COMMUNISM ON THE DECLINE

GEORGE C. GUINS

COMMUNISM ON THE DECLINE

The Failure of "Soviet Socialism"
Incurable Evils
Discredited System
Symptoms of Demoralization
The new Generation
Formation of new Psychology
Some Rays of Light
Cold War with the West
Inner Conflicts
Soviet Crisis—a Challenge to the Western World

MARTINUS NIJHOFF — THE HAGUE
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PREFACE

Communist dictatorship rests not only on a police regime supported by terror. As this writer tried to explain in his previous work, *Soviet Law and Soviet Society*, the Communist regime is founded to a large degree on the economic dependence of all citizens on the State, as an universal monopolist and a single employer. It is impossible to support such a regime by means of coercion only. Communism tries therefore to impress people with its achievements and to suggest great expectations. It declares itself infallible and invincible.

The decay of Communism starts when its achievements cease to satisfy people, when its promises do not raise enthusiasm, and its infallibility becomes exposed; when people begin to understand that the Communist philosophy is based on illusions and its regime is vicious and despotic. When this occurs then coercion proves to be more and more inefficient, and it becomes more and more difficult to secure the people's support. The government begins to feel that the roles are changed and that it is the government which depends on the people rather than the people on the government.

The numerous facts collected in the present work allow us to believe that Communism has already reached a stage characterized by symptoms of a progressive decay. The present work does not, however, contain any predictions. The fallibility of Communism is at present exposed by the Communist leaders themselves, but it has not yet lost its stake in the successful competition with democratic nations in the cold war. During almost forty years of its existence the Communist State has several times been on the brink of definite failure. Yet it still exists. The constant fluctuations of foreign policy and unexpected complications in world events make it impossible to predict how and when the present cold war between the two political camps, Communism and the Free World, will end.

But at present symptoms of the degeneration of Communist system are obvious, and it would be erroneous to underestimate them. There is a strong possibility that the present stage of Communism is its last stage.

Some of the materials for the present work were collected in connection with the course of lectures on the "Legal Order of a Communist State" given at the University of California (Berkeley). The writer expresses his gratitude to Prof. Peter H. Odegard, the Chairman of the Political Science Department of the same University, who helped the writer to receive a grant from the *Institute of Social Sciences of the University of California*, in 1954–55, and to Prof. Robert J. Kerner, the Director of the *Institute of Slavic Studies* at the same University, for his assistance during the writer's association with the Institute.

Many of the leading ideas of the present work have been expounded by the writer in various chapters of his previous works: *Soviet Law and Soviet Society*, and (in Russian) *New Ideas in Law* (two volumes), 1932–33; *Social Psychology*, 1936; *Law and Culture* (the Origin and Development of Law), 1938; and *The Entrepreneur* (in cooperation with Lev G. Zikman), 1940.

The present work was completed at the end of 1955. A part of Chapter VIII was published in the *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.* (October, 1955), and some extracts in the form of articles in the *Vestnik* of the same Institute (Muenchen) No. 3 and 4, 1955.

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WAR OR PEACE?

INTRODUCTION

Millions of people want to know how long the world will remain divided into two camps and how and when the insupportable tension and insecurity might be eliminated. Will it be war or peace? Is the communist stronghold unassailable, or can one expect the gates of the stronghold to be opened from within?

Pessimists deny any possibility of significant inner disorder in the Soviet Union, and their arguments seem to be indisputable. The vitality and strength of the Soviet regime should not be underestimated. Its police system is still strong enough to paralyze any opposition and to prevent any revolutionary movement. Its propaganda is well-organized and effective. The communist state concentrates unlimited political and economic power in the hands of its government. Every individual—whether he be worker, official, farmer or professional man, a party member or not—is completely under the domination of the government. It can deprive him of his livelihood, separate him from his family, and pass sentence on him without public trial. Special permission is necessary before any social group may organize and no organization is allowed to exist after it ceases to be useful to the government. Such a regime, it would seem, excludes any possibility of an organized anti-government movement.

Distribution of wealth depends completely upon the government. Being a universal monopolist, it can increase its revenues by raising the prices on the products of the labor of its serfs. It is within its power to improve the conditions of a certain group of the population, at the expense of another one or of some individual citizens and workers; to doom its opponents to starvation, and to attract adepts by its advantages. There is no doubt that such a system helps communists to survive the most dangerous crises.

However, the strength of their political and social ideologies lies not so much in their power of resistance as in their positive

achievements. Communism promotes the Utopian dream of creating paradise on earth, of becoming the highest stage of civilization. This is, in fact, only a typical case of extremism originated by the phenomena of early capitalism with its exploitation of workers, colonialism, and political and economic inequalities. When the necessary reforms are late in coming, revolutionary doctrines seem to be inspiring, and radical decisions alluring. But there comes a time when all the vices of extremism become evident, when expectations are frustrated, and bitterly disappointed people turn their hatred upon the new system and the new rulers.

There are, therefore, optimists who are ready to predict not only the inevitable but even the imminent disintegration of the communist power. They refer to the negative side of the communist experiment, its failure to improve the conditions of the working masses, its repulsive political regime and its depressive spiritual atmosphere.

Communism with its large-scale industrial projects still may impress the imagination of people in underdeveloped countries. Communists, as ardent supporters of industrialization and passionate revolutionaries, are able, indeed, to accelerate technical progress and achieve an impressive amount and variety of construction. In the Soviet Union, they have succeeded in organizing and developing certain branches of heavy industry and of realizing some grandiose projects, and they have transformed an agricultural country into a great military power. But what was the price of all these achievements? How many sacrifices did they demand, and what was the practical result of many of the grandiose constructions such as the White-Sea-Baltic and Volga-Don canals, forcible colonization of the Arctic, and others?

The experience of the Soviet Union, moreover, showed that the accelerated tempo of industrialization violated the principles of a normal organic development of national economy and created inevitable disproportion and discrepancies among various branches of production. The universal monopoly of the state proved to be completely unsuitable for the successful development of agriculture and light industry. Enormous overhead expenses, losses in material and defective products, and low quality of production became a chronic ailment in communist economy

and evidently an incurable one. Everywhere shortages in food and commodities follow the institution of the communist economic system. The communist government cannot overcome these chronic shortages, especially periodical agricultural crises.

After almost forty years of existence, the Soviet government has survived a more serious crisis than may appear at first glance. This crisis arose not from the admittedly low level of agricultural production, but rather from the degeneration of the whole Soviet system. Communism promised to abolish exploitation of man by man, but it has substituted for this exploitation another and much worse kind—the exploitation of defenseless people by a powerful state. One of the slogans, which lured the working masses, assured the people of a free society of workers and peasants. In reality, however, the communists organized a monstrous state with an enormous bureaucratic apparatus and a regime of drastic measures; and they demanded unconditional obedience and unlimited sacrifices. They further promised social and material equality, but created a new privileged group and sharp contrasts between the wealth of a few and the poverty of the masses.

Social and spiritual life under communism is no less repugnant than its economic system is vicious. The exacting ideology of Leninism-Stalinism does not tolerate criticism and deviations; it does not even allow doubts. Many renowned communists shared the fate of class-enemies only because they had made objections or expressed doubts. There is no freedom even in apparently neutral, non-political spheres of spiritual activity. Communism ignores individual differences and personal enquiries and interests. It fetters spiritual life and individual creativeness, and sooner or later the individual begins to revolt against jailors of his spirit. The current generation in the Soviet Union already has revealed its indifference toward communist slogans and divergence from communist morals. It wants either individual freedom and a better life or a new sublimating ideology and spiritual values.

There are in the Soviet Union symptoms of dissatisfaction, doubt and indignation among intellectuals and even party members. Fluctuations of Soviet foreign and domestic policy reflect the embarrassment of the ruling group. The communist party has not at the present time rallied around its leaders in

the spirit that circumstances demand. There is no solidarity even among the leaders of the party. Some are business-like people who feel that the country needs a breathing-spell and improved conditions of life; others are stubborn communists who ignore the sentiments of the people and believe in the miraculous force of orders and omnipotence of the party.

It is very probable that the Soviet Union does not want war. Yet it has not ceased its preparation for war and continues to brandish its arms. Under Moscow leadership, international communism continues to cause tension throughout the world. Is a lasting peace possible under such conditions? And what does the notorious idea of 'coexistence' promise to a troubled world?

Any decision of the problem disturbing the present world demands a thorough study of Soviet reality and the symptoms of the dissatisfaction which characterizes the present situation in the communist world. The following text is based on a study of the Soviet periodical press over a period of about twenty years. Evidence was collected from official sources. The result shows that a great majority of the defects of the Soviet program are really chronic—that in 1936 and 1945 Soviet newspapers described the same troubles and defects which were exposed in 1954 and later. It shows also that, in proportion to the stabilization of the Soviet system, social stratification and economic inequality become more and more drastic, and, finally, the regime becomes more and more impotent in the face of growing anti-communist trends. The numerous quotations and examples assembled in the following text may be of help in reaching a decision of some of the most pressing problems of our day.

The times are changing and we with them (*Tempora mutantur et nos mutamur in illis*). No social system is unchangeable. Ideological movements and social systems replace each other. They are all more or less short-lived and cannot survive the conditions which originate them. Each one has its optimum after which it begins to decay. Communism is not an exception.

PART I

THE GREAT ILLUSIONS

The Soviet ideology, on which the Soviets have organized their political regime and economic system, was inherited from the illusions and errors of the 18th and 19th centuries. Soviet philosophy is based on the idea that there is no limit to scientific potentiality and technical achievement. Rationalism and faith in technical progress predetermine their attitude toward the great problems of social life.

Being self-confident Marxists, the Soviet leaders believe that they know not only of what progress consists but also how it can be accelerated and what its outcome will be. Their utilitarian ethic justifies any measures which they believe may stimulate progress and secure happiness for mankind. Everything that handicaps progress is thought to be reactionary and must be eradicated. Any opposition is immoral, and ruthless measures against opposition are allowed.

On the basis of these premises, the idea of a planned economy evolved. A certain group of the wizards believe that they understand better than anybody else what mankind needs and what the final and perfect stage of human progress is. They lead the whole world to communism, a social order which will eliminate private ownership of the means of production and concentrate them in the hands of the state, representing a classless society and free of any exploitation of man by man.

Thus, organization of economic life in this new society must be based on the principles of a national planning system. The necessity for universal planning determines the organization of the new order. State property, transforming the state into a universal monopolist, is its main legal formula. Collectivist psychology is its new ethical principle.

Chapter I

RATIONALITY OF A UNIVERSAL MONOPOLY

Minds bred in the atmosphere of great scientific discoveries and technical progress cannot resist the temptation to reduce economy to a rational system based on planning. It is an alluring idea. Those who believe in the possibility of subjecting all natural forces to human genius accept easily the theory that the national economy can be transformed through planning. The apostles of Marx are consistent when they eliminate private property, nationalize both industry and agriculture, and monopolize trade in the hands of the state. They believe that economic rationalization, which involves the renunciatition of competion, will cut down unnecessary expenditures and put an end to depression and unemployment.

One of the most authoritative Marxists, K. Kautsky [1] said:

> Without creation of new premises and installation of fresh equipment, only due to the closing down of small factories and work-shops and transfer of their complement of labor to establishments of larger scope, wages can be increased threefold... Only private property situated on the means of production (land, factories) hinders the expansive development of its contemporary production power.

Kautsky predicted that enrichment, and consequently a further rise in the cultural level, will be accomplished after the re-organization of the economic system and will provide peoples with 'security, quietude and leisure.' 'The earning of a livelihood,' he said, 'will no longer provide cause for anxiety and worry.'

1. Organization vs. Economic Anarchy

Marxist socialism described centralized and planned economy as superior in efficiency to the 'anarchical' and undirected economy of the capitalist world. A capitalist works without pre-emptory orders; he strives to expand production, but, as a result, floods his market with products for which there is no

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[1] K. Kautsky, *Social Revolution*, Chicago, Ch. Kerr & Co., 1905. pp. 143–146, 188.

demand and an economic crisis eventuates. The same occurs, Marxists argue, in the field of agriculture since farmers may expand or limit the areas under cultivation and choose their own crops. With financial capital it is the same. Looking for a lucrative investment, it may disregard useful branches of industry, which promise but a modest return, and support some parasitical but profitable undertaking. It may also prefer to invest overseas, where the interest is high, rather than to support the national economy. According to the same doctrine, a similar situation would not exist if economic details were subjected to a central authority and a rational plan were devised for allocating and directing the use of the resources in all branches of the national economy.

The central organ, as supervisor of the national economy, is well supplied with factual data concerning all the demands of both domestic and foreign trade. It may regulate trade in the interests of the population and for the further development of the national economy. The productive capacity of the country may also be coordinated with the general plan. The state is in a position to plan both production and distribution rationally, to close down some enterprises, and conversely, to expand others and supply them with the necessary equipment, manpower and credit. Agriculture, in turn, is also subjected to a system of planning which decides cultivation areas, methods of work, selection of grains, and distribution of harvests. All financial resources, which are concentrated in the hands of the government, are distributed among the various branches of the national economy without concern for profit but with an eye to encouraging and developing those areas which are actually the most important for the future of the nation.

Such are the advantages of a planned economy as described by Marxist theorists. The introduction of total planning in the Soviet Union represents the first grand experiment of this kind, and Soviet authors claim it to be most successful.

> ... after competition and anarchy in production had lost their sway, a new objective economic law based on the socialization of the means of production arose and took effect—the law of an organized (proportional) development of the national economy. This economic law makes possible,

> and at the same time implies as an objectively established *necessity*, a state-planned system of national economy.
>
> The objectively established law of the organized development of national economy finds its realization not in the form of an elementary process, but as the execution of state plans issued in the form of legal provisions ... as, for example, concerning the preparation and distribution of new cadres of skilled workers. [1]

According to the same author, the theory of Marx and Lenin arms people with the 'authentic scientific *knowledge* of the existing regularity of social development.' It is the basis of Soviet policy and, consequently, Soviet legislation expressing the Party policy rests on 'the objective necessity uncovered by the classics of Marxism-Leninism.' Social development is not willed, but based on the 'objectively existing necessity of the correlation of industrial relations with the productive forces.'

2. *Theory and Practice*

Marx and Kautsky did not foresee the many obstacles and complications that could present themselves along the way of the practical realization of national planning, and they extolled its expected benefits. When they were discussing the future rationalization of the national economy through planning and centralized control, there had been no practical application of this formula and their discussion was purely speculative. Besides, they were writing at a time when the traditions of utopian socialism were still lively. The 'scientific' socialism of Marx had to devise a more solid basis for the expectations and hopes of the utopians.

For the Soviet writers of our time it is different. They have behind them the experience of a series of five-year plans. They must know that planned economy in actual practice did not bear out expectations. Certain obstacles, which had been ignored, became obviously insurmountable. Some of them were produced by the new system itself and appeared during the process of its realization. No proper means of remedy were found, and the Soviet government failed in its endeavor to overcome them.

There is no doubt that the idea of planning is reasonable in

[1] N. G. Aleksandrov, 'K voprosu o sootnoshenii ekonomicheskikh i juridicheskikh zakonov v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve' *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 4, 1953, p. 28, 34.

principle. Modern economies in countries with well-developed industries and mechanized agriculture agree with this idea. Large concerns do certainly plan their production. The government, in turn, utilizes statisticians to keep business-men informed of unfavorable conditions which might result in overproduction, unemployment or inflation. Private associations and chambers of commerce have the same service for the benefit of their members. But there is a quantitative and, consequently, a qualitative difference between planning of one or another branch of the economy and the idea of planning the whole national economy. The latter is a 'universal plan' embracing industry and agriculture, finances and trade. It excludes private initiative and competition and makes every branch of economic activity subject to the directives and control of corresponding agencies of the central government.

A plan embracing the whole system of national economy may seem to be one of the highest achievements of the human mind, the most reasonable or most rational system. But, as a matter of fact, Soviet experience has made it clear that the plan as such never completely coincides with preconceived ideas and can never be fulfilled with exemplary exactitude.

There is, first of all, a factor which is not subject to human control—the natural forces on which agricultural production depends. Even if there were the possibility of working out a correct plan for industry, it is hardly possible to avoid mistakes in planning agricultural production. At the same time, a 'universal plan' is not a complete plan if it does not coordinate both industry and agriculture.

Another factor which may handicap the realization of plans is the 'psyche' of the people. Planned economy transforms the owner into a servant of the state. Employment is fettered. Choice of vocation, formerly unrestricted, is, if not actually interdicted, constrained.

> Departure from an enterprise or office as well as transfer from one enterprise or office to another may take place only through permission granted by the manager of the enterprise or the head of the office. (Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Ukaz of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of June 26, 1940). According to the Decree of April 25, 1956, departure

> without permission is subject to disciplinary fines, notation in the employee's work-record, or turn to comradeley court.

On the other hand, a peasant is bound to agricultural work by the mere fact that he was born in a village. He has no passport and therefore cannot reside in a town or an industrial settlement. He must stay where he was born and continue to be a peasant unless he is recruited by an agency of the Ministry of Labor Reserves (the Ministry of Culture since March 16, 1953).

In addition to passports, Soviet legislation has introduced another document to control the movement of workers and peasants. This is the labor book. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of December 20, 1938, required every official and worker to have his own labor book. According to that Decree:

> The workman or office worker who is going to be hired must present his labor book to the management of the enterprise or office. The management may hire only workers or employees who present their labor books... (Art. 6)
>
> The labor book is kept by the management of the enterprise (or, eventually, office) and is returned to the workman or office worker only at the time of his discharge. (Art. 9)

A manager may refuse his workman or office worker permission to leave, knowing that the worker cannot be hired elsewhere without producing his passport and labor book. Thus, the employee is virtually chained to his job.

The following incident illustrates this system: A very good young worker married and wanted to change his job for one paying better wages in another shop of the same factory, since he currently did not earn enough to support his family. However, his chief would not allow his transfer because he wanted to keep this good worker in his own shop. But, he could not raise the employee's wages because of the established pay rates. (*Trud*, January 29, 1954.) From this, it seems that the poorer you work, the more freedom you have.

It is well known that compulsory labor is less efficient. Inasmuch as workers and peasants are fixed to their jobs, managers cannot rely on the enthusiastic performance of their jobs. The destiny of a plan is vitally affected by the fluctuations of the personal efforts of workers and peasants.

In addition to the problems described above, economic planners are troubled by difficulties inherent in the planning itself. A certain part of the planning has to be realized by state orders. Every government has its plans for railway, dam, and irrigation canal construction, forestry projects and, in particular, armament manufacture. That the Soviet Union or any other communist state works out such plans for several years in advance (five-year plans, for example) is nothing new. The only difference consists in the execution of such plans. It is possible to allocate orders, partly or in total, among private enterprises or to concentrate all of them in the government's plants and factories. The communist state follows the second procedure. It is abnormal for the state to produce something for its citizens. The state is not an ordinary manufacturer; it is a power. It may limit consumption and regulate it in conformity with its political objectives. Meanwhile, consumption is haphazard. Tastes are capricious, and it is only in regard to articles of primary necessity that there is a consistent demand. Even though a state has replaced all industrialists supplying items of consumption, it cannot ignore the psychological factors well known to private traders familiar with the needs and tastes of their customers. Although the state may replace private traders, it must continue to satisfy the needs and tastes of every social and national group as well as the demands of local conditions and peculiarities. But it is difficult to imagine how a bureaucratic apparatus can replace millions of private traders closely connected with the local population. It is equally difficult to work out a satisfactory plan of production for all kinds of dry-goods, utensils, stationery, etc., for two hundred million people and for distribution of all these items throughout that vast country with all its various climatic conditions and peoples of different cultural levels, customs and habits. It is necessary besides to pay attention to the interdependence of each and every branch of industry and agriculture. Industry has to be supplied with raw materials; the latter has to be extracted from mines or produced on farms in various parts of the country. It is necessary to coordinate transportation of all these materials, to supply city and town populations with food, to supply factories with coal or oil, with equipment and spare parts for repair, to supply villages with manufac-

tured products and other commodities which farmers do not produce themselves.

Fulfillment of the national economic plan also requires adequate distribution of engineers, technicians, and other specialists, as well as skilled workers. The state is responsible for the procurement of all kinds of specialists to meet current needs in much the same way as it procures the necessary raw materials and equipment for plants and factories. In practice, however, the distribution of skilled workers and technical personnel does not correspond to the needs of normal development of the national economy. It was revealed in 1953 after the consolidation of kolkhozes that better educated and more experienced managers were needed to operate the new consolidated farms. [1] The new estates, whose average acreage was almost three times that of the old collective farms and which were equipped with modern agricultural machinery, remained, however, under the management of inexperienced and untrained personnel. Machine-tractor stations (M.T.S.), in turn, need managers with higher qualifications to keep the machines in proper condition and to organize the field work. Finally, it was discovered that there was a shortage even of skilled workers in agriculture. The more intelligent farmers and tractor operators preferred to leave their poor working and living conditions in the country for more attractive jobs and better earnings in industry. Although the freedom of farmers to change jobs and residence is limited by the existing law, they may do so when recruiting agents of the State offer them jobs and contracts in industrial enterprises. As a result, agriculture, as a foster child, has lost its best workers to industry.

Another problem was recently discovered in the education of experts and specialists. It was necessary for the government to prevent both 'overproduction' and 'underproduction' of each category of specialists. But the Soviet government did not succeed in this task. *Pravda* states:

> A significant gap is admitted in training specialists with higher and middle educations. As a result, in a number of

[1] Since 1950 new large farms have been formed consisting of three, five and even more old ones (*ukrupnenie kolkhozov* or consolidation of collective farms). All common buildings, inventories, cattle and other property became the property of one consolidated kolkhoz.

> branches of the national economy there are fewer technicians than engineers. (*Pravda*, September 23, 1954).

The article further indicates that the Council of Ministers of the USSR later changed the educational plan and limited admissions to institutions of special training.

3. *Confessions of Soviet Leaders*

To work out a plan of national economy is a trying task in itself but to carry it out is a still more difficult problem. Soviet newspapers give various illustrations of mistakes which seem unavoidable:

> There are many great shortcomings in the metal supply planning. This can be seen from the following examples alone. Paradoxical as it sounds, about 100,000 tons of metal are being shipped out of Leningrad whereas Leningrad itself could use at least half of that metal and even more than that if the planning were reorganized.
>
> A second example: Leningrad receives from 7000 to 7500 tons of nails, sent entirely from the South and the Urals, while there is a plant in Leningrad which produces 7000 tons of nails and ships its entire output outside Leningrad. (From a speech of Comrade Andrianov, Leningrad. *Pravda*, October 8, 1953, pp. 4–5).

Any national plan must be worked out and supervised by the center. But it is difficult to decide where the jurisdiction of the center ends and the competence of local bodies begins.

> The planning organs, while working out basic tasks, often also try to prescribe from the center a number of detailed instructions concerning the economic activity of enterprises, construction projects, railroads, sovkhozes. And this is done without an essential knowledge of local conditions and potentialities, and results in mistakes.
>
> A vital defect of the system of planning is its extreme centralization which considerably hampers the initiative of local agencies, complicates the work, and causes the account system to swell and paper work to increase enormously, distracting employees from practical work and fulfillment of plans. (*Izvestia*, July 9, 1954, p. 3).

For a central organ, every plan is a blueprint; for local agencies, it is an actual work order. It is easier for the central organ to

change an original project than for the local agency to reorganize its activity and carry out a new project. It is no wonder that owing to the instability of work programs, local agencies lag behind or do not fulfill the plan.

> The Ministry (of Oil Industry) changes its construction plans every month. In 1952 the annual plan of the Tuimazin Territory Administration was changed twenty-one times; last year, seventeen times, and during the six months of 1954, nine times. The collapse of the projected program for the construction of housing and cultural edifices is a result of this defective system. Upon reconsideration of the plan, new constructions are usually envisaged and the necessity to finish those constructions already started is disregarded. Thus, many constructions remain uncompleted. (*Trud*, August 13, 1954, p. 3).

Some defects are the result of psychological factors or of poor organization. To prevent excessive spending and high production costs, all business agencies of the state operate on a system of accounts: they have their own budgets, are responsible for losses and encouraged to make profits. It is a reasonable system, but it can have some unexpected consequences. Although all state enterprises belong to the same owner, they sometimes have contradictory interests and neglect one another's needs if catering to those needs might increase their expenses or decrease profits. M.T.S. will not repair machines at their own expense but wait until they are worn out enough to be replaced by new ones. Factories will not transfer surplus spare parts to other state enterprises because they prefer to secure a stockpile for the future. State stores do not deliver goods to tractor operators working in remote areas since they can sell to others without this additional service and expense. Having no competitors, state enterprises are conservative and avoid risk and initiative. Their managers are more interested in ostentatious success than in satisfying their customers:

> Directors of some enterprises neglect the interests of the people and, in order to fulfill the plan for gross output, prefer to manufacture products of higher value or those easier to produce. (*Izvestia*, Editorial, September 8, 1954).

Malenkov in his report to the 19th Congress of the Communist Party criticized 'the existing practice of producing some

items of minor importance at the expense of the more important kinds of production prescribed by the plan.'

Speaking at the August session of the Supreme Soviet in 1953, Malenkov further pointed out the disproportionate development of the various branches of the national economy of the Soviet Union, the poor organization of industry, the continual losses shown by many enterprises and even whole industrial branches, the inadequate increase of labor productivity and the marked backwardness of light industry and agriculture. Agricultural development, particularly, lagged far behind the development of industry and the needs of the population.

> From 1940 through 1952, gross output increased (in comparable prices) only 10 per cent while the output of industry during the same period two to three times. An obvious discrepancy between the population's growing needs and the production level has been formed during the past years.
>
> Animal husbandry is in an unsatisfactory economic state; the same can be said for vegetables and potatoes... The number of cows at the beginning of 1953 was three to five million fewer than at the beginning of 1941 and eight to nine fewer than at the beginning of 1928. (From Khrushchev's speech on the Agricultural Program. Report to the Plenary Session of the Ts. C. of the CPSU, September 3, 1953. *Izvestia*, September 15, 1953, pp. 1–6).

The Soviet government has undoubtedly succeeded in furthering the development of heavy industry, that branch of the national economy which is most suited to centralized planning. Heavy industry serves as the touchstone of the soviet planned economy, and the Soviet government has treated it as the 'cornerstone of the socialist economy' according to Lenin's legacy. Yet, even here are some shortcomings which cast doubts on the value of nationalizing key branches of industry.

In April 1954, Malenkov reported to the Supreme Soviet that the Ministries of Ferrous Metallurgy, Oil Industry, Transport and Heavy Machine Building Industry, Lumber Industry and others did not fulfill the plan in 1953. Many enterprises of the metallurgical industry, machine-building, forest and cotton industries, and especially housing construction failed to increase their productivity. (*Trud*, April 27, 1954).

According to *Izvestia* (August 10), official plans for exploiting

the new powerful enterprises of the ferrous metal industry were not realized in many regions. During 1953 and the first half of 1954, the construction of many blast furnaces, open-hearth furnaces, rolling mills, coke ovens and plants for deposits of ores and aggregates had not been completed due to lack of labor discipline and frequent work stoppages. *Izvestia* emphasized that only one-fourth of the engineers were working on construction while all others preferred office work.

> In open-hearth furnaces at ferrous metallurgy enterprises, the established norms for the expenditures of raw materials were not in general observed, and, as a result, in the rolling mills there occurred in 1953 overexpenditures of 238.000 tons of metal charge and of more than 200,000 tons of metal. (Report to the Supreme Soviet by Minister Zverev on April 21, 1954).

Izvestia, on September 22 and in its editorial of September 23, 1954, described some of the organizational shortcomings of the metallurgical industry. In one of the largest plants in the Donbas, the Makeevo plant, furnaces were not fully loaded 473 times during 1954. There was negligence in the care and control of the furnaces, and labor discipline was unsatisfactory. As a result, there were losses amounting to millions of roubles and many thousand tons of underproduced cast iron, steel and rolled iron. Similar deficiencies were described in the organization of labor and production in seven other large-scale plants. Hundreds of violations of technological regulations and labor discipline fouled production and caused stoppages, accidents and defective production and, finally, large losses in the production of metal. (*Izvestia*, September 23 and 29, 1954).

The conditions in the coal industry were no more encouraging. The Minister of Finance of the USSR, Zverev, in his budget report to the Supreme Soviet in April 1954 (*Izvestia* and *Pravda*, April 22, 1954) stated that the coal industry, despite tremendous aid from the government, failed to fulfill labor productivity goals. Modern equipment was not properly used. According to Zverev's report, only from 55 to 60 per cent of the available coal combines and cutting and loading equipment were used in 1953. There were mine trusts and combines which had not reached even the prewar level of labor productivity. Thus, the extraction

of coal per worker at the Voroshilovgrad Coal Combine was lower in 1953 than before the war.

However, during three years of the last five-year plan, coal extraction in the Kuznetsk coal mines increased 24.7 per cent, labor productivity 16.3 per cent and the production cost per ton dropped eight per cent. (*Pravda*, May 28, 1954, p. 2).

In the Zverev report, the Lumber and Paper Industry also made a poor showing. This industry consistently failed to fulfill state plans for lumber procurements and shipments and failed to meet the national economy's increased requirements for lumber materials. Despite the increased mechanization of lumbering, the output of lumber per worker was four per cent lower in 1953 than in 1940. In lumber procurement enterprises by the end of 1953, only a fourth of the drag winches and little more than half the lumber-hauling tractors and trucks were in good working condition.

This branch of industry has continued to work at a loss for a number of years. In 1951, the losses were 1,400,000,000 roubles; in 1952, 1,800,000,000, and in 1953, 2,200,000,000 roubles. The operational costs of lumber procurement enterprises, instead of being reduced three per cent in 1953, as stated in the plan, increased considerably over those of 1953.

In heavy industry the story is quite different. Heavy industry's output is three to four times as great as in 1940, according to Saburov's report at the Anniversary Session of the Moscow Soviet on November 6, 1954 (*Pravda* and *Izvestia*, November 7, 1954). But how great are its losses, how large its unproductive expenditures? How often is there a failure to coordinate production with the supply of raw material, to match modern technical equipment with the technical training of workers and supervisors? How often does machine repair lag behind requirements? What are the advantages of a planned economy in view of such failures and shortcomings in the plans and their fulfillment?

There is, besides, discrepancy between growing production and the development of transportation. 'For a number of years the railroads have failed to meet the plans for the loading of goods, and important goods at that,' Kaganovich stated at the Railwaymen's Conference in May 1954. (*Pravda*, May 24; *Izvestia*, May 25).

Characterizing the 'achievements' of the railroad exploitation, Kaganovich indicated with deep concern that—

> A railroad car spends 10 per cent of its total turnaround time at way-station stops, 10.5 per cent at junctions, 28.8 per cent at sorting depots and 30.3 per cent in loading and unloading ... The limitations on braking lower average technical speed by 1.5 to 2 kilometers an hour ... Idle time of cars at sorting depots occupies an especially large part in the turnaround of cars. Each car stands idle at the yards for 62.7 hours of its normal turnaround time ... Trains with freight of national importance (coal, grain, oil, etc.) were put on the same footing as trains carrying local and less important goods. ... The quality of locomotive repairs is not high, and in some yards it is quite low.

These shortcomings and many similar ones occur in the various branches of industry, agriculture and trade. Soviet newspapers do not spare critical comments and reprimands; the shortcomings and failures, as we have seen, are not at all denied.

Chapter 2

ECONOMY WITHOUT ENTREPRENEURS

For the realization of a rational state economic plan, it was necessary for the government to have unlimited control over all branches of the national economy. 'Abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production,' as it is explained in the Soviet Constitution (Art. 4), put an end to the capitalist state and initiated a new epoch of economy without entrepreneurs.

Private property, if it survived at all, lost its economic significance. The State replaced millions of private owners and became a 'universal monopolist.' This was that great change which characterizes the social revolution: it destroys almost all private rights.

Ownership occupies a central position in a system of private law. Sales, leases, employment and work contracts, loans, pledges mortgages, deposits, societies: in short, the far greater number of contracts are directly associated with the right to private property. With the abolition of that right, contractual relations are reduced to their most elementary forms. Once the right to

private property disappears, the right of inheritance disappears as well. Correspondingly, insofar as the property relations between man and wife, and parents and children are fixed by community of life and household expenses, the character of the family changes.

The abolition of the right to private property, therefore, introduces radical changes in the conditions of life. These changes were characterized by the Russian scholar, B. N. Chicherin, as the most revolutionary disruption of the fundamentals of human life:

> 'Political revolutions by no means have as far-reaching significance as social revolutions. The former affect only the apex of society, leaving untouched the numerous threads interwoven in the private relations of the people. But as soon as ownership is infringed upon, everything totters. Man cannot be sure of himself. He feels that his personal world is assailed, his freedom is in jeopardy and his activity circumscribed. His family, everything that is dear to him, and his past and present life are in turmoil. The primary elements of social existence are upset and many of the relationships binding people together are rent. Whenever a question of this kind is brought up for decision, society trembles for its very existence...'[1]

Every disruption, however, eventually loses its disruptive character. Generations replace one another, become adapted, and accustom themselves to new conditions. Won't they construct a better kind of life than when the right to private property had to be reckoned with? Won't a new order of social relations, an order at once more practically expedient and more just, emerge? Enthusiasts of nationalization predict that, since individual property will become national property, the income from its exploitation will be distributed in accordance with the requirements and deserts of individuals and the needs of the country, that is, in the general interest. Such are the great expectations that inspire revolutionaries and fill the masses with hope.

1. *Private property right: an 'apple of discord'*

The right to private property is not an absolute. Throughout

[1] B. Chicherin, *Sobstvennost i gosudarstvo* (Ownership and the State), Vol. I, 1882, p. 14.

the span of centuries it has met with different evaluations. Not only radicals, but also profound moral thinkers dreaming of a higher form of justice, have estimated property ownership as something less than the 'sacred' right it has come to be considered in the past two centuries.

Saint Augustine (354–430) recognized ownership of property as a right bestowed by the state. Contrasting property ownership with freedom of conscience, he asserted that freedom of conscience is an innate right of man while ownership is something given to him as a privilege. Ownership exists only when and where it is established by human law. Thus, the great Christian philosopher ascribed to property ownership only a relative significance.

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), on the basis of his general doctrine of the two laws, that of God and that of man, relegated property rights to the law of man, since, according to divine law, the right to use the goods of the material world belongs to one and all. According to Aquinas, he who has a surplus has something that belongs to other people. Even Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) continued to treat private property rights as the result of luck or force.

The attitude toward ownership changed radically in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. From the time of Locke (1632–1704), the right to private property has been characterized as a natural right of man and as one of the manifestations of human freedom, of inalienable benefit, possessed by man from birth. The philosophy of individualism recognizes the right of property ownership as sacred and treats it as the basis of the social order. Law protects this right against violation by private persons and guarantees compensation in the event of alienation or limitation in the public interest. A French philosopher of the 19th century, Fouillée, very eloquently characterized ownership when he defined it as 'a freedom which has descended to the earth from high above and the clouded heights beyond.'

Yet the property right has never ceased to be a target of bitter criticism. The goods of our world are distributed unequally on the basis of property rights and not everyone by any means enjoys its gifts. It is not surprising, therefore, that the right of property has been characterized as an unjust privilege of the few. Cicero compared distribution of property to a theater in which all the

seats are already filled; admission is barred to others. In the modern world the French anarchist, Proudhon, called property 'theft'. The Russian anarchist, Leo Tolstoy, also treated property negatively.

On the ground of such a criticism of ownership, the socialist philosophy of collectivization required, as a counterbalance against individualism, the nationalization of the means of production and the basic resources of the country. Communism goes still further. It promises complete abolition of private property as the mother of all social injustice and vice, and scornfully repudiates the 'bourgeois' world in which property exists.

Nevertheless, howsoever open to criticism certain facts and events associated with the existence of property may have been, ownership of property retained great vitality. States rise and fall, regimes undergo radical changes and social structures change as well, but property ownership survives. This vitality of the institution of property may be considered as evidence of its important practical significance. Moreover, if the characterization of ownership as a 'sacred' right appears as an obvious idealization, to condemn it without qualification seems a considerable exaggeration of the negative aspects of that social order which rests upon the ownership of property. The experience of the Soviet Union, which has introduced an extensive program of nationalization of the means of production and drastic limitations to the personal property of its citizens, deserves careful study from this point of view. Before turning to a study of the Soviet system, however, it is essential for a better understanding of that subject to familiarize ourselves with the rise and development of property in its historical perspective. We must consider both its positive functions and those negative phenomena which property rights, under certain conditions, can engender.

Property ownership was undoubtedly an outgrowth of the instinct of appropriation, connected in its turn with the instincts of nourishment, self-protection, and reproduction. Whatever is needed for the nourishment and protection of one's own life and the life of one's progeny was appropriated. As this instinct is passed on, children from the very earliest age exhibit a proclivity for appropriating and defending what they consider as 'theirs'. Domination over objects simply 'procured' is joined subsequently

by domination over the products of labor, and then, with the establishment of a settled mode of life, by domination over land and shelter. It is therefore not surprising that the right of property ownership has become so thoroughly rooted in people's psychology that uprooting it, if that is even possible, is not a matter of issuing acts of legislation. It can be accomplished only as the result of a lengthy process of re-education and of a change in the conditions of life.

In the course of civilization, certain types of property ownership have acquired a particularly important meaning. The institution of slave ownership gave some human beings domination over others. Ownership of landed property acquired its particular significance in the feudal period when it gave lordship over serfs attached to the lands (a right not of the same character as slave-ownership). Finally, in the industrial period, ownership of the means of production placed the workers in a position dependent upon the entrepreneurs.

All these types of ownership brought about that inequality in the distribution of wealth which has been so mercifully criticized, favored the rise of privileged classes of society, and enabled some human beings to exploit others. Is the defense of property as the fulfillment of a natural instinct sufficient to justify the existence of such a right, which in its developed form is so removed from its original basis? May the right of property be justified if it has really become a basis of social inequality and of the formation of privileged social groups? The discrimination of an elite group and the maintenance of its privileged status has, like property, been a constant feature of social life from the most ancient times. Property ownership is not, however, the only institution which originates and secures inequality and produces social stratification. Not even the socialistic government of the Soviets has been able either to avoid an inequality in the distribution of subsistence commodities, or to eliminate social stratification and the formation of upper and lower groups. This serves as proof of the naturalness of this feature. No doubt, property ownership maintains an elite by material advantages for the purpose of its preservation and replenishment, but this is not its exclusive nor main function.

Property ownership fulfills in fact many and varied useful

functions. The rise of private property precedes the formation of a privileged class and its abolition would not prevent the formation of a new upper group. The problem of property ownership's functions and its significance, as well as of the conditions under which its beneficial effects might be secured, deserves, thus, a thorough study.

2. *The Entrepreneur—a target of sharp attacks*

The practical significance of ownership in the life of society is determined by the objects of property. Property consisting of consumer goods, of necessities, and objects of comfort administers to the daily needs and personal tastes of individual people, encouraging thrift while they are not provided with all that they need or desire, and freeing them from care when everyting that is needed for their own life has been provided in the fullest measure. Property consisting of the means of production has a different character. Property consisting of land, machinery or large amounts of capital opens the way for the exercise of extensive initiative and creative work. Inasmuch as property ownership includes the right to hold and dispose of property, it creates a motive for producing new commodities, for acquiring new income and wealth. It is Adam Smith to whom the honor belongs for an especially precise formulation of this useful function of ownership, a function opening the way for personal enrichment and, simultaneously, the enrichment of the nation. Although the owner is free to possess and use his property and is under no obligation to exploit his wealth productively, wealth, in the large majority of cases, is not squandered, but serves for further increase of property or accumulation of capital.

Thiers, in his tract on property, uses, as a retort to the socialists the very same arguments as did Adam Smith:

> 'All travellers have been struck by the state of languor, misery, and devouring usury of those countries in which property is not sufficiently guaranteed. Travel into the East, where the despot claims to be the sole proprietor; or, what comes to the same thing, go back to the middle ages, and you will discern the same features everywhere: the soil neglected because it is the prey most exposed to the greed of tyranny, and reserved for the hands of slaves, who have not

the choice of occupation; commerce preferred, as escaping more easily from exactions; in commerce, gold, silver, and jewels sought as the property more easily concealed..."

'These choice aliments, those beautiful and suitable garments which you envy in the rich, the poor will have some day ... An idle promise, say you. Not so idle, if we judge by the past. Three or four centuries ago, kings in their palaces trod on floors strewn with fresh gathered leaves or straw; now, the humble tradesman walks on carpets gay as the flowery fields in spring.'

'... The earth is covered, it is true, with proprietors, but ... it is highly cultivated, and produces a hundredfold more than it did originally; ... productions a thousand times more abundant and less costly; ... for seven or eight centuries ago you would have been shod with a piece of leather fastened by strings, and now you wear shoes which protect your feet from the cold, the damp, and the flint stones. Your clothing would have been a sheepskin, and now you have cloth. Your dwelling would have been one of those foul, pestiferous hovels, the remains of which are still to be seen in some of our old cities, and now you have healthy and substantial houses." [1]

An essential point to be noted is that enterprise of whatever sort, once it has captured the imagination, tends to become intensified, to become a 'dominanta', to use the expression of I. P. Pavlov, the renowned physiologist: it predominates in the psychology of man over other incentives and interests. Material interest and personal profit, in that case, retreat to the background. Like the ardent hunter or fisherman who will continue to hunt or fish, even when the catch is already a large one, because he gets carried away and unconsciously become absorbed in his enthusiasm, the entrepreneur, even when he is already fully secure, cannot keep away from the 'business' which occupies his attention. [2] Again, in such a case, business experiences and interests are transmitted from one person to another, in accordance with the general laws of social psychology, by imitation, inspiration, or psychological infection. Competition intensifies effort, success inspires hopes, habituation to business becomes an important factor in economic progress.

The developement of business enterprise is a direct function

[1] Louis A. Thiers, *The Rights of Property*, London, 1848, pp. 25, 54, and 75.

[2] L. I. Petrazhitskii, *Aktsii, birzhevaia igra i teoria ekonomicheskikh krizisov*, S.P.B. 1911.

of property ownership since it is property ownership which guarantees the right of free management and the right of appropriation of all profits. Yet, at the same time, it makes the property owner bear the responsibility in case of loss. The potentiality of success in a situation constantly threatened by misfortune and losses creates those stimuli, activating mind and will to their greatest efforts, which characterize the *motivating* function of the right of property ownership. Motives in business enterprise vary; they are determined not only by the personal discretion and interests of the property owner but also by the kind and nature of the property owned and by the existing economic and social conditions. The in-born instinct of ownership creates the stimulus for appropriation and accumulation but not for labor or for concern about public interests. This instinct is egocentric; and, when social culture had not yet attained that level at which it takes measures to protect the interest of the workers and society, the accumulation of considerable means in the hands of one person opened the way to extensive possibilities in exploitation and speculation. The history of the right of property ownership, as a social phenomenon, is the history of business enterprise as a function of property right and of the gradual development and application of various measures for the protection of society against possible abuses of this right.

Whereas business enterprise is not to be found without the right of property ownership, still not every property owner can be an entrepreneur since not everyone possesses the essential qualities. Enterprise assumes appropriate interest, initiative, resourcefulness, and economic prudence: a combination of qualities not given to all men. Therefore, among several property owners with identical material potentialities, only one might turn out to be a genuine entrepreneur. The possibility of turning out to be the fortunate entrepreneur is in the power, on varying scales of course, of a small landowner as well as of the owner of a large estate, of a small, independent businessman in commerce or industry as well as of the owner of a large factory. The entrepreneur is the only one who does not follow routine but uses his efforts to improve and develop his business, the one who, accepting risk, introduces something new. [1]

[1] G. Guins and L. Zikman, *Predprinimatel*, Harbin, 1940.

Nevertheless, even provided with the appropriate psychological factors, business enterprise cannot receive its proper development unless the economic, political, and juridical conditions are favorable. Unpropitious legislation, in particular, can kill enterprise initiative. The successful development of business enterprise presupposes inalienability of rights and freedom from interference. Law cannot admit unrestricted freedom since unrestricted freedom can lead to acts which are harmful from the point of view of the government and of the public. Yet the freedom which property ownership allows is the least restricted by law since its practical exploitation is bound up with risk. This forces the property owner to use self-restrictive measures, to be cautious, to remember that it is not always profit alone that lies in store for him. Apart from that, the property owner has obligations to his family since the government makes each individual citizen responsible for the future of his children and dependents.

3. Two sides of the medal

The *motivating* function of property ownership, which is expressed in the incitement to save and to use articles of property productively, may become an *educative* function when interest in and attachment to business become attributes of character, developing thriftiness, economic prudence, tenacity in the realization of business projects, ambition and initiative combined with a certain optimism in the estimation of the chances of success, and, therefore, a readiness to face risk. Such psychological attributes may be considered positive capital in a population, the psychological assets of a nation.

The freedom allowed by property ownership finds its application not only in economic but also in social activity. People with good moral backgrounds developed and fortified by religious training make use of their wealth for the support of charitable and educational institutions or directly help the needy. Activity of that sort ennobles and elevates those who engage in it and, at the same time, gives others a very valuable moral example. Governmental and community programs of indiscriminate social welfare do not have the same ennobling influence.

One should also take note of the fact that the right of property ownership, the consciousness of having something which one can call one's 'own', increases the consciousness of one's own worth. Depending on the value or the profitableness of the property owned, it also produces that feeling of independence which is so important for the development of a citizen in a democratic state and, consequently, of the democracy itself.

From the foregoing it is clear that the utility of the property right becomes manifest principally when the means of production or, in general, anything which can give increase of capital and dependable incomes, constitutes the property owned. The useful psychological function of property ownership comes into play more strongly if the property is owned individually and not collectively. In large companies or social institutions or governmental programs, initiative,risk, and interest are decreased or restricted; the place of the individual property owner is held by directors or administrators and the conduct of the business acquires a bureaucratic character which becomes the more obvious the more grandiose the dimensions of the undertaking.

An analysis of the significance of the right of property ownership, of its motivating and educating influence on people, must not stop with the characterization of its active side, its effect on the behavior of property owners. The existence of the right of property ownership and its protection by the government assumes respect and recognition of existing rights on the part of the non-owners, who belong to the passive side. Without this sort of respect, no defense of property from encroachment, from violation of the rights of the owner, from larcency and sabotage, will succeed. When the overwhelming majority of property owners uses its wealth freely, an essential social discipline, founded on respect for the rights of others, is also developing and becoming inculcated. It is only through this discipline that law and order in general and a system of disproportionate distribution of material goods in particular can exist. And it is only when this discipline is strong that the further perfection of a juridical system can be realized. This kind of social conduct is not attained by means of compulsion and penalties. A nation in which every citizen is a property owner is being inconspicuously exercised in

the consciousness of human worth and, at the same time, in respect for the rights of others.

The history of property right is also characterized by the development of various limitations and controls, as has already been mentioned above. However valuable the positive functions of the property right may have been, one cannot indeed close one's eyes to the negative features which it does or can produce in the absence of control. Freedom of management and exploitation, the possibility of gain and enrichment, create the stimuli for rapacity which becomes manifest in the exploitation of human beings as well as of wealth. Acquisition of wealth and, especially, transmission of wealth through inheritance, can engender parasitism, since they provide for a secure existence through wealth received without labor, and can promote prodigality. So far as the passive side, the employee, for example, is concerned, exploitation fosters envy and dissatisfaction with the social order which upholds inequality. This negative attitude toward property ownership becomes more accentuated when inequality in the distribution of wealth is combined with lavish luxury or out and out prodigality. Contrasts in wealth also promote the outgrowth of theft and other crimes involving property.

It is precisely these negative features of property ownership which have given rise to the idea that the means of production should be nationalized. Under such a system it is supposed that no speculation, no exploitation, no rapacity, no parasitism, no crimes against property rights can exist.

4. 'Socialist property'

The Soviet system is the prime example of a program of full nationalization of the means of production. Its results, therefore, are extremely instructive.

Two kinds of property exist in the Soviet Union: the socialist property of the state and cooperatives and the personal property of its citizens. The distinction is determined not so much by the subjects of this or that form of ownership as by the objects of their rights (Articles 5–10, Constitution of the Soviet Union).

To the state belong all the means of production, all lands, resources, industrial and commercial enterprises, banks, trans-

portation, postal, telegraph and telephone service, power stations machine and tractor stations—in short, everything that can be used for production and everything that serves the needs of industry, commerce, or agriculture. Property ownership on that scale constitutes the 'universal monopoly' of the state. There are no restrictions on what the universal monopolist can do; he knows no competition and bears no risk. All the sources of subsistence are in his hands and, therefore, the entire population is completely dependent upon him.

The Soviet Constitution describes the property of the Soviet state as "belonging to the whole people', but the real owner is not the people but the state. The interests of the people and of the state frequently differ. The state functions in accordance with long-range plans whereas its people are primarily concerned with the present; a nation consists of living persons while the state's needs transcend the interests of current generations. The people are asked, therefore, to make certain sacrifices in the interests of the state. The state, in turn, when it lowers the price on goods belonging to and sold by it or remits accumulated arrears, sometimes yields its interests.

State property is put to use not by the free initiative of individuals or individual ministries but in conformity with a plan issued in the form of a special law. A plan established as a law must be strictly observed by the people as well as by the agencies of the government.

The property of collective farms and cooperatives is also 'socialist property'. The nature of this property is restricted. Collective farms own livestock and implements, the buildings on the land allotted by the state to the collective farms for use 'in perpetuity', and possess the right to a certain portion of the products of collective farm economy. Nevertheless, this property is termed 'socialist' for no insignificant reason. The characteristics of property rights—free disposal and appropriation of products or profits—have been eradicated. [1] Collective farms cannot dispose of their stocks or implements or buildings or even of the products of their labor; they are obliged to fulfill that part of the agriculture-production plan which falls to the lot of each individual

[1] See A. V. Venediktov, 'Uchenie t. Stalina o sotsialisticheskois sobstvennosti,' *Izvestia Akademii Nauk S.S.S.R.* Otdel ekonomiki i prava. M. 1949, 6, pp. 409–432

collective farm and to furnish the state with the minimum fixed in each individual case of grain products, vegetables, meats, milk products, etc. In connection with this obligation, they are responsible for the maintenance of 'socialist' property as property designated for the needs of the state. Consequently, they are deprived of the right to dispose, at their own discretion, of barns, implements, livestock, and harvested crops. Only those products in surplus after the fulfillment of compulsory deliveries in kind to the state, and after a number of other conditions have been fulfilled, remain at the disposal of the collective farms.

The obligations of the collective farms and the restrictions on their right of disposal have been formulated in the following way:

> 'The artel binds itself to conduct its collective farming according to plan, observing exactly the plans of agricultural production drawn up by the agencies of the workers 'and peasants' government, and the duties of the artel toward the government.'
>
> 'The artel shall accept for precise execution the programs of sowing, fallow ploughing, weeding, harvesting, threshing, and autumn ploughing prescribed in consideration of the condition and peculiarities of collective farms, and also the government plan for the development of stock breeding.' (Art. 6 of the Standard Charter of an Agricultural Artel of February 17, 1935).

In addition to the instructive regulations just quoted, a Soviet author emphasized:

> 'It is forbidden to use the land bound to the collective farms for other than agricultural purposes not authorized by law, as, for example, for the constructions of industrial enterprises not connected with agricultural economy, the building of summer houses for rental, etc. ... It is forbidden to lease pastures and other agricultural allotments to other juridical or physical persons.' [1]

The decree of October 23, 1938, ordered kolkhozes to liquidate enterprises not connected with agriculture and to stop exploitation of land resources. [2]

The rights of other kinds of cooperatives are not so well defined. However, legislation concerning associations and unions in gener-

[1] *Zemelnoe pravo*, Gos. Izd. Jurid. Literatury. Moscow, 1949, pp. 196–219.
[2] *Pravda*, Oct. 23, 1938.

al, [1] like that controlling the whole economic organization, makes any economic enterprise entirely dependent on the state, without whose consent no economic enterprise could exist. The state is the sole distributor of real estate, raw materials for manufacturing, merchandise for selling, credit, means of transportation, etc. Consequently, cooperatives are state-controlled, just as are all other societies and unions, and perform functions in connection with the state's over-all plan. For example, consumers' cooperatives in rural areas distribute merchandise in exchange for agricultural products and, in that way, increase the stocks of these products at the disposal of the state; certain manufacturing cooperatives supply the population with minor implements and goods of common, everyday use which are not produced by state enterprises; others turn out hand-made goods, such as rugs, embroidery, lace, which are surrendered to the state for export or for sale in 'univermags' (department stores).

Since the economic activity of all state and cooperative enterprises is subordinated to an over-all plan, the directors of so-called Soviet 'tresty' and 'kombinaty' [2] and the managerial boards of the cooperatives are limited in choice of the kind and scope of production, in employment conditions, in choice of markets, and find themselves dependent upon other state or state-controlled agencies when it comes to equipment, transportation, and credit. The directors of major concerns and trusts in capitalist countries are more independent than the directors of state enterprises in the Soviet Union. The president and the board of a large share-holder company are at their own discretion within their own sphere of activity and arrange matters at their own risk; they can determine, accordingly, with what powers their managers shall be invested. In the Soviet Union, not even the individual republics enjoy such an independence since state property belongs to 'the whole people', i.e., belongs to the whole Union and not to the separate republics. So, for example, ac-

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[1] G. C. Guins, *Soviet Law and Soviet Society*, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1954, pp. 273–77.

[2] A *trest*, a term derived from 'trust' in English, is a group of enterprises, or a single enterprise, having an independent budget; enterprises of both extractive (mining) and manufacturing type, or enterprises of different kinds united in a single business group are usually called *kombinaty* (combines). They consist of a group of related plants and other enterprises producing one or a group of related products.

cording to the Constitution of the Soviet Union, the Union determines the basic principles of land tenure and the use of mineral wealth, forests, and waters (Constitution of the Soviet Union, Art. 14, q); the Union republic determines only the procedure governing the use of land, mineral wealth, forests, and waters (Constitution of the RSFSR, Art. 19, n) and the autonomous republics determine 'the direction and control over the procedure governing use.' [1]

> 'The character of state socialist property as belonging to the whole people finds its expression preeminently in the fact that the one and only owner of all the property at the disposal of the government is the Soviet people organized as a socialist state.' 'Since the socialist state itself is the one and only subject of the right to state property, all this property without exception, and no matter in whose control it may be, constitutes the *single* fund of state property.' 'In carrying out its program of united political and economic guidance, the socialist government plans and regulates—albeit on different scales and with the application of various methods —all socialist organizations, both governmental and cooperative (collective farms) and other public organizations.' 'The socialist state acts simultaneously as the bearer of both *governmental power* and of *property right.*' [2]

State enterprise in the Soviet Union, in the words of a Soviet writer, is 'a group of workers who carry out, under the guidance of management, the work assigned to them by the state.' [3]. The separation of various kinds of property does not denote their allocation to the ownership of legal entities for exploitation. It means only the allocation of state property to the operative management of special bodies. Legal entities (juridical persons) in the Soviet Union are established by the state 'for the realization of objectives assigned to them and for that purpose they are invested with certain rights to the independent management of the enterprise entrusted to them.' [4]

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[1] *Zemelnoe pravo*, p. 119.

[2] A. V. Venediktov, *Gosudarstvennaia sotsialisticheskaia sobstvennost.* Izd. Akademii Nauk S.S.S.R. M. 1948, pp. 313–319.

[3] A. V. Venediktov, 'Organy upravleniia gosudarstvennoiu sotsialisticheskoiu sobstvennostiu,' *Sov. gos. i pravo*, 12, p. 28 (cf. his 'Gosudarstvennye iuridicheskie litsa v S.S.S.R.', *Sov. gos. i pravo*, * 10, 1940).

[4] Ia. F. Mikolenko, 'Gosudarstvennye iuridicheskie litsa v sovetskom grazhdanskom prave', *Sov. gos. i pravo*, No. 7, 1951, pp. 40–53; Prof. S. N. Bratus, *Sub'etkty grazhdanskogo prava*, Gosizd. Iurid. Lit. M. 1950, p. 101.

5. *'Khoziastvenniki'*

There are no longer any capitalists in the Soviet Union. Together with them the country lost the entrepreneurs. It is a mistake, however, to identify 'enterpreneur' with 'capitalist.' Entrepreneur ability is a special talent or gift endowing people with a willingness to undertake risky ventures — exploitation of new opportunities, new materials, new methods of production, new inventions, new markets, etc. It is a socially valuable quality which only certain people possess. And it very often happens that a capitalist is not an entrepreneur, and, reversely, an entrepreneur is not a capitalist. An entrepreneur is a person who is concerned with starting a business, who not rarely depends on outside financial support and who becomes a capitalist in the event that his venture is successful but may very well lose his fortune over and over again if he does not desist from experimenting and organizing new enterprises.

The propaganda directed against capitalism in its early stage of development has survived the more recent evolution of capitalism. Derogatory epithets, such as 'boundless egoists,' 'exploiters' and the like, continue to stigmatize all capitalists, so that the entrepreneur, identified with 'capitalist' in the meaning described above, is depicted as an evil genius, a congenital, merciless, avaricious, and insatiable exploiter of labor. Let us agree that some capitalists and entrepreneurs might be people of the worst moral character. But if we speak about the entrepreneur as a special type of man, we must recognize those special distinguishing characteristics and endowments which stimulate economic progress. A man endowed with the natural talents of an entrepreneur creates that which others cannot, even under favorable circumstances and notwithstanding their special training.

A German writer has characterized this special gift, using the following comparisons:

> 'As two painters, given the same job, do it in a distinctive way, as two leaders performing the same piece obtain diverse results from their conducting of the same orchestra, as two cooks, using the same provisions to fulfill a special order, serve up dishes of various quality, as two heads of departments with an equal staff, two commanders with the same number of soldiers attain distinctive results, so, in like

> manner, does the economic ability tend to reach varying success in any organization that has been inaugurated with the aim of attaining a certain definite purpose.' [1]

Unfortunately, because of lack of knowledge or inculcated prejudice, many people ignore the useful social functions of the 'entrepreneur.' [2] Now that that social group has been eliminated in Russia by the new 'socialist system,' what has replaced it?

From what has been said, it is apparent that the economic organization of the Soviet Union does not provide for positions involving the psychology of the right of property ownership and business enterprise. Those who formulate and ratify the state plan and those who execute that plan are not entrepreneurs who might derive profit or suffer losses, depending on the success or failure of the undertaking, but civil servants. They receive salaries and carry out a plan of work not with an eye to profit but in conformity with the assignments they receive and with the economic policy and national goals of the ruling party or, more exactly, of its leaders. They do not bear even that responsibility which the regular general meeting of stockholders imposes upon the elected board of directors of stockholding companies, since, in the Soviet Union, there is no analogous meeting of persons concerned in the enterprise. Even the ratification of the plan by the Supreme Soviet is of purely formal character. Those who work out the plan are qualified civil servants responsible to their own chiefs. Those who manage state enterprises are also civil servants. Therefore, even the psychology of the so-called *khoziaistvenniki* (those persons occupying official positions in some aspect of the country's economy) is the psychology either of civil servants or of active party members, if they are at the same time party workers in responsible positions. The motives characteristic of the civil servant's behavior are ambition, the desire to work one's way up, to receive promotions or awards, fear of reprimands or penalization, apprehension of 'not being like.' A system of official dependence induces a certain accuracy in the fulfillment of assignments, to avoid responsibility for changes made of one's own accord. At worst, it encourages obsequiousness and a tendency for higher officials to pass res-

[1] E. Schwiedland, *Zur Sociologie des Unternehmentums*, 1933, s. 10.
[2] G. Guins and L. Zikman, *Op. cit.*, Introduction.

ponsibility on to lower ones or vice versa, or for some organizations in the economic set-up to pass responsibility on to others, using the devices of correspondence, inquiry, and reference from one executive to another. At best, *khoziastvenniki* display a certain sympathetic attitude toward the plans in project and Party enthusiasm. All this is typical of bureaucracy and the active membership of political parties and differs substantially from the psychological motivation of property owners and independent businessmen.

Chapter 3

COLLECTIVISM

State planning of the national economy, an economy without entrepreneurs, can succeed when it corresponds with the needs and material resources of the country. Even when sacrifices are demanded and privations involved, such a system can be successful if it can manage to arouse people's enthusiasm, but on that basis it is none too durable. Enthusiasm never lasts long. There are few people disposed to work for the future and to devote themselves to a common cause, sacrificing their interests in the present. There are also few people able to understand an over complicated program involving various reorganizations and constructions undertaken in the name of an abstract idea such as 'socialism' or 'communism'.

1. *Collectivism by coercion*

It seems hardly questionable that a great majority of people are individualists; at least it was so in Russia on the eve of the Revolution of 1917. Peasants, artisans, businessmen, people of the free professions, state officials and employees of all government offices and private enterprises—all those people who composed the majority of the population of the Russian Empire, were not at all prepared for collectivism. There has been, however, a widely spread delusion that Russian peasants were bred in collectivist psychology as members of village communes. The village communes were not, in fact, a prototype of the collective farms

established by the Soviets. They had nothing in common with the collective form of agricultural economy. Every peasant household in pre-revolutionary Russia had its plot of land which was exploited independently of the village commune. Every peasant family worked this plot at its own risk and using its own initiative. The land belonged to the village commune, but after each periodical reallotment, every household received several plots of land for a certain period, usually for about ten years, which were exploited by the peasants without any interference from outside. There was, therefore, no economic collectivism as regards exploitation of land. It is true that the conditions of life in the village commune demanded a certain mutual assistance and cooperation, but it did not exceed essentially the cooperation and mutual assistance which exists wherever people have mutual interests. It should be mentioned, moreover, that at the time of the revolution there were not only village communes in Russia but also about a million individual farmers. In addition some six million people had submitted petitions for individual farming and were eager to obtain complete emancipation from the village communes.

Collectivism existed to an even smaller degree among other social groups. Businessmen, tradesmen, and artisans are all individualists in that they are owners of enterprises which they exploit at their own risk. The conditions of their existence are more or less similar everywhere and the psychology of these people working for their own profit is, naturally, individualistic, even if they be devoted to their work and generous in donations for public needs. Workers and employees can hardly be characterized as collectivists. There is certainly an essential difference between their working conditions and those of artisans and peasants. Factory workers are hired and receive assignments and orders, their cooperation is obligatory and their interdependence unavoidable. Yet they are legally and economically independent of each other; each of them has his own job and his own share in the form of his wage. It is easier to unite workers to protect common interests, but, insofar as they are working for their employer, they are not collectivists.

Even more individualistic are the intellectuals—scholars, lawyers, physicians, writers, artists. They want and need independ-

ence to develop their talents and to carry out their individual plans and projects. This circle is the source of the most ardent fighters for individual freedom.

This description of Russian society should not be taken to mean that individualism was absolute there and reigned without limitations. Where there are collective interests, there is also cooperation, mutual assistance, and a certain amount of collectivism. Village communes and cooperatives educated Russian peasants in an understanding of the advantages of common enterprises, in solidarity and consciousness of social obligations, and in observation of discipline. A very popular organization in Russia was the artel. This was a voluntary organization of people who joined together for certain kinds of work and who owned the necessary implements. The artel was organized as a legal entity with a chairman (*starosta*) at its head. That kind of organization educates its members in the psychology of collectivist character to a greater extent than the ordinary cooperative. Among the leaders of the cooperative movement in Russia, there were people disinterestedly devoted to the idea of cooperation and its purpose of improving conditions. But certainly ordinary members of the cooperatives took part only if they derived profit therefrom.

There were idealists among the officials and members of the *zemstvo* (provincial and county self-government) who worked without sparing themselves for the welfare of the fatherland and population. The overwhelming majority of commissioned officers in the imperial army and navy were educated in the idea of justice without regard for social stratifications and protecting legal order and truth. The religious teachings of the Orthodox Church humbled egoist feelings and achievements. Social ideologies in turn arose in Russia which inspired people to undertake unselfish and generous work and even to make sacrifices for a common cause.

In spite of the conditions described, individualism in general prevailed, and on the eve of the February Revolution in 1917 the country expected and needed more economic and political freedom. This did not prevent Lenin and his followers, when they seized power, from carrying out their socialist program. They believed that 'zoological individualism' was not inherent in the psychology of people but was a product of private ownership

and of the exploitation, competition and struggle for existence, profit and wealth which characterized the capitalist system. As the materialist philosophy held that human morals and behavior are determined by the totality of productive relationships forming and characterizing the social-economic structure, it was thought that reorganization of the national economy and creation of a new socialist structure of social life would replace the individualist with a collectivist psychology. A new environment modifies human nature.

> 'Wild feelings and views,' wrote Stalin, 'are not so eternal as some people believe: there was a period of primitive communism, when private property did not exist; then the epoch of individualistic production followed, when private property became master of the feelings and minds of people; a new is coming, the time of socialist production—and it will not be a miracle if the feelings and minds of people become permeated with socialist aspirations.' [1]

This theory was not substantiated in actual practice. Peasants resisted actively and passively. At first, they resisted requisitions of products for city and factory supply; later they resisted collectivization. Workers violated discipline. Intellectuals did not wish to cooperate, and many of them joined anti-communist movements. The reorganization of the economic structure had been carried out by violence. Some social groups were exterminated, others subjugated. Private property was nationalized, private trade abolished, agricultural economy collectivized, free professions subjected to state control, but the individualist psychology and drive for freedom and independence stubbornly survived. Peasants were especially persistent. The Soviet press constantly points out that there are still survivals of the pre-revolutionary period and explains various crimes as evidence of these survivals. Opposition to the existing regime, at present mostly passive, takes the form not only of sabotage and negligence but also of subversive activity. As court trials, the penal code, and the concentration camps evince, not only peasants but also workers, state employees, members of the free professions, and even members of the Communist Party are among the non-

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[1] Stalin, *Sochinenia*, Vol. I, p. 338.

conformists and dissenters who cannot reconcile themselves with the socialist order and the new superstructure. The Soviet literary critics complain that the 'black' characters described in literary works seem to be more vital than the 'white'.

The persistence of the individualist psychology in Russia suggests that it may be a constant in human nature. Enthusiasm for building up socialism is lacking, because the State monopoly established in connection with the universal plan does not inspire people. The State and the People must not be identified. Such an identification exists in the constitution and some official documents for propaganda only. It has already been pointed out that the interests of the state do not coincide with the interests of the population. The average peasant will not agree that the existing regime improves the conditions of his life and that compulsory deliveries to the state have been established in his interest (see below, Chapter XVII). The average worker does not believe that he is one of the owners of all plants and factories because neither he himself nor the trade union to which he belongs can alter the conditions of labor. A non-party state employee remains a poor clerk at the mercy of his boss and the *partorg* (representative of the Party organization). On the other hand, the state itself emphasizes the fact that the interests of the population are satisfied at the expense of the state. For example, in contrast to the officially proclaimed identification of the Soviet state and its population, the authors of the Decree of December 14, 1947, declared the following:

> 'Carrying out the currency reform demands certain sacrifices. The state is taking upon itself the greater part of these sacrifices but it is necessary for the population to bear a part; all the more so since it will be the last sacrifice.'

Thus the State's sacrifices are opposed to those of the population.

It is very probable that at the beginning of the socialist construction, there was enthusiasm in certain groups of the population and devotion to the plan of industrialization. But such feelings are growing weaker and weaker. As time goes by, the urge to satisfy personal interests rather than to emphasize the public duty becomes more and more insistent.

2. *Contradictions*

The Soviet leaders are still faithful to the doctrinal precepts which they have inherited from their teachers. They believe that communist morality demands that the individual serve the collectivity and the masses: 'The basis of communist morality is the struggle for the strengthening and completion of the communist order.' [1]

> 'The moral right of the collectivity (is) to present to the individual the demands required by its interests, and the moral duty of the individual (is) to fulfill his obligations toward his class and people and to acknowledge the priority of the general interests of society before his own personal interests...' [2]

Contrasting communist morals with bourgeois morals, a Soviet writer states that the latter 'subordinate social interests to personal interests and consider any other resolution of the problem as suppression of the individual,' while communist morals emphasize the pre-eminence of the social interests. Correspondingly, the difference between 'capitalist' law and the law of the 'proletarian' state is characterized as follows:

> 'Capitalist law is based upon abstract "natural rights"; it places the person in the center of the world, surrounds him with a cult and therefore establishes the limits of the state ... however, the proletarian state sets the limits not upon itself but upon its citizens.' [3]

The Soviet regime has existed for about forty years. Has it educated people in conformity with the precepts of communist morals? On March 27, 1953, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted amnesty to non-political criminals. This measure was motivated by the 'devotion of the Soviet people to socialism and their conscious and honest concern in regard to their public duties.'

The Soviet writer M. Z. Selektor, in his article published in a Soviet philosophical magazine, asserts that:

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[1] Lenin. *Sochinenia*, 4th Ed. 1950. Vol. XXXI, pp. 217–219.

[2] G. Gak, 'Voprosy etiki v Marksistsko-Leninskom mirovozrenii,' *Bolshevik*, May, 1948. No. 9, pp. 25–40.

[3] Malitsky, *Sovetskoe gosudarstvennoe pravo*, Kharkov 1926, p. 14. Cf. M. M. Agarkov, 'Osnovnye printsipy Sovetskogo grazhdanskogo prava,' *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1947, p. 35.

> "... workers of our (Soviet) country, incited by their devotion to the Soviet fatherland and a sense of public duty, are carrying on a struggle against everything that impedes the development of Soviet society, and give themselves up wholly to the great cause of building up communism.'

He characterizes the Soviet people as ideal collectivists:

> 'Supreme fidelity to the socialist fatherland, a new attitude toward public property and work, faithfulness to public duty and collectivism, internationalism incompatible either with nationalism and chauvinism, or with cosmopolitanism, socialist humanism uniting devotion to all working people with hatred for the oppressors and exploiters—such are the noble traits characterizing the moral physiognomy of the Soviet people.'
>
> 'For the Soviet people a matter of public concern is, at the same time, their personal concern.' [1]

However, the same writer refers to 'the remnants of bourgeois ideology and survivals of private ownership psychology and morals', whose manifestations he observes

> 'in antisocial, antigovernmental acts, damaging the building up of communism' ... against which the Soviet court has to carry on a struggle: Misappropriations of socialist property, malicious violations of state and labor discipline, hooliganism, and other anti-social acts.'

His description of Soviet reality does not conceal that

> 'Soviet law directs the whole strength of its penal repression against spies, diversionists, traitors, misappropriators of state property, gangsters, and murderers.' [2]

The rich collection of crimes just listed is not the only evidence of the discrepancy between the official versions of the remarkable traits of the Soviet people and gloomy reality. The most convincing evidence is that the post-Stalin domestic policy has been forced to retreat because of the crisis in agricultural economy, a

[1] M. Z. Selektor, 'Pravo i nravstvennost". *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 2, 1954, pp. 73–74; 77; 83.

[2] Op. cit., p. 81. This article is similar to a number of others on the same subject. For example, S. Kovalev in his article 'Communist education of workers and liquidation of the survivals of capitalism in the people's consciousness" (*Sov. Gos. i Pravo*, 1947, No. 5, pp. 9–22) asserts at first that 'Individualism and egoism are alien to the masses of the Soviet people' and later lists shirkers, idlers, grafters, and other people among the bearers of pre-revolutionary psychology.

result of lack of enthusiasm for collectivism and the peasantry's passive resistance to socialist pressure.

3. *Concessions to individualism*

After the first several years of the 'militant communism' stage of the Soviet regime, it became necessary to retreat and let the people 'enrich themselves.' This was the period of relative economic freedom, the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP). That period proved to be the richest in both prosperity and cultural achievements. The next period, the period of industrialization and collectivization, transformed Russia into a great industrial and militarized power, but it demanded the application of ruthless measures to 'reeducate' the people in the spirit of collectivism. Repressions alone were not sufficient. Coercive reeducation was not efficient enough. Some concessions to individualist incentives were indispensable. In order to increase labor productivity, it was necessary to satisfy the personal interests of workers and to improve their living conditions. In order to eliminate larceny and misappropriation of state property, it was necessary to provide for people's existence, to supply them with necessities and other commodities. However, the Soviet government could not do so on a large scale without sacrificing its main goal of rapidly increasing the industrial potential of the country predestined to become the 'Stronghold of Socialism.' It had to limit its concessions to a system of encouragements and rewards for the most devoted or most eager servants of socialism.

In 1931, Stalin proclaimed the abolition of *uravnilovka* (levelling of wages). Since that time there has been increasing differentiation in compensation. A system of bonuses, premiums, and various rewards was introduced, connected with privileges of a material character and with the formation of upper strata of the population. [1] With the aid of penalties and rewards, the Soviet government succeeded in improving labor discipline and efficiency but not in reeducating people in the spirit of collectivism. On the

[1] The Soviet system of penalties and rewards from the legal and social point of view is described by G. Guins, *Soviet Law and Soviet Society*, pp. 173–181. See also W. W Kulski, *The Soviet Regime*, Syracuse University Press, 1954, parts 3 and 4.

contrary, the contrasts between luxury and extreme poverty gave birth to various abuses of privileged conditions and power, increased crimes against both socialist and personal property rights, and corrupted the morals of some groups of the population living in prosperity and comfort. All these negative phenomena are characterized in the Soviet press as the 'survivals' of capitalism.

Soviet writers continue to assert that there is no contradiction between personal and public interests in the socialist system, that this system, on the contrary, guarantees the highest harmony between the interests of the individual and society. This motif became especially popular after Stalin's death when the government started its desperate drive to overcome the agricultural crisis and to encourage greater productivity and efficiency of labor in general. It was necessary, for that purpose, to make more concessions to individualistic trends, and, at the same time, to show that this was not a retreat from socialist positions.

It was acknowledged in the Resolutions of the plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of September, 1953, and February, 1954, that there was an admitted violation of the reasonable correlation between the public and personal interests in kolkhoz economy. The Central Committee called to mind Lenin's instruction that 'the material interest of every individual enterprise and of every particular worker in the results of work is one of the fundamental principles of socialist economy.[1] The leading organ of the Party noted that 'the principle of material interests has been applied successfully in regard to production of cotton, sugar beets, tea, citrus and some other cultures, but disregarded in such more important branches of agriculture as animal husbandry and production of vegetables and potatoes.'

> 'The material interest of kolkhozes and kolkhoz workers was not sufficiently stimulated ... and as a result ... animal husbandry and production of vegetables and potatoes lagged behind.' [2]

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[1] *Pravda*, September 15, 1953.

[2] T. G. Grigorian, 'O sootnoshenii lichnykh i obshchestvennykh interesov', *Voprosy Filosopfii*, No. 2, 1954, pp. 131–32; the same problem has been discussed by I. V. Pavlov, 'Nekotorye voprosy sovetskoi pravovoi nauki' (*Sov. Gos. i Pravo*, No. 7, 1953, pp. 14–27); I. Glotov, 'Printsip materialnoi zainteresovannosti-rychag moshchnogo pod'iema selskogo khoziastva' (*Kommunist*, January, 1954, pp. 70–87); G. Glezerman, 'Pravilnoe sootnoshenie obshchestvennykh i lichnykh interesov-neobkhodimoe uslovie stroitelstva kommunisma' (*Kommunist*, No. 4, 1954, pp. 22–37).

Khruschev, the main engineer of the consolidation of kolkhozes, which completely eliminated the individual farmer in the new organization of a large scale kolkhoz, now brings out the significance of individual economy:

> 'Only those who do not understand Party policy, the policy of the Soviet state,' he said in his report to the September session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 'might think that possession, within the limits of norms established by the charter of the agricultural artel, of the productive cattle by a kolkhoz household in some way threatens the socialist regime.' [1]

Within a short period of time, from September 1953 to March 1954, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued a series of decrees which provided that material profit be given for greater production through collective effort and through individual labor on the house and garden plots on the part of members of kolkhozes. Compulsory deliveries have been lowered, while prices for the contributions of livestock, potatoes, vegetables, and some industrial crops have been raised. Peasants have more products at their disposal for their own needs and for selling on the market for the highest possible price. Higher prices for vegetables and fruits in winter and spring encourage saving and preserving. The new law of August 8, 1953, concerning agricultural taxation, lowered taxation on the production of private households of kolkhoz farmers on the condition that they observe the established minimum of labor days for the kolkhoz. [2]

The new regulations are undoubtedly favorable for peasants and may stimulate their endeavors. The problem is whether they are adequate and permanent. [3]

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[1] N. S. Krushchev, *O merakh dalneishego razvitia selskogo khoziaistva SSSR*. Doklad na Plenume TsK KPSS, 3 Sent. 1953. Gospolitizd. 1953, p. 29.

[2] I. V. Vasiliev, 'Novyi zakon o selskokhoziastvennom naloge v SSR.' *Sov. Gos. i Pravo*, No. 6, 1953, pp. 15–25.

[3] Directives of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. iussed on March 10, 1956 (See below ch. XVIII, 1) have emphasized again collectivist trends.

Part II

"SOCIALIST" REALITY

The Soviet economic system, a system based on fallacious ideas, did not bear out expectations or justify sacrifices. The state national economic plan proved to be better on paper than in practice. National economy is so complicated and depends on so many factors—climatic, psychological and organizational—that numerous mistakes, discrepancies, and miscalculations are inevitable. Moreover, the state economic plan requires centralization, but, even under the very best conditions, extreme centralization of the administration of the national economy in a huge nation leads inevitably to excessive bureaucracy.

Abolition of private property and liquidation of individual economic enterprises in connection with the nationalization of all branches of national economy deprives the nation of very valuable enterpreneur activity and of a school of practical education in which people learn careful calculation, thrift, and industriousness. Finally the installation of collectivism by compulsion is contrary to the psychology of average people and cannot be brought about without ruthless measures. These in turn engender various fraudulent acts against the existing order and lower the morals of people instead of raising them.

As a result the socialist reality presents a very disappointing picture.

Chapter 4

BUREAUCRACY

The administrative apparatus of the national economy in the U.S.S.R. is monstrously cumbersome. There are in the Soviet Union about five hundred ministries, including those of the constituent Union Republics and Autonomous Republics, and an enormous number of various government agencies.

1. The Enormous Apparatus

In 1924, when the federal government of the Soviet Union was established, there were in Moscow only ten People's Commissariats (now ministries). In 1936, the number of commissariats in the central government apparatus increased to eighteen: Defense, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Railways, Postal and Electrical Communications, Water Transportation, Heavy Industry, Defense Industry, Food Industry, Light Industry, Timber Industry, Agriculture, State Grain and Livestock Farms, Finance, Internal Trade, Domestic Affairs, Justice, and Public Health. The last ten were called Union-Republican Commissariats as they coordinated the activity of the same commissariats of the Union Republics.

Since that time, and especially since the end of World War II, the central apparatus has expanded more and more. During the short period from 1945 to 1946, more than twenty-five ukazes were issued, reorganizing the central apparatus of the U.S.S.R. The People's Commissariats were renamed Ministries and the central government was enormously enlarged and transformed into an extremely powerful bureaucratic machine comprising fifty-eight ministries. It was hardly possible to explain the organization of a number of Ministries, in particular that of the ministries: two of Oil Industry, two of Coal Industry, two of Fishing Industry (always one for the Eastern and the other for the Western regions) as purely administrative acts. It was more comprehensible in connection with the Soviet tendency to control the economy of satellites and the further expansion of the sphere of Soviet influence anticipated at that time.

For various reasons the organization of the central government underwent constant revision. In February, 1947, the Supreme Soviet approved the ukazes issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet concerning the establishment of the fifteen ministries. Six weeks later, on the fourth of April, still another ministry, the Ministry of Forest Economy, was established, and such changes continued incessantly.

An acquaintance with the organization of ministries in the U.S.S.R. is not easy because of constant changes. Now one ministry is divided into several, now, on the other hand, several

ministries are united into one, and all this not infrequently takes place within a period of several months.

In the year of Stalin's death, there were 48 ministries, 4 committees, and ten assistants of the Chairman of the Council of Ministries of the U.S.S.R. The numerous ministries did not take part, it must be assumed, in deciding the most important political questions. It is more than probable that such questions were decided by the Chairman (Premier) and his assistants, who were almost all at the same time members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, of the highest organ of the Communist Party. The higher administration of the state was thus concentrated in the Chairman and his assistants; it is impossible otherwise to imagine action by a government consisting of sixty persons.

After Stalin's death the number of ministries was reduced to 26 and the number of the assistants to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers was reduced. Malenkov motivated this reorganization as already projected before Stalin's death: it seemed to be not only more convenient from the administrative point of view but also more economical. Appropriations for the 1953 payrolls of the central apparatus of the Soviet government were decreased six and a half billion roubles as compared with 1952. The reform proved, however, to be unsuccessful. Beginning in June, 1953, several new ministries began to be created and new assistants to the Chairman appointed.

In April 1954 at the final meeting of the first session of the newly elected Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev, speaking on the subject of the establishment of new ministries, declared that,

> 'As experience has shown, ministries under which a large number of undertakings are consolidated cannot efficiently cope with the problems of management. Therefore, we have recognized it as expedient to divide the consolidated ministries into several units.'

The Supreme Soviet confirmed the new composition of the Council of Ministers. The highest administrative organ of the Soviet Union was restored to the same form it had during the Stalin period. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers and his deputies and vice-chairmen are the real ruling group as the majority of these ten people are at the same time members of

the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Besides the ministries of the U.S.S.R., there are also ministries of the Union Republics and of the Autonomous Republics, amounting to several hundreds of ministries in all, and this profusion of central organizations is entirely natural. In point of fact, every branch of the economy on the territory of a state of such enormous size and of such complex population and geographical conditions makes it requisite that some special central office be available. This central authority plans and directs the economic organizations or undertakings in its jurisdiction (either directly or by means of corresponding agencies in the republics), calculates expenditures, furnishes information, and controls the establishments under its jurisdiction throughout the whole extent of the country. Under such conditions, every kind of industry could have a separate ministry. When matters become too complicated, the chief of the ministry cannot actually direct all the departments and he is forced to delegate responsibility to his assistants, who thereby virtually become ministers themselves, without, however, any independence of activity.

Yet, if this plenitude of central establishments is unavoidable, then the abundant paper-work that accompanies it is also unavoidable. A great many questions touch upon the fields of interest and competence of several offices. The activity of one is tightly bound up with the activity of the other. Sometimes it is a matter of securing machinery or machinery parts, sometimes raw materials are needed, sometimes deliveries are delayed, sometimes there is a lack of fuel, etc. Then an unavoidable exchange of letters takes place, inquiries to which, not infrequently, unsatisfactory answers are received, and so there follow repeated inquiries and the inter-office correspondence grows and grows. When a question is under dispute or a decision involves some difficulty or risk, correspondence is also used in order to delay the decision or to transfer the responsibility to some other office or person.

The increase of central institutions is matched by an increase of local ones as well. Each of the All-Union Ministries has representation in the Union Republics. *Trests* are under the jurisdiction of the ministries of economy. Each Union Republic ministry has under its jurisdiction a corresponding ministry in

the Union Republic and each Union Ministry has a corresponding ministry in the Autonomous Republics under its juridiction. The personnel staffs of these establishments are swollen with people. Besides that, there are frequent cases of duplication of work on account of the existence of several agencies occupied with one and the same matter. A number of examples taken from official Soviet sources were cited in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Vol. VI, 29, p. 20–21, Sept, 1, 1954):

> 'In Kiev, there are six city hotels, eleven public bathhouses, and seven barbershops and service enterprises. One would expect the administration to be quite capable of directly supervising these enterprises. However, in addition to this administration, there can also be found here a hotel trust, a bathhouse and laundry trust. Surely it must be clear to the Kiev City Soviet Executive Committee that these are superfluous and unnecessary.'
>
> 'Frequently an administration has more officials than actual workers.'
>
> 'As is known, there is no oil production in Moscow, but this does not prevent the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Oil Industry from maintaining twenty-one supply organizations in the capital at a tidy cost.'
>
> 'The U.S.S.R. Ministry of the Lumber Industry sent all its lumber enterprises instructions ... called for filling in 118 different forms containing more than 40,000 indexes! —for example: How many days off, holiday and sick leave, did horses in lumber enterprise transport units have during the quarter?'

A number of similar examples could be cited. Soviet newspapers are full of them. The government was worrying about the overgrown apparatus:

> 'Within the past few years, in the capital of Estonia, a number of state institutions and organizations have come into being the utility of whose existence arouses serious doubts. It is entirely unclear as to what most of them are concerned with and what good they do.'(*Izvestia*, 'Swollen Payrolls,' August 28, 1954, p. 2).

> 'In the fishery belonging to the Dzerzhin mine, there is a director, a bookkeeper, and a secretary in charge of management ,a loading chief, two drivers, and ten laborers for fifteen fishermen. The same situation is probably to be found in

other places as well.' (*Krokodil*, August 20, 1954, No. 23, p. 4, with accompanying cartoon).

From the time that industrialization and collectivization were carried out and the national economy of the Soviet Union was put under central control, increase in the numbers of state employees has been a chronic phenomenon. Soviet newspapers have periodically pointed out and still do point out this fact and one can easily find examples with almost the same content, referring to the pre-war and postwar periods.

A cumbersome administrative apparatus and a certain amount of bureaucracy are characteristic of large-scale enterprises under capitalist economy also, but the large concerns of the capitalist world are independent of the state, make decisions of their own accord on important issues, employ experienced people to manage the work and, to avoid difficulties of a financial nature, consolidate their undertakings vertically and horizontally for the purpose of self-sufficiency in supply and limitation of competition. They cannot, however, entirely avoid competition; they do bear risk and, for that reason, are always concerned about cutting the costs of production. Soviet economy has none of these checks to counteract bureaucratization, and its economic apparatus is typically that of state function with all the negative traits of bureaucracy. The psychology of entrepreneurs degenerates; the psychology of the civil servant contaminates the economic atmosphere. Positions in the administrative apparatus offer various advantages, principally because in such positions the risk of responsibility is less, and employees gather like flies about the administrative apparatus of 'socialist economy'.

'Socialist property', Soviet-style, has surrendered the economy of the country into the hands of state employees, of people whose psychology is that of the civil servant.

2. The paper-flood

The Soviet press periodically begins a campaign against bureaucracy. Even *Krokodil* has devoted entire issues to this malady of the Soviet regime (in this connection a particularly significant issue was No. 27, September 30, 1953, published on the eve of the nineteenth convention of the Party), but the malady remains

incurable. It has arisen as a consequence of universal monopoly and the centralization connected with it. When faced with a plan dictated from above, there is some risk in showing initiative or in making any independent decisions and the fulfillment of the plan is undertaken by a large number of establishments and persons. Production on paper often takes the place of actual work.

In the thirties, Soviet newspapers made special note of the swollen payrolls of economic establishments and the disproportionate growth of office staffs and administrative personnel at the expense of operations personnel. On an average, there were 100 government employees to every 420 laborers. In 1954, the Minister of State Control of the R.S.F.S.R. indignantly pointed out that in the Ministry of Communal Economy there are 138 chiefs to 348 ordinary employees. (*Sovietskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 6, 1954, p. 17–18).

Such over-staffing with administrative and office personnel is explained not only by the fact that people wish to avoid responsibility or to live in the city and enjoy greater comforts, but also by the system itself, which requires an incredible amount of paper work, sometimes 40 per cent of the whole working time.

Almost every day Soviet papers criticize red tape and an abnormal distribution of technical personnel, clearly in favor of paper work at the expense of production work.

The more people working in offices, the more paper-work produced and the more extended becomes the procedure for the practical solution of current problems. Complaints of this kind have constantly appeared in the Soviet press for at least ten years.

> 'Kuzbasugol is not carrying out the coal production plan. One engineer on the staff proposed a new method of increasing the efficiency of the work. However, his project got pigeonholed in the offices of the Combine and the Ministry of the Coal Industry of the Eastern Areas and never got out.' (*Izvestia*, October 23, 1946).

In another article, under the title 'About One Plant and Two Ministries,' *Pravda* relates how the most pressing problems of the Lipetsk tractor factory are not solved either in the factory or in the ministries. The management asks for instructions, but to no avail. (*Pravda*, January 10, 1947).

The tractor factory in Vladimir constantly lags behind. One of the top members of the staff complains:

> 'We cannot work; we have continual conferences and answer innumerable questionnaires. On Sunday, March 30, for instance, we had three conferences and consultations, which continued from morning till late at night.'

An interesting example of the red tape in the bureaucratic management of industry is described in the editorial of *Izvestia* on April 25, 1947:

> 'In 1946, according to the Control Bureau, a factory in Omsk contacted the Ministry of Local Industry of the R.S.F.S.R. 23 times by mail and telegraph asking for raw materials and offering different plans for increasing and improving production. Several telegrams proved to be lost in the Ministry; the others were never answered, in spite of repeated requests.'

After examination it was established that the Ministry of Local Production of the R.S.F.S.R. received more than 200,000 different requests and letters during 1946. Of that number two-thirds were duplicates, i.e. repeated requests.

It might be interesting to know how Soviet industry overcame its defects during the War. For the period of the War we have no data or production reports. Still, the successful prosecution of the war leads one to think that on the industrial front matters were no worse than on the military front. How can this be explained? It is very probable that during the war production was adjusted to war needs and simplified to the greatest degree and that the bureaucratic machine spent its strength and significance. Not so many instructions and circulars were published, not so many hundreds of pages of reports were written, but each plant was afire with the desire to give as much as possible and to work as best it could for the defense of the fatherland. The initiative of managers had greater vent, and competion in price and quality was replaced by patriotic rivalry. But all the evils and the red tape revived after the war and became an organic peculiarity of the Soviet apparatus.

In 1954, Khrushchev reported to the Supreme Soviet that the Riazan machine-construction plant's directorate had received from the Ministry of Machine Construction 2,580 directives and

had sent out 10,250 communications of various sorts. The executive Council of the Kuibyshev Regional Soviet had, during the previous year, sent out about 12,000 instructions, directives, and telegrams. (*Pravda*, April 27, 1954).

The Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Kaganovich, in his report to the All-Union conference of railroad transportation criticized the system of work of the Ministry of Communications and informed the conference that 'during 1953, the Ministry issued 1.5 million papers and 12 million telegrams. The Ministry uses up 40 puds of paper (one pud—36 pounds avoirdupois) per day.' 'Such a stream of paper,' Kaganovich said,' is an evidence of excessive centralization.' (*Trud*, May 25, 1954).

In order to decrease the 'paper work,' the Soviet government decided to diminish the staff of the existing institutions of the government. Corresponding measures were evidently discussed in the spring of 1954, when members of the government publicly criticized the existing practice. It was clear also from the Soviet newspapers:

> 'Simplification of the structure ministries, departments and institutions, reduction in gradations of leadership, elimination of parallelism in work and abolition of unnecessary links will not only save billions of roubles but will release tens of thousands of highly skilled specialists for production, will bring guidance closer to the localities and more effectively influence the progress of work.' (*Izvestia*, July 17, 1954).

The government began to transfer more than 80,000 agronomists, engineers, mechanics ,and other groups of workers to new state-farms and kolkhozes on virgin soil. Khrushchev informed the Supreme Soviet about this measure at its April 1954 session. Since November 1954 a systematic reorganization of the ministries and their local agencies has been in process on a wide scale.

> '... the Soviet government has started wholesale dismissals of Soviet civil servants because of the "muddle" in the bureaucracy.' The disclosure came in the form of a dispatch in the official Soviet Communist newspaper *Pravda*.
>
> 'A harmful, bureaucratic practice has established itself in some links of the state apparatus,' *Pravda* said. 'Fundamental attention... is being concentrated not upon the concrete and live task of organizing the working masses ... but upon

> the drafting of various and numerous directives, resolutions, references, letters, and accounts.
>
> This leads to muddle, red tape, and irresponsibility.' (*San Francisco Chronicle*, November 21, 1954).

The new measures will hardly be of any help because the state apparatus frequently does not satisfy the requirements of its mission, as *Pravda*, competent in questions of this sort, testifies:

> 'There are people among the personnel of government and industry whose attitude towards the decisions of the Party and government is a formal one lacking in any sense of responsibility. They don't show any alacrity in their work and they don't care whether the work goes poorly whether the interests of the country are being harmed.' (*Pravda*, Editorial, August 26, 1954).

Evidently before releasing a large number of state officials, the administration prepared lists of those whose release could be ordered without loss to administrative work.

In its article about the initiation of the campaign to purge the overcrowded apparatus of the administration of its superfluous elements, *Pravda* recommends that the persons released be correctly utilized:

> 'Heads of ministries and departments, Party, Soviet and administrative organizations must see to it that the released officials are transferred to industrial and agricultural enterprises, constructions and transport services in a carefully planned manner. It is necessary to avoid decisively mistakes committed in the past, such as the transfer of officials from one administrative organization to another, instead of into really productive work after decreasing managerial staffs.
>
> The measures now being carried out to reorganize ministries and departments, to cut down administrative staffs are only the first steps in fundamentally improving the work of the state apparatus.' (*Pravda*, 'for Further Improvement of the State Apparatus, 'November 20, 1954).

What the next steps will be in 'fundamentally improving' the state apparatus is still not clear. No matter what measures will be undertaken, they will not be effective. An ultra-centralized apparatus cannot help but be bureaucratic and the apparatus of an economy based on 'universal monopoly' cannot help but be monstrously cumbersome. The failure of the attempt in 1953

to reduce the number of ministries gives evidence that the existing system demands a monstrous apparatus. If the national economy is controlled from the center by 56 ministries, whose close interdependence requires a constant exchange of correspondence and who can only function on adequate information from all local agencies, then 'red-tape' cannot be eliminated. [1] The measure undertaken by the 'collective leadership' are only a palliative.

Chapter 5

ACHIEVEMENTS AND SHORTCOMINGS IN INDUSTRY

Industralization of the Russian Empire became, after the unsuccessful Crimean War of 1855–56, an evident and urgent necessity. This campaign brought to light the inadequacy of the transportation system, the lack of railroads, the unsatisfactory means of supplying an army, and a poor sanitary system. The gifted Russian chemist, Mendelyeev, in his book *Towards an Understanding of Russia* (*K Poznaniiu Rossii*) proved conclusively that the future well-being of Russia demanded that special attention be paid to the development of industry. An agricultural country, he explained, feeds the industrial countries and occupies a position subservient to them. An increase in agricultural products while industry was still undeveloped would have led to a drop in wheat prices and Russia would have become dependent on foreign products. That is why the further development of national industry together with improvement in the living conditions of the peasants would, according to Mendelyeev, have been the best answer to the problems of the Russian peasant economy and national independence.

Russia did, in fact, take steps in that direction. Many non-Russian authors are surprised to learn how far Russian science had advanced and how rapidly the development of Russian industry was progressing before the revolution. With respect to

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[1] 'The number of various directors, supervisors and assistants has been reduced more than half. However, they still comprise a rather high percentage of the entire staff... Formerly there were two senior specialists for every specialist. Now, although the proportion is at least inverted, there remain two senior specialists for every three rank-and-file specialists ('How Reorganization of a Ministry Apparatus is Progressing'. *Izvestia*, Febr. 24, 1955. p. 2).

Russian industrial progress, Lenin, in his book, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* [1] pointed out that toward the close of the nineteenth century Russia's industrial development was progressing much more rapidly than anywhere else in Europe. Between 1898, when Lenin wrote his book, and the Revolution of 1917, Russia had made still greater economic progress. During the nine years between the Russo-Japanese War and World War I alone, production output had been doubled in Russia.

In spite of her general backward state, pre-war Russia's industrial production was exceeded in Europe only by Great Britain, Germany and France. [2] In many branches Russian industry was excellently equipped and its products excelled foreign products. [3]

In spite of the success of its industrial development, Russia was still not strong enough in comparison with highly industrialized Germany with her shorter distances and widely developed railroads. World War I shattered the Russian economy and undermined the prestige of the government. Then came the revolution, the communist experiment, the civil war and the terrible famine of 1921–1922 when the country was ravaged and reduced to poverty. It became imperative to make up for lost time, to work at a greatly accelerated tempo, and it was for these objectives that the five-year plans were formulated.

The project of transforming the country of peasants into a stronghold of socialism coincided thus with the historical trends of the economic development of the Eurasian empire. With the five-year plans the great industrial revolution began in Russia.

1. *Five Year Plans*

The accomplishments in the field of industry cannot be denied. They are acknowledged by impartial experts. 'Russia became in 1950 the second most powerful nation in the world.' [4]

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[1] V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, International Publishers, N.Y. 1936, Vol. I, pp. 219–389.

[2] Cf. N. Bazili, *Russia Under Soviet Rule.* London, Allen and Unwin 1938, p. 269.

[3] Professor V. I. Grinevetsky *Post-War Prospectives of Russian Industry*, (in Russian) Moscow 1922 pp. 7–8, 17–18, 28 and 76.

[4] Cf. Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, Prentice-Hall, New York, 2nd Ed. 1954. Chapter XV.

In appraising the achievements of the Soviet Five-Year Plans, one must take into consideration some peculiarities of the legal and economic order created by the Soviet regime. The centralization of all industrial management in the hands of the state secures complete control over reorganization; all state resources may be utilized and manpower mobilized for the realization of the most complicated projects.

The Soviet state has a monopoly on all foodstuffs and other commodities and can set the prices, thus making the people pay for all state expenditures and losses. This would not have been possible in pre-revolutionary Tsarist Russia with its representative system and the requirement that the state's budget be approved by the House of Representatives (*Duma*). And, finally, the Soviet Regime has made feasible its enormous industrial program by arbitrarily determining wages and using the practically free labor of *lishentsy* (disfranchised persons) and concentration camp inmates. Such conscription of labor would never have been possible before the October Revolution of 1917. It would have been contradictory to the principles of Tsarist progressive labor legislation and would have aroused a veritable storm of indignation in all parts of the country.

The Soviet government, controlling not only all material resources, but also all scientific, technological and physical facilities of the country, is in a position to conscript science itself to the service of the State.

The industrialization of Russia, as the Soviet government accomplished it, was mainly the result of the complete subjugation to the State of all the forces of the country-material, physical and intellectual. But it was also the result of a great urge for 'construction', which had inflamed the dynamic forces of the nation and created enthusiasm and readiness for self-sacrifice.

However, such circumstances are none too durable when maintained by a special system of penalties and rewards. And even a system of artificial incentive will eventually become ineffective if the economic system engenders bureaucracy and causes so many insuperable difficulties that people lose confidence in the economic system itself.

In a great number of cases, civil servants display an attitude toward their work which is harmful to the economic structure.

It often happens that an official considers that his duty has been fulfilled in a proper way if he writes a resolution or forwards a document he has received to another agency ('The Worshippers of Resolutions,' *Izvestia*, August 24, 1954).

> 'A number of Soviet and administrative agencies have not yet overcome the bureaucratic practice of concentrating basic manpower not on the concrete and actual work of carrying out Party and governmental directives, but on filling up papers...' (Article by N. M. Vasiliev, Minister of State Control of the Russian Republic. *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 6, 1954, p. 18.

In anxiety to 'please the boss' by fulfilling or overfulfilling plans quantitatively, industrial bureaucracy spares neither materials nor expenses. The several most recent examples cited in chapter I are not exceptional. For twenty years the same data and the same complaints have appeared in Soviet newspapers.

2. *Industrial losses*

The reports and speeches of Soviet officials contain the following data for 1938: In the automobile industry the loss through rejections was 305 million roubles; according to the Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy, in 1938 the losses from rejections amounted to 383 million roubles, or 5.5 per cent, by the time production was completed. At the Ufa plant rejections are 20 per cent of the cost of production, at the 'Stankolit' plant 19 per cent, at the 'Sharikopodshipnik' plant 11 per cent, and so forth.

The industry of the All-Union Commissariat of Machinery had no quality indexes and, as a result the year of 1938 ended with a deficit of 28 million in heavy industry alone. At the Dniepro-Petrovsk plant defects were 40 per cent of the entire production of the plant. Because of losses from defects, the cost of production in the metallurgical industry, instead of falling according to the plan for 1938, rose 3.5 per cent.

The post-war data concerning the Soviet economy exactly repeats what was already familiar to everybody who had been acquainted with the Soviet system of the pre-war period. The People's Commissar of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R., Poskonin, in a

report to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic on the budget for 1945 (a special supplement to the Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet No. 35, June 1945), cited some very revealing figures as examples of mismanagement. He mentioned that the glass-works of the Republic suffered enormous losses in breakage and defective articles in 1944. At the 'Red May' glass-works 35 per cent of the glass produced was defective or broken. The cost price of some products fluctuated even as much as 100 per cent.

The Commissar mentioned losses in the textile, light, and timber industries as being especially grave. Enormous losses have an adverse effect on the welfare of the population, make any basic rise in workers' wages impossible, and ruin the country. Exploitation in the Soviet Union is the result produced by the system itself. The losses and overhead expenses of a state enterprise are always higher than those of private enterprise. The private owner tries to save every penny and simplify management as much as possible.

During the discussion of the budget for 1946, 'mismanagement losses, waste of raw materials, unfinished products, fuel, and electricity; defective products; stoppages' were pointed out, just as before (in a speech by Deputy Kuliev, for example).

According to the report of the Minister of Finance, Zverev, losses for 1946 amounted to 333,537.000 roubles. Losses from defective manufacture at the plants of the Ministry of the Transtation Machine Industry for seven moths of 1946 amounted to 130 million roubles and non productive expenditures totalled 57 million roubles. In seven months of 1946 the enterprises of the Ministry of the Automobile Industry had losses from defective manufacture amounting to 65,300,000 roubles and nonproductive expenditures of 46,200,000 roubles. (*Moscow News*, October 19, 1946).

The chairman of the Budget Commission pointed out in his report that the net cost of production in the Kokand stocking spinning combine almost doubled in two years. There are tremendous losses also in the fishing industry during both the processing and transporting of fish products. (*Pravda*, October 17, 1946). Because of the high losses the level of accumulation of capital was too low.

In 1946 Deputy Volchkov initiated in the Supreme Soviet a

plan to prosecute those responsible for defective products on charges of 'embezzlement of state money and materials.' [1]

Undoubtedly squandering of materials and defective manufacture are not the exception, but a widespread phenomenon, if they are discussed in the Supreme Soviet and if Draconian measures are proposed in order to eliminate them. In fact, mention of considerable losses from the above-mentioned failings of the productive system has become a daily phenomenon. At a meeting of the Supreme Soviet during the discussion of the State budget, the Minister of Finance Zverev cited the following facts:

> 'Losses from defective manufacture at a Moscow factory of the Ministry of Tank Construction exceeded 300,000 roubles, or 3.7 per cent of the net cost. Nonproductive expenses amounted to 117,000 roubles. As a result oft hese facts and because of nonobservance of proper technical procedure, the net cost of production exceeded estimates by almost 12 per cent.'
>
> 'During the second quarter of 1946 the metallurgical plant at Chusovaya exceeded its estimated consumption by more than 7,000 tons of iron ore at the blast-furnace and more than 2,000 tons of metal at the rolling mill.'
>
> 'During the third quarter of 1946 the Kalinin factory of the Ministry of Light Industry of the U.S.S.R., which produces substitutes for leather, used about 150 tons of different materials in excess of its estimated consumption, including 28 tons of caoutchouc.'
>
> 'Losses at factory No. 632 are 7.3 per cent. As for administrative expenses, at the latter factory they were 30 kopecks per unit of production, while at factory No. 643 they were one rouble 58 kopecks.' (*Izvestia*, Feb. 21, 1947. Report by Minister of Finance Zverev.)

Such a collection of evidence of uneconomical production might be endlessly continued. The same Zverev reported to the Supreme Soviet in April, 1954, the incessant increase of losses in the lumber industry, from 1,4 billion roubles in 1951, to 2,2 billion roubles in 1953, and the great losses in coal and metal production.

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[1] A similar measure was offered for another purpose: 'It is time to initiate harsh measures against the managers who do not meet their obligations to other factories.' (*Izvestia*, April 28, 1946).

3. Low Quality and High Cost Production

It is no wonder that, because of overexpenditures and high nonproductive expenses, the net cost of products very often exceeds the amount estimated in the plan. For example, according to the data of the same Minister, a harvesting machine at factory No. 81 of the Ministry of Agriculture Machine Construction costs twice the amount provided for by the plan.

The cost of producing one ton of coal in the enterprises of the Coal Industry of the Western Areas in 1945 was 12 roubles 65 kopecks higher than the planned figure. In 1946 the production cost of one ton of coal was still higher. During the first half of 1946 the production of a crate of glass at the Gorki glass factory cost 89 roubles as against 45 roubles provided for in the plan, etc.

In order to avoid the unpleasantness connected with overexpenditures, some plants sacrifice quality for quantity and produce, for example, scythes of such a small size that they are practically useless. (*Pravda*, October 19, 1946, No. 249).

Early in 1948 (*Izvestia*, No. 89) there began a series of prosecutions of engineers, factory and plant managers and assistants indicted for production of bad quality. Engineer Vikhota of the Grodno factory was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for production of poor quality bicycles during a long period; in Leningrad a chief engineer, Malinovsky, was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for producing low quality felt boots (*valenki*) the manager of the Totsk Bakery in the Chkalov region was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for baking low grade bread. At the same time Yashunin, the director of the sewing factory in Moscow, Smirnov, the technical instructor of the same factory, and Nikitin, the chief of technical control, were indicted for turning out poor quality work. Simultaneously the General Prosecutor's office instructed all its local organs to prosecute mercilessly all those responsible for inferior manufacture.

However, it is scarcely possible to improve industry by repressive measures only. There are some evils inherent in the Soviet economic system itself. All Soviet enterprises strive most of all for high production figures. Their ambition is to overfulfill the plan and, in order to achieve this task, they are not above using various reprehensible means. Now one factory

increases its gross output by producing many goods of minor importance at the expense of the basic products (*Pravda*, May 23, 1948); now another factory sets itself a low quota, knowing in advance that it can exceed it without much strain (*Pravda*, May 31, 1948); now, and this is the worst, still another factory turns out inferior, if not quite useless, products, such as the undersize scythes in the example cited above.

Complaints about the poor quality of goods continue. Another practice has become current, that of producing more than the planned amount of secondary goods at the cost of non-fulfillment of orders for important products. Malenkov, at the nineteenth convention of the Party, characterized this as an 'anti-state' practice. Two years later the same practice was described in a Soviet paper:

> 'Certain ministries and enterprises still permit the harmful practice of overfulfilling quotas for the production of goods of secondary importance and not producing enough of the most important type of product, including those in short supply.' (Editorial, *Izvestia*, June 14, 1955).

In the meantime, the system itself compels producers to prefer poor quality production, as the following explains:

> 'It is more advantageous for the workshop to produce low-quality beds since it has the right to profits only in case the sum total of the costs of raw materials and other supplies used in production does not exceed 25 per cent of the total cost of production."
>
> 'For the production of durable beds it is necessary to use expensive materials (net made from first-rate wire) and, for nickel details, to buy materials in the shops.' (*Trud*, January 29, 1954).

A characteristic incident was reported by a furniture factory worker, Petrakovsky, who was discharged for criticism of the management. Kursk Furniture Factory, where Petrakovsky was employed, produced furniture of a very poor design. Petrakovsky wasted much effort attempting to convince the manager of the factory, Kogan, to improve the design and to produce carved furniture. Finally he wrote a critical letter to the local newspaper, *Kurskaya Pravda*, and subsequently was discharged from his job. Simultaneously with the discharge of Petrakovsky, the manager of the factory, Kogan, closed down the carving shop,

explaining his motive in the following terms: 'If we should start production of carved furniture, the factory would get a larger plan assignment.' (*Trud*, January 13, 1951, p. 3).

More data about defective production are given below in Chapter VII (Trade).

4. Wastefulness

Besides bad quality production, Soviet newspapers expose over-expenditure as another evil of Soviet industrial economy. Wastefulness of material and money is not always a consequence of misuse and negligence. The same phenomena recur from year to year. Sometimes wastefulness is caused by lack of coordination between different government institutions. For example, some construction jobs remain unfinished for several years, uncompleted structures are allowed to fall into disrepair, and hundreds of thousands of roubles are lost. (*Izvestia*, No. 82, 1948, *Pravda*, May 31, 1948).

Overhead expenses amount sometimes to almost one hundred per cent, owing to excessive administrative personnel and unsatisfactory inventory procedures. (*Pravda Vostoka*, April 18, 1948).

The same phenomena constantly prevail, and neither orders nor prosecutions and punishments can bring improvements. The usual outcome of these efforts is that new and different methods are invented to hide the exact losses. Accounts are adjusted for that purpose. For example, the Artinsk Scythe Factory showed a loss of 74,000 roubles in its balance sheet, while according to its annual report losses exceeded one million roubles, thirteen times more than the loss reported on the balance sheet.

> 'In order to emphasize the importance of compliance with plans for lowering industrial production costs, the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. has decided that bonuses to executives and engineering and technical personnel in industrial enterprises for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of production programs may not be issued unless the state plan of production costs is met. The bookkeeping accounts are to be the only basis for the issuance of bonuses for fulfilling or overfulfilling production quotas and reducing production costs.' (Zverev's Report to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. *Moscow News*, October 19, 1946).

Some enterprises increase their charges to others in order to cover their own expenses. The river transport complains, for example, of the excessive prices it has to pay for ships. Because of these high prices, the transport is compelled to include exceedingly high amortization expenses and thus to raise its cost estimates. The river transport is also overcharged for repairing ships and for loading and unloading.

5. *Organizational defects*

There is insufficient cooperation between various enterprises. The river transport complains that the railroads do not furnish cars, transshipment equipment and manpower quickly enough and do not pay the demurrage fee when they cause idleness of ships. The fact that ships are idle at the moorings of various enterprises and organizations which are served by the river transport is the main cause of unsatisfactory utilization of river tonnage. (Deputy Shashkov's speech during the budget debates. *Izvestia*, February 25, 1947).

Under Soviet conditions, even experienced administrators usually become bureaucrats. Men at the head of the Soviet industry do not know the meaning of crisis; they have no fear of going bankrupt. The director of a Soviet enterprise can transact business at a loss for a long period. Such methods of accounting have developed that in order to complete and analyze the account books one must spend months on them, and in the meantime the staff of employees will have changed several times.

It is difficult, however, to determine whether organizational defects are caused by the incompetence of managers or are the consequence of the general system. It is clear, at any rate, that the defects described in the Soviet press are rather usual than exceptional.

> 'Organization of labor and production at a group of enterprises has not been efficiently worked out and the inevitable consequence is that machinery stands idle, equipment is unused and working time is wasted ... there are also considerable losses of raw materials and other supplies and fuel at many plants and factories and the endeavor for higher quality production lags behind.' (*Trud*, Feb. 19, 1954. Editorial).

> 'At some plants production is low and technical standardization badly organized. At the present time, standard norms of production do not by and large correspond to the modern level of technology and do not serve to stimulate greater labor efficiency. Properly established production norms amount, in total, to only 32.5 per cent. At many enterprises, economical calculation has not become a rule, labor is badly organized and mechanical equipment is not put to use satisfactorily.' (*Trud*, Feb. 19, 1954. Editorial).

It is very possible that managers of plants and factories, afraid of underfulfillment of planned production, intentionally do not raise production norms. So far as other organizational defects are concerned, they may be connected with delays in supplying materials and fuel and various inconsistencies in the planning itself.

It is also not surprising that Soviet enterprises are slow about introducing innovations. For example, the glass industry did not introduce new styles or models of glassware, giving as the reason the necessity of receiving preliminary estimates of net cost and official prices. (*Pravda*, August 24, 1954, Editorial)

One must suppose that every director would have acted in the same way in order not to exceed official estimates and credits received and not to get over-stocked in the event that orders for the new articles are not received.

The paper snarl and bureaucracy of Soviet economy is joined fatally with extreme centralization of the administration of the national economy. Centralization in its turn is unavoidable owing to the subordination of the whole economy to a single plan.

The Soviet press continues to record the various serious defects of industry:

> 'Due to the poor work of a group of establishments performing the first stages of metallurgy, certain machine-construction plants, among them plants manufacturing agricultural machinery, do not work at their full capacity.' *Izvestia*, July 30, 1954).
>
> 'At a group of plants of the Ministry of Heavy Machine-Construction, a great deal of the work time and great amounts of metal are expended unproductively and equipment is not efficiently used.' (Editorial in *Izvestia*, August 4, 1954).

> 'Frequently, the normal rate of production is impeded because of serious shortcomings in material and technical supply to industrial establishments, because raw materials and other supplies are not delivered at the proper time, and because the cooperation between plants is poorly organized.' (Editorial in *Izvestia*, September 9, 1954).

To stimulate technological development, a special State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers was established by the Ukaz of May 28, 1955, and the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a Resolution on July 11, 1955, in which it acknowledged that Soviet industry lagged behind developments in modern technology. The Plenum obliged ministries and departments to improve the utilization of existing machinery, to introduce more effective methods for increasing labor productivity on the basis of advanced technology, and to reorganize the structure of industrial management, which remains cumbersome and has too many levels. (*Pravda* and *Izvestia*, July 13, 1955).

Within the past few years, the lumber industry has become a highly mechanized branch of the national economy. Nevertheless, it fails to fulfill the plans and is one of the most unprofitable industries. The press considers the underlying reason for the lag to be 'the low productiveness of labor and the poor use of machinery.' (Editorial in *Izvestia*, September 11, 1954).

By no means are all the defects of the organization and fulfillment of economic plans publicized. There is a certain kind of 'mutual protection association' or comradely solidarity among industrial executives; one 'covers up' for the other (cf. the story 'The destiny of a comrade,' *Octiabr*, Feb.1955). Here are a few typical examples:

> 'The norms for the permissible breakage were set at from one to six per cent. The Kuzaievskii chinaware factory sent a cargo of chinaware plates and dishes eleven tons in bulk to the Voronezh obltorg (regional trade) base. Upon unloading, it was discovered that about 2000 dishes were broken. A commission determined that breakage had occured because of incorrect packing. Instead of being packed in straw and hay, the dishes were packed in wet meadow moss which froze in the severe cold. However, the recipient unconditionally acknowledged as "normal" breakage of more than 1000

dishes (2.5 per cent of the entire quantity), accepted it on his own account and sent the factory which had made the delivery a claim only for breakage above one thousand. In a declaration to the arbitration committee, it was pointed out, on this score, that the Kuzaievskii factory generally loads its shipments carelessly and a large above-normal breakage of dishes always occurs.'

'The Dulevskii chinaware factory had sent a shipment of chinaware dishes to the Leningrad *univermag* (department store). Upon unloading, a commission determined that 686 dishes were broken. The breakage occurred, as was concluded by the commission, because the crate had been incorrectly packed in violation of the rules set for the technical conditions. Plates were packed without paper wrappings; the other ware was wrapped in very thin paper, similar to cigarette paper, after which it should have had a second wrapping of heavy paper. Wet shavings were added to the packing and the paper became damp. There were not enough shavings and the dishes were not separated. The breakage turned out to be 2.63 per cent of the load, while, according to the norms for breakage, only 1.8 per cent was permitted. Therefore the recipient 'forgave' the sender a breakage of more than 400 units, accepted it on his own account, and put in a claim for only 0.83 per cent of the breakage.' (From the article, 'Certain questions on the practice of arbitration,' *Sov. gos. i pravo*, No. 7, 1953, pp. 81–82).

One can find in the Soviet press a still greater number of examples of disorder in the agricultural industry. The latter depends to a considerable degree on industrial production, the quality of agricultural machines, the quantity of spare parts. The corresponding data are cited below. But there are cases where industrial planning ignores the interests of some branches of the agricultural economy. The failure of the fishing industry is a direct consequence of bureaucracy defective organization and, the disastrous effects of industrialization ignoring its influence on another branch of the national economy.

6. *Fishing Industry*

It would seem at first glance that there is nothing easier to solve than the problem of fishing. There must be quite a large amount of fish in the Soviet Union; it is only a question of increasing the catches. At least that is the way it was before the 1917 Revolu-

tion. There were plenty of fish of all varieties. Herring on the dinner table was the sign of a modest budget. Dried Caspian sea roach (*vobla* or *taran*) could be purchased for pennies. The rivers abounded in fish for anyone who had the time to sit behind a fishing pole an hour or two or to get some friends together to set up nets.

The markets offered all the fish one could want and it was not expensive. Fish was eaten smoked, salted, and marinated. Caviar, smoked sturgeon, and salmon found their way to the dinner table. Red caviar appeared hardly fifteen years before the first World War. In the Far East, from where it was originally shipped, it was not considered a commodity of any special interest until an enterprising merchant made the effort to import it. Little by little in the provinces of European Russia it became an inexpensive appetizer on the tables of families with average incomes.

The Ural cossacks used to catche normous sturgeons. Inhabitants along the Volga and in Siberia feasted on sterlet. In the cities of southern Russia they were familiar with tender mackerel. The people in Siberia regaled themselves with fish no less tender, with grayling and others. One would have to go to considerable pains to enumerate and describe them all. Commercial fishing was comparatively insignificant since the city populations were not yet very large and the villages fed themselves on their own catches, supplying land owners with the surplus. The fishing industry developed in correspondence to need. Sometimes, despite the existence of special regulations established by law to preserve fish, there were occasions when the catch exceeded all possible demands and the owners of fisheries, so as not to cut prices drastically, threw away the cheaper sorts of fish.

Now what has happened since the revolution? Where have all the fish gone? The Soviet government has alluded to a significant increase in demand. Demand has, of course, increased since the city population has considerably grown in number and the national market has considerably grown in size. Rural conditions, also, have changed. From the time they became collective farmers, peasants have no longer been able to dispose of their own time as before. There is ample reason for calling the collective farm a 'grain factory.' The collective farmer cannot now dispose of his time and attend to all needs by himself or with the aid of his

family. He must purchase most products which the kolkhoz does not produce. The fishing industry is in the hands of special artels. Fishing is under the control of special guilds and 'trests'. If there were large amounts of fish, planned quotas would simply be increased.

Plans for state fish purveyance are, indeed, increased but not fulfilled. The plans for 1951 and 1952 were not fulfilled. The plans for 1953 fared somewhat better but the population did not experience any improvement. Soviet newspapers published articles and letters which spoke about the shortage of fish on the market. The government could not deny it. Mikoyan, at that time the Minister of Trade, promised to expand the scale of production and to eliminate the shortage of fish on the market. For this purpose the Soviet government acquired possession of a group of special advantages.

The five-year plans which industrialized the country lead one to expect an intensified mechanization of the fishing industry, as well as of any other branch of industrial economy. If not, what was the purpose of all the sacrifices people had made?

The state, which has for more than a quarter of a century been putting into effect a grandiose program of industrialization, cannot fail to have at its disposal a technological advantage over the fishing industry of pre-revolutionary times.

Even at that, the Soviet government has still another advantage. After the defeat of Germany and Austria, it insured its position of dominance over the Danube, annexed a part of German territory with the city of Königsberg, and strengthened its influence in the north, in the area of the Murman Coast and Petsamo. Königsberg, renamed Kaliningrad, was resettled by fishermen from the Caspian Sea. The possibilities for the development of fishing had expanded not only in technical but in territorial dimensions. These possibilities are especially important in the Far East, where, after the defeat of Japan, the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands were joined to the Soviet Union. Japanese competition in the rich fishing region disappeared; all the advantages to be derived there fell into the hands of the Soviets.

In the food-provisioning plans of the Soviet economy fish could not fail to occupy a conspicuous place. It is much more

difficult to increase harvests and extend areas under cultivation than to enlarge the catch of fish. Nature herself hands over these riches to man and it remains for him only to exploit them intelligently so as not to squander them and to provide for the preservation and distribution of catches. At the XVIIIth convention of the Communist Party in 1939, a plan was projected, as one of the goals of the third five-year plan, 'to increase the ocean-going fishing fleet and to complete the organization of fishing combines in Komsomolsk, Khabarovsk, Moscow and Muynak, and the construction of cold-storage plants and twenty smaller refrigerator units.' The plans of subsequent years provided for the uninterrupted growth of fishing.

The fish catch undoubtedly increased. But, as has already been shown, during the last several years plan fulfillment has lagged behind assignments. In the course of a number of years we have read in Soviet newspapers about the unsuccessfulness of the lumber campaign and the fish campaign. In May 1953, *Izvestia* reported that 'in recent years, reserves and catches of fish of such valuable species as carp, bream, perch have been sharply curtailed. Only small amounts of Caspian roach and herring are caught.' (*Izvestia*, May 1953, No. 123). In 1954, the Soviet government concluded an agreement for purchase of fish in Denmark and Norway. A country with exceptionally rich fish resources buys fish from its neighbors. The people complain, as is evident from the letters and correspondence sometimes published in Soviet newspapers and from the words of Mikoyan himself, who acknowledged that the needs of the population were not satisfied, that there is not enough fish on the market. If there were, why buy it?

It is impossible to hide the truth. Fish reserves are being depleted. The market gets fish of increasingly inferior sorts. Soviet newspapers reported the poverty of the salmon catch. Just as in the other branches of Soviet economy, quantity is in the foreground, quality in the background. *Krokodil* (August 20, 1954) has already ridiculed the fish industry and has given away the secret that hopes to increase fish catches and thus to augment the diet of the population with fish are largely based on catching tiny spratherring.

What had happened? The fish, of which there was such an

abundant supply, could not have depleted themselves and the people were not responsible—the means for large-scale fishing were not in their hands. What caused the loss of fish was the defectiveness of the Soviet economy and devices employed for the fulfillment of industrial plans without consideration of the consequences. That is what all available sources make clear. First of all, chemical factories and tanneries without sewage purification units pollute river waters and lakes, poisoning and killing the fish. Another reason is the construction of dams and large electric-power stations. When the construction was in process, no attention was paid to the movement of fish in the rivers. Hydrotechnical constructions blocked off the fish's usual passages. And it is here that the defect becomes most evident in a state system of planning which fails to take into consideration all the consequences of the various kinds of 'great works to build up communism' and of the 'transformation of nature.'

It must be added that the organization of actual work in the fishing industry incorporates those same vices, undermining productiveness and causing superfluous expenditures of money and time, that are characteristic of all branches of the Soviet economy. Here is what *Izvestia* has to say, for example:

> 'During the current year (1954), the available fishing fleet has been used in the poorest possible way. About forty boats were left unrepaired . . . as far as the boats in good order were concerned, they stood idle for weeks owing to the unsatisfactory organization of fishing . . . As a general rule, fishing boats are sent out without complete supplies of fishing equipment.' (*Izvestia*, July 13, 1954, p. 2).

The following editorial in *Izvestia*, written when the fleet should have already been fully prepared, desperately predicts a new failure:

> 'Fishermen of the Azov-Donets basin are poorly outfitted with a fleet, repairs hardly finished.'
>
> 'The autumn fishing run on the Baltic Sea is still ahead. However, the rate of preparation for it arouses apprehension . . . The hold-up in repairs of boats causes the fishermen considerable alarm: it is just possible that the fleet won't be ready for the autumn fishing season.' Just as it did last year, the Ministry of Lumber Industry U.S.S.R. is letting the fishermen down by its extremely poor supply of tar to

> fisheries.' 'Only 10 per cent of the tar and other wood-product ship-repairing materials have arrived at the Azov-Black Sea basin.' (*Izvestia*, September 15, 1954).

There is difficulty of another sort; when fishing is in full swing and the cargoes of fish are brought to receiving points, the latter are not ready to receive anything. Or else, the fish industry artels haven't any means to transport the cargoes. This is mentioned not only in the article just quoted but also in *Krokodil*. At just about the same time as *Izvestia*, *Krokodil* sarcastically explains the hold-up in unloading cargoes: 'Fish storage points do not accept the fish because the delivery exceeds the one 'according to plan'. It turns out that the fishermen are supposed to hold up on their fishing so as not to exceed the unloading and storage plan.'

Finally, there is the general affliction of the whole system: the administrative apparatus has become so overgrown that for fifteen fishermen there are seventeen office workers; paper work has become more important than practical work. The net cost of the product becomes incredibly high and the prices on free markets are lower than in state stores. (*Krokodil*, August 20, 1954).

In order to fulfill the plan, illegal fishing tackle is put into use, barbarous methods for catching fish are employed, young fish are being exterminated, and great quantities of fish are caught before they are old enough to spawn. The present, like a vampire, sucks the blood, depriving future generations of living resources. And to make up for the shortage of more desirbale fish the masses of the people are offered tiny 'sprat-herring.' These are caught in great quantities and rescue the fulfillment of the plan from the point of view of statistics.

Chapter 6

THE AGRICULTURAL CRISIS

The agricultural economy is the weakest side of the Soviet system. The negative consequences of bureaucracy and the decline of responsibility and interest which we have observed in the industrial field are much more in evidence in agriculture and there

is an astonishing repetition of identical ailments which attests to their incurability. Official reports and editorials in the Soviet press sound warnings and cry out that the provinces show evidence of chaos, that party workers 'have lost all sense of responsibility' and 'lack of business sense.' *Izvestia* and *Pravda*, in a series of articles and reports from rural districts, condemn the indifference which is manifest in the rundown condition of many kolkhozes; farm machinery is allowed to deteriorate, crops are gathered carelessly, and the population of the Soviet Union-formerly Europe's granary—is periodically faced with a food shortage.

1. *Indifference of the rural population*

Simply glancing through Soviet newspapers over some period of time is sufficient to form a definite idea of how, year after year, the same disappointing picture is repeated. After the end of World War II, we find in these newspapers the very same thing we had read many times before the war.

The Soviet newspapers *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, and *Trud* of 1945 and more recent times give innumerable examples of the negligence and indifference of peasants both on kolkhozes and sovkhozes—hundreds of tons of various kind of grain, containing high percentages of moisture, rotted because they were not dried (*Pravda*, August 25, 1945); a crop spilled along the highway in one place and on a muddy threshing floor in another place (*Pravda*, October 3, 1945); cattle with no winter forage (*Pravda*, September 20, 1945); etc.

> 'Kolkhozes are sowing what is easier, not what is more valuable'; 'Inertia and routine block the way to progress.' (*Izvestia*, April 20, 1946); 'Agronomists are not in the fields' (July 4); 'Dangerous sluggishness' (July 5); 'Combines stand idle instead of working' (July 6); 'Cotton is badly farmed in Turkmenia' (July 6).

During the Fall of 1946, Soviet newspapers complained. 'Grain harvesting in the Stavropol region has almost stopped'; 'Threshing is too slow.' (*Pravda*, October 26). 'Unharvested corn is left in the fields.' 'In the Bashkir Autonomous Republic the state production quotas have not been met. This is explained by the shortage

of fuel. A false explanation! That is not the case; it is not lack of fuel, but anti-government attitudes which exist in that region'. (ibidem). 'In the Chkalov (Orenburg) region, grain was left on the stalks and on threshing floors.' (*Izvestia*, September 29). The kolkhozes of the Ishim region are careless—'there are a thousand hectares of unharvested wheat and oats.' In the Tiumen region, 'the accumulation of grain on threshing floors is conducive to waste. The crop of one hundred fifty thousands hectares remained unthreshed.' (*Pravda*, October 21).

Anyone who regularly read the headlines in the newspapers *Pravda* and *Izvestia* for at least one month in the fall of 1946 could not help getting the impression that the general situation on the kolkhozes was near collapse and that a feeling of uneasiness reigned in the highest spheres of the Soviets. These are some of the headlines:

> 'Hasten to deliver grain as fast as possible"; 'Increase deliveries"; 'Take good care of grain' (*Izvestia*, October 19); 'Harvest crops to the last ear.' (October 23); 'Speed up threshing' (October 25); 'Deliver grain without interruption' (October 27); 'Insure preservation of grain stocks' (*Izvestia*, editorial October 29); 'Hasten grain harvesting in Kazakhstan' (October 30); 'The Altai regions, behind in their work, are to be helped in fulfilling their duties' (October 31); 'For better discipline in kolkhoz work' (editorial, November 1); 'Make the most of the working day, raise labor efficiency' (November 3); 'Do not slow down the struggle for grain' (editorial, November 13); 'Keep grain safe from spoiling' (November 17); 'Eliminate carelessness in grain deliveries to the State' (November 28).

In his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in February, 1947, published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* on March 7, 1947, the former Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Andreyev, cited many examples of carelessness in kolkhoz economy. Instead of building up their own necessary stocks of seeds, some kolkhozes borrow seeds from others and never return them. Cattle breeding is conducted negligently.

> 'Pigs are wasted like small change.' 'The average increase in horses in 1946 was only 38 foals for every hundred mares.' 'Carelessness in fodder-storage is astonishing; for instance, in

> the Kemerovo region, in 1946, one-third of the meadowlands remained unmown and cattle went without sufficient forage in winter, and thus were doomed to perish. The Chkalov region began the winter with a deficiency of fodder while about a hundred thousand hectares were unmown; approximately the same situation prevailed in the Kostroma region and others.'

A high percentage of cattle disease has been recorded. Offspring and newly acquired horned cattle on the kolkhozes of the Saratov region totaled 74 thousand head, of which 15 thousand perished from disease and 23 thousand were used for the various needs of the kolkhozes; as for sheep, 170 thousand were added by breeding and purchase, but 53 thousand died and 80 thousand were squandered. In the Vologda region in 1946 the kolkhozes recorded 158 thousand new-born sheep and goats, however the decrease exceeded offspring: 194 thousand of the total number of sheep and goats were lost, including 58 thousand lost by disease, etc. etc.

The editorial of *Pravda* on March 29, 1947, reports again that in the southern regions of the country 'the machines of the M.T.S. are still used unsatisfactorily; for instance, during the harvest period hundreds of machines are idle because they are still being repaired; the sowing program progresses unsatisfactorily on the shallowly ploughed earth; tractors are used for such easy work as harrowing, which could be done with the aid of cattle.' The best season for sowing has been missed in the largest grain-producing area of the Gorki region (*Pravda*, March 19, 1947); in the Kurgan region, one of the largest and most important agricultural regions, despite the fact that it received 350 new tractors, plenty of various agricultural machines, and a large supply of fuel and lubrication materials (*Pravda*, May, 13, 1947); in the Novosibirsk region (*Pravda*, May 16, 1947); and many others.

Various measures were carried out in order to raise the productivity of kolkhoz economy and to overcome the negligence and indifference of the rural population. But, in spite of everything the over-all picture of agricultural economy in 1953 did not become any more encouraging. It seems incredible that one of the highest officials of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev, has to reprimand the rural administration for non-observance of the elementary principles of agricultural economy:

'Harvesting of grain crops is prolonged one and a half to two months in a number of districts. A substantial reduction in harvest losses is a major reserve for increasing gross grain deliveries . . . And who does not know that straw must be brought from the fields immediately after the harvest?

'Or consider the sowing norms. It is clear that a full norm of seeds must be sown in order to obtain a high harvest. This principle is often ignored, however, with the connivance of the district Party and executives Committees. Collective and State farms very often sow, instead of 120 to 180 kilogr. of wheat, 80 to 90 kilogr. which reduces the yield . . .'

'and lastly, a word about damage inflicted on grain crops by livestock. Livestock and poultry are still turned out on winter crops of collective farms all through the autumn. Everyone is well aware that this causes irreparable harm to the plantings, but though they are aware they look in silence on this outrageous picture.'

Khrushchev did not say, however, as everyone in his audience must have known, that peasants eat seeds instead of using them for sowing because they do not have enough food, and that they let livestock and poultry harm plantings during the fall because they do not have enough fodder and grains to feed them.

Certainly, in rural economy much depends on the industry and efficiency of the farmers but it would be wrong to attribute all the omissions in kolkhoz practice to the peasants. The kolkhoz economy experiences many difficulties because of the stupendous bureaucracy which is a general affliction of the Soviet regime, and because of the disorganized and unsatisfactory work of the M.T.S.

2. Grafters and parasites

The insufficiency of food supplies is equally painful to ordinary citizens and to civil servants. The kolkhoz administration is more interested in products than salary. The machine-tractor stations work more willingly if they are supplied with products; etc. It is not surprising, therefore, that chairmen of kolkhozes, district officials, directors of the M.T.S. and individual Party members and officials connected with the kolkhoz administration, are in the habit of taking products from the kolkhozes—cattle, furs, various materials— and sometimes even money.

Soviet newspapers sometimes describe petty abuses of this kind.

> 'The director of the propaganda and agitation section of a district committee, Comrade Krivoshchekova, "mowed" 100 puds of hay for her cow, which had been illegally obtained from the "New Road" artel." ' The secretary of the Tulun district committee, comrade Kamyshev, took from the "Molotov kolkhoz", free of charge, three cart-loads of hay; he found a boar on another kolkhoz and laid in a supply of food for it dirt cheap.' Comrade Kamyshev returned a cow to the "Little Red Star" kolkhoz 'only under great pressure from higher organizations.' (*Pravda*, November 18, 1946).

Information of the type described belongs to the time when the Soviet government organized a special institution, the Council on Collective Farms, with the aim of stimulating the interest and efforts of the members of collective farms, strengthening discipline, and eliminating violations of the collective farm chapters. One of the functions of that Council was to protect kolkhozes from 'grafters' and 'parasites'.

The reference to 'grafters' and 'parasites' has a double significance. In the first place, it points out the widespread abuse of power by the Party workers who direct the kolkhozes. In the second place, it indicates a struggle against excessive growth of administrative personnel—growth at the expense of productive and responsible workers.

The Council, established by special decree of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the C.C. of the A.C.P. (b) on Sept. 19, 1946, hardly succeeded in its task of eliminating abuses which became characteristics of rural life. And the abuses are certainly not only petty ones, as the following story illustrates.

> The chairman of a kolkhoz in Kazakhstan, Lebaev, 'surrounded himself with relatives, spongers, and grafters, squandered hundreds of centners of wheat and about a hundred head of kolkhoz cattle, and generously bestowed gifts on influential officials of the regional institutions...' All complaints addressed to the Executive Committee of the Alma Ata Communist Party organization (Oblkom) were futile (*Pravda*, May 16, 1948).

In addition to the nepotism acknowledged by Stalin, it became

a very common practice to place relatives and friends in lucrative jobs and for everyone to protect one another in case of failure or exposure. Because of this kind of collusion, it is extremely difficult to eliminate grafting. High officials and Party men show the country a bad example since they often abuse their power and influence, accept presents from the kolkhoz administration, or acquire produce for very low prices. In 1952, a Soviet writer described that practice as a deeply rooted evil. [1]

Abuses and nepotism are, however, not the only evils of Soviet rural economy. There are others inherent in the system itself, in its centralized and bureaucratic regime.

3. *Bureaucracy in agricultural economy*

The universal planning system requires centralization to coordinate all branches of economy, but centralization, in turn, paralyzes initiative and the ability of local agencies to adjust to local conditions and changeable weather. In 1940, the Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. issued 1,113,000 directives, orders, decisions, regulations, and instructions (*Izvestia*, March 11 1941). Could it have been any less in 1954, when the Ministry of Agriculture consisted of 422 administrations, departments and sections, as Khrushchev ironically reported to the Supreme Soviet (*Pravda*, April 27, 1954)?

Local agencies and kolkhoz administrations were no less swollen. The former People's Commissar of Agriculture, Yakovlev wrote in 1935 (*Voprosy organizatsii selskogo khoziaistva*) that 'the expenses for administration of the kolkhozes amount to about one third of what the farmers produce.' In the 'Red Poppy' kolkhoz of the Chelyabinsk region there were, before the war, 290 able-bodied workers and 54 'officials'. In general the number of administrative employees was extremely high in comparison with those actively at work in the fields, and the expenses for the upkeep of this branch almost equalled the productive laborers' share of the income.

Izvestia describes conditions on the 'Red Banner' kolkhoz in the Kurgan region as follows:

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[1] I. Glotov, 'Obshchestvennaia sobstvennost—osnova kolkhoznogo stroya,' *Bolshevik*, No. 10, 1952, pp. 50–52.

> 'One is surprised to see many people whose business is 'general direction', as compared with those who organize the work and are fully responsible for realization of the plans.' (*Izvestia*, October 20, 1946).

In its editorial of March 25, 1947, the same paper indignantly reports that according to the data of the Minister of Rural Economy, in Gelendjik in the Krasnodar region only three out of a total of thirty agronomists are working on kolkhozes.

Andreyev reported to the plenum of the Communist Party that 'more than half of the agronomists were working in the administration, less than half directly in production.'

Therefore, many farms experience a shortage of field laborers while they have an oversupply of white-collar help. Some kolkhozes of the Tambov region consumed about 30 to 40 per cent of their workdays in maintaining the administrative and supervisory staff. (*Izvestia*, December 15, 1946).

In order to have an idea of the number of parasites attached to the kolkhozes it is sufficient to cite the following data. Within one year after the decree of September 19, 1946, 748,000 people including administrative personnel and people who had no relation to actual kolkhoz work, were removed from the payrolls. (*Pravda*, Editorial, September 19, 1947).

At the very same time, however, the staff of the Machine-Tractor Station (M.T.S.), maintenance of which also falls upon the shoulders of the kolkhoz farmers, expanded. In addition to the five to six million people of the kolkhoz administration proper, there were no less than two million tractorists, mechanics, drivers, combine-operators, engineers, and other people from the personnel of the M.T.S. whose allowances and wages are paid at the expense of the kolkhozes.

The enormous kolkhoz administration is typically bureaucratic. The following is an example of bureaucracy reigning in kolkhoz work:

> 'The chairman and the brigadiers (leaders of work teams), instead of discussing and preparing a working plan the night before, do not meet until nine o'clock in the morning, by which time a good farmer should have already worked several hours.' (*Izvestia*, April 17, 1946).

It is not due to the farmers' negligence or indifference, but rather

to imperfect organization that spring takes the kolkhozes by surprise: 'The labor-team leader doesn't know with whom or how he is supposed to go about starting the work in the fields'; 'not a single one of the fifteen tractor teams is fully equipped or is located where the work is going to be;' 'The labor teams have not yet even received their yearly assignments for tractor work...' (*Sovietskoe khoziaistvo.* April 4, 1953, No. 2). During the first three months of 1953, the headlines in the same periodical [1] gave evidence of the fact that the bureaucratic approach to work seriously troubled the administration:

> 'The Fruits of Stereotyped Management' (Jan. 6), 'When Will the Red-Tape Be Done Away With?' (Jan. 7), 'When Are Mineral Fertilizers Going To Be Shipped?' (Feb. 3), 'Smolensk is Taking its Time about Shipping Fertilizers.' (Feb. 6) 'In the Predicament of Unconcern and Inexactness.' (Feb. 12), 'The Fruits of Poor Organization' (Feb. 13). 'What About Next Year's Harvest?' (Feb. 25). 'Are Personal Decisions going to be Forgotten?'' (Feb. 28). 'They Don't See the Real Life Behind Orders.' (March 3). 'Kolkhozes delay in Purchasing Seeds.' (March 29).

In the second half of 1953, the Soviet government sounded the alarm, appealing for a restoration of agriculture to a sound condition.

4. Shortcomings of mechanization

The state spent colossal sums of money on the mechanization of agriculture but the results have not corresponded with the investments [2]. The reasons are, as articles and reports in Soviet newspapers show, various disorders in M.T.S. operations.

Describing the conditions of agriculture in different regions, *Pravda* (No. 163, 1945) reported that in 1944 only three out of fifty-four Machine-Tractor Stations carried out the original harvesting plan in the Stalin region due to the bad condition of the combines. In the editorial of *Izvestia* for July 26, 1945, we read:

> 'The M.T.S. of the southern regions have not fully completed the repairing of harvester combines. In the Voronezh and Kursk regions only two thirds of the combine stock has

[1] Published under the title *Sotsialishcheskoe zemledelie* up to April 1953.

[2] Cf. N. M. Jasny, *The Socialist Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. Plans and Performance,* Stanford Univ. Press, 1949.

> been repaired. At the beginning of the harvest campaign in the northern Caucasus only 22 per cent of the threshing machines had been repaired. Only one third of the threshing machines is in working order in Siberia where the harvest campaign is to be started.'

In the same issue of *Izvestia*, under the title 'Consequences of Disorganization.' we read that 'the actual progress of harvesting is in drastic contrast with the plan.' Combines continue to stand idle, the efficiency of the work is very low.

Judging by Soviet reports, one may assume that the profits of Soviet agriculture are absorbed by the cost of repairing and amortizing machinery. Exactly the same picture was observed in the pre-war period; even the percentage of tractors standing idle was almost the same, as if it were stabilized. For example, the Commissar of Agriculture, Eikhe, in a revealing speech delivered in January 1938 before the Central Committee of the Communist Party, cited the following figures: of the 5.819 Machine-Tractor Stations (M.T.S.), 2,088 did not have workshops for repairing tractors. By January 10, 1938, only 30 per cent of the damaged tractors had been repaired.

In other words two-thirds of the machines proved to be useless, just the same proportion as was stated after the war.

The explanation is very simple. Complete repair jobs are done at the expense of the state, but partial repairs are done at the expense of the M.T.S. The latter, in order to economize, keeps putting off repairs until the machines no longer run; then the M.T.S. refuses responsibility for repairing them and the machines. are turned over to the care of the state.

In 1946, everything was repeated in stereotyped form, as if it had become a law. Every season has its dark spots:

> 'Tractors are entrusted to inexperienced people and, therefore, are often out of order.' (*Izvestia*, April 17, 1946.) 'More than one half of the tractors are out of order because of unsatisfactory repairs.' (April 20, 1946).

In the fall season similar complaints were raised concerning harvesting machines. 'A number of machines are paralyzed because of insufficiency of spare parts.' (*Izvestia*, August 13, 1946).

'The M.T.S.s purchase spare parts from private individuals

and pay them triple the price.' Thus they encourage plundering of spare parts, not to mention squandering state money. (*Izvestia*, December 26, 1946).

The same alarming headlines, the same appeals are repeated. In December 1946, *Pravda* attacked different local organizations and factories in several editorials ,accusing them of being careless in so vital a task as supplying villages with machines and spare parts. *Pravda* said that 'the most important task of the national economy in 1947 is to obtain a large harvest on collective and state farms.' The Party's most influential paper urged industry to increase to the utmost the output of spare parts. The tractor fleet, it commented, was 'badly worn out,' and in the meantime production of tractor parts lagged behind the plan by at least 50 per cent by December 10, 1946.

Since the beginning of 1947, the alarming headlines and articles have not disappeared from the papers:

> 'Tractor repair is neglected in Tataria' (*Pravda*, Jan. 29, 1947); 'Repair of tractors has collapsed in the Penza region' (*Izvestia*, Jan. 26); 'An investigation in Ulianovsk disclosed that at eleven o'clock the majority of the tractor mechanics were idle, having nothing to do; that a number of them left the shop; that the forge was empty; and that the turners were sitting in the office.' (*Pravda*, Feb. 1); 'In Tashkent, in one of the M.T.S.s, the tractors were in a ramshackle, leaky shed, and water poured down on the machines; in another M.T.S. a machine just put back to work after being repaired proved to have 15 defects; in general, repair work was only half done.' (*Izvestia*, Feb. 2). In the Stalingrad region, where a delay in the repairing of tractors was one of the reasons for a bad harvest in 1946, the same phenomenon is repeated; instead of 95 or 100 machines, only 50 or 60 have been repaired, etc.

The former Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Andreyev, in his report to the Party conference in February, 1947, mentioned above, described the work of the M.T.S.s very unfavorably:

> 'The M.T.S. show little interest in raising the productivity of rural economy, scientific tillage, seasonable sowing and harvesting.' 'A number of M.T.S. try to do just comparatively easy tillage and leave the difficult tilling job undone.' 'In the Gorki region the ploughed area exceeded by 30 per

> cent the area called for in the plan, but the harvest came to only 81 per cent of the estimated amount; in the Tula region, the ploughing plan was exceeded by 2 per cent but productivity was only 77 per cent of the expected figure.' 'In order to fulfill the ploughing plan, the M.T.S.'s try to plough soft soil instead of virgin soil.' 'The combines and agricultural machines generally are only half repaired when the season for using them in the fields arrives.'

In spite of all efforts, the situation did not change essentially. In 1948 we still read the same (Cf. *Pravda*, May 25, June 2, 1948).

The main cause of the failure to harvest, dry and purify raw cotton at the proper time in the past years was the irregular use of cotton-harvesting machines and of other technical means as well as of the unsatisfactory organization of harvesting itself. The plan of machine-harvesting was never fulfilled. The same occured in 1954.

> 'Preparation for machine-harvesting on the kolkhozes is alarming ... the repair of cotton-harvesting machines is far from being completed.' 'Still more alarming is preparation for machine-harvesting of cotton on the kolkhozes of the Tajik U.S.R. ... An enormous number of machines are not prepared there for work.' (*Izvestia*, Sept. 16, 1954).

In January 1954, a special conference was convened by the CC of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers USSR to discuss the needs of the M.T.S. and to stimulate their execution of measures offered in September 1953 by the Party and the government for the further improvement of their work.

5. *Administrative helplessness*

Two years have passed since Stalin's death. The Soviet government has been doing its best to overcome the agricultural crisis and eliminate food shortages in the country, but the troubles remain the same. A series of happenings, unheard of under conditions of independent farming, are repeated year in and year out on the collective farms under conditions where there is no personal responsibility.

'The Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU directed the attention of the Ministry of Agriculture USSR, the Ministry of Sovkhozes USSR, and the local Party and Soviet organiza-

tions to the fact that repetition of the mistakes and shortcomings which occured during last year's harvest would not be permitted. Measures must be taken once and for all to do away with the attitude of unconcern for grain losses, and to insure the swiftest possible completion of preparation of all material and technical components and the organized deployment and successful conduct of the harvest.'

That is what *Izvestia* wrote in its editorial of July 1, 1954, recalling the June plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, and, in a series of articles during that same month, they appealed to the people not to repeat the mistakes of past years.

> 'In the Kholmogor region there is a shortage of feed every year and plans for the development of a community animal-husbandry project are never carried through. Even hay has to be brought in from other areas ... The principle reason for this condition of the feed base is the delay, repeated year in, year out, in the preparation and conduct of the hay harvest.' (*Izvestia*, July, 1 1954).
>
> 'Last year on the kolkhozes in Pskov oblast, the harvest of flax seed and fibre did not amount to a significant part of the harvest estimated in the plan. The proper solutions have not been found from the lessons of past years.' (*Izvestia*, July 3, 1954, Editorial).
>
> 'At Kuban, grain losses are considered an unavoidable evil ... the field is strewn with ears of grain and a herd of pigs follows right behind the combines. No one thinks about fixing the machines or getting rid of losses.' (*Izvestia*, July 11, 1954, p. 2).
>
> 'Local Ukrainian farm bureaus poorly organize the fight against garden and berry-orchard pests ... The factories in the Vinitskii oblast, where the fight against fruit and berry pests was carried on unsatisfactorily, are already experiencing a lack of raw material. The same thing is happening in Volynsk oblast ...' (*Izvestia*, July 13, 1954, Editorial).

In June, leading figures in the agricultural field met in Siberia with Khrushchev participating. On the basis of the data presented at that meeting, *Izvestia* writes in its editorial of July 14:

> 'A considerable portion of the kolkhozes, M.T.S.s. and sovkhozes in Siberia has not yet begun tilling the fields for sowing and planting potatoes, vegetables, and fodder roots ... many kolkhozes, M.T.S.s. and sovkhozes slowly go about

the work of . . . hay cutting. A great deal of cut hay remains unstacked.'

In August, other kinds of troubles begin. The crops have ripened, harvesting takes place, and a considerable portion of the crops is lost.

In Omsk oblast, 'only half of 37 warehouses were ready for use. Grain dryers and conveyers were received but turned out not to have any motors. Last year, a large amount of grain was lost in transit. Measures were not taken to prevent these losses during the current year.' 'In Kurgan oblast, M.T.S.s. were not supplied with fuel and lubricants.' (*Izvestia*, August 19, 1954).

At Altai, 'Bumper crops aroused a feeling of complacency and unconcern in the managers of a number of regions . . . in rate of harvesting operations, Altai came out in last place among the oblasts of western Siberia.'

'The efficiency of the combines is low. The daily output per combine does not exceed 5 to 6 hectares.' 'On the 26th of August, eleven combines stood idle the whole day because of breakdowns. On that very same day, seven combines drove all around the roads in search of ripe-grain sites; the agronomists did not show the machine operators in advance where they were supposed to work...' (*Izvestia*, Sept. 5 1954, p. 2).

In Krasnoyarsk territory, 'the biggest grain regions . . . handle reaping intolerably slowly. Khakas autonomous oblast has especially lagged behind: only 3.9 per cent of the harvest plan has been fulfilled.' (*Izvestia*, Sept. 9, 1954).

'Out of 1,348 roofed warehouses, which were projected for construction before the beginning of the harvest, not more than 300 are ready; instead of 864 driers only 105, and out of 3,373 storing places only 315 are ready. It is evident that the first rainy day threatens to make considerable difficulties in regard to harvesting and delivery of cotton to the State.' (*Izvestia*, Sept. 16, 1954).

The examples cited show the gloomy picture of agriculture in the Soviet Union which so troubles the Party and the government. Since the fall of 1953, constant meetings have been called and conventions held to discuss measures which might restore agriculture to a sound condition, increase its productivity, and improve the diet of the population. Innumerable examples of backwardness and inefficiency in all oblasts were brought up at the conventions and meetings. Using published materials and

newspaper information from all parts of the country, it would be possible to cite a great number of illustrations which characterize the reasons for failure in the fulfillemnt of plans in the area of lumbering, animal husbrandry, fish industry, vegetable growing, and sometimes even the reasons for decline, as was officially noted in the area of animal husbrandry. All these data testify to the civil servant attitude towards work and the negligence of executives, as well as to the lack of co-ordination between the various economic branches.

At the beginning of August 1954, the newspapers reported that, according to information received from kolkhozes and sovkhozes, there was a delay in putting the combines into action. Threshing operations were poorly organized in many regions. In the Tatar Republic, crops were harvested from 616,000 hectares but only a little more than half of that amount was threshed; in the Chuvash Republic, crops from 184,000 hectares were harvested but only the grain harvested from 44,000 hectares was threshed, i.e., less than one quarter of the harvest; in the Bryansk Region, not more than a third of the harvested grain was threshed. Meanwhile, there aren't enough enclosed places for threshing and the rainy period is approaching. (*Pravda*, Aug. 6).

Meanwhile, reports about the unsatisfactory condition of M.T.S machinery began coming in and continued to come in all summer.

> '... The mobile machine shop doesn't have a single machine part for a combine ... The M.T.S.s. aren't always able to supply combine operators with even the most essential spare parts for their machines. The harvest is at its height but at the supply organization you can't find even such necessary items as segments, brass bearings, knives ...' (*Izvestia*, July 11, 1954, correspondent from Kuban).
>
> 'In the Tyumen Region ... prospects are good for the harvest ... but the plan for the repair of combines has been only slightly more than half fulfilled. By the 10th of July, the M.T.S. of the region had 500 combines less ready for harvesting operations than at that same date last year. The Regional Agricultural Directorate continues to manage the M.T.S.s with old, office-bureaucratic methods.' (*Izvestia*, July 10, 1954).
>
> 'The condition of the combine pool in a number of areas of Siberia and the Urals ... has caused considerable alarm...'
>
> 'In the Altai Territory, according to the data as of July 20th, more than 4000 combine operators were still not pre-

pared to go to work; in the Novosibirsk Region, more than 2000; in the Molotov Region ,more than 1,500. The directors are building up accounts for spare parts shipped to them; they do not make use of local possibilities.' (*Izvestia*, July 3).

'A great many of the areas in the Krasnodar Territory now carry on harvesting and grain-storage operations at a much slower rate, worse than last year. '(*Izvestia*, August 5).

'In the Penza Region, the combines' work is poorly organized.' 'A great number of combines are poorly equipped for going out into the fields. The quality of machine repair is checked superficially ... more than 200 combines are standing around at M.T.S. lots.' (*Izvestia*, August 11, p. 2).

In Kuban, 'according to the data of the Territorial Directorate of agriculture, during the second half of August the M.T.S.s work 154.000 tractor shifts and let 120.000 tractor shifts stand idle.' 'In August, about sixty per cent of the mechanical engineers could not cope with their daily production assignments.' (*Izvestia*, Sept. 7, 1954, Editorial).

The mismanagement described in the newspapers presents a glaring contrast to those hopes which the government of the Soviet Union had placed in the M.T.S. In recent times, the leading role of the M.T.S. in agriculture has been constantly stressed in Soviet publications.

'The M.T.S. is not a contractor, not a hiring station. It is the guide and organizer that directs the development of kolkhoz economic activity, insuring the fulfillment of state plans for the further expansion of agriculture.' [1]

'Each kolkhoz should enjoy the services of one or two specialists who belong to the staff of a M.T.S. At the same time, the responsibility of the state inspector, whose job is to check on the quality of agricultural work, falls to the chief agronomists of a M.T.S. and they are immediately subordinate to the chief of the regional agriculture and state-purveyance directorate.' [2]

'Tractor operators were kolhoz members and only temporarily worked on the tractors of the M.T.S. Now they and the tractor workteam leaders, together with their assistants and the accountant-fuel-attendants, are considered full-time M.T.S. workers and are entered on the M.T.S. payroll.' [3]

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[1] P. P. Piatnitsky, 'Dogovornye otnoshenia MTS s Kolkhozami na novom etape.' *Sov. gos. i pravo*, No. 1, 1954, p. 7.

[2] I. V. Pavlov, Nekotorye voprosy sovetskoi pravovoi nauki,' *Sov. gos. i pravo*, No. 7, 1953, p. 22.

[3] Op. cit. p. 25.

Meanwhile the M.T.S.s, whose primary task is to regulate and improve collective-farm agriculture, themselves continue, as has been described, to suffer from irregularities in repair operations and from imperfections of an organizational character in supply. And, as was explained, the picture is not a new one. On the contrary, when one reads in the newspapers covering the year 1954 about inoperative machines, about the lack of spare parts, and about unfinished repairs, and compares reports about these disorders with what was reported in preceding years, one might very well believe that the practice of twenty years of collective farm economy has established a certain regularity of unsatisfactory organization and work in the technical outfitting of agriculture.

Where purveyance is well conducted, transportation falls behind; the organizers are responsible:

> 'Hundreds of thousands of poods [1] of grain have piled up on the threshing floors where they are likely to spoil. The mountains of threshed grain constantly grow larger but the speed of the cartage of threshed grain from the threshing floors grows slower.' 'The majority of kolkhozes do not have enclosed threshing floors or driers.' 'Due to the poor administration of the oblast agricultural directorate, drivers lose a great deal of working time daily at the filling stations as well as at the elevator. It is sufficient to say that, during the last tenth of the month of August, 120 trucks, which arrived here from the Latvian SSR, remained idle on the elevator 2,000 hours over the norm. During that time, the drivers could have made 500 trips.' (*Izvestia*, Sept. 12, 1954 p. 2).
>
> In Novosibirsk oblast, 'The grain-cleaner and drier installations pool has considerably expanded but the driers do not operate properly; huge lines of trucks form, waiting for loading and unloading, losing a great deal of time and not fulfilling assignments.' (*Izvestia*, Sept. 11, 1954, p. 2.)

6. *'Know thyself'*

The troubles described in Soviet papers appear to be unavoidable and the reason for the troubles seems to be not the ill will or insufficient vigilance of the employees but the idiosyncrasies of

[1] Pood a Russian weight equal to about 36 pounds avoirdupois.

the organization itself. For example, not even the best plan can of itself give exact indications as to where, how many, what sort of spare parts should be sent out. To do that, it would be necessary to calculate all the inevitable changes occuring in the process of work and all possible deviations from average norms and to be positive that the fulfillment of the order is within the power of the factories manufacturing spare parts. Evidently, production is lagging behind demand, and, for that reason, a situation develops so that 'spare parts are shipped into Kuzbas from the Krasnodar Territory, the Byelorussian SSR, from Odessa and Novorossiisk.' (*Pravda*, Aug. 28, 1954, p .2) or that 'spare parts are sent throughout the districts without consideration for the needs of the M.T.S., 'as was brought out in a statement by Nedachin, a member of a conference on the problem of the M.T.S. convened in June 1954 by the Central Committee of the Party.

It is no more surprising, on the other hand, if 'Dead stock amounting to hundreds and thousands of unneeded spare parts has accumulated in the warehouses of many *lespromkhozes* (state lumber industry works) (*Izvestia*, Sept. 16, 1954, p. 2), since Soviet enterprises could neither sell nor exchange materials they did not need[1] whereas to start a correspondence about it meant complicating the matter by going to all kinds of explanations and trouble. Each establishment is responsible for itself within the limits of its competence. Owing to the unusual complexity of organization existing in the Soviet Union, it is hardly possible even to determine who is responsible for the mistakes which cause shortages or losses.

The central apparatus cannot help but be the cumbersome, and its vices cannot but be transmitted from top to bottom in view of the dependency of local organizations on the great number of central and intermediary republic and regional organizations. Therefore, it was a vain threat on the part of N.S. Khrushchev 'to pull up bureaucracy by the roots':

> 'It is essential to carry the work of reducing the apparatus of ministries still further, to send part of the workers away

[1] Ukaz of Feb. 16, 1941 of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, prohibiting the sale, exchange and renting of equipment and surplus materials by state enterprises. *Vedomosti*, No. 8, 1941. Abrogated by the Ukaz of May 13, 1955 (*Vedomosti*, June 8, 1955).

> to practical jobs. Instead of those workers who lag behind life and are shot through with bureaucracy we should take those people who have proven themselves on the job, who have experience of practical management of machine-tractor stations, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes. If we do so, things will surely improve.'
>
> 'We must carry on a most ruthless campaign against bureaucracy and red tape.' (*Pravda*, March 21, 1954, from a speech at the Plenum of the CC of the Party, Feb. 23, 1954).
>
> 'It is essential to reduce considerably the amount of office correspondence, inflated book-keeping, to ruthlessly uproot bureaucracy, that paper style of management' (from a speech of Khrushchev's before the Supreme Soviet, April 26, 1954, *Pravda*, April 27).

The organizational measures of the post-Stalin period for coming to grips with the backwardness of agriculture, measures which apparently Khrushchev himself, since he inspired them, bears the main responsibility, not only do not uproot but rather fortify bureaucracy. The reduction in the number of kolkhozes, theoretically advantageous for the mechanization of agriculture as well as for its management and control, will remove the administration of the kolkhozes still further from the peasants and will diminish personal responsibility in work to even a greater extent than was the case before. It will also complicate the apparatus of management and control as regards the hierarchy, in that responsibility for success will fall not only to the kolkhoz administration but also to the M.T.S.s and to party organizations.

One must not forget that every kolkhoz, since it is in fact not an independent co-operative (*artel*) as officially characterized but one of the economic agencies of the government, must fulfill a certain part of the state agricultural plan and follow without deviations instructions and directives of the state and party organizations.

> 'The artel binds itself to conduct its collective farming according to plan, observing exactly the plans of agricultural production drawn up by the agencies of the workers' and peasants' government and the duties of the artel toward the government.
>
> The artel shall accept for precise execution the programs of sowing, fallow ploughing, weeding, harvesting, threshing, and autumn ploughing prescribed in consideration of the

conditions and peculiarities of collective farms, and also the government plan for the development of stockbreeding.' (Art. 6 of the Standard Charter of an artel). [1]

The land offices of the Ministry of Agriculture, the District Agricultural Bureaus, the executive committees of the district soviets, and, naturally, the village soviets, are all agencies to whose supervision collective farms are subject. The M.T.S.s are thus not the only leading agencies which stand over the kolkhozes; they are, in turn, subordinated in the multilevel structure of the Soviet administrative apparatus [2]. Their staffs have been significantly increased and strengthened quantitatively:

'Over 20,000 engineers and technicians have come to the M.T.S.s. from industry and other branches of the economy. In answer to the appeal of the Party, tens of thousands of tractor and combine operators, drivers and other skilled workers have returned to the M.T.S.s for work on kolkhozes.' (*Pravda*, Jan. 30, 1954).

'The volume of construction on the M.T.S.s for 1954 has been increased six times in comparison with 1953.' (ibid).

The M.T.S.s, however, have not become 'collective employers' or 'managers'. In their new aspect, they bear a greater responsibility, they are better equipped, but, as we have seen from the facts cited above concerning harvest operations, they remain joined with the total organization.The elimination of various unforseen complications which hamper success does not depend on them.

Do the economic results of 'socialist property' correspond to the capital outlays and those sacrifices made by the population for the development of industry? Economists can best make judgements about that. But so far as agriculture is concerned, the Soviet government itself, in the persons of Malenkov and Khrushchev, has acknowledged the catastrophic failure. For all the expenditures which the people have made the increase in productivity from 1940 through 1952 amounts to only ten per cent, as was reported by Khrushchev to the Plenum of the CC of the

[1] Since 1956, kolkhozes have been given some freedom in disposing their land under the supervision of course of the M.T.S.s

[2] The system of the control over the organs controlling the collective farms is well described in the voluminous work by Prof. W. W. Kulski, *The Soviet Regime. Communism in Practice.* pp. 644–650; see also Guins, *Soviet Law*, pp. 131–33, and corresponding footnotes.

Party at a meeting Sept. 3, 1953; that is beyond doubt an indication of failure.

In the course of twenty years, the fundamental ailments have not been cured. So complicated an apparatus arises on the foundation of 'state' and 'cooperative socialist' property, and responsibility becomes so dispersed among the innumerable offices, that all efforts to correct the unsatisfactorily functioning system have been, as we have seen, without result.

On February 8, 1955, Malenkov in his momentous confession of failure acknowledged the lagging behind in agriculture as the result of his *personal* inexperience.

7. *A Stake on Virgin Soil*

The measures which the Soviet government of the post-Stalin period applied to surmount the agriculture crisis acquired an alarmist character, especially after Khrushchev took upon himself the top-level administration of the program to restore agricultural efficiency. All the measures he instituted were carried out on the widest scale and with the greatest urgency.

The upturning of virgin soil was given a position of prime importance in this scheme of enactments. The settlement of vast stretches of virgin lands could not help but seem a merciful way out of the agriculture crisis. However, the achievement of such a plan was hardly so easy a matter as Khrushchev apparently thought when he dispatched droves of people to the steppes of Kazakhstan with the same abruptness with which, in the earlier 'voluntary' merger of kolkhozes, he intended to displace farmers from long-settled areas and move them into non-existent 'agrotowns.'

The upturning of virgin soil, in the sense of the utilization of uncultivated and uninhabited lands for settlement and cultivation, is not a new thing in Russia. It had been achieved by migration both as a matter of natural and unguided colonization and of the organized and officially supported settlement of unexploited lands. In the second instance, it was achieved with the necessary circumspection and after fundamental preparation. Regions designated for settlement were thoroughly studied by professional agronomists and then, in the event that they were acknow-

ledged suitable lands, provision was made for water. Wells were dug, the quality of the water was tested, and the sufficiency of sub-soil water for water supply was determined. Next, thoroughfares were built and construction materials shipped to specially designated and equipped bases. And only after all these preparatory measures were representatives (*khodoki*) invited from villages where the available arable land was scarce to become acquainted with the conditions of life and farming. If the representatives acknowledged the lands and the climatic conditions suitable, they themselves made known to their fellow villagers their observations and conclusions; and then those who were willing packed up and, in a real sense, voluntarily set out for the new territories. They were given the means to build homes and supplied on credit with agricultural machinery; the means for building schools and churches were provided. A few years later, practically every one of the newly created settlements was transformed into a thriving community. When the new settlers wrote back home about the life, their example was followed by other members of their families and total strangers, inspired by the example and the success of those who preceded them.

During the years before the First World War and the Revolution, 2 or 3 hundreds of thousands of families, i.e. up to a million people a year, crossed over the Ural range on their way to new settlement regions. Special officials were appointed to render assistance. At several juncture points, stop-over stations were erected where migrants could rest, do their laundry, get medical aid, if necessary, receive information about the road ahead, and send news back to the friends and family they had left behind at home. Everything was arranged to lighten the journey, to encourage the people and to help them maintain their health and strength.

Is that how it is done these days? Were the lands first studied, were preparations made to enable to live there—water supply, hospitals, living quarters? The very size of the territory being settled is in itself evidence of the fact that there was no such preparation and couldn't have been. The exploitation of virgin soil comes about as a matter of necessity and orders from the authority in power. Administrative and technical posts are filled by officials displaced from their jobs in the course of a reduction

of the staff in central and local institutions. They are furnished financial aid and given generous 'promises.' So far as what they receive at their destinations is concerned, we have no exact information. However, newspaper reports in the Soviet press give certain indirect indications. For example, it was reported that five thousand cots were sent out for eight thousand of these displaced officials. How they were supposed to distribute these cots is a challenge to the imagination: a cot cannot be cut up into pieces, and even so, in that state they could hardly be used for what they were intended. From other reports we discover that young people who set out for virgin soil in a movement of 'enthusiasm' dictated them from above—although, to be sure, one can allow that it was in part also a result of that authentic outburst of enthusiasm characteristic of young people,—were living in tents. It is possible to spend the summertime in tents on the Kazakhstan steppes as the nomads do. But are they provided with water? How do they live in the winter? Some newspaper photos give evidence of the fact that houses are being built. It is common knowledge, however, that construction plans have not been fully achieved anywhere. Besides, for surviving the winter season even in completed houses there is still necessary fuel supply. During the winter on the steppes there are severe frosts. And the fact remains that, even in the cities, the inhabitants of the Soviet Union cannot rely upon a regular fuel supply.

How reliable is the new settlers' supply of foodstuffs? In one of the newspapers it was reported that new settlers received an adequate supply of tea and sugar. For the Soviet inhabitant that is a rare treat. However, the trouble is that there are no tea kettles to be had. For the most part, kerosene was available—also a precious item not accessible to everyone—but there are no lamps. The settlers complain about the lack of troughs and kitchen utensils, although, as a matter of fact, there is no special need for the latter anyhow. There are few provisions to be found in the mobile stores and food is prepared in mobile community kitchens. Yet, it is a known fact that, if people are required to do heavy physical labor, they need more than just bread, they need vegetables and meat as well. Where is this to be obtained when there is an outstanding lack of vegetables and meat throughout the entire Union? And as for tooth brushes, thread, pencils and

envelopes, in order to obtain such items one has to travel over 500 miles away to Magnitogorsk.

Such is the situation. One can imagine how many people became ill and permanently lost their health, how many did not manage to survive. Do the economic results justify the sacrifices made? Is the mass resettlement plan expedient from the economic point of view?

The economic results of mass resettlement and of the transfer of huge quantities of machinery and great numbers of agronomists to steppe regions will be, one can be quite certain, insignificant in comparison to the sacrifice in terms of people and technological materials. The expedient exploitation of uncultivated lands requires no less serious a preparation than as was the case in the tsarist times of organized resettlement. All those difficulties which exist in European Russia with regard to the efficient use of tractors and combines and which have to do with repair, spare part supply, fuel provisions, harvesting operations, properly timed threshing, grain storage and so forth, will be no less strongly felt in the Asiatic parts of the nation.

According to the official statistics for 1954, settlement of uninhabited lands satisfied expectations since the gross output of grain within the borders of the Asiatic Regions and Republics showed some surplus. It is possible that later statistical reports will be promising as well. However, what is reported by Soviet newspapers in their day to day news reports is not cheerful by any means. For instance, a reader need only leaf through *Pravda* for the month of August, when the grain harvest is in process, and before his eyes will develop a picture of such mismanagement, such inefficient organization of labor and supply, such constant stoppages and losses, that all belief in the success of the feat undertaken, and in the justification for the human sacrifices and sufferings which this feat required, completely disappears.

For example, a report comes from the fertile Altai territory to say that combine repair was not completed in time for reaping operations, that out of 460 storehouses and sheds for grain storage only a few dozen were built, that 40 powerful grain-drying and cleaning set-up elevators had to be constructed, but that construction was also held up. (*Pravda* August 3, 1955). Twenty new sovkhozes have been created in the territory, encompassing

hundreds of thousands of hectares of virgin land, but the Ministry of Sovkhozes neglected to furnish these farms with harvesting equipment. The construction of essential buildings is also coming along unsatisfactorily.

Later it was reported that the harvest was slow in a number of places in Altai. Grain storage is poorly organized, especially on virgin lands where there is no mechanical apparatus for unloading grain (*Pravda*, August 29).

In Kirghiz republic the harvest of grain is sluggish. Grain losses grow with every passing day. Harvesting operations are organized in an extremely unsatisfactory manner (*Pravda* August 17, p. 2). At the beginning of September, the same newspaper reported that, with rain falling in the Kazakh SSR, shipment and storage of grain were nevertheless poorly organized and delays occurred with the result that the grain was spoiled (*Pravda*, September 3).

At the same time, news items of a like nature come out of other areas: familar complaints about the tardiness of farm machinery repair, the lack of organization in grain shipment for threshing, exposure of harvested crops to rainy weather, pile-up of crops in open places due to the lack of barns and sheds, poor quality harvesting leaving grain still in the fields, and every possible kind of crop loss. These sombre reports are printed in great numbers and refer to a considerable number of regions so that, upon the most careful perusal, there can only be one conclusion: substantial improvements have not been achieved[1].

Included in Khrushchev's plan are the alternation of grain and corn crops, on an area spreading over almost half the territory of the nation, and improvement in cultivation methods. The ideas which lie at the bases of these plans are not devoid of sense. However, the means to their achievements is just as rash, just as poorly thought out as the plan for the utilization of arid regions without preliminary preparation and without proceeding in gradual stages. In an effort to follow prescripts, corn has been planted even in places where it cannot grow. As for the new method of cultivation, it was introduced following the experiments of the agronomist, Maltsev, which had had successful

[1] Khrushchev has acknowledged at the XXth Party Congress that the results of the cultivation of unexploited lands did not meet the expectations (see below Ch. XVIII pp. 258–260).

results in many areas. However, the significance of his innovations is in all likelihood overevaluated. Here is what one specialist has to say about this matter:

> 'Maltsev proposed a deep plowing once every four or five years using a special plow without a molboard. During the remaining years the soil was to be subjected to a shallow disking to a depth of 7 to 10 centimeters. Sowing took place on stubble ground that had been disked but not plowed.
>
> 'The Central Committee of the Party has been fostering the Maltsev method on hundreds of thousands of hectares... farmers are being exhorted to adopt the new system regardless of the soil and climatic conditions. However the Maltsev system is by no means a panacea for all Soviet agricultural ills. Chiefly, the method does not have a scientific basis. In essence it is only a method of working the soil ... The application of the Maltsev system to all types of soil and climatic conditions is doomed to failure.' [1]

Chapter 7

TRADE

The Soviet State is the exclusive exporter and importer and almost the only trader within the country. Receiving grain, vegetables, dairy products, hides, wool, etc. as taxes from the kolkhozes, and having at its disposal all industrial products, the state cannot be bankrupt. And, conversely, it can take any profit it likes since it sets prices freely.

One should note that, besides state trade, some kinds of private trade have been permitted. There are so-called 'free' markets where farmers have the right to sell their surplus products at any price determined by a free agreement between seller and buyer. They have no right to sell outside those markets and cannot use any 'middleman' (speculators). Kolkhozes, in turn, have the right to sell surpluses at prices not exceeding average prices established for state trade. Citizens are also permitted to buy and sell, 'from hand to hand', used wearing apparel or, occasionally, new articles at the official city markets. The sellers, however, must present their passports, pay the regular admission fee of

[1] *Vestnik Instituta po Izucheniiu Istorii i Kultury SSSR.* (*Forschungsinstitut.* Muenchen) No. 2, 1955, p. 131.

twenty kopecks, and obtain a permit 'to sell from hand to hand'. In order to prevent any speculation, the prices asked by these private traders may not be higher than those in government shops. Violation of these rules as well as secret trade are punished by imprisonment or heavy fines (Decree of August, 22, 1932, concerning the prosecution of speculation; U.S.S.R. Collection of Laws, 1932, No. 65, text 375).

Of the forms of private trade described, that of the citizens, consisting mostly of second-hand goods, cannot have any substantial significance. As for the kolkhoz markets, they undoubtedly can substantially improve the conditions of both the urban and the rural population. It depends, however, on the size of the surpluses, on which members of the kolkhozes may dispose of them, and on their interest in selling them, since peasants cannot buy the goods they need in the city if the city markets are empty.

The communist creed is inimical to the 'free market'development and for that reason the government raised the socalled agricultural tax paid by farmers from the income they received apart from their share in the kolkhoz economy. Profit received from the selling of products on the free market belongs, certainly, to this additional income. Consequently, up to recent times the Soviet government undertook all possible measures to pump all surpluses of agricultural products into the States' stocks. For that purpose, the government has developed the net of the 'selpo', village consumers' cooperative stores. They had to purchase agricultural products in exchange for various manufactured goods and commodities which otherwise it was impossible to get because of shortages.

The State trade remained nevertheless essentially monopolistic. According to the plan of retail trade for 1947, the turnover of co-operative trade constituted but seven per cent of State trade in cities and about twenty per cent in villages (*Pravda*, April 21, 1947). It is indicative also that revenue from the turnover (sales) tax is the principal source of state revenue in the U.S.S.R. In 1947, it amounted to about 58 per cent and in 1954 to about 41 per cent of the whole amount of state revenues. In 1956 it amounted to 270.6 billion roubles, or 46 per cent of revenues. The Soviet government is not, of course, a speculator. In levying taxes, it aims at covering its expenses and providing for the pressing

needs of the population. But, if the first task is being carried out successfully, the second is still very far from a satisfactory solution. The development of light industry, i.e., the production of articles of prime necessity, lags far behind the actual needs of the population, and the productivity of agriculture does not correspond to the capital outlay on its development. This was flatly acknowledged by the Soviet government itself.

1. *Shortcomings of the State trade*

In the report presented by the Minister of Trade of the Soviet Union, Mikoyan, to the All-Union Soviet Conference of Trade Officials in October 17, 1953, it was stated:

> '...one must say in all bluntness that trade still lags behind the rapidity of the growing demands of the population... It is necessary to raise the level of all trade workers to the requirements and tasks of today's Soviet trade... within the next two to three years it will be possible to buy all necessary items in every city and every rural district ... in many places we still have a shortage of meat, sausages, animal fats and fish...'

Mikoyan did not say anything new. Soviet officials and newspapers could not help describing various shortcomings of Soviet trade for years and did so even more eloquently. For example, according to the report of I. A. Vlasov, who was then the Chairman of the Budget Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. the largest among the sixteen Union Republics of the Soviet Union:

> 'In 1945 the trade organizations of the republic failed to measure up to the state budget, according to the accounts, by a sum of 355 million roubles or 26.6 per cent of the estimates. In a number of regions (*oblasti*) ... a significant portion of the working capital was invested in goods of bad quality and in goods difficult to market.' (*Izvestia*, June 23, 1946).

The situation became worse due to the bureaucracy characteristic of the entire Soviet system. While at the oilbase in Arkhangelsk there are large stores of oil, the population remained without kerosene because of disagreements among the numerous commercial organizations, the 'torgs, urses, and orses.' (Urs—workers'

supply department; Ors-workers' supply section) (*Izvestia*, February 2, 1947).

After four years of war, during which supplies for the population were, naturally, reduced to a minimum, the needs of the people became especially acute. Soviet newspapers reflected the seriousness of the situation, devoting leading articles to the question of domestic trade, and the government promised an improvement in supply and a reduction of prices. However, in the years which have elapsed, no essential improvement could be observed.

At the beginning of January, 1948, the commercial director of Mostorg, Moscow's largest department store, published an extremely critical article in *Trud*, the trade union newspaper.

He pointed out that for the full value Soviet rouble, since the revolution in December 1947, the customer insisted upon a better quality of goods.

Meanwhile, factories continued to supply his store with large amounts of inferior merchandise and did not even begin to satisfy the demand for many commodities.

He gave some striking examples. For instance, in one lot of 20,000 pairs of shoes from the Paris Commune factory 25 per cent proved to be below standard.

In a lot of 5,000 pairs of women's shoes from the Burevestnik factory almost a third were defective. The same was true of a consignment of rubber footwear from the Red Bogatyr and Red Triangle factories.

A large amount of cloth was sent back to the famous Three Mountain textile factory because of poor quality.

'Notwithstanding the large appropriations for the production of electric vacuum cleaners and refrigerators,' he wrote, 'these extremely necessary household appliances are not being manufactured anywhere at present.'

Still more disappointing is the fact that during the spring of 1948 there was a critical shortage of bread in Moscow. Thereupon the Minister of Trade was fired. The government was evidently not satisfied with the results of the development of trade in general and of cooperative trade in particular.

At the All-Union Congress of Consumers' Cooperatives in May 1948, the Chairman of the Presidium of the *Tsentrosoyuz* (All-

Union Cooperative Organization), I. Khokhlov, reported that in 1947 the retail trade of the consumers' cooperatives doubled in comparison with 1945, while in the occupied territories it increased 2.2 times.

The amount of cotton, linen, woollen and silk fabrics, ready made clothes, knitted goods, and various types of industrial goods sold in the rural areas in 1947 was 63.2 per cent more than in 1946.

These figures are not very impressive, especially when one takes into consideration that the difference is 'in comparison with 1945,' the last year of the War, and that many of the figures are for regions that 'had been subjected to occupation.'

At the same Congress, many discouraging facts were cited. One speaker related that, in a certain village, suits received for selling were of small sizes and not suitable for farmers.

Another complained that everywhere in the villages there was still a shortage of scythes, sickles, ropes and other articles of daily use. Again and again reference was made to the inferior quality and inadequate assortment of goods.

After the adjournment of the Congress *Pravda* in the editorial of May 29, 1948 concluded:

> 'Problems raised by the Party and the Government before the Consumers' cooperatives are far from being solved. The reorganization, which was started in accordance with the Government's decision, has not yet been accomplished. Neither the villages nor the cities are developing their trade on the scale which the Party and the Government demand.'

On June 24, 1948 the same paper reported that in Donbas it was very difficult to get hair brushes, shoebrushes, toothbrushes, suspenders, belts, glasses, knives, handkerchiefs, ties, tape measures etc.

If even a small bicycle part was lost it could not be replaced.

'Our trade,' complained a certain comrade Ivanov from the Donbas, 'is in a hopelessly muddled state.'

In 1954, Soviet papers described the same discomfiting picture of shortages and the intolerable disorganization of trade in the Soviet Union.

> 'In Alma Ata shops customers look in vain for good-quality foot-wear. But the shelves are bursting with nonmarketable boots and shoes.'

'Groceries in Stalinsk sell only cotton oil, while shops of the local URS and the Kuznetsky Metallurgical Kombinate sell only sunflower oil, and some others only soya-oil. This is so because the Kemerovo base supplies oil by cisterns while trade organizations do not have sufficient credits at their disposal for purchasing more than a single cistern and are thus compelled to sell only a certain kind of oil.' (*Trud*, Editorial of January 6, 1954).

'In the dry-goods department of the *Univermag* there is shortage of a hundred items ... there are 327 items in the price-list of the Kharkov transport-machine building plant which is producing aluminium ware also. However, the plant delivers only pans of four sizes, small dishes and jugs. One cannot find in Kharkov even ordinary tin dishes, little brushes for cleaning bottles, or asbestos wicks for gas-lamps, or mailboxes.' (*Trud*, January 7, 1954, p. 2).

'One cannot find in the shops of the industrial enterprises (in Asbest of the Sverdlovsk region) even such goods as toothpowder, razor blades, buttons, ordinary school pens; ...in shop No. 12 there are no cigarettes; in No. 34 for a long time there have been no sandals, socks, neckties, needles, etc.' (*Trud*, May 12, 1954).

Shvernik, president of the All-Union Council of Trade-Unions reported to the XIth Congress of the Trade-Unions on June 7, 1954, that

'The inspection of the shops in the Bobruisk, Lida and Homel regions of the Byelorussian S.S.R. has disclosed that there was no salt, matches, cereals or other necessities while these goods were available in the warehouses.'

The delegate Vasiutochkin from the Kustanai region reported at the same Congress that the M.T.S.s working on the virgin lands are not supplied with provisions and other necessary products. The newspaper *Trud* published, in turn, (on August 4) the following correspondence.

'There are stocks of threads, needles, buttons and soap in the trade base of the Akmolinsk Regional Union of the Consumers' co-operatives. Why then are there no such commodities in the shops of the sovkhozes 'Svobodny', 'Moskovsky', 'Krasivensky', 'Ostrovsky', and others?'

'In cooperative shops you can find old stocks of cigarettes of a high quality and wet, and makhorka (inferior kind of tobacco) as hard as stone, and childrens' feltboots and jackboots. Nobody needs them.'

'Many new sovkhozes are located on the shores of rivers and lakes. There is such a lot of fish there that it seems to be possible to fish using one's hands. But there is no fish in the cookshops.'

Almost identical are the complaints published in the same paper concerning the unsatisfactory conditions of trade in the Stalingrad region:

'Warehouses of the Voroshilov Regional Union of the Consumers' co-operatives are packed with goods. At the same time, one cannot find sometimes the most necessary commodities in the shops. Inhabitants of a village, Abhonerovo, experience not infrequently a shortage of kerosene, although it may be found in the regional store. There were also hitches in the supply of salt, considerable stocks of which lay for a long time at the near-by station. In general, the best goods, especially perishable ones, never reach the rural shops; they are not being moved from the regional center.'

'The Regional Union of Co-operatives does not satisfy the economic needs of kolkhozes. It doesn't have even hayforks or ropes. To get wheels farmers have to go to the adjoining Astrakhan region.''

'A hitch in supply is occuring as regards salt, tobacco, soap, and kerosene.' (*Trud*, June 29, 1954, p. 2).

While the rural population is not supplied satisfactorily with the products of manufacture, cities and towns, in turn, are not supplied sufficiently with agricultural products.

'In Riazan on October 2 only crude buckwheat and second rate tomatoes were sold. In the shop window one could see carrots and beets, but the stocks of these were sold out the day before.' (*Izvestia*, October 22, 1954, p. 2).

Besides shortages of all kinds of necessities and commodities, the discouraging picture of the Soviet trade is characterized by extremely low quality of goods. This fact is also acknowledged by the government and, consequently, by the newspapers. According to Shvernik's report to the XIIth Plenum of the VTsSPS,

'Bad quality footwear for 461 thousand roubles was returned to the shoe-factory 'Labor Commune.'

'During nine months of 1953 about fifteen per cent of the

> fabrics delivered from The Moscow Cotton Products Factory to the trade organizations were rejected as imperfect.'
> 'The Kuznetsk shoe-factory got back from the net of trade organizations about four thousand pairs of footwear and more than twenty five thousand pairs were revaluated as the lowest quality goods.'
> 'The central Univermag (Department store) returned to the Otekhovo Cotton. Factories Kombinate various goods for more than one and a half million roubles.' (*Trud*, January 9, 1954).

On July 6, 1954, *Izvestia* published an article in which a reference was made to an example of bad quality production:

> 'The Sverdlovsk base of the Wholesale Clothing Trade (*Glavtorgodezhda*) had been supplied with 1,321 pair of pants and 1,144 of them were returned for mending as imperfect. Out of an assortment of fifty products stamped as first-rate goods, none corresponded to the specification of the first-rate goods. A certain part was acknowledged to be improper for selling, and others were reevaluated as second and third rate goods.'

2. *Mobilization of co-operatives*

The Soviet government cannot remain indifferent to the irregularities of supply to the population and various measures have been undertaken for eliminating them.

The Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. in its decree of November 9, 1946, decided to widen the circle of trading enterprises and to draw into trade the producer and consumer co-operatives, having charged them at the same time with the responsibility for the expansion of production of consumer goods and foodstuffs.

In taking this measure, the Soviet government anticipated that the co-operatives would be able to organize the exchange of commodities between city and village, buying surplus agricultural products in the village and directing to the village various kinds of manufactured articles. It was also expected that co-operation would attract to this work and, particularly, to the production of various consumer goods, the unemployed or not fully employed city dwellers, and would organize the production of such articles in those places where state industry is still

inadequately developed. (*Pravda*, November 11, 1946. No. 268).

The Soviet government expected also that the producers' co-operatives would be able to supply the village with various kinds of household instruments, ironware, knitted goods, etc., and articles which state industries did not produce at all or produced in insufficient quantity, and that the village would then give its surplus produce in exchange. Thus both village and city would gain. The government reckoned that development of the work of the co-operatives might be useful also in certain other respects. Part of the population would gain an opportunity for additonal earnings. In particular, casualties of World War II who were unsuited for work in factories might be attracted to work of the co-operative type. Part of the village population could devote its leisure to handicraft work for the improvement of its mode of life through the agency of co-operative trade. Various specialties and articles of an artistic character —furniture, embroidery, lace, different kinds of pickled and smoked foods, etc.,—would then appear on the market.

In connection with the government decree, M. Makarov, Minister of Trade of the U.S.S.R., published a long article in *Izvestia* (November 17, 1946, No. 270). In it a number of serious defects in Soviet trade were enumerated. He noted correctly the basic defect in Soviet trade from which all the rest followed: 'The directors of Soviet stores can be completely unconcerned over the fact that their stores may go bankrupt.' In fact, having no fear of bankruptcy, the stores purchase goods without taking account of demand, which results in an overstocking of millions of roubles worth of goods. However, the inferior quality of many goods is also a factor. Using long-term credit, Soviet stores are not interested in a rapid turnover and, as the Minister said, many goods lie in them for months without moving. The Minister, however, overlooked, or intentionally ignored the fact that some stores purposely delayed sales lest they be compelled to close their doors when the shelves were empty.

The Minister correctly noted another phenomenon characteristic of times of commodity scarcities and the absence of social control, namely, that some stores sold goods of wide consumption to various organizations for black-market distribution. It was very probably in such a manner that party and other influential

organs have been supplied with goods which average people could not get.

The Minister of Trade placed great hopes on the fact that, with the appearance of the new co-operative stores, competition would stimulate state trade also.

The government in 1947 bound the consumers' co-operatives to purchase one thousand tons of poultry, ten thousand tons of fish, 180 thousand boxes of eggs, five thousand tons of lard, 500 thousand tons of potatoes, 100 thousand tons of vegetables, fruit, dried fruit, berries, mushrooms, nuts and honey. These were to be sold in the city and the workers' settlements at prices set in local markets, no higher than those established for state commercial trade. At the same time, the consumers' co-operatives must begin the processing of agricultural products, and open sewing, shoe-making, and other shops.

The staff of the all-Russian union of invalids' co-operatives, '*Vsekoopinsoyuz*,' is located in Moscow on Voronskaya Street. It unites all unions of the provinces, regions, and autonomous republics and about three thousand artels. In 1947 the disabled veterans' co-operatives were assigned 50 million roubles for the development of new enterprises and the equipment of stores. Forty-one thousand disabled veterans of the Patriotic War began to work in the system of the co-operatives. (*Ogoniek*, No. 48–49, 1946).

In the article by the Minister of Trade we find the following expectations:

> 'Now in the cities and in the workers' settlements, the consumer and producer co-operatives and the disabled veterans' co-operatives, which dispose of significant quantities of consumer goods and which are able to mobilize additional resources of foodstuffs and manufactured articles, are approaching state trade in their network of stores, stalls, and stands.'
>
> 'The right to sell through their trade network has been given to the artels and associations of the producer co-operatives, to the disabled veterans' co-operatives, to the enterprises of regional industry and consumer co-operatives.' (*Izvestia*, November 17, 1946).

There was definitely a deliberate official optimism in these statements of the Minister. Where, indeed, can the co-operatives

obtain the significant quantities of consumer goods which, in the Minister's words, they are to dispose of? And where do kolkhozes get provision surpluses? There is no less optimism in the enlightening instructions which the Minister of Trade gives to the government shops. His entire program brings to mind those good intentions with which 'the road to hell is paved.'

> 'It is necessary,' according to him 1) "to stimulate production and try to obtain goods in the necessary assortment and of good quality; 2) to develop a progressive and well-equipped network of specialized stores selling conveniences, kitchenware, needlework, dry goods, etc. It is proposed to organize a network of comfortable stores and shops for the sale of fashionable clothes, linens, and shoes, particularly in Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Gorki and certain other cities; 3) for success in competition with the co-operatives, to strive for the 'honor and distinction' of their enterprises with regard to selection, quality, cultural (!) appearance of the stores, and improvement of service; 4) to develop such forms of trade as the acceptance of advance orders, home deliveries, gift shops, and the sale of piece goods; 5)to develop work on semi-finished and finished goods for sale to the population, as for example, hot-pads and embroidery; 6) to open a retail trade network, including retail trade of the type which once existed in Mosselprom; 7) to see to profitableness, the reduction of costs, and the increase of accumulations.'

It is difficult to say when it will be possible to carry out this great program. Probably even the Gosplan cannot set the exact date, but in 1946 great hopes were placed on the coming year. 'Next year will witness unprecedented strides in the development of the producers' co-operatives,' promised the administration. 'It is planned to increase the output of footwear, clothing, furniture, and other consumer goods, raising the total output of producers' co-operatives to 8,900 million roubles.' (*Moscow News*, December 1946).

The development of the co-operative movement has, in reality, been very slow. During 1946, no great success in the realization of co-operative trade was observed. In December the work of the co-operatives of the Moscow Oblast was admittedly unsatisfactory. The district consumers' association opened altogether only two stores and fifteen stalls in Moscow. According to newspaper reports, the assortment of goods was limited, the

shops and stores poorly equipped and not adapted for trade in wintertime. The prices on some goods were higher than the market price. (Editorial in *Izvestia*, December 17, 1946, No. 294).

Nor have hopes been realized in Kharkov. A number of stalls, owned by various artels and associations of producers' co-operatives, have appeared in the markets of Kharkov. Tinsmith, furriers, chemists, and metalworkers carry on trade in them. They sell buckets, cans, basins, portable iron stoves, putty, nails, locks, dry paints, fur collars, and other consumer goods. As for consumers' co-operatives, they purchased and sold to the population, in the period between the publication of the decree of the Council of Minister and the end of the year: 98 tons of meat, eight tons of vegetables, four tons of potatoes ,three tons of milk, 1,700 eggs, 700 kilograms of honey, and certain quantities of other products. It is necessary to note in addition that of the goods purchased only a few tons of meat and little else were obtained in Kharkov. More than eight thousand men work in the consumers' co-operatives. This means that for each worker one kilogram of vegetables, one-half kilogram of potatoes, a mug of milk, and a drop of honey is provided. And how much for customers? The figures speak for themselves.

It became still worse in 1947. A boom had followed the November, 1946, decision of the Government about the co-operative trade, but by 1947 this boom was already falling off.

> 'Out of 19.000 co-operative stores, shops, and stalls opened during the first half of 1947 only 3,500 were opened during the last three months, and out of 3,000 new co-operative eating houses only 300 were opened during the same period.'
>
> 'Many co-operative stores serve their customers unsatisfactorily.' 'In such a large industrial center as Magnitogorsk only 20 stalls were opened.' 'In the co-operative shops of Sverdlovsk, Zlatoust, and several other cities there are a lot of unmarketable goods, but no vegetables at all.' (*Izvestia*, August 15, 1947).

The newspaper *Pravda* harshly criticizes the methods of the co-operatives, who raised a great clamor over opening trading operations, but who, in fact, for the most part, were active only on paper. Certain co-operatives were carrying on trade where kolkhozes could also trade with success, in areas where there were neither cities nor workers' settlements. Others, fascinated by the

possibility of liberal travel allowances, sent their representatives to the most remote republics. Their agents hurried off to Kuban and Georgia; there were reports of agents being sent to Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, etc. Some others bought products in the communal market and then sold them from their stalls, as though from their own stock, while in fact they were simply passing the goods from hand to hand. Their quantity on the market is not increasing, but prices were being inflated. (*Pravda*, December 20, 1946, No. 300).

What was said concerning Moscow and Kharkov was probably fully applicable also to many other large cities. *Pravda*, January 6, 1947 and *Izvestia*, January 18, 1947 carried reports from other districts:

> 'From the reports and materials of the preliminary inquiry, performed on the spot by the Council of Ministers of the R.S.F.S.R., it has been brought to light that in the Penzenskaya and Molotovskaya provinces the decree of the government on the development of co-operative trade and increased production of consumers' goods is not being carried out satisfactorily.'

Particular hope has been placed on the expansion of the network of commercial eating-houses and tea-shops. But not all party organizations have really understood the work and undertaken it wholeheartedly:

> 'Co-operative trade in the cities and in the country as yet is developing slowly. In Kharkov, Molotov, Kiev, and a number of other cities the work on commercial eating-houses and tea-shops is being neglected.' (*Pravda*, January 6, 1947).

'The network of the new co-operative undertakings is developing ineffectively,' Zverev, Minister of Finance, testified before the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. (*Izvestia*, February 21, 1947, No. 44).

From the reports of the Soviet newspapers it was possible to reach the conclusion that the well-to-do groups of the Soviet urban population, i.e., the upper strata of Soviet bureaucracy, the party, and the army, originally gained most from the new policy. Only they have access to those things of which, for example, the magazine *Ogoniek*, transported with delight, writes:

> 'In Great Kharitonovski Lane exhibits of future (co-operative) products: knitted goods, bone lace, good shoes, furry bears, stylish dolls. We shall soon see them on the shelves of the stores. Our children will play with the wonderful toys and wear the fluffy sweaters. In our rooms will appear durable, beautiful furniture and comfortable beds.' (*Ogoniek*, No. 48–9, 1946).

In general co-operative trade cannot provide a significant improvement in the provisioning of the population until the kolkhozes can actually dispose of a large quantity of surplus foodstuffs and state industries are freed from the standardization connected with the constant development of heavy industries. This was authoritatively and accurately acknowledged by *Izvestia*: 'Development of Soviet trade is impossible unless we have more merchandise.' (Editorial, March 21, 1947).

3. *'Culture of trade'*

There were no essential changes for the better in the conditions of Soviet trade in 1953. Mikoyan's report and Soviet papers acknowledged that various troubles which were causing the Soviet government so much anxiety in 1946 and 1947 had not ceased to exist. And it is not a simple coincidence that Mikoyan's program was amazingly similar to the above cited program of his predecessor, Minister Makarov.

There is still a shortage of commodities, especially in the country, and of agricultural products, especially in the urban settlements. Assortment of goods is poor and, under the existing basic regulations, as Mikoyan reported, trade organizations are obliged to select goods in accordance with the contracted assortment, which is in fact a compulsory assortment. 'If a trade organization' said Mikoyan, 'does not accept any of the goods in the assortment contracted for at the center, this trade organization is not granted instead, other goods for which there is demand in the given district.' Such a limitation of choice is understandable, because the production of goods is limited itself, and many products are therefore not available at all. Mikoyan appealed to the trade personnel and suggested:

> 'Trade personnel have the obligation of presenting industry

> with the task of organizing production of new kinds of goods, of introducing new items, of constantly pressing industry to produce high-quality goods which are in demand among the public.' 'It is impossible,' he added, 'to tolerate further a situation in which a newly produced item at first is of the highest quality and then, when the producer's attention to it slackens, deteriorates in quality.'

Mikoyan's report gives good evidence that the Soviet government is aware of all defects of the existing system of trade, and again, as in 1946, the Minister of Trade solemnly asserted that within two or three years there would be essential improvements and even that 'it will be possible to buy all necessary items in every city and every rural district.'

Is there any chance that the Soviet government will fulfill its promise this time? No doubt the general conditions are at present more favorable than they were immediately after the end of the war. Production of commodities is certainly increased, the network of trade enterprises has essentially developed. More than 3,000,000 persons are employed in state and co-operative trade. 'This is a great army,' said Mikoyan in his report. The Minister of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R. reported on May 31, 1954 to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Republic that

> 'The sale of goods by the Consumers' Cooperatives which is responsible for the trade in rural districts increased twenty-five per cent during the first half and thrity-two per cent during the second half of 1953 as compared with the preceding 1952.' (*Trud*, June 1, 1954).

Yet there is still much to do. Production of both commodities and agricultural products is insufficient. Many products are unsatisfactory.

> 'It is impossible to go on tolerating light industry's output of textiles of monotonous, dull, gloomy colors and poor designs and patterns. Industry must produce textiles of bright, rich, attractive colors, and they must be color fast.' (From Mikoyan's report).

This is not all. Mikoyan emphasized also the necessity of better railroad service, in particular of using express freight trains for delivering some commodities and products; construction of new warehouses; and further development of the network of trade

enterprises, as the number of retail trade shops lags behind the increase of the sales volume.

Like Makarov earlier, Mikoyan did not forget to direct the attention of the responsible officials and co-operatives to the necessity of improving the service itself. They call it 'culture of trade' in the Soviet Union.

> 'Culture of trade', explained Mikoyan, 'means not only the attractive appearance of the store and cleanliness and order in the salesrooms and auxiliary premises, but attractive display of the entire rich and varied assortment of items and prompt sale, as well as providing services to the buyer in making alterations in ready-made clothes, in cutting cloth, in home delivery, etc.'

Referring to the existent practice, the Minister said:

> 'Frequently goods are carelessly wrapped in paper. In order to buy caviar, cottage cheese, clabber, honey and jam, the purchaser must bring his own container for buying these items ... Many trade workers disregard the fact that potatoes and vegetables are often dirty and have earth on them when sold, that greens are wilted, and that the customer has to bring a shopping bag when he comes to buy products. This is inadmissible.'

As we have seen already, neither various shortages nor various defects of trade service and supply were eliminated in 1954.

On January 16, 1954, *Pravda* in an editorial reproached trade employees for continuing to allow various enterprises to supply bad quality goods. On August 6, 1954, *Izvestia* disapproved editorially of employees who not only do not insist on the delivery of goods products but even defend the unfair contractors.

Another great shortcoming is the unreasonable distribution of goods on hand and the practice of compulsory assortment.

> '*Tsentrosoiuz* (The Central Union of Cooperatives) is planning distribution of goods unreasonably. Some bases are often glutted with unmarketable goods ... Leningrad base of the Textiltorg compels village-shops to accept unseasonal goods of which the customer has actually no need together with the seasonal goods. Knit fabrics, for example, one can get only together with low rated stockings and socks.' (*Trud*, April 10, 1954, p. 2).

Conditions of supply are especially unfavorable in the remote

parts of the country. Tractor operators tilling virgin and idle lands, have to interrupt their work to get tobacco, cigarettes, matches and soap. A correspondent of *Trud* informs us that a tractor-brigade, working thirty kilometers away from a village, no longer got supplies when the motorized shop (*avtolavka*) went out of existence. 'The Chairman of the regional union of the consumer co-operatives explained: marketable goods sell out quickly. Then why go to all the bother about it!' (*Trud*, June 29, 1954, p. 2).

It sounds almost sarcastic for *Pravda*, after having published an article entitled 'Trade without capitalists and speculators' to characterize a chronic ailment of Soviet trade:

> 'Unfortunately we still have many trade workers who handle matters in their charge unsatisfactorily. In a number of places the faulty practice of mechanically distributing goods throughout provinces and districts has not been eliminated, with the result that there are large surpluses of goods in one place and shortages in another ... Trade is unsatisfactorily handled in a number of rural districts.' (*Pravda*, Editorial, July 8, 1953).

One year later, on July 6, 1954, *Izvestia* in its editorial acknowledged the same kinds of irregularities in distribution, obstructing the supply of daily necessities .At the conference of delegates of the consumers' co-operatives in Moscow in July, 1954, (see *Izvestia*, July 1 to 4, 1954) Yusupov, Chairman of the Uzbek union of consumers' co-operative, criticized the existing system of planning orders and distribution of goods. He said that the Tsentrosoiuz was not sufficiently familiar with the economy and demands of the individual republics and regions and that as a result 'orders for textiles, clothing and footwear had been changed eight times.'

Another delegate, Chernov, criticized the activity of the whole basis of the Ministry of Trade which did not secure unloading of the delivered goods, violated contracts regarding assortment, and even executed their other obligations unsatisfactorily.

Trade organizations, like everything else in the Soviet Union, are no strangers to that gnawing vice of the Soviet system, bureaucracy. *Izvestia*, criticizing the Ukrainian trade apparatus, asserted that out of 56 employees of the *Ukrnarpit'a* (office of the

people's nutrition in Ukraine Republic) not more than five or six were working conscientiuosly. In Kiev, where from time to time one cannot buy matches, salt, kerosene, and some other necessities the stream of paper from the Ministry is so great that the officials in the departments and sections have no time to make acquaintance with trade practices even under their very noses. In the meantime the apparatus of the Ukrainian Ministry of Trade 'consists of more than 160,000 employees.' (*Izvestia*, October 28, 1954, p. 2).

Bureaucracy apparently exists in the co-operative organizations, too. This has been indicated indirectly by the Minister of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R., Fadeev, who reported to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic that the losses of the government's *torgi* amounted to 198.6 million and losses of consumer-co-operatives to 567.5 million roubles because of high overhead expenses and business mismanagement (*Trud*, June 1, 1954). At the conference of delegates of the consumers' co-operatives, Ivolgin and some other delegates suggested a possible way to cut down the staff of co-operative organs (*Izvestia*, Reports of the Conference, July 1 tot 4, 1954).

Some problems of the unsatisfactory organization of trade were discussed also at the XIth Congress of the Trade Unions in Moscow in June, 1954. Liniaeva, President of the Saratov Regional Committee of the Trade Union of Workers of Consumer Co-operatives, acknowledged various shortcomings of the co-operative trade, not only lack of knowledge of demand, but the facts of 'false measurement, wrong weight and cheating in counting'. But she added reasonably that

> 'A cultural trade requires first of all well equipped premises ... half the sovkhoz-stores have to be reconstructed ... Wrapping paper is supplied scantily. The trade net is badly equipped.'

The most desperate criticism of the trade system one can find, however, in the Resolution of the Plenum of the Ts. C. of the CPSU of June 24, 1954. It reprimanded both the government's organs and the co-operatives.

> 'As a result of the extremely unsatisfactory leadership of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry, of the *Tsen-*

> *trosoiuz* and the Ministry of Supply, the purchase of husbandry products is being carried out unsuccessfully; contracts for the sale of milk, meat, and wool are not concluded with many kolkhozes, and, on the other hand, kolkhozes cannot purchase necessary goods in exchange for products sold by them because they are not delivered in time in many regions. *Tsentrosoiuz* and its local organs unsatisfactorily manage the business laid upon them of barter trade with kolkhozes, do not suppress squandering and misassignment of specially singled-out goods, and allow the kolkhozes to get considerably into debt with regard to the purchase of manufactured goods, especially of tracks, roofing and other goods and do not take necessary measures for furnishing kolkhozes with containers for packing and shipping the products of their provisions.' (*Trud*, June 27, 1954, p. 3).

On July 1, 1954, the message of the Ts.C. of the CPSU and Council of Ministers addressed to the IVth Congress of Representatives of the U.S.S.R. Consumers' Co-operatives, was published in the Soviet papers. Co-operatives were invited to radically improve existing systems of supplying rural settlements with commodities and to take all possible measures for satisfying their growing demands. It was emphasized, also, as an urgent goal, that co-operatives must exploit the vast possibilities at their disposal for obtaining from kolkhozes additional stocks of provisions for the urban population.

Naturally the Congress resolved that

> 'All consumers' co-operative organizations must take as the basis of their further work the directives of the Party and the Council of Ministers ... and eliminate grave shortages ... guarantee unconditionally fulfillment of state plans for procurement and purchases of farm products and raw materials, and strengthen and extend contractual relations with collective farms for purchasing farm products and selling to kolkhozes the goods which they need.' (*Pravda* and *Izvestia*, July 8, 1954).

However, all news relating to the second half of 1954 leaves no doubt that no essential improvements were accomplished. It is impossible to eliminate at once all the described shortcomings; to increase production of agriculture and light industry and to raise the quality of production, to improve conditions of transportation and supply for securing it in all villages and remote parts of the spacious country, to reconstruct trade premises and warehouses,

to reduce trade expenses and to eliminate bureaucratic attitudes toward business and even misuses which are the result of the necessity of completing the economic plan and of deriving profit. Trade Inspection *Glavurs* (Chief Administration of Workers' Supply) disclosed that 95 out of 513 enterprises of the Ministry of Chemical Industry applied incorrect and unverified measuring instruments.

> 'In store No. 11 of the ORS of Yaroslavl dowel factory and in some other stores goods have been sold for illegally raised prices and first class goods were replaced with poorer class goods.' (*Trud*, Editorial, August 12, 1954).

During 1953 and 1954, the Soviet government more noticeably improved supply to the upper classes of the population. It was certainly easier to increase production of bicycles, television sets, electric refrigerators, stamped aluminum utensils, metal bedsteads, chocolate and chocolate items and cookies, than production of footwear of all sizes and all kinds, of buttons, pins, needles and other practically innumerable items of daily use of which every citizen is in need.

For better publicity, the Soviet government has established an excellent State Department store, GUM (*Gosudarstvennyi Universalnyi Magazin*) in Moscow. How much it corresponds to the needs of common people may be decided on the ground of the following description in a Soviet paper:

> 'Beauty shops are being opened, and shoe shops and shops for ready-made clothes, perfumes, art objects and jewellry ... In the ladies' model footwear shop, a special X-ray apparatus is used for checking whether a shoe fits well ... The shop is artisticially decorated. Here, dresses of various fashions are shown on rotating displays ... On the first floor is located the grocery department "Gastronom". Floors are made of marble, walls decorated with paintings, ceilings are glass plate ..." (*Trud*, January 13, 1954).

4. Why the private trade?

In Mikoyan's report and in a number of articles in the Soviet press one can read that

> 'Only in socialist society does there appear the possibility of establishing rationally organized trade with low overhead

and operating charges and based on genuine concern for the interests of the consumer.'

The real facts do not confirm that purely theoretical and over optimistic point .On the contrary, the real facts lead one to believe that private initiative and free economy based on the risk of the traders and their competition give better results for lower prices as regards the satisfaction of people's needs.

In economic and social literature, the trader, as such, had to bear the brunt of much critical abuse. He was characterized as a typical parasite, a useless and unnecessary intermediary whose profits lay heavily on the shoulders of the consumer. This point of view was easily taken for granted by the common man who was consequently a grateful subject for demagogic propaganda.

However, the Soviet experiment demonstrates all the inconveniences attached to the elimination of private trade. It has created first of all such a centralization of distribution that nobody could get anything without standing in line for hours. Soviet citizens are more than familiar with this wearisome waste of time. Sometimes they had to start standing in line in the middle of the night so as not to miss the moment when the doors of the state shop open in the morning to avoid being told that the required article or commodity is out of stock and being doomed to repeat the annoying experience. But, since the government increased the number of the distributing centers and shops, at least in the large cities, another fact has become obvious: overhead costs increased, too, and there was no difference for customers between the profit earned by retail traders before the revolution and the expenses of the state for keeping a numerous staff of employees in so far as they had to cover the overhead expenses of the store. At the same time it became evident that private traders served customers much better than the state's employees.

The retail-trader, like any entrepreneur, has to compete with other retail-traders and is subject to the risk of loss. He knows that he may secure a profit only if he succeeds in providing his potential customer with goods of the best quality and is able to satisfy his needs and tastes at the lowest possible prices. He cannot transfer his losses to the shoulders of his customers. Neither can he force a compulsory assortment on them and abuse trade regulations, as proved to be the practice in some Soviet shops.

On the contrary, he is willing to indulge the caprices of his customers, satisfying their individual demands, arranging credit, delivering goods to their homes, sending out information about various novelties, and fulfilling their orders. [1]

The substitution of the store run by the government or cooperative for the private trader brought about limitation both in distribution of goods and in their assortment. It is quite impossible for a planned economy to provide the population with all the items which one can find in any five- and ten-cent store in countries of unfettered economy. It would be a superhuman task to work out such a plan, to produce and distribute all those items. The state can only establish one or several GUMs, as a kind of exhibition, satisfying the needs of its upper classes and tantalizing the masses.

In a free economy, traders not only serve their customers, but also provide assistance to industry. Private trade is at the same time a kind of daily plebiscite in which customers approve or reject the offerings of producers and the development of production is adjusted to the customers' wishes. Reversely, in a country of universal state monopoly, trade is completely dependent on supply; customers are disfranchised and voiceless, industry becomes the legislator and if it does not satisfy the demand, speculation and crooked dealings are stimulated.

A typical case was reported by the three workers of the Moscow fruit and vegetable store No. 20. These workers (Shchetinnikova, Lapshits, and Ageev) accused the manager of the store, Kruglov, of dishonest dealings.

> 'They reported his doings to the Office of Retail Trade, and Kruglov was removed from his post and assigned to another office. The new manager of the store, Rizhnikov, was even more dishonest than Kruglov. The three workers reported him to the procurator and Rizhnikov was charged with criminal responsibility. The third manager of the store, Izmailova, having been half an hour in the Office, issued an order for the discharge of the three workers. But the trade union and the court came to the aid of the workers, and the order was set aside. Izmailova then refused to remain in the store and was transferred to manage another store. However,

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[1] G. C. Guins and L. Zikman, *Predprinimantel*, pp. 29–30.

> the discharge of these workers was later carried out by the fourth manager of the store in cooperation with the director of the Office of Retail Trade. On October 24, 1950, the Presidium of the Regional Council of Trade Unions (obkom) requested the reinstatement of the discharged workers, but the Director of *Mosplodovoshchtorg* (Head of the Office of Moscow Fruit and Vegetable Trade) considered reinstatement as not expedient, and on January 14, 1951, the three workers were still unemployed.' (*Trud*, January, 14, 1951, p. 3).

It would be unreasonable to believe that all four managers of store No. 20 were dishonest. The first manager, Kruglov, was accused of charging first-rate prices for second-rate products. Offenses of the second manager were not described, but probably were similar to those of Kruglov. It is probable that fruits and vegetables reached the retail store in Moscow in an already damaged condition due to an inefficient system of supply. But the retail store, in order to balance the budget, sold them at originally planned prices. The managers were charged for what was the responsibility of the economic system, and the workers, like any other customers, probably did not wish to understand them. Neither can they understand all other peculiarities of Socialist trade 'based on the genuine concern for the interests of the customer.'

Chapter 8

LABOR WITHOUT PROTECTION

The development of labor legislation in the Western world is characterized by the protection of the workers' material, cultural and moral interest. It secures for them fair compensation, rest and leisure, sanitary and safety conditions at the plants, the right to organize trade unions and to struggle for better labor conditions with the support of collective bargaining and strikes. Such progressive development although greatly stimulated by the activity of the trade unions, is partly the result of the state's legislative initiative in the interests of social order, justice and the prosperity of the working people.

The Soviet Union is nominally 'a socialist state of workers and

peasants' (Art. 1 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.). However workers, like peasants, are not masters but servants of the Soviet state. They, like all other citizens, are governed by the Communist Party or more exactly by the small group of its leaders. The Party does not follow the will of the people; it leads it. It controls both government institutions and public organizations. Workers cannot organize independent unions for protecting their interests. It is the Party which organizes and controls the trade unions (Art. 126 of the Constitution). Workers in the Soviet Union cannot struggle to better their living and working conditions, not only because trade unions are controlled by the state, but also because their very employer is the 'socialist state'. Although this is supposed to be the 'workers' state,' 'production is considered a public duty, a matter of state importance,' (*Trud*, September 16, 1954, No. 218, Editorial) with the result that to strike becomes a criminal act of counter revolutionary sabotage.

It is hardly possible to understand labor conditions in the Soviet Union without bearing in mind the peculiarities of a state whose control over its citizens is based on unlimited political power and universal monopoly.

Hired by the state, workers in the Soviet Union depend on the State to a greater degree than workers of any other nation depend on their private employers. The Soviet state is both entrepreneur monopolist and legislator. Workers are not only hired people. They are state subordinates, and the state establishes wages, working hours, standard output, and factory regulations which have the force of law.[1] Labor conditions, therefore, become much less favorable than those in countries under a democratic regime and free economy, where citizens and their organizations can protect their interests, and where the government is responsible to the people and may be changed when it does not answer to the wishes of the nation. Labor conditions are also better protected in free economy countries since entrepreneurs in such countries are private persons or private companies with which trade unions can bargain and against which they can employ, if need be, such drastic measures as strikes.

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[1] See G. C. Guins, *Soviet Law*, Chapter XIII, pp. 150–173.

1. *Soviet Trade Unions*

Trade unions in the Soviet Union are agencies of the Party and of the government. L. Kaganovich characterized them as the 'backbone of the proletarian dictatoship.' [1] There is no Ministry of Labor in the U.S.S.R. In 1933 the People's Commissariat of Labor of the U.S.S.R. was abolished with all its local agencies and its functions were transferred to the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS or AUCTUC) and to local organizations of the trade unions and their councils and committees. The Chairman of the VTsSPS is a high official appointed by the Party and government and the All-Union Central Council has taken the place of the abolished People's Commissariat of Labor, i.e. it is the Ministry of Labor under another name. It gives instructions and directives to all trade union organizations in conformity with the Party and government policy.

Wages, working hours, standard output and factory regulations are under the jurisdiction of the government. Like every private entrepreneur, the Soviet state strives to decrease expenses:

> '... in determining the level of wages, the Soviet state starts from the premise that the growth in labor productivity must outstrip the increase of wages. This is one of the necessary conditions of lowering unit production cost.' (Kapustin, *Voprosy Ekonomiki* No. 6, June, 1954, pp. 18–31).

Instead of guaranteeing a minimum wage, as law does, for example, in the U.S., Soviet law has established maximum wage rates. Some additional payments are characterized as a 'hidden form of arbitrary raising of wage rates.'

Since production is 'a matter of state importance', labor discipline established by the government is characterized by absolute submission to all orders of management and labor legislation supports that discipline with very strict penalties.

Trade unions cannot help workers raise their wages unless production is increased; they have to support discipline as it is prescribed by law and instigate workers to fulfill and overfulfill the state's production plans. In other words, they have to protect the interests of the employer rather than of the workers.

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[1] Quoted from Varshavsky, K. M. *Trudovoe pravo SSSR*, p. 7.

The Trade Union Statutes [1] formulate the main task of Trade Unions very emphatically:

> Trade Unions 'organize socialist competition among office and factory workers for the maximum increase in labor productivity, for fulfillment of state plans, for constant advance in all branches of industry, transportation and agriculture, for a higher quality of product with a lower cost of production, and for complete utilization of all reserves of the socialist economy.'

To support labor discipline is another significant duty of the trade unions. In her report to the XI-th All Union Congress the Secretary of the VTsSPS, Popova, stressed the duty of every member of the trade union movement 'to struggle against any manifestation of lack of discipline in productive work because any violation of labor discipline causes damage to the state.' According to the principles of Soviet legal practice, Popova's admonition means that every worker has to report violations of discipline on the part of other workers. Such a practice is enforced by making all workers responsible in case of stoppage or spoilage, for all workers are obliged to prevent stoppage or spoilage caused by the negligence of other workers. [2]

Besides the obligations of a constant character such as those mentioned above, trade unions have to fulfill some special duties established or formulated *ad hoc* in connection with the current trends of Soviet policy. At the XII conference of the Plenum of the Central Council of Trade Unions, which preceded the XIth Congress, Shvernik, as the chairman of VTsSPS, formulated the current task as follows:

> 'Soviet Trade Unions unite in their ranks tens of millions of workers and office employees. This is a great labor army and to mobilize and direct its creative energy for the struggle for increasing grain production is, at present time, the most urgent need.' (*Trud*, March 25, 1954, Editorial).

The functions of the trade unions directly connected with the

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[1] The latest wording of the Statutes was approved by the XIth Congress. The full text was published in *Trud*, June 19, 1954.

[2] N. Alexandrov, *Voprosy truda v sovetskom zakonodatelstve*. Profizdat, 1936 p. 48 See also R. Noskin's article in *Trud*, January 8, 1952, in which he mentions 'the patriotic movement making workers responsible for equipment under the terms of socialist safety and integrity.'

needs of working people are usually listed together with the duties toward the state and Party, as secondary in comparison with the political ones. The Trade Union Statutes, in their recent wording approved by the XIth Congress, have formulated them as follows:

> 'The USSR Trade Unions rally office and factory workers around the Party and mobilize them for the struggle to build communist society, to steadily raise the material and cultural level of the working people and strengthen as much as possible the active defense of the Soviet motherland against the aggressive actions of its enemies, to educate office and factory workers in the spirit of internationalism and of establishing fraternal ties with the working peoples of all countries.'

Art. 38 of the Statutes, in its latest wording, includes some supplements to the former text as regards the duties of the primary trade union organizations, i.e. workers' organizations of individual plants or even shops ('factories and shop committees.')

> They must 'bring to bear various measures in order to promote and instill advanced experience, checking the fulfillment of housing construction and cultural activity and the development of trade and public dining rooms.' They must also 'develop criticism and self-criticism and education of trade union members in the spirit of irreconcilable attitude toward "defects".' (*Trud*, June 16, 1954).

In the article quoted such vital needs of workers as housing construction and organization of dining rooms are mentioned. Trade unions also must check whether wages are paid on time (one of the workers' grievances), help workers in getting commodities and food, and develop cultural activity.

2. *Political leadership of the Party*

The problem is where the trade unions should lay stress, whether on the interests of workers or on political goals and trends. What is their role to be in the case of a conflict between the interests of the state, as the employer, and of workers hired by the state? It is hardly difficult to answer that question, realizing that trade unions are agencies of the state. But if in a particular case there is some doubt, it is the Party which instructs and guides the leaders of the trade unions.

The leading role of the Communist Party, as concerns the trade union movement, is constantly emphasized in various resolutions and articles:

> 'The most important duty of the Trade Unions is to mobilize the masses of working people for the fulfillment of the decisions of the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet, September Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. and the resolutions of the Party and government... There is no more important or honorable task than to struggle for the swiftest realization of the magnificent plans for the further progress of socialist economy and the prosperity of the nation as worked out by the Communist Party and the Soviet government. Under the leadership of the C.P., Soviet Trade Unions will fulfill with great credit the tasks set before them.'

The XIIth Plenum of the Central Council of the Trade Unions has, in turn, formulated the current duties of trade unions as follows:

> 'The central and local committees and councils as well as primary organizations must improve their cultural and educative activity among the toiling masses. Activity of all clubs, "palaces" and houses of culture, "red corners", libraries and reading rooms have to correspond to the tasks set by the Party ... All political work among the masses must be adjusted for educating workers and employees in the spirit of faith in the invincibility of the great cause of communism, supreme devotion to the Party, communist attitude toward work, careful attitude toward socialist property, high revolutionary vigilance, and strengthening the ties of friendship of peoples.' (*Trud*, ibidem)
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> 'It is not superfluous to remind comrades that every leader of a trade union is a political worker, promoted by the masses to a high position.' (*Trud*, Editorial, June 15, 1954).[1]

3. Bureaucratism

Trade unions in the Soviet state, like all other Soviet organizations, are subject to strict subordination in conformity with so-

[1] The primacy of the Party was stressed in the solemn declaration of the XIth Congress: 'Soviet trade unions always have been and will be faithful and active executors of the policy of the Communist Party, which is the vital force of the Soviet society... (They) see in the Communist Party their wise leader, inspirer and organizer.' (See Solomon M. Schwartz, "Soviet Trade Unions Today". *Problems of Communism*, No. 6, 1954, p. 32 U.S. Information Agency).

called 'democratic centralism'. Their organizational structure is determined by the Statutes of June 15, 1954, as follows:

> 12. Trade unions are organized on the basis of democratic centralism, which means:
> a) all trade union organizations from top to bottom are elected by the trade union members and are accountable to them.
> d) lower trade union organizations are subordinated to higher ones.
> 23. In the intervals between U.S.S.R. trade union congresses, the All-Union Council of the Trade Unions guides the entire work of the trade unions.
> 25. The All-Union Central Council elects a Presidium and Secretariat.

This organization means that in practice all local trade unions are subject to the All-Union Council or its Presidium and follow all their directives. The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions decreases or increases the number of local trade unions at its discretion and predetermines the composition of all trade union organizations. Members of local trade union councils are elected in conformity with the lists of candidates approved by the upper organizations, and the congresses consist of delegates practically nominated from above. No wonder that the Trade Union Congresses consist rather of trade union bureaucrats than of workers. Their composition, like the composition of the Supreme Soviets, demonstrates the amazing 'coincidence' of government policy and the 'wishes of the people.'

Among the delegates of the Xth Congress of trade unions, which took place in April 1949 (the IXth Congress was in 1932), there were 315 workers, 23.5 per cent of the total number of the delegates. At the XIth Congress of 1954, there were 421 workers out of 1364 delegates, or 30.9 per cent of the total number of delegates. But even these worker-delegates belonged to a special group. According to the report to the Congress of its Mandate Commission (*Trud*, June 10, 1954), all worker-delegates belonged to the 'innovators of production.' The other delegates at the Congress were members of the Central Council of trade unions (446), of the local councils of trade unions (95), of the republican, territorial, regional, railway and water basin trade union committees (186), or of the city, area, factory, plant committees (63),

and the *proforgi* (heads of the primary trade-union organizations).

It is revealing that most of the worker—'innovators' (earlier 'stakhanovites'), in 1949 were representatives of heavy industry; in 1954, in conformity with new economic trends, they were mostly representatives of the agricultural and procurement trade union organizations, food and consumer's goods industries, and medical and cultural workers.

As regards the character of their work, Trade unions do not differ from administrative institutions. 'Paper work ruins the living work' says *Trud*, referring to a series of examples: the Central Committee of Coal Industry Trade Unions 'dispatches to its local organizations from 120 to 200 messages daily. During 1953, it dispatched 20,346 various papers; during the first three months of 1954, 5,243 documents.'

Characterizing the activity of the Lumber Industry Trade Unions the same article adds:

> 'The cardinal duty is to mobilize workers and office employees for fulfillment of the program worked out by the Party and government and to raise the level of their work in connection with new requirements.'
>
> However, 'During the last months the Presidium of the Regional Committee had about three meetings per month. At every meeting it discussed from 4 to 7 important problems and, in addition, from 30 to 50 problems connected with current business. Each meeting requires one and sometimes two working days. After the meeting, it is necessary to prepare minutes and then to prepare materials and to work out the projects of the decisions for the next meeting, etc...'

'During a period of nine months, the Regional Committee dispatched several *puds* of directives.' (*Trud*, February 25, 1954).

Paperwork prevails in the trade union organizations. The Leningrad Regional Committee had four meetings and discussed 354 problems during one month (*Trud*, February 26, 1954, p. 2). The local trade union of the Stalingrad hydrotechnical construction workers during five months received 400 resolutions and other kinds of papers from the Central Council of Trade Unions (*Trud*, April 9, 1954, p. 2).

Involved in paper work and discussions as they are, trade union workers neglect direct contact with local enterprises. A

correspondent of *Trud* from Chkalov region, where there are several trests executing construction works, 157 M.T.S.s and about 100 sovkhozes, reports that the representatives of the Central Committee of the Electric Industry Trade Unions have visited the region only three times during four years (*Trud*, May 17, 1954, p. 2). 'Trade union workers in general do not like to go to villages.' 'Contact with lower organizations is in general insufficient.' (*Trud*, May 13, 1954, p. 2).

4. Violations of labor law

It often happens that trade unions have to protect their members from violations of their rights.

> 'In some enterprises, due to the unsatisfactory organization of production, there exists the vicious practice of "storm work" which, in turn, provokes most flagrant violations of regulations safeguarding labor.' As an illustration, the paper refers to the Moscow bearing factory named after Kaganovich where 'at the end of each month, several shops continue working for long periods on days off.' (*Trud*, May 26, 1954, Editorial).

Such a phenomenon is evidently not an exception if the organ of the Central Council of the Trade Unions devotes an editorial to that problem. In fact, from time to time one can find in newspapers the same complaints. Various enterprises in the Chkalov region violate the regulations safeguarding labor. *Trud* reports: 'The situation is especially abnormal at the enterprises of the road construction and assembly trest in Chkalov. Its manager cancels days off and organizes overtime work.' (*Trud*, August 12, 1954, p. 3).

Does the trade union protect workers from such violations? It is more than probable that, if it does, it does it reluctantly; often it does not protect at all. The following case is, probably, a typical one:

> 'The Chief Technical Inspector of the Central Committee of the trade Union of Machinebuilding Industry Workers passed a resolution that those guilty of organizing work during days off should be prosecuted. But the Central Committee overruled it.' (*Trud*, Editorial, May 21, 1954).

No wonder that trade unions prefer to sacrifice the interests of

workers, even those which are protected by law, if its main function is to assist in fulfilling and overfulfilling production plans.

Violations are numerous and diverse. How often they arise can be determined with reference to the enormous figure mentioned by Shvernik at the Congress of Trade Unions:

> 'In 1953, the VTsSPS received more than 160,000 complaints and letters... The Communist Party demands the eradication of bureaucracy and red tape as regards the examination of the workers' complaints.' (Cf. also the article by I. Vetrov, 'On the Protection of Labor'', *Izvestia*, September 1, 1955).

The newspaper *Trud* publishes only a few of the letters which it receives but it uses them in its editorials in a generalized form. As a result, it becomes possible to imagine the real conditions of labor and the violations of law practiced in every-day life.

The Soviet constitution proclaims (Art. 119) the right of citizen to rest and leisure. Labor law ensures this right for workers and office employees. But, as we have seen, the managers cancel days off with impunity and thus the right to rest becomes a sham right. Workers are not seldom deprived in practice of their constitutional right to rest and leisure because administration quite arbitrarily distributes permits for a place in the sanatoriums and resorts.

> 'In Odessa *Glavprosnab* (Chief Administration of Supply) of the Ministry of Industry distributed one third of its permits among employees in high positions. One of the fortunate people was the wife of the chief of the supply department of a jute factory who did not work herself but was enabled to enjoy a good rest nevertheless. Among the people upon whom were conferred similar benefits were the friends, acquaintances and relatives of the office manager.' (*Trud*, March 2, 1954, p. 3).

One of the frequent conflicts between workers and managers arose because of the dismissal or transfer of workers from one job to another without sufficient reason.

> For example, 'The chief of the trest *Molpromstroy* dismissed engineer Balanutsa because of curtailment in the budget, but in a fortnight he appointed to the same position comrade Kemchinsky, the husband of the chief bookkeeper.' (*Trud*, June 18, 1954, p. 2).

'A certain woman worker, Pchelina, had a position in the laboratory. She was transferred to the job of a storekeeper. She rejected this appointment and was dismissed because of curtailments in the budget, but, simultaneously, another person was appointed in her place.'

'The chief bookkeeper, Roudman, was dismissed in spite of his forty-five years of experience on the ground that "he did not pass the examination". The commission of the regional trade union composed of experienced bookkeepers did not acknowledge the motives of the dismissal as sufficiently grounded, but the lady-manager refused to restore Roudman.' (*Trud*, June 18, 1954, p. 2).

It is interesting to point out that most of the cases of wrongful discharge deal with discharges of workers for criticism of management or for the attempt to go over the head of management with grievances. For example, a communications worker of the fishing industry in Astrakhan and a Union organizer (*profgrouporg*), named Stepanov, was discharged by the local manager, Turin, for sending a complaint to the Moscow office concerning shortage of tools and materials and systematic delays in payment of wages. Discharge was clearly illegal because Stepanov was a trade union officer and could be discharged only with the consent of the union. The order of his discharge was revoked by the Assistant Minister of the Industry. (*Trud*, August 19, 1951, p. 2).

The same newspaper related the story of the dismissal of a pregnant worker for the only reason that she was pregnant and had the right to take leave, and another case when a watchman was refused pay for overtime work during repairs when he had to work during holidays. (*Trud*, July 2, 1954, p. 2).

'During the spring of 1953, the miners of the trest "Krasnogvardeiskugol" complained that the administration badly violated labor law. It would seem that the regional committee had to raise the question incisively and on principle and would compel the managers of the mines to respect Soviet law and to restore order. But it acted otherwise.' At its meetings, a number of resolutions were adopted concerning the restoration of the illegally dismissed miners, but the Regional committee did not draw a general conclusion from these facts.' (*Trud*, January, 1954. p. 2).

Another violation of law is the refusal to pay workers having fixed wages, such as watchmen, guards, stablemen and janitors,

for days off and holidays. Sometimes the administration denies the payment due to the workers on the basis of progressive premiums (*Trud*, June 18, 1954, p. 2); there are many cases of arbitrariness and favoritism in distribution of bonuses.

> "... the manager of an enterprise is vested with the authority to distribute bonuses among workers in accordance with their individual achievements. Special funds for this purpose are made available by the government and the distribution is strictly controlled by law. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of cases of favoritism in distribution and misappropriation of funds. Thus, the manager of coal mine No. 9 of the trest Skuratovugol had offset a 23,000 rouble deficit in the director's fund at the expense of a bonus fund. He also paid large bonuses to his chauffeur, secretary and cashier while leaving some good production men without a bonus.' (*Trud*, September 18, 1951, '*Kak u nas raspredeliaiutsia premii.*' p. 3).

Wages are not always paid on time. The Trade Unions Statutes, in its latest wording, vested trade unions with the power to struggle against this violation of workers' rights. This phenomenon was very impressively described some years ago in *Trud*.

> 'Will wages be paid today? That is the question which comes up at the Southern Pipe Factory every 20th of the month when payroll slips are issued. Having received a payroll slip, a worker is not at all sure that on the same day he will get money. Money may be paid to him tomorrow, or the day after, or even in a week, that is, any day between the 20th and 30th of the month. At times there is not enough cash to go around and it may be necessary for a worker to go to the accounting department several times a day.
>
> For those who work the night shift it is particularly difficult to receive wages. They must wait for one or two hours after the end of their shift, and sometimes even come back to the accounting department during the day.
>
> It seems that such conditions do not bother the management of the factory. No measures to improve the work of the accounting department and to assure the payment of wages on the established day have been taken.' (*Trud*, May 31, 1951, p. 2).
>
> 'Delays in payment of wages seem to be most common in lumber and mining industries located in remote regions: Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk and Arkhangelsk. But there are also similar cases which take place in enterprises or institutions

> of central location. For example, there were cases of constant delay in payment of wages to medical employees and teachers of Tula district which is only a short distance from Moscow.' (*Trud,* January 24, and July 12, 1951).

Incorrect computation of wages is another source of labor grievances. This is particularly true of the construction industry, machine repair shops, and other industries where work done by the individual employee or by a group of employees is not readily ascertainable. An operation, or a job, may be divided into so many small units of output that the computation of wages on the basis of this standard norm would be too time consuming and impractical. For example, in the construction industry, the work is itemized in such small details that there are standard rates for each cross-cutting of a board (1.3 copeck), and for each bend of a steel reinforcement (0.31 cop.). (*Trud,* April 10, 1951. *'O normakh i rastsenkakh na stroitelnykh rabotakh.'* p. 3).

> Standard rates, sometimes up to 300 in number (*Trud,* July 26, 1951 'Tipovoe ukrupnenie rastsenki,' p. 3) are expressed in fractions of a copeck and must be enumerated on the job order (*naryad*) which is given to each worker or a group of workers by a foreman or a time clerk (*normirovshchik*). Due to the obvious impracticability and cumbersomeness of this system, there is a tendency to avoid the use of fractional rates. Instead, time clerks compute wages on the basis of rough estimates (*'s potolka,'* i.e. off the ceiling).' (*Trud,* April 10, 1951).
>
> Furthermore, job orders (naryady) sometimes are written after the work has been completed, and often are incorrect. For instance, at Chkalov Locomotive-Repair Plant, job orders are written only twice a month, postdate, and 'from memory.' Sometimes they are written on scraps of paper and frequently are incorrect or lost altogether. 'It is no wonder,' states the reporter, 'that some workers for months cannot receive pay for the completed work.' (*Trud,* September 16, 1951, *'O nariade i uchete vyrabotki'* p. 2). [1]

Trade unions are used to support administration rather than workers and the complaints of the latter remain often without issue. During conventions and conferences, such a practice is criticized but without practical effect. The following caricature

[1] The last five quotations have been borrowed from the manuscript of *Labor disputes and grievances in the U.S.S.R.* by Valerian A. Postovsky prepared under the supervision of the present writer (Univ. of California, Berkeley, Library, pp. 41–42).

appeared in *Trud*: An office employee attracts the attention of the director to the fact that 'the bookcase is crowded with complaints. —'Well, well,' answers the director, 'we evidently have to buy another bookcase.'

Such is Soviet reality. When the patience of the people is overstrained, the government pretends that it is ready to do its best to improve abnormal conditions. Newspapers are allowed to publish complaints, to reproach the guilty persons, to threaten violators, but the mountain brings forth but a mouse, as the improvements, if any, are not durable.

5. *Violations of collective agreements*

Collective bargaining was not practiced at all in the Soviet Union, from 1934 up to 1947, as an 'obsolete form of industrial relations.' [1] Since its restoration in 1947, it has had but a secondary significance and was often disregarded. But in more recent times a new trend has arisen.

> 'There are still among the leading economists and trade union workers some people who do not concern themselves about collective agreements ... it is necessary to put an end decisively to such a careless attitude toward collective agreements.' (*Trud*, July 24, 1954).

This new trend is probably one of those characteristic temporary retreats in the face of urgent need. Its permitting the publication of various facts concerning violation of collective agreements affords many illustrations of what 'caring for workers' needs' means in Soviet practice and how the interests of the workers are neglected.

> 'From year to year,' *Trud* reports, 'the administration of the Magnitogorsk metallurgical combine does not fulfill agreements concerning safety of workers ... in many shops ventilation is out of order.' (Editorial, January 23, 1954).

In the same article it was stated that:

> 'The agreements concerning the measures necessary for the workers' safety were only two thirds fulfilled by a number of enterprises in others still less ... the economic administration continues to be indifferent as regards the living and working conditions of workers; they consider

[1] N. G. Alexandrov i D. M. Genkin, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, 1946, p. 106.

caring for workers' safety as something of minor importance.'

'During the examination of how the collective agreements were fulfilled by the Tbilisi (Tiflis) meat-combine named after Mikoyan it was ascertained that only 60 per cent of the appropriations for protecting workers' safety was spent for that purpose.' (*Trud*, February 20, 1954, p. 2).

The case described is typical and not a new one. In their endeavor to produce in greater quantity and at a smaller cost the Soviet economic administration (*khoziastvenniki*) neglects not only the interests but also the health of workers.

'Machinery for oil extraction and oil refineries is built with complete disregard for the rules of safety. The All-Union Scientific Research Institute designed a number of safety devices but there is no specialized enterprise to produce these devices. Enterprises which would produce safety devices are interested only in fulfillment of the production plan. As a rule, they fulfill orders with great delay. Thus, one of the Baku factories ... for two years has been holding up production on a small order of safety devices which are designed for protection from high voltage. A factory named after Sardarov for a year and a half has been holding up an order for one hundred hoists for tower workers ...

The necessity to create a special trest to produce and install numerous safety devices in industry had become evident ...

As in any field, an important role in safety engineering is played by qualified personnel. At present in many enterprises positions of safety engineers are occupied by persons without special technical education. Very frequently, such positions are occupied by lawyers or finance specialists. The enterprises, however, need safety engineers who are familiar with both technological processes and industrial hygiene as well as with legislation concerning labor safety.

A great need is felt for special scientific and technical literature. Publications of these materials in no measure satisfies the existing demand ..." (*Trud*, September 2, 1951, p. 3).

Indifference to workers' safety is a constant phenomenon. Ventilation, for example, is evidently a sore spot at Soviet factories. 'Ventilating mounting occupies too much room, is expensive, uneconomical and often rather contaminates than improves the atmosphere.' (*Trud*, June 6, 1954, p. 2).

Medical care in general lags behind normal standards at Soviet factories. Either there is no equipment, or it is out of order, or

there is equipment but no personnel. At Sestroretsk rubber-technical production, for example, there are X-ray rooms in which two thirds of the apparatus was out of order. In a tool-producing factory there is a dispensary but no personnel. (*Trud*, March 30, 1954).

Outside the factories conditions are no better.

> 'In the settlement of power station workers, near Kuibyshev, there is no bathhouse at all. In order to take a bath, one has to travel 15 kilometers to town. Finally, the Ministry of Power Stations of the USSR decided to free the workers from this inconvenience. Comrade Kucheriavyi, the manager of ... construction divisions ... was directed to build a bathhouse. A whole year was allowed for construction, although such a small bathhouse could have been built in three months.
>
> However, after the expiration of the one-year period, in place of the bathhouse there was only a foundation overgrown with grass.' (*Trud*, January 24, 1951, p. 3). [1]

Workers exhausted after strenuous work in the factory live in such conditions that they cannot restore their energy.

> "Here is a settlement of workers—Zaporozhie Levoe. It is located ten kilometers from town. In this settlement we have no bathhouse, no restaurant, and no store. The Organization of Workers' Supply of the plant 'Zaporozhstal' opened two stands for the sale of foodstuffs but these stands cannot possibly satisfy all of the population.
>
> One must go to town for every trifle, and it is not an easy task. The nearest streetcar stop is from three to four kilometers away...' (*Trud*, April 20, 1951, p. 3).

Three years later the living conditions in Zaporozhie had not changed for the better.

> 'There is still only one bath-laundry combine but it seems to be concerned about anything but caring for the inhabitants' needs.' (*Trud*, May 19, 1954, p. 2).
>
> 'Streetcar lines are terribly bad. They are inadequate for the transportation needs of a city population. People are often compelled to go to work on foot, walking from four to five kilometers in order not to be late and to report to work before their shift starts.' (Ibidem).

[1] Borrowed from Postovsky's manuscript (see footnote on p. 131) partly published in the *Machinists' Monthly Journal*, October, 1953, p. 317.

There are many complaints on the part of workers that they are not provided with dining rooms and healthy food.

> 'Many hundreds of workers every evening return to the dormitories of settlement Dalnii near Kazan. Through the open doors and windows one hears the clanging of pots and pans. Unmarried workers of Kazan Farm Machinery-Building Plant, having completed a working day, are busy cooking. Already six years have passed since the cafeteria was closed in the settlement.
>
> In the course of several years young workers inserted a paragraph into resolutions of numerous meetings and conferences concerning the opening of a cafeteria in the settlement. But the management of the enterprise stubbornly refuses to cooperate. Consequently, more than 600 unmarried workers do their own cooking.' (*Trud*, August 29, 1951, p.2).

Three years later we read almost the same:

> 'It is already two years that the working youth at the Yaroslavl dowel-pin factory have been requesting the director of the factory to organize a dining room at the hostel... The administration remains, however, deaf to the requirements of the young people ... It is not impossible to organize a dining room, but there is no care for the needs of the young workers on the part of the economic and trade-union leadership at the enterprise.' (*Trud*, January 24, 1954, p. 2).

Further quotations would be superfluous. The Soviet government acknowledged the necessity to organize dining rooms and restaurants for improving living conditions of workers and gave appropriate instructions to its local agencies in 1953 and 1954. There is not sufficient data, however, on which to judge how successful the new development has been. The problem is evidently not so simple. The existing dining rooms are often not satisfactorily equipped and do not have sufficient kitchen utensils, tinware or crockery, and customers have to wait in long lines until they can receive food (*Trud*, March, 30, 1954). If there are dining rooms, there is insufficient food, and managers gladly offer *vodka* and other liquors instead of healthy food and soft drinks.

This is a typical picture:

> 'An overwhelming number of the M.T.S.s in the Rostov region have no stores, no dining rooms. In the refreshment-rooms there is nothing to buy but *vodka*, wine and ginger-

> bread. Even tea one can find but rarely ... In the villages too stores and medical and cultural institutions are unsatisfactory.' (*Trud*, January 24, 1954, p. 2).

A similar situation exists according to Soviet newspapers in many small towns and other settlements.

Workers also sometimes cannot get fuel. It is amazing that even miners are not supplied with coal in spite of guarantees included in collective agreements. They do not get coal 'in conformity with the stipulated norms.' In response to complaints, the CC of the Trade Union answered: 'It is not only at your place that such a situation exists.' (*Trud*, August 13, 1954, p. 2).

> 'During the present year as during the last one,' reports *Trud*, August 29, 1954, p. 2) 'scores of letters were received reporting that collective agreements in regard to fuel supply remain unfulfilled. Especially many complaints of that kind were received from the builders of the metallurgical and chemical enterprises. The vital problem is still not solved.'

It is no better on the cultural front:

> 'The club building of the Rzhevsk factory (in Kalinin) is not prepared for the winter season, windows are not glazed, stoves not repaired. Plaster pours down from the ceiling, dirty strips decorate the walls.
>
> The administration is obliged by collective agreement to repair the cultural institution, but ... it is only a paper obligation.' (*Trud*, February 25, 1954).

Several articles published in *Trud* and *Pravda* describe another side of cultural conditions. Some clubs are in good condition but they do not attract people. Their activity programs are not interesting. Management does not care or does not know how to put spirit into the club's activity.

> 'Everything is stereotyped, routine dominates. There is no creative imagination, no initiative, and finally there is no real concern about the cultural leisure of working people—that is what causes boredom at the clubs.' (Editorial in *Trud*, May 19, 1954).

Trade unions, as we have seen, do not assist workers. The admonitions in the newspaper *Trud* bring no response because the trade unions have first of all to support administration not workers. Problems of cost production, of plan fulfillment and in gener-

al of state needs always have priority as compared with the living conditions of workers. Neither the government nor the newspapers are ignorant as far as reality is concerned, but the whole system is based on sacrifices. In order to console the people and to inspire them with confidence in the future, newspapers are instructed to disguise the shortcomings of the present from time to time, but the main trend remains the same.

> 'The administration of the Tuapse oil refinery plant obviously neglects workers' needs. In the meantime, the factory committee and its chairman, Forostinov, are passive. The latter obviously does not wish to 'strain relations' with the director of the plant ... The chief engineer with the approval of Forostinov threatened loudly those who persistently complained.' (*Trud*, May 21, 1954, p. 1, Letter to the Editor).
>
> 'Trade unions are vested with the right of controlling housing, stores, dining rooms, communal and medical institutions. But they use that right only on a very limited scale.' (*Trud*, June 6, 1954, Editorial).

Is it not natural that 'workers cease to apply to the trade union committees with similar complaints? They know that this will not help them anyhow.' (*Trud*, May 19, 1954, p. 1 'Letter to the Editor'). In the meantime there are certain very urgent needs of the working people demanding special attention. Among them, the housing problem is worthy of special attention.

6. *Violation of housing provisions*

Complaints made by workers with regard to non-fulfillment or unsatisfactory fulfillment of housing construction are, perhaps, the most frequent and insistent complaints. Several years ago, this was the main problem discussed by the Plenum of the VTsSPS as a question of most pressing importance, and it was even brought up, as a most urgent problem, at conferences and at the last congress of Trade Unions.

Since the restoration of collective bargaining, Trade Unions do not forget to engage management to build certain housing units as well as washrooms, bathhouses, dining rooms, laundries and resort houses. Corresponding obligations are fixed by every collective agreement, but they share the fate of many other conditions concerning the betterment of living conditions of

working people. Managers do not execute their obligations, and trade unions either are unable to force them to fulfill them or remain intentionally inactive.

The government, on its part, promises to improve the living conditions of workers, reprimands its local agencies for neglecting the vital needs of working people, and appropriates money for housing, but as yet there are no essential improvements. Year after year newspapers give the same distressing information.

At Petrozavodsk, in June 1952, a correspondent for *Trud* reported that 'many ministries and departments of the Finno-Karelian Republic were not familiar with allocating appropriations for housing construction.' The same reporter recorded that only one of the eleven construction organizations had completed the five-month building program and that officials disregarded the housing and cultural needs of the workers as a matter of secondary importance. (*Trud*, June 28, 1952).

In Leningrad, the city-wide meeting of the union *aktiv* was discussing in June 1952 the summary report of the VIII plenary session of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and noted that despite the great advances made in the material-cultural conditions of the working people, there were still many great shortcomings in housing construction with many building organizations failing to fulfill the plans. (*Trud*, January 29, 1952, p. 1).

N. Zhiliaev, editor of 'Bolshevik Signal,' a paper for railroad workers, criticized the railroad administration for the way in which it carried out its contractual obligations with the workers. According to the labor agreement of October 1, 1951, a sixteen-unit apartment was to be erected at Sagiz station, an eight-unit one at Guriev, and a dormitory for the technical school in Chkalov. But the Deputy-Minister of Railroads, Comrade Gavrilov, put a stop to the construction of these buildings. *Dorprofsozh* informed the Central Committee of the union but the stop-order remained in force. (*Trud*, January 5, 1952, p. 2. 'Letter to the Editor').

An editorial from *Trud* (October 29, 1952) explained that unions were often responsible for not exerting 'social control' over the execution of the housing provisions of the collective bargaining contracts. It was stated that union officials ignored important

obligations to the workers for the sake of harmonious relations with the ministries. Excerpts from the editorial follow:

> 'It is well known that many ministries and local soviets have failed year after year to carry out plans for housing construction and have not utilized funds allocated for this purpose.
>
> The Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building has shown poor concern for housing construction ...
>
> Minister Comrade Stepanov and his assistant Comrade Karasev ... feel that the workers' need for living quarters is a matter of secondary importance...'
>
> This also applies to Comrade Tsarev, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Agricultural Machine Building Trade Union ...
>
> They would sacrifice the vital interests of the working people for the sake of a 'friendly relationship' with the ministry's administrative officials.' (*Trud*, October 29, 1952, p. 1)

Another editorial from *Trud*, (January 16, 1952) published on the eve of the annual campaigns for the signing of collective bargaining agreements, does not contain a single reference to the secondary aspects of those agreements, that is, the sections referring to housing construction and other material-cultural needs of the workers. What is emphasized is that the contracts provide for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the state economic plan for 1952. Particular attention in the contracts of 1952 was paid to the improvement of quality of products, lowering the cost of production, careful use of materials, fuel, and electric power, and perfection of production technique.

It sometimes happens that failure to abide by the housing construction clause of the collective bargaining agreements extends over a period of five years. The result is that the projected housing is not available even though the plans for construction and the money allocated were included in each year's agreement. Such a case has been recorded at the Tuschinsk Hosiery Factory in 1951 and later at Dnepropetrovsk Locomotive Repair Plant, where a two-story dormitory could not be constructed for five years in a row. (*Trud*, January 10, 1952, p. 2).

In Pushkino, a suburb of Moscow, the construction of the resort house had been started in 1938. At the beginning of 1953, the VTsSTS instructed the local trade union to secure its completion. (*Trud*, Jan. 5, 1954, p. 3).

When the Ministry of Railroads signed the 1951 contractual agreement, it had evidently no intention of keeping its pledge to provide the workers at the locomotive repair plant in Dnepropetrovsk with adequate housing facilities. The Ministry reduced the funds allocated for housing construction in the Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhie, and Lvov locomotive repair plants by 600,000 roubles.

The action of the Ministry was in violation of established procedures which required that both parties to the contract be in agreement and that the decrease in funds be discussed at a general meeting of workers and employees. (*Trud*, January 10, 1952).

In 1953, there were still no changes for the better:

> 'The Ministry of Power Plants and Electrical Industry did not fulfill the plan of housebuilding ... Owing to the Ministry's fault, thousands of workers lost a chance to move to the new flats.
>
> Workers of the enterprises of the light industry did not receive more than 100,000 meters of square housing as compared with the state plan.' (*Trud*, January 16, 1954, Editorial).

At the XIth Congress of the Trade Unions, Shvernik referred in his report to various deviations from the house-building plan and the shortcomings of its fulfillment. According to his data,

> 'In 1953, the Ministry of Construction erected 600,000 square meters of housing, and during the first quarter of 1954 more than 200,000 less than it had to erect ...
>
> Especially unsatisfactorily fulfilled is housebuilding by the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Sovkhozes. The Ministry of Agriculture fulfilled during the first three months of 1954 only 7 per cent and the Ministry of Sovkhozes, 17 per cent of the state plan.'

Shvernik stressed also that:

> 'Some living quarters are opened for occupancy unfinished and with numerous technical defects. For example, *Saratovgasneftstroy* (Administration of Saratov Gas and Oil Construction) has constructed an apartment house named after Kirov without chimneys which, as everyone knows, makes living there impossible. In many houses built by the same trest, roofs leak, and doors and window frames are warped.'

All these examples and references give us sufficient right to

conclude that workers' interests in the 'state of workers and peasants' have no protection.

Chapter 9

PRIVATE ECONOMY

'Socialist' property occupies a dominant position in the Soviet system. The role of 'personal' property is insignificant. Soviet personal property regulations pursue two aims; in the first place, to prevent any possibility of property owners' exploiting other persons, and, in the second, to prevent a revival of capitalism via accumulation and development of small-scale enterprises.

As a Soviet writer explains:

> 'The personal property of citizens in the Soviet state is a derivative of public-socialist property, comprising 90 per cent of all the productive funds of the country.' [1]

Yet the existence of 'personal property' and some private undertakings in the Soviet Union cannot be ignored. It is an evidence of the vitality of economic individualism and of the impossibility of eliminating every kind of private enterprise. It is also important to account for the origin and character of some private fortunes in the Soviet Union, which cannot be used as a productive force.

1. *Limitations of 'Personal property'*

Very few of the items of property which could be utilized as sources of income remain as items of 'personal property.' Certain kinds of cattle and fowl, both in limited quantities, minor tools essential for working the small plot of household land and garden (wooden plows, harrows, waggons, sledges, scythes, sickles, hoes, rakes, pitchforks, shovels, axes and so forth) are personal property objects for farmers. Besides minor agricultural implements, the equipment for certain trades and skills, essential items for hunting, fishing and other occupations (a special permit must be

[1] M. V. Kolchanov, 'K teorii sobstvennosti.' *Izvestia Akademii Nauk SSSR.* Otdel Ekonomiki i Prava. Moskva, 1949. No. 4, p. 286.

received for firearms and ammunition), can also be private property.

Essential equipment of a specialized sort—instruments, accessories, books et al.—can be acquired by professional people and craftsmen: doctors, dentists, musicians, singers, artists, draftsmen, tailors, shoemakers, knitters, glaziers, grinders, carpenters, cabinet makers, blacksmiths, locksmiths, barbers, photographers, and motor vehicle and cart carriers.

By a decree of August 26, 1948, citizens of the Soviet Union were allowed to buy and build their own houses not to exceed five rooms, consisting of one or two stories, within city or outside the city. The plots of ground necessary are leased for an unlimited period from the city or state land reserves. Owners must keep their houses in repair, lay sidewalks and in general observe all the rules established by the executive committees of the local soviets as well as the conditions of the contractors. In connection with expanding home-building, 'housing-associations' have sprung up which build cooperative houses and contract to build cottages and residences for private persons.

Although it permits the kinds of personal property listed, Soviet legislation sets up various restrictions to prevent speculation. A Soviet jurist, P. Orlovsky, now a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, expounded, in one of his early papers,[1] the following principles of private property which indicate the obligations and limitations to which every property owner is liable:

1. The objects of the right of personal property must be utilized personally by the owner himself or his family for the satisfaction of personal needs, for his or their household and for personal comfort. The re-sale of objects of personal property for higher prices (speculation), lending of money or goods at profitable rates of interest, etc., are not permitted. Such utilizations of property are punished as criminal acts.

The law permits the owner to rent a house or rooms, but the rent cannot exceed the established apartment rents with an additional charge of twenty per cent. (Law of October 17, 1937).

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[1] P. Orlovsky, 'Pravo lichnoi sobstvennosti grazhdan.' *Sov. gosudarstvo* No. 6 1938, pp. 68–84.

2. The owner must make an economical and suitable use of his property.

3. No use of the items of property is allowed which would have a result contrary to law or would attempt to by-pass a law or to violate the rules of the socialist community, as well as any use which would do harm to the socialist state or other owners. So, for example, it is forbidden to destroy objects of personal property in any way detrimental at large, such as the slaughter of pedigreed cattle, etc. [1]

4. The gratuitous transfer of the right of property is permitted but in the case of a gift valued above 1,000 roubles, it must be certified by a notary. (Article 138, Civil Code). Non-observance of this formality will render the transaction invalid and can, in certain cases, entail criminal responsibility (Article 63, Criminal Code).

Tradesmen owning the tools of their trade can utilize them only by their own personal labor or the labor of members of their family and of one apprentice, but in no case can they hire workers. The Law of March 27, 1937 permitted the following occupations for private persons: bookbinding, shoe repair, cabinet making, carpentry, chimney cleaning, electric-machine shop work, tailoring and sewing in general, house repair, glass working, barbering, laundering, locksmithing, optical glass grinding, house painting, photography, plumbing, and porter and carrier work.

Private persons do not have the right to manufacture clothing, footwear or various other leather or metal goods for general sale, but they can manufacture them to order. Various household goods, pottery, dishware, musical instruments and art objects can be manufactured for sale. Since raw material is needed for the manufacture of such items, and since is practically impossible for private persons to obtain it, artels and cooperatives are, as a general rule, organized to handle the conduct of the trades listed. Peasant handicraftsmen are freer in their choice of trades, the utilization of raw material and the sale of manufactured articles. Such kinds of work are for them a traditional occupation and a

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[1] Use of 'private property' in contradiction to its 'social and economic purpose' deprives it of 'protection by law' in conformity with Civil Code, Art. 1.

subsidiary source of income. Moreover, rural living conditions require the presence of such manufacturing and skilled workers in villages to serve the needs of the rural population.

The making of sausages, bread, pastries, and various soft drinks for sale is also widespread, but such goods must be of one's own making from one's own materials.

2. *Private undertaking*

Personal property in this limited sense serves only as a means of achieving subsistence or an additional income for the owner himself and for his family and cannot serve as a source of accumulation. It is for this reason that it is called 'personal' property in contradistinction to private property in a free economic system, which makes possible the rise of private undertakings with hired workers.

In the Constitutions of the Lithuanian (Article 8), Moldavian (Article 9), and Estonian (Article 8) Soviet Union republics, 'together with the Socialist economic system... private economy is allowed individual peasants, tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and small-scale private industrial and commercial undertakings within the limits established by the law.' The content and basic direction of these laws can be judged not only by reference to the legislation of the Soviet Union but also by reference to the corresponding Article 9 of the Constitution of the Latvian SSR which is much more specific in this instance:

> 'Together with the socialist economic system, which is the dominant form of economy in the Latvian SSR, the law allows the small-scale, private economy of individual peasants and handicrafstmen, based on their personal labor and excluding exploitation of the labor of others.'

It is not difficult to see how much more limited the circle of private undertakings and the conditions for their existence is in Latvia. But what is said in the Constitution itself can be said as well in a special law. There can be no doubt that, within the borders of the Soviet Union, only those private undertakings can exist which are based on the personal labor of the people who undertake them and that the private economic activity of in-

dividual peasants in all republics is being gradually absorbed by the kolkhozes. [1]

Trade and craft undertakings in the Soviet Union, due to their familial character, usually pass through inheritance to those who survive the head of the family. Soviet inheritance law encourages that sort of succession. [2] New trade or craft undertakings can be started only at the expense of savings which, for the average citizen, rarely reach any considerable amount, or when a lump sum of money is received in the form of a prize or winnings from the national-loan lottery. However, private persons who have permanent earnings must receive special permission to take up a supplementary form of labor in the form of a trade or craft so that it will not distract them from their permanent occupations.

3. *Legitimized riches*

Certain persons in the Soviet Union receive large salaries and rewards and are in a position to amass considerable savings. The persons who receive large money rewards are Soviet dignitaries whose functions consist of a number of combined duties. They enjoy privileges of various kinds with regard to living quarters and supply and receive special allowances. High rates of pay are established for the command staff of the army and navy, also. Directors of state enterprises receive, over and above their salaries, special money rewards (bonuses). Writers and composers have copyrights and some of them enjoy large royalties from the sale or performance of their works. Certain scholars, artists and actors are well provided for. All these people constitute the upper stratum of Soviet society. The means which they receive they spend on everyday needs, on items of comfort, on trips to resorts, on their children. It is for these people that various luxury items are manufactured and sold in Soviet *univermags* (department stores) and that there are expensive restaurants (Ararat and Argivi in Moscow), beauty salons and fashionable shops. Frequently Soviet novels, describe the luxurious furnishing of

[1] Cf. comments by Prof. A. I. Denisov, *Sovetskoe gosudarstvennoe pravo*, p. 174 (footnote).

[2] G. C. Guins, *Soviet Law and Soviet Society*. p. 126–127.

the homes of famous people: scholars, writers, engineers (see, for example, the novels, 'Long Live the University' and 'Students'). The Soviet aristocracy, just as the nobility did before the revolution, cultivate a disdain for any other source of income than that directly connected with their social position.

Therefore, all ways are closed for the development of a private enterprise beneficial to the country.

Chapter 10

GENERAL APPRAISAL OF 'SOVIET SOCIALISM'

The Soviet government is proud of its system of national economy, which is officially characterized as a 'socialist system.' The explanatory memorandum published in Soviet newspapers on January 30, 1939, simultaneously with the economic program for the future, stated: 'We have fully adopted a socialist system'; 'We have liquidated the peasant, the industrialist, the merchant.'

> 'The effect of the Five-Year Plan was to lay an unshakeable foundation of a socialist economic system in our country in the shape of a first-class socialist heavy industry and collective mechanized agriculture, to put an end to unemployment, to abolish the exploitation of man by man, and to create the conditions for the steady improvement of the material and cultural standards of our working people.' [1]

In his speech on the twenty-sixth anniversary of the October Revolution, November 6, 1943, Stalin proudly announced that the successes of the Red Army bore witness 'to the greatest achievements of the Soviet system,' which had succeeded in raising the fighting power of the country and in uniting its many nationalities.

Similar praises of the 'greatest achievements' of the Soviet system are repeated on every occasion and in every official announcement and publication. The *Moscow News* enumerates the most striking achievements:

> 'We have no unemployment, and shall not have. This makes things very much easier for workers and office employees of

[1] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.* International Publishers, New York, 1939, pp. 329–330.

> our country. We do not have the anarchy in production characteristic of capitalism which leads alternately to booms and crises that shake the whole economic system to its foundations and make the working people forever uncertain of tomorrow. Our economic life is directed by a national plan.' (*Moscow News*, November 7, 1946).

1. *'Socialism' or State capitalism?*

Evidently the leaders of Soviet Russia are firmly and sincerely convinced of the superiority of their system of national economy which they consider to be real socialism. However many competent writers belonging to the socialist camp not only disapprove of this system but do not even recognize it as socialist.

> 'Socialism, as understood by the international labor movement, and as a genuine alternative to capitalism, has not been realized in the Soviet Union.' 'The despotic bureaucracy became an economically privileged and, therefore, in the last analysis, an exploiting group.' [1].

On the other hand, a distinguished English socialist, George D. H. Cole, recognized the order existing in the USSR as a real socialism:

> 'The basic fact is that the Soviet Union remains socialist in its essential institutions. The land and the factories belong to the people; production is planned not for profit but for use; the class-system has been torn up by the roots.' [2]

Cole's characterization is based on purely abstract premises.

A Yugoslav communist, a member of the Third International, Anton Ciliga, according to his own experience in Soviet Russia, gives an opposite appraisal of the Soviet socialism; he calls it 'State capitalism':

> '... The working masses saw themselves more and more riveted to the conditions of the slaves and mercenaries of a capitalism that was no longer private, but belonged to state and caste.'
>
> 'By order of the dictator, a new gospel was introduced; the worker's hierarchy, the "reform of the wage-system" in order to create greater differentiation in the remuneration of

[1] E. Strauss, *Soviet Russia*, London, 1941, pp. 318, 321.

[2] D. H. Cole, *Europe, Russia and the Future*, V. Gollanz Ltd., London, 1942, pp. 18–19.

> extreme groups. This essentially capitalist principle was declared to be in accordance with Socialism and Communism.'
>
> 'The worker was no longer to be stimulated to produce goods by collectivism, by, be it forced, solidarity, but by the old capitalist piece-work system, the contract with progressive premiums long since abolished in the West owing to the workers' movement.' [1]

Not only A. Ciliga, but many other authors deny the Socialist nature of the Soviet economy, characterizing it as 'state capitalism.' This term seems paradoxical, applied to the country where all traces of capitalism are obliterated, where the laborers and peasants are supposed to work for the socialist state as they would for themselves, because the interests of the state are their own interests, and they are working not for a private person but for a common cause.

Capitalism is based on private initiative, competition, production for an unknown and indefinite market, private property, the risk, losses, and profits of entrepreneurs. Even a layman feels that there is something contradictory in such a definition as 'state capitalism'. The Soviet State is an universal monopolist with no competitors on the domestic markets, no risks, completely excluding free initiative, and with power to adjust production to the needs of definite markets both inside and outside the country. A state has no interest in profit as capitalists have.

Those who call the Soviet system 'state capitalism' are using the word 'capitalism' for two reasons: either they do not consider it to be socialism, or they want to stress the specific peculiarities of Soviet labor law. They mean that the Soviet system has not eliminated the most undesirable peculiarities of the capitalist system. They want to stress that the Soviet system in its contemporary form is based on a most ruthless exploitation of labor and protection of the privileges of the ruling class. Instead of enthusiasm and consciousness of a common interest, the stimuli are either compulsion or incommensurate reward.

2. *Sacrifices in the name of Socialism*

In order to gauge contradictory appraisals of the Soviet system it is necessary above all to start with an objective evaluation of

[1] Anton Ciliga, *The Russian Enigma*, London, George Routlege and Sons, Ltd., 940, pp. 92, 266. The same in French—*Au pays du grand mensonge*, 1938.

planned economy and of the exceptional conditions which enabled that system to be brought into Soviet Russia.

(1) For an all-embracing state plan to succeed, it is necessary that its problems be simplified to the maximum. The plan and the realization are facilitated if the population is satisfied with what it can find on the market, even if its most pressing needs are only partially met. Such simplification characterizes the Soviet system of planned economy.

In Soviet Russia neglect of the interests of the population was carried too far. Soviet planned economy put state interests foremost. The real test of this system would come if the demand for the development of heavy industry were to decrease, and if factories of the heavy industry were to be forced to close or to be reconstructed for the needs of light industry. It is certainly much easier to draw up a plan for new factories, power stations, railroads, irrigation systems and for the production of locomotives or sheet iron, than to provide the population with various commodities such as clothing, utensils, household appliances, garden tools, stationery, and all the other necessities and conveniences of daily life.

(2) During the period of the realization of the Five-Year Plans the Soviet economic planners did not worry about problems of expenses and losses.

It is very expensive to produce synthetic rubber from the dandelion-like plant, Kok-Sagyz, growing in Central Asia. Nevertheless, it is produced without regard for the cost. It is doubtful whether a mechanical cotton-picking machine, a kind of elaborate vacuum cleaner, could work advantageously for the reason that the cotton balls are not all ready at the same time. Nevertheless, this expensive experiment is being carried on. It is very expensive to replace imported coal in Leningrad with the coal from Donbas. However, importing coal from England is banned. And so forth.

The Soviet planners will not consider cost, if a problem has to be solved. Such unsound financial procedure is possible only when the state controls the entire economy and the administrative apparatus has at its disposal all the profits of the national economy and the power to distribute them without any supervision by an independent parliament.

(3) The Soviet currency (*chervonnyi ruble*) is not quoted on the foreign exchange. Its relation to other currencies is determined arbitrarily and is controlled by forbidding the import and export of roubles. Within the country the buying power of Soviet money is completely dependent on the state, which dictates the prices on all commodities of prime importance: housing, transportation facilities, and so forth. Foreign trade is also concentrated in the hands of the state, and, therefore, absolutely no competition exists on the home market. Soviet citizens have nothing to do with their money if there are no goods on the market, and they give it back to the state in the form of loans.

It should be remembered, moreover, that in Soviet Russia it is exceptional to import consumer goods to make up for the insufficiency of domestic production. Though poorly supplied, the population of Soviet Russia, as we have seen above, has to cover enormous losses and expenses. The sarcrifices of several generations for the future of the nation could be justified if it were really impossible to achieve the same results with less suffering and regimentation and fewer deprivations.

3. Why 'universal monopoly'?

Is it possible in the circumstances described to insure the country's well-being? Is it reasonable to expect that 'state ownership' of positively all the means of production and subordination of the whole national economy to the central management of the 'universal monopolist' will create a lasting foundation for the economic prosperity, social justice and moral soundness of the nation? The experience of the Soviet Union does not give any basis for optimism.

Centralization of management and control with maximum limitations on private initiative are likely to be unavoidable under certain extreme circumstances. There are many economists who acknowledge that the circumstances of present-day world economy demand a regularization of foreign trade, a redistribution of raw materials and markets, and that all this is possible only if a corresponding *planning* of economy is achieved within the various countries. During the war such planning became a necessity, for otherwise devaluation of money, specualtion, and

a rise in living costs could not have been prevented. After the war, during the period of returning to the peace-time tempo and the reorganization of economy in war-devastated countries, some control over production and distribution of the products of industry and foodstuffs remained a must. Thus, even if one were to reject the need for all-embracing planning over a lengthy period, some form of organized economy for a number of years to come would still remain a necessity.

This, however, does not mean that private property must be abolished and that competition and free enterprise have no place in the general picture. Did not both England and the United States prove during World War II that tremendous problems of armament can be met and a system of distribution perfected without abolishing private ownership but by merely subjecting it to a series of temporary limitations adaptable to the demands of changing conditions?

The organization of national economy is necessary also when the circumstances require an immediate, radical reorganization in the national economy, as, for example, its accelerated industrialization. That was the case in Russia. But even such a radical reorganization may be achieved by less drastic means than those employed in Soviet Russia by coordinating instead of subordinating, without totally abolishing private enterprise, which creates both new sources of income and new comforts; without freeing industry from risk, which stimulates the greatest economy and foresight; and, finally, without converting a state into a huge and dangerous bureaucratic machine. From this machine people must flee for their lives. Only the people driving it are safe, and they only until they fall off.

Under a system of state property ownership, pyramids can be erected, seas can be connected by canals, experiments can be conducted to 'transform nature,' such as Stalin's projects for afforestation of arid areas, which remained just as arid as before, for the irrigation of such deserts as Kara-Korum, or for the colonization of the arctic by means of compulsory settlements. The militarization of a country can be accomplished with particular success. Undertakings and objectives of that sort are beyond the powers of private capital and usually can be accomplished only by compulsion. But when it is a matter of developing light in-

dustry and supplying the population with the limitless variety of essential consumer goods, private enterprise has all the advantages over centralized state economy with its universal plan. Its advantages are adaptability and market knowledge, and the stimulus, natural in view of competition, to give the population the best and the cheapest possible.

4. Alleged advantages

Let us now consider whether the Soviet system has any advantages over the systems in the capitalist countries—advantages such as elimination of economic depressions, unemployment, and exploitation; assurance of equal opportunity; and the nurturing of an advanced collectivist psychology (a desirable goal, in the opinion of the Soviets) [1]

a) In Soviet denunciations of capitalism the problem of depressions is usually the leading point. The crises of capitalist economy arise as a consequence of overproduction. But these crises, occuring when supply exceeds demand, in other words when the buying power is low, are, we may say, an embarrassment of overabundance. They are the result of a lack of planning and organization on a national scale. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Soviet economy, since it is planned, prevents crises of this type.

However, every system of economy has its own kind of crises. In Soviet Russia there are no capitalistic crises. But the system of universal state monopoly existing in Soviet Russia under the guise of socialism has its own peculiar crises, namely disproportion in the various parts of the plan, [2] violation or nonobservance of the plan, underproduction, and overexpenditures. There are no capitalist crises in Soviet Russia. But there is never an abundance of goods, either. There is no competition within the country, and the government does not permit any from the outside. The state can shift workers from one branch of the economy to another and from one part of the country to another; the workers either are compelled directly by the state or are

[1] See G. Guins, *Soviet Law*, pp. 340–343; and his "Claims and Realities of Soviet Socialism,' *The Russian Review*, July 1952, pp. 138–147.

[2] W. W. Leontiev, Sr. 'Soviet Planning.' ('Development of Separate Branches without Interrelation') *The Russian Review*, Autumn, 1946, pp. 33–34.

prompted by economic conditions, which in turn are controlled by the state. The Soviet state can raise or lower prices of goods without fear of bankruptcy. The workers cannot demand higher pay, and the government can, in effect, lower wages simply by raising the prices of necessities.

It is not surprising, therefore, that there are no crises, in the capitalist sense of the word, in Soviet Russia. There are, however, other kinds of crises: lack of commodities, high prices, low wages, and low purchasing power of money, due to the lack of goods. If the essence of a depression, as an economic calamity, is the pauperization of the masses, then there is a permanent depression in the Soviet Union. The crisis of the kolkhoz economy is a striking illustration of the type of disaster to which the Soviet system is subject.

Capitalist countries have already worked out means of relieving depressions: unemployment insurance, public works, accumulation of savings and operating reserves during prosperous times, and storing of surplus commodities. They can also adopt some methods of planning, when necessary, as, for example, during a war. The difficulties that sometimes arise can be attributed, to a considerable extent, to the dependance of one nation on another in this age of world economy, since there is no organization for the supervision of world trade.

The Soviet system has not yet proved that it can overcome its characteristic crisis: chronic poverty.

b) Soviet Russia prides itself on its lack of unemployment. But what does 'unemployment' mean? It does not mean that people cannot find any work at all; it means, rather, that people cannot find sufficiently remunerative work corresponding to their qualifications. If unions, at the first sign of a depression, allowed their members to accept work of any kind and at any wages, unemployment would not exist even in capitalist countries.

There is no unemployment in the Soviet Union only because the state has complete control of labor and there are no strong, independent unions to protect the workers. The Soviet government banishes millions of people (including prisoners of war) to its concentration camps for hard labor under the most severe conditions. Another reason for the absence of unemployment in the Soviet Union is the shortage of manpower for carrying out

the five-year plans. The labor of women and teen-age boys and girls is exploited. A considerable portion of the burden of Soviet Russia's agricultural work rests on the shoulders of women. More than 50 per cent of the workers in factories still are women and youths.

In spite of all measures Soviet Russia still needs technical personnel and skilled workers. The Soviet government delays the repatriation of war prisoners and tries to draw out of Western Europe hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and emigrés. These actions indicate not only that the Soviet government is mistrustful about future international relations but also that it desperately needs manpower.

c) Turning to the problem of 'exploitation,' which Marxian theory defines as the appropriation of 'surplus value' by the entrepreneur, or, in other words, inadequate compensation, we believe that for the rank and file worker or peasant it makes no difference whether an entrepreneur or the state is responsible for failing to pay him his full wages, or whether a capitalist or a landlord or an official lives at his expense. The Soviet Union has bred millions of 'paper workers' and all kinds of police agents who are better fed and dressed than people working in the factories and in the fields. A Soviet economist justifies it by the needs of the future, but for a worker or a peasant it is still exploitation. If, in the words of an old Russian saying, 'a crucian (a favorite Russian fish) likes to be fried in sour cream,' then there is no exploitation in the Soviet Union. If a rank and file peasant or worker likes to live hungry and exhausted while his government spends great amounts on all sorts of stage properties to impress the outside world and on furthering worldwide communism, then there is no exploitation of the masses in the Soviet Union.

Let us suppose that a factory under private ownership paid its workers 300,000 roubles and alloted the owner 30,000 roubles by way of profit. If the same factory, after transfer to state ownership, pays its workers 250,000 rubles and the State pockets the same 30,000 rubles, the workers can only lose through the change in economic system. It is still worse if the 50,000-rubles decrease in the workers' earnings is the result of mismanagement, defective manufacture and non-productive expenditures. Workers then

lose also as consumers and it is workers and peasants who bear the burden of all losses and enormous unnecessary expenses.

The cumbersome, impractical and costly apparatus of state economy makes the whole economic system unremunerative and, consequently, burdensome for the population. It is for that reason that workers and peasants are liable to a kind of exploitation that has long disappeared in the countries of advanced capitalism.

5. *The real consequences*

After the completion of industrialization, the existing system in the Soviet Union lost all justification. While destroying useful and sound types of private property and eradicating, together with them, those positive psychological stimuli which make private property a vital and socially beneficial juridical institution, Soviet state property has created nothing of an equivalent psychological value. On the contrary, it has engendered a host of negative features. Although it abolished private property, the Soviet system did not eliminate exploitation; it merely substituted state exploitation for private exploitation. Whereas private exploitation is subject to legislative restrictions and state control, state exploitation leaves the workers defenseless; it knows no restrictions, no control, and even permits the slave labor of millions of people in prison camps where they perform the most hazardous undertakings of the state.

The Soviet state has preserved, in the form of 'personal property' in particular that most negative form of private property which encourages unproductive expenditures, leads to excesses and serves as a source of demoralization for the property owners and their heirs. Under Soviet conditions, the systems of both personal and state property create a temptation for people in poor or only slightly better than poor circumstances, inciting them to thievery, acts of fraud and speculation.

The national economic system, in the final analysis, does not gain, whereas national morals deteriorate.

Part III

SOCIALIST SOCIETY AND LIFE

There are no exploiters and exploited in the Soviet Union in the Marxist meaning, and the 'socialist' state is frequently characterized as a 'classless society' which does not know exploitation 'of man by man.' In 1936, the Soviet Union became officially 'A socialist state of workers and peasants,' (Art. 1 of the Constitution): which are rather two social groups than two different classes.

Social structure and social life in the Soviet Union are, however, more complicated. The 'universal monopoly' of the state has brought about not only 'exploitation by the state,' instead of exploitation 'of man by man', but also a formation of upper and lower social classes with different interests and psychology. The development of the 'socialist' state stimulated the formation of a new social group, the Soviet intelligentsia, consisting of the ruling Party men, numerous officials, members of the administrative apparatus, managers and scientists, as well as cultural workers: scholars, writers, artists and other representatives of the so-called free professions. This social group plays a very significant role in the political, economic and cultural life of the country and is given many advantages as regards the conditions of life.

Chapter 11

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The organization of 'socialist society' began November 10, 1917, when the Soviet government, in conformity with the communist ideal of universal equality, issued a decree concerning abolition of all class divisions, designations, titles and distinctions of civil rank. Abolition of private property and the proclamation of the new demagogic maxim: 'He who does not work, neither shall he eat,' (Art. 12 of the Constitution) was to level conditions of existence.

In fact, however, the social pyramid did not disappear. Those who were at the bottom before the Revolution of October 1917 proved to be the masters of the new situation, and, reversley, the members of the upper classes and of various groups of intelligentsia were humiliated and deprived of the means of existence. No pyramid can stand on its end, and it was easier to demolish its upper part and then to reconstruct it with new people, partly from the bottom. A new peak appeared immediately and extended upwards as new people from various social groups of the old society began to rise up the social ladder, forcing out or pushing each other down. Gradually a new ruling group was formed, and the social pyramid reestablished out of new human material.

The 'socialist society', as it exists at present, is headed by an indispensable ruling class, surrounded or supported by 'distinguished people' in gold trimmed uniforms, several millionaires and a great number of wealthy people. Below the upper strata, besides workers and farmers, some of whom belong also to the privileged group, there are in the Soviet Union great numbers of pariahs, people doomed to forced labor and to a slavish existence.

1. *Vertical mobility*

Some decided contrasts among people in Soviet society are indisputable. Insignia, decorations, and badges indicating degree of education catch one's eye on the streets of the Soviet Union and in various pictures in the illustrated magazines. There is no less a contrast between expensive restaurants and poor eating houses, between the fashionable dresses of the ladies of the upper strata and the rags of the women cleaning the streets. Inequality prevails everywhere; there is no equality even among the members of the communist party. Stalin characterized the existing hierarchy in the Party as follows: 'The highest leaders' in the role of 'generals,' under them, the 'officer staff' resting in turn on the 'lower party commanding staff,' etc. [1]

But, if there is no problem as concerns the existence of upper and lower social groups, there is doubt on the part of some students of the Soviet Union as concerns stabilizing the existing

[1] Quoted by Samuel Harper, *The Government of the Soviet Union*, N. Y. 1946, p. 53. In the collected edition of Stalin's works this characterization is evidently deleted.

social differentiation. Some scholars believe that a society which is 'on the way from socialism to communism' will inevitably abolish the existing stratification and realize human equality.

Complete equality is certainly an abstract and impracticable idea. A social order can hardly exist without division of society into several strata, at least until the society reaches a higher intellectual and moral level. But as far as egalitarian trends exist, they intend that various obstacles impeding advancement up the social ladder be abolished and the conditions of vertical mobility facilitated. One might expect that 'socialist society' would excel in opportunities for a successful and easy vertical mobility, and that every citizen in the Soviet Union is already in a position to rise up the social ladder with the support of the state. If it were so, the social stratification which exists at present in the Soviet Union, should be but a temporary phenomenon of transitional character.

The problem whether the existing stratification in the Soviet Union is stabilized or will be eliminated soon is most significant for understanding Soviet society and its development. First of all it is the problem of whether the Soviet regime has facilitated vertical mobility. Elimination of social differences is a general trend of our age. The modern democracy with a free economy opens many opportunities for a prompt and unrestricted vertical mobility. Private ownership gives an industrious man with something of the entrepreneur in him the chance to save and increase his property: a farmer may become a rich landowner, a small tradesman may become an industrialist or merchant, a successful entrepreneur may become a captain of industry. No less favorable are the conditions of social work in a modern state. A person of high intellectual ability, or even an average man with integrity and devotion to the public interest, does rise to the highest positions in his own field. The same must be said as regards the free professions. Gifted writers, artists, composers, eminent scholars, inventors, etc., whatever their origin, have a chance to gain national or international popularity and to be compensated generously. Civil service in a country where there is no privileged aristocracy and where promotion is not limited and does not depend on special protection, is no less favorable than private activity for a man with a good training and back-

ground. Vertical mobility under such conditions proceeds without hindrance and 'Who's Who?' is subject to numerous additions and corrections.

Has the Soviet Union overtaken the modern democratic state in this respect? Its constitution does not recognize any legal obstacles for promotion or advancement: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his work.' But this constitutional provision (Art. 12) does not say who evaluates abilities and appraises work. Meanwhile, promotion depends obviously upon the system of evaluation. There is no such thing as private ownership in the Soviet Union on the basis of which one could undertake an independent enterprise with the risk of winning or losing. The Soviet state is a universal monopolist-employer, and everybody depends upon the state, which establishes conditions of labor and dictates wages. In a country of free economy, success depends on the abilities of the entrepreneur and on evaluation by consumers, whose attitude towards one or another kind of product constitutes a kind of anonymous vote. In the Soviet Union every participant in economic activity depends on the state, or, to put it more exactly, on his bosses. Neither are there free elections in the Soviet Union. All public organizations and associations are in fact agencies of the state. [1] They exist for purposes approved by the state, are subject to state control, and may be dissolved at any time by order of the corresponding administrative agency. Those who work in the trade-unions, cooperatives or in the unions of writers, composers, etc., do not differ essentially from the employees and officials of the state. Their service is evaluated by state officials or by Party men. Neither are there free professions in the Soviet Union. Writers must render service to the Communist Party and government by propagating leading slogans in a literary form and by blaming or ridiculing inimical trends. Scholars are supported only so far as their activity is considered to correspond to the ideology of the Party and to be expedient for current needs. Everything belongs to the state and any promotion depends on how the state or the Party evaluates a particular artist and the practical or political significance of his creations. Artists have no free market for their

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[1] See G. Guins, *Soviet Law*, Ch. XII.

canvases. There are no private art galleries, theatres, cinema studios.

It is far more desirable for most people to take their own chances and depend upon free competition than to be dependent upon a 'boss' and his caprices. But in the Soviet Union not only individuals but the whole nation depends on the government. Everywhere and always the same dependence and the same measures and methods of evaluation restrict individual activity and deprive society of the freedom of choice. In theory everything belongs to the whole people, but this sovereign people has no right or possibility to express its judgment freeely. It receives only that which has already been evaluated positively by its government or the ruling party.

There are no legal limits and allegedly no national, religious or racial prejudices in the Soviet Union, but, as we have just seen, the conditions for vertical mobility are less favorable there than in a democratic state. Is it possible to believe that the state will gradually abolish all forms of control and secure full freedom for the people as soon as the reasons for suspicion disappear and nothing threatens political stability? Such optimism has no foundation in the existing trends of the Soviet regime, and, unless the regime itself radically changes, people who compose the upper social strata will jealously guard their privileges and keep the 'others' from rising up the social ladder.

2. Intelligentsia

On August 10, 1953, Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution was amended. To its previous description of Soviet society as composed of 'workers and peasants' was added a third category, the 'working intelligentsia.'

The composition of the Communist Party is accordingly defined at present as a union of 'the most active and politically conscious citizens within the ranks of workers, peasants and working intelligentsia.' The new formulation is significant. The role of the intelligentsia may be illustrated by the following data. Out of the total of 1,316 deputies elected to the two houses of the Supreme Soviet in 1950, there were 629 educated people or 48 per cent of the total; in 1954 intelligentsia received 809 places out of 1,347, or

60 per cent of the total number of deputies. No less indicative are the figures concerning the composition of the Congresses of the Trade Unions. The number of workers among the delegates in these congresses since the end of W.W. II amounted from 25 to 30 percent. All others were officials of various kinds, mostly of the central trade union organizations belonging to the intelligentsia. [1]

The leading cadres of the Soviet intelligentsia are composed of the members of the Communist party and belong to the ruling group. The interests of those who govern and are appointed and those governed or controlled are different. The lack of understanding between these two social groups is well characterized in the play 'The Guests' by Zorin, widely disapproved by the Soviet critics. The play (see below chapter XIII) was acknowledged to be harmful and slanderous in that it might leave the impression, it was said, 'that the structure of Soviet society consists of people who have executive posts and those who depend on them,' and that officials are mostly negative types. [2]

It is certainly untrue that the majority of officials are rascals, and Zorin hardly believed that it was so, but what is true is that the conditions of the Soviet universal monopoly transform officials into bureaucrats and separate them from real life and from the manual laborers. Another writer, Ovechkin, who cannot be accused of lack of enthusiasm and faith in communist doctrine, at least in his essays, nevertheless attacks communists of the upper party organizations for their bureaucratic vices [3] and so do many other authors. In this they are in unison with Khrushchev, Malenkov, and other leaders of the post-Stalin period, who have acknowledged the evil of paperwork and separation from life and the working people in government institutions.

At the same time the general conditions of life of this ruling bureaucratic group are much better than those of average workers and peasants and Soviet legislation does not encourage workers and peasants to change their jobs for white-collar work. The educational system and the economic conditions are unfavorable for the children of peasants and workers.

[1] See above Chapter VIII.

[2] *Sovetskaya kultura*, June 5, 1954.

[3] Ovechkin, 'V tom zhe raione,' *Novyi mir*, No. 3, 1954, pp. 35–36, and his other stories (see below p. 188).

According to the *Uchitelskaya gazeta* (Teachers News),

> 'The national economic plan for ensuring that all children receive instruction is often not met. It is being particularly badly carried out in Amur, Novosibirsk, Novgorod, Astrakhan and Omsk provinces ... According to the current data, more than 4000 children fail to attend classes in the Tatar Autonomous Republic. In Gorky, as checkups have shown, there are from 20 to 40 children in every school not attending classes. In the Minyar district of Cheliabinsk province alone, 240 pupils in the first through seventh grade are not attending school ... A great many pupils are not attending in Astrakhan, Belgorod, Bryansk, Ivanovo Kaluga, Kemerovo, Tambov and a number of other provinces of the Russian Republic ... The number of children enrolled in the fifth through seventh grades in the Uzbeck Republic is especially unfortunate ...' [1]

Children who do not attend schools are mostly sons and daughters of workers and peasants, and the schools which are not attended are mostly elementary schools. There are two kinds of schools for free education, one elementary with a four-year course, and the other a junior high school type offering seven years of education. As a general rule there are only elementary schools in the villages. Farmers' children who want to continue their education must move elsewhere. Not many can do so because of the inconveniences of transportation, and because children in the villages are wage earners from the age of twelve.

Inhabitants of cities and towns are in a more advantageous situation. Their children may start elementary education and continue it without interruption in the same school up to the seventh year. But that is not the only advantage. Seven-year schools usually have better teaching personnel, sanitary conditions, and equipment. But still better in all respects are the secondary schools having grades up to the tenth year.

Students of seven-year schools who have passed all grades have theoretically the right to enroll in one of the ten-year schools. In practice, however, it is not so easy. According to the decree of the People's Commissars of September 3, 1935, the eighth grade of secondary school is usually made up of students who have

[1] *Uchitelskaya gazeta*, Oct. 16, 1954. Editorial and article by Vlassov, Assistant Director of the Chief School Administration of the R.S.T.S.R. (Translated in the *Current Digest*, Vol. VI, No. 42 Dec. 1, 1954).

passed the seventh grade of the same school. Only fifteen per cent of the vacancies must be reserved for students coming from other schools. [1]

Beginning with the eighth year, education was not free of charge. School fees were especially hard for farmers, as they must live in the country and pay for boarding their children at school. Although school fees are abolished, (*Pravda*, June, 10, 1956), inhabitants of cities will still have the advantages described above.

Conditions become still more complicated for boarding students if there are no dormitories, and this is not a rare occurrence. Sanitary conditions are also unsatisfactory:

> 'In Ulianovsk, Lipetsk and Kursk provinces and the Tatar Autonomous Republic dormitories are badly equipped ... A school cannot function normally if it has no fuel. Yet in Kemerovo, Tiumen, Astrakhan and Kaluga Provinces many of the schools have not been provided with firewood. In Gorky, Kalinin, and other provinces repairs of school buildings have not been completed. Before the cold weather comes, repair work must be finished and firewood laid in at the schools and dormitories. By providing transportation to school it is possible to prevent children who live far away from gradually dropping out of schools.' [2]
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> 'A checkup has shown that elementary health conditions have not been provided in many schools of Kamensk province ... no ventilation of rooms ... lighting is below standard in many schools ... many school dormitories are inadequately equipped, health conditions are below standard, and there is no provision for meals ...' [3]

3. *The new pyramid*

It is clear now how many material and formal obstacles to educational advancement, exist for the children of small wage earners and especially of farmers. Meanwhile such advancement is the only way to the higher social strata. To become a member of the 'working intelligentsia' and to share its priviliges, it is necessary to graduate from one of the institutions of higher learning. As we

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[1] For further information see W. W. Kulski, *The Soviet Regime*, pp. 457–497.
[2] *Uchitelskaya gazeta*, Oct. 16, 1954 (See above note 6).
[3] *Uchitelskaya gazeta*, Oct. 23 1954 p. 4. (Curr. Digest, No. 42, 1954.

see, the present educational policy of the Soviet state rather hampers than facilitates the rise of children of the lower strata; institutions of higher learning, as well as the best schools, are primarily for the children of the privileged groups. Every citizen has a right to housing accomodation, but he gets it only if there is a vacancy. It is the same as regards education. Every boy and girl has a right to be admitted to the eighth grade of secondary school, but only if the stipulated 'fifteen per cent' of vacancies does not close the door in his or her face. No one who has not passed through the ten-year school can be admitted to an institution of higher learning. But even those who succeed in passing secondary schools cannot always enroll and graduate from universities and special schools of higher learning. There is again the material problem and the problem of limited vacancies. Here again everything depends on the government's policy. And it is very indicative that the Soviet government at the same time that it declared in 1956 the forthcoming abolition of school fees, intended to retain the so-called privileged schools.

In September 1954, the Soviet government issued a decree concerning technical training and distribution of engineers and technicians which tended to increase the number of the latter. (*Pravda*, September 23, 1954). To put this measure through it is enough to decrease the number of vacancies in the higher technical schools, to cancel or decrease the number of scholarships, and to fail to provide accommodations in students' dormitories. In such a case, the doors of the institutions of higher learning will remain open for the children of wealthy people only. And that is the real practice. No wonder that the number of children of peasants and workers in institutions of higher learning is relatively low.

Meanwhile, the children of high officials and wealthy Soviet citizens have various advantages with respect to promotion. The larger the earnings of the parents, the better the housing accommodations and the better social ties, which is no mean consideration, the better the prospects. Several Soviet novels devoted to student life depict the differences in conditions of life and sources for subsistence of students of Moscow University. Even in Moscow, where almost all students are selected from the Komsomol and receive scholarships, some live in a kind of com-

fort and have such opportunities as others can only dream about.[1]

The tempo of vertical mobility, which in the Soviet Union depends mostly on the level of education, is thus restricted. If we consider further the system of wages, inheritance law, and limitations established by the passport system for free movement and change of profession, the tendency of the Soviet regime to stabilize the existing stratification becomes quite obvious.

The existing stratification corresponds to the needs of universal planning. Such a plan must secure for every branch of the national economy, the necessary cadres of farmers, workers or intellectuals with appropriate training. From this point of view it is expedient to encourage children of peasants to adopt the profession of their parents, as well as to prepare from among the children of the skilled workers and state officials the successors in their professions. Stabilization of the existing stratification is not only a social but also an economic problem. There is also a political reason for stabilization. The state ruled by communists needs reliable cadres of officials. Children of those who already have reached a privileged position are, as a general rule, more reliable politically and better prepared for responsible administrative functions than others. They grow up in an atmosphere which makes them accustomed to certain advantages and among people who are satisfied with their conditions, devoted to the existing regime and ready to protect it [2]

Soviet reality, after almost forty years of the development of the Soviet state, leads us to believe that since the young generation has been bred in the atmosphere of social inequality [3] and disregard of the original ideal of egalitarianism, there is, a possibility of dangerous social conflicts in the future. There may be a struggle for power between those who are acquiring the habitual prejudices of the people of higher strata against 'boorish'

[1] Trofimov, *Studenty* (translated in English) and *Hail our University* (*Zdravstvui Universitet*) by Grigory Skvirsky, *Oktiabr*, Jan. and Feb. 1952.

[2] See Guins, *Soviet Law*, Ch. XX pp. 264–270.

[3] '...different habits of speech, manners, and dress are built up and transmitted from one generation to the next. In addition, the tendency for families of similar social station to live near each other in the same community leads to the choice of marriage-partners from families with approximately the same background. All of these forces are at work in the Soviet Union, and it is a safe prediction that they will eventually result in the emergence of a class system resembling in many ways that in the United States excluding the South." Barrington Moore Jr. *Soviet Politics-The Dilemma of Power*, Harvard Univ. Press, 1950, pp. 245–46).

people, and those who will oppose them and demand a more democratic regime. This conflict will be probable, however, only when the present leaders, still educated in the traditional ideas of communism, are completely replaced by the representatives of the new generations.

Chapter 12

FORMATION OF NEW PSYCHOLOGY

The Soviets pretend that their socialist state has already developed through education a new kind of man devoted to the communist cause, ready to sacrifice himself in the interests of the socialist fatherland and its ideals, an industrious, honest and unprejudiced citizen, a loyal follower of the great teachers and founders of the socialist state.

This pretense is based on the theoretical premise that if a certain economic order is changed, then the consciousness of man also changes. The new economic and social order gives birth to a new man. Such a doctrine is not lacking in some measure of truth. It is unquestionable that material conditions of life represent one of the most significant factors in human behavior, and as far as the Soviet regime has radically changed the foundations of the national economy and, correspondingly, of social structure, people's psychology cannot remain without significant changes. However, there are other powerful stimuli which can neutralize or oppose or even eliminate the influence of material factors. Every nation has its traditions and customs, its history, religion and culture, which support some conservative trends. No regime can ignore the legacy of the past: literature, art, and all other political and cultural achievements. Meanwhile, any contact with the past widens the point of view, leads to conflict with contradictory ideologies, sows doubts and revises obliterated ideas.

There is, moreover, another factor in human behavior, quite independent of outside influence. This is the human ability to cogitate and to search for the truth. All social changes are derivatives of the two parallel developments, social and individual. A constant correlation between the two exists; the social does not always have prevalence. Marxists oversimplify the problem of

human behavior, ignoring the significance of innate moral dispositions and principles of justice and goodness. A thinking man may feel repulsion and be revolted with existing conditions even if they are most favorable for himself. On the other hand, those who are indoctrinated in a certain line of thought nevertheless begin to criticize and protest if they are disappointed.

What the Soviet press characterizes as the survivals of the past is in fact behavior, as a resulting from doubts and disappointment, contradictory to the existing order. It is difficult and probably premature to generalize about it, but it would be a serious omission not to mention it if one is interested in the psychology of the 'Soviet man.' It is equally important to analyze the significance of the new conditions of life and the specific psychological processes among certain groups and certain types of individuals.

1. The new generations

The future of Russia belongs undoubtedly to its young generation. The remnants of the people of the prerevolutionary period are quite inconsiderable. Former nobles, landowners, industrialists, merchants, army officers and well-to-do peasants, if any survived the Revolution and systematic extermination, have been stamped out. A few adapted themselves to the new regime and lost their identity long ago. If there are still any survivors, they are few and quite old.

The so-called 'old bolsheviks' who achieved the Revolution of 1917 have also disappeared. Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Mikoyan are but a few indestructible remnants of the communist revolution. Of the others, some were purged, some died a natural death, some were killed on the front lines. Those who survived have betrayed many of the orginal ideas and principles of Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin and other leaders of the Revolution. Lenin would undoubtedly be stupefied if he should rise from his tomb to meet Soviet marshals in their splendid uniforms, to visit his successors in their luxurious country-houses, or to appear in the restaurants Ararat or Argivi, or the hotel-bars and beauty salons in the GUM (State Department Store) in front of the Kremlin.

Those who were children in 1917 are now grandfathers. The second generation is growing up, its members and their offspring will be the real 'new men' of the Soviet land. Khrushchev, Malenkov, Gromyko and their aides will be forced out soon by these new men. The present stage is transitional, the new changes are imminent. The psychology of the 'new men' has to be considered above all when the future of Russia is speculated upon. It is certainly not easy from afar to form opinion about a people. Yet there are facts which reveal the essential peculiarities of Soviet youth.

There was a generation acquainted with the communist regime only and disdainful of both the prerevolutionary order and the capitalist world. Its world-outlook was artificially limited and based on erroneous prejudices and premises.

One must also remember that this generation grew up in an atmosphere of frenzied construction, engulfed by the enthusiasm for large-scale plans and constructions. The former political revolutionists were succeeded by the *economic revolutionists*. They saw all the difficulties and all the errors of the construction periods; they learned from experience the significance of special training and of inherent talent; they learned to recognize that all people are not born equal either mentally or physically. Wishing to attain a place in the new world, they have worked industriously and earnestly and have produced many a gifted person. The new generations are and will be educated in the atmosphere of scientific and technical progress.

As the construction period advanced and experience was obtained, *the feeling of national pride* was born; first, in the pride of achievement, in the deep satisfaction with the results of construction. But the cultivation of nationalism began in earnest during World War II. Military themes and experiences, rather than economic subjects, inspired Soviet novelists, poets and playwrights during the war; heroic deeds of soldiers and commissioned officers; the fidelity of wives and sweethearts waiting for their husbands and betrothed; the patriotism of former political dissenters liberated from concentration camps, etc. Some of the patriotic novels, films, and plays were among the most popular and typical of this period. The survivals of this heroic epoch will live in stories, songs and monuments. By his frank contempt

for the Russian nation, by his plundering as a conqueror, and by his boundless cruelty, Hitler succeeded in stirring up against himself a mighty wave of reborn Russian patriotism. The internationalist government was forced to pay tribute to and to exploit the nationalist feeling and it tries, in vain, to transform it into a 'socialist patriotism.' [1]

A *taste for European civilization and culture* is the third important development. For a long time Russia was completely isolated. The Russian people had been artificially separated from the European peoples as if by a Chinese wall. The Russian press had portrayed the decadent West as a doomed world and had cultivated self-reliance in the Russian people. Now, however, many breaches have appeared in this wall. Since the Red Army entered the Baltic States and Finland (and afterwards Germany and the East European countries) a picture of a different kind of life opened before the eyes of the Russians. Sailors began to visit America, and delegations bringing back their impressions from abroad in turn acquainted Russia with a different kind of life. In spite of all the barriers created by Soviet authorities, some facts about Europe and the United States filter through the Soviet borders as a result of the knowledge of foreign language and the influence of foreign books, magazines, and newspapers. Personal impressions formed in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, and other satellite nations will be especially significant. The contrast between what is described in Soviet sources concerning the bourgeois world and what people can see and learn for themselves only strengthens the idea that the bourgeois world is much more attractive. There are still intelligent people in Russia!

Consequently, although imbued with a nationalistic feeling, proud of the old Russian culture and the creative power of the new period, proud of its victories and of the possibilities that are opening up before Russia, the new Soviet intelligentsia is nevertheless aware of the might and magnitude of other nations which it has relegated to the 'Old World' but which, evidently, are not yet ready to perish. More than that, the intelligentsia sees that, contrary to what its leaders would have it believe, there still is much that may be envied. The so-called 'collective leadership' of the post-Stalin period has decided itself that a further isolation

[1]) Barnhoorn, Fred C., *Soviet Russian Nationalism*, N.Y. Oxford Univ. Press, 1956.

from the West will not be expedient and has, though with certain precautions, assigned several groups of reliable specialists to visit the United States, a 'stronghold of capitalism.'

The Moscow government itself decided, when Russia became a world power after World War II, that certain proletarian habits had to be eliminated. Commissars were renamed Ministers,material splendour was introduced with some exaggeration as regards uniforms, decorations, and designations, in conformity with the idea of the grandeur of the socialist state. As the 'nouveaux riches' used to do, Soviet statesmen adopted the custom of luxurious receptions to impress the imagination of foreigners and to display their prosperity. For the same reason luxurious hotels have been constructed, restaurants opened, Gosudarstvennyi Univermag (GUM) established, and objects of luxury produced.

It is very easy indeed to acquire the habit of living in comfort and the members of the upper social groups, especially wives and daughters, soon appropriated all of the luxuries and devices of the bourgeois household. In Soviet novels, comfort, fashionable dresses, rich furniture are constantly described or mentioned as customary features of the households of engineers, academicians, professors, etc. It will hardly be possible to exterminate the idea of Soviet citizens that they have right to comfort or to deprive those who have acquired it of the advantages which they enjoy. Members of the upper social strata, and those who represent a specific upper class among a certain social group, such as *vydvizhentsy* (the promoted workers and farmers), stakhanovites and innovators, as they are at present designated, will protect their wealth and, probably, resist such changes as may threaten their prosperity.

Such are some of the main trends, which characterize the modern Soviet Union and its people. Business psychology, instead of socialist fanaticism; nationalism, instead of internationalism; a taste for culture and comfort, instead of original communist ascetism and sacrifices; all these, we believe, characterize the 'new people' of the Soviet Union, not so much those who are still riding the crest of power, as those who are on its threshold.

2. *'Enough of being Slaves'*

There are, certainly, people who support the Soviet Government.

It can count on those members of the Communist Party who are steadfast in their belief that the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism is infallible; officials and intellectual workers who are given various privileges; workers and peasants who have received special honors and monetary rewards; and numerous representatives of non-Russian nationalities who are actively involved in Soviet policy; finally, on those who, under the influence of propaganda and one-sided information, believe that the communist world is invisible and that the future belongs to communism. However, it would be a tremendous exaggeration to assert that the whole Russian population is reconciled to the Soviet regime and system and that anti-Soviet moods do not exist within the nation. The opposite opinion can be proved by striking phenomena: concentration camps in the Soviet Union, where several million people are confined; the numerous displaced persons in western Europe; and the socalled 'nevozvrashchentsy,' or 'non-returners' (Soviet citizens who refuse to return from abroad). Especially significant, however, is the fact that among the Russian D.P.s who resisted repatriation, were many rank-and-file workers and peasants forcibly removed during World War II from Russia to Germany and Austria for forced labor (the so-called *Ost-Arbeiter*). They preferred to stay in ruined Europe to returning to their 'socialist fatherland.'

There is opposition among all groups of the Soviet population, among the workers and peasants and among the intelligentsia. To the latter group belong such persons as the former Soviet diplomats Besedovsky and Barmine, who quitted their diplomatic posts before World War II; Kravchenko, the author of the well-known book *I Chose Freedom*; Guzenko, a former official of the Soviet Embassy in Canada the author of a best-sale novel, *The Fall of a Titane*; a high-ranking general, Gulishvili, who deserted the Soviet occupation zone in Germany in the fall of 1947; agents of the Soviet intelligence service: Rastvorov in Japan, Petrov in Australia and Khoklov, major of the M.G.B., who preferred to live in exile than to be a murderer, to mention but some of the best known. These members of the Soviet governing group were not impressed with the apparent growth of Soviet might and for various reasons were glad of an opportunity to break off with the Soviets. Among the numerous DPs and refugees

are former communists, who were disappointed in Stalin's policy and in his miraculous Five-Year Plans and who denounce both the ruthlessness and the falsity of the Soviet regime.

Among the refugees there are also scholars who want freedom of thought and who are distressed by the incessant party directives and the unceasing subjugation to the official philosophy, which does not allow freedom for scientific work even to astronomers and botanists. There are even some former officers who do not wish to submit again to the 'politruks,' [1] political instructors and representatives of the Communist Party in military units. These officers fought bravely against the aggressors for the freedom and independence of their nation, but they are not at all disposed to fight for the triumph of communism throughout the world.

'Enough of being slaves'—these are words one usually hears from those who turn down a proposal of repatriation to the Soviet Union. It is evident that the Soviet government has no confidence in Soviet citizens who have been abroad. Those few of the D.P.s who have succeeded in escaping once more after post-War repatriation have witnessed the fact that everybody, without exception, was searched at the frontier. Both officers and soldiers were disarmed, regardless of the fact that they had fought for their Soviet fatherland. Those who tried to hide even a revolver were severely punished. As to prisoners of war and displaced persons, they were mostly confined after repatriation in notorious concentration camps.

Inside the country, it is more than probable that opposition is growing among the dissatisfied and state-exploited workers and peasants. They are least capable of organization under Soviet conditions, but their strength lies chiefly in passive resistance, as has been proved by the peasantry.

3. Discredited system

Every police state supports its regime by force. The Soviet Union did not hesitate at the most merciless repressions, but it is impossible, as we have seen, to explain the vitality of the

[1] The institute of 'politruks' was abolished during the War under the pressure of military circles and restored again after its end.

Soviet regime as a result of the use of terror only. There was enthusiasm which helped in the realization of the five-year plans, and there was and still exists a kind of fascination before the Great Power which pretends to dominate the world, the seductive prospects of the reorganization of the whole world on the principles of the brotherhood of all nations, the abolition of exploitation, egalitarianism, and universal prosperity. No terror would be sufficient if the regime had no support at all.

However, socialist construction has evidently ceased to inspire people. Enthusiasm is vanishing and giving way to disappointment. Decade after decade, the government demands sacrifices but the conditions of life remain unimproved. Decade after decade, the government gives solemn promises and does not fulfill them. Who will sacrifice endlessly for an unknown future?

The usefulness and success of the industrialization undertaken and realized during the several five-year plans are beyond doubt and the working people cannot ignore them, but these are some enterprises of a planetary scale which might be postponed without any harm, the realization of which would require enormous expenses of labor and material investments. Does the utility of the Baltic-White Sea canal justify the hastiness of construction, the ruthless exploitation of concentration camp prisoners, the many thousands who died from exhaustion or the cold during the construction? What was the justification of the construction of the Volga-Moscow river canal when that construction made it necessary to level several villages and remove thousands of peasants? Is it so urgent to transform Kara Kum desert in the Transcaspian area into a cultivated land, an undertaking which will cost many billions and which demands exploitation of a great number of voluntary and forced laborers and engineers, while there are so many urgent needs in the heart of Russia, for the satisfaction of which the material means and manpower might be used with substantial profit for the population? But the communist government prefers the pretentious plans of the 'Transformation of nature,' afforestation of an area of several thousand square miles, building a canal 1,000 kilometers long in the desert, formation of a new sea, supposed to be the Siberian Sea, between the steppe regions and Western Siberia; all with alluring promises and astronomical figures but without any

visible profit for the present. Everything is begun with enthusiasm but meets various obstacles and often stops, like afforestation, or lags behind like the project of irrigating 1,000,000 hectares of land in the Ukraine, which was promised to be completed in 1957 (*Izvestia*, Sept. 21, 1950). Some of these projects, like the Baltic-White Sea and Volga-Don canals, are performed without any essential practical use, but mostly as new strategic waterways.

'Socialists' who boast that they achieve the best harmony by their system of planning violate in fact the law of organic development of economic forces and create greater and greater shortcomings which they are not able to eliminate. Despite some significant achievements due to the individual genius of scholars and engineers, the system as a whole is proving defective and unworkable, unless radically reorganized. The population suffers from shortages of commodities and even food, from inadequate housing construction, from the defects of transportation, but the government continues to work out new large-scale plans because it has created a huge apparatus which it cannot stop, and especially because its centralized system is not adjusted for production and distribution of a great number of every-day necessities.

Not only the population but many of the Soviet leaders understand that it is necessary to change the economic policy. After Stalin's death the nation expected some relief, and increased production of commodities and necessities was promised. It was, however, not the first time the nation had heard such promises. Among the principal aims of the famous Stalin Five-Year plan of 1946, one could read: 'the food industry must be expanded to the fullest possible extent, consumer goods manufactured on a large scale, the incomes of the collective farmers increased, commodity exchange extended.' But, as the XIXth congress of the Communist Party in October 1952 solemnly acknowledged, the promises were not fulfilled.

Malenkov's government tried to steer in a new direction, but did not succeed. The lack of solidarity in the 'collective leadership' so obviously manifested in the liquidation of Beria and humiliation of Malenkov in 1955, and subsequent return to the former economic policy based on the development of heavy industry, did not strengthen the prestige of the party and the whole system. Businesslike people among the Party men who

occupy responsible positions cannot be confident that they will be supported in their activity by other Party men who hold no administrative positions, but, like Khrushchev, supervise and interfere in the sphere of responsible administration.

The Party undermined its own prestige in acknowledging at the XXth Congress in February 1956 that the 'cult of personality' which had dominated during Stalin's regime, but had in fact its roots in the Leninist theory of leadership, had been a vicious system; that the history of the Communist Party as Mikoyan asserted it at the Congress, proved to be falsified in the text which had served for a long time as the main source of political education; and, finally, that some of the respectable communists had been dishonored undeservingly. All these revelations were made by the present rulers who took part in the veneration of Stalin during his life and openly or silently supported his acts. How can these people still be respected? And what will be the consequences of the confession that the Party regime had been founded for about thirty years on the deceit, hypocrisy and ignobility of the Party hierachy? The new leaders have discredited not only Stalin but themselves, and the regime which they want to support. A rank-and-file citizen suspected all this if he did not know it. At present he has a ground not only to suspect, but to assert, that the whole system is rotten.

The Communist regime is losing its strength inside the Soviet Union. At the same time symptoms of corruption and disintegration have become more and more noticeable since the end of World War II among both rank-and-file people and Party men. They find reflection in the mirror of literature.

Chapter 13

REFLECTIONS IN LITERATURE

'Socialist realism' does not permit writers to describe reality as they themselves observe and understand it. Writers must be optimistic about the dark side of life in their socialist fatherland and interpret it as a survival of capitalism. They must emphasize, by way of contrast, the positive achievements of socialism. If negative types from among the Soviet people attract

their attention, they must overlook them, stressing positive types or opposing an ideal man to the real one, a 'new Soviet man.' Under such conditions it is for Soviet literature to be a true mirror of socialist reality.

Yet, Soviet literature may help to disclose the existing trends, conflicts and needs of Soviet people. It is not accidental that Soviet writers are much more successful in describing negative characters than positive ones. Soviet critics help us involuntarily when they attack one or another writer, reproaching him for having described various negative types and negative sides of life more vividly than positive types and socialist achievements. Anyone who is familiar with Soviet shortcomings, the antimoral behavior and crimes of Soviet citizens, easily finds in novels, plays and essays help in understanding Soviet reality. The information which newspapers offer is fragmentary, *Krokodil* satire may be considered as exaggeration, whereas literature gives typical images in a memorable form. Literature can be, therefore, a source of knowledge of Soviet life, even though adjusted to the 'social command' of the government.

Of even greater advantage are those literary works which do not disguise reality as it is. As regards the post-War stage, there are but a few works of that kind. Their authors were subject to repressions or at least they were sharply criticized in Soviet periodicals. These few works were published some time before Zhdanov's attack, in 1946, against deviations from 'socialist realism,' but there are other literary works of a realistic character which belong to the early years of the post-Stalin government.

1. Anti-socialist realism

The first victim of the new policy of the Communist party and government towards non-conformist writers was the Soviet humorist, Zoshchenko. During the war he published a story of an autobiographical character, 'Before Sunrise,' which was later characterized by the literary critic Egolin, as a 'vulgar, filthy lampoon against Soviet reality.'

The immediate cause of Zoshchenko's disgrace was his story, 'The Adventures of a Monkey', presumably written for children. At first glance the story seems quite innocent. It concerns a

monkey that escapes from a zoo during a bombardment and runs about loose in the city. The monkey soon begins to feel the strain of a life of freedom: she gets hungry and there is no place she can get anything to eat. 'There is nothing edible on the streets. She can't just drop into a cafeteria—with a tail. Or a cooperative. The more so because she has no money. And no ration card. What a nightmare!' But it just so happens that at a certain cooperative some carrots, turnips and cucumbers are on sale, and a long line of people are waiting. The monkey doesn't think of joining the line but jumps right up onto the counter, grabs a bunch of carrots from the clerk's hand, and without even asking 'how much'?—'a monkey, after all; she doesn't understand what's what'—runs out of the store. The clerk just about faints from the shock. 'And really, you can get quite a scare if suddenly, instead of the usual, normal kind of a customer, something hairy and with a tail jumps up beside you. And, what's more, doesn't pay a cent!'

Everybody begins to chase the monkey: kids, grown-ups, a militiaman (blowing his whistle) and a dog. The monkey runs with all her might and thinks to herself that it was pretty stupid to have left the cage and that, at the first opportunity, she would go right back to the zoo. In the meantime, to escape her pursuers, the monkey jumps over a wall. On the other side of the wall there's a boy, Alyesha Popov, who always wanted to have just such a monkey. So he catches her and takes her home and feeds her. But Alyesha's grandmother is none too happy about the monkey, especially when the monkey swipes a half-eaten piece of candy from grandma and pops it into her mouth. That drives grandma just about to tears. Grandma's ultimatum is that either she or the monkey must live in the zoo, not both in the same house. But Alyesha succeeds in pacifying her by promising to train the monkey to behave just like a human, to eat with a spoon, and drink tea from a glass, and not to steal sweets.

The next day when Alyesha is at school and grandma is taking a nap, the monkey decides to go and do the town again. This time an old disabled veteran, Gavrilych, carrying a little basket with soap and underwear to the steam-bath, catches sight of the monkey. At first, he can't believe his eyes, he thinks maybe it's the beer he had not too long before. Gavrilych soon realizes,

however, that is a real monkey and worth ten rounds of beer if he sells it at the market. He lures the monkey with a piece of sugar he happens to have in his pocket and takes her with him to the bath where he intends to wash her with soap and water and tie a ribbon around her neck and so get more for her when he sells her.

The monkey doesn't mind; 'I'll let this old peg-leg carry me around in his basket,' she thinks to herself, 'It's kind of interesting, even.' And at the steam-bath it is just like Africa, and the monkey is feeling fine until Gavrilych gets some soap in her eyes. That makes the monkey go into a rage and she tears through the dressing room all covered with soap suds, scaring the clients who were undressing out of their wits, and dashes out into the street where another chase takes place with Gavrilych, half-dressed and carrying his shoes in his hand, bringing up the rear. At this moment, Alyesha, who was grieving for his lost monkey, turns up and the monkey jumps into his arms. His right to keep the monkey is recognized.

The boy keeps his promise to his grandmother and trains the monkey to behave. She doesn't steal other people's candy any longer and even wipes her nose with a handkerchief. The narrator of the story relates that he dropped in on Alyesha one day and saw the monkey sitting at the table with an air of importance 'like a ticket seller at the movies,' eating rice pudding with a spoon. Then Alyesha says: 'I have trained her to be just like a human being and now all children and even adults, in a way, can take her as an example.'

In order to judge the furor which greeted the appearance of Zoshchenko's story, we need only remember that Zhdanov called the writer 'a vulgar person, a liberal completely alien to the ranks of Soviet literature.' As for his works, Zhdanov said they were 'poisoned by a bestial enmity to the Soviet order.' Zhdanov believed that it was Zoshchenko's intention to 'picture the Soviet people as idlers and monsters and as stupid, primitive people.' 'Zoshchenko', remarked Zhdanov, 'is not disposed to find any positive type among the Soviet people. As in this story, 'The Adventures of a Monkey', Zoshchenko is in the habit of making fun of the Soviet way of life, the Soviet order and the Soviet people, trying to disguise it with idle talk and useless humor.'

Only a person who fully understands 'the charms of Soviet life' realizes that Zoshchenko's story is in fact not as innocent as might seem at first glance. Imagine with what bitter laughter the Soviet reader greeted the monkey's meditations as to where it was better to live, in a cage or in freedom. Imagine, also, the bitter laughter which greeted the mention of the grandmother's half-eaten candy, a delicacy of which the rank and file Soviet citizen has forgotten even to dream at that post-War time; and, finally, the mention of that solemn day when a long line was formed at the doors of the cooperative, waiting to buy 'carrots and turnips'.

The description of the peaceful tea-party at Alyesha's house, his grandmother eating candy and resting in an armchair, the lump of sugar in the Gavrilych's pocket, his basket of clean linen and a bar of soap—all this is ridiculous. At the time when the story was published, Soviet citizens had not seen these items for a long time, especially soap, which had the value of gold in Soviet Russia, and which was such a rarity that only a mad person would waste it on a monkey. Certainly it is mockery to speak of a mug of beer for ten roubles (about two American dollars), and Gavrilych's running with his shoes in hand (for if they had been left in the bath, they would have been stolen). It is also malicious to write of a monkey owning a handkerchief and eating rice pudding, since the common Soviet man has neither. Undoubtedly the Soviet reader well understood Zoshchenko's satire, and his story probably had great success as a reminder of hopeless and everlasting poverty. And just at a time when the authorities were trying to arouse a resurgence of energy and a spirit of sacrifice in order to realize the fourth Five Year Plan of 1946–50.

2. Anti-Social feelings

A distinguished poet, Akhmatova has also been accused of anti-Soviet trends. If Zoshchenko's satire provoked the indignation of those in power because it reminded the Soviet citizen of his miserable life, then Akhmatova's poems were blamed because they were permeated with gloomy pessimism, or, according to Zhdanov, with 'decadence.' During World War II, The Great Patriotic War, as it is known in Russia, Akhmatova, said Zhdanov, wrote of the loneliness which she had to share with her black

cat. 'The black cat looks at me as with the eyes of the century. Everything is plundered, betrayed, sold!' writes Akhmatova. Her sonnet 'A Poem Without a Hero,' irritated Party people by its title alone because Party people want to see every Soviet man a hero of labor work and of the Union.

It goes without saying that Zoshchenko and Akhmatova were but scapegoats since the matter did not concern them alone. The magazine *Leningrad*, which was abolished simultaneously with the attack against Zoshchenko and Akhmatova because of its harmful tendencies, published a parody by Khazin on Pushkin's well known poem 'Eugene Onegin.' The chapter entitled 'Onegin's Return' describes his troubles with the *zhilotdiel* (Bureau of Distribution of Living Space) and his impressions of the city and of the streetcar where he was not only shouted at, pushed, shoved, etc., but robbed of some of his possessions. He was finally utterly stupefied at seeing Tatyana, high on a building, dressed in overalls and painting the walls.

Alexander Khazin was properly rebuked for his parody. 'The real significance of Kahzin's libel', said Zhdanov, ''lies in his attempted comparison of our up-to-date Leningrad with the St. Petersburg of Pushkin's time. The author dislikes everything in our contemporary Leningrad—while Onegin's time, according to Khazin, was a Golden Age. He dislikes zhilotdiel, ration cards, passports. He dislikes the fact that those 'heavenly creatures' whom Onegin admired are at present traffic regulators, carpenters etc. How could the editors of 'Leningrad' approve this libel against Leningrad and its remarkable people?' exclaimed the revolted Zhdanov.

In reality, Khazin's guilt lay only in the fact that he continued to write in the style popular during the war when antipathy towards pre-revolutionary culture retreated before the necessity to strengthen national pride by mobilizing the memories of the past. Since the war, on the contrary, it has been necessary to concentrate all effort on propaganda about the achievements of the revolution.

Poetry was also subjected to strictures. One of the Soviet critics, Danini, in a review of his, expressed regret that there still existed in Soviet post-war poetry such subjects as 'a little leaf on a twig.' 'It is an unpleasant phenomenon,' continues this critic,

'that these lyrics of shallow sentiment coexist with the poetry of great ideas and great feelings—the poetry which is truly contemporary.'

As an illustration, the same critic cited a poem in which the author described his impressions on looking out of the window of his railroad coach. The poet described at first summits covered with blue clouds and shining snow, and later the monotonous landscape of the steppe with poor peasants' huts; a tiresome, trivial picture.

The hidden intent of this poem, the critic said, was to contract the meagerness of our every day life with something 'romantically sublime.' 'An old and blind idea,' he exclaimed indignantly.

> 'Our contemporary Soviet man wants to find in poetry not merely his present image, but rather his future image, his future experience, he wants to recognize in a hero of a lyrical work the image of himself as he dreams of being in the future.
>
> 'In our poetry of today we can easily feel a note of "the hard-won rest" "of the long awaited quiet", and of "deserved peace". In the meantime, the two worlds, an old and a new one, stand opposing each other, not in the same positions, but still with the same irreconcilability. It would seem that the motif of quiet and rest should cease to have a place in our contemporary lyrics. However, it is still with us...' (*Znamia*, No. 11–12, 1946).

3. *Typical conformists and deviations*

Some post-war novels serve to illustrate the way in which the new directives have materialized.

Ehrenburg in his novel, 'Storm', characterizes World War II as the trial of strength of two worlds, the World of Communism and the Bourgeois World. In France and in other countries only Communists were able to organize the struggle against enemy occupation known as the Resistance Movement. Only the armies of the Soviet Union and the defenders of Stalingrad were able to save Paris and Europe.

People of bourgeois mind and sympathies were collaborators with the Nazis. A poet believing that 'art exists for art's sake' is characterized by the author as a person prone to collaboration with the enemy. Industrialists co-operated during the war with the Germans and after the war with the intelligence services and

the American imperialists. Englishmen, the lackeys of imperialism supply armaments to the French monarchists (nonsense well known to Ehrenburg) and refuse military supplies to the communist resistance.

An American correspondent, Bill Coster, anticipates the pleasure of describing the rout of the Reds, but is disillusioned by events and then begins to falsify the French 'resistance' in a series of slanderous dispatches.

Pavlenko, the late Stalin laureate, depicts in his novel, *Happiness*, a rural district in Crimea devasted by the Germans. The novel's heroes are ordinary people, ex-servicemen, war invalids, collective farmers and minor officers in the local administration absorbed in restoration work. The leading character is Colonel Voropaev, an old bolshevik and former comissar with a fine war record. He took part in the campaign until the liberation of Bulgaria, when he was seriously wounded and forced to leave the front as an almost hopelessly disabled veteran after a leg amputation and lung infection.

There are no miracles in this novel. It does not have a 'happy ending.' Yet Pavlenko's heroes find happiness nevertheless. They take part in rebuilding the whole country, are inspired by the achievements and ignore personal comfort and ease.

Voropaev from the first day of his arrival in the Crimea abandons his plan to settle down to a quiet life. The ferment of his old communist temperament, the habit of being in the forefront and of undertaking the most difficult and dangerous tasks, directs him to active participation in reviving the country ravaged by Nazis and to organize kolkhozes of new settlers. He gives lectures, declares the kolkhoz in a state of siege and opens an economic offensive with the aid of farmers who follow his appeal to organize shock-units in order to accelerate all urgent work. He does not spare his health and when during the Yalta conference one of his former colleagues, a general, offers him a high position in one of the Army institutions, he refuses. Having heard this Stalin, then present at Yalta conference, invites Voropaev to come to see him.

The author does not limit himself to a description of Voropaev's victories on the economic front. While on the fighting front, Voropaev had fallen deeply in love with a woman surgeon

named Alexandra Goreva who remained with the army. This gives the author an opportunity to describe liberated Europe and the members of the decadent bourgeoisie.

In Vienna, Goreva meets the opportunist Altman who is ready to serve anyone in whatever victorious camp. His equally bourgeois wife is interested only in clothes. In an old castle belonging to Herzog Vaalsee, a scion of the old nobility, Goreva can observe the degeneration of the old Austrian aristocracy. Herzog accepts the business proposition of an American major who is at the same time a salesman and intends to supply Austria with American soap.

In the novel, Americans are depicted as drunkards or businessmen afraid of the growing competition of the Russians.

The characters participating in the Russian occupation of Eastern Europe express their belief that Russia will not leave the occupied countries until it succeeds in organizing a 'new life' there. Fascism has not been destroyed only to be replaced with another system of slavery, and Goreva, returning to see Voropaev is sorry to leave 'the field of battles' still not won.

A number of literary works of the post-war period are devoted to kolkhozes. T. Nikolaeva described in her novel *Zhatva* (Harvest) how a backward kolkhoz was transformed into an advanced one. Her main character is a woman who surpasses her husband in creativeness and in understanding the needs and trends of agricultural development. S. Babaevskii was awarded the Stalin prize for his novel, *Light over the Land* (*Svet nad zemlei*), in which he described the electrification of a kolkhoz. None of these novels described the difficulties which kolkhoz farmers had to overcome. They were rather a kind of propaganda in a literary form. The heroine of Nikolaeva's novel, which is also a prize novel, is a type of worker whose interest in the State's production plan supersedes any concern for personal happiness. Tendencies of this kind were so exaggerated by Nikolaeva and some other writers that the magazine *Sovetskoe iskusstvo* on May 6, 1953, when it had become more liberal, ironically described the love interest of 'a genuine communist girl' as dependent upon the success of her boy-friend in the field of national economy: 'fulfill the quota one hundred per cent and then I shall love you.'

Limited in their choice of subjects and in expressing their real

attitude as regards the people and their life, some authors preferred to devote their works to the past. Perhaps the best works of that dark period were the *Lone White Sail* by Kataev, The *Unusual Summer* by K. Fedin, and some historical novels.

4. 'The thaw'

During a short period from the second half of 1953 up to the late summer of 1954, several literary works appeared, written with sincerity and without fear of the truth. Some of the dark sides of 'socialist reality' unmasked in these works correspond to what Soviet newspapers disclosed at the same time.

In Panova's novel, *The Seasons* (*Vremena goda, Novyi mir*, November and December, 1953) Bortashevich, communist manager of a large commercial enterprise of the State, becomes the victim of his ultra-modern wife who married him to the opportunities which her husband's position opened for living in luxury, being elegantly dressed, possessing jewelry and enjoying all kinds of privileges. She has connections with several scoundrels employed in the same enterprise who commit embezzlements under the cover of their chief and supply his wife with money and presents. The secretary of the local Party organization has full confidence in her husband, his good friend, and visits them without wondering of the source of the family's wealth. Neither do the children, honest and enthusiastic as their father by nature, have any suspicion.

The characters of the new generation in the novel are the most impressive. There are among them both positive idealists and enthusiasts, and individualists, neglecting society's conventions and demands, who want to live for their own pleasure. Such is Gennadii, son of a very respected communist family. Both his father and mother grew up in the atmosphere of the revolution of 1917. His father is a railway engineer who did not forsake his job and continues to drive trains as he did at the time of revolution. His mother is a very prominent Party worker with a responsible position. But the son differs completely from both. He neglects the requirements of the komsomol, to which he belongs and when offered a part in an afforestation project he objects: 'I don't need these trees.' He wants to live in conformity with his own

desire, to have his own car, to rest at the seashore, to travel in comfortable railway carriages, to avoid work. He is not ashamed to live at the expense of an older woman, a widow who has a grown son, and he borrows money from one of the scoundrels who take part in the above mentioned embezzlements. The latter count on the possibility of exploiting his dependence and putting him in the wrong if their crimes are discovered. Some other young men, less important characters, are also subject to demoralizing influences. One has connections with the criminal circle but later breaks with them, the other sings Esenin's antisocial poem: 'I live dreaming with pure heart, yet I will murder someone when I hear the whistling fall wind.'

There are no exaggerations in Panova's novel. She does not picture everybody in dark colors. Several characters are attractive, especially some of the young boys and girls, but her novel leaves the general impression of disintegration in communist society or, at least of the decay of communist energy and vigilance. There is in the novel an outstanding engineer who develops the enterprise he heads, constructs magnificent buildings and succeeds in various projects of practical significance for the workers. But he ignores the interests of the town as if his enterprise were an island separated from the surrounding area. Gennadii's parents are unable to turn him to the right way. The responsible Party men take no notice of crimes under their very noses. No wonder that the novel was severely criticized as not corresponding to Soviet reality and as transferring to the modern period the mores and types of the NEP period (*Pravda*, May 27, 1954).

In the meantime a play, The *Guests* (*Gosti*), concerned with a characterization of the old and the new generations was published in the magazine *Teatr* (No. 2, 1954). Here again we meet negative and positive types but, this time, the repugnant characters belong to the upper communist society: a high communist bureaucrat, his wife and his son, a representative of the 'golden youth.'

The respected communistKirpichev a seventy-year old former worker who has been *chekist*, Dzershinsky's assistant and is now a deputy of the Supreme Soviet lives in a small country town in a house presented to him by the government. The household includes his wife and his grandson, Sergei, who left his father when the latter married a girl with whom he had had an affair

before his first wife died. This family and their good friends are all honest people, devoted to the ideals of the Revolution. Sergei's father, Peter Kirpichev, with his second wife, Sergei's young brother, Tiema, and Tiema's girl friend Nika arrive from Moscow for a visit. These guests display the traits of the demoralized generation and bring new ideas of behavior from the capital into the conservative atmosphere of the province.

It happens that the destiny of a certain attorney depends on Peter Kirpichev, who occupies a high position at the Ministry of Justice. This case and the attitude of Peter toward the innocent attorney disclose his amorality. Peter Kirpichev arrives in a car with expensive luggage and from the first moment makes his family feel that he belongs to high society. He proves to be selfish opportunist, a man who despises the *liudishki*, humble persons belonging to the low strata. He makes his career unscrupulously and his attitude toward the indicted attorney demonstrates his egotistical, ignoble character. His second wife belongs to the same kind of people. His young son in Moscow had become accustomed to visit restaurants and bars, and had acquired a cynical attitude towards girls and love.

The old Kirpichev and his daughter and grandson, Sergei, are revolted when they unmask Peter. The father is disappointed in the new generation which has appropriated the fruits of the revolutionary struggle of their fathers. But still more indignant is the sister, for whom people like her brother seem to be a new type of 'bourgeois' class with a similar psychology and way of life. She believes that it is 'power' which has demoralized her brother and the other bureaucrats of the proletarian country. As regards Peter's elder son, Sergei, he declares war on his father; he gives a solemn vow that he will fight against him everywhere and for life.

Naturally Zorin's play was slashed to pieces by the critics as a false and slanderous work. The author was accused of perverting socialist reality in characterizing a vicious bureaucrat as a product of Soviet society, the most democratic and perfect society, instead of explaining his vices as a survival of the past (*Literaturnaia gazeta*, May 27, 1954). The Moscow playwrights' section devoted a special meeting for a discussion of Zorin's play and it was said that such a man as Peter Kirpichev could not

'feel quite at home in Soviet life, like a fish in water.' (*Literaturnaia gazeta*, June 3, 1954).

Zorin's play, however, was not the only one published at this time with a critical approach to the representatives of the ruling group. *Partorg* Enotov, a character in A. Surov's play, *Respectable People* (*Poriadochnye liudi*, *Oktiabr*, No. 10, 1953) wants to make a career of promoting a young steel plant worker as an innovator, with the idea that this will make him popular among the workers and will win him a promotion to the position of Secretary of the *oblkom*. However, because of the support he renders to the young innovator he comes into conflict with another communist, the gifted and honest engineer Nikitin, who understands that the young innovator is being spoiled by flattery and that he lags behind his comrade, a more experienced worker. Nikitin challenges the young man to a competition with his comrade which proves that Nikitin was right. The young innovator is ashamed and enraged. But his father, an old bolshevik, and his sister are on Nikitin's side and the unsuccessful innovator, under their influence, acknowledges that he was wrong. Enotov, in spite of his intrigues, loses.

Surov's play reflects a split in the 'monolithic' communist party. Enotov represents those communists who make politics a career. Irresponsible as concerns business activity, they interfere in the engineers' activity, collect data about their private lives in order to harm or to deter them, and introduce politics into business life. Nikitin, on the other hand, has a direct connection with the Ministry and counts on its support. He is a realist, knowing people with all their defects, and tries not only to increase production but also to improve the workers living conditions and cultural level. In his conversation with a lady physician he characterizes one of his subordinates as 'a mixture of falsehood and ignorance,' another as 'obstinate, arbitrary and arrogant,' and a third as a 'loose and uncultured man.' Some are dishonest. One of them, for example, tries to make things easy for himself by offering Nikitin a side of lamb. One was found in the workers' rest house sleeping on the new rug in his dirty overall, beneath an elegant picture. He was tipsy and cried heart-rendingly: 'Drink, enjoy your life, life doens't happen again.'

Surov's loyalty to the regime is beyond doubt. It was his

play, *The Mad Haberdasher*, whose main character was a foolish caricature of the former president of the United States. Surov received a prize for another play, *Daybreak over Moscow*, in which a worker girl excels her mother, the manager of a factory and a conservative communist, by introducing some innovations. If such an author depicts the conflicts between two different groups of Party men in dark colors, this cannot be understood but as a significant phenomenon. And perhaps it was not accidental that Surov became a drunkard and was expelled in 1954 from the Union of Soviet Writers.

The same must be said concerning a series of essays by V. Ovechkin about collective farms, *Working Days on a Kolkhoz* (*Raionnye budni*), and others, published in the magazine *Novyi mir* (No. 9 and 12, 1952; No. 3, 1954; No. 3 and 5, 1956). Here again we find two types of communists. On the one hand are the bureaucrats for whom the most important thing is getting favorable production figures and keeping themselves comfortably in their jobs by issuing impracticable orders in conformity with directives from above. On the other hand are the business-like people who understand all the defects of existing conditions of work on the collective farms, unjust taxation in kind, exploitation of women, unsatisfactory organization of MTSs, corruption, nepotism and incompetent kolkhoz chairmen, appointed rather than elected and having no experience. Ovechkin does not overlook cultural features. He characterizes the declining interest among the young people in the political doctrine of communism and the decay of energy among farmers, who use religious holidays as a pretext to get out of work.

The literary works cited, so emphatic in their characterization of the negative sides of communist society and its way of life, are not unique. Other plays like *The Fall of Pompeiev* by M. Virta, *The Crown Prince* by A Marienhof, *Public Figure* by I. Gorodetsky, as well as the novels: *Mother Volga* by F. Panferov (*Znamia*) and *Russian Forest* by Leonov (*Znamia*, No. 10–12, 1953) and essays like *Padenie Ivana Chuprova* (*The End of Chuprov*) by Tendriakov (*Novyi Mir*, No. 11, 1953) and 'The Fate of the Comrade' by M. Parkhomov (*Oktiabr*, Febr. 1955, pp 3–73) are devoted in whole or part to the symptoms of demoralization and decay in Soviet society.

A special place in the literature of the transitional period, from the Stalin regime to his 'epigoni', belongs to Ehrenburg's story 'The Thaw' (*Znamia*, No. 5, 1954, No. 4, 1956). The gifted opportunist, Ehrenburg, amazed his readers when his work appeared, and the title of this story soon became symbolic.

The scene of the story is a provincial city and all the characters are connected with a large plant whose manager, engineer Zhuravlev, is a typical representative of the 'production and overproduction' drive. Workers of the plant live in slums and the manager knows their miserable conditions, but he prefers to appropriate money at his disposal for enlarging and improving the plant, and constructs a new workshop. He is devoted to the enterprise's interests and is proud of its successful development, yet he is also an ambitious man and dreams about awards and promotion. He has gifted assistants, experienced engineers, and he pays tribute to their useful work, but he is afraid of competition. One of these assistants Sokolovsky, reproaches Zhuravlev for neglecting the workers' vital needs. Zhuravlev considers this a personal attack and starts a campaign of calumny against his imaginary competitor. In the meantime, almost on the eve of the realization of his technical program, when final success and the expected triumph are so near, an unforseen event ruins all his plans. A tornado destroys the slums. Many workers remain without shelter, and Zhuravlev is recalled from his position.

For Soviet readers it was a typical story. The housing problem is one of the most neglected and workers' needs are almost always sacrificed for the benefit of fulfilling and overfulfilling production plans.

Some of the characters in Ehrenburg's story are old people, others young; some are married, others lonely, having lost either husband or wife, some still bachelors. In connection with the development of the story the personal life of all these people is described. Zhuravlev's wife, Lena is disappointed in her husband and leaves him. She falls in love with the engineer, Koroteev, but she is afraid that the latter does not respect her for breaking her family life. Koroteev, in turn, is unfortunate because he loves Lena, but does not dare to express his feelings. Sokolovsky's wife was a flighty, empty and corrupted woman. She left him long before the time of the story. He is lonely and is very much

attracted to the physician, Vera Sherer, whose husband was killed by the Germans. She also likes him. But both remain reticent about their true feelings. Sonia, a member of the Komsomol is in love with Savchenko a young engineer. But Sonia is educated in collectivist psychology; she is afraid to become a slave of her personal feelings. Her personality is well expressed in her conversation with her father, an outstanding teacher in retirement. She is surprised that her father wastes time in conversations with a young boy and she suggests that it would be better if he were to write someting about his experience in his pedagogical work rather than waste time on individual students. 'An article for a million readers, isn't that more valuable than consultations with teen-age boys?' 'Arithmetic will never replace living beings,' her father argues.

All the characters of Ehrenburg's story are afraid of their feelings. Zhuravlev is distressed when his wife leaves him, but he begins at once to appraise his personal misfortune from the point of view of the Party's possible attitude, and how this situation may influence his career. Zhuravlev's wife is afraid of her growing love because she believes that such feelings are more suitable to a bourgeois society and old-fashioned types of women, characters of the prerevolutionary novels. Koroteev, who loves her, tries to hide his feelings and makes a speech in the club against divorce and women breaking their family ties. One of the heroes of the story reproaches modern literature for discussing such insignificant problems as human feelings.

However, at the end of the story these suppressed personal feelings break out. Koroteev meets Lena on the street and his love overcomes his reticence. Both soon are happy. Vera Sherer makes the shy Sokolovsky happy as she understands him at last and simply invites him to wait for her until she returns from her patient; and Sonia is happy when Savchenko comes to the station to say goodbye and promises to come to see her at the place where she is going to start civil service. This is 'the thaw.' Be more simple, more sincere, more free in your feelings, the story suggests.

A particular place in the story belongs to Sonia's brother, Vladimir Pukhov. He starts his artistic career in Moscow brilliantly but overestimates his opportunities. He leaves for the country,

intending never to return to the capital: 'One has to pay court to the artists, to watch who has been praised and who has been blamed, and constantly to dispute his piece of pie.' In the provincial city he adapts himself to the existing demand and sells his artistic gift, as he characterizes himself, 'now for painting a prize-winning milkmaid, now white hens, now a joyful woman, a citizen with chocolate in her hand.' 'Ideas are not paid,' he says, 'one living for ideas only risks having his neck wrung.' While Pukhov is thus sailing with the prevailing wind and getting fat fees for the posters he paints instead of artistic pictures, Saburov, who is living in the same city, escapes into the realm of a pure art, art for art's sake, and is unknown and poor. But Pukhov, when he drops in to see his old friend and inspects his pictures, is impressed by the high artistic quality of Saburov's pictures. He does not hide his envy. This is the third significant element in Ehrenburg's story. Pukhov the opportunist surrenders. He understands the value of independent art, a motif so familiar in the Soviet Union during the short period of comparative freedom in literature and art.

The significance of the story is beyond doubt. It is not a great literary work, especially its second part. Yet it is or was a challenge to the dominating outlook and principles. In suggesting that human feelings and affections must be considered Ehrenburg, perhaps involuntarily, has pronounced a judgment against communism, which distorts the human soul.

As a 'happy ending,' the manager is exposed; opportunism is humiliated. Yet the general impression is dreary: a gloomy picture of a spiritually exhausted and broken people up to the moment when the thaw comes almost elementally as a miracle.

The well-known writer, Simonov, a 'what-do-you-wish' man, and the *Komsomolskaya Pravda* attacked Ehrenburg for his story, characterizing it as an exaggeration of the negative sides of Soviet life. *Literaturnaya gazeta* started a special discussion of the story on its pages and published a series of readers' letters (October 5, 1954), the majority of which supported the critical comments. But there were also some letters acknowledging that the story was a timely work realistically characterizing Soviet life in both its failures and its achievements and describing the dark side of the life which it called the reader to fight against.

The vivid interest in, and sharp reaction against, the literary works cited are an evidence that they touched upon very sore subjects. If these literary works were the only exponent of the dark sides of socialist society of the present day they would still be sufficient for understanding how dangerous these features are for the future of the communist regime. Nobody can suppose that Soviet writers of Panova's, Ehrenburg's or Surov's rank could risk the publication of their realistic works if they had not characterized typical phenomena and touched upon burning problems.

But literary works are not the only evidence. One could imagine what has been written in literature on the basis of acquaintance with the peculiarities of Soviet economics and with the conditions of life as described from day to day in the Soviet papers.

Chapter 14

THE BAD SYMPTOMS

Human psychology is one of the most complex subjects for study and comprehension. The Marxist interpretation of human behavior as a function of the material conditions of life and the economic system is an extreme simplification. Soviet doctrine, which is, in turn, a further simplification and vulgarization of Marxism, asserts that the new socialist system established in the Soviet Union has changed the nature of people for the better. There are, however, all kinds of vices in the Soviet Union: murder, larceny, bribery, drunkenness, hoodlumism, speculation, disregard for law, injustice, everything that we can observe in any other country. No Soviet writer can deny it, but it is explained as a survival of the past.

> 'As a result of social and economic transformation ... the psychology of the Soviet people has changed and new lofty politico-moral qualities have taken shape. The socialist consciousness of Soviet citizens is displayed in their attitude towards work as a matter of honor, glory and heroism.
>
> 'Against the background of the heroism of the working masses, survivals of capitalism in the minds of individual citizens appear intolerable, survivals such as are displayed in an un-socialist attitude towards work, a parasitical manner

> of life (for example, speculation), the output of defective products, graft, absenteeism, refusal to work on the pretext of observing religious rites or holidays, various violations of labor discipline. An important case of capitalist survival, one which hampers the strengthening of labor discipline, is drunkenness, causing absenteeism and unwarranted absence, defective output, etc. These survivals represent the remnants of an old ideology which is still maintained as a result of the fact that the people's consciousness and its development lag behind their economic conditions, and which is kept up in the consciousness of the backward and less stable elements of our society by capitalist encirclement. [1]

In order to understand human behavior and the existence of bad and good characters among the members of a society, it is necessary to consider more than only the material factors. Human behavior, if we use the terminology introduced by the late Russian scholar, I. V. Pavlov, is a reaction to a number of stimuli. Some reactions are conditional and changeable, determined by the environment, including social milieu, profession, prosperity or need, as well as education and the influence of cultural conditions, religion, literature and art; others are unconditional and stable reflexes which are innate, sometimes subconscious, and which differ from one man to the other, even within the same social group and under the same economic and social conditions. A society of human beings could not exist unless it was possible to regulate human behavior and to educate a man, as a member of the social group, to follow some standards; on the other hand no progress is possible unless there is freedom to develop individual peculiarities. Social life is characterized by the constant interdependence between society and individuals.

Contrary to official assertions, many phenomena of Soviet social life are not at all remnants of the past, but either results of the Soviet system itself or products of innate propensities which new institutions and systems of education have proved incapable of eradicating or even weakening.

> 'A dance was in full swing when into the hall walked a frail youth who, taking his time, began to elbow his way a bit closer to the orchestra. He attracted attention not by

[1] E. A. Panova, 'On the significance of Soviet Law in the Inculcation of a Communist Attitude Towards Work," *Sov. Gos. i Pravo*, No. 7, 1954, pp. 48–50.

> anything in himself, but by his ultra-fashionable attire: a long baggy coat, narrow green trousers, a necktie of all the colors of the rainbow. In short, this was a typical representative of the tribe of zoot-suiters. Of course it is not with his intellect nor talents or labor successes that such a fine fellow is able to dazzle people. All his hopes lie in a special suit, a way of fixing his hair, a manner of walking and dancing.' (*Literaturnaya gazeta*, June 19, 1954).

Such an individualist may also be a man who wants to break with routine. Manifestations of individualism depend mostly on the character and general trends of social life. The same must be said concerning many negative phenomena of Soviet life. There are many reasons for asserting that they are the product of the Soviet order.

1. *'Personal property' and demoralization*

Soviet law protects personal property which may, at present, consist of property of considerable value and in considerable quantity. But only the personal property of artisans and individual peasants consists of objects which may be used for productive purpose. Such property is of a very limited quantity. As regards the personal property of officials, party men, some individual peasants and worker-innovators, and some people of the free professions, the character of its social significance is one calculated to stimulate devotion to the regime and those particular activities in line with the government's policy and trends. Such property is deprived of any productive character. People of the above mentioned groups may succeed in accumulating capital which exceeds ordinary needs but, under the existing economic order, they cannot undertake any enterprise at their own risk and create a socially significant business. Riches in the Soviet Union stimulate parasitism. It is that worst kind of ownership which always provokes envy and hatred.

Those who become very wealthy waste their means spending their money on comfort or even luxury and spoil their children. Various excesses and contrasts in the way of life are inevitable consequences of the existing system, and they demoralize the young generation especially. Children of large income families are accustomed to luxury. The wastrel, dissolute 'golden youth'

attracted the attention of the authorities when a murder was committed by a group of young people who suspected one of the participants of their wild parties of informing on them. It was discovered that all of the members of the crowd were the children of prominent Soviet people. They received so much money from their parents that they could waste it in going to restaurants and dancing with girls. In addition they had their own country house where they could pass the night with their girlfriends[1]

The 'golden youth' like everything new and imitate western fashions. The official organ of the Ministry of Culture called these young people *'styliagi'* from the word, style. The paper describes one of the parties which take place in the apartments of 'respected and important people'. Vladimir, whose party is described, greets his fellow 'styliagi' and 'after toasts to the women he opens a door to another room and politely invites them in French: 'Now ,ladies and gentlemen, please go for a walk' and he expressively winks at his friends.' [2]

One of the caricatures in *Krokodil* represents a goodhearted mother who reproaches her husband, evidently a scholar, for giving their son only 'a miserable hundred-rouble bill,' with which he can only go to a beerhall, while children of celebrities enjoy themselves in restaurants. Behind the mother stands her beloved idler and spendthrift in a pose of expectation [3].

The way of life of the 'golden youth' has evidently become so well known that both *belles lettres* and newspapers have devoted their attention to this new phenomenon [4] Among the older generation, also, this way of life has its practitioners. An illustration may be cited in the case of the scandal in which A. Surov, N. Virta and F. Parfenov, all outstanding Soviet writers, were expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers for their 'petty-bourgeois looseness, aristocratic anarchism and arrogance.' [5] Virta, it seems, had a country house and his wife was in the habit of riding horseback, wearing a veil and carrying a riding crop like the fashionable ladies of high society in the past, and leaving behind her

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[1] See article '*Plesen*' (A Growth of Mold) in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, No. 273, 1953.
[2] *Soviet Culture*, January 18. 1955.
[3] *Krokodil*, No. 8, 1954. Cf. also No. 1 and 6, 1954.
[4] See above Ch. XIII, and *Izvestia*, April 10, 1954.
[5] *Kommunist*, No. 8, June, 1954; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, April 6, 1954.

clouds of dust where peasant women were laboring in the fields.

The luxurious life of certain groups of people provokes envy and imitation. In the absence of more normal ways for the overwhelming mass of the people to improve their material living conditions, there develops a certain avidity for making money by illegal means: speculation, bribery and larceny.

Judging by press reports, speculation is widespread despite prosecution since it offers a comparatively easy, although still risky, way to improve one's material situation. In those forms in which speculation can occur in the Soviet Union it is not likely to cause the national economy any serious harm. However, it is prosecuted as a harmful survival of 'bourgeois' culture, as a contagious condition inciting parasitism. For example, Rosa Martynova, an exemplary Moscow *komsomolka* (member of the Communist Youth Union), stood in line every time a new lot of goods arrived, made purchases and then re-sold what she had bought to persons who did not wish or were not able to stand in line. She was sentenced to five years in prison for speculation. Certain Messrs. Mamedov in the Caucases purchased leeches used for medical purposes from private persons and sold them to the Ministry of Health in Moscow. They received for the leeches they sold six times more than they themselves had paid, and within a year had earned several hundreds of thousands of roubles getting wealthy at the expense of their suppliers whom they paid much less and of the state to whom they sold at a very high price. Still another example: citizens Lyuborsky and Mogilevsky bought karakul skins in Tashkent and forwarded them to Moscow. There, furriers made fur collars, caps and ladies' coats from the skins and earned high profits. The speculators were sentenced to from five to ten years imprisonment (*Ptavda*, August 8, 1954). M. O. Soskin, former head of the technical supervision department of the Ministry of Oil Industry, speculated in automobiles, buying them at state prices and selling at a profit. (*Izvestia*, November 25, p. 4).

Panova's novel, *The Seasons*, leads us to think that many speculative acts are performed with the participation or under the protection of the officials, who receive a share of the profit from the speculators. The individual cases cited above are only examples of the kind of thriving speculation performed by people

who, under normal conditions of trade, might have been useful entrepreneurs.

More dangerous from the social point of view is the development of various kinds of larceny. Thievery is especially widespread. In Soviet legal literature, this every day occurence, like all other negative phenomena, is described as a survival of capitalism. But increasing punishments designed to protect state, collective farm and personal property are evidence of the fact that thievery is developing and spreading in the Soviet Union on the ground of the conditions created by its economic system.

The paper *Trud* relates the following story:

> 'A young man with a rumpled jacket and unbuttoned shirt is standing before the court. Tell me, Zavodkov, asks the presiding judge, why is it that you do not work anywhere? —'What for?' the accused answers insolently, 'One can live without that.'
>
> Zavodkov had been released by amnesty from punishment for an earlier crime. Upon his return from jail he had felt no desire to live by honest work, and had organized a gang of robbers. Entering the attic of Ready-to-Wear Clothing Store No. 35 in Orekhovo-Zuevo, Moscow Province, the robbers broke through the ceiling and forced their way into the premises. After stealing silver fox, karakul and white fox scarves worth about 80,000 rubles, the criminals escaped. In a short time they robbed two more stores ... Morozova, Lusenkova, Loginova, and Mikhaleva, all unemployed ,took upon themselves the sale of the stolen goods. As their "commission" each of them received a piece of cloth and 500 roubles.' (*Trud*, June 24, p. 4, 1954).

We may agree that Zavodkov is a type of born criminal. But how is one to explain the behavior of a young man born under the Soviet regime and 're-educated' in a Soviet prison as a survival of the Past? And what is one to say about his attitude towards honest work? Is it not lack of interest in and respect for work which is not voluntarily chosen? It is difficult to understand the behavior of his accomplices, four 'unemployed' girls, except as a case of temptation to acquire clothes which they were in no position to buy themselves but which they had seen on other, more fortunate women. Under Soviet conditions of limited trade and excessive prices, profitable re-sale of stolen articles becomes a typical feature.

A former legal counsel for a Soviet trest in Odessa, B. Konstantinovsky, related, in one of a collection of cases, how a band of young men, among whom there were members of the Komsomol, stole products from the trest and were protected by some Party men who received as compensation a share of the stolen goods. This occurred at a time of great shortage of bread, and it was bread which had been stolen. The character of the crime, the participants, their cooperation with the Party, everything in that case indicated that it was not a survival of capitalism but the result of specific conditions: the 'socialist' state, economic conditions, party organizations, the system of centralized production and trade.[1]

The state fleeces its citizens and they steal the 'socialist' property they created with their own hands, following along with the slogan 'plunder what has been plundered.' However, the state in addition creates an extreme inequality in the distribution of property goods and the temptation for poor people is too great. It is this situation which explains the severity of punishments established by Soviet law for protection against all kinds of larceny, particularly infringement upon 'personal' property (Decrees of June, 4 1947).

Apparently in the consciousness not only of the thieves themselves, but of the judges, also, protection of personal property represents protection of a privileged group of the population. Soviet jurists, therefore, have to give some explanation for the severity of punishments for stealing from private persons. They call to the attention of the 'organs of the dictatorship of the working class' that they often do not fully appreciate the significance of the question when they suppose that theft of other people's goods causes harm to individual people only. They explain that stealing personal property is a crime against socialist society, since the worker whose property rights are inadequately protected by the state loses confidence in the security of the position he wins by devoting his energy to socialist production and, in that way, increasing the national income and his own share in it [2]

[1] A number of the typical examples of robbery is given by B. Konstantinovsky, Ed. by H. Berman, *Soviet Law in Action*. The recollected cases of a Soviet Lawyer. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953.

[2] P. Orlovsky, 'The Right of Personal Ownership of Citizens,' (Russian) *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo*, 1938, No. 6, p. 84.

> 'In the Soviet Union there is no exploitation of man by man,' explains a popular textbook, 'Citizens acquire personal property through socially-beneficial work and the thief who makes an attempt on it does not deserve any leniency. The decree of June 4, 1947, punishes theft of the personal property of citizens by confinement in a corrective-labor camp for a period of from 6 to 10 years.' [1]

There are no criminal statistics published in the Soviet Union for public use, as was done by the Russian government before the Revolution[2], but there is sufficient evidence, in addition to legislation itself, that the inequality of wealth, contrasts of prosperity and need, and the shortage of food and necessities provoke a severe increase in thievery.

2. *The 'happy life'*

If some negative phenomena as regards the behavior of Soviet people can be explained as a reaction to the economic conditions, then others are the result of the onesidedness of fettered Soviet culture, the monotype of propaganda, radio and newspapers, and a consequent spiritual emptiness.

At the XIth conference of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of the Railway-Transport Workers, the Chairman of the Central Committee, Cherednichenko, characterized the activity of the Workers' Clubs and Palaces of Culture as follows:

> 'There is not sufficient equipment or materials for securing comfort ... There are no new songs, one-act plays, sketches, jests, cheerful masters of ceremonies; nobody is concerned about supplying cultural-educative institutions with a constantly new repertoire of a high artistic level.' (*Trud*, June 11, 1954, p. 2).

There are new constructions of Palaces of Culture ,but some of them remain empty:

> 'In 1951, workers of the 'Magnesit', a plant of Cheliabinsk, were given a wonderful present, a new Palace of Culture. This beautiful building remains empty however. Young workers drop in very seldom. And as regards the staff,

[1] *Osnovy sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava*, Jurid. Izd-vo Min. Just. Moscow 1947, p. 561; excluded in the edition of the same textbook of 1953. See p. 358.

[2] R. Rudenko, USSR Prosecutor-General acknowledged the necessity of criminal statistic (*Sov. gos. i pravo*, May 1956); it is not clear, however, when will it be available for publication.

> engineers and technicians, they have stopped visiting it at all. They are bored here: there are no interesting lectures, no evening parties, and the collective of artists' activists is working unsatisfactorily.' (*Trud*, February 26, 1954, p. 3).

As a response to the article cited, the same paper on March 4, 1954, published a report under the title, 'Dull and uncomfortable.'

Young people are oversaturated with political indoctrination. In his report to the 12th Congress of the Delegates of Komsomol Organizations (Y.C.L.) the secretary of that organization, A.N. Shapelin reports that:

> '... among pupils, even among Y.C.L. members, there are cases of unworthy behavior in public places, on the streets or in school, of rudeness to teachers, parents and adults, and, moreover, cases of hooliganism. In many schools there is an absence of extracurricular political training; interesting, absorbing and entertaining programs are not conducted. Many of the pupils are dissatisfied with the content of the Y.C.L. and Pioneer organizations' work, are lost to their influence, seek an outlet for their initiative and energies in other and sometimes bad ways.
>
> 'There are serious shortcomings in the ideological-political training of students. Some students sneer at their instructors, disregard justified criticism by their comrades, behave improperly with their families and even indulge in acts of hooliganism. There have been such cases at some higher educational institutions in Moscow, Lvov, Krasnodar, Gorky and Khabarovsk.' (*Komsomolskaya pravda*, March 20, 1954).

Almost simultaneously, *Komsomolskaya pravda* (Feb. 12, 1954) published a letter in which a mother complained that her son had begun to drink. In addition to that letter the newspaper published information according to which,

> 'Young miners soon take to drinking vodka ... Those who do not are held up to scorn ... There has been no effort on the part of Y.C.L. officials to boldly oppose drunkenness and hooliganism, which so degrade young Soviet miners.'

In the summer of 1954 almost all Soviet newspapers at the same time opened a campaign against drunkenness [1], expressing serious distress and characterizing it as 'a most evil vice.' (Gladkov,

[1] *Pravda*, July 11, and 16, August 6; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, July 13 and 29; *Komsomolskaya pravda*, July 31 and August 4; *Izvestia*, August 10; *Trud*, August 12 and 21, etc.

Literaturnaya gazeta, July 19, 1954). Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Health in his article 'For a healthy life' appealed to the socialist consciousness of citizens:

> 'In capitalist society alcoholism and poverty are the results of social inequality and cruel exploitation of the working people. The allegations of certain bourgeois ideologists are, therefore, ludicrous when they claim that the poverty of the population is due to excessive drinking ... The struggle against alcoholism concerns the vital interests of the state.' (*Pravda*, Aug. 6, 1954, p. 2).

The Minister's article seemed, probably, more ludicrous to the workers and peasants who read it, because they knew well that inequality and poverty exist in the Soviet Union and that the state itself is responsible for the 'abysmal drunkenness and abysmal boredom' about which *Komsomolskaya Pravda* wrote on July 31, 1954. They know that when the workshop buffets, opened for the sale of cold snacks, were prohibited from selling vodka, they started to sell wine and beer. At the factory dining rooms, one can get wine, cognac and liquor without restriction. In the neighborhood of every factory there are the so-called *zabegalovki*, refreshment-rooms, which are dens of insanitation and hearths of hoodlumism. Newspapers attack drunkenness as a 'major public evil', and — at the same time the ORSes (Departments of Workers' Supply), in their drive for increasing turnover and, correspondingly, profit, find it most profitable and convenient to sell liquor in order to fulfill the trade's plans. 'It is more difficult to get a dinner in an eating-house than to get drunk.' All this was exposed in the newspaper *Trud* (August 12 and 21, 1954).

According to Soviet newspapers, novels and plays, everybody drinks: workers and engineers, peasants and chairmen of kolkhozes, soldiers and officiers, writers and artists, students of the institutions of higher learning and of the middle schools [1]. And hoodlumism is the brother of drunkenness.

> 'One Sunday Tsukanov, a plasterer and Tyrkin, a driver, who lived together in a dormitory, visited a nearby bar. They had something to drink, then returned to the dormitory. Here vodka once again appeared on the table. after drinking out of all human semblance, they decided to "stroll"

[1] 'Tasks of the Soviet School' by I A. Kairov, Russian Republican Minister of Education. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Aug. 8, 1954.

around the dormitory. They met N. Gromov in the corridor and started to pick a fight. Words changed to blows. During the fight Tsukanov wounded Gromov with a knife.' (*Pravda* July 4, 1954. Footnote of the Editor: 'Instances of drunkeness are not infrequent in this dormitory on Saikin street).

The following examples of hoodlumism may illustrate how dangerous for peaceable citizens is the dissoluteness of some groups of young men.

'On a bright June night ... a sergeant of the Leningrad militia, V. Stolyar, was seeing his girlfriend home. In the Petrograd area they came across four youths who pushed the girl rudely, and, in answer to the rebuke of the sergeant, threatened him with revolvers, V. Stolyar gave the alarm. Militiamen arrived in time and arrested the hoodlums. Edward Zhukov-Lisosky was 15 years old, Vladimir Orlov and Edward Sovetov 16, and Ariful Mamleev was 17.' (*Current Digest*, Vo. VI No. 25, 1954).

'Engineer K. and his family were relaxing on the beach of the Luzanovka Resort in Odessa. Swimming not far from him his wife suddenly shrieked in terror and went under. K. noticed a man who had surfaced close by and who was "amusing" himself by diving alongside women bathers. When the engineer tried to reason with him, the "amuser" and his comrades beat him up. Next day he was examined and a fracture of the fifth rib, impaired hearing and aggravation of nearsightedenss resulting from a hemorrhage in the left eye were established.' (*Izvestia*, August 8, 1954).

Is there any advantage on the side of 'socialist' society as compared with the 'bourgeois' countries, if the young people have no respect towards women or intellectuals, are armed with revolvers and do not hesitate to resort to force? Soviet newspapers do not give us a full picture, but those who have lived in the Soviet Union assert that even the militia is afraid of the young hoodlums whose skirmishes on the streets frequently result in murder.

3. The 'parental' regime

There is something in the Soviet Union worse than speculation, drunkenness and hoodlumism. It is the growth of criminality, in particular of ruthless murders. On May 7, 1954, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet extended capital punishment,

earlier applied only in the case of the most important political crimes, to premeditated murder if committed in aggravated circumstances.

The new law has already been applied several times. The following cases were reported in the newspapers (translated in the *Current Digest*, N. 26, 1954):

> 'On the evening of May 9, Natalya Doronina, with her sister and girlfriend from the village of Salkov, near Zvenigorod, were having a good time in a club. When the girls decided to go home, Puchenkov approached them. He volunteered to escort Natasha to Salkov. She was acquainted with him and accepted his offer. Before reaching the village in which the girl lived, the accused attempted to rape his companion, but she resisted. Then the villain took a razor from his pocket and slashed the girl's face. Bleeding and screaming she fled to the village.
> 'I overtook her and began to strangle her,' the criminal said cynically. Puchenkov was sentenced to death by shooting.' (*Pravda*, June 19, 1954, p. 4).
>
> 'K. D. Oreshkin had twice been fired from jobs for persistent drunkenness and theft. He had recently worked as a logger in the Kuyar lumber camp in Medvedevo district, Mari Autonomous Republic, and lived in the same bunkhouse with Tamakaev and his wife, workers at the same lumber camp. The husband and his wife looked after Oreshkin, and he took his meals with them. Oreshkin decided to murder and rob the people who had given him shelter. At night, when the husband and wife were asleep, the murderer killed them with an axe. Taking their money, Oreshkin set out for a workers' settlement of the Chernushka timber tract, to his family. Once home, he changed his clothes, burned his trousers, jacket and rubber boots, on which there were traces of blood.
>
> Oreshkin confessed to the premeditated murder in court. The fact of the robbery was also fully established.' (*Izvestia*, June, 27 1954, p. 6). The murderer was sentenced to death.

In contrast to American newspapers informing their readers about every atrocious crime in superfluous detail and under startling headlines, there is in Soviet newspapers a deficiency of information concerning criminal life in the country. Yet some crimes are described, as in the quotations above, and numerous kinds of criminal acts, with a special stress on crimes against socialist property and labor discipline, are cited in various articles

of a general character. Evidently brutal crimes were not a rare occurence if the government took it for granted that it was necessary to resort to capital punishment in order to intimidate potential murderers. This is evidence, though indirect, of growing criminality. A number of crimes among them some ruthless murders and subsequent capital punishments were described in the *Current Digest of Soviet Press* (cf. Vol. VII, 1955, No. 5, p. 22; No. 15, pp. 29–32; No. 19, p. 16; No. 22, pp. 18–20) according to information borrowed from Soviet papers published in various parts of the Soviet Union and not available for private persons.

The democratic countries cannot boast that their moral atmosphere is perfect, that delinquency is in decline, but they at least do not pretend that they have found a panacea against criminality. One cannot find in the legal acts and literature of the western nations such pretentious declarations as, for example, the text of the Art. 3 of the Soviet Judiciary Act of 1938:

> 'By all activities, the court shall educate the citizens of the USSR in the spirit of devotion to their country and the cause of socialism, in the spirit of precise and unswerving execution of the Soviet laws, of a watchful attitude toward socialist property, of labor discipline, of an honest attitude toward governmental and public duties, and of respect for the rules of socialist community life.' [1]

In conformity with the law quoted, Soviet jurists assert that:

> 'By encouraging, prescribing or forbidding one or another activity, the provisions of Soviet law influence the masses' consciousness of justice, develop and enrich it, instill in the consciousness of the masses the foremost progressive ideas about Soviet laws which are in accord with the will of the Soviet people, the builders of communism, establish new socialist rules of conduct and organizational habits. The provisions of Soviet law promote the ever increasing saturation of the legal consciousness of Soviet people with communist ideas.' [2]
>
> 'Soviet law is of extraordinary importance in the work of communist education of the working people. The laws of the Soviet state educate in every citizen the qualities without which it is impossible to make the transition from socialism to communism: discipline in work, an honest attitude to the

[1] Translation by V. V. Gsovski, *Soviet Civil Law*, Vol. II, p. 502.
[2] Panova, op. cit. See above, p. 193, footnote 1.

> state and public duty, respect for rules of socialist community life, and care for socialist property.' [1]

Neither the pretentious promises of law nor the optimistic assertions of jurists correspond to reality. On the contrary, Soviet legal order can be acknowledged to be responsible for the decay of morality and increasing criminality in the country. It cannot be otherwise inasmuch as the government itself demonstrates a lack of respect for legal order, violates the constitution, submits justice to policy and resorts to terror, abusing its discretionary power.

First of all, the Soviet constitution is a sham constitution, and every Soviet citizen knows it. It is not a 'supreme law 'as a constitution is supposed to be; in fact it is the Statutes of the Communist Party which can be considered as the supreme law. The Party concentrates in its hands the legislative, executive and judiciary power.

> 'The Party exercises the leadership of the working class, of the peasantry, the intelligentsia, of the entire Soviet people, in the struggle for the consolidation of the dictatorship of the working class, for the consolidation and development of the socialist system, for the victory of communism ...' (Excerpts from the preamble to the Party Statutes of 1939).

The militant character of the Party organization is such that demands are made for the 'subordination of the minority'; that the decisions of higher bodies be 'unconditionally binding upon lower ones'; that the 'unity of the Party' be safeguarded (Sections 3 and 21 of the Statutes, as amended by the XIXth Party Congress, October, 1952); and that Party members be 'subject to transfer from one organization to another,' (Ibid. Section 8, note).

> 'The Central Committee of the CP directs the work of the central Soviet and public organizations through the Party groups within them.' (Section 36).

To the central Soviet organizations belong the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Court of the USSR. The Supreme Soviet has practically been replaced by its Presidium, which consists of communists only (33 members of the

[1] R. Rudenko, USSR Prosecutor-General, 'Constantly strengthen Socialist law enforcement,' *Pravda*, January 5, 1954.

Presidium instead of 1347 deputies of the Supreme Soviet). In the Supreme Soviet itself members and candidates of the Party in its two houses number 1050 communists, or 78 per cent of the total number of members, and 297 non-party men elected in accordance with Party recommendations. The Council of Ministers also consists of communists and is governed by the Presidium whose members, the Chairman of the Council and his deputies, are members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the C.P., i.e. its highest, its omnipotent body. Finally, the Supreme Court also consists exclusively of members of the Party.

In accordance with the principle of so-called 'democratic centralism,' all Party organizations as well as individual Party members have to follow the directives of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the C.P. This organ approves laws before they are presented to the Supreme Soviet or its Presidium and the latter unanimously vote for them. The Presidium of the Central Committee appoints and dismisses ministers of all ranks; it also appoints members of the Supreme Court and recalls them before the expiration of the five year term established for the judges of the Supreme Court by Art. 105 of the Constitution. When the fate of a certain person has to be decided the Presidium of the CC of the Party prescribes the composition and the conditions of the trial. Such a special procedure recently took place in the Beria case which was tried *in camera* by a special tribunal, under the chairmanship of Marshal Konev, with only one member of the Supreme Court participating.

Party organizations exist in all ministries, academies, universities, sovkhozes, machine tractor stations, etc., and they 'signal' the higher Party organizations about the defects that come under their observations. The same method is applied to achieve effective control of 'public organizations': trade unions, co-operatives (including kolkhozes), youth organizations,sport and defense organizations, cultural, technical, scientific and all other 'voluntary' organizations of writers, artists, composers, etc.

It is thus quite clear that all institutions established by the constitution are in fact subordinated to the Party leaders and that all rights given by the constitution to citizens are as conditional as the formulation of the corresponding articles indicates

(freedoms given 'in order to strengthen the socialist system', Art. 125 of the Constitution). What 'legal consciousness,' what respect for constitutional institutions and rights can be inculcated under a decorative legal regime which conceals the arbitrariness and irresponsible power of the Party leaders? No Soviet citizen is safe from that arbitrariness. He may be arrested and banished, may be dismissed or deprived of his legally acknowledged right; he always depends upon the grace or disgrace of the Party men. Peasants and workers are subject to such arbitrariness no less than people of any other social group.

> 'In Khomutovsky, Verkhni Lyubazh and certain other districts in Kursk province, a checkup disclosed that collective farm boards had replaced educational work among the collective farmers with indiscriminate levying of fines, sometimes in direct violation of Art. 17 of the Collect. Farm Statutes.'
>
> 'Art. 14 of the Statutes requires collective farm boards to release pregnant women from work a month prior to and a month after childbirth, crediting them with half the average workdays for the period. In Slavsko and Strelki districts, Drogobysh Province, collective farm boards do not always grant pregnant women the leaves due them, and village and district Soviets do not always ensure strict observance of the Collective Farm Statutes aimed at safeguarding collective farm women's rights in every way.' [1]
>
> 'Comrade Kozodoi, head of the workers' supply department on the Southwest Railroad's Kazatin Division, dismissed N. M. Chaikovskaia, mother of two children, without considering the decision of the rates and conflicts commission. The people's court reinstated her. But she lived through many unpleasant days and comrade Kozodoi who violated the labor rights remained unpunished.'
>
> 'Comrade Strelkov, a worker in the construction and assembly administration of the Vinnitsa Superphosphate Plant, was granted a plot of ground by the City Soviet executive committee for the construction of a house. Strelkov lived with his family in an apartment belonging to the plant. People in the construction and assembly administration decided to take advantage of this fact and quickly drafted a request to the people's court for the eviction of C. Strelkov. No matter how hard the worker tried to convince

[1] 'Strictly uphold citizen's rights' by V. Boldyrev. USSR Prosecutor General. (*Izvestia*, April 8, p. 2 1954; *the Curr. D. of Sov. Pr.* v. VI, No. 14.). Similar cases cited by M. Klinov, Sverdlovsk Province Public Prosecutor in *Izvestia*, January 19, 1955, p.2.

> the head administration that he was still building the house and that he could not yet live there, he was not believed. Falling under the influence of the 'imposing official' and listening to the erroneous conclusion of C. Gorokhovsky, the assistant city prosecutor, the people's court decided to evict Strelkov and his family without providing them with an apartment ... Distressed by the unjust decision of the people's court, C. Strelkov turned for legal advice. The lawyer entrusted with the case appealed to Vinnitsa Province Court. The illegal decision of the people's court was reversed.' [1]

A rank and file citizen has no guarantee against illegal resolutions and orders:

> 'The Omsk City Soviet Executive Committee adopted a resolution which stated that land in excess of 450 square meters on plots allocated for private housing could be taken from citizens although the law provides that individual builders in cities and workers' settlements have a right to plots of up to 600 sq. meters.'
>
> 'The Korpilovsky District Soviet, Poltava Province in a directive required 12 citizens to work three days without pay on construction of a school, because they failed to appear promptly before the district Soviet at its summons. [2]

The administration guards the wives of officials and their personal interests but does not assist people to be satisfied in conformity with the rulings of people's court:

> 'It is hot in the city. The streets have not been sprinkled. There is a street sprinkler, but it sprinkles the personal plots of the militia chiefs.
>
> The wife of Tabolov, the head of the republic militia administration, is accustomed to travel to the seaside. Several militiamen are taken from their duties to safeguard her along the entire route. Militiaman C. Potapenko's report linked certain militia officials with speculators. Militiaman C. Didur commented upon the friendly attitude of certain militia divisions toward hoodlums.' (*Izvestia*, July July 7, p. 2. Feuilleton 'In defense of the Militiaman.').
>
> 'There are frequent cases where mothers do not receive alimony for long periods of time because the executive personnel of institutions connive with the husband. Some

[1] "A lawyer's Notes: Guarding Rights of Soviet Citizens.' By Lawyer V. Golovko. *Izvestia*, Nov. 26, 1954, p. 2 (*Current Digest*, Jan. 5, 1955).

[2] See footnote on p. 207.

courts do not exercise the proper supervision over this and the prosecutor's office does not take vigorous steps.' [1]

At the same time justice is not on the right level. Some court decisions sound like anecdotes:

'A year ago a fire started at a hay depot in Vinnitsa. Investigators went to the scene of the fire and established that it resulted from the prank of a six-year old boy. Unexpectedly the City Prosecutor sanctioned the arrest of the head of the depot as guilty of negligence because there were rabbits under the hay barns which he bred there and thus created the conditions which attracted children chasing rabbits.

The director of the depot was sentenced to one and a half years' imprisonment .This sentence was upheld by the provincial court and only the Ukrainian Republic Supreme Court reversed the decision of the people's court and the provincial court.'

Reading some of the court decisions it is difficult to understand whether the judge is stupid or dishonest.

'On duty as a night watchman, Sedova detected two thieves: truck driver Tarasov and loader Khlupnov. Sedova reported the crime; the militia made a search and found stolen meat with the Muromsk Meat Combine's stamp on it in Tarasov's shed. Khlupnov, who had started the trip with empty pockets was found to possess a large amount of money ...

The court decided to make an on-the-spot investigation. Sedova had to indicate the position of wheels, their direction with respect to the sack of meat being taken to the shed, and to state exactly whether or not the truck's radiator stood on the same level with the windows of the nearest house, and if not then why not ...

After the check it became clear as day, that the accused were guilty. Nevertheless Atabekov, the people's judge, acquitted the criminals and wronged an honest woman who had warned of the theft of public property, implying she had lied. (*Pravda*, July 5, 1954).

It is the worst state of affairs when a judge does not dare to try a case in conformity with his own understanding and convictions because he is afraid of disgrace and, therefore, prefers to decide in conformity with the supposed wishes of his bosses. An amazing case of such conduct ignominous for a judge, was related by the

[1] *Izvestia*, Nov. 26, 1954, p. 2. See footnote 16; also *Izvestia*, March 22, 1955, 'Implementation of People's courts Decisions' by A. Polyanskaia.

former Soviet lawyer, B. Konstantinovsky, mentioned above:

> 'A cashier, known as an honest man, was robbed when he carried money from the bank. He was not provided with the means of transportation by the administration of the plant, contrary to his request. A plan-conscious judge did not acquit him. The judge explained his sentence simple-heartedly:
>
> 'Comrade legal adviser, how can I acquit this man when I have already acquitted three before him?'

The judge's behavior becomes understandable when we read another case related by the same author:

The people's judge, Mme Morosova, acquitted a worker accused of a crime against an Odessa factory. The district procuracy protested the decision of the lenient judge. It was reversed and the worker was sentenced to the maximum penalty. As regards Mme Morozova, she was promptly removed from her job by the order of the Party for 'not being able to cope with her work' and 'for failing to maintain constant vigilance.'

Judges in the Soviet Union are not independent. Vyshinskii explained it flatly:

> 'In the court ... the class struggle, which after all submits the proceeding and the end of every court trial to its own law, inevitably finds its expression.'
>
> 'Neither court nor criminal procedure is or could be independent of politics. This means that the contents and form of judicial activities cannot avoid being subordinated to political class aims and strivings." [1]

Certainly judges are elected in conformity with the recommendations of the Communist Party and from among the members of the Party. The latter may recall them and the independence of judges, as was illustrated above, is thus contrary to Art. 112 of the Constitution. No wonder that the decisions of the lower courts are based mostly on conjecture as to what corresponds to the politics and wishes of the leaders rather than on sufficient evidence and the conviction of the judge. Only the higher courts, especially the Supreme Court of the USSR, set aside some of the obviously unjust decisions and allow one to think that there is still justice in the state of workers and peasants.

[1] A. J. Vyshinskii, *Teoria sudebnykh dokazatelstv v Sovetskom prave.* Moskva. 1946, pp. 39, 53.

In general, conditions in the Soviet Union are characterized by arbitrariness and ruthlessness in all branches of the government .Exaggerating the evils of the capitalist world, some Soviet writers use words and colors which they could apply to their own state:

> "Complete defenselessness of personal rights ... Murders and personal injuries at the capitalist enterprises ... mutilations of revolutionaries, workers and peasants, committed for maintaining the domination of exploiters, are characteristics of the bourgeois society. The existence itself of capitalist society is a source of the greatest peril for the life and health of millions of workers.' [1]

In the sentence quoted it is enough to alter the words 'bourgeois' and 'capitalist' and everybody will recognize the Soviet Union. Probably Soviet authors, having no knowledge of the realities of the world of freedom, cannot help borrowing their impressions from every day Soviet life. This is a bad symptom for the Soviet regime. At the same time it lets one hope that there is or will be in the Soviet Union a positive reaction, in a search for spiritual and political freedom.

Chapter 15

SOME RAYS OF LIGHT

An intelligent person cannot remain indifferent to evils which destroy the normal conditions of life. According to a saying, 'fish seek greater depths, man a better life.' Many people adapt themselves to the ruling spirit of corruption, follow the wrong way, do what everybody does. But there are always those who cannot be dishonest, ruthless and base, those who understand that moral decay threatens the existence of society and do not reconcile themselves with the existing order. Some of these people remain passive, some react in various ways, criticizing, opposing and undermining the existing regime. Such people may be found not only among those who suffer from the existing system but also among the privileged and ruling groups. History gives us many

[1] V. M. Chikhvadze. 'Sovetskii sud v borbe za preodolenie perezhitkov kapitalisma.' *Sov. gos. i pravo*, 1949, No. 2, p. 24.

examples of how slaveholders emancipated their slaves, landlords distributed their estates among the farmers, children of high ranking dignitaries became revolutionaries and joined back-to-the people movements, as occured in Russia in the seventies of the XIXth century. There are such transitional periods when members of the ruling class lose their confidence in the justice of the existing order and in their right to govern and to retain their privileges.

People in the Soviet Union have the same human nature as any other people. The Prosecutor-General of the U.S.S.R. complains that 'there still remain among us remnants of bourgeois ideology, survivals of private property psychology and morality.' [1] Perhaps if the new conditions of life had been better, people would easily have become accustomed to them. But when agricultural economy is in a disastrous condition and so many farmers are living in need, who would be surprised that they want independence and dream about private property. Who would be surprised if workers, observing the circumventions to which managers have to resort and suffering from unsatisfactory transportation, supply and red tape, cease to believe in socialism. The most intelligent peasants and workers understand that the organization of their work suffers from lack of coordination, red tape, and unjustified interference by higher level institutions. Such criticism is not a remnant of the past, but a response to the present reality. Everybody wants better housing accomodations, a better supply of necessities, and more satisfactory entertainment. Such desires characterized as a 'bourgeois habit' or 'remnant of the capitalist period,' are in fact inborn and will never disappear. Even an animal can discern what is more convenient and more comfortable.

However, dissatisfaction and disappointment are not confined to those who suffer from shortages and discomfort. Writers, artists and composers are suppressed by interference with their creative activities. They want more freedom. Dissatisfaction and doubt gnaw at the roots of the regime. The most intelligent and conscientious people among the Partymen are losing their confidence in the doctrine and program. The government is

[1] R. Rudenko, 'Constantly strengthen socialist law enforcement.' (see footnote on p. 205).

rushing about in search of means to restore the people's spirit, to improve the conditions of life and to strengthen its own power.

Thus, together with demoralization and decay some symptoms of moral regeneration inevitably appear in the Soviet Union.

1. Search for truth

During the short period of 'the thaw,' Soviet magazines published some critical reviews of earlier literary works which did not correspond to reality.

F. Abramov in his article 'People of the Kolkhoz Village in Post-War Prose' [1] criticized the novels of S. Babaevsky, *Kavaler zolotoi zvesdy* (*The Knight of the Golden Star*) and *Svet nad Zemlei* (*Light over the Land*), of G. Nikolaeva, *Zhatva* (*Harvest*) and T. Medynskaia, *Maria*. The first two were awarded the Stalin prize. Abramov reproached the authors for their onesidedness and idealization of the kolkhoz reality. They left undescribed, he wrote, the troubles of the kolkhoz economy, and the reader might imagine that the transition from satisfactory to the flourishing conditions of kolkhozes might be performed rapidly and easily as soon as a man of energy and strong will takes it in his hands.

'Even every-day life was illuminated with fireworks' by some of the authors said the critic. 'A kolkhoz suffers from a shortage of fodder, and it rapidly overcomes the shortage and dispenses fodder in abundance' (Nikolaeva); 'the harvest is poor, people are short of bread, but the kolkhoz builds a power station.' (Babaevsky).

Electrification does not inspire some farmers with enthusiasm:

> 'Harvesting time is near, it is a political moment, the country is waiting for bread; in the meantime the regional authorities are projecting transformation of nature and renovation of villages.' (*Light over the Land*).

However, such a sober, business-like discussion is characterized as a conservative one. A villager expressing his disapproval of

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[1] F. Abramov, 'Liudi kolkhoznoi derevni v poslevoennoi proze' (Literaturnye zametki). *Novyi mir*, Mart-Aprel, 1954, pp. 210–231.

the inopportune projects is described as a main brake hindering the rapid development of the region.

The authors of the novels under review forget, according to Abramov, the conflicts and contradictions existing in reality. Such phenomena are left in the shade; reality is varnished; the transformation of petty landowners into collective farmers occurs as a kind of miracle.

The same idea in a more general form was expounded by the critic Pomerantsev. [1] In his article 'On Sincerity in Literature' he appeals to writers and critics and suggests that they be independent and sincere. 'If I be independent,' he writes, 'then my truth will correspond with our common truth.' To make clear what independence he has in mind, Pomerantsev uses the following comparison:

> 'I feel ill at ease and would speak and act unnaturally if I knew that my neighbor had drilled a hole in my wall and was watching and listening.'

In other words he finds that writers feel that they have to weigh their every word because someone is listening. As a result writers do not expound their real feelings and ideas but follow stereotypes. Readers on their part easily notice it.

> 'Depressingly identical, these books! Their characters, themselves, beginnings and endings are stereotyped. They are not books, they are twins—it suffices to read one or two of them to know what a third will be. In all of them one finds everywhere the familiar platitudes . . . When a librarian asked a young man why he ceased to come for books, he answered: 'I read three novels. They are all alike.'

The same applies to the literary critics. Their reviews are also stereotyped. They do not expound their opinions; they pronounce sentences. Sometimes they fear to offend, and they do not compare, do not explain what differences exist between the various authors.

The worst, however, is that insincerity leads to description of an imaginary picture or a varnished one, instead of life as it exists, or to removal of the black spots from the picture and omission of everything unsavory and nasty.

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[1] Pomerantsev, 'Ob iskrennosti v literature", *Novyi mir*, No. 12 1954, pp. 218–245. (*Current Digest*, Vol. VI, March 17, 1955).

Pomerantsev's article provoked a vivacious discussion. Naturally it did not please the critics—conformists accustomed to 'pronounce sentences'. One such critic, Vasilevsky, was merciless. 'Pomerantsev completely overlooks,' he wrote, 'the question of the writer's world outlook, his Party stand... After all, Soviet criticism is based on the Leninist teaching that art is a specific form of social consciousness. The Communist Party formulating the tasks of literature and art has guided our criticism and esthetics.' [1] Some students sent a letter in defense of Pomerantsev to the editor of the *Komsomolskya Pravda* [2]. The students repeat at the end of their letter Pomerantsev's points: 'The Soviet reader ... severely condemns any violation of living truth, any dullness and stereotype in literature.'

The last word did not belong, however, to the students. It was spoken by Marietta Shaginian, a renown partisan of the Party line.

> 'In exploring new materials one of the most important factors for an essayist is ... the correct understanding of current Party policy, and understanding of the living demands of the day ... One and the same great book—the present day in our Soviet life—lies before the essayist; the same daily newspapers carry their work; the same problems sharply posed by life itself and illuminated by guiding Party decisions, seize essayists ..." [3]

M. Shaginian herself was attacked when she published her Diary. It was analyzed by Lifshitz, a literary critic, who found it displayed an exorbitant self-confidence, superficiality and frequent cases of ignorance. [4]

Quoting her book, he illustrated how she described various subjects without sufficient knowledge, overcolored with an obvious lack of objectivity the achievements of the Soviets, in contrast with the western world and the Russian past. Characterizing her work as permeated with complacency, the critic reproached M. Shaginian for publishing it. He found that such a book could have but a negative influence on the young generation.

[1] Vitaly Vasilevsky, 'From false positions" *Literaturnaya gazeta*, January 30, 1954. He was supported by L. Skorino in her article Discussions in the open. (*Znamia*, No. 2, 1954).

[2] Letter to the editor, *Komsomolskaya pravda*, March 17, 1954, p. 3.

[3] *Izvestia*, October 26, 1954.

[4] M. Lifshits, 'Diary of Marietta Shaginian." *Novyi mir*, Feb. 1954, pp. 206–237.

The arrows of that criticism struck indirectly the general trend among writers to sacrifice truth for propaganda, including for that purpose various irrelevant technical details in literary works without knowledge of the subject.

It is easy to guess that neither novels, plays nor critical articles which deviated from 'socialist realism' were approved. Socialist realism prescribes dark glasses while looking at the capitalist world and pink ones for the socialist reality.

The magazine *Novyi mir* and the articles of the critics Pomerantsev and Shcheglov in particular, were reprimanded; the editor was replaced. The reaction of the Party was distinctly expressed in the following quotation from *Pravda*:

> 'Unfortunately, we still sometimes have writers who rejoice seeing only darkness around them. Like poisonous insects they crawl out of their holes at the least chance ... All this applies not only to writers who, with hard hearts, create vicious works and oppose the people, but also to some critics to whom Soviet literature is not dear ...' [1]

During the second half of December, 1954, the Second Congress of Soviet Writers was held in Moscow (the first took place in 1934). In its message addressed to the Congress, the Communist Party emphasized in a positive form the main tasks of Soviet literature: 'to inspire the Soviet people to perform creative labor and to overcome all difficulties and shortcomings along their path, to inspire them with the great cause of building communism.' And simultaneously, 'not to stand aside from the struggle against the reactionary forces of the old world.' The Soviet Writers' Union was instructed in turn to 'continue to devote its main attention to ideological training... The Union's constant concern should be that our writers ... see and know our contemporaries, the real heroes—the builders of communism.'

The same motifs prevailed in the report of Surkov, the Chairman of the Union, and in the co-report presented by K. Simonov, who in his concluding words invited his colleagues: 'not to expend their powers in fighting each other over trivialities, when history has called them to a merciless fight against the old world.'

There were, however, a few speeches in which some other

[1] 'One cannot write about people without a love for people,' by Villis Lacis. *Pravda* October 16, 1954.

motifs were sounded. M. Sholokhov, one of the most gifted and independent authors, did not support the exaggerated eulogies of Soviet literature. While acknowledging the appearance of some gifted young writers, he said with distress that 'a grey current of colorless, mediocre literary works is gushing from the pages of magazines and is flooding the book market.' He criticized the existing system of encouraging authors with rewards, wittingly hinting that this system encourgages the authors to sell their gift rather than to create artistic works. Another member of the Congress, V. Ovechkin, the author of excellent essays on kolkhoz life, also criticized the existent system of awarding bonuses for literary works and recommended honesty in writing:

> 'It is necessary to write in such a way that we will not be ashamed to look our readers, the true creators and builders of life, in the face—to write in such a way that the people, who are building communism, will always and in every way think only of our writers.'

V. Kaverin in his speech expounded his dreams about the future, when literature will be independent and critical of itself. In that form he opposed the desired conditions of literary freedom to the existing dependence and servility. Some speakers mentioned writers and critics in disgrace, expressing the hope that they would not be deprived of the possibility to contribute to the Soviet literature. [1]

In general even the voices of the most independent speakers seemed to be strangled. It became clear that critical realism would be eliminated, the opposition to the existent trends rebuked. Yet the period of relative freedom had its effect; some works were written, some words pronounced and some suppressed feelings manifested.

In the light of new trends, it hardly seems unexpected that the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (January 11, 1955) also raised the burning question concerning the freedom of creative activity in science. It is well known how widely scientific forces are utilized in the Soviet Union and it is hardly possible to deny that in general scholars are respected and supported. But certainly the pragma-

[1] For information about the Congress and its meetings see translations in Vol. VI of the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. A general appraisal may be found in *Problems of Communism*. Vol. IV No. 2, 1955, by Prof. G. Struve, and in the *Soviet Studies*, Vol. VII, 1, by B. Malnick.

tic attitude which dominates in the Soviet Union does not favor purely theoretical researches. Moscow University was once reprimanded by the Minister for Higher Learning, Kaftanov, for such an 'inadmissible choice of topics for scientific research,' as interest in spiders and indifference to vital problems of agriculture and industry. What is worse, however, is that science must submit to the tutelage of an ideology characterized in the following lines:

> 'In order to secure a successful development of socialist science it is necessary to free it of servility to bourgeois ideology and to remember that science is dependent on class interests.' (*Pravda*, March 3, 1948).

In accordance with that precept, a scholar could be accused of subservience to bourgeois ideology or of deviation from the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. No wonder that, for the sake of self-preservation, some scientists did not hesitate to resort to such extravagant titles as 'Marxism in Surgery,' or 'The Dialectics of Graded Steel.' [1] Sometimes, however, such a specific method of safeguarding one's works is not applicable. The famous case of Lysenko's theory may be used to illustrate how serious the troubles can be for obstinate scientists.

Academician Lysenko, in conformity with Stalin's ambitious plan for the transformation of nature, attacked Soviet scientists who insisted on the Mendelian theory of heredity. He asserted that it was possible to overcome hereditary properties and to develop new characteristics acquired under the influence of the newly created surroundings. He demanded, therefore, that biologists undertake the appropriate research and plant-breeding.

Lysenko's theory contradicted universally adopted views and provoked indignation on the part of other Soviet scholars, but it appealed to the inclination of the revolutionary mentality to think that there were no insurmountable obstacles for Soviet science. Prof. A. R. Zherbak, an internationally known Soviet geneticist, submitted an article to an American magazine in which he undertook to refute Lysenko's biological theories and claimed that Soviet scientists were helping to build a 'general

[1] See 'Soviet Science and Political Philosophy,' by Prof. Karl Sachs. (The *Scientific Monthly*, July, 1947. Vol. LXV, No. 1.

world-wide biology.' Such a point of view met with the emphatic disapproval of the Party, and Zherbak had to publish a letter in which he announced: 'I, as a Party member, do not consider it possible for me to retain the views which have been recognized as erroneous by the Central Committee of the Party.' Several other opponents were removed from their jobs and the Academy's presidium published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* a letter addressed to Premier Stalin in which Stalin was promised that the Academy would 'correct mistakes' in biology and develop Soviet science 'in the name of the victory of communism.' Later a similar letter was also published by the Academy of Medical Science. (*Pravda*, Sept. 25, 1948) [1] After Stalin's death, Lysenko's authority was disavowed and his theory submitted to criticism.

The interference and control of the Party are especially restrictive in the field of the humanities. Jurists and philosophers are subjected to the regime which Stalin himself characterized as 'Arakcheev's regime.' [2] Historians and economists share the same fate. [3] They are all limited in their scientific discussions. They have to adopt the truth which is established by the leaders and which, for a certain period at least, is considered as the only true Marxist doctrine.

The extravagances of such a tutelage are evidently acknowledged at present to be harmful. Scholars are in fact fighters for scientific truth. Each one believes conscientiously in his method or research and his doctrine ,and the competition of methods and discussions stimulates the progress of human knowledge. It is symptomatic that the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* has expounded the same point:

> 'The existence of one single school of science in any field of knowledge and also the 'non-disclosure'" of schools, the lack of an open conflict of views and mutual checkup on

[1] Pamela N. Wrinch, 'Science and Politics in the USSR; The Genetics Debate. *World Politics*, Vol. III, No. 4, July 1951, pp. 486–519.

[2] Arakcheev—a general responsible for the reactionary police system during the last years of the reign of Emperor Alexander I (1825). *Arakcheevshchina* is a synonym for police control and interference in the sphere of cultural life. Stalin used this expression in his work on linguistics in which he criticized the theory which for a while was considered to be indisputable.

[3] See 'Recent Conflicts in SovietHistoriography' by A. Mazour and H. Bateman (The *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. XXIV, Bo. 1, March 1952). Also—attacks against economists at the time of the dethroning of the leading communist authority, Varga, in 1948.

each other, lead to narrowing of the creative horizon and threaten some schools with the danger that their own views and work become fetishes.' [1]

2. *Sense of freedom*

The campaign for truth is at the same time a striving for freedom. Only freedom secures the successful development of science; in its atmosphere only does the competition of ideas become productive and progressive. Only a free press can uncover the evils of social life and defend victims of injustice and of the inexpediency of the existing system. Only a free press can choose subjects independently and discuss them according to the understanding of the individual authors, who expound their own ideas concerning right and wrong, the past and present, the needs of the nation and its future. Only freedom allows every author to be himself, realist or symbolist, or servant of art for art's sake.

Every writer, like every scholar, wants to be free in his creative activity. Ehrenburg expounded this common feeling of writers in his article 'Concerning the writer's work.' [2] In spite of a certain carefulness in his discussion, he succeeded in expressing the main ideas in a very clear form. Speaking about the ties between the writer and the people in socialist society, which are sometimes interpreted as a 'social order,' he added, 'but not even the most unconscionable editor would have dared to dictate to Chekhov on what theme he is to write.' And he indicated the field in which the writer must be independent, the field of human psychology, 'man's inner world,' for he knows it better than his fellow citizens. 'Many critics, publishers, reviewers and editors,' continued Ehrenburg, 'consider that if some imperfections still remain the writer should not mention them.' But then he will ignore reality because many, but not all vices have disappeared since the October Revolution.

> 'It is enough to glance through a newspaper file for one month to find in the articles and feuilletons exposés of swaggering bureaucratic self-protection, obsequiousness, routine, self-will, egoism and other 'imperfections and deformities!'

[1] *Current Digest*, Vol. VII, No. 2, pp. 7–8.
[2] *Znamia*, No. 10, 1953.

Ehrenburg ended his article with the following significant words:

> 'I look with hope to tomorrow ... readers will still read excellent books. They cannot be ordered or planned.'

Almost simultaneously a certain Romashev in *Pravda* (October 23, 1953) criticized contemporary Soviet dramaturgy:

> 'Many of our new plays are even constructed from single patterns without boldness or artistic daring ... in several recent plays there is evident an absence of individuality on the author's part, a lack of creative power.'

One month later a similar article appeared devoted to problems of music. [1] Its author was the outstanding composer, Khachaturian.

> 'Can we Soviet composers say that our work meets the constantly growing cultural requirements of the Soviet people? ... No, we cannot say that. We must admit honestly and boldly that the achievements of Soviet composers in recent years are still far from meeting the high demands presented by the people ... Don't we have many works aimed at some "arithmetical average" taste, works in which the composer, losing his own creative individuality, covers up with dull, artificial musical phraseology? ... How many times have we heard "monumental" works, employing tremendous numbers of instruments and voices, and representing blatant emptiness of compositon flavored with an important, timely theme expressed chiefly in 'programmatic' title and substitutes.'

Like Ehrenburg for the writers, Khachaturian requires freedom of choice and freedom from interference for the composers:

> 'I think the time has come to revise our established system of institutional guardianship over composers ... I will say more: We must resolutely reject the wrong practice of interference with the composer's creative processes by officials of music institutions ... Let the composer and the libretto writer themselves work carefully on their composition, on their own RESPONSIBILITY. No tutelage!'

Shostakovich in turn published an article in which speaking about the 'Joy of the creative search' he supported the artists' right to a daring search for originality. [2] Soviet composers should

[1] *Sovetskaya musyka*, No. 11, Nov. 1953. Translated in the *Current Digest*, Vol. V, No. 46.

[2] *Sovetskaya muzyka*. No. 1. 1954.

not be protected from the search for the new, from following an independent, untrod path of art.[1]

But freedom of the press and even of music cannot be secured in a country where the totalitarian regime subjects the economic, social and cultural life to its control and demands that all cultural workers absorb and propagate its ideology. A totalitarian regime does not permit people to be free either politically or economically and culturally. The freedoms established by the Constitution are conditional: 'In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system' (Art. 125). It is the Party to which belongs the exclusive right to determine what does correspond to the interests of the working people; and the Party is the only organization which may decide what strengthens and what weakens the socialist system. Under such conditions, in order to get freedom it is necessary to struggle for it. When a sense of freedom is awakened, when the wish for freedom is expressed, it will not fade. This is the beginning of the struggle.

3. Sense of justice

While a man can breath normally, he does not notice and does not appraise the air without which he cannot exist. So it is as regards law. When people are accustomed to live under the protection of a legal order which secures the inviolability of their rights, they do not appraise its great social significance. But when they are deprived of such a protection and suffer from the arbitrariness of those who have more power, from partiality on the part of administration and judges, from prejudices and discriminations they begin to demand legality and justice, no less than people who gasp for breath require fresh air.

It was symptomatic when Marshal Zhukov, at the reception arranged by Molotov in 1954 seconded a toast offered by the United States ambassador in the name of justice. If even such a distinguished Soviet statesman feels of what great value it is to live in the atmosphere of justice, what must be the feelings of rank and file Soviet citizens? A 'loyal student of Lenin and Sta-

[1] President, of the USSR Academy of Arts, Gerasimov followed writers and composers in 1956 only (See *Sovetskaja kultura*, March 27, 1956. p. 3).

lin' who suddenly falls into disgrace and is declared to be incapable of ruling the country feels undoubtedly the same way a worker feels who is not promoted because he is not a member of the Party, or is deprived of a day-off, or is injustly fined, or a farmer who is taxed more heavily only because he is industrious and produces more than another. A manager feels the same if he is dismissed or transferred to a lower position because of failure to fulfill the plan of production, although there was no fault on his part. Each has his own complaint and his particular case when he suffers from arbitrariness, defenselessness or injustice, but the feelings of everybody are similar: everybody wants to be sure that his right is inviolable, that the court is impartial, that arbitrariness is punishable no matter what its source.

An ordinary citizen of the totalitarian state does not dare to express his protest against arbitrariness or injustice. Neither has he means to do so. If he is told that he is a criminal, he must acknowledge it and confess. It is memorable how several physicians and surgeons were arrested at the beginning of 1953, accused of murdering Zhdanov and attempting to poison some other Soviet statesmen. They were tortured and confessed, but finally were liberated as innocent victims of a false report and inadmissible methods of investigation with the aid of violence. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions of people, if only they could rise from their graves, would testify that they perished after the same kind of extorted confessions, arbitrariness and violence.[1] Many millions are suffering from arbitrariness and injustice but do not dare to protest openly. But this does not mean that they have become reconciled to such a system. The Soviet government knows it and from time to time it takes the initiative in exposing injustice and promising to exterminate it.

Since Stalin's death in 1953 and 1954 several articles have appeared in Soviet magazines and newspapers which acknowledged injustice and emphasized the government's determination to put an end to the violations of human rights.

> 'Not a single instance of violation of the rights of Soviet citizens should remain unpunished ... In assuring great

[1] The crimes of Stalin's period have been acknowledged by N. Khrushchev in his address at the closed meeting of the XXth Party Congress (See *N.Y.Times*, June 5, 1956).

> rights and freedoms for Soviet people, the USSR Constitution at the same time places serious obligations upon them ..." [1]

Without a sense of humor, but certainly provoking sarcasm on the part of Soviet citizens, the USSR Procurator-General, R. Rudenko published an article in *Pravda*, [2] in which he asserts:

> 'Only in our country is the inviolability of the person completely insured. "No person may be placed under arrest except by a decision of a court or with the sanction of a prosecutor," says Art. 127 of the USSR Constitution. Soviet law qualifies as a serious abuse of office the illegal imprisonment of a Soviet citizen or employment of illegal means in the course of investigation.'

Rudenko forgot to say that ready made orders of the Procurator are at the disposal of the MVD police and did not indicate what the guarantees against the illegal acts of the latter are. It is, however, very significant that illegality is acknowledged and blamed. More than that. It is acknowledged that the Party organs interfere in the activity of the courts and violate the principle of the independence of judges.

> 'The recently passed resolution of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. with regard to the evidence of interference on the part of certain Party offices in the discussion of legal matters, must be strictly followed. The resolution stated among other things that certain local Party institutions, instead of the political direction and control of the activity of the offices of Public Prosecutors, have taken upon themselves unlawful interference in the decisions of legal matters.' [3]

4. Religious movement

When life is hard, prospects unpromising and rulers unreliable, people feel with particular strength the need for a superhuman force to which they can address their prayers and hopes. It is

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[1] Ya. Umansky, 'Freedom of the individual and guarantees of the constitutional rights of USSR citizens,' *Sov. gos. i pravo*, No. 7, 1953, p. 23–43; cf. *Izvestia*, August 17, 1955, p. 2 and August 21, p. 2.

[2] 'Constantly strengthen socialist law enforcement, '*Pravda*, Jan. 5 1954, p. 2. Translated in the *Current Digest*, Vol. V, No. 50.

[3] 'For the further development of the science of state law' (*Sov. gos. i pravo*, No. 7, 1954. Editorial).

not accidental that religion gains more and more influence in the Soviet Union. For a long time it was ridiculed, blamed and subjected to humiliations and persecution. However, during World War II the atheistic government could not help retreating and letting people resort to their religious faith. Mothers and wives prayed for their loved ones, fathers and sons for their own and their relatives' lives, and the whole people for the salvation of their country from the ruthless enemy. The atheistic government could not afford to underestimate the significance of that moral support so needed during the war by individuals and so helpful for the state itself, and it had to become reconciled with the Church and religion. The official doctrine that 'religion is opium for the people' was shelved and was replaced by tolerance.

In the meantime, in addition to temporary war-time needs, other more lasting political calculations convinced the Soviet government that it would be expedient to support the existence of the Orthodox Church. The government reckoned on strengtheing its influence in Eastern Europe where it had acquired political control after the end of World War II and in the Near East where the Moscow patriarchate had started to assist the patriarchates in that area which were without sufficient material means. In the Soviet Union itself the Moscow patriarchate gathered the orthodox clergy under its control and helped overcome separatist tendencies by the establishment of a center of religious authority.

The activity of the Church has been limited. No religious education is allowed up to the age of eighteen; no charitable organizations can be connected with the churches; and church sermons cannot be given on questions other than those of a purely religious character. Thus the activity of the Church is limited to ceremonies and rites of a purely religious character.

Nevertheless, the rise of religious feelings once awakened did not stop. In 1955, under the Moscow patriarchate there were 70 eparchies, 22,000 parishes, 40,000 priests, 90 monasteries, 2 academies and 8 seminaries[1]. In 1939, there were only 4,225 parishes and no institutions for religious education. The increasing number of parishes indicates the demand of the population. More and more wedding ceremonies are performed in

[1] Some of the quoted figures, borrowed from Soviet sources, seem to be exaggerated for propaganda purpose.

conformity with religious ritual; even members of the Party baptize their children; members of the komsomol attend church services. Soviet newspapers do not deny that fact and complain that religious zeal interrupts the normal developement of factories' and kolkhozes' operations.

> 'Absenteeism during Christmas was greater than during February and March together. During the Easter holidays twelve workers did not report to work at the mechanical plant ... The 8th of May, a number of workers and their families were preparing to go to a nearby village to celebrate the so-called St. Niel's day ... On Trinity Sunday, June 13, many people from surrounding settlements poured into the church. The same was repeated at Whitsuntide. Two young girls, weavers of the factory, and one twenty year old girl worker of the mechanical plant, sing in the church choir on working days. On religious feast days one may encounter engineers, doctors, young communists and active trade union members at the festivities.' (*Trud*, June 29, p. 2. 'Old things do not disappear by themselves.")

Krokodil from time to time publishes various caricatures which only confirm that members of the Party and komsomol attend church services and engage in the ritual. In July, 1954 *Komsomolskaya Pravda* reported that celebrations of various Christian holidays caused the absence of a number of workers. A total of 10,000 working days were lost. [1]

The Communist Party is concerned about the obvious success of the religious movement and does not remain inactive. Newspapers try to 'discredit religion as a product of superstition and ignorance: 'Science and religion are irreconcilable.' (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, July 1, 1954).

> 'V. Filippova and G. Tarasova with their own eyes saw an icon in the village church "turn from old into new". It seems that a similar miracle took place in some old womans' house in the neighboring village of Yurmanka. The old lady rose in the morning and could not believe her eyes: The icon had become like new.' (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, February 20, 1954).

[1] *Komlskaya somoPravda* complains that people celebrate St. John's, the Holy Virgin of Tikhvin's, and St. Peter's days, as well as the Holy Mother of Kazan's day and the Feast of the Assumption during the summer when every working day is valuable.

Soviet newspapers charge that religious festivals poison people's health by giving rise to drunkenness which causes hoodlumism and keeps them from work. Particular attacks are directed against the Evangelists (*Trud*, June 29, 1954) and Baptists (*Trud*, August 22, 1954). The latter are accused of being 'American spies.'

> 'The American imperialists are glad to use the sect for the purpose of recruiting spies to send to the USSR and the people's democracies. Since the victory of socialism, objective conditions for the existence of religious sects have disappeared in the Soviet land. But there still remains a small and diminishing group of several sects, among which are the Baptists ... By their sermons the Baptists attempt to distract the workers from active participation in communist construction. For that reason it is necessary by all means to help the believers to free themselves from the influence of Baptist ministers and to strive to draw every Soviet person into public activity.' (*Sovetskaya Latvia*, Oct. 20, 1954).

Communist propaganda cannot compete with the influence of religious cults and ethics. Christianity discourages communists. The ideal of love, especially 'love thy enemy,' maintains its spiritual influence, while communism teaches hatred of one's enemies. Christianity admonishes people not to value too highly the material goods of the world, while communism demands sacrifices rather for technical constructions and other purposes of a material character than for the benefit of the living people. No wonder that communist propaganda fails [1] and communist entertainments cannot compete with great religious celebrations.

> 'Anti-Easter evenings and lectures during Easter were projected in the clubs of the woodworking factory and factory of tanning extracts. However, workers did not come ... they knew that there was nothing of interest at the clubs.' (*Trud*, June 29, 1954. Correspondence from Vyshnii Volchok)

The last hope rests with scientific propaganda. 'Anti-religious propaganda on a scientific foundation is a problem of vital importance for trade-union organizations and the administration of clubs and palaces of culture.' (*Trud*, July 1, 1954).

Propaganda is to be directed against all other religions, in particular against Islam:

[1] *Pravda*, March 13, 1955 acknowledged that there are 'big shortcomings' in the political education of Communists.

> 'Islam and its rites play a reactionary role, since they hinder the development of the national and class consciousness of workers and peasants ... In our country the rites of Islam, like those of other religions, remain only as a survival of the ideology of the old exploiter society.' [1]

On November 10, 1954, the Communist Party declared that it would not support any militant campaign against religion, but only scientific propaganda; N. Khrushchev signed a new directive about atheist propaganda in which he explained its principles:

> 'The Party Central Committee considers it wrong that many Party organizations show a lack of guidance in scientific-atheist propaganda and do not show concern about careful selection of propaganda cadres ... It must be borne in mind that actions insulting to the church, clergy and those citizens who are believers are incompatible with the policy of the Party and the State in the conducting of scientific-atheist propaganda and are contrary to the USSR Constitution, which grants freedom of conscience to Soviet citizens ... it is stupid and harmful to cast political doubt on Soviet citizens because of their religious convictions ... the task of the Party, state and public organizations consists in fundamentally improving cultural-enlightening work among the public and thereby achieving a further rise in the cultural level of the working people.' (*Pravda*, Nov. 11, 1954, p. 2).

The moderate tone of the directive of the Party quoted testifies that no religious persecutions are to be expected at the present time. The Party is in general in a defensive position as regards religion and does not possess the proper weapons for attack or even for protection against its further success.

Religion gives people consolation and moral support. It also helps them educate their children. Unexpectedly, the Soviet government finds itself in a position to exploit the beneficial influence of religion and its moral effect, as they preserve society from further disintegration. Religious organizations are politically loyal.[2] Nevertheless every religion, and Christianity especially, contradicts official doctrine and materialist philosophy and in the long run undermines the foundations of the 'socialist society.'

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[1] Excerpts from *Kommunist Tadzhikistan* translated in the *Current Digest*, Vol. VI, No. 28, August 25, 1954.

[2] See Guins, *Soviet Law*, pp. 278–282.

PART IV

WAR OR PEACE?

The communist state is militant by the nature of its program. Its slogan, 'Workers of the world unite,' formulates its final goal and predetermines its foreign policy. The World Revolution is the main goal and the sweetest dream of communists. Capitalism has to be destroyed and a new uniform economic, social and political regime established for the whole world.

The leaders of the Soviet Union never have concealed this aim. 'What is our country but a base for the World Revolution?' said Stalin. [1]

> 'The victory of socialism in one country is not a final aim in itself. Revolution in one country is not to be considered as a self-sufficient quantity, but rather as a means of furthering and accelerating the victory of the proletariat in all countries. The victory of the revolution in one country ... is at the same time the first stage and necessary condition for the world revolution." [2]

According to Stalin, the first preparative stage (often characterized as a period of 'peaceful coexistence') consists in developing supporting and encouraging revolution in all countries; the second one, according to Lenin and Stalin, in its accomplishment:

> '... the proletariat which has expropriated the capitalists and organized socialist production at home must rise against the remaining capitalist world, attracting to itself the oppressed masses in other countries, stirring them up to rebellion against the capitalists and, if necessary, employ military force against the exploiting classes and their states.' [3]

The Soviet Union, as the first state in which socialism was realized, became the stronghold of the internationalist revolutionary movement and its capital, the headquarters from which that movement is directed.

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[1] J. Stalin, *Voprosy Leninisma*, Moscow, 1922, p. 59.
[2] Stalin, J. V., *Sochinenia*, Vol. 6, p. 396.
[3] Lenin, *Sochinenia* Vol. XXIII, pp. 232–33.; Stalin, Vol. 6, pp. 399–400.

On September 10,1947, in his message of greeting on the occasion of the 800th anniversary of Moscow, Stalin said:

> 'Moscow is ... the battle standard of all thinking people in the world, all the oppressed races and nations, in their struggle for liberation from plutocracy and imperialism.'

The newspaper, *Moscow News* added in turn:

> 'Can Moscow be called a European city? No, Soviet cities, and particularly, Moscow, are not "European". They are Socialist ... Moscow stands a beacon of light for the East and the West.'

In conformity with the final goal of the communist government, Soviet foreign policy cannot but be aggressive. Its 'peaceful coexistence' is in fact 'cold war.' To weaken adversaries, to undermine their forces, to provoke and support conflicts between them, with all possible means, that is the system which is applied by the Soviets, in addition to unscrupulous propaganda. The 'hot war' remains in reserve, as a concluding act.

The strength of the communist government and the fate of its revolutionary venture depend, however, not only upon the condition of the non-communist nations, but also on resistance within the communist country itself. It seems at first sight not a difficult task for a one-party government, with armed forces at its disposal, to liquidate all its internal enemies. From the beginning the Soviet government applied the methods of a 'hot war' against its adversaries inside the country. The most conspicuous representatives of various non-communist political parties and social groups, active or not, were mercilessly exterminated. Revolts of peasants and the sailors' mutiny in the Kronstadt fortress were ruthlessly suppressed. It proved more complicated to force peasants to become reconciled with collectivization. But even in that case the Soviet government did not hesitate to use most cruel measures. About six million peasants were treated as criminals only because they opposed collectivization. They were banished to various camps or to remote parts of Siberia. Husbands and wives were separated, and all transported under such conditions that many of them perished before reaching their destination.

Since 1917, all enemies of the Soviet regime and Communist party born and bred under the prerevolutionary order have either

been exterminated or died; a few who survived have adapted themselves to the new system. Yet an opposition to the Soviet regime still exists. This was acknowledged officially by the leaders of the Communist Party at its XIXth Congress, in 1952, in their references to survivals of the psychology of the past and the undermining activity of capitalist agents and spies. The latter are, in fact, people who are disappointed with socialism and have no interest and belief in communism. These people want first and foremost economic and cultural freedom. A hot war against these, mostly invisible, enemies would be no more effective than the use of atomic bombs against inimical ideas.

Chapter 16

THE PEACEFUL NATION

World War II was so disastrous and inhuman that its atrocities filled the hearts of people everywhere with indignation. Public opinion demands peaceful settlement of international conflicts. The United Nations organization was established to prevent wars; Art. 39 of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits in principle 'any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.'

In reality the United Nations became a forum in which the representatives of the various interests and ideologies of the democratic nations and communist bloc expound their ideas concerning the means of securing peace. The Soviet Union is the main opponent of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court, and, moreover, does not accept arbitration by the United Nations. The Soviet Union supports the idea of national sovereignty in its absolute meaning and rejects the idea of compulsory arbitration as an anti-democratic, 'world-state' idea and a cosmopolitan tendency. As a matter of fact every member of this international community can still refer to its sovereignty and disregard the United Nations when it cannot count on its support.

Under such conditions, the United Nations organization cannot secure peace for it is not able to enforce its decisions. The

Soviet Union, in particular, may find various pretexts and resort to various acts of violence in order to realize its revolutionary aims. The 'peaceful' communist bloc may exploit any possibility for securing its interests with the aid of violence; its philosophy of war and aggression is sufficiently flexible and will justify such an act.

1. *Philosophy of war*

Philosophers and jurists, even of comparatively recent periods, have supported the right of states to start a 'just war' as a right existing from time immemorial and belonging to the system of natural law. Since ancient times the concept of 'just' war, as opposed to 'unjust' war, has existed, in which concept the inevitability of war was assumed. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, international law acknowledged the right to resort to war. Every war was in practice considered as a just war and was limited only as far as the use of certain weapons, system of administration of occupied territories, and treatment of war prisoners were concerned.

The new stage in the development of international law begins with the establishment of the League of Nations by the Versailles Treaty of 1919. Art. 11 of the Covenant of the League declared war a matter of concern to the whole League. However, this new trend did not prevent World War II. Afterwards the United Nations replaced the League, broadening its scope and extending its goals. Yet the problem of war and peace is still not solved, and it cannot be solved successfully because of the philosophy of totalitarianism which justifies the system of violence.

Stalin acknowledged the possibility and acceptability of war. In his letter written in 1930 to Maxim Gorky he said quite frankly:

> 'We are not against war. We are against imperialist war. But we are for the emancipating, anti-imperialist revolutionary war, despite the fact that such a war, as is well known, is not free from the "horrors of bloodshed," but rather is full of them.' [1]

[1] Stalin, *Sochinenia*, Vol. XII, p. 176. Declaration of the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International proclaimed: "The Soviet Union does not cherish any illusion as to the possibility of durable peace.... wars of proletarian dictatorship against world capitalism are inevitable and revolutionary."

The same point is expounded in the main hand-book of communists, the *History of Communist Party (bolsheviks)*:

> 'A just war does not seek annexations. It is a war for liberation with the purpose either of protecting a certain nation against an attack from outside and an attempt to enslave it, or for liberating a people from capitalist enslavement or, finally, liberating colonies from the yoke of imperialism.' [1]

Stalin's and Vyshinskii's declarations in connection with the Korean war were indicative of the general principles of a 'war for liberation.'

There is no other nation in the world today militarized to a greater degree than the Soviet Union. It is not only armed to the teeth, figuratively speaking, not only maintains the largest espionage net of any nation, but also fosters in its population inimical feelings against all potential enemies, against non-communist countries, and especially against the United States, and encourages a spirit of hatred and belligerence.

After the end of World War II, Soviet poets were reprimanded for expounding themes of 'deserved rest,' 'imperturbable quiet,' and 'long expected stillness,' as 'motives foreign to our time, when two irreconcilable worlds stand in opposition to each other.' [2]

Soviet art is also not encouraged to promote pacifism. The review of an exhibition of paintings by the late artist, M. Grekov, in the Tretiakov Galleries in Moscow, praised scenes depicting battles taken from episodes in the Civil War and expressing the martial spirit of a people fighting for liberty. These pictures were praised by the *Moscow News* for having no trace of that pacifism which is so noticeable in the famous battle pictures of Vereshchagin. In spite of the 'Geneva spirit', the same feeling has been revived in connection with a recent exhibit of battle painting (*Izvestia*, August 20, 1955).

Nations which do not accept the communist ideology or program are doomed according to communist convictions; and the destruction of this doomed world is considered to be one of the goals of the communist states. Consequently, Soviet diplomats protest against rearmament of Germany while they assist East Germany and China to develop their military forces in full conform-

[1] *Istoria VKP* (b). Kratkii kurs. M. 1938, p. 161.
[2] *Zvezda*, No. 11, 1946.

ity with the Soviet pattern. The Soviet Union supported the Chinese communists against Chiang Kai-shek, but blame the United States for defending Taiwan (Formosa). In every case, the Soviet Union justifies its support by referring to the fact that it supported a communist against a non-communist nation, an eventually doomed country enslaved by capitalism.

2. *Intervention*

Every intervention, even if it is justified by high principles of morality and disinterestedness on the part of the interveners, may develop into a system of control and occupation with the result that the nation subject to intervention protests against it. No wonder that intervention, like war, is a subject of criticism in modern international law. On the other hand, there being no supra-national authority and the existing international organization not being sufficiently strong, a sovereign nation has no other means of realizing those objectives which it considers as just. Some jurists therefore admit intervention as a legal measure in such exceptional circumstances as, for example, in rebellion against a tyranny when people appeal for assistance in their struggle for freedom, and in the case of an emergency brought about by the activity of a third nation organizing disorders in another state [1]

There is no consistency on this point in Soviet legal theory. One of the most authoritative experts on international law in the Soviet Union, Prof. E. Korovin, originally supported the idea that 'revolutionary intervention' does not contradict the tendency or the duty of the Soviet state to assist sovereign nations in 'the establishment of the most progressive social and political system.' 'Intervention may become,' he said, 'the mightiest instrument of progress, a surgical measure to ease the birth of a new world. [2] But later Korovin was forced to reject this idea as one of his mistakes. 'The Soviet Union,' he wrote, 'is not a supporter of revolutionary intervention but the opponent of any intervention.' [3]

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[1] Cf. Scelle, G. *Manuel de Droit International Public*, Paris, 1948. Ch. 5, 1–3.
[2] E. Korovin, *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo perekhodnogo vremeni*, M. 1925, p. 6.
[3] E. Korovin's review in the *Harvard L. Rev.*, 1936, pp. 1392–95.

It is known, however, that the Soviet Union intervened in the domestic affairs of Roumania and forced King Michael to appoint a communist as premier. In Czechoslovakia it prohibited the signing of the Marshall Plan. During the civil war in China it supplied Chinese communists with armaments of the surrendered Japanese troops, instead of transferring them to the legitimate government of China, at that time headed by Chiang Kai-shek, and thus violated the agreement concluded with the latter. [1] But from the Soviet point of view this action was assistance to a 'sovereign people' in its attempt to liberate itself from unlawful oppression by the counter-revolutionary minority. A more drastic example of Soviet intervention was the participation of Soviet tanks in the suppression of the German workers' rebellion against the communist government of East Germany in June, 1953. That rebellion was undoubtedly an event of domestic jurisdiction and, besides, it was a rebellion of working people and not of exploiters.

Except in the case of the rebellion in East Germany, the Soviet Union did not use open intervention with the assistance of military forces. The usual Soviet methods of intervention and subversive activity are: organization of 'fifth columns,' infiltration by a variety of Soviet agents, including incognito officers, soldiers, and experienced leaders for the support of communist activities, and, finally, donation of generous supplies of money, armaments and literature.

Having worked out a special system of supporting its partisans and organizing the revolutionary movement in other countries, the Soviets naturally prefer not to allow intervention on the part of the nations ready to counteract.

Soviet jurists have to adapt their theories to the needs of the current policy. Although the admissibility of intervention under certain conditions was logically connected with the principle of 'just war' adopted by Stalin, it was disavowed when open intervention began to be an inexpedient weapon. Thus, in conformity with higher policy, intervention is characterized at present as an aggressive act.

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[1] G. C. Guins, *Soviet Law*, pp. 339–40.

3. Aggression

The wars of the twentieth century have had the character of aggression and various international documents, especially from the period between the two world wars, used the term aggression and attack instead of, or on a par with 'war', 'aggressive war' and 'resort to war.' The Manchurian Affair of 1931, the Italian conquest of Abyssinia (1936), the Soviet invasion of Finland (1939) and Hitler's invasion of Poland (1939) all were undertaken without declaration of war. These notorious events stimulated jurists and governments in their endeavor to define aggression.

In February, 1933, M. Litvinov, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., offered a very broad definition of aggression to the disarmament conference organized in Geneva by the League of Nations. It included declaration of war and any kind of attack. His definition contained a point which proposed to consider as aggressor even a state which helps to overthrow a foreign government or regime, namely:

> 'Support extended to armed bands, organized on its (another state's) territory, with the purpose of invading the territory of another state; or the refusal, despite the insistence of the state being invaded, to deprive the above-mentioned bands of any assistance or support.' (Paragraph 5, Article 2 of the proposed definition).

A special article pointed out that no political, military, economic, or any other consideration could excuse or justify aggression. A definition of acts of aggression, similar to that offered by Litvinov, was promoted seventeen years later, on November 4,1950, by the delegate of the Soviet Union in the United Nations Organization. A number of situations which cannot serve as justification for acts of aggression were enumerated in a special supplement to Article 2, as follows:

A. The internal condition of any state, as, for example:
   (a) The backwardness of any nation politically, economically or culturally;
   (b) Alleged shortcomings of its administration:
   (c) Any danger which may threaten the life or property of aliens;
   (d) The establishment or maintenance in any state of any political, economic or social system;

B. Any act, legislation or order of any state, as for example:
   (a) The violation of international treaties;
   (b) The violation of rights and interests in the sphere of trade, concessions or any other kind of economic activity acquired by another state or its citizens;
   (c) The rupture of diplomatic or economic relations;
   (d) Measures in connection with an economic or financial boycott;
   (e) Repudiation of debts;
   (f) Prohibition or restriction of immigration or modification of the status of foreigners;
   (g) The violation of privileges granted to the official representatives of another state;
   (h) Refusal to allow the passage of armed forces proceeding to the territory of a third state;
   (i) Measures of a religious or anti-religious nature;
   (j) Frontier incidents.

The Soviet draft of the Resolution concerning the definition of aggression was rejected, after discussion, by the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization. Diplomats preferred to avoid dangerous oversight and to let a general concept of aggression develop through practice in connection with events. The general objection was most clearly summed up by the French delegate. 'In a world subject to change, said he, 'no determination of what aggression is can be free of uncertainty and possible errors.'

Some very incisive remarks were made by the delegate of the Netherlands, Mr. Von Balluseck. Referring to the Vyshinskii attacks on the capitalist states and his appeal for liberation from the capitalist yoke, Mr Balluseck said, 'If a war to liberate a people from the yoke of capitalism is justified, and not punishable as aggression, what has become of the Charter of the United Nations Organization by the terms of which an attempt to change the *status quo* through armed force was definitely aggression?' [1]

There were indeed reasons to fear the possibility of 'cunning' and 'indirect aggression' on the part of the Soviet Union. The delegates to the United Nations did not pay special attention to

[1] Fifth Session of General Assembly. Question of the duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. First Committee Meetings, 4th–10th November, 1950. U.N.Doc. A/C I/SR 384–390.
Sixth Session. Question of the Definition of Aggression. First Comm. Meetings, 5th–23rd January 1952. U.N.Doc. A/C 6/SR 278–295.

the enumeration in the Soviet resolution of the cases when a military attack cannot be justified. It is not difficult to see through this part of the resolution as intending to protect the means and methods employed by the Soviet Union and its satellites for the subjugation of other nations .It prohibits, for example, intervention in the case of a revolution or counter-revolution or of a civil war in another state. This would permit the Soviet Union or Communist China to organize revolutionary movements for the overthrow of the existing regimes in certain countries and for their conversion into so-called 'people's democracies' and eventually into Soviet satellites, without allowing other countries to interfere. They would thus be unhampered in their programs of subversive propaganda, of infiltrating communists into trade-unions and other influential organizations with the purpose of organizing sabotage, supplying armaments to underground forces, and encouraging revolts. At the same time they would be guaranteed that in case of a counter-revolution, or of a liberation movement against the communist regime, the non-communist states would be deprived of the possibility of supporting such a movement.

It is certainly also in the interests of communist revolution to prohibit use of force in such cases as the violation of international treaties or refusal to pay debts, abolition of concessions, prosecution of foreigners. Nations whose regime is based on respect for law do not employ such practices; there is no genocide, no kidnapping of opponents, etc., in those countries where rule of law exists. Such practices are employed by nations where law is only an instrument of policy and where any violation of private or individual rights can be justified by the ultimate objective.

The Soviet definition attempts to protect with impunity and support all those measures which it has applied in transforming Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, in Europe into its satellites; and China, North Korea, Mongolia and Indo-China, in Asia,its dependents; in transforming independent Baltic states into Soviet Union Republics and in annexing Tannu-Tuva. At the same time, it does not include in the list of acts of aggression new methods of hidden aggression which it has invented, as, for example, the continued military occupation of foreign territory under the pretext that a treaty of peace has not

been signed, whereas the signing of that treaty depends on the Soviet Union itself. In 1933 it characterized as aggression 'support extended to armed bands which are about to invade the territory of another state.' The point quoted was later deleted from a similar resolution and other official documents offered or signed by the Soviets. It was omitted in connection with the invasion of South Korea by 'Chinese volunteers.' In the textbook *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo* (International Law), published in 1951 (p. 580) this 'unsuccessful' paragraph was not mentioned as if it had not existed. Could it be otherwise, since the Soviet Union supplied 'Chinese volunteers' with arms and justified their invasion into North Korea, as earlier it justified the invasion of Greece by guerillas organized and supported in communist controlled Bulgaria?

Having failed to get its definition approved in the United Nations, the Soviets submitted it to the Second World Congress of the so-called 'Peace Partisans,' in Warsaw, which naturally passed it unanimously. Prior to that Congress, a petition for discriminating aggression as a criminal act was worked out in Stockholm, in March 19,1950, and later the same petition was supported by the World Federation of Trade-Unions on December 10, 1950.

What is worthy of special attention is that these petitions emphasize the inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of other countries:

> 'We deem it necessary that the attempts of aggressors to confuse the very concept of aggression and thus to justify foreign intervention in the internal affairs of other countries be exposed. No political, strategic or economic considerations nor any motives connected with the internal situation or the internal conflicts of any state, can serve to justify armed intervention by any state whatever in the affairs of another state.' (*Pravda*, November 23, 1950).

The point set forth in the petition quoted corresponds to the argument used in the official documents and articles of the Soviet jurists when they tried to prove that it was the United States and not China which had committed an aggressive act. Referring to paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter of United Nations Organization, they emphasized the fact that the war in Korea was a

civil war and that no foreign state had the right to interfere and support one or the other party in a civil war since such interference was a kind of aggression[1]. The same argument has been used in the case of Formosa Taiwan. In both cases this argument contradicts political reality, supports communist cause and disagrees with the policy of the United Nations Organization. There was and there is still no Korean Republic as a single state, and Formosa was not officially recognized as a part of the territory of Red China.

The vital interest of Soviet diplomacy in the definition of aggression may be explained first of all by the possibility of exploiting the Soviet proposed draft for the purpose of propaganda. A detailed Soviet definition may appear to be a rejection of any aggressive act which might cause a repetition of terrible wars. The Soviet draft might gain an especially favorable support on the part of Asiatic and African nations fighting for liberation and independence, as well as of the nations protecting their newly established revolutionary order.

The opposition which met the Soviet draft in the 'Special Committee of the United Nations on the Question of Defining Aggression' did not discourage the Soviet government. On August 18, 1953, in conformity with the new trends of the post-Stalin period the Soviet representatives proposed to the same committee a revised text of definition. The amendments included in the revised text seem to be a Soviet concession to the criticisms set forth in 1950 against the original text. First of all the section concerning armed bands invading a foreign country, whose exclusion from the Litvinov draft in 1950 was emphasized by the critics of the Soviet draft, was restored. Thus the Soviets returned in 1953 to what they proposed in 1930 and what they excluded in 1950. They included, besides, new sections 2, 3, 4 and 5, providing a possibility of international reaction against indirect aggression and economic and ideological forms of aggression not mentioned in the earlier draft.

The new sections are:

> 2. 'That state shall be declared to have committed an act of indirect aggression which: (a) Encourages subversive activ-

[1] Articles in *Izvestia*, August, 9, 11, 13 and 15, 1950, on the 'Question of the definition of aggression.'

ity against another state (acts of terrorism, diversion, etc.); (b) Promotes the outbreak of civil war within another state; (c) Promotes an internal upheaval in another state or a reversal of policy in favor of the aggressor.

3. That state shall be declared to have committed an act of economic aggression which first commits one of the following acts: (a) Takes against another state measures of economic pressure violating its sovereignty and economic independence and threatening the bases of its economic life; (b) Takes against another state measures preventing it from exploiting or nationalizing its own natural riches; (c) Subjects another state to an economic blockade.

4. The state shall be declared to have committed an act of ideological aggression which: (a) Encourages war propaganda; (b) Encourages propaganda in favor of using atomic, bacterial, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction; (c) Promotes the propaganda of fascist-nazi views, of racial and national exclusiveness, and hatred and contempt for other people.

5. An act other than those listed in the preceding paragraphs may when committed by a state be deemed to constitute agggression if declared by resolution of the Security Council in a particular case to be an attack or an act of economic, ideological or indirect aggression.'

(Quoted from the documents of the Special Committee, September 14, 1953. A/Ac. 66/L 2 Rev. 1[1]).

Reading the above quoted amendments, one may infer that the Soviet government is wholly absorbed in domestic affairs and rejects its former communist aggression. In fact, it is the Soviet government which until now has been undertaking acts of terrorism on the territory of other nations, such as, for example, abductions of its political enemies; it is the Soviet government which has provoked upheavals in other states; has submitted east-European nations to economic pressure and has promoted propaganda of hatred and contempt for the capitalist world, especially for the United States. It seems very probable that the Soviet Union expects that the Western nations will use its political troubles and economic complications for developing economic pressure and ideological war or even for supporting the inimical activity of refugees from the U.S.S.R. and the satellites, or invasions of the 'armed bands' from South Korea and Taiwan. If so, then the revised draft of the definition of aggression may be considered as designed to prevent in future such undesirable

complications for the communist government, for the sake of security and guaranteed peace. No doubt the Soviet Union, China and the communist governments of the East-European satellites are interested in discontinuing anti-communist propaganda from abroad. The communist governments would certainly like to stop broadcasts from the special radio-stations as well as dispersion of anti-communist leaflets within the boundaries of the satellites, the Soviet Union and China, an act performed at present by means of balloons dispatched from the territory of Western Europe and Taiwan.

However, as an interpretation of the Soviet amendments to the draft of a definition of aggression as a simple concession or retreat would be too optimistic neither would it be correct to consider the proposed amendments as purely self-protecting. The Soviets have an essential advantage with regard to propaganda and subversive activity in foreign countries as compared with the democratic countries. They can develop their propaganda against the existing governments of other nations and support subversive activity against them on the territory of the latter by means which their political adversaries do not use. They may organize the so-called fifth columns and underground forces in the democratic countries and disseminate revolutionary literature with the aid of communists. In the meantime such activity on the territory of the communist states is almost entirely excluded because of the difference of legal order and regime. While the democratic nations have guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, of political parties and assemblies, in the countries under communist rule every social and political activity is under strict control and all freedoms are abolished.

The adoption of the Soviet draft would serve first and foremost the interests of the communist camp. The communist government could thereby gain an opportunity of challenging their adversaries as aggressors. On the basis of the proposed Soviet definition revolutionary propaganda organized abroad by the political refugees, especially if materially supported or simply encouraged by the public institutions of certain states, would become a pretext for various international complications. And certainly applying economic pressure or initiating and supporting a civil war or antigovernment movement within one or another

nation of the pro-communist camp would then justify the application of some acts of force on the part of the communist countries, as self-defense measures against the aggressive acts of their adversaries. On the other hand, it is not an accidental omission that the dissemination of communist ideas of class hatred and the slanderous misinformation against capitalist countries and their policy and governments are not mentioned in section 4 of the Soviet draft. The arbitrary imprisonment and maltreatement of citizens of the democratic nations are also omitted, evidently as the acts of sovereign nations not subject to cognizance by an international agency.

It is true that the Soviet draft of a definition of aggression provides in its last wording (section 5) an apparent possibility to expand that definition through extensive interpretation if this is deemed necessary on the basis of future experience. Such a possibility is, however, very doubtful inasmuch as it presupposes the approval of the Security Council of the United Nations, where the Soviet Union has the right of veto.

The whole document is, thus, neither a concession nor a retreat, but a simple bluff. No wonder that diplomats remained sceptical and did not support the Soviet draft in the Committee even after the cited amendments. That scepticism had to be overcome in Geneva by the 'new spirit' of mutual confidence and friendliness.

Chapter 17

INNER CONFLICTS

There are not a few writers who believe that communism is in harmony with the Russian national spirit and therefore that the Russian people, although disappointed in certain political trends and economic measures of the Soviet regime, yet are not opposed to communism in essence. Russian religious philosophers such as Berdyaeff and Karsavin have discussed communism in its Russian interpretation as an expression of the Russian propensity for absolute, universal happiness and radical change for the better and explained communism's success as a result of its affinity with the Russian mind. Others, non-Russians especially, with certain

prejudiced ideas about Russia's past and the notorious Russian imperialism, are predisposed to interpret the Soviet regime and its policy as a continuation in changed form of traditional Russian tyranny and expansion.

The majority of writers and politicians understand, however, that communism is supported by violence and by an economic system in which all people are dependent on the government, that it deprives people of freedom and of the possibility to organize any resistance, compels them to commit immoral acts, misinforms and deceives and is an international evil, the same evil in all nations and in both hemispheres. Not all, however, are able to understand how people can submit themselves to such a system of government which is contradictory to human nature, and why they do not overthrow it.

It is hardly necessary to argue with those who characterize communism as a phenomenon of Russian culture and product of Russian history, since communist ideology now dominates in so many non-Russian countries in Europe and Asia. Based on Marxist doctrine and originated in Western Europe, as a product of a critical appraisal of capitalism, it has developed into an ultra radical revolutionary movement for various reasons in various countries but not without similarity to such revolutionary doctrines of modern times, as, for example, Sorel's syndicalism in France. It would not be difficult, on the other hand, to prove that the Russian population has not reconciled itself to the Soviet regime but is forced to suffer it. After such brilliant works as those of Eugene Lyons [1] and Hugh Seton Watson [2] it is superfluous to refer to the durable struggle between the Russian people and the Soviet government, the struggle for freedom and self-determination and the unfavorable circumstances which have doomed the people to a new kind of serfdom. A great deal of factual data, characterizing the dissatisfaction of various groups of population with the existing regime and, at the same time, the obstacles hampering the process of liberation, has already been given in preceding chapters.

The inner struggle is still not over. The Soviet government is

[1] Eugene Lyons, *Our Secret Allies: the Peoples of Russia.* Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1954.

[2] Hugh Seton Watson, *From Lenin to Malenkov.* The History of World Communism Fr. Praeger. 1954.

continuing its war on peasants and its attempt to suppress spiritual freedom. New moods were awakened after Stalin's death, and an obvious unsteadiness of Soviet inner policy leads one to believe that some further development in social and political events can be expected.

The new moods cannot but disquiet the Soviet leaders. These trends do not correspond to the revolutionary ideology of communism in which the present leaders have been bred. Nationalism contradicts international ideals; recognition of the achievements of the Western culture contradicts the doctrine of decaying capitalism and the advantages of socialism as a foundation of new spiritual values; and, finally, impressions of the well being of the western world cause further disillusionment in the attainments of socialism and weaken the willingness to sacrifice.

1. Economic antagonism

Thirty years ago a certain communist, devoted to the idea of the industrialization of the country and convinced that his party would significantly raise the level of the wealth of workers and peasants, told the present writer: 'We Communists understand very well that we are forcing people to undergo various privations and sufferings, but this is only a transitional period, inevitable if we want to secure happiness for future generations.'

This was a very typical judgment. The present is sacrificed for the benefit of the unknown future; the needs of living people, for the success of a huge plant or another kind of technical project; the wealth of the nation, for the ideal of world revolution. A small group of communist leaders take it for granted that they know better than the nation itself what it needs and for that reason they deprive people of their natural right to freely choose a way of life.

The events of the post-Stalin period lead us believe that even among the communists of highest rank there is discord as regards the value of their former policy. Khrushchev represents a conservative wing which resorts to the former methods of realizing large scale projects by the means of orders, high pressure and compulsory sacrifices for the benefit of the future; Malenkov, on the other hand, represents a group of business-like communists

with a predilection for a more careful policy and some concessions to the needs of living people. We have seen reflections of such divergences in the literature of the period of relative let-up of the regime. Divergences are not a new phenomenon in the history of the Russian Communist party, but never before did they coincide with such an economic and political depression as can be observed at present in the Soviet Union.

The agricultural crisis and the anti-government moods of the peasantry are the most significant inner complications of the Soviet regime. Since the very beginning of the socialist revolution, the Soviet government has been in conflict with the peasantry. From time to time this conflict took on the form of a real war. From the early twenties up to the middle thirties, there was open and incessant struggle between peasants and the government. Detachments of the Red Army during the first years of the Revolution requisitioned grain stocks in villages and suppressed peasants' uprisings or rebellions by force of arms. Then, after the beginning of collectivization, the Communist government ruthlessly suppressed opposition. After the accomplishment of collectivization, the situation seemed to be stabilized. Several millions of wealthy peasants were banished, the opposition overcome. Yet the conflicts between the communist government and the peasantry were not eliminated; they became a chronic disease of national life and took on the character of a cold war inside the country.

Peasants cannot reconcile themselves with the obligation to deliver to the state a certain percentage not of their actual crop, but of the theoretical harvest which they should have received from their sown area. The deliveries to the state, fixed in a definite quantity, remained unchanged no matter how small the harvest and in case of drought or some other economic or climatic complication collective farms peasants were doomed to starvation. The situation became still more unfavorable for the peasantry when in the spring of 1940, the collective farms were required to contribute a certain percentage of the theoretical harvest not from land they had actually planted, but from all the arable land at their disposal. This measure was undertaken in order to force peasants to increase the land under cultivation. Similar regulations were established as regards deliveries of meats, dairy

products, hemp, flax, wool, fruits and vegetables. No doubt it was in the interests of both farmers and the country to exploit all the arable land, but it was not the peasants'fault if sometimes they could not fulfill the program. Kolkhoz economy depends as we have seen (See Ch. VI) not only on the industry of its members and climatic conditions but also on whether manpower is sufficient, agricultural machines are in good order, directives from various controlling organs are reasonable, and the administration of the kolkhoz is proper. No wonder that some kolkhozes succeed in their tasks while the others suffer from poor harvests. Hence, passive resistance, sabotage of the collective farm economy and the special attention which peasants pay to the small scale but more independent economy of the individual land plots assigned, according to the Charter of Collective Farms, to every household and known as house and garden plots.

In the meantime the members of the communist government continued to believe that it was possible to reeducate the peasants and to eradicate their individualist disposition, which they considered just a survival of the past. They invented various measures to force farmers to work more actively for the kolkhozes than on their house-and-garden plots and established various obligatory deliveries which involved even the household economy. This strategy proved unsuccessful, and the Soviet government undertook the so-called 'consolidation' of collective farms. Stalin, Khrushchev, and their aides have adopted as a truth the disputable idea that a large scale economy always has the advantage over a comparably small one. On the basis of that premise, 250,000 kolkhozes were consolidated into approximately 90.000. The government did not publish its instructions concerning the initiative and conditions of consolidation, although references to Party instructions sometimes appeared in the Soviet press, and — preferred to describe consolidation as a voluntary movement.

Originally there was a project to displace all farmers from their household and to settle them in 'agrogorods,' small country towns, supplied with all the cultural institutions and utilities usual in any civilized center. This project if it had been realized might have radically changed the conditions of life of farmers and transformed them into workers of the grain-factories. However, the project proved to be fantastic. Its realization would have re-

quired a long period of time and large appropriations of money, materials and technical means, and it was postponed. Consolidation was accomplished in the form of the establishment of a common administration for several kolkhozes. The economic results of the new reform did not justify the hastiness with which it had been performed. Agricultural production has not increased; on the contrary the shortages of grain, vegetables and meats became, as we have seen, so pressing that the government began to have recourse to some urgent measures.

The new agricultural project orginated in 1954 by Khrushchev, who was equally responsible for the acceleration of consolidation, consists in enlarging the area under cultivation by upturning virgin land. This new project had to be carried out in the same prompt manner as was the earlier consolidation of kolkhozes. People resettled in the areas predestined for cultivation are not supplied with dwellings, provisions, fuel and other vital necessities; there are no storage facilities for machines, nor sufficient means of transportation. Everything has to be organized simultaneously with the process of colonization and, probably, at the expense of the existing kolkhozes in the European part of the country, which will be deprived of some technical assistance and, possibly, manpower.

The history of collectivization, consolidation and, at present, the colonization of virgin land, is characteristic of the system of realizing by force various measures which completely reorganize the living conditions of many millions of people. Without asking the opinion or consent of the people directly interested, the government prescribes, demands obedience, insists, applies force, prosecutes for any resistance, ignores the sacrifices and sufferings of individuals. It meets, however, with passive resistance, apathy, inertia, and this is the cause of the agricultural crisis. Antagonism against hare-brained projects provokes a cold war between the Soviet government and the peasantry.

Between the government and the industrial workers there are not such sharp conflicts. Neither their way of life nor their psychology have been subjected to radical changes in the process of industrialization. The modern technique of well equipped plants requires more skill, but this is quite a normal and progressive phenomenon.

However, even workers, the real proletarians, who are supposed to be masters of the socialist state, have many reasons for being dissatisfied with the existing regime. The method of industrialization and especially the development of heavy industry and munition factories, at the expense of light industry, demands sacrifices on the part of the whole population, and workers suffer no less than the other groups of the population, except for some privileged social groups. Wages are low, standard output high, and factory regulations even after the recent amendments[1], too strict. Some violations of labor regulations involve financial liability which ruin the conditions of life not only of the guilty worker but also of his family. Soviet workers, as has been explained above, are deprived of the elementary protection of their interests, since trade-unions are rather government agencies than professional organizations. Such of their interests as housing quarters, food and fuel supply and factory sanitation are always in the background. Naturally, the great majority of workers cannot be satisfied with the existing system and their dissatisfaction finds expression from time to time in the form of conflicts with the administration or Partymen.

The feature most hated by the workers is, however, the so-called stakhanovite movement. It was invented and supported by the economic administration. Managers of industrial enterprizes are always interested in overfulfilling plans of production and decreasing expenses. For that purpose it is necessary to raise the standard output, and they organize specially favorable conditions for a certain worker or a group of workers and help him or them exceed the record to get an award. Later, standard output is revised with reference to the new record and thus an average worker must make every effort to maintain his wage lest it be subject to a cut. Stakhanov was the first worker whose name became known to the country in connection with his record in mine-work. Workers understand, certainly, that the system described is disguised exploitation. The unfriendly attitude of the workers towards stakhanovites is, probably, the reason why that name is rarely used at present and is replaced by 'worker-innovators.'

[1] Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 25, 1956, "On Abolition of legal liability of Workers and Office Employees for leaving Employ of Enterprises and Institutions without permission and for Absence from Work without Valid Reasons".

If the conditions of peasants in the Soviet Union be compared with the conditions of the population of an occupied country heavily taxed for the benefit of the occupier, workers are, in turn, subject to direct exploitation under the vigilant eye and well organized supervision of the conqueror. The occupier is the Communist party which has to be eulogized for its 'wise leadership' and 'beneficial role.' No wonder that after the extermination of the upper classes and the 'kulaks' of prerevolutionary time there are still so many inhabitants of concentration or correctional camps from among the peasants and workers.

However, some workers and peasants are promoted to the ranks of those granted higher wages and various privileges. That privileged minority helps the upper groups of the privileged communist party to support the regime. While an average citizen is deprived of many necessities and leads a miserable life, members of that group are better supplied and enjoy more comfort.

Economic differences exist in every country, but they are more striking in the Soviet Union not only because it is a 'socialist' state but also because the contrasts between the most prosperous minority and the needy people are no less tremendous than they are in the economically and socially backward countries. The Soviet government tries, therefore, to deceive the population by describing the conditions of life in the democratic countries, in particular in the United States, in the most wretched terms and does not allow Soviet citizens to have contact with foreign countries.

2. Social conflicts

Significant economic differences usually engender social conflicts between the economically better and economically worse social groups. There are, however, insufficient data to assert that such an antagonism between the rank-and-file people and the upper social groups exists in the Soviet Union.

There is, inversely, something which may unite numbers of people belonging to various groups, both those living in miserable conditions and those enjoying privileges or having certain power at their disposal. This uniting force is the antagonism between the freedom-loving man and the compulsory regime of the Soviet

state. Every freedom-loving citizen, whoever he is, a worker, peasant, or an intellectual, a rank-and-file man or a party member cannot reconcile himself with the regime which deprives him of independence, controls his mind, puts pressure on his conscience and transforms him into an instrument of Party policy dictated by a small group of leaders. Is a Party member safe from being purged, a chairman of a kolkhoz from being fired, a distinguished writer from being cast into oblivion? The fate of a Soviet citizen depends on a variable 'general line' of Party policy or is committed to the charge of the secret police. Who can accept with resignation a life under the sway of an unlimited power which establishes duties rather than rights, transforms elections into demonstration of loyalty to the government, arbitrarily recalls the elected, compels the population to welcome any drastic measure, any limitation of freedom, any change in the government or in its policy? This is what stimulates cold war between the communist government and the social forces inside the country. To prevent manifestations of anti-government feelings and to eradicate opposition, the Soviet government controls all social organizations and transforms them into its own agencies. [1]

Another kind of movement inside the Soviet Union which disturbs the government is so-called 'local nationalism.' In its national policy the Soviet trend is in harmony with the final goal of uniting and merging the uniformly organized nations 'into the potentially largest single state.' [2]

There are and will be national movements among minority groups, especially among the Moslem and Ukrainian peoples. The extermination of the Kalmucks, Ingushes, and Tatars in the Crimea after World War II gives a clear indication of the dissatisfaction and opposition among some of the national tribes. Soviet policy has created a number of potential enemies among the Poles, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and other nations dominated by the Soviets since the War.

Representatives of all the peoples under the Soviet heel gathered together abroad and created the 'Antibolshevist Block of Nations' to struggle against Soviet dictatorship. The motto of this move-

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[1] G. Guins, *Soviet Law*, Ch. XXI, pp. 270–286.

[2] A. Alymov i S. Studenkin, 'Sovetskii federalism i demokraticheskii tsentralism', *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo*, 1933, No. 1–2, p. 13.

ment, 'Liberty for the nationalities, freedom for the people,' best characterizes the new moods and wins the sympathy of the politically conscious Soviet citizens.

It is not surprising then, that even in 1944, when the 'Great War for the Fatherland' was still in progress, a struggle had already begun against nationalist feelings among various nationalities of the Soviet Union, especially among some of Moslem peoples.

The periodical *Bolshevik* (*Kommunist*, since 1953) published the following editorial:

> „The party organization must bring to light each and every manifestation of opinion of a nationalist character in the realm of history, literature and art." (No. 17–18, September, 1944).

At the same time the Tatar Regional Committee (*Oblastkom*) of the Communist party was reprimanded for the activities of the Tatar Institute of Languages, Literature, and Art, which had permitted the introduction of too much *Tatar nationalism* in plays and operas dealing with contemporary subjects, to the detriment of the 'great ideals of the Leninist-Stalinist brotherhood of nations of the U.S.S.R.'

Local nationalism is opposed to Soviet nationalism. The latter, according to an article by S. Kovalev entitled 'The National Pride of the Soviets' (*Izvestia*, August 13–14, 1947), is based on the consciousness of the great achievements of Soviet socialism, of the advantages of the Soviet system over the systems of the bourgeois world, and of the Soviet Union's great international mission. To strengthen Soviet nationalism the West and its 'rotten' culture are discredited, especially the culture and economics of the United States, the Soviets' chief competitor in international influence and prestige.

The Soviet attitude towards the problem of a state may be compared with its philosophy of large enterprize. Communists want to merge the whole world 'into the potentially largest single state' as they try to consolidate collective farms or amalgamate factories. They believe that 'the advantages of large states from the point of view of both economic progress and the interests of the masses, are beyond doubt.' [1]

Such a general trend is least favorable for supporting the auto-

[1] Lenin, *Collected Works*, Internat. Publishers. Vol. XIX, p. 50.

nomy of national minorities. The principle of federalism was declared at the beginning of the Revolution for tactical reasons only. Independence and national self-determination promised at that time to the national minorities were later explained as a temporary retreat from the principle of centralism and an unavoidable concession to national movements. [1] 'Uniformity' as a principle of unification means not only the sovietization, i.e. organization of all national republics in conformity with the standard of the R.S.F.S.R., as well as centralization of economic institutions and regulation of economic life in conformity with a single state plan, but also subordination of cultural life to directives and trends from Moscow.

Local nationalism is characterized as 'bourgeois' nationalism inimical to 'Soviet nationalism,' in other words, the only nationalism recognized as having the right of existence, moulded in Moscow and prophesizing the greatness of Russian culture and its leading role. Any deviations from the standards approved in Moscow, as the most suitable from the point of view of the final goals and the current trends, must be eliminated.

Conflicts between Soviet patriotism and local nationalisms found their most obvious manifestation in the periodical attacks of *Bolshevik* (*Kommunist*) against Ukrainian nationalism and various literary and historical works and cinema productions of the national minorities belonging to the Moslem world. [2]

3. Ideological and political differences

Subjugation of cultural activity to the control and regulations of the Communist party is the hardest of all the privations to which intelligent people are doomed in the Soviet Union. A literary work, unless it is in conformity with Marxism-Leninism in its official interpretation, cannot be published, and not seldom novels and plays already published are later prohibited. The existing party censorship not only prevents the publication of undesirable books but even prescribes what has to be written. Writers who are subject to such a mental tyranny can hardly be

[1] G. Guins, op. cit. pp. 217–220.

[2] Several illustrations are given by Dr. W. W. Kulski in his *The Soviet Regime*, pp. 102–112.

sincere partisans of the regime which orginates it. Interference in scientific activity and prescription of certain theoretical doctrines, such as took place in genetics, linguistics, history of literature, and jurisprudence, humiliates scholars and revolts their feelings of dignity as men of culture and their respect for conscientious research and free thought. No other reaction could be expected from composers, film producers, and artists against prohibition of the so-called 'formalism'.

After Stalin's death, in 1953 and part of 1954, writers, composers and scholars succeed in expressing their real feelings. The period of relative freedom of thought did not last, however. The communist state cannot recognize freedom, it will constantly fight against it. At the beginning of 1955 the Minister of Culture was replaced, the regime of the governmental wardship reestablished.

Religion is another enemy of communists. Antireligious activity is another kind of cold war inside the Soviet Union and its satellites. But, in that war the nation rather than the government proved to be victorious. Since the official recognition of the Church organization in 1943, and the restoration of the Patriarchate in 1945, the development of religious life has become more and more significant in the U.S.S.R.

The Church is subject to various limitations. According to the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church Administration, the Moscow Patriarch is only the highest hierarch. The government has established a special institution, The Council for the Affairs of the Greek-Orthodox Church, which exercises an effective control over the activities of the Patriarchate. The patriarch does not have any real administrative power as regards the lower hierarchs; he makes suggestions to the bishops in charge of dioceses rather than instructs them. That means that they depend more on the local representatives of the Council than on the central Church institution. Conferences of Bishops can be organized only with the permission of the government. The organization of the Church is thus not firm enough.

Neither is the organization of parishes firm. Church buildings, sacred vessels and other church implements belong to the state and are given to the parish for use. For the organization of a new parish, twenty persons have to get permission, and to register it. Evidently, registration will not be permitted unless all twenty

initiators are known as completely loyal. It is not improbable that some of the twenty are agents of the Soviets who inform the local authorities about church activities. If registration is permitted the twenty persons who applied for registration elect from among them three persons as an executive organ. The other parishioners may elect an auditors' committee consisting of three persons only. There are no other meetings or functions of the parishioners. Thus organizational connections between the parishioners do not exist in fact. The functions of the Church are limited to ceremonies and offices (see Ch. XV). Churches cannot organize the religious education of young parishioners before they reach the age of eighteen.

Similar limitations exist also as regards the other religions, for which a special Council has been established.

However, in spite of all limitations and the unfavorable attitude of the Party towards the religious movement, it is growing. Theoretically, the Soviet government can resume persecutions against clergymen and close the churches at any time, as they belong to the state. But it is improbable that the government will do so after it has recognized the Church and used its authority inside the country and abroad. A new attack against religion is possible only if communism succeeds in its ardent task to realize world revolution. As regards the present situation, communism has been defeated as a substitute for religion. The Church is dependent and weak as an organization, but religion is independent of the communist ideology. It gives people what they need and do not find in the poor spiritual culture of the communist state.

Since the first days following the end of the War, the Communist party has again been demanding the most careful attention to the education of the populace in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and has even insisted that purely technical workers, such as stagehands, be indoctrinated. Even ballet and musical productions must reflect the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.

However, interest in purely Marxist literature is obviously decreasing. At the conference of the representatives of the komsomol organizations in 1954 it was stated that the members of these organizations are indifferent to Marxist literature. The best representatives of the young generation want freedom of thought

and are looking for spiritual values. The rank-and-file want individual happiness. The literature of the last years reflects these new moods.

Judging by the tone of the Soviet domestic policy aimed at the eradication of 'harmful' thoughts and moods contrary to Soviet ideology, it is evident that these new thoughts and moods are very deep-rooted and hard to eradicate.

The foregoing mostly concerns the intelligentsia. As regards the working masses in general, they expect first and foremost an essential betterment of their conditions of life. According to their belief, that is the only just reward and compensation for all their losses and sacrifices. Otherwise the question, 'What did we pour our blood and sweat for?' is raised.

Chapter 18

THE AMAZING CHANGES

The Soviet Union, continuing to play the dangerous game of communist aggression while the security of its own home ground is still certain, could easily find itself at war on two fronts. The constant build-up of armaments at the cost of improvement in the living standard of people has become a matter of peril in view of the improvement in the economic situation of Western Europe, the decline in influence of the communist parties [1] and the greater cooperation and solidarity of the enemies of communism. The situation has compelled the Soviet government to exercise caution inside the country and to disguise its subversive activity abroad.

1. The pressing needs

The first two years of the post-Stalin period could be characterized by the expression 'putting on the brakes'. Malenkov attempted to soften the previous policy. He reduced the Stalin cult and brought forward the question of improvement in living

[1] See Simon Wolin, *Communism's Postwar Decade* (The Gains and Losses in the Communist World Since 1945), The Taminent Institute, 1955.

conditions for prime consideration. As a means of boosting the economy and of increasing productivity, he appealed to the self-interest of workers, increasing their share in the national income and lightening the tax burdens for kolkhozes. Such a policy, however, was unable to afford noticeable improvements within a short period of time. The demands of the population were on the up-swing while supply remained meager as before. Mikoyan, who held the post of Minister of Trade, was generous with his promises and predicted that the supply of goods of prime importance would soon be improved. But it was impossible to fulfill such promises. Industry had to be reorganized, production of raw materials essential for the manufacture of consumer goods increased, and the war industry considerably curtailed. In the meantime, with the curtailment of heavy industry in the interest of light industry and a corresponding curtailment in armaments, the balance of military power might have become detrimental to the international prestige of the Soviet Union as the leader of the communist movement throughout the world. The situation was complicated by the government's admission of economic adversity and the spectacle of Stalin cast down from his pedestal was undermining the prestige of the Party and of communism at home. Sensing that the reins were slackening in the hands of the government, writers, as we have seen, rather boldly began to demand freedom of creative expression and openly to make known their disillusion with Soviet reality.

Understanding that, with conditions as they were, any display of weakness was dangerous, the Party decided upon a change of policy. The leading role fell to Khrushchev, who set a course in line with orthodox communist policy with respect to the national economy. Heavy industry was again moved to the foreground as a basis for further strengthening the military power of the USSR. The planning system received a new official confirmation: Soviet newspapers placed emphasis on the fact that 'the plan is a law' for all the branches of the economy. The agricultural labor force was placed under stringent control and lost even the semblance of kolkhoz independence. [1] Open appointment and dismissal of kolkhoz directors falls to the responsibility of the Machine Tractor Stations, according to the Resolution of the CC of the

[1] Cf. *Voprosy ekonomiki*, June, 1955, pp. 58–67.

CPSU adopted on September 13, 1953. Appointments are often unsuccessful. Some of the appointed chairmen are not even familiar with the conditions of agricultural economy. Others are pure bureaucrats, and still others consider their new position as a source of personal profit. [1]

A firm conviction of the advantages of large-scale farming under the control of trained agronomists and of utilizing the most advanced technology is the moving spirit of Khrushchev's' agricultural policy. The inspirer of the consolidation of kolkhozes and the substitution of 'agrotowns' for farm villages, Khrushchev has continued to follow these ruling propositions. His program for the utilization of virgin lands is designed to create vast new government estates, sovkhozes, and kolkhozes no less vast. Management of agriculture is somewhat decentralized. It became possible to adapt the agricultural program to local conditions, [2] but kolkhozes are in fact subjugated to the supervision of the MTS, which depend in turn on other administrative agencies. Thus decentralization exists mostly on paper.

In 1954, grain production was too low in the Soviet Union and its increase, if any, in 1955 did not meet the expectations of the Soviet government, as was acknowledged at the XXth Party Congress. Extraordinary measures, such as turning up virgin and idle lands and increased corn sowing acreage, did not help sufficiently. The expediency of both these measures evidently evoked doubts, and Khrushchev had to defend his program at the Congress:

> 'Some comrades might ask: 'Are we right to plant virgin land in drought areas? A study of available data shows that even with periodic droughts the introduction of grain farming in Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Urals is profitable and economically justified. If out of five years we have two good harvest years, one average and two poor ones, it is still possible to farm to considerable advantage and produce grain at low cost, in view of the relatively small outlay required for grain growing in these conditions'.

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[1] Submission of kolkhozes to administrative control and appointed chairmen is eloquently described by Ovechkin in his last essay, "Trudnaia vesna" ("The Hard Spring"), *Novyi mir*, No. 3, 5, 1956.

[2] Resolution of the CC of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR (see next page).

Khrushchev's calculation:—two good, one average and two poor harvest years— is undoubtedly quite arbitrary, and some agronomists believe that poor harvest years in the drought areas will prevail. The real cost of Khrushchev's experiment is not known, particularly in regard to the health and even life of those people who were sacrificed by the government for that experiment.

The program was, perhaps, less detrimental in regard to the second measure, corn sowing.

'Did the Party C.C. make a mistake in recommending this crop?' said Khrushchev.

> 'No, comrades, it was not a mistake .... in places where corn growing was left carelessly to drift, the collective and state farms had poor crops .... In every province there are collective farms which obtained a high corn yield'.

In general, however, agricultural conditions continued to be unfavorable. Years of experience have shown that the negative features described in the first two parts of this work, which plagued the Soviet agricultural economy for two decades, are repeated as before with implacable regularity. However, neither Khrushchev nor the other members of the Soviet government agree with such a conclusion. They continue to believe that the main cause of low agricultural production is the peasants' indifference and indisposition toward collective farming and they intend to deprive farmers of any economic independence.

The Resolution of the CC of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, published in Soviet papers on March 10, 1956, recommends decreasing individual farmers' plots. The Resolution lays stress on the advantages of exploitation of land by the means of abundant M.T.S.s and a high level of mechanization. If farmers will agree to diminish their house-and-garden plots, the area of collective economy will increase and the kolkhoz will exploit it better than individual farmers can on their allotments. Consequently profits of individual farmers will increase in the form of their share in the kolkhoz's returns. The Resolution is formulated as a recommendation, and it emphasizes the farmers right to dispose of their land according to their own judgment. [1]

[1] Resolution of the CC of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, "On the Charter of the Agricultural Artel and the further development of initiative of collective farmers in the organization of collective farms." (*Pravda* and *Izvestia*, March 10, 1956).

However, kolkhozes are at present controlled by the M.T.S.s, whose directors are government employees, usually members of the Party. For them the Resolution of March 10, 1956 is an instruction and they will certainly strive to accomplish the government's directives.

Agriculture continues to be the most complicated problem of the Soviet economy. The level of agricultural production depends not only on the industry of farmers but also on the adequate organization, efficient service of the M.T.S.s and transportation, and similar factors. The Soviet government proved to be unable to set all these cogwheels operating adequately. It was even unsuccessful in preparing reliable cadres of agronomists capable of fulfilling the duties of directors of collective farms.

But there are complications and difficulties also in the field of industry, especially in light industry. The conference of technological personnel of Soviet industry held in May 1955 brought to light Soviet backwardness: obsolete equipment, inefficient organization of labor, and low productivity as a result of all these defects.

The Soviet experience shows that a centralized planning system may be successfully applied in some branches of heavy industry. Heavy industry is practically centralized in capitalist countries as well, with the difference that the great capitalist concerns are managed by hired rather than appointed personnel. Similarly, they are not controlled by bureaucratic organizations but belong to corporations interested in profits and therefore in the lowest expenditure a high quality product will allow. Competition between state and private concerns in heavy industry does not necessarily predetermine the superiority of the products of private concerns, but this is not the case in light industry.

The development of light industry in the Soviet Union is unsatisfactory. Complaints concerning the lack of various necessities and the low quality of products continue to appear in the Soviet papers. Observers report that many products which appear on the market are merely copies of Western products. It is probable that some improvement may be achieved if the government appropriates more credits for the development of light industry. But it is very doubtful that the centralized planning system is able to secure the production and satisfactory distribution of the

numerous items of every-day consumption as well as a private economy can. Neither can a bureaucratic apparatus organize production of consumer goods for the needs and tastes of customers as well as private entrepreneurs and tradesmen can. It is hardly an accident that in the Soviet Union there is a relatively greater increase in production of various luxury objects such as television sets, washing machines, refrigerators, automobiles, than of everyday necessities.

The members of the Bulganin–Khrushchev government are supposed to believe that communism will secure prosperity for the people. But there are among the members of the government many specialists with a good economic and technical education. They must understand that it is impossible to improve agricultural conditions and to reorganize industry and at the same time to accomplish a large program of armaments. A breathing spell is necessary and for that purpose a durable period of truce must be secured.

In the meantime the government cannot ignore the increasing desires of the population. The population cannot forget the promise given after Stalin's death that living conditions would be improved. Members of collective farms expect increasing profits from the kolkhoz economy; workers expect increased wages and shorter working days, invalids expect larger pensions. It is necessary to extend housing, to provide the population with fuel, and to increase production of commodities.

The government thus faces a very dangerous and delicate situation. It wants to impress the world with its military power, but it cannot simultaneously fulfill all its obligations to the population. To *'faire bonne mine à mauvais jeu'* it tries to appease the population with various inconsequential reforms and promises of a political character, such as the safeguarding of socialist legality. While the domestic policy seeks to appease the Soviet people, foreign policy is calculated at once to destroy the unity of the capitalist world and to secure a durable truce without decreasing Soviet influence in world affairs.

2. Peaceful co-existence

Destalinization pursues two objects. It is designed to inspire the Soviet people with some hope that the arbitrariness of the secret police will be abolished, constitutional rights protected, and living conditions improved. Destalinization may be appraised also as a measure to convince the outside world that the Soviet order will be reorganized in conformity with the democratic pattern, and that the further development of the Soviet Union will bring it closer to the western world. However, the post-Stalin regime continues as a dictatorship based on the domination of a small group of communist leaders who are at the same time policy-makers, law-makers and founders of the new morals. Such a regime is incompatible with the 'rule of law' and destalinization has not appealed very much to the western world. It was necessary to impress the world with some striking changes in foreign policy.

With enviable resoluteness the Soviets began to retreat from some of their former positions. For years the western powers had insisted that the occupation of Austria was unjustified. For years they tried in vain to persuade the Soviet Union to evacuate troops from Austria and restore its independence. The Soviets obstinately rejected all overtures for making peace with Austria. Thus it was a real surprise when Moscow invited the Austrian premier to negotiate a peace treaty. Soon afterwards Soviet troops were evacuated from Austria. After World War II, the Soviets forced Finland to cede them the port of Porkkala. This port is located close to the capital of Finland, Helsinki, and thus its occupation by the Soviets hardly appealed to Finnish national feeling. Displaying their friendly intentions, the Soviets restored Porkkala to the Finns. This was another sign of the new Soviet attitude toward democratic nations. That act was followed by the conclusion of peace with the German Federative Republic and negotiations with Japan.

The restoration of normal diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia must be mentioned separately. The Soviet attitude toward Tito and Titoism seemed to be irreconcilably inimical. But the Soviet Union effected a compromise with Tito in order to display its tolerance toward nationalistic trends, to dispel the doubts of

small nations and to attract new friends to itself, at the expense of the democratic camp. The restoration of normal relations with Belgrade stimulated nationalist movements in the Soviet satellites. Hence it became necessary to give more freedom to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Roumania, and the Soviet government did not hesitate at this risky new step.

These new directions in Soviet foreign policy could not be considered a sufficient manifestation of genuinely peaceful and friendly intentions. Rather, the Soviet Union appears determined to create a more favorable balance between the communist and democratic camps.

Reduction of armaments is the fervent dream of all nations who have suffered from war. It is not only the Soviet Union which suffers from a budget overweighted with appropriations for war industry and the maintenance of huge armed forces. All western powers have been making every effort to reduce military expenses. Germany, no matter how strong her desire to participate in defense alliances with the other western powers, cannot help but ponder the question whether it wouldn't be more advantageous to remain neutral, with that neutrality safeguarded by the forces of other nations. The dynamic and daring Bulganin-Khrushchev foreign policy, cannot fail to affect the mood of at least of a part of the anti-communist camp.

One cannot, however, regard the Soviet peace movement with complete confidence. Communism cannot reject aggression; it can only postpone the achievement of its final objectives. For the communist leaders rejection of plans for world revolution and unification of the whole world through eradication of private property and free enterprise and annihilation of the capitalist class is just as impossible as the rejection of communism itself. The policy of the Soviets is therefore deceptive.

The Soviet Union does not conceal the motives of its new struggle for peace. They are frankly expounded in a leading Soviet magazine:

> 'The idea of peaceable coexistence is supported by the U.S.S.R. because the Soviet state wants to secure peace to accomplish its communist construction on a stupendous scale.' [1]

[1] *Mezhdunarodnaia zhisn'* (International Life) No. 3, 1956. Editorial, "The XXth Party Congress Endowment to the Thesaurus of Marxism–Leninism," p. 8.

One may add that the Soviet Union can also reckon on the potential successes of Communist China which is now surviving a great economic crisis and vitally needs a breathing spell for strengthening its power. With the aid of strong militarized China the Soviet Union may submit all Asian nations to communist rule[1]. In order to support China and at the same time to secure its own power in Asia the Soviet Union intends to accomplish some grandiose projects in Siberia and Far-Eastern regions. About one million people are mobilized in connection with these projects, which are included in the sixth Five-Year plan. Since 1954, 350,000 people have been forced to migrate to virgin lands beyond the Urals. Among them 10,000 engineers, technicians, government employees and factory workers were transferred from cities and industrial centers to agricultural regions for reclamation purposes. In addition to these new resettlers, some 400,000 or even 500,000 young people are needed in connection with the above mentioned projects in Siberia and the Far Eastern regions. [2]

The present conditions in the Soviet Union make it difficult to secure manpower for the development of agricultural and fulfillment of new constructions. The next several years in the Soviet Union will be characterized by a drastic decrease of young people of the conscription age, as the result of the war which started in 1941. There is therefore a special reason why the Soviet Union is forced to reduce its armed forces and simultaneously to strive for the disarmament of its potential enemies. To succeed in that goal the Soviet Union pretends to be a leader of the struggle for peace and exploits any occasion for peaceful gestures and the practice of 'smiling diplomacy.'

On April 17, 1956, the text of the Cominform statement of dissolution was published in the Italian newspaper *L'Unita*. This communist organization was forced in 1947, as a substitute for the notorious Comintern which was dissolved during World War

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[1] "The mighty camp of Socialism, with its population of over 900,000,000, is growing on strength. Its huge internal forces, its decisive advantages over capitalism are being increasingly revealed from day to day." (From "Khrushchev's report to the XXth Congress", *Pravda*, February 15, 1956).

[2] On behalf of the C.P. Khrushchev exhorted the members of the All-Union Conference of young Builders in Moscow to fulfill their patriotic duty and go to Siberia voluntarily (*Pravda*, April 3, 1956, pp. 1–2).

II, in 1943. It is probable that the dissolution of the Cominform is a gesture of friendliness toward Tito, who was expelled from the Cominform in June 1948 for his 'hateful policy in relation to the Soviet Union.' After the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to Belgrade, the further existence of the Cominform proved to be impolitic. But there are some more significant reasons for its dissolution, and it is very probable that they were agreed upon during the visit with Tito, if not actually suggested by him. The statement concerning the dissolution explains these new reasons in the form of new conditions for the activity of the working class and communist parties:

> 'The formation of a vast "peace zone" that includes European and Asian states, socialist and non-socialist friends of peace'
> and 'The development and strengthening of many communist parties in the capitalist, dependent and colonial countries...'

This means that communism intends to enlarge rather than to limit its activities. The dissolved Cominform included neither China nor North Korea and North Vietnam. Except for the satellites, Italy and France, the communist parties of European countries were not represented in the Cominform. The dissolution of the Cominform provides Moscow with better opportunities not only to restore cooperation with Yugoslavia but also to strengthen the unity of communist parties of many other nations the world over, although recognizing to a great extent their independence in domestic affairs. This new form of co-operation of communist parties will undoubtedly be more convenient for the organization of popular fronts in the countries which are ruled by the non-communist governments. As a matter of fact, the dissolution of the Cominform will not prevent a certain communist center from transferring its directives through reliable agents. At the same time, there will be no formal reasons to reproach communists that they follow directives of a foreign country.

There is no essential change in the international situation. The world is still divided into two irreconcilable camps and the apparent Soviet concessions do not eliminate their mutual enmity. There remain two Germanies, two Chinas, two Koreas, two Indo-Chinas, and all the East-European satellites and dependent Asian

nations. The Soviets are striving for the establishment of a truce until such time as they are strong enough to launch a new offensive. Is there any guarantee that they will not take every advantage, as before, to inflame race and class conflicts, aggravate discords among European nations, or between European and non-European nations, and sharpen any international and domestic conflicts in order to involve one or the other Western nation in armed clashes or inner troubles?

Up to the present time Marxism-Leninism has taught that only war will bring communist countries the decisive victory over capitalism. But Khrushchev set forth at the XXth Party Congress a new, more optimistic philosophy. On the eve of World War II, he explained, the Soviet Union was the only country pursuing an active peace policy, while at present 'there is a world camp of socialism which has become a mighty force,' "there is besides a large group of other countries with a population amounting to many hundreds of millions supporting the movement of peace" and 'the workers' movement in the capitalist countries has become a tremendous force today'.

Khrushchev's report to the Congress never mentioned the United Nations as an active world organization for preventing wars. Neither did he pledge to eliminate the subversive activity of communist parties. He has ascribed peaceful intentions only to the communist world, and aggressiveness to the free world. Characterizing democratic nations as imperialistic and bellicose, he ignored the fact that it was the Soviet Union which has incorporated, by the means of military occupation and a series of treaties concluded under the pressure, the Baltic states, some parts of Finland and Eastern Germany, Carpathian Ruthenia and Bukovina in Europe and Tannu-Tuva and the Kurile Islands in Asia. Several East European nations are besides subjugated, though formally they remain independent. Khrushchev did not mention the conclusion of a friendly pact with Hitler and the division of Poland on the basis of that pact, or that it was the Soviet Union which incited the guerilla war in Greece and the Korean war in the Far East. Nor did he mention that it was the Soviet Union which continued to maintain the largest army after the end of World War II while all other great powers reduced their military forces.

While speaking of peace and disarmament the Soviet government utilizes any opportunity to show its continuously strengthened military force. Now it explodes atomic and hydrogen bombs, now it organizes a show of modern aviation, and always tries to impress the world with its invincible power, provoking other nations to increase in turn their armaments.

Contrary to the assertions of communists, it is from the com-, munist camp that war may proceed. The democratic regime submits governments to the will of the people, while communist governments consider their own will as the will of the people. The governments of democratic countries cannot ignore public opinion, the free Press and the opposition. Totalitarian governments, among which the communist government represents the most typical and all-embracing totalitarian regime, exclude all opposition, freedom of the press and the possibility of the organized expression of public opinion. The governments of the democratic countries are limited in disposing of the material resources of their countries by budgetary and other regulations. A communist government may dispose of all the resources of its country, concentrate all efforts on building up military forces, and conclude pacts of an aggressive character.

Communism strives to unite the whole world under the same totalitarian regime and spares no efforts for subversive activity in non-communist countries. This is so well known that Khrushchev could not pass it by in his report to the XXth Party Congress. Predicting the inevitable victory of communism in the whole world, he declared that if 'reactionary forces in some countries resist a peaceful transformation to communism they must be overthrown by an acute revolutionary struggle.'

The Soviet Union needs a breathing spell to fortify its economy, build up an invincible stronghold in Asia and amalgamate conspiratorial forces on a world-wide scale. In the meantime it will lull the vigilance of the democratic world, attract the sympathies of so-called neutralists and continue the 'communist offensive' by "peaceful" means. It is in this way that the "spirit of Geneva" may be exploited for the further advantage of communism.

At the inter-parliamentary conference held in Helsinki at the end of August 1955, the representative of the U.S.S.R. declared

(*Pravda*, August 26, p. 4) that "the Soviet Union is striving for broad international cooperation" and that the parliamentary group of the U.S.S.R. was ready to show every consideration to exchange visits of workers in the arts and sciences, international get-togethers, congresses, conferences, exhibits, exchanges of literature and information. The so-called "parliamentary" group of the members of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is composed of Soviet dignitaries, members of the Party, and its declarations bear, of course, an official stamp. The Soviet government is certain that Soviet scholars, writers, artists, and musicians, under the control of the Ministry of Culture, will be impervious to Western propaganda and Western cultural influences. Perhaps it expects Western individualists, arriving in the Soviet Union without the proper indoctrination and sound acquaintance with the Soviet system, to be susceptible to Soviet propaganda and to help communism by stimulating well-disposed attitudes towards it in the Western community of nations.

The West cannot reject a peace-seeking policy; that would accord neither with its interests nor with the feelings of its peoples. However, it must be armed not only in the military sense, so as not to become the victim of unexpected changes, but also in the sense of a thoroughgoing knowledge and understanding of the ultimate goals of communism as it actually is[1].

[1] The president's of the U.S. offer to establish an organized exchange of information and visitors *Pravda* (July, 12, 1956) rebuffed as an attempt to establish "nests of spies" in the U.S.S.R.

CONCLUSION

How may the present stage of communist development be characterized? Have we sufficient data to predict its further development in evolutionary process or its collapse? Is it possible that the troubled world will suddenly be shaken by the exciting news: "Revolution in Russia," "Moscow is in the hands of the resurgents?"

The Soviet Union is too complicated a phenomenon to be reduced to the terms of one simple problem with one unknown. But what we have the right to say, on the ground of the confessions of the Soviets themselves and factual data above cited and quoted, is that communism is approaching its 'final stage.'

The Soviet Union continues to be a great and mighty power in spite of all complications and troubles. It is an empire with exceedingly rich resources and an advanced technique. It commands a strong army and a great number of cultural workers of high qualifications. Many an expert in Soviet affairs believes that there is not sufficient reason to expect that the economic troubles in the Soviet Union will become insupportable and that the communist government will not survive them. The Soviet government may be compared to the heir of a multimillionaire: in spite of all its fantastic experiments and prodigality, it is secured from bankruptcy. Thanks to such circumstances, not only the "final stage" but even the death throes of communism may be very prolonged.

Communism, moreover, has at its disposal all the riches of the prerevolutionary culture, its literature, music, and art. It can open the treasury of the past to distract the people from the privations and the dreary atmosphere of ready-made ideas and poor creations prepared in conformity with the "social command". Thus, the situation is not desperate for communism even in the field of spiritual life, although it cannot betray its own ideology, which does not satisfy esthetic or moral needs.

What then will happen? The communist creed excludes a possibility of evolution, for what we mean by evolution could only be political suicide for communists. The present leaders, at least, will not surrender unless they are forced to do so. Evolution, if any, will be more probable under their successors who will come from the ranks of the younger generation. The present leaders, on the other hand, continue to insist upon the infallibility of both the doctrine and their leadership. They may change their tactics but not their final goals and principles.

Khrushchev, a typical bolshevik of the old school, clearly expounded his and his colleagues' belief when he told *Pravda* readers that those who were waiting for communism to crumble would have "to wait until shrimps learn to whistle."

The present Soviet leaders continue to believe that only large scale agricultural economies will succeed. They believe also that the Communist Party regime is indispensable for securing the economic and social progress of the country. They are blinded by the successes of Soviet industrialization and the expansion of communism in Asia.

The Soviet economic system may succeed in the field of heavy industry and in building military potential. The Soviets may boast of their achievements in regard to the atomic experiments and progress of aviation, but they lag behind in a great number of industries. The prospects for essential improvements seem to be hopeless, unless the whole system is reorganized. In both agriculture and the production of consumer goods it is necessary to admit private initiative or at least to furnish directors of enterprises greater autonomy. But the Party leaders are afraid of letting the control out of their hands. Instead of extending the initiative of farmers it has subjected them to the M.T.S.s, and instead of extending the initiative of directors, it has placed them in a position of greater dependence upon party-men. In July 1955, at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Party, a resolution was adopted (see *Pravda* and *Izvestia* of July 13, 1955), after an appeal for "intensification", "perfection" and "improvements" of every kind. The plenum addressed itself to all executive offices of the Party—republic, teritorial, district and municipal— with an appeal to intensify supervision of the fulfillment of these assignments. Articles which subsequently

appeared in *Pravda* emphasized the fact that Party organizations are responsible for the fulfillment of assignments in the sphere of industry as well as of agriculture.

Although the Party's economic policy is neither expedient nor clever and in spite of the fact that the Soviet government neglects the crying needs of the population, the government finds sufficient support from some social groups. Well paid intellectuals working in scientific institutions, high-ranking officials and military commanders, and some groups of workers and farmers are satisfied with the conditions of life and work. They compose the privileged groups and, like the party-men, may be afraid of radical changes.

However, the privileged groups are not very numerous. The number of disillusioned and dissatisfied is much greater. But some of them are inert; the others cannot find leaders and are disorganized because of the existing regime, which deprives people of freedom of the press and associations. [1]

The situation is, nevertheless, not hopeless. As modern Soviet literature leads us to believe, the upper classes of Soviet society are losing their formerly strong morale.

In the play by Zorin, *The Guests* (see Chapter XIII), the father, representing the old generation of "bolsheviks", says to his son at the end of the play:

> ... 'for us life was hard. We were imprisoned, fought at the front, prepared the revolution, then consolidated it. I became, as they say, a great man; but what has changed in my life? Nothing! People have begun to work more. The blessings have all come to you. I always thought that this was a good thing—for us there were the storms and gales, but because of that he has the sun and roses'.

However, this son, a Soviet official, is depicted in the play as a rascal and villain, cynically enjoying "sun and roses." and there are similar bureaucrats and officials in the texts of many other literary works cited and quoted above. The new generation of rank-and-file communists does not consist of idealists and heroes, but at best of realists and sober economists (*khoziastvenniki*); in the mass, however, it is composed of people with the most prosaic interests and egocentric psychology.

[1] See Guins, ***Soviet Law and Soviet Society***, pp. 235–38 and 277–78.

There are not sufficient data to estimate the morale of high officials and influential party-men in the Soviet Union, but history teaches us that when the ruling and privileged classes begin to understand that their historical role is over, their morale inevitably lowers. First appear certain solitary persons, disappointed in their activity and losing confidence in the rightness of their cause. Later they find numerous followers who criticize the regime, although it secures their privileges; and this is the beginning of the end. Such people lose their will to resist, and then begins the disintegration which undermines the inner forces of communist cadres. Nobody can assert that there are no honest men among the communists, and it is improbable that these honest people have no doubts and do not lose confidence in what they do. [1] Among the recent refugees from beyond the iron curtain, there are officers and officials of higher rank, and this is an evidence that disappointment and antagonism to the regime have penetrated deeply into the upper strata of Soviet society.

Still more vulnerable are the working masses. Peasants and workers at large have many reasons to be disappointed and not to support the communist regime. The Soviet army is, therefore, not absolutely reliable. It is made up of farmers and workers and reflects the moods dominating in the country. It is not in vain that the Soviet governement keeps soldiers under constant control.

The situation became more complicated after Stalin's death and Beria's execution. After some wavering the new government decided to uncrown Stalin and to make him responsible for all negative phenomena of Soviet life. But destalinization has undermined the prestige of communism. Anti-Stalin exposures have awakened general criticism and in particular criticism directed against Stalin's aides, who are at present at the helm of the state. Criticism is directed against communism too as a doctrine and program. The communist ideology does not appeal to people and the communist program does not seduce the rank-and-file citizen.

According to the official interpretation, the Soviet state is "on the way from socialism to communism." It is a long way, as

[1] One of the characters in Ovechkin's essay, "Trudnaia Vesna", a director of the MTS, advises peasants not to forget that they are the legal masters of their kolkhozes and that they have a right to protect their vital intersts. In conformity with that suggestion a kolkhoz meeting was organized at which the appointed chairman was ousted and a new chairman elected. It was quite a revolutionary suggestion.

Stalin explained in 1952, in his swan-song at the XIXth Congress of the Communist Party. It is a mission without a visible end, and hardly anybody considers it seriously. The transitional period from socialism to communism means, as regards domestic policy, stabilization of the universal monopoly of the state and, as regards foreign policy, the further expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. In the meantime Soviet economic system and principles of government are all set and unalterable. The new socialist constructions promise only new privations and endless sufferings.

The Soviet government tries, therefore, to impress the population with its diplomatic successes. For a while it succeeded in this field. Some nations which begin to reorganize their economy are impressed with the successes of Soviet industrialization. They do not know democratic methods of government and the Soviet regime does not repel them. Some weak nations are impressed with Soviet military might. In general, however, a vigilant attitude toward Soviet smiles and gestures seems to prevail, until solid deeds prove Soviet readiness to cooperate honestly with the free world.

The fate of communism depends to a larger degree, perhaps, upon the development of international relations and the strength of the western world. Communism has not yet lost its will to struggle for domination. However, under the present conditions of inner complications and the rising strength of its adversaries, it has to be more careful. A comparative appraisal of the development of social and economic life in the East and West leads one to believe that the postwar world has reached its turning point. Now is the time when the great democracies can and must take the initiative. History calls them to start an ideological and diplomatic offensive rather than to continue the sterile policy of "containment" or defeatist "neutralism".

In order to compete successfully with the radical revolutionism of the communist ideology and policy, the West needs innovation, Communism cannot be beaten by reactionary forces and obsolete political and social ideas. Communism had the advantage when it exploited not only disunity and national antagonisms, as for example between France and Germany, but also such inveterate vices of the past as colonialism in Africa and Asia, parliamentary intrigues and instability of governments,

and the backwardness of the social system and dissatisfaction of the lower classes at certain times and places. Fortunately, the recent development of the Western world is characterized by symptoms quite opposed to the symptoms of growing crisis in the Soviet Union. Against its will, communism helped Europe to overcome some of its prejudices. A feeling of economic, cultural and political solidarity is growing up under the pressure or communism, and communism's reliance on the disunity of Western Europe has unexpectedly proved to be baseless. Simultaneously economic and political systems become more and more stable in European countries. As economic conditions improve, the influence of communist parties inside the European nations decreases and the chances for the inner disturbances expected by communist diplomacy become less real.

If the sober appraisal of the existing situation does not lead to excessive optimism, neither does it suggest pessimism. Communism is growing weaker, the Western world stronger. Soviet evolution seems to be a very long way off, revolution not yet visible. But who can assert that neither evolution nor revolution is a possibility? Politicians must not lose a chance. The time may come when the West, if it be alert, can accelerate the process by which the Russian people will join the family of democratic nations.

In the long run Russia will liquidate the extremes of the communist experiment. The Soviet system may be characterized as the antithesis of the prerevolutionary order and system if its economic and social life is taken for the thesis. On the eve of the Revolution Russia was an agricultural country par excellence in spite of the successful development of her industry since the end of the XIXth century. The Soviets fulfilled their plans for industrialization. It has been done ruthlessly and uneconomically. Yet as a result Russia, at the expense of the sufferings and privations of the population, has become a great industrial power. This means that she has a new elite, a new leading social group. The whole population has acquired a practical experience which it did not have before.

The economic and social changes of the expired period exclude any possibility of the restoration of the prerevolutionary structure. Changes will take place, but these changes should have a character of synthesis, not the return to the initial point, the

thesis. The future Russia will need those people only, from the midst of her new intelligentsia and emigrés, who understand the new conditions and are able to cooperate with the workers and peasants of the industrialized country, to liquidate the excesses of the communist regime and to secure for the working people the welfare and cultural conditions promised but not realized by the revolution.

It is possible that under pressure from the bottom communism will try to prolong its existence with the aid of the new compromises. Some of such compromises may prove to be temporarily effective, but they will not save communism, whose ideology is contrary to human nature. Besides, compromises usually stimulate exactions, and therefore after one compromise another has to follow. Destalinization is already a kind of compromise and it is indicative that the Soviet government already tries to limit its consequences and not to allow expansion of criticism by the 'rotten elements' and 'liberals'[1]. As another example it may be mentioned that when the Soviet government mitigated its control over the satellites this new compromise stimulated national feelings and in Czechoslovakia provoked manifestations against the communist regime.[2]

The more people become acquainted with the Soviet reality as it is, the stronger will be their support of non-communist governments. The better non-communist governments understand that the continued existence of the communist regime is not only oppressive for the nations under their way but also dangerous for other peoples, the less will they support the international prestige of Communist rulers with various solemn receptions and useless conferences.

In the years ahead, the peoples of the West must wage their own peaceful counter-offensive in order to aid in the eventual disappearance of communism and not in its continued existence. There are symptoms of growing discontent inside the Soviet Union and its satellites, and "We can hope", as United States Secretary J. F. Dulles said: "for ultimate changes more fundamental than any that have so far been revealed".

If nobody can predict when and how "fundamental changes"

[1] *Pravda*, Editorial. April 5, 1956.
See illustrations in *Life*, June 4, 1936.

will proceed, everybody has sufficient reason to be sure that they are inevitable and that communism is already on the decline.

But what positive assistance can the democratic nations render to the peoples of Russia to help them in their anti-communist activity? Propaganda may be effective if it corresponds to the needs of the people.

Anti-communist propaganda is not sufficient to arouse a political movement inside the Soviet Union. The Russian people know better than anybody else how difficult their life is, but they do not know how they can organize their ecomonic life if communism should be liquidated.

It is a tremendously complicated problem indeed. Abolition of kolkzones consolidated into 90,000 large estates, abolition of compulsory delivery of agricultural products and restoration of free trade, denationalization of some branches of industry—all these problems demand a very elaborate study. Without a detailed plan of reorganization and a well-worked out plan of economic support, liquidation of communism will bring on chaos and the "liberated" people will damn its liberators.

Constructive ideas concerning the future of communist states and an elaborated plan of assistance, in case of the failure of the communist regime, will be the most powerful weapons of propaganda, and the West must not be sparing in its time and attention to these vital problems.

The Russian people do not know whether the Western nations are their friends or enemies, whether they really want to help them for purely humanitarian reasons or want to establish an economic dependency and exploit Russia for their own interests. They want to know whether the West will respect the historical frontiers of the Russian state or try to dismember the country.

The West can and must win its struggle for freedom. Its cause is just, its truth is higher, its system is more promising. Propaganda is a more powerful weapon against communism than atom and hydrogen bombs, which are good only as deterrent weapons. But propaganda demands a progressive and realizable program of reorganization of the enslaved world. And propaganda will not be effective unless it expands from a united and sound democratic world. The weakness of the West was and is one of the main sources of communist strength.

ABBREVIATIONS

Agrogorod	Small country towns which had to replace villages in connection with Khrushchev's plan of consolidation of collective farms (kolkhozes).
Bolshevik	The Bolshevik, theoretical and political magazine of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. Since the end of 1952 renamed in *Kommunist.*
C.C. of the A.C.P.(b)	Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), see C.C. of the C.P.S.U.
C.C. of the C.P.S.U.	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as renamed after the XIXth Congress of the Communist Party in 1952.
Charter of Collective Farms	Standard Charter of an Agricultural Artel, of February 17, 1935.
Chekist	Official or agent of the Cheka, (*Chresvychainaia Komissia*), organ of extermination of the enemies of the Soviet regime.
Cominform	Organization established after the end of W.W. II for 'information', in fact for unification of political activity of communist regimes and parties in Europe.
Congreses, XIXth and XXth	Congresses of the C.P. of the Soviet Union of 1952 and 1956, alternately.
Consolidation of kolkhozes	Also *ukrupnenie* or amalgamation of colective farms.
Constitution of the U.S.S.R.	The so-called Stalin Constitution of 1936.
Current Digest	The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, published weekly by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, N.Y.
Decree	*Postanovlenie* or Resolution of the Council of Ministers and usually of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.; sometimes used instead of *Ukaz* (see below).
D.P.s	Displaced persons, especially those who refused to return their native countries under the communist regime.
Dorprofsozh	Trade Union of Railway Workers.
Estonia	Estonian Union Socialist Republic, one of the constituent Republics of the U.S.S.R.
Glavurs	Chief Administration of workers' supply.
G.U.M.	State Department Store (see *Univermag*).
Khoziastvenniki	Those persons occupying official positions in some aspect of the country's economy.
Krokodil	Soviet satirical weekly.
Latvia and Lithuania	Union Republics (see Estonia).
M.G.B.	Ministry of State Security, one of two Ministries in charge of the struggle with the enemies of the Soviet regime. Amalgamated with the M.V.D. after Stalin's death and replaced with the Committee of State Security after liquidation of Beria.
M.T.S.	Machine -Tractor Stations.

Mostorg	Moscow's largest department store before the establishment of the G.U.M.
N.E.P.	Period of the New Economic Policy between 1921 and 1928.
Oblast	Region, one of the sudivisions of the Soviet Republics.
Oblcom	Committee of the region.
Ogoniek	Soviet illustrated weekly.
Ors	Section of workers' supply.
Politruk	Political leader, in particular in the army.
Proforg	Head of the primary trade-union organization.
Resolution of the Plenum of the TsC. of the CPSU	Resolution of the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
R.S.F.S.R.	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, one of the sixteen (at present fifteen) Soviet Union Republics, now called in Soviet press, the *Russian Republic*.
Soviet Gos. i Pravo	*Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, the leading magazine of the Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.
Sovkhoz	State farm, usually large estate exploited by hired workers and serving like model farm.
S.P.B.	St. Petersburg, former capital of the Russian empire, at present Leningrad.
Tataria	Tatar Autonomous Republic, one of the national republics of the R.S.F.S.R.
Tajic or Tadzhik S.S.R.	One of the Soviet Union Republics, also Tadzhikistan.
Ukaz	Legislative act of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
Univermag	*Universalnyi magazin*, department store.
URS	Administration of Workers' supply (see Glavurs and Ors).
Uzbekistan	Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, one of the Union republics (see R.S.F.S.R. and Tajic republic, also Estonia, Latvia, etc.).
VTsS.P.S.	All-Union Central Committee of Trade-Unions (Vsesoiuznyi Tsentralnyi Sovet Professionalnykh Soiuzov).
Y.C.L.	Young Comunists' League (Komsomol).
Zabegalovki	Refreshment rooms.

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6. *Pravda*, Moskva. 1938; 1945–48; 1953–56.
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