,305 Philippine – 210,617
Postcolonial citizens and ethnic immigrants	Dutch Antillean and Aruban – 131,722	Brazilian/Peruvian ( <i>Nikkeijin</i> ) – 372,305

Source: Figures as calculated for 2007–2008 from Dutch and Japanese governmental, UNDP, and World Bank<sup>13</sup> statistical data sources.

In these respective cases, the Dutch and Japanese governments did not anticipate the future social, economic, and political incorporation of Dutch Antilleans and Arubans and Latin American *Nikkeijin*. They thought of them as *temporary* but more recently have had to reconcile their increasing *permanence* within their democratic contexts. This has resulted in several programs aimed at facilitating immigrant integration that have been labelled assimilationist in the Dutch case. In the Japanese case, despite the efforts of a few municipalities, there is no national policy focused on immigrant integration. The Netherlands and Japan are older liberal democracies with different traditions, policies, and practices regarding immigration. As such, these international and cross-regional cases provide an opportunity for examination under two different traditions and institutional contexts. The



similarities and differences of these countries and immigrant populations provide the basis for comparing the factors determining immigrant political incorporation and political transnationalism in these advanced industrialized democracies.

## Chapter summaries

This chapter has introduced the book's central argument(s), the groups of study, and presents some of my basic findings. It explores some normative and empirical questions around how migrations are produced – the implications of citizenship and ethnicity for political inclusion, the role and impact of new and old immigrants in host societies – and how this fits into the new recognitions of multiculturalism in liberal democratic states.

Chapter 2 examines the main theoretical bodies of literature relevant to the political, social, and economic forces and state policies that have produced Dutch Antillean and Aruban and Latin American *Nikkeijin* migration to the Netherlands and Japan. It demonstrates that globalization and Dutch and Japanese state policies best explain the convergences in these migrations that began around the same time period 1985/1990.

Chapter 3 discusses the roles of Dutch and Dutch Antillean and Aruban nationalisms and the pre- and postcolonial political history of Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles and Aruba in setting the stage for the 1985/1990 Dutch Antillean and Aruban mass migration to Netherlands. In doing so, it tests Fennema and Tillie's (2001) hypothesis that the limited political incorporation and political transnationalism of Dutch Caribbeans in the Netherlands is due to a political culture engendered by the legacies of colonialism and slavery in their countries of origin.

Chapter 4 explores what accounts for the low political incorporation of Dutch Antillean and Arubans in the Netherlands, despite their Dutch citizenship. I argue regime type, limited political opportunity structure, along with the difficulties of small group size, language, and a 'myth of return' hinders Antillean immigrant political incorporation. I show how the traditionally liberal, tolerant, multicultural Netherlands seems to be *re-ethnicizing* in some ways that privilege Dutch ethnicity and the implications for Dutch citizenship.

Chapter 5 looks at emigration and immigration policy in modern Japan and argues that they reveal long unresolved and contested visions of the role of ethnicity in Japanese nationalism and national identity. It analyses the various iterations of Japanese nationalism that have facilitated the out-migration of Japanese to Latin America and elsewhere, their return migration to Japan in the late 1980s and 1990s, as well as more recent government program to facilitate their voluntary return to Latin America. In so doing, a challenge is made to accounts of a monolithic, monocultural, Japan.

Chapter 6 analyses the limited Latin American *Nikkeijin* political incorporation in Japan. As many are not Japanese citizens, I explain their constrained formal and informal political incorporation with regime type, limited political opportunity structure, along with the difficulties of small group size, language, and a 'myth of return'. The chapter makes the case that, in some ways, Japan is *de-ethnicizing*, which suggests broader implications for Japanese citizenship.

Chapter 7 seeks to explain the limited political transnationalism of Dutch Antilleans and Arubans in the Netherlands and Latin American *Nikkeijin* in Japan. It asks why these groups that are deemed 'transnational' display varying degrees of limited transnationalism. It argues that home country level of dependency on migrant remittances, electoral rules and practices that complicate overseas voting, and a dearth of active host country ethnic advocacy organizations limits the emergence of political transnationalism.

Chapter 8 comparatively summarizes my research findings and analysis of the factors determining these migrations during the period of 1985–2008. This includes attention to the future implications of globalization and postcolonial citizen and ethnic migration on the political inclusiveness of increasingly multi-ethnic and multicultural liberal democracies.

## 2

# Convergence? Globalization and State Policies in the Production of Postcolonial Citizen and Ethnic Migration

This chapter examines the forces that have produced post-1985/1990 postcolonial Dutch Antillean citizen and *Nikkeijin* ethnic migrations to the Netherlands and Japan and analyses several bodies of international labour migration thought including push–pull models, dual labour market, world-systems, and globalization. Globalization and state policies best explain the convergence in the use of formal citizenship and shared ethnicity in these unintended and intended legal migrations. Other theories are quite convincing in their emphasis on the labour market and wage differentials, the temporary status of immigrants, and core periphery relations. However, they fail to adequately take into account the role of the state in producing migrations and the ways in which shared citizenship and ethnicity with the host country facilitates these phenomena.

The narrative of these migrations provides an analysis of ‘symbolic politics’ (Edelman, 1964). Edelman (1964) writes, ‘political symbols bring out in concentrated form those particular meanings and emotions which the members of a group create and reinforce in each other. There is nothing about any symbol that requires that it stand for only one thing’ (1964:11). Similarly, the possession or lack of a certain citizenship or ethnicity can be used as

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symbols of inclusion or exclusion. The Dutch and Japanese states employed 'symbolic politics' (Edelman, 1964) around forms of membership, that is, Dutch citizenship or ethnic visas (*teijusha*), to help change perceptions or mitigate a crisis. This resulted in the use of Dutch citizenship and Japanese ethnicity in these migrations to the Netherlands and Japan but with little to no policy of accommodation for these immigrants.

Despite their inherited access to their new countries of residence, these immigrant groups have been marked as outsiders in the Netherlands and Japan. Other examples of host countries with postcolonial or ethnic migrations, for example, France and Germany, demonstrate the difference between 'symbolic politics' and 'practical politics'. This can be seen in the way they provide a different reception to some immigrant groups in terms of adequate accommodation and assistance with integration for these groups.

Grosfoguel (2003) distinguishes between the French Bureau pour le développement des migrations dans les départements d'outre-mer (BUMIDOM) promoted and the Dutch unintended response to the postcolonial Caribbean migration to France and the Netherlands. The BUMIDOM assisted with transportation costs and jobs within the French public administration privileging the economic incorporation of postcolonial French Caribbean citizens. The Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations lacked adequate state policies oriented towards successful incorporation (Grosfoguel, 2003:183,189; Sharpe, 2005:303). Brody (2002) finds that, up until recently, *Aussiedler* German ethnic migrants were treated as returning members of the German national community and provided citizenship, language instruction, and funding. However, although *Nikkeijin* are extended visa privileges in Japan, they are treated as foreigners and provided with little assistance. *Aussiedler* have been 'courted' by the conservative Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) political parties, which have sought to emphasize the shared heritage of Germans and *Aussiedler* as opposed to the 'otherness' of the more politically liberal guest workers (Brody, 2002:28,91–96). Why are Antilleans and *Nikkeijin* not treated like French Caribbeans and *Aussiedler* (Sharpe, 2005:303)?

## Defining globalization

Following Held et al. (1999), I identify globalization as 'a process or (set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power' (16). Globalization is seen by several theorists as embodied in globalized processes of market liberalization aka 'neoliberalism' (Harvey, 2007) that began in the 1970s and 1980s and the oil price aftershocks of the 1980s characterized by a steep decline

of oil prices (Castles and Davidson, 2000; Gilpin, 2000; Mittelman, 2000; Sassen, 2001). Sassen (2001) and others theorize that globalization produces migrations where market conditions combine with political and social factors to structure migration (Sassen, 1988; 1996; 2001; Lim, Leam 1992; Held et al., 1999; Castles and Davidson, 2000). Globalization is characterized by inexorable interdependence, deregulation, convergence of states, markets, rights, and networks, as well as the increased speed of markets and communications, transportation and technology facilitating mass migrations of people (Friedman, 2000; Gilpin, 2000; Mittelman, 2000; Sassen, 2001; 2006; Stiglitz, 2003).

My research suggests the same globalized processes of integration and deregulation that resulted in a decrease in the price of oil and mass unemployment during the 1980s worked in concert with state policies to produce these Antillean and *Nikkeijin* migrations to the Netherlands and Japan. Following Held et al. (1999), the velocity and intensity of these migrations occur within the same time period, are cross-regional, follow political processes of imperial and ethnic connections to OECD countries, and are sustained by transnational family and ethnic networks. This chapter shows the ways in which 'belonging' and membership around citizenship and ethnicity are *instrumentalized* by both state and non-state actors for what they perceive as political leverage or gain.

## Comparison of postcolonial citizen and ethnic migration to the Netherlands and Japan

The Antillean and *Nikkeijin* migrations share the traits of originating in the Latin American and Caribbean region, have cross-regional destinations where they are legal immigrants, initiate within the same time period 1985/1990, and make up the third and fourth largest and newest ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands and Japan. They are both individual and family transnational with increasing numbers of female migrants (Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000; Yamanaka, 2000) (see Table 2.1). The Netherlands and Japan are two countries that face the dilemmas of international migration and immigration in the context of a globalizing world.

Table 2.1 Comparative citizen and ethnic migration

	Antilleans	<i>Nikkeijin</i>
Time of mass outmigration	Post-1985	Post-1990
Basis for legal migration and immigration	Citizenship	Ethnicity

Table 2.1 (Continued)

	Antilleans	Nikkeijin
Formal/legal sanction for migration and immigration	Formal/legal Dutch nationality and citizenship	Special visa for Japanese 'ethnic returnees'
Triggers for outmigration	1954 Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands ( <i>Statuut</i> ) Automation of Exxon and Shell Oil refineries in Aruba and Curaçao, declining oil markets, depressed Netherlands Antilles (N.A.) and Aruban economies	1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act Japan's need for 'unskilled labour workers' by replacing 'foreign workers' with Japanese 'ethnic' migrant workers
Type of migration	1985 Closing of Exxon and Shell Oil refineries in Curaçao and Aruba Permanent 'right of abode' in the Netherlands (NL) sanctioned by 1954 Charter ( <i>Statuut</i> ) Economic/labour migration	Depressed economies of Brazil and Peru Access to ethnic visa for Japan sanctioned by 1990 Immigration Act Recruited economic/labour migration
Increased feminization of migration	Individual/family Yes	Individual/family Yes
Class identity in country of origin	Poor and working class	Working and middle class
Citizenship regime type of host society	The Netherlands (Civic)	Japan (Ethnic)
Perception of these immigrants in host society	Foreigners/outsideers ( <i>Allochtoon</i> )	Foreigner/outsideers ( <i>Dekasegi</i> )
Minority status in host society	Third largest/newest	Fourth largest/newest
Integration/ accommodation programme in host society	Yes, inadequate	No
Transnational networks and communities	Yes	Yes
Culture of migration	Yes	Yes

### Setting the stage for an Antillean postcolonial Dutch citizen migration to the Netherlands: The 1985 closing of oil refineries in Aruba and Curaçao

The islands of the Netherlands Antilles were Dutch colonies since the 17th century. By the 20th century, Dutch colonial possessions included the Dutch

Antillean islands, Suriname, and Indonesia (former Dutch East Indies). The Netherlands main colonial concern was with Indonesia as a wealth producer and it had little contact with its much less valuable Dutch Caribbean island colonies until later in the 20th century. In light of its colonial war and loss of its Indonesian colony (Indonesia declared independence in 1949), the Netherlands wanted to improve its image at the UN and around the world. In the beginning of the post-war worldwide process of decolonization, the Dutch initiated a 'model decolonization' granting their colonies more autonomy and participation in their own governance.

The Dutch liberal imaginary and 'self-awareness' about its colonial practices resulted in the 1954 Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands or '*Statuut*'. This was the 'official' end of colonial relations. It granted the Netherlands Antilles, as well as Suriname (independence, 1975), the status of equal partners and integral parts of the Kingdom with representation in the Netherlands. The Netherlands had hoped that autonomy would lead to gradual independence for these islands but this was never realized.

Oostindie and Klinkers (2003) write: 'The American press was generally positive; and on the grounds of the Charter, the United Nations relieved the Netherlands in 1955 from its obligation to report on the progress of the decolonisation process in its former Caribbean colonies'(85). Up until 10 October 2010, the 'overseas countries' of the Netherlands consists of the Netherlands Antilles, a kind of federation comprised of the small island states of Curaçao (the administrative capital), Bonaire, Saba, St. Eustatius and St. Maarten, and Aruba. Although Aruba obtained '*status aparte*' or separation from the Netherlands Antilles in 1986, it remains an 'overseas country' of the Dutch Kingdom (Baker, 1992:137).<sup>1</sup> Defence and foreign affairs, and nationality/citizenship remain the responsibility of the Netherlands. Dutch islanders have Dutch passports and the permanent right to live and work in the Netherlands/European Union.

Oil refineries were opened in Aruba and Curaçao to refine Venezuelan oil in 1919. By the second half of the 20th century, Aruba and Curaçao had two of the world's largest oil refineries: the Lago (Exxon) oil refinery on Aruba and the Isla (Shell) oil refinery on Curaçao. Aruba and Curaçao's positions as major oil refineries and the security of the Dutch nationality produced economic and political competitive advantages for those islands over their neighbours. The oil sector demanded more labour and both oil refineries recruited and attracted labour from around the Caribbean and the world. The refineries quickly became the most important employers on these islands.

By the 1950s, oil sector expansion began to diminish and, in 1985, automation and the decreasing price of oil forced the closing of the refineries of both the Lago and Isla oil refineries, leaving few opportunities for employment. The Antilleans were well aware of the fate of the former Dutch colony of Suriname after its independence in 1975, when half of its population migrated to the Netherlands and those who stayed behind faced

increasing poverty. This, along with the conferment of Aruba's 1986 'status aparte' caused many to fear that full independence was next, which could bring the same instability and poverty that had occurred after independence in Suriname. This spurred a mass outmigration of poor and working-class Dutch Antillean and Aruban Dutch citizens to the Netherlands.

The Netherlands, hoping to improve its image after its Indonesian debacle designed its 'symbolic' extension of equal partnership and Dutch citizenship, but did not anticipate the mass migration of thousands of Antilleans to the Netherlands. Between 1980–2004, the number of Antilleans in the Netherlands went from 40,736 to 130,722 and became the newest and fourth largest ethnic minority grouping in the Netherlands<sup>2</sup> (see Table 2.2).

*Table 2.2 Dutch Antilleans and Arubans in the Netherlands, 1980–2004*

<b>Dutch Antilleans and Arubans in the Netherlands, 1980–2004*</b>	
1980	40,736
1981	44,867
1982	47,505
1983	49,390
1984	51,050
1985	53,020
1986	56,878
1987	61,696
1988	66,818
1989	72,040
1990	76,552
1991	80,901
1992	84,932
1993	86,511
1994	87,087
1995	86,192
1996	86,824
1997	88,709
1998	92,105
1999	99,130
2000	107,197
2001	117,089
2002	124,870
2003	129,312
2004	130,722

\*First-generation immigrants and second-generation offspring with one or two first-generation parents.

Source: 'Allochtoon naar herkomstgroepering op 1 januari, vanaf 1972, 2005 Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba', Central Bureau voor de Statistiek, Voorburg/Heerlen 23/5/2006 (Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands).



### Setting the stage for a *Nikkeijin* ethnic migration from Latin America to Japan: The 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act

Emigration and immigration have been historically characterized as controlled affairs in Japan. The famed Meiji Reforms of the late 19th century, which was responsible for Japan's modernization, impacted displaced landless tenants who migrated to cities with little hope but emigration. The farmers of some of Japan's rural areas were plagued by overpopulation, declining agricultural prices, increasing debt, and unemployment (Tsuda, 2003:55,56). Until the early 1900s, the United States was the primary destination for Japanese emigration. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 opened the door for Japanese workers to come in as replacements for Chinese workers. However, the 'Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907–1908' between the United States and Japan restricted Japanese immigration to the United States and redirected Japanese migration to Latin America. In Latin America, the abolition of slavery at the end of the 19th century and a downturn in European immigration had created a labour shortage and Japanese emigration helped to meet the expanding demand for coffee and other agricultural production in Brazil, Peru, and elsewhere in the region (Castles and Miller, 2003).

By the 20th century, Japan had an official policy of only allowing 'skilled' foreign workers to legally enter and work in Japan. There were ongoing debates between those wishing to maintain the 'homogeneity' of Japan by restricting much needed unskilled foreign labourers and those advocating the opening and internationalization of Japan; these continued over the course of the bubble economy of the 1980s. By the 1980s, businesses in prosperous Japan were recruiting foreign workers to perform the 3D (dirty, dangerous, and demanding) jobs the Japanese no longer wanted to do but the process complicated by Japan's official policy. Many of these workers came from Asia but had been previously employed in the oil industry of the Middle East (Kashiwazaki, 2000). A World Bank (2007) study concludes that the influx of Asian foreign workers from Middle East was one of the main catalysts for the eventual 1990 Immigration Act change in Japanese immigration policy, which enabled *Nikkeijin* to emigrate to Japan.

The World Bank (2007) study notes:

One of the most important factors is that a push-force in neighboring Asian countries coincided with a pull-force in the Japanese economy in the 1980s. As far as the supply side is concerned, one of the most important reasons for the sharp increase was probably the decline in the demand for Asian migrant workers in the Middle East. In the 1970s an increasing number of Asians had been recruited to work at construction sites in the oil producing Middle Eastern countries. When the price of crude oil quadrupled after the First Oil Crisis in 1973, a construction boom occurred in the oil-rich countries. Given the relatively small population size of these countries in the Middle East, they started

to recruit a large number of temporary immigrants mostly from Southern Europe and Asia. As a result, the number of migrant workers from eight Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea) to the Middle East grew from a little more than 0.1 million in 1976 to more than 1.2 million in 1982. Nevertheless as the price of crude oil went down in the 1980s, the construction boom subsided, and some 400,000 Asian migrant workers lost their jobs and had to return to their home countries . . . . To these unemployed workers, Japan, one of their rich neighbors, appeared as the new land of opportunity.<sup>3</sup>

As in the case of the post-1985/1990 Antillean migration to the Netherlands, falling oil prices and the subsequent firing of workers, produced a migration of workers (but, in this case, Asian workers to Japan) in both documented but increasingly undocumented circumstances. Meanwhile, the declining economies of Latin America during the 1980s had fairly significant populations of Japanese heritage. Japanese authorities were aware of these co-ethnics and many of them were increasingly willing to come and work in Japan. The Japanese government wanted to satisfy the need for cheap unskilled labour as well as maintain its 'ideology of common ethnic ancestry' (Tsuda, 1999:12) and prohibition against unskilled foreign labour. This resulted in the 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, which effectively created a 'side door' (Brody, 2002) for unskilled labour by allowing *Nikkeijin* to legally enter Japan and work. Tsuda (1999) writes:

When the revised Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act was implemented in 1990, the Japanese government decided to legally admit the *Nikkeijin* without restriction up to the third-generation sansei.<sup>4</sup> This new immigration policy opened up the floodgates, enabling mass return migration. Although the government's decision was based on economic and political consideration, a sense of transnational ethnic affinity with the *Nikkeijin* based on common ties of blood and racial descent provided the critical ideological justification necessary to make the change in policy acceptable.

(Tsuda, 1999:10)

The Act allows second and third-generation *Nikkeijin*, to legally live and work in Japan. Many are known as *dekasegis* or temporary migrant labourers (Tsuda, 1999:12; 2003:xii). It seems the thinking was that their Japanese 'ethnicity' would make them less of a risk to public order. Although this was originally presented as a way for overseas 'ethnic Japanese' to experience their 'homeland', it was clear that the objective was to solve a demand for cheap unskilled foreign labour. The increasingly dire circumstances of the Brazilian and Peruvian and other Latin American economies prompted many *Nikkeijin* in those countries to emigrate to Japan as short term contract labourers for the prospect of jobs that could improve their lives.

In the 1990s, more than 200,000 *Nikkeijin* from Latin America (Yamanaka, 2000) came to reside in localities with job opportunities in auto parts and other small and mid size factories. Between 1985 and 2004, the number of registered Brazilians and Peruvians in Japan went from 2,475 to 342,307<sup>5</sup> and country's third and largest and newest ethnic minority. It is assumed that most registered foreign nationals from Brazil, Peru, and other parts of Latin America in Japan are *Nikkeijin*.

Table 2.3 Brazilian and Peruvian nationals registered in Japan, 1985–2004

Number of Brazilian nationals registered in Japan, 1985–2004		Number of Peruvian nationals registered in Japan, 1985–2004	
1985	1955	1985	480
1988	4159	1988	864
1991	119,333	1991	26,281
1994	159,619	1994	35,382
1997	233,254	1997	40,394
2000	254,394	2000	46,171
2001	265,962	2001	50,052
2002	268,332	2002	51,772
2003	274,700	2003	53,649
2004	286,557	2004	55,750

Source: '2005 Immigration Control', 11th Issue of the 'Immigration Control Report', Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, Japan (Table 11: 'Changes in the number of registered foreign nationals by nationality (place of origin)', p. 30).

### State policy, oil, and unintended and intended migrations

There are many similarities and differences between the involvement of the Dutch and Japanese states in the production of these postcolonial citizen and ethnic migrations and the reception of these immigrants in their host societies. This makes it easier to understand the forces that produce migrations and the linkage between immigration and incorporation (Castles and Miller, 2003). In these cases, one sees the interplay of state policy, oil crises, deregulation, integration, labour demands, ideology, as well as ethnic and kinship networks within the similar time periods of 1985/1990. Miller (1992) writes, '[t]he oil price aftershocks and the precipitous decline of oil prices at several junctures in the 1980s raised the spectre of repatriations of migrant workers from oil-rich countries' (Miller, 1992:311). In much the same way, for Antilleans the decreasing price of oil, automation of the refineries, and other compounding issues led to the 1985 closing of the Shell and Exxon oil refineries in Curaçao and Aruba. This initiated the use of Dutch citizenship by way of their integration in the Dutch Kingdom for migration purposes. Dutch citizenship was granted by virtue of the 1954 Charter for the Kingdom

of the Netherlands in light of Dutch efforts to improve its international image. This set the stage for an unintended post-1985 mass outmigration of poor and working-class Antilleans to the Netherlands. In Japan, Asian migrant workers from the declining oil industry increasingly came to Japan to take on unskilled labour jobs during the 1980s. The problem of foreign migration and the need for unskilled labour in the context of Japan's national ideology and self-perception as a 'non-immigration' country led to the solution of this problem with immigration law reform and a special ethnic visa (*teijusha*) for *Nikkeijin*, which resulted in the 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. The 1990 Act led to an intended legal outmigration (recruited and otherwise) of mostly working and middle-class *Nikkeijin* from Latin America to Japan on the basis of shared Japanese 'ethnicity'. The Netherlands and Japan instrumentalized membership with the outcomes of both unintended and intended mass migrations

Table 2.1 shows the similarities and differences in these two migrations in terms of their legal sanction for immigration and the triggers for out-migrations to the host countries of the Netherlands and Japan. Figure 2.1




Figure 2.1 Convergence in production of Dutch postcolonial citizen and Japanese ethnic migration




Figure 2.2 GDP (US\$), GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) PPP (US\$), and population (2003–2004)

\**Nikkeijin* population figures for Brazil from Brody (2002) and the Sao Paulo Humanities Center as cited by Tsuda (2003) has the Japanese Brazilian population in Brazil as approximately 1,228,000. *Nikkeijin* population figures for Peru from the International Nikkei Research project website 'Nikkei Demographics of the World'. As cited in Japan International Cooperation Agency, *Kaigai Iju Tokei* (FY1952-FY1993), (Tokyo, 1994:124–125). The data were originally collected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and reported in *Kaigai Zaiju Hojin Chosa Tokei*. As an extension of the International Nikkei Research Project, Hirabayashi et al. (2002: xvii) also lists the old figures of 620,370 Japanese Brazilians in Brazil and 55,472 Japanese Peruvians in Peru. See <http://www.janm.org/projects/inrp/english/demogrph02.htm>.

Sources: Bank van de Nederlandse Antillen; Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands Antilles; US State Department Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Background Note, December 2005; World Bank's World Development Indicators Database, April 2006; Centrale Bank van Aruba; US State Department Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Background Note: Aruba December 2005; Central Bureau of Statistics of Aruba and the Population Registry Office of Aruba; UNDP's 2005 Human Development Report; Central Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands); Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, Japan.

illustrates globalization and Dutch and Japanese state policies around citizenship and ethnicity as the independent variables that produced these migrations. It illustrates the convergence in the use of citizenship and/or ethnicity as 'symbolic politics' in these migrations. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 refer to the post-1985/1990 exponential increase in immigrants from the small Dutch Caribbean islands of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba in the Netherlands and *Nikkeijin* from Brazil and Peru in Japan. Figure 2.2 points to demographic, economic, and social indicators of the countries of origin and the countries of settlement as a means to understand some of the factors that may attract migrants to host countries and away from home countries. Which group of international labour migration theories best explains the use of formal citizenship and ethnicity in these post-1985/1990 migrations?

Brody (2002) argues that the globalization school best explains the contemporary *Nikkeijin* migration to Japan. Following this framework, I show why Held et al.'s (1999) description of globalization best explains the convergences in the Dutch and Japanese state policy and the use of formal citizenship and ethnicity as 'symbolic politics' in these unintended Antillean and intended *Nikkeijin* migrations. I continue with an analysis of push-pull models, dual market theories, world-systems theory, and finally Held et al. (1999) and other theories associated with globalization.

### **Push-pull models**

Push-pull models of immigration are intuitive to many people. Push-pull models of immigration are mostly derived from neoclassical economic theory. According to them, individuals make a calculated rational choice or cost-benefit analysis and migrate from home countries to be rid of negative 'push' factors (economic, political, and social) and benefit from the positive 'pull' factors of the host countries (economic, political, and social) (Lewis, 1954; Ranis and Fei, 1961; Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987; Borjas, 1990). As noted by Massey et al. (1993), this neoclassical interpretation in its macro form follows theorists such as Lewis (1954), Ranis and Fei (1961), and Harris and Todaro (1970) and explains migration in terms of geographic disparities in the supply and demand for labour and wage differentials.

Countries with a large endowment of labor relative to capital have a low equilibrium market wage, while countries with a limited endowment of labor relative to capital are characterized by a high market wage, as depicted graphically by the familiar interaction of labor supply and demand curves. The resulting wage differentials in wages causes workers from the low wage country to move to the high-wage country. As a result of the movement, the supply of labor decreases and wages rise in the capital-poor country, while the supply of labor increases and wages fall

in the capital-rich country, leading, at equilibrium, to an international wage differential that reflects only the costs of international movement, pecuniary and psychic.

(Massey et al., 1993:433)

Theorists of micro theory in this neoclassical tradition such as Sjaastad (1962), Todaro (1969; 1976; 1980), Todaro and Maruszko (1987), and Borjas (1990) place emphasis on the cost-benefit analysis of individuals and their expected earnings in terms of where they can be the most productive and best employ their skills rather than just the wage differentials posited in the macro theory. For example, Borjas (1990) argues that there is a market for immigration and uses the example of the United States and what it offers to immigrants when compared to other countries to explain the size and composition of the immigrant pool entering the United States (Borjas, 1990:8-9). Borjas (1990) writes:

Economists typically assume that individuals behave in ways that maximize their well-being. In the context of the immigration market, this means that after potential migrants compare the feasible alternatives, they choose the country that provides the best economic opportunities. There exists a close analogy between the immigration market and the job market. Like the person looking for work, potential migrants enter the market, receive offers from competing host countries and their home country, compare the offers, and make a decision.

(Borjas, 1990:12)

Both push and pull models perceive mass migrations such as the Antillean and *Nikkeijin* trends or patterns of mass migration as the aggregate rational decisions of many individuals due to wage differential or expected earnings. In short, people migrate to improve their standard of living. Although this line of reasoning is convincing, it fails to adequately take into account the role of the state in producing migrations and the ways in which shared citizenship and ethnicity with the host country facilitates migrations. These theories place great emphasis on the labour market and wage differentials as primary determinant factors in migration. This may partially explain the *Nikkeijin* migration from Latin America to Japan. However, it does not account for the Antillean migration to the Netherlands. Antilleans live in a relatively affluent part of the world, when compared to their geographic neighbours but are regarded in the Netherlands as coming from a poor and working-class and unskilled background. *Nikkeijin* are often thought of in their home countries as originating from the working or middle class with skilled or professional backgrounds. However, they are sometimes regarded in Japan as people who could not cope with conditions in their home countries and so travelled to Japan in pursuit of short term, relatively profitable

employment. Push–pull models explain the migration of skilled workers as a response to what they perceive as differences in the rate in return rather than what they possess in terms of human capital in their home country. Hence, skilled and unskilled workers are expected to follow different migration patterns. These theories do not explain the convergences of the migrations of this study around the same period.

As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the divergence in the GDP per capita (PPP) of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba and the Netherlands is not wide. Simmons and Guegant (1992) note ‘the role French and Dutch national policy in maintaining income levels in their current and former colonies’ (Simmons and Guegant, 1992:99). Grosfoguel (2003) points out that 40 per cent of Antilleans in the Netherlands rely on state assistance as their principle source of income as opposed to 19 per cent for the Dutch national average (Grosfoguel, 2003:184). Hence, push–pull models do not sufficiently analyse factors that go beyond wage differentials or expected earnings. They do not account for the reasons migrations persist in spite of restrictive policies and attitudes in host countries. Additionally, push–pull models don’t consider the consequences of permanent settlement in the host countries even for those who have inherited access due to shared citizenship or co-ethnicity (Brody, 2002). A more complete theory of migration would have to take into account the ways in which migrations are structured by social and economic functionality.

## Dual market theories

While push–pull models break migration down into a rational choice cost–benefit analysis, dual market theories argue that advanced industrialized economies are divided into primary and secondary labour markets. These theorists argue that there is a social and economic function to the structure of wages and labour (Piore, 1979; Massey et al, 1993). One of the most important significances in this area, as Piore (1979) argues, is that international migration is caused by a ‘permanent’ demand for immigrant labour that is embedded in the economic structure of advanced industrialized states. He writes:

The dual-labor market hypothesis is that the functioning of the labor market is best understood in terms of a model in which the market is divided into a primary and a secondary sector. Migrants are found in the secondary sector. The jobs in the primary sector are reserved for natives. There is a fundamental dichotomy between the jobs of migrants and the jobs of natives, and the role of migrants in industrial economies can be traced to the factors that generate the distinction initially, to the role and function of the secondary sector in which migrants are found, and to the evolution of its labor requirements.

(Piore, 1979:36)



Dual market theorists contend that because of this social and economic function to the structure of wages and labour, low-wage jobs are difficult to fill with native labour pools. This is because natives desire status rather than just income and, for the same reason, migrants are willing to do this kind of work because they are indifferent to the social stigma of low-wage jobs. Dual market theorists argue that the belief of many migrants that they are only *temporarily* in the host country facilitates the functionality of the dual market.

Massey et al. (1993) note that, for dual market theorists, international migration stems from the intrinsic demands of modern industrial societies that can be summed up in terms of 'structural inflation', 'motivational problems', 'economic dualism', and 'the demography of labour supply' (440–444). Two key aspects of dual market theories are the social context of 'structural inflation' and the 'problem of motivation' where people believe that wages and status should correlate and thus 'wages offered by employers are not entirely free to respond to change in the supply of workers' (Massey et al., 1993:441,443). They argue that informal and formal institutions and mechanisms, for example, unions contracts, regulations, and so on, are put in place to make certain that wages and 'hierarchies of prestige and power' correspond and correlate with one another in ways expected and perceived by people. For them, status acts as a 'motivational factor' in the labour market and low status and jobs with little or no future present a 'motivational problem' that make these jobs difficult to fill with native workers but easy to fill with migrant workers who seek income rather than status (Brody, 2002:20). Migrants view working at a job with low-level status in a purely instrumental way or simply as a means to earn money. Temporary residence in the host country facilitates the assignment of higher status to migrants in the home country.

Dual market theories may partially explain why working- and middle-class origin *Nikkeijin* from Brazil and Peru would go to Japan and work in a low-wage job for the promise of higher income despite the lower status. However, they do not explain the mass migration of poor and working-class origin Antilleans to the Netherlands in spite of limited opportunities for unemployment. In fact, unemployment for this group reached 15 per cent in 2004 as opposed to the rate for indigenous Dutch people of 5.2 per cent the same year.<sup>6</sup> Dual market theories argue that 'international labour migration is largely demand based and is initiated by recruitment on the part of employers in developed societies or by governments acting on their behalf' (Massey et al., 1993:444). According to Piore (1979) and others, immigration is driven by labour demand rather than supply. This partially explains the *Nikkeijin* case in Japan case but does not account for the role of ethnicity in the group's legal migration and increasing permanency. It does not explain the Antillean case in the Netherlands, which lacks the recruitment element and where many end up living on government subsidies due to structural unemployment. Dual labour market theory accounts for the

temporary status of workers but does not explain permanence over time or the persistence of migration where there is full or nearly full employment in host countries (Brody, 2002:20–21).

Antilleans migrate to the Netherlands for the benefits of the Dutch welfare state but also are aware of the reality of racism and discrimination as well as the persistence of unemployment and the perception of crime among Antilleans youth in the Netherlands. They very much resent these aspects of Dutch society and the colonial history upon which they are built. Despite their working and middle-class status in Brazil and Peru, *Nikkeijin* are becoming more aware of what awaits them in terms of lower status jobs and the stigma of coming from developing countries. This comes as state and society realize that many will permanently reside in Japan. For both Antilleans and *Nikkeijin*, there is a growing number of unemployed and undereducated youth prone to attack by the local media as well as to antisocial behaviour in the Netherlands and Japan. Dual market theories do not exclude the rational, self-interested calculus of migrants posited in neoclassical economic theories. Nonetheless, they reduce the causes of migration to labour market factors without taking into account the role of the state, state policy, and transnational family and ethnic networks in the production and persistence of these migrations. They also disregard the role of international regimes and norms and the consequences of permanent settlement for these legal immigrants who can remain in the host country due to their shared legal citizenship or co-ethnicity (Brody, 2002:21). While dual market theories account for the social and economic functions of wages and labour, other theories of migration do take into account the role of the state and less temporary conditions in the production of migrations.

### **World-systems theory**

Developed by Wallerstein (1974) on the basis of Braudelian theory, theorists in the world-systems tradition explain migration at the systems level and as the product of the structure of the world market that has developed from the 16th century onwards. Wallerstein (1974) writes:

It will be the argument of this book that three things were essential to the establishment of such a capitalist world-economy: an expansion of the geographical size of the world in question, the development of variegated methods of labor control for different products and different zones of the world economy, and the creation of relatively strong state machineries in what would become the core-states of this capitalist world economy. (38)

Following Wallerstein (1974), world-systems theorists divide the world-system into an interdependent core, semi-periphery, and periphery marked by an international division of labour (Petras, 1981; Portes and Walton,

1981; Boswell and Jorjiani, 1988; Sassen, 1988; Castells, 1989; 2001; Bolaria and Bolaria, 1997; Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodriguez, 2002; Grosfoguel, 2003). Wallerstein (1974) defines a 'world-system as one in which there is an extensive division of labour' (349).

[T]his division is not merely "functional" but "geographical" in that "the range of economic tasks is not evenly distributed throughout the world-system and "for the most part, is a function of social organization of work, one which magnifies and legitimizes the ability of some groups within the system to exploit the labor of others, that is, to receive a larger share of the surplus. (349)

Wallerstein (1974) refers to the advantaged states as the 'core states' and argues that, 'in such states, the creation of a strong state machinery coupled with a national culture' serves both as a mechanism to protect disparities that have arisen within the world-system and as an ideological mask and justification for the maintenance of these disparities' (349). He argues that peripheral areas should not be called 'peripheral states' because peripheral areas are characterized by 'weak or nonexistent states' ranging from colonial situations to 'low degrees of autonomy' or 'neocolonial situations'. Wallerstein (1974) contends that the 'semi-peripheral areas . . . are in between the core and the periphery on a series of dimensions' and play a necessary structural role in a world-economy (349). Due to a combination of historical and geographic circumstances distinguishing their respective economic resource capacities, Brazil, Peru, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba can all be classified as 'semi-peripheral areas'.<sup>7</sup>

World-systems theorists argue that the 'penetration of capitalist economic relations into peripheral, non-capitalist societies creates a mobile population that is prone to migrate abroad' (Massey et al., 1993:444). They explain labour migration as not the result of rational individual decisions to migrate, a 'bifurcated' labour market, or other particular labour market but the result of the incorporation of the non-capitalist world into the global system. Petras (1981) argues that a 'hierarchical system of production' unified by an international division of labour' is central to the world-system and explains the movement of labour across states.

Labor migration is the movement of workers within this historically interdependent grid. Interstate movement of labor are: a) generated in part by the specific economic and political influences of the stronger core economies over the weaker ones, and the pattern of class formation which results; b) drawn from one labor market to another by variations in level of real and social wage remuneration to labor; c) recruited across national boundaries from an international pool of reserve labor; d) regulated by state policies which define the conditions of boundary crossing; and

e) shaped by the cyclical rhythms and secular trends of the entire world economy. All of these influences fluctuate in form, content and degree.  
(Petras, 1981:45)

For Petras (1981), seemingly non-economic factors only appear as non-economic in origin but are decidedly economic in impact and ultimately 'serve the economic advantage of capital that which is importing global labor' (55). Portes and Walton (1981) address labour and class within the context of migration and the world-system.

The phenomenon of migration, therefore stands at the crossroads between international and domestic inequalities and class exploitation. It is a way through which the exploited contribute to ever-expanding structures of economic domination and, simultaneously, the form in which they react to their constraints. It shows how economic concentration and inequality are perpetuated by the initiatives of both dominant groups and their victims.

(Portes and Walton, 1981:65)

Castells' (1989) 'informational cities' and Sassen's (1991; 2001) 'global cities', although a key element of her globalization thesis, analyses fit in the core/periphery thesis of world-systems. For them, the world economy is managed from a small number of cities such as New York, London, and Tokyo, 'in which banking, finance, administration, professional services and high tech production tend to be concentrated' (Massey et al., 1993:447). This concentration of wealth in 'global cities' is managed by a highly educated workforce which creates a demand for services from unskilled labourers. These unskilled service jobs are usually filled by immigrants who at the same time must somehow live on subsistence wages in and around some of the most expensive cities in the world. The simultaneous demands of capital and labour for highly educated workforce and unskilled labour creates a situation of a 'bifurcated labour market' in the global cities with poorly educated natives resisting unskilled labour jobs and moderately educated natives remaining in the declining industries, leaving the city or relying on welfare programs. These analyses can aptly apply to the migration of Antilleans as well as *Nikkeijin* to the Dutch and Japanese metropolises but does not explain the widespread unemployment of Antilleans and their continued migration to the Netherlands and the peculiarities of *Nikkeijin* employment in mid-size factories outside the Japanese urban centres.

Simmons and Guengant (1992) agree that world-systems theory is useful for interpreting 'the changing and variable nature of the Caribbean incorporation as a semi-peripheral region within the North American political economy' (99). Despite this, the authors contend that it 'minimizes the role of cultural forces (such as cultural resistance, ideology, racial prejudice,

etc.)' (Simmons and Guengant, 1992:99). Mielants (2002) has noted up until recently most world-systems analyses viewed migration as the integration of low-wage labour into the core countries. Grosfoguel's (2003) analysis of Puerto Rican and other migrations from Caribbean 'overseas countries' and 'dependent territories' to the United States and European metropolises brings another insight with relevance especially to the Antillean case. He argues that the main distinguishing feature of these migrations from what he deems as 'modern colonies' is the type of welfare state in the metropole that will facilitate incorporation (Grosfoguel, 2003:190). Echoing Simmons and Guengant (1992); Grosfoguel (2003) contends Wallerstein (1974; 1984) as well as Portes and Walton (1981) overemphasize the 'economic aspects of the core-periphery relationship' but adds that they fail to note the importance of the 'geopolitical strategies of the interstate system' (104). He writes:

I intend to rethink the modern world-system from multiple Puerto Rican locations and experiences, which reveal the limitations of the so-called decolonization of the modern world, both in terms of the global political economy and the dominant geoculture, and its imaginary.

(Grosfoguel, 2003:2)

Grosfoguel (2003) argues that geopolitics historically has been one of the crucial factors promoting Caribbean migration to the metropolises. Drawing on Bourdieu's (1977) concept of 'symbolic capital', the author contends that the purpose of these 'geopolitical strategies' in the Caribbean by the metropolitan powers has often been to obtain political or military security or symbolic/ideological capital (Grosfoguel, 2003:104–105). Although Grosfoguel's theory describes some of the 'symbolic politics' of the extension of equal partnership and Dutch citizenship to the Antilles as positive image projection as well as Japan's establishment of a special 'ethnic' visa to solve its unskilled foreign labour deficit, it remains at the systems level. It tells us little about the politics of the migrations, its commonalities and convergence with other types of migrations, i.e., postcolonial and ethnic migrations, and the transnational family and ethnic networks that help structure them.

World-systems theory accounts for migration flows from particular places and at various times as a result of the role of state in creating migration flows and state sponsored recruitment to the core. However, it does not explain the continuing flow of Antillean migrants to the Netherlands in spite of more restrictive anti-immigrant Dutch attitudes and policies or the role of ethnicity in the politics of the migration of *Nikkeijin* to Japan. The systemic level analyses of world-systems theory and its emphasis on economic considerations neglects the politics of the way that migrations can be structured as a result of 'symbolic politics' around membership. This notion of 'symbolic politics' and its impact on structuring migration is clearly illustrated in these migrations.

## Globalization theory

Globalization and Dutch and Japanese state policies have produced a convergence in the use of citizenship and ethnicity in these post-1985/1990 legal migrations of Antilleans to the Netherlands and *Nikkeijin* to Japan. In line with Held et al.'s (1999) definition, globalization best explains the coming together of state policies around the 'symbolic politics' of citizenship and ethnicity, the velocity and intensity of these migrations occurring within the same time period, the cross-regional destinations, and the use of transnational networks. The same globalized processes of integration and deregulation that resulted in a decrease in the price of oil and mass unemployment during the 1980s met with Dutch and Japanese state policies in the production of these migrations.

### 'Imperial' connections and 'obligations'

Held et al. (1999) remind us that basic economic factors driving migrations have themselves been frequently overlain by political factors shaping the migration process. They note migrations have been formally and informally coordinated regulated and necessitate infrastructure, institutions, transport, and communications. It is argued that a variety of 'imperial' (Held et al., 1999) connections and 'obligations' (Held et al., 1999) have boosted the level of immigration into France, Britain and the Netherlands (we can add Japan), determined its geographical composition, and changed the terms on which immigrants enter those countries. This helps us to understand the 'imperial' connections' of postcolonial Dutch citizenship and Japanese ethnic 'obligations' in the way of Japanese blood descent. These 'imperial' connections and 'obligations' have been demonstrated in Dutch and Japanese state policy and the use of Dutch citizenship and Japanese ethnicity for migration purposes.

The convergence in the production of the post-1985 and 1990 migrations of Antillean and *Nikkeijin* migrations to the Netherlands and Japan, in response to Dutch and Japanese state policy and the extension of forms of membership fit Held et al. (1999) and other contemporary analyses of globalization. This includes the mass unemployment created by 1970s–1980s deregulation, automation, decreasing oil prices, and instability of world markets (Sassen, 1988; 2001; 2006; Castles and Davidson, 2000; Friedman, 2000; Gilpin, 2000; Mittelman, 2000; Stiglitz, 2003).

Globalization expands on Wallerstein's (1974) 'world-systems theory' and articulates the initiation and persistence of migration and permanent settlement based on the globalization and structural characteristics of markets and rights along with the impact of the changing nature of state sovereignty at both the macro and micro levels (Sassen, 1988; 1996; 2001; Lim, 1992; Castles and Davidson, 2000). Although other models such as the 'new economics of migration' focus on the role of family or household remittances in migration decision-making and 'migration systems approach' (Massey

et al., 1993: 436,454) shows migration processes as structured and stable systems, globalization theory is more comprehensive. Held et al.'s (1999) descriptive analysis of globalization goes beyond explaining migration in terms of cost-benefit analysis, social and economic structures, or the purely economic variables raised by push-pull models, dual market theories, and world-systems and adds the impact of states, networks, ideas, and institutions within the political, economic, and sociocultural contexts of migration.

### **The political and economic foundations of globalization and migration**

There is some debate about when globalization begins and hence its role in producing migrations. Gilpin (2000) identifies globalization with the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions in the post-Second World War era. Sassen (2001) associates it with the decline of the Bretton Woods institutions (Sassen, 2001). Friedman (2000) argues that it is correlated with the post-Cold War era. For Held et al. (1999), 'globalization... refers to movements of peoples across regions and between continents, be they labour migrations, diasporas or processes of conquest and colonization'. They refer to the term 'globalization of migration' as

transoceanic or transcontinental movements which preceded the formation of nation-states: for example, the flows of enslaved Africans to the Americas from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century prior to the existence of any recognizable African-nation state.

(Held et al., 1999:284)

For Held et al. (1999), the premodern era was characterized by regional migrations, and what is new in contemporary migration are the global movements of peoples, economic migration to the rich OECD<sup>8</sup> countries (such as the Netherlands and Japan), and the regional systems of migration that have emerged alongside global flows. Castles and Davidson (2000) speak to Held et al.'s (1999) notion of the velocity and interconnectedness of migrations in the context of globalization:

What is new today is the all embracing character of global relationships, the speed of reaction through electronically networked markets and media, and the decline of central control as the role of national government diminishes.

(Castles and Davidson, 2000:4)

They contend that the period 'since 1945 but especially since 1980' has been marked by large-scale migrations of various types including: 'temporary and permanent movements; labour migrations and refugee exoduses; individual and family flows; highly skilled specialists and manual workers'

(Castles and Davidson, 2000:8). It is argued that 'globalization means the rapidly increasing mobility of people across national borders' (Castles and Davidson, 2000:8). This reflected in the post-1985/1990 Antillean and *Nikkeijin* migrations to the Netherlands and Japan.

In all of these cases, globalization is characterized by interdependence; deregulation; convergence of state policies, markets, rights, and networks; and the increased speed and capacity of communications, transportation and technology enabling mass migration.

The 'velocity', 'intensity', cross-regional nature, and imperial connections and ethnic obligations (Held et al., 1999) are clearly reflected in the rapid increase of these immigrant populations in the Netherlands and Japan (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3). The velocity and intensity of the cross-regional Antillean and *Nikkeijin* migrations appear to be in relation to the decline of the Bretton Woods institutions and the oil-crisis price aftershocks of the 1980s. Gilpin (2000) points out that a key aspect of the decline of the Bretton Woods institutions was the 1970s demise of the international monetary system of 'fixed rates' for price stability to one of 'flexible' rates' with no agreement on rules as an 'anti-inflationary measure'. He writes:

However, by the time of the Vietnam War in the 1960s, the United States had ceased to pursue a policy of price stability, and the acceleration of inflation caused by the war eventually led to the abandonment of the fixed rate system by the Nixon Administration in August, 1971.

(Gilpin, 2000:60)

Gilpin notes the effects of the move away from fixed rates, the effects of the 1973 Oil Crisis, and the Vietnam War. He sees this as facilitating the move towards the informality and lack of transparency of the 'New Protectionisms of the 1970s' as well as the belief of 'monetarists'. This notion holds there is an inherent rate of unemployment and that government efforts to decrease unemployment below a 'natural rate' will result in higher inflation. For monetarists, the welfare state was responsible for the economic troubles of the 1970s. This along with the belief of central banks to commit to anti-inflation policies, the rise of an international financial market made possible by modern communications and new financial techniques and instruments have made possible contemporary globalization. This period since the 1970s is what Mittelman calls 'accelerated globalization' (Mittelman, 2000:19). Others talk about this as the time in which 'neoliberal' policies came of age (Harvey, 2007). Harvey (2007) writes:

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, free markets, and



free trade.... There has everywhere been an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism in political-economic practices and thinking since the 1970s. (2)

Sassen (2006) refers to the globalization of the 1980s as a 'tipping point' (Sassen, 2006:301). Whereas the decline of the price of oil during the 1980s and automation eventually led to the closing of the Exxon and Shell oil refineries on Curaçao and Aruba propelling many to the Netherlands, the same declining oil industry lead Asian foreign workers in the Middle East to increasingly make their way to Japan in search of employment. Thereby, producing the negative reaction that paved the way for the 1990 Immigration Act allowing *Nikkeijin* emigration to Japan from Latin America.

The cases of the Antillean and *Nikkeijin* outmigrations to the Netherlands and Japan is consistent with the theory that globalization produces 'migrations' (Sassen, 1996; 1998; 2001:325). For Sassen (1988; 1996:63; 2001), arguing the effects of globalization, market conditions combine with political and social factors to make migration 'highly structured phenomena' (Sassen, 1988; 1996:63; 2001; Lim, 1992; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996; Held et al., 1999; Castles and Davidson, 2000; Brody, 2002:22).

Sassen (2001) resonates with Held et al.'s (1999) notion of *imperial* connections and *obligations* and their role in mass migrations. Developing previous work (Sassen, 1988), Sassen (2001) argues that major migration flows to places like the United States, United Kingdom, Japan (we can add the Netherlands) are 'not haphazard in origin'. In fact, she contends that they are 'in good part rooted in the economic or political/military histories of their countries' and these act as 'bridges' for the movement of capital, goods, labour, and hence facilitate migration flows (Sassen, 2001:33). The distant colonial and political history of the Netherlands in relation to the Dutch islands, Japan's history of migration with regard to Brazil and Peru, and the internationalization of these economies helps explain these migrations. For Sassen, migrations are 'produced' and 'require specific conditions' such as the 'rapid internationalization' and 'casualization' of the employment relation' (Sassen, 2001:325). Hence, low-wage service jobs are filled by legal and illegal immigrants to support a highly paid managerial class in the global cities and thus legal and illegal immigrants come to constitute reconstructed 'serving classes' (Sassen, 2001:322). These realities in terms of decline of the Bretton Woods institutions and the role of political histories in the production of these migrations as well as 'internationalization' and the 'casualization' and 'informalization' of the employment relation are seen in both these cases. Dutch *imperial* connections and Japanese ethnic *obligations* help to explain why Antilleans as well as *Nikkeijin* emigrate to the Netherlands and Japan during the same time period rather than the United States which is closer in geographic proximity and offers equal or better economic opportunities.

Freeman (1995) argues immigration policy in liberal democracies is typically determined by clientelistic politics of powerful organized interests that stand to benefit from expansive immigration policies and seek state capture on these issues. Hollifield (1998; 2000; 2006) disagrees and is also critical of some theoretical analyses of globalization and charges it with an overemphasis on economic variables and a lack of political analysis of the role of the state. His views about the ways in which ideas and institutions are important in state policy formulation around immigration policy speak to these cases. Hollifield (2000) contends:

With migration, by contrast, economic arguments (about the costs and benefits of migration) tend to be overshadowed by political, cultural, and ideological arguments. National identities and founding myths, what I have called elsewhere “national models,” come into play in the making and unmaking of coalitions for admissionist or restrictionist migration policies (Hollifield 1997a, 1997b). Debates about migration in the making and unmaking of liberal-democratic (OECD) states revolve as much, if not more so, around the issues of rights, citizenship, and national identity than around issues of markets (cf. *infra*). The coalition that form to support more open migration policies are often rights-markets coalitions. Debates about sovereignty and control of borders are reduced to debates about national identity – a fungible concept that reflects values, morality, and culture, rather than a strictly instrumental, economic calculus.

(Hollifield, 2000:162)

The Dutch and Japanese cases reflect this notion of ‘national founding myths’ or ‘national models’. This can be seen in the Netherlands self-image as a ‘liberal and tolerant’ society not capable of sustaining colonial war crimes or Japan as a ‘homogenous and ethnically pure society’ and the admission of postcolonial or co-ethnic immigrations. These ‘national founding myths’ or national models seem to be critical to policies of inclusion or admission rather than a simple economic calculus.

### **Globalization, the liberal democratic state, and membership**

The globalization model argues that migration begins because of political and market forces, ethnic networks, and transnational communities. It contends that, in spite of restrictive policies and anti-immigrant contexts, migration flows persist due to the convergence of economic globalization and expansion of human rights regimes. For globalization theorists, the liberal extension of membership rights and access contributes to a ‘decentering’ of state sovereignty limiting state power to control migration flows and permanent settlement (Sassen 1996:28). Soysal (1994) argues the emergence of ‘universal personhood’ and ‘post-national belonging’ based on universal human rights is ‘rapidly eroding the nation-state’. Castles and Davidson

(2000) note that the 'conventions and declarations of supra-national bodies like the UN...gradually incorporated (universal human rights) into the constitutions and laws of *nation-states* (my emphasis)' (18). While the nation-state may have been 'decentred' (Sassen, 1996) due to globalization and the extension of rights, it has certainly not been eliminated. Similarly, Castles and Davidson argue 'the nation-state is still the key reference point for citizenship, and is likely to remain so' (19).

Some interests would like to revoke or alter the rights or access enjoyed by Antilleans and *Nikkeijin*. In 2005, a proposal<sup>9</sup> was introduced to deport unemployed Antillean youth to their home islands but this was found not to be feasible due to their Dutch citizenship. In the midst of the global financial crisis, in 2009 the Japanese government launched a programme to facilitate the paid voluntary return of unemployed Latin American *Nikkeijin* to their countries of origin. Initially, this was said to be conditioned on the promise that they never return but later this condition was said to be a misinterpretation. As the Netherlands and Japan are liberal democracies, it is very difficult to revoke or alter 'rights' in this globalized and integrated era. Both events prompted enormous national and international outrage prompting changes in positions. Hollifield (2006) argues that 'as foreigners gain a legal foothold in liberal societies, rights accrue to them, and they become political actors capable of shaping both policy and polity' (Hollifield, 2006:183). In their theory of 'complex interdependence', Koehane and Nye (1977) argue that a liberal-institutionalist order came into existence after Bretton Woods with transnational actors and new types of exchange that were institutionalized in the form of regimes that constrain state policy. Ruggie's (1982) concept of 'embedded liberalism' takes into account the ideas, norms, and values of the post-war order and the role of liberal notions of rights in the international system. Hollifield (1992) discusses these concepts in terms of the extension of liberal and universal 'rights-based' regimes that place emphasis on human rights and social justice and constrain the realist notions of sovereignty and national self-interest and the power of states to prevent immigrants' permanent settlement and forces them to recognize migrants as individuals.

### **Transnational networks, transnational communities, and migration systems**

In addition to liberal extension of rights, analysts' of globalization inclusion of transnational communities, ethnic and family networks as well 'migration systems', and 'cultures of migration' help to explain the 'initiation' and 'persistence' of migrations (Brody, 2002:23). In their characterization of labour migrations, Portes and Rumbaut (1996) note 'migration is a network-driven process' and that numerous studies have shown, 'it is the transnational networks that families and communities build that provide the backbone for the continuing labour flow' (32,291). Antilleans (Van Hulst, 2000; Fennema

and Tillie, 2001) as well as *Nikkeijin* (Tsuda, 1999; 2003; Yamanaka, 2000) have been identified, to varying degrees, as 'transnational communities'. Several have noted the presence of migration systems, transnational family and kinship networks facilitated by advanced and cheaper communications and transportation infrastructure, in some cases sending remittances<sup>10</sup> back to the home country and in others not, and a 'culture of migration' in the Antillean and *Nikkeijin* migrations<sup>11</sup> (Simmons and Guengant, 1992; Tsuda, 1999; 2003; Van Hulst, 2000; Yamanaka, 2000; Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003). Kritz and Zlotnik (1992) define a 'migration system'

as a network of countries linked by migration interactions whose dynamics are largely shaped by the functioning of a variety of networks linking migration actors at different levels of aggregation. The attention given to the role of institutional and migrant networks in channeling and sustaining migration is a key aspect of the systems approach.

(Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992:15)

Much like Held et al. (1999), Kritz and Zlotnik (1992) argue that 'international migrations do not occur randomly but take place usually between countries that have close historical, cultural, or economic ties. Moreover, migrants are increasingly assisted in their moves by networks of earlier migrants, labour recruiters, corporations, travel agents or even development agencies' (Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992:1). The 'culture of migration' can be seen as a part of a migration system that compliments family and ethnic networks and thus assists in the perpetuation of migration flows. Tsuda (1999) notes that Japanese Brazilian ethnic migration occurred in the absence of 'intense' economic relationships between Brazil and Japan (Tsuda, 1999:8). The same can be said, to a lesser degree, of the Antillean migration, because the Netherlands had a rather distant relationship with its Caribbean colonies. The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba continue to maintain closer economic ties to the United States.<sup>12</sup> In spite of this, these migrations have persisted to the Netherlands and Japan and 'transnational' family networks along with political and historical factors are an important part of the explanation. Tsuda (1999) argues, 'transnational ethnic connections channelled migration to Japan, and the creation of a culture of migration and transnational migrant labour networks expanded and diversified the migrant flow' (Tsuda, 1999:23). He writes about how migration came to be glorified within the Japanese-Brazilian sending community and led to the development of a culture of migration that encouraged larger numbers emigrating to Japan' (Tsuda, 1999:22).

Although labour recruitment is not a current element of the Antillean migration experience, Simmons and Guengant (1992) contend that a 'culture of migration' may be endogenous to the Caribbean. This helps to

explain the perpetuation of migration despite a more recent improved economic situation in Aruba and some of the other Dutch islands due to tourism. Simmons and Guengant (1992) write:

[T]he Caribbean culture-of-migration may be viewed as a historically conditioned response that leads workers to look for jobs abroad because this is what their ancestors did... In fact, the term 'culture of migration' may better describe the recent period in which Caribbean peoples have viewed migration as integral to socio-economic mobility. Such a culture emerged from the uprooted history of the Caribbean population, first as slaves or indentured labourers from abroad, then as free villagers on marginal lands, dependent on seasonal plantation work and circulatory migration for survival. This history heightens the tendency to emigrate as socio-economic opportunities change. However, the culture-of-migration also includes the need to maintain a connection with 'home' through visiting, circulation, and return migration. And, once abroad, the Caribbean emigrant may be more prone to move again, from Britain to Canada from Canada to the United States, from anywhere back home. (102–103)

Although they began as male migrations, the Antillean as well as the *Nikkeijin* migrations have become increasingly family oriented and feminized. Ehrenreich and Hoschschild (2002) attribute 'globalization' to the phenomena of the 'feminization of migration' where 'women are on the move as never before in history' from poor countries to rich ones, where they serve as nannies, maids, and sometimes sex workers' (2). For them, what is new today in the era of globalization is the number of female migrants with 'half of the world's 120 million legal and illegal migrants... now believed to be women' and 'the long distances they travel' (Ehrenreich and Hoschschild, 2002:5).

In this way, Van Hulst (2000) notes a limited period in the 1960s of unskilled labour recruitment and then the recruitment of nurses from the Dutch Antilles to care for the elderly in the Netherlands (Van Hulst, 2000:99). He points out the eventual cessation of this labour recruitment and the unintended post-1985 mass migration of poor and working-class Antilleans that has become increasingly feminized. This 'feminization' of the Antillean migrations occurred because many women are heads of 'single parent families' and leave the islands to escape a poor family living arrangement or an abusive or substance-dependent spouse or partner. Van Hulst (2000) writes, 'since 1988, approximately three quarters of Antillean families in large cities have a female head of household... many of these multi-problem families are dependent on benefits' (106). Although many do not find employment, he notes how they experience 'migration as progress'

for social and economic reasons (Van Hulst, 2000:106). He writes about the experience of Antillean women in the Netherlands:

After a sometimes long period of enduring problematic living situations in the homes of relatives who had preceded them, exploitation by lodging-house keepers and such, most women get their own housing for the first time via the municipality. With their benefits, they also achieve the desired autonomy from family and men. Many men overseas are structurally unemployed and cannot support their wives and children which often leads to separation. The women stay behind with the children until another man presents himself as the answer to her problems. His presence is usually temporary, and often he too leaves behind one or more children. Financial autonomy in the Netherlands weakens this vicious circle. Many women cite this as the greatest benefit of migration.

(Van Hulst, 2000:106)

Yamanaka (2000) has pointed out the employment of older *issei* and *nissei* women (first and second generation) who work as health attendants or assistants in hospital and homes (140). She has noted that *Nikkeijin* migration to Japan has become much younger and feminized following the 1990 Immigration Act (Yamanaka, 2000:107). Yamanaka (2000) writes:

By 1994, females had increased in all but two age categories, lowering the sex ratio to 132. Finally, the proportion of children aged under fourteen among the migrants increased from 4.5% to 6.5% between 1998 and 1994. Clearly the Nikkei Brazilian migration to Japan is family-oriented, involving a high proportion of women and children.

(Yamanaka, 2000:135)

Brody (2002) notes that a variation of this is 'one parent, usually a Nikkei father, working in Japan for a short time, returning to Latin America and, accompanied by a spouse and children, traveling to Japan for a longer and possibly a permanent stay' (55). The Antillean and *Nikkeijin* share in the phenomena of globalization and initial individual male and increasingly feminized family migrations.

### **The use of 'symbolic' politics**

The Dutch citizenship of Antilleans and the Japanese 'ethnicity' of *Nikkeijin* are salient examples of 'symbolic politics' (Edelman, 1964). The disparity between globalization and the extension of rights and immigration and state policies aimed at immigrant integration have been pointed out in many contexts (Cornelius et al., 1994). Indeed, it is quite a paradox that Antilleans and *Nikkeijin* are treated more as 'members' of their host countries prior

to their entering their territories (Brody, 2002:102). These migrations have come together in what Cornelius et al. (1994) have identified as the 'gap hypothesis' that is

the gap between the *goals* of national immigration policy (laws, regulations, executive actions, etc.) and the actual results of policies in this area (policy *outcomes*) is wide and growing wider in all industrialized democracies, thus provoking greater public hostility toward immigrants in general (regardless of legal status) and putting intense pressure on political parties and government officials to adopt more restrictive policies.

(Cornelius et al., 1994:3)

The contradiction between Dutch and Japanese official government policy towards its Antilleans and *Nikkeijin* in immigration policy and actual treatment in terms of integration<sup>13</sup> and accommodation in the Netherlands and Japan illustrate the disconnect between the 'symbolic politics' (Edelman, 1964) of geopolitical strategy, ideology, and membership in the nation and the 'practical politics' of how to accommodate, integrate, and incorporate immigrants to a host society (Brody, 2002:102).

## Conclusion

Globalization and Dutch and Japanese state policies explain the convergence in the use of citizenship and ethnicity as 'symbolic politics' in these outmigrations. Several theories articulate the initiation and persistence of migration and permanent settlement based on the globalization and structural characteristics of markets and rights along with the impact of the changing nature of state sovereignty at both the macro and micro levels (Sassen, 1988; 1996; 2001; Lim, 1992; Castles and Davidson, 2000). Despite being unintended and intended, the cases studied here illustrate the theory that globalization produces 'migrations' and (Sassen, 1996; 2001:325) are 'highly structured phenomena' (Sassen, 1988; 1996:63; 2001; Lim, 1992; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996; Held et al., 1999; Castles and Davidson, 2000; Brody, 2002:22). Other models such as the 'new economics of migration' focus on the role of family or household remittances in migration decision-making, and the 'migration systems approach' (Massey et al., 1993: 436,454) shows migration processes as structured and stable systems. However, globalization theory is more comprehensive and has the most explanatory power in these instances. Globalization encompasses these and best explains variables raised by push-pull models, dual market theories, and world-systems along with the impact of states, networks, ideas, and institutions within the political, economic, and sociocultural contexts of migration. It has been noted that there is a lack of study in political science of the relationship between immigration and incorporation (Hollifield, 2000:175). As economic

and political globalization, 'decentered' (Sassen, 1996:28) sovereignty, and the expansion of human rights regimes and membership rights continue to converge, the problems of immigrant political incorporation will continue to become centre stage. The Netherlands and Japan provide a unique opportunity for examining the politics of postcolonial citizens and ethnic migration in the age of globalization.



# 3

## Old and New Nationalisms, Pre-migration Political Legacies

We are one [Dutch] kingdom. But the concept of the kingdom is maybe a concept that we, coming from the Caribbean have, but people that live here [in the Netherlands] don't have.<sup>1</sup>

In 2009, Hero Brinkman, a member of a Dutch parliamentary delegation to the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba and a member of Gert Wilders far right PVV (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*) (Party for Freedom), inflamed passions by suggesting that the Dutch islands be auctioned on eBay (*Expatica*, 2009). Over the last ten years, for the first time in Dutch history, the islands of the Antilles have become a focus of Dutch parliamentary debate (Oostindie, 2011:38). This suggests a rather tenuous attachment to and inclusion of the Dutch islands in constructions of Dutch nationalism and national identity. The attenuated connection is partially explained by the political development of Dutch nationhood and expansion in the Dutch Caribbean and now finds itself expressed in island-based nationalisms as well as new assertions of Dutch nationhood.

Social scientists believe that there is a level of connection between levels of civic engagement and political incorporation. Given the trajectory of the political history of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba and the recent nationalistic developments in the Netherlands, one might assume that there would not be high levels of civic engagement due to the burdens of colonialism, slavery, and dependence. In this chapter, I will show that although one may reasonably draw the conclusion that there are low levels of civic engagement, and indeed, in points of the Antilles and Aruba's history that might have been true, that claim today is no longer true.

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With kind permission from Springer Science+Business Media: Sharpe, Michael. September 2005. 'Globalization and migration: Post-colonial Dutch Antillean and Aruban immigrant political incorporation in the Netherlands', *Dialectical Anthropology* 29: 3–4. This chapter is based in part on this article.

This chapter discusses Dutch and Curaçaoan, Dutch Antillean, and Aruban nationalisms and the pre- and postcolonial political history of Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba, particularly examining their roles in setting the stage for the post-1985 Dutch Antillean (including Aruban) mass migration to the Netherlands. The chapter addresses the claim that the limited incorporation of Antilleans in the Netherlands is due to the political culture<sup>2</sup> and lack of ‘civicness’ (Almond and Verba, 1963) in their countries of origin (Fennema and Tillie, 2001). This will lead to a discussion in Chapter 4 of the factors around Antillean political incorporation in the Netherlands.

### **The structure of the Dutch Kingdom**

The Kingdom of the Netherlands is mostly European and partially Caribbean. Before 10 October 2010, The Kingdom of the Netherlands was made up of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles – a federation of the five island states of Curaçao (administrative capital), Bonaire, Saba, St. Eustatius, and St. Maarten<sup>3</sup> – and Aruba. The Dutch Leeward islands of Aruba (population 103,484) (Aruba Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006:1), Curaçao (130,627), and Bonaire (10,791) are located just off the coast of Venezuela; and the Dutch Windward islands of Saint Eustatius (2,292), Saba (1,349), and St. Maarten (Dutch side, 30,594) are located just easterly from Puerto Rico (Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands Antilles, 2005:15). Hence, the total population of the Netherlands Antilles (175,653) and Aruba (103,484) in 2006 was approximately 279,137, and, more recently, has been closer to 300,000.

Dutch, Papiamentu, and English are official languages. Papiamentu, a Portuguese Creole combining Spanish, Dutch, English, and African influences, serves as the lingua franca of the Dutch Leeward islands of Aruba,<sup>4</sup> Curaçao, and Bonaire. English functions as the vernacular of the Dutch Windward islands of St. Eustatius, St. Maarten, and Saba. Hence the Leeward and Windward islands are quite distant in terms of language, geography, and culture. These are multicultural and multiracial societies with varying degrees of historical influence from Africa, indigenous Indian Caribbean peoples, Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere. Its peoples hold Dutch citizenship with the ‘permanent right of abode’ in the Netherlands.

### **Structure of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba**

The governors of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are appointed by and represent the Dutch Queen. The Dutch Antillean and Aruban governments appoint resident ministers who represent them in the seat of the Dutch government in The Hague. The ministers are allowed to take part in discussions of the Kingdom Cabinet but are not accountable to an Estates General or national houses of parliament<sup>5</sup> (Koulen and Oostindie, 1987:15–16). The Netherlands Antilles has a ‘land’ or central government that is responsible to

a directly elected land parliament and each island has an island government responsible to a directly elected council. Most political power is concentrated in these elected bodies called the '*Staten*' and in island councils. In Aruba, there is a *Staten*, a prime minister, and a council of ministers (Baker, 1992:136).

### **Dutch nationalism – Pillarization to a New Netherlands?**

With a recent rise in anti-multiculturalist, Islamophobic, and anti-immigrant sentiment and discourse shown by some political parties and commentators in the Netherlands, Dutch nationalism and national identity have become hot topics in recent years. It is useful to understand the origins of the Dutch state and its relationship to its current Caribbean kingdom partners and former Caribbean colonies to understand the contemporary context. These origins begin with a revolt against Spanish rule under the leadership of Calvinist William of Orange that led to the 80-year war between the Low Countries and Spain. The Union of Utrecht in 1579, united the seven northern Dutch provinces, and is regarded as the foundation of the Dutch Republic. This provided a starting point for Dutch mercantilist expansion all over the world, but, for our purposes, namely, in the Caribbean. What began as the early Dutch Republic went through several iterations and periods of war and foreign domination. This includes the Batavian Republic created by Napoleon under French rule in the 1790s, a new Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, Belgium's departure from the Kingdom in the 1830s, the introduction of parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy in 1848, universal male suffrage in 1917, neutrality in the First World War, German occupation during the Second World War, up until the contemporary Dutch Kingdom (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002).

Blakely (1993) points out that the Netherlands was born out of intense religious and political conflict and thus had spiritual as well as practical concerns of political consolidation and commercial prosperity (1–2). The Netherlands was noted in the 17th century or 'Golden Age' for its wealth, power, and status as a seafaring trading giant with global reach. It was also known for being an early country of immigration that accommodated multitudes of immigrants including Flemings, Huguenots, and Jews from France, Spain, and elsewhere in Europe (Blakely, 1993:8–9; De Jong, 2010:24). Schama (1997) titles his book about Dutch culture of the 17th century, *The Embarrassment of Riches* because of the Dutch tensions around the pursuit of prosperity and the constant worry about spiritual corruption (Schama, 1997). All of this is testimony to the multiple identified and often conflictual construction of the Netherlands.

What then is Dutch nationalism and what defines Dutch national identity? The Netherlands is most commonly categorized as a plural society able to reconcile religious and ideological differences. Prak (1999) argues that

there 'was no such thing as Dutch citizenship' in the Dutch Republic and describes it as a 'federation of the seven sovereign provinces' (18). Earnest (2008) writes:

Prior to 1795, each of the United Provinces maintained its own laws and practices for membership in the political community. A citizen of Gelderland may not have any rights, for example, if he or she moved to Utrecht. Because of the commercial nature of some of the provinces, furthermore (particularly Holland) had a considerable number of residents who were born in other nations. Several provinces allowed natives to purchase citizenship with attendant rights, including the right to vote. Although this practice was undeniably discriminatory based on individual wealth, it nevertheless reflects the provinces conception of the political community as a multiethnic, communal construct rather than a linguistic or ethnic one. (114)

Prak (1999) traces the transition of citizenship from a local urban phenomenon of 'burghers' under the Dutch republic to a national citizenship with the Napoleonic centralizing influences of the Batavian Republic and notes how local traditions and communal rights were institutionalized in this new construction. Stuurman (2004) classifies the Netherlands as having a 'communitarian-liberal' model of citizenship (183). For these and other reasons, many contend that the Dutch state has always been highly decentralized (Bagley, 1973). Much of this suggests a template for a Dutch policy tradition of multiculturalism, community rights, and inclusion of foreigners. However, as the rise of Calvinism coincided with the revolt against Catholic Spanish rule, Calvinism became associated with a kind of 'Dutch patriotism' (Bagley, 1973:2). It has been argued that until the mid-20th century, the strongest unifying force was a 'religious nationalism, based on Calvinism' (Blakely, 1993:11) with Catholics somewhat subjugated until the 19th century (Bagley, 1973:2). Dutch nationalism and nationality would grow to encompass and be defined by tolerance and agreement around religious and ideological divisions.

### ***Verzuiling*/'Pillarization'**

For Lijphart (1968), a key factor behind Dutch consensual democracy is Dutch nationalism; the feeling of belonging to a common nation as well as to one's *zuiling* or bloc. From the late 19th century to the late 1960s, Dutch society developed into a system of four blocs or *verzuiling* (pillars) that accommodated and pacified religious and ideological differences. The Dutch institutions of *verzuiling* or 'pillarization' and 'consensual' and 'consociational' democracy, were noted for compromise, power sharing, and the granting of some autonomy to certain groups, that is, Protestants, Catholics, Liberals, and Socialists and maintained a high level of democracy

in this once deeply divided society (Lijphart, 1968; 1969; 1999). De Jong (2010) writes:

People bought groceries, meat, milk, and eggs from shopkeepers of their bloc; they voted for political parties that represented the bloc and sent their children to bloc schools. Consequently, an identity of *being* Dutch had to reconcile with robust bloc identities, these identities were fundamental to the concept of *being* Dutch.... The affairs of state were organized around a high degree of self-containment and mutual isolation of blocs. Overarching contact among the blocs was limited to the elite level, essentially in order to run the nation's public affairs. (45–46)

Lijphart (1968) contends that this segregation was not *apartheid* but 'self-imposed social isolation' and one instance where the idea of a 'separate but equal doctrine' has worked (202). Oostindie (2011) states that concerns over whether to accept foreigners during the First World War or Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany were not prompted by concerns about national identity but rather economic or political issues (40). For him, 'the *verzuilde*, "pillarized", Netherlands had no strong tradition of directed nation-building and felt it could also do without it; the *verzuilde* institutions would help willing newcomers to assimilate' (Oostindie, 2011:40). Later waves of migrants would arrive in the 20th century, including Indonesians, guest workers from Turkey and Morocco, and, some years after, Surinamese and Antilleans. By the late 1960s, the Netherlands was embracing secularization and individualization and the blocs broke down. The coming of guest worker immigrant groups, predominantly Muslim groups, that is, Turks and Moroccans, coincided with the breakdown of the *verzuiling* or 'pillarization' system.

Van Amersfoort (2010) considers post-war immigration policy and finds lack of a policy intention to integrate guest worker immigrants into the pillars and finds them too small at the time to develop their own. Pillarization was replaced with a profound affirmation of liberalism (Lechner, 2008:133). It is notable that the system left institutional patterns that are recognizable to this day, such as the state funding of parents' choice of religious or public schools and the state's one-time embrace of multiculturalism and minority policies. Other examples include state funding of certain group organizations as well as the contemporary multiparty system where parties represent particular religious and other groups.

### **New Dutch nationalism?**

With the demise of the *verzuiling* or 'pillarization' system, a very secular contemporary Netherlands seems to struggle around issues of Dutch nationalism and national identity. During the late 1970s and 1980s, Dutch

society initially accepted a 'multiculturalism' that was very much influenced by the old *verzuiling* or 'pillarization' system. It was thought that migrants could better integrate while retaining their own language and culture and many of the guest workers were expected to return home. By the later 1980s, it was becoming clear that the guest workers and their descendants were in the Netherlands permanently. The Dutch warm embrace of multiculturalism cooled by the 1990s as the state was criticized for accommodating immigrants, who did not speak the Dutch language or integrate into Dutch society. The integration of Muslim immigrants into Dutch society and their acceptance of Dutch liberal norms continue to be called into question (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007), and the 9/11 events further heightened the scrutiny. In 2000, Paul Scheffer, sociologist and politician, wrote a provocative article called *Het multiculturele drama* ('The Multicultural Drama') published in the very influential newspaper *NRC-Handelsblad*. The article highlights 'the multicultural drama' or the tragedy of the contradiction of politically correct multicultural policies that do not deal with the isolation of immigrants and ethnic minorities, and their overrepresentation in crime statistics, unemployment, poverty, and the growing underclass (Scheffer, 2000). In a 2007 article in the *NRC-Handelsblad*, Piet Emmer, historian, points to Scheffer's (2007) book *Het Land Van Aankomst* (The Country of Arrival) and its analysis of the problematic impacts of immigration, the failings of multiculturalism, and the need for more restrictive immigration. He notes Scheffer's recognition of the benefit of postcolonial migration in heightening Dutch public awareness about colonialism and slavery. In this regard, Emmer (2007) warns against pampering Antilleans out of guilty feelings about the Dutch past. He suggests that unlimited Antillean immigration is causing a 'national trauma' and much damage to Dutch society (Emmer, 2007). Guadeloupe (2010) argues that 19th constructions of race and ethnicity are reified in Dutch Caribbean studies and Dutch public discourse. Negative associations of Antilleans with problem youth and social disorder continue to emerge in the public sphere.

A new nationalism seems to be taking root that seeks its definition in an opposition to immigrant groups, asylum seekers, multiculturalism, as well as the larger Europe (Maas, 2007). One can see responses to these tensions in the popularity of political movements such as that of the populist Pim Fortuyn (*Leefbaar Nederland*) (Liveable Netherlands) and his anti-immigration stance which declared that the Netherlands was a 'full country' and branded Islam as a 'backward culture' (Lechner, 2008:74). He was assassinated in 2002 during the Dutch national election campaign. Other examples include the derisive attacks against Islam of Theo van Gogh and his subsequent murder in 2004, the 2005 Dutch vote against the European constitution, and, quite significantly, the 2010 electoral success of the above mentioned extreme right anti-Islam populist politician Gert Wilders and his *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV) (Party for Freedom).

This has prompted calls for a return to an idealized Dutch past when things were good and 'pure'. These voices harken back to the grand success of the Dutch republic of the 17th century, the 'Golden Age', as well as an imagined pre-immigrant past 'the archetype of a pure bred autochthon with deep ancestral roots in the Dutch polder' (De Jong, 2010:21,75,74). Oostindie (2011) argues that 'there has never been a culturally homogeneous understanding of nationhood' (16). He notes the recent concerns about Dutch nationalism and national identity and demand for what Scheffer (2007) has called 'a defined idea of the Netherlands' (Oostindie, 2011:16). Despite De Jong's (2010) observation that the Dutch government does not define Dutch identity beyond its respect for law and order and in sharing the Dutch language (81), 'some suggest that in the slipstream of *True Dutch* claims a liberal-secular white Dutch majority has emerged that defines – at long last – a collective Dutch identity' (64). One can see that defining Dutch nationalism and Dutch national identity beyond the pillarization system is a work in progress that has never really included Antilleans. It should also be noted that despite their Dutch citizenship and islands status as Dutch Kingdom partners, Antilleans are classified as *Niet Westers allochtoon* or 'non-Western' 'non-native' Dutch as are Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and others. New notions and attitudes around Dutch nationalism and national identity calls into question how Antillean and other Dutch citizens of non-European immigrant background (*allochtoon*) fit into these emerging conceptions. How does the political history of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba fit within Dutch history? How has Dutch colonialism influenced island-based nationalisms?

### **Political history of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba**

The Dutch empire encompassed much of the world including New Netherlands (New York), the current Dutch Caribbean islands, Dutch Brazil and Suriname, the Dutch East Indies (later Indonesia), and some parts of Africa. In the 1600s, due to its focus on commercial rather than religious concerns, the Dutch were the only Western power allowed to trade with Japan by the Tokugawa Shogunate. The Dutch tended to set up trading and military posts that did not necessarily spread the Dutch language. Despite a relationship with the Dutch Caribbean that dates back to the origins of the Dutch Republic, the Netherlands experienced little interaction with its Dutch Caribbean colonies until well into the 20th century. Different than the UK and US relations with their Caribbean possessions and unlike France's nationalistic attachment to its 17th century 'old colonies' in the area, the Netherlands has always had a distant relationship (Ramos and Rivera, 2001). This can be explained in part by the political development of Dutch nationhood and its expansion in what would become the Dutch Caribbean.

Again, among many priorities, the young Dutch Republic was concerned with political consolidation and commercial prosperity. Some have argued that the Dutch state was an instrument of the Dutch bourgeoisie to consolidate economic hegemony (Wallerstein, 1980). In the 17th century, the Caribbean became a new battleground with the Spanish. Spain initially claimed the islands later to be called the Netherlands Antilles. According to Oostindie (2005), the engagement in the Caribbean allowed the Dutch to 'shatter Spanish monopoly' and supply Caribbean salt for the herring<sup>6</sup> industry, then very important to the Dutch Republic (2). The Dutch West India Company was given the mission of supporting Dutch efforts against Spain through war making, privateering, and trade (Blakely, 1993; Oostindie, 2005). In 1634, the Dutch West India Company took possession of these islands from Spain making them military and trading posts. As was the case in their involvement in Japan and elsewhere, Dutch interests in the Caribbean did not concentrate on spiritual conversion but rather on trade and expansion. As a consequence, Curaçao and Aruba remain predominantly Catholic, a hold over from Catholic Spain's colonization, which the Dutch were fighting both at home and abroad. Curaçao was initially a strategic centre of trade and commerce that was used as a transshipment point and depot for African slaves bound for the Caribbean and the Americas (Postma, 1990:299). Hence, the islands of the Antilles began as a Dutch colony in 1634 under the governmental authority of the West India Company (Blakely, 1993:3).

In 1848, the islands of the Netherlands Antilles were separated from Suriname. Curaçao became the administrative capital with the rest of the Dutch islands as its dependencies or 'Curaçao and Dependencies'. The prominence of Curaçao as the administrative capital, and hence the centre of power and influence, has political ramifications that continue today. Suriname's plantation economy had its heyday in the 19th century. However, a larger presence of native Dutch deepened the influence of cultural, linguistic, and social ties to the Netherlands. This positioned the Surinamese as suppliers of teachers, favoured business middlemen, and managers for dispatch to Curaçao, Aruba, and other Dutch islands. Today's independent Suriname has Dutch as a commonly spoken and written language, which cannot be said of the Dutch islands that remain within the Dutch Kingdom.

### **Slave trade**

Dutch involvement in the slave<sup>7</sup> trade began in the 1630s. Curaçao was initially the main base in the Caribbean for the Dutch fleet and supply point for all ships en route from the Netherlands to the then Dutch colonies of Brazil and New Netherlands (Blakely, 1993). Curaçao and, later St. Eustatius, became major slave depots for the entire Caribbean and the Americas. According to Postma (1990), the Dutch are responsible for approximately five per cent of the total Atlantic slave trade (299,302). Although Curaçao



had some small crop production, Curaçao's, and to a lesser extent, Aruba's small size and landscapes were not conducive to agricultural production. Hence, Aruba did not experience any slavery of significance comparable to many other Caribbean islands.

Curaçao was known for better treatment of slaves, a higher proportion of freedmen, and a much smaller and more stable white population than Suriname which was the only real plantation economy in the Dutch empire (Blakely, 1993:30). The final abolition of slavery was not enacted until the Emancipation of 1863, many years after England (1834) and France (1848), because of controversy over the compensation due to be paid to former slave owners (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003:39). By the end of the 19th century, Curaçao had lost its significance for the Dutch with the waning of the slave trade. St. Maarten was still somewhat important for its salt deposits necessary for the vast Dutch fishing industry (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003:29–33).

As previously noted, Curaçao was a major slave depot and thus had a much larger number of slaves, Dutch and other Europeans with most of its native Indian population decimated or deported. A segmented and somewhat segregated society emerged with a black Catholic majority. White Protestants, Jews, and mixed race peoples were socially positioned between blacks and whites. In contrast, although there was a brief gold rush in the 19th century, Aruba was for the most part left to itself due to the perception of less productive land. This enabled Aruba to retain more of its native Indian population, which eventually mixed with Europeans to become a Euro-mestizo Catholic majority. The lack of riches sought by the colonizers kept these islands out of Dutch attention for some time until the 20th century.

### **Oil and economic empowerment**

The Netherlands interest in the Dutch islands began to change with Curaçao's and Aruba's capability to refine oil. The discovery of oil in Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela, and the opening of the Panama Canal in the 1910s were the major catalysts for a period of economic success. The close proximity of Aruba and Curaçao to Venezuelan oil and their connection to the Netherlands produced prosperity and economic emancipation for some time. The islands' deep harbours, unlike the more shallow harbours closer to the Venezuelan oil fields, were conducive to receiving large oil tankers. In the 1920s, Lago Oil Company (Esso/Exxon) and Isla Oil Company (Royal Dutch Shell) began to refine Venezuelan oil and ship it from Aruba and Curaçao to world markets. Additionally, the oil companies were concerned about the impact of the instability of several successive Venezuelan governments on the regional oil industry. This prompted the location of the oil refineries on the comparatively stable Dutch islands, which were protected by Dutch law and military. Aruba and Curaçao soon became areas of vital strategic importance. By the 1930s, Aruba and Curaçao once again became

of some importance to the Netherlands. Native Dutch were sent from the Netherlands to the colonies and, by 1936, Dutch became the only language of instruction in the schools (Van Hulst, 2000:96).

During the Second World War, Lago became a primary source for fuel and eventually the world's largest oil refinery (Baker, 1992:24). Many came to take advantage of this economic opportunity. After the opening of the oil refinery in 1919, the population of Aruba grew from 8,200 to 51,000 and that of Curaçao tripled to 102,000 in 1950 (Van Hulst, 2000:99). Exxon and Shell actively recruited foreign labour including Surinamese, immigrants from the Dutch and British Windward islands, and native Dutch from the Netherlands. Some argue that this was done because island 'natives' were perceived as lazy and others contend these foreign labourers were easy to control. Lago and Isla quickly became the most important employers on these islands and wielded enormous economic and political influence. On the island of Aruba, by agreement with the Dutch government, Lago had to provide their own medical facilities, recreation, and school for the children of their employees (Green, 1973:24).

The Dutch Caribbean developed pigmentocracies where power and status became merged with gradations of skin colour. As the Dutch islands gained autonomy, reflections of their racialized societies became part of their self-conceptualization. These were projected in their national constructions; that is, Aruba's self-promotion as a Euro-mestizo Indian population in contrast to Curaçao Afro-descended identity. Residential and social segregation that separated whites and non-whites persisted in both Curaçao and Aruba. The black British West Indians who came to live there were separated from the 'native' black and Euro-mestizo Indian populations. Exxon and Shell recruited the foreign labourers for purely utilitarian reasons and did not foresee them being incorporated into the local society and polity. Although there was great racial and ethnic diversity in Aruba and Curaçao, there were little prospects for the political incorporation of many of these people. Even the large and vocal presence of black British West Indians in the electoral polls did not ensure their political incorporation. The Dutch citizenship of the Dutch Windward islanders facilitated some of their integration but many other groups were forced to relocate due to a combination of racial factors and the lack of possession of Dutch citizenship during initial decline of the oil industry in the 1950s.

### **The Dutch Caribbean in the shadow of the Dutch East Indies colony**

Much of the relations between the Netherlands and Dutch Caribbean until the 1940s can be characterized as 'careless colonialism' (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003:57). This is because of its formulation in the 'shadow' of Dutch primary concern with its prosperous East Indies (Indonesia) colony. The Dutch Caribbean was ruled in a centralized manner up until 1951. Oostindie and Klinkers (2003) refer to the political centralization of decision

making in the Netherlands and the lack of enfranchisement of local populations:

Not until 1936 were Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles given new statutory regulations in which the measure of internal autonomy was generally broadened (again eleven years after this has happened in the East Indies in 1925). For the first time in history, a largely elected local Council was founded in the Antilles, the 'Staten of Curaçao'; in reality, no more than approximately five percent of the local population became enfranchised.

(Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003:61)

Until the Second World War, Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles were mostly administered in a colonial way, where the Governor headed the colonial administration, received instructions from the King in The Hague, had the power to override local councils, or states, and was not accountable to them. Moreover the local councils were not representative of the populations (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003:61). Vermeulen (2005) argues that Dutch colonial administrations were not very interested in seeing a democratic political system with a vibrant civil society develop, and notes that Suriname's first general election was not held until 1949 (151).

### **1954 *Statuut* (Charter) for the Kingdom of the Netherlands**

As a consequence of the devastating colonial war that resulted in the loss of its prized Indonesian colony in 1949 and with the process of decolonization going on around the world, the Netherlands initiated a 'model decolonization' process (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003:73). The Netherlands originally thought of this as a way to retain Indonesia and improve its international image. They granted their other colonies of the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname more autonomy and participation in the government. The Dutch government hoped this would lead to the gradual independence of their Dutch Caribbean territories. This resulted in the 1954 Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands or *Statuut* which gave the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname the status of integral and equal parts of the Kingdom with representation in the Hague. The 1954 *Statuut* represents the 'official end' of colonial relations. Defence, foreign affairs, and nationality were the only governmental functions left that were the responsibility of the Netherlands. De Jong (2005) notes:

After Indonesia pulled out of the Kingdom, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles reaped the fruits of the Netherlands' attempts to keep Indonesia on board. The West-Indian countries had been party to the Netherlands promise, broadcast on December 6, 1942, by Queen Wilhelmina in exile

in London, to de-colonize the Kingdom. The arrangements that were then conceived had not been meant for these much smaller territories. The Caribbean territories, however, would not budge on the concept of a free association of autonomous states as the heir to the colonial Kingdom and stuck to the original liberal terms of the Charter of the Kingdom-to-be. The Caribbean countries claimed autonomy, not independence. They aimed to be partners of an equal footing with the Netherlands and succeeded, at least on paper, when in 1954 a new Charter of the Kingdom was enacted. The Charter included the rule that any changes require the unanimous consent of the parties involved. The Netherlands gave in to the aspirations of these small states, believing at the time that there was neither much to gain nor much to lose. The empire was already gone. Moreover, the Charter was not meant for eternity; one day the Caribbean countries would become independent. (86)

Dutch island elites used and benefitted from the Indonesian debacle. They successfully negotiated more autonomy and equal standing while remaining in the Dutch kingdom. It is only with the 1954 implementation of the Charter did Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles have a system of parliamentary democracy with universal suffrage and a Dutch style of administration (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003:65). Up until the most recent constitutional reform, these political arrangements remained unchanged except for Surinam's termination from the *Statuut* with its full independence in 1975 and the 1986 confirmation of Aruba's 'status aparte' from the Netherlands Antilles. Hence the liberal context of the Charter or *Statuut* provided the basis for more autonomy as well as inclusion.

### **Curaçao's 'Trinta di Mei' – The May 1969 Uprising and Dutch Military Intervention**

The 1954 *Statuut* took effect during a period of decline at the end of oil sector expansion and increasing unemployment in both Curaçao and Aruba. The majority black population of Curaçao experienced the racially segregated society and the government of the white, Protestant-led, Democratic Party as a semi-dictatorship. This culminated in the 30 May 1969 revolt known as the *Trinta di Mei* in which the Netherlands militarily intervened in Curaçao under the *Statuut*. The events sparking the *Trinta di Mei*, in the Willemstad capital of Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles, was the result of a labour dispute between workers and management that was couched in a racialized class hierarchy with remnants that persist today. The uprising, which caused injuries, loss of life, and millions of dollars in property damage, was one of the manifestations of the May Movement that came to fruition in 1969 and mobilized striking workers. Wilson 'Papa' Goddett and Amador Nita of the original Frente Obrero Liberashon (FOL) were active in the May Movement.

The labour dispute was between the Curaçao Federation of Workers (CFW) and Werkspoor Caribbean (WESCAR), the main contracting company within Shell (Sharpe, 2009). The CFW wanted a wage agreement similar to one previously negotiated for Shell employees by another union. On 9 May 1969, the CFW led workers on a strike against WESCAR and this was joined by the Petroleum Workers Federation of Curaçao, and others against Shell. Godett and other leaders made speeches and led a crowd of thousands on a march from Shell headquarters to Fort Amsterdam, the seat of the government, calling for an overthrow of the government, which was seen to be partially responsible for the plight of workers. Godett was eventually shot and wounded and the crowd broke up, spreading through the downtown area setting buildings on fire and looting stores. On 30 May, a curfew was imposed for the weekend and soon the Dutch military arrived in Curaçao from the Netherlands to assist the police (Anderson and Dynes, 5–6).

Although some view this event as a labour revolt, others see it as an uprising against racism and oppression that ultimately resulted in Curaçao having its first black Governor Ben Leito and first black Prime Minister Ernesto Petronia and the opening of opportunity for black working-class Curaçaoans and Antilleans (Van Hulst, 2000:98; Sharpe, 2009). This event is widely regarded as pivotal in a transition from a mostly non-black minority ruling elite to a majority black dominated sometimes anti-*Makamba* (anti-Dutch) populist politics. The labor and racial unrest of 1965 on Curaçao, and Dutch military intervention under the Charter would prove to be key because of the then perception of ‘neocolonial’ action on the part of the Netherlands. In the midst of initial immigration from Suriname and Dutch efforts to stave it and be rid of ‘neocolonial’ imagery around its policies, the Dutch went with Suriname’s increasingly vocal nationalists and pushed for gradual independence of its Caribbean partners instead of ‘autonomy’. This played an important role in Suriname’s independence from the Dutch Kingdom in 1975 with the result of mass emigration to the Netherlands.

### **Aruba’s ‘status aparte’ – Aruba’s secession**

Many assert Aruba wanted separation from Curaçao and the Netherlands Antilles since at least the 1930s (De Jong, 2005). While the notion of secession began with Henny Eman, Sr in the 1930s this was passed down to his son Shon Eman, and then his son Henny Eman, Jr who was the leader of the Arubaanse Volkspartij (AVP) during the 1970s. Although the AVP pushed for separation, it was Betico Croes Movimiento Electoral di Pueblo (MEP) that broke away from AVP and dominated Aruban politics during the 1970s and 1980s. Elected and unelected Aruban political elites responded to the Curaçaoan revolt with suspicion and associated it with the ‘black power’ movement as opposed to the projected Euro-mestizo identity of Aruba. This provided the Arubaanse Volkspartij (AVP), Aruba’s pro-Dutch right-leaning

party, the momentum to intensify its decades old campaign for separation from the Netherlands Antilles. After a referendum in 1977, strikes and riots erupted in Aruba and the Dutch were compelled to reluctantly consider Aruba's desires for *status aparte* to be free of Curaçao's administrative centralism (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003:123).

The *Trinta de Mei* provided much of the impetus for Aruba to seek *status aparte* or separation under the leadership of Betico Croes who died suddenly before the granting of *status aparte*. This was negotiated under the condition that Aruba would become independent in 1996 but was eventually taken off the table. Ironically, the MEP party suffered an electoral defeat and so the first Aruban cabinet was headed by AVP's Henny Eman (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003:130). Indeed, this was a decades-long desire of several Aruban political actors on the right as well as the left. It should be noted that Aruban political activist 'Betico' Croes of the MEP party is normally credited 'as the father of the Aruban nation' because of his realization of Aruba's *status aparte* in 1986.

### **Aruban, Curaçaoan, and Dutch Antillean nationalisms**

Curaçao's *Trinta di Mei* and Aruba's *Status Aparte* are defining moments in the respective island nationalisms and as articulations of their national identities. Just as the Dutch invoke 'the struggle for freedom' against an oppressive ruler as its national founding myth (Lechner, 2008:68), Aruba as well as Curaçao similarly have theirs. This includes William of Orange battling Spanish Catholic domination, Curaçao's legacies of slave rebellion and Goddett and others fighting race and class oppression and Dutch coercion, and Aruba's harmonious marriage of Europeans and Indians with later Eman and Croes confronting Curaçao (Antillean) and Dutch control. For the other Dutch islands, at times this 'struggle' against oppression is more local against the larger island of Curaçao with Curaçao responding that it is 'struggling' with carrying too much of the burden of the smaller islands. At other times, the 'struggle' is directed at the Netherlands as an anti-Dutch populist politics. In these times of multicultural backlash, the Netherlands initiates and responds with its own populist 'struggles' against 'Antillean problems' of youth criminality and financial burden. These various invocations against an outside adversary are invoked on all sides to rally nationalist self-definition and solidarity.

The national identity claims of Aruba and Curaçao remind one of the discourse between the Dominican Republic and Haiti in terms of self-definition of white and indio in relation to blackness (Oostindie, 2006:8). In addition to wanting more control over their own destiny, Aruba's secession from Curaçao and the Netherlands Antilles was in part predicated on the premise that its population was not black and should not be dominated by black Curaçao. Aruba and Curaçao, as the two largest and arguably most

important islands, used their power relations relative to the Netherlands and played off one another's self-projections. Significantly, Aruba's *status aparte* was negotiated in contrast to Curaçao in the context of Dutch anxiety about being seen as simply colonizers or neocolonialists as well as the then numerous crises in the Republic of Suriname.

The 'national founding myths' of Aruba and Curaçao rely on a respectively Euro-mestizo, light skinned, more Latino Papiamentu speaking 'real Aruban' rhetoric of nation that, despite recent research showing the contrary (Alofs and Merckies, 2001; Alofs, 2007), has little to do with slavery or blackness. This is opposed to a proudly black slave descendant 'Nos bon yu di Korsow' (We the good children of Curaçao) 'Curaçaoan' notion of nationhood that is in large part defined by its 'native' black slave descendant population to the exclusion of white, lighter skinned, and some foreign black descendant members of its society (Oostindie, 2005; 2000). Aruba's national founding myth has to do with the island being settled by a marriage of the 'advanced' Europeans (Spanish and then Dutch) and noble Amer-Indians giving birth to the Papiamentu speaking 'real Aruban' nation in the absence of blacks or slavery. In contrast, Curaçao's national founding myth is that after the near elimination of the indigenous population and importation of African slaves, an oppressive and racist structure emerged. Valiant former slaves who engaged in slave rebellions and their descendants created a 'Nos bon yu di Korsow' blood line and Papiamentu speaking culture and island nation.

Hobsbawn (1990) writes about how nationalism was invoked in the once pending 'status aparte' or secession of Aruba from the administrative centralism of Curaçao as the capital of the Netherlands Antilles:

[A]ll movements seeking territorial autonomy tend to think of themselves as establishing 'nations' even when this is plainly not the case; and all movements for regional, local or even sectional interests against central power and state bureaucracy will, if they possibly can, put on national costume, preferably in its ethnic-linguistic styles . . . Aruba plans to break away from the rest of the Netherlands West Indies, because it does not liked to be yoked to Curaçao. Does that make it a nation?

(Hobsbawn, 1990:177-178)

It can be said that Curaçao and Aruba have many things in common. They share a Dutch colonial heritage and modern political and legal linkages to the Netherlands and Europe, as well as cultural connections with Latin America and the United States. They are just about 117 kilometres (73 miles) from one another and are limited in size and capacity in terms of geography, population, and natural resources. Arubans and Curaçaoans (along with the nearby Dutch Antillean island of Bonaire) have majority Catholic populations and share the distinction of being the world's only speakers of the

Papiamentu<sup>8</sup> language. However, as previously noted, for much of their more recent histories, there has been rather intense rivalry between the smaller Aruba and the larger Curaçao.

It can be said the Netherlands Antilles as a nation is formulated on a shaky colonial platform that never quite cohered. The Netherlands Antilles was a postcolonial creation of the Netherlands that was designed to be temporary and result in general independence. De Jong (2010) notes the 'Antillean maxim' that the Netherlands Antilles only exists in the Netherlands (160). Despite some linguistic affinity due to the shared languages of Papiamentu in the Dutch Leeward islands and English in the Dutch Windward islands, there is little in the way of common identity. The Leeward islands and Winward islands are quite different and a sizeable distance from one another. Each island has looked out for its own interest vis-à-vis Curaçao as well as the Netherlands. The lack of national cohesion of the Dutch Antilles is illustrated in the fact that it was not until the year 2000 that an Antillean national anthem was adopted. Moreover, my research suggests that there is not much of a sense of Dutch Kingdom consciousness in the Netherlands. There may be a bit more of it on the Dutch islands particularly with regard to their comparatively higher standard of living relative to their neighbours as well as the mobility and ease of travel afforded by their much valued Dutch passports.

Recent referenda on the islands demonstrate very little desire for independence (Oostindie, 2006). Thus, the people have used the voice given to them by virtue of the liberal democratic polity and international attention to negotiate legal attachment to the Netherlands with autonomy. De Jong (2005) notes, by the 1990s the political winds had changed to an emphasis on good governance and concern over the development of durable institutional structures (87). Anxieties have been raised about the islands vulnerability to drug trafficking and money laundering and the Netherlands responsibility not to leave the them in an unworkable situation. Hence, despite populist rallying cries to sell the islands or give them to Venezuela, Dutch liberal democratic norms and postcolonial responsibility do not allow the Netherlands to exit its relations in the Caribbean.

With new revelations about their histories, new immigrants, and the impact of globalization, these nationalisms and national identities continue to redefine themselves. Aruban and Curaçao nationalisms and national identity begin with Dutch colonialism and continue within the Dutch Kingdom's liberal democratic framework. Along with little sense of cohesive awareness in the Dutch Kingdom, the contemporary new Dutch nationalism that began to take form during the 90s seems far less accommodating of difference than in previous years. The presence of the Netherlands has vacillated over time in the Dutch Caribbean but now it must come to terms with the inclusion of its fellow Dutch citizens (*rijksgenoten*) from the across the oceans.



## **Events triggering migration to the Netherlands**

Despite famed Antilleans who were members of the Dutch resistance and killed during the World War II German occupation such as Curaçao born George Maduro<sup>9</sup> and Aruba born Boy Ecury, the Netherlands experienced little contact with fellow citizens from the Dutch Caribbean 'overseas countries' until the 1970s. The early 1960s marked the beginning of a shift from a small elite student migration to a labour force from the lower classes recruited by Dutch businesses from the Dutch Caribbean. An initial Dutch Caribbean mass migration occurred when half of Suriname's population migrated to the Netherlands around the time of its declaration of independence from the Netherlands in 1975. However, as previously noted, by the mid-20th century, Aruba and Curaçao had two of the world's largest oil refineries. The 1985 closing of the Lago (Exxon) and Isla (Shell) oil refineries in Aruba and Curaçao and the 1986 granting of Aruba's 'status aparte' from the Netherlands Antilles initiated a mass migration of poor and working class people from those islands to the Netherlands that has yet to cease. An early small elite, culturally assimilated, student migration, mostly from Suriname but including the Dutch islands, has been fairly well integrated into the Netherlands. It is important to note that because of the Netherlands' emphasis on local autonomy, island nationalisms, and the hope for future independence of these islands, funding for education and Dutch language instruction has fallen by the wayside in Curaçao and Aruba. As a result, unlike the different historical circumstances of the Surinamese that produced Dutch language as a vernacular in Suriname in addition to their native language of Sranan Tongo, many contemporary Dutch Antilleans and Aruban immigrants come to the Netherlands with poor education and little knowledge of the Dutch language and Dutch culture.

Key events prompting mass migrations of people from the Dutch Caribbean include:

- 1) The 1975 declared independence of Suriname, which resulted in half of its population's migration to the Netherlands around the time of the declaration;
- 2) The 1985 closing of the oil refineries in Aruba and Curaçao prompted the unintended consequence of a massive migration of poor and working class people to the Netherlands;
- 3) The 1986 conferment of the 'status aparte' of Aruba from the Netherlands Antilles.

By 2004, the main non-Western ethnic minority immigrant groups in the Netherlands consisted of the Turks (351,648), Surinamese (325,281), Moroccans (306,219), and Antilleans and Arubans (130,722) and their numbers, for the most part, would only increase.<sup>10</sup> From 1984 to 1999,

the number of Antilleans tripled to about 106,000 (Van Hulst, 2000:94). In 2000, about 117,090 first-generation Antilleans and Arubans and their second-generation descendants were living in the Netherlands (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003:179). Of the Surinamese descent population, in 1998, more than 105,000 comprised a second generation that was the product of Surinamese-Dutch relationships (Van Niekerk, 2000:69). The majority of these ethnic minority immigrant groups live in the *Randstad* area (Amsterdam, the Hague, and Rotterdam). All Antilleans, and some 90 per cent of the Surinamese descent population hold Dutch citizenship (Van Niekerk, 2000:69). Although Dutch government policy initially allowed in migrant guest workers from Turkey and Morocco during the 1970s and 1980s to do 3D (Dirty, Dangerous, and Demanding) jobs with the expectation that they would return to their countries of origin, eventually their families came to join them producing multiple generations of immigrant families in the Netherlands. Government policy has finally come to accept the permanent residency of many students and migrant labourers. These events have prompted new discussions about the status of the Dutch Kingdom, and the Dutch citizenship, migration, and political incorporation of Antillean postcolonial citizens and other non-Western ethnic minorities in the Netherlands.

### **Fennema and Tillie's (2001) political culture case for low Dutch Caribbean political incorporation in the Netherlands**

In this section of the chapter, I will present historical and contemporary evidence that the Dutch Antilles and Aruba were and continue to be 'civic' societies marked by high degrees of formal and informal political participation. In this way, it will provide the bases for a re-evaluation of Fennema and Tillie's (2001) argument of Dutch Caribbeans lack of 'civicness' in the Netherlands as a product of a political culture engendered by the legacies of colonialism and slavery in their countries of origin.

Since 1985, the Netherlands allows legally resident foreign nationals to vote in local elections thus enfranchising many Turkish and Moroccans legal residents. Antilleans, Surinamese, Turks, and Moroccans are recognized minorities with organizations eligible for government funding.<sup>11</sup> (Soysal, 1994:48–50; Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000:23) With the aim of measuring 'civicness' among ethnic groups in Amsterdam, Fennema and Tillie (2001) employ a network analysis of ethnic organizations. They build on Almond and Verba's (1963) notion of the relationship between 'civic culture' and political participation. As Tocqueville implied, they also maintain that the 'quality of democratic governance resides in voluntary associations' which can guard against bad governance and be training grounds for acquiring democratic practices (Fennema and Tillie, 2001:30). Advancing a social capital argument (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993), Fennema and Tillie (2001) contend that 'civic community building is the creation of trust

among organizations' (33). They draw on the assumption that a community of residents with a balanced mix of vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal (reciprocal) social relations have more of the social and political trust or 'civicness' necessary for the pursuit of collective goals, that is, local politics, trust in political institutions, and participation in elections.

The authors argue that Turks in Amsterdam displayed the highest degree of civic community when measured in terms of their many more voluntary and ethnic associations that are well connected through networks of interlocking directorates and ethnic newspaper readership. Their results indicate that the civic community, political participation, political trust, and transnationalism of the Turkish and Moroccan ethnic groups are much higher than that of Antilleans and Surinamese. For Fennema and Tillie (2001), the dual nationality and networks afforded by the transnational orientation of the Turkish group facilitates their political integration as opposed to the Dutch Caribbean groups' Dutch citizenship and limited transnationality. The authors found, despite Dutch citizenship and Dutch language ability, the Dutch Caribbean groups were the most unlikely to participate or demonstrate trust through voting or other forms of civic participation in Amsterdam (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2).

In an earlier study of the 1994 and 1998 Dutch municipal elections (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, The Hague, and Arnhem) Tillie (1998)

Table 3.1 Organizational and network indicators of civic community

Ethnic group	(1) Organizations in network	(2) Isolated organizations	(3) Number of interlocks	(4) Civic community
	N	As % of (1)	N	Index
Turks	89	46	62	4
Moroccans	82	39	45	5
Surinamese	70	71	12	9
Antilleans	35	80	8	16

Source: Fennema and Tillie, 2001.<sup>12</sup>

Table 3.2 Turnout at three Amsterdam municipal elections

	Turnout		
	1994	1998	2002
Turks	67%	39%	28%
Moroccans	49%	23%	22%
Surinamese/Antilleans	30%	21%	26%
Overall turnout	56.8%	45.7%	47.8%

Source: Fennema and Tillie, 2001; Tillie, 2004; Tillie and Slijper, 2003.<sup>13</sup>

Table 3.3 Voting for ethnic candidates 1998

Ethnicity of voter	Ethnicity candidate						N (100%)
	Dutch	Turkish	Moroccan	Surinamese	Antillean	Unknown	
Turkish	8%	83	2	1	–	6	1740
Moroccan	42	5	47	2	–	4	720
Surinamese	47	2	1	47	–	3	994
Antillean	84	1	3	6	1	5	118

Aggregate Data for Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, The Hague, Arnhem.<sup>14</sup>

Source: Tillie (1998).

found that Dutch Antilleans hardly supported co-ethnic or ethnic candidates and voted primarily for native Dutch candidates, and that Dutch Caribbeans as well as Moroccans were more inclined to espouse an anti-racist identity<sup>15</sup> (see Table 3.3). He speculates that ethnic cleavage plays a dominant role at the local level while ideological orientation may be more important at the national level and suggests further research.

Fennema and Tillie (2001) maintain that political culture attributed to colonialism and slavery can explain why Dutch Caribbeans in Amsterdam score consistently lower on their civic community index, participate less, and display less trust in political institutions (37). For them, the Turkish conception of nationhood is strong, religion provides them with shared values, and their political culture allows them to make strategic alliances. They argue:

We find comparable patterns of electoral turnout in Britain, where Indian voters have a higher voter turnout than white voters, while voters from the Caribbean countries have a substantially lower voter turnout (Saggar, 1998:55). Here as well as in the Netherlands, the explanation for the low participation of citizens from the Caribbean islands may be found in their history of colonialism and slavery. In a multicultural society there are large differences in civic organization, political organization and political trust among ethnic groups that may be well explained by the history of the country of origin.

(Fennema and Tillie, 2001:37)

In contrast, Miller (1989) explains the higher voter turnout of some Asian Indian groups in the United Kingdom as a product of their higher socio-economic status. One can draw a similar correlation between the poor and working class identity of some of the Antillean population in the Netherlands and their apparent lack of political incorporation. However, Fennema and Tillie (2001) contend that the greater integration of Turks in

the political arena and Surinamese in the labour and educational arenas in Amsterdam demonstrates that political integration does not necessarily correspond with other forms of integration. A look at relevant aspects of Curaçao (Dutch Antillean) and Aruban political histories can provide some insight.

### **Curaçao Dutch Antilles, and Aruba as civic societies?**

In spite of histories of colonialism, varying degrees of slavery, as well as dependence, my research suggests that Curaçao and Aruba had and maintain fairly vibrant civic cultures characterized by contentious elections and an active associational life. Although having to deal with the challenges of small islands, the indicators of contemporary liberal democracy are present on these islands including regular and peaceful democratic alternations of governing parties and coalitions, rule of law, independent judiciary, and guaranteed political and civil liberties. As for civil society, Alofs and Merkies (2001), Kalm (1975), Green (1969, 1974, 1983) and others note that many ethnic associations founded by immigrants from the British and Dutch West Indies and Suriname. They argue this was done in order to ease their integration into Aruba and Curaçao and to facilitate those somewhat divided societies to deal with their presence. Although distinctions have been made between 'bonding' (ethnic) and bridging (non-ethnic) social capital, Fennema and Tillie (2001) contend that ethnic communities become civic communities when involved in democratic processes. Tillie and Slijper (2003) maintain that both have a positive effect on participation in Amsterdam politics. So many people came from the British West Indies in the 1950s that there were more of them on the electoral polls in Aruba than in their home islands (Van Hulst, 2000:99). Some remained and have risen to political prominence. Aruban as well as Curaçaoan political elites have shown a great deal of political savvy. In line with local referenda, they continue to effectively negotiate the retention of their statuses as equal parts of the Dutch Kingdom, with Dutch citizenship and full mobility, as well as Dutch development aid.

Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles and Aruba and the Netherlands share the distinction of being 'plural societies'. Dew (2003) characterizes Antillean political culture as 'seriously fragmented and disorganized' (371). Although ethnicity remains an important factor in Antillean and Aruban politics and the Dutch media often portrays Curaçaoan as well as Aruban politics as corrupt and characterized by patronage, these Dutch islands display medium-to-high voter turnout, participation in local referenda and in civil society organizations (see Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6).

If we compare the voting statistics of Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles to those of national parliamentary voting statistics in the Netherlands (all

Table 3.4 Elections for Aruba parliament

Year	Total vote	Registration	% of turnout
1985*	37,033	43,393	85.3%
1989	36,465	43,054	84.7%
1993	40,240	45,680	88.1%
1994	39,986	46,848	85.4%
1997	45,327	52,752	85.9%
2001	48,565	56,617	85.8%
2005	51,990	60,635	85.7%

\*Note: Under the framework of the new constitutional status of Aruba ('status aparte'), the Island Council of Aruba elected on 22 November 1985 became the first Parliament of Aruba as of 1 January 1986.

Source: Statistical Yearbook 2006 Central Bureau of Statistics of Aruba.<sup>16</sup>

Table 3.5 Elections for the Parliament of the Netherlands Antilles

	Electorate	Number of valid votes	% of turnout
<b>Bonaire</b>			
1990	6235	5262	84%
1994	7079	5681	80%
1998	8376	6540	78%
2002	8376	5893	70%
<b>Curaçao</b>			
1990	112044	72925	65%
1994	112044	72207	64%
1998	126221	77228	62%
2002	126221	67151	53%
<b>St. Maarten</b>			
1990	N/A	8007	–
1994	N/A	8018	–
1998	14531	9195	63%
2002	14531	8096	56%
<b>St. Eustatius</b>			
1990	N/A	772	–
1994	1081	819	76%
1998	1236	965	78%
<b>Saba</b>			
1990	N/A	627	–
1994	N/A	588	–
1998	715	599	84%
2002	1058	N/A	–

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands Antilles.

Table 3.6 Results of elections for the island councils

	Electorate	# of valid votes	% of turnout
<b>Bonaire</b>			
1987	N/A	5463	–
1991	N/A	5295	–
1995	7479	5804	78%
1999	7479	6488	87%
2003	7699	5982	78%
<b>Curaçao</b>			
1987	111408	71210	64%
1991	111408	70508	63%
1995	120016	70977	59%
1999	120016	70562	59%
2003	N/A	N/A	–
<b>St. Maarten</b>			
1987	N/A	6788	–
1991	12304	8665	70%
1995	12861	9437	73%
1999	15190	10285	68%
2003	11055	N/A	–
<b>St. Eustatius</b>			
1987	N/A	841	–
1991	N/A	848	–
1995	N/A	944	–
1999	N/A	1093	–
2003	N/A	–	–
<b>Saba</b>			
1987	N/A	643	–
1991	N/A	608	–
1995	N/A	636	–
1999	727	566	78%
2002	N/A	N/A	–

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands Antilles.

of which use the same proportional list parliamentary system), there is not a wide divergence in the patterns of voter turnout (see Table 3.7 for the Netherlands).

Contrary to Fennema and Tillie's (2001) contention of the effects of colonialism and slavery on the 'civicness' of countries of origin, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has found that the former Dutch colonies of Indonesia, Suriname, and Aruba have by far the highest voter turnout of postcolonial states at 82% (see Figure 3.1).

Additionally, Curaçaoan and Aruban political ingenuity have provided them a much higher standard of living and level of participatory democracy

Table 3.7 National elections in the Netherlands

Year	Total turnout	Registration	% of turnout
1981	8,738,238	10,040,121	85.2%
1982	8,273,631	10,216,634	80.3%
1986	9,199,621	10,727,701	84.2%
1989	8,919,787	11,112,189	78.0%
1994	9,021,144	11,455,924	75.2%
1998	8,607,787	11,755,132	70.1%
2002	9,515,226	12,035,935	79.1%
2003	9,666,602	12,076,711	80.0%
2006	9,854,998	12,264,503	80.35%

Source: International Idea.<sup>17</sup>




Figure 3.1 Influence from previous colonial power and voter turnout<sup>18</sup>

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

VAP = voting age population.

than many of their neighbours.<sup>19</sup> In light of these facts, Fennema and Tillie's (2001) characterization of Dutch Caribbean civic culture seems somewhat unsubstantiated.

Fennema and Tillie's (2001) notion of limited Dutch Caribbean transnationalism as a product of a political culture engendered by colonialism and slavery is empirically problematic. In addition to the historical fact that Aruba did not experience significant slavery in comparison to other Caribbean islands, Oostindie and Klinkers (2003) identify postcolonial Dutch Caribbean groups as transnational communities (63). Van Niekerk (2002) describes the ways in which bills generated in Suriname are paid for electronically by relatives in Amsterdam. The description of 'transnational' certainly applies to the multi-identified and multilingual Antilleans in the Netherlands and their home countries.



Dominicans in the United States are an Afro-Caribbean group with a historical legacy of colonialism and slavery that are also described as 'transnational'. We will later explore the ways in which this transnationality has been facilitated by remittances and inexpensive and reliable communications and transport (Guarnizo, 2001:214). Poor and working class Dominicans in the United States and Turks in the Netherlands and their states have facilitated transnational political identities that have positively effected their political participation. By all indications, the Dutch Caribbeans are also highly 'transnational' but for reasons to be laid out in subsequent chapters this does not translate into a political transnationalism that facilitates political incorporation. Turks initially arrived as a mostly male population of 'guest workers', spread throughout a number of countries later to be joined by their families with the assistance of government sponsored family reunification programs. Although many Dutch Caribbeans came to the Netherlands as members of immigrant families and not as individual migrants, this provides little explanation for the apparent divergence in the development of immigrant political transnational networks (Vermeulen, 2005:153).

The Netherlands extension of citizenship rights did not anticipate the causes that precipitated Dutch Caribbean outmigrations to the Netherlands. In spite of a reputation for patronage and corruption in the Netherlands, Curaçao, Dutch Antilles and Aruba all maintain active participatory and associative civic cultures. Beyond political culture in countries of origin, what other factors explain the limited political incorporation of Dutch Caribbean groups in the Netherlands? What role, if any, does Kingdom status and citizenship play in formal and informal political processes? What about Dutch Caribbean political collaboration among themselves and with other groups? What limits or facilitates the political incorporation and political transnationalism of Antillean immigrants in the Netherlands? Subsequent chapters will provide explanations beyond political culture engendered by the legacies of colonialism and slavery in the Dutch Antillean and Aruban countries of origin.

# 4

## What Does Postcolonial Dutch Citizenship Mean in Political Terms? 1985–2008

Well, there's a legal context and a social context. I think, legally, of course, they (Antilleans) are just internal migrants, but socially they are seen as outsiders. Even someone from Limburg who moves to Friesland (within the Netherlands) will probably be seen as an outsider. But the fact that we come from 8000 kilometers away, by definition makes us outsiders, even though we have the same passport and the same citizen rights.<sup>1</sup>

There is a legal and societal context in which postcolonial Dutch Antilleans find themselves situated in the Netherlands. Shared legal citizenship implies a 'region of legal equality' (Brubaker, 1992:21) and 'full community membership' (Marshall, 1992:45) that should facilitate immigrant political incorporation. As integral parts of the Dutch Kingdom, the peoples of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are the only recent immigrant group that arrive in the Netherlands born and raised as Dutch citizens. They are also linguistic, social, and cultural outsiders as well as officially categorized ethnic minorities. Oostindie (2011) speaks of the advantages of postcolonial ties to the Netherlands, that is, Dutch citizenship and permanent right of abode, as a 'postcolonial bonus' for first generation postcolonial migrants (44–47). As in the French Antillean case (Beriss, 2004), Dutch Antilleans become Antilleans in the Netherlands and are lumped together with other immigrants and seen as part of the 'immigrant problem' in Dutch society (20–21). If political incorporation is difficult for Antilleans, advantaged with legal citizenship and some degree of familiarity with Dutch systems, it should be even more trying for others. Their experiences can signal the opportunities and limits to political space and inclusion for immigrants and ethnic minorities. This chapter addresses the political incorporation of Antilleans in the Netherlands.

In contrast to Japan, the Netherlands is widely regarded as a paragon of liberal democracy with traditions of tolerance, compromise, accommodation of

religious and ideological difference, immigration, and a more recent embrace of multiculturalism. Despite their 'postcolonial bonus' of Dutch citizenship, Antilleans in the Netherlands have been found to have the lowest levels of both formal and informal political incorporation of any foreign origin group (Buijs, 1986; Buijs and Rath, 1986; Rath, 1990; Fennema and Tillie, 2001; Jacobs and Tillie, 2004; Tillie, 2004). In contrast to the case in the French republic, most Dutch Antilleans residing on their home islands cannot vote in Dutch national elections from their home countries<sup>2</sup> but they use the same electoral system as the Netherlands. The Netherlands has a proportional representation party list electoral system, which is generally associated with multiple party representation, higher voter turnout, and better inclusion of women and minorities (Lijphart, 1984; 1994; 1999). Considering long-held assumptions about the consensual and accommodating political culture in Dutch liberal democracy,<sup>3</sup> one would assume that shared legal citizenship would lead to easier political incorporation when compared to other ethnic minority groups.

Many postcolonial immigrants retain the formal citizenship of the colonial host society as a consequence of the extension of citizenship 'as a form of ideological integration' (Castles and Davidson, 2000:55). Grosfoguel (2003) refers to formerly 'colonial' extensions of metropolises, for example, Puerto Rico and the Dutch Antilles, as 'modern colonies' because of the shared qualities of post-First World War formation, metropolitan citizenship, free mobility to the metropole, and access to rights and welfare from the metropolitan state (178,180). There are a number of studies that suggest that many postcolonial legal citizen immigrant groups are reluctant to participate politically in their host societies (Memmi, 1965; Fanon, 1968; Falcón, 1983; Miller, 1989; Crowley, 1996; Fennema and Tillie, 2001; Tillie, 2004). Crowley's (1996) comparative analysis of British and French immigration policies argues that 'formal rights are not sufficient to ensure the integration they grant immigrants'(8). Miller (1989) finds postcolonial citizens and non-citizens of immigrant origin participate disproportionately less in European political systems because 'they apparently do not feel sufficiently part of the political system to participate in it' (132). Fanon (1968), Memmi (1965), Essed (1991) Mielants (2009), and others note the debilitating impact of colonial oppression and racism. Others maintain that an 'adversarial subculture' or 'oppositional frame of reference' is produced that deters participation (Gans, 1992; Portes and Zhou, 1993). Beriss (2004) discusses how experiences with racism in France helped to spark French Antillean activism and demands for recognition and political representation (66).

The literature cites several reasons for the low political incorporation of Dutch Caribbeans ranging from class, unemployment, low socio-economic status, 'not feeling at home' and racism to a lack of 'civic community' due to a political culture engendered by the legacies of colonialism and slavery. A fairly common sentiment among some Antilleans (Curaçaoans) is *wij zijn*

*hier omdat jullie daar waren* (we are here [in the Netherlands] because you Dutch were there [in the Antilles and elsewhere colonizing and enslaving]). In other words, there is a notion of being 'owed' and now collecting an unpaid debt owed by the Netherlands for colonialism and slavery. Some blame the Dutch citizenship of the Antilleans as a disincentive to participation compared to non-citizen and naturalized citizen foreign groups. As pointed out in Chapter 3, Antilleans display fairly high levels of both formal and informal political participation on their home islands. Falcón's (1983) structural analysis of the high political participation of Puerto Rican poor and working class legal US citizens in Puerto Rico and their low political participation once they arrive in New York City sheds some light. He suggests several factors including patronage, registration procedures, party competition, population size, central versus peripheral location, legal sanction, media, level of modernization, and the nature of elections can explain the differential levels of political participation.

By 2008, the largest and most prominent *Niet Westers allochtoon* or 'non-Western', 'non-native Dutch' ethnic minority immigrant groups in the Netherlands were Turks (372,714), Surinamese (335,799), Moroccans (335,127), and Antilleans (131,841) out of 1,765,730 'non-Western' foreigners and a total foreign population of 3,215,416.<sup>4</sup> As a consequence of the minorities policy (*Minderhedennota*) of the 1980s, Antilleans, Arubans, Surinamese, Turks, and Moroccans are recognized minorities with consultative bodies and organizations eligible for government funding (Soysal, 1994:48–50; Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000:23). A minister of integration and immigration and a centralized policy of immigrant integration has the mission to integrate and 'improve the socio-economic position of disadvantaged ethnic minorities...and full and active citizenship' (Van Hulst, 2000:4). There was an early small elite, culturally assimilated student migration fairly well integrated in the Netherlands. However, the more recent group of young Antilleans immigrants (particularly Curaçaoans) that arrived in the Netherlands, many with limited education and insufficient knowledge of Dutch language and culture, has been spotlighted in Dutch media and political rhetoric. Antilleans residing in the Netherlands are often better socially and economically incorporated than other ethnic minority groups. However, these indicators of social integration do not seem to translate into politics. What explains the paradox of the Antillean 'postcolonial bonus' and low political incorporation in Dutch liberal democracy?

My research indicates fairly limited Antillean immigrant political incorporation at the national, local, and civil society levels in the Netherlands. A number of factors such as regime type, limited political opportunity structure, along with the difficulties of small group size, language, and a 'myth of return' hinder Antillean political incorporation in the Netherlands. The Netherlands more recent assimilationist oriented 'civic citizenship' regime (Brubaker, 1992:175–176) and state policies (Weiner, 1996:46) point to a

re-ethnicizing trend towards creating a civic atmosphere in which Antillean and other immigrants and ethnic minorities may feel out of place. The media's focus on a small number of criminal Antillean (Curaçaoan) youth has distorted the Antillean reality.

The political opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1994:85,86) in the way of the small size, low status, and fragmented nature of the Antillean groups in this proportional list electoral system and the unwillingness of Dutch political parties and unions to pursue relationships with these groups has limiting effects. The politicians and policymakers on the national and local levels that I interviewed expressed far more interest in the much larger Turkish, Moroccan, and other Muslim immigrant groups as actual and potential constituencies. Although ethnic minority representation improved with the change of the party system in 1994, by 2010 only three people of Antillean origin have been elected to Dutch parliament in Dutch history. No ethnic minority has ever been part of a Dutch Cabinet as a minister or, up until recently, in the upper house. Few Antilleans have been elected to city council positions, and as a group, they display surprisingly low voter turnout.

The ways in which civil society has been restructured via state incentives through the transformation of the system of government funding for ethnic minority groups from a 'minorities policy' to an assimilationist oriented 'integration policy' compounds and undermines Antillean organizing for political advocacy. Although a number of Antillean (Aruban) social cultural organizations exist, there are few dedicated to political advocacy and there is a lack of formal organizations with a common goal. By the time Dutch political parties and immigrants discovered one another in the 1990s, there was only a fragmented Antillean political identity and limited funding available for Antillean political advocacy organizations under the Integration Policy. Since 1994, some elite groups of Antilleans have come together in reaction to anti-Antillean legislation in order to address problems in their communities, but they remain somewhat disconnected from the more recent wave of more poor and working-class Antilleans. Additionally, lack of command of the Dutch language, relatively recent mass arrival, and the intention of many to return to the home islands limits Antillean interest in Dutch politics and makes this group less attractive to Dutch political parties and organizations. This, in turn, hinders outreach to the Antillean community, which affects voter turnout and representation and further compounds limited Antillean political incorporation.

All of this says much about the disconnect between rationales that fuel policies and the outcomes in terms of integration and immigrant political incorporation. The case of the political incorporation of the Antilleans in the Netherlands tells us much about the use of postcolonial immigration policies and the relational nature of the politics of formal citizenship. It demonstrates the ways in which symbolic politics around membership is instrumentalized at various times by both the state and informal political

actors for political or economic gain. Although the *Statuut* or 1954 Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands was established to improve the international image of the Netherlands following the loss of its Indonesian colony, it may have finally helped to promote a better understanding of Dutch colonial history in the Caribbean and the realities of an increasingly multicultural Netherlands.

### **The Netherlands: Emerging ‘ethno-republican’ conceptions of citizenship and state policies**

In the time since the beginning of the Antillean mass migration in 1985, the social and political environment of the Netherlands has changed. As pointed out in Chapter 3, there seems to be a grasping for a definition of Dutch nationalism and national identity formed in opposition to the main ethnic groups, particularly Islamic ones, such as Turks and Moroccans, as well as Antilleans. Even though they are a small group, in recent years, for the first time, Antilleans have become a source of parliamentary debate. As a consequence of the lack of education in the Netherlands about the history of Dutch Antilles and Aruba, many native Dutch people are not aware that the Dutch Antilles and Aruba are part of the Dutch Kingdom and consequently perceive Antilleans as ‘foreigners’ and not as internal migrants. Beyond legal inclusion through formal citizenship, there is little else to distinguish the group from other immigrants and minorities. High-level Antillean elites point out that even Dutch government officials are sometimes unaware that the islands are part of the Dutch Kingdom. The Netherlands recent assimilationist oriented ‘civic citizenship’ regime (Brubaker, 1992:175–176) and state policies (Weiner, 1996:46) have created an environment that further questions the inclusion of Antilleans.

Although the Dutch Kingdom has a primarily *jus sanguinis* basis for citizenship, it can also be classified as a ‘civic citizenship’ regime (Brubaker, 1992:175–176) because of its fairly open naturalization policy and ‘liberal’ traditions.<sup>5</sup> I argue that the Netherlands is a formal ‘civic’ citizenship regime but with a growing restrictiveness around citizenship. De Hart (2004) has characterized this as the development of an ‘ethno-republican’ conception of citizenship, which she indicates as the uniting of liberal-democratic principles with an ethnic conception of nationhood including an assumption of cultural assimilation (150). Howard (2006) has identified the condition in which a right wing government is mobilized on the issue of immigration and citizenship reform as a key issue in the restrictive developments in the Netherlands and other European countries (450). This applies to the Netherlands in the late 1990s and 2000s, when anti-immigrant sentiment and the later centre-right government of Christian Democrats (CDA) and Conservative Liberals (VVD) under populist right wing party pressure of the Pim Fortuyn movement had a role in shaping legislation.

The 1984 Dutch Nationality Act (progressive minded in the tradition of the ethnic minorities policy) made the right to opt for Dutch citizenship available for second-generation immigrants in the Netherlands. However, a change of the nationality act that was approved in 2000 made ‘civic integration’ courses and tests for naturalization mandatory for new immigrants. Many suggest that naturalization is no longer seen as a tool of integration but rather the outcome of successful integration. The reinitiation of the loss of a naturalized Dutch citizen original nationality upon naturalization was reintroduced in 1997 (van Oers et al., 2006:403,392). The effect of the more restrictive turn in access to citizenship is evidenced in the dramatic reduction in naturalizations after the 2000 nationality law took effect in 2003 (see Table 4.1).

The Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics records in 2003 a substantial reduction in the number of naturalized Turks and Moroccans. Whereas in 2003 some 3000 Turks and 6000 Moroccans were granted Dutch nationality, six years prior ‘ten times as many Turks were naturalized... and in the preceding three years almost twice as many (Moroccans) were granted the Dutch nationality’.<sup>6</sup>

In parliamentary discussion around naturalization, the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) expressed the sentiment of many when it emphasized the importance of Dutch citizenship in ethnic and cultural terms in its defence of restrictive naturalization with tests of language and knowledge of society. The 2000 Dutch Nationality Act entered into force 2003 and has a naturalization requirement of an exam consisting of a test of societal knowledge and a test of the ability to read, write, and speak Dutch along with five years of uninterrupted residence in the Netherlands prior to application. From 1998–2006, new residents from the ‘overseas countries’ (Dutch Antilles and Aruba) and elsewhere were obliged by law (1998- *Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers-*

Table 4.1 Naturalizations to the Dutch nationality, 1985–2004

1985	16,000
1986	12,000
1987	10,000
1988	7000
1999	58,000
2000	46,000
2001	43,000
2002	42,000
2003	25,000
2004	21,000

Source: Central Bureau voor de Statistiek, Voorburg/Heerlen 10 May 2007.

(WIN)/1998 Newcomer Integration Law) to attend a year long Dutch integration course consisting of some 600 hours of Dutch language instruction, civic education, and preparation for the labour market.<sup>7</sup> Although the law had some financial penalties for non-compliance, such as the withholding of welfare subsidies, the penalties were minor and rarely enforced by local governments (Joppke, 2007:6–7). The recent change of management of the integration policy area from the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to the Ministry of Justice is revealing. As in the Japanese case, it reveals integration now as a ‘primarily law and order affair’ (Joppke, 2007:7). An official in charge of integration policy from the Ministry of Justice talks about the prior requirements for Antilleans:

In 1997, when you had our first acts for the integration of newcomers in Dutch society, and then in Parliament there was some discussion because also the people from the Netherlands Antilles (and Aruba) not always knew or could speak the Dutch language, didn’t know enough about Dutch society, so that in Parliament there was an amendment on the Act that the Antilleans (and Arubans) were obliged also when they first came to the Netherlands to learn Dutch... from 1997 they were obliged – they were obliged to follow a course.<sup>8</sup>

This sends the signal that the assimilationist trend and integration as law and order is quite inclusive of Antillean fellow Dutch citizens. Additionally, the possibilities to lose the Dutch nationality have increased (Van Oers et al., 2006:414). The point has been made that the contents of the exam are not published and hence the government offers no opportunity to prepare for them (De Hart, 2004; Van Oers et al., 2006; Joppke, 2007). In March 2003 a leader of a project on the nationality act and a seminar to introduce the naturalization exam aid said: ‘one cannot study to be Dutch, one has to feel Dutch’ (Van Oers et al., 2006:415). I contend this ‘ethno-republican’ sentiment in the Netherlands ‘civic citizenship’ regime is indicative of prevailing attitudes and state policies.

### **De-ethnicization and Re-ethnicization**

Joppke (2003) and Bartolini (2000) argue that trends in immigration policy towards ‘de-ethnicization’ (easing access for all immigrants) or re-ethnicization (reinforcing ties with emigrants abroad across foreign born generations) is dependent on the ideological leaning of the government with the liberal left favouring ‘de-ethnicization’ and the conservative right opting for ‘re-ethnicization’ (Joppke, 2003:432). In this way, in addition to the tightening of the rules of naturalization and assimilationist turn, another indicator of the privileging of Dutch ethnicity in Dutch nationality is the change of Article 15c of the 1984 Dutch Nationality Act (*Rijkswet van het Nederlanderschap* (RWN) in 2000 to allow foreign born former Dutch



nationals (born to at least one Dutch parent) who have lived in the country of their birth for ten or more uninterrupted years and have the nationality of that country to regain the Dutch nationality.<sup>9</sup> While dual nationality is being restricted for the second generation and those who have naturalized on the grounds that it restricts integration, it is being encouraged and facilitated for former Dutch nationals who regain the Dutch nationality with the rationale that they do not have integration problems (Van Oers et al., 2006:407). As one MP from the CDA (Christian Democrats) remarked, 'still the idea of many (native) Dutch people is that Dutch people are blue-eyed blond people'.<sup>10</sup>

This reification of Dutch ethnicity in the Dutch citizenship regime along with several state policies reflect attitudes and a trend towards the re-ethnification of Dutch citizenship with an assimilationist agenda that provides limited space for the recognition of Antillean and others. These can act as impediments to Antillean sense of belonging and political incorporation.

### *Allochtoon and autochtoon*

Another indicator of the change of attitudes and assimilationist turn in 1990s Dutch state policy with emphasis on integration is the government's classification and use of the terms *allochtoon* and *autochtoon*. *Allochtoon* is a term that some regard as derogatory and roughly translates as something to the effect of 'non native', referring to those of foreign background who are born outside of the Netherlands or those born in the Netherlands to one or two foreign born parent(s)' (Van Hulst, 2000:20). The term *autochtoon* refers to the 'native Dutch' or those people whose parents were both born in the Netherlands regardless of where they themselves were born.<sup>11</sup> Entzinger (2003) argues that the rationale of using the term *allochtoon* is that it can more readily identify individuals rather than communities, relieve the task of deciding which groups qualify for certain policy measures, as well as to do to measure the development of the offspring inter-ethnic marriages (Entzinger, 2003:73). However, many protest the use of the terms as a means of negative classification and indicator of second-class citizenship.<sup>12</sup>

Some argue it is unconscionable that despite their *jus sanguinis* birthright status of legal Dutch citizens, Antilleans are classified and statistically counted by government agencies in the Netherlands as *Niet westerse allochtoon* or non-Western *allochtoon*. Non-Western *allochtoon* are those whose first- and second-generation ethnic background is from the Dutch Antilles, Aruba, Surinam, Turkey, Africa, Latin America, or Asia.<sup>13</sup> The term *allochtoon* becomes even more an indicator of second-class citizenship when one considers that the term *Westerse Allochtoon* or Western *allochtoon* includes most Western European countries, North America, Oceania as well as Japan and Indonesia and hence is a socio-economic and cultural rather than a geographic categorization.<sup>14</sup> *Allochtoon* usually implies 'Non-Western *allochtoon*' and people classified as 'Western *Allochtoon*' are rarely referred

to as such in the media or in popular discourse. De Hart (2004) notes that even naturalizing immigrants remain *allochtoons* and hence, 'they still did not belong to the Dutch >Us< (De Hart, 2004:161). A staff member from *Stichting Overlegorgaan Caribische Nederlanders* (OCAN) (Consultative Body of the Caribbean Dutch) talked about the classification of Antilleans as '*allochtoon*'.

In Holland, they (Antilleans) are, and as well by politicians, by politics, by the average person, they are seen as foreigners. Well, they (Antilleans) are seen as *Allochtoon*, and it doesn't matter. And if you want to know how they think of the Antilleans, check for instance, *Telegraaf* newspaper, (Dutch national daily newspaper) oh, it's horrible. They (the native Dutch) don't see them or most of them, they don't consider them as Dutch. They see them as foreigners.<sup>15</sup>

The use of the word '*allochtoon*' to classify co-citizens adds to the ambivalent political reality of Antilleans. As previously indicated, for non-Dutch nationals, these types of courses and now tests are the path to gaining Dutch citizenship. Although Dutch citizens, Antilleans are in the category of non-Western *allochtoon* and were part of the target group of the (1998 – *Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers* – (WIN)/1998 Newcomer Integration Law) and hence were obligated. However, Western *allochtoon* citizens from the European Union are exempted (because it would be considered discrimination on the basis of nationality) and the citizens of most OECD countries such as the US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Japan are exempted through bilateral treaties (Joppke, 2007:19–20).

### **Remigration policies**

Remigration policies are among several measures that have the capacity to heighten notions of inclusion and exclusion. The remigration policies are a revision of the former Emigration Act of 70 years earlier that provided some assistance to Dutch nationals who wanted to leave the Netherlands due to the then poor economic situation, housing shortages, and high birth rate. The Repatriation scheme came into force in 1985 and the Repatriation Act came into effect in 2000 and administered nationally through though the *Nederlands Migratie Instituut* (Netherlands Migration Institute).<sup>16</sup> The Act targets people age 45 and older from certain minority groups and their descendants (for example, those from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam) as well as refugees and asylum seekers and supports their return to their country of origin. There are two aspects of the Act: a Basic Provision (*Basisvoorziening*) and a Remigration Provision (*Remigratievoorziening*). The Basic Provision consists of a once-only allowance for travelling expenses to and within the country of destination, luggage expenses, and living costs during the first two months of resettlement. The Remigration Provision entails a monthly

benefit for recipients who are 45 years or older and can cover other expenses depending upon family composition and standard of living in the country of destination.<sup>17</sup>

Among the conditions for provisions is that one must be of a nationality other than the Dutch nationality or if one has both the Dutch nationality and another nationality they must renounce the Dutch nationality, and not already made use of the Act.<sup>18</sup> Although Antilleans and Arubans are not currently eligible because of their Dutch nationality, there was a period of assistance from 2001 through 2004, when they were included based on the premise that a number of these immigrants would wish to go back to their home countries and start businesses.<sup>19</sup>

The Director of the Netherlands Migration Institute spoke about the Act as it related to Dutch Antilleans and Arubans:

This was a special program only for Antillean and Arubans. But because they are Dutch citizens, they can come back any time they like. And that's not the intention of the Act; the intention is to support people to immigrate and *stay there (my emphasis)*, if they want. So it was, it was very, very difficult to control that ... there was a special program. They (Antilleans and Arubans) can't make use of the Remigration Act, but there was a special program because there are many problems in the big cities.<sup>20</sup>

The Act, in effect, pays multigenerational ethnic minorities to renounce their Dutch nationality and return to their country of origin. In its description of this Repatriation Act, the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations claims:

The Netherlands is unique in possessing a Repatriation Act. It is the only country in the world with legislation that facilitates both the integration (Newcomers Integration Act) and the repatriation of migrant. According to the (former) Minister for Urban Policy and Integration of Ethnic Minorities, the Repatriation Act has 'fully emancipated migration policy'.<sup>21</sup>

These attitudes reflected in the Dutch citizenship regime and state policies point to an increasingly assimilationist direction that has shaped the political opportunity structure for much of the Antillean communities.

### Political opportunity structure

Changes in the Netherlands political opportunity structure have opened up access to participation for some excluded groups but not necessarily Dutch Antilleans. I use Tarrow's (1994) notion of political opportunity structure<sup>22</sup> to describe the Netherlands' political system or political resources *external*

to Dutch Antillean communities and not purely its original sense of collective action or social movement. Tarrow (1994) notes the possible changes in political opportunity structure as 'the opening up of access to participation, shifts in ruling alignments, the availability of influential allies, and cleavages within and among elites' (Tarrow, 1994:86). I look at the Netherlands formal liberal democratic political system at the national and local levels and note changes that have opened and closed access to participation.

The Dutch parliament consists of the *Erste Kamer* (First Chamber) and the *Tweede Kamer* (Second Chamber). The Second Chamber is by far the more important of the two houses. It has the sole right to initiate legislation and amend bills submitted by the Council of Ministers. It shares with the First Chamber the right to question ministers and state secretaries. The First Chamber is composed of 75 members indirectly elected for four-year terms by the 12 provincial legislatures. It cannot initiate or amend legislation, but its approval of bills passed by the Second Chamber is required before bills become law. The First Chamber generally meets only once a week, and its members usually have other full-time jobs. The Second Chamber consists of 150 members, elected directly for a four-year term – unless the government falls prematurely. The elections use a proportional party list system where members are elected on a party slate or list of candidates and those elected represent the entire country.

The proportional representation system facilitates a diversity of political parties contesting elections with ideological orientations ranging from left to right as well as particularistic parties such as the *Verenigde Senioren Partij* (United Seniors Party), the *Partij van de Dieren* (Party for the Animals), and many others. During Second Chamber elections, the Netherlands is divided into 19 electoral districts allowing parties to put up candidates who are well known in particular regions but the votes cast for each party in each district are ultimately counted all together.<sup>23</sup> The proportional system is used in all Dutch democratic bodies. It can take as little as 0.66 per cent of the national vote for parties to gain a seat in the *Tweede Kamer* or Lower House. There is no threshold for small-party representation. Hence, the electoral system makes for multiple political parties where coalition governments are the norm.

Prior to 1966, Dutch politics and society was deeply divided and characterized by *verzuiling* or a system of pillarization in which society was divided into various pillars or '*zuiling*' with their own organizations that had little contact, most notably Catholics, Protestants, Liberals, and socialists (Lijphart, 1968). The Dutch institutions of 'pillarization', 'consensual', and 'consociational' democracy noted for compromise, power sharing, and the granting of some autonomy to groups, that is, Protestants, Catholics, Liberals, and Socialists traditionally maintained a high level of democracy in this once deeply divided society (Lijphart, 1968; 1979; 1999; 1969). This 'consociational democracy' (Lijphart, 1975) was characterized by a fragmented political culture with cooperation among the political elites of the

various subcultures. When pillarization began to break down after 1966, a period of conflict ensued and some of these parties began to merge to gather more votes. 1994 was a pivotal year because it marked the first time in 90 years that a cabinet was formed without a Christian democratic party. The cabinet was formed by a 'purple coalition' government of PVDA (social democrats), VVD (Conservative liberals), and D66 (progressive liberals).

For Lijphart (1999), consensual democracies, such as the Netherlands, are the superior type of democracy and most appropriate for plural societies with many cleavages. He maintains that consensual democracies score higher when it comes to the quality of their democracy as characterized by their 'kinder and gentler policies', including social inclusiveness of minorities and women, fewer people in prison, and better welfare services (Lijphart, 1999). Proportional representation is argued to be fairer than majoritarian methods in translating popular support for political parties into legislative seats, helping small parties, enhancing voter choice, and supporting higher voter turnout (Sodaro, 2008:215). Norris (2005) finds that Dutch proportional representation exemplifies the pattern of consensus democracy with regard to the 'inclusiveness' of women and minorities but she cautions that it may not serve women and minority groups in the same way.<sup>24</sup> She suggests other measures for ensuring diversity such as the use of statutory quotas regulating the candidate selection processes in all parties and/or reserved seats.

### **Dutch Antillean and Aruban ethnic minority participation/representation and political opportunity structure**

The number of ethnic minority members in Dutch parliament since 1985 reveals that ethnic minority representation was quite poor up until 1994. Since the 1994 change of the party system, ethnic minority representation has become progressively better and by 2003 was in proportion to the population with 10 per cent of the Lower House of foreign origin (Table 4.2). However, Antilleans have not often been elected to the lower house. Only three persons of Antillean origin (all Curaçao born) were elected in Dutch history up to 2008 (Table 4.2). In 1994, Herbert Fermina became the first Antillean elected to Dutch parliament in Dutch history. He was elected with D66 during the dramatic change of the party system in 1994 but was not re-elected in 1998. John Leerdam, artist, writer, and first Afro-Caribbean chair of the PVDA in Amsterdam, was the second Antillean elected to Dutch parliament in 2003 and first to be re-elected in 2006.<sup>25</sup> Cynthia Ortega-Martijn of the *ChristenUnie* (ChristianUnion) was also elected in 2006 and is apparently the first Antillean born woman to be elected. Hence, there were only three Antillean born politicians elected to the Second Chamber since 1985.<sup>26</sup> No ethnic minorities have been part of a Dutch cabinet as ministers. This held the same as well as in the First Chamber for some time (Keuzenkam and Merens, 2006:249).<sup>27</sup>

Table 4.2 Number of ethnic minority group members in the Second Chamber/Lower House

	1986	1989	1994	1998	2002	2003	2006
Turks	0	0	0	2	2	3	4
Moroccans	0	0	3	3	4	2	3
Surinamese	0	0	2	3	3	4	3
Antilleans/Arubans	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
Molukkans	1	1	1	1	0	n/a	n/a
Others	0	1	1	2	2	3	n/a
Total	0	2	8	11	11	13	12

Source: Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands.<sup>28</sup>

Antilleans have the lowest formal and informal political participation and representation when compared to other ethnic minority groups as well as the native Dutch (Rath, 1983; 1988a; 1988b; Pieters, 1984; Tillie, 1998; Fennema and Tillie 2001). With as little as 0.66 per cent of the vote needed to gain a seat in the lower house, this seems a bit perplexing. Tillie (1998) speculates that ideological orientation may be more important at the national level and ethnic cleavage more dominant at the local level and suggests further research. Castles and Davidson (2000) argue that formal political rights do not guarantee political participation for minorities in a marginal economic situation. They contend that the quantitative status of minorities may exclude them from effective political participation and use the example of the formal citizenship and low voting participation of impoverished African-Americans. The authors argue that this is the result of the sometimes mutually reinforcing criteria of exclusion based on socio-economic position and minority status. They contend this may lead to a situation in which minorities have limited access to information, media control, or are excluded because of language and lack real opportunities for participation which translates into a 'social exclusion' that often means 'political powerlessness' (Castles and Davidson, 2000:108–109)

### Economic and social indicators

The overall socio-economic situation of Antilleans is not particularly worse than other ethnic minorities and in fact often better but it is frequently quite different from the native Dutch. Antillean unemployment was at 14.5 per cent in 2004, Surinamese 10.6, Moroccan 17.5, and Turkish 14.3 compared to the native Dutch rate at 4.2.<sup>29</sup> According to *CBS Nederland*, Antilleans had an average income household income of 28,960 Euros in 2004 as opposed to Surinamese (36,040); Turks (34,820), Moroccans (32,920) or the native Dutch (47,400). A government study reports that one-quarter of first generation Antillean (including Arubans) and Surinamese migrants are

living on social benefit compared with one in ten in the second generation.<sup>30</sup> However, the same study notes that a higher proportion of Antilleans and Surinamese, compared to Turks and Moroccans, can be counted among the middle class.<sup>31</sup> Despite one-third of young Surinamese and Antilleans (including Arubans) being unemployed,<sup>32</sup> Antilleans and Surinamese as a whole are doing fairly well compared to other ethnic minorities on measures of education, labour market participation, and unemployment. Ethnic minority intermarriage with native populations is often cited as an indicator of integration. Although Surinamese and Antillean single parent families often live on social benefits, it is also of note that more than 40 per cent of the marriages of Surinamese and as many as 60 per cent of Antillean (including Arubans) marriages are to an indigenous Dutch person compared to 'just over 10 per cent of Moroccans and Turkish marriages'.<sup>33</sup> However, these indicators of social integration do not seem to translate into politics.

### **Attitude of Dutch parties**

There appears to be a lack of commitment of Dutch political parties to the Dutch Antillean communities that suggests their small size and status in the political opportunity structure. If anything, the political parties' priorities lay with the very large and potentially key constituencies of Muslim ethnic minority groups such as the Turks and Moroccans and not the Antilleans. In 2006, the electorate of non-Western ethnic minorities was 1,120,000 out of a total electorate of 12,455,000 in the Netherlands<sup>34</sup> (see Table 4.3). Rath (1983; 1988a) notes the distance between political parties and immigrants and specifically speaks to the passivity of Dutch political parties to recruit Antilleans, Surinamese, and other immigrants. Entzinger (2003) sees the more recent increase in representation of Dutch citizens of immigrant origin in Dutch parliament as evidence of the increasing attractiveness of ethnic candidates that don't scare away native Dutch voters (Joppke and Morawaska, 2003:66). Size and status of the Antillean communities in comparison to other ethnic minority groups tells us much about the lack of political party prioritization.

*Table 4.3* Breakdown of non-Western ethnic minority electorate

Turkey	235,000
Suriname	235,000
Morocco	195,000
Antilleans and Arubans	85,000
Other countries (Iran, Iraq, China, Somalia, etc.)	370,000
Total	1,120,000

*Source:* Dutch Centre for Political Participation.<sup>35</sup>

The comments of several politicians around their party's interest in the Antillean communities are quite revealing. Although the centre-left D66 was the first party to have an Antillean elected to parliament on their list, it has waxed more to the right as the Netherlands has moved to centre-right, especially on the issues of immigration and integration. In 2005, D66 helped to draft legislation with the former right leaning anti-immigrant minister Rita Verdonk, former Minister for Immigration and Integration, of the VVD to require that troubled, specifically Antillean and Aruban, youth, who either committed a crime or were not employed within a few months be deported to their home islands. This was eventually found to be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and not to be feasible because of the Dutch citizenship of Antilleans and Arubans. However, the effort reflects a mood within the Netherlands and D66. An MP from the VVD, formerly of the right leaning populist *Leefbaar Nederland* (Liveable Netherlands) remarked that his party does not recruit Antilleans like the PVDA or CDA, compared the small size of Antillean groups and their 'overrepresentation in violent crime' and linked this to their low political participation.

**Q: Does the VVD actually go out to recruit Antilleans and Arubans?**

I think that the most important reason that they [Antilleans] are not very well represented over here is that they are small in number, that they are still a small group when you are looking to the other groups. Yes, they are over-represented in violent crime, the Antilleans.<sup>36</sup>

Although it was not the first party with an Antillean in parliament, many regard the PVDA as one of the most open parties to immigrants and ethnic minorities. The PVDA promoted on its list John Leerdam, the second Antillean to be elected and the first reelected to parliament. There is clearly a distinction between being chosen to be on an electoral list and the unusual possibility of being re-chosen to appear on the list. Rath (1990:145–146) shows that immigrants at least initially prefer social democratic parties, like the PVDA, because they are usually part of the working class and many tend to believe that they are more supportive of immigrant interests. Entzinger (2003) (in Joppke and Moraskawa, 2003) notes most immigrants in the Netherlands tend to vote for the left political parties (Entzinger, 2003:66). Rath (1988a) (Rath in Cross and Entzinger, 1988) and Entzinger (2003) point out the attractiveness of Christian parties to the Islamic communities. By 2004, the three main political parties, the PVDA, CDA, and the VVD, show varying degrees of interest in and attractiveness to immigrant and ethnic minorities.

Another dynamic in several parties is the placing of ethnic minorities far down the electoral list ballot in 'ineligible' (Rath, 1988a) positions or in positions for which they could not possibly be allocated a seat. For the most part,



this is an attempt to avoid the label of discrimination or simply tokenism. A female member of parliament of Surinamese origin from the centre right CDA remarks about discrimination and being put on the list:

We have now 75 people on the list. And, so I was number 8 four years ago, and that is when they really want to show hah, we have someone from whom we expect a lot. And now I'm number 14. Which is also very high, because the first 15 are very high on the list. I'm even higher on the list than some of our people in government. **Q) And did you experience any discrimination yourself when you come on the list?** Yes, always. No, it's part of life. You know I was put very high on the list; I was number eight and I was not working for years, like many people in political affairs in my party. So many people did not know me. So many people said, 'Who is this black woman? We have never seen her, why is she number eight? What's so special about her?' so that makes it many people up until today find it very important to let me feel that I am just a simple black woman and I do not think that I have some special capacities.<sup>37</sup>

The MP went on to point out the necessity of parties noticing the importance of Surinamese and Antillean participation. She notes that what is important for participation is both personal initiative and the *space* and opportunities one gets in political parties.

I think it has to do with the personal urge to really do something about it, and secondly, the chances you get and the space you get in political parties.<sup>38</sup>

An Antillean origin PVDA politician blames the political parties themselves for the lack of Antillean involvement, participation, and representation due to the small size of these constituencies and prioritization of Turkish and Moroccan communities on both the national and local levels.

It is basically the cause of the political parties themselves; they do not make any effort to help the Antilleans or the Arubans to participate in the political process. But they have been Moroccanized now and in the last elections for the city councils, they were little, little, very little, Antillean and Suriname candidates. And in the last parliament elections, in my political party the Labour Party, PVDA, there were nearly two black candidates from Curaçao. I think that political parties are not aware of, they are not well aware of the effect they have. And I believe that the leadership of the party should intervene in this and fight.<sup>39</sup>

Tillie's (1998) analysis of the role of ideology at the national level seems to be confirmed by my research. However, it appears that the size and status of the group are definitive in the attractiveness of political parties to promote ethnic minority candidates and participation from those groups. Antilleans are now represented in proportion to their population on the national level but their size and status produces less interest in their representation and participation from political parties. There is a general assumption by political parties that ethnic minority candidates can in some way represent their respective groups. Antillean and Surinamese parliamentarians meet periodically to discuss issues. Despite some civil society group efforts among communities and a consultative structure for ethnic minorities, there appears to be little of in the way of collaboration. Oostindie (2011) suggests 'a postcolonial background provides less and less grounds for political organization' (20). This has much to do with old colonial rivalries among the Antilleans, Arubans, and Surinamese, strong island identities that work against a consistent Antillean identity, as well as mutual distrust of the Moroccan and Turkish communities that endure and work against collective action.

### **Local government**

It can be said local government is the place where Antilleans and other ethnic minorities and immigrants engage government authority on a daily basis. As a consequence of the Minorities Policy's goals of establishing equality before the law, since 1985 foreign residents who have been legally resident for five years or more have the right to vote in municipal elections<sup>40</sup> (Van Hulst, 2000; Entzinger, 2003:65). A look at local government can say much about the political opportunity structure for Antilleans in relation to other ethnic minorities. Notably, although the conditions for voting and to be a representative in parliament are tougher because they require Dutch citizenship, the proportion of ethnic minorities in the lower house is still greater than in the municipal councils (Keuzenkam and Merens, 2006:248).

Many local initiatives in the way of consultative voice and programmes to encourage the political participation of minorities (Rath, 1988b:629; Rath, 1990:148) have been discontinued with the change from the Minorities Policy to the Integration Policy. Several local governments have abolished formal consultation with advisory councils of ethnic minorities, with the rationale that many of these were previously dominated by the first generation immigrants who were out of step with the demands of the second generation communities (Van Hulst, 2000:24; Entzinger, 2003:78) I investigated Antillean political incorporation in the local governments of Amsterdam (Province of North Holland), The Hague (Province of South Holland), and Rotterdam (Province of South Holland), in the urban centre known as the *Randstad*, all chosen because of sizeable Antillean and other

ethnic minority populations. In each of these cities, ethnic minorities from the four major groups comprise a minimum of 25 per cent of the population, with Antilleans making up between 6 and 13 per cent of the 4 major ethnic minority groups and 1.5 to 3 per cent of the total population of each city. One in three residents of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and the Hague are members of non-Western ethnic minorities<sup>41</sup> (Gijberts, 2004:16). Hence, there is a concentration of non-Western immigrants and ethnic minorities in the *Randstad* area and this should have consequences for their political incorporation.

### Local government structure

A look at local government structures assists understanding the political opportunity structure at the local level. The Netherlands is divided into twelve provinces with the central, provincial, and municipal governments as the three tiers of government. The local authority (municipal authority) is seen as the most important level of government below the national government in the Netherlands. The local council is the highest level of Dutch local government. A municipal authority consists of a council, mayor, and an executive, which is made up of the mayor and an aldermen (*wethouder*). Municipal councils are elected by local residents for four-year terms. The municipal executive is the executive branch of the local council. Aldermen are elected by and from the local council. The size of the council and number of aldermen is dependent on the size of the population. Although the local council is a formalized system, it is often bypassed by the informal relations of aldermen, civil servants, and interest groups who are connected through other arrangements (Hendriks, 2001). The provinces are responsible for the administrative oversight of the local government. Provinces and municipalities are considered tiers of local government along with local water boards, which are responsible for local water management.<sup>42</sup>

Ethnic minority political participation tends to lag behind the native Dutch. This is evidenced by the low Antillean political incorporation in these local governments. Rath (1988b; 1990) points out that even government programmes developed during the time of the Minorities Policy to encourage the political participation of ethnic minorities were not often successful (Rath, 1988b; Rath, 1990:148). As local government is closer in proximity to the people and the Netherlands has the same proportional list system as their home islands, one would expect Antillean participation to be just as high or higher than other ethnic minority groups. Most Dutch Antilleans resident on the islands cannot vote in Dutch national elections. As a consequence, I argue the general knowledge of first generation Antilleans of Dutch politics tends to be limited. Antilleans do not yet have enough of a shared political identity to present a formal cleavage in politics. As is the case on the national level, political opportunity structure, small size and low status, perceived language barrier, length of residence, and myth of return make Antilleans

less attractive than other groups to political parties and limits their political incorporation. A look at voting for municipal elections in Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam is quite revealing (see Tables 4.4 and 4.5). Although voter turnout was generally lower than the other groups for Antilleans and Surinamese between 1994 and 2002, with the exception of The Hague, it is significantly higher in Amsterdam in 1994 for all groups, and for Turks in particular. While voter turnout for Moroccans drops in Amsterdam between 1994 and 2002, it stays the same in The Hague, and increases in Rotterdam for all groups (see Table 4.4). The number of city council members between 1986 and 2002 increases for all groups except for Antilleans where it drops from a high of 8 in 1998 to 5 in 2002 (see Table 4.5). As shown by Tillie (1998), in 1994 and 1998, Antilleans and Surinamese tended to vote PVDA, D66, and *Groenlinks*.

Table 4.4 Ethnic minority turnout for municipal council elections, 1994, 1998, and 2002 (in per cent)

	Amsterdam			The Hague		Rotterdam		
	1994	1998	2002	1994	1998	1994	1998	2002
Turks	67	39	28	–	36	28	42	54
Moroccans	49	23	22	–	23	23	33	39
Surinamers/Antillean	30	21	26	–	27	24	25	28
Overall turnout	57	46	48	58	58	57	49	55

Source: Social Cultural Planning Office.<sup>43</sup>

Table 4.5 Number of municipal council members by ethnic minority group 1986–2002

	1986	1994	1998	2002
Turks	14	32	74	113
Moroccans	4	7	21	26
Surinamers	19	21	33	36
Antilleans/Arubans	1	1	8	5
Moluccans	2	7	7	6
Others	7	5	6	18
Total	47	73	149	204
As a percentage of the total number of all municipal council members	0.4%	0.7%	1.5%	2.4%

Source: Social Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands.<sup>44</sup>

It is quite noticeable that D66 received much support in 1994, the same year that Hubert Fermina became the first Antillean member of parliament, but this dropped off to 5 per cent in 1998 when D66 lost heavily in parliamentary elections. Turkish voters supported the PVDA, CDA, and *Groenlinks*, and the Moroccans tended to vote for *Groenlinks* and PVDA. Entzinger (2003) points out in 1998 close to 30 per cent of the Turkish vote went to the Christian Democrats (Entzinger, 2003:66). Tillie (1998) notes one important difference between the 1994 and 1998 elections is the increase in the voting for 'other' parties like the Turkish *Demir* and *Multicultural Party '98 (M '98)* as well as some Surinamese and Antillean support for the more right wing populist *Leefbaar* (Liveable) parties (Tillie, 1998:86). Immigrants and ethnic minorities hardly supported the VVD and the orthodox Christian parties like the SGP, GPV, and RPF or the Socialist Party in 1998 (see Tables 4.6–4.7). In 2002, PVDA received the largest share of the ethnic minority vote, followed by CDA, *Groenlinks*, and other parties and then VVD, SP, and D66. In the 2002 elections, no Antilleans were elected to the municipal council from the PVDA. However, Turks were overall elected within the PVDA and

Table 4.6 Party choice for ethnic groups in Dutch municipal elections, 1994 (main parties)

	PVDA	D66	Groenlinks	CDA	VVD	SGP GPV RPF	Others	N (100%)
Turkish	45%	6	14	28	1	–	5	2359
Moroccan	36	4	56	2	1	–	1	1271
Surinamese	50	13	16	11	3	1	7	1632
Antillean	45	17	16	7	7	1	8	271

Note: Aggregate data for Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, The Hague, Arnhem, Enschede, Tilburg.  
Source: Tillie, 1998:85.

Table 4.7 Party choice for ethnic groups in Dutch municipal elections 1998 (main parties)

	PVDA	D66	Groenlinks	SP	CDA	VVD	SGP GPV RPF	Others	N (100%)
Turkish	30%	2	16	1	29	1	–	21	2210
Moroccan	42	1	45	1	4	1	–	5	1040
Surinamese	62	4	11	3	5	2	1	12	1354
Antillean	51	5	13	6	87	5	2	10	174

Note: Aggregate data for Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, The Hague, Arnhem.  
Source: Tillie, 1998:85.

secondly by CDA. The PVDA also has a fairly large representation as Council members from the Surinamese and Moroccan groups. Local parties were also able to gain a number of municipal council seats for ethnic minorities. Moroccan and Surinamese council members were both elected from *Groenlinks*.

The VVD, SP, and D66 show very little representation among ethnic minority council members. In 2002, the CDA, *Groenlinks*, and the VVD as well as local parties were able to gain seats for Antillean municipal council members and not the PVDA (see Table 4.8 and 4.9). In his study of the 1994 and 1998 Dutch municipal elections (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, The Hague, and Arnhem), Tillie (1998) found that while the vast majority of Turks were more likely to vote for Turkish candidates and almost half of Moroccan and Surinamese voters support a candidate of

*Table 4.8* Ethnic minority municipal council members by political party, 2002

Political party	Number of ethnic minority members	Total number of council members	Number of ethnic minority as % from each party
PVDA	87	455	6%
CDA	42	2152	2%
Groenlinks	33	432	8%
Local parties	31	2521	1%
VVD	9	1504	0.6%
SP	5	143	3%
D66	1	278	0.4%
Total	208	9080	2.3%

*Source:* Dutch Centre for Political Participation.<sup>45</sup>

*Table 4.9* Ethnic minority municipal council member by ethnic background and political party, 2002

Political party	Turks	Surinam	Moroccans	Antilleans	Others
PVDA	52	14	13	–	8
CDA	29	6	2	1	4
Groenlinks	15	3	9	1	5
VVD	3	4	–	1	1
SP	1	1	–	–	3
D66	1	–	–	–	–
Local parties	12	8	2	2	7

*Source:* Dutch Centre for Political Participation.<sup>46</sup>

their own ethnicity, Dutch Antilleans hardly supported co-ethnic or ethnic candidates and voted primarily for native Dutch candidates. Rath (1988) notes the presence of ethnic parties like the *Hakyol*, Turkish Muslim party, *Hindoestani Janta Congress*, *Surinamese Hindu Party*, and parties mobilizing around the interest of all ethnic minority groups such as *Party of the Minorities*, *Migrants Union*, *Progressive Minorities Party*, *Solidarity and Immigrants Alliance 86'* (Rath, 1988a:281) Other more recent parties mobilizing along broader cross-cutting themes include *Solidair Nederland*, an initiative by migrants, *Lokaal, Duurzaam Nederland* (Durable Netherlands), an offshoot of *Leefbaar Nederland*, and *Islam Democraten*, a Dutch Islamic party. In the 2006 municipal elections Surinamese/Antillean turnout in Amsterdam was fairly consistent with 2002 but jumped considerably in Rotterdam to some 55 percent, the number of Antillean municipal council members increased by just one, with four Antilleans from PVDA, one VVD, and one from *Lokaal*.<sup>47</sup> It appears more likely that Turks will form their own political parties and vote for their own candidates. There also has been some indication of collaboration among groups in the form of multi-ethnic immigrant parties on the local level. The politicization of ethnic cleavage at the local level notwithstanding, the preceding evidence indicates that Antilleans do not yet have enough of a cohesive shared political identity to engage a local ethnic politics.

Much of the electoral behaviour around Antilleans can be explained by the electoral calculus of political parties as they respond to the political climate and available resources relative to other groups. As previously mentioned, there is a tendency to put candidates in 'ineligible' positions on the party list.<sup>48</sup> Table 4.4 shows that turnout tends to be higher in Rotterdam where the population of Antilleans and other ethnic minorities is much larger and more concentrated. Hence, providing more of an incentive to the political parties to seek out votes. The PVDA's consistent appeal to immigrants and ethnic minorities but over time those constituencies are more dispersed to a wider variety of parties. The Second Kok government and the PVDA in a coalition with the VVD and D66 is re-elected in 1998 and with this there is a surge in the number of Antilleans elected to municipal councils (Table 4.7). By 2002, the PVDA begins to lose strength with the rise of the right wing populist anti-immigrant *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (LPF) and the murder of its leader Pim Fortuyn eight days before the election. This led to a short lived coalition government of CDA, LPF, VVD where no Antilleans were elected to municipal councils or at the national level from the PVDA but the VVD, CDA, *Groenlinks* all elected Antilleans to municipal councils. The preceding demonstrates that participation and representation has much to do with the political party interest, the size of the electorate and its perceived status within the political opportunity structure, as well as the available political talent within a given time.

Fennema and Tillie (2001) argue that especially Turks and less so Moroccans are more 'civic' and hence politically participate more than Antilleans and Surinamese due to different political cultures in their countries of origin. In addition to previously identified factors, I argue the difference in political incorporation in the Netherlands is rather because the Turkish and Moroccan communities have greater ethnic affinity and their Islamic faith helps to mobilize their comparatively much larger communities. Due to the issue of state support for Islamic organizations, Rath (1988b) notes the affiliation between Turkish Islamic associations such as *Federation of Turkish Islamic Associations* (STICF) and the CDA as well as independent Turkish political parties in the 1986 local elections (637). For the earlier generations of Moroccans this was bound up with home country politics and other impediments to political incorporation. Rath (1988b) points to the fact that 'the turnout of Moroccans in the 1986 local elections was low because many Moroccans obeyed the summons of the King to boycott the elections' (Rath, 1988b:640). Entzinger (2003) suggests that, although the 1992 Dutch legislation increased possibility for dual citizenship, it did not formally change anything formally for Moroccans because the Moroccan constitution stipulates that a Moroccan citizen can never lose his/her citizenship even if they naturalize to another nationality (Entzinger in Joppke and Moraskawa, 2003:67). Referring to Turkish and Moroccan voting behaviour, several of the Antillean leaders I interviewed spoke of the centrality of the imam, mosques, and coffee shops in mobilizing these constituencies to vote and participate.

One prominent Dutch scholar of the Dutch Caribbean compared the different ethnic minorities and the interest of political parties in them as key. His analysis also reflects the assumption of low class and status.

Because what it takes, of course, is apart from an awareness among white politicians that they matter, that their issues matter, but also their votes matter. It was problem also that it took some time before you have the emergence of a Turkish and Moroccan middle class choosing able politicians, competent politicians. Then of course, the present Antillean population in the Netherlands has a larger, considerable group of people who are not competent for politics basically because they are not fluent in Dutch. And actually the group that is fluent in Dutch is rather limited.<sup>49</sup>

The effect of small size and low status in the political opportunity structure is reflected in the relatively few Antilleans in city councils relative to other ethnic minorities and also in low Antillean voter turnout. Several of those I interviewed reflected the concern about the lack of Antillean and Aruban cohesion into an effective political constituency and low participation. As indicated earlier, there is little sense of an Antillean identity in the Caribbean. Antilleans identity really takes form in the Netherlands



and still in the process of being developed. Despite the integration of many Antilleans into Dutch society, the size of Antillean communities, their status, and fragmented identity combine to impact the interest of political parties and Antillean participation and representation.

There appears to be differences among the three cities Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam with regard to their Antillean populations. Whereas Amsterdam can be characterized as fairly *open* and The Hague as more *progressive*, Rotterdam can be categorized as more *restrictive* in terms of policies towards its Antillean populations. There have been varying degrees of local policy innovation around Antilleans. These policies help to set an attitudinal tone towards the Antillean communities and can spark or limit participation. A possible reason for the relative openness of Amsterdam may have something to do with the smaller size of the Antillean populations there, its long time progressive mayor Job Cohen (a former State Secretary for Migration), and his staff as well as Amsterdam's past history of dealing with immigrant groups.<sup>50</sup> The 'Antillean problem' is regarded as quite mild and not high on the Mayor's agenda in Amsterdam. Amsterdam has an international policy facilitating cooperation with *herkomst landen* (countries of origin) of Amsterdam's residents.

The Hague has developed innovative policies to deal with the specific problems of Antilleans and Arubans, with regard to language and the fact of some background in the language unlike other immigrants. They have developed have a special training programme called ASA for 'postcolonial' Antilleans, Surinamese, and Arubans because of their exposure and varying degrees of proficiency in Dutch as well as their reluctance to be mixed in with other immigrants.<sup>51</sup> An official from the organization coordinating local government activities in the Netherlands classified Rotterdam as 'hard-line' because of its history with the right wing populist anti-immigrant Pim Fortuyn movement with Rotterdam as its base.<sup>52</sup> Some contend that Rotterdam does not feel enough of a need to employ Antilleans in projects that deal with their communities. With the large size of the Antillean communities in Rotterdam, there is a specific focus and commitment to the 'small groups' of 'problem Antilleans' with regard to nine areas including families and debt police.<sup>53</sup>

## **21 Antillianengemeenten (21 Antillean cities) and VIA-Verwijsindex Antillianen (Reference index of Antilleans)**

Since the early 2000s, a programme has been developed under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice to monitor and provide assistance to 'at risk' Antillean youth and was scheduled to end in 2008. This is particularly targeted to 21 municipalities with more than 3 per cent Antillean and Aruban population. The programme was set up under Rita Verdonk of the VVD, former minister of immigration and integration, and known as the *21 Antillianengemeenten* (21 Antillean Cities). It is the only programme of

its kind targeting a specific group, namely Antilleans and Arubans. The programme is based on agreements between the Ministry of Justice and these municipalities and focus on three goals: (1) reduction of the percentage of Dutch Antillean and Aruban youth in criminal activities, (2) reduction of the percentage of Dutch Antillean youth leaving school prematurely, and (3) reduction of youth unemployment of Dutch Antillean and Aruban youth. Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam are all members of the 21 Antillean cities but they have few other specialized services for these postcolonial citizens.

As a unitary state, most funds for local government in the Netherlands come from the central government. Despite the small size of the Antillean and Aruban populations, the number of Antillean cities grew from an original number of 7 to 22. Some speculate that this is really a funding issue. The budget for the 21 Antillean cities is some 5 million Euros a year for those 21 municipalities to have this special policy.

Several ministries and politicians noted that many Antillean youth were not registering at the municipalities when they moved to the Netherlands and thus unable to be identified and tracked in the system. For this reason, a registration system or database of personal information *VIA-Verwijsindex Antillianen* (Reference Index of Antilleans) specifically for Antillean and Aruban youth was proposed to be set up but publicly criticized by the Antillean and Aruban governments as well as OCAN. It was found to be a violation of Dutch privacy laws and taken off the table.<sup>54</sup> All of this demonstrates that although Antilleans are not a large group or constituency in the electoral system, they can be used for political expediency particularly as law, order, and immigration have become important issues in electoral politics. Considering the political climate in the Netherlands over the last few years, it is not surprising that several of the left and right parties did not disagree with the notion of a 21 Antillean cities. As these programmes target specifically Antilleans and Arubans, I argue they have the effect of stigmatization because they are around crime and not social or political inclusion. Miller (1989) drawing on evidence from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, suggests immigrant turnout increases in political contests marked by attacks on immigrants. As Rotterdam has the highest concentration of Antillean groups as well as the most restrictive policies towards these groups, this could explain the increase in turnout over time (Table 4.4). There are differences in policy approaches to Dutch Antillean co-citizens that can have an effect on immigrant political incorporation in the political opportunity structure.

### **Structure of civil society**

There is a phenomenon in the Netherlands of many informal Antillean civil society<sup>55</sup> organizations but very few dedicated to political advocacy. I argue this is explained by the ways in which the Dutch state has or

has not provided incentives for Antillean and Aruban civil society organizations dedicated to political advocacy to organize. Rath (1988b) notes 'long before mass immigration there were already various political organizations of Antilleans' in the Netherlands. He argues that these and other organizations of Indonesians and Surinamese were mostly aimed at home country politics but suggests by the 1980's the orientations of these organizations were changing towards Dutch politics (Rath, 1988b:636). He adds, 'Surinamese and Antillean organizations prefer a pluralist course in which their own identity plays a dominant role' (Rath in Cross and Entzinger, 1988:273). Van Hulst (2000) cites the Dutch government's tendency to lump Antilleans, Arubans, and Surinamese together and the low social cohesion and self-organization of Dutch Caribbeans' civil society as factors that contribute to low participation in the Dutch society (Van Hulst, 2000:109-110). Fennema and Tillie (2001) found Turks in Amsterdam displayed the highest degree of civic community compared to other groups when measured in terms of their many more voluntary and ethnic associations that are well connected through networks of interlocking directorates and ethnic newspaper readership. They explain the higher civic community, political participation, and political trust of the Turkish and Moroccan ethnic groups compared to Dutch Caribbeans with their political culture thesis (Fennema and Tillie, 2001).

With the some 14.5 per cent average unemployment as opposed to 4.2 per cent for the native Dutch between the years 1996 and 2005, it can be said more recent Antilleans in the Netherlands are widely perceived as poor and unemployed or possibly working class. One would assume class as a basis for collective action and/or participation but this does not seem to be the case and has much do with the ways in which civil society is structured in the Netherlands. Rath (1988b) notes the important role of the Dutch government in promoting the political participation of ethnic minorities in the Minorities Policy. Rath (1988b) writes:

One of the goals of its minorities policy is to strengthen the political influence of immigrant ethnic minorities and, to the end, it has funded ethnic organizations which help the participation of ethnic minorities in the larger society and has invited these organizations to comment on policy matters.

(Rath, 1988b:637)

Entzinger (2003) points to the ways in which the former Minorities Policy was based on the previously described *verzuiling* or pillarization system that dominated Dutch society until the Christian democrats, who were once its main proponents, did not form part of a Dutch cabinet for the first time in 1994 (Entzinger in Joppke and Moraskwa, 2003:77). Under these institutional arrangements of pillarization, each minority group was perceived in

terms of group membership and their culture was seen as key to their emancipation. This became known as ‘integration with the retention of identity’ and recognized ethnic minority group organizations were eligible for government funding (Entzinger in Joppke and Moraskwa, 2003:63). After the PVDA, VVD, and D66 secular parties took control of the cabinet in 1994, the Integration Policy was implemented which downplays the cultural dimension of ethnic minorities and integration and ‘the establishment of ethnic and cultural organizations is primarily considered the migrants responsibility . . . migrants may acquire state subsidies for certain activities like sports or in the performing arts, but on the same conditions as for any other organization with a social or cultural objective’ (Entzinger in Joppke and Moraskwa, 2003:78).

Rath (1985;1990) and Entzinger (2003) point out the lack of involvement of immigrants in the minorities policies at all levels and note that local voting rights and consultative bodies did not come from immigrants themselves (Rath, 1985:1; Rath, 1990:139; Entzinger in Joppke and Moraskwa, 2003). Despite efforts to promote Antillean and ethnic minority political participation under the Minorities Policy of the 80’s, Rath (1983; 1988a; 1988b; 1990) notes lagging immigrant and ethnic minority participation and argues that the Dutch political parties and ethnic minorities had not found each other as yet. Government programmes were designed to spawn the political participation of ethnic minorities under the Minorities Policy during the 1980’s generously funded Antillean organizations. Beriss (2004) shows a similar phenomena of France’s Agency nationale pour le ‘insertion et la promotion des travailleurs d’Outre–mer (National Agency for the Promotion and Insertion of Workers from Overseas, ANT) subsidizing of Antillean non-profit organizations and their subsequent proliferation from the 1980’s on (65–66). However, Dutch political parties had not yet realized immigrants and ethnic minorities as a political constituency.

While the work of Koopmans et al. (2005) suggests that this state sponsorship under the Minorities Policy led to greater fragmentation of minority communities and the ‘institutionalization of inequality’ (245), Bosma and Alferkink (2012) contend there is little evidence to show a link between these subsidies and the growth and/or fragmentation of postcolonial migrant organizations. I argue by the time *Dutch political parties* and immigrants and ethnic minorities had found one another in the 1990’s, there was only a fragmented Antillean political identity and limited available funding for Antillean political advocacy organizations under the Integration Policy. The first Antillean former member of parliament elected just at the beginning of the Integration Policy in 1994 was among many who note the significance of organizations in Dutch civil society and their importance in the incorporation process.

One Antillean-origin Amsterdam local government official captured the sentiment of many regarding the loss of funding for Antillean organizations

by virtue of the change to the Integration Policy and the way this was rationalized and assisted through September 11, the murders of Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn, and the impact on Antillean political influence:

[S]o it has been accelerating, especially with all the things, September 11th, with the murder of Theo van Gogh, Pim Fortuyn, it has all become that if you want to organize yourself on the basis of your ethnic origin, you are bad, you don't want to integrate . . . the political influence of Antilleans is very low, very low.<sup>56</sup>

The state ideology organizing civil society has been one that changed from the representation of individual minority groups to one that asks for all minorities to join in a state directed initiative towards assimilation. A director of PROFOR, an organization in Amsterdam that previously provided support to Antilleans, now must provide to all minority groups and is reflected in the change of the name of the organization from Forsa (meaning 'power') to Proforsa, and now PROFOR. The director pointed out:

Later on, in all the provinces everything was changing and all the support systems were forced to work together, and become one support system for all ethnic minorities, or actually for all people, white, black . . . In the last few years (we are called) PROFOR. And in the past we were only for Antillean people, Antillean and Aruban people, and now we are for all the ethnic people. You see everywhere that there is no support system anymore for the Antillean people.<sup>57</sup>

Despite the presence of a few formal and numerous informal Antillean social cultural organizations, many act as service delivery agents rather than political advocates. These organizations exhibit a characteristic lack of a shared Antillean or Aruban shared identity or sense of purpose beyond an affiliation with an individual island identity or service delivery and are rarely political. There are many informal organizations but lack of a common goal or strategy. The evidence suggests that this has much to do with the change to an integrationist or assimilationist state ideology that does not provides incentives for Antillean organizing around political advocacy as well as Antillean ambivalence about a Dutch or an Antillean political identity.

This 'double consciousness' or ambivalence about being Antillean and/or Dutch is reflected in many of my interviews. Many talked about Dutch citizenship and the lack of an Antillean identity as an impediment to Antillean political organization. One native Dutch member of parliament for the Socialist Party echoed that the reason Dutch Antilleans may not organize themselves like other ethnic minority groups may be due to their Dutch citizenship.

One reason why this may be is because they (non-Antillean minorities) were not Dutch, they were migrants. They were migrants in a new country, and that may be the reason why they got organized. Maybe I am not sure, but when you are from the Dutch Antilles, you may think, well I am Dutch, why do I need to have my own organization?<sup>58</sup>

Rath (1983) argues that Antillean organization 'is more like an elite of welfare workers' (Rath, 1983:453). Gittell (1980) notes how community organizations can be co-opted by the state and made into service delivery agents rather than advocates. This seems to be the case with several of the more formalized organizations that receive government funds and service the Antillean communities in the Netherlands.

The director of the *Stichting Welzijnsorganisatie Antillianen en Arubanen* (SWA) (Antilleans and Arubans Wellbeing Foundation), an organization dedicated to providing services to the Antillean and Aruban communities in Rotterdam, noted how it was started in 1976 by students as a social cultural organization. It soon became more of a service delivery agent as an independent foundation funded by the government and working closely with the Social Welfare Service, the police, and the Ministry of Justice.

SWA was started 30 years ago by students from the Antilles. It was for people coming together because there was no place for people from the Antilles to come together and so it started as a social and cultural institute and organization, more for people to meet each other and do things together. And later, during the years when the population of people from the Antilles started to change—more social problems and such—we started to change to social welfare. It started with the projects and in the last ten years, we do a lot of projects together with the (Social Welfare Service) and also with the police and the Ministry of Justice.<sup>59</sup>

One Antillean director of *Sabana*, a fairly large Antillean and Aruban organization in Amsterdam, remarked about his organization's lack of capacity to engage in political advocacy.

I'm assuming we'll promote them (Antillean politicians), but not as an organization *Sabana*, because we can't do that.<sup>60</sup>

Another Antillean activist spoke of the cooptation of Antillean organizations during the Minorities Policy through government funds and its impact on political advocacy.

10, 15 years ago, you had ethnically-oriented organizations of Antilleans, but they were all professional organizations. Paid staff, ok. They received their targets from the government, who paid them. So, what they

did, they had to comply with that way the government asked of them. Ok, I always said they are not Antilleans and Aruban organizations, they are organizations oriented towards the Antillean and Aruban community- oriented, and not from. That's, because the first allegiance was with the government from where the money comes. Ok, of course, I mean, it's black and white the way I put it, so I always say the true Antillean and Aruban organizations are what they call *zelf organisaties* [self-organizations].<sup>61</sup>

I argue that the many informal organizations with a lack of shared identity and common purpose, the role of government funding and establishment as service delivery agents rather than political advocates, as well as the assimilationist tone of the Integration Policy reinforces a sense of ambivalence and limits political incorporation for these people of colour born and raised with the Dutch citizenship within the Dutch Kingdom.

One would expect Dutch unions to be an entry point for Antilleans and Arubans to join in collective action around class unity. However, Dutch trade union membership is traditionally low.<sup>62</sup> Dutch trade unions long followed the pattern of *verzuiling* or pillarization but this changed when the Catholic and Socialist Unions merged into the *FNV* (Federation of Dutch Trade Unions) trade union in 1976, which has since dominated the trade union scene in the Netherlands (Vranken, Jan in Layton-Henry, 1990). Rath (1988b) points out the two largest trade unions in the Netherlands *FNV* (Federation of Dutch Trade Unions) and *CNV* (Christian National Trade Unions) do not necessarily promote the interests of immigrants and ethnic minorities. According to the European Industrial Relations Observatory Online information about the two largest Dutch trade unions in 2003, *FNV* had only 1,226,000 members and *CNV* had just 355,000 members.<sup>63</sup> It is difficult to determine the ethnic membership breakdown of unions because they generally don't record it (Rath, 1988b:631; 1990:63). One Cameroonian origin *wethouder* (alderman) in Amsterdam commented on the way that unions protect the status quo, using the example of the pension crisis that is particular to immigrants.

**Q: About the role of Dutch unions, are they active in recruiting Antilleans and Arubans and other foreigners?**

I don't think so....The unions, in spite of their rhetoric are anti-immigrant. Migrants come in side ways, so by the time they will start building anything that looks like a pension, they are seven, eight years behind the Dutch. So we have what is called a hole in our pension scales. And any attempt to get the unions to talk about it, to use it as part of the political agreements so migrants can get up-to-date for building pensions faster has been rejected by the unions because the last time they

tried, they lost something like 100 members. So the union is chicken to do what it takes and there is a major generation of migrants coming up who will need pension who will find out that they cannot live on their pensions. So there is something that needs to be done. There is a really big hole in our pension scale. . . . In spite of the rhetoric, unions, are not the natural friends of the migrants. Unions are something to protect, and the thing they have to protect is the status quo.<sup>64</sup>

Although Rath (1988b) argues that the *CNV* union may pay more attention to religious and ethnic or cultural backgrounds, it seems the *FNV* and *CNV* unions feel that they are the ultimate interest organizations for workers and maintain an assimilationist tone arguing that immigrants should be treated just as any other worker. Hence, unions have not been active in the recruitment of the Antillean and Aruban communities and thus present less of a platform for collaboration around collective action.

As for Antillean and Aruban ethnic newspapers, the Resident Minister of the Netherlands Antilles as well as the Resident Minister of Aruba publish newsletters in Dutch that target the Antillean and Aruban communities in the Netherlands. *Antilliaanse Dagblad (Antillean Daily)* is published in the Antilles and available some places in the Netherlands. In addition to several entertainment-related magazines, *Resumen*, is a publication that focuses on the large Antillean community in Rotterdam. However, as far as Antillean ethnic newspapers in their native Papiamentu or English languages, there are none that target the entire Antillean community in the Netherlands. Despite a lack of Antillean ethnic newspapers, there are several radio stations but these are in the way of entertainment and not necessarily political advocacy.

Since the 1994 change of the party system with the Christian democrats not forming part of a Dutch cabinet, elite groups of Antilleans and Arubans have come together to address the aforementioned issues of Antillean criminal youth and social cohesion. These groups include *TOPA (Team Ondersteuning Participatie in Antillanengemeenten)* (Team Support Participation in Antillean Cities), *Vereniging Antilliaans Netwerk* (United Antillean Network), *Uitvoeringsorganisatie Stichting Ontwikkeling Nederlandse Antillen (USONA)* (Support Organization Foundation for Cooperation with the Netherlands Antilles), the *KAG Foundation*, as well as the *Movimientu Antiano I Arubano pa Promové Partisipashon (MAAPP)*. *OCAN* and *MAAPP* were instrumental in successfully lobbying against the proposed deportation of criminal Antillean youth as well the registration system or *VIA-Verwijsindex Antillianen* (Reference Index of Antilleans).

All of the above named organizations are organized around Antillean and Aruban emancipation but only *Movimientu Antiano I Arubano pa Promové Partisipashon (MAAPP)* has a mission specifically dedicated to political advocacy. *MAAPP* was informally launched in 1994 grew into a larger voluntary organization in 2000 headed by Reuben Severina. *MAAPP* is committed to



promoting the political participation and representation of the Antillean and Aruban constituencies in the Netherlands and is funded mostly by members and private donors. The organization mobilizes Antilleans to join political parties, to vote within their parties for Antillean candidates, and to become part of organizations and build consciousness in order to have more influence as a bloc.<sup>65</sup>

Seeking to resolve the issues of small size and low status of the Antillean and Aruban communities, the organization aims to influence particularly those who are already in positions of power.

No, but the quantity, number – 130,000, it's not much, it's not even a half per cent, I guess. So, by numbers, we won't get there, if you only look at the numbers. You have to look at the quality. Just like having people at those high positions, and we have a lot of Antillean and Arubans on strategic positions in Ministries and the point is to get them together, the networking, together, that's what we are working on.<sup>66</sup>

I contend that part of the problem of these organizations is that they are often headed by assimilated elites who are a great social distance from the more recent lower class arrivals from the islands. Drawing on evidence from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Miller, (1989) finds immigrant turnout increases in political contests marked by attacks on immigrants. In line with this, it can be argued that these organizations are formed under circumstances in which recent Dutch legislation and attitudes have placed Antilleans under some level of attack. Even some elites are in a situation where they are stigmatized by their association as Antilleans and Arubans in the Netherlands. This may have the unintended effect of forming an Antillean political identity and mobilizing them as constituency. An official from MAAPP argues that the Antillean communities' reaction to the restrictive policies of the Balkenende government as well as MAAPP's active promotion influenced the elections of John Leerdam as well as Cynthia Ortega-Martijn in 2006.<sup>67</sup> However, in spite of a more recent reaction to restrictive policies in way of the political mobilization of the Antillean and Aruban communities, there has been a very limited civil society organizations dedicated to political advocacy.

In addition to the preceding, the perceptions of the difficulties of the Dutch language and a powerful myth of return combine to limit Antillean political incorporation. Unlike the other major ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands, Antilleans are born and raised in the Dutch Kingdom and, when the native Dutch are aware of the historical connections, they are expected to speak Dutch. However, this is not correlated with the linguistic realities of the more recent arrivals from Curaçao and the rest of the Dutch Antilles and Aruba. Although 'Dutch' is an official language in the Dutch Antilles and Aruba, Papiamentu is quickly outstripping Dutch in the schools

on the leeward islands both as matters of island pride and capacity and Dutch language education is being reserved for elites. One native Dutch member of parliament spoke about language, education, unemployment, and other problems for some Antilleans.

... mostly they have problems to get work in the Netherlands, they don't have enough education when they come here, they don't- it's difficult to speak Dutch because they have in school only Papiamentu (in some places), so you are (legally) Dutch, but when you can't speak Dutch and you come here, it's I think very difficult. So you have a social economic problem when you come here, mostly because your parents also don't have education and you have problems on one of the islands and then you go and say, 'Well you go to the Netherlands and everything is ok,' but that's not how it works. You can have the same problems here, problems with drugs, discrimination in the Netherlands also happens, we are not so tolerant. People always think that we are a very tolerant country, but I think the real life is a bit different.<sup>68</sup>

Additionally, a powerful myth of return works against first generation Antillean political incorporation in the Netherlands. An Antillean community activist notes the myth of return.

Well, *every* Antillean, every Antillean that you ask, 'Wil je terug?' (Do you want to go back?) They want to go back, yes, everyone. Most of the time they still stay thirty years, forty years. *So everyone wants to go back*, but the day when they go back never comes.<sup>69</sup>

In addition to historical rivalries limiting collective action among Antilleans, there are internal divisions within the various ethnic groups. Among Antillean organizations it is possible but sometimes personalities get in the way. There seems to be little collaboration outside the formal consultative structure for recognized ethnic minorities and some initiatives by individual political actors on the local level. The ways in which the Dutch state has structured Dutch civil society along with the relative newness, small minority size and fragmented status, the perceptions and difficulties of the Dutch language, and a powerful 'myth of return' among Antillean immigrants are contributing factors to the limited presence of Antillean civil society organizations dedicated to political advocacy.

## Conclusion

The examples of postcolonial inclusion in the Dutch kingdom, the extension of Dutch citizenship, and lack of intent to accommodate migration

to the metropole illustrates the disconnect between 'symbolic' and 'practical' politics (Edelman, 1964; Brody, 2002:102). This is distinguished from the state-accommodated migrations of the postcolonial French Caribbean islanders to France (Grosfoguel, 2003). In this way, the Dutch citizenship of Antilleans is a political-legal left over from the time of the 1954 Charter that the Netherlands is no longer able to exit due to the norms of the current liberal democratic context (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003).

The more recent reification of Dutch ethnicity in the Dutch citizenship regime reflects a trend towards the *re-ethnicization* of Dutch citizenship with an assimilationist agenda that may leave little room for the positive recognition of Antillean identities. In this way, the current assimilationist-oriented regime inhibits Antillean and Aruban efforts 'to express their ethnicity through group action'. Moreover, several state policies reinforce the notion and atmosphere of not 'belonging'. These include classification of Antilleans and Arubans as non-Western *allochtoon*, previously mandatory and assimilatory integration programmes with Dutch language and cultural instruction, proposed deportation and registration of 'criminal' Antillean youth as well as 'remigration programmes', and media focus and politicization of a small number of criminal Antillean youth. Unlike other immigrants who have no expectation of recognition, this runs counter to the initial *expectation* of many Antilleans and Arubans to be positively recognized as compatriots in the Dutch society and produces ambivalence and/or apathy.

Antilleans in the Netherlands show some of the limits to minority participation and representation in proportional systems. My analysis reveals the electoral calculus of political parties and their prioritization of older excluded and larger groups such as Turks and Moroccans, and other Muslims in the Netherlands, rather than recent immigrant co-nationals/co-citizens from the Dutch Antilles or Aruba. Although Dutch multiparty proportional liberal democracy presents many opportunities to establish one's own political party and win seats with just 0.66 per cent of the vote, Antilleans and Arubans are not yet enough of a unified political identity to effectively achieve this. As for collaboration among immigrant and ethnic minority groups, despite some efforts on the local level, little emerge on the national level due to internal group differences.

Changes in the structure of civil society are reflected in the ideological change from the 'minorities policy' to the 'integration policy', limiting government funding of ethnic minority groups and thus compromising some initiatives in Antillean organizing for political advocacy. In addition to the fact that Dutch trade union membership is traditionally fairly low, Dutch trade unions maintain a rather assimilationist view that advocates for their membership and not necessarily the Dutch Antillean and Aruban or other ethnic minority communities. The small size of these groups, the general perception of low status in Dutch society, difficulties with the Dutch language, relatively recent mass arrival, and intention to go back to the home

islands limit their interest in Dutch politics and make them less attractive to Dutch political parties and organizations, thus limiting their voter turnout and further compounding their limited political incorporation.

The case of the Dutch Antilleans in the Netherlands suggests that shared legal citizenship does not necessarily lead to immigrant political incorporation. In this way, Dutch Antilleans are formal members of the Dutch kingdom but have lacked 'substantive citizenship' for much of their time in the Netherlands. The irony is that despite Lijphart's (1968; 1989; 1999) contention of the positive attributes of 'consensual' and 'consociational' democracy in the Dutch case and particularly proportional representation and a multiparty system in the way of minority and women's political incorporation, this has not necessarily been true of Dutch Antilleans. This is particularly striking as they are currently the only immigrant and ethnic minority community born and raised as members of the Dutch Kingdom.

In spite of limited Antillean participation, legal citizenship is important as a vehicle for participation as evidenced in the three Antillean politicians that were elected to national office in 1994, 2003, and 2006. There have been signs of change in more recent years in the form of some formal and informal participation in reaction to the restrictive and sometimes discriminatory turn of the Dutch government towards Antillean communities. In 2006, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), concluded that the principle of equal treatment prohibited the different treatment of Dutch nationals living abroad and Dutch nationals in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba with regard to the electoral process. Dutch nationals living abroad (and not the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba) were allowed to vote for the European Parliament but Dutch nationals living in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba were not. The European Court found that this could not be justified and the Dutch parliament subsequently changed the election law. As of 2009, Dutch Antilleans and Arubans were allowed to vote in European parliamentary elections. It may be a matter of time before Antilleans are better politically incorporated in the Netherlands.

The case of the Dutch Antilleans in the Netherlands raises several normative questions around immigration policy, postcolonial citizenship, and national minority status that have important policy consequences. Are Dutch Antilleans immigrants to be considered internal migrants, national minorities, or a special category of historically oppressed national minorities? Does a small population mean that a particular group with longstanding ties to a country should not politically matter? Although distant, perhaps given the centuries-old ties to the Netherlands and their small size, there should be special mechanisms for their recognition and voice in the Dutch democratic polity in much the same way as there are reserved seats for marginalized groups in other parts of the world. The ways in which a historically oppressed postcolonial group is treated has important implications and learning effects for all members of a society about the workings and

functionality of democratic politics. Given the reactionary mode of Dutch politics in recent years, increasing population and growing marginalization of ethnic minority communities, and the reification of Dutch ethnicity in Dutch government and society, perhaps a reassessment of Dutch colonial history and a more inclusive definition of what it means to be 'Dutch' is necessary for the maintenance of Dutch liberal democracy.

# 5

## Constructing the Nation: Japanese Emigration and Immigration from the late 19th to the 21st Century

If you are a specialist with professional skills then you are able to work in Japan. However, for the basic people who come as simple unskilled labourers Japan doesn't accept at the moment those people coming under this kind of category. However, when we come to the second category (*teijusha*), these people are allowed to live in Japan because of their status or birthright. There is no discretion as to what activities they are doing. *So it is quite possible, for example, that someone who has the teiju visa could carry out unskilled labor in Japan. That would be acceptable. And recently many numerous Nikkeijin (Japanese descendants) have come on this long term residence visa – the teiju visa.*<sup>1</sup>

(Emphasis my own)

Japan shares with the Netherlands the characteristic of being a historic country of emigration but differs in the distinction of being a 'latecomer to immigration'. Japan was a country of emigration from late 19th century until well into the 20th century. In the late 20<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, Japan wrestles with the challenges of contemporary immigration. A *New York Times* article quoted a Latin American *Nikkeijin* foreign worker in 2009... "They put up with us (*Latin American Nikkeijin*) as long as they needed the labor.... But now that the economy is bad, they throw us a bit of cash and say goodbye." The above quotes reveal a certain ambivalence (White et al., 1990) about the role of nationalism, particularly *minzokushugi* (ethnic nationalism), in Japan's emigration and immigration policy. The first quote references Japan's post-war prohibition against unskilled foreign labour and the change in immigration policy in 1990 that prioritized the 'blood ties' of *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendants) and resulted in a surge of Latin American *Nikkeijin* immigration. The second quote refers to the 2009 programme that facilitated the paid voluntary repatriation of the very same

*unemployed* Latin American *Nikkeijin* to their countries of origin. Nationalism is deployed at different times and periods to justify and legitimize various political actors and actions (Brubaker, 2004). This chapter looks at emigration and immigration policy in modern Japan and argues that they reveal long unresolved and contested visions of the role of ethnicity in Japanese nationalism and national identity.

The aforementioned tension is detected in the nationalism of the Meiji Restoration and the state policies and practices that facilitated the out-migration of Japanese to Latin America and elsewhere beginning in the latter part of the 19th century, the 1990 Immigration Act calling for the return migration of people of Japanese descent to Japan in the 1990s, and the more recent programme for their paid voluntary return in the wake of the 2008 World Financial Crisis. The chapter begins with a discussion of the Meiji Restoration and beginning of Japanese emigration to Hawaii, Latin America, and elsewhere. It will then discuss the early 20th century emergence of ethnic nationalism and Japan's aspirations to an imperial multi-ethnic state as well as the post-war re-emergence of ethnic nationalism and the idea of homogeneity. Within this context, the 1990 Immigration Act and the recalling of Japanese descendants from Latin America is addressed. This leads to the most recent programme to voluntarily repatriate jobless unemployed *Nikkeijin*. The chapter looks at the politicization of ethnicity for political and economic gain and the ways in which ambivalence around its role in Japanese nationalism and national identity may provide space for new and more inclusive constructions of Japanese identity.

### **National founding myths/national models**

In the tradition of Alexis de Tocqueville (1945), Hollifield (1997a; 1997b) has described what he calls 'national founding myths' or 'national models'. These 'national founding myths' or 'national models' usually refer to essentialist narratives about the founding of the nation that are supposed to be reflective of the identities and values of the nation. In Japan, this can be seen in the national myth of descent from the sun goddess *Amaterasu*, the significance of the emperor as emblematic marker, and the enduring concept of Japanese ethnic homogeneity.

Commonsensical notions of Japan's national identity and its immigration policy lend an image of an inviolable hermetically sealed national container with ethnic, cultural, and linguistic purity at its core. Reischauer and Jansen (1995) suggest this joining of 'nation, race, language and culture' in the case of Japan in the production of an 'us vs. them' mentality (Reischauer and Jansen, 1995:395–396). Reischauer (1990) was among the most outspoken of Western intellectual advocates of the idea of Japanese homogeneity. He argues that by the 8th century, the Japanese people were already homogeneous (10). Reischauer and Jansen (1995) articulate the sentiment around

shared blood ties that bind race, language, and culture along with the claim to Japan's uniqueness in the following:

The origins of Japan's sense of uniqueness are easily found in its long history of isolation, at first natural but later self-imposed, its distinctive culture, its unusual type of language, its unique and very difficult writing system, and its strong patterns of group organization. Above the close-knit family stood the local community, above it the feudal domain or modern company, and at the top of the nation, which was geographically, linguistically, and culturally very distinct from all others. To the Japanese the world seemed quite obviously divided between Japan and the rest of world. Other categories were not important, such as the lands of East Asian culture, Christendom, or even the human race. The important thing was one was either Japanese or one was not... Nation, language, race, and culture are related but distinct concepts to most modern peoples but in Japan they all seem virtually synonymous.

(Reischauer and Jansen, 1995:395–396)

Although many think of Japan as one of the world's most homogenous societies, early literary records indicate that Japan possessed very distinct linguistic communities. An example of this is in the famed Japanese classic *Tale of Genji* written in the 11th century by Lady Murasaki in which she describes the people living beyond the walls of the town of Kyoto as being 'wild' and 'speaking like birds' and Kyushu (one of the islands making up the Japanese archipelago) as 'a wild country across the sea'.<sup>2</sup> At the time of the Meiji Restoration there was still a great deal of linguistic diversity in Japan, the Japanese spoken in Kyushu was very different to that spoken on Honshu and almost mutually incomprehensible. Along with the pre-existing linguistic variation, significant ethnic minorities would develop over time, most notably, the indigenous Ainu, Okinawans, Koreans, Chinese, and the outcaste *Buraku*.<sup>3</sup>

There were significant foreign influences and contributions to what is now regarded as standard Japanese language and culture including those from the Portuguese, the Dutch, as well as the significant borrowings from the Chinese writing system, language, religion, and culture. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to reach Japan in the 1540s and introduced several aspects of European culture including Catholicism, which was ultimately rejected. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Dutch were the only Western power allowed by the Tokugawa Shogunate to trade with Japan in the 1600s due to the Dutch focus on commercial rather than religious concerns. During this period of Japan's isolation, *Rangaku* or 'Dutch learning', a body of Japanese knowledge, developed through the acquisition of Western scientific knowledge via Japan's contacts with the Dutch.



Anderson (1991) notes that the borrowed Chinese ideographic reading system transformed into a phonetic script was already widely in place at the time of the Meiji Restoration. Along with this, he identifies several elements that were instrumental to state consolidation. These include the institutionalization of national language and centralized school system, which enabled the development of mass literacy in schools as well as print and universal military conscription. This was reinterpreted and utilized by the Meiji oligarchs as a singular Japanese identity with the idea of the Japanese emperor as an 'emblem' of the nation and of community with the blood of the Japanese emperor denoting membership and thus promoting the idea of a homogenous nation (Komai, 2001:14).

Cohen and Passin (1987) describe the development of modern Japan as fluid and heterogeneous rather than static and homogenous.

In the seventh and eight centuries, in response to their encounter with the Chinese, they (the Japanese) absorbed Chinese culture, language, writing, and religion. Again in the last decades of the nineteenth century, forced to open their country to the world, they responded by embracing industrialization, a European system of government, and a modern military establishment. That road led in time to constantly expanding military ventures ending with a disastrous war. And when the guns fell silent in 1945, the Japanese, their cities in ruins, their country under American military occupation, their old course at an impasse, were compelled to undertake another shift in national direction... (T)hey kept to the new course and remade their nation along the new lines, so that today it is as far from Meiji as Meiji was from Tokugawa and Tokugawa from the era of the Yamato clans fourteen centuries ago.

(Cohen and Passin, 1987:1)

Japan's nationhood speaks to several interpretations including Hobsbawn's (1990) idea of invented tradition, Gellner's (1983) notion of it as a tool of modernization and Anderson's (1991) concept of 'imagined community'. Anderson (1991) defines the nation as an 'imagined political community – imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign'.<sup>4</sup> For him, these political communities are imagined because members of these communities will never know most of their fellow members. The author argues:

It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.<sup>5</sup> ... Finally, it is imagined as a community, because regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal, comradeship.<sup>6</sup>

Anderson (1991) develops the concept of 'official nationalism' or 'a means for combining naturalization with the retention of dynastic power'<sup>7</sup> in the following:

Once in power, however, the rebels, whom we remember today as the Meiji oligarchs, found that their military prowess did not automatically guarantee political legitimacy. If the Tenno ('Emperor') could be quickly restored with the abolition of the Bakufu, the barbarians could not be so easily expelled. Japan's geopolitical security remained just as fragile as before 1868. One of the basic means adopted for consolidating the oligarchy's domestic position was thus a variant of mid-century 'official nationalism,' rather consciously modelled on Hohenzollern Prussia-Germany. Between 1868 and 1871, all residual local 'feudal' military units were dissolved, giving Tokyo a centralized monopoly of the means of violence. In 1872, an Imperial Rescript ordered the promotion of universal literacy among males. In 1873, well before the United Kingdom, Japan introduced conscription. At the same time the regime liquidated the samurai as a legally-defined and privileged class, an essential step not only for (slowly) opening the officer corps to all talents, but also to fit the now 'available' nation-of citizens model. The Japanese peasantry was freed from subjection to the feudal *han*-system and henceforth exploited directly by the state and commercial-agricultural landowners. In 1889, there followed a Prussian-style constitution and eventually universal male suffrage.<sup>8</sup>

Anderson's (1991) concept of 'official nationalism' is especially useful to show how the national ideology of Japanese ethnic homogeneity and national identity would be used by Japan's Meiji and then post-Second World War authorities for the consolidation of political power and modernization.

### **Meiji Restoration**

As is the case with other countries, Japanese nationalism emerges as an attempt to form national unity from a disparate populace. The modern Japanese state begins with the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the Meiji Constitution of 1880. This period of government from 1868–1912 that restored imperial rule is said to be responsible for emergence of modern Japan. It is important to recall that this replaced the Tokugawa Shogunate and several semiautonomous domains with a centralized state. Pyle (1969) notes:

In 1868, a party within Japan's warrior aristocracy seized power and embarked upon a revolutionary programme that transformed the nation. Rejecting traditionalistic proposals for overcoming the political crisis provoked by Commodore Perry in 1853, these warrior revolutionaries liquidated the Tokugawa system, abolished the privileges of their own class, and

remorselessly sacrificed elements of Japanese tradition. They met the challenge of Western power by dismantling the old structure and by building a new political and social order inspired by the civilization of their Western adversaries. In the course of their active leadership, from 1868 through the turn of the century, Japan made the transition from a predominantly agrarian to a nearly industrial economy (Pyle, 1969:1).

Japan's Meiji Restoration imported Western educational, military, and industrial techniques and the old order hierarchal values were changed to suit a modern society. Social relations were transformed and adapted which allowed for greater social mobility and the emergence of middle class values. This newly established united Japanese political entity maintained the Emperor as both symbol and instrument of political consolidation for the idea of united 'Japan' against an invading and modernizing Western world.

Wilson (1992) points to use of myth in the fact that the 16-year-old boy Mutsuhito as the Meiji emperor was 'ritually put as the successor of the sun goddess *Amaterasu*' (4). Although the boy was technically the sovereign, this small self-selected group of high officials, the Meiji oligarchs, spoke for the boy and 'effectively ran the country' (4). Wilson (1992) notes the ways in which the appeal of the imperial myth provided the oligarchs with political legitimacy. Doak (1996) argues that early cultural nationalists in Meiji Japan emphasized 'the particularity of Japanese culture' or cultural nationalism as a means of strengthening the state (82). He contends that the dominance of former 'domains', particularly the *Satsuma* and *Chosu* alliance, contributed to a widespread notion that they had too much control and the sentiment that the new government was not representative of the entire nation. If one looks at the disciplining actions of the Meiji state in trying to gain allegiance from the old domains and the populist attitudes hostile to the new state reacting to 'internal colonialism', it is easy to see 'the continuity between the later anti-state populism and later forms of ethnic nationalism' deployed by the right as well as the left (Doak, 1997:288). For Gluck (1985), the Meiji Restoration is the foundation of the modern Japanese debate around national identity.

## Ethnic nationalism

Doak (2007) notes that the idea of the ethnic nation (*minzoku*) was only sporadically used in the early days of the Meiji period but by the end of Meiji period it was favoured by critics of the government. The 1889 Nationality Act did not explicitly define the Japanese people as an 'ethnic nation but a quasi-ethnic approach to national identity that is comparable to the mixed ethnic-civic nationality of Wilhemian Germany' (Doak, 2007:148). This takes place within the context of a surge in ethnic nationalist discourse on the far right and left during the end of the Meiji period and the efforts of the Meiji state to co-opt its appeal within a legal framework. The 1899

Nationality Act was a claim to national identity based on *jus sanguinus* and patrilineal lineage. The point is made that this would be not sufficient to prove that even *Amaterasu*, the ancestor of the Japanese, was Japanese (Doak, 2007:148).

Like Germany, Japan is closely linked with the 19th century nationalism used to consolidate nation state formation from a disparate populace. This state consolidation culminates in the rise of the Japanese nation-state in the 19th century with the modernization agenda of the Meiji Restoration. Kashiwazaki (2000) writes about Japan's *jus sanguinis* nationality laws and its relatively recent origins in Meiji Japan. Although the rule emphasizing descent rather than birthplace appears to fit well into the image of the ethnically exclusive nature of Japanese society, the initial codification of the principle of *jus sanguinis* dates back to the 19th century. The Meiji government codified nationality law in 1899 in response to the external pressure to modernize the regulation of nationality. The principle of *jus sanguinis* was a logical choice for two reasons. First, it was compatible with previous legal practices, in particular the family registration system that had been used to define the subject population. Second, the principle was prevalent in continental European countries, where many of the advisers of the Japanese government came from (Kashiwazaki, 2000:438).

Doak (1996) argues that ethnic nationalism began to take powerful but still rudimentary form in the early 20th century around the time that Japan was preparing for the 1904 Russo-Japanese War (82). He contends this discourse of ethnic nationalism had two variations corresponding to a change in Marxist theory on the role of nationalism in global liberation as well as populist movements against the Japanese state due to the disheartening terms of the Portsmouth Treaty that ended the Russo-Japanese war (83). Okamoto's (1982) depiction of the Hibiya Riot of 1905 that developed in reaction to what the Japanese public deemed as the government's agreement to the humiliating terms of the Portsmouth Treaty demonstrates the significance of the riot in the sense of popular resistance and the assimilatory power of the state (275). He writes that 'the Hibiya riot should be defined as a mass riot for public justice under the banner of the emperor. As a 'church and king riot', its fundamental orientation was naturally traditionalist and conservative' (Okamoto, 1982:273). For him, this set a precedent for political protest on the both left as well as the right. Ethnic nationalism could remedy the Meiji tension between 'elite patriotism' and 'popular redemption' (Doak, 1997:293). Doak (2001) notes, despite the fact that there was a pronounced focus on ethnic nationalism in the 1930s, 'ethnic forms of nationalism became especially influential in Japanese discourse during the period around WWI and President Woodrow Wilson's widely publicized proclamation of '[ethnic] national self-determination'' (6).

The ideal of the Japanese emperor was used as a symbolic emblem during the time of the Meiji oligarchs and subsequently came to be manipulated to support the idea of homogeneity, 'with the sharing of the royal blood

becoming an important marker of membership in this homogeneous nation' (Komai, 2001:14). For this reason, the concept of Japanese nationality has been since the time of the Meiji Restoration closely linked to Japanese citizenship. Japan's Meiji authorities used 'official nationalism' and the existing sociocultural and linguistic hybridization to construct a Japanese 'national' identity for the consolidation of political power and modernization. Other factors that facilitated the Meiji campaign for nationalist construction were Japan's relative isolation and internal pacification by the Bakufu, exploitability of the imperial monarchy for the nationalist project, as well as the fact that the new norm of national community was coming of age in Europe and so the idea of self-defence against Western barbarians could be rationalized in terms of international norms (Komai, 2001:96).

### Japan and emigration

One striking irony is that amidst the cultural nationalism of the Meiji period begins a series of efforts at the coordinated emigration of Japanese abroad. The tension between 'elite patriotism' and 'popular redemption' is reflected in the Meiji government's initial lifting of Tokugawa emigration restrictions. Emigration functioned to serve several demographic, economic, and political needs including first and foremost the easing of the demands of a rapidly growing population as well as the extension of Japanese military and political influence abroad. Some regard emigration as a type of 'safety valve' releasing population pressures and avoiding unrest by displaced poor and landless farmers. Takenaka (2004) as well as Moorehead (2010) note that emigration was part of Japan's colonial project that involved workers sending remittances back, which both expanded ties abroad and contributed to acquiring resources that could potentially be used in the expansion of Japanese territorial influence, an important element of Japan's modernization. She points to the ethnic and racial implication of emigration in the international context of Japanese colonialism:

Citing the colonial history of prosperous European countries, Japanese statesman and scholars often stressed that emigration and expansion were critical 'to the prosperity of the Japanese race' . . . . In his 1906 essay 'Japanese Colonialism' (*Nihon Shokumin-ron*), Minoru Togo asserted the importance of Japan's duty to expand abroad as the only Asian country capable of becoming a colonial power, and according to Shigenobu Okuma in 'The Expansion of the Yamato (Japanese) Race and Colonial Projects' (1908), 'the most urgent task is to send emigrants (*shokumin*) . . . under the banner of the rising sun' (Takenaka, 2004:79).

Emigrants thought of emigration as an opportunity to acquire wealth in the form of gold or fertile land to farm and grow prosperous. The tide of Japanese emigration changed with the policies of receiving governments (Tsuchida, 1998). The initial emigrants were regarded as *dekasegis* or temporary migrant workers. This began during the Meiji Restoration in

the 19th century and waxed and waned as emigrants set off for various destinations including Hawaii, the United States and Canada, Peru and Brazil, the Philippines, as well as Manchuria.

Emigration from Japan was illegal under the feudal Tokugawa government until it fell in 1868 when Imperial Rule was restored by Japan's Meiji reformers. This development opened the country to the outside world after some two hundred years of effective isolation (Yamanaka, 2000:127; Brody, 2002:45). By the 1880s, the Meiji Reforms and its government's deflationary policies controlled inflation but caused some duress in terms of a fall in the price of rice which hurt many farmers who were already injured by heavy taxes. The many farmers who failed in their efforts as well as landless tenants migrated to cities where they found they could not cope with the emergent industrialization and capitalism and hence many chose to emigrate (Yamanaka, 2000:127). Tsuda (2003) writes about these early migrants, 'many were farmers who were suffering from difficult conditions in Japan's rural areas, which were plagued by overpopulation, declining agricultural prices, increasing debt, and unemployment' (Tsuda, 2003:55,56). The origins of these emigrants include areas that were poor and mainly agricultural such as Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, Okinawa, Kumamoto, Fukuoka as well as Nigata and Fukushima prefectures (Tsuchida, 1998:87; Takenaka, 2004:80).

The first wave of emigration was organized by private emigration companies with the United States and Hawaii as primary destinations. In 1885, a group of Japanese young unmarried males were recruited to work in Hawaiian sugar plantations as contract labourers and became the first acknowledged group of Japanese emigrants (Yamanaka, 2000:127). The emigrants often faced harsh treatment and sometimes 'slave-like' conditions. The experiences of some early Japanese emigrants who were poorly treated and appealed to the Japanese government for protection added to growing official sentiment against the idea of emigration (Brody, 2002:45). In 1894, the Meiji government established the 'Regulations to Protect Emigrants' which became the Emigrants Protection law in 1896, these 'were intended to control emigration companies' but not necessarily to protect migrants (Tsuchida, 1998:87). Emigration to the United States was a main destination up until the 1900s, when US immigration policy became decidedly exclusionary of Asians. In spite of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 making way for the Japanese workers as replacements, the 'Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907-1908' between the United States and Japan restricted Japanese immigration in the United States and redirected the migration to Latin America. Due to the abolition of slavery and a downturn in European immigration, Latin America was experiencing a labour shortage for the expanding demand for coffee and other agricultural production in Brazil, Peru, and elsewhere so welcomed the influx of Japanese immigrants (Castles and Miller, 2003; Tsuda, 2003:56). Brody (2000) notes that 'much of the Japanese emigration of this period can be classified as 'state policy emigration', sponsored

and encouraged by the Japanese government' (Brody, 2000:45). Emigration would be promoted to destinations including Peru, Brazil, the Philippines, and Manchuria.

### Peru

Japanese emigration to Peru began in 1899 and to Brazil in 1908. The beginning of mass emigration to South America began with 790 people aboard the ship *Sakuramaru* landing in Peru in 1899 who they were assigned to work on sugar cane plantations. After lobbying the Peruvian government to allow contract labour, the president allowed the emigration by decree. The *Morioka Imin Kaisha* (Morioka Emigration Company) arranged the emigration with the permission of the Japanese government (Tsuchida, 1998:97–98). Over time, the Japanese immigrants faced harsh treatment and anti-Japanese sentiment. After several of their number died, they petitioned to be sent back to Japan. Despite these developments, the emigration continued after a three-year period of stoppage. Tsuchida (1998) writes 'in the whole history of Japanese migration overseas, the emigration to Peru proved to involve the most serious privations' but in spite of this, he notes, by 1923 some 18,000 immigrated to Peru (98). Takenaka (2004) notes that emigration to Peru was encouraged by the Japanese government and over time was done with the help of government subsidies and institutions (78). In 1923 the Peruvian government banned contract immigration and thus 'severely restricted' Japanese immigration to Peru (Suzuki, 1969:15; Tsuchida, 1998:98). Japanese could only immigrate to Peru if invited by family members who were already resident in the country (Takenaka, 2004:80).

### Brazil

Japanese emigration to Brazil begins in 1908 with 781 people on the ship *Kasadomaru* to work on coffee plantations with subsidies from the Sao Paulo provincial government. The subsidies were cut in 1923, but by then there were already some 33,000 Japanese immigrants. As in the case of Peru, these workers faced sometimes slave-like conditions and the Japanese government maintained a negative attitude towards emigration and left the recruitment of emigrants up to the emigration companies in this first phase of Brazilian emigration (Tsuchida, 1998:99). By 1924, the Japanese government once again pivoted and saw emigration as a way to deal with growing domestic problems such as population increase and unemployment following the First World War and a way to provide relief to the victims of the Great Kanto earthquake. The government initiated an active effort to encourage emigration and used its *Kaigai Kogyo Kaisha* (Overseas Development Company) to facilitate the process, including recruitment via public lectures, free room and board prior to departure, the paying of commissions, subsidized prefectural level emigrant associations, and paying travel expenses, all of this was done in the context of the promotion of assimilation and permanent settlement in the new country (Brody, 2002:47).

By 1933, some 23,000 Japanese had immigrated to Brazil (Suzuki, 1969:15). This high level of immigration to Brazil came to an end in 1934 with new restrictions on Japanese immigration amid growing Brazilian nationalism and fear of Japanese imperialism (Brody, 2002:48). This phase of immigration to Brazil ended with the beginning of the Second World War and the subsequent allied occupation (Suzuki, 1969:17). The signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 and the end of the occupation initiated the resumption of emigration. The Japanese government encouraged emigration with transportation subsidies and Brazil as a primary destination between 1952 and 1963 with some 46,000 Japanese immigrants entering Brazil (Suzuki, 1969:17). Emigration diminished in the 1960s due to the growth of Japan's post-war economy and labour demands at home (Brody, 2002:48,46). In line with Japanese emigration policy since the end of the Second World War, the Japanese government provided financial support via the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for Japanese emigrants to several countries in Latin America, including a large Japanese descendant (*Nikkeijin*) population today.<sup>9</sup> JICA states in its 2011 annual report:

JICA has focused on helping emigrants settle into their adopted countries through programs including emigrant loans (for the purchase of land and assisting farming operations), settlement area programs (land development and subdivision) and infrastructure development programs (agricultural production, community facilities, medical care, hygiene and education) ... With the decrease in the number of new emigrants, Japan's emigration policy ended in fiscal 1993.<sup>10</sup>

According to the Sao Paulo Humanities Center cited by Tsuda (2003), there are approximately 1,228,000 Japanese Brazilians in Brazil (Brody, 2002:49; Tsuda, 2003:57). The International Nikkei Research Project<sup>11</sup> cites the Japan International Cooperation Agency 1993 survey that the Japanese Peruvian community has a population of about 55,472.

### **Philippines and Manchuria**

Besides supporting emigration to North and South America, Japanese 'state policy emigration' also encouraged emigration to the Philippines and Manchuria for both demographic and political reasons. Some 30,000 Japanese immigrated to the Philippines in the 1920s and 1930s and 300,000 to Manchuria in the 1930s (Brody, 2002:46). Poor working conditions resulting in numerous deaths caused a precipitous decline in the number of emigrants to the Philippines and the government stopped encouraging emigration there. Around 1932 state policy emigration promoted emigration to Manchuria. This was both a political and military manoeuvre. With the creation of the Manchukuo state in 1932 and Brazil's restrictions of Japanese immigration around the same time period, Manchuria



became a focal point of Japanese emigration (Tsuchida, 1998:102). The Japanese government had the goal to make Japanese 10 per cent of the Manchukuo population within 20 years with the aims of maintaining peace and order in Manchukuo, defend against the Soviet Union and 'establish Japanese order' with members of the 'Youth Volunteer Corps for Developing Manchuria and Mongolia' being deployed as farmers and settlers (Tsuchida, 1998:103). Close to 200,000 people died after the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in 1945.

### Interwar years

The interwar war years are characterized by Japan's colonial exploits. Takenaka (2004) notes that while emigration was being encouraged, and by the 1920s was 'promoted in the name of the nation', there was a simultaneous trend of bringing in labourers from the colonies including some 770,000 Koreans between 1917 and 1927 (79,78). Komai (2001) argues that prior to the Second World War, Japan was moving towards the multicultural and multi-ethnic incorporation of its long-term residents such as Koreans and Chinese from its colonies in the tradition of belonging to the 'nation of citizens' and 'community of nations' models. Lie (2001) contends 'modern Japan was characterized by (multi-ethnic) imperialism, not (mono-ethnic) nationalism' and goes on to illustrate how the 'belief in Japanese ethnic homogeneity became dominant in the postwar decades' (Lie, 2001:112). Doak (2001) notes the culturally defined ethnic concept of nationality as a critical aspect of Japan's imperialist ideology in constructing a social hierarchy of a mono-racially dominated multi-ethnic empire (4). Komai (2001) suggests that Japan initially confronted its problems with multi-ethnicity in 1895 when it colonized Taiwan during the Sino-Japanese War. The government was presented with the problem of how to treat the Taiwanese people who were distinct from the Japanese but whose land had become a Japanese territory. It also had become necessary for foreigners to live among the Japanese in order to have revisions of unequal treaties that had been established with some of the Western powers.

Although some argued that the discrimination against blacks in the United States provided an example of the problems of multi-ethnic societies and thus a reason to avoid becoming one, others maintained that the Japanese were in fact a people of mixed blood because many of its people originally came from the Korean Peninsula. Due to this reasoning, the Mixed Residence Order of 1910 was instituted (Komai, 2001:13,96). This along with the annexation of Korea in 1910 prompted the government to give Koreans and Taiwanese the status of Japanese but under the policy of *Kominka* (transformation into subjects of the Emperor), they were denied suffrage when resident in Taiwan or Korea (Komai, 2001:13). Komai (2001) contends that this showed some Japanese aspirations to be a multi-ethnic state.

## **Post-Second World War re-emergence of the concept of a homogeneous nation**

As previously suggested, the mythical concept of a homogenous nation re-emerged after the Second World War. Following Japan's defeat in the Second World War, Japan came under Allied occupation and this lasted until 1952. Koreans and Taiwanese were no longer under Japanese colonial rule but the question of their nationality while residing in Japan was still being contested. Kashiwazaki (2000) notes that the Japanese government began to associate former colonial subjects with social disorder and this, along with the heightened tensions caused by the Korean War and the failure to reach agreement on post-war settlement with South Korea, prompted Japan to take a unilateral action and declare the loss of Japanese nationality for all former colonial subjects as of April 1952 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect (Kashiwazaki, 2000:439). This statement set into place the nationality law then based on the paternal line, the 1951 Immigration Control Regulation, and the 1952 Foreign Registration Law and then Regulation (Komai, 2001:14–15). In the post-war reconstruction of Japan, both the Japanese and US authorities made use of the idea of Japanese homogeneity for the purposes of political consolidation in the face of a variety of perceived communist threats and influences from the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea and their resident populations within Japanese territory (Kashiwazaki, 2000:439). This helped to set the stage much of Japan's current immigration policy.

The result of the government's position of preserving Japanese homogeneity, and the way that it has impacted immigration policy has privileged the maintenance of public order over integration. The notion that Japanese ethnic and cultural homogeneity was a key factor in Japan's post-war reconstruction and modernization has become 'commonsense' (Van Wolferen, 1989:267; Kashiwazaki, 2000:436). In spite of the existence of sizeable traditional ethnic minorities of the indigenous Ainu (24,000), Okinawans (1 million), Koreans (600,000 plus), and the long discriminated outcaste Buraku (3 million), the myth of Japanese ethnic and cultural homogeneity has been reinforced by the relatively small size of the 'foreign' population whose proportion to the Japanese population was just reaching about 1 percent even in the early 1990s (Peng Er, 2005:225). Lie (2001) has shown what has been called 'the unmixing of Japan', with the collapse of the empire and reduction of ethnic diversity and embrace of homogeneity. He notes this as well as the emergence of a post-1960s new nationalism associated with Japan's peaceful prosperity in direct opposition to a past imperial multi-ethnic and militarist Japan (Lie, 2001:134). For Lie (2001) and others, the *Nihonjinron* or theories of Japaneseness, that many think of as a resurrection of Japanese cultural chauvinism gave rise in the 1980s and was used to both justify and legitimize Japan's post-war miracle. Hence, changing

definitions of Japanese nationhood from the Meiji era to the present suggest that political circumstances have determined national membership of who is 'Japanese' at different points in history. Although emigration was considered as part of the national interest, many in the Japanese public considered emigration as a form of 'exclusion' and saw emigrants as *kimin* or 'abandoned people' (Takenaka, 2004:81). The immigration policy that allowed for the immigration of *Nikkeijin* co-ethnic immigrants in the 90s once again points to the use of ethnicity and ethnic nationalism to resolve political and economic problems.

### Setting the stage for *Nikkeijin* return migration<sup>12</sup>

Due to concerns about communist influences, post-war Japanese authorities discouraged labour migration, and immigration policy was subsequently established around the maintenance of public order. A consequence of this is that Japan has one of the strictest immigration regimes in the advanced industrialized world, a focal point being the prohibition of unskilled immigration labour. Japan has been pointed out as an anomaly due to it being 'the only industrial democracy that has not relied heavily on foreign labor to fuel economic growth in the postwar period, if we discount the resident Korean and Chinese populations' (Hollifield, 1992:15). Some have argued this is due to xenophobia and desire to maintain ethnic homogeneity (Tsuda, 1999; 2003) and others contend that Japan's structure as a developmentalist state provided alternatives to foreign labour (Bartram, 2004:132,140). By the 1980s Japan's booming bubble economy had a growing need for unskilled labour. Businesses in prosperous Japan were recruiting workers to perform the 3K(*kitsui, kitanai, kiken*) [demanding, dirty, and dangerous] jobs the Japanese no longer wanted to do. Some of this need for cheap labour had been met by Asian workers (many from Bangladesh and Pakistan) laid off or fired from the declining Middle East oil industry of the 1980s. However, this recruitment was complicated by the fact Japan has an official policy of only allowing 'skilled' workers to legally enter and work. Hence, falling oil prices and the subsequent firing of workers produced an Asian worker migration to Japan in both documented but increasingly undocumented circumstances. The presence of these foreign workers was increasingly regarded as unwelcome (Goto, 2007).

Debates arose over the course of the bubble economy of the 1980s among interests wanting to maintain Japan's 'homogeneity' by restricting much needed unskilled foreign labourers and those advocating the opening and internationalization of Japan. Kashiwazaki (2000) notes the presence of the aforementioned Asian workers was perceived by some as a threat to social order. Meanwhile, the declining economies of Latin America during the 1980s had significant *Nikkeijin* populations of which some Japanese authorities were aware and, given the circumstances, increasingly willing to come and work in Japan. Within this context, some suggest the Japanese

government wanted to satisfy the need for cheap unskilled labour, especially for small and medium sized manufacturing firms, as well as maintain its 'ideology of common ethnic ancestry' and prohibition against unskilled foreign labour (Tsuda, 1999:12).

There are several different theories as to what led to the 1990 immigration reform. Tsuda (1999) argues that due to a combination of business interests represented among Japan's long time ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ)'s interest in the maintenance of Japan's racial and ethnic identity, as well as some civil society groups desire to have Japan's restrictive immigration policy lifted, 'the legal admission of the *Nikkeijin* became an increasingly attractive option for the Japanese government' (Tsuda, 1999:10). Goto (2007) argues the influx of Asian foreign workers from the declining Middle East oil industry of the 1980s was one of the main catalysts for the 1990 Immigration Act enabling *Nikkeijin* to immigrate to Japan. Surak (2008) points to Kajita et al's. (2005) discussion of the discourse within the Ministry of Justice and the implementation of the *tei-jusha* visa to accommodate people who had been living in Japan for a long time by equalizing residence privileges among third generation immigrants, including *Zainichi* Koreans and *Nikkeijin*. Yamanaka (1993) contends the *Nikkeijin* connection with Japan and Japan's 'myth of racial homogeneity' eased the way for their entry into Japan. She writes:

Official documents dating from before the 1989 Reform suggest that maintenance of cultural and 'racial homogeneity' was a major concern of policy makers and the ruling Liberal Democratic party. Such documents often refer to Japan's possession of 'one ethnic group, one language' as a key contributing factor to its post-war economic miracle. The *Nikkeijin* were acceptable because, as relatives of Japanese they 'would be able to assimilate into Japanese society regardless of nationality.

(Yamanaka, 1993:78–79)

Urano and Yamamoto (2008) provide some analysis of the structural imperatives.

The migration of Brazilians to Japan increased rapidly in the 1990s when the Japanese Government put the revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act into effect, which permitted second and third generations of Japanese descendants to live and work in Japan. Since then, the number of Japanese Latin Americans, particularly Brazilians and Peruvians, has grown dramatically, supplying the peripheral labour market in the manufacturing sector, particularly in the automobile, electronic and food-processing industries. Some authors regard the revision of the law to be the result of structural labour shortages and pressure emanating from organized economic associations. The introduction of the Japanese

descendants (*Nikkeijin*) and trainees (*ginno jisshu sei*) was a response to these pressures. At the same time, the Japanese government maintained its restrictive discourse concerning the introduction of unskilled foreign workers.

(Urano and Yamamoto, 2008:224)

Surak (2008) argues the *Nikkeijin* were used to avoid the label of racial discrimination in not allowing Bangladeshis, Pakistani's and Iranians and at the same time comply with international human rights norms by allowing *Nikkeijin* entrance to Japan for 'family reasons' (Surak, 2008:562). Most agree on the 1990 Immigration Act as a political compromise which created a 'side door' (Brody, 2002) for unskilled labour by establishing the *teijusha* visa allowing *Nikkeijin* to legally live and work in Japan (Tsuda, 1999:12;2003). It was thought that their Japanese 'ethnicity' would make them less of a risk to public order (Yamanaka, 1993). Although this was originally presented as a way for overseas *Nikkeijin* to experience their 'homeland' and 'visit their ancestors graves', it was clearly designed to satisfy demands for cheap unskilled foreign labour and balance the Japanese ideology of homogeneity and prohibition against unskilled foreign labour (Tsuda, 1999:11–12; Surak, 2008).

### The 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act

The 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act and *teijusha* (long-term residence) visa allows second and third generation *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendants) from Brazil, Peru, and elsewhere around the world to legally immigrate to Japan on the basis of their Japanese 'blood descent' or ethnicity. Spouses and children are also able to stay for up to one year, with unlimited renewals, which has enabled a mass transnational family immigration (Tsuda, 1999:12; 2003; Yamanaka, 2000; Brody, 2002; Takao, 2003). One can prove Japanese ethnicity or Japanese 'blood descent', and hence eligibility for the *teijusha*, with the possession of an ancestor's *koseki* (family register). Officials noted that the entrance and stay of *Nikkeijin* are accepted based on<sup>13</sup> submission of their family registration (*koseki*) to prove their bloodline and family tree.<sup>14</sup> Additionally, the 1990 Immigration Act established a trainee programme for pre-college workers from developing countries to work less than full-time for up to three years at 'trainee' wages (Komai, 2001). By 2008, there were some 100,000 trainees in Japan (Ministry of Justice, 2009). Surak (2008) suggests that 'Japan has developed a *de facto* rather than *de jure* foreign labor recruitment policy, sustained by co-ethnics, as well as by students and trainees entering through side doors' (Surak, 2008:563).<sup>15</sup> Although Latin American *Nikkeijin* are not classified as foreign 'guest workers', many function as such. I have argued elsewhere that much of the preceding evidence suggests the initiation and maintenance of

a *de facto* guest worker program based on co-ethnicity with the presumption that it would be more palatable to the Japanese public and policymaking community (Sharpe, 2010).

Initially, the mostly working and middle class Latin American *Nikkeijin* were reluctant to become *dekasegis* employed as lowly contract labourers in factory jobs. However, the poorly performing Brazilian and Peruvian economies along with the prospect of using their 'Japanese ethnicity' to legally migrate to Japan eventually presented a perception of an opportunity to significantly increase their incomes and someday return with some wealth and prosperity. Latin American *Nikkeijin* are normally recruited for short-term contract labour jobs in Japan by job brokers in Japan or Latin America known as *haken gyōsha* who end up having tremendous control over these workers' lives because many lack Japanese language skills and cultural competencies. Job brokers charge substantial fees for services with the result that Latin American *Nikkeijin* are unable to save as much money as they had anticipated (Yamanaka, 2000:140). During the 1990s, hundred of thousands of Latin American *Nikkeijin* came to reside in areas including Hamamatsu City, Toyota City, and Kawasaki City, as well as Oizumi Town, and Ota City, localities with job opportunities in small and mid size factories and other types of low and unskilled labour.

As Brazil and Peru have two of the largest *Nikkeijin* communities in the world, most Latin American *Nikkeijin* in Japan originate from those countries. In 2004, the Brazilian and Peruvian registered population was estimated to be about 342,307<sup>16</sup> and the total number registered of South American foreign nationals was 358,211 or 18.1 per cent of registered foreign nationals in Japan.<sup>17</sup> Although they were originally thought to be *dekasegis* (temporary migrant labourers) in Japan, up until the financial crisis of 2008, the realities of their increasing permanence have become evident over time. In 2004, the number of registered foreign nationals in Japan hit a new record high of 1,973,747 or 1.55 per cent of Japan's total population of 127,687,000.<sup>18</sup> Between the years 1985 and 2008, the number of registered Brazilians and Peruvians in Japan went from 2,475 to 372,305.<sup>19</sup> Hence, by 2008, the registered foreign population was 2, 217,426 or 1.74 per cent of Japan's total Japan.<sup>20</sup> The largest groups of registered foreigners in Japan in 2008 were the Chinese at 655,377, North and South Koreans at 589,239, Philippines at 210,617, Brazilians at 312,582, and Peruvians at 59,723 of the total the number of 2, 217,426 registered foreign nationals in Japan (Ministry of Justice, 2009) (see Table 5.1).

Despite notions of common ethnic ancestry, many Latin American *Nikkeijin* have found themselves estranged from Japanese society and relegated to low skilled employment via labour segmentation in the manufacturing, electronics, and food processing industries (Takenoshita, 2006). Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities are often Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking linguistic and cultural Latin American (i.e. Brazilian and Peruvian)

Table 5.1 Changes in the number of registered foreign nationals in Japan by nationality

Nationality	1985	1988	1991	1994	1997	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2008
Total	850,612	941,005	1,218,891	1,354,011	1,482,707	1,686,444	1,778,462	1,851,758	1,915,030	1,973,747	2,216,426
Korea	683,313	677,140	693,050	676,793	645,373	635,269	632,405	625,422	613,791	607,419	589,239
China	74,924	129,268	171,071	218,585	252,164	335,575	381,225	424,282	462,396	487,570	655,377
Brazil	1,955	4,159	119,333	159,619	233,254	254,394	265,962	268,392	274,700	286,557	312,582
Philippines	12,261	32,185	61,837	85,968	93,265	144,871	156,667	169,359	185,237	199,394	210,617
Peru	480	864	26,281	35,382	40,394	46,171	50,052	51,772	53,649	55,750	59,723
The United States	29,044	32,766	42,498	43,320	43,690	44,856	46,244	47,970	47,836	48,844	n/a
Thailand	2,642	5,277	8,912	13,997	20,669	29,289	31,685	33,736	34,825	36,347	n/a
Vietnam	4,125	4,763	6,410	8,229	11,897	16,908	19,140	21,050	23,853	26,018	n/a
Indonesia	1,704	2,379	4,574	6,282	11,936	19,346	20,831	21,671	22,862	23,890	n/a
The United Kingdom	6,792	8,523	11,784	12,453	14,438	16,525	17,527	18,508	18,230	18,082	n/a
Others	33,371	43,680	73,131	93,383	115,627	143,240	156,724	169,656	177,651	183,876	n/a

enclaves around manufacturing centres where they are used to perform 3K (*kitsui, kitanai, kiken*) [demanding, dirty, and dangerous] jobs as cheap contract labour. Additionally, there have been accusations of some being associated with criminal activity (Goto, 2007). As most Latin American *Nikkeijin* children do not have formal Japanese citizenship and education is not compulsory for foreign national children in Japan,<sup>21</sup> there are also problems with school attendance (Yamanaka, 2006:101). Most of my Japanese as well as Latin American *Nikkeijin* informants remarked that *Nikkeijin* are not 'Japanese' and the only difference between them and other foreigners is their privileged status based on blood connections when it comes to immigration with no formal restrictions on types of employment.

### **2009 Kikoku Shien Jigyo (Help Return Programme)**

Given what some perceive as the sanctity of Japanese ethnic ancestry, the thought of financial incentives to repatriate guest workers or 'the golden handshake' (Hollifield, 1992:77,197) as has been done in France and Germany seems unthinkable in the case of Japan. However, given the historical context laid out in this chapter, this is not so surprising. In the midst of the World Financial Crisis beginning in October 2008, many began to observe that as the demand for manufactured goods slowed. Foreign workers and Latin American *Nikkeijin* were the first to be laid off and fired (*Japan Times*, 2009:7). A 31 March 2009 press release from Japan's Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare gave the impression that unemployed Latin American *Nikkeijin* workers and their families who wanted to repatriate to their Latin American home countries could collect payment to facilitate repatriation on the promise that they not return to Japan under the same visa status. This elicited expressions of outrage from *Nikkeijin*, other aspects of civil society, and the international media (Sharpe, 2010).

The translated text of the 31 March 2009 press release from the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare reads:

#### **Summary of returning support project for Nikkei unemployed<sup>22</sup>**

Under very difficult circumstances to find new employment, the Ministry of Labour, Health, and Welfare will provide a certain amount of funding as a returning support for those who gave up on reemployment and decided to return their country, with condition that they will not re-enter Japan under the same visa status.

\*For those who receive the fund as a part of immigration policy, they are not allowed to reenter to Japan *meanwhile* [my emphasis] under the same visa status.

Composition of Returning Support Fund



- Implementing Agency

Hellowork (a part of administration carried out by the Industrial Employment Stabilization Center)

- Targeted Population

Nikkei population who entered Japan prior to the start of this project (prior to 31 March 2008) worked and lost their jobs. Nikkei population and their family who gave up on re-employment in Japan, and return to their country and will not re-enter Japan under the same visa status.

- Funding Amount

JPY 300,000 per applicant, JPY 200,000 per dependants.

For those who are receiving unemployment insurance, certain amount (\*) will be added.

\*If remaining insured days are more than 30 days, JPY 100,000 will be added. If remaining insured days are more than 60 days, JPY 200,000 will be added.

- Schedule

This will be implemented from April of this year.

Source: 31 March 2009 Ministry of Health,  
Labour and Welfare (Press Release)

The *Kikoku Shien Jigyo* called for unemployed Latin American *Nikkeijin* returning to their home countries under the programme to receive about US\$3,000 per person plus US\$2,000 for each dependent family member (Masters, 2009). The former health minister and senior lawmaker of the then ruling Liberal Democratic Party, Mr Jiro Kawasaki, took a leadership role around the repatriation plan as a way to address rising unemployment (Tabuchi, 2009). This was also framed as a token of humanitarian assistance to assist jobless Latin American *Nikkeijin* foreign workers who would have a difficult time finding a job and thus may be better off going back to their home countries.<sup>23</sup> International media expressed surprise as it went against widely held notions of Japanese ethnic ancestry because the press release seemed to imply that Latin American *Nikkeijin* could not return to Japan if they accepted the money (Masters, 2009; Tabuchi, 2009; Sharpe, 2010). The Japanese government claimed that other governments such as Spain had recently introduced similar measures to deal with unemployment but one distinction in the case of Spain is those immigrants are allowed to reclaim

their status after three years (Tabuchi, 2009). A critical difference here is that unemployed Latin American *Nikkeijin* had the choice to use the programme specifically on the basis of their Japanese ancestry. The fact that the aforementioned 'trainees' from China and elsewhere were not offered the *Kikoku Shien Jigyo* suggests again an ethnic consideration.<sup>24</sup>

Japanese, Brazilian and Peruvian media, the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, *Time* magazine and others reported on this press release and suggested the point that Latin American *Nikkeijin* who used the programme and repatriated would *never* being allowed to return to Japan. There were declarations of outrage from the Brazilian and Peruvian governments and protest actions from the Japan Metal and Information Machinery Workers and groups of Latin American *Nikkeijin* aided by Japanese NPO support organizations outside of embassies and Japanese ministries. Soon after, the Japanese government announced that the wording of the press release measures was *misinterpreted* by the foreign press and national media.

In the last sentence of the first paragraph of the press release, the sentence above the first asterisk,<sup>25</sup> the government claimed that 'meanwhile', for them meant until the economy improves or changes and was misinterpreted to mean 'never'. The press release's actual wording seems a bit uncertain. The government claimed that they did not mean to say '*never* return' but rather workers could return when the said economic situation is assumed to improve within three years. One individual from the Ministry of Labour, Health, and Welfare suggested that by July 2009, some 7,000 Latin American *Nikkeijin* used the programme to repatriate to their home countries.<sup>26</sup> The *Asahi Shimbun* that by the end of July, 2009, some 8,435 *Nikkei* Brazilians had used the fund, and other more recent anecdotal accounts estimate close to 10,000 used this assistance since then.

Changes of emigration and immigration policy point to different ways in which Japanese ethnicity and *minzokushugi* (ethnic nationalism) have been used to legitimize actions aimed to address demographic, political, economic, and even military issues. This includes cultural nationalism, expanding population, and emigration of the Meiji Restoration; and Japan's subsequent ethnic nationalism, colonial ambitions, political and military expansion, and aspirations to a multi-ethnic empire. Post-war Japan is characterized by the 'unmixing' of the Japanese empire, a ban on unskilled immigrant labour, the redeployment of the idea of ethnic homogeneity by allied and Japanese authorities, as well as economic miracle and the bubble economy of the 1980s and 1990s. This generated a need for cheap unskilled labor that was partly satisfied by the 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, which called for the preferential treatment of 'blood connections' and the return migration of *Nikkeijin* and 'trainees'. The World Financial Crisis of 2008 and relatively high unemployment produced the 2009 *Kikoku Shien Jigyo* (Help Return Programme) to voluntarily repatriate Latin American *Nikkeijin*. Japan's emigration and immigration policies

reveal long unresolved and contested visions of the role of Japanese ethnicity and *minzokushugi* (ethnic nationalism) in Japanese nationalism and national identity. Hence, changing definitions of Japanese nationhood from the Meiji era to the present suggest political circumstances have determined national membership of who is 'Japanese' at different points in history.

### Resolving the ethnic nation?

*Nikkeijin* are included as members of the Japanese ethnic nation due to blood ties but most Latin American *Nikkeijin* do not possess state membership with the rights and duties of access to formal participation in the activities of the state. *Nikkeijin* are given preferential treatment at the policy level because of blood or family connections but in reality are not treated much differently from other foreigners beyond this. Pak (2000; 2006:80) and Takao (2003) note the recognition of some local government of foreign residents as *shimin* or 'local citizens' by allowing them to take part in some local decision-making via foreign residents assemblies and local referenda. There are consistent indications in the way of cultural assimilation as a prerequisite for naturalization. Surak (2008) suggests that 'Japanese behaviour – even more than Japanese blood' is crucial for 'full state membership through naturalization' (Surak, 2008:564). Much of the above seems to contradict commonsensical notions of Japaneseness and Japanese national identity and points to new distinctions beyond a *jus sanguinus* reality. This may help to open the doors wider to the recognition of a multicultural reality.

Japan has been through several iterations where ethnicity and *minzokushugi* (ethnic nationalism) have been used by political actors on both the right as well as the left. Although Japan is changing, ethnicity or 'blood ties' continue to play an important role in Japanese immigration policy. Several have noted *Nikkeijin* in Brazil, Peru, and elsewhere as examples of groups stereotyped with the attributes of 'model minorities' (Hirabayashi, et al., 2002; Takenaka, 2009a). What role, if any, does ethnicity have in both formal and informal political processes? What is the status of Latin American *Nikkeijin* political collaboration among themselves and with other groups? What limits or facilitates the political incorporation and political transnationalism of Latin American *Nikkeijin* immigrants in Japan? The next chapter will address the role of Japanese ethnicity in immigrant political incorporation in Japan.

# 6

## Is Blood Thicker than Water Politically? Latin American *Nikkeijin* in Japan 1990–2008

Some Japanese parliamentarians went so far as to comment that the revision of the 1990 legislation was a mistake. It is due to Japanese misunderstanding that *Nikkeijin* understand Japanese and Japanese culture because *Nikkeijin* share the blood of Japanese. Surely, some of them carry Japanese tradition, but after marriages and changes of life style many *Nikkeijin* cannot understand Japanese or Japanese culture.<sup>1</sup>

There are several well-known cases of ethnic return migration around the world (Tsuda, 2009) including *Aussiedler* in Germany, Romanian Hungarians in Hungary, Jewish as well as Italian diasporic returnees respectively in Israel and Italy, and Chinese Koreans in South Korea, each with varying degrees of political incorporation in their host countries. From these experiences, it seems blood and water are not necessarily mutually exclusive but dependent upon context and situation.

In the way of the advantages of Oostindie's (2011) 'postcolonial bonus' for first generation postcolonial migrants in the Netherlands (noted in Chapter 4), there is a somewhat equivalent *ethnic bonus* or privileged status around *Nikkeijin* access to legal residence and any category of employment in Japan. Despite this ethnic bonus, Latin American *Nikkeijin* in Japan are often lumped together with others as 'immigrants' and 'foreigners'.<sup>2</sup> In a somewhat similar vein that Antilleans are '*allochtonen*' in the Netherlands, Latin American *Nikkeijin* are *gaikokujin* in Japan. Although they were originally thought to be *dekasegis* (temporary migrant labourers) in Japan, the

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This chapter has drawn upon material from Michael Orlando Sharpe, 'What does blood membership mean in political terms?: The political incorporation of latin American *Nikkeijin* (Japanese Descendants) (LAN) in Japan 1990–2004', *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, Volume 12(1), pg 113–142, (2011) © Cambridge University Press, reproduced with permission.

realities of their increasing permanence have become evident over time. Between the years 1985 and 2008, the number of registered Brazilians and Peruvians in Japan jumped from 2475 to 372,305.<sup>3</sup> By 2008, the registered foreign population was 2, 217,426 or 1.74 per cent of Japan's total.<sup>4</sup>

This chapter discusses the political incorporation of Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* in Japan between 1990 and 2008. Shared ethnicity implies 'full community membership' (Marshall, 1992; Alesina and Glaser, 2004; Salter, 2004) that facilitates immigrant integration and political incorporation. Unlike Antilleans in the Netherlands, few *Nikkeijin* or other foreign residents and their descendants in Japan have political rights or citizenship.<sup>5</sup> Many *Nikkeijin* are second- or third-generation born in Latin America with little Japanese language ability or cultural familiarity. *Nikkeijin* youth are sometimes negatively stigmatized in the media through an association with crime. While many studies analyse the challenges of Latin American *Nikkeijin* social-cultural and labour incorporation in Japan (Tsuda, 1999; 2003; Brody, 2002; Roth, 2002; Takao; 2003), few have adequately addressed their political incorporation within the context of Japan's liberal democracy<sup>6</sup> (Peng-Er, 2005) in the English language.

In his analysis of the political incorporation of immigrant noncitizen guestworkers from Turkey, Algeria, and Morocco in Europe, Miller (1989) found that, prior to and after being extended political rights, noncitizen guestworkers in Europe engaged in 'extra-electoral' politics or political participation not necessarily inclusive of electoral politics. This includes participation in homeland politics from immigrant organizations in the host countries; consultative voice arrangements between immigrant organizations and host governments; and active involvement in unions and factory councils, political, religious, and civic organizations, and extra-parliamentary opposition or political movements that choose not to take part in electoral politics. Latin American *Nikkeijin* noncitizen workers in Japan are in a similar situation to the noncitizen guest workers in Europe but one would assume easier social and political incorporation on the basis of their shared ethnicity that allowed them to legally emigrate to Japan. Considering long held assumptions regarding Japanese homogeneity, one would assume that claims around Japanese ethnic affinity would easily precede the claims of the long-term resident *Zainichi* Koreans or Chinese.<sup>7</sup>

When Latin American *Nikkeijin* are compared to older resident groups in Japan, such as *Zainichi* Koreans, there is a marked distinction in terms of immigrant political incorporation. Naturalizations from the *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese minority communities to the Japanese nationality have traditionally been very limited due to restrictive and assimilatory naturalization requirements. However, changes in law and attitudes have produced a noticeable increase in naturalizations from these communities. *Zainichi* Koreans have their own very politically powerful ethnic civil society organizations such as *Mindan* (the pro-South Korean Residents Union) and

*Chongryun* (the pro-North Korean organization) dedicated to political advocacy. *Mindan* and *Chongryun* actively promote opposing positions on voting rights for foreigners with permanent residency. The pro-Taiwanese Overseas Chinese Association of Tokyo also is supportive of *Mindan's* efforts toward foreign suffrage. *Zainichi* Korean demands for participation and representation on the local level have been met with the establishment of foreign residents assemblies such as, the Kawasaki Foreign Residents Assembly, now replicated in various localities. The first self-declared openly ethnically Korean and Taiwanese members of the Japanese national parliament or Diet were elected in 2004. Political parties such as New Komeito Party, presumably interested in the electoral potential of *Zainichi* Koreans who comprise significant membership of their affiliated Buddhist organization *Soka Gakai*, have advocated for *Zainichi* Korean voting rights as permanent residents on the local level.

In contrast to the *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese communities, Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities in Japan, despite the shared ethnicity that enables their legal residency in Japan via the *teijusha* visa, are not naturalizing at nearly the same rate and their political participation and representation is much more limited. The evidence suggests that there are in fact many *Nikkeijin* sociocultural organizations, such as the active Brazilian and Peruvian soccer clubs, but a dearth of organizations dedicated to political advocacy. Unlike the *Zainichi* Korean or Chinese organizations dedicated to political advocacy, there is no unified or prominent Latin American *Nikkeijin* national organization other than *Kaigai Nikkeijin Kyokai* (Association of Japanese and Nikkei Abroad), sponsored by the Japanese government and founded in 1957 and recognized by the government with non-profit organization (NPO) special status in 1967. It is an international organization funded by the JICA (Japan International Cooperation Association) of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is engaged in mostly cultural and educational activities. *Covenio Kyokai*, founded in 1989 by several Peruvian Nikkei organizations with the assistance of the Embassy of Peru in Japan also provides help to Latin American communities through facilitating remittances to home countries as well as providing access to Latin American products and services. Both of these organizations provide some limited support but, for the most part, are not dedicated to or engaged in political advocacy.

There is very limited Latin American *Nikkeijin* immigrant political incorporation at the national, local and civil society levels in Japan demonstrating that shared ethnicity does not necessarily facilitate immigrant political incorporation. The findings suggest there was no extension of citizenship or political rights to the *Nikkeijin* because the original intent of the 1990 Immigration Act was to facilitate temporary stays rather than permanent residency. There is clearly a disconnect between central and local level on

immigration policy. Although there has been policy innovation towards more incorporation on the local level, that is, Foreign Residents Assemblies, referenda, and ombudsmen, it has been piecemeal and inadequate. The 1990s electoral system reform to a mixed member system combining proportional representation and single member districts diminished some previous single party dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) privilege and dominance and has produced a few more women and ethnic minorities in parliament but not one Latin American *Nikkeijin* descendant. It is notable that these ethnic minority politicians were elected as part of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The politicians and policymakers I interviewed on the national and local levels expressed the sentiment that *Zainichi* Koreans and other long-term excluded groups be extended voting rights before the *Nikkeijin*. Most bills introduced for foreign suffrage have been aimed at permanent residents (namely *Zainichi* Koreans and Chinese) and not those on the *teijusha* visa (i.e. *Nikkeijin*). Although there is media coverage of groups and even political parties like the New Komeito party advocating for voting rights for *Zainichi* Koreans and other permanent residents, one rarely sees media coverage or groups advocating for local voting rights specifically for *Nikkeijin* on the basis of their Japanese blood descent.

This chapter addresses the following questions: Why doesn't the Japanese government extend political rights or full legal citizenship to *Nikkeijin* like the German, Italian, and other governments do for their overseas co-ethnics? As co-ethnicity is what provides the eligibility for the *teijusha* visa that makes *Nikkeijin* legal in Japan, what role does co-ethnicity play in both formal and informal political processes? What limits or facilitates the political incorporation of *Nikkeijin* co-ethnic immigrants from Latin America in Japan? I argue that Japan's changing ethnic citizenship regime characterized by a racially and ethnically determined *jus sanguinis* basis for citizenship, the conservative LDP's single-party dominance of the political opportunity structure, and the ways in which Japan's civil society is structured that, up until recently, made it difficult to formally establish political advocacy organizations, combined with language difficulties, relative newness of residence, small size, low minority status, and a powerful myth of return among the Latin American *Nikkeijin* immigrant communities limits their political incorporation in Japan. This case tells us much about the relational and perspectival nature of the politics of ethnicity and nationality and the ways in which sentiment around them can be instrumentalized by both state and non-state actors. This chapter addresses how Japan's changing ethnic citizenship regime, political opportunity structure and structure of its civil society along with *Nikkeijin* Japanese language difficulties, newness of residence, small size, low minority status, and an enduring myth of return and the ways in which these combine to limit their political incorporation between 1990 and 2008.

## Japan's ethnic citizenship regime

Japan's *jus sanguinus* 'ethnic citizenship' regime type facilitates the emigration of those with shared blood ties but it is also one of the principle facts that limits the Latin American *Nikkeijin*'s and other foreigners' political incorporation in Japan. I argue Latin American *Nikkeijin* find themselves included as members of the Japanese community when they are outside of Japan, but excluded from this membership once in the country. Japan can be characterized as an 'ethnic citizenship' regime for its similarity to the German 'ethnic citizenship' regime or *Volksgemeinschaft* (Brubaker, 1992) that is less integrative of immigrants because of its racially and ethnically determined *jus sanguinis* basis for citizenship. Despite limited liberalization of nationality laws, Japan classifies itself as a non-immigration country and in 1990 implemented the Immigration Control Act and the *teijusha* visa that selects on the basis of blood descent or ethnicity. Zolberg (2000) argues 'Japan comes closer than any other economically advanced constitutional democracy to retaining a fundamentalist version of *jus sanguinus*' (383). Kashiwazaki (2000) notes that Japan's *jus sanguinus* basis for nationality and citizenship implies not conceptualizing its resident aliens as 'future citizens'. Chung (2010) argues that Japan is 'the only advanced industrial country with a fourth-generation immigrant problem' (3). She points out that, with the exception of *Nikkeijin*, 'it is the only advanced industrial country that does not grant family reunification rights to migrant labourers' (Chung, 2010:13). Hence, in the context of Japan's 'ethnic citizenship regime', as indicated in Chapter 5, nation, race, language and culture are fused and can be rather exclusionary (Reischauer and Jansen, 1995:395–396). This poses formidable challenges for persons of foreign origin and other traditionally marginalized groups in Japan and elicits an obvious question: *Why wouldn't an ethnic citizenship regime make steps to socially and politically incorporate its co-ethnics?* Following many others, my contention is that the *teijusha* visa was created because the stay of *Nikkeijin* was always intended to be for *temporary labour* and not *permanent settlement*. Hence, the arguments around blood affinity appear as both an official rhetoric employed as a matter of economic convenience and a signal of deeper ambivalence in regard to Japanese ethnicity and nationality. The rationalization and compromise in the admission of the *Nikkeijin* was predicated on temporary labour. However, in the event that they did remain in Japan, there was an *expectation* of easier assimilation due to consanguinity. In response to my question regarding the rationale and intent of the 1990 Immigration Act, a Ministry of Justice (MOJ) official remarked:

In 1990, the revision was not just to get the *Nikkeijin* a visa. Around that time, we were seeing increasing numbers of foreigners coming to be residents in Japan and we decided to review the various status and



residency categories. We added various new residency categories at that time. And also we created a category for the status of resident or the *teijusha*. Prior to 1990, there was not any specific kind of status that included the *Nikkeijin* so it was on a case-by-case basis. The usual practice was that those *Nikkeijin* often had to apply and the Ministry of Justice would have to make a decision whether to approve their application as a special case. From 1990, the law was refined and also we introduced the regulations regarding the *teijusha*.<sup>8</sup>

When asked further about the *teijusha* visa and the notion of Japanese descendants being less of a risk to public order, the response was even more revealing:

In any country, if people have blood ties or descendants from that nationality, the same nationality then of course it is easier to accept those people. It is also true to say in Japan. This qualification about the status of *teijusha* which includes the *Nikkeijin* and is not limited just to the South American *Nikkeijin*. It also includes of course the US, China, all around the world, anyone who has got Japanese blood connections.<sup>9</sup>

A Brazilian Consulate official suggested that *Nikkeijin* are very much social, cultural, and linguistic, and political 'outsiders' in Japan.

What the Japanese have, I think, discovered is that having a Japanese face doesn't mean you are Japanese. They have finally come to that conclusion. When they revised the law (1990 Immigration Act), I think that was their conception, if you are of Japanese blood you have inherited Japanese culture as well. Fifty years ago maybe this was the case with the first immigrants: first generation, second generation. Very close knit communities, they passed on their own culture, they passed on language, they passed on everything. Now in Brazil, fourth generation, there is a degree of intermarriage and this is over 60 per cent. Brazil is a mixture of over 60 different races. They (the Japanese) have come to the conclusion that its not, the fact that you look Japanese that you be Japanese.<sup>10</sup>

One Japanese official from the Kawasaki International Association, a local organization providing assistance to foreign residents, characteristically describes the situation and frustration with and among Latin American *Nikkeijin* immigrants:

A lot of trauma takes place with the *Nikkeijin*. Just because they look Japanese, people automatically assume that they speak Japanese while they don't. So, they are complex from there because (Japanese) people think that they can understand what they are thinking but they can't

because the other person doesn't know Japanese well. It's not being understood that the other person does not speak Japanese. Problems involving this kind situation do take place.<sup>11</sup>

The initial waves of Latin American *Nikkeijin* came to Japan expecting to be accepted as part of the Japanese nation only to find that they have been treated as outsiders and often face discrimination. The Japanese director of a community organization working with Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities in Toyota City put the dilemmas of *Nikkeijin* co-ethnicity this way:

When they come to Japan, they can come because of Japanese blood. They consider themselves Japanese but here they are considered foreigners and they will be discriminated against in a lot of the media. I think Nikkeis here don't consider themselves as Japanese. **Q: And do the Japanese consider the Nikkei Japanese, part of them?** NO!<sup>12</sup>

(My emphasis)

Several Latin American *Nikkeijin* informants told me of their strong feeling of Brazilian or Peruvian identity and nationality once in Japan and their treatment by the larger Japanese society as 'outsiders'.<sup>13</sup> A Brazilian *Nikkeijin* Catholic priest and activist remarked that most Brazilian *Nikkeijin* consider themselves Brazilian.

**Q: So they (the *Nikkeijin*) still feel themselves as Brazilians or Japanese?**

They (the Brazilian Nikkei) feel themselves as Brazilian. They (Nikkei children) might be born in Japan but their nationality is Brazilian and they don't take the Japanese nationality.<sup>14</sup>

Gellner (1983) writes, '[t]wo men are of the same nation only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation' (7). I argue Japan's 'ethnic citizenship' regime does not adequately recognize Latin American *Nikkeijin* once they are resident in Japan to have a positive effect on their political incorporation. One young Brazilian *Nikkeijin* community member described her feeling about herself as much more Brazilian than Japanese. She notes:

If we (Nikkei) go to Brazil, we are foreigners, we are Japanese, but if we come here (Japan), they say we are Brazilians.<sup>15</sup>

Unlike Antilleans in the Netherlands, Latin American *Nikkeijin* are not classified by the government as a distinct group. Instead, they are categorized according to their Brazilian, Peruvian, or other nationalities. Most informants that I interviewed, including those in the Japanese government,

Japanese non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community organizations, foreign consulates, and Latin American *Nikkeijin*, considered the *Nikkeijin* to be 'foreign', 'Brazilian', 'Peruvian', or Latino rather than 'Japanese'. Discrimination plays a major role in the lives of Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities in Japan. In spite of what he views as an overall positive response, Takao (2003) notes, 'the massive influx of these foreigners into local communities resulted in a wide range of discriminatory practices relating to labour, medical care, housing, and education' (542). In this way, Japan's ethnic citizenship regime does not recognize its Latin American *Nikkeijin* co-ethnic immigrants once within Japan. Latin American *Nikkeijin* residents in Japan are now embracing the identities of their countries of origin, building their own Brazilian and Peruvian communities with separate schools, restaurants, stores, newspapers, etc. These factors of non-recognition within Japan's ethnic citizenship regime serve to function as barriers to being and feeling a part of the Japanese community.

### **Naturalization in Japan's changing ethnic citizenship regime**

As formal political rights are most commonly attached to legal citizenship, one of the most deleterious effects of 'ethnic citizenship regime' types is the limited opportunity for naturalization, hence limiting the extension of formal political rights. It is estimated that only between 9 and 13 per cent of Latin American *Nikkeijin* have formal Japanese citizenship/nationality with voting rights and access to a Japanese passport (Tsuda, 2003:98). Despite relative marginalization, Japanese 'blood ties' do make it easier for *Nikkeijin* to legally naturalize to Japanese nationality due to the close link between Japan's family registration system and Japanese nationality. Although many anecdotal accounts reference the former naturalization requirements of changing one's name to a Japanese name, mastery of the Japanese language, and cultural inspections by government officials to assess the degree of 'Japaneseness' and acceptability as a Japanese, the naturalization process has been liberalized with the 1984 revision of the Nationality Law. However, administration of Japan's naturalization process is still 'characterized by a complicated set of documentation with an emphasis on precise records, family-based naturalization, and criteria for assimilation and good conduct' (Kashiwazaki, 2000:444).

The aforementioned Brazilian *Nikkeijin* Catholic priest put this within the context of the difficulties of naturalization for the *Nikkeijin* communities:

**Q) If they had the opportunity, do you think that people (Nikkei) would become Japanese?**

Japan's law is quite strict so its very hard... And (once they naturalize) then they have to give up the Brazilian nationality? Yes, that's right. Q) Many people don't want to do that (give up the Brazilian

**nationality)?** They (*Nikkeijin*) don't want, especially this. And Japan's rules are very strict. Hard headed. They don't find out the foreigners' point of view, only their point of view. And there are so many rules that the foreigners [often] cannot find out what to do. In some foreign countries, there are laws preventing discrimination, we don't have that in Japan.<sup>16</sup>

As previously indicated, the naturalization rates of *Zainichi* Koreans and Chinese compared to the Latin American *Nikkeijin* suggest some changing attitudes about Japanese nationality. It has been noted some 90 per cent of Korean Japanese have not naturalized' (Tsuda, 2003:x). According to Japan's MOJ, about 15,000 (mostly *Zainichi* Korean Japanese and Chinese Japanese) naturalize to the Japanese nationality every year. Between 1997 and 2004, some 185,371 persons naturalized with most being originally Korean or Chinese nationals (see Table 6.1). As Table 6.1 indicates, naturalizations have actually increased but not necessarily from the foreign born Brazilian, Peruvian or other smaller Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities.

One newspaper report notes that since 1965, only 300,000 foreign-born persons, have naturalized to the Japanese nationality and thus met the requirement of a five-year stay, fluency in the Japanese language and evidence of 'culturalization' to Japan.<sup>17</sup> Although the 1984 nationality law revision has somewhat liberalized the naturalization process, due to the fact all foreigners must renounce the citizenship of their country of origin in order to acquire Japanese citizenship, many Latin American *Nikkeijin* do not choose to naturalize because they intend to one day go back to their home countries, exemplifying the myth of return (Yamanaka, 2000). There is also no 'as of right' acquisition of citizenship for the second generation born in Japan. Hence, despite the increasing Latin American *Nikkeijin* permanency in Japan, these factors additionally compound the limitations of their social and political incorporation. However, this is not the case for

Table 6.1 Naturalizations to the Japanese nationality, 1997–2004<sup>18</sup>

	Original nationality	Original nationality	Original nationality	Total number of naturalizations
	Korea	China	Others	
1997	9678	4729	654	15,061
1998	9561	4637	581	14,779
1999	10059	4377	619	16,120
2000	9842	5245	725	15,812
2001	10295	4377	619	15,291
2002	9188	4442	709	14,339
2003	11778	4722	1133	17,633
2004	11031	4122	1183	16,336

the comparatively large *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese communities that are increasingly obtaining Japanese nationality. Despite decades of discrimination, these multigenerational communities are becoming more of a force in Japan's politics and changing political opportunity structure where their long-term residence, Japanese language ability, and cultural familiarity are increasingly seen as more legitimate than, and possibly even trumping, Latin American *Nikkeijin* claims to membership based on blood descent and ethnic affinity.

### **Political opportunity structure – One party dominance?**

Between 1990 and 2008, changes in Japan's political opportunity<sup>19</sup> structure have opened up access to participation for some excluded groups but not necessarily Latin American *Nikkeijin*. Here again, as in Chapter 4, Tarrow's (1994) notion of political opportunity structure works well in an examination of Japan's political system or political resources *external* to Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities.

There has been little discussion of an extension of political rights for the *Nikkeijin* at either the national or local levels in Japan. This has to be examined within the context of the LDP's one-party dominance of the political opportunity structure. Japan has the unusual distinction of being governed by the conservative LDP since the party's founding in 1955, with its sole losses occurring in the election of 1993 and in 2009.<sup>20</sup> (Pempel, 1990:3–4) In his study of the three decades or longer one-party democratic regimes of Israel, Sweden, Japan, and Italy, T. J. Pempel (1990) cites the commonalities of one-party democratic systems as electoral systems that foster a 'multiparty system', a 'cycle of dominance', and the two interrelated commonalities of a 'historical evolution marking the origins, the maintenance, and the possible ending of dominance'. He contends that the consequence of long-term dominance are the ability of the ruling party to use government for its own benefit both in terms of patronage and in shaping the political life of a country, including its symbols (Pempel, 1990:336). Pempel (1990) notes that within the 'cycle of dominance' there is usually a 'mobilization crisis' where the party creates new opportunities for groups as well as mobilization within a certain historical period where old patterns are destroyed and old alliances are shattered. The LDP was created in 1955 out of a merger of two of its conservative business and economic growth-oriented major components due to concern around a newly fused and mobilized Japan Socialist Party in the midst of US occupation and the Cold War.<sup>21</sup> The LDP used its power to discredit the Socialist and Communist Parties of Japan, break the most radical trade unions of the 1950s and 1960s, and set Japan's high economic growth as well as cooperative defence, and security relationship with the United States within the Cold War context (Pempel, 1990:353–354). Within the Cold War and anticommunist environment, Korean and Chinese

immigrants (many of whom were formerly forced labourers) from Japan's former colonies came to be viewed by both Japanese and US authorities as potential threats to internal security and were, as a consequence of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, stripped of Japanese nationality. In the midst of a devastated post-war economy, the conservative LDP was the party of post-war modernization and it guided Japan's ascent to economic success and status as the second largest economy in the world (Neary, 2002:1). Hence, the LDP's history helps to contextualize Japan's conservative immigration policy.

Up until the recent change of government in the summer of 2009 with the Democratic Party of Japan's electoral victory, the LDP's dominance<sup>22</sup> of the political opportunity structure was a key factor in limiting Latin American *Nikkeijin* as well as other legal foreigners (i.e. *Zainichi* Koreans) political incorporation. This follows Joppke's (2003) thesis that immigration policy trends towards '*de-ethnicization*' (the easing of immigrant access) or '*re-ethnicization*' (reinforcing ethnic ties abroad) depending on the ideological leaning of the government. He argues that the liberal left favours '*de-ethnicization*' and the conservative right has a bias towards '*re-ethnicization*' (Joppke, 2003:301–335). The LDP's one party dominance created self-sustaining systems of patronage and corruption where *Nikkeijin* 'blood descent' hence '*re-ethnicization*', was privileged for culturally acceptable and politically expedient cheap *temporary* labour but not necessarily for formal citizenship. Moreover, suffrage for the multigenerational *Zainichi* Koreans, and even less so for the *Nikkeijin* and other 'foreign groups', was never a consistent priority for the LDP.

Koff's (2006) discussion of the periods of one-party dominance in the states of Italy and Japan notes a characteristic lack of coordination among various institutions regarding immigration policy because one-party hegemony creates an environment where information is a source of power among public institutions and intraparty competition establishes factions that control specific ministries and interests sparking institutional competition for power and resources (176). Tsuda and Cornelius (2004) discuss the institutional competition in the establishment of Japan's 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act:

During the immigration policy debate of the 1980s, a grand total of seventeen Japanese government ministries and agencies were involved in immigration policy making, each responding to different pressures and possessing different, if not conflicting, viewpoints and agenda, including those that strongly advocated more open immigration policies.

(Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004:451)

Milly (2006) argues the Japanese state's administrative character ensures many immigrant policy-related matters are addressed without consideration

by the legislature and point out the lack of 'political leadership' in the legislature advocating for foreign residents (128,127). This institutional competition characteristic of one party democracies resulted in the political comprise of the 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act which had a policy of *re-ethnicization* for temporary labour but with no accommodation for increasing permanency.

### Electoral reform of the 1990s

Prior to the electoral reform of 1994, the Japanese system was a multi-seat, medium-sized constituency election system. This majoritarian system is also known as the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) where voters cast a single vote in multi-member districts. Multiple candidates within the same party may compete with one another for support within a given district. Because candidates names did not appear on the ballot and had to be written in by voters, candidates did everything possible to be recognized and incumbents running for re-election initiated 'pork barrel' projects in their districts. These practices encouraged lavish spending that perpetuated cycles of corruption and the dominance of the LDP who, as the governing party, had the power to allocate government funded projects to districts with LDP deputies. Concerns about one-party dominance and LDP factionalism and corruption focused attention on electoral reform in the first half of the 1990s. After the LDP's loss in 1993, in a bid to open up the political system, Prime Minister Hosokawa of the newly formed Japan New Party and his short lived seven-party coalition government proposed sweeping reforms of the electoral system. In addition to other new opposition parties, the Japan Renewal party and the New Harbinger Party were formed. The multi-member system was abolished in January 1994 with a revision of the Public Offices Elections Law.

Although the 1994 electoral system reform<sup>23</sup> has resulted in the lessening of LDP privilege and the limited incorporation of some previously unrepresented communities such as the *Zainichi* Koreans and Taiwanese, this has not been the case for Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities. It is of note that although the electoral reform took place during the beginning of mass *Nikkeijin* arrival and settlement in Japan, there was never any serious consideration of the extension of legal citizenship or formal political rights to those communities. This appears to have had more to do with the political parties electoral calculus around the size and status of potential constituencies than ethnic affinity. Neary (2002) argues that the 1990s electoral reform changed the balance and relations between the political parties. He notes 'since 1993 the LDP has not been the sole party in power and the role of the *zoku* (tribes) and *habatsu* or party factions has declined' and the overall influence of elected politicians may be increasing (Neary, 2002:138).

Due to the 1994 reform, the Japanese electoral system is now a mixed member system combining both single seat constituency and proportional

representation systems. The lower house has 300 seats that represent single-member-districts and 180 seats chosen by proportional representation. The upper house has 152 single member seats and 100 chosen by proportional representation by a single nationwide electoral district. Members of the lower house are elected for four-year terms and the half of the upper house are elected every third year for a six-year term. This combined system that moved from SNTV to 'first past the post' single member districts and proportional representation was structured to combine the name recognition of single member districts where members run by name combined with the fairness of proportional representation to allow for the representation of smaller parties. Individual voters select one candidate and one party and hence may vote for a candidate from one party on single seat ballot and another party on the proportional representation list (Collingwod, 2008:577).

As noted earlier, it is often argued that proportional representation systems can be more effective in promoting the election of women and minorities. This is because, compared to other systems, there is less of a need for individual campaign financing because the party rather than the individual usually finances the campaign. Proportional representation systems are also said to produce more voter choice within a multiparty system. Following Lijphart, consociational theorists argue that proportional systems are more like to be conducive to accommodation of minorities and hence produce more legitimate and stable democracy (Lijphart, 1968; 1969; 1994; 1999). My findings suggest a correlation between the introduction of electoral reforms, particularly proportional representation, and the emergence of more women, minority, and foreign community concerns and opposition in Japanese national politics. Although several commentators have argued that the reforms are inadequate, I contend that electoral reform has enabled the emergence of some leadership on the behalf of immigrants in Japan's legislature. In regard to recently elected politicians of foreign background in Japanese politics, most have been elected by proportional representation and from, up until recently, opposition parties like the DPJ created in the late 1990s. Despite the *re-ethnicization* of Japan's immigration policy, no foreign born politicians of Latin American *Nikkeijin* background have been elected in any national contest. However, the reforms enabled other long-standing residents of foreign origin to run for office and be elected. Among the elected foreign origin non-*Nikkeijin* office holders are Marutei Tsurunen, a naturalized Japanese and former Finnish national and the first foreign-born politician in Japanese history to be elected to the upper house in 2001, and Shinkun Haku, of mixed Korean and Japanese parentage from the Korean minority, naturalized in 2002, and the self-declared first politician to openly express his Korean background and be elected to the upper house in 2004. Although not elected by proportional representation, Ms. Ren Hou, of mixed Taiwanese and Japanese parentage, naturalized in 1985, was elected in 2004 to the upper house by SMD



representing Tokyo from the DPJ. As Hou is a prominent television journalist, this is consistent with the theory that SMD relies more on individual name recognition. It should also be taken into account that Tsurunen is the only elected politician who is both of non-Japanese descent and foreign-born. The others, such as Haku and Hou, are people of mixed parentage who have been born and raised in Japan but only fairly recently naturalized Japanese, enabling them to vote and run for office. One house member, a former Tokyo bureau chief for the Seoul-based *Chosun Ilbo* daily newspaper, reflected on what he perceives as attitudinal change towards the *Zainichi* Korean population.

I was the first to be elected as a publicly known Korean Japanese. My mother's country is Japan and my father's country is Korea. All the people here that know me, know my origin. It's very popular in a special way.... The Japanese people voted for me. Nowadays, the Japanese people are changing. Maybe, in my case, maybe 10 years ago, a Korean, (people think) 'no', 'no', 'no', but nowadays, a Korean, ok, (I will) vote. I think it is a very significant thing that you have only one vote and you are giving your vote to a Korean (foreign) person.<sup>24</sup>

It is of note that both Haku and Hou express the desire to use their offices for the improvement of relations between Japan and their parents' home countries. As for women, Ogai (2001) indicates the number of women in the Diet increased in the 1996 and 2000 elections mostly in the proportionally elected seats (208). It is noteworthy that 35 women won seats in the lower house election of 2000 as opposed to the 23 in the previous Diet. The previously mentioned centrist New Komeito party emerged as a player after the 1996 elections soon after reforms were put in place.

Another sign of change in relation to electoral reform is the running of certain candidates to try to capture overseas voters. Michio Takakura, publisher and president of the Japanese language *Nikkei Journal* based in Paraguay was an LDP candidate in the 2004 upper house proportional representation elections. Takakura, a Japan born and raised emigrant to Paraguay where he lived for some 28 years, returned to Japan and holds Japanese citizenship as well as permanent residency in Paraguay.<sup>25</sup> He ran to try to raise the status of *Nikkeijin* immigrants in Japan and promote international expatriate ties. Although unsuccessful this has been viewed as an attempt by the LDP to compete with the DPJ's promotion of 'internationalized' candidates of foreign origin as well as to appeal to some 610,000 overseas Japanese voters due to the 1998 election law amendment which allows Japanese nationals living overseas to vote in the proportional representation section of national elections.<sup>26</sup> Hiroshi Kawauchi's election, as a DPJ politician, to the lower house in 1996 and his subsequent re-elections in 2000, 2003, and 2005 all by proportional representation (enabling overseas

nationals abroad to vote for him) along with his embrace of the issues of the *Nikkeijin* community of the Dominican Republic, several of whom, originate in his home district of Kyushu, also denotes a change in the interests in the electoral potential of 'overseas' Japanese communities and *Nikkeijin* communities abroad with Japanese citizenship. Kawauchi, born and raised in Japan, has taken up the case of Japanese emigrants who were sent by the Japanese government to the Dominican Republic in the latter half of the 1950s with promises of prosperous land only to find that the land was rather unproductive. After release of government documents in 1999, the Dominican *Nikkeijin*, with the help of Kawauchi as secretary-general of the Japan-Dominican Parliamentarians League, lobbied and took the Japanese government to court and, although they lost the case due to statute of limitations, won an apology and some compensation in 2006.<sup>27</sup> Although Takakura and Kawauchi were both born and raised in Japan, their actions and interests along with the LDP and DPJ reflect a change and an opening of the political system particularly with regard to 'overseas Japanese'. However, this has little impact on most Latin American *Nikkeijin* who characteristically lack Japanese nationality or formal legal citizenship, and thus cannot vote.

Changes in Japan's electoral and party system have transformed Japan's political opportunity structure and realigned cleavages. These changes privilege older excluded groups, namely *Zainichi* Koreans over newer excluded groups such as the Latin American *Nikkeijin*. Chung (2010) has documented the ways in which Japan's citizenship policies and the growth of its foreign population, have given its 'special permanent residents', that is, *Zainichi* Koreans, considerable bargaining power (6). My research indicates that the demands of the *Zainichi* Koreans are seen as more legitimate than those of the Latin American *Nikkeijin*. It is of note that virtually no media reports discuss the extension of political rights to Latin American *Nikkeijin* on the basis of their co-ethnicity but instead argue the benefits and detriments of extending local voting rights to foreign nationals in general and *Zainichi* Korean 'special permanent residents' in particular. As noted by Pak (2006), the only advocacy for foreigners at the national level has been for local suffrage and these demands mostly reflect the wishes of the *Zainichi* Korean community. The real push behind the extension of foreign voting rights came from *Mindanao*, and the *Zainichi* Korean community of 'special permanent residents', many of whom are descendants of Japanese colonial subjects and one of the best organized of Japan's minority communities.<sup>28</sup> The pro-Taiwanese Overseas Chinese Association of Tokyo supports these efforts. *Mindanao* has been campaigning for suffrage since 1986 arguing that 'foreigners with permanent residency are a part of Japanese society'.<sup>29</sup> One councillor responded to a question I had about the extension of formal political rights or citizenship to *Nikkeijin*.

I never thought about it. If they start to demand it, it could be possible. It is a good question. I have never thought about it. But maybe that could be the exception even for LDP members because the ancestors were Japanese so maybe. Maybe that is one step. It's not impossible.<sup>30</sup>

The preceding quote speaks to the ambivalence of legislators regarding the political incorporation of Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities beyond privileged emigration to Japan on the basis of shared Japanese blood relations. One former Tokyo Immigration Office official who now heads the first and only policy think tank on immigration policy remarked:

Japanese politicians don't show much interest in foreign migrant issues. Very, very few. Probably two or three. Foreigners in Japan are very small in number and also they don't have the vote so there's not so much movement yet but in the future I don't know, it might change.<sup>31</sup>

The opposition of Japanese conservatives persists in the LDP's argument that foreigners should naturalize because voting rights for foreigners works against the interests of Japanese citizens in national security and education and would lead to a right at the national level (Takao, 2003:548–550). My informants noted the DPJ's internal divisions on the issue of foreigners' suffrage.

Despite this, the issue of foreign suffrage continues to periodically rise to the surface and is regularly defeated. Although the LDP and the New Komeito Party had some agreement on the issue when they formed a coalition government along with the now defunct Liberal Party in 1999, the LDP has since shied away from this due to opposition from powerful conservative members. As written in the *Japan Times*, 'while New Komeito Secretary General Teysuzo Fuyushiba has said it is unfair that non-Japanese (permanent) residents who are part of communities and pay taxes cannot take part in policy making, the highest hurdle to clear is the Liberal Democratic Party'.<sup>32</sup> The New Komeito and the Conservative Party submitted an unsuccessful bill regarding local suffrage for all permanent residents in 2000.<sup>33</sup> Additionally, amidst the contest of the Upper House election of 2004, New Komeito came with a manifesto promoting suffrage rights for permanent foreign residents. Many speculate that the interest of New Komeito in promoting these bills is to capture the votes of the many *Zainichi* Koreans members of *Soka Gakkai*, New Komeito's affiliated Buddhist organization.<sup>34</sup> Since 1998, several bills introduced and defeated around these issues include the 'Bill to Grant Voting Rights in Local Elections to Foreign Residents with Permanent Residency' proposed by the Komei Party and Democratic Party and the 'Bill to Grant Foreign Residents with Permanent Residency the Rights to Vote and Run for Office in Local Elections'.<sup>35</sup>

*Table 6.2* Changes in number of alien registrations of special permanent resident by nationality<sup>36</sup>

Changes in number of alien registrations of special permanent resident by nationality (place of origin)	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Total	513,269	500,782	489,900	475,952	465,619
Korea	507,429	495,986	485,180	471,756	447,805
China	4,151	4,060	3,924	3,406	3,306

*Table 6.3* Changes in number of alien registrations of permanent resident by nationality<sup>37</sup>

Changes in number of alien registrations of permanent resident by nationality (place of Origin)	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Total	145,336	184,071	223,875	267,011	312,964
China	48,809	58,778	70,599	83,321	96,647
Brazil	9,062	20,277	31,203	41,771	52,581
Philippines	20,933	26,967	32,796	39,733	47,407
Korea	31,955	34,624	37,121	39,807	42,960
Peru	7,496	11,059	13,975	17,213	20,401

One can observe from the preceding that many of these foreign suffrage bills have been aimed at 'permanent residents', namely the *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese communities of 'special permanent residents' (see Table 6.2). I have already noted in Table 6.1 that an increasing number of former Korean and Chinese nationals have taken Japanese nationality, which will eventually increase their power as a political constituency. As Table 6.3 illustrates, there was an increase in 'permanent residents' between 2000 and 2004, particularly from the Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* communities, but they still represent a small proportion of the total compared to the *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese communities.<sup>38</sup> These data indicate the priority of the *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese communities as actual constituencies in electoral politics rather than the Latin American *Nikkeijin*.

One Kawasaki International Association representative remarked:

So, it terms of priority, I do believe those who are living in Kawasaki for a longer time are the Korean residents should be considered first priority when giving right to vote instead of Nikkeis.<sup>39</sup>

An official from Japan's largest human rights organization spoke about the *Buraku* (outcaste) minority as the strongest politically and in terms of finance. He noted the effect of the leadership's lack of interest in organizing those without voting rights as something that prevents them from representing foreigners' interests in electoral politics. In this way, LDP dominance of the political opportunity structure and the 'ethnic citizenship' regime restrictions on voting rights and naturalization reinforces the limited Latin American *Nikkeijin* political incorporation.

It is because (most *Nikkeijin* and other foreigners) don't have voting rights. In order to win elections, we need to organize those who have voting rights or citizenship. As a result, the election campaign of the BLL representatives were not quite fully involved with those who are not recognized as minorities like Okinawa people, (Okinawa people have the vote because they are legal Japanese citizens) or foreigners or the migrant community who don't have voting rights. But I was saying the importance of the BLL leader to become a senator is to channel noncitizens or not recognized minorities onto the political stage, but it's political.<sup>40</sup>

Brody (2002) questions how the measures towards suffrage for 'special permanent residents', for the most part focused on *Zainichi* Koreans and Chinese, will apply to Latin American *Nikkeijin* permanent residents as well as how potential future measures to integrate them would impact the *Zainichi* Korean community (Brody, 2002:108). As the Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* communities move from the *teijusha* visa to permanent residency, it could be just a matter of time before the Latin American *Nikkeijin* community makes political demands similar to those of the *Zainichi* Korean community. However, for the time being, the privileged groups seeking and being sought after for foreign local suffrage are the *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese communities.<sup>41</sup> Although ethnicity is still considered to be important, most informants viewed the long-term *Zainichi* Korean community as ultimately sharing more of a stake in membership in local communities and most deserving of foreign local suffrage over the more recent Latin American *Nikkeijin* immigrants. Thus challenging the co-ethnicity hypothesis and supporting Carens (1989) notion that citizenship claims vary with degree and length of social ties and residence. This is to say that the long history of the marginalized *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese claims making is having an impact in relation to the presence of Latin American *Nikkeijin* in Japan's changing ethnic citizenship regime and political opportunity structure.

## Local government

Japanese local government is arguably the most significant nexus between Latin American *Nikkeijin* and other foreign communities and government.

By most accounts, Japanese local governments are left on their own without much support from the central government with regard to immigrant incorporation. There have been many positive initiatives at the local level in Japan in the way of consultative voice in the form of foreign residents assemblies, local referenda, ombudsmen and measures, including those against housing discrimination, access health insurance, pension benefits, as well as some civil service jobs. Despite this, there appears to be a disconnect between Japan's national and local state policies on immigration that limits *Nikkeijin* and other immigrant's integration and political incorporation. While Pak (2000; 2006) and Takao (2003) argue that local government has responded positively to immigrants in the ways of innovative policies that facilitate integration and political incorporation, Tsuda (2003) and Yamanaka (2000) document the limitations of local government in terms of inadequate services and limited participation by *Nikkeijin* and other immigrants. Here, my focus is on Latin American *Nikkeijin* political incorporation in the local governments of Hamamatsu City (Shizuoka Prefecture), Toyota City (Aichi Prefecture), and Kawasaki City (Kanagawa Prefecture) and in these places I have looked for evidence of both formal and extra-electoral participation. These are municipalities with sizeable Latin American *Nikkeijin* populations chosen because of their mix of Brazilian and Peruvian Nikkei and other 'foreign' immigrant populations that exist alongside older *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese foreign resident communities.

Hamamatsu City contains one of the largest populations of Latin American *Nikkeijin* migrants in Japan.<sup>42</sup> It is an industrial city known for the Yamaha, Kawai, Suzuki, and Honda corporations that produce motorcycles, automobiles, musical instruments, and textiles. Many Latin American *Nikkeijin* migrants here work for small subcontractors that are contracted by these corporations to produce parts for their industries. Toyota City is the head office of the Toyota Motor Corporation, which similarly offers contracts to subcontractors who in turn employ *Nikkeijin* migrants and other labourers to produce parts.<sup>43</sup> Toyota City has one of the largest residential concentrations of Brazilians in Japan with many living in the Homi Danchi, a public housing complex of close to 10,000 with more than 5,000 many elderly Japanese and the remainder composed of Brazilians and others.<sup>44</sup> Kawasaki City is an industrial city adjacent to metropolitan Tokyo with significant high technology interests. It has one of the largest foreign resident communities in Japan.<sup>45</sup> In each of these cities, foreigners comprise between 2.05 and 3.85 per cent of the total city population.

One reason for the inadequacy of integration schemes in several of these localities is that they are piecemeal and unevenly applied and hence often lack central local policy coordination. Their attitudes towards foreigners are also based on the particular localities history with foreign immigration in the past. It has long been the duty of local government to register foreign

nationals as stipulated by the Foreigners Registration Act<sup>46</sup> (Pak, 2000:248). Local government officials have stated that the national government has unfairly placed the burden of dealing with the integration of foreigners on local governments. However, few local governments have adequate capacity. The lack of a policy of recognition and accommodation on the part of the national government and failure to collaborate with local governments further explains the lack of *Nikkeijin* political incorporation in Japanese municipalities. This failure of collaboration of the national and local governments can be found in the structure of central and local relations.

### Local government structure

Japan features a strong centralized unitary state that is struggling to decentralize power from its capital of Tokyo. The 1947 Constitution sought to change central-local relations and strived toward a system of 'local self-government' set forth in the Local Autonomy Law (*Chiho Jichi Ho*). Since the 1960s there have been moves for more decentralization and by the 1990s there was considerable interest in both decentralization and reducing the size of local government. Prefectures are headed by governors (*chiji*) and cities, towns, and villages are headed by mayors (*cho*). Local voters directly elect governors, mayors, and local assemblies. The local electorate even has the power of 'recall' or audit over those elected by a petition of 2 per cent of the electorate. Local government is elected by the multi-member constituencies used prior to 1993 in the national parliament or Diet.<sup>47</sup> Prefectures, cities, and towns are subdivided into administrative area units which act as constituencies with representatives in proportion to the size of the area. Although most local government politicians are not formally associated with any political party, it is most common for prefectural-level politicians to belong to a local branch of a national party (Neary, 2002:155). Despite this, local governments have been forced to instigate policy innovation around immigration and to respond to decentralization reforms around 'citizens self-government'.

#### 'Local citizens?'

Scholars have noted the inclusion of foreign residents as *shimin* or 'local citizens' by some local governments, who have opened up various aspects of local decision-making, within the context of foreign resident assemblies and local referenda.<sup>48</sup> (Pak, 2000; 2006:80; Takao, 2003; Chung, 2010:14) Although Constitutional guarantees of social and civil rights are only extended to Japanese nationals/citizens, Pak (2000) notes that the Local Government Act is used as justification by some local governments to define resident foreigners as 'local citizens' due to their taxes and other

contributions to community. Proponents of this view argue that the Local Government Act mandates that local authorities ensure the 'safety, health, and welfare of all local citizens, including non-Japanese' (Pak, 2000:252). This is strongly articulated in Kawasaki<sup>49</sup> and speaks to the reality of daily engagement and opportunities for local integration policy.

### Local policy innovation

Despite the lack of legislation enabling foreign nationals to vote in local elections, there has been marked local policy innovation. Proximity to foreign populations and the responsibility of local government to local communities have been noted as reasons for the responsiveness of some local governments (Takao, 2003; Pak, 2006). Pak (2000) adds to this list the history of progressive policymaking as a result of the movement politics around environmental and social welfare issues during the 1960s and 1970s when local government was more responsive than the national government. This had the consequence of turning local governments into legitimate policy innovators and enabling them to use existing national government internationalization policies in ways that provide outreach to foreigners. Officials in Toyota city noted that after 1990 the internationalization policy was used to solve the friction between Japanese people and foreign residents with *Tabunkyukosei*, or 'coexistence and multiculturalism'.<sup>50</sup> This has led to interactions with local politicians and coalitions with Japanese citizens, the multigenerational *Zainichi* Korean resident community, and other foreign residents as well as spaces for community interactions between local government and foreign residents (Pak, 2000). One of most famous examples of this is the Kawasaki Foreign Residents Assembly initially established by Kawasaki City in 1996. The Kawasaki Foreign Residents Assembly, modelled on similar councils in Europe (Layton-Henry, 1990), was brought about through the initiative and mutual trust between the *Zainichi* Korean foreign resident and Japanese communities and has now been replicated in several other municipalities in Japan (Pak, 2000:259). One Kawasaki official elaborated on the role of the large Korean community of Kawasaki City in the establishment of the country's first foreign residents assembly:

After they (the *Zainichi* Koreans) started saying they wanted to be treated equally, a lot of discussions and negotiations were ongoing and rather than just telling the [local] administrative body what they wanted to be done, what they want to do, they also wanted to be part of the administrative body or part of the local government. Because the national law does prohibit persons of foreign nationality to become city council members in any city in Japan, in order to understand the needs of the people, the local government of Kawasaki decided for such an assembly for foreign residents.<sup>51</sup>



Takao (2003) argues that much is being done for foreigners in Japan and points to the extension of health insurance and pension benefits to foreigners since the 1982 removal of a nationality clause in the National Pension Law (527–528). He cites the primary source driving this process as being the particular role of local government in policy initiatives. As early as 1971 the local governments of Kawasaki, Sapporo, and Yokohama were providing National Health Insurance to all registered foreigners, including North Korean residents, against the wishes of the national government and the opposition of the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications (Takao, 2003:541). Usui (2006) notes that beginning with Kawasaki City in 1996, during the 1990s several local governments, including Osaka, and Kyoto, eliminated the nationality clause and allowed foreign nationals to hold civil service jobs (Usui, 2006:51).

As housing discrimination is a major problem for foreigners in Japan, one Kawasaki local government official provided an example of how the Kawasaki Foreign Residents Assembly provided a policy remedy. One needs a guarantor to rent an apartment in Japan. It has proven to be very difficult for foreigners to find such guarantors. The City of Kawasaki contracted with a guarantor company for rentals thus providing guarantors for foreigners and Japanese persons alike.<sup>52</sup> Scholars have written about the integration programmes of some local governments and their international associations in providing language training and assistance as well as employment and psychological counselling to foreigners in the form of telephone help lines and 'living guides' written in several languages that address living and accessing basic services in Japan (Pak, 2000; 2006; Takao, 2003:530). A proposal realized by both the Kawasaki and Hamamatsu Foreign Residence Assemblies was to use the far easier phonetic *Hiragana* characters (the most basic of Japanese written script) on top of regular written Japanese in some policy documents and letters from school to home to facilitate better communication with foreigners.<sup>53</sup>

According to a human rights report on foreigners and minorities living in Japan, on 18 January 2002, the town of Maibara in Shiga Prefecture enacted a 'Residents Voting Ordinance' in which foreign residents were granted voting rights along with other residents for the first time. Between 2002 and 2005, over 200 municipalities passed resident voting ordinances that recognize the right of foreign residents to vote. In most cases, these were ordinances to hold a 'local referendum by residents' on the merger of local municipalities, establishment of nuclear power plants or garbage incineration facilities. However was the case with national-level initiatives, most ordinances stipulate that they apply to 'foreigners with permanent residency status'.<sup>54</sup> Although the numbers of Latin American *Nikkiejin* with permanent residency is increasing, many remain on the *teijjusha* (long-term residence visa). Additionally, local ombudsmen have been set up in some municipalities to allow foreign residents and others to lodge complaints.

### Limits to local innovation?

Despite positive instances of local policy innovation, my analysis of municipalities reveals very limited *Nikkeijin* political incorporation. Tsuda (2003) contends that the *Nikkeijin* have not been active at the local levels in Japan (Tsuda, 2003:228). Pak (2000) compares the difference between the comparatively more progressive local government incorporation programmes for 'foreign residents' in Hamamatsu and Kawasaki with that of Kawaguchi and Shinjuku. She attributes the more progressive programmes to the legality and affinity for the 'racially' akin *Nikkeijin* communities in Hamamatsu and the actions and social capital of the long standing *Zainichi* Korean community and local government in Kawasaki as opposed to the many undocumented immigrants in Kawaguchi and Shinjuku (Pak 2000:265–270). In spite of their differences, both Tsuda's and Pak's analyses indicate a very limited political opportunity structure. Beyond their access to legal long-term residency visas and employment, *Nikkeijin* are viewed by local governments as non-Japanese or 'foreigners' and offered few mechanisms for political incorporation.

There have been various criticisms of policy innovations not going far enough. Although there are Latin American representatives in the Foreign Residence Assemblies of Kawasaki and Hamamatsu,<sup>55</sup> their effectiveness is limited by different selection processes and their roles are restricted. Much of their work seems to be centred on the passing of proposals that may or not be further considered by the Mayor or City Council. Kawasaki's foreign integration policy apparently is driven by the long-term *Zainichi* Korean foreign resident community. Hamamatsu is dependent upon foreign workers for its industries and thus prioritizes future immigration and integration. Toyota City has a highly concentrated population of Latin American *Nikkeijin* residents in its Homi Danchi public housing complex. It experienced some tension and violence between Brazilian *Nikkeijin* youth and Japanese residents over issues of noise, garbage disposal, and crime.<sup>56</sup> Toyota City local government sees its Latin American *Nikkeijin* as particularly tentative foreign residents likely to return to their home countries.<sup>57</sup> It is of note that both Kawasaki and Hamamatsu have Foreign Residents Assemblies established in 1996 and 2000, but Toyota City has no Foreign Residents Assembly. Foreign Residents Assemblies do not appear in every city and those that do exist often reflect the history and the character of the city in which they appear. For example, Kawasaki can be characterized as more *open*, Hamamatsu as more *inviting*, and Toyota City as more *restrictive* in behaviour towards Latin American *Nikkeijin* immigrants. One reason for the inadequacy of integration schemes is that they are piecemeal and unevenly applied and often lack central local policy coordination.

Scholars have argued that local social integration programmes are run by Japanese officials with limited immigrant input and participation, and are at

best surface level efforts at multiculturalism with a view towards assimilation and inadequate attempts at dissemination due to language barriers (Tsuda, 2006:27,280, 281; Yamanaka, 2006). Although the situation is changing, my findings substantiate these claims. There is an overall emphasis on integration or assimilation and/or 'social cohesion'. There are few 'foreign' local civil servants employed in these municipalities beyond those employed as language consultants. Although health insurance has been extended to foreign nationals resident in Japan, many who foresee staying in Japan for short periods of time are often not covered by either the Health Insurance System for company employees or the National Health Insurance System for the self-employed (Takao, 2003:529). A number of officials suggested that many *Nikkeijin* do not subscribe to health insurance because they don't want the insurance fees deducted from their salary. Another suggestion was that employers were not always willing to pay their share of the costs to insure their *Nikkeijin* employees.

While it is a true that local referenda and ombudsmen have been implemented in some municipalities and allow greater participation by foreign residents, a human rights report cites that many local governments have excluded foreign nationals from local referenda by local ordinance as well as from eligibility to be social workers, members of local boards of education, or Committee for the Protection of Human Rights due to 'Regulations Governing Electoral Rights'.<sup>58</sup> Again, along with localities that allow foreign residents to vote in local referenda, the foreign residents assemblies are the only formal political institution available to foreign residents. Collaboration among different foreign groups appears to be very limited as there is a tendency for groups to use their collective resources to pursue what is in their best interests rather than collaborative efforts. A Hamamatsu official remarks:

As a foreigner, the contact with a Japanese formal [political] institution will be only this Foreign Residents Assembly. Other groups that work for their communities will be from each country or each group but their contact and working [collaboration] will depend on [the situation].<sup>59</sup>

The character of local referenda open to foreign nationals is dependent on the politics of each locality and compounds the lack of access for *Nikkeijin* and other foreign national residents. There are various challenges faced by these localities with Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities with regard to language, foreigners registration system, education, insurance and pension payments, garbage disposal, and noise. Yamanaka (2006) argues that local governments rely too much on NGOs for service delivery (Tsuda, 2003:24). Indeed, local government services in education are being contracted out to NGOs staffed by volunteers who often lack expertise and training.

### **Committee for localities with a concentrated foreigner population**

Many of the above mentioned concerns were initially addressed in a policy document demanding more assistance from the national government known as the 'Hamamatsu Declaration' that was created by 13 cities that comprised the Committee for Localities with a Concentrated Foreigner Population (CLCF) on 19 October 2001.<sup>60</sup> These initial 13 cities (which by 2004 became 16 and later 18 cities and growing), all with high concentration of recent Latin American *Nikkeijin* immigrants, acted collectively to put forward policies that strived for 'social cohesion' and called on national and prefectural governments to reform public education, national health insurance, foreign registration, and, in another major meeting of CLCF hosted by Toyota City in 2004, proposed the formation of a national office to coordinate these policies for foreigners (Pak, 2006:68). Toyota City hosted and organized the conference to exchange information and to demand policy reform from the central government.<sup>61</sup>

It is notable that children of foreign nationality are not legally obliged to go to school in Japan (Tsuda, 2006:21). The 'Hamamatsu Declaration' put forth proposals for an educational programme suited to each child's language ability and a Japanese language programme for foreign national children who attend public elementary and junior high schools. Other education proposals from the Hamamatsu Declaration are the establishment of a Japanese language assistance programme in public elementary and junior high schools; support programme for school admissions (especially for those not registered in school); the establishment of special local facilities for foreign resident children; and a network that coordinates and financial and human resource support from the national and prefectural governments as well as the private sector. Additionally, the Declaration proposed a revision of the health insurance system to accommodate temporary and return migrants and the promotion of enrolment and payment into public social insurance and health insurance programmes and the streamlining and integration of the foreign resident register and the Japanese resident register systems.

There is a lack of coordination and communication between central and local government with regard to immigration policy and accommodation. Despite some significant local policy innovation around immigration, there has been limited Latin American *Nikkeijin* political incorporation or collaboration with other groups at the local level in Japan.

### **Structure of civil society**

Latin American *Nikkeijin* civil society<sup>62</sup> (Pharr, 2003) in Japan like the Antilleans in the Netherlands, have developed numerous informal organizations, but no political advocacy organizations. Pak (2000:268) notes that

foreign newcomers to Japan have yet to form political organizations representing their own interests. Shipper (2008) argues that legal foreigners such as the *Nikkeijin* do not form secular immigrant associations for ethnic identification or political voice but rather establish 'ethnic enclaves' that depend on assistance from ethnic businesses (60,61). Takao (2003) suggests that most newcomers are not well organized in contrast to the very well-organized oldcomer *Zainichi* Korean community (547). Yamanaka(2006) notes the existence of Brazilian Nikkei social and religious groups and networks of formal and informal immigrant women's organizations in Hamamatsu City. However, she too points to an absence of political activism and attributes the reasons for the Brazilian *Nikkeijin's* lack of activism to 'enhance their rights' to their temporary employment status in the manufacturing industry, which does not facilitate *Nikkeijin* organization, and perhaps also to a lack of political consciousness due to their intention to return to Brazil (Yamanaka, 2006:100). As Latin American *Nikkeijin* are widely perceived as working and sometimes middle class, educated people in their countries of origin and some 86 per cent are employed in the manufacturing industry in Japan (Goto, 2007), one could assume that class might be a basis for collective action or participation. However, this does not seem to be the case and has much to do with the way that civil society is structured in Japan. Japan's 20,000 unions are organized on the basis of company specific enterprise unions rather than industry and these unions generally do not accept part-time workers as members. Many Latin American *Nikkeijin* and other workers are generally on temporary contracts and not formally employed by the companies for which they work, the ways in which unions are organized acts can act as an impediment to collective action (Shipper, 2002:20; 2006:277). Despite this fact, a few community unions, which are generally open to any individual including some that work with foreign workers, such as the Kanagawa City Union in Kawasaki City (Urano and Stewart, 2007:103–121), have proven a viable avenue for some Latin American *Nikkeijin* and others with regard to labour consultation and labour disputes (Shipper, 2002:20; 2006:277; 2008; Tsuda, 2006:26).

Takao (2003) points out that from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s Japanese citizens organized grassroots support groups that served as service providers to foreigners (544). Shipper (2008) suggests the involvement of support groups organized by Japanese citizens to assist undocumented foreigners have been more effective than groups organized by the immigrants themselves. In addition to the some 200 foreigner support organizations, Tsuda (2003) and Brody (2002) have both observed Latin American *Nikkeijin* organizations engaged in sociocultural activities and assistance on the national and local levels, such as the Comite de Assitencia Trabalhadores Latino Americanos (CATLA) and the Comite dos Latino Americanos Nikkeis (CLAN) (Tsuda, 2003:235). As a large segment of Latin American *Nikkeijin* are Catholic, support has also been made available from religious

organizations.<sup>63</sup> In Toyota City, Centro Latino-Americano de Homigaoka (Celaho)/Paolo Freire school provides bilingual education and other services to local Latin American communities. As previously noted, *Kaigai Nikkeijin Kyokai* and *Covenio Kyokai* provide assistance to the Latin American *Nikkeijin* community in Japan. Additionally, Latin American *Nikkeijin* have an active ethnic press with the significant readership of the Portuguese and Spanish language newspapers of *International Press* as well as *Mundo Latino* and *Mushashi* and other publications that address areas ranging from entertainment to labour and social issues. In spite of this, there is an absence of Latin American *Nikkeijin* organizations dedicated to political advocacy. A rather famous non-*Nikkeijin* Brazilian activist and journalist, referred to a reason for the lack of political organizing as having to do with weakness of the role of NGOs in Japan.<sup>64</sup> I suggest that the answer lies more in the ways in which the state has structured Japanese civil society along with the relative newness, small minority size, and weak status of this community as well as the difficulties of reaching fluency in the Japanese language, and the 'powerful myth of return' among *Nikkeijin* immigrants.

Pharr (2003) notes eight distinctive features of post-war Japan's civil society, when compared to other advanced industrial democracies, including (1) the underrepresentation of political advocacy groups and their relative weakness in number, membership, and funding; (2) the tendency of producer groups to predominate; (3) comparatively weak labour and consumer organizations relative to producer groups; (4) the weak role of religious organizations; (5) few social movements have institutionalized themselves as permanent public-interest organizations with large professional staffs and policy agendas; (6) the working together of the mass media and political and business establishments; (7) a surprisingly small but growing international NGO sector; (8) and a close relation between an activist state and civil society (Pharr, 2003:321). Pharr's (2003) institutionalist explanation accounts for the impact of Japan's activist developmentalist state, that began with the 19th-century Meiji Restoration, on Japanese civil society in so far that it prioritized modernization and economic development and sought to shape and configure civil society in ways that complimented those efforts. In this way, the Meiji government and subsequent government in the way of sponsorship and subsidies favoured producer and business interest groups as well as neighbourhood associations (numbering some 298,000 today) that would produce social capital rather than political advocacy risking threat to the state. These were favoured over other types of civil society groups and the institutional effects of this are still being felt today (Pharr, 2003:325–326).

Although the 1998 NPO Law, which grants smaller volunteer organizations and other civic groups corporate status, has made civil society more viable. Up until recently, it was very difficult to establish a political advocacy

organization in Japan. Pekkanen (2006) argues that Japan has a dual pattern of civil society in which there are many neighbourhood associations but very few professional advocacy organizations. He explains that Japan's political institutions, its regulatory framework, financial flows, and political opportunity structure, account for this pattern of civil society (Pekkanen, 2006). The state structure of incentives create the pattern of civil society, while, according to Pekkanen,

a strict legal framework, limited funding pattern, indirect regulations (such as postal regulations that make bulk mailing for civil society organizations prohibitively expensive) and the profile of opportunities that a state's political structure creates for influencing policy – all these factors profoundly affect the development of civil society in Japan.

(Pekkanen, 2006:2–3)

Both Pharr (2003) and Pekkanen (2006) observe that, until recently, Japan's Civil Code, dating back to 1896, made it very difficult to gain legal standing as a 'public interest' organization without getting past several hurdles. For this reason, NPOs could not become legal persons and created difficulties for both growth and independence, which has had implications for political advocacy. Additionally, obtaining tax-exempt status remains difficult. Although lobbying is permitted, the lack of access to tax deductible contributions makes most groups who already lack resources less viable in issue advocacy. Pekkanen (2006) argues that this creates difficulties for movements to institutionalize as demonstrated by the lack of institutionalization of Japan's social and environmental movements of the 1960s and 1970s.

The 1998 NPO Law is important because it is the first significant change in legal regulation of Japan's civil society since the Meiji period of the late 19th century. For Pekkanen (2006) as well as Shipper (2006) the 1998 NPO Law has had some impact on Japan's civil society. According to Shipper (2008), this has been limited to service-providing NGOs such as women's support groups and medical NGOs (195).<sup>65</sup> Pekkanen (2006) notes that the 1998 NPO Law accompanied 1990s electoral reforms and hence provided a different set of incentives for political actors and interest group lobbying. Shipper (2006) argues the law has not had much impact on the growth of small issue-oriented groups. He contends that the state has not been active in promoting or discouraging 'ethnic immigrant' organizations in Japan, but suggests that this development is more the product of intergroup competition from ideological differences (Shipper, 2008:270–271). One long-term foreign resident expressed the difference between the Latin American *Nikkeijin* and *Zainichi* Korean communities' political advocacy in a way that summed up the generally perceived more legitimate claims of the long-term

and multigenerational resident *Zainichi* Korean community as opposed to the post-1990 Latin American *Nikkeijin* community.

Well, Korean residents in Japan have long established groups. They have big voices in politics here. Those voices have been around a lot of the change in laws related to foreigners in Japan. For example, the elimination of fingerprints from the foreign registration cards took place about seven to eight years ago that was primarily because of pressure from Korean residents. That is also the same basis for local representation for non-citizens in politics primarily to appease Korean interests both North and South because the two groups of expatriate residents keep very separate political agendas here. Of course, other foreigner groups in Japan have taken advantage of the efforts that they have made. Because of the special historical relationship between Japan and Korea, its just logical and natural and the Koreans being probably the biggest group (of foreigners) in terms of population.<sup>66</sup>

Of course, the longstanding *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese ethnic organizations are not truly immigrant organizations for which the task of organization must be quite formidable. Hence, it should be no surprise that Japan has few NGOs created and run primarily by immigrants (Tsuda, 2006:281). When asked why there are very few Latin American *Nikkeijin* organizations that engage in political advocacy, responses range from cultural arguments, such as the assertion that Latin Americans are simply disorganized; to the theory that *Nikkeijin* need the social networks only for jobs, but the political aspect is not yet relevant to them; to the idea that this community is too busy to organize politically because of their demanding work schedules; to the suggestion that they are overly fixated on the notion of going back to their countries of origin. I suggest adding, in addition to the aforementioned, the structure of Japanese civil society structure which, up until recently, made it very difficult to incorporate and engage in political advocacy.

In spite of the noticeable absence of Latin American *Nikkeijin* political advocacy today, there appear to be avenues opening up that could lead to more engagement. Included in the aforementioned 200 immigrant support groups are Christian, especially Catholic, religious organizations and community unions that appear to be more actively involved in organizing Latin American Nikkei immigrants for political advocacy. There seems to be a higher degree of interest, receptiveness, and optimism around Latin American *Nikkeijin* political advocacy from the leadership of these types of organizations. According to the Catholic Bishops Conference of Japan, there were some 406,974 foreign born Catholics in Japan in 2000.<sup>67</sup> The interest in *Nikkeijin* and foreign migrants can be explained by the strong connection between Latin Americans and the Catholic Church and the interest of the Church in supporting the Catholic faith throughout the world. A Japanese



Catholic nun and leader of a Christian foreign advocacy group states the mission of her organization:

To defend migrants, refugees, and people on the move. To defend their human rights and also to support their lives. Of course, we are Catholic so we need to take care of their faith.<sup>68</sup>

As previously noted, community labour unions have been fairly active in labour consultation for foreign workers, including providing translation services and counselling in cases of labour disputes and rights violations. This is another arena where I find some evidence of the beginnings of political advocacy for Latin American *Nikkeijin* workers and other foreigners. As stated previously, most of the 20,000 Japanese labour unions are affiliated with companies and are closed to temporary workers. However, there are some 500 open unions in the country. Of those, there are about 50 that work specifically with migrant labourers. These community unions, which are for the most part open to allowing any person to join at any time, benefit by increasing their constituencies and memberships. Kanagawa City Union, likely the best-known example, is one of these open unions. With a membership of 850 mostly irregular and foreign workers – 50 per cent from Latin America, 20 per cent from Japan, and 20 per cent from other parts of Asia – it is most commonly mentioned in terms of its openness to foreigners. The mission of the union includes bringing relief to those who are involved in some kind of labour dispute or the victims of labour exploitation, improvement of labour environment for members, as well as political and social improvement. For foreign workers communities in general, layoffs and salary payment problems are prevalent but Nikkei community members come to the union primarily for help with navigating labour laws and to seek support in dealing with discrimination in salary and treatment.<sup>69</sup>

There is the beginnings of self organization from other foreign communities such as the SNP Pilipino union, primarily organized by overstay workers in Kanagawa Prefecture with 90 per cent of its members as illegal and 10 per cent legal workers as well as very recent efforts from the Peruvian workers trying to form their own union, the Forma Condor Union, to which they are giving logistical support and advice. These findings about foreign self-organization lend consideration to the prospect of more foreign workers forming their own branch unions (Roberts 2000:283; Tsuda 2006:283). However, one difficulty with these unions is that foreigners come to the union to get their problems solved and once this is accomplished they often leave because they are acting on an individualistic level rather than seeing themselves as part of a broader push workers rights or for the attainment of ideological goals (Shipper, 2006:277). On the political advocacy level, there is little evidence of interest from *Nikkeijin* communities in unions as a whole or in forming such unions. Tsuda (2006:283) argues that ‘even community

labour unions that have welcomed foreigners have been unable to mobilize them for collective action against employers because of their general lack of interest, episodic participation, and internal conflicts'. Efforts like the SNP and Forma Condor Union show some sign of organization that hopefully will get to the level of advocacy but for now there is little evidence of interest particularly from legally resident Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities.

Several characteristics of group status compound limited Latin American *Nikkeijin* political incorporation. The difficulty of the Japanese language serves as a significant barrier to both social integration and political incorporation. Separation of Latin American *Nikkeijin* and Japanese in the workplace and in general reinforces the non-acquisition of the language. Japanese activists note that they cannot translate all Japanese government documents into foreign languages, so they must take the lead.

I think the second biggest problem is actually language. If we just collaborate with a certain language group, its easier but there are many migrants who speak just English, Spanish, Tagalog, Bengali, or Thai, . . . if you imagine just to prepare one meeting with all different languages. . . . And this organization is working mainly against the government so we have to read all government documents, its all in Japanese and we try to translate what we are thinking. Still it is not enough. We cannot translate all documents, even only in English, we cannot translate government documents into English, so very difficult something. The basic issue is [the documents] are only in Japanese so we cannot tell them what they are really saying.<sup>70</sup>

Another issue is the high cost of quality Japanese language education as well the unavailability of qualified Japanese instruction outside of metropolitan areas. Several of those interviewed felt that this could be addressed if the government was willing to provide free or affordable Japanese language classes for foreign residents.<sup>71</sup>

Additionally, the relative newness and small size and status of Latin American *Nikkeijin* groups also limit their political incorporation. As one Argentine *Nikkeijin* lawyer said about the political significance of the relatively small size of the *Nikkeijin* groups, 'Latin America's Nikkeis, 400,000 in Japan, its nothing'.<sup>72</sup> This could be a formidable force when compared to the next largest groups of *Zainichi* Koreans and ethnic Chinese but I argue that the linguistic differences of these Portuguese and Spanish speaking immigrants and their low status in Japanese society along with their internal hierarchy and intergroup rivalry works to constrain their ability to organize. There is a prejudicial notion of Brazilian Nikkei being more of 'pure' Japanese blood and Peruvians being mixed or indigenous and more likely to fake their Japanese descendancy with false documents and even plastic surgery to facilitate a *teijusha* visa. Along with discrimination based on generational degree of Japanese descendancy, *Nikkeijin* who look more phenotypically standard

Japanese and speak better Japanese are said to be generally favoured by the *haken gyôsha* or *haken gaisha* labour brokers over the Peruvians and this has proved to make for some conflict. A Peruvian *Nikkeijin* worker responded remarked on this issue.

There is somewhat soft discrimination. Brazilians believe that they are superior. There is a kind of racism because the Peruvians have a lot of indigenous faces but not all of them. But when you go to a *haken gaisha*. He will say, where are you from? You say I am from Peru or Bolivia. He will say no we are just looking for a Brazilian. That happens. Really. But you say but ah, I can speak Portuguese to you. The point is that if you speak all the interview in Japanese that is a good point so then say this guy, ok good. But there is some discrimination even among the Haken Geisha. For example, you call for a job and then they say we just want a *Nikkeijin* with a Japanese face. Even though you are Brazilian but you have a Brazilian face, no. It's terrible. If you can speak very good Japanese, then they say now very good.<sup>73</sup>

Takenaka (2009b) points to this hierarchy and notes that Brazilians along with Argentinians that speak good Japanese tend to get better paying jobs and assume higher posts than Peruvians. Peruvians are most likely to be the first fired in times of economic downturn.<sup>74</sup> (271) She notes the differential use of ethnicity by the state as well as *Nikkeijin* themselves (Takenaka, 2009b:277). These interviews indicate some doubts about the functionality of *Nikkeijin* as a pan-ethnic identity in Japan to facilitate political incorporation in Japan.

Again, in contrast to the extended length of residence and geopolitical ties of the long established *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese communities that have been very politically active, the *Nikkeijin* communities are relative newcomers with most arriving after the 1990 Immigration Act. This along with their relatively small size and low minority status help to constrain their limited political incorporation. There is little to indicate any efforts towards political collaboration, no bonding or bridging among groups. Antiracism and antidiscrimination could be a way to unite these various groups but lack of public recognition and political will around the issues of these groups, the lack of antidiscrimination law and mechanisms, and the pursuit of self-interest act as barriers to collaboration.<sup>75</sup>

Finally, we must address the powerful 'myth of return' (Yamanaka, 2000; 2006:100; Tsuda, 2003: xii) to their countries of origin, which has an influence on the lack of political organization of the Latin American *Nikkeijin* resident in Japan. There seems to be a relationship between the intent to return and the lack of political organization. Several activists informed me that *Nikkeijin* generally are focused on their individual lives and the possibilities of return and are simply not interested in larger political issues. One community activist in Toyota City noted: 'they came

here to get money, to accumulate money, to go back there. Basically, they are individuals'.<sup>76</sup> The Japanese state structure of incentives along with various group characteristics of Latin American *Nikkeijin* have constrained the establishment of Latin American *Nikkeijin* political advocacy organizations.

## Conclusion

Japanese ethnic nationalism has clearly influenced Japanese immigration policy and its 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in ways that privilege Japanese ethnicity but not in terms of outcomes of immigrant political incorporation. In this case and others, I suggest that ethnicity serves as a political construction. Shared ethnicity does not necessarily facilitate immigrant political incorporation. Japan's *jus sanguinis* 'ethnic citizenship' regime type facilitates the immigration of those with shared blood ties, but it is also one of the principle facts that limits the social and political incorporation of *Nikkeijin* and other foreigners in Japan due to their lack of legal Japanese citizenship or political rights. There is clearly a disconnect between central and local levels on immigration policy. Although there has been policy innovation towards more incorporation for foreign workers on the local level, the steps taken have been piecemeal and inadequate. Different localities have a range of policy inclinations towards their *Nikkeijin* communities spanning from open to restrictive. While there is no Foreign Residents Assembly in some localities, like Toyota City, Foreign Residents Assemblies established in other cities, such as Kawasaki and Hamamatsu, with the intention of providing some voice to foreign communities are largely limited to writing proposals that may or may not be moved to the next level. This has much to do with the history of the particular localities with foreign immigration at various times and the lack of central local policy coordination.

The 1990s reform of the electoral system to a mixed member system combining proportional representation and single member districts has reduced some of the previous LDP dominance and privilege and has led to changes in the political incorporation of women and some representatives of older and larger foreign resident groups such as Koreans and Taiwanese as well as to some attempts to woo overseas Japanese with legal citizenship. However, not one Latin American *Nikkeijin* descendant has been elected to office in any national contest. Neither the change of the electoral system or the liberalization of the nationality law has resulted in the formal political incorporation of Latin American *Nikkeijin* in any significant way.

It seems that although ethnicity is still very important, it is increasingly trumped by length of residence and social ties, with most informants viewing the long-term *Zainichi* Koreans and Chinese communities as ultimately sharing and having more of a stake in membership in local communities over the more recent co-ethnic *Nikkeijin* immigrants. The national and local

politicians and policymakers that I interviewed expressed the sentiment that *Zainichi* Koreans and other long-term excluded groups should be extended voting rights before the *Nikkeijin*. Although there is media coverage of groups and even political parties like the New Komeito Party advocating for voting rights for *Zainichi* Koreans and other permanent residents, one rarely sees media coverage or groups advocating for local voting rights for *Nikkeijin*.

There is little evidence of *Nikkeijin* organizations mobilizing for political advocacy. Up until recently, several legal and institutional hurdles made it very difficult to incorporate a political advocacy organization in Japan. Language difficulties emerge as a particularly large impediment to *Nikkeijin* political incorporation and segregation in the labour market reinforces non-mastery of the Japanese language. Internal hierarchy among the *Nikkeijin* also works against collaboration. The 1998 NPO Law, which reflects a change in non-profit status law, may open up new opportunities for civil society organizations but has yet to impact Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkei* immigrant political organization. Catholic organizations and community unions appear to be the most open for political advocacy of Latin American *Nikkeijin*.

Although Japan has undergone changes conducive to stronger liberal democracy, the social and political incorporation of its foreign communities, and, specifically for this study, the community of Latin American *Nikkeijin* co-ethnics, remains a challenge. As Latin American *Nikkeijin* immigration emerged from an array of changeable political and economic factors and their length of stay and permanent residency is increasing in Japan, the possibility of political incorporation and collaboration with other groups may become reality in the not too distant future but has not materialized as yet. All of this says much about the disconnect between the xenophobic sentiment that can fuel immigration policy and the outcomes in terms of integration and immigrant political incorporation. The case of the political incorporation of the *Nikkeijin* in Japan tells us much about how nationalism informs immigration policy and the relational nature of the politics of ethnicity. It demonstrates the ways in which symbolic politics around membership based on ethnicity is instrumentalized at various times by both the state and informal political actors for political or economic gain and ultimately regardless of ethnicity or blood ties. Japan's older and larger excluded groups with voting rights are being increasingly heard in contrast to the *Nikkeijin* 'foreigners' without voting rights. It is ironic that the shared ethnicity of the *Nikkeijin* that was once used to symbolize sameness, familiarity, and safety by the state has more recently been flipped on its head to symbolize 'foreignness' and criminality. This case demonstrates both the use of the 'symbolic politics' (Edelman, 1964) of ethnicity and membership as well as the 'gap hypothesis' (Cornelius et al., 1994:3) or the gap between the goals of national immigration policy and outcomes. Oddly enough, although this policy was established to maintain homogeneity, it may have helped to push open the doors wider to the realities of an increasingly multicultural Japan.

# 7

## Political Transnationalism in Question: What Limits the Political Transnationalism of ‘Transnational’ Groups in Liberal Democracies 1985–2008?

This chapter addresses the factors that limit or facilitate the development of political transnationalism of Dutch Antillean and Aruban postcolonial Dutch citizens in the Netherlands and the Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendants) in Japan. These groups are legal immigrants who inherit host state access because of shared Dutch citizenship and a Japanese visa (*teijusha*) based on consanguinity. While transnationalism usually implies simultaneous sociocultural belonging, attachment, and activity in two or more states, political transnationalism specifically refers to both formal and informal political activity in both the country of origin and the host country. In this chapter, I derive my definition of political transnationalism from Guarnizo (2001), as ‘to be incorporated formally and simultaneously ‘here’ and ‘there’ through privileges opened up by dual citizenship, and the reach... of government programs, political parties, and candidates for office from their countries of origin’ Guarnizo (2001:214). My research indicates extensive transnationalism in the way of sociocultural attachments and interaction, but very limited political transnationalism among Antilleans in the Netherlands and *Nikkeijin* in Japan. The literature on political transnationalism is rather silent on what makes groups already labelled ‘transnational’ become politically transnational. There has been

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little systematic attempt to explain the limited emergence of political transnationalism in these two cases.

As previous chapters have already discussed the migration and political incorporation of these groups in the Netherlands and Japan, this chapter attempts to explain the limited emergence of political transnationalism. This has much to do with the economic state of countries of origin and their level of dependence on migrant remittances, home country formal electoral rules and party systems, host country active ethnic advocacy organizations, and group status. The chapter will begin by problematizing political transnationalism. This will be followed by an analysis of formal electoral systems, rules, and party systems of the Dutch Kingdom, concentrating on Curaçao and Aruba in relation to the Netherlands and Brazil and Peru with regard to Japan, and the lack of active ethnic advocacy organizations for these groups in their host countries. We will close with a discussion of group status, another factor that limits the emergence of political transnationalism for Antilleans and Arubans in the Netherlands and Latin American *Nikkeijin* in Japan.

### **Problematizing political transnationalism**

The difficulties of integration for many contemporary immigrant groups has led some to argue that transnationalism and/or post-nationalism can facilitate social and political incorporation (Schiller et al., 1992; Bauböck, 1994; Schiller et al., 1994; Soysal, 1994; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Portes et al., 1999; Portes et al., 2002). Morawska (2001) defines transnationalism as, ‘a combination of civic political memberships, economic involvements, social networks and cultural identities that links people and institutions in two or more nation-states in diverse, multilayered patterns’ (175–176). According to Schiller and Fouron (1999), ‘transnational migration is a pattern of migration in which persons, although they move across international borders, settle, and establish relations in a new state, maintain ongoing social connections with the polity from which they originated’ (344). Guarnizo (2001) suggests that political activity in both host and home societies are facilitated by dual citizenship, government programs, political parties, and home country candidates for office (214). Defining transnationalism and political transnationalism and delineating the point where one begins and the other ends has produced some conceptual blurriness in the literature.

Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a) defines transnational political practices as ‘various forms of direct cross-border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees (such as voting and other support to political parties, participating in debates in the press), as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country (or international organizations) . . . In contrast to economic and social practices,

regular cross-border contact, but not necessarily travel, is a constitutive part of political transnational practices' (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a:762). Itsigsohn (2000) defines the 'immigrant's political transnational field' as 'a realm of recurrent and institutionalized interactions between, on the hand, immigrants and their social and political organizations, and on the other hand, the political institutions and state apparatus of the country of origin' (Itsigsohn, 2000:1129–1130). Shain and Barth (2003) define diaspora as 'a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland – whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control' (Shain and Barth, 2003:452). Lyons and Mandaville (2012) draw a distinction between the 'transnational politics' of transnational advocacy groups and NGOs towards an ethics of cosmopolitanism and that of diaspora mobilization with particularist, parochial, territorial and ethno-national agendas (7). While much of this scholarship has done the work of identifying and labelling types and practices of transnational phenomena, a number of issues seem to be overlooked. For example, where does transnationalism end and political transnationalism begin? Additionally, questions of more systematic linkage between political transnationalism and immigration political incorporation arise (Minnite, 2009:58). Does shared citizenship, ethnicity, or minority status matter? What are we to expect politically from groups already deemed 'transnational' as well as 'diasporic'?

### **Transnational communities and diasporas**

Both the Dutch Antilleans and Arubans and Latin American *Nikkeijin* have been identified in the literature as 'transnational communities' as well as 'diasporas'. However, it seems that scholars disagree on the extent of Antillean transnationality. Oostindie and Klinkers (2003) argue that Dutch Antilleans and Arubans have created a diaspora in the Netherlands of 'truly transnational' communities. Fennema and Tillie (2001) identified a Turkish transnational orientation that lends dual nationality and eases political integration to Turks living in the Netherlands. This model is contrasted with what they determine as the Dutch Caribbean groups' Dutch nationality and limited transnationality. Fennema and Tillie (2001) attribute this to a political culture created by colonialism and slavery in the Dutch Antillean and Aruban countries of origin. Yamanaka (2000) discusses transnationalism as shaping a process of *Nikkeijin* 'circular diaspora formation'. Ishii (2003) notes the ways in which the transnational strategies of Brazilian *Nikkeijin* between host and home countries have been understudied (209). Tsuda (2003) argues that Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* are transnational communities without a transnational consciousness and notes both their lack of interest and participation in both home country politics as well as politics in Japan. Given the notable interaction between host and home countries of these groups afforded by increasingly globalized technological and transportation infrastructure, there is little doubt of their transnationality



However, as per the aforementioned, these groups have been labelled with varying degrees of 'transnationality' but with little distinction or reference to political transnationalism.

### **Remittances and more?**

Some of the literature on transnationalism contends that the increased flow of remittances from migrants living in economically advanced countries to their home countries leads to the development of politicized transnational communities. This is because home states become dependent on the financial flow and ties to their citizens abroad and thus seek to increase these linkages while in turn immigrants seek more of a voice in their home country's affairs (Guarnizo, 1998; Jones-Correa, 1998; Guarnizo, 2001). Mobilization through political transnationalism is argued to increase political incorporation in both the home and host countries. Guarnizo (2001) notes that the politics of the Dominican Republic is heavily influenced by overseas Dominicans and their remittances facilitated by inexpensive and reliable communications and transport. The 1994 Dominican approval of dual citizenship intensified this transnationalism peaking with the 1996 election of New York transmigrant Dominican President Leonel Fernandez. The Dominican government advocates the acquisition of American citizenship for Dominicans in the United States with the hope that they will involve themselves with policy related to Dominican issues (Itzigsohn, 2000; Guarnizo, 2001). Itsighson (2012) notes Dominican as well as Mexican state efforts to 'tap into the resources of migrant communities' and construct a 'transnational nation' (192, 196). Østergaard-Nielsen (2003b) highlights the efforts of sending states including the expansion of dual nationality to both encourage naturalization and thereby increase the political influence of their nationals on foreign governments as well as offer them sets of rights in the home county. She notes the influence of emigrants and diasporas in homeland politics as well as lobbying to have nationals abroad represent home country interests by playing a role in bilateral relations, for example, Irish, Greeks, Jews, and Mexicans in the United States, Turkish and Armenian, Cyprian, and Eritrean minorities in Europe, and elsewhere (18,19,20,212c).

Guarnizo (2001) shows the strengths and weaknesses of an emergent political transnationalism in the examples of Colombians in New York and Salvadorans in Los Angeles. He points to consular intervention to naturalize and mobilize political activity as well as social fragmentation and political wariness and, in the case of the Salvadorans in Los Angeles, the absence of strong organizations. He points to the end of a civil war politics, the consequential presence of organizations, recent arrival, and a struggle to become documented in the latter case (Guarnizo, 2001:236–243). While acknowledging the major contribution of migrant remittances to the economies of Colombia, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic, Guarnizo et al. (2003) finds differences in their political transnationalism based on

individual characteristics (human capital), the contexts of migration, and social networks. For example, Dominicans were more likely to engage in electoral politics, Salvadorans most likely to participate in the politics of their local hometowns and regions, and Colombians least likely to engage in home country politics. They conclude that political transnationalism is undertaken by a small minority of migrants sensitive to changing contextual conditions and not as extensive as previously thought. Lyons and Mandaville (2012) argue that the *real politik* of domestic comparative politics, including party politics, interest groups, and patrimonialism and clientelistic behaviour have become transnational through globalization and its new patterns of human mobility and transnational social networks. How does this apply to postcolonial Dutch Antilleans and Arubans in the Netherlands and Latin American *Nikkeijin* in Japan?

### **Emergence of political transnationalism**

Although Dutch Antilleans and Arubans and Latin American *Nikkeijin* are identified in the literature as 'transnational communities' and 'diasporas', there is little evidence of political transnationalism among these groups in the Netherlands and Japan. The facts that these groups possess the legal right (citizenship) or access (*teijusha* visa) of entry and settlement and hence freedom of movement and have differences in terms of rights, human capital and remittances offers little to explain their limited political transnationalism. Itsigsohn (2000) uses the cases of the development of a political transnationalism in the Dominican, Haitian, and Salvadoran communities to identify an institutional pattern of transnational politics. He notes that 'this pattern is linked to a particular form of insertion in the world economy, to the development of competitive party politics, and to the presence of strong immigrant organizations in the receiving countries' (Itsigsohn, 2000:1147). Itsigsohn (2000) argues that political transnationalism is likely to emerge given the existence of three conditions: 1) when the home country is in such an economic position that it needs the financial resources of immigrants (i.e. remittances); 2) when there is a presence of competitive party politics in the home country; and 3) when there are strong organizations of immigrants in the host countries (Itsigsohn, 2000:1126, 1149). Itsigsohn contends that what is new and different from other periods is 'the inclusion of the political organizations organized by immigrants abroad in the democratic political competition of the sending countries' (Itsigsohn, 2000:1144).

Portes (1999) draws a distinction between old and contemporary political transnationalism in that, 'first, political transnationalism is greatly aided at present by technological developments and by the size and economic resources of expatriate communities. Second, to the extent that home governments become involved proactively in these activities, they create the conditions for greater voice for immigrant organizations that can turn them

towards promotion of their own objectives' (Portes, 1999:475). Koslowski (2005) argues that emigrant participation in home country politics or what he calls 'the globalization of domestic politics' is 'driven by three factors: increasing migration, which expands the number of potential political actors; the transportation and communications revolutions, which enable emigrants to maintain contact with their home countries more easily; and increasing democratization, which creates not only a climate conducive to political activity in host states but also opportunities in home states' (Koslowski, 2005:25).

Building on Itsigsohn's (2000), Portes' (1999), and Koslowski's (2005) arguments, I contend that home country degree of dependency on migrant remittances, electoral rules and practices that complicate overseas voting, and a dearth of active host country ethnic advocacy organizations aligned with group status limits the emergence of political transnationalism in these cases (see Table 7.1).

### **Economic state of countries of origin and migrant remittances**

When we compare the Dutch Antillean and Aruban communities in the Netherlands with the Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* communities in Japan, there is vast divergence when it comes to their economic situation and the amount of remittances being sent back to their home countries. While the Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities in Japan send the Japanese yen equivalent of billions of dollars to their home countries, the Dutch Antillean and Aruban communities in the Netherlands remit very little to their home islands. The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Netherlands Antilles has a total population of 180,800 (2004) with a GDP of US\$2.8 billion (2004), and a GDP per capita (PPP) of US\$16,000 (2004).<sup>1</sup> Aruba has a total population of 99,000 (2004) with a GDP of US\$2.145 billion (2004) and a GDP Per Capita (PPP) of US\$21,878 (2004).<sup>2</sup> The Netherlands had a total population of 16.3 million in 2004 with a GDP of US\$512.7 billion (2003) and a GDP Per Capita (PPP) of US\$29,371 (2003).<sup>3</sup> As there is not an extremely wide divergence in the GDP Per Capita PPP of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba and the Netherlands, these data indicate that Dutch Antilleans and Arubans live in a relatively affluent part of the world when compared to their geographic neighbours. However, the ways in which wealth is actually distributed and the access to opportunities is a different matter. As indicated in Chapters 2 and 3, Antilleans and Arubans move to the Netherlands for various reasons including access to better paying jobs, education, and the generous Dutch welfare state.

Although Brazil and Peru lie in the same Latin American and Caribbean region, a different picture emerges when we look at their economic situations. Brazil has a total population of 181.4 million (2003) with a GDP of US\$505.7 billion (2003) and a GDP per capita (PPP) US\$7,790 (2003).<sup>4</sup> Peru

Table 7.1 Variables limiting the emergence of political transnationalism

		Electoral rules and practices				Group status			Outcome
	Remittances from host to home countries	Electoral system	Electoral rules	Party system	Ethnic advocacy groups in host country	Perception of government and politics			Political transnationalism
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	N/A	Parliamentary PR list	No overseas voting rights (only special conditions)	Multiparty/fragmented	Very limited	Somewhat corrupt	Small	Simultaneous ambivalent minority	Limited
Brazil	Yes	Presidential PR open list	No dual nationality Compulsory Voting Overseas Voting rights in presidential elections	Multiparty/fragmented	Very limited	Somewhat corrupt	Small	Simultaneous ambivalent minority	Limited
Peru	Yes	Presidential PR open list	Dual nationality possible but not allowed by Japan Compulsory Voting Overseas Voting rights in presidential and congressional elections Dual nationality possible but not allowed by Japan	Multiparty/fragmented	Very limited	Somewhat corrupt	Small	Simultaneous ambivalent minority	Limited

Table 7.2 Population, GDP, GDP (PPP) data for Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, the Netherlands, Brazil, Peru, and Japan, 2003–2004

	NA	Aruba	NL	Brazil	Peru	Japan
Population	180,800 (2004)	99,000 (2004)	16.3 million (2004)	181.4 million (2003)	27.2 million (2003)	127.6 million (2003)
GDP	US\$2.8 billion (2004)	US\$2.145 billion (2004)	US\$512.7 billion (2003)	US\$505.7 billion (2003)	US\$60.8 billion (2003)	US\$4.3 trillion (2003)
GDP (PPP)	US\$16,000 (2004)	US\$21,878 (2004)	US\$29,371 (2003)	US\$7,790 (2003)	US\$5,260 (2003)	US\$27,967 (2003)

Source: Compiled from UN, World Bank, and Dutch Antillean and Aruban Central Banks (see notes 2–7).

has a total population of 27.2 million (2003) with a GDP of \$60.8 billion (2003) and GDP Per Capita (PPP) of US\$5,260 (2003).<sup>5</sup> Japan has a total population of 127.6 million (2003) with a GDP \$4.3 trillion (2003) and a GDP Per Capita (PPP) of US\$27,967 (2003).<sup>6</sup> Hence, unlike the Dutch Kingdom, there is a wide divergence between GDP and the GDP Per Capita of Brazil, Peru, and Japan (see Table 7.2). Thus, when we compare the Netherlands and Japan, it makes sense that while some 70 per cent of the Latin American adult immigrants living in Japan send remittances, with 304,824 of them sending a combined total of about \$2.65 billion to their families on an annual basis. Very little in the way of remittances is being sent from the Antillean communities in the Netherlands to their home countries.<sup>7</sup> However, contrary to the conventional wisdom on remittances and political transnationalism, Antilleans and Arubans as well as Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* display little political transnationalism (see Table 7.1). I argue that while dependence on remittances increase the likelihood of the emergence of political transnationalism, the level of dependency on migrant remittances, electoral rules and practices and ethnic advocacy organizations aligned with group status in host and home countries best explains the lack of political transnationalism.

## Electoral rules and practices

Despite the divergence in the level of dependency on remittances, the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, Brazil, and Peru are all governed by multiparty democracies, but all share patterns of having electoral rules and practices that complicate overseas voting, fragmented party systems, and governments that are perceived as potentially corrupt and that are marked by clientelistic and patronistic behaviour. Following Itzigshohn (2000), I contend

that the structure of the electoral systems and party systems in the home countries are both important variables in explaining the limited political transnationalism of our groups and countries of study. In this examination of the home countries' electoral rules and practices between 1985 and 2008, we look at the formal democratic political system and changes that have affected access to participation.

### **Netherlands Antilles and Aruba**

As stated in Chapter 3, The Dutch Kingdom is currently made up of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba. The Netherlands Antilles is a federation of the five island states of Curaçao (administrative capital), Bonaire, Saba, St. Eustatius, and St. Maarten. The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba<sup>8</sup> are not independent but Dutch 'overseas' self-governing countries with defence, foreign affairs and nationality the Kingdom's responsibility. Most of their populations hold Dutch nationality and have full mobility and 'the right of permanent abode' in the Netherlands (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003). The total population of the Netherlands Antilles (175,663) and Aruba (92,676) in 2001 was 268,339.<sup>9</sup>

The Dutch Antilles and Aruba are parliamentary democracies. In terms of the electoral system, the Dutch Antilles and Aruba use the same proportional list parliamentary system as the Netherlands and there is not a wide divergence in patterns of voter turnout. In spite of this, there is little evidence of political transnationalism. I believe that a key element in the constraints of the emergence of Dutch Antillean and Aruban political transnationalism is the fact that the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba do not extend overseas voting rights<sup>10</sup> and hence their communities in the Netherlands generally do not have the right to vote in Dutch Antillean and Aruban elections. Moreover, Dutch Antilleans and Arubans generally cannot vote in Dutch national elections from their home islands. Additionally, politics is a fairly self-contained phenomena on the Dutch islands sometimes characterized by party fragmentation in these multiparty systems as well as occasionally associated with clientelism and patronage that some have deemed corruption (Hoefte, 1996). As one government official informant of Antillean origin remarked:

Not only Curaçao, mind you, I'm not only blaming Curaçao – the whole of the Caribbean has this paternalistic system, and that is why politics is a very personal thing in the whole of the Caribbean. It is not your ideology that counts, no, I know you, and you will take care of me if I vote for you, etc., ... So it's a very personal thing.<sup>11</sup>

It is of note that when we compare the size of the populations of these islands at 268,339<sup>12</sup> with the size of these groups in the Netherlands at 130,722,<sup>13</sup> we can see that a considerable proportion of Antilleans and Arubans live in the Netherlands. Hence, a change in the electoral rules to

allow overseas voting from the Netherlands in Dutch Antillean and Aruban elections might well change some of the dynamics of the self-contained and sometimes clientelistic phenomena of island politics.

These factors combined with the realities of little to no existing dependency on the remittances of the Antillean and Aruba communities in the Netherlands make for conditions in which Antillean and Aruban political parties have little incentive to pursue Antillean and Aruban voters in the Netherlands. Beyond occasional delegational visits by those members of parliament who have the islands on their agenda, there is a lack of substantive Dutch political party interest in the electoral potential of the Dutch islands. Moreover, the fact the most Dutch Antilleans and Arubans cannot vote in Dutch national elections further compounds this limited political transnationalism.

The Dutch Ministry of Interior writes:

All Dutch nationals who are aged 18 or over on polling day are entitled to vote in elections. Dutch nationals resident abroad are entitled to vote in elections to the Lower House and the European Parliament. However, in the case of Dutch nationals living in the Netherlands Antilles (and Aruba), certain conditions are attached: they must have previously resided for at least ten years in the Netherlands, or be a Dutch public servant, or be the spouse, partner or child of a Dutch public servant and form part of the same household as that person. Only those resident in a particular province or municipality on the day on which candidates are nominated may vote in the election for the provincial or municipal council concerned.<sup>14</sup>

And now we see this come full circle, as Dutch political parties as well have little to no incentive to mobilize support in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba and a situation has been created in which Antilleans and Aruban knowledge of Dutch politics is rather limited because there has been no pressing need to be knowledgeable about this subject. It can be said that even if these groups did have voting rights in the Netherlands, Dutch political parties would be unlikely to pursue these groups on their home islands because of the small size of these island populations and the relatively low status of these groups in the Netherlands.

Chapters 3 and 4 have already discussed the ways in the Dutch Antilles and Aruba have been depicted in the Dutch media as a wasteful drain on the Dutch economy. The Antillean and Aruban communities in the Netherlands have been associated with crime, antisocial behaviour, and a burden on the Dutch welfare state. It is quite telling that the PVDA (Dutch Labor Party) had an established office in New York City for many years but maintained little presence in the Dutch Antilles and Aruba. One member of parliament's (PVDA) response about this reveals the obvious prioritization of influential professional native Dutch citizens with overseas voting rights over Dutch

Antilleans and Arubans in the selection of New York rather than the Dutch Antilles and Aruba for an overseas office.

**Q: I see that the PVDA (Labor Party) has an office in New York, why is that?**

Yes, you have a lot of Dutch people working in New York. And (the PVDA) felt that those people who are Partij van de Arbeid, when they're living in New York they should also have a network of New York, so that's how they started the base in New York.<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, as the Dutch Antilles and Aruba are part of the Dutch Kingdom, and hence not independent states and all have the Dutch nationality, there is no possibility of dual nationality.

The Netherlands has a participatory and consultative structure for recognized minorities, which has its foundations in the Minorities Policy (*Minderhedennota*) of the 1980s. Under the Minorities Policy, these organizations gave solicited and unsolicited advice to the Minister, but since 1997 under the integration policy, 'the emphasis is more on the exchanging of views than on giving advice' (Van Hulst, 2000:22). The *Stichting Overlegorgaan Caribische Nederlanders* (OCAN) (Consultative Body of the Caribbean Dutch)<sup>16</sup> is an independent consultative organization of the Dutch Kingdom government, originally established in different form under the Minorities Policy and now under the Integration Policy, that is subsidized by the Executive Board Coordinating the Integration Policy of the Dutch Ministry of Justice. OCAN advocates for the interests of the Antillean and Aruban communities in the Netherlands.<sup>17</sup> It used to be an advisory body but, with the change from the Minorities Policy to the Integration Policy, it and the other consultative organizations representing ethnic minorities no longer performs in an advisory capacity but only has a consultative status. Moreover, organizations like OCAN, *Vereniging Antilliaans Netwerk* (United Antillean Network), and the *Movimientu Antiano i Arubano pa Promové Partisipashon* (MAAPP) are for the most part oriented towards the Antillean and Aruban communities in the Netherlands. Foundations such as the *Uitvoeringsorganisatie Stichting Ontwikkeling Nederlandse Antillen* (USONA) (Support Organization Foundation for Cooperation with the Netherlands Antilles) are also concerned with Antillean development cooperation with the Netherlands. My interviews reveal some disagreement between the plenipotentiary Resident Ministers of Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles as to their role towards the Antillean and Aruban communities in the Netherlands. The Netherlands Antilles minister seems to favour the position that the integration of the Antillean community is the responsibility of the Dutch municipalities. Aruba's minister seemed to be more concerned with facilitating the educational success of Aruba's large student population



in the Netherlands. On the Antillean and Aruban organizational level there is little sustained effort by Dutch Antillean or Aruban organizations in the Netherlands to mobilize political action in the Dutch islands or to influence the Antillean and Aruban governments. Notables such as Curaçaoan born Dutch MP John Leerdam (PVDa) and others have had a presence in debates on the Antilles both in the Netherlands and the Dutch islands. A change towards the emergence of a political transnationalism would more than likely require greater interdependence among the home islands and the Dutch Antilleans and Aruban communities in the Netherlands, a change of voting rules allowing overseas voting for these communities<sup>18</sup> as well as more governmental transparency, and many more Dutch Antillean and Aruban organizations in the Netherlands dedicated to political advocacy.

### Brazil

At the time of the beginning of the *Nikkejin* migration in 1990, Brazil had experienced civilian democratic rule for only five years. Prior to this, Brazil was under military rule from 1964–1985. Brazil is a presidential federal republic and its new constitution was approved in 1988. Throughout its political history, Brazil has been negatively impacted by enormous wealth disparity, corruption, and party fragmentation. Freedom House (2004) points out that civilian rule has been plagued by corruption scandals, which led to the impeachment of Brazil's first directly elected president following military rule, President Fernando Collor de Mello (1989–1992).<sup>19</sup> Mainwaring (1991) notes that Brazil uses all three of the most common electoral methods in its electoral system. He writes:

Like several other Latin American nations, Brazil has a mixture of representational formulas uncommon in the advanced industrial democracies. Power in the political system is concentrated in the executive branch. Elections for most executive offices, including president, governors, and mayors of cities with at least 200,000 voters, have a majoritarian format with a runoff between the two top finishers if nobody obtains 50 percent of the vote in the first round. Elections for mayors of cities with under 200,000 are based on a single round plurality method, and senate seats are also filled in plurality (first-past-the post) elections. Still other positions (federal deputies, state deputies, town council representatives) are filled in proportional system.

(Mainwaring, 1991:22)

The president is directly elected and serves as both head of state and government. Brazil has a bicameral legislature (Lower House-Chamber of Deputies/Upper House-Senate). The electoral system for Chamber of Deputies is a proportional representation open list system, based on federal states, which permits voters to vote for a party or write in the names of individual candidates.

The write-in procedure requires name recognition, which candidates develop through pork-barrel distribution politics. Much like Japan's electoral system before the 1994 reforms, many contend that this system encourages clientelism and corruption. Power and Roberts (1995) characterize the ways in which party authority and the party system is weakened in the elections for the lower house or Chamber of Deputies and how the complications of this system may negatively impact newly enfranchised voters:

Elections for the lower house known as the Chamber of Deputies employ an unusual system known as open-list proportional representation. In contrast to the more common party-list or closed-list stem of PR, in Brazil the political parties do not rank-order their candidates – instead the voters do this on election day via preference voting. If a candidate's party achieves the electoral quotient and wins seats in the legislature, his/her individual election is determined by his/her position relative to other candidates of the same party. In other words, voters completely determine the order of candidates elected, and the parties have no say in the matter. This weakens party authority over politicians, and means that individualism rather than programmatic or ideological concerns is what dominates campaigns.

(Power and Roberts, 1995:799)

Mainwaring (1991) notes how the electoral rules that emerged during and as a consequence of authoritarian military rule limit party discipline and party loyalty and reinforce individualistic behaviour such as party switching, thus weakening the party system (Mainwaring, 1991:24–26, 21). One of the most notable aspects of Brazil's new electoral system put in place with the 1988 constitution is that presidents have difficulty putting together majority coalitions for legislative initiatives so its can be a challenge to accomplish major policy objectives. This is in turn accompanied by an underdeveloped and fragmented party system characterized by a multiplicity of weak parties and party loyalties in which candidates and people switch parties easily, further complicating the legislative process. The Brazilian president enjoys broad powers but in order to get legislation passed, Brazilian presidents must attempt to hold coalitions together. The fragmented Congress makes for inefficiency and occasional gridlock, which is reinforced by the federal powers of the states. For this reason, presidents are often forced to govern by 'emergency measures' which allow a president to initiate laws for 30 days, after which the Congress can either pass or reject them (Klesner, 2008:752).

Despite the large amount of remittances being sent annually from the Brazilian *Nikkeijin* community in Japan to Brazil, there is little proof of a developing political transnationalism. Brazil has the legal requirement of compulsory voting<sup>20</sup> for Brazilian citizens, optional for illiterates and those over 70 years of age, which is taken fairly seriously with penalties

for non-compliance ranging from fines to an eventual loss of the right to vote (Power and Roberts, 1995:800). It is compulsory to vote, but since 1989 overseas Brazilians are only allowed to vote in presidential elections (Calderon-Chelius, 2007:128,136). There is a lack of Brazilian political party presence or outreach in Japan despite the legal requirement of compulsory voting. I argue that Brazil's fragmented party system and cumbersome overseas voting procedures along with the relatively small size of the Brazilian population in Japan (286,557)<sup>21</sup> makes it fairly unattractive for Brazilian political parties to pursue potential Brazilian voters in Japan. Additionally, although Brazil allows dual nationality, the Japanese government technically does not allow dual nationality past 22 years of age.<sup>22</sup>

Although the Brazilian government has set up computerized electoral stations to facilitate overseas voting in presidential elections, there are bureaucratic complications to overseas voting procedures. This includes the requirement that one must register as an overseas voter some six months prior to an election. Due to the fact that many intend to return to Brazil, many Brazilian *Nikkeijin* prefer not to transfer their voting registers so that when they go back to Brazil they won't have to retransfer. As voting is compulsory, noncompliance is punishable by the withholding of government services such as access to passports or public documents. Hence, one must justify nonvoting. Brazilian nationals in Japan simply go the consulate and obtain a stamp stating that they were abroad. This is an important reason for the small size of the electorate in Japan at just 86,000 and can serve as impediments to overseas voting.<sup>23</sup>

Additionally, Brazilian *Nikkeijin* themselves are discouraged by what they perceive as clientelism and corruption in Brazilian politics (Mainwaring, 1991:39). The economic and political crisis of Brazil during the 1990s is what caused many Brazilian *Nikkeijin* to immigrate to Japan in the first place. The President had been impeached and people felt unprotected by their government. There was a sense of discontent and lack of belief in Brazilian politicians and institutions.<sup>24</sup> In 2004, Transparency International rated Brazil number 59 out of total of 146 countries with a corruption score of 3.9 on a ten-point scale ranging between 10 for 'highly clean' to 0 for 'highly corrupt' on its Corruption Perceptions Index 2004.<sup>25</sup>

In spite of this, as Brazilian democracy consolidates, the Brazilian *Nikkeijin* community could become more attractive to Brazilian political actors. The Bank of Brazil's website<sup>26</sup> has a section that focuses on servicing the Brazilian *Nikkeijin* community in Japan. In what can be speculated as a response to the billions of dollars in remittances sent from Japan, the Brazilian government instituted 'roving consulates' that provide consular services, legal and educational advice to the Brazilian community throughout Japan, and 'citizens councils' of Brazilian community or business leaders who meet to discuss ways and means to help the Brazilian community in Japan around questions of education, health insurance, social security, etc., and

who serve as a link between the Brazilian community and Japanese local governments.<sup>27</sup>

Although there are several notable *Nikkeijin* organizations in Japan including *Kagai Nikkeijin Kyokai* (Association of Japanese and Nikkei Abroad), my research indicates a lack of Brazilian organizations in Japan dedicated to political action in Brazil. However, the growing efforts of the Brazilian government to maintain ties to the Brazilian community in Japan reflect an acknowledgement of the amount of financial resources being sent. I contend that whether or not this results in the development of a political transnationalism between the Brazilian *Nikkeijin* community and Brazil is determinant on the continued need for overseas remittances, the consolidation of Brazil's democracy and party system, a change of Brazilian overseas voting procedures and practices, the growth of the population, and more Brazilian *Nikkeijin* immigrant advocacy organizations in Japan.

### Peru

As in the case of Brazil, Peru has alternated between periods of civil and authoritarian rule since its independence in the 19th century. Contemporary Peru is a constitutional republic. Elected civilians have held office since a 12-year military dictatorship ended in 1980, but this coincided with the rise of the Shining Path Maoist insurgency that has now lasted for more than two decades. At the time of the beginning of the Peruvian *Nikkeijin* migration in 1990, Peru had only experienced civilian democratic rule for some ten years and most of those years can be characterized by a political atmosphere of graft and corruption and the constant fear of terrorist attack from the Shining Path insurgency. The corrupt political establishment and the rise of the Shining Path paved the way for the 1990 electoral victory, and the accompanying repressive measures, of Japanese descendant, President Alberto Fujimori. Schmidt (1996) demonstrates how Peru's electoral rules allowed the political outsider Fujimori's electoral victory to undercut the then growing leftist movement in electoral politics through an article in the constitution which allowed for simultaneous candidacies for the executive and legislative branches and a majority runoff system modelled on the French Fifth Republic (Schmidt, 1996:330).

Hence, the Peruvian *Nikkeijin* migration to Japan initiated in 1990 took place amidst the ascension of Alberto Fujimori to presidential office. In 1992, Fujimori, with military backing, suspended the constitution and dissolved congress replacing it with an 80-member constituent assembly that created a unicameral congress closely under presidential control (Freedom House, 2004). Kenney (2004) shows how institutional factors such as the president's lack of a legislative majority led to this breakdown of democracy in Peru in 1992 (Kenney, 2004:3). These actions of Fujimori were rationalized as legitimate in the fight against Shining Path terrorism and in 1996 Congress

passed a law allowing Fujimori to run for a third turn arguing that it was not a violation of the constitution's limit of two terms because this was essentially a run for a second term under the new constitution of 1993.

Although Fujimori was to face presidential challenger Alejandro Toledo in a 2000 runoff election, Toledo refused to participate on the grounds of repressive measures by the incumbent administration. During this time a videotape was released that raised suspicion that electoral support for Fujimori in the Congress was being achieved through the bribing of opposition members to switch sides. This resulted in Fujimori being driven from office and an opposition leader being chosen as interim president. During this period, Fujimori fled to Japan where it was determined that he possessed Japanese nationality because his parents had registered him at the Japanese Consulate in Peru at birth.<sup>28</sup> A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established in Peru in 2001 to reconcile the human rights violations by both the Fujimori government and the Shining Path. Elections were held in 2002 bringing Toledo to power but in time he too was accused of graft and corruption.

Contemporary Peru is generally regarded as a democracy. Schmidt (1996) demonstrates how the 1985 electoral system led to a fragmented party system through, like Brazil, its version of open-list proportional representation and preferential voting within the context of its political economy and insurgency (Schmidt, 1996:338). Along with constitutional reform, Peru's highly centralized political system was restructured in 2002 granting more autonomy to subnational units. As for the electoral system, the single nationwide district was replaced by multiple districts but still using a proportional open list system with seats allocated to various departments based on the population. Freedom House (2004) argues that this reform has allowed the long neglected population outside of the four largest cities to have some attention from the state and political parties.<sup>29</sup> The president and 120 members of the unicameral congress are directly elected for five-year terms. In spite of Peru's legal requirement of compulsory voting,<sup>30</sup> as in the case of Brazil, Peru's party system continues to suffer from party fragmentation. Freedom House (2007) writes:

The Peruvian political system is open to the rise and fall of new political parties – too open according to many political observers. Lack of programmatic coherence and constant party switching have discredited political parties in the eyes of Peruvians, which further reinforces the trend toward fragmentation.<sup>31</sup>

Like Brazil, in spite of the fairly large amounts of remittances being sent annually from the Peruvian Nikkei community in Japan to Peru, there is little evidence of the emergence of political transnationalism. Some may

argue that the five-year Japanese residence of President Fujimori is evidence of an emergent Peruvian *Nikkejin* political transnationalism. I contend that Fujimori's period of residence is uncharacteristic and has more to do with the political decision of Japanese bureaucrats who appreciated Fujimori's handling of the 1997 Japanese Embassy in Peru hostage crisis rather than evidence of an overall Peruvian *Nikkeijin* political transnationalism.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, Schmidt (1996) notes that the Japanese *Nikkeijin* community in Peru did not support Fujimori because he was never active in its activities (Schmidt, 1996:347).

As with Brazil, Peru's fragmented party system and cumbersome overseas voting procedures along with the relatively small size of the Peruvian constituency in Japan do not encourage Peruvian political parties to pursue potential Peruvian voters in Japan. Since 1980, it has been compulsory for overseas Peruvians to vote in presidential and congressional elections.<sup>33</sup> Even so, there appears to be a lack of Peruvian political party presence or outreach in Japan. Peru has a fairly complicated system of overseas voting with noncompliance punishable by fines and sanctions that prevent individuals from obtaining basic government services. As one recent US newspaper report regarding the Peruvian community in the United States notes:

Until they pay the fine, Peruvians who don't vote fall into a kind of 'civic death' that prevents them from obtaining government services, such as obtaining a birth certificate for a child or finalizing a divorce in their country. Those abroad can't access consular services, such as renewing a passport or replacing an identity card until they settle up. In Peru, registering to vote is automatic for anyone who has a national identity card, which is necessary for basic activities, such as opening a bank account.<sup>34</sup>

One report of a Peruvian citizen in the United States explains what he perceives as a lack of service for the amount of remittances sent, 'It's abusive, with all the money we send back to Peru, we are still treated like second-class citizens.'<sup>35</sup> It seems there is an expectation of exchange of money for connection and government service. Although Peru and Brazil have different positions in the global economy, they share in the phenomena of similar barriers to *Nikkeijin* political transnationalism. And here as well, the size of the Peruvian population in Japan (55,750)<sup>36</sup> is unlikely to attract the substantive attention of the Peruvian political parties. Despite the Peruvian legal requirement of compulsory voting in both the presidential and congressional elections, some Peruvians may not have registered their domiciles at the Peruvian Consulate because of their intent to return to Peru or for other reasons.<sup>37</sup> Additionally, Peruvian *Nikkeijin* themselves are discouraged by what they perceive as corrupt Peruvian politics. In 2004, Transparency International rated Peru number 67 out of total of 146 countries with a corruption score of 3.5 on a 10-point scale ranging between 10 for 'highly clean'

to 0 for 'highly corrupt' on its Corruption Perceptions Index 2004.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, as noted above with Brazil, although Peru allows dual nationality, the Japanese government technically does not allow dual nationality past the age of 22 years of age.

In spite of this, in time, as Peruvian democracy consolidates and matures and the size of the population in Japan increases, the Peruvian *Nikkeijin* community could become more attractive to Peruvian political actors. As one Peruvian born *Nikkeijin* remarked regarding the interest of Peruvian political actors in the Peruvian *Nikkeijin* community in Japan due to remittances:

Not too much [interest previously from Peruvian political actors] but now they are starting to care because (there is) a lot of money from other countries.<sup>39</sup>

Although there are a few Peruvian *Nikkeijin* organizations in Japan, *Covenio Kyodai* has the distinction of being founded in 1989 by several Peruvian Nikkei organizations with the assistance of the Embassy of Peru in Japan and *Kagai Nikkeijin Kyokai* (Association of Japanese and Nikkei Abroad). It provides support and assistance to the Peruvian *Nikkeijin* community in Japan in the form of assistance to transfer remittances primarily to Peru but also to Brazil, and other parts of Latin America, educational assistance, tours around Japanese prefectures, as well as a bookstore with Spanish and Portuguese titles and a shop offering Latin food products located in the same building that houses both the Peruvian and Brazilian consulates in Tokyo. Despite the fact that organizations like *Covenio Kyodai* along with *Kagai Nikkeijin Kyokai* (Association of Japanese and Nikkei Abroad), and other organizations provides some assistance, there is a lack of Peruvian organizations in Japan dedicated to political action or to influencing the government in Peru. However, efforts of the Peruvian government to maintain ties to the Peruvian community in Japan through organizations like *Covenio Kyodai* reflects an acknowledgement of the amount of financial resources being sent. As in the case of Brazil, I contend that whether or not this results in the emergence of a significant political transnationalism between the Peruvian *Nikkeijin* community and Peru is determinant on the continued need for overseas remittances, consolidation of Peru's democracy and party system, a change of Peru's overseas voting procedures and practices, the growth of the population, and more Peruvian *Nikkeijin* immigrant advocacy organizations in Japan.

## Group status

Group size and status combined with the aforementioned helps to explain the limited the emergence of political transnationalism in these cases. Morawska points to group size in the host country and impact of the

home country economy as directly affecting the likelihood of political transnationalism (Morawska in Joppke and Morawska, 2003:145–146). Among many contextual arguments in favour of external voting rights, Bauböck (2003) discusses the potential of an informed electorate by virtue of a globalized communications and technological infrastructure and the limited impact of a small overseas electorate (Bauböck, 2003:713–714). In addition to other factors, these analyses highlight the importance of the size of the group in the emergence of political transnationalism. Transnational networks of Brazilians and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* certainly exist, but they have not provided further linkages to a political transnationalism.

Despite remittances, Guarnizo et al. (2003) find differences in the political transnationalism of migrants from Colombia, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic. Where Dominicans and Salvadorans were both engaged transnationally, Dominicans were more likely to participate in electoral politics and Salvadorans were more likely to be involved in their localities of origin; Colombians not very engaged at all. Their highlighting of the context of migrations lends important insights for this analysis. There are political roots to Dominican emigration and it is a relatively peaceful democracy with strong party competition and a strong presence of concentrated expatriate communities in the United States. El Salvador is an incipient democracy with frail parties and not much room for Salvadoran migrants to get involved in electoral politics. Salvadoran migrants left a situation of political violence for the United States, where many are undocumented and hail from small towns and rural areas with which they have strong bonds. Hence, they direct their efforts towards developing their local communities. Colombian migrants live in rather dispersed communities in the United States and are alienated from Columbia's politics due to their escape from a situation of distrust, drug war, widespread corruption, and violence. With relevance to the Antillean and *Nikkeijin* cases, one can see underlying themes ranging from party fragmentation, clientelism, corruption, to relatively young democracies (i.e. Brazil and Peru) that colour the lenses and opportunities of these transnational migrants. Following Lyon and Mandaville (2012), the *real politik* of domestic comparative politics has not yet spread to the Antillean and Aruban communities in the Netherlands or the Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkikeijin* communities in Japan.

In the Dutch Antillean and Aruban cases, the small size of these individual island-based identities and the fact that they retain no external voting rights serve as a disincentive for either Dutch Antilleans or Aruban political parties to pursue potential voters in the Netherlands and likewise, Dutch political parties have little inclination to mobilize support among Dutch Antillean and Aruban voters on the Dutch islands. Politics is a relatively self supporting phenomena on the Dutch islands sometimes characterized by party fragmentation in these multiparty systems as well as occasionally



associated with clientelism and patronage. Moreover, the realities of little to no existing dependency on the remittances of the Antillean and Aruban communities in the Netherlands make for conditions in which Antillean and Aruban political parties have little incentive to pursue Antillean and Aruban voters in the Netherlands. In addition to lack of knowledge and interest about Dutch politics produced by the structural arrangements and electoral rules, it is often said that even with voting rights, Dutch political parties would be unlikely to pursue these groups on their home islands because of the small size of these island populations and fairly low status of these groups in the Netherlands. As the Kingdom of the Netherlands is comprised of only the Dutch nationality, there is no possible option of dual nationality.

In the case of Brazil, the relatively small size of the Brazilian *Nikkeijin* population in Japan within the context of Brazil's fragmented party system, clientelistic relations, and overseas voting procedures makes the Brazilian *Nikkeijin* community in Japan fairly unattractive for Brazilian political parties to pursue potential Brazilian voters in Japan. Similarly, the comparatively even smaller size of the Peruvian *Nikkeijin* population in Japan within the context of Peru's fragmented party system, clientelistic relations and overseas voting procedures makes Peruvian *Nikkeijin* fairly unattractive for Peruvian political parties to pursue potential Peruvian voters in Japan. Despite compulsory external voting in presidential elections in Brazil and presidential and congressional elections in Peru, there are similar outcomes of limited political transnationalism that are further exacerbated by the Japanese government's prohibition against dual citizenship. Moreover, there is a perception of government and politics of these countries of origin as clientelistic and somewhat corrupt and this deters participation and hence impedes the emergence of political transnationalism.

### **Simultaneous ambivalent minority status**

Additionally, the status of the groups in both the country of origin and the host country plays a role. In their comparison of the transnationalism of manor ethnic minorities, Fennema and Tillie (2001) point the extensive political transnationalism of the Turkish groups in the Netherlands and subsequently attribute the difference in the political incorporation of these groups in the Netherlands to their strong sense of nationality, shared values of religion, dual nationality and networks. This is contrasted with what they view as the singular Dutch nationality and limited transnationality of the Dutch Caribbean groups. Tsuda (2003) has noted the extremely limited political transnationalism of *Nikkeijin* in Japan (Tsuda, 2003:229). I argue the puzzle around the status of these groups as inheritors of access to liberal states by virtue of shared legal citizenship and co-ethnicity has more to do with their simultaneous and tenuous identities and attachment to their home and host societies. I call this phenomenon *simultaneous ambivalent*

*minority status*. As we have already discussed the formal constraints of formal dual nationality for these groups, it can be said that they form a transnational space in which they belong to both the country of origin and home country and neither one simultaneously. Koslowski (2005) writes:

The migrants act of taking on two nationalities, however, can be indicative of neither assimilation nor homeland political identification but rather of an ambivalent political identity, multiple political identity or even an apolitical identity.

(Koslowski, 2005:23)

Dutch Antilleans and Arubans are majorities on their home islands but de facto small minorities within the Dutch Kingdom and de jure small minorities within the Netherlands. However, beyond the formal-legal distinction of Dutch nationality, they are not necessarily included in the Dutch self-conceptualization of the Dutch ethno-cultural nation but more often deemed as 'foreign' and rarely considered by the Dutch state and society as 'Dutch'. Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* are relatively small minorities in their home countries that are only recently being included in ethno-cultural self-conceptualizations of 'Brazilianness' or 'Peruvianness' and, similar to the Dutch Antillean and Aruban case in the Netherlands, beyond their formal legal visa based on Japanese blood descent, have come to discover that they are deemed as 'foreigners' in Japan and rarely recognized by Japan's state and society as 'Japanese'. My research indicates that, in addition to the small size, *simultaneous ambivalent minority status* limits participation and plays a role in constraining political transnationalism.

## Conclusion

Specific discourse on the political transnationalism of postcolonial citizens and ethnic migrants that inherit host state access to liberal democracies seems to have been overlooked in scholarly debates. This chapter has attempted to interrogate political transnationalism for groups already labelled 'transnational' in the scholarly literature, namely Dutch Antillean and Aruban postcolonial Dutch citizens in the Netherlands and Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* in Japan. Despite the presence or absence of remittances, compulsory voting, differential human capital, or postcolonial citizenship or co-ethnicity, there is little observance of political transnationalism. Building on Itsigsohn's (2000), Portes' (1999), and Koslowski's (2005) arguments, my analysis of the evidence suggests that home countries degree of dependence on migrant remittances, formal electoral rules and party systems in the home countries, as well as the lack of the presence of active ethnic advocacy organizations in the countries of reception along with small size and peculiar simultaneous ambivalent

minority status explain the limited emergence of political transnationalism in these cases. This work shows the ways in which the emergence of political transnationalism can be constrained even for groups otherwise deemed 'transnational' in liberal democracies. The analysis has demonstrated the conceptual blurriness between transnationalism and political transnationalism and the need for more research.

# 8

## Conclusion – Inheriting the State: Contextualizing the Future of Postcolonial and Ethnic Migration and Political Inclusion

As the velocity and intensity of migrations increase around the world, legal citizenship and ethnicity are becoming two of the most contested issues facing the modern state. Debates flare around who should be granted rights of entry and exit, extended legal citizenship or political rights, and whether those membership rights should be privileged or entitled to those of a particular ethnicity with claims to the origins of the state. As discussed in previous chapters, both the Dutch Caribbean postcolonial groups in the Netherlands and the Japanese co-ethnic groups in Japan are legal immigrants who have inherited the state. This happens as a ‘postcolonial bonus’ (Oostindie, 2011) or ethnic bonus that grants host state access to legal residence and employment via Dutch citizenship or Japanese co-sanguinity. These chapters have revealed immigrant political incorporation to be a difficult process even for those equipped with the privileges of a ‘postcolonial bonus’ or an ethnic bonus. As such, postcolonial and ethnic migrants can shed a great deal of light on barriers to inclusion for all. This book has focused on the relationship and interaction between the forces that propel migration, immigration policy, political incorporation, and political transnationalism. This concluding chapter comparatively analyses the key propositions and insights of this study on globalization and the political incorporation and political transnationalism of Dutch Antilleans in the Netherlands and Latin American *Nikkeijin* in Japan.

Cross national comparison of these immigrants who inherit the state on the basis of shared legal citizenship or co-ethnicity enables an opportunity to test whether shared legal citizenship or co-ethnicity has any effect on political incorporation and political transnationalism. Despite the fact that most

Antilleans are Dutch citizens and *Nikkeijin* are legal residents, who, for the most part, lack Japanese citizenship or political rights, what is particularly striking is the similar outcomes and interesting variations in terms of the limited political incorporation and political transnationalism in these two 'older democracies' (Dahl, 1989) in two very different parts of the world. Although Antilleans have very active and participatory political cultures on their home islands in the Caribbean part of the Dutch Kingdom (see Chapter 3) and *Nikkeijin* are widely perceived as having an elite and professional status in Latin America, I have found limited Antillean political incorporation and political transnationalism in the Netherlands and very limited political incorporation and political transnationalism of *Nikkeijin* in Japan. The evidence suggests that rather than a simple calculus of affinity around citizenship or ethnicity, these matters speak to the 'central question of who benefits and for what reasons' (Markovitz, 1977:345) and the role this plays for state and non-state actors in the development and establishment of immigration policies, outcomes of immigrant political incorporation, and the emergence of political transnationalism.

Although a rather complex endeavour, this book has been well worth the effort because so few other works have effectively and cross regionally looked at the political, social, and economic forces associated with globalization, their impact on postcolonial and ethnic migration and political incorporation, and the ways in which they can signal the political direction of host states. My goal has been to empirically test commonplace notions around the alleged integrative qualities of citizenship and ethnicity by looking at immigrants with shared legal citizenship or immigrant co-ethnics. The Netherlands and Japan are two advanced industrialized states in two different parts of the world that are often said to epitomize liberal, tolerant, and multicultural (in the case of the Netherlands) and conservative, illiberal, and monocultural (in the case of Japan) ideas of nationhood and traditions in contemporary liberal democratic states. Although citizenship and ethnicity are forms of social closure, my research suggests that despite possession of legal citizenship with the host state or belonging to the host ethnic nation state, a group may be virtually politically excluded. And if political incorporation proves difficult for immigrant groups advantaged by shared citizenship or ethnicity, then it will certainly be even more challenging for the multitudes of immigrants and ethnic minorities without citizenship or ethnic ties. This points to the need for state policies of recognition, accommodation, and multiculturalism in the interests of democracy. This work provides additional empirical evidence that nationalism and civic and ethnic understandings of nationhood in liberal democratic states are not fixed but can change based on a dynamic constellation of power interests. Although globalization has been said to facilitate transnationalism and, in turn, transnationalism can foster political incorporation for marginalized groups, this work provides a cross-regional empirical analysis for why

political transnationalism does not necessarily emerge for groups deemed to be engaged in 'transnational' activity.

### **Globalization and the symbolic politics of membership**

The Dutch Antilleans and Latin American *Nikkeijin* migrations were not haphazard (Sassen, 2001) or based on purely economic incentives, but instead grew out of a moment when globalization (Held et al., 1999) and Dutch and Japanese state policies produced a convergence in the use of citizenship and ethnicity that lead to these unintended and intended post-1985/1990 legal migrations. The same globalized processes of integration and deregulation that resulted in a decrease in the price of oil and mass unemployment during the 1980's coincided with Dutch and Japanese state policies in the production of migrations of Antillean Dutch citizens to the Netherlands and *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendants) to Japan. Following Held et al. (1999), these migrations occur within the same time period, they are cross-regional, both follow political processes of imperial connections and obligations in the form of ethnic connections to OECD countries (i.e. the Netherlands and Japan), and depend upon transnational family and ethnic networks to help to sustain these processes.

In both cases, the Dutch and Japanese states employed 'symbolic politics' around the extension of some form of membership rights on the bases of citizenship or ethnicity as symbols of inclusion and affinity to solve an international and/or national political problem that resulted in the use of Dutch citizenship and Japanese ethnicity in unintended and intended migrations to the Dutch and Japanese metropolises but with little to no policy of accommodation for these immigrants. 'Symbolic politics' around membership, in the wake of their Indonesian colonial war, is behind the Netherlands' end of formal colonial relations with the Dutch Caribbean and its extension of Dutch citizenship and inclusion in the Dutch Kingdom with the 1954 Charter or *Statuut* which they clearly hoped would make them look more favourable in the eyes of the United Nations and in the world (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003). The same can be said of the 'symbolic' politics around membership that resulted in a political compromise among business and policymakers that enabled a special visa (*teijusha*) or 'side door' for prohibited unskilled foreign labour (Brody, 2002) to be created with the 1990 Immigration Act allowing the need for unskilled labour in Japan to be satisfied by *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendants) from Latin America and elsewhere instead of 'foreign labour'. This extension of some form of membership citizenship rights did not anticipate permanency. These examples of tacit inclusion and the lack of intent to accommodate migration to the metropole illustrate the disconnect between 'symbolic' and 'practical' politics (Edelman, 1964; Brody, 2002:102). Ironically, in each instance the

symbolism around the Dutch Antillean and Aruban and Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities that once denoted membership for some political actors has more recently been invoked by the media and by policymakers to signal 'foreignness' and criminality. These cases reveal a clear disconnect and analytical distinction between the logic of the motivation for the establishment of these state policies that extends some form of membership allowing the legal immigration of these immigrants to be put in place and its effects.

Several have pointed to the important role of the state and the context of reception in successful incorporation. Grosfoguel (2003) distinguishes between the French BUMIDOM promoted and the Dutch unintended postcolonial Caribbean migration to France and the Netherlands. With the difference being that the BUMIDOM assisted with transportation costs and jobs within the French public administration which facilitated the economic incorporation of postcolonial French citizens from the French Caribbean islands (Grosfoguel, 2003:183,189). Brody (2002) notes the difference in the context of reception for *Aussiedler* (German ethnic descendants) in Germany and *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendants) in Japan and finds that whereas *Aussiedler* are provided citizenship, language instruction, and funding, *Nikkeijin* are extended visa privileges with little assistance (Rätzzel, 1990; Faist, 1994; Faist and Haußermann, 1996). Up until recently *Aussiedler* were sought after by the conservative German CDU/CSU political parties, which have attempted to emphasize the shared heritage of Germans against the 'foreign' guestworkers (Brody, 2002:91–96, 28). Bloemraad (2006) compares the political incorporation of immigrants in the United States and Canada and finds that Canada has been more successful in supporting immigrant political incorporation through the promotion of naturalization and the funding of immigrant organizations due to Canadian state policies that encourage immigrant political incorporation and recognition of Canada's multiculturalism. Bloemraad (2006) has shown the social nature of political incorporation and the importance of community organizations and networks as well as the influence of the state as an important part of the process.

The policies that enabled legal migration to the Netherlands or Japan foresaw these immigrants as instrumental and temporary and hence never anticipated their *permanent* residence. It is difficult for these states to halt their immigration because of the rights discourse and the liberal democratic contexts in which they are situated. As one Antillean origin informant remarked, the Dutch public's general sentiment about the status of the Dutch Antilles and Aruba in the Dutch Kingdom, is akin to a marriage that one cannot leave. Although a form of membership rights was granted by the Dutch and Japanese state's either by means of formal legal citizenship or a visa based on Japanese ethnicity with limited restrictions on residence and unlimited access to the labour market, this was clearly intended as temporary or at best a 'passive citizenship' (Habermas, 1994; Suzuki, 2003) and not an 'active' and

'substantive citizenship' (Bottomore, 1992) implying active participation in the business of government.

### **Shared legal citizenship and co-ethnicity/re-ethnicization in the Netherlands and de-ethnicization in Japan**

My findings suggest that shared legal citizenship or co-ethnicity does not necessarily lead to the political incorporation. In contrast to an expected automatic politics of affinity around shared legal citizenship or co-ethnicity, I have argued here that the limited political incorporation of Antilleans in the Netherlands and *Nikkeijin* in Japan has much to do with citizenship regime types, associated state policies, and political opportunity structure. The civic citizenship regime type of the Netherlands and the ethnic regime type of Japan exhibit more recent trends that reflect changes in national ideology with important implications for political incorporation. Although the Netherlands is a civic citizenship regime, it is taking on the characteristics of an ethnic citizenship regime that creates an environment in which many Antilleans, despite their Dutch citizenship, may feel out of place and not particularly welcome. This can be seen in its recent assimilationist tone, the reintroduction of Dutch ethnic criteria in its naturalization requirements and the effect this has already had in terms of the reduction of naturalizations, and remigration programmes for multigenerational immigrants and ethnic minorities. On the other hand, whereas Japan is an ethnic citizenship that selects on the basis of ethnicity by allowing *Nikkeijin* immigration to Japan, it does not extend citizenship or political rights to them, which has restricted their access to political participation. As pointed out in Chapter 6, naturalization laws have been liberalized and there have been increases in naturalizations numbers of long excluded groups in Japan, such as the *Zainichi* Koreans and Chinese. Hence, some of these changes are making Japan begin to look as though it is on its way to becoming a civic citizenship regime. This has much to do with the changing political opportunity structure in each context.

Although viewed as 'insiders' because of their access to their host country, Antilleans as well as *Nikkeijin* are regarded as 'outsiders' or 'foreigners' in their host countries. When Dutch politicians refer to the Dutch they are commonly not referring to those 'Caribbean' Dutch who reside in the Antilles or Aruba or even those of Antillean or Aruban descent who reside in the Netherlands. Although some have emphasized that cultural racism rather than biological racism is more characteristic of the Netherlands, it seems that for many, a Dutch person means a blonde blue-eyed person. In contrast, despite what is often a shared phenotype, one local government official in Kawasaki, Japan said that he preferred not to think of the *Nikkeijin* as Japanese and a Brazilian consular official informant remarked that Japanese society has finally figured out that just because you look



Japanese that you may not be Japanese. Although their civic and ethnic regime types remain, the evidence suggests trends towards *re-ethnicization* in the Dutch case and *de-ethnicization* in the Japanese case.

### **Dutch Antillean and Aruban immigrant political incorporation in the Netherlands**

Despite their legal Dutch citizenship, Antilleans have experienced little immigrant political incorporation in the Netherlands. Although distant, Antilleans share hundreds of years of history with the Netherlands and are *de jure* minorities within the Netherlands and *de facto* minorities within the Dutch Kingdom, they were never intended to be included in the Dutch consensual or consociational models. As previously indicated, it was hoped that the inclusion of the Dutch islands in the Dutch kingdom would be only *temporary* and eventually lead to formal independence from the Netherlands.

The Netherlands more recent assimilationist-oriented 'civic citizenship' regime (Brubaker, 1992:175–176) and state policies (Weiner, 1996:46) do not adequately positively recognize the political, cultural, and social identities of Antilleans as Dutch nationals/citizens and a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and in this way inhibit efforts 'to express their ethnicity through group action'. I argue that this reification of Dutch ethnicity in the Dutch citizenship regime reflects a trend towards the *re-ethnicization* of Dutch citizenship with an assimilationist agenda in which Dutch Antilleans and Arubans can feel out of place because it leaves little room for the recognition of their collective identities as part of the Dutch nation and produces an atmosphere in which they may feel not welcome. Several people of Antillean origin remarked about their thinking they were 'Dutch' vis-à-vis others prior to their arrival in the Netherlands but noted a rude awakening as to the limitations of their 'Dutch' identity once resident there. For this reason, one Antillean origin politician in the Netherlands referred to his work there as 'development work' because of what he thought as the prevailing general ignorance about Dutch Antilleans and Arubans as part of the Dutch Kingdom. A member of parliament from the Socialist Party made the point that the reason for the lower political organization of Antilleans when compared to other groups in the Netherlands is that they expect to be accepted due to their shared Dutch nationality. In this way, as opposed to other groups who do not expect acceptance, the Dutch citizenship of Antilleans creates an *expectation of recognition* and acceptance that is difficult to be realized. To some extent, Antilleans are recognized as Dutch only in the legal sense outside of the Netherlands but not within it.

State policies have contributed to a rather unwelcome atmosphere for some of these Dutch citizens from the Caribbean part of the Dutch Kingdom. It is well documented that the Netherlands has changed from a pacesetter of multicultural policies under its Minorities Policy during the

1980s to a more assimilationist approach under the more recent Integration Policy of the 1990s and 2000s. With regard to differences between the Minorities Policy and Integration Policy, one general problem of the official governmental consultative organizations under the Integration Policy is that they are now limited to just exchanging views and no longer provide advice. Hence organizations like *Stichting Overlegorgaan Caribische Nederlanders* (OCAN) (Consultative Body of the Caribbean Dutch), the official governmental consultative organization representing the Antillean and Aruban minorities in the Netherlands, have limited influence. Other state policies have contributed to an unwelcome atmosphere for Dutch Antilleans and other immigrants and ethnic minorities. For example, what began under the 'Minorities Policy' to identify disadvantaged groups and assist them with 'emancipation' has now been used to negatively differentiate groups under the 'Integration Policy'. Now, Antilleans, and other ethnic minorities are classified as '*non-Western allochtoon*' or 'non-western non-native Dutch' and, up until recently, mandated along with other newcomer 'non-western non-native Dutch' immigrants and ethnic minorities to take integration courses. This is reminiscent of the assimilationist Americanization efforts of the early 20th century in the United States (Bloemraad, 2006), in that it includes Dutch language and cultural instruction and require participants to prove their 'Dutchness' through examinations.

In addition, a state 'remigration policy' has been targeting multigenerational immigrants and ethnic minorities, for some years including Dutch Antilleans and Arubans, and encouraging them to return to their countries of origin with promises of financial and logistical assistance from the Dutch government as long as they renounce their Dutch citizenship and not come back to permanently reside in the Netherlands. These policies set a tone in opposition to a general sentiment of belonging regardless of one's inclination to 'feel Dutch'. Understandably, some Antilleans express distress over these policies. To make matters worse, there has been a focus by the media and some policymakers on a small number of criminal Antillean, namely Curaçaoan, youth and these negative images have distorted Dutch views of Antilleans and have produced state policies that target the 'Antillean problem' as a way of distributing resources among municipalities rather than addressing the needs of the Antillean and Aruban communities. There is clearly a need for a more positive state recognition of Antillean, Aruban, and other immigrant and ethnic minority groups to facilitate their social inclusion and political incorporation.

A key factor in the political opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1994:85,86) of the Netherlands that further limits the participation and representation of Antilleans is the attitude of Dutch political parties towards these communities because of their small size and fragmented nature. Additionally, the perceived language barrier, the relatively short length of residence relative to other groups, and the expectation to return to their country of

origin combine to limit Antillean political incorporation in the Netherlands. The evidence indicates that Dutch political parties have little interest in the Dutch Antillean and Aruban communities because of these factors. If anything, despite the emphasis in media and some policymakers on Islam as a threat to Dutch society within this *re-ethnicizing* civic citizenship regime, my findings indicate that Dutch political parties prioritize the comparatively larger electorate of the Turkish and Moroccans communities, many of whom were granted Dutch citizenship during the 1990s before the drastic reduction in naturalization, rather than the small electorate of the Antillean Dutch citizen and Kingdom partner communities. Even if Antillean candidates are placed on party electoral lists to satisfy some need for 'diversity', my interviews suggest that there is a tendency to put those candidates far down on the lists in 'ineligible' position in which they could not possibly be elected.

The change of the party system in 1994 is noted as pivotal because it marked the first time in 90 years that a cabinet was formed without a Christian democratic party. It is of note that what has been called an assimilationist position that favours Dutch ethnicity took shape with the change of the party system in 1994 under the Purple coalition government of PVDA (social democrats), VVD (Conservative liberals), and D66 (progressive liberals). De Hart (2004) points out that the more recent 'ethno-republican' conception of Dutch nationality that privileges 'native' Dutch ethnicity began to reach some fruition under the Purple government (1994–1998) as a strategy to build *consensus* between the right and left on issues of immigration, integration, and minorities policies. Although ethnic minority representation in the national parliament began to improve with the change of the party system in 1994, only some three people of Antillean origin have been elected to Dutch parliament in Dutch history and no ethnic minority has been part of Dutch Cabinet as a Minister or in the upper house. Additionally, few Antilleans and Arubans have been elected in municipal councils and more commonly display a characteristic pattern of low voter turnout in the Netherlands.

Along with the fact of a lack of knowledge among many of the native Dutch in the Netherlands about the Dutch islands, which is reflected in the lack of information offered in Dutch educational textbooks, electoral impediments such as Antilleans not being able to vote in Dutch national election limits Antillean knowledge of Dutch politics and in turn limits political participation. There are limitations to the ways in which Dutch Antilleans and Arubans are represented as members of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as well. This can be seen in the difference in attitudes and practices of the Dutch Antillean and Aruban resident ministers; the Antillean resident minister feels that Dutch municipalities should be looking after the interests of Antilleans in the Netherlands rather than his own office while the Aruban resident minister believes that his office must serve as an advocate for Aruban communities, particularly Aruban students, in the Netherlands.

In spite of concentrations of Antilleans and Arubans in the urban centre of the *Randstad* (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague) very few from these communities have been elected to municipal councils. Again, the priority of political parties is with larger constituencies such as the Turkish, Moroccan, and other minority communities and here it is even more apparent because legally resident foreign nationals can vote in Dutch municipal elections. Although there have been efforts at local collaboration in the form of multi-ethnic political parties, I find little evidence of Antilleans and Arubans initiating the founding of a political party among themselves or in collaboration with other groups. My findings in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague indicate that local policymakers and policies set an attitudinal tone. Whereas Amsterdam can be characterized as fairly *open* and The Hague as more *progressive*, Rotterdam with the largest concentration of Dutch Antilleans and Arubans can be categorized as more *restrictive* in terms of policies towards its Antillean and Aruban populations. I argue that these policies help to set an attitudinal tone towards the Antillean and Aruban communities and can spark or limit participation.

Many that I interviewed emphasized the importance of organizations in the Dutch context. The ways in which civil society has been restructured through the transformation of the system of government funding for ethnic minority groups under the 'Minorities Policy' to an assimilationist oriented 'Integration Policy' that tends not to fund ethnic organizations, particularly with political ambitions, compounds and undermines Antillean organizing for political advocacy. There are a number of Antillean and Aruban social cultural organizations, but few with a political orientation or dedicated to political advocacy. There appears to be a lack of formal organizations with a common goal. Despite the newsletters of the resident ministers there is no national Dutch Antillean and Aruban newspaper in the Netherlands to address community issues and goals. Although there had been government efforts to spark Antillean political participation under the Minorities Policy, I contend that by the time Dutch political parties and immigrants found each other in the 1990's there was only a fragmented Antillean political identity and limited available funding for Antillean political advocacy organizations under the Integration Policy.

The Netherlands has characteristic low trade union membership and unions have tended to look out for the interests of their members and not necessarily Dutch Antilleans and Arubans. Rath (1988) points out that the two largest trade unions in the Netherlands FNV (Federation of Dutch Trade Unions) and CNV (Christian National Trade Unions) do not necessarily promote the interests of immigrants and ethnic minorities. In addition to trade union membership being relatively low in the Netherlands in general with just 29 per cent of the total working population belonging to a union in 1985, there is much higher unemployment among immigrants and ethnic minorities in comparison to the native Dutch (Rath, 1988b:632). According

to the European Industrial Relations Observatory Online, the two largest Dutch trade unions in 2003, FNV had only 1,226,000 members and CNV had just 355,000 members. Hence, unions have not been active in the recruitment of the Antillean and Aruban communities and thus present less of a platform for collaboration around collective action.

Additionally, my findings indicate that shared citizenship and social and political incorporation are not necessarily correlated. Despite the facts that the overall socio-economic situation of Antilleans in the Netherlands is not much worse and often better than other minorities and they characteristically have higher rates of intermarriage with the native Dutch than other minorities, Antilleans lag behind other immigrants and minority groups in terms of political incorporation.

As for political collaboration between immigrant and ethnic minorities, there seems to be little outside the formal consultative structure for recognized ethnic minorities and some initiatives by individual political parties on the local level. Political collaboration among different ethnic minority and immigrant groups is also limited by self-interest, conflicting personalities of leadership, and fragmentation. Since 1994, some elite groups of Antilleans have come together in reaction to anti-Antillean legislation and to address problems in their communities. However, it seems Antilleans do not yet have enough of a shared political identity to present a cleavage politics. This is one of the reasons Antilleans have not been able to form a political party and win a seat in parliament even with the low margin of 0.66 per cent of the vote. In addition to the aforementioned, the small size of these groups, their low status in Dutch society, their *expectation to be recognized* as part of the society because of their Dutch citizenship, their perceived lack of command of the Dutch language, their relatively recent mass arrival and intention to go back to their home islands all limit their interest in Dutch politics and makes them less attractive to Dutch political parties and organizations, thus limiting their voter turnout and further compounding their limited political incorporation. These factors combine to explain the phenomena of limited Dutch Antillean and Aruban political incorporation between 1985 and 2008.

### **Latin American *Nikkeijin* political incorporation in Japan**

My research supports the idea that ethnicity is a political construction and shared ethnicity does not necessarily lead to immigrant political incorporation. Although Latin American *Nikkeijin* can immigrate to Japan because of their shared Japanese ethnicity, they have very limited political incorporation in Japan, either formally or extra-electorally. This research brought me to the key question of, why wouldn't an ethnic citizenship regime make steps to socially and politically incorporate its co-ethnics as in the German and other cases? Although the establishment of the *teijusha visa*

was originally presented as a way for overseas 'ethnic Japanese' to experience their 'homeland', it was clear that the primary motivation was to solve a demand for cheap unskilled foreign labour and in a way consistent with the Japanese national ideology of racial and ethnic purity and its long-time prohibition against unskilled foreign labour (Tsuda, 1999:11–12). Following many others, my contention is that the *teijusha* visa was always intended to be for *temporary labour* or as *dekasegis* (temporary migrant labour) and not *permanent* settlement. The rationalization and compromise in the admission of the *Nikkeijin* was predicated on temporary labour. However, in the event that *Nikkeijin* did remain in Japan, there was an *expectation* of easier assimilation due to shared blood ties. Japan's *jus sanguinis* 'ethnic citizenship' regime type facilitates the emigration of those with shared blood ties but it is also one of the principle facts that limits the social and political incorporation of *Nikkeijin* and other foreigners in Japan. I argue that *Nikkeijin* find that they are included to some degree outside of Japan and excluded once in the country. As opposed to other groups who do not expect acceptance, the Japanese ethnicity of *Nikkeijin* and their legality of residence in Japan based on it creates an *expectation of recognition* and acceptance that is difficult to be realized. Many remarked that they are perceived as 'Japanese' in Brazil and 'Brazilian' in Japan.

Although Japan has shown some recent inclination towards a civic citizenship regime, I contend that the ethnic regime type label still applies. In spite of limited liberalization of nationality laws, Japan classifies itself as a 'non-immigration country' and in 1990 implemented the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act and the *teijusha* visa that selects on the basis of 'blood ties' or ethnicity. As in the case of the Dutch Antillean and Aruban communities in the Netherlands, Japan's 'ethnic citizenship' regime (Brubaker, 1992:175–176) along with state policy (Weiner, 1996:46) do not adequately positively recognize the political, cultural, and social identities of Latin American *Nikkeijin* as a part of Japanese society once resident in Japan and in this way inhibit efforts 'to express their ethnicity through group action'.

Liberal Democratic Party single party dominance of the political opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1994:85,86) is a key factor to further explain the limited *Nikkeijin* as well as other legal foreigners (i.e. *Zainichi* Koreans) political incorporation. The one party authority of the conservative LDP has created self-sustaining systems of patronage and corruption where the 'blood ties' of the *Nikkeijin*, and hence '*re-ethnicization*', was favoured for culturally acceptable and politically expedient cheap *temporary* labour but not necessarily citizenship or political rights. Moreover, suffrage for the *Zainichi* Koreans, and even less so for the *Nikkeijin* and other 'foreign groups', at no time has been a consistent LDP prerogative. The 1990's electoral reform to a mixed member system combining proportional representation

and single member districts has changed the party system. It has diminished some previous LDP prominence and facilitated more women and a few ethnic minorities in parliament as well as provided some attempt to woo overseas Japanese with voting rights. However, not one Latin American *Nikkeijin* descendant has been elected to office. Neither the change of the electoral system or the liberalization of the nationality law has not yet resulted in the formal incorporation of Latin American *Nikkeijin* in any significant way.

Despite the discourse and rhetoric around Japanese blood ties, it is quite surprising that on the national and local levels many expressed the sentiment that *Zainichi* Koreans and other multigenerational residents be extended local voting rights before the *Nikkeijin*. Political parties such the New Komeito party advocates for *Zainichi* Koreans and ethnic Chinese and other permanent residents voting rights. However, there is a dearth of media coverage or groups advocating for local voting rights for *Nikkeijin*. More often there are depictions in the media of 'criminal Brazilian or Peruvian' youth as somehow representative of these groups. It seems that although ethnicity is still very important, it is increasingly trumped by length of residence and social ties, with most viewing the long term *Zainichi* Koreans and ethnic Chinese as ultimately having more of a stake in local community membership and as the most deserving of foreign local suffrage. The political opportunity structure of Japan in the way of the small size, low status, and fragmented nature of the Latin American *Nikkeijin* groups who for the most part lack legal citizenship in this long-time one-party dominated state and now mixed member electoral system and the unwillingness of Japanese political parties to pursue or advocate for Latin American *Nikkeijin* because of this, further limits their political incorporation.

Although there has been policy innovation towards more incorporation on the local level in the form of Foreign Residents Assemblies, local allowance to participate in some local referenda, and the establishment of local ombudsmen in some localities, my analysis of the three different municipalities of Hamamatsu, Toyota City, and Kawasaki City reveals very limited *Nikkeijin* political incorporation. The irony is that the same ethnic citizenship regime that privileges blood descent allowing *Nikkeijin* immigration to Japan also limits their political incorporation because they do not possess formal Japanese citizenship allowing formal voting on the local level. There are and have been some Latin American representatives in the Foreign Residence Assemblies but their presence is limited and Foreign Residents Assemblies are constrained to the passing of proposals which may or not be considered or realized by the Mayor or City Council. My responses from local government officials illustrate the point of three different approaches based on three different histories of the localities. Kawasaki can be characterized as more *open*, Hamamatsu as *inviting*, and Toyota City as a bit more

*restrictive* towards its new Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* immigrant communities. There is clearly a disconnect between the central and local level on immigration policy. I contend that the lack of a policy of recognition and accommodation on the part of the national government and failure to collaborate with local governments further explains the lack of *Nikkeijin* as well as other foreigner's political incorporation on the local level. One reason for the inadequacy of integration schemes is that they are piecemeal and unevenly applied because they are based on the history of particular localities with foreign immigration at various times and hence often lack central local policy coordination.

Although some significant policy innovation around immigration have come from Japan's local government, Japan's ethnic citizenship regime, the lack of a state policy of recognition and accommodation for *Nikkeijin* immigrants that coordinates central and local government and a political opportunity structure shaped by the administrative character of one party dominance along with other factors have made for very limited *Nikkeijin* political incorporation and/ or collaboration with other groups at the local level in Japan.

Despite the fact that there are many *Nikkeijin* social cultural organizations, I find little evidence of *Nikkeijin* organizations that mobilize for political advocacy. Several of my informants explained the reasons for the lack of Latin American *Nikkeijin* organizations engaged or dedicated to political advocacy with cultural arguments that ranged from Latin American disorganization, Latin American *Nikkeijin* workers needing social networks only for jobs, to too busy working to be involved in political activity or fixated on returning to their home countries. Despite many Latin American *Nikkeijin* community organizations engaged in social, cultural, economic, cultural and religious activities, the political aspect of their development in the form of formal or extra-electoral participation has been profoundly limited.

Although the 1998 Non-profit Organization (NPO) has made civil society more viable, up until recently, it was very difficult to establish a political advocacy organization in Japan. The evidence suggests that the ways in which the state has structured Japanese civil society through hurdles discouraging political advocacy along with the relative newness, small minority size and weak status, the difficulties of the Japanese language, and a 'powerful myth of return' among *Nikkeijin* immigrants are contributing factors to the absence of *Nikkeijin* civil society organizations with a political orientation in Japan. One powerful example of this is despite Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* working and middle class origins and a large presence in the manufacturing industry in Japan, class is not a basis for collective action. Many *Nikkeijin* and other workers are generally on temporary contracts and not formally employed by the companies for which they are employed. Most of Japan's 20,000 unions are organized on the basis of company specific enterprise unions rather than industry and they normally do not allow part-time



or temporary workers. Hence, the ways in which unions are organized act as an impediment to collective action (Shipper, 2002:20, Shipper, 2006:277). The evidence suggests that labour integration and political integration are not necessarily correlated.

As a consequence of this labour segmentation, language emerges as a key variable in limiting political organizing. Many referred to the difficulty of the Japanese language as a barrier to both social integration and political incorporation. One Brazilian *Nikkeijin* told me about the separation of Brazilian *Nikkeijin* and Japanese in the workplace and in general thus reinforcing the non-acquisition of the Japanese language. Japanese activists frequently mentioned that they had to step into leadership roles in organizations due to the difficulties of *Nikkeijin* and other immigrants in acquiring the Japanese language. However, in contrast to the Dutch case, there are national newspapers and other publications available in both Portuguese and Spanish to the *Nikkeijin* communities of Japan.

In spite of the noticeable absence of *Nikkeijin* political advocacy, Christian, especially Catholic, religious organizations and community unions appear to be growing more actively involved in organizing Latin American *Nikkeijin* immigrants for political advocacy. There is a sizeable population of Catholics among Brazilian, Peruvian, Filipino and other immigrants in Japan. Additionally, community labour unions have been fairly active in labour consultation, including translation services, and advocating for immigrants in cases of labour disputes and violations of foreign workers rights. Among the 500 open unions where individuals can be members, there are about 50 unions that also work with visa overstayers and problems of the migrant workers. The community unions, which, for the most part, have a policy of open membership, benefit by increasing their constituencies and memberships. Hence, Catholic organizations and community unions have been among the most active in political advocacy of *Nikkeijin*.

The change in non-profit status law that will open up new opportunities for civil society organizations has also not yet directly impacted Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* political organization. Although Japan has undergone several changes conducive to a stronger liberal democracy, the social and political incorporation of its foreign communities, namely Latin American *Nikkeijin* co-ethnics, remains a challenge. There appears to be very little collaboration among different foreign groups. There is a tendency for groups, especially older, more established groups, to use their collective resources to pursue their own best interests rather than participating in collaborative efforts. Despite their linguistic differences, as the Latin American Nikkei Brazilian and Peruvian communities move from *teijusha* (long term residence) visas to permanent residency, it could be just a matter of time before the *Nikkeijin* community makes political demands similar to that of the *Zainichi* Korean community. It is also possible that a consideration of suffrage for those on the *teijusha* visa may be one day demanded and

considered. However, no such moves have been made to date. The evidence suggests that the factors named here explain the phenomena of very limited Latin American *Nikkeijin* political incorporation in Japan.

### **Postcolonial versus ethnic bonus? Similarities and differences of political incorporation**

The cases of the Antillean immigrants in the Netherlands and *Nikkeijin* immigrants in Japan and the relative similarities and differences in the formal incorporation of these two proportionally similar groups speaks to the strengths and limitations of electoral politics and legal citizenship in liberal democracies. It is quite remarkable that the Netherlands as a multiparty proportional system and Japan, as up until recently a one-party dominated, multi-member system could have similar outcomes in terms of the political incorporation of their postcolonial citizen and co-ethnic communities. Sassen (2006) argues that 'legal citizenship does not always bring full and equal membership rights because these rights are often conditioned by the position of different groups within a nation-state' (Sassen, 2006:292). In this way, the cases of the Dutch Antilleans and Arubans in the Netherlands and *Nikkeijin* in Japan are examples of what Sassen (2006) has described as the increasing phenomenon of being 'authorized yet unrecognized' (Sassen, 2006:296). Despite their lack of political rights, albeit in a piecemeal and inadequate way, *Nikkeijin* may be better informally incorporated by means of extra-electoral participation at the local level in a few municipalities in Japan than the Antillean Dutch, despite their citizenship. The difference is that, although Antilleans have lower participation and representation than other immigrants and minority groups, they do have some formal representation on the national, local, and civil society levels in the Netherlands. In contrast, some long-term excluded groups have naturalized and have been elected. *Nikkeijin* informally participate and are somewhat informally represented in a few localities but not at the national level in Japan. Hence, legal citizenship does not ensure participation or representation; both the Dutch and Japanese cases demonstrate that it is better to possess legal citizenship or politics rights than not. In both the Netherlands and Japan, the electoral calculus of political parties causes parties to seek out older excluded and larger groups who possess legal citizenship such as Turks, Moroccans, and other Muslims in Netherlands and the *Zainichi* Korean and ethnic Chinese communities in Japan, rather than the smaller in number and recent immigrant fellow Dutch citizens from the Dutch Antilles or co-ethnic *Nikkeijin* from Latin America. Despite the significance of extra-electoral participation, the prioritization of certain older and larger excluded groups by political parties and organizations has much to do with the possession of legal citizenship or indications of naturalization and the relative size and status of potential constituencies. Although this is not a confirmation of citizenship as equal

membership, the possession of it provides a framework from which to better negotiate for equality.

### **‘Criminal youth’ and inadequate state policies**

These cases speak to the need for state policies of accommodation that facilitate immigrant political incorporation. However, ironically both countries have focused on policies that address the small population of ‘criminal youth’. This is reflective of the politics behind these state policies. It is notable that the citizenship and ethnicity once used to symbolize shared membership are now used by various political actors as a means to show that they are advocates of law and order and tough on crime. In both cases, the youth of the recent immigrants from the Antilles as well as *Nikkeijin* from Latin America have come to be associated with a tendency for criminality that has been depicted in the media, by policymakers, and in popular imagination as characteristic of the entire group. Instead of state sponsored programmes that aim at accommodation, which also facilitates political incorporation, this has resulted in special programmes created in localities in both the Netherlands and Japan with concentrations of these postcolonial citizen and ethnic populations. The programmes target the ‘troubled’ youth of these groups and are designed to reduce criminality and hasten the integration of these ‘foreigners’. The most prominent example of this in the Netherlands is the programme called the ‘21 Antillean Cities’ and in Japan, a somewhat similar programme known as ‘Committee for Localities with a Concentrated Foreigner Population (CLCF)’. Within the context of the centralized states of both countries’, municipalities pursue assistance and compete for the funds that accompany these programmes from the ministries of the central government. My interviews suggest that municipalities compete for the funds that come with these programmes regardless of the size of their respective populations of these ‘troubled youth’ and for these reasons the programmes continue to grow and add more cities, but do not address the overall problems of the barriers to political recognition and inclusion.

### **Political transnationalism**

Although Dutch Antilleans and Arubans are identified in the literature as ‘transnational communities’ and ‘diasporas’, there is little evidence of the emergence of political transnationalism among these groups in either the Netherlands or Japan. The facts that these groups possess the legal right or access to entry and settlement and hence freedom of movement to and from their host and have divergent flows of terms of remittances offers little to explain the limited political transnationalism in these two cases. When we compare the Dutch Antillean and Aruban communities in the

Netherlands with the Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* communities in Japan, there is vast divergence when it comes to their economic situation and the amount of remittances being sent back to their home countries. While the Latin American *Nikkeijin* communities in Japan send the Japanese yen equivalent of billions of dollars to their home countries, the Dutch Antillean and Aruban communities in the Netherlands remit very little to their home islands. Rather than a political culture from their countries of origin, the evidence suggests that the limited emergence of a political transnationalism in the cases of this study can be seen in the degree of dependence on migrant remittances, the political opportunity structure in the way of the formal electoral rules and party systems in the home countries, the lack of the presence of active ethnic advocacy organizations in the countries of reception along with the small size and peculiar *simultaneous ambivalent minority status* of these groups in their host and home countries.

There are marked observations of transnationalism in the form of interaction between host and home countries. In addition to the fact that in the Dutch Antillean and Aruban cases little money is being remitted, political transnationalism does not emerge because the electoral system and fragmented party system is somewhat prone to clientelism sometimes deemed as corruption. Additionally, voting procedures that disallow Antilleans and Arubans to vote in Dutch national elections nor allow Antilleans and Arubans living in the Netherlands to vote in island elections make for a situation in which Dutch Antilleans and Arubans are not very knowledgeable about Dutch politics and Antillean, Aruban, and Dutch political parties have little incentive to seek out constituents. My interviews and documentary evidence reveal a lack of interest of Dutch political actors about the islands and vice versa for Antillean and Aruban political actors on the islands. Moreover, the lack of Antillean ethnic advocacy organizations in the Netherlands and, what I have labelled, their *simultaneous ambivalent minority status* (being a small minority with multiple allegiances) combine to limit the emergence of political transnationalism for these groups. These factors make for conditions in which Antillean and Aruban political parties have little incentive to pursue Antillean and Aruban voters in the Netherlands. It can be said that even with voting rights, Dutch political parties would be unlikely to pursue these groups on their home islands because of their small populations. However a sizeable group of Antilleans and Arubans live in the Netherlands. Hence, a change in the electoral rules to allow overseas voting from the Netherlands in Dutch Antillean and Aruban elections might change some of the dynamics of the self-contained and sometimes clientelistic phenomena of island politics.

In contrast, despite the Japanese yen equivalent of millions of dollars in remittances being sent from Japan back to Brazil and Peru, the evidence suggests a political transnationalism does not emerge because of the home countries' electoral systems and fragmented party systems that are prone to

clientelism and corruption. Other factors are the cumbersome overseas voting procedures, the lack of immigrant political advocacy groups in Japan, and the small size and *simultaneous ambivalent minority status* (being a small minority in home and host countries with multiple allegiances) of these groups in Japan as well as in their home countries. My interviews with consular officials and community members indicate an awareness of the impact of remittances from *Nikkeijin* communities in Japan. Although the growing efforts of the Brazilian and Peruvian governments to maintain ties to the Brazilian and Peruvian communities in Japan reflects an acknowledgment of the funds being remitted, I contend that whether or not this results in the development of a political transnationalism between the Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* communities in Japan and Brazil and Peru is dependent on the continued need for overseas remittances, the consolidation of Brazil's and Peru's democracies and party systems, a change of Brazilian and Peruvian overseas voting procedures and practices, the growth of the Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* populations in Japan, and the development of more Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* ethnic advocacy organizations in Japan.

These findings indicate that the emergence of political transnationalism goes beyond the presence of a certain political culture in the country of origin, the sole existence of dual loyalties, or the presence of migrant remittances and must combine with the favourable conditions of a consolidated democratic electoral system and the presence of immigrant organizations. This analysis specifically addresses the factors that limit the emergence of political transnationalism for these transnational and diasporic identities. As these groups are transnational, diasporic, as well as pan-ethnic identities, the preceding has not addressed why these pan-ethnic identities have not been used for political mobilization.

## Pan-ethnicity

In addition to having both transnational and diasporic identities, Antilleans and *Nikkeijin* can also be called pan-ethnic identities but what prevents mobilization of these identities for collective action? Pan-ethnicity has been used as a mechanism for political mobilization in various contexts. Dutch Antilleans and Arubans (Arubans are statistically counted as Antilleans in the Netherlands due to historical reasons) and Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* carry pan-ethnic labels of 'Antillean' and '*Nikkeijin*', in comparing these groups, the question arises why they have not used these labels politically to mobilize their communities in the host countries? Okamoto (2003) has made the distinction between transnational homeland politics and pan-ethnicity as two different processes in that national origin groups are more likely to organize separately for homeland politics (Okamoto, 2003:820–821). Okamoto (2006) defines pan-ethnicity as 'when

the membership or community is comprised of culturally and linguistically diverse national origin groups that are often seen as homogenous by outsiders' (Okamoto, 2006:3). Some studies have shown the ways in which the state creates groups and categories and views them as a 'single administrative unit', that is, Latinos, Asians, or Native Americans in the U.S. for the distribution of resources (Espirtu and Ong, 1994:301). This racialization has in turn have led some groups to mobilize around pan-ethnicity. Padilla (1985) has shown how Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans organized themselves along a Latino identity in response to civil rights and affirmative action legislation in Chicago during the 1970s. Espiritu (1992) provides an analysis of the construction of an Asian American pan-ethnic identity in response to societal threats and government policies. Both Dutch Antilleans and Arubans and Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* have pan-ethnic labels that have been organized by the state but these pan-ethnic identities have rarely been actualized in political terms by its members.

Okamoto's (2003) theory of pan-ethnicity is very useful for understanding the structural conditions that both facilitate and limit pan-ethnic political mobilization. Although Okamoto concentrates on the United States, she suggests that that her research is applicable to other contexts. She asks, 'under what conditions then are distinct national-origin groups who often differ in language, culture, religion, and immigration status, able to construct a pan-national identity and organize collectively under such an identity?' (Okamoto, 2003:811–812) Okamoto (2003; 2006) expands on 'competition theory' and 'cultural division of labour theory' and applies them to construct a theory of the structural factors that lead to the emergence of pan-ethnic identity. Building on 'competition theory' which argues that when there are two or more ethnic groups in competition, collective action will occur because they will compete for position within the social hierarchy, Okamoto (2003) contends that competition among pan-ethnic groups will increase the rate of pan-ethnic collective action, 'whereas competition within pan-ethnic groups will decrease the rate of pan-ethnic collective action' (Okamoto, 2003:815–816; 2006).

Expanding on the cultural division of labour theory, Okamoto (2003; 2006) posits that when there is occupational segregation of ethnic subcultures from one another, solidarity based on pan-ethnicity should develop and follow by pan-ethnic collective action. Hence, 'when Asians as a group are concentrated in particular occupations, this leads to the heightening of pan-ethnic boundaries and leads to pan-ethnic outcomes whereas the segregation of Asian subgroups into different occupations heightens ethnic boundaries and has a dampening effect on pan-ethnicity' (Okamoto, 2006:17). Okamoto (2003) synthesizes and contextualizes these competing theories and finds the same processes occur at the larger pan-ethnic as well as the national origin levels in that 'the same mechanism is at work, segregation processes foster common interests, networks, and identities.

In addition, intragroup competition dampens pan-national collective action efforts, while ethnic or national-origin organizing contributes to higher rates of panethnic activity' (Okamoto, 2003:835). She suggests that more research needs to be done to determine whether these factors can be applied to different group formation processes both inside and outside of the United States (Okamoto, 2003:835–836).

Okamoto's (2003; 2006) theory helps to explain why pan-ethnic collective action has rarely occurred for Antilleans and *Nikkeijin* in their host societies. Despite the fact most *Nikkeijin* are employed in the manufacturing industry in Japan and Antilleans are spread throughout all levels of the labour force in the Netherlands, there is little in the way of collective action around pan-ethnic identity. Following Okamoto (2003; 2006), in both cases, we find both 'intra-ethnic competition' between the dominant groups Curaçao and Arubans in the Antillean case and Brazilian and Peruvians in the *Nikkeijin* cases. As pointed out in previous chapters, rivalries exist in both pan-ethnic identities that deter the use of pan-ethnic identities for collective action. Many have noted the tensions that exist between the more numerous Afro-descended Curaçaoans as opposed to the Euro-mestizo identified and economically slightly better off and favoured Arubans, which has fostered 'competition' within the 'Antillean' pan-ethnic group that has interfered with pan-ethnic collective action around an Antillean identity. Similarly, the more numerous Brazilian *Nikkeijin* workers in Japan are sometimes said to view themselves as superior and are favoured by labour brokers because of a perception of closer proximity to Japanese ethnic purity as opposed to the many mixed race (indigenous native American and Japanese descendant) labourers of the Peruvian *Nikkeijin*. This 'cultural division of labour' has worked as a deterrent to organizing pan-ethnic collective action around a pan-ethnic *Nikkeijin* identity in Japan. Hence, following Okamoto (2003; 2006) structural variables within each context have impeded pan-ethnic collective action.

## Conclusion

This book has analysed the political, social, and economic forces that have propelled and sustained the post-1985/1990 legal migration of Dutch Antillean and Aruban Dutch citizens to the Netherlands and Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendants) to Japan. It has looked at their political incorporation and political transnationalism in these countries of reception. The evidence suggests that globalization and Dutch and Japanese state policies have produced a convergence in the use of Dutch citizenship and Japanese in these post-1985/1990 migrations to the Netherlands and Japan. Citizenship and ethnicity are revealed as political constructions that can be used as political symbols for political leverage or gain with little or no regard for substantive and participatory membership. In contrast to

immigrants with no prior connections to a host country, if anything shared citizenship or ethnicity of immigrants creates an expectation of shared membership that is not often realized and can lead to ambivalence and apathy.

Moreover, even when groups are deemed as 'transnational' and 'diasporic' as well as 'marginalized', this may not develop into a political transnationalism regardless of the political culture of origin or the presence of remittances, which speaks to the conditionality of the democratic consolidation of electoral systems, party systems, and the presence of ethnic organizations focused on political advocacy. In addition to transnational and diasporic, these groups can be characterized as pan-ethnic, but intra-ethnic competition has hampered the pan-ethnic label from being used for political mobilization. As the Netherlands *re-ethnicizes* and Japan *de-ethnicizes*, these two cases tell a story beyond inherited access and postcolonial and ethnic bonuses and indicate the need for accommodation of all immigrants in the way of state policies that facilitate political incorporation and recognition of various identities in the polity by means of multiculturalism.

The ways in which globalization, immigration, and citizenship interact serve as lenses to recognizing some of the strains and contradictions of membership in contemporary liberal democratic states. While the state may be in the process of being 'decentred' and 'denationalized' due to the effects of globalization, it continues to be an important reference point for migration, citizenship, and transnationalism. The cases of Antilleans in the Netherlands and *Nikkeijin* in Japan stand as legally 'authorized yet unrecognized' actors within policy settings that have exhibited both the trends of *re-ethnicization* as well as *de-ethnicization* from which it is difficult to determine where these *de jure* insiders but *de facto* outsiders fit in. These insider/outside groups serve as heuristic categories to understand political exclusion and inclusion. They illustrate the politics of membership around citizenship and ethnicity as constructivist and relational. Despite various degrees of social and economic inclusion for these groups in the Netherlands and Japan, the evidence suggests a need for state policies that recognize the cultural rights and equal membership of these groups in the polity.

This book has shown that, despite the extension of rights, membership in the liberal democratic polity is manipulated and instrumentalized by different political actors for political gain or leverage regardless of co-nationality and citizenship or ethnic ties. Based on the evidence collected and presented, several factors point to improvement of the political incorporation of these groups. In the case of the Antilleans in the Netherlands, there needs to be some discussion and resolution about whether or not Antilleans are indeed, internal migrants, national minorities (Kymlicka, 1995) or historically marginalized extra-territorial national minorities within the Dutch Kingdom with rights of accommodation as such, regardless of the small size of their constituency.



As what takes place in the Netherlands ultimately has an effect on the lives of Dutch Antilleans and Arubans, voting rights in Dutch national elections are an important consideration. The recent change in the Dutch law to allow island residents to vote in European Parliamentary elections speaks to this point. Moreover, voting rights for Dutch Antilleans and Arubans resident in the Netherlands in the island elections would certainly do something to improve the self-contained island politics and the accountability of these polities. Beyond the resident ministers and consultative bodies, a better process of formal representation, consultation, and advice and hence greater voice both with regard to the Dutch Antillean and Aruban communities and their overseas countries is very much needed. Norris (2004; 2005) has shown some of the positive qualities as well as the deficiencies of proportional representation for groups concentrated in certain geographic areas. Norris (2005) concludes that any electoral reform in the Netherlands which introduces single member districts or some variation would probably serve to decrease gender and possibly ethnic diversity in Parliament and suggests other measures for ensuring diversity such as the use of statutory quotas regulating the candidate selection processes in all parties, reserved seats, and the use of voluntary for political parties. In light of the group's small size, these mechanisms should be used if it is deemed important for the overseas countries' communities resident in the Netherlands to be consistently represented. Much more needs to be done to ensure that these communities with hundreds of years of historical connections to the Netherlands are recognized in terms of accommodation of their language, culture, and history without expectations of an unattainable and undesirable assimilation. This would do much to improve the political incorporation of the Antillean communities in the Netherlands.

Beyond the obvious extension of legal citizenship or political rights to *Nikkeijin*, in the Japanese case, there needs to be greater recognition of the cultural rights of the *Nikkeijin* and other minorities as national minorities (Kymlicka, 1995) and of the changing face of Japan as a multicultural country of immigration. There is also a pressing concern with better coordination between the central and local governments on immigration policy and an integration policy and programme that takes into account the needs of the country's recent immigrants and historically marginalized groups. State sponsored accommodation is especially needed in the areas of free or affordable professional Japanese language instruction which has been very expensive, antiracist legislation, and the recognition of Japan's old and new multicultural realities. As political opportunity structure and Japan's liberal democracy continues to evolve and change along with new generations of *Nikkeijin* being able to better communicate in Japanese, it is expected that *Nikkeijin* political incorporation will improve.

Further research is required to identify the particular institutional mechanisms that would better facilitate the political incorporation of Dutch

Antillean, Aruban, and *Nikkeijin* and other immigrant groups in the respective cases of the Netherlands and Japan. There is a need in political science for additional comparative research using citizenship and ethnicity as independent variables in political incorporation as well as on the linkage between immigration and incorporation. Additional comparative research needs to be done gathering data on other cases in which globalization and state policies have produced other migrations of co-citizen and co-ethnic immigrants to other liberal democratic states. With the growth of globalization, immigration flows, transnationalism, and dual citizenship we are likely to see more of these and other immigrants in other host societies, and it is probable that they will encounter similar problems in their host societies that could add to our general knowledge of how to integrate immigrants and other marginalized groups in the polity.

This book has revealed the relational nature of how citizenship and ethnicity are manipulated as indicators of membership by the state and various political actors with no plans of accommodation. In the Dutch case, the current assimilationist oriented Integration Policy is, in large part, a reaction to the previous Minorities Policy and pays little regard to the recognition of various groups in the Dutch society. The Japanese case presents little to no policy of accommodation or of recognition of immigrants or longstanding ethnic minorities. Although I have found social, economic, and political incorporation to be not necessarily correlated in the cases of this study, the evidence suggests a social nature to immigrant political incorporation where community organizations and networks are important; hence the need for state policies that help accommodate immigrants through this process and facilitate their political incorporation, including recognition that they are a part of a multicultural society. It is hoped that this book will contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between globalization and state policies behind migration and the linkage with outcomes of immigrant political incorporation and the emergence of political transnationalism.

# Appendix

## Methodology

My methodological approach is comparative, historical, and empirical. I employ a method from Charles Tilly (1984) called 'a variation finding comparison'. Tilly argues that a useful comparison is one that eliminates the 'principle of variation in the character or intensity of a phenomenon having more than one form by examining systematic differences among instances' (Tilly, 1984:116). Towards these ends, along with the collection of demographic and other statistical data from both government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), I conducted 160 qualitative in-depth structured and semi-structured open-ended interviews over several months in 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 in the Dutch kingdom (including the Netherlands and the Dutch islands of Aruba and Curaçao) and Japan with national and local politicians, policymakers, NGOs, community organizations, community activists, journalists as well as local governments with older and newer high concentrations of Dutch Antillean, Aruban, and other immigrants in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague in the Netherlands and Toyota City, Hamamatsu City, and Kawasaki City in Japan. Additional interviews were conducted with the local governments of Oizumi Town and Ota City. I identified informants through Dutch, Japanese, Antillean and Aruban, and Japanese *Nikkeijin*-oriented newspapers and websites and employed a snowball sampling technique making contacts for my interviews through government officials, scholars, political party leaders, activists, and community organizations of each country initially in the New York area, followed by outreach on the ground in each country. Other organizations and community leaders in the Netherlands and Japan as well as Curaçao, Dutch Antilles and Aruba were identified through the 'snowball' method. My interviews were complemented by data collected from programmes and activities of government ministries, agencies, organizations, and groups interviewed as well as demographic data from their surrounding communities. The interviews lasted from one hour to a maximum of two hours. All the interviews were conducted in Dutch, Papiamentu, Spanish, Japanese, Portuguese, and English with interpreters employed as necessary. Most of the interviews were digitally audio recorded in both the original language and translations to ensure accuracy and were later transcribed.

## Research design and data collection

The research was conducted using both quantitative and qualitative data and is based on my fieldwork in the Netherlands, Japan, and the Dutch islands of Aruba and Curaçao in 2006–2012. In addition to primary source material such as local newspapers and government documents, about 160 qualitative in-depth semi-structured, open-ended interviews were conducted with national and local politicians, government officials, and local leaders to get a better sense of the attitudes, needs, and interests of and towards these immigrants and other communities in each place.

The Netherlands never intended to be a country of immigration and over the last decade has experienced domestic backlash. Japan has little experience with

foreign immigration and a policy against unskilled foreign labour. Following Cornelius et al.'s (1994) typology, case studies of the political incorporation and political transnationalism of first-generation Antilleans and *Nikkeijin* in the Netherlands and Japan are appropriate for a systemic analysis. As most Dutch Antillean migration from Curaçao and Aruba (1985) and *Nikkeijin* migration from Brazil and Peru (1990) occurred around the same time period, this was the research focus. Local areas were chosen because of their concentrations of these primarily first-generation and other older communities of immigrants.

The study focuses on first-generation Dutch Antillean and Aruban immigrants in the Netherlands and Brazilian and Peruvian *Nikkeijin* immigrants to Japan. I define first-generation as Dutch Antillean or Aruban born whose Dutch citizenship facilitated legal migration to the Netherlands and *Nikkeijin* as those Latin American born whose Japanese ethnicity facilitated their legal migration to Japan.

My analysis of the data collected enabled an assessment of the political, social, and economic factors producing these migrations in order to determine whether formal legal citizenship or co-ethnicity with host societies facilitates immigrant political incorporation and allows us to examine the factors that enable or impede it as well as the conditions that facilitate or limit the emergence of political transnationalism. An examination of the data collection enables a determination of why *Nikkeijin* are being included as 'local citizens' by some local governments in Japan while Antilleans seem reluctant to participate regardless of formal political rights. In light of the fact of non-citizenship for most *Nikkeijin*, I looked for signs of both formal and extra-electoral participation.

I use indicators (Table A.1) based on the following definitions chosen for their broad identification of political participation. Jones-Correa (2002) defines political incorporation as the formal (citizenship, naturalization, and voting) and informal (membership in nongovernmental and community organizations and associations, etc.) means of participation in a given location and the extent to which immigrants interests are reflected in political outcomes and policies (3). Guarnizo (2001) identifies transnationalism, and what I identify as political transnationalism, as 'to be incorporated formally and simultaneously "here" and "there" through privileges opened up by dual citizenship, and the reach...of government programs, political parties, and candidates for office from their countries of origin' (214). For Miller (1989), extra-electoral participation includes homeland participation, consultative voice, unions and factory councils, political, religious, and civic organizations, and extraparlimentary opposition. The application of these indicators to the data collected assessed group political incorporation, political transnationalism, and/or extra-electoral participation (see Table 1).

Data collection included the use of government demographic statistical data; individual level voting surveys; in-depth interviews; textual analysis of government, political party, and community organization policy documents; community organization membership; policy speeches; and review of relevant databases and newspapers. Additionally, I used the widely recognized and respected databases of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Freedom House, Transparency International, UNDP, and the World Bank for data on voter turnout, electoral systems, political analysis, political corruption, human development, and socio-economic indicators.

Interviews provided answers to difficult 'how and why' questions about ethnic self-identification, language, occupational status, class identity, structural racism, political party and organizational positions and membership, economic and political

*Table A.1* Indicators of immigrant political incorporation, political transnationalism, and extra-electoral participation

	<b>Indicators of immigrant political incorporation</b> Jones-Correa (2002)	<b>Indicators of political transnationalism (Guarnizo, 2001)/extra-electoral participation (Miller, 1989)</b>
Netherlands	Leadership and membership in local and national political parties	Dutch citizenship/political participation in the Netherlands and/or Curaçao, Aruba
	Voting in local and national elections	Transnational outreach of Aruban, Curaçaoan, and Dutch state programmes, and political parties
	Membership in NGOs, community organizations, and associations	Politicians from their countries of origin and settlement
	Interests reflected in local and national political outcomes and policies	<b>Extra-electoral participation</b> Homeland participation; consultative voice; unions and factory councils; political, religious, and civic organizations; extra-parliamentary opposition
Japan	Naturalization	Japanese citizenship/political participation in Japan and/or Brazil and Peru
	Voter registration and party membership	Transnational outreach of Brazilian and Peruvian state programmes and political parties
	Leadership and membership in local and national political parties	
	Voting in local and national elections	Politicians from their countries of origin and settlement
	Membership and leadership in NGOs, community organizations, and associations	<b>Extra-electoral participation</b> Homeland participation; consultative voice; unions and factory councils; political, religious, and civic organizations; extra-parliamentary opposition
	Interests reflected in local and national political outcomes and policies	

interest, participation, involvement, and plans to return to home countries. As most *Nikkeijin* in Japan are not Japanese citizens, while naturalization statistics illustrate something about the incentives and level of inspiration to formal citizenship for immigrants, interviews and analysis of community organizations say much more than voting statistics. In Japan, I interviewed *Nikkeijin*, Japanese community leaders, representatives of community organizations, Japanese national and local politicians, government officials, and diplomatic representatives. I asked them about naturalization, sending state influence and political rights, and the factors impacting their political incorporation, political transnationalism, or extra-electoral participation. Similarly, interviews were conducted with Antilleans, Antillean community leaders, community organizations as well as Dutch national and local politicians, and government officials in the Dutch kingdom but with a view towards the reality of Antilleans as legal Dutch citizens.

# Notes

## 1 Postcolonial Citizens, Ethnic Migration, and Political Incorporation in Liberal Democracies: Locating the Dutch and Japanese Cases

1. This book centres on developments around the Netherlands Antilles prior to its dissolution on 10 October 2010. Before this, the Kingdom of the Netherlands was made up of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba. The Netherlands Antilles was a federation of the five island states of Curaçao (administrative capital), Bonaire, Saba, St. Eustatius, and St. Maarten. As of 10 October 2010, the Dutch Kingdom consists of the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao, and St. Maarten. The smaller former Dutch Antillean islands of Bonaire, Saint Eustatius, and Saba have been fully integrated as 'special municipalities' of the Netherlands. As parts of the Dutch Kingdom, all Dutch islanders retain Dutch citizenship/nationality with the permanent right of abode in the Netherlands and European Union.
2. I define citizenship as legal membership that includes a broad range of civil, political, and social rights, that is, in the 'legal sense to designate the formal status of membership in a political community' (Bosniak, 2001:240–241). The 'pivotal right is that of participation in law-making and government' (Castles and Davidson, 2000:vii). Nationality is defined here as belonging to a nation. A nation can be defined as 'a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights for all members' (Smith, 1991:14). The members of a nation lay claim to a clearly defined territory and not necessarily in biological terms (Sodaro, 2008:148). Following Sassen (2006), I use the terms citizenship and nationality interchangeably as they essentially refer to the same concept (281). (See European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship for similar essentially synonymous usage of definitions of citizenship and nationality. <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/citizenship-glossary/89#Natnal>, Accessed 6 June 2012).
3. Ethnicity is defined here as per Max Weber's definition as 'those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relation exists' (Roth and Wittich, 1978:389).
4. Globalization is defined here as 'a process or (set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial relations and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact—generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power' (Held, et al., 1999:16). The globalized processes of market liberalization

or aka 'neoliberalism' (Harvey, 2007:7) that began in the 1970s and 1980s and the oil price aftershocks of the 1980s characterized by the precipitous decline of oil prices are often associated with the term globalization. These global political, social, and economic processes have propelled migrations around the world. State and migrants have utilized former imperial and ethnic connections and networks for legal migration purposes. As the Dutch and Japanese cases illustrate, these are often former imperial or ethnic diaspora connections that provide immigration possibilities as a result of the extension of some form of membership rights, that is, the right to legal entry and settlement on the basis of shared citizenship or ethnicity.

5. While transnationalism usually implies simultaneous sociocultural belonging, attachments, and/or activity in two or more states (Morawska, 2001; Guarnizo, 2001), political transnationalism specifically refers to both formal and informal political activity in both the country of origin and the host country (Portes, 1999; Itzigsohn, 2000; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a).
6. Except during the long hot and humid summers, some establishments including the Japanese (Diet) parliament in Tokyo and elsewhere where some male politicians and bureaucrats dress 'cool biz' in shirt sleeves with no neckties or jackets.
7. Interview with Member of Lower House of Parliament, VVD, and former prosecutor of Amsterdam, 24 January 2007.
8. My prior experiences in these countries is non-participant observation that has enhanced this research. Since this study is both theoretical and empirical, I drew upon my experience in the Netherlands and Japan. As a US/Dutch dual citizen of Aruban/Dominican background who is married to a Japanese citizen/national and has lived, worked, studied, and established academic contacts and data resources in the countries of study, I was in a unique position to conduct this research.
9. First-generation immigrants and second-generation offspring with one or two first-generation parents.

Source: 'Allochtonen; geslacht, leeftijd en herkomstgroepering', 1 januari Central Bureau voor de Statistiek, Den Haag/Heerlen (Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands), <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=70787NED&D1=0&D2=a&D3=0&D4=a&D5=18-39&HD=120606-2151&HDR=T,G4&STB=G1,G2,G3> (Accessed 11 June 2012).

10. Brazil and Peru have two of the world's largest Japanese descendant communities. As a consequence of the 1990 Immigration Act, it is assumed that most Brazilians and Peruvians in Japan are *Nikkeijin*. Tsuda (2003) notes that although registered as 'foreigners: some 90% of Korean Japanese have been born and raised in Japan but have not been granted Japanese citizenship and have not naturalized' (Tsuda, 2003:x).
11. Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development, p. 143, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/PR2-HDR09-HDI-E.pdf> (Accessed 13 June 2012).
12. Source: '2009 Immigration Control', 15th Issue of the 'Immigration Control Report', Japan. Immigration Bureau. Ministry of Justice, 'Section 2 - Foreign Nationals Residing in Japan,' p. 21.
13. World Bank Data World Development Indicators (WDI), and Global Development Finance (GDF) <http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2> (Accessed 14 June 2012).



## 2 Convergence? Globalization and State Policies in the Production of Postcolonial Citizen and Ethnic Migration

1. Aruba's scheduled 1996 full independence was not implemented, and it remains a part of the Dutch Kingdom.
2. Source: 'Allochtoon naar herkomstgroepering op 1 januari, vanaf 1972, 2005 Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba', Central Bureau voor de Statistiek, Voorburg/Heerlen 2006-05-23 (Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands: [http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/print/printing.asp?validate=1&STB=G1,G2,G3,G4&LA=nl@. .](http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/print/printing.asp?validate=1&STB=G1,G2,G3,G4&LA=nl@.)).
3. See Goto (2007).
4. Tsuda writes in his endnote 35 'Under the new immigration provisions, the *Nikkeijin* are allowed to enter Japan on two types of visas, both of which have no activity restriction and can be renewed an indefinite number of times. For the second-generation Nisei, the previously restrictive requirements and procedures for obtaining the *Nihonjin no Haigusha* (spouse of Japanese) visa were simplified, making it much easier for them to enter Japan, as long as they can prove their Japanese descent. The government also set aside a new *teiyusha* (long-term residence) visa category for the third-generation sensei' (Tsuda, 1999:28).
5. Source: '2005 Immigration Control', 11th Issue of the 'Immigration Control Report', Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, Japan (Table 11: 'Changes in the number of registered foreign nationals by nationality (place of origin)', p. 30). available at <http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/IB/ib-01.html>.
6. Source: 'Unemployment growth rate among foreigners slowing down', 28 February 2005. Central Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands). The same report states, 'people with a non-western background (which includes Antilleans and Arubans) are on average three times more often unemployed than native Dutch people'. It goes on to note, 'unemployment among people' with a non-western background increased up to 16% in 2004 as opposed to the indigenous population which increased from 4.2% in 2003 to 5.2% in 2004 (<http://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/menu/themas/arbeid-inkomen-sociale-zekerheid/arbeidsmarkt/publicaties/artikelen/2005-1658-wm.htm>). 'Unemployment grows faster among foreigners', 8 March 2004. Central Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands, CBS), available at <http://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/menu/themas/arbeid-inkomen-sociale-zekerheid/arbeidsmarkt/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2004/2004-1408-wm.htm>.
7. Simmons and Guengant (1992) identify the Caribbean as a 'semi-peripheral region within the North Atlantic political economy' (Simons and Guengant, 1992:99).
8. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (<http://www.oecd.org>).
9. As cited in Note 98 (Sharpe, 2005), in 2005 Dutch Immigration and Integration Minister Rita Verdonk introduced a proposal to require young Dutch Antilleans and Arubans (18–24 years of age) to find employment or begin studies within three months of arrival in the Netherlands or face deportation.
10. A report on 'Remittances from Japan to Latin America: Study of Latin American immigrants living and working in Japan', presented at Inter-American Development Bank Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors on 6 April 2005 in Okinawa, Japan, states 70% of the Latin American adult immigrants living in

Japan send remittances on a regular basis; 304,824 Latin American immigrants living in Japan send about US\$2.65 billion to their families on a yearly basis; each remittance averages approximately US\$600; Latin Americans send money home about 14.5 times a year; those that send to one person send about 11 times a year and send to an additional relative about 3.5 times a year (p. 40). No data available as yet about Dutch Antillean and Aruban remittances from the Netherlands back to their home countries.

11. Although there is little dispute about the role of transnational labour and ethnic networks, there is some dispute about the presence of transnational family networks in initiating migration.
12. Both Dutch Antillean and Aruban currencies are pegged to the US dollar.
13. As written in Sharpe (2005), the Dutch law 'Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers' (WIN) stipulates that since 1998, new residents from certain non-Western countries including the Dutch Kingdom partners or 'overseas countries' of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are obliged to attend a year long Dutch integration course for which they must initially pay half although they are reimbursed upon its completion (Sharpe, 2005:304).

### 3 Old and New Nationalisms, Pre-migration Political Legacies

1. Interview with Amsterdam Mayor's Office Official, 12 January 2007.
2. Almond and Verba (1963) define political culture as specifically political orientations and attitudes toward the political system and the role of self within it.
3. This chapter centres on developments around the Netherlands Antilles prior to its dissolution on 10 October 2010. As of 10 October 2010, the Dutch Kingdom has consisted of the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao, and St. Maarten. The smaller former Dutch Antillean islands of Bonaire, Saint Eustatius, and Saba have been fully integrated as 'special municipalities' of the Netherlands.
4. In 1986, Aruba obtained 'status aparte' from the Netherlands Antilles making it an integral self-governing part of the Dutch Kingdom but independent of the administrative centralism of Curaçao and the Netherlands Antilles. Although Aruba was scheduled to become fully independent in 1996 from the Dutch Kingdom, this idea was rather unpopular among its population and permanently negotiated off the table.
5. Dutch Antilleans and Arubans resident on the islands cannot vote in Dutch national elections unless they have lived in the Netherlands for ten years or more.
6. One can still very often witness the Dutch enjoying 'Hollandse Nieuwe Haring' salted raw herring on the streets of the Netherlands today.
7. Bosma and Alferink (2012:279) argue the Nationaal instituut Nederlands slavernijverleden en erfenis (NiNsee) (National Institute for the Study of Dutch Slavery (NiNsee)) as an outcome of Dutch multicultural policies and an example of memory politics. In a sign of the change of political attitudes, NiNsee launched a petition stating that by January 2013 their subsidies from the Ministry of Education, Research, and Science may no longer exist and thus threaten the Institute's existence. <http://www.ninsee.nl/petitie/tekenen.php> (Accessed 29 March 2013).
8. These two islands have recently found new innovative ways of nationalistic differentiation by writing the language differently. Oostindie has observed the recent phenomena of highlighting of a specifically Aruban Papiamentu 'that is supposedly more latino in spelling and pronunciation, against the Papiamentu of Curaçao' (Oostindie, 2005:130).

9. There is a miniature city named after him called Madurodam in the Hague, the Netherlands.
10. First-generation immigrants and second-generation offspring with one or two first-generation parents.  
*Source:* 'Allochtonen; geslacht, leeftijd en herkomstgroepering', 1 januari Central Bureau voor de Statistiek, Den Haag/Heerlen (Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands) <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=70787NED&D1=0&D2=a&D3=0&D4=a&D5=18-39&HD=120606-2151&HDR=T,G4&STB=G1,G2,G3> (Accessed 27 June 2012).  
 In 2010, their numbers increased to Turks (383,957), Surinamese (342,279), Moroccans (349,005), and Antilleans and Arubans (138,420).
11. The Netherlands has a participatory and consultative structure for recognized minorities. Vermeulen and Penninx (2000).
12. As calculated from Fennema and Tillie (1999) Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam, Civic communities and ethnic networks. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 25 (4), 703–726.
13. Tillie, Jean and Boris Slijper. 'Immigrant Political Integration and Ethnic Civic Communities in Amsterdam', 7. Paper Presented at the Conference on 'Identities, Affiliations, and Allegiances', Yale University (2–3 October 2003). The authors note that due to data collection limitations they could not distinguish between Surinamese and Antilleans. Same data were published without 'overall turnout' in Jean Tillie 'Social Capital of Organisations and Their Members: Explaining the Political Integration of Immigrants in Amsterdam', in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30 (3) (2004):534. Reprinted with the permission of the publisher (Taylor & Francis Ltd, <http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals>).
14. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
15. Tillie, Jean (1998): 71–95.
16. *Source:* Statistical Yearbook 2006 Central Bureau of Statistics of Aruba, p. 27.
17. <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?country=NL> (Accessed 27 July 2012).
18. By permission of International IDEA from Figure 20 'Influence from Previous Power', copyright International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2012. See website [http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter\\_turnout6.cfm?renderfor%20print=1&](http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter_turnout6.cfm?renderfor%20print=1&) (Accessed 27 July 2012).
19. Both the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba generally scored well above the Latin American and Caribbean regional average on most of the World Bank's Governance Indicators of voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (see website of World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI) Project <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp> (Accessed 3 June 2013).

#### 4 What Does Postcolonial Dutch Citizenship Mean in Political Terms? 1985–2008

1. Author interview with the Resident Minister of the Netherlands Antilles. 11 January 2007.
2. All Dutch nationals who are aged 18 or over on polling day are entitled to vote in elections. Dutch nationals resident abroad are entitled to vote in elections to the Lower House and the European Parliament. However, in the case of Dutch nationals living in the Netherlands Antilles, certain conditions are attached: they

must have previously resided for at least ten years in the Netherlands, or be a Dutch public servant, or be the spouse, partner or child of a Dutch public servant and form part of the same household as that person. Only those resident in a particular province or municipality on the day on which candidates are nominated may vote in the election for the provincial or municipal council concerned. Electoral Council, October 2005, Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations. 'Elections in the Netherlands.' Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations.

3. On a scale from 1–7 with '1' being the most free and '7' being the least free and on a scale with the designations of 'Free', 'Partly Free' or 'Not Free' on a combination of political and civil liberties ratings, Freedom House classifies the Netherlands as a parliamentary democracy with the distinctions of '1' for Political Rights and '1' for Civil Rights, and 'Free'.
4. First-generation immigrants and second-generation offspring with one or two first-generation parents.

*Source:* 'Allochtonen; geslacht, leeftijd en herkomstgroepering', 1 januari Central Bureau voor de Statistiek, Den Haag/Heerlen. (Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands) <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=70787NED&D1=0&D2=a&D3=0&D4=a&D5=18-39&HD=120606-2151&HDR=T,G4&STB=G1,G2,G3> (Accessed 11 June 2012).

Of the 130,722 Antilleans in 2005, 84,000 are island born with three quarters of the Antillean population born on the island of Curaçao and 16 per cent born on the island of Aruba. from Harmsen, Carel. 'Eerst generatie Antillanen naar geboorte-eiland' Central Bureau voor de Statistiek. <http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/24E5C16A-FA80-4DEA-AC54-EB10FF1D303D/0/2005k4b15p022art.pdf> (Accessed 30 August 2012).

5. Some have criticized these citizenship regime types and their connections with civic versus ethnic definitions of nationhood as overly simplistic in so far as they ignore that all nations have both civic and ethnic qualities and may provide equal access to citizenship.
6. <http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2004/2004-1528-wm.htm> (Accessed 11 September 2012).
7. As stipulated by Wet Inburgering Nieucomers (WIN).
8. Interview with Ministry of Justice Official, 11 January 2007. In the new law effective from January 2007, Antilleans and Arubans are no longer obliged to take the course but all newcomers are obliged to pass an exam in order to stay for which they must pay. The requirement does not include those with certain levels of higher education.
9. <http://www.minbuza.nl/en/services/consular-services/dutch-nationality/regaining-dutch-nationality> (Accessed 11 September 2012).
10. Interview with Member of the Lower House of Parliament, CDA, 17 January 2007.
11. Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands. Voorburg/Heerlen, 2006. <http://www.cbs.nl/CmsSiteEngine/Presentation/Functional/Template/Special Page Template>. 6 December 2006.
12. There has been some debate in parliament about the use of the term 'allochtoon'. Among earlier attempts by others, in 2008 former Minister of Justice Hirsch Ballin of CDA urged that 'allochtoon' and 'autotochtoon' no longer be used because they create unnecessary divisions in society. However the consensus in parliament was that these terms has become too assimilated in Dutch culture and were necessary to identify problems impacting vulnerable minorities in society (Expatica, 2008, <http://n.expatica.com/>

nl/news/Parliament-says-term-allochtoon-is-indispensable\_3216.html (Accessed 30 March 2013). Some such as former Integration Minister Eberhard van der Laan of the PVDA suggested in 2009 that the term 'New Netherlanders' be used rather than '*allochtoon*' and '*autochtoon*' because the new terms does not emphasize a persons origins but rather that they belong in the Netherlands. [http://www.expatica.com/nl/news/community\\_focus/Dutch-minister-wants-immigrants-to-integrate-better\\_58184.html](http://www.expatica.com/nl/news/community_focus/Dutch-minister-wants-immigrants-to-integrate-better_58184.html) (Accessed 30 March 2013).

13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Interview with the Director of OCAN, 9 January 2007.
16. Nederlands Migratie Instituut. See website <http://www.nmigratie.nl/>.
17. Netherlands Migratie Instituut 'To Stay or to return' and the Dutch Migration Institute (brochure).
18. Ibid.
19. <http://www.nmigratie.nl/engels/antillen/index.html>. This stipulation only paid moving expenses for one time.
20. Interview with the Director of the Nederlands Migratie Instituut (NMI), 24 January 2007.
21. Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations, April 2000. 'Factsheet'. 'Repatriation Act'.
22. Tarrow (1994) defines political opportunity structure as 'consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure' (Tarrow, 1994:85).
23. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 'General Elections in the Netherlands'. [http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS\\_TCP=tcpPrintMinBuza2&CMS\\_ITEM=MBZ4](http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_TCP=tcpPrintMinBuza2&CMS_ITEM=MBZ4).
24. Norris (2004; 2005) suggests some reasons for the discrepancy in the inclusion and political support of women and minorities in proportional systems when compared to majoritarian systems may be because of geography and other factors. Whereas women are spread evenly throughout all districts minorities may be geographically concentrated so there 'may be an incentive to select minority candidates for seats' (Norris, 2005:18–19).
25. John Leerdam was repeatedly voted the most well dressed man in the Dutch parliament. Interview with Member of Lower House of Parliament, PVDA, Nederlands-Antilliaanse en Arubanse Zaken, Kunst, Cultuur and Media, 18 January 2007.
26. James Sharpe, a Dutch born Aruban descendant, was elected as an MP for several months in 2010 as a member of the far right PVV (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*) (Party for Freedom). He participated in hurdling competitions for the Netherlands Antilles in the 1992 Summer Olympics.
27. The Dutch Centre for Political Participation reports that in the 1<sup>st</sup> short lived Balkenende Cabinet (2002–2003) under the coalition government of CDA, LPF, and VVD there was one state secretary (*not a minister*) of Surinamese origin from the anti-immigrant radical right wing populist LPF. Philomena Bijlhout's office as state secretary for Emancipation and Family Affairs lasted only a few hours after it was found that that she had lied about her links to the former military dictatorship in Surinam and forced to resign. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2146966.stm> (Accessed 16 August 2012) The fourth Balkenend cabinet had two ethnic minority state secretaries, Aboutaleb and Albayrak. 'Allochtonen

- in de politiek' (Updated 18 August 2010) ([http://www.prodemos.nl/content/download/1021/7058/file/Dossier%20Allochtonen% 20in% 20de% 20politiek-herziene%20versie%2007072010.pdf](http://www.prodemos.nl/content/download/1021/7058/file/Dossier%20Allochtonen%20in%20de%20politiek-herziene%20versie%2007072010.pdf)) (Accessed 16 August 2012).
- In 2007 there were three (4 per cent) ethnic minorities in the First Chamber/Upper House and by 2011 this was down to 1 (1 per cent). Huis voor Democratie en Rechtsstaat. Diversiteit in Provinciale Staten, Gedeputeerde Staten en Eerste Kamer in 2011, Amsterdam. June, 2011 ([http://www.prodemos.nl/content/download/1020/7054/file/Rapport% 20diversiteit%20juni%202011.pdf](http://www.prodemos.nl/content/download/1020/7054/file/Rapport%20diversiteit%20juni%202011.pdf)) (Accessed 16 August 2012).
28. Keuzenkam and Merens, 2006, 248. The figures for 2002 are after election and formation of a new cabinet. Figures for 2003 from the Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek. Dutch Centre for Political Participation. Vrouwen en allochtoon in de nieuw gekozen Tweede Kamer 2006. Amsterdam. 39 November 2006. Figures for 2006 from the Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek. Dutch Centre for Political Participation. 'Aantal allochtoone van de Tweede kamer naar afkomst'; 'Allochtonen in de politiek' (updated 18 August 2010) (<http://www.prodemos.nl/content/download/1021/7058/file/Dossier%20Allochtonen%20in%20de%20politiek-herziene%20versie%2007072010.pdf>) (Accessed 16 August 2012).
  29. Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands. Voorburg/Heerlen, 2006. tabel: Beroepsbevolking; naar geslacht: <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/Table.asp?LA=nl&DM=SLNL&PA=37940&D1=10&D2=26-36&D4=a&STB=G1,G2,G3&HDR=T>.
  30. Gijsberts, Merove. 2004. *Ethnic Minorities and Integration: Outlook for the Future*, The Hague: Social and Cultural Planning Office, Table 4.1. p. 22.
  31. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
  32. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
  33. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
  34. Insituut voor Publiek en Politiek, 30 November 2006. 'Vrouwen en allochtoon in de nieuw gekozen Tweede Kamer 2006'. Amsterdam.
  35. *Ibid.*
  36. Interview with Member of Lower House of Parliament, VVD and former prosecutor of Amsterdam, 24 January 2007.
  37. Interview with Member of the Lower House of Parliament, CDA, 17 January 2007.
  38. Interview with Member of Lower House of Parliament, CDA, 17 January 2007.
  39. Interview with Member of Regional Parliament of Province of Flevoland, PVDA, 24 January 2007.
  40. This provision of foreign voting rights has not been granted in provincial elections due to the rationale that the granting of voting rights at the provincial level would give people without the Dutch citizenship the power to influence the composition of the Upper Chamber and hence matters of defence and foreign policy.
  41. (Non-Western ethnic minorities here means in addition to the Moroccan, Dutch Antillean and Aruban, Surinamese, and Turkish major ethnic minorities) Most municipalities in the Netherlands have only a small percentage of non-Western ethnic minorities, usually no more than 10 per cent (Gijberts, 2004:16).
  42. Dutch mayors do not have many policy-related duties and are mostly held responsible for public order. Responsibility is shared with the aldermen (*wethouder*) who sit with the mayor on the municipal executive and is in charge of the daily operations and management of the local government. In spite of the fact that local parties can recommend mayoral candidates, mayors are deemed to be impartial and appointed by the national government for six-year terms.

Mayors assess the merits of a particular local government. One argument for mayors being appointed by the national government and not elected is that they can facilitate the external relations of the local government and concentrate of the quality of local governance (Hendriks, 2001; John 2001). Water boards are an important aspect of Dutch local governance and democratic tradition as they evolved from the need for water management in a country where half of the land mass lies below sea level. Water boards are public bodies like the central government, provinces, and municipalities but their executive councils are elected by property owners in localities. Provincial authorities consist of a provincial council, a provincial executive, and a Queen's Commissioner. Provincial council members are directly elected for four years and the number of members depends on the province's population. These members then appoint a few of their number to serve as a four-year term as the provincial executive. The Queen's commissioner is appointed by the central government for a six-year term and chairs both the provincial executive and the provincial council. The provincial authorities are responsible for environmental management, spatial planning, energy, social work, sport, and cultural affairs. There are some 496 municipalities in the Netherlands and municipal authorities are responsible for water supply, traffic, housing, schools, social services, health care, sport, recreation, and culture (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

43. Keuzenkam, Saskia and Aans Merens (eds.) 2006. *Social Atlas of Ethnic Minority Women*. The Hague: Social Cultural Planning Office, p. 239 (Full statistics about the Hague were not available).
44. Keuzenkam, Saskia and Aans Merens (eds.) 2006. *Social Atlas of Ethnic Minority Women*. The Hague: Social Cultural Planning Office, p. 247.
45. Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek, Mei 2002 (Dutch Centre for Political Participation). 'Aantal en Afkomst Allochtoon Gemeenteraadsleden na Verkiezingen van 6 Maart 2002.
46. Ibid.
47. Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek, Mei 2002 (Dutch Centre for Political Participation). 'Aantal en Afkomst Allochtoon Gemeenteraadsleden na Verkiezingen van 6 Maart 2002. Lisette Dekker. Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek 18 August 2010. 'Allochtonen in de politiek'.
48. Interview with Member of Lower House of Parliament, PVDA, Nederlands-Antilliaanse en Arubanse Zaken, Kunst, Cultuur and Media, 18 January 2007.
49. Interview with Dutch scholar of the Dutch Caribbean, University of Leiden, 22 January 2007.
50. In 2006 the Amsterdam PVDA called for a ban on the use of the term 'allochtoon' in the municipal council (*AD*, 4 September 2006). <http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/817676/pvda-wil-af-van-het-woord-allochtoon.html> (Accessed 31 March 2013).
51. Interview with Vice-Mayor of The Hague's Office, 11 January 2007. It is of note that both the *Solidair Nederland* and *Islam Democrats* are based in The Hague.
52. Interview with Chairman, Board of Directors, Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (Association of Netherlands Municipalities), 18 January 2007. It is interesting to note that at one time in 2006 there was a proposal to make Dutch language mandatory in public spaces in Rotterdam (*AD*, 19 January 2006). <http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/1038/Rotterdam/article/detail/2329840/2006/01/19/Nederlands-op-straat-verplicht.dhtml> (Accessed 30 March 2013).
53. Interview with Local Government of Rotterdam Policy Advisor, Coördinator 21 Antillianengemeenten, Gemeente Rotterdam, Directie ABZ Openbare Orde en Veiligheid, 15 January 2007.

54. 'No database of Antilleans', *Expatica*, 17 August 2007.
55. Pharr (2003) defines civil society as organizations formed outside of the state, market, and family (Pharr, 2003:318).
56. Interview with Amsterdam Mayor's Office Official, 12 January 2007.
57. Interview with the Director of ProFor, 10 January 2007.
58. Interview with Member of the Lower House of Parliament, SP, 18 January 2007.
59. Interview with the Director of the Stichting Welzijnsbevordering Antillianen en Arubanen (SWA), 15 January 2007.
60. Interview with the Director of Sabana, 24 January 2007.
61. Interview with President/Director of MAAPP, 19 January 2007.
62. Social Cultural Planning Office. August 2004. Theo Roes (Ed.). *The Social State of the Netherlands* (Summary) [http://www.scp.nl/english/publications/books/903770168x/Social\\_State\\_Netherlands\\_summary.pdf](http://www.scp.nl/english/publications/books/903770168x/Social_State_Netherlands_summary.pdf).
63. European Industrial Relations Observatory on line. <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2004/03/update/tn0403105u.htm> (Accessed 31 August 2012).
64. Telephone interview with Amsterdam Wethouder (Alderman), 4 February 2007.
65. Interview with President/Director of MAAPP, 19 January 2007.
66. Interview with President/Director of MAAPP, 19 January 2007.
67. Interview with President/Director of MAAPP, 19 January 2007.
68. Interview with Member of the Lower House of Parliament, Groenlinks, 17 January 2007.
69. Interview with the Director of Sabana, 24 January 2007.

## 5 Constructing the Nation: Japanese Emigration and Immigration from the late 19th to the 21st Century

1. Interview with Ministry of Justice Officials, 1 August 2006.
2. Maher, pp. 1–2.
3. Buraku is a Japanese word referring to village or hamlet. The word began to acquire a new connotation after the administration in the Meiji era (1868–1912) when they started to use 'Tokushu Buraku' (special hamlet) in reference to former outcaste communities. Buraku people or Burakumin (min refers to people) are a caste-like minority among the ethnic Japanese. They are generally recognized as descendants of outcaste populations in the feudal days who were assigned tasks such as slaughtering animals and executing criminals. The general public perceived these functions as 'polluting acts' under Buddhist and Shintoist beliefs. The National Levelers Association was founded by Buraku people in 1922 to unite and fight against daily occurrences of discrimination. After the Second World War, Buraku liberation movements were reunited in 1946 under the name of the National Committee for Buraku Liberation, which later evolved into the current Buraku Liberation League (BLL). This struggle to improve the poor living conditions of the Burakumin developed into a movement demanding a national policy on Buraku problems.

As a result, the Cabinet Dowa Policy Council clearly stated that the solution of the Buraku problem was a State responsibility, in their recommendation of 1965. The Committee and subsequently the BLL successfully facilitated the national government to consecutively enact laws to improve the living environment of Buraku areas. Information from the website of the Headquarters of the Buraku Liberation League: <http://www.bll.gr.jp/eng.html> (Accessed 11 July 2012).

4. Anderson, Benedict 1991, pp. 5–6.



5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 7.
7. Ibid., p. 86.
8. Ibid., p. 95.
9. Interview with *Kaigai Nikkeijin Kyokai* Official, 31 July 2009.
10. Japan International Cooperation Agency 2011 Annual Report, p. 144. <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2011/pdf/all.pdf> (Accessed 21 August 2012).
11. *Nikkeijin* figures for Peru from the International Nikkei Research project website 'Nikkei Demographics of the World'. As cited in the Japan International Cooperation Agency, *Kaigai Iju Tokei* (FY1952–FY1993) (Tokyo, 1994) pp. 124–125. The data were originally collected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and reported in *Kaigai Zaiju Hojin Chosa Tokei*. The number includes the permanent resident and Nikkei population. Nikkei is defined as those who do not have Japanese citizenship but are descendant of the Japanese (Naturalized Issei, Nisei and Sansei, etc.) on the website <http://www.janm.org/projects/inrp/english/demogrp02.htm>. As an extension of the International Nikkei Research Project, Hirabayashi et al. (2002:xvii) also lists the old figures of 620,370 Japanese Brazilians in Brazil and 55,472 Japanese Peruvians in Peru. More recent information from Brody (2002) and the Sao Paulo Humanities Center as cited by Tsuda (2003) has the Japanese Brazilian population in Brazil as approximately 1,228,000. No updated statistics available for Japanese Peruvian population in Peru.
12. Some of this, including information on the 2009 *Kikoku Shien Jigyo* (Help Return Programme) and the 'Summary of returning support project for Nikkei unemployed', has drawn from *Policy and Society*, Vol 29 /Issue 4, Michael Sharpe, 'When ethnic returnees are *de facto* guestworkers: What does the introduction of Latin American Japanese *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendants) (LAN) suggest for Japan's definition of nationality, citizenship, and immigration policy?', pp. 357–369, Copyright (2010), with permission from Elsevier.
13. Response via E Mail to interview questions from Ministry of Justice Official, 21 July 2009.
14. Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official at Cabinet Office meeting, 16 July 2009.
15. Surak (2008) echoes Yamanaka (1993).
16. *Source*: '2005 Immigration Control', 11th Issue of the 'Immigration Control Report', Japan. Immigration Bureau. MOJ, p. 30.
17. Ibid., p. 27.
18. '2005 Immigration Control', 11th Issue of the 'Immigration Control Report', Japan. Immigration Bureau. MOJ, p. 27.
19. '2005 Immigration Control', 11th Issue of the 'Immigration Control Report', Japan. Immigration Bureau. Ministry of Justice, Table 11 'Changes in the number of registered foreign nationals by nationality (place of origin)', p. 30. (Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau, 2009), <http://www.moj.go.jp/NYUKAN/nyukan91-2.pdf> (Accessed 29 March 2010).
20. <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000007330.pdf> (Accessed 8 November 2012).
21. Interview with officials from the Ministry of Education, 16 July 2009.
22. <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/houdou/2009/03/h0331-10.html> (Accessed 27 March 2010).
23. Personal view of bureaucrat at institute specializing on Japan's labor policy, 2 July 2009.

24. In April 2009, the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare announced the *Shuro Jumbi Kenshu Jigyo* programme to retrain jobless LAN in order for them to secure other employment. <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/houdou/2009/04/h0428-2.html> (Accessed 11 September 2010).
25. Some have speculated that the asterisk and sentence after it were added later due to government and civil society pressures.
26. Interview with official from Ministry of Labour, Health, and Welfare, 22 July 2009.

## 6 Is Blood Thicker than Water Politically? Latin American *Nikkeijin* in Japan 1990–2008

1. Interview with Oizumi Multicultural Center Official, 27 July 2009.
2. As Brazil and Peru have two of the largest *Nikkeijin* communities in the world, most Latin American *Nikkeijin* in Japan originate from those countries. Takenaka (2009b) points to the fact that *Nikkeijin* are a heterogenous group and notes the differences between Peruvian and Brazilian *Nikkeijin*. Although Brazilian and Peruvian and other Latin American *Nikkeijin* are distinct groups with marked differences, they share the commonalities of being legal immigrants in Japan because of their Japanese ethnicity and face many of the same problems and challenges particularly with regard to immigrant political incorporation.
3. '2005 Immigration Control', 11th Issue of the 'Immigration Control Report', Japan. Immigration Bureau. Ministry of Justice, Table 11 'Changes in the number of registered foreign nationals by nationality (place of origin)', p. 30 (Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau, 2009) <http://www.moj.go.jp/NYUKAN/nyukan91-2.pdf> (Accessed 29 March 2010).
4. <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000007330.pdf> (Accessed 8 November 2012).
5. Tsuda (2003:8) estimates the number of *Nikkeijin* with Japanese nationality in Japan at 10 per cent and cites one survey from Cornelius, 1998 at 9 per cent and another from the Japan Institute of Labor at 13 per cent.
6. Peng-Er (2005:223–226) argues that Japan is a liberal democracy because it has regular national and local elections, competitive political parties, a free and active media, academic freedom and civil society organizations. On a scale from 1–7 with '1' being the most free and '7' being the least free and on a scale with the designations of 'Free', 'Partly Free' or 'Not Free' on a combination of political and civil liberties ratings, Freedom House classifies Japan as a parliamentary democracy with the distinctions of '1' for Political Rights and '2' for Civil Rights, and 'Free'. Hence, in this chapter, Japan is identified as a liberal democracy and provides an analysis of Latin American *Nikkeijin* co-ethnic political incorporation within this context. Freedom House. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>.
7. Significant parts of the *Zainichi* Korean and Chinese oldcomer communities are descendants of former Japanese colonial subjects. According to the MOJ's Immigration Bureau in 2008 were the Chinese at 655,377, North and South Koreans at 589,239, and Philippine nationals at 210,617 registered in Japan.
8. Interview with MOJ's Immigration Office, 1 August 2006.
9. Interview with MOJ's Immigration Office, 1 August 2006.
10. Interview with Consulate General of Brazil in Tokyo Official, 1 August 2006.
11. Interview with Kawasaki International Association Official, 21 August 2006.
12. Interview with Japanese NGO Official Toyota City, 25 July 2006.
13. Takenaka (2009b) notes differential responses to ethnic marginalization in Japan. She argues where Brazilians embrace their Brazilian identities, Peruvians are

more ambivalent about their Peruvian identity and more readily identify as *Nikkeijin*.

14. Interview with Brazilian *Nikkeijin* Catholic priest, 26 July 2006.
15. Interview with Brazilian *Nikkeijin* community member, 31 July 2006.
16. Interview with Brazilian *Nikkeijin* Catholic priest, 26 July 2006.
17. 'Issue of Nationality: Number of Naturalization in the Past 10 Years'. Japan Ministry of Justice website, [http://www.moj.go.jp/TOUKEI/t\\_minj03.html](http://www.moj.go.jp/TOUKEI/t_minj03.html) (Accessed 16 June 2007).
18. Doug Struck, 'We're Talking about Apartheid: Expat Brings American-Style Human Rights Fight to Japan', in *The Japan Times* (16 July 2003), p. 15. Reprinted from the *Washington Post/Los Angeles Times*.
19. Tarrow (1994) defines political opportunity structure as 'consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure' and notes the possible changes in political opportunity structure as 'the opening up of access to participation, shifts in ruling alignments, the availability of influential allies, and cleavages within and among elites'. p. 86. I use the term similarly to Robert Pekkanen, *Japan's Dual Civil Society: Members Without Advocates* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 19–20.
20. T.J. Pempel (1990) defines one party dominance along four dimensions, dominance in number, dominance in bargaining position, chronological dominance, and dominance governmentally.
21. It is important to note that the close relationship between the LDP, the business community, and the bureaucracy stems from both the post-World War II Occupation and the business government relationship established during the Meiji Restoration.
22. See discussion of one party systems in T. J. Pempel (ed.) (1990:3–4).
23. The reform attempted to create a competitive two party system and more efficient government. As discussed in Norris, 2004:5.
24. Interview with Member of House of Councillors, 4 August 2006.
25. Taro Karasaki, 1 July 2004. World News. '2004 Upper House Election: Parties play up 'international' side to reflect changes in domestic policy'. <http://www.axisoflogic.com/cgi-bin/exec/view.pl?archive=56&num=9725&printer=1/>.
26. Cited from *The Japan Times*, 21 May 2004, <http://www.100scooter.com/AsiaPacificMediaNetworkJAidat.htm>.
27. Interview with Member of the House of Representatives, 20 July 2006. Also referred to in Nakata, Hiroko. 22 July 2006. 'Koizumi apologizes to emigrants: Dominican Republic settlers to paradise lie draws regrets'. *The Japan Times*, p. 2.
28. *The Japan Times*. 14 October 2000. 'Voting rights legislation hit by Congryun brass' <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20001014a7.html>.
29. Matsubara, Hiroshi. 1 December 2000. 'Opponents sidetrack suffrage debate: Conservatives take advantage of divided Koreans, push naturalization,' *The Japan Times*. <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn2001201b4.html>.
30. Interview with Member of House of Councillors, 18 July 2006.
31. Interview with Former Tokyo Immigration Official and Head of Policy Think Tank, 12 July 2006.
32. Akemi Nakamura, 10 November 2004. 'Suffrage for foreigners gain momentum, Diet to take up bill on local voting rights, but LDP is dragging its feet', *The Japan Times*. <http://www.search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20041110f1.html>.

33. Suvendrini Kakuchi, 22 November 2000. 'Japan at odds on voting right for foreign residents', *Asia Times Online*, <http://www.attimes.com/japan-econ/BK22Dh01.html>.
34. Taro Karasaki, 1 July 2004. World News. '2004 Upper House Election: Parties play up 'international' side to reflect changes in domestic policy'. <http://www.axisoflogic.com/cgi-bin/exec/view.pl?archive=56&num=9725&printer=1>.
35. Network for Human Rights Legislation for Foreigners and Ethnic Minorities. 'A Human Rights Report on Foreigners and Ethnic Minorities Living in Japan 2006' (Tokyo: Japan), p. 42.
36. Source: '2005 Immigration Control', 11th Issue of the 'Immigration Control Report', Japan. Immigration Bureau. Ministry of Justice, From Data Section, Table 28 'Changes in the Number of Alien Registrations of Permanent Resident by Nationality', p. 178.
37. Source: '2005 Immigration Control', 11th Issue of the 'Immigration Control Report', Japan. Immigration Bureau. Ministry of Justice, From Data Section, Table 28 'Changes in the Number of Alien Registrations of Permanent Resident by Nationality', p. 176.
38. While the number of registered foreign nationals with 'Spouse of Child of Japanese National' decreased in 2004, the number of those with 'Spouse of Child of Permanent Resident' increased every year from 2000 to 2004 as the number of permanent residents increased. 2005 Immigration Control', 11th Issue of the 'Immigration Control Report', Japan. Immigration Bureau. MOJ, pp. 34–35.
39. Interview with Kawasaki International Association Official, 21 August 2006.
40. Interview with Japanese NGO official, 4 August 2006.
41. It is also possible that a consideration of suffrage for those on the teiujusha (long-term residence) visa may be someday demanded and considered.
42. Hamamatsu has a population of 601,878 in 2004 including 13,270 registered Brazilians and 1576 registered Peruvians in 2004. After the July 2005 merger of 12 former cities, towns, and villages, Hamamatsu is the largest city in Shizuoka Prefecture with its population of 817,648 (2006). Hamamatsu now has 18,528 (2006) registered Brazilians and 2,226 (2006) registered Peruvians.
43. Toyota City has a population of 360,698 (2004), with 6,497 (2004) Brazilians and 647 (2004) Peruvians. Toyota City merged with several cities, towns, and villages in April 2005 and now has a population of 413,419 (2006) with 7,379 (2006) registered Brazilians and 743 (2006) registered Peruvians.
44. Toyota City Local Government Official, 25 July 2006.
45. Kawasaki City has a total population of 1,280,480 (2004) It has some 26,636 (2004) registered foreign residents including 1,414 (2004) registered Brazilians, 589 registered Peruvians and a long standing community of zainichi Korean foreign residents of 9,266 (2004). [1,308,313 (2006)] From the Kawasaki City Government website. 'The Principal Statistics of Kawasaki'. <http://www.city.kawasaki.jp/20/tokei/home/statistics/stat/stat.htm>.
46. The Alien Registration System was changed to a Resident Registration System effective July 2012. [http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/newimmiact\\_1/en/index.html](http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/newimmiact_1/en/index.html) (Accessed 10 January 2013).
47. Japan Fact Sheet. 'Local Self-government: Growing Citizen Awareness and a push for local authority'. <http://web-japan.org/factsheet/local/govern.html>.
48. Visible efforts are being made to accommodate foreign citizens as 'local citizens' in localities such as Oizumi and Ota, for example, via construction of a multicultural centre converted from a convenience store in Oizumi and the

- provision of some information in native languages, educational assistance, and consultations.
49. Interview with Kawasaki Local Government Official, 21 July 2006.
  50. Interview with Toyota City Local Government Official, 25 July 2006.
  51. Interview with Kawasaki City Local Government Official, 21 July 2006.
  52. Interview with Kawasaki City Local Government Official, 21 July 2006.
  53. Interview with Kawasaki City Local Government Official, 21 July 2006.
  54. Network for Human Rights Legislation for Foreigners and Ethnic Minorities. 2006. 'A Human Rights Report on Foreigners and Ethnic Minorities Living in Japan 2006'. Tokyo: Japan, p. 41.
  55. Kawasaki has a Foreign Residents Assembly of 26 people that has 8–10 meetings a year and Hamamatsu has a Foreign Residents Assembly of 10 people that meets once a year and they both have 'open discussions' to allow other local residents to participate.
  56. In 1999, there was a conflict between Brazilian *Nikkeijin* youth and Japanese in the Homi Danchi public housing complex when right-wing Japanese demanded the expulsion of the Nikkei Brazilians. The conflict escalated to the point of setting a car on fire but was dissipated by police.
  57. Interview with Toyota City Local Government Official, 25 July 2006.
  58. Network for Human Rights Legislation for Foreigners and Ethnic Minorities. 2006. 'A Human Rights Report on Foreigners and Ethnic Minorities Living in Japan 2006'. Tokyo: Japan, p. 41.
  59. Interview with Hamamatsu Local Government Official, 26 July 2006.
  60. Committee for Localities with a Concentrated Foreigner Population. 'Hamamatsu Declaration and Proposals'. 19 October 2001. ACT City Hamamatsu Congress Center.
  61. Interview with Toyota City Local Government Official, 25 July 2006.
  62. I define civil society as organizations formed outside of the state, market, and family (Pharr, 2003:318).
  63. As referred in Shipper (2008:92) The Catholic Bishops Conference of Japan notes some 406,974 foreign born Catholics in 2000. <http://www.cbcj.catholic.jp/jpn/data/00data.htm> (Accessed 2 August 2010).
  64. Interview with Brazilian journalist and human rights activist, 1 August 2006. The activist resisted a Hamamatsu jewellery store's policy to not allow Brazilians to come in the store for fear of crime. She sued the store and won on the basis of non-discrimination based on Japan's rather recent 1996 ratification of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The activist is often referred to as the Rosa Parks of Japan. (Japan's Constitution is interpreted to ban all discrimination for Japanese nationals but not necessarily for others.)
  65. Tsuda (2006) and Yamanaka (2006) indicate that most of the immigrant advocacy NGO's are run by 'middle class Japanese citizens who identify with the marginalized and dispossessed and are committed to social equality and human rights turning these NGOs into largely paternalistic organizations that benevolently bestow services based on their own assumptions about what is best for their foreign residents' (Tsuda, 2006:281).
  66. Interview with long-term resident and foreign community activist, 14 July 2006. <http://www.cbcj.catholic.jp/jpn/data/00data.htm> (Accessed 29 July 2007).
  68. Interview with the Director of Catholic Commission of Japan for Migrants, Refugees, and People on the Move, 11 July 2006.
  69. Interview with Chairman of Executive, Kanagawa City Union, 31 July 2006.

70. Interview with Secretary General of Solidarity with Migrants Japan (SMJ), 19 July 2006.
71. Interview with American businessman and coordinator of The Community, 14 July 2006.
72. Interview with Argentinean Nikkei lawyer and journalist, 3 August 2006.
73. Interview with Peruvian Nikkei migrant, 8 June 2006.
74. See Chapter 5. It is important to note that there was some public outcry by Latin American *Nikkeijin* around the 2009 *Kikoku Shien Jigyo (Help Return Programme)* in the midst of the World Financial Crisis that began in October of 2008.
75. Interview with Secretary General of the International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR), 4 August 2006.
76. Interview with Director of Centro Latino-Americano de Homigaoka (Celaho)/ Paolo Freire, 25 July 06.

## 7 Political Transnationalism in Question: What Limits the Political Transnationalism of 'Transnational' Groups in Liberal Democracies 1985–2008?

1. The sources data for GDP, GDP Per Capita (PPP) for the Netherlands Antilles are: the Bank van de Nederlandse Antillen <http://www.centralbank.an/>; US State Department Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Background Note December 2005: Netherlands Antilles; World Bank's World Development indicators Database, April 2006; [http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=ANT](http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=ANT;Background Note December 2005: Netherlands Antilles; World Bank's World Development indicators Database, April 2006; http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=ANT;); According to the 2001 Population and Housing Census as recorded by the Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands Antilles <http://www.central-bureau-of-statistics.an/census/antde2.asp> the Netherlands Antilles as a whole had a population of 175,653 in 2001 and Curacao, the administrative capital, had a total population of 130,627.
2. For Aruba, Centrale Bank van Aruba [http://www.cbaruba.org/cba/home.do;http://www.cbaruba.org/cba/getPage.do?page=STATISTICS\\_SELECT\\_DATA\\_ARUBA](http://www.cbaruba.org/cba/home.do;http://www.cbaruba.org/cba/getPage.do?page=STATISTICS_SELECT_DATA_ARUBA); US State Department Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Background Note: Aruba December 2005 <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/22491.htm>; According to the Central Bureau of Statistics of Aruba and the Population Registry Office of Aruba, the total population of Aruba at end of 2004 was 102,149. <http://www.aruba.com/extlinks/govs/cbstats.html>.
3. The Netherlands: UNDP's 2005 Human Development Report [http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/country\\_fact\\_sheets/cty\\_fs\\_NLD.html](http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_NLD.html); <http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/countries.cfm?c=NLD>; World Bank's World Development Indicators April 2006; <http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=NLD>.
4. Brazil: UNDP's 2005 Human Development Report [http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/country\\_fact\\_sheets/cty\\_fs\\_BRA.html](http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_BRA.html); <http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/countries.cfm?c=BRA>; World Bank's World Development Indicators April 2006; <http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=BRA>.
5. Peru: UNDP's 2005 Human Development Report [http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/country\\_fact\\_sheets/cty\\_fs\\_PER.html](http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_PER.html); <http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/countries.cfm?c=PER>; World Bank's World Development Indicators April 2006.

6. Japan: UNDP's 2005 Human Development Report [http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/country\\_fact\\_sheets/cty\\_fs\\_JPN.html](http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_JPN.html); <http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/countries.cfm?c=JPN>; World Bank's World Development Indicators April, 2006 <http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=JPN>.
7. A report on 'Remittances from Japan to Latin America: Study of Latin American immigrants living and working in Japan' presented at Inter-American Development Bank Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors on 6 April 2005 in Okinawa, Japan states 70 per cent of the Latin American adult immigrants living in Japan send remittances on a regular basis; 304,824 Latin American immigrants living in Japan send about \$2.65 billion to their families on a yearly basis; Each remittance averages approximately \$600; Latin Americans send money home about 14.5 times a year; those that send to one person send about 11 times a year and send to an additional relative about 3.5 times a year (40). No data available as yet is available about Dutch Antillean and Aruban remittances from the Netherlands back to their home countries. My interviews indicate very little is being sent.
8. In 1986, Aruba obtained '*status aparte*' making Aruba an integral self-governing part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands but independent of the administrative centralism of Curacao and the Netherlands Antilles. 2001 figure from Aruba's Central Bureau of Statistics. Demographic Profile. 2004. Central Bureau of Statistics. Aruba. The population of Aruba was 92,676.
9. Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands Antilles. 2005. Census 2001 Publications. Demography of the Netherlands Antilles: An Analysis of Demographic Variables. Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands Antilles, 15.
10. Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2007. Voting From Abroad: The International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, pp. 235, 241.
11. Interview with Raad van State (Dutch Council of State), 9 January 2007.
12. Compiled from the 2001 figure from Aruba's Central Bureau of Statistics. Demographic Profile. 2004. Central Bureau of Statistics. Aruba and Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands Antilles. 2005 and the Census 2001 Publications. Demography of the Netherlands Antilles: An Analysis of Demographic Variables. Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands Antilles, p. 15.
13. First-generation immigrants and second-generation offspring with one or two first-generation parents.  
*Source:* 'Allochtoon naar herkomstsgroepering op 1 januari, vanaf 1972, 2005 Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba,' Central Bureau voor de Statistiek, Voorburg/Heerlen 2006-05-23 (Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands).  
<http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/Table.asp?STB=G1,G2,G3,G4&LA=nl&DM=SLNL&PA=70...>  
<http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/print/printing.asp?validate=1&STB=G1,G2,G3,G4&LA=nl@...>
14. Electoral. Council. October 2005. Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations. 'Elections in the Netherlands.' Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations.
15. Interview with Antillean origin Member of Parliament, PVDA 18 January 2007.
16. In 2005, the Dutch political party D66 helped to draft legislation with the former right leaning anti-immigrant Minister Rita Verdonk, former Minister for Immigration and Integration, of the VVD to have troubled specifically Antillean and Aruban youth, who either committed a crime or were not employed within a few months be deported to their home islands. This was eventually found to be

in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and not to be feasible because of the Dutch nationality of Antilleans and Arubans. OCAN along with other organizations actively petitioned against this policy initiative. The Dutch government was criticized by the Antillean and Aruban governments as well as OCAN and others for bills referring to an establishment of a database designed specifically for tracking 'troubled' Antillean and Aruban youth. This was taken off the table by the end of 2008.

17. OCAN operates within the framework of the *Wet Overleg Minderhedenbelied* (WOM) and the *Landelijk Overleg Minderheden* (LOM).
  18. A recent change in Dutch electoral law allowed Arubans and Dutch Antilleans to vote in the June 2009 European parliamentary elections. Former Aruban Resident Minister Mito Croes was among the leadership championing these voting rights. He unsuccessfully ran on list of the Dutch Christian Democratic party (CDA) for a seat in the European parliament in 2009.
  19. [http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc\\_country\\_detail.cfm?year=2004&co...](http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?year=2004&co...)
  20. [http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory\\_voting.cfm?renderforprint=1&](http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm?renderforprint=1&)
  21. Source: '2005 Immigration Control', 11th Issue of the 'Immigration Control Report', Japan. Immigration Bureau. Ministry of Justice, Table 11 'Changes in the number of registered foreign nationals by nationality (place of origin)', p. 30. Immigration Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Justice <http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/IB/ib-01.html>.
- \*Most Brazilian and Peruvians are assumed to be Nikkeijin (Japanese descendants).
22. <http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/tcon-01.html>.
  23. Interview with Consul General of Brazil in Tokyo, 1 August 2006.
  24. Interview with Consul General of Brazil in Tokyo, 1 August 2006.
  25. [http://archive.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2004](http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2004) (Accessed 6 August 2013) Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceived level of public sector corruption in countries and territories around the world. © Transparency International 2004. All Rights Reserved.
  26. <http://www.bb.com.br/portallbb/home/geral/index.bb>.
  27. Interview with Consul General of Brazil in Tokyo, 1 August 2006.
  28. Japan' technically does not allow dual nationality past the age of 22 and claims that if a Japanese possessing dual nationality fails to make a choice of nationality within a certain time period, 'you shall be deemed to have made a declaration in which you swear that you choose to be a Japanese national and that you renounce the foreign nationality, at the time of the expiration of such period.' <http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/tcon-01.html>.
  29. [http://www.freedomhuse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc\\_country\\_detail.cfm?year=2004&co...](http://www.freedomhuse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?year=2004&co...)
  30. [http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory\\_voting.cfm?renderforprint=1&](http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm?renderforprint=1&)
  31. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2007/peru> (Accessed 6 August 2013).
  32. Fujimori spent five years in exile in Japan after fleeing Peru as his government collapsed under a corruption scandal. The Japanese government determined in 2000 that he holds Japanese citizenship after Tokyo confirmed Fujimori's birth was registered with a Japanese consulate in Peru and he had never renounced his Japanese citizenship. [http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2007/06/27/report\\_fujimori\\_to\\_run\\_in\\_japan\\_vote/?rss\\_id=Boston.com/+News](http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2007/06/27/report_fujimori_to_run_in_japan_vote/?rss_id=Boston.com/+News).



33. Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2007. *Voting From Abroad: The International IDEA Handbook*. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, p. 242, 17.
34. Wood, Casey. 'Peruvians vote required, even abroad: Peru's strict mandatory voting law applies even to those living abroad, and voters can face fines if they don't head to the pools on Sunday', in *The Miami Herald*, 8 April 2006, p. 1. <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/us/Inacademic/delivery/PrintDoc.do?from...>
35. Perez, Miguel. 8 April 2006. 'Peruvians in N.J. elect to grumble about voting,' *The Record*, 8 April 2006. p. 1. <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/us/Inacademic/delivery/PrintDoc.do?from...>
36. Source: '2005 Immigration Control', 11th Issue of the 'Immigration Control Report', Japan. Immigration Bureau. Ministry of Justice, Table 11 'Changes in the number of registered foreign nationals by nationality (place of origin)', p. 30. Immigration Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Justice <http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/IB/ib-01.html>.  
\*Most Brazilian and Peruvians are assumed to be Nikkeijin (Japanese descendants).
37. Wood, Casey. 8 April 2006. 'Peruvians vote required, even abroad: Peru's strict mandatory voting law applies even to those living abroad, and voters can face fines if they don't head to the pools on Sunday,' in *The Miami Herald*, 8 April 2006, p. 1.
38. [http://archive.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2004](http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2004) (Accessed 6 August 2013) Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceived level of public sector corruption in countries and territories around the world. © Transparency International 2004. All Rights Reserved.
39. Interview with Peruvian *Nikkeijin* migrant, 14 July 2006.

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